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PRACA DOKTORSKA

A Cognitive Study of Insults

(Kognitywne studium obelg)

dr hab. Bogusław Bierwiaczonek, prof. AJD w
Częstochowie

Sosnowiec, 2015

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0. Introduction

The Oxford English Dictionary defines insults as “act[s], or the action[s], of insulting; injuriously contemptuous speech or action” (Onions, 1965: 1020). According to Webster’s English Dictionary an insult is “a gross indignity offered to another either by word or act; an act of speech of insolence or contempt” (Gove, 1981: 1173). The aim of this thesis is a cognitive analysis of insults in connection with the issues of linguistic impoliteness, swearing and taboo language. These problems have, until very recently, been neglected in the mainstream course of linguistic analysis. Contemporary semantic theories have often disregarded the study of offensive or impolite language as a legitimate field of linguistic analysis and this issue has been conspicuously underrepresented in the majority of academic textbooks (cf. Kempson, 1977; Cruse, 1991; Lyons, 1996; Cann et al., 2009). Jay (2000: 10) claims that the problem lies in the nature of the topic; offensive speech and taboo language constitute a significant taboo in the present culture and linguistic attempts at addressing these issues have themselves been subject to a certain academic taboo. In the area of pragmatic studies Bousfield (2008: 2) points to the conceptual bias which has favoured comprehensive studies of linguistic politeness over the phenomenon of linguistic impoliteness (cf. Leech, 1983, Levinson, 1985; Brown and Levinson, 1987). However, as noted in by Bousfield (2008: 1) conflictive talk serves important purposes and is common in certain types of discourse. Similarly, offensive speech is a phenomenon of great ubiquity. As Crystal (1987: 60) points out:

The subject [of offensive speech] ranges from subtle forms of intellectual sarcasm and humour to the crudest possible attacks on a person’s courage, sexual prowess, or relatives. At one level, attacks may be subtle and indirect, involving allusion and figurative speech; at another there may be explicit taunts, boasts, name calling and jokes at the other’s expense.

It appears, therefore, that comprehensive account of semantic and pragmatic phenomena must include the issues of offensive language, emotional speech and linguistic impoliteness. Fortunately, in recent years there has been considerable progress in this field (Culpeper, 1996, 2005; Jay, 1992, 2000; Culpeper et al., 2003; Wajnryb, 2005; Allan and Burridge, 2006; Bousfield, 2008; Bousfield and Locher, 2008; Pinker, 2008))

The purpose of this thesis is to apply the precepts and analytical tools of cognitive linguistics to a comprehensive analysis of insults. The analysis will be based on a corpus of English film scenes showing different real-life conflictive situations and involving different types of verbal aggression. For a comprehensive view of the problem, the corpus data will be considered from four different theoretical perspectives: the theory of Idealised Cognitive Models (ICMs) as proposed by Lakoff (1987), the theory of speech acts as put forward by Searle [1977 (1969)] and refined from the cognitive perspective by Kalisz (1993; 1994a), Kalisz and Kubiński (1993) and Sokołowska (2001a), Langacker's (1990) conception of network models, and the cognitive theory of force dynamics as presented by Talmy (1988). These four different cognitive linguistics perspectives are aimed at providing a complementary and comprehensive account of the phenomenon of insults and to validate the feasibility of the cognitive paradigm for the study of offensive speech and verbal aggression. In order to achieve these aims, the present work is divided into six consecutive chapters with chapters 1 – 4 providing a theoretical background for the practical corpus analysis of insults in chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides conclusions emerging from the analysis of insults in chapter 5 and suggests a number of fields for further research concerning the issues of impoliteness, swearing and verbal aggression.

Chapter 1 outlines, in the most general way, some core precepts of autonomous linguistics. Section 1.1 refers to Ferdinand de Saussure and Noam Chomsky, whose works have been foundational for many strands of analysis in contemporary linguistics. The common denominator of these two approaches consists of the fact that they treat language as an autonomous formal system which should be investigated irrespective of other human capacities. These foundational assumptions have wielded a significant influence on the mode of semantic description. Section 1.2 addresses the problem of the traditional approach to semantics whereby the study of meaning has been attempted within the framework of the autonomous paradigm. This kind of analysis has considered sentential meaning to be subject to truth-value assessment and lexical meaning to be analysable in terms of componential analysis. As shown in section 1.3., this kind of approach falls within the scope of the objectivist paradigm, wherein concepts are held to be definable in terms of their essential features which put

them inside the scope of a given category. Thus, linguistic and conceptual categories have been claimed to possess clearly defined, rigid and non-fuzzy boundaries. In line with these assumptions the membership of a given concept into a category is sanctioned by whether or not the category possesses the necessary and sufficient features for the category. Hence, the objectivist paradigm has licensed the mode of lexical description involving the componential analysis of binary primitive features. However, section 1.3 mentions also the inadequacies of this type of lexical analysis. It is claimed that linguistic analysis based on the objectivist paradigm poses certain significant difficulties for its application in the study of actual real-life concepts. There is, therefore, a need for a different paradigm of linguistic analysis, one which would also provide a plausible explanation of the problem of insults.

Chapter 2 presents an alternative to autonomous linguistics, namely the cognitive approach. The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the main precepts of cognitive linguistics and present the theoretical tools applied in the practical part of the present work. This chapter constitutes, therefore, the theoretical framework for the forthcoming analysis of verbal aggression. Section 2.1 presents some key guiding assumptions in the cognitive perspective to language. Cognitive linguistics is shown as a part of a broader functionalist tradition, which holds that language is best explained in terms of the functions it performs in relation to real-life communication. In cognitive linguistics language is perceived not as an autonomous human faculty, but as a part of human cognitive system. Cognitive linguistics holds that language is a particular manifestation of the same cognitive processes which are applied for the non-linguistic purposes of perception, categorization, mental imagery and reasoning. The study of language must, therefore, account for the whole spectrum of environmental, biological, psychological, developmental, historical and socio-cultural factors and cannot be separated from the broad context of language usage. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the cognitive approach to the study of meaning. In accordance with the main precepts of cognitive linguistics, the cognitive approach to semantics focuses on the function of linguistic expressions and the array of linguistic and non-linguistic factors involved in the processes of meaning construction and communication. In cognitive linguistics lexical

concepts are analysed in terms conceptual structures such as frames, domains, ICMs and network models. Contrary to the view of categories licensed by the objectivist ontology, the mode of meaning description based on these conceptual structures reveals categories as scalar phenomena; linguistic and conceptual categories appear to encompass both prototypical and non-prototypical members, and they can often be plausibly aligned on the scale of graded membership for a given category. Section 2.2 is concluded with a brief account of the cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy, which is a fruitful field of analysis within the cognitive paradigm.

An example of the practical application of the cognitive approach to semantics is presented in section 2.3, wherein Lakoff's (1987) model of anger is discussed. Lakoff presents the idealised cognitive model which reflects the understanding of the concept *anger* in the American culture. Lakoff's ICM of anger encompasses different metaphoric and metonymic mappings, as well as the prototypical scenario of anger. Apart from the prototypical scenario, he presents a number of non-prototypical scenarios of anger, which involve certain amount of divergence from the central prototypical model. The analysis of anger, as presented in Lakoff (1987), serves as the basis for the discussion of the prototypical model of verbal aggression attempted in chapter 5.

Section 2.4 discusses another methodological tool applied in the practical part of this dissertation in chapter 5, namely the theory of force dynamics as put forward by Talmy (1988). Talmy's approach constitutes a generalisation over the notions of linguistic causation. The theory of force dynamics explains causative relations through the force-dynamic interaction of two opposing elements, agonist and antagonist. Section 2.4. discusses different kinds of causative relations depicted by agonist - antagonist interaction and provides – after Talmy (1988) – different areas of cognitive research wherein the theory is applicable, e.g. psychological and sociological relations.

Chapter 3 focuses on some pragmatics aspects of linguistic insults. The discussion is centred around the issues of linguistic politeness and impoliteness and the theory of speech acts. Section 3.1. touches upon the problems of linguistic politeness and linguistic impoliteness. The discussion of linguistic impoliteness

provides a broad pragmatic perspective on the issue of swearing and verbal insults. Since, historically speaking, the studies of linguistic impoliteness constitute largely an extension of the study of linguistic politeness, it is necessary to look at two sides of the politeness-impoliteness coin (cf. Bax, 2012: 253-6). Section 3.1. discusses the most important approaches to linguistic politeness, as presented by Grice (1975), Leech (1983), Sperber and Wilson (1986), Brown and Levinson (1987), and the study of impoliteness conducted by Culpeper (1996) and Bousfield (2008). The discussion presents a continuous progression of politeness theories, including Brown and Levinson (1987), whose face-management theory has become the most significant approach to the contemporary studies of linguistic politeness. Brown and Levinson's account has been revised and reformulated by Culpeper (1996; 2005) and Bousfield (2008) for the analysis of linguistic impoliteness. In particular, Bousfield's (2008) approach is shown to be perhaps the most comprehensive study of impoliteness up to date and most of his observations prove to be confirmed by the corpus analysis in chapter 5.

In section 3.2 the phenomenon of verbal aggression is presented against the background of speech acts theory. The section discusses the theory of speech acts as it was formulated by Austin (1975 [1962]) and Searle (1977; 1981). Austin's initial take on the problem of speech acts constitutes an account of linguistic performatives, i.e. utterances that *do* things, as opposed to linguistic constatives, i.e. the utterances that *say* things. Austin's work is, however, subject to internal evolution wherein these two distinct classes of utterances are finally merged under the general theory of speech acts. Searle's version of the theory constitutes the traditional and widely accepted approach to the study of speech acts. His approach is particularly centred around the study of illocutionary acts. One of Searle's aims is to establish the felicity conditions of different speech acts. In Searle's view – much in accordance with the objectivist paradigm – such conditions are necessary and sufficient for a given category. This claim, however, has been challenged by cognitive linguistics. Section 3.2. discusses the cognitive view of the study of speech acts, wherein felicity conditions for a given speech act are considered to be prototypical rather than necessary and sufficient. Thus, individual speech acts may be presented in terms of radial models, as demonstrated by Kalisz and Kubiński (1993), Kalisz (1994a) and Sokołowska (2001b). Finally, section 3.2 discusses

Grzegorzczkova's (1991) account of the speech act of insults. In an attempt to differentiate insulting from other kinds of utterance acts, Grzegorzczkova proposes four felicity conditions for the speech act of insults. It is claimed that these conditions, in accordance with the cognitive theory of speech acts, may be plausibly considered as prototypical, rather than necessary and sufficient. Thus, Grzegorzczkova's prototypical conditions are analysed from the cognitive perspective in the corpus analysis of insults in chapter 5.

Chapter 4 discusses the phenomena of taboo, swearing and insulting from a broader neurological, psychological and socio-cultural perspective. Section 4.1 presents the issue of cultural and linguistic taboo and discusses the main sources of taboo expressions which different languages draw upon. Taboos are powerful. The penalty for transgressing them may vary from social disapproval to downright fatality. An expression which is employed in order not to refer to a taboo – or an otherwise dispreferred linguistic expression – in a non-threatening way is a euphemism. Section 4.2 touches on the problem of linguistic euphemisms, dysphemisms and orthophemisms. A number of examples are proposed and various ways of coining new euphemisms are presented after Burrige (2006a: 456-7). Linguistic dysphemisms, as linguistic expressions which are deliberately employed to be offensive, constitute raw material for the verbal activity of swearing (cursing) discussed in section 4.3. Swearing does not involve the communication of formal linguistic meaning, but is employed to express a wide range of emotions; it is a linguistic activity which typically involves breaking a certain linguistic taboo in order to let off steam, emphasize certain pieces of information or to assault an interactant with abusive language. In an actual cursing episode different functions – as described in section 4.3 – may be fulfilled simultaneously.

The discussion of swearing is further continued in section 4.4, wherein Jay's (2000) Neuro-Psycho-Social theory of speech is presented. Jay views cursing as a complex neuro-psycho-social phenomenon. His approach is an attempt to present a comprehensive and integral account of cursing. This is attempted by discussing different relevant neural, psychological and socio-cultural variables which either increase or decrease the likelihood of an individual's swearing. Jay (1992; 2000)

also presents a five-stage model of verbal aggression which accounts for the prototypical instances of abusive swearing. It is in the light of this model – adopted as the prototypical scenario of insults – that the corpus data is analysed in chapter 5.

Section 4.5. addresses the problem of insulting directly. In accordance with Brown and Levinson (1987), Grzegorzczkova (1991), Jay (1992; 2000), Allan and Burrige (2006), Bousfield (2008) verbal insults are defined as linguistic utterances wherein the speaker conducts a direct, explicit and unredressed attack at the face of an interactant by the use of negative, typically taboo language, as an act of retribution towards that interactant for a certain act of provocation on their part. Insults typically refer to certain categories of linguistic taboo. Section 4.5 presents the most common kinds of dysphemistic expressions employed in insulting. It is also noted that apart from assaulting an interactant with negative language, insults may serve other functions. Offensive speech may be used for emphatic purposes, or in order to signal a close interpersonal link between the speaker and another party(ies) (banter). Such functions of swearing are also discussed in chapter 5, wherein the practical analysis of insults is presented.

Chapter 5 presents a practical analysis of insults based on 130 film scenes taken from 39 full-feature English movies. This study draws on the theoretical concepts put forward in the preceding chapters for the aim of a comprehensive account of insults. Section 5.1 focuses on the analysis of insults in the light of ICM theory as proposed by Lakoff (1987). For the purposes of the present analysis I adopt Jay's (2000) five-stage model of verbal aggression as the prototypical scenario of insulting. Thus, Jay's model accounts for the prototypical instances of insults. Individual stages of Jay's model are discussed in relation to the prototypical cases of insults in the corpus data. In accordance with Lakoff, in section 5.2 I present a number of non-prototypical categories of verbal aggression, which involve certain variations on the prototypical model. Thus, sections 5.1 and 5.2 present different prototypical and non-prototypical categories of insults and reveal verbal aggression as a category encompassing prototypical and non-prototypical examples.

Section 5.3 provides the study of the data samples from a different perspective, involving the cognitive study of speech acts. The prototypical and non-prototypical categories of insults presented in section 5.1 and 5.2 are analysed in the light of Grzegorzczkova's (1991) conditions for the speech act of insulting. In accordance with the cognitive paradigm, these conditions are taken to be prototypical rather than necessary and sufficient. This kind of analysis allows for a representation of insults as a radial category involving non-central members – wherein one or more of Grzegorzczkova's conditions are violated – constructed around the central cases, where all of these conditions are fulfilled.

Section 5.4 presents insults in terms of a network model, which facilitates a comprehensive and inclusive view of the category of insults. Analysing offensive speech in terms of a conceptual network accounts for different categories of prototypical verbal aggression and non-prototypical verbal and non-verbal insults. The view of verbal aggression emerging from the network model analysis shows that a comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon cannot be reduced to the discussion of any single semantic or conceptual structure.

Finally, section 5.5 provides the study of the corpus data from the point of view of force dynamics theory. This perspective allows for a simplified view of different intrapersonal and interpersonal tensions involved in the process of insulting. The force-dynamic model of prototypical insults refers to the intrapersonal and interpersonal planes of the speaker and explicate different stages of Jay (2000) in the light of the theory of force dynamics. It is claimed that the force-dynamic theory can account for every category of insults presented in the corpus analysis. In order to illustrate that, in section 5.5 I present also a number of non-prototypical instances of insults listed in section 5.2. It is also argued that the force-dynamic analysis of insults may account for different kinds of outcome scenarios within the prototypical and non-prototypical models of insults.

The cognitive study of insults presented in this work is inevitably subject to numerous simplifications and inadequacies. The discussion of different theoretical issues mentioned in chapters 1-4 does not give justice to their complexity and offers only a most cursory account of some theoretical concepts of semantics, pragmatics, cognitive linguistics, neurology, psychology and sociology. The

reason for that is the breadth of perspective attempted in the present thesis and the fact that in order to achieve my purposes I have touched upon only the most important problems which are indispensable for a comprehensive study of insults. Furthermore, the mode of corpus data analysis adopted in this work may also be a matter of some controversy. Some issues connected with the limitations of my methodology are addressed in section 5.0. It must be stated here that the study of verbal aggression and swearing would most certainly benefit from a more complex and comprehensive form of corpus analysis. However, the account of verbal aggression proposed in this work fulfils the aims I have set before myself. Firstly, in accordance with Jay (1992, 2000), Allan and Burridge (2006), Bousfield (2008), Pinker (2008) it shows a comprehensive study of impoliteness, swearing and insulting as a worthwhile aim of academic pursuit. Secondly, it shows insults as a complex and intricate linguistic phenomenon analyzable from different perspectives and complementary points of view. Thirdly, it validates the cognitive perspective as an appropriate paradigm for the study of verbal aggression and related phenomena. Fourthly, it proposes a number of areas of research which may be pursued in the future research concerning verbal conflict, swearing and verbal aggression.

1. Some aspects of the autonomous approach to language

The present chapter discusses the most important precepts of autonomous linguistics for the aim of contrasting them with the cognitive approach to language as presented in chapter 2. By the name of autonomous linguistics I refer, after Taylor (1995: 16), to different strands of precognitive linguistics traditions, particularly as exemplified by the strands of linguistics influenced by Ferdinand de Saussure and Noam Chomsky. The common denominator of these traditions is a similar scope of linguistic enquiry, which views language as a autonomous to other human capacities (cf. Widdowson, 1998: 24-6). Autonomous linguistics is a historically well-grounded linguistic tradition encompassing different strands of analysis and theoretical approaches. Therefore, the discussion attempted below by no means presents an accurate summary of different theoretical paradigms falling under the heading of the autonomous approach. Instead, what follows is a few observations concerning the most important tenets of the autonomous approach to language, which are discussed in the course of this dissertation.

Section 1.1 discusses the most important precepts of the autonomous paradigm by referring to Ferdinand de Saussure (section 1.1.1) and Noam Chomsky (1.1.2). Their works have wielded perhaps the most lasting influence on the autonomous linguistics and have become foundational for the contemporary study of language. The theories of de Saussure and Chomsky have also shaped the autonomous approach to the study of semantics, wherein the study of linguistic meaning has been thought of as “a formal science akin to logic and certain branches of mathematics” Langacker (1988c: 4-5). Section 1.2 discusses the autonomous approach of semantics as it is presented by Kempson (1977). According to this approach the study of sentential meaning consists of truth-value assessment of sentential meaning and componential analysis of lexical meaning. Componential analysis, based on the study of binary primitive features for lexical concepts, complies with the objectivist paradigm briefly discussed in section 1.3. According to this view, linguistic and conceptual categories are subject to formal logic and their boundaries are clearly demarcated. Concepts which belong to a given

category must possess necessary and sufficient features and those that do not lie outside the scope of a given category. Section 1.3. presents some problems emerging from this approach to lexical analysis. It discusses a number of natural categories which do not appear to fully comply with the restraints of formal logic and the objectivist paradigm. Thus, it is argued, an alternative approach to the study of meaning should be applied for the purpose of analysis of lexical and conceptual categories. Such approach, in the form of the cognitive paradigm, is presented in chapter 2.

1.1. The main precepts of autonomous linguistics

1.1.1. de Saussure (1966 [1915])

De Saussure (1966) begins his course with the discussion of the primary purpose of the study of language. He is concerned with previous linguistic traditions, which by pursuing different goals have not clearly established what language is and, consequently, have become a conglomerate of only loosely connected scientific disciplines. Thus, he proposes that the primary goal of linguistics is the analysis of language viewed as an abstract, self-contained system of linguistic signs (language - *langue*). De Saussure makes a clear distinction between *langue* and *parole* (speaking), which refers to the executive side of language; parole is the actual language usage by a particular person in a given context. Parole is heterogeneous: it is an individual act dependent on various physical, physiological and psychological factors. Langue, on the other hand, is homogenous in that it is a self-contained whole, independent of influences from outside the system (de Saussure, 1966: 9-13). In order to illustrate the relationship between langue and parole de Saussure (1966: 11) proposes the following scheme of speaking-circuit between two interlocutors:




Figure 1. Speaking circuit in conversation (de Saussure, 1966: 11)

The graph represents two speakers engaged in the act of conversation. A sound-image (a linguistic sound) produced by Speaker A activates its corresponding image in Speaker B's mind (*psychological process*). In turn, Speaker B's brain transmits neural impulses to the organs of speech production (*physiological process*). This is followed by a *physical process*, whereby sound waves travel from B's mouth to the ears of A. With the sound waves activating corresponding mental images in A, the whole process is reversed and continued in the opposite direction. The whole pattern of repetition takes place as long as the conversation is continued. In de Saussurean analysis these psychological, physiological and physical processes belong to the scope of speech (*parole*), not to the scope of language. The place of language proper in the speech event is illustrated by the following, more schematic figure:




Figure 2. Communication schema (de Saussure, 1966: 12)

The C - S link represents speakers' psychological processes whereby sound-images are linked with mental concepts. This is followed by physical and physiological processes of phonation and audition. And these processes are

external to language proper, which according to de Saussure (1966: 14) is reflected in the segment of the speaking circuit where the sound-image is associated with the concept in the act of conversation. The speakers simply draw on the language resources to execute the act of speaking (*parole*).

To sum up, de Saussure postulates that the proper aim of linguistics is the analysis of language understood as a self-contained, homogenous, system of linguistic signs. It is distinct from speech, which is its executive side. The act of speaking necessarily draws on distinct psychological, physical and psychological processes, which are external to and independent of language. While speaking is a function of an individual person, language is a closed system, which exists perfectly only within a collectivity and is not affected by factors from outside the system. Any properly analysable language change can occur only within the system and is a result of the interaction of linguistic signs.

1.1.2. Chomsky (1965; 1975)

The common denominator of de Saussurean analysis and the strand of linguistics inspired by Noam Chomsky is the belief that the ability for language is independent of other human capacities, though Chomsky – and his followers involved in generative linguistics – have adopted a quite distinct, mentalist approach. Chomsky (1965: 3-4) assesses that linguistic theory is primarily concerned with ideal speaker-listener situations, in which the language conversation flow is not disturbed or distorted by factors such as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention. Such ideal language conditions would be the perfect reflection of speakers' linguistic *competence* (the speaker-hearer's knowledge of language), as opposed to linguistic *performance* (the actual use of language in concrete situations). It is linguistic competence, distinct and not influenced by linguistic performance, which for Chomsky is the proper subject of linguistic analysis.

Chomsky observes, however, that ideal language conditions are hardly attainable, therefore the role of linguists is to infer from the data gathered from speakers' performance the underlying system of the rules of language; language understood

not as any particular human system of communication, but the set of rules and principles shaping and governing all human languages.

Chomsky (1975: 4) observes that human language is a system of remarkable complexity governed by abstract principles that are universal by biological necessity. Language for Chomsky is a product of specifically human intelligence and may provide “a mirror of mind,” which is an idea repeated in different strands of linguistics and cognitive sciences (cf. Pinker, 2008). Despite the fact that it is an incredibly complex system, human children learn it without formal instructions with relatively little exposure. Chomsky notes that while humans and animals are capable of inductive reasoning, only humans have the capacity to learn complex language. Therefore, the basic mental structure on the basis of which particular human languages are learnt must be innate and hard-wired into human brains. In stating so Chomsky (1975: 10) criticises Skinner and behaviourists, who have denied the rationality of studying human “internal states.” In Chomsky’s view the inquiry into these structures through language is rational, scientific and necessary.

A crucial issue in linguistic analysis is for Chomsky the problem of how speakers learn the abstract system of language. Chomsky (1965: 25-33) discusses the problem of language acquisition with reference to Language Acquisition Device (LAD) – a mental structure possessed by every human being which allows for reconstructing the proper grammar of language from a limited pool of primary linguistic data. LAD operates in strictly rule-governed fashion – it allows a child to internalize grammatically correct sentences and discard the ungrammatical ones. LAD is a mental organ whose function is to provide a set of universal principles of grammatical organization, or *Universal Grammar (UG)* (Widdowson, 1998: 12).

Chomsky (1975: 28-30) defines UG as “the system of principles, conditions and rules that are elements or properties of all human languages.” As such UG, being invariant among humans, expresses “the essence of human language.” UG in Chomsky’s analysis is the innate mental structure which governs the structure and use of all human languages. It specifies their properties in relation to sound, meaning and structural organization. Upon being exposed to a particular language, children draw upon the principles of UG pre-existent in their minds in order to

master their first-language skills in a relatively short time. Chomsky (1975: 32-33) postulates that children do so by constructing structure-dependent rules and ignoring structure-independent rules. Thus, UG – and, consequently, language – in the light of Chomskyan analysis is viewed as a formal, structure-oriented construct. Consequently, Chomsky advocates the importance of grammar, and syntax, which he sees as the substantive element of language. In doing so, Chomsky views language ability as a distinct mental organ, which is independent of other human faculties. Chomsky (1975: 35) agrees that the distinct mental organ of language remains in interaction with speakers' *commonsense understanding* of extralinguistic reality, human systems of beliefs, expectations and knowledge concerning extralinguistic objects, their properties and their classification. Such constructs, however, because of being concerned with extralinguistic reality, have no direct impact on syntax-oriented language capacity, which stems from pre-formed, innate, structure-governed and distinct mental organ of language.

1.2. The autonomous approach to semantics

Langacker (1988c: 4-5) observes that the main precepts of Chomskyan tradition equate linguistics with “a formal science akin to logic and certain branches of mathematics.” Consequently, this view of language excludes the study of lexicon and semantics from the scientific analysis of linguistic competence, since “speakers are capable of ignoring meaning and making discrete well-formedness judgements based on grammatical structure alone.” This section discusses the classical approach to semantics as it has been described in autonomous linguistics. Due to the wealth and complexity of precognitive semantic traditions, the discussion below touches only on a few issues, which are important in the course of the further analysis. The present description of the autonomous approach to semantics is primarily based on Kempson (1977). By no means, however, should it be vied as an adequate presentation of Kempson's approach. Below I briefly discuss only a few issues pertaining to the problems raised in the course of this work. In doing so, I take Kempson (1977) to be representative of the classical

(autonomous) approach to semantics as far a few core issues discussed in this section are concerned.

Kempson (1977: 4-9) states that a successful semantic theory must fulfil at least three conditions. Firstly, it must adequately capture that nature of word meaning and sentence meaning and describe the relation between them. Secondly, it must allow for predicting the ambiguities of linguistic forms in relation to words and sentences. Thirdly, it must provide explanation and description for the systematic relations between words and between sentences (synonymy, antonymy, hyponymy etc.). In accordance with the generative paradigm, Kempson notes that in semantic description a finite collection of rules must explain the infinite set of grammatically possible sentences of a particular language. In doing so, she consciously adopts Chomskyan competence-performance distinction; Kempson proposes that the aim of semantics should be the truth-based semantic analysis of words and sentences. Such analysis gives insight into speakers' linguistic competence. All of the factors which influence communication but are not objects of formal semantic analysis are relegated to the study of performance.

Kempson's approach to lexical meaning is influenced by the theory of *componential analysis*, whereby words are defined and described as complexities made up of more basic semantic components (or markers)¹. Kempson adopts the convention whereby semantic markers are represented within square brackets. Hence *woman* is [FEMALE], [ADULT], [HUMAN]. *Man* is [MALE], [ADULT], [HUMAN]. *Wife* is [MARRIED], [FEMALE], [ADULT], [HUMAN] while *husband* is [MARRIED], [MALE], [ADULT], [HUMAN]. *Spinster* is [NEVER MARRIED], [FEMALE], [ADULT], [HUMAN], as opposed to *bachelor* who is, [NEVER MARRIED], [MALE], [ADULT], [HUMAN]. These features are presumed to be necessary and sufficient for the description of lexical meaning. Kempson (1977: 83-103) employs componential analysis in order to account for different systematic relations between words (e.g. hyponymy, synonymy, antonymy). *Spinster* is the hyponym of *woman*, since it contains all the features of *woman* as part of its specification. *Wife* and *spouse* are synonymous because their

¹ cf. Katz (1972)

semantic specification is identical. The relation of antonymy² stems from the incompatibility of semantic components of two lexical items: *Bachelor* stands in opposition to *husband* due to [MARRIED]/[NEVER MARRIED] discrepancy within their semantic descriptions. Kempson argues that this kind of analysis is not limited to kinship relations but can plausibly be extended to other lexical fields. Thus, she claims, componential analysis allows for the description and analysis of semantic relations within the lexicon, which is one of the aims of a successful semantic theory.

Another aim of a successful semantic theory is an adequate description of sentential meaning. Kempson's (1977: 23-27) analysis of sentential meaning in terms of truth-based approach stems from Tarsky's (1933) formula for the truth of a sentence:

S is true if and only if p

According to this formula the sentence *Snow is white* is true if and only if snow is white. Kempson notes that this approach equates linguistic meaning with the set of rules under which a given sentence is true. Hence,

S means that p ≡ S is true if and only if p

This equation, however, poses a problem. It does not require for a given sentence to be paired with the set of conditions *necessarily* contributing to the truth of the sentence. For instance, the formula given allows for the following, admittedly flawed assertion:

**Snow is white* is true if and only if grass is green.

Kempson's answer to this problem is the following reformulation of Tarsky's equation:

S means that p ≡ Necessarily S is true if and only if p.³

² Kempson (1977: 84-5) notes that antonymy is not a precise terms and presents four types of incompatibility relations: true antonyms, multiple taxonomies; gradable antonyms and converse pairs.

³ Kempson (1977: 27-40) agrees that this formula is „extremely controversial“ and poses some philosophical problems, especially with regards to the issues of relation between logical truth and sentence meaning.

By the virtue of *necessarily* the above formula excludes non-necessary logical relations. Thus:

The boy hurried to his home is true if and only if a male child quickly went to the place where he lived.

John killed Bill is true if and only if John caused Bill to die.

Christ is immortal is true if and only if Christ lives for ever.

What is evident in the above sentences is the reliance on necessary and sufficient conditions, which form the basis of the truth of sentential meaning. The existence and feasibility of such conditions, as has been mentioned above, is also presumed by Kempson in the discussion of lexical meaning. Thus, in accordance with the last condition for a semantic theory provided by Kempson, it is necessary to stipulate the relation between lexical and sentential meaning. Kempson (1977: 28-30) notes that the standard approach to this issue has been that the interpretation of a sentence is dependent on the interpretation of words building up that sentence. Hence, The sentence *The boy hurried to his home* is true by the virtue of the meaning of the terms *boy*, *hurried* and *home*. However, Kempson notes that the issue is more complicated than that; the above sentence is comprehensible not only by the virtue of the meanings of individual words, but also by the virtue of their syntactic position within a sentence; as grammatical subject, verb and object. In the same way – Kempson argues – a dictionary entry representing the meaning of a particular word is in fact “a schematic representation of its contribution to sets of truth conditions which comprise the meaning of sentences.” Thus, the relation of lexical and sentence meaning is the one of two-way dependence; the interpretation of sentences depends on the meaning of words they include and the explanation of the meaning of these words is a function of how they contribute to the interpretation of the sentences which they are made of.

In conclusion, in Kempson’s approach lexical and sentential meanings are analysed within truth-based approach in accordance with the generative paradigm and Chomskyan competence-performance distinction. Linguistic performance is based on the knowledge of grammar and draws from the repertoire of lexicon for the purpose of constructing and communicating meaning. The factors influencing communication which fall beyond the scope of linguistic competence and sentence logic are relegated into the theory of performance. Lexical meaning is

described and analysed in terms of necessary and sufficient semantic components. These components are used to explain the semantic relations within lexicon. Sentential meaning is based on the formal logic interaction of necessary and sufficient truth-based conditions. The relation of lexical and sentential meaning is the one of mutual dependence.

It has to be admitted that the above description of autonomous approach, based on Kempson (1977), is by no means representative of the whole of autonomous semantic tradition in that it proposes a considerably limited perspective on the autonomous approach to the study of meaning.⁴ This limited approach, however, has the virtue of briefly presenting a few tenets of autonomous semantics which have been adopted by or provided inspiration for numerous authors working in the field of semantic description (cf. Katz, 1972; Katz and Fodor, 1963, Katz and Postal, 1964, Bierwisch, 1967; 1970). In a similar way, authors working outside the generative paradigm have adopted the program of searching for universal building blocks of meaning (cf. Wierzbicka, 1980; 1992). Taking this into consideration, in the following section I will present a few problems connected with the autonomous approach to semantics.

1.3. Some problems with the autonomous approach to semantics

Kempson (1977: 30) notes that:

The program for the truth-based theory of meaning is to devise a set of semantic rules which provide a principled way of mapping an uninterpreted string of symbols constituting a sentence onto an interpretation of that string.

In other words, the goal of the truth-based theory of meaning is to provide objective criteria for matching the strings of linguistic symbols with their meaning in order to comprise meaningful sentences. Sentences are made of words, which contribute to the truth of sentences. In Kempson's account lexical items are analysable in terms on necessary and sufficient semantic components. Similarly, sentential meaning is dependent on truth-based necessary and sufficient condition

for a given sentence to be true. This section presents some problems which stem from the above view of semantics. In trying to identify and present them, I am going to refer to Fillmore (1975), Lakoff (1987), Taylor (1991) and Aitchison (1994).

The program advocated by Kempson falls within what Lakoff (1987: 157-69) calls the objectivist paradigm. What follows is a cursory and simplified version of the argument in accordance with Lakoff (1987). The objectivist paradigm can be divided into objectivist metaphysics – the view of the nature of the world – and into objectivist epistemology – how humans experience the world, i.e. the nature of human cognition, language and knowledge.

In objectivist metaphysics the reality consists of entities with clearly definable features. Some of these features are *essential*, i.e. they make a thing what it is; other features are *accidental*, i.e. peripheral to the true essence of things. The entities of the world can be organized into clear-cut categories with strict boundaries. The relation between distinct categories is the one of objectivist logic; there are objective rules which allow for assigning a given entity to a particular category; if a given entity possesses appropriate essential features, this entity falls within this category.

In objectivist epistemology cognition is based on the manipulation of abstract symbols. Symbols have meanings by virtue of linking them with objectively existing entities of the world. Concepts stand in relation both to other concepts within the conceptual system and to categories and entities in the real world. Thus, language is thought to mirror objective reality. Entities exist independently of human experience and human cognition. A conceptual category is a symbolic representation of entities objectively existing in the world. Thus, conceptual categories are defined in terms on necessary and sufficient features shared by all their members. Categories are either comprised of semantic primitives or constitute their logical combinations. The clear boundaries of categories allow for organizing them within the relation of hierarchy with certain categories being superior, subordinate or at the same level to others.

⁴ For a more comprehensive account of different precognitive traditions in semantics refer e.g. to Geeraerts (1986; 1988a).

Lakoff's (1987: 185-218) criticism of the objectivist paradigm relies on the inadequacy of objectivist metaphysics and epistemology. Firstly, there appear to be no convincing criteria for absolutely objective classification of world entities. Lakoff discusses here natural categories, put forward as evidence for objectivist claims: Depending on whether the categories *fish* and *zebras* are judged relative to phenetic criteria (overall similarity) or cladistic criteria (shared derived characteristics) they are judged to respectively constitute cohesive categories or not; all members of the categories *fish* and *zebras* share some similar features, but at the same time not all fish and not all zebras possess the same set of shared derived characteristics. The inclusion or exclusion of a particular real world entity within the categories depends on the classification scheme one employs. Therefore, essential features for fish and zebras are not objective in the sense of being grounded in objective extralinguistic reality. Secondly, the objectivist view of language and cognition assumes the existence of clearly delineated linguistic and conceptual categories. These categories are thought to stand in clear logical relation to real world and other categories within the conceptual system. Lakoff notes that in the absence of objectively definable real world categories, it cannot be convincingly claimed that language mirrors objective reality. Moreover, conceptual categories do not appear to be clearly delineated and in strict logical relations to each other within the conceptual system. Lakoff discusses in this context the category *mother*. The category *mother* – in contemporary American understanding of the term – includes women who have given birth to a child (birth mother), women whose egg has developed into a child (genetic mother), women who are legally responsible for bringing up a child (legal mother) and others. All of these are subcategories of mother, sharing some characteristic features and differing in others. Sub-categories of mother do not appear to have strict boundaries and can be shown to overlap to a large extent with each other. Thirdly, our understanding of mother stems from human experience, where different kinds of mothers – including genetic, surrogate, foster mothers – have to be understood, categorized and internalized. Hence – Lakoff claims – language and cognition are not independent of human experience, but are based on it and motivated by it. This point constitutes one of the essential claims of cognitive linguistics presented in chapter 2.

When discussing the problems of linguistic categorization Taylor (1995: 21-37) observes that the objectivist paradigm refers back to Aristotle, whose theory may be summarised in the following way:

1. Categories are defined in terms of conjunction of a necessary and sufficient features.
2. Features are binary.
3. Categories have clear boundaries
4. All members of a category have equal status.

The above points have been demonstrated to tie closely to the objectivist metaphysics and epistemology. At the same time, they provide the basis for classical semantics, whereby categories are strictly delineated and the membership of a given entity is stipulated by its possession of essential features.

Consider, once more, the example of *bachelor*, who, according to this approach, is defined as [NEVER MARRIED], [MALE], [ADULT], [HUMAN]. According to Aristotelian logic, any entity that conforms to the listed features is a member of the category. However, as Fillmore (1975, 1977) points out, there are unmarried adult male individuals who are not normally classify as bachelors, e.g. the pope, widowers, male divorcees etc. At the same time, it is possible to call a married man a bachelor, possibly relating to some specific features of his behaviour or character (Taylor, 1991: 95). Thus, it follows, the category of *bachelor* does not appear to be strictly definable by a set of necessary and sufficient binary semantic features.⁵ As a further illustration of this, consider the following – rather light-hearted – description of *tiger* provided by Aitchison (1994: 45):

⁵ Fillmore (1975, 1977ab, 1982) applies this line of thinking to a number of other concepts, including *widow* and *orphan*.

A tiger is 'large Asian yellow-brown black-stripped carnivorous maneless feline' according to one dictionary [...]. Which of these characteristics are essential? [...] Most people would accept that ANIMAL is a necessary condition of tigerhood [...]. People might also agree that tigers needn't be carnivorous. If you said 'Harry's tiger is a vegetarian,' it would be quite plausible to receive the reply: 'I'm not surprised, he probably can't afford to feed it on meat.' What about stripiness? 'Of course tigers have to be stripped. Whoever heard of an unstriped tiger?' say a few people. But many people are more permissive, and make comments such as: 'I read in a paper that you can have white tigers, so stripiness can't be essential' – though white tigers, incidentally, are quite a disappointment: they are in fact honey-coloured, with faint stripes.

The above description points once more at the difficulties arising from the claims of objective, real-world based conceptual and linguistic categories and the attempts at ascribing necessary and sufficient essential features to them.

Summing up the problems connected with the classical view of semantics. Firstly, conceptual and linguistic categories do not appear to exist absolutely objectively and independently of human experience. Secondly, categories do not appear to have strict, easily-delineated boundaries. Their borders are more plausibly understood as a function of their fuzziness and overlapping with other categories. Thirdly, the membership of a given entity to a given category is not strictly governed by the possession of necessary and sufficient features. Linguistic description based on such features proves to be largely inadequate for the comprehensive analysis of a given category. Fourthly, the autonomous approach presupposes strong distinction between semantics understood as the study of the construction and expression of meaning and pragmatics – the study of realisation of meaning in context. Suffice it to say here that this distinction has sparked some crucial theoretical difficulties, not least importantly the issue of relation between semantics and pragmatics.⁶ The issues of pragmatics which are important in the course of the present dissertation will be the topic of chapter 3. Chapter 2 below discusses a possible alternative to the autonomous approach to language and cognition, namely the cognitive paradigm.

2. The cognitive approach to language and linguistics

The aim of the present chapter is to provide a theoretical perspective according to which the subsequent study of insults is carried out, namely the cognitive approach to language and linguistics. This chapter presents also the theoretical tools applied in the corpus study of insults in chapter 5. Due to the complexity and richness of the cognitive approach to language, the present chapter proposes only the most cursory review of the most important precepts, tools and assumptions of the cognitive approach to language.

Section 2.1 discusses the main tenets of cognitive linguistics. Cognitive linguistics, which can be viewed as a part of a broader functionalist tradition (Langacker, 1999), has emerged for a large part as an opposition to the autonomous approach. The cognitive paradigm denies the view of language as an autonomous mental faculty and claims that language is a part of human cognitive system. Thus, language draws on the common repertoire of the basic cognitive processes which operate in other spheres of human endeavours.

In section 2.2 the main precepts of the cognitive approach to the study of meaning are presented. The cognitive semantic approach relies on the description of concepts relative to more general conceptual structures reflecting human cognitive processes. Thus, section 2.2.1 provides a cursory overview of cognitive frames, domains and idealised cognitive models. The structuring of concepts relative to these constructs reveals the inadequacy of the objectivist paradigm wherein categories are comprised of members possessing necessary and sufficient features. Instead, as shown in section 2.2.2, linguistic categories are structured around their prototypical members and prototypical effects can be traced to operate in different areas of linguistic investigation and in different spheres of human activities. In section 2.2.3 I present Langacker's (1990) conception of network models. Section 2.2.4 focuses briefly on the cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy, which

⁶ For a discussion of this issue, including different theories within semanticism and pragmaticism approach refer e.g. to Leech (1983) and Levinson (1983).

are cognitive processes operating in semantics, as well as in different areas of linguistic research.

Section 2.3 presents a practical application of cognitive theory to the study of anger, as it was carried out by Lakoff (1987). Lakoff's discussion of the idealised cognitive model of anger presents different metaphoric, metonymic mappings and the prototypical scenario of anger, which converge on the understanding of anger in contemporary American culture. Lakoff's prototypical scenario of anger shows considerable similarity to Jay's (2000) model of verbal aggression (section 4.4.4) and, as such, constitutes the basis for the corpus analysis of insults in the light of ICM theory in sections 5.1 and 5.2.

Section 2.4 presents another theoretical tool of cognitive linguistics which is applied in the corpus analysis of insults, namely the theory of force dynamics as put forward by Talmy (1988). The theory of force dynamics allows for the depiction of interactants' intrapersonal and interpersonal processes. Section 2.4 presents the basic force-dynamic patterns of description and points out different areas of their application. The force-dynamic study of some prototypical and non-prototypical categories of insults is presented in section 5.5.

2.1. The main precepts of cognitive linguistics

Cognitive linguistics, as it has been put forward and described by Lakoff and Thompson (1975), Fillmore (1982; 1985), Fauconnier (1985; 1997), Lakoff (1987), Langacker (1988c; 1991ab; 1999), Fauconnier and Sweetser (1996) and others has emerged as an alternative to autonomous linguistics. Cognitivism constitutes now a well-established conglomerate of related approaches, methods and analytical tools for the description of language. Due to the richness and complexity of the modern cognitive tradition (Langacker, 1999: 24), this section offers only the most cursory overview of the most important tenets of the cognitive approach.

Langacker (1999) presents cognitive linguistics as a part of broader functionalist linguistic tradition. In the functionalist enterprise language, as a meaningful

system of signs, is shaped by the functions it serves and a variety of factors, including environmental, biological, psychological, developmental, historical and socio-cultural considerations. Understanding of these factors is considered to be prerequisite and foundational to any kind of linguistic investigation (Langacker, 1999; Kalisz, 2001a). In the light of this observation, biology is claimed to provide a better analogy for linguistic investigations than formal sciences, especially mathematics (Langacker, 1988c: 4; Kalisz, 1994b). The functionalist endeavour may be contrasted with an equally broad descriptivist tradition, which encompasses also different strands of autonomous linguistics. Langacker (1999: 17) lists the following domains of investigations for descriptivist and functionalist agendas:

<i>Descriptivist agenda:</i>	<i>Functionalist agenda:</i>
structure	function
sentences	discourse
cognitive representation	actual speech behaviour
synchronic language structure	language change
individual languages	typology and universals
acquired language system	acquisition process
psychological manifestation	neurological basis
theory and description	practical application

Figure 3. Domains of linguistic investigation (Langacker: 1999: 17)

Langacker (1999) observes that cognitive linguistics operates mainly within the functionalist framework. However, he also advocates attempts at reconciling the two agendas in order to create a more coherent and representative view of language in its different aspects. Such interdisciplinary studies encompassing the cognitive approach with different domains of descriptivist agenda have now been undertaken e.g. in language acquisition (Skehan, 2010; de Knop, 2010; Pütz and Sicola, 2010; Bielak and Pawlak, 2013), psychology (Sternberg, 1996; Salvati and Rabuano, 2010) and grammatical description (Góralczyk, 2009; Patard and Brisard, 2011). An interesting attempt at combining the findings of the two agendas is construction grammar (Goldberg, 1995; Foolen and van der Leek, 2010).

A central claim of cognitive linguistics is that language is not an autonomous mental faculty, but is a part of and manifestation of human cognitive system. The kinds of mental processes in language are not fundamentally different from cognitive abilities employed outside language (Croft and Cruse, 2009: 1-2). In Fauconnier's (2000: 96) terms "language is only the tip of a spectacular cognitive iceberg [...]." Human language, in fact, is shaped and governed by the same set of mental operations that are used for non-linguistic processes of perception, categorization, mental imagery and reasoning. These basic processes can be inferred from language use and cognitive linguists prefer to focus on the functions of language rather than strict logical truth-value approach to language; language and linguistic investigation – in short – cannot be separated from the broad context of language usage (cf. Langacker, 1988a; Kalisz, 1994b, Heine, 1997; Langacker, 1999; Fauconnier, 2000).

Langacker (1988c: 10-11) observes that in the above sense cognitive linguistics is relativistic; individual languages may draw from different set of cognitive resources for the communication of equivalent ideas. However, cognitivist tradition is not Whorfian in the sense that speakers' cognitive processes do predetermine how and what they are able to think. Speakers have no difficulty creating novel mental images if the ones already licensed by linguistic convention do not satisfy their needs. Though the peculiarities of individual languages influence the conventional ways of expressing ideas, speakers' cognitive processing allows for the novelty of emergent expressions.

The cognitive model of linguistic communication involves a significant amount of background mental processing. This is represented by Langacker (1988c: 14):




Figure 4. The cognitive model of communication (Langacker, 1988c: 14)

Generally, language users employ the whole set of resources for the task of constructing and decoding linguistic meaning. Symbolic units (the grammatical component), general and contextual knowledge, communicative aims and objectives, aesthetic values etc. are in constant interplay in a particular speech situation. This complex network of resources has to be organized and channelled by the mental process of coding accompanied by problem-solving categorization in order to be employed in a particular usage event. Both the addressor and the addressee face the coding problem. While the speaker roughly starts with conceptualisation and attempts to arrive at the appropriate vocalisation, the hearer undertakes the process in reverse. This, in fact, is analogous to the de Saussurean model of interpersonal communication.⁷ However, both the speaker and the hearer have to mentally construct the usage event as a whole by means of the cognitive resources at their disposal. The cognitive resources, in turn are employed to make sense of the extralinguistic reality. Thus, contrary to the claims of autonomous linguistics, there is a significant – albeit indirect – link between the system of language and extralinguistic reality. The above model of communication has also the virtue of explaining this link. It has to be emphasized that since any conceptualisation or vocalisation results from a huge amount of mental processing, language relates to the physical world only indirectly, through a vast cognitive network. Svorou (1994: 2) highlights this in the following diagram:




Figure 5. The relationship between language, cognition and physical world (Svorou, 1994: 2)

As the above diagram shows, there is no direct link between language and the physical world. Such link is only possible via the mediation of cognition and

⁷ See *figure 1* in section 1.1.1.

cognitive processing. Thus, in an actual speech situation interactants draw on the inventory of available cognitive resources in order to produce or comprehend utterances; language is irrevocably “filtered” through cognition. Such claims undoubtedly have a long philosophical tradition going back at least to Kant.⁸ What they also suggest is that the folk model of communication – in which ideas as ‘packed’ into words, ‘transferred’ to the addressee and ‘unpacked’ by the receiver – is inadequate and does not describe the communication process in its complexity (cf. the discussion of *conduit metaphor* in Reddy, 1979; Langacker, 1991a: 161-2).

It has to be borne in mind here that most cognitive resources represented in *figure 5* are activated in a particular speech situation without the speaker’s awareness. The vast and complex network of cognitive processes is performed in the background without involving the speaker’s conscious attention. This feature of language is referred to by Fauconnier (2000: 98-102) as the *economy of language*. Human cognitive system operates with utmost efficiency. Speakers are virtually unaware of the complex set of mental operations they perform unless they attempt an in-depth analysis and indulge into reverse-engineering of the communication process. Alternatively, the complexity of the background processing may be revealed by instances wherein communication is severely impaired (e.g. cases of aphasia). In this context Fauconnier discusses another feature of language, namely *operational uniformity*. Operational uniformity refers to the observation that many basic cognitive processes, like the figure-ground effect, binding, prototypical structures or semantic mappings, operate across different levels of linguistic analysis (syntax, phonology, semantics, pragmatics etc.). This observation also diverges from the precepts of the autonomous tradition, where semantics, pragmatics, syntax and phonology are presumed to be independent levels of linguistic enquiry. As a consequence, different attempts at re-evaluation of the traditional distinction between distinct levels of linguistic analysis have been attempted. Taylor (1995) discusses how prototypical effects operate across distinct levels of linguistic analysis, including semantics, syntax and phonology. Sokołowska (2001a) in her study of speech acts advocates a view wherein the traditional semantics/pragmatics distinction appears to be inadequate.

⁸ See e.g. the discussion of Kantian *Ding an sich* (thing-in-itself) in Andrzejewski (1995).

Bierwiazzonek (2013) provides a convincing account of how metonymic mappings operate across distinct levels of linguistic analysis such as semantics, pragmatics, morphology, including an account of the neuro-physiological basis for metonymic effects.

Operational uniformity provides the basis for the third feature of language discussed by Fauconnier (2000: 98-102), which is *cognitive generalisation*. Insofar as language is just a particular manifestation of the spectacular ‘cognitive iceberg,’ the basic mental processes can be observed in different non-linguistic areas of human mental activity. In fact, numerous studies have been put forward showing how cognitive processes operate outside language e.g. in fine arts (Coulson and Oakley, 2003; Eggertssen and Forceville, 2009; Schilperoord and Maes, 2009; Zbikowski, 2009), literary and translation studies (Tabakowska, 2001; Stockwell, 2006; Jaén and Simon, 2012) history of religion (Sroka, 2006), gesture studies (Kita, 2003; McNeill, 2005; Cienki and Müller, 2008) and sign language analysis (Poizner et al., 1987; Marschark et al., 1997). Interdisciplinary research of this nature is wilfully pursued within the cognitive paradigm.

2.2. Some remarks on the cognitive approach to semantics

The non-autonomous approach to language within the cognitive paradigm licenses the view of semantics whereby the study of meaning is pursued with relation to human cognitive processes. In short, in cognitive linguistics meaning is equated with conceptualisation (Langacker, 1988c: 5-6). Historically speaking, the cognitive view of semantics emerged largely as an opposition to truth-conditional semantics and componential analysis discussed in section 1.2. The autonomous paradigm has tended to give priority to the study of grammar and syntax. In cognitive linguistics, on the other hand, the study of meaning constitutes a driving force of linguistic enquiry. The following sub-sections aim at providing a brief overview of the most important tenets and tools of cognitive semantics. It must be said, however, that the description below is seriously limited in scope and significant elements of cognitive semantic theory have not been discussed. Consequently, a number of concepts are left out of the discussion below, including mental spaces and the theory of conceptual blending (Fauconnier, 1985,

1997; Fauconnier and Sweetser, 1996; Sweetser, 1999; Coulson, 2000; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). The discussion below focuses on a few concepts indispensable for the further analysis in the present dissertation, namely conceptual frames, cognitive domains, and idealised cognitive models.

2.2.1. An overview of conceptual structures: frames, domains, ICMs

The claim of cognitive linguistics that meaning is equated with conceptualisation calls for an adequate description of the conceptual structures which can be used to analyse mental concepts, and – hence – linguistic meaning. One of the first significant attempts in this respect was the theory of mental frame semantics put forward by Fillmore (1982; 1985). Fillmore describes mental frames as coherent regions of conceptualisation which allow for the representation of semantic expressions. He observes that truth-conditional approach does not account for the asymmetries in semantic descriptions. To take the already-cited example, the componential semantic description of *bachelor* and *spinster* differs only with regards to [MALE]/ [FEMALE] distinction in their semantic description. However, speakers of English typically share many additional assumptions about bachelors and spinsters. Bachelors in American culture are assumed to behave in a certain way and live a particular lifestyle of their own will. Spinsters are typically assumed to have a different set of shared features and their unmarried status is thought to be of doleful necessity. These assumptions are based on the knowledge and expectations shared by the speakers of a particular language. Similarly, the analysis of *girl* and *boy* shows irregularities in the way these terms are applied; for one thing, *girl* appears to be used for females of wider age range than *boy* is in case of males. Thus, a componential analysis account wherein these terms are differentiated solely by means of their sex appears to be inadequate. Fillmore analyses such examples relative to conceptual frames encompassing not only linguistic knowledge, but also extralinguistic assumptions and expectations about the world; *Boy*, *girl*, *bachelor* and *spinster* evoke frames encompassing not only biological differences, but also different attitudes of language speakers towards society and gender roles (Fillmore, 1982: 126-31; Croft and Cruse, 2009: 7-9).

While analysing the relations between concepts within the conceptual system, Langacker (1991a: 183-5) observes that empirical analysis of English terms often points to the relation of interdependency. For instance, the concept *arc* (a section of the circumference of a circle) requires the concept of *circle* for its semantic description. Similarly, *circle* requires the notion of *space* for its explication, as illustrated in *figure 6* below.




Figure 6. The profiling of concepts *circle* and *arc* (Langacker, 1991a: 184)

Langacker employs the terms *profile* for the concept that is described relative to certain conceptual structure and *base* for the conceptual structure that is presupposed by the concept. A single conceptual base may be used to profile a number of different concepts. Langacker observes *diameter*, *radius*, *chord* also presuppose the term *circle*. On the other hand, a concept may be described relative to one or more cognitive domains (domain matrix) (Langacker, 1991a: 147). Thus, Langacker equates *base* with *cognitive domain* understood as “any coherent area of conceptualization relative to which semantic structures can be characterized (including any kind of experience, concept, or knowledge system)” (Langacker, 1991b: 547) In this sense, therefore, the terms domain and frame have been claimed to refer to the same type of mental construct and have often been used interchangeably (cf. Croft and Cruse, 2009: 17).

Langacker (1991: 148-50) concedes that domains may be characterized by different levels of complexity. The most basic domains include *colour space*, *temperature*, *time* etc. Linguistic communication, however, often requires a set of more complex cognitive domains with one concept depending on several levels of cognitive domains. The concept of a letter, for instance, *T* is profiled against the

domain of *the alphabet*. This domain in turn presupposes the notion of *the writing system*, which again is understood relative to the general activity of *writing* and so on:




Figure 7. Domain matrix for the concept *T* (after Croft and Cruse, 2009: 26)

Thus, the concept of *T* is shown relative to a *domain matrix*, presupposing certain domain structure for the conceptualisation of a particular notion. This relates also to what Langacker, 1988b: 54 refers to as the increasing complexity of cognitive domains (cf. Croft, 1993).

Another term used within cognitive semantics and one that will serve as the basis of insult analysis in chapter 5 is the concept of idealised cognitive models (hereafter ICMs), proposed by Lakoff (1987: 68), who describes it in the following way:

Each ICM is a complex structured whole, a gestalt, which uses four kinds of structuring principles:

- *propositional structure, as in Fillmore's frames*
- *image-schematic structure, as in Langacker's cognitive grammar*
- *metaphoric mappings, as described by Lakoff and Johnson⁹*
- *metonymic mappings, as described by Lakoff and Johnson*

Each ICM, as used, structures a mental space, as described by Fauconnier.

Thus, ICM – in Lakoff's description – is a general conceptual structure encompassing mental frames and cognitive domains; idealised cognitive models encompass all kinds of linguistic and encyclopaedic knowledge about the world – including speakers' beliefs and expectations. This knowledge is structured within ICM for the purpose of conceptualisation and the production of meaning.

In effect, ICMs represent an idealised view of reality; they reflect speaker's internal theories about the world. In Lakoff's analysis the category of bachelors is described relative to the BACHELORHOOD ICM whereby speakers expect bachelors to be macho-type heterosexual individuals who date a lot of women etc. Thus, unmarried adult males who do not comply with these requirements (e.g. priests, gays, Tarzan-like figures) are not considered to be good examples of the category (Lakoff, 1987: 85-6). At the same time, drawing from the knowledge encompassed in this ICM it is possible to ignore the truth-conditional semantic features of *bachelor* in order to arrive at meaningful linguistic expressions:

- (1) Mary's husband is a real bachelor. (Taylor, 1995: 95)
- (2) bachelor girl

In (1) a married man is described as a bachelor, possibly to indicate certain features of his behaviour or character, for instance he may be an insatiable womanizer. In (2) the description of a female individual as a bachelor suggests that she may exhibit traits and characteristics of bachelors presumed by the BACHELORHOOD ICM. Lakoff (1987) notes that the above kind of analysis is limited to the view of bachelors as they are seen in contemporary American culture. Other national or social groups may well have a distinct idea of bachelors based on their expectations and experience. This points, once more, to the fact that

⁹ See section 2.2.4.

ICMs incorporate broad knowledge of the world and expectations of reality as they are presented by speakers internal theories.

Lakoff (1987: 74-6) observes that ICMs may have a complex overlapping structure. The concept *mother*, for instance, is describable relative to a number of models:

The BIRTH model: the person who gives birth is the mother

The GENETIC model: the female who contributes the genetic material is the mother.

The NURTURANCE model: the female adult who nurtures and raises a child is the mother of that child.

The MARITAL model: the wife of the father is the mother.

The GENEALOGICAL model: the closest female ancestor is the mother.

Prototypical mothers in the American culture are defined relative to all of the above ICMs; a mother is a person who has provided genetic material for and given birth to a child, nurtures this child, is the wife of the child's father. There are, however, instances of non-prototypical mothers who do not comply with all of the models presented above, such as stepmothers, foster mothers, genetic mothers, unwed mothers etc. Thus, the category MOTHER has, in Lakoff (1986: 83-4) terms, a radial structure, wherein different conventionalized sub-categories of non-prototypical mothers are structured around one central, prototypical case. Lakoff's concept of radial categories is adopted in section 5.3.5 for the purpose of the corpus analysis of the speech act of insulting.

2.2.2. The role of prototypes in the cognitive enterprise

In the previous section the term *prototypical* was used in order to describe female individuals who comply with all the sub-models of the ICM cluster MOTHER. This, however, requires some further elaboration. The problem here touches upon the issue of how conceptual categories are structured. In the objectivist paradigm, discussed in section 1.3, categories have clear, rigid boundaries. Entities of the world possess necessary (essential) and sufficient features which make them members of a certain category. Each entity either belongs or does not belong to a given category. There is no degree of membership, with each member of a

category being as good and proper as its other members. Thus, *stallion*, *mare*, *filly* and *colt* belong to the category *horses* in the same way *Chihuahua*, *spaniel*, *dachshund* and *German Shepherd* belong to the category of *dogs*. At the same time, entities such as *tiger*, *carrot* and *cupboard* do not belong to either of these categories, since they lack the essential membership features (cf. Taylor, 1995: 21-37; Croft and Cruse, 2009: 76-7).

A number of empirical studies in psychology (e.g. Rosch, 1973, 1975, 1978; Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976) have shed a rather different light on this issue. A typical study of Rosch and her associates focused on confronting their subjects with a number of possible linguistic categories, such as BIRD, VEGETABLE, FURNITURE, FRUIT, CARPENTER'S TOOL. For each category an array of possible members was suggested and the subjects' task was to mark to what extent a given concept is a good exemplar of the category. Rosch's subjects ascribed different values to various category members. For example, in the category BIRD subjects marked *robin* as the best example. Other good exemplars – but scoring lower marks – were *dove* and *canary*. Slightly worse instances incorporated *owl*, *toucan* and *parrot*, which – in turn – were better than *peacock* or *duck*. The most marginal examples of the category included *ostrich* and *penguin*:




Figure 8. Birdiness ranking (after Aitchison, 1994: 54)

Rosch's findings proved to be consistent across the analysed categories. This and similar analyses have pointed towards the view of categorisation in which categories possess better and worse instances or members. Categories are structured around their best exemplars, which are referred to as *prototypes* (Aitchison, 1994: 52-6; Croft and Cruse, 2009: 75-7).

Apart from the kind of analysis exemplified by Rosch, there are numerous empirical methods for deciding which items constitute prototypical members of a category. Croft and Cruse (2009: 78-9) mention empirical tests based on frequency and order of mention, order of learning, verification speed and priming. All these methods point towards a different status of prototypes in comparison to less-prototypical instances and the construction of conceptual categories around the prototypical members.

In a broader perspective, the above presented view of categories has been shown to influence the human processes of learning, planning and communication (cf.

Taylor, 1995: 239-56; Croft and Cruse, 2009: 74-5). It also allows for the explanation of the phenomenon of overlapping categories. Aitchison (1994) demonstrates that by virtue of the terms *vase*, *cup* and *bowl*:



Figure 9. Vase-cup-bowl continuum (after Aitchison, 1994: 46)

This discussion goes back to Labov's (1973) classic study in which he presented a group of subjects with a series of cup-like objects of different dimensions and shapes, with different elements and utilized in different contexts (e.g. food vs. drink). To each of these variables Labov has ascribed a different numerical value for the aim of establishing consistency profiles for the categories of *cup*, *bowl*, *vase* etc. In Labov's study subjects answers may be represented on a continuum without strict boundaries between individual objects. Moreover, the alteration of certain variables helps to switch speakers intuition, e.g. the addition of a handle to a object increases its chances of being called a cup. In the same way, more rectangular objects of high width-to-depth ratio were called bowls if they were utilised in the context of food. Labov, thus, concedes that there are certain characteristics of prototypical household receptacles. However, there are borderline objects, which, in accordance with the prototype theory, are structured around the best exemplars and allow for the overlapping of categories.

The question of the source of prototypical effects still remains – to a large degree a matter of debate. Possible answers include solutions based on the statistical frequency of expressions, salient exemplars of categories, high ratio of family resemblance of prototypical expressions, their perceived closeness to an ideal or

paragon, stereotypical effects and metonymic models. (cf. Lakoff, 1987: 77-90), Geeraerts, 1988b; Croft and Cruse, 2009: 80-1). Lakoff (1987: 68-9) regards prototypical effects to be a consequence of structuring human knowledge in terms of idealised cognitive models. Thus, based on the bachelorhood ICM, prototypical bachelors are the ones who act and behave in a certain way, licensed by speakers assumptions and intuitions. Similarly, prototypical mothers comply with the central cases of the category, wherein female adult individuals share the features emergent from a number of sub-models (the BIRTH model, the GENETIC model, the NURTURANCE model etc.).

Today, despite some discussion surrounding the theory of prototypes (cf. Croft and Cruse, 2009: 87-91), there is a wide consensus within cognitive linguistics and psychology that conceptual categories are typically structured against prototypical exemplars or prototypical clusters. These prototypical instances allow for the conceptualisation of the less-prototypical members of categories. The existence of non-prototypical instances allows for the phenomenon of category overlapping with some members possibly falling into the scope of more than one categories.

The notion of prototypes has been used by cognitive linguists in many areas of linguistic analysis. Taylor (1995) discusses the implications of the prototype theory not only in semantics, but also in phonology, morphology and syntax. Kalisz (1993) and Sokołowska (2001a) discuss the role of prototypical effects in the pragmatic aspects of language. Prototypical effects will play a significant role also in the analysis of insults undertaken in sections 5.1 and 5.2 wherein prototypical and non-prototypical categories of insults are proposed based on the film corpus data.

2.2.3. Langacker's (1990) network models

Langacker's (1990: 266-72) theory of network models is another theoretical tool which will be used for the purpose of insult analysis in the later part of this thesis. Network models provide a kind of category representation wherein the members of a category are depicted as interconnected nodes of a conceptual network. These

models incorporate prototypical instances of a category as a special case. Elements of a network are characterized by different levels of schematicity and are linked to each other by different kinds of categorizing relationships. Langacker (1990: 166-7) distinguishes three kinds of relations between network elements: extension, elaboration and mutual similarity. The relation of extension amounts to a value conflict between two elements of a network. Hence, if [B] is an extension of [A], [B] is incompatible with [A], but is nonetheless categorized by [A]. Elaboration indicates the relation of a network element elaborating or instantiating on a conceptual schema. Thus, if [B] elaborates [A], [B] is compatible with [A] and conforms to the specification of [A], but is characterized by a more detailed specification than [A]. Finally, the relation of mutual similarity amounts to the extent to which two elements of a network are perceived to be similar to each other. It differs from the relation of extension only by the lack of directionality. Langacker illustrates network models by representing different senses of the polysemous lexical term *run*:




Figure 10. The network model of *run* (Langacker, 1990: 267)

Figure 10 shows a network representation of the verb *run*. The most cognitively salient, prototypical element of the network (personal rapid 2-legged locomotion) is marked with heavy lines. The most general and schematic structure (rapid motion) is placed at the top of the diagram and is indicated by a dashed box. The vertical dimension of the diagram provides information about the level of schematicity (generality) of individual nodes: from top to bottom the elements of the diagram are characterised by decreasing generality and increasing specificity. This is due to the relation of elaboration (symbolised by solid unidirectional arrows) in which a network element elaborates on a more schematic structure. The outward growth of the diagram is primarily based on the relation of extension (symbolised by unidirectional dashed arrows). As noted above, the relation holds whenever one element is categorised in terms of another one despite their incompatibility. The relation of mutual similarity is symbolised by a bidirectional dashed arrow.

Langacker notes that the diagram above does not attempt to present the precise configuration of the network, nor does it illustrate how far upward or downward this network is extended in speakers' conceptual systems. This, in fact, may differ from speaker to speaker. What the diagram shows, however, is that categories represented in terms of a network model reveal a complex structure and may not plausibly be reduced to a single node; the conceptualisation of *run* is based on the interrelations of the network elements, rather than on any individual elements of the network.

Langacker (1990: 272-8) acknowledges the broad applicability of network models and illustrates that by applying this line of analysis to elements of phonology, morphology and semantics. In section 5.4 I will apply the theoretical framework of network models for a more detailed and comprehensive view of the category of insults.

2.2.4. The cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy

In the autonomous linguistic paradigm the phenomenon of metaphor has been regarded largely as a stylistic or rhetorical phenomenon, unrelated to language

competence. Typical explanations of the phenomenon have involved the processes of super-imposition of the non-literal interpretation of the world on the literal linguistic interpretation (cf. Kempson, 1977: 71-4).

In cognitive linguistics the study of metaphor and metonymy constitute a vital area of linguistic analysis. Metaphor and metonymy are regarded as conceptually and neurologically grounded phenomena which provide conceptual patterns for a significant amount of human conceptualisation. As Lakoff (1993: 204) puts it: “[...] metaphor is a major and indispensable part of our ordinary, conventional way of conceptualizing the world [...]”. Thus, metaphor – and metonymy – belong not only to the domain of rhetoric, but they structure and influence the way language is used (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; 1993; Bierwiazzonek, 2013).

The cognitive study of conceptual metaphor was sparked by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), whose theory diverges from the traditional notions of metaphor as a poetic or rhetorical device. In Lakoff and Johnson’s view “the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 5). They argue that much of human conceptualisation is metaphorical in nature:

(3) ARGUMENT IS WAR

- (a) Your claims are *indefensible*.
- (b) He *attacked every weak point* in my argument.
- (c) His criticism was *right on target*.
- (d) I *demolished* his argument.
- (e) I’ve never *won* an argument with him.
- (f) You disagree? Okay, *shoot!*
- (g) If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out.
- (h) He *shot down* all of my arguments.

(4) TIME IS MONEY

- (a) You’re *wasting* my time.
- (b) This gadget will *save* you hours.
- (c) I don’t *have* the time to *give* you.
- (d) How do you *spend* your time these days?
- (e) That flat tire *cost* me an hour.
- (f) I’ve *invested* a lot of time in her.
- (g) I don’t *have enough* time to *spare* for that.
- (h) You’re *running out* of time.
- (i) You need to *budget* your time.

- (j) *Put aside* some time for ping pong.
- (k) Is that *worth your while*?
- (l) Do you *have* much time *left*?
- (m) He's living on *borrowed* time.
- (n) You don't use your time *profitably*.
- (o) I *lost* a lot of time when I was sick.
- (p) *Thank you for* your time.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 5)

A *target concept* (ARGUMENT, TIME) is conceptually structured in terms of – usually cognitively more grounded and simpler – *source concept* (WAR, MONEY). Different set of assumptions, expectations and data about the source concept are mapped onto the target concept for the purpose of conceptualisation. This process involving metaphorical entailments is characteristic to metaphoric mappings.

In cognitive linguistics metaphor is considered to be a cognitive process involving conceptual mapping between a source domain and target domain, as a result of certain analogies between the concepts or structures profiled against these domains (Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 69-70; Radden, 2000: 408; Goossens, 2003: 352; Panther and Thornburg, 2003b: 279-80; Kövecses, 2010: 4-5)¹⁰. It is useful to note here that in contemporary cognitive linguistics – in accordance with the feature of cognitive generalization¹¹ – the study of metaphor has gone well beyond the analysis of linguistic structures into the areas of fine arts, cinema, gesture studies, multimodal metaphor, foreign language teaching and others (cf. Forceville and Urios-Aparisi, 2009; Kövecses, 2010). This has helped to made the study of metaphor one of the most vibrant areas of enquiry within the cognitive paradigm.

Apart from metaphor, metonymy is another phenomenon which has received considerable interest in contemporary cognitive linguistics. The term metonymy may be traced back to antiquity. It originates from the Greek words for *change* (*meta*) and *name* (*onoma*). A noteworthy definition of metonymy comes from an ancient politician and philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 B.C. – 43 B. C.). In his work *Rhetorica ad Herennium* Cicero defined metonymy as “the figure that

¹⁰ For an alternative approach to the role of cognitive domains in understanding the phenomena of metaphor and metonymy see e.g. Croft (1993)

draws from an object closely akin [...] an expression suggesting the object meant, but not called by its own name” (Bierwiazzonek, 2006) A contemporary interest in the theory of metonymy has been largely sparked by Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980), whose examples of metonymies include:

- (5) The *ham sandwich* is waiting for his check.
- (6) He likes to read the *Marquis de Sade*.
- (7) *The Times* hasn’t arrived at the press conference yet.
- (8) *New windshield wipers* will satisfy him.

(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 35)

In Lakoff and Johnson’s terms metonymy refers to instances whereby “we are using one entity to refer to another that is related to it”. However, Lakoff and Johnson do not elaborate on metonymies in greater detail.

Lakoff (1987: 78) considers metonymy to be a particular kind of relation within an ICM, more precisely the one in which one element of an ICM stands for another element from the same ICM. His examples include:

- (9) The *White House* isn’t saying anything.
- (10) *Wall Street* is in panic.
- (11) Don’t let *El Salvador* become another *Vietnam*.

Koch (1999) proposes an account of how PART FOR WHOLE and WHOLE FOR PART metonymies operating within conceptual frames as described by Fillmore.

Generally, there appears to be a wide consensus among cognitive linguists that metonymy is “[...] a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain, or ICM” (Kövecses and Radden, 1998: 39, cf. Radden, 2000: 408; Queller, 2003: 211; Panther and Thornburg, 2003b: 282-3). Perhaps the most comprehensive contemporary account metonymy is provided Bierwiazzonek (2013), who regards metonymy to be “a process of transfer of meaning based on the co-activation of two relatively strongly associated concepts or conceptual structures [...] which are part of a single coherent conceptualisation”.

¹¹ See section 2.1.

Bierwiaczonek's approach allows for a wide perspective of metonymy including the description of metonymic effects operating in semantics, pragmatics and morphology.

The above discussion of metaphor and metonymy referring to them as two distinct conceptual processes involving respectively inter-domain and intra-domain conceptual mappings. It has been suggested, however that the difference between metaphors and metonymies is not always clear cut (cf. Kövecses and Radden, 1998: 61-2). Radden (2000) in place of these two categories proposes the *literalness-metaphor-metonymy continuum*. His argument is that in a number of cases individual language samples may be represented by means of a continuum ranging from literal uses of language through properly metonymic instances to clearly metaphorical usages. As an illustration of this argument Radden discusses the concept *high*:

Literal		Metonymic		Metaphorical
<i>high tower</i>	<i>high tide</i>	<i>high temperature</i>	<i>high prices</i>	<i>high quality</i>

Figure 11. Literalness-metonymy-metaphor continuum for *high* (Radden: 2000)

According to Radden (2000), in the literal sense the concept *high* refers only to the vertical size of an object. This use is represented in *high tower*. *High tide*, apart from the vertical dimension, embraces also the idea of the horizontal one. The fact that the concept *high* refers, apart from verticality (literal meaning), to another dimension makes this expression quasi-metonymic. Therefore, it can be described as an intermediate stage between the literal use and the metonymic one. *High temperature* is an instance of genuine metonymy. In Radden's analysis, the correlation between a higher position on the thermometer scale and rising temperature gives rise to this particular instance of UP for MORE metonymy; the higher position on the thermometer is associated with higher temperature. *High prices* exhibits traces of metaphor and metonymy at the same time. Radden maintains that this expression can evoke different mental images in speakers' minds. Some are likely to associate *high* in this example with a rising line in a

graph (THING for ITS REPRESENTATION metonymy). Alternatively, the expression can be understood as a MORE is UP metaphor. The last expression presented by Radden (2000) on the scale, *high quality* seems to be purely metaphorical making use of the metaphor common in many languages: GOOD is UP (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 14-21).

The idea of literalness-metonymy-metaphor continuum appears to have a good neurological basis. Bierwiazzonek (2005) proposes that cognitive processes on the conceptual level – and hence their semantic representations – significantly parallel the neural processes in the brain. Therefore, different semantic relations (such as metaphor, metonymy, hyponymy) reflect different strengths of neural connections in the brain. For instance, the strongest neural connections underlie hyponyms, since there is a relation of necessity between hyponyms (e.g. *tulip*) and their hyperonyms (e.g. *flower*). Metonymy may be a result of a slightly weaker connection (the relation of mental contiguity) and the metaphor with only few features shared by target and source domains would be underlain by the weakest neural connections.

Bierwiazzonek (2013: 231-58) elaborates on the neuro-physiological basis of conceptual relations by putting forward the neural theory of metonymy (NTM). According to the NTM theory, metonymy is “a cognitive manifestation of neural processes whereby the activation of one group (circuits) of neurons causes the activation of another group (circuits) of neurons.” (Bierwiazzonek, 2013: 258). This process of co-activation constitutes, thus, a natural neural counterpart of the conceptual relations holding between elements of the same frame or ICM. Bierwiazzonek discusses how the essential features of metonymy, namely association, mental substitution and highlighting can be studied in terms of neural relations. Bierwiazzonek’s account is concluded by noting that although there are still some questions concerning the neuro-physiological underpinnings of metonymy, the process of intra-domain conceptual mappings may plausibly be reinterpreted in neural terms. What remains to be seen is whether this line of analysis concerning metonymy (and metaphor) will be further pursued by other authors in future research.

2.3. Lakoff's (1987) analysis of anger

Lakoff's (1987) analysis of anger requires the use of methodological tools discussed above, in particular the theory of ICMs, prototypical effects and metaphoric/ metonymic mappings. His goal is to provide a comprehensive and convincing account of how anger is conceptualised in English. Lakoff (1987: 380-1) considers the following language samples:

- (12) He *lost his cool*.
- (13) She was *looking daggers* at me.
- (14) I almost *burst a blood vessel*.
- (15) He was *foaming at the mouth*.
- (16) You're beginning to *get to* me.
- (17) You make my *blood boil*.
- (18) He's *wrestling* with his anger.
- (19) Watch out! He's *on a short fuse*.
- (20) He's just *letting off steam*.
- (21) Don't *get a hernia!*
- (22) Try to *keep a grip on yourself*.
- (23) Don't *fly off the handle*.
- (24) When I told him, *he blew up*.
- (25) He *channelled* his anger into something constructive.
- (26) He was *red with anger*.
- (27) He was *blue in the face*.
- (28) He *appeased* his anger.
- (29) He was *doing a slow burn*.
- (30) He *suppressed* his anger.
- (31) She kept *bugging* me.
- (32) When I told my mother, *she had a cow*.

Lakoff sets out to prove that these superficially unrelated expressions reflect complex conceptual structuring of anger based on human cognitive abilities discussed in the above chapters, (mental imagery, metaphoric and metonymic mappings, prototypical effects etc). He starts by identifying a number of conventional metonymies English speakers use to talk about anger. Based on our extralinguistic knowledge and bodily experience we know that typical physiological effects of anger include increased body heat, rise of internal pressure, redness in the face and neck area, agitation and interference with accurate perception. Speakers often use these to metonymically stand for being angry:

- (33) Don't get *hot under the collar*.
- (34) When I found out, I almost *burst a blood vessel*.
- (35) She was *scarlet with rage*.
- (36) She was *shaking* with anger.
- (37) She was *blind with rage*.

(Lakoff, 1987: 382-4)

All of these examples are instances of PART FOR WHOLE metonymy, when a part of a prototypical scenario stands for its whole.

The folk theory of anger also allows for the central metaphor of ANGER IS HEAT. Lakoff claims that this central metaphor is manifested in its two main variants: ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER – when applied to fluids – and ANGER IS FIRE – when applied to solids. The ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID metaphor converges with BODY IS A CONTAINER metaphors. Thus, the body of an angry person is conceptualised as a container filled with a hot fluid:

- (38) He was *filled* with anger.
- (39) I had reached the *boiling point*.
- (40) Keep *cool*.

From extralinguistic experience speakers possess the knowledge of what may happen to a hot liquid in a container. If the heat increases, the fluid rises. Heating often produces steam and internal pressure. If the pressure gets sufficiently high, the liquid may finally explode. Therefore, for the sake of making sense of anger, speakers transfer this knowledge from the source domain to the target domain. Such transfers – which Lakoff refers to as *metaphorical entailments* – are accounted for in the cognitive paradigm and are evident in the English language:

- (41) His pent-up anger *welled up* inside him.
- (42) Billy's just *blowing off steam*.
- (43) He was *bursting with anger*.
- (44) When I told him, he just *exploded*.
- (45) I *blew my top*.

(Lakoff, 1987: 384-5)

The ANGER IS FIRE metaphor is also evident in linguistic data. In these cases the understanding of anger is based on speakers' knowledge of what fire does to a

solid object. The fire first has to be ignited, then it needs to be supported and it finally consumes the object. This knowledge allows for the following examples:

- (46) Those are *inflammatory* remarks.
- (47) Your insincere apology just *added fuel to the fire*.
- (48) After the argument, Dave was *smouldering* for days.
- (49) He was *consumed* by his anger.

The phenomenon of metaphorical entailments once again points to the fact that in case of metaphor speakers do not just *speak* about one concept in terms of another. Instead, they comprehensively *understand* one concept in terms of another one by the virtue of cross-domain mappings.

Apart from the HEAT metaphor, Lakoff (1987: 389-96) identifies other metaphors which are significant for the conceptualisation of anger:

ANGER IS INSANITY

- (50) I just touched him, and he *went crazy*.
- (51) You're *driving me nuts!*

ANGER IS AN OPPONENT

- (52) I'm *struggling* with my anger.
- (53) She *fought back* her anger.
- (54) He *surrendered* to his anger.

ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL

- (55) He has a *ferocious* temper.
- (56) He *unleashed* his anger.

ANGER IS A BURDEN

- (57) Unburdening himself of his anger gave him a sense of *relief*.
- (58) You'll feel better if you *get it off your chest*.

Lakoff emphasizes that these metaphors also are experientially grounded and they allow for metaphorical entailments for a more comprehensive understanding of anger.

Having identified the main metaphors and metonymies influencing our understanding of anger, Lakoff (1987: 397-400) proposes the following 5-stage prototypical scenario of anger.

STAGE 1: OFFENDING EVENT

There is an offending event that displeases S. There is a wrongdoer who intentionally does something directly to S. The wrongdoer is at fault and S is innocent. The offending event constitutes an injustice and produces anger in S. The scales of injustice can only be balanced by some act of retribution. That is, the intensity of retribution must be roughly equivalent to the intensity of offence. S has the responsibility to perform such an act of retribution.

STAGE 2: ANGER

Associated with the entity anger is a scale that measures its intensity. As the intensity of anger increases, S experiences physiological effects: increase in body heat, internal pressure, and physical agitation. As the anger gets very intense, it exerts a force upon S to perform an act of retribution. Because acts of retribution are dangerous and/or socially unacceptable, S has a responsibility to control his anger. Moreover, loss of control is damaging to S's own well-being, which is another motivation for controlling anger.

STAGE 3: ATTEMPT AT CONTROL

S attempts to control his anger.

STAGE 4: LOSS OF CONTROL

Each person has a certain tolerance for controlling anger. That tolerance can be viewed as the limit point on the anger scale. When the intensity of anger goes beyond that limit, S can no longer control his anger. S exhibits angry behaviour and his anger forces him to attempt an act of retribution. Since S is out of control and acting under coercion, he is not responsible for his actions.

STAGE 5: ACT OF RETRIBUTION

S performs the act of retribution. The wrongdoer is the target of the act. The intensity of retribution roughly equals the intensity of the offence and the scales are balanced again. The intensity of anger drops to zero.

The prototypical scenario for anger encapsulates what typically happens in a situation when S gets angry. It also possesses the virtue of explaining the possible causes and effects of the anger. Lakoff stresses here that metaphoric and metonymic entailments described above jointly converge on the above scenario for the sake of understanding the concept of anger. Lakoff, however, is quick to admit that this prototypical scenario by no means exhausts all possible anger-related situations. There are a large number of possible *non-prototypical scenarios*

for anger. Among numerous examples Lakoff (1987: 399-404) puts forward are the following ones:

INSATIABLE ANGER: You perform the act of retribution and the anger just doesn't go away.

In stage 5, the intensity of anger stays high.

Example: *His anger lingered on.*

REDIRECTED ANGER: Instead of directing your anger at the person who made you angry, you direct it at someone or something else.

The target of anger is not the wrongdoer.

Example: *When I lose my temper, I kick the cat.*

EXAGGERATED RESPONSE Your reaction is out of proportion to the offense.

The intensity of retribution outweighs the intensity of the offense.

Example: *Why jump down my throat? You have a right to get angry but not to go that far.*

CONSTRUCTIVE USE: Instead of attempting an act of retribution, you put your anger to a constructive use.

S remains in control and performs a constructive act instead of a retributive act. The scales remain unbalanced, but the anger disappears.

Example: *Try to channel your anger into something constructive.*

TERMINATING EVENT Before you have a chance to lose control, some unrelated event happens to make your anger disappear. Anger doesn't take control of S. Some event causes the anger to go out of existence.

Example: *When his daughter smiled at him, his anger disappeared.*

SPONTANEOUS CESSATION: Before you lose control, your anger just goes away.

Anger doesn't take control of S and the intensity of anger goes to zero.

Example: *His anger just went away by itself.*

SUCCESSFUL SUPPRESSION: You successfully suppress your anger.

S keeps control and the intensity of anger is not near the limit.

Example: *He suppressed his anger.*

IMMEDIATE EXPLOSION: You get angry and lose control all at once. No Stage 3. Stages 2 and 4 combine into a single event.

Example: *I said Hi, Roundeyes! and he blew up.*

NURSING A GRUDGE S maintains his anger for a long period of time, waiting for a chance at a retributive act. Maintaining that level of anger takes special effort.

Stage 2 lasts a long time and requires effort. The retributive act does not equal angry behaviour.

WRATH The intensity of the offense is very great and many acts of retribution are required in order to create a balance. The intensity of the anger is well above the limit and the anger lasts a long time.


The non-prototypical cases of anger mentioned above diverge in certain ways from the prototypical model. Thus, Lakoff (1987: 405) concludes that there is no single unified cognitive model of anger. Instead, what emerges is a cluster of related models differing from the prototypical instances to a different degree. There is, therefore, no conceptual core that all kinds of anger have in common. Instead, different emergent models bear family resemblances to each other.

Lakoff's discussion of the prototypical and non-prototypical models of anger will prove to be crucial for the corpus study of the prototypical and non-prototypical cases of insults in sections 5.1 and 5.2.

2.4. The theory of force dynamics in language and cognition


Another research tool which will prove to be indispensable for the corpus analysis of insults in chapter 5 is the theory of force dynamics as presented by Talmy (1988). Force dynamics theory refers to how entities interact with respect to force. This includes the exertion of force, resistance to force, overcoming of such resistance, blocking force and the like. Force dynamics is a generalisation over the traditional linguistic notions of causative relations and analyses them as sets of finer semantic primitives. The relations of force within the force dynamics theory is illustrated by the interaction of *Agonist* (*Ago*), the focal force entity, and *Antagonist* (*Ant*), the force element that opposes it. Talmy (1988: 55) illustrates the following basic steady-state force-dynamic patterns with their corresponding example sentences:

(59)




The ball kept rolling because of the wind blowing on it.

(60)




The shed kept standing despite the gale wind blowing against it.

(61)



The ball kept rolling despite the stiff grass.

(62)




The log kept lying on the incline because of the ridge there.

Examples (59) – (62) illustrate the conventional description of force dynamics elements. Agonist is indicated by a circle, and Antagonist by a concave figure. The intrinsic tendency of Agonist is represented by a dot – tendency towards rest – or an open arrow – tendency towards movement. The stronger entity is identified by a plus sign. Finally, the end-result of Ago/Ant interaction is depicted under the figures by either an open arrow on a straight line – action – or a straight line with a dot – repose. Thus, in (59) Ago has a tendency towards rest. However, by the virtue of stronger Ant that exerts force on weaker Ago, the end result is movement. (60) is an analogous situation; this time, however, Ago is the stronger entity, producing rest as the end result. In (61) Ago, which is the stronger entity, has a tendency towards movement. This tendency is blocked in (62) by the stronger Ant. Thus, the end-result in (61) and (62) respectively is action and repose. The four steady-state force-dynamic patterns can be thus distinguished by

three variables: Ago's tendency (toward rest in (59) and (60), toward action in (61) and (62)), Ago's force relative to Ant's (lesser in (59) and (62), greater in (60) and (61)) and Ago's resultant (action in (59), (61), rest in (60) and (62)).


Apart from the steady force dynamics patterns Talmy (1988: 56-7) discusses Ago/Ant interactions within the framework of shifting force-dynamics models, as in (63) – (66):

(63)




The ball's hitting made the lamp topple from the table.

(64)




The water's dripping on it made the fire die down.

(65)



The plug's coming lose let the water flow from the tank.

(66)




The stirring rod's breaking let the particles settle.

In (63) the introduction of stronger Ant overcomes Ago's intrinsic tendency towards rest, which is illustrated by the change in the resultant of force interaction from repose to action. In analogous example (64) stronger Ant blocks Ago's tendency towards movement. In (65) the removal of stronger Ant allows the Ago to realise its internal tendency towards movement, while in (66) the removal of Ant results in the stoppage of Ago due to its intrinsic tendency towards rest. Thus the effect of Ant in the above examples may be described as either causing [(63) and (64)] or letting [(65) and (66)] and the resulting action of Ago may be called starting [(63) and (65)] or stopping [(64) and (66)]

Another example of shifting force dynamic patterns, discussed by Talmy (1988: 58-9), includes cases in which the balance of forces may shift due to strengthening or weakening of either entity. This is illustrated in (67)

(67)



The enemy overcame us as we stood defending the boarder (enemy = Ant, us = Ago)

In (67) the exertion of force of Ant on Ago results in Ago getting weaker and Ant getting stronger. Thus, there is a shift in force balance, which is indicated by the


arrow pointing from Ago to Ant. As a result of the change in balance shift Ant overcomes Ago's tendency towards rest, thus enticing Ago's movement. This is marked by the change from the state of repose (dot) to movement (open arrow).

Talmy (1988: 68) notes that the kind of analysis presented in the above examples could be applied to different kinds or relations traditionally referred to as 'causing' and 'letting,' including prototypical and non-prototypical instances, such as: onset causing of action or rest, extended causing of action or rest, different types of 'letting,' instances with stronger or weaker Antagonists and the like. Talmy (1988) extends this framework of analysis to psychological reference, social relations, modal verbs and to argumentation and expectation in discourse. For the purpose of this thesis I will confine myself to the discussion psychological and social extensions of force dynamics theory, areas of research which will prove to be useful in the force-dynamic analysis of insults in section 5.5.

The application of force-dynamics theory to psychological reference (Talmy, 1988: 69-73) reflects intrapersonal tensions within an individual's psyche. One part of self, which wants to perform certain action is identified as Agonist, while the part of self that does not want the action to be performed is understood to be Antagonist. This analysis allows for the description of such concepts as *refraining* or *holding oneself back*:

(68)


1 hold 2 (SELF) back from VPing:



He held himself back from responding

(69)

1 refrain from VPing




He refrained from responding

In the above examples the part of self which strives towards movement (Ago) is blocked by the stronger part of self which counteracts this tendency (Ant). The dotted box around the elements of the diagram indicate that they are parts of the same psyche. The additional labels above the diagrams show the grammatical patterns of the two expressions. In (68) the phrase *1 hold 2 back from VPing* links *1* with Ago and *2* with Ant. In (69) the same meaning is lexicalised under a single lexical item *refrain*. Thus, the whole diagram is labelled with *1*.

Another description of the speaker's intrapsychological tension is depicted in (70), which illustrates speakers' exertion in performing a certain action. Here the part of the psyche indentified as Agonist has a tendency towards inaction, while the other part of the psyche (Ant) overcomes this resistance in order to instigate one's psychological activity:

(70)

1 exert 2 (SELF) } to VP
in VPing



He exerted himself in pressing against the jammed door


In (69) – (70) Agonist is identified with the self desires and urges which reflect inner psychological state of an individual, while Antagonist acts as a suppression, or a blockage of this psychological state. Hence, Talmy (1988:71-3) identifies the desiring part as more central and the suppressing part as more peripheral. He notes also three factors underlying the general organisation of the force-dynamics relations within the psyche. Firstly, the most basic, unmarked state of the central part of the psyche (Ago) is that of repose. Thus, Ago's tendency towards rest has to be overcome by the more peripheral part (Ant) with tendency towards action. Secondly, the physical aspect of a sentient entity is treated in language as essentially inert, unless it is animated by the psychological component. Thus, the body itself does not reveal any intrinsic tendencies and has to be animated by one's psyche. Thirdly, different force dynamics patterns can form chains of casual relationships, thus giving rise to complex concatenation structures, as in (71):

(71) Fear kept preventing the acrobat from letting the elephant hold up his lighttrope.

Instances of this kind belong to an open-ended class of complex patterns of causation.


The application of the theory of force-dynamics to social reference (Talmy, 1988: 71-5) focuses on inter-psychological force relations between distinct sentient entities. Thus, Ago/Ant interaction typically reflects interpersonal pressure one can withstand or yield to. Basic sociodynamic patterns of this kind include the following:

(72)



The peer pressure made him join the game.

(73)




The father resisted the child's pleas and cries to buy her a new toy.

In the above examples Agonist is faced with a sociological pressure towards a certain action. In (72) the stronger Antagonist overcomes Ago's tendency towards rest, while in (73) the stronger Ago resists the pressure exerted by Ant. The resultant state is respectively movement and repose.

Talmy (1988: 75-7) discusses complex socio-dynamic relations within the framework of complex causative patterns. These involve the notions of phase and factivity. Phase is a location along a temporal sequence which is the subject of focus in a given utterance. Factivity refers to occurrence or non-occurrence of a particular phase. Consider the following:

(74)



- (i) She urged him to leave.
He was reluctant to leave.
- (ii) She persuaded him to leave.
He relented. / He gave in to her on leaving.
- (iii) (She struck out with him on his leaving)
He refused to leave. He wouldn't leave.

Example (74) represents a scenario of sociological pressure exerted on Ago. At the same time, Ago also exerts pressure on Ant, which is represented by two additional EXRTN boxes. Phase (a) illustrates the resistance of Ago against Ant. This phase is continued in (a') which represents gradual weakening of Ago and strengthening of Ant. Phase (b) shows the critical moment at which the balance of forces is shifted to Ant. Finally, phase (c) illustrates the result of the change, whereby Ago's resistance is overcome by Ant. Individual conceptualisation patterns depend on the focus of attention on particular phases and their elements. According to Talmy, (74i) shows examples where the focus is on phase a and the occurrence of b and c is not known. (74ii) focuses on phase c, where phases b- c have already occurred. (74iii) also focuses on (c). In this case, however, (b) has not occurred. Thus, the end-result should be represented as repose instead of movement.

The extension of force dynamics theory to psychological reference provides a framework for the force-dynamic analysis of verbal aggression in section 5.5.

3. Some pragmatic aspects of insults

As noted in section 1.1.2 above, the traditional autonomous approach to language has held to the traditional distinction between linguistic competence and performance. This has further influenced the distinction between semantic and pragmatic studies. However, as noted in section 2.1, cognitive linguistics does not assume strict lines of division between semantic and pragmatic phenomena. Therefore, the present chapter discusses some pragmatic aspects of linguistic insults which are indispensable for the account of verbal aggression proposed in this dissertation. The issues raised here are re-evaluated and analysed from the cognitive perspective in the practical analysis of insults in chapter 5. The present chapter is by no means an adequate summary of the study of pragmatics, nor does it attempt to provide an even cursory view of different pragmatic phenomena pertaining to linguistic insults. The aim of this chapter is a cursory description of some pragmatic aspects of verbal aggression which are implemented in the course of the present dissertation. This is achieved by an account of different perspectives on linguistic politeness and impoliteness (section 3.1) and a view of insults as speech acts (section 3.2).

3.1. Perspectives on linguistic politeness and impoliteness

The issue of conflictive talk and verbal aggression inevitably touches upon the problems of linguistic politeness and impoliteness. Linguistic politeness may be defined as a set of conversational rules to which speakers must adhere to in order to achieve a harmonious and non-conflictive verbal exchange (cf. Malkjæmer, 2010: 422) The importance of politeness has been noted by Grice (1975:47), who claims that apart from conversational maxims there are maxims of aesthetic, social or moral value – such as “Be polite”, which under normal circumstances are followed in conversation. The contemporary interest in politeness studies has been especially influenced by the works of Leech (1983) and Brown and Levinson (1987). However, as Bousfield (2008: 2) notes, there has been a considerable imbalance between the studies of politeness and the study of linguistic impoliteness, i.e. “the use of communicative strategies designed to attack face,

and thereby cause social conflict and disharmony” (Culpeper et al., 2003: 1545). Thus, in order to provide a comprehensive view of linguistic politeness, it appears to be indispensable to account for the problem of linguistic impoliteness as well (Bousfield, 2008: 2).

The main aim of this section is an account of the main approaches to the problem of linguistic politeness and impoliteness and their evaluation for the aim of analysing the issues pertaining to linguistic impoliteness and verbal aggression. The approaches to politeness discussed below include a summary account of Grice (1975), Leech (1983), Sperber and Wilson (1986) and Brown and Levinson (1987). The issue of impoliteness is discussed with reference to Culpeper (1996) and Bousfield (2008), whose work constitutes perhaps the most comprehensive account of the issues of linguistic impoliteness up to date.

3.1.1. Grice (1975)

A meaningful discussion of how interlocutors cooperate in conversation must start with Grice (1975), and his general Cooperation Principle (hereafter CP):

Make your conversational contribution such as it is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

(Grice, 1975: 45)

CP is assumed to be a universal principle of interpersonal communication. From this general principle Grice derives four general categories of conversational maxims:

- I. Maxim of Quantity
 - a. Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current purposes of exchange)
 - b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required

- II. Maxim of Quality
 - a. Do not say what you believe to be false
 - b. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence

- III. Maxim of relation: Be relevant

- IV. Maxim of manner: be perspicuous
 - a. Avoid obscurity of expression
 - b. Avoid ambiguity
 - c. Be brief
 - d. Be orderly

(Grice, 1975: 45-6)

Grice argues that in the absence of indications to the contrary speakers generally abide by these principles for the task of successful conversational cooperation.

Consider (75):

(75)

A: Where is the monkey wrench

B: It's on the closet by the window.

In the above exchange, by answering A's question, B makes their statement just as required for the current purpose (Quantity), there is no indicator that the contribution is false (Quality), the answer is relevant to the question (Relevance) and the manner of exchange is such that allows for successful communication of the message (Manner). Generally, all other things being equal, we observe CP and the Maxims of conversation and we expect that others do the same.

Grice (1975: 49) notes, however, that there are a number of cases wherein a speaker may fail to fulfil a particular maxim. Such non-observance of maxims may take a number of forms:

I. Violating a maxim:

Covert and unostentatious non-observance, which – as Grice (1975: 46) – notes makes the speaker liable to mislead.

II. Opting out of a maxim:

Ostentatious and disclosed non-observance of a maxim e.g. I cannot say more as an example of opting out the maxim of quantity

III. A clash of maxims:

Situations wherein speaker may be unable to fulfil a certain maxim without violating another one.

IV. Flouting a maxim:

Blatant non-observance of a maxim. This blatancy in Grice's terms gives rise to conversational implicature, in that the contribution is blatantly infringing on a maxim and forces the interlocutor to re-evaluate the sentence's meaning.

Grice's (1975) account of CP and conversational maxims does not shed a clear light on the problems of linguistic politeness and impoliteness. Grice (1975:47) notes that apart from conversational maxims there are maxims of aesthetic, social or moral value – such as “Be polite”, which under normal circumstances are followed in conversation. This issue, however, is not sufficiently elaborated on in his account.

Bousfield (2008: 25-9) – after Thomas (1986) – accuses Grice's CP of being a principle of linguistic cooperation concerned with making sure that the addressee understands the addressor's message. As such, therefore, CP is not concerned with social norms of linguistic politeness. Moreover, Bousfield (2008: 30-1) notes that Grice's account of CP and conversational maxims provides a list of cooperation principles which are relative and, thus, ill-suited for the purposes of their practical application. What follows in the next section is a description of an alternative approach which draws upon Grice's (1975) account.

3.1.2. Leech (1983)

Leech's (1983) approach to politeness draws on Grice (1975) in that he adopts Grice's Cooperative Principle in his model of Interpersonal Rhetoric. Leech (1983: 80-2) notes that Grice's CP explains how speakers – through flouting certain maxims – convey the meaning of messages, which subsequently has to be worked out on the basis of conversational implicature. However, it does not account for *why* speakers employ such tactic. In order to explain that, Leech proposes an number of additional principles working alongside CP. The most significant of them is Politeness Principle (hereafter PP). Leech sees PP as a necessary complement to CP, which rescues PP from serious difficulties in its practical application. PP may be formulated in its negative and positive form:

NEGATIVE POLITENESS:

Minimize (other things being equal) the expression of impolite beliefs

POSITIVE POLITENESS:

Maximize (other things being equal) the expression of polite beliefs

(Leech, 1983: 81)

Leech sees CP and PP as complementary, however he suggests that it is possible to argue for a higher regulatory role of PP. While CP is responsible for ensuring that interlocutors remain cooperative in a conversation, PP's function is to maintain an appropriate social balance between the interlocutors and mutually friendly relations between them for the purpose of successful communication. Thus, Leech argues, PP can overrule CP, as in polite requests, exemplified in (76), where the maxims falling under CP (in particular the maxims of QUANTITY and QUALITY) are violated in order to minimize the expression of impolite beliefs through an indirect speech act.

(76) You couldn't help me move these tables, could you?

Leech (1983: 132-3) enumerates six maxims following from PP, each of which can be divided into two sub-maxims referring to negative and positive politeness:

	NEGATIVE POLITENESS	POSITIVE POLITENESS
I. TACT MAXIM	a) Minimize cost to other	b) Maximize benefit to other
II. GENEROSITY MAXIM	a) Minimize benefit to self	b) Maximize benefit to other
III. APPROBATION MAXIM	a) Minimize dispraise of other	b) Maximize praise of other
IV. MODESTY MAXIM	a) Minimize praise of self	b) Maximize dispraise of self
V. AGREEMENT MAXIM	a) Minimize disagreement between self and other	b) Maximize agreement between self and other
VI. SYMPATHY MAXIM	a) Minimize antipathy between self and other	b) Maximize sympathy between self and other.

Figure 12. Maxims of politeness (Leech, 1983: 132)

In all of the above sub-maxims *self* refers to the speaker, while *other* may refer to the addressee and any other third party involved in conversation.

In discussing the above maxims, Leech (1983: 133) proposes a certain hierarchy by noting that not all of the above are of the same importance. Maxim I appears to be more significant than Maxim II. Similarly, Maxim III provides stronger constraint on conversational behaviour than Maxim IV. Furthermore, in each of the paired sub-maxims, a) appears to be more significant than b); negative politeness seems to be a more powerful constraint than positive politeness, since speakers' predominant conversational imperative is minimizing the expression of impolite beliefs over maximizing the expression of polite beliefs towards other.

Within Leech's model of Interpersonal Rhetoric CP and PP are mutually complementary *first order maxims*. Leech (1983: 146-9) – rather tentatively – lists two more first-order principles: The Interest Principle (Say what is unpredictable, and hence interesting) and the Pollyanna Principle (prefer pleasant topics of

conversation to unpleasant ones). From the point of view of the aim of this thesis, it is also interesting to have a look at two *higher-order* (or *second-order*) principles in the model of Leech's Interpersonal Rhetoric, namely Irony (mock politeness) and Banter (mock impoliteness) Principle. Leech (1983: 142-4) describes Irony as a second-order principle, since its function is explainable only in terms of first-order principles. Irony Principle (hereafter IP) enables speaker to be impolite while seemingly being polite by superficially breaking CP in order to uphold it as a final effect. It realises that through breaking either the maxim of Quality or Quantity:

(77) That's all I wanted!

(78) With friends like him, who needs enemies?

(79) Bill wanted that news like he wanted a hole in the head.

(Leech, 1983: 142)

As Leech notes, the ironic force of an illocution is often signalled by exaggeration or understatement, e.g. in (77) the presence of *all* makes the hearer less likely to interpret the statement at its face-value and thus missing the ironic effect. As Leech notes, another factor signalling irony is particular mode of sentence intonation.

Banter (mock politeness) constitutes the opposite of irony, in that it constitutes an impolite (at face-value) way of being friendly or even intimate. Leech (1983: 144-5) provides a number of examples of mock impoliteness:

(80) What a mean cowardly trick (as referring to a particularly clever move)

(81) Here comes trouble!

(82) Look what the cat's brought in!

In the above examples, impoliteness, which necessarily for the banter effect must be understood as insincere, has the virtue of establishing and strengthening the positive bond between interlocutors. The mechanism here is based on the fact that low position on the scale of politeness is correlated with low value on the scale of authority and social distance. Hence, by the virtue of being impolite at face-value, speakers signal the familiarity and intimacy between them. Since banter

utterances may make use of IP, as well as other principles, Leech (1983: 145) suggests that banter could be called a *third-order principle*.

The following figure summarizes Leech's (1983) model of interpersonal rhetoric:

<i>First-order principles</i>	<i>Higher-order principles</i>	<i>Contributory maxims</i>
Cooperative Principle		Quantity Quality Relation Manner
Politeness Principle		Tact Generosity Approbation Modesty Agreement Sympathy Phatic?
	Irony Banter	
Interest Principle		
Pollyana Principle		

Figure 13. Model of Interpersonal Rhetoric (Leech, 1983: 149)

Leech's account of Interpersonal Rhetoric may be criticised on several grounds concerning its application to the study of conflictive communication. Firstly, as Bousfield (2008: 48-9) notes – after Spencer-Oatey (2000), Spencer-Oatey and Jiang (2003) – Leech's maxims are described in terms of universal valences, whereby one pole of a maxim is seen as universally more desirable. However, there are numerous contexts which may alter the valences as they are presented by Leech. Bousfield (2008) discusses such contexts in his research data, referring e.g. to military context, the context of policing activities, and kitchen chores. Secondly, and more importantly, Bousfield (2008: 49-50) argues that Leech (1983) in stating that PP stands alongside and rescues CP adopts a view of CP as a social-goal-sharing principle concerned with building a positive rapport between the interlocutors for the purpose of successful communication. However, Leech

does not discuss how his model of Interpersonal Rhetoric may account for conflictive or aggressive communication. Thus, Leech's model may be used and implemented only when it is concerned with an explanation of linguistic politeness. As such, though, it appears to be ill-suited for the discussion of impoliteness and abusive language.

3.1.3. Sperber and Wilson (1986)

Sperber and Wilson's (1986) ostensive-inferential theory of relevance seeks to place the study of linguistic implicature on more empirically cognitive grounds than the ones proposed by Grice (Bousfield, 2008: 31). A core interest of Sperber and Wilson is how speakers construct the inferred meaning in a given context. In the light of relevance theory interpersonal communication starts with an act of ostensive behaviour (ostension), whereby the speaker (S) communicates to the hearer (H) his or her intentions and H is thus engaged in the process of inference. Thus, Sperber and Wilson (1986: 50-54) equate ostensive and inferential communication, which they perceive as interpersonal communicative encounter from the perspective of S and H respectively. Labouring under the influence of S's ostension, H must infer the intended meaning based on the context of the utterance. S's ostensive behaviour may point to an element or elements of context H has previously ignored, thus giving rise to a particular set of assumptions. H, however, does not make his or her judgement based on any randomly chosen assumptions allowed by the context. The information processed must be *relevant* to H, in that – in connection with the already-possessed data – it provides grounds for the act of adequate inference. Thus, "the act of ostension carries the guarantee of relevance" (Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 46-50).

Sperber and Wilson (1986: 123-8) claim that in deciding which particular assumption is relevant in a given context H weighs whether an assumption has an adequate contextual effect. Furthermore, H undertakes an estimate of conceptual effort he/she must indulge in to process information. Thus, the degree of relevance of a particular assumption is evaluated based on the scale of contextual effect and cognitive effort on the part of H:

RELEVANCE

- a. *Extent condition 1*: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that its contextual effects in this context are large.
- b. *Extent condition 2*: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that the effort required to process it in this context is small.

Sperber and Wilson (1986: 125)

Thus, a low degree of contextual effect and a high scale of cognitive effort required coincide in insignificant relevance of an assumption, while a high scale of contextual effect and a low degree of cognitive effort maximize the relevance of an assumption in a given context.

Sperber and Wilson (1986: 158) describe the principle of relevance (hereafter PoR) in the following way:

PRINCIPLE OF RELEVANCE

Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance.

In their analysis, PoR is the governing ostensive-inferential principle subsuming Grice's CP and conversational maxims. PoR operates universally and is applied intuitively by interlocutors. They do not have to possess the explicit knowledge of the principle and are not in the position to flout or otherwise fail to observe it. Sperber and Wilson also advocate the potential of the theory of relevance to account for both explicit and implicit ostensive communication (Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 161-3).

However, the theory of relevance makes no explicit reference to the study of linguistic politeness. Moreover, Sperber and Wilson's approach appears to contest the regulative role of linguistic cooperation. Sperber and Wilson (1986: 161-2) state that:

[...] Grice assumes that communication involves a greater degree of cooperation than we do. For us, the only purpose that a genuine communicator and a willing audience necessarily have in common is to

achieve successful communication: that is, to have the communicator's informative intention recognized by the audience. Grice (1975: 45) assumes that communication must have "a common purpose or a set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction" [...] This does not follow from the principle of relevance, and is not automatically conveyed by every ostensive stimulus. Knowledge of such a common purpose, when it exists, is one contextual factor among others, and it is only as such that it can play a role in comprehension.

Such position appears to be at risk of failing to recognize the importance of politeness for the study of communication. In Xie's (2003: 811) terms:

To ignore politeness studies entails running the risk of miscommunication, conflict and friction, among other things. In other words, where there is communication, there is politeness study.

Furthermore, Bousfield (2008: 31-2) accuses the theory of relevance of being – at its best – the theory of the perception and interpretation of politeness. Thus, the theory over-privileges the role of H at the expense of S, while a successful theory of (im)politeness must successfully and comprehensively account for the role of both interlocutors (cf. Watts, 2003: 23).

Taking this into account, I will turn to a more exhaustive account of linguistic politeness as proposed by Brown and Levinson (1986).

3.1.4. Brown and Levinson (1987)

Brown and Levinson's (1987) develop their face management theory on the basis of Goffman's (1967) concept of *face*, which is defined as:

[...] the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes – albeit an image that others may share, as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for himself.

(Goffman, 1967: 5)

Goffman (1967: 6) goes on to state that a person tends to experience emotional responses to their face. The nature of these emotional responses results from interpersonal encounters between the person and the others; the person may "feel

good,” “feel bad,” or experience no strong emotional response depending on whether and to what extent his or her needs and expectations have been fulfilled in the context of the interpersonal encounter.

Brown and Levinson (1987: 61) define *face* as “ [...] the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself.” They point out that the notion can be analysed in its two aspects:

NEGATIVE FACE: the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction - i.e. to freedom of action and freedom from imposition

POSITIVE FACE: the positive consistent image or “personality” (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants.

Brown and Levinson (1987: 62) define negative and positive face in terms of one’s personal desires or needs:

NEGATIVE FACE: the want of every “competent adult member” that his actions be unimpeded by others

POSITIVE FACE: the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others.

Thus, negative face is defined in terms of the freedom to perform an action, while positive face refers to a person’s wants of desirability, approbation, likeability, understanding and admiration from others.

Brown and Levinson’s face management view provides an account of how interlocutors redress the affronts to their face, which are realised by *face threatening acts* (FTAs). FTAs are defined as verbal or non-verbal acts of communication, which “by their nature run contrary to the face wants of the addressee and/or of the speaker” (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 65).

Brown and Levinson (1987: 65-8) go on to provide the following classification of FTAs:

I. Acts threatening the hearer's face

1. Acts threatening negative face of the hearer

- a. Acts that predicate some future act of S and put some pressure on H to do (or refrain from doing) the act
 - i. orders and requests
 - ii. suggestions, advice
 - iii. reminders
 - iv. threats, warning, dares
- b. Acts that predicate some positive future act of S towards H and put some pressure on H to accept or reject them
 - i. offers
 - ii. promises
- c. Acts that predicate some desire of S toward H or H's goods, which gives H reason to think that he might be forced to protect the goods
 - i. compliments, expressions of envy or admiration
 - ii. expressions of strong (negative) emotions towards H – e.g. hatred, anger, lust (S indicates possible motivation for harming H or H's goods)

2. Acts threatening positive face of the hearer

- a. Acts that show that S has a negative evaluation of some aspect of H's positive face
 - i. expressions of disapproval, criticism, contempt or ridicule, complaints or reprimands, accusations, insults
 - ii. contradictions or disagreements, challenges
- b. Acts that show that S doesn't care about H's positive face
 - i. expressions of violent (out-of control) emotions, irreverence, mention of taboo topics, including those that are inappropriate in the context
 - ii. bringing of bad news about H or good news (boasting) about S
 - iii. raising dangerously emotional or divisive topics
 - iv. blatant non-cooperation in an activity
 - v. use of address terms and other status-marked identifications in initial encounters

II. Acts threatening the speaker's face

1. Acts threatening negative face of the speaker

- a. Acts that offend S's negative face
 - i. expressing thanks
 - ii. acceptance of H's thanks or H's apology
 - iii. excuses
 - iv. acceptance of offers
 - v. responses to H's *faux pas*
 - vi. S's unwilling promises

2. Acts threatening positive face of the speaker

- a. Acts that directly damage S's positive face
- b. apologies
- c. acceptance of compliments
- d. breakdown of physical control over body, bodily leakage, stumbling or falling down etc.
- e. self-humiliation, shuffling or cowering, acting stupid, self-contradicting
- f. confessions, admissions of guilt or responsibility
- g. emotion leakage, non-control of laughter or tears

Brown and Levinson's (1987: 68) note that interlocutors in a conversation typically seek to avoid FTAs or implement certain strategies to minimize threat to the face of their own and the face of others. Thus, in the context of interpersonal encounter and confronted with a possible FTA, speakers may utilize one of the following strategies (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 68-70):

- I. **BALD ON-RECORD STRATEGY** (performing FTA on record without a redressing action): the most direct, unveiled and concise way of communication possible (e.g. *Do sit down!*). This strategy is normally implemented when S does not fear H's reaction.
- II. **POSITIVE POLITENESS** (performing FTA on-record with a redressive action orientated towards the positive face of H): strategy based on indicating that S cares about at least some of the positive face wants of H. This strategy is realised e.g. by treating H as a friend or a cared-for member of the in-group). A possible threat to the face is mitigated by fulfilling some of H's positive face wants.
- III. **NEGATIVE POLITENESS** (performing FTA on-record with a redressive action orientated towards the negative face of H): strategy based on indicating that S cares about at least some of the negative face wants of H. This is realised through ensuring H that S will not, or will only to the minimal extent possible, infringe on H's freedom of action. Linguistic

exponents of this strategy are self-effacement, formality, restraint and indirectness. A possible threat to the face is mitigated by fulfilling some of H's negative face wants.

- IV. OFF-RECORD STRATEGY: performing FTA off-record, thus giving H more than one possibility of interpreting S's illocution. This strategy is typically realised through linguistic ambiguity. By employing this strategy S attains a status in which "he cannot be held to have committed himself to one particular intent," leaving the intended meaning of the utterance negotiable (e.g. *Damn, I'm out of cash. I forgot to go to the bank today* when S intends to borrow some money from H).
- V. DON'T DO THE FTA: FTA avoidance strategy deployed when FTA is so threatening the S or H's face that S decides it is best to withdraw and do not perform FTA.

Brown and Levinson (1987: 71-4) note that in order to decide which strategy should be used in a particular conversational context, interlocutors' decision is based on the perceived extent of threat to the addressor or the addressee's face. Thus, if there is little threat perceived, the addressor tends to deploy more indirect and perspicuous strategies (e.g. bald on-record). If the threat to the face is significant, the addressor's tendency switches towards more avoidance-based strategies (e.g. off-record), even as far as implementing strategy V. Hence, Brown and Levinson's classification is structured in terms of hierarchy based on the perceived threat to the face. This is summarised in *figure 14*:




Figure 14. Hierarchy of FTA strategies (Brown and Levinson, 1986: 69)

When faced with the possibility of performing an FTA, the addressor may decide to do the FTA or not to do the FTA. If the latter option is chosen, no possible threat to the face is realised; however, this also results in not verbalizing his or her wants or intentions. If the addressor decides to do the FTA, he or she may go *on*

record or *off record*. Going on record refers to direct and unambiguous conveying of the addressor's message. Going off record refers to conveying one's message in a purposefully ambiguous way, so that one cannot be held accountable for the message conveyed. Thus, in (83) and (84) the speaker goes on record and off record respectively:

- (83) I (hereby) promise to come tomorrow.
 (84) Damn, I'm out of cash, I forgot to go to the bank today (as a request for a loan).

If the speaker decides to go on record, he or she may do so with or without a redressive action. Going on record *without a redressive action* (*baldly*) involves doing FTA in the most "direct, clear, unambiguous and concise way possible," e.g. as in issuing a direct order:

- (85) Do the dishes.

Brown and Levinson (1987:69) state that FTA's are normally performed this way when the addressor does not fear retribution from the addressee. This may be e.g. due to the circumstances wherein the urgency or efficiency of communication is of primary importance, wherein the threat to addressee's face is very small, or if the addressor is vastly superior in power than the addressee. An alternative on record strategy involves the use of a *redressive action*, i.e. actions which "give face" to the interlocutor. Such actions are aimed at minimizing a possible face damage by indicating that no such damage is intended. Such redressive actions may take the form of either *positive politeness* or *negative politeness*. Positive politeness – as noted above – is aimed at recognizing the positive needs of the speaker, such as the need of being appreciated and belonging to the in-group. Negative politeness is concerned with the negative needs of the speaker of being unimpeded in his or her freedom of action.

Brown and Levinson's (1987) face management view of politeness is criticised by Bousfield (2008) on three grounds. Firstly, the *bald on-record* superstrategy, as it is described by Brown and Levinson is a *form-based* strategy, as opposed to *function-based* strategies of positive and negative politeness. Moreover, the off-record strategy stands in this account as a separate category, unrelated to the theoretical-functional framework of face. Bousfield, thus, argues for a model of

FTAs wherein on-record and off-record strategies are necessarily linked to Positive and Negative Politeness (Bousfield, 2008: 60-5), as illustrated in *figure 15* below:




Figure 15. Revised politeness hierarchy (Bousfield, 2006: 65)

Secondly, Bousfield (2008: 65-67) after Werkhoffer (1992) observes that Brown and Levinson's approach is biased towards reconstructing the rationality of speakers who – based on their positive and negative wants – engage in what they try to make a polite conversation.¹² The discussion of conflictive situations, which by their nature may subsume a different model of interlocutors, is largely excluded from this view. Also, Brown and Levinson's static and hierarchical model does not fully account for the dynamics of face-maintaining processes of the speaker and the addressee (and sometimes a third party) who are engaged in a particular conversational context. Thirdly – and perhaps the most importantly – for the reasons mentioned above, the face management view, as it is presented by Brown and Levinson (1987) seems to be inadequate for a detailed study of conflictive situations, impoliteness and insults. In Bousfield's (2008: 56) terms:

¹² Cf. the concept of Model Person (MP) in Brown and Levinson (1987: 59-8)

[...] Brown and Levinson's approach is clearly a theory interested in the creation of social harmony and social cooperation. [...] there is nothing *explicit* on confrontational or disharmonious communication, which is ultimately indicated through, I argue, impoliteness.

For this reason, for a comprehensive view of insults, it is necessary to refer explicitly to the theory of impoliteness. In the following sections I shall discuss the approaches to the study of linguistic impoliteness as proposed by Culpeper (1996) and Bousfield (2008).

3.1.5. Culpeper (1996)

Bousfield (2008: 90) compliments Culpeper (1996) for putting forward a viable theoretical framework for the study of impoliteness and providing some empirical data for the aim of testing the model. Due to its verifiability against real-life language data and its applicability in numerous studies of conflictive situations, Bousfield considers Culpeper's account of impoliteness to be the most promising working model to provide the basis for his own approach. Unlike Leech (1983) and Brown and Levinson (1987), whose views tend to favour politeness and treat it as a default position in a conversation, Culpeper (1996) argues that in some contexts (e.g. the military context) impoliteness, rather than being a marginal human activity, is a standard interpersonal attitude. Therefore, there is a strong need for an adequate description of linguistic impoliteness. Thus, Culpeper's aim is to focus on strategies that are aimed at causing "social disruption" through attacking the face of the interlocutor(s). For this purpose, Culpeper adopts Brown and Levinson's (1980) notions of face and FTAs and applies them to the analysis of impoliteness.

Culpeper (1996: 354) notes that the reasons for being impolite vary: sometimes being impolite is a sign of a higher status than your interlocutor, since a more powerful party has more freedom to attack the interlocutor's face. Alternatively, being impolite may be a means of trying to negotiate your status in a given context. In other contexts, still, it is contrary to the participant's interest to maintain the face of the other (e.g. in interpersonal encounters which constitute zero-sum games) or a long-term aim may be achieved through employing a short-term impoliteness strategy (e.g. in the court of law).

Drawing on Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness strategies, Culpeper (1996: 356) enumerates the following impoliteness strategies, which are means of attacking the interlocutor's face:

- I. **BALD ON-RECORD IMPOLITENESS** – the FTA is performed in a direct, clear, unambiguous and concise way in circumstances where face is not irrelevant or minimised [...]
- II. **POSITIVE IMPOLITENESS** – the use of strategies designed to damage the addressee's positive face wants.
- III. **NEGATIVE IMPOLITENESS** – the use of strategies designed to damage the addressee's negative face wants.
- IV. **SARCASM OR MOCK POLITENESS** – the FTA is performed with the use of politeness strategies that are obviously insincere, and thus remain surface realisations [...]
- V. **WITHOLD POLITENESS** – the absence of politeness work where it would be expected.

The above categories refer directly to Brown and Levinson (1987), but with two important differences. Firstly, Culpeper (1996) considers sarcasm to be a separate impoliteness super-strategy, while Brown and Levinson see it as an off-record strategy, typically employed to perform a critical remark towards the other (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 262-5). Secondly, Brown and Levinson's bald on-record strategy applies to cases where there is little face at stake, and thus FTA is performed without a redressive action. In contrast, Culpeper's bald on-record impoliteness is employed precisely when the threat to face is significant, thus constituting a direct and unambiguous attack on the interlocutor's face.

Culpeper (1996: 357-8) names the following positive and negative impoliteness strategies:

- I. **Positive impoliteness output strategies:**
 - a. Ignore, snub the other – fail to acknowledge the other's presence
 - b. Exclude the other from an activity
 - c. Dissociate from the other – for example deny association or common ground with the other; avoid sitting together
 - d. Be disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic
 - e. Use inappropriate identity markers – for example, use title and surname when a close relationship pertains, or a nickname when a distant relationship pertains.

- f. Use obscure or secretive language - for example mystify the other with jargon, or use a code known to others in the group, but not the target.
- g. Seek disagreement – select a sensitive topic.
- h. Make the other feel uncomfortable – for example do not avoid silence, joke or use of small talk.
- i. Use taboo words – swear, or use abusive or profane language.
- j. Call the other names – use derogatory nominations

II. Negative impoliteness output strategies:

- a. Frighten – instil a belief that action detrimental to the other will occur.
- b. Condescend, scorn or ridicule – emphasize your relative power. Be contemptuous. Do not treat the other seriously. Belittle the other (e.g. use diminutives).
- c. Invade the other's space – literally (e.g. position yourself closer to the other than the relationship permits) or metaphorically (e.g. ask for or speak about information which is too intimate given the relationship).
- d. Explicitly associate the other with a negative aspect – personalize, use the pronouns *I* and *you*.
- e. Put the other's indebtedness on record.

Culpeper notes that the above list is open-ended and other strategies can be added to it.

Culpeper (1996: 359-66) goes on to analyse how the above theoretical framework of impoliteness is realised in language data taken from army training camps and drama dialogues. This is what Bousfield (2008: 90) considers to be a significant merit of Culpeper's approach. Based on real life data, this kind of analysis has provided the framework for others interested in the problem of impoliteness (cf. Culpeper et al., 2003; Cashman, 2006) Furthermore – as Bousfield (2008: 87) notes – Culpeper considers cases wherein politeness work is not carried out though it is expected (withhold politeness). This is a significant possibility, not always accounted for in other impoliteness studies (cf. Lachenicht, 1980).

However, Bousfield (2008: 89-91) observes some weaknesses in Culpeper's (1996) approach. Firstly, similarly to Brown and Levinson (1987), Culpeper (1996) does not account for instances wherein (im)politeness strategies can be mixed in discourse. Secondly, the open-endedness of the categories of positive and negative impoliteness strategies proposed by Culpeper (1996) may cause some methodological difficulties in trying to delineate a coherent and theoretical

model of impoliteness. Thirdly, and most importantly, according to Bousfield (2008: 92-4), Culpeper (1996) neglects to perceive face as a multi-faceted phenomenon; in a particular context interlocutors tend to employ different mixed sets of positive and negative impoliteness strategies. Thus, in Bousfield terms, there is no methodological reason to differentiate between positive and negative impoliteness while analysing real-life language data. Taking this into account, Bousfield (2008) provides his own model of impoliteness presented below.

3.1.6. Bousfield (2008)

Bousfield's (2008) own approach to impoliteness comes as a response to Leech (1983), Lachenicht (1980), Brown and Levinson (1987) and is a modified version of Culpeper (1996; 2005). Bousfield's aim is to apply discourse analysis to the discussion of data taken from a number of documentary programmes where one may expect impolite utterances to occur. These include programmes on police and military training, policing activities, restaurant kitchen work, traffic wardens routines. For the reasons described above in sections 3.1.4 and 3.1.5 Bousfield disregards bald on-record impoliteness strategy and conflates positive and negative impoliteness under one heading. Bousfield (2008: 95) proposes the following set of superstrategies for impoliteness:

I. On record impoliteness

The use of strategies designed to *explicitly*

- a. attack the face of an interactant
- b. construct the face of an interactant in a non-harmonious or outright conflictive way
- c. deny the expected face wants, needs, or rights of the interactant, or some combination thereof

The attack is made in an unambiguous way given the context in which it occurs.

II. Off-record impoliteness

The use of strategies where the threat or damage to an interactant face is conveyed indirectly by way of [Gricean] implicature and can be cancelled (e.g. denied) [...], given the context in which it occurs.

- a. Sarcasm
Sarcasm constitutes the use of individual or combined strategies which, on the surface, appear to be appropriate but which are

meant to be taken as meaning the opposite in terms of face-management [...]

b. Withhold politeness

[...] withhold politeness where politeness would appear to be expected or mandatory [...]

Throughout the remainder of his book Bousfield (2008) discusses the use of the above strategies in his data collection. What follows is a short summary of his main findings.

Bousfield (2008: 101-43) discusses different impoliteness strategies which are evident in his data. In particular, he discusses Culpeper's (1996) categories – (e.g. snub, dissociate from the other, be uninterested, use inappropriate identity markers, use taboo words, sarcasm/mock politeness). Bousfield also considers cases which are not directly covered by Culpeper, such as criticising, hindering/blocking, enforcing role shift or challenging the interlocutor. He also gives an account of some prosodic aspects of impoliteness (e.g. shouting), a discussion elaborated in greater detail in Culpeper et al. (2003).

Bousfield (2008: 145-167) goes on to discuss the dynamics of impoliteness at the level of single utterances. He observes that in actual impolite exchanges there is usually an interplay of different strategies employed by the interlocutors. Thus, Bousfield investigates three different consecutive stages of an impolite utterance. Firstly, there are *pre-impoliteness strategies*, which announce the impoliteness strategies following them or which are aimed at getting the addressee's attention. Secondly, there are two types of complex *utterance middles*; the speaker may decide to repeatedly use the same impoliteness (super)strategy, or to employ a mix of different strategies in a single utterance. Finally, there are *utterance ends*, which consist of post-intensifying interrogatives, whose function is to force feedback from the addressee or to further intimidate them through enforcing the speaker's position. Bousfield illustrates the realisation of these stages by means of examples taken from his data.

In his following two chapters, Bousfield discusses the dynamics of impoliteness at the level of discourse, with interactants' utterances analysed in the context of the whole impoliteness event. Arguably, this discussion provides the most

comprehensive view of impoliteness in its different contexts and will resonate strongly with the corpus analysis of insults proposed in chapter 5. The following is my summary of Bousfield (2008: 169-221). I consciously exclude from the discussion below Bousfield's account of the role of the turn-taking system in impolite conversations (Bousfield, 2008: 223-260). The reason for that is that although this account provides additional information and allows for a more comprehensive study of the data given, the methodology of my corpus analysis presented in chapter 5.0 of the present thesis does not focus on such considerations.

Discussing the dynamics of impoliteness at the level of discourse, Bousfield (2008: 169-221) again focuses on discourse beginnings, discourse middles and discourse ends.

Discourse beginnings are discussed relative to the context in which they appear. Bousfield (2008: 169-83) refers here to the broad meaning of context, incorporating the physical, social and psychological background of impolite utterances. This context provides a complex set of factors influencing the choice and use of impoliteness strategies in a given interaction (e.g. physical circumstances, presence of audience or other parties, social status of interlocutors, power relations between them). Moreover, discourse roles, apart from the speaker and the addressee, include numerous other interactants, whose actions or presence may influence the course of impolite exchanges (e.g., bystanders, overhearers). Finally, the context of a given situation instils the interactants with appropriate background knowledge, which is relevant to the course of the exchange. Relative to the discussion of the context of the exchange, Bousfield (2008: 183-7) adopts Jay's (1992) concept of the offending event to give an account of how the impoliteness is triggered. In accordance with Jay (1992)¹³ Bousfield analyses different factors connected with the offender (e.g. age, status, ethnic group) and different types of offending events triggering the use of impoliteness.

Bousfield's (2008: 186-206) discussion of discourse middles focuses on the ways in which an addressee of an utterance may react when faced with impoliteness. The addressee may choose to respond or not respond. The lack of response may

¹³ See section 4.4.4.

have numerous reasons. It may be an attempt to save one's face, refusal to have a further conversation, silent accepting of the addressor's FTA, or simple misunderstanding of the impolite message amongst others. If the addressee decides to respond, he or she must choose between countering and accepting FTA. Countering FTA may be based on offensive vs. defensive countering strategies. Offensive strategies are based on countering FTA through an attack on the speaker's face. Defensive strategies take numerous forms, including abrogation (role switching), ignoring the face attack, offering an account for one's actions, pleading or opting out of the conversation. Below is Bousfield's summary of response options.




Figure 16. A summary of response options (Bousfield, 2008: 203)

The scalar representation of Offensive-Defensive options indicates that an offensive response strategy may have a secondary effect of defending one's own face, and a defensive strategy may simultaneously be a means of offending the interactant.

Bousfield's (2008: 206-17) discussion of discourse ends focuses on how a conflict situation may be resolved, including physically and/or verbally submitting to one's opponent, dominant third party intervention, compromise, stand-off or withdrawal. Without going into details here, it is useful to state, that some of these means of resolving verbal conflict will be discussed also in the corpus analysis of

insults (chapter 5). As a final part of his analysis, Bousfield (2008: 219) proposes the following extended summary of response options:




Figure 17. An extended summary of response options (Bousfield, 2008: 219)

The model shown in *figure 17* starts with Participant 1 engaging in a triggering event sparking Participant's 2 action. Participant 2 may thus decide either to respond or to withdraw from the exchange by not responding. If the first possibility is chosen, Participant 2 may either deny the opposing position or accept the opposing position (submit). Denying the opposing position may take the form of either countering Participant's 1 remark or producing a compromise. Finally, countering Participant 1 may involve defensive or offensive remarks. Regardless of which course of action Participant 1 takes, his or her decision may lead to a possible standoff wherein neither side wants to withdraw from the situation. Participant's 2 decision may also be seen by Participant 1 as an antecedent event or FTA which requires further retaliatory verbal actions. Thus, Participant's 2 reaction to the original triggering event – for which Participant 1 is responsible – may itself constitute a triggering event sparking Participant's 1 action. In deciding on the course of the action Participant 1 faces the same decisions as Participant 2. Such repeated exchanges may result in the whole chains of mutual impoliteness acts. One realisation of these are insult chains discussed in section 5.2.7.

3.2. Insults and the theory of speech acts

The theory of speech acts has emerged largely as a reaction to a particular brand of philosophical positivism according to which unless a sentence could be verifiable in relation to its truth or falsity, it was strictly speaking *meaningless* (Levinson, 1983: 226-7). This approach, wielding a significant influence on the classical approach to sentential analysis¹⁴, has been challenged by J. L. Austin, whose posthumous work has been re-evaluated and modified by J. R. Searle. Due to the complexity of philosophical background work concerning the theory of speech acts and the incredible width of different contemporary approaches to the speech acts issues, the following section does not provide even a cursory overview of the speech acts enterprise as a whole. What follows below is a summary account of the crucial problems indispensable for the corpus analysis of

¹⁴ See section 1.2

the speech act of insults in section 5.3. The issues raised in the present section are centred around a brief account of Austin (1975) and Searle (1977; 1981), the cognitive linguistics approach to the problem of speech acts and Grzegorzczkova's (1991) analysis of the speech acts of insults, whose approach is re-evaluated in section 5.3 in order to provide a comprehensive view of insults as a speech act from the cognitive perspective.

3.2.1 Austin (1975)

The contemporary study of speech acts has been inspired by Austin (1975), whose theory has emerged in opposition to the trend of strict logical positivism, permeating philosophy throughout the first half of the 20th century. In accordance with this trend, the meaning of sentences has been primarily judged based on their truth-value, i.e. sentences have been tested for their truth or falsity – in order to be considered meaningful. Austin's work diverges from such assumptions. He discusses expressions which cannot be described as “true or false” and signify and constitute the *doing* an action. His examples include:

- (86) *I do* (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife) – as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony.
- (87) *I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth* – as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem.
- (88) *I give and bequeath my watch to my brother* – as occurring in a will.
- (89) *I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.*

(Austin, 1975: 5)

Austin calls this group of expressions *performatives* as opposed to *constatives*. Performatives, unlike constatives, do not describe or constate a given state or situation and, therefore, are not subject to truth-false logic. Instead, they invoke and bring about certain changes in the world. As Austin (1975: 6) puts it: “when I say, before the registrar or altar, *I do*, I am not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging in it.” Therefore, the initial constative/performative distinction in Austin's analysis is based on the assumption that the former are used to *say* things, while the latter are used to *do* things (hence the title of his work).

While analysing performatives, Austin observes that uttering performative sentences does not automatically bring about the desired effects. For instance, smashing a bottle against the stem of a ship and uttering an adequate formula does not necessarily bring about the result of naming the vessel. This is, for instance, when the person involved in the act of naming has not been authorized to perform the act. Austin calls such acts unhappy or *infelicitous* as opposed to happy or *felicitous* ones. Austin (1975: 14-15) proposed the following set of general felicity conditions for speech acts:

- (A. 1) There must exist a conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,
- (A. 2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.
- (B. 1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and
- (B. 2) completely.
- (Í. 1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts and feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in it and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts and feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further
- (Í. 1) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.

However, as Austin points out, these conditions do not have the same status. Whenever conditions (A. 1) to (B. 2) are not satisfied, the act in question is not successfully performed at all; it fails to come off. For instance, when the act of naming a marine vessel is performed by an unauthorized person (violation of condition A.1) or during a wedding ceremony the requisite formula is not pronounced correctly (violation of condition B.1), the act is not achieved; it does not come off. Austin calls this kind of infelicities *misfires*. On the other hand, in a violation of conditions (Í. 1) and (Í. 2), although the act is achieved, it is still unhappy in a way that it is insincere. For example, promising something without an intention to act accordingly is still a promise, but an insincere one; it is a “promise but...” This group of infelicities is called *abuses*.

Sentences (86) – (89) above exemplify the category of *explicit performatives*. They explicitly name the acts they that they are intended to perform. Austin

(1975: 32-3) discusses also the category of *implicit performatives*. His examples include:

- (90) Go!
- (91) There's a bull in the field!
- (92) I shall be there.

Utterances of this kind are also meant to invoke certain extralinguistic effects, however the act of ordering, promising etc. is not explicitly stated in the sentences. While analyzing implicit performatives, Austin notes that, depending on the context, they may have more than one function. For instance, example (91) may be uttered as a warning, a protest, or a statement. Moreover, there often seems to be no incongruity between an utterance being a performative sentence and having certain true-false value. Statement (91) as an act of warning is at the same time true if there is a bull in the field indeed. Therefore, the initial distinction between constatives – which “say” things – and performatives – which “do” things – may not be accurate. Austin thus restates his theory and as a result he proposes that each statement can be analysed in its three aspects:

- I. **Locutionary act:** the utterance of a sentence with a certain sense and utterance.
 - II. **Illocutionary act:** the act of informing, ordering, warning etc. by virtue of a conventional force associated with it.
 - III. **Perlocutionary act:** the act of bringing about or achieving certain (extralinguistic) effect, such as convincing, persuading, deterring etc.
- (Austin, 1975: 109)

Locutionary act is associated with the traditional understanding of the meaning of a sentence; it reflects the utterance level of act. Illocutionary force is connected with performing an act *in* saying something, i.e. it is focused on the speaker's intention. Finally, perlocutionary force can be described as an act of having a certain effect *by* saying something; it represents the outcome of a speech act and, as such, is predominantly hearer-oriented.

In Austin's analysis all three forces are necessarily connected in uttering a given speech act; uttering a locutionary act inadvertently means performing the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts connected with it. In order to illustrate that Austin (1975: 101-2) provides the following examples:

(93)

Act (A) or Locution

He said to me 'Shoot her' meaning by 'shoot' shoot and referring by 'her' to her.

Act (B) or Illocution

He urged (or advised, ordered, &c.) me to shoot her.

Act (C. *a*) or Perlocution

He persuaded me to shoot her.

Act (C. *b*) or Perlocution

He got me to (or made me, &c.) shoot her.

(94)

Act (A) or Locution

He said to me, 'You can't do that.'

Act (B) or Illocution

He protested against my doing it.

Act (C. *a*) or Perlocution

He pulled me up, checked me.

Act (C. *b*) or Perlocution

He stopped me, he brought me to my senses, &c.

He annoyed me.

In analysing the above instances Austin concedes that the three kinds of acts are intrinsically linked with each other and cannot be separated; all utterances exhibit at the same time locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary force. Thus – as Levinson (1983: 231) notes – Austin's argument undergoes a particular internal evolution from positing a clear distinction between constatives and performatives to the view of sentences as intrinsically complex acts which possess locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary force at the same time. In an effort to reconcile these two perspectives Austin (1975: 145-6) proposes that in case of constative sentences speakers abstract from the illocutionary and concentrate on the locutionary force of an utterance. On the other hand, in case of performatives the emphasis is put on the illocutionary force of the utterance.

Austin (1975: 151- 64) concludes his theory with a classification of speech acts. He distinguishes five general classes:

- I. **Verdictives** – characterized by the giving of a verdict, usually by a jury, arbitrator, or umpire (e.g. *convict, hold, estimate*).
- II. **Exercitives** – connected with exercising of powers, rights, or influence (e.g. *appoint, degrade, dismiss, excommunicate*).

- III. **Commissives** – typified by promising or otherwise undertaking (e.g. *promise, vow, guarantee*)
- IV. **Behabitives** – a group connected with a wide range of attitudes and social behaviour (e.g. *apologise, congratulate, condole*)
- V. **Expositives** – statements which point to how our utterances fit into the course of an argument or conversation (e.g. *reply, concede, argue*).

This classification has since been profusely discussed and modified. One version of such arguments is presented below.

3.2.2. Searle (1977; 1981)

Austin's enquiry into the problem of speech acts is further carried out by Searle (1977). Levinson (1985: 238) notes that Searle's theory is Austin's systematized, in part rigidified with inclinations towards general considerations about the philosophy of language. Searle (1977) in his analysis adopts Austin's distinction into distinct speech acts. However, he substitutes locutionary acts with two different types. Accordingly, his classification includes:

- I. **Utterance act**: the utterance of words (morphemes, sentences).
- II. **Propositional act**: referring and predicating.
- III. **Illocutionary act**: stating, questioning, commanding, promising etc.
- IV. **Perlocutionary act**: the consequences or effects illocutionary acts have on the actions, thoughts, or beliefs, etc. of hearers.

(Searle, 1977: 23-5)

Searle admits that in principle these categories may be further multiplied. For instance, it is possible to divide utterance acts into phonetic act, phonemic acts, morphemic acts etc. Searle – like Austin – is predominantly interested in illocutionary acts. Therefore, Searle (1977: 30) stresses the role of *illocutionary force indicating devices* (IFIDs). IFIDs are different linguistic ways of communicating what illocutionary act the speaker is performing in a given utterance. In English they include at least: word order, stress, intonation contour, punctuation, the mood of the verb, and performative verbs (e.g. *apologise, warn, state*). Searle concedes that in an actual speech event there is often no need for an explicit illocutionary force indicator, since the context may make it clear what the illocutionary force of the utterance is. One of Searle's aims is to search for *constitutive rules* of speech acts. These are the rules that underlie different

conventional ways of performing illocutionary acts in different languages. He attempts to establish a set of constitutive rules for the speech act of promising. What is important to note here is that Searle – much in accordance with the objectivist paradigm¹⁵ – treats these conditions as *necessary* and *sufficient*. To illustrate that consider Searle’s (1977: 57-61) analysis of the speech act of promises. A given act is a promise if and only if:

1. Normal input and output conditions obtain.
2. S (speaker) expresses the proposition that p in the utterance of T.
3. In expressing that p, S predicates a future act A of S.
4. H (hearer) would prefer S’s doing A to his not doing A.
5. It is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events.
6. S intends to do A.
7. S intends that the utterance of T will place him under an obligation to do A.
8. S intends (i-I) to produce in hearer the knowledge (K) that the utterance of T is to count as placing S under an obligation to do A. S intends to produce K by means of the recognition of i-I, and he intends i-I to be recognized in virtue of (by means of) H’s knowledge of the meaning of T.
9. The semantic rules of the dialect spoken by S and H are such that T is correctly and sincerely uttered if and only if conditions 1-8 obtain.

(Searle, 1977: 57-61)

Searle observes that conditions 1, 8 and 9 generally apply to all kinds of illocutionary acts and are not peculiar to promises. Conditions 2 and 3 establish the *propositional content* rule. Conditions 4 and 5 are labelled as *preparatory conditions*. Condition 6 is the basis for *sincerity rule*. Finally, condition 7 is considered in Searle’s analysis to be the *essential rule* for the illocutionary act of promising. Although Searle treats his conditions as necessary and sufficient, he himself has to allow for insincere promises, which he considers to be “promises nonetheless.” Accordingly, Searle (1977: 62) rephrases the sincerity condition in the following way:

6a. S intends that the utterance of T will make him responsible for intending to do A.

¹⁵ See section 1.3.

Apart from promises, Searle (1977: 66 - 67) applies the above approach to the study of other speech acts, including requests, warnings, greetings and congratulations. The common denominator which holds in all these cases is that they are analysed in terms of propositional content, preparatory, sincerity and essential conditions. These conditions are considered to be necessary and sufficient for a given speech act.

Apart from constitutive rules for different speech acts, Searle is also interested in developing their universal taxonomy. Searle (1981) criticises Austin's classification on the grounds that it focuses on illocutionary verbs, rather than illocutionary acts. Moreover – he claims – there seems to be no clear and consistent principle or set of principles on which Austin's taxonomy is constructed. Searle's own classification of illocutionary acts is based on 12 parameters, of which the most crucial are: the *illocutionary point* of an utterance, the direction of fit between words and the world (*world-to-word* or *word-to-world*) and the expressed psychological state of the speaker. On this basis Searle (1981) proposes the following taxonomy of illocutionary acts:

- I. **Assertives:** they commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition (e.g. *stating, concluding, deducing*)
- II. **Directives:** they constitute an attempt to get the hearer to do something (e.g. *requesting, ordering, inviting*)
- III. **Commissives:** they commit the speaker to some future course of action (e.g. *promising, vowing*)
- IV. **Expressives:** they express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about the state of affairs specified in the propositional content (e.g. *apologising, congratulating, condoling*)
- V. **Declaratives:** their successful performance brings about the correspondence between the propositional rule and reality (e.g. *appointing, baptising, excommunicating*)

Searle's classification also allows for the class of *assertive declarations*, i.e. declarations which at the same time, like assertives, are characterized by the sincerity condition. Examples of such expressions would include a football referee declaring offside or a judge issuing a verdict in the court of law.

Although put under criticism and refined by numerous authors (cf. Levinson, 1983: 240-3; Kalisz, 1993: 44-51), Searle's taxonomy still remains a significant

basis for the discussion of illocutionary acts classification. In the following section I shall briefly discuss the cognitive linguistics view of the study of speech acts.

3.2.3. The cognitive approach to speech acts analysis

The cognitive approach to speech acts analysis is based on the general premises operating within the cognitive paradigm. In cognitive linguistics meaning is equated with conceptualisation (Langacker, 1988c: 5). Therefore, cognitive linguists do not postulate clear *a priori* demarcation lines between semantic and pragmatic phenomena, and semantic and pragmatic knowledge (Langacker, 1988b: 57; Kalisz, 2001b: 13). The principle of *operational uniformity*, discussed in section 2.1 above, specifies that human cognitive processes operate across different levels of linguistic analysis. This is illustrated e.g. by numerous studies which focus on metonymic processes operating in pragmatics (e.g. Panther and Thornburg, 1999, 2003a; Hernández, 2007; Bierwiazzonek, 2013). Metonymic mappings in pragmatics can be observed e.g. in speech acts when one element of a cognitive scenario provides access to the illocutionary force of the utterance, as in POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy operating in the REQUEST scenario (*Can you take out the rubbish, please?*).¹⁶ Although the analysis of this sort is by all means worthwhile and informative, in this section I am going to focus on the cognitive study of the felicity conditions of illocutionary speech acts, as presented by Kalisz (1993; 1994a), Kalisz and Kubiński (1993) and Sokołowska (2001a).

The cognitive approach to speech acts has been attempted e.g. for the analysis of promises (Kalisz and Kubiński, 1993; Kalisz, 1994a), invitations (Sokołowska, 2001b) and compliments (Drabik, 2004). Sokołowska (2001a) discusses the whole classes of speech acts falling under Searle's taxonomy. A common theme of these works is treating speech acts as natural categories and considering their felicity conditions as prototypical, rather than necessary and sufficient. In order to illustrate that I shall refer to Kalisz and Kubiński's (1993) account of promises.

¹⁶ Cf. Panther and Thornburg's (1999; 2003a) account and its discussion and modification in Bierwiazzonek (2013).

Kalisz and Kubiński (1993) consider Searle's conditions 3 – 7 for the speech act of promises. They provide a number of examples wherein individual conditions appear to be violated:

- (95) I don't give a damn whether you want it or not, I will get it for you anyhow.
- (96) Maybe you don't want it but I will buy that umbrella.
- (97) I'll do the dishes tonight.
- (98) All right, I'll get it for you but don't holler at me if I have problems delivering on my promise
- (99) I'll do my best but I can't tell you it will help.
- (100) I can promise you that this is already settled.

Examples (95) and (96) clearly violate Searle's condition 4. However, as Kalisz and Kubiński maintain, it would be erroneous to place such cases outside the scope of promises. In their analysis, cases like these are still members of the category, though they represent unwanted, or *unsolicited promises*. Example (97) – in a situation where the speaker used to do the dishes every night and it is rather obvious that they will do it this time too – does violate condition 5. Still, such instances belong to the category of promises (*evident promises*). Similarly, instances (98) and (99) represent *tentative promises*, while utterance (100) refers to a past event. These two categories violate conditions 7 and 3 respectively. What is important to reiterate here is that in Kalisz and Kubiński's account all of the examples above – despite their violation of certain conditions proposed by Searle – are not excluded from the category of promises. Instead, they are considered to be less prototypical members of the category. Kalisz and Kubiński refer here to Lakoff's (1987) concept of radial categories, exhibiting non-central members structured around a prototypical centre.¹⁷ Thus, Kalisz and Kubiński (1993: 76) propose the following diagram for the category of promises:

¹⁷ See section 2.2.




Figure 18. Promises as a radial category (Kalisz and Kubiński: 1993: 76)

The left-hand side of the diagram, with numbers 3 – 7 enclosed by an oval figure, represents the instances of promising, where Searle's conditions 3 to 7 obtain. For Searle these conditions are necessary and sufficient and any speech act that does not comply with them is excluded from the category of promises. For Kalisz and Kubiński the circle represents the prototypical members of the category of promises. From these cases different non-prototypical subcategories are derived. In these subcategories appropriate felicity conditions are not fulfilled. However, they are still considered promises – although non-prototypical ones.

Apart from demonstrating prototypical effects for promises, Kalisz and Kubiński's (1993) account allows for a conceptual link between distinct speech acts. This is demonstrated by *promises – unsolicited promises – threats* continuum on the above graph. Kalisz (1994a) elaborates on this by adding the category of *warnings* as an intermediate subcategory between unsolicited promises and threats. Therefore, the cognitive account of speech acts, describing them as radial models with prototypical and non-prototypical members allows for a comprehensive view of speech acts with certain speech act categories overlapping with each other.

By their own admission, Kalisz and Kubiński's (1993) demonstration of promises as a radial model is a considerable idealisation. However, it has the virtue of explaining the cognitive linguistics take on the problem the felicity conditions for

speech acts. In the light of this discussion let us now turn to the discussion of insults as speech acts.

3.2.4. Insults as a speech act

A study of insults as a speech act has been undertaken by Grzegorzczkova (1991), who understands insults as a conscious verbal act of invoking negative evaluation of the addressee. This judgement must be communicated through the use of negatively-charged verbal expressions. Another important element of an insult is the intention to humiliate the addressee in effect of the act. Grzegorzczkova differentiates between insults and other linguistic phenomena, such as offence, slander and criticism. She proposes different sets of characteristics for those acts. Offence, for instance, does not have to be a verbal and conscious act; it is possible to offend the interactant unwillingly and/or by means of certain extralinguistic behaviour. Slander consists of communicating negative judgement about someone when it is not true. Criticism involves invoking negative evaluation of the interactant, however, usually without the use of insolent language. In Grzegorzczkova's terms, the category of insults, while being a separate class of speech acts, shares certain common characteristics with the above categories. Grzegorzczkova (1991: 199-200)¹⁸ puts forward the following felicity conditions for the speech act of insults:

1. X's utterance contains a negative evaluation of Y (Y may be a particular person, or a group the person belongs to, or a particular ideology the person holds [...])
2. X intends Y to feel humiliated.
3. X uses words which are emotionally and axiologically negatively charged.
4. As a result of X's utterance Y feels insulted (perlocution).

In Grzegorzczkova's analysis these conditions represent "the best" (prototypical) cases of insults. She concedes, however, that not all of the above conditions must be fulfilled. Grzegorzczkova allows for cases where X's utterance does not refer to Y directly, but is a publically uttered statement about certain groups or

¹⁸ Translation mine – L. M.

doctrines (violation of condition 1). Similarly, the lack of speaker's intention to insult (violation of condition 2) – although difficult to verify – does not exclude such cases from the class of insults. Finally, condition 4 is violated in cases which do not succeed in bringing about the psychological state of Y feeling insulted (or humiliated, downgraded). In Grzegorzczkova's analysis the essential condition for insults, which cannot be violated, is condition 3; insults must involve the use of verbal expressions which are emotionally and axiologically negatively charged. The simultaneous presence of other conditions puts a given act among the best exemplars of the category. Violation of conditions 1, 2, and 4 according to Grzegorzczkova, makes the corresponding acts "worse" members of insults, without necessarily excluding them from the category.

Grzegorzczkova's account has the virtue of putting forward clear and analysable set of felicity conditions for the speech act of insulting. She also agrees that in certain instances of insults not all of the above conditions must be fulfilled. Their violation does not necessarily put a given act outside the category of insults, but they may be considered *worse* examples of the category. However, Grzegorzczkova does not elaborate on different variants of non-prototypical insults which may result from violating these conditions. Similarly, her study lacks practical support, since she does not provide real-life examples of insults. Thus, in section 5.3 I adopt Grzegorzczkova's conditions for the corpus analysis of different categories of speech acts in the light of the cognitive theory of speech acts.

4. Taboo, swearing and insults

The present chapter focuses on a the linguistic and cultural reality of taboo, swearing and insults. The main aim of the below description is to present a broad neurological, psychological and socio-cultural perspective for the practical analysis of verbal aggression carried out in chapter 5. Understandably, what follows below is not a full and comprehensive account of different neural, psychological and socio-cultural factors influencing swearing and insulting. The description below constitutes a simplified account of those aspects of verbal aggression which are indispensable for the corpus analysis of insults in chapter 5.

Section 4.1 touches upon the issue of linguistic and cultural taboo and presents the main sources of contemporary linguistic taboos. Tabooed body parts, bodily excretions, deities, prohibited activities and objects constitute the typical basis for swearing and verbal aggression. Section 4.2 focuses on how language manages taboo topics through the use of euphemisms and dysphemisms. Euphemisms constitute polite alternatives to dispreferred language expressions in a given context, whereas dysphemisms draw on various taboos in order to create social disruption and offend the interactant(s). The problem of swearing is addressed in section 4.3. Crystal (1995: 173) points out that swearwords technically do not communicate linguistic meaning. Instead, they have a function of satisfying the speaker's emotional needs. Section 4.3. presents different functions of swearing as proposed by Pinker (2008: 339-49) in connection with a number of examples of offensive speech . Section 4.4 discusses Jay's (2000) Neuro-Psycho-Socio theory of speech, which aims to provide a comprehensive account of cursing through the account of neurological, psychological and socio-cultural variables influencing interactants' swearing episodes. These variables are briefly discussed in sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 respectively. Section 4.4.4 focuses on Jay's five-stage model of verbal aggression, which constitutes the basis of the corpus analysis of prototypical and non-prototypical insults in sections 5.1 and 5.2. Finally, section 4.5 deals with the phenomenon of insults directly. In accordance with the above discussion, the definition of insults is provided. Section 4.5 discusses also different types of euphemistic expressions used in insulting and hints at different

functions that insults may serve in conversation. These issues are put to an empirical test in the corpus analysis of verbal aggression in chapter 5.

4.1. The cultural and linguistic reality of taboo

Crystal (1995: 172) defines *taboo* language as “items which people avoid using in polite society, either because they believe them harmful or feel them embarrassing or offensive.” According to Allan and Burridge (2006: 2-3) the term was first reported by Captain James Cook in 1777, who on his journey to Polynesia mentioned the Tongan *tabu* as a term for actions and behaviours which were not to be undertaken among the indigenous community. Captain Cook described the customs of the local people whereby women were strictly forbidden to eat with men. On another occasion he reported on a local custom whereby the house visited by the king becomes *taboo* and can no longer be inhabited by its original owner. Taboo, therefore, in its most general sense, refers to things, persons, actions and behaviours which are not to be touched, done, interacted with, spoken of or undertaken, lest they bring about harm to the violator or the whole society. (Allan and Burridge, 2006: 3-4). The penalties for violating a taboo may vary from social disapproval to downright fatality. In principle any kind of human behaviour may undergo tabooisation. Burridge (2006b) states that common cultural taboos include bans on naming dangerous animals, dietary restrictions, limits on interaction with members of higher social classes and certain aspects of birth, death and menstruation. Allan and Burridge (2006: 1) enumerate the following categories of universal human taboos:

- I. Bodies and their effluvia (sweat, snot, faeces, menstrual fluid etc.)
- II. The organs and acts of sex, mictruition and defecation
- III. Diseases, death and killing (including hunting and fishing)
- IV. Naming, addressing, touching and viewing persons and sacred beings, objects and places
- V. Food gathering, preparation and consumption

What follows below is a short description of these categories.

Historically speaking, perhaps the most salient category are the restrictions against invoking deities and supernatural powers. In many religions, direct references to the divine are taboo, (e.g. Brahmanism, Judaism, Islam). Leviticus 24:16, for instance, makes it plain that “blaspheming the name of the Lord” is punishable by death. In Hebrew the name of God, rendered by the tetragram YHVH – and assimilated into English as *Jehovah* or *Jahveh* – is taboo and is not supposed to be pronounced. Therefore, for referring to the divinity, orthodox Jews typically employ a range of linguistic substitutes, such as *Adhonai* (the Lord) or *Hashem* (the Name) (Gebert, 2004: 80; Cibien, 2010: 83). The ban on direct verbal references to the divine is often paralleled with prohibition of the artistic representation of God. Such is the case in Judaism and Islam. Generally, in the context of religion, human interaction with gods, holy places and sacred objects tends to be strictly limited and regulated as to who, where and under what circumstances can undertake a given action.

The ban on the unauthorized or blasphemous use of holy names may stem from a particular ontological status which in many cultures has been ascribed to proper names and the process of naming. The ancient Babylonians believed, for instance, that:

[...] there is no difference between thought and its referent, between name and the object it refers to. “To create” means “to give name” and “to exist” is to “have name.”

(Keller et al. 1988: 238-9)¹⁹

Similarly, different Slavonic tribes used to believe that having a name is the crucial condition for existence (Malec, 2004: 49). Therefore, giving a name has been considered to be identical with the act of creation. Proper names have been believed to hold the essence of things or persons named. Thus, knowing and uttering the name of a person is equated with exerting control over them; whoever owns the name, owns the person. Therefore, using the name of deities in vain has been perceived as an act of usurpation of divine power, and hence such an act has been considered one of the most salient taboos. Throughout the history of religion,

¹⁹ Translation mine – L. M.

therefore, the name of divinity has had a privileged status of secrecy and holiness, as illustrated in the ancient Egyptian hymn to Amon-Ra:

His Name is hidden /'IMN/ from his children
In his name Amon /'IMN'/ [...]

(Bator 2000: 45)²⁰

Contemporarily, as mentioned above, the idea of holiness and secrecy of God's name is a strong theme in Judaism. This is the reason why the God of Israel refused to divulge his name to Jacob (Genesis, 32: 24-30) and why the Hebrew prayer of *Amidah* (or *Shemoneh esreh* – “Eighteen blessings”) – one of the most important prayers in Judaism – clearly expresses the holiness of God's name in *Kedushat Hashem* (sanctification of the Name):

You are Holy, and your Name is Holy,
And Saints glorify you every day, for ever,
For You are God, Great and Holy King,
Blessed are, You, Yhvh, Holy God.

(Cibien, 2010: 83-4)

Another kind of taboo discussed by Allan and Burrige is connected with diseases, death and restrictions concerning food preparation and consumption. Most societies and religions have had dietary injunctions regarding certain types of food. Jews and Muslims are prohibited from eating pork. Muslims are not supposed to drink alcohol, while Catholics are urged not to eat meat on Fridays. The Bible enumerates a number of species which are not to be eaten (Leviticus: 11) and provides other numerous dietary regulations. It is often argued that many of these prohibitions have been of sanitary and health-protective nature. For instance, the biblical taboo against eating pork has been argued to be motivated by the fear of trichinosis, although it appears conceivable that the regulation reflects the local environmental and climatic changes in the Middle East, which led to abandoning the production and consumption of pork (Harris, 2007: 40-7). The issues connected with health protection are related to another group of taboos, namely illnesses and dying. The dread of disease and death indeed appears to be a universal human theme. In many societies names of the deceased, objects and

²⁰ Translation mine – L. M.

places connected with them have been considered taboo (Burridge, 2006b: 454). Languages employ numerous euphemisms to refer to these topics. In contemporary Western culture, for instance, the language used by medical doctors, patients and the media reveals a tendency to employ numerous euphemistic expressions for particular diseases (Pinker, 2008: 343). The taboos involving ailment and death appear to be more significant in some parts of the world than in others. In societies where the level of hygiene and healthcare is high, the dread of disease has largely been modulated by sanitation and pharmacology (Pinker, 2008: 344). It's worth mentioning here that numerous languages, for instance English, do not have many swearwords connected with diseases. Other languages – on the other hand – have retained this trait (cf. Polish *cholera*).

Another category of linguistic taboos involves constraints on mentioning certain body parts and their effluvia. Blood, saliva, faeces, nails and hair have been believed in many cultures to potentially hold magical powers. According to these beliefs, individuals may be harmed by mutilating or casting spells on their bodily or bodily substances. Conversely, their proper handling has been believed to have the effect of preventing a person from harm or having certain beneficial results (Allan and Burridge 2006: 172; Pinker, 2008: 345). Certain effluvia, most notably blood, has been believed to contain the essence of life. This may be a factor behind dietary restrictions and prohibitions concerning eating or drinking blood in many religions and cultures.

Irrespective of their supposed magical powers, contemporary reaction of Western societies to many bodily effluvia is one of disgust. Allan and Burridge (1991: 69-74) present the results of the questionnaire they conducted among a group of Australian students and university staff. The subjects were asked to ascribe the revoltingness rating for different bodily substances and provide a degree to which different body parts were – in their opinion – freely mentionable in conversation. The results have shown that the most revolting bodily substances included faeces (*shit*) and vomit followed by *urine* and *semen*. The body parts which were reported to be the most taboo were *vagina*, *penis* and *anus*. Pinker (2008: 334-5) observes that the substances marked by the highest level of revoltingness are

possible carriers of dangerous diseases and that the least freely mentionable body parts are typically the ones which produce this kind of bodily waste. Pinker states that although in contemporary Western societies the dread of effluvia has largely been modulated by sanitation and garbage disposal, the thought about or interaction with these substances in many contexts is still considered inappropriate or even revolting and thus a subject of taboo.

Finally, the organs and acts of copulation also provide an extensive range of tabooed expressions. The reasons for that appear to be complex. Pinker (2008: 346-7) notes that in contemporary Western culture sex – understood as a conscious act undertaken by consenting adults – doesn't appear to be an obvious candidate for restricted language. Still, in many languages – including English – sexual terms belong to the most emotionally powerful expressions. The taboo surrounding sex and genitals may derive from their procreative functions; the fear of genealogy and considerations of their progeny motivates people to take a deep interest in these matters and urges them to be possessive of their partners genitals (Allan and Burrige, 1991: 54). At the same time, male and female genitalia are organs whereby bodily effluvia are excreted, which may be a factor adding up to the power of this taboo. One should also not undermine the fact that sexual fluids are possible vectors of sexually transmitted diseases. As Pinker (2008: 347) puts it: “sex has high stakes, including exploitation, disease, illegitimacy, incest, jealousy, spousal abuse, cuckoldry, desertion, feuding, child abuse and rape.” These factors appear to build up on the cultural perception of sex as a subject of taboo.

The sources of taboos presented above appear to be universal across cultures in the sense that they are manifested worldwide. At the same time, taboos are subject of constant cultural and linguistic evolution. Burrige (2006b: 452) remarks that the most powerful taboos in contemporary Western culture appear to be motivated by social disapproval, rather than by fear of the divine. Hughes (1991: 4) remarks that the general evolution trend of English taboo expressions represents the change from *higher* themes of swearing, such as God and the supernatural, to *lower* ones, involving certain physical functions (copulation, defecation and urination). His book is a thorough analysis of this process in English. The transfer

of significance from religious to secular taboos is well illustrated in numerous linguistic expressions, where religious maledictions, such as the ones presented in (101a) below provide a linguistic pattern for sexual and scatological expletives (101b) (Hughes, 1991: 21):

- (101)
- (a) For Christ's sake!
 - (b) For shit's sake!/ For fuck's sake!

A possible explanation for this fact is that while religious swearwords have began to lose their significance, in order to have a similar effect, substitutes with heavy emotional load had to be employed. These substitutes happen to be predominantly sexual and scatological expressions (Pinker, 2008: 358-9). A general trend observed by Pinker and others is that certain taboos and swearwords connected with them tend to lose their emotional significance over time. This phenomenon of *semantic inflation* of swearwords is exemplified, for instance, by the history of the expletive *hell* and *damn*, which in contemporary English have lost much of their emotional significance (Pinker, 2008: 341-2).

The history of taboo language is inadvertently connected with the attempts at controlling linguistic expression. Allan and Burridge (2006: 24) make a distinction between *ensorship* and *censoring* of language. Censorship of language refers to official, institutionalized attempts of suppressing linguistic expression, while censoring refers, more broadly, to official and institutionalized attempts, as well as individual choices of speakers. Censorship of language has been introduced and re-introduced throughout centuries. From the Biblical injunctions described above to the Laws of Alfred in 900 A.D. (Hughes, 1991: 43) to modern-day laws and regulations (Pinker, 2008: 324). Typically, their aim has been to institutionally protect language against elements which have been considered blasphemous, offensive, abusive, or simply inappropriate. On the other hand, individual self-censoring of language, as reflected in individual speaker's choices is a psychologically grounded phenomenon; due to social, legal and religious norms speakers are under constant pressure to censor their language, lest they be held responsible for it. Awareness of this fact is manifested e.g. in the use

of euphemistic expressions, a short account of which is proposed in the following section.

4.2. Linguistic euphemisms, dysphemisms and orthophemisms

Cultural taboos, described above, are manifested in language to a large degree through the use of *euphemisms* and *dysphemisms*. Allan and Burridge (1991: 11) state that:

A euphemism is used as an alternative to a dispreferred expression, in order to avoid possible loss of face; either one's own face or, through giving offence, that of the audience, or of some third party.

Euphemisms protect one's face²¹ through the use of avoidance language and evasive expressions, often in order to protect oneself or other people from dire consequences of breaking a taboo (Burridge, 2006a). Euphemisms, however, do not serve exclusively as substitutes for taboo words. Allan and Burridge (1991: 12-13) point out that euphemisms are often simply more preferable and acceptable alternatives for words or expressions which in a given context are perceived by speakers to be wrong, inappropriate, ill-suited or offensive.

A dysphemism is defined by Allan and Burridge (1991: 26) as

[...] an expression with connotations that are offensive either about the denotatum or to the audience, or both, or is substituted for a neutral or euphemistic expression for just that reason.

Dysphemisms, therefore, are the opposite of euphemisms; they are disfavoured expressions employed precisely for their potential to offend or attack the other's face. Allan and Burridge (2006: 33) introduce also the category of *orthophemisms*; neutral expressions used in non-offensive speech to refer to a denotatum in a non-euphemistic way. Orthophemisms often involve the use of formal or technical language, while euphemisms tend to be more colloquial or figurative. A range of words with the same denotatum, but different connotations is referred to by Allan and Burridge as *x-phemism*. In other words, x-phemisms are sets of euphemisms,

dysphemisms and orthophemisms for a given referent. Let us have a look at the following examples:

	Orthophemism	Euphemism	Dysphemism
I.	1. faeces	Poo	shit
II.	2. toilet	Loo	shithouse
III.	3. menstruate	have a period	bleed
IV.	4. my vagina	my bits	my cunt
V.	5. Jesus	Lord!	Christ! [blasphemy]

Figure 19. Orthophemisms, euphemisms and dysphemisms (Allan and Burridge, 2006: 32)

The dysphemisms presented above are related to different linguistic taboos discussed in section 4.1; I-III constitute terms for bodily waste, IV presents terms for female sexual organs, and V refers to the taboo of naming deities and supernatural agents and entities. Burridge (2006a: 457) points out that whether a given expression is an orthophemism, euphemism or dysphemism is partially dependent on the socio-cultural context. Judgements may vary depending on dialects, social groups or individual speakers. In short, “there is no such thing as *Everyman’s euphemism* or *Everyman’s dysphemism*”. Additionally, euphemisms and dysphemisms change over time, undergoing the processes of amelioration or pejoration (cf. Allan and Burridge, 1991: 21-3).

Perhaps the best evidence for the importance of euphemisms and dysphemisms in language is their ubiquity. Allan and Burridge (1991: 96) estimate that English has accumulated approximately 1,200 terms for *vagina*, more than 1000 for *penis*, 800 for *copulation* and 2,000 for *prostitute*. There is a number of different strategies which may be employed when coining new x-phemisms. Burridge (2006a: 456-7) enumerates the following strategies for making euphemisms:

²¹ See section 3.1.4.

- I. Shortening
 - a. Clippings (e.g. *jeeze/ gee* for *Jesus*)
 - b. Acronyms (e.g. *snafu* for *situation normal, all fucked up*)
 - c. Abbreviations (e.g. *S.O.B* for *son-of-a-bitch*)
 - d. Omissions (*I need to go* [to the toilet])
- II. Circumlocution (e.g. *postconsumer secondary material* for *garbage*, *excrementitious human kidney fluid* for *urine*)
- III. Remodelling
 - a. Phonological distortion (e.g. *crust/cripes* for *Christ*)
 - b. Blending (e.g. *zounds* for *God's wounds*)
 - c. Reduplication (e.g. *twiddle-diddles* for *testicles*)
 - d. Alliteration (e.g. *om-pom/umpti-poo* for *toilet*)
- IV. Semantic change
 - a. Metaphor (e.g. *riper years* for *old age*)
 - b. General-for-specific metonymy (e.g. *nether regions* for *genitals*)
- V. External borrowing (e.g. *perspire* instead of *sweat*, *expectorate* instead of *spit*)
- VI. Internal borrowing (e.g. *treponemal disease/cupid's measles* instead of *syphilis*)

Burridge (2006a: 457) states that most of the same strategies are also employed for coining new dysphemisms. One main difference, however, is that insofar as euphemisms make a wide use of general-for-specific metonymies, dysphemisms tend to employ part-for-whole metonymic pattern, as evident e.g. in *tits* for breasts or *prick* for a disliked or disloyal man. With their potential to offend and insult, dysphemisms provide raw language material for the activity of swearing discussed below.

4.3. General remarks about swearing

The present section touches upon the issues of the verbal practices of swearing and cursing. The term *cursing* technically refers to wishing harm on a person (Jay, 1992: 2-3). This can be realized through invoking divine powers or performing maledictive rituals. The origins of the activity, therefore, point to its religious or mythical significance. In contemporary English the meaning of cursing includes also “utter[ing] offensive words in anger or annoyance” (Pearsall, 1998: 451). The

related term *swearing* also refers to wide range of phenomena. Hughes (1991: 4-6) notes that in English it is possible to *swear by* or *swear that* (something is so), *swear to* (do something) and *swear at* (somebody or something). In the past swearing or taking an oath was predominantly connected with taking a divine agent as one's witness (swearing *by* in the sense of swearing *in the presence of*). This refers to the idea of the magical or mystical properties of language mentioned in section 4.1. Swearing *by* the divine holds a divine agent responsible to punish the perpetrator in the event of human perfidiousness.

However, the understanding of swearing has undergone evolution and now, apart from “mak[ing] a solemn statement or promise undertaking to do something or affirming that something is the case”, the term refers also to “us[ing] offensive language, especially as an expression of anger” (Pearsall, 1998: 1873). Hughes (1991) discusses the whole set of socio-cultural factors shaping the understanding of swearing and profane language over different historical periods. He also illustrates the constant process of evolution of swearing and its public perception. In English the history of foul language has been shaped by its early Germanic and Medieval heritage, the cultural precepts of the Reformation and the Renaissance, through the decorum of Augustan and Victorian Eras to the modern ideas of cultural latitude and linguistic restraints following it. As mentioned earlier, a salient trend which emerges from Hughes's analysis is that the process of historical change in English has resulted in a considerable shift from the “higher” references to the mythical and the divine towards the “lower” forms of swearing, including physical faculties of copulation, urination and defecation. This general trend – pertaining to the bulk of Western perception of swearing – has also been observed by other authors (Burridge, 2006b: 452; Pinker, 2008: 340).

In the subsequent analysis I shall follow Jay (2000: 9) in using the terms *swearing*, *cursing* and *offensive speech* interchangeably to refer to “emotionally powerful, offensive words or emotionally harmful expressions that are understood as insults.” Jay points out, however, that curse words are not always used as insults:

Cursing serves the emotional needs of the speaker and cursing affects listeners emotionally. Cursing permits a speaker to express strong emotions and/or produce an emotional impact on the listener. The impact can be positive, as in joking or sexual enticement, or it can be negative, as in name calling and sexual harassment.

(Jay, 2000: 9-10)

Crystal (1995: 173) points out that swearing is a universal phenomena, although speakers differ concerning the range and offensiveness of the expletives they typically employ. Thus, cursing – in its broad sense – encompasses different sub-types of emotional speech, such as profanity, blasphemy, obscenity, vulgarity, taboo, epithets and, notably, insults (Jay, 1992: 1-8). The common denominator for these categories appears to be the use of emotionally powerful, offensive words (Jay, 2000: 10). Thus, cursing allows speakers to realise their emotional needs and/or to have an emotional impact on the hearers. In order to achieve this aim cursing typically involves the use of linguistic dysphemisms. Pinker (2008: 339-49) identifies the following themes that reoccur in swearing:

- I. Deities and supernatural entities
Jesus!; hell!; Holy Mary!
- II. Orifices and excrements
ass; shit; piss; arsehole
- III. Illnesses and pestilence
A plague on both your houses!; A pox on you!
- IV. Disfavoured ethnic and social groups
nigger; queer; Jew
- V. Copulation and genitals
fuck; cunt; prick; pussy

As evident in the above classification, cursing is not necessarily based only on taboo words and expressions. The term *Jew*, for instance, is not necessarily taboo, yet employed in specific context it may be understood as an insult. Similarly, *cow*, *mongrel* and *rat* are not taboo by themselves, yet calling somebody these names in conversation typically constitutes an act of verbal abuse. It appears, therefore, that the basic ingredient of cursing is negative emotions being evoked by the use of specific language. Taboo expressions, due to their nature, give rise to such emotions, but so can non-taboo words with strong emotional connotations in a given context.

The exact function of cursing reflects a number of different human needs, since, as Pinker (2008: 350) suggests, people swear in at least five different ways:

- I. descriptively:
Let's fuck!
- II. idiomatically:
It's fucked up!
- III. abusively:
Fuck you, motherfucker!
- IV. emphatically:
This is fucking amazing!
- V. cathartically:
Fuck!!!

These categories are by no means exclusive and clear-cut. However, they serve the purpose of providing an idea of the basic functions served by cursing. What follows is a cursory look at each of these categories of offensive speech.

Descriptive swearing, usually through violating a taboo or employing language which evokes strong negative feelings, brings to mind the most disagreeable aspects of a given referent, usually in order to evoke certain extralinguistic effect. Therefore, if one says *Stop scratching your balls!* or *Could you please pick your dog's shit from my lawn!* the negative emotional appeal of the terms used is likely to spark an adequately stronger reaction on the part of the hearer. It is by the virtue of the choice of the terms used (*balls* and *shit*) that such sentences have a greater effect than their non-taboo equivalents.

Idiomatic swearing is evident in a large repertoire of conventionalised idioms that are present in language. In English this is manifested in such expressions as *It's fucked up!*, *Give them hell!* Such terms evoke emotional impact on the hearer through their taboo qualities. It has to be noted, however, that the process of conventionalisation of such expressions is often accompanied by the decrease in their emotional significance. This semantic inflation of swearwords – mentioned above in section 4.1 – appears to be a common effect of the frequent use of certain negative terms.

Abusive expletives, or insults, are aimed at offending another person or a group of people. Therefore if the speaker says *You stupid cunt!* or *You ugly motherfucker!* he or she usually intends to evoke in the hearer the perlocutionary effect of feeling

downgraded and negatively evaluated. Such expressions constitute a direct and conscious attack at the other's face. These instances of swearing *at* somebody, which are central to the present analysis, will be the subject of a more detailed analysis in section 4.5.

Another quality of offensive speech is its emphatic function. Because of the emotions they evoke, swearwords tend to attract attention. This feature is exploited in the use of such expressions as *That was fucking amazing!* or *What the bloody hell are we supposed to do now?* Pinker notes that this mechanism has been also used in advertising, e.g. in the restaurant chain Fuddruckers and the clothing brand FCUK (French Connection UK) (Pinker, 2008: 333). Emphatic function typically is an automatic response to strong emotions the speaker feels when faced with linguistic taboo. The use of emphatic swearing is highly culture-dependent, but often socially acceptable. Moreover, emphatic swearing may be socially beneficial for building one's credibility. Rassin and van der Heijden (2005), for instance, point out that proper use of expletives may be advantageous for the defendant in the court of law.

Finally, cathartic swearing has the virtue of alleviating the speaker's stress or negative emotions. For instance, using expletives such as *fuck!!!* and *holy shit!!* in a highly emotional situation may serve to relieve the emotional stress. Thus, this kind of offensive language plays an important part in personal psychological hygiene. It has been reported, for instance, that people who swear suffer less from stress than those who do not (Crystal, 1995: 173 after Ross, 1960: 470-81). Cathartic swearing, apart from the virtue of relieving negative feelings, appears also to raise human pain threshold. It has been reported that individuals experiencing discomfort can withstand the circumstances much longer when they are allowed to utter obscenities in the process (Sharples, 2009).

A crucial observation to make is that the above functions of cursing are not exclusive and one utterance may serve several different functions. Consider the following instances:

- (102) These *stupid pricks* deserve to be hanged.
- (103) This car is *fucked up*! It won't start.
- (104) What the *bloody hell* are we supposed to do now?
- (105) You *motherfucker son of a bitch* have taken my car!

Example (102), apart from being descriptive is also an insult aimed at a third party. In (103) the idiomatic *fucked up* may well be used to give vent to the speaker's stress (cathartic function). Cathartic and emphatic functions appear to be simultaneously present in *bloody hell*, which is another idiomatic expression (104). Finally, in (105), the function of insulting appears to be accompanied by descriptive, emphatic and cathartic qualities. In an actual speech context, the functions described above typically overlap and many instances of swearing simultaneously serve numerous functions mentioned above. This observation will prove to be important for the corpus analysis of insults undertaken in chapter 5.

4.4. Swearing in the NPS theory

The Neuro-Psycho-Social Theory of Speech was first formulated in Jay (1992) and developed and reformulated in Jay (2000). The primary aim of the NPS theory is to integrate relevant pieces of information from neurology, psychology and sociology for a comprehensive account cursing. According to this theory, swearing as a neuro-psycho-social phenomenon is inadvertently dependent on these three factors.

A crucial distinction in the NPS theory is made between *propositional (controlled)* and *non-propositional (reflexive)* swearing. Cursing, Jay (2000: 33-43) argues, can be more or less reflexive (automatic), depending on the brain areas activated in individual swearing episodes. Propositional cursing is a part of consciousness or working memory, while reflexive swearing is produced without one's conscious awareness. Jay proposes that reflexive cursing resides mainly in the right hemisphere of the brain, while propositional offensive speech is dependent – to a large degree – on the left hemisphere. Propositional cursing is accompanied by conscious decisions of the speakers, who are cognitively aware of their episodes of swearing and possible consequences. Speakers make conscious decisions to use certain expressions and by doing so they follow grammatical

rules of their languages. Propositional swearing is typically employed strategically in order to wield certain extralinguistic effect on the listener or the audience. Non-propositional swearing, on the other hand, involves a lesser degree of speaker's conscious decision-making processes. Reflexive verbal aggression functions as an automatic response cry to a highly emotional situation. It can, thus, be compared to animal vocalisation in an instance of threat or danger. In humans, however, this angry vocalization is often accompanied by uttering a highly emotive, usually taboo, term.

Non-propositional cursing typically involves short expletives. This kind of swearing is idiomatic and does not always appear to follow the grammatical rules of languages. Consider the following:

- (106) I took her to my flat and we *fucked* all night.
- (107) You can *stick* that *stupid* book up your ass and *piss off* before I *bash* your brains.
- (108) It's no use talking to that *idiotic mule*!
- (109) (*God*) *damn it!*
- (110) *Fuck you!*
- (111) What the *hell* is that?

Examples (106) – (108) are instances of propositional (controlled) cursing. The speaker is assumed to be fully aware of his or her swearing and possible consequences. The strategic decision is motivated by certain extralinguistic goal. Such goals may possibly include: offending somebody through an attack at their face [(107), (108)], voicing one's opinions about something [(106), (107), (108)], wielding an effect on the hearer(s) or the audience [(106), (108)]. warning or threatening somebody (107). Typical instances of propositional swearing make use of fully grammatical sentences. Taking into account the functions of swearing described in section 4.3, propositional swearing often appears to be either descriptive (106), (107), or abusive (107), (108)

Non propositional (reflexive) cursing is represented above in (109) – (111). Typically, these are short, lexicalised or idiomatic expressions functioning as

response cries²² to an emotional situation. This response may be a reaction to fear, anger, surprise, pain, discomfort and other feelings and situations. Reflexive swearing is often idiomatic; it typically involves short utterances, as presented in (109) – (110) or spontaneous response cries embedded in grammatical sentences, as in (111). Non-propositional swearing often is ungrammatical and does not follow the rules of the language. Consider (110) – (111). In the light of the standard grammar of English these sentences should be incorrect. Consider also the following:

- | | |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|
| (112a) Clean yourself! | (115a) What in the earth is that? |
| (112b) *Clean you! | (115b) *What the earth is that? |
| (113a) Show yourself! | (116a) What in the world is that? |
| (113b) *Show you! | (116b) *What the world is that? |
| (114a) Kill yourself! | (117a) What in the heaven is that? |
| (114b) *Kill you! | (117b) *What the heaven is that? |

(112b), (113b) and (114b) may be described as ungrammatical, since standard English does not normally take *you* as an object in imperative statements. A plausible alternative would be the use of the reflexive pronoun *yourself* (or *yourselves*), as in (112a), (113a) and (113a). It appears that the same should be true of (110), and although it is perfectly plausible to say *fuck yourself*, example (110) represents a typical abusive expletive lexicalised in contemporary English. Similarly, (115b), (116b) and (117b) could be deemed ungrammatical due to the lack of the preposition *in*, which is present in (115a), (116a) and (117a) respectively. However, in (111) the sentence is acceptable without *in*; *hell* in this sentence functions as an automatic expletive embedded into a grammatical sentence.

Another, and perhaps more convincing, way of explaining the syntactic and semantic idiosyncrasies of English offensive speech terms is to approach them from the point of view of construction grammar. Construction grammar, as formulated and applied by Lakoff (1987), Fillmore et al. (1988), Fillmore and Kay (1993), Goldberg (1995) and others, refers to the mode of grammatical

²² The term *response cries* was first introduced by Goffman (1978), who understood it to mean taboo expletives and non-word localizations produced at the time of experiencing strong psychological stress (Jay, 2000: 51).

representation undertaken by a significant number of cognitive linguists. The central purpose of construction grammar is the analysis of constructions, understood as form-meaning correspondences which cannot be explained in the light of standard syntactic and semantic rules of language. Individual constructions encompass phonological, morphological, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic and discourse-functional information, but the rules governing their form and meaning representation cannot be predicted from the general rules of syntax and semantics and are analysable only at construction level.




Figure 20. The symbolic structure of a construction (Croft and Cruse, 2009: 258)

Figure 20 symbolically presents the typical conventions employed in construction grammar analysis. Relevant pieces of information about form of a construction are linked with the appropriate data concerning its conventional meaning. The symbolic linking is realized at the level of construction and not at the more general level of syntactic and semantic representation of language, as in the case of componential syntactic theories (cf. Croft and Cruse, 2009: 257-62).

For the purposes of illustration of how English offensive speech can be analysed in the light of construction grammar analysis, consider two of the most common constructions used in abusive swearing (*figure 21* and *figure 22*). A proper representation of abusive swearing requires describing the constructions in terms of their syntactic, semantic and pragmatic components:




Figure 21. Construction grammar analysis of *You N*

Figure 21 shows a significantly productive pattern of English abusive terms, wherein the subject pronoun *you* is syntagmatically aligned with a noun (*N*). This syntactic information is linked with appropriate semantic representation of identifying the hearer with a bad person. The pragmatic function of this utterance is the speaker (*S*) cursing the hearer (*H*). The construction shown *figure 21* is realized in language samples such as *you motherfucker*, *you bastard*, *you stupid goat*, *you pig* and many others.

Another common abusive construction is shown in *figure 22*.




Figure 22. Construction grammar analysis of *Vt you*

In *figure 22* the form of *Vt you*, where *Vt* stands for a transitive verb is mapped onto the corresponding meaning of wishing a negative occurrence to happen to the hearer (malefactive). The pragmatic function of the construction is, likewise, of *S cursing H*. The diagram may explain abusive constructions such as *fuck you*, *damn you*, *screw you* etc. It should be noted again that the interpretation of the linked elements does not depend on any general rules of syntax and semantics. The interpretation of the syntactic and semantic information is attainable only at the level of the construction.

Irrespective of the mode of representation the syntactic and semantic idiosyncrasies of English swearing terms, the propositional/reflexive distinction in the NPS theory does not presume two separate centres for swearing in the brain for several reasons. Firstly, swearing depends – as it will be presented subsequently in section 4.4.1 – on several different brain areas in the right and left hemispheres. Secondly, these areas themselves are interdependent and in constant cooperation. The distinction between propositional and non-propositional swearing is, therefore, not clear-cut and individual swearwords reflect different levels of one's conscious control. The NPS theory presupposes a continuum of cursing utterances ranging from reflexive to propositional swearing at the two polar extremes (Jay, 2000: 34).

According to NPS theory, propositional and non-propositional cursing depends heavily on a whole range of neurological, psychological and sociological factors. Jay (2000: 22) summarises that in the following model:




Figure 23. The Neuro-Psycho-Social Model of cursing (Jay, 2000: 22)

The neurological, psychological and socio-cultural factors influencing cursing converge in different ways in swearing episodes. Some of these factors are briefly outlined in the following sections.

4.4.1. Some neurological aspects of swearing

According to the NPS theory, neurological activities provide a physiological framework for swearing. Neurological factors are indispensable, though not sufficient for accounting for why people curse (Jay, 2000: 31). NPS Theory proposes that while reflexive swearing depends heavily on the right hemisphere of the brain, propositional cursing requires greater involvement of the left

hemisphere. Contemporary neurological evidence suggests that swearing may be triggered at the limbic level of the brain, involving the right hemisphere as the centre of emotions (Pinker, 2008: 330-331). Reflexive swearing does not require a significant amount of involvement of the left hemisphere, since it makes use of conventional, pre-learnt emotional response cries. Propositional swearing, on the other hand, involves greater involvement of the cortical level of the brain in the left hemisphere. Thus, propositional swearing depends on the same areas of the brain which are responsible for denotative speech, joke telling, sarcasm etc. Non-reflexive cursing, in short, involves the parts of brain responsible for non-emotional speech for phonological, syntactic and semantic processing of swearing episodes (Jay, 2000: 53).

The above claims are substantiated by reports from patients with aphasia: patients with left-hemisphere damage predominantly retain the ability to swear even if their language abilities have been impaired. Their swearing is predominantly reflexive; subjects have been reported to retain the ability to utter expletives on their own, but to have been unable to repeat a swearword when asked to do so. The majority of patients with right hemisphere lesions, on the other hand have been reported to have lost the ability to swear altogether. This is accompanied by the loss of understanding of metaphorical speech and manifestations of “indifference reactions,” whereby patients lack interest in their own mental and emotional status (Jay, 2000: 37-8; Allan and Burridge, 2006: 78; Pinker, 2008: 334).

There appears to be some strong evidence in contemporary neural sciences to suggest that reflexive swearing resides in deep and ancient parts of the human brain. While denotations of words are typically stored at the cortical level in the right hemisphere, their connotations are spread between the limbic system and the neocortex, especially in the right hemisphere. The connotations of words which are stored in these parts of the brain include the emotional load of words and expressions (Pinker, 2008: 330-1).

As follows from the above discussion, swearing is dependent on the emotional brain, or the parts of the brain responsible for the evoking, inhibiting and expressing emotions. The classical philosophical view of rationalist philosophy

has been that emotions are parasitic to reasoning. Emotions, it has been presumed, do not play a role in human understanding of the world other than disrupting and obstructing the proper processes of reasoning. This perspective, however, has recently been challenged. Damasio (2006), for instance, proposes that rather than disturbing the reasoning processes, emotions may, in fact, assist in arriving at meaningful and rational conclusions. Emotions have the virtue of highlighting (or marking) certain aspects of a situation or certain outcomes of possible actions. Positive emotions connected with a situation provide a strong neurological and psychological incentive for a certain scenario. Negative emotions, on the other hand, are a deterring factor against undertaking a particular course of action. This observation provides the basis for *the somatic marker* hypothesis. Somatic markers are special instances of feelings, which in the process of learning have been connected to possible future outcomes of certain scenarios. Somatic markers are learned through experience and are formed within the constraints of internal and external factors, including social and ethical conventions (Damasio, 2006: 173-180). Damasio remarks that in many circumstances excessive thinking may be less advantageous than reacting on a “gut feeling” evoked by somatic markers. Thus, somatic markers allow for making instantaneous decisions which are beneficial to an individual. Damasio assumes that human reasoning depends on several brain systems across distinct levels of neural organizations, including the centres which are responsible for the processing of emotions and feelings. The organ that appears to be crucial for the control of emotions, and thus for the production of expletives is the amygdala, whose primary function appears to be the control of anger and aggression. Extensive human and animal studies have also shown that the amygdala plays a vital role in the processing of emotions. In people the organ lights up when the subject is confronted with an angry face or a taboo word. Monkeys with the amygdala surgically removed have no difficulties learning a new shape, but have problems associating it with a negative stimulus introduced at the same time. In humans damage to the amygdala causes inability of normal processing of emotions and may result in patients getting themselves in problematic situations without their conscious awareness of doing so (Jay, 2000: 77; Damasio, 2006: 69-70, 133-4; Pinker, 2008: 332).

Another brain organ that seems to be heavily implicated in the production and control of expletives is the basal ganglia. This structure computes messages from many parts of the brain, including the amygdala. Different components of the basal ganglia inhibit each other, therefore damage to the structure causes a number of different abnormalities which are linked e.g. to Parkinson's disease and Huntington's disease. Pathological changes in the basal ganglia have also been linked to Gilles de la Tourette Syndrome, a partly hereditary neurological disease. The condition is manifested through uncontrolled muscle spasms, nervous twitches and uncontrollable vocalizations. In some patients the symptoms include coprolalia; uncontrollable outbursts of expletives and swearwords. Patients are unable to control themselves and feel a irresistible urge to curse, especially when they are in public places. Although the pathogenesis of Tourette Syndrome remains largely unknown, linking it to changes in the basal ganglia appears to have good grounds: some research suggests that in Tourette patients the areas of the basal ganglia responsible for the controlling and inhibiting offensive vocalisations have been damaged, leading to uncontrollable outbursts of coprolalia. (Jay, 2000: 64-7; Pinker, 2008: 335-7).

4.4.2. Some psychological aspects of swearing

Though neurological phenomena provide a physiological basis for cursing, they are not sufficient for a comprehensive analysis of offensive speech. Therefore, NPS theory discusses a number of psychological aspects necessary for the account of swearing episodes. Cursing is dependent on a whole range of personality factors. Jay (2000: 84) argues that two aspects that are clearly linked with swearing are one's sexual anxiety and religiosity. Individuals with high sexual anxiety and/or high religiosity are more highly offended by cursing. They are more likely to restrain themselves and more readily sanction others' swearing practices (Allan and Burrige, 2006: 78).

Speakers' sex appears to be an important correlate of swearing. In general, men appear to swear more than women. At the same time men exhibit a wider range of swearwords and they use stronger obscenities (Jay, 2000: 166-7, 260-5). Correlated with this are social and cultural standards and preconceptions; women

traditionally have been ascribed the features of nurturance and sensitivity, while aggression and dominance have been traditional male traits in many cultures. These preconceptions have influenced the traditional attitude of leniency towards male swearing as opposed to female cursing in Western societies. Jay (2000: 166) notes that since women started to enter the contexts traditionally reserved for men, the expectations have shifted and the discrepancy between men's and women's swearing has been diminishing.

Apart from one's sexual anxiety and religiosity other personality correlates of cursing discussed by Jay (2008) include age, temperament, coping skills, personality type, moral reasoning and psychological deviations. All these factors play a role in swearing, either increasing or decreasing an individual's inclination to curse. Jay (2000: 88) proposes the following diagram for psychological motives for cursing:




Figure 24. Psychological motives and restraints for cursing (Jay, 2000: 88)

The above diagram shows the strength of the motives and restraints on cursing deriving from different psychological factors. Strong religiosity, for instance provides weak motives for swearing and strong restraints against it. Impulsive personality, on the other hand is a strong motivating factor for cursing with little restraint against the use of bad language.

Neurological and psychological variables discussed above provide a necessary, though not sufficient perspective on cursing. For a more comprehensive picture of swearing the socio-cultural factors must be taken into consideration as well.

4.4.3. Some socio-cultural aspects of swearing

Socio-cultural aspects of swearing refer to the influence of speakers' social and cultural environment on their cursing practices. Such aspects in Jay's analysis include: *formality, intimacy, taboo, privacy, gender role, disgust*. Socio-cultural variables may either increase or decrease one's likelihood to curse. For instance, high level of intimacy with the interlocutor typically increases an individual's likelihood to swear, while the a high level of formality often decreases the chances of engaging in swearing episodes.

An individual's swearing practices are learnt, shaped and moderated within society. Children swear from a very young age and this ability persists into adulthood and the old age (Allan and Burrige, 2006: 78). Cursing as such is dependent on one's social learning history. In children this includes, for instance, the process of education, parental practices and peer influence. In short, children's cursing practices are formed by the social environment they are brought up in. The cursing habits learnt in childhood have a strong impact on speakers' verbal behaviour in their adult lives (Jay, 2000: 115-21).

In adults swearing is strongly related to one's relative status within the society. There are two sources of such status: the relative power between interlocutors and the social distance between them. The relative power is defined by a range of factors such as one's class, social position, occupation etc. One's relative power is not the same in all situations; it depends on the context of a conversation. Social distance derives from interlocutors' discrepancies in age, (un)familiarity, gender and socio-cultural backgrounds. The relative status of interlocutors influences one's swearing practices, in that swearing at (or in the presence of) an individual with a lower status is possible without the loss of face, while swearing at somebody of a higher relative status is more likely to spark an angry response and bring social sanctions on the speaker (Jay, 2000:157-63, Allan and Burrige, 2006: 77-8).

The issue of the interlocutor's gender as a factor shaping their swearing practices has been discusses e.g. by Simkins and Rinck (1982) and Jay (2000: 260-5). Their research helps to substantiate the claim that women are, in general, less liable to

swear than men. In addition to that, the likelihood of cursing and the terms used tends to change depending on whether the interlocutors are in the context of same-sex or mixed-sex group. In the research reported by Simkins and Rinck (1982) both sex groups have revealed different sexual terminology while in conversation within a same-sex group than a mixed-sex group. In same-sex groups both men and women have been reported to use more colloquial and fewer formal terms than in mixed-sex groups. Simkins and Rinck (1982) report also on other contexts, such as the subjects conversing with their parents and their spouses/lovers. The parent context is characterised by the greatest percentage of formal expressions. The spouse/lover context, on the other hand, is reported to be marked by the highest percentage of euphemistic expressions.

As the above discussion suggests, cursing episodes vary in appropriateness depending on the socio-cultural contexts in which they are used. In a particular context the speaker must make a decision of whether their utterance is appropriate or inappropriate (Jay, 1992: 12-13). This depends on the interlocutors and the audience and on the socio-cultural circumstances under which communication takes place.

4.4.4. Jay's (1992; 2000) model of verbal aggression

The above discussion of swearing points to the view of cursing, which is a phenomenon biologically based on the neural structures, dependent on psychological factors and shaped and constrained by social ones. All these factors have to be taken into consideration for an exhaustive account of cursing. Hence, Jay (2000: 28) provides the following general formula for the likelihood of swearing:

IF neurological state + psychological state + socio-cultural setting, THEN (+) or (-) likelihood of cursing.

Neurological factors combined with psychological and socio-cultural ones are, thus, inevitably interconnected in the process of swearing. Combination of these factors accounts for whether an individual is more or less likely to curse.

The combination of these variables is presented in Jay's (1992; 2000) model of swearing discussed below. Jay (1992: 96-107) proposes a five-stage model of anger as it is manifested in American culture:

STAGE 1: THE OFFENDING EVENT
STAGE 2: THE DEGREE OF ANGER
STAGE 3: ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL ANGER
STAGE 4: LOSS OF CONTROL
STAGE 5: RETRIBUTION

One should note the affinity of the above stages to Lakoff's (1987) model (section 2.3), although Jay (1992) makes no clear reference to Lakoff's work. It is important to stress here that Jay's (1992) – like Lakoff's (1987) – is a highly idealised model of anger. What follows is a short presentation of the model as described by Jay (1992):

The five-stage model of anger begins with the speaker (hereafter S) experiencing certain offending event, which evokes the feeling of anger in S. This event is commonly caused by another individual, the offender, or the wrongdoer (hereafter W). The nature of the offending event may vary. For instance, the offending event may be triggered by certain speech or comment on the part of W, W's extralinguistic behaviour or certain emotions experienced by W, which are conspicuous to S. In order to decide how to respond to the offending event, S has to take into consideration a number of factors, such as W's age, sex, relative status, ethnic group, physical appearance and the social-physical status in which the offending event takes place. Other variables to be taken into account are the level of intentionality of W's behaviour and the perceived damage the offending event has done to S. The type of S's response is also different in a situation of non-human wrongdoer and S as W to himself, wherein the typical function of S's response is not to communicate anger, but to give vent to S's negative emotions (the cathartic function of swearing).

The offending event initiates in S a natural reaction of anger at W. Jay (1992: 101) notes the anger experienced by S is a combination of three different types on information. Firstly, S experiences the reaction of his/her autonomous nervous system, such as higher blood pressure and heart rate, changes in respiration and perspiration, pupil dilation, etc. Secondly, S undertakes a cognitive appraisal of

the situation, including the social and physical setting, the nature of the offending event, the degree of harm, etc. Thirdly, in contact with the offending event S manifests certain kinds of emotional expression, such as facial features, muscle and body movements, cultural expectations or learned responses. These three types of information converge for the experience of anger and S's response to the offending situation is correlated with emotional intensity and arousal.

STAGE 3 reflects the prototypical American reaction to experiencing negative emotions, which is attempts at controlling them. Jay (1992: 102) notes that although controlling one's anger is a function of conforming to social norms, people differ with respect to their abilities to control their emotions; some people are by nature, or by nurture more inclined to expressing their anger than others. Furthermore, S's ability to control anger depends on the kind of offending event, the degree of damage perceived and the characteristics of W. Jay (1992: 103) remarks that anger is more readily inhibited when W is of a very young or a very old age, when W has a higher social or relative status than S (e.g. employers, superiors, authorities), when W is of close relation to S (e.g. a family member), when W possesses certain intimidating physical characteristics (e.g. physical size), and when W is perceived by S to be mentally deficient and unaccountable for his/her actions. The attempts at controlling anger may take different forms, such as suppressing one's anger, giving W a less offensive remark or comment than is perceived by S to be just, or employing non-taboo forms of giving vent to one's emotions (e.g. in the form of jokes, or sarcasm).

When anger is not suppressed at STAGE 3, S will lose control over his or her anger. The loss of control is typically accompanied by uttering exclamations and/or expletives at W. These expletives normally consist of swearwords referring to a particular taboo. The use of expletive may be more or less conscious (more or less reflexive). In uttering swearwords S has to take into account the characteristics of W and the physical and socio-cultural setting of the exchange. In certain situations S may decide to use a milder expletive or employ a euphemistic term. In others, the socio-cultural background and the features of W may incline S to engage in heavier and more emotional swearwords. Jay (1992: 106) notes that at this stage the expletives used may serve the function of S's emotional needs,

rather than being a conscious attempt at insulting W. Therefore, Jay (1992: 106-7) discusses another, final stage of his model.

In Jay's analysis, the stage of retribution (STAGE 5) occurs when swearing, cursing and insults are fully realised. At this stage, S consciously attacks W with verbal abuse in order to get even for the anger he or she has experienced. Depending on the force of S's response, there are three possible scenarios. Firstly, by equating the nature of the response with the offence perceived, S *gets even* with W. Getting even refers to punishing W for carrying out the offending event by assaulting him/her with offensive language, and thus levelling-up the scales of justice. Secondly, S may make his or her verbal response less abusive compared to the offence perceived. This may be the result of some characteristics of W, e.g. W is very young or very old, W is superior to S and so on. In this scenario, S's emotional needs may remain unsatisfied. Thirdly, S's reaction to the offending event may be greater than the nature of the event. This scenario may lead to W feeling unjustly rebuked or insulted, which may spark a reaction on his part. In short, an insult itself may constitute an offending event, which may in some cases lead to chains of insults whereby both interlocutors verbally assault each other. Such possibility has been discussed by Bousfield (2008: 219)²³. This scenario will also be discussed in section 5.2.7 in connection with the corpus analysis in the present thesis.


Jay's (2000: 57-61) model of verbal aggression is an adaptation of his model of anger to the analysis of abusive language. Jay's (2000) stages include:

- STAGE 1: PROVOCATION
- STAGE 2: DEGREE OF ANGER
- STAGE 3: INHIBITION
- STAGE 4: DISINHIBITION
- STAGE 5: RETRIBUTION

Since Jay (2000: 57-61) is a summary and adaptation of Jay (1992: 96- 107), I will only reiterate the main points at this point. Stage 1 requires a provoking event performed by the wrongdoer (W), such as insulting remarks, property damage, bodily harm or any other variable that is evaluated negatively by S. The

²³ See *figure 17* in section 3.1.6.

provocation results in S's emotional arousal. Swearing may accompany different emotional states, including anger, frustration and surprise. The emotional state experienced by the speaker need not necessarily be undesirable, though swearing typically accompanies negative feelings and emotions experienced by S, most typically, anger (Jay, 2000: 52; Allan and Burridge, 2006: 78). Hence, STAGE 2 is represented as the degree of anger rising in S as a result of the provocative factors. When the degree of anger reaches a certain level, the inhibition stage is reached. Here S takes into account the inhibiting factors which suppress swearing. It is possible that at this point S's cursing episode may successfully be suppressed. When this is not the case, the cursing episode is disinhibited in STAGE 4. In STAGES 4 and 5 S undertakes a risk-benefit analysis of swearing, taking into account such factors as the physical and social context of the utterance, different characteristics of W, including his/her relative status, the audience and possible overhearers, legal consequences and so on. The factors weighed in STAGES 4 and 5 influence the sort of verbal response and the degree of aggression on the part of S. In STAGE 5 verbal aggression is fully realised. This stage accounts also for the overall consequences of S's swearing; in a cursing episode, the scales of justice may be balanced (getting even), S may assault W to a lesser degree than his perceived level of offence requires (underreaction), or S may react too harshly and too strongly (overreaction). The model, with its different factors is summarised in the below figure:



* Abbreviations: Body temp., body temperature; moral dev., moral development; Instrumental cond., Instrumental Conditioning.

Figure 25. The model of verbal aggression (Jay, 2000: 61)

It has to be noted, however, that the model described above refers to propositional swearing, where the speaker goes through the inhibition stage, makes conscious decisions whether to swear and what kind of language to use in a given context. According to Jay (2000: 58), non-propositional (reflexive) swearing occurs immediately after STAGE 2, with little inhibition and with limited control over what language to used in a given occasion.

In my corpus analysis of insults in sections 5.1 I shall adopt Jay's (2000) model of verbal aggression for the study of the model of insulting. This model reveals close similarity with Lakoff's (1987) prototypical scenario of anger. Thus, I shall treat Jay's model as a prototypical scenario of verbal aggression, from which a number of non-prototypical models may be derived. The prototypical scenario of insults is presented in section 5.1. The non-prototypical categories of verbal aggression present in the corpus data are discussed in section 5.2.

4.5. Insults

The above discussion allows finally for a comprehensive look at the phenomenon of insults. The phenomenon is multi-faceted and may be analysed in terms of face threatening acts, speech acts, or idealised cognitive models as presented by Lakoff (1987) and utilized by Jay (1991; 2000). In this section I shall firstly attempt to define the phenomenon of insults and then, present the sources of taboos that insults draw upon. Finally, I shall briefly discussed how insults are realised, before moving on to a corpus-study of insults in chapter 5 below.

According to Allan and Burrige (2006: 79) to insult someone verbally is to "abuse them by assailing them with contemptuous, perhaps insolent language that may include an element of bragging." Insults are instances of abusive swearing, typically aimed at the listener, as illustrated in Allan and Burrige (2006:79):

(118) You asshole, you're a fucking tight-ass cunt. Get fucked.

As examples of abusive swearing aimed directly at the speaker, insults constitute a bald on-record impoliteness strategy in terms of Culpeper (1996) and an on record impoliteness strategy in terms of Bousfield (2008). Thus, to insult is to

explicitly and without any redressive actions attack the face of the interactant. According to Grzegorzczkova (1991) this attack is performed specifically through the use of words which have negative emotional and axiological charge. Such words typically involve swearwords referring to certain taboos described in section 4.1. The use of swearwords is normally aimed at offending the interactant. At the same time, however, it may serve the emotional needs of the speaker (letting off steam). Insulting is a verbal result of complex mental processes as described by Jay (1991; 2000); insults are typically sparked off by an offending event performed by the wrongdoer (W). The offending event causes a degree of anger in the speaker (S), which is followed subsequently by the stages of inhibition and disinhibition. An insult is an act of verbal retribution to W, who is responsible for the occurrence of the offending event. In short, thus, a verbal insult is a direct attack at the face of an interactant through the use of negative, often taboo language, utilized as an act of verbal retribution for certain offending event. This definition of insults will provide the basis for carrying out the data corpus analysis in chapter 5.

Insults directed at a human wrongdoer typically make use of dysphemistic terms for someone's appearance, mental ability, behaviour, character, beliefs, familiar and social relations. These features must be evaluated negatively by the speaker, the hearer or/and the audience. Allan and Burridge (2006: 79-85) enumerate the following categories of dysphemistic expressions used in insults:

Comparisons with animals that are conventionally ascribed certain behaviours:

bat, cat, fox, vixen, pig, cow, bitch, cur, dog, mongrel, louse, dove, hawk, coot, galah, chicken, turkey, mouse, rabbit, bull, ox, goat, ape, monkey, ass/donkey, mule, rat, snake.

Epithets derived from tabooed bodily organs, bodily effluvia and sexual behaviours:

asshole, prick, shit, fucker, poofter, arse-licker, cock-sucker, dipshit, cock-sucker, wanker, whore, slut, slapper, slug

Dysphemistic epithets that pick on real physical characteristics that are treated as though they were abnormalities:

Fatty!, Baldy!, Four-eyes!, Short-arse, weakling!

Imprecations and epithets invoking mental subnormality or derangement:

Airhead!, Silly!, Retard!, Moron!, Idiot, Cretin, Kook! Loony, Loopy, Nincompoop!, Ninny, Fool!, Stupid!, Halfwit!, Nitwit!, Dickhead!, Fuckwit!, Fuckhead!, Shithead!,

Dysphemisms involving sexist, racists, classist, ageist language:

mick, paddy, frog, kraut, hun, chink, jap, paki, polak, ayrab, towel-head, kike, coon, nigger, slope, gook, UFO,

Slurs on the target's character:

arsehole, asshole, bag, bastard, battle-axe, bidy, codger, crank, crone, cunt, dag, dick, dork, drip, dweeb, faggot, foggy, fuddy-duddy, fuss-budget, galoot, geezer, grommet, grot, grump, hag, nerd, pansy, per(vert), poof(ter), prick, queer, schmuck, scumbag, shirtlifter, sissy, slag, slob, slut, SOB/ son of a bitch, tramp, twat, wanker, wimp, witch.

What follows is a cursory look at the above categories as they are explained in Allan and Burridge (2006: 79-85).

Animal categories make use of certain features of appearance or behaviour, which have traditionally been ascribed to certain animal species. Hence *bitch* is a woman held in contempt, often because of her alleged promiscuity. *Cow* and *sow* denote a disliked, sometimes stupid or overweight woman. *Louse* is an irritating, unpleasant person one wants to get rid of. *Mongrel* is a nasty man held in contempt. *Pig* denotes a rude, untidy person of either sex, while *snake* refers to an untrustworthy individual who intends to do harm to other people. These and similar expressions are used metaphorically to refer to people. It is worth mentioning here that the majority of HUMAN is ANIMAL metaphors appear to be used dysphemistically. There don't seem to be many animal metaphors with positive connotations, *lion* and *eagle* among a few possible exceptions.

Epithets derived from tabooed bodily organs, bodily effluvia and sexual behaviours derive from universal human taboos, described in section 4.1. They bring to mind the most disagreeable aspects of sexuality, bodily organs or people

who engage in fornication. As Allan and Burridge (2006: 80-81) point out, many insults referring to sexuality are used idiomatically and it is not possible to replace dysphemistic terms with orthophemisms without a loss of their emotional significance:

- (119) **Defecate on you!*
- (120) **Urine off!*
- (121) **You vagina!*
- (122) **You faeces!*
- (123) **He's a real fornicating vagina!*

On the other hand, it is possible to insult someone by calling them a *cock-sucker* and *penis-sucker*, *arse-licker* and *behind-licker*, *poofter* and *homosexual*, *whore* and *prostitute*. The epithets referring to sexual behaviours reveal strong anti-homosexual tendencies. In spite of increasing atmosphere of tolerance in the Western culture, references to homosexuality still function as significant insults. Similarly, the long-held tendency of insulting women by accusing them of sexual promiscuity or/and prostitution strongly persists in contemporary English and other languages (Allan and Burridge, 2006: 81).

Expressions referring to real physical characteristics make use of certain salient features of the target person. This evaluation may be based on the social norms shared by the interlocutors, alternatively it may be the subjective opinion of the speaker. In contemporary Western culture being overweight or obese is a highly undesirable characteristic, hence *fatty!* is likely to offend an overweight addressee. *Baldy!* refers to a person who suffers from alopecia, while *four-eyes!* is typically aimed at a person wearing eyeglasses. *Weakling*, on the other hand, refers to somebody's lack of physical prowess. Insults derived from physical characteristics also include references to certain disabilities, hence *cripple*, *paraplegic*, *blind*, *deaf*, *dumb* etc. Similar expressions, under the influence of political correctness, seem to be among the stronger insults in contemporary Western societies, as a result of strong cultural taboo against insulting disabled people.

In contemporary Western culture mental devaluation is held as one of the most significant stigmas. Therefore, it is not surprising that a whole category of insults makes use of expressions invoking a mental deficiency of a person. The stigma is

so strong that many expressions which started as euphemisms for mental derangement soon underwent pejoration. Such was the case with *mentally disabled* and the adjective *special*, applied to people with mental or physical subnormalities in the late twentieth century (Allan and Burrige, 2006: 82). A similar tendency can be observed in the history of the terms *insane* and *asylum*, whose original sense was respectively *not healthy* – in the most general sense (from Latin *sanus*) and *refuge* (Burrige, 2006a: 460). On the other hand, many expressions for mental subnormality have been re-invented by certain groups as terms of praise. Allan and Burrige (2006: 83) report that the terms *maniac*, *crazy* and *nutter* function as slang terms of recognition among certain social groups.

Different -IST epithets, including sexist, speciesist, classist, ageist and other dysphemisms make use of a disfavoured category of people the target belongs to. Different human groups are in constant contact with each other. This coexistence leads at times to tensions and conflicts. This appears to be the general rule underlying the rise of such epithets. Examples of sexist epithets in English include *lady*, *skirt-chaser*, *fag* and *dyke*. Among ageist epithets there are *hag* and *old prick*. There is also a multitude of nation and ethnicity-related insults in English, such as *mick*, and *paddy* for an Irish person, *frog* for a French, *kraut* and *hun* for a German, *chink* for a Chinese, *jap* and *nip* for a Japanese, *paki* for a Pakistani, *polak* for a Pole, *ayrab*, *towel-head* or *camel jockey* for an Arab, *kike* or *yid* for a Jew, *coon* or *nigger* for blacks, *gook* and *UFO (Ugly Fucking Orientals)* for an Asian. Burrige (2006a: 458) points to the fact that due to the social and legal push towards fairness and equality the -ist dysphemisms have acquired a special status in the Western culture, comparable to the status of profanity in the times when religion played a much more significant role in people's lives. Thus the epithets invoking one's race, sex or ethnicity appear to belong to the most offensive insults in contemporary English.

Finally, slurs on the target's character make use of the different epithets aimed at the disagreeable features of the target's character. The terms used for that purpose are derived from different categories of insults described above. For instance, terms for body parts and genitalia which are often used to describe one's character include *arsehole/asshole*, *cunt*, *prick* and *dick*. The last three terms reveal the

tendency, whereby female genital terms are metonymically used for women, while male genitalia typically denote men. This, however, is not always the case. In English a man may be called a *pussy* or *cunt* in the sense of respectively being feminine or weak in character and being unintelligent, rude or annoying. Some slurs make use of one's sexuality or age, as in *fag*, *faggot*, *wanker*, or *hag*. These terms have been adopted from the sexist and ageist language in order to denote disagreeable features of the target's character. Some terms used for describing one's character (e.g. *He's a devil!*) may be ambiguous between an insult and a term of approval.

The typical function of insult, as it was stated above, is offending the interactant. However, abusive swearing may serve a number of other functions. In insults aimed at a non-human wrongdoer the primary function of verbal aggression appears to be giving vent to S's negative emotions (Jay, 1991: 99). Insults may also accompany a number of speech acts, such as threats, warnings and orders. The common denominator of these appears to be the relation of power; in the directives such as above S must emphasize or maintain his relative superiority towards H. Therefore, insulting accompanying these speech acts is perhaps best seen as an verbal element of emphasizing S's power over H.

Another function of insults cited in the available literature is their cultural and ritual qualities. Jacquemet (2006: 403-4) points to the cross-culturally widespread practice of verbal duels, which are typically ritualised exchanges of insults between two or more male interactants. English also has had a long history of ritual insults (including verbal practices such as flyting and playing the dozens). Ritual insults are part of society's customs or traditions. They involve a competition of wits, intellect and one-upmanship by assailing the competitor with foul language. Being a kind of competitive game of teasing the opponent, they do not necessarily constitute an attack on the interlocutor; instead, but they may have the virtue of strengthening the bonds within the group. Allan and Burridge (2006: 85-7) cite, among others, the following examples of *playing the dozens*, a verbal duelling practice which is very popular among African American community:

- (124) You were so ugly at birth, your parents named you Shit Happens.
 (125) You're so dumb, if you spoke your mind you'd be speechless.
 (126) Your breath smells so bad, people on the phone hang up.
 (127) Your girlfriend is so stupid, the first time she used a vibrator she cracked her two front teeth.
 (128) Your father is like cement, it takes him two days to get hard.
 (129) Your mother has so many crabs she walks sideways.
 (130) Iron is iron, and steel don't rust, but your mama got a pussy like a Greyhound bus.

Reinventing terms of insult to denote an expression of positive identification within a group of people is another noteworthy linguistic phenomenon. As it has been noted above, among certain youth groups epithets such as *crazy* and *maniac* are slang terms for a strong macho man. The same is true for *mean* like in the names of sports teams, such as *Pensacola Mean Machine* and *Mean Machine Sailing Team*. Other groups have re-invented sexual slurs, such as in the expressions *Queer Nations*, *queer studies*, *Dykes on Bikes* (a cycling group for lesbians) or *the Phunky Bitches* (Pinker, 2008: 329). Perhaps one of the most notable examples of re-defying racial slurs has been the frequent use of *nigger* (often spelled *nigga*) among Afro-Americans as a badge of identity or solidarity. It should be noted, however, that often the use of a term by an in-group is unavailable for a member of an out-group. For instance, the use of *nigger* by a white person is likely to be received as an insult, regardless of the speaker's intentions. It is also interesting to note here that the metonymic mechanisms re-inventing derogatory terms for expression of social or group approval have been discussed by Voßhagen (1999).

Crystal (1995: 173) points out that swearing has important social functions, including a marker of social distance, when speakers manifest their disagreement with social norms by swearing in public, or as a signal of in-group solidarity marked by the use of similar swearing patterns. The use of insults as terms of positive recognition within a group points to the category of banter (mock impoliteness). This category is discussed by Leech (1983) as a separate communicational superstrategy²⁴. Banter refers to expressions which are impolite or insulting at face-value, but their communicative intention is to express

²⁴ See section 3.1.2.

closeness, respect or intimacy. Banter is typically addressed to the people that S remains in close relations with, such as friends or family:

(131)

S1: Hullo congenital idiot!

S2: Hullo, you priceless old ass!

S3: I'd no idea you two knew each other so well!

[Allan and Burrige, 2006, p. 87 after *Punch* cartoon: quoted in Stern 1965:323]

(132)

[Two urban working-class Australian Aboriginal girls]:

S1: Gimme the smoke if you want it lit Eggbert.

S2: Here shit-for-brains. [Passes the cigarette].

S1: Geez, you're a fuckin' sook. I swear to God.

S2: Shut up fucker.

[Allan and Burrige, 2006, p. 88 after Allen 1987: 63]

In the above exchanges the function of the swearwords and taboo expressions is not to offend, but to maintain, stress and communicate a close emotional or social between the interlocutors.

Different functions of insults, including the ones mentioned above, are discussed in connection with the corpus analysis of film samples in chapter 5 below. Section 5.1 presents prototypical instances of insults, wherein the prototypical aim of the speaker is to insult and humiliate the addressee. Ritualized practice of insult duels is presented in section 5.2.10. Friendly banter is discussed in 5.2.11. Different types of dysphemistic expressions employed in the corpus data insults are listed in section 5.3.3.

5. Insults: a corpus analysis

The present chapter is centred around a corpus-based study of insults in English. The study makes use of the theoretical discussion of insults presented in chapter 4. Similarly, for the analysis of insults below I am going to implement analytical tools discussed in chapters 2 and 3. In particular, the present analysis is aimed at applying the theoretical tools of cognitive linguistics for a corpus-based analysis of insults. The data corpus discussed below is based on 39 full feature English films, from which a selection of 130 film scenes has been made. Section 5.0. presents the data corpus and discusses the methodology of further analysis. This analysis consists of three areas of enquiries. Firstly, sections 5.1 and 5.2 discuss insults in the light of Jay's (2000) model of verbal aggression as the prototypical scenario of insults. Thus, prototypical insults are analysed and a classification of non-prototypical members of the category are proposed. Secondly, section 5.3. centres on the analysis of insults as a speech act. In this section Grzegorzczkova's (1991) conditions for the speech act of insults are analysed in the light of corpus analysis and a cognitive evaluation of the speech acts of insults – in accordance with section 3.2.3 will be proposed. Thirdly, section 5.4 provides the analysis of insults in terms of Langacker's (1990) network models. This analysis enables a broad perspective of verbal aggression, which includes prototypical and non-prototypical instances of insults, including their non-linguistic realisations. Fourthly, section 5.5. implements Talmy's (1988) theory of force dynamics for the analysis of insults. In accordance with the description standards put forward in section 2.4, a force-dynamic model of prototypical verbal aggression will be discussed there. As a variation of this model a number of non-prototypical types of insults will be described in the light of force dynamics theory. Finally, section 5.6 attempts at consolidating the main findings of the corpus analysis and presenting the conclusions following from the discussion of the data samples. In order to avoid repetition in the present chapter the terms *insults*, *verbal aggression*, *abusive swearing*, *verbal attack* and *offensive speech* are used interchangeably to refer to the act of insulting.

5.0. Methodology

The present chapter discusses a corpus-based analysis of insults carried out on a selection of 39 English films. The alphabetical list of these films is presented in Appendix 2. Unless indicated otherwise, Appendix 2 contains theatrical release versions of the films. The list includes exclusively contemporary full-feature movies. In deciding to put them on the list I have focused on their inclusion of material which possibly gives rise to scenes of verbal conflict. Therefore, in Appendix 2 there is a large selection of thrillers, horrors and drama movies with a number of situational comedies, gangster movies, black noir films and others. The corpus films selected aim at representing reasonably real-life based interpersonal verbal exchanges. Thus, productions which may provide unrealistic conversation contexts – e.g. fantasy films, science-fiction movies, cartoons and animated productions – have been excluded from the corpus.

From the films listed in Appendix 2 a selection of 130 film scenes has been made. The scenes, which are listed in Appendix 3, constitute the corpus data for the analysis of insults in the present chapter. In order to avoid possible confusion and to differentiate them from other language samples discussed in the present thesis, the film scenes analysed below are numbered (i1) – (i130), where *i* stands for *insult (sample)*. All the scenes selected contain a situation of verbal conflict wherein linguistic insults are realized. In deciding on the inclusion of an individual scene in the corpus data, I have referred to the definition of insult provided in section 4.5, where insults have been defined as a direct attack at the face of an interactant through the use of emotionally negatively charged, often taboo, language. Thus, the samples included in Appendix 3 typically involve a situation of verbal conflict between two or more interactants wherein an act of verbal aggression is carried out. It must be noted here, however, that Appendix 3 includes a number of samples only loosely related to the definition of insults presented in section 4.5. The reason for this is that for a comprehensive analysis of insults it is necessary to allow for non-prototypical instances of verbal aggression, which – in accordance with Lakoff (1987) – may be presented in terms of a radial model, wherein only some features and characteristics are shared

by individual models. Such non-prototypical cases of verbal attack are discussed in section 5.2.

The movie scenes listed in Appendix 3 are described in the form of a simplified turn-based system, rather than the stave method employed by Bousfield (2008). I have implemented this method based on the considerations for the economy and clarity of the forthcoming description. In adopting the stave method Bousfield's (2008) aim was to provide a comprehensive account of impolite verbal expressions, in which different forms of impoliteness are analysed in relation to their classification, their dynamics at the utterance and discourse level and the role of the turn-taking system. Thus, his method had to be more complex and precise. For the purposes of my analysis the simplified turn-taking method appears to be sufficient, though a number of critical points about my methodology can be made. These will be discussed towards the end of this section.

In Appendix 3 all the movie scenes are individually and uniquely numbered (i1) – (i130). Each sample is rendered with a short context description – provided inside square brackets – followed by an turn-based verbal exchange between a number of speakers (S) and interactants (I). The speaker/interactant distinction is based on the type of input provided by different agents into a conversation. Any party that provides verbal input into the exchange is marked as a speaker (S). A party that does not provide verbal input, but who provides a significant influence to situational context is rendered as an interactant (I). Thus, individual speakers and interactants in the below samples are marked as S_x and I_x respectively, where x is the indexical number referring to the order in which they appear in the exchange. The part(s) of each exchange which include taboo or emotionally-significant language expressions, analysable as verbal aggression, are marked in text by the use of italics. The movie scenes discussed below also come with omission of some of their parts. These omissions have been carefully chosen so as not to influence the nature of the exchange and have been marked as in-text square brackets containing a triple dot. Any additional information indispensable for the correct description of individual scenes is provided inside square brackets. Finally, each movie scene is marked with the film source it has been taken from.

Unless indicated otherwise, the film sources of movie samples are listed in Appendix 2.

The forthcoming data analysis constitutes a practical application of the theoretical framework presented in chapters 2 and 3 for the aim of a comprehensive account of insults. The sample data is analysed here from three different and complementary perspectives. Firstly, a study of insults as an idealised cognitive model will be proposed. For this aim I take Jay's (2000) model of verbal aggression – as presented in section 4.4.4 – and analyse it in the light of ICM theory in accordance with Lakoff (1987)²⁵. Thus, in section 5.1. the prototypical model of insults is presented. This model incorporates cases of verbal aggression wherein all of the stages of Jay (2000) are realized. These stages are individually discusses in relation to the corpus data in sections 5.1.1 – 5.1.5. The ICM theory predicts that apart from the prototypical members of a category a number of related non-prototypical models can be distinguished. This is the subject of section 5.2, where the data samples containing non-prototypical instances of offensive speech are discussed and categorized. It is also analysed there how these sub-categories of insults relate to the prototypical model and in what ways they diverge from it.

In section 5.3. the focus of interest is the analysis of insults in the light of the theory of speech acts. In particular, I adopt Grzegorzczkova's (1991) approach, where she proposes four distinct conditions for the speech act of insults.²⁶ In accordance with the cognitive view of the speech act analysis presented in section 3.2.3, in the subsequent analysis I take Grzegorzczkova's conditions to be prototypical rather than necessary and sufficient. Therefore, in sections 5.3.1 – 5.3.4 each of Grzegorzczkova's conditions is analysed separately in relation to the data samples. Section 5.3.5 summarises the corpus speech act analysis by means of a radial model encompassing prototypical and non-prototypical instances of verbal aggression in a single figure.

Section 5.4 provides an account of verbal aggression in terms of Langacker's (1990) network models. This kind of analysis facilitates a broad and inclusive

²⁵ See sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.

view of insults, including prototypical and non-prototypical instances of offensive speech. More importantly, it allows us to present non-verbal instances of insults alongside verbal categories of abusive swearing. The view of offensive speech which emerges this way is not subject to a strict reductionist approach; the representation of the category of insults cannot be attained by means of analysing a single conceptual structure, but it depends on the study of interrelations holding between different structures within a conceptual network.

Section 5.5 focuses on the analysis of insults in the light of the theory of force dynamics, as presented by Talmy (1988)²⁷. The theory of force dynamics is thus applied for the analysis of offensive speech at the intrapersonal and interpersonal level. After the simplified intrapersonal model of verbal aggression and the simplified intrapersonal model of verbal aggression are presented in sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 respectively, a more comprehensive model of prototypical insults is provided in section 5.5.3. This model takes into account different stages of Jay (2000) and combines both the intrapersonal and interpersonal dimensions for the purpose of a more detailed description of abusive language. In section 5.5.4 the theory of force dynamics is applied to a number of non-prototypical instances of insults, in particular to *reflexive insults*, *redirected insults*, *intensifying insults* and *insult chains*. It is noted there, however, that virtually every kind of verbal aggression could be convincingly presented in the light of force dynamics theory.

Finally, section 5.6. provides conclusions to the corpus analysis by consolidating the findings emerging from the discussion proposed in sections 5.1 – 5.5.

A number of possible issues can be raised in connection with the methodology of the present corpus analysis. As I see it, there are three main points of criticism which can be made. I shall subsequently name them and provide a possible response.

Firstly, when it comes to the data for the present analysis, it may be claimed that feature movies do not constitute the most representative source of real-life verbal insults. The nature of feature movies – unlike documentaries – is not to faithfully

²⁶ See section 3.2.4

²⁷ See section 2.4.

reflect reality, but to present it in a way which is attractive and catchy for the audience, Therefore, in directing colourful and attention-gripping scenes film makers may tend to provide contexts of verbal aggression which exaggerate certain aspects of offensive speech. A possible answer may be that while a documentary production analysis – of the sort attempted by Bousfield (2000) – would perhaps be more representative of certain aspects of verbal aggression, it would require a completely different approach and methodological description standards. Furthermore, the kind of analysis presented below is aimed at describing different prototypical and non-prototypical instances of insults that can be produced in different situational contexts rather than providing judgements concerning their precise mirroring of real-life situation. Therefore, the mode of analysis applied below appears to be sufficient for the realization of my aims.

Secondly, a possible objection may be made concerning the arbitrariness of the selection of particular scene samples for the present analysis, and thus a possibility of misrepresentation of the data in question. It must be admitted that the selection has been personal and rather arbitrary, however at no point in the subsequent analysis was the exclusion of any problematic material attempted. The data samples have been chosen and presented in accordance with the standards described in this section. A large selection of samples (130 movie scenes) also helps to alleviate the fears of data samples being diametrically unrepresentative. Therefore, even if some of the movie scenes from Appendix 3 have been chosen based on the authors personal bias, this does not diametrically change the inclusion or absence of the kinds of insults described below.

Thirdly, an issue may be made in connection with the mode of film scene description based on the simplified turn-taking system rather than the stave method preferred by Bousfield (2000). Although it must be admitted that the simplified turn-taking description contains certain inadequacies, it appears – as it has been already noted – to be sufficient for the course of the subsequent analysis. The method applied by Bousfield (2000) had to, by necessity, be more complex in order to achieve different analytical aims. Therefore, the simplified turn-taking model does not allow for a comprehensive account of the dynamics of insulting in the conversation or for the account of the role of the turn-taking system. Similarly,

the simplified mode of film scenes presentation does not give a guarantee of an adequate representation of the interactants' actions, thoughts, feelings and state of mind in all their complexity. By necessity, the film scenes are presented in a fairly simplified and idealised way. However, in order to provide an account of the prototypical and non-prototypical types of insults based on Jay (2000) and to analyse the data in the light of speech act theory and the theory of force dynamics the method adopted below appears to be economical, clear and sufficient. It is by the virtue of combining two different approaches to the problem of insults that I arrive at meaningful conclusions in section 5.6. Thus, the economy and clarity of data presentation should, in my view, be considered an asset rather than a fault.

5.1. Prototypical instances of insults

In section 4.5 verbal aggression was defined as an act of conscious attack on the face of an interactant. The attack is carried out by means of words and expressions which are negatively emotionally and axiologically charged. Such terms typically include references to different taboos presented in section 4.1. In this section I shall adopt Jay's (2000) model of verbal aggression for the discussion of the prototypical instances of insults. Thus, I take Jay's model to be an prototypical scenario of insults in accordance with Lakoff's (1987) account of ICM theory. It has also been noted above that Jay's scenario of offensive speech closely resembles Lakoff's (1987) account of anger²⁸. Jay's (2000: 58-61) model of verbal aggression is reiterated below.

STAGE 1: PROVOCATION
 STAGE 2: DEGREE OF ANGER
 STAGE 3: INHIBITION
 STAGE 4: DISINHIBITION
 STAGE 5: RETRIBUTION

In accordance with Jay (2000), the prototypical model of verbal aggression begins with a conscious act of provocation performed by a the wrongdoer (hereafter W) to the speaker (hereafter S) (STAGE 1). Both S and W are conscious human agents present at the scene of the interaction. S undertakes a cognitive evaluation

of the act of provocation, the characteristics of W and the contextual aspects of the provocation. The act of provocation is thus internalized by S who perceives it as an act of injustice. Thus, S experiences the rising degree of anger (STAGE 2). As the degree of anger rises, S begins to experience urges aimed at redressing the balance of justice and alleviating the feeling of anger. A typical reaction to the anger experienced, however, are attempts at inhibiting it (STAGE 3). Thus, S carries out attempts at inhibiting his or her anger. At this point S weighs a number of factors which either assist or obstruct the attempts at inhibiting the negative feelings, such as the type of the provocation event, characteristics of W, presence of a third party or audience, the power relations between S and W. If at the stage of inhibition S's anger is successfully suppressed, verbal aggression is not realized. However, if S's attempts at inhibiting his or her anger fail, the anger is disinhibited (STAGE 4). At this stage S undertakes a risk-benefit analysis of abusive swearing and weighs up the factors influencing the kind of verbal response produced. Among things which S must take account of are the evaluation of W and W's characteristics, the balance of relative power between S and W, the physical context of the utterance and the presence of any third party agents. Having weighted these factors S engages in a verbal attack towards W. The act of verbal aggression constitutes an act of retribution (STAGE 5) towards W as a response to the act of provocation and the feeling of injustice perceived by S. By indulging into insulting S gets even with W and the scales of justice are balanced. Alternatively – depending of the interplay of contextual variables – S may overreact or underreact relative to W's act of provocation.

In accordance with Lakoff (1987) and Jay (2000), the prototypical instances of insults are the cases of verbal aggression wherein the stages are fully realized as shown above. In the corpus data demonstrated in Appendix 2 such prototypical instances are exemplified by samples (i1) – (i63). What follows is the description of how individual stages of the prototypical model of verbal aggression are realized in these insult samples:

²⁸ See section 2.3.

5.1.1. Provocation

The prototypical scenario of insults requires in STAGE 1 a certain act of provocation performed by W towards S as the first stage of the model. This act of W must relate to S and be negatively evaluated by S. It is this act of provocation that is responsible for the rising level of anger in STAGE 2. Both W and S are present in the context of the exchange. The acts of provocations of W towards S are evident in the prototypical instances of insulting exemplified in (i1) to (i63). The provocation may take different verbal or non-verbal forms. What follows is a short description of non-verbal and verbal types of provocation respectively based on the sample data (i1) – (i63).

Firstly, a common form of non-verbal provocation is bodily harm or physical damage incurred by S at the hands of W [(i4), (i6) (i18) (i33), (i34), (i35) (i40), (i43)]. Typically, a greater degree of harm requires a greater intensity of verbal aggression on the part of S in order to redress the balance of justice [cf. (i43) and (i33)]. The insult may be an immediate reaction to the bodily harm experienced by S [(i33), (i34), (i40), (i43)]. Alternatively, S may refer to physical injury done to S by W in the past [(i18), (i35)]. The act of provocation can also be the physical injury done by W not to S, but to a third party S is related to. This may include S's friend or acquaintance, a family member, S's property or a familiar object etc. In samples (i4) and (i6) what sparks S's insult is the bodily damage incurred by a third party S is related to. Moreover, in certain situations a mere possibility or potentiality of physical damage may constitute a provocative event (i21).

Secondly, what constitutes non-verbal acts of provocation are often W's actions or behaviours which are judged by S to be contrary to S's interest, such as W's disruptive or uncooperative behaviour [(i1), (i3), (i7), (i13), (i15), (i17), (i24), (i27), (i28), (i31), (i42)], H's competing with S or challenging S's authority [(i11), (i19), (i20)], acts of betrayal (i2), (i49), (i58), theft (i9), perjury (i41), imprisonment (i47), unauthorized use of S's resources (i29) or a failure to perform a certain task (i51), (i63). S's judgement of W's acting contrary to S's interests brings about the subjective feeling of injustice, which requires S's taking steps towards re-establishing the balance of justice.

Thirdly, provocation may arise from the nature of relations between S and W. This may be realized through W's competing with S (i11) or not recognizing S's authority [(i16), (i46), (i56)]. S may judge W's actions negatively based on S's authority, social role or profession. For instance, public order authorities, such as police officers, and detectives may easily be provoked when faced with criminals or offenders [(i52), (i53), (i54)]. Similarly, (i56) exemplifies a criminal's insult towards a police officer who intends to arrest him. Thus, in addition to a negative evaluation of W's actions, instances like these plausibly include an element of not recognizing W's authority by S. Moreover, S may be provoked by his or her negative evaluation of other aspects of W, such as appearance [(i37), (i38), (i39), (i50)], character [(i55), (i60)], ethnic background (i48) or mental sub-normality (i22).

The verbal acts of provocation may include different forms of verbal abuse aimed at S, such as insulting and name calling [(i1), (i46)], swearing (i10) or otherwise offensive or inappropriate remarks and verbal activities [(i12), (i23), (i44), (i62)] on the part of W. All of these verbal acts must be negatively evaluated by S and produce the rising level of anger. Apart from verbal abuse aimed at S directly, the provocation event may involve insults or offensive remarks towards a third party related to S. This is exemplified in (i61), where S1 is infuriated after having heard an offensive remark about his female friend (S3) uttered by a third party (S2). Apart from verbal acts of provocation, S's insult may be triggered by W's not answering S's questions or failing to respond in the way that is expected. Such verbal reluctance is consequently taken by S as a deliberate act of defiance and, hence, brings about the feeling of anger. This is demonstrated e.g. in (i45), where S's takes W's repetition of the word *what* as an act of provocation.

As predicted by Jay's model, the act of provocation is measured against the characteristics of the wrongdoer, such as W's age and familiarity to S, the interactants relative status, perceived damage incurred by S as a result of the act of provocation. The same verbal or non-verbal act in different circumstances may be considered an act of provocation or not. Is a given act is considered a provocation in a given context, different extra-linguistic factors may either moderate or increase S's feeling of injustice and, hence, the nature of S's

response. This is illustrated e.g. in (i48), where a gang member (S3) is taunted and thrown out of the house by his mother (S1). Although S1's words may easily be construed as a provocative act, S3 leaves the house obediently, without answering back. Thus, S3 has moderated his anger and S1's remarks are not perceived to be so provocative as to lead to insulting her back. In (i46) the same gang member (S3) reacts with verbal abuse and physical taunts towards another gangster (S1) when faced with no more intense offensive remark. The key difference is the balance of relative power in the two samples; the reaction towards the insult produced by one's mother is typically different than the reaction towards one's colleague, partner or collaborator, especially when the encounter presupposes an element of rivalry or competition. The relation of interactants' relative power and the intensity of provocation event required to spark an appropriate answer is also well illustrated in data samples involving the cases of strict hierarchy and power discrepancy between interactants. In certain contexts, e.g. the army, the police, employer-employee relations, where one of the parties has a high degree of power over others, the more-powerful party may commonly engage in provocative behaviour without sparking a negative reaction on the part of the interlocutor(s) or the audience. This is evident in (i17), (i25), (i26), (i32), wherein the more powerful party engages in insulting without sparking the addressee's answer. One reason for that is that in strict power-relation circumstances there normally exist different means of executing power of the more-powerful party over his or her subordinates and punishing them for insubordination or the lack of respect. Thus, for fear of foreseeable consequences, the subordinate party may inhibit their anger, or, alternatively, give vent to their emotions in circumstances in which the wrongdoer is not physically present. Such cases, involving insulting an absent W are discussed in section 5.2.2 below.

5.1.2. Degree of anger

STAGE 2 of the prototypical model of verbal aggression requires a rising degree of S's anger in response to W's act of provocation. As stated by Jay (1992: 101-3), swearing may accompany different emotional states of S, including anger, frustration or surprise. Hence, I take *degree of anger* to function here as a cover

term for different negative emotions induced in S as a result of W's provocation in Stage 1. These may include – apart from anger – frustration, surprise, dismay, distaste, disgust, contempt and others. In accordance with Jay, the degree of anger results from the convergence of S's cognitive appraisal of the provocative situation, as well as the bodily symptoms experienced as a reaction of S's autonomous nervous system. Negative emotions experienced by S are manifested to W and/or other parties by means of different signals, such as facial features and muscle or body movements.

In the prototypical instances of insulting (i1) – (i63) the act of provocation induces in S the rising degree of negative emotions, which ultimately leads to retribution in the form of verbal abuse. As stated above, the type of negative emotions may vary. Admittedly, the exact nature of negative emotions experienced by S is difficult to identify to a satisfying degree. A detailed psychological introspection of interactants' minds is difficult to attain and goes well beyond the scope of this thesis. In some cases, however, it seems plausible to propose the names of the emotions experienced by S. What follows is a tentative description of possible negative feelings experienced by S in samples (i1) – (i63).

Anger appears to be a typical emotional response to an act of provocation and is discernable in the majority of prototypical instances of insulting. With the notable exceptions of (i14), (i20), (i41), (i47) it may be claimed that all of the examples (i1) – (i63) reveal at least some degree of S's anger. Other emotional responses may include disgust or disdain towards W [(i10), (i14), (i17), (i20), (i55)], contempt concerning W or W's actions [(i15), (i48), (i50), (i52), (i54), (i59), (i63)] rage (strong anger rising quickly): [(i6), (i21), (i33)] the feelings of surprise [(i14), (i41)], or frustration (i7). It appears therefore, that different types of negative emotions experienced by S are not mutually exclusive, but may be sparked as a result of a single provocative action. In (i10), (i15), (i17), (i48), (i50), (i54), (i55), (i59), (i63) S's feeling of anger appears to be mixed with the attitude of disgust and/or contempt towards W. In (i14) the feeling of surprise at W's erroneous answer is accompanied by the expression of contempt towards his perceived unintelligence and ignorance.

The instances which do not appear to present a visible level of anger rising may be explained in a number of ways. Firstly, the dominant emotion experienced by S may be different from anger and may include disgust [(i52), (i53)], contempt [(i14), (i11), (i20), (i47), (i52)], surprise (i41), or hatred [(i47), (i58)] Secondly, being emotional in Western culture is often taken as a sign of the lack of self-control. Thus, not showing one's anger may be speakers' conscious strategy of showing their superiority over W. This is evident, e.g. in (i14), where the academic expert scorns a contestant in a calm and controlled manner. Thirdly, the expression of anger in a given situation may not serve S's interests and they may decide not to disclose their true feelings. In the context of power negotiation, for instance, instead of showing one's anger, S may realize his or her long-term interests better by a remark of face-value contempt towards the interactant. In (i20), for example, the racial slur indulged by S1 is ultimately recognized as an act of defiance and not bending to another party's will.

Alternatively to not showing one's anger, speakers may decide to openly show their anger, frustration or rage. The disclosure of rage is especially interesting, since it appears that in some instances the level of anger rises so quickly that it becomes difficult to control. Thus, the verbal aggression following the act of provocation becomes an almost automatic response to the act of provocation. This is evident in examples (i6), (i21), (i33) and (i34) where the act of provocation is perceived by S to be so serious that the anger rises almost instantaneously. In the above examples this act of provocation includes bodily harm done to S [(i33), (i34)] or to a third party related to S (i6) and an act of bringing about a potential danger to S by cutting him off in car traffic (i21). These instances may be considered borderline examples of prototypical verbal aggression swearing as described in this section and non-prototypical reflexive insults on the other hand, as described in section 5.2.4 below.

Generally, the level of anger experienced by S as a result of the provocative event of W depends on the nature of the provocation and the psychological disposition of S. Typically, the more intense the act of provocation is, the higher, more intense level of negative emotions it produces. On the other hand, speakers vary when it comes to the extent they can manage their anger. Certain speakers, in

appropriate circumstances, more readily disclose their negative emotions [e.g. (i4), (i6)], others are more prone to remaining (or appearing) calm in a conflictive situation (i14). This touches on the question of speakers' anger inhibition, which is stage 3 of Jay's model of verbal aggression.

5.1.3. Inhibition

As a result of W's provocation, S starts experiencing the rising level of negative emotions. The experience evokes the feeling of injustice and compels S to undertake attempts at a redressive action, aimed at re-establishing the balance of justice. However, S does not normally engage in a redressive action towards W automatically. According to Jay (1992: 101), the typical reaction to one's negative emotions in American culture consists of attempts at controlling and inhibiting them. Thus, in the prototypical model of verbal aggression STAGE 3 is reached, which is the stage of inhibition, wherein S tries to gain and attain control over his or her anger.

Jay (1992: 101-3) assumes that individual speakers' ability to control anger is partly sanctioned by one's cultural background and the process of upbringing and education. On the other hand, the ability to control one's anger depends on speakers' individual predispositions. Some people are innately predisposed to more readily express their anger than others. This is dependent on their psychological traits and the norms and expectations they have internalized during their upbringing and education. It must also be noted that at the stage of inhibition S takes into account the broad context in which W's act of provocation is carried out. This includes the nature of provocation and the degree of harm S experiences, the physical context of the provocation, presence or absence of a third party and different characteristics of W, such as age, (un)familiarity and the balance of power relations between S and W. The process of S's cognitive appraisal of these factors, which ultimately leads to one of the two possible scenario outcomes; S's anger can either be successfully inhibited and suppressed, or, following the stage of inhibition, S's anger is successfully disinhibited in STAGE 4. What follows is a short consideration concerning these two scenarios.

If S's anger is successfully inhibited, the inhibition may be either complete or partial. S's anger may be completely inhibited in a situation where the factors obstructing the verbalisation of S's anger decisively outweigh the intensity of his or her anger. Therefore, S's anger is not communicated to W (and/or to a third party(s)) and no verbal attack is attempted. This may be the case, for instance, in the situation of a great superiority of relative power of W over S. In the contexts which sanction such circumstances – e.g. the military context, policing activities, workplace arguments – one agent may have much more relative power over another interactant and possess means of executing his or her power and punishing any perceived acts of disobedience. Thus, in (i25) a recruit soldier (S2) at a boot camp, despite a stream of clear verbal provocation from the drill instructor (S1), completely inhibits his anger making no attempts at any conspicuous redressive actions. Similarly, in (i17) the driver and a passenger of a pulled-over car (S2 and S3) suppress their negative emotions in an encounter with a police officer (S1), who simultaneously indulges in verbal abuse towards them. Since the anger of S is completely inhibited and no act of verbal aggression is thus realised, the scenario of complete inhibiting of S's anger is subsequently left out of the course of my subsequent analysis.

On the other hand, S's anger may be partially inhibited in a situation wherein S decides that in a given context the risks of giving a full vent to his or her anger outweigh its possible benefits. Thus, S may decide to give vent to his or her anger only partially. This, as Jay (1992: 103) points out can be achieved by assaulting W with a less offensive level of verbal abuse, e.g. in the form of joking, sarcasm or other non-taboo verbal replies. Leech (1983: 144) lists irony as a less dangerous form of verbal abuse. Since, such verbal reactions touch upon the broad problems of impoliteness and verbal conflict, and not directly on the issue of insults, they are largely relegated from the discussion below. However, the partial inhibition of S's anger may also take the form of a less intense insult. Thus, such cases belong to the focus of my interest in this chapter. In fact, the cases in which S's intensity of verbal abuse is moderated as a result of the contextual inhibiting factors belong to the prototypical instances of verbal aggression as it is described below.

In the prototypical instances of insulting (i1) – (i63) S undergoes the stage of inhibiting his or her anger before verbal aggression is realized. Although the methodology of sample analysis applied in this chapter puts significant restraints on the precise attempts of satisfactory account of inhibiting factors in all language samples, what follows is a tentative description of the main kinds of factors influencing the level of S's anger inhibiting as they are illustrated in (i1) – (i63).

Jay (1992: 100) enumerates the nature of the offending event as an important factor influencing the inhibition of S's anger. Serious offending events cause a higher degree of anger. A high degree of anger requires, in turn, a more intense redressive action on the part of S. In other words, the higher degree of harm caused by the offending event correlates with the smaller possibility of successful anger inhibition on the part of S. Thus, if the offending event is of serious nature, involving causing physical harm to S, S's property or to a third party related to S [(i4), (i6), (i21), (i33), (i34), (i57)] threats or attempts at S's health or life [(i8), (i35), (i47), (i49)] or acts of betrayal or indiscretion [(i2), (i28), (i58)] the typical reaction tends towards a swift and direct verbal attack. On the other hand, less serious or direct act of provocation may prompt S to indulge in a less offensive and more inhibited verbal response, as illustrated in (i14), wherein an overseeing expert (S1) responds to a contestant's erroneous response during an academic competition in a calm and collected manner without the use of strong taboo language.

Another important factor influencing the degree of anger inhibition present in (i1) – (i63) is the balance of relative power between the interactants. In the context of a significant imbalance of power, the more powerful party may verbally attack the opponent directly, without much attempt at inhibiting their anger. Such is the case e.g. in the context of policing activities [(i13), (i17), (i52), (i53), (i54)], the military training [(i25), (i32)] or supervisor-supervised relationship (i26), where one party (e.g. a police or military officer) wields considerable power over their interlocutor(s) and possesses means of punishing and disciplining them. As noted above, in such circumstances the party or parties with a lower degree of power are more likely to inhibit their anger for fear of possible consequences.

In a verbal context which licenses interactants' opportunity for competing over the balance of their relative power, the inhibition of S's anger is influenced by the need of the negotiation of their position. Since high likelihood of verbal abuse correlates with the high degree of relative power, S may decide to engage in insults as a means of showing his superiority, disrespect and fearlessness of the interactant(s). Such situations are common e.g. in the contexts of mafia or criminal activities [(i45, (i46), (i47), (i56)], or sports or business competition [(i11), (i27), (i60)], where S's insults are purposefully disinhibited for the aim of establishing his or her relative status.

Another strong factor influencing the degree of anger inhibition of S, as described by Jay is individual speakers' psychological predispositions. As noted above, the kind of analysis undertaken in this thesis does not appear to be particularly well-suited for a detailed psychological description of different states of interactants' minds. However, a few instances point to the fact that speakers may be more sensitive towards particular kinds of offensive events, which may explain their producing a rather uninhibited response to particular kinds of verbal provocation. For instance, S1 in (i23) is particularly sensitive to being called *stupid*, which is a remark producing uninhibited verbal aggression on his part. On the other hand, S3 in (i31) remains unimpressed by the string of expletives produced by S2, which points to strong differences of sensitivities between two agents. Individual speakers' psychological predisposition towards swearing may also be plausibly explained by the type of education they have received and the background they come from. Allan and Burrige (2006: 34-37) talk in this context about the middle-class politeness criterion (MCPC), according to which the indicator of certain level of upbringing or education is refraining from using certain taboo terms in public. This is illustrated in (i10) and (i22), where S1 and S2 respectively, being middle or upper-class citizens largely inhibit their anger towards W. In doing so, they employ milder taboo terms than their interactants of a different social background.

The presence of a third party or audience serves yet another factor enhancing or inhibiting S's verbal aggression. In some circumstances the presence of a third party may help to inhibit S's insults. This is illustrated e.g. in (i3), where S1

engages in verbal abuse towards S2 only when I3 has left the room. Attempts at inhibiting verbal abuse towards W may be undertaken in circumstances of official hearings (i7) and court proceedings (i18), where S must take into account the consequences of engaging in verbal abuse in front of a large audience often consisting of authorities or officers. Conversely, in some circumstances the presence of a third party may be a factor which makes S engage in verbal abuse more readily, such as in (i1) where S2 gives vent to his emotions in the presence of S3, possibly in order to communicate his anger S3 as opposed to simply letting off steam.

Finally, a factor which influences the degree of anger inhibition is the level of familiarity and gender roles of interactants. In (i48) S3, a Cuban gangster, who in other circumstances proves to be very aggressive and particularly prone to violence [cf. S3 in (i47) and S1 in (i78)], calmly takes abuse from his mother, at the same time inhibiting any negative verbal response. Similarly, in (i30) a mafia member (S2) refrains from verbal aggression towards his own wife despite clear verbal provocation on her part. In general, it must be said verbal aggression of men towards women is in the Western culture sanctioned to a much greater extent than verbal aggression of men towards men or women towards men. This is illustrated also in (i91), where a man (S2) takes a significant amount of verbal abuse from a woman (S1) before responding with physical violence on his part.

It has already been noted that the interplay of individual factors influencing the degree of S's anger inhibition that culminates in either successful inhibition or disinhibition of his or her negative emotions. As noted above the cases of complete anger inhibition are left out of the subsequent analysis on the grounds that they do not lead to the realisation of verbal aggression. Similarly, instances wherein S's anger inhibition takes the form of employing a different form of verbal reaction than a verbal insult (e.g. sarcasm or jokes) – although interesting for the purpose of the study of impoliteness – are largely disregarded from the subsequent account of offensive speech. The cases of prototypical insults described in this section follow the pattern of successful anger disinhibition (STAGE 4) following attempts at inhibiting S's anger in STAGE 3. Thus, as noted above, the influence of STAGE 3 on S's cursing episode as a whole may

come in the form of inducing a less intense level of verbal abuse towards W. A number of other kinds of verbal abuse which may function as forms of S's anger inhibition are described below in the analysis of non-prototypical instances of insults, in particular in sections 5.2.3 (*delayed retribution*) and 5.2.5 (*redirected anger*). Instances of verbal aggression wherein little or no attempts at anger inhibition are attempted on the part of S are discussed in section 5.2.4 (*reflexive insults*).

5.1.4. Disinhibition

In the prototypical model of verbal aggression STAGE 4 (disinhibition) comes as a direct result of S not inhibiting his or her anger completely at STAGE 3. If the degree of anger outweighs the balance of factors inhibiting S's negative emotions, S's anger is disinhibited in the bid to redress the balance of justice.

As Jay (2000: 61) points out, S's disinhibition of negative emotions may take different forms, including e.g. the utterance of response cries, instances of swearing at no discernable target (cathartic swearing), and directing one's anger to human vs. non-human targets. Disinhibition of one's anger may also be more or less reflexive. The issues concerning swearing at non-human targets and reflexive insulting are discussed in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.4 respectively. The analysis in the present section touches upon the prototypical instances of swearing wherein a human agent S indulges in a propositional (non-automatic) verbal attack towards another human agent W – responsible for the provocation event at STAGE 1 – for the purpose of re-establishing the balance of justice. Such scenario is represented by the prototypical instances of insults (i1) – (i63).

At the stage of disinhibition, as Jay (2000: 58) maintains, S undertakes a risk-benefit analysis of abusive swearing. Not all circumstances allow for the same kind and degree of offensive speech. Before engaging in the act of verbal aggression, S takes into account – among other things – the physical and social context of the utterance, different characteristics of W, the relation of power between S and W, the presence or absence of audience or overhearers. Depending on S's cognitive appraisal of these factors, the verbal response may differ in form,

strength and offensiveness, ranging from the most blatant and highly taboo attack on W's face to inhibiting one's anger completely, as noted in section 5.1.3 above.

The factors influencing the disinhibition of S's verbal aggression parallel those that were discussed in connection with inhibition-inciting variables in STAGE 3. As far as the physical and social context of an utterance is concerned, it has already been noted that a number of contexts, such as official hearings or enquiries [(i7), (i18)] license S's tendency towards inhibiting his or her anger. Other contexts, however – such as military, police and mafia activities – allow for a more decisive anger disinhibition on the part of S [cf. (i25), (i32), (i46), (i51), (i52), (i53)]. The presence or absence of any third parties (audience, overhearers) may serve as a factor assisting either the inhibition or disinhibition of S's anger [cf. (i1) vs. (i3)]. As noted above, the balance of relative power between the interactants is another vital issue. The more relative power in a given context S possesses relative to W, the more he or she is likely to engage in the act of insulting. Conversely, the disproportion of relative power benefiting W over S correlates with a lesser likelihood of S's indulging in abusive swearing. One is not likely to insult a police officer, a supervisor or a powerful authority for fear of possible consequences. Similarly, insulting a member of family is often culturally sanctioned, as illustrated by (i30) and (i48).

Simultaneously to weighing different factors influencing his or her anger disinhibition, S in STAGE 4 decides on particular words and expressions employed in order to insult W. A reasonably full register of taboo expressions employed for this purpose in samples (i1) – (i63) is presented in section 5.3.3. Suffice it to say here that the specific emotional terms employed in episodes of verbal aggression are often gender-specific. A number of expressions appear to be employed specifically for men, e.g. *motherfucker* [(i4) (i42), (i45) (i52)], *son of a bitch* [(i2), (i8), (i26)], *jerk/ jerk-off* [(i13), (i29)] and *cunt* [(i28), (i33)]. Others, most notably *bitch* [(i1), (i34), (i35), (i58)] and *whore* [(i30), (i58)] are reserved for women. Another gender-related trait may be referring to appearance and clothes as a means of verbal abuse [cf. (i19)], which appears to be more frequent among women than men.

The effect the swearing episode has on W is discussed in the following subsection.

5.1.5. Retribution

Jay (1992: 106) points out that after STAGE 4, where S's anger is disinhibited comes the act of retribution or retaliation (STAGE 5). It is – in Jay's view – this act of retribution what insulting is all about. Therefore, in the prototypical model of verbal aggression the stage of retribution (STAGE 5) is a concluding element of the scenario. Offensive speech constitutes in this model the act of verbal retribution for the harm incurred by S as a result of W's act of provocation. Thus, STAGE 5 accounts for the overall consequences of S's cursing episodes in the prototypical instances of insults (i1) – (i63).

Jay (2000) distinguishes three main outcome scenarios of verbal aggression. Firstly, the intensity of insult aimed at W by S may be equal to the degree of harm incurred by S as a result of W's provocation. Thus, S *gets even* with W. Secondly, the degree of insult may be higher than the harm incurred by S as a result of W's provocation. In that case S *overreacts* in comparison to the nature of the offending event. Thirdly, it is possible for S to *underreact* to the provocative event. This takes place when the intensity of the insult is lower than the degree of harm incurred by S as a result of the act of provocation. What follows is a tentative and cursory attempt at describing these three kinds of outcome scenarios based on the prototypical insult samples.

Firstly, the intensity of the insult appears to be equal to the degree of harm in the samples where the context suggests that after the insults no further action is undertaken by either of the interactants. The reason is that S *gets even* with W and, for this reason, there is no need for either side to carry out further attempts at re-establishing the balance of justice. This appears to be the case e.g. in (i2), (i15), where the balance of justice between the interlocutors appears to be redressed. Furthermore, S often appears to *get even* with W in a situation of insults uttered as a retribution for physical pain done to S or for the threat to S's life, health of S's possessions. This is evident e.g. in (i21), (i33), (i34) or (i40). It must be borne in

mind here that – in accordance with the account of the cathartic function of swearing discussed in section 4.3 – engaging in verbal aggression may be a means of alleviating S's physical stress as well as getting even with W.

Secondly, S's *overacting* relative to the degree of W's provocation may have a number of reasons. One of them is S being particularly sensitive to a particular kind of offending event. In (i22), for instance, S1 verbally overreacts at the suggestion that he is unintelligent. In (i46) S3 overreacts at being assaulted with demeaning references concerning his unambitious profession of a kitchen assistant. Furthermore, S may also produce a more intense verbal abuse relative to the nature of W's provocation when the physical context in which the scene takes place appears conducive to swearing and insulting. This, as already noted, is often the case in contexts such as military training [(i25), (i32)], policing activities [(i52), (i53)], and criminal activities [(i47), (i49), (i56)]. Finally, a frequent cause of S's overreacting is a particular emotional predisposition at the time of uttering the insult. When S experiences strong negative emotions, it is easy to overreact, since strong emotions require intensive means of letting off steam in order to re-establish one's psychological balance. For instance, the particular emotional states of S1 in (i7) and S2 in (i18) causes these agents to swear in the context of official hearings, which – relative to the nature of offending event and the physical context of the utterance – could easily be construed as overreacting.

Thirdly, the problem of S's *underreacting* relative to the intensity of W's provocation is a result of a particular interplay of contextual factors which favours the inhibition of S's anger. Since, as mentioned above, in the prototypical model of verbal aggression S runs a risk-benefit analysis of insulting, the factors inhibiting S's offensive speech shape and model the outcoming swearing episode, often by restricting the intensity of verbal abuse. Such modelled and restricted response on the part of S can be construed as underreacting relative to the degree of the provocation. An extreme form of that is total inhibition of any kind of negative response for fear of possible consequences [cf. S2 and S2 in (i17), S2 in (i25) and (i32)]. S may often underreact in social consequences which culturally sanction negative response towards particular kinds of addressees. As noted above, swearing against a woman or family member in the Western culture often

brings about strong negative consequences for the perpetrator. Therefore the male speakers in (i30), (i48) and (i91), when confronted with clear acts of provocation, respond in a calm manner, not giving vent to their negative feelings, and thus underreacting relative to the nature and intensity of the offending events.

The three kinds of retribution outcome scenarios described above lead to different foreseeable consequences for the model of insulting. The scenario of S getting even with W typically bring about the redressing of the balance of justice. As a result, S's anger disappears and the swearing episode is discontinued. S overreacting relative to the intensity of provocation may lead to W feeling unjustly insulted and, consequently, engaging in consecutive redressive actions – possibly insults – against S, leading thus to a chain of repeated and intensifying insults as described in section 5.2.7 below. S's underreacting relative to the degree of W's provocation may result in S not feeling emotionally satisfied by the undertaken form of anger disinhibition. Thus, S may decide to try to compensate for that by employing a further means of re-establishing the balance of justice and releasing his or her negative emotions in another way. This may be realized, for instance, through S delaying his or her negative response in time, or through redirecting his or her anger towards another party or object. The non-prototypical cases of insults involving instances of delayed retribution and redirected insult are discussed below in sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.5 respectively. A force-dynamic model of prototypical verbal aggression is presented in section 5.5.3.

5.2. Non-prototypical instances of insults

The prototypical model of insulting presented in section 5.1 above describes the prototypical cases of verbal aggression as illustrated by examples (i1) – (i63). The ICM theory presented by Lakoff (1987)²⁹ predicts that apart from the central prototypical cases of insults, a number of non-prototypical instances of the category may be distinguished. Such non-prototypical kinds of verbal aggression are exemplified in corpus samples (i64) – (i130) and described in the present section. Non-prototypical instances of insults constitute different sub-models

²⁹ See sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.

diverging from the prototypical scenario in numerous ways. This may be due to the lack of individual stages of Jay's (2000) model or the realization of individual elements of the model in a different way than predicted by the prototypical scenario. What follows in sections 5.2.1 – 5.2.12 is a tentative attempt at providing an account of the non-prototypical scenarios of insults. The description below does not aspire to constitute an exhaustive list of non-prototypical kinds of verbal aggression. However, what follows is a tentative taxonomy of the main non-prototypical scenarios based on the corpus samples (i64) – (i130). It should be also noted that the classification presented below converges in many aspects with Lakoff's (1987) account of the non-prototypical scenarios of anger presented in section 2.3. Thus, Lakoff's categories of REDIRECTED ANGER, IMMEDIATE EXPLOSION and WRATH coincide, to a large degree, with the account of the non-prototypical instances of insults described in sections 5.2.5, 5.2.4 and 5.2.6 respectively. Similarly, Lakoff's category of TERMINATING EVENT is shown as one of the possible outcome scenarios for the instances of intensifying insults and insult chains presented in sections 5.2.6 and 5.2.7.

5.2.1. Non-human wrongdoer

The prototypical instances of insulting – with a possible exception of a humanoid S2 in (i2) – present a verbal interaction between two or more human agents. The act of provocation is performed by one human being to another. Thus, the human wrongdoer is available for the act of verbal retribution as a means of re-establishing the balance of justice. However, Jay (1992: 99; 2000: 61) allows for the possibility of a non-human wrongdoer in his account of verbal aggression. In such cases, Jay points out, the provocation event is not caused by a personal human subject, but usually emerges from circumstances which are more accidental or non-intentional in nature. In such a scenario W may be a non-human animate being or an inanimate object. The source of S's anger may also be a particular set of circumstances or occurrences judged by S to be negative. Thus, in engaging in verbal aggression, S's intent is not to insult W or to communicate his or her anger – unless there is a human third party present in the context of the utterance – but to give vent to S's negative emotions (letting off steam). Thus,

such use of offensive speech matches the cathartic function of swearing discussed by Pinker (2008: 350) and presented in section 4.3.

In the corpus analysis of insults, nonhuman wrongdoer is present in samples (i64) – (i70). As noted above, the wrongdoer may be animate [(i64), (i66), (i67), (i70)], or inanimate [(i65), (i68), (i69)]. The act of provocation perceived by S may differ. The provocation coming from an animate wrongdoer may be connected with failing to behave in the way expected or welcome by S (i64), or a possible danger to S or another party coming from W, which is often matched with a strong negative evaluation of W [(i66), (i67), (i70)]. The act of provocation coming from an inanimate object in the samples presented is characterized by either a piece of equipment failing to work [(i68), (i69)] or a machine performing activities in a way contrary to S's will and interests (i70). In accordance with Jay (2000), since the wrongdoer in (i64) – (i70) is nonhuman, the function of verbal aggression is primarily of cathartic nature; its aim is to let off steam, with a possible descriptive element informing or highlighting the negative elements of W to any audience or overhearers [cf. (i67)].

5.2.2. Absent wrongdoer

Apart from the situation of a non-human wrongdoer there are circumstances where the wrongdoer responsible for the act of provocation is at the same time absent from the context of the utterance. Thus, W is not available as a potential aim of S's insult and S verbal aggression must be realized without a clear target, or S's anger must be redirected to a third party as shown in section 5.2.3 below. If the wrongdoer is absent and S's anger is disinhibited without a conspicuous target, S's verbal aggression has primarily cathartic and, possibly, descriptive in function.

The situation of an absent wrongdoer is illustrated in instances (i71) – (i78). W may be absent from the context of S's verbal aggression for a variety of reasons. Firstly, W may physically be absent at the time and place of uttering the insult (i71), (i73), (i74), (i75), W may be unconscious (i72), dead (i76), (i78), or unavailable for a situation where S requires W's help or assistance (i77). In insulting an absent wrongdoer S usually engages in a negative evaluation of W or

of W's actions, with a possible exception of S1 in (i72), whose verbal aggression appears to be an emotional reaction to the stress-inducing situation wherein a person related to S is unconscious. In verbally attacking an absent W, S may react to different acts of provocation, e.g. W's destructing of S's property (i74), W's failure to obey S's orders – with fatal consequences for W [(i76), (i78)], W's avoiding being captured by S (i75), W being unresponsive to S's calls (i77), or general negative evaluation of W, often based on S's previous experiences [(i71), (i72), (i73)]. It is also useful to note here that the absent W may be a non-human wrongdoer at the same time. In (i66) W is a nonhuman alien specimen (I2) who had been fighting against S1 before being defeated. In the context of S1's utterance I2 is believed to have died as a result of the spaceship exploding.

In the situation of an absent wrongdoer, W – because of being absent from the context of the utterance – cannot feel insulted, humiliated and, consequently, is unable to further retaliate for the insult. This may be one reason why S engages in this type of insult. However, in some situations a third party may take the insult on the behalf of absent W. Such is the case in (i74), where S2 instructs S1 on the inappropriate racial term S1 has used referring to W.

The main function of insulting an absent W appears to be either the need of providing a negative description of W [cf. (i71), (i73), (i74), (i75)] or of letting off steam, i.e. the cathartic function [cf. (i76), (i77), (i78)]. The descriptive and cathartic function of swearing, according with the points raised in section 4.3 are not exclusive and in the above examples the two functions may converge in a single utterance, where S in providing a negative description of W alleviates his or her negative emotions at the same time [e.g. (i75), (i76), (i78)].

5.2.3. Delayed retribution

Instances of S's delayed retribution to W's provocation constitutes a variation of the scenario of absent W presented in the above section. Such cases involve S's response to W's provocation being delayed in time. Typically, In such case W performs an act of provocation towards S, which urges S to undertake attempts at redressing the balance of justice. However S inhibits his or her anger in the

presence of W and the act of verbal aggression is delivered after W becomes disengaged from the context of the utterance.

The film samples containing delayed retribution are presented in (i79) – (i82). In all those samples S's insult towards W is delivered only after S has either physically left the scene [(i79), (i81), (i82)], or has terminated the phone conversation (i80).

The main motivation for delaying one's negative verbal response appears to be either the fear of losing face as a result of engaging in verbal aggression in the presence of S or the fear of consequences stemming from insulting a party who wields more relative power in a given context [e.g. (i82)]. In short, S decides that in a given context it is desirable to inhibit his or her negative response in W's presence. However, the emotional tension resulting from the feeling of injustice is still present in S. Thus, when W removes himself or herself from the context of the verbal exchange, S delivers the insult in order to satisfy his or her emotional needs (cathartic function) or providing a negative evaluation of W to possible overhearers or audience. As such, therefore, delayed retribution may be seen as a form of inhibiting one's anger, as noted in section 5.1.3 above.

The elements of delayed retribution may be found also in previously discussed examples (i10) and (i36). (i10) is interesting in that the context shows that S2 demands compensation for his destroyed rug. When S1 denies any compensation and throws S2 out, S2 decides to pick up a rug from S1's mansion and leave with it. Thus, S2 commits an act of delayed retribution for S1 verbal aggression towards him by means of taking S1's property without his consent. It is interesting to see that this particular act of retribution is not verbal in nature. Instead, it involves an act of theft from S1. Thus, although the present thesis focuses on the act of verbal retribution for provocation, it must be noted that possible retribution options S has at his or her disposal are not limited to verbal acts of aggression or impoliteness. Also in (i36) S1's reaction to the verbal aggression from S2 is not verbal, but takes the form of killing S2. Having executed the act of murder, S1 goes on to instruct other audience members about the fatal consequences of anybody's assaulting her verbally. This warning is accompanied by the insult aimed at the audience members. Thus S2 gives vent to her negative emotions and

emphasizes the threat she is making (the emphatic function of swearing). As such therefore, her verbal response may be seen as an act of delayed retribution to S2's insult. At the same time, the insult is aimed at the audience, so this particular sample may be construed an instance of redirected anger. Insults delivered in a situation of redirected anger are discussed in section 5.2.5 below.

5.2.4. Reflexive insults

The prototypical instances of verbal aggression presented in section 5.1 include the examples of propositional (controlled) swearing, i.e. the acts of verbal aggression which result from speakers' working memory. Propositional swearing is produced with the assistance of speakers' conscious awareness and the resultant verbal expressions follow the grammatical rules of a particular language. However, as noted in section 4.4, Jay makes a distinction between propositional swearing and reflexive (automatic) swearing. Reflexive swearing is produced without one's conscious awareness and does not – generally speaking – reflect conscious decisions-making processes of the speakers and often takes the form of response cries uttered under highly emotive circumstances. Reflexive swearing is typically based on idiomatised short expletives and, as such, it does not always follow the normal grammatical rules of language (e.g. *fuck you, hell*).

Jay (2000: 58) points out that in reflexive swearing the stage of disinhibition (STAGE 4) follows directly after the rising level of anger (STAGE 2) – without the influence of the intermediate stage of inhibition (STAGE 3). STAGE 3 is concerned with S's attempts at inhibiting his or her anger as a result of the cognitive appraisal of different contextual factors. Since in reflexive swearing STAGE 3 is not realized, reflexive swearing is produced instantaneously as a result of the rising level of S's anger.

Taking the above into account I take the term *reflexive insults* to refer to instances of non-propositional swearing which simultaneously constitute a verbal attack on W carried out as a means of redressing the balance of justice. As mentioned in section 4.4 above, such instances of offensive speech could plausibly be explained in terms of construction grammar analysis, although this kind of analysis goes

beyond the scope of my thesis. What follows below is a tentative description of reflexive insults based on the corpus samples (i83) – (i86).

Non-propositional swearing in its most typical form is represented in (i85), wherein S1 repetitively engages in a short vulgar expletive (*fuck*) as a reaction to a highly emotive situation. However – as pointed above – for reflexive swearing to fall into the category of insults, it must possess the abusive element, i.e. it must be, potentially at least, aimed at another interactant. This appears to be the case in (i84), where S1 repeats the expletive *motherfucker* several times in the highly emotive context of a gunfight. Thus, the expletives function as response cries to the situation of high level of stress and other negative emotions. In examples (i83) and (i86) a highly emotive situation evokes the response cry in the form of *son of a bitch*. This phrase functions as a verbal expletive without being directly and conspicuously aimed at any interactant. However, potentially at least, it possesses the abusive element of referring to an interactant by means of a typically abusive expression. Therefore, the examples presented above appear to have, apart from a cathartic quality, an abusive function. Thus, they can be discussed as insults falling into the category of reflexive verbal aggression.

It has to be noted here that – as pointed out in section 4.4 – individual speakers' swearing episodes may be less or more automatic. Therefore, examples of truly reflexive or truly propositional swearing may be described as residing at two extremes of a bipolar scale with numerous instances of semi-automatic and semi-propositional samples residing in between. In the previously discussed prototypical cases of verbal aggression (i1) – (i63) one may also find certain elements of reflexive insults. In (i4), for example, S2 uses the expletive *son of a bitch* as a response to the damage done to his property by a fellow crew member. In (i6) in a highly emotive context of a fellow crew member being killed, S3 assaults S1 with the phrase *you bastard*. The same phrase is employed in (i68) with reference to an inanimate object. In (i21) the expletive *asshole* is aimed at the driver who has cut S1 off in car traffic. Similar examples may be analysed as having at least some elements of reflexive swearing and may be described as residing somewhere along the scale of “automaticity” of verbal aggression.

Reflexive swearing is also presented in the form of a force-dynamic model in section 5.5.4.

5.2.5. Redirected insults

The cases of redirected insults provide another way of giving vent to one's negative emotions without directly assaulting W with negative language. In that sense, they are similar to the cases of delayed retribution and may constitute another form of S's anger inhibition. In the instances of redirected insults S experiences the rising level of anger as a result of W's provocation. However, instead of assaulting W directly, S lets off steam by redirecting his or her negative emotions to a third animate or inanimate entity (T). This may be, for instance, a result of W having significantly higher relative power or T being more accessible as the target of S's verbal aggression in a given context.

In the film corpus presented in Appendix 3 the instances of redirected anger are exemplified in (i87) – (i89). Example (i87) presents perhaps the most typical instance of redirected anger. S1 is angry about a press leakage of some confidential materials and he decides to redirect his anger to a fax machine. Thus, he uses physical violence against an inanimate object, naming at the same time his actions. In (i88) S2 is enraged after a conversation with I1, who has hung up on him. Thus, he redirects his anger to a passer-by who happens to comment on S2's foul language. (i89) shows the context of an office dispute where S3 plans to stop the argument between S1 and S2. This activity is seen as S2 as an attempt to stop him from voicing his mind. As a result, S2 redirects his anger at S3, thus assaulting him with insolent language.

Apart from being a form of inhibition of anger in a situation when W has more contextual power than S, redirected insults may appear in situations where W is no longer available at the scene of the exchange [e.g. by termination of a phone call as in (i88)] or the identity of W cannot be stipulated by S (i87). In (i89) S's redirection of anger is a result of intensifying anger building inside S. Thus, S intends to direct some of this anger towards T who has tried to stop him in his

spree of verbal aggression. Instances of intensifying insults constitute the focus of interest in the following section

5.2.6. Intensifying insults

As noted above, Lakoff (1987) – in his account of the non-prototypical scenarios of anger – mentions cases of *INSATIABLE ANGER* and *WRATH*. Instances of intensifying insults seem to encompass elements from these two categories in a single model. Intensifying insults are examples of verbal aggression where the act of retribution undertaken by S does not lead to lowering the level of S's anger. Instead, the level of anger is gradually intensified, which urges S to undertake further attempts at redressing the balance of justice. The rising degree of negative emotions in S requires more intense verbal aggression in order to compensate for the harm incurred by S. As a result, S engages in a continuous spree of intensifying verbal insults towards W.

In the corpus samples cases of intensifying insults are represented in (i89) – (i93). A case of intensifying insult is also presented in (i28), where in a retribution to I2's lack of cooperation S1 assaults I2 with a stream of insults. A similar business context is present in (i89), where S2 loses his cool at S1's suggestion of his business inefficiency. S2's anger is subsequently intensified, leading to a prolonged spree of offensive speech. In (i90) a spaceship crew member (S1) gets enraged at (I3) for having put their lives in possible jeopardy. (i91) presents a situation where S1 tries to convince S2 to commit a murder for her. When S2 declines, she starts to assault him with an increasing level of verbal abuse. (i92) exemplifies actions of a criminal mob boss, who violently assaults his wife in front of a fellow mafia member. Finally, in the context of a bar brawl (i93), S3 engages into a spree of insults towards S4 as a result of being violently told off. Thus, the common denominator in the cases of intensifying insults is a high and rising degree of verbal abuse, possibly resulting from a serious nature of W's provocation [(i90), (i91)] or the kind of verbal context which is particularly conducive to verbal aggression [(i92), (i93)].

An interesting issue to raise at this point is the question about the possible outcome scenarios for the model of intensifying insults. In theory, S's anger may escalate *ad infinitum*. In practice, however, the situation must be resolved at some point. One possibility is the intensity of S's insult increasing to the point where it balances the level of anger resulting from W's provocation. Another option is W or S withdrawing from the conversation, thus causing the spree of insults to die down. If S or W do not withdraw from the conversation, the ever-increasing spree of insults may culminate in an outbreak of violence [cf. (i93)] Alternatively, the intensifying spree of insults may be terminated by the involvement of a third party, either by verbal or non-verbal means. The condition for a third party's successful intervention, however, is that the intervening party should respond with an action of sufficient significance to stop the intensifying spree of S's insults or that this party possesses sufficient relative power in a given context to stop S. This is not always the case, as demonstrated by S2's unsuccessful attempts at silencing S1 in (i92). Instances of intensifying insults are also described in the light of the theory of force dynamics in section 5.5.4.

5.2.7. Insult chains

In the discussion of Bousfield's (2008) model of impoliteness in section 3.1.6 it was pointed out that Bousfield's model allows for cases of verbal aggression whereby one interactant's act of impoliteness triggers the impolite verbal response of another party. Thus, the parties involved in the context of verbal aggression may engage in a chain of mutual verbal aggression (cf. *figure 17* in section 3.1.6).

Insult chains constitute a category of non-prototypical insults wherein this mechanism is realized in relation to the verbal conflict between S and W. W's act of provocation constitutes an initial incentive for S's retaliatory action in order to redress the balance of justice. Contrary to the prototypical model of verbal aggression, however, S's retribution does not result in getting even and resolving the conflictive situation. Instead, in accordance with Bousfield's account, S's verbal retribution constitutes an act of provocation for W. As a result, the level of anger in W rises and W is urged to redress the balance of justice. If W decides to balance the level of justice by means of verbal aggression, the intensity of his

or her insult must be equal to or higher than the degree of S's initial retribution. Thus, W assaults S with a possibly more offensive act of verbal abuse. If W's assaulting S is taken by S to be another act of provocation, S may experience further need for re-establishing the balance of justice. In order to redress the balance the intensity level of verbal retribution on the part of S must be equal or higher than W's verbal attack on S. Thus, in the case of insult chains S and W engage in continuous and self-sustaining chains of possibly ever-increasing insults.

Cases of insult chains are presented in (i93) – (i99). In (i93) S3's intensifying spree of insult described above is triggered by S4's verbal aggression towards S3, which – in turn – is a reaction to S3 assaulting him verbally in response to the act of provocation (sitting on S2's car) committed by I1 and S4. Thus, (i93) – apart from containing an instance of intensifying insults, constitutes an example of insult chains between S3 and S4. Insult chains typically involve two conflicted interactants throwing quick and short bursts of insults at each other. Samples (i94) – (i97) and (i99) exemplify conflictive situations involving insult chains of S1 and S2. In (i98) the conflicted parties are represented by S1 and S3.

As in the case with intensifying insults, the self-sustaining chain of insults may – in theory – continue *ad infinitum*. In practice, however, the conflictive situation requires some form of resolution at a certain point. The possible outcome scenarios are similar to those that pertain to instances of intensifying insults described in the above section. S or W may decide, at some point in the repeated chain of insults, to suppress their anger or withdraw from the conversation (i95). If this is not the case, the increasing intensity of insult chains may culminate in physical violence between the interactants [(i93), (i96), (i97)]. Insult chains may also be terminated by some kind of terminating event or by an intervening third party [(i94), (i98), (i99)]. As was the case with intensifying insults, the condition here is that the intervening party must be of sufficient position, possess enough relative power in a given context or to undertake verbal or non-verbal actions which are significant enough to stop the insult chain. In (94), for instance, S3's verbal intervention wields enough power to stop the increasing verbal exchange between S1 and S2. In contrast, in (i97) S3 and I4 do not have the sufficient

position to stop S2 in his stream of insults. Consequently, the insult chain between S1 and S2 culminates in physical violence.

The category of insult chain is presented in section 5.5.4 in the form of a force-dynamic model. Similarly one form of conflict resolution, namely a successful intervention of a third party is explained there in the light of the theory of force dynamics.

5.2.8. Incidental insults

In his account of different types of threats to an interactant's face Bousfield (2008: 68-9) – after Goffman (1967: 14) – identifies the category of incidental offences, namely cases of linguistic impoliteness which “[...] arise as an unplanned but sometimes anticipated by-product of an action – action the offender performs in spite of its offensive consequences, though not out of spite.” Thus, the category of incidental insults encompasses instances of S's verbal aggression uttered as a result of W's act of provocation which do not appear to have been directly aimed at insulting W, although such by-product could have been predicted by S. As such, therefore, incidental verbal attacks carry the potentiality of offending W.

Incidental insults in the film corpus are represented by samples (i100) – (i103). In (i100) an employee of a legal firm (S2) reacts to her lawyer partner's (S1) suggestions of a lower salary bonus with derogatory remarks about lawyers in general. Since S1 is a lawyer himself, S2's remarks may be taken by him to be an exercise in verbal abuse towards him. In (i101) S1 – a white property owner – engages in racial slurs in the presence of a black man as a result of being confronted with the dead body of a black man in his house. In (i103) a captive serial killer indulges in derogatory remarks about his victims in the presence of law enforcing officers, who may potentially take offence at his words. Some degree of insult potentiality may also be traced in S1's derogatory remarks about S2's friend in (i15). Incidental insults are, therefore, often realised through verbally assaulting either a group of people or a person related to W or with

whom W feels a degree of affinity or empathy. In engaging in this kind of verbal act S anticipates W feeling insulted or offended as a result of the utterance.

At the same time, incidental insults, because of being only indirectly aimed at W leave some space for negotiation and interpretation of the meaning of a given utterance. In such sense, the insult delivered by S retains traits of vagueness, ambiguity and may be described as veiled.

Pinker (2008: 393-415) describes a number of potentially conflict-stimulating interpersonal encounters in the light of game theory. In trying to achieve their interactional aims e.g. in the context of a bribery attempt or a sexual come-up, the speaker runs a risk-benefit evaluation of stating their aims directly versus engaging in a face-value vague, veiled verbal act. Pinker's point is not only that in many cases veiling one's intentions brings about a more beneficial balance of possible risks and awards, but also that it results in manipulating the response options of others to one's advantage. For instance, if a car driver accused of speeding makes a direct bribery offer to the intervening police officer (*If you let me go without a ticket, I will pay you fifty dollars*), the driver stands a chance of not getting a ticket in case of a dishonest cop, but runs the risk of being arrested for bribery in case of an honest officer. However, if one's offer is indirect and veiled (*Maybe there is a way of settling this between us?*) A possible payoff of going away without a ticket (a dishonest cop scenario) is matched with the possibility of simply receiving the traffic ticket in case of the honest intervening officer. Thus, the driver retains the possibility of a beneficial pay-off, reducing the cost of unfavourable scenario outcome at the same time. In veiling the insult the driver also reduces the cop's response options, since it is more difficult and more risky to charge somebody with a bribery attempt based on an ambiguous statement on their part. Thus, the honest police officer does not arrest the driver although both parties involved are aware of what kind of message is ambiguously conveyed.

Similarly, S may engage in incidental insults precisely in order to minimize potential negative payouts in a given context. It has been mentioned above that abusive language may bring about serious consequences for the offender, e.g. in the form of retribution from the target, social disapproval or legal outcomes. In

veiling one's insult S may retain the benefit of verbally assaulting W, limiting the scope of prospective negative consequences. For instance, in (i100) by engaging in abusive remarks about lawyers S2 may satisfy her emotional needs. However, she may not easily be charged with insulting S1, since her remarks are aimed at a group of people and not at him personally. Thus, by engaging in the veiled act of verbal aggression S may intend for W to feel humiliated, but in doing so S leaves open the possibility to withdraw from the conflict context should a need of that arise (*I didn't really mean to offend you.*)

Regardless of S's intentions, the possibility of meaning negotiation of S's utterance is also open for W. Upon being confronted with a veiled insult, W may understand or fail to understand the insult as referring to him or her. If W understands the insult, depending on the contextual variables, he or she may give vent to his emotions by performing a retaliatory action towards S. However, if the risks of such an action in a given context outweigh its possible benefits, W may *pretend* to not have understood the insult or to have understood it in a different way than the one licensed by the illocutionary force of S's utterance. Thus, both interactants involved engage in a risk-benefit evaluation of their actions. A particular course of W's action as a response to the verbal aggression of S hangs in the balance of the interplay of contextual factors inhibiting or assisting the realization of S's verbal aggression.³⁰ Thus, in (i101) S2, a black man, suppresses his anger at being exposed to S1's racial slurs, because he urgently requires S1's help. On the other hand, in (i102) a police officer (S1) reacts verbally to a serial killer's (S2) violent account of his victims. Here, the duty police officer possesses superior relative power over the captive criminal and seizes the opportunity to give vent to his emotions, possibly verbally downgrading the serial killer at the same time. Apart from incidental insults, a category of accidental insults may be discussed. This issue will be raised in section 5.3.2.

5.2.9. Self-insults

Self-insults are cases of verbal aggression where S engages in verbal aggression against him- or herself. Jay (1992: 99-100) discusses cases of such insults in which S is simultaneously the wrongdoer responsible for the provocation event. For instance, shutting the car door on a new raincoat may urge S to utter a remark such as *What have you done, you stupid dumbass?!* Jay claims that the function of such self-depreciating comments is the one of self-instructing and self-correcting in order to avoid similar incidents in the future. Engaging in swearing also serves S's emotional needs in a given situation. On the other hand, as noted in section 3.2 above, Leech's (1983) MODESTY PRINCIPLE calls for minimizing praise of self and maximizing dispraise of self in a conversation. Thus, self-insulting – apart from the function of self-instructing and self-correcting – may constitute a politeness strategy in a particular context.

In the film corpus self-insults are represented by samples (i103) – (i106). The motivation behind S1 insulting herself in (i103) seems to be – apart from a possible self-correction exercise – an attempt to let off steam. In a highly emotional situation of her husband losing consciousness during an underwater expedition, S1 is instructed to continue to speak to him, thus giving vent to her own emotions. At the same time she engages in demeaning herself in front of other members of the underwater expedition, possibly in order to strengthen the positive ties between them and the group. A similar context of S talking to an absent (dead) interlocutor is undertaken in (i106). Here, the possible motivation of S1 is to alleviate his negative emotions by indulging in a self-insult. In (i104), S1's engages in a verbal insult towards himself and towards his fellow inmates (S2 and S3) simultaneously. By demeaning his fellow prisoners S1 intends to wield sufficient influence in order to convince them to perform their routine tasks. At the same time, engaging in self-insult S1 builds up a sense of in-group belonging between himself and S2 and S3. Thus, he emphasizes their similar status in the given context and, ultimately, convinces them to pick up their routines. In (i105), in his final speech in front of the court of law, S1 engages in a

³⁰ See sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.4.

self-insult, possibly as a part of verbal strategy aimed at winning the judge's and jury's favour.

In the examples listed above the primary intention of S in engaging in self-insult is not to make himself or herself feel downgraded or humiliated, but to let off steam, engage in the exercise of self-correction, or to exert certain extralinguistic effects on the listeners by means of a politeness strategy referring to the principle of modesty. At the same time, as suggested in section 4.5 above, swearing and insulting may constitute a means of in-group identification. Certain social groups have redefined the terms of insults and used them to refer to members of the in-group in a positive way, cf. the use of *nigger* among certain black American communities. Therefore, an element of self-insulting as a means of in-group identification and recognition appears to be present in (i104) and (i105). In case of the former, the kind of verbal remark issued by S1 constitutes an example of the typical language of inmate communities. In case of the later, the use of self-insult in front of the court of law may be seen as a more or less intentional language transfer performed by S1, who uses a typical language used in the streets in the court of law. Groups such as prisoners and criminal gang members often use insults and swearing as a means of identification and recognition, as exemplified in (i120), where the term *motherfucker-to-the-max* employed by S2 constitutes a term of recognition for S1 and his position in the criminal circles. Insults employed as a means of in-group identification and positive recognition of individual gang members bears resemblance to the category of banter, which is discussed in section 5.2.11 below.

5.2.10. Insult duels

Jacquemet (2006: 403-4) defines verbal duels as a culturally widespread communicative practice of the competitive exchange of insults and verbal taunts between at least two interactants in a ritualized context. Verbal duels are used either as a means of conflict resolution or as a form of competitive verbal gameplay between two or more parties. The interactants' input is typically judged by the audience, who decide on the winner of the exchange. The ritualized context and the rule-governed nature of the exchange allows the participants to engage in

a verbal duels without sparking a serious real-life conflict between them. Trespassing these rules may result in serious consequences for the offender.

Allan and Burrige (2006: 85-7) discuss ritual insults in the form of flyting and playing the dozens. Flyting refers to the historical ritualised practice of taunting another party with offensive, abusive language. The practice is widely present in the account of Anglo-Saxon, Norse and Scandinavian myths where on certain occasions gods would taunt each other in a kind of competitive game. Playing the dozens represents a contemporary version of such activities, especially among certain African American groups. The practice typically consists of ritualised verbal duels aimed at vilifying another party and their relatives. Flyting and dozens constitute a competitive game in that they are:

[...] a confrontation of wit, insight and upmanship, in which people try to outdo each other in richness of their rhetorical scorn by taunting another person with insults about them or their family in front of an audience.

(Allan and Burrige, 2006: 86)

In insult duels the audience serves a number of functions. Audience members may get actively involved in the event by encouraging the contestants, giving exclamations of their approval or disapproval, cheering or hackling them. It is typically the audience who collectively decide on the winner of the exchange by expressing their enthusiasm for the winner and/or disapproval for the loser. The presence of the audience also has a regulatory role; the rules of the exchange are enforced and guarded by the collectivity, who has the power to undertake disciplinary measures in case of their trespassing.

In the sample corpus insult duels are represented by instances (i107) – (i108). Example (i107) illustrates the practice of a rap battle. The context is a Detroit club, where S1 and S2 engage in a duel of mutual taunts, which involves throwing insults, epithets, critical remarks and accusations at each other. In accordance with Jacquemet (2006: 403-4) the interactants involved engage mainly in exaggerated remarks, far-fetched comparisons and over-the-top insults. In the context of such exchange taunts which are too close to real-life verbal abuse would be considered a trespassing of the rules of the exchange, and thus sanctioned against by the audience. The rules of a rap battle require the parties involved to throw insults and

accusations at each other with the aim of outdoing each other in the game of taunts. At the same time, the interactants attempt to appear unimpressed by the stream of insults being thrown at them.

In (i108) a group of outcast boys on a desert island is engaged in a verbal duel between their leader (S1) and his newly-arrived adversary (S2). S2 is initially opposed to taking part in the exchange, but finally he yields and takes up the challenge. As a result he verbally outwits S1 and asserts his superior position over him.

In both of the above examples the role of the audience is to ensure that the rules of the verbal duel are followed (regulatory function), to give support to interactants and encourage their exchange [cf. S4 in (i108)] and to declare the winner of the exchanger, often by means of cheering or applauding the victorious party.

Example (i109) represents a special type of ritualized verbal aggression, known as roasting. Allan and Burridge (2006: 87) define this activity in terms of unmerciful and purposeful mockery of another person in his/her presence in front of an audience. Roasting usually is light-hearted exercise in mocking the target for purely humorous reasons. Thus, the target of roasting is supposed to not take the insults at their face-value, but to enjoy the attackers clever remarks and witty comparisons. By doing so, the target usually projects an image of himself or herself as a person capable of self-criticism and self-humour. In (109) S3's insulting remarks about S2 have been interpreted as an exercise of roast. Thus, S2 encourages S3 to go on to taunt the remaining members of the board present at the meeting. The input of S3 and the audience in the verbal event – through laughter and encouraging remarks – is to assure S3 that his remarks are taken to be offensive and to incline S3 towards further verbal taunts. Allan and Burridge (2006: 87) point out that apart from humorous qualities, roasts may also constitute means of expressing in-group solidarity. This functional feature puts instances of roasts in close affinity with the category of friendly banter described below:

5.2.11. Banter

As noted in section 3.1.2 above, Leech (1983) considers Banter (mock impoliteness) to constitute – alongside Irony (mock politeness) – a *higher-order principle* in his model of Interpersonal Rhetoric. Allan and Burrige (2006: 87) define banter as

[...] the use of normally abusive address forms or epithets which are uttered without animosity, which can be reciprocated without animus and which typically indicate a bond of friendship.

Thus, banter constitutes an impolite – at face-value – way of being friendly or intimate. This mechanism is based on the fact that low value on the scale of politeness is correlated with low degree of authority and social distance. Thus, by engaging in face-value verbal aggression towards an interlocutor, S highlights the relationship of closeness and intimacy between himself/herself and the target of face-value verbal aggression. The condition here is, however, that S and the target of banter must be in sufficiently close interpersonal relations. An exercise of banter aimed at a party of a more significant social distance from S may easily be construed as a malicious verbal attack. In order for banter to fulfil its function, S's comment must also be understood as insincere. Hence in the case of banter S often engages in overstatement, exaggeration and employs particular prosodic aspects of speech in order to mark the symbolic difference between the intention of his or her utterance and genuine cases of verbal aggression.

In the sample corpus instances of insults employed as banter are exemplified in (i110) – (i119). In these examples interlocutors are in a considerably close social bond, be it the relation of friendship, cooperation, familiarity or in-group solidarity. Since low social distance between interlocutors is marked by low value on the scale of politeness, uttering insults in this context is interpreted as a way of being friendly, cooperative and may serve to strengthen the bond between the interactants. Thus, the face-value insults are interpreted as banter, which may be signalled e.g. by way of laughter, non-offensive comments or an exercise in counter-banter aimed at S.

Another significant function of banter is represented in (i119) – (i121). Here the verbal aggression is uttered not only to signal and maintain a positive bond between the interlocutors, but also to signal their particular in-group status to any particular members of an out-group. As such, verbal taunts between members of the in-group may indicate – apart from the perception of closeness, appreciation and in-group solidarity – the sense of belonging, one’s position in group hierarchy and the social distance from members of the out-group. In (i119) two black gang members engage in a series of insults, including an insult slur, which uttered in other contexts would be taken as highly insulting. In their conversation, however, the use of such terms indicates closeness, cooperation and in-group solidarity. Similar use of insult is exemplified in (i120), where the term *motherfucker-to-the-max* is taken as a term of recognition between mob members. In (i121) S3’s use of the use of the term *bad* is meant to be taken as an expression of appreciation of S2, which is signalled by the reaction of smiling and friendly physical taunts.

5.2.12. Non-taboo insults

The last category in my description of non-prototypical verbal aggression touches upon an issue of a significant variety of linguistic expressions which are rather loosely related to the definition of insults proposed in section 4.5, where insulting was defined as a direct attack at the face of an interactant by means of words and expressions which have negative axiological and/or emotional connotations. The presence of words and expressions which are emotionally negatively charged is the essential characteristics of insults in Grzegorzycowa’s (1991) account.³¹ However, there are different non-taboo verbal utterances and non-verbal actions which may be considered insults towards an interactant. In the sample corpus below such examples are represented in (i121) – (i130). These instances may be divided into non-taboo verbal utterances (i121) – (i125) and non-verbal actions and occurrences which may be construed as insults (i126) – (i130). What follows is a cursory and tentative discussion of these two categories.

³¹ See section 3.2.4 and the subsequent analysis in sections 5.3.1. – 5.3.6.

In the prototypical instances of insults discussed in section 5.1 above example (i19) illustrates S2 assailing her female law partner S1 with contemptuous language concerning a particular article of her clothing as a retribution to S1 having suggested – in very unemotional terms – S2’s ignorance about a legal case. This insinuation has been internalized by S2 as an insult, which is expressed by her subsequent comment on the situation (*She insulted me*). Thus, there is a group of verbal utterances which may be considered insults, which do not include the use of taboo or emotionally significant language. The motivation for considering such instances to be insults appears to be based on the illocutionary and/or perlocutionary force of such utterances; if in a given utterance X intends Y to feel downgraded and humiliated (Grzegorzczkova’s condition 2) – and/or as a result of X’s utterance Y feels downgraded and humiliated (condition 4), such an utterance may be classified as an insult, even though X does not use words which have negative emotional and/or axiological connotations (condition 3). In this sense virtually every instance of linguistic impoliteness and every kind of verbal attack on the interlocutor’s face may be considered an insult, be it an exercise in insinuation, irony, criticism, the use of inappropriate identity markers, verbal non-cooperation or any other kind of impolite verbal act. (i121) illustrates S1’s – a woman – insinuating that S2 – a man – possesses particular feminine characteristics. In (i122) S3 makes a suggestion of being intimate with S1’s mother, consequently sparking aggression on the part of S1. A reference to S1’s tragic family history is raised in (i123), which leads to S1’s emotional breakdown. (i124) and (i125) show conversations between gang members in which a suggestion is given of respectively S1’s inferior position relative to S2 and S2 being not serious. Both cases reveal the insulted party’s angry reaction to the insult, which shows that the interactant has been offended (perlocution) regardless of the other wrongdoer’s intentions (illocution). Therefore, such verbal acts may also be construed as insults, which may even be directly named and called an insult, as in (i124).

The discussion of verbal aggression in the present thesis so far has focused on insults as a verbal phenomenon. However, a cursory lexicographical analysis of insults points to the fact that different non-verbal actions and occurrences may be construed as insults. The Oxford English Dictionary and Webster’s Dictionary

provide an archaic meaning of insults as an act of physical attack (Onions, 1965: 1020; Gove, 1981: 1173). In this sense the term has a military usage of an open and sudden attack, without preparations (Onions, 1965: 1020). In medical usage an insult is also an occurrence of damage to the body or one of its parts (Gove, 1981: 1173; Pearsall, 1998: 948). The New Oxford Dictionary of English defines insults also as “thing[s] so worthless or contemptible as to be offensive” (Pearsall, 1998: 948). It appears, therefore, that non-verbal insults may include any kind of action, situation, product, attitude, undertaking of one party (X) or the neglect to perform a certain action by X which may be construed as insulting or damaging towards another party (Y). This appears to be the most inclusive definition of insults which may be given. The defining feature here is that as a result of a particular non-verbal happening Y feels downgraded, humiliated or insulted. In (i126) S1 refers to a hypothetical appearance of an in-stage imposter and calls this kind of appearance insulting. (i127) refers to religious claims and attitudes in general as constituting an insult. In (128) the written will of S2’s late father is referred to by S1 as an insult, since S1 does not agree with what the will contains. Likewise, categorizing a certain product as insulting is undertaken by S1 in (i130) in his review of video games. (i129), on the other hand, illustrates the lack of a customary expression of politeness as a cause of insult, with fatal consequences for the offender and his associates. All these non-verbal occurrences have been taken – and in some cases directly named – acts of insults.

It appears that in the case of non-verbal insults the feature which allows for their inclusion in the category appears to be the perlocutionary effect Y of feeling insulted as a result of X’s utterance, action, product, service, or a situation, happening or occurrence for which X is responsible, with simultaneous lack of negatively charged taboo terms and expressions being used.

5.3. Insults as a speech act

Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 above discussed the classical approach to the theory of speech acts as it was presented by Austin (1975) and Searle (1977; 1981). Proponents of the classical approach – as it was mentioned – have attempted to

provide a list of felicity conditions for different speech acts. These felicity conditions have been claimed to be necessary and sufficient in order for a given act to belong to a given category. In section 3.2.3 the cognitive view of the theory of speech acts was presented. Cognitive application of the theory of speech acts licenses the view of felicity conditions whereby individual conditions are not considered to be necessary and sufficient, but as prototypical for a given act. Thus, there exists a spectrum of different prototypical and non-prototypical acts which may belong to a single given category. Finally, section 3.2.4 has presented Grzegorzczkova's (1991) account of the speech act of insults. Grzegorzczkova puts forward the following felicity conditions for the speech act of insults. X engages in the speech act of insulting against Y if:

Condition 1

X's utterance contains a negative evaluation of Y (Y may be a particular person, or a group the person belongs to, or a particular ideology the person holds [...])

Condition 2

X intends Y to feel humiliated.

Condition 3

X uses words which are emotionally and axiologically negatively charged.

Condition 4

As a result of X's utterance Y feels insulted (perlocution).

In describing the above conditions Grzegorzczkova notes that not all of the above conditions must be fulfilled in every instance of insults. In violating condition 1 X may issue an insult about a certain group or doctrines Y is, however loosely, related with. Similarly, X's intention to humiliate Y (condition 2) does not – in Grzegorzczkova's opinion – belong to the essential features of insulting. Also, X's engaging in verbal aggression also does not necessarily bring about the perlocutionary effect of Y feeling insulted (condition 4). In Grzegorzczkova's view these conditions make up for the most typical instances of insulting. However, the only essential feature of insults is stipulated in condition 3; in insulting Y X uses words which are emotionally and axiologically negatively charged. In Grzegorzczkova's analysis, condition 3 constitutes the essence of insulting, and as such cannot be violated if a given act is to be classified as an insult. The remaining conditions – by Grzegorzczkova's admission – make up for

the “good” examples of insults. However, their violation does not automatically put a given act outside the scope of the category, but may result in this act being a “worse” category member.

In the present section I am going to briefly explore Grzegorzczkova’s conditions for the speech act of insults in the light of the cognitive theory of speech acts. The conditions proposed by Grzegorzczkova are, thus, considered to be prototypical for the category of insults. Individual conditions are discussed separately in sections 5.3.1 – 5.3.4 in relation to the corpus data samples presented in Appendix 3 and discussed above in sections 5.1 and 5.2. Each condition will be matched with different categories of prototypical and non-prototypical insults. Section 5.3.5 below sums up the discussion and proposes a radial model of the speech act of insulting based on the forthcoming analysis. Since the theory of speech acts may not plausibly be applied to non-verbal acts, I consciously decide to disregard the category of non-verbal insults discussed in section 5.2.12 above. In the discussion below Grzegorzczkova’s agent X is identified with the speaker (S) and Y is identified with the wrongdoer (W) in line with Jay’s (2000) model of verbal aggression.

5.3.1. Condition 1

Grzegorzczkova’s condition 1 (hereafter Cond. 1) states that in the speech act of insults X’s utterance must contain a negative evaluation of Y, where Y may be a particular person, or a group the person belongs to, or a particular ideology the person holds. As an example of that Grzegorzczkova (1991: 199) states that contemptuous remarks about religion and religious symbols may be considered insults for religious people. Conversely, non-believers may take offence in analogous remarks about atheism. Grzegorzczkova holds that X’s insult should be issued to Y directly or should be spoken in public. She admits that X’s engaging in critical remarks about Y in private does not normally bring about the act of insulting, although X’s remarks about different doctrines and groups of people may be received as offensive.

In the majority of prototypical instances of verbal aggression (i1) – (i63) X's insult is directed at Y personally. The target of insulting (Y) is at the same time the wrongdoer (W) responsible for the rising level of anger in S. Therefore, S's (X's) natural reaction is to try to redress the balance of justice by verbally assaulting W. This – in the majority of cases – is realized by conveying a negative evaluation of W directly and in W's presence [e.g. (i2), (i3), (i6), (i9), (i13), (i17), (i23), (i32), (i40)]. S may also insult W through negative references to a group of people associated with W [(i10), (i20)] or a person W is related to [(i15), (i59), (i91)]. X may also decide to indulge in a critical remark about Y's possessions or an object associated with Y [(i7), (i19), (i37)]. Therefore, the cases of prototypical verbal aggression fulfil Cond. 1.

In case of a non-human wrongdoer [(i64) – (i70)] and absent wrongdoer [(i71) – (i78)] Cond. 1 is fulfilled in that X engages in a negative evaluation towards W who is respectively absent, or non-human. As such, therefore, W is unable to comprehend and internalize S's verbal attack, which leads to no perlocutionary effect of W feeling insulted. This issue is discussed in section 5.3.4 below. Cond. 1 is also fulfilled in instances of delayed retribution [(i79) – (i82)]. Here X engages in a negative evaluation of Y when Y has already withdrawn from the context of the exchange. This – as illustrated in section 5.1.3 above – constitutes often a form of inhibited verbal aggression, wherein S gives vent to his emotions only when W has already left the scene and is unable to retaliate or punish W for the offence.

Cond. 1 appears to be realized in instances of reflexive insulting [(i83) – (i86)]. Although non-propositional swearing typically is realized through conventionalized and short verbal expressions, instances of reflexive insulting consists of cases of non-propositional swearing which possess certain insulting or offensive qualities. For instance, in (i83) S2 – apart from giving vent to his emotions – appears to engage in a negative evaluation of I3 (*son of a bitch*)

In the category of redirected insults [(i87) – (i89)] X redirects his or her anger from Y to another party T. In doing so, X does not engage in the negative evaluation of W. In this sense, therefore, Cond. 1 is violated. However, in the case of redirected anger X's negative evaluation is transferred from X to T, often based

of a certain act of provocation on T's part (e.g. S3's intervention in (i88)). Thus, T becomes a new wrongdoer for the act of redirected verbal aggression. T's act of provocation is, consequently, retributed with a verbal attack on the part of X. In this sense, thus, redirected insults do reveal a negative evaluation of an interactant (T). This agent, however, is a different entity from the original wrongdoer X. Therefore, cases of redirected anger do not fulfil Cond. 1.

Instances of intensifying insults [(i89) – (i93)] and insult chains [(i93) – (i99)] fulfil Cond. 1 in that they reveal instances of verbal aggression wherein the negative evaluation of Y is present. As discussed in sections 5.2.6 and 5.2.7 respectively, in these two categories X's negative evaluation of Y becomes intensified as a result of the rising level of anger which is revealed in the increasing degree of offensiveness of X's remarks.

Incidental insults [(i100) – (i103)] appear to comply with Cond. 1. However, X's negative evaluation of W is never stated directly. Instead, incidental insults – as they are discussed in section 5.2.8 – typically make use of references to a person or a group of people Y is associated with. In (i100) S2 assaults S1 with offensive comments about lawyers as a whole. (i101) shows S1 indulging in vulgar racial comments in front of a black interactant (S2). In (i102) the captive killer's (S2) negative remarks about his victims can be taken as insulting by the escorting police officers. It is precisely through not referring to Y directly that X may veil his or her insult as described in section 5.2.8.

Insults directed at self [(i103) – (i106)] and ritual insults [(i107) – (i108)] comply with Cond. 1. In case of the former, Y to whom X's verbal aggression is directed is at the same time X himself or herself. Ritual insults, on the other hand, involve the negative evaluation of Y in connection with some ritual proceedings.

The cases of banter [(i110) – (i120)] reveal a face-value negative evaluation of Y. However, this face-value negative evaluation has the perlocutionary effect of showing close bond and revealing intimacy between X and Y. Face-value negative evaluation of Y may also serve the purposes of in-group recognition of Y. Thus, Cond. 1 is not realised, since X's utterance contains precisely *positive*

evaluation of Y. Also in case of Roasts, the face-value impoliteness is used precisely to convey a humorous effect.

Finally, the category of non-taboo verbal insults fulfils Cond. 1 in that X's non-taboo remarks contain a negative evaluation of Y [(i124) – (i125)], a person associated with Y [(i122)] or a group associated with Y [S3's remarks concerning S2's family in (i123)].

5.3.2. Condition 2

Grzegorzczkova's (1991) condition 2 for the speech act of insults (hereafter Cond. 2) states that X intends Y to feel humiliated as a result of X's utterance. This condition refers, thus, to the illocutionary force of the speech act of insulting. Grzegorzczkova (1991: 200) notes that in the category of insults the lack of X's intention to humiliate Y is not verifiable and, as such, does not provide sufficient grounds for disregarding a given act as a member of the category. Still, such examples would be considered as somewhat dysfunctional. Although I recognize the methodological difficulties concerning a detailed analysis of the interactants' intentions, what follows is a cursory account of Cond. 2 based on the corpus data.

In the prototypical instances of insults (i1) – (i63) Cond. 2 appears to be realized. As noted in section 5.1, in the prototypical model of insulting S engages in verbal aggression W in order to retribute W for W's act of provocation. S typically intends to do so by inciting in W the feel of being insulted (humiliated, downgraded). Thus, this state of mind of W is meant to be retribution for the harm incurred by S a result of W's provocation. Thus, Cond. 2 appears to be fulfilled in the cases of prototypical instances of insults [e.g. (i7), (i14), (i19), (i23), (i30), (i31), (i38), (i49), (i55)].

In the prototypical model of insults, however, X's intention may not be limited solely to incurring negative state of mind of W. In the corpus film samples there are numerous examples with different illocutionary force elements in which making Y feel humiliated is only an accompanying effect of a different illocutionary force of X's utterance.

In accordance with the emphatic function of swearing presented in section 4.5, verbal aggression may be employed in order to highlight an important piece of information for the addressee.

Bousfield (2008: 61), after Thomas (1995: 170), cites the following exchange between an uncle, who believes there is a bomb planted in the stands at his racecourse, and his nephew, who presumably is hiding in the stands:

[...] Toby, get off the stands. The stands are not safe. Toby, for Christ's sake do what I say. This is not a game. Come on *you little bugger* [...] for once in your life be told.

The uncle engages in an act of verbal aggression towards his nephew in order to emphasize the imminent danger and make the nephew act accordingly. As Bousfield (2008: 62) puts it, in this instance “[...] the speaker employs a short-term goal of causing face damage, in order to achieve the long-term benefit of saving his nephew's life”. Generally speaking, the emphatic function of swearing may also be successfully utilized in contexts which normally do not involve the use of insolent language. Consider the following excerpt from a debate concerning the existence of God, wherein the atheist speaker refers to the inadequacy of the cosmological proof of the divine in the following words:

All of this massive Big Bang cosmological churning and destruction and annihilation [...] all of this could be part of a plan. There's no way an atheist can prove it's not. But it's some plan, isn't it, with mass destruction, pitiless extermination, annihilation going on all the time, and all of this set in motion on a scale which is absolutely beyond our imagination in order that the pope can tell people not to *jerk off*.³²

By the virtue of a dysphemistic equivalent of *masturbate* the speaker highlights his position, draws the audience attention, and possibly strives to establish a rapport between himself and the listeners based on the attitude of informality. Similarly, if a professor during a scientific debate states that he agrees with his co-debater in that “the problem of the origin of life is one *hell* of a difficult problem”³³, the professor attempts to highlight an important aspect of his

³² Christopher Hitchens in The Great God Debate:
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2kZRAOXEFPI> (access: 29.03.2015).

³³ Michael Ruse in The Origin of Life: Evolution or Design:
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2CnZ3n8I5b8> (access: 29.03.2015)

presentation and, possibly, to relate to the audience in a more direct and informal way.

The feature of emphasizing an important piece of information through the use of verbal aggression appears to be present in a number of corpus samples, e.g. (i7), (i10), (i18) and (i27). In such examples the emphatic quality of insults is often matched with the function of letting off steam by giving vent to speakers' negative emotions.

Insulting very often accompanies the speech act class of directives. Insults are found in orders [(i5), (i12), (i17), (i37), (i44), (i52), (i53)] and warnings [(i11), (i13), (i42)]. The reason behind that appears to be that directives are aimed at making the hearer take a particular course of action. Thus, they often involve the speaker bending the other agent(s) to his or her will. In order to successfully achieve that the speaker must possess sufficient relative power over the hearer. Since swearing correlates with having more relative power in a given context, the speaker may use insulting alongside an order, warning or threat to negotiate or emphasize his or her relative power in a given context. Verbal aggression may also accompany certain speech acts of commissives, e.g. threats [(i8), (i36), (i46)]. In such cases, the speaker may want to highlight that he or she is in power to take a certain act which is harmful to the addressee.

Highlighting one's power is also a vital issue in the contexts of clear power disproportion and discernible hierarchy of agents, e.g. the army, policing activities, mafia practices, workplace relations. By engaging in verbal aggression in such contexts X may intend to show and highlight his or her superior position relative to Y [e.g. (i20), (i25), (i26), (i32)]. In such contexts the use of insults helps to highlight the relative power of the interactants and/or to negotiate their relative power in a given context. The negotiation of power is often associated here with showing one's superiority and setting up and maintaining the relation of hierarchy between the interactants. This is connected with insulting as a possible intimidation technique that X may engage in. In (i36), for instance the boss of Chinese mafia uses insults not only to issue a threat towards the other gang bosses, but also to intimidate them. Insults employed for the purpose of the

hearer's intimidation are also employed in (i46) and (i56). Also these two examples illustrate a highly competitive context of criminal or mafia activities.

On the other hand, in the context of power negotiations, X insulting Y may indicate X's refusal to cooperate with Y or recognize X's status. This is evident in several examples, e.g. in (i43), (i47), (i56), where the speakers refuse to proceed in accordance with the interactant's will and assert that by insulting them. Finally, insulting may be a conscious way of provoking an interactant to take a particular course of action, e.g. in (i33) and (i34) the speakers consciously provoke their interactants to perform an act of violence on them, in order to save others from said violence (i33) or to provoke further fighting (i34). In short, thus, apart from the intention of inciting in Y the feeling of being humiliated or downgraded, X's intention may be aimed at different forms of influencing Y's actions or attitudes, usually as a result of negotiating, highlighting or establishing a particular kind of power relation between the interactants.

Non-prototypical instances of verbal aggression discussed in section 5.2 also reveal different illocutionary force elements, which may differ from X's intention of Y feeling downgraded and humiliated. In the cases of non-human wrongdoer [(i64) – (i70)] X knows that Y, being a non-human animate or inanimate entity, is unable of being emotionally moved by X's insult. The main motivation of S indulging in verbal aggression in such cases appears to be the need to give vent to one's anger and frustration, as described in section 5.2.1. Thus, in verbal attacks in non-human wrongdoer Cond. 2 is not fulfilled.

Cond. 2 appears to be violated also in cases of absent wrongdoer [(i71) – (i78)] and delayed retribution [(i80) – (i82)]. Since Y is absent from the context of the utterance (the former category) or X's insult is delivered when Y has already left the scene (the latter category), X's act of verbal aggression appears to have a primary function of serving the emotional needs of S, as noted in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 respectively. It must be noted here, however, that even if Y is not present at the scene of X's insult, the act of verbal aggression may be intentionally employed to insult a third party related to Y. In (i15) – for instance – S1's negative remark about the absent I3 may be taken by S2 as offensive due to the relation of friendship between S2 and I3.

Instances of reflexive insulting [(i83) – (i86)], in accordance with the account of non-propositional swearing presented in section 4.5, appear to involve little degree of X’s conscious intention to insult Y. Since the main function of reflexive swearing appears to be the need of satisfying the speaker’s emotional needs, usually by letting off steam in a stress-inducing situation, and since reflexive verbal aggression is an automatic psychological process, there is little intention of X aimed at making Y feel humiliated. Thus, Cond. 2 appears to be violated. Reflexive insults, however, may have the *effect* of humiliating Y’s, which is discussed in section 5.3.4 below.

Cases of redirected verbal aggression [(i87) – (i89)] do not fulfil Cond. 2 in that the original wrongdoer Y becomes unavailable for X as the target of X’s verbal aggression. In examples (i87) – (i89) X redirects his or her anger towards a third party T who is more readily available as a target of X’s verbal attack. Thus, such instances involve no intention of X insulting the original wrongdoer Y, although in redirecting his or her anger X may intend to humiliate T as an act of retribution for T’s verbal intervention [cf. (i88), (i89)]

In intensifying insults [(i89) – (i93)] and insult chains [(i93) – (i99)] Cond. 2 is fulfilled due to the fact that X intends Y to feel humiliated as a result of his or her repeated verbal attacks. Moreover, the need to retaliate Y typically increases in the course of X’s verbal aggression. Thus, X’s intention in these two respective categories may be described as increasingly more significant, which results in repeated strings of insults on the part of X.

Incidental insults [(i100) – (i102)] – in accordance with section 5.2.8. – are cases of verbal aggression where X’s intention cannot be convincingly and decisively stipulated. Since incidental insults “arise as an unplanned but sometimes anticipated by-product of [X’s] action” (Bousfield, 2008: 68 after Goffman, 1967: 14), Incidental insults appear to have no clear component of X’s clear intention to induce in Y the feeling of being offended, although such by-product may have been anticipated by X. Thus, Cond. 2 appears not to be fulfilled in cases of incidental insults. Apart from the category of incidental offences, Bousfield (2008: 69-70) – after Goffman (1967: 14) describes also *accidental* threats to one’s face. These may be cases of faux pas, gaffes, boners or bricks wherein the

offending person “may appear to have acted innocently; his offense seems to be unintended and unwitting”. Therefore, accidental insults may bring about the perlocutionary effect of *W* feeling offended, although without *X*’s intending to do so. Thus, the category of accidental insults also violates Cond. 2. The class of accidental insults is also presented in the radial model of insults proposed in section 5.3.5.

Cases of insults directed at self [(i103) – (i106)] also appear to violate Cond. 2. In accordance with section 5.2.9, in directing *X*’s verbal aggression at himself or herself, *X* intends to fulfil his or her emotional needs, engages in an exercise of self-correction or self-instructing or performs a particular politeness strategy aimed at influencing a third party, the audience or overhearers. There is no intention, however, of *X* inducing in himself or herself the feeling of being humiliated or offended. Thus, Cond. 2 remains unfulfilled.

Insult duels, as illustrated in (i107) – (i108) possibly fulfil Cond. 2 in that by a particular ritualized social practice *X* intends *Y* to feel humiliated as a part of the ritualistic proceedings. It was shown in section 5.2.10 that in the cases of competitive verbal duels the party being attacked with insolent language often attempts not to reveal his or her feeling of being offended, since that would plausibly indicate their succumbing to their competitor’s verbal abuse. Thus, *X*’s intention to humiliate and insult *Y* may be linked to *X*’s intention of emerging as a winner of the verbal duel.

A different situation may be observed in the case of roasts (i109) and verbal banter [(i110) – (i121)]. In case of the former, *X*’s intention is not to insult or humiliate *Y*, but to create a humorous occasion wherein *X*, *Y* and the audience enjoy *X*’s clever and witty verbalisation of *X*’s face-value insults. In case of the latter – as noted in section 5.2.11 – *X*’s face-value verbal aggression is employed to highlight or strengthen the positive relationship between *X* and *Y* and as an expression of recognition and in-group solidarity with *Y*. Therefore, instances of roasts and banter violate Cond. 2 in favour of a different set of perlocutionary effects.

Finally, non-taboo verbal insults [(i121) – (i125)] appear to reveal X's general intention of Y feeling humiliated as a result of X's utterance. This effect is realised by means of non-taboo references, including suggestions, insinuations, mocking, criticising or any other form of intentional verbal impoliteness. Thus, the category of non-taboo verbal insults complies with Cond. 2 for the speech act of insulting.

5.3.3. Condition 3

Grzegorzczkova's condition 3 for the speech act of insults (hereafter Cond. 3) demands that X uses words which are emotionally and axiologically negatively charged. Therefore, in insulting X makes use of words and expressions which exhibit negative emotional and axiological evaluation of Y in order to verbally assault Y. For Grzegorzczkova this is the essential feature of insulting, which defines the true cases of verbal aggression and differentiates insults from other similar speech acts. In the film samples presented in Appendix 3 this condition is realized in the great majority of cases. The emotionally and axiologically charged words employed by X to assault Y typically refer to different kinds of taboo language presented in section 4.1 or different themes used in insulting shown in section 4.5.

In the prototypical instances of insults [(i1) – (i63)] Cond. 3 is fulfilled. The negatively charged words employed in this group typically draw – as will be presented below – on the major taboo word sources presented in section 4.1.

Cond. 3 also holds throughout non-prototypical instances of verbal aggression such as non-human wrongdoer [(i64) – (i70)], absent wrongdoer [(i71) – (i78)] and delayed retribution [(i80) – (i82)]. X's negative evaluation of Y cannot be, however, comprehended and internalized by Y because of Y being non-human, Y being absent or Y being withdrawn from the scene of the utterance, as discussed in sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 respectively.

In cases of reflexive insulting [(i83) – (i86)] X assaults Y with non-propositional swearing, which typically involve short conventionalized verbal expressions

produced without much involvement of X's decision-making faculties. Thus, automatic swearing typically has the function of conventional response cries, as illustrated in section 5.2.4. Redirected insults [(i87) – (i89)] negatively charged words and expressions are used to assault a third party T towards which X's anger is redirected. In both of these categories Cond. 3 is realized.

Intensifying insults [(i89) – (i93)] and insult chains [(i93) – (i99)] – as noted in sections 5.2.7 and 5.2.8 respectively – involve the increasing level of verbal abuse from X towards Y. Thus, Cond. 3 is realized either through a stream of repeated negative references of by the insult terms becoming increasingly intensified.

Incidental insults [(i100) – (i102)] employ negatively charged words and expression typically in order to assault a group of people associated with Y. Thus, X's utterance has a degree of potentiality to offend Y and Cond. 3 is realized. In self-insults [(i103) – (i106)] X employs negatively-charged language towards himself or herself. Thus, this category also Cond. 3 is also fulfilled.

In instances of insult duels [(i107) – (i108)] and roasts (i109) the negatively-charged words and expressions employed by X are used for a different social function. In case of the former, they are used in a particular type of verbal competition game. In case of the latter, they are used to incite a particular kind of humorous social exercise. Thus, both of these categories match Cond. 3.

Banter [(i110) – (i121)] involves X assaulting Y with negatively charged language for the purpose of strengthening, emphasizing or communicating a positive bond between X and Y. Since , as noted in section 5.2.11, low value on the scale of social distance correlates with low degree of politeness, X highlights his or her closeness with Y by the virtue of assaulting Y with face-value offensive language. Therefore, instances of banter comply with Cond. 3.

The categories discussed above involve the use of negatively charged words and expressions taken from different taboo-related sources. Below I list the words with negative emotional and axiological connotations taken from samples (i1) –

(i121) and provide a short consideration of how they are related to the categories of dysphemistic expressions enumerated in Allan and Burridge (2006: 79-85).³⁴

The most prevailing theme in X's utterances towards Y appears to be the epithets derived from tabooed bodily organs and bodily effluvia. These include *ass(hole)* [(i18), (i21), (i25), (i47), (i60), (i61), (i81), (i113), (i118)], *pussy(ies)* [(i61), (i107), (i110)], *cunt* [(i28), (i33), (i117)], *prick* (i79), *dick(s)* (i25), *wiener* (i1), *butt* (i108), *balls* (i88), *cock* (i31), *shit* [(i3), (i7), (i11), (i25), (i27), (i37), (i38), (i41), (i49), (i52), (i53), (i56), (i90), (i91), (i98), (i107)], *shithead* [(i9), (i27), (i28)], *crap* [(i64), (i69)], *shitter* (i31), *dipshit* (i97), *scum(bag)* (i100), *filth* (i60), *fart* (i109), *sack of entrails* (i115). This category also includes sexual activities and people involved in them: *fuck(ing)* [(i12), (i18), (i19), (i31), (i32), (i33), (i40), (i43), (i46), (i49), (i50), (i51), (i54), (i62), (i63) (i76), (i77), (i78), (i80), (i82), (i85), (i86), (i88), (i89), (i91), (i92), (i93), (i94), (i97), (i113)], *fucker* [(i53), (i61)], *fuck-up* (i63), *fuckhead* (i44), *motherfucker* [(i4), (i32), (i42), (i45), (i52), (i70), (i84), (i119), (i120)], *bitch(es)* [(i5), (i34), (i35), (i58), (i65), (i67), (i71), (i72), (i103), (i107)], *son of a bitch/ sons of bitches* [(i2), (i8), (i26), (i36), (i66), (i83), (i99), (i104)], *whore* [(i58), (i91), (i95), (i102)], *jerk(-off)* [(i13), (i29), (i39)], *fagot* [(i93), (i118)], *hooker* [(i95), (i96)], *gay(lord)* (i93), *cocksucker* (i51), *slut* [(i73), (i109)], *pederast* (i102), *wanker* (i94). Similarly, people Thus, references to human sexuality and tabooed body parts and bodily substances appear to be the most significant source of emotionally and axiologically charged words.

Other groups of negatively-charged expressions constitute comparisons with animals: *pig* [(i82), (i108)], *cockroach* [(i15), (i49)], *animal* (i48), *ape* (i24), *monkey* (i51), *maggot* (i32), *worm* (i78), *parasites* (i115), references to Y's mental subnormality: *stupid* [(i23), (i24), (i94), (i95), (i108), (i111), (i115)], *idiot* [(i16), (i28), (i91), (i109)], *retard(ed)* [(i91), (i93), (i116)], *freak* [(i17), (i54)], *dumb* (i51), *insane(ly)* (i14), *crazy* (i58), *moron* (i109), insults aimed towards Y's ethnic, social or professional background: *nigger(s)* [(i20), (i101), (i119)], *spick* [(i75), (i112)], *Chinaman* (i74), *nazi* (i107), *bum* [(i10), (i48)], *hillbilly* (i107), *trailer trash* (i107), *quack* (i40), *dishwasher* (i46), and X's references to real or

³⁴ See section 4.5.

perceived characteristics of Y: *bastard* [(i6), (i30), (i57), (i59), (i68), (i75), (i105), (i109)], *loser* [(i106), (i109), (i114)], *junkie* [(i50), (i92)], *fat* (i88), *ugly* (i19), *bad* (i121), *nihilist* (i97), *hunk of plastic* (i90), *wimp* (i109).

In actual instances of verbal aggression terms like the ones listed above can be combined in different streams of negatively charged expressions, e.g. *monkey ass* (i46), *fucking worm* [(i78), (i108)], *lousy bastard* (i30), *gutless fuck* (i33), *crazy little whore* (i58), *cast-iron bitch* (i103), *two-time loser* (i106), *fuckin' spick bastard* (i75), *poor miserable suffering son of a bitch* (i104), *lying crying spying prying ultra pig* (i108). It was noted in the discussion of non-prototypical verbal aggression in section 5.2 that in some instances of offensive speech repeated streams of insults belong to constituting features of certain kinds of verbal abuse, most notably intensifying insults (section 5.2.6) and insult chains (section 5.2.7).

The only category of non-prototypical insults in which Cond. 3 is not realized are the instances of non-taboo verbal aggression [(i121) – (i125)] described in section 5.2.12. These are instances of verbal aggression involving the use of words and expressions which do not reveal axiological or emotional negative evaluation. These may include instances of irony, sarcasm, insinuation, verbal criticism, blatant verbal non-cooperation, the use of inappropriate identity markers, or any other kind of verbal impoliteness. In case of the instances gathered in the sample corpus, the impoliteness techniques employed by X include insinuation of a man's possessing excessively feminine features (i121), suggestions of Y's mother improper sexual conduct (i122), references to Y's difficult and tragic history (i123), hints at Y's inferior position relative to X (i124) or Y being unintentionally funny (i125). Since these examples do not involve the use of words with negative emotional or axiological connotations, Cond. 3 is violated. However, such cases may be classified as insults, possibly due to the intention of X to humiliate Y (Cond. 2) and/or Y's feeling insulted as a result of X's utterance (Grzegorzczkova's condition 4). Therefore, instances of non-taboo verbal insults are accounted for in the radial model of verbal aggression in section 4.5.

5.3.4. Condition 4

Grzegorzczkova's condition 4 for the speech act of insults (hereafter Cond. 4) states that as a result of X's utterance Y should feel insulted (humiliated downgraded), although Grzegorzczkova (1991: 200) considers this condition to be a non-essential one. She states that a given insult may fail to incite in Y the feelings of being humiliated or downgraded. In such case, the insult may be considered as somewhat defective. The tentative name I adopt for such insults in section 5.5.2 is unsuccessful insults.

Prototypical acts of verbal aggression typically bring about the perlocutionary effect of W feeling humiliated and downgraded. At this point it must be noted that comprehensive analysis of the perlocutionary force of insults is not plausible in this thesis. As it was the case with the illocutionary force of X's utterance, such aim would require a much more detailed introspection into the interactants' minds.³⁵ This in the frame of the methodology applied in this work is hardly attainable. Therefore, what follows below is a cursory and upmost tentative account of the perlocutionary effect of insults as described in the film sample corpus.

As far as the relation between illocutionary and perlocutionary effects is concerned, it must be said that the two kinds of acts may have a different value in a single utterance. Post (2001: 141) points to cases of axiological divergence wherein the interlocutors involved in the process of conversation understand a speech act in a different way concerning its evaluation on a PLUS-MINUS scale. For instance, an announcement of a university lecture being cancelled – an occurrence which is normally readily welcome by students – may be valued differently if the addressee of the announcement was supposed to retake an exam with this lecturer the following day. Thus, the illocutionary force value (announcing good news) diverges from the perlocutionary effect value (disappointment, fear). In the corpus data there are numerous examples wherein the intended illocutionary force of S's utterance is understood by the addressee in a different way. For instance, in (i23) S1's stream of verbal aggression which,

³⁵ It must be noted, however, that a convincing analysis of perlocutionary effects based on minimal verbal exchanges is proposed by Post (2001; 2013).

presumably, was aimed at insulting S2 is interpreted by S2 as an interesting exhibition of S1's verbal prowess. In (i109) S3's scornful remarks are interpreted by S2 as an exercise in roast, although this has not been S3's intended aim, since he has been incapacitated for lying and is voicing his honest opinion about S2. What this points to is that the perlocutionary effect of S's utterance in the below examples may differ from the illocutionary force intended by the speaker.

In the prototypical instances of insults [(i11) – (i63)] Cond. 4 appears to be fulfilled in the majority of instances. In the prototypical model of verbal aggression S engages in a verbal attack towards W as a redressive action for the act of provocation carried out by W. S's act of verbal attack is aimed at evoking in W the feeling of being humiliated or downgraded, and thus *getting even* with W.

The fact of X feeling downgraded as a result of Y's insult may be revealed through a particular emotional reaction on the part of W [(i22), (i23), (i55)], by reacting to S's insult with an episode of swearing [(i39), (i50), S1's reaction to S2's remarks in (i23)], or by reacting with violence to the insult [(i61), S1's reaction in (i36)]. Alternatively, W feeling downgraded may be revealed through W taking legal or disciplinary action [e.g. in the context of official legal hearing (i7), (i18), or in the context of educational assembly, as in (i16), where S2 is led out of the auditorium after having insulted the speaker]. Such reactions on the part of Y, show that X feels downgraded as a result of the insult and this feeling urges him or her to undertake a particular course of action against X.

As noted in section 5.1.5 above, in prototypical instances of insulting, S – apart from getting even with W – may also overreact or underreact relative to the degree of W's provocation. These two alternative outcome scenarios may bring slightly different perlocutionary effects for the speech act of insulting. S overacts when the intensity of S's insult is higher than the level of W's provocation. This may lead to W feeling unjustly assaulted, and may – in consequence – spark an act of verbal aggression on his or her part. If S engages in a further verbal response, this outcome scenario may culminate in a chain of verbal aggression as described in section 5.2.7 above. S underreacts relative if his or her verbal aggression is less intense relative to the degree of W's provocation. This, as noted above, results often from a particular interplay of contextual factors favouring

some degree of anger inhibition on the part of S. In a context which is not conducive to swearing S may inhibit his or her anger through modifying the form or intensity of the verbal response [S2's reaction in (i30) and (i91)], or by completely refraining from any verbal retributive actions [cf. S2 and S2 in (i17), S2 in (i25) and (i32)]. If S, through underreacting, inhibits his or her verbal aggression, the emotional needs of S may be left unsatisfied. Thus, S may engage in an alternative way of giving vent to his or her anger. This may take the form of delayed retribution or redirected anger, as noted in sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.5 respectively.

Grzegorzycowa's (1991) account of the speech act of insulting allows also for cases of insults wherein as a result of X's verbal aggression Y does not feel downgraded or humiliated. This may be a result of Y's not having understood the insult (i24) or considering W's insult as not being significant enough to take notice of it (i31), or deciding to ignore S's insult in order to achieve certain contextual gain. In (i41), for instance S1 ignores S2's verbal aggression, because he urgently wants to convince S2 to leave the town. Moreover, it must be noted that there are many circumstances which license Y's pretending to not having been insulted. Y may decide to hide his or her true emotional verbal reaction e.g. to show his or her indifference to X's verbal aggression. As noted in section 5.2.10, such attitude is often characteristic for the parties indulging in the competitive game of insult duels. A similar attitude is revealed in instances (i13), where S2 reveals a nonchalant and unchanging attitude towards authorities, in (i31), where S3 flatly states that she is not impressed by S2's swearing, and in (i59), where S2 intends to show that he is not moved by S1's reference to being born out of wedlock. In such cases, because of the methodological difficulties described above, it is difficult to state precisely whether Y is truly unimpressed by S's swearing, or if it is a pretence strategy employed in order to show one's superior position or indifference to X's words.

Apart from the considerations of Y being humiliated as a result of X's utterance, it was noted in section 5.3.2 that insults may accompany different speech acts, most notably the class of directives. In such cases insults may serve the aim of negotiating or highlighting the superior relative power of the X, and thus assisting

the process of influencing Y's actions. Thus, X's swearing episode may assist in bringing about the perlocutionary effect of Y following X's instructions [e.g. (i12), (i17), (i44), (i53)]. Insults may also help S to achieve other perlocutionary effects, such as successfully negotiating and asserting one's position (i20), or successfully intimidating the interactant(s) [(i45) and (i49)].

The above discussion points to the fact that, as it was noted in section 4.3, a single swearing episode may have a number of different perlocutionary effects. Apart from making the addressee feel humiliated (the abusive function) and highlighting an important piece of information or emphasizing one's status (the emphatic functions) the act of verbal aggression is frequently used in order to alleviate his or her emotional tensions (the cathartic function), to let off steam. This quality of verbal aggression appears to be present e.g. in (i15), (i18), (i21), (i23), (i30), (i34), (i52), (i56), (i63). It should be, therefore, borne in mind that different functions of swearing may be realised simultaneously in a single act of verbal aggression.

As far as non-prototypical instances of insults are concerned, in the case of non-human wrongdoer [(i64) – (i70)] Y is not downgraded as a result of X's utterance. Both animate and inanimate non-human party is unable to comprehend X's verbal aggression and, thus, revealing any particular feelings as a result. Thus, Cond. 4 is violated. Similar lack of perlocutionary effect of Y feeling humiliated is present in the instances of absent wrongdoer [(i71) – (i78)] and delayed retribution [(i79) – (i82)]. Since Y is not present at the time and place of delivering the insult, the perlocutionary effect of insulting Y is not realized. It is possible, however, that in insulting an absent wrongdoer, the insult may be taken by a third party which may be related to W. In (i74), for instance, S1 refers to a person of Asian descent using a pejorative racial term. S2 takes offence on behalf of the absent party and instructs S1 on the correct nomenclature.

Reflexive insults [(i83) – (i86)] are, as noted above, delivered without the speaker's conscious awareness and constitute an immediate, uninhibited reaction to W's provocation. Therefore, engaging in reflexive verbal aggression does not involve X's conscious intention to humiliate Y. Thus, the perlocutionary force of this kind of acts also hangs in a balance; as a result of reflexive verbal aggression,

Y may or may not be humiliated, depending on the context of the utterance and the actual words and expressions used in a given context. Whether or not Y feels humiliated as a result of X's utterance depends to a large degree on the psychological predisposition of Y and his or her sensitivity to a particular kind of offensive language.

In the cases of redirected anger [(i87) – (i89)] X redirects his or her anger towards a third party T. Therefore, Y is not directly assaulted with offensive language and Cond. 4 is not fulfilled. However, X's utterance may have the perlocutionary effect of insulting T, who is viewed by X as a substitute of insult target or a secondary wrongdoer.

In the categories of intensifying insults [(i89) – (i93)] and insult chains [(i93) – (i99)] the perlocutionary effect of X's verbal aggression cannot be *a priori* stipulated. These, however, are instances of verbal aggression wherein X cannot satisfy his or her anger and engages in a spree of increasingly emotional expletives. Such expletives may or may not result in Y feeling downgraded and humiliated. However, because of the increasing intensity of insulting, there is high possibility that at some point the insult will successfully bring about the effect of Y feeling insulted. In (i91) and (i93), for instance, S2 and S3 respectively reveal clear emotional reaction to their interlocutors' insults at some point in the course of their exchange. Similarly, in insult chains, the perlocutionary effect of Y being offended as a result of X's utterance may be visible through Y's emotional reaction to X's swearing [e.g. (i95), (i98)], or by Y engaging in some kind of non verbal retaliatory reaction towards X, such as an outbreak of physical violence [(i93), (i96), (i97)].

Incidental insults [(i100) – (i102)], as noted in section 5.2.8, arise as an unplanned, but sometimes anticipated effect of X's utterance. Thus, their perlocutionary effect cannot be stipulated *a priori*. X may anticipate the effect of Y being humiliated, but this effect is not necessarily brought about. Thus, cases of incidental insults carry a potentiality for offending Y as a result of indirect verbal aggression, as illustrated by the corpus samples.

In self-insults [(i103) – (i106)], Y does not feel downgraded as a result of his or her swearing episodes. As noted in section 5.2.9, the main function of this type of verbal aggression is that of self-instructing or influencing the audience or overhearers by means of this particular politeness strategy. X's aim, however, does not normally include inciting in himself or herself the feeling of being downgraded or humiliated. Thus, Cond. 4 is not realized.

Insult duels [(i107) – (i108)] constitute a ritualized verbal competition aimed at outwitting one's opponent, inciting in him or her the feeling of being humiliated, and impressing the audience, and thus winning the competitive event. However, the specific perlocutionary effect of X's utterance is not known in this context. It is possible that the interactants feel humiliated as a result of each other's taunts, but the rules of an insult duel typically license their behaviour wherein they attempt to appear unimpressed by each other's verbal aggression.

Cond. 4 is not realized in cases of roasts (i109) and banter [(i110) – (i121)], since those categories include face-value offensive remarks for the aim of respectively creating a humorous and witty conversational context and strengthening, emphasizing and signalling the positive bond between interlocutors. It is possible, however, that X's utterance is misunderstood in this context and the offensive contents is taken literally by Y, thus inciting in him or her the feeling of being humiliated and downgraded.

Finally, in the cases of non-taboo verbal insults [(i121) – (i125)] Cond. 4 is realized. Although in verbal non-taboo insults taboo words and expressions are not utilized, the perlocutionary effect of Y feeling humiliated is realized, which may be revealed through an emotional reaction (i123), or on the outbreak of violence or physical reaction on the part of Y [(i122), (i124), (i125)]. Thus, although such cases violate Cond. 3, the perlocutionary effect of Y feeling humiliated as a result of X's utterance appears to be a primary reason for including the category of non-taboo verbal aggression inside the scope of the category of insults and in the radial model of insults presented in the following section.

5.3.5. Insults as a radial category

The present section summarizes the discussion of insults as a speech act by providing a radial model of prototypical and non-prototypical verbal aggression. This model is based on the analysis of the film corpus data from the point of view of speech act analysis carried out in sections 5.3.1 – 5.3.4 above. In the analysis I have taken Grzegorzycowa's conditions for the speech act of insulting and applied it to the analysis of prototypical and non-prototypical insult categories described in sections 5.1 and 5.2. What emerges is a complex pattern of different insult categories sharing some of Grzegorzycowa's conditions and differing in others. This is consistent with the cognitive perspective on the speech act analysis, which predicts that individual speech act categories may be presented in terms of a radial model as illustrated by Kalisz and Kubiński (1993).³⁶ What follows is a tentative radial model of insults emerging from the above analysis of verbal aggression.

³⁶ See section 3.2.3.




Figure 26. Insults as a radial category

In *figure 26* I implement the standards of description presented by Kalisz and Kubiński (1993) for their analysis of the speech act of promises. The full oval figure represents cases of insults wherein all of Grzegorzczkova's conditions are fulfilled. These conditions are respectively represented by the numbers 1. – 4. It must be noted here that the categories represented as complying with Grzegorzczkova's conditions do not require all Cond. 1-4 to be fulfilled in every instance of verbal aggression. For instance, it was noted in section 5.3.4 above that in prototypical instances of verbal aggression as a typical result of X's utterance Y feels downgraded and humiliated, this is not the case in every single corpus sample. The perlocutionary effect of X inducing in Y the feeling of being insulted is, therefore, not conclusively stipulated by the fact that a given act belongs to the category of prototypical verbal aggression. This, however, does not mean that prototypical verbal attacks – as a whole – violate Cond. 4. In fact, most member of the category fulfil this condition, which is depicted in its idealised way in *figure 26*.

The categories of non-prototypical verbal aggression wherein different conditions are actually not fulfilled are presented to the right of the oval figure. These categories are linked via straight lines with the conditions which they violate. Each category may be presented as violating one or more of Grzegorzczkova's conditions, which will be represented by the number of straight lines referring to them.

In the above diagram the categories which fulfil Cond. 1-4 include prototypical insults, intensifying insults, insult chains, and insult duels. Instances of prototypical verbal aggression, as described in section 5.1, comply with Cond. 1-4. Similarly, the categories intensifying insults, insult chains, and insult duels – described in sections 5.2.6, 5.2.7 and 5.2.10 respectively – fulfil all of the above condition, although they diverge from the prototypical model in a number of other ways. Thus, these three categories are presented, alongside prototypical insults, as instances wherein conditions 1 – 4 proposed by Grzegorzczkova hold.

Cond. 2 is not fulfilled in reflexive insults, since non-propositional swearing is used specifically as a reflexive psychological mechanism in order to let off steam in a stressful situation. Such instances, as noted in section 5.2.4, do not involve a

significant degree of the speaker's decision-making faculties, and – as such – should not be discussed in the terms of X's intentions.

Cond. 2 is also violated in incidental insults, since, in accordance with section 5.2.8, in such cases X may anticipate that his or her utterance may invoke in Y the feeling of being humiliated. However, this effect is not planned by X, which results in Cond. 2 being not fulfilled. As a further elaboration on the intentionality of X's verbal acts, section 5.2.8 also mentioned the category of accidental insults, which do not involve any degree of X's volition and anticipation. Therefore, such category could be presented as an extension of the incidental insult box.

Cond. 3 is violated in the instances of non-taboo verbal insults presented in section 5.2.12. This is the only category which violates Cond. 3, considered by Grzegorzczkova as essential for the speech act of insulting. In non-taboo verbal insults the perlocutionary effect of Y being humiliated is brought about by other means than using words which are emotionally and axiologically negatively charged.

The categories of non-human wrongdoer, absent wrongdoer, delayed retribution and self-insults violate simultaneously conditions 2 and 4. Cond. 2 is violated since, X does not intend to insult Y who is, respectively, non-human, absent, withdrawn from the context of the utterance or happens to be X himself or herself. The lack of X's intention to humiliate Y is matched with the lack of corresponding perlocutionary effect (Cond. 4). The use of verbal aggression has different functions in these categories, as described in sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3 and 5.2.9 respectively.

The two categories of insults where three different Grzegorzczkova's conditions are violated are redirected insults (section 5.2.5) and banter (section 5.2.11). In redirected insults Cond. 1 is not fulfilled, since X's verbal aggression is redirected from Y to a third party T. In banter the same condition is violated since the face-value impolite utterance contains precisely a positive evaluation of Y. Consequently, in redirected insults and banter X does not intend Y to feel humiliated (Cond. 2), nor does the utterance bring about such effect (Cond. 4). The only condition which is fulfilled in these categories is the presence of

negatively-charged words (Cond. 3), employed in order to let off steam and alleviate X's emotions (redirected insults) or used to signal a close interpersonal link and in-group solidarity between X and Y (banter).

The above-presented radial model of insults, in spite of its simplified and idealised form, allows for a few conclusions to be drawn from the above discussion. Firstly, the category of insult may be analysed in the light of speech act theory wherein individual conditions for a given category are exhaustively discussed. This kind of analysis facilitates a more comprehensive view of insults by providing a perspective on verbal aggression which is aimed at the analysis of different conditions for the speech act of insulting. Secondly, the application of the tools of cognitive linguistics allows us to undertake a study of insults wherein individual conditions are considered to be prototypical rather than necessary and sufficient. Thirdly, in accordance with the cognitive view of the speech act analysis, a radial model of insults may be presented, wherein – apart from the categories which comply with all of Grzegorzczkova's conditions – a number of non-prototypical sub-models diverges from the prototypical cases with respect to their realisation or non-realisation of Cond. 1-4. Fourthly, it has been shown that each of the conditions for the speech act of insulting presented by Grzegorzczkova – including Cond. 3, which by Grzegorzczkova (1991) was considered essential – in the radial model of insults can be violated by a given non-prototypical speech act of insults, which still may plausibly be considered to belong to the category of verbal aggression. Finally, the link between incidental insults and accidental insults suggest that it is possible to present a more comprehensive radial model encompassing the speech act of insults and other speech acts which bear resemblance to it. In particular, different linking patterns can be suggested between insults and related categories, such as offence, slander and criticism mentioned by Grzegorzczkova (1991). Such radial model of different insult-related speech acts goes, however, beyond the framework of the present work and may only be put forward as a suggestion for further enquiry into the problem of verbal aggression.

Despite its informative values, the analysis of insults presented in *figure 26* has a few considerable drawbacks. Firstly, putting the categories of prototypical insults,

intensifying insults, insult chains and insult duels together inside an oval figure designating the fulfilment of Cond. 1-4 may suggest that these categories have the same status. This is not so, since – as noted in section 5.2 – intensifying insults, insult chains and insult duels are non-prototypical instances of offensive speech and are characterised by different level of divergence from the prototypical model of verbal aggression. Secondly, matching speech act categories with the conditions they do not fulfil by a solid line may cause confusion arising from the fact that solid lines can be interpreted as indicating the fulfilment of a given condition rather than a lack of such fulfilment. Thirdly, and perhaps the most importantly, the presentation of verbal aggression in the framework of speech acts theory does not allow for a comprehensive and inclusive account of insults, since non-verbal insults must be – by necessity – relegated from the diagram. For a more detailed and global representation of different verbal and non-verbal categories of insults consider the following discussion of insults as a network model.

5.4. Insults as a network model

In this section I employ the theoretical framework of Langacker's (1990) network models, presented in section 2.2.3, for an inclusive and comprehensive view of abusive swearing. For this aim I shall incorporate different elements of the analysis presented above in sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. In particular, I take the prototypical and non-prototypical categories of insults and, based on their specification in terms of the fulfilment of Grzegorzycowa's conditions (section 5.3) and the realisation of the prototypical scenario of verbal aggression (sections 5.1, 5.2), I propose the following tentative network model of insults:




Figure 27. Insults as a network model

Figure 27 presents the network model of insult in accordance with the standards of description put forward by Langacker (1990: 266-72). From top to bottom the diagram is characterised by decreasing level of generality and increasing level of specificity. The relation of elaboration and extension are indicated by, respectively, solid unidirectional arrows and dashed unidirectional arrows. Dashed bidirectional arrows represent the relation of mutual similarity between elements of the network.

At the top of the diagram there is the most general schema, which incorporates an act, occurrence or product insulting to the addressee. This structure includes the most general definition of insults, as is was proposed in section 5.2.12: any action, situation, product, attitude, undertaking of one party (X) or the neglect to perform an action by X which may be construed as insulting or damaging towards another party (Y). The general schema is instantiated (elaborated) in two structures: VERBAL INSULTS and NON-VERBAL INSULTS. The main focus of this thesis has been the phenomenon of verbal aggression. However, as noted in section 5.2.12, insults may also be realised non-linguistically through a particular behaviour, attitude, lack of customary politeness etc. Thus, non-verbal insults can be presented as an extension of verbal insult, as indicated in the diagram by a dashed arrow. The relation of extension implies a conflict of values of these two categories (verbal – non-verbal). However, non-verbal insults are still categorized in terms of verbal insults on the basis of their effect of offending Y.

The structure of VERBAL INSULTS is elaborated by two categories: SUCCESSFUL INSULTS and UNSUCCESSFUL INSULTS. In applying these terms I consciously adopt the perlocutionary criterion of insults, according to which successful insults are those verbal acts which bring about the effect of Y feeling insulted and unsuccessful insults are those that do not bring about this effect. This is illustrated by the specification of 4 in SUCCESSFUL INSULTS and -4 in UNSUCCESSFUL INSULTS, which refers to the former category fulfilling Cond. 4 and the latter one failing to fulfil this condition. For the remainder of the diagram numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the specification of individual nodes refer to the fulfilment of Cond. 1-4 by these categories. Additional

specification values refer to the characteristic features of non-prototypical instances of insults, as they were presented in section 5.2.

The distinction between SUCCESSFUL INSULTS and UNSUCCESSFUL INSULTS in *figure 27* is not identical to the traditional speech act differentiation between felicitous and infelicitous speech acts.³⁷ In the classical speech act analysis not fulfilling any of the conditions for a particular speech act results in a given act being infelicitous. By contrast, the successful/unsuccessful distinction is based on the criterion of perlocution (Cond. 4). Neither can unsuccessful insults be identified with speech act misfires, since an act which fulfils Cond. 4 may still misfire.³⁸ Taking this into account, in the later part of this thesis I employ the term *successful insults* for the acts of verbal aggression which bring about the perlocutionary effect of Y feeling insulted, humiliated or offended and *unsuccessful insults* for those acts that do not bring about this effect.

The category of SUCCESSFUL INSULTS is instantiated by three structures: UNINTENDED INSULTS, NON-TABOO INSULTS and PROTOTYPICAL INSULTS. Consider these three categories in turn. UNINTENDED INSULTS is a conceptual schema which allows for the structuring of ACCIDENTAL INSULTS, INCIDENTAL INSULTS and REFLEXIVE INSULTS. Unintended insults elaborate on successful insults, in that Cond. 1, 3 and 4 are fulfilled in them. Accidental insults, incidental insults and reflexive insults, in turn, instantiate on unintended insults, since apart from the values of 1, 3 and 4, they possess in their specification additional elements differentiating them (*Acc.*, *Inc.* and *Ref.*). As noted in sections 5.2.8 and 5.3.2, accidental and incidental insults arise, respectively, as an accidental, and unplanned – but sometimes anticipated – offence to Y. Reflexive insults, as presented in section 5.2.4, are produced automatically as a reflexive reaction to a situation of stress. The category of NON-TABOO VERBAL INSULTS elaborates on SUCCESSFUL INSULTS in that in its specification, apart from Cond. 4, it fulfils also Cond. 1 and 2. The structure of SUCCESSFUL INSULTS is elaborated by PROTOTYPICAL INSULTS. This is the most salient, prototypical structure in the network model of insults, which is

³⁷ See section 3.2.1.

indicated by heavy lines. As discussed in section 5.3, prototypical insults fulfil Grzegorzczkova's Cond. 1-4 (values 1, 2, 3, 4). The prototypical instances of insults provide a significant amount of categorization for non-prototypical categories. This is congruent with the analysis undertaken in section 5.2, where different categories of offensive speech were described relative to the prototypical model of verbal aggression. In *figure 27* PROTOTYPICAL INSULTS structure non-prototypical categories of insults through elaboration and extension. Consider these two types of relations in turn.

PROTOTYPICAL INSULTS is instantiated (elaborated) in INTENSIFYING INSULTS, INSULT CHAINS and INSULT DUELS. The relation of elaboration holds because intensifying insults, insult chains and insult duels fulfil Cond. 1-4, which is illustrated by 1, 2, 3, 4 in their specifications. At the same time, these categories are characterised by additional elements differentiating them, as discussed in sections 5.2.6, 5.2.7 and 5.2.10 respectively. This is indicated by the values of *Int.*, *I.Ch.* and *I.D.* in their specifications.

The categories which are extensions of PROTOTYPICAL INSULTS in *figure 27* include NON-TABOO VERBAL INSULTS, INCIDENTAL INSULTS, REFLEXIVE INSULTS, BANTER, REDIRECTED INSULTS, NON-HUMAN WRONGDOER, ABSENT WRONGDOER, DELAYED RETRIBUTION and SELF-INSULT. The relation of incompatibility stems from the fact that in all of these categories at least one of Cond. 1-4 is not fulfilled, while in prototypical instances of verbal aggressions all of these conditions are realised. The conditions that are fulfilled in individual nodes are indicated by the numerical values in their specifications. The categories extended from PROTOTYPICAL INSULTS possess also in their specifications additional differentiating elements, which, in accordance with the discussion in section 5.2, are characteristic to them and differentiate them from the prototypical instances of verbal aggression.

Apart from being extensions of PROTOTYPICAL INSULTS, BANTER, NON-HUMAN WRONGDOER, ABSENT WRONGDOER, DELAYED RETRIBUTION and SELF-INSULTS elaborate on the structure of

³⁸ Consider Grzegorzczkova (1991), who states that an act which does not bring about the effect of Y feeling offended should not necessarily be relegated outside the category of insults, although

UNSUCCESSFUL INSULTS. This is because they share the common feature of the lack of the perlocutionary effect of Y feeling offended as a result of the utterance. This is presented as the value of -4 in the specification of unsuccessful insults, which – due to the fact that they do not fulfil Cond. 4 – are extensions of the category of SUCCESSFUL INSULTS.

The network model of insults presented in *figure 27* has a number of important advantages. Firstly, it facilitates the presentation of not only different categories of verbal aggression, but also non-verbal instances of insults. Ranging from the most general schema of any act, occurrence or product insulting to Y to the most specific categories of offensive speech, analysing verbal aggression in terms of a network model enables the representation of virtually every category of insults discussed in sections 5.1 – 5.3 in a single diagram. Secondly, the network model allows us to adequately represent the special status of prototypical verbal aggression. In *figure 27* PROTOTYPICAL INSULTS are highlighted as the most salient category of offensive speech, providing a significant amount of categorization in terms of elaboration and extension relations. This is congruent with the discussion of the non-prototypical instances of insults attempted in section 5.2, where different categories of non-prototypical insults were described relative to the prototypical scenario of verbal aggression. Thirdly, *figure 27* presents the difference between successful and unsuccessful insults. This, as noted above, is due to employing the perlocutionary criterion for the categorization of verbal insults, which enables the categorization of different structures in terms of their perlocutionary effect. Successful and unsuccessful insults shall also be discussed below in the context of force dynamics analysis in section 5.5.2. Finally, the description of insults in terms of a network model points to insults as a complex and intricate category, which is viably described in terms of a network structure.

Understandably, the network model of insults presented in *figure 27* should be considered as a tentative suggestion. It is impossible for me to state to a satisfying degree the exact structure of the network and the precise nature of relations between different elements of the model. It is also not viable to adequately

such an act might be considered defective.

represent the degree of the upward and outward growth of the network, especially since – as noted in section 2.2.3 – this may well vary from speaker to speaker. However, there appears to be convincing evidence that a comprehensive view of insult which includes more general and more specific, verbal and non verbal categories is convincingly described in terms of a network model, and not in terms of any single schema or structure.

5.5. Insults in the light of force dynamics theory

The aim of this section is to complement the analysis of insults undertaken in the preceding sections by incorporating the precepts of the theory of force dynamics discussed in section 2.4. The theory of force dynamics is employed in order to illustrate the prototypical instances of insults as presented in section 5.1 and a number of non-prototypical models of insults, as shown in section 5.2. The categories of verbal aggressions which are described below include prototypical insults, reflexive insults, redirected insults, intensifying insults and insult chains. The discussion below focuses on two levels: the intrapersonal perspective and the interpersonal perspective. The intrapersonal perspective focuses on a simplified analysis of the psychological processes that occur within a single individual and lead to the act of verbal aggression. It accounts for whether an individual speaker engages in the act of verbal aggression towards W or suppresses his or her anger. Subsequently, the interpersonal perspective accounts for how insults are realized in the context of interpersonal encounters; it investigates the interaction of two separate sentient beings engaged in a verbal conflict. Thus, for the purpose of a plausible account of verbal aggression in the light of force dynamics theory, the present section discusses a simplified intrapersonal model of verbal aggression (section 5.5.1) and a simplified interpersonal model of verbal aggression (5.5.2) before moving to the account of a force-dynamic model of prototypical insults (section 5.5.3) and a number of force-dynamic models of non-prototypical insult categories (section 5.5.4)

5.5.1. A simplified intrapersonal model

This section attempts to incorporate the extension of force dynamics to the psychological (intrapersonal) reference as presented in section 2.4 to the analysis of the speaker's intra-psychological factors accompanying verbal aggression. Interpersonal factors which assist inhibition of disinhibition of S's verbal aggression were presented in sections 4.4.4 and 5.1. It was noted in section 5.1.3 that there are two viable basic scenarios following the stage of anger inhibition in Jay's (2000) model of verbal aggression; either the speaker's anger is successfully inhibited and the swearing episode is suppressed, or the anger is disinhibited in the form of verbal aggression. Thus, the discussion of a simplified intrapersonal model of verbal aggression pertains to the conceptualisation of our human *inner lives* and our internal psychological tensions.

A convincing account of different conceptual systems for comprehending our inner psychological tensions is presented by Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 267-90). Lakoff and Johnson make a distinction between *the Subject*, which is the essential part of a person's psyche encompassing conscious thought, reasoning, will and subjective experience, and *the Self*, which encompasses those personal aspects which are not picked by the Subject, including a person's psychological urges, interpersonal relations, social roles, body, past actions, and so on. In analysing the relationship between the Subject and the Self Lakoff and Johnson distinguish different metaphorical systems for conceptualising our inner lives. These systems conceptualise the Subject as being personlike and distinct from the Self, which can be conceptualised as a person, an object or a location.

In the prototypical model of verbal aggression, presented in section 5.1, the rising level of anger experienced by the speaker (S) is followed by S's attempts at inhibiting his or her anger. If anger is successfully inhibited, verbal aggression is not realised. However, if the degree of anger continues to rise, it will reach a point at which it is not longer possible to for S to inhibit his or her negative emotions. Hence, S's verbal aggression is successfully disinhibited.

Both of these scenarios may be explained in terms of what Lakoff and Johnson (1999) call *the social self metaphor*. In this kind of metaphor the Subject and the

Self are metaphorised in terms of two distinct persons who are in interaction with each other. Specifically, the Subject and the Self may be conceptualised as adversaries. This metaphor may explain different kinds of conflictive relations within a single individual's psyche, which are evident in linguistic expressions such as *struggle with yourself*, *struggle with your emotions*, *be your own enemy* and so on. Taking this into account, in the reminder of this thesis I consciously adopt *the Subject* to refer specifically to the central, conscious part of S's psyche, and *the Self* to refer to the set of psychological urges, including the rising level of anger, which facilitate the disinhibition of the S's verbal aggression. The interplay of relations between the Subject and the Self may plausibly be represented in terms of a force dynamic model. Consider the following simplified intrapersonal diagram of insulting:




Figure 28. Simplified intrapersonal model of verbal aggression

In the above model Ago represents the Subject and Ant stands for the Self. In accordance with force dynamics conventions, a dotted box indicates the fact that elements of the diagram are parts of the psychological dimension of a single sentient human agent. In Jay's model of verbal aggression the default position of an unprovoked individual is one of rest: unprovoked S does not normally engage in the act of verbal aggression. Thus, Ago's initial position is that of non-action, which represents the state of mind due to which no insults are produced. The introduction of Ant represents S's psychological internalization of the wrongdoer's (W's) provocation. The scales of justice are unbalanced, the level of anger rises. S intends to redress the balance by performing an act of insult. As a

result, the Self prevails over the Subject's tendency to rest and the act of verbal aggression is realised. This is represented by the change of Ago's status from rest to action.

An alternative diagram could be presented for cases whereby the act of verbal aggression is successfully suppressed within S's psyche:




Figure 29. Simplified intrapersonal model of suppressed verbal aggression

The situation here is analogous to *figure 28* in that Ago's default position is repose and the psychological factors inducing action (insult) are introduced in the form of Ant. In this model, however, the Subject (Ago) is stronger than the Self (Ant). As Jay points out, insulting, as a taboo activity, is not automatically undertaken as a response to every provocative situation. The Subject is motivated by the array of factors suppressing S's swearing, as they were described in section 5.1.3 above. Thus, Ago prevails and the act of verbal aggression is suppressed. This model represents the category of suppressed insults, i.e. the cases wherein S's abusive swearing is internally suppressed and not realized. Since no act of verbal aggression is produced as a result, I consciously leave out the cases of suppressed insulting from my further analysis.

Figure 28 presented above remains incomplete in that it does not reflect the process of internal psychological tensions, which lead to the production of verbal aggression on the part of S. An alternative diagram is presented in *figure 30* below, where the degree of anger rising in S is represented as the transfer of force balance from Ago to Ant as a result of exerting continuous psychological pressure:




Figure 30. Simplified intrapersonal model of psychological balance transfer

In *figure 30* the continuous exertion of psychological force, (EXRTN box) represents prolonged psychological pressure of the Self (Ant) onto the Subject (Ago). The pressure results from the fact that Ago's initial position is towards repose, which indicates that the inclination of the speaker, through education and psychological factors is towards non-insulting. The continuous exertion of psychological pressure causes the shift of force balance from Ago to Ant. Thus, the initial state of non-action (lack of verbal aggression) is changed into movement (insult). This model represents cases where S yields to his/her negative emotions as a result of continuous increase of the level of negative feelings experienced.

Although the above diagrams represent the general intrapersonal scenarios of insults (psychological inhibition or disinhibition of verbal aggression), they do not do justice to the complexity of intrapersonal processes as pointed out by Jay (1992; 2000). Moreover, they do not show insulting as a interpersonal phenomenon; insulting resides also in the interpersonal tensions between separate human agents and this must also be accounted for in a comprehensive force-dynamics model of insulting. Before such model is attempted in section 5.5.3, consider – therefore – a simplified interpersonal model of insulting proposed in the following section.

5.5.2. A simplified interpersonal model

In the simplified interpersonal model of insulting Ago and Ant represent two interactants involved in a verbal exchange containing insults. Ago, as the focal

force entity, represents S, while Ant, as the force element that opposes Ago, represents W. Thus, Ago/Ant interaction represents S engaging in the act of verbal aggression towards W. The resultant of this interaction indicates whether or not the act of insult has been delivered successfully. The categories of successful and unsuccessful insults were discussed above in section 5.4 Below I adopt the same perlocutionary criterion for successful insults. According to this criterion if S's act of verbal aggression brings about the effect of Y feeling offended or insulted it is a successful insult. Conversely, if S's act of verbal aggression does not bring about the effect of Y feeling offended or insulted it belongs to unsuccessful insults. Consider the following simplified model of successful insults:




Figure 31. Simplified interpersonal model of successful insults

In the simplified model of successful insults Ago represents a conscious independent human agent who engages in the act of verbal aggression (S) and Ant represents the insultee; a human agent who receives S's insult (W). Ago's tendency for movement represents S indulging in the act of verbal aggression towards W. W's (Ant) initial position is repose, since a party who is not insulted does not reveal the feelings of being offended or humiliated. In the simplified model of successful insults, as a result of Ago's influence, the end result changes from rest to movement, which represents the successful delivery of insult, whereby W has been insulted as a result of S's utterance.

An scenario with a different outcome may be presented for insults wherein the perlocutionary effect of W feeling downgraded is not successfully realized. Such unsuccessful insults follow the pattern presented in *figure 31*, wherein a movement-oriented Ago is introduced to confront a repose-inclined Ant. However, in unsuccessful insults Ant's tendency to rest is stronger than Ago's influence. Thus, the end-result of such confrontation is the lack of movement. Such scenario, illustrated in *figure 32*, represents the cases wherein the

perlocutionary effect of insulting, i.e. W feeling of being insulted is not realized. In short, W remains emotionally unmoved as a result of S's verbal aggression. This scenario, although by all means possible and accounted for in Jay's model of verbal aggression, violates Cond. 4 for the speech act of insulting. Thus, it shows a non-prototypical outcome scenario of insulting, since such cases do not bring about the effect of offending the insultee. Taking this into account and for the sake of brevity and clarity, I disregard such unsuccessful insults from my further analysis in this section.




Figure 32. Simplified interpersonal model of unsuccessful insults

By analogy to the cases of psychological balance transfer shown in figure 30, an additional scenario of the interpersonal simplified model of insulting may be proposed. In the speech act of insulting the perlocutionary effect of S insulting W is hardly an instantaneous occurrence. Insulting W is a process that develops over time. It is commonly the case that W does not feel offended at the exact moment of being confronted with W's verbal aggression. W normally requires some time in order to internalize or understand the insult. W's emotional defence mechanism against being insulted may give in slowly. Alternatively, S may need to repeat the insult, as presented e.g. in the category of intensifying insults (section 5.2.6). Consequently, the process of evoking in W the feeling of being downgraded or humiliated may be represented as a process of balance transfer resulting from continuous exertion of force by Ago over Ant:




Figure 33. Simplified interpersonal model of balance transfer

In *figure 33* the continuous exertion of force from Ago to Ant represents a continuous exertion of emotional pressure of S over W. This may include the process of W internalizing S's insult or the repetition of offending remarks by S. As a result of the continuous exertion of force, Ago prevails over Ant and the initial status of rest changes into movement. This represents S successfully insulting W, i.e. bringing about the perlocutionary effect of W feeling downgraded and humiliated. The transfer of balance is represented by the full arrow pointing from Ant to Ago.

5.5.3. A force dynamic model of prototypical insults

The simplified models of insulting presented in the two preceding sections may be used to explain the resolving of intrapersonal and interpersonal tensions present in the act of insulting. However, insulting is not solely a intrapersonal or interpersonal process; an adequate account of verbal aggression must include both the intrapersonal and interpersonal perspectives described in a single model. Moreover, the simplified models presented above do not account for different stages of Jay's verbal aggression. In short, thus, there is a need for a force dynamic model of insulting which shows the unfolding of the process of insulting on the interpersonal and intrapersonal level in time, as described by Jay (1991; 2000). This model is represented in *figure 34* below:




Figure 34. Force-dynamic model of prototypical insults

Figure 34 illustrates the force-dynamic model of prototypical insults as presented in section 5.1. The model is presented on the time scale (t) and consists of eight consecutive stages (a) – (h). The force-dynamic model of prototypical insults incorporates the five-stage model of verbal aggression presented in Jay (2000), which is discussed on the intrapersonal and the interpersonal level. The interpersonal level of analysis is presented in stages (a), (f) and (g), while the intrapersonal level is depicted in stages (b), (c), (d), (e) and (h). At the interpersonal level in stages (a), (f) and (g), in accordance with the simplified interpersonal model of insults presented in *figure 31*, Ago represents the speaker (S) engaged in the act of verbal aggression towards W and Ant represents the Wrongdoer (W) at whom the act of verbal aggression is directed. At the intrapersonal level – reflecting the internal processes going on in S's mind – in stages (b), (c), (d), (e) and (h) Ant and Ago stand for, respectively, the inner insult-oriented urges of S (the Self) and the conscious, decision-making part of S's psyche (the Subject). For the sake of clarity and avoiding confusion the intrapersonal level of analysis encompassing stages (b), (c), (d), (e) and (h) is marked by a square dotted box. In addition to that, Ant and Ago representing the Self and the Subject have been marked by broken lines, in order to distinguish them from Ant (W) and Ago (S), which are depicted by solid lines.

In the force-dynamic model of insulting stages (a) and (b) correspond to Jay's Stage 1, (c) corresponds to Stage 2, (d) corresponds to Stage 3, (e) and (f) correspond to Stage 4, (g) and (h) correspond to Stage 5. All the stages are aligned on a timeline (t). Full pointed arrows indicate the temporal sequence of individual stages (a) – (h). Dotted arrows represent indirect links between different elements of the model.

Stage (a) represents the act of provocation which sparks S's swearing episode. This act of provocation is committed by W (Ant) towards S (Ago). In the prototypical account of insulting provocation is a conscious act performed by a human agent W at another human agent S. The initial state of S is that of rest, which represents the state of mind of the individual who remains unprovoked. The act of provocation is successfully performed; as a result of it S feels provoked, which sparks S's further actions. The successful performing of the act of

provocation is represented by the balance transfer from Ago to Ant and by the change of Ago's status from repose to movement.

Stage (b) shows the beginning of the process of internalization of W's provocation in S's mind. The act of provocation in stage (a) brings about the feeling of harm for S, which urges S to undertake actions aimed at redressing the balance of justice. The act is cognitively acknowledged by S in stage (b), which is marked by the introduction of Ant at this stage. Ant stands here for the Self, the inner urges of S striving at redressing the balance of justice through insulting W. Ago stands here for the Subject, the conscious decision-making part of S's psyche. In stage (b) S experiences the feeling of provocation, however, the decision to verbally attack W has not been made yet by S. Thus, the end-result of his stage is that of rest.

The cognitive appraisal of W's provocation began at stage (b) is further continued in stage (c). Here the feeling of hurt experienced by S leads to the increasing level of anger. Thus, the Self becomes stronger, which is represented by an upward-pointing arrow over Ant. The Self wields influence on the Subject (Ago). However, at this point the Ant does not prevail over Ago and the insult is still not realized. This is shown by the lack of movement as the end-result of this stage.

The rising level of anger at stage (c) urges S to try to resolve the situation of internal conflict. Stage (d) represents S's attempts at inhibiting his or her anger. In the prototypical model of insulting the speakers try to inhibit their anger, since disclosing their emotions may bring about certain undesirable costs, e.g. in the form of W's or audience's sanctions. As noted in section 3.1.4, expressions of strong emotions towards an interactant may constitute a possible face threatening act. Thus, the Subject (Ago) is inclined to repose. The Self (Ant) starts to exert continuous pressure on the Subject to redress the balance of justice, which is depicted as the EXRT box attached to Ant. At the same time, the factors inhibiting S's verbal aggression begin to exert pressure on the Subject. These inhibiting factors are represented in the EXRT box attached to Ago. Thus, Ant and Ago at this stage exert continuous pressure at each other. The result of this exertion of pressure resides in the balance of forces between Ant and Ago; if the factors

inhibiting S's swearing prevail over the insult-oriented urges of S, S's insult is suppressed and the verbal aggression is not realized. For this reason, this particular scenario – as illustrated in *figure 29* – has been ignored in my further analysis and, thus, it is not accounted for in *figure 34*. If the level of anger is sufficiently high to overcome the rest-inclined conscious part of S's psyche, S's verbal aggression is disinhibited. This is discussed in the following two paragraphs.

Stage (e) is a result of the increasing level of S's internal tensions presented in stage (d). In the prototypical instances of insulting the Self becomes so strong that it outweighs the factors inhibiting S's swearing. As a result, S's verbal aggression is psychologically disinhibited. This is represented as the transfer of balance from Ago to Ant in stage (e). At this stage, which jointly with stage (f) corresponds to Jay's stage 4, S makes a cognitive evaluation of the context of the exchange, the features of W, possible audience and overhearers etc. S makes also the decision concerning the language which is about to be employed in the act of verbal aggression. S's conscious decision to engage in the act of verbal aggression towards W is represented by the change of Ago's status from repose to movement, which is the result of the balance switch from Ago to Ant.

When S has run the process of cognitive appraisal of the context of verbal aggression in (e), S verbally engages in insulting. This is represented in (f), wherein the verbal act of S's aggression is realized. This is the first stage in which S's state of mind is verbally manifested. S involved in the act of insulting is represented as Ago with the tendency for movement. Since a party which is not subject to verbal aggression remains not insulted, W is shown here as Ant with the tendency for rest. The broken line arrows pointing from stage (a) to stage (f) indicate that S and W presented here are the same parties as those involved at the stage of provocation. The tension between Ago and Ant present at stage (f) is resolved in the next section. In accordance with Grzegorzczkova (1991), the prototypical perlocutionary effect of the speech act of insulting is that W feels insulted (downgraded, humiliated). Thus, if Ago at stage (f) is stronger than Ant, the perlocutionary effect of insulting is realized. If Ant prevails over Ago, S fails to bring about the effect of W feeling downgraded or humiliated. This possibility,

explained in *figure 32* above, has been discussed as non-prototypical, and thus it has been disregarded in our further analysis. Therefore, such possibility is not accounted for in the force-dynamic model of prototypical insults.

Stage (g) represents the perlocutionary effect of W feeling humiliated as a result of S's act of verbal aggression. Ago/Ant interaction at this stage is analogous to the situation depicted in *figure 33*; in the prototypical instances of insults S's verbal aggression is sufficiently powerful to evoke the feeling of being humiliated in W. This is shown by the transfer of balance from Ant to S and the stage result of repose changing into movement. Thus, S's successfully bringing about the effect of W's humiliation is an important element in Jay's stage 5, which accounts for the overall consequences of swearing. The situation of W being humiliated may have further continuation e.g. in the form of insult chains, as described below in *figure 38*.

Finally, stage (h) completes the overall consequences in the prototypical act of verbal aggression. This stage accounts for the consequences of S's swearing episode which pertain to S and S's state of mind. Thus, this stage is realized at the intrapersonal level. Stage (h) is a direct consequence of S's engaging in the verbal aggression at stages (f) and (g), and an indirect consequence of S's internal decision undertaken at stage (e). While Jay (2000) discusses three main outcome scenarios of S's verbal aggression, stage (h) shows the most prototypical one, wherein the balance of justice is restored and the level of anger in S falls. Consequently, the internal insult-oriented urges of S (the Self) are alleviated, which is represented by the downward-facing arrow in Ant. Thus, the repose-inclined conscious part of S's self (the Subject) prevails and the balance shift results in changing the stage outcome from movement to rest.

The force-dynamic model of prototypical insults presented above, is a highly schematic description of Jay's (2000) model of verbal aggression. As noted above, *figure 34* does not account for cases wherein S's verbal aggression is suppressed at stage (e) and the instances which do not bring the perlocutionary effect of W being insulted or bring about a different perlocutionary effect at stage (g). Similarly, stage (h) provides only one outcome scenario at the intrapersonal level, namely the situations where S's anger is alleviated as a result of the

swearing episode. Moreover, *figure 34* does not account for different categories of non-prototypical verbal aggression as presented in section 5.2. Thus, the following section attempts to provide a number of models for the non-prototypical instances of insults.

5.5.4. A force dynamic model of non-prototypical insults

The force-dynamic model of insulting presented above in *figure 34* accounts for the cases of prototypical verbal aggression as described by Jay (2000). In order to complement this analysis in the present section the force dynamic models of some non-prototypical types of insults are presented. In order to follow the description standards implemented in *figure 31* above, in the present section I analyse these non-prototypical instances which involve a verbal exchange between two distinct human agents, who are present at the scene of insulting. Thus, cases of non-human wrongdoer (section 5.2.1), absent wrongdoer (section 5.2.2), delayed retribution (5.2.3), and self-insults (5.2.9) are not accounted for below. Moreover, in accordance with the convention introduced in *figure 34* above, in the present analysis I disregard the instances of insults wherein the perlocutionary effect of W feeling humiliated as a result of S's verbal aggression is not realised or the outcome of S's swearing episode cannot be stipulated. Such is the case with incidental insults (section 5.2.8), insult duels and roasts (section 5.2.10), banter (section 5.2.11). In order to abide by the essential feature of insults as illustrated in Cond. 3, I do not include in the analysis below instances of non-taboo verbal and non-verbal insults, although the perlocutionary effect of the insultee being humiliated or downgraded is positively present there. It must be noted here that force dynamic analysis may be successfully applied to those non-prototypical instances of insults which are not discussed in this section. The reason I do not attempt to show them here is solely for the purposes of clarity and brevity and in order to stick to the force-dynamic conventions implemented in this chapter. Therefore, in the subsequent analysis I discuss instances of reflexive insults (section 5.2.4), redirected anger (section 5.2.5), intensifying insults (section 5.2.6) and insult chains (section 5.2.7).

In accordance with Jay (2000: 58), in non-propositional swearing S's episode of verbal aggression is realized as a direct effect of the rising level of anger at stage 2. Reflexive swearing is realized with limited consciousness and awareness on the part of S. Non-propositional verbal aggression is realized without S's attempts at inhibiting his or her anger and swearing is disinhibited immediately without the intermediate inhibition stage. This is presented in *figure 35* below:




Figure 35. Force-dynamic model of reflexive insults

The model of reflexive verbal aggression is, in fact, a simplified version of the prototypical insults presented in *figure 34* above. In stages (a) and (b) the model is analogous to the cases of prototypical insults; (a) represents the act of provocation performed by W towards S. This act of provocation is psychologically internalized by S in (b). Stage (c) differs from the prototypical model in that it encompasses into one stage the elements of stages (c) and (e) of *figure 34*; in reflexive insults the rising level of anger, represented by the upward-facing arrow in (c) is a direct cause for the psychological disinhibition of insults. Thus, at this stage there is a balance transfer from Ant to Ago, which results in the change in the stage outcome from rest to action. The action status represents the psychological disinhibition of S's abusive swearing. Thus, in *figure 35* Jay's Stage 3 (anger inhibition) does not occur and Stage 2 (level of anger) and Stage 4 (disinhibition) are merged at stage (c) of the model. Stages (d), (e) and (f) are exactly analogous to stages (f), (g) and (h) in *figure 34* respectively. Stage (d) represents S's disinhibition of his or her verbal aggression. Stage (e) shows the prototypical perlocutionary effect of insulting, i.e. the successful bringing about W's feeling of being downgraded or humiliated. Finally, (f) represents the prototypical outcome of insulting at the psychological level, wherein S's anger as a result of the swearing episode subsumes as the balance of justice is restored.

Another variation of *figure 34* is presented below. It accounts for cases of *redirected insults* presented in section 5.2.5:




Figure 36. Force-dynamic model of redirected insults

In the case of redirected insults, S's anger – typically because of W withdrawing from the scene of insulting in the meantime – is redirected to a third party. Thus, at the interpersonal level there is a need of Ago's interaction with two distinct Ant figures. For the sake of clarity Ago representing the speaker is additionally marked by (S), Ant standing for the wrongdoer is indicated by (W) and Ant representing the third party that S's anger is redirected to is marked by (T). In the force-dynamic model of redirected insults stages (a) – (e) are directly analogous to stages (a) – (e) in the prototypical model presented in *figure 34*. They indicate, respectively, the introduction of W's act of provocation, psychological internalization of this act by S, the rising level of anger, S's attempts at inhibiting the anger and successful disinhibition of insult at the psychological level. In stage (f), however, which represents the verbal disinhibition of S's insult, the wrongdoer (W) at which the anger is prototypically aimed becomes unavailable. As noted in section 5.2.5, W may leave the scene of insulting, hang up the phone or in any other way become unavailable as the target of S's verbal aggression. This is indicated by (W) qualified with the upward-pointing block arrow. At the same time, a third party (T) is introduced into the scenario (the downward-pointing block arrow) Thus, T becomes available as the target of S's verbal aggression. The introduction of (T) in stage (f) is symbolic; it is entirely possible that (T) has been introduced into the context at any of the preceding stages or that (T) has been present in the context all along. Similarly, W's leaving the scene of insulting may have occurred at any of the stages (a) – (f) or that W has been absent all along as the insult aim for S. Thus, placing S's withdrawal and T's arrival exactly at stage (f) is purely of symbolic and simplifying significance. The level of anger rising at stage (c) and the psychological disposition to disinhibit S's anger at stage (e) require the occurrence of verbal aggression in stage (f). Since W becomes unavailable and T is introduced, S's anger is directed at T. Stage (g) presents the prototypical perlocutionary effect of insulting, i.e. the insultee feeling downgraded or humiliated. In this case, whoever, the insultee is T and not W, which S's act of verbal aggression is prototypically aimed at. Stage (g) represents the prototypical perlocutionary effect at S's psychological level, whereby as a result of S's verbal aggression the scales of justice are rebalanced and then stage result is marked as repose.

Another non-prototypical model of insults analysable in the light of force dynamics theory is the category of intensifying insults (section 5.2.6). This is presented in *figure 37 below*.




Figure 37. Force-dynamic model of intensifying insults

The force-dynamic model of intensifying insults is presented in accordance with the simplified intrapersonal model of verbal aggression and the simplified interpersonal model of successful verbal aggression presented in *figure 28* and *figure 31* respectively. Stages (a), (c) and (e) refer to the simplified intrapersonal model of verbal aggression and stages (b), (d) and (f) reflect the simplified interpersonal model of successful insults. The choice of the simplified models for the description of the force-dynamic diagram of intensifying insult has been made in order to achieve the brevity and clarity of description.

The force-dynamic model of intensifying insults begins with stage (a), which represents the psychological balance transfer of insults, analogous to *figure 30*. Ago represents the conscious, decision-making part of S's psyche (the Subject) and Ant stands for internal psychological urges responsible for the disinhibition of S's anger (the Self). As a result of constant exertion of force by Ant (EXRTN box), the balance is shifted and Ago's initial position of repose changes into movement. The psychological disinhibition of S's anger is verbally realized in (b). In this stage – by analogy to *figure 33* – Ago stands for the speaker (S) and Ant represents the wrongdoer (W). Ago's tendency towards movement represents verbal disinhibition of S's anger; at this stage S engages in an act of verbal aggression towards W. The transfer of balance represents the prototypical perlocutionary effect of insulting, whereby as a result of S's verbal aggression W feels downgraded or humiliated. Thus, S's verbal aggression is successfully realized, which is represented by the change of the stage status from rest to action.

In case of intensifying insults, as noted in section 5.2.6, S's engaging in the act of verbal aggression does not bring about the alleviating of S's negative emotions. Instead, the level of anger in S rises and S's psychological balance remains unaddressed. This is represented in (c). The initial status of Ago (S's conscious decision-making part of self) is a result of the psychological disinhibition of anger at stage (a). This is represented as a single arrow over Ago. However, as a result of the verbal disinhibition of anger in stage (b), S's insult-oriented urges become more intense, which is depicted as Ant with a double arrow. The resulting exertion of force (EXTN box) of Ant over Ago results in a balance shift from Ago

to Ant and in a more intense disinhibition of S's swearing episode. This is presented as the change in the stage status from a single arrow to a double arrow.

A more intense psychological predisposition towards swearing on the part of S results in a stronger verbal disinhibition of S's anger. This is presented in (d), wherein the initial position of Ant (W) reflects the end status in stage (b), wherein S has already engaged in the initial act of verbal aggression towards W. However, as a result of a stronger psychological inclination towards swearing resulting from stage (c), S's insult in (d) is more intense. This is represented by Ago with a double arrow. Thus, the emerging tension between Ant and Ago's status results in the transfer of balance and the change of stage outcome in (d) from a single to a double arrow. This indicates the perlocutionary effect of W being humiliated to a higher degree, since more intense insults tend to bring about stronger negative feeling connected with them on the part of the insultee. It must be stated here that although the end-result in (d) suggests that as a result of S's intensified insult W is strongly insulted than in (b), this may not always be the case; it is possible that W's feelings of being insulted remain on the same level or that W is not moved, but S's psychological disinhibition of swearing gets more intense nonetheless. The convention shown in (d), as far as the interpretation of the stage result in concerned, serves only for the purposes of clarity.

The stronger verbal disinhibition of S's insult in (d) sparks an ever-stronger psychological inclination towards swearing in (e). Here Ant's initial position reflects the end result of stage (c). The Subject has already been moved towards swearing at stages (a) and (c). Hence, Ago with a double arrow in (e). At the same time a stronger verbal disinhibition of S's insult in (d) results in S's stronger urges towards swearing (Ant with a triple arrow). The resulting tension culminates in an ever stronger psychological disinhibition of insults, marked by the stage result change from double to triple arrow. Finally, stage (f) represents an ever-intensifying verbal disinhibition of S's anger. This is presented by the tension between a double arrowed Ant and a triple-arrowed Ago. The result is yet another transfer of balance between them and the change from a double arrow to a triple arrow as the stage result. This result, prototypically, may stand for a stronger level

of W's humiliation resulting from an ever-increasing level of S's verbal aggression.

The model presented in *figure 37* may, in theory, be expanded *ad infinitum* with ever-increasing levels of S's psychological inclination towards swearing and S' ever-intensifying verbal aggression. This is represented by the (g,h,i ...) box. In reality, however the verbal conflict must be resolved at some moment, be it verbal aggression, withdrawal or a third party intervention (examples). It may be noted here that such scenarios are also analysable in the light of force-dynamic theory, which will be exemplified in *figure 39* wherein S's verbal episode is inhibited by a direct influence of a third party T.

A different model may be proposed for *insult chains*, described in section 5.2.7. This model is presented in *figure 38*. Representing insult chains within the framework of force dynamics theory requires a multi-level model including psychological dimension of both interlocutors and the verbal dimension where the act of insult is actually realized. The three levels of analysis are designated by the braces on the left hand-side of the diagram. (V) indicates the production level of insults wherein the act of insulting is verbally realized. (Ps) refers to the psychological-level analysis with additional qualification of (PsS) designating the psychological dimension of the speaker and (PsW) indicating the psychological level analysis of the wrongdoer. For the sake of brevity and clarity I adopt the convention utilised in *figure 37* above, whereby the verbal and psychological level analysis is presented in the light of the simplified interpersonal model of balance transfer (*figure 33*) and the simplified intrapersonal model of psychological balance transfer (*figure 30*). In accordance with these standards, stages (b), (d) and (f) are depicted as the simplified interpersonal model of insulting involving verbal interaction between S and W, stages (a) and (e) refer to the simplified intrapersonal model of the speaker (S) and stages (c) and (g) refer to the simplified psychological model of the wrongdoer (W). These different levels of analysis are shown by the use of separate braces. The verbal level of analysis in the force-dynamic model of insult chain requires subsequent stages of the speaker insulting the wrongdoer and the wrongdoer insulting the speaker. Thus, in order to avoid possible confusion Ant and Ago figures at this level of analysis are

additionally marked by S and W to indicate the speaker and the wrongdoer respectively. The model of insult chains presented in *figure 38* below consists of seven consecutive stages (a) – (g) with the possibility of extending the number of stages virtually *ad infinitum* (h,i,j):




Figure 38. Force-dynamic model of insult chains

The force-dynamic model of insult chains begins with stage (a), which refers to the psychological dimension of the speaker (PsS). Ant-Ago interaction at this stage represents the disinhibition of S's swearing at the psychological level and is directly analogous to the simplified psychological model of balance transfer presented in *figure 30*. In stage (a) the continuous exertion of force (EXRTN box) of S's internal swearing-oriented urges (Ant) incite the action of the Subject, the conscious decision-making part of S's psyche (Ago). Thus, S's anger is disinhibited at the psychological level, which is marked as the change of balance from Ago to Ant and change of the stage result from rest to movement. Stage (b) represents the actual realization of S's insult at the verbal level (V). Ago-Ant interaction is directly analogous here to the simplified interpersonal model of balance transfer in *figure 33*. As a result of the continuous exertion of force (EXRTN) box of Ago (S) to (W), the balance changes and the stage-result changes from rest to movement. This illustrates the successful disinhibition of S's insult whereby W feels insulted and humiliated. Stage (c), which belongs to the psychological level of W, represents the state of W's mind resulting from S's insult at the previous stage. The initial position of Ago (the conscious decision-making part of W's psyche) is that of repose. however, S's swearing episode results in W's undertaking attempts at redressing the balance of justice. One way of achieving this is by engaging in an act of verbal aggression towards S. Thus, W's internal insult-oriented urges (Ant) are inclined towards action. At the same time, in insulting S, W decides to "outdo" S in swearing, e.g. to react in a stronger stream of expletives than the ones S engages in at stage (b). Therefore, at stage (c) Ant is marked with a double right-facing arrow. The resulting tension results in a psychological disinhibition of W's anger towards S, which is indicated by the change of stage status from rest to action (a double arrow). Stage (d) is a direct consequence of W's psychological anger disinhibition in (c). (d) reflects the verbal disinhibition of W's anger towards S. Therefore, Ant represents S and Ago stands for W. Ant is marked with a single arrow, which indicates that S has already engaged in swearing at stage (b). At the same time Ago (W) – as a result of W's psychological disinhibition in (c) – engages in a stronger spree of verbal aggression than the one depicted in stage (b). This is illustrated by a double right-facing arrow in Ago. The resulting tension culminates in the change of the stage status from a single to a double arrow, which represents the prototypical effect of

S feeling offended to a higher degree. Consequently, the verbal conflict between S and W is intensified. S's feeling of being insulted prompts S towards a psychological disinhibition of yet another stream of insults towards W. This is shown in (e). The conscious decision-making part of S's psyche has already been moved towards verbal aggression in (a). Therefore, Ago is marked by a single arrow. The intensifying verbal conflict in (d) results in S's more intense insult-oriented urges. These urges are aimed at increasing the verbal conflict and thus "outdoing" in swearing. Thus, the urges are represented as Ant with a triple right-facing arrow. The Ant-Ago tension results in the further and increased psychological disinhibition of S's insult, which results in the change of the stage-status from one to three right-facing arrows. Stage (f) represents further increase in the intensity of verbal conflict between S and W as a result of S's anger disinhibition in (e). Stage (f) represents S as Ago and W as Ant. Ant is shown with a double arrow, which refers to W already having been insulted in stage (d). Ago's intensity of verbal aggression is marked by a triple arrow, reflecting the level of psychological disinhibition at stage (e). The Ago-Ant tension results in a status change from a double to a triple arrow. This represents W being further insulted and a further culmination of verbal aggression between the interactants. This culmination is progressive, as evident from the level of movement shown in stages (b) (d) and (f). Finally, S's verbal disinhibition of anger in (f) inclines W towards a psychological state wherein W intends to outdo S by engaging in a further insult in (g). Here, the level of psychological disinhibition of W is intensified, which is demonstrated by the change from two to four right-facing arrows as the end-result at this stage. Stages (g,h,i ...) reflect the possibility of extending the model to additional stages with ever-increasing psychological and verbal disinhibition of insults between the interactants. In theory, therefore, the model can be extended *ad infinitum*. In practice, however, the tension resulting from S-W interaction must be resolved at some point. Such resolution may come, as noted in section 5.2.7, in the form of a third party intervention, a terminating event, S or W withdrawing from the scene or an outbreak of violence. It is foreseeable that all of these scenarios may be presented in the light of force-dynamic analysis. For the sake of illustration consider the force-dynamic model of a third party intervention depicted in *figure 39*:




Figure 39. Force-dynamic model of a third party intervention

The force-dynamic model of a third party intervention represents an insult chain between S and W which is successfully terminated by a direct influence from a third party. The model in its stages (a) – (f) is directly analogous to the model of insult chains presented in *figure 38*. Stage (a) represents the psychological disinhibition of S's swearing, which results in the verbal insult of S towards W in (b). As a result of feeling insulted, W's anger is intensified, leading in stage (c) to the psychological disinhibition of a more intense insult. This is verbally realized in (d), where W insults S by means of a stronger expletive than was utilised in (b). As a consequence of (d), in stage (e) S's anger is psychologically disinhibited. The psychological urges in S increase, which results in a stronger verbal disinhibition of anger in stage (f). The result of the continuous progression of S-W conflict at the verbal level is shown as the stage result of a triple right-facing arrow in (f). In stage (g) an intervening third party (T) is introduced in the form of action-inclined Ago. This party is a separate and conscious human being whose aim is to stop S and W in their increasing spree of insults. Thus, the direction of T's movement is opposite to the end-result of (f). Moreover, in order to stop S and W in their spree of verbal aggression, the intensity of T's action must be equal or stronger than the stage result in (f). Otherwise, T would react too weakly, thus producing no effect of stopping S and W. Therefore, T's action is represented in (g) as Ago with triple left-facing arrows, corresponding to triple right-facing arrows in (f). As a result of T's action S and W's increasing spree of insults is terminated. This is illustrated in the psychological description of S and W presented in (h') and (h'') respectively. These events converge on a single scenario, hence they have been categorized under a single heading (h). In (h') S's internal urges to swear as presented at stage (e) in the form of triple right-facing arrows are stopped by a stronger rest-inclined Ant. This Ant stands for the psychological internalization of T's terminating action. Since Ant is stronger than Ago, the force balance switches from Ago to Ant and S's psychological disinhibition of further insults is stopped. This is represented as the change of end-result in (h') from a triple arrow movement to rest. In (h'') W's internal insult-inclined urges present at stage (c) in the form of a double arrow are represented by a movement-inclined Ago. This Ago interacts with a stronger rest-inclined Ant, which represents the psychological internalization of T's terminating action in W.

Ant/Ago interaction results in the change of force balance and the change in the end status of (h'') from a double arrow movement to repose. With S and W's insults psychologically inhibited as a result of T's action in (g), no further insults are verbally disinhibited. It must be stated here that T's intervention may occur at any stage of the model. If T's intervention is introduced at an earlier stage, the degree of T's action may be smaller in order to stop S and W in their spree of insults. However, if the intervention happens at a later stage, T's intervention must, by necessity, be more intense in order to stop S and W's ever-increasing insult chain.

5.6. Preliminary conclusions

In the present chapter I have presented a corpus-based study of insults in English. The corpus consists of 130 different film scenes (Appendix 3) taken from 39 full-feature English movies (Appendix 2). The film scenes selected for data analysis illustrate different realistic conflictive verbal situations wherein different acts of verbal aggression have been produced. In accordance with the main precepts and theoretical tools of cognitive linguistics presented in chapter 2, I have analysed the corpus data by means of four different and complementary theoretical approaches: the ICM theory (sections 5.1, 5.2), the cognitive theory of speech acts (section 5.3), Langacker's conception of network models (section 5.4), and the theory of force dynamics (5.5).

In section 5.1, in accordance with Lakoff (1987), I adopted Jay's (2000) five-stage model of verbal aggression as the prototypical scenario of insults. Jay's five stage model discusses insults as a verbal act of retribution to a wrongdoer for his or her act of provocation in order to restore the balance of justice. In Jay's model propositional (non-automatic) verbal aggression is realized through five consecutive stages: PROVOCATION, DEGREE OF ANGER, INHIBITION, DISINHIBITION, RETRIBUTION. In accordance with the prototypical scenario of insults, the prototypical instances of verbal aggression include the cases wherein the above five stages are realized as depicted in Jay (2000). Thus, in the prototypical model of insults S's verbal aggression is sparked by the act of provocation performed by a conscious human wrongdoer (W)

(PROVOCATION). As a result of W's provocation S's level of anger increases (DEGREE OF ANGER). S's reaction towards the rising level of anger are attempts at inhibiting his or her negative emotions (INHIBITION). When the level of anger reaches a certain threshold, S can no longer inhibit his or her emotions, which leads to the verbal disinhibition of S's insult (DISINHIBITION). The disinhibited verbal aggression constitutes a an act of retribution for W's provocation. As a result of S's swearing episode, W is insulted and the balance of justice is restored (RETRIBUTION). The prototypical model of verbal aggression has been shown to be sufficient for the description of samples (i1) – (i63) of the film scenes samples. Sections 5.1.1 – 5.1.5 discuss how each of Jay's stages is realized in the corpus data.

Lakoff's (1987) account of the ICM theory predicts that apart from the central, prototypical cases a number of non-prototypical instances may be proposed for a given category. In accordance with that, the corpus data of film scenes has shown that apart from the instances which realize the prototypical model presented in Jay (2000), there is a large portion of samples [(i64) – (i130)] which diverge from this model in a number of ways. Section 5.2 presents a number of such non-prototypical instances of verbal aggression. These include cases of non-human wrongdoer (section 5.2.1), absent wrongdoer (section 5.2.2), delayed retribution (section 5.2.3), reflexive insults (section 5.2.4), redirected anger (section 5.2.5), intensifying insults (section 5.2.6), insult chains (section 5.2.7), incidental insults (section 5.2.8), self-insults (section 5.2.9), insult duels (section 5.2.10), banter (section 5.2.11) and non-taboo insults (section 5.2.12). Each of these categories is characterized by a particular realization of the scenario of abusive swearing which diverges from Jay's (2000) prototypical model of verbal aggression. The occurrence of non-prototypical instances of insults alongside the prototypical cases is fully predicted and licensed by Lakoff's ICM theory and the main precepts of cognitive linguistics.

In section 5.3 I undertook the analysis of corpus data in the light of the speech act theory. For this aim I have applied Grzegorzczkova's (1991) account of the speech act of insults, where she proposes four different conditions for the speech act of insulting. In accordance with the cognitive perspective of the theory of

speech acts discussed in section 3.2.3, Grzegorzczkova's conditions were taken to be prototypical, rather than necessary and sufficient for the speech acts of insults. The corpus-based analysis of individual conditions carried out in sections 5.3.1 – 5.3.4 has shown that applying this theoretical perspective provides a plausible account of different prototypical and non-prototypical categories of verbal aggression which may be presented in terms a radial model, as illustrated e.g. by Kalisz and Kubiński (1993). Apart from the instances of insults wherein all of Grzegorzczkova's conditions are realized (prototypical insults, intensifying insults, insult chains, insult duels), there are a number of categories wherein one or more of Grzegorzczkova's conditions are violated. These include redirected insults, reflexive insults, delayed retribution, incidental insults, non-taboo verbal insults, non-human wrongdoer, absent wrongdoer, self-insults and banter. The analysis of Grzegorzczkova's conditions also points to the possibility of other insult types being distinguished, namely the category of accidental insults. These are instances of verbal aggression which do not involve S's intention or anticipation of insulting W. As such, this category may be treated as a particular non-prototypical extension of incidental insults. What this also points to is that in the light of cognitive speech acts analysis, insults may be considered to be a particular kind of act which is related to other similar speech acts, such as criticism or slander.

In spite of its informative values, the speech act analysis of offensive speech remains incomplete, in that it does account for the instances of non-verbal insults. This problem was addresses in section 5.4, where verbal aggression was analysed in the framework of network models theory as proposed by Langacker (1990). Representing insults in terms of a conceptual network not only allows us to plausibly represent prototypical and non-prototypical instances of insults in a single diagram, but provides the most inclusive account of verbal aggression, ranging from any kind of offensive or insulting action, occurrence or product to the most specific categories of verbal attacks. It is important to note here that insults understood that way possess a complex and intricate network structure, which cannot be reduced to a single structure or conceptual schema.

Finally, section 5.5 complemented the corpus analysis of insults by providing an account of verbal aggression in the light of force-dynamics theory as presented by Talmy (1988). In accordance with the standards of description presented in section 2.4, prototypical and non-prototypical instances of verbal aggression may be analysed in terms of the interplay of forces between different elements within these models at the intrapersonal level of the speaker and at the interpersonal level of social relations. In section 5.5.1 the simplified intrapersonal model of verbal aggression is presented. S's insult is presented there as a result of S's inner insult-oriented forces prevailing over S's rest-inclined conscious part of self. The simplified interpersonal model of insult in section 5.5.2 presents insult as the interpersonal process involving two distinct human agents S and W. These two simplified models subsequently converge in section 5.5.3 on a more comprehensive model of prototypical insults, which accounts for Jay's (2000) prototypical model of verbal aggression. This model illustrates the five consecutive stages of Jay (2000) by means of the force-dynamic interplay of intrapersonal and interpersonal elements. Section 5.5.4 adopts this kind of force-dynamic analysis and extends it to a number of non-prototypical cases of insults, namely to instances of reflexive insulting, redirected anger, intensifying insults and insult chains. What this suggests is that virtually every category of prototypical and non-prototypical verbal aggression may be plausibly accounted for in the light of the theory of force dynamics.

Admittedly, the above analysis, due to the methodological restrictions presented in section 5.0 reveals a number of inadequacies and areas where further research could be continued. The data samples discussed above have been taken from a wider context of verbal aggression, and presented in their idealized form by means of the simplified turn-taking description system. The method of data presentation does not allow for the analysis of the prosodic aspects of verbal aggression or the role of the turn-taking system, a task which is undertaken e.g. in Bousfield (2008) and Culpeper et al. (2003). Similarly, in the above analysis a number of important aspects of verbal aggression have been disregarded, e.g. the exact nature of psychological restraints and impulses of insulting, gender roles, the influence of the physical context of S's utterance on his or her swearing practices.

In spite of those limitations, in the above analysis insults have been shown to constitute a complex linguistic phenomena which can be effectively analysed within the framework of cognitive linguistics. The account of verbal aggression undertaken in the present thesis points to the view of insults as a scalar phenomenon. Apart from the central, prototypical instances of verbal aggression, represented by Jay's (2000) model of verbal aggression and Cond. 1-4, there is an array of different language samples which may be classified as offensive speech. Insults, as described in 4.5 refer predominantly to verbal phenomena involving a certain reference to a particular taboo, However, as shown in section 5.2.12, a number of non-taboo verbal acts and different non-verbal acts may also be considered insults. This is presented in *figure 27* by means of a network model. Verbal aggression, as noted in section 5.1, typically are uttered as a response to W's act of provocation, in order to restore the balance of justice. Insults, however, may serve different functions, including giving vent to one's negative emotions, emphasizing an important piece of information, or wielding a particular influence of an interactant or a third party. Swearing and offensive speech constitute an exercise of force. By means of verbal aggression the speaker may attempt to show his or her superiority over the interactant(s). This mechanism, however, is reversed in the case of banter, where insults are a means of establishing and communicating a positive link between the interactants. The aims of insults are realized by either verbally assaulting W, redirecting one's anger, swearing at a non-human or absent wrongdoer , by engaging in increasing chains of insults. These scenarios may be further developed, as illustrated by the description of a third party intervention shown in *figure 39*.

6. Conclusions and areas of further research

In this thesis I have presented a study of insults from the cognitive perspective. This has been done through five consecutive chapters with chapters 1 – 4 building up a theoretical background for the corpus analysis of insults presented in chapter 5.

Chapter 1 briefly discussed the most important tenets of the autonomous approach to language. In particular, through a brief reference to de Saussure (1966) and Chomsky (1965; 1975), it was shown how autonomous linguistics has considered language to be an autonomous and distinct human faculty. In accordance with Chomsky, the proper subject of linguistic analysis is linguistic competence, as opposed to linguistic performance. The autonomous approach has licensed the approach to semantics whereby sentential and lexical meaning is considered to be subject to formal logic and strict scientific formulae in the form of truth-value assessment and componential analysis. This mode of analysis goes along the lines of the objectivist paradigm, according to which linguistic and conceptual categories are analysable in the light of strict logical variables. Thus, categories are assumed to possess solid, non-fuzzy boundaries and their membership is licensed by the possession of necessary and sufficient features by a given entity.

Chapter 2 presented an alternative to autonomous linguistic, namely the cognitive paradigm, according to which the analysis of insults in the present thesis has been carried out. Cognitive linguistics views language not as an autonomous mental faculty, but as “the tip of a spectacular cognitive iceberg [...]” (Fauconnier, 2000: 96), and seeks to demonstrate that cognitive mechanisms involved in the processes of perception, categorization, mental imagery and reasoning are also manifested in language. In the cognitive approach to semantics linguistic meaning is equated with conceptualisation (Langacker, 1988c: 5-6). Thus, cognitive linguists do not insist on a strict distinction between semantic and pragmatic phenomena, but show that different cognitive processes operate across traditionally distinct levels of linguistic analysis and, indeed, in different areas of human activity. The study of meaning in cognitive linguistics is pursued in

relation to conceptual structures such as frames, domains, idealised cognitive models, network models. Conceptual and linguistic categories are structured within such mental constructs in a way which reveals them as natural rather than objectivist phenomena. Categories appear to possess fuzzy, overlapping edges and are structured around their prototypical examples or prototypical clusters. Thus, they are analysable in terms of scalar phenomena. A particular representation of the practical application of the cognitive theory is provided by Lakoff's (1987) analysis of anger, wherein different metaphoric and metonymic mappings are linked to the prototypical scenario of anger. Lakoff's account of the prototypical scenario of anger is crucial for the first of the three theoretical tools applied for the corpus analysis of insults in the practical part of this thesis (chapter 5). The second tool of cognitive linguistics applied in the corpus analysis of verbal aggression is Talmy's (1988) theory of force dynamics, which has the virtue of presenting psychological and sociological relations of causation in terms of the interplay of different force dynamic elements within the model of verbal aggression.

Chapter 3 discussed some crucial issues pertaining to insults which have traditionally been the subject of interest for pragmaticians. In particular, the analysis was centred around the most important perspectives on linguistic politeness and impoliteness and on the view of insults as a speech act. The account of different perspectives on linguistic politeness, including Grice (1975), Leech (1983), Sperber and Wilson (1986), Brown and Levinson (1987) has shown politeness as a significant and vibrant area of pragmatic enquiry. However, it has also revealed a considerable conceptual bias towards the study for the rules of harmonious conversational exchange, whereby the opposite has been neglected. The perspective on linguistic impoliteness is presented by the account of Culpeper (1996) and Bousfield (2008). Their approach has shown disruptive verbal behaviour as a non-marginal activity fully worthy of linguistic enquiry. The view of insults as a speech acts draws on the traditional approach to the problem of speech acts analysis, as demonstrated by Austin (1975) and Searle (1977; 1981). In particular, Searle's approach aims at providing felicity conditions for different speech acts. These conditions, in accordance with the objectivist paradigm, have been considered to be necessary and sufficient, thus mandating either the

inclusion or exclusion of a given act from a particular category of speech acts. The cognitive approach to speech acts analysis has modified the classical approach by considering individual felicity conditions for different speech acts as prototypical in nature. Thus, different speech acts are analysable in the light of radial models which include prototypical and non-prototypical instances of a given category. Chapter 3 presented also Grzegorzczkova's (1991) account of the speech act of insulting, wherein four felicity conditions for the speech acts of insults are presented. The cognitive re-evaluation of Grzegorzczkova's approach constitutes the third theoretical perspective used in the corpus analysis of insults in chapter 5.

Chapter 4 presented a wider neurological, psychological and socio-cultural background of insults. The discussion was centred around the issues concerning cultural and linguistic taboo and the linguistic activity of swearing. The presence of different taboos constitutes a universal cross-cultural and cross-linguistic characteristic. Their importance is manifested by the ubiquity of linguistic euphemisms and dysphemisms, which constitute a particular "shield and weapon" utilised by interactants in the course of verbal encounters (cf. Allan and Burridge, 1991). The linguistic reality of swearing has been described relative to a variety of different functions, including their emphatic, cathartic and abusive qualities. In an individual swearing episode, it is claimed, different functions may simultaneously be present, thus fulfilling a number of different functions of cursing. This view of swearing is also licensed by Jay's (2000) neuro-psycho-social theory of speech, which seeks to establish a perspective of swearing which accounts for different neurological, psychological and socio-cultural factors influencing verbal aggression. In particular, Jay's (1992; 2000) five-stage model of verbal aggression, bearing significant resemblance to Lakoff's (1987) model of anger, provides the basis for the prototypical scenario of insults discussed in chapter 5. Chapter 4 is concluded with an account of linguistic insults, which are defined as direct attack at the face of another party or parties by the use of negative, typically taboo language, used as a retribution act for certain offending event. By engaging in the act of insulting, the speaker draws on different types of dysphemistic expressions, as presented by Allan and Burridge (2006: 80-5). It has also been noted that insults may fulfil different interactional aims, including assaulting the

interactant with abusive language, playing along in a certain ritualised event and highlighting and establishing positive relations between the interactants (friendly banter). Such functions are also accounted for in the practical part of the present thesis in chapter 5.

Chapter 5 provided a practical realisation of the theoretical issues raised in the preceding chapters in the form of a corpus analysis of 130 film scene samples. The corpus data was analysed from four different and complementary theoretical perspectives: the theory of idealised cognitive models as proposed by Lakoff (1987), the cognitive approach to speech act analysis, Langacker's (1990) theory of network models and the theory of force dynamics as put forward by Talmy (1988). These four approaches allow for the view of insults from different methodological angle, thus providing a reasonably comprehensive account of verbal aggression.

Firstly, the account of insults as an idealised cognitive model has focused on the description of the prototypical scenario of insults in terms of Jay's (2000) five-stage model of verbal aggression. Thus, prototypical insults – samples (i1) – (i63) in the corpus data – have been shown to comply with the temporal sequence of Jay's stages of PROVOCATION, DEGREE OF ANGER, INHIBITION, DISINHIBITION and RETRIBUTION. Lakoff's account of idealised cognitive models allows for the existence of non-prototypical scenarios related to the central cases in a number of ways. Such non-prototypical instances of insults have been identified in the corpus samples (i64) – (i130) and the categories of non-human wrongdoer, absent wrongdoer, delayed retribution, reflexive insults, redirected anger, intensifying insults, insult chains, incidental insults, self-insults, insult duels, banter and non-taboo insults have been distinguished. The non-prototypical categories of verbal aggression share a common feature of differing from the central prototypical model in a number of ways, which involve different realisation of Jay's prototypical stages.

Secondly, the account of insults in the light of speech act theory involves applying Grzegorzczkova's (1991) conditions for the speech acts of insults for the aim of analysing the prototypical and non-prototypical categories of verbal aggression. In accordance with the cognitive perspective on the theory of speech acts,

Grzegorzycykowa's conditions have been considered prototypical, rather than as necessary and sufficient. The description of individual conditions in relation to the corpus data has revealed the plausibility of this type of data analysis. The speech act of insults has been presented in terms of a radial model, encompassing different prototypical and non-prototypical categories of insults. It has been shown that virtually every condition proposed by Grzegorzycykowa may be violated in actual instances of insults, including Cond. 3, considered by Grzegorzycykowa to be the essential feature of insulting. The speech act analysis of insults allows also for the analysis of the illocutionary and perlocutionary force of insults, allowing for the description of the speaker's intentionality and the effect of his or her verbal aggression.

Thirdly, the account of verbal aggression in terms of Langacker's (1990) network models presented an comprehensive and inclusive perspective on abusive swearing, whereby apart from the prototypical cases of offensive speech different non prototypical categories of verbal and non-verbal insults are represented in a single network model. This kind of analysis shows insults as a complex category, analysable in terms of a network of related structures. This kind of analysis cannot be subject to a reductionist approach which would aim at representing insults in terms of any single conceptual structure.

Fourthly, the analysis of insults in the light of force dynamics theory facilitates the account of intrapersonal (psychological) and interpersonal (sociological) aspects of verbal aggression. The analysis carried out in chapter 5 involves a force dynamic representation of prototypical insults, as well as certain models of non-prototypical verbal aggression, including reflexive insults, redirected insults, intensifying insults and insult chains. It has been claimed, at the same time, that the theory of force dynamics is applicable to the description of virtually every category of verbal aggression described above. Additionally, the description of insult models in terms of force dynamics allows for an adequate representation of different model outcome scenarios, as depicted in the model of a third-party intervention in *figure 39*.

There are a number of general conclusions which may be drawn from the above analysis of insults. Firstly, verbal aggression has been shown as a non-marginal

linguistic activity pertaining to different conversational situations and utilised in different contexts. As shown in the corpus samples (i1) – (i130) offensive speech constitutes a ubiquitous linguistic phenomenon and, as such, is a promising and worthwhile area of future academic enquiry. Secondly, the above discussion reveals verbal aggression as a multi-faceted and complex activity. This is perhaps best illustrated by the account of offensive speech in terms of a complex network model, as presented in section 5.4. The analysis of insults in the light of the prototypical scenario of verbal aggression allows for a comprehensive study of different scenario elements proposed by Jay (2000). Thus, such perspective allows for the description of different kinds of provocation events, the analysis of negative emotions building up in the speaker, the processes of anger inhibition and the factors influencing the outcome of these processes, different ways in which the speaker's verbal aggression may be disinhibited and the outcomes of the model concerning its psychological effects and the form and degree of the speaker's retribution. The delineation of different non-prototypical categories of insults which diverge from the prototypical scenario allows us to view insults as a scalar phenomena and facilitates the account of different functions of swearing (abusive, cathartic, emphatic, ritual, social). The view of insults as a speech act allows for the analysis of different issues emerging from the conditions for insulting as described by Grzegorzczkova (1991). Most notably, such analysis allows for the account of the speaker's intentions (Cond. 2) and the effects the act of verbal aggression may have (Cond. 4). The analysis of non-verbal insults (section 5.2.12) has also shown that Cond. 3 - considered by Grzegorzczkova to be essential for the speech act of insulting - may be feasibly analysed as prototypical, in line with the cognitive perspective of the theory of speech acts. The force-dynamic analysis of insults allows for a view of interactants' intrapersonal and interpersonal processes operating in verbal aggression. Moreover, the force-dynamic analysis of insults has the virtue of analysing different types of verbal aggression outcome scenarios, including third party intervention, spontaneous cessation, terminating event and others. Thirdly, the multi-faceted analysis of verbal aggression converges on an inclusive and comprehensive picture of insults analyzable from the cognitive perspective. The cognitive perspective allows for establishing the category of insults as a natural category subject to prototypical processes and allows for placing insulting in a

wider scope of disharmonious human activities, as evidenced by the discussion of the categories of incidental insults, accidental insults and non-taboo insults. Thus, the cognitive paradigm appears to provide satisfactory perspective for the future analysis of verbal aggression and related phenomena. Fourthly, the discussion of insults points to a promising and worthwhile perspective of scholarly enquiry encompassing different elements of linguistics, cognitive sciences, neurology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, legal sciences for the purpose of a more comprehensive account of impoliteness, swearing and verbal aggression. As shown in chapter 2, researches in the cognitive field readily welcome such eclectic and inter-disciplinary approaches in the bid to provide a more representative and more comprehensive view of human cognition and human nature. What follows below is a tentative list of suggestions concerning different areas of enquiry pertaining to insults, swearing and impolite verbal behaviour which may be pursued in the future.

Despite the width of theoretical issues and three different approaches to the practical analysis of insults presented above, the present thesis inevitably contains significant oversimplifications, shortcomings and inadequacies. These can be presented as a few suggestions for the future research into the phenomenon of verbal aggression. For one thing, the theoretical tools applied in the present thesis for the corpus analysis of insults may be further applied in order to provide a fuller account of verbal aggression. A more comprehensive account of prototypical and non-prototypical categories of insults would perhaps reveal different additional kinds of offensive speech. A more detailed account of insults as a speech acts would reveal a more representative picture of the radial model of insulting. Future studies of offensive speech should also include more extensive network model diagrams for a more detailed and inclusive account of abusive swearing. Similarly, as mentioned above, verbal aggression could be elaborated to a greater degree in terms of a force-dynamic model of insults, encompassing also a more detailed description of different elements of prototypical and non-prototypical scenarios of insults. Future studies of insults would also benefit from the corpus analysis of more representative data samples, including real-life linguistic data. This data could be presented in a more exhaustive way, encompassing e.g. the analysis of different prosodic aspects of offensive speech

and the role of the turn-taking system, as illustrated in Culpeper et al. (2003) and Bousfield (2008). The account of verbal aggression put forward in the present thesis contains also significant simplifications concerning the role of different neural, psychological and sociological variables influencing the linguistic practice of verbal aggression. Thus, future research may focus e.g. on the different patterns of power relations between interactants, the processes of acquisition of swearing, the role of education and upbringing in offensive verbal activities, and the issues of gender roles in connection with offensive speech. Enquiries into the field of verbal aggression may also be of interest in the field of lexicography, language didactics and translation studies. Cognitive linguists may also focus on the analysis of different constructions present in insults from the point of view of construction grammar. A promising area of analysis is also the account of verbal aggression from the perspective of axiological value-laden analysis of perlocutionary effects and perlocutionary acts, as proposed by Post (2001; 2013)

Contemporary areas of further research concerning the issues of linguistic impoliteness, verbal conflict and swearing are perhaps best presented in Jay (2000) and Bousfield (2008).

Bousfield (2008: 266-7) suggests that future enquiries into the problem of impoliteness may focus on deepening the understanding of impoliteness and a more representative account of the interplay of different impoliteness strategies in discourse. A comparison between different impoliteness strategies would foster the understanding concerning which strategies carry a greater degree of offensiveness than others. A more comprehensive view of impoliteness issues should also concentrate on the role of turn-taking system and prosodic aspects for a fuller account of distinct impoliteness phenomena. Another area of fruitful research is how speakers manage impoliteness by utilizing different counter-impolite strategies in conversational contexts.

Jay (2000: 269-72) advocates a multidisciplinary effort concerning the enquiry into swearing in order to provide a more comprehensive perspective of different issues of neurology and neuropathology, the relation between cursing and aging, practical application of offensive speech analysis to linguistics, computer

language models and AI projects, sexual education, multicultural issues, legal and judicial problems and the diagnostics of mental disorders.

All in all, although some progress in this field has already been made, what remains to be seen is what directions the future research into the issues of impoliteness, swearing and verbal aggression will take.

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Appendix 2: Alphabetical list of corpus films

8 Mile (2002), C. Hanson (dir.)
 The Abyss (1989), J. Cameron (dir.)
 Alien (1979), R. Scott (dir.)
 Alien 3 (1992), D. Fincher (dir.) – 2003 special edition
 Alien: Resurrection (1997), J. P. Jeunet – 2003 special edition
 Aliens (1986), J. Cameron (dir.) – 2003 special edition
 Anchorman: the legend of Ron Burgundy (2004), A McKay (dir.)
 The Big Lebowski (1998), J. Coen and E. Coen (dirs)
 Billy Madison (1995), T. Davies (dir.)
 Con Air (1997), S. West (dir.)
 Carlito's way (1993), B. De Palma (dir.)
 Donnie Darko (2001), R. Kelly (dir.)
 Dumb and dumber (1994), P. J. Farrelly and R. L. Farrelly (dirs)
 Erin Brockovich (2000), S. Soderbergh (dir.)
 Escape from Alcatraz (1979), D. Siegel (dir.)
 A fish called Wanda (1988), C. Crichton (dir.)
 Full metal jacket (1987), S. Kubrick (dir.)
 Glengarry Glen Ross (1992), J. Foley (dir.)
 Goodfellas (1990), M. Scorsese (dir.)
 Hook (1991), S. Spielberg (dir.)
 In the loop (2009), A. Iannucci (dir.)
 Inception (2010), C. Nolan (dir.)
 Jarhead (2005), S. Mendes (dir.)
 John Rambo (2008), S. Stallone (dir.)
 Kill Bill vol. 1, (2003), Q. Tarantino (dir.)
 Kill Bill vol. 2, (2004), Q. Tarantino (dir.)
 Liar liar (1997), T. Shadyac (dir.)
 Memento (2000), C. Nolan (dir.)
 Predator (1987), J. McTiernan (dir.)
 Predator 2 (1990), S. Hopkins (dir.)
 Pulp fiction (1994), Q. Tarantino (dir.)
 Scarface (1983), B. De Palma (dir.)
 School for scoundrels (2006), T. Phillips (dir.)
 Seven (1995), D. Fincher (dir.)
 She's all that (1999), R. Iscove (dir.)
 Sin City (2005), F. Miller (dir.)
 The way of the gun (2000), C. McQuarrie (dir.)
 There will be blood (2007), P.T. Anderson (dir.)
 The Wrestler (2008), D. Aronofsky (dir.)

Appendix 3: List of corpus film scenes

(i1)

[S1 and S2 are co-founders of an experimental underwater drilling platform. S1, a woman, is talking to S2, her ex-husband, via intercom. She is disgruntled by the news that S1 has rented the oil rig platform for an underwater rescue mission without her consent. S3 is S2's colleague.]

S1: We were that close to proving a submersible drilling platform could work. I can't believe you let them grab my rig!

S2: Your rig?

S1: My rig! I designed the damn thing.

S2: Benthic Petroleum paid for it. So as long as they're holding the pink slip, I go where they tell me.

S1: I had a lot of riding on this. They bought you, didn't they? More like rented you cheap!

S2: I'm switchin' off now. Bye-bye.

S1: Oh, OK. Virgil, *you wiener!* You never could stand up to a fight!

[S2 switches off the intercom]

[...]

S2: *God, I hate that bitch!*

S3: Probably shouldn't have married her then, huh?

[The Abyss, 1989]

(i2)

[The crew of the spaceship Nostromo (S1, S3, I4) are looking for a way to kill an alien specimen who on their ship has already killed two of their crew members. For this purpose they have plugged in a disconnected android (S2) whose secret mission had been to protect the alien. The crew members want to extract important information from S2]

S1: What was your special order?

S2: You read it. I thought it was clear.

S1: What was it?

S2: Bring back life form, priority one. All other priorities rescinded.

S3: The damn company. What about our lives, *you son of a bitch?!*

S2: I repeat, all other priorities are rescinded.

[Alien, 1979]

(i3)

[S1 – superintendent of a prison complex – has invited S2 – Chief Medical Officer – to discuss the current difficult situation in their prison. S1 accuses S2 of secretly sabotaging his administrative efforts. Another administrator, S3, is present in the room]

S1 [to S2]: Sit down, Mr. Clemens.

S2: Thank you.

S1: [Offering coffee] Sugar?

S2: No, thanks.

S1: Milk?

S2: Just a little, please.

S1: [to S3] Thank you, Mr. Aaron.

[S3 leaves the room closing the door behind him]

S1 [to S2]: Listen to me, *you piece of shit!* You screw with me one more time, I'll cut you in half!

S2: I'm sorry. I don't think I understand.

[Alien 3, 1992]

(i4)

[A group of space pirates are preparing their equipment to board the US Marine spaceship to deliver requested cargo for illegal science experiments. Cole (S1) and Vriess (S3) – a wheelchair-bound man without feeling in the lower part of his body – are checking the equipment. Another crew member (S2) is observing them from upstairs playing with his knife. Suddenly, S2 throws his knife so that it plunges in S3's leg]

S1: What is wrong with you?

S2: Just a little target practice. Vriess isn't complaining.

S3: [noticing the knife sticking from his leg]: Goddammit! Johner. *you son of a bitch!*

S2: Come on, man. You didn't feel a thing.

S1 [to S2]: *You're an inbred motherfucker, you know that?*

[S2 is mocking S1 by uttering noises resembling monkey sounds. S1 picks up the knife]

S2 [to S1]: I'll take the knife back now.

[...]

[S1 breaks S2's knife against a piece of equipment]

S2: Son of a bitch! Don't push me. little Cole. You hang with us a little while, you'll find out I am not the man with whom to fuck.

[S2 leaves slapping a piece of equipment violently]

[Alien: resurrection, 1997]

(i5)

[A group of space travelers (S2, S3 and S4) are escaping from the alien-infested spaceship the Auriga before blowing the ship up. They have been stopped by a mad scientist (S1), who does not want the ship to be destroyed. S1 has taken a hostage at a gunpoint. This hostage is an android who must perform certain operations before they can escape from the ship. S2 is an ex-soldier of S1.]

S1: Nobody moves, or I put a cap right where this little droid's brain is. [to S2]: Distephano, take the weapons!

S2: Begging your pardon, sir, but fuck you!

S1: Fine. Then I kill her, and you kill me, and we all die, and nobody goes home!
Now drop the weapon!

[S2 and S4 drop their weapons]

S1: Then *this little synthetic bitch* is gonna plug into the Auriga and she is gonna take us right back to home base, according to the standard emergency procedure.

S3: No, she's not!

S2: Are you crazy? You still wanna bring those things back to Earth?

S4: Haven't you been paying any attention today?

S1: Ahh, the intellectual speaks!

[S4 makes a move at S1, who stops him at a gunpoint]

[Alien: resurrection, 1997]

(i6)

[A group of survivors on an alien-infested spaceship are running for their lives from an alien specimen. S1 is a medical officer at the ship responsible for the infection. Call (S2) and Vriess (S3) belong to a space pirates group who has taken S1 captive after he had executed an attempt at their lives. The group encounters a locked door they have to pass in order to escape the alien]

S1 [slamming against the door]: It won't break. Give me your weapon!

[S2 hands him over her gun]

S1 [Aiming the gun at S2]: You really are way too trusting!

S3: No!

[S1 shoots S2 in the chest. S2 falls down from a metal scaffolding into a pool full of water]

S3 [Shooting his shotgun at S1]: You killed her. *You bastard!*

[S1 opens the door and escapes]

[Alien: resurrection, 1997]

(i7)

[The space accidents enquiry board are questioning Lt Ripley (S1), who has detonated a commercial spaceship in order to kill an alien species. Ripley is trying to convince the board members that the alien species exists and poses considerable threat to humankind. S2 is the board chairman]

S1: Look, I can see where this is going. But I'm telling you that those things exist.

S2: Thank you, Officer Ripley. That will be all.

S1: Please! You're not listening to me. Kane, the crew member... Kane, who went into that ship, said he saw thousands of eggs there!

S2: Thank you, that will be all.

S1: [Raising her voice and standing up] Goddammit, that's not all! *Because if one of those things gets down here, then that will be all and all this, this bullshit* [holding document papers in her hands] *that you think is so important, you can just kiss that all goodbye!*

S2: [After a pause] It is the finding of this court of enquiry that Warrant Officer E Ripley, NOC 14472, has acted with questionable judgment and is unfit to hold an ICC licence as a commercial flight officer. Said licence is hereby suspended indefinitely [...] These proceedings are closed. + that could have been better (overreaction of S)

[Aliens, 1986]

(i8)

[A military rescue operation. S2 has just attempted to kill two fellow crew members in order to protect an alien specimen he intends to exchange for money. S1 is a fellow crew member. The group has assembled to decide what to do with Burke]

S1: I say we grease *this rat-fuck son of a bitch* right now!

S2. [perspiring, staying silent]

[Aliens, 1986]

(i9)

[S2 is attacked in his house by a thug (S1), who demands money from him. S2 is dunking S1's head in the toilet]

S1: Where's the money, Lebowski? We want that money, Lebowski. Bunny says you're good for it. Where's the money, Lebowski? Where's the money, Lebowski? Where's the fuckin' money, *shithead?*

S2: [Gasp] It's down there down somewhere. Let me take another look.

[S1 dunks S2 again]

S1: Don't fuck with us.

[The Big Lebowski, 1998]

(i10)

[S2, an unemployed hippie bowler, has arrived at the mansion of a millionaire (S1), demanding compensation for his rug, which, as S2 presumes, has been destroyed due to S1's fault. S1 decisively refuses to compensate for the rug. S3 is S1's chief lackey of the house.]

S1: I cannot solve your problem, sir, only you can.

S2 [With resignation]: Oh, fuck it.

S1: Yeah, "fuck it." That's your answer to everything. Tattoo it on your forehead.

[S2 is leaving, S1 is shouting after him] Your revolution is over, Mt Lebowski! Condolences. *The bums lost!* My advice to you is to do what your parents did. Get a job, sir! *The bums will always lose! You hear me Lebowski? The bums will always lose!*

[S2 closes the door behind him]

S3 [Coming up.] How was your meeting, Mr. Lebowski?

S2: OK. The old man told me to take any rug in the house.

[S2 is seen carrying a large carpet out of S1's mansion]

[The Big Lebowski, 1998]

(i11)

[A bowling competition S1, named Jesus, is S2's competitor, who comes up to S1 to taunt him before their face-off in the semi-finals. S3 is S2's friend sitting with him]

S1 [Coming up to S2 with his partner]: *Are you ready to be fucked, man?* I see you rolled your way to the semis. Dios miho, man. Liam and me, we're gonna fuck you up.

S2 [With indifference]: Yeah, well, that's just, like, uh your opinion, man.

S1: Let me tell you something, *pendejo*. *You pull any of your crazy shit with us, you flash a piece out on the lanes*. I'll take it away from you and stick it up your ass and pull the fuckin' trigger till it goes click.

S2: Jesus...

S1: You said it, man. Nobody fucks with the Jesus.

[The Big Lebowski, 1998]

(i12)

[S2 and S3 are two friends watching a theatre show. S1, their fellow mate who comes with important news about the man they have been looking for.]

S1[to S2]: He lives in North Hollywood on Radford, near the In-N-Out Burger.

S2: Come on, the In-N-Out Burger's on Camrose.

S1 [Patiently]: Near the In-N-Out Burger.

S3: Those are good burgers.

S1 [Angrily at S3]: *Shut the fuck up, Tony*.

[S3 stays quiet]

[The Big Lebowski, 1998]

(i13)

[At the police station. S2, a hippie bowler, has been stopped by the police. The sheriff, S1, considers S2 to be a troublemaker and intends to warn him not to act against the law in the area which is under his responsibility.]

S1: [...] Now we got a nice, quiet little beach community here, and I aim to keep it nice and quiet. So let me make something plain. I don't like you sucking around, bothering our citizens, Lebowski. *I don't like your jerk-off name. I don't like your jerk-off face. I don't like your jerk-off behaviour, and I don't like you, jerk-off*. Do I make myself clear?

S2: [After a prolonged pause, with indifference] I'm sorry, I wasn't listening.

S1: [throws a coffee mug at S1]

S2: Fucking fascist.

[S1 comes up to S2 and drops him over to the ground]:

S1: Stay out of Malibu, Lebowski! [Kicking S2 on the ground] Stay out of Malibu, *deadbeat!* [Lowering his face to S2]: Keep your ugly fuckin' goldbrickin' ass out of my beach community.

[The Big Lebowski, 1998]

(i14)

[An academic decathlon competition. S1, an expert overseeing the contest comments on an erroneous and outrageously unintelligent answer from a contestant (S1)]

S1: *Mr. Madison, what you've just said is one of the most insanely idiotic things I have ever heard. At no point in your rambling, incoherent response were you even*

close to anything that could be considered a rational thought. Everyone in this room is now dumber for having listened to it. I award you no points, and may God have mercy on your soul.

S2: Okay, a simple "wrong" would've done just fine.

[Billy Madison, 1995]

(i15)

[A group of gangsters are going on a secret mission. S1 and S2 are standing on the boat's bridge. S3, S2's friend, is in the cabin, absent not aware of S1 and S2's conversation. S1 – a newly met acquaintance – detests S3 for his superior attitude]

S1 [About S3]: This guy a friend of yours?

S2: Yeah, he's a friend of mine.

S1: *He's a fuckin' cockroach!*

[Carlito's way]

(i16)

[During a high school assembly full of teachers and students, a guest speaker (S1) is presenting his theory. S2 – a student who is in strong disagreement with this theory – has come to the microphone and taken some issues with S1's words.]

S1: [...] It breaks my heart to say this, but I believe you are a very troubled and confused young man. [...]

S2: You're right, actually. I'm pretty troubled and I'm pretty confused. [...] *but I think you're fucking idiot.*

[A gasp of surprise from the audience. The school principal comes up and forcibly removes the student from the microphone, walking him out of the room]

[Donnie Darko, 2001]

(i17)

[Two friends (S2 and S3) have been pulled over in their car by a police officer (S1). S1 notices full beer bottles in the car. He does not know that the bottles include S3's urine from his going to the toilet in the car]

S1: You fellows been doing a bit of boozin', have you? Sucking back on grandpa's old cough medicine?

S2: No. Oh, no, sir.

S3: No, no.

S1 [Pointing at the bottles]: What's that?

S2: That's nothing, sir.

S3 Yeah, nothing.

S1: Did you know it's against the law to have an open alcohol container here in the state of Pennsylvania? Come on, give me that booze, *you little Pumpkin Pie hair cutted freak*, come on.

[S2 and S3 hand over the bottles]

[Dumb and dumber, 1994]

(i18)

[A court of law. The woman plaintiff (S2) has sued a medical doctor for damages as a result of the car accident she has suffered in. S2 is being questioned by the counsel for the defence (S1). S3 is the counsel for the prosecution. S4 is the judge.]

S1: So, you must have been feeling pretty desperate that afternoon.

S2: What's your point?

S1: Broke, three kids, no job. A doctor in a Jaguar must have looked like a pretty good meal ticket.

S3: Objection!

S4: Sustained!

S2: What? He hit me.

S1: So you say.

S2: He came tearing around the corner out of control.

S1: An ER doctor, who spends his days saving lives, was the one out of control?

S2: *That asshole smashed in my fucking neck!*

[A whisper of surprise from the audience. S3 closes his eyes in resignation]

[Erin Brockovich, 2000]

(i19)

[A group of law partners are discussing a legal case. S1, a woman, has questioned her female partner's, S2's, knowledge of the case. S2 has just demonstrated to everybody's satisfaction her superior knowledge of the subject. S3 is their fellow partner and S2's boss present at the conversation]

S1: Okay, look, I think we got off on the wrong foot here...

S2: *That's all you got, lady. Two wrong feet in fucking ugly shoes.*

[S1 stays silent with a concern in her face]

[S2 continues a discussion leaving the building]

S2: She insulted me!

S3: Bullshit. It was a misunderstanding.

[Erin Brockovich, 2000]

(i20)

[Prison. A white inmate (S1) comes up to the leader of a black gang (S2), who is sitting on the top step with other members of his gang sitting below him]

S1: Something special about those steps?

S2: The higher you sit, the more status you got. So we kind of play King of the Mountain. Except here we don't play for fun, man.

S1: And you're King?

S2: Yeah.

[S1 starts walking down the steps]

S2: Now I figure there's two reasons why you didn't sit down on my step. Either you're too scared, or you just hate niggers. Now which is it, boy? You too scared? Hmm?

S1 [turning back and sitting on S2's step] Nah. *I just hate niggers.*

[S2 looks at S1 with an attitude of respect]

[Escape from Alcatraz, 1979]

(i21)

[A man driving a car (S1) is violently cut off by another driver]

S1: *Asshole!*

[A fish called Wanda, 1988]

(i22)

[S1, a criminal, is accidentally hiding in a lawyer's house. The lady of the house (S2) is having a conversation with the man. In order to avoid being discovered, S1 pretends to be an undercover CIA agent.]

S1: Look, you obviously don't know anything about intelligence work, lady. It's an X-K-Red-27 technique.

S2: My father was in the Secret Service, Mr. Manfredjin St John, and I know perfectly well that you don't keep the general public informed when you are debriefing KGB defectors in a safe house.

S1: Oh, you don't, huh?

S2: *Not unless you're congenitally insane or irretrievably stupid, no.*

S1 [With tension in his face]: Don't call me stupid.

S2: Why on Earth not?

S1: Oh, you English are so superior, aren't you?. Would you like to know where you'd be without us, the old US of A to protect you? I'll tell you. The smallest fucking province in the Russian Empire, that's what. So don't call me stupid, lady. Just thank me [S1 leaves the room.]

[A fish called Wanda, 1988]

(i23)

[S1, a criminal, has overheard S2's conversation in which S2 has referred to S1's inferior intellect. S1 demands an apology]

S1: Now, apologize!

S2: Are you totally deranged?

S1[With tension in his face]: *You pompous, stuck-up, snot-nosed, English, giant, twerp, scumbag, fuck-face, dickhead, asshole.*

S2 [With the air of superiority]: How very interesting. You're a true vulgarian, aren't you?

S1: You are the vulgarian, *you fuck*. Now apologize!

[A fish called Wanda, 1988]

(i24)

[S1, a woman involved in a burglary, has met with a lawyer from whom she has intended to obtain important information. S1 scorns her partner and lover (S2) for having arrived at the meeting and mindlessly assaulting the lawyer.]

S1: I was dealing with something delicate, Otto. I'm setting up a guy who's incredibly important to us, who's going to tell me where the loot is and if they're going to come and arrest you. And you come loping in like Rambo without a jockstrap and you dangle him out a fifth-floor window. Now, was that smart? Was it shrewd? Was it good tactics? *Or was it stupid?*

S2: Don't call me stupid.

S1: *Oh, right! To call you stupid would be an insult to stupid people! I've known sheep that could outwit you. I've worn dresses with higher IQs. But you think you're an intellectual, don't you, ape?*

S2 [Smiling unwillingly]: Apes don't read philosophy.

S1: Yes they do, Otto. They just don't understand it.

[A fish called Wanda, 1988]

(i25)

[First day of a military boot camp. S1, a drill sergeant, inspects new recruits. S2 is an inspected private]

S1: How tall are you, private?

S2: Sir, five-foot-nine, sir.

S1: Five-foot-nine, *I didn't know they stacked shit that high!* You're trying to squeeze an inch on me somewhere, huh?

S2: Sir, no, sir.

S1: Bullshit! *It looks to me like the best part of you ran down the crack of your mama's ass and ended up as a brown stain on the mattress.* Where the hell are you from anyway, private?

S2:: Sir, Texas, sir.

S1: Holy dog shit! Texas? *Only steers and queers come from Texas, Private Cowboy, and you don't look much like a steer to me, so that kinda narrows it down. Do you suck dicks?*

S2: Sir, no, sir!

S1: *Are you a peter puffer?*

S2: Sir, no, sir!

S1: I bet you're the kind of guy who would fuck a person in the ass and not even have the goddamn common courtesy to give him a reach-around. I'll be watching you!

[Full Metal Jacket, 1987]

(i26)

[A meeting of three real estate salesmen (S2, S3 and I4) with a trainer sent to motivate them. The trainer (S1) is clearly unsatisfied with the salesmen's results. S2 has come up to the coffee machine to make himself some coffee].

S1: Let's talk about something important. [To S2]: Put that coffee down! Coffee's for closers only.

S2: But

S1: Do you think I'm fucking with you? I am not fucking with you. I'm here from downtown. I'm here from Mitch & Murray. [turning to S3 and I4] And I'm here on a mission of mercy. [to S2] Your name is Levene?

S2: Yeah.

S1: You call yourself a salesman, *you son of a bitch?*

S3 [getting up]: I don't gotta listen to this shit.

[Glengarry Glen Ross, 1992]

(i27)

[A real estate office. S2 – the manager of the office – walks out of his office where a police officer is questioning people in connection with a recent office burglary. S2 has just been scorned by a co-worker for carelessly revealing to a customer that his cheque has already been cashed, thus leading to the cancellation of an important contact. S1 is another co-worker of S2. S1 believes that he has just closed an important contract and is in enthusiastic mood because of this fact].

S1: *You are a shithead, Williamson!* Can't think on your feet, you ought to keep your mouth closed. Now can you hear me? I'm talking to you. Can you hear me?

S2: Yes, I hear you.

S1: Ricky is right. Can't learn it enough, got to learn on the streets. You can't buy it, you gotta live it. [...] You don't belong in this business.

S2: I don't belong in...

S1: [...] Your partner depends on you [...] and you go with him and for him or *you're shit!* Huh? *You are shit!* You can't exist alone. [...] You've just fucked a good man out on six thousand dollars and his goddamn bonus because you didn't know the shot! Gee, you could do that and you're not man enough to say what get you, I don't know what... if you can't take something from that than *you're scum, you're a fucking white bread. A child would know it and he's right.* If you're gonna make something up, John, be sure that it helps. Or keep your mouth shut. I'm done with you.

[...]

[Glengarry Glen Ross, 1992]

(i28)

[S1, a real estate agent has been talking to his customer, who came to demand to cancel their deal. I2, S1's business associate, has accidentally told the customer that his check has already been cashed and that the deal cannot be cancelled. The customer leaves the office in panic].

S1 [to I2, increasingly irritated]: You stupid fucking cunt! You, Williamson, I'm talking to you, shit. You just cost me 6 thousand dollars. Six thousand dollars and one Cadillac. That's right. What are you gonna do? What are you gonna do about it, *asshole? You fucking shit! Where did you learn your trade, you stupid fucking cunt, you idiot? Who ever told you that you could work with men? Oh, I'm gonna have your job, shithead. I'm going downtown and talk to Mitch & Murray, and I'm going to Lemkin! I don't care whose nephew you are, who you know, whose dick you're sucking on. You're going out, I swear to you [...]*

[Glengarry Glen Ross, 1992]

(i29)

[A young man (I1) working in a restaurant has helped a wounded man in the street using a number of kitchen aprons to dress his wound. S2, his boss, shows his dissatisfaction with this fact]

S2 [to I1]: *You're a real jerk.* You wasted eight fucking aprons on this guy.

[Goodfellas, 1990]

(i30)

[S1, a gang member, is having an argument with his wife (S2), who does not want to let him go out at night.]

S1: Get out. Get out of my life!

S2: You're fucked up in the head. This is all in your mind.

S1: *You're a lousy bastard.*

S2: You've got a problem. [Leaves]

S1: *Go to your ready-made whores. That's all you're good for! Get out of my life. I can't stand it!*

[Goodfellas, 1990]

(i31)

[A discussion in the office of Secretary of State for the Department of International Development (S1). S2 is Director of Communications for the Prime Minister. S3 is Director of Communications for the Department of International Development. S1, S2 and S3 are discussing important public statement they want to issue. S2 is unhappy about S3's presence during the conversation]

S1 [to S2]: Judy and I thought I could row back on Question Time, tonight

S2: You're not going on Question Time tonight, you've been disinvented

S1: We've been prepping Question Time!

S3: Why wasn't I told about this?

S2: Why the fuck would I tell you about it? *I've just told you to fuck off twice yet you're still here?*

S3: You should tell me about it as it's a scheduled media appearance by a member of this department and therefore it falls well within my purview!

S2: Within your 'purview'? Where do you think you are, *some fucking regency costume drama? This is a government department, not some fucking Jane fucking Austen novel! Allow me to pop a jaunty little bonnet on your purview and ram it up your shitter with a lubricated horse cock!*

S3: Your swearing does not impress me. My husband works for Tower Hamlets and believe me those kids make you sound like... Angela Lansbury!

[S2 leaves the room]

S2: [to Simon] She's married? Poor bastard.

[In the loop, 2009]

(i32)

[US army boot camp. New recruits are lining up. The drill sergeant (S1) comes up to one of the recruits (S2)]

S1: Swofford!

S2: Sir, yes, sir!

S1: *You the maggot whose father served in Vietnam?*

S2: Sir, yes, sir!

S1: Outstanding! Did he have the balls to die there?

S2: Sir, no, sir!

S1: Too fucking bad! He ever talk about it?

S2: Sir, only once, sir! Good! Then he wasn't lying!

[S2 looks S1 in the eyes]

S1: Are you eyeballing me with those baby blues? Are you?

S2: Sir, no, sir!

S1: Are you in love with me, Swofford?
S2: Sir, no, sir!
S1: Oh, You don't think I look good in my uniform, Swofford?
S2: Sir, the drill sergeant looks fabulous in his uniform, sir!
S1: Oh, so you're gay, then and you love me, huh?
S2: Sir, I'm not gay, sir!
S1: Do you have a girlfriend, Swofford?
S2: Sir, yes, sir!
S1: Guess again, *motherfucker! Jody's banging her right now! Get on your face and give me 25 for every time she gets fucked this month. Down on your face!*
[S2 starts performing physical exercise]

[Jarhead, 2005]

(i33)

[A battalion of Burmese soldiers has captured a group of American mercenaries who had raided their military base, freeing a group of captives and killing a number of Burmese soldiers. The Americans are being beaten and buttered. A Burmese officer walks up to them with a cane hitting the mercenaries. S1 is the commander of the mercenary group]

S1 [to the Burmese officer] *You gutless fuck! Come and have a go at me, you lady-boy cunt! Come on you!*

[The officer comes up and hits S1 with the cane]

[John Rambo, 2008]

(i34)

[Two women, former assassin group members are fighting. They have already badly bruised each other and are wielding knives standing opposite each other]

S1 [to S2]: *Come on, bitch. Come on!*

[Kill Bill vol 1, 2003]

(i35)

[After a messy fight two women have regained their composure and are talking to each other in the kitchen. S2 holds a grudge against S1 for having tried to murder her before and for killing her unborn daughter. S1 is trying to convince S2 that she has changed since that time. S2 does not agree and demands a death duel]

S1 I know I fucked you over. I fucked you over bad. I wish to God I hadn't, but I did. You have every right to wanna get even.

[...]

S1: Look, If I could go back in a machine, I would. But I can't. All I can tell you is that I'm a different person now.

S2: Oh, great. I don't care.

S1: Be that as it may. I know I don't deserve your mercy or your forgiveness. However, I beseech you for both on behalf of my daughter [showing a picture of her daughter to S2]

S2: *Bitch!* You can stop right there. Just because I have no wish to murder you before the eyes of your daughter does not mean that parading her in front of me is gonna inspire sympathy. You and I have unfinished business. [...]

S1: So when do we do this?

S2: It all depends on when you wanna die. Tomorrow, the day after tomorrow?

S1: How about tonight, *bitch*?

S2: Splendid. Where?

[Kill Bill vol 1, 2003]

(i36)

[The meeting of Japanese mob bosses in Tokyo. The chair of the meeting is half-American half-Chinese woman (S1). One of the bosses (S2) violently protests against the woman's leadership, scorning her rudely for her mixed ethnic background]

S1 [runs up to S2 and cuts his head off with a samurai sword. The head falls on the table. The remaining mob bosses gasp in shock]

S1: [to the mob bosses] As your leader I encourage you from time to time, always in a respectful manner, to question my logic. If you're not convinced a particular plan of action I've decided is the wisest, tell me so. [...] No subject will ever be taboo. Except, of course, the subject that was just under discussion. The price you pay for bringing up either my Chinese or American heritage as a negative is I collect your fucking head. [Lifting up the severed head] Just like this fucker here! [Shouting] Now if any of *you sons of bitches got anything else to say, now's the fucking time!*

[The bosses stay silent]

[Kill Bill vol 2, 2004]

(i37)

[An American strip club. The owner (S1) tells one of the bouncer (S2) off for being late and comments on the cowboy-like hat the bouncer is wearing]

S1: [...] and the hat, *that fuckin' hat*. How many times have I told you? Don't wear that *fuckin' hat in here*. How many?

S2: All customers wear hats

S1: I'm not the boss of the customers. I'm the boss of you. And I'm tellin' you that I want you to keep *that shit-kicker hat* at home!

[S2 takes off the hat and leaves the room slowly.]

[Kill Bill vol 2, 2004]

(i38)

[S1, a female assassin, has just poisoned her male fellow killer with black mamba's venom. She is sitting over the dying man referring to another female assassin, their mutual enemy, whose S2 has previously buried alive]

S1: Right at this moment the biggest 'r' I feel is regret. Regret that maybe the greatest warrior I have ever met met her end at the hand of *bushwhacking, scrub, alchy piece of shit like you*. That woman deserved better.

[S2 dies whimpering]

[Kill Bill vol 2, 2004]

(i39)

[S1, a filthy beggar, asks S2, a lawyer, of some money in the street. S2 has been incapacitated for lying and feels an irresistible urge to tell the truth in every circumstances.]

S1: Got any spare change?

S2: Absolutely!

S1: Could you spare some?

S2: Yes I could!

S1: Will you?

S2 [shaking his head]: hmm-hmm!

S1: How come?

S2: Because I believe you will buy booze with it! *I just want to get from my car to the office without being confronted by the decay of western society!...* Plus I'm cheap! [S2 runs off]

S1 [after S2]: *Jerk-off!*

[Liar liar, 1997]

(i40)

[A psychologist (S1) is examining a patient suspected of short-term memory loss (S2). The test consists of S1 picking up any three objects from the table. Some of these objects carry low-voltage electric current]

S1: [Picks up an electrified objects and jerks his hand back in pain] What the fuck?

S2: It's a test, Sammy.

S2: [Giving S1 the finger] Well, test this, *you fucking quack!*

[Memento, 2000]

(i41)

S1: We gotta get you out of here.

S2: Why?

S1: Of, come on, Leonard. How many times have I got to tell you? It's not safe to hang around here for you anymore.

S2: Why not?

S1: Because the cops are looking for you.

[...]

S1: He's a bad cop. He's the one who checked into the Discount Inn. He's been calling you for days now, telling you shit, slipping envelopes under your door [...]

[...]

S2: *You're full of shit!*

S1: No, I'm not. He knows you are not good on the phone, so he's been calling you up

[Memento, 2000]

(i42)

[A group of soldiers are silently making their way through the jungle in the enemy territory. Suddenly, one man (I1) trips and falls down on the ground making a sound and nearly revealing the group's position. S2 is a fellow soldier from the group]

S1: *You're ghostin' us, motherfucker.* I don't care who you are back in the world. You give our position one more time, I'll bleed you, real quiet, and leave here. Got that?

[Predator, 1987]

(i43)

[A group of special-force police officers are trying to capture an alien specimen in a closed slaughterhouse. Their fellow officers are observing the procedure in a police van on surveillance cameras. Suddenly one of the officers, S1, finds out that the alien has discovered the presence of the group. He intends to run to the slaughterhouse to warn the group. S2 and S3 are fellow officers trying to stop him]

S1: Shit! [running to the van door]

S2 [to S3] Stop him!

[S1 knocks two officers down and grabs S3 by the throat aiming a gun at him]

S1: Door! Open it.

S3: *Go fuck yourself!*

[S1 tightens his grip on S3's neck]

S3: Ok. Ok.

[S3 opens the door]

[Predator 2, 1990]

(i44)

[A couple - woman (S1) and a man (S2) - are having their morning toilette in the bathroom. The man is impersonating a mentally challenged person]

S1: Stop it! Stop it! [S2 continues] *Shut up, fuckhead!* I hate that mongoloid voice!

S2. Ok, ok. Sorry, sorry! I take it back.

[Pulp fiction, 1994]

(i45)

[Two hitmen, S1 and his partner, have been conscripted by a gang leader – Marcellus Wallace – to get back a valuable possession that has been stolen from him. The hitmen arrive at the house where the thieves, with their leader S2, are hiding. The hitmen have just recovered the stolen property and killed one of the thieves. S1 turns to S2 trying to further intimidate him]

S1: What does Marcellus Wallace look like?

S2: [shaking] What?

[S1 violently tosses a coffee table across the room]

S1: What country you're from?

S2. [shaking] What?

S1: What ain't no country I've ever heard of! They speak English in What?

S2: [shaking] What?

S1: English, *motherfucker!* Do you speak it?

S2. [Shaking] Yes!

S1: Then you know what I'm saying!

S2: Yes!

S1: Describe what Marcellus Wallace looks like!

S2. [shaking uncontrollably] What?

S1: [pointing his gun at S2's head] Say what again! Say what again! I dare you, I double dare you, *motherfucker*. Say what one more goddamn time!

[Pulp fiction, 1994]

(i46)

[Two aspiring gangsters and a cheap bar workers (S2 and S3) are negotiating with their employers a job involving moving a large transport of marihuana. S3 is an ambitious gangster who does not agree with the pay offer proposed. S2 is satisfied with this offer. S1 and S4 are the employers offering the job.]

S1: I got something for you.

S2: Yeah? What do we gotta do?

S1: Gotta unload a boat. Marihuana. 45 tons. You get 500 dollars each.

S2: 500? That's great.

S3: You gotta be kidding. 500? Who do you think we are? Baggage handlers? The going rate on a boat is 1000 a night, you know that.

[...]

S1: What's with this dishwasher, chico? Don't you know we could've got any space cadet to hit Rebenga cheaper? 50 bucks!

S3: Then why didn't you? And don't be callin' me no fuckin' dishwasher, or *I'll kick your monkey ass. Who the fuck are you?*

[S3 makes move towards S1. S1 puts his hand on his gun.]

S2 [Physically stopping S3] You can't do that, man.

[S1 calms down]

[Scarface, 1983]

(i47)

[Two gangsters (S1 and I3) are being held captive by a rivaling mob group who want to acquire a large sum of money from them. S1 is the leader of the group. S2 is one of the captive gangsters]

S1 [To S2]: You want to give me the cash, or do I kill your brother first [pointing to I3] before I kill you?

S2: *Why don't you try sticking your head up your ass? See if it fits.*

S1: Yeah? Okay.

[S1 comes up to a closet, takes up a chainsaw and walks up to I3 in order to torture him, dragging S2 along]

[Scarface, 1983]

(i48)

[A Cuban gangster (S3) has arrived at his mother's home to visit her. The mother (S2) is not happy about S3's criminal activities and passionately tells him off. S2 is S2's sister present at the exchange.]

S1 [To S3]: You know, all we hear about in the papers is *animals like you* and the killings. It's Cubans like you who are giving a bad mane to our people. People who come here, work hard and make a good name for themselves. People who send their children to school

[S3 stays silent]

S2: Mama, what are you saying? That's your son!

S1: Son? I wish I had one. *He's a bum. He was a bum then and he's a bum now.*

[To S3]: Who do you think you are?

[S3 shrugs his shoulders, staying silent.]

S1 [Emotionally to S3]: I don't want you in this house anymore! I don't want you around Gina! So come on. [Pointing to the door] Get out!

S3: [Getting slowly towards the door] Okay.

[...]

S3: Okay, Mama. [Leaves the house]

[Scarface, 1983]

(i49)

[A wounded Cuban gangster (S2) has arrived at his former partner's house. S2 knows that his partner (S1) has tried to assassinate him and has arrived to get his revenge.]

S1 [To S2, pretending being concerned]: Jesus Christ! Tony, what happened to you?

S2: [Showing his bloody jacket]: They wanted to spoil my 800 dollar suit.

S1: Who the fuck did this?

S2: Hitters. I don't know. Somebody must've brought them in. I've never seen them before. [...]

S1: I'll bet it was the Diaz brothers.

[...]

S1: We'll return the favour for you in spades.

S2: No, I'll take care of this myself.

[...]

S2: *Hey Frank, you're a piece of shit!*

S1: Tony, what are you talking about?

S2: *You know what I'm talking about, you fucking cockroach.*

[...]

S2: I stayed loyal to you! I made what I could on the side, but I never turned on you, Frank! Never! *And you, man ain't got his word is a cockroach.*

[...]

S1: Okay, alright Tony. I was the one.

[S2 releases the safety catch on his gun]

S1: Please, give me a second chance, Tony. Will you do that, please? [Starts begging S2 for his life]

[Scarface, 1983]

(i50)

[S1, an established gangster, is sitting in a restaurant with his wife (S3). There is S1's partner (S2) sitting with them at the table. S1 is drunk and observes his wife snorting up a line of narcotics.]

S1 [To S2]: Is this it? That's what it's all about? Eating, drinking, fucking, sucking....

S2: Come on.

S1: snorting. Tell me. Then what? You're fifty. You got a bag for a belly. You got tits, you need a bra. They got hair on them. You got a liver and they got spots on it and you're eating and fucking shit. And you're looking like these rich fucking mummies in here.

S2: Come on, it's not so bad. Could be worse.

S1 [Continuing]: Is this what it's all about?

S2: [Trying to calm S1 down] Forget it.

S1: This what I work for? Tell me. [Pointing to S3 sitting across the table] Look at her. *A junkie. I got a fucking junkie for a wife. She don't eat nothing. Sleeps all day with them black shades on. Wakes up with a Quaalude...*

S2: Don't pick on her, man.

S1 [In increasingly emotional voice]: *And who won't fuck me 'cause she's in a coma. I can't even have a kid with her. Her womb is so polluted I can't even have a fucking little baby with her.*

S3: [To S1]: You son of a bitch! You fuck! [throwing water into S1's face]. How dare you talk to me like that?

[Scarface, 1983]

(i51)

[S1 and S2, two gangsters are talking on the phone. S1 is scorning S2 for a job he was supposed to do and that he has not completed.]

S1: *You fucking dumb cocksucker!* You blew it.

S2: Take it easy when you talk to me!

S1: I told you a long time ago, *you fucking living monkey*, not to fuck with me!

S2: [Violently picking up the phone apparatus]: Hey, who do you think you're talking to, huh? You wanna fuck with....

[S1 hangs up the phone]

[Scarface, 1983]

(i52)

[A police special forces unit has arrived – fully armed – at the home of an alleged serial killer with the intent to arrest him. They are entering the bedroom and see a man under blankets lying on the bed. S1 is a member of the police special forces]

S1: Morning, sweetheart! Get up now, *motherfucker*. Now! Get up, *you sack of shit*.

[One officer lifts the blanket uncovering a disfigured and unconscious human body]

[Seven, 1995]

(i53)

[A police station. S1 – a mentally deranged serial killer – has willfully arrived to hand himself over to a detective (S2). S3 is a fellow detective and S2's partner]

S1: [Shouting] Detective! You're looking for me.

S2: [Aiming at S1 with a gun]: Don't you fuckin' move! On the fuckin' floor!

S3: [To police officers running in]: Keep away from him!

S2: On the fuckin' floor!

S1: I know you.

S2: Now! Get down! Get down! On your stomach, *you piece of shit*, now! [S1 is slowly kneeling down.] All the way! All the way, *fucker!* Faster, faster! Faster, *fucker!* Now! Nose on the ground! [A police officer puts handcuffs on S1]

[Seven, 1995]

(i54)

[A captive serial killer (S1) is on the way to the place where he has suggested he wants to show the bodies of two of his victims. S2 and S3 are police officers escorting him and having a conversation on the way. S1 is referring to his previous encounter with S2, where he spared S2's life]

S1: You're only alive because I didn't kill you.

S2: Ok, sit back.

S1: I spared you.

S2: Sit back!

S1: Remember that, detective, every time you look in the mirror at that face of yours for the rest of your life. Or should I say, for the rest of what life I allowed you to have.

S2: Sit back, *you fucking freak! Shut your fucking mouth!* You're no messiah, you're a movie of the week, you're a fucking T-shirt, at best! [S1 and S2 relax on their seats]

S1 [after a pause, in a calm voice]: Don't ask me to pity those people. I don't mourn them and more than I do the thousands that died at Sodom and Gomorrah.

[Seven, 1995]

(i55)

[A high-school party. S1 and S2 are two conflicted female students. S1 is unhappy about S2's appearance at the party. She deliberately spills her drink over S2's dress.]

S1: Oh, Oopsie. You know, you really should be more careful with silk.

S2: Thank you.

S1: Excuse me?

S2: Thank you. For a minute there, I forgot why I avoided places like this and people like you.

S1: Avoided us? Honey, look around you. To everyone here who matters, *you're vapour, you're spam, a waste of perfectly good yearbook space, and nothing's ever gonna change that.*

[S2's eyes tear up]

S1: Oh, you aren't going to cry are you?

[S2 runs off the room crying]

[*She's All That*, 1999]

(i56)

[S1, a police officer, is chasing a kidnapper (S2), who is escaping with his victim, an underage girl. S1 manages to catch S2 at a fishing harbor]

S1: Roark! Give it up. Let the girl go.

S2. You can't do a goddamn thing to me, Hartigan! You know who I am, you know who my father is! You can't touch me, *you piece of shit cop!* Look at you. You can't even lift that cannon you're carrying!

S1. Sure I can. [S1 shoots, wounding S2 in the ear and knocking him over.]

[Sin city, 2005]

(i57)

[S1 is carrying out a private investigation concerning the person who killed his lover. In the course of the enquiry S1 finds his way to a farm where the killer – S2 – lives. S1 and S2 meet in a fight, during which S1 recognizes S2's identity]

S1: It was you, *you bastard.* You killed her. You killed Goldie!

[S2 knocks S1 unconscious with a sledgehammer.]

[Sin city, 2005]

(i58)

[S2, a female gang leader, is being held kidnapped by another gang. She is approached by S1, a former colleague of hers, who has betrayed her group and have given S2 over to her kidnappers.]

S1: This is over, Gail. There's no fighting them [...]. We gotta cut a deal.

S2. *You little bitch!* You sold us out!

[...]

S1. They offered me what you could never offer me – A way out. I had to watch out for my own neck.

S2: Your neck.... Your precious scrawny little neck! [S2 launches herself forward sinking teeth in S1's neck, pulling out a chunk of flesh.]

S1: You're crazy! You could've ripped my throat, *you crazy little whore!*

[A gang member comes up and knocks S2 over with the blow of his fist]

[Sin city, 2005]

(i59)

[S2 has visited his father (S1), a wealthy oil entrepreneur to inform him that he is moving away with his wife to start his own oil company. S1 is disgruntled and bitter about that fact, since he thinks that S2 will become competition for him. S1 reveals that S2 is not his genetic son, but is an orphan, whom S1 has decided to use instrumentally throughout his career to buy land for his oil fields. S2 is hearing-impaired and communicates with S1 through a sign language interpreter]

S1: So now you know. Look at me! *You're lower than a bastard.* [After a pause] You have none of me in you. You're a bastard from a basket.

S2: [After a prolonged pause]. I thank God I have none of you in me. [Gets up and walks away.]

S1: You're not my son. You're just a little piece of competition. [Shouting repeatedly after S2, who is going away] *Bastard from a basket!!*

[There will be blood, 2007]

(i60)

[S2, a reverend and family member has come to a wealthy oil entrepreneur's (S1) mansion. S2 has revealed that he is in financial trouble and has asked S1 for help. S1 has made him repeatedly admit that he is a false prophet before revealing that he has no intention to help him. S2 is crying and S1 continues to taunt him]

S1: Stop crying, you sniveling ass. Stop your nonsense. *You're just an afterbirth, Eli.*

S2. [sobbing] No.

S1. *That slithered out of your mother's filth.*

S2. [sobbing] No.

S1. *They should've put you in a glass jar on a mantelpiece.*

S2. [Continues to sob]

[There will be blood, 2007]

(i61)

[A bar patron and a professional wrestler (S1) walks into a strip club. There he walks up to an acquaintance female stripper (S3), who is performing a dance for a group of young men. The men dismiss S3 rudely for her being middle-aged. S2 is one of the young men involved]:

S1 [Walking into the room]: You've been a little rude to the lady. How about an apology?

S2: Fuck you, man!

S1: You don't talk to the lady like that.

S2: I talk to her like that if I wanna talk to her like that.

S1: You don't need to be talking to her like that.

S3 [to S1]: Hey, it's cool. I got it, I got it. It's alright.

S1: [to the young men]: Let me tell you something. I guarantee you this lady is a hundred times hotter than any *skunk-ass pussy you're gonna be marrying*.

[The young men stand up to S1 violently and after a short scramble leave the room]

S1: [after the leaving men]: *Fucker!*

[The wrestler, 2008]

(i62)

[Randy "The ram" Robinson, a professional wrestler and a bar patron (S1). is trying to get a closer relationship with a female stripper, S1, whom he is attracted to and who he thinks is attracted to him as well. S2 is opposed to his advances]:

S1: The club and the real world, they don't mix.

S2: I take that's a lot of bullshit, because you still feel something.

S1: You're a customer, ok? You're a fucking customer. I don't go out with customers. You got it?

S2: [looking miserable] Yeah, I got it. [To a bartender]: Hey, can I have some tequila over here, please? [Passing some money to S2]: There you are, here.

S1: What's that?

S2: I wanna a dance.

S1 [Looking strenuously at S2]: Stop that.

S2: What's the matter? You gonna refuse a paying customer? I wanna goddamn dance, sweetheart.

S1 *Fuck you.*

S2: Come on, get up there and move your ass, squeeze your tits, shake your fucking ass.

S1 [Raising her voice]: *Fuck you!*

S2: Pretend you like me! Give me a goddamn dance.

S1 *Get the fuck out of here!*

[an off-screen voice of a bouncer]: Ram, let's take it outside. [S1 leaves]

[The wrestler, 2008]

(i63)

[S2, a father who wants to fix his strenuous relationship with his adult daughter (S1) has failed to come to a meeting he had previously arranged with her. He comes round to her house to apologize. His daughter violently tells him off]:

S1: [Emotionally] You know, I waited in that restaurant for two hours. Two fucking hours telling myself: "Maybe something happened. Maybe he's stuck in traffic," but no. You keep doing the same shit to me over and over again!

S2: Yeah, I know. I apologize. Look, I apologize. It's just that I got a lot of stuff swirling around in my head and I went and I had a drink and another drink and I lost pace.

S1: [Emotionally] That's what you're doing to me is some tough shit.

S2: [To himself]: Goddamn it, why am I going this?

S1: [Crying]: *Because you are a fuck-up! You're a living, breathing fuck-up* and I cannot fuckin' do it anymore! I can't stand it. I can't fucking cry for you anymore. I can't fucking do it anymore! [throwing things at S2]. Get out of here!

S2: Calm down [trying to embrace S1]

S1: I hate you. I fucking hate you!

[The wrestler, 2008]

(i64)

[The crew of the spaceship Nostromo are searching for an alien specimen that is hiding somewhere on the ship. Suddenly their cat, Jonesey, gets in their way and runs away. Worried that the presence of the animal may confuse them, the crew decide to isolate the animal. S1, a crew member, is looking for the cat to get him out to a safe place]

S1: Here, kitty. Here, kitty, kitty. *Kitty crap*. Jones!

[Alien, 1979]

(i65)

[S1, an officer of a commercial spaceship has activated the emergency destruct system of the ship. S1 makes her way to the emergency escape shuttle, however she is blocked by an alien and cannot go past. S1 hurries back to the control room to abort the destruct procedure. She performs the process required, but the main computer named Mother does not stop the countdown]

Overhead: The option to override detonation procedure has now expired.

S1: Mother! I've turned the cooling unit back on! Mother!

Overhead: The ship will automatically destruct in T minus five minutes.

S1: *You bitch!* (S1 smashes the control board with a piece of equipment)

[Alien, 1979]

(i66)

[S1, the last surviving member of the spaceship Nostromo manages to escape in a space shuttle before blowing up her ship. She is convinced that the alien species she had been fighting with has died in the explosion]

S1: I got you, *you son of a bitch*.

[Alien, 1979]

(i67)

[S1, a spaceship officer is fighting with an alien specimen – an alien queen – who is attempting to seize her fellow crew member, an underage female. S1 comes into the scene armed with a man-operated heavy cargo loader]

S1 [to the alien queen]: Get away from her, *you bitch!*

[The alien turns to S1 and a fight begins]

[Aliens, 1986]

(i68)

[S1 – suffering from diarrhoea - has had to use the toilet. His date has just informed him that the toilet is broken and it does not flush. The girl is waiting for him outside the bathroom. S1 is desperate to flush the toilet and is attempting to dismantle the toilet cistern mechanism]

S1 [at the toilet]: Come on. Flush, *you bastard!*

[Dumb and dumber, 1994]

(i69)

[A woman intends to make an important phone call, but there is no range on the receiver.]

S1 [At the phone]: *Oh, you fucking piece of crap with no signal! Fuck!*

[Erin Brockovich, 2000]

(i70)

[A soldier (S1) is fighting an alien in the jungle. During their face-off the alien takes off his mask, uncovering his face.]

S1: *You're one ugly motherfucker.*

[The fighting resumes]

[Predator, 1987]

(i71)

[Two oil rig workers (S1 and S2) are observing a group of marines descending for a military operation onto their oil rig in helicopters. They are observing the situation from the inside of a building, without being heard or seen by the people outside]

S1: This... could get pretty ugly

S2: Yeah. Does not look good at all.

[Out of one helicopter comes a woman especially disliked by the two men]

S1: Oh, no. Look who's with them. *The queen bitch of the universe.*

[The Abyss, 1989]

(i72)

[S1 has just pulled his wife (I2) out of the water. I2 is unconscious. S1 and his fellow crew members are trying to resuscitate her]

S1: Come on. Breathe, baby. Goddamn it! Breathe! Goddamn it, *you bitch!* You never backed away from anything in your life! Now fight! [Slapping S2] Fight! [...]

[The Abyss, 1989]

(i73)

[S1 and S2, two bowling were supposed to deliver ransom to the kidnappers of a millionaire's wife and failed to do so. They are discussing the situation]

S1: They're gonna kill that poor woman, man!

S2: What the fuck are you talking about? That poor woman, *that poor slut* kidnapped herself. C'mon, dude, you said so yourself.

S1: Man, I said I thought she kidnapped herself. You're the one who's so fuckin' certain.

S2: That's right, dude, 100 per cent certain.

[Alien, 1979]

(i74)

[S1, S2, and S3 are three white friends at a bowling club. S1 is complaining to S2 about a thug of Chinese origin breaking into his flat and urinating on the rug, destroying it. S3 has just arrived to listen to the conversation]

S1 [to S2]: Walter, *the Chinaman* who peed on my rug, I can't go give him a bill. So what the fuck are you talking about?

S2: What the fuck are you talking about? The Chinaman is not the issue here, dude. I'm talking about drawing a line in the sand, dude. Across this line you do not..... Also, dude, Chinaman is not the preferred nomenclature. "Asian-American", please.

[The Big Lebowski, 1998]

(i75)

[A group of gangsters are following a man. They are observing him in a bar. After a while they realize that he has escaped from there through the bar's secret underground basemen. S1 is one of the gangster's commenting out loud the man's disappearance]

S1: *The little fuckin' spic bastard!*

[Carlito's way, 1993]

(i76)

[US army boot camp field exercise. Recruits are being made to crawl under barbed wires with instructors simulating a battlefield by throwing grenades and firing rifles above the recruits' heads. One recruit does not stand the stress and raises his head from the ground. He is immediately hit by an ammunition round in the head. The drill sergeant (S1) orders to cease fire]

S1: Cease fire! [S1 comes up to the dead body of the soldier] Shit! [Looks around at the other recruits lying on the ground, then he turns to the dead body] I told you to keep the fucking head down! If you'd listened to me, you'd still be fucking alive right now, *stupid fuck!*

[Jarhead, 2005]

(i77)

[A man (S1) is racing across a street in a car with an unconscious woman who has overdosed on drugs. S1 has dialed the phone number of a friend who is able to help him in this situation. S2 does not answer the phone]

S1: [to the receiver] *Fuck you, Lance. Answer!*

[Pulp fiction, 1994]

(i78)

[S1 and S2, two gangsters are driving a car. S1 is in strong disagreement with S2 about the job they have to do together.]

S1 [Shoots S2 in the head killing him]: You die, motherfucker! [To the dead body] What do you think I am? *You think I'm a fuckin' worm, like you?* I told you, man. I told you, don't fuck with me!

[Scarface, 1983]

(i79)

[S1 is supervising evacuation of his crew members from an underwater oil rig platform. For this purpose they require certain equipment that S2 has just arrived with after having borrowed it from S1 without permission]

S1 [to S2]: Hey, Coffey. We're a little pressed for time.

[S2 walks by with indifference without responding]

S1: [to himself]. *Prick!*

[The Abyss, 1989]

(i80)

[S1, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomacy, is phoning S2, Secretary of State for the Department of International Development to enquire about the person responsible for the leakage of confidential information to the media.]

S1: Also the committee got leaked and that leak came from your department. I want a head on a plate to go [S1 hangs up].

S2: You're not my boss. Errr.... *fuck off!*

[In the loop, 2009]

(i81)

[A mob member (S1) whose boss ordered to take out his wife for a night is asking a fellow mob member for advice]

S1: Look, I'm not a fucking idiot, alright? It's the big man's wife. I gonna sit across from her, chew my food with my mouth closed and laugh her fuckin' jokes and that's it.

S2: Hey. My name's Paul, this shit's between you' all.

[S2 walks away]

S1: So what' you fucking ask me about for? [to himself]: *Asshole!*

[Pulp fiction, 1994]

(i82)

[Two police detectives are questioning a leather outfit store owner about the piece of equipment made by him for an alleged serial killer. The owner (S1) presents them with a picture of the outfit he has been commissioned to manufacture. The two detectives are leaving the store taking the picture with them]

S1: The picture! The picture! [The police officers leave closing the store door behind them] *Fucking pigs!*

[Seven, 1995]

(i83)

[A group of survivors on an alien-infested spaceship have just found out that one of their fellow group members has survived being shot in the chest. The group finds out that I3 is an android. S1 and S2 are fellow group members]

S1: [to I3]: You're a robot?

S2: *Son of a bitch!* Our little Call is just full of surprises!

[Alien: resurrection, 1997]

(i84)

[A gangster shootout. Two man are shooting at each other. S2 has just wounded S1, who continues his shooting at S2.]

S1: I'll kill ya! *Motherfucker! Motherfucker!* I'll kill ya! *You motherfucker!*

[S2 shoots S1 in the chest killing him.]

[Carlito's way, 1993]

(i85)

[A real estate agent (S1) walks into his office after learning that the office has been robbed. He wants to enquire the office manager (S2) about the contract that he closed the night before, for which he expects a reward in the form of a Cadillac car.]

S1: Williamson, Williamson. Did they get the contracts? [Opening the door to S2's office] Tell me [...], they stole the contracts. Did they get my contract? Did they? Don't fuck with me, pal. I'm talking about the fucking Cadillac car that you owe me.

S2: They didn't get your contract. I filed it before I left.

S1: They didn't get my contract?

S2: They got Excuse me. [closing the door behind him].

S1: *Fuck, fuck fuck!!!* Williamson! Williamson, open the fucking door! [forcibly opening the door to the office]

[Glengarry Glen Ross, 1992]

(i86)

[A group of police officers (S1, S2 and S3) are investigating a crime scene. They notice a naked body hanging from the ceiling. At the same time they are informed that the Deputy Police Chief requires them to leave the building immediately.]

S1 [to himself]: *Son of a bitch!*

S2: What the fuck is going on?

S3: This is not good, Mike. Not good at all.

[Predator 2, 1990]

(i87)

[Senior Press Officer in the Office of the Prime Minister (S1) comes into the office of his associate (S2) demanding to know if she has been responsible for the leakage of important information. S3 is a fellow associate present in the office.]

S1 [entering the room to S2]: Hey, horse of the year, was it you?

S2: Was what me?

S1: Answer the fucking question! Was it you?

S2: Was what me, Jamie? I have no idea what you're talking about.

S3 [to S1]: She can't answer the question, can she? Unless she knows what it is.

S1: You leaked Liza Weld's paper to the BBC, right? Now, tell me you leaked it.

S2: No, I didn't. I didn't leak it.

S1: I know the leak came from in here. [Pointing to the fax machine on the desk] From this fucking fax machine right here.

S2: No. There's no... There's no way.

S1: Do you see what I'm doing to this machine?

S2: Jamie, don't.

S1: See?

[S1 knocks the fax machine off the table]

S2: Jesus Christ! Fuck, Jamie.

S1 [kicking the fax machine on the floor]: *You see how... angry I am with the piece of office equipment that leaked this document? [...] Can you even imagine how angry I am with the person who leaked it, can you?*

[In the loop, 2009]

(i88)

[S2, Director of Communications for the British Prime Minister, is talking on a phone in the street. I1, his office collaborator has just hung up without bothering to listen the important information S1 has intended to communicate. S3 is a tourist walking by]

[I1 hangs up on S2]

S2 [to the phone]: *Fucking hung up, haven't you? You fucking hoity-toity fucking...*

S3 [walking by to S2]: *Hey, buddy? Enough with the curse words, all right?*

S2 [to S3]: *Kiss my sweaty balls, you fat fuck!*

[S2 runs into the distance]

[In the loop, 2009]

(i89)

[A meeting in a real estate office. The office has recently been robbed and there is a police officer questioning a salesman in the next room. S1 is the leading salesman in the office . S2 is a salesman who has just walked out of the next room, having been questioned by the police. S3 their associate, talking enthusiastically to S1 about the successful closing of a recent contract.]. S1 is informing S2 about business leads which have been lost in the robbery.

S1 [to S2]: You haven't got a lead.

S2: Why not?

S1: They took them.

S2: They were fucking garbage any case, so god damn.

[S3 continues to talk to S1 about his transaction]

S2: Did they steal the contracts?

S1: Fuck you care?

S2: Fuck that's supposed to mean?

S3 [to S2]: Hey, will you shut up? I'm telling him something.

[...]

S2 [to S1]: What does that mean?

S2 [turning to S2] : It means, Dave, you haven't closed a good one in a month, none of my business, you want to push me to answer you. So you haven't got a contract to get stolen or so forth.

S1: You have a mean streak in you, Ricky, you know that? [to S3]: *Shut the fuck up!* [to S2]: Ricky, you got a mean streak in you. [to S3]: And what the fuck are you babbling about? [to S1]: You bring that shit up. Of my volume. You were on a bad one and I brought it up to you you'd harbour it. You'd harbour it a long long while. And you'd be right. [...] You're fucked, Rick—are you fucking nuts? You're hot, so you think you're the ruler of this place...?! You want to...

S3: Dave...

S1: [to S3] *Shut up!!!* [to S2 increasingly angry, losing control] Decide who should be dealt with how? Is that it? I come into the fuckin' Office today, I get humiliated by some jagoff cop. I get accused of...*I get this shit thrown in my face by you, you genuine shit, because you're top name on the board...!!!*

[Glengarry Glen Ross, 1992]

(i90)

[A group of survivors on an alien-infested spaceship are trying to escape it. They have just learnt that S3 – an android – in cooperation with S2 – another group member – has hastened the collision of the spaceship with the Earth by changing the spaceship's coordinates. Thus, S2 and S3 have limited the group's time to escape from the alien-infested spaceship. S1 is another fellow group member disgruntled by S2 and S3's decision.]

S1: [to S3]: What did you do, robot?

S2: Let's go! Come on!

S1: [to S2] Hey! You wanna die here with your brothers and sisters, that's cool. But I plan to live past today. *If this little hunk of plastic is pullin' any shit, I'm gonna kill her!*

[to S3] *Kill you! Does that compute? Or do I have to draw you a schematic?*

S2 [grabbing S1 by the throat] Hey!

[S2 grabs S1's tongue mocking pulling it off]

S2 [to S3]: You want another souvenir?

[S3 smiles lightly. S2 lets S1 go. S1 calms down and stops arguing]

[Alien: resurrection, 1997]

(i91)

[S1, a woman, and S2, a man, are quarrelling. S1 wants S2 to kill a man for her. S2 is a patient with short-term memory loss who is seeking revenge for the death of his wife. S2 is opposed to S1's pleading]

S1: Help me.

S2: How?

S1: Get rid of Dodd for me. Kill him. I'll pay you.

S2: What do you think I am, I'm gonna kill someone for money?

S1: What then? Love? What would you kill for? Kill for your wife, wouldn't you?

S2: [Increasingly tense] That's different!

S1: Not to me, *I wasn't fuckin' married to her!*

S2: Hey, don't talk about my wife!

S1: [Raising her voice]: I can talk about whoever the fuck I want! I can say whatever I want and you won't remember. *I can call your wife a fuckin' whore and we can still be friends!*

S2: Calm down!

S1: Easy for you to say. You can't get scared. *You don't know how, you fucking idiot! [...] You don't know a fuckin' thing* [S2 looks clearly tense and enraged].

S1: You can't get scared, but hey, can you get angry?

S2: Yes!

S1: *You pathetic piece of shit!*

S2: *I can say whatever the fuck I want and you won't have a fuckin' clue, you fuckin retard.*

[Memento, 2000]

(i92)

[S1, an established gangster, is sitting in a restaurant with his wife (S3). There is S1's partner (S2) sitting with them at the table. S1 is drunk and observes his wife snorting up cocaine.]

S1 [To S2]: Is this it? That's what it's all about? Eating, drinking, fucking, sucking....

S2: Come on.

S1: snorting. Tell me. Then what? You're fifty. You got a bag for a belly. You got tits, you need a bra. They got hair on them. You got a liver and they got spots on it and you're eating and fucking shit. And you're looking like these rich fucking mummies in here.

S2: Come on, it's not so bad. Could be worse.

S1 [Continuing]: Is this what it's all about?

S2: [Trying to calm S1 down] Forget it.

S1: This what I work for? Tell me. [Pointing to S3 sitting across the table] Look at her. *A junkie. I got a fucking junkie for a wife. She don't eat nothing. Sleeps all day with them black shades on. Wakes up with a Quaalude...*

S2: Don't pick on her, man.

S1 [In increasingly emotional voice]: *And who won't fuck me 'cause she's in a coma. I can't even have a kid with her. Her womb is so polluted I can't even have a fucking little baby with her.*

S3: [To S1]: You son of a bitch! You fuck! [throwing water into S1's face]. How dare you talk to me like that?

[Scarface, 1983]

(i93)

[A group of young people are waiting outside a night club to get in. Suddenly a car alarm sounds. S2, a male club patron and his girlfriend (S3) look up and notice two men (S4 and I1). I1 is ostensibly sitting on the bonnet of S2's car. S5 is S2 and S3's fellow bar patron.]

S2: [Turning off the car alarm with a remote] Hey, hey. Yeah you, get up. [I1 does not move] What are you retarded? Get off the fucking car!

[I1 keeps sitting on the car].

S3: *Hey dickless, get off the fucking car! Hey fucksuck, get your slippery fucking ass off the car! Listen to me, get off the fucking car with your fucking ass!*

S4: *Shut that cunts mouth or I'll come over there and fuck-start her head!*

[A moment of consternation. Somebody from the crowd laughs loudly. S1 and S2 begin walking towards S3 and I4 with a group of people, including S5.]

S3: *You're gonna wish you never fucking got up this morning asshole, because my boyfriend's gonna fuck you up! And then after that while he's fucking up your fucking gay uncle over there I'm gonna fucking cut off your cock and mail it to your mother, you fucking faggot bitch! You gaylord fucking bitch! How do you like that? You like that a lot, you fuckin' faggot? You like to ass fuck? Fontanella fucking babyheads!*

S5 [To S3]: Go ahead.

S3 [Continuing]: *You like to fuck babyheads? You like to fuck boys? He's gonna fuck you in the ass, how do you like that? He's not even gay but he'll do it just to fuck...*

S2 [To S3 trying to calm Her down]: Honey, honey. [To S4] She's got a big mouth but she's not kidding. I'm gonna whip you silly and I'm gonna fuck you stupid. You wanna do the man dance? First dance is yours.

[S4 pushes S2 off and hits S3 in the face. A messy fight between S4 and I1 and the whole group breaks out.]

[The way of the gun, 2000]

(i94)

[A group of convicts are contemplating their difficult situation. The alien species they had previously caught is on the loose again. The superintendent and a number of convicts have already been killed by the beast. S1 is a fellow convict, S2 is a deputy prison administrator, S3 is a fellow convict and group leader.]

S1 [...]: What are we gonna do?

S2 [to S1]: Do you want a smack in the mouth, *you stupid wanker? Shut the fuck up and stop causing panic!*

S1: Panic? *You're so fuckin' stupid you couldn't even spell it.* Don't talk to me about panic. [S1 and S2 begin to assault each other verbally]

S3: Shut up, both of you! Shut up!

[S1 and S2 calm down and stop arguing]

[Alien 3, 1992]

(i95)

[Two rivaling co-anchors at a local television station taunt each other as they go off the air. S1 is male, S2 is female.]

S1: *You are a real hooker. I'm gonna slap you in public.*

S2 [chuckling]: *You have man boobs.*

S1: *You've got a dirty whorish mouth. I'm gonna punch you in the ovary.* That's what I gonna do. A straight shot.

S2: Ooh, ow.

S1: *Right to the baby-maker.*

S2: *Ah, jazz flute is for little fairy boys.*

S1: Okay, you know what? That's uncalled for. I can't work with this woman [S1 leaves].

[Anchorman: the legend of Ron Burgundy, 2004]

(i96)

[Two rivaling co-anchors at a television news station are arguing about the equipment S1, a woman, needs to use. S2, a man, is currently using the machine for a personal aim.]

S1: Excuse me.

S2: Miss Corningstone, What are you doing?

S1: I need this machine so I can watch a tape for a story, Ron.

S2: Well, I'm using the tape. I'm showing Jeffrey my Emmy tape. We are watching history.

S1: Mr. Burgundy, I'm a professional, and I would like to be able to do my job.

S2: Well, big deal. I am very professional.

S1: Mr. Burgundy, you are acting like a baby.

S2: I'm not a baby, I am a man. I am an anchorman.

S1: You are not a man. You are a big fat joke.

S2: I'm a man who discovered the wheel and built the Eiffel Tower out of metal and brawn. That's what kind of man I am. You're just a woman with a small brain. With a brain a third the size of us. It's science.

S1: *I will have you know that I have more talent and more intelligence in my little finger than you do in your entire body, sir.*

S2: *You are a smelly pirate hooker.*

S1: *You look like a blueberry.*

S2: *Why don't you go back to your home on Whore Island?*

S1: *Well, you have bad hair.*

[Onlookers gasp in surprise]

S2: What did you say?

S1: *I said... your hair... looks stupid.*

[S2 screams and a fight between him and S1 ensues]

[Anchorman: the legend of Ron Burgundy, 2004]

(i97)

[A group of three bowling friends (S2, S3 and I4) is assaulted in the street by three thugs demanding money from them. S1 is the leader of the thugs]

S1: OK. So we takes the money you have on you and we calls it even!

S2: *Fuck you!*

S3 [to S1]: Hey, no. Come on, Walter. Come on, we're ending this thing cheap, man.

S2: No, what's mine is mine.
S1: No funny stuff.
S3: Alright, alright [S3 and I4 begin searching for money in their wallets.]
[...]
S2: What's mine is mine.
S1: *We fuck you up, man.* We takes the money.
S2: Come and get it.
S1: *We fuck you up!*
S2: Show me what you got, *nihilist!*
S1: *Fuck you.* [S1 draws a sword].
S3 [Scared to S2]: Walter, come on. He's got a sword.
S2: *Dipshit with a nine-toed woman.*
S1: *Fuck you!*
[S2 hits S1 with a bowling ball. A messy fight begins]

[The Big Lebowski, 1998]

(i98)

[Officer Sims, an undercover armed DEA agent, has been on a plane by a group of runaway prisoners who had taken over the plane. His superior, Duncan Malloy (S1), discusses this situation with two other public servants from the Marshall's office (S2 and S3). S3 has been responsible for the transport of the prisoners. S2 is his superior joining the discussion]

S1: What about Sims? What happened to Sims?

S2: Duncan, they killed him.

S3: They got the plane. [moment of silence]

S1: [...] Tell me, Skip, what kind of a Keystone Cops operation are you guys runnin' here, huh?

[to S3] *And you! You, you little shit. You got my agent killed!*

S3 Hey, he brought a gun on the plane!

S1: If I knew the way you guys run things, I would've told him bring a fuckin' uzi on board!

S3: No one carries on these flights! No one! He brought a gun on board and he got himself killed. And in doing so, he compromised the safety of my men!

S1: *Your men are incompetent! They let themselves get taken over by a bunch of thugs in chains and cages!*

S3: I'm not gonna stand around and listen to this *shit!*

S2: Guys, guys. Let's work it out.

S1: Okay. Okay.

[S1 and S3's tempers subsume]

[Con Air, 1997]

(i99)

[Two co-founders of an underwater oil rig (S1, S4) are confronting soldiers (S2, I3) who for the sake of a secret operation have brought a nuclear bomb on board of the rig]

S1 [to S3]: You know, you've got some huevros bringing that thing on my rig. [...] Does that struck anyone as particularly psychotic, or is it just me?

S2: Mrs. Brigman, you don't need to know the details of our operation. It's better if you don't.

S1: You're right. I don't need to know. What I need to know is that thing is off this rig. Do you hear me, Roger Ramjet?

S2: You're becoming a serious impediment to our mission. Now you either do an about-face and walk out of here, or I'll have you escorted out.

S1: [increasingly emotional]: I will not do an about-face and get outta here! Who the hell do you think you're talking to? [I3 grabs S1 and forces her towards the exit]

[...]

S4: [to I3] You let her go, man. Do it. Do it now!

S2 [to I3]: Let her go.

S1 [to S2]: Coffey, *you son of a bitch!*

S4 [to S1]: Lindsey! Cool it.

[S1 calms down]

[The Abyss, 1989]

(i100)

[S2, a female employee in a law firm, is disputing with her boss (S1) about the value of bonus check she is about to receive]

S1: I have your bonus cheque. I want you to be prepared. this figure is not exactly what we discussed.

S2: Why not?

S1: I have your bonus cheque. I want you to be prepared. this figure is not exactly what we discussed.

S2: Why not?

S1: Because after careful considerations I felt that figure was not appropriate.

[...]

S2: I did a job. You should reward me accordingly. It's not complicated. That is the fucking problem. All you lawyers do is complicate situations that aren't complicated. *Do you know why people think lawyers are back-stabbing blood-sucking scumbags? Because they are.* I cannot believe that you are doing this to me now [...]

[Erin Brockovich, 2000]

(i101)

[Two mob members have come to their acquaintance in a car with the dead body of a black man inside. S2, a black man, and I3, a white man, have come to ask S1 – a white man for help to dispose of the body. S1 is dissatisfied with this situation. He rebukes S2 and I3 violently]

S1: You know what's on my mind right now? [...] It's the dead *nigger* in my garage. [...] When you came pulling in here, did you notice a sign up front of my house that said "dead niggers' storage?"

S2. Jimmy, you know I ain't seen no shit.

S1: Did you notice a sign up front of my house that said "*dead niggers' storage?*"

S2. No, I didn't

S1: You know why you didn't see that sign?

S2: Why?

S1: Because it ain't there, *cause storing dead niggers ain't my fucking business!*

(does S2 stay silent?)

[Pulp fiction, 1994]

(i102)

[A captive serial killer (S2) is on the way to the place where he has stated he wants to show the bodies of two of his victims to the police. S1 and S3 are police officers escorting him. S1 and I3 are talking to S2 on the way. S2 is describing his former victims]

S1 [to S2]: Wait a minute, I thought all you did was kill innocent people.

S2: [looking at S1]: Innocent? Is that supposed to be funny? An obese man, a disgusting man, who could barely stand up. A man who if you saw on the street you would point to your friends, so they could join you in mocking him? A man who if you saw while you were eating, you wouldn't be able to finish your meal! And after him I picked a lawyer [...]. This is a man who dedicated his life to making money by lying with every breath that he could muster, to keep murderers and rapists on the street.

S1: Murderers?

S2 A woman!

S1: Murderers, John, like yourself?

S2: A woman! So ugly on the inside that she could barely go on living if she couldn't be beautiful on the outside. A drug dealer, *a drug dealing pederast*, actually. And let's not forget the *disease-spreading whore*! Only in a world this *shitty* could you even try to say these were innocent people and keep a straight face. And that's the point. We see a deadly sin on every street corner, in every home, and we tolerate it. [...] Well, not anymore. I'm setting the example. And what I've done is gonna be puzzled over, and studied, and followed forever.

S1: Yeah. [to I3]: Illusions of grandeur.

[Seven, 1995]

(i103)

[S2, a deep ocean diver is on a mission to disconnect an armed nuclear bomb at the bottom of the sea. S2 is going well below the safe diving limit and is starting to experience physiological problems connected with high water pressure. S2, his wife, is talking to him to keep him conscious.]

S1: Bud, There's some.... some things I need to say. It's hard for me, you know. It's not easy being a *cast-iron bitch*. It takes discipline and years of training [...]

[The Abyss, 1989]

(i104)

[Two convicts (S2 and S3) are complaining to their co-prisoner and group leader (S1) that they do not want to go about their everyday duties with another prisoner. S1 makes his decision concerning the conflict]

S1: The boy's going with you. Golic is just another *poor, miserable, suffering son of a bitch*, just like you and me.

S2: Except he smells worse.

S3: And he is crazy.

S1: Knock off the shit! You've got a job to do. I don't wanna hear another word about Golic. Ok?

[S2 and S3 lower their heads in resignation.]

[Alien 3, 1992]

(i105)

[The court of law. Full room with the judge, the jury, the prosecution and the defence. The defendant (S1) is making his final speech explaining his background to the court.]

S1: Now, I ain't sayin' that my way would have been different had my mother been alive when I was a kid, 'cause that's all you hear in the joint: "Oh, man. I didn't have a chance." No. Bullshit. I was already *a mean little bastard* while my mother was alive, and I know it.

[Carlito's way, 1993]

(i106)

[S1 is sitting on a bed next to his deceased lover, who has been murdered at night when they were asleep]

S1: Damn it, Goldie. Who were you and who wanted you dead? Who were you besides an angel of mercy giving a *two-time loser* like me the night of his life?

[Sin city, 2005]

(i107)

[S1 – a black man – and S2 – a white man – are engaged in a rap battle in front of a group of people in a Detroit club].

S1 [to S2]:

You catch a bad 1,

You're better off shooting yourself with poppa doc's hand gun.

Climbing up this mountain, your weak,

I leave you lost without a paddle.

Floatin' up shits creek.

You ain't Detroit. I'm the D.

You're the new kid on the block

about to get smacked to the boondocks.

Fucking nazi your squad ain't your type,

take some real advice

and form a group with Vanilla Ice.

And what I tell you, you better use it.

This guys a hillbilly this ain't Willie Nelson music.

Trailer trash, I'll choke you to your last breath

and have you look foolish like cheddar bob when he shot himself.

Silly rabbit, I know why they call you that ...

cuz you follow future like he got carrots *up his ass crack*.

And when you acted up

that's when you got jacked up

and act stupid like Tina Turner when *she got smacked up*.

I crack your shoulder blade

you'll get dropped so hard that Elvis'll start turning in his grave.

Now I know why they left you out in the dark.

You need to take your white ass

back across 8 mile to the trailer park.

[The crowd cheers]

(...)

S2 [to S1]:
 This guy raps like *his parents jerked em*.
 He sounds like Erick Sermon ... the generic version.
 This whole crowd looks suspicious
 it's all dudes in here except for *these bitches*.
 So, I'm a German, huh?
 That's ok you look like a *fucking worm with braids*.
 These leaders of the freeworld rookies.
 Lookie, *how could 6 dicks be pussies?*
 Talking about shits creek bitch,
you could be up piss creek with paddles.
 This deep. You still gonna sink, you're a disgrace,
 ya they call me rabbit this is a turtle race.
 He can't get with me spittin this shit wickedly
 lyckety-shot a spika-a-spicketly split lyckety.
 I'm gonna turn around with a great smile
 and walk my white ass back across 8 mile
 [The crowd cheers intensely]

[8 Mile, 2002]

(i108)

[A secluded community of adventurous boys are having their meal. S1, the leader of the group, is challenging their guest, an adult male (S2), who used to be the group's leader and poses a threat to S1's leadership. S3 is a friendly fairy who tries for S2 to remember his time among the group and regain his leading role. S4 is one of the boys. There is a group of other children present at the table]

S1: *Eat your heart out, you crinkled, wrinkled fat bag!*

S2: You're very ill-mannered, young man.

S1: *You're a slug-eating worm.*

S3: Come on, you can do better than that.

S2: You're encouraging him?

S1: Yes, *show me your fastball, dust brain! You paunchy, sag-bottomed puke pot!*

Kids [raising their hands]: Bangarang, Rufio!

S2: You're a very poor role model for these kids, do you know that?

[Kids whistle and show a gesture of disapproval]

S2: I bet you don't even have a fourth-grade reading level.

S1: *Haemorrhoidal sucknavel.*

S2: Maybe a fifth-grade reading level.

[Kids whistle and show a gesture of disapproval]

S1: *Boil-dripping, beef, fart-sniffing bubble butt!*

Kids [raising their hands]: Bangarang, Rufio!

S2: Someone has a *severe ca-ca mouth*, you know that?

S1: *You are fart factory, Slug-slimed, sack-of-rat-guts-in-cat-vomit, cheesy, scab-picked, pimple-squeezing finger bandage. A week old maggot burger with everything on it and flies on the side!*

Kids: [with disgust] Ugh!

S2: *Substitute chemistry teacher.*

S4: Come on, Rufio, hit him back.

S1: *Mung tongue.*

S2: *Math tutor.*

S1: *Pinhead.*

S2: *Prison barber.*

S1: *Mother lover.*

S2: *Nearsighted gynecologist.*

S1: *In your face, camel cake!*

S2: *In your rear, cow derrière.*

S1: *Lying, crying, spying, prying ultra-pig.*

S2: *You lewd, crude, rude, bag of pre-chewed food dude.*

Kids [raising their hands]: *Bangarang, Peter!*

S2 [with irritation]: *You... you man! Stupid, stupid man!*

S1: *Rufio, if I'm a maggot burger why don't you eat me! You two-toned zebra-headed, slime-coated, pimple-farmin' paramecium brain, munchin' on your own mucus, suffering from Peter Pan envy!*

[...]

Kids: [chanting and cheering] *Banning, Banning, Banning is bangerang.*

[Hook, 1991]

(i109)

[A meeting of the board of directors at a law office. Board members (I -I) are sitting around a table. The president of the board of directors (S2) is sitting at the far end of the table. A female office associate (S1) arrives with a co-worker (S3), whom she intends to introduce to S2. S3 has been incapacitated for lying and feels an irresistible urge to speak the truth in every circumstances]

S1 [entering the room]: *Pardon me for interrupting your meeting. [to S2] Mr. Allen, You remember Fletcher Reede?*

S2: *Oh, yes. Nice to see you again, Fletcher. By the way, I'll be observing you in court this afternoon. I've been hearing some good things about you.*

S1: *Fletcher has just been telling me how much he thinks of you. Why don't you tell Mr. Allen. Well, what do you think of him?*

S3: *He's a pedantic, pontificating, pretentious bastard, a belligerent old fart, a worthless steaming pile of cow dung, figuratively speaking.*

[A moment of pause and consternation. Suddenly S2 starts laughing loud. Others in the room join him]

S2: *That's the funniest damn thing I've ever heard. You're a real card, Reede. I love a good roast! [Pointing to I4] Do Simmons!*

S3: *Simmons is old! He should've been out of the game years ago but he can't stay home cause he hates his wife! You've met her at the Christmas parties. She's the one that gets plastered and calls him a retard! [To I5] And you, Tom, you're the biggest brownnose I've ever seen! You've got your head so far up Mr. Allen's ass, I can't tell where you end and he begins!*

[Laughter continues]

S2: [laughing] *Priceless!*

S3: [to I 6] *You have bad breath caused by gingivitis. [to I7] You couldn't get a porn star off. [to I8] Your hairpiece looks like something that was killed crossing the highway. I don't know whether to comb it or scrape it off with a shovel and bury it alive. [to I9] Loser! [to I10] Idiot! [to I11] Wimp! [to I12] Degenerate! [to S1] Slut!*

S2 [Getting up, continuing laughing]: *I like your style, Reede! That's just what this stuffy company needs - a little irreverence!*

S3: *Good! I'll see you later, dick-head!*

[Laughter continues]

[Liar liar, 1997]

(i110)

[A group of underwater oil rig workers are checking the equipment necessary for their mission of rescuing the people in a damaged nuclear submarine. They have been handed with radiation meters S1-S3 are oil rig workers. S4 is a navy officer assigned to supervise their mission]

S1: This tell us how much radiation we're getting?

S2: Whoa, whoa! I'm not going near no radiation! No way!

S3: [to S2] Hippy, *you pussy!*

S2: What good is the money, six months later your dick drops off?

[Oil rig workers start laughing]

S4: [Springing up violently to his feet] What is your problem, huh? On this dive you'll do absolutely nothing without direct orders from me. And you follow those orders without discussion, Is that clear?

[Oil rig workers stay silent]

[The Abyss, 1989]

(i111)

[S1, a space traveler, is back on the Earth after an unusually long hypersleep in a cryotube on her space shuttle. S1 is resting in a hospital infirmary. S2 comes in holding S1's cat]

S1: [smiling] Jonesey. Come here! Hey. Come here. How are you, *you stupid cat?* How are you? [kissing the cat]. Where have you been?

S2: I guess the two have met, huh?

[Aliens, 1986]

(i112)

[Three gangsters are leaving on a boat. S1, a white man, wants S2, a Hispanic man, to untie the mooring line]

S1: [to S2] Cast her off!

S2: What's that?

S1: Untie the fuckin' rope, *you spic*. Come on!

[Carlito's way, 1993]

(i113)

[At a party. A gangster, S1, is talking to his girlfriend about a group of her friends behaving in an inappropriate way.]

S1 [...] Look at those fuckin' friends of yours. They're a fuckin' embarrassment. Go do something. Be a hostess.

S2: [Laughing] *Fuck you, asshole!*

S1: Yeah, fuck me!

[Carlito's way]

(i114)

[Two good friends and flatmates are discussing their daily adventures at work, which turn out to be less than successful for both of them]

S1: So, you got fired again, huh?

S2: Oh, yeah. They always freak out when you leave the scene of an accident, you

know.

S1: Well, I lost my job, too.

S2: Man, *you are one pathetic loser!* [laughing] No offense!

S1: No, none taken.

[Dumb and dumber, 1994]

(i115)

[A pirate captain (S1) is addressing his cheering crowd of followers on their pirate ship before embarking on a mission aimed at destroying their enemies]

S1: Thank you. Well, *my stupid, sorry parasitic sacks of entrails ...*

[The crowd bursts out with laughter]

S1: Revenge is mine.

[The crowd cheers]

[Hook, 1991]

(i116)

[A group of soldiers going on a mission in a boat. They are sitting on the deck. S2 is singing]

S1: [to S2] Hey! Knock that shit off!

S2: En-Joo don't like the arts?

S3: En-Joo don't like shit.

S1: [to S3] I like your sister, Diaz.

S3: *She's got a thing for retards.*

[John Rambo, 2008]

(i117)

[S1, a man, and S2, a woman, who used to have a relationship are fighting. S2 has just attacked S1 with a heart-exploding martial arts technique, which is certain to kill S1 in a couple of seconds. S1 has resigned from further fighting to utter his final words to S2]

S1: Pai Mei taught you the five-point palm exploding heart technique?

S2: Of course he did.

S1: Why didn't you tell me?

S2: I don't know. [Starting to cry] Because I'm a bad person.

S1: No, you're not a bad person. You're terrific person. You're my favourite person. But every once in a while you can be *a real cunt.*

[S2 laughs through her tears]

[Kill Bill vol 2, 2004]

(i118)

[A group of soldiers are going on a rescue mission in a helicopter. S3 is chewing something in his mouth and trying to offer his food to other soldiers.]

S1 [to S2]: Get that stinkin' shit out of my face!

[S3 offers his food to I2, who does not react]

S3: *Bunch of slack-jawed faggots around here!* This stuff will make you a goddamn sexual tyrannosaurus, just like me.

S1: *Strap this on your sore ass, Blain!*

[Soldiers start laughing]

[Predator, 1987]

(i119)

[S1, a black gang member, calls his black boss (S2) to request support in dealing with the problem of transporting a dead body]

S1: All I want to hear from your ass is: we've no problem, Jules, I'm on the motherfucker! Go back in there. *Chill them niggers out* and wait for the cavalry, which will be comin' directly.

S2. You ain't got no problem, Jules. I'm on the motherfucker. Go back in there and *chill them niggers out*. And wait for the Wolf, who should be coming directly.

S1: You're sending the Wolf?

S2. You feel better, *motherfucker*?

S1: Shit, *negro*! That's all you had to say.

[Pulp fiction, 1994]

(i120)

[A group of gangsters are meeting in a bar. They have made it clear that they do not want to pay for their drinks. S1 – the bar owner and respected former mob boss – comes up to them to ask what the problem is. S2 is the leader of the gangster's group. S3 is his associate.]

S1[Coming to the table]: Excuse me. Something wrong with the check?

S2 [Kissing a girl, not lifting his eyes up to S1]: Yeah, something fuckin' wrong with the check!

S3 [Noticing S1, to S2]: Benny!

S2: What, man? [Noticing S1, With the air of respect] Shit. Fuck. Oh shit, man. I'm sorry, Mr. Brigante. I'm sorry. I got no problem. [...] We haven't been formally introduced, you know. My mane is Benny Blanco from the Bronx.

S1: You know me?

S2: Yeah, I know you. You're Carlito Brigante, *motherfucker-to-the-max*

[...]

S2 [to S3]: What's the matter with you? Pay the fuckin' goddamn check, bitch.

[S3 pays the check.]

[Carlito's way, 1993]

(i121)

[Navy soldiers are on a rescue mission to search for missing space colonists. Two men (S1 and S3) and one woman (S2) are in the middle of their morning exercise routine]

S1 [to S2]: Hey, Vasquez. Have you ever been mistaken for a man?.

S2. *No, have you?*

S3. [laughing and giving S1 a high five] Oh, Vasquez. *You're just too bad.*

S1: [Smiling, slaps S3 in the face. They both smile and walk away.]

[Aliens, 1986]

(i122)

[Two rivaling television news teams meet on the street. They are making comments about each others' clothing. S1 is a member of Evening News Team. S2 and S3 are members of Channel 4 News Team]

S1: Hey, nice clothes, gentlemen. I didn't know the salvation army was having a sale.

[Evening News Team laugh]

S1: Am I right, am I right? Look at these guys.

S2: Hey, where did you get those clothes? At the toilet store?

S1: What are you doing on our station's turf, Burgundy? You're about to get a serious beat-down.

S3: *I will smash your face into a car windshield and then take you mother, Dorothy Mantooth, out for a nice seafood dinner and never call her again.*

S1 [making a move at S3]: Dorothy Mantooth is a saint, you understand me?

Dorothy Mantooth is a saint.

S4: Hey, leave the mothers out of this, alright?

[Anchorman: the legend of Ron Burgundy, 2004]

(i123)

[High school. During classes S2, a girl with tragic family background, and a fellow classmate, are giving a science classroom presentation about their project for Infant Memory Generators, special eyeglasses generating visual images for infants. S1, a fellow classmate raises his hand to ask questions. S3 is another fellow classmate]

S1: What if the parents like put the pictures of Satan, dead people, crap like that?

S2: Is that what you'd show your kids?.

S3: Uhm, well. I mean, *didn't your dad like stab your mom?*

[...]

[S1 sulks. She is subsequently seen leaving the school crying.]

[Donnie Darko, 2001]

(i124)

[A group of gangsters are meeting in a bar. S1 is a mob boss, and a former employer of S2, a gang member who has just arrived wearing a suit and is saying hello to his friends. I3 and I4 are S1's associates. S5 is one of S2's friends]

S1 [noticing S2]: Hey, Tommy. All dressed up. All grown up and doing the town. Look at this. [...] Come here.

S2: Hey, Billy. How are you?

[S1 and S2 embrace]

S2. Jesus Christ Almighty. You look terrific [...] You're getting too big on me now.

S1: Just don't go busting my balls, Billy, ok?

S2: Hey, Tommy, if I was gonna break your balls I'd say, "*Go get your shine box.*"

[I3 and I4 laugh]

S1 [to I3 and I4]: This kid was great. I used to call him "Spitshine Tommy." I swear to God. We'd make the shoes look like fucking mirrors. Excuse my language. He was terrific. He was the best. He made a lot of money.

S2 [to S1]: No more shines, Billy.

S1: What?

S2: I said, no more shines. Maybe you didn't hear about it. You've been away a long time. They didn't go up there and tell you. I don't shine shoes anymore.

S1: Relax, will you? [...] I'm breaking your balls a little bit, that's all. I'm only kidding with you...

S2: Sometimes you don't sound like you're kidding, you know, there's a lot of people around.

S1: I'm only kidding with you, we're having a party, I just came home and I haven't seen you in a long time and I'm breaking your balls, and you're getting fucking fresh. I'm sorry, I didn't mean to offend you.

S2: I'm sorry too. It's okay. No problem.

[A pause. S1 and S2 have a drink]

S1: *Now go home and get your fuckin' shinebox.*

S2 [breaking the glass]: Mother fucking mutt! [Makes a move at S1 and is restrained by his friends] You, you fucking piece of shit!

S1 [taunting S2] Yeah, yeah, yeah, come on, come on, come on!

[S2 is escorted out by his friends]

[...]

S5 [to S1]: You insulted him a little bit. You got a little bit out of order yourself.

S1: I didn't.

S5: You insulted him a little bit.

[Goodfellas, 1990]

(i125)

[A group of gangsters are sitting in a bar. S2, a gang member tells the group a funny story about his confrontation with the police. S1 and S3 are other group members. The group laughs loudly at S2's words.]

S1: *You're really funny. You're really funny.*

S2: What do you mean I'm funny?

S1: It's funny, you know. It's a good story, it's funny, you're a funny guy.

[laughs]

S2 [With tension in his face]: What do you mean, you mean the way I talk? What?

S1: It's just, you know. You're just funny, it's... funny, the way you tell the story and everything.

[The group stays quiet]

S2: Funny how? What's funny about it?

S3 [to S2]: Tommy no, You got it all wrong.

S2 [to S3]: Oh, oh, Anthony. He's a big boy, he knows what he said. [to S1] What did ya say? Funny how?

S1: Just...

S2: What?

S1: Just... ya know... you're funny.

S2 [with emphasis]: You mean, let me understand this cause, ya know maybe it's me, I'm a little fucked up maybe, but I'm funny how, I mean funny like I'm a clown, I amuse you? I make you laugh, I'm here to fuckin' amuse you? What do you mean funny, funny how? How am I funny?

S1: Just... you know, how you tell the story, what?

S2: No, no, I don't know, you said it. How do I know? You said I'm funny. How the fuck am I funny, what the fuck is so funny about me? Tell me, tell me what's funny!

[A long pause]

S1: Get the fuck out of here, Tommy!

[Everyone laughs]

S2: Motherfucker! I almost had him, I almost had him. You stuttering prick, you. Frankie, was he shaking? I wonder about you sometimes, Henry. You may fold under questioning.

[Goodfellas, 1990]

(i126)

[James Randi, a practicing magician and psychic debunker during a lecture]
[...] I am an actor. I'm an actor who plays a specific part. I play the part of a magician [...] If someone were to appear on this stage in front of me and actually claimed to be an ancient prince of Denmark named Hamlet, *you would be insulted*. And rightly so. Why would a man assume that you would believe something bizarre like this? But there exists out there a very large population of people who will tell you they have psychic, magical powers [...]

[James Randi at TED conference, Feb. 2007:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W7W1Vf_CMCC (access: 29.03.2015)]

(i127)

[Christopher Hitchens, a journalist and anti-religious activist during a debate]
[Religion] attacks us in our deepest integrity. *It's an insult to us, in other words*. It says that we, you and I, could not individually or collectively decide upon a right action or right thing without celestial divine permission. We would not know right from wrong if we did not have heaven's permission to do so [...]

[Christopher Hitchens in Hitchens vs. Hitchens debate: on God, war, politics and culture: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7nIRJvMz4K8> (access: 29.03.2015)]

(i128)

[A hotel room. The owner of Fisher Morrow, a multi-million dollar international corporation is a dying man, who has left a will to his son and the heir to the corporation (S1). S1 is brought face to face with his Godfather and chief advisor (S2). It has turned out that S2 has been running a criminal scheme in order to prevent S1 to follow his father's will, with which S2 does not agree with.]

S1 [to S2]: The kidnappers are working for you?

S2: Robert...

S1: You're trying to get that safe open? To get the alternate will?

S2: Fisher Morrow has been my entire life. I can't let you destroy it.

S1: I'm not gonna throw away my inheritance, why would I?

S2: I couldn't let you rise to your father's last taunt.

S1: What taunt?

S2: The will, Robert. That will? *That's his last insult*. A challenge for you to build something for yourself by telling you you're not worthy of his accomplishments.

[Inception, 2010]

(i129)

[An assassination squad leader (S1) is telling his subordinate assassin (S2) a story about a Chinese kung-fu master]

S1: Once upon a time in China [...] Head Priest of White Lotus Clan, Pai Mei was walking down the road contemplating [...] And a Shaolin monk appeared on the road coming the opposite direction. As the monk and priest crossed paths, Pai Mei, in a practically unfathomable display of generosity, gave the monk the slightest of nods. The nod was not returned. Now, was it the intention of the Shaolin monk to insult Pai Mei, or did he just fail to see the generous social gesture? The motifs of the monk remain unknown. What is known were the consequences. The next morning Pai Mei appeared at the Shaolin temple and demanded of the temple's Head Avid that he offer Pai Mei his neck *to repay the*

insult. The Avid first tried to console Pai Mei, only to find out Pai Mei was inconsolable. And so began massacre of the Shaolin Temple and all sixty monks inside at the fists of the White Lotus.

[Kill Bill vol 2, 2004]

(i130)

[An internet review of the top 20 worst video games of all times]

Ride to Hell: Retribution is an *insult in every sense of the word*. It's an *insult to gamers*. It's an *insult to game developers*. It's an *insult to women* and it's an *insult to bikers, who are portrayed in this game as nothing but rapists and idiots, who kill people just because they don't like them* [...]

[The top 20 worst games ever, DXFan619 YouTube channel:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQQmH1PH_K0 (access: 29.03.2015)]

Summary

Łukasz Matusz

A Cognitive Study of Insults

The phenomena of linguistic impoliteness, taboo language and verbal aggression have until recently been underestimated in the mainstream strands of linguistic analysis. In the recent years, however, a number of important publications (Jay, 1992; 2000; Allan and Burridge, 2006; Pinker, 2008; Bousfield, 2008) have sparked an increased interest in these problems.

The main objective of this dissertation was a comprehensive cognitive analysis of insults. I have tried to demonstrate that the tools of cognitive linguistics can adequately account for different categories of insulting expressions. In order to illustrate that, I have analysed a corpus of 130 film scenes from four different theoretical perspectives: Lakoff's conception of Idealized Cognitive Models, the cognitive theory of speech acts, Langacker's notion of network models, and Talmy's theory of force dynamics.

This dissertation is divided into two parts: the theoretical part includes chapters 1-4, and the practical application part is presented in chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides general conclusions emerging from the present study.

Chapter 1 focuses briefly on the most important tenets of the autonomous approach to language, in opposition to which the main precepts of cognitive linguistics have been formulated. It discusses also the traditional formal logic and compositional account of semantics, which is shown to be a natural and inevitable consequence of the objectivist view of categorization.

In chapter 2 the discussion is centred around the most important precepts of cognitive linguistics and the presentation of the cognitive tools employed in the practical part of this dissertation. Cognitive linguists view language as a non-autonomous human faculty, which is part of the general conceptual system. Hence, different processes of perception, categorization, mental imagery and

reasoning are found in language, as well as in other spheres of human activity. This chapter presents also the cognitive analytical tools which are employed in the research part of this dissertation: the ICM theory, Langacker's conception of network models and the theory of force dynamics put forward by Talmy.

Chapter 3 provides a view of different pragmatic issues pertaining to the problem of verbal aggression. In particular, the discussion is focused on the issues of linguistic (im)politeness and speech acts analysis. The account of different views of linguistic politeness and impoliteness provides a wider pragmatic perspective on the phenomenon of verbal aggression. The description of the theory of speech acts focuses on the theoretical background for the contemporary study of speech acts and the cognitive application of the theory. In accordance with Grzegorzczkova (1991), four felicity conditions for the speech act of insulting are proposed:

1. X's utterance contains a negative evaluation of Y.
2. X intends Y to feel humiliated.
3. X uses words which are emotionally and axiologically negatively charged.
4. As a result of X's utterance Y feels insulted (perlocution).

The cognitive analysis of these conditions constitutes another theoretical perspective applied in the practical part of this dissertation.

In chapter 4 a wider neurological, psychological and socio-cultural background of insults is presented. Through the discussion of taboo, swearing and verbal aggression, offensive speech is shown to be an intrinsically neurological, psychological and socio-cultural phenomenon. Chapter 4 presents also Jay's (2000) 5-stage model of verbal aggression:

STAGE 1: THE OFFENDING EVENT
 STAGE 2: THE DEGREE OF ANGER
 STAGE 3: ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL ANGER
 STAGE 4: LOSS OF CONTROL
 STAGE 5: RETRIBUTION

This model is subsequently implemented in chapter 5 as the prototypical scenario insults.

Chapter 5 constitutes the practical realisation of the theoretical discussion carried out in the preceding chapters. A corpus analysis of 130 film scene samples is presented and analysed by means of the four cognitive linguistics research tools mentioned above. The analysis of verbal aggression in terms of the ICM theory allows us to distinguish different prototypical and non-prototypical categories of insults. Prototypical verbal aggression follows the stages shown in Jay's model. The categories of non-prototypical insults presented in chapter 5 include: non-human wrongdoer, absent wrongdoer, delayed retribution, reflexive insults, redirected insults, intensifying insults, insult chains, incidental insults, self-insults, insult duels, banter, non-taboo insults and non-verbal insults.

The practical application of speech acts analysis focuses on studying offensive speech in terms of felicity conditions which, in accordance with the cognitive theory of speech acts, are considered to be prototypical in nature. The account of verbal aggression as a network model provides a comprehensive and inclusive perspective on the phenomenon of insults. Finally, the analysis of different prototypical and non-prototypical categories of offensive speech in terms of force dynamics theory represents the interplay of intrapersonal and interpersonal factors pertaining to verbal aggression and verbal conflict.

Chapter 6 presents the general conclusions emerging from the study of insults in chapter 5. I conclude that insulting constitutes a significant interpersonal and linguistic activity, which is worthy of further academic enquiry. Because of its social, psychological and linguistic complexity, any adequate account of insulting must call for the kind of theoretical tools provided by cognitive linguistics. Chapter 6 proposes also a number of areas pertaining to the problems of linguistic impoliteness, swearing and verbal aggression which may be undertaken by the future researchers working in these fields.

Streszczenie

Łukasz Matusz

Kognitywne studium obelg

Zjawiska niegrzeczności językowej, języka tabu i agresji werbalnej przez długi czas były niedoceniane w głównym nurcie analizy językoznawczej. Jednakże w ostatnich latach pojawienie się szeregu ważnych publikacji takich autorów jak Jay (1992; 2000), Allan i Burrige (2006), Pinker (2008) i Bousfield (2008) spowodowało wzmożone zainteresowanie językoznawców tą problematyką.

Celem niniejszej dysertacji jest kognitywna analiza obelg w języku angielskim. Twierdzę w niej, że narzędzia językoznawstwa kognitywnego pozwalają na adekwatny i wyczerpujący opis różnych kategorii wyrażen obelżywych. Materiałem badawczym pracy jest korpus złożony ze 130 scen wyselekcjonowanych ze współczesnych filmów anglojęzycznych, które analizuję z czterech różnych perspektyw teoretycznych: koncepcji idealizowanych modeli kognitywnych Lakoffa, kognitywnej teorii aktów mownych, modeli sieciowych Langackera i teorii dynamiki siły Talmy'ego.

Praca podzielona jest na dwie części: część teoretyczna składa się z rozdziałów 1-4, część badawcza przedstawiona jest w rozdziale 5. Rozdział 6 stanowi próbę omówienia najważniejszych wniosków z przeprowadzonych badań oraz podsumowanie głównych punktów dysertacji.

W rozdziale 1 skupiam się na krótkim opisie najważniejszych założeń autonomicznego podejścia do języka, w opozycji do którego formułowane są główne zasady językoznawstwa kognitywnego. Rozważam tu również tradycyjne podejście do semantyki językowej oparte na logice formalnej i analizie składnikowej i wykazuję – za Lakoffem (1987) – że wywodzą się one z obiektywistycznej teorii kategoryzacji.

Rozdział drugi opisuje najważniejsze założenia językoznawstwa kognitywnego i przedstawia narzędzia teoretyczne użyte w praktycznej części pracy. Językoznawcy kognitywni stoją na stanowisku, że język jest nieautonomiczną ludzką zdolnością i częścią ludzkiego systemu pojęciowego. Dlatego też różne procesy percepcji, kategoryzacji, schematów wyobrażeniowych i pojmowania obecne w języku odnoszą się również do innych pól ludzkiej działalności. W rozdziale drugim prezentuję również narzędzia analizy kognitywnej użyte w części praktycznej dysertacji: teorię idealizowanych modeli kognitywnych, koncepcję modeli sieciowych i kognitywną teorię dynamiki siły.

W rozdziale trzecim prezentowane są różne zjawiska pragmatyczne odnoszące się do problemu agresji werbalnej. W szczególności skupiam się tu na problematyce (nie)grzeczności językowej i analizie aktów mownych. Podsumowanie różnych teorii dotyczących grzeczności i niegrzeczności językowej ukazuje szerszą perspektywę pragmatyczną omawianych zagadnień. W opisie teorii aktów mownych skupiam się na teoretycznych podstawach tej teorii i jej aplikacji w ramach paradygmatu kognitywnego. Przedstawiam również pracę Grzegorzczkowskiej (1991), która proponuje cztery warunki aktu mownego obelgi:

1. Wypowiedź X-a zawierająca sąd negatywny o Y-ku.
2. Intencja X-a wywołania w Y-ku poniżenia
3. Obecność słów nacechowanych ekspresją negatywną aksjologicznie i emocjonalnie
4. Perlokucja w postaci stanu psychicznego Y-ka: Y poczuł się zelżony

Kognitywna analiza tych warunków stanowi kolejną perspektywę teoretyczną użytą w praktycznej analizie wyrażen obraźliwych w niniejszej pracy.

Rozdział czwarty prezentuje szersze neurologiczne, psychologiczne i społeczno-kulturowe uwarunkowania obelg. Poprzez dyskusję pojęcia tabu językowego, przeklinania i agresji werbalnej wyrażenia obelżywe ukazane są jako złożone zjawisko o podłożu neurologicznym, psychologicznym i społeczno-kulturowym. W rozdziale czwartym opisuję również pięcioetapowy model agresji werbalnej Jay'a (2000):

ETAP 1: OBRAŹLIWE WYDARZENIE
ETAP 2: STOPIEŃ GNIEWU
ETAP 3: PRÓBY KONTROLI GNIEWU
ETAP 4: UTRATA KONTROLI
ETAP 5: UKARANIE SPRAWCY

Model Jay'a użyty jest w rozdziale piątym jako prototypowy scenariusz obelg.

Rozdział piąty stanowi praktyczną realizację teoretycznych wywodów prowadzonych w poprzednich rozdziałach. W rozdziale tym opisuję analizę obelg w oparciu o korpus 130 scen ze współczesnych filmów anglojęzycznych przy użyciu czterech narzędzi językoznawstwa kognitywnego prezentowanych powyżej. Analiza agresji werbalnej w ramach teorii idealizowanych modeli kognitywnych pozwala na wyłonienie szeregu prototypowych i nieprototypowych kategorii obelg. Na podstawie powyższych rozważań definiuję prototypowe wyrażenia obelżywe jako akty werbalne które wyczerpują model Jay'a. Do nieprototypowych obelg wyszczególnionych w pracy należą kategorie nie-ludzkiego sprawcy, nieobecnego sprawcy, odłożonej kary, obelgi odruchowej, obelgi przekierowanej, obelgi intensyfikującej, łańcucha obelg, obelgi przypadkowej, auto-obelgi, pojedynku na obelgi, przyjacielskiej obelgi, obelgi bez komponentu tabu językowego i obelgi niewerbalnej. Praktyczna aplikacja kognitywnej teorii aktów mownych skupia się na studium prototypowych i nieprototypowych aktów obelżywych pod kątem ich warunków zaproponowanych przez Grzegorzyczkową. Warunki te, zgodnie z założeniami kognitywnej teorii aktów mownych, ukazane są jako z natury prototypowe. Prezentacja obelg w ramach modeli sieciowych ukazuje obszerną, lecz spójną perspektywę omawianych problemów. Wreszcie analiza prototypowych i nieprototypowych kategorii wyrażen obelżywych jako modeli dynamiki siły ukazuje wzajemne oddziaływanie intra- i interpersonalnych czynników odgrywających rolę w aktach agresji werbalnej.

W rozdziale szóstym prezentuję konkluzje płynące z części badawczej pracy przedstawionej w rozdziale 5. Zjawisko obelgi jest nie-marginalną czynnością językową i jako taka powinna być przedmiotem dalszych rozważań akademickich. Jestem przekonany, że teoretyczne narzędzia językoznawstwa kognitywnego w sposób zadowalający i wyczerpujący opisują tę problematykę. W rozdziale

szóstym proponuje się również szereg zagadnień dotyczących zjawisk niegrzeczności językowej, przeklinania i agresji werbalnej które mogą być podejmowane przez autorów zainteresowanych tymi dziedzinami.