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CULTURE, CORRUPTION AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORM

Perspectives on Problem of Ethics in the Nigerian Public Service

Master's Thesis in
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

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ABSTRACT:

Corruption has been adduced in recent past to be synonymous with the culture of developing countries especially African culture by some schools of thought. The primary aim of this research is to see how true this deduction and premise are? Culture**,** corruption and public management reform are different concepts, how do they affect one another in public service related issues? A broader view becomes a necessary tool in this type of analysis. Culture represents living entity, corruption represents an act and while public management reform represents a state of dissatisfaction that requires a change.

Analysis based on a comparative approach on corruption shows that corruption is universal. From one culture to another the causes and effects differ in many ways. Public management reform from cultural interpretation differs in terms of result outcomes. The need to understand a particular cultural environment before public management reform ideas are introduced and applied becomes a key strategy to success. Culture is like force that could aid or limit public management reform ideas. Public management reform ideas are positivism premised to create public good. Corruption could become resilient if a thorough environmental check is not done, especially when public management reform ideas are aimed at removing corruption. However, public management reform ideas have the tendencies of removing traditional structures that encourage the growth of corruption.

For the Nigerian public service the complexity emanating from the diversity of the Nigerian state structural arrangements is the major cause of administrative corruption in the public service. Building an ethical filled public service becomes a difficulty because a majority of the populace sees the state as a foreign element. This further creates a problem of loss of trust towards the holistic Nigerian state vision. The Nigerian state is a product of British imperialism that accommodates over 300 different ethnic groups, where some are dominant and others are dominated. The primary aim of capturing the state apparatus which the public service is also a part, for either selfish or ethnic interest becomes the order of the day. A privileged–marginalised dichotomy is therefore created in the Nigerian state that is automatically transferred to the public service. New public management reform ideas especially that of participatory state model becomes a relevant tool in building social capital. An increase in social capital leads to an increase in trust because people from these diverse backgrounds will network with an understanding of the opposite. This in turn will reduce corruption in both the Nigerian state and the public service.

1. INTRODUCTION

I chose the topic "culture, corruption and public management reform" in order to explicate the relationship between these three concepts, especially how they relate and affect one another. However, perspectives on problem of ethics in the Nigerian public service goes along in showing the various ways ethical issues can be evaluated in relation to social and structural elements.

Conventionally, culture is defined as a way of life of a particular people or group. Culture is an elaborate concept because every living thing has its unique way of doing things. I would state the fact without any compromise that without culture human being is incomplete. Culture is the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses in addition to art and literature, life styles, ways of living together, value system, traditions and beliefs (UNESCO 2002, qtd. in Huovinen 2007).

Corruption is popularly referred to as the act of diverting public interest or public good for personal gain. I would start by saying in my own words from an exploitative perspective that corruption is a deliberately designed act to cause profit and enrichment to the exploiter and agony and deprivation to the exploited. According to Salminen (2008: 40), corruption is an act of giving, promising or offering wrongful satisfaction or compensation. In Lawton's (1998: 26) perspective, defining what is corruption depends upon personal gain, breaking the rules, how often it happens and the value of the gifts.

Constructing a definition for corruption presents several difficulties, because like many other forms of behaviour, it is an elusive and complex phenomenon. One of the difficulties is constructing a definition which is not dependent on the moral or normative evaluation of the researcher. This has sometimes elicited a tendency to condemn, which has impeded objective analysis. This explains why some writers deliberately avoid defining it. Another is the fact that a definition of corruption which is clearly ethical is also subjective and a discussion of causes and consequences will require prior agreement amongst all participants about the relevant normative values.

For this reason corruption is basically defined in most social science discussions, in terms of deviations from legal norms themselves. This norm based definition has tended, however, to allow discussion to take place at the cost of ruling out some important activities which in everyday sense would be considered corrupt. (Khan 1996, qtd. in Edevbaro 1998: 27.)

Public management reforms are public sector oriented; they could also be referred to as public sector reforms. According to Pollit and Bourckaert (2004: 32), public sector reform is in fashion and no self respecting government can afford to ignore it. Public management reform is pragmatic and positivism premised. It centres on the philosophy of the need for a paradigm shift in the ways public sector activities had formally been handled. According to Pollit and Bouckaert (2004: 15): *"We are aware that reform is a term with deep roots in the politics of improvement and refers not to total change, but to the reshaping of something that is already in existence (reform)."*

According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004: 32): *"Thus we have one set of reasons for widespread public sector reforms–to restrain public spending, lighten the bureaucratic burden and reshape social policies that can no longer be afforded."* Reforms could be influenced as a result of external factors. According to Esteves De Araujo (2001: 915): *"Reform has been influenced by the experience of other countries*."

The ideas of reforms in general and public management reform (new public management reform) in particular are to create public good. The idea not to explore their principles even if culture could be a barrier to their implementation will cause a perpetual darkness and acute living in bondage in any country or nation whose ideal is to properly conduct public business. The Nigerian public service today is at a *cross road*. The reason is not that it has not acknowledged and implemented some reform ideas but other *social and structural elements* have served as impediments to the successful realization of public management ideas.

Reforms are not new to man kind, taking a historical overview from the arguments for the science of administration by Wilson Woodrow; there has always been a position that

you do not copy a system or style of doing things from an external source without first screening it with the traditional values and principles before implementation. We can borrow the science of administration with safety and profit if only we read all fundamental differences of conditions into its essential tenets, we have only to filter it through our constitutions, only to put it over a slow fire of criticism and distil away its foreign gases. (Wilson 1887: 32.)

The Nigerian state by all social and structural judgements is a complex state. It is complex because in defining a giving state, the historical evolvement of the state in question should be examined. The Nigerian state emerged as a British concept. Britain acquired the territory now known as Nigeria as result of the peaceful effort made by the then German Chancellor, Otto Von Bismarck on the need for the peaceful sharing or acquisition of territories in Africa, the New World (Americas) and Asia among the European super powers in 1884–1885 in a conference popularly known as the Berlin Conference. The "Trust" concept that has eluded and created other problems in the Nigerian state and many other colonised territories emerged from this conference where territories in African, Asia and those of the New World (Americas) were sliced, slashed and balkanised like a "wedding cake" meant for guests consumption (Wagbafor 2003).

The Nigerian public service is as complex as the Nigerian state. The complexity is best understood from a cultural interpretation. Culture according Tylor (1871, qtd. in Huovinen 2007) is : *that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."* Therefore, giving the Nigerian public service a cultural interpretation, a historical approach is necessary. A historical approach can not be well analysed without a clue on the evolvement of the people that made up the history.

From colonial period to post colonial era series of administrative reforms have been undertaken in the public sector in Nigeria. However, the aims or goals of the reforms have not been realized largely due to *social and structural* complexity of the Nigerian state. Therefore, I would state that the Nigerian pubic service among many other things but first needs "Trust". Trust is an attitude that we have towards phenomenon that we

hope will be trustworthy, where trustworthiness is a property, not an attitude (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 2008). Trust performs the function in social, professional or economic life of allowing order, stability, continuity and, indeed, the maintenance of all kind of life at all (Lawton 1998: 71).

Now trust has a very pragmatic value, if nothing else. Trust is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people's word. Unfortunately this is not a commodity which can be bought very easily. If you have to buy it, you already have some doubts about what you have bought. Trust and similar values, loyalty or truth–telling, are examples of what the economist would call "externalities." They are goods, they are commodities; they have real, practical, economic value; they increase the efficiency of the system, enable you to produce more goods or more of whatever values you hold in high esteem. But they are not commodities for which trade on the open market is technically possible or even meaningful. (Arrow 1974: 23, qtd. in Edevbaro 1998: 35.)

1.1. Research Statement

It has been noted in most quarters that corruption is a part of developing countries (Africa) culture. According to Werner (1983: 195):

> *"It thus, became simplistic to attribute corruption in developing countries to cultural heritages which produced "supportive values." In these countries, where citizens have negative attitudes towards public authority, "gift–giving" practices have been transformed into corruption only by the imposition of western values. In these countries, "there exist a gap between law (as imposed by western and alien standards) and accepted informal social norms (sanctioned by prevailing social ethics…In sum, these countries demonstrate a "folklore" a "climate," and "way of life" with regard to corruption."*

The above statement can however not be concluded to be true, because corruption thrives in every society. According to Alatas (1990: 11, qtd. in Mulinge & Lesetedi 2002: 51), corruption is a problem that is trans-systemic; that is, it inheres in all social systems - feudalism, capitalism, communism and socialism. The causes and effects of corruption differ from one society to another. The major reason why the Nigerian state

and its public service have been caught in a web of system corruption is due to the diversity of the Nigerian state. Based on this premise a large majority of the populace tend not to trust the state because of the marginalising formation of the state. The effects of corruption on the other hand stem from underdevelopment to uncertainty and insecurity.

Culture is a people attribute; corruption is an act, and reforms are ideological propositions. Culture and corruption are tied to each order in many relative ways, from causes to solutions. Culture and corruption are two other concepts that affect each other in many relative ways either negatively or positively in an attempt to move to the next level. Reforms and corruption interact in order to create changes. These changes might not occur without a proper study of environment (figure 1).

Culture

Causes   Affects

Corruption   Reforms

Changes

Figure 1. Culture , Corruption and Public Management Reform Inter–Relationships.

Culture which is seen as complex whole of phenomenon must be acknowledged as tangible resource. Linking culture, rhetoric and public management helps to understand, describe and explain typologies of public management. However, in order to understand the interaction between culture and public sector reform there is a need to go beyond culture theory and a necessity to take a multi–disciplinary approach. Administrative

reform then may be considered as possessing four discrete but interconnected aspects. These are environment, content, strategy and dynamics. (Zifcak 1994: 137; Bouckaert 2007: 30–37; Schedler & Proeller 2007: 23–25.)

The need to understand that reforms utilization would vary from one country to another, region to another and even community to another should not be taken for granted. *However the benefits, of reforming are always more than the pains of not trying,* because in the act of trying loopholes are detected and lessons are learned in a coded or open form. The lessons learned thereby create the mind or the notion for the need of a more positive change. For the Nigerian state and it public service, new public management reform ideas can increase trust, through its positive effect on social capital. An increase in social capital would no doubt reduce corruption in the public service.

Prior to 1900, the Nigerian state did not even exist as a single country but was collection of provinces loyal to different authorities. On the 1st of January 1900, Great Britain formally established its authority and began to administer Nigeria as a single entity in 1914 with the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates (Edevbaro 1998: 23). This amalgamation is what is popularly referred to in the Nigerian political circle as the "mistake" of 1914. It is a mistake because Great Britain did not put the diverse nature of Nigeria into consideration, but rather it was done out of the aim of having administrative ease flow.

Created out of a motley of nationalities and ethnic groups (different estimates of various language groups range from 250 to 400), of which three are dominant- the Hausas, the Ibos, the Yorubas and some six large ethnic minorities, - Nigeria is today's Africa's most populous country and one of the largest in terms of territory. It has a population which is estimated at between 140 – 150 million. Nigeria's central problem is how to evolve a workable socio-political and economic order since it acquired political independence on October 1, 1960. The departing British colonial administration transferred three key principles of governance- federalism, democracy and a mixed economy with major roles for both public and private sector organizations. These three have been inspirational in the country's post-independent constitutions (1960, 1963, 1979, 1989, and 1995) but

none of the principles has been allowed a full application in Nigeria's turbulent post-independence existence. (Olowu, Otobo & Okotoni 2008.)

From the context of the Nigerian state the desire to capture the state apparatus for either selfish reason or ethnic interest is the cause of the centralisation that encourages other causes of corruption like elitism and patron–clientelism that is also extended to the public service. These elements might not be the cause of corruption when another country is put to contestation. Culture and reforms affects each other relatively depending on the perspective one is adopting. Reforms have tendency to change static structure that encourages the growth of corruption to make it less vulnerable to corruption. Corruption could however remain resilient even with the adoption of reforms. However, all these depend on the cultural environment that is in question and methods adopted to tackle it.

1.2. Literature Review

A lot of experts in the field of public management have been so concerned over the years about how to make government function better by being more efficient, effective and accountable through reform ideas. According to Pollit and Bouckaert (2004: 15): *"reform is a "Loaded" term in the sense that strongly implies not just change but beneficial change, a deliberate move from less desirable (past) state to a more desirable (future) state."* But little concern has been given to the historical antecedents of different countries and their culture.

The ideas of public management reforms can not be separated from the people, because people make up a nation and these individuals could acquire different cultures that their various societies shape and mode for the aim of having a collective identity. Our culture does shape our orientation and social identity through its limitations and expectations of what will be collectively defined as acceptable. Every person carries with himself or herself modes of thinking, feelings and potential acting which were learned through out

their life time, much of it has been acquired in early childhood because at that time a person is most susceptible to learning and assimilating (Hosfstede 1997: 4).

Ideas rule the world, from Classical thinkers like Socrates and Plato to Medieval thinkers like Hegel and Bentham and even contemporary thinkers like Gore and my humble self. Ideas are product of environment which culture to a large extent determines. The source of one's mental programming lies within the social environment in which one grew up and collected one's life starts within the family; to the neighbourhood at school; in youth camp and at work place (Hofstede 1997: 4).

Only very few political administrations world wide have remained unaffected by the wave of reform that has swept through the public sector over the past several decades. The magnitude of reform undertaken in most political systems may have been unprecedented, at least during peacetime, but reform also may have tended to be extremely piecemeal and unsystematic. The lack of defined visions and integrated strategies may partly explain why the results of the reforms have tended to disappoint so many of their advocates. (Caiden 1990; Peters & Savoie 1994; Ingraham 1995, qtd. in Peters 2001: 16.)

The foisting of reforms, in addition with the particular administrative and political problems of many of these countries (developing), means that managerial and political consequences of reform are rather different from those more industrialised and democratized countries. Getting an in-depth conceptualisation of administrative reform requires understanding the traditional model of governance that is backdrop against which attempts at reform must be viewed. (Peters 2001: 3.)

This natural spread of ideas has been most characteristics of administrative reform in industrialised democracies. This system of policy transfer has been more characteristics of the less developed countries and transitional regimes, which must trade compliance with what has come to be known as "good governance" for loans and grants from the major international donor organization. It is however important not to rule out the fact

that the ideas themselves have some appeal and some advocates, but there are some external pressures and incentives to adopt the programs. (Peters 2001: 163.)

It is quite obvious on one hand; there are the less–developed countries of Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia. On the other hand there are numerous transitional regimes, the countries that until a decade ago were under control of the Communist Party. These existing administrative philosophies constitute the environment within which government functioned before the advents of reforms and therefore establish some impediments under which reform would function. To some extent the traditional model found in these countries is little different from that of the industrialised Western countries. This style of change may present severe problems in creating effective administration and especially in institutionalising flexible accountability. (Peters 2001: 164–165.)

Even if the traditional concepts of public administration in many regimes of these two different countries (Developed and Developing) may appear some what similar to those found in the industrialised democracies, the absolute fact is that they may rather differ. New Public Management has had a lot of drawbacks in developing countries and nearly even more in the other groups of states where it is being implemented. In particular, it will however require an administrative system that comes as close to some of the traditional ideals of probity and egalitarianism as possible. (Peters 2001: 164–165.)

A large number of scholars in public administration and management research would side the fact that a relationship exists between the culture of a nation and the way public management arrangements are coordinated. Therefore, it has become imperative for public management research and theory to posses ideas of the mechanisms and forms on the interrelationship between societal culture and public management. As public administration and management issues are becoming more globalized, experts have become more aware of the influence of societal culture on the number of choices a country has for the design of public administration. (Schedler & Proeller 2007: 1–4.)

The concept of culture is the effort making in order to explain differences in the behaviour of diverse groups of actors in situation that are objectively alike. Therefore, culture research is the search for the shared subjective which manifest in a mutual sense making process among actors that will be call cultural group. However, functionally speaking, culture has become an object of management just like strategy and structure. In managerial writing, culture is being subjected to the quest of rational management because it can not be altered for purpose of achieving a holistic outcome. (Schedler & Proeller 2007: 4–8.)

One of the earliest recent studies that has given attention to cultural aspects in the public sphere is the one conducted by Almond and Verba (1963, qtd. in Schedler & Proeller 2007: 8). They both studied the social and cultural forces interlinked with political institutions and introduced new concepts such as political culture and civic culture to explain political behaviour. They argued that institutional stability can be achieved when society's political institutions are congruent with its underlying political culture. However, the notion of political culture has been expanded to include attitudes towards public policy. Relating the rationale to public management and administration could inform the idea that organisations, structures and management practices can only be supported and successful when they are in agreement with existing culture.

The socio–cultural model implies only culture can influence public management, rather public management influencing culture because culture is seen as stable and external to public management. This point reaffirms the position of Caiden and Sundaram (2004: 376, qtd. in Schedler & Proeller 2007: 9–11), that when countries have relied on foreign experts, the foreigners have too often ignored domestic circumstances and confused matters by incorporating their foreign values; imposed reforms by elites have been formally adopted but informally evaded. This led Schick to argue that developing countries should not implement public management reform articulated by international organization because of cultural differences.

The culturalist approach holds a different view from the social–cultural approach. The culturalist approach emphasises the fact that culture and organisation are not treated as

separate phenomena, but organisation are considered as cultures and analysed as such. Smircich (1983, qtd. in Schedler & Proeller 2007: 11–12), agues that culture is not a variable to describe and explain organisation, but a metaphor for organisation. For historical institutionalist school of thought, culture is a characteristic of the institutional context and is related to the mutual interpretation of historical experience within an organisation.

The relationship between culture and public management in the tradition of the historical institutionalism points specific traditions and beliefs at the national level which seem plausible and relevant to explain certain features and development. Here, culture is not only seen as an external phenomenon, but organisation can also modify culture in the sense that strategies induced in organisations today may ultimately affect and shape self images and preferences of actors of tomorrow. This has informed idea of public management reform experts like Pollitt and Bouckaert (2006, qtd. in Schedler & Proeller 2007: 13–14), to conclude that most of the comparative public management research in the past has been mainly based on historical institutionalism.

Sociological institutionalism is another school of thought that has dealt on the relationship between culture and public management. In their perspective for organisation to exist is not rational selection of actors but of cultural specific. Institutions are not derived from the premises of formal rules, procedures and norms, but in addition a system of symbols, cognitive scripts and moral framing. More also, from the interlinkage between organisation and individual action is highly interactive and mutually constitutive and institutions affect behaviour by normative and cognitive dimensions. (Schedler & Proeller 2007: 14.)

Researches in public management from an international context stress the fact for new organisational practices are adopted to enhance social legitimacy, and not to increase any means–end–efficiency. It is for this reason that scholars like Hall and Taylor (1996, qtd. in Schedler & Proeller 2007: 15), have advised other experts to posses the knowledge of social–cultural context of any public management reform. However, rational choice–based cultural theory has a different view because here, culture and

organization are treated separately. This theory elaborates on the importance of culture as a pool of political resources. Cultural resources are similarities, such as race, language, religious beliefs that facilitate communication and reduce costs.

In public management contexts, different cultural dispositions and the political instrumentalization therefore make it hard to export public management concepts among social environment, which is the reason for the public management reform unequal goal realisation. The functionalist theory took a farther view by seeing the task of changing administrative culture as the responsibility of public management reform. New public management (NPM) reforms lead to an obvious change in administrative culture describe by values, like cost consciousness, results orientation, and entrepreneurial behaviour. (Schedler & Proeller 2007: 16–18.)

Schedler and Proeller (2007: 23–25) have noticed in the arguments of Hood (1999), Osborne and Gaebler (1992) and Naschold (1996) that in recent times, public management reform literature has increasingly become culture alert, compare to early thoughts on NPM reforms that dedicated interests on the ideological, doctrinal, and instrumental aspects and sought to learn from best practice abroad as experts like. Therefore, for public management research, creating more knowledge about the way to approach culture as a social phenomenon is fundamental, especially for an international scholarship (Bouckaert 2007: 30–37).

The concept of culture could be analysed in different forms and shapes. *However it is clear that there is no best culture for public sector reform. One needs to only make best of a country's culture to make a successful public management reform within each cluster.* A well coordinated public sector is most time considered to be of major importance, but at the same time it appears to be a huge challenge. Public sector reforms struggling with the coordination conundrum are numerous and countries display a certain dynamic in their adoption of coordination instruments throughout time. (Beuselink, Verhoest & Bouckaert 2007: 77–105; Bouckaert 2007: 38–40.)

According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004, qtd. in Beuselink et al. 2007: 77–105; Bouckaert 2007: 38–40), the politico–administrative system of a country has an important role to play in the design of management change. Next to the politico–administrative system is the cultural dimension as defined by Hofstede. Taking into account the politico–administrative system of a country and the scores of countries on certain cultural values provide some useful insights and added value for the analysis of coordination initiatives.

From an international perspective, public management arrangements differ significantly from country to country. A primary attribute for these differences may be variation of different civic cultures with differing views of the state institutions. There experts in public management, international practitioners, should be aware of the influence culture has on the possibilities and limits of concept transfer between different organisations and jurisdictions. Economic arrangements for example, are partly a function of systemic change; they are a function of random, fortuitous events as well. Systematic forces on the other part include culture, position, power, institutions and competing values. (OECD 1995: 7–9; Thompson & Jones 2007: 203–210.)

Therefore, investing in Information Technology (IT) for example is not enough without due consideration of relational architecture, set of processes or routine and culture. If the public sector is to remain responsive to the needs of those it serves, government must foster the development of organisations that perpetually adapt and reshape themselves to meet changing client needs, and that develop new ways to cope with the changing world. *All strategies must reflect the fact that reform is a journey rather than destination*. (OECD 1995: 7–9; Thompson & Jones 2007: 203–210.)

Numerous studies have questioned whether reform has indeed lead to improved public service delivery. In recent time reform initiatives have been introduced with the objective of changing a rule bound public service to one which serves the public interest. These changes have not reduced the incentives and opportunities for corruption in most developing countries. Public management reform might have the objective to get the public service to perform better – to function more like private companies, but at what

cost? Public management reform may fail to produce its intended objective, or even leave the public service worse off than originally found. One such contradiction seems to occur when one considers to effect of public management reform on the prevention of corruption. (Webb 2007: 1–2.)

According to (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2004, qtd. in Webb 2007: 3), three features of administrative reform is worth reflecting on: its emphasis on the decentralisation of authority; its move away from tenured staff to contract staff; and its shift from controlling inputs to outputs and outcomes. 'Freeing managers to manage' creates opportunities for corruption. Greater management autonomy for public servants lead to excessive discretion, and create opportunities for fraud and corruption as they are freed from traditional budgetary control measures.

As Von Maravic (2007, qtd. in Webb 2007: 4), notes public management reform has not only lead to the empowerment of managers with less hierarchical control and supervision, but also to greater exposure to conflicts of interest and an increase in incentives and opportunities for corruption. Commenting on new public management tendencies at local authorities in Germany, the decentralisation of authority to public enterprises has not been accompanied by the necessary strengthening of control and audit capacity. Municipal auditors have criticised the higher decision making discretion for managers propagated by public management reform, without the required increase in control and audit functions. In fact, managers have defended this new freedom stating that too much management supervision constrains their management flexibility.

It most be noted at this juncture that those who have criticised new public management reform ideas have applied a more myopic than holistic view. For example those who have dealt with the relationship between public management and corruption, have addressed corruption from a tradition perspective by not taking an in-depth look at the causes of corruption which social elements can be part of. Corruption is a phenomenon that can not be eradicated over night but a step by step approach can lead to a gradual reduction. It is also based on this premise that some scholars have concluded that corruption is part of developing countries culture as noted above. A strong relationship

exists between culture, corruption and public management reform and defining this relationship depends on approach adopted

1.3. Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this research is first to apply relative outlook to issues of culture, corruption and public management reform on how they affect one another. The idea is to posit how new public management reform ideas can correct some anomalies in the Nigeria public service. This study discusses the many ways of viewing corruption. Whether is of developing countries culture as it has been pointed in some quarters or not. The position of this research is to however, take a comparative outlook in answering this question, which at the end shows corruption is universal but the causes tend to differ from one culture to another. Reforms outcome tend to differ from one culture to another, but a careful study of a particular cultural settings tells the ways of applicability and possible result outcome. After a careful study of the Nigerian case, based on the diversity, new public management reform ideas can increase state trust which is the major cause of corruption in the Nigerian public service. The method of study I will adopt in this research is qualitative or secondary and comparative analyses based on the availability of literatures and convenience to research information.

2. ETHICAL ISSUES AS A THEORTICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Central Concept

Studies in ethics usually start with one known word "Good". Ethics is a science that evaluates the question of human happiness. Ethics is the study of moral principles. Ethics is an ideological outlook on what is good or bad, beautiful or ugly, just and unjust, favourable and unfavourable, desirable and undesirable, rational and irrational, moral and immoral, normal and abnormal and so on. According to Salminen (2008: 7), ethics understands the nature of morality, world of philosophy, values and morals. Ethics is a set of principles, often defined as a code that acts as a guideline to conduct; this set provides a framework for acting (Lawton 1998: 16). Traditionally speaking, ethics in public administration means the obligation to avoid injury (Stewart 1984: 139).

Any discussion of ethics takes place upon shifting sands. What is to count as ethical behaviour will also change over time and between places. This truism has led some commentators to argue that we cannot say anything significant about ethics because of ethical relativism and subjectivity. Such arguments, depends upon the circumstances or you have to take account of the context or you have to understand phenomena beliefs and values and not impose your own judgements. This is true, of course, and it is difficult to justify universal principles when we accept that, under certain circumstances, lying can be justified and rules can be broken. (Lawton 1998: 15–16.)

2.1.1. Issue

The following are the questions Lawton (1998: 17) asked about an "issue":
▪ What is an issue?
▪ What makes an issue?
▪ What makes it an ethical issue?
▪ Who defines it as an issue?
▪ At what level is it an issue-social, Organizational or Individual?

These questions I will attempt to answer now. Although, my subsequent evaluations would give better self defined answers. There must be an occurrence for there to be an issue, so occurrence is tied to an issue. Issues are raised because of a disagreement over an important topic of discussion or action (Lawton 1998: 17). An occurrence becomes an issue when it has an effect on a phenomenon. An occurrence becomes an ethical issue when it has an effect on ethical phenomena. An occurrence is defined as an issue by any concerned stake holder. An occurrence is an issue at social, organizational and individual level.

From the answers to the questions above, one gets to understand that an issue is an *all encompassing* concept. Why has there been an increase in corruption and a need to restructure the public service are some examples of issue. Whatever their status, there is the perception that a range of issues appeared on the agenda as a result of development of reforms to the management of public service world wide (Lawton 1998: 21). For the purpose of paper my look on ethical issues shall be narrow down to corruption.

2.1.2. Corruption

According to Werner (1983: 195): *"Corruption as modus operandi has been observed throughout the world, corruption is universal."* When talking about corruption, no country or institution should be regarded as saint because interest could be corruption. However, the difference is its level of prevalence. According to Mulinge and Lesetedi (2002: 51), the problem of corruption is both an endemic and a universal one which affects all world nations but in varying degrees and forms.

Corruption is a multi–faced phenomenon, linking multiple issues together such as *abuse of entrusted* power for private gains; low integrity; taking bribes; maladministration, fraud, and nepotism (Salminen, Viinamäki & Ikola–Norrbacka 2007). Huberts, Lasthuizen and Peeters (2006: 90, qtd. in Salminen et al. 2007): *"compare corruption to an iceberg, in which only the tip can be seen and only known facts can be taken into consideration."* Corruption can serve different interest that can be beneficial or as an

impediment. Corruption is no doubt a multidimensional concept which can be seen from different perspectives. According to Singh (2008):

> *"Thus multinationals, supported by western governments and their agencies, are engaging in corruption on a vast scale in North and South alike. Donor governments and multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund frequently put forward anti-poverty and "good governance" agendas, but their actions send a different signal about where their priorities lie. Corruption is increasingly cited as a reason for withholding foreign aid or debt relief. If a country's inability to pay interest on its loans is due to its leaders siphoning off national earnings into their own bank accounts, the reasoning goes, surely extending aid or cancelling the debt will merely sanction further graft. For multinationals, bribery enables companies to gain contracts (particularly for public works and military equipment) or concessions which they would not otherwise have won, or to do so on more favourable terms. In 1999, the US Commerce Department reported that, in the preceding five years, bribery was believed to have been a factor in 294 commercial contracts worth $145 billion, the report observed."*

Influenced by the developmental approach of the 1960's, corruption was associated with the process of modernization. Every modernizing system was regarded as being susceptible to corruption, as was the case in Western societies which evidence peak levels of corruption as they experienced socio–political development. Developing countries, therefore, were assumed to allow corruption to become a usual and expected part of the national maturation process. It however, became simplistic to attribute corruption in developing countries to cultural heritages which produced "supportive values." In these countries, where citizen's attitudes towards public authority are low, "gift–giving" practices have been transformed into corruption only by the imposition of western values. Ideologies in these developing countries encourage the existence of corruption. (Werner 1983: 194–195.)

In a counter rejection of the "self destructive nature" theory of corruption, rationally held beliefs in America indicate that corruption has now become part of the national lifestyle. A growing body of literature suggests that corruption may well be endemic to America's politics, business, and social institutions. This implies a lack of boundaries to corruption imposed by political ideology or development. Corruption, for example is a feature of communist countries and nations now in the final stages of political development. Therefore, the theoretical tenet that corruption is a dependent variable of development is false. Corruption is universal. It can thrive and propagate itself in any level of political and bureaucratic development. (Werner 1983: 195.)

Despite the oddness of relevant concepts, definitions of corruption have been categorised into groups: (1) public office–centred definitions which involve the deviation from legal and public duty norms for the sake of private benefits, be it for peculiar or status gains, or influence; (2) market–centred definitions which view corruption as a "maximizing unit," a special type of stock–in–trade, by which public officials maximise pecuniary gains according to the supply and demand that exist in market place of their official domains: (3) public interest–centred definitions which emphasize the betrayal of public interest by preference of particular to common interests. (Werner 1983: 193.)

Peter and Welch (1978, qtd. in Werner 1983: 193), classified corruption according to its legal, public interest, and public opinion bases. While the first two bases are unique, the third deserves scrutiny because it does not so much define corruption as ask who determines what is corrupt. This was based upon Heiden–heimers' "Litmus test," which deemed corruption to be black, gray, or white, depending upon the commonality of perception by the public and its officials.

Peter and Welch (1978, qtd. in Werner 1983: 193), further took a logical step in categorizing a corrupt act in accord with its four components: the donor, the recipient, the favour, and the payoff. They wrote that corruption would be perceived as "limited" when: the recipient public official acts as a private citizen; a constituent pays a public official as opposed to the official "putting his hand in the till"; the favour is a routine part of the public official's job or benefits the public interest; and payoff is small, long–range, or in the form of support rather than money. In the final analysis, then a "bad" political act is deemed less corrupt if it is performed for the "good" of the constituency.

Corruption is really no doubt a complex and elusive concept and because of this the definitions are oriented in different perspectives. According to public office oriented definition of Marx Weber (1968 qtd. in Edevbaro 1998: 30):

> *"Legally and actually, office holding is not considered ownership of a source of income, to be exploited for rents or emoluments in exchange for the rendering of certain services, as was normally the case in the Middle Ages...rather entrance into an office...is considered an acceptance of a secure existence. It is decisive for the modern loyalty to an office that, in the pure*

type, it does not establish a relationship to patrimonial authority, but rather is devoted to impersonal and functional purpose."

Corruption is behaviour which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private–regarding (family, close private clique) peculiar or status gain; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private–regarding influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgement of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation, illegal appropriation of public resources for private use. (Nye 1967: 419, qtd. in Edevbaro 1998: 30.)

However, the relativity of the concept of corruption really can not be undermined because from a legal perspective it is argued in terms of legal laws. Corruption may be taken to include those modes of employing money to attain private ends by political means which are criminal or at least illegal, because they induce persons charged with a public duty to transgress from that duty and misuse the functions assigned to them (Bryce 1921: 524, qtd. in Edevbaro 1998: 31). Salminen et al. (2007) argue corruption to be: *"a threat to open and transparent governance, sustainable economic development, the democratic process, and business practices."*

Defining corruption is never complete without a look at public interest oriented definition. Corruption can also be analysed from a philosophical, economic, institutional and structural based definitions. According to Carl Friedrich (1966: 74, qtd. in Edevaro 1998:31):

> *"The pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a power holder who is charged with doing things, i.e. who is a responsible functionary or officeholder, is by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for induced to take actions which favour whoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage to the public and its interests."*

However, based on general research about corruption, a positional view is relevant when evaluating it. Relativity strongly counts because of its general dynamic nature which experts have argued independently.

2.1.3. Administrative Corruption

Administrative corruption refers to unethical practises that take place in both public and private sector organizations. Administrative corruptions like bribery, nepotism, favouritism, poor attitude to work and so on that are prevalent in the Nigerian public sector today, have a historical antecedent that dates back to the pre colonial, colonial and post colonial era. The universality and theoretical nature of administrative corruption should also not be undermined.

It is a fact that current concepts of administrative corruption date from the ideas of the French Revolution, which swept away private monarchical government and replaced it with representative government. Office became a public trust, and official's servant of the community. Public and private were replaced by qualification for office. Venality and nepotism were abolished and office holders ceased to have private rights in their office. Officials became full–time, and were paid by salary, not from private profits gained from conducting the government's business. Therefore, it became necessary to separate personal lives of officials and the conduct expected from them in their work by the enforcement of rules. Public accountability entailed continued hierarchical bureaucratic control as opposed to sporadic, dilatory judicial intervention. (Caiden & Caiden 1977: 183.)

It should also not be forgotten that before the transformation practices now thought of as corrupt provided the basis of government. Nepotism, venality, and exploitation of public function for private profit were not only usual but also served needs of the monarch which could not be fulfilled through more legitimate channels. But even while such practices were commonplace, they were by no means accepted. As long as the ancient empires, before even the use of money was popular, corruption was recognized and vigorous attempts made to combat it. In the Athenian city–state, a public audit was instituted in order to check corruption and enforce a public role upon officials. In republican Rome, even while provincial officials and others were making their fortunes at the expense of the state and its subjects, awareness of corruption existed and orators such as Cicero spoke out against it. (Caiden & Caiden 1977: 183–184.)

The early European monarchies contributed to the eradication of corruption with a lot of institutionalised norms and machinery they put on ground, even if to serve their own needs, they sometimes protested against it. Lack of bureaucratic standards, entrenchment and pervasiveness, functionality for the short–run purposes of the regime or participants, did not mean that corruption was well recognised and its consequences realized. As a frequent, and sometimes normal, requirement of government, it was not an exception from the norm: it was the norm itself, although regarded as wrong. (Caiden & Caiden 1977: 184.)

The increased visibility of administrative corruption has become a persistent and disturbing feature of our time. Almost every issue of the daily press brings, it seems, fresh examples of allegedly corrupt behaviour on the part of public and private figures. The recent increase in corruption has witnessed increased academic interest in a subject long deemed for appropriate research, but still not regarded as a subject of study in some circles. Fortunately, obvious rejections to research into corruption – problems of measurement, difficulties of access, bias and evaluation – have been largely attenuated, if not overcome. It is accepted now that it is the responsibility of the social scientists to choose for their research subjects which touch on or embrace problems central to human society, and not merely those convenient to tools they have to handle. (Caiden & Caiden 1977: 301.)

Political and administrative corruptions in the United States also carry the post-functionalist thesis. As corruption becomes institutionalized and systemic, it involves the loss of moral authority, weakens efficiency of government operations, increases opportunities for organized crime, encourages police brutality, add to the taxpayers burden, undermines political decisions, leads to inefficient use of resources, and benefits the unscrupulous at the cost of good citizens and tax payers. (Caiden 1979: 295, qtd. in Werner 1983: 198.)

Administrative corruption is related to bureaucratic corruption. Although when analysing corruption in the public service, bureaucratic corruption nearly comes to mind first. Unless it is understood that bureaucratic corruption is opportunistic (rent-seeking)

behaviour and is related to the scope and extent of government regulation of economic activities, cleanup programs are unlikely to succeed (Mbaku 2008). The Nigerian public service has in recent years been highly bedevilled by the elements of administrative corruption that hindered the dream of realizing an ideal civil service that would have been positioned in meeting the yearnings and aspirations of millions of Nigerian citizens through the state vision.

2.2. Administrative Corruption and Watergate

The universality of corruption can never be undermined. In discussing the issue of administrative corruption one important case study is the "Watergate" saga that happened in the United States of America. Issues from the United States serve as standard in comparative analysis especially issues that relate to administration based on the height she has reached in democracy and in the application of the principles of "good governance".

Watergate is a public administration issue; to be sure, as an epidemic is a breakdown of public health. Most often, we in public administration repeated Lord Acton's (1947 qtd. in Sundquist 1974: 164) phrase that: *"Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,"* but we did not really believe it. Instead, we believed Louis Brownlow (1947, qtd. in Sundquist 1974: 164) when he said: *"During the whole history of the thirty–two presidents, not one has been recreant to high trust, and none has used his power to aggrandise himself at the expense of our settled institutions."* And that may have been true enough when it was said.

Watergate scandal has had a shattering effect upon America at all levels. Some of the seeds which grew to Watergate were undoubtedly planted by past administration in America. More profoundly, it is reflection of developments and deterioration in the fabric of American society, social, economic, moral, and technological. Truly, it is not the first scandal which sullied American public life. We have had Credit Mobillier, Teapot Dome, political corruption of public relief programs in the 1930s, and Internal

Revenue malfeasance in the early 1950s, although none of these had the pervasiveness and shattering impact of Watergate. From another perspective, one may observe that most of the perpetrators and directors of Watergate misdeeds were reputedly honest and upright persons before they entered the political campaign or the administration. Nearly all that went wrong is connected directly or indirectly to the subject of ethics in the public service. (Mosher 1974: 343–347.)

President Nixon who is the central figure in the Watergate scandal, as well as others in his administration, has defended some of his and their actions on the grounds that the same things were done by past administration. Based on these revelations, the people of America and their elected representatives have been alerted to the danger of future Watergate and initiated a search for legal and other means to thwart or minimize them. The effectiveness of codes and mechanisms for their enforcement depends first upon continuing scrutiny of the decisions and actions of public officials. However, there is no "fail safe" mechanism whereby appropriate ethics of public officers and the public interest may be assured, and whereby the ethics of public employees may be implemented. *Ultimately, the assurance of high standards of ethical behaviour depends upon the standards of ethical behaviour and upon the people who aspire to and gain public office, and more particularly upon the system of values they have internalized.* (Mosher 1974: 347–348.)

Watergate is the name of a hotel–office–apartment complex in Washington D.C. when individuals associated with President Nixon's re-election campaign were caught breaking into the Democratic National Committee Headquarters located in the Watergate complex in 1972, the resulting cover–up and national trauma that were condensed into one word (Watergate) (Shafritz, Hyde & Parkes 2004: 195). Many of the actions in relation to the Watergate case, the burglary of offices, the forgery of a letter, the laundering of money through Mexico, and so on, were clearly criminal (Mosher 1974: 347–348). It is quite clear from the analysis above that the Watergate incidence is a clear justification to the "universality of corruption" because similar or worse cases have occurred in the Nigerian state and its public service.

2.3. Divergent views on Corruption

The arguments whether corruption is good or bad, profitable or unprofitable have occupied discussions from ancient days to contemporary times and this also had been in a relative form. Lincoln Steffens (1957, qtd. in Willbern 1984: 120), explaining the cause of corruption, compared the situation to that in the Garden of Eden, the trouble, he said, was not the serpent–that was his nature, nor was it the weakness of Eve or Adam–but the fault he said was in the apple. It is in this sense that some schools of thought had tried to justify the issue of corruption.

Revisionist Approach

Of late corruption has been touched from a moralist perspective. Its cause was seen as the gaining of positions of power and trust by evil and dishonest men. The solution was to "turn the rascals out." Corruption was therefore incidental to the working of society which might be safeguarded by appropriate laws and exhortations. Lincoln Steffens himself, late in his career drew attention to the role of incentives fostering corruption in the private enterprise society, by providing "ordinary men" with "extraordinary temptations". A similar disquiet, and concern for corruption as rooted in the mores and institutions of society, stimulated a rejection of moralistic and individualistic explanations by students of comparative administration. (Caiden & Caiden 1977: 178.)

It was natural to ask "Why do certain societies at particular times appear especially prone to corruption?" Rejecting the answer of comparative administration movement, the revisionists were led to the view that corruption stemmed from norms of polities and administration which differed from those of the West, and might even fulfil political, administrative, and economic needs better than the public ethic fostered by aid officials. Corruption was not incidental but structural: it could therefore be removed from the realm of the moral to the neutral. (Caiden & Caiden 1977: 178.)

In retaining a residual definition of corruption, but rejecting the specific substantive standard to which it pertains, the revisionist have dissolved corruption. In their

conception, corruption is by definition exceptional, the departure from the normal ways of doing business: corruption cannot itself be the norm. Once corruption in other words, becomes sufficient widespread as to constitute a normal rather than an exceptional mode of behaviour, it ceases to exist. A variation on this theme is the view that corruption is "dislocated" behaviour resulting from a lag in the value system of the community in relation to institutional change. Corruption is thus legitimised in terms of its prevalence, and of its functionality: indeed given the inappropriateness of Western institutions, corruption does not really exist at all–it is simply a different way of doing business. (Caiden & Caiden 1977: 183.)

The revisionist school took a close part in its analysis of corruption. However, should not be condemned completely because position must be taking which in rational sense must differ from another. This will lead us to another schools position on the issue of corruption.

Functionalism

Functionalism in its own contribution to corruption was inspired by the structural–functionalist schools in sociology and anthropology which perceive corruption as fulfilling positive functions. They challenged the earlier assumption that the public consequences of corruption were overwhelmingly dysfunctional. They view; some kinds of corruption may perform functions that are more or less beneficial from the perspective of society at large as a way of finessing more basic difficulties in society at large as well as beneficial for the interests of those directly involved. In summary they regarded corruption as broadly functional for a system's survival and development, or at least as a way of finessing more basic difficulties in society and economy. (Edevbaro 1998: 51.)

According to Huntington (1970: 63, qtd. in Edavbaro 1998: 54), modernization encourages corruption by the amends it produces on the output side of the political system, because modernization involves the expansion of governmental authority and activities subjected to governmental regulations. He further posits that the functions, as

well as the causes, of corruption are like those of violence; they are both signs of weakness of structure and they are both means by which individuals and group relate to the political system through participation in the system.

It is clear from the above that the functionalist school took a close position with that of the revisionist school of thought. Although, just making the same argument that corruption is not inimical to political and administrative institutions in a different language. This will however, lead to the position of yet another school of thought.

Dysfunctionalism

The dysfunctional school completely condemned corruption as an act. In their argument, they described corruption as an enemy of national development because it impedes rather than encourage economic growth. According to Gould and Amoro–Reyes (1983: 23, qtd. in Edevbaro 1998: 57–58):

> *"Corruption encourages and perpetuates closed politics, preventing development and encourages violence; perpetuates and widens social class and economic division, leading to societal strain and preventing cohesion; prevents policy and diverts public resources, contributing to conditions of private affluence and public squalor...In addition, kickbacks and illegal commissions which have to be paid to high ranking bureaucrats and officials not only increase government expenditures and siphons off scarce funds, but eventually lead to the need to increase revenues either through borrowing or by cutting back on other policy programs of greater importance, which again ultimately lead to a general loss for the country."*

If a government, as it is in most developing countries, is anxious to carry out a program of economic development, the distrust of government by citizens which results from corruption in public service is particularly serious. *This loss of trust* in government authenticity increases the difficulties of enforcing criminal, revenue and other laws. In Africa in general and Nigeria in particular people look up to politicians for examples, if the elite is widely corrupt as in the case of Nigeria the average citizen has no choice but to emulate them. Furthermore, corruption generates distributive inefficiency by permitting the least efficiency contractor with the highest ability to bribe to be the recipient of government contracts. A good case study is when a civil servant or a politician may support a contract for a certain sum; put 10% back for the favour of

awarding the contract: 90% of the allocated amount goes for public purpose, 10% goes into personal gains and acquisitions. (Edevbaro 1998: 57–58.)

One of the earlier comments that kicked against the position of the functional school on the issue of corruption by a political figure came from Singapore's former minister of Foreign Affairs and Labour, S. Rajaratnam. According to Rajaratnam (1968: 54, qtd. in Werner 1983: 196):

> *"I think it is monstrous for these well–intentioned and largely misguided scholars to suggest corruption as a practical and efficient instrument for rapid development in Asia and Africa. Once upon a time, Westerners tried to subjugate Asia and Africa by selling opium. The current defence of Kleptocracy is a new kind of opium by some Western intellectuals, devised to perpetuate Asia backwardness and degradation. I think the only people... pleased with the contributions of these scholars are the Asian Kleptocrats."*

It is quite clear from the argument above that to the dysfunctional school corruption is an act of taking one step forward and three backward. In the contribution of Khan (1967, qtd. in Edevbaro 1998: 58), consequent upon the scale of corruption involvement, any significant diversion, of public resources into the private sphere is likely to have far–reaching consequences for overall economic and social development.

The dysfunctional school however reacted to the prepositions of the functional and revisionist schools as irrational and illogical. According to Caiden and Caiden (1977: 184):

> *"The revisionists, however, have made a link between corruption and development, by indicating that where political and administrative system are deficient, corruption may compensate and prove of general benefit to development...Often there is an uneasy ambivalence regarding which is to be dependent variable, development (or modernization) or corruption. The revisionist handle the problem of change along classic functional lines, i.e., corruption is a dysfunctional of the system, which arises because the system cannot accommodate change. There is a further ambiguity in the "cultural" argument, which does not make it clear whether we are discussing actual traditional norms held by "traditional man" (if he exists) or the breakdown in these norms impacted upon by the Western–type development. The more that corrupt practices approach the dimensions of a norm, or are accepted standard behaviour, the more they impede both administrative and societal changes."*

2.4. Classifications of Corruption

Corruption manifests in different dimensions, and because of this, different names have been given to each level of manifestation. They are however the following:

▪ **Individual Corruption:** This is personalized type of corruption, it occurs at individuals own limit, the philosophy behinds it occurrence is personally oriented. The effects of this type of corruption are however easy to curb. Individual cases of corruption can be rooted out by the application of organizational sanctions, because the wrong–doer is taxed with the evidence, penalized for minor offence and prosecuted under major once to prevent re–occurrence (Caiden & Caiden 1977: 188).

▪ **Grand Corruption:** According to Salminen (2008: 44), this type of corruption involves bribery, treason, fraud, misuse of public funds, abuse and misuse of public power nepotism and paying of kick–backs in public affairs They are prevalent in both public and private sector organizations and likewise, in both developed and developing countries.

▪ **Petty Corruption:** This type of corruption is mostly not regarded as corruption especially in developing countries like Nigeria because the mode it operates is often trivialized. According to Salminen (2008: 44): *"they are Non–performance of studies, improper gifts, illegal surveillance, and misuse of confidential information and manipulation of regulations."* According to Edevbaro (1998: 39): *"The bending of official rules in favour of friends, as especially manifested in the somewhat untruthful reporting of details, the ignoring of cut–off dates, the fixing of parking tickets, even the issuance of death certificates to a healthy person and so on."*

▪ **Maladministration:** This type of corruption acts against the set standards of the principles of administration. Also in the words of Salminen (2008: 44) they include: *"unnecessary delaying of affairs, inadequate consultation, lack of loyalty and protecting unethical behaviour."*

▪ **Systemic Corruption:** This type of corruption is the broader type because others classified above have an accommodation in here, it is different from individual type of corruption; this one is an embedded corruption that is not limited within one individual owns belief. Rather, its philosophies are group oriented if not even societal. It almost becomes like culture, in the sense that it becomes an acceptable standard among members of a group, organization and society. When instituted it becomes very difficult to remove.

Systemic corruption is prevalent today in most countries (e.g. Nigeria) and jurisdictions, particularly where society prizes organizational loyalty over the public interest, where past standards of public rectitude and personal integrity have been eroded, and where notions of public responsibility and trust have been thrust aside with exploitation of public office for private gain. It occurs whenever the administrative system itself transposes the expected purposes of the organization, forces participants to follow also would be termed unacceptable ways, and actually pushes those who do not play along. Pretence is a major feature of systemic corruption, because the organization professes an external code of ethics which is contradicted by internal practices and internal practices encourage, abet, and hide violations of the external code. (Caiden & Caiden 1977: 186–187.)

In systemic corruption collective guilt finds expression in rationalizations of the internal practices and without strong external supports there is no serious intention of ending them. Further, violations of public norms are known to all. Systemic corruption can not be handled so easily, because there is no guarantee that if the most serious offenders are removed, or if everyone who is guilty replaced, corruption will not persist. The tradition certainly will continue with new players. Successors will make sure they will not be caught so easily by examining where their predecessors went wrong and so reorganizing to make any repetition of exposure much harder. The system persists even if the people change. It must be ascertained that systemic corruption impedes rather than aid change. (Caiden & Caiden 1977: 187–188.)

2.5. Effects of Corruption

The effects of corruption come in two perspectives that could either be positive or negative. First, it has been argued by the functionalist school that corruption serves a functional purpose for a social systems survival and that it could help in bringing in the marginalised into the decision making stream of governance and general administration. While the dysfunctional school believes corruption is evil to a systems growth and it hinders socio–economic development. However, for the purpose of this paper I shall take a position on the fact that corruption causes more harm than good. In a critical observation of the Nigerian state in general and its public sector in particular, there are clear evidence that corruption has been a major cause of poverty that has caused a lot of harm to the general populace.

In regard to this paper from my personal assessment of corruption in the Nigerian state, I would assert that the following are the effects of corruption:

▪ **Underdevelopment**: Underdevelopment is a state of not having the requirements that guarantees an acceptable standard of living, it cuts across almost all sectors, economic, political and social. From a global outlook, underdevelopment causes a perpetual darkness and societal set back. As it has been experienced in most poor countries around the world and Nigeria in particular, and I guess it was in this light, that Hegel said a very long time ago "that as far as history goes Africa remained engulfed in the dark mantle of the night." Some of the features of underdevelopment stems from poverty which includes low standard of living, hunger, deprivation, homelessness, to mention but a few.

The ever worsening social, political and economic situation in Nigeria needs no restatement. It is evident that Nigeria is in state of breaking and grievous crises. The number of Nigerians living in absolute poverty is rising yearly, while malnutrition and disease have also risen in no small measure, this deterioration has, however, acquired a singular significance by its intensity and deep footedness. How do we explain Nigeria's lack of progress in virtually all areas of human development and the tragic enormity of

the consequences? Clearly, lack of progress or underdevelopment is a complex phenomenon which is difficult to explain. Nevertheless, a close look at Nigeria's political process reveals some elements of explanations. Surely, the Nigerian crises have internal and external causes. (Edevbaro 1998: 14.)

Nigeria is a country that is blessed with enormous human and natural resources. With over 60 universities comprised of both private and government controlled to over 30 polytechnics and over 40 colleges of education, Nigerians are still unable to work by through the dynamics of attaining development. It is quite saddening to note that most of these so called institutions of higher learning turn out what I should call "half baked" graduates every year.

Because of corruption that has bedevilled the higher places of learning, most students no longer take there studies seriously because there is an option of what they popularly call "blocking" of some corrupt lecturers, which is an act of paying "cash or any kind" to obtain study credits. According to Balogun (2008: 10): *"While this is prima facie useful, it does not necessarily follow that the credentials make the employee, even when we discount the possibility of forgeries and certificate racketeering, academic training by itself might not adequately prepare a person for a job."* Paper qualification is what matters in the Nigerian society without any clue to how it was attained.

 Nigeria is one of the worlds largest producers of crude oil and natural gas with large deposit of other mineral resources like bitumen and lime stone. However, it is also one of the worlds poorest of nations what a "paradox", because corruption has eaten so deep almost in all sector. Money from these resources is stolen into private accounts. I would state here without any fear or compromise that those Nigerian leaders from Tafawa Bellewa to Olusegun Obansanjo were "philosophically barren" because they lacked the true philosophical dynamics of development in there head. All they have been able to do was to coin the Nigeria state and her wealth into personal property. This has led to making Nigeria a "rentier" state, meaning a state that lives on rent from natural and mineral resources without any form of tangible human and capital investment that

would in turn create a more viable and a holistic development. This factor has had a multiplier effect on the Nigerian public service general performance.

According to Late Ken Sarowiwa (1996, qtd. in Edevbaro 1998: 15):

> *"Of all the countries with black gold, Nigeria was the only one that had succeeded in doing absolutely nothing with it. The Arabs had used their oil very well indeed; not only had they given their people education and a lot else that conduced to good living; [Nigeria] also had invested nothing, absolutely nothing. They had spent all their money buying foreign food which they consumed or even threw away; in paying for ships waiting on the high seas to deliver food. Sometimes, they paid out hundreds of millions of dollars for goods and services not delivered."*

▪ **Social Inequality:** Social inequality remains a very great social problem. In Nigeria corruption has so widened the gap between the rich and poor and the gap continues to widen everyday that passes up to the extent that the middle class is not visible any more. In a capitalist economic system, it is a fact that bourgeoisie tends to dominate, but in Nigeria, this fact has been over shadowed with great abnormality. The taxation system has completely failed, because of the systemic corruption in the whole system; the bourgeoisie is able to buy his way by given what they call "Kola" (bribe) to officials in most cases senior officers at the ministry of internal revenue for him not to pay or to be able to avert the due tax he ought to pay to the government which would have helped in providing social and infrastructural amenities for the common man to enjoy. This leads to a position of making the rich abnormally richer and the poor seriously poorer.

The end result of this is for the marginalised to see any opportunity to serve in any position either private or public as an avenue to enrich himself so that he would in turn become like the bourgeoisie some day. Corrupt oriented competitions become the *in thing*. Questions of how much you were able to utilise your position on corrupt premised act are asked by both close relations and friends. This becomes worse based on the way the bourgeoisie goes about intimidating the poor with his "ill gotten wealth" through his numbers of possessions spread around the country. The poor are even more intimidated to the extent of being denied social justice at the police station and even in the court of law. Inequality from this perspective ends in creating in turn a loosed attitude in the behaviours of the marginalised by also indulging in corrupt practices in order to belong to bourgeois elite class.

▪ **Violence**: The foundation of most of the World violence in general and Nigeria in particular is premised on interest. But for the Nigerian case, it is clear that the interest to capture the state apparatus and resources has led to the increased violence and restiveness especially of youths in the Niger Delta. Hostage taking has become a lucrative business in the crude oil rich states of the Niger Delta. Children are adopted from schools, mothers from residential quarters and expatriates from oil fields. The incidence of hostage taking from the Niger Delta started as a child's play but today it has gained a lot of grounds. Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta People (MEND) is one the strong "Militia" groups that exist in the region today. Their activities range from hostage taking to illegal looting (bunkering) of petroleum products and even in blowing up of crude oil pipelines of non cooperating Multinational oil companies like Shell and Mobil or as a protest to government detention of one of their members.

The leaders that took over political power from the then colonial masters (Britain) instead of working out ideal development that would be all encompassing adopted a myopic "lootocracy" ideology. Ibrahim (1988; 1989, qtd. in Edavbaro 1998: 15) argues that: *"corruption, has, in the public at least, seemingly acquired the status of a directive principle of Nigerian state policy as successions of elected and un–elected or self– appointed rulers have looted public funds."* According to Edevbaro (1998: 15): *"The political problems associated with the abuse of office (corruption) in Nigeria, have increased to the extent that people now assert Nigerian state operate "lootocracy" or government of looting of the state treasury."*

▪ **Unemployment:** The effects of corruption on the Nigerian labour market can not be under–estimated. Instead of Nigeria's looted funds to be active in the economy through the creation of jobs, rather they are passive and lying low in Swiss Bank accounts and other Bank accounts overseas. Another dimension is the acquisitions of tangible assets like mansions that no one lives in and companies that create jobs for the citizens of the host countries abroad. While, they watch their own people suffer in abject poverty and unemployment. The Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), which is a body that was set up by the last administration of Olusegun Obansajo to fight against

corruption especially financial crime of any sort, stated at the end of the last administration that 30 out of the 36 state governors were corrupt.

However, the Effort of the Economic and Financial Crime (EFCC) to curb Nigeria of corrupt practices is in big doubt because it is used in most cases to chastise political opponents and those not loyal to the central government. According to Njoku (2008):

> *"One name that has become topical in current Nigerian mass media and public discourse is Nuhu Ribadu. He [was immediate past] chairman of the Nigerian Federal government's anti-corruption outfit – Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). He has made series of headline news through his ventures and utterances, which claim to rid Nigerian public service of corruption. Mr. Ribadu and the activities of the EFCC represent one approach to the issues of socio-political corruption and its aligned problems. This approach considers corruption and socio-political problems as consequences of moral depravity of individual persons and groups. In this case, addressing the problems of corruption consists in launching 'wars against corruption', which target individuals or groups of people. Social philosophy and ethics refer to this as the agency question."*

Thousands of graduates are produced every year in addition to the millions unemployed in the labour market. Because there leaders have failed and continue to remain insensitive, the large Nigerian youth population in order to keep themselves busy and to eat two square meal a day help in getting themselves employed by engaging in all sorts of criminality. The most popular one they are known for is cyber crime. This has almost become a tradition among them. Spam mails are neatly designed in form of formal letters to attract interested preys who in most cases reside abroad. Fake business proposals are put forward with enticing interests, any body that falls to their antics are asked in most cases to transfer a huge some to foreign account and immediately they collect the money, and that would be the end of the business because they disappear into thin air as if they never existed.

▪ **Uncertainty and insecurity:** The end products of every other effects of corruption lead to very high uncertainty and insecurity. Based on the fact that Nigerians do not know how events would turn the next minute, the marginalised in Nigeria tends to scramble for the little opportunities available to make up. Corruption has paralysed the manufacturing industry that would have helped in reducing this social tension through the creation of jobs. It has been noted that over a trillion naira was spent on the power sector during eight years of Olusegun Obasanjo but rather power has remained less

inconsistent than before. The contractors that were used to execute the failed power projects were either close family members, friends or foreign companies which had to pay a ransom as kick backs. Because of this, "bread winners" are sent out of their jobs everyday.

The restiveness of youths in the Niger Delta which corruption has caused because of the failure to provide them with jobs and good education, has led to the incessant harassment of innocent citizens. In most parts of Nigeria, people no longer sleep with their two eyes closed because of arm robbery attacks, the high ways are worse when travelling. The police that would have been the last hope of the common man are also very corrupt, because they rather protect the rich who are able to pay for their service than the average citizens who have nothing to offer. Privatization in public management reform ideas, if well articulated would help the public sector to be more result oriented. Privatisation in the last administration only helped to increase the wealth accumulation of the Nigerian political bourgeoisie. The large percentage shares of TRANSCORP, a corporation that acquired most of the public corporations that were sold are owned by the former president (Olusegun Obansanjo) and his loyal associates and family members.

I would state here again the Nigerian state and its public service are seriously in need of trust. Because lack of transparency of government policies has almost made the people to see governance as a process they are not included because the general interest of the populace is always betrayed by the elites in the public sector whom they entrusted it with.

3. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE NIGERIAN STATE AND ITS PUBLIC SERVICE

It is right before evaluating the complexity of the Nigerian state and its public service to first take a brief historical insight at the Nigerian state and the public service. The true journey to the Nigerian state started when the European struggle to establish forts and trading posts on the West African coast from about the mid–1600s to the mid–1700s which was part of the wider rivalry for trade and empire in the Atlantic. The British, like other newcomers to the slave trade, found they could compete with the Dutch in West Africa only by forming national trading companies. (Nigerian Table of Content 2008.)

The first of such effective English enterprise was the Company of the Royal Adventurers, chartered in 1660 and succeeded in 1672 by the Royal African Company. Only a monopoly company could afford to build and maintain the forts considered essential to hold stocks of slaves and trade goods. In the early eighteenth century, Britain and France towered above Dutch dominance in West African trade; and by the end of the French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815); Britain had become the dominant commercial power in West Africa. (Nigerian Table of Content 2008.)

Prior to 1900, the Nigerian state did not even exist as a single country but was collection of provinces loyal to different authorities. On the 1st of January 1900, Great Britain formally established its authority and began to administer Nigeria as a single entity in 1914 with the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates (Edevbaro 1998: 23). This amalgamation is what is popularly referred to in the Nigerian political circle as the "mistake" of 1914. It is a mistake because Great Britain did not put the diverse nature of Nigeria into consideration, but rather it was done out of the aim of having administrative ease flow.

According to Olowu, Otobo and Okotoni (1997, qtd. in Sekwat 2002: 500):

> *"The history of the Nigerian civil service dates back to 1914 when the British colonial rulers established a unified government structure that encompassed the territory now known as Nigeria. During the colonial era, the Nigerian civil service was dominated by imperial European officials with power concentrated in the hands of a few of them (appointed colonial officers). The main*

function of the imperial civil service was maintenance of law and order. The colonial government adopted the process of "Nigerianization," a process that involved rapid replacement of foreign or imperial administrators in the civil service with nationally-oriented qualified Nigerians over a decade prior to Nigeria's attainment of independence. In 1952, the colonial government set up the Philipson-Adebo Commission to review the phase of the Nigerianization process. By the time the commission submitted its report two years later, the 1954 constitution had declared Nigeria as a federation, thus shifting attention from issues and concerns about Nigerianization to regionalization of the country's civil service."

According to Schiavo-Campo, Tommaso and Mulherjee (1997: 5, qtd. in Sekwat 2002: 504), civil service programs are generally designed to improve the core function of the civil service and to create a workforce of the size and with the incentives, accountability, ethos, and skills needed to provide quality public services. The problem of low morale, corruption, limited training, inefficiency, and poor compensation constitutes the key issues that militate against the possible realisation of Nigeria's post-independence civil service reform goals.

Sekwat (2002: 504) have noticed that researchers like Aina (1982), Phillips (1991), Adamolekun and Ayeri (1990), Koen (1990) a myriad of inherent constraints that impeded the reform initiatives described above. For instance, dishonesty and incompetence within the civil service as major or inhibiting factors. Also inefficiency, mismanagement, disorganization, over-centralization, neglect of training, and lack of measurable objectives as persistent administrative weaknesses. Other constraints identified are corruption, lack of integrity and honesty, low morale, and the absence of a strong commitment to professional ethical standards in the public sector.

A public service reform is no doubt a complex process that may involve profound changes in the policies, strategies, and programmes of governments to make them more responsive to the demands of the people. It was evident that the Nigerian public services like many others in Africa needed radical changes. The government needed to respond to widespread poverty and inequalities by improving its service delivery to the citizenry, and to promote a system of transparency and accountability. Observations show, however that the reforms measures adopted by many African countries to achieve their objectives. Inadequate researches about structure have led to this failure (Oyeyinka 2006: 14.)

In the words of Olowu and Ademolekun (1999, qtd. in Oyeyinka 2006: 14), donors and multilateral agencies and governments consistently make wrong diagnoses and prognoses of civil service problems in Africa. Some problems are based on inadequate information. The ideological lens through which donors see problem of development may also have given rise to the tendency to apply the same solution to Africa's problem irrespective of different histories. In this context, reforms are largely supply–driven rather than being demand–driven. Much of the research on the African Civil Service has focused on getting the policy right in the shortest possible time without a clear focus on reforming the institutions. Reform agents lack the understanding of the historical forces that shape ideas in these societies.

The complexity of the Nigerian public service must be argued along with that of the Nigerian state, because in there it sprang up in most cases. The public service is part of the Nigerian state and manifestations in it are reflected directly or indirectly in the public service. Nigeria is most often featured as a deeply divided state in which major political issues are vigorously – some would say violently – contested along the lines of the complex ethnic, religious and regional divisions in the country. (Osaghae & Suberu 2008.)

The issues that generate the fiercest contestation include those that are considered fundamental to the existence and legitimacy of the state, over which competing groups tend to adopt exclusionary, *winner-take-all strategies of game theory*. These include the control of state power, resource allocation, and citizenship. As a consequence, deeply diverse states tend to be fragile and unstable because almost by definition, there are fewer points of convergence and consensus among the constituent groups than are required to effectively mitigate or contain the centrifugal forces that tear the society apart. (Osaghae & Suberu 2008.)

Before the coming of the colonial masters (Britain) the different regions had their own systems of administering their people. The Northern region was rigidly centralised with the Sultan at Sokoto and Emirs were appointed at other sub regional levels that pay strong allegiance to the Sultan at the centre. The Southern region was divided into two.

The Western region and the Eastern region, the former was moderately centralised while the latter was decentralised. The Western part had Obas and Onis with other traditional chiefs who had power to take decision in their own local territories without a compulsory due consultation with the Obas and Onis. The Eastern part was decentralised because representation was done on family basis. The most elderly in a family represented the rest members of the family at council meetings which in most cases took place at the various town centres and village square in the case of village.

In evaluating the complexity of the Nigerian state in a contemporary sense, it is relevant to understand some specific features that make up ethnic nationalities and organizations in Nigeria. The diagram presented in table 1 would help to that effect.

Table 1. The Complexity of the Nigerian State.

Acronym/Term	Explanation (English)
Aguleri	A sub-ethnic group within the Igbo ethnic group
Ahmadiyya	A Muslim sect
Bini	A historically dominant minority ethnic group
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
Damnosa hereditas	Burdensome inheritance
Efik	A historically dominant minority ethnic group
Hausa	An ethnic group predominantly situated in the North
Idoma	(sometimes grouped together with the Fulani, Hausa-
Igala	Fulani)
Igbo	A minority ethnic group
Ijaw	A minority ethnic group
Ikwerre	An ethnic group predominantly situated in the East
Itsekiri	A historically dominant minority ethnic group
Jukun-Chamba	An ethnic group in the Rivers state
Kataf	A historically dominant minority ethnic group
Kutebq	An ethnic group originating in Cameroon
OIC	An ethnic group
Oyo Modakeke	An ethnic group
Quadriyya	Organisation of Islamic Conference
Salariat	A sub-ethnic group within the Yoruba ethnic group
Tiv	A Muslim sect, brotherhood
	Intelligentsia, Bureaucrats, Technocrats
	An ethnic group (Taraba and Benue States)

Source: Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria (2005, qtd. in Osaghae & Suberu 2008).

It is therefore no doubt that Nigeria presents a complexity of individuals as well as crisscrossing and recursive identities of which the ethnic, religious, regional and sub-ethnic are the most relevant and the main bases for violent conflicts in the country. This is both from the point of view of the identities most commonly assumed by citizens especially for political purposes and the identities often implicated in day-to-day contestations over citizenship as well as competitions and conflicts over resources and privileges. To point the inter-connectedness of ethnic, regional, and religious identities and the fact that they are often mutually reinforcing, they are sometimes compounded or hyphenated as ethno-regional and ethno-religious. (Osaghae & Suberu 2008.)

 The latter references have historical, geographical and political origins. They evolved from the old regional structures of the Nigerian federation, where identities were shaped by leaders of the dominant ethnic groups – Hausa/Fulani in the Northern region (predominately Muslim), Igbo in the Eastern region and Yoruba in the Western region – that exercised some form of hegemonic control over the regions. As a result, ethno-regional identities were, and continue to be, used as shorthand references to the dominant ethnic groups acting as regional 'hegemonies'. (Osaghae & Suberu 2008.)

A critical view on the Nigerian public service which has been caught in a web of systemic corruption in the recent years is complexity oriented. The values in which activities in the Nigerian public service are carried out are *alien and primordial* oriented. As earlier referred, before 1900, Nigeria did not exist as single state but was a collection of provinces owing allegiance of various types to the British invaders, on New Year's Day 1900 Great Britain formally established its dominion and began to administer Nigeria as an entity in 1914 by joining the Northern and southern province (Edevbaro 1998: 23.)

In a narrow sense, public administration existed already in traditional, pre-colonial Nigeria. Certain pre-colonial social formations (tribal or ethnic) had an advanced pattern of political-administrative organisation. This was certainly the case for the kingdoms and empires of such people as the Yorubas, Binis, Fulanis, Tivs and the Hausas. With these organisational structures, 'chiefs' and other rulers assumed or acquired responsibilities for raising taxes or armies, and performed a variety of functions which in 'modern' societies have become the province of specialised, separate governmental institutions. The organisation was functional, limiting itself to management of the king's court, collection of tributes and other duties as well as resolution of disputes and transmission of orders and instructions of the reigning king or chief. (Edevbaro 1998: 24.)

The Nigerian public service is today at a cross road because of the corruption that has bedevilled its practices. When the colonial masters (British) were leaving Nigeria, they left behind a Western administrative oriented style in Nigeria that was premised on the

'Weberian' model or system of administration which was a product of class struggle that originated from feudalist political system in Europe. In this type of administrative structure, there is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules and office holding is a vocation because the position of the official is in the nature of a duty that requires defined training (Weber 1922: 50–51).

According to Max Weber (1968, qtd. in Edevbaro 1998: 86), there are three different types of hierarchy: legal-rational, charismatic and traditional, the idea of domination combines legitimacy and a specific mode of exercising authority. In the developed western states the legal-rational domination is strictly based on impersonal rules. However, the Nigerian public service has an overlap of legal-rational domination and traditional domination. This overlap is a key factor while administrative corruption has thrived over the years in the public sector.

Max Weber's (1968, qtd. in Jain 2008) theory of bureaucracy describes a new type of organizational a setting which is known as bureaucracy. This Weber had argued started to emerge in the second half of the Nineteenth century. According to him, in this kind of organization leadership and authority emanates from a more "rational framework" unlike what was formally attained, because authority and leadership was previously derived from either charisma or tradition. In relation to charismatic authority, followers obeyed gifted leaders out of devotion, loyalty and respect. While for the case of traditional authority, historical factor was one of the reasons, because followers obeyed a leader for the reason he or she was in a traditional position with a traditional power, for example in the case of monarchical or other related heredity leadership position.

> *"Weber believed that authority in the new, bureaucratic organizational form was more 'rational' because leaders were recognized and obeyed for subscribing to values of logic, efficiency and reason. Such organizations functioned on the basis of 'legitimately' derived laws, rules and regulations. And laws, rules and regulations derived their legitimacy from the consistent, disciplined, rationalized and methodical calculation of optimum means to given ends. Weber posited that bureaucratic action was typically oriented towards solving problems and that bureaucratic decision-making was guided by the objectives of efficiency, calculability and predictability. Consequently, decisions were more rational because they were made 'without regard to persons', i.e. were immune to personal, irrational, and emotional aspects."* (Jain 2008.)

Weber (1947, qtd. in Kilcullen 2008), identified three key characteristics of bureaucratic organizations. Firstly, bureaucracies had a formal and unambiguous hierarchical

structure of power and authority. Secondly, bureaucracies had an elaborate, rationally derived and systematic division of labour. And finally, bureaucracies were governed by a set of general, formal, explicit, exhaustive and largely stable rules that were impersonally applied in decision making; moreover, all decisions and communications were recorded in permanent files and such records were used to refine existing rules and derive new ones. Weber also noted that bureaucracies entailed a separation of personal from official property, and that bureaucrats were usually selected on the basis of their qualifications (and not nepotism), were appointed (not elected), and were compensated via a salary.

According to Weber (1947, qtd. in Kilcullen 2008), the goal of bureaucracy – the reason why it had evolved - was to maximize efficiency. He posited that bureaucracies were technically efficient instruments of administration because their institutionalized rules and regulations enabled all employees to learn to perform their duties optimally with high sense of confidence.

It is quite clear that from the analysis of an ideal bureaucracy premised on the idea of the chief proponent (Max Weber), that what is attainable in the Nigeria Public Service is a *complete aberration*. The dominance of traditional values is still very much available in the Nigerian public service. Jobs are given on "who know man bases" (nepotism), promotion are influenced through Patron–Client network. Recruitments are carried out on closed door bases because they are not made known to the entire public and even if announcements are made on popular communication networks like television, radio and newspaper, the people who are to be employed are already known. Their recommendations come from the elite class. These points will further be made clearer in subsequent discussions as the paper continues.

Using my experience as a case study in understanding the aberration in the Nigerian public service in relation to the Weberian bureaucratic features which Borgatti (2008), stated as specification of jobs; scope of authority system of supervision and subordination; unity of command; training in job requirements and skills application of consistent and complete rules; assign work and hire personnel based on competence and

experience. I was employed in the Nigerian public service in 1995 without any formal interview and training. It all happened when one highly placed public personnel told my uncle that there were vacancies in the judiciary. My uncle only told him he had a nephew he would like to "fix up" and there the deal was sealed. In the evening the man in question brought my letter of employment home and I started working the next day. This happened so because my uncle was a highly placed member of the bourgeoisie class which the official felt if giving a favour like that, in return something tangible would flow which surely was the end result.

3.1. Causes of Corruption in the Nigerian Public Service

It is necessary before we go further to look at causes of corruption in the Nigerian public service. The following are however factors I shall consider from my own perspective as the causes of corruption in the Nigerian state and its public service

▪ **Rigid Centralisation**: The centralisation of the Nigerian state and its civil service started from the Amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorate in 1914 by Fredrick Lugard. First the amalgamation of Nigerian was not done with the clear consciousness to really unify the people, but for political and economic reasons that would serve the benefit of the colonial masters. According to Nyityo (2008), one of the primary reasons for the amalgamation of the country was economic; the Lugardian administration derived most of its revenue from customs duties which a large proportion came from the southern coast ports. The colonial regime created both administrative and social inequality in the way public positions and state revenues were shared. The Northern protectorate due to its traditional centralization found more favour with the colonial administration.

Amalgamation of Nigeria to a large extent produced its own peculiar problems for the administration. Field officers anxious to come up with proposals on development projects particularly at the grassroots had enormous difficulty trying to secure funds from the central treasury to execute such projects. The list of those who opposed the amalgamation is endless. Heads of Departments of the various Ministries, Directors of

Works and Managers of special projects as well as Lieutenant Governors of the various Regions were also opposed to the idea of over concentration of authority at the centre. Moreover, the absence of sufficient level of elasticity in meeting the very basic challenges regarding the maintenance of law and order tended to create some problems for the provincial officials. Whichever way we look at it, there was growing awareness of problems caused by the amalgamation of the country. (Nyityo 2008.)

These problems were further compounded by the existence in Nigeria of different political structures playing different roles among the various groups and societies within their jurisdiction. The first election in 1960 was a clear manifestation of this. The eastern region, an Ibo dominant region for example was dominated by National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC), the Yoruba dominant west was Action Group (AG) and while the Hausa–Fulani dominant north was Northern people Congress (NPC). The prevalence of different political structures even led, in some cases, to a rejection of the basic pattern of British practice. (Nyityo 2008.)

The colonial administration never thought it wise to duly seek the consent of the various nationalities that made up Nigeria whether they would love to live together as a nation. Nigeria centralisation was further compounded by the adoption of the 1954 Lyttleton federal constitution. The constitution made provision for the existence of three regions, these regions were not given the autonomy of controlling their various endowments but instead the central government was given the fiscal authority to control the resources of the various regions and return given allocation according to size and population. Subsequent constitution like the republican constitution of 1963 had also followed by retaining the federal government fiscal authority over principal sources of revenue in the federation (import and export duties, mining rents and royalties and some personal income taxes), most of the revenues so collected were returned to the regions on the basis of derivation. (Adesopo, Agboola & Akinlo 2008.)

The gloomy attraction at the centre led to the fall of first republic in 1966 because rivalries were created among the different ethnic groups. The 1966 January coup of General Aguyi Ironsin, a military general from the eastern region was countered by that

of General Yakubu Gowon a military general from the northern region in July 1966. This was so because Ironsi made a decree in May 1966 that returned the nation to a unitary system. The northern elites were threatened by this stand and sponsored a coup led by Gowon that returned the nation to status quo because over 90 percent of the resources that generate the nation's revenue come from the south. (Adesopo, Agboola & Akinlo 2008.)

It is however important to stress here that the Nigerian federalism is not a true federalism because regions (states) have no defined power to act on their own. The centralisation of the Nigerian state is also manifested and extended to its public service. The decision to appoint public servants to very "sensitive and juicy" public position in the federal civil service comes from the all powerful centre, and these appointments are done on "who know man" bases. Public servants appointed on this ground pay allegiance to the centre on a primary note while the public interest is meant to suffer.

Public servants from this background are usually very corrupt because no common man can question their actions. The centralisation problem has resulted in the demand for resource control by the ethnic minorities which have the bulk of black gold (crude oil) in their backyard but still the most impoverished region because they are not well represented at the centre. The present agitation for resource control is a pure manifestation of loss of trust in the all powerful centre. According to Nyityo (2008): *"resource control movement is in the main a nationality movement aimed at encouraging every state or region to look inwards with a view to tapping its natural and human resources in order to attain sustainable development for its people."*

The position of the 17 Nigerian Southern state governor's resource control summit in Benin City, the Edo State Capital, March 27, 2001, was the declaration of fiscal Federalism based on the principles of national interest, need and derivation. Its communiqué at the end defines resource control as "the practice of true federalism and natural law in which the federating units express their rights to primarily control the natural resources within their borders and make agreed contribution towards the maintenance of common services of the government at the centre. (Dafinone 2008.)

This dogma is not true in its entirety as the individual and not the state is the final repository of this General Will. The benefits of resource control according to Chief Obafemi Awolowo should accrue to the individuals and not the state, following the principles finally expatiated upon by Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations* in 1776. The host governor, Mr Lucky put forward the need for state freedom. According to him, the issue at stake in Nigeria's economic philosophy is that the current formula for the distribution of the nation's wealth is unacceptable. As members of the same family, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria owes it as a duty to call all shades of opinion to decide the matter rather than the pursuit of the matter through the court. (Dafinone 2008.)

The Nigerian–Biafra war of 1967 to 1970 was a fall out of the centralization problem, but the fear of violence and the idea of partition are still present among citizens of Africa's most populous nation. Nigeria's nascent democracy and crusade against corruption have not calmed agitations for independence nationwide. Calls for self determination have played a subtle role in the debates over resource control at the national conference, as southern delegates push for more proceeds from oil to be spent in oil-bearing areas. But outside conference halls and diplomatic circles, the push for "self-service" has already taken over the minds of youth in the Niger Delta, Africa's largest oil reservoir. Military forces are highly visible in protecting the state land administration while huge business is in progress offshore. (Patinvoh 2008.)

Youth organizations are also highly armed, with all the necessary tools for oil bunkering. Foreign oil dealers and petroleum giants like Shell, Chevron and Texaco share the same turf, and used their economic influence in 2006 when one Niger Delta leader -- Alhaji Mujaheedeen Asari Dokubo the leader of a militia group called the "Movement for the Emancipation Niger Delta people (MEND), threatened to bomb all petroleum installations. They successfully lured the then Nigeria President Olusegun Obasanjo to send his presidential aircraft to bring Dokubo to Abuja for negotiations that ended with a peace deal. Both state and federal governments recognize Dokubo's legitimacy as a charismatic leader of the Ijaw, the largest ethnic group in the Niger Delta region. (Patinvoh 2008.)

▪ **The Human Resource Question:** Human resource in contemporary time has been discussed in the academic circle to be a very positive tool to economic, social, political, and even scientific development compare to financial capital. This is so because it determines the type of management organizations will posses. The Human Resources Management functions are staffing, recruiting and training the best employees, ensuring they are high performers, dealing with performance issues, and ensuring your personnel and management practices conform to various regulations (McNamara 2008.)

In conceptualising a nation, as we have just done in the case of Nigeria, it is tempting then to suggest that the single determinant of a nation's growth is the amount of resources it possesses. To put it in another language, a nation waxes or wanes depending on its natural resource endowment. If this hypothesis is not totally false, it is also not exactly true. The experience of the last forty years has demonstrated that one factor that has proved decisive in Africa's development effort is the nature of the available human resource. It is this factor, rather than any other, that has pushed the continent farther on the path of dependence, recession and economic decay. It is the only energy source that has the potential of igniting the engine of recovery and growth. (Balogun 2008.)

Taking an in-depth look at the evaluation, we may even advance the proposition that of all the variables crucial to an understanding of the development process; the human resource stands out as an independent variable. It is the variable that operates on, and transforms, other variables to produce a given development scenario. If the human resource is presumed to be so important, what then is its true nature, and in what ways can we support its development and growth? Human resource is more than the complements of staff required to implement a specific policy or programme. It is even more than the "training" and "development" of manpower. We are getting close to the true character of human resource when, in addition to the preceding components, we look at the morale and motivation of the work force, the tactics and strategies adopted in deploying the workforce on agreed assignments, as well as the internal (management) and the external (socio-cultural) influences operating on the behaviour of employees. That in total leads to goals realization. (Balogun 2008.)

A proper utilization of human resource, at the same time, identifies the factors that militate against its optimum allocation, what policy measures can we suggest to correct the defects, what actions can we urge employing authorities to take to derive maximum benefits from the monies and efforts which they invest on recruitment, training and manpower development as well as on the overhauling of the management environment against possible outbreaks of productivity-resisting diseases (notably, corrupt practices, mismanagement of diversity, sagging morale, bad time-keeping, wilful elongation of procedures(red tape) and brain-drain). The Nigerian public service will no doubt attain an enviable height because the growth and development of any nation depends on the public service and the motivation of her human resource, especially in the case of Nigeria where diversity has so much influence on its politics and administration. (Balogun 2008.)

The unethical practices, especially that of administrative corruption in the Nigerian public service have also been as a result of the human resource question, because human resource coordination in Nigeria lacks the true developmental expertise. From the pre–colonial era to post colonial era the production processes in Nigeria is still based on primordial value. This is as result because the management system is not "knowledge intensive" and they all in turn affect the economy that goes a long way in determining the living standard of the general citizens.

According to Sveiby (2000, qtd. in Lähdesmäki 2007), knowledge intensive firm is a firm whereby large numbers of employees or workers are highly educated and its product does not consist of goods or services but complex non standard problem solving. Work and organisation that are knowledge intensive revolve around the use of intellectual and analytical tasks, and are typically seen as requiring an extensive theoretical education and experience to be carried out successfully (Alvesson 2004: 1). In realising the knowledge intensive oriented public service, human resource management becomes very relevant because of the leadership role it ought to play. According to Amidon and Macnamara (2001,qtd. in Lähdesmäki 2007):

> *"Leadership is needed to foster the climate, the practices and the incentives of knowledge sharing. Knowledge leadership is the process of building the intellectual capital of an organization. Knowledge leaders are educators of best practices and stewards of the frameworks that facilitate*

knowledge creation and sharing. Knowledge leadership is a matter of context, competence, culture, communities, conversations and common language, communications, and coaching."

Training of qualified manpower that ought to run the Nigerian public service falls below the standards with all the ramifications. The ideal teachings that will expose the public servant to understanding what is unethical is lacking in all sense. It is however not expected for a public servant that is not exposed to ethical principles and morality in public business not to collect bribe when carrying out the public assignment or to understand what is called the principle of *public interest*.

One major philosophy guiding public interest connotation is that the public servant should consider the general interest of the populace against any other interest that could be personal or selfish when handling public matters. Personnel issue is no doubt a very big problem to the Nigerian public service due to the pattern in which they are recruited and trained, and because of this public servants end up in not knowing the exact thing to do at the most appropriate time. For the Nigerian public service to meet the challenges of the 21st century and challenges of a diverse nation like Nigeria the human resource question must be adequately addressed because without that the systemic corruption that has bedevilled the activities increase instead of decrease.

▪ **Elitism:** There is the popular say in Nigeria that "the elite will have their way while the masses will have their say." This shows the height of how dichotomous and stratified the Nigerian state and its public service are. Social inequality is absolutely obvious to any stranger's first visit to Nigerian. The elite class in Nigeria spreads across the social–political, economic and religious sphere of the society. The elite class is the dominant class in Nigeria; they are also regarded as the "men of timber and calibre" the "movers and the checkers" of society. However, in order to understand elitism as a concept as it affects the Nigerian state and its public service it is better to streamline it in this respect so as to have clearer understanding of its origination. As already stated, Northern Nigeria had a centralised political administrative system in the pre–colonial era. The Northern centralisation was what the colonial masters took advantage of because it was used for most colonial experimentations.

Indirect rule, a system where colonial masters delegated power and authority to traditional rulers was a big success in the North because it was easy for Sultan to coordinate and manage public affairs due to the reason that he was highly recognised and respected by his subjects compare to Western and Eastern region where indirect rule was a mere success and a complete failure respectively. At the beginning of colonial rule in Nigeria, the Fulani aristocracy became intermediaries in the colonial administration by serving as the testing ground for the policy of indirect rule, existing rulers were renamed "Native Authority" (Edevbaro 1998: 105). Based on this fact the colonial masters became closer to the North. First they advised the Northern elite on the need to encourage their people to join the military.

The southern elite in no small measure gave the colonial masters a tough time because they were more educated. From this point the Northern elite became so worried after the amalgamation that their hegemony might be tempered by the southern educated elite. The main aim of the northern leaders and emirs was to protect their region from Southern imperialism, but actually this preoccupation with protecting themselves was clearly in order to preserve their hegemonic social order. The worries of the Northern elite manifested in 1966 when the first military coup took place led by a Southern General and the then prime minister, Tafawa Belewa and other notable political figures from the North were murdered. (Edevbaro 1998: 105.)

At the time the Northern elite was able to regain power in a counter coup in 1966. From then till now elitism took a different shape in the Nigerian state and its public service. In an attempt for the Northern Hegemony to dictate the way things are done in the whole aspect of the Nigerian state, a body Known as the "Northern Mafias Group" located in Northern power house (Kaduna) was formed. This body sole interest was to protect the interest of the North by determining who will govern the Nigerian state and its relevant strategic parastatals. Northern mafias group is a body of Northern elite that comprises of retired and serving military personnel's, past presidents and heads of state, Sultan and Emirs, top ranked public personnel and so on all from the North. Here fore, the concept of identity is therefore created. (Edevbaro 1998: 105.)

Imoagene (1989 qtd. in Osaghae & Suberu 2008), that considering the very large influence of Marxism and radical political economy perspectives, analyses of class identities in Nigeria have divided them into two broad classes. First is the dominant class or elite, which has also been variously referred to as the ruling class (elite), the political class (elite), the privileged class, and the hegemonic class (elite). Second is the dominated class also called the masses, the ordinary people, and the non-elite; terms that describe the urban segment of the poor and underprivileged, as well as the peasantry which is the common name for rural dwellers. *The working class, whose identity is built around labour, constitutes a special category of the dominated classes.* For a long time, analysts talked of a middle class, made up of the educated elite and the privileged salaried–intelligentsia, bureaucrats, technocrats, and so on.

The stratified identity premise created by the Northern mafias group, which is a very strong dominant elite class as far as the Nigerian state is concerned goes a long way in affecting the structures and activities of the Nigerian public service. Anybody that would work against their interest is not allowed to have access to some strategic public service positions. Although, since the coming of democracy their influence has been weakened to a little extent but their boys still run things in various government strategic positions. How do we expect to have an ethical value filled public service in Nigeria when unethical men are in strategic government positions? When the shepherd is corrupt, the sheep surely shall follow suit.

▪ **Patron–Clientele:** The patron–clientele phenomenon is an extension of the elite phenomenon. Keefer and Vlaicu (2005, qtd. in Keefer 2008) argue that: *"the inability of political competitors to make credible promises to citizens lead them to prefer clientelist to policies, under provide non–targeted goods, over provide targeted transfers to narrow groups of voters, and to engage in excessive rent-seeking."* Although class categories exist, it has been argued that in terms of consciousness of belonging to classes and acting on that basis, classes are fragile and underdeveloped in Nigeria. This explains why the term 'elite' is sometimes preferred to 'classes'. It is, however, generally agreed that the Nigerian elite is divided along ethnic, regional and religious

lines, and that this is a major factor in the underdevelopment of class forces, including working class consciousness.

Class–based evaluation of clientelism provides the theoretical basis for developing a relationship between political and economic activities. Therefore it could be ascertained that clientalism is a method of political control premised on patronage and coercion. Flynn argues that clientelism is a deliberate system that fosters political integration and control exercised from the top which reinforces class control in the system as a whole. From this perspective, patron–client networks regulate and narrow access to the state resources. They serve as mechanisms for distributing state resources strategically working either to marginalise key individuals and groups or win over their political support. (Edevbaro 1998: 65.)

Patron–client networks create master–servant relationships. The true nature tries to maintain the *status quo ante* of top dominance. In regard to Nigeria, the state resources are captured in other to remain relevant in the scheme of things. According to Herbst (1996: 157, qtd. in Edevbaro 1998: 65–66):

> *"Clientelism as it is practised in Nigeria should not be seen merely as theft by individuals seeking to raid the coffers of the state...Rather, the distribution of state offices is legitimated by a set of political norms according to which the appropriation of such offices is not just an act of individual greed or ambition but concurrently the satisfaction of the short–set of the population."*

In regard to the Nigerian public service, corruption and other unethical practices have become endemic because clientelism has eaten so deep. The nature of corruption in it is systemic because in order for the patron–client networks to be maintained, constant *oiling* is needed and doing that must take a regular shape of bribery and other unethical practices especially on the side of the most senior public servants who are most involved. The true notion is a top–down distribution.

▪ **Kinship and Extended Family Nature:** The nature of most African societies manifests a strong kinship and extended family relationship. This relationship is so informally institutionalised that any individual that does not believe in it, is said to either be a deviant or has been influenced by western culture. It is most times a belief in

many Nigerian homes that the first salary or wage (first fruit) of any working member must be divided among all the relevant relations both extended and nuclear. This type of practice goes a long way in justifying the height of collectivism in most African culture.

Evaluating corruption from an African perspective, using Nigeria as a case study, the relevance of kinship ties can not be under estimated. It is agreed that vertical solidarities of tribalism or at least, of the extended family structure remain intact almost everywhere in Africa, thereby encouraging nepotism and favouritism in bureaucracies. This makes government ill–qualified to act as economic agents and arbitrators. This argument is usually premised on the belief that in traditional society, a person tends to carry his first task to his own kin, lineage and clan or ethnic group. This obligation for example would make any senior public officer to consider any vacant public position to his relatives rather to another even if unqualified or inexperienced. (Edevbaro 1998: 47.)

▪ **Colonial Factor:** The colonial society has been described by Underdevelopment theorist like Frantz Fanon as inhuman. The colonial society was a possible replay of the Hobssian's state of nature, which was nasty, solitary and brutish because man was a wolf to man. According to Frantz Fanon (1963, qtd. in Wagbafor 2003) his book "wretched of the earth", the colonial society was a Manichaen society. Manichaeism is a philosophical outlook on duality, for example, light and darkness. That is therefore to state that the colonial society was characterised with duality. In his words it was a society that was characterised by Light and darkness and suffering and affluence. According to (Rempel 2008), legally and practically, the colonial state considered the indigenous populace as subjects, not citizens. According to Community Portal of Nigeria (2008):

> *"The colonial authorities approach to the 'management' of the Nigerian economy was characterized by two main orientations. The first was informed by the major factor which initially informed British presence in the territory that eventually became Nigeria and eventually British colonial rule the search for cheap supplies of resources, human and material, to contribute to the sustenance of the British Empire. It was the need to ensure that the exploitation of Nigeria's resources for the benefit of the empire was undertaken in a more efficient manner that led to colonial rule. Thus during the early decades of colonial rule, the colonial authorities in Nigeria were concerned with the provision of basic infrastructure and services in the country to the extent that they were required to enhance the sourcing and shipment of raw materials to Britain."*

For economic reasons, colonial authority was not interested about what would become of Nigeria and her public service when they eventually hand over power to indigenous ruler. The economic reason drove Nigeria to a stratified society; schools like Kings College and Queens College with a very high standard compare to their rest counterpart, were formed to serve the interests of the colonial master's children and their comprador Nigerian bourgeoisie because they only could afford it. The economic reason further turned the Nigerian state to a raw material exporting state and a dependant on imported finished goods. This general notion of dependency was later transferred to the public service. The colonial authority did not create an atmosphere in which Nigerians at large and the public service will be creative. In the words of Balogun (2008):

> *"In explaining the vast contributions of a thinly populated Nigeria to world trade in primary commodities, we cannot but acknowledge nature's bounty in the form of fertile soil, favourable weather and constantly good harvests. But over and above these natural advantages, the colonial administrators consciously applied the then rare skill of managing people and ensuring that they (the mass of the people) produced the goods and services required for the sustenance of the colonial economy."*

According to Oyeyinka (2006: 13) Adamolekun (1988) and Muhtahaba (1989) have argued that: *"Many African states did not extend the concerted effort made to gain independence to social–economic development, but continued to maintain neo–colonial dependent economies."* Today, many commentators see clientelist relations as constitutive of colonial state power (Edevbaro 1998: 219). In a school like Kings College anti–corruption clubs were formed so that values of fairness would be inculcated to members because of the unjust nature the colonial masters ran the Nigerian state, unfortunately, members of these clubs on their own relative parts became agents of corrupt practices when they had opportunities to serve in various public office positions when the colonial masters had left.

Government rhetoric in Nigeria appear strongly linked to the colonial factor, to more generally concentrate visions of social change and well being on the agency question – the view that the polity is bad because of the actions of particular 'bad' individual persons. The hope is that the society will become better if the 'bad' persons are removed and replaced with 'good' persons (people of God or people with the fear of God).This

view of social change was already visible in Nigeria before the dawn of political independence and thereafter. (Njoku 2008.)

In June 1950, a few students of the King's College, Lagos, a high school, formed a club known as the league of Bribe Scorners, with the objective never to give or receive bribes for the rest of their lives. This effort (plausible as it may be) would be an interesting topic for real reflection, when one considers that a good number of the students of the King's College, Lagos in the 1950s later became politicians in 1966 and were in control of public service when Major Nzeogwu staged his coup on the ground that public service was swimming in corruption and that politicians/public servants were receiving 10% kick-backs for all awarded contracts. (Njoku 2008.)

▪ **Loss of Trust:** The loss of trust is the most serious of all the causes of corruption in the Nigerian state and its public service. The backwardness of the Nigerian state and the persistent administrative corruption that has engulfed its public service is as a result of the loss of trust on the part of the citizens and public servants respectively. According to Peters (2001: 166): *"this loss of trust, in turn, presents a difficult problem for the regimes that have followed to create a sense of fairness in the system and to create legitimacy."*

The element of I do not care (lukewarm) attitude in the public service is caused by loss of trust. Government business is seen as an alien business. If you ask an average Nigerian public servant, how is the job going? He or she will in turn tell you government work is put on the Shoulder, when it becomes so heavy you throw it down. Redundancy, late coming and absenteeism at work are other clear manifestations of this loss of trust. Prayer sections are held during office hours and in offices because of fear of the unknown. Using my case as an example, I was laid off from the public service in 1996 along many others without any official notification or entitlement after retrenchment.

A holistic overview of all the causes of corruption in the Nigerian state and its public all fall down to the problem of loss of trust which has in total turned the Nigerian state to a

"rent seeking state" that is one of the major reason of her underdevelopment and poverty. The continuous rigid centralisation of the Nigerian state and its public service is as result of loss trust because ethnic groups do not trust one another. The dominant ethnic group is scared of the dominated ethnic group because of fear of possible secession like the one that lead to the civil war in 1967.

Cooptation into the elite group in Nigeria takes a very slow process; first, the elite in Nigeria tend to agree more than they disagree, so recruiting new elites is difficult because of the fear of betrayal since trust is very "scarce commodity". In order to maintain the free flow of rent, the patron–client network is well nurtured in the Nigerian state and its public service because the fear of interruption is also caused by the loss of trust. Although the kinship and extended family nature could be regarded as part of the African culture, but to very large extent as far as the Nigerian state is concern is based on the loss of trust because there is this constant fear that if it goes out of my family reach it might never be found or regained even if is that which ought to belong to the general society at large.

The loss of trust is indeed a very big problem to the Nigerian state and its civil service. The administrative corruption in the Nigerian public service has a firm root on the loss of trust that emanates from the way the Nigerian state is structured. I would at this juncture reiterate the need of trust in the Nigerian state and its public service.

3.2. Corruption and Culture

Every society has its unique cultural problem; the cures however are not the same from one society to another. Hofstede (1997: 13) consolidating on past works of renowned social anthropologists like Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, in addition with sociologists like Alex Inkeles and Daniel Levinson. Was able to put forward some dimensions of National Culture from a survey data carried out on values of people in more than 50 countries. The people surveyed are staffs in the local subsidiaries of one large multi national corporation-IBM.

The national culture dimensions by Hofstede (1997) are the following:

- ▪ Large power distance culture and small power distance culture
- ▪ Individualist and a collectivist culture
- ▪ Masculinity and feminist culture
- ▪ High uncertainty avoidance and low uncertainty avoidance culture

According to Hofstede (1997: 14), recently a fifth dimension of the differences of national cultures was identified; opposing a long-term orientation in life to a short-term orientation. The study of culture in recent years has witnessed or experienced a significant boom through the ideas of culture enthusiasts. Even more recently, a new dimension of national culture has been discovered; that is the high context communication and low context communication culture. In high context communication culture, people rely more on context, emphasis is not on the use of written or oral form of expression while the opposite is case in low context communication culture which has precise and open language behaviour (Huovinen 2007).

The large power distance culture, collectivist culture, masculinity, high uncertainty avoidance and high context communication cultures are features in over the 300 ethnic groups in Nigeria, judging from Hofstede's classification and other rational evaluations from other authors in the field of cultural studies.

The idea of cultural study comes in different forms; Hofstede (1997) for example was interested in organization. Organization I would define as a group with an objective. This definition will lead to organizational culture. According to Schein (2004: 17):

> *"The culture of a group can now be defined as a pattern of shared basic assumption that was learned by a group as it solved its problem of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problem."*

National culture and organizational culture are however, different. National culture shapes and modes national values and orientations of individuals in particular nation, organizational culture on the other hand is what makes one organization distinct from

another organization. According to (Hofstede 1997: 18), research results about national culture and their dimensions proved to be only partly useful for the understanding of organizational culture. This argument is relevant to my thesis because giving the dynamics of administration only a cultural judgement is not enough. Therefore, a more holistic judgement that will include structural elements can be of great importance.

According to Hofstede (1997: 28): *"power distance can therefore be defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a particular country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally."* Large power distance culture accepts inequality while small power culture reacts to inequality. It could be premised on how family structures and educational philosophies are arranged. Nigerian society accepts inequality a lot, but it is not enough to conclude that the prevalence of corruption is due to this reason.

Individualism and collectivism are other forms of national culture dimension. Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose. In this type of societies everyone is expected to look after him or herself and her immediate family. Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty…large power distance countries are also likely to be more collectivist, and small power distance countries to be more individualist and vis a vis. Therefore, we can take the position that corruption in any form can not be concluded to be part of either a society that has an individualist culture or collectivist culture. Although, a relationship exist that tends to relate rich countries to individualist culture and poor countries to collectivist culture. (Hofstede 1997: 52–54.)

Masculinity and femininity are also other forms of national culture dimension. Masculinity pertains to societies in which social gender roles are clearly distinct, in this type of societies men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success whereas women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. Femininity on the other hand pertains to societies in which social

genders roles overlap, here, both men and women are supposed to be gentle, kind, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. Finally, Uncertainty avoidance is another dimension of national culture. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations. This could be further classified to high uncertainty avoidance culture and low uncertainty avoidance culture. (Hofstede 1997: 82–83, 113.)

A comparative analysis is presented in table 2.

Table 2. A Culture Dimension Analysis (Hofstede 1997: 53).

Individualism index (IDV) values for 50 countries and regions		
Score rank	Country or region	IDV Score
1	USA	91
2	Australia	90
3	Great Britain	89
4/5	Canada	80
6	New Zealand	79
7	Italy	76
10/11	Sweden	71
13	Norway	69
14	Switzerland	68
17	Finland	63
26/27	Arab countries	38
30	Greece	35
33/35	East Africa	27
39/41	West Africa	20
50	Venezuela	12

I decided to use the individualism index analysis to drive home the argument that corruption should not be concluded to be part of developing countries culture. Social and structural elements must be put into consideration as I have observed that of "trust" in the Nigerian contest. According to Hofstede (1997: 50):

"The Swedes and the Saudis in this true story have different concepts of the role of personal relationship in business. For the Swedes, business is done with a company; for the Saudis, with a person whom one has learned to know and trust. As long as one does not know another person well enough it is convenient to have present an intermediary or go–between, someone who knows and is trusted by both parties. At the root of the difference between these cultures is a fundamental issue in human societies: the role of the individual versus the role of the group."

Arab countries and West African countries (where Nigeria falls) are classified to be developing countries and in a critical evaluation of Hofstede dimensions of national cultures, they both have close features. The significance of trust as an element that connects people from diverse background was not understated by Hofstede as it regards Saudi Arabia. It is no doubt therefore that Saudi Arabia as a nation could have some complexities like that of the Nigerian state. Hence, trust becomes a key ingredient in the relationship of the Saudis. From this background again we can ascertain how trust can help in curbing corruption and other ethical issues that manifest in negative forms in the Nigerian state and its public service respectively. In an attempt to justify my position further I shall look at various countries standings in "transparency international" corruption perception index (table 3).

Table 3. Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International 2007.)

Country Rank	Country	2007 CPI Score
1.	Finland	9.4
4.	Sweden	9.3
19.	France	7.3
20.	USA	7.2
38.	Botswana	5.4
42.	Italy	5.2
45.	Southern Africa	5.1
122.	Ukraine	2.7
149.	Nigeria	2.2
180.	Somalia	2.0

Transparency international is a German based non governmental organisation that plays the role of a watchdog in corruption related issues and comes out every year with her

ranking on how different countries stand on the corruption index. Finland has maintained a quite good position by being ranked first as the least corrupt nation in the world the second consecutive year after just loosing the top sport to Iceland in 2005 since the year 2000. In looking at the issue of corruption from a comparative perspective, Finland remains a good starting point basically on the reasons why it has enjoyed a good position on the corruption index ranking. According to Tiihonen and Tiihonen (2008), discussion of reasons for and causes of corruption leads inevitably into the political system, because administration is so closely connected to it.

Finland is a country with few serious worries, which have served as a measure of how well things have been going in general. The risk of being accused of wrongdoing and being excluded from normal social circles has been a key strategy for the reduction of corruption and this is why individual cases of corruption have always been rareIn spite of the modernisation of the public sector, the core of governmental administration has maintained the legal tradition. An administration without clear political posts, with a low hierarchical structure, and, at the same time, with a high degree of individual and collective responsibility among civil servants at every level of administration, as well as exposure to public scrutiny. (Tiihonen & Tiihonen 2008.)

A civil servant must be proactive in carrying out duties in the best interests of the citizens. In Finland it is very rare for someone from outside the administration to be appointed to the higher posts within it, even though there is not a closed career system. Finland does not have any elite educational establishment for the production of future high ranking civil servants along the lines of France's Ecole Nationale d'Administration, the ENA. Nor does Finland have hierarchical administrative structures as in some southern European countries. (Tiihonen & Tiihonen 2008.)

It is no doubt that the Finnish governmental tradition has been premised on legalistic principles , but at the same time practical and flexible, it is also relevant to know that the Supreme Court, which is the highest instance for clarifying and examining values in legal and administrative affairs, from time to time clarifies what are intended to be the standards. This mechanism controls the behaviour of the political elite and the top-level

civil servants and because this is reflected in the lower levels of administration, everyone is reminded of the limits and correct interpretation of the norms. Naturally this requires the Supreme Court to be genuinely independent. In Finland the civil service profession has been open. Appointments are based on open applications, appropriate academic qualifications, professional aptitude and work experience. Finns are used to handling most legal problems very pragmatically. (Tiihonen & Tihonen 2008.)

The logic goes like this: Rules are old, brief, clear, strict, and taken seriously. Circumstances and structural, social or cultural changes in real life are also taken into consideration. A crime in central government is, as with any kind of crime, a relative matter. But there are limits for corruption and bad governance. The Finnish ethical principles help in no small measure in inculcating the spirit of discipline to the extent that the youngest public servant even without experience knows the limit for corruption (bribery). (Tiihonen & Tihonen 2008.)

We can therefore deduce that the Finnish state and its civil service are structurally arranged to create trust. Trust in the sense that everybody is carried along with utmost transparency unlike the Nigerian state and its civil service. Corruption is minimal in the Finnish system because the people believe in it while corruption is rampart in Nigerian system because the people have a very little or no belief in the entire structural arrangement. It is no doubt therefore to note that all Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland and Denmark) see trust as essential ingredients in general administration and this is one major key of their prosperity.

It is realistic to say corruption increases if ethical guidelines and codes of conduct are not established or clearly stated or if civil servants do not obey them. Good governance and good administration are loaded with ethical values and principles, such as trust, transparency, responsibility, accountability, responsiveness and participation. They represent the opposite to corruption, and more particularly, opposition to misbehaviour, mismanagement, and maladministration. A holistic evaluation of all the values stated, "Trust" is and has been an essential part of responsible government and good administration in all Scandinavian countries. Trust in public authorities is rather high

and trust is seen as a cornerstone of a civic society. Public confidence in impartiality, objectivity, and lawfulness of the government and its institutions has remained strong in Finland. (Salminen, Viinamäki & Ikola–Norrbacka 2007.)

For a more relativistic view on the issue of corruption and culture, Italy will be another good stand point. According to Del Monte and Papagni (2008), in the 1980s Italy was very corrupt compared to other industrialised countries and at least on the basis of the former index, corruption increased in Italy till recently and Italy ranks among the developed countries as one of the worst in terms of institutional quality.

It is no fallacy to say that the Italian society is strongly affected by this negative phenomenon call corruption. One of the most important mechanisms was the system of political patronage, in Italian is called *clientelismo* that allowed groups of citizens linked directly to politicians to reap high rewards through special laws (*leggine)* or through political appointments. Such rewards and appointments were not aimed at enhancing efficiency or recruiting professional expertise. The interaction between politicians, bureaucracy and groups of citizens directly linked to politicians was a characteristic of the Italian political system but it was only in the early 1970s that political corruption began to spread. The different emphases laid on corruption in the two periods from the Second World War to the 1970s and later are probably caused by the much higher spread, in the 1980s, of bribes in relations between citizens and public administration. (Del Monte & Papagni 2008.)

According to Del Monte and Papagni (2008), in Italy corruption increased as a consequence of changes in the political and institutional system and corruption has spread even to those levels of administration, such as the judiciary, from which it was absent in the past. They further argue that the spread of corruption weakened the sense of loyalty to organized society and the climate of corruption created further incentives for corruption, due to the belief that known offenders can continue their corrupt practices with little risk of punishment. It is quite obvious from this background that corruption has persisted in the Italian state and its public service because of some structural and social complexities that can also be related to some in Nigeria. The

structural arrangements of the Italian state and its public service create a low level of "Trust" in the system from a citizenry perspective.

Botswana is another stop in the corruption and culture analyses. The public administration is critical to Botswana's future challenges, like it has been to the past accomplishments. Thus, in addition to the four rational principles that have underlain all past National Development Plans which include, democracy, development, self–reliance, and unity there is now a fifth principle: "Botho" or the concept of developing every citizen into a person of well–rounded character. Furthermore, Botswana's political system has been remarkably stable and peaceful. (Ayeni 2002: 194–195.)

The vitality of the democratic process is reinforced by the fact that governmental institutions and other structures have side–by–side existence with several functional interest groups, nongovernmental bodies, and a comparatively free press. It is a fact that Botswana has enjoyed the reputation of being blessed with an honest government. However, there were revelations of corrupt practices by public officials in the early 1990s, but the government moved promptly to prosecute the leading culprits, and the vice president and a number of cabinet member's resigned in the clean up exercise. (Ayeni 2002: 195–196.)

 Independent Botswana has advanced based on three philosophies: rapid and sustainable economic growth, in a third position among all developing nations and far in excess among every other African countries, based on this growth an accompanying build–up of a relatively viable governmental system took place with focus on finance and planning. Secondly the civil service has maintained a high level by providing a fairly good compensation for her officials and by observing a well define lines of authority and accountability. Lastly the political elite has consistently sort expert advice from bureaucrats, both groups have maintained closeness and mutuality of interest in different areas of commerce and general administration. (Good 2008.)

It can be ascertained from the above that the Botswana state and its public service are structurally arranged to create trust among the different components that make up the

state. There is transparency and accountability, thereby making it uneasy ground for corrupt practices to grow and become firm. In answering the question further, whether it can be concluded to say corruption is a part of African culture. I would say it is wrong once again based on the analyses above. Finland and Italy fall under close categorisation in individualist culture dimension analysis. Nigeria and Botswana are both classified as less individualist nations compare to Finland and Italy. However, on the Transparency International corruption perception index, Finland is ranked first above many other countries even Botswana before Italy.

That is to say corruption tends to persist more in Italy compared to Botswana. Although Nigeria which has a close cultural features perception like Botswana is ranked among one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Therefore, it can be concluded that structural complexities that drive away the element of trust in the Italian state and its public service are also additionally present among host of other factors in the Nigerian State and its public service. So, corruption can not be concluded to be part of African culture. The ability for a people to trust a system goes along way in reducing corruption. For the Nigerian state and its public service to move forward, they must be structurally arranged to win the people's trust and confidence.

4. SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF THE MARGINALISED IN NIGERIA

Taking an in-depth look at the concept of reform is a good starting point towards the task of solving the problem of the marginalised in Nigeria. Reforms in public administration have had a relative view from the onset. This is because experts in the field have had different views on the topic. Reforms in public administration date back to the argument for the science of administration by different scholars of old. A good starting point is Woodrow Wilson who is one of the foremost advocates for the science of administration.

Peters (2001: 4) have seen that Kaufman (1978), Aucoin (1990) and Peters (1995) that reforms have the tendency of solving some problems and also in the process creating a new set of problems that may generate subsequent reforms. This position on care about administrative reform does not mean that the old ways of running government were necessarily better. What the appeal to produce does argue is that these approaches to public management did solve certain problems, albeit creating some additional problems of their own. Overturning those older modes of administering certainly have solved some problems but in the process perhaps revived older difficulties and perhaps even created new ones. If the potential costs of discarding the existing system of public administration are not recognized, then change may appear entirely too attractive.

The science of politics which have begun some century ago has a new offspring known as the science of administration. It is a product of our generation. Administration is the most obvious part of government; it is government in action; it is the executive, the operative, the most visible side of government, and is of course as old as government itself. There is scarcely a single duty of government which was once simple which is not now complex; government once had but a few masters; it now has scores of masters. Where government once might follow the whims of a court, it must now follow the views of a nation. Those views are steadily widening to new conception of state duty; so that the same time that the functions of government are every day becoming more complex and difficult, they are also vastly multiplying in number. Administration is everywhere putting its hands to a new adventure; the idea of the state is the conscience

of administration. This is why there should be a science of administration which shall seek to straighten the paths of government and purify its organization, and to crown its dutifulness. (Wilson 1887: 22–24.)

It is for this reason that we must regard civil service reform in its present stages as but a prelude to a fuller administrative reform. New Administrative ideas are now rectifying methods of appointment and must go on to adjust executive functions more fitly and to prescribe better methods of executive organization and action. Civil service reform is thus but a moral atmosphere of official life by establishing the sanctity of public office as a trust, and by making the service unpartisan, it is opening the way for making it businesslike. (Wilson 1887: 28.)

The modes of it activities must be improved in other to make it more appealing. The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics; it at most point's separated even from the debatable ground of constitution study. The object of administrative study is to rescue executive methods from the confusion and costliness of empirical experiment and set them upon foundations laid deep in *trusted* principles. (Wilson 1887: 28.)

From generation to generation, century to century partisans and self-seeking and corrupt men of all sorts employ much the same means to make office-getting and administration serve their ends. Human nature has not been changed by republican institutions. Good government does not come from neglect, from conceit, or from party zeal, even in a republic. However the past can be forgiven, we can hardly find in the future a justification for a continued neglect of the science of administration which, as we have seen, the statesmen of every other enlightened nation have made one of the paramount studies of politics. But, it is not merely such natural increase and expansion which will continue to make that science more profound and its neglect more disastrous. (Eaton 1880: 16–20.)

It is the order of growing civilization that the functions of official life must become more and more various, delicate, and difficult. The character of public administration in

the United States does not concern merely the growing millions of her own people, but the republican cause and the fate of free institutions in every quarter of the globe now and for ages to come. No other knowledge will compensate for the ignorance as to the best means of securing capacity and fidelity in public administration. (Eaton 1880: 16–20.)

Enough has been said, it is believed, to show that there are two distinct functions of government, and that their differentiation results in a differentiation, though less complete, of the organs of government provided by the formal system. These two ways of doing public business may for purposes of convenience be designated respectively as Politics and Administration. *Politics* has to do with *policies or expressions of the will,* while *Administration* has to do with the *execution of these policies*. (Goodnow 1900: 35.)

It would be noticed that from these definitions, both lay stress upon the fact that politics has to do with the guiding or influencing of governmental policy, while administration has to do with the execution of that policy. There are, then, in all governmental systems two primary or ultimate functions of government, viz. the expression of the will of the state and the execution of that will. There are also in all states separate organs, each of which is mainly concerned with the discharge of one of these functions, respectively, Politics and Administration. (Goodnow 1900: 36.)

Public administration is the management of men and materials in the actualisation of the purposes of the state. The objective of public administration is the most efficient utilization of the resources at the disposal of officials and employees. These resources include not only current appropriations and material equipment in the form of public buildings, machinery, highways and canals, but also the human resources bound up in the hundreds of thousands of men and women who work for the state. In all pure rationality good administration seeks the elimination of waste, the conservation of material and energy, and the most rapid and completes achievement of public purposes consistent with economy and the welfare of the worker. (White 1926: 57.)

The industrial revolution and its many social, economic and political implication are fundamentally responsible for the new social philosophy and the new concept of public administration, the urbanization of industrial states and the crystallization of powerful social classes and economic interests have not only increased the area and intensity of administrative activity. The Power of the civil service is increasing. The fight of classes over the distribution of the social surplus has led to the intervention of the state on behalf of the economically disadvantaged (children, women, labouring classes) by insistence on minimum wage, limited hours of labour, and healthy working conditions. The interest of the twentieth century in public administration is due to a variety of cause of these the rapidly increasing cost of government. The fact is that the role of administration in the modern state is profoundly affected by the general political and cultural environment of the age. (White 1926: 59–61.)

The science of administration has displayed undaunted strength in almost all it ramifications. One of the most obvious features of recent writing on public administration is its large volume and wide scope. Much of the specialization, however, is in the functional aspects of administration, rather than in its institutional aspects. The problem of the philosophy that our administrators entertain is intimately related, in turn, to that of the adequacy of theory of organization. (Waldo 1948: 150.)

The main tenets of the public administration movement emerged in the decades preceding 1914; they crystallised into a general political theory in the progressive years. But, the apparent likelihood of a disintegration of the outlook and the synthesis of a new one must be recognised. In any event, if abandonment of the politics administration formula is taken seriously, if the demands of present world civilisation upon public administration are met, administrative thought must establish a working relationship with every major province in the realm of human learning. (Waldo 1948: 151–152.)

The carrying out of governmental functions needs action. No matter how many studies may be required, government in the final analysis is action oriented. So it is true that some governmental executives who are able to administer public affairs with distinction would probably fail if transferred to private enterprise. Politicians inevitably rub up

against more consideration; they tend to be broadly stimulated. Government exists precisely for the reason that there is a need to have special person in society charged with function of promoting and protecting the public interest. In a narrow sense government tends therefore to be less efficient because of its public nature. The public nature of the government's business thus makes for a great difference in organization discipline. Government is different because it must take account of all the desires, needs, action, thoughts, and sentiments. Government is different because government is politics. (Appleby 1945: 132–135.)

It is therefore a necessity to note, popular government requires that it be the executing authority which shall be subordinated to the expressing authority, since the latter in the nature of things can be made much more representative of the people than can the executive authority. In other words, practical political necessity makes impossible the consideration of the function of politics apart from that of administration. *Politics must have a certain control over administration*, using the words in the broad senses attributed to them. That some such relation must exist between the two ultimate functions of government is seen when we examine the political development of any state. (Goodnow 1900: 37.)

According to Boyne, Farrel, Law, Powell and Walker (2003: 3), a public management reform as a deliberate change in the arrangement for the design and delivery of public services Taking a stand from the arguments for the science of administration by different public management scholars from above, therefore, it become so obvious that reform in general and public management reform is a product of *time and circumstance*. This is because immediate happenings always drive the need for a change; also from this position we could arrive at premise that public management reform is not permanent or static.

According to Caiden (1969, qtd. in Boyne et al. 2003: 3), the whole essence of reform is getting some one to do something they would not otherwise do by themselves; this implies that reform is bound to encounter resistance The resistance reforms in general

and public management in particular could encounter may start from "culture" which shapes the values and beliefs of a particular people to act in particular way.

4.1. Traditional Principles of Public Service

Public service is an old fashion business and some principles have guided its activities over the years before the ideas of new public management reform came in, some of the traditional principles are the following which Peters (2001) highlighted:

▪ **Neutrality**: The principle of neutrality states that the public service must not be political. This principle gained its root from the politics-administration dichotomy from classical administrative thinkers like Wilson Woodrow and host of others. According to Kaufman (1956, qtd. in Peters 2001: 4), the first of the principles is the assumption of an apolitical civil service and associated with the politics-administration dichotomy and the concept of "neutral competence" within the civil service.

The basic idea is that civil servants should not have known political allegiance of their own and that they should be able to serve any government in power (Peters 2001: 4–5). This can be attained through the acts of the civil servants not given any sort of preferential treatment to one government policies against that of another government, rather government policies must be seen with utmost neutrality, and where the justification would be guided by the need to protect the public interest.

▪ **Stability and Permanence:** This principle states that the job of the civil servant should be stable and permanent, so that it would be an avenue for pursuing a life time career and self actualisation. Here the civil servant should not be moved up and down rather, there should be a considerable boundary limitations to activities of public servants.

▪ **Institutionalization:** Another assumption under girding traditional public administration is that there should be an institutionalised civil service that is governed

as a corporate body (Peters 2001: 10). From this principle, the civil service should be seen as an established entity that must be professionally and distinctively oriented.

▪ **Inner Regulation:** Another chestnut or assumption is that civil service should be acquiescent and respond almost without question to policy directives issued by its nominal political masters (Peters 2001: 11). Here the position of the civil servant is that of obedience. Orders must be accepted the way they come from top hierarchy.

▪ **Equality:** According to Peters (2001: 12), in a traditional conception, clients with the same objective characteristics should receive exactly the same benefits, no matter where or from whom they receive them. Here the civil service applies no bias in dealing with any of its client in accordance with the services delivered and specialization.

The above points on the traditional principles of public service shall however be evaluated further in my subsequent discussions in this write up because they shall form issues when the ideas of new public management reforms are put into contention and Weberian ideal bureaucracy contraction to traditional values in the Nigerian public service. However, it is necessary at this point to put forward some developments that have informed the idea of terming the above principles of public service as the "the traditional principles of public service.

According to Lawton (1998: 2), the conditions and context within which public officials carry out their duties have changed tremendously following:

- ▪ The adoption of markets and quasi–markets public sector reform idea (this may be termed the market imperative).
- ▪ Devolved management responsibility (the fragmentation imperative).
- ▪ Creation of business units and cost centres (the fragmentation imperative).
- ▪ The adoption of short–term contracts (the anti–career imperative).
- ▪ Contracting out and privatization (the public/private interface imperative).
- ▪ The exhortations for managers to be more entrepreneurial, flexible and responsive (the managerialism imperative).

▪ The pressure on limited resources (the cost imperative).

▪ An increase in demands from what has become known as the customer (the customer imperative).

▪ The growth in the "evaluative state" (the audit/performance imperative).

It is a fallacy to expect that a public servant whose take home salary can not feed his family to remain committed to ethical principles or not to take bribes when carrying out public duties or even develop passive attitude towards his duty. It is also fallacy to expect a public servant whose due promotion has been withheld by senior public personnel because he is from a minority ethnic group to remain committed to duty. It is also a fallacy to expect a people whose right in their backyard crude oil wealth is being extracted and yet denied of basic social amenities and inadequate compensation to the damages done to their environment not to indulge in violent activities to call for attention. It is also a fallacy to expect someone whose vote was not counted in a particular general election to participate in another general election. There is a big truth in the saying that when you smite the shepherd the flock scatter. These and many others are the backgrounds to understanding the cases of the "marginalised" in the Nigerian state.

While the category of majority groups remains intact, a number of scholars have identified important distinctions and reconstructions within the ranks of minorities that in fact show that there are inequalities among minorities. Ekeh, has moved from differentiating 'marginals' or dispersed minorities such as the Ijaw and Ebira (cut from their kith and kin in other regions) from other minorities, distinguishing between 'historically dominant minorities' which were powerful overlords in the pre-colonial and colonial periods (Ijaw, Bini, Efik, Itsekiri) and 'political minorities' which were marginalized and excluded both from power in the regions and the overall national power grid. (Osaghae & Suberu 2008.)

Osaghae (1986, qtd. in Osaghae & Suberu 2008), has pointed to the multiple characteristics of minorities and identified categories of powerful national minorities made up of: historically dominant minorities, which have been influential national

actors; northern and southern minorities; and religious minorities, all of which have unequal access and opportunities in the power and resources arena. Finally, in the struggles for more equitable access to power in the 1990s, it became fashionable and expedient for several non-minority groups including the Igbo and some Yoruba subgroups to redefine themselves as 'minorities' in view of their alleged marginalization and exclusion from power and resources. Such redefinitions have not however, changed the historical context of the majority-minority cleavage.

Out of the marginalised in the Nigerian state the public service comes almost top. Top because it suffers the end results of all *class struggles* that take place in the Nigerian state. The failure of any administration is in most cases attributed to the public service while its staffs remained the least paid and motivated. Motivated in the sense of training and compensation, in order to make public personnel's more knowledge intensive, and thereby becoming more creative and dependent. For any country to move forward a holistic developmental approach has to be adopted, an approach that will be all encompassing. It is in this sense I shall be looking at possible ways of solving the problem of the marginalised in the Nigerian state.

4.1.1. A Comparative View of Social Capital and the Nigerian State

The sociological concept of 'social capital' which has recently been made popular in the field of political science and general administration by scholars like Robert Putnam is one approach in solving the problem of the marginalised in the Nigerian state and its public service. Social capital is the social network that unites people of heterogeneous tradition in order to have social sympathy for one another. The diverse nature of the Nigerian state in terms of ethnicity can benefit from the principle of social capital through the establishment of trust which has eluded the Nigerian state from the onset.

It is quite a fact to state where the level of "civic community" is low the strength of electoral competition to fight corruption will be weak. One variable that has been explicitly considered in few econometric works on the determinants of corruption is social capital. Social capital is created from the horizontal networks and relations

between individuals, groups and organizations in civil society. The notion of social capital draws on observations of Toqueville on democracy in the USA, where democracy developed and consolidated because American people largely participated in what constitute the primary social institutions such as the family, the school, the neighbourhood and church civic organizations. Social capital is embedded in primary social institutions which provide people with basic values, such as high levels of social trust, cohesion and participation. (Del Monte & Papagni 2008.)

From Aristotle to Tocqueville, political and social scientists have emphasised the importance of building social capital, that is about social networks and the norms of reciprocity associated with them (Putnam & Goss 2002: 3). According to Hanifan (1920, qtd. in Putnam & Goss 2002: 4):

> *"In the use of the phrase social capital I make no reference to the usual acceptance of the term capital, except in a figurative sense. I do not refer to real estate, or to personal property or to cold cash, but rather to that in life which tends to make these tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit...the community as a whole will benefit by the cooperation of all its parts, while the individual will find in his associations the advantages of help, sympathy, and the fellowship of his neighbours."*

Social capital as a concept has been greeted with high relevance from different perspectives. From Tanzania to Sri Lanka and Italy researches have shown that economic development under some circumstances can be boosted by sufficient stock of social capital. In United States and United Kingdom studies have found that social networks both formal and informally helps in the reduction of crime. However, Japan and Finland are not left out in the social capital evaluation because of its positive relevance to physical health. (Putnam & Goss 2002: 6.)

Social interaction, in its real sense helps to resolve dilemmas of collective action by encouraging people to act in *trustworthy* way when they might not be willing to do so. Social capital can thus be simultaneously a private and public good. We describe social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity as social capital, because like physical and human capital, social networks create value, both individual and collective. Numerous studies have shown that human happiness is much more closely predicted by access to social capital compare to financial capital. (Putnam & Goss 2002: 7–8.)

Social capital turns based on the level to which people associate regularly with one another in settings of relative equality, thus building up relations of trust and mutual reciprocity. In the case of Britain, the level of community involvement measured by associational membership, charitable endeavour, and informal sociability have remained resilient in comparison to the United States, the reasons for this are not far fetched. First is the radical transformation in the educational system, marked by a massive expansion of both secondary and postsecondary education. Secondly, a change in the overall class structure of the British society, driven by economic and political developments, which has altered the distribution of occupations and life situations across the populace and lastly, British forms of government actions that have done much to encourage and sustain voluntary community involvement. (Hall 2002: 22–35.)

Over three decades, Britain moved away from an educational system that was *stratified by class background* and provided far fewer years of schooling on average compare United States. By 1990, the number of women with post secondary education was virtually equal to that of men. This to a very large extent increases community involvement because of those who have a greater propensity for civic engagement. It is a fact that community involvement drastically increased when the system of higher education was expanded to take in a broader range of people from more diverse background, many of whom did not have the benefit of these other socializing factors, the average effect of postsecondary education. However, expanding the access of women to higher education seems to have had a major impact on levels of social capital in Britain. Generally, in Britain the level of social capital seems to be most strongly sustained by the middle class. (Hall 2002: 42–49.)

Recent studies have shown that almost three–quarters of the British electorate still vote and the number of British citizens who engage in some form of political participation beyond voting has risen in no small measure. A substantial body of evidence also suggests that these levels of political participation and attentiveness follow from the high levels of associational activity, voluntary work, and informal sociability in British society. Therefore, remain an interesting case for analyst of social capital. It provides an

example of an economically advanced democracy in which levels of social capital as most indicators have shown no decline in recent decades. (Hall 2002: 50–54.)

Social capital can be said to be economic capital that does not merely exist but can also be misused by people who are either too lazy or too preoccupied with selfish interest, which thereby hinder them for being committed to the moral memories of their community as Robert Bellah had started. From a more pragmatic perspective *social capital is capital*, and like every other type of capital, it may be distributed unequally; indeed, it may have a tendency to become more unequally distributed over time, except other checks are in place, and its role may be one of exclusion rather than inclusion, thereby, creating a *privileged–marginalised dichotomy*. (Wuthnow 2002: 76–78.)

From this background, it can be noted that a possible reason for the slide of social capital in the United States is that existing social arrangements have become systematically more exclusionary, *causing some segments of the population to feel unwelcome and to cease participating*, or failure to provide the resources that would have engineered a positive attitude in the people towards participating in civic activities. (Wuthnow 2002: 79.)

Trust in others is much more a role of social–economic privilege than involvement in associations. The measurable differences between the more privileged and the marginalised on trust appear to have remained relatively stable in recent decades, the larger impact of reducing trust in government in the United States by the people is a function not only of firsthand social relationships, or even of social status, but of national leadership. Therefore, it is necessary for leaders to note the unwillingness for the public to trust human nature is not because the public is spending limited time in voluntary associations but *because of leaders inability to live up to public expectations.* (Wuthnow 2002: 85–87.)

However, other views have it, that the decline in electoral turnout is related to high concentration of joblessness, crime, and other social problems in a particular environ. It is relevant at this juncture to state that that adequate attention in the United State needs

to be concentrated in creating social capital that does a better job of *bridging* between the privileged and the marginalised. (Wuthnow 2002: 88–100.)

Social capital in France as compared to those in other developed and advanced democracies is highly threatened because of the weakness of its social cohesion and the challenges posed to its democratic ideals. Social capital is a volatile product of social exchange in a dynamic supply and demand relationship. It is however no doubt that the workings of a political system in a society will influence the nature of its social capital as much as the nature of its social capital will influence the performance of its political system. The relative weakness of France's associational networks, unlike other European countries, is often related to the dual influence of Catholic culture and a centralised state because of this little room for citizen initiative is created. The distance effect leads to the preservation of integrity and opportunities for personal development as the motivating factor for asserting one's presence in any form of association. (Worms 2002: 137–160.)

Networks of sociability between neighbours help solve daily practical problems or defend against external threats. This resourceful capital is limited in city outskirts in France where the bulk of poverty is centred. It is clear that unemployment level of immigrant population is twice that of the aborigine. Also the Algerian Muslims out of all the immigrant population suffer more coercive and ideological segregation. Though, immigrants in general are targets of racism and xenophobia because they are most cases subjected to spot search by police premised on their physical appearance. The republican concept of equal access by all citizens external to the public system of education prevents pupils showing any symbol of a distinctive identity. (Worms 2002: 161–166.)

Social capital is no doubt tied to the political system. In France, trust in political institution is at historic lows. The parliament, administration, and political parties are among the least trusted institution in the nations and continue to lose public trust and esteem. It is also obvious that linkage between the lower and upper levels of French society is missing; this is as a result of the weakness of bridging social capital and

political institutions. However, it is important to stress at this juncture that the greatest threat to social ties is not caused by organised crime but rather, it comes from minor delinquency and incivility, which create a sense of insecurity and diminish trust in others, which is an essential ingredient of social capital. Since trust represents the core value of social capital, it is clear that feelings of insecurity can have a serious negative effect on social capital formation. (Worms 2002: 176–181.)

In relating the concept of social capital to the Nigerian state and its public service, I will start by saying if, social capital exists in Nigeria, and then it is at its lowest level. This is because formal and informal sociability or networking exists on stratified self or group centeredness. A public servant from a majority ethnic group sees himself more superior to a public servant from a minority ethnic group even if the latter is higher in terms of official position. A public servant whose faith differs from another tends to see the other as alien, even if they might wear biased smiles for each other during office hours, but down deep the differences count. Public servants engage in fetish practices in order to keep juicy public positions.

Social capital has remained resilient in United Kingdom from Hall's (2002) argument above because individuals of diverse background and identity are co-opted in the general system of things especially in the field of education. The educational system in Nigeria that ought to be a major avenue for building social capital is at a brink of collapse, *school today and strike tomorrow.* Recently, the Nigerian Union of Teachers has embarked on an indefinite strike action to press home demands for better working conditions and remuneration and on the part of federal government mum is the word as there is no initiative even for dialogue (Komolafe, Ahiuma–Young & Ochayi 2008).

Social capital is relatively weak in the United States from Wuthnow's (2002) argument above because of the Privileged–marginalised dichotomy. The Race question is still very much there and societal stratification is obvious. It is however no doubt that social capital is at its very low in France because societal complexities are managed with biased intentions as Worms' had argued above, which almost exemplifies the Nigerian context.

It will be wrong to say that social capital does not exist in the Nigerian state. It does exist but in *non true* bridging manner. People tend to socialize and network along ethnic lines. Voluntary associations like the Boys Brigade and Boys Scout are in a state of extinction. Rather, youths tend to join secret cults in most cases with the primary aim to perpetuate evil. A very close look at the various institutions of higher learning in Nigeria, one will find out that activities of rival cult groups like Eye Confraternity, Black Axe Confraternity, Buccaneer Confraternity and others too numerous to mention stem from Raping to Murder. However, this is not to say to fraternize is bad because it is an avenue of building social capital but due to the structure of the Nigerian state, priorities are misplaced and privileges are abused for selfish reasons.

According to Soyinka (2008, qtd. in Dayo 2008), college fraternity has become a norm all over the world as it provides avenues for college old mates to meet and fraternize even past presidents of the United Nations and other world leaders belong to one college fraternity or the other. Judging from the Nigerian experience based on the activities of these cult groups, one could be tempted to say to fraternize is evil. The reason for this is still based on trust which is almost not in existence because these cult groups are formed along ethnic lines. All these have aftermath effects on the public service because a Permanent Secretary who is oriented towards the philosophy of a particular cult group would do everything possible within his reach to frustrate the efforts a Director of Personnel who is oriented towards the philosophies of another even while doing the public business.

Administrative corruption has remained rooted in the Nigerian public service because almost every public servant tends to pursue and defend self or ethnic interest before the public interest that ought to come first. It is for this reason I had stated earlier above that the Nigerian public service is the most marginalized of the Nigerian state because nearly all public servants see it as an *alien or secondary* object. It is on this note I would state again that the Nigerian public service is seriously in need of trust. Trust will help in winning the confidence of the people.

4.1.2. New Public Management Reform Ideas

New public administration was born in late 1960's and 1970's. As field or profession goes, public administration is young. Its early impetus was very much connected with civil service reform, the city manager movement, the "good government" movement, and the professionalization of the administrative apparatus of government. Three particular events or activities occurred between the mid- 1960 and 1970 that strongly marked the society and the government and hence public administration: the war in Vietnam, the urban riots and continued racial strife, and Watergate in the United States. (Frederickson 1980: 1–3.)

These crises and events resulted in new government programs and general ways of carrying out public administration affairs. The new public management idea is the packaging of old ideas in new vocabulary. The treads of the public administration fabric are well known. Herbert Kaufman describes them simply as the pursuit of these basic Values: representativeness, politically neutral competence, and executive leadership. (Frederickson 1980: 3–5.)

Peters (2001) has helped in putting forward some framed new public management reform ideas, which are the participatory state, market model, flexible government and deregulated state. But e–governance has been making its own rounds in some other quarters. All these and their relationship with other ideas I shall be evaluating next and how they could increase *trust* in the Nigerian state and its public service.

▪ **Market Model**: Market model believes that the assumptions of private sector model are the best way of managing the public sector. However, the market model has received its own criticisms from some scholars who believed the assumptions have not been able to meet with the expectations of its advocates in some instances it has been applied. King and LeGrand have argued that there is no single market model, rather than the fundamental belief in the virtues of competition and an idealised pattern of exchange and incentives. (Peters 2001: 22–25.)

It is no doubt that market model is mostly associated with governments of the political right; it has also been a feature of more leftist government that have followed them like Tony Blair and Bill Clinton. The most salient pedigree of market approach is premised on the belief that a market mechanism is most efficient for the allocation of societal resources. Another intellectual pedigree of market model is premised on the analysis of the failings of conventional bureaucracies by scholars like Niskanen because of the maximising behaviour of public bureaucrats. Therefore market model is relevant because it will create competition and autonomy for agencies within the public sector. (Peters 2001: 26–30.)

Another strong intellectual pedigree of market model is premised on the generic management and New Public Management (NMP) put forward by Pollit, Hood and Massey. The ideological limit here is that management is management irrespective of where it is being carried out, either in the private or public sector. Through the utilisation of techniques and motivational devices from the private sector, which some advocates of new public management like Gore argues that good manager can produce better government for less money and better serve the public interest. The central aim is to bring from the private sector some relevant management techniques like strategic planning, Management by Objective (MBO) and Total Quality Management (TQM) to the public sector. As it has been argued above in the words of Frederickson, that new public management is the packaging of some classical administrative ideas in new vocabulary. (Peters 2001: 31–32.)

As it has been argued by Campbell and Peters that ideological shift to managerialism is an ideological replay of *politics–administration dichotomy*. The complexity of government organisations is responsible for its inefficiency and ineffectiveness but if rationally sized (decentralised) would make it respond adequately to the needs from the environment. Here, the scheme of differential rewards is necessary that shall depend on government capacity to measure the performance of organisations and employees in order to increase motivation and audit simplification. (Simon 1997: 1; Peters 2001: 33–46.)

The need for the career public servants to become involved in the public policy process would be enhanced. Simon state, in his decision making approach, that a general theory of administration must include principle of organisations that will insure correct decision making, just as it must include principles that will insure effective action, where who carries out the physical task of organisation becomes relevant. All these become necessary for the sake of the public interest that is the primary target of public business. Therefore, the taxpayer becomes better served by government acting in more businesslike approach. (Simon 1997: 1; Peters 2001: 33–46.)

The philosophies that guide the market approach are no doubt to make public sector more result oriented. According to Clinton (1993, qtd. in Gore 1993: 557): *"we spent too much money for programs that do not work; it is time to make our government work for the people, learn to do more with less, and treat taxpayers like customers."* However, ways market model ideas can increase trust in the Nigerian public sector I shall argue as this paper progresses.

▪ **Participatory State Model:** New public management commitment to responsiveness and social equity implies participation. The participatory state model emphasises the need for democratic and collective mechanisms to be key features in governance by understanding what the public wants and finding ways toward fulfilling them. Like the market model, the participatory model believes conventional bureaucracies are obstacles to the realisation of the tenets of good governance and management. (Frederickson 1980: 12; Simon 1997: 1–2; Peters 2001: 50–51.)

While monopoly appears to be the major issue addressed by the market model, hierarchy is the evil most directly addressed by the participatory model. It is obvious that the real physical task of executing an organisation's objectives falls to the persons at lowest level of the administrative hierarchy. Therefore an all inclusive approach is paramount in the decision making process. A great deal of energy and talent lies wasted at the lower echelons of hierarchies, workers and clients closest to the actual production of goods and services in the public sector have a better understanding of how they work. (Frederickson 1980: 12; Simon 1997: 1–2: Peters 2001: 50–51.)

The participatory model advocates the need for increased participation, which should be structured in way to include the *mass public* and the individuals directly benefiting from a policy. It is no doubt that workers would be more productive if they are more *empowered and involved* in the organisational decision making process. Total Quality Management (TQM) as a participatory idea is to inculcate in the employees the concept that the quality of their product is their primary consideration. The participatory model in addition, reinforces the sense of collective identity within the public service that has been threatened by more individualistic method of evaluation and reward put forward by market approach. (Lipsky 1980: 414; Peters 2001: 52–57.)

Street–Level Bureaucracy as a strand of the participatory model helps the workers to identify with clients even to the provision of services they might not formally be entitled and this in turn helps to bring in clients to participate in the administrative system. And it is in this context street–level bureaucrats are called public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their job, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their job. (Lipsky 1980: 414; Peters 2001: 52–57.)

The participatory model of governing is also committed to managing the participation of citizens and the relationship between state and society. Decision making is not exclusive preservation of the political elites because isolating important decisions from public involvement will generate policy errors and opening up the system to information and argument from variety of interested parties would help in minimizing errors. Therefore, there is a need to involve a wider range of the populace in the shaping of issues, in the formulation of responses, and perhaps also in the implementation of programs after they have been adopted. (Peters 2001: 58–60.)

The participatory model has received criticisms from some quarters because involving the general public in some complex policies like nuclear program would cause another form of red tape and based on this fact the participatory model should be seen as means to an end. However, the relevance of inculcating communitarian values and greater

public involvement can not be overemphasised even as relative control is necessary in order to create a uniform sense of adherence and focus. (Peters 2001: 61–64.)

No theory can be concluded to be free from theoretical complications, the participatory state model is not in many ways exempted but the ways in which the ideals of the participatory model can increase trust in the Nigerian state and its public service in particular I shall be looking at as this paper progresses.

▪ **The Flexible Government Model:** The flexible government model emphasises the need for government and its agencies to make appropriate policy responses to environmental changes rather than just responding in their habitual ways to what are inherently novel changes. The permanence of government, both for individual and public organisations is generally regarded as inimical to growth. At a more basic level a flexible government is simply one that is capable of responding effectively to new challenges and of surviving in the face of changes. Further adaptations may include structural changes and as well as substantive policy choices, if the dream of governments having flexible reactions to changing circumstances is to be realized. (Peters 2001: 77.)

The flexible government model is a derivative of liberal philosophies. Here, public policies become less rigid; the benefit for all is put into consideration. Rules and regulations tend to checkmate the excesses from ever changing global polity towards guiding the national interest to a position it would remain more committed to the public interest. The flexible government model like every other model has its relative weaknesses. On the possible ways this model can increase trust in the Nigerian public service I shall put forward as progress is being made.

▪ **Deregulating Government Model:** Deregulating government model emphasises the need for the reduction of formalised rules and regulations and the elimination of rules that will cause red tape to public service functions. Therefore, the public service workers would be less controlled in carrying out the public business. *Administrative discretion* becomes a relevant tool for the public service worker in the day to day

dealings. What is then created is a kind of vertical specialisation which is the sharing of decision making between low and high level personnel.

According to Simon (1997: 8), vertical specialisation permits greater expertise in the making of decisions because when the responsibility of a decision requiring a particular skill is allocated to a person with that skill better results are arrived at. Simon (1997: 9) further argues that the discretion of subordinate personnel is highly limited by policies determined by top administrative hierarchy and conventionally set rules and regulations in dealing appropriately with technically matters.

In many ways deregulation appears even more appropriate for developing regimes based on the fact that they have been strictly regulated. Riggs has argued that in less developed political system rigidity and formalism existed side by side with high levels of variability and individualism. The formal rules of bureaucracy have been well institutionalised and have been central to governing on one side and on the other; those rules often were hijacked to benefit favoured political groups. Therefore, given the rigidity that are most time attributed to bureaucracies in many of the less developed nations, the strategy of deregulation might be considered a natural approach to reform. (Peters 2001: 174–175.)

Deregulating state model also like other models of reforms has its own short comings. Peters (2001: 175–176), argues if formalised rules of conduct are removed, there is little for the civil servant to rely on as guidance in making decision, that is to say therefore, less developed system may require more rules if they are to meet the goals of good government. However, possible ways this model can increase trust in the Nigerian public service would be examined further as progress is being made in this research.

▪ **E–Governance Model:** E–Governance model of reform is quite a new approach to reforming the public sector. This model emphasises the adoption information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the management of public service to make it more functional by increasing growth and reducing unnecessary delay (red tape). The terms e-government and e-governance are often used interchangeably in discussions and

analyses of how governments are relating with the citizenry through the applications of ICTs to fulfil their duties as governing bodies and to better serve the public (Riley 2003: 3). Riley (2003: 3) further argues that e-government can be a more productive version of government in general, if it is well implemented and managed while e-governance can evolve into participatory governance if it is well supported with the appropriate principles and objectives.

With the introduction of this model, governments can query, inform, and transact with the public over electronic networks. Governments have been able to take advantage of increased awareness of public usage of the internet to interact. Many programs that involved information outreach were experiencing cost escalation as publishing, printing, and distribution costs continued to rise. Instead of cutting such efforts entirely during the period of down-sizing, the "webification solution" allowed documents to be posted on the World Wide Web with savings of as much as 75% of former costs. This is the part of governance that refers to interaction between public servants and the citizenry and interest groups, based on this whole idea, the masses now have the potential to participate in general administration and rule making especially in the United States. (Riley 2003: 19–24.)

Although it could be started that e–governance is related in many ways to be a tenet of the participatory state model, but it is more useful when analysed separately because of its contemporary outlook nature. This concept has been subjected to rational criticisms because of some complexities surrounding its usage, but how this concept can increase trust in the Nigerian public service I shall also be looking at as progress is being made in the research.

4.1.3. New Public Management Reform Ideas and Trust

As I had stated in my introductory chapter that New Public Reform Ideas can increase trust in the Nigerian state and its public service in particular. This present chapter is titled solving the problem of the marginalised which, the public service is a major victim. Although this research focuses primarily on the Nigerian public service, my

argument has taking a holistic approach by looking at complexities of the Nigerian state, this has been so because one can not address issues in the public sector without references to the latter. It must not be forgotten that the public service is part of the political *superstructure*. Even Karl Max in his economic theory strongly linked the Bases (Mode of Production (MP) + Relations of Production (RP)) to the Superstructure (Wagbafor 2003).

Participatory state model as regards to trust increase is a good starting point. The problem with the Nigerian state and its public service is the *loss of trust* from the part of a large majority of its citizenry on the entire state structures. This has led to *I do not care* (loosed attitude) and the self and ethnic seeking Nigerian attitude that have led to the increase of administrative corruption in the public service. Because of these reasons, the public interest comes secondary. According to Peters (2001: 71): *"the participatory state model assumes that the public interest is served by encouraging employees, clients, and citizens to claim the maximum involvement possible in policy and management."*

It is no doubt therefore to state that the participatory state model can increase social capital which in turn increases trust in a system. The tenets of the participatory state model would help in *bridging the societal gap* between people that has resulted from the diverse nature of the Nigerian state. The participatory state model is a strong panacea to the problem of loss of trust because of its democratic and collective ideals that can help in solving the problem of marginalised.

Apart from loss of trust, other causes of administrative corruption in the Nigerian public service are elitism, rigid centralisation, patron–client relationship and the kinship and extended family nature, which effects have worsened because of some tenets of conventional bureaucracies. The participatory state model can help in breaking the strong hold of the elites in the Nigerian public sector by shaping it to be an all inclusive affair. Therefore, marginalised voices could be held and their complaints taken note of, in order to make them feel belong to the system and by so doing their trust could be won over.

If every public servant is allowed to participate in decisions that affect their various duties the rigid centralisation and the idea of monopolising public offices as family business problems would be a thing of the past. Trust would no doubt increase if the average public worker is more empowered and involved to the extent of even becoming street–level–bureaucrats. As street–level–bureaucrats public servants will have more opportunities to interact and meet with clients (populace) face to face and thereby making them to become part of the governance processes. By so doing, the public interest will form the *building block* of governance, the already established notion of seeing the Nigerian state and its public service as alien would become a thing of the past.

As already argued the participatory state model is a means to an end. For the Nigerian state and its public service is a means to multiple ends. The participatory state model could lead to *referendum* that will help in finding a lasting solution to the problem of diversity. Here, different ethnic groups (majority and minority) would be asked to make known their grievances and wants. With this even the Niger Delta Crisis that has taken a worrisome dimension could be addressed. If this genuine feeling of *belongingness* is achieved, the general populace would see the Nigerian state as there own, patriotism and commitment would increase because of the *renewed trust* towards the state. Public workers on their part will give their best to the public interest; government work will no longer be put on the shoulder because the principle of Total Quality Management (TQM) shall renew the spirit of commitment and a better public service that will serve the people better.

Market model is another panacea to the problem of loss trust in the Nigerian state and its public service. As it has been argued, another factor that causes corruption in the Nigerian public service is the human resources question. The market approach can help in solving this problem and also increase trust. The market model can help the Nigerian public service to be more result oriented through the downsizing of government establishments. At present the structures of the Nigerian public service is so big for effective administrative control, and this has led to the problem of *ghost workers*. It has been complained in recent times that the Nigerian public service has a lot of names on

its pay role who are not active workers; the salaries paid to this type of workers are collected and shared among senior public staffs.

Market mechanisms would further make the public service to be more attractive for qualified young graduates who can use there various ideas in transforming the public sector. At present the minimum wage of Nigerian public service is 7,500 naira (about $50 U.S) per month. For this reason young qualified experts tend to look at the private sector for a career, thereby leaving the public service to be run by *political sycophants and touts*. It could otherwise, be argued that downsizing of the public could lead to the reduction of trust based on the premise of who and who is going to be remove. There is truth in the adage that says a living rat is better than a dead lion.

It is better to have an active public service that is innovative and can help government in meeting the task of good governance that can positively effect the entire citizenry than to have a passive public service that is like an open market place that can not inform any positive changes in government policies that can also affect the people well. Downsizing of the public service must be done with all sense of rationality and professionalism by not been biased in putting ethnic sentiments into play. Affected staffs must be given the right compensation and advice that can help them in establishing themselves in other spheres of life.

It is no doubt that conventional bureaucracies have increased the issue of redundancy in the Nigerian public service because of the red tape they cause in preparation of staff deserved benefits after retirement or death. Most pubic workers under this categories deserved benefits are sat upon by senior public workers and in most cases not paid. The serving low level public servants trust in the system is further reduced because of this act and by so doing attach a loosed attitude to work.

The utilisation of techniques and motivational devices like Management by Objective (MBO) and Total Quality Management (TQM) from the private sector would no doubt increase trust in the Nigerian public service because public workers would have all the necessary incentives to perform based on the theory of differential rewards they tend to

get through result outcomes. Market mechanisms will further increase trust in the Nigerian public service based on the spirit of competition and autonomy they tend to inform. If different averagely sized government establishments are given liberal autonomy to provide same public services, there is no doubt competition would increase. This competition will inform efficiency and effectiveness in public service delivery.

 Market model is a means to an end like the participatory state model. The Nigerian public service is backward because of its productive capacity. The average civil servant will give all his best to public business and shun unethical practices (corruption) if his take home salary can comfortably take care of his basic needs. Trust in the public service and the Nigerian state at large would increase from the side of populace if public service delivery targets the public interest as its first goal and public choices are increased. Although the dynamics of the market model have it short comings but still they remain an optional tool in reforming the already decaying Nigerian public sector.

The flexible government model like other new public management reform ideas can increase trust in the Nigerian state and its public service in particular. One of the problems with the Nigerian public service is that primordial values tend to override formal principles. The *self seeking* nature of the Nigerian political elite and their Uncle Toms (yes men) in top positions in the public sector creates rigidity in the system of things.

The assumptions of the flexible government can help in directing public policies to the ever changing environment in other to remain positioned in serving the public interest rather than a secular interest that wants the *status quo* to remain for selfish interest reasons. The flexible government model informs the need to always focus on reform, and this act increases public trust because the populace and the public servants would always have this believe that government is poised to meeting with their dreams for a better society, and thereby identifying with the systems goals and aspirations.

The Deregulating state model is another new public management idea that can increase trust in the Nigerian public service. Another major problem with the Nigerian public

service is this element of *order from above* phenomenon; by this I mean rigid rules and regulations from the all powerful centre to oil the patron–client network in the public sector. The average Nigerian public servant especially the low level ones can not act on their own initiative when carrying out public business. This phenomenon has led almost all workers in the public sector to be "yes men" because the limits they are expected to go have been spelt out for them.

The deregulating state model of reforming the public sector would help to increase public trust in the civil service through the reduction of rules and regulations that hinder goals of public service to be first directed towards public interest. This model shall further increase trust in the public service by allowing public servants both top and low levels personnel to apply their own discretion in some matters that affect their duties thereby, making them to feel relevant in the system of things and also identify with all sincerity with the system.

For the e–governance model and trust increase in the public service little argument is necessary for now. The Nigerian state in its entirety is still backward in terms of technological know how. For the adoption of information and communication technologies (ICTs) to properly function in government–citizen's relationship, the structure must be well arranged to suit that purpose. For the Nigerian state and its public service in particular in terms of structural arrangement, is very weak in realizing the goals of e–governance model.

In relation to the restructuring and the increase of trust in the Nigerian public service, the starting point is the rational adaptation of the tenets of participatory state model, followed by that of the deregulating state and flexible government model before market model. E–governance model will then be useful as complimentary elements especially in the area of reducing cost and red tape.

4.1.4. Challenges of New Public Management Reform Ideas

It is no doubt that new public management reform ideas have its setback and challenges based on fact that reforms are product of time and circumstances which could further be influenced by unpredictable global trends. For example according to Peters argument above, the market model has received criticisms from some scholars who believed the assumptions have not been able to meet with the expectations of its advocates in some instances it has been applied.

The participatory model has received criticisms from some quarters because involving the general public in some complex policies like nuclear program would cause another form of red tape. Peters further argues, if formalised rules of conduct are removed, there is little for the civil servant to rely on as guidance in making decision, that is to say therefore, less developed system may require more rules if they are to meet the goals of good government. It has also been argued that downsizing could lead to unemployment thereby adding to social tension.

Reforms as it has been stated are means to ends. The Nigerian state has its own cultural dynamics that differ from other country. That is why this research has focused on the cultural aspects of public management reform. The results of reform utilisation must differ from one culture to another. In this research the Nigerian picture has been taking into context that led to the adoption of this perspective of analysis.

The present global financial crisis is big blow to market approach if I must confess. This has led to government in most countries, from America to Europe and Asia to Africa to search for optional bail out plan for the financial sector. A mockery of *capitalism in crisis* may have been the gist in some quarters especially for those that prefer the lefty approach. First I must state that capitalism is a more adventurous economic approach that goes extra length in the creation of wealth and in this attempt could encounter some complications like the present one, if the market approach was a complete rubbish China with its kind of political orientation (Communism) would not have been playing its present role as a Bridger through her bailout grants. However, this does not signify

the end of capitalism, for capitalism shall surely rise stronger. At this juncture reform becomes a relevant tool.

The situation on ground could be likened to that of Great Depression and the effects are spreading beyond the financial sector to other sectors. The financial system is the engine room of the economy. The present financial crisis had its origin from other traditional factors that have led to previous banking crises in the United States and other nations. Also some non–traditional features that are similar to this one. Some traditional causes are: a boom era of big credit growth, sustained rise in prices of asset and explosive lending to non creditworthy economic agents. However, among the novel features are: the development of the originate–and–distributive model of transferring risk, a high appetite for yield that nurtured a growing demand for high risk assets, Ex–ante ignorance and ex–post uncertainty on the risk features of mortgage–based securities, related derivatives and credit–defaults swaps, inadequate corporate governance and management incentives in financial institution. (Gurria 2008.)

We must learn from these flaws. OECD is a right forum to exchange ideas on these issues and to propose and put forward new approaches to these challenges. We need to start thinking of what longer solution might look like, and the OECD committee will play a strong role in this respect. The starting point will be to review the primary regulatory and market failures that have emerged from this crisis. The present financial crises has cast a shadow over the global economy, it must also be ascertain that some positive development should be noted. Beneath the dark clouds of this financial crisis, global current account imbalances have been decreasing; global FDI inflows reached a record of 1.8 trillion dollars in 2007, oil and food prices have started to come down and emerging economies while slowing are still are showing remarkable stability and resilience. (Gurria 2008.)

To act more positively to this type of challenges in a more plural and complex global economy, we shall keep advancing steadily in our enlargement and enhanced engagement processes, because we are becoming more inclusive and global. Helping decision makers like you, to design, promote and implement better reforms shall be our

priority. The risk of postponing economic reform is one primary lesson learned from this financial crisis. *The complications of approving a bailout plan revealed the importance of building a stakeholder support for crucial reforms.* Your (Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly) ideas broaden our perspective and experience as policy brokers, decision makers from diverse backgrounds, exemplify both a highly appreciated input and a great opportunity to understand and build together the stable, sustainable and inclusive global economy our children deserve. (Gurria 2008.)

5. CONCLUSION

Culture, corruption and public management reform ideas affect one another in relative ways, depending on the context. Culture can no doubt affect corruption but it is wrong to conclude that corruption is part of developing countries culture. Culture also can affect public management reform ideas while public management reform ideas can also affect culture. It has been stated in this research that corruption is universal and causes differ from one country to another. For the Nigerian case the loss of trust is the main cause of administrative corruption in the public service. This new public management reform ideas especially that of the participatory state model can be a panacea.

It has been argued that the complexity of the Nigerian state is major cause of administrative corruption in its public service. In the words of Putnam (2000, qtd. in Bunting 2007), the higher the diversity in a neighbourhood, the lower the levels of trust, political participation and happiness between and within the ethnic groups but, diversity is a social construct that can be deconstructed and reconstructed Putnam, further argues, that you can erase an old line and replace it with new line that will be more encompassing in terms of identity through the removal of the *old we* and replacing with the *new we*.

For the Nigerian state to move to the next level, the reconstruction of a new identity is important. An identity that will be all inclusive, where different ethnic and religious group shall see the task of building a *new Nigeria* as their first priority. The need to build trust among people of diverse backgrounds and orientation can not be over emphasised. The ability of a people to win the trust of foreigners increases foreign investment and initiative, which thereby increases socio–economic development.

It is no doubt the Nigerian state is corrupt and administrative corruption is strongly rooted in every fabric of the Nigerian public service. The question now is that shall we continue in sin that grace continue to abound? The religious preachers will say God forbid. The way forward for the Nigerian state is a strong ideological re–orientation for every of her citizen. Personality is a product of environment. Using my self as an

example I must sincerely confess that it took me five months to get *delobomized* (loosed) from the Nigerian mentality through the influence of the Finnish state arrangement. The need to make every Nigerian feel relevant in the system of things is a major weapon to curbing corruption from the system. Citizens must be encouraged to identify with the ideals of the state and through this, the general attitude of seeing the state as an alien would be corrected and true development can start gaining grounds. According to Todaro (1985: 85, qtd. in Imhanlahimhin 2000: 10–11):

> *"Development must, therefore, be conceived of as a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes, and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and the eradication of absolute poverty. Development , in its essence, must represent the whole gamut of changes by which an entire social system, turned to the diverse basic needs and desires of individuals and social groups within that system, moves away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory and toward a situation or condition of life regarded as materially and spiritually better."*

In making further progress, focusing on cooptation as a mechanism is relevant. In attempting a definition, cooptation is the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to stability or existence. The element of cooptation tells us something about the process by which an institutional environment impinges itself upon organisation or a nation and effects changes in its leadership, structure, or policy. Cooptation could be formal or informal. It is formal when it involves openly declared and formally ordered relationships. (Selznick 1949: 155.)

When the authenticity of the authority of a governing agency is called into question, it therefore becomes relevant for every individual and group or organisation which attempts to exercise control, must also attempt to win the consent of the governed. Thus any given act of formal cooptation will tend to fulfil both the political function of defending legitimacy and the administrative function of establishing credible channels of communication and direction. Cooptation is informal when attention is given to pressure of specific centres of power within the community. This is not necessarily a case of the sense of legitimacy or of general and diffuse lack of confidence because legitimacy and confidence may be well instituted with relation to general public, but organised forces (like the Niger Delta militia groups in Nigeria) which are able to

threaten the formal authority may effectively shape its structure and policy. (Selznick 1949: 156–157.)

These external elements could be brought into leadership structure based on the resources they posses, this is because *cooptation signifies a state of tension between formal authority and social power*. The character of the co-opted elements will gradually define the action available to the group which has won adaptation at the price of commitment to outside elements because the tendency for participation to become equal to involvement is rational in all sense. (Selznick 1949: 156–157.)

The Nigerian public service is part and parcel of the Nigerian state and different values and orientations in the Nigeria state affects one way or the other the activities of public service. Rigid centralisation, the elite element and patron–clientele among some other factors aid and abet administrative corruption in the public service. In order to bring trust to the entire system, new public management reform ideas have a role to play. Trust is most necessary at this time in order for the foundation of a new Nigeria to be built. The Nigerian public service has been affected from different class struggle mostly originating from centre of general administration. This persistence hold is as a result of the diverse nature of the Nigeria state because different ethnic groups try to hold on to state power any time they are opportune to, because of the fear or if we let go it may never return. Therefore the state is seen as means of raising private capital and living for a particular group or class at time to the detriment of the rest.

The new public management reform idea of the participatory state model can help in the general restructuring of the Nigerian state and her public because the good of the Nigerian state will automatically affect the public service in many positive ways. The participatory state model can help in framing the most important new identity. This can happen by means of making every Nigerian to feel relevant in the system of things and can be realised by making the principles of true democracy to gain root, so that election results will represent the true wish of the people.

At the time different ethnic nationalities and interests are co-opted formally or informally to the general system of administration social capital will increase because people could then relate more with one another *irrespective of ethnic or ideological differences*. By this position trust among people of different background will increase, the state will no longer be seen as an alien because people would like to identify with the goals and aspirations of the state. This new found identity will increase trust in the public service because public servants seeing themselves as engine room to drive the goals of the state will position themselves in serving the public interest before any other.

Unethical practices (administrative corruption) would be forced to give way to hard work and results attainment. The market model reform ideas can now set to consolidate on the new found identity by making the public service more market driven. Flexible government model, deregulating state model and e governance reform ideas can also increase trust in the public service by inculcating more rational policies, removal of primordial system of administration and increasing the level of knowledge intensive orientations among public servants to be able to meet with the challenges from ever changing external environment. At the time (NPM) is able to change the former ways of doing things in the Nigerian public service, is then right to say cultural aspects of public management reform.

5.1. Limitations and Recommendations

One most important limitation to new public management reform ideas increasing trust in the Nigerian state and its public service is the ever increasing *political greed* among the different elite groups. Irrespective of the improvement in government revenues in recent years, corruption and mismanagement remain a major cause of Nigeria's failure to make meaningful progress in improving the lot of ordinary Nigerians. These financial factors are closely linked with the rampant political violence in Nigeria. Not all aspirants to political office in Nigeria can raise on their own the substantial resources usually necessary to compete in the country's violent and corrupt political system

especially if they do not enjoy control over public resources to begin with. (Human Right Watch 2008.)

As a result, in many parts of Nigeria, successful candidates are often those who are "sponsored" by wealthy and powerful individuals known in Nigerian parlance as political godfathers. These godfathers are not mere financiers of political campaigns. Rather they are individuals whose power stems not just from wealth but from their ability to deploy violence and corruption to manipulate national, state or local political systems in support of the politicians they sponsor. In return, they demand a substantial degree of control over the governments they help bring into being not in order to shape government policy, but to exact direct financial "returns" in the form of government resources stolen by their protégés or lucrative government contracts awarded to them as further opportunities for graft. (Human Right Watch 2008.)

Godfathers also require their sponsored politicians to use government institutions to generate patronage for other protégés. Former Oyo State governor Victor Olunloyo put the relationship between politicians and their "godfathers" this way: Money flows up and down, political aspirants during the election period, want the patronage of the puppeteer. Afterwards money will flow in the opposite direction back from the puppet to the puppeteer. (Human Right Watch 2008.)

The extent of poverty in Nigeria is disturbingly very high, especially with respect to the lower 40 percent of the population who suffer the vicissitudes of inequitable distribution of national wealth or income. This to a very great extent limits the possible transformation new public management reform idea can offer. In Nigeria, in spite of the chunk given to education in the national budget, yet the literacy level remains significantly low. (Imhanlahimhin 2000: 34–38.)

Poverty and illiteracy are no doubt two very strong limitations to the perfect realization of new public management reform ideas in Nigeria. As the popular say goes, "a hungry man is an angry man" and a man under this condition might not have any reason to trust

and be trusted. The same goes for an illiterate man who either can read or write. The ability to understand the dynamics of (NPM) is limited.

I hereby, recommend for further researches on how to *reduce the gloomy attractions at the centre.* Possible legislations and reforms should be encouraged by both arms of the Nigerian legislature (Senate and the House of Representatives) on how to evolve true federalism so that the different components that make of the Nigerian state could see the need on looking inward to bringing out there diverse potentials.

Unnecessary incentives attached to public offices like the annually changing of official vehicles and apartment renovations should be reduce to its lowest and making it more service delivery avenues, so that it would become less attractive for public *gain seekers* that seek after public positions as *a do or die affair.* In addition allocations to education by all the three tiers government should increased drastically in order to encourage a more enlightened society that would be reform welcoming.

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