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PRO GRADU THESIS

A Bridge Builder or a Raconteur?

How Japan Manoeuvres the Global Development Discourse within the TICAD Process

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Abstract

Japan has been a major actor in the field of development cooperation for five decades, even holding the title of largest donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) during the 1990s. Financial flows, however, are subject to pre-existing paradigms that dictate both donor and recipient behaviour. In this respect Japan has been left wanting for more recognition. The dominance of the so called 'Washington Consensus' embodied in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank has long circumvented any indigenous approaches to development problems.

The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) is a development cooperation conference that Japan has hosted since 1993 every five years. As the main organizer of the conference Japan has opted for the leading position of African development. This has come in the wake of success in the Asian region where Japan has called attention to its role in the so called 'Asian Miracle' of fast growing economies. These aspirations have enabled Japan to try asserting itself as a major player in directing the course of global development discourse using historical narratives from both Asia and Africa.

Over the years TICAD has evolved into a continuous process with ministerial and follow-up meetings in between conferences. Each conference has produced a declaration that stipulates the way the participants approach the question of African development. Although a multilateral framework, Japan has over the years made its presence more and more felt within the process. This research examines the way *Japan approaches the paradigms of international development cooperation* and tries to direct them in the context of the TICAD process. Supplementing these questions are inquiries concerning Japan's foreign policy aspirations.

The research shows that Japan has utilized the conference platform to contest other development actors and especially the dominant forces of the IMF and the World Bank in development discourse debate. Japan's dominance of the process is evident in the narratives found in the conference documents. Relative success has come about by remaining consistent as shown by the acceptance of items from the TICAD agenda in other forums, such as the G8. But the emergence of new players such as China has changed the playing field, as they are engaging other developing countries from a more equal level.

Keywords: Japan, Africa, TICAD, development cooperation, discourse, development paradigm

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Abbreviations

AAF	Asia-Africa Forum
AATIC	TICAD Asia-Africa Trade and Investment Conference
AfDB	African Development Bank
AU	African Union
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CDF	Comprehensive Development Framework
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
GCA	Global Coalition for Africa
GNP	Gross National Product
IDGs	International Development Goals
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JBIC	Japan Bank for International Cooperation
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NERICA	New Rice for Africa
NIC	Newly Industrialized Country
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
TAA	Tokyo Agenda for Action
TCSF	TICAD Civil Society Forum
TFHS	Trust Fund for Human Security
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
UN	United Nations

UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN-NADAF	United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WB	World Bank

Introduction

Japanese foreign policy since the Second World War has been influenced by two inter-related phenomena. Under the U.S. security umbrella Japan adopted the so called 'Yoshida doctrine' enabling it to concentrate on economic development and relying on its ally for military protection. Complementing this arrangement is Article 9 of the Japanese constitution that prohibits the use of military force outside Japan and thus prevents Japan from participating in peacekeeping operations or interventions in a military capacity.[1]

This has created a situation where instead of military power, foreign aid has become a cornerstone of Japanese foreign relations. Naturally Japan's history with its neighbours, especially with China, has mandated the reliance on economic power. Japan was one of the original members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) at the time of its founding in 1961.[2] During the 1990s Japan became the largest donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) only to sink back to the fourth or fifth largest in the 2000s.

The explanations for Japan's preference for economic, rather than military power are quite obvious. Other than the restrictions imposed by the constitution, any sign of a militarily more assertive Japan would ignite a backlash from the country's immediate neighbours. Instead, the country has opted for a more subtle approach into international affairs that includes among other things a reliance on economic power. The seminal work in Japan's use of foreign aid for foreign policy goals has been done by Alan Rix. Already in the early 1990s, Rix concluded that foreign aid played an important part in Japan's aspirations for a top position on the stage of international relations.[3] Hook et al. have dubbed the subtle approach as 'quiet diplomacy', a term that encompasses not only

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[1]   Green 2001 pp. 272.
[2]   Hook et al. 2005 pp. 230.
[3]   Rix 1993 pp. 178.

the tools available but also the domestic political processes that have necessitated Japan's unique approach to international relations.[4]

Beyond the numbers, Japan has taken an active role in redefining the way development and the related discourses are understood. This has come in the wake of continued criticism targeted at Japan's use of economic aid as either a tool for promoting the country's export-driven economy or simply as a way to offset its account surplus during the peak years of the 1980s.[5] The brunt of criticism has revolved around the fact that Japan has not come up with a clear philosophy to guide its behaviour as a foreign aid donor, opting instead for furthering domestic economic performance through request based large-scale infrastructure projects in developing countries.[6] In essence, this has meant the creation of a system where Japanese businesses advice aid receiving countries in how to apply for Japanese aid money that is then used by Japanese companies to implement the planned projects in those countries.

I argue that by following the evolution of Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) insights can be made into Japanese foreign political aspirations.[7] Although historical ties between Japan and Africa are minimal, the simple fact that Japan has taken on the challenge of African development is more than enough of a reason to inquire what the country hopes to gain from the endeavour. More than this, by interpreting the way Japan reacts and participates in the global discourse on foreign aid and development cooperation through the declarations issued by TICAD, this research will attempt to carve out the nature of Japanese agency within that discourse. Declarations and policy statements coming forth from the proceedings resonate not only within the donor community but also among the ranks of developing countries.

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[4]   Hook et al. 2005.
[5]   Green 2001 pp. 229-30.
[6]   Hatakeyama 2008 pp. 345.
[7]   TICAD in a nutshell: The conference is co-organized by Japan, United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (UN-OSSA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and has thus far taken place four times in 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008. The conference is a non-pledging forum where cooperation partners from the North and South gather to discuss issues pertinent to African development.

Although sometimes only a marginal segment of global foreign relations, foreign aid discourse is nonetheless an intricate and commonly acknowledged part of how a global community is being constructed. The flow of foreign aid from the rich North to the poor South is considered to be a mutually beneficial arrangement. Multinational organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and its subsidiaries create forums where commonly shared goals are discussed and put into practice. David Leheny and Kay Warren present an interesting idea of how the relationship between China and Japan has shaped Japan's internal aid politics.[8] Similar transnational currents can be seen in the global aid debate where converging aid preferences shape the actions and behaviour of all global aid donors. Arguing on the lines of Frank et al., who propose that the responsibilities of the modern nation-state concerning environmental protection are increasingly formulated in a global setting,[9] I intend to elaborate on a global developmentalist agenda as part of the creation of a world society. The process of creation is a battlefield of competing narratives and motives where active stakeholders participate in defining how to best approach the question of development. As Japan has had to struggle with its past, it has found it hard to participate fully in the creation process.[10]

Foreign aid is understood through different development paradigms, some of which form dominating regimes. In recent years one such has been the free market oriented model of the 'Washington Consensus' originating from the international financial institutions involved in development cooperation. Challenging this paradigm is hard as most of the actors involved in development cooperation have accepted the underlying ideology of minimal state interference and market dominance. Japan treads a different path in this respect but success in introducing a new paradigm has been hard to come by as will be seen.

My thesis will consist of two intertwining parts. First, it will map out the evolution of the TICAD process from its humble beginnings to its current stage as one of the main forums for African development issues. This part of the thesis will take on the guise of

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[8]   Leheny & Warren 2010 pp.16.
[9]   Frank et al. pp. 97.
[10]   Takahashi 2005 pp. 10-11.

historical reconstruction. Second, I will examine the distinct patterns of developmentalism proposed by Japan during the process. My thesis will rest on the assumption that a global discourse on developmentalism emerged during the turn of the millennium. This discourse has been made apparent in the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that have come to guide global development efforts.

Within this discourse on developmentalism, Africa and especially Sub-Saharan Africa is the epicentre where efforts for a better world converge. The aforementioned MDGs are a clear indication of this. Any progress that has occurred during the first decade of the new millennium has for a great extent been due to positive developments in China and India.[11] This has created a situation where the Sub-Saharan Africa looms in the global developmental consciousness as an eternal black hole where all those who enter it end up abandoning all hope for a better tomorrow.

The Asian experience on development achievements has both shown the viability of foreign aid interventions but also made it painfully clear how similar developments have been lacking in other parts of the world, especially in Africa. Japan has garnered some credit for Asian development as the region has been the major destination for Japanese aid distributions since the Second World War. This experience has even been recorded in the first declaration coming out of TICAD in 1993 and has since been reiterated in subsequent documents. The development history of Asia, called the 'Asian miracle' epitomizes the creation of narratives for development discourse purpose and Japan has been active in utilizing this set of paradigms for furthering its own agenda.

The materials used in this thesis are not unproblematic. The world of development discourse is formed by declarations and accords coming out of international conferences. During these conferences, large numbers of participants have to come to an agreement on what constitutes the right approaches for achieving development. As de Waal points out, the dominant discourse on aid prevents us to a large degree from taking an outside look. Aid becomes the only solution to the prevailing problems,[12] but

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[11] UN 2010 pp. 7.
[12] de Waal 1997 pp. 624.

within the dominant discourse, diverging debates are initiated by active parties. I claim that Japan has found a way to promote a distinct view on development and this view can be accessed through careful examination of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development. This development view in itself is not contested but rather the way Japan has utilized a multilateral platform for directing the aid debate. The question of whether or not Japan has been successful in promoting its own vision will also be a part of the research.

1. Japanese Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy

1.1 From humble beginnings

ODA has become one of the cornerstones of Japanese foreign policy. This has been necessitated by restrictions imposed by the country's constitution that prevent Japan from participating in military operations beyond its national borders. In practice this has meant that Japan hasn't been able to contribute fully to United Nations peacekeeping operations, a matter that has affected Japan's aspirations for a United Nations Security Council permanent membership.

After its inception in 1954 as a part of the Colombo Plan[13] and the country's integration into the global aid community as a part of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD in 1961, development co-operation has been a cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy. These humble beginnings soon evolved into an orchestrated effort for Japanese economic recovery. In aid receiving, war torn countries the financial distributions were seen as war reparations but they worked to advance Japan's economic presence in the region. The oil shock of 1973-74 helped to bring new focus into aid policy as the resource-dependant nation had to expand its aid programme to include vital producers of raw materials. During the 1980s, with the increase of the aid budget, a more conscious effort was made for utilizing the available resources as diplomatic tools. The importance of foreign aid has been iterated by Kent E. Calder in his article on Japanese foreign policy behaviour. In it the author distinguishes the foreign aid arena as the sole forum where Japan has been able to exert some sort of leadership role that hasn't been subject to the same kind of domestic and international forces as other policy forums.[14]

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[13] The Colombo Plan was set up in 1950 by the Commonwealth countries to promote economic and social development in the Asia-Pacific region through foreign aid and technical assistance. Non-Commonwealth countries were soon able to join and Japan did this on October 6, 1954. The government of Japan fixed this date as the beginning of Japan's ODA.

[14]   Calder 2003 pp. 612.

The peculiarities of post-war Japanese history created a situation for the nation in which the normal way of diplomacy was made difficult. Diplomacy, in a very general sense, is a world of self-interested actors who employ a set of tools available for them in order to gain some sort of upper hand in relation to their competitors. For Japan these tools were severely restricted as a result of the U.S. occupation. The 1947 constitution put together by mainly U.S. input prohibited the use of armed forces as a state policy as outlined in Article 9. This necessitated a close alliance with the former occupier as, after 1949, Japan was surrounded by a socialist bloc. Under prime minister Yoshida Shigeru Japan adopted the so-called 'Yoshida Doctrine'. According to this doctrine Japan should concentrate on economic and national rebuilding under the security umbrella of the United States.[15] The benefits were obvious: Japan could use resources normally allocated to defence for recovery. However, the arrangement wasn't without its drawbacks. Japan had to relinquish a part of its foreign political independence as it had to conform to U.S. pressure in geostrategic terms. These terms included the use of foreign aid in securing alliances with the poor countries of the Third World.

The Cold War saw little change in the basic set-up of a bilateral U.S.-Japan security alliance. The post-war decades were a triumph of Japanese economic development. As the country was integrated into the Western bloc, it was able to not only access the markets there but also extend its influence in the neighbouring regions of South East and South Asia. Dennis T. Yasutomo has identified the main stages of Japanese economic diplomacy until the 1990s.[16] In the first stage war reparations paved the way for an economic expansion into Asian markets. Motives for distributing aid were purely economic and dictated on domestic needs for resources and export markets.[17] During this stage the distribution of aid was susceptible to U.S. pressure. As Orr has noted, for the United States strategic considerations came before those of economic security.[18] Under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japan had to concede in terms of aid allocation, although this was more evident in the cases of Latin America and the Caribbean.[19]

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[15]   Hook et al. 2005 pp. 32-33.
[16]   Yasutomo 1989.
[17]   Ibid. pp. 491-92.
[18]   Orr 1988 pp. 755.
[19]   Ibid. pp. 749.

The first oil shock of 1973-74 marked a turning point in Japanese aid policy. The geographic scope of aid had to be expanded to include other regions besides Asia, as Japan sought new sources for importing energy and other resources. This had the added effect of imbuing the distribution of aid with a political agenda.[20] Expectations concerning a more visible agenda began to emerge as Japan's contribution to international financial institutions and foreign aid grew during the 1980s.[21]

The role of aid as a diplomatic tool grew alongside the expansion in both geographic and financial terms. As Japan gave public pledges to double its ODA beginning in 1977[22] aid began to take on a much more central role in diplomatic efforts. Helping to speed up this process were the disapproving voices from the international aid community that questioned the way Japan was using foreign aid for domestic gains as a way to ease the expansion of Japanese companies. By the end of the 1980s, Japan had begun to take its first steps in formulating an aid philosophy that would not only act as a guideline for aid policy but would also answer the criticism of an ambiguous international actor.[23]

The emergent aid philosophy that Japan began to pursue was based on two principles: efforts of self-help and its own legacy as the only non-Western developed nation. The first principle drew heavily from the latter as Japan had had to develop its economy from the wreckage of the Second World War Although Japan had, in 1954 through the Colombo Plan, helped to induce economic growth in the South East Asian region, the country had had to simultaneously rely on economic aid in the form of loans from international financial institutions, namely the World Bank (WB). The last repayment of these loans, borrowed between 1953 and 1966, was paid in 1990, coinciding with Japan's rise as the foremost donor of ODA.[24]

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[20]   Yasutomo 1989 pp. 492-93.
[21]   Green 2001 pp. 229-30.
[22]   MOFA 1977 "Diplomatic Bluebook", found on the MOFA website (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/index.html).
[23]   Yasutomo 1989 pp. 495.
[24]   MOFA 1990 (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1990/1990-2-2.htm#Item%205.%20Expansion%20of%20Official%20Development%20Assistance%20%28ODA%29).

Since the first attempts at formulating an aid philosophy Japanese foreign aid policy has gone through a maturation process during the 1990s and 2000s. The first clear indication of this was the 1992 ODA Charter adopted by the Japanese government. In the charter Japan laid out, for the first time, guidelines for aid distribution. Although drawn with a rough brush, the charter nonetheless lays out some conditions for recipient country behaviour. This qualitative change had the added effect, in addition to the guidelines, of eroding the tradition of a request based aid distribution.[25] Despite its name, this tradition had relied on Japanese expertise within the recipient country. Referring to a often iterated ideal of promoting self-help efforts by developing countries, Japan had preferred projects that originated from the receiving side. With the limitations of a poor country, the recipient had to rely on Japanese consulting companies to design projects that would be taken on by Japanese firms.[26] The ODA Charter was revised and updated in 2003.

The new millennium has brought with it challenges to Japan's foreign aid. The qualitative improvement in aid has come on the footsteps of a declining aid budget. Japan maintained its top donor position throughout the 1990s, finally giving it up in 2001 to the United States. As a top donor Japan was unable to exert the kind of ideological leadership that was expected, although it wasn't for lack of effort. While writing cheques, Japan attempted to influence the course of aid debate, at times re-conceptualizing existing discourse, at others taking a stab at establishing new approaches. The most serious effort has been targeted at gaining recognition for the so called 'Asian Miracle' narrative that emphasis the key role states have in inducing development. This has flown in the face of the free-market ideology emanating from Washington-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Having failed to change the existing discourse in this respect, Japan has reverted to towing the line to a large degree.[27]

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[25]   Katada 2002 pp. 331.

[26]   Kawai & Takagi 2004 pp. 266-67.

[27]   Akiyama & Nakao 2005 pp. 12-13.

1.2 Japan as an aspiring global power

Japan's status as an economic giant rather than a political force has come about due to the country's close alliance with the United States. On one hand this close relationship has ensured stability for Japan to build its economy but at the same time it has circumvented any attempt by the Japanese to assert them on the international stage. However, as Japan's economic cooperation policies in the Asian region have garnered praise especially among aid receiving countries it has bolstered the country's confidence in extending its influence beyond the economic sphere.

The nature of Japan's international role has been the subject of an extensive debate. Mainly the debate has centred on how Japan's economic performance could or should place the country on a path to global leadership. Potter and Sueo conclude in their review of current literature on the nature of Japanese foreign policy that Japanese foreign political activism does indeed follow the dictates of an economic agenda while decreasing in intensity outside the East Asian region.[28] Thus the use of foreign aid as a central pillar of foreign policy for Japan shows no signs of decreasing in validity.

The new development regimes of the 21st century have offered Japan ways out of its geoeconomic approach to ODA as they have expanded the field of development cooperation. This expansion has enabled Japan to situate itself among the other donors at the OECD. Adhering to common causes has been necessary for Japan as resistance for a development paradigm coming outside of the conventional regime has been extensive. At the same time however, domestic constraints have inhibited the full use of Japanese ODA for foreign political gains. Economic stagnation has brought back the need to protect Japanese economic interests when possible.[29]

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[28]   Potter & Sueo 2003 pp. 329-30.
[29]   Hook & Zhang 1998 pp. 1066.

1.3 Japan-Africa relations in brief

Interpreting the significance of the TICAD process necessitates examining Japan's evolving relations with the African continent before the 1990s. On top of this, the nature in which Japan interacts with African nations has to be clarified. On the latter the numbers speak for themselves: the share of total ODA directed toward the continent has remained in the region of 10 % throughout the evolution of the TICAD process. With the absolute numbers of foreign aid dropping during the turn of the millennium, Japan's financial involvement took a turn for the worse.

The low level of foreign aid flowing from Japan to Africa reflects the lack of historical ties these two share. Quite naturally, before the first oil crisis of the 1970s, Japan had no real interest in the region. But as economic necessities sparked the initial diplomatic interest in African affairs, the lack of historical ties was brought up as a strength rather than an inhibiting factor. As Japan had not been a major power in the region it didn't have the colonial burden shared by the European powers that had dominated the region well into the 20th century.

Japan's entrance to the African region on a major diplomatic level occurred during a time when the problems plaguing the continent were in danger of being sidelined by major geopolitical events. Although unburdened by a colonial past, Japan's relative unfamiliarity with the region meant that it opted for a multilateral approach, engaging both institutions such as the UN and other donors.[30] Thus from the start, Japan has somewhat unwillingly distanced itself from the very issues it has stated pursuing. This is best evident by the fact that it was only in 2001 that the first incumbent prime minister of Japan visited the continent. However, nearly two decades of engaging the issues of African development and the region have created strong ties that Japan will have a hard time of severing even in the face of a more serious economic downturn.[31]

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[30]   Ampiah 2008 pp. 2.
[31]   Ampiah 2005 pp. 114.

The TICAD process has become to embody the relationship between Japan and Africa during the past two decades. On rhetorical level Japan has likened itself as initiating a similar kind of development that had occurred in the Asian region since the end of the Second World War[32] Emphasis was put on economic self-reliance that would be brought about through investment in infrastructure and human capital. On top of this, Japan took on the task of tackling specific issues such as infectious diseases. Both of these approaches are integral parts of the conference series.

The reasons for a continued Japanese involvement in the African continent are made poignantly clear by the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), the successor of the Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) whose main function was to help Japanese companies into new markets. Africa has reserves of rare metals that are required in Japan's high technology industries and the low-level infrastructure offers an opportunity for Japanese companies to continue exporting a development model that has a proven track record in East Asia.[33]

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[32]   MOFA 2001a pp. 137-38.
[33]   JBIC 2008 pp. 4.

2. Modelling Development

2.1 Global construction of development models

As foreign aid has become a staple of international relations, a series of models, describing preferred action donor countries should take, have emerged. These models encompass various development paradigms from a focus on economic output of the receiving country to what kind of an impact aid would have on the social sector (health, education etch.) Before the end of the Cold War, geostrategic interests dictated the behaviour of donor countries to a large extent. The collapse of the Soviet Union was seen as heralding a new age not only in global politics but also in the foreign aid community. The hegemony of the capitalist West now undisputed, development models arising from the premises of a market-based system soon emerged to take the centre stage.

Development cooperation has, since the early days of the Marshall[34] and Colombo plans, been a playing field of vested political interests. Disguised as either humanitarian intervention or poverty reduction strategy, development has had to succumb to interpretations arising from politically charged agendas promoting either a market-oriented or a state-led approach. Another field of contention has the focus of development: fulfilment of the so-called 'basic human needs' or economic growth. This roughly laid out fourfold table of market versus the state and the social versus the economic has come to embody the conflicting development paradigms found in the field of development cooperation.

The models arising from the twin dichotomies described above have obvious consequences depending on how they are applied. Using discursive tactics, development models create narratives that deny agency and, on the surface, remove any endogenous inhibiting factors, such as unyielding geography or social resistance.[35]

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[34] The Marshall Plan was an American program that was designed to prevent the spread of communism in Europe by providing economic assistance to countries after the Second World War.
[35]   Klak & Myers 1997 pp. 133-34.

Likewise, the motives behind promoting one approach on the expense of another have had their integrity questioned by voices arising from both within the developing world as well as among the ranks of the members of the OECD. One such notable example is Japan. Although part of the so-called first world of developed economies, Japan has emerged as an opponent of the institutional hegemony on development discourse imposed by the IMF and World Bank. Japan's critique is aimed at the vision of a "stageist teleological conception of development"[36] promoted by the aforementioned institutions in the form of free market capitalism with a minimal state presence. In this vision there is only one path to development: a step-by-step eradication of intervening policies to let the free market run its course. Japan's suggestion has been to accept the distinct characteristics of aid receiving countries and design development cooperation along those terms, thus diminishing the deterministic aura found in the prevailing discourse.

Kenichi Ohno makes an interesting observation when discussing the role and significance of ODA in global development efforts. The new millennium has witnessed the emergence of a poverty reduction agenda where eradicating poverty should require more than the one-stop-shop solutions of the past. Still, as Ohno notes, the only remedy that everybody can agree on is increasing the global ODA budget.[37] This kind of approach forces the recipient countries in the margin as their own agency is neglected. Worse than this, according to Ohno, is the fact that poverty reduction is in danger of becoming yet another quick fix scheme in a long line of trial-and-error solutions. The need for taking into account the unique background and capabilities of each developing country should be the starting point of every development effort.

2.2 The cycle of development models

Prescriptions for development problems have been varied and numerous. A good example is the rise and decline of the structural adjustment programmes (SAP) of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These programmes were designed to

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[36]   Sheppard & Leitner 2010 pp. 186.
[37]   Ohno 2002 pp. 3.

tackle the macroeconomic issues endemic in developing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s.[38] Intended as a short-term solution, targeted at ensuring stable macroeconomic conditions, the SAPs soon ran into trouble. Reforms undertaken by developing economies, in order to be eligible for adjustment loans, hit those most vulnerable. Denied agency was another contributing factor as adjustment was to be carried out according to what the North deemed appropriate.[39] What made matters worse was the fact that these adjustment interventions quickly became a staple of international aid efforts, the duration of which was counted in years rather than months.[40]

Under criticism from participating governments and voices within the foreign aid community, among them Japan, the financial institutions accepted a more broad vision on development that focused on poverty reduction, rather than on macroeconomic austerity. The end result of this shift in focus was the adoption of the so called "poverty reduction agenda" embodied in the IMFs Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the UNs Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Thus the last two decades of the 20th century had witnessed two major shifts in aid vision that not only affected the modality of aid given but also the way development was understood by the global aid community.

These shifts occurred both out of necessity and due to changes in global politics. Decline of the socialist block enabled the spread of development ideals based on market forces to penetrate the aid community. As mere fiscal output was not able to capture the whole phenomenon, social and institutional aspects were elevated into the centre stage. In recent years, economic growth has once again returned as a point of interest, providing Japan with an opportunity for showing leadership capabilities.[41]

The importance of understanding the on-going cycle of development cooperation discourse is not only a question of finding the parameters with which foreign aid is

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[38]   WB & IMF 1990.
[39]   Ishikawa 2004 pp. 5-6.
[40]   Ibid. pp. 26.
[41]   GDF 2008 pp. 2.

distributed. When a new approach emerges on the stage of foreign aid, those promoting it try to assert it as a dominant regime whose priorities should be adhered by all aid actors. The success of a new regime is dependent upon those found in its background, such as powerful financial institutions and governments. For example, the World Bank and the IMF have been successful in initiating a new drive for poverty reduction as of 1999, based on their Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).[42]

2.3 Japan's participation in the global development cooperation debate

Although for the most part aligned with the major economic powers found in the G8 and the DAC of the OECD, Japan has nonetheless carved out a distinct position within the foreign aid community. The country's own experience in developing its economy in the post-war years imbued it with not only a sense of the extraordinary regarding the so-called 'East Asian Miracle' but also with an awareness on how to approach the question of development. As a development actor, Japan has been somewhat marginalized throughout the post-war history. The success story that is Japan's post-war economic growth became a staple of Japanese aid interventions. At the core was the notion of mobilizing resources for growth with the state playing a key part. The goal was always to achieve a self-reliant status as an equal to the modernized nations of the world.[43]

The Japanese development view draws heavily from the experience of East Asian nations, including its own. Starting from similar backgrounds in the 1960s as contemporary African countries, East Asian countries focused mainly on improving economic performance and output. Reduction of poverty occurred as a consequence of development and growth, not the other way around. The state structures and economic conditions in the region during the start of East Asia's catch-up process were as varied as they are today in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is against this background that Japan promotes a new way of achieving regional development in Africa.

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[42]   Yanagihara 2003 pp. 12.
[43]   Ohno 2008 pp. 41.

As Japan entered the ranks of the economic powers and began participating in the formation of global development discourse, major points of contention emerged. These contentions manifested themselves in the two dichotomies described above. The "East Asian Miracle" was adopted by parties promoting a neoclassical agenda of market supremacy while economists recognizing the importance of government involvement in the process tried to upturn their dominance.[44]

The culmination of this was the study done by the World Bank in 1993, requested by the government of Japan that examined the extent to which government intervention had benefited the Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC) of East Asia.[45] As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.2.4 the study, although acknowledging some contribution made by government involvement, it didn't stray far away from the Banks neoclassical interpretation of post-war economic success of the region.

In recent years, as interest in reanimating the growth agenda has emerged, Japan has found itself in an advantageous position. Although Japan has incorporated prevailing discourses into its own aid policies, such as the MDGs, it has nonetheless maintained a position that draws heavily on its own experiences. One of the more visible ones has been the promotion of projects and programmes that enable economic growth. This approach has been criticised for its narrow scope as for measurements used for evaluating success or failure include household income levels and growth of GNP. These indicators have failed to capture the complexity of poverty as a phenomenon.[46] The distinction from this usual approach in the Japanese one has been to include the country's own experience in developing its economy. This experience includes the recognition of guided industrial policy that would benefit the receiving country as a whole.[47]

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[44]   Akiyama, Akiyama & Minato 2003 pp. 26.
[45]   Ibid. pp. 53.
[46]   Ranis & Stewart 2000 pp. 198.
[47]   Ishikawa 2005 pp. 33.

Japan has also been active in promoting new ways of understanding the way poverty and deprivation affect the most vulnerable. The most visible push has been made for the concept of "human security".[48] The vague nature of the concept has made it possible to make it a ubiquitous part of Japanese foreign policy. Human security has found its way into places such as Japan's ODA policy and dialogue within the G8.

Japan's aspirations for the recognition of a distinctly Japanese development model are not only tied to the intricate play of international relations. Recognition of Japan as a formidable development policy formulator is considered a step necessary in the country's advance on the ladders towards a great power status. Complementing this is the nature of Japan's own development history and its position as the first non-Western developed nation. Similar nationalistic drive that fuelled the development process during the post-second World War period can be found behind Japan's more and more outspoken views. Nation-building achieved, Japan is carving out a distinct place within the international community all the while yearning for recognition. Africa is in this respect a testing ground for home-grown theories that Japan has already utilized in its immediate region of East Asia.

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[48]   JICA 2006 pp. 3-6.

3. TICAD: Formation of a process

3.1 In Brief

Foreign aid had its origins in the aftermath of the Second World War A devastated Europe had to be rebuilt and in the Asia-Pacific, similar arrangements were carried out by relevant parties. The East-West divide meant the use of aid for garnering unabashedly selfish foreign political gains. The end of the Cold War was seen in the foreign aid community as heralding a new dawn for global aid allocations without political motives. At the centre of this new global environment for foreign aid is Africa and its decades long stagnation in terms of economic, human and social development.

Japan's relations with the African continent before the first TICAD can be characterized as following the dictates of economic and security interests. Historically, Japan didn't suffer from a colonial burden and its ties to the continent were limited in number. Under the 'Yoshida Doctrine' Japan followed the lead of the United States in foreign politics on the continent. This meant for example quietly condoning the actions of undemocratic regimes as dictated by Cold War realities. One notable example was a distinct pro-Pretoria policy of Japan.[49] Still, as Ampiah notes, Japan had taken part in the 1955 Afro-Asian Bandung Conference seeking neutralism and decolonization thus establishing a connection with the continent.[50]

At the same time, economic recovery and growth within Japan necessitated the extraction of resources and discovery of new markets for Japanese products. Within this framework, Africa played a secondary role against East and South East Asia for a long time. But after the oil crisis of 1973 a more expansive diplomatic thrust for new resource providers was carried out.[51] These series of diplomatic missions found their way to a number of African countries that hitherto had remained outside of Japanese interests.

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[49]   Morikawa 2005 pp. 488.
[50]   Ampiah 2005 pp. 107.
[51]   Alden 2002 pp. 2-3.

TICAD came into being during a time when the world was starting to emerge from the bipolar order of United States and the Soviet Union. The collapse of the latter at the turn of the 1990s meant that the number of nation states increased dramatically. Emerging from the economic stagnation of a   planned socialist economy meant that these new members of the global community were in dire need of assistance. As the world rallied behind them the African continent was in danger of disappearing from the global aid agenda.

The first TICAD convened in 1993 for the purpose of turning the worlds gaze on the problems still endemic in Africa. The 1980s were deemed as a 'lost decade' in Africa, due to the failings of economic development and slow speed of democratic reforms. From the start the Asian experience was hailed as a shining example of what international cooperation can achieve. Utilization of this 'Asian Miracle' narrative was especially appealing to Japan as it had been Japanese involvement in the region that had engendered positive results.

3.1.1 TICAD I: Setting the agenda

The first conference came into being amidst worries of a global donor fatigue. The structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s had taken their toll on both donors and recipients and disillusionment towards foreign aid had descended on the global stage.

It was in this atmosphere that Japan took the initiative on African development issues. In the aftermath of the 46th General Assembly of the United Nations, Japan announced that it would hold an international conference focusing on African development problems. During the UN session, the assembly adopted The United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF).[52] The agenda called for a renewed interest in the continent, especially in the fields of ODA, foreign direct investment (FDI), trade and debt cancellation. Sustained economic growth became one of the central pillars for a successful African recovery. In the resolution this was

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[52]   UN 2002 pp. 1.

translated as requiring an annual economic growth rate of 6 per cent during the course of the 90s.[53] This emphasis on economic development would later come to penetrate the whole of the TICAD process.

From the start, the first conference aimed at producing a joint declaration that would testify to the dedication of all partners involved and serve as a guideline for future endeavours.[54] It was made clear that TICAD would not be a forum for additional aid pledges. Instead, the conference would strive to deepen international cooperation and create a space for dialogue between development partners from the North and South. More importantly, the conference took on the task of promoting an agenda based of African ownership of the continent's development. Providing assistance for African countries was conditioned on them reaching a state of self-reliance.

Outcome

The first conference produced the "Tokyo Declaration". In this document were set the general principles for a continued international cooperation for African development. These principles were the product of a joint discussion carried out in preparatory meetings and the two-day conference. The importance of sustained economic growth was advocated as well as possible lessons to be learned from the Asian experience of development.

The Declaration consisted of six parts. Starting with the need for political and economic reforms, the declaration goes on to stipulate the importance of including the private sector in development efforts. The importance of regional cooperation and integration for improved trading conditions as well as ensuring a stable environment through disaster relief are made apparent. Lastly the declaration points out the lessons to be learned from the Asian development experience while stressing the need for international cooperation where African countries strive for self-reliance and their donor partners offer support.

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[53]   UN 1991.
[54]   MOFA 1993a.

Within these different sectors distinct patterns emerge. The sought after economic growth is tied to reforms in politics and society. Keywords are of liberalization and integration into the global economic community. However, the declaration does note the individual characteristics of African countries, allowing some room for initiatives emerging from the region.[55] This point is further extrapolated in relation to structural adjustment programs (SAP). The participants acknowledge the shortcomings in the areas of human capital, social services and access by the poor that SAPs had had.

The first conference ended on a more or less abstract note. The declaration states that the participants intend to hold a conference similar in scale before the turn of the century.[56] Clear commitment to a continuous TICAD process didn't emerge. The review of the promises made in the declaration was taken up by the three main co-organizers.

3.1.2 TICAD II: Moving on to action

The aftermath of the first TICAD left a clear need for a more concrete approach to the problems faced by Africa. The second conference took on the task of formulating a plan of action that would face Africa's problems head-on instead of remaining on a theoretical level.

If the first conference had to carry the burden of a dissipating Cold War mentality the second TICAD was not without its own overbearing shadow. In 1997 the Asian financial crisis had turned the world's gaze on that region and its immediate problems. Although, as the 1999 DAC Development Co-operation Review notes, since Japan acted on the crisis with considerable response, the country was also able to move the TICAD process to the next phase.[57] It is notable that in the 1999 DAC Peer Review the Asian financial crisis and TICAD II appear in connection as notable Japanese foreign aid efforts of that year.

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[55]   TICAD I: Tokyo Declaration on African Development pp. 1-2.
[56]   Ibid.
[57]   OECD 1999.

The preparatory process for TICAD II was initiated at the Ninth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD IX) in Midrand, South-Africa in 1996. Already in 1994 the government of Japan, the UN and Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) had held the first Asia-Africa Forum as a follow-up for TICAD I. The forum embodied the need for deeper South-South co-operation especially between Asia and Africa. This process was continued in 1997 when the second Asia-Africa Forum was held in Thailand.

For TICAD II the goal from the beginning was to come up with an action plan that would produce action-oriented results.[58] Yet again, emphasis was put on the fact that TICAD II would be a non-pledging conference but that it would build upon the results of the first conference. The first signs of an evolving process within the TICAD framework thus appeared during these times.

Outcome

The immediate result of the second TICAD was the adoption of the "Tokyo Agenda for Action" by all the participants of the conference. Compared to the declaration that came from the first conference this agenda included an 'Action Plan'. This plan contained specific goals to be achieved in a number of human and social fields. The problems faced by the African continent were divided into concrete categories ranging from education and health to lack of private sector development and agriculture.[59]

Under the primary theme of 'Poverty reduction and integration into the global economy' are found the underlying principles of 'ownership' and 'global partnership'. The primary theme iterates the first goal to be reached by 2015: reducing the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty by at least one-half. Reduction will be achieved primarily through economic growth that should exceed 5 per cent annually.[60] In this respect the agenda echoes the conclusions made already in 1991 in the UN-NADAF.

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[58]   MOFA 1997b "Launching of TICAD II Process".
[59]   TICAD II: Tokyo Agenda for Action.
[60]   Ibid. pp. 1.

Furthermore, this intended growth should come through investments in infrastructure and social services while maintaining sound macroeconomic policies.

The primary theme and its relevant courses of action reveal how Japan intended to promote development efforts within the African context. Ownership of the process is put into African hands by demanding the countries of the region to establish and maintain critical infrastructure and political stability.[61] Development partners from the North on their part work within the free market economy by promoting trade, investment and technology transfer.

The action plan adopted in the agenda was a significant step forward in pushing the TICAD process towards concrete measures for enabling development. Drawing lessons from the East Asian development experience, the action plan sets targets to be reached by 2005 or 2015 in three different fields:

1) Social development and poverty reduction
2) Economic development
3) Basic foundations for development

What is notable about these targets is the fact that they promote the concepts of 'ownership' and 'partnership' by assigning different responsibilities to African countries and their development partners. Although this division can be seen as exemplifying the Japanese insistence on 'self-reliance' and thus removing donor accountability it is also a sign of evolving North-South relations within the framework of global developmentalism. One of the major shifts that occurred in this framework in the 1990s was the emphasis put on development co-operation instead of distribution of aid. Catch phrases such as 'empowerment' and 'participatory approach' signalled the increasing involvement of people from the South in their own development efforts.

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[61]   TICAD II: Tokyo Agenda for Action pp. 1-2.

3.1.3 TICAD III: A Look Back

The end result of TICAD II came out at a pivotal time in global aid discourse. Four decades of foreign aid distribution had not solved the world's problems. A new approach was needed. The turn of the millennium gave incentive to come up with a global-level initiative that would bring the less-developed nations into a prosperous 21st century. Manifested in the Millennium Development Goals this global effort has special significance for Japan as within the goals there is an unspoken acknowledgement of a special interest in Sub-Saharan Africa.[62] More importantly, the goals adopted in the UN initiative more than echo those put forth in the Tokyo Agenda for Action coming out of TICAD II. Setting goals to be reached by 2015 in fields such as poverty eradication, education and disease control the MDGs overlap significantly with TAAs promotion of an African led development agenda.[63]

During the period between TICAD II and III Japan took initiative on African issues outside the conference framework. Japan invited the presidents of Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa to attend the Okinawa G8 Summit in 2000.[64] The Okinawa Communiqué produced by the summit concluded that the inclusion of non-G8 countries is essential for solving the problems of ever-intensifying globalization,[65] thus rewarding Japanese efforts. The next year marked the first occasion that an incumbent prime minister of Japan visited the African continent.[66] Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori travelled to South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria during 2001 diverging from the contemporary climate of disinterest in African affairs.[67] The visit came at a time when Japan had been forced to cut its ODA budget due to persistent economic stagnation during the 90s. The visit can thus be seen as reassuring Japan's African development partners that Japan will stay committed to their cause.

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[62]   Cooray et al. 2005 pp. 6-7.
[63]   TICAD 2003 pp. 3-4.
[64]   Shinsuke 2005 pp. 474-75.
[65]   G8 Communiqué Okinawa 2000.
[66]   Adem 2009 pp. 10.
[67]   Adem 2001.

Global changes during the first years of the new millennium had a profound effect on Japanese development policy guidelines. As a response to the 9/11 attacks the U.S. initiated 'war on terror'. This meant that Japan had to adapt its foreign policy to meet the needs of its ally. This is reflected in the revised ODA Charter that Japan adopted in 2003. The charter takes note of the ever frequent occurrence of terrorism and conflict and how they pose a threat to the international community.[68] These changes had cast a shadow on global efforts for African recovery. The call for another conference focused on African development was once again urgent.

Outcome

The shift that had occurred in the global development discourse marked the proceedings of the third TICAD. The expansion of dialogue between the rich industrialized countries of the North and their African development partners was noted from the very beginning.[69] More concretely, the ownership of the development process by African countries promoted by the previous conferences had manifested itself in "The New Partnership for Africa's Development" (NEPAD) created a year before.[70] Adopted as an official programme of newly formed African Union (AU), NEPAD was quickly acknowledged by the G8 at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit.[71]

One of the major goals for TICAD III was to integrate NEPAD into the existing conference process.[72] The Japanese view of an African ownership of its own development process had now a solid form accepted by the global development community at large. On the Japanese side the emergence of NEPAD signalled a possible alternative to the "Washington Consensus".[73] Furthermore, the partnership forged at TICAD III between the conference and NEPAD gave Japan an official recognition as one of the leading development partners of Africa.[74]

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[68]   MOFA 2003b "Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter August 29, 2003"
[69]   MOFA 2003e "Opening Remarks by Mr. Yoshiro Mori, Chairperson of TICAD III"
[70]   UN 2002.
[71]   G8 Africa Action Plan 2002.
[72]   TICAD III: Tenth Anniversary Declaration
[73]   Matthews 2004 pp. 508-09.
[74]   UN 2002 pp. 44.

Besides integrating an African approach into the conference proceedings, TICAD III marked a new beginning in other ways as well. Previous conferences had been called forth almost on an *ad hoc* basis with little reference to a continuous process.[75] At TICAD III there emerged for the first time an official acknowledgement that TICAD had found its own momentum within the global development community. The tenth anniversary of the process was thus seen as an opportunity to take stock of past efforts and embark upon a new path. To this end a review of the TICAD process until the third conference was carried out by Ambassador Rasmus Rasmusson of Sweden. The review, not surprisingly, acknowledged the role TICAD had played in promoting the twin concepts of 'ownership' and 'partnership' as well as the significance of opening up new venues for South-South cooperation within the Asian-African context.[76]

As mentioned above, the turn of the millennium had witnessed the emergence of a number of development initiatives such as MDGs and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, South Africa. These initiatives among a plethora of others had created an environment of developmentalism where efforts related to Africa stood at the foreground. TICAD III came about at a moment where well established practices carried a lot of weight.[77]

TICAD III also became a venue for promoting the concept of 'human security'. This concept had its origins in the 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report* in which an attempt was made to broaden the field of security issues.[78] In the report security meant not only the security of a nation and its borders but also the security of an individual in terms of livelihood, environment and health. Japan had become an ardent advocate of this term during the 1990s. At the UN Millennium Summit in 2000 prime minister Mori proposed the establishment of an international commission on human security.[79] The commission, headed by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, produced a final report *Human*

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[75]   Lehman 2005 pp. 435.
[76]   Rasmusson 2003 pp. 10-11.
[77]   UNU 2003 pp. 2.
[78]   UNDP 1994 pp. 22-24.
[79]   Edström 2008 pp. 192-93.

Security Now during the first half of 2003[80], well before the third conference. The report noted the active involvement of Japan in the cause to promote human security as a mainstream approach to development.[81]

3.1.4 TICAD IV: A show of force

The TICAD process had all but been formalized in the third conference so a fourth TICAD was expected within the international community by 2008.[82] That year Japan would host a G8 Summit in Hokkaido and these two major international events were quickly linked together in preparation for the conference.[83] Results from the conference proceedings would be conveyed to the G8 Summit. Japan thus reinforced its role as a link between Africa and its partners from the North.

The fourth conference came about at a time when Japan had answered to global calls for more visible aid effort. Japan had transformed its commitment to the African cause into concrete measures well before by announcing in 2005 the doubling of ODA to the continent within three years.[84]

The fourth conference was called forth in a positive atmosphere regarding African development, especially in fields of economy and governance.[85] Already in 2003 an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) had been adopted within the NEPAD framework to help countries monitor governance performance. In economic terms, the continent had experienced impressive growth rates of more than 5 per cent. Although dark clouds were gathering in the form of rising food and oil prices, the conference nonetheless adopted the subtitle "Towards a Vibrant Africa".

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[80]   Edström 2008 pp. 201.
[81]   CHS 2003 pp. 142.
[82]   MOFA 2006a pp. 121.
[83]   MOFA 2007a "TICAD IV Regional Preparatory Meeting in Lusaka (Southern and East Africa)"
[84]   MOFA 2005a Asian-African Summit "Speech by H.E. Mr. Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister of Japan"
[85]   ODI 2008 pp. 1.

The preparatory proceedings leading up to the May conference included reiterations on familiar topics of boosting economic growth, ensuring human security through achievement of MDGs and striving towards good governance. In addition, the parties involved discussed the importance of climate change as this debate had gained momentum in relevant international conferences.[86] During these proceedings, voices from the civil society were also heard but their participation remained on a superficial level. Attempts to influence the content and output by civil society organizations (CSO) had increased during the TICAD process but official status as a participant had been denied in the past.[87]

Outcome

TICAD IV adopted the "Yokohama Declaration: Towards a Vibrant Africa". In it the participants identify three pillars of African development for the consequent five years.[88] Those pillars were:

- Boosting economic growth
- Ensuring human security through MDGs and good governance
- Addressing environmental issues and climate change

For the first time the TICAD process established a formalized follow-up process in line with the "Yokohama Action Plan" adopted simultaneously with the declaration. The plan further elaborated on the three pillars and was the latest testament to a Japanese view on what engenders development.[89] Infrastructure was once again put on the fore as a prerequisite for economic growth and efficiency and innovation in agriculture were promoted as solutions for solving the hunger problem.

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[86]   MOFA 2007b "TICAD IV Regional Preparatory Meeting in Tunis (North, West and Central Africa)"
[87]   TCSF 2009 pp. 13.
[88]   TICAD IV: Yokohama Declaration.
[89]   TICAD IV: Yokohama Action Plan.

Civil society organizations had been involved in the TICAD process since the beginning but remained only in the margins during the first three conferences.[90] Civil society participants had been allowed to observe and speak but they were removed from the planning and decision making procedures.[91] The Yokohama Declaration takes note for the first time of the need to engage civil society in Africa, Japan and on the international stage. CSOs and the academia are also mentioned within the action plan as needing inclusion within the participatory approach of the process.

The Yokohama Declaration can be said to have been a success for both Japanese diplomatic efforts and development agenda. Not only had Japan managed to incorporate African issues into high-level summits of the new millennium[92] but it had also been persistent in bringing a distinct view on development into the global stage. This emphasis on state-aided economic growth enabling poverty reduction deviated from the stance within the "Washington Consensus" of market liberalization and poverty reduction based on the IMF supported Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).[93]

More significantly, the declaration notes the need for reform in the United Nations system and especially regarding the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Japan has insisted that the UNSC needs to be reformed to match the change in global politics since WWII.[94] This has more or less implied increasing the number of permanent members to include, among others, Japan.

TICAD IV enabled Japan to showcase initiative on global development issues and reach out to its African partners through dialogue and new promises for doubling of ODA to the continent by 2012.[95] It had been partly due to lack of African support that Japan, along with Brazil, India and Germany, in 2005 had failed to win enough votes for

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[90]   ACT2003 2004 pp. e7-e9.
[91]   TCSF 2006 pp. 84.
[92]   Lehman 2007 pp. 12-13.
[93]   Ibid. pp. 15.
[94]   Hanaoka 2005.
[95]   Watanabe 2008 pp. 9-10.

UNSC reform.[96] TICAD IV gave new momentum for Japanese diplomatic efforts as high-level policy dialogue was complemented with generous aid pledges.

3.2 TICAD I

3.2.1 One-Size-Fits-All?

Since the end of the Second World War, foreign aid has come to define Japanese involvement in international relations. The adoption of a 'peace constitution' under the U.S. controlled occupation regime meant that Japan had to rely on economic rather than military might in solidifying a global presence. Under the U.S. security umbrella, Japan was able to build up its economy but at the same time it relinquished a part of its international agency. Engaging the global community through a diplomacy of economy has not been without controversies. A painful reminder of Japan's uneasy position within the international community was the 1990-91 Gulf War. During the operation, Japan resorted to so called 'checkbook diplomacy'. Instead of sending military troops, the country financed the coalitions actions with a total sum of 13 billion USD.[97]

The need for a much more clearly defined international role had emerged by the 1980s in Japan. The reason for this was the growth of the country's economy to become the second largest in the world behind the United States. In tandem with the growth of domestic economy, Japan had increased its Official Development Aid (ODA) by leaps and bounds, starting in 1978. The first of the Medium-Term Targets for development aid adopted that year aimed at doubling Japanese ODA within the next three years and subsequent targets followed the same line of thinking.[98] These developments expanded Japan's involvement with international affairs not only economically and politically but also geographically. Although Asia remained the number one region for Japanese

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[96]   Watanabe 2008 pp. 17.
[97]   Hook et al. 2005 pp. 358-60.
[98]   MOFA 1985.

financial contributions, by the 1980s Africa had emerged in the Japanese aid consciousness through improvements in both quality and quantity of foreign aid.[99]

Economic considerations related to resource scarcity within Japan and the political realities still remaining in the final years of the Cold War had also directed Japanese aid behaviour. Still, in the circles of developed nations contributing to global development, namely the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Japan stood out in the way the country used its foreign aid. Characteristics of Japanese foreign aid before the 1990s consisted of a high proportion of loans compared to grants, the share of grants being around 40-50 % in the early 1980s, regional concentration on Asia and a focus on economic infrastructure rather than on the then contemporary aid trend of basic human needs.[100] These characteristics were explained by the regional concentration as Asian countries were interested in building their infrastructure and Japan was looking for ways to improve both economic and political relations with its neighbours after a devastating war.[101]

It was with the emergence of a global development agenda that Japan moved towards the African continent. Beginning in the 1970s, Japan came under pressure to become more involved with African affairs. This pressure was related to the general criticism voiced against Japan's aid during the 1980s: issues such as tying of aid to Japanese economic interests, the ratio of ODA compared to Gross National Product (GNP) and the regional imbalance as Asia received the bulk of Japanese aid compared to other regions.[102] More importantly, the pressure to increase the grant element of Japan's ODA was connected to the global effort of satisfying basic human needs.[103] Rather than focusing on improving economic output of aid receivers, this approach aimed at providing the people of the developing world basic services, such as education, health

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[99]   Ampiah 1996 pp. 109-10.
[100]   MOFA 1986.
[101]   Akiyama & Nakao 2005 pp. 4.
[102]   MOFA 1987.
[103]   The 'basic human needs approach' emerged in the 1980s as an alternative to the prevailing mode of measuring development through growth in gross national product (GNP). It was argued that to alleviate poverty, the international community needed to take into account social indicators consisting of literacy, access to clean water and average calorie consumption. Hicks & Streeten 1979 pp. 571.

and clean water through wealth redistribution. As such, this approach conflicted with Japan's own methods of promoting economic growth through infrastructure development.

3.2.2 Finding a form

During the Cold War, foreign aid had been subject to geopolitical strategic considerations. Aid was used quite unscrupulously to further ideological goals both within the Western and Soviet blocks. The dominant aid discourse during the 1980s, in line with the economic policies of Reagan and Thatcher, had been that of structural adjustment (SA). Structural adjustment conditioned aid receivers to processes of privatization and free market policies. Countries receiving aid were subject to World Bank (WB) and IMF policies that dictated how the country's economies should be reorganized according to neoliberal ideals. These included the liberalization of trade, devaluation of national currency, removal of subsidies and the deregulation of prices and interest rates to name a few.[104] As de Waal points out, this created a system where governments within the developing world had to answer to international funding agencies rather than their constituency.[105] Budgets were drawn up based on fiscal responsibilities towards donors and lenders rather than on socio-economic realities within the respective countries.

It was within this kind of climate that Japan emerged as a major donor of foreign aid. By the end of the 1980s Japan had claimed the status of an economic giant and accordingly had begun to utilize its vast economic resources as a foreign policy tool in the form of foreign aid. The history of Japan's foreign aid dates back all the way to the 1950s when Japan joined the Colombo Plan designed to promote social and economic development in the Asia-Pacific region. Since then the main focus of Japan's foreign aid contributions has been East Asia. The region has received approximately 60 % of Japan's bilateral aid donations annually. In the early years Japan's aid philosophy was

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[104] Olukoshi 2000 pp. O-P.
[105] de Waal 1997 pp. 627-28.

wrapped around the idea of furthering domestic exports but the geographic expansion of its aid program put the country under pressure to adapt to prevailing aid discourses.

Japan entered the new aid regime after a sharp increase in its ODA budget. The energy crises of the early 1970s had prompted Japan to increase its foreign aid spending to ensure more stable resource flows from developing countries. At the 1978 G7 Bonn Summit Japan had pledged to double its ODA within three years by adopting its first Medium-Term Target in ODA.[106] During the summit, special attention was given to the world's poorer countries, namely the countries of Africa. It was expected that this would increase the overall share of aid distributed to the Least Developed Countries (LDC). In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa this had a profound effect on the amount of aid targeted to the region by Japan: by the beginning of 1990s the amount of aid directed to the region had grown almost five-fold from 200 million USD to nearly one billion USD.[107]

With the collapse of the Soviet Union the WB and IMF led aid regime relying on privatization and liberalization seemed to have emerged victorious. At the same time however, impeded by the growing economic power of Japan, expectations for a more active role in international affairs had emerged both within the country as well as outside. Responding to these expectations, Japan, besides expanding its foreign aid programme, took on the task of formulating a distinct aid philosophy. One of the more visible results of this process was the 1992 ODA Charter that, for the first time, laid out rough guidelines for Japan's aid disbursements. But more significant had been the adoption of SA programmes within the WB – IMF aid discourse. All of these developments would be featured in the first of a series of conferences related to African development issues held in October of 1993 in Tokyo.

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[106]   G7 1978 "G7 Communiqué Bonn, Germany, July 17". For G8/7 declarations: (http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/index.htm).
[107]   OECD 2010 (http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/).

3.2.3 Conference diplomacy

The first conference on African development (TICAD I) was a manifestation of a subtle process that had been going on in the background of Japanese foreign politics since the middle of the 1980s. Hosting an international conference related to development cooperation meant that Japan had a forum for articulating its own views on the matter. The 1980s had witnessed major changes in the field of development aid that had left Japan somewhat uneasy as to its role as a major donor. Hosting the conference was at once a culmination of Japan's involvement with the African continent until that point and at the same time the beginning of a redefinition in Japanese involvement in the development aid debate. Japan's entry on the stage of international development cooperation had come about more on the premises of an increasing aid budget reflecting the size of the country's economy rather than through a conscious effort to promote a distinct development agenda. Questions of 'aid leadership' had sprung up as the country's aid budget grew.[108]

The immediate result of the conference, the Tokyo Declaration[109], encompasses the ambiguous nature of Japan's aid philosophy in the African context: detachment guided by an Anglo-Saxon agenda and foreign political aspirations emanating from a leading position within the East Asian sphere of influence. The first can be seen in the way Japan incorporates the debate on structural adjustment into its overall development policy while the latter brings forth the question of the 'East Asian Miracle'. These topics are found among the six priority areas included in the document: 1) political and economic reforms, 2) economic development through activities of the private sector, 3) regional cooperation and integration, 4) emergency relief and development, 5) Asian experience and African development and 6) international cooperation.[110] Structural adjustment is discussed under the first while the 'Miracle' is touched upon in the fifth section. These two themes illuminate the way Japan was trying to manoeuvre within a world order that demanded conformity, in the form of adhering to the 'Washington

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[108]   Rix 1989 pp. 461.
[109]   See Annex I pp. 94 for the declaration.
[110]   TICAD I: Tokyo Declaration 1993.

Consensus'[111], while at the same time encouraged a more affirmative leadership role in line with the size of the country's economy and ODA disbursements.[112]

The detachment of Japan is apparent already in the formation of the conference. Alongside Japan, the conference was co-organized by the UN and GCA. This multilateral approach was in line with Japan's foreign political experience with the continent. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, Japan's relations with Africa, excluding South Africa, had been almost non-existent before the turn of 1990s. As Japan's colonial reign had only extended to its immediate neighbours, it didn't have the same kind of incentive felt in Europe and the US for African development. One major exception to the rule was Japans trade relation with the apartheid regime of South Africa.

The declaration espouses an agenda set forth by the leading actors in world development during the 1980s and 1990s.The beginning of the 1990s saw great changes in the world in ways unimaginable just a few years earlier. The collapse of the Soviet bloc meant that the U.S. led Western order had emerged victorious from the Cold War. The superiority of a market-driven ideology was thus established as a norm both within interstate politics and in the field of development cooperation. Changes of this magnitude in international relations had their impact also within Japanese discourse on development aid and on the role of ODA as a tool of foreign policy.[113]

Adherence to structural adjustment policies penetrates the declaration, even receiving a mention of their own under the heading 'Political and Economic Reforms'. What is interesting, though, is that the rigid nature of SA programmes is acknowledged in the document. The declaration suggests that more emphasis should be placed on the distinct nature of each country participating in SA programmes. This echoes the opinion held in Japan that development cannot be achieved through a one-size-fits-all solution. Another point of contest is the way SA programmes are dictated from the outside, thus

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[111] The Washington Consensus refers to a set of neoliberal economic policy conditions offered to mainly developing states by global financial institutions, namely the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These policies include, among others, removing barriers for international trade, lowering tariffs and privatization.
[112] OECD 1996 pp. 11-12.
[113] MOFA 1991.

effectively removing recipient agency. Japan had promoted the idea of 'self-help' in its relations with aid recipients in the Asian region. Nonetheless, a clear sign of Japan's involvement in SA was given by the Deputy Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata in his policy speech during the conference. According to him, countries accepting the necessary reforms would be applicable to non-project type grant assistance totalling in the region of 700 million USD.[114]

3.2.4 Approaching development

The significance of structural adjustment regime for Japan's aid to Africa has been demonstrated by Howard Stein. In his study on structural adjustment programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa Stein showed how Japan reacted to the emergence of a U.S. led aid regime on the continent. By analysing the statistical data on aid disbursements Stein concluded that, since its adoption, SA policy-based funding featured quite vividly in Japan's total aid spending during the latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s.[115] The analysis revealed not only the emergence of SA policy based funding but also its effects on Japan's aid contributions to countries participating in structural adjustment. Rather than directing more aid to countries with closer economic ties to Japan, more emphasis was put on whether or not a country had accepted the SA mechanisms.

The paradigm shift, from the basic human needs approach to the need for structural adjustment that occurred in mid-1980s, came about due to concerns over the ability of the governments of the developing world to pay the debts incurred during the previous decade. According to a WB report, developing countries found themselves in dire economic straits that had their origins in poor internal macroeconomic policies and external shocks. The first included overvalued exchange rates and increased spending, while the latter was embodied primarily in the 1970s energy crises that necessitated increased lending from financial institutions and other nations.[116] The idea behind structural adjustment policies was to move away from centralized economies by

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[114] MOFA 1993b "Policy Speech by H.E. Tsutomu Hata, Deputy Prime Minister and Ministry for Foreign Affairs".
[115] Stein 1998 pp. 38-9.
[116] Mills 1989 pp. 6.

privatizing government owned companies and services while getting rid of price control mechanisms and letting a free market system to set in.

The SAPs necessitated for the first time Japan to take a stand on development policy. The basic question was the role of the state in inducing or inhibiting development. According to the WB and the IMF, the role of the state should be minimal: guaranteeing a stable environment for private sector operators and ensuring the best possible conditions for investment both from domestic and international sources. Although Japan had gone along with the multinational financial institutions plans, by the early 1990s it had done so increasingly grudgingly. A study by Rie Taniguchi and Sarah Babb illustrates Japan's growing discontentment towards the 'Washington Consensus' and the country's efforts of promoting an alternate view on development.[117] Among the main points in Japan's opposition were the factors that had contributed to the so called 'East Asian Miracle'. This miracle was in essence the ability of Japan, as well as the newly industrializing countries of the region, to maintain high figures of growth while simultaneously providing basic social services on an increasing scale.

Japan's take on the issue was that the government played a significant role in guiding the industrial growth and subsequent increase in living standards in the East Asian region. However, the 1993 *East Asian Miracle Report*, published by the World Bank did not arrive at the same conclusion. Although funded by the Japanese government and including contributions from high-ranking Japanese scholars, the overall findings were a let-down as they did not deviate from the neo-liberal agenda put forth by the financial institution.[118] The key issue, according to Robert Wade, was the question of whether or not development aid in the form of direct-credit programmes to selected key industry sectors could engender positive results in the economies of developing countries.[119]

Within this context the Declaration's promotion of a possible connection between East Asia's success and Africa's future comes to life. Timing also plays an important role. The report had been published already in September of that year so the contents and the

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[117]   Taniguchi & Babb 2009 pp. 289.
[118]   Ibid. pp. 292.
[119]   Wade 1996 pp. 7-8.

view of the World Bank on the matter had been available to the organizers. The fact that the declaration takes up the question of an East Asian economic miracle is a testament to Japan's global aspirations for a strengthened role in the field of development aid.

Japan being one of the co-organizers contrasts the segment with prevailing development prescriptions. Although not directly challenging the Anglo-Saxon model of free market idealism, this part of the declaration nonetheless questions the validity of a single transferable model, even going so far as casting doubt on whether or not Asia's experiences can be used as examples. Still, the fact remains that the inclusion of an 'Asian experience' narrative within the document is an attempt at widening the scope of discussion. Conference proceedings and documents offer a way of reaching consensus and bringing about new norms and policies.[120] The first TICAD was a proving ground for Japan's aspirations for a more clearly defined international role. The country had to balance between the demands of dominant aid regime and a sense of purpose engendered by the success of an East Asian development model, whether or not the premise for this had been proven.

3.2.5 Something to prove

At the time of the first conference, Japan was still in the process of defining its role in the overall context of international development co-operation. The beginning of a new decade had brought forth intensified criticism towards the way Japan operated within the international community. The most obvious example had been the Gulf crisis where Japan had been accused of 'checkbook diplomacy', meaning the use of economic resources rather than human and military capabilities. A sense of urgency for Japan's international role matching that of its economic prowess had appeared and this urgency found willing actors within the development aid forum. The first TICAD came about during a time of reconfiguration and readjustment of Japanese development policy. It was at once a testament to the number one donor status that Japan had gained a few years earlier and an attempt by the country to display what it had to offer to the international development cooperation community.

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[120]   Mulikita 1999 pp. 13.

3.3 TICAD II

3.3.1 Refining aid

The five years between the first and second TICAD witnessed a Japan that was starting to come to terms with a changed world order and its own role in it. Harsh lessons had been learned when the apartheid regime of South Africa was overturned, leaving Japan for a while in a confused state regarding the nature of the bilateral relation.[121] The end of the Cold War meant a drastic reduction in *gaiatsu*, or foreign pressure, on Japanese foreign policy, as geopolitical considerations gave way to promotion of free market idealism and democracy movements.[122] The confusion felt in Japan was in part due to unclear nature of the country's ODA, or more specifically, the lack of guiding principles. This was before the adoption of the first ODA Charter in 1992.

The charter, adopted already before the first conference, laid out the basic philosophy for Japanese ODA (self-help efforts by developing countries), principles by which ODA should be distributed (sustainable development, monitoring trends in military spending of recipient countries, pro-democracy and free market systems) and priority areas of ODA (focus on Asia, ensuring basic human needs and supporting the building of infrastructure).[123] However, the charter also laid out a path for the coming decade. Although, as the charter admits in the very first lines, the document had come about due to foreign pressure on clear aid policy guidelines, it nonetheless cemented the attitude of Japanese officials concerning the priorities, form and model foreign aid should take. Asian experience was tied intricately with the promotion of self-help, as this had been the recipe for success for Japan.

Japan's redefinition of its aid policy did not end here. Coming in the wake of planned cuts in the ODA budget, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs set up a council on ODA reform in 1997 with the task of improving transparency and effectiveness of foreign aid.

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[121] Alden 2002 pp. 377-78.
[122] See Akitoshi 1999 for an explanation of gaiatsu in Japanese foreign aid debate.
[123] MOFA 1992: Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter.

More importantly, reform was needed as the field of foreign aid had exploded into a plethora of approaches: some insisting on environmental issues to be given centre stage while others emphasized the need for improved gender sensitivity.[124] Among the findings were the definitions for Japanese involvement in African development. Since the realities in Africa, especially the Sub-Saharan region, consisted of a stagnated economy and high levels of absolute poverty, Japanese ODA would be needed and essential in helping the region's countries achieve development.[125]

3.3.2 On precarious grounds

The first conference had ended on an ambiguous note. Although international attention for the African dilemma had been achieved, the question remained what, if anything, would come next? The most tangible contribution for an intensified African recovery coming out of the conference, on the Japanese side, was the promise of grant aid for potable water projects totalling from 250 to 300 million USD in the next three years.[126] The non-pledging nature of the conference cast a shadow of doubt on whether or not any actual results would be forthcoming. This critique stemmed from the same frustration that had been prevalent since the 1970s: the unwillingness of major donors, including Japan, to reach the 0.7% target of aid when compared to GNP[127]. On average, the major donors had reached a level of 0.3%, with only a select few going as high as 1%.[128] Also, the fact that TICAD I didn't include actual projects mandated by the proceedings was taken as a sign that the international community wasn't serious about the issue of African development. This, according to Rasmusson, is a misinterpretation of the purpose of TICAD: the process should not be seen as a forum for additional aid pledges but rather as a venue for engaging African countries and their development partners.[129] The concepts of 'ownership' and 'partnership' are key in unlocking the purpose of the process.

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[124]   MOFA 1998a "Council on ODA Reforms for the 21st Century – Final Report".
[125]   MOFA 1998a.
[126]   MOFA 1993c (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1993/c2_2_2.html).
[127]   Clemens & Moss 2005 pp. 10-11.
[128]   Birdsall 2005 pp. 16.
[129]   Rasmusson 2003 pp. 4-5.

The second conference did however start to build up speed already in 1994, when Japan, together with the government of Indonesia, the UN Secretariat, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and GCA, organized the first Asia-Africa Forum (AAF) in Bandung, Indonesia. Held as a follow-up to TICAD I, the AAF continued on the path laid out in the Tokyo Declaration.[130] These included the sharing of experiences by Asian development partners on issues ranging from structural adjustment to agriculture and economic infrastructure. The Bandung Framework for Asia-Africa Cooperation adopted at the forum mentions the pragmatic relationship between government and the private sector in Asia and urges the African participants to follow a similar path. This pragmatism in the Japanese case can be interpreted as a somewhat closer relationship between the public and private than free market ideologists would agree on. The second Asia-Africa Forum in Bangkok, Thailand, continued on these lines while at the same time putting emphasis on the importance of agricultural development.[131]

3.3.3 Stepping up to the plate

TICAD II was organized at a time when Japanese prominence on the field of development cooperation was at its peak. The number one donor status the country had taken at the turn of the decade had only been strengthened during the first half of the 1990s. The status reached its peak in 1995 when Japan's ODA disbursements totalled 14.5 billion USD or ¼ of the global ODA.[132] More importantly, Japan had shown that it was willing and capable to assume a role suited for that position. ODA had been recognized as a central pillar of Japanese foreign policy, made more important by the signs of 'aid fatigue' shown by other DAC countries.[133] Japan had made a point of not only maintaining high levels of ODA disbursements but also having an active role in various international forums on development issues. Although Japan came under criticism in terms of aid quality, for example focusing on higher education rather than

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[130]   UN 1994.
[131]   UN 1997.
[132]   OECD 2010.
[133]   MOFA 1995 (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1995/chp2_2.html#1_h).

on primary[134], it gained praise for stepping up its international role, especially during the Asian financial crisis of 1997. But during this time Japan didn't rely solely on its vast economic resources. The country's profile as a foreign aid power house was confirmed on numerous occasions as it took charge of directing the course of development discourse, finally bringing them all together for the second conference.

The outcome of the second conference, the Tokyo Agenda for Action (TAA)[135], solidified Japan's take on development. Like its predecessor, the document is a testament to its time by declaring as the primary theme poverty reduction but with a Japanese twist. The shift towards an approach that would emphasize more than a restructuring of a recipient country's economy had begun already in the early 1990s. Development professionals and scholars had noted that the most vulnerable groups were left outside when deciding on a particular course of action.[136] Pro-growth policies were supplemented by a more 'human centred approach' that took into consideration for example the state of a country's social sector. During the conference, under Japan's guidance, the participants agreed on an approach that could be labelled as 'poverty reduction through economic growth'. Japan's input can be seen in the way infrastructure was named as one priority area, in line with Japan's aid priorities laid out in the country's ODA Charter.

Compared to the first conference, the end result had some meat over its bones. Not only did the document reaffirm the international community's resolve to the challenge of African development, but it took a clearer stance on what that challenge meant in concrete terms. What was remarkable about the document is how it formulated the complex questions of development into clearly defined goals. These goals were laid out in the Action plan of the declaration. Section 1, under the heading *Social development and poverty reduction: promoting human development*, included targets to be achieved by either 2005 or 2015 in education, health and gender issues. The targets widened the scope of poverty from the norm of per capita income to questions of livelihood, education and participation in mutual matters.

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[134]   OECD 1999.
[135]   See Annex II pp. 101.
[136]   Serageldin 1989 pp. 50-52.

There is an obvious reason for this approach: a few years earlier Japan had been an active force in formulating the DAC report on how the global community should tackle development issues in the 21st century. The report, *Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation*,[137] which was also welcomed at the next G7 meeting in Lyon,[138] laid out for the first time concrete and measurable targets for different developmental issues such as hunger, poverty and education. These International Development Goals (IDGs) would later be adapted as the Millennium Development Goals.[139] The DAC report had a profound impact on the development debate and Japan was acknowledged as a significant part of the overall proceedings. The forum for the debate could not have been more opportune for Japan. The DAC consists of all the major donors of foreign aid with the World Bank, IMF and UNDP taking an observatory role. Although not guiding the disbursement of foreign aid of its members directly, the DAC nonetheless operates as a discussion forum where aid policies come under a critical light. The mechanisms for this are the periodical peer reviews.[140] More than the targets, Japan had emphasized the role of developing countries in engendering positive results, solidifying its own approach of 'ownership in the South, partnership globally'.[141]

On the surface these two documents, the DAC report and TAA, read as if written using the same template. The goals for eradicating extreme poverty, improving access to education and health services, reducing the death rate of infants and children and ensuring environmental sustainability are almost word for word identical. This is not surprising as Japan had been very active in the DAC, suggesting the inclusion of specific goals into the report on a new development strategy.[142] These goals were then easily brought into preparatory discussions on the next TICAD.[143] A notable exception

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[137] DAC 1996.
[138] G7 1996 "G7 Economic Communiqué: Making a Success of Globalization for the Benefit of All, Lyon, France, 28 June".
[139] Hulme 2009 pp. 25-27.
[140] DAC webpage (http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_33721_1_1_1_1_1,00.html).
[141] MOFA 1997a (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1997/I-a.html#15).
[142] MOFA 1996b (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1996/c_5.html).
[143] MOFA 1998c "The Second TICAD – The First Preparatory Committee Meeting, Co-Chairmen's Summary".

is made by TAA in the role of ODA. While the DAC report made a reference to the UN target of 0.7% of GNP as a part of the responsibility of the donor community, the TAA only mentions "adequate levels of ODA" or how it is essential to "optimize the use of ODA resources that are available".[144] This is in line with the non-pledging nature of the conference, placing more emphasis on creating a more efficient environment for existing aid levels.

The TAA however goes into more detail in how poverty reduction, the main agenda for the 21st century, should be pursued by African countries. Agriculture is named as a key sector in a number of fields: improving livelihoods, ensuring sustainable development and gender issues. By picking up agriculture, the participants acknowledged the realities of the continent and how improvements in one specific sector could act as a catalyst for other developments. At the same time, a focus on agriculture was a sign of Japan's approach to the continent. Efficiency could be brought about by improving the technical side of cultivation, focusing on new crops such as a new variety of rice and agriculture would be yet another field where African partners could benefit from Asian experiences.

But what stands out the most from the TAA is the emphasis on private sector development and especially the role industry should play in Africa. Here Japan had most to offer, since the country had been basing its aid philosophy on promoting the improvement of economic performance and creating an export-oriented economy in the Asian region. Dialogue both within Africa between government and the private sector and inter-regionally based on the experience of NICs was named integral in creating a vision for African development.

3.3.4 From forum to forum

Japan's prominence on the field of development cooperation was noticeable between the first two conferences. The two forums, the DAC of the OECD and G7, had offered Japan an opportunity to show off its capabilities in directing the foreign aid debate. The

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[144]   TICAD II pp. 2.

African question was brought forth again in 1997 at the G8 Denver Summit where a partnership for African development was endorsed by the participants.[145] The United Nations had also been a venue for Japanese initiatives: in 1995, the minister for foreign affairs, Yohei Kono, had addressed the 50th General Assembly with the objective of urging the adoption of a 'new development strategy' where a "comprehensive approach" including ODA, trade and macro-economic policies would be complemented by an "individual approach" that would take into consideration the distinct characteristics of each developing country.[146] The adoption of international development targets was also brought forth by the Japanese representative thus heralding the eventual rise of a new aid regime in the beginning of the 21st century.

This was a natural evolution of Japanese aid philosophy. Although the debate on the 'East Asian Miracle' had ended on a stalemate, it had nonetheless helped mature Japan's agency among other major donors. The positive feedback from the first conference had encouraged Japanese officials to take the African issue into other forums where the country's position could be reiterated, thus creating an environment more susceptible for further policy suggestions. At the same time Japan could use these opportunities to hone its own national interest in the African context. Besides the often cited need to procure energy and mineral resources, the African continent had offered very little in the way of political or economic gains.[147] The chance to appear as a leading proponent of African development, on the other hand, could prove to be a stepping stone in "globalising its [Japan's] foreign policy".[148] This meant complying to international practices in aid policy while at the same time asserting a distinct identity by reiterating the 'Asian miracle' narrative.

The incorporation of the International Development Goals was not the only noteworthy item on the TAA. Tied to them were the twin concepts of 'ownership' and 'partnership' that Japan had been promoting since the end of the first TICAD. Again, Japan shows consistency by adhering to the guidelines found in the ODA Charter. In essence,

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[145]   G8 1997.
[146]   MOFA 1996a (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1996/II-b.html#2).
[147]   Eyinla 1999 pp. 421.
[148]   Ibid. pp. 422.

ownership means the active involvement of aid receiving countries and their attempts at achieving a 'take-off' through self-help measures. This basic philosophy has its roots in Japan's own history of managing to build a ruined nation into one of the most powerful economies in the world in only a few decades. In the TAA this philosophy is painstakingly made clear as every goal is accompanied by a division of labour between African countries and their donor partners in the conference. Thus for example, African countries are encouraged to establish time-bound strategies for assisting the most vulnerable while the development partners will actively monitor these poverty-reduction programmes under the heading '1.3 Other measures to assist the poor'.

The detailed distinction between the responsibilities of African countries and their international partners reflects a shift in the global aid debate during the 1990s. Development cooperation had been a testing ground for donor driven solutions, mainly dictated by the international financial institutions.[149] These solutions included the SAPs and other free market approaches that were aimed at integrating developing countries into a global economy. However, after two decades of implementing these processes the donor community had to come to terms with the negligible results. A pressing issue was the lack of agency on the recipient side, as having to accept foreign intervention in the form of economic assistance maintained a relation based on unequal terms. Tomohisa Hattori has shown that this inequality doesn't go away even when with the increase of grant aid on the expense of loans.[150] What was needed was an approach that would allow the recipient to have more control over aid allocation and as a result would engender domestic solutions to pressing issues.[151]

3.3.5 A waning champion

Yet again, as was the case with TICAD I, the second conference can be seen as a culmination of a period in Japanese aid history. By seizing the opportunity of heralding African development in various international forums, Japan was able to promote itself as a conscientious and active member of the global aid community and therefore worthy

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[149]   Owusu 2003 pp. 1666-69.
[150]   Hattori 2001 pp. 646-48.
[151]   de Renzio et al. 2008 pp. 1-2.

of its number one position in terms of aid distributed. The Tokyo Agenda for Action reiterated the same principles and course-of-action found in the DAC report for the 21st century, thus solidifying Japan's status as a major player in the foreign aid debate.[152] Japan's active involvement in the various international forums mentioned above helped give prestige to the same issues discussed by African countries themselves, as Japan emphasized at every turn the need for African ownership of the continent's development. This sentiment can be found in the way TAA refers to the 1995 Cairo Agenda for Action that had laid out a path for African development.[153]

By championing the concepts of 'ownership' and 'partnership' Japan not only helped to formulate an international development strategy but it was also responding to domestic pressures brought about by fiscal restraints. The delegation of responsibility to recipient countries was at once a healthy adjustment towards empowerment and agency but it could also be seen as a sign of Japanese donor fatigue. Going from 'quantity to quality' was a nice way of rephrasing the cutbacks in foreign aid disbursements as improvements in quality had already been under way in the form of an ODA Charter. A new development strategy heralded by the Japanese government through its twin concepts laid down a foundation for a more reciprocal relationship between North and South. This relationship would find its way into the emerging aid regime of the new millennium embodied in the PRSPs and MDGs.

3.4 TICAD III

3.4.1 Domestic constraints and global revitalization

Coming into the third conference of 2003, Japan had had to come to terms with a decade of stagnated domestic economic development. Throughout the 1990s, Japan had been able remain as the number one donor of ODA, although the absolute amount had

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[152]   MOFA 1999 (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999/ov2_2_02.html#c_2_2).
[153]   OAU 1995: "Relaunching Africa's Economic and Social Development: The Cairo Agenda for Action.

started to decline after 1995. Japan lost the number one position to the United States in 2001.[154] The fiscal structural reform enacted in 1997 had solidified the decline of the country's ODA budget coinciding with administrative reforms in the corresponding ministries.[155]

Internationally, the global aid community had witnessed the emergence of a new aid regime, embodied in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Building on the work of the DAC, the international community had convened the Millennium Summit in 2000. The end result, the Millennium Declaration, reaffirmed the international community's commitment for development efforts and established the goals to be reached by 2015.[156] The document also put the question of African development into limelight as the continent had not been able reproduce the positive results achieved in the emerging economies of Asia and Latin America.

Alongside the MDGs, the international aid community had adopted another set of policies designed to facilitate a more efficient and productive development cooperation process. Responding to a call for more equal and participatory approach, the international financial institutions had come up with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the overall Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF). While the former laid out the actions a participating country would have to take in order to achieve poverty reduction, the latter was a document in which a developing country defined the priorities and programmes needed to reach the goal through a domestic consultative process.[157] The CDF thus incorporated the idea of 'ownership' in a very concrete way as it made it the recipient country's responsibility to draft an appropriate framework paper.

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[154]   MOFA 2002 (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2002/part1_1_2.html#sh_3).
[155]   MOFA 1998b (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1998/II-b.html).
[156]   UN 2000: The Millennium Declaration.
[157]   IMF 2002.

3.4.2 The rocky road to TICAD III

The third Asia-Africa Forum (AAF III) was convened in May of 2000 as a follow-up activity to TICAD II. Focusing on the two productive sectors found in the TAA, agriculture and private sector, the forum produced the Kuala Lumpur New Millennium Statement that continued on similar lines as the previous ones, promoting the incorporation of Asian experiences into African development practices.[158] However, the ministerial-level meeting held in December of 2001 in Tokyo provided Japan a head start in paving the way for an international recognition of a development vision emanating from Africa.[159] The African countries had agreed on a programme for the continent's future called the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and this document would soon start its tour on the international stage. At the meeting it was confirmed that for the TICAD to efficiently support NEPAD, the process should be strengthened. The participants also noted the importance of a continued process in the face of new challenges emanating from international terrorism. Thus one of the central pillars in TICAD, keeping African development as a priority in the international community, was agreed on.

One of the most important diplomatic events in Japan-Africa relations occurred in January 2001, when the first incumbent Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, visited the continent. In a speech given at Midrand, South Africa, Mori reiterated Japan's commitment to the African cause and announced that TICAD III would be held in the future.[160] The trip to Africa was as much about reaching out diplomatically beyond the Asian region as it was about reassuring Japan's development partners of the country's continued dedication for their cause in the face of domestic changes.

These changes, as already mentioned, were due to the fact Japan had had to come to terms with its low-performing economy. In 2001 the US had reclaimed the top position as a donor of ODA, while Japan had continued the cuts in its own aid budget. A decade

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[158]   MOFA 2000.
[159]   MOFA 2001b "Chair's Statement of the Ministerial-level Meeting of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)".
[160]   MOFA 2001c.

of aid leadership had brought about 'aid fatigue', a condition most visible in the decline of aid disbursements. Adding insult to injury, during the period of stagnation, the aid fatigue had affected also the general public in Japan, turning their attitudes towards ODA relatively negative.[161] Internationally the turn of the new millennium had brought about a new drive for development efforts that had materialized in expanding ODA budgets. Japan was thus cast into an unflattering light, compelling the country to seek out new ways of remaining in the ODA game.[162]

In order to answer to both the international concerns and the change in domestic attitude, Japan turned to a solution that had proven its usefulness in the past. A focus on aid quality rather than quantity was seen as a way to reassert Japan's position. Within the donor community, this meant a re-examination of development priorities and philosophy. The ODA Charter, embodying these aspects of Japanese foreign policy, had come under scrutiny as well, as the world faced new challenges in the form of international terrorism. The fiscal restraints put on ODA had necessitated the relevant stakeholders to examine the way available resources could be used to maximum efficiency. The end result of this process was a revised ODA Charter adopted in 2003 The charter announced the objective of Japan's ODA was to "contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan's own security and prosperity".[163] Japan could thus relate to the world a renewed commitment to the common cause.[164]

3.4.3 Changes in the international development regime

As discussed in Chapter 2, the period from 1980 until the first half of the 1990s can be described as an era of adjustment in the global foreign aid debate. The period was dominated by IMF and WB led policies requiring aid receiving countries to adhere to strict macroeconomic conditions. A change in policies started becoming apparent during

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[161]   OECD 2003 pp. 19.
[162]   MOFA 2003a.
[163]   MOFA 2003b.
[164]   MOFA 2005b.

the second half of the decade, as even strict adherence to adjustment policies had not yielded expected results.[165]

The adoption of the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and especially its operative part, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), was on the one hand a reaction to poor performance under the 'structural adjustment' regime. At the same time, the 1990s had witnessed the emergence of a plethora of development paradigms. From human rights to disease control all the way to access to basic services, different stakeholders were promoting different approaches. Added to this, the increase in aid budgets and donors, governments in the South were struggling between donor demands and suggestions and their own claim to sovereignty.[166] Dependence on aid did not alleviate the problem.

With the adoption of the PRSPs an effort was made to incorporate those stakeholders that had been left outside of previous paradigms and as a consequence had suffered more than mere deprivation. The concept of 'ownership' was thus expanded beyond the governmental institutions to include those stakeholders of development that had been denied participation, such as women.[167]

Ownership was not only handed down from above but was complimented by fact that the countries of Africa had taken an initiative at the turn of the century. By first establishing the African Union (AU) and secondly adopting the NEPAD as its development arm, African countries had indicated to the rest of the world that the continent was willing, if not able, to carry its share of the load. The predecessor of AU, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), had been criticized as being inflexible and weak in the face of continuing human rights abuses and conflict since its inception in 1963 and so a new body for a unified Africa, one that would rise to meet the challenges of the 21st century, was needed.

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[165]   Pender 2001 pp. 405-6.
[166]   Williams 2006 pp. 6-9.
[167]   TCSF pp. 18-19.

NEPAD was coined as a linkage that would facilitate international donor activity in the African context. As Africa had been pinpointed as one key area of the Millennium effort, there was a need for an African counterpart for integrating the practices of the donor community.[168] The link was confirmed in the implementation declaration handed to the UN in 2002 where the participants of NEPAD promise to adhere to the newly emerging practices of CDF and PRSPs.[169] This constituted a return to the mainstream of contemporary development regime as poverty reduction through the mechanisms described above had become the norm.[170]

3.4.4 A decade of processing

Ten years of TICAD related activities and developments in the international arena had accumulated into recognition of a shared African agenda by donors and recipients alike. This sentiment was not without its challenges. Since the previous conference, the world had once again gone through a tumultuous period, much like in the early years of TICAD. On the negative side, the 9/11 attacks on the twin towers in New York had made it painstakingly clear what rising inequality and persistent poverty could produce. Regional conflicts brought on by scarcity and deprivation could, in a global world, extend beyond national borders in the form of international terrorism.[171] Development efforts thus incorporated within them the concept of security, as improving livelihood standards and increasing access to both services and decision making bodies were seen as diminishing the chance of conflict.

On the other hand, the period between the second and third conferences had been a time of intensifying interest in African affairs, heralded to a large extent by Japanese initiative. In addition to extending the first PM visit to the continent, Japan kept the momentum going in a number of venues. In 2000 Japan started a practice in the G8 that has been maintained since. At the request of the hosting government, leaders from three African nations, South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria, were invited to attend the Okinawa

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[168]   de Waal 2002 pp. 469-70.
[169]   UN 2002a pp. 26-27.
[170]   Hope 2002 pp. 400-1.
[171]   Sunaga 2004 pp. 2.

summit, thus extending the reach of the forum outside the economic giants.[172] Carrying on the torch of Africa within the G8, Japan found its efforts bearing fruit when, in 2002 the participants announced the adoption of the 'Africa Action Plan' at the Kananaskis summit. The plan included a strong commitment by the G8 for an African owned vision for development.[173] Japan could thus claim a small victory in its pursuit towards a broad acceptance for the concept of 'ownership' by aid receiving countries.

The G8 plan was more than complimented with the adoption of the Johannesburg Declaration Sustainable Development, coming from the World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in South Africa 26th August-4th September the same year. The Plan of Implementation following the declaration affirmed the emergence of Africa as an assertive partner. The document also acknowledged the contribution of the TICAD process in engendering an environment for a global African agenda.[174] Coming into the third conference, an international agenda for developmentalism had emerged, based on the common drive for poverty reduction. The twist for the new millennium was the emergence of active participants in the South. The challenge for TICAD III was thus how to incorporate these new frameworks into the existing process.

The Tenth Anniversary Declaration[175] of TICAD III was a chance for the participants, and especially Japan to take stock of the past decade. What had started as a single diplomatic event brought on by a shift in the geopolitical atmosphere had by the new millennium evolved into a process with regular post-conference proceedings and a distinct message. The legacy of the previous two conferences was transformed into a vehicle for a deeper cooperation as the parties involved acknowledged the unique nature of TICAD: that of not a series of conferences but an evolving process that aimed at increasing the ownership of African countries in their own development paths.[176]

The overarching theme for the third conference was to respond to Africa's own efforts at integration into the global aid community. As the TICAD process had carried the torch

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[172]   ODI 2008 pp. 4.
[173]   G8 2002.
[174]   UN 2002b pp. 44.
[175]   See Annex III pp. 118.
[176]   MOFA 2003f.

of African ownership, it was only natural that it would adopt a development strategy originating from the continent. Coming into TICAD III, NEPAD had already been circulated in other major international arenas where reception had been enthusiastic and positive. This tour was in part organized for raising awareness for an indigenous framework. Donor conditioned development had failed the continent so more space for policy guidelines thought of by recipients themselves was in call. Besides awareness, there was a calculated effort to exhort additional assistance as ownership without resources was not enough.[177]

The tenth anniversary of the TICAD process offered an opportunity for Japan to solidify the conference process as a staple in the field of international summits. Building around the body of material that had been produced since the last conference, Japan situated itself, as the host of the process, at the centre of the emergent African agenda.[178] The narrative was built around the central pillar of "awareness raising", following a dramatic arch from crisis to resolution. According to the narrative, in 1993 Japan was compelled to act, as the rest of the world was walking by Africa. Five years later as the world trembled under the economic quake emanating from Asia, Japan once again stepped up and convened the second conference. All the while in the sidelines Japan continued to press for the acknowledgement of the core principles needed for a genuine push for development, those of the frequently mentioned 'ownership' and 'partnership'.[179] The result, from the Japanese perspective, was quite impressive. By the third conference, a *de facto* African agenda had emerged, embodied on the African side by the adoption of NEPAD and the subsequent successful recognition tour it was taken on in the major international forums from the UN to the G8.[180]

The twin concepts that had originated ten years previously, had found their way into not only declarations coming from the TICAD process but also other major international forums, the latest of which had been the G8 Summit in Evian in June of that year.[181] The consistency shown by Japan in bringing its views under public scrutiny had been

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[177]   UN-NADAF 2002.
[178]   MOFA 2004a.
[179]   MOFA 2003d (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2003/part1_2_1_4.html#s_3).
[180]   Owusu 2003 pp. 1664.
[181]   G8b 2003.

made possible in part by the way TICAD had been organized since the beginning. Although hosted by Japan, the conference had as its co-organizers the UN, GCA and the World Bank. This multilateral approach, while dividing some of the authority between the different parties, nonetheless enabled Japan to present its own ideas as more universal than it would have been able to do alone. But as the process was refined with each conference and the preparatory meetings between them, the nature of Japan's involvement began to grow in prestige. By drawing a parallel between Africa's past inability to determine its own faith and that of Asia's success on its own terms, Japan was able to validate its own activity within the development aid community. At the same time however, by emphasizing the 'Asian way' as a solution to Africa's problems, Japan inadvertently eroded African agency. By denying the existence of a universal development model, while at the same time insisting on the applicability of the Asian experience in the African context, Japan painted itself in an ideological corner.[182]

Building on this development vision, Japan had taken an initiative in importing a new concept into the global aid debate. As mentioned in Chapter 3.1.3, the 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report* had first introduced 'human security' to the global aid community. The idea had been to expand not only on the definition of traditional security from military perspectives to an individuals capabilities and possibilities but also on what constituted development. Overconsumption of resources that the North had based its success on would not yield positive results if applied worldwide.[183] As Japan's foreign policy had rested on the country's economic shoulders, it needed something else to carry the weight. Lessons learned from 'chequebook diplomacy' had been put to use in drafting and revising the country's ODA policy. Human security offered yet another chance for Japan to show its peers how it could assume ideological leadership.[184]

Major diplomatic manoeuvrings had accompanied Japan's embracing of this new concept. Already in 1999 the UN Secretariat and the Japanese government had established the Trust Fund for Human Security (TFHS). Financed solely from Japan, the

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[182]   Edström 2010 pp. 31-32.
[183]   UNDP 1994 pp. 18.
[184]   Edström 2008 pp. 149-50.

TFHS soon became a vehicle for projects that MOFA had the last say in.[185] The TFHS acted as a stepping stone for Japan into promoting the new concept on a global scale. After announcing the establishment of a commission on human security at the UN Millennium summit in 2000, Japan could claim to be on the forefront of the international development debate. Confirmation for this came in the aftermath of the release of the report on human security by a commission headed by Japan's Sadako Ogata and the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen in 2003. The concept was referred to, for example, at the G8 Summit in Evian of that year.[186] Naturally, the concept found its way into the anniversary declaration. Junichiro Koizumi, the Prime Minister of Japan, in his keynote speech also referred to Japan's commitment of 'human security' in the African context.[187] Emphasizing the devastation infectious diseases and conflict cause the people of Africa, Koizumi used the TICAD platform to announce a 1 billion USD grant assistance over the next five years, making a reference to a similar pledge made at TICAD II.

3.4.5 New kids on the block

Japan's interest in promoting the concept of 'human security' can be viewed as a response to the lack of recognition the country suffered with the MDGs. Japan had been a major contributor to the formation of IDGs, the predecessors of the millennium goals and had, since the first TICAD, eagerly promoted the attainment of these goals, both within and outside the process[188]. Although highly supportive of the development paradigm coming from the Millennium Declaration, there still remained some doubts in Japan to the extent poverty reduction could be achieved by focusing solely on increased aid commitments at the expense of growth promotion.[189] This sentiment reflected the sense of loss felt in Japan over the fact that Japan's financial contributions have not been met with the appropriate level of recognition regarding ideological leadership.[190] The ambivalent nature of 'human security' made the concept easy to introduce in various

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[185]   Edström 2008 pp. 162-63.
[186]   G8 2003a "Chair's Summary, Evian, 3 June 2003."
[187]   MOFA 2003c.
[188]   Amiya-Nakada 2007 pp. 81-2.
[189]   Akiyama & Takao 2005 pp. 12-13.
[190]   Ohno & Ohno 2002 pp. 5-6.

forums but at the same time removed any concrete meaning from it.[191] The concept was a pragmatic solution to pressing issues of Japanese aid agency.

Even more significant than the stock-taking and incorporation of the concept of 'human security' during TICAD III was the recognition that the initiative had become a staple of the international development regime focused on Africa. Realizing this, it would be important to maintain the momentum and continue to develop relationships in a more institutionalized manner.[192] In the emergent 'millennium agenda' the centrality of the African question had empowered Japan into pursuing a more active role in relation to the development debate. By tying the TICAD process intricately with its counterpart in Africa, NEPAD, Japan secured a confirmation for its efforts in the past ten years.

After jump-starting the debate on African development, Japan began to pursue its own course within the overall framework, while it gained momentum. But the new millennium brought with it not just a renewed interest in the world's poor that had had its origins in the new security regime that tied terrorist threats with their socio-economic origins.[193] Development actors outside the privileged club of the DAC began their emergence on the international stage, China being the most prominent of them. For Japan this meant a serious challenge as not only did China begin to approach the African continent from a more equal position as it still remained a developing nation itself but also the form of China's aid closely resembled that of Japan's with similar targets and means of delivery.[194]

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[191]   Edström 2008 pp. 258-9.
[192]   MOFA 2003f.
[193]   Woods 2007 pp. 14-15.
[194]   McCormick 2008 pp. 80.

3.5 TICAD IV

3.5.1 When opportunity knocks

The institutionalization of the TICAD process during the previous conference had meant that the African partners and the international development community could rely on a future conference to be held sometime before the turn of the decade. However, despite the high spirits at the end of TICAD III there still remained a lingering doubt whether or not Japan would be able to host a fourth conference.[195] These doubts were finally alleviated in 2005 when Koizumi announced on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Asian-African Summit in 1955 that Japan would host TICAD IV in 2008.[196]

The timing of the fourth conference offered a unique opportunity for Japan. Japan was in line to host the years G8 Summit in Hokkaido. These two major diplomatic events were quickly linked together with the intention of bringing the results from TICAD to the attention of the major economic powers.[197] Priority areas for the fourth conference had been drafted during preparatory meetings, as had been the case throughout the process. These included 1) boosting economic growth, 2) ensuring 'human security', including the achievement of MDGs and 3) addressing environmental issues and climate change.[198] Thus, the fourth TICAD had from the get-go a distinctly Japanese agenda as both economic growth and 'human security' had been associated with Japan's approach to development in the past.

These priorities had emerged first during the TICAD Asia-Africa Trade and Investment Conference (AATIC) held in Tokyo in November of 2004. AATIC had been convened in order to raise awareness on the potential of trade and investment between Asia and Africa and had been supported by both TICAD stakeholders and NEPAD. The conference produced a joint declaration that outlined the way for Africa to reach

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[195]   Lehman 2005 pp. 442.
[196]   MOFA 2005a.
[197]   TICAD 2008 pp. 5.
[198]   Ibid. pp. 5.

prosperity, that of pursuing poverty reduction through economic growth.[199] Attaining and maintaining growth was even placed as a prerequisite of achieving the MDGs and it was recognized that the sentiment had been growing in popularity in different international forums.

The period leading from TICAD III to the fourth conference had been marked with a definite increase internationally in interest towards Africa. This had offered Japan ample opportunities to promote its continuing commitment to the TICAD process. The 2005 Asian-African Summit held in Bandung had granted Japan the opportunity to once again identify itself as a major partner of African development. Prime Minister Koizumi used this opportunity to announce the doubling of ODA to Africa within three years as well as reiterating the need for allowing African states to determine themselves appropriate courses of action, in line with Japan's development philosophy.[200] In addition, Koizumi referred to the fact that for Japan the year 2005 had been celebrated as the "Year of Africa" in which the TICAD process had been utilized for increased international cooperation for Africa.

3.5.2 A year of hosting

Africa had remained a high priority also on the G8 forum. The 2005 Summit in Gleneagles had prioritized the continent in its communiqué under the headline "A historic opportunity". The same kind of positive sentiment would carry on into the next TICAD. The 2005 communiqué not only confirmed the central position held by the AU and NEPAD in fostering African ownership and their responsibility in ensuring good practices but also emphasized the centrality of private sector development and economic growth through investments in infrastructure as essential for reaching goals of poverty reduction.[201] Supplementing the communiqué, the Africa Personal Representatives had produced a progress report on the 2002 Africa Action Plan adopted at the Kananaskis summit. The report noted the strong connection between TICAD and Africa's own efforts manifested in NEPAD and the AU and its contribution in enhancing African

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[199]   MOFA 2004b pp. 1.
[200]   MOFA 2005a.
[201]   G8 2005a "The Gleneagles Communiqué- Africa: A historic opportunity".

ownership and international partnership.[202] Thus, both on the level of development paradigms as well as international relations Japan had been able to penetrate the development community.

As the MDGs had become the central focus of development efforts after their launch in 2000, it had become necessary for TICAD and Japan to situate themselves more profoundly within this framework. For this purpose, MOFA had requested an evaluation to be made of the process. The evaluation was carried out under the themes of "relevance of policy", "effectiveness of results" and "appropriateness of processes".[203] The main findings of the evaluation, carried out by third parties, was that Japan had been able, through the TICAD process, to situate itself within the global aid community in terms of adhering to MDG guidelines on policy level.[204] The evaluation also urged Japan to put more effort into areas where it had an advantage when compared to other donors, such as infrastructure. The results were thus highly positive for Japan as they confirmed the validity of the TICAD process while encouraging the country to take a more affirmative stance.

TICAD had also continued to make progress as a major partner of the African continent. At the Tenth Ordinary Session of the AU in January of 2008 in Addis Ababa, the AU assembly had made a decision to strengthen cooperation with the process in preparation for the fourth conference.[205] The assembly acknowledged the role of Japan in "sustained efforts to promote peace and prosperity in Africa".

The agenda for TICAD IV had also accommodated the rise in global environmental consciousness that had occurred in the wake of the recognition of dangers posed by climate change. In the preparatory proceedings, a ministerial conference had been held in Nairobi, Kenya in March of 2007 that had focused on energy and sustainable development. In the Chair's Summary, the participants once again iterated the importance of 'ownership', this time emphasizing the diverse nature of African

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[202]   G8 2005b pp. 33.
[203]   MOFA 2008a "Evaluation of Japanese Assistance to Africa through the TICAD Process".
[204]   MOFA 2008a pp. 2.
[205]   AU 2008.

countries.[206] This emphasis can be seen as echoing the insistence for a case-by-case approach that would undermine the hegemony of Washington Consensus one-stop-shop solutions. As the African continent is among the most vulnerable regions in terms of climate change, the question of tying environmentalism and sustainability with development was taken up by the conference. Japan's experience in building its economy while facing the environmental consequences stemming from uncontrolled industrialization was referred to as a platform for cooperation.

As already mentioned, for Japan 2008 was a year for major diplomacy. Already in January, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, the Prime Minister had seized the opportunity and announced the Japan's plan to start a "Cool Earth" initiative, which would include a partnership mechanism in line with the country's development philosophy. The partnership would involve setting up a 10 billion USD fund for combating climate change in developing countries through green technology, energy efficiency and mitigation.[207] It was a strong start for the year as the same themes would be carried over to May and June, TICAD and G8 Summit respectively.

Coming into the fourth conference, Japan could feel secure about its prominent position in directing the aid debate. At the G8 Development Cooperation Minister's Meeting in April that year, the first that Japan had hosted, the agenda read like it was taken out of a Japanese foreign aid manifesto. The participants emphasized the importance of boosting economic growth to ensure the achievement of MDGs, reducing poverty and enabling self-reliance in developing countries. Human security was recognized as a key concept in defining the way global aid efforts should be coordinated in order to not only alleviate people's suffering but also to empower them to "fulfill their potential."[208]

3.5.3 Yokohama Declaration

The participation numbers of TICAD IV were impressive. With 3000 participants, including representatives from 51 African states, 41 of which were state-level, 34

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[206]   MOFA 2007c.
[207]   WEF 2008.
[208]   G8 2008a "G8 Development Cooperation Ministerials, Chair's Summary, Tokyo, April 6 2008".

development partner countries and 77 international organizations plus others from the private sector and civil society, the conference could undeniably claim to have been a major platform for raising awareness on African development.[209]

The "Yokohama Declaration: Towards A Vibrant Africa" was compiled according to the aforementioned priority areas of boosting economic growth, 'human security' and climate change.[210] The positive developments on the African continent had contributed to the participants adopting the declaration with a forward-looking theme. This impetus was transcribed in the text. Although being mindful of the amount of challenges, the document remarked on numerous occasions the potential and untapped resources, natural and human, available in Africa.

The declaration was a celebration of Japanese aid leadership. The document yet again commended the African countries on their continued pursuit of 'ownership' in their development through the establishment of the AU and its programme arm, NEPAD. 'Partnership' was tied not only to the dedication of the G8 powers and the international aid community but also to Japan's commitment through the TICAD process. Japan's exceptional position was even marked by the acknowledgement made in the introduction when the participants placed Japan at the "center" of promoting the twin concepts in the African development context.

The priority areas of the declaration were expanded on familiar lines that adhered to qualifications found in Japanese aid philosophy. In the area of economic growth, the participants recognized the importance of both industrial development and infrastructure on a regional scale. These sectors, along with increased output from the agricultural sector, were deemed as necessary for sustained economic growth that the continent had been experiencing in the years before the fourth conference. Thus, the priority issues of a focus on poverty reduction through efforts in agricultural development and promotion

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[209]   MOFA 2009 pp. 5-6.
[210]   See Annex IV pp. 124.

of sustainable growth found in Japan's revised ODA Charter from 2003 made their way into the proceedings of TICAD IV.[211]

Human security was once again a topic of discussion. The declaration and the action plan both approached this concept from the point of view of the MDGs. The declaration identified the millennium goals as "Economic and Social Dimension of "Human Security". The Chair's Summary however handled the relation as parallel rather than intertwined, commenting on the correspondence of the targets and objectives set during the process with the MDGs.[212] The persistence with which Japan had and continues to pursue the wider acceptance of 'human security' can be explained by the country's eagerness in representing itself as a viable candidate for aid leadership. The vague notion of promoting "freedom from want" as well as "freedom from fear"[213], has been embraced by the Japanese with relative ease. The idea is not to limit the scope of the concept so that it means only one set of things but to rather use the concept pragmatically in implementing Japanese aid actions.[214] These actions then would translate in the global aid community as a distinct Japanese approach.

Accompanying the declaration, the participants also adopted the Yokohama Action Plan.[215] In the plan Japan was once again placed at the "center" of the TICAD process and was commended on its dedication. The most significant aspect of the action plan, in regards to Japanese credibility and standing in the global aid community, was the confirmed dedication of a continuing TICAD process. The priority areas from the declaration were outlined in terms of measures to be taken in the next five years. However, the actions to be taken remained quite ambiguous. For example, under the priority area of agriculture, in an effort to increase productivity, the action to be taken was for the TICAD process to seek alignment with NEPAD's Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). Concrete projects were thus replaced with a focus on expanding action a discursive level.

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[211]   MOFA 2003b.
[212]   MOFA 2008c.
[213]   CHS 2003 pp. 4.
[214]   Edström 2008 pp. 258.
[215]   See Annex V pp. 131.

Other measures in the same priority area emphasize the importance of technological solutions, such as developing new crop varieties and utilizing more efficient farming technologies. Japan's input is easily detected here as the country had been an ardent advocate of New Rice for Africa (NERICA), a variety of rice that combines the high yields of an Asian parent and the ability to survive in harsh conditions found in an African parent.[216] NERICA was singled out among the actions, embodying not only a key to African prosperity, but also the Japanese aid philosophy of 'partnership' and improved South-South cooperation.

Throughout the declaration Japan was singled out as a significant partner in various sectors. This prominence could be attributed to the announcements the Prime Minister had made of both doubling ODA to the African region by 2012, a feat it had announced and completed once over during the three previous years[217], and increasing efforts for doubling direct investments from the Japanese private sector between 2008 and 2012. Japan went as far as allowing the ODA and investment pledges to make their way into the Yokohama Action Plan, thus exposing them to more concrete peer pressure in case of unfounded optimism. These signs of commitment to the African cause, including the Cool Earth Programme with its 10 billion USD fund for developing countries, should be considered as feats of strength from a country that had had to rely on economic prowess in diplomatic affairs. Although emphasizing at every turn that the TICAP process would not be a platform for additional aid pledges, Japan had utilized the conference platform on several occasions, either directly or indirectly, for its own announcements on additional or supplementary aid pledges.

3.5.4 Symposium

The post-war success story of Japan in building its economy was highlighted in a joined symposium titled "TICAD IV International Symposium on "Economic Development in Africa and Asian Growth Experience"[218], the results of which were brought to the main conference. Attended by such prominent figures as Donald Kaberuka, the president of

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[216]   MOFA 2002b.
[217]   MOFA 2008b pp. 29.
[218]   JICA 2008.

the African Development Bank (AfDB), Meles Zenawi, the Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Joaquim Alberto Chissano, former President of the Republic of Mozambique, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania as well as the then current Chair of AU and headed by Sadako Ogata, the President of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the symposium held discussions on the state's role in maintaining sustained economic growth and as a result inducing development.

After an opening address by the president, the symposium was opened by a video greeting from Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate in economics and a professor at Columbia University. During his video message, professor Stiglitz regretted the fact that African economies had not heeded the lessons to be learned from the East Asian experience in formulating their economic policies. Although admitting that the role of the state can also be harmful, professor Stiglitz also reminded the participants that the free market can cause disasters on a very different scale, as had started to become evident in the sub-prime crisis originating from the United States.

From there the symposium heard the presentations of the aforementioned panel members. President Kikwete of Tanzania started by expressing a common view in Africa of Japan being dependable friend of the continent. He then continued by describing Tanzania's path in industrialization since its independence and how the state had influenced, or rather through ill-choices, had stifled growth. He concluded by reiterating the need for industry promotion in Africa along the lines of the Asian and Japanese experience.

Prime Minister Zelawi used his turn to deride the prescription solution offered to the African continent in the last two decades, an unyielding free market ideology that had led to economic stagnation. Referring to professor Stiglitz, Zelawi criticized the 'Washington Consensus' of ignoring the active role the state had had in promoting growth in East Asia and Japan. Being mindful of not stepping into the same hole of policy orthodoxy, Zelawi admitted that Asia as well as Africa consisted of a huge number of states, all of which had their own distinct qualities. Turning to pragmatism,

the role of the state, according to him, would nonetheless be essential in building infrastructure, a prerequisite of sustained economic growth. He concluded by expressing his desires for an expanded uptake on lessons from Asia.

Former President of Mozambique, Mr. Albert Chissano focused in his speech on his country's experience in rebuilding a civil war torn nation. Emphasizing the need for an all-inclusive approach that incorporates not only the public and private sector but civil society and individuals as well, Chissano stresses the importance of partnership that goes beyond national borders. Putting the concept of partnership into context, Chissano mentions the construction of an aluminium smelter plant by the Mitsubishi Company as an example of North-South-South cooperation, as the initiative gathered together not just Japan and Mozambique but also neighbouring countries.

The last presenter, president of the AfDB Donald Kaberuka summed up the preceding discussions by reiterating the important lessons to be learned from them. Firstly, the African development agenda should be constructed on a pro-growth basis. In order for growth to emerge, the state's role would need to be more substantial than it previously had been for the state is the only body that has the resources to ensure stability and encourage the private sector to operate efficiently. Secondly, infrastructure is not only essential for large scale projects but also for individuals who want to take advantage of opportunities not available in their immediate surroundings. All of this is tied to the path of development, or as Mr. Kaberuka calls it "sequencing issue". African development could be a success if it tried to follow the sequence of providing the agricultural sector all the support of the state and with that output, would follow a course of trading and strengthened institutions on a secure infrastructure basis.

The results of the symposium, with its impressive list of participants, illustrate the way Japan was able to take advantage of this rare opportunity. Hosting two major conferences almost back to back enabled Japan to showcase rarely seen leadership skills. The tenacity with which Japan has continued to pursue the validity of its 'Asian miracle' narrative is a testament to the country's clear vision of its place within the global aid community. As the AfDB president Kaberuka mentioned in his symposium

presentation, the 1997 Asian financial crisis dealt a serious blow to the narrative.[219] Before the crisis, the economic success story of the East and South East Asian region had engendered a positive response from developing countries, especially on the African continent, regarding the kind of development path they should follow. Japan's involvement in the success story, through yen loans and focus on economic infrastructure, had imbued the country with a sense of purpose regarding the rest of the developing world.

The TICAD-related Asia-Africa Forums were established for the purpose of creating a more enabling environment for the transfer of economic lessons emanating from Asia.[220] Added to this, the country's own experience in rebuilding a devastated nation in the post-war era, the development vision of Japan had become fused with notions of a strong state managing the course of a country's development path. This sentiment resonated strongly with the members of the developing countries from African region, who had been seeking recognition for their own agency since the 1980s. During that time they had had to conform to outside pressure embodied in the structural adjustment programmes. This is contrasted with Japan's vision of a continent that could and should take charge of not only its development but also the economic policies needed for it. Japan's vision is also a refreshing change in the current climate of MDGs and poverty reduction narrative that utilizes imagery of absolute poverty from a region long seen as nothing but a drain on international resources.[221]

The symposium was a chance for Japan to validate it's somewhat discredited approach to development. The promotion of the 'Asian miracle' narrative is an indication of how, within the multilateral framework of the TICAD, Japan has started to take more and more bold steps. The perfect example is the inclusion of a need for UN reform within the official conference items, an agenda Japan has pursued feverishly the past two decades.[222] Under the heading "5.0 Consolidation of Peace and Good Governance" the Yokohama Declaration calls for reform at the UN, singling out the Security Council

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[219]   JICA 2008 "Presentation by Donald Kaberuka, President of the African Development Bank Group".
[220]   Eyinla 2000 pp. 226.
[221]   Yamada 2010 pp. 73.
[222]   MOFA 2005d, MOFA 2011b.

among the main bodies. In this way Japan is trying to create a supportive environment for regime change through the medium of conference diplomacy.

3.5.5 G8 and Beyond

As promised by Japan, the results of TICAD IV were carried over to the G8 Summit held in Hokkaido, July of that year. As the year 2008 had been dedicated as the midpoint for realising the MDGs, development and African issues would have been highly relevant topics for the Summit even without a TICAD. In the Chair's Summary, the participants highlighted the importance of a private sector-led economic growth in Africa, the dominant theme of the fourth conference.[223]

The summit also held an outreach session focused solely on development and Africa.[224] The leadership of Japan was evident in the session document as all the staples of Japanese aid philosophy are present in it: pro-growth bias, mention of 'human security' and calls for a more broad partnership. Issues of global health are also named as a priority area. Japan had been a key player in the establishment of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2002 as, at the 2000 G8 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit, the country had announced the Okinawa Infectious Disease Initiative through which Japan not only implemented health-related assistance but also raised awareness on the importance of disease control.[225] The most striking feature of the outreach session was however the section on Africa. Taking the title from the Yokohama Declaration, the section basically reiterated the proceedings of TICAD IV. Japan was thus successful in integrating a process it had increasingly taken control of, into the proceedings of the world's leading economies.

Through the latest conference Japan was able to overcome some of the fatigue that had set on the domestic foreign aid field. Taking an active stance and promoting the African cause in multiple forums following the period from the third conference marked Japan's

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[223] G8 2008b "G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit, Chair's Summary, July 9 2008".

[224] G8 2008c "G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit, Development and Africa, July 8 2008".

[225] MOFA 2005c "Health and Development Initiative (HDI) – Japan's contribution in achieving the health related MDGs".

attempts at diverting criticism from its declining aid budget. This focus on quality on the expense of quality has unfortunately distinguished Japan from the rest of the donors in the years following 9/11, breaking the narrative of Japanese exceptionalism.[226] Part of this focus has been the formalization of TICAD with its ministerial meetings and conferences. As a part of the latest TICAD, the participants of the conference also set up a follow-up mechanism for the TICAD process. As fiscal constraints have remained in place, thus inhibiting Japan from assuming the economic leadership in aid for the foreseeable future, TICAD has been essential in acting as a bridge in linking Japan's aid policies and visions to international initiatives.

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[226]   MOFA 2006b.

Conclusion

The documents coming out the TICAD process reveal the evolution of Japanese foreign aid policy at the turn of the 21st century. By the first conference Japan had emerged as the top donor among the members of the DAC. At the same time however, the bewilderment caused by the international community's reaction to Japan's inaction during the Gulf War sent shock waves throughout the relevant ministries.[227] The shock was compounded by criticism of Japan not following its financial contributions in ODA with appropriate development vision.[228] Thus the first conference showcased the first attempts by the Japanese to define a distinct model. Timing ensured maximum exposure: the conference was held during a time when aid fatigue towards the African region was at an all-time low.

At the turn of the millennium Japan had to come to terms with its declining ODA budget. Looking at the conference documents it becomes evident that Japan made every effort to offset the decrease in aid disbursements by maintaining a momentum in both the process itself as well as with the items on discussion during the individual conferences. Thus the process carries an overall theme throughout, emphasizing donor-recipient cooperation and changes in development discourse are integrated into the proceedings. At the height of Japan's reign as the top donor, the country had a chance to influence the development community but failed to impart any recognisable features to the new paradigm of poverty reduction. The predecessor of the MDGs, the International Development Goals of the mid-90s, was that chance. Having missed that opportunity, though not because of lack of effort, Japan opted to promoting the concept of 'human security'.

The Japanese view on development has come about due to part disillusionment, part the desire to step forth on the international stage as willing and responsible member. Around this view Japan has attempted to create a narrative where the country has emphasized its special nature among the other donors of foreign aid. Not only is Japan

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[227]   Green 2001 pp. 203-4.
[228]   Ibid. pp. 233-34.

the sole non-Western donor but its post-war economic history has been a source of validity for its approach to development. The significance of offering the 'Asian model' to the developing countries of Africa was not as a solution for the problems plaguing the region. Rather it was the fact that it embodied a "voice of dissent" against the dominant discourse that undermined the agency of aid receiving countries.[229]

The creation of a narrative has taken its impetus from the often mentioned 'Asian miracle'. As the lead goose of the flying geese of Asia, Japan has had to struggle with gaining international recognition for its narrative, especially within the powerful financial institutions. The TICAD process has been used as a medium for gaining international prestige, as other venues have proven resistant to Japanese persuasions. The multilateral nature of the conferences has diluted the Japanese approach to the extent that Japan has been able to exhort the participants to validate the narrative within the process. The best example of this is the symposium on African and Asian economic development from TICAD IV during which prominent figures expressed views highly complementary of the Japanese approach.

The TICAD process has enabled Japan to manoeuvre within the developmentalist regime. As foreign political constraints have necessitated Japan to rely on foreign aid as a central pillar of foreign policy, the country has come face to face with conventions that frame the discourse on development. These include conforming to existing practices, such as a preference on grant aid. Japan has utilized the TICAD process for both integrating existing discourses within its own foreign aid policies and also for carving out a distinct agency. The first can be seen in the way Japan has reacted to changes in the development regime, such as the rise of MDGs as well as adjusting the TICAD approach itself. After the first conference, Japan responded to criticism concerning the ambiguous nature of the Tokyo Declaration. The Tokyo Agenda for Action that was adopted five years later laid down more concrete measures for international cooperation towards Africa. The same happened with the latest conference that added a more institutionalized follow-up mechanism.

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[229]   Pazim 2008 pp. 7.

As the TICAD process has evolved, it has become more and more a platform for promoting a Japanese agenda on development. This might reflect the declining importance of the process itself. Although participation in numbers has grown steadily, changes in the global economic and political climate have made it poignantly clear that a development forum that focuses solely on expanding dialogue without concrete measures, such as new financial flows, cannot justify its existence. At every turn Japan has emphasized the non-pledging nature of the TICAD process having all the while used the opportunity offered by high-level international forum to gain diplomatic points by announcing TICAD -related projects or ODA increases. This unpredictability gets lost in the overall continuum that emphasizes the twin concepts of 'ownership' and 'partnership'.

The concept of 'ownership' warrants some additional discussion. Donor conditionality had harmed the receivers of foreign aid during the adjustment period so a solution was sought in increasing agency on the receiving side. Ownership means not only increased say but the concept also changes the nature of development discourse from interventionist to cooperative. In the Japanese context however, ownership is understood through the developmental state paradigm where a country's sole purpose is to promote development. The key is self-help and the medium for it is preference on loans. According to the reasoning, using loans to finance projects creates a virtuous cycle of economic growth and independence as having to pay back the loans requires more effort than receiving grant aid. This philosophy is distinctly Japanese as it draws from the country's experience in the post-war era. Sharing these mutual experiences of nation-building with developing countries has been met with some success but convincing other donors of the validity of Japan's approach to ownership is another story. At the same time however, the concept is used to remove some accountability from the Japanese side by insinuating that any failure in achieving development will be due to lack of effort by those receiving aid. Whether or not Japan has been successful in defining how 'ownership' is understood in the global aid community will be for subsequent research to find out.

The distance created by a multilateral approach has had its benefits and drawbacks for Japan. The inclusion of different UN bodies and financial institutions has made the TICAD process part of the emergent developmental regime of the new millennium. The exact bodies involved in TICAD are worthy of noting. The fact that UNDP became one of the co-organizers of the process is significant in that the body's approach converges more with that of Japan's on key issues than with those of the IMF or WB. On the debate on market versus state relevant UN bodies have questioned the free market policies as a viable solution for achieving development. However, Japan has had to sacrifice part of its prestige by going multilateral. By not taking on the African issue on its own Japan has raised doubts concerning the country's dedication and resolve.

On the whole, the TICAD process has become yet another notch on Japan's belt in its bid to become a member of the United Nations Security Council. The mention of the need for UN reform in the Yokohama Declaration has clear motives behind it. The African group in the UN consists of 54 member states and is the largest regional grouping. Japan is well aware of the voting potential found in the group, noting that "since the establishment of the African Union (AU), Africa increasingly tends to vote as a single bloc, which further adds to Africa's influence."[230]

Unfortunately, Japan is not alone in recognizing the importance of a developing Africa. China has not only expanded its economic presence in the region but has also taken up holding similar high-level diplomatic forums since 2006. What is even more detrimental to the Japanese agenda is how China has followed its ever increasing financial contribution to the region with a political agenda that emphasizes commonality of goals and solidarity between the countries of the South. These common goals include the reform of the UNSC, a move that would certainly make any plans of Japan's inclusion void.[231] Working from an intermediary level, as it doesn't belong to the G8, China is able to assert a sense of equality that is lacking in the donor-recipient relationship

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[230] MOFA 2006a pp. 120.
[231] FOCAC 2009 "Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012)".

between the rich North and poverty stricken South and this has been noted within Africa.[232]

There is an opportunity for Japan to raise its profile in the coming years. The next TICAD is to be convened in 2013, according to schedule. The UN Millennium Development Goals that have been integrated into the process have their deadline in 2015. While progress has been made practically everywhere, Africa and especially Sub-Saharan Africa might not be able to reach the targets by 2015.[233] Japan has seized the opportunity provided by two decades of focus on Africa. During the Third Ministerial Follow-Up Meeting of TICAD in Dakar, Senegal in May of 2011, Japan was able to create a continuum for the upcoming MDG follow-up meeting in June of that year in Tokyo.[234] But if the fifth conference turns out to be nothing more than a gathering of state officials and empty rhetoric, Japan might have to relinquish its precarious hold on African development to the same countries on whose development legacy Japan has built its narrative.

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[232]   Sautman & Hairong 2007 pp. 90.
[233]   UN 2011.
[234]   MOFA 2011a "Communiqué of the Third TICAD Ministerial Follow-up Meeting in Dakar, Senegal, May 2- 11".

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ANNEX I

Tokyo Declaration 1993

At the first Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD I), the entire gathering of over 1,000 participants from 48 African countries, 13 donor countries, international organizations, observer countries and other groups, including civil society organizations, adopted the Tokyo Declaration on African Development.

The Declaration was the conference's expression of agreement on the search for dynamic international cooperation for development in Africa.

The Tokyo Declaration, subtitled "Towards the 21st Century," states:

We, the participants of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), consisting of African countries and Africa's development partners, declare with one voice our continued dedication to the development of Africa towards a new era of prosperity. We, therefore, solemnly adopt the present Declaration, in the firm belief that it will serve to strengthen an emerging new partnership for sustainable development of Africa based on self-reliance of African countries and the support of Africa's development partners.

Background

1. Africa's economic and social crises of the 1980s highlighted the development challenges faced by this Continent. To address these challenges, many African countries have embarked on far-reaching political and economic reforms. We, the participants of TICAD, are encouraged by signs in recent years of both positive macro-economic performance and political development resulting from those reforms. In so doing, we nevertheless recognize the continued fragility and vulnerability of Africa's political and economic structures and situations that inhibit the achievement of sustainable development. TICAD intends to give further impetus to these reforms, taking into account the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF).

2. With the end of the Cold War, African countries and the international community now have an opportunity to share a broader common understanding of the need for dynamic development cooperation. The development of the Continent has emerged as an imperative in our search for a better future.

3. While special consideration should be given to obstacles confronting Africa, we are determined to strengthen our collective forward-looking efforts for the development of the Continent. This has been the spirit in which we have conducted our deliberations on the issues central to sustainable development in Africa.

4. These issues include the on-going process of simultaneous political and economic reforms, the necessity of increased private sector participation in domestic economic activity, the promotion of regional cooperation and integration, and the detrimental effects of humanitarian emergencies on Africa's socio-economic development. We recognize that the Asian experience of economic development and the catalytic role of international cooperation offer hope and provide a challenge for African economic transformation.

Political and Economic Reforms

5. Convinced of the advent of a new international era, we, the African participants, reaffirm our commitment to pursue and further strengthen political and economic reforms, in particular democratization, respect for human rights, good governance, human and social development, and economic diversification and liberalization. To achieve sustainable, broad-based economic growth, we, the participants of TICAD, believe that more open, accountable and participatory political systems are vital, including a stronger role for civil society. We recognize that political, economic and social reforms must be initiated and carried out by African countries themselves, based on their visions, values and individual socio-economic background. Africa's development partners should therefore support African initiatives in these areas.

6. We, the participants of TICAD, recognize that simultaneous implementation of political and economic reforms, while conducive to development, may often entail painful transition processes. The interaction between political and economic reforms, which over time should be mutually reinforcing, is a complicated process which requires support to bring about progress. We, Africa's development partners, reaffirm our commitment to providing priority support to countries undertaking effective and efficient political and economic reforms. We, the participants of TICAD, also reaffirm our commitment to enhancing constructive dialogue to facilitate the reform processes.

7. We, the African participants, reaffirm our commitment to improving the quality of governance, in particular, transparency and accountability in public administration. We recognize that criteria for public expenditure should aim at enhancing overall socio-economic development and reducing non- productive expenditures. The building of human and institutional capacities for sustainable development is essential for all of these objectives. We commit ourselves to creating the enabling environment for training, retaining and effective utilization of human resources and improving institutional capacities. We, Africa's development partners, will enhance our support for African capacity building including improved technical assistance.

8. We, the participants of TICAD, reaffirm that structural adjustment programmes should take more actively into consideration the specific conditions and requirements of individual countries. We reiterate that political and economic reforms should ultimately lead to the alleviation of poverty and enhanced welfare of the entire population. To that effect, structural adjustment programmes should contain, more than in the past, measures to improve the access of the poor, in particular, to income-earning opportunities and to effective social services, while seeking to shield them as far as possible from adverse social consequences. Increased priority should be given to

investment in human capital through nutrition, health and education programmes, especially to improve the situation of women and children. Additionally, noting that the overall economic development in Africa has not kept pace with Africa's rapid population growth, we recognize the importance of sound population policies and call upon African Governments and the international community to address this issue within the socio- economic development process.

Economic Development through Activities of the Private Sector

9. The private sector is vital as an engine for sustainable development.

We, the participants of TICAD, agree that though foreign aid has an impact on development, its role is only supplementary in magnitude and catalytic in nature. We recognize that a workable and practical cooperation between government and the private sector is a key factor for development. A climate of trust between these two actors should be encouraged and interaction promoted. We realize that political and economic stability is a pre-requisite to commitments for long-term investments.

10. We, the African participants, are determined to continue policies which foster a greater role for the private sector and which encourage entrepreneurship. While stepping up deregulation measures, we will provide and maintain, in cooperation with our development partners, physical infrastructure and viable administrative, legal and financial institutions.

We consider in general the informal sector as a source of vitality for African economies which deserves support in order to further mobilize entrepreneurial capacity, generate employment, and to facilitate the transition into the formal economy.

11. We, the participants of TICAD, are convinced that further improvements in financial systems and practices are needed to stimulate domestic savings investment, and to prevent and reverse capital flight.

12. In support of these efforts, we, Africa's development partners, shall continue to provide assistance in order to improve the enabling environment which requires economic reforms and privatization, the building of human and institutional capacities, and the development of financial intermediation. We recognize the importance of appropriate insurance and guarantee schemes to protect private enterprises investing in Africa from political and economic risks.

13. We, the African participants, affirm the central importance of international trade to our future development prospect. We, Africa's development partners, will work to facilitate market access for African products globally and to assist in upgrading and diversifying African exports. We, the participants of TICAD, support the vital role of private associations such as the African Business Round-Table and confirm the usefulness of investment and trade-promotion initiatives within Africa and between Africa and the rest of the world.

Regional Cooperation and Integration

14. We, the African participants, reaffirm our vision and aspiration for ultimate regional integration and cooperation goals as embodied in the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community. We, the participants of TICAD, realize that although these goals have been, since the early years of independence, a logical development strategy for African countries, most of which have small national markets, greater efforts must now be made in promoting inter-regional trade and investment.

15. We, the African participants, will ensure that our commitments to regional schemes are fully incorporated in our national development plans, policies and programmes.

16. We, Africa's development partners, welcome and support the renewed commitment to regional cooperation and integration as has been recently demonstrated by African countries. These regional arrangements should continue to be consistent with the multilateral open trading system, and contribute to trade expansion. We will continue to extend our support to African countries' efforts aimed at reducing obstacles to integration through measures such as reduction of trade and investment barriers and policy harmonization, and to viable regional endeavours particularly in the area of infrastructure development and capacity building. We, the participants of TICAD, believe that regional integration should also be pursued by encouraging private sector initiatives, adopting consistent and gradual approaches for broadening exchanges and rationalizing existing schemes.

Emergency Relief and Development

17. We, the participants of TICAD, note with great concern that over the last two decades, and particularly in recent years, that a large number of African countries have suffered and are still suffering from natural and man-made disasters. The international community has responded generously to these situations since the early crises in the 1970s.

18. These disasters have constrained development in many African countries, destroyed the very basis for development, increased the number of refugees, and diverted human and financial resources that otherwise could have served development purposes.

19. We, the participants of TICAD, realize that man-made disasters are the result of a complex interplay of political, economic and social factors. In this context, lack of democratization and respect for human rights and the rights of minorities are among the root causes of these disasters.

20. We, the participants of TICAD, accept that responsibility for disaster prevention and management rests primarily with Africans themselves. We, the African participants, are therefore determined to devote our efforts to addressing the root causes of these disasters. We also confirm the critical role of regional cooperation as demonstrated in the past. We, the participants of TICAD, underscore the need to establish effective mechanisms for prevention, preparedness and management of man-made and natural disasters in general, and to strengthen food security schemes in particular. We, therefore, welcome the decision of the Organization of African Unity to establish the

Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and pledge our support to strengthen the effective functioning of this mechanism.

We also reaffirm our willingness to assist victims of disasters, and urge the removal of all hindrances to effective distribution of relief supplies.

21. We, Africa's development partners, having recognized that there is a continuum between emergency relief and development, will ensure that the humanitarian assistance for the affected communities continue to be provided for resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Asian Experience and African Development

22. Over the past 30 years, in contrast to Africa, the countries of East and South-East Asia have achieved high rates of growth in per capita income. We, the participants of TICAD, are mindful that in view of the differing international and internal conditions no one model of development can be simply transferred from one region to another. Nevertheless, we acknowledge some relevance of the Asian experience for African development. The very diversity of successful Asian countries gives hope that lessons can be drawn for African development.

23. We, the participants of TICAD, have noted that as demonstrated by the successful examples of the Asian development experience, the backdrop of development success lies in the combination of a strong commitment by the leadership and the people to economic prosperity, appropriate long-term development strategies and functional government administration to pursue these strategies coherently.

24. We have also noted that the policy factors which contributed to the remarkable performance of East and South-East Asia have included
(1) the rational application of macro-economic policies and maintenance of political stability, (2) the promotion of agricultural production through technological research and innovations as solid basis for socio-economic development,
(3) long-term investment in education and human resource development as priority of development strategy,
(4) market-friendly and export-led policies to advance and adapt modes of production in order to increase opportunities for trade and economic growth,
(5) measures to stimulate domestic savings and capital formation by developing financial intermediation and by expansion of banking services at the community level,
(6) policy emphasis on the private sector as an engine of growth and development, and
(7) early implementation of land reform.

25. We, the participants of TICAD, recognize that development achievement in East and South-East Asia have enhanced opportunities for South-South cooperation with Africa. We welcome the interest shown by some Asian and African countries in promoting this cooperation.

International Cooperation

26. We, the participants of TICAD, have concluded that the current situation in Africa calls for increased solidarity among us to act in full partnership to address this situation. This new partnership should be based on Africa's objective to achieve self-reliance on the one hand and responsive support by Africa's development partners on the other.

27. We, the participants of TICAD, agree that stability and security are pre-requisites to sustainable development, and that it is essential to make efficient use of scarce resources and to minimize military and other unproductive expenditures.

28. We, the participants of TICAD, realize that development calls for full participation by the people at all levels, who should be galvanized toward action as agents for progress. In this regard, we acknowledge the dynamic and diversified role of African women in various sectors of the economy and recommend that special measures be taken to promote their rights and roles in order to enhance gender equity and to remove all legal, social and cultural barriers for advancement of women. Furthermore, we recognize the need to enhance cooperative efforts with local NGOs and other institutions of civil society which play constructive roles for African development.

29. We, Africa's development partners, will make all efforts to enhance development assistance to Africa, despite current global economic difficulties. This assistance will be increasingly oriented toward the priorities set by African countries. In making commitments to continued and enhanced cooperation, we will take into account the expectation of our constituencies that resources be spent where they are most efficiently utilized for the greatest development impact.

30. As African countries are at various stages of development, and have different cultural and historical backgrounds, we, Africa's development partners, may take differentiated approaches as we plan and implement our development cooperation, with due regard to aid coordination.

31. We, Africa's development partners, will apply a comprehensive approach covering aid, trade, debt strategy and investments. We, the participants of TICAD, reaffirm that debt and debt service still pose serious difficulties to many African countries. We emphasize the necessity to urgently address the debt issue within the overall context of debt relief and flows of new financial resources for development. We confirm the validity of the international debt strategy and invite the Paris Club to continue reviewing the question of debt relief for the poorest highly-indebted countries, especially with regard to earlier reductions in the stock of debt on a case by case basis. We urge creditor countries to take into account the difficulties that heavily indebted African countries are now facing.

32. We, the participants of TICAD, reiterate the importance of a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations and will make all efforts to remove trade barriers and other trade practices that prevent the expansion of African exports including exports to other African countries. We underscore the importance of primary commodities for many African countries' export earning and the need for diversification to reduce the volatility of these earnings.

33. We, the participants of TICAD, confirm that United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) agreements should be steadfastly implemented with a special emphasis on balanced relationships among agriculture, population and environment policies, particularly drought and desertification.

34. We also recognize that many of the gains made in Africa are threatened by the HIV/AIDS pandemic and related diseases which are already of a disastrous proportion in some countries. There is a need for a much stronger response by Africa and its development partners, for preventing and controlling these diseases including caring facilities as well as measures addressing its socio-economic impacts.

Follow-up

35. We, the participants of TICAD, pledge to take, in our respective spheres of responsibility, measures aimed at advancing the spirit of this Declaration through effective policies and actions. We have entrusted the three co- organizers of TICAD with evaluating and reviewing progress made towards the implementation of this Declaration. Ultimately, we intend to hold a conference of a similar magnitude and membership at the latest before the turn of the century.

By virtue of the deliberations, guidance and consensus of the conference we believe that prospects for significant development of Africa have been greatly enhanced.

Tokyo, Japan
6 October 1993

ANNEX II

Tokyo Agenda for Action 1998

I. Introduction

1. Africa is undergoing a profound transformation. Since the first Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD-I) in 1993, a number of countries have emerged as open and democratic nations, which are beginning to achieve significant economic growth. Sound political and economic reforms that promote democratic principles and facilitate market-driven economic activity have encouraged this resurgence.

2. Nevertheless, widespread poverty and inadequate policies stunt individual potential in a sizeable number of countries. In most cases, the poorest segment of the population has yet to benefit from overall economic growth. Poverty and inequality contribute to political instability. Violent conflicts ravage the lives of many, and the foundations for durable peace and security remain fragile. Conflicts have to be settled by peaceful means using existing mechanisms of conflict management provided by the United Nations system, the OAU, and African sub-regional organizations.

3. We are therefore determined to build on the progress made since TICAD-I, and renew the resolve to meet the remaining challenges in African development. To this end, we, the participants of TICAD-II, have gathered here in Tokyo to adopt this Agenda for Action. We reaffirm our strong commitment to the actions identified here, which will be followed up by African countries with support and assistance from their development partners in the spirit of true partnership, building on the ownership and priorities of African countries themselves.

II. Primary theme and underlying principles

1. Primary theme: Poverty reduction and integration into the global economy

4. The primary theme of this Agenda for Action for African development is poverty reduction through accelerated economic growth and sustainable development, and effective integration of African economies into the global economy. The challenges of poverty reduction, with a goal of reducing the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty by at least one-half by the year 2015, underscore the importance of economic growth that is equitable, with all segments of the population participating in economic activities and sharing in the benefits. Political and social stability, as well as good governance, is essential for sustainable development. Equally without development, peace and stability are not durable.

5. Poverty reduction requires a multi-sectoral perspective and should be integrated as an objective into all development efforts. It is estimated that the real GDP of African countries would need to grow significantly more than 5 per cent annually for meaningful poverty reduction. Poverty-reducing economic growth requires sound macro-economic policies for financial stability, increased national savings and resource mobilization for productive investment and employment generation to rationalise public expenditures, particularly reducing non-productive activities and concentrating on priority areas, such as infrastructure and social sectors. Improving income distribution, also requires pro-poor strategies and policies, comprising measures that encourage the

development of micro, small, and medium enterprises, revitalise the rural economy, increase the level and quality of government spending on social services, and provide safety net programmes to protect those in extreme poverty. Lessons can also be drawn from the relevant experience of Asian development, especially its focus on human development and institutional capacity building.

6. In 1996, Africa's share of total world trade was less than 2 percent and its share of total foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing countries only 2 percent. Both need to be increased substantially to sustain high rates of growth and facilitate the integration of African economies into the global economy. Promoting trade reform and increasing the inflow of private capital will require African countries to create enabling conditions, including critical infrastructure, legal instruments, and enhanced human capital.

7. Africa's development partners are encouraged to support the development efforts of African countries *inter alia* by providing adequate levels of ODA, promoting (FDI) foreign direct investment flow to Africa, opening markets to African exports, seeking lasting solutions to Africa's external debt burden, and facilitating the transfer of technology.

2. Underlying principles

8. Ownership and partnership are the underlying principles of the Agenda for Action. These principles are embodied in the Cairo Agenda for Action for the economic and social development of Africa. They have also been endorsed in the 1996 strategy of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD for "Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation." TICAD-II provides, therefore, an opportunity to reflect on the implementation in Africa of this strategy, concentrating efforts on achieving specific and measurable goals based on African priorities, as endorsed in various international fora.

(i) Ownership

9. The 1995 Cairo Agenda for Action defines the economic and social development priorities for Africa as determined by Africa itself, and the TICAD-II initiative is in supports of these priorities. Ownership is derived when development priorities, as set by Africa, are pursued. This ownership should be based on a continuous dialogue between government, the private sector and civil society.

(ii) Global partnership

10. African development should be pursued on the principle of global partnership that creates a common framework for cooperation among all development actors, which include African governments, private sector, civil society, and Africa's development partners comprising donor countries, and regional and international organizations. In the spirit of true partnership and mutual commitment, African leadership should guide these concerted development efforts.

III. Approaches and cross-cutting themes

1. Approaches

(i) Strengthening coordination

11. Strengthening coordination among external partners is essential to improve the effectiveness of development cooperation and to optimize the use of ODA resources

that are available. Enhanced coordination between external and national partners and among all actors of society is also vital for reinforcing ownership and partnership. First, improved coordination supports coherent national development strategies that establish clear objectives and targets. Second, strong coordination among external and national partners throughout the process of programme and project planning and implementation would help eliminate duplication among donors and reduce the strain on the scarce human resources of African countries. Third, existing approaches and mechanisms for coordination at the field-level, including the sector investment programmes, Consultative Group meetings, and Round Tables, need to be refined. For African countries to exercise leadership in coordinating external assistance, it is essential to strengthen African capacity to lead the coordination process.

(ii) Regional cooperation and integration

12. Since the adoption in 1980 of the Lagos Plan of Action, African countries have emphasized regional cooperation and integration as important tools for pursuing their development. In an increasingly integrated world, sub-regional and regional groupings provide higher visibility to global investors, promote cross-border trade and investment, and reduce production and marketing costs. African countries and their development partners recognise the importance of regional cooperation for liberalising trade arrangements, developing regional physical infrastructure and institutions, including regional capital markets and research institutes, tackling common environmental issues, controlling infectious diseases, and preventing, managing, and resolving conflict. External support is essential to build and strengthen regional institutions' capacity and further implementation of programmes of African sub-regional economic groupings.

(iii) South-South cooperation

13. In recent years, South-South cooperation, especially since the Asia-Africa fora in Bandung in 1994 and Bangkok in 1997, has demonstrated great potential through the sharing of Asian experiences by African countries. Since 1993, trade and investment between the two regions rose, and, resulting in increased trade and investment flows between the two regions, and growing institutional networking among research and training institutions, and chambers of commerce has been growing. The potential benefits to Africa of Asian-African and intra-African cooperation could be captured further by strengthening its African capacity to learn and apply lessons from other regions' development experiences and by establishing effective mechanisms that promote South-South cooperation in various forms. In addition, triangular cooperation involving developed countries and international organizations can facilitate the expansion of South-South cooperation.

2. Cross-cutting themes

(i) Capacity building

14. To reinforce African countries' ownership of their development strategies, they must strengthen their capacity for the analysis, planning, implementation, management, and monitoring of development policies and programmes. This capacity must be widespread, residing in individuals, organizations, and institutions. To give this critical link new impetus, African countries have recently completed a proposal for a global Partnership for African Capacity Building (PACT). Another approach to enhancing

capacity is to establish an effective cooperation mechanism among research and training institutions in Africa, Asia, and donor countries, as well as international organizations.

(ii) Gender mainstreaming

15. Women play significant roles in all spheres of economic and social life, and make vital contributions to household welfare. Yet, they suffer from lack of access to productive assets and essential social services. Therefore, mainstreaming gender perspectives in all development policies and programmes is critical for empowering women to fully and equally participate in economic and social activities and to better combat poverty. Promoting gender equality, which is an important element of democracy, and advancing women's economic and social status would also increase economic efficiency.

(iii) Environmental management

16. Environmental management is essential for sustainable development, as high population growth continues to place a heavy burden on Africa's natural resource base. Poverty reduction strategies should take into account that as the poor struggle for survival, they tend to rely increasingly on fragile natural resources. Therefore, policies, plans and decision-making processes for African development should reflect pressing environmental issues, including desertification, land degradation, water management, deforestation, biodiversity, and natural disaster prevention and mitigation.

IV. Action plan

1. Social development and poverty reduction: promoting human development

17. Sustainable human development is the ultimate objective of all development. Social development, in turn, helps create enhanced capacity of the poor to participate productively in economic and social activities and improve income distribution. Poverty is widespread in Africa, with the majority of the poor living in rural areas. It is estimated that women account for about two-thirds of the African poor, and the feminization of poverty is an issue that requires special attention. The experience of poverty reduction in East Asia demonstrates that rapid economic growth with equitable income distribution over a sustained period of time can help lift the poor above the poverty line. With regard to social development, sub-sector targets should be set and resources allocated for the priority areas of education, health and population, and special measures for the poor.

1.1 Education

18. Education is central to human capacity building, which was the key to accelerated growth and sustained poverty reduction in East Asian economies. Enhanced human capital is critical for African countries that aim to effectively participate in an increasingly integrated and knowledge-based world economy. The educational challenge is immense. Some African countries enrol fewer than one half of their children in school. And more than one-half of African women are illiterate. Constraints on public resources, inefficient utilization of existing resources, and persistent high population growth make drastic improvements in education difficult to achieve. Breaking the vicious development cycle triggered by a weak human capital base requires a significant acceleration in education development that implies a radical shift

in the way education is financed and managed, and in the priorities, scale and speed of implementation of education programmes.

19. Since educational attainment varies greatly in African countries, they should be considered in the following three categories, with different priority actions for each. In post-conflict countries, actions should focus on rapid resumption of education and rehabilitation of educational facilities. Countries facing low enrolments and low literacy should accelerate participation. Thirdly, countries that have achieved a more developed education system need to sustain education reforms and promote qualitative and quantitative expansion and institutional development.

(a) Goals and objectives

• by 2005, ensure that at least 80 percent of children complete primary education, with universal primary education by 2015;

• by 2005, reduce adult illiteracy to half of the 1990 level, emphasizing improvements in female literacy;

• eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005;

• improve the quality of education, and strengthen linkages between education and employment;

• enhance national and regional capacities in the area of science and technology.

(b) Guidelines for action

To achieve the above goals, African countries will:

i. increase the share of total resources allocated to education, allocate a higher percentage of education expenditures to basic education programmes, broaden the resource base by mobilizing resources from communities and the non-governmental sources, including the private sector, and ensure efficient and effective utilization of resources;

ii. enhance adult education and skill development programmes targeting women and the poorest segment of the population, including literacy programmes in local languages;

iii. improve the quality and relevance of education by strengthening teachers' training, providing improved school curriculum and teaching materials, and building necessary facilities;

iv. promote technical and vocational training aimed at improving labor productivity and increasing the opportunity for employment;

v. develop non-conventional methods, such as distance education and community management of schools, and establish better partnership with NGOs, to improve educational access in under-reached areas.

Development partners will:

i. provide financial and technical assistance to support African countries' education priorities in the context of African governments' sector-wide education programmes, particularly for basic education;

ii. support national, regional, and sub-regional activities to introduce information technologies that expand access to education;

iii. assist in developing national and local capacities for education policy analysis and programme implementation;

iv. support multi-country collaborative programmes that facilitate sharing of experiences.

1.2 Health and population

20. In the African context of high population growth rates and pervasive poverty, health services and facilities in most countries are not only inadequate and in a state of decline, but they also tend to be biased towards urban centers and curative, rather than preventive care. Africa's maternal and infant mortality, fertility, unmet family planning needs are the highest in the world, and its contraceptive prevalence rates the lowest. Improvements in human development and poverty reduction will require improved access by the poor to basic health and reproductive services, improved local health services that can reduce the burden of diseases, advances in the status of women, and involving men in reproductive health and population programmes.

21. The burden of disease is enormous, especially infectious and parasitic diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, polio, and HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDS in particular has exacted a tremendous toll in human suffering, death, and lost productivity. Currently, of the 31 million adults and children living with HIV/AIDS worldwide, 21 million of them live in Africa. Eighty per cent of all women with HIV/AIDS are in Africa. As a result of HIV/AIDS, life expectancy is declining, infant and child mortality are on the rise, and individuals' productivity and economic development are threatened. The insidious effects of HIV/AIDS affect the entire spectrum of economic and social activities.

(a) Goals and objectives

i. by 2005, reduce maternal mortality to half of the 1990 level, and in half again by 2015;

ii. by 2015, reduce the mortality rates for infants and children under the age of five years to one-third of the 1990 level;

iii. provide access to reproductive health services for all individuals of appropriate ages by the year 2015;

iv. strengthen preventive measures to reduce the incidence of infectious and parasitic diseases, including HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), malaria, tuberculosis, and polio;

v. by 2005, provide access to safe water supply and sanitation for at least 80 percent of the population; vi. by 2015, reduce by half the number of people who are malnourished.

(b) Guidelines for action

To achieve the above goals, African countries will:

i. improve pre- and post-natal care facilities, nutrition, education, and immunization coverage against the major childhood diseases;

ii. invest in district health infrastructure by expanding training programmes for primary care providers, building district level management capacity, and increasing the participation of women and grassroots organizations in community-level health services;

iii. create a legal and cultural environment that allows free and voluntary family planning methods, including child-spacing and contraceptives, and create behavioral change through improved information, education and communication activities for HIV/AIDS prevention in local languages;

iv. promote the rights of adolescents to access to medical and scientific information concerning reproductive health, and target youth with education, information, and services aimed at preventing and stopping harmful traditional practices, such as female genital mutilation;

v. increase the number of safe water supply points and strengthen the capacity of communities to maintain water facilities, and improve environmental health, particularly in densely populated urban areas, by improving waste disposal and sanitation facilities;

vi. reduce health care costs through the increased use of generic medicines and the gradual introduction of health insurance.

Development partners will:

i. provide financial and technical assistance to support African countries' efforts to improve primary health care facilities, particularly in the rural areas;

ii. assure donor cooperation for a coordinated approach to population policies and programmes, reproductive health, and HIV/AIDS, including the integration of cross-sectoral HIV/AIDS strategies;

iii. enhance assistance for the prevention and treatment of infectious and parasitic diseases, including malaria.

1.3 Other measures to assist the poor

22. While poverty reduction is an overarching goal of all the sectors addressed in TICAD-II, this section focuses on measures that directly assist the poor.

(a) Goals/objectives

i. by 2015, reduce at least by at least two-thirds the number of women currently living in poverty;

ii. create employment opportunities and diversify the sources of income for the poor by increasing their access to productive assets such as land and credit, as well as markets for goods and services;

iii. enhance the survival capacity of the most vulnerable, and provide assistance to those affected by social and natural calamities.

(b) Guidelines for action

To achieve the above goals, African countries will:

i. establish poverty reduction strategies with time-bound goals and targets and annual benchmarks and social indicators, and strengthen the institutional capacity to operate appropriately targeted poverty reduction programmes particularly at the local level;

ii. increase the access of the poor, especially women, to micro credit and employment opportunities through innovative income- generation programmes;

iii. provide safety-net measures for the most vulnerable by providing supplementary income, including labor-intensive public-works schemes;

iv. encourage and promote the participation of NGOs, private sectors and local community organizations in the design and implementation of poverty reduction programmes.

Development partners will:

i. jointly with African governments, actively monitor progress under poverty-reduction programmes and encourage appropriate policy adjustments;

ii. encourage international financial institutions (IFIs) to give greater consideration to the impact of structural adjustment programmes on the poor;

iii. assist the strengthening of training programmes that enhance the capacity of communities to plan and manage their development activities.

2. Economic development: promoting the private sector

23. A major challenge for African countries is to raise and sustain growth rates at much higher levels and to create employment and increase income for effective poverty reduction. At the same time, globalization presents additional challenges and new opportunities for African countries. Consequently, they have to devise national development strategies aimed at enhancing their international competitiveness in tradeable goods and services through the expanded application of appropriate technologies, including labor-intensive technology, to improve skills and productivity and provide essential services more efficiently. Development partners are encouraged to assist African countries in this endeavor.

2.1 Private sector development

24. African countries intend to strengthen support private enterprise, which covers a wide range of activities from the micro enterprises of the informal sector to the small and medium enterprises of the manufacturing sector, as a key stakeholder in economic and social development, as well as the principal engine of growth and generator of wealth and employment. The public sector should concentrate on those activities for which it is best suited, especially the efficient delivery of core public services, and should disengage from those activities which the private sector is better able to perform. For the private sector to realize its full potential as the main engine to stimulate growth, the government should remove actual and perceived constraints to business activity, so as to encourage the creative talents of actual and potential African entrepreneurs. At the same time, the capacity of public institutions that are critical to the functioning of a modern market economy needs to be strengthened. Support for the modernization of the informal sector, where the majority of the growing urban poor is employed, is an essential component for poverty reduction.

(a) Goals and objectives

i. ensure a sound and conducive environment for the development and expanded activity of the private sector, with a particular emphasis on the development of domestic entrepreneurs;

 ii. promote and substantially increase foreign direct investments and trade, with a particular emphasis on exports;

iii. develop micro, small and medium enterprises, including the informal sector.

(b) Guidelines for action

To achieve the above goals, African countries will:

i. establish and maintain a sound macro-economic policy framework and an open economy based on continued and enhanced economic reforms, liberalized exchange and trade systems and investment regimes, strengthened institutional, legal and regulatory systems, reformed state institutions that operate with transparency, accountability, competence and professionalism, and rule of law;

ii. ensure efficient physical infrastructure through regulatory reforms, privatization, and additional investments in key infrastructure (including road/rail transport, telecommunications, power, ports, shipping and transit facilities), harness modern information and communications technology, and encourage private sector participation in infrastructure financing and operation;

iii. encourage and promote the growth, diversification, and deepening of the financial sector so as to facilitate savings mobilization to meet the investment and working capital requirements of business, within the context of a deregulated but prudentially supervised system of financial intermediation;

iv. promote regional integration by removing obstacles to, and otherwise facilitating, cross-border trade and investment, including harmonizing tax and investment codes;

v. undertake measures to enhance the entrepreneurial, managerial and technical capacities of the private sector;

vi.strengthen national and sub-regional mechanisms for investment and trade promotion by disseminating information about business opportunities, identifying and targeting prospective investors and export markets, servicing investors, and providing export credit and insurance schemes; vi. strengthen chambers of commerce, trade and professional associations, and regional networks to provide market information and training for their members, in order to promote exports and investment;

vii. organize dialogue between government and private sector to develop a shared vision of economic development strategy and remove constraints to private sector development;

viii. strengthen and encourage the growth of micro, small, and medium-scale industries through appropriate technical support from service institutions and civil society, and improve industries' access to capital by strengthening micro-financing schemes, with particular attention to women entrepreneurs;

ix. provide assistance to improve technical and managerial capabilities of business enterprises by supporting technology acquisition, production improvements, and training and skills development.

Development partners will:

i. facilitate market access for African products in the world market;

ii. encourage foreign direct investment in Africa by publicizing investment opportunities, extending guarantees and additional measures to mitigate investors' risk based on country risk analysis, where appropriate, and providing matching equity

contributions and accompanying long-term finance, as well as using concessional finance as a catalyst;

iii. assist in capacity building in the private sector, as well as strengthening country and sub-regional capacity in trade negotiations, implementing the rules and regulations of the WTO, and identifying and exploiting new trading opportunities that emerge from the evolving multilateral trading system;

iv. promote enhanced South-South and Asia-Africa cooperation, which can be a major contribution of TICAD-II, through the exchange of experiences, including in business management, and collaborative relationships to stimulate joint ventures, investment and trade;

v. provide support for the establishment or strengthening of micro-financing schemes.

2.2 Industrial development

25. Industrial development is central to the structural transformation necessary for African economies to increase incomes and employment and diversify exports. In Africa, there is a growing consensus that accelerated economic transformation will depend on the synergies between industrial and agricultural development, as reflected in the programme of the Alliance for Africa's Industrialization (AAI).

(a) Goals and objectives

Increase the production, competitiveness, and diversification of the domestic private sector, especially in the agro-industrial, mining and manufacturing sub-sectors, with potential for exports and employment creation.

(b) Guidelines for action

To achieve the above goals, African countries will:

i. reinforce the links between industrial and agricultural development policies and harmonize the activities of relevant government agencies;

ii. develop new industries, or upgrade existing ones, where African countries have comparative advantages, including agro-based industries and energy and mineral resource-based industries;

iii. encourage an African-Asian dialogue on industrial development, based on the experiences of newly industrializing countries.

Development partners will:

i. facilitate partnership through the development of mechanisms, such as joint business councils, for information sharing between Asian and African firms, and for working towards the establishment of joint ventures and sub-contracting arrangements;

ii. assist the strengthening of African training institutions for industrial development, particularly through the promotion of networking with Asian partners;

iii. promote the transfer of technologies to African countries.

2.3 Agricultural development

26. Africa's economic performance and poverty reduction are strongly linked to agricultural development, including fisheries, livestock, and forestry development. The agriculture sector accounts for some 35 per cent of the continent's GDP, 40 per cent of

exports, and 70 per cent of employment. In the short- and medium-run, Africa's ability to achieve sustainable broad-based growth and development requires a revitalization of the rural economy. To this end, increased attention should be given to the smallholder sector and the role of women farmers. Strengthening the linkage between rural producers and urban markets also constitutes an important part of the strategy.

27. In recent years, African agricultural production has grown and exports increased, due to better policies, new technologies, improved terms of trade in some commodities, and increased yields in some crops. Despite these gains, Africa's agricultural production and productivity for both food and cash crops remain low. In particular, food production has not kept pace with population growth in a number of countries in Africa. Weak exports and the fluctuations in prices of raw materials threaten its ability to pay for needed imports of equipment and inputs for agriculture and industry. Moreover, the increasing demand for farmland due to rapid population growth has often resulted in considerable environmental damage, including soil erosion, loss of soil fertility, water degradation, and deforestation. Given the rapid migration of rural populations to urban centers, the rural economy also needs to be able to provide attractive income-earning opportunities.

(a) Goals and objectives

i. improve the productivity of agriculture with particular attention to small-scale and women farmers;

ii. ensure food security for all people and increase the poor's access to adequate food and nutrition;

iii. promote measures against natural resource degradation and encourage production methods that are environmentally sustainable;

iv. integrate the rural poor in the market economy and provide them better access to input and output markets.

(b) Guidelines for action

To achieve the above goals, African countries will:

i. deepen agricultural sector reform with respect to producer and consumer prices, input and output markets, agricultural trade, and the restructuring of agricultural parastatals, in order to improve farm efficiency and profitability;

ii. increase public investment and the participation of rural populations in building and rehabilitating rural infrastructure, and support the development of private sector in rural transport, marketing, processing and storage;

iii. increase public investment in agricultural research, and ensure it addresses the needs of small-scale and women farmers, establish better linkages between Asian and African research institutions for capacity building, and promote access to modern technologies and production methods through improved extension services;

iv. increase the security of water supply for agriculture by establishing small-scale irrigation facilities, improving local water management, and increasing the exchange of information and technical staff between Asia and Africa;

v. improve land tenure security under traditional and modern forms of tenure, and promote necessary land reform;

vi. foster regional, sub-regional, national, and household food security via the increased production, transport, storage and marketing of food crops, livestock and fisheries, with particular attention to the needs of the poor, as well as the establishment of early warning systems to monitor drought and crop production;

vii. strengthen intra-regional and Asia-Africa cooperation for the implementation of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, and improve soil fertility with appropriate soil and crop husbandry techniques;

viii. enhance agricultural credit and finance schemes and improve access to credit by small-scale and women farmers, taking advantage of the cooperation with Asian agricultural financial officials, cooperatives, and farmers' groups;

ix. strengthen the capacity of farmers' organizations and cooperatives

Development partners will:

i. encourage access of African food and agricultural products, particularly processed products, to international markets;

ii. support African networking with external partners, especially Asian partners, in the areas of agricultural technology and know-how, extension services, and rural infrastructure;

iii. support investment in research in the areas of high yield crops and durable preservation and storage;

iv. provide support for building national and regional capacity for multilateral trade negotiations, including food sanitation and other agricultural trade regulations.

2.4 External debt

28. The international community has implemented a series of measures to address the external debt burden of low-income countries, including concessional financial assistance from multilateral institutions, concessional rescheduling, debt forgiveness, and concessional new finance from bilateral creditors. Furthermore, the Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, developed by the IMF and the World Bank, was adopted in September 1996. The HIPC Initiative aims at reducing to sustainable levels the debt burden of HIPCs that are pursuing strong programmes of adjustment and reform. The African Development Bank approved its contribution to the Initiative in 1997. Nine countries, including seven African countries, have reached the decision points and seven (of which five African) have been found eligible for HIPC assistance. Several additional African countries are expected to reach decision points soon. In their recent review of the Initiative, IMF and the World Bank agreed to extend until end-2000 the original deadline for countries to enter the HIPC Initiative through adopting adjustment programmes supported by the two institutions. This extends the opportunity for a group of African countries – many just emerging from conflicts – to begin building track record of good policy performance required under the HIPC Initiative. Furthermore, the IMF and the World Bank have agreed that programmes supported by IMF post-conflict emergency assistance could count —on a case by case basis— toward the HIPC track record, thus potentially bringing forward the delivery of assistance for some African countries to allow more countries to qualify. However, the debate about external debt goes beyond the HIPC Initiative, which was not intended to meet the needs of all African countries.

(a) Goals and objectives

The main objectives should be to achieve durable solutions to the external debt problems of African countries, including debt cancellation and debt service relief where appropriate.

(b) Guidelines for action

To achieve the above goals, African countries will:

i. agree on and implement economic and structural reform programmes supported by the Bretton Woods institutions and the African Development Bank in order to establish the necessary track record needed to be considered for concessional stock-of-debt rescheduling from bilateral countries and/or for HIPC assistance;

ii. reinforce social programmes and their execution, and direct the savings obtained from debt relief to the social sectors, with a view to reducing poverty;

iii strengthen national accounting systems and build human capacity in debt management; iv. improve coordination with donors in the search for durable solutions; v. explore all available debt relief mechanisms.

Development partners will:

i. ensure the full financing of the HIPC Initiative and provide financial support for those multilateral institutions, especially the African Development Bank, that may not be able to cover their full share of the cost under the HIPC Initiative;

ii. expedite, in a determined manner, the extension of debt relief to more countries within the terms of the HIPC Initiative, taking note of the proposal by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his report on Africa to the Security Council (S/1998/318) of 13 April 1998 ;

iii. search for approaches, including within the HIPC framework where appropriate, to solving the debt problem of post-conflict countries, especially those which have arrears with multilateral institutions;

iv. continue providing debt relief with existing mechanisms and promote enhanced measures that go beyond debt rescheduling, including cancellation or measures comparable to cancellation of remaining ODA debts by bilateral creditors, taking note of the proposal by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the recommendation by G-8 leaders at the Birmingham Summit in May 1998;

v. continue providing appropriate concessional finance, including grant funding, to help improve the debt profile of African countries; and

vi. search for creative new solutions, including debt swap options for the reconstruction of economic and social infrastructure; vii. support the capacity-building efforts of African countries in implementing sound macro-economic policies and debt management.

3. Basic foundations for d Development

29. Democracy and good governance, as well as peace and security, are essential to socio-economic development, in Africa. The fundamental principles of democracy and good governance are widely accepted, but their applicability to the African context should take into account the specificity of each individual country, its historical

circumstances and cultural realities. Violent conflicts in a number of countries constitute a major obstacle to sustainable development in Africa, potentially reversing its economic progress and impeding its future development.

3.1 Good governance

30. In recent years, many African countries have made significant progress in democratization. To consolidate this positive trend and achieve further progress in social and economic development on a sustained basis, African countries need to intensify their efforts to further strengthen good governance, taking into account their respective cultural and political circumstances.

(a) Goals and objectives

i. strengthen constitutional legitimacy and democratic systems based on the principle of separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers;

ii. strengthen institutions that are essential components of good governance and democracy;

iii. promote respect for human rights and the rule of law;

iv. enhance accountability, and transparency and efficiency in public administration;

v. promote a culture of tolerance, and promote broader participation in the decision-making process, particularly participation by women and civil society;

vi. promote social justice by encouraging equitable development across different ethnic groups and geographic areas.

(b) Guidelines for action

To achieve the above goals, African countries will:

i. ensure that multiparty democratic elections are truly free and fair, and strengthen appropriate institutions;

ii. establish an independent, impartial and adequately funded judiciary to ensure fair and effective enforcement of the law;

iii. strengthen human and institutional capacities of the legislature and enhance its oversight functions in relation to policy-making and budget formulation;

iv. establish a lean, competent, transparent, accountable, and merit-based civil service, with institutional support for anti-corruption measures;

v. strengthen administrative capacity also at the local level and facilitate the process of decentralization;

vi. facilitate the development of a strong civil society, including community-based organizations and women' s groups, and forge a genuine partnership between civil society organizations and government institutions involved in socio-economic development;

vii. consider the establishment of independent human rights and Ombudsman institutions, and promote civic education, with particular focus on human rights education.

Development partners will:

i. support efforts of African countries in strengthening human and institutional capacities of the legislature, judiciary, and executive branch of the government;

ii. support sub-regional/regional exchanges of experiences on best practices relating to governance, including devising indicators for the effective delivery of public services.

3.2 Conflict prevention and post-conflict development

31. Over the years, a number of wars have been fought in Africa, undermining Africa's efforts to pursue a durable peace stability and sustainable development. In recent years, Africa has made progress in conflict prevention, management, and resolution. In this respect, the establishment of the OAU mechanism is a significant step. Efforts by the OAU and sub-regional organizations need to be supported and consolidated to prevent a recurrence of conflicts and to initiate and strengthen post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction of the affected countries. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has issued a report on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa (S/1998/318), which specifies actions to mitigate the potential for conflict.

(a) Goals and Objectives

i. strengthen African structures and capacities for conflict prevention, management and resolution;

ii. develop and implement effective confidence-building measures at national, regional and sub-regional levels as part of preventive strategies;

iii. provide a smooth and early transition from emergency relief in conflict situations, through rehabilitation and reconstruction, to post-conflict development;

iv. ensure the security of refugees and internally displaced persons.

(b) Guidelines for Action

To achieve the above goals, African Countries will:

i. intensify regional and sub-regional cooperation by exchanging information, monitoring and controlling illicit trafficking and stockpiling of small arms and light weapons. Towards that those ends, African countries may consider the possibility of conducting a study on appropriate measures for registering transactions of small arms and light weapons within the framework of the United Nations or and other regional mechanisms, including the intensification of cooperation within OAU for the possibility of formulating a convention on the illicit possession and transfer of small arms;

ii. provide vocational training to former and demobilized combatants and refugees; and develop programmes for effective management and eventual destruction of accumulated weapons, especially small arms;

iii. make efforts, where appropriate, to invite accession to and early entry into force of the 1997 Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines, and assist in the rehabilitation of victims and strengthen programmes for skill development for de-mining;

iv. ensure the protection and voluntary repatriation of refugees under international and humanitarian principles, such as those provided for in the United Nations and OAU refugee conventions, and work towards the establishment of international mechanisms to assist host governments in maintaining the security and neutrality of refugee camps and settlements;

v. promote the active participation and involvement of civil society including women' s NGOs and women' s groups in peace building and conflict prevention.

Development partners will:

i. support integrated approaches to security and development, including capacity-building for police and internal security forces, and strengthening of border controls;

ii. continue financial and technical assistance to strengthen the capacity of the OAU and sub-regional organizations for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, as well as African centers for training in conflict prevention and peace-keeping;

iii. support the United Nations and OAU' s efforts to develop an early warning and response system by enhancing their capacities to gather, analyze and disseminate necessary information through their communication and data bank systems;

iv. provide the necessary assistance in land mine clearance for affected countries and demobilization of soldiers and their reintegration into civilian life, and increase the exchange of information between Asia and Africa on de-mining experience and technology;

v. take necessary action to monitor and prevent the export of small arms to potential conflict areas;

vi. support for emergency and post- conflict relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and development, through mobilizing resources and coordinated efforts within a framework of a long-term strategy, so as to facilitate the transition from emergency relief to development assistance;

vii. provide assistance to ensure prevention of recruitment of children into armed forces and provide for productive social re-integration of demobilized child soldiers through support to their families and through provision of sound education, recreation, and employment opportunities;

viii. assist countries hosting refugees in restoring the social and economic infrastructure which have been destroyed in the process of refugees' movements and settlements.

V. Follow-up

32. The true measure of success of the Agenda for Action will depend upon how effectively the participants can translate their commitments into specific actions by integrating the Agenda for Action developed in the TICAD-II process into their development programprogrammes at national, regional and inter-regional levels. This national, regional and inter-regional integration of the Agenda for Action should be the main thrust of follow-up to TICAD-II. For this purpose, concrete steps should be taken, bearing in mind the value-added aspect of TICAD-II, namely South-South cooperation as a modality o development cooperation, particularly between Asia and African countries, with special emphasis on private sector cooperation. For this purpose, aAppropriate indicators should be used, taking into account in collaboration with the ongoing work in the UNUnited Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions and OECD, in order to measure progress in achieving goals and targets contained in the Agenda for Action. A series of review meetings will be organized to assess the achievement of goals and targets.

33. Information sharing on the progress in the follow-up process will further be facilitated through the establishment of TICAD-II contact points among the participants and an internet Web site to disseminate information widely across all sectors of society. Coordination of this effort will be the joint responsibility of the co-organizers.

ANNEX III

TICAD Tenth Anniversary Declaration

We, the participants of the Third Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD III) held in Tokyo from 29 September to 1 October 2003, having reviewed the achievements of the ten-year TICAD process and discussed the future direction it should take in light of the latest developments on the African continent and in the international arena, declare as follows:

I. New Challenges for African Development
II.

We recall that the TICAD process was launched in 1993, a time when international interest in Africa was waning as a result of the end of the Cold War. During the following decade, the TICAD process has consistently promoted African development from the standpoint of African countries and peoples by assisting Africa to enhance its ownership of its development programs and reviving international partnership in support of such programs. These basic principles of the TICAD process, now widely shared not only by African countries but also by the international community as a whole, have made a significant contribution to encouraging international commitment to African development within international frameworks such as the United Nations and the G8 process.

In the 1980s and 1990s, African leaders had already expressed the political desire to demonstrate Africa's ownership of its development process through the Lagos Plan of Action, and later agreeing to the establishment of the African Economic Community. At the dawn of the new century, the framework for realization has been established through the transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) and the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as a programme of the AU. The international community welcomed this commitment by Africa and offered to provide its solid support for achieving sustainable development through various initiatives such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the LDC's Plan of Action, the Monterrey Consensus, the G8 Africa Action Plan, and the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). This momentum in both Africa and the international arena thus evolved into an interactive process of ownership by Africa and partnership by the international community. Recognizing this positive international trend that can create a critical turning point in Africa's development process, the TICAD process, together with NEPAD, is now to embark on a new challenge to realize the African Vision that "Africa will claim the twenty-first century" by fully employing its abundant natural and human resources for self-sufficient and sustainable development and enjoying the benefits of trade, industry, and investment through integrating Africa into the global economy.

We, the participants of TICAD III, hereby reaffirm TICAD's basic philosophy and renew our political commitment to the goal of African development on this commemorative occasion of the tenth anniversary of TICAD. We believe that this

"TICAD Tenth Anniversary Declaration "constitutes another important step for major progress toward African development in the twenty-first century.

II. Achievements of the TICAD Process

We acknowledge that TICAD is not simply a series of conferences but an evolving process. The TICAD conferences have brought a general consensus on development philosophy and priorities for African development through the "Tokyo Declaration" and the "Tokyo Agenda for Action," adopted at TICAD I (1993) and TICAD II (1998), respectively. The TICAD process has also been playing a catalytic role in translating its philosophy and priorities into tangible projects in areas such as human resources development and socio-economic infrastructure. The ceaseless efforts under the TICAD process over the past ten years, thus, have steadily contributed to African development by presenting unique views on African development and new grounds for partnership. Its key achievements include the following:

1. Raising Awareness of the Challenges Facing Africa

It is noteworthy to recall that each TICAD conference has contributed toward maintaining the focus of the international community on African development during periods when global attention to Africa was about to be diverted to other regions. TICAD I was convened in 1993 after the end of the Cold War; TICAD II in 1998 coincided with the Asian financial crisis; and the TICAD Ministerial-level Meeting in 2001 was held immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. At those critical moments, The TICAD process, together with other regional and international initiatives, continually highlighted African development and provided the advocacy momentum to mainstream African issues on the international agenda in a series of international forums, including the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, G8 Summits, the WSSD, and the Third World Water Forum. This momentum successfully led to the concerted cooperation of the international community through the United Nations and the G8 process and complemented Africa's own efforts as manifested by NEPAD and the AU. The TICAD process thus significantly contributed to raising awareness of the challenges facing Africa and its tenth anniversary comes at a time when the circumstances for African development are more favorable than ever, both within Africa and externally. However, we have noted with regret that there was little or no progress in advancing the Doha Development Agenda at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun. The creation of an equitable international trade system remains as a major challenge to African development.

2. "Ownership" and "Partnership"

The TICAD process has constantly advocated that "ownership" by African countries of their
development processes and "partnership" by the international community in support of such
ownership are essential for African development. These concepts have found wide acceptance

among the international community including African countries. NEPAD, in particular, shares with

TICAD its emphasis on African ownership and its focus on priority areas such as peace and

governance, human resources development, infrastructure, agriculture, and private sector

development. The TICAD process thus welcomes the establishment of NEPAD, while NEPAD recognizes the TICAD process as a pivotal initiative in addressing the challenges of African development. It is therefore a natural consequence that the TICAD process and NEPAD support and complement each other.

3. Expansion of Development Partnership

The TICAD process is a unique international framework that has the active participation of diversified development actors, including African countries, African regional organizations, Asian countries, partner countries and international organizations, as well as the private sector and civil society organizations such as NGOs. This broad coalition expands development partnership, enriches ideas, and augments resources for African development. In particular, it is of great significance that the TICAD process has underscored the importance of South South cooperation, especially Asia-Africa cooperation that utilizes the successful economic development experiences of Asian countries. The enormous potential of Asia-Africa cooperation is illustrated by such examples as the development of NERICA (New Rice for Africa: a new rice variety developed by crossing Asian and African species) and private sector cooperation to facilitate economic linkages between the two regions, especially in trade and investment. As a result, the TICAD process, by suggesting additional ways to meet the challenges faced by Africa, has provided diversity and dynamism to the development process of the African continent. It is therefore of particular importance that Asian countries are more actively involved in supporting the implementation of NEPAD through the TICAD process.

III. A Compass for the Future of the TICAD Process

We, the participants of TICAD III, note with satisfaction that the TICAD process has facilitated the synchronization of Africa's efforts and the commitment of its development partners, in other words, African ownership and international partnership, and synthesized the resources of both sides for a common purpose. Thus, the TICAD process has contributed to enhancing ownership and partnership to develop genuine solidarity that leads to expanded and multi-layered cooperation in support of African development. Now Africa has provided a powerful vehicle - NEPAD to accelerate African development. The TICAD process provides the philosophies of ownership and partnership as wheels of the vehicle, the solidarity between Africa and its development partners as the engine and the globally combined resources as fuel. Furthermore, through TICAD high-level policy forums, Africa and its development partners seek the underlying philosophy and guiding principles of cooperation for African development, which can serve as a compass for African development. Reaffirming international commitments to existing guidelines including the "Tokyo Declaration" of 1993 and the

"Tokyo Agenda for Action" of 1998, we, the participants of TICAD III, reconfirm that African development should continue to emphasize the following viewpoints:

1. Leadership and People's Participation in the African Development Process

To realize development based on ownership, it is imperative that the political leaders of African countries exercise committed and progressive leadership. It is also indispensable that the peoples of Africa, the primary beneficiaries of development, share the spirit of NEPAD and actively participate in the development process. Achieving a well-balanced and sustainable development of Africa that genuinely and directly benefits African people is too formidable a challenge to be addressed through a single approach. This challenge can best be met by adopting a mutually reinforcing combination of two approaches: state-led development based on leadership and democratic governance, on the one hand, and community-based development based on the empowerment of individuals, on the other. It is essential that political leaders and their people share common values and work together to achieve their development goals. This national commitment upheld by strong leadership and grass-roots participation will ensure successful and sustainable development.

2. Peace and Good Governance

We note with appreciation the improved peace and security in some parts of Africa resulting from efforts by Africans themselves supported by the international community. However, it still remains critically important that African countries should consolidate such peace and put an end to remaining conflicts on the continent in order that States can devote all their capacity and resources to economic growth and sustainable development. Conflict is a serious obstacle to African development not only because it exhausts the States involved and wastes the resources of nations and peoples, but also because conflict leaves long-term consequences such as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), landmines, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons that often exacerbates conflicts. It is encouraging that some African regional organizations and countries are playing key roles in the prevention and management of conflicts, but the consolidation of peace process including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of excombatants (DDR), the repatriation of refugees and IDPs, and demining still requires broad support from the international community, and measures to prevent the illegal proliferation and trafficking in small arms and light weapons. In order to prevent the recurrence of conflicts, it is also essential to address the root causes of conflicts and to promote steadily economic and social reconstruction based on good governance that entails democratization and the adoption of appropriate macroeconomic policies. Although African ownership should primarily take the lead in the African development process, international partnership also has an important role to play in extending comprehensive and integrated assistance to African countries and peoples that are hindered from exerting such ownership by conflict.

3. Human Security

Ensuring the security of States is a prerequisite for the development of African countries, but may not automatically lead to better lives of individuals in Africa. It is

likewise imperative to protect the peoples of Africa from any threats to their survival, dignity, and livelihood, and moreover to empower all, including women, children and other vulnerable groups, to shape and fully own the process of building communities and nations. Such protection and empowerment are pivotal concepts underlying human security. The Millennium Declaration of the United Nations in 2000 and the report of the Commission on Human Security in 2003 underscored the fact that the peoples of Africa still face serious problems such as poverty, hunger, infectious diseases including the HIV/AIDS epidemic especially, and a lack of education, thus indicating that Africa is the continent where human security is least assured. The TICAD process therefore places great emphasis on the concept of human security with a view to relieving the African people of their present afflictions, providing them with peace and hope for the future, and engaging them in the development process.

4. Respect for Distinctiveness, Diversity, and Identity

In order for Africa to take full ownership of its development process, Africa needs to set its own development goals. Self-confidence and self-esteem, based on due understanding of and respect for the history and cultures of Africa as the cradle of humankind, constitute the main driving force of African-owned development. The international community should not only acknowledge Africa's distinctiveness, diversity, and identity simply from cultural and historical points of view, but also recognize them as indispensable to African development. This approach, consonant with the NEPAD development philosophy, helps Africans to become true pioneers in carving out their own destiny. The international community is encouraged to support this view and incorporate it into development cooperation policies toward Africa.

IV. A New Partnership: Mutual Respect and Trust

We, the participants of TICAD III, recognize that the challenges facing African development are pressing global issues that must be addressed by both Africa and its partners in the twenty first century. One of the ultimate goals of the TICAD process is to forge solidarity between Africa and the rest of the international community based on ownership and partnership because African development can be achieved only by the concerted efforts of Africa and its development partners. Africa should determine and own, with self-confidence and self esteem, the direction it will take in pursuit of self-sufficient and sustainable development. The international community, at the same time respecting and trusting Africa's ownership, should deliver timely and substantial assistance to help Africa make the best use of its own resource, through enhancing current initiatives to promote market access and fair trade in order to support the efforts of African countries to gain a meaningful foothold in the global market place. It is also necessary to increase ODA and promote foreign direct investment.

We recall that the African Union has stated that "today's investment in children is tomorrow's peace, stability, security, democracy, and sustainable development," and also that NEPAD declares that it aims to "give hope to the emaciated African child that the 21st century is indeed Africa's century" (NEPAD, paragraph 207). Affirming mutual "respect" and "trust," we, the representatives of Africa and its development partners, are now to take a new step forward to fill the hearts of children in Africa with hope, not

despair, and their lives with peace, not instability. This momentous step must be one that is taken not by leaders alone but also by each individual in all African countries and throughout the international community. We firmly believe that such a step, taken with great confidence and shared conviction, will truly take Africa forward to a bright and hopeful future. We, the participants of the Third Tokyo International Conference on African Development, while proudly acknowledging the achievements of the TICAD process, hereby pledge to support Africa's ownership, especially the implementation of NEPAD, by working together to address the new challenges set before us.

1 October 2003, Tokyo

ANNEX IV

YOKOHAMA DECLARATION

TOWARDS A VIBRANT AFRICA

30 May 2008

1.0 Introduction

1.1 The Heads of State and Government, and delegations of Japan and 51 African countries, together with the representatives of 34 other countries, 75 international and regional organizations, and representatives of the private sector, academic institutions and civil society organizations from both Africa and Asia, met in Yokohama, Japan from 28 to 30 May, 2008, for the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development - TICAD IV.

1.2 The Conference took place against the backdrop of a rapidly-changing Africa determined to take responsibility for and to assert ownership over its own destiny: and an Africa increasingly confident and capable, itself, of determining that destiny.

1.3 The Participants at TICAD IV acknowledged that from its inception in 1993, the TICAD Process with Japan at its center and other co-organizers including the United Nations, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank playing a valuable role stressed the importance for Africa to exercise full "ownership" of its own development agenda and the need for a genuine "partnership" with the international community in pursuit of that agenda. In this regard, the TICAD Process has also served as a bridge between Africa and Japan and Asia as a whole, and as a Forum through which the Asian development experience can be shared with Africa. It is clear that the pursuit of an even closer relationship, based on shared concerns and common strategic interests, is of critical importance in terms of further enhancing global development and stability.

1.4 The Participants at TICAD IV also recognized the need for Africa's diversified development partners, working together with the governments of Africa and with the African Union (AU) and its institutions and programmes - in particular the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) - to actively strive for far greater synergy and effective coordination between and among existing and future initiatives in support of the continent's development.

2.0 Recent Trends and Challenges

2.1 The Participants at TICAD IV acknowledged the positive trends which have emerged across the African continent in general since TICAD III in 2003. Increasing political stability and improved governance, buttressed by strong economic growth and rising levels of foreign direct investment - much of it coming from Asia - have helped to create a new awareness of trade, investment and tourism opportunities available across the continent. These opportunities present a hitherto unprecedented prospect for the countries of Africa to achieve real and sustainable economic growth, and to make, thereby, real and sustainable progress towards poverty alleviation, and genuine improvements in the quality of life and self-reliance across the continent.

2.2 In this regard, the Participants at TICAD IV commended the birth in 2001 of NEPAD, the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into AU in 2002 and the increasing effectiveness of Africa's Regional Economic Communities (REC's) as further confirmation of Africa's determination, and enhanced capacity to exercise full ownership of its own development agenda. The Participants also welcomed the strengthening of cooperation between AU and TICAD, which is exemplified by the resolution adopted at the Tenth Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly held in Addis Ababa from 31 January to 2 February 2008.

2.3 The Participants also took note of the outcome of this above-mentioned AU Assembly, which called, inter alia, for an immediate acceleration in the industrialization of Africa, a definitive shift away from dependence on primary products, and the development of Africa-based industries for local value-addition and processing.

2.4 The Participants at TICAD IV noted the strenuous efforts being made by the African countries themselves towards improved governance across the continent, including the ongoing work of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

2.5 The Participants at TICAD IV recognized that, notwithstanding these very encouraging trends, the countries of Africa continue to face a number of serious challenges and that achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will be a difficult task. The most immediate of these challenges includes continuing widespread poverty and unemployment in rural and urban areas coupled with rapid population growth. Other significant challenges are low agricultural productivity, together with generally poor agricultural infrastructure ,and the increasingly severe effects of climate change ; low levels of industrialization and inadequate generation of and access to energy across the continent; the scourge of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other infectious diseases which continues its ravages across much of the continent; inadequate access to education at all levels and a corresponding lack of adequate education-infrastructure - specially in sub-Saharan Africa. The Participants emphasized the special needs of least developed countries, land-locked and small island developing states. They also paid special attention to the issue of soaring rise of food prices and its negative impact on poverty reduction in Africa.

2.6 The Participants acknowledged that while African governments bear primary responsibility for the economic and social well-being of their respective peoples, the international community and , Africa's development partners in particular, have a crucial role to play in supporting Africa's own efforts to address and overcome these challenges.

2.7 In this regard, the Participants stressed the importance for the G8 countries to honor the commitments already made in respect of support for African development and for all Africa's development partners, including emerging partners to work towards a greater coordination and strengthening of the broad international partnership with the African continent - specifically to facilitate a greater focus of effort and to avoid duplication and any unnecessary wastage of scarce resources.

2.8 Building on the positive trends in Africa and guided by the vision outlined in NEPAD, but also fully cognizant of the considerable developmental challenges which continue to confront the countries of Africa, the Participants at TICAD IV committed themselves to work together on the following specific but inter-related priority-areas:

- Towards Boosting Economic Growth
- Towards Ensuring Human Security, including achieving MDGs and consolidation of   peace and good governance
- Towards Addressing Environmental Issues and Climate Change

3.0 Boosting Economic Growth: Forging a Genuine Partnership towards a Vibrant, Prosperous Africa

3.1 The Participants at TICAD IV stressed that it is essential to accelerate broad-based economic growth and diversification and acknowledged the enormous, as-yet largely untapped natural-resource potential across the continent.

Human Resource Development

3.2 The Participants at TICAD IV noted the enormous challenges facing African countries in the area of human resource development, especially in the field of science and technology. They noted the significant contribution being made in this regard by Japan and other development partners, and recognized the considerable potential for expansion in this critical sector of development cooperation.

Accelerated Industrial Development

3.3 The Participants recalled the conclusions of the Tenth Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly, with regard to the urgent need to accelerate the industrial development of Africa.

Infrastructure

3.4 The Participants emphasized the fundamental need to focus on the development of region-wide infrastructure.

Agricultural and Rural Development

3.5 The Participants at TICAD IV acknowledged the role of agriculture as a major component of economic activity across the continent, and emphasized the urgent need to significantly enhance current levels of agricultural productivity, and increase support to this critical sector, including through provision and management of water resources. Agricultural and rural reform in the framework of the NEPAD Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) were acknowledged as effective means to achieve food security and poverty alleviation and major driving forces for economic growth. In this regard, it is important to provide assistance for rural entrepreneurs and local industries.

Trade and Investment

3.6 The Participants at TICAD IV noted that, although the current levels of international trade and investment with African countries, including trade and investment flows between Africa and Japan, and other Asian countries had certainly improved, Africa's share of global trade and investment flows was still insignificant. Accordingly, the Participants recognized the need to work together for the early, fair and balanced conclusion of the WTO Doha Round. They also acknowledged the importance of "Aid for Trade" initiative.

Promotion of Tourism

3.7 The Participants stressed that Africa has enormous potential in this sector, and that tourism has the dual effect of positively impacting on several other sectors whilst building a positive image of Africa. They emphasized the importance, for African countries, to cooperate more closely in the tourism sector and, in this regard, recognized the need for sharing of experiences and know how as well as the promotion of technical cooperation programs. The specific importance of Eco-tourism was also underlined.

Role of the Private Sector

3.8 The Participants at TICAD IV noted, also, the important role of the private sector - both domestic and foreign - in the promotion and financing of sustainable economic growth in Africa, especially with regard to the effective exploitation of the continent's natural resources, and the development of industrial, energy and mineral, agricultural, financial and other services sectors, and, equally, in the development and management of Africa's considerable human resources.

3.9 In this context, and spurred by the progress being made towards improving the overall business climate across the continent, the Participants welcomed the growing interest and activities of the Japanese and other Asian private sectors. They also welcomed Japan's initiative to strengthen closer Public-Private Partnerships by promoting trade and investment in Africa.

4.0 Achieving the Millennium Development Goals - MDGs: Economic and Social Dimension of "Human Security"

4.1 The Participants at TICAD IV noted that more vigorous impetus is necessary to attain the Millennium Development Goals by the year 2015. They acknowledged the inter-relatedness of the MDG's and the urgent need to promote a more fully-comprehensive approach towards their general attainment.

4.2 The Participants welcomed TICAD IV's focus upon and promotion of the concept of "human security", which underscores freedom from fear and freedom from want, and emphasizes the protection and empowerment of individuals and communities.

4.3 **Community Development:** Building Safe and Healthy Communities

The Participants acknowledged that strengthening a comprehensive and community-based approach would help in achieving the MDGs. This approach encompasses human resource development, decent job-creation, in particular for the youth, income generation, expansion of access to primary health-care and basic education, as well as agricultural and rural development, including through promotion of the One-Village-One-Product (OVOP) movement.

4.4 **Education:** Realizing Education which opens up a New Future

The Participants stressed the fundamental need to improve the quality of and expanding access to education for all African people, with special emphasis on youth, and to promote education linked to growth and self-sustainability, including technical and vocational training, science and higher education, while ensuring a cross-sectoral approach.

4.5 **Health:** Ensuring Reliable Health and Sanitation

In addition to tackling HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, polio and other infectious diseases, the Participants acknowledged the significance of strengthening health systems to effectively deal with major health challenges including maternal, new-born, and child health. The Participants highlighted the importance of human resource development of health workers and expressed concern regarding the brain-drain of skilled health professionals.

The Participants warmly welcomed the creation of the Hideyo Noguchi Africa Prize, the first ever of its kind.

4.6 **Gender:** Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment

Recognizing the significant role of women in development and peace consolidation, the Participants at TICAD IV reemphasized the importance of advancing and protecting the human rights of women and promoting women's empowerment. They stressed the need to address issues such as disparity in education, violence against women, and insufficient participation of women in all spheres of decision making, while taking into account the cultural specificities of different countries.

5.0 Consolidation of Peace and Good Governance: Political Dimension of "Human Security"

5.1 The Participants reiterated that development and peace must work in tandem with each other. They noted the significant progress made in this regard across the African continent and stressed that, to realize a Vibrant Africa, dividends of peace must spread to every corner of the continent.

5.2 The Participants also reemphasized that countries coming out of conflict need special assistance to get on the path of reconstruction and sustainable development and to enjoy the fruits of prosperity. For this to come about, seamless peace-building efforts encompassing conflict prevention, early warning measures, conflict resolution, and preventing relapses into conflict, are critical as they will promote durable peace on the continent. To sustain peace acquired through these processes, sound vigorous democracy, continuous and inclusive dialogue, and strengthened governance need to be vigorously fostered. Furthermore, a smooth transition between one phase and another, and linkages between support for peace consolidation and other areas of development, are also crucial.

5.3 The Participants put an emphasis on the importance of Africa's ownership and welcomed AU's initiatives such as the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to improve governance. The participants also welcomed the goodwill shown by development partners, especially to enhance Africa's peace-keeping capabilities. The participants also called attention to the significant role of the UN and its bodies such as the Security Council and the Peace Building Commission as well as the AU, Africa's regional organizations and African countries themselves contributing to peace keeping operations. They commended the mediation efforts of African countries for the reconciliation and peaceful resolution of armed conflicts, as well as their engagement in peace-keeping operations.

5.4 The Participants emphasized the importance of the early reform of the main UN bodies including the Security Council to better meet the international environment of

the 21st century. The Participants reemphasized that the member states should exert efforts on the Security Council reform during the current session of the UN General Assembly.

6.0 Addressing Environmental Issues and Climate Change: To establish "Cool Earth Partnership"

6.1 Climate Change:

The Participants at TICAD IV noted that African countries, which emit the least and embrace the Congo Basin, considered as the second largest ecological "lung" in the world, have generally been extremely vulnerable to the negative effects of climate change, including increased environmental degradation, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and droughts and desertification that further threaten food security and health, as well as to increasingly frequent extreme weather patterns. African countries continue to be inadequately equipped in terms of their mitigation and adaptation capacities.

The Participants at TICAD IV recognized the need to assist Africa to enhance environment protection initiatives and welcomed the initiatives taken by Africans themselves including the International Solidarity Conference on Climate Change Strategies for African and Mediterranean Regions held in Tunisia in November 2007. African countries appreciated Japan's "Cool Earth Promotion Programme" and acknowledged Japan's efforts in seeking to develop an international framework looking beyond the first steps taken in the current Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions.

In this regard, the Participants welcomed the announcement by the Government of Japan, in January 2008, of its intention to establish a "Cool Earth Partnership" with US $ 10 billion Financial Mechanism on the basis of policy consultations between Japan and developing countries - including African countries - to address the effects of climate change and to modernize their industries, by way of technology-transfer, to render them more energy-efficient and more environment-friendly.

6.2 Water: Securing access to water and sanitation

The Participants acknowledged the importance of water as an indispensable resource for addressing development needs such as health, agriculture/food production, disaster risk reduction, and peace and security. They also acknowledged that it was essential to promote the sustainable use of water resources.

6.3 Education for Sustainable Development (ESD)

The Participants acknowledged the importance of the Education for Sustainable Development initiative and its promotion to address environmental issues effectively.

7.0 A Broadened Partnership TICAD within a Broadened Global Partnership towards a Vibrant Africa

7.1 The Participants at TICAD IV acknowledged that, since its inception in 1993, the TICAD Process has strengthened the twin concepts of "Ownership" and "Partnership" and has made a significant contribution to African development.

7.2 The Participants recognized the importance of enhanced South-South cooperation within the context of TICAD Process and acknowledged the positive results of efforts, under TICAD Initiative, to promote trade and investment flows between Asia and Africa as well as encourage intra-Africa trade.

7.3 The Participants acknowledged the active involvement of African, Japanese and international civil society organizations in the TICAD process, and the importance of further broadening the existing TICAD partnership using a participatory approach. They also stressed the need to achieve greater synergy and coordination between and among existing initiatives so as to attain greater coherence, focus and efficiency in the overall global development partnership for a vibrant Africa.

8.0 The Way Forward

8.1 The Participants at TICAD IV noted, with sincere appreciation, the continuing commitment of development partners including the Government of Japan, other TICAD co-organizers and the international community to the promotion of African development and, in particular, their championing of the TICAD Process.

8.2 The Participants warmly welcomed the progress achieved so far by the TICAD Process, and also commended the action-oriented outcome of the Conference and appreciated that this was clearly captured in this Declaration and in the accompanying TICAD IV Action Plan.

8.3 The Participants also welcomed the establishment of a TICAD Follow-Up Mechanism, tasked to continuously monitor and analyze the implementation of the TICAD Process as a whole, and the ongoing assessment of its impact upon African development across its many sectors of activity.

8.4 The Participants noted that a successful and timely attainment of the overarching objective of sustained and accelerated African development would require the commitment and engagement of the entire international community, and the knowledge and resources of all of Africa's development partners to be mobilized in a more consolidated and synergetic manner.

8.5 The Participants welcomed the commitment of Japan, as the G8 Chair, to reflect the outcomes of the TICAD IV at the discussions of the July 2008 G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit and to seek active G8 support for African development.

ANNEX V

Yokohama Action Plan

30 May 2008

Preamble

1. This Action Plan, under the "Yokohama Declaration," is designed to provide a road map for the support of African growth and development under the TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on African Development) process.

2. With robust economic growth of more than 5% per year and enhanced political stability, Africa is on the path toward the broad-based growth and development that will help it become a "continent of hope and opportunity."

3. The TICAD process seeks to support this objective by mobilizing knowledge and resources to assist African countries accomplish clear development goals and achieve tangible outcomes. Since its inception, TICAD has been based on principles of ownership by African countries, partnership, and the expansion of South-South cooperation.

4. This Action Plan lays out goals to be achieved and specific measures to be implemented through the TICAD process during the next five years to further the three TICAD priorities of Boosting Economic Growth, Ensuring Human Security (including the Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Consolidation of Peace and Good Governance), and Addressing Environmental Issues/Climate Change under the Broadening Partnership. Progress will be monitored through the TICAD follow-up mechanism.

5. The Government of Japan at the center of the TICAD process, has taken the initiative to show its strong commitment by announcing doubling ODA to Africa by 2012. This will contribute to the effective implementation of assistance so that the goals along the above-mentioned priorities can be achieved. The Government of Japan will also strive to actively mobilize all the policy tools it has to double direct investment from the Japanese private sector to Africa from 2008 to 2012.

Boosting Economic Growth

- Introduction -

The TICAD process will promote a "Vibrant Africa" and its accelerated economic growth and diversification through support for infrastructure development, trade, investment and tourism, and agriculture. It will seek to advance self-sustainable economic growth that is effectively linked to poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs, and encourage all stakeholders, including the private sector, to act together in support of the efforts African countries are making to broaden and accelerate growth through, inter alia, development of their human resources.

Infrastructure

It is essential to develop an infrastructure network to promote and support the expansion of industry, trade and investment as well as agriculture. The Commission for Africa report to G8 Gleneagles Summit indicated that additional assistance of 10 billion dollars per year would be required to meet Africa's infrastructure needs by 2010. African experts are now drafting a mid-long term strategic plan, which will necessitate both an expanded regional infrastructure and capacity building for maintenance and management.

Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD Process

The TICAD process will focus on:

1. Regional transport infrastructure, including roads and ports
2. Regional power infrastructure
3. Water-related infrastructure
4. Enhanced involvement of regional institutions
5. Promotion of public-private partnership (PPP) in infrastructure

1. Regional transport infrastructure

Provide financial and technical assistance for the planning, construction and improvement of regional transport corridors and international ports.

Support capacity building for the management and maintenance of regional infrastructure.

Promote facilitation of cross-border procedures such as One Stop Border Post (OSBP).

Support technical cooperation for comprehensive community development along with infrastructure development.

2. Regional power infrastructure

Strengthen cooperation to provide a stable power supply for the whole region, and to build capacity to manage and maintain regional power networks.

3. Water related infrastructure

Support agricultural water-development initiatives to rapidly expand the share of land under irrigation, and other improved water control and management infrastructure.

4. Enhanced involvement of regional institutions

Support capacity building of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and regional development banks to better plan, finance and execute infrastructure programs, and provide technical assistance for regional infrastructure investment planning.

5. Promotion of public-private partnership (PPP) in infrastructure

Promote, support and strengthen PPP in infrastructure such as ports, railway and electric power plants to increase opportunities for the private sector by utilizing other official flows (OOF).

Trade, Investment and Tourism

African Governments, recognizing the importance of trade and investment to sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction, are making efforts to promote trade and attract foreign investment, drawing on the experiences of the Asian economies. African Union (AU)/New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and RECs are also formulating common regional trade policies including improvements in the legal and regulatory framework and regional infrastructure, in order to promote intra-African trade and facilitate Africa's integration into the world economy. In this context, the TICAD process aims to achieve a significant increase of trade with and investment to African countries in collaboration with the private sector.

Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD process

The TICAD process will strengthen efforts to:

1.Promote and expand trade
2.Encourage foreign investment
3.Assist private sector development
4.Promote tourism

1. Promote and expand trade

Provide duty-free and quota-free market access for essentially all products originating from all African least developing countries.

Scale up "Aid for Trade" to increase the global competitiveness of African countries by accelerating assistance including Japan's "Development Initiative for Trade" and support the early, fair and balanced conclusion of the WTO Doha development Agenda negotiations.

Assist product development and export promotion in Africa, by further promoting One Village One Product (OVOP) initiative.

Enhance infrastructure management capacity through projects such as the OSBP.

Provide assistance to improve trading practices, and to build capacity in trade policy making and coordination of African countries and RECs.

2. Encourage foreign investment

Provide assistance to improve investment climate including the legal and regulatory frameworks in African countries.

Support the establishment of an information and consultation platform on the business climate for private companies intending to enter into African markets.

Utilize more effectively official funding sources such as investment credit, trade and investment insurance to enhance PPP and leverage private capital flows to Africa.

Provide assistance for capacity building to improve economic and corporate governance.

3. Assist private sector development

Support African countries to plan and implement industrial development strategies and policies, drawing on Asian experiences as appropriate.
Provide technical support to improve productivity, competitiveness and business expertise in promising industries, taking into account the effectiveness of information and communication technology (ICT).

Expand assistance to support the development of small and medium enterprises and local industries.

Collaborate with international financial institutions and regional development banks to strengthen the financial sector, including through the development of local bond markets and local currency financing mechanisms.

Provide technical and financial assistance to promote self-reliant utilization of energy and mineral resources.

4. Promote tourism

Encourage and assist African countries' efforts to address security, hospitality management, infrastructure and environmental constraints to tourism development including through tourism training programs.

Support tourism operators to increase familiarization with African destinations and improve knowledge of the continent and what it has to offer.

Exploit the opportunity provided by the 2010 World Cup Soccer Tournament in South Africa to support long-term tourism promotion through events such as travel fairs.

Agriculture and Rural Development

Seventy percent of the poor in Sub-Sahara Africa or 230 million live in rural areas, and increase in food production and agricultural productivity are critical for food security, poverty reduction and economic growth in Africa. While the agricultural sector can be a driving force for the African economy, the continuing increase in food, fertilizer and fuel prices has become ever more threatening to food security.

African countries have recognized the importance of the agricultural sector for development and are implementing NEPAD's Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) that seeks to improve agricultural productivity to attain an average annual growth rate of 6 percent by 2015. As part of that agenda, African countries have committed, in accordance with the 2003 AU Maputo

Declaration, to allocate at least 10% of national budgetary resources for agriculture and rural development within five years.

Support for agriculture under the TICAD process will include attention to the environmental impact of agricultural activities, as well as the empowerment of women, who play a critical role in agriculture, and the encouragement of South-South cooperation including triangular cooperation.

Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD Process

The TICAD process will seek alignment with the CAADP agenda to:

1.Enhance capacity to increase food production and agricultural productivity
2.Improve access to markets and agricultural competitiveness
3.Support sustainable management of water resources and land use

1. Enhance capacity to increase food production and agricultural productivity

Provide assistance to expand agricultural research, extension and advisory services including for adaptation to climate change, development of new crop varieties and improvement of soil fertility and other farming technologies, and increase the number of agriculture professionals through support for agriculture-related education and training in a gender sensitive manner.

Assist smallholders and farmers' organizations to adopt new technologies, expand agricultural land and the use of inputs and introduce appropriate machinery and equipment to raise productivity.

Increase rice production through developing capacities to adopt systematic crop management, and new methodologies including wider use of New Rice for Africa (NERICA), aiming at doubling the rice production in African countries in ten years.

Strengthen regional networks for transboundary pest and animal disease control.

2. Improve access to markets and agricultural competitiveness

Increase investments in physical infrastructure, such as roads, ports and market facilities in order to reduce transport cost, improve the ratio of retail to farm gate prices, reduce the percentage of post-harvest losses, and increase the percentage of agricultural production that is sold.

Provide technical and financial assistance to farmers to move up the value-chain and meet agricultural product and export standards.

Expand provision of credit to smallholders, especially women, to facilitate their uptake of new technologies and inputs, and accelerate their integration into agri-business value-chains.

Support pilot activities to promote the participation of small scale farmers, associations and small traders in the tender processes.

3. Support sustainable management of water resources and land use

Support reforms in land titling, ownership and use to increase smallholder decision making power over the use and disposition of land.

Promote development, rehabilitation and maintenance of water resources management infrastructure to contribute to the joint efforts aiming at expanding the irrigated area by 20% in five years.

Enhance water resources management capacity through better tillage methods and water harvesting and storage, introduction of new technologies and capacity building of local governments and farmers' organizations.

Provide finance for small-scale community-managed irrigation and water management schemes for local markets, and individual smallholder schemes for high-value markets.

Achieving MDGs

- Introduction -

2008 is midway to the 2015 target for achieving the MDGs. Accelerated progress in Africa is crucial as statistics indicate that many Sub-Saharan African countries will fall short of attaining the goals, and that problems such as high maternal mortality rates and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS remain serious. While economic development is necessary in order to reduce poverty, it is also essential that the fruits of the economic growth reach all members of society, including the most disadvantaged, and are not restricted to a privileged few.

In order to promote the achievement of the MDGs in Africa, the TICAD process will focus on the notion of "human security," which aims at building societies in which people are protected from threats against their lives, livelihoods and dignity and are empowered to realize their full potential. In enhancing "human security," a special emphasis will be placed on bottom-up, comprehensive, multi-sectoral and participatory approaches that encourage collaboration among national and local governments, international organizations, civil society, and other actors. Paying due attention to the inter-relatedness of each of the MDGs, the TICAD process will proactively focus on the areas of health and education, where the delays in achieving the MDGs are most conspicuous, and will encourage community development, gender equality, and the active participation of civil society.

Community Development

Community development and empowerment are vital elements of enhanced human security, both in rural and urban areas. Gender perspective is indispensable as women play an important role in community development. Cultural consideration is also important to ensure sustainable community development. Furthermore, community based approach is indispensable for consolidation of peace during transitional phase.

In the Declaration on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa, members of AU have recognized the importance to address social development, poverty reduction and employment creation in a coherent and integrated manner, and committed themselves to

empowering the poor and the vulnerable, particularly in the rural communities and the urban informal economy, the unemployed and the under-employed.

Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD Process

The TICAD process will focus support on:

1.Comprehensive "Glocal" (global and local) community development
2.Community based approach building on functional hubs

1. Comprehensive "Glocal" (global and local) community development

Support a comprehensive community-driven development approach and build on experiences such as the African Village Initiative (AVI) and the African Millennium Village (AMV).

Provide technical assistance, marketing skills and micro-finance for decent job creation, especially for young people, and income generation by collaborating with co-operatives.

Expand the OVOP project.

2. Community based approach building on functional hubs

Provide a comprehensive package of services at schools and community learning centers, including water supply and sanitation, school meals, first aid and referral service, literacy, and life-skill education, in addition to basic education.

Encourage involvement of local people in the school management ("School for All") in order to enhance their access to education and learning outcomes, and to strengthen linkages with local economy including through home grown feeding programmes.

Support water resource management by local co-operatives to generate income for education, health and agriculture initiatives.

Improve health centers as the core of support and provide training for health/medical workers.

Improve human settlements by establishing community development committees to improve housing, sanitation, water supply and drainage facilities.

Education

To achieve Education for All (EFA) and the MDGs, African countries need to develop holistic education sector plans and allocate sufficient national budgetary resources to implement them and develop related capacities. The TICAD process will support not only these efforts but also promote education and human resource development that leads to growth and sustainable socio-economic development. In doing so, efforts to achieve gender parity in education and synergy with other sectors including health, water and sanitation, need to be pursued.

"The Second Decade of Education for Africa" (2006-2015), adopted by the AU in November 2007, has identified gender and culture, educational management information systems, teacher development, education and training, tertiary education, technical and vocational education and training, curriculum, and teaching and learning materials, and quality management as priority areas for the sector. In this framework, African countries aim to develop functional national Educational Management Information Systems (EMIS), achieve full gender equality in primary and secondary education, and bridge the gender gap in participation in mathematics, science and technology at the tertiary level.

Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD Process

The TICAD process in respect of the commitments and actions made by African countries, will focus on the African efforts as follows:

1.Basic education - expansion of access and quality
2.Post basic education and higher education/research
3.Multi-sectoral approach
4.Education management

1. Basic education - expansion of access to and quality

Support construction and rehabilitation of school buildings and related infrastructure.

Provide assistance to train and ratain primary and secondary school teachers and support the establishment and expansion of teacher training systems and organizations.

Promote capacity development of local education administration and community-based school management through "School for All" programme.

Promote knowledge/experience sharing within Africa and between Asia and Africa on such themes as culture and gender sensitive curricula, learning materials and training manuals.

2. Post basic education and higher education/research

Promote human resource development in support of productive sectors by expanding institutions for technical and vocational education and training.
Strengthen partnership among universities, colleges and research institutes through joint researches and the exchange of researchers and students to expand research and knowledge accumulation in science and technology.

Promote high-level inter-governmental dialogues to strengthen science and technology cooperation.

3. Multi-sectoral approach

Establish child-friendly school environment through comprehensive packages of assistance including safe water and sanitation facilities with separate toilets for boys and girls, school feeding, or food for schooling (take-home ration) and first aid and referral services.

Enhance life-skill education, including on prevention of HIV/AIDS and improvement of hygiene behaviors.

4. Education management

Support the efforts to better manage education including the collection and analysis of education-related information/data to understand and meet educational needs.

Health

Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, faces serious challenges such as the prevalence of infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), malaria and polio, and the high infant mortality rate and maternal mortality ratio. In addition, the emerging threats of climate change and global food crisis will pose new challenges to achievement of a range of health goals, from control of infectious disease to alleviating the burden of malnutrition. These challenges constitute a serious constraint to social and economic development, and a comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach involving, inter alia, safe water and sanitation, nutrition, basic education, gender equality is required.

It is against this background that the Meeting of AU Ministers of Health in April 2007 adopted the "Africa Health Strategy," to promote the strengthening of overall health systems in Africa. AU has laid out regional strategies on major diseases and health issues including "Abuja Declaration and Framework for Action for the Fight against HIV/AIDS, TB and Other Related Infectious Diseases," in which African countries targeted to allocate 15% of public budget to the health sector, "African Regional Nutrition Strategy," as well as "Maputo Plan of Action for the Operationalisation of the Continental Policy Framework for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights," and "Strategic Framework for Reaching the Millennium Development Goal on Child Survival in Africa", and efforts are being made accordingly.

Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD Process

The TICAD process, in respect of the commitments and actions made by African countries,will engage in:

1.Strengthening of health systems
2.Improvement of maternal, new-born and child health
3.Measures against infectious diseases

1. Strengthening health systems

Promote training and retention of health workers to contribute to the joint effort achieving the WHO goal of at least 2.3 health workers per 1,000 people in Africa.

Improve the provision of health services, including through expansion of health infrastructure and facilities.

Promote establishment of monitoring and evaluation of health systems to enable policy decisions based on precise health information.

Encourage and recognize medical research and exemplary medical service practices combating infectious diseases in Africa through the Hideyo Noguchi Africa Prize.

2. Improvement of maternal, new-born and child health

Support interventions focusing on reducing under-five mortality rate and maternal mortality ratio.

Promote continuum of care for women and children across the span of pre-pregnancy, pregnancy, child birth and childhood via high impact intervention such as provision of immunizations and micro-nutrients for children.

Support the international efforts to achieve universal access to reproductive health services.

Contribute to the international efforts to raise the proportion of birth attended by skilled birth attendant in Africa to 75% in five years, as targeted by WHO.

3. Measures against infectious diseases

Support the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM).

Strengthen central government institutions for HIV/AIDS and prioritize prevention of new infections.

Support efforts to achieve the target of reducing by 50 % TB prevalence and mortality rates by 2015 relative to 1990 levels, including through prevention, testing, and treatment activities under Direct Observation Treatment, Short-course (DOTS).

Promote effective implementation of anti-malaria activities by combining preventive measures including distribution of long lasting insecticide-treated bed nets, and awareness raising and provision of nursing care.

Support comprehensive efforts to eradicate polio from Africa, through surveillance and vaccination campaigns.

Make efforts to control or eliminate Neglected Tropical Diseases through awareness raising, treatment and access to safe water and sanitation.

Consolidation of Peace, Good Governance

- Introduction -

Recently Africa has made great progress in ending conflicts and promoting rehabilitation, including efforts on building the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and promoting African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This is an unparalleled opportunity for Africa to consolidate peace and strengthen good governance. Conflicts are indeed significant impediment to human security and development.

Consolidation of peace encompasses different phases and a variety of actions, including preventing conflicts, mediating between parties and negotiating peace agreements, restoring and maintaining security and public order, providing humanitarian assistance, supporting rehabilitation, promoting social and economic development, and improving democratic governance. These processes require seamless and continuous support to make them irreversible.

Conflicts easily spread in Africa where many countries share borders, and therefore, regional aspects should be taken into consideration in consolidating peace. Efforts in conflict prevention as well as risk management to minimize damages upon the outbreak of conflicts are also indispensable. Community-based and participatory approaches with an emphasis on enhancing capacities of local population help promote the ownership of African countries. The most vulnerable groups in society such as women, children, the elderly, and the persons with disabilities also need particular protection and support. At the same time, importance of strengthening coordination as well as sharing information and good practices among internal and external actors engaging in peacebuilding activities should be emphasized.

Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD Process

The TICAD process will specifically focus on:

1.Conflict prevention
2.Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance
3.Restoration and maintenance of security
4.Promotion of good governance

1. Conflict prevention

Contribute to developing the effective operation of Africa's early warning systems including the planned Continental Early Warning System under the APSA.

2. Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance

Support early recovery and quick-impact interventions, including assistance to basic social infrastructure and services and to the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Support livelihoods through vocational training, job creation, and start-up assistance to small business and agriculture.

Assist efforts to protect the most vulnerable groups in society, in particular, through improved access to education to reintegrate in society children and adolescents affected by armed conflict.

Support efforts on disarmament of armed groups, de-mining, destruction of unexploded ordnance, stockpile management and collection of small arms which will contribute to both the restoration of safety, security and good governance and humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.

Further promote mine action including mine risk education, victim assistance and de-mining projects in collaboration with NGOs and the private sector.

Encourage private sector contribution in peacebuilding efforts.

3. Restoration and maintenance of security

Enhance capacity of military, police, and civilians in African countries engaging in peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding.

Strengthen PKO centers in Africa and encourage exchange of experience between Asia and Africa.

Support the African Stand-by Force under the APSA.

Assist efforts in strengthening cross-border control and regional cooperation to regulate the flow of small arms, smuggling and human trafficking.

4. Promotion of good governance

Support the implementation of the Programs of Action of the APRM Country Review Report.

Provide assistance to build capacity in legal systems, financial control and the public service.

Strengthen economic governance through the NEPAD-OECD Africa Investment Initiative.

Addressing Environmental/Climate Change issues

- Introduction -

Addressing climate change is an urgent challenge for Africa, given its vulnerability to adverse impacts such as more frequent and intense droughts and floods. In order to realize a "global sustainable society", it is necessary for all countries, including those in Africa, to collaborate and develop an effective framework beyond 2012 on climate change, and take action toward the goal of reducing global greenhouse gas emissions.

The TICAD process will promote policy dialogue in the field of climate change, support developing of an effective framework, and strengthen assistance to African countries that make efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and achieve economic growth in a compatible manner, in the areas of policy planning, mitigation, access to clean energy, and adaptation to climate change. With regard to adaptation, the TICAD process will promote effective management of water resources, as well as efforts in related areas such as health, agriculture and food security.

In this context, it is important to promote a participatory approach involving a wide range of stakeholders including central governments, international organizations, local governments and communities, private sector and civil society organizations. Furthermore, coordinated efforts are required under various initiatives including Japan's "Cool Earth Partnership" with Africa. In Africa, efforts are underway at the national

level as well as within international and regional frameworks developed by the United Nations, AU/NEPAD and RECs.

Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD Process

The TICAD process will strengthen efforts, in the following areas:

1. Mitigation
2. Adaptation
3. Water and Sanitation
4. Education for Sustainable Development (ESD)

1. Mitigation

(1) Promotion of mitigation measures

Support active participation by African countries in developing an effective framework beyond 2012 on climate change, in which all countries take actions and work together, based on the Bali Action Plan.

Promote the formulation of projects and awareness-raising campaigns for further implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and support the institutional and capacity development of Designated National Agencies in each country.

Support the development of and access to basic information on forest resources and land use to encourage sustainable forest management and promote conservation and reforestation projects in response to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD).

(2) Promotion of the use of clean energy and improvement of energy access

Support the formulation of policies and plans to expand usage of renewable energy, and assist renewable energy programmes including facilitating transfer of management and maintenance technology.

Support the development and management of electricity power grid to promote improved access to and efficient use of electricity, and promote better access of the poor to affordable and efficient energy through comprehensive rural development programmes.

2. Adaptation

Promote technical assistance such as establishing and updating the Global Map data for the entire Africa, describing the status of its environment in five years.

(1) Measures against natural disasters

Support the formulation of natural disaster prevention and emergency activity plans based on the assessment of risk and vulnerability of each region to disasters including droughts and floods.

Assist efforts to establish early warning systems and strengthen capacity at the community level to cope with natural disasters.

(2) Measures to combat desertification

Assist the development and dissemination of new and existing technologies for utilization of water resources, soil conservation and reforestation including utilization of drought-resistant plants.

Assist efforts to raise awareness to combat desertification at the community level and introduce appropriate measures to reduce overgrazing, over-cultivation and deforestation.

3. Water and Sanitation

(1) Effective water resources management

Assist formulation of water cycle management plans based on the assessment of potential water resources and specific local conditions and the improvement of administrative capacity to implement these plans.

Promote the transfer of technology and expertise on water resources management with due consideration to the specific situation of each region.

(2) Access to safe water and sanitation facilities

Promote the development of water and sanitation facilities with affordable technologies.

Support capacity building of managers and users of water and sanitation system and promote awareness raising campaigns to improve hygiene practices including hand washing.

4. Education for Sustainable Development (ESD)

Promote ESD through integration of ESD into policies and practices to realize a more sustainable society.

Broadening Partnership

- Introduction -

The TICAD process has consistently embraced the concept of "Ownership" and "Partnership" and the scope of the "Partnership" with Africa has expanded steadily.

Asia-Africa cooperation is one of the key elements of the TICAD process that progresses through mutual learning and sharing of best practices and technology between the two regions. African countries are in the process of integration, making strides towards the deepening of an intra-African partnership within the framework of the Abuja Treaty. They have also made significant achievements as embodied in the action plan of the NEPAD, while the AU has made its own strides in collaboration with

RECs as major pillars of continental integration. Broad-based partnership and a participatory approach involving private companies, NGOs and academia is crucial, and African countries are making efforts to engage as many actors as possible in the process of development. Better coordination among these partners under the African ownership is also of vital importance for these efforts to lead to maximum outcome and impacts on the ground.

Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD Process

The TICAD process will strengthen efforts to:

1.Promote South-South Cooperation, in particular Asia-Africa Cooperation
2.Deepen Regional Integration
3.Broaden Partnership

1. Promote South-South Cooperation, in particular Asia-Africa Cooperation

Transfer efficiently skill and technique, share knowledge and experience, and promote joint research within Africa and between Asia and Africa.

Promote the exchange of people, trade and investment and services to strengthen the ties between Asia and Africa.

Encourage the full use of existing institutions mandated in the field of South-South cooperation, such as the Asian Productivity Organization (APO) and National Productivity Organizations in both Asia and Africa.

2. Deepen Regional Integration

Encourage triangular cooperation, both in the context of intra-Africa and Asia-Africa cooperation, recognizing the important role of the AU/NEPAD and RECs.

3. Broaden Partnership

Promote PPP, in recognition of the important role of private sector in the African development.

Enhance coordination with the civil society and encourage cooperation with the academia.