

WINNING THE LONG GAME: TRANSFORMING ENEMIES INTO ALLIES

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Abstract

The complexity of globalization and how it impacts U.S. national security combined with the political need to create policies easy for the general public to understand have caused U.S. politicians to rely heavily on sanctions and the military as instruments of foreign policy. This thesis discusses the negative impacts of these policies, and presents alternatives, using case studies of post-World War II Germany and Japan, post-2003 invasion Iraq, the development of South Korea, and the emergence of China. It applies the lessons learned to Iran and North Korea in an effort to identify a more moderate path to liberal democracy for both countries.

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Chapter I: Introduction

It is time to change U.S. policy towards Iran and North Korea into one that actively seeks to change both rogue states into modern allies of the global community. The United States has followed the Cold War era policy of containment through sanctions and military posturing for dealing with North Korea and Iran for decades. Containment policies against these rogue states have prolonged human suffering and allowed each country to continually threaten regional security. An overemphasis on spreading democracy, with inadequate attention paid to building the foundations for liberalism, have led to the rising numbers of illiberal democracies throughout the world and generated a global security crisis of human rights abuses. Foreign policy analyst Fareed Zakaria elaborates the key difference between liberal and illiberal democracies: “[F]or almost a century in the West, democracy has meant *liberal* democracy--a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of the basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property. In fact, this latter bundle of freedoms--what might be termed constitutional liberalism--is theoretically different and historically distinct from democracy.”¹ Building the foundations for constitutional liberalism through continuous engagement will improve national security much more effectively than broad sanctions or military operations. Democracy without security and a stable foundation will fail.

The United States, as the world’s most powerful economy and military, has assumed a lead role in the imposition of sanctions and military actions against other states. Author James Dobbins states: “Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has felt free to intervene not simply to police cease-fires or restore the status quo but to try to bring about the more-fundamental transformation of war-torn societies, much as it had assisted in

transforming those of Germany and Japan four decades earlier.”² The United States has adhered to a containment strategy against Iran and North Korea in spite of its efforts to promote democracy and trade elsewhere. Sanctions against Iraq, Iran, and North Korea have, to date, failed to stop North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and failed to prevent Iran from conducting proxy wars in the Middle East.

Broad sanctions and military force are the United States’ primary tools of international coercion. Sanctions are supposed to be the peaceful alternative to military force. Researchers Fred Hansen and Axel Borchgrevink determine that “sanctions can be military, cultural, political or economic, depending on the tools available and the aims and purposes of the sanction.”³ Military force is, on the other hand, costly and focuses on breaking down power and institutions rather than building the foundations for a liberal society. Both options, however, satisfy the short-term goals of domestic politics by displaying decisive actions against the undesirable behavior of foreign actors. Both options have proven to be ineffective at achieving the development of liberal democracy, and have often created greater problems for the targeted populations and the international community.

Broad sanctions are supposed to reduce the means of control an offending regime can use against its population, and create the opportunity for a popular overthrow from the inside. Instead, research indicates they increase the ruling regime’s control over the population by generating scarcity that creates greater dependence. Sanctions also generate a rich environment for crime and corruption that threatens to spill over into neighboring countries and destabilize entire regions. A study by Daniel Drezner showed that sanctions increase criminal activity: “By punishing ordinary market activity, sanctions give entrepreneurs a strong incentive to take the criminal route—and they usually earn higher-than-usual profits in

the bargain.”⁴ Economic sanctions encourage illicit activity by punishing the legitimate economy and constrain legitimate development that could form the basis for a liberal democracy.

Military intervention, on the contrary, is an expedient way to overthrow a regime, but the costs are high in blood and treasure and the aftermath results in a power vacuum if there is no bureaucracy to maintain basic state functions. Power vacuums have proven to be hot spots for illicit activity and terrorism. Efforts by the international community to fill these vacuums have proven ineffective in many cases. One of the worst, and most recent, cases of a disastrous power vacuum was the one that occurred in Iraq after the 2003 ousting of Saddam Hussein by the U.S. military. United States Army Colonel James R. Hoy, Jr. wrote that: “The Bush administration's decision to pursue a policy of regime change led to discussions on how to conduct the post-war occupation and reconstruction efforts. Some believed that military success would provide the opportunity to export democratic ideals to the troubled Middle East.”⁵ The complete dismantling of the government, or De-Ba’athification in Iraq, failed because the nation’s bureaucracies were removed from power, leaving it in a state of chaos for which the United States was not prepared. Post-war Iraq was an extreme case but serves as an excellent example of why we need a better strategy for preparing underdeveloped rogue states for modernization, stability, and integration into global society.

Democracy alone is not the key to stability and security. Fareed Zakaria warns of the dangers of overemphasizing democracy alone: “Democracy without constitutional liberalism is not simply inadequate, but dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions, and even war.”⁶ Iran and North Korea are both technically

democracies. These conditions can be preemptively reduced through the cultivation of stable state bureaucracies that can be used to implement and facilitate the development of foundational institutions for liberal democracy. Many countries lack stability and the requisite foundational institutions for building liberal democracies which limits the effectiveness of state building efforts. There have been repeated instances of oppressed people overthrowing their governments, followed by vocal support for democratic reform from the international community, only to slide back into either some level of anarchy or the rise of a new dictator as in many Mid-Eastern states following the Arab Spring in 2011.

A more effective strategy would be to prepare a population for liberal democracy and a globally integrated economy by continually engaging it through various means and channels that build foundational institutions. Doing so may reduce the risk or impacts of sudden shocks. Jonathan Monten identifies the core risk of introducing elections into a recently unstable state too early. “Introducing democratic elections before the development of strong public institutions can also raise the risk of instability and violence.”⁷ The sudden shock of regime change forced upon an unprepared population will result in a return to the familiar, in most cases one dictator is simply replaced by another. Societies need to develop the foundational institutions necessary for successful democracy founded on constitutional liberalism and free trade. Other institutions such as free press and a liberal education system also act as the pillars of a democratic society. Eva Bellin states: “Political institutions don't have to be of indigenous origin to be acceptable. So long as the innovations are perceived as serving key interests and don't come at the expense of national identity, then institutions of foreign derivation might be expected to survive.”⁸ Building such institutions requires the support of local elites. Successful state building efforts of the past have used ruling elites

and established bureaucracies to disseminate and execute strategies for development. These groups have the influence and technical expertise to accomplish such ambitious national transformations. These were major components of the successful reconstruction of Germany and Japan following World War II.

Populations need to be prepared for liberalization, democracy, and economic integration through sustained engagement. Isolation from the international community contributes to state decay. The case study of Iraq after the 2003 invasion highlights the importance of institution building. Eva Bellin determined that several conditions existed in post-war Germany and Japan that were not present in Iraq: “The successful creation of stable democracies in Germany and Japan was facilitated by their endowment with relatively developed economies, ethnic homogeneity, strong state institutions, and historical experience with democracy, as well as context-specific factors such as the experience of devastating defeat, the fear of Communist threat, and the dictatorial freedom of occupation bestowed by contemporary cultural norms.”⁹ Change for both countries was facilitated by a list of unique scenarios not likely to be repeated in the modern world. Therefore continuous engagement with states is a better strategy for spreading democracy, maintaining stability, and improving U.S. national security in the modern world by reducing the impacts of sudden shocks to the international system. Doing so can build and strengthen the requisite public institutions for successful democracy and peaceful relations. Keeping isolated populations engaged in the international community is a better way to prepare them for full participation once their isolating and rogue regimes have fallen. As Fareed Zakaria stated: “Economic, civil, and religious liberties are at the core of human autonomy and dignity.”¹⁰ Cultivating such institutions, not democracy alone, should be at the core of U.S. foreign policy.

This paper will explore the impacts of both sanctions and military force on states identified by former President George W. Bush as members of the ‘Axis of Evil’, as well as some examples of authoritarian states that have been liberalized over time. It will explore alternatives to sanctions and military intervention and offer some recommendations as to how they can fulfil domestic political needs while accomplishing the grand strategy of security and stability.

Research Design

This paper evaluates the lessons learned from past state-building efforts to identify effective strategies that can be applied to current and future efforts. It discusses the United States’ failures in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. The three case studies are compared to the successful democratic transformations of Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The rapid development of China over the past forty years is included as a case study due to the success of trade relations with the United States and the impact it has had on regional security. Korea studies expert Eun Mee Kim explains the difficulties facing developmental states. “The paradox of South Korea's remarkable success in development was that it forced the state to reevaluate its *raison d'être* and to curtail its functions. The weakening developmental state is presented with unusual challenges when a more dramatic breakdown of the authoritarian regime and ensuing democratic consolidation occur.”¹¹ The end of the paper briefly discusses the People’s Republic of China, its modernization, its trade partnership with the United States, and what that means for the historical ideological differences. It uses the lessons learned from the failures in Iraq and the successes of Japan, Germany, South Korea, and China to determine the best courses of action for overcoming threats and normalizing relations with North Korea and Iran. Essentially, the slower transformation of South Korea

and the slow liberalization of China act as models for modern developing states. University of Nottingham Professor Hongyi Lai discusses China's development, along with its growing pains: "From the 1960s to the late 1970s China pursued self-reliance and isolated itself from the market-oriented world economy. Between 1955 and 1978, China was almost completely free of foreign direct investment (FDI)."¹² The case studies provide insight into alternate ways of overcoming foreign policies that maintain the status quo and prolong human suffering. I drew upon existing research to provide insight and perspectives into lessons learned from all cases. The goal is to find a way to eliminate the rogue behavior of Iran and North Korea without the major shocks to international order caused by sudden collapse.

Chapter II discusses why America needs to democratize the world. It clarifies the democratic peace theory and how it has formed the foundation of United States foreign policy. Democratic Peace Theory expert Bruce Russett provides a strong summary of the theory: "Fellow democracies are likely to provide larger and more reliable markets, to be more politically stable and less likely to fight their democratic neighbors, and to avoid human rights abuses and civil wars with consequent cross-border spillovers of refugees. Democratic neighbors are also more apt to form a mutual protection society against unconstitutional usurpation of powers at home, as well as join in collective security endeavors against common external foes."¹³ I then discuss how it has shaped U.S. foreign policy goals and why it is important to overcome the threats caused by rogue states.

Chapter III defines rogue states and discusses the origins of the Axis of Evil. Rogue state politics have influenced policy towards those states stricken with the label. States labeled as rogues tend to get ostracized from the international community and are frequently targeted with sanctions and military operations. Former President George W. Bush took the

rogue state label farther in 2002 when he labeled Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an “axis of evil.” The section goes on to discuss the ‘Axis of Evil’ identified by former president George W. Bush, how that impacted American perceptions of each state, and how that has influenced relations. Each will be discussed in greater length in later chapters.

Chapter IV delves into the use of sanctions as a favorite ‘peaceful’ way of punishing transgressors. An article by Dursun Peksen and A. Cooper Drury, covering the negative impacts of economic sanctions on potential democracy, identifies the corrosive effects of sanctions: “Economic sanctions inadvertently help the targeted regime consolidate authoritarian power by enabling elites to enhance their ties with the key political supporters, while at the same time economically disrupting its opposition groups (e.g., an opposition party or an anti-regime social or political movement) to sustain their political relevance.”¹⁴ It uses the persistence of the regimes in North Korea and Iran as examples of how sanctions have failed to improve national security. They do little more than satisfy short-sighted domestic political goals and in many cases harm the people they are supposed to help. A brief example of how the United States used targeted sanctions against Banco Delta Asia to bring North Korean leaders to the bargaining table demonstrates a successful usage of sanctions to achieve a goal. A government study highlighted the effectiveness and limitations of the targeted sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK): “North Korea, already one of the poorest and most isolated countries in the world, was brought back to the six-sided table at least in part due to the pressure exerted by the Treasury’s actions against Banco Delta Asia, a small bank in Macao that had been accused of money laundering activity, including moving counterfeit U.S. dollars for the regime.”¹⁵ Unfortunately that was quickly undermined when the United States returned to a policy of leniency towards the

North Korean regime. The purpose of this case study is to show that targeted sanctions can be an important policy tool for achieving limited objectives when used in conjunction with grand strategies, however, they are ineffective when used as a means of regime change over a long period of time.

Chapter V discusses the difficulties associated with military interventions. The drawbacks of which are the high cost in blood and treasure and a negative response from afflicted populations and the international community. Military interventions can create sudden shocks to international order, create power vacuums, and create general instability in the international system. The levels of resources applied to Germany and Japan after World War II do not necessarily apply to modern efforts as Christopher Coyne states in his book on the effectiveness of military intervention. “The same level of resources –monetary aid, troops, organization of elections, and so on—as was invested in West Germany and Japan in 1945 will generate a drastically different outcome in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2005.”¹⁶ Military intervention may be an expedient solution to immediate threats, but they can also create greater problems. This chapter discusses post-2003 Iraq and the importance of using existing state structures to maintain stability and facilitate change. The de-Baathification policy in Iraq created a state of anarchy for which the United States had not planned. A study by Colonel James R. Hoy concluded that: “The whole-scale firing of hundreds of thousands of government workers had an enormous impact on security and economic recovery in a country with 50% unemployment.”¹⁷ De-Baathification was built on the belief that all Saddam loyalists would be toxic to the country and lead it back into a dictatorship. There was an unrealistic expectation that the citizens of Iraq would join together and build a democracy in the power void. Instead the country slipped into a bloody civil war and is now struggling

to survive against the Islamic State's regional ambitions. The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq serves as an example of what can happen in an extreme case in the wake of military intervention. Any usage of military interventions comes attached with political backlash and unforeseeable expenses and consequences. Preemptive and preventive military actions have become staples in U.S. political repertoire over the past two decades. History has proven, however, that military miscalculations can harm the very existence of a state itself. Bruce Bechtol takes the consequences of preemptive strikes against North Korea to their logical maximum in his book on the threats of North Korea when he states: "Thus, in any planning for a preemptive strike, the assumption that it would start a full-scale war should be an integral part of the process."¹⁸ The military is not designed to build institutions in foreign countries. Therefore, any planning for stability operations, state building, and regime changes should take a more proactive approach that focuses on institution building and the formation of mutually beneficial partnerships over a longer period of time and well in advance of a state-failure.

Chapter VI is split into two sections covering the post-World War Two democratic transitions of Germany and Japan. Each case is unique in its circumstances but the motivation was essentially the same. The United States needed to rebuild each country into a strong democracy, with capitalist economies to prevent the spread of communism or the rise of another dictator. It also needed to develop the internal structures of both to support democracy and prevent the sort of singular national thought and control that led to the war. Both cases succeeded in spite of their differing circumstances. Eva Bellin singles out the key component of success for state building efforts in Germany and Japan: "Both Germany and Japan emerged from World War II with meritocratically organized, rule-bound state

institutions intact. Both possessed an effective police force, judiciary, and civil service with which to govern.”¹⁹ Their success has influenced the reasoning of many political planners who expect efforts to rebuild failed states or collapsed regimes will result in the creation of stable and modern states. Jonathan Monten singles out the key difference that created drastically different outcomes in Japan and Iraq. “The U.S. approach to state-building in Iraq differed dramatically from Japan. In the case of Iraq, the United States failed to preserve the existing capacity of Iraqi state institutions, and faced substantial barriers to rebuilding those state institutions that had eroded or collapsed as a result of the war and ensuing insurgency conflict.”²⁰ Developing the foundations for stable societies integrated into the international community will give them a chance to become allies in spite of what adversities lie ahead..

Chapter VII draws upon past experience to identify the pillars that form the foundations of a successful democracy. Each country used in the previous case studies has adapted its traditional culture to modern ways of life, and each has developed at different paces and from different foundations. As Fareed Zakaria stated: “The process of genuine liberalization and democratization is gradual and long-term, in which an election is only one step.”²¹ Analysis of each case study shows that tapping the most stable institutions in a developing state can drastically improve national support for liberalizing programs and democratic development. The building of the Republic of Korea’s army using officers trained by the Japanese military is an example of what would have been a better policy in Iraq, especially since many dismissed Iraqi officers formed the Islamic State. Historian Gregg Brazinsky highlights this point in his book on the transformation of South Korea into a modern democracy. “A handful of Koreans who were able to attend the Japanese Military Academy or other elite officer training schools would eventually play a vital role in the

formation and development of the ROK army.”²² Many German troops were used in a similar way to secure Germany after the fall of the Nazis. In contrast, Iraq was left without experienced leaders capable of fighting off al-Qaeda cells and the rise of the Islamic State. The biggest fear of those running a country is that they will lose their elite status and support for their lifestyle. Eva Bellin identifies the importance of elite buy in: “The commitment of elites is central to successful democratization.”²³ Supporting elites, however, has backfired on the United States in the past. Strategies for dealing with either Iran or North Korea need to be comprehensive and adhered to until success is achieved. A leading academic on the subject of Korea and state development, Eun Mee Kim explains the obstacles of state transition faced by South Korea: “The comprehensive developmental state requires, from the beginning, a high degree of autonomy from dominant social classes and groups, and a state bureaucracy that efficiently and effectively implements policies. Not many Third World nations have these conditions.”²⁴ Current strategies of the United States tend to vacillate between punishing and rewarding, a process that rogue regimes have masterfully manipulated to their own advantage. A consistent strategy of foundational institution building with emphasis on stability throughout a gradual transition towards constitutional liberalism, free trade, and democracy should improve the chances of breaking the status quo and transitioning these states into functional members of the international community.

Chapter VIII briefly discusses some of the domestic political obstacles that need to be overcome. A compilation of articles edited as a book by Historian Frank Jacob summarizes the dilemma facing United States foreign policy formulation. Politicians build their careers on satisfying the demands of their constituents, a process that has led to many short-sighted policies in the United States. The goal of the paper is to identify the key components for

effective state building and the foundations for liberal democracy and national security. Eva Bellin highlights the key components of such efforts: “One of the most robust findings of twenty-five years of political science rumination on democratization is that durable democracy is strongly correlated with economic development.”²⁵ Rogue states have supported terrorism and America’s enemies, and are potential flashpoints that could lead to regional conflicts. They create instability in the international environment that creates human suffering and threatens the stability of neighboring states. Applying the lessons of state building towards converting Iran and North Korea into stable and relatively liberal states would greatly reduce terrorism and nuclear proliferation as well as reverse sources of bellicosity and regional instability.

Summary

The greatest threat to the United States and the international community is the instability of other states. President Barack Obama described the current national security environment in his 2010 national security strategy: “Wars over ideology have given way to wars over religious, ethnic, and tribal identity; nuclear dangers have proliferated; inequality and economic instability have intensified; damage to our environment, food insecurity, and dangers to public health are increasingly shared; and the same tools that empower individuals to build enable them to destroy.”²⁶ There are rogues in the international community who have defied pressures to cease their pursuit of WMDs, improve their treatment of their populations, and cease their support for terrorism. Iran and North Korea use their defiance of the United States and international norms as a tool to justify their repressive internal measures and their rogue behavior. These two rogue states persist in spite of sanctions and

military threats. Political Scientist Elizabeth Saunders defines the history, usage, and meaning of rogue state:

“In the 1990s, the term ‘rogue state’ became fashionable in US foreign policy discourse. The United States government bestowed the ‘rogue state’ label on countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea. The most commonly invoked criteria for ‘rogue’ status were state support for terrorism and the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the same time, many traditional US allies, especially members of the European Union, consistently rejected the ‘rogue state’ label and stronger incarnations such as the ‘axis of evil.’”²⁷

This research attempts to address how to overcome rogue regimes and bring them into compliance with international norms. Both Iran and North Korea have internal political, social, and economic infrastructures that are critical to facilitating any changes.

Two key lessons from the occupation of Iraq are that the state bureaucracies should be left in place, and that democracy requires certain developed institutions before it can take root. In times of uncertainty people tend to revert to the familiar. Middle East studies specialist Andrew Flitner attributed U.S. failure in Iraq to its removal of preexisting Iraqi state institutions. “The United States had trouble restoring security and stability because it had precipitated the virtual collapse of the Iraqi state by undermining its coercive, administrative, legal, and extractive institutions.”²⁸ The United States should begin preparing Iran and North Korea for liberalism, trade, democracy, and inclusion in the international community by finding ways to engage their populations in ways that influence them towards becoming more modern states, ease the shock of regime change and avoid the backlash of military actions. An article edited by Alexander Lennon puts it into perspective: “Even in cases where regime change might be justified--and international consensus on this exists--war is acceptable only when waged in legitimate self-defense or as the collective decision of the United Nations Security Council.”²⁹ Both states present unique challenges such as

reconciliation for the two Koreas and the theocratic fanaticism in Iran. Engagement requires a degree of compromise and acceptance of rogue regimes that could create political recourse within the U.S. domestic political arena. Building economic infrastructure, social institutions such as free press and school systems, and exposing the population to the international community will help liberalize these states and prepare them for democracy. In the case of North Korea, South Korea would undoubtedly inherit a derelict state that is not prepared for full integration and reconciliation. Inheritance of a derelict North would have lasting negative impacts on the South. Author Alexander Lennon describes United States policy towards North Korea: “U.S. policy toward North Korea in the last decade has been, for the most part, narrow and tactical, focusing on the crisis du jour rather than on a broader game plan.”³⁰ A more developed North Korea could be brought more into line with South Korea and the reconciliation process would be smoother and more gradual. That strategy would more likely be agreeable to the Chinese who also have a large stake in the future of North Korea and regional stability.

Iran has many existing state institutions that could liberalize the country once the Ayatollah’s parallel political institutions have been removed. Iran’s unique political situation is described well by foreign policy expert Behzad Tabatabaei: “In a theocracy the will of the people is subject to the will of God. A religious government or theocratic rule does not derive its authority from the people unlike a republic. The proper description of Iran’s political system is a totalitarian regime that is a theocratic dictatorship.”³¹ The future scenario for freedom and democracy in Iran would require some form of reconciliation between the common people, the ruling elites and hardliners. Major offenders can be brought to justice while the outliers are reintegrated into society just as in post Nazi Germany. Iran could

potentially be turned from state sponsor of terror to regional stabilizer. It can be converted from example of authoritarian theocracy to liberal democracy because it already has a multi ethnic population with a history of democracy and established state bureaucracies.

My recommendation is to proactively develop the state institutions that will allow it to change, rather than wait for an internal collapse before trying to implement a new regime. The critical first step is to begin engaging economically. Democracy alone is not the key to global security. This point is highlighted by Fareed Zakaria: “Far from being a temporary or transitional stage, it appears that many countries are settling into a form of government that mixes a substantial degree of democracy with a substantial degree of illiberalism.”³² There may be times when the offending regime cannot be completely isolated from economic development efforts. In such instances we must look to the future potential of the country and weigh the pros and cons. Bruce Russett provides insight into improving state building and regime change: “The better alternative to regime change by force is democracy by example and peaceful incentives. The United States did play a major role in persuading dictators in South Korea and the Philippines to surrender power, and European states, acting individually and especially through regional international organizations, provided similar assistance in Eastern Europe and states of the former Soviet Union.”³³ Governments and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) can coordinate efforts for social welfare and development programs to begin building institutions that will become the foundations for a future democratic society by building liberal social and economic institutions. Finally, the threats of military force and sanctions should be used conservatively as they can easily be used to frame the United States as an enemy of the people which strengthens the offending regime’s legitimacy. A 2014 study by Manuel Oechslin singles out the dangers of sanctions

specifically: “As intended, the imposition of sanctions makes a previously reluctant citizenry more inclined to revolt. Thus, to prevent an immediate ouster, the elite has to increase the cost of a revolt — and it can do so by reducing the supply of public goods. A lower supply means lower incomes for the citizenry and hence more strain (i.e., a steeper fall in utility) associated with a revolt's destructive effects.”³⁴ The ultimate goal is international peace, stability, and respect for human rights and freedom from oppression. There will always be those who seek otherwise, therefore a stronger international community built on liberalism will be more able to provide each other with security from such oppressors as well as maintain the stability that is essential to security. United States national security and international security cannot be separated in the modern globalized world

Literature Review

Title: Peksen, Dursun, and A. Cooper Drury. "Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy."

Subject: The Impact of Sanctions

The authors use time-series cross-national data (1972-2000) to identify sanctions as having a negative impact on democracy rather than influencing reforms as intended. They go further to suggest that broad sanctions actually increase oppression because the ruling elite must cut off resources to their opposition and the regime must increase ties with the ruling elite.

Ultimately the ruling regime finds a way to maintain its wealth and status, if not increase it, while passing the impacts of the sanctions on to the populations they are designed to help.

Title: Jacob, Frank. *Diktaturen ohne Gewalt? Dictatorships without Violence?*

Subject: How dictators assert power

This book explores how dictators use violence to build and secure their power base. Of particular note is how the Kim regime in North Korea has masterfully engineered a nationwide network of violence and suspicion to keep itself in power. The fear and intimidation factor that these regimes create among their own people should not be underestimated. It creates a tricky moral predicament where the ruling elite are the source of stability, yet must be punished for their crimes against humanity.

Title: Dobbins, James. *America's Role In Nation-Building: From Germany To Iraq.*

Subject: Nation Building

The book draws upon lessons learned from nation building efforts in Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan and compiles a list of conclusions regarding nation building. Essentially time and effort put into building a state determine the net result. One of the lessons learned is that it is much easier to rebuild a nation with a history of governance by using its existing institutions. That means there is some hope for states such as Iran and North Korea due to their established bureaucracies and political systems which can be used to implement policies and maintain continuity of basic state functions.

Title: Drezner, Daniel W. "Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice."

Subject: Targeted Sanctions

Targeted sanctions have gained favor as a more humanitarian alternative to broad sanctions, yet they may have a lesser impact on instigating reforms or regime changes. Financial

sanctions targeted directly at offenders have become a favored instrument of international pressure by members of the United Nations. They limit the collateral damage that broad sanctions such as trade embargoes have on the afflicted populations. However, their success does not rate any higher, and may be lower, than that of broad sanctions. They can still be an effective tool that should be included in the repertoire of policies at the disposal of the international community used in conjunction with other strategies and tactics.

Title: Eun Mee, Kim. "Contradictions and Limits of a Developmental State: With Illustrations from the South Korean Case."

Subject: State Building in South Korea

This paper identifies the challenges faced by a state during a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. "Examination of the South Korean case helped identify and explain the roles of three main actors in development: the state, capitalists, and labor."³⁵ The developmental authoritarian regime in South Korea had a stake in keeping labor costs low in order to make themselves economically competitive. Labor unions worked to overcome severe political repression and built some of the foundations for democracy as they organized to improve wages and working conditions. There are important foundational institutions to develop as precursors to democracy.

Title: Lai, Hongyi. "Uneven Opening of China's Society, Economy, and Politics: Pro-Growth Authoritarian Governance and Protests in China."

Subject: Modernization and economic liberalization in China

The author identifies the success of China's open economy along with the shortfalls of its closed government. "Negative by-products of pro-growth authoritarianism include weak rule of law, official corruption, violation of people's rights, and few channels for public inputs in policy and public grievances. These defects in Chinese governance help to account for outbursts of frequent protests during the period of high economic growth."³⁶ Economic liberalization has given people a greater stake in their own governance which has increased pressure on the government to more effectively respond to the people's demands. China is well on the path to modernization which may ultimately lead it into democracy.

Title: Bechtol, Bruce E. Jr., *The Last Days of Kim Jong-il: The North Korean Threat in a Changing Era*

Subject: North Korea

This book assesses the many threats of North Korea as a rogue state in flux after the death of its well positioned leader Kim Jong-Il and his succession by his less prepared son Kim Jong-Un. North Korea is a greater threat than ever due to its advanced nuclear weapons development and its new leader's need to consolidate power. "Because Kim Chong-un is so young and because the succession process was rushed following his father's stroke, he almost undoubtedly did not hold the same power in the beginning of 2012 that his father had when he assumed the leadership role in 1994."³⁷ North Korea presents many challenges for the United States. They are proliferators of both WMDs and terrorism, and engage in many illicit activities. They could drag the United States into a prolonged and much larger conflict as well as continue to profit by funding and arming our enemies.

Title: Tabatabaei, Behzad. "The Political Economy of Oil, Terrorism and Institutional Development in Iran and its Impact on the Middle East."

Subject: Iran's dual bureaucracies

The author goes into great detail about the internal workings of the Iranian government and the dual structure set up by Khomeini to control the state. "The redundant framework of dual institutions creates rent-seeking, corruption, misallocation of scarce resources, an ineffective massive governmental bureaucracy, central planning, capital flight and a general state of insecurity."³⁸ Reform within the religious bureaucracy is not possible without compromising revolutionary ideals, making it unlikely. Iran is not positioned to adapt to rapid economic growth or the changing demands of Iranian society due to its gridlocked government institutions.

Title: Flibbert, Andrew. "The Consequences of Forced State Failure in Iraq."

Subject: State Building Failure in Iraq

The article attributes the state building failure in Iraq on the United States' decision to completely dismantle the Iraqi government. The United States dismantled the Iraqi bureaucracy and its military, leaving the most competent members of state administration alienated and unemployed. This led directly to the violent insurgency that plagued and prolonged the occupation and has left Iraq in its current weakened condition. Iraq was left without the basic mechanisms of government which could have been tapped to maintain order and basic state functions to keep society together. They would also have been of great use in administering U.S. plans and programs designed to reform and democratize the state.

Title: Monten, Jonathan. "Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan."

Subject: Post conflict state building

This article identifies the successes and failures of U.S. postwar state building efforts by comparing three case studies and identifying the different factors such as the ideologies of the U.S. politicians responsible for planning, levels of funding, preexisting levels of state development, and whether or not the bureaucracies were left intact. It identifies the successes of Japan's postwar reconstruction and compares it to the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan.

While there are many fundamental differences between Japan in the 1940s, Iraq in 2003, and Afghanistan in 2001, the lesson is that the key to effective state building is to use the existing bureaucracy to administer the development plans. The author identifies the fundamental differences between the three case studies and shifts in U.S. policy between 1945 and 2003.

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⁹ Eva Bellin, "The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 4 (2004): 607.

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Chapter II: Why The United States Needs To Democratize The World

Democratic Peace Theory

An important question to ask is: Why does the United States need to democratize the world? There are certainly plenty of reasons such as trade security, resource access, and the improvement of human rights, but how do they relate to the continued existence of the United States? The current existential threat to Americans is non-liberal democratic states and non-state groups desiring to establish their own state (e.g. the Islamic State-ISIS), especially those threatened by the American way of life. Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) has been a major influence on U.S. foreign policy since the union was first formed. The premise is fairly simple and is well defined by DPT expert Bruce Russett: “Fellow democracies are likely to provide larger and more reliable markets, to be more politically stable and less likely to fight their democratic neighbors, and to avoid human rights abuses and civil wars with consequent cross-border spillovers of refugees. Democratic neighbors are also more apt to form a mutual protection society against unconstitutional usurpation of powers at home, as well as join in collective security endeavors against common external foes.”¹ There is strength in numbers and security in familiarity. There has also been a paradigm shift in the source of legitimacy according to influential political scientist Francis Fukuyama: “While there have historically been many forms of legitimacy, in today’s world the only serious source of legitimacy is democracy.”² The United States has specialized in bringing down autocratic states from its birth, having taken on the British monarch to the Soviet Premiers and emerged victorious. Democracy appeals to the common people, which threatens elites across the world. It has proven difficult to overthrow once it has taken root in the social and political cultures of the people. The very nature of the democratic system, with

power shared by many, and the institutions needed to uphold it make it robust. Stability is good for development. Democratic states, though the path may be difficult, have achieved a higher level of development over the long run. Development leads to improved human rights, increased wealth through better trade, improved living standards, and a reciprocal stake in global stability. Authors Derek Reveron and Kathleen Mahoney single out the changing threat to U.S. security: “Whereas in the past authoritarian and expansionist regimes were usually considered the greatest threats to human security, today it is weak, poor, undeveloped states.”³ The United States needs more democracies in the world because they improve the overall stability and security of the globe, which reduces the existential threats to the American way of life.

Democratic peace theory has guided U.S. politics since the beginning of the state. It is not fully understood what it is about democracy that promotes peace. Research shows the theory to be widely relevant but fails to conclude exactly why. Bruce Russett identifies another key point to consider regarding democratization: “The policy relevance of the observation of democratic peace highlights all the more powerfully the need to fully understand what it is about democracy that should be transmitted to other countries.”⁴ It is not as simple as overthrowing a dictator and establishing a vote, a lesson hard learned in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. Author Larry Diamond highlights the importance of more thorough development in his book: “Democratic structures will be mere facades unless people come to value the essential principles of democracy: popular sovereignty, accountability of rulers, freedom, and the rule of law.”⁵ Building a democracy requires a keen understanding of the necessary institutions required to support a democracy, a well-understood grand strategy for

aiding in the development of the world's potential democracies, and the social and political context of the state to be democratized.

Liberalism is the guiding school of thought in American politics. It is a belief that people are inherently good-natured and that the world can be made a better place when people are given freedom and the tools to flourish. Liberalism, along with the Democratic Peace Theory, assumes that spreading democracies in other countries will reduce or end wars. Bruce Russett identifies one of the key benefits of democracy over other forms of government: "Politics within a democracy is seen as largely a non-zero-sum enterprise: by cooperating. All can gain something even if all do not gain equally and the winners are restrained from crushing the losers."⁶ The historical practice of zero-sum mercantilism imposed upon foreign colonies by European powers has generated skepticism towards the motives of economically-driven former colonial powers. Liberalists tend to overlook the barrier of public perception in establishing new democracies. The optimistic view personified by the George W. Bush administration that once a dictator was removed from power democracy would quickly fall into its place has proven itself false. In practice, building democracy is much more complicated.

There are many in the world who want freedom, democracy, trade, and all the quality of life improvements that go with it. These must be cultivated over time. A willing population helps but they need the tools to build the foundations of a successful democracy. Alexander Downes and Jonathan Monten highlight the importance of context in their published essay on building democracy: "Domestic context matters: some countries are better candidates for democratization than others, and external efforts to bring about democratic change are more likely to work where those preconditions are present than where

they are absent.”⁷ First, investments in education and business infrastructure provide the brainpower and the economic power to support the population. Second, the establishment of the free press and the cultivation of dissent and discourse are necessary to keep the people informed and to challenge ideas and policies. Third, a balance of power governmental structure is a critical security feature. It has proven difficult to achieve, especially in the early days of a new democracy when power is easier to seize. In fact it may be the most difficult pillar of western democracy to establish. Schools and businesses can be readily aided by outside investors and inside taxes, and the free press is readily embraced by a nation’s dissenters, but getting people to share power is dangerous and elusive. Francis Fukuyama highlights one of the more difficult aspects of establishing a new regime: “Formal rules can be readily changed as a matter of public policy; cultural rules cannot, and while they change over time, it is much harder to direct their development.”⁸ Greed and fear cloud long term vision as individuals seize the instability in a developing state to improve their own wealth, stature, and security. In reality they will all be wealthier and more secure in a stable system but that requires long-term thinking, beyond one’s own immediate impulse and even lifespan. The dilemma is well stated by Francis Fukuyama, “Even if the society as a whole is better off with good institutions, every new institutional arrangement produces winners and losers, and the latter can be depended on to protect their relative positions.”⁹ Getting all the pieces of a successful democracy to align within the short time frame a state has during a major governmental change is incredibly difficult. Failure can create resentment among the population and facilitates the perception of an outside hegemon attempting to impose its will on a weaker state. Such a perception is often used by those seeking to gain power for themselves, which leads to the long-term idealization of America as the enemy. Samuel

Huntington identified a major obstacle in the 1960s that still holds true: “In many, if not most, modernizing countries elections serve only to enhance the power of disruptive and often reactionary social forces and to tear down the structure of public authority.”¹⁰

Resentment from failed attempts at democratization has fueled the internal politics of the world’s rogue states. Developing the requisite institutions for democracy over time and in such a way that promotes goodwill towards the United States is difficult but the correct way forward.

Foreign Policy Goals

Formulating foreign policy in a democratic society is a complicated matter. The United States has vacillated between isolationism and interventionism since its foundation. “Ever since independence from the United Kingdom was obtained in the early 18th century, one of the most pressing concerns of US foreign policy has been to determine how much entanglement in world affairs is good for the welfare of the young nation.”¹¹ That statement by European political science author Frank Jacob sums up well the dilemma in formulating the United States’ foreign policy. As the most powerful nation, economically and militarily, US foreign policy is of major concern to most nations of the world, perhaps more so than domestically.

The United States Department of State is responsible for formulating and carrying out much of the country’s foreign policy. However, policies and strategies must be coordinated with the many other government offices charged with the business of international affairs, most notably the Department of Defense. The finer points of war making are beyond the scope of this thesis; it will only address the Military Instrument of Power in its role as a tool for state building. The State Department plays a key role in the formulation of national

strategy regardless of its budget being a fraction of the Department of Defense. The State Department identified areas to improve and created a plan to implement changes with its 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) modeled after the Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): "[W]e will build up our civilian power: the combined force of civilians working together across the U.S. government to practice diplomacy, carry out development projects, and prevent and respond to crises. Many different agencies contribute to these efforts today. But their work can be more unified, more focused, and more efficient."¹² Its two overarching goals are to build civilian power for diplomacy, development, and crisis response, and to improve interdepartmental cooperation to generate a more unified and efficient effort. The military provides credibility to U.S. diplomatic efforts by providing force to back-up and counter threats. The overarching strategy is to include allies in the business of global security rather than act as a single global hegemon. Such a policy is a stronger long-term strategy because it will reduce the acquisition of enemies and feelings of resentment if properly executed. Politicians cannot simply 'wing it' when it comes the nation's grand strategy and expect to achieve the desired outcome.

The modern state system is complicated, yet most of the world's states are on a similar path of development and modernization, albeit at differing stages and with widely varying forces of resistance. The United States will need to coordinate the efforts of its many departments and offices in order to meet the challenges of the modern world, with the greatest threat to national security being failed states: "The complex challenges to national security in the 21st century will require intelligent integration of resources and unity of effort within the government."¹³ The United States began a massive reorganization in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Most notable was the establishment of the Department of Homeland

Security, a Director of National Intelligence, and fusion centers where intelligence agencies and police departments coordinate information and combine efforts to counter national security threats. Former Senior Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University, Patrick Cronin, states: “Coordination...is an essential prerequisite for stabilization operations, intelligence collection, and homeland security activities.”¹⁴ Changing the bureaucratic structure is easier than changing bureaucratic culture, however, and it has taken agencies some time to establish their niche in the national security framework and to adapt to the changing demands of the global environment. Developing a synergy among the many departments within the U.S. government is essential to carrying out any long-term security and development strategies.

The United States government recognizes the global environment and the enormous influence it has over it, and is seeking to wield that power responsibly. It continues, however, with uncoordinated efforts that lead to waste and contradictory objectives. According to Dennis Murphy, a Professor of Information Operations and Information in Warfare at the U.S. Army War College: “The current information environment, the American attitude toward propaganda, bureaucratic processes that are, by their very nature, cumbersome and slow, all combine to make effective strategic communication difficult indeed—but not impossible.”¹⁵ Understanding and acknowledging global issues is only the first major step towards adapting. It will take strong leadership and an effective plan to institutionalize the cultural changes that need to be made within the various agencies. Bureaucratic cultures, however, will not be easily changed. A culture of change ready to adapt to evolving future scenarios, capable of quickly reinventing itself to meet rapidly changing demands needs to be fostered within the U.S. bureaucratic system. Policymakers and bureaucrats are well aware of

the internal obstacles that need to be overcome in order to carry out effective national strategies. The next step is to find a way to facilitate the necessary cultural changes required to execute the mission.

The purpose of this section is to determine why, and how much, the United States ought to entangle itself in international affairs. The strategies and deficiencies of government are well established and well researched. However, the question of ‘why’ is not as clear at times. Going back to the quote by Frank Jacob reiterates the dilemma of US foreign policy: “Ever since independence from the United Kingdom was obtained in the early 18th century, one of the most pressing concerns of US foreign policy has been to determine how much entanglement in world affairs is good for the welfare of the young nation.”¹⁶ The answer is fairly simple but not always apparent. Former President George W. Bush identified the state of affairs in his 2002 National Security Strategy: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few. We must defeat these threats to our Nation, allies, and friends.”¹⁷ His statements, now well over a decade old, remain relevant. The dynamic of globalization has changed the nature of the world’s problems. Now crime, corruption, terrorism, disease, famine, and poverty are global issues that threaten the stability of the international system more so than military threats from powerful states. Governments are threatened less by other governments and more by internal collapse. These global issues spread like famine and threaten to collapse neighboring states. The ‘domino effect’ of this era is not one of states falling under communist rule, it is of states collapsing into anarchy. The mass interconnectivity of the globalized era means that problems in a single state can quickly have a global impact and threaten states separated by oceans.

Monarchies and the old system of interwoven aristocracies have steadily collapsed over the past three hundred years. They have given way to self-determination, which has led to intense competition among differing ideologies on how governments should be run. Samuel Huntington identified the source of this conflict as a disparity between political, social, and economic development: “The primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change.”¹⁸ The struggle has led to multiple world wars and numerous regional conflicts. In the end there were two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, championing two competing ideologies and bringing much of the world under their influence. The most intense competition, and at times conflicts, happened in the “Third World” or the countries not directly aligned with either superpower or who were still struggling to emerge from colonialism. Professor Gregg Brazinsky, specialist on U.S.-East Asian relations during the Cold War, states U.S. priorities during the era. “The United States deemed capturing the loyalties of the vast regions of the globe emerging from colonialism as crucial to the struggle against Communism.”¹⁹ Cold War hegemony by either superpower was largely viewed as a continuation of colonialism. However, the heat of competition between the two powers’ blinded both to this important sensitivity. When the United States emerged in the late 1980s as the lone global power, it was largely expected that most other countries would simply adopt the superior form of government. However, the world did not share this sentiment and a global power grab ensued as people attempted to seize power at home. Many states propped up by the Soviets collapsed into anarchy, which aided the emergence of modern terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the flood of weapons and WMD technology onto the global market.

Powerful factions could no longer pit one superpower against the other. Instead the United States became the leviathan to be feared as dictators instigated conflict to provoke the United States in ways that allowed them to maneuver themselves as champions of their people fighting the great world imperial power. The golden age of democracy that was expected after the dissolution of the Soviet Union did not happen. Instead, many states fell into anarchy as they lost the support of the Soviet Union. Establishing and maintaining legitimacy is crucial in developing democracies. According to Larry Diamond: “The smaller the proportion of citizens who believe a democracy is legitimate, the more vulnerable the system is to breakdown, by a military overthrow, an executive seizure of power, a disintegration of political order, or a collapse of the state.”²⁰ It is instability that creates an environment conducive to terrorism and allows rogue regimes to come to power.

Two threats emerged from the Cold War era that are relevant to this thesis. One is that North Korea, recipients of Soviet largesse, had to quickly alter their strategy for survival after the collapse of the Soviet Union who were propping the Kim regime up with massive amounts of aid. This resulted in an increased pursuit of WMDs as a means of security and blackmail. The other was terrorism. Terrorism existed long before the fall of the Soviet Union but the failed states left in its wake were perfect recruiting grounds of disenfranchised militants. Islamic terrorists, led by Osama bin Laden, developed a ‘far enemy’ strategy and began plotting to attack the United States. Resistance to modernization and backlash against the United States manifested itself when terrorists attacked the United States on 11 September 2001. These attacks changed national strategy and forced the nation to begin changing its Cold War focus. Alexander Lennon, editor-in-chief of *Washington Quarterly*, the journal for the Center of Strategic and International Studies, singled out a key turning

point in international relations caused by the September 11, 2001 attacks. “Indeed, one clear lesson of September 11, 2001, was that geographic locations traditionally defined as “rear area,” such as the U.S. homeland, are increasingly at risk.”²¹ The subsequent Global War on Terror has impacted the global community and awakened all to the problems associated with globalization.

This new era of global connectivity and interdependence has disrupted the antiquated Westphalian system of respect for state sovereignty and the United States has been at the forefront of this push: “The United States needed a motive to become involved in international affairs, and issues surrounding democracy, human rights, maintaining stability, and opposing aggression were the most likely candidates.”²² Yale University Political Science professor Elizabeth Saunders predicts potential backlash caused by the United States’ forceful strategy for international security: “The US strategy of trying to impose its vision of international society unilaterally on its allies and its enemies alike may yet backfire. But for now, all states must live, however uncomfortably, with the effects of a US policy that makes WMD proliferation and terrorism the relevant criteria for inclusion in what can be an exclusionary international society.”²³ Now it is apparent that problems in one state can impact the world. Terrorist from a small region are motivated and capable of carrying out attacks around the world, and rogue states threaten to upset regional stability. The U.S. invasions and forced regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq, in spite of global criticism, sent the message that support for terrorism and rogue behavior by sovereign powers will not be tolerated. The forced regime changes have sparked the debate over when it is acceptable and how they should be carried out. War has its many drawbacks and justification is difficult in this era. An essay in by Pascal Boniface makes clear the limits of waging war: “Even in

cases where regime change might be justified--and international consensus on this exists-- war is acceptable only when waged in legitimate self-defense or as the collective decision of the United Nations Security Council.”²⁴ The controversy surrounding the invasion of Iraq is regarding President George W. Bush’s preemptive strike against the Ba’ath Party and Saddam Hussein. President Bush had labeled Iraq as one of three members of an ‘Axis of Evil’ along with Iran and North Korea. Global fallout following the U.S. decision to invade Iraq and complicated international stability concerns generate a need to find a better way to address the other two members of Bush’s Axis of Evil, Iran and North Korea. These two rogue states present their own unique problems and require unique solutions that accomplish national security goals while satisfying the international community. Samuel Huntington wrote that: “The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government. The differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities.”²⁵ The two traditional methods of sanctions and military force have proven ineffective at changing the behavior of either state. A better way forward is to coax rogue states into cultivating consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, and stability into their governments by using existing state institutions wherever possible.

Endotes

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Chapter III: What Is A Rogue State?

‘Rogue State’ is a term used by the United States to define certain states that do not function within international norms. The negative connotations of the term serve political interests well. George Washington University Professor of Political Science Elizabeth Saunders traces the origins of rogue state doctrine to the early 1990s: “In the 1990s, the term ‘‘rogue state’’ became fashionable in US foreign policy discourse. The United States government bestowed the ‘‘rogue state’’ label on countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea. The most commonly invoked criteria for ‘‘rogue’’ status were state support for terrorism and the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the same time, many traditional US allies, especially members of the European Union, consistently rejected the ‘‘rogue state’’ label and stronger incarnations such as the ‘axis of evil.’”¹ There is no single definition of a rogue state. Instead it is a politically expedient phrase that serves the interest of U.S. politicians. It is, however, a powerful and effective term that describes well certain states. The rogue state label, like terrorism, is a highly subjective and highly politicized, but ill-defined term. The term came into being sometime near the end of the Cold War, according to Elizabeth Saunders. “Although it appears in the Congressional Record as early as 1987, when Representative Pete Stark called Iran a ‘‘rogue,’’ it was not until the post-Cold War era that the ‘‘rogue state’’ label gained widespread currency within the United States.”² The term has menacing connotations and has acted as a powerful political tool for ‘othering’ or vilifying America’s rivals. Defining the criteria for the rogue state label has been a topic of much debate. Middle East Studies expert Barry Rubin offers one definition of a rogue state: “A rogue state is one that puts a high priority on subverting other states and sponsoring non-conventional types of violence against them. It does not react predictably to

deterrence or other tools of diplomacy and statecraft.”³ His definition, however, is quite vague; any state could react unpredictably, and if a state is labeled as a rogue, then by his definition it is expected to react differently to conventional forms of coercion. That is the problem with Iran and North Korea. They continually have adverse reactions to conventional threats, yet the United States continues to rely on threats of sanctions and military force to try to coerce both states into more favorable actions. Barry Rubin elaborates upon his definition of a rogue state: “Similarly, a rogue state is not just a country whose interests clash with the United States, but one that also jeopardizes the international order. Such a state threatens to draw the United States into conflict even if America seeks to avoid it.”⁴ Iran and North Korea are threats, but their regimes have an interest in avoiding a large-scale conflict with the United States that would result in their removal. Instead, they use just enough conflict and provocation as a tool for staying in power and blackmailing the international community. Further, non-rogue states that are weak, underdeveloped, and unstable are at least as threatening to international security.

Richard Cupitt highlights another problem with the rogue state label. He explains “The behavior of friends, though the results in some cases may be more detrimental than the action of rogue states, will often be ignored or rationalized.”⁵ This is a powerful statement that illustrates the subjectivity of the rogue label. The term “Rogue state” sounds threatening and thus simplifies the politics of aggressive policies such as military action and thorough sanctions. Misbehavior by allies is justified through different political language. A study published in the *Journal of Politics and International Affairs* and written by Kim Sang-joon shows that rogue states do not necessarily exhibit worse behavior than non-rogues: “Rogue state politics have been vilifying the so-called ‘rogue states’ under the premise that they have

been posing a universal threat to all nations since the early 1980s. However, the five rogue states show relatively similar, or insignificantly worse, behavior patterns in interstate disputes compared to non-rogue states during the period 1980-2001.”⁶ The study questions the validity of rogue state politics but hints at the power of creating such labels.

The connotations are strong and it is politically expedient for rallying support for expanding budgets. The label removes credibility of states and their supporters once it has stuck: “In a sense, the labeling of a country as a rogue state is a certificate of political insanity, in terms of the rules of realpolitik and maintaining international order,”⁷ according to Barry Rubin. In many ways he is correct. Any talk of normalizing relations with Iran or North Korea would likely be met with severe domestic political backlash as has been true with politics surrounding the Iran nuclear deal.

All of this begs the question of whether or not Iran and North Korea are actual threats to the United States. The answer is yes. The regimes in both states have cleverly positioned themselves as champions of their people by provoking the United States and presenting themselves to the people as defenders against a powerful and foreign aggressor. The United States has repeatedly played into this role and shows no signs of changing in the near future. Both nations are developing WMDs and have ties to terrorist organizations. Iran and North Korea understand that their conventional threats are no match for the military power of the United States. Both have developed asymmetric strategies and pursued nuclear weapons to offset their conventional disadvantages. Both states have historically supported terrorist groups. Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution Thomas Henriksen attributes Iran and North Korea's increase in pursuit of WMDs to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. “Iran and North Korea have aggressively strained to acquire nuclear weaponry. They

saw Iraq's sad fate for pretending to have nuclear arms."⁸ The threat of invasion had the opposite effect from what was intended; Instead of convincing Iran and North Korea to comply with U.S. demands it caused them to increase their research and development of asymmetric warfare capabilities and nuclear weapons.

There are multiple rogue states, but none have been as belligerent or complicated as Iran and North Korea. Both possess all the elements of a rogue state such as irrational behavior, pursuit of WMDs, and support for terrorism, extreme human rights violations, and brinksmanship. There are complications to dealing with both as Larry Diamond points out in his 2008 book *The Spirit of Democracy*. "In the case of Iran, the Arab Gulf states, Nigeria, and more recently Azerbaijan and Venezuela (under Hugo Chavez), Western dependence on their vast oil revenues greatly diminishes the leverage of the rich democracies."⁹ North Korea has its major regional complications as well. Dr. Bruce Bechtol sums up the threat in his comprehensive book on the threats and uncertainties of the North Korean regime: "Because of North Korea's ability to retaliate and its unpredictable government, any preemptive strike would have to be so widespread and on such a large scale that undoubtedly it would cause an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula."¹⁰ There is also the issue of China's involvement with North Korea. Thomas Henriksen sums it up quite bluntly "China will not permit a sanction-induced implosion of the North Korean regime."¹¹ Both Iran and North Korea are open about their hatred of the United States and their desire to destroy it along with its allies. Just as Iraq is an extreme case of failed state-building, Iran and North Korea are extreme cases of rogue states that provide an excellent catalyst for the formulation of better state-building policy. The current policy of containment prolongs the suffering of their citizens and allows each state to continue creating problems for the United States.

Origins of the Axis of Evil

Strong and stable states are better equipped to combat the problems associated with globalization such as poverty, disease, famine, international crime, terrorism, and WMD proliferation. President Barack Obama singled out this point in his opening to the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS): “The United States is part of a dynamic international environment, in which different nations are exerting greater influence, and advancing our interests will require expanding spheres of cooperation around the world.”¹² Other states can provide regional stability through security efforts as well as economic and human development. President Obama also wrote about the importance of this trend in his 2010 NSS: “Due to increased economic growth and political stability, individual nations are increasingly taking on powerful regional and global roles and changing the landscape of international cooperation.”¹³ Combatting the many globalized threats requires cooperation among the world’s powers. The ability to combat global threats is weakened when states are at odds with each other. Therefore, labeling a state or regime as an enemy has long-term political and social implications.

The George W. Bush administration was adamant about confronting the nation’s enemies boldly and directly, which manifested in his famous labeling of an “Axis of Evil” in regards to states seeking Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and believed to be in alliance with terrorist organizations in his 2002 State of the Union address (SOTU). President Bush declared “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.”¹⁴ Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were the three states President Bush referred to in his speech.

The usage of the term “evil” implies the purely malicious intent of these states and seemed fitting in the emotionally-charged wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Labeling them the “axis” evokes the threatening nature of the World War II Axis Powers. The phrase stuck and became a powerful political rallying point for actions against all three states. It also acted as a turning point in the focus of the War on Terror. Senior Research Associate at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Daniel Heradstveit, along with colleague and Syracuse University Professor of Political Science G. Matthew Bonham conducted research on the impact of former President Bush’s labeling of Iran as a member of the Axis of Evil. The authors concluded “The use of the phrase Axis of Evil was a restructuring of the American understanding of the ‘War on Terror,’ in which the focus shifted from Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa‘ida, with their allies and bases in Afghanistan, to a series of other states, whose involvement in that operation ranged from minimal to non-existent.”¹⁵ The damage may not have been apparent to most observers during the frenzy that followed the September 11, 2001 attacks, however, Heradstveit and Bonham point out “Prior to the Axis of Evil speech, Iranian-American relations had been undergoing a thaw.”¹⁶ The U.S. operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and its hunting of Osama bin Laden served the mutual interest of Iran who was on the side of Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance. According to Heradstveit and Bonham, “Following the attacks of 9/11, Iran and the United States now had a common interest in crushing the Taliban. Iran envisaged a new geopolitical role for itself in Afghanistan and Central Asia, in alliance with the United States.”¹⁷ The inclusion of Iran in the Axis of Evil reaffirmed for Iranian hardliners America’s role as “The Great Satan.” The statement had a powerful impact on Iranian domestic politics, especially

since autocracies rely on the threat of outside enemies to justify their harsh internal repression.

The phrase itself has strong connotations and effectively altered domestic views of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as co-conspiring villains and served to rally domestic political support for sanctions and military actions against the three states. A U. S. senator testifying before Congress in 2007 on the results of sanctions against targeted regimes explained the counterproductive nature of such tactics: “If anything, the anti-American sentiment aroused by sanctions often strengthens the popularity of such leaders who use America as the convenient scapegoat to divert attention from their own tyranny.”¹⁸ Any attempt at rallying domestic support for actions against another country by vilifying that country may also be used to rally domestic political support within the targeted country, thus making it more difficult to improve relations, cooperation, and ultimately security. President Bush’s speech undoubtedly achieved both results.

The domestic impacts of the speech within the United States were that it restructured thinking on the War on Terror. According to Heradstveit and Bonham, “The key concepts in this restructuring have been firstly ‘terrorist states,’ which implies the ‘indivisibility of terrorism’ and therefore that the collective responsibility for 9/11 is on any state so designated; and secondly, weapons of mass destruction, because anyone who possesses them may be tempted to sell or give them to terrorists, thus evoking fears of chemical, biological, or even nuclear attacks on American cities.”¹⁹ The Bush administration took the fear of the 9/11 attacks to its logical maximum; belligerent and unpredictable states transferring WMDs to terrorist organizations and using them as a proxy to strike the United States suddenly was a realistic threat. This, of course, is unlikely as states would be handing enormous power over

to militant groups they cannot control. It could perhaps be used as a last ditch effort to strike while the United States prepares to invade, but the complexity of most WMD technology makes it prohibitive to the terrorist groups operating in the early 2000s.

Implications of the Speech

The 'Axis of Evil' speech effectively combined terrorism, WMDs, and Rogue States into a single enemy of the United States. Weapons of Mass Destruction were of increasing concern due to the vulnerability of the United States homeland and the nullification of the safety of Mutually Assured Destruction because terrorist groups do not represent a single state that can be targeted. Terrorists have also proven willing to sacrifice themselves and others for shock value. The mistake Saddam Hussein made was bluffing about having WMDs. That instigated an invasion, which in turn motivated Iran and North Korea to step up their pursuit of functional WMDs. North Korea successfully detonated a nuclear device within three years of the U.S. invasion of Iraq as noted by Dr. Bruce Bechtol: "On October 9, 2006 the North Koreans conducted their first plutonium underground nuclear test, effectively ending any debate about whether they actually had nuclear weapons."²⁰ North Korea has likely transferred some of its technology to Iran, a nation with direct ties to the terrorist group Hezbollah. North Korea may have aided the group in the construction of underground tunnels used to fight Israelis in Lebanon as Bruce Bechtol also states in his book: "Several reports note that all or most of Hezbollah's underground facilities were built primarily under the supervision of North Korean instructors in 2003-2004."²¹ The labeling as an enemy, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, along with longstanding sanctions against both countries, left Iran and North Korea few choices but to cooperate with each other. Still, the ties are loose.

The implications of the Axis of Evil speech are clear: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were the enemies of the United States. The three states, each with their own eccentric and tyrannical leaders, provided a more recognizable villain than faceless, stateless, terrorists. The label undoubtedly evokes a strong sense that something must be done quickly. Daniel Heradstveit discussed the usage of the ‘axis’ metaphor and concluded “It appears rather that Bush was using the Axis metaphor in the original sense, to suggest that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were not only Evil countries in themselves, but were in alliance with one another against the rest of us. In other words, this is not merely Evil but a conspiracy of Evil.”²² It was designed to rally domestic support for programs targeting these three countries. The side effect is that it set back prior advancements in diplomatic relations with the labeled states. The speech gave increased credibility to Iranian hardliners as Daniel Heradstveit notes in his research: “The conservatives took the speech as the final proof that their enemy image of the United States had been right all along, and that the reformers, with their wish for dialogue, were naïve. And it is very hard for the reformers to argue with this, as most people will perceive the Axis of Evil to be insulting and degrading.”²³ Relations with Iran have been particularly tense since the speech by President Bush. The United States has been challenged in the region by Iran who has helped instigate instability in Iraq, challenged the United States in the Straits of Hormuz, and worked with North Korea to purchase missile and nuclear technologies. According to Francois Heisbourg, chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, Bush’s threats toward Iran have encouraged its further development of nuclear technology: “If a country--Iran particularly comes to mind--becomes convinced that it will be the next object of U.S. attempts at regime change, for example, it is possible that it might hasten what is currently a partially developed WMD-acquisition or -

development program.”²⁴ To reiterate a previous quote from Daniel Heradstveit: “Prior to the Axis of Evil speech, Iranian-American relations had been undergoing a thaw.”²⁵ The speech set U.S.-Iranian diplomacy back well over decade with no real progress towards recovering.

The implications were much more substantial and immediate for Iraq. The U.S. invasion in 2003 quickly routed the Iraqi military and removed Saddam Hussein from power. The aftermath, however, proved a long and difficult effort. Explaining the reasons for the invasion has long been the source of debate. The ‘axis of evil’ speech was certainly a factor in setting up support for the war, as international relations scholar Raymond Hinnebusch explained: “The Bush doctrine and the 2002 National Security Strategy, formulated in response to the 9/11 attacks, make explicit the coercive turn: the call for ‘full spectrum dominance’; the strategy of dealing with resistance to the US not simply through traditional containment, but via ‘preventive wars’; the resort to unilateralism, with ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing’; the view that states not with the US in the war on terrorism are against it; and the claim that only the US liberal model is legitimate, with sovereignty exempting no nation from the demand that it conform.”²⁶ The implications of which have been the loss of U.S. blood and treasure, the increased pursuit of WMDs by Iran and North Korea, the destabilization of the Middle East, and the formation of the Islamic State terrorist group that continues to plague regional security and poses an increasing global threat.

The invasion of Iraq, and the grouping of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as equal threats to U. S. national security was an anomaly of U.S. foreign policy as Raymond Hinnebusch explains, “This, of course, is all quite a change from traditional US foreign policy that was based on the containment of threats and that viewed hegemony as being rooted in consent

derived from multilateral consultation, hence necessarily limited by international law and institutions and requiring a priority for diplomacy over military force.”²⁷ The effects of which we will continue to feel for the foreseeable future unless policy is changed or returned to the status quo. The United States has done little to thaw relations with Iran or improve its handling of North Korea in spite of a substantial administration change. White House correspondent and columnist for U.S. News & World Report Kenneth Walsh broke down the weakness of the Axis of Evil speech in an article written shortly after the speech was delivered: “For one thing, describing Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an axis of evil suggests links among the three that don't exist. Iran and Iraq are mortal enemies. And while North Korea has supplied missile technology to Iran, Pyongyang remains one of the most isolated totalitarian states in the world.”²⁸ North Korea sells its nuclear technology to Iran out of necessity for capital and not as part of an underlying conspiracy between the two; Iran is seeking increased weapons capability to deter an attack from the United States.

The ambiguity of the Bush doctrine had many consequences due to the openness of its interpretation. He used prevention and preemption interchangeably, which left many in the international community confused as to his intentions. Francois Heisbourg summarized the problem well: “If the Bush doctrine strictly boiled down to preemption--in turn, tied to the concept of imminent threat--then the new U.S. national security strategy would not necessarily involve upsetting basic principles governing the use of force in international relations. Conversely, when preemption is used interchangeably with prevention and both are subject to wide interpretation, the legitimization of the use of force may be revolutionized.”²⁹ Its vagueness can be attributed to strategic flexibility, but I attribute it to a lack of understanding the precise threats faced by the United States at the time the speech was

written in 2002. The broadening of the War on Terror from its focus on defeating al-Qaeda into a mission of defeating the Axis of Evil came from a measure of cognitive dissonance over the fact that a non-state actor was able to carry out such a devastating and direct attack against the United States.

Kenneth Walsh had his own interpretation shortly after the speech was delivered: “Bush had other goals, too. One was to prod Congress into passing his proposed \$48 billion in spending increases for the Pentagon this year. Another was to rally support for his own version of Reagan's missile defense system--one that Bush says would protect against attacks by rogue nations. Finally, if there is another terrorist attack, Bush can say he did all he could to avoid it.”³⁰ The President had already been widely criticized for his initially subdued reaction to the 9/11 attacks.

The 9/11 attacks happened at a time when Americans were feeling invulnerable. No such attack had taken place on U. S. soil since the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in 1941. The response to Pearl Harbor was swift and decisive. The United States went to war against well-defined and powerful enemies who threatened much of the world with tyranny. The Soviet Union was unwilling to attack the U. S. homeland directly due to fear of reprisal widely known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) where both countries possessed enough weapons to destroy each other many times over. Unfortunately, the conspirators behind the 9/11 attacks had no fear of reprisal, they had no country to defend, and it may be that Americans needed to believe that a more tangible group, such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were somehow conspirators behind the attacks. Something largely accepted no matter how loose the connection.

Endotes

¹ Elizabeth N. Saunders, "Setting Boundaries: Can International Society Exclude Rogue States?" *International Studies Review* 8 (2006): 23.

² Elizabeth N. Saunders, "Setting Boundaries: Can International Society Exclude Rogue States?" *International Studies Review* 8 (2006): 26.

³ Barry Rubin, "U.S Foreign Policy and Rogue States," *The Middle East Review of International Affairs* 3 no. 3 (1999):

⁴ Barry Rubin, "U.S Foreign Policy and Rogue States," *The Middle East Review of International Affairs* 3 no. 3 (1999):

⁵ Richard T. Cupitt, "Viewpoint: Target Rogue Behavior, Not Rogue States," *The Nonproliferation Review Winter (1996)*: 52.

⁶ Kim Sang-joon, "The Validity of Rogue State Politics," *Journal of Politics & International Affairs*, Spring, 2008.

⁷ Barry Rubin, "U.S Foreign Policy and Rogue States," *The Middle East Review of International Affairs* 3 no. 3 (1999).

⁸ Thomas H. Henriksen, *America and the Rogue States* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 120.

⁹ Larry Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy: The struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World*, (New York: Times Books, 2008): 113.

¹⁰ Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. *The Last Days of Kim Jong-il: The North Korean Threat in a Changing Era* (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2013): 110.

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- ¹¹ Thomas H. Henriksen, *America and the Rogue States* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 143.
- ¹² Barack H. Obama, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2010): 43.
- ¹³ Barack H. Obama, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2010): 43.
- ¹⁴ George W. Bush, *State of the Union Address* (Washington D.C.: The White House Archives, 2002).
- ¹⁵ Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham "What the Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran," *Middle East Journal* (2007): 423.
- ¹⁶ Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham "What the Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran," *Middle East Journal* (2007): 427.
- ¹⁷ Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham "What the Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran," *Middle East Journal* (2007): 427.
- ¹⁸ *House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session*, "Isolating Proliferators and Sponsors of Terror," (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007): 9.
- ¹⁹ Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham "What the Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran," *Middle East Journal* (2007): 423.
- ²⁰ Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. *The Last Days of Kim Jong-il: The North Korean Threat in a Changing Era* (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2013): 91.
- ²¹ Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. *The Last Days of Kim Jong-il: The North Korean Threat in a Changing Era* (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2013): 119.

²² Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham "What the Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran," *Middle East Journal* (2007): 426.

²³ Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham "What the Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran," *Middle East Journal* (2007): 437.

²⁴ Francois Heisbourg, "A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences," *Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime Change, and U.S. Policy Toward Iran, Iraq, and North Korea*, eds. Alexander Lennon and Camille Eiss (Cambridge Mass: MIT Press 2004): 15.

²⁵ Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham "What the Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran," *Middle East Journal* (2007): 427.

²⁶ Raymond Hinnebusch, "The US Invasion of Iraq: Explanations and Implications," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 16, no. 3 (Fall2007 2007): 219.

²⁷ Raymond Hinnebusch, "The US Invasion of Iraq: Explanations and Implications," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 16, no. 3 (Fall2007 2007): 219.

²⁸ Kenneth T. Walsh, "Taking on the 'Axis of Evil.'," *U.S. News & World Report* 132, no. 4 (February 11, 2002): 18.

²⁹ Francois Heisbourg, "A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences," *Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime Change, and U.S. Policy Toward Iran, Iraq, and North Korea*, ed. Alexander Lennon and Camille Eiss (Cambridge Mass: MIT Press 2004): 8.

³⁰ Kenneth T. Walsh, "Taking on the 'Axis of Evil.'," *U.S. News & World Report* 132, no. 4 (February 11, 2002): 18.

Chapter IV: The Problem With Sanctions

Broad sanctions have been the preferred tool of statecraft for those desiring to do something about problem states while avoiding the expense and political backlash military engagements. Research shows that they are overwhelmingly ineffective and mostly serve the interests of domestic politicians needing to display action against offensive behavior within the international community. Researcher in the Department of Economics at Tilburg University in the Netherlands, Manuel Oechslin, defined the desired end-state of sanctions: “There is a general notion that, as Mack and Khan (2000) put it, ‘the pain inflicted by sanctions on citizens of target states will cause them to pressure their government into making the changes demanded by the sanctioning body.’ But very little analytical work has actually been devoted to the exact channels through which sanctions are supposed to promote democratization.”¹ Basically sanctions are implemented on little more than the belief that they will work and there is insufficient research defining how they will actually achieve democracy. In short, sanctions are a politically expedient tactic for domestic politicians to achieve the desire of their constituents to take non-military action against foreign regimes.

There is much research into the ineffectiveness of sanctions to produce democratic reforms. Much of the research shows that sanctions actually harm liberties in the targeted country. Cooper Drury and Dursun Peksen found sanctions to be harmful to political liberties in their study. “The empirical findings—based on analysis of time-series cross-national data over a 28-year (1972–2000) period—support the assertion that the presence of sanctions reduces political liberties in target countries.”² Their research also shows that time is a factor in the damage caused by sanctions: “Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that the longer economic sanctions are in place, the greater cumulative negative effect they inflict on

democracy.”³ Short-term sanctions targeted at specific behavior may still be a valuable tool for international statecraft, but broad sanctions designed to achieve idealist goals are corrosive to the populations they are designed to help. A 2013 working paper by research fellows Dr. Christian von Soest and Dr. Michael Wahman at the German Institute of Global Area Studies differentiates two objectives of sanctions: “Some sanctions, like those aimed at ending nuclear proliferation or at punishing regimes that harbor terrorists, are directly related to national security concerns. Democratic sanctions, on the other hand, are less directly connected to classic realist goals of international politics.”⁴ Most sanctions are little more than an act to appease domestic constituents and often cause harm to the populations they are intended to help. Some forms of targeted sanctions applied in conjunction with specific goals, however, can be effective tools of coercion. This chapter discusses the research consensus of sanctions as well as their application toward Iran and North Korea.

The Research Consensus

The research consensus is that sanctions cause more harm than good. Most sanctions are designed to appease political constituents’ desire for leaders to take action against offensive behavior of foreign governments; they are a domestic show of force. Norwegian scholar Ketil Fred Hansen, and Senior Researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Axel Borchgrevink made multiple conclusions about the causes and effects of sanctions. They identified the basic goal of most sanctions: “As a rule, the official goal of sanctions is to reprimand a regime. However, empirical experience over the past 20 years has shown that it is primarily the civilian population that suffers, whereas the regime and elite are much better protected from the effects of sanctions.”⁵ They concluded that sanctions actually help the targeted regime retain power and may actually increase their oppression of the

afflicted population. The research by Dursun Peksen and A. Cooper Drury supports this viewpoint. The duo concludes “the regime seeks to mitigate the impact of the economic costs caused by the sanctions by taking control of the economy or intervening in it to influence the flow of wealth.”⁶ They found that sanctions harm any opposition within the sanctioned country: “The second effect of the regime’s intervention in the post-sanction market is to limit resources flowing to opposition groups... Consequently, this combination of shifting resources in the target regime’s favor and declining economic capacity of opposition groups makes it unlikely that the target regime will be coerced.”⁷ This is a problem if the sanctions are designed to instigate a democratic transition.

As another example, the longstanding U.S. sanctions against the small island nation of Cuba have failed to topple the Castro regime, yet remain in place to the detriment of Cubans due to ideological differences between the United States and Cuba and due to continued lobbying in the United States by Batista supporters. As one congressman stated in a 2007 joint hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade: “China, Russia, the Middle East, North Korea and Cuba all represent huge markets for our farm products yet many in Congress favor current or proposed trade restrictions that prevent our farmers from selling to the billions of people in these areas.”⁸ In this case ideological differences do not explain the continued sanctions because the United States and People’s Republic of China share the same ideological differences, yet are powerful trading partners. Lifting sanctions against Cuba would have a limited impact on the United States and possibly a disproportionate impact on Cuba. Therefore, a conclusion to be drawn from that case is that the sanctions remain because they are not economically inconvenient for the United States,

yet they maintain a measure of political support from voters who believe the Castro regime ought to be punished.

Sanctions, effective or not, play an important role in international politics. Hansen and Borchgrevink make this point in their research: “One aim of economic sanctions can be to signal internationally that the behaviour of the regime in question is unacceptable.”⁹ Sanctions send a clear signal in international politics where other types of messaging can be misinterpreted. It sends a clear message that the sanctioning state is willing to take action against an offending regime. Sanctions need not be internationally coordinated if signaling is their primary intention as Hansen and Borchgrevink also point out: “If the most important objectives concern political gains related to media, national public opinion and the building of an international image, it obviously matters less whether sanctions are internationally coordinated or not.”¹⁰ International sanctions can be more effective, however, when coordinated between states, especially when they are narrow in scope and targeted at specific offenders within a regime.

Smart Sanctions

Targeted sanctions, or ‘smart sanctions’ have potential as a tool of statecraft when used in conjunction with grand strategy and to achieve immediate goals. Broad sanctions have proven harmful to targeted populations. They are often presented to the public in the context of promoting democratic reforms abroad. They are designed, however, to promote domestic political interests such as appeasing constituents’ desire to see action taken against the undesirable behavior of international actors. They also send a clear signal that certain behaviors are undesirable. The research consensus is that broad sanctions, typically economic, cause more harm to targeted populations and actually reduce the amount of civil

liberties in the targeted population as well as weaken internal liberal opposition to oppressive regimes. Fred Hansen and Axel Borchgrevink found a use for sanctions, however: “One lesson that emerges from the sanctions literature is that in order to be efficient, sanctions should have clear and limited objectives.”¹¹ Targeted sanctions, or smart sanctions, have a shorter lifespan and much more specific focus than typical economic sanctions. Daniel Drezner, professor of International Politics, defined smart sanctions: “Ostensibly, smart or targeted sanctions are the precision-guided munitions of economic statecraft. They are designed to hurt elite supporters of the targeted regime, while imposing minimal hardship on the mass public.”¹² For example, smart sanctions were used against the North Korean elite in 2005 to bring them back to the bargaining table to discuss their nuclear program.

Thomas H. Henriksen, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, wrote about the effectiveness of the 2005 smart sanctions against North Korea in his book *America and the Rogue States*: “Responding to North Korea’s money laundering from drug sales and counterfeiting American currency, Washington took Action. The US Treasury’s Operation Smoking Dragon imposed financial sanctions on Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macau in late September 2005.”¹³ The United States is the most economically powerful state in the world and that power gives it great influence over the global banking industry. All regimes need money and access to U.S. markets is one of the largest sources of it. Members of the Kim regime were laundering money through Banco Delta Asia in Macau. The United States threatened sanctions against the bank for its complicity in aiding the Kim regime. The threat of losing access to the U.S. money market was enough to convince the bank to freeze assets to the family. That in turn got their attention and brought North Korean leaders back to negotiations over their nuclear program. Chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism,

Nonproliferation, and Trade, Brad Sherman identified the need for the United States to use its greatest power assets to achieve its goals in his opening statements to a 2007 Senate hearing: “The greatest challenge to America is combatting terrorism and proliferation of WMD. The greatest power of America is our economic power. It is long past time that we have hearings to see how we can bring our greatest power to deal with our greatest threats to our national security.”¹⁴ He identifies the goals of the Senate hearing: “Our goal is to affect the behavior of U.S. companies and their subsidiaries, foreign companies, particularly oil companies and banks, the World Bank and other international organizations.”¹⁵ The sanctions against Banco Delta Asia are an excellent example of what targeted sanctions can achieve. Member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Edward R. Royce stated one of the other positive gains from the targeted sanctions against North Korean leaders in the same 2007 hearing: “Perhaps a greater consequence was the message that was sent to bankers throughout the region about the pitfalls of dealing with the North Koreans, and as a consequence of that several cut ties to the regime.”¹⁶ Dursun Peksen describes the benefits of targeted sanctions over broad sanctions as at least minimizing the unintended negative effects of broader sanctions: “At minimum, such targeted sanctions in the forms of arms embargoes, financial asset freezes or international travel bans on the political elites will not worsen the economic well-being of the opposition.”¹⁷ Targeted sanctions have potential as an effective tool of international statecraft that can put pressure on members of oppressive regimes.

The economic influence of the United States is particularly potent because oppressors tend to hold power for their own financial benefit. Squeezing that benefit is a quick way to bring them to negotiations as the United States proved with the sanctions episode against Banco Delta Asia in Macau in 2005 that brought North Korean leaders

back to negotiations over their nuclear program. According to David Asher, Victor Comras, and Patrick Cronin in their book *Pressure: Coercive Economic Statecraft and U.S. National Security*: “The use of targeted financial measures does not obviate the need for economic sanctions but rather adds to their potential effectiveness.”¹⁸ They elaborate by explaining how the two can be used in conjunction, “Pressure strategies that are well conceived and executed (meaning that they are characterized by clear objectives and a deep understanding of an adversary’s vulnerabilities and decision-making calculus) can counter, contain and disrupt dangerous and destabilizing behavior from mass killings to nuclear proliferation.”¹⁹ In short, the goals and results of any sanctions episode need to be limited and measureable within a narrow time frame. Embargoes lasting decades do nothing more than appease domestic political groups and harm the targeted populations, decreasing liberalism and democracy.

Case Study: Iran’s nuclear development

Broad sanctions have failed to stop Iran’s nuclear development. U. S. relations with Iran became intensely adversarial after the 1979 revolution and hostage crisis. According to Navid Hassibi at the Research Group in International Politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen in Belgium: “Iran has faced sanctions since the early days of the Islamic Revolution that resulted from the 1979 US Embassy hostage crisis. Over the last decade, however, its nuclear activity has triggered a comprehensive set of economic, trade, personnel, and military sanctions.”²⁰ The leaders of the Iranian revolution used U. S. support for the Pahalavi regime as an initial justification of its rise to power. They have subsequently used U. S. sanctions as continued justification for their political repression of their own citizens. Author and lecturer on the political history of the Middle East Ali M. Ansari wrote: “In 1979, Khomeini found

himself leading a revolution that was, and remains, plural in construction and united only in its enmity toward its common foe, the shah and his puppet master, the United States.”²¹

Iranian hardliners have leaned on this adversarial relationship as a source of support and power. Shahram Chubin, Director of Research at the Geneva Centre for Security Studies in Switzerland, and Robert Litwak, director of the Division of International Studies at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., summed up the complexity of the Iranian predicament: “The particular experience of Iran--revolution, war, sanctions, and estrangement from international society--has created a shared sense of embattlement in a hostile environment, leaving little scope for debate.”²² There is a discrepancy between Iranian and American worldview and political culture that has prevented the two nations from reaching agreements on major issues in the Middle East. Mahmood Sariolghalam, associate professor at the School of Economics and Political Science of the Shahid Beheshti (National) University of Iran in Tehran, explains the differences between the two worldviews and political cultures:

Iran’s current leadership makes foreign policy decisions fundamentally on revolutionary idealism, especially on the Palestinian issue, rejecting the two-state solution; pursues a security doctrine based on ambiguity; assists military groups, characterizing them as freedom fighters; and confronts U.S. dominance in the Middle East. In contrast, the United States is determined to institutionalize the two-state solution, regards an unfriendly Iran’s security doctrine as opposed to its interests and those of Israel, views Hamas and Islamic Jihad as terrorist groups, and aims to contain Iran’s Middle East activities and projection of power.²³

Understanding the political needs of a rival government is essential to designing effective strategies to coerce that government into favorable actions.

Iran and North Korea both continue their nuclear development programs in spite of international pressure led by the United States. Their programs persist in defiance of pressure

from the United States. Iran's program is not as developed as that of other proliferators such as Pakistan or North Korea, but they were well on their way to building nuclear capacity for a weapon until the 2015 nuclear deal. The nuclear deal attempts to remove secrecy from the Iranian program and allowed them to develop nuclear energy in ways that limit their ability to develop nuclear weapons. Shahram Chubin and Robert Litwak predicted the consequences of Iran's secrecy: "Heightened suspicion that Iran's civilian nuclear energy infrastructure masks a clandestine weapons program has galvanized international cooperation among the United States, the European Union, and Russia and is likely to result in increased external pressure on Iran to remain in compliance with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments."²⁴ There is motivation derived from its intense adversarial relations with the United States, its desire to act as regional hegemon, the need for the ruling elite to maintain power and relevance among their own population, and access to technology from fellow 'Axis of Evil' member North Korea. Research scholar at Princeton University and former diplomat Seyed Mousavian wrote in 2014: "The West, by denying the rights of Iran to a peaceful nuclear program, gave the greatest impetus for Iran to press for self-sufficiency by completing unfinished projects and ensuring domestic supply of reactor fuel in the future."²⁵ Iran is notoriously vague in its political dealings, which fosters greater suspicion regarding its intentions for its nuclear program. According to Shahram Chubin and Robert Litwak: "The implicit rationale for the nuclear weapons program lies in the worldview of the hard-liners, who see the program as the ultimate guarantor of Iran's influence and security and, not incidentally, their own political power."²⁶ Iranian leaders provoke the United States and use America's reaction to their provocations as justification of an existential threat that in turn justifies their level of power and control over the state. The United States has fallen into this

trap repeatedly since at least 1979. It can be avoided in the future by leaving Iran ways out of provocative actions that preserve their dignity. The 2015 nuclear deal with Iran is designed to accomplish that. Time will tell whether or not it is successful and other factors, such as the outcome of U.S. elections, can influence its overall success.

Placing Iran and North Korea into the same category of enemies of the United States created a bond between the two where one had not previously existed. With the United States as common enemy and having both been largely sanctioned out of trade with the rest of the international community both countries have had little choice but to cooperate with each other. Francois Heisbourg made a strong point in 2011 that the United States has provided the catalyst for further nuclear proliferation: “Indeed, one of the lessons that an overtly targeted country such as Iran might draw from the North Korean case is that possession of a nuclear deterrent precludes the United States from considering military action.”²⁷ Kenneth Waltz identified nuclear weapons as a defensive weapon, a condition that manifested itself during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union where Mutually Assured Destruction became the accepted outcome of a nuclear showdown. Iran could effectively hold the Middle East hostage if it were to acquire nuclear capabilities. The fear is that they could then begin to support terrorist groups once again without fear of military invasion. After all, the Kim regime remains in power in North Korea in spite of its aggressive provocations and being at a conventional military disadvantage (that is not to discount the factor of a possible confrontation with China). The threat of a single nuclear strike against South Korea or Japan is catastrophic enough to force even the world’s only superpower to tread with caution when dealing with the rogue nation. Seyed Mousavian makes an important counterpoint, however: “Iran fully understands that possessing WMD might provide a short

term regional advantage, but one that would turn into longer-term vulnerability as it would lead to a regional arms race.”²⁸ Iran has many rivals in the complex Middle Eastern environment. Possession of nuclear weapons could provoke any number of adverse reactions, notably the placement of U.S. nuclear assets in the region. The United States remained poised to launch a nuclear counterstrike against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. It has also sanctioned North Korea into extreme poverty. At the same time the United States has ignored, or at least responded without military action, nuclear proliferation among states who do not rely on extreme anti-U.S. sentiment for power. Seyed Mousavian identifies it as a double standard applied to Iran by the west: “When compared with the West’s pressure on Iran (which has not acquired nuclear weapons), the strategic relations of the P5+1 to Israel, India, and Pakistan (which have nuclear weapons and are not parties to the NPT) clearly show that the West applies a double standard in its nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament strategy.”²⁹ This double standard comes from Iran’s extremist rhetoric against the United States and its ally Israel. Very public anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric make it easy to villainize by powerful lobby groups in the United States. This villain image was galvanized by former President George W. Bush’s 2002 ‘Axis of Evil’ speech where he effectively tied Iran to North Korea, Iraq, and the September 11, 2001 attacks in the minds of the American public. The 9/11 attacks and the following campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan gave the United States and Iran a reason to cooperate, which would have easily opened up the lines of communication between the two states. Bush’s speech, however, cut those ties and rekindled the adversarial relationship between the two states: “The metaphor targets entire countries, not their leaders. It does not differentiate between the evil leaders and the others who live in the country.”³⁰ Doing so, according to Daniel Heradstveit and Matthew Bonham,

alienated Iranian moderates who would have been much more open to cooperation with the United States prior to the speech; the speech polarized both nations until the 2015 nuclear deal which has been a breakthrough in relations.

Iran's nuclear provocations inspired multilateral sanctions led by the United States. According to Navid Hassibi and Tom Sauer easing of these sanctions will be necessary in order to advance negotiations with Iran: "A peaceful resolution to the Iranian nuclear standoff will require a negotiated settlement, undoubtedly including some form of sanctions relief package."³¹ Any talk of easing up on Iran meets with political backlash in the United States where Iran is often portrayed as an unpredictable rogue with aspirations to eliminate the state of Israel, attitudes to which the Iranian government's rhetoric easily lends credibility. This has been the case with the 2015 nuclear deal. Plenty of obstacles work against the easing of sanctions and improvement of U.S.-Iran relations. Hassibi and Sauer identified some obstacles to lifting sanctions: "Two potential roadblocks exist when it comes to lifting legislated sanctions. One is that some of these laws also refer to non-nuclear issues, such as human rights and links to terrorism."³² They also discuss the lack of will among U.S. politics combined with heavy influence from lobby groups: "Another obstacle is the lack of political will on Capitol Hill that could threaten efforts to soften sanctions. The longstanding influence that certain lobbying entities such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) exert over Congress is a notable factor."³³ The aforementioned factors combined with the pro-Israel views of American evangelicals and the distrust of Muslims that exists among many U.S. voters make it less likely that U.S. politicians will support the lifting of sanctions. Such a move could be widely unpopular among voters who still see Iran as a member of the 'Axis of Evil'.

Case Study: North Korea's nuclear development and brinksmanship

The failures of sanctions against North Korea to stop its nuclear development are much sharper in contrast to Iran where development has been stalled for the time being. Hostilities between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea date back to the end of World War II when the Korean Peninsula was partitioned at the 38th parallel into separate zones of control by the United States to the South and the Soviet Union to the North. The DPRK survived the downfall of the Soviet Union and persisted under the dynastic rule of Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il, and Kim Chong-un. According to Barry Rubin: "Its bizarre internal dictatorship, invasion of South Korea in 1950, and direct involvement in terrorism guaranteed it a place on the roster of rogues."³⁴ They have become the quintessential rogue state with perpetual brinksmanship, nuclear ambition, illicit activities, and support for terrorist organizations. This behavior is unlikely to stop as long as the status quo is maintained as explained by Angelo State University Professor of Political Science Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.: "As long as the DPRK assesses that it can advance its foreign policy through brinkmanship and provocations-and no signs indicate that the leadership in Pyongyang has stopped believing it-we can expect North Korea to take a variety of action to "push the edge of the envelope."³⁵ The North Korean nuclear program serves two purposes; security and money for the Kim family. The country is already known as 'the hermit kingdom' due to its extreme isolation from the international community, both self-imposed and through sanctions. They have learned to work around sanctions and are continually finding ways to generate cash for the regime while the people live in poverty. Bruce Bechtol summed up the difficulty of sanctioning the Kim regime: "What is certain is that North Korea's proliferation networks are constantly adjusting, evolving, and reinventing

themselves in order to survive and provide money for the Kim family, the elite, and the military.”³⁶ The regime has proven itself resilient in spite of decades of increasing sanctions. Thomas Henriksen elaborates the failures of the United States in his book *America and the Rogue States*: “The United States’ decades-long engagement of North Korea yielded little beyond Pyongyang’s broken promises, frustrating artful dodges, and its relentless pursuit of nuclear weaponry.”³⁷ These conditions create tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Containment policies prolong the humanitarian crisis that exists in North Korea and leave it unprepared to be integrated into South Korea or the international community.

The prospect of unification raises important questions and concerns regarding sanctions. While there may be plenty of ways to forcibly or peacefully unify the peninsula, there are serious concerns that require attention in advance of any unification efforts. Decades of sanctions against North Korea, and exploitation of the population by the Kim family, have left North Korea in a derelict state. It stands in stark contrast to the Republic of Korea’s rise as a well-developed industrial power with strong alliances. The disparity between the two Koreas is too great for unification at this time. Any future potential for unification requires the North to be brought closer to the South’s level of development. Doing so would require breaking the North’s isolation from the world and this cannot be done with current policies.

China is also a major factor in any dealings with North Korea. Thomas Henriksen pointed out China’s goals for the DPRK: “Beijing’s goal before and after the crowning of Kim Jung-un in his father’s place remains to nudge the DPRK along the Chinese-blazed trail of market socialism while retaining a loose overlordship over its militarized vassal.”³⁸ The United States and China have a generally good diplomatic

relationship, however, ideological differences over the future of North Korea combined with the past experience of having been drawn into a war against each other by the North complicate the advancement of policy. David Shambaugh explains the PRC's views as to the best way forward for the DPRK: "China's Korea analyst draw explicit parallels to Maoist China (particularly during the Great Leap Forward) and argue that North Korea's only viable option to avoid national suicide is to follow China's reformist example."³⁹ The problem with allowing North Korea to develop is twofold. The first issue is that it would require recognition that the Kim regime is legitimate. The second issue is that it would concede to the Chinese model of developmental authoritarianism. Both are conditions that will not sit well within U.S. politics and could be used to weaken alliances between the United States and regional actors such as South Korea and Japan. Conceding power to China may also embolden it to take greater actions toward fully asserting its claims to Taiwan and many smaller islands currently under international dispute in the Pacific. Giving China greater license to act as regional hegemon is an issue of concern due to the PRC's poor human rights record and the relative loss of U.S. power in the region. Progress is gridlocked due to conflicting interests, therefore the status quo remains and the North Korean people suffer. China has a direct interest in maintaining North Korea according to David Shambaugh: "Preventing collapse is Beijing's bottom line because collapse would have enormous tangible human and economic consequences for China, not to mention the intangible political impact of another failed Communist state."⁴⁰ China's efforts to maintain stability in North Korea currently undermine U.S.-led sanctions against the regime, and while China has an interest in the denuclearization of North Korea, it has a greater

interest in a stable North Korea. The Kim family has also continually invented new ways to support itself, therefore sanctions have done more to harm the people of North Korea while the ruling elite remain wealthy. The Republic of Korea does not wholly support punitive sanctions against North Korea as was pointed out by David Shambaugh: “The PRC and ROK both oppose a punitive approach based on sanctions, and neither seems to endorse the Bush administration’s policy of tailored containment.”⁴¹ Sanctions create instability which the DPRK is not lacking. They are also generating poverty that will be dumped on their only two land neighbors, China and South Korea, if the regime collapses. A military campaign would expedite a refugee crisis and could provoke a larger conflict with China. The only two options are to maintain the status quo and delay the inevitable collapse of the regime, or to begin proactive measures to bring the North up to greater levels of development to reduce a future refugee, humanitarian, and economic crisis.

The big setback to helping North Korea develop is that we would inadvertently be feeding its massive military. The DPRK maintains its claim as the sovereign ruler of the entire peninsula and would use its conventional forces for such purpose according Bruce Bechtol: “This huge army not only maintains itself as a major power broker in the country, but it continues to provide the DPRK with the means to achieve their long-range strategic goal - to unify or dominate the Korean Peninsula by force.”⁴² This army has been unable to achieve such ends due to the strong alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea’s militaries. This has led North Korea to develop its asymmetrical threat capabilities which Bruce Bechtol identified in his book *The Last Days of Kim Jong-il: The North Korean Threat in a Changing Era*: “Because the U.S.-ROK military alliance has deterred large-scale

aggression from North Korea since 1953, the leadership in Pyongyang has had to find a way to incite fear, to create tension, and to attempt to undermine the government in South Korea-- and this helps bring North Korea closer to the goal of dominating the Korean Peninsula.”⁴³ The idea of North Korea ruling the whole peninsula may be fantasy but it does possess enough military capability to ruin South Korea. Any military actions against the DPRK require extreme caution so as not to provoke a catastrophic war that would set the peninsula back to its World War Two era conditions. Max Fisher, former writer and editor at *The Atlantic*, stated the risk associated with actions against North Korea in a 2012 article: “The North Korean military has made clear that it will over-react to any military provocations, making any strike extremely risky as it could slide into full-on -- and potentially nuclear -- war.”⁴⁴ The risk of an overreaction has been a real possibility that is taken seriously by military planners. The DPRK has a history of exacting revenge through rogue military strikes against South Korea and its American counterparts. It is also notoriously patient when it comes to planning these attacks, many coming years after the event for which they are retaliating. Max Fisher goes on to talk about how few alternatives have been left for the North, “The world has already taken so many things away from North Korea, it doesn't really have many deterrents left, short of all-out war.”⁴⁵

The regime has a notorious, and almost comical, pattern of not upholding its end of any deal offered to it. According to Max Fisher: “The U.S. occasionally boosts food aid, giving North Korea an incentive to cooperate, but the regime rarely holds to its side of the deal and doesn't seem too bothered when the food aid is taken away.”⁴⁶ The ruling elite have little concern for the plight of their people, leaving few options for effectively dealing with the Kim regime. The two options are to either undermine the Kim regime, or to at least

recognize the potential of the regime and its intricate state apparatus for maintaining order within North Korean society. Undermining the regime could facilitate a state collapse that would dump its starving and impoverished population on the world. Its neighbors, South Korea, China, and Japan would no doubt bear the brunt of the humanitarian crisis. The alternative draws upon China's model of development but requires two difficult and politically unpopular realities for the United States. One is conceding to a Chinese model, the other is recognizing at least some legitimacy of the Kim regime in North Korea. Such recognition would undoubtedly be spun by the regime as a great victory and affirmation of its legitimacy. However, allowing an influx of trade and investment would expose the North Korean population to the world. Doing so would empower the people to question their government and press for more quality of life improving concessions. Increased trade requires an increase in skilled workers, which would also lead to improved schools. The Kim regime currently has no concern for the plight of its people and uses the rest of the world's concerns for human rights to its own advantage. Max Fisher stated it well in a 2012 article for *The Atlantic*, "So North Korea is using its poverty and isolation as its weapons, striking out at the world -- sometimes apparently at random -- and building up its "asymmetric capabilities" to keep its borders as militarized and tense as possible. This keeps North Koreans in, the world out, and Pyongyang's enemies focused on preventing another deadly attack."⁴⁷ This combination of tactics has proven effective for the longevity of the Kim regime, and while the rest of the world may look on in disgust, they are currently the only apparatus holding the country together and containing the human crisis to within their own borders. If the world wants to solve this human crisis without assuming the costs and responsibilities for it, they will have to recognize and concede to the North Korean ruling

elite. Otherwise it is time to remove the regime and deal with the problems head on. Current strategies do nothing more than pass the problem on to future generations who will be left with an even greater crisis. In the past, America has supported autocracies where doing so advanced its goals and continues the same practice in many areas today. While the United States has traditionally been opposed to any communist regime, that form of government has proven itself ineffective and is no longer an ideological or existential threat to democracy. In fact, much of the world has seen the merits of a liberal democratic system and is increasingly moving in that direction. It is not a new idea to support a brutal regime towards the ends of development. The United States tolerated a succession of dictators and human rights abuses in South Korea's long march towards becoming a bright spot in the world for development. The difference is that some authoritarians and their regimes are cast as enemies while others are touted as allies. The difference is almost entirely political spin. After all, enemies mean threats and threats mean political power. Programs to defend against enemies are politically expedient.

Endotes

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⁴⁵ Max Fisher, "Defying History: How Kim Jong Un Could Hold Onto Power for Decades," *The Atlantic*, August 6 (2012).

⁴⁶ Max Fisher, "Defying History: How Kim Jong Un Could Hold Onto Power for Decades," *The Atlantic*, August 6 (2012).

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Chapter V: The Problem with Military Interventions

Nations have generally avoided direct military interventions in other countries since the Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War in 1648. Hundreds of years later, globalization has made interventions relevant again. Hans Günter Brauch notes: “Both environmental impacts of military activities and of wars, and the environment as a cause or contributing factor to hazards, migration, crises and in the extreme case also to conflicts have posed ‘threats’, ‘challenges’, ‘vulnerabilities’ and ‘risks’ that have been conceptualised since the late 1980s in the context of U.S. ‘national security’ and since the 1990s increasingly also as dangers to ‘human security’.”¹ Globalized crime and terror organizations as well as various human crises brought on by famine and war cross borders and create security and stability concerns for other states. Nonintervention was built on the premise of respect for a nation’s sovereignty. Larry Diamond identified this changing trend: “Over the past two decades, however, traditional notions of sovereignty--of ‘nonintervention’ in the internal affairs of other countries--have fallen out of favor, while deliberate efforts to promote democracy have flourished.”² Instability in one region can easily spill over into neighboring countries or cross the globe and create problems. Western-style democracy is generally seen as the solution to many global issues due to its level of economic success and political stability. Many global problems have taken root in less developed former third world countries such as Somalia. Piracy around the Horn of Africa, for example, stems from lack of opportunity in Somalia and impacts many industrialized countries using shipping routes through the area. This creates a need for politicians to ‘do something’ as pressure from businesses and people impacted by the piracy increases and creates a reason to intervene in the

region's domestic affairs. Intervention typically refers to foreign military operations in the afflicted country. The United States has the power projection capability to conduct these operations globally, thereby making military intervention a politically expedient solution to global problems. Francis Fukuyama pointed out the opportunity for reform generated by a political crisis in his book *State-building: Order and governance in the 21st century*: "It often takes a crisis of one sort or another--whether external, like a war or pressure from foreign governments, or internal, like a revolution or economic collapse--to create the political conditions for major institutional reform."³ The justifications and goals of military interventions have been vague since the Vietnam War. The end-states and exit strategies for military operations are unclear and the operations become less politically popular as their length in time increases. Dean Acheson Research Professor of International Relations and Political Science Bruce Russett discussed the inability of military interventions to produce democracy in a 2004 article on the Democratic Peace Theory: "Military interventions have sometimes installed democracies by force, but they have more often failed, and the successes have been immensely expensive in lives and treasure."⁴ Still, the United States military is the only institution equipped to rapidly respond to crises anywhere in the world. Change has been happening globally at an increasing pace, however, so it is time to update national strategies to better address the demands of globalization.

More developed countries make military interventions from the outside cost-prohibitive and failing states lacking the resources to resist an invasion lack the internal mechanisms for successful transition. Alexander Downes and Jonathan Monten, reinforced such a point: "Countries that lack favorable preconditions tend to be weak, and thus the

immediate costs of toppling their regimes are low, making them tempting targets. But democracy is unlikely to take hold in these states, and the costs of intervention can grow astronomically in the wake of regime change because the conditions that hinder democratization are also those that increase the likelihood of civil war.”⁵ Such a dynamic was a factor in the post-2003 Iraq reconstruction efforts due to the decision to completely dismantle the government and remove all members of the Baath. The result was a civil war and over a decade of combat operations to stabilize the country. Alexander Downes explains how the views of policy makers that influenced the decision to embark upon a military intervention in spite of the limited chances of success: “Policymakers in democracies tend to be optimistic about the possibility of spreading democracy, but their optimism is not supported by the conclusions of most scholarly studies of forceful democracy promotion.”⁶ The problem is that militaries are designed to destroy and are much less effective as tools for creating positive change. The U. S. military is unrivaled in its capabilities and is widely viewed as a reliable institution by the American public. This makes it the preferred instrument of diplomacy, regime change, and purveyor of democracy. However, this is not the purpose for which it is organized. As Alexander Downes and Jonatan Monten explain, military interventions fail because “First, simply overthrowing foreign leaders is unlikely to enhance democracy, and may actually contribute to chaos and even civil war in target states. This is an important lesson given the rise of precision airpower and remotely piloted drone aircraft.”⁷ Airpower and drone warfare decrease the number of American lives risked in a military intervention, making it a more tempting option for policymakers. Drone warfare has proven controversial for many reasons, not the least of which is its tolerance for collateral damage and loss of civilian lives. They do however point out a scenario where military

intervention can help uphold or restore a democracy: “A second lesson is that intervention to restore democracy in recently democratic countries that have reverted to autocracy—either through a coup or foreign occupation—can succeed.”⁸ This situation does not apply to recent interventions in non-democratic countries and does not apply to Iran or North Korea. Eva Bellin elaborated on a similar point in 2004 and commented “Historical experience suggests that although military occupation may increase the likelihood of democratization, and wise policy choices certainly improve its chances, the outcome is largely shaped by factors, both domestic and international, that cannot be controlled by military engineers operating within the confines of current cultural norms and conventional limits of time and treasure.”⁹ This is a scenario that became apparent as the U.S. occupation of Iraq dragged on. The Iraqi reconstruction project is an extreme scenario that highlights the shortcomings of military intervention. It provides an excellent case study for military interventions and inspired this research into alternative strategies for aiding stability and inspiring moves towards gradual liberal democratic reforms that improve national security for the United States.

Case Study: The aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq

The 2003 invasion of Iraq provides a worst-case scenario study of how military interventions and operations can go badly. Much discussion has gone into the justifications and causes of the second invasion of Iraq. Raymond Hinnebusch, professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews provided an outsiders view of the decision to invade Iraq: “Compared with other wars, there appears to be an especially radical cleavage between the justifications for war advanced by its proponents—Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—which proved to be hollow, and the actual motives and causes.”¹⁰ The decision to invade in spite of weak justifications damaged the reputation of the United States

among the international community. Previously it had rallied a multilateral coalition to its cause in Afghanistan based on sympathies gained in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the realistic threat al-Qaeda created for much of the world.

Another view is that a small group of neoconservatives drove the United States into a prolonged conflict. According to Hinnebusch, “What went wrong from a realist point of view was that ‘extremists’ managed to capture US foreign policy and set it on a path at odds with the national interest.”¹¹ He explains the frightening lack of opposition to the invasion within the United States and noted “The view that the war was an aberration faces, however, a hard time accounting for the utter absence of opposition in Congress, the silence of the corporate world and the ease with which the public was brought to acquiesce in a war that, a short time before, had been on nobody’s agenda except for the clique Bush brought to power.”¹² The decision to invade Iraq was made in the wake of the 9/11 attacks at a time when Americans were feeling vulnerable and angry. President Bush shaped support early by including Iraq in his ‘Axis of Evil’ reference during his 2002 State of the Union address, effectively associating Iraq, Iran, and North Korea directly with the Global War on Terror. The decision to invade was made quickly and the initial combat operations were over before effective political opposition could be rallied, leaving the United States with a failed state in the Middle East to manage. Time has proven the 2003 Iraq invasion to be a complete debacle in spite of the success of the 2007-2011 troop surge (reversed by domestic politics). Pursuing a similar strategy against Iran or North Korea is unnecessary. It would be wiser to work with their current ruling institutions to more gradually and effectively instigate reform.

The aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq damaged the reputation and credibility of the United States. There have been many books and articles analyzing the decision and

justifications for the invasion, but this section focuses on the lessons learned from reconstruction efforts. It will focus on the de-Ba'athification policy that removed any and all Saddam supporters and left the country entirely without leadership. Andrew Flibbert observed: "After taking the country by force in 2003, the United States disbanded the Iraqi military, dismantled its bureaucracy, transformed its legal system, and replaced its leadership from top to bottom. The result was a brutal and multi-headed insurgency, ongoing terrorism, economic stagnation, crumbling infrastructure, rampant criminality, sectarian and ethnic polarization, and low-grade civil war."¹³ The decision, designed to remove a major source of contention in Iraq, inadvertently led to a civil war in Syria and the rise of a new terrorist group with visions of establishing a renewed Caliphate in the Middle East. The Islamic State (IS) has emerged as a new threat to U.S. national security, the democratically elected Iraqi government, and regional stability. The organization was formed from, and is led by, former leaders of the Iraqi military excluded from Iraqi reconstruction efforts. Colonel James R. Hoy Jr. argues "Failing to mobilize this manpower for positive use was a major policy mistake. In short order the U.S. could have re-assembled the Army and employed it to keep order or conduct public works projects. Bremer's 23 May decree banning the organization stripped away a key national institution that could have played an important role in stabilizing the country."¹⁴ Andrew Flibbert made a similar observation: "The short, regime-ending war in March and April 2003 was directed at Saddam Hussein and his military, but the postwar dismantling of the Iraqi state presumed the relative insignificance of state power and authority. This was both by design, in the Bush administration's decision to eliminate instruments of oppression like the Iraqi military, and by ideologically prompted inattention, in the discarding of working-level Ba'athist bureaucrats, police, and other instruments of

organized authority.”¹⁵ The de-Ba’athification program was extensive and left Iraq without a functioning bureaucracy, a void the U. S. military was not prepared to fill. The repercussions have clearly manifested themselves in the extreme turbulence of the current situation in the Middle East.

The decision to pursue de-Ba’athification was based on the reconstruction efforts in Germany following the Second World War. Colonel Hoy reiterated this point and declared “In an effort to understand this current reconstruction mission many turn to historic examples of occupation for insight. Invariably the American experience in de-Nazification is viewed as a model for success.”¹⁶ There were numerous other factors that contributed to the overall success of German reconstruction, not the least of which was Germany’s preexisting industrial and political experience combined with large influxes of foreign capital and security efforts. De-Nazification was little more than a political show at the end of the war. Furthermore, Germany had exhausted its resources and the political will of the Nazi party by the end of combat operations as explained further by Colonel Hoy: “In many ways Germany was effectively de-Nazified through the impact of five years of devastating war, six million deaths, and Hitler’s failure to provide security and prosperity. Still the success of America’s largest reconstruction effort certainly looms large as a model for our occupation effort in Iraq.”¹⁷ Ultimately, many former members of the Nazi party were allowed to return to positions within the German bureaucracy due to their competence in running the country. The process in Iraq was less forgiving, due to an exponential increase in media coverage that would likely have generated political backlash at the inclusion of Ba’ath party members and military leaders.

The process of de-Ba'athification was extensive in Iraq. According to Colonel Hoy, it even extended into the economic realm as "De facto economic de-Ba'athification tends to blacklist companies that did business with Saddam's regime, further stifling the few outlets for progress."¹⁸ Iraq was starved of its bureaucracy and income, conditions that led quickly to anarchy and civil war as millions of displaced and unemployed citizens were left without basic goods and services and no clear direction, factors that an intact bureaucracy and semi-functioning economy could have reduced. Instead, the U.S. military was left entirely in charge of maintaining order in Iraqi society. Muslim nations, like many others, are not keen to rule by foreign militaries, a reality that decreased the chances for success. Military occupation can be interpreted as imperial intentions and plays directly into the motives of rising authoritarians and warlords whose power depends directly on their ability to resist foreign occupiers. Colonel Hoy summed up the damage caused by de-Ba'athification: "With a party membership of 2 million citizens, a strict policy denies the nation the critical talents that previously allowed the country to function. The de-Ba'athification Order has crippled health services, education, and security."¹⁹ The de-Ba'athification policy was ideologically driven and ignored the realities of state-building and post-war reconstruction efforts. Much of the optimism going into Iraq was driven by the success of the reconstruction efforts in Germany and Japan following the Second World War.

The realities of both reconstruction efforts were largely ignored going into Iraq. It may be that optimism blinded policy makers and much of the American public to the true scope and difficulties faced in both scenarios. Jonathan Monten explains a key difference: "In contrast with the Japanese occupation, where the purges were narrower in scope and attempts were made to ensure a basic continuity in the state, the de-Baathification order was wider and

deeper—it applied to a broader range of government officials and at greater levels in the bureaucracy. The result severely weakened Iraqi national political institutions.”²⁰ The cases of Japan and Germany will be evaluated later in this paper, but the key difference is that their bureaucracies were left largely intact. It is a topic that lacks media appeal, but it is crucial to understand the importance of high-functioning bureaucracies as not only an instrument of stability but as a network which can reliably implement reforms. Bureaucrats know how to deliver services and provide continuity to the daily lives of citizens. Future operations ought to tap bureaucracies as a resource to implement new policies of reform.

Preemptive/preventive military overthrow of Iran or North Korea is not an option

Extensive research has gone into explaining the justifications of the 2003 Iraq invasion and plenty of discussions exists concerning whether it was right or wrong. The major lesson to take away is that such a full-scale military overthrow is an ineffective means for establishing democracy. In the case of Iraq, it actually decreased regional stability and increased Iranian and North Korean incentive to pursue asymmetric warfare capabilities and nuclear weapons as a defensive measure against invasion. The ‘Axis of Evil’ speech set back progress in the relationship between the United States and Iran and damaged what little rapport existed between the United States and North Korea at the time. Mahmood Sariolghalam put it simply: “The United States should avoid military solutions to settle its differences with Iran, as military strikes on Iran would delay rapprochement for many years to come.”²¹ The threat of a larger scale war exists with any military actions. The Asia-Pacific region is particularly sensitive to this phenomenon that hinders any military strike against North Korea. Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and Mike

Mochizuki, professor of political science at George Washington University discussed the repercussions of a strike against North Korea nuclear reactors: “Any military strike at North Korea’s nuclear reactors and plutonium reprocessing facilities at its Yongbyon site north of Pyongyang would be extremely risky in light of the possibility that a larger war would result.”²² A strike against North Korea has the potential to drag the United States into a much larger scale conflict. Military strikes are off the table as a tool of coercion against North Korea, a fact of which Pyongyang is keenly aware.

A strike against Iran would be devastating to regional stability in the Middle East. It is the last remaining stable state in a chain that stretches from Syria to Pakistan. In short, the United States needs Iran to maintain regional stability. A military strike would be a strategic misstep. Further, while Iran has dissidents and moderates, many are willing to rally behind their government when facing external threats. Military saber-rattling alienates these groups. Mahmood Sariolghalam explained the heightened difficulty associated with a direct attack against Iran and noted “Iran is not Iraq, and if the current disarray in post-Saddam Iraqi society is at all alarming, Iranians are far more prepared to defy foreign rule and are passionate about doing so.”²³ Iran’s anti-American and anti-Semitic rhetoric is of concern to many and provides adequate media fodder for anti-Iranian and pro-Israel lobbies, but is topical in nature. It serves the purpose of appealing to hard-liners and for the leadership to maintain its legitimacy since it has built much of its platform on both. Iranians understand the repercussions of war, especially against the United States, and thus seek to avoid it. Yet they are also motivated to increase their role as a regional power, which requires the expansion of military capabilities. As Mahmood Sariolghalam explained, “Careful observation of Iranian politics shows that almost all Iranians agree that violence should not be used, that

incremental change should guide all attempts at reform, and that foreign military intervention would be costly for Iran.”²⁴ Strategic patience is paramount when dealing with the Middle East, as well as their sensitivity to foreign intervention. There is no reason to tear down the political institutions Iranians have already constructed. The same holds true for North Korea’s complex bureaucracy.

Nuclear weapons, while egregious, are defensive in nature and nuclear-armed states have an interest in maintaining control of their nuclear technology and not allowing it to fall into terrorist hands. Pakistan has managed to accomplish that even if little else. Preemptive or preventive strikes against nuclear plants would only set back diplomacy, increase rivalry, and reduce future chances of liberal democratic reform. A full-scale military strike against the ruling institutions, and purges akin to de-Ba’athification in Iraq would eliminate the channels that would implement such changes. As Samuel Huntington stated in his 1968 book *Political Order in Changing Societies*, “Authority has to exist before it can be limited, and it is authority that is in scarce supply in those modernizing countries where government is at the mercy of alienated intellectuals, rambunctious colonels, and rioting students.”²⁵ His statement holds true today and is strengthened by the current state of disarray throughout the Middle East left by the invasion and failed reconstruction efforts in Iraq. A smarter approach that builds on existing institutions would net liberal democratic gains that would increase security and stability.

Endotes

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¹³ Andrew Flibbert, "The Consequences of Forced State Failure in Iraq," *Political Science Quarterly* 128, no. 1 (2013): 67.

¹⁴ Colonel James R. Hoy, Jr. "The Rise and Fall of the Renaissance Party: Implications of De-Ba'athification on Iraqi Society," (Carlisle Barracks: Army War College, 2004): 10.

¹⁵ Andrew Flibbert, "The Consequences of Forced State Failure in Iraq," *Political Science Quarterly* 128, no. 1 (2013): 68.

¹⁶ Colonel James R. Hoy, Jr. "The Rise and Fall of the Renaissance Party: Implications of De-Ba'athification on Iraqi Society," (Carlisle Barracks: Army War College, 2004): 11.

¹⁷ Colonel James R. Hoy, Jr. "The Rise and Fall of the Renaissance Party: Implications of De-Ba'athification on Iraqi Society," (Carlisle Barracks: Army War College, 2004): 9.

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²⁰ Jonathan Monten, "Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan," *Annals Of The American Academy Of Political & Social Science* 656, no. 1 (2014): 182.

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Chapter VI: Successful Democratic Transitions

The case studies of post-World War II reconstruction efforts in Japan and Germany are often used as a benchmark for success with which to measure subsequent efforts. Both were unique cases, however, in which the lessons learned do not readily translate into success for most modern cases. The failed reconstruction effort in Iraq started with optimism derived from the successful democratic transitions of Japan and Germany. Some observers claimed that surely an America with an even greater military capacity and much larger economy than what it had at the end of World War II could easily repeat a successful democratic transition in Iraq. As Eva Bellin wrote, “Democracy cannot flourish in a context of chaos, as countless cases of failed democratization from Haiti to Somalia have shown. Here, too, Iraq is sorely disadvantaged in its quest for democratization when compared to the cases of Japan and Germany.”¹ Post-invasion Iraq did not exist in the same context as Japan or Germany at the dawn of their reconstruction efforts. Japan and Germany had well-established political and bureaucratic cultures, diversified and heavily industrialized economies, and a high degree of national solidarity. As Francis Fukuyama stated, “Both Germany and Japan were both very strong bureaucratic states long before the United States defeated them; indeed, it was the strength of their states that led them to be great powers and threats to the international system in the first place.”² The reconstruction efforts in Japan and Germany were exactly that, reconstruction. Both states were rebuilt on a foundation of existing institutions that were used to implement democratic reforms.

The total costs of Japanese and German reconstructions were reduced by their preexisting state structures. According to a 2006 Congressional Research Service report, “Total U.S. assistance to Iraq thus far is roughly equivalent to total assistance (adjusted for

inflation) provided to Germany — and almost double that provided to Japan — from 1946-1952.”³ The costs of the first three years of Iraqi reconstruction already significantly outpaced the costs of rebuilding Japan and Germany. Twelve years later the country is still unstable and significantly lacks the power, structure, and resources it once had under Saddam Hussein, which still remained far behind that of Japan or Germany in the first half of the twentieth Century. So in 2003 the United States removed a dictator believed to be stockpiling WMDs, purged all of his supporters and subsequently the bureaucratic know-how of the Iraqi state, and tried to establish democracy in an already fractured country with no history of national unity or democratic governance.

Another important point is the expectations of reconstruction. The same 2006 report singled out this fact: “Countries today have much higher expectations of what the United States should contribute to reconstruction in Iraq relative to what was expected following World War II.”⁴ Japan and Germany were defeated at the end of the largest scale conflict the world has experienced. Their resources and national will were exhausted and both readily accepted the terms of defeat. Their populations expected the reconstruction efforts that followed and did not resist the occupying militaries at the end of the war. Both Japan and Germany had the national strength to invade, defeat, and dominate large swaths of territory while Iraq in 2003 struggle to mount a semblance of self-defense. Iraq had exhausted its military capacity fighting Iran in the 1980s and with its defeat in the first Gulf War followed by a decade of enforced no-fly zones and sanctions.

In fact, it was Iraq’s lack of military capacity and national strength that led Saddam to pursue WMDs in the first place. He no longer had the conventional forces to defend himself or impose his will on neighboring states. Japan and Germany, although defeated, had retained

a sense of nationalism and much of their political and industrial experience. Both had strong foundations on which to rebuild. Eva Bellin summed up the difference: “In short, both Japan and Germany had crucial political institutions, practices, and habits of mind to call upon when building their new democracies in the postwar period. The same cannot be said of Iraq.”⁵ The existing Iraqi state was loosely stitched together and administered by the British at the end of World War I. It lacked the long history and unified national identity that existed for centuries in Japan and for close to a century in Germany where a unified state was formed because the many microstates already shared a similar identity, history, culture, and language. Much the opposite is true of Iraq where a tribal culture divided along ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural lines exists. The governments of Japan and Germany signed formal declarations of defeat to end World War II. “And although the war devastated much of the physical capital in both countries, Japan and Germany retained the human, organizational, and social capital (that is, skilled workers, skilled managers, and social networks) that is the lynchpin of economic development,”⁶ according to Eva Bellin. Saddam Hussein and much of his Ba’ath supporters either hid or fled Iraq during the 2003 invasion, leaving the country leaderless. The anarchy created a vacuum that left Iraq wide open for insurgency at a time when groups such as al-Qaeda were desperate for a new battleground on which to fight the United States. The power vacuum combined with the scope of development and state-building required by the Iraqi state, and the insurgency supported by outside forces left the United States in a difficult position. The Bush administration had conducted the invasion of Iraq on the premise of stopping Saddam Hussein from acquiring and using WMDs, an objective achieved in short-order, but resulted in human crisis and state

failure. Democracy, as explained by Bruce Russett, became the Bush administration's answer to resolving the crisis:

Certainly their postwar policy was built on the principle that the former German and Japanese governments could never have been peaceful, and that democratization of their systems was essential. To this end they devoted enormous material and intellectual resources (for Germany alone more than an order of magnitude in dollars than any subsequent effort). Their success served as an example to those in the Bush administration who hoped to achieve a similar result in Iraq.⁷

The fact that the Iraqi government disintegrated under the U.S. invasion left responsibility for its reconstruction, due to the largely unilateral decision to invade, almost entirely on the United States. Optimism generated from the successes of Japan and Germany made any reconstruction effort an afterthought to invasion planners. Reconstruction planning may have been simplified in their thinking as something that simply required a large application of money and resources, a task the most powerful country in the world could relatively easily manage. The reality is that state-building is much more difficult to achieve and that Japan and Germany are poor examples because they were already well-developed states before any reconstruction efforts took place. More modern state-building enterprises tend to take place in poorly developed, weak, or failed states that lack the necessary ingredients for success. Those states that are candidates for liberal democracy already have well-established and legitimate governments typically with strong militaries capable of engaging in the kind of prolonged warfare between states that is unacceptable to the international community. The lessons learned from the following case studies of Japan and Germany show that certain levels of institutional development are necessary before any truly liberal democracy can be established. Even the United States was formed by people with an established pattern of unity, education, economic development, written law, and cooperation.

Case Study: Reconstruction of Japan

Japan's successful reconstruction was largely a result of its prior level of development. The reconstruction of Japan started after its formal surrender aboard the USS *Missouri* in the summer of 1945. General Douglas MacArthur was given unilateral authority to conduct the reconstruction efforts. The Japanese mainland had been heavily bombed during the war but much of its government infrastructure remained intact. MacArthur sought to use the existing infrastructure to implement reforms and reconstruction projects. Many of the ideas on state authority and how to use it were influenced by Great Depression-era thinking in the United States according to Jonathan Monten: "New Deal ideas about state-building also heavily influenced the U.S. democratization agenda in Japan. At both the planning and implementation stages, U.S. officials sought to use the power of the state to advance democratic reform."⁸ These ideas were possible only because the Japanese state had preexisting institutions capable of governing. It also maintained legitimacy, largely due to the decision to keep Emperor Hirohito in place while limiting his power. He served as a figurehead of the Japanese people and gave credibility to reforms and programs implemented by MacArthur. According to Christopher Coyne, "[J]apan had a highly industrialized economy with the requisite knowledge of the relevant production, organizational, and management techniques."⁹ This knowledge meant that what Japan really needed to rebuild were an influx of resources, most of which had been exhausted by the war effort. Democracy and land reform were imposed as a means to preventing the Japanese from another attempt at imperial expansion.

By 1945 Japan already had a centuries-old history. It was a culturally homogenous island nation. Although it had initially rejected modernization after its early encounters with

the west, it eventually saw the need to modernize or be conquered by outsiders and embarked upon a rapid modernization effort that in itself could serve as a case study in modern state-building. This period, known as the Meiji Restoration, began in 1868 and both restored the emperor of Japan and modernized Japan into an industrial state. During this period Japan emerged from the old shogunate system into a state with modern institutions, bureaucracies, and industrial capability. These same reforms allowed Japan to become the imperial power it was during the war as well as allowed for its rapid return as a modern developed state and powerful industrial economy following its defeat. According to Jonathan Monten, General MacArthur used this to his advantage during the reconstruction period:

From the Meiji period in the nineteenth century onward, Japan systematically acquired the attributes of the modern, European state. In particular, Japan built a highly effective national bureaucracy, led by an efficient, nonpartisan, professional class of civil servants. The United States allowed this state apparatus to continue relatively unchanged, exemplified by the decision to allow the emperor to remain as the nominal head of state.¹⁰

The Japanese government already had a long established legitimacy among the people, and this legitimacy remained after the war in spite of their defeat. MacArthur was able to use this legitimacy to conduct the reconstruction effort and implement democratic reforms relatively unopposed.

A modern industrial economy and well-established bureaucracy were not the only advantages the Japanese had in 1945 over Iraq in 2003. According to Christopher Coyne, “Another important characteristic of Japanese society was the existence of a shared national identity.”¹¹ Japan is culturally and ethnically homogenous. Minority groups comprise an extremely small portion of the population and the Japanese language is strongly consistent throughout its borders. Furthermore, Japanese culture stresses conformity and emphasized the dynamic of the group over the will of the individual. All of this gives the Japanese a sort

of unity of purpose that has enabled them throughout history to achieve radical transformations over short periods of time. General MacArthur was able to use this to his advantage when initiating changes through the existing structures.

The United States faced a dilemma when determining how to manage a defeated Japan. The Japanese had provoked the United States to war with their horrific attack against the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on 7 December 1941. The war effort against Japan included the internment of Japanese-Americans, as well as a massive anti-Japanese propaganda campaign. Anti-Japanese sentiment was high and the U. S. government had to consider whether to punish Japanese leaders responsible for the war or to leave them in place and expedite the rebuilding of the country. Jonathan Monten discussed this balance in his book: “[T]he U.S. occupation sought to purge the government of individuals associated with the previous ruling regime, but not in a way that would risk weakening the underlying administrative capacity of the Japanese state.”¹² One of the most important figureheads in Japanese politics was also one of the most hated outside of Japan. Emperor Hirohito, and his fate, was the topic of debate among the war victors. General MacArthur recognized his importance as noted by Christopher Coyne: “In a series of reports from MacArthur to policymakers in the United States, the general noted the importance of the institution of the emperor for the maintenance of social order.”¹³ It was a bold and unpopular move that greatly increased the effectiveness and speed of the reconstruction effort. According to Christopher Coyne, “In other words, the emperor was able to reduce the transaction costs associated with solving the coordination problem of shifting from the pre-war order to the new postwar order.”¹⁴ MacArthur was able to achieve “buy-in” from the Japanese population by issuing orders through the emperor because, according to James Dobbins, “Despite the

economic and humanitarian crisis that resulted from the war, the emperor still enjoyed the support of the vast majority of Japanese. The bureaucracy, the Diet (Japan's parliament), and the cabinet were intact, functioning, and prepared to cooperate."¹⁵ This proved to be a crucial element of reconstruction that minimized the time, effort, and costs on the part of the United States and ultimately led to Japan's rise as a democracy. The successful reconstruction helped Japan become one of the United States' top trading partners and a key element of the Asia-Pacific security strategy. Had the Emperor been subjected to punishment or execution, instead of simply having his executive power limited, the Pacific theater might look quite different today.

Lessons Learned

There are important lessons to be learned from the occupation of Japan; many of the lessons were not applied to Iraq. Jonathan Monten discussed the indecision to form a formal occupation authority: "In contrast with the Japanese occupation, Bush administration decision-makers also, at least initially, rejected the idea of creating a formal occupation authority that would wield sovereignty in Iraq, and instead formed the ORHA under a retired general, Jay Garner."¹⁶ The ORHA he refers to is the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. The decision may have been influenced by a desire to avoid imperial connotations and avoid appearing as conquerors to the Iraqi population. This makes sense because Iraq had never actually attacked the United States and there was not a prolonged war effort. The problem with ORHA, as Jonathan Monten stated, is that it did not wield sovereignty in Iraq. This created a problem when coupled with the decision to purge Iraq of Ba'ath Party members. As explained earlier and discussed by Jonathan Monten, "A key factor in the success of the Japanese case was the U.S. choice to preserve the

bureaucratic capacity of the Japanese state, limit the purge of individuals who were associated with prewar nationalism but nonetheless held critical institutional knowledge, and channel state power toward promoting social and economic reform.”¹⁷ The purging of Ba’ath Party members in Iraq left the country in a state of anarchy. Many military leaders, who could have been used to rebuild Iraqi security forces and fight or even prevent the insurgency, fled the country and aided in the formation of the Islamic State militant group that now plagues the region. Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath Party, no matter how antagonistic, were the only institution holding the fragile country together prior to the invasion.

In viewing the success of the Japanese occupation and the failure of the Iraqi occupation, one may make the conclusion that reforming government institutions and improving development is a better method for spreading liberal democracy. As Christopher Coyne noted, “If citizens do not view constructed, or reconstructed, institutions as being credible, they will fail to make the investment necessary to make such institutions self-enforcing over time.”¹⁸ This was exactly the case in Iraq. Many Iraqis celebrated the initial ouster of Saddam but soon changed their tone when the realities of the anarchy caused by the inadequate planning by the United States set in. The ensuing insurgency fed off dissatisfaction over the failure of basic public services and goods as well as the Muslim disdain for foreign occupiers in their homelands.

Anti-Saddam sentiment in the United States developed over a decade of belligerence and anti-U.S. rhetoric from Saddam. His claims of having WMDs and refusal to work with United Nations weapons inspectors at a time when Americans were feeling vulnerable made him an easy target of retribution. A similar, yet much more well-founded, sentiment in the

United States was generated by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as explained by James Dobbins, “Because of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the perceived ferocity of the subsequent war in the Pacific, there was substantial anti-Japanese sentiment among the U.S. public, particularly toward the emperor.”¹⁹ Overcoming negative sentiments toward unpopular figureheads is one of the great challenges facing future democratizing efforts. Figureheads such as Khamenei and Kim Jong-Un serve as a focal point of rage for outsiders but also serve as a unifying force within their own constituencies. It will take great political savvy to reduce their power while retaining them, along with others, as important figureheads and perhaps allowing them to be branded as champions of reform. More important are the state bureaucracies, especially in Iran and North Korea where they are reasonably developed. As Jonathan Monten pointed out from the occupation of Japan, “Instead of dismantling the Japanese state, the occupation preserved and channeled it toward a series of social and economic reforms designed to promote a wider distribution of wealth, an expanded middle class, and greater social pluralism. These policies all created the conditions for sustainable liberal democracy in Japan once sovereignty was transferred to an elected government.”²⁰ The Japanese example can be applied to a culturally and ethnically homogenous state such as North Korea with a strong central government, although, many other factors present in Japan prior to its reconstruction are not present in North Korea. It still, however, has some industrial capacity and knowledge to build upon. The key is to develop those capacities in advance of any reform or regime change.

The presence of U.S. troops is another issue associated with occupations that creates aggravation among the occupied. James Dobbins wrote about MacArthur’s sensitivity to this issue and how it led to the decision to withdraw troops from Japan: “MacArthur and the DOS

had been calling for a peace treaty since 1949 because they believed that the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japanese towns and cities served as an irritant rather than a force for stability.”²¹ Using U.S. troops to occupy Iran or North Korea, both with long histories of strong anti-American sentiment, simply will not work. It would give cause to potential insurgents who would sabotage any operations to gain power and tarnish the reputation of the United States. The reconstruction efforts in Iraq proved this to be a powerful force that is extremely difficult to overcome. It would be much easier to coerce states into reforms without applying such irritants.

In the end, the occupation of Japan was successful due to two primary factors; the strength of preexisting institutions, and the decision to tap those institutions. James Dobbins explained the phenomenon, “Despite the absence of a long democratic history and the existence of an authoritarian culture, nation-building in Japan was successful. The speed and relative ease of the Japanese transformation had two primary causes: the U.S. decision to co-opt Japanese institutions and the unilateral process of nation-building.”²² Unilateralism worked in the case of Japan because MacArthur was able to use the Japanese government and because the population as a whole was ready to accept their defeat and the consequences of that defeat. However, it was not without drawbacks as James Dobbins explains, “[T]he decision to absolve the emperor in whose name the war was fought of all responsibility leaves the Japanese today somewhat less reconciled with their history, less ready to admit their war guilt, and consequently less reconciled with their neighbors than are the Germans.”²³ Tensions remain in the Asia-Pacific over the war. The Japanese did considerable damage to the surrounding countries that remain a source of nationalistic contention between Japan and the territories they conquered during the war, whereas the outcome in Germany

was quite different. Germany is fully integrated into European society and is well-reconciled with its neighbors. The next section discusses the drastically different style of reconstruction that took place in Germany following their official defeat at the end of World War II.

Case Study: Reconstruction of Germany

The occupation of Germany was much different from Japan. It was a multilateral effort that left the country divided between East and West for decades; however, its ultimate success can also be attributed to its prior levels of development. The multilateral effort had innate complications due to the difficulty of reconciling the differing objectives of the occupiers. Christopher Coyne explained that “In contrast to the case of Japan, where MacArthur had unilateral control of the occupation, agreement between the various Allied countries was required for designing and implementing broad and general policies that affected all zones in Germany.”²⁴ Reaching a consensus between states is a complicated process. Each had been impacted differently by the war. France had been occupied and controlled by the Nazis, Great Britain had been heavily bombed by the Luftwaffe, and the United States had entered the European theater of war to aid its allies and suffered little damage to the homeland by the Nazis. Pressure to counter increasing pressure from a Soviet Union with motives very different from those of the western allies was also a major factor that influenced the reconstruction effort.

Germany quickly became central to the Cold War standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, like Japan, Germany had preexisting institutions that provided a solid foundation for state-building and democratization. Christopher Coyne further explained, “Germany was an industrialized country with well-developed economic, social, and political institutions that had evolved prior to both World War II and the Allied

occupation of the country.”²⁵ These institutions were used in West Germany to build a democracy while East Germany was relegated to being a Soviet client state. Also like the Japanese, the Germans had been thoroughly defeated in the war and its citizens were accepting of their fate at the hands of their occupiers.

Economic recovery and democratization became a top priority throughout Western Europe as a way to counter Soviet expansion. Then Secretary of State George C. Marshall came up with a plan to boost western European recovery using a large influx of aid from the United States. West Germany was the focal point of his plan, but it eventually encompassed most of Western Europe as well. The war devastated Germany and left much of its population jobless, homeless, and starving. Therefore, much of the aid targeted meeting basic human needs, as the 2006 congressional report explained: “The entire amount of Marshall Plan aid is usually considered economic reconstruction funding, even though much of the aid provided, in the first year particularly, was foodstuff to feed workers whose productivity was compromised by malnourishment. (The severe winter of 1946-1947 in Europe made hunger a greater problem at that point than it was right at the end of the war and made apparent the need for increased food and other assistance.)”²⁶ West Germany was vulnerable, and although the Soviet Union had been an ally and essential factor in defeating the Nazis, the Soviets used the opportunity to expand and establish buffer states. Tensions quickly escalated into the Cold War once the common enemy had been defeated. The Communist threat lent urgency and credibility to reconstruction plans. The reconstruction of Western Europe and Germany was the beginning of the decades-long showdown between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Lessons Learned

The severity of the war in Europe, the scope of its impact, the totality of the Germans defeat, and mounting tensions between the Western allies and the Soviet Union generated a powerful urgency to the reconstruction effort. The keys to its success, however, were the Germans' political organization and their well-established economic and industrial experience. As Christopher Coyne explained, "Similar to the circumstances in Japan, in spite of the fact that the war had caused physical destruction to much of the infrastructure of the country, the existing endowment of skills, knowledge, and the art of association was conducive to the establishment of liberal democratic institutions in the postwar period."²⁷

The key to the Marshall Plan was providing the Germans with food and raw materials that they then used to rebuild their own country. There was no insurgency in Germany, in spite of the differing outside influences of their occupiers. German citizens all had a stake in the success of their country. Germany also had an established tradition of democracy, Hitler was elected after all. Iraqi citizens tried to rebuild but were easily divided along tribal and religious lines. The Iraqis were much more vulnerable to outside influencers such as Iran and al-Qaeda than the Germans in 1945 were to the Soviet Union, United States, France, and Great Britain. The fact that the Germans were able to conquer much of Europe is a testament to their level of political organization and industrial development. Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, was barely holding the Iraqi state together. It quickly fractured under pressures of invasion. Much of the success of the German reconstruction can be credited to its citizens according to Christopher Coyne, "Although a military government was established, occupiers largely relied on indigenous citizens and grassroots support for democracy and self-government, by utilizing existing institutions, occupiers were able to overcome the problems

associated with achieving credibility.”²⁸ The ability and willingness of Iraqi citizens to quickly organize into a democracy was grossly overestimated. They lacked the established capacity to do so in spite of their willingness to participate in the election process.

Liberal democracy is the direction much of the world is already moving. Trying to force it through military campaigns will only set it back. As Christopher Coyne wrote, “Indeed, the German reconstruction should be seen less as an exercise in imposing liberal institutions and more as an exercise in overseeing emergent indigenous institutions of self-government.”²⁹ The reconstruction effort would never have succeeded if Germany were not already a well-developed country with a unified population who identified with German nationality. Any country exhibiting such factors in this day is not likely to be targeted unless they become aggressive. Iraq displayed aggression against Iran in the 1980s and Kuwait in the early 1990s, but after a decade of war with Iran and a crushing defeat by the United States in the first Gulf War, Iraq no longer had the capacity to engage in such aggression. Saddam Hussein’s WMD feint was designed to keep himself in power and it backfired. Iraq in 2003 was nowhere near the level of development in Germany in 1945. That combined with the decision to remove what state-forming capacity it had through de-Ba’athification, and the invasion happening at a time when America was at war with al-Qaeda, doomed the reconstruction of Iraq to failure. It is easy to infer from the victory over an enemy such as the Nazis that no future task is too big for the United States, but this simply is not true. As Christopher Coyne pointed out, “In short, even if aid was indeed a major factor in the successful reconstruction of West Germany, that success does not imply that injecting aid into weak, failed, and war-torn states will generate a similar outcome, because the existing

endowment of skills, culture, and knowhow will vary across cases.”³⁰ This is a crucial lesson for policy makers to understand before getting into another Iraq-like situation.

Conclusion

Both Germany and Japan were rebuilt under similar circumstances. Both had well-developed institutions that allowed them to become global powers in the first place. Reconstruction was a matter of tapping into those institutions while reforming them so that neither country would attempt regional conquest again while allowing both to become industrial leaders in the free world. The other is that the circumstances of the war and the totality of their defeat were extreme. Both were an existential threat to many states throughout the world and therefore had to be defeated for survival. Expectations of the victors were quite different due to circumstances as well, as stated in a 2006 Congressional report, “Germany and Japan had both declared war on the United States and during at least the first year after World War II, U.S. policymakers were inclined to provide only a survival level of food and other assistance to its defeated enemies in order to avert starvation and prevent massive outbreaks of disease.”³¹ Iraq up until 2003 was merely a nuisance to the region. The country lacked the cohesion and capacity to dominate the Middle East. An important lesson learned from this case study is that the strength and capability of a state’s bureaucracy is an important metric for its potential for reform. As Francis Fukuyama stated in his book, “A critical issue facing poor countries that blocks their possibilities for economic development is their inadequate level of institutional development. They do not need extensive states, but they do need strong and effective ones within the limited scope of necessary state functions.”³² Iraq was a weak state that was reduced further through the de-Ba’athification policy, and the reconstruction of the state was more of an afterthought to the

invasion. Furthermore, the war was short-lived and did not initially lead to the prolonged suffering of the Iraqi people. Another point that was identified in the 2006 Congressional report was that “Democracy-building became the primary objective of U.S. assistance to Iraq very early in the occupation, as no caches of biological and chemical weapons were found. Unlike the cases of Germany and Japan, there was no massive humanitarian crisis requiring aid in Iraq.”³³ Instead, aid programs focused on providing security and building state capacity almost entirely from nothing. This added to the sense of imperialism felt by the Iraqi people against the United States, an important factor that was used by insurgent leaders to further destabilize the already fragile country. Future stability and security efforts ought to focus on increasing development and expanding state capacity where it is inadequate. Globalization has brought many positive changes to the world but states are now threatened more by international crime, corruption, and terrorism than they are by the expansionist goals of neighboring states. It will take organized governments with enforcement capabilities and the legitimacy of their constituent populations to control instability and human suffering brought on by the negative effects of globalization.

Endotes

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² Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Order and Governance in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004): 38.

³ Nina Serafino, Curt Tarnoff, and Dick K. Nanto, "U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany, and Japan Compared," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006): iii.

⁴ Nina Serafino, Curt Tarnoff, and Dick K. Nanto, "U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany, and Japan Compared," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006): iii.

⁵ Eva Bellin, "The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 4 (2004): 600.

⁶ Eva Bellin, "The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 4 (2004): 596.

⁷ Bruce Russett, "Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace," *International Studies Perspectives* 6, no. 4 (2005): 398.

⁸ Jonathan Monten, "Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan," *Annals Of The American Academy Of Political & Social Science* 656, no. 1 (2014): 187.

Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008): 119.

¹⁰ Jonathan Monten, "Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan," *Annals Of The American Academy Of Political & Social Science* 656, no. 1 (2014): 178.

¹¹ Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008): 120.

¹² Jonathan Monten, "Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan," *Annals Of The American Academy Of Political & Social Science* 656, no. 1 (2014): 179.

¹³ Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008): 121

¹⁴ Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008): 121.

¹⁵ James Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation-Building: from Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003): 27.

¹⁶ Jonathan Monten, "Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan," *Annals Of The American Academy Of Political & Social Science* 656, no. 1 (2014): 181.

¹⁷ Jonathan Monten, "Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan," *Annals Of The American Academy Of Political & Social Science* 656, no. 1 (2014): 188.

¹⁸ Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008): 123.

¹⁹ James Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation-Building: from Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003): 27.

²⁰ Jonathan Monten, "Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan," *Annals Of The American Academy Of Political & Social Science* 656, no. 1 (2014): 187.

²¹ James Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation-Building: from Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003): 35.

²² James Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation-Building: from Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003): 52.

²³ James Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation-Building: from Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003): 53.

²⁴ Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008): 132.

²⁵ Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008): 127.

²⁶ Nina Serafino, Curt Tarnoff, and Dick K. Nanto, "U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany, and Japan Compared," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006): 4.

²⁷ Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008): 127.

²⁸ Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008): 130.

²⁹ Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008): 131.

³⁰ Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008): 134.

³¹ Nina Serafino, Curt Tarnoff, and Dick K. Nanto, “U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany, and Japan Compared,” *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006): 2.

³² Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Order and Governance in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004): 120.

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Chapter VII: The Long Game Of Gradual Reform

The reconstructions of Japan and Germany took place under extreme circumstances at the end of the largest war in history. The international system has developed controls to help prevent such an outbreak in the future. The specific conditions that existed in post-World War II Japan and Germany are unlikely to be repeated. Instead a much more gradual change is more palatable to an international community that prefers stability. This chapter focuses on the case studies of South Korea and China and their long road of gradual reforms. South Korea emerged from a very poorly developed nation to one of the leading economies and a flourishing democracy. China, while still far from democratic, has made strides to improve the lives of its citizens and emerged as an industrial power and one of the leading trading partners of the United States. The roads to development for either country have not been smooth but nonetheless have been much less of a shock to the international system than previous case studies.

It is easy to attribute the success of both South Korea and China's stability and legitimacy to their economic success. This is not the whole story. As Aurel Croissant, Professor of Political Science at Ruprecht-Karls-University and Professor Stefan Wurster at the University of Trier stated, "The assumption that good performance does not protect against regime failure is supported by the fact that even economically successful autocracies, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and Chile, experienced regime crisis and a transition to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s."¹ The case study of South Korea provides an example of separately developing economic capacity and forming a democratic society. Basically, the justifications for government actions and policies were routinely called into question as the country developed. Eun Mee Kim, Professor at Ewha Woman's University, South Korea,

explained it well: “The paradox of East Asian development is that the state is forced to reevaluate its *raison d’être* upon its success in attaining economic growth.”² In other words, the state can use economic growth as justification for its authoritarian policies but is forced to reconsider those policies once a certain measure of growth is attained. The other side to that point is that economic growth lends credibility and legitimacy to the state, but that legitimacy can fail if growth stagnates. In contrast, legitimacy in a democracy is based on obtaining the consent of the governed. What happened in South Korea was interesting in that the developmental state became less relevant once certain levels of development were achieved. According to Eun Mee Kim, “The paradox of South Korean development was that the state was forced to reevaluate its *raison d’être* and to curtail its functions as it successfully attained the goal of development.”³ South Korea developed in the context of a Cold War battleground between the United States and Soviet Union. Economic and democratic developments were heavily aided by the United States. Communism, on the other hand, took root in China and blended fairly well with China’s long history of authoritarianism. The country endured failed policies until economic reforms set it on its current path of rapid growth. Its potential as a democracy remains to be seen, but economic reforms have improved the quality of life for its citizens and allowed it to become one of the most important economic powers in the world. Access to its population of billions, cheap manufacturing capacity, and now its enormous market are crucial to the global economy. The opening of China’s markets has brought global exposure to its citizens, increased education opportunities, and drastically increased the global engagement of the once isolated country. The following case studies of South Korea and China evaluate the development of each into stable states and drivers of the global economy.

Case Study: Modernizing South Korea

South Korea followed a long struggle to modernize into one of the world's leading economies and into a flourishing democracy. It endured war and dictatorships to develop into what it is today. As Gregg Brazinsky put it, "Of the numerous places where nation building was attempted, South Korea was one of the few to emerge as a wealthy democracy at the end of the twentieth century."⁴ South Korea was a major recipient of U. S. development assistance and military protection beginning at the end of World War II and the Japanese occupation and lasting throughout the Cold War. Ultimately, however, it was the will and determination of the Korean people spurred on by competition with the threatening DPRK and their regional rivals in Japan. It is easy to attribute its success to its circumstances and the amount of aid received, but ultimately its success was due to the desire of its people to form a strong nation. Three primary groups of influence emerged in South Korea's struggle for development according to Eun Mee Kim: "Examination of the South Korean case helped identify and explain the roles of three main actors in development: the state, capitalists, and labor."⁵ The three groups repeatedly found themselves in conflict, which was sometimes violent. It also served as a sort of interim for balance of power politics within the state. Early on the state had the advantage and often brutally cracked down on protests and political dissidence. The state also collaborated with capitalists, primarily large business conglomerates known as the *chaebol*, to whom the state channeled much of the foreign aid to spur economic growth. The state also kept labor cheap to develop an export-based economy of cheap finished goods. Labor eventually was able to organize and fight for reforms to improve wages and working conditions. The state and the capitalists brought economic reform, while labor formed the foundations for democracy.

South Korea's development started from almost nothing. It was an impoverished vassal state of Japan that developed into a culturally vibrant, politically active, and economically powerful nation. Eun Mee Kim, Pil Ho Kim, and Jinkyung Kim, identified the relevance of South Korea's development: "Broadly speaking, South Korea's development can be relevant for countries faced with the triple challenge of extreme poverty, lack of democratic governance, and fragile security."⁶ All three are problem areas in regions considered threats to global stability. Unfortunately, many of these areas lack the national will the South Koreans had throughout their development.

The early authoritarian regimes of South Korea were tolerated by the United States because they were viewed as more stable and capable of resisting the aggression of North Korea. Chung-Sok Suh and Seung-Ho Kwon characterized the attitude of the international community during the Cold War toward South Korea: "During the Cold War era, the international environment favoured the Korean developmental state because the prosperity of Korea in particular was important to the United States."⁷ North Korea was heavily supported by the Soviet Union, which in turn led to a developmental race on the Korean Peninsula that influenced decisions and attitudes regarding South Korea. Gregg Brazinsky identified the underlying belief of U.S. planners and noted "U.S. officials believed that, by providing the right kinds of resources, they could stimulate economic development and democratization in regions where neither of these phenomena had made significant inroads"⁸ The success of South Korea has proven difficult to replicate in other regions. One of the contributing factors to its success was the persistence of engagement by the United States who refused to ostracize the emerging state due to its strategic importance. The threat of takeover by Communist North Korea prevented the United States from upsetting the fragile stability in

the South. As Chung-Sok Suh and Seung-Ho Kwon stated, “Internally, the division of the country between the communist north and capitalist south gave legitimacy to the military dictatorship in the south.”⁹ The South Korean dictators were anti-communists and pro-capitalists, which were the reasons they were tolerated in spite of their brutal treatment of citizens.

South Korea had a long and difficult road to development. Their path included a full-scale invasion from North Korea. Leadership changes did not happen smoothly and at times were conducted using assassinations and coups. The country, however, remained focused on achieving development. Its people were determined to build a country that could gain international respect and rival its neighbors in Japan. Internally, its people had many conflicting views as to how the country should move forward. The conflicting views of the population became a major driver of reform in the later decades of South Korea’s development. Chung-Sok Suh and Seung-Ho Kwon explained it well:

In response to environmental changes and external shocks, successive Korean governments have adopted neoliberal and welfare policies selectively while retaining developmental capacities and trajectories. This coexistence of policies that reflect alternative market economic systems was not a confused adoption of conflicting policies; rather, it was a deliberate choice of the government, which deployed a flexible policy mix in responding to changes in the environment and hence contributed to continuing growth and development over the past 20 years.¹⁰

An important point to remember is that the United States acted as a security guarantor for South Korea.

With the United States providing the bulk of its international security, the South Koreans were able to focus on domestic issues. South Korea developed under unique circumstances. According to Eun Mee Kim, Pil Ho Kim, and Jinkyung Kim, “As a matter of fact, the domestic political context in which developing countries find themselves is quite

different from that of South Korea in the twentieth century. In the post-Cold War world, where authoritarianism is not seen as an alternative, but an utterly immoral system of government, it would be extremely difficult for governments to openly pursue such hard authoritarian policies as South Korea did during the Cold War era.”¹¹ South Korea’s model of authoritarian development is not ideal for today’s world, but there are still many relevant points that can be applied to current development efforts. One is to encourage domestic involvement in the development of the government while focusing aid efforts on foundational institutions such as education and industry. The United States also helped build the military and a free press, two institutions who often found themselves at odds but nonetheless played vital roles in building the country. The key takeaway is continuous engagement in spite of setbacks is crucial when promoting development towards liberalization and democracy. The United States was often protested as a villain and puppeteer in South Korea, and not always liked by South Korean leadership, but continued sending development aid and providing military assistance due to the security threat of North Korea.

Case Study: China’s Modernization

The People’s Republic of China presents an interesting alternative case study for development and security. It is a communist country that has become one of the leading trading partners of the United States. It is essential to the U.S. economy yet has committed human rights violations such as restrictions on speech, the holding of political prisoners, and brutal crackdowns against protesters. U.S.-Sino relations improved drastically after President Nixon’s 1972 visit to China. Hongyi Lai, professor at the University of Nottingham, United Kingdom, summarized this phenomenon: “Since the late 1970s, with firm support initially

from Deng Xiaoping and later his successors, China has decisively opened up its closed economy and steadily integrated with the world market.”¹² This process fueled China’s rapid growth as well as increased its connections with the rest of the globe. The focus of China’s government shifted as well, according to Hongyi Lai: “Under the reformist leadership, the bureaucracy and the Party apparatus have been transformed from ones that were suited to political control and ideological indoctrination to ones that maintain stability, encourage rapid economic growth and deliver decent macro-economic management.”¹³ The result has been beneficial, and while social reform has not happened in China to an extent more palatable to Americans, it is improving.

The increased economic performance of China has improved the quality of life for its citizens and increased their demands for reforms but not necessarily their demands for democracy. According to Jinghai Zheng, Professor at Harbin Engineering University, and Liming Wang, Professor of Haiju at Beijing University of Technology: “Long-standing issues such as excessive reliance on the state to provide public goods and the omnipresent government control of resource industries are largely consistent with China’s record of civilization state development in various ancient dynasties.”¹⁴ Similarly to South Korea, China has followed a path of pro-growth authoritarianism that has allowed its economy to thrive while maintaining state control. According to Lai, “A single-minded pursuit of high growth and refusal to open up the political system are interlocked core features of pro-growth authoritarianism.”¹⁵ This was the case in South Korea, which existed under a much different security threat than China. China has no direct rival poised to conquer its landmass or its extensive population.

It could be that the state has established legitimacy by connecting itself to economic growth, but also may run deeper into the roots of Chinese culture, history, and Confucianism. An important point is made by Weiyang Zhang, Professor of Economics at the National School of Development, Peking University, “The idea market in China is underdeveloped and heavily restricted because of the monopoly of the Communist ideologies. Nevertheless, Chinese economists and scholars in other social sciences have played important roles in the production of new ideas for the reform movement.”¹⁶ Government restrictions have slowed the development of reformist ideas and prevented a buildup of momentum by political reform movements. Regardless of government restrictions, democracy does not have a positive history in China with the corrupt Chiang Kai-Shek government having been routed by Communist forces and exiled to Taiwan. Economic reform may provide a “back door” for liberalization and democracy and has at least has opened up communications and dependency between states as well as become a common ground for diplomacy to prevail in spite of conflicting nationalist objectives of regional powers and the United States in the Asia-Pacific.

Trade relations have been crucial to China’s development and it has assumed a major role as a regional power and driver of the Asia-Pacific economy. The advancement of China and South Korea have become intertwined, with China passing the United States as South Korea’s largest trading partner. According to David Shambaugh: “In 2001, China became South Korea’s largest trading partner, surpassing the United States; South Korea is China’s third-largest trade partner.”¹⁷ As a result, the United States has experienced a relative loss of influence in the region.

Is it wrong for being different from our system?

The big questions concerning China is whether or not their system of government is socially acceptable to the international community, and is it a threat? Like any system it has its dissidents, however, its legitimacy is largely unquestioned by the Chinese population. Understanding Chinese cultural background may explain their views on government. Jinghai Zheng and Liming Wang summarize some key differences between western and eastern processes and comment “While religion, capitalism, and national identity underpinned the establishment of Western modern democratic institutions, Confucian values, rights to property, and ancestry worship formed the basic values underpinning establishment of the Chinese civilization state.”¹⁸ The differing basis of thought influences their views on the legitimacy and role of government. Furthermore, they may have less tolerance for sudden change than westerners or may simply enjoy the economic growth they have achieved. Unfortunately, China still commits human rights violations, a source of friction among its people. According to Lai, “The Chinese Communist Party still dominates politics, and the policy making process remains largely inaccessible to the public. As a result, the state and officials often ignore people’s rights, legitimate interests, due process and relevant laws.”¹⁹ In addition, Honggyi Lai explains, “The courts and judges cannot independently make legal decisions and are subject to political interference.”²⁰ The Chinese government’s lack of transparency and lack of an independent court system both act as a major source of domestic contention and makes the country unreliable for foreign investors. Such a dynamic restricts the upper ranges of China’s growth potential and will likely become a major point of contention for Chinese politics. Unrestricted state control may have helped China achieve its current levels of growth similarly to state control in the early days of South Korea. According

to Zheng, however, “State control of the means of production hence further enhances the concentration of power toward the central government with few checks on the balance of power in the governance structure.”²¹ A lack of balance of power eventually leads to internal instability. China is already prone to large cathartic outbursts of protests from its population who are underrepresented in government according to Lai: “Even though high economic growth may increase the level of popular support for the regime, it does not preclude outbreaks of popular protests.”²² China will eventually have to reform to maintain legitimacy; this will likely occur if it reaches a point of economic stagnation.

In spite of positive trade relations, mistrust still exists between the United States and China, especially concerning both China’s regional ambitions and its nuclear program. Development of this relationship is critical to reigning in the nuclear program of North Korea. The importance of China (and Russia) in nonproliferation is explained well by Richard Cupitt, “As long as neither the Russian nor Chinese government appears set to make an immediate challenge against the basic principles or norms of the current international system and as long as their compliance is essential for an effective nonproliferation export control system, excluding these states from negotiating the rules and procedures of nonproliferation export controls will surely produce acrimony and little interest in abiding by those rules and procedures.”²³ Maintaining the balance between accepting China and pressing it toward liberal democratic reforms is essential to regional stability. China may never fully embrace western-style democracy or it may do so decades into the future. It does serve as an example of the progress that can be made through positive engagement over persistent sanctions. The United States could have isolated China from much of the global economy through sanctions, but that may have left it unstable like many other sanctioned states. A

failed China would be catastrophic in today's world due to its size, population, resources, and geography.

Lessons Learned: Keep The Bureaucracy Intact

The lesson learned from the case studies of South Korea and China is that persistent positive engagement achieves greater results toward development, liberalization and democratic reform than sanctions. Francis Fukuyama wrote that change needs to come from within in order for it to last: "The majority of cases of successful state-building and institutional reform have occurred when a society has generated strong domestic demand for institutions and then created them out of whole cloth, imported them from the outside, or adapted foreign models to local conditions."²⁴ South Korea adapted western institutions to its own cultural and national needs, while Maoist China attempted to build their own system. The Maoist experiment failed; China began its miraculous rise when it adapted foreign economic models to its domestic needs. North Korea has attempted to remain isolated, partly through its own designs and partly due to sanctions against it, and it is one of the most destitute countries in the world. Engagement, politically, culturally, and economically, with the rest of the world is a key to changing conditions within the country. It cultivates a diversity of ideas and trade that make countries more robust by making them more readily adaptable to change. This process is hampered by sanctions that ostracize whole countries from the international community.

Healthy states require functioning state institutions that work as the pipelines for delivering public goods and services. According to Andrew Flitbitt regarding the forced state-failure in Iraq, "Without minimally functioning state institutions, domestic governance became all but impossible until new thinking and associated state-building policies came to

the fore.”²⁵ By that time sectarian violence had fractured the country. Damage from which it appears Iraq will never recover, at least not as the complete state the west has tried to create. Koreans, in both north and south, already possess a shared identity in spite of ideological differences between the two governments. There is potential for a future as a unified state as well as separate functioning states if the North can be modernized.

The case studies of South Korea and China indicate that a strong developmental autocracy is necessary for rapid development. Eun Mee Kim warns, however, that care should be taken when attempting to apply this model to the developing world: “[T]he costs of rapid development based on a strong developmental state should be carefully weighed before this model of growth is adopted by other Third World nations.”²⁶ Both South Korea and China were fraught with human rights violations throughout their development and China is still prone to them. The potential of existing institutions to maintain stability and act as pipelines for reform policies should weigh heavily into the decision of how much to tolerate and whether or not to apply sanctions or initiate military actions. Former White House correspondent Kenneth Walsh predicted the many consequences of U.S. policies:

Even talk of military action against Iraq could undermine Arab and Muslim support in the fight against terrorism and adds to instability in the region. Increasing pressure on North Korea could reverse conciliatory moves by Pyongyang, such as its 1994 agreement to freeze its nuclear weapons program and its 1999 moratorium on testing long-range missiles. And continued hostility from Bush could jeopardize Iran's cooperation in efforts to develop a new government in Afghanistan.²⁷

The Middle East remains unstable and relations between the United States and Iran, as well as the United States and North Korea, remain tense.

State-building and peacebuilding efforts are largely undervalued. Policy tends to lean more towards punishment and retaliation in the form of sanctions and military actions.

Jonathan Monten raised an important question, “how external interveners can balance the need to hold regime figures accountable for past crimes or abuses of power, while still preserving the institutional knowledge and experience critical to state capacity.”²⁸ Iraq demonstrates the consequences of dismantling the state, while South Korea and China demonstrate what can be accomplished through and by developing state capacity. Neither Iran nor North Korea suffers from the afflictions of failed states such as Somalia, where any semblance of a unified central government has failed to take root. Francis Fukuyama identified a problem with attempting to build a state from nothing: “The international community knows how to supply government services; what it knows much less well is how to create self-sustaining indigenous institutions.”²⁹ Iran and North Korea already possess self-sustaining indigenous institutions. Iraq had a strong central state, albeit with less potential than Iran or North Korea, prior to the 2003 invasion as James Dobbins pointed out: “Compared to other cases, such as Kosovo, Somalia, and Afghanistan, Iraq benefits from having a strong state capable of imposing order on society.”³⁰ A renewed focus on peacebuilding efforts, rather than punishment, is necessary for influencing positive changes in functioning states. According to Alexander Downes and Jonathan Monten, “Democracies may be better off employing nonforceful means—such as foreign aid, development assistance, and attempts to build civil society—to bring about a more democratic world.”³¹ Such policies may seem unpopular among domestic constituents when applied to states that commonly use strongly anti-American rhetoric in their political speech but will ultimately lead to improvements in security, relations, and living conditions.

Endotes

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³ Kim Eun Mee, "Contradictions and Limits of a Developmental State: With Illustrations from the South Korean Case," *Social Problems* 40, no. 2 (1993): 243.

⁴ Gregg Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007): 1.

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⁶ Kim Eun Mee, Kim Pil Ho, and Kim Jinkyung, "From Development to Development Cooperation: Foreign Aid, Country Ownership, and the Developmental State in South Korea," *Pacific Review* 26, no. 3 (July 2013): 315.

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¹² Hongyi Lai, "Uneven Opening of China's Society, Economy, and Politics: Pro-Growth Authoritarian Governance and Protests in China," *Journal Of Contemporary China* 19, no. 67 (November 2010): 823.

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¹⁴ Jinghai Zheng and Liming Wang, "Institutions and Development: The Case of China in Comparative Perspectives," *Emerging Markets Finance & Trade* 50 (November 2, 2014): 4.

¹⁵ Hongyi Lai, "Uneven Opening of China's Society, Economy, and Politics: Pro-Growth Authoritarian Governance and Protests in China," *Journal Of Contemporary China* 19, no. 67 (November 2010): 825.

¹⁶ Zhang Weiyang, "The Power Of Ideas And Leadership In China's Transition To A Liberal Society," *CATO Journal* 35, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 36.

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²² Hongyi Lai, " Uneven Opening of China's Society, Economy, and Politics: Pro-Growth Authoritarian Governance and Protests in China," *Journal Of Contemporary China* 19, no. 67 (November 2010): 831.

²³ Richard T. Cupitt, "Viewpoint: Target Rogue Behavior, Not Rogue States," *The Nonproliferation Review Winter (1996)*: 51.

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²⁵ Andrew Flibbert, "The Consequences of Forced State Failure in Iraq," *Political Science Quarterly* 128, no. 1 (2013): 69.

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Conclusion: Reform Through Constructive Engagement

Reform is more likely to happen through constructive engagement. There is a greater need than ever for international cooperation on issues impacting human security. President Obama recognized that need in his 2010 National Security Strategy: “And without effective mechanisms to forge international cooperation, challenges that recognize no borders—such as climate change, pandemic disease, and transnational crime—will persist and potentially spread.”¹ Many of these threats have manifested themselves within recent decades. Issues such as transnational crime and terrorism have planted roots in weak and failed states incapable of preventing such organizations from operating within their borders. Therefore, state-building has become a key component of national security. Francis Fukuyama provided a succinct definition of state-building: “State-building is the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones.”² State-building is the proactive component of national security that requires the forging of partnerships in the international community for the purpose of expanding state capacity to contribute to global security as well as U. S. national security.

Turning enemies into allies requires a strong focus on the big picture. Leaders must avoid being dragged into adversarial relationships by constituents who do not see it. It is easy to gain power by “othering” based on the prejudices of a constituency, but there is nothing to be gained outside of one’s own position. One of the biggest advantages to fostering positive relations is economic gains in the non-zero-sum system that currently exists. Derek Reveron and Kathleen Mahoney-Norris recognized such a dynamic and noted “For the United States, the economic success generated by developing countries translates into gains from trade and investment with those countries.”³ Economic ties generate more than revenue, they facilitate

the exchange of ideas by opening up lines of communication. Zhang Weiying explained how this impacted China: “Just as China imported a great deal of technology and equipment developed in the West, it has also imported many ideas from the West.”⁴ The flow of ideas improves the knowledge bank of how to solve particular problems. Improvements in economic standing also impacts people’s stake in their government and influences what they demand of their leaders. The interconnectivity and co-dependency may also decrease the perception of the other side as a foreign enemy due to an awareness of dependency and larger-scale cultural exchanges. Eun Mee Kim pointed out another interesting side-effect to creating economic ties: “Various groups that emerge in the process of economic growth present different demands to the state. The state is thus challenged to negotiate and bargain with major actors. To do this successfully requires more skill and finesse than can be found in an authoritarian regime, where the state can simply repress groups and ignore demands.”⁵ In South Korea, economic ties were one of the factors that aided its transition to democracy. China has shown similar results, but its larger size and already well-established single party government, and cultural preferences, have inhibited democratic reforms.

The countries of the world have experimented with many political ideologies since monarchies fell out of favor hundreds of years ago. Differing views and political experiments have been the source of mistrust and war between states. Two hundred years of experimentation, however, have established certain truths, not the least of which is that democracy is the best source of legitimacy. As Francis Fukuyama explains, “Democratic countries are often better able to survive economic setbacks because their legitimacy comes from democracy itself (e.g., South Korea in 1997-98).”⁶ Democratic governments gain their legitimacy directly from their constituents. Thus, in a properly functioning democracy,

legitimacy is maintained because the leaders are supported by a majority of the people. In a liberal democracy, minority groups remain protected in spite of conflicting views as to who should be in charge. Power is more evenly balanced and the government is able to survive a changing world through adaptability.

The security environment in the post-World War II world has taken on a dynamic quite different from previous eras. Interstate conflict is resolved through more peaceful means than large scale war since modern technology has rendered war destructive to the point where neither side truly wins. Well-developed states integrated into the global community are not an existential threat to national security. The threat has shifted to weak and failing states according to Christopher Coyne: “It is unlikely, at least in the near future, that there will be significant threats from countries that have reached relatively high levels of development. Instead, at least in the near term, the main threat appears to be from weak, failed, and conflict-torn states or rogue groups within those states.”⁷ Overcoming these threats requires interstate cooperation. This cooperation cannot happen if adversarial relationships with unpopular regimes are prioritized over cultivating positive ties to the countries those regimes represent.

North Korea and Iran were promoted to chief rivals of the United States by former President George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech. Leaders of both states use strong anti-American rhetoric to strengthen their own grip on power and the United States has consistently played directly into their goals by reciprocating the speech and escalating military posture. North Korea has mastered this relationship through three consecutive generations of Kim leadership. The United States has exhausted sanctions against the regime and limited its engagement with much of the world. According to Mike O’Hanlon and

Michael Mochizuki, “[T]he type of limited engagement pursued over the last decade may have inadvertently encouraged the DPRK to develop a counterproductive habit of using its weapons programs to gain money and diplomatic attention.”⁸ There is no end in sight to the stalemate on the Korean Peninsula due to the maintenance of the status quo. Furthermore, the possibility of unification is now hindered by the will of the Korean people and the growing disparity between North and South. According to O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, however, the United States ought to prepare for the possibility of unification: “Unification of the Korean peninsula will occur on its own timetable. U.S. decisionmakers cannot wait for Korean unification, however, to develop strategies to address its aftermath and to ensure that U.S. security interests are protected in that environment.”⁹ Preparation has primarily consisted of military operations designed to establish and maintain security in the immediate aftermath should a sudden unification occur. There are many scenarios for unification, but the process does not have the buy-in of all countries that would be impacted, chiefly the Chinese who are more concerned by the possibility of having a failed state as a neighbor. Chinese aid undermines sanctions designed to starve the leadership of North Korea. These sanctions starve the people of North Korea, while the leadership continues to benefit from its grip on the country and its illicit activities. North Korea stands as an example of the logical maximum of sanctions, which can be applied to current sanctions regimes against Iran. Positive engagement is more likely to influence both internal reform and international stability by creating ties that facilitate the exchange of ideas, co-dependency, and diplomacy. According to Max Fisher, “The more that North Koreans learn of the outside world’s comparatively astonishing wealth and freedom, the less interested they seem to be in participating in the North Korean system.”¹⁰ Iranians, on the other hand, are better educated

and more globally connected than North Koreans and are known to be interested in more engagement with the global community. Why not capitalize on it?

The Big Issue of Overcoming Structural Conditions

As discussed earlier, preexisting conditions can have a profound impact on the outcome of state-building efforts. Yet many attribute its success or failure to the amount of time and resources applied to it. As stated by Jonathan Monten, “One of the most prominent arguments to emerge in the literature on U.S. state-building is the claim that successful state-building depends on the level of commitment by the intervener, measured in terms of the duration of the operation and the investment of material resources such as manpower and aid.”¹¹ Believers in this theory often point to the success of the reconstruction efforts in Germany and Japan following World War II. Christopher Coyne disagrees, “Post-World War II Japan and West Germany are extremely poor points of comparison for these modern threats, and employing them as a baseline will generate faulty and inaccurate analyses of the potential for success in future reconstruction efforts.”¹² The case studies of South Korea and China serve as better examples of how modern instances of state-building may look as far as the amount of time, domestic buy-in, and struggle required to build indigenous institutions capable of creating order and security as well as advancing national goals and hopefully facilitating liberal and democratic reforms, two related but separable goals. State-craft and diplomacy should focus on building and reforming existing institutions within target states. Doing so will provide a greater chance of buy-in and legitimacy from the indigenous populations. Developing state capacity where there is none, or where it is inadequate, is a crucial step toward building a more liberal democratic global community. Jonathan Monten shared this point of view and noted: “The U.S. experience provides evidence supporting the

view that international actors face barriers to building the scope and strength of the state in countries that lack key preconditions such as prior bureaucratic capacity and high levels of economic development and social homogeneity.”¹³ Iran and North Korea already have bureaucratic capacity and social homogeneity. The United States can improve the security environment by engaging both economically. Doing so will spur the development of bureaucracies, professional classes, and open the door to reform.

The lesson of Iraq, Germany, and Japan demonstrates the need for state capacity. In Iraq, the bureaucracy may have been too corrupt to be effective in the long-run, but it would have been easier to allow it to hold the country together in the invasion’s aftermath and reform it later, especially having captured and removed Saddam Hussein. The decision completely to dismantle the Iraqi bureaucracy proved to be a bad one. The same will likely hold true in Iran and North Korea. As Francis Fukuyama stated, “What only states and states alone are able to do is aggregate and purposefully deploy legitimate power. This power is necessary to enforce a rule of law domestically, and it is necessary to preserve world order internationally.”¹⁴ Liberal democracy is ideal, and likely the direction much of the world is headed, but that ideal for many may take decades of foundational development before it begins to become a reality. Even then, the expectation that countries will resemble the American political ideal is unlikely. Each culture will apply its own unique influences to create the government that suits its needs.

Democracy faces another challenge in the world. Many countries, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, are democracies in name but little else. North Korea has been under dynastic rule since its very beginnings in the late 1940s. As Larry Diamond stated, “Many other regimes in the world are only pseudodemocracies because the realities

and rules of the political game really do not make it possible, except through extraordinary means, to evict the ruling party, coalition, or cabal from power,”¹⁵ Many ‘democracies’ lack the basic freedoms necessary to foster healthy political discourse. Larry Diamond also stated: “Freedom to campaign requires some considerable freedom of speech, movement, assembly, and association in political life, if not more broadly in civil society.”¹⁶ If one were to apply the Iraq, Germany, or Japanese models of defeat militarily followed by rebuilding, one would be forced into a never-ending debate over who is and who is not an acceptable target. It is better to focus on institutional development and trade.

State-building in the form of foreign aid is not without its drawbacks. It risks replacing state-capacity rather than aid in developing it. According to Jonathan Monten, “In these cases, aid may crowd out domestic capacity-building: national leaders may have little incentive to invest scarce resources in improving state capacity in these areas while they are being accomplished by international actors.”¹⁷ For this reason, states with pre-existing capacity, or those with the national will to develop, are most likely to become economically strong and hold the most potential to become liberal democracies. Other states where corruption persists and state leaders work more to obtain their own power and wealth rather than serve the interests of their people, are likely to fail regardless of how much aid is applied to them. These factors that inhibit development also inhibit the effectiveness of sanctions. Fred Hansen and Axel Borchgrevink explained how “If the leaders of non-democratic regimes are more interested in accumulating resources for themselves than in protecting the collective good, reduced revenues may fail to change the policies of the regime, while leaving even less resources available to the general populace.”¹⁸ The better way forward is to stay constructively engaged with the population in spite of its political leadership. This was

often the case throughout South Korea's formative years when the United States tolerated brutal dictators due to its larger focus on regional security. History has proven that citizens will always outlast their leaders.

Another political trap to avoid is being drawn into conflict by leaders who stand to profit from it. Many will use rhetoric and brinksmanship, as well as instigate genocides, in order to perpetuate war. James Mittleman explained in his book *Hyperconflict: Globalization and Insecurity* how: "In executing political violence, some combatants do not seek to win a war but to perpetuate it."¹⁹ Fear is an easy political device and old ethnic rivalries are often the simplest lines along which to divide a community. War also generates significant economic opportunities according to James Mittleman, "Levels of military spending have escalated and offer sizable economic opportunities. War can provide a cover for crime. It begets economic gain for certain international actors, insurgency leaders, as well as the holders of state power and their key supporters. Spending by the state is also supplemented by remittances from diasporic networks seeking to support those perceived as brethren."²⁰ As we have witnessed in the United States, nothing arouses patriotism quite like a war.

Globalization is both positive and negative depending on how it is used. The problems facilitated by globalization can also be combatted by it. James Mittleman explained the key points: "The larger security challenge is to expand connectivity, which is the way to advance peace and prosperity. Key to reducing violence is endorsement of the system of security rules for allowing globalization to flourish."²¹ Exiling states from the global community by labeling them as "rogues" or "evil" does nothing to advance security. Connectivity at various levels and in official capacities is the key to countering connectivity

through illicit activities and globalized criminal and terrorist networks. Connectivity is also a key to facilitating development. According to Larry Diamond, “With development, the quantity and variety of information available explodes, and more important, control over it is dispersed.”²² Ideas can flourish in the same anarchic environment in which states exist. Active measures, such as sanctions, isolate states and their citizens from the rich community of information. It is information and desire for a better life that causes citizens to rise up against repressive regimes, not economic desolation caused by foreign-imposed sanctions.

Balancing Foreign Policy with Domestic Politics

Domestic political needs impact foreign policy. Former President Bush weighed his political needs when deliberately labeling Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an “Axis of Evil.” He chose his words carefully. Kenneth Walsh explained the reason why: “The war in Afghanistan has gone so successfully, he told aides prior to his address, that Americans were becoming complacent. Just as important, evidence was piling up at Bush's daily intelligence briefings of possible new acts of terrorism, and this had the president worried.”²³ His speech froze diplomatic relations between the United States and all three named countries. It also set the United States on the warpath with Iraq. Iran and North Korea may have been targeted next had the aftermath of the Iraq invasion not gone so poorly. The complete collapse of the Iraqi state was an extreme case that made apparent many lessons in state-building, chief among them that democracies cannot simply be installed through military force where there is no prior history of healthy state institutions. Second, countries cannot be prepared for democratic transitions through decades of sanctions. The Iraqi state had been so impoverished by sanctions that it was not prepared to survive on its own after the invasion.

That stands in sharp contrast to Germany and Japan following World War II where reconstruction was a rebuilding process and not seeking to create a state from nothing.

Countries such as Iran and North Korea should not be ostracized from the international community through rogue state politics unless the international community is willing to take swift and decisive action against them. Military action against other states is not readily accepted by the international community. Taking unilateral actions harms international relations and diplomacy. The alternative, sanctions, is not productive for building healthy state institutions. Fred Hansen and Axel Borchgrevink explained one of the reasons why not: “Sanctions are seen by many as contradicting the concept of ‘partnership’ in development. By imposing sanctions, a donor country is stating quite explicitly that it knows what is the best policy to follow for the recipient country.”²⁴ Sanctions are designed to punish unacceptable behavior but have become a politically expedient crutch for ‘peaceful’ actions against offending states. They are rarely targeted directly at individual offenders within a regime however. Instead, they end up harming the population and relations between the sanctioned and the imposing country. As Manuel Oechslin concluded in his study, “One of these observations is that targeted regimes hardly try to dampen the negative economic consequences; targeted regimes rather tend to respond by pursuing policies which severely compound the sanctions' adverse effects on the economy.”²⁵ Basically, those in power are able to counter the impact of the sanctions by deflecting the impact onto their populations in a zero-sum effort to cover their losses at the people’s expense. Much research supports this conclusion according to Daniel Drezner, “Research emanating from wildly disparate theoretical and methodological perspectives came to the same conclusion about the effect of comprehensive sanctions: they disproportionately hurt politically weak groups and benefited

target regime sympathizers.”²⁶ The alternative of smart sanctions shows greater promise in satisfying the need to do something about belligerents in the international system without increasing the suffering of their citizens. Daniel Drezner explained the benefits well: “For recalcitrant members of the Security Council, smart sanctions offered the opportunity to cooperate with the hegemonic actor in the international system. At the same time, smart sanctions would not impose excessive humanitarian costs or threaten lucrative trading relationships with target countries.”²⁷ These trading relationships are important channels of both money and ideas that greatly benefit the countries involved.

Trade relations are a critical tie that bind states in the international system. The improvement of U.S.-Sino relations after former President Nixon opened up diplomacy in the 1970s is a stark reminder of the impact trade relations can have. Bruce Russett explained one of the harder to measure benefits of trade, “To the degree that trade benefits consumers and producers broadly throughout a society, its beneficiaries have a stake in the continuation of commerce and in the reliability of institutions that provide continuity.”²⁸ Successful trade relations can greatly alter the relationship between states. China was turned from Cold War rival to one of the United States’ largest and most valuable trading partners. Iran and North Korea have the potential to be greatly altered through trade as well. Larry Diamond explained some of the vulnerabilities that authoritarians have to being connected to the international community through trade: “Linkages that render authoritarian states vulnerable to Western pressure include conventional economic ties (trade, investment, and credit), security ties (treaties and guarantees), and social ties (tourism, immigration, overseas education, elite exchanges, international NGO and church networks, and Western media penetration).”²⁹ Authoritarians such as the Kim regime in North Korea are driven by money

and power, two things that trade can enhance. Iran seeks to be an active member of the international community and influential power within the Middle East. Its rulers are very likely to be open to trade. Bruce Russett explains some of the human rights benefits that can be accomplished through trade relations: “Preferential Trade Agreements often have human rights provisions. These agreements have been most effective in reducing violent repression when they incorporate ‘hard’ rather than ‘soft’ enforcement mechanisms (that is, the ability to terminate trade agreements and impose sanctions on repressive member states, rather than mere verbal standards that do not affect membership or market access).”³⁰ Trade relations are one of the most powerful tools of diplomacy and the United States has the most powerful economy in the world. This asset should be used actively to engage countries throughout the world in a beneficial manner. Incorporating this into grand strategy would help focus efforts and reign in some of the negative impacts of non-governmental aid programs. Trade requires regulation and infrastructure, while aid is less beneficial.

Aid from both the government and non-governmental organizations is often counterproductive to the task of building state-capacity. Francis Fukuyama explains “Those footing the bill for aid programs want to see the maximum number of patients treated and do not want their money to go to local bureaucrats, even if it is these bureaucrats who must provide health care services in the long run.”³¹ It is important to develop this state capacity in order for countries to have the foundation on which to build a democracy. According to Francis Fukuyama, “A good state institution is one that transparently and efficiently serves the needs of its clients--the citizens of the state.”³² It is a challenge to forge institutions where they do not have historical foundations. It is counterproductive to tear them down, even in countries that use them to impose their authoritarian systems on their citizens. Instead, the

United States should use its economic instrument of power to build trade relations that will facilitate infrastructure development that will become the pipelines for development. Francis Fukuyama made an important point to keep in mind: “Holding on to a certain structure of political power is often a life-and-death issue for leaders of poor countries, and no degree of external public-goods financing from the donor community will be sufficient to offset losses of power and prestige that will accompany true reform.”³³ If the enemy is the Ayatollah and the Kim regime, then perhaps the better way to inspire their populations to depose them is by empowering them through trade rather than impoverishing them through sanctions and military threats. Authoritarians use negative actions by the United States to justify their own power and legitimacy. They thrive on the adversarial relationship with the United States. Take that away from them and they are left with few sources of legitimacy and their people will begin to question and challenge their power. It may be counterintuitive to open up relations with such anti-American governments as Iran and North Korea, but it is the best way to reform them. It takes power away from the belligerent authoritarian leaders and gives it to their people. As Fareed Zakaria stated, “As in the West, liberalization in East Asia has included economic liberalization, which is crucial in promoting both growth and liberal democracy.”³⁴ Sanctions and military actions can be reserved as a last resort against a regime truly intent on attacking the United States, and can be targeted at offending regime members. Military action can be reserved as a defensive measure until conflict is imminent. For the majority of the time, the United States should focus on constructive engagement, even with the most belligerent of regimes. Doing so will increase the chances of reform or internal overthrow of authoritarians, and prepare them for reconstruction, liberalization, and democratization.

Endotes

¹ Barack H. Obama, *The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America*, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2010): 40.

² Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Order and Governance in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004): ix.

³ Derek S. Reveron and Kathleen Mahoney-Norris, *Human Security in a Borderless World. Boulder* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2011): 70.

⁴ Zhang Weiyang, "The Power Of Ideas And Leadership In China's Transition To A Liberal Society," *CATO Journal* 35, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 38.

⁵ Kim Eun Mee, "Contradictions and Limits of a Developmental State: With Illustrations from the South Korean Case," *Social Problems* 40, no. 2 (1993): 243.

⁶ Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Order and Governance in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004): 28.

⁷ Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008): 135.

⁸ Michael O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, "Toward a Grand Bargain with North Korea," *Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime Change, and U.S. Policy Toward Iran, Iraq, and North Korea*, eds. Alexander Lennon and Camille Eiss (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004): 159-160.

⁹ Derek Mitchell, "A Blueprint for U.S. Policy Toward a Unified Korea," *Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime Change, and U.S. Policy Toward Iran, Iraq, and North Korea*, eds. Alexander Lennon and Camille Eiss (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004): 187.

¹⁰ Max Fisher, "Defying History: How Kim Jong Un Could Hold Onto Power for Decades," *The Atlantic*, August 6 (2012).

¹¹ Jonathan Monten, "Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan," *Annals Of The American Academy Of Political & Social Science* 656, no. 1 (2014): 184.

¹² Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008): 135.

¹³ Jonathan Monten, "Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan," *Annals Of The American Academy Of Political & Social Science* 656, no. 1 (2014): 185.

¹⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Order and Governance in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004): 120.

¹⁵ Larry Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy: The struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World*, (New York: Times Books, 2008): 24.

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¹⁷ Jonathan Monten, "Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan," *Annals Of The American Academy Of Political & Social Science* 656, no. 1 (2014): 186.

¹⁸ Ketil Fred Hansen and Axel Borchgrevink, "Cutting Aid to Promote Peace and Democracy? Intentions and Effectiveness of Aid Sanctions," *European Journal Of Development Research* 18, no. 4 (2006): 624.

¹⁹ James H. Mittelman, *Hyperconflict: Globalization and Insecurity* (Stanford: Stanford Press, 2010): 37.

²⁰ James H. Mittelman, *Hyperconflict: Globalization and Insecurity* (Stanford: Stanford Press, 2010): 36.

²¹ James H. Mittelman, *Hyperconflict: Globalization and Insecurity* (Stanford: Stanford Press, 2010): 28.

²² Larry Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy: The struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World*, (New York: Times Books, 2008): 99.

²³ Kenneth T. Walsh, "Taking on the 'Axis of Evil,'" *U.S. News & World Report* 132, no. 4 (February 11, 2002): 18.

²⁴ Ketil Fred Hansen and Axel Borchgrevink, "Cutting Aid to Promote Peace and Democracy? Intentions and Effectiveness of Aid Sanctions," *European Journal Of Development Research* 18, no. 4 (2006): 625.

²⁵ Manuel Oechslin, "Targeting Autocrats: Economic Sanctions and Regime Change." *European Journal Of Political Economy* 36 (2014): 24.

²⁶ Daniel W. Drezner, "Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice," *International Studies Review* 13, no. 1 (March 2011): 99.

²⁷ Daniel W. Drezner, "Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice," *International Studies Review* 13, no. 1 (March 2011): 100.

²⁸ Bruce Russett, "Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace," *International Studies Perspectives* 6, no. 4 (2005): 404.

²⁹ Larry Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy: The struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World*, (New York: Times Books, 2008): 112.

³⁰ Bruce Russett, "Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace," *International Studies Perspectives* 6, no. 4 (2005): 404.

³¹ Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Order and Governance in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004): 41.

³² Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Order and Governance in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004): 26.

³³ Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Order and Governance in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004): 37.

³⁴ Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 6 (1997): 27.

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