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FACE

an interdisciplinary perspective

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An Interdisciplinary Perspective

To my Mother, my Sister Nika and Tomek

Ewa Bogdanowska-Jakubowska

FACE

An Interdisciplinary Perspective

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Reviewer
Anna Lubecka

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Everything is in the face.
Cicero

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List of the most common abbreviations and notational conventions

BNC   — British National Corpus
dim.   — diminutive
FFA   — face-flattering act
FTA   — face-threatening act
H   — the hearer
L1   — first language
L2   — second language
LDCE   — *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English*
OALD   — *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English*
OED   — *Oxford English Dictionary Online*
OPWN   — *Wielki słownik polsko-angielski PWN-Oxford*
S   — the speaker
SJP   — *Słownik języka polskiego*

Italics are used when words are used metalinguistically, e.g., *face*, *twarz*, or when new concepts or phenomena are introduced, e.g., *physiognomy.*

CAPITALS are used for concepts and conceptual elements, e.g., THE FACE FOR THE PERSON.

Preface

This book is to show the concept of face from many distinct perspectives. Paul Ekman, who studied the face and facial expression for more than fifty years, said in an interview for the *San Francisco Chronicle* (2002) that "Everyone is interested in faces." My fascination with faces is the main reason why I have taken up the concept. As a linguist whose main research interests focus on sociocultural conditioning of language use, I cannot concentrate exclusively on the physicality of face. Therefore, I decided to create a picture of the concept which would include its most important aspects. Although my intention is to provide a thorough presentation of face, the key issue is to be the role it plays in social interaction. Entering into contact with other people, we have to take into account:

- the face as a part of the body, with its stable features and transient expressions,
- face understood as an image of self which every person creates during social interaction.

The social significance of these two aspects of face is indisputable and deserves a close analysis.

Thus, the topic of the book is face, and the main objective is to carry out an analysis of this complex, multi-dimensional concept in an interdisciplinary perspective (interdisciplinarity is understood here as the diversity of practices and relations among disciplines (Fairclough and Duszak, 2008)). The concept of face has been the subject of many academic papers and monographs in different disciplines, e.g., psychology, sociology, cultural and historical anthropology, philosophy, literary studies, biology, medicine, communication studies, linguistic pragmatics and sociolinguistics. It should be indicated, however, that no monograph on the subject of face has been published, which takes such an interdisciplinary perspective as the present work. The interdisciplinary perspective taken here involves:

- a cognitive study of the concept of FACE,
- an analysis of the role of the face as a part of the body over the centuries and across cultures and disciplines,
- a cross-cultural analysis of face as a folk concept in Anglo-American (further in the book called American; for the explanation see p. 168) and Polish cultures,
- a presentation of the *Cultural Face Model* — a new theoretical approach to face interpretation and management.

It is also worth mentioning that face is not a "popular" topic among Polish scholars. There are only a few publications on face by Polish authors (e.g., Kępiński, 1998; Marcjanik, 1991/2001; Kopytko, 1993, 1993a; Filipowicz, 1998; *Twarz. Punkt po punkcie*, 2000; Kornacki, 2004; see also Kisiel, 1992; Tomiczek, 1992; Duszak, 1998), myself among them (e.g., Jakubowska, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2007a, 2007b). There are, however, no works on the emic concept of Polish face. The present work is to compensate for this lack.

Introduction

Justification of the approach

Face is a complex concept which over the centuries and across cultures has attracted a lot of attention among both scholars and laymen. Even a superficial observation of any aspect of everyday life results in finding faces. Before greeting a friend, we have first to identify his face. Drawing money from our bank account or crossing the border we have to present our identity card with a photo of our face. In face-to-face interaction, the success of meeting other faces depends on whether they like our face. However, no matter how we communicate with others, e.g., face to face, by phone or through an internet communicator, we have to think about face (the self-image). To lose face is one of the greatest dangers involved in social interaction.

A brief look into a dictionary allows us to see abundance of meanings of the word *face* or of any of its equivalents in other languages. Putting the English word *face* through an internet search engine gave 640,000,000 results, and a search for the Polish word *twarz* (face), 8,650,000. This indicates the omnipresence and complexity of the concept. We are, literally and metaphorically, surrounded by faces. To understand the concept, however, one cannot restrict its analysis to one discipline or one perspective.

No one can deny the social character of face. Changing Erving Goffman's (1967: 12) words slightly, we can say that it is a condition of interaction. Any form of social contact between individuals (*social interaction*) is conditioned by face; its existence, recognition and maintenance. *Communication*, the transfer of messages from one interactant to another, is necessary for social interaction (Giddens, 2006). The face (the part of the body) is indispensable for an individual to participate in social interaction and communicate with others. First of all, because its elements contribute to the transfer of information from

one interactant to another: the lips, one of the organs of speech, participate both in verbal and nonverbal communication, the eyes "tell" us things that are left out by the lips. The face as a whole is an invaluable source of information about its owner. Possession of the face makes it possible for the individual to be recognized by other interactants and identified as a particular person. Mutual maintenance of face (the image of self) involves treating the other with due respect. Deprived of the face, either through an unfortunate accident or injury or through improper behaviour, the individual is incapable of interaction with others.

The face is not only social but also cultural in nature. The face we present to others during social interaction, although said to be the mirror of our soul, to some extent can be controlled by its owner. Facial expressions of emotions have been proved to be universal, but there are significant differences across cultures in the extent to which they are free or controlled. All cultures have special display rules regarding the expected management of facial appearance and emotional expressions (Ekman, 1999). Face (the image of self) is also culture-determined. In different cultures, different aspects of self may be foregrounded during social interaction, as members of these cultures are "face sensitive" to various attributes related to different hierarchies of values (Ruhi and Işik-Güler, 2007; Spencer-Oatey, 2007). The concept of culture helps greatly to understand the diversity of human behaviour (Fitzgerald, 1993), both verbal and nonverbal; it helps one also to understand interpersonal relations which shape the culture-specific content of face (Duszak, 1998).

As can be seen, the face (the part of the body) as well as face (the self-image), due to their social relevance, are closely interrelated. As such they are a focus of interest and subject to research in many academic disciplines, social sciences in particular, e.g., cultural anthropology, communication studies, psychology (social psychology in particular), and sociology. The face is subject to philosophical investigations. For medicine, it is both a location of illness symptoms (e.g., in psychiatry) and a part of the body to be cured (e.g., plastic and aesthetic surgery). In criminology, facial features have been investigated for signs of a criminal nature. The face had even its own "science" — physiognomy. Finally, face (the self-image) has become one of the central notions of sociolinguistics-based politeness research. Such a diversity of approaches to one concept suggests that it constitutes a good construct for interdisciplinary use.

Because face is culture-determined, it is reasonable to investigate how it (both facial expression and image of self) is managed cross-culturally. There is a distinction between the cross-cultural and intercultural aspects of communication. As William Gudykunst (2001: 19) states, *cross-cultural* "involves comparisons of communication across cultures," while *intercultural* communication "involves communication between people from different cultures." In the present book, face will be analysed across cultures.

Taking into consideration everything mentioned above, I think that face as a multi-faceted concept, involving psychological and social motivation, cultural knowledge, and the ability to perform appropriate roles, deserves to be presented in an interdisciplinary perspective. The main aim of the book is to present a comprehensive picture of face.

Methods of collecting data

Methods of collecting data should be adjusted to the aims of the study. As this book involves different approaches to the concept of face and investigates its different aspects, the data used in the respective parts of the book are of different character. In this study two kinds of data have been used:
- ethnographic data,
- linguistic data.

The *linguistic data* are collated from:
- English and Polish dictionaries,
- word searches conducted in newspapers and literary works,
- various corpora,
- word searches conducted on the Internet, on web pages both in English and in Polish,
- American and Polish library catalogues,
- electronic resources,
- general observation.

The *ethnographic data* used in this study come from different sources as well. Ideally, to study behaviour across cultures, which is what a cross-cultural study of face involves, the researcher should use multiple methods of collecting data. In my selection of ethnographic data collecting methods, I was inspired by Erving Goffman's "eclectic array of sources," including newspapers, memoires, novels and observations. Goffman (1959) used both casual observation and participant observation. In the former case, he himself admitted that he was following Georg Simmel, the German sociologist, who justified his opinions by his own observations. The ethnographic data used in this study come from:
- introspection,
- participant observation,
- interviews,
- questionnaire,
- searches of newspapers and literary works.

Introspection is "a means for data collection only about one's speech community" (Saville-Troike, 2003: 96). The method can give valuable information and important insights about the researcher's own culture, his beliefs, values and behaviour, which on the one hand constitute useful data, and on the other stimulate the formation of working hypotheses. Introspection can be a starting point for fieldwork; the researcher can use the data obtained by introspection to select problems to be investigated by other methods. It can also give him some clues as to the questions to be asked in interviews.

In this study, I resorted to introspection at the beginning of my fieldwork when I tried to formulate working hypotheses on which my analysis of the concept of face was to be based.

Participant observation is useful for researchers investigating different domains of culture. It is the most common method of collecting ethnographic data, in which the researcher participates in the situation he observes. In a talk about his fieldwork methods given in 1974, Goffman defines participant observation in the following way:

> a technique that wouldn't be the only technique a study would employ, [...] It's a matter of getting data, it seems to me, by subjecting yourself, your body and your own personality, and your own social situation, to the set of contingencies that play upon a set of individuals, so that you can physically and ecologically penetrate their circle of response to their social situation, or their ethnic situation, or whatever (1989: 125).

Such an understanding of participant observation requires that the researcher immerse himself in the culture he is to investigate, become a part of it, and allow its routines to become his own. This makes the method appear very time-consuming. Another weakness of this method is that conclusions drawn from the analysis of the data obtained by means of it are not open to verification and replication by others (Rosenfeld *et al.*, 1995: 186–187). However, it has also some benefits. As Muriel Saville-Troike (2003: 97) claims:

> One of the most important benefits of participation is being able to test hypotheses about rules for communication, sometimes by breaking them and observing or eliciting reactions. Participation in group activities over a period of time is often necessary for much important information to emerge, and for necessary trusting relationships to develop.

Participant observation allows the researcher to collect information about spontaneous, natural behaviour, not monitored in any way by the participants, during everyday social interaction.

As maintenance of face is a condition of interaction, I used participant observation by taking part in various types of social gatherings, both formal

(e.g., faculty meetings, seminars, conferences) and informal (e.g., parties, restaurants or cafés, street encounters) to see how participants manage their face, express concern for the other's face or react to a face threat.

Both the *interview* and the questionnaire constitute a good supplement to participant observation. Interviewing may provide a lot of valuable cultural information and explanation for the data collected by observation. Unlike participant observation, which presents the researcher with the "real" specific behaviours (what actually occurs), interviews provide "ideal" answers (the respondents give answers which reflect a cultural ideal or norm) (Saville-Troike, 2003). An interview usually has the form of a guided conversation during which the researcher asks questions with no predetermined response alternatives (Saville-Troike, 2003).

I decided to choose this method of collecting data, because:

> To achieve conceptual equivalence so that meaningful cross-cultural comparisons can be made, it is important first to determine the meaning of face in various cultures. Open-ended interviews or surveys in which people within the culture respond to questions designed to elicit the meaning of face are needed. Such studies would help identify commonalities with which to establish a conceptualization of face that is shared by various cultures [...]. To determine which situations involve face, determination of common emotions associated with face is necessary (Cocroft and Ting-Toomey, 1994: 500).

The interviews prepared for the present research were carried out in informal settings. They were composed of open-ended questions intended to elicit the information concerning the informants' culture, the values they cherish and the meaning of the concept of face as well as face management during social interaction. Sometimes I asked some supplementary questions in order to get a more clear and full answer.

The *questionnaire* is a data collecting method which, like the interview, involves asking questions that can be either close-ended or open-ended. As in the case of interviewing, the informants give answers which reflect cultural ideals or norms rather than admit what they actually mean or do. A questionnaire can be an alternative for interviewing, because it is much less time-consuming. However, its weakness is that the researcher does not have the chance to ask additional questions to clarify the respondents' answers.

The questionnaire used in the present research consisted of open-ended questions which were designed, as in the case of the interviews, to elicit data concerning culture, face interpretation and management.

As face is to be analysed cross-culturally, i.e. as it is interpreted and managed in two cultures, American and Polish, American and Polish respondents participated in the research. All of them were native speakers of their respective languages. Both groups came from a similar sociocultural

background and were rather homogenous. All of the participants were educated (university or high school graduates), often related in some way or another to university circles. There were 110 respondents, 50 Americans and 60 Poles, aged 22 to 74.

The application of this multiple-method approach allowed me to collect objective data which adequately illustrate the picture of face and represent patterns of face-related behaviours in the two cultures.

Outline of the book

The book consists of five chapters and conclusions. It shows interrelations between different aspects of the concept of face as well as between face and other concepts or phenomena relevant to its description. Chapter 1, "A cognitive study of the concept of FACE in English and Polish," is devoted to a general presentation of the concept of face. First, a semantic analysis of the English word *face* and the Polish word *twarz* is carried out; lexicographic definitions of these two words which are found in modern English and Polish dictionaries, respectively, are compared. Second, I employ the cognitive linguistics approach to present the concept of FACE as a radial category and FACE/TWARZ metaphors existing in English-speaking and Polish cultures, respectively. I use the English word *face* to refer to the universal concept of face; when referring to a culture-specific concept I use the word modified by an adjective denoting a given nationality (e.g., *the Polish face*) or a word denoting an emic concept (e.g., *twarz*).

In Chapter 2, "The face as a part of the body," the face is described in terms of the functions it performs in human life, the impact of its appearance on interaction with other people and the quality of life, and the meanings it conveys. Here I ponder the role of the face in our lives and discuss various approaches to this specific part of the body taken over the centuries and across cultures by different scientific or pseudo-scientific disciplines, such as anthropology, criminology, medicine, psychology, philosophy, physiognomy, and sociology.

The rest of the book deals with face as an image of the self which is socially constructed. However, in order to carry out an adequate analysis of the concept of face, one cannot avoid the study of the self (the self is said to be externalized through the face). In Chapter 3, the self is defined from psychological, sociological and philosophical perspectives. It is a concept which is central to various social theories describing the complexity of individual experience. As such it is contrasted with other related concepts, such as soul, identity and person. Finally, the self is described in terms of its relationship with the body,

starting with body—soul dualism, and leading to the body as a symbol of the self.

Face as a social construct is the topic of the next two chapters. Chapter 4 depicts the commonsense concept of face, a folk or emic notion. First, it is presented together with some related concepts, such as morality, dignity and honour. Second, the concept of culture and the models of cultural variability (Hofstede, 1980, 1991, 2001; Triandis, 1995; Hall, 1976) are introduced, as emic concepts of face need to be analysed against the cultural background. Culture and cultural experience have a strong impact on our hierarchies of values, ways of thinking and social relations, and they also shape the self (Marsella, 1985; Holland, 1997; Thoits and Virshup, 1997; Hofstede, 1998; Owens and Aronson, 2000; Barker, 2005) and face (the self-image). In the following sections, three emic concepts of face are described and analysed against the detailed background of three cultures: Chinese (as Chinese culture is said to be the original source of the concept of face), American and Polish. The analysis of the Chinese concept of face is based, for obvious reasons, on sociological and linguistic literature. My analyses of the American and Polish concepts of face are based on the data I collected in the United States and in Poland, and supported by a discussion of the character of interpersonal relations and the role of facial expressions in the two respective cultures.

The presentation of the academic concept of face, in Chapter 5, begins with an analysis of the works of Erving Goffman, the American sociologist who was the first to employ it in his research. In his works on "the world of social encounters," he presents social interaction in a theatrical perspective: treating its participants as actors, he sees the ritual organization of everyday social contacts, and perceives maintenance of face as a condition of interaction. Goffman's original ideas have become an inspiration for scholars in many academic disciplines, e.g., social psychology, sociology, (intercultural/cross-cultural) communication studies, linguistic pragmatics and sociolinguistics. Next, there follows an overview of the theories whose central concept is face. The first and most thorough treatment of the concept is Brown and Levinson's (1978, 1987) theory of politeness. Their theory and conceptualization of face were met with many voices of criticism, the most important of which are discussed. This discussion is followed by the presentation of other relevant theories and conceptualizations of face. Finally, in the section "The Cultural Face Model — and approach to face interpretation and management," I present my own contribution to the interpretation of the social construct of face, formulating an alternative theory of face and facework, the *Cultural Face Model*. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the applicability of the model to American and Polish cultures.

Conclusions include general remarks on the character of the concept in question.

Chapter 1

A cognitive study of the concept of FACE in English and Polish

1.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I am going to discuss:
- the word *face* and its Polish equivalents; I want to find out what *face* and *twarz* (and its Polish synonyms) mean in the two languages, respectively;
- the concept of FACE; I want to analyse FACE metaphors existing in English-speaking and Polish cultures.

The important role of the concept of FACE and its complexity result from the way we perceive the world, which is both anthropocentric and anthropomorphic (Maćkiewicz, 2000). Our perception of the world is based on two principles (Maćkiewicz, 2000: 31):

> [...] the man is the centre of the universe [...] and the world was created in our own image. That is why the names of parts of the body constitute a good starting point for the discussion on the popular (or naïve) perception of reality recorded, or perhaps — spelled, in language.

The way we perceive the surrounding reality and talk about it is based on our physical and cultural experience. "Some of the central concepts in terms of which our bodies function — UP–DOWN, IN–OUT, FRONT–BACK, LIGHT–DARK, WARM–COLD, MALE–FEMALE, etc. — are more sharply delineated than others" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 57). It is in terms of these concepts that our social reality is organized. The face can also be analysed in terms of these concepts. The face is the FRONT part of the head, which is in

the UPPER part of the body. And UP IS GOOD, and if we adjust the metaphor mentioned by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980), FRONT IS GOOD. Face is the LIGHT side, always looking towards the sun (cf. Tuan, 1998). In ancient Greece the word meaning "face" also denoted noon, while the word meaning "back of the head" also denoted midnight (Tuan, 1998). Thus the face in its physicality is special. Its location gains it a positive evaluation. This goes in line with the way we conceptualize the space:

FRONT IS GOOD	BACK IS BAD
to look somebody in the face (to look directly at somebody)	*to do something behind somebody's back* (unknown to the person concerned) (LDCE)
face to face with somebody/something (in the direct presence of somebody /something)	*to turn one's back on somebody* (to avoid or refuse to help, esp. unfairly or unkindly) (LDCE)
patrzeć komuś w twarz (to look somebody in the face)	*obgadywać kogoś za plecami* (to gossip about somebody behind his back)
spotkać kogoś twarzą w twarz (to meet somebody face to face)	*zadać komuś cios w plecy* (to stab somebody in the back)
odwrócić się do kogoś twarzą (to turn one's face to somebody)	*odwrócić się do kogoś plecami* (to turn one's back on somebody)

Turning our face to the other, we reveal ourselves to him to some extent and in this way signal our willingness to engage in social interaction. The "naked" face implies directness and openness. In the world of social relations, the face is a person's accessibility to the other. As Tadeusz Sławek (2000: 19) claims, the face is the name for communication, agreement "which perhaps in the articulatory sense is silent, but in the philosophical sense does not leave anything unsaid." Further, he (Sławek, 2000: 20) maintains that:

> It is natural that we are puzzled by those who turn their back on us, those who turn their face away. Somebody who has turned his back on me protects his solitude; his back is an impenetrable barrier, a boundary, which I cannot overcome.

The special role of the face in every individual's life as well as in social life is reflected in language. The next section deals with English and Polish words denoting the face included in English and Polish dictionaries, respectively. In the sections to follow, the concept of FACE is analysed within the framework of cognitive linguistics in terms of its metonymic and metaphoric extensions.

1.2. *Face* and *twarz* — two words for one concept?

To best understand a word it is necessary to start with its etymology. The English word *face* is of Latin origin: it is related to the Latin word *facia*, the altered form of *faciēs*, meaning "form, figure, appearance." The etymology of the word *faciēs* is uncertain: some scholars refer it to *facēre*, meaning "to make," others to the root *fa-*, meaning "to appear, shine" (*Oxford English Dictionary Online* (OED), 2007, Second Edition 1989; Klein, 1971; Onions, 1966).

> The general sense of 'form, appearance,' which in Latin was app[arently] the source of the more specific use 'visage, countenance,' is in many of its Eng[lish] applications apprehended as a transferred use of the latter [...] (OED).

The Polish word *twarz* is of Slavonic origin. It is etymologically related to another Polish word, *tworzyć* (to create, make). In Old Polish, the noun *twarz* denoted the result of this action, "creation, product, work." It also meant "(living) creature," "form, shape, figure" or "person, sex." The sense "oblicze" (face) is secondary to the sense "creation, form, shape, figure" (Boryś, 2005; Długosz-Kurczabowa, 2008). Wojciech Kalaga (2006) mentions the old-fashioned word of Italian origin *facjata*, which means "face" and is used in colloquial Polish in a jocular sense (*Słownik języka polskiego* (SJP), 1978–1981). Although the two words in question, *face* and *twarz*, have completely different, unrelated etymologies, their past semantics seem to have a lot in common.

A short analysis of two dictionary entries for English *face* and Polish *twarz* will show whether their contemporary senses bear any resemblance. The English word *face* has verbal and nominal meanings. In most dictionaries, separate entries describe each meaning, within which a number of senses are characterized. In the *Oxford English Dictionary Online*, the entry *face* (noun) takes up 37 pages. This reflects the great diversity of senses of the word. With the omission of a few irrelevant senses (e.g., technical uses), the entry defines *face* as:

I.
  a) The front part of the head, from the forehead to the chin; the visage, countenance, both in man and lower animals,
  b) Person,
  c) With reference to its position in the front of the body, or as the part presented to encounter. Some phrases express the notion of confronting or opposition, e.g., *to meet (a person) in the face* (to confront directly),

d) Sight, presence, e.g., *before* or *in the face of* (before the eyes of, in the sight of),

e) The countenance as expressive of feeling or character; a countenance having a specified expression, a grimace, e.g., *to make, pull a (crooked, pitiful, wry, etc.) face*,

f) Command of countenance, esp. with reference to freedom from indications of shame; a 'bold front'; impudence, effrontery, e.g., *to have the face to (do something)*.

II. Outward form, appearance:

g) External appearance, look, e.g., *at the first face* (at the first appearance/look, at first sight),

h) Visible state or condition; aspect, e.g., *the face of the country*,

i) Outward show; assumed or factitious appearance; disguise, pretence, e.g., *to put on a good face on (a matter)* (to make (a matter) look well),

j) Good name, reputation, e.g., *to save one's face*.

III. The part of a thing presented to the eye:

k) The surface or one of the surfaces of anything, e.g., *the face of the earth*,

l) The principal side (often vertical or steeply inclined) presented by an object; the 'front' as opposed to the 'flanks,' e.g., *the face of a cliff/building*,

m) Of anything having two sides: The side usually presented outwards or upwards; the 'front' as opposed to the 'back'; the 'right' side of cloth, e.g., *the face of the card*.

The entry for *face* (verb) is much shorter than the one for the nominal senses:

I. To show a bold or opposing front:

n) To meet (danger, an enemy, or anything unpleasant) face to face; to meet in front, oppose with confidence or defiance,

o) To look in the face of; to meet face to face; to stand fronting,

p) To look seriously and steadily at, not to shrink from, e.g., *to face the facts*.

II. With reference to the direction of the face:

q) Of persons and animals: To present the face in a certain direction; to look,

r) Of persons and animals: To present the face or front towards; to look towards,

s) Of a building, a country, and objects in general: To be situated opposite to, front towards.

The senses of the word *face* are classified by lexicographers into several super-senses, which allows the reader to see their great diversity. The definitions of *face* provided above show the wealth of its meanings and the internal complexity of the concept.

Słownik współczesnego języka polskiego (Dictionary of Contemporary Polish) (1999) defines the Polish word *twarz* (face) as:

a) przód głowy człowieka (od czoła po brodę) (the front part of the human head (from the forehead to the chin)),
b) człowiek, osoba (a person).

The word *twarz*, then, has a narrower meaning than the word *face*, as it can be used only with reference to humans (the front part of an animal's head is called *pysk* or *morda* in Polish). Other senses of the word *twarz* are not defined, but the lexicographers provide numerous examples of its use.

In the majority of cases, the two words, *face* and *twarz*, share their senses, although some senses mentioned in the entry for *face* are realized in Polish by other face-related words. Here is a list of Polish expressions with the word *twarz*, or other face-related words, semantically equivalent to expressions with the word *face* mentioned in OED:

> *Stanąć* [*znaleźć się*] *twarzą w twarz (z kimś, z czymś)* (to be face to face with somebody/something) (cf. sense (c) of the word *face*)
>
> *Rzucić (coś, czymś) (komuś) w oczy* [*w twarz*] (to throw something (e.g., an insult) at somebody) (cf. sense (d) of the word *face*)
>
> *Uśmiechnięta twarz* (a smiling face) (cf. sense (e) of the word *face*)
>
> *Na pierwszy rzut oka* (at first sight) (cf. sense (g) of the word *face*)
>
> *Stracić twarz* (to lose face), *wyjść (z czegoś) z twarzą* (to get out of something without losing face), *zachować* [*uratować*] *twarz* (to save face) (cf. sense (j) of the word *face*)

The sense of "a 'bold front'; impudence, effrontery" (cf. sense (f) of the word *face*) is rendered in Polish by the word *czelność*, e.g., *mieć czelność (coś zrobić)* (to have the face to (do something)). The abstract noun *czelność* is derived from the adjective *czelny*, meaning "arrogant, insolent or impudent" (Boryś, 2005). *Czelny* appeared as a result of back-derivation from the adjective *bezczelny*, meaning "insolent, shameless," which itself is derived from the prepositional phrase *bez czoła* (without a forehead), meaning "without shame" (Boryś, 2005). Thus the sense of "a 'bold front'; impudence, effrontery" is rendered in Polish by means of a word denoting an element of the face, the forehead. The sense of "visible state or condition; aspect" (cf. sense (h) of the

word *face*) is rendered in Polish by a synonym of *twarz*, *oblicze* (countenance, face, character, aspect), e.g., *zmieniające się oblicze Europy* (the changing face of Europe). To express the sense of "outward show; assumed or factitious appearance; disguise, pretence" (cf. sense (i) of the word *face*), Poles use the word *mina* (face, facial expression), e.g., *robić dobrą minę do złej gry* (to put a good face on a bad business) (Stanisławski, 1982). "The part of a thing presented to the eye" (cf. senses (k–m) of the word *face*), which in many contexts is called in English *face*, in Polish is referred to by means of several words, e.g., *powierzchnia* (surface), *ściana* (wall), *fasada* (façade), *front* (front), *tarcza* (shield), *awers* (obverse) or *strona* (side). All the words share some semantic features with the word *twarz*: +visible, +surface and +front.

> *powierzchnia ziemi* (the face of the earth)
>
> *północna ściana Rysów* (the northern face of Mt. Rysy)
>
> *fasada/front gmachu Muzeum Narodowego* (the façade/front of the National Museum building)
>
> *tarcza zegara* (the face of a clock)
>
> *awers monety* (the face of a coin)
>
> *prawa strona materiału* (the face/right side of cloth)

The word *twarz* can also be used in the expression *do twarzy*, meaning "good or suitable for somebody's appearance." A similar sense can be rendered by the adjective *twarzowy*, which, apart from its basic meaning "facial," as in *nerw twarzowy* (facial nerve), means "becoming, flattering."

> *Do twarzy ci w niebieskim.* (The blue colour suits you, you look good in blue.)
>
> *Ta sukienka jest bardzo twarzowa.* (This dress looks good.)

The above analysis of what the dictionaries say about the two words, *face* and *twarz*, shows that:
- While the word *face* has both nominal and verbal senses, the word *twarz* has only nominal meanings.
- There is a high degree of both semantic and pragmatic equivalence between the two words. The word *face*, however, appears in a greater number of contexts than *twarz*.
- In some contexts in which in English the word *face* is used, in Polish other face-related words appear.
- There are also some face-related words in English.

The face-related words are those which include:

- words denoting parts of the face (e.g., *eyes*, *oczy*) or their derivatives (e.g., *czelność*),
- words denoting actions involving a part of the face (e.g., *sight*, *widzenie*),
- synonyms of the words *face* and *twarz* (e.g., *countenance*, *oblicze*),
- words sharing one of the senses of *face* and *twarz*, "the part of a thing presented to the eye" (e.g., *façade*, *fasada*, *powierzchnia*, *ściana*, *front*, *tarcza*, *awers*, *(prawa) strona*).

1.3. A theoretical framework

The concept of FACE is going to be presented and analysed within the theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987, 1993).

Lakoff (1987) formulated a notion of *radial category*, which can be represented structurally as a container. Its subcategories are containers inside it. It is structured by the *center–periphery* schema. One subcategory is the *center*, defined by a cluster of converging cognitive models. The other subcategories, *non-central extensions*, are linked to the center. They "may be 'subcenters,' that is they may have further center–periphery structures imposed on them" (Lakoff, 1987: 287). Extensions are not specialized instances of the central category, but are extended by convention as its variants (Lakoff, 1987). Different categories have a radial structure; e.g., Lakoff (1987) presents the two concepts of MOTHER and TRUTH as radial categories; Roman Kalisz and Wojciech Kubiński (1993) discuss the radial category of speech acts; Bogusław Bierwiaczonek (2002), analysing various subcategories of LOVE, describes them in terms of radial models. In the radial category, there may be two different kinds of extensions: *metaphoric* and *metonymic*.

In cognitive linguistics, *metaphor* is understood as "a cross-domain mapping in the same conceptual system" (Lakoff, 1993: 203), e.g.:

> TIME IS MONEY
> You are *wasting* my time.
> You're *running* out of time.
> That flat tire *cost* me an hour (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 7–8).

The target domain is "usually abstract or psychological, and the source domain, usually a physical domain, is more basic and easily accessible for human perception" (Kalisz *et al.*, 1996: 42). The term "metaphorical expression refers to a linguistic expression (a word, phrase, or sentence) that is the surface realization of such a cross-domain mapping" (Lakoff, 1993: 203). The mappings

are not arbitrary. They obey the principle called by Lakoff (1993) the *Invariance Principle*, which says that:

> Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain (Lakoff, 1993: 215).

These mappings are grounded in the body and everyday experience. The inherent target domain structure automatically limits the mappings. For example, in the metaphor ACTIONS ARE TRANSFERS, actions are conceptualized as objects which are transferred from an agent to a patient (e.g., *to give someone a kick*, *to give someone a punch*). It is common knowledge that an action does not exist after it occurs (target domain knowledge), while the recipient possesses the object given after the giving (source domain knowledge). However, this cannot be mapped onto the target domain as no such object as a kick or a punch exists after the action is over (Lakoff, 1993).

Our knowledge about the world is organized by *Idealized Cognitive Models* (ICM), perceived as structured wholes having parts (Lakoff, 1987). *Metonymy* is defined as "a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain, or ICM" (Kövecses and Radden, 1998: 39). Using the concept of ICM, Zoltan Kövecses and Gunter Radden (1998: 48–54) formulated a typology of metonymy:

- THE WHOLE ICM FOR ITS PART, e.g., *America* for "the United States,"
- PART OF AN ICM FOR THE WHOLE ICM, e.g., *face*, *hand*, *head*, *leg* for "the person,"
- PART OF AN ICM FOR ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME ICM, e.g., *She was upset* for "something made her upset."

It is often hard to distinguish between metaphors and metonymies, although the criteria for distinguishing between them are quite clear (Kalisz, 2001). The difference between them may be characterized in the following way: While metonymy "involves a contiguity relationship, which can be expressed by several specific associative relationships," metaphor involves a relationship between both domains, which can be characterized in terms of similarity (Feyaerts, 2000: 64). Because metonymic mappings occur within one domain, there are no qualitative differences between the elements of the relationship, as in the case of metaphorical mappings (Kalisz, 2001). Unlike metonymic mappings, metaphorical mappings occur only within the same ontological realm (the "concept" realm) but map across different and "distant" domains (Kövecses and Radden, 1998; Dirven, 1993).

Metaphors and metonymies often interact with each other (Barcelona, 2000a; cf. Goossens, 1990). Most often this is interaction at the purely conceptual level. There are two subtypes of this interaction (Barcelona, 2000a: 10):

- the metonymic conceptual motivation of metaphor (cf. *metonymy-based metaphor* in Radden, 2000),
- the metaphorical conceptual motivation of metonymy.

In the first case the mapping involves two conceptual domains which can be traced back to one conceptual domain (Croft, 1993) (e.g., the metaphor SAD IS DOWN/HAPPY IS UP is conceptually motivated by the metonymy DOWN(WARD BODILY POSTURE) FOR SADNESS (Barcelona, 2000b)). The metaphorical conceptual motivation of metonymy may be found in metonymic interpretations of a linguistic expression possible only within a co-occurring metaphorical mapping (e.g., *to catch somebody's ear* — the metonymy EAR FOR ATTENTION, a specific variety of the metonymy BODY PART FOR (MANNER OF) FUNCTION is conceptually motivated by the metaphor ATTENTION IS A (TYPICALLY MOVING) PHYSICAL ENTITY (Barcelona, 2000a)).

There is an obvious relation between metaphors and metonymies and culture, understood "as a set of shared understandings that characterize smaller or larger groups of people" (Kövecses, 2005: 1). As Lakoff and Johnson claim in their book *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), metaphors exist not only in language, but also in thoughts and action. They cannot be treated as mere linguistic ornaments, because "we actually understand the world with metaphors" (Kövecses, 2005: 1). In different cultures people share different understandings of the world and conceptualize reality in different ways, and consequently the metaphors they use also vary. Certain conceptual metaphors, however, are potentially universal or near-universal. These metaphors are based on universal human experiences and are shared by different cultures, but in different languages they commonly display variation in metaphorical linguistic expressions (Kövecses, 2005).

FACE belongs to the conceptual system in terms of which we both think and act. It is one of the concepts which govern our everyday life. Among its numerous meanings, FACE is the positive social value every person effectively claims to have (cf. Goffman, 1967). And as one of many social values it is not independent, but must form a coherent system with the other metaphorical concepts we live by. As a term designating a very significant element of the human body, *face* is considered "part of a universal analogical repertoire which can be used for metaphorical production in all cultures" (Strecker, 1993: 121).

1.4. FACE as a radial category

FACE is an example of a *radial category*. It is structured radially with respect to a number of its subcategories. This radial structure involves a central subcategory and peripheral extensions which are its variants understood via their relationship to it (Lakoff, 1987). The concept of FACE cannot be clearly defined in terms of common necessary and sufficient conditions. The central subcategory of FACE is the prototypical face, defined as the front part of the head from chin to forehead and hair line:

> *The stone struck him on his face* (OALD).
>
> *She had a round face.*
>
> *Z bliska jego twarz wydawała się jeszcze bardziej odrażająca.* (From close up his face seemed to be even more repugnant.)
>
> *Jej piękna, opalona twarz przyciągała wzrok wszystkich mężczyzn.* (Her beautiful, suntanned face caught all men's eyes.)

Non-central subcategories are metonymic and metaphoric extensions of the central subcategory (see Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. The radial category of FACE

The metonymic extensions of the category FACE are:
- FACE = the person,
- FACE = the (person's) look,
- FACE = the person's inner state,
- FACE = an image of self/a good name/reputation,
- FACE = the presence of/confrontation with somebody/something.

The metaphoric extensions are:
- FACE = a mask,
- FACE = a bold front/self-confidence which is disrespectful or rude,
- FACE = a façade/the front, outer or most important surface of something.

The metonymic extensions: FACE = the person, FACE = the (person's) look, and FACE = the person's inner state, constitute a central subcategory for their own extensions (see Fig. 2–4).

Fig. 2. The radial subcategory FACE = the person

Fig. 3. The radial subcategory of FACE = the person's look

Fig. 4. The radial subcategory FACE = the person's inner self

1.5. FACE metaphors in English and Polish

The metonymies and metaphors of FACE to be discussed here, although not proved to be universal, can be observed at least in the two analysed cultures, English-speaking and Polish. The examples of metonymic and metaphorical expressions come from English and Polish dictionaries, literary texts, the Internet, web pages both in English and Polish, American and Polish library catalogues, electronic resources, and observation of everyday life.

The FACE metonymies and metaphors presented below exist in English-speaking and Polish cultures. The metaphorical expressions related to them in the two languages often display semanto-syntactic equivalence, although in Polish expressions we can find also other words than *twarz*, e.g., *oblicze* (face), *czoło* (forehead), *nos* (nose), *oczy* (eyes), *policzek* (cheek), *widzenie* (sight), *czelność* (audacity) and *potwarz* (calumny, slander).

(A) THE FACE FOR THE PERSON

The metonymy THE PART FOR THE WHOLE has traditionally been given special status under the name of synecdoche (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Parts which are used to stand for physical things include well known metonymies: body or body parts such as hand, face, head, heart, or leg for the whole person (Kövecses and Radden, 1998; Niemeier, 2000), e.g.,

> *We need a couple of strong **bodies** for our team.*
>
> *There are a lot of good **heads** in the university.*
>
> *Co dwie **głowy** to nie jedna.* (Two heads count more than one) — a Polish proverb
>
> *Jej mąż to taka złota **rączka**, wszystko potrafi zrobić.* (Her husband is a golden hand (dim.) (meaning "handy about the house"), he can do everything.)

In our conceptual system there is a special case of the metonymy THE PART FOR THE WHOLE, namely, THE FACE FOR THE PERSON. (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 37). People often refer to other people as *faces*. This tells us a lot about the importance of the face as a part of the human body and as a source of information about its owner. This metonymy exists both in English-speaking and Polish cultures, which can be exemplified by English and Polish metonymic expressions:

> *She's just a pretty **face**.*
>
> *There are an awful lot of **faces** out there in the audience.*

*We need some new **faces** around here* (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 36—37).

*Na zebraniu były same nowe **twarze*** (SJP). (In the meeting there were only new faces.)

*Obce **twarze** zawsze ją onieśmielały.* (Strange faces always made her shy.)

In colloquial Polish, this metonymy can be found in utterances in which TWARZ = OSOBA (person) (Maćkiewicz, 2000):

*Wypadło pół litra na **twarz*** (na głowę). (There was half a litre per face (per person, per head).)

A special case of the metonymy THE FACE FOR THE PERSON is the metonymy THE FACE FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF A HUMAN VISAGE:

*Walker arrived in London. His **face** was in every print shop* (OED).

*Jackson's was the first high profile **face** to portray a physical transition from African to Caucasian* [...] (Kemp, 2004: 32).

*The second **face** is an extraordinary mask, made in New York in the early years of the twentieth century by W.T. Benda* (Kemp, 2004: 33).

*Internetowy Bank **Twarzy** umożliwia zaprezentowanie się każdej osoby, która chce pracować i zarabiać w reklamie.* (The Internet Bank of Faces makes possible the presentation of every person who wants to work and earn money in advertising.)

***Twarze** Fryderyków. Portrety i małe formy groteskowe.* (Fredericks' faces. Portraits and small grotesque forms.)

Another special case of the metonymy THE FACE FOR THE PERSON is the metonymy THE FACE FOR THE REPRESENTATIVE (cf. Pietrzak-Porwisz, 2007).

*The new **face** of the Democratic Party — and America* (Barack Obama).

[*Obama*] *offered searing and far-reaching attacks on his presumptive Republican opponent* [*McCain*]*, repeatedly portraying him as the **face** of the old way of politics and failed Republican policies* (*The New York Times*, August 29, 2008).

*Football star David Beckham's appeal seems to be ever rising; latest reports indicate that the handsome sport star has been offered a £10 million deal to be the **face** of a new L'Oreal hair care line.*

*Janusz Palikot, **twarz** Platformy Obywatelskiej.* (Janusz Palikot, the face of the Civic Platform party.)

> *Twarzą L'Oreala została Penelope Cruz.* (Penelope Cruz became the face of L'Oreal.)

The Polish actress Joanna Szczepkowska, discussing the moral aspects of actors' participation in advertisements, said:

> *Skoro ona taka wrażliwa, daje swoją* **twarz***, to już naprawdę musi być dobre...* (If she is so sensitive, and gives her face, it [the product] must be really good...) *Jeśli reklamujesz towar swoją* **twarzą***, to tym samym wchodzisz w całą siatkę prawną dotykającą konkurencji. A więc jeśli utożsamiasz się publicznie z jednym kefirem, to już nie wolno Ci się utożsamić z innym.* (If you advertise a product with your face, at the same time you enter a legal net involving the competition. Thus, if you identify yourself in public with one kefir, you cannot identify with another one.) (*Wysokie Obcasy*, Nr 38, September 27, 2008).

The above examples express the metaphor: THE FACE IS A THING WHICH CAN BE USED FOR SOME PURPOSE, e.g., for advertising some product. Thus, the special case of this metaphor is: THE FACE IS A TOOL OF WORK.

(B) THE FACE FOR THE (PERSON'S) LOOK

The face is the part of the body that helps us identify the person. As Antoni Kępiński (1998: 196) argues:

> One should expect that in at least higher vertebrates, the head is an essential factor in mutual recognition and the recognition of basic emotional states. This is certainly so in man — the face is his identity card. Covering the face makes the identification of another person difficult or impossible.

In a similar vein, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 37) comment on the role of the face in human recognition:

> In our culture we look at a person's face — rather than his posture or his movements — to get our basic information about what the person is like. We function in terms of a metonymy when we perceive the person in terms of his face and act on those perceptions.

The metonymy THE FACE FOR (THE PERSON'S) LOOK, or its special case THE FACE FOR THE PERSON'S IDENTITY (cf. Kępiński, 1998), is very productive and has been an intriguing inspiration for many authors. For example, Milan Kundera (1991), in his novel *Immortality*, ponders the role of the face in human life. One of his characters, Agnes, talks about the relation between the face and identity:

> *Yes, you know me by my name, you know me as a face and you never knew me in any other way. Therefore it could never occur to you that my face is not myself* (Kundera, 1991: 35).

In English and in Polish, the two metonymies are realized by the following expressions:

> *I know your **face**. You're Mary Robinson.*
>
> *He knew her by **sight**.*
>
> *Tak się zmienił na **twarzy**, że go nie poznałam.* (He had changed in the face so much that I did not recognize him.)
>
> *Znała go z **twarzy**, ale nie wiedziała jak się nazywa.* (She knew him by his face, but she did not know his name.)
>
> *Znamy się tylko z **widzenia**.* (We know each other only by sight.)

In Polish, there are two equivalent expressions, *z twarzy* and *z widzenia* (by sight). This is not accidental. We can tell something about a person, we can identify him, only if we look at his face. The face and vision are one. The face is a vision. This is true in German and ancient Italian, in which the words *Gesicht* and *viso*, respectively, mean both "vision" and "face" (Stimilli, 2005). Dante Alighieri, in *Paradise* (Dante and Beatrice rise to the empyrean, the tenth circle. Here all Heaven is revealed as a river of light, as a celestial rose) (2004: Canto XXX, 19–33; 319–321), uses the word in these two senses:

> *I saw her beauty passing all our ways*
> > *of understanding, and believe indeed*
> > *that He alone who fashioned her enjoys*
> *Its fullness. From this pass I must concede*
> > *myself more overcome than ever was*
> > *tragedian or comic at the peak*
> *Of difficulty: as the sun in eyes*
> > *that tremble weakly, so my memory*
> > *of her sweet smile now robs the intellect*
> *And leaves me at a loss. From the first day*
> > *I saw her **face** until this **vision** now,*
> > *my road to song has not been cut away,*
> *But here, as every artist, I must bow*
> > *to my last power, and cease to follow on*
> > *her loveliness by signs in poetry.*

The face helps us to identify the person's gender, age and ethnicity. As Dan McNeill (1998: 96) argues, "Race is in the face."

*a pale**face***

*blada **twarz*** (a paleface)

*a Teutonic **face**, an Anglo-Saxon **face***

*nordycka **twarz**, słowiańska **twarz**/nordyckie **rysy (twarzy)**, słowiańskie **rysy** (twarzy)** (a Nordic face, a Slavic face/Nordic features, Slavic features)

*żydowski **nos*** (A Jewish nose)

*murzyńskie **rysy/wargi*** (Negro features/lips)

(C) THE FACE FOR THE PERSON'S INNER SELF

Władysław Kopaliński, in his *Słownik Symboli* (2001: 441), defines *twarz* as "the speech without words, the door to the invisible in the man, a substitute for the whole man, an occasional revealing of oneself." The face is considered to be an external manifestation of what is going on in the person. THE FACE FOR THE PERSON'S INNER SELF is a special case of the metonymy THE OUTER FOR THE INNER. The face (the outer) can reveal to others a person's personality, character and intellectual abilities, and psychological and physical state (the inner). The metonymy is conceptually motivated by the metaphor THE FACE (BODY) IS THE MIRROR OF THE MIND (SOUL) (see also Section 2.4.), which is expressed in language by:

> The **face** is an image of the soul, and the eyes its interpreter (*Cicero on the Ideal Orator*, 2001).

> *Reading **Faces**: Window to the Soul?* (Zebrowitz, 1997).

> *Każdego **twarz** pokazuje, jakim się wewnątrz znajduje.* (Everyone's face shows what he is like on the inside.) — Polish proverb (Kopaliński, 2001).

Sometimes, however, this characteristic of the face is extended to the whole body, e.g.:

> *The human body is the best picture of the human soul* (Wittgenstein, 1968).

The face, nonetheless, does not always show what happens in the person's soul/mind:

> *There's no art*
> *To find the mind's construction in the face* (Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, 1.iv).

> *Twarz nie zawsze umysłu okrywa.* (The face does not always show what is [happening] in the mind.) — Polish proverb (Kopaliński, 2001).

The face is a good source of information about its owner. We can read the face like a text. Or more properly, the face is a text, and its owner is the author (Limon, 2000). We can get a lot of information about a person by studying his face:

> Your **face**, my thane, is as a book where men
> May read strange matters [...] (Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, 1.v).

> Read o'er the volume of young Paris' **face**,
> And find delight writ there with beauty's pen; (Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet*, I.iii).

> As a rule a man's **face** says more of interest than does his tongue [...] it is the monogram of all his thoughts and aspirations (Schopenhauer, "On physiognomy," 1810).

> Looking at his **face** I understood what had happened.

> The actor has absolute control over his/her **face** and expression (BNC).

> The **face** can betray its owner.

> Smutek malował się na jej **twarzy**. (Sorrow was painted on his face.)

> Powiedział, że wszystko w porządku, ale zdradziła go **twarz**. (He said that everything was all right, but his face betrayed him.)

> Winę miał wypisaną na **twarzy**. (He had his guilt written on his face.)

> Miał bardzo przejrzystą **twarz**, widać było kiedy kłamie, a kiedy mówi prawdę. (He had a very transparent face; one could see when he was lying and when he was telling the truth.)

We usually comment on a person's condition on the basis of the appearance of his face:

> You look ill/unwell.

> His **face** bore the mark/sign of disease.

> Wyglądasz źle/niewyraźnie/na chorego. (You look unwell/ill.)

> Chorobę miał wypisaną na **twarzy**. (He had the disease written on his face.)

> Jego **twarz** nosiła wyraźne piętno choroby. (His face bore the mark of illness.)

> **facies** hippocratica (Lat), **oblicze** hipokratesowe (Hippocratic face) (Kopaliński, 2001).

The face is very important in social interaction, because unlike the rest of the body it is often "naked" (Kępiński, 1998). That is why it is so easy to recognize somebody's emotions expressed on the face. It is easier to control

hand movements, movements of other parts of the body, or verbal reactions than facial expression, because mimic muscles are difficult to control intentionally. "The face does not lie" (Kępiński, 1998: 196). The degree of face control may be both idiosyncratic and culture-specific. In some cultures it is greater than in others, e.g., in Chinese culture it is greater than in European culture, in English greater than in Polish (Kępiński, 1998). Besides, the degree of face control depends on the social role of the person, e.g., whether he is a judge, a doctor or an actor (Kępiński, 1998).

The information about a person comes not only from the face as a whole, but also from its parts: the forehead, eyes, nose, lips and chin. The *forehead* is the uppermost part of the face. Traditionally, it is associated with a person's state of mind (general orientation in the surrounding world and general attitude to what happens there) (Kępiński, 1998) or mental abilities. The forehead, for example, can express surprise, disbelief or concentration (Kępiński, 1998). Some linguistic expressions denoting the expression on the forehead are related to the metaphor THE FOREHEAD/FACE IS LIKE THE SKY (cf. Kępiński, 1998):

> *zachmurzone **czoło*** (the [frowning] clouded-over forehead (covered by temporary wrinkles))
>
> ***Czoło** mu się rozpogodziło*. (His forehead brightened up.)
>
> ***Twarz** się komuś rozjaśniła, rozpogodziła*. (Someone's face brightened up.) (SJP).
>
> *zachmurzona twarz* (a clouded-over face)

The size and shape of the forehead can imply a person's mental abilities. It is commonly believed that a large forehead signifies a high level of intelligence, and a low forehead, a low level of intelligence:

> *Low **foreheads**, high pinched nasal roots, nasal bridges and tips varying to both extremes of breadth and narrowness, excesses of nasal deflections, compressed faces and narrow jaw, fit well into the picture of general constitutional inferiority* (Hooton, 1939: 306).
>
> *Miał takie niskie **czoło** i wyglądał jak neandertalczyk*. (He had such a low forehead that he looked like a Neanderthal.)

Of the whole face, the *eyes* are the best source of information about a person. Folk tradition says that the eyes do not lie. Looking at the person's eyes, or into them, we can learn what his true feelings are. Georg Simmel (1901/1959: 281) says that "The eye epitomizes the achievement of the face in mirroring the soul." As Kępiński (1998: 198) says, one "can put a mask on other parts of the face, on the eyes — not. Their expression can be controlled by

[our] volition only to a minimal degree." That is why it is so easy to recognize a person's emotional state by looking into his eyes. The English word *eyes* and its Polish equivalent *oczy* (or the words *spojrzenie* (look) and *wzrok* (sight)) are often modified by phrases denoting emotions or states of the mind:

> radiant **eyes**, unhappy **eyes**, smiling **eyes**
>
> Your questioning **eyes** are sad. They
> seek to know my meaning as the moon
> would fathom the sea (R. Tagore, *The Gardener XXVIII: Your Questioning Eyes*).
>
> a mocking **look** (OPWN)
>
> **oczy** wesołe, **oczy** smutne (cheerful eyes, sad eyes)
>
> psie **spojrzenie** (a dog's look)
>
> **oczy/spojrzenie** nieprzytomne (vacant eyes/look)
>
> (nie)ufne **oczy** ((mis)trustful eyes) (Kępiński, 1998: 199)
>
> Powiedział, że nie przejmuje się niczym, ale **spojrzenie** go zdradziło. (He said that he did not care, but his look betrayed him.)
>
> Nic nie mówiła, ale z jej **oczu** można było wszystko wyczytać. (She did not say anything, but one could read everything in her eyes.)

The way somebody looks at others tells also whether he is shy and timid or bold:

> She dropped her **eyes** in embarrassment.
>
> He looked her in the **face** and said he was leaving.
>
> Wstydliwie spuszczała **wzrok/oczy**, gdy miała się publicznie odezwać. (She dropped her gaze/eyes when she was to talk in public.)
>
> Miał odwagę spojrzeć jej ojcu prosto w **oczy/twarz**. (He had the courage to look her father in the eyes/face.)

Metaphorically, THE EYES ARE CONTAINERS (Maćkiewicz, 2001). Looking into another person's eyes implies trying to learn something about his feelings, state of mind and attitude towards others:

> Look into the **eyes**, and you'll see a whole different person.
>
> Zajrzeć komuś głęboko w **oczy**, to jak zajrzeć mu w duszę. (To look into someone's eyes is like looking into someone's soul.)

The *nose* is the element of the face that plays the least important role in providing the information about its owner and his feelings and thoughts:

*My children turn up their **noses** at fresh vegetables* (LDCE).

*Trudno ją było zadowolić. Na wszystko kręciła **nosem**.* (She was hard to satisfy. She turned up her nose at everything.)

The *lips* are an important part of the face. Unlike its other parts, the lips, which are an organ of speech, can literally "say" what one feels and means. However, they can also express nonverbally one's feelings and thoughts:

O, what a deal of scorn looks beautiful
*In the contempt and anger of his **lip**!* (Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, 3.i)

*Ostentacyjnie wydęła **usta**.* (Ostentatiously, she pouted her lips.) [an expression of dissatisfaction or contempt]

*Zrobiła **usta** w podkówkę i łzy pociekły jej po policzkach*. (She turned her mouth down and tears rolled down her cheeks.)

The shape of the lips is said also to speak about their owner's character/ personality. Kopaliński (2001) writes that a big mouth is said to signify self-confidence, a salivating mouth, lecherousness. Narrow lips are said to imply dogged determination. In English a big mouth implies talking too much:

*Don't tell him any secrets; he's got a big **mouth*** (meaning "he talks too much, and will tell somebody") (LDCE).

The lowest part of the face which can tell us something about its owner is the *chin*. Although it is not so good a source of information as the eyes or lips, it is said to give some hints as to a person's strength of character and emotional state:

*a weak/strong **chin***

*All the time he tried to keep his **chin** up.*

*Silny **podbródek** mówił o jego sile i zdecydowaniu*. (The strong chin testified about his strength and decisiveness.)

***Podbródek** zaczął mu drgać. Wiedziałam, że zaraz się rozpłacze*. (His chin started to tremble. I knew he was about to break down.)

Analysing the human face, one can observe temporary and permanent elements. The temporary elements, related to a particular social situation, are momentary facial expressions of joy, laughter, sadness, anger, anxiety or hostility. The permanent elements are said to tell about the person's past experience and character (Kępiński, 1998). By analogy to this dichotomy of

facial expression, the metonymy THE FACE FOR THE PERSON'S INNER SELF has two special cases:

(C1) THE FACE FOR THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTION

(C2) THE FACE FOR THE PERSON'S PERSONALITY/CHARACTER

Face is a countenance or expression on the face. It tells us about the physical and emotional states of a person (e.g., *red-faced*, suggesting a connection between emotion and physiological change; *shame-faced*, pointing at an intimate connection between shame and facial expression (Ho *et al.*, 2004); or ***twarz purpurowa z wściekłości*** (a face purple with rage); ***twarz*** *czerwona ze wstydu* (a face red with shame), suggesting the same connection). The importance of facial expression cannot be overestimated. Deprived of it, an individual is incapable of establishing and maintaining relationships and interacting with others. As Kobo Abé (1967: 27–28) says, in his novel *The Face of Another* (the main character lost his face and had to wear an artificial face):

> *The face, in the final analysis, is the expression. The expression – how shall I put it? – well, the expression is something like an equation by which we shape our relationship with others. It's a roadway between oneself and others. If it's blocked by a landslide, even those who have been at pains to travel it will think you are now some uninhabited, dilapidated house and perhaps pass by.*

The metonymy THE FACE FOR THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTION is realized by many linguistic expressions:

> *a happy **face**, a cheerful **face**, a radiant **face**, a laughing **face***

> *Robert tried to compose his **face** into an expression of humble trust* (BNC).

> *Polly hastily rearranged her **face** into an expression of businesslike interest* (BNC).

> *Conservatives on the platform fixed their **faces** into expressions of interested concern* (BNC).

> *When he was told he couldn't go to the zoo he pulled a long **face*** (LDCE).

> *żałosna **twarz/mina*** (forlorn face), *uśmiechnięta **twarz/mina**.* (smiling face)

> *naburmuszona **mina*** (a sour face (showing dissatisfaction))

> ***twarz** pełna wyrazu* (a face full of expression)

> ***twarz** bez wyrazu* (an expressionless face)

> ***Twarze** się dzieciom wydłużyły, że nie będzie wycieczki.* (The children's faces fell [when they heard] that they would not go on the excursion.) (Dunaj, 1999)

The metonymy THE FACE FOR THE PERSON'S PERSONALITY/ CHARACTER is the other special case of the metonymy THE FACE FOR THE PERSON'S INNER SELF:

> Marion's **face** and smile were angelic (BNC).

> He was an old man with a kind **face**.
> Miał taką dobrą/szlachetną/dobroduszną **twarz**. (He had such a good/ noble/good-natured face.)

> Z jego **twarzy** biła inteligencja. (His face shone with intelligence.)

> Za oknem zobaczyła wściekłą **twarz** psychopaty. (Through the window she saw the enraged face of a psychopath.)

This metonymy is also expressed by means of the following phrases:

> inteligentny **wyraz twarzy**, inteligentne **spojrzenie** (an intelligent expression/ face/look)

> psychopatyczny **wyraz twarzy**, psychopatyczne **spojrzenie** (a psychopathic expression/face/look)

The metonymies THE FACE FOR (THE PERSON'S) LOOK and THE FACE FOR THE PERSON'S PERSONALITY/CHARACTER are the basis for the metaphor THE FACE IS THE LOOK/CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PLACE/INSTITUTION/PHENOMENON (cf. Pietrzak-Porwisz, 2007).

> The real **face** of the political emigration from Germany

> The **face** of my motherland

> The changing **face** of India

> The changing **face** of the third world

> Odnowić **oblicze** tej Ziemi ─ naszej Ziemi. (To renew the face of the Earth ─ our Earth.) (John Paul II)

> Nowe **oblicze** polskiej architektury (The new face of Polish architecture)

> Odmienne **oblicze** kobiet w polskim filmie (A different face of women in Polish film)

> Nowa **twarz** postmodernizmu (The new face of postmodernism)

> Nowa **twarz** i program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości (The new face and programme of the Law and Justice party)

(D) THE FACE FOR AN IMAGE OF SELF

Face is fundamental to a sense of self (Cupach and Metts, 1994). The metonymy THE FACE FOR AN IMAGE OF SELF organizes the world of social interaction. This metonymy may be understood in two different ways: as THE FACE FOR A TRUE IMAGE OF SELF, or, using Goffman's (1967: 5) sense of face (also called *social face* (Tjosvold, 1983)), as THE FACE FOR AN IMAGE OF SELF DELINEATED IN TERMS OF APPROVED SOCIAL ATTRIBUTES or THE FACE FOR A POSITIVE IMAGE OF SELF (a self-image which is socially acceptable). In the latter case, the self-image does not have to be true; it is the positive self-image claimed by its owner, the interactant. The metonymy in the Goffmanian sense, THE FACE FOR A POSITIVE IMAGE OF SELF, is closely related to another metonymy, THE FACE FOR A GOOD NAME/REPUTATION. These metonymies are realized in English by means of the folk expression *to lose face*, meaning "to be embarrassed" (Brown and Levinson, 1987), whose origins have been traced to Chinese culture (Mao, 1994; Ho, 1975). Mao (1994: 45) claims that the word *face* is a literal translation of the two Chinese words *mianzi* and *lian*, which originally appeared in the phrase *to save face* which was used in the English community in China, and conveyed the meaning of preserving "one's credit, good name, reputation." In this way, this metonymic use of the word *face* was borrowed into English from Chinese. "[The] first evidence of the sense of *face* [...] is attested by an 1876 quotation from R. Hart in *These from the Land of Sinim*: 'Arrangements by which China has lost faces'" (Ervin-Tripp *et al.*, 1995: 45; Hart, 1901). Susan Ervin-Tripp *et al.* (1995: 47) give the following explanation for this borrowing:

> [There] was an accelerating fad for things and ideas Chinese which peaked in the mid-eighteenth century, with the importation of tea, porcelain, silk, chintz, and wall-paper, the copying of Chinese and Japanese decorative elements in Chippendale furniture and Gobelin tapestries, and the design of Chinese-style rooms and Chinese gardens.
>
> The Jesuit missionaries became interested in Chinese philosophical traditions, particularly in Confucius, and in turn the philosophers were attracted to the idea of a secular morality unlinked to religion. [...] As is usual in borrowing, assimilation to the borrowers' concerns revealed a quite superficial acquaintance with Chinese culture, [...] the missionaries created a stereotype, a Chinese who was imagined on the basis of Confucius to be soft and polite [...].

The two Chinese words denoting face can be found in many different collocations (see Section 4.4.); in English, according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the collocational range of *face* meaning "good name, reputation" is

limited to two expressions, *to save face* and *to lose face*. As mentioned in Section 1.2., the Polish word *twarz* also has the sense of "good name, reputation," and occurs in similar contexts.

> *Criticism should never cause the recipient to lose **face**, inner dignity or self-respect* (BNC).
>
> *He was afraid of failure because he didn't want to lose **face** with his colleagues* (LDCE).
>
> *Saving **face** is the strongest motive in the world* (OED).
>
> *Hiding from others may save **face**, but at the cost of an increased weight of private guilt and doubt* (BNC).
>
> *Kiedy nie udało mu się pokonać przeciwnika, czuł, że stracił **twarz** w oczach swoich przyjaciół, którzy liczyli na jego zwycięstwo.* (When he failed to beat his opponent he felt he has lost his face with his friends, who all expected him to win.) (Kakietek, 2004)
>
> *Za wszelką cenę starał się zachować **twarz**.* (At all costs he tried to save face.)
>
> *Z całej tej kłopotliwej sytuacji udało im się wyjść z **twarzą**.* (They managed to maintain face in this embarrassing situation.)

The metonymies THE FACE FOR AN IMAGE OF SELF and THE FACE FOR A GOOD NAME/REPUTATION are the conceptual motivation for the metaphor AN ATTACK ON THE FACE (PART) IS AN ATTACK ON THE PERSON'S IMAGE OF SELF/GOOD NAME:

> *It was a slap in the **face** for her parents when she ignored their advice and gave up her job* (LDCE).
>
> *His words were like a slap across her **face**. The blood rushed to her head* (BNC).
>
> *It was a slap on his **cheek**.*
>
> *Nie dostał awansu, na który tak liczył. Dla niego to był **policzek**.* (He was not promoted, and this was [a slap on] his cheek.)
>
> *Sam Niesiołowski po debacie mówił, że słowa Kaczyńskiego to **potwarz** [...].* (Niesiołowski himself said after the debate that Kaczyński's words were a slander.) (*Gazeta Wyborcza*, December 4, 2008)

The Polish word *potwarz* (calumny, slander, libel) is etymologically related to the word *twarz*. Calumny constitutes an attack on and threat to the person's self-image, his good name/reputation.

(E) THE FACE IS A MASK

The metaphor THE FACE IS A MASK carries a truth which is in opposition to everything that has been said above, i.e. that the face is naked, that it does not lie and is a reflection of the soul. It agrees only with the metonymy THE FACE FOR A POSITIVE IMAGE OF SELF and the Goffmanian interpretation of FACE. Every person can to some extent control his facial expression and put on different masks, suitable for certain situations and for his social role, through which he wants to be perceived by other people. As Kępiński (1998: 204) says, the mask "is a certain kind of social mimicry, [by means of which] the individual deceives other participants in the social contact." He puts on different faces like actors in the ancient theatre put on different masks.

> *He put the best **face** on his dismissal, saying that he had intended to take another job anyway.*
>
> *Unruffled, his **face** was now a **mask** of deep interest* (BNC).
>
> *His **face** was a taut bitter **mask*** (BNC).
>
> *The woman's thin **face** was a **mask** of terror* (BNC).
>
> *A false **face**, seen but unable to look back* (Kobo Abé, *The Face of Another.* 1967: 15).
>
> *Although she didn't feel very confident, she put on a brave **face** and accepted the challenge* (LDCE).
>
> *He put on a poker **face** and nobody could make him say anything about the trial.*
>
> *a two-**faced**/double-**faced** liar*
>
> *No matter how many **faces** I have, there is no changing the fact that I am me* (Kobo Abé, *The Face of Another,* 1967: 19).
>
> *Openly or covertly, anxiously or eagerly, we catch our reflections in mirrors, glass doors and shop-fronts and 'put on a **face** to meet the faces' when we go out* (Kemp, 2004: 23).
>
> *W trudnych sytuacjach przybierał **maskę** niewinności.* (In difficult situations he put on a mask of innocence.)
>
> *Zrzucił **maskę** i ukazał swoje prawdziwe oblicze.* (He dropped the mask and showed his true face.)
>
> *człowiek o dwu twarzach* (a man with two faces (insincere)) (Kopaliński, 2001).
>
> *Bardzo szybko odkryli jego **dwulicowość**.* (They soon discovered his duplicity.)
>
> *Przybrał pokerową **twarz** i nic więcej już nie chciał powiedzieć na ten temat.* (He put on a poker face and did not want to say anything else about it.)

Here the face is not a source of truth, but something that is used to hide it. The inconsistency between the metonymy THE FACE FOR A TRUE IMAGE OF SELF and the metaphor THE FACE IS A MASK can be compared to the inconsistency between the INNER-SELF metaphor and the REAL-ME metaphor, discussed by Lakoff (1996):

> *I'm not myself today. That wasn't the real me yesterday* (Lakoff, 1996: 107).

> *Her sophistication is a façade. You've never seen what she's really like on the inside* (Lakoff, 1996: 108).

Discussing the INNER-SELF metaphor, Lakoff argues that the real Self is the inner, private self; the external, public Self is not real. This conception of a hidden self is inconsistent with "the REAL-ME metaphor, in which the 'real' self is normally the visible, public self rather than the hidden, private self" (Lakoff, 1996: 108). Likewise, the "naked" face tells the truth about its owner; it is a reflection of his inner, private self, while the mask is not a real face; it is an image of his public self.

It is not only a human being that can have more than one face; things, abstract concepts and phenomena also can. The metaphor THE FACE IS AN ASPECT OF SOMETHING takes the following linguistic forms:

> *The rural **face** of white supremacy.*

> *The present personal: philosophy and the hidden **face** of language.*

> *The **Face** of Immortality* (Stimilli, 2005).

> *Druga **twarz** Europy.* (The other face of Europe.)

> *Druga **twarz** portretu.* (The second face of the portrait.)

> *Ukryta **twarz** twojej osobowości.* (The hidden face of your personality.)

(F) THE FACE IS A BOLD FRONT
THE FACE IS SELF-CONFIDENCE WHICH IS DISRESPECTFUL OR RUDE

People do not always behave according to the rules of politeness. Quite often they do not show due care for other people's wants and are self-confident and daring in a disrespectful or rude way. The expressions *to have the face/the cheek to do something*, meaning "be bold or impudent enough" (OALD) are linguistic realizations of the metaphor THE FACE IS A BOLD FRONT/ SELF-CONFIDENCE WHICH IS DISRESPECTFUL OR RUDE:

> *He had the **face** to ask me for money.*

> *He had the bare-**faced** impudence to ask me for a loan 10 minutes after we had been introduced!* (OALD).

*bare-**faced** lies*

*He had the **cheek** to ask me to do his work for him!*

*Miał **czelność** poprosić ich o pożyczkę.* (He had the face to ask them for a loan.)

***Bezczelne** kłamstwo! Kłamie w* (*żywe*) *oczy!* (That's a blatant lie! He is lying in his eyes (meaning "through his teeth")!)

(G) THE FACE FOR THE PRESENCE OF SOMEBODY/SOMETHING
THE FACE FOR THE CONFRONTATION WITH SOMEBODY/SOMETHING

When we meet somebody *face to face*, we come into his presence, or confront him. Face implies the presence of a person or thing, the physical or metaphorical proximity or confrontation. The physical proximity is especially vital in social interactions, in which the fact that we see our interlocutor, his face and the expression on his face may influence the outcome of the conversation. "Face makes presence" (McNeill, 1998: 237). The examples below are linguistic realizations of the metonymy THE FACE FOR THE PRESENCE OF OR CONFRONTATION WITH SOMEBODY OR SOMETHING:

*I've talked to him on the phone but I've never actually met him **face to face*** (LDCE).

*There is a greater time lag in a printed book, as in a recording, than there is in **face-to-face** talk* (OED).

*He shut the door in John's **face**.*

*In the **face** of great hardship, she managed to keep her sense of humour* (LDCE).

*He wouldn't be so rude to her **face*** (LDCE).

*He does not like to be praised to his **face*** (OED).

*How can you show your **face** here after the way you behaved last night?* (OALD).

*Po wielu latach spotkali się wreszcie **twarzą w twarz**.* (After many years they finally met face to face.)

*W **obliczu** niebezpieczeństwa, zawsze potrafił wziąć się w garść.* (In the face of danger, he was always able to pull himself together.)

*Powiedziała mu prosto w **twarz/oczy**, że go nie kocha.* (She told him to his face that she did not love him.)

*Roześmiał mi się w **twarz/nos**.* (He laughted in my face/nose.)

*Zamknęli mu drzwi przed **nosem** i tyle.* (They closed the door in his [face] nose.)

*Po tym wszystkim, jak możesz **się** tutaj pokazywać?* (After all this how can you show yourself [your face] here?)

(H) THE FACE IS A FAÇADE
THE FACE IS THE FRONT, OUTER, OR MOST IMPORTANT SURFACE OF SOMETHING

The metaphor A MOUNTAIN IS A PERSON consists of the following, conventionally fixed, expressions of language, *the foot of the mountain* (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 54) and *the face of the mountain*, in which the mountain is personified. In the latter expression, the metaphor A MOUNTAIN IS A PERSON interacts with the metaphor THE FACE IS A FAÇADE or THE FRONT, OUTER, OR MOST IMPORTANT SURFACE OF SOMETHING, which consists also of other fixed expressions (cf. the metaphorical use of the word *czoło* meaning "the front part of something" in Maćkiewicz (2006)), e.g.:

> the **face** *of a clock* (OALD)
>
> *They disappeared from the* **face** *of the earth* (OALD).
>
> *The team climbed the north* **face** *of the mountain* (OALD).
>
> *The value of a coin is shown on its* **face**.
>
> *The* **face** *of the house from one end to the other was covered with vines and passion flowers* (OED).
>
> *The miners work at the coal* **face** *for seven hours each day* (LDCE).
>
> the **face** *of the fabric*
>
> *a double-***faced** *fabric*
>
> *The* **face** *of an anvil is its upper surface* (OED).
>
> *Budynek Opery Narodowej zdobiła bogata* **fasada**. (The building of the National Opera was graced with a rich face/façade.)
>
> **Frontową ścianę/Front** *domu porastało dzikie wino.* (The face of the house was covered with Virginia creeper.)
>
> **lico** *budynku* (the face of the building) (SJP)
>
> **lico** *siekiery* (the face of the axe) (SJP)
>
> **licowa** *(prawa)* strona tkaniny (the face of the fabric)
>
> *Dwóch górników pracowało na* **przodku**. (Two miners were working at the front [coalface].)

   The metonymies and metaphors analyzed above form a complex, though not complete, picture of the concept of FACE as it functions in both English-speaking and Polish cultures. Having analysed FACE metaphors and metonymies existing in the two cultures, one can observe that the word *face* is more broadly used than its Polish equivalent *twarz*. The word *face*, with a few

exceptions in which it can be replaced by other words, appears in all face-related metaphorical expressions. The word *twarz*, on the other hand, is one among the many words found in Polish face-related metaphorical expressions. Apart from *twarz*, Polish face-related expressions include:

- *twarz* synonyms: *oblicze*, *lico*;
- words denoting parts of the face: *czoło*, *nos*, *oczy*, *usta*, *podbródek*;
- words derived from the above: *bezczelny*, *czelność*, *potwarz*;
- words denoting the front part of something, e.g., *fasada*, *front*, *przodek*.

Taking the above analysis into consideration, one can conclude that FACE, or to be precise its cultural variations, English face and Polish twarz, are conceptualized in a highly similar way. However, certain senses, which in English are related to the face as a whole, in Polish are taken over by names of some of its parts.

Chapter 2

The face as a part of the body

2.1. Introduction

The face is the most important element of self-perception and sensitivity to the other. According to Courtine and Haroche (2007: 7), "the face is a subject of individual work, indispensable for talking and interacting with other people." They say "the face speaks." The face is what makes an individual social. We literally speak with our face, but we also "speak" using different facial expressions. To fully participate in social interaction, we need the face. We need it to communicate with others and to create our self-identity.

Thus, the face cannot be treated like other parts of the body. Sławek (2000: 29; Sochoń, 2000) maintains that "all our culture is oriented at the face (façade) [...]." The special character of the face is stressed by Berrios (2003: 56; Kemp, 2004), who tries to find an adequate conceptual apparatus for the study of the face:

> The face is not a 'natural kind' but a 'cultural construct' and hence its study requires a discipline that may borrow equally from biology, theology, poetry, history, philosophy, portraiture, and aesthetics.

Throughout human history, people in general and representatives of various scholarly and artistic disciplines in particular have made this special part of the body the centre of their interests and investigation. The face, perceived as the source of information about its owner, has become central to our understanding of our own identity.

A discussion of the face as a part of the body, however, has to begin with the fundamental question — is it exclusively human?

2.2. Is the face exclusively human?

If we posed the question what the face is, we would find many different answers. The first thing which comes to our mind is that the face is a part of the body. This aspect of the face is always mentioned first in definitions. *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989) defines *face* as "the front part of the head, from the forehead to the chin"; the visage, countenance: in man and in lower animals (e.g., lion, eagle, insect).

The human face is an anatomical entity which arose through biological processes during human evolution (Henneberg *et al.*, 2003). The evolution of the human face from its apelike ancestral form was gradual. It was regulated by three main factors: changing diets, the ability to process food extra-orally, and the development of the ability to produce spoken language (Henneberg *et al.*, 2003).

There are different anatomic-evolutionary definitions of the face. One says that the face consists of two eyes, nostrils, and a mouth. Another definition "requires evolutionary transformation of the skull, in which a face is recognized in mammals, but not in fish, amphibians, or reptiles. The jaw is suspended from the braincase in reptiles, but mammals have: (a) three ear ossicles, (b) a secondary palate separating the airway passage from the mouth, and (c) vertical positioning of the dentary, with alterations of the jaw muscles" (Cohen, 2006: 3).

The human face, as we know it now, appeared about 200,000–130,000 years ago, with modern *Homo sapiens* in Africa. It differs significantly from the face of the Neanderthals, as it has flattened, the forehead has risen to house the ballooning brain, the nose juts out, the Neanderthals' bulging browridges turn into human eyebrows, the skull is no longer moonlike and more oval, and the chin appears (McNeill, 1998). The face is "the center of our humanity" (Kuczynski, 2006: 117; Kalaga, 2006). Its mere existence makes possible our contacts with other human beings. Through the face we gather information about the world and communicate with others. It is through the face that we breathe and nourish ourselves. It is indispensable for our survival.

The view that the face is an exclusively human feature is nothing new. It was already represented by ancient thinkers. Aristotle (384–322 BC), in his *Historia Animalium*, defines the face in the following way:

> The part below the skull is named the face, but only in man, and in no other animal; we do not speak of the face of a fish or of an ox (Aristotle, 1965: I. vii–ix).

Several centuries later, Dante Alighieri (1265—1321) expressed a similar opinion, that the face identifies us as human beings. Dante, in his *Divine Comedy* (1309—1320), writing about Abel being killed by Cain and the marking of Cain, explains the mark on Cain's brow:

> The sockets of their eyes seemed rings without gems. Whoso in the face of men reads OMO, would surely there have recognized the M (Dante, 1920: *Purgatory*, Canto XXIII, 176).

In Cain's face, as in the face of any other man, his name is inscribed — *(H)OMO* (meaning "man" in Latin or Italian). The *O*s represent the two eyes, and the *M* is made by the lines of the cheeks or eyebrows (Synnott, 1993; Stimilli, 2005). Thus we have our name inscribed in our face, as an identification mark. Our face makes us human.

The head, and particularly its front part, the face, were always treated specially in comparison to the rest of the body. From earliest times, the head was associated with the essence of life and people treated this part of the body with great reverence. In many cultures it was believed that the spirit was located in the head and resided in the breath (Edson, 2005). "The face, as unique, physical, malleable and public, is the prime symbol of the self" (Synnott, 1993: 73). It is *unique*, because there are no two identical faces in the world. The face provides others with a lot of important information about the person. Looking at it, we can determine its owner's age, sex, ethnicity and race; we can say whether he or she is beautiful or ugly, fat or thin (Zebrowitz, 1997). The appearance of a person is constantly changing over the course of his life. This includes the face, which gradually changes with age. The facial changes include the growth of the face, the loss of primary teeth and the emergence of permanent dentition during childhood, the maturation of the adult face after puberty, the loss of teeth and the formation of lines and wrinkles in old age (Henneberg et al., 2003). "Contrary to the popular belief that faces of members of various human 'races' differ predictably, the majority of the variation of facial metric characters occurs among members of same populations, while sexual dimorphism and population differences each are responsible for minor, though significant portions of the total facial variation" (Henneberg *et al.*, 2003: 41). Thus, the face marks us as individuals. Each of us is different from the other.

The face is *physical* as the body is. Understandably, the face as the front part of the head is the anatomical feature that attracts the greatest attention. Thus the first impression of a person is, in fact, the impression made by his face. It is usually by the face that a person is evaluated at first sight. The face is also accorded primacy in our social relations. Its *malleability*, resulting from a great number of mimetic muscles (80), allows for thousands of facial expressions. The

facial muscles, which "are fundamentally just sphincters that regulate vision, olfaction, and ingestion," are used for social displays — "facial expressions of emotion" and facial paralanguage (Fridlund, 1994: 80; cf. Kryk-Kastovsky, 1997). From the behavioural point of view, communication by facial expression is the necessary condition defining the face. Fish, amphibians, reptiles and birds cannot smile or frown. In contrast, mammals can suckle and chew, supported by a muscular tongue, movable lips and cheeks. Their external ears can change their positions; their movable nose is used in smelling and touching. Some mammals have facial hair — the vibrissae — on either side of the muzzle, chin, cheeks, and above the eyes, serving "as tactile organs, which are associated with musculature that allows them to move voluntarily. [...] The muscles of facial expression in primates, including humans, allow direct emotional communication" (Cohen, 2006: 4).

This special function of the face does not result only from its physical construction, but also from the fact that the face is *public*; it is the part of the body that is most of the time on public display. "Face makes presence" (McNeill, 1998: 237). In Western cultures it is one of the few parts of the body that remains naked (along with the hands) (Hennegerg *et al.* 2003; Schoug, 2001). It is the face, as well as language, that can convey messages:

> A language is always embedded in the faces that announce its statements and ballast them in relation to the signifiers in progress and subjects concerned. Choices are guided by faces, elements are organized around faces: a common grammar is never separable from a facial education. The face is a veritable megaphone (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 179).

The face, however, is not only public, but also *private*. It stands for the self. it is "a self-image," "a reflection of the soul." It is "a showcase of the self" (McNeill, 1998: 4). Looking at it we can learn a lot about its owner's inner life. The face can "tell" us something about his true self (there is a saying: *the face does not lie*), or it can be a mask, put on to hide his true feelings (see also Section 1.5.). The face, like the body, is an object which can be manipulated by the self from behind (Giddens, 1991). The face we show to others is not always our true face. We manipulate our body, and the face in particular, to be accepted by others. This ability to manipulate the face is said to be exclusive to humans.

Man is said to be a social creature. The face he constantly displays during interaction with others also has a *social* character. The face and facial expressions, together with other gestures, make up the fundamental content of the contextuality or indexicality which is the condition of everyday communication (Giddens, 1991; Gabryś-Barker, 2004). "To learn to become a competent agent — able to join with others on an equal basis in the

production and reproduction of social relations — is to be able, which is also important, to be seen by others to do so" (Giddens, 1991: 41). Instead of talking about human communication, i.e. communication between individuals, we perhaps should talk about communication between faces (the basic form of communication is face-to-face communication). It is the face that "can send messages too elusive for science, so far, and it bewitches us with its beauty. The Trobriand Islanders deemed the face sacred, and well they might, for it is our social identity, compass, and lure, our social universe" (McNeill, 1998: 4). The variety of meanings ascribed to the word *face* over the centuries shows how many different functions and roles the face has played and how important it has always been both for an individual person and for social life.

The answer to the question posed in the beginning of the section, is the face exclusively human, is not simple, as there are many definitions of the face, some of which make it limited to humans and others not. However, from the anthropocentric perspective, the face is an exclusively human feature.

2.3. The face as a person

As characterized above, the face is not simply one of the parts of the body. It is both physical and personal, and as such it is the prime determinant of our personal and social identities. It symbolizes the self. Its special character consists in that it can stand for a person. This is reflected in our language. A person identifies himself with his face, saying *it is me*. We often speak metaphorically about meeting new faces (meaning "persons") (see Section 1.5.).

The proto-concept of the face is the ancient Greek πρόσωπον, which originally meant "face, countenance, mask." In Hellenistic Greek, *prosopon* also denoted "dramatic part, character, person, person of the Trinity, outward form, appearance." (OED; Berrios, 2003). Thomas Hobbes (1588−1679), in *Leviathan*, writes about the identification of the person with the face:

> The word Person is Latin: instead whereof the Greeks have πρόσωπον, which signifies *Face*, as *Persona* in latine signifies the *disguise*, or *outward appearance* of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask or Visard: and from the Stage, hath been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a *Person* is the same that an *Actor* is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation [...] (Hobbes, 1651/1973: 83).

In Latin the two concepts, face and person, seem to be equivalent. What is more, the person stands for the outward appearance, the face and the mask. Hobbes compares the situation of everyday conversation to performance on the stage. The person is always an actor, showing to others his face or mask.

The exceptionality of the face and its sole ability to identify the person can be illustrated by the following example: Person A shows his holiday pictures to person B. Not all of them are masterpieces of photographic art. One picture shows only someone's feet (the camera was pointed too low). Person A, pointing to it laughingly, says, *It's me. These are my legs*. Another picture shows a group of tourists by the Siklawica falls, and their faces are visible. Pointing to a man standing on the right, person A says again, *It's me*. He can easily identify himself in all the pictures, because he knows all the situations in which they were taken. But the situation would be different if someone else (neither the photographer nor his object) were to confront the persons in the pictures. He definitely would be unable to identify the owner of the feet. Whereas if he knew the person he would be able to identify him by his face.

It is true that "the face is an identity card" (Kępiński, 1998: 196; Orzechowski, 2007). The identification of a person is almost impossible when his face is hidden or covered. Almost impossible, because there are also other marks which can help identify him. Kępiński (1998, 1998a; cf. Ciechowicz, 2000) claims that the legs and the hands can also have an identification function. The hands, like the face, are also almost always naked. In the hands, as in the face, we may read a person's life history, the history of his active attitude to reality in particular. If the face is the reflection of our emotional attitude to others, the hands are a reflection of our volitional attitude. The hands of manual workers differ from the hands of white collar workers, and those of infants differ from those of elderly people (Kępiński, 1998). But it was the face that was used by Alphonse Bertillon (1853–1914), a French physiognomic anthropologist and criminologist, who in 1883 developed the photographic identification system. These were photographs of the head, taken in profile and in full face, printed on a card providing pertinent information for the purposes of identification (e.g., date of birth, height, or hair colour) (Kemp, 2004). Known as *mug shots*, such photographs have been used for many decades by the police to identify criminals. Later, however, the full-face identification photograph became the international method for identifying individuals on passports, driving licences or identity cards (Kemp, 2004). So, more than any other part of the body, the face functions as an identification mark for a particular person.

The metaphor THE FACE FOR THE PERSON (see Section 1.5.) has been used also in the name of the popular social networking website, *Facebook*, in which users present their personal profiles with full-face photographs and join school, workplace or region networks. The website's name derives from the

name of books given to freshmen students at the start of the academic year by university administrations with the intention of helping them get to know each other better. As in the books, on the website people can find their friends identifying them by their name and face.

2.4. The face as a mirror of the soul

The face does not serve only as an identification mark, it is also said to function as a display of the person's inner life. For centuries philosophers and scholars in various disciplines were intrigued by the relationship of the body to the soul. The Greeks adopted as their highest law that impulse of the will which they called *Kalokagathia* (καλοκαγαθία, meaning "beautiful and good (the perfect character)"), denoting "nobility and goodness of character" (OED). The doctrine involved the relationship between the beauty of the body and that of the soul. According to it, the face is the "effect" of the soul. Sometimes the soul is visible through the eyes "(*animi sedem est in oculos*), and generally it is reflected in the face" (Chojecki, 2000: 201). Plainly speaking, a good character is reflected in a beautiful face, and a nasty character in an ugly face.

A distinct discipline was even established, *physiognomy*, which was already known in Mesopotamian culture. The word *physiognomy* has many etymologies, but one of the most credible suggests that it is meant "to spell out the hidden rules of composition of the human body, those rules that determine the make-up of each individual" (from *physis* and *gnōme*, "the rule of nature") (Stimilli, 2005: 33). Physiognomy can be defined as "the study of the features of the face, or of the form of the body generally, as being supposedly indicative of character; the art of judging character from such study" (OED), or simply as "judging character and personality traits from facial features" (Cohen, 2006: 221). It has been practised by representatives of different professions, such as philosophers, doctors and astrologers, and by average people who wanted to learn more about others with whom they interacted face to face.

Physiognomy understood in this way has attracted a lot of attention in every epoch, although the methods and theories used have differed. Physiognomy can be treated as a special type of *somatomancy*, divination (the body reveals knowledge by supernatural means) from the human body (Lessa, 1958). Over the centuries two main types of somatomancy could be observed, *astral somatomancy* – judging a person's character and temperament from the features of the body and astrology, and *natural somatomancy* – divination from the human body only (Lessa, 1958). Lessa distinguishes four types of the latter: theriologic physiognomy, the doctrine of the average person, the

pseudo-inductive type, and the inductive method. *Theriologic physiognomy* involves a comparison of human faces and animals. A person's character is likened to the behavioural characteristics of the animal which the person's face resembles. The ideas of this type of physiognomy are also reflected in modern language. Every day we use idioms of comparison such as *as bold as a lion*, *as gentle as a lamb*, *as greedy as a wolf/pig/dog*, *as innocent as a dove*, *as obstinate as a mule*, *as silly as a sheep*, or *as wise as an owl* (Seidl and McMordie, 1978). The *doctrine of the average person* is based on the assumption that the mental, moral and physical attributes are most favourable if they approach the average. "People who departed from the norm were, in proportion to their deviation, inferior in mentality, morality, and appearance" (Cohen, 2006: 221). This shaped the way people perceived others; nowadays people often detest those who are different or stigmatized in some way (see Section 2.10.4.). The *pseudo-inductive type* is a single-case method with overgeneralization. If a woman with dimples in her cheeks has a character that pleases everyone, then all women with such dimples have such a character. The last is the *inductive method* based merely on examining a person's face on the basis of which the character and personality traits are determined (Lessa, 1958). All these methods, which had the common feature that they were based on an intuitive mode of reasoning, constituted the methodological framework of physiognomy. This, together with the fact that it could not test any of its theses and did not formulate any general rules, made physiognomy excluded from academic disciplines. Nevertheless, judging character and personality traits from the face has been through the centuries a very popular pseudo-scientific occupation in many parts of the world.

2.4.1. Reading faces in ancient China

In China, *siang mien* — the reading of faces — has been practised for more than 2000 years. In ancient China, it was based on the premise that body balance depends on the two forces, negative (the *yin*) and positive (the *yang*). Equilibrium between them is said to be important for good health. The yin has feminine and maternal influences on the right side of the face, the yang has masculine and paternal influences on the left side of the face. If the yin is dominant, the person is submissive and overemotional. If the yang is dominant, the person is a high achiever, striving for success (Hu, 1944; Cohen, 2006).

Chinese face-reading consists further in a detailed analysis of facial elements, such as facial shape, three facial zones, the eyebrows, eyes, nose, mouth, ear, cheek, cheekbones, chin, and moles. The Chinese believe that the forehead zone

indicates a person's mental capacity, the eyebrow-to-nosetip zone indicates a person's fortune and ability to overcome obstacles, and the nosetip-to-chin zone indicates the suitability for old age (Young, 1984; Cohen, 2006; Mong, 1989). The face is also divided into eight regions: life region, pulse points, career region, wealth region, friendship region, parental region, health and energy region, and love region, each of which is analysed separately to show a person's predispositions in a certain area of his life (Young, 1984; Cohen, 2006; Mong, 1989). The Chinese believe that even the smallest detail of the human face carries some information about its owner. Therefore they scrutinize every inch of the face and combine the results with the astrological data. Thus, "the Five elements, the Yin and the Yang i.e. the negative and the positive forces of the universe and the human body, the stars including the Heavenly Stems [...] and Earthly Branches [...], and all the minute details of the eyes, nose, eyebrows, ears, mouth, hair, hands and feet and a thousand and one other things of the human body form one complete whole in this study of a person's character and destiny" (Mong, 1989: 11). Such a detailed data analysis is supposed to result in a thorough description of the person's character and future life.

2.4.2. Physiognomy in ancient Greece and Rome

China was not the only cradle of physiognomy. It developed also in other regions of the world. In ancient Greece and Rome, it was used by philosophers and physicians. In ancient Greece, it was probably Pythagoras (ca 580–500 BC), who began the study of physiognomy. He is said to have selected his students on the basis of their facial features. Pythagoras, however, was not the only one who put the physiognomic knowledge into practice. Hippocrates (460–377 BC) and Galen (129–199) incorporated it in their medical treatises and used it in medical diagnoses (Tytler, 1982; Fridlund, 1994; Cohen, 2006) (see also Section 2.10.1.).

The first text devoted entirely to the problem of physiognomy, which established the conceptual foundation for the discipline, was the treatise *Physignomics* (*Physiognomica*) (1984) once attributed to Aristotle (384–322 BC) (though it is now thought to have been written by one of his disciples), in which the author established a new technique or art of dealing with faces. The main assumptions of this discipline are:

- "Soul and body [...] are affected sympathetically by one another: on the one hand, an alteration of the state of the soul produces an alteration in the form of the body, and contrariwise an alteration in bodily form produces an alteration in the state of soul" (1984: 1243).

- The face is the part of the body which is most fit to indicate a person's character.

The author discusses the role of different parts of the body, the face included, and their importance as signs of character. He does not talk only about the face as a whole, but concentrates also on its constituent elements: lips, nose, eyes, and forehead. Their shapes and colour can tell a lot about their owner's character. The author claims that:

> The most suitable part of all is the region of the eyes and forehead, head and face; next to it comes the region of the chest and shoulders, and next again, that of the legs and feet; whilst the belly and neighbouring parts are of least service. In a word, the clearest signs are derived from those parts in which intelligence is most manifest (1984: 1250).

He mentions three methods of analysing the human appearance. The first one involves relating a specific mental character to different animals:

> The face, when fleshly, indicates laziness, as in cattle; if gaunt, assiduity, and if bony, cowardice, on the analogy of asses and deer. A small face marks a small soul, as in the cat and the ape; a large face means lethargy, as in asses and cattle. So the face must be neither large nor little: an intermediate size is therefore the best (1984: 1246).

The other two methods are based on the inferences drawn from racial differences and facial expressions, respectively. The latter together with gestures are "interpreted by their affinity to different emotions" (1984: 1240).

Physiognomy was also among the interests of Aristotle himself. Analysing human faces he looked for forms and shapes indicating different types of character. In *Historia Animalium* (1965), Aristotle writes about the facial signs of psychological traits:

> Persons who have a large forehead are sluggish, those who have a small one are fickle; those who have a broad one are excitable, those who have a bulging one, quick-tempered. [...] Straight ones [eyebrows] are a sign of soft disposition, those which bend out towards the nose, a sign of harshness; those which bend out towards the temples, of a mocking and dissimulating disposition (I. vii–ix). [...] eyes may tend to blink, or to remain unblinking, or exhibit no extreme in either direction: the last-named show the finest disposition, the first indicates instability, the second impudence (I. ix–x, x–xi). [...] Large, projecting ears are a sign of senseless talk and chatter (I. xi).

A specific shape, bend or curve of a part of the face or its certain movement could be interpreted as a sign of a particular disposition or a feature of character.

The problem of the relation between the body and the soul or the character traits was a very popular topic in ancient Greece. Aristotle had many followers who were inspired by his works and tried to interpret human faces. Galen, mentioned above, a Greek anatomist and physician, claimed that personality was a reflection of four humours or fluids that make up human body (Cohen, 2006). He used the signs he read in the human face in his medical diagnoses.

Even in ancient times, the conviction of the interdependence between the face and character traits was not shared by everyone. Some people observed that the human appearance, especially the face, often does not agree with the character of the person. The beautiful face does not have to imply a beautiful soul, and the beautiful soul does not have to dwell in a beautiful body. This could be explained by the fact that the "'Signatures' which the physiognomist observes in the face indicate disposition, not necessity" (Berland, 2005: 28). Although natural inclinations are important and play a great role in the formation of a man's character, a lot depends on his free will (Berland, 2005). Thus, in some cases the face can mislead the physiognomist. Cicero (106–46 BC), the Roman orator, mentions the problem in *De Fato*, where he writes about Socrates:

> Again, do we not read how Socrates was stigmatized by the "physiognomist" Zophyrus, who professed to discover entire characters and natures from their body, eyes, face and brow? He said that Socrates was stupid and thick-witted because he had not got hollows in the neck above the collarbone [...]. He also added that he was addicted to women [...] (1948: 203–205).

Cicero claims that although the face is the reflection of the soul, natural inclinations and character are not fixed and can be changed by means of "the rational control of the passions" (Berland, 2005: 29). In other words, it is possible for a man to change his character by the mere power of his mind, and this does not have to involve a change in his physiognomy.

Although the face was investigated and analysed, and treated as the source of knowledge about the man, its relevance was never directly stated by the ancients. St Jerome (342–420) was probably one of the first to mention the importance of the face in human life:

> The face is the mirror of the mind, and eyes without speaking confess the secrets of the heart (Letter 54; 1975: 251; in Synnott, 1993).

Over the centuries this truth served as the starting point for the adepts of physiognomy and other disciplines investigating the face. The thoughts and ideas of the first physiognomists remained popular in the years to come and became reformulated according to the main trends of the subsequent epochs.

2.4.3. Physiognomy in Europe

The popularity of the study of the face in Europe has its roots especially in ancient Greece and the texts of the first physiognomists. In addition, the approach to face-reading in a particular epoch always represented general trends of that time. During the Middle Ages, Europe turned away from naturalism toward the occult, and this had its effect on physiognomy. "Facial morphology now provided clues not to temperament but to fate, and face-reading joined the astrologer's armamentatium along with numerology, soothsaying, and palmistry. This physiognomy was cosmological [...]" (Fridlund, 1994: 3). The interest in the face revived, and many works on physiognomy were published, mainly by astrologers and physicians. Astrologers described human bodies and faces according to seven planetary types. In 1272, an astrologer to Emperor Frederick II, Michael Scott, wrote *De Hominis Physiognomia*, in which he provided physiological explanations of the facial muscles and nerves, and the causes of the appearance of certain features were said to be astrological (Cohen, 2006). Physicians looked for the illness symptoms in the face. In the Middle Ages, following the tradition of Hippocrates and Galen, physiognomy was also related to medicine, which is evident in the concept of *complexio* (the totality of the physical make-up). If the medical treatment was to be effective, the practitioner, in forming his diagnosis, had to use his knowledge of physiognomy and the four temperaments (Tytler, 1982). In brief, in the Middle Ages, physiognomy based on Greek tradition provided the explanation of human fate, understood cosmologically as well as physically. The face was treated as a source of information concerning the person's future life and physical condition.

The revival of physiognomy was based not only on the Greek tradition but also on the Arab art of *firāsa*, which taught a person to infer from the other's face and body (and the smallest details, such as the shape of the nose) the truth of his soul and the secrets of his heart (Courtine and Haroche, 2007). Arab physiognomy developed independently of Greek physiognomy. It was an art of second sight which enabled a person to "quickly and correctly evaluate a given person [...] on the basis of his external features [...] visible only to a trained eye" (Mourad, 1939: 1; in Courtine and Haroche, 2007: 29). The two physiognomic traditions, Greek and Arab, had a strong impact on European physiognomy and the first texts on the role of the face in human life.

The interest in the face as an image of the soul is visible in many medieval literary works. There were numerous texts "that dealt with the beauty of an upright soul in an upright body, a Christian ideal of the soul externally revealed" (Eco, 1986: 10). Gilbert of Hoyt in his *Sermones in Canticum Salomonis* (XXV, 1; PL, 184, col. 129; in Eco, 1993: 10) writes:

And have regard also for the bodily countenance whose grace can be seen in its abundant beauty; for the exterior face can refresh the spirit of those who look upon it, and nourish us with the grace of the interior to which it witnesses.

In a similar tone, St Bernard (ca 996–ca 1081) reasons in his *Sermones in Cantica*:

The body is an image of the mind, which, like an effulgent light scattering forth its rays, is diffused through its members and senses, shining through in action, discourse, appearance, movement – even in laughter, if it is completely sincere and tinged with gravity (LXXV, 11; PL, col. 1193; in Eco, 1993: 10).

The relationship between the beauty of the face and the beauty of the soul also fascinated Dante. In *Convivio*, intended to be a comprehensive summary of the truths of philosophy, he explains that the soul is expressed through the face and has an impact on its looks:

And since in the face the soul operates chiefly in two places, because in these two places all three natures of the soul, as it were, have jurisdiction, I mean in the eyes and in the mouth, she adorns these most of all, and directs her whole attention thither to beautify them as far as possible. And in these two places I affirm that these pleasures appear by saying, 'In her eyes and in her sweet smile.' These two places by a graceful simile may be called balconies of the lady, namely, the soul, who dwells in the edifice of the body, for she oft-times shows herself there though as it were under a veil. She reveals herself in the eyes so manifestly that any one who gazes intently on her may know her feeling at the moment (1909: 153–154. Tractate III. viii. 38–75).

As can be seen, Dante does not treat the face as a whole, but analyses the role of its two main parts, the eyes and the mouth. He employs two metaphors, THE BODY IS AN EDIFICE and THE BODY IS THE HOME OF THE SOUL, together with the related metaphors, THE FACE IS A FAÇADE and THE EYES AND THE MOUTH ARE THE BALCONIES (WINDOWS). The soul, which dwells in the body, hides behind the façade (the face). Only a careful observer can notice it in the eyes and the mouth. Dante believes that the soul contributes significantly to the beauty of the body, and to the beauty of the face in particular.

The beginning of the 16th century was marked by an increase in the interest in the face and "the science of the face," which was a natural continuation of the ancient Greek concept of the body–soul relation. The Latin saying *in facie legitur homo* (a man's character lies in his face) became popular again. This view is represented by Giambattista della Porta (1538–1615) in his treatise *On Human Physiognomy* (1586/1601), where he says that the face is an image of the

soul, and the eyes are an image of the face, at the same time reaffirming the eyes' "traditional preeminence among the facial features as the site of the soul" (Stimilli, 2005: 67). Della Porta combines the Aristotelian comparative method with the Hippocratic typology of temperament. He compares human beings to animals to describe their character. Persons whose faces resemble lions are courageous, while those who resemble goats are stupid. In sum, man is an accumulation and extract of different animal species. Della Porta illustrates his disquisition by an iconography of human faces and the animals that they resemble. In his work *Of Celestial Physiognomy* (1603/1627), he rejects the idea of astrological influence on human facial features and character, which was earlier (especially in the Middle Ages) widely propagated by astrologers (Cohen, 2006). He argues that human character is not influenced by planets or zodiac signs. He tries to find specific facial features that could help him diagnose whether a person is sanguine, phlegmatic, melancholic or choleric. The four temperaments correspond to the four elements and four animals: the man who is quick-tempered or choleric has the nature of fire and that of the lion; the phlegmatic man has the nature of water and that of the lamb; the sanguine man has the nature of air and that of the monkey; the melancholic man has the nature of earth and that of the pig (Magli, 1989; Fridlund, 1994). For della Porta (1601), the main purpose of physiognomy is to decipher the face of the other. The face is to be understood as a social stigma, telling us whether a person is moral or evil and spoiled, in which case people should avoid him for their own good. Physiognomy can be useful also for the analysis of ourselves. Della Porta claims that by observing our own face we can learn about our own self.

Not for all physiognomists of that time did the face matter as a social stigma. Others saw in it the signatures of nature and individuality. Paracelsus (ca 1493–1541), a Swiss physician and philosopher, treated physiognomy as "a subdiscipline of signature theory, a science whose aim is to decode the manifestations of nature as expressions of its own powers" (Bergengruen, 2005: 42). He claims that the external form is shaped according to its inner being, not the other way around. So the inner being and its corresponding physical signature are manifestations of individuality and a consequence of man's fall from grace (Paracelsus, 1999; in Bergengruen, 2005).

The doubts about the interdependence between the face and the character traits, already expressed by the ancients, echoed in the works of the prominent representatives of that time. One of Michel de Montaigne's (1533–1592) essays, *Of Physiognomy* (1603), is devoted to this subject, and in it he writes:

> There is nothing more truely-semblable as the comformity or relation betweene the body and the minde (1603/1906: 357).

Montaigne was convinced that there exists a relationship between the body and the mind, but unlike others he was reluctant to concede that a beautiful mind dwells in a beautiful body:

> [...] me thinkes that the same feature and manner of the face, and those lineaments by which some argue certaine inward complexions and our future fortunes, is a thing that doth not directly nor simply lodge under the Chapter of beauty and ill favourdnesse, no more than all good health [...] For ill favour and ill composed face may sometimes harbour some aire of probity and trust. As on the contrary I have sometimes read between two faire eyes the threats of a maligne and dangerous ill-boding nature [...] A mans looke or aire of his face is but a weake warrant, notwithstanding it is of some consideration (de Montaigne's, 1603/1906: 359).

Such reluctance, however, was not represented by Jerome Cardan (16th–17th century), an Italian philosopher, mathematician and physician, who developed a new discipline called *metoposcopy*, or face-reading, based on the physiognomic principles formulated by Aristotle; it consisted in reading the lines and marking of the forehead (the forehead was mapped into zones, each one denoting a planet). Cardan wrote two works on the subject, *Metoposcopia* (1658) and *Fisionomia Astrologica* (1659). According to his theory, every mark on the face, even "the moles, warts and wrinkles are 'divined' for their cosmic significance" (Synnott, 1993: 80). The universe, according to Cardan, is organized in a hierarchy of three orders of decreasing importance, which are mutually interdependent. The three of them, the intellectual or divine order, the celestial or astral order and the earthly or elementary order influence the human microcosm, in particular the face (Magli, 1989). In other words, the way the human face looks is cosmologically determined, and its features tell us about the person's life and individuality.

In spite of the great popularity of physiognomic ideas, enthusiasm for physiognomy was not shared by all social circles. The Catholic Church condemned physiognomy and metoposcopy, together with other disciplines based on divination, such as oneirology, necromancy, pyromancy, oenomancy, pedomancy, geomancy, chiromancy, fortune-telling, and judicial astrology ("the constant campaign against astrology by the Holy Inquisition and the proscriptions against its exponents in the papal bulls of Paul IV in 1559 and of Sixtus V in 1586") (Tytler, 1982; 43; Berland, 2005). Divination was treated as "sacrilegious because it attempts to foresee the future, which is God's to dispose of as he sees fit. It also fails to acknowledge the power of grace to effect moral change" (Berland, 2005: 25). The church condemned physiognomists for trying to acquire a power which belonged entirely to God. These acts of condemnation against physiognomists and representatives of other related disciplines did influence significantly the development and popularity of these disciplines.

Over the centuries the fashion for physiognomy did not diminish. However, with the decline of astrology, its character changed. It was no longer predictive and cosmic, but became more descriptive in the Aristotelian mode (Synnott, 1993). This new, more tentative, approach to physiognomy was represented by William Hogarth (1697–1764). In 1753, he published *Analysis of Beauty*, in which he expressed his ideas about taste and beauty. One chapter, entitled "On the face," is devoted to physiognomical issues. In it Hogarth voices a thought deeply rooted in people's minds, "the face is the index of the mind," but he seems not to be completely convinced by physiognomical theory, reasoning that human appearance is the result of many other factors (Hogarth, 1753/1810: 125–127).

This more rational approach to physiognomic ideas and to the "power" of the face was soon overshadowed by a significant new figure in European physiognomy. Johann Gaspar Lavater (1741–1801), a pastor from Zurich, in 1775 published his classic work *Essays on Physiognomy*, which made the discipline even more popular. He defined physiognomy as "the science or knowledge of the correspondence between the external and internal man [...]" (1804: 19), or "the knowledge of the signs of the powers and inclinations of men," which involves character in rest (1804: 20). He distinguished it from *pathognomy*; "the knowledge of the signs of the passions," which involves character in motion (1804: 20). Lavater believed that he had a special gift for recognizing God in people through the divination of traits from the shapes of their face. What distinguished him from other physiognomists was that he insisted on the use of artistic representations of the human face, rather than the living face, as the object of physiognomic analysis. He was fascinated by the human face, which he treated as the element of the body that most clearly distinguishes man from other living creatures. He believed that the face and its parts, when analysed motionless or in motion, provide the observer with a great variety of information concerning the man's interior:

> The head, especially the face, and the formation of the firm parts, compared to the firm parts of other animals, convince the accurate observer, who is capable of investigating truth, of the greatness and superiority of his intellectual qualities. The eye, the look, the cheeks, the mouth, the forehead, whether considered in a state of entire rest or during their innumerable varieties of motion, in fine, whatever is understood by physiognomy, are the most expressive, the most convincing picture of interior sensation, desires, passions, will, and of all those properties which so much exalt moral above animal life (Lavater, 1804: 14).

Lavater maintained that man has three types of life: the lowest – animal life, which encompasses the area between "the belly" and "the organs of generation";

the moral life, which is located in the breast; and the supreme, intellectual life, which is located in the head. All of them are expressed through the face:

> If we take the countenance as the representative and epitome of the three divisions, then will the forehead, to the eye-brows, be the mirror, or image, of the understanding; the nose and cheeks the image of the moral and sensitive life; and the mouth and chin the image of the animal life; while the eye will be to the whole as its summary or centre (Lavater, 1804: 16).

Thus different parts of the face are related, according to Lavater, to different powers and skills of the interior. And, in accordance with folk tradition, he believed that

> [...] intellectual life, or the powers of the understanding and the mind, make themselves most apparent in the circumference and form of the solid parts of the head; especially the forehead, [...] the power of thinking resides [...] in the head, and its internal parts (Lavater, 1804: 15).

In the chapter "Of the harmony between moral beauty and physical beauty" (1804: 175–203), Lavater discusses in greater detail the relationship between morality and outer appearance. According to him, "The moral life of man, particularly, reveals itself in the lines, marks, and transitions of countenance" (Lavater, 1804: 15). Unlike Montaigne, who was reluctant to agree that the beautiful mind dwells in a beautiful body, or Hogarth, who saw many other factors as formative of the human appearance, Lavater believed that the man's moral stance influences his appearance, especially his face:

> Moral degradation changes the body, producing "caricaturas" of the original, while true goodness confers "lasting charms" on the exterior. [...] the beauty and deformity of the countenance is in a just, and determinate, proportion to the moral beauty and deformity of the man. The morally best, the most beautiful. The morally worst, the most deformed (Lavater, 1804: 182–183).

The role of Lavater's work and its impact on the "science" of physiognomy is enormous and undeniable. Lavater turned physiognomy into a respectable discipline, his work was rapidly translated into the major European languages and he became a celebrity. But his controversial theories also encountered many opponents, e.g., Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. First of all his "eclectic approach was criticized for its methodological weaknesses" (Percival, 2005: 18). He was accused of forming judgements based on prior knowledge of the person, and not on direct observation and contemplation of the subject, which he claimed.

Hegel (1770–1831) was one of the most ferocious opponents of Lavater. In his *Phenomenology of Mind* (1807/1931: 342), he strongly attacks Lavater's main ideas, calling physiognomy a "science" which deals with the person's "presumed reality and seeks to raise to the level of knowledge uncritical assertions of everyday physiognomy," and which is "therefore something with neither foundation nor finality" (Hegel, 1931: 348). Everyday physiognomy, as distinguished from Lavater's "science," is defined by Hegel as a familiar procedure of mankind, in divining and supposing what is in a man's mind from bodily expressions (e.g., the tone of his voice, the lineaments of his face, the play of his features, and in general the conformation of his body). For Hegel, physiognomy, like craniometry and phrenology, which will be discussed below, is a pseudo-science. He calls physiognomy "guesswork thinking" (1931: 347), referring to the words in Shakespeare's *Macbeth*: "There is no art to find the mind's construction in the face" (Act I. iv). As an alternative Hegel presents his own view on the relation of the inner to the outer:

> This outer, in the first place, does not act as an organ making the inner visible, or, in general terms, a being for another; for the inner, so far as it is in the organ, is the activity itself. The mouth that speaks, the hand that works, [...], are the operative organs effecting the actual realization, and they contain the action qua action, or the inner as such; the externality, however, which the inner obtains by their means is the deed, the act, in the sense of a reality separated and cut off from the individual (Hegel, 1931: 340).

He further continues discussing the problem of making the inner visible:

> If now the external shape and form were able to express the inner individuality only in so far as that shape is neither an organ nor action, hence only in so far as it is an inert passive whole, it would then play the role of a subsistent thing, which received undisturbed the inner as an alien element into its own passive being, and thereby became the sign and symbol of it — an external contingent expression, whose actual concrete aspect has no meaning of its own — a language whose sounds and tone-combinations are not the real fact itself, but are capriciously connected with it and a mere accident so far as it is concerned (Hegel, 1931: 341).

Hegel sees the true self expressed mainly by and through the man's actions, the body in general, and the face in particular, being the mere symbols of the self. "The true being of a man is [...] his act; individuality is real in the deed [...]" (Hegel, 1931: 349). For him, the spirit is actualized in a man's demeanour, which distinguishes him from other living creatures. Although not a physiognomist himself, agreeing with physiognomists (e.g., Dante and Della Porta) Hegel believed that a man's soul can be visible in his eyes. In *Aesthetics, Lectures on Fine Art* (1835/1975), Hegel writes:

> [...] the external human form is alone capable of revealing the spiritual in a sensuous way. The human expression in face, eyes, posture and air is material and in these is not what spirit is; but within this corporeality itself the human exterior is not only living and natural, as the animal is, but is the bodily presence which in itself mirrors the spirit. Through the eye we look into a man's soul, just as his spiritual character is expressed by his whole demeanour in general. If therefore the bodily presence belongs to spirit as *its* existence, spirit belongs to the body as the body's inner being and is not an inwardness foreign to the external shape, so that the material aspect neither has in itself, nor hints at, some other meaning. The human form does carry in itself much of the general animal type, but the whole difference between the human and the animal body consists solely in this, that the human body in its whole demeanour evinces itself as the dwelling-place of spirit and indeed as the sole possible existence of spirit in nature (Hegel, 1975: 433–434).

Discussing the ideal formation of the human head on the basis of the Greek profile, Hegel also concentrates on the relation between the physical and the spiritual (1975: 729):

> [...] the human face has a second centre in which the soulful and spiritual relation to things is manifested. This is in the upper part of the face, in the intellectual brow and, lying under it, the eye, expressive of the soul, and what surrounds it. [...] with the brow there is connected meditation, reflection, the spirit's reversion into itself while its inner life peeps out from the eye and is clearly concentrated there. Through this emphasis on the forehead, while the mouth and cheek-bones are secondary, the human face acquires a spiritual character.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) shared Hegel's idea of the spirituality of the face. For him, the relation is clear:

> That the outer man is a picture of the inner, and the face, an expression and revelation of the whole character, is a presumption likely enough in itself, and therefore a safe one to go by; [...] (Schopenhauer, 1910: 61).

But unlike Hegel, Schopenhauer was a physiognomist and believed that the deciphering of faces is an art which provides us with fuller and more interesting information about the person than his tongue. "For the face of a man is the exact impression of what he is; and if he deceives us, that is our fault, not his" (Schopenhauer, 1910: 66). Schopenhauer stressed the importance of physiognomy for the cognition of human nature. He claimed that:

> The study of physiognomy is one of the chief means of knowledge of mankind, because the cast of a man's face is the only sphere in which his arts of

dissimulation are of no avail, since these arts extended only to that play of feature which is akin to mimicry (Schopenhauer, 1910: 67).

Schopenhauer believed that by observing a person's face one can learn about his intellectual and moral qualities. But "it is only in conversation that the features and especially the eyes become animated, and the intellectual resources and capacities set their mark upon the countenance" (Schopenhauer, 1910: 66). However, he pointed out that

the rule does not apply to moral qualities, which lie deeper [...], to get a pure and fundamental conception of a man's physiognomy, we must observe him when he is alone and left to himself [...] [then] he is wholly himself (Schopenhauer, 1910: 67).

Simply speaking, a man's intellectual qualities can be noticed when he enters into interaction with others, while his moral qualities, kept secret, can be observed only when he takes off the mask in private. Thus it is much easier to discern a man's intellectual capacity than his moral character. Such an attitude to the relationship between morality and outer appearance made Schopenhauer's physiognomy significantly different from Lavater's ideas.

Lavater's physiognomy, however, had more supporters than opponents. One of Lavater's most famous supporters was his great friend, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832). In the beginning, Goethe was really enthusiastic about Lavater's physiognomic analysis. He even mediated between Lavater and the Weidmann publishing house in Leipzig, which was to print the first volume of his *Physiognomische Fragmente*. Goethe's portrait, with a physiogmomic interpretation, appeared in the third volume of Lavater's work (Gray, 2004). Later, however, Goethe became sceptical about Lavater's methods and criticized him for exaggerated "Lavaterianism." Although he did not lose interest in physiognomy, Goethe came completely to reject Lavater's views. He carried out some osteological studies, concentrating mainly on the intermaxillary bone, which he also found in animals. But in this, Goethe was interested in anatomical, not physiognomic or characterological, issues (Gray, 2004). He "was interested in the typical, understood as the reference to the 'type,' to the common 'idea' of species," the type referring to an idea or an archetype in the Platonic sense (Gray, 2004: 173). In the 1930s he was hailed as having been the founding father of modern German physiognomy (see Section 2.12.2.), and his intellectual authority was exploited to rehabilitate physiognomy during the Nazi era.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, parallel to Lavaterianism, physiognomic investigations went beyond discussions of characterological issues and concentrated on physiognomy as a sign of race and the face as a sign of man's fall (see Section 2.12.1.). These started with Petrus Camper (1722–1789),

a Dutch anatomist, who tried to establish national and racial distinctions among humans on the basis of measurements of the human skull. In a famous lecture, first presented to the Amsterdam Drawing Academy in 1770, on the facial angle, he established a gradation of humans and animal species based on the angle of *facial prognathism*. Camper established the "facial line," or "facial angle" — *linea facialis* — formed by the intersection of two lines, one drawn from the base of the nose to the base of the skull, the other from the nose to the most prominent part of the forehead. So it was "the line constructed mathematically out of the geometry of the face. It was to serve as the key to the anatomical segregation of humans from the higher forms of animals" (Gray, 2004: 148). Camper treated the facial angle as one of the criteria for identifying human beings as belonging to a particular race. His system of human face measurements was soon developed into the formal system of *craniometry* (measurement of the skull) established by Johann F. Blumenbach (1752–1840), a German physiologist and anatomist (Henneberg *et al.*, 2003). According to the principles of craniometry, the idealized Greek face has a 100 percent angle. The smallest angle, 70 percent, is characteristic of the skull of the Negro "as the dividing line between humans and apes" (Gray, 2004: 109).

Physiognomy and craniometry were not the only disciplines focusing on the analysis of the head and the face. A new morphological enterprise became popular, called *phrenology*. According to this theory, developed by Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828), the mental powers or characteristics of an individual consist of separate faculties, each of which has its location in an organ found in a definite region of the surface of the brain, the size or development of which is commensurate with the development of the particular faculty; this led to the study of the external conformation of the cranium as an index to the position and degree of development of the various faculties (OED). Unlike physiognomy, phrenology was a learnable system and was not based on divination. It consisted in scrutinizing bumps on the head for memory, reason and imagination (McNeill, 1998). In spite of Gall's openly negative attitude to Lavater's physiognomy, the two disciplines were often practised together (Tytler, 1982).

The 19th century can be called the age of physiognomy, as Lavater's ideas "permeated many areas of culture," literature, art, medicine and the newly established social sciences (Percival, 2005: 20). In 1886, the German physician Theodor Piderit (1826–1912) published his book *Expression and Physiognomy*, the publication of which marked the beginning of neo-physiognomy. Piderit disclaimed both Lavater's physiognomy and Gall's phrenology. He maintained that muscular movements of the face indicate sentiments, and the exercise of these muscles causes permanent changes in the face (Fridlund, 1994). Piderit (1886: 139–140; in Fridlund, 1994: 11) believed that:

> Facial expressions provide not only insight into a person's momentary psychic state; his individual peculiarity, up to a certain point, can likewise be guessed from them. In young faces, in which characteristic physiognomic traits have not yet been developed, one is solely dependent upon the careful observation of such signs. When during lively conversation certain mimetic facial movements are repeated very often, with little provocation, one may be sure that these mimetic traits will, over time, develop into physiognomic ones, and in judging such a person one will rarely be wrong to attribute physiognomic significance to such mimetic indicators [...] Physiognomic traits may be assumed to be mimetic movements that have become permanent.

Thus, what we can learn about a mature man's self from his physiognomy, we can learn about a youth from his facial expression. The neo-physiognomy propagated by Piderit differed from the physiognomy of the earlier epochs in that it did not give priority to the analysis of the face in rest over the analysis of the face in motion, and that it was based on common knowledge employed by ordinary people during social interaction and deeply rooted in the folk tradition.

Among those who treated the face through the prism of the folk tradition was Georg Simmel (1858–1918), a German professor of philosophy. For Simmel, the face can tell a lot about the person. In his essay "The aesthetic significance of the face," he writes that "in the features of the face the soul finds its clearest expression" (1901/1959: 276). But he goes even further, claiming that "The face strikes us as the symbol, not only of the spirit, but also of an unmistakable personality" (Simmel, 1959: 278). In other words, the face is a sign of our humanity and a display of our character. Simmel agrees with many of his predecessors, maintaining that the eyes are a very important element of the face. Looking at a person's eyes, or into them, we can learn what his true feelings are. We can control facial expressions, but we are unable to control the expression of our eyes. They tell all the truth about ourselves (see also Sections 1.5. and 2.5.).

Nowadays physiognomy as a "science" is almost completely forgotten. Nobody treats it seriously any longer. It has the status of nothing more than, as Hegel called it, "guesswork thinking." Daniel McNeill, in his monograph *The Face* (1998: 168), poses the question of the validity of physiognomy and answers it in the following way:

> It posits genes that link facial surface to mental and emotional traits. In fact, no a priori fiat excludes such bonds. The genetic code yields many odd associations. For instance, a diagonal cleft in the earlobe comes with greater risk of heart attack.

We cannot entirely reject the link between the inner and the outer, between the self and the face, but there is little evidence for its existence. "Yet a folk

physiognomy persists. People utterly ignorant of Lavater make judgements from facial stereotypes, often predictably across cultures" (McNeill, 1998: 168). They cannot stop doing this and by analysing the face of the other they are constantly doing the "guesswork."

2.5. The face and expression of emotions

The face is the body area which is most usually naked and on almost constant display to others (except for the use of the veil in certain cultures), and as such it is "a source of social signalling and communication via its multitude of muscles serving expressions" (Gilbert, 2002: 32). The face involves movement; it is never stable. It is hard to find a moment when the face does not express anything. As Denis Diderot maintained: "In the man every moment has its physiognomy and expression" (Diderot, 1795/1984: 371; in Courtine and Haroche, 2007: 7–8). Man interacting with others all the time communicates something to them. This communication involves not only the use of words, but the whole person. His body, similarly to the word, is an expression, "the natural language of the soul." The face as part of the body is part of this natural language too (Courtine and Haroche, 2007: 21). Facial expressions, like words, can tell the truth or lie:

> The face is an uncanny semaphore. In life and in some fictions like *Jane Eyre*, it issues messages of startling depth and infinite hue. We rely on these signals constantly and willy-nilly, for almost none of us can define them. We are reading a language we cannot articulate and may not consciously notice. Yet we regularly feign these cues. Deceit pervades animal communication, and even chimps can lie with their faces. The face is both ultimate truth and fata morgana (McNeill, 1998: 8).

Thus the human face is able to lie. In our interactions with other people we are often insincere, do not want to say everything we know or think, or do not speak the truth. Concealment or lying can occur not only at the linguistic level, for we can lie or try to conceal our true feelings or opinions without saying a word. Facial expressions do not always occur when emotions are experienced, because people are capable of inhibiting their expressions. On the other hand, emotions do not always occur when a facial expression is shown, because people are capable of fabricating an expression (Ekman, 1999). This requires some mastery in the control of one's face. Actors, who are professionally instructed in this art, are often called masters of "the facial nerve" (McNeill,

1998: 240). Very often, however, these attempts are unsuccessful, because, as Kępiński claims (1998), the eyes do not lie; they are the part of the face that we cannot mask. The eyes give away what we really feel. That is why to hide their inner reactions, secret agents, apart from putting on the *poker face* (good poker players show neutral faces), wear reflex sunglasses to make their eyes invisible (see also Section 1.5.). Lying with one's face is a hard task. In order to assume an appearance of objectivity, examiners during exams or interviewers at job interviews try to conceal their true feelings towards the candidates, putting on a mask of indifference. In intimate relations many people, especially women, try to assume an air of mystery to make themselves look more attractive. Some people, however, seem incapable of hiding a lie, like Pinocchio, whose nose grew longer whenever he was lying.

The idea that the face is a source of communication had been known before, but it was in the 17th and especially the 18th centuries that it became a source of inspiration for many scholars and researchers. Early analyses of facial expressions, similarly to physiognomy, combined moral philosophy with the observation of human character (Berland, 2005). The moral element can also be found in the works of Charles Le Brun (1619–1690), a French painter and art theorist. He studied facial expressions and was among the practitioners of the *symptomatology* of emotion, the study of facial expression in movement (as distinguished from physiognomy – the study of the shape of the face at rest) (Duchenne de Boulogne, 1862/1990). Le Brun based his investigations on the Cartesian ideal of the body and claimed that the pursuit of the good and aversion to the harmful produces passions in the mind. The brain, which is the mental site of the passion, is adjacent to the face, which is the locus of expression. "Moral conduct is initially produced by impulses, which the face expresses. Thus the study of facial expression has a moral dimension" (Berland, 2005: 27). Facial expressions signal our emotions, both positive and negative, and our attitudes towards various problems and, most of all, towards others.

Although facial expressions were mainly analysed in humans, some researchers noted that some animals are also able to express emotions using their facial muscles. Charles Bell (1774–1842), a Scottish anatomist, surgeon and artist, in *The Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression as Connected with the Fine Arts* (1872), claims that emotions and passions are marked on the faces of both humans and animals by movements of muscles designed by the divine for that purpose. He mentions a special apparatus for communicating by a "natural language" the use of which results in changes in the face. Bell's views on the participation of the divine were shared by a famous French physician and neurologist, Guillaume Benjamin Armand Duchenne de Boulogne (1806–1875).

Duchenne de Boulogne, in his book *The Mechanism of Human Facial Expression*, published in 1862, presented a study in which he identifies the particular muscles producing specific changes in facial appearance. To do so he

carried out an experiment in which he asked his subjects to make certain facial expressions. He also electrically stimulated their faces to produce expressions:

> Armed with electrodes, one would be able, like nature herself, to paint the expressive lines of the emotions of the soul on the face of man. What a source of new observations! (Duchenne de Boulogne, 1862/1990: 9).

In his book, Duchenne claims that facial muscles are dedicated mainly to the expression of emotion:

> The face in repose must undergo some modification by the tonic force of these muscles, [...]. Facial expression is formed in repose in the individual face, which must be the image of our habitual sentiments, the *facies* of our dominant passions (1990: 31).

He discovered that all the facial muscle actions can occur involuntarily, and only some can be produced deliberately, which agrees with the results of modern clinical neurological research (Ekman, 1990). Some of these facial movements are more difficult to make voluntarily than others:

> The muscles that move the eyebrows, of all the expressive muscles, are least under the control of the will; in general only the emotions of the soul can move them in an isolated fashion (Duchenne de Boulogne, 1990: 43).

One of the most important findings Duchenne made was that there exist certain facial patterns which are universal, common to all humanity, and can be easily identified as evidence of certain emotions, e.g., happiness, merriment, grief, or terror:

> In the face, our Creator was not concerned with mechanical necessity. He was able in his wisdom, or — please pardon this manner of speaking — in pursuing a divine fantasy, to put any particular muscle in action, one alone or several muscles together, when he wished the characteristic signs of the emotions, even the most fleeting, to be written briefly on man's face. Once this language of facial expression was created, it sufficed for him to give all human beings the instinctive faculty of always expressing their sentiments by contracting the same muscles. This rendered the language universal and immutable (Duchenne de Boulogne, 1990: 19).

His claim for the universality of certain facial expressions has been confirmed by the results of modern research carried out in this field (Ekman, 1989; 1990; Peck, 1987). Ekman and Oster (1982) found that, although humans have a language of the face that is limitless, there is a limited number of innate facial expressions of emotion. They are identified with six basic emotions: happiness,

anger, disgust, sadness, fear, and surprise, the last two often being combined. The universal in facial expressions, according to Ekman (1999), is the connection between particular facial configurations and particular emotions.

> Our evidence, and that of others, shows only that when people are experiencing certain strong emotions, and are not making any attempt to mask their expressions [...], the expression will be the same regardless of age, race, culture, sex, or education (Ekman, 1998: 391).

The six basic expressions of emotion are universal, but the contexts in which they are displayed depend on cultural factors (Ekman and Oster, 1982). In all cultures, there are special *display rules* regarding the expected management of facial appearance and emotional expressions (Ekman, 1999). In the so-called backstage, using the terminology of the theatrical model of interaction, when the culture-specific norms of social behaviour do not apply, universal expressions of emotion can be observed: "In private, when no display rules to mask expressions were operative, we saw the biologically based, evolved, universal facial expressions of emotion" (Ekman, 1984: 321). There are significant differences across cultures as to the extent to which facial expression of emotions is free or controlled. For example, the Japanese mask negative emotions with a smile; they smile when they are pleased and when they are embarrassed (like Westerners), but also when they are depressed and shocked. For them smiles are commonly false (McNeill, 1998). Americans treat the smile like a social mask which should be put on whenever the person comes into contact with others. Poles perceive the "smiling mask" as something extremely artificial and insincere. Thus, expressing emotions interculturally, like intercultural communication in general, can cause some problems or even communication breakdown.

Probably the first attempt to explain why certain facial actions occur was in the book *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* by the English naturalist Charles Darwin (1809–1882), published in 1872. Darwin provides here the first natural-history study of human facial behaviour (Fridlund, 1994). He is looking for evidence for the continuity of humans with nonhuman primates and nonprimates. He agrees generally with the main results of Duchenne's work. According to Darwin, facial expressions are universal and innate or inherited, but result from mechanisms that do not have a current function. He shows that these expressions are either accidents of nervous system wiring or vestiges of old habits; the vestigial habits being the behavioural equivalents of the "rudimentary, atrophied, or aborted organs" (Fridlund, 1994: 25). What makes Darwin's findings different from Duchenne's is that Darwin believes that facial expressions do not imply a communicative function, so they do not express emotions, but only accompany emotion "by force of habit." He

restricts the communicative function to those faces which are made wilfully, including those that intentionally resemble the habitual ones (Fridlund, 1994). Despite all this, Darwin does not deny the great importance of facial expressions in our lives, enumerating their various functions (Darwin, 1998: 359):

- They serve as the first means of communication between the mother and her infant.
- We readily perceive sympathy in others by their expression.
- The movements of expression give vividness and energy to our spoken words.
- They reveal the thoughts and intentions of others more truly than do words, which may be falsified.

Contemporary research results have proved that Darwin was mostly right in his studies of facial expressions (Ekman, 1998).

One of the more interesting facial expressions is the *smile*. It is unique and differs from other facial expressions in many ways. The smile takes only two muscles, while others require three to five. It is the easiest facial expression to recognize. The smile is characteristic exclusively of humans: "A smiling mouth *smiles* only in a human face" (583; Wittgenstein, 1947/1968: 153). The uniqueness of the smile consists in that it cannot be successfully simulated:

> [...] it will be simple for me to show that there are some emotions that man cannot simulate or portray artificially on the face; the attentive observer is always able to recognize a false smile (Duchenne de Boulogne, 1990: 30).

That is why Duchenne distinguished between the smile of enjoyment and the social or feigned smile, in creation of which different facial muscles take part. The smile of enjoyment is the one which is produced when the eyelids are tightened (easily done by the majority of people), the cheeks are raised and the skin from around the eyes is drawn inward (only a few people can do this voluntarily). Describing the mechanism of the smile of enjoyment, Ekman and Friesen (1982) called it, in his honour, the *Duchenne's smile* (called also "felt smile" or *enjoyment smile* by Ekman *et al.* (1990)):

> Related to enjoyment – in terms of when it occurs and how it relates both to subjective experience and distinctive physiological changes – and other smiling [is] not. [...] The Duchenne smile, in which the orbicularis oculi, pars lateralis muscle that orbits the eye is contracted in addition to the zygomatic major muscle's pull on the lip corners, is a better sign of enjoyment than other kinds of smiles (Ekman *et al.*, 1990: 350).

Thus, the true smile employs two muscles, one of them "curves the mouth" and the other "hoists the cheek, pressing skin toward the eye in a squint of joy." In a wider smile, the teeth can flash and the eyes can glisten (McNeill, 1998: 182). Such a smile cannot be feigned.

There are innumerable smile variations, of which Ekman identifies eighteen. He distinguishes between genuine, essentially involuntary and biologically based smiles (enjoyment smile) which can also occur when people are alone (Ekman *et al*., 1990), and other smiles which are merely "put on," and as such are voluntary and perceived as "false." Voluntary smiles can appear in different situations and have many functions: they can cover fear or contempt, keep the expression of emotion or the emotion itself under control, or indicate a willingness to bear negative feelings without protest. They can be blends: the "enjoyable-anger" or sadistic smile, the "enjoyable-sadness" smile, or the "enjoyable-surprise" smile. Other smiles can signal embarrassment, flirtation, or a frightening but exhilarating experience (Brener, 2000). A different smile accompanies criticism, and yet another is used to show agreement or approval. False smiles are "made deliberately to convince another that enjoyment is occurring when it is not" (Ekman *et al*., 1990: 343; Ekman and Fiesen, 1982). Apart from them, there are also *masking smiles*, which "are made deliberately to conceal the experience of negative emotions, and *miserable smiles*, which acknowledge a willingness to endure an unpleasant circumstance" (Ekman *et al*., 1990: 343). Almost any emotion can be masked by a smile (Ekman, 1992). One of the most reliable indicators of the false smile is the lack of eyebrow movement. (Brener, 2000). In the false smile, only the zygomatic major muscle, which runs from the cheekbone to the corner of the lips, moves (Ekman and Friesen, 1982).

Fridlund (1997) rejects the distinction between "authentic" and "false" expressions, smiles included; he claims that all these expressions are social and voluntary, and all these smiles can be observed during social interaction. He (1997: 104–127) argues that all facial expressions can be treated as social signals, they are "messages" rather than "readouts of an 'emotional state.'" Thus the face's chief display role is paralinguistic, i.e. facial expressions accompany and supplement speech (Fridlund, 1994). We smile in many different situations, both pleasant and unpleasant. The smile is very important when we are interacting with others. We smile at introductions, we smile when we greet each other and when we say goodbye. The absence of a smile in contexts where it is expected is immediately noticed and is often interpreted as seriousness, contemplation, or lack of concern for the feelings of the others.

Ekman does not deny the social character of some types of smile. He admits that the face can express more than just emotions. According to Ekman *et al*. (1982), the face can send messages not only about transient and sometimes fleeting events, such as feelings or emotions, but also about "moment-to-moment

fluctuations of a conversation." "[E]ven in highly emotional situations, emotional facial expressions are outnumbered by facial actions that regulate the flow of conversation and illustrate speech as it is spoken" (Ekman, 1990: 272). These facial actions are called *conversational signals*. Ekman and Friesen (1969) created a typology of facial paralanguage (how the face can act in conversation rather than how it does act), based on inductions from informal observations of natural and contrived conversations. According to them, there are four main types of paralanguage:

- *Emblems* are facial gestures that are used to replace words. Facial emblems are usually part of a larger emblematic display. These are "collusive winks" (meaning "I'm with you"' or "You're in on this with me") co-occurring with a yaw of the head pointing the wink to the other (Fridlund, 1994: 297) or the "facial shrug" (meaning "I don't know" or "You've stumped me") (Ekman, 1985/1992), which Fridlund (1994: 297) describes as facially marked by a "downturned, horseshoe-shaped mouth," often accompanied by a momentary tilt of the head.
- *Adaptors* are self-manipulative facial actions, e.g., biting the lips, wiping them, clamping, running the tongue in the crevices between the teeth and cheeks, and then widening the eyelids, or working the jaws (Fridlund, 1994).
- *Illustrators* are illustrative facial movements whose main function is to vivify speech. They can do so in three different ways. They can place accent on the uttered words (e.g., raising the eyebrows), they can replace finger-pointing and function as an indexical (e.g., tilting the head and raising the eyebrows when saying "that's my friend over there") or they can indicate spatial relationships (e.g., raising and lowering the brows to indicate "above" and "below") (Ekman and Friesen, 1969; Fridlund, 1994).
- *Regulators* are used to regulate access to the floor during conversation (e.g., the head nod indicating that we have got the point; the exaggerated mouth movements preparatory to speech showing that we want to add a word or two; the raised eyebrows signalling that we like what others are saying and want them to continue; frowns and head shakes signalling that we do not like it and want them to stop; yawns signalling that we find it boring; and forward head jerks signalling that we want them to say it faster) (Ekman and Friesen, 1969; Fridlund, 1994).

This facial paralanguage plays an important role in human communication. It illustrates or replaces the linguistic production, and as such it is as meaningful as language is. Anna Wierzbicka (1999; 2000) calls it "the semantics of facial expression." For her, facial expressions are analogous to verbal utterances. Each of them sends a message which has a certain meaning. The meaning of a facial expression, like the meaning of any verbal utterance, can rely on the "Natural Semantic Metalanguage," used in linguistic semantics; in

other words, all facial expressions can be expressed verbally. Analysing the nature of the human smile, Wierzbicka (1999: 177) maintains that:

> Whether a particular smile is voluntary, involuntary, or semi-voluntary, or "false," sincere, or semi-sincere, is irrelevant from the point of view of this smile's social meaning: no matter what a smiling person actually feels, or thinks, or wants, a smile as such never means "I feel something bad now"; it always means "I feel something good now."

A semantic analysis of the human face, according to Wierzbicka (2000), requires the identification of minimal meaningful units of facial behaviour (e.g., brow furrowed, eyebrows raised, eyes wide open, corners of the mouth raised, corners of the mouth lowered, mouth open, lips pressed together, upper lip and nose "raised"). The messages expressed "facially" have an inherent first-person, singular and present-tense orientation, like performatives, because they express the speaker's current state of mind (e.g.: "I am smiling because I feel something good now, not because somebody else feels it or I felt it some time ago"). Adopting a semantic approach to the analysis of the human face, Wierzbicka proposes to analyse human faces "from the point of view of human understanding rather than neural programming" (2000: 176), which, according to Ekman, "links facial muscles with particular emotions." However, these two perspectives, although different, complement each other and present facial expression in a full light.

Expressions on the face we present to others, no matter what their mechanism is, whether they are voluntary or involuntary, and whether they are genuine or pretended, provide some information about us, our feelings and our intentions. This information is important for us (self-presentation), the others (communication) and our interaction with them. What they see is our true face, expressing our true emotions, sending the message we really mean, or a mask, intended to pretend or to hide something.

2.6. Face and mask

There is an undeniable relation between the concept of face and the concept of *mask*. This relationship is both semantically and physically close. First of all, both the face and the mask are usually on public display. Both play an important role in social life. We turn the face or the mask to confront the other. The mask exists only in a dialogue with the other; only then is it meaningful (Ciesielski, 2006). The mask as well as the face may be used for the expression of some emotion, and in that for the deception of the other (cf. Bachelard,

1986). The mask is always used to put on the face, to hide it. *Mask* is "a covering for the face" (OED).

The origins of the two concepts can be traced back to ancient Greece. The ancient Greek word πρόσωπον meant both "face" and "mask" (see Section 2.1.). Thus, the two concepts were rendered by means of one word. In Greek and Roman theatre actors and members of the chorus wore comic or tragic masks (*prosopon*). The mask signified the role the actor was playing. The individual hidden behind it was not known to the public, in the usual sense of knowing someone, i.e. by recognizing his face. He was only known *per sonare*, that is, through the voice (Fridlund, 1994). In classical Latin there was the word *persona* meaning "mask, character, role." The English word *person*, originating from it, apart from the original meaning ("an assumed character or role"), means "the aspect of a person's character that is displayed to or perceived by others" (OED).

The word *mask* has more than one meaning. The most common, narrow meaning of the word is "a false face with which one hides the features in order to disguise oneself" (Pernet, 1992: 10). The notion of mask is even included in the figurative meaning of some words equivalent to English *face*: the two Japanese terms *menboku* and *taimen* include the character for mask (*men*) (Haugh, 2005). The mask is a method of hiding the identity of an individual for purposes of spiritual transformation or supernatural communication. The word *mask* refers also to "ornaments that crown the head but do not cover it, to the elements of costumes worn in front of the face (veils, visors), and to entire or partial disguises of the body or face". It can also mean "all representations of a face, whether or not they are worn on the face or on the head of a dancer" (Pernet, 1992: 10–11). Some authors extend the definition of mask to paintings.

Masks are elements of culture which have been used for at least 20,000 years. There are some records in the form of cave paintings depicting figures with animal masks, and there are early Egyptian images of humans with animal heads, and Incan burial chambers containing masks of gold to cover the faces of the dead (Edson, 2005). Masks are said to be universal (Edson, 2005). And so are the functions they have. They were worn to provoke fear, to symbolize social status, but also to mock or to amuse. Wearing a mask, a person moved from the real world to one which was otherwise out of reach (Oettinger and Kenagy, 1988). The first masks might have been used for protection against the elements, as protection for warriors, as disguises to confuse animals being hunted, to appease the gods, or to attract a woman (Edson, 2005). Thus, from the very beginning, masks played an important role in religious, economic, and social activities. Prototypical masks were removable. The appearance of a person was also changed by means of other forms of physical masking, such as tattooing or scarifying (Edson, 2005). In many societies, such body

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modifications, including face lacerations, were indications of rank and status. The person's physical appearance altered by means of such mutilation conformed in this way to customs specific for a particular society (Edson, 2005). Such indelible masking, or marking, was to denote group membership and to reinforce group identity. The initiates received permanent marks, e.g., tattoos (Maori women usually inked the chin and the upper lip; in India Kumbi and Warli women tattooed dots and lotus symbols on their faces; in the 1980s punks tattooed their heads and other parts of the body, arms and legs, with skulls and swastikas; permanent make-up), scars (made by cutting or scratching the skin with shells, knives, or stones and rubbing clay or ash into the wound), brands (shaped scarification applied with hot needles or tools), or some form of anatomical modification such as teeth extraction or shaping; lip, nose, ear, or tongue perforation; and head, neck, arm, or foot deformation (Edson, 2005; McNeill, 1998). The lips and earlobes were distended to accommodate lip or ear plugs. Some people, women in particular, adorned their faces by painting them with the juices of wild fruit and leaves. According to Claude Lévi-Strauss (1979), such cosmetic facial paintings, representing different arrangements of fundamental elements, e.g., spirals, hatching, volutes, frets, tendrils, or crosses and whorls, were popular among the Siberian primitives, in New Zealand and among the Caduveo Indians in southern Brazil.

According to the anthropological evidence:

> [...] the true home of masks is in ritual. [...] Impersonation — "acting" is most easily effected if the ritualist's or actor's face is covered by another face, one whose symbolic value is encoded and recognizable, thus integral to its appearance (Patton, 2007: 361).

In many cultures masks were, and sometimes are, used as "ancillary paraphernalia of ritual events" (Edson, 2005: 6). They were used in rituals as early as in the Neolithic Age, ca 6500 BC. Shamanic practices and ritual dances the world over deployed masks (Patton, 2007). Elaborate theriomorphic masks were used in healing ceremonies by Inuits (Patton, 2007). A shaman, priest or tribe chieftain performed a ritual dance wearing a mask (Edson, 2005). The use of masks was intended to change the identities of individuals in a "magical" way for purposes of spiritual transformation or supernatural communication (Patton, 2007). Mircea Eliade, in *Symbolism, the Sacred, and the Arts* (1992: 64) stresses the mystic function of masks:

> Ceremonial nakedness greatly increases the magico-religious power of woman [...] Man, on the contrary, increases his magico-religious possibilities by hiding his face and concealing his body.

Some people put on masks or painted their faces before approaching the dead (e.g., indigenous peoples in South America) or before starting a journey (e.g., the peoples of the North West Coastal region of North America) (Edson, 2005). The mask was a primary element of dramatic activities in which imitative movements and dances were used to placate supernatural powers or appease them to fulfil the people's wishes or grant them success. It was "revered as an apparition of the mythical being" that it represented, even though everyone knew that it was made by man and that a man was wearing it (Edson, 2005: 9). Masks (prosopa) were significant elements of the worship of the god Dionysus at Athens, and it is likely that "their use in rites and celebration predates the emergence of drama" (Ley, 2006: 25).

The *theatre* (dramatization) is said to have begun as a masked ritual (Smith, 1984). Masks in Greek theatre were used to enhance the individual qualities of the characters played by the actors. In Greek and Roman theatre, by changing masks the actor appeared and reappeared as different characters, or he altered the masks for the same character within a play to achieve a dramatic effect (e.g., in Euripides' *Helen*, the main protagonist appears in two different masks, expressing different emotions) (Ley, 2006). These were full head masks with an exaggerated jaw, usually made of fragile materials, linen and wood. Comic masks were distortions, some of them were modelled directly on life, caricaturing a well known individual, e.g., a politician, playwright, or philosopher (Socrates was portrayed in this way) (Ley, 2006). The use of masks in ancient Greek theatre is known to have become a universal Western symbol for dramatic acts.

Masks were, and sometimes still are, used in Chinese and Japanese theatre. The Chinese theatrical tradition has always involved intricate costumes and refined and elaborated styles of "painted face" make-up (Dolby, 1983). Masks were mainly connected with exorcism or merrymaking diversions, and were restricted to supernatural roles. They also symbolized spirits or animals, such as fish, lions, bears, leopards, or tigers (Dolby, 1983). Generally, make-up was preferred. It had two prime uses, "to render the player more comic or to render him more awe-inspiring" (Dolby, 1983: 29). Looking at the painted faces of the actors, the audience could also tell the characters' age, social position and moral character. The painted face defined the character's identity on stage, just as the face is related to the social position a person occupies and the role he plays in real life (Ho *et al*., 2004).

Much Japanese theatre is played with a "stone face"; the facial expressions of the actors or their masks are predominantly serious and tragic. In Kabuki theatre, which has been a major form of artistic expression in Japanese society for over four hundred years, actors do not wear movable masks, but put on make-up (Cavaye *et al*., 2004). Make-up styles range from the realistic to the exaggerated, but they are always white, as white skin is traditionally a sign of

refinement and high social status, and white is associated with purity. In Nō theatre, actors wear masks (about sixty different types). "[W]ith the exception of some clearly ferocious or very happy masks, their most important characteristic is the ambiguity of their expressions" (Cavaye *et al.*, 2004: 177). Actors have to communicate different emotions through the unchanging expression of the mask's face. In Kyōgen theatre, unlike in the other two kinds of Japanese theatre, there is a lot of laughter, and masks are employed only for supernatural characters, e.g., gods and devils, and for animals (Cavaye *et al.*, 2004).

In Europe masks were especially popular in the 17th century, when people (e.g., lovers and prostitutes) wore them to disguise their identity when pursuing clandestine activities or those which were socially disapproved of (Edson, 2005). Over the centuries, masks came to be used for playful reasons; those made of velvet or silk and concealing the whole face or the upper part of it (except the eyes) were worn on or held in front of the face for disguise at balls and masques; others, made of pasteboard or plastic, were grotesque or comical representations of faces and were worn at carnivals (the carnival in Venice still cultivates this tradition). Masks also had a commemorative function. At the death of some prominent person (e.g., the king, the emperor, a writer or a composer), the likeness of his face was made in clay or wax by taking a mould from the face itself (*death-mask*).

In modern times, masks differ from what they were originally. They are either utilitarian or metaphorical. Masks are used for practical purposes; they are usually protective coverings for the face, worn to protect it from physical injury in certain sports and other activities (e.g., *fencing mask*). Some, made of fibre or gauze, are designed to protect the mouth and nose by filtering dust or microorganisms from air inhaled or exhaled. Other masks are to protect the person from inhaling a potentially poisonous gas (*gas-mask*), or to enable to breathe while underwater swimming or diving (*diving mask*). Through the *oxygen mask*, placed over the patient's nose and mouth, oxygen or anaesthetic is supplied. To appear young and become more attractive, women spread various cosmetic preparations (*beauty mask* or *face mask*) on their faces. Masks have always been used by bandits, robbers and terrorists (*robber's mask*) to hide their identities. None of these masks can be compared to the ritual or theatrical ones either in their form or function. But all of them have one thing in common — they are close to the face.

Mask is a metaphor (see also Section 1.5.). In lyric poetry authors often hide behind a mask. Their opinions and emotions are expressed by a fictional character, a persona, acting as their mask or *alter ego*. This practice was quite common among romantic poets, e.g., George Gordon Byron (1788—1824) and Juliusz Słowacki (1809—1849) used Oriental heroes to distinguish the writer from the character in the work (Głowiński *et al.*, 1991). Writing lyrics of the

mask is also popular among modern poets; it consists in anthropomorphization of objects, animals, and plants. In one of the poems by Bolesław Leśmian (1877–1937), for example, the shield is talking to the knight, and its words express the knight's dream; the shield is a mask of the poet (Kulawik, 1994). Hiding behind the mask allows the poet to freely express his ideas and at the same time avoid the risk of taking responsibility for his own words.

We talk about "'tearing the mask from someone's face' or 'unmasking' him, meaning that we have removed his disguise as an honest man and exposed him for what he really is" (Lommel, 1972: 7). Such a mask is a pretence, a front, an outward show intended to deceive the other. It is a relational category. The mask becomes a mask only in the presence of the other, who tries to interpret it; otherwise it is a meaningless façade (Ciesielski, 2006). It is also a facial expression assumed deliberately to conceal an emotion or give a false impression, or an outward appearance which belies a person's true nature (see also Section 2.5.). A person can be said *to put on, throw off or drop the mask* (OED). We are all "*personas* who speak from behind a mask, even off-stage [...]. This 'mask' is the musculature of our face, which regulates our social roles just as the Greco-Roman mask did for the actor who wore it" (Fridlund, 1994: 80). We choose our masks with respect to the roles we perform and the expectations of others:

> We model ourselves so much on the expectation of others that we assume the mask or, as the Jungians say, the *persona* which life assigns to us, and we grow into our type till it moulds all our behaviour, down to our gait and our facial expression (Gombrich, 1986: 111).

The mask is a sociocultural construct. And like culture itself, it is employed to change the natural reality. People use it to hide their nature. During social interaction with others, as Hobbes claims in *Leviathan* (1651/1973), the mask becomes more important than the face. Our natural face reveals our desires and emotions. Authenticity, unrestrained expression and spontaneity do not agree with the social order. That is why every rationally thinking individual has to hide his face behind various forms of convention. Showing a "naked face" is often not accepted even in private interactions.

The 18th century physiognomic texts acknowledge the great impact civilization has on the body. The body in general, and the face in particular, are stigmatized by civilization. Good manners, courtesy, and the requirements of civilized dressing inhibit the physiological forces of the natural body. For Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), civilization causes nature to degenerate and weaken; it is "a prison for the body" and a mask for the face (Courtine and Haroche, 2007: 95). Rousseau (1956) claims that the evil is in the look. Everyone wants to be looked at and respected. The one that can best respond to

others' looks is the most respected. This is how refinement became important, and how the first principles of politeness (*civilité*) were created. For Rousseau civilization as well as politeness and refinement appear in a definitely disfavourable light. In a similar way, Watts (2005: 44) describes polite behaviour in eighteenth-century England, writing:

> If we scratch the surface of polite behaviour in the eighteenth century, we frequently encounter not only "inconsideration and irreligion" but also "positive selfishness, malevolence, evil" (Sell, 1991: 210).

At that time, politeness was linked to social class and was treated "as a sign of good breeding and high social status, but it did not necessarily correlate with consideration for, and deference towards, other individuals" (Watts, 2005: 44). As a consequence, "[...] polite manners would connote, not a refinement in feeling, but only the most sinister refinement in lying [...]" (Sell, 1991: 210). Politeness, understood in this way, was used as "a mask to conceal ego's true frame of mind" (Watts, 2005: 47). In eighteenth-century England, the mask of politeness served many important functions (Watts, 2005):

● to enhance individuals' social standing,
● to signal their membership in a social elite,
● to exclude would-be members of the elite,
● to stigmatize and/or persecute out-groupers who oppose the elite's claims to socio-political hegemony.

None of these functions involved the well-being of others or the fulfilment of altruistic goals.

In a similar vein, Honoré Gabriel Riqueti de Mirabeau (1749–1791), the French writer and statesman who introduced to the French language the word *civilisation*, describes it as a mask which does not mean anything (1756–1760; in Courtine and Haroche, 2007: 149):

> If I asked most of you what civilisation means to you, I would hear that it is good manners, civility, politeness and refinement so common that appropriateness rules everywhere and replaces particular laws. [...] Everything seems to me only a mask of virtue, and not its face, and civilization means nothing for the society if it does not endow it with some form and content the virtue should assume.

The society that was so criticized by Rousseau and Mirabeau is called by Courtine and Haroche (2007) *the society of the mask*. They claim that 18th-century social relations could be characterized by (2007: 151):

- the duality of the man — he is both the being and appearance, *être* and *paraître*;
- the praise of appearance on account of its accessibility;
- poise and refraining from the expression of emotions;
- calculation in the relations with others.

The best example of such a society is the royal court, "a theatre of intrigues," in which courtiers were symbols of duality and servility. The prevailing regime of public activity was *the regime of the mask*, in which the individual identity was encoded in forms that imposed a mask on the individual (Filipowicz, 1998). The performance of a certain social role required from the individual to enhance his social standing and to signal his membership in a social elite — this always involved the use of an appropriate mask.

François de La Rochefoucauld (1613–1680) (1939) contrasts the mask of civility with the "natural" mask. For him, the mask does not have to be a sign of artificiality, calculation or servility. It does not have to prevent the manifestation of authenticity. The mask, in this sense, has to be suitable for the person. Everyone has to find the mask which would suit his face best and be in harmony with his inner self. Rochefoucauld propagates naturalness, authenticity and sincerity, which better than pretence can help us gain the approval of others.

The depiction of the society of the mask, however exaggerated it may seem nowadays, resembles a picture of the present society we are part of. What we usually put on public display differs a lot from what we really are. What really matters in our relations with others is how they perceive us and how we perceive them. Any uncontrolled expression of emotion can spoil our image and as such should be avoided. As a consequence, our relations with others cannot be based on mutual sincerity but have to be maintained in a coldly calculated manner. Thus our society, too, is mask-dominated. But what Mirabeau called *civilisation* has matured and our general attitude to it has changed. More than two centuries after Rousseau and Mirabeau critically wrote about the role of civilization and politeness, Leszek Kołakowski agreed with them in claiming that during the civilizing process the human face acquires a mask which distinguishes it from the face of other living creatures. However, he does have a different opinion on the character of civilization's impact on the face. He claims that "there is no reason for maintaining that our animal nature is 'true,' and our humanity is deviation and voluntary self-deception" (2004: 280). In his view, by becoming civilized human beings we put on masks (these thin layers of culture and civilization) which are not aimed at deceiving anybody. The mask becomes our "second nature." There is no longer any difference between the face and the mask. "The mask has clung to the face" (Kołakowski, 2004: 281). Kołakowski thinks that if we expressed everything we felt we would live

a barbaric life, beyond culture. Referring to the Greek etymology of the word *truth*, meaning "noncovering," as Heidegger proposed, he reasons that even if *truth* means "noncovering," this does not imply that we should live noncovered, naked.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, one of the characteristic aspects of public behaviour has been, as Filipowicz (1998; Kalaga, 2006) claims, the glorification of sincerity and authenticity. The prevailing regime of public activity has become *the regime of the face*, in which the individual creates his self-image (face) and demonstrates his identity (Filipowicz, 1998). Nowadays, as Józef Tischner (2004: 165) maintains, "if a man is a person, it means that he is an expression of something which is hidden in him – he is an expression of some truth." The concept of person implies an identity to the man. The participation in social interaction does not only involve the performance of a social role, but also the process of self-creation. Individuals actively participate in what we call today *civil society*, "a community of people accepting the imperative of friendly co-participation, encoded in the concept of *civility*" (Filipowicz, 1998: 10). As the regime of the mask evolved into the regime of the face, together with the dominating patterns of public activity the understanding of the concept of civility and politeness has likewise changed. Even if, as in the 17th or 18th centuries, politeness nowadays does not fulfil altruistic goals but is a mask to hide the individual's true frame of mind, it appears in a much more favourable light. We put on the modern mask of politeness for other reasons than the cultivators of polite manners in 17th- or 18th-century France or England. Nowadays, politeness functions (Watts, 2005: 47):

- to avoid conflict (Fraser and Nolen, 1981),
- to tone down potential aggression (Brown and Levinson, 1987),
- to ensure that interactions will be accomplished smoothly, in an atmosphere of relative harmony (Lakoff, 1975; Leech, 1983).

Both politeness and the mask have acquired a new positive meaning. We put on the mask of politeness to make others feel good, or we do so for the common good. This is what Kołakowski is talking about – the mask which turns us into civilized persons.

The regime of the face, which prevails in our public life, does not imply getting rid of all masks. Apart from masks that are the thin layers of culture and civilization, there are masks which, as Zygmunt Bauman (1996: 153) claims, are "uniforms [which] classify, referring to symbols, categories and categories of symbols." Masks are omnipresent; we have to get used to them, but at the same time we should be aware of the danger they can carry:

> the mask one puts on depends on whom one has to deal with and what one
> needs to do. To know how to behave I have to learn the meanings ascribed to

different types of masks and remember reactions associated with them. But even then I cannot feel completely safe. One cannot count on the mask like on the face: the mask may be put on and taken off; the mask hides more than it reveals (Bauman, 1996: 154).

We may say that persons are the masks they put on. "The man-person is a being that in the drama and through the drama reveals his 'face'" (Tischner, 2004: 167). Thus, the mask takes over the role of the face. We present ourselves to others and to ourselves, and see ourselves in their eyes. The masks we then present to the world are fashioned upon our anticipations of their judgements (Strauss, 1959). The face no longer reflects their judgements. It is the mask that "takes on the role of the social mirror" (Kępiński, 1998: 106; cf. Ciechowicz, 2000; see also Sections 1.5., 2.4. and 2.5.). Witold Gombrowicz calls the mask *gęba* (mug). The main protagonist of his metaphorical novel *Ferdydurke* (1937/1989), Józio, looks for his own true face, the source of his identity and freedom, and wants to get rid of the mask, which shows a deformed picture of him. Every contact with other people involves, using Gombrowicz's terminology, *przyprawianie gęby* (putting on a mug (a deformed mask)). This constitutes part of the process of socialization. The individual becomes a prisoner of convention and fossilized patterns of behaviour. His image depends on others:

> [...] człowiek jest uzależniony od swego odbicia w duszy drugiego człowieka, chociażby ta dusza była kretyniczna (Gombrowicz, 1989: 9).
> (The man depends on his own reflection in the other's soul, even if this soul is idiotic.)

In Gombrowicz's model of the world, the individual will stay forever in "the magic of mugs-masks" (Kietlińska, 1995: 16),

> gdyż nie ma ucieczki przed gębą, jak tylko w inną gębę, a przed człowiekiem schronić się można jedynie w objęcia innego człowieka (Gombrowicz, 1989: 254).
> (because there is no escape from the mug, except only to another mug, and one can take refuge from a man only in the arms of another one.)

Social life is crowded with masks, deformed substitutes of our faces, imposed on us and on our identities as a kind of superordinate form. The mask, or *gęba*, is a self-image forced on us by others (cf. Kietlińska, 1995). Prisoners of culture, wanting to get the acceptance of others, we hide our true self behind it. The mask and the face become one.

2.7. The face of the other

Emanuel Levinas has been called "an increasingly central presence in contemporary debates about identity and responsibility" (Hand, 1996: 1). His work encompasses the major philosophical and ethical problems of the 20th century. Almost everything Levinas wrote refers to the face-to-face relation, or the encounter with the Other (human being) (Bernasconi, 2000). One of the most outstanding features of his philosophical ethics is his consideration of the face. He himself writes that it was the Bible that was one of his main inspirations for treating the concept of face (Levinas, 1990a: 140):

> For us, the world of the Bible is a world not of figures, but of faces.

Discussing this source of Levinas' inspiration, Astell (2004: 32) states that:

> He associates the Glory of God's face-to-face encounter with Moses in Exodus 33: 20 — "My face you cannot see, for no one sees me and still lives" — with the glory of the divine commandments, vulnerable to disobedience, that were given to Moses on the holy mountain: "The Torah is given in the Light of a face" (Levinas, 1990b: 39, 47).

In Levinas' description of the face of the Other, it is possible to see a reminiscence of the Holy Face (Levinas, 1981: 49):

> The one is exposed to the other as a skin is exposed to what wounds it, as a cheek is offered to the smiter.

How are we to define Levinas' concept of face? For Tischner (2002: 174), "the face goes beyond every 'what.' The face is the face." In *Totality and Infinity* (1969), Levinas discusses the face at great length. For him, when we come into social interaction with the Other, we have to forget about his corporeality. His face as a part of his body no longer matters. What we have to take into account is human well-being, as

> access to the face is straightaway ethical. You turn yourself toward the Other as toward an object when you see a nose, eyes, a forehead, a chin, and you can describe them. The best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes! When one observes the color of the eyes one is not in social relationship with the Other (Levinas, 1985: 85).

Thus the face cannot be reduced to an object of perception. It is a "disincarnate presence of the Other. [...] It is the source of revelation of the other who cannot

be encompassed in cognition" (Wyschogrod, 2000: 245). We can get to know him by looking into our own self. The face of the Other is accessible only "starting from an I" (Levinas, 1969: 220). Discussing the character of the face of the Other Levinas (1969: 194) writes: "His face in which his epiphany is produced and which appeals to me breaks with the world that can be common to us."

The Other's face is the bearer of values and human personality (Wyschogrod, 2000). Levinas writes about its upright exposure, its lack of defence. It is naked and destitute. "[...] there is an essential poverty in the face; the proof of this is that one tries to mask this poverty by putting on poses, by taking on a countenance. The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of violence" (Levinas, 1985: 86). But at the same time it says: "you shall not commit murder." This is its meaning. For Levinas, the face is meaning without context. When we talk about people, we usually refer to them by the roles they perform or by special attributes they have. So they are characterized in relation to others. Here, the face is meaning by itself. You are you (1985: 86).

For Levinas, there are two dimensions of face, the physical face, belonging to a particular person, and face as the relation with the Other. In *Time and the Other*, he describes this relation in the following way (1987: 78–79):

> The relationship with the Other, the face-to-face with the Other, the encounter with the face that at once gives and conceals the Other, is a situation in which an event happens to a subject who does not assume it, who is utterly unable in this regard, but where nonetheless in a certain way it is in front of the subject.

During the encounter with the Other the face simultaneously gives away the information about the Other and acts as a façade, behind which he can hide.

The face is like a façade. "By the façade the thing which keeps its secret is exposed, enclosed in its monumental essence and its myth, in which it gleams like a splendour but does not deliver itself" (Levinas, 1969: 193). However, the face is not given to us in the mode of sense experience; we do not see it. It is given to us as language. There is a strong connection between the face and discourse. Levinas says that "The face speaks" (1985: 87; see also Sections 1.5. and 2.5.). It invites us to a relation and by discourse maintains the relation with us (Levinas, 1969). It is "only in cooperation with the Other that any cognition is possible" (Bogdanowska, 2001: 139). Through discourse the Other tells us something about himself, The face cannot be contemplated; it must be responded to. The Other is greeted, answered for. "Speaking, rather than "letting be," solicits the Other" (1969: 195). Finally we can see his disincarnate face.

"The epiphany of the face is ethical" (1969: 199). The relationship with the Other can result in conflict, but such conflict can arise after the epiphany of the face. Levinas claims that entering into a social relationship with the Other, we

present and expose ourselves at the same time. Such a presentation in face-to-face interaction always involves imposition. Any imposition can potentially lead to conflict:

> To manifest oneself as a face is to *impose oneself* above and beyond the manifested and purely phenomenal form, to present oneself in a mode irreducible to manifestation, the very straightforwardness of the face to face, without the intermediary of any image, in one's nudity [...] (Levinas, 1969: 200).

Certainly, the expression of the face does not provide us with information concerning the Other's inner state, but is rather a presentation of the self, which does not have to be true. And as such it should always arouse our suspicion:

> The Other who expresses himself precisely does not *give* himself, and accordingly retains the freedom to lie. But deceit and veracity already presuppose the absolute authenticity of the face [...]. What we call the face is precisely this exceptional presentation of self by self, incommensurable with the presentation of realities given, always suspect of some swindle, always possibly dreamt up (Levinas, 1969: 202).

The truth of the face is its own truth. The Other guarantees what he says no matter whether he is lying or is telling the truth. Social interaction is a revelation of the inequality between self and others.

The Other is always superior (Wyschogrod, 2000). He stands in an asymmetrical relation with the self. The Other always commands and is the teacher of the self. The face of the Other bears the trace of God. Our relationship can never be one of equality:

> The relationship between us and the Other is asymmetrical. The Other is higher, he gives us an order, 'you shall not commit murder.' It is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke to me (Levinas, 1985: 89).

But on the other hand, the face of the Other is destitute, and to it we owe all. In *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence* (1981), Levinas writes about the responsibility for the Other and for his face. Entering into the relationship with him, we create the image of his body (face), which makes us serve him. This is a moral relationship, which Zygmunt Bauman (1990: 17) characterizes as "I being for the Other, I bearing responsibility for the Other." This is a non-reciprocal relationship; we are responsible for the Other, but cannot expect reciprocity from him. Bauman (1990: 20) interprets Levinas' concept of responsibility in the following way:

> Responsibility is my affair, reciprocity is his. My responsibility is unexceptional and unconditional. The Other need not "prove" anything to "deserve" it.

All human relationships can be characterized by the "mastery" and poverty of the Other at the same time. This is a distinctive feature of all social relations. Levinas illustrates this with an example: before an open door we say to the Other, "After you, sir!".

2.8. Face-blindness

Prosopagnosia can be defined as "an inability to recognize a face as that of any particular person" (OED), or face-blindness (Stimilli, 2005) (from the Greek *prosopon* — "face" and *agnosia* — "lack of knowledge"). It presupposes "a pre-eminence of the figure over the face," which "is undoubtedly the legacy of Greek humanism" (Stimilli, 2005: 1).

Medically speaking, prosopagnosia stems from brain damage, due to which people suffering from it often do not recognize friends, family members, or even themselves (The human brain has special areas devoted to face recognition — face cortex) (McNeill, 1998). This kind of brain damage has a serious impact on the social life of the person suffering from it, as it often leads to isolation from the relatives and friends. Face-recognition is indispensable for normal functioning among people. The inability to associate a person's face with his name, social role or any aspect of social context may lead to serious social disfunction. Unawareness of the "problem" on the part of the others often makes them perceive the sufferer as ill-mannered and impolite, and as a consequence it can lead to social ostracism.

The problem of prosopagnosia is not new. It was already recognized by the ancients, for whom the figure often meant more than the face. This is signalled in one of early Plato's dialogues, "Charmides." This is a dialogue in which Socrates converses with Critias and a beautiful youth, Charmides (both members of Plato's own family). At the beginning Socrates, talking with Critias about Charmides, agrees that he is extraordinarily good looking (literally, well-faced: *eyprosōpos* (Stimilli, 2005: 1)). All the people around are "gazing at him as if he were a statue" (Plato, 2005: 4). His body is much more attractive to them than his face: "if he can be induced to strip," someone says, "he has such a fantastic body that you won't even notice his features" (literally, he was faceless: *aprosōpos* (Stimilli, 2005: 1)) (Plato, 2005: 4). So, if naked, Charmides's body would "efface his face in the eyes of the viewers" (Plato, 2005: 4) (a similar effect of effacing the face is achieved by Rembrant van Rijn

in his first self-portrait; but his motivation was different: the artist used the technique of *chiaroscuro* in order not to expose his self and face to view (Drong, 2001)). The adjective *aprosōpos*, used by Plato to describe Charmides, was later used in Greek law in reference to slaves, those who have no face, those who are no legal person. "A face is no body, *personne*" (Stimilli, 2005: 2). In the modern world, some people are dismissed as a *nobody*, meaning "a person of no importance or influence" (LDCE). Nobody is a person who counts only as a mere presence, but we do not want or do not need to identify him. We seem not to notice his face.

Subsequently Socrates tries to test Charmides in order to see whether his physical beauty corresponds to inner beauty, which to Socrates is much more important. Charmides is then invited to speak. In Socrates view, it is not through the face that man truly reveals himself but through language. "Language is the true face of man, for language is the face of the soul, and not just of the body" (Stimilli, 2005: 3). So does the face tell us anything about its owner or is it only a sign of identity? Stimilli argues that "physiognomy is indeed bound to remain a prosopolepsia, an acceptance, or just a reconnaissance, of the other's face *prima facie*: we do not reach any knowledge through physiognomy, we can only acknowledge faces, or recognize them" (2005: 4). The true cognition of a person is only through discourse, by means of which we can interact with him.

A similar idea, of the face being overshadowed by the body, is expressed by Joshua Reynolds in his manifesto of classical aesthetics, *Discourses on Art* (1778/1961):

> As the general figure presents itself in a more conspicuous manner than the features, it is there we must principally look for expression or character; *patuit in corpore vultus*; and, in this respect, the Sculptor's art is not unlike that of Dancing, where the attention of the spectator is principally engaged by the attitude and action of the performer; and it is there he must look for whatever expression that art is capable of exhibiting. The Dancers themselves acknowledge this, by often wearing masks, with little diminution in the expression. The face bears so very inconsiderable a proportion to the effect of the whole figure, that the ancient Sculptors neglected to animate the features, even with the general expression of the passions (Reynolds, 1961: 159−160).

The Latin words Reynolds quotes (and misspells) belong to Statius, *latuit in corpore vultus*, meaning "the face hid in the body" (Stimilli, 2005: 2). Sometimes the face, as in the example given by Reynolds, loses its usual attraction in comparison to the whole body. Then it seems almost nonexistent, just another part of the body. Others cannot recognize it.

Prosopagnosia, both as an intention and as a mental disorder, always did and always will exist. A momentary inability to recognize somebody or

recognizing the wrong person may happen to everybody. Jacques Derrida, in *The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond* (1987: 188), describes his own experience:

> [A] man came up to greet us thinking that he recognized me, and then excused himself at the last moment — he must be suffering, as I am, more and more, from prosopagnosia, a diabolical impulse to find resemblances in faces, to recognize, no longer to recognize.

Errare humanum est (to err is human), and prosopagnosia constitutes a part of this erring. We do not recognize somebody in a person, or we recognize the wrong person in him. The inability to recognize faces does not, however, prevent us from seeing people's personhood and beauty.

2.9. The face and beauty

Thinking about *beauty* in the human body, most people would immediately look for it in the face. Other parts of the body may be characterized as beautiful, but it is definitely facial beauty that becomes the beauty of the observed person. A person may have beautiful hands or legs, but having beautiful hands or legs is not enough for him or her to be called beautiful. This is one more argument for the centrality of the face in the human body and its special role in the life of a person.

Everyone knows that a beautiful face makes a person beautiful. But what does it mean to be beautiful? What makes us perceive a particular face as being more attractive than others? Alexander Pope (1688–1744), in his *Essay on Criticism* (1711/1988: part II, lines 45/46), writes about the complexity of facial attractiveness:

> Tis not a lip, or eye, we beauty call,
> But the joint force and full result of all.

The general impression of the beauty of the face is hard to explain, as its particular elements can hardly be called beautiful. It is their combination that allows us to see the beauty of the whole — the face. The beauty of the face is conditioned by many factors, biological, aesthetic and psychological. Standards of beauty have changed over the centuries and across borders.

Beauty in general and the beauty of the human body in particular have fascinated philosophers, scholars, artists and ordinary people for centuries. The ancient Greeks paid a lot of attention to the aesthetic side of life. They loved

beauty in all its manifestations, artistic, spiritual and bodily. The body and beauty are a central theme of Plato's philosophy, in which beauty is equated with goodness. Apart from that, he associates beauty with love, happiness, wisdom, truth and knowledge, while ugliness is correlated with evil, ignorance, lies, hate, unhappiness and destruction (Plato, 1963: 373, 493–495). Aristotle was also interested in beauty, but he understood it in a different way, for he saw it in "order and symmetry and definiteness" (1984: 1705). But what he was most fascinated by was the human face. For Aristotle, who established what was later called *facism*, the face reflects the inner qualities, both spiritual and intellectual, of a person. Facism in association with Plato's *beautyism* created a picture of the beautiful face "semiotically linked to God, Love, the self and the soul; it is far more than simply physical" (Synnott, 1993: 80).

The question of human beauty was later taken up by many other philosophers. Some of them considered forms of beauty to be expressions of ideas. Kant (1724–1804), for example, in his *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790/2000: 120), maintains that beauty in the human figure can be taken as "the visible expression of moral ideas, which inwardly govern human beings"; he argues that only human beauty can be taken as a unique standard for beauty, because it is the only form of beauty that can express something absolutely and unconditionally valuable, namely the moral autonomy of which humans alone are capable. At the same time he holds that there is no determinate way in which this unique value can be expressed in the human form; thus there is always something free in the outward expression in the human figure of the inner moral value of the human character (Kant, 2000).

Hegel explains the beauty of the face in a different way. In *Aesthetics* (1975), he discusses the ideal formation of the human head as presented in the Greek sculpture. He describes the face as consisting of two distinct parts, theoretical or spiritual (the forehead) and practical (the mouth, the organ of nourishment). The nose (the organ of smell) belongs to both parts. According to Hegel, for the face to be beautiful, the two parts of the face have to be in harmony:

> [...] the Greek profile introduces a beautiful harmony into the gentle and unbroken connection between the forehead and the nose and so between the upper and lower parts of the face. The effect of this connection is that the nose is made more akin to the forehead and therefore, by being drawn up towards the spiritual part, acquires itself a spiritual expression and character. [...] Something similar is true of the mouth too. [...] it serves [...] in man for speech, laughter, sighing, etc., and in this way the lines of the mouth already have a characteristic connection with the eloquent communication of spiritual states or of joy, grief, etc. (1975: 730)

He also claims that:

> [...] these particular parts [of the face] have to have their form harmonized into the head as into one whole. Here the beautiful shape is determined by a line which most nearly approaches an oval, and therefore anything sharp, pointed, or angled is dissolved into a harmony and a continuous soft connection of form, but without being purely regular and abstractly symmetrical or running away into a manifold variety of lines and their turning and bending as happens with the other parts of the body (Hegel, 1975: 737−738).

Facial beauty understood in this way could be mathematically calculated. The ancient Greeks defined facial attractiveness using the mathematical concept of the *Golden Proportion*, a ratio of roughly 1: 1.6 which is used to describe the relationship between different parts of physical structures. The Golden Proportion was later used by Renaissance artists such as Leonardo da Vinci in painting the human face by using it as a guide for placing facial features (Rubenstein *et al.*, 2002). In other words, according to the Greeks one can talk about an attractive face in terms of proportionality (e.g., eye-to-eye distance, nose length) and facial recognition (Gilbert, 2002).

The beauty of the face, however, does not depend only on the symmetry and harmony of its features. Charles Bell, in *The Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression as Connected with the Fine Arts* (1872), stresses the importance of temporary expressions, which may change the face completely and make it beautiful:

> Beauty of countenance may be defined in words, as well as demonstrated in art. A face may be beautiful in sleep, and a statue without expression may be beautiful. On the other hand, expression may give charm to a face the most ordinary. Hence it appears that our inquiry divides itself into − the permanent form of the head and face; and the motion of the features, or the expression (Bell, 1872: 19).

The expression of thought and emotion makes the face look special, and as a consequence, beautiful:

> A countenance may be distinguished by being expressive of thought; that is, it may indicate the possession of the intellectual powers. It is manly, it is human; and yet not a motion is seen to show what feeling of sentiment prevails. On the other hand, there may be a movement of the features, and the quality of thought − affection, love, joy, sorrow, gratitude, or sympathy with suffering − is immediately declared. A countenance which, in ordinary conditions, has nothing remarkable, may become beautiful in expression (Bell, 1872: 20).

From times immemorial people have looked for a universal standard of beauty. Darwin, in *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872/1998), debunks it as a myth. He claims that "It is certainly not true that

there is in the mind of man any universal standard of beauty with respect to the human body" (1872/1998: 890). Recent research results, however, challenge this view. Many researchers (e.g., Rhodes *et al*., 2002; Little *et al*., 2002) claim that:

- There is considerable agreement about which faces are beautiful and which are not.
- Preferences appear very early in development, before cultural standards of beauty are likely to have been assimilated.
- Some standards of beauty are part of our biological heritage.

Beauty is claimed to be "ingrained in our biology: characteristics associated with evolutionarily relevant advantages to the choosing individual are perceived as attractive" (Little *et al*., 2002: 84). Besides harmony and symmetry, of great importance are secondary sexual characteristics, which are partly responsible for our perceptions of facial *attractiveness*. "Face shapes carry markers of underlying physiological processes" which indicate the likelihood of survival and reproductive success (Gilbert, 2002: 32; Little *et al*., 2002). Among such markers are the levels of testosterone, which in men shape jaw and cheek bone, and oestrogens, which in women shape facial bone architecture and lip fullness (Gilbert, 2002; Jackson, 1992). Females are judged by their attractiveness to a greater extent than males are, and these judgements have real consequences for their lives.

Research conducted in the 19th century provides results allowing us to conceptualize facial attractiveness by pointing to its main factor — averageness. Francis Galton (1822–1911), an English anthropologist (1883, 1888), tried to find out whether members of different groups (e.g., vegetarians and criminals) had specific facial characteristics. He created photographic *composite images* (he overlaid images of faces onto a single photographic plate) of the faces of vegetarians and criminals, respectively, to see if there was a "typical" facial appearance of members of these two groups. As a side result, he noted that a final composite, "averaged" face is more attractive than the component faces. J.T. Stoddard (1886, 1887), an American psychologist, came to a similar conclusion, when he created composite faces of members of the National Academy of Sciences and graduating seniors of Smith College (Rubenstein *et al*., 2002). These findings have been confirmed by contemporary research — averageness is an important component of facial beauty.

Most attractive of all facial features seem to be specific exceptional features, such as large eyes and a small nose, which convey *neoteny* (the retention of juvenile characteristics in a (sexually) mature organism (OED)), and high cheekbones in women, and a large chin in men, which convey sexual maturity (Cunningham *et al*., 2002). Besides the power of averageness, regularity and harmony, the beauty of the face and its attractiveness are associated with other

factors such as youthfulness, smoothness of complexion and health (Rubenstein *et al.*, 2002; Rhodes *et al.*, 2002). This is important in mate preferences, though more in males than in females (Jackson, 1992). But maximum facial attractiveness can be achieved only when to the above-mentioned facial features one adds a "positive nonverbal facial expression, and grooming qualities that are prescribed by the culture" (Jackson, 1992: 226). None of features, however, can fully explain why we perceive certain faces as beautiful, nice or attractive.

Some variation in facial attractiveness depends on social context. Keating (2002: 181) claims that some "aspects of facial growth conveying social status information evolved in humans as in other species. [...] Faces are 'attractive' in that they draw us into relationships," whether it be as friends, lovers, caregivers, or followers. Facial status cues convey charismatic qualities that make us like, follow, or trust some people more than others (Keating, 2002). Besides, facial attractiveness can serve many other functions, such as advertising genetic quality, a desirable age and sex, nonthreatening familiarity, or desirable personality traits (Zebrowitz and Rhodes, 2002).

The face, beautiful or not, young or old, is the part of the body which is most attended to by means of various procedures, such as make-up, shaving and cosmetic surgery. One common goal underlies the use of all these procedures — to make the face more attractive (cf. Łotocka, 2000). In different times and different cultures, however, the cannon of facial appearance has differed. Facial make-up has looked different and there have been different attitudes towards it. But generally speaking, make-up was, and still is, used to make an individual's face look more expressive, and in this way more attractive. Its main function is to highlight elements of the face: the eyes, the lips, and sometimes the cheeks. The Egyptians were among the first ones to see the value of cosmetics in increasing allure. Egyptian women wore green malachite eye shadow and black antimony and kohl. Men wore paint.

> [Cleopatra] typically daubed blue on her upper eyelid and malachite green on her lower. [...] she lined her eyelids and darkened her eyebrows with black kohl, and smeared white ceruse over her face, neck, and breasts. She colored her cheeks with yellow ochre and her lips with a carmine dye (McNeill, 1998: 293).

Nowadays, facial make-up has become an exclusively female domain. Women's interest in face-adorning is continually fuelled by the flourishing cosmetics industry, which is all the time launching new beautifying cosmetics (e.g., mascara, eye shadow, powder, rouge or lipstick).

Women are not the only to think about their appearance and care for their face. To look attractive men "play" with their facial hair. Biologically speaking, beards emerge after puberty and indicate sexual maturity. The beard enlarges

the apparent size of the jaw, and is said to be the sign of a man's aggressiveness and reproductive success (a beast mark). This conviction originates from the days where our teeth were weapons and it was important for a male to have a big jaw (McNeill, 1998). In civilized times, facial hair in men depends on fashion (facial hair on a woman's face, however, is considered unacceptable or freak). Men grow a moustache, beard or sideburns, or to look neat and tidy they shave. Sometimes the beard is used as a mask to hide a man's identity.

Another type of facial adornment, which is permanent, is "tattoos, scarification, piercing, cutting, mutilation, and the intersection of various objects into the nose, lips, or ears" (Cohen, 2006: 227). The ancient Thracians, Assyrians, and Britons tattooed their faces. Face tattoos appeared also in northern Africa, the Middle East, India, and among the native inhabitants of North and South America (McNeill, 1998). They were used as signs of ancestry, group membership, and prestige (see also Section 2.6.). But they also could be a stigma, e.g., the Romans tattooed slaves between the eyes (McNeill, 1998). In modern times, this type of facial adornment is popular only in certain sub-cultures.

For some people, however, simple make-up or any other adornment is not enough. For aesthetic reasons they undergo surgical treatment. Some want to become more attractive and beautiful, some want simply to look younger. Cosmetic surgery procedures, such as upper or lower *blepharoplasty* (removal of excess upper or lower eyelid skin), *rhytidectomy* (face lift/neck lift), or forehead lift, different procedures for treating facial wrinkles, such as chemical peels, dermabrasion, laser resurfacing, or collagen or botulinum toxin injections are intended to reverse or at least diminish facial aging changes which as time goes by strongly influence the contour and appearance of the face (Nesi *et al.*, 2001). To appear closer to the present canon of beauty people undergo, e.g., *rhinoplasty* (changing the shape of the nose), hair transplantation, orthodontic treatment or some types of orthognathic surgery (Cohen, 2006). A beautiful and attractive face, however, is not enough. It has to allow for the proper and aesthetic expression of emotions; it has to be able to smile in an appropriate way. That is why a new specialization has appeared, *smile restoration*, combining dental and plastic surgery and aimed at improving or restoring (after some illness or accident) the ability to smile (Szarota, 2006). All these actions and procedures have a common aim, the realization of the old ideal — the happy soul in the beautiful body.

Sometimes a single improvement does not satisfy the person. He, or more often she, wants more. It has become very popular to undergo a *makeover*:

> the total overhaul of a woman's appearance [...] On daytime television, mostly female audiences still yelp with pleasure when a woman — or man — is

transformed into a new and better person through makeup, hairdo, wardrobe (Kuczynski, 2006: 6).

Making oneself over has now become a part of the American lifestyle. Surgery is no longer perceived as mere cutting and suturing; it has become a part of "the journey toward enhancement, the beauty outside ultimately reflecting the beauty within" (Kuczynski, 2006: 7). Cosmetic surgery has inspired reality programs (e.g., *Extreme Makeover* in the US) in which individuals who do not like their own appearance and have low self-esteem spend a long time under the care of a plastic surgeon, a physical trainer, a hairdresser, a make-up artist and a stylist to become "better," more attractive and, finally, to accept their self-image (Kuczynski, 2006). Similar TV programs have recently been launched in many European countries, Poland included, as a response to the general fashion for the young and beautiful.

Commercial culture has a strong influence on the face. It not only contributes to beautifying it but has also turned it into a tool of commerce. The body, and the face in particular, have, "over the past few years, become one of the principal mainstays in the selling of merchandise" (Hagège, 2005: 21; Kemp, 2004). In most cases, the face has to be young and beautiful, but empty. The face in advertisements contradicts everything that has been said about this special part of the body over the centuries: it does not, and should not, reflect its owner's personality. The only purpose in staging it is to sell some product (Hagège, 2005). As Hagège (2005: 26–27) writes:

> The beauty market is huge, as we have seen. To better sell beauty in all its forms, it has been assimilated into that elusive thing known as seduction, by transforming desirable *subjects* into *objects* of desire. By dehumanizing them. The imagery of advertising manages the illusion through fakery by preserving only its form and identifying that form with a product. This mimetic reference is used a great deal in advertising.

We can say that the body, and the face in particular, are used to sell (advertise) different types of products. The face is often used in cosmetics advertisements, and then it has to portray the effectiveness of the cosmetic advertised. We say that "a certain actress has become the face of a certain cosmetics company"; in other words she has sold her own face to the company, so that it can be used to enhance product sales (see also Section 1.5.). It is no longer the face of a particular individual, but becomes an icon. It is an idealized and manipulated image which is offered to the consumers. Once again the face is used to deceive.

The power of facial beauty should not be neglected. A beautiful face can have a great impact on its owner's life and relations with others. That is why beauty and attractiveness are a common topic of folk sayings and proverbs, e.g., the Polish proverb *Nie to ładne, co ładne, lecz to, co się komu podoba* (Nice is not

what is nice, but what others find attractive), or the popular English maxim with the same meaning, *Beauty is in the eye of the beholder*. Rubenstein *et al.* (2002: 28) do not agree with the sentiment expressed in these sayings, arguing that "mathematical averageness is a necessary and fundamental characteristic of perceived attractiveness in the human face". However, the folk wisdom should not be entirely rejected. When we analyse the attractiveness of somebody's face we always, apart from current standards of beauty, take into consideration our subjective taste and preferences. Other sayings concerning attractiveness, *Beauty is only skin deep*, indicating that a person's appearance is not a true reflection of his or her inner personality traits, *Never judge a book by its cover*, advising us that we should not base our treatment of others upon their physical appearance (Rubenstein *et al.*, 2002), and *A fair face may hide a foul soul* (Kakietek, 2004), are constantly confirmed by our everyday experience. In spite of that, people often tend to judge others by their outward appearance. These judgements influence our perception of people and shape our attitudes toward them. For people with nice faces, they make their life easier, and for people with faces which do not meet the beauty/attractiveness standards, they make their life full of disappointment.

2.10. The "troubled" face

Not all people enjoy a beautiful, healthy-looking face which evokes warm feelings or at least acceptance in others. Many people have "troubled" faces. They can be "troubled" in two ways. These faces may express their owners' problems, either physical or psychological. The face in such cases functions as a displayer showing that something is going wrong in the person's body or psyche. In other situations the face, or more specifically its particular features, may get its owner into trouble, when other people react to it with hostility and contempt. The face perceived as such, as a trouble displayer and a trouble cause, once again proves its centrality in human life.

2.10.1. The face as a display of illness symptoms

The face is a part of the body in which it is easy to observe the first symptoms of an illness. It always reflects both a person's psychological and physical condition. First of all, this is because the face is naked and constantly on

display to others. The slightest change in a person's mood and psychological condition is visible in the face, when its expression is uncontrolled. Any illness affects its physical appearance: the skin, its colour and texture, the eyes and other facial features. Hippocrates (ca 460–377 BC), "the father of Western medicine," was one of the first who used facial cues to detect his patients' state of health. He believed that a facial examination could help him accurately diagnose the patient. In "Prognostic," he writes:

> In acute diseases the physician must conduct his inquiries in the following way. First he must examine the face of the patient, and see whether it is like the faces of healthy people, and especially whether it is like its usual self. Such likeness will be the best sign, and the greatest unlikeness will be the most dangerous sign. The latter will be as follows. Nose sharp, eyes hollow, temples sunken, ears cold and contracted with their lobes turned outwards, the skin about the face hard and tense and parched, the colour of the face as a whole being yellow or black (1923: Vol. II, i–ii, 9).

The above description of an ill face is now known by the term *facies hippocratica*. In his treatise on prognosis, Hippocrates claims that the body can predict its own decay and that the face is the main displayer of its symptoms. So every physician should start the examination of the patient with the examination of his face.

In the traditional medicine of China, Japan and some other Far Eastern cultures, the face was also treated as a main diagnostic tool. Modern research has provided some evidence that Hippocrates and other ancient medics were right to ascribe so much importance to the face as the mirror of man's physical condition (Zebrowitz, 1997).

In short, the face is a good displayer of illness. It can undergo many different transformations which can be treated as signs of the illness process. As has been said, this refers also to the problems of the psyche. There are some mental disorders which, apart from affecting the person's behaviour, change his face, which may even become difficult to identify.

2.10.2. The face as a symbol of split personality

Split personality (also called *Multiple Personality Disorder* or *Dissociative Identity Disorder*) is a condition in which two or more distinct identities are present in one person and alternately take control of him. It is characterized by a splintering of identity. The individual suffering from Dissociative Identity Disorder fails to integrate different aspects of his identity. Beside his primary

identity, which carries his name and is usually passive and depressed, he experiences other identities related to a completely different self-image and life history. These identities are often in open conflict or do not know each other (Colman, 2009).

Cases of split personality have always fascinated people, and not only psychiatrists. Robert Louis Stevenson (1850–1894) devoted to it his novel *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* (1885/2004), an allegory of the destruction of a human personality. In it he describes the life of Dr Henry Jekyll, a respected, good-natured citizen who lives a double life, turning into his alter ego, Edward Hyde, who is capable of every meanness and even of murder. At first, Mr Hyde is not identified with Dr Jekyll, as they differ not only in their behaviour but also in their bodily appearance. Mr Hyde has his deeds imprinted in his face. He differs a lot from Dr Jekyll; his face bears the mark of evil.

Interest in the "differentness" and uniqueness of individuals suffering from split personality also inspired Gene Brewer, an American doctor, who wrote a novel about a psychiatric patient claiming to be from another planet (*K-PAX* (2002)), called "prot," who turns out to be one of the alter egos of Robert Porter. Robert suffers from Dissociative Identity Disorder as a result of some traumatic experience (his wife and daughter were brutally murdered and he killed their murderer). Unlike Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, Robert and prot resemble each other, but the great differences between the two personalities have a strong impact on their facial expression, which makes them at first almost impossible to identify with each other.

These two examples are literary depictions of split personality, which show how an individual's behaviour can influence his perception by others, how his corporeality gets transformed under the pressure of different personalities and different expectations on the part of others. The face of a person with more than one personality and more than one identity is a "troubled" face as well.

2.10.3. Face and shame, guilt and embarrassment

Trouble in the face may also be brought about by some everyday social experience evoking strong self-directed emotions, such as shame, guilt or embarrassment. Shame, guilt and embarrassment are universal emotions which belong to the most painful of human experiences. All of them "are intimately rooted in religion and ethics, conceived and experienced differently in different cultures and at different historical times within the same culture" (Ho *et al.*, 2004: 64). In Christian tradition, shame and guilt are said to originate from humankind's first transgression against God's command, and as such they are

the consequence of original sin (Ho *et al.*, 2004; Jędrzejko, 1998). In the Bible, original sin is presented with strong sexual overtones. Having eaten the fruit of the tree of knowledge, Adam and Eve realized that they were naked and they felt shame, which they had not felt before. In Christian understanding, these two emotions, shame and guilt, are related to nakedness and sexuality.

Shame is the most socially significant of all emotions. It is "a socio-cultural phenomenon that reflects and refracts wider social trends and relationships" (Pattison, 2000: 131). It performs many social functions:

- it helps to define social boundaries and norms,
- it signals the state of social bonds,
- it provides a powerful tool of social conformity and control (Pattison, 2000: 131; Ho *et al.*, 2004).

Characterized in this way, shame can be said to be a necessary element of social order (Pattison, 2000). Public shaming is "instrumental to socialization" and constitutes a potent sanction (Ho *et al.*, 2004). In the former times, public shaming or humiliation used to be a common mode of punishment for petty crimes.

Shame and guilt "originate from the internalization of cultural standards" (Ho *et al.*, 2004: 75). Cultures differ in terms of standards they promote and different attitudes of their members towards shame, guilt and their role in social order. Pattison (2000) distinguishes between "'shame-based' cultures" and "'guilt-based' cultures." The former are based on conformity to unwritten rules, the maintenance of honour and appearance, and the avoidance of pollution; while the latter, which evolved from the former, are based on juridical rules and procedures, internalized conscience and the concept of correlation between offence and punishment. In both types of culture, however, shame exists.

Individuals can choose from a wide range of possibilities how to present themselves to others in clothes, manners, behaviour and attitudes. This allows for freedom of self-expression. However, "it also creates anxiety as people worry about whether their 'face fits'" (Pattison, 2000: 143). Being constantly on display, under the eyes of a critical audience, the modern self tries to perform its role correctly. This necessarily creates a lot of strain and anxiety (Goffman, 1959; Pattison, 2000). And any failure to perform adequately involves shame, "cutting to the centre of personal esteem and identity" (Pattison, 2000: 143). So, while the experience of shame is a personal phenomenon which is individually experienced, shame itself is a phenomenon which is socially conditioned. No one is shamed in social isolation from others. We can feel shame only by participating in social interaction.

The experience of shame is usually associated with "negative automatic thoughts of the self." It is a complex set of feelings, cognitions and actions which are self-focused. It is dependent on the competencies to construct the

social self and that is why it is called a "self-conscious emotion" (Gilbert, 2002: 5–6). Any action which can cause a flaw in the social self may make a person experience shame. This experience often leaves its imprint on the person's body and face in particular.

> To speak of Shame as a Virtue is incorrect, because it is much more like a feeling than a moral state. It is defined, we know, to be 'a kind of fear of disgrace,' and its effects are similar to those of the fear of danger, for they who feel Shame grow red and they who feel death turn pale. So both are evidently in a way physical, which is thought to be a mark of a feeling rather than a moral state (Aristotle, 1911: 99: 1128b).

The way Aristotle defines shame in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1911) immediately connects it to the face, which expresses our emotions and feelings. Shame expresses itself through the face, making it turn red. In fact, shame can be expressed through other parts of the body as well, e.g., the neck, which can also turn red, or the hands, which can sweat.

There are close associations between shame and a certain kind of facial expression (Ho *et al.*, 2004). The feeling of shame is most often expressed, especially in young persons and in women, in the form of blushing. Blushing is regarded as "a facial expression of the 'self-conscious' emotions — an outward manifestation of shame, embarrassment, shyness and/or modesty" (Crozier, 2002: 206). The feeling of physical heat which causes blushing is the source of the metaphor: SHAME IS FIRE, which gives rise to many metaphorical expressions in Polish (Jędrzejko, 1998):

> *Myślałam, że spalę się ze wstydu*. (I thought I would burn up with shame.)
>
> *Jego twarz płonęła wstydem*. (His face was burning with shame.)
>
> *Jego czoło płonęło wstydem*. (His forehead was burning with shame.)

Another metaphor related to this troublesome feeling is SHAME IS A WAVE OF WARMTH:

> *Fala wstydu objęła jej twarz i rozlała się na szyję.* (Jędrzejko, 1998) (A wave of shame covered her face and spread over her neck.)

Shame, guilt and embarrassment are emotions expressed by means of blushing. However, blushing is not the only signal the face can give. Anxiety or fear blanche the face (McNeill, 1998). But, according to Darwin:

> Of all expressions, blushing seems to be the most strictly human; yet it is common to all or nearly all the races of man, whether or not any change of

> colour is visible in their skin. The relaxation of the small arteries of the surface, on which blushing depends, seems to have primarily resulted from earnest attention directed to the appearance of our own persons, especially of our faces, aided by habit, inheritance, and the ready flow of nerve-force along accustomed channels; and afterwards to have been extended by the power of association to self-attention directed to moral conduct (Darwin, 1872/1998: 358).

The self-attention that Darwin writes about can be directed towards two important aspects of the person's social self: social behaviour, mentioned above, and appearance. Our appearance often evokes anxiety in us. The need to be accepted and classified as attractive to others makes us self-conscious. There is also a special feeling of shame connected with the body and the face in particular. The so-called "body (and facial) shame" is evoked by the conviction of an unwanted physical appearance (Gilbert, 2002).

Shame and the other related emotions are expressed through the face (a part of the body), and are caused by some threat to face (a self-image). We feel shame when we lose face, our good reputation or good name (cf. Ho *et al*., 2004). This experience can be characterized as that of "internalized pollution":

> There seems to be a kind of metaphorical affinity between ancient notions of pollution, defilement and dishonour and contemporary experiences and descriptions of shame, albeit that the latter mostly now refer to the experience of individuals rather than describing a primary social reality (Pattison, 2002: 89).

Shame, like pollution, "has elements of social dislocation and exclusion" (Pattison, 2002: 89). Shame, like pollution, is often accompanied by the feeling of being unworthy of respect. The ashamed person may feel as if he stands "outside the social order and social relationships," as if he is "in the wrong, and thus in the state of alienation from others" (Pattison, 2002: 89; Termińka, 1998). The power of this emotion is proof of the great importance of others in our life. Shame, which is a reaction to a face-threat (a threat to our self-image), is marked on our face.

When we lose face, we can also feel other emotions than shame, for example wanting to hide, humiliation, or feeling inhibited, inferior, self-conscious or exposed. In such situations, we often feel embarrassed. Embarrassment is a form of emotion which is closely related to shame. It is also a social phenomenon which lies at the heart of the social organization of everyday behaviour. "It provides a personal constraint on the behaviour of the individual in society and a public response to actions and activities considered problematic or untoward" (Heath, 1988: 137). Embarrassment plays a vital role in sustaining the individual's commitment to social norms, values and conventions (Heath,

1988). In his pioneering paper "Embarrassment and social organization" (1956), Goffman investigates the interactional organization of embarrassment. He maintains that "An individual may recognize embarrassment in others and even in himself by objective signs of emotional disturbance: blushing, fumbling, stuttering, [...] blanching, blinking, [...] absent-mindedness and malapropisms" (Goffman, 1956: 264; Ho *et al.*, 2004). This may happen "if expressive facts threaten or discredit the assumptions a participant has projected about his identity" (Goffman, 1956: 265), as a consequence he may temporarily lose balance and self-control and he "cannot for the time being mobilize his muscular and intellectual resources for the task at hand" (Goffman, 1956: 265–266). As such, embarrassment is a feeling which may have a strong impact on the organization of social interaction (Merkin, 2006a). To avoid being embarrassed, people try to preserve and negotiate face in all communication situations.

Shame, guilt and embarrassment occur in social contexts; shame and guilt are said to be felt in situations of moral transgression, while embarrassment is said to appear in situations of loss of poise or composure (Ho *et al.*, 2004). These three emotions are undeniably face-related. On the one hand, they appear when the person's face (self-image) is threatened by some unfortunate event, evoked either by his action or the action of another person. On the other hand, the feeling of shame, guilt or embarrassment causes some disturbance which usually influences the person's physical face.

The imprint left on the face by these strong negative emotions is only momentary, and it can soon be forgotten. Due to its transient nature, it rarely involves social exclusion or any other serious social consequences. But apart from these momentary signs on the face, sometimes there are also some long-lasting signs which determine the person's social life and negatively influence his relations with others.

2.10.4. The stigmatized face

The term *stigma*, which originates from Greek, refers to "bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier" (Goffman, 1963/1986: 1). The signs were cut or burnt into the body, and the persons who had them — slaves, criminals, or traitors — were treated as blemished and ritually polluted, and were to be avoided. In Christian times, the term acquired two additional meanings, and referred to "bodily signs of holy grace" and "bodily signs of physical disorder" (Goffman, 1986: 1). *The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology* (2000) defines stigma as "a social attribute which is

discrediting for an individual or group." The modern concept of stigma or *spoiled identity* is when a person feels that there is some blemish in his identity that excludes him from social relations and society (Goffman, 1963/1986). Nowadays stigmatized people, those who have spoiled identity, possess "an undesired differentness from what we had anticipated" (Goffman, 1986: 5), and because of that they are excluded from social participation. In fact, a stigma is "a special kind of relationship between attribute and stereotype" (Goffman, 1986: 4) existing in a given society.

Every society establishes means of categorizing persons and "a complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories" (Goffman, 1986: 2). So when we meet a person, we can easily anticipate his category and attributes, his social identity, from first appearances. If he possesses an attribute that makes him different from what is an established standard, he is often treated as a tainted person, with the attribute that makes him different being a stigma. A good description of social stigmatization is provided in the novel *The Scarlet Letter* (1850/1964) written by Nathaniel Hawthorne. The main character, a young woman, as a result of an extramarital affair, gives birth to a daughter. The act of adultery she has committed, as morally wrong, is totally unacceptable for the 17th-century Puritan society. The woman is punished for her sin with public humiliation (a common form of punishment for minor offences at that time) and a symbolical stigma of the scarlet letter "A," standing for adultery, attached to her dress. She is stigmatized socially by committing adultery and literally by "a rag of scarlet cloth."

Goffman (1986: 4) distinguishes three types of stigma:

- various physical deformities (*stigmas of the body*),
- blemishes of individual character, such as weak will or dishonesty, or blemishes inferred from a known record of, for example, mental disorder, imprisonment, addiction, alcoholism, or unemployment (*stigmas of character*),
- the tribal stigma of race, nation or religion (*stigmas of social collectivities*).

A person with a physical deformity, especially when it is a facial deformity (e.g., a harelip or misshapen nose) suffers a lot of discrimination starting in early childhood. This type of discrimination, having its origins in rules of physiognomy, is deeply rooted in many cultures. One of the main premises of traditional Arab physiognomy, which was later adopted by European physiognomy, is:

> [D]o not trust the one-eyed, the lame, hunchbacked, the red-haired and those with a rare beard, in other words — anybody who has any bodily deficiency. Avoid those who have any physical flaw, because they are mean, foul and insincere, and you will only regret spending time with them (Mourad, 1939: 61; in Courtine and Haroche, 2007: 31).

Such a differentness is often approached with a mixture of curiosity and suspiciousness. For example, the title character of the film *The Elephant Man* (directed by David Lynch, 1980), a 19th-century Englishman who suffers from heavy disfigurement caused by some congenital disease, spent many years as a side-show freak. This sensitive and intelligent man hidden behind a monstrous "mask" suffers from losing his real countenance and, as a consequence, from losing his dignity and good name. His deformed face is his stigma. This also happens to people suffering from Moebius Syndrome. This is a rare neurological disorder which affects the cranial nerves and makes those with the condition unable to move their faces and eyes. They cannot smile, frown, suck, grimace or blink their eyes (Moebius Syndrome Foundation). Incapable of any expression, their faces are like masks. Jonathan Cole, a neuropsychologist, in his book *About Face* (1998), writes about facial mobility problems. He describes how they can influence selfhood and social relations. The necessary condition of good relations with others is an emotional sensibility revealed to them via the face. Individuals deprived of that, or as Cole describes them, "without a face," are socially invalidated. He describes several case histories which

> tell of the essential role of the face in the expression and experience of feeling itself. Those who were hardly aware of the facial origin of their problems show how deep within us are these matters that they only brought to light by a shattering disconnection between personality and the face (Cole, 1998: 192).

Physical damage to the face can also have "particular powers of horror" (Kemp, 2004: 66). Seeing a deformed face, people often expect that its owner has a matching character and can exhibit "monstrous" behaviour (e.g., Quasimodo in *The Hunchback of Notre Dame* (1831) by Victor Hugo).

As has been mentioned above, the stigmatized face does not involve only facial deformity. Other types of stigma are also imprinted in people's faces. Some stigmas of character strike the observer at first sight, e.g., the red nose and the bloodshot eyes of alcoholics. This type of stigma can very often determine the exclusion of a person from normal social interaction. Any attempts on his part to participate in it may lead to open expressions of contempt, fear or hostility on the part of the others. A dark complexion, slanting eyes, an aquiline nose or any other facial trait which is not typical for members of a particular culture and race can evoke negative or even hostile reactions. Thus we can divide members of a society into the *normals*, who do not depart negatively from particular expectations, and persons with a stigma, who are despised and disapproved of by the normals. The stigmatized often disapprove of their own attributes and feel shame due to them.

2.11. The hidden face

As mentioned above, the face is one of the few parts of the body that are constantly on display to the public. However, this is not always the case. In some cultures, women are made to hide their faces behind a veil. The Koran says that women "should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, [...]" (Chaudhry, 1995: 42). But there is no consensus in the Muslim world whether women should be completely covered. Chaudhry quotes the following story:

> Ayesha reported that Asma'a daughter of Abu Bakr came to the Prophet of Allah while there were thin clothes on her. He approached her and said: O Asma'a! When a girl reaches the menstrual time, it is not proper that anything on her should remain exposed except this and this. He hinted on her face and palms (Chaudhry, 1995: 42–43).

Thus, the face together with hands can be left uncovered. However, *Purdah*, the dress code, requires a "non-display rule." It varies among Muslim communities. There are two kinds of garments, body tents and face veils. The best known body tent is *chador*, a black swath of fabric hanging from pate to anklebone (worn by women in Iran, and among Lebanese Shiites). The *abayya* is the Arabian *chador*, "a black cloak with arm slits." The *chadris* is the Afghan version, a colourful tent with an oblong lattice over the face. The *farshiyah* is the white coverall that leaves a single eye exposed (in Libya). There are two types of face veil, the *niqab*, which completely occludes the face, while the *burqa* is "a black-and-gold face mask" that usually hides all but the eyes (in the Persian Gulf) (McNeill, 1998: 269). Whatever type of veil a woman wears, it makes her face invisible to the public and therefore deprives her of one type of expression. The veil becomes her mask, but a mask which does not say anything about its owner, a mask which makes her faceless.

Some advocates of *purdah* claim that it "frees women from the leers of men and the whims of fashion"; others say that it "is an assertion of cultural pride, a symbol of resistance to the West" (McNeill, 1998: 270). Thus, from the Muslim point of view, *purdah* is a tradition which should be cherished and complied with; it makes women free. But from the Western point of view, it deprives them of the right to participate in social interaction, as the face, understood both literally and metaphorically, is the condition of interaction (cf. Goffman, 1967).

"Dress codes stem from custom, not sense, as fashion designers well know. And purdah fits into a larger system of sexual segregation" (McNeill, 1998: 270). In the Muslim world, women's faces undergo segregation by means of the

veil. Divisions in different societies, however, can go also along other lines, such as racial or occupational. There are cultures and situations in which the face becomes a criterion for segregation and discrimination.

2.12. The "wrong" face

In the early 19th century, physiognomists took to analysing the faces of the ill-reputed: the mentally ill and criminals. Both were regarded as *atavistic* (evolutionary reversions) (Fridlund, 1994). The mentally ill were said to have their illness written on their faces, the criminals — their crimes. Drawing extensively on the tradition of physiognomy and craniometry, researchers tried to provide scientific justification for the anatomical segregation of races (Cohen, 2006). In various disciplines, research was carried out to reinforce pre-existing racial prejudices and stereotypes. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) maintain,

> [r]acism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face, which endavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes tolerating them at given places under given conditions, in a given getto, sometimes erasing them from the wall, which never abides alterity (it's a Jew, it's an Arab, it's a Negro, it's a lunatic...). From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be.

The face which is not like ours, by some (e.g., racists) treated as a "wrong" face, is the topic of this section.

2.12.1. The "mismeasured" face

Craniometric studies started by Petrus Camper, and especially his concept of *linea facialis* (see Section 2.4.3.), gave rise to interest in physiognomy as a sign of race. One of the leading representatives of "racial" physiognomy was Carl Gustav Carus (1789–1869), famous for his cranioscopic works (*cranioscopy* is the examination of the size and configuration of the skull; the term was formerly applied to what is now commonly called phrenology (OED)). He was among the first German physiognomists who became interested in the question of race. In

his famous *Über ungleiche Befähigung der verschiedenen Menschheitsstämme für höhere geistige Entwicklung* [On the unequal capacities of the different human races for higher intellectual development] (1849), he presents a typology of races. According to Carus, people can be divided into "daylight," "twilight," and "nocturnal." He claims that his cranial measurements of diverse people show that "daylight" peoples of Europe have the frontal lobe (the seat of intelligence) predominating, the "twilight" peoples – those of Asia and North and South America – have a larger medial brain (the locus of the emotions), while "nocturnal" peoples, the blacks from Africa, have the occiput (the locus of desire and will) well developed. The main conclusion of his work is that the peoples of Europe have the greatest intellectual capacities and are thus superior to other human beings (Gray, 2004).

Paul Broca (1824–1880), a professor of clinical surgery in Paris, became famous for his studies which consisted in weighing human brains during autopsies to determine the cranial capacity of human skulls. Broca claimed that the appearance of the face, and generally the head, specific for a particular race determines the social capacity of the person:

> A prognathous[1] face, more or less black color of the skin, woolly hair and intellectual and social inferiority are often associated, while more or less white skin, straight hair and an orthognathous[2] face are the ordinary equipment of the highest groups of the human series [...]. A group with black skin, woolly hair and a prognathous face has never been able to raise itself spontaneously to civilization (Broca, 1866: 280–296; in Cohen, 2006: 225).

The Swedish scientist Anders Retzius (1796–1860) popularized another measure of craniometry, *the cranial index*, calculated as the ratio of maximum width to maximum length of the skull. Retzius distinguished between dolichocephalic skulls, relatively long (ratio of .75 or less) and brachycephalic skulls, relatively short (ratio of over .8). On the basis of this index, he created a theory of civilization, according to which Stone Age peoples of Europe were brachycephalic, and were later invaded and replaced by Bronze Age peoples (Indo-Europeans, or Arian dolichocephalics). Some more primitive, brachycephalic people survived among Basques, Finns, and Lapps (Gould, 1996). This theory was later disproved by Broca, who found dolichocephalics among Stone Age skulls (he himself was brachycephalic) (Gould, 1996).

Craniometry and craniometric studies evoked, and still evoke, a lot of controversy. In many cases, research results were adjusted to match pre-existing opinions. In the 1840s Samuel George Morton, a scientist and physician from

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[1] Forward-jutting (Cohen, 2006).
[2] Straight (Cohen, 2006).

Philadelphia, analysing the physical characteristics of the brain and measuring skulls, formulated the ranking of various races, according to which whites were the highest, Indians were in the middle, and blacks were the lowest. Among whites, Teutons and Anglo-Saxons were the highest, Jews were in the middle, and Hindus were the lowest. The results of his measuring studies matched American prejudices (Gould, 1996). More than a hundred years later, Stephen Jay Gould decided to check Morton's measurements. He found that Morton had often included or deleted large subsamples in order to conform group averages to prior expectations. He had made calculations to demonstrate the superiority of Teutons and Anglo-Saxons, because he was convinced that variation in skull size recorded differential, innate mental ability.

Racial prejudice can also be found in the works of the English psychiatrist John Langdon Haydon Down (1828–1897), who published in 1866 a paper entitled "Observations on an Ethnic Classification of Idiots." He provided there a now classical description of the Mongolian type of idiot. Down described some cases of mental retardation in children whose facial features, according to him, had not evolved to conform to the Anglo-Saxon type. These children were said to be "trapped" in the inferior Mongolian race. This type of mental retardation was called *Mongolism*. Recently the term was replaced by the more politically correct *Down's syndrome* or *Trisomy-21 syndrome* (the actual genetic defect). The syndrome has nothing to do with the Mongolian people's intelligence (Fridlund, 1994). Children suffering from Down's syndrome can be easily recognized by a characteristic face, which Down described in the following way:

> The face is flat and broad, and destitute of prominence. The cheeks are roundish, and extended laterally. The eyes are obliquely placed, and the internal canthi more than normally distant from one another. The palpebral fissure is very narrow. The forehead is wrinkled transversely from the constant assistance which the levatores palpebrarum derive from the occipito-frontalis muscle in the opening of the eyes. The lips are large and thick with transverse fissures. The tongue is long, thick, and much roughened. The nose is small. The skin has a slightly dirty yellowish tinge, and is deficient in elasticity, giving the appearance of being too large for the body (Down, 1866: 261).

These facial features were treated as a sign of mental deficiency. Although Down believed that "A very large number of congenital idiots [are] typical Mongols," he claimed that mental deficiency can be marked also by facial features specific for other races. Accordingly, he called those who suffer from other types of mental deficiency idiots of the "Ethiopian variety," "white negroes of European descent," or "idiots of the Malay type." Following the stereotype of the superiority of the white race, he maintained that "if a mentally

defective member of a white race could show the racial features of a non-white race, it proved that racial differences were not specific" (Brain, 1967: 4). He tried to prove human unity by showing that the representative features of lower races could appear in degenerates of the higher.

All the research carried out by the scientists mentioned above involved the search for signs of race in the human head and face. Very often it was inspired and influenced by racial prejudice; sometimes it even contributed to reinforcing it. The results of the research together with the racial prejudice that existed in many European societies prepared the basis for the formation of a new dangerous type of physiognomy which flourished in the early decades of the 20th century in Germany.

2.12.2. The "racial face" in Germany

Deeply rooted in the German intellectual tradition, physiognomy engaged many creative representatives of German thought, such as Lavater, Lichtenberg, Herder, Goethe, Gall, Hegel, Carus, Schopenhauer, Klages, Kassner, and Kretschmer (Gray, 2004; see also Section 2.4.3.). Having flourished in the 19th and early 20th centuries, physiognomy developed powerfully and most perniciously from "the racial-genetic turn German biology and anthropology underwent in the early decades of the twentieth century, leading up to the catastrophe of the Nazi racial state. The convergence of these diverse intellectual forces occurred during the years of the Weimar Republic, leading to an explosion of physiognomically-oriented theories in diverse academic and intellectual disciplines in the years from 1918 to 1935 and beyond" (Gray, 2004: xx). In this period of time, the face was turned into a socially and politically powerful tool used against other races.

The years of the Weimar Republic are often described as the time of "the physiognomic boom" and the emergence of the German "physiognomic worldview." In 1919, one of the most significant German physiognomists, Rudolf Kassner (1873–1959), published his first physiognomist work, "Zahl und Gesicht" [Number and face], in which he breaks with an essential principle of the physiognomic tradition, "the identification of the external and the internal," the conviction that the body is the mirror of the soul (Gray, 2004: 167), and postulates "the great paradox of every physiognomics" which says that "the human being only is the way he looks, because he does not look the way he is" (1919: 3, 192; in Gray, 2004: 167). Unlike traditional, "scientific" physiognomists, Kassner glorifies subjectivism; he claims that the subjective interpretation of the face is the form of empathy through imagination. The

power of imagination legitimizes every possible interpretation of other people (Gray, 2004). In "Physignomik" Kassner defines what he calls *Ständegesicht* (the socially determined face):

> the socially determined face means that the physician, the scholar, the schoolteacher, the tailor, the interior decorator, the painter, the Count, the Baron, the accountant, that each of these figures also has the peculiar face befitting his social class, the socially apt face (1932: 5, 29; in Gray, 2004: 204).

Among the representatives of the "physiognomic boom" was Ludwig Klages (1872–1956), a psychologist, who created a physiognomically based theory of expression, and Ernst Kretschmer (1888–1964), a physician, who tried to relate physiognomic body types to predispositions for certain mental illnesses (Gray, 2004). But the most representative figure of the physiognomic worldview, and the most infamous of them all, was a proto-fascist thinker, Hans F.K. Günther (1891–1968). Called "Rassen-Günther," or "Race-Günther," he applied physiognomic theories to racial anthropology and was one of the strongest advocates of the Nordic Movement in Germany. He practised a type of materialist physiognomy which sought to establish the relationship between intellectual, spiritual, and cultural traits and such physical features as blue eyes, blonde hair, a particular skull form, and the shape of the nose (Gray, 2004). Using various tools to measure the head and face, Günther analysed the proportions of the skull and used them as the primary characteristic of the European races he identified (Gray, 2004). According to Günther, the members of the "Nordic" race, identified with a cross section of modern Germans, had the long and narrow (dolichocephalic) skull, and the "Eastern" race — the Slavic peoples — had the short and broad (brachycephalic) skull (Gray, 2004). The main source of the information about hair and eye colour that Günther used in his studies was *Germania*, in which Tacitus describes the Germanic peoples (Gray, 2004). All the physiognomic attributions he analysed in his studies are mediated by criteria of race. People's negative attitude towards another person who has dark hair or a pointed nose, for example, according to Günther, is due to the "blood," which intuitively separates "us" from others (Gray, 2004: 233). Thus, his racial physiognomy was mainly based on Germanic tradition, intuition and pseudo-scientific research.

Interpreting the anatomical features of human beings as indicative of both racial type and certain psychological and characterological traits specific for those particular racial types, Günther expressed the common prejudices of middle-class Germans about their representatives (Gray, 2004). The typology he formulated was extremely Eurocentric: he believed that all races which are extra-European are lower than the low. This also applied to the Jews, who,

according to racial physiognomists of Weimar Germany and Nazi Germany, were the primary vehicles of degenerate Otherness (Günther, 1929; in Gray, 2004). He did not treat Jews as a religious or cultural community; Jewishness, for him, from the very beginning, was an innate racial characteristic associated with certain attributes. Thus the only way to eradicate these attributes was to eradicate the Jews themselves (Günther, 1929). The conclusions formulated by Günther were well suited to the epoch he lived in and were soon used as a scientific basis of Nazi policy.

The biased results of these and other studies by racial physiognomists coincided clearly with the anti-Semitic prejudices of the Nordic Movement, and created favourable ground for the Final Solution (Gray, 2004). In the Third Reich, racial physiognomy was put into practice. The main racial-physiognomic theories formulated in Germany at this time were popularized among the general public, the young generation included. Obligatory classes were organized on racial ethnology in schools. The popularizers of racial physiognomy claimed the absolute infallibility of the methods of the "science," which in practice consisted in cranial measurements and comparison of eye and hair colour with a range of colours listed in special charts. The idea that "race is in the face" (McNeill, 1998: 96) in Nazi Germany became a dangerous truth. Having the "wrong" face very often meant a death sentence. The saying that *the face can betray its owner* got a new literal meaning.

2.12.3. The criminal face

Criminals, like the mentally ill, were in the 19th century treated as brutish animals that were incapable of participating in social life. As such they became subjects of academic research. A new discipline was even established, called criminal anthropology. Its creator, Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909), an Italian physician, claimed that people who committed crimes are evolutionary throwbacks. Their atavism is both physical and mental. In his works, and especially in *Criminal Man* (1887/2006), Lombroso saw in features characteristic of criminals many resemblances to animals, "negroes" and "Peruvian Indians." He tried to prove that heads and faces of criminals had many apish features: greater skull thickness, simplicity of cranial sutures, large jaw, the dominance of the face compared to the cranium, precocious wrinkles, low and narrow forehead, large ears, dark skin, greater visual acuity, inability to blush, and absence of baldness (Cohen, 2006). Lombroso discussed analogies between savages and delinquents, among which were the oblique eyes, the small skull, the developed jaw, "the forehead retreating obliquely from the eyes," the

large ears, and "a greater extension of all new characteristics added to the necroscopic characteristics which assimilate the European criminal to the Mongolian and Australian type" (Lombroso, 1895/2004: 38). All "these characteristics pointed to one conclusion, the atavistic origin of the criminal, who reproduces physical, psychic, and functional qualities of remote ancestors" (Lombroso Ferrero, 1911: 7—8).

Fifty years later Ernest A. Hooton (1887—1954), who investigated the relationship between the criminal life and physical features, came to similar conclusions, though stripped of the atavistic connotations. He claimed that "within the human species it is reasonable to suppose that hereditary, racial, or other physical differences may be associated with mental and behaviouristic variations" (1939: 252). According to Hooton, crimes arise from deteriorated organisms, so the primary cause of crime is their biological inferiority. Criminals are both socially and physically inferior individuals. Analysing their appearance, Hooton came to the following conclusions:

> Marked deficiencies in gross dimensions and in head and face diameters are unequivocal assertions of undergrowth and poor physical development (1939: 305—306). Deficiencies of dark brown eyes and of blue eyes suggest that these criminals include fewer of the relatively pure racial types and more of the mixed types than occur among civilians. Noses broader relative to their height that are characteristic of the civil check sample are an evidence of infantilism or of primitiveness. Poor development of other facial dimensions favours the former interpretation. Low foreheads, high pinched nasal roots, nasal bridges and tips varying to both extremes of breadth and narrowness, excesses of nasal deflections, compressed faces and narrow jaw, fit well into the picture of general constitutional inferiority. The very small ears with submedium role of helix, prominent antihelix, and frequent presence of Darwin point, hint at degeneracy (Hooton, 1939: 306).

Lombroso and Hooton were not the only ones to pursue the physiognomic route in studies of the nature of criminals. In the 1940s, a new interdisciplinary specialty called criminology developed. Within the range of its research was the criminal face. In 1939, Thornton showed photographs of 20 criminals convicted for various offences to 175 University of Nebraska students and asked them to identify the crime each man had committed. "The students discriminated accurately at a level significantly better than chance" (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1986: 80). E. Kozeny (1962) divided 720 physiognomies of criminals into 16 offence categories and found significant differences in facial features across at least some categories (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1986). The results of these studies were, however, strongly undermined by the results of research carried out by Bull and Green (1980), who showed 10 photographs of men to a group of civilians and police officers and asked them to say which of eleven listed

crimes each photographed man had committed. Both civilians and officers made similar choices, but what makes this study particularly interesting is that none of the photographed men had ever committed any crime (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1986). Thus, the face is a source of information about its owner, but the information it provides does not always have to be true. The face can mislead those who perceive others in terms of stereotypes.

Similar situations occur quite frequently — persons whose faces match the stereotypical facial traits of criminals often are evaluated on the basis of their appearance. The power of stereotype is great. People "agree to some extent about the faces that go with certain crimes" (Wilson and Herrstein, 1986: 81). Due to their unfortunate "criminal" face some persons are more often than others evaluated as morally unreliable and suspected of committing various offences or crimes. As argued above, the criminal face is not the only face which is perceived as "wrong." The "wrong" face may be defined as a face whose features evoke some negative connotations in a group of people, for example:

- a face displaying some symptoms of mental disorder,
- a face of different colour and/or having features other than specific for the members of the group,
- a face evoking the feelings of fear and uneasiness, and as such treated as a sign of the person's capability to do something wrong, e.g., to commit crimes.

The stereotype of the "wrong" face often has a strong negative impact on the interpersonal relations, and social life in general, of the people having facial traits characterized as typical of the mentally ill, members of other races, or criminals.

Chapter 3

The concept of self

3.1. Introduction

As mentioned above, the concept of face is inseparably related to the social aspect of human life. And it is not only because of the character of the face, a part of the body, which functions as "a source of social signalling and communication." It is also because face is an image of self created by individuals during social interaction. As such it can be classified as a social construct which needs other people in order to be created.

To adequately describe the concept of face, understood as an image of *self*, I have decided to start from its "source." An individual's face is said to reflect his or her self; it is the self's image. Thus, to truly understand face, one should start from the self. To understand the complexity of face, one has to take into account the problem of self-conceptualizations and identities (Tracy, 1990; Scollon and Scollon, 1994). The topic of the self differs from other academic topics in that it is shared by many disciplines. It is of great interest to psychology, anthropology, sociology and philosophy. Other concepts which are related to the concept of self, and sometimes confused with it, are identity, soul and person.

Like the concept of self, *identity* can be characterized as a complex construct of transdisciplinary nature. It is defined as "the sense of self, of personhood, of what kind of person one is" (Abercrombie *et al.*, 2000: 171). Self and personhood develop through communication. Identity is "biologically based but ultimately symbolically transformed by culture" (Fitzgerald, 1993: 26). Fitzgerald (1993: 3) treats identity as "the academic metaphor for self-in-context." In spite of the undeniable relation between the two concepts, self and identity do not have the same meaning, as there are forms of identity which are not based on self, e.g., such forms of group identity as national

identities, which require a commonality of interests and group solidarity. The creation of the self is more subjective (Elliot, 2007).

The *soul*, which has interested both ordinary people and thinkers from the beginnings of civilization, was thought to be "the distinguishing mark of living things, as something that is the subject of emotional states and that is responsible for planning and practical thinking, and also as the bearer of such virtues as courage and justice" (Lorenz, 2003). In ancient times the soul was supposed to be responsible for mental or psychological functions like thought, perception and desire, and to be the bearer of moral qualities (Lorenz, 2003).

A third concept related to the self is *person*. The word derives from classical Latin *persōna*, meaning "mask used by a player, character in a play, dramatic role, the part played by a person in life, character, role, position, individual personality, juridical person, important person, personage, human being in general" (OED). Later on the meaning of the word *person* evolved. Over the centuries, the person gradually acquired "individuality that existed apart from the mask, or role" (Fitzgerald, 1993: 42). The Western concept of person has a Christian origin, and it is endowed with moral character, independence, free will, responsibility and consciousness, "thereby establishing the locus of rationality and individual unity in the concept of the self" (Fajans, 1985: 370). For John Locke (1632–1704) (1978) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1802) (1785/1964), who understood the concept in a similar way, persons are intelligent subjects capable of imposing law upon themselves. Kant maintains that because of this capacity they deserve respect.

3.2. The definition of *self*

Self is a concept which is central to various social theories in which there are different approaches to the description of the complexity of individual experience (see Elliot, 2007). It is a concept which is hard to define, and its definitions have caused many controversies among researchers. It is equated with (Leary and Tengney, 2003: 6–8):

- the person himself or herself (in everyday discourse),
- all or part of an individual's personality (in everyday discourse),
- "the inner psychological entity that is the centre or subject of a person's experience" (e.g., James, 1890),
- perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and beliefs about oneself,
- an "executive agent" regulating people's behaviour (e.g., Baumeister, 1998).

The first two meanings are now avoided in academic work as the self is thought to refer to something else than person or personality. While the other three are the most frequently used meanings of self, there are many others, because the term *self* or the prefix *self*- are used in many different contexts with many different meanings. Generally speaking, the self(-concept) is "the set of meanings we hold for ourselves when we look at ourselves" (Stets and Burke, 2003: 130). It is based on (Stets and Burke, 2003):

- our observations of ourselves (the self-image),
- our inferences about who we are from others' behaviour towards us (the reflected self),
- our wishes and desires (the idealized self),
- our evaluations of ourselves (self-esteem).

George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) (1934), who is thought to be one of the founders of *symbolic interactionism*, a theoretical approach to the self, claims that every individual has "a thing-like self" which can be distinguished from the immediate organism. It is a complex concept and can be looked at and analysed from different perspectives. On the one hand, it is presented as something belonging entirely to the individual, something responsible for his psychological structure, and shaped to some extent by the culture he belongs to. In a similar tone, Spiro (1993: 114) sees the self as "the cultural conception of some psychic entity or structure within the person." According to Ashmore and Jussim, the self is "crucial to making sense of the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of individuals" (1997: 11–12). But on the other hand, the self is "also important to explaining the formation, maintenance, and dissolution of [...] personal relationships and role relationships" (Ashmore and Jussim, 1997: 12). It appears as an important agent in the formation of societies and cultures (Ashmore and Jussim, 1997). Thus, the self is not only created by culture, but itself creates it. Its character and structure not only are the core of the individual's personhood but also influence the nature of the individual's relations with others and the character of greater collectivities of individuals such as societies.

The concept of self has been central in psychology since the 1890s, back to which can be dated the beginning of the scientific analysis of the concept. In 1890 William James published *The Principles of Psychology*. The main assumption of his work was that the self is a major determinant of human thought and behaviour, and as such can be taken into consideration as a subject of scientific analysis (see also Calkins (1900), "Psychology as science of selves"). The date of the publication of James' seminal work also saw the birth of symbolic interactionism, the study of the relationship between self and society (Abercrombie *et al.*, 2000). James Mark Baldwin (1897), Charles Horton Cooley (1902), and George Herbert Mead (1934) are three scholars whose works had a great impact on the formation of symbolic interactionism.

According to this school of thought, both the self and society are created and sustained through the process of symbolic communication between social actors. The self is shaped by social interaction, but it also has an impact on social reality. The self and society are mutually interdependent (Stets and Burke, 2003: 128; Mead, 1934; Stryker, 1980; Denzin, 1992). The self influences society through the individual's behaviour. Society influences the self through language and meanings that make it possible for a person to take the role of the other, reflect on himself as an object, and participate in social interaction (Stets and Burke, 2003). As Mead claims in his famous work *Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of the Social Behaviorist* (1934), the social self is created through interaction with other people. During the process of self creation it is language that plays a principal role. People, unlike other living creatures, communicate by means of symbols. That is why this approach to the self is called symbolic interactionism.

The social character of the self is said to lie in the fact that it can exist only in relationships with other selves (Mead, 1934/1972). That is, "each individual finds himself or herself in a web of complex social relations" (Dunning, 2003: 433). Understood in this way, the concept has a definitely interpersonal character.

Interactionists have taken two basic views of the self. In the first one, arising from the works of Mead, who extended Kant's idea in which a transcendental "I" is contrasted with an empirical "me," "the self became the structure that organized the flow of experience confronted and produced by the person" (Denzin, 1988: 67). William James (1890) also differentiated between the subjective and objective aspects of selfhood. For him, the principal form of the self is the knower, the subject, or the "I," which is at the centre of consciousness. The self as subject interacts with the self as object, the "me." The word *self* is reflexive, in the sense that it can be both subject and object. Every individual can take the attitude of others and act toward himself as they do. In other words, he can become an object to himself. Such an objective, impersonal attitude toward oneself is treated as an instance of rational conduct. The "me" is the social identity of which the "I" becomes conscious during the social development of the individual. However, Mead's (1934) understanding of the concept of self differs from James's in that his self is not mentalistic; it is rather a "social object which lies in the field of experience" (Denzin, 1992: 4). The "I" is present in memory. The "me" is in the other's attitude towards the self; it represents the situation in which the self is. The "I" responds to this situation (Mead, 1934: 175). Thus, the self is a result of the social symbolic interaction. This understanding of the self has been maintained in the majority of interactionist theories of the self.

The second view of the self within the interactionalist tradition treats it as a linguistic structure; The "I" and the "me" are perceived as linguistic terms that

are given in the language of the subject. Denzin (1988: 67) claims that these two views of the self are incompatible and cannot be held simultaneously, as "the self and its component structures are either linguistic structures, in which case the language speaks for the subject, or the "I" and the "me" have to be assumed to exist alongside language, as primordial, deep structures of a structure called self."

The first view is represented by Erving Goffman (see Section 5.2.5.). Goffman's research interests ranged from urban anthropology, ethnology of communication and micro-sociology (with the study of social interaction) to sociolinguistics. Among the concepts he studied were self, face and ritual in social interaction. In spite of the diversity of topics he investigated and his unwillingness to subscribe to any particular trend, he is often placed in the symbolic interactionist tradition of sociological thought.

Anthony Giddens is a self theorist whose impact on sociological thought can be compared to that of Goffman. But unlike Goffman, Giddens (1991) claims that in the late Modern Age the self is a *reflexive project*. *Self-identity* is not a constant entity. It is rather a way of thinking about oneself which varies in different situations. Changes in an individual's life are always related to the need for some psychological reorganization; the self is constructed and transformed in the reflexive process, involving both individual and social changes. The individual reflects on his own identity and tries to rework it. *Reflexivity*, according to Giddens (2006), is the relationship between knowledge and social life. It is a process of incessant self-defining based on observations and reflections on psychological and social information which could influence the individual's choices (Elliot, 2007). In this way, the individual makes use of the knowledge to change his self-identity.

Self-identity does not refer merely to the persistence of the self over time, but "presumes reflexive awareness. It is what the individual is conscious 'of' in the term 'self-consciousness.'" It is "something that has to be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual" (Giddens, 1991: 52: cf. Goffman's *ego identity* (1963/1986)). It is the knowledge of the self, its mental representation and its image in the individual's eyes (Gajda, 2008). Discursively, self-identity can be defined in terms of the linguistic differentiation of "I"/"me"/"you" (or their equivalents). For Giddens (1991; Gajda, 2008), the relation of "I"/"me"/"you" is internal to the language, and not, as Mead claimed, one that connects the unsocialized part of the individual, the "I," to the social self. It is through language that self-identity is expressed and created. The language is an integral element of the individual's self-presentation.

3.3. The self and its components

We all are human beings, and as such we share some necessary characteristics which make us different from other living species. But each of us is also unique and different from other people. What makes us different and unique is both external and internal to the individual. To define ourselves we use different identities. Identities are parts into which the self is organized, and each of them is tied to different aspects of the social life, positions and role relationships a person holds in the society (Stryker, 1980; Stets and Burke, 2003). *Identity* can be defined as

> a set of meanings attached to the self in a social role, this set of meanings serves as a standard or reference for a person. When an identity is activated in a situation, a feedback loop is established (Stets and Burke, 2003: 137).

Discussing the concept of identity, Anna Lubecka describes it as

> the self-consciousness in all aspects of being and action, i.e. the knowledge of one's corporeality, spirituality and emotionality [...] (Lubecka, 2005: 30).

It involves both features which are shared by all members of one group, community or culture and features distinguishing them from others (Lubecka, 2005: 30). Identity incorporates the individual and the social.

From the very beginning of the study of the self, scholars have discussed the multiplicity of the human self and provided various descriptions of its components. James (1890: 294) maintained that a person "has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognise him" (see also Mead, 1934; Harter, 1997). These selves are organized into a *complete unitary self* whose components correspond to different aspects of the social process the individual is involved in (Mead, 1934). A person's self-concept is typically represented as a set of self-aspects (*multiple selves*) (Showers and Zeigler-Hill, 2003; Fitzgerald, 1993). Thus, in the unity of the self there is multiplicity of identities. The basis for the multiple self-concept varies from individual to individual; it usually includes distinct roles, contexts, relationships, activities, traits, and states (Showers and Zeigler-Hill, 2003).

Various scholars have divided the self into different component elements. According to James (1890), the self (he calls it *empirical self*) consists of three parts: the material self, spiritual self and social self. The *material self* refers to tangible objects, people, and places, talking about which one can use one of the possessive pronouns, *my* or *mine*. It includes the bodily self (e.g., *my head*, *my hand*) and the extracorporeal self (e.g., *my computer*, *my son*, *my book*). The

spiritual self "refers to our perceived inner psychological qualities" (Brown, 1998: 25; cf. Denzin's *phenomenological self*). It includes everything we refer to as *my* or *mine*, but which is not a tangible object, a person, or a place. These are our emotions, interests, abilities, motives and desires. The third self-component is the *social self*, the creation of which involves the participation of other people. Baldwin (1897), whose interests focused mainly on social aspects of the self, claims that the social self consists of ego and alter. *Ego* refers to your own view of yourself, while *alter* to your thoughts about other people. Ego elements include an individual's social roles, interests, affiliations, and interpersonal relations. Alter elements include all the persons an individual has some thoughts of, e.g., intimates, friends, acquaintances, and public figures.

Denzin (1992), who also analyses the concept of self from the symbolic interactionist standpoint, adds to James' three self components a couple of others. The *linguistic self* refers to the person filling in the empty personal pronoun (*I*, *me*) with personal, biographical, and emotional meanings. The *ideological self* involves the broader cultural and historical meanings surrounding the definition of the individual in a particular group or social situation (e.g., tourist, husband). The *self as desire* refers to "that mode of self experience which desires its own fulfilment through the flesh, sexuality, and the bodily presence of the other" (Denzin, 1992: 26).

Although the human self is a complex of natural, species-given structures and processes, it is also a cultural construct. The natural ("true," "real," or "private") self exists beneath a sometimes dazzling, but always thin, cultural overlay (Holland, 1997: 162; Ashmore and Jussim, 1997; Barker, 2005). We are similar by nature, but we differ a lot in the ways we behave. This way of thinking is shared by many theorists of self. For Turner *et al.* (1987), everyone uses three basic self-categorizations to define themselves: human identity, social identity and personal identity. *Human identity* is that part of an individual's self-concept which involves the features shared by all human beings. *Social identity* "refers to how we are regarded and recognized by others" (Brown, 1998: 24; cf. Denzin's (1992) *interactional self* presented and displayed to another in a sequence of action). It is a socially constructed and socially meaningful category which is accepted by an individual as descriptive of himself. It provides answers to the question "Who am I?" (Thoits and Virshup, 1997). It is this part of an "individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1981: 255; 1978; 1972). Our social identities may be based on our membership in various categories (e.g., nationality, ethnicity, gender, age, social class), the roles we play (e.g., mother, husband, teacher), our membership in different organizations (e.g., political parties, professional societies), our vocations (e.g., scholar, tailor, artist), or our membership in "stigmatized groups"

(e.g., the homeless, people with AIDS) (Gudykunst, 2004: 77). We can simultaneously be members of many groups or communities, and as such have many different identities which form the self.

Personal identity is the part of the self-concept that defines the individual as unique. Goffman (1986: 57) describes personal identity as

> the positive marks or identity pegs, and the unique combination of life history items that comes to be attached to the individual with the help of these pegs for his identity. Personal identity, then, has to do with the assumption that the individual can be differentiated from all others and that around this means of differentiation a single continuous record of social facts can be attached, entangled, like candy floss, becoming then the sticky substance to which still other biographical facts can be attached.

So what distinguishes an individual from others can be (Goffman, 1986: 56; Harter, 1997):

- a "positive mark" or "identity peg," e.g., "the photographic image of the individual in others' minds, or the knowledge of his special place in a particular kinship network,"
- "name-bound" — information about his life history (Giddens, 1991),
- "body-bound," or more specifically face-bound — information concerning his pattern of behaviour.

The personal identity is a self-description referring to unique details of biography and idiosyncratic experiences. It is a construct deeply embedded in interpersonal relationships in which the impact of significant others is of crucial importance (Harter, 1997). Thus, both the individual and the social have a strong impact on its creation.

Brewer and Gardner (1996) see an individual not only as a participant in social interaction in which he comes into contact with other people, but also as a member of various collectivities which can influence him as a person. That is why they distinguish between three aspects of the self: the *individual self* (cf. personal identity as described above), which can be defined by personal traits that differentiate a self from others, the *relational self* (cf. social self/identity and interactional self as described above), defined by dyadic relationships assimilating the self to significant others, and the *collective self* (cf. social self/identity as described above), defined by group membership that differentiates "us" from "them" (Hogg, 2003; see also Tajfel and Turner, 1979). All these forms of self-conceptualization are socially constructed and grounded and are culturally variable (Harter, 1997; Hogg, 2003; Barker, 2005). They depend on cultural and social circumstances (see Section 4.3.3.). All self components are "enacted" during social interaction and become part of a person's biography.

The self-concept may also be described in terms of the truth-falsity of its components. Among the multiplicity of selves an individual may have true and false ones. The true self is what constitutes "the real me." True self-behaviour consists in "saying what you really think," "expressing your own opinion." This is not always what individuals would like to show to others. The false self, on the other hand, is created when an individual tries to live up to the standards and expectations of significant others. False self-behaviour, then, includes "not stating your true opinion" and "saying what you think others want to hear" (Harter, 1997: 85). The main reasons for not expressing one's true self are:

- the belief that it will not be accepted by significant others,
- an attempt to be approved of,
- an attempt to avoid rejection,
- an attempt to maintain a good social relationship with others.

So hiding the true self and creating a false one is usually done for pragmatic reasons. Certainly, acting differently in different contexts does not have to constitute false self-behaviour (Harter, 1997). We behave in different ways in different situations in which we "put on" different social identities. This multiplicity in unity is a characteristic feature of every individual self-concept.

3.4. Self-presentation

Self-presentation can be defined as:

> The conscious or unconscious control of the impression that one creates in social interactions or situations. It is one of the important forms of impression management, namely management of one's own impression on others through role playing (Colman, 2009: 682).

The concept of self-presentation often has negative connotations of superficiality, pretence, deceit, and immoral manipulativeness (Schlenker and Pontari, 2000), yet it has been a popular topic in many scholarly disciplines, including social psychology, sociology, counselling, developmental psychology, and organizational behaviour. The scientific study of self-presentation started with the works of early psychologists and sociologists (James, 1890; Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934); they stated that people see themselves as they think others see them. So the self is built on reflected appraisals. It is produced in social interaction and reflects other people's opinions about the individual. According to Cooley, who introduced the concept of a "looking-glass" self (a *reflected self*),

a person observes how others see him, and afterwards incorporates their views into his self-concept (Tice and Wallace, 2003).

The self arises in the process of the social experience of the individual as a result of his relations with others. The full development of the self depends on the particular attitudes of other individuals toward the individual and the social attitudes of the generalized other or the social group to which he belongs (Mead, 1934). However, as mentioned above, our self-concepts are not constant. They undergo continual change, depending on the situation we are in and the different others we are interacting with. We see ourselves "in the 'looking glass' of others' appraisals and build or construct a self that is congruent with the appraisals of others" (Tice and Wallace, 2003: 92). Thus, significant others (e.g., parents, siblings, relatives, friends, teachers, bosses), or a "generalized other" have a great impact on the person's form of self (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934). Mead, who developed Cooley's idea of the looking-glass self, claims that generalized others, the whole social group and their views of the person, are extremely important for the formation of the person's self. The idea of the reflected self was later developed by Goffman (1959) in his book *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, in which, using theatrical metaphorization, he studied how people behave in front of others and "control the impression they form of him" (Goffman, 1959: xi) (see Section 5.2.1.).

Self-presentation is "aimed at establishing, maintaining, or refining an image of the individual in the minds of others" (Baumeister, 1982; cf. Goffman, 1959; Leary and Kowalski, 1990). In other words, it consists in using behaviour to communicate some information about oneself to others. It is one of the most important elements of communication, an underlying motive of many aspects of social behaviour (Goffman, 1959; Baumeister, 1982; Bangerter, 2000; Leary, 2005). Like other acts of communication it is conditioned by social values and interactional norms specific to a particular culture. As mentioned above, it is a type of *impression management*, which is "the goal-oriented activity of controlling information in order to influence the impressions formed by an audience" (Schlenker, 2003: 492). Self-presentation is a more specific term referring to the control of information about the self (Schlenker and Pontari, 2000).

Self-presentation is a complex activity that is shaped by "a combination of personality, situational, and audience factors" such as:
- an expression of self,
- a role-played response to situational pressures,
- conformity to the identity expectations of salient others (Schlenker, 2003: 498; Brown, 1998),
- conformity to culture-specific norms of self-presentation (Kuryło and Urban, 1997).

So, to present oneself in an effective and positive way, it is not enough to communicate some information about oneself to others and present them with a somewhat glorified picture of the self irrespective of context. Schlenker (1975) stresses the importance of managing the impression of consistency between the individuals' self-perceptions, their behaviours and the reactions of others to these behaviours in situations in which reality interferes with self-enhancement (e.g., when public events could invalidate an unrealistically positive self-presentation). The presented image of self must be consistent with the role an individual plays in a particular situation and with the expectations, both socially and culturally conditioned, of other participants.

Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934) stress the interplay between the private and the public self. A "true," "real" or "private" self is constructed through one's choices and performances. Creating the self is a matter of self-presentation only insofar as it is concerned with establishing and maintaining one's public self, that is, the image of one in the minds of others (Baumeister, 1982). Usually, it is a slightly polished and glorified picture of the self which is believed by the individual to be true, but sometimes self-presentation may be a little manipulative and result from deceptive activity designed to exploit others (Schlenker, 2003). Thus, self-presentation can involve deceptions about oneself as well as genuine images of oneself (i.e. what one thinks one really is). Leary (2005), however, claims that usually the image presented by us is relatively true.

The two main self-presentational motives are to please others and to construct (create, maintain, and modify) one's public self congruent with one's ideal (Baumeister, 1982). Behind these motives there is one fundamental motive of "constructing a desired identity" resulting from the two desires for having positive, socially desirable qualities, and for the approval of others (Schlenker, 2003). In reality, however, self-presentation is often guided by other, more pragmatic, motives.

When self-presentation is treated as a goal-oriented activity, it can be viewed as a transaction rather than a mere expression of self. Then what is at issue is not the individual but his relationship with other people (the audience) (Schlenker, 2003). The results of this presentation are beneficial images which are expected to facilitate the individual's goals. Such images, although preferably positive and socially desirable, in practice sometimes are socially undesirable or even negative if their being such may facilitate the individual's goals (Schlenker, 2003).

The extent to which people resort to self-presentation depends on the social context, i.e. on the important others with whom they interact, and the relationship between them and a generally understood situation. The careful presentation of self is especially relevant:

● to important, evaluative situations that prompt people to behave pretentiously, such as a job interview,

- to formal situations that cue well-established social roles and interaction rituals, such as a wedding,
- to situations in which the actor feels himself to be the centre of an audience's attention and may experience shyness or stage fright, such as giving a speech (Schlenker and Pontari, 2000: 201).

In other conditions, focusing less consciously on the type of impressions they are making on others, people mostly express their genuine qualities. However, there are people who by virtue of their personality characteristics, such as high self-monitoring or public self-consciousness, are more likely to self-present almost all the time (Schlenker and Pontari, 2000). Some self-images resulting from conscious presentation are more desirable than others, as they are associated with beneficial consequences for the person, such as approval, respect, or material rewards; they are called *desirable identity images* (Schlenker and Pontari, 2000: 204). In other words, desirable identity images refer to what a person "would *like to be* and thinks he or she *really can be*" (Leary and Kowalski, 1990: 40).

Self-presentation, especially the kind that is goal-oriented, is "sensitive business" (Holtgraves, 1990: 197) and can create a threat to the individual's positive self-image (face). In fact, as Goffman (1955: 226) claims, "there is no occasion of talk so trivial as not to require each participant to show serious concern with the way in which he handles himself and the others present." The end-result of the self-presentation activity is a self-image − face, a complex of positive attributes the individual wants to be associated with and characterized by. These attributes vary with respect to the interpersonal relations the individual has with others, the social situations in which he interacts with them, and the culture he belongs to.

3.5. The self and the body

For centuries philosophers have pondered the nature of the relation of body and self, or body and soul, or body and mind. The body as understood here is not just skin and bones, but is "loaded with cultural symbolism, public and private, positive and negative, political and economic, sexual, moral and often controversial" (Synnott, 1993: 1). The self, on the other hand, is our internal structure, and consists of experiences specific for an individual person. Since times immemorial, people have looked for the place in which the self is located. And some have claimed to have found it. Descartes (1649/1989) maintained that the soul is in the pineal gland, a small organ in the centre of the brain in

which he believed all our thoughts are formed. Some have searched for the "true" self. Sigmund Freud looked for it "in the darkest regions of our heart." Many philosophers and thinkers have pondered over the locus of the "true" self, thinking it to reside somewhere inside the body or the mind (Fontana and Tillett, 1993).

There have been different opinions and theories concerning the relation of body and self/soul/mind. Some have insisted on the dualism of body and self/soul/mind, others have maintained that a person is his body.

3.5.1. Body–soul dualism

Body–soul dualism had already become a subject of philosophical investigation in ancient times. Aristotle, in *De Anima* (1968), writes:

> It is not necessary to ask whether soul and body are one, just as it is not necessary to ask whether the wax and its shape are one, nor generally whether the matter of each thing and that of which it is the matter are one. For even if one and being are spoken of in several ways, what is properly so spoken of is the actuality (1968: ii 1, 412b 6–9).

The two, body and soul, are closely related: one cannot act without the other, but it is the soul that is responsible for the actual organization of the body; it is the form of the body. No activities specific to the soul, e.g., imagination or passions, can occur without the assistance of the body. Thinking seems to Aristotle to be an exception – the only human activity which exclusively belongs to the soul and does not need any relation to the body. Aristotle also claims that:

> [...] they all join the soul to a body, or place it in a body, without adding any specification of the reason of their union, or of the bodily conditions required for it. Yet such explanations can scarcely be omitted; for some community of nature is presupposed by the fact that the one acts and the other is acted upon, the one moves and the other is moved; interaction always implies a *special* nature in the two interagents. All, however, that these thinkers do is to describe the specific characteristics of the soul; they do not try to determine anything about the body which is to contain it, as if it were possible, as in the Pythagorean myths, that any soul could be clothed upon with any body – an absurd view, for each body seems to have a form and shape of its own. It is as absurd as to say that the art of carpentry could be embodied in flutes; each art must use its tools; each soul its body (Aristotle, 1968: 407b 14–25).

For Aristotle, each particular soul is connected to a particular body. Each body has a specific form of its own, and is unique. He argues that "a human soul is actualized "in a matter of its own appropriate to it." For Aristotle, "matter refers to the *particular* organic totality which is besouled" (Spicker, 1970: 7).

"I think, therefore I am" – this is the main principle of Cartesianism. In his *Discourse on the Method* (1637/1985), René Descartes claims that the human soul is completely distinct from the body. They are two completely distinct substances which separate at death. Descartes maintains that:

> I was a substance whose whole essence or nature was only to think, and which, to exist, has no need of space nor of any material thing. Thus it follows that this ego, this soul, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body and is easier to know than the latter, and that even if the body were not, the soul would not cease to be all that it now is (Descartes, 1985: 21).

The body is like a machine (Descartes, 1989). Animals are machines but people are more than that, because in addition to the machine-like body they have a soul. And what makes human beings different from animals is the ability to conduct conversations and to reason. For Descartes, the body is the "not-I," and "the 'I' in the total absence of any relation or activity of the body has no power of imagery or sense" (Spicker, 1970: 13). The "I" is a completely spiritualized concept. It is neither the self nor the person. By the self Descartes (1950) understands the composite whole of the mind and the body. Descartes (1950: VI, 94) agrees with Aristotle when he writes that:

> Nature likewise teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel but that I am besides so intimately conjoined, and as it were intermixed with it that my mind and body compose a certain unity. For if this were not the case, I should not feel pain when my body is hurt, seeing I am merely a thinking thing, but should perceive the wound by the understanding alone, just as a pilot perceives by sight when any part of his vessel is damaged.

The coexistence of the mind and the body fascinated also Thomas Hobbes, he saw them as distinct from each other. In his famous work *Leviathan* (1651/1973: 53–54), he writes:

> this 'I', that is to say, the mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body [...] I considered myself, firstly, as having a face, hands, arms, and the whole machine made up of flesh and bones, such as it appears in a corpse and which I designated by the name of body.

3.5.2. The body and the soul/self in modern philosophy

The dualistic concept of soul and body prominent in Cartesian philosophy was finally rejected. The majority of modern thinkers claim that (Spicker, 1970: 17–18; Synnott, 1993):

- a person is not a nonphysical or nonbodily entity;
- the distinction between a person and his body is not perfectly legitimate;
- it is not merely a contingent fact that a person has *that* body which he calls *his*;
- a person *necessarily* has *that* particular body which he calls his;
- this body which is mine could not (logically) have been the body of someone else;
- this body which is mine cannot (logically) someday be the body of someone else;
- no two persons can (logically) be said to exchange or switch bodies;
- the identity of the body is not logically independent of the identity of the person whose body it is;
- although it is correct to say that a person *has* a body, it is more precise to say that a person *is* his body.

Thus, it is no longer valid to talk about body–soul dualism. A person is his body. "Body is also, and primarily, the self" (Synnott, 1993: 1). And as a consequence, the identity of the body depends on the identity of the person whose body it is (This is, certainly two-way dependency, for the person's identity also depends on the identity of his body).

John Dewey (1859–1952) maintains that:

> The soul is immanent in the body just so far as it has made the body its organic instrument. The common saying that the "body is the organ of the soul" is literally much truer and more significant that is usually thought or meant. [...] Organ presupposes function, and soul and body are related indeed as function and organ, activity and instrument. [...] The body is the organ of the soul because by the body the soul expresses and realizes its own nature. It is the outward form and living manifestation of the soul (1886/1970: 117).

For Dewey, the relationship between the soul and the body consists in that the soul being transcendent, it expresses and manifests its nature in the body. In other words, the body is a reflection of the soul, while the soul is an acting force which is constantly forming the body.

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) analyses the relationship between the body and consciousness; the body "from the start posited as a certain *thing* having its

own laws and capable of being defined from outside" and consciousness, which can be "reached by the type of inner intuition which is peculiar to it" and which can be grasped "by a series of reflective acts" (Sartre, 1970: 218). The body is the instrument and the end of our actions. Sartre claims that it is impossible to distinguish "sensation" from "action," as "this is what we had in mind when we made the observation that reality is presented to us neither as a *thing* nor as an *instrument* but as an instrumental-thing" (1970: 226). The body is not a "contingent addition to the soul; on the contrary it is a permanent condition of possibility for my consciousness as consciousness *of* the world and as a transcendent project toward my future" (1970: 235). Finally, Sartre states that:

> The body is the instrument which I am. It is my facticity of being "in-the-midst-of-the-world" in so far as I surpass this facticity toward my being-in the-world (Sartre, 1970: 239).

According to Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908−1961), who was among those to reject dualist theories of body and soul, "The body is no more than an element in the system of the subject and his world" (1970: 249). He claims that a man is literally what others think of him and what his world is. Moving his body, he is aware neither of the actual stimulus nor of its reaction, he is his body.

The self is embodied and constantly "'on display' to others in terms of its embodiment" (Giddens, 1991: 58; Goffman, 1967). Both the self and the body are social constructs, shaped in different ways by members of different groups and cultures. The body, its parts and attributes are undoubtedly social, and determine our lives. They have a strong impact on the creation of our social and personal identities.

3.5.3. The body − the symbol of the self

The body determines who we are, and at the same time is the symbol of the self (cf. Synnott, 1993; Magli, 1989; Łotocka, 2000). It is "highly polarized in moral terms: male/female, old/young, beautiful/ugly, fat/thin, black/white/ red/yellow, and so on, with valences depending upon personal and cultural values" (Synnott, 1993: 3). Our identities depend largely on these attributes of the body. The identity expectations of salient others together with a stereotypical perception of these bodily attributes determine our life and as a consequence our identities. To a great extent we are perceived and evaluated in terms of the way we look and manage our bodies. The attributes of the body contribute to

the overall image of the person, and have a strong impact on the person's self-image.

Although the body is a social category, not all its parts are equally social, as the body is also internally polarized; there are public parts (e.g., the face) and private parts (e.g., the genitals). This coincides with the traditional Western dichotomies of front/back, high/low and good/bad (Synnott, 1993; see also Section 1.1). These dichotomies are visible in the metaphors by means of which we function in our everyday life:

UP IS GOOD and DOWN IS BAD

FRONT IS GOOD and BACK IS BAD

THE PUBLIC IS ON DISPLAY and THE PRIVATE IS HIDDEN

WHAT IS ON DISPLAY IS GOOD and WHAT IS HIDDEN IS BAD

The majority of the human body is hidden from the public, as something shameful and embarrassing. These parts of the body are called private or intimate, and their exposure is considered to be something morally wrong and socially unacceptable. The back of the body is treated differently from its front part. The only part of the body which is "naked," constantly on display to the public, is the face. It is in the upper, front part of the body, and as such deserves respect. Thus, something low and therefore bad, like the genitals, is hidden from public view, while something high and therefore good, like the face, is constantly subject to public evaluation.

There are several aspects of the body which are especially relevant to the self and self-identity (Giddens, 1991). These are appearance (features of the surface of the body, the face included), demeanour (determining how appearance is used by the individual in everyday activities; Goffman, 1967), sensuality (the handling of pleasure and pain), and regimes ("modes of providing food and other basic organic necessities" (Giddens, 1991: 61), or "learned practices that entail tight control over organic needs" (1991: 62), to which bodies are subject). All of them help create an image of the person in the eyes of others. Bodily discipline, and especially routine control of the body, is essential for the self, both for its management and presentation. It is the necessary condition for an individual to be accepted by others as a competent member of society (Giddens, 1991). By controlling particular aspects of the body and the way it functions, the individual complies with social norms.

The face plays a special role in the creation of self-identity and in self-presentation. It has to be under constant control, as it is traditionally treated as a mirror of the soul and a part of the body which expresses the person's emotions (see Sections 2.4. and 2.5.). Socially speaking, it is the most important

part of the body. The information provided by a person's face can be divided into:

- information which is given independently of the person's will, concerning his identification and social identities,
- information whose giving can be controlled to some extent by the person, concerning his feelings and attitudes.

People can try, however, to control or even to block both types of information. To hide their identity, they can put on masks. To change their social identities, they can put on make-up (a kind of mask as well), which will make them look younger or older, beautiful or ugly, or which will hide their gender. To control the expression of their true feelings or to hide their true attitudes towards others, people also put on masks, but unlike the real masks, these ones are metaphorical; they change the face into an expressionless mask.

Whatever could be said about the relationship between the self and the body (the face included), one thing will be always true: in the unity which they form — the person — there is a two-way dependency: the self (the inner) has to some extent power and control over the body (the outer); and the body determines to some extent the self.

Chapter 4

Face as a folk concept

4.1. Introduction

In most recent research on politeness and face, authors distinguish between *first-order face* and *second-order face*. The distinction is made by analogy to the distinction between first-order and second-order politeness made by Watts *et al*. (1992; Eelen, 2001). First-order face (face1), as Haugh (2009: 5) notes, is conceptualized in two different ways:

- the commonsense concept of face, a folk or emic notion (Haugh and Hinze, 2003; Ruhi and Işik-Güler, 2007; Terkourafi, 2007),
- the notion of face from the participant's perspective, as opposed to the analyst's perspective.

In the present study, I take the first, *emic*, perspective. Second-order face (face2) is an academic concept. By analogy to the definition of politeness2 by Watts *et al*. (1992: 4), one can characterize face2 as "a more technical notion which can only have a value within an overall theory of social interaction."

In this chapter, face1, a folk notion, is subjected to analysis. First, it is presented together with some related concepts, such as morality, dignity and honour. Second, the emic concepts of face are investigated in a broad sociocultural context, understood in terms of values, norms and beliefs.

Although face is considered a universal concept, its meaning and social role differ across cultures. In other words, there are culture-specific conceptualizations of face which function "as a kind of shared cultural construct that constrains social behaviour" (Haugh, 2009: 4). Such an understanding of face makes culture an indispensable factor in helping to explain social behaviour. That is why, before particular folk notions of face are analysed, I would like to concentrate on culture and, in particular,

dimensions of cultural variability, which may explain differences in face-related behaviour.

Next, three culture-specific conceptualizations of face are presented: Chinese, American and Polish. The reasons for a discussion of Chinese face are different from those in the case of American and Polish face. First, in Chinese culture, face has a special role to play in social interaction, as it is "a measure of the recognition accorded by society" (Chang and Holt, 1994: 99). Second, it was Chinese face that was first introduced into academic discourse (Hu, 1944), eleven years later to be borrowed into sociology by Goffman (1955). Third, the origins of the concept of face have recently been traced to Chinese culture (e.g., Mao, 1994; Ho, 1976). The two chapters to follow are devoted to an analysis of the American and Polish concepts of face, presented in a broad sociocultural context. These two independent analyses, apart from forming a general picture of the two respective concepts, also aim to stress differences and similarities between the two cultures in the character of interpersonal relations, facial expressions and face-related behaviour.

4.2. Face, morality and related social concepts

The social concept of face is related to certain social values. Through face an individual expresses his self. When he participates in social encounters, he has to follow some moral rules, which "determine the evaluation he will make of himself and of his fellow-participants in the encounter, the distribution of his feelings, and the kinds of practices he will employ to maintain a [...] ritual equilibrium" (Goffman, 1967: 45). Face is associated with pride, honour, dignity, tact, respect and esteem. All these values, like face, are indispensable if the individual wants to be a member of a community and successfully participate in social interatcion. Face, however, involves more than the values enumerated above. Ho (1976: 868; see also Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001) argues that

> one finds in literature that face has been variously confounded with an assortment of sociological as well as non-sociological concepts, such as status, prestige, dignity, honor and the like. [...] If one substitutes other terms, such as 'prestige,' for 'face,' however, one is invariably left with a dissatisfaction that some essential component of 'face' has been left out.

So these concepts, although related to face and functioning as components of the meaning of face, are not sufficient to explain the concept as a whole.

4.2.1. Face and morality

Morality is what makes an individual human. It "is about human well-being. All our moral ideals, such as justice, fairness, compassion, virtue, tolerance, freedom, and rights, stem from our fundamental human concern with what is best for us and how we ought to live" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 290). We should behave in a right and honest way, always having in mind the enhancing of well-being, but especially the well-being of others. This is in line with what two fathers of ethics asserted centuries ago. According to Socrates, virtues produce benefits and happiness. Only what is virtuous is really beneficial. People often go astray because they do not know what is good. Thus, virtue is the knowledge that we have to acquire to be able to make the right choice, and as a consequence to become happy (Tatarkiewicz, Vol. 1, 1978). In a similar vein Aristotle argues that virtues which people develop lead them to act morally. In *The Nicomachean Ethics* (1911), he starts with what all people think to be the aim of life, *eudaimonia* ("happiness," "well-being"). He maintains that in seeking happiness people acquire habits which help them to choose what is right. These habits are formed at home with the family, which provides them with the necessary nurturance. This nurturance turns them into fully-fledged human beings, well-balanced and aware of what is morally right.

For Kant, to act morally means to act out of duty. Good feelings and inclinations cannot be the motive for moral action, as they are not subject to the will. Kant's ethics is universalistic: there is nothing personal in duty, which can be the only motive for moral action. The point of duty is to adhere to the moral principle. This is the *categorical imperative*, which says: "Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will to become a universal law" (Kant, 1785/1964: 30). So it does not tell us which principle we should adopt, but that we should adopt the principle which could be adopted by everyone (Flew, 1979; Tatarkiewicz, Vol. 2, 1978).

According to David Hume (1711−1776), who represents a social orientation in ethics, moral choices are mainly motivated by sentiments. In Book 3 of his *Treatise of Human Nature*, "Of Morals," he argues that moral sentiments are not simple and primal, because they are the result of associating. They are not egoistic, either. The primal sentiment is benevolence or sympathy, which Hume treats as a natural, biological phenomenon. We morally evaluate our own actions in terms of benevolence or sympathy for others (1740/1969; Tatarkiewicz, Vol. 2, 1978). John Stuart Mill (1806−1873) maintains that the ultimate goal of every individual is the promotion of the agent's own happiness, hedonistically understood as consisting in pleasure (Tatarkiewicz, Vol. 3, 1978). In Chapter II of *Utilitarianism*, Mill explains how "the creed which accepts as the foundations of morals 'utility' or the 'greatest happiness principle' holds that

actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure" (Mill, 1861/1965–1991: II 2).

Over the centuries, philosophers have presented different views of morality, and they have found different motivations for moral action. But what their theories have in common is the treatment of morality as a code of conduct. For Kant and Mill, morality is a code that all rational individuals would put forward for governing the behaviour of all moral agents, and it has a fairly definite content. Kant regards morality as applying to behaviour that affects no one but the agent; however, he admits that it is also commonly related to behaviour that affects other people. Mill, and most other philosophers writing in English, restrict the concept of morality to behaviour that, directly or indirectly, affects others (Gert, 2005). Morality as a code of conduct exists in every society and every community. By adhering to it in social interaction an individual becomes part of his group.

According to Mead, morality is constituted

> where the person has in his own conduct the universals that govern the whole community. The community thus becomes moral, as it can recognize itself in one of its citizens. This is characteristic of human society; the behavior of the group as a whole enters into the separate individual (Mead; cited by Miller, 1982: 168).

In this way moral issues are pervasive in social life. Every social activity has a moral sense, and all moral choices are socially conditioned. Thus, morality has a definitely social character. An individual can behave in a moral way only in relation to others. Charles Taylor, in *Sources of the Self* (1989: 15), argues that morality involves three dimensions:

> [...] our sense of respect for and obligations to others [...], our understanding of what makes a full life [and] the range of notions concerned with dignity.

Whenever we come into contact with other people, we are expected to do our best to treat them with due care and respect, and do whatever is consistent with their face; we are expected to take care of their social well-being. Certainly, we think also about our own well-being and face. The moral character of social interaction is stressed by Jürgen Habermas. He maintains that "interaction is the dialectic of the moral life; claims of right and wrong are implicit in all modes of communication" (Habermas, 1975: 37). Similarly, Garfinkel (1967: 50) claims that "daily life is a morality." Morality understood in this way constitutes "an externally functioning set of values, norms and patterns of behaviour and an internal element of the individual consciousness" (Mariański,

2006: 8). Its most important element is a set of moral values that determine what is perceived as good or bad in the society. Understood in this way, these values are variable and reflect the collective consciousness. They are actualized in social norms, which describe how to behave properly (Mariański, 2006). Moral order involves routine everyday activities, and participants of social life see it in ordinary types of action and images of everyday life.

Participation in social interaction affects individuals. Goffman (1967: 45) maintains that the person becomes "a kind of construct, built up [...] from moral rules that are impressed upon him from without." These rules turn him into "an interactant." He is taught "to be perceptive, to have feelings attached to self and a self expressed through face, to have pride, honor, and dignity, to have considerateness, to have tact and a certain amount of poise" (Goffman, 1967: 44; Mariański, 2006), which together constitute "universal human nature." Morality as understood by Goffman thus strongly resembles Emile Durkheim's morality, which depends on the group the person belongs to and on the hierarchy existing in it. To be able to co-exist and interact with other members of the group/society, the person has to comply with the moral rules existing in it.

The general capacity to be bound by moral rules, as Goffman says (1967), belongs to the individual, but the rules which transform him into a human being derive from "requirements established in the ritual organization of social encounters" (1967: 45). This set of moral rules presents every individual participating in the social encounter "in an idealized light, a light which in turn celebrates wider social values." The participants enter into a temporary agreement to undertake the joint task of this idealization and celebration. Each of them has a role to play in the performance of the ritual order (Strong, 1988: 234). Thus, adherence to moral rules seems to be the only rational course of action. It helps the participants to "idealize" the image of self (face) they try to maintain during the social encounter. If they behave in the right way they are rewarded by their inner sense of self-esteem and self-respect, and they are granted acceptance, approval and respect by other participants. If they behave as though they did not know the difference between right and wrong they are punished by internal guilt, shame, lack of self-respect and lack of acceptance by other participants.

As social interaction and communication always involve the other or others, any decision we take, any choice we make, has an impact on them. This can also influence face, which, according to Goffman (1967), is "a condition of interaction." To be able to interact with others successfully, or at all, the individual has to maintain his own face and the face of the other. To do so, he has to engage in highly moral activities, which are "moral" in the sense that they are motivated both by the sense of duty to oneself as well as to the other (cf. Kitowska-Łysiak, 2000). One's moral decisions play an important role in the process of self-construction. The ultimate goal of the individual's choice-making

and social activities is successful face-management, i.e. presenting oneself in the best possible light and making it possible for the other to do the same. Morality is an indispensable element of the constant redefinition of individuals' face and the interaction in which they participate with others. Thus there is a close relationship between face, morality and social interaction (see Fig. 5).

MORAL ACTIONS → MUTUAL FACE MAINTENANCE → SOCIAL INTERACTION

Fig. 5. One-Way Dependency in Social Encounters

Concluding what has been discussed above, one can assume the following order of dependencies. Face, or to be precise the maintenance of face of all the participants, is a condition of interaction. Mutual face maintenance, which is a common enterprise of all the participants, makes possible for them successful interaction, or any interaction. Face maintenance is only possible when another condition is fulfilled, when the participants engage in action which results from adhering to a moral code of conduct, for example, when they express considerateness, behave in a tactful way and treat the other with due respect.

4.2.2. Face and pride, dignity, tact, respect and (self-)esteem

> To understand the concept of face [...], we have to understand the moral conditioning or moral drives (e.g., shame, guilt) of the self (Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001: 36).

Pride and *shame* are two emotions which may indicate the salience of face to a particular situation (Cocroft and Ting-Toomey, 1994). These are two primary emotions which can be treated as "a sign of the state of one's social bond with others" (Scheff, 1990; see also Section 2.10.3.). Pride and shame are related to both self-face and other-face, because, as Scheff maintains, they communicate the state of one's attitude both to the self and to the other. Shame is invariably related to situations in which face is threatened or lost: "One becomes painfully embarrassed and flustered when one 'loses face' in public" (Scheff, 1990: 170). Every human being feels the need for approval and inclusion, the need for pride and the need to prevent shame. Face is the locus of all these needs, and face-negotiation is one way to secure social bonds and satisfy these needs (Cocroft and Ting-Toomey, 1994). Even though pride, like face, exists in most cultures, it gets different interpretations. In individualistic cultures (see Section 4.3.2.), it is positively evaluated and associated with the positive feeling of self-satisfaction and success. In collectivistic cultures, it is negatively evaluated

and treated "as a sign of arrogance and as failure to acknowledge the contributions of others" (Cross and Gore, 2003: 550). This can be explained by the great importance attached by members of collectivistic cultures to modesty, which is in opposition to pride.

Another value which is said to be related to the notion of face is *dignity*. It is an idea which organizes a certain type of evaluative thinking. But it is not so much an element of the collection of moral values as a superordinate idea for morality which determines the range of the community (Środa, 1993). Dignity is indispensable for an individual to feel well with himself as well as with others. So, as in the case of face, mutual dignity maintenance and the avoidance of affronts to other people's dignity as well as dignified behaviour are a condition of interaction. Lebra (1976), who discusses dignity and disgrace, asserts that a balance between them is necessary for face maintenance. This balance can be achieved by employing certain supportive mechanisms, e.g., tact.

Tact is commonly understood as consideration in dealing with others. According to Goffman, it is employed by participants of social interaction as a means of maintaining trust between them. He claims (1967: 30) that:

> Tact in regard to face-work often relies for its operation on a tacit agreement to do business through the language of hint — the language of innuendo, ambiguities, well-placed pauses, carefully worded jokes, and so on. The rule regarding this unofficial kind of communication is that the sender ought not to act as if he had officially conveyed the message he has hinted at, while the recipients have the right and obligation to act as if they had not officially received the message contained in the hint.

Tactful behaviour is an indispensable element of face-oriented activity (*facework*, see Section 5.2.7.). It has many functions. Employing tact helps to sustain mutual confidence and respect (Giddens, 1988) as well as to avoid conflict situations (Leech, 1977). Such situations are always potentially threatening to participants' face, so self- and other-awareness and intuition are indispensable in order for the interaction to be successful.

To live up to their face, people behave with dignity and in a tactful way, and show *respect* for others. Respect is identified with high opinion and *esteem* for a person. Manifesting respect for others we show admiration and consideration for them. Respectful behaviour is very important for face maintenance. Face operates along the continuum of respect and contempt (Penman, 1990). Showing respect we give face to others; treating them with contempt we threaten their face. To maintain good social relations with others, and thus avoid conflict in social interaction, we are oriented at the respect end.

Self-esteem, or "an attitude toward or an evaluation of oneself" (Cross and Gore, 2003: 549), is not less relevant for the success of social interaction than

the display of our positive evaluation of others. The way we perceive ourselves
has a great impact on the picture of ourselves we create in the eyes of others.
Therefore self-esteem, which is an important element of one's self-conception, is
identified with face by many scholars (e.g., Hirshon, 2001; Spencer-Oatey 2000,
2003; Ruhi and Doğan, 2001). Like face, self-esteem depends on standards set
up by cultural norms and culture-specific models of self. As such it differs
across cultures.

     Morisaki and Gudykunst (1994: 69) maintain that an individual's self-esteem
"is a combination of both personal and collective self-esteem."

> On the one hand, self-esteem is based on fitting in, being accepted, pleasing
> others, and gaining approval for meeting the expectations of others. On the
> other hand, self-esteem is based upon realizing one's unique potentialities;
> being an individual in one's own right; and having others recognize, respect,
> affirm, support, and encourage one's personal talents and individual
> uniqueness. [...] A balance must be achieved between fitting in and being an
> individual in one's own right (Josephs, 1991: 8–9).

The balance between the two types of self-esteem, however, differs across
cultures; personal self-esteem prevails in individualistic cultures, while collective
self-esteem prevails in collectivistic cultures. In cultures in which the
independent model of self (see Section 4.3.3.) prevails, an individual has high
self-esteem when he succeeds in being independent, autonomous and unique,
when he can say, "I am special and different from others" (Cross and Gore,
2003: 549). In cultures in which the interdependent model of self prevails, an
individual has a good attitude towards himself and evaluates himself highly
when he behaves according to the social and moral standards operating in his
culture, and he is in a good relationship and harmony with other people. In
other words, he has high self-esteem when he can say, "I am similar to and in
harmony with others" (Cross and Gore, 2003: 549).

4.2.3. Face and honour

Apart from pride, dignity, tact, respect and (self-)esteem, the concept of honour
is the one most often referred to in face-related discussions. *Honour* is the
concept most often identified with face.

> [...] notions of face naturally link up to some of the most fundamental cultural
> ideas about the nature of the social persona, honour and virtue, shame and
> redemption [...] (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 13).

The close connection between the two concepts becomes clear if one compares their dictionary definitions. Honour is defined as:

- (*honour*) high respect, esteem, or reverence, accorded to exalted worth or rank, deferential admiration or approbation, [or as] received, gained, held, or enjoyed: glory, renown, fame, credit, reputation, good name (OED),
- (*honor*) poczucie godności osobistej, dobre imię, cześć (feeling of personal dignity, good name, reverence); *plural* only: dostojeństwa, godności, odznaczenia (high position, rank, distinctions); *plural* only: oznaki czci, poważania, szacunku (indications of reverence, high regard, respect) (SJP).

Face in its social sense is defined as:

- (*face*) good name, reputation (OED),
- (*twarz*) szacunek (respect) (SJP),
- (*twarz*) dobre imię, szacunek ludzki (good name, human respect) (Kopaliński, 1987).

As can be seen above, the two concepts honour and face have a lot in common. Both concepts are defined in part as good name, reputation and respect (which can be gained by moral conduct). The words *honour* and *face* in English, and *honor* and *twarz* in Polish, are partial synonyms. For example, in Polish it is possible to say *stracić honor* (lose honour) or *uratować honor* (save honour) instead of saying *stracić* or *zachować/uratować twarz* (to lose or save face).

Renée Hirschon (2001) reaches similar conclusions when he analyses the character of social life and politeness in Greek culture. He claims that face and honour are cognate concepts. He discusses two interpretations of the concept of honour. The first refers to a person's reputation, prestige and esteem, the second to a person's intrinsic worth and moral integrity. In the first case it is an attribute which belongs to social life, while in the second case it is a moral attribute, "inherent in a person's notion of self" (Hirschon, 2001: 20). These are the same attributes and values constitutive of the notion of face.

Harald Weinrich, in the essay "Politeness, an affair of honor" (2005), tries to find some relation between honour and politeness. According to him, honour "expresses the high opinion held by *others* (to the extent that they themselves are possessed of honor) of the absolute value of the honorable man's personal worth," whereas politeness serves "to accommodate *others*, to be as pleasant as possible to them so as actually to please them" (Weinrich, 2005: 109). The code of honour is more rigid than the code of politeness, which consists of subtleties and nuances. Weinrich mentions a social strategy of avoidance employed to prevent insult and loss of honour. And this is "the special task of politeness," claims Weinrich, quoting Claude Chauchadis (1990). Thus, politeness involves avoidance (cf. Brown and Levinson's (1987) concept of negative politeness; see Section 5.3.1.1.). Weinrich claims that the

honour code is masculine and the politeness code is feminine. He explains this in the following way:

> At the center of the honor code is masculine honor, which must be defended with weapon in hand against every insult [...]. Women's honor, which differs in many respects from men's, depends in the last analysis upon it, since a woman who loses her virginity or a woman who violates the commandment of faithfulness in marriage brings more disgrace to the male members of her family than to herself [...]. To that extent, by the rules of this code, feminine honor is only a pendant to masculine honor. [...] The reverse is true with regard to gender and politeness, which in Europe [...] has taken a specifically feminine turn, in the form of courtesy. [...] At the center of this conduct stands the conversation, a gay and witty form of linguistic intercourse (2005: 111–112).

The division into men's and women's honour is also noted by Hirschon (2001), who maintains that there are different constituents of honour for men and women. Men's honour is connected with upholding the reputation of the family and protecting it from insult; men are expected to be brave and assertive. Women's honour is associated with shame, entailing modesty and chaste behaviour.

Honour is said to be located in the human body (Weinrich, 2005: 112):

> Everything that attacks honor touches the body, and in this sense "touches on honor," like a slap in the face but also an insulting word that makes the face redden with anger, and correspondingly all affairs of honor ultimately concern "body and soul."

The honour code depends on this fundamental corporeality. The norms of politeness also have corporeal elements as they require that polite people control their "creatureliness" (Weinrich, 2005: 112). The corporeality of face is even more evident, due to the bodily origin of the concept. Besides, it encompasses the two areas; to maintain face people are obliged to comply with both the honour code and the norms of politeness. Face is gender-neutral and is inclusive of both types of honour. Face concerns go far beyond the honour concerns mentioned above. Apart from men's and women's honour concerns, they include the need for dignity, respect and esteem, the need to be treated tactfully and the need for justified pride and self-esteem.

4.3. Defining culture

The concept of *culture* is central to studies of intercultural and cross-cultural communication. It helps researchers understand the nature of social interaction. There are many different definitions of the concept of culture, depending on the perspective taken on it.

For Lado (1957) the term culture is "synonymous with the 'ways of a people,'" a structured system of patterned behaviour. A similar definition is proposed by Gudykunst (2004: 41), who writes about "an implicit theory that guides our behavior." No one, however, knows all the aspects of his own culture, and each member of a culture sees it in his own individual way (Gudykunst, 2004). Culture is also conceived of as "the *context* in which people derive a sense of who they are, how they should behave, possibly where they are pointed in the future" (Fitzgerald, 1993: 59). Their identity, functioning as a link between intention and action, guides their behaviour "through complex rules that connect culture and communication" (Fitzgerald, 1993: 59).

Hofstede (1980: 260) defines culture as "the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another." Admitting that culture is a "fuzzy" concept, he makes his definition more specific, referring to culture "in the anthropological sense of broad patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting, which includes much more than 'civilization' alone" (1998: 5). These "mental programs" shared by the majority of members of a culture include symbols, rituals, and values (Hofstede, 1991). Culture is understood in a similar fashion by Ting-Toomey and Chung:

> [...] a meaning system that is shared by a majority of individuals in a particular community. On a general level, it refers to a patterned way of living by a group of interacting individuals who share similar sets of traditions, beliefs, values, norms, and behaviors. On a specific level, cultural values and norms influence the expectations that we hold in the development of personal relationship (Ting-Toomey and Chung, 1996: 237—238; cf. Spencer-Oatey, 2000; Scollon and Wong Scollon, 2001).

For the aims of the present study, the definitions formulated by Hofstede and Ting-Toomey and Chung constitute the most useful interpretation of the concept of culture.

To be able to get to know, to understand, or to adequately describe people's behaviour typical for a given culture one has to specify its key elements: traditions, beliefs, symbols, rituals, values and norms. *Beliefs* constitute sets of basic assumptions shared by members of a culture. *Symbols* are signs, artifacts, words, gestures, or nonverbal behaviour that stand for something meaningful to people sharing the culture. *Rituals* are fossilized patterns of behaviour regularly

performed by members of a community or a culture (Goffman, 1971, 1983; Hofstede, 1991; Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001; Giddens, 2006). All these elements and the way they are understood and interpreted by members of a culture reflect the values cherished in it.

Cultural values can be defined as "broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others" (Hofstede, 1991: 8), or "a set of priorities that guide desirable or undesirable behaviors or fair or unfair actions" (Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001: 10; cf. Dubisz, 2002). They serve as "the explanatory logic for why people behave the way they behave" (Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001: 10). Values are attitudes or interests that people in a cultural group cherish for their own sake, or cherish instrumentally as something that is essential to the maintenance of the group itself (Corson, 1995). They provide guidance for human activities. *Norms* are sets of rules specifying what constitutes proper or improper behaviour in a given situation. They are "standards for values" that exist within a group of people (Hofstede, 1991). In other words, cultural values translate into interactional norms, which determine the communicative behaviour of members of a given culture. Some researchers, however, think that cultures do not differ in values but "in their intensity, salience and degree of importance attached to them" (Lubecka, 2000: 37). Wierzbicka (1991: 61; cf. Gumperz, 1985) claims that "what is at issue is not just different cultural values. [...] The crucial fact is that different pragmatic norms reflect different hierarchies of values characteristic of different cultures." All these key elements are interrelated and influence each other, creating a unique culture against which people enter into various relationships and engage in social interactions.

Other aspects of culture which influence the nature of communicative behaviour, and as such constitute a conceptual basis for the present study, are *social relations*, which play a very important role in the formation of behavioural patterns and interactional norms. Social relations are a part of social life which differs between cultures. The character of these relations depends on the perception of the role of an individual in a given culture.

4.3.1. Cultural traditions and belief systems

The cultural shaping of the individual members of a particular society begins with a culture's religious and philosophical heritage and traditions (Cross and Gore, 2003). These are usually expressed in various religious texts (e.g., the Bible, the Torah, the Koran), historical documents, legal documents (e.g., the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, the 3rd of May Constitution, or the Gdańsk Shipyard demands). The way we are and the way we think depend

on the traditions we are brought up in (e.g., Roman Catholic tradition, Protestant tradition, a tradition of living with parents in Poland, a tradition of mobility in the United States).

The documents and traditions have a strong impact on people's beliefs about human nature and about relations between people, and on normative and moral beliefs. The way people live and perceive the world is shaped by religious and national traditions. The religious and historical texts of the East and the West differ significantly in their representations of the world and the individual. The Confucian and Buddhist texts, for example, present "the person and objects as continuous with and embedded in the environment. This resulted in a *holistic* worldview, in which persons and objects are understood and perceived as part of a greater whole" (Cross and Gore, 2003: 539–540). Western texts present people as separate from the world and society. This idea of the person is "part of an *analytical* worldview, which originated in ancient Greek philosophy." According to the Greeks, the world is a collection of discrete objects which can be classified in terms of their stable, universal properties (Cross and Gore, 2003: 539). In this way, an individual is perceived as independent and autonomous, separated from the natural world. These two opposed views of the world have a great impact on hierarchies of values, social norms and the role of the individual in the society.

4.3.2. Dimensions of cultural variability

In his books *Culture's Consequences* (1980) and *Cultures and Organizations. Software of the Mind* (1991), Hofstede claims that cultures can be positioned in four independent dimensions, power distance, masculinity–femininity, uncertainty avoidance and individualism–collectivism. Each of these dimensions of culture can be measured relative to other cultures.

Power distance, the aspect of culture which involves "*dependence* relationships," is the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions (e.g., family, school, or the community) or organizations (the places where individuals work) within a country expect and accept an unequal distribution of power (Hofstede, 1991; 2001; Merkin, 2006a). Along the power distance dimension, we can distinguish between small power distance cultures and large power distance cultures. In the former, people think that inequalities among people should be minimized; less powerful individuals are dependent on more powerful individuals to a limited extent. In the latter, people think that inequalities among people are desirable; there is considerable dependence of less powerful individuals on more powerful individuals. According to Hofstede

(2001), in large power distance cultures, people value respect and formal deference to any type of authority. In other words, members of small power distance cultures believe that power should be distributed relatively equally, while members of large power distance cultures believe that it should be distributed unequally.

Another dimension mentioned by Hofstede (1991, 1998) along which cultures vary is the dimension of *masculinity–femininity*. Masculine societies are those in which "men are supposed to be assertive, tough and focused on material success," and women are to be "more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life" (Hofstede, 1998: 6). In feminine societies, both men and women are to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.

Uncertainty avoidance, the next dimension of cultural variability discussed by Hofstede (1980, 1991, 2001), refers to "the extent to which people feel threatened by ambiguous situations and have created beliefs and institutions that try to avoid these" (Hofstede and Bond, 1984: 419). This dimension pertains to how people deal with conflict and aggression and how tolerant they are of ambiguity. Different degrees of uncertainty avoidance can be found in every culture, but one model (high uncertainty avoidance or low uncertainty avoidance) always predominates. Hofstede distinguishes high uncertainty avoidance cultures (e.g., Japan, France) and low uncertainty avoidance cultures (e.g., England, Ireland, Denmark, the USA). For people in high uncertainty avoidance cultures, "what is different is dangerous," so they try to avoid uncertainty, accept aggressive behaviour and freely express emotions. To reduce uncertainty, they resort to ritualistic behaviours and customs to avoid ambiguity (Hofstede, 2001; Merkin, 2006b). For people in low uncertainty avoidance cultures, "what is different is curious" (Hofstede, 1991: 119).

The most important dimension of cultural variability is *individualism–collectivism*, which is said to have the greatest impact of them all on communicative behaviour. Individualism characterizes societies in which ties between people are loose and individuals are expected to look only after themselves and their family (Hofstede, 1991). Collectivism characterizes societies in which individuals throughout their lifetime are integrated into their ingroups, which protect them in return for loyalty (Hofstede, 1991). Individualism–collectivism is not a static dimension. Cocroft and Ting-Toomey (1994) claim that individualism and collectivism should be treated on a continuum basis.

The two types of culture, collectivistic and individualistic, differ in the way their members understand morality. Among collectivists morality is "more contextual" and the supreme value is the welfare of the collective (e.g., family). Morality in collectivistic cultures (such as those of Japan and China) is connected with adherence to many specific rules; to be moral means to comply with these rules in particular situations (Triandis, 1995). People in collectivistic cultures are particularistic in this respect; they tend to apply different value

standards to members of their ingroups and outgroups. In individualistic cultures (such as those of Australia and the United States), morality is perceived in more universalistic terms; the same value standards apply to all people (Gudykunst, 2004).

Individualistic and collectivistic cultures can be divided with respect to relations among people into *horizontal* and *vertical* (Triandis, 1995). Horizontal cultures are those in which people see themselves as the same as and equal to others, while vertical cultures are those in which people feel different from others and do not value equality much. Both types of culture can be found among individualistic and collectivistic societies. Thus, there are vertical individualistic cultures (e.g., the United States, Germany and Great Britain), in which people try to stand out from others, and value freedom but do not value equality (although equality is said to be one of the most important American values!); and horizontal individualistic cultures (e.g., Sweden and Norway), in which people act as individuals, but at the same time do not try to stand out from others, and value both equality and freedom. In horizontal collectivistic cultures (e.g., Japan) people highly value equality, but do not attach much importance to freedom, while in vertical collectivistic cultures (e.g., India) people value neither equality nor freedom (Triandis, 1995).

Another difference between individualistic and collectivistic cultures lies in interpersonal communication. Hall (1976) distinguishes between *low-* and *high-context* communication. In individualistic cultures, in which people are more affect-oriented and more inclined to talk than members of collectivistic cultures, low-context communication predominates, in which "the mass of information is vested in the explicit code" (Hall, 1976: 70; Gudykunst *et al.*, 1996). Explicit messages are used to convey personal thoughts, opinions and feelings (Ting-Toomey, 2005). In collectivistic cultures, in which people are more concerned with avoiding hurting others than members of individualistic cultures, high-context communication predominates, in which "most of the information is either in the physical context or internalized in the person, while very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message" (Hall, 1976: 79; Gudykunst *et al.*, 1996). What matters is the "multilayered" context (e.g., historical context, social norms, roles, situational and relational contexts) framing the interaction encounter (Hall, 1976; Ting-Toomey, 2005).

According to Gudykunst (2004; Gudykunst *et al.*, 1996), the individualism— collectivism dimension shapes communication on two distinct levels: cultural and personal. At the cultural level, patterns of behaviour depend on cultural norms and values. Individualism "refers to the broad value tendencies of a system in emphasizing the importance of individual identity over group identity, individual rights over group rights, and individual needs over group needs" (Ting-Toomey, 1994: 314). Individualistic cultures draw up the "I" identity as the prime focus; they are concerned with the authenticity of

self-presentation style, and they value autonomy, choices, and negative-face need (Ting-Toomey, 1988; cf. Shweder and Bourne, 1984). Members of such cultures see themselves as independent of any collectives, and they are primarily motivated by their own preferences and needs. They put the emphasis on individual initiatives and achievement (Triandis, 1995, Gudykunst, 2004). Collectivism "refers to the broad value tendencies of a system in emphasizing the importance of the 'we' identity over the 'I' identity" (Ting-Toomey, 1994: 314). Collectivistic cultures are concerned with the adaptability of self-presentation style, and they value group goals over individual goals, interdependence, reciprocal obligations, and positive-face need (Ting-Toomey, 1988). Members of such cultures see themselves as parts of one or more collectives — e.g., family, business company, or nation — and are primarily motivated by the norms of these collectives. They put the emphasis on belonging to certain groups rather than on their own achievement (Triandis, 1995; Gudykunst, 2004).

At the personal level, the patterns of behaviour used by members of a particular culture depend on individual socialization. There are three main characteristics that mediate the impact of individualism–collectivism on communication: personality orientations, individual values, and self-construals (Gudykunst, 2004; Gudyunst *et al.*, 1996). Triandis *et al.* (1988) distinguish two types of personality, which can appear in both individualistic and collectivistic cultures: *idiocentric* and *allocentric*. Idiocentric individuals in individualistic cultures "do their own thing" and do not pay attention to the needs of other members of their ingroup, while allocentric individuals in individualistic cultures are concerned about them. Allocentric individuals in collectivistic cultures "feel positive about accepting ingroup norms," while idiocentric individualists in collectivistic cultures "feel ambivalent and even bitter about acceptance of ingroup norms" (Triandis *et al.*, 1988: 325).

4.3.3. Culture-specific concepts of self

The other two important components of individual personalities which determine the way people behave and communicate are individual values and self-construals. Cultural experience conditions our values, ways of thinking and social relations, and it also conditions the formation of self (Marsella, 1985; Holland, 1997; Thoits and Virshup, 1997; Hofstede, 1998; Owens and Aronson, 2000; Barker, 2005). One of the most powerful ways in which cultures shape individual behaviour is "through their influence on one's way of being a person [...] The self-system is a primary locus of sociocultural influence — the basis of

culture-specific being" (Markus *et al*., 1997: 13). Interacting with other members of his culture, the individual becomes a person — an actor in a social theatre. The concept of self presented by each person in particular social interactions is central to the functioning of people in any social setting, and it is still used in much the same way in almost every culture. But members of different cultures conceptualize the self in different ways, and to define themselves they use the concepts, values, and ideologies provided by their cultural environment (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Cross and Gore, 2003). Thus, many researchers consider it universal, although "its component elements differ in significance according to culture and societal context" (Earley, 1997: 37; Brown and Levinson, 1987; Ting-Toomey, 1994; Gao, 1996). What is universal in the self is the sense of being physically distinct and separate from others and some awareness of internal activity; many aspects of the self, however, are specific to particular cultures. Culture influences both the content and structure of the inner, private self as well as the public self whose nature depends on the individual's relations with others and social institutions, which vary cross-culturally (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Markus *et al*., 1997).

The cultural shaping of the self occurs at four levels (Cross and Gore, 2003: 539):

- Cultural models of the person derive first from the sociohistorical ideals and values of a society.
- These sociohistorical ideals and values shape social customs, practices, and institutions, including linguistic practices, employment practices, and educational and legal systems.
- These practices and institutions provide settings and situations in which individuals act and behave.
- These experiences in everyday settings sculpt a self and shape individual psychological tendencies.

As a result of the process of cultural shaping, in different cultures two different construals of the self can be found, *the independent self-construal* and *the interdependent self-construal* (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). The Western independent "self as an entity containing significant dispositional attributes, and as detached from context" differs from the Oriental self "as interdependent with the surrounding context, [in which] it is the 'other' or the 'self-in-relation-to-other' that is the focal in individual experience" (Markus and Kitayama, 1991: 225). Individuals with a strong independent sense of self perceive themselves as autonomous, self-reliant, unencumbered, and as "rational choice makers." Individuals with a strong interdependent sense of self perceive themselves as "ingroup-bound, obligatory agents, and as relational peacemakers" (Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001: 33; Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Both self-construals exist in every culture. So it is possible to find individuals with

a strong independent sense of self in collectivistic cultures, and individuals with a strong interdependent sense of self in individualistic cultures (Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001). However, the independent self-construal can be said to be characteristic of individualistic cultures, in which a dualistic worldview prevails, according to which the self is a separate, independent entity. The interdependent self-construal, on the other hand, is characteristic of collectivistic cultures, in which a holistic worldview prevails, propagating the connectedness of individuals to each other, and in which the self is seen as an integral part of the natural world.

Individualistic and collectivistic cultures differ in the degree to which their members wish to project an authentic self in a given situation and the degree to which they choose to maintain a social self (Ting-Toomey, 1988: 215). In individualistic cultures, individuals' public self-image should be consistent to a certain degree with their private, authentic self-image. Their identity is based on what they own and their experiences (Triandis, 1995). The individual is perceived as central and relationships as peripheral and "not definitive of personhood." The relation between the self and others is construed as independent and separate. Individual motivation is dominant (Cross and Gore, 2003).

In collectivistic cultures, the self is bounded by mutual role obligations and duties, and as such is subject to negotiation during social interaction (Ting-Toomey, 1988; Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998). Collectivists' identity is based on relationships and group memberships (Triandis, 1995). The relation between the self and others is construed as harmonious, interdependent, and interconnected. The individual and society are interdependent and mutually supportive. The individual is viewed as embedded in relationships and defined by social contexts, fundamental relations, and social positions (Cross and Gore, 2003).

In individualistic cultures, an independent self-construal and personal identity are the most important factors influencing behaviour. In intergroup situations, however, people's behaviour is based mainly on their interdependent self-construal and social identity (Morisaki and Gudykunst, 1994). In collectivistic cultures, an interdependent self-construal and social identity are the most important factors influencing behaviour. This does not mean, however, that independent self-construal and personal identity do nor influence people's behaviour to a certain extent in some situations (Morisaki and Gudykunst, 1994). These different conceptualizations of the individual and his roles in the social organization, strongly influencing the character of social relations and behavioural patterns, are a key to understanding cross-cultural differences in social interaction in general, and face-management in particular.

4.3.4. Emic and etic approaches to the study of cultural concepts

There are two main approaches to the study of culture, cultural concepts and communication, the emic approach and the etic approach. Originally the two terms *emic* and *etic* were used in the discussion of phonemics (the study of the sound systems of particular languages) and phonetics (a universal system of describing sounds used in various languages) (Pike, 1967; Befu, 1989; Hinze, 2005). Later the two terms were transferred into the area of cultural research (Pike, 1967; Befu, 1989).

The *emic approach* involves studying cultures from the inside. In this approach, behaviour is analysed from within the system, only one culture is examined, and the criteria are relative to internal characteristics. It focuses on describing how members of a particular culture understand their own communication. The *etic approach* involves looking at cultures from the outside and comparing them using predetermined characteristics. In this approach, behaviour is analysed from a position outside the system, many cultures are examined and compared, and the criteria used are considered absolute or universal. This approach is to compare how a specific aspect of communication occurs in different cultures (Berry, 1980; Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey, 1996). Emic analyses often are identified with the use of qualitative methods of research, and etic analyses often are identified with the use of quantitative methods (Gudykunst, 2000). The two approaches are used in the studies of culture and communication in interpersonal relationships across cultures. As Gudykunst (2000: 312) argues, for methodologically sound cross-cultural research both approaches are needed. "Etic measures allow us to understand commonalities across cultures, while emic measures allow us to understand unique aspects of behaviour within cultures."

Face is a category which can be investigated and analysed both as an emic (culture-specific) and etic (universal) concept. The specificity of face lies in the fact that some researchers consider it universal, while others treat it as a concept which cannot be analysed as a universal category, but rather as an emic concept, requiring investigation of its various culture-specific aspects. For example, Strecker (1993: 120) writes that "'face' is, after all, not an 'etic' but an 'emic' category and should be studied as such." The problem is not so simple, though. Face should be treated in some respects as universal and in others as culture-specific.

Universal in face is:
- the function of the face (a part of the body) as "a source of social signalling and communication,"
- the existence of face (self-image) as a social construct.

The rest is culture-specific. Basic facial expressions of emotion are universal, but the contexts in which they are displayed depend on cultural factors (Ekman and Oster, 1982). The social rules governing the display of and control over facial expressions differ cross-culturally. And so do systems of social values, which determine the socially constructed image of self. The basic, universal desire inherent in human nature "for a 'good' face" earns different interpretations in different cultures, because the constituents of 'good' are culturally determined (O'Driscoll, 1996: 4), as is the content of face (Mao, 1994; Matsumoto, 1988). Moral rules, hierarchies of values and social organization are specific to particular cultures; in consequence the image of self created on their basis must also differ. Cultures differ in the nature of face relationships. In individualistic cultures, face relationships are said to be a matter of individual face, while in collectivistic cultures they are rather a matter of the face of one's family, one's cultural group, or one's corporation (Scollon and Wong Scollon, 2001). The emic concepts, such as English *face*, Chinese *mianzi* and *lian*, Japanese *kao*, *menboku*, *taimen*, and *mentsu*, and Polish *twarz*, are said to be the "key players" in social interaction; however, they differ in importance. Social interaction is governed by different norms, and takes different forms and meanings depending on the cultural context (Hinze, 2005). This has a great impact on the emic concept of face. Thus face should be investigated and analysed in a culture-specific perspective. A discussion of its universal applicability could follow.

In Section 4.4., the Chinese concept of face is presented against the cultural background, with special consideration of Confucianism. In the following two sections, the emic concepts of *face* and *twarz* are analysed and discussed as appearing in two cultures, Anglo-American (Section 4.5.) and Polish (Section 4.6.), respectively.

4.4. The Chinese concept of face

4.4.1. Chinese culture and its Confucian roots

Chinese culture, like most oriental cultures, can be categorized as collectivistic. The Chinese see society as a unit (Lee-Wong, 2000). Their social orientation, as Bond (1991: 34) maintains:

> Is reflected in the highest endorsement they give to group-related traits and roles, as well as the fact that their ideal self is closely involved in social

relationships. The dimensions they use to perceive themselves and others are likewise focused on interpersonal concerns, not on mastery of the external world or absorption with narrowly personal processes.

For the Chinese, society and various social relations are more highly valued than the individual. The individual self is bounded by mutual role obligations and duties, and as such is subject to negotiation during social interaction (Ting-Toomey, 1988; Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998). The Chinese value group goals over individual goals, interdependence, reciprocal obligations, and the need for approval and appreciation from others (Ting-Toomey, 1988; Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998). In Chinese culture, sincerity and demonstration of respect and deference are indispensable for successful social interaction (Lee-Wong, 2000: 310). One of the most important cultural values is *qiangong* (modesty and courtesy), which leads the Chinese to downgrade or deny any instance of verbal recognition, praise, compliments or admiration (Bond, 1991; Kornacki, 2002).

The philosophy of the school founded by Confucius (551–479 BC), "the Venerable Master K'ung," is the key to understanding Chinese culture. Although many people think of traditional Chinese culture as Confucian, Confucianism was only one of the intellectual movements that have existed in China over the centuries (van Norden, 2002). Confucius was mainly "concerned with values as the basis of social and political order" (Flew, 1979: 72). One of the main concepts of his doctrine is *dào* (*tao*), which originally meant "way" (in the sense of "path" or "road"). *Dào* is the proper way to behave and the proper way for society to be organized (van Norden, 2002).

Another concept of Confucianism is the *lǐ* (*li*), meaning "rites" or "rituals." They include matters of etiquette, everything concerning one's way of life or ethos, and proper behaviour in general (van Norden, 2002). The *lǐ*, like all rituals, have a symbolic function. Their performance is required for the proper organization of the society. The reason why they are so powerful, however, is a mystery (van Norden, 2002). In modern Chinese there are several compound nouns involving *lǐ*, e.g., *lijiao* (the Confucian ethical code), *lijie* (courtesy, etiquette, protocol ceremony), *limao* (courtesy, politeness, manners), and *lisu* (etiquette, custom) (van Norden, 2002).

One of the ethical terms used by Confucius is *rén* (*jen*), meaning "benevolence," "humaneness," and "goodness" (van Norden, 2002). This is what every individual should aim at. Confucius was concerned with the cultivation of character and the problems of human perfection in both the individual and social sense (van Norden, 2002, Cheng, 1986). This is related to one of the most important values in Chinese culture mentioned above, modesty. "Perfection" and "self-training" involve the avoidance of boasting, of over-estimation of one's abilities and of the exaggeration of one's capacities,

which can evoke envy or unpleasant feelings in others (Hu, 1944). Confucianism held that "perfection of an individual is an essential way for achieving social and political harmony and ordering which in their turn should have preserved and encouraged individual perfection" (Cheng, 1986: 337). The supreme value of *rén* is to value connection to others, similarity to others, and harmony in relationships (Ho, 1995).

Yì (*i*) is another ethical term in the Confucian vocabulary. It means "right," "righteousness," "appropriate" and "moral." In Chinese culture, which was, and still is, highly role-conscious, and in which social relations have always been vertically structured, what is right or appropriate is determined by an individual's social role (Lee-Wong, 2000; van Norden, 2002). Thus the value of an individual strongly depends on the way he performs his social roles. According to Confucian ethics, self-cultivation involves expression of the goodness of an individual in five kinds of basic social relationships (Cheng, 1986; Earley, 1997)):

● emperor–subject (or righteousness),
● father–son (or closeness),
● husband–wife (or distinction),
● elder–youth (or order),
● friendship (or faithfulness).

The self in the Confucian sense is defined by a person's surrounding relations, which are supported by cultural values such as filial piety, loyalty, dignity, and integrity (Gao, 1996). Thus, the Chinese self (see interdependent self-construal (Markus and Kitayama, 1991)) needs to be recognized, defined, and completed by others, whose needs, wishes and expectations are essential for its development (Gao, 1996). The importance of other people in the creation of the Chinese self results from the values prevailing in Chinese culture, such as tolerance for others, harmony with others, and solidarity with others. This is reflected in social norms prevailing in Chinese culture, such as modesty and humility, reserve and formality, and inhibition of strong feelings (Gao, 1996).

Through moral self-cultivation an individual can achieve perfection, while social harmony is an extension of virtues from an individual to his family and to the society (Cheng, 1986). The connectedness between people, especially within the family, is the key issue in Chinese culture. The Confucian *Golden Principle* states:

> The humane man, wishing to establish himself, seeks to establish others; wishing to be prominent himself, he helps others to be prominent (Ho, 1995: 133–134).

The social order is maintained through the fundamental social roles (e.g., parent, child, husband, wife), which determine people's behaviour in social interaction (Gao, 1996).

Confucian philosophy can be summarized in three main principles (Cheng, 1986: 337):

- Self-cultivation of a person must be conducted in the context of developing social relationships.
- The successfulness of self-cultivation of a person must be judged in terms of successfulness of development of social relationships under a rule of government.
- The ultimate form of successfulness of development of social relationships is a good government under which everyone is well and properly placed in an order of social relationships and everyone will look upon the maintenance and improvement of this order as defining an intrinsic quality of his existence and the worth of his moral achievement.

These three principles can serve as a basis for the understanding of the Chinese concept of face.

4.4.2. Face in Chinese culture

Face is one of the central concepts in Chinese culture. Evidence for this is the great number of expressions that employ the words denoting "face" in the Chinese language. The notion of face also appears in Chinese sayings and proverbs, e.g., *Ren yao lian, shu yao pi* ("A man needs face like a tree needs bark"). This old saying tells a lot about the place of the concept of face in Chinese culture. It refers to a person's self-esteem, which is often formed on the basis of others' remarks. If they are positive, one's self-esteem is boosted, and consequently, one has face (Gao, 1996). John MacGowan, in his book *Men and Manners of Modern China* (1912) comments on the specificity of Chinese face:

> A Chinese is dominated by one passion, viz., to look well before his fellow-men. To do this successfully is to have 'face.' To fail, or to appear in disgrace, is to 'lose face.' He is well aware of the scenic effect, and so he is always arranging the play that he may give the onlooker the best view of himself (MacGowan, 1912: 301).

Chinese face emphasizes the harmony of individual conduct with the views and judgement of other members of the community. For Ho (1976: 883), Chinese face is

11*

the respectability and/or deference which a person can claim from others, by virtue of the relative position he occupies in his social network and the degree to which he is judged to have functioned adequately in that position, as well as acceptably in his general conduct; the face extended to a person by others is a function of the degree of congruence between judgements of his total condition in life, including his actions as well as those of people closely associated with him, and the social expectations that others have placed upon him. In terms of two interacting parties, face is the reciprocated compliance, respect, and/or deference that each party expects from, and extends to, the other party.

Face in Chinese culture does not belong to an individual, but it can be considered only in relation to others with whom he interacts. It is related to such social concepts as honour, dignity, prestige, reputation and good name:

> This word 'face' embodies two broad lines of thought, though these by no means exhaust the many possibilities that lie lurking within it. The first of these is honour, or reputation. Another idea contained in the word 'face' is self-respect, or dignity, a thing that a Chinese must maintain at all costs and in all circumstances. Whether he is right or wrong, he must never be placed in a position where he would have to blush for himself. His 'face' must be maintained at all costs (MacGowan, 1912: 301).

Thus, face in Chinese culture plays a very important role in social interactions and in the established social code, which regulates how people should behave in different situations.

There are two concepts of face (*mianzi* and *lian*) central to an understanding of the character of social relations in Chinese culture, and explanatory of the Chinese concepts of self and relational development (Gao, 1996). According to Hu (1944), these two concepts of face are based on two distinct sets of criteria for judging human behaviour.

> [Mianzi (or *mien-tzǔ*)] stands for the kind of prestige [...]: a reputation achieved through getting on in life, through success and ostentation. [*Lian* (or *lien*)] represents the confidence of society in the integrity of ego's moral character, the loss of which makes it impossible for him to function properly within the community. [It is] both a social sanction for enforcing moral standards and an internalized sanction (Hu, 1944: 45).

Thus, according to Hu, *mianzi* is the non-moral type of face, *lian* the moral type. This distinction is, however, undermined by Hinze's (2005) argumentation; he claims that neither is *mianzi* completely devoid of moral content nor is *lian* an exclusively moral type of face, as it is often used in situations in which successful social performance matters most.

Mien is a very old term, which acquired a figurative meaning referring to "the relation between ego and society" as early as the 4th century BC (Hu, 1944: 45). *Mianzi* is the modern Chinese word which is the closest to *mien* (Lee-Wong, 2000). *Mianzi* can be looked at from two perspectives, subjective and objective. From the former, it is "the value and importance of oneself in one's self-esteem with regard to social relationships and society at large" (face as "a personal claim"). From the latter perspective, *mianzi* is "the social place of a person as recognized by others in the same society or in the same community," or "the social position or value of a person as recognized by a specific person on a special occasion" (face as recognized by others) (Cheng, 1986: 332). So the objective *mianzi* is the desire for public acknowledgement of one's prestige or reputation (Mao, 1994; Ji, 2000). In general, it depends on and is assessed in terms of what others think (Ho, 1976), and what they say about a person; verbal recognition, e.g., praise, compliments or admiration, is vital for the Chinese (Kornacki, 2004). "A person's *mianzi* usually varies according to the group with which he is interacting" (Ho, 1976: 869; Cheng, 1986). So the same person can have different *mianzi* in different relationships, in different situations.

Mianzi can be large or small. The larger it is, the greater the influence, respectability and authority the person has. There can be different sources of *mianzi*, e.g., power, ability, wealth, high offices, high social position, political and academic titles, social ties to prominent people, and avoidance of acts causing unfavourable comments (Hu, 1944; Cheng, 1986). Thus, the higher the status, the greater the expectations are, and the greater are the demands for maintaining face (Ho, 1974). *Mianzi* may be kept, given, taken, gained, lost or saved. What can happen to a person's face is reflected in language. In modern Chinese, there are many expressions with *mianzi*, e.g., (Lee-Wong, 2000: 24):

> *ai mianzi*: 'love face' (be concerned about face-saving),
>
> *you mianzi*: 'have face' (enjoy due respect),
>
> *gei mianzi*: 'give face' (show due respect for someone's feelings),
>
> *tiu mianzi*: 'lose face' (shame/humiliation),
>
> *baoquan mianzi*: 'save face' (maintain one's self-respect/reputation).

The other word meaning "face" is *lian*, which is a relatively modern term. The earliest reference cited in *The K'ang-his Dictionary* dates from the Yuan Dynasty (1277–1367) (Hu, 1944: 45). It refers to "the minimum social respectability a person has in the society regardless of his actual social position, prestige, wealth or power" (Cheng, 1986: 336). It is used as "a protective mask

(persona)" that a person wears for communicating with other people in society (Cheng, 1986). Everyone should possess it. *Lian* is a sign of a person's moral worth. It must be preserved and maintained by conforming to social rules of conduct and good taste. But it can also be lost, or "torn up." When a person loses *lian*, he can be treated as being below moral dignity. A person "tears up" his *lian* when he does not behave according to standards of social decorum (Cheng, 1986). In Chinese, there are also many expressions with *lian/lien*, e.g., (Hu, 1944: 46–54):

> *tiu lien*: 'to lose face' (condemnation by a group for immoral or socially disagreeable behaviour),
>
> *pu-yao lien*: 'not to want face' (a serious accusation meaning that the ego does not care what society thinks of his character),
>
> *mei-yu lien*: 'to have no face' (interchangeable with *pu-yao lien*; the most severe condemnation that can be made of a person),
>
> *lien-p'I hou* or *po*: 'the skin on the face is thick' or 'thin' (the thick skin (negatively valued) is hard to penetrate with social disapproval; the thin skin (positively valued) is highly sensitive to public opinion).

To lose *lian* means "a condemnation by a group for immoral or socially disagreeable behaviour" (Hu, 1994: 4).When a person loses or breaks *lian* it is much more serious than when he loses *mianzi*, because to lose *lian* means dishonour and disgrace (Cheng, 1986; Earley, 1997; Haugh and Hinze, 2003). This difference, however, is not due to the absence/presence of the moral element, but due "to the seriousness of the particular event that has brought about the loss" (Hinze, 2005: 174). The loss of *mianzi* causes less serious damage to the social image than the loss of *lian*.

Chinese face can be associated with individuals or with groups. Apart from damaging or losing one's own *lian*, a person may lose *lian* for important others (e.g., his friends, family, company, superiors or country); in other words he may bring disgrace or ridicule upon them by behaviour incompatible with the social rules of conduct (Hu, 1944). Thus, participating in social interaction, the person avoids situations which may cause the loss of his individual face as well as the face of the group he belongs to.

Confucianism can be treated as the ideological foundation of the Chinese concept of face. The Confucian family is the basic social structure, in which the most important values are family unity, harmony, propriety, mutual consideration, and role relationship based on the obligations and duties to the other family members (Cheng, 1986). The conceptions of a good society and of a government function on the same principle. Members of a society or government are like good family members, acting on the basis of feelings

derived from self-cultivation, "virtue, good faith and trust toward one another," and respect for the honour and good will of others (Cheng, 1986: 340). The concept of face involves the values forming the Chinese family, society and government. And it can be treated as both the goal and the means for "the harmonization of human relationships" (Cheng, 1986). Public knowledge and external evaluation are extremely important for the operation of face in Chinese culture (Haugh and Hinze, 2003). As Cheng (1986: 341) claims, "the very source of face comes from the five relationships." *Lian* is the basis of the equilibrium in "the five relationships of a person in the process of his social growth and self-cultivation," while *mianzi* is "an enlargement of the scope of meaningful relations through the basic five relationships of a person" (Cheng, 1986: 341).

Every person living in the society has the right to *lian* (an honest, decent face), while his *mianzi* differs depending on his social status, family background, personal ties and self-presentation skills (Hu, 1944). Relations with others often shape an individual's identity. *Mianzi* and *lian* can operate vicariously, i.e. one's identity can be shaped by the identity of others with whom one is connected (Hinze, 2005). So the importance of *mianzi* and *lian* in Chinese society cannot be overstated. Chinese face is not only the goal and the means for "the harmonization of human relationships"; it is also the starting point from which one gets involved in social interactions.

4.5. The Anglo-American concept of face

4.5.1. Culture of the United States

Some Americans say they have no culture, as they conceive of culture as "an overlay of arbitrary customs" which can be found only in other countries (Althen, 1988). They are often unable to say anything about American culture. Some even deny that there is an American culture at all (Spindler and Spindler, 1993). There are, however, some basic ideas and values which all Americans share. They are presented in the documents creating the United States (the Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights). The most important of these ideas and values are individualism, freedom and equality. All of them are reflected in what is known as the mainstream American culture, "usually equated with the predominant white middle class" (Naylor, 1998: 51), or to be more precise, with the WASPs – the

white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants belonging to the middle class. However, most studies of American culture come to the same conclusion: "Beyond the dominant, major, or orienting ideas of individualism and freedom, Americans seemed to share very little" (Naylor, 1998: 51). Therefore, American culture is hard to define. Unlike many other cultures, it is not homogeneous. It comprises many genetically unrelated cultural communities and ethnic groups. This is especially visible on the west coast, in northern California (where the data for the present study were collected), which, apart from Anglo-Americans, is inhabited by Latinos, Asians, and African Americans. The present study involves only Anglo-American culture (further called American culture), as taking into consideration other ethnic groups could bring to the fore elements specific for these cultures and at the same time blur the picture of the culture which is already sufficiently difficult to define.

According to Hofstede's latest research results (2001), the United States (aside from Australia, Great Britain, Holland, Canada and Luxemburg) is among the most individualistic cultures. American culture values individuality, respect rooted in the conviction of equality between people, moderate emotionality, the promotion of success and solidarity, and the need for freedom of action and freedom from imposition, which is expressed by means of different face-saving devices, such as restraint, hedges, questions, expressions of deference, polite pessimism and conventionalized indirectness (Ting-Toomey, 1988; Johnson, 1985; Wierzbicka, 1985; Lubecka, 2000).

Individualism is a key to understanding Anglo-Americans (further called Americans). They cultivate their individuality. As Fitzgerald (1993: 40) maintains:

> American culture is often said to revolve around the ideal of the autonomous self, as individualism (personal autonomy) has long been a primary focus of American and, to a large extent, Western culture [...]. For Americans, the fulfillment of self is of paramount value.

From very early childhood Americans are told to consider themselves as separate individuals who are distinct from others and who are responsible for their own lives. In American society, as in so-called Western societies in general, "the paramount concern for individual rights, i.e. what is owed to the individual" is reflected in the strategic type of politeness (Bargiela-Chiappini, 2003: 1466). Maintaining independence and protecting the "natural rights" of each individual constitute the basis of American morality (Markus *et al.*, 1997). However, there is often a big difference between the ideals and the reality:

> Individualism leads to the assumptions about freedom, privacy, and equality that are shared among Americans, but rarely practiced. Freedom of speech in

public goes hand in hand with equality in public, but the "private" is also part of the reality with which people deal. The view that all people are of equal value and should be given the same or equal opportunity is tied to individualism and abundance, even if it is often violated in actual practice. It is an imperative as opposed to a fact of life for them (Naylor, 1998: 59; Althen, 1988).

In American culture, the idea of independence is put into practice in many different ways. It is visible, for example, in linguistic practices – the use of conventionally indirect forms of request or suggestion to avoid imposition, as well as in social practices, such as telling guests to "help themselves" (Naylor, 1998), "make themselves at home," or accepting their turning down food offers.

The idea of freedom is the foundation of American culture. For individualists such as Americans, this most crucial value means "*being able to do what you want to do, providing you don't interfere with the freedom of others*" (Lakoff and the Rockridge Institute, 2006: 88). Thus, the individual's right to freedom is restricted only by the consideration for another individual's freedom. American freedom includes:

> physical freedom, freedom to pursue goals, freedom of the will, and political freedom, where citizens freely choose who runs the state and where the state, by law, cannot interfere with the basic freedoms of its citizens (Lakoff and the Rockridge Institute, 2006: 88).

Among the basic freedoms is the freedom of *choice*, fundamental to the successful life of the individual. Americans represent a consumer culture which cultivates the value of choice. Choice and various practices of choosing are, as Markus *et al.* (1997: 24) maintain, "central to many domains of U.S. life." Having a choice and being able to choose what one wants helps people manifest their individuality and control their own life, which is the measure of their success.

Another crucial value is *equality*, which for Americans means equal participation in social, educational, political and economic life, and "translates into *equal opportunities* for all people" (Naylor, 1998: 56). This potential "*sameness of distribution*" (Lakoff and the Rockridge Institute, 2006) constitutes the basis which makes it possible for members of the mainstream culture to focus on achievement, success and mobility. One of the main tenets of the culture is that "by hard work, anyone can achieve success" (Naylor, 1998: 57). For Americans, life is dominated by a drive for success. Success is what everyone should aim at. Professional success, success in private life, or success in social relations makes the person attractive to others. The drive for success is related to the American Dream, which results from Americans' individualism

and "their belief in equal opportunities to attain the abundance of America, freedom to pursue the wealth (the measure of attainment), and all the rest that goes together to make for the American Dream (home ownership, expensive cars, lots of material goods, etc.)" (Naylor, 1998: 54). The American Dream can come true and the individual can become an achiever who attains a success, when he is not afraid of change. Change together with hard work is believed to be the way to success. This is change understood in a positive sense, involving improvement. Mobility implies such a change — a change for the better; Americans distinguish different types of mobility (Naylor, 1998): geographical mobility (to get education or to get a new, better job) and mobility in social standing.

All these values — individualism, freedom, especially freedom of choice, equality of opportunity, the focus on achievement and the drive for success — have a strong impact on the character of American culture, which Naylor (1998) calls a culture of *diversity*. Both the United States and American culture can be characterized by multiple diversities, including ethnic, racial, religious, political, social and ideological. Some of these diversities are consequences of American individualism and freedom, the freedom of individuals to choose, to act, and to achieve whatever they want (Naylor, 1998). Americans show tolerance for any manifestation of diversity, expressed by politically correct behaviours which oppose any kind of "stigmatization" of an individual (Lubecka, 2001). American society, in spite of its great respect for equality, is "more vertical than the average individualistic culture" (Triandis, 1995: 46). As Triandis claims, this is related to the fact that Americans like to be distinguished and to "stick out." Thus, diversity, together with distinctness and any type of otherness, are perceived as definitely positive. On the one hand, Americans often behave in such a way as to be noticed or to look distinct. On the other hand, they have a great tolerance for peculiarity and all kinds of eccentricity.

In American culture people put the emphasis on appearances over reality. American culture is a culture in which the norm of affirmation dominates, according to which everyone should be, or at least should seem to be, satisfied and happy (Naylor, 1998; Wojciszke and Baryła, 2005). This is related to the general drive for success and the focus on achievement. It is not enough to be successful, to be an achiever; one has to show others that this makes him satisfied and happy. Kövecses (2005) claims that at the heart of American culture lies the metaphor LIFE IS A SHOW or SPECTACLE or ENTERTAINMENT (cf. Goffman's metaphors of social interaction — see Sections 5.2.1. and 5.2.2.). This metaphor organizes extensive portions of experience in many areas of American life, starting from everyday social interaction, through spectator sports, shopping, politics and war to landscape planning. Thus, the American concept of life is understood in terms of different forms of entertainment (Kövecses, 2005). Popular sports events are turned into

monumental shows. Advertising and selling products involves almost theatrical scenery. American politics (e.g., *political stage*; "McCain must rely on more than *stagecraft*" (http//: election.foxnews.com)), and especially the elections, and even war (e.g., "Palin has visited the Iraq war *theater*" (http//: blogsforjohnmccain.com)) are areas of life in which the metaphor LIFE IS A SHOW exists. A proof of this is the high linguistic productivity of the metaphor (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 57):

> LIFE IS A PLAY
>
> She always wants to be *in the spotlight*.
>
> That's not in *the script*.
>
> What's your *part in* this?
>
> He *blew his line*.
>
> He *saved the show*.
>
> He always *plays the fool*.
>
> That attitude is just a *mask*.
>
> You deserve a *standing ovation*.
>
> He plays *an important role* in the process.
>
> He only *played a bit part* in my life.
>
> I'm *improvising*.
>
> It's *showtime*!

4.5.2. Interpersonal relations and facial expressions in Anglo-American culture

The metaphors LIFE IS A SHOW and SOCIAL INTERACTION IS A THEATRE also organize extensive portions of interpersonal experience. Social interaction and interpersonal relations are shaped by two omnipresent motives, the self-presentational motive to look successful and happy and the interpersonal motive to "make others feel good" (Wierzbicka, 1999a). To present a consistent positive self-image and at the same time make others feel good requires self-control, which is considered the key to successful social interaction in American culture.

Americans believe that emotions are irrational and hard to control, and as such dangerous (Lutz, 1989). Catherine Lutz, an American anthropologist, investigated how Americans talk about emotions, and she noted that they often resort to the rhetoric of emotional control; they talk about emotions as *controlled*, *managed* or *coped with*. The "good" emotions should be controlled, while the "bad" ones, such as a sense of guilt, envy or anger, should be avoided (Szarota, 2006). This does not mean, however, that no expression of any emotion is allowed. Wierzbicka (1999a; Klos Sokol, 1994) claims that American culture promotes certain types of controlled emotion, namely, *friendliness*, *cheerfulness* and *happiness*. All of them are related in expressing a generally understood positive attitude to everything and everyone. Friendliness, or expressing kindness to others, is the main principle of social interaction in American culture. This is reflected in the common use of how-are-you type questions, frequently expressed good wishes (e.g., *Have a nice day!*, *Enjoy yourself!*), compliments, and various positive comments and exclamations (e.g., *Awesome!* (extremely good)). Friendliness is also expressed by showing willingness to stay in contact in the future; this purpose is most often served by invitation-like forms (e.g., *We have to meet some time*, *Let's get together again*), which are intended as "statements of good intention" (Wolfson, 1993; Jakubowska, 1999).

Cheerfulness, or being in good spirits, is a must in American culture. This is expressed in many sayings, such as *Keep smiling*, *Look on the bright side of life, or Cheer up!* To show others that they are cheerful, Americans smile (Ekman calls this type of smile *the false smile*). Being cheerful is an indispensable element of the American self-presentation style. When a person shows a broad smile to others, he creates a positive self-image which, on the one hand, makes others think "something good" about him, and on the other hand, is a conscious attempt to get rid of "bad feelings" and evoke "good feelings." This is connected with the cultural principle of positive thinking. Somebody who is cheerful and happy is accepted and liked by others, and, which is also important, he feels good (Wierzbicka, 1999a). The smile employed to enhance the individual's public image is called by Szarota (2006) the *self-presentational smile*.

The smile plays a very important role in social interaction in American culture. Americans treat the smile like a social mask which should be put on whenever a person comes into contact with others. Klos Sokol (1994: 93) writes about the American Smile Code, according to which members of American culture have at their disposal several types of smile for different occasions:

> [...] a half smile or smile without opening the mouth in the bank, in the shop or on the bus is a polite sign that the person has noticed the other. This

means that the person is ready to cooperate, but he does not look for any social contact. A smile without opening the mouth, e.g., to someone sitting next to him on the plane, may mean: "I'm friendly, but, please, do not accost me". A broad smile is nice, but if somebody is smiling from ear to ear to strangers, they may think that he is batty, stupid or whacked. Or, even worse, they will think he is a politician.

Americans also smile because they want to look happy. Happiness, or the feeling of pleasure, contentment or satisfaction, is what everyone should try to achieve. A happy looking person is perceived in American culture as one to be trusted and respected, somebody who is competent and successful. A person who is smiling is perceived as one who controls the situation. The same function as that of the happy self-satisfied face is often performed by various positive self-presentational comments and responses to how-are-you type questions which are "as positive as possible" (Ferrara, 1980: 333; Jakubowska, 1999).

As mentioned above, in American culture unrestrained expression of emotions is perceived in a negative way. This equally concerns positive and negative emotions. Americans identify expressing emotions with irrational behaviour, and their unwillingness to show their feelings is dictated by self-face concerns (Duszak, 2003). The "cool" way of talking is related to the two positive features, self-control and the ability to be *dispassionate* (the word has positive connotations in English) (Wierzbicka, 1999a). To behave in this way, Americans avoid controversial topics and engage in conversations on topics on which they have similar opinions to their interlocutors. They tend to avoid certain topics which would make them engaged, such as personal matters, politics and religion (Althen, 1988; cf. Barnlund, 1989). This also explains the popularity of *small talk*, "light conversation on unimportant or non-serious subjects" (LDCE). Instead of expressing emotions, Americans talk about them or analyse them. This introspection is very important, as the self-analysis helps them distance themselves from their own emotions and as a consequence control them. This control involves both expressing emotions and making them less intense (Wierzbicka, 1999a).

Self-control does not have to be applied to the expression of opinions. In American culture, everyone is allowed to say what he thinks. The freedom of expression, however, does not apply to the speaker's personal opinions about others. This can be explained by the culturally determined need to make others "feel good" (Wierzbicka, 1999a). This consideration for others is nothing more than a thin cultural overlay which has nothing to do with "real" concern for them. Thus, friendliness expressed during social interaction is enacted for the sake of "show."

The character of interpersonal relations has been formed mainly by the two predominant elements of American culture, individualism and mobility. High

mobility has caused most Americans to be separated from their family and relatives whom they replace with new friends (Naylor, 1998). Americans, as individualists, belong to many ingroups, and enter and exit them with great frequency and ease. This does not allow them to develop very intimate relationships (cf. Triandis, 1995). As a consequence, their personal relationships are often shallow. Naylor (1998: 61; Althen, 1988) describes Americans as "*superficial* in friendliness" and tending to avoid personal commitments. They easily make friends with everybody, but their friendships, based on spontaneity, are rarely deep.

Interacting with others in a very superficial manner, Americans value informality, talkativeness and egalitarianism (cf. Fitzgerald, 1993; Althen, 1988). Informality, making friends with everybody and "fake" friendliness (together with "fake" smiles) are characteristic of everyday social encounters. In addition, as Naylor (1998) maintains, Americans have a tendency to depersonalize their interactions with others. Both informality and depersonalizing are used as a protective shield or mask behind which the American self is hidden. Talkativeness is meant to help avoid silence, which is unacceptable during social interaction. Egalitarianism is reflected, for example, in the common use of the personal pronoun *you*, which used indiscriminately to everybody functions as "a social equalizer" (Wierzbicka, 1985: 164). Unwillingness to disclose one's self is also visible in the fact that Americans highly value *privacy*. They say that people *need some time to themselves* or *some time alone* to come to terms with reality or think something over. The little of the self that is intentionally presented has to appear successful, self-satisfied, cooperative and, most of all, liked by others.

4.5.3. Face in Anglo-American culture

In mainstream American culture, value orientations emphasize the individual and individuality (Spindler and Spindler, 1993; Naylor, 1998). Thus, the primary orientation tends toward the individual self rather than toward the significant other. Self-assertiveness, a high degree of self-reliance and independence are highly valued by Americans (Chu, 1985). The American concept of self emphasizes "the ideal of development toward autonomy and the liberation of the self from external authority as part of social growth" (DeVos, 1985: 178). The independent self-construal (Markus and Kitayama, 1991) which predominates in American culture reflects the analytical worldview in which "the person is defined by stable properties, separate from his or her social context" (Cross and Gore, 2003: 542; Scollon and Scollon, 1994: 151). An

individual's self is unique, autonomous and independent. These are considered the three most important aspects of the contemporary American concept of self.

From the very beginning American children and young people are treated as fully-fledged human beings who are deserving of respect. They are perceived as unique individuals, responsible for their words and actions. This has consequences for their face. As Ervin-Tripp *et al.* (1995: 67) claim, Americans treat face "as given to the individual in childhood, like good name or good health, and capable only of being lost, restored, or saved." Thus young people, like other members of American society, have face, which constitutes their self-image, as Goffman (1967: 5) maintains, delineated in terms of positive social attributes. Although the attributes undergo some changes along with the age of the individual, there is an invariant set of attributes specific for American culture. My American respondents, when asked about attributes commonly identified with face, most frequently mentioned the following concepts:

Table 1. Social attributes identified with face in American culture

Value	Mentioned by the respondents (per cent)
Good reputation	100
Credibility	88
Self-respect	84
Dignity	76
Social status based on achievement	42
Appearance of competence	40
Pride	32

The selection of attributes defines the American conceptualization of face. *Good reputation* is an attribute most frequently identified with face, which, like face, can be easily damaged by any kind of "improper" behaviour, i.e. the one considered morally wrong and violating social norms. *Credibility*, identified with trustworthiness and competence, is often associated with prestige and respect. However, face is given not only to those who deserve respect and are respected by others, but also to those who present a self-satisfied image of self, and feel respect for themselves (*self-respect*). For Americans, *dignity* is a very important aspect of self-image; this true worth gains an individual the respect of others. Another highly valued attribute related to face is *social status based on achievement*. An individual is worth how much he can achieve. His face and the respect he gains are the measure of his achievement and success. Social status which contributes greatly to face (i.e. gives face to the individual) is achieved by hard work, skill and *competence*. Competence, or at least its appearance, has a very strong positive impact on the image of the individual in the eyes of others. The last of the most frequently mentioned social attributes is *pride* (high opinion of oneself) which together with self-respect comprises the aspect of face

which entirely depends on the individual's psychological state. Thus, American face is a self-image which is mainly based on moral aspects of the individual's social performance and status acquired through personal effort. Similar results were produced by the research done by Cole (1989; discussed by Morisaki and Gudykunst, 1994). Making a study of culture-specific conceptualizations of face, Cole noted that the definitions of face formulated by his North American respondents most frequently included credibility, individual reputation, self-respect, ego, claimed position in interaction, appearance of strength, recognized positive worth, pride, status, lack of embarrassment, and self-defense.

American face belongs exclusively to an individual who is independent of others and free to choose his optimal course of action. As Cross and Gore (2003: 537) argue:

> In the United States, the individual, separate from social ties, obligations, and impediments, is sovereign. The maxim 'To thine own self be true' dominates the understanding of how one should behave. The ideal person chooses his or her own goals and direction and recognizes his or her distinctness from others (Cross and Gore, 2003: 537).

The individual's independence and autonomy is a consequence of loose social bonds. His decisions and actions result from his being true to himself and a rational way of thinking. He perceives himself, and is perceived by others, as a unique person, distinct from others that similarly are unique and distinct. This uniqueness and distinctness is related to self-orientedness.

> Achieving the cultural goal of independence requires constructing oneself as an individual whose behaviour is organized and made meaningful primarily by reference to one's own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and action, rather than by reference to the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others. [...] the person is viewed as 'a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgement, and action organized into a distinctive whole [...]' This view of the self derives from a belief in the wholeness and uniqueness of each person's configuration of internal attributes (Markus and Kitayama, 1991: 226).

The attributes that determine the individual's uniqueness are involved in the creation of his personal identity. "Americans often assume that people are 'self-made,' [...]." For them, identity is something which is personally 'constructed' (Fitzgerald, 1993: 58). Although in interpersonal relations the social identity (based on one's ingroup/outgroup categorization) also matters, it is one's relatively stable set of internal attributes that identifies the person as a unique and separate whole irrespective of situation.

The American concept of face is based on the independent conceptualization of self. It is described by Morisaki and Gudykunst (1994: 57;

cf. Goffman, 1955, 1967) as "independent face" (i.e. independent of any other person's face). It is "put on" by each participant and negotiated during social interaction. What is "put on" is a mask-like face which is to be in line with the requirements of good social relations necessary for successful social interaction (e.g., friendly, cheerful and happy).

As Ervin-Tripp *et al*. (1995) argue, American face is "individualized." The actions of one individual do not affect the face of any member of his family. Americans do not consider the actions of their family members as relevant to their own face. In other words, everyone takes responsibility for his actions, and it is only his own face that can be threatened by them. Similarly, any threat to the individual's face affects his face exclusively, not anyone else's.

When interacting with others, Americans are oriented mainly at their own face. For Americans, self-face maintenance is more important than other-face maintenance (cf. Ting-Toomey, 1988), although other-face is not neglected. Other-face maintenance is motivated by the necessity to make others feel good, the necessity for cooperation, and self-presentational reasons. The most important face need is the need for freedom of action and freedom from imposition. The next most important one is for a "good" self-image. In American culture, the "good" self-image involves the following features:

● (of the person's self-image) self-satisfied, happy, successful,
● (of the person's interpersonal skills) friendly, outgoing, cooperative, talkative,
● (of the person's character) independent, self-assertive, competent, competitive.

These features were most frequently mentioned by my American respondents asked about the "meaning" of the positive self-image. This goes along with what Klos Sokol (1994: 24) describes as the American self-presentation style:

> Patting oneself on the shoulder as a gesture of appreciation may seem to some people distasteful, but it is deeply rooted in American mentality. We have developed a habit of 'selling oneself,' if it is necessary. We can with great ease talk about our professional achievements, also in private situations.

Thus, face understood as a self-image created and negotiated by participants during social interaction is used to help "sell" the self, which is not always as amiable and positive as face seems to imply.

The self-image (face) that is so carefully created and negotiated during social interaction with others can easily be threatened or lost, either due to some action by its owner or due to some action performed by others. The interviewed Americans, when asked about face-threatening or face-loss situations, mentioned:

● situations in which the person shows lack of competence or makes a serious error,
● situations in which the person fails to do something (e.g., failure to fulfil a promise),

- situations in which the person does something that is inconsistent with his projected self-image (e.g., the use of swearwords),
- situations in which somebody else does and/or says something that threatens his self-image (e.g., calling names, the use of wrong address terms, failure to greet the person when this is interpreted as showing lack of respect),
- situations in which somebody else puts the person in a position in which he feels imposed on (e.g., when he is made to admit something he is ashamed of, or when he is made to do something he does not want or like to do).

In the already mentioned study by Cole (1989), his North American respondents enumerated similar face-threatening situations: personal failure (e.g., when a person loses an argument), threats to the person's credibility, and threats to the person's self-image. Thus, what poses the greatest threat to Americans' face is failure, the opposite of one of their greatest values (success). Lack of success in any aspect of their life, be it in private life, at work or in interpersonal relations, always constitutes a serious threat to face. The resulting self-image is out of keeping with American social norms. Americans must always be happy-looking, competent "winners" or "survivors." The other type of face threat is any kind of imposition, made by the other, an attempt to limit a person's independence and freedom, the foundations of American culture.

The picture drawn above shows Americans as good actors constantly participating in and creating a one-person show, in front of a very demanding audience. The face they put on display must be at all costs positive. All the features mentioned above, theatrical gestures (of good intentions), exaggerated enthusiasm, frequent positive exclamations (e.g., *It's awesome!*, *It's great!*, *Great job!*) and a friendly smile, which for members of other cultures seems fake and insincere, constitute the self-image specific for members of American culture.

4.6. The Polish concept of face

4.6.1. Polish culture

Even though, according to Hofstede's latest research results (2001), Poland can be found in a relatively high position on the individualism–collectivism scale, Polish culture has been considered collectivistic by many researchers (e.g., Lewicka, 2005; Lubecka, 2000). Lewicka (2005), in her paper "'Polacy są wielkim i dumnym narodem,' czyli nasz portret wielce zróżnicowany," which is

devoted to the Polish system of values, compares the results of different cross-cultural research projects on values (Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz and Bardi, 1997; Inglehart, 1990, 1998; Hofstede, 2001). This analysis suggests that Poland is one of the most conservative, hierarchical and collectivistic countries among those studied. This inconsistency in evidence on the evaluation of Polish culture can perhaps be explained by the changes which took place in Poland after 1989. The transition from communism to liberal democracy resulted in social, as well as economic transformations (Wnuk-Lipiński, 2001). Their consequences have been cultural changes and the opening of Poland to modern Western culture, American culture in particular (cf. Ożóg, 2002; 2002a; 2004). As Triandis claims (1995: 15):

> In the formerly Communist countries, the shift toward market economies has much in common with the shift from collectivism to individualism in many parts of the world.

Poles have borrowed the main Western values and assimilated some elements of Western lifestyle. For example, success, especially financial success, has become one of the most important aims of life; individualism, independence, freedom of choice and greater mobility have become the main categories of the lifestyle of the Polish young generation (Triandis, 1995). Skudrzykowa and Warchala (2002; Kita, 2006; Marcjanik, 2007) even talk about the fashion for privacy, individualism and individual expression among the young generation.

However, Polish individualism is nothing new. There can be found many eras in Polish history when individualism together with an emphasis on personal freedom dominated, e.g., the period of *złota wolność* (Lat. *aurea libertas* – golden liberty) (the 16th–18th centuries), "rights and privileges gained by Polish gentry" (Kopaliński, 1987) and the law of *liberum veto* (free 'I do not allow') (1652–1791), "the right to break off the parliamentary session by one member shouting *I do not allow*," a free voice of the gentry democracy (Kopaliński, 1987). Individualism and the need for freedom of action is also a traditional element of Polish everyday life, which is reflected in some proverbs and sayings, e.g., *Każdy sobie rzepkę skrobie* (Everyone peels his own turnip), meaning "everyone does his own job, neither expecting any help from others, nor providing any help to them," *Wolnoć Tomku w swoim domku* (Tom, (you) can do (whatever you want) at your home), meaning "everyone can do whatever he wants in his house, without paying any attention to others."

Traditionally Poles value respect, interdependence, reciprocal obligations, family, friendship, intimacy, emotionality, hospitality, and modesty, and have a strong need for inclusion and approval, especially from significant others (cf. Lubecka, 2000; Wierzbicka, 1991). Dyczewski (1995), having analysed a great number of studies on values in Polish culture, created a list of values

which he presented to a group of respondents of different ages. This resulted in a list of the most typical values for Polish culture (it is not a hierarchical ranking) (1995: 64):

1. Family, the family spirit, home.
2. Community, the sense of togetherness.
3. Affection for childen and the importance of the role of women.
4. Sensitivity to transcendental values and to sacrum, religiousness.
5. Irrationalism, emotionality, romanticism.
6. Internal freedom, personal dignity, honour, individualism.
7. Forgiveness, lack of vindictiveness and cruelty.
8. Hospitality, sociability, generosity.
9. Readiness to sacrifice, a sense of duty.
10. Love of freedom, patriotism.
11. Optimism, hope against hope.
12. Openness to other cultures, tolerance, universalism.
13. Respect for creative work.
14. Democracy, spirit of good citizenship and criticism of authority.

This list reflects the equivocal nature of Polish culture, which, on the one hand attaches significance to family and the sense of togetherness, and on the other cherishes individualism and democracy. This is similar to the results of the research I have carried out (see Table 2).

Table 2. Major values in Polish culture

Values	Mentioned by the respondents (per cent)
Family and friendship	97
Dignity	87
Freedom	98
Independence	85
Faith/religion	85
Individualism	80
Honour	77
Respect, especially for the elderly	73
Hospitality	67
Democracy	58
Tolerance	55
Patriotism	47
Emotionality	42

Almost all my Polish respondents when asked about values typical for Polish culture mentioned family and friendship; these invariably constitute the most important aspect of life and the greatest value for the majority of Poles. This and other values mentioned constitute a mixture which does not allow of an

easy and explicit classification of Polish culture. Theoretically, knowledge of the values that a particular cultural group subscribes to should help the researcher to classify it. The character of Polish culture, though, is not easy to define, first because it arises from Polish historical tradition, second because Poland is undergoing significant transformations in the most vital areas of life. The presented list (Table 2) shows that the Polish hierarchy of values is also in the process of changing. Important values, such as honour, patriotism, respect for the elderly and even hospitality, have lost their primary position in the hierarchy. And the others, such as independence and individualism, have gained in significance. Generally speaking, we can observe a gradual axiological shift in Polish culture. As Kazimierz Ożóg, in the paper "Współczesna polszczyzna a postmodernism" (2006: 104), maintains:

> The values that constitute the core of the national culture have receded into the background: *honour*, *patriotism*, *responsibility*, *common good*, *beauty*, *truth*, *dignity*, *service*, *modesty*, *mercy*, *fidelity*, *family*, *home*, *morality*, *justice*, *tradition* and *work*. [...] [In the foreground,] a new axiological system [has appeared], a system of concepts and values characteristic of postmodernism. These are mainly pragmatic, hedonistic values, related to consumption.

Polish culture is said to be neither excessively masculine nor excessively feminine (Lewicka, 2005). On the one hand, Poles cherish close family bonds and friendship, value leisure, and celebrate family reunions and religious festivals, which is typical for feminine cultures. Unlike members of masculine cultures, Poles do not hesitate to externalize their feelings, both positive and negative. On the other hand, there is Polish masculinity which is deeply rooted in our history and patriotic tradition. It is connected with the idea of struggle for independence and freedom and romantic heroism. Among the values that used to have one of the highest positions in the value hierarchy in Polish culture are *Bóg, honor, ojczyzna* (God, honour, homeland) (also the motto of the Polish army), which form a trinity constituting the ideological basis for patriotically-oriented Poles, especially during hard times (e.g., the partitions of Poland, and the First and Second World Wars). God and the Roman Catholic Church were for a long time, and still are, extremely important to the majority of Poles. The Church played a consolidating role, gathering and supporting people during hard times (e.g., when Poland lost independence, or during the "Solidarity" era) (cf. Cudak, 2002). Honour, originally a virtue specific to knights and the nobility, is for Poles one of the most face-related values. To behave in a dishonourable way always involves a significant damage to face or face loss. The third value — homeland — has always been highly cherished, especially when Poland lost and had to fight for its independence; the nation's faithful sons sacrificed their lives to make it free and independent. Nowadays,

when Poland is a fully independent country, everyday life has become highly commercialized and people are more money- and pleasure-oriented, these values are not so important as they used to be. Now honour is often less important than money, other material gains and success, which dominate the new Polish reality. As some Poles say, *czasem trzeba schować honor do kieszeni, jeżeli chce się coś zyskać* (sometimes one has to put one's honour in one's pocket, if one wants to gain something). Such moral compromises seem to be an integral element of Polish social life in the era of consumerism. The same factors have also put patriotism on the sidelines of Polish social life. For many young Poles, it is a relic of the past.

Respect, marked by large power distance and ascribed status, is among the traditional Polish values. Poles respect their family, the elderly, women, their nation, tradition and property. Respect towards people is expressed by the use of appropriate forms of address, "the speakers' nearly self-effacing presence in requests and apologies to superiors (age, gender and status)," and "age- and status-oriented politeness" (Lubecka, 2000: 54; Jakubowska, 1999). Attachment to and respect for one's own land and home country in the past resulted in limited mobility. Poles accepted stability and a settled way of life. A person who frequently changed his place of residence, or was homeless or of unknown origin, was viewed with great suspicion (Kosowska, 2002). Nowadays, however, stability resulting from attachment to one's place of residence is often perceived negatively. Greater mobility has become generally accepted, as many Poles move to get education, to find a better job or better living conditions, although getting one's own flat and establishing a family are still among their principal aims in life (Kosowska, 2002). Many young Poles move to other European Union countries. Others, especially the most ambitious ones, commute to the largest Polish cities, e.g., Warsaw.

Interdependence and *reciprocal obligations*, *family bonds* and *friendship* constitute the basis of Polish interpersonal relations. Group membership, loyalty to one's group, group responsibility and the idea of solidarity are very important to members of Polish culture (Kosowska, 2002). The most important group in every Pole's life is his family, which constitutes a point of reference for life and provides support of all kinds, financial included. The great variety of kinship terms in the Polish language suggests the special role of family in Polish culture (Dubisz, 2002: 125–132). For Poles, apart from family, friendship is of great value. According to *Słownik Języka Polskiego* (1979), friendship in Polish culture involves close, warm-hearted relations based on mutual kindliness, sincerity, trust and the ability to count on the other in any circumstances. The dictionary enumerates expressions which can modify the word *przyjaźń* (friendship): *bezinteresowna* (unselfish), *dozgonna* (lifelong), *niezachwiana* (unswerving), *prawdziwa* (true), *serdeczna* (bosom), *szczera* (sincere), *wzajemna* (mutual), *zażyła* (intimate), *do grobowej deski* (till the day one dies). The features denoted

by these expressions, however, characterize not only friendship, but also other types of close relations. *Intimacy*, for example, inherent also in the majority of family relations, is especially cherished by Poles who see in it the basis of the emotional stability of any relationship.

Hospitality is another value important to the majority of Poles. This is visible in Polish folk wisdom, expressed in numerous proverbs, e.g., *Gość w dom, Bóg w dom* (A guest in the home, God in the home), *Czym chata bogata, tym rada* (Whatever is at home, will do [to serve the guests]), *Postaw się a zastaw się* (Pledge your entire fortune and cut a dash). The import of these sayings is that the guest is a blessing sent by God. A good host should sacrifice everything he has to entertain his guests, even go into debt. Polish hospitality can be evinced as a genuine expression of feelings, a sincere interest in the guests' life, spontaneity, and the high value put on relationships (Jakubowska, 2004a). Polish hospitality, however, can sometimes be troublesome for guests, as the host's duty is to feed the hungry and to give drink to the thirsty (Kosowska, 2002; Skudrzykowa, 2002). This duty has to be performed irrespective of the guest's will. The Polish understanding of hospitality differs markedly from the American one; the two expressions *Make yourself at home* and *Help yourself*, so frequently uttered by American hosts, signal that they do not want to impose anything on their guests and give them freedom of action and choice. Unlike American culture, in which imposition is to be avoided, even "for the good" of the guest, Polish culture promotes imposition as an expression of hospitality (e.g., *Musisz skosztować jeszcze tej sałatki* (You must try this salad), or *Nie wypuszczę cię, jeśli nie zjesz jeszcze jednego kawałka mojego tortu* (I won't let you go if you don't eat another piece of my cake)). However, together with the above-mentioned social and economic transformations, Polish hospitality is also changing. People work more and have less time to socialize, and face-to-face contacts are often replaced by e-mails, sms messages or telephone conversations at most.

Boasting in general, and boasting about one's success in particular, has never been accepted in Polish culture (Jakubowska, 1996, 1999; Grybosiowa, 2002). *Modesty* was, and still is, considered by some Poles one of the fundamental values that should be acquired by young people. The mention of one's own success or any positive comment about oneself should be avoided. What is more, any comment of this kind made by another person should be played down. Modesty is in conflict with *the need for inclusion and approval*, which is the major face need in Polish culture. This need is satisfied by means of different positive face-saving devices, such as expressions of gratitude, good wishes, congratulations and compliments on the interlocutor's appearance, possessions, good work and achievements. Traditionally, modesty is marked by timidity and lack of assertiveness, visible in responses to compliments and congratulations (which are often played down or even rejected) and "in the way

self-presentations are made [...] (inappropriateness of stressing one's virtues and successes)" (Lubecka, 2000: 54–55; Marcjanik, 2002). Due to the axiological changes, however, modesty is no longer the top value. This has an impact on the way people, especially members of the young generation, respond to compliments and congratulations; they rarely reject them or play them down. Like in American culture, in Polish culture acceptances have become the most frequent responses to compliments and congratulations (Arabski, 2004; Bogdanowska-Jakubowska, 2010). Generally, the Polish self-presentation style has changed; the self-image that young Poles create has nothing to do with modesty, timidity or shyness, and it does not preclude mention of a person's success and achievements. One can tell others about one's success without being perceived as a braggart.

In Polish culture, the need for acceptance prevails over the need for autonomy. The approval of important others is more valued than freedom of action and freedom from imposition. Poles, especially members of the older generation, often say: *Co ludzie powiedzą?* (What will people say?), *To nie uchodzi!* (This is not proper! [outdated]), *To nie wypada!* (This is not done!) (cf. Marcjanik, 2006). That is why it is more threatening to one's face to be criticized than to be paid an uninvited visit. "Polish pragmatics of politeness can be characterized by the principle of non-acceptance of any refusal and of no consideration for other people's objections and excuses" (Antas, 2002: 355). This especially refers to offers and invitations which "must" be accepted; such impositions are not treated as violations of the others' freedom of choice or as a threat to their face. This type of imposition is in accordance with Polish norms of politeness. In this area, however, there have also occurred some changes: especially among the young generation. Although the need for acceptance is still very important, younger Poles do not pay so much attention to what other people will say about them. They are also more sensitive to any imposition or limitation on their freedom. For their parents, for example, privacy was less important and isolation was viewed negatively. This is evident from their attitudes toward unexpected visits, often interpreted as a welcome surprise. This, however, has changed, and as Poles become more and more individualistic and constantly lack for time, they are beginning, at least among the younger generation, to value privacy and interpret unexpected visits as a disturbance.

Having adopted the Western/American style of life, with a drive for success, individualism, independence, freedom of choice, tolerance and mobility (cf. Ożóg, 2006), Poles remain faithful to traditional Polish values. What makes them different from members of Western cultures, and American culture in particular, is their uncontrolled *emotionality*, which consists in a genuine expression of feelings, both positive and negative, sincere interest in the interlocutor's life, directness of self-expression, spontaneity, and a high value put

on relationships (Lubecka, 2000). In Polish culture, expression of emotions is a norm. This is reflected in the language, in which there are many expressive forms: diminutives (e.g., *Tomek*, *Tomeczek*, *Tomiś*, *Tomisiek*, *Tomaszek*), or other words of endearment (e.g., *słoneczko* (sun (dim.)), *kochanie* (dear), *żabciu* (frog (dim.)), *skarbie* (darling)) (see also Jakubowska, 1999). Some words of endearment can take the form of augmentatives, e.g., *Bacha*, *Krycha*, *Grzechu*, which express a slightly different emotional attitude (Kryk-Kastovsky, 2002). In Polish culture, a person who does not show his emotions is, as Wierzbicka (1999a) claims, perceived by others as *cold* (meaning that this person does not "feel" anything). Generally speaking, emotionality in Polish culture shapes interpersonal relations and influences everyday communication in every social situation.

4.6.2. Interpersonal relations and facial expressions in Polish culture

As far as interpersonal relations are concerned, Poles are collectivists. Generally, they have few intimate relationships, which are developed through their lifetime or at least over many years (cf. Triandis, 1995). This characteristic feature is reflected in Polish vocabulary. Poles use three terms, *przyjaciel/przyjaciółka* (friend), *kolega/koleżanka* (friend) and *znajomy/znajoma* (acquaintance) (Wierzbicka, 2007), which differ in the degree of intimacy. The first one can be used to refer to someone with whom the individual is in a close and intimate relationship; the second is comparable to the English *friend*; the third is only used with reference to someone with whom the individual is in a relationship of low intimacy. Among the young generation of Poles, however, there is a strong tendency to have as many friends (*koledzy* or *znajomi*) as possible; these relationships are rather superficial and loose. These friends are persons to whom they say *hello*, and with whom they engage in the Polish version of small talk when meeting in the street, at the office or at a party.

The older generations of Poles, however, do not like talking about matters that do not interest them. They do not value the so-called "safe" conversational genres, such as small talk, as they feel it is not worth talking about unimportant matters. The free exchange of opinions accompanied by the expression of often negative emotions is widely approved of (Wierzbicka, 1999a). Poles follow the imperative to say what one thinks. This freedom of expression includes also one's opinions about the hearer, no matter whether they are positive or negative (e.g., *Ty chyba zupełnie zgłupiałaś* (You must be completely crazy)). So, even though the hearer's feelings are not neglected, the stress is on the speaker's

feelings (Wierzbicka, 1999a). This explains, for example, Poles' attitudes towards compliments and congratulations, which are universally used to "make others feel good." Poles often treat them as insincere and with a certain kind of reserve. If the speaker wants to show that his intentions are sincere, he often says: *To nie komplement. To prawda* (This is not a compliment. What I say is true.) (Jakubowska, 1999). Unlike Americans, Poles rarely talk about or analyse their emotions; they prefer to spontaneously express them, both verbally and nonverbally (Wierzbicka, 1999a). Such uncontrolled expression of emotions is often a threat to good social relations.

Polish culture stresses the importance of ingroups, which protect their members in return for loyalty. For every individual, it is vital to establish and maintain good relationships with other members of his ingroup and at the same time create his own social identity as a member of this group. This is achieved by means of claiming common ground with other members and establishing in-group solidarity. Doliński (2005) claims that complaining is often used for such purposes, as it can be treated as an attempt to agree on the evaluation of the surrounding reality and opinions on relevant social issues (e.g., common complaining about high prices, the difficult situation in the job market, or a demanding boss).

Wojciszke and Baryła (2005) maintain that in contrast with American culture, which is a *culture of affirmation*, Polish culture is a c*ulture of complaining and glorification of suffering*, in which to be unhappy constitutes the norm. Contemporary Poles have developed a widespread habit of complaining, or expressing dissatisfaction, no matter whether they experience it or not. This feeling of dissatisfaction centres mainly upon public rather than private or family affairs. Poles are also discontented with their own financial situation and future prospects (Wojciszke and Baryła, 2005). The norm of being unhappy and dissatisfied is related to another norm governing Polish social life, the norm of negative thinking, which makes Poles perceive everything in a negative light, describe everything in negative terms and expect the worst. According to Wojciszke and Baryła (2005: 42), the Polish public sector is "an incubator of the culture of complaining"; they claim that the longer people work in this sector the more frequently they complain, the more convinced of social injustice and the more discontented they are. Complaining distinguishes Polish culture from other cultures, American culture in particular. Our predilection for complaining can be contrasted with the American predilection for success. Complaining is a social activity which is always aimed at some audience (Wojciszke and Baryła, 2005; Klos Sokol, 1994; Antas, 2002). It can be explained by the conviction, widespread in Polish culture, that talking about one's happiness may lead to social rejection. For Poles, the American self-presentation style involving the expression of self-satisfaction and positive thinking seems extremely superficial and theatrical. Our complaining nature is

especially visible in typical responses to how-are-you type questions. In American culture, the answer to such questions is expected to be "brief, elusive, and as positive as possible" (Ferrara, 1980: 333). In this way, Americans show to others the self-image as a self-satisfied, successful person, who should be appreciated and approved of. In similar situations, Poles tend to downgrade the positive self-report (Jakubowska, 1999; cf. Grybosiowa, 2002; Doliński, 2005). They say: *Jakoś leci* (It's going somehow), *Po staremu* (As before), *Może być* (It could be worse), or *W porządku* ((It's) alright) (Ożóg, 1990; Jakubowska, 1999). This attitude is said to be deeply rooted in Polish history and cultural tradition. Members of the younger generation, though, in replying to how-are-you type questions, follow the American pattern and present themselves as successful irrespective of the real situation.

In Poland, a part of interpersonal relations is constituted by specific gender relations based on what Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak and Pawełczyk (2007) call *benevolent sexism*, which, as they say, has its roots in the-knight-and-his-lady tradition. Polish women are disadvantaged and idealized at the same time. After the Second World War, both the influence of the communist regime and the Roman Catholic tradition preserved the traditional gender roles. Women were responsible for child rearing and man/husband caring, while men were to struggle for the country and support the family (Jakubowska, 2007, 2009; Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak and Pawełczyk, 2007). During the communist era, social life in Poland was undergoing gradual changes. More and more women entered the workplace. They did so mainly out of necessity; they still believed in the traditional division of gender roles. Nowadays, women try to reconcile their career with family life and bringing up children, to be perfect wives and mothers and at the same time develop professionally. Trying to successfully perform so many conflicting social roles, they are still treated as the ladies of their knights, often getting *panie przodem* (ladies first), compliments and a kiss in the hand. Along with the changes in the Polish social and economic life, the position of women has changed a little for the better, although their situation is still that of the "disadvantaged" and "idealized." This is visible almost in every area of social life in which women perform roles other than their traditional gender roles.

One of the characteristic features of Polish culture and language is a well developed system of formal categories of politeness. The Polish language possesses a regular grammatical category of honorifics, among certain verbal forms and within personal pronouns (Jakubowska, 1999; Huszcza, 2005). One could even talk about the so-called traditional Polish *titular mania*, which was especially strong among members of Academia, representatives of the so-called professions (lawyers and doctors) and others who due to the function they perform or post they hold deserve to be addressed by a title. However, in modern Polish, the frequency of the use of titles is gradually decreasing due to

the westernization of Polish culture and the tendency to treat everybody as equal. This is related also to the process which Marcjanik (2002a; Grybosiowa, 2006) calls *democratization of politeness*, which consists in shortening the distance between interactants. This is often accompanied by *nonszalancja* (nonchalance) (Marcjanik, 2006) and *luz* (ease of manner) (Ożóg, 2002; 2005). *Nonszalancja* refers here to verbal or nonverbal behaviour which does not in principle involve breaking any basic norm of Polish politeness, but which is perceived by the addressee as being inadequately or insufficiently polite in a particular situation (e.g., the use of the title *Pan/Pani* + first name to customers in service encounters, to those whom we do not know well; the use the second person plural form to a group addressee) (Marcjanik, 2006; Grybosiowa, 2006). *Luz* refers to natural behaviour which is not restricted by stiff norms of politeness. *Zachowywać się na luzie* means "to behave in a casual manner, without inhibitions." This kind of behaviour involves greater directness and greater freedom of expression.

While in almost every area of social life there can be noticed various changes involving the borrowing of elements of the Western style of life and patterns of behaviour, the Polish face (part of the body) seems to be resistant to any foreign influence. In Poland, it is expected that the face should reflect what one really feels. If it does not, it is a sign that the person is insincere (Szarota, 2006). Poles, who smile in as many different situations as members of other cultures, do not like to smile "without any particular reason," and perceive the "smiling mask" as something artificial and insincere. The smile seems to be important mainly in private life (Szarota, 2006). This can be explained by the general lack of trust towards strangers, which is instilled in children from a very early age. Polish mothers tell their children: *Nigdy nie rozmawiaj z obcymi* (Never talk to strangers), or *Nawet nie patrz na obcą panią lub pana, jeżeli mówiliby coś do ciebie* (Don't even look at a strange woman or man, if they talk to you). Looking directly at another person is interpreted in Polish culture as an invitation to interaction. It is believed that it can attract unwelcome attention or provoke aggression. A direct look accompanied by a smile employed by a woman and aimed at a man is treated as sexually provocative. That is why Poles rarely smile at strangers and tend to avoid direct eye contact with them. Direct looks and genuine smiles are reserved for family, relatives and close friends. Smiling strangers are viewed with suspicion and distrust. According to Marcjanik (2007: 28), "the Pole [...] smiles when he thinks that such behaviour is for him for some reasons advantageous, that it is profitable." Polish culture, according to Szarota, represents a model of a "culture without a smile." The majority of Poles rarely smile in public. A sad face and a pained expression, together with a slumped posture, are the nonverbal effects accompanying complaining, which is one of the main Polish strategies for establishing harmony and maintaining good social relations (cf. Antas, 2002). For Poles,

a solemn face at work is a sign of competence and professionalism. Generally, in the presence of others, Poles seem to be serious, sad and tired. At least, this is how members of other cultures perceive us.

4.6.3. Face in Polish culture

In Polish culture, the primary orientation is on the one hand on significant others and one's relationship with them, on the other hand on individuality. Traditionally, the Polish concept of self emphasizes the ideal of ingroup interdependence and cooperation. In addition, it is now undergoing some changes connected with the general shift towards individualism. Poles, for example, are learning what the concept of self-assertiveness means and that it should be perceived as a positive value (the word *assertiveness* does not have any equivalent in Polish and has been recently borrowed by Polish; the Polish word used sometimes as its equivalent — *pewność siebie* — has a negative connotation). As mentioned above, other Western/American values, such as the autonomy of the individual, self-reliance and independence are also becoming highly popular, especially among the younger generation of Poles. Thus, there is not one self-construal predominating in Polish culture. The interdependent self-construal predominates among the older generation and the less educated, while the independent self-construal predominates among the younger generation, who started their adult life within the last twenty years, and the educated. This is in line with the view presented by Ewa Kosowska in her paper, "Kultura polska. Korzenie współczesności" (2002: 106–107):

> The basis of the differences that shape the modern axiological standards turns out to be the level of education and the generation factor. In spite of the strong influence of new elements [that create culture], the essence of Polish identity is based on a range of traditional attitudes which different groups of Poles refer to. [...] One can meet persons who build their hierarchy of values on the traditional patterns of national culture and those who take the postmodern orientation.

The *Polish self-construal*, like Polish culture, is evolving. It reflects the view in which the person is created by his roles and relations with others as well as by "stable properties, separate from his or her social context" (cf. Cross and Gore, 2003: 542). An individual's self is either/partly unique and independent or/and interdependent and belonging. Members of the younger generation often fight an internal battle between the traditional Polish upbringing model, which requires close contacts with the family, involving strong and long-lasting

interdependence and taking into consideration "what others will say," and the new, "westernized"/"Americanized," model, according to which they are independent individuals who have the right to liberate themselves from external authority and be "unique" (cf. DeVos, 1985; Scollon and Scollon, 1994).

As has been said in Section 4.5.3., American children are treated as fully-fledged human beings deserving of respect. In Polish culture, children and young people "do not deserve respect," and face is not given to the individual in childhood. This is visible in the manner adults treat them and refer to them. Everyday politeness and facework in general seem not to apply in interaction with children (there is an almost total lack of the use of such words as *dziękuję* (thank you), *proszę* (please)). In the adult world, their face concerns often do not count at all. A good illustration of the Polish attitude to children is the saying: *Dzieci i ryby głosu nie mają* (Children and fish do not have the right to speak), meaning, "a well brought up child should keep silent." This is related to the principle, taught in the former times, that the child can speak only when addressed by an adult. However, the child can share some of his family face, as Polish face can be either treated as belonging to an individual or as shared among some important groups, such as the family. Face can be treated as a heritage which can be lost, restored or saved. The following examples of a teacher's comments addressed to her student illustrate this:

> *Od profesorskiego dziecka więcej się wymaga.* (More can be expected of a professor's child than of others.)
>
> *Znam twoich rodziców i wiem, że stać cię na więcej.* (I know your parents and I know that you are capable of much more.)

The following comment by a father to his son also invokes family face:

> *Nie kompromituj nas zachowując się w taki sposób!* (Don't compromise us by such behaviour!)

Thus, the actions of one individual can affect the face of his family, as the reputation of his family can influence his own face. These comments are related to face which is shared by members of a group (the family), but face can also be shared by members of some groups of professionals, e.g., doctors. Members of this group are very sensitive to any critical comment directed towards their colleagues, whether it concerns their professional competence or their moral integrity. Although in both cases (the family and the collectivity of doctors), the facework stimulus is loyalty to other co-members, the value of group face in these two cases is perceived differently in Polish society. The positive evaluation of family face results from the traditional Polish respect for the family. The negative evaluation of the face of the professional group of doctors is related to the general condition of Polish health care.

In Polish culture, face is acquired and gradually increases together with social status in adult life (cf. Ervin-Tripp *et al.*, 1995). It can be identified with the following set of attributes mentioned by my Polish respondents, asked about concepts commonly identified with face:

Table 3. Social attributes identified with face in Polish culture

Value	Mentioned by the respondents (per cent)
Honour	95
Respect	92
Dignity	67
Positive self-image	62
Good reputation	60
Faithfulness to one's principles	50
Social status based on achievement	47
Social status based on a position acquired through ascription	42
Credibility	42

The selection of attributes, presented in Table 3, defines the Polish conceptualization of face. *Honour*, the attribute most frequently identified by Poles with face, and *respect*, like face, can be lost due to behaviour at variance with what is morally acceptable. The high percentage of mentions of *dignity*, *positive self-image* and *good reputation* proves that Poles perceive face as a positive worth which can bring them success in relations with others. Another highly valued attribute related to face is *faithfulness to one's principles*, which requires the identity of the presented opinions/principles with the opinions/principes acted on. A value which contributes greatly to face in Polish culture is *social status*, both the one *based on achievement* and the one *based on a position acquired through ascription*. Face depends on an individual's hard work, skills and competence as well as on his relationship to important others (i.e. belonging to a respectable family, having an influential relative or being the son/daughter of a respectable or successful person). The latter type of status used to prevail over the former; however nowadays people are more often evaluated on the basis of what they have achieved and what they represent than on what they belong to. The last face-related value on the list is *credibility*, which, according to the Polish respondents, has a much smaller impact on the individual's face than that claimed by the American respondents. Taking everything into consideration, Polish face is a self-image based mainly on moral aspects of the individual's performance, others' opinion of the individual and generally understood social status, in which social ascription still has its part.

The Polish concept of face is based on the two competing self-construals existing simultaneously in Polish culture. Therefore it can be described neither as purely independent nor as purely interdependent, it is rather *face "in*

transition" (i.e. undergoing certain changes, parallel to the changes in Polish society and culture). The type of face which is "put on" by each participant during social interaction depends on the context of the situation and on one's relationship with others. Unlike the American mask-like face, which is friendly and smiling, the Polish face still recalls a pained, unhappy mask, although there are some changes in the direction of the more positive and more optimistic image.

Together with transformations that have affected Polish economic and social life, there can be noticed significant changes in the *Polish politeness model*, in which, according to Kazimierz Ożóg (2005: 14), "there has occurred a shift from expressing kindness towards another person to focusing on oneself." The speaker becomes more important than the addressee. He can behave in certain ways, as he is a free, autonomous participant in social interaction who has the right to self-expression (Ożóg, 2005). Thus, interacting with others, Poles, like Americans, are oriented mainly at their own face. However, they express greater mutual-face and other-face maintenance than members of individualistic cultures, such as American culture. They use more approval-seeking strategies than autonomy-preserving strategies, because inclusion and approval still dominate over autonomy among their face needs (cf. Morisaki and Gudykunst, 1994). In Polish culture, the "good" self-image involves the following features:

- (of the person's positive image) cheerful (although it may sound paradoxical), nice,
- (of the person's interpersonal skills) amiable, considerate, approachable, non-conceited, cooperative,
- (of the person's character) independent, caring, competent, generous, sensitive.

These features were most frequently mentioned by my Polish respondents asked about the "meaning" of the positive self-image.

Self-presentation may take many different forms; people employ many different strategies to present themselves to others in an acceptable way; they always try to show their positive attributes, or at least try to convince others that they possess them. The Polish self-presentation style differs from the American; this results from the differences in hierarchies of values, the character of social relations and the type of self-construal prevailing in Polish and American cultures. Klos Sokol (1994: 24), an American linguist who worked at the University of Warsaw, discusses the differences between Polish and American self-presentation styles:

> The Polish sociolinguist, Adam Jaworski, claims that modesty is a feature highly valued in Polish culture. At the same time, he stresses the difference between the Polish and American way of self-presentation. The American way

('Listen to what I have achieved') is 'looking for confirmation' from others. It consists in the hearer agreeing with the speaker, and then congratulating him [on what he has achieved]. This can seem to be arrogant in comparison to the Polish preference for modesty ('I didn't come out best'). Jaworski describes this style of behaviour as 'getting [a compliment/congratulation] out [of the other].' Finally, the hearer objects to the speaker's low self-evaluation and stresses his good points.

Generally speaking, self-presentation consists in stressing one's positive attributes and down-playing one's negative attributes (Goffman, 1959; Baumeister, 1982; Leary, 1999; Schlenker and Pontari, 2000; Schlenker, 2003). In Polish culture, a "good" self-image is often created by means of down-playing one's own positive attributes. These are, however, only appearances (resulting from false modesty) which are intended to enhance the self-image.

Doliński (2005: 59) describes another typically Polish strategy of self-presentation, complaining. This can be employed by an individual to show that he is in possession of some desirable attributes, to save his face, or to present to others some positive but stressful incidents. Poles, for example, often complain about hotel rooms or food served at a restaurant, implying in this way that they are used to higher standards of living and eating. They complain about other people's behaviour, intelligence or moral standards to show in this way that they are better (i.e. behave in a proper way, are more intelligent and have higher moral standards). Doliński maintains that the act of complaining is a signal that others do not reach the standards used by the complaining individual. Another situation in which Poles resort to complaining is when in the presence of important others they perform an act which is threatening to their own face. This is reflected in the Polish saying: *Marnej tanecznicy wadzi rąbek u spódnicy* (A bad workman (always) blames his tools). For example, students who failed the exam often blame for their failure an excessively demanding examiner, bad luck or difficult access to the required resource books. Thus, every failure or error can be excused in this way, and such an act of excuse-complaining is a self-face-saving device. As mentioned above, boasting about one's success or happiness is not accepted in Polish culture, because it does not agree with the Polish norms of self-presentation, which require modesty and sincerity. However, the need to talk about something positive that happened, is happening or will happen to us is universal. To comply with the norms of self-presentation, Poles refer to their success or happiness by means of complaint. So instead of boasting openly about getting a better job, getting married or buying a new expensive car, they complain about the stressful situation in their new job, about many problems connected with their wedding organization or about their inability to choose the car's colour. Simply speaking, what Americans say explicitly about their true or alleged success or happiness, Poles imply, or allude

to, "putting on" a suffering face. This suffering, pained face, however, is falling "out of fashion" as members of the young generation of Poles adopt the Western/American way of self-presentation.

Polish face, which is created in a way foreigners often perceive as devious, can easily be threatened or lost. The interviewed Poles, when asked about face-threatening or face-loss situations, mentioned:

- situations in which the person, or a member of his group/family, or one of his belongings, is disapproved of or rejected by important others (e.g., criticizing, failing to invite him to a party),
- situations in which somebody else does and/or says something that threatens the person's self-image (e.g., offending, calling names, failure to greet the person, interpreted as showing lack of respect),
- situations in which the person does something that is inconsistent with his projected self-image (e.g., lying which is found out by others),
- situations in which the person shows lack of competence or makes a serious error, unforgivable mistake, or faux pas,
- situations in which the person fails to do something (e.g., letting another person down, betraying another person's trust).

This list clearly shows how important for Poles is the opinion of other people. It is the approval of others, especially important others, and their perception of the person's image that mainly contribute to the creation of Poles' face.

A good illustration of the Polish attitude to face is a statement made by the Polish politician Marek Borowski on his resignation as deputy prime minister (February 4, 1994):

> *Funkcje sprawować można różne, twarz ma się tylko jedną* (Markiewicz and Romanowski, 1998: 90).
> (One may perform many functions, but he has only one face.)

For every person, face is a value of the utmost importance which cannot be neglected in any situation.

The picture drawn above shows Poles as a cultural group that is highly diversified in terms of values they cherish, employed patterns of behaviour and self-construals. Similarly, Polish face cannot be classified unambiguously, either as independent or as interdependent. Like Polish culture, Polish face is undergoing great changes, changes towards individualism among them. That is why it is face "in transition."

Chapter 5

Face as an academic concept

5.1. Introduction

As a scholarly concept face has existed for about sixty years. It was first introduced into academic discourse by Erving Goffman (1922–1982) (1955, 1967), called by Randall Collins (1988: 41) "the greatest sociologist of the latter half of the twentieth century." Goffman created a theoretical construct and based it on the Chinese concept of face, as presented by Hsien Chin Hu (1944), in her seminal paper on Chinese face, and on some sociological theories (e.g., Emile Durkheim, 1912). Goffman's ideas about face and facework became an inspiration for representatives of many areas of social sciences. Their traces can be found both in social psychology and linguistic research. As Levinson (1988: 161) puts it, "the 'face-work' ideas have been recycled as a theory of linguistic politeness by Lakoff (1973), Brown and Levinson (1978), Leech (1983) and others." Following Goffman, other scholars focused on the concept of face, diverging from the original folk meaning of the notion.

The concept of face discussed in this chapter is an academic concept, the so-called second-order face (face2). The chapter begins with a presentation of the works of Erving Goffman. Next, an overview of theories whose central concept is face is provided. Finally, my own contribution to the interpretation of the social construct of face, an alternative theory of face and facework, the *Cultural Face Model*, is presented. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the applicability of the model.

5.2. Erving Goffman's world of social encounters

All people live in "a world of social encounters" in which they enter into contact with other people. This contact may be of face-to-face or mediated nature. Face-to-face interaction, as Goffman defines it, is "the reciprocal influence of individuals upon one another's actions when in one another's immediate physical presence" (1959: 13), or an occasion when two or more persons are co-present with one another. Co-presence occurs when persons "sense that they are close enough to be perceived in whatever they are doing, including their experiencing of others, and close enough to be perceived in this sensing of being perceived" (1967: 17). And whenever they are co-present, they are sources of information for one another. Goffman distinguishes two types of information, the information that they *give* (voluntarily) and the information that they *give off* (involuntarily, whether the individual wants to give it or not). The former involves verbal symbols or their substitutes, and this is communication in its traditional sense, whereas the latter "involves a wide range of action that others can treat as symptomatic of the actor" (Goffman, 1959: 2). Thus, for Goffman, face-to-face interaction is much more than what people say; what he is interested in is an integrative view of human communicative behaviour.

   People's conduct in each other's immediate presence is governed by what Goffman, in *Behavior in Public Places* (1963), calls *public order*. Public order is a part of *social order*, which is defined as "the consequence of any set of moral norms that regulates the way in which persons pursue their objectives" (Goffman, 1963: 8). These norms require that every individual should be perceptive and considerate, have pride, honour and dignity, and should behave tactfully, and have feelings and some amount of poise. These are the moral values, which the *self* expresses through *face*.

5.2.1. Social interaction in dramaturgical perspective

Goffman's dramaturgical approach to social interaction provides a detailed elaboration of the Shakespearean thought, "All the world's stage, and all the men and women merely players" (*As You Like It*, act II, scene 7). A similar idea is expressed by Hobbes, in *Leviathan*, where he says: "So that a *Person*, is the same that an *Actor* is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation [...]" (Hobbes, 1973: 83). On this basis Goffman formulates the role theory, in which human communication is presented metaphorically as action on the stage where

individuals play their roles interacting with others. He writes (1959: 30; cf. Edgley and Turner, 1975):

> While in the presence of others, the individual typically infuses his activity with signs which dramatically highlight and portray confirmatory facts that might otherwise remain unapparent or obscure. For if the individual's activity is to become significant to others, he must mobilize his activity so that it will express *during the interaction* what he wishes to convey.

This dramaturgical perspective is first taken in his *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959), which he characterizes as "a sort of handbook" describing dramaturgical "principles." In his description of social interaction in this work, Goffman uses the metaphor: SOCIAL INTERACTION IS A THEATRE. This dramaturgical model involves the existence of a series of selves, "one 'inside' the other, after the fashion of [...] a Russian doll. The divisions match those between playwright, producer, actor, and part" (Burns, 1991: 107). The social self ("producer") controls whether the individual's role is appropriate to the social position in which it is fixed ("part"). But there is also "an inner 'I'" which manages the social self through social situations (Burns, 1991: 107). Goffman claims that social situations provide "the natural theater in which all bodily displays are enacted and in which all bodily displays are read" (1983: 4).

All "the activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence in any way any of the other participants" is called a *performance* (1959: 26). Participants, or performers, actors, to make their performances successful use *fronts* (masks), expressive equipment such as appropriate facial expressions, speech patterns, role attitudes and stage props (e.g., insignia of office or rank). As "abstract stereotyped expectations" (1959: 28), fronts help the performers become more convincing and credible, and add "dramatic realization" to their performances. Performances are "idealized", i.e. shown to fully adhere to the norms and hierarchies of values of the actor's culture. As Manning (1992: 41−42) comments:

> [...] performances are both realized and idealized as our all-too-human selves are transformed into socialized beings capable of expressing control. During a performance the individual's attributes may be stretched to the needs of the occasion and different audiences will be held in a greater or lesser degree of 'mystification,' thereby allowing the performer to maintain a distance from which to appear more interesting.

Performances are often staged by teams, sets of individuals whose cooperation is necessary to maintain the definition of a given projected social situation. Sometimes in the team performance there is a *director*, someone who dominates the show and controls the performance of team members. They

perform in *frontstage* and *backstage* ("front regions" and "back regions"). The front-stage is the place from which the actors can be seen by the audience. Here they give their performance, tend to be polite and behave in accordance with certain standards of decorum. In the backstage, they behave in a completely different way. They can relax, drop their fronts and "step out of character." The backstage is a place "where the impression fostered by the performance is knowingly contradicted as a matter of course" (1959: 114). Thus, the actors' behaviour is regionally variable. Usually, the passage from the frontstage to the backstage is closed off from the members of the audience and the entire back region is kept hidden from them. For the performance to be fully successful the audience has to agree to believe that the frontstage is the only reality. Examples of this can be found almost everywhere, e.g., in a mental hospital:

> If a mental hospital staff is to give a good impression of the hospital to those who come to visit their committed kinfolk, then it will be important to be able to bar visitors from the wards, especially the chronic wards, restricting the outsiders to special visiting-rooms where it will be practicable to have relatively nice furnishings and to ensure that all patients present are well dressed, well washed, well handled and relatively well behaved (Goffman, 1959: 116).

Due to the regional variability of behaviour in team performances, team members have to keep the information of backstage activities secret. Goffman distinguishes five types of secret (1959: 141−143): "dark secrets" (facts incompatible with the image of the team), "strategic secrets" (facts about what the team is planning to do), "inside secrets" (facts whose knowledge marks an individual as a member of the team), "entrusted secrets" (facts that are kept secret because of the possessor's relationship to the team to which the secret refers), and "free secrets" (facts which can be disclosed without discrediting the team's image). The knowledge of these facts can be valuable to other people with *discrepant roles* (e.g., informer, shill, spotter, shopper, mediator, nonperson (such as servant), confidant, or colleague). They may try to get access to these secrets by pretending to be team members. Most of them have access to the backstage, and they try to use it to gain something for themselves.

The disclosure of backstage information, however, may happen also due to inadvertent loss of the balance of formality and informality established for the interaction. Usually, members of two interacting teams present themselves to each other for interaction purposes and "tend to maintain the line that they are what they claim to be: they tend to stay in character" (1959: 166). The disclosure of some damaging information by members of one team means their dropping "out of character." In such situations performers often make exclamations such as *Good Lord!* or *Oh my God!*, or their facial equivalents, admitting in this way to their momentary inability to sustain the performed character. Discussing communication in which performers convey information

incompatible with the image officially maintained, Goffman distinguishes its four types (1959: 168–187):

- *treatment of the absent*, which involves presenting the absent in a disrespectful way (e.g., ridiculing, gossiping about, caricaturing, cursing or criticizing),
- *staging talk* ('shop talk'), in which people of different social roles engage when discussing their performance problems and audience reception,
- *team collusion* with part of the audience, which consists in communication conveyed in such a way "as to cause no threat to the illusion that is being fostered for the audience" (1959: 175),
- *realigning actions*, involving unofficial communication, speaking out of character "in a way that will be heard by the audience but will not openly threaten either the integrity of the two teams or the social distance between them" (e.g., innuendo, mimicked accents, jokes, significant pauses, veiled hints, purposeful kidding or expressive overtones) (1959: 187).

To avoid the disclosing of discreditable facts every performer engages in what Goffman calls *impression management*. In managing "the show," he does his best to behave in such a way as to make his projected self match his presented self. However, "scenes" happen when he acts in a way that may damage his own image or the image of the other. Such disruptions of projections (e.g., faux pas, unmeant gestures, or inopportune intrusions) may result in a serious threat to or total destruction of "the polite appearance of consensus" (1959: 205). The persons involved may feel flustered, embarrassed or nervous, and this may further jeopardize the performance. However, both the performer and the audience want the show to be successful and are ready to take some preventive measures. The performer employs some defensive practices. The audience also contributes greatly to the maintenance of "the show." To help the performer maintain his presented self, members of the audience employ protective practices and exercise tact.

In the situations which Goffman mainly portrays, actors manipulate their performances to hide their true motives. Everything they are engaged in is staged. For Giddens (1988: 260; Manning, 1992), what Goffman describes is "a cynical world of self-concerned agents, in which appearance counts above all else."

5.2.2. Social interaction as a game

Social interaction is a hazardous enterprise. An individual, interacting with others, takes a chance of being embarrassed or humiliated due to some

inadvertent disclosure of some damaging facts or some action that threatens his self-image. Therefore, social interaction is not only a theatrical event, it is also "a gamble," a game of risk (Goffman, 1959: 236) (SOCIAL INTERACTION IS A GAMBLE; SOCIAL INTERACTION IS A GAME).

Goffman first resorts to the game analogy in his doctoral dissertation, "Communication Conduct in an Island Community" (1953), where he notes that during social interaction the islanders try to extract as much as possible information about each other, but reveal as little as possible about themselves. These practices, which consist in the routine withholding and uncovering of information, are called by Goffman "gain strategies." He suggests that they are so common "that it is better to conceive of interaction not as a scene of harmony but as an arrangement for pursuing a cold war" (1953: 40). This war, however, is one that allows for some working acceptance which makes social interaction possible. For Goffman, interaction is played like a game of "concealment and search" (1953: 84).

The game metaphor is also used in *Encounters* (1961), where it is viewed as a good way of describing the structure of real-life interactions, in which winning and losing are the key issues. In "Where the action is," published in *Interaction Ritual* (1967), Goffman refers to the world of gambling and casinos. He tries to employ a casino vocabulary in the analysis of everyday life. "Action," which takes place during *plays*, is connected to "chance taking." Every participant, or *player*, risks *a stake* or *bet* in trying to win the prize. The prize that he wins or the bet that he loses is the *payoff*. Bet and prize combined are called the *pot*. As in actual gambling, there are two types of *odds* on winning, *theoretical* ones, "referring to the chances of a favorable outcome compared to those of an unfavorable one," and *true odds*, given biases (1967: 150). The *advantage* of the play is the pot from which the bet is subtracted. "When there is neither advantage not disadvantage, the play is said to be *fair*" (1967: 151). One can talk about the action when the bets are staked. Then the game is played and "a fully known set of *possible outcomes* is faced" (1967: 150).

The attractiveness of gambling and games can be explained in the following way: our everyday social life is "safe and momentless," and, as Goffman claims, we need the chance-taking actions and fateful situations in order to affirm some aspects of our character which "can be neither expressed nor earned safely" (1967: 260). There is the widely held belief that character can be dramatically acquired and lost, and that is why individuals are ready to go through with chancy situations no matter what the likely cost to themselves, in this way manifesting pride. During moments of action, "character is gambled," generated, no matter whether its expression is good or bad. "The self [...] can be voluntarily subjected to re-creation" (1967: 237).

The game perspective is also used in "Expression Games," published in *Strategic Interaction* (1969), where Goffman discusses *moves* available to players in games other than casino games (e.g., moves made by agents in some undercover operation). The players in expression games have at their disposal different types of move: the *unwitting move* (behaviour unoriented to the observer's assessment – "the subject acts mindlessly relative to impression management"), the *naïve move* (the behaviour of the observer believing in the subject's unwitting move – "the observer draws information from what he takes to be an unwitting move"), the *covering move* (behaviour intended to produce expressions to improve the individual's situation – "the subject attempts to influence the conclusions that the observer comes to") (Goffman, 1969: 17), the *uncovering move* (behaviour aimed at uncovering covering moves), and the *counter-uncovering move* (behaviour aimed at countering uncovering moves) (1969: 18–19). Goffman concludes the essay with the statement:

> In every social situation we can find a sense in which one participant will be an observer with something to gain from assessing expressions, and another will be a subject with something to gain from manipulating this process. A single structure of contingencies can be found in this regard which renders agents a little like us all and all of us a little like agents (1969: 81).

Game analogies point "to the calculative element in our everyday dealings and present us as information managers and gain strategists" (Manning, 1992: 71). Goffman uses them to show and explain the mechanisms of social interaction. However, he is aware of the existence of other important elements of our social life, which make it more predictable and less hazardous – rituals.

5.2.3. The ritual organization of interpersonal contacts

Goffman's early work was inspired by the Durkheimian tradition in sociological theory, which if reduced to its most simple elements, says that "social reality is at its core a moral reality" (Collins, 1988: 44). In The *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912/2001: 282), Durkheim suggests that ritual is what keeps society together. He writes that religious rituals are "a collection of ceremonies intended solely to awaken certain ideas and feelings, to link the present to the past, the individual to the collectivity." Such rites consist of "recalling the past and making it in some way present by means of an actual dramatic representation" (Durkheim, 1912/2001: 278). In being faithful to the past, people "preserve the collectivity's moral profile" (Durkheim, 1912/2001: 277).

In performing rituals, people fulfil certain duties towards society and in this way become social beings, dependent on the collectivity they belong to. For Durkheim, the moral is inseparably related to the religious. Having investigated totemism as a religion, he came to the conclusion that in any religion one can find two categories or two worlds — the sacred (gods) and the profane (believers). They enter into relations which Durkheim calls *rites*, enabling the two worlds to communicate. He distinguishes three kinds of rites: *negative rites*, which prevent the sacred from contacting the profane; *positive rites*, through which the profane communicates with the sacred; and sacrificial rites, which are resorted to in case of some loss or disaster. The concept of rites, as understood in this way, became an inspiration, first for Goffman in writing about the ritual character of social order, and second for Brown and Levinson (1987), who elaborated on strategic, goal-oriented politeness (negative and positive politeness).

Goffman noted that a similar description can be given to rituals we perform every day while interacting with other people. The recurrence of certain communicative goals (face maintenance being the main one) in interpersonal communication results in some communicative strategies being turned into *interaction rituals* (cf. Rawls, 1987). The similarity to Durkheim's idea of rites is clearly visible in his understanding of rituals. In *Relations in Public*, Goffman defines *rituals* (or *interpersonal rituals* (1981: 20); *contact rituals* (1983: 10)) as perfunctory, conventionalized acts "through which an individual portrays his respect and regard for some object of ultimate value to that object of ultimate value or to its stand-in" (1971: 62). Every social situation which Goffman analyses as a ritual is centred on the self. Conversation is a ritual, whose aim "is to create a little temporary cult, a shared reality consisting of whatever is being talked about" (Collins, 1988: 47). He compares the ritual of conversation to a mystic trance or "a psychosis-like state" (Collins, 1988: 48). In *Interaction Ritual*, he writes that "talk creates for the participant a world and a reality that has other participants in it. Joint spontaneous involvement is a *unio mystico*, a socialized trance" (Goffman, 1967: 113).

Later, Goffman characterizes these rituals as "micro-ecological metaphors" serving as "summaries and iconic symbols of structural arrangements" (1983: 11). Individuals participating in social interaction, following a certain social code, perform some actions (rituals) which, apart from their explicit meaning, have symbolic meaning which must be expressed for the interaction to be successful. Thus, the metaphor he refers to may be formulated in the following way: SOCIAL INTERACTION IS A RITUAL, or CONVERSATION IS A RITUAL.

These rituals have the following ingredients (Collins, 1988: 44):

- The group (which may be as small as two persons) is assembled face to face. Ritual is thus a micro-situational phenomenon, though it has macro, trans-situational consequences.
- The participants develop a mutually aware focus of attention. They focus on the same thing, action, or thought; and they become aware that each other is focusing upon it. [...] The content of a ritual is arbitrary. [...] The stereotyped action found in formal rituals is important only because it provides an easy and habitual common focus.
- The participants share a common emotional mood. Again, the particular emotional content is arbitrary, since any mood held in common can sustain a ritual: reverence, fear, thankfulness, anger at one's enemies, love, and so forth.
- If these ingredients are present, an intensification takes place. The mood becomes heightened.
- The consequences of such ritual interactions are to shape the subsequent behaviour, thought and feeling of those who took part in them. [...] Rituals thus produce (and reproduce) moral sentiments in individuals. [...] The physical and mental world, in short, becomes populated with objects that symbolize society. Internalized and carried around in the minds of individuals, these symbols become the steering mechanisms by which people recognize co-members. By means of these symbols people feel where to gravitate for support, where are the centres of power they must respect. On the negative side, they recognize the boundaries of their groups by the lack of respect for their own sacred symbols; [...].

Interacting with other people is potentially threatening to every participant. And the function of the interaction rituals is to establish and/or maintain a state of *ritual equilibrium* in social interaction. The equilibrium can be maintained when individuals adhere to the moral rules specified in the social code, which designates the general pattern of the game every participant is obliged to play. The code includes *ritual constraints* which have to do with "how each individual ought to handle himself with respect to each of the others, so that he does not discredit his own tacit claim to good character or the tacit claim of the others that they are persons of social worth whose various forms of territoriality are to be respected" (Goffman, 1976: 266). The term *ritual order* is used by Goffman in two ways. First, referring to the 'moral' character of interaction, he claims that participants in social interaction have a moral obligation to sustain their own and each other's claims to relevant identities, in other words, an individual possessing certain social characteristics has a moral right to be treated by others in an appropriate way, and is obliged to be what he claims. Second, the ritual order stands for "the 'standardized' character of interaction" — a certain kind of "ritualization" (Williams, 1988: 67). Strong (1988) claims that ritual order is nothing but etiquette, which lends weight and stability to every encounter.

This involves a certain kind of ceremonial activity. In "The nature of deference and demeanor," published in *Interaction Ritual* (1967), Goffman distinguishes two different components of this activity, deference and demeanour. The two are strongly reminiscent of Durkheim's idea of the interdependence of social beings and their "duties towards society" (Durkheim, 1912/2001; see also Bargiela-Chiappini, 2003). *Deference* functions as "a symbolic means by which appreciation is regularly conveyed *to* a recipient *of* this recipient, or of something of which this recipient is taken a symbol, extension, or agent" (1967: 56). Such ceremonial activity usually takes the form of rituals. People have to address each other properly with respect to the context of the situation, the relationship between the interlocutors and their social status.

As stated above, for Goffman conversation is a ritual activity. "It is a little social system with its own boundary-maintaining tendencies" (1967: 113). The conversational boundaries are marked by the rituals, which in *Relations in Public* (1971), Goffman calls *access rituals* (greetings and farewells) (see also *status rituals* in Goffman, 1967). "Greetings mark the transition to a condition of increased access and farewells to a state of decreased access" (Goffman, 1971: 79). Apart from access rituals, there are two kinds of ritual interchanges: *supportive rituals*, which are performed for the sake of mutual support (e.g., thanks, congratulations, condolences), and *remedial rituals*, performed when the person tries to remedy an offence he has committed and thus re-establish a state of ritual equilibrium (e.g., apologies) (Goffman, 1971; or *interpersonal rituals* in Goffman, 1967).

In writing about deference, Goffman concentrates on two types of activity, *avoidance rituals* and *presentational rituals*. The former make the participant keep his distance from the recipient and refrain from doing anything that would impose anything on him, while the latter are acts through which he shows his appreciation of the recipient. This distinction is similar to Durkheim's classification of ritual into negative and positive rites. Both Durkheim's positive and negative rites (2001) and Goffman's rituals present a dichotomy between "a desire to include the individual" and "showing respect for his privacy" (Goffman, 1967: 76). Goffman stresses a special function of the negative rites, as "a central organizational device of public order" (Goffman: 1971: 63). Respect for the other's privacy, giving him feedom of choice and refraining from imposing anything on him are, in fact, prominent elements of American public order, which Goffman analysed.

The other component of ceremonial activity, *demeanour*, is usually "conveyed through deportment, dress, and bearing," which is to show others that the individual is a person of desirable or undesirable qualities (Goffman, 1967: 77). Goffman enumerates attributes characteristic of a well demeaned individual, e.g., discretion, sincerity, modesty, control over his emotions, appetites and desires, and poise.

The individual is responsible only for the demeanour image of himself. The deference image of himself he owes to the other participants, while he is responsible for the deference image of the others. Thus to create a complete self-image the individual needs others, as self-presentation is a ritually coordinated sequence of social actions by means of which a person gains his position in a network of social relations. A "dialogistic character," as Goffman (1971) claims, is typical for all interpersonal rituals. They have to be performed during the interaction of at least two persons (e.g., the giver and the receiver of the compliment, the offended and the offender in the case of apology or account), as a reply makes the ritual complete.

5.2.4. Frames

The ideas presented in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* and in "Fun in Games," published in *Encounters* (1961), were later revised and refined in Goffman's longer and more mature *Frame Analysis* (1974). The theatricality of everyday behaviour, which was "used not simply as a metaphor but as a paradigm for social conduct" (Burns, 1991: 239) and the game-like character of social interaction, described by Goffman as a series of interactional moves between players, are shown here in a new light. In *Frame Analysis*, Goffman treats theatricality only as the necessary consequence of the individual's ability to divide the self into "a multiplicity of part-selves" (Burns, 1991: 239), but the main theme remains the same – how people manipulate social situations to achieve their goals.

Although the terminology used is different, the concepts lying behind it are the same as those presented in *The Presentation... Frame* refers to "any situation, as it has become organized through social moves up to the point in time, [...] a socially defined reality" (Collins, 1988: 54) (cf. frontstage). Frames help us define the situations we are in and our experiences; they answer the question "what is happening?" There are formal situations (e.g., lectures) in which the structure is consciously and purposively manipulated by individuals (performers) to have a certain effect on the audience. The more formal the situation, the greater the embarrassment caused by frame-breaking is. Frame space (cf. backstage) (e.g., personal conversation), on the other hand, is any informal situation in which "both participants more or less interchangeably take the stage, as well as sympathetically participate in what the other person is trying to put on" (Collins, 1988: 56). Even though devoid of much of the tension characteristic of formal situations, conversations in informal situations are not free from problems of framing and staging. Performance failures,

however, do not involve as much embarrassment as in the case of formal situations.

According to Goffman, frames organize our experiences and make social interaction meaningful. The most fundamental frames are called "primary frameworks"; Goffman divides them into "natural" and "social." The natural frameworks define situations as "purely physical," unguided by human agency, while the social frameworks, which "provide background understanding for events that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human being," define situations as "guided doings" involving intervention (1974: 22).

Any framework can be *keyed*, i.e. its meaning can be transformed into something patterned on but independent of it (e.g., a make-believe key transforms a serious frame into a non-serious one) (Manning, 1992). The keying itself can be rekeyed indefinitely. In the case of a frame incorporating rekeyings, each transformation can be said to add a *layer* or *lamination* to the activity. In the innermost layering, "dramatic activity can be at play to engross the participant" (Goffman, 1974: 82). The outermost lamination ("the *rim* of the frame") provides information concerning the status of the activity in the real world. Primary frameworks can also be transformed by *fabrications*, an effort by one or more individuals to manage activity so that others will have "a false belief about what it is that is going on" (Goffman, 1974: 83). Keyings and fabrications leave participants unsure as to what is happening, so they are no longer able to identify the frame.

In order to make participants sure that a given frame is maintained, during social interaction various procedures *anchoring* the frame activity are employed. Manning (1992: 127) defines them in the following way: "Anchors use a series of devices to convince us that what appears to be real is real." These are bracketing devices (telling us when a frame begins and ends), resource continuity (it is possible to verify past events), roles (played by participants, telling us what to expect in the interaction), or assumptions we make about human beings. These assumptions are especially important for the anchoring of the frame. As Goffman (1974: 293) states:

> It is hardly possible to talk about the anchoring of doings in the world without seeming to support the notion that a person's acts are in part an expression and outcome of his pursuing self, and that this self will be present behind the particular roles he plays at any particular moment.

So whatever we are doing, whichever roles we play, our activities are marked by our character and personality. Our unique self spans all the roles we perform, and "[b]eliefs about the constant nature of personal identity anchor a frame and limit its meaning" (Manning, 1992: 128).

5.2.5. Goffman's concept of self

Goffman provides a double definition of *self*. The first definition describes it as "an image pieced together from the expressive implications of the full flow of events in an undertaking." The second shows it as "a kind of player in a ritual game who copes honorably or dishonorably, diplomatically or undiplomatically, with the judgemental contingencies of the situation" (Goffman, 1967: 31). Thus, the self is an end-product of what one did in the past and what one is doing at the moment of interaction. But it is not so much a private attribute as a public reality created during social interaction. Goffman (1959: 13) claims that:

> When an individual enters the presence of others, they commonly seek to acquire information about him or to bring into play information about him already possessed. They will be interested in his general socio-economic status, his conception of self, his attitude towards them, his competence, his trustworthiness, etc.

When participating in social interaction an individual tries to present a positive image of self, consistent with his true or pretended socio-economic status, his idea of goodness and trustworthiness, and the expectations of the important others. In some situations, by some linguistic choices and modes of behaviour the individual presents his competence, genuine or not, in a given field. All this information constitutes the overall image of self established during social interaction. The second definition presents the self as a "player in a ritual game," deliberately making certain choices and analysing thoroughly every move that may have an impact on the self-image.

Durkheim claims that "Man is double" (1912/2001: 29). This strongly influenced the way Goffman sees the individual: as a coexistence of the sacred and the profane. Goffman's concept of self resembles Durkheim's soul, which is something sacred and "as such is opposed to the body, which in itself is profane. The soul is distinguished not only from its material envelope, as inside is distinguished from outside; [...] it is seen to have a spark of divinity" (1912/2001: 193). Goffman ascribes the same features to the self. He describes it as "a sacred object which must be treated with proper ritual care and in turn must be presented in a proper light to others" (Goffman, 1967: 91). The self is created during interaction with other people, through acting with proper demeanour and through being treated by others with deference.

The rituals of deference and demeanour consist mainly in the "worship" of the self. The ritual code existing in society requires individuals to establish and maintain a self-image consistent with their line and also to help others to maintain their self-image. Thus it is a *ritual cooperation* in enacting a shared

reality (Collins, 1988). People have to accept how others define themselves and protect these self-definitions. This is what the politeness of everyday interaction consists in (Collins, 1988).

The self, as the central sacred object of modern society, is unreal. It is real only as a symbol, a linguistic concept that is used to account for what people do. "It is an ideology of everyday life, used to attribute causality and moral responsibility in our society [...]" (Collins, 1988: 50). In his theory of the socially constructed self, Goffman maintains that everything related to the self consists of symbolically defined social roles that the individual plays in different situations (social roles are similarly presented by Mead (1934/1972)), his social status, and his relations with other people.

5.2.6. Face

As has been mentioned above, Goffman claims that there is a close relationship between the process of creation of the self and the context of interaction. Depending on the context, individuals try to create and maintain their self-image (face), adjusting their behaviour to the roles they play and to the others they are interacting with. Thus, face is the key issue in every social interaction. It is the concept that governs our thoughts and behaviour.

Goffman was one of the first to take up the concept of face from an academic point of view. In his seminal work *Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behaviour*, Goffman defines face as "the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact" or "an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes" (1967: 5).

For Goffman, face is a public property. It is not part of a person's body, but something that is "located in the flow of events in the encounter" (1967: 7). As such it is only on loan to the person from society. This public character of Goffman's concept of face also brings it near the Chinese conceptualization of face (cf. Hu, 1944; Ho, 1976; Chang and Holt, 1994). On the other hand, his "sacred self" and face are inherently individualistic. The ideal social actor Goffman describes is based on the Western model of the person, obsessed with his self-image.

In contacts with other people, every person tends to act out a *line*, "a pattern of verbal and non-verbal acts by which he expresses his view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself" (Goffman, 1967: 5). A person may *have*, *be in*, or *maintain face* when the line he takes presents an image of him as internally consistent and supported by

judgements of other participants. Then he can feel confidence and assurance. In other situations, he may be *in wrong face* when his social worth cannot be integrated, or *out of face* when he does not have a line of the kind participants in certain situations are expected to have; generally speaking, the person may be said to *lose face*. Then he can feel ashamed and inferior because of the possible damage to his reputation. A person may *save his face* when "he sustains an impression for others that he has not lost it" (Goffman, 1967: 9). To *maintain face* is not easy. Everyone has to try to live up to his face by showing respect for others, avoiding certain actions which "are above or beneath him, while forcing himself to perform others even though they cost him dearly" (1967: 9). Unless the individual conducts himself properly, face (being only "on loan to him') will be withdrawn.

   Face is, for Goffman, at the centre of interaction. This drives his account toward the individual and the psychological at two levels (Schegloff, 1988: 95):

● the understanding of "conduct by reference to a concern for preservation or demeaning of face" (one's own or the other's),

● the presentation of an organization of interaction which is driven by the individual's main interest, face.

Thus, on the one hand, face can be the key to understanding why interactants behave one way and not another. Their conduct is aimed both at their own face and the face of the other. On the other hand, the whole interactional activity is focused on the management of the individual's face.

   The individual's face, like the self whose image the face is, is for Goffman also "a sacred thing, and the expressive order required to sustain it is therefore a ritual one" (Goffman, 1967: 19). Face maintenance requires a ritual order, acts "through whose symbolic component the actor shows how worthy he is of respect or how worthy he feels others are of it" (Goffman, 1955: 328; 1967: 19). The necessity of taking care of both one's own face and the face of the other, on the one hand, and the dialogic character of interaction rituals, on the other, make face a common enterprise implying mutuality of considerations.

   Face is related to such concepts as pride, honour and dignity (see Section 4.2.). All of them can be perceived as major reasons for sustaining a particular *expressive order* (an order regulating the flow of events so that everything expressed by them will be consistent with an individual's face). When his actions result from duty to himself, one can speak of pride; when from duty to wider social units, honour; and when his actions are aimed at handling his body and feelings, or the things with which he has physical contact, dignity (Goffman, 1967).

   A member of any group is expected to have self-respect and to be considerate towards others. Goffman claims that the combined effect of the rule of self-respect and the rule of considerateness makes the person conduct himself

so as to maintain both his own face and the face of the other participants of the encounter. The mutual acceptance (of the lines taken by interactants) that is gained in this way is the basic structural feature of social interaction, especially of the face-to-face type. However, it is usually "a 'working' acceptance, not a 'real' one" (Goffman, 1967: 11). Everyday interpersonal interaction is like stage performance, in which everything is conventional, enacted and controlled by the participants.

> Ordinarily, maintenance of face is a condition of interaction, not its objective. [...] To study face-saving is to study the traffic rules of social interaction; one learns about the code the person adheres to in his movement across the paths and designs of others, but not where he is going, or why he wants to get there (Goffman, 1967: 12).

Thus, to be able interact with others successfully, or to be able to interact at all, the person has to maintain his own face and the face of the other. Sometimes it seems that there is no difference between one's own face and the face of the other. In certain relationships, the members share a face, which means that an improper act on the part of one member is also a source of embarrassment to the other members. In such relationships the individual's face depends on the tact and good conduct of the others.

In Goffman's world of social interaction all activities in which the self is engaged are highly moral. Morality, which is not understood here in terms of principles or imperatives, plays an important role in the process of self construction. It is an indispensable element of the constant redefinition of individuals' face and the interaction in which they participate with others.

5.2.7. Facework

To secure their self-image, people engage in what Goffman calls *facework*, "the actions taken by a person to make whatever [they are] doing consistent with face" (Goffman, 1967: 12). The main function of facework is to counteract events that are potential threats to face. In fact, almost all acts involving others are modified by considerations for face. The knowledge of facework and the ability to use it is often identified with tact, *savoir-faire* or diplomacy (Goffman, 1967). The practical realization of this knowledge and the actual use of social skills differ across different cultures and societies; in other words, members of different cultures employ their own characteristic face-saving practices.

When engaged in any face-saving action, the individual has simultaneously a defensive orientation to save his own face and a protective orientation to save the face of others. So when someone's face has been threatened, it is of secondary importance who will do facework: the offender, the offended or a third party (Goffman, 1967). Since each participant has to do everything both to save his own face and to protect the face of the other participants, every social interaction can be treated as an undertaking requiring "tacit cooperation in face-saving" (Goffman, 1967: 29). Goffman enumerates several types of tacit cooperation, e.g., tact (e.g., in making it easy for the others to do facework), or reciprocal self-denial. This cooperation can be noticed in different kinds of facework.

Goffman differentiates two kinds of facework, the *avoidance process* and the *corrective process*. The former consists in avoiding potentially face-threatening acts. The latter involves performing various redressive acts. When one of the participants fails to avoid performing a face-threatening act, he and other participants "find themselves in an established state of ritual disequilibrium or disgrace" (Goffman, 1967: 19). To re-establish the ritual order, the participant has to perform some redressive acts. They form part of the whole *redressive interchange*, "the sequence of acts set in motion by an acknowledged threat to face, and terminating in the re-establishment of ritual equilibrium" (1967: 19). The redressive interchange usually consists of four moves, challenge (calling attention to the misconduct), offering (the offender's correcting for the offence and re-establishing the ritual order), acceptance (of the offering as "a satisfactory means of re-establishing the expressive order and the faces supported by this order" (1967: 22)), and thanks (for forgiveness on the part of the offender).

Even though, as mentioned above, the main function of facework is to counteract events that are potential threats to face, facework is also used in aggressive interchanges (Goffman, 1967: 24–25). These are situations in which an individual presents favourable facts about himself and unfavourable facts about the other, and shows that he can handle himself better than his adversary. In this case, facework involves neither mutual considerateness nor tacit cooperation, indispensable for successful interaction. Whatever the particular interactants' intentions, though, one thing remains true: all their actions have an effect on face.

Goffman's main concern throughout his career was to investigate social interaction, narrowly understood as "that which uniquely transpires in social situations, that is, environments in which two or more individuals are physically in one another's response presence" (1983: 2). Summing up his academic work in his Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association (1983: 2), Goffman called the interaction order "a substantive domain in its own right," worth investigating because most of our everyday life is spent in the presence of others.

Although, Goffman's (1983: 5) "own experience has been mainly with middle-class conduct in a few regions of America," and it is to this environment that his findings apply, the social mechanisms and patterns of behaviour he describes are not unique to this particular social group. What is more, Goffman finds in face-to-face interaction some universal features, because, as he claims, the necessity for it "is rooted in certain universal preconditions of social life" (1983: 3). He makes it clear that what he writes about social interaction in the American middle class may be characteristic of social interaction in other social groups, at other times and in other places. He believes in the existence of what he calls "universal human nature," which makes people follow certain patterns of conduct and behave in a similar way irrespective of what culture they belong to:

> [...] underneath their differences in culture, people are the same. [...] [S]ocieties everywhere, if they are to be societies, must mobilize their members as self-regulating participants in social encounters. One way of mobilizing the individual for this purpose is through ritual; he is taught to be perceptive, to have feelings attached to self and a self expressed through face [...] (Goffman, 1967: 44).

5.3. Face theories — an overview

In this section, I will review the main theories of face and facework. All of them have appeared as a result of the *face* studies "boom" which started in the late 1980s. The original sources of their inspiration were two seminal works, "The Chinese concepts of face" (1944) by Hsien Chin Hu, and Erving Goffman's *Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face-to-Face Behavior* (1967). The direct inspiration, however, was Penelope Brown and Stephen C. Levinson's theory of politeness (1978, 1987), in which face is the central concept.

In the case of Brown and Levinson's theory and that of many others, facework is equated with (im)politeness. So apart from face and facework, (im)politeness will constitute one of the key issues here. However, the overview of the theories to be presented does not include politeness theories that do not treat face as a causative factor.

Drawing from the same theoretical sources, the theories represent various approaches to the concept in question:
- a sociolinguistic approach to face:
  - perceived in terms of individual wants,
  - perceived as an interactional and relational phenomenon,

- a cross-cultural approach,
- a socio-psychological approach,
- a communicative approach.

5.3.1. A sociolinguistic approach to face

The popularity of the concept of face in sociolinguistics results from the need to understand how participants negotiate their positions in social interaction, what language they use to encode their assumptions about these positions, and to interpret their assumptions about the self-image (face) presented by other participants in communication (Scollon and Wong Scollon, 2001).

The sociolinguistic approach to face and facework was first presented by Brown and Levinson in their theory of politeness. From the moment of its publication, the theory and, especially, the conceptualization of face evoked a great number of criticisms. The main voices of criticism of Brown and Levinson's theory, whose discussion will follow its presentation, concern the way they conceptualize face, their claim to the universality of their concept of face (especially its negative aspect), treating face as a determinant of interactional dynamics, their conceptualization of *face-threatening acts* (FTAs), and the concept of facework. In spite of this, the theory still attracts a lot of attention among scholars of different disciplines, linguists in particular. Some of them, drawing inspiration from its main assumptions, try to reformulate and improve it. As a result, new face theories have appeared which are inspired by Brown and Levinson's model.

5.3.1.1. Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness

Brown and Levinson's (1978, 1987) theory is the most thorough treatment of the notion of politeness. It is grounded in Grice's (1975) model of conversation and his Cooperative Principle, which has an impact on one of the main assumptions of the theory, namely, that human communication is rational and goal-oriented. Central to Brown and Levinson's theory is the concept of face, drawn from Erving Goffman's (1967) work and the English folk notion of face, and partly based on Emile Durkheim's (1912/2001) work.

Brown and Levinson constructed a Model Person (MP), who is "a wilful fluent speaker of a natural language, endowed with two special properties –

rationality and face" (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 58). By rationality they mean the availability to the MP of a mode of reasoning "from ends to the means that will achieve those ends" (1987: 58). They define face as "the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself" (1987: 61). Interacting with others, the MP has to choose the optimal means to achieve communicative goals. Doing so, he is caught between two wants, the want to be efficient in whatever he is going to do, no matter how threatening this may be to the other participant's face, and the want to satisfy his face. He has to assess the potential threat to the other participant's and his own face, and choose the strategies that would minimize it. The type of politeness presented in the model is similar to Goffman's concept of facework, whose main aim is to maintain every participant's face during social interaction. For Brown and Levinson, however, politeness involves mainly avoiding face threat and minimizing face loss.

Brown and Levinson's face, unlike Goffman's, is an image intrinsically belonging to the individual, which consists of two related aspects (1987: 61):

- *negative face*: the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction — i.e. to freedom of action and freedom from imposition,
- *positive face*: the positive consistent self-image or "personality" (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants.

Further on they redefine face in terms of basic wants (1987: 62):

- *negative face*: the want of every "competent adult member" that his actions be unimpeded by others,
- *positive face*: the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others.

Brown and Levinson argue that the abstract concept of face and "the social necessity to orient oneself to it in interaction" (1987: 62) can be treated as universal. However, the two face wants (negative face and positive face) are "subject to much cultural elaboration" (1987: 13). In other words, the content of face, i.e. what the exact limits are to personal territories and what the publicly relevant content of personality consists in, differs across cultures.

Face, however, is not only want; it is something that can be threatened, lost, or saved. Brown and Levinson claim that it is something which is "emotionally invested" and "must be constantly attended to in interaction" (1987: 61). As all participants are endowed with face, it is in their mutual interest to maintain each other's face during social interaction. Thus people cooperate in maintaining face (1987: 61):

> In general, people cooperate (and assume each other's cooperation) in maintaining face in interaction, such cooperation being based on mutual vulnerability of face. That is, normally everyone's face depends on everyone else's being maintained, and since people can be expected to defend their faces if threatened, and in defending their own to threaten others' faces, it is in general in every participant's best interest to maintain each others' face.

Certain kinds of actions, Brown and Levinson maintain, are intrinsically face-threatening, i.e. they are contrary to the face wants of the hearer and/or of the speaker. There can be distinguished acts that threaten negative face and acts that threaten positive face. Another distinction involves acts threatening the hearer (H)'s face and acts threatening the speaker (S)'s face. All these acts are called *face-threatening acts*. They can be divided into:

- acts threatening the hearer's negative face (e.g., requests or warnings),
- acts threatening the hearer's positive face (e.g., expressions of disapproval or criticism),
- acts threatening the speaker's negative face (e.g., expressing thanks or excuses),
- acts threatening the speaker's positive face (e.g., apologies or acceptance of a compliment).

In all the cases, the authors provide long lists of acts, which can be performed during everyday social interaction and which have to be dealt with by all participants. They maintain that to avoid face loss or face damage, every rational user of a natural language will try to avoid FTAs, or at least will employ certain strategies to minimize the threat.

Brown and Levinson distinguish five strategies for doing FTAs. To choose one of them, every rational language user will have to take into consideration the possible face-threatening character of the act he intends to make. He can choose to avoid doing it or to minimize its threat using one of the strategies. Doing an FTA *off record*, the speaker resorts to using metaphor, irony, rhetorical questions, understatement, tautologies, and hints, "so that the meaning is to some degree negotiable" (1987: 69). Off-record FTAs depend on implicature. According to Brown and Levinson (1987: 213), "the basic way to do this is to invite conversational implicatures by violating, in some way, the Gricean Maxims of efficient communication." *On-record* FTAs are done when S's communicative intention is clear to other interlocutors. Doing an FTA *baldly, on record*, S does so in the most direct, unambiguous, concise way. On-record FTAs without redress are done in conformity with Grice's Cooperative Principle (Grice, 1975); they are transparent, sufficiently informative, and relevant. *Redressive action* is meant "to counteract the potential face damage of the FTA by doing it in such a way, or with such

modifications or additions, that indicate clearly that no such face threat is intended or desired" (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 69–70). There can be two kinds of redressive action: positive politeness and negative politeness, which strongly resemble Goffman's concepts of avoidance and presentational rituals. Brown and Levinson admit that these two strategies were borrowed from Durkheim's distinction between negative and positive rites. *Positive politeness* is oriented toward the hearer's positive face. The potential face threat is minimized "by the assurance that in general S wants at least some of H's wants" (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 70). *Negative politeness* is oriented toward redressing H's negative face. Here the potential face threat is minimized by the assurance that S recognizes and respects H's negative-face wants and will not impede him in his action.

Brown and Levinson (1987: 71) maintain that "any rational agent will tend to choose the same genus of strategy under the same conditions – that is, make the same moves as any other would make under the circumstances". These circumstances can be specified in terms of three sociological variables by means of which the agent can analyse the weightiness of an FTA (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 74):

- the "social distance" (D) of S and H (a symmetric relation),
- the relative "power" (P) of S and H (an asymmetric relation),
- the absolute ranking (R) of impositions in the particular culture.

These factors, existing "in many and perhaps all cultures," are employed by Brown and Levinson (1987: 74) in the following equation to calculate the weightiness of the FTA:

$$W_x = D(S, H) + P(H, S) + R_x$$
Where W_x is the weightiness of the FTA.

The knowledge of the weightiness of a particular FTA is to help the speaker to determine the appropriate strategy to be used. For example, a request for passing the salt at the table, which does not constitute a great imposition, can be performed by means of strategies which do not involve much redress, while a request for a great favour, which would be highly threatening to the H's face, will require the use of a strategy involving more redress.

Much research has been conducted on the influence of these three variables on the weightiness of the FTA. It has been confirmed that the higher the speaker power, the lower is the level of politeness (e.g., Holtgraves and Yang, 1990; Holtgraves and Yang, 1992). The imposition variable also gained great support (e.g., Brown and Gilman, 1989; Holtgraves and Yang, 1992). The social distance variable proved to be most controversial; some researchers agreed that

greater politeness is related to greater distance between interlocutors (e.g., Holtgraves and Yang, 1992); others negated the importance of this factor (e.g., Baxter, 1984; Brown and Gilman, 1989).

To test the cross-cultural applicability of their model, Brown and Levinson present and discuss many examples of similar politeness strategies used in three different languages: English, Tamil and Tzeltal.

The model of politeness presented by Brown and Levinson, and their interpretation of face as the key concept in the goal-oriented behaviour of the rationally thinking language user, have become an inspiration for researchers from many different disciplines, such as sociolinguistics, social psychology, business and management studies, gender studies, etc. Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness has, since its first publication in 1978, and revision in 1987, been used as a basis for further research in politeness and face. It constitutes a theoretical framework for some empirical work on speech act realization patterns, and for some cross-cultural studies of politeness.

5.3.1.2. Criticism of Brown and Levinson model of politeness and face

Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness and face has been widely discussed, deeply investigated and broadly applied. Many scholars have tested its main theses. The results of this research, however, have evoked a lot of criticism of the model.

Criticism of the way Brown and Levinson conceptualize face

Brown and Levinson's conceptualization of face has especially attracted attention and has been challenged by many linguists. Fraser (1990: 239; Mao, 1994; Watts, 2003) noted a big difference between Goffman's and Brown and Levinson's definitions of face: while in the former the public is an intrinsic constituent, in the latter the public is treated as an "external modifier." Goffman's face is a "public property" which is "located in the flow of events" and "on loan from society," while Brown and Levinson's face is a "public self-image," which belongs to an individual (cf. Arundale, 2006).

Their conceptualization of face lacks an important social identity element. This is noted by many scholars (e.g., Matsumoto, 1988; Lim and Bowers, 1991; Lim, 1994; Mao, 1994; Spencer-Oatey, 2000; Spencer-Oatey and Xing, 2000). Spencer-Oatey and Xing (2000: 279) argue that people have two positive face wants, "a desire for positive evaluation in terms of personal qualities" and

"a desire for positive evaluation in terms of social identity." In Brown and Levinson's face, the latter element is missing, in this way depriving face of the necessary social grounding.

Werkhofer (2005), who discusses "the social constitution and the power of politeness," comments on Brown and Levinson's choice of ideas that they use as a basis for their theory of politeness, namely, Grice's (1975) conversational maxims and Goffman's (1955) concept of face. For him, the two ideas seem to be incompatible, first due to their (a)social nature, second due to the fact that it is difficult or even totally impossible to adhere to conversational maxims in face-maintaining or face-saving. Werkhofer rightly argues that such a combination of ideas could only bring about the construction of a politeness theory which "will turn out to be a problematic, inherently contradictory venture" (2005: 160). He ponders the role of the concept of face in Brown and Levinson's model:

> Though to some degree socially oriented — more so at least than the Gricean approach — this notion [Goffman's face metaphor] abstracts from macro-sociological dimensions. And being selectively received, it only partially serves the function it is meant to serve here, that is, it does not really compensate for the asocial nature of the Gricean model (Werkhofer, 2005: 162).

The weakness of Brown and Levinson's concept of face consists in the fact that it is not treated as a social phenomenon. Werkhofer criticizes Brown and Levinson also for

> [r]eceiving Goffman's face selectively, [claiming that they] reinterpret it in unambiguously individualistic terms, abstracting not only from the dimension of ritual order, but from all kinds of social order [...] they unduly favour individualistic, Gricean elements over the social ones taken from Goffman (Werkhofer, 2005: 178).

Face is not described in terms of what may happen between participants during social interaction, but rather in terms of "what is assumed to be represented within a single speaker's mind" (Werkhofer, 2005: 180). Likewise, O'Driscoll (2007: 467; Kopytko, 1993, 1993a) refers to Brown and Levinson's conceptualization of face as a set of wants as "a severe truncation of Goffman's original definition," which does not include the social element so relevant in Goffman's definition of face. O'Driscoll (2007: 467) mentions two important elements, "the social dependence of a person's face" and "its situational contingency," which are absent from the concept of face-as-wants. It is in this absence that O'Driscoll sees the cause of the limited application of the concept to many cultures. Kopytko (1993: 98; 1993a), discussing the reduction of face to wants, argues:

> Face is more than just want, if it is at all. It is also (or perhaps primarily) a social value and norm. Face is value in itself. Someone (an actor) is afraid of losing face because of a probable loss of reputation, respect, social prestige or any kind of social punishment. The frustration of his individual want which may be a blow to his positive self-image, may still be less harmful than the distortion of his public self-image and its social consequences.

Eelen (2001) notes inconsistency between the way face and the Model Person are conceptualized by Brown and Levinson and what they explicitly maintain. They deny any normative dimension for their framework. For them, the main goal of politeness is conflict-avoidance, which can be achieved by strategic face-attendance. However, as Eelen (2001: 126) argues:

> [...] the validity of face and rationality is based on the claim that they are *"[...] assumptions that all interacting humans know that they will be expected to orient to"* (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 58). Face and rationality are standards people are expected to live up to – in simple terms, social norms.

The Model Person represents normative social expectations which help interactants to see the effect of their behaviour on others. It constitutes a norm, whether they admit it or not, that:

> [...] normally everyone's face depends on everyone else's being maintained, and since people can be expected to defend their faces if threatened, and in defending their own to threaten others' faces, it is in general in every participant's best interest to maintain each others' face, [...] (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 61).

Criticism of Brown and Levinson's claim to the universality of their concept of face (especially its negative aspect)

A large amount of the criticism aimed at Brown and Levinson's model of politeness and concept of face involves their cross-cultural validity. In spite of the claim for the universality of the concept of face, Brown and Levinson created a cognitive model of face which is founded on Western ethnocentric assumptions (Bargiela-Chiappini, 2003; Watts, 2003):

- the existence of a predominantly rational actor,
- strategic, goal-oriented facework.

This is an individualistic concept of face. Brown and Levinson admit that (1987: 61):

> [Their] notion of 'face' is derived from that of Goffman (1967) and from the English folk term, which ties face up with notions of being embarrassed or humiliated, or 'losing face.'

They borrowed the concept of face from Goffman, who defines it as "an image of self." But in doing so, they also adopted his social psychological interpretation of face and the Western conceptualization of the interactant (Arundale, 2006). The second source of their notion of face (the English folk term) is said to be responsible for "the negative bias" omnipresent in Brown and Levinson's picture of human communication (Terkourafi, 2007). They claim that (1987: 74):

> It is safer to assume that H prefers his peace and self-determination than that he prefers your expressions of regard, unless you are certain of the contrary.

This assumption, as Terkourafi (2007) notes, is present neither in Goffman's nor in Durkheim's works. The individualistic character of the notion of face, resulting from the reference to these two sources, and "the negative bias" in Brown and Levinson's presentation of human communication, are not consonant with their claim to the universality of face, and have often been criticized as ethnocentric (e.g., Matsumoto, 1988; Gu, 1990; Wierzbicka, 1991; Nwoye, 1992).

The negative aspect of face is said to have "a strong anglocentric bias" (Wierzbicka, 1991: 67; Kasper, 1990: Reynolds, 1995), as it is held to presuppose a Western-style individualistic notion of self. Evidence from studies of different languages and cultures (Ide, 1989: 223–248; Matsumoto, 1988: 403–426; Gu, 1990: 443–467; Ting-Toomey *et al.*, 1991: 275–296; Nwoye, 1992: 309–328; Strecker, 1993: 119–141; Cocroft and Ting-Toomey, 1994: 469–506; Ervin-Tripp *et al.*, 1995: 43–71) suggests that both politeness phenomena in general, and the notion of face in particular, are perceived and manifested differently in different cultures. Strecker (1993: 121) argues that

> although the metaphor of 'face' may well prove to be a part of the very wide-spread analogical repertoire which can be utilised for metaphorical production in all cultures, its specific meanings are far from universal and demand investigation.

Major criticism of Brown and Levinson's claim to the universality of their concept of face (especially its negative aspect) comes from Asian scholars. In Chinese culture, as Lee-Wong (2000: 24) suggests, "face maintenance is essentially an act of balancing — the perception of self in relation to other." This is consonant with what Mao (1994: 460) claims:

> Chinese face encodes a reputable image that individuals can claim for themselves as they interact with others in a given community; it is intimately linked to the views of the community and to the community's judgement and perception of the individual's character and behaviour.

In a similar vein, Hinze (2005: 177) claims that defining face in the way Brown and Levinson do does not apply to Chinese *mianzi* and *lian*, which rather consist in "*other people's* impression/image of oneself." The Goffmanian face is what is "claimed" by an individual, or what he "wants to claim" (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 61). However, as Hinze suggests, in Chinese context, neither *mianzi* nor *lian* can or need be claimed (Hinze, 2005). This is clearly explained by Hsu (1996: 70):

> [P]ersonal intention or claim is by no means a necessary condition in the matter of 'face' (*mianzi* or *lian*). One may be viewed positively by the public and thereby have 'face' without wishing or striving for it. After all, the public does not grant someone respect because he or she claims it, or treat without deference because it is not being claimed. One symptom of this problem is that these definitions do not fit some popular Chinese expressions of 'face.'

Discussing the concept of negative face, Gu (1990) does not agree with the claim that concerns for autonomy and imposition are specific to Western cultures. He argues that they also exist in Eastern cultures, but that they are not regarded as face concerns. He does not, however, entirely reject the concept of negative face, but redefines it in Chinese terms. For him, "the Chinese negative face [...] is threatened when self cannot live up to what s/he has claimed, or when what self has done is likely to incur ill fame or reputation" (1990: 242).

Matsumoto (1988; Mao, 1994), who discusses the notion of face in Japanese, criticizes Brown and Levinson (1987) for neglecting the interpersonal perspective on face, and for stressing the importance of negative face. She maintains that:

> What is of paramount concern to a Japanese is not his/her own territory, but the position in relation to the others in the group and his/her acceptance by those others. Loss of face is associated with the perception by others that one has not comprehended and acknowledged the structure and hierarchy of the group. The Japanese concepts of face, thus, are qualitatively different from those defined as universals by Brown and Levinson. The difference transcends the variability of cultural elaboration acknowledged in Brown and Levinson's theory (e.g. what kinds of acts threaten face, what sorts of persons have special rights to face-protection, etc.) and calls into question the universality of a core concept: the notion of face as consisting of the desire for approval of wants and the desire for the preservation of one's territory. [...] [In Japanese culture, a]cknowledgement and maintenance of the relative position of others, rather than preservation of an individual's proper territory, governs all social interaction (Matsumoto, 1988: 405).

Some years later, in a discussion note "Reply to Pizziconi" (2003: 1517; cf. Pizziconi, 2003), Matsumoto clarifies her objections to Brown and Levinson's concept of face: "I was questioning the efficacy of employing what appeared to be an English folk concept in a universal account of linguistic politeness." But in spite of all the criticism and arguments against Brown and Levinson's claim for the universality of face, Matsumoto (1988: 423) does not deny the fact that

> 'face' defined as one's 'socially given self-image' is plausibly a useful notion in explaining a universal motivation for politeness. The observations I have made, however, suggest that the constituents of 'face,' and, thus, the objects of people's concern in conversational exchange, are dependent on the culture.

For Ide (1989), Brown and Levinson's model of politeness understood as "diplomatic behaviour" cannot be treated as universal. A really universal definition of politeness, according to her, should include both acts of *volition* and *wakimae* (*discernment*). Volitional politeness is the type of politeness which the speaker decides to use irrespective of the type of situation. Discernment is "the choice of linguistic form or expression in which the distinction between the ranks or the roles of the speaker, the referent and the addressee are systematically encoded" (Ide, 1989: 230; cf. Mayumi, 2002). In discernment, as Hill *et al*. (1986: 348) explain, "the speaker can be considered to submit passively to the requirements of the system." And cultures differ in the prominence of volition/discernment (Hill *et al*., 1986: 348):

> The relative prominence of Discernment over Volition appears to predominate in the polite use of language by speakers of Japanese. Conversely, Volition appears to predominate in the polite use of American English.

Both Matsumoto (1988) and Ide (1989) argue that what is of importance in Japan is not individuals' right to be unimpeded in their actions, but their relation to others in the group and their acceptance by those others. A similar objection was put forward by Haugh (2005), who claims that the Japanese folk notions of face are not so much of what is claimed by an individual through his behaviour, but rather are based on evaluations of the individual (or group) by significant others. Fukushima (2002: 58) does not agree entirely with this criticism, saying:

> [...] in contemporary Japan, in which individualism has also developed as the economy has grown [...], the aspect of negative face wants in Brown and Levinson's sense is important.

Positive face, in Fukushima's opinion, in such collectivistic societies as Japan, includes a subcategory: "the desire to conform to social conventions,

acknowledging one's position in a group" (Fukushima, 2002: 59). Fukushima admits that both aspects of face are relevant in Japanese social interaction.

Objections to Brown and Levinson's model were also raised by Mao (1994: 471), who notes that, according to them,

> cultural variability only determines how polite behaviour is to be evaluated, whether it is essentially positive-politeness oriented or negative-politeness oriented (or a combination of both). Cultural variability, they argue, does not affect their posited positive and negative face. [...] this position is not quite tenable any more.

To Mao, this position is untenable in at least two cultural contexts he has investigated, Chinese and Japanese. In these two cultures, face "gravitates toward social recognition and hierarchical interdependence," while American face "spirals outward from individual desires and wants" (Mao, 1994: 471). Mao maintains that these are two divergent face orientations which shape our behaviour during social interaction. He develops an alternative interactional construct — the *relative face orientation*, defined as a direction of face "that emulates [...] one of the two interactional ideals [...]: the ideal social identity and the ideal individual autonomy" (Mao, 1994: 472). The content of face in a given culture is determined by one of these two ideals, which are similar to the distinction between interdependent and independent construals of self. Mao objects also to Brown and Levinson's failure to identify the original source of the concept of face. This, to Mao (1994: 454), has an "impact upon their formulation of face, [and] has consequences for their theory's claim of universality."

Brown and Levinson's claim for the universality of negative face is also rejected by Ukosakul (2005), who discusses the significance of face in Thai culture. She claims that

> the Thai notion of face is not so much one's right to act freely (à la Brown & Levinson) but rather other people's acceptance of one's accomplishments and social position in society. Consequently, people who express behaviours which are considered 'positive' for the face tend to be people of whom Thai society approves (Ukosakul, 2005: 119).

The concept of negative face and its individualistic character, however, has been criticized not only by Asian researchers. Nwoye (1992), who analysed politeness in Nigerian Igbo society, claims that among the Igbo the main concern is not for the individual's self-image, but for the group self-image. He defines Igbo society as "egalitarian" and states that for them "concern for group interests rather than atomistic individualism is the expected norm of behaviour" (1992: 310). What matters is what he calls the group face. "[T]he avoidance of

behaviour capable of lowering the public self-image or self-worth of one's group [is] dictated by the fear of *imecu iru* (to darken face)" (Nwoye, 1992: 314). Hirschon (2001) comes to similar conclusions in his analysis of politeness in Greece. He states that Greek face is a collective as well as a personal matter. In a similar vein, other researchers raise criticism with respect to the inapplicability of the concept of negative face to some cultures (e.g., Strecker's (1993) study of face in the Hamar culture in southern Ethiopia and Kadt's (1998) study of face in Zulu culture).

Objections to Brown and Levinson's concept of face and its universal applicability (although significantly less numerous) have also come from Western scholars. Watts, Ide and Ehlich (2005: 10) question the validity of Brown and Levinson's concept of negative face, asking:

> But how is negative face to be understood in a culture in which the possessions of individuals are at one and the same time the possessions of the community, or in which the individual's right to act depends crucially on the consent of the community?

Criticism of Brown and Levinson's concept of face as a determinant of interactional dynamics

Another type of criticism concerns face as a determinant of interactional dynamics. Some scholars argue that in non-Western cultures there are different determinants of interactional dynamics than face. Bargiela-Chiappini (2003: 1463; 2006: 422) distinguishes between:

- status-based cultures (e.g., China, Korea, North America), in which normative and volitional politeness coexist, and face is "an important, if not central, explanatory key to interpersonal behaviour" (cf. Brown and Levinson's face),
- socially stratified cultures (e.g., Japan, Mexico, and the Zulu in South Africa), in which normative politeness dominates, and face "takes second place to seemingly more dominant notions such as discernment, *respeto* (Garcia, 1996) and deference."

Ide (1989: 241), who suggests that discernment, rather than face, is the main motivation for politeness in Japanese culture, explains the difference between these two culture groups in the following way:

> In a Western society where individualism is assumed to be the basis of all interactions, it is easy to regard face as the key to interaction. On the other hand, in a society where group membership is regarded as the basis of interaction, the role or status defined in a particular situation rather than face is the basis of interaction.

Criticism of Brown and Levinson's conceptualization of face-threatening acts and their role in social interaction

Defining face-threatening acts, Brown and Levinson claim that these are acts which are intrinsically threatening to face. This conceptualization of FTAs, the method Brown and Levinson employ to classify them, and especially the fact that acts are classified as threatening or not without reference to the situation in which they are performed, have evoked a lot of criticism among scholars (e.g., Matsumoto, 1988; Gu, 1990; Nvoye, 1992; Spencer-Oatey, 2000; Fraser, 2005; O'Driscoll, 2007). Some of them maintain that the illocutionary acts identified by Brown and Levinson as face-threatening cannot be said to be so in all cultures and in all social contexts. O'Driscoll (2007: 469) argues that no act can be either intrinsically threatening or intrinsically supportive to face, as "Effects on face are radically situational." The same illocutionary act in one situation can constitute a threat to face, while in another it can be supportive of it.

Brown and Levinson provide a classification of FTAs with respect to the type of face threatened (positive or negative) and whether it is the speaker's or the addressee's face, but they seem not to consider that many acts may be directed at more than one aspect of face. Sifianou (2001: 399) claims that all acts, and specifically compliments, are multidirectional, that is, "they are not merely or primarily threats oriented to the addressee's negative aspect of face": such acts primarily enhance his self-image. Similarly, Sifianou and Antonopoulou (2005) note that such acts as requests, which are treated by Brown and Levinson as primarily threatening to the addressee's negative face, can also enhance his positive face, indicating closeness and solidarity or the speaker's high opinion of the addressee. All acts can range along a continuum from the most face-threatening ones to the most face-enhancing ones (Sifianou and Antonopoulou, 2005). The degree of face threat or face enhancement of an act depends on its situational and sociocultural context.

The picture of social interaction presented by Brown and Levinson is rather gloomy and dominated by face-threatening acts; it does not have any positive elements (O'Driscoll, 2007). Terkourafi (2007: 321), discussing this picture, writes about "an avalanche of negative terms" (e.g., "being embarrassed or humiliated," "losing face," "maintaining face," "the mutual vulnerability of face," "defending face" and "threatening face" (1987: 61)). Kerbrat-Orecchioni (2005), discussing characteristic features of politeness in France, proposes a 'revamped' Brown and Levinson Model. She adopts their idea that politeness equals facework. However, agreeing with those who criticize Brown and Levinson's model for being overly pessimistic, Kerbrat-Orecchioni stresses the fact that there is another side of politeness: "on a more positive note, politeness also consists in producing 'anti-threats' (given that face-work aims both to save one's face and to

expand on it)" (2005: 30). In other words, she claims that we should see the positive side of some FTAs. Such acts as an expression of gratitude, a good wish or a compliment, which are considered by Brown and Levinson as threatening to the hearer's negative face, are primarily an 'anti-threat' to this individual. Such acts that reinforce the other's face Kerbrat-Orecchioni calls *face-flattering acts*. A similar view is presented by Manno (2005), Sifianou (2001) and Sifianou and Antonopoulou (2005).

Presenting their politeness strategies, Brown and Levinson (1987: 68) write:

> In the context of the mutual vulnerability of face, any rational agent will seek to avoid these face-threatening acts, or will employ certain strategies to minimize the threat.

Thus, according to them, face threats are the main reason for politeness. For Bargiela-Chiappini (2003: 1461), their ideal rational actor makes "obsessive" attempts to mark and protect personal territory from potentially harmful interpersonal contact, which, she argues, is not in line with the work of Durkheim they quote frequently, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1912/2001). There Durkheim (1912/2001: 311) maintains that "the negative cult serves only as an introduction and preparation for the positive one". It is treated as "a condition of access to the positive cult" (1912/2001: 309), and constitutes a positive contribution in the interaction between the individual and society. Brown and Levinson's negative face, understood as the claim to freedom of action and freedom from imposition, and negative type of politeness, understood as redressing the other's negative face, seem not to be derived from Durkheim.

Criticism of Brown and Levinson's concept of facework

Brown and Levinson see facework as strategic conflict-avoidance. In other words, people engage in facework to avoid conflict in social interaction. This approach to facework has met with a lot of criticism, especially among non-Western scholars (e.g., Hill *et al.*, 1986; Matsumoto, 1988; Ide, 1989; Gu, 1990; Nwoye, 1992; Mao, 1994; Yu, 2003), who argue that in many cultures (especially those that are collectivistic) the main motivation for facework is establishing and/or maintaining harmony during social interaction. Referring to the above criticism of Brown and Levinson's concept of facework, O'Driscoll makes an attempt to defend it. He maintains that

> the degree of conscious strategy employed in an act is more situationally than culturally determined. [...] [Besides,] it is precisely the handling of FTAs which the B&L's model was designed to explain (B&L: 56–57). They clearly

state (B&L: 93) that their strategies could be used for other face purposes but that is not what they address (2007: 470).

There are, however, more serious criticisms related to the general interpretation of politeness in Brown and Levinson's model. Watts (2003) argues that what they offer is a theory of facework, rather than a theory of politeness. Supporting his claim with many examples of positive and negative politeness, he maintains that "the linguistic structures that realize these facework strategies are by no means always associated with linguistic politeness, although of course a large number of them may be" (2003: 93). Many utterances which constitute the so-called politic behaviour (see Section 5.3.2.) are not inherently polite, but doing some facework, they may be interpreted as polite in a particular context.

Brown and Levinson's theory focuses mainly on other-oriented politeness and does not pay attention to the speaker's face needs. In this way, it does not account for an important area of social interaction. Trying to compensate for this, Chen (2001) builds a model of self-politeness within the framework of Brown and Levinson's theory. The main concerns of the speaker, according to this model, are self-face needs and *self-face threatening acts redress*. Similar arguments are expressed by Manno (2005), who claims that politeness does not concern only the addressee's face (e.g., tact and compliments), but also the speaker's face (e.g., modesty).

The foregoing discussion of criticism of Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness and face shows that, although far from universal and unable to account for all culture-specific social behaviour, it nevertheless provides us with the picture of social interaction which after some modifications could adequately explain the mechanisms of human behaviour and clarify the role of face in social interaction. The main objections to the model can be summarized in the following points:

- Their definition of face, a "public self-image," which belongs to an individual, lacks an important social identity element.
- Their claim for the universality of face (especially negative face) is untenable, because in some cultures concerns for autonomy and imposition are not interactionally relevant.
- Contrary to what Brown and Levinson assume, in many (non-Western) cultures there are other determinants of interactional dynamics than face.
- Their claim that certain acts are intrinsically threatening to face is untenable, because effects on face are situation-dependent.
- Their conceptualization of facework as strategic conflict-avoidance is not cross-culturally valid, as establishing and maintaining harmony rather than avoiding conflict is the main motivation for facework in some (non-Western) cultures.

In spite of many criticisms aimed at its several aspects, Brown and Levinson's model has become the milestone in the politeness and face research. Many scholars either use it as a theoretical framework for various types of research (e.g., on facework in nursing interactions (Spiers, 2007)) or treat it as a starting point for the formulation of their own theories.

5.3.1.3. Face theories inspired by Brown and Levinson's model

The theories of face to be discussed here, Thomas Holtgraves' (1992) *face management theory of language use*, Ron Scollon and Suzanne Wong Scollon's (2001) model of politeness (or face), Jim O'Driscoll's (1996; 2001; 2007) *model of face-opposition* and *face model of language choice in intercultural communication*, and Jonathan Culpeper's (1996) model of impoliteness, differ in many respects, but have one thing in common — their source of inspiration and the theoretical background from which they have begun is Brown and Levinson's model of politeness.

Face management theory (Holtgraves)

Holtgraves (1992) proposes a *face management theory of language use* which is based on the works of Goffman (1967; 1971) and Brown and Levinson (1987). He argues that face and facework can be extremely useful for understanding language use. Concerns with face and facework, or as Holtgraves prefers to call them means of *managing face*, are the necessary prerequisites for orderly social interaction.

The main assumptions of the face management theory are the following (Holtgraves, 1992: 155):
- Face concerns are encoded both in utterances carrying a face threat (single turns at talk) and in sequences of talk.
- "[T]he more threatening the act (as a function of power, distance, imposition, and possibly other variables), the greater the extent to which face concerns will be encoded."
- The hearer's face support is possible only when the speaker's face concern is not of greater importance.
- Face management processes are involved both in language production and language comprehension.
- Differences in the assessment of face threat depend on individual, cultural and subcultural factors, which result in differences in the extent to which face is attended to in language.

The face management theory was formulated on the basis of the research on Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness conducted on requests (Holtgraves and Yang, 1990), accounts, disagreements, and self-disclosures. In spite of many similarities, the face management theory differs from Brown and Levinson's theory in some important respects. First, it assumes that face is managed linguistically over a series of turns rather than only within a single turn. Thus, in the assessment of face threat or face support what matters is preference organization (Holtgraves, 1992; 2005). Second, differences in face management do not depend exclusively on cultural factors but are also conditioned by individual ways of behaviour and subjective ways of perception. The face management theory tries to explain both the social and the psychological aspects of language use. Holtgraves (1992; 2009) claims that the key issues to understand differences in cross-cultural communication are the universal concept of face, which has a "regulatory role" in social interaction, and the two variables, power and psychological distance, which underlie social interactions in all cultures. They strongly influence the linguistic production and comprehension on any occasion. To some extent, Holtgraves' face management theory tries to compensate for the inadequacies of Brown and Levinson's theory.

Politeness (or Face) Systems (Scollon and Wong Scollon)

Drawing on the work of Brown and Levinson, Scollon and Wong Scollon (1993; 2001) discuss the effect of self-presentational strategies in terms of the communication of politeness, in which face (as in Brown and Levinson's model) is the central concept. According to them (Scollon and Wong Scollon, 2001: 45), face is not only "the negotiated public image, mutually granted each other by participants in a communicative event." Participants, before they begin any communication, must make assumptions "about the face they want to claim for themselves and are willing to give to the other participants" (2001: 45). Later face is negotiated during interpersonal communication. This combination of assumptions about the participants and their relationships and the negotiations of these assumptions are called by Scollon and Wong Scollon the study of face, or politeness theory.

For them, face is a paradoxical concept. It has two aspects, *involvement* (cf. *positive face*, *solidarity politeness*) and *independence* (cf. *negative face*, *deference politeness*). On the one hand, people want to be involved with other participants and to show them their involvement; on the other, they want to maintain some degree of independence from other participants and to show them that they respect their independence. The involvement aspect of face concerns "the person's right and need to be considered a normal, contributing, or supporting member of society" (Scollon and Wong Scollon, 2001: 46). The independence aspect of face stresses "the individuality of the

participants" and "their right not to be completely dominated by group or social values, and to be free from the imposition of others" (2001: 47). The paradox consists in that the two aspects of face "must be projected simultaneously in any communication" (2001: 46) and that they are in conflict: "emphasizing one of them risks a threat to the other" (2001: 48). Thus, any communication involves a threat to face, both to involvement face and independence face, as well as both to the speaker's face and the addressee's face. In other words, we cannot avoid the problem of face, and, Scollon and Wong Scollon (2001: 48) claim that "There is no faceless communication."

They formulated a model of politeness (or face) which is based on the assumption that face relationships (i.e. relationships between and among participants in communication) consist of two elements:
- an unmarked set of initial assumptions,
- a series of negotiations in which those assumptions are ratified or changed.

Although it is not stated explicitly, face is presented here as a relational construct based on the interactants' assumptions and negotiations. Scollon and Wong Scollon claim that normally face relationships, once established, are fairly stable and rarely subject to negotiation. However, they do not take into account that during social interaction the relationship between interactants may be subject to change. Other factors may influence the relationship and cause participants to re-negotiate it.

The authors describe the regularities in face relationships as *politeness (face) systems*, which depend on three main factors, power (+P, –P), distance (+D, –D), and the weight of imposition (+W, –W). There are three main types of politeness systems in different contexts (1993; 2001: 54–56):
- Deference politeness system (–P, +D), in which participants (e.g., two university professors) treat each other as equals and use many independence politeness strategies,
- Solidarity politeness system (–P, –D), in which participants (e.g., two close friends) treat each other as equals and use many involvement strategies,
- Hierarchical politeness system (+P, +/–D), in which participants (e.g., an employer and his employee) recognize and respect their different social positions (an asymmetrical relationship). The person in the superordinate position uses involvement strategies "in speaking 'down,'" whereas the person in the subordinate position uses independence strategies "in speaking 'up.'"

The three face systems provide the strategies for possible relationships that can occur during communication. They resemble Robin Lakoff's (1977) rules of politeness (*Formality*, *Hesitancy* and *Equality*), which can be applied in different situations and depend on relations between interactants.

The face and politeness model proposed by Scollon and Wong Scollon creates a picture of social interaction almost as gloomy as that of Brown and Levinson. The inevitability of face threat in every interaction with the other and the conflict between involvement face and independence face present interpersonal encounters as a risky venture.

O'Driscoll's model of face-opposition and face model of language choice

O'Driscoll (1996) elaborates on Brown and Levinson's conception of positive and negative face and tries to uphold their claim that these are universal phenomena. To succeed in that, he outlines a different conception of *positive* and *negative*. He claims that:

> It is quite manifest of human existence, and contingent on the existential facts of human life, that people need to do some things with other people and some things on their own. This is a condition which humans share with all primates. [...] A universal category of human wants relative to human interaction can thus be posited. The two opposing sides of this category may be characterised as, on the one hand association/belonging/merging and on the other hand dissociation/independence/individuation (O'Driscoll, 1996: 10).

These oppositions involve, in varying degrees, either contact (*positive wants*) or lack of contact (*negative wants*). Irrespective of personal inclinations and cultural norms, nobody likes either his positive or negative wants to be disregarded (e.g., lack of recognition of one's return home, or lack of recognition of one's right to be alone sometimes, respectively).

Unlike wants dualism, face, according to O'Driscoll (1996: 12), "results from the more specifically human trait of foreground consciousness – our capacity for being introspective and for being aware of ourselves through the passage of time." He derives face from wants dualism in the following way:

- For every human being, it is not enough that his wants *be* satisfied. He wants to *feel* that they have been, are being, or will be satisfied. This want is called *self-esteem*.
- Our self-esteem depends largely on the attitudes of other people towards us. "This aspect of our self-esteem – the part that depends on others' attitudes towards us – is *face*" (O'Driscoll, 1996: 12).

As O'Driscoll maintains, face is involved in the satisfaction of positive and negative wants. Like Brown and Levinson, he distinguishes between positive and negative face, but he understands face dualism in a slightly different way. Positive face is "the need for one's positive wants to be given recognition," while negative face is "the need for one's negative wants to be given recognition"

(O'Driscoll, 1996: 13). These are not mere desires for association/togetherness or disassociation/apartness, respectively, but the need for some symbolic recognition of these desires by others. O'Driscoll (2007: 480) admits that his model of *face-opposition* "trades in richness for clarity," as it encompasses only one of many aspects of face — togetherness/apartness. It does not involve feelings of general esteem, which are traditionally related to face, such as shame, pride, embarrassment, confidence, approval, or disapproval.

Apart from the two aspects of face in interaction, O'Driscoll (1996) discusses the third one — *culture-specific face*, which is involved in folk notions of face. While the desire for good face is universal, the constituents of good face or a good self-image, things to do with personal esteem, are culturally variable; they depend on the value judgements people make and on attributes considered praiseworthy or blameworthy in a particular culture. Even more significant than culture-specific face is *situation-specific face*, because face exists only in situated interaction (2007).

O'Driscoll (2007) stresses the difference between the cross-cultural, which involves culture-specific norms and values, and the intercultural. And he claims that the study of *interaction across cultures* (IAC), apart from the concepts of norms and values, needs culture-specific *descriptive parameters*, among which he sees the parameter of positive and negative faces, understood as "a uni-dimensional spectrum." On one end point on the scale there is positive face(work), involving connection and belonging, on the other, negative face(work), involving separation and individuation. This kind of facework does not necessarily arise from FTAs. This is especially relevant to IAC, as routine moves across cultures differ along the positive-negative scale. While in one culture paying positive face is a routine, in another the routine move consists in paying negative face. An FTA can appear as a result of the divergence between the respective routine moves. O'Driscoll (2001) also maintains that in different cultures many conversational turns are prejudiced in favour of different responses, and that this is partly for the sake of face. In other words, using conversation analysis terminology, he claims that cross-cultural differences in preference organization are face-related. Face dualism is applicable cross-culturally because the constituents of positive and negative face "are inherent in the human condition." Attention to both kinds of face should "be instantiated in every culture to at least some degree" (1996: 29). But he considers the division into positive and negative politeness cultures as "a gross generalisation."

O'Driscoll's interpretation of face can be applied to the analysis of intercultural communication, viewed both as "the colliding of the two cultures" and as "the interaction, via their different identities, of the two walking micro-cultures" (1996: 30). Intercultural communication, according to O'Driscoll, depends on:

- social norms, which are system-internal,
- norms for dealing with outsiders,
- individual characteristics of the participants and their reactions during social interaction.

All these factors have a strong impact on face-related choices made by participants of intercultural communication. According to O'Driscoll's (2001) *face model of language choice in intercultural communication*, language choice is one of the most frequently recurring aspects of IAC. This is in line with what Tracy (1990: 217) states: "Facework refers to the identity implications of messages" and "while face concerns are not necessarily focal, they are always immanent." O'Driscoll contends that "since language choice is one kind of identity implication, it partakes in this immanence" (2001: 251). The language choice made by an interactant is part of the *line* (cf. Goffman, 1967) he takes during a particular social encounter, and results in a *face claim*. Thus, the interactants can use a language associated with *ego*, a language associated with *alter*, or a language which is a link between them. They can posit three faces, respectively. An interactant puts on an *ethnoliguistic face* when he uses L1, which involves stressing ethnolinguistic group membership. When interactants choose to use "a language of international standing," which is L2 for both of them, they predicate a *cosmopolitan face*. The third type is *polite face*, which is put on by an interactant when he uses *alter's* L1. These three faces are not mutually exclusive. O'Driscoll wants them to be treated as "face-primitives" which can be combined according to the situation. The language choices interactants make have implications for their mutual face (2001: 258):

- Use of Lx predicates *ego's* ethnolinguistic face and *alter's* polite face.
- Use of Ly predicates *ego's* polite face and *alter's* ethnolinguistic face.
- Use of Lz (L2 for both) predicates cosmopolitan face for both.

In multilingual settings, interactants' choice of language always results in predicating *ego's* and *alter's* faces which are interdependent.

O'Driscoll's (1996, 2001, 2007) insightful discussion of the concept of face, and face opposition in particular, gives a new interpretation to Brown and Levinson's face dualism. It shows that face is not limited to the two wants; apart from other constituents, it involves also social recognition of these wants. O'Driscoll's interpretation of culture-specific face helps to explain some differences in face-related behaviour across cultures; he sees the source of these differences in the constituents of good face and value-judgements specific for a given culture. His face model of language choice in intercultural communication accounts for identity- and face-related issues resulting from a particular language choice. The model may have an explanatory role in the

analysis of identity creation and mutual face maintenance in intercultural communication.

Face and impoliteness (Culpeper)

Face is a central concept in the model of impoliteness proposed by Culpeper (1996) and Culpeper *et al*. (2003). The model is the reverse of Brown and Levinson's model of politeness. The main difference between Brown and Levinson's model of politeness and Culpeper's model of impoliteness is that in the latter superstrategies, instead of minimizing a face threat, attack face. As in the case of politeness, the main reason for impoliteness is face. Culpeper enumerates several circumstances in which impoliteness is most likely to appear. It happens especially when there is an imbalance of power between interactants. This leads to a situation when "the vulnerability of face is unequal and so motivation to cooperate is reduced" (1996: 354). Impoliteness appears also when it is not in the participant's interest to maintain the other's face. In equal relationships, the question of impoliteness is more complex. Culpeper argues that impoliteness correlates with intimacy − in intimate relationships, people are more hostile towards each other than are strangers, and they know which aspects of face are particularly sensitive to attack. Certainly, impoliteness is more likely to appear in dislike relationships in which people expect less concern for face. By analogy to Brown and Levinson's politeness strategies, Culpeper (1996: 356−357) proposes five impoliteness strategies:

- *Bald on record impoliteness* − the FTA is performed in a direct and unambiguous way in a situation when face is not irrelevant,
- *Positive impoliteness*, employed to damage the hearer's positive face,
- *Negative impoliteness*, employed to damage the hearer's negative face,
- *Sarcasm or mock politeness* − "the FTA is performed with the use of politeness strategies that are obviously insincere, and thus remain surface realisations,"
- *Withhold politeness*, which involves the absence of "politeness work" where it is expected.

All these strategies are used to attack particular aspects of the other's face. However, as Culpeper claims (1996: 361):

> The notion of face is not confined to the immediate properties of the self, but can be invested in a wide range of phenomena such as one's family, job, nationality. Liu (1986) conceptualised the notion of face as consisting of concentric circles with the most face-laden closest to the ego.

Insults or other impolite remarks may be directed at different components of the other's face, e.g., his social roles, personal values, self-sufficiency, mental abilities or psychological make-up.

Before the publication of Culpeper's paper, "Towards an anatomy of impoliteness" (1996), most researchers focused on politeness and investigated the so-called "polite" speech acts and the strategies used to mitigate threats to face. Culpeper was the first to concentrate on the analysis of the "negative side" of politeness. His model is a reversed version of Brown and Levinson's theory; all the strategies, instead of minimizing a threat to face, are aimed at maximizing it. The model includes an interesting interpretation of the concept of face; Culpeper's face has a broader scope of meaning, because it also includes properties which are not directly relevant to the self and face, although in certain situations they can constitute sensitive issues to the self.

The applicability of Culpeper's (1996) system of impoliteness strategies has been already successfully tested. It was used by Barbara Kryk-Kastovsky (2006) as a methodological tool for the analysis of impoliteness in the Early Modern English court. In this way, she has proved that the synchronic pragmatic apparatus is capable of analysing diachronic data. To improve the system of impoliteness, Kryk-Kastovsky also suggested a distinction between structural (syntactic) impoliteness (comparable to Culpeper *et al.*'s (2003) bald-on-record impoliteness) and semantic/pragmatic impoliteness (related to the literal meaning or the speaker meaning of a particular utterance).

5.3.2. A relational (interactional) approach to face

This approach, although stemming from the same source as the previously discussed models, has developed in opposition to them. Politeness and facework are considered by the representatives of this approach in a broader, discursive, perspective. Face no longer belongs to an individual, but is conjointly created by interactants who form a certain relationship during social interaction. The relational approach to face is represented by Richard J. Watts and Miriam A. Locher, Helen Spencer-Oatey, Francesca Bargiela-Chiappini, Robert Arundale and Marina Terkourafi.

Face and relational work – the discursive approach to politeness and face (Watts, Locher)

In the introduction to the new edition of *Politeness in Language* (2005), Watts stresses the importance of the distinction between first-order and

second-order politeness, presented in the first edition (1992; later developed by Eelen, 2001, Watts, 2003). First-order politeness consists of lay concepts of politeness, while second-order politeness "refers to the constructs of theoretical politeness models proposed in the literature" (Locher, 2006: 252). Watts (2005: xx) claims that:

> Evaluative terms [...] such as *polite*, *impolite*, *rude* etc. are subject to discursive dispute in that participants in social interaction are likely to differ in attributing these evaluations to individuals' contributions to the interaction.

In other words, what is perceived as polite by some people may seem impolite to others. This is why many politeness researchers (e.g., Watts, 2003, 2005; Locher, 2006; Locher and Watts, 2005; Haugh, 2007) postulate a discursive approach to politeness. It abandons the creation of any theory of politeness or a theory which would be universal and valid cross-culturally (Watts, 2003, 2005a, Locher and Watts, 2005). What should be at issue is *relational work*, which refers to "the 'work' individuals invest in negotiating relationships with others" (Locher and Watts, 2005: 10). It comprises negatively marked behaviour (impoliteness, rudeness), positively marked behaviour (politeness), and unmarked behaviour (*politic behaviour*) (Locher, 2006: 249–251). The difference between the former two and the latter lies in the fact that (im)polite behaviour is that which is perceived as being beyond what is expectable, while politic behaviour, as Watts (2003: 19) defines it, is "linguistic behaviour which is perceived to be appropriate to the social constraints of the ongoing interaction, i.e. as non-salient." Thus, relational work comprises all types of behaviour that can be observed during social interaction. It can be understood as equivalent to Goffman's concept of facework. However, the term *facework* in contemporary politeness literature is usually limited to face-threat mitigation and polite behaviour.

Central to the concept of relational work is Goffman's (1967) face, as "any interpersonal interaction involves the participants in the negotiation of face" (Locher and Watts, 2005: 11). The discursive approach to face and politeness (Watts, 2003: 142, 2005; Locher, 2004, 2006; Locher and Watts, 2005; cf. Lerner, 1996) is in line with Goffman's ideas on face and interaction:

> We can interpret Goffman as implying that face is constructed discursively in instances of socio-communicative verbal interaction, i.e. it is constructed socially. If this is the case, we need a theory of facework rather than one of politeness, unless we are prepared to give up the notion of face threat mitigation as being the basis of politeness (Watts, 2005: xxix).

Locher and Watts (2005) agree with Goffman that face does not belong to an individual, but is constructed *discursively* during interaction with other people in accordance with the line an individual has taken, so that every individual can

have an infinite number of faces, each attributed in different social encounters. For Locher and Watts, as for Goffman, faces are like masks, "on loan to us for the duration of different kinds of performance" (Locher and Watts, 2005: 12; Locher, 2006).

The works of Watts and Locher represent an important turn in politeness and face research. The changes they propose can be presented in the following postulates:

- Face is a relational construct; it is created discursively during social interaction with other people.
- Facework does not equal politeness. It involves the whole spectrum of behaviour observed in social interaction.
- Relational work, which is equivalent to facework, involves all types of behaviour people engage in to negotiate relations with others (impolite/rude behaviour, polite behaviour and the so-called politic behaviour).
- Politic behaviour is a type of behaviour (neither polite nor impolite) which is appropriate for a particular situation.

The discursive approach to politeness and face postulates the abandonment of the creation of politeness and face theories and a focus on the analysis of relational work.

Rapport management (Spencer-Oatey)

Language has a dual function, the transfer of information and the management of social relations. Spencer-Oatey (2000) refers to the latter aspect of language use as *rapport management*. The key term here is *rapport*, defined as "(dis)harmony or smoothness-turbulence in relationships [...] which is partly dependent on relational (mis)management" (2007: 647). The theoretical framework presented by Spencer-Oatey (2000) incorporates elements of Brown and Levinson's, Leech's, and Fraser's views on politeness, and is an attempt to find some remedy for the weaknesses of these models. Spencer-Oatey (2000: 12) uses the term *rapport management* rather than *face management*, as the former "suggests more of a balance between self and other," while the latter focuses only on "concerns for self." However, the former includes the latter.

Rapport management involves two components, *the management of face* and *the management of sociality rights*. Spencer-Oatey's understanding of face is in line with Goffman's (1967), and face management is the management of face needs. The management of sociality rights involves the management of personal/social expectancies. *Sociality rights* "reflect people's concerns over fairness, consideration, social inclusion/exclusion and so on," and can be defined as "fundamental personal/social *entitlements* that individuals effectively claim for themselves in their interactions with others" (Spencer-Oatey, 2000:

14). Two types of sociality rights can be distinguished: *equity rights*, entitlements to personal consideration from others and to fair treatment, and *association rights*, entitlements to an association with others "that is in keeping with the type of relationship that we have with them" (2000: 14).

The rapport management framework differs from Brown and Levinson's model of politeness in that apart from the individual (the personal conceptualization of face) it also includes the social (the management of interpersonal relations). Distinguishing between face needs and sociality rights, Spencer-Oatey rejects Brown and Levinson's conceptualization of positive face and negative face as face needs. For her, while positive face can be treated as a face need, negative face is rather a sociality right. As a consequence, rapport or harmony in social interaction can be threatened in two ways (while Brown and Levinson's model specifies one): through face-threatening behaviour and through rights-threatening behaviour. While Brown and Levinson concentrate on threats to face and their mitigation, Spencer-Oatey (2000) holds that people interacting with others can hold different orientations towards rapport – they may want to enhance (e.g., give face to the other), maintain (e.g., use appropriate words of address, honorifics or register), neglect (e.g., concentrate more on maintaining their own face than on maintaining harmony) or challenge it (e.g., deliberately cause others to lose face).

Spencer-Oatey (2005) distinguishes between the pan-situational face (*respectability face*) (see Ho, 1994) and the situation-specific face (*identity face*) (see Goffman, 1967). Respectability face corresponds to the Chinese concepts of *mianzi* and *lian*, and refers to "the prestige, honor or 'good name' that a person or social group holds and claims within a broader community" (Spencer-Oatey, 2005: 102). It reflects the relative values of the following attributes: biographical variables (e.g., age, sex), relational attributes (e.g., marriage ties), social status indicators (e.g., educational attainment, occupational status, wealth), formal title/position/rank, personal reputation (moral or amoral) and integrity. As cultures differ in the degree of importance attached to different attributes, the understanding of respectability face can differ across nations and social groups.

Identity face, corresponding to Goffman's concept of face, is "a situation-specific face sensitivity" which can be threatened or enhanced in specific interactional encounters (Spencer-Oatey, 2005: 103). Identity face includes:

- face claims reflecting people's social values,
- face claims related to specific social attributes,
- face claims occurring in specific social encounters/interactions,
- face claims to social group membership.

Spencer-Oatey (2005), analysing the bases of face sensitivity, refers to Simon's (2004) self-aspect model of identity. According to her, people's claims to

identity face depend on the positive values that they associate with their various self-aspects ("concepts that serve to process and organise information about oneself"). Self-aspects can refer to psychological characteristics "(e.g., introverted), physical features (e.g., red hair), roles (e.g., father), abilities (e.g., bilingual), tastes (e.g., preference for red wine), attitudes (e.g., against the death penalty), behaviours (e.g., 'I work a lot') and explicit group or category membership (e.g., member of the Communist Party)" (Simon, 2004: 45). Some of these self-aspects are more important to the individual's identity than others. Around them, certain sensitivities develop, including bodily features and control, possessions, performance, skills, social behaviour and verbal behaviour.

Face sensitivities depend also on the importance people attach to certain values (i.e. on their personal value systems) and the context of interaction. Spencer-Oatey (2005) quotes the psychological work on universal values of Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz *et al*. (2001), who found that 10 different value constructs emerged in the majority of countries/cultures. Discussing the types of positive social values which people may claim for themselves and be sensitive to, Spencer-Oatey divides Schwartz's value constructs into:

- independent value constructs (e.g., self-direction, stimulation, hedonism and achievement), which are characteristic for independent self-construals,
- interdependent value constructs (e.g., universalism, benevolence, conformity and tradition), which are characteristic for interdependent self-construals.

By analogy to Brewer and Gardner's (1996) three-level perspective on self-representation, Spencer-Oatey (2007) proposes distinguishing three types of face sensitivities (Brown and Levinson' model of politeness focuses only on individual face sensitivities):

- individual face sensitivities, involving individual qualities,
- relational face sensitivities, involving qualities of the relations between interactants,
- collective face sensitivities, involving qualities of a group.

She claims that taking into consideration the three perspectives, individual, relational and collective, allows the researcher to make a complete analysis of face.

Spencer-Oatey (2005) also discusses interconnections between face, (im)politeness and wants — factors influencing people's perceptions of rapport. She maintains that all three elements are conceptually distinct and "can work both independently and in different directions" (Spencer-Oatey, 2005: 108). Thus, impolite behaviour, which constitutes a breach of behavioural expectations, does not have to involve a face-threat. And conversely, a threat to face is not always associated with impoliteness.

Recently, Spencer-Oatey (2009) has propagated an action-oriented approach to the study of face. She claims, rightly in my opinion, that an analysis of face issues is not enough, and that the communicative activity of the interactants should be analysed as a whole. Issues that contribute greatly to the description of face are participants' self-presentational concerns, the identity attributes they are face-sensitive to and their interactional goals. Self-presentation is an element of every interaction which has a strong impact on face issues. Self-presentational concerns interrelate with face concerns (cf. Ruhi, 2009). To maintain or enhance his own face, the speaker engages in positive self-presentation, even if it may be face-threatening to others. Spencer-Oatey is right to note that the problem of face sensitivities is much more complex than Brown and Levinson's duality of face. Interactants are often face-sensitive to many identity attributes (e.g., generosity, power, friendliness) other than the ones included in the concepts of positive face and negative face. People entering into interaction with others have various interactional, relational and transactional, and long-term and short-term goals. All these goals influence the construction and management of face in social interaction.

According to Spencer-Oatey, face is the central but not the only issue in social interaction; as such it should be investigated against the background of other communicative activities. In her rapport management framework, she combines the individual (face management) with the social (sociality rights management). Apart from analysing social interaction exclusively in terms of face concerns, she focuses also on the management of interpersonal relations. To make a complete analysis of face, Spencer-Oatey interprets it with respect to the relative value of relevant social attributes and to the interactant's own face claims. Doing so she takes three (instead of one) different perspectives, individual, relational and collective.

Face as a relational and interactional phenomenon – Face Constituting Theory (Arundale)

Arundale (2006) puts forward an alternative to both Brown and Levinson's and Goffman's concepts of face. Questioning Goffman's concept of *the social self*, which was later drawn on by Brown and Levinson, he maintains that social actors do not reproduce interaction rituals imposed on them during their socialization, but are actively engaged in sustaining the social order during interaction with other people. Another critique involves the fact that in describing the dynamics of talk, in spite of the earlier claim that "the proper study of interaction is not the individual and his psychology, but rather the syntactical relations among the acts of different persons mutually present to one another" (1967: 2), Goffman focuses on ritual requirements and the psychology of social actors. A third critique presented by Arundale is that Brown and

Levinson in their theory of politeness adopt Goffman's social psychological concept of face, with its Western conceptualization of the social actor. Brown and Levinson's face becomes even more individual and psychological when it is redefined in terms of individual wants, which "are not an interactionally relevant phenomenon" (Arundale, 2006: 200).

Drawing on Baxter and Montgomery's (1996) Relational Dialectics Theory, Arundale creates his own *Face Costituting Theory* (1999; 2006). Baxter and Montgomery claim that persons engaged in everyday communication form and sustain relationships which can be described by three different dialectics. These relationships can be characterized by openness or closeness with the other, certainty or uncertainty about the relationship, and connectedness with the others or separateness from them. Arundale makes use of the dialectic of connectedness and separateness to reconceptualize Brown and Levinson's concepts of positive and negative face. In his Face Constituting Theory, he redefines face as:

> [...] a culturally specific interpreting that participants achieve interactionally regarding their persons as dialectically connected to and separated from one another. Face is central to being human in that connecting creates the social out of the individual, while dialectically, separating creates the individual out of the social (2009: 51).

Instead of Brown and Levinson's positive and negative face, he distinguishes between *connection face* and *separation face*, which have meanings broader than, but inclusive of, positive and negative face. The main difference between Arundale's face and Brown and Levinson's face is that the concepts of connection face and separation face are not based on any emic concept of face. They are culture-general (cf. universal face needs of affiliation and autonomy). The two kinds of face are conceptualized as a dialectic, which differs from a dualism of face, or from the conceptualization of the two aspects of face as two opposite poles of a continuum (cf. O'Driscoll, 1996; 2007), in which movement towards one end means movement away from the other. A dialectic, according to Arundale (2009), involves two distinct, although unified, phenomena which function interdependently in a dynamic and interactive manner.

Face Constituting Theory provides an alternative explanation of face and facework which is based on two shifts:
- away from Goffman's (1955) view to a relational account of the social self and face,
- away from an encoding/decoding to an interactional achievement model of communication (Arundale, 2006: 207).

Arundale (2006: 201; Bargiela-Chiappini, 2003) proposes an alternative ontology to "Goffman's (1955) ontology of the monadic social actor engaged in rituals of presentation and avoidance," the ontology in which "face is not a matter of the individual actor's public self-image. Instead, [...] face is an emergent property of relationships, and therefore a relational phenomenon, as opposed to a social psychological one." Using the compound term *persons-in-relationship-to-other-persons*, he maintains that "social selves exist only in relation to other social selves, not as separate, monadic individuals" whose actions can be explained by internal wants and desires. And they "can be conceptualized only in view of the relationships they sustain in communicating with other social selves." A "relationship" is defined here as "a single dyadic phenomenon, not the sum of two separate monadic phenomena. A relationship is therefore distinct from a 'role' in that a role is an abstract pattern observed in communication events across multiple dyads" (2006: 200–201).

The shift to an interactional achievement model of communication implies that no utterance inherently carries any meaning relevant to face. The utterance gains a specific face meaning only during interaction between participants. In other words, participants conjointly co-constitute face in conversation. As a consequence, no utterance is inherently face-threatening. Arundale (2006: 209) explains face threat "as a participant-specific evaluation of the face meanings and actions conjointly co-constituted in the moment."

To sum up, Arundale's conceptualization of face is both relational and interactional; it is created and maintained only in relation to other people during social interaction. In his interpretation of the concept of face, Arundale rejects the individual and the psychological as irrelevant to social interaction. This does not seem to be viable, as persons-in-relationship-to-other-persons at the same time remain persons of certain character, life, preferences, likes and dislikes. Thus, participants of interaction should be considered both in terms of their individual features and in terms of the relation they create with others. Accordingly, face should be better considered as both individual and relational.

The universal concept of face, rationality and cooperation (Terkourafi)

In line with Arundale, Terkourafi (2007) admits that face is both relational and interactional. She goes further and calls face, alluding to Grice's Cooperative Principle (1975), the "accepted purpose... of the talk exchange" (2007: 316). As a consequence, she proposes the following reformulation of the Cooperative Principle (2007: 317):

> Co-operate as much as necessary to constitute your own face (which may involve constituting or threatening your interlocutor's face in the process).

The reformulated Cooperative Principle is social. And face becomes the central element and the point of reference in human communication. It regulates the generation of implicatures. Mutual awareness of face makes interactants continue inferencing until they constitute their own faces (cf. Jakubowska, 2001a).

Looking for a universal concept of face, Terkourafi agrees with O'Driscoll (1996: 8), who argues that we need a second-order notion of face which would be "divorc[ed] from any tie to folk notions, [...] a theoretical construct, not a notion which various societies invest with varying connotations." Such "a universalizing notion of Face2" should have two properties (Terkourafi, 2007: 322; 2009):
- Its biological grounding in the dimension of approach/withdrawal;
- Intentionality (as this is understood in the phenomenological tradition).

Terkourafi identifies the dimension of approach/withdrawal with the evaluation of a stimulus as 'friend' or 'foe,' which is encountered across species, and as a consequence may be considered universal. Intentionality is understood here as "the distinguishing property of mental (as opposed to physical) phenomena of being *about* something, i.e. directed at an object" (2007: 323). Thus, face2 is intentional in the sense that "it presupposes an Other. Awareness of the Other, in turn, presupposes a notion of Self" (2007: 323). Intentionality as a characteristic of face2 is specific to humans, and what is more it is grounded, as Terkourafi argues, "in the interactional dyad," as one cannot "have face" in isolation. During social interaction, participants are involved in joint action, and the face of one participant is constituted in the way the other perceives him. Certainly, all this is true, but is the interactional dyad the only grounding? It is true that one cannot "have face" in isolation, but if deprived of one's individuality/character one cannot have it either.

Terkourafi's face2 is a universal concept. Particular conceptualizations of face1 appear when this face2 is filled with particular culture-specific contents under particular socio-historical contexts. She has recently employed the theoretical concept of face in empirical research on contemporary Greek society (Terkourafi, 2009), linking together its different manifestations observed in various social circumstances.

What makes Terkourafi's proposal different from others discussed above is its cross-disciplinary basis, which gives support to the claim for the universality of face2. This basis consists of neurophysiological research on emotions and the phenomenological tradition in philosophy. It is different from the models described before that are based on socio-psychological and communication studies. Terkourafi's concept of face2 refers, on the one hand, to the primal nature of all living species and, on the other, to the distinctive feature of human beings.

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5.3.3. A cross-cultural approach to face

In the vast literature on intercultural and cross-cultural communication, the concept of face plays a very important role (e.g. Ting-Toomey's (1994) *The Challenge of Facework*). Cultural norms and values strongly influence and shape the way people communicate and present themselves, and they also have an impact on the type of facework employed and the content of face. The theory which most thoroughly tries to account for face and facework in communication across cultures is Stella Ting-Toomey's *Face-Negotiation Theory*. This approach has also been employed by other researchers, e.g., Christopher Earley (1997), who concentrated on face in organizational context.

Face-Negotiation Theory (Ting-Toomey)

Apart from Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness, Ting-Toomey's *Face-Negotiation Theory*, the first version of which was published in 1988, is the most thorough presentation of the concept of face and facework. The main assumptions of Face-Negotiation Theory are (Ting-Toomey, 1988; 1994):
- People in all cultures try to maintain and negotiate face in all communication situations.
- Active face management by both participants is especially demanded in a conflict (face-threatening) situation.

For Ting-Toomey, face is "the claimed sense of favorable social self-worth and the simultaneous assessment of other-worth in an interpersonal situation" (Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998; Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001: 36). It is a "cluster of identity- and relational-based issues." According to Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, face can simultaneously be perceived at three levels, affective (e.g., feelings of shame and pride), cognitive (e.g., calculating how much to give and receive), and behavioural. The concept of face is especially problematic in vulnerable interpersonal situations, such as request, embarrassment or conflict situations, when the interactants' self-images are threatened (Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998).

   Ting-Toomey argues that cultural values and norms influence and shape the way people manage face. Her understanding of the concept of face is based on Brown and Levinson's dichotomy, positive and negative face, but what makes it different is the cultural variability dimension of individualism–collectivism. According to Ting-Toomey (1988: 216–217), *approval face* (need for association; Brown and Levinson's positive face) and *autonomy face* (need for dissociation and independence; Brown and Levinson's negative face) are universal concepts which can be found in every culture, but

while one might expect both negative facework and positive facework to be present in all cultures, the value orientations of a culture will influence cultural members' attitudes towards pursuing one set of facework more actively than another set of facework in a face-negotiation situation. Facework then is a symbolic front that members in all cultures strive to maintain and uphold, while the modes and styles of expressing and negotiating face-need would vary from one culture to the next.

From the *individualistic perspective*, the self is "free to pursue its own personal wants, needs, and desires." Facework in individualistic cultures is aimed at preserving "one's own autonomy, territory, and space, simultaneously respecting the other person's need for space and privacy" (Ting-Toomey, 1988: 216). From the *collectivistic perspective*, the self is "bounded by mutual role obligations and duties." Facework in collectivistic cultures "is focused on how to lend role-support to another's face and at the same time not to bring shame to one's own self-face" (1988: 216).

Face is not a simple concept; it consists of three dimensions (Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001: 36—37):
- locus of face — a concern for self, other, or both,
- face valence — whether face is being defended, maintained, or honoured,
- temporality — whether face is being restored or proactively protected.

In her Face-Negotiation Theory, Ting-Toomey concentrates on the first, main, dimension of face. *Self-face* is the concern for one's own self-image threatened in the conflict situation, *other-face* is the concern for the self-image of other participants in the conflict situation, while *mutual-face* is the concern for both images of self and others, or the image of their relationship (Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998; Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001).

Ting-Toomey argues that the way individuals tend to their own face and to the face of the other depends on the culture they belong to, their individual characteristics, and relational factors (e.g., relationship length, familiarity, intimacy, and power dynamics) and situational factors (e.g., conflict salience, intensity, interaction goals, and public—private setting) (Ting-Toomey, 1988, 1994, 2005). The self—other dimension and the approval face and autonomy face dimension are influenced by the cultural context (the individualism—collectivism dimension). Members of individualistic cultures are mainly concerned with self-face maintenance, to assert and defend the "I" identity, and enhance personal self-esteem responses. Members of collectivistic cultures are mainly concerned with both other-face and mutual-face maintenance, to maintain harmony between interactants and diffuse shame and anxiety in social interaction, and to enhance the "we" identity and social self-esteem responses (Ting-Toomey, 1988, 1994; Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998; Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001).

Another value dimension that strongly influences the character of facework is power, as face-negotiation process entails "complex, power interplay" between the participants in conflict. In *small power distance* cultures, defending and asserting one's personal rights reflects self-face behaviour; individuals are concerned with horizontal facework interaction (i.e. minimizing the respect-deference distance via informal interaction). In *large power distance* cultures, on the other hand, playing one's role optimally and carrying out one's ascribed duties in a responsible way is perceived as appropriate facework; individuals are concerned with vertical facework interaction (i.e. maximizing the respect-deference distance via formal interaction) (Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998: 194–195; Merkin, 2006a).

People engaged in facework can use either *low-context* or *high-context* strategies. Ting-Toomey (2005) claims that members of individualistic cultures tend to engage in low-context, direct styles of facework, while members of collectivistic cultures prefer high-context, indirect styles.

Facework and conflict management depend also on some individual-level factors, mainly on the distinction between *independent* and *interdependent* *self-construals* (Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998; Ting-Toomey, 2005). Ting-Toomey (2005) maintains that independent self-construal is associated with self-face concern, and interdependent self-construal with other-face concern.

In her paper "The matrix of face: An updated Face-Negotiation Theory" (2005), Ting-Toomey, modifying her Face-Negotiation Theory, discusses possible *face movement* (or *face moves' patterns*) options that a negotiator has at his disposal in a conflict episode. He can choose (2005: 76):

- mutual-face protection moves, which involve high concern for self-face and high concern for other-face movements,
- mutual-face obliteration moves, which involve low concern for self-face and low concern for other-face movements,
- self-face defensive moves, involving high concern for self-face and low concern for other-face movements,
- other-face upgrading moves, involving low concern for self-face and high concern for other-face movements.

These movements, however, through which face becomes more noticeable, are performed only in conflict situations (e.g., face threat or face attack). During everyday social interaction, maintaining one's own face and the face of the other requires only performing everyday interaction rituals (Goffman, 1959; Ting-Toomey, 2005; 2009), which are hardly noticeable (cf. Watt's politic behaviour).

In different situations, individuals have different face wants and needs (more than just those for autonomy and inclusion) (Ting-Toomey, 2005; cf. Spencer-Oatey, 2009). Consequently, in different situations the content of face differs as

well. Ting-Toomey distinguishes the following face content domains (Ting-Toomey, 2005: 81):

- *autonomy face*, concerned with the individuals' "need for others to acknowledge [their] independence, self-sufficiency, privacy, boundary, nonimposition, control issues, and vice versa (i.e. our consideration for the face needs of the other on the autonomy face domain),"
- *inclusion face*, concerned with the individuals' "need for others to recognize that [they] are worthy companions, likeable, agreeable, pleasant, friendly, and cooperative,"
- *status face*, concerned with the individuals' "need for others to admire [their] tangible or intangible assets or resources such as appearance, social attractiveness, reputation, position, power, and material worth,"
- *reliability face*, concerned with our "need for others to realize that we are trustworthy, dependable, reliable, loyal, and consistent in [our] words and actions,"
- *competence face*, concerned with our "need for others to recognize our qualities or social abilities such as intelligence, skills, expertise, leadership, team-building skills, networking skills, conflict-mediation skills, facework skills, and problem-solving skills,"
- *moral face*, concerned with our "need for others to respect [our] sense of integrity, dignity, honor, propriety, and moral uprightness."

These face domains are not separate areas; their boundaries overlap, and during a single interactional encounter one often has to tend to or negotiate more than one face content topic.

In Ting-Toomey's model of facework, face is a multi-dimensional concept. She presents general directions in facework along various dimensions: self–other, individualism–collectivism, power distance, low–high context and self-construals. To account for the differences in face concerns and conflict behaviours, she also takes into consideration relational and situational factors. Generally speaking, Face-Negotiation Theory helps to explain how all these dimensions and factors influence conflict styles, face management and the content of face. Since its first publication in 1988, it has been improved and updated several times (Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998; Ting-Toomey, 2005), gaining support from research (e.g., Oetzel and Ting-Toomey, 2003) carried out to test its applicability.

Face, harmony, and social structure (Earley)

In his book *Face, Harmony, and Social Structure* (1997), Earley presents a model which integrates concepts of face and harmony into a general social structure or social system, understood here as behavioural interactions of individuals existing within a culturally organized population. As Earley claims (1997: 40):

> The model [...] is a psychologically based analysis of how culture and society impact organizations and their functioning and how organizations and employees reciprocally influence one another.

The model includes six basic elements: face, harmony, social actor, organizational structure and context, and societal context.

The key concept of the model is face, whose regulation and maintenance drives all the aspects of the model that involve employee behaviour within an organizational context. Earley's conceptualization of face is based on the works of Hsien Chin Hu, David Yau-Fai Ho, Erving Goffman and Stella Ting-Toomey. The author does not view face as an exclusive product of social discourse, but treats it as an extension of self in a social context. Following Hu (1944), Ho (1976) and other researchers who investigated the Chinese concept of face, Earley claims that there are two forms of face (although his understanding of the two concepts differs a little from the Chinese conceptualization):

- *lian*, "a person's adherence to moral or evaluative rules of conduct based on universal, societal, organization, and community standards for accepted behavior" (Earley, 1997: 56),
- *mianzi*, "a characteristic of a person that reflects his or her standing in a social hierarchy, such as position, status, role, et cetera" (Earley, 1997: 57).

In other words, *lian* involves the moral character and morality of action, and *mianzi* involves aspects of interpersonal relations and personal prestige. There are also other significant differences between *lian* and *mianzi*. *Lian* is given to every person as a birthright, while *mianzi* may be earned from one's family or peers. *Lian* can be maintained (through engagement in moral acts) or lost, but cannot be recovered easily, while *mianzi* can be lost or gained during social interaction. In Earley's conceptualization of face, in addition to two forms of face, there are also two different sources of these perceptions — internal and external reference. Thus, face involves internal as well as external presentations of oneself. Earley (1997: 57) argues that "face reflects an interaction of self and others' perceptions and attributions." Although Earley admits that *lian* depends mainly on internal reference and *mianzi* on external reference, in both cases other references are also possible. Internally enacted *lian* involves self-evaluation based on adherence to a "moral standard of behavior internally referenced" (Earley, 1997: 56). Externally enacted *lian* involves social evaluation of the morality and goodness of the individual's behaviour. Internally enacted *mianzi* is related to the individual's personal view of his achievements, while externally enacted *mianzi* to social recognition of his position. Earley argues that face is a concept central to the functioning of people in any social setting, organizational settings included, and it is "an engine driving the entire [social] system" (Earley, 1997: viii). As a universal concept, face has different emic

realizations in different cultures. As a consequence, face regulation and maintenance depend on culture and societal context.

Societal context, for Earley, involves the cultural values and beliefs shared among individuals. He analyses societal context in terms of six cultural dimensions which are relevant to interpersonal interaction and morality, and as such relevant to face. These cultural dimensions are: individualism—collectivism, tightness vs. looseness (referring to "the extent to which rules and norms are present and enforced within a given society" (1997: 27)), relationship to nature, power distance, guilt vs. shame (referring to "the nature of people's relationship to moral principles), and masculinity—femininity.

As Earley analyses the reciprocal influence of organizations and their employees, *organizational context* together with *organizational structure* are important elements of the model discussed. Organizational context refers to the general situation in which organizations operate in a particular society, whereas organizational structure, including technology, institutional roles and rules, intraorganizational dependencies, communication systems and governance structures, refers to the influences of the organization on the social actor, his behaviour and the regulation of face.

The next element of the model is the *social actor*, referring not only to the psychological aspect of a person within a society (the mental representation of his personality, his identity and social roles), but also to his view of himself formed "through direct experience and evaluations adopted from significant others" (Earley, 1997: 33). Earley discusses various forces driving the social actor's behaviour. One of the most important of these is face. He enumerates several intrapersonal and interpersonal dynamics which are also relevant for the social actor, e.g., role expectations, personal values, self-concept and social identity. The social actor's behaviour is guided also by organization and culture. However, as Earley maintains, there is a two-way dependency. On the one hand, the social actor's behaviour, face-related behaviour included, is shaped both by culture and organization. On the other hand, the way he behaves and maintains face has an impact on the organization and its structure, and patterns of interaction. He shapes the nature of his organizational setting "in order to facilitate personal and collective motives and desires" (1997: 34). According to Earley, the social actor is a major determinant of an organizational content and structure, and patterns of interaction specific for a particular social setting, while face is the underlying determinant of the actor's motives and intentions.

The concept of *harmony* is another relevant element of the model. It can be compared to Goffman's (1959) facework. Harmony is understood by Earley as "face regulatory processes" which, unlike Goffman's facework, occur both within an individual's own psyche and in a group of people. Through harmony, "face is exchanged, adapted, and built upon via social interactions" (Earley, 1997: 119). In other words, harmony, according to Earley, is a form of social

equilibrium (cf. Goffman's *ritual equilibrium*), a balance in the presentation and regulation of face, which is socially desirable.

These six elements constitute the model the author has applied to a cross-cultural analysis of organizational behaviour in group, organizational, institutional and societal contexts. The main subject of the analysis is face in organizations in four cultural contexts: the Czech Republic, India, Sweden and the United States.

The model of face presented by Earley differs from the models described earlier in many respects. According to him, face involves both the social (it is partly a product of social discourse) and the individual (it is partly an extension of self). Although Earley claims that face is universal, his conceptualization of face is based on the modification of culture-specific concepts, Chinese *mianzi* and *lian*. The greatest difference between Earley's model and others that have been discussed here is that in his model the two aspects of face can be both internally and externally enacted, i.e. they are created on the basis of self and other evaluations. Thus, the actor creates his face not only by his actions and self-presentation, but also by self-evaluation.

5.3.4. A socio-psychological approach to face

The two models I shall now discuss, Horst Arndt and Richard W. Janney's (1985, 2005) model of face and William R. Cupach and Sandra Metts' (1994) *Theory of Face Management in Close Relationships*, represent an approach which incorporates the social and the interpersonal.

Face and tact (Arndt and Janney)

According to Janney and Arndt's (2005) socio-psychological view, politeness is a dynamic interpersonal activity which can be divided into social and interpersonal. *Social politeness* involves the use of socially appropriate forms, adherence to social norms and performance of social rituals. Its main function is to facilitate interactional exchange. *Interpersonal politeness*, or tact, "is rooted in people's need to maintain face, in their fear of losing it, and in their reluctance to deprive others of it" (Janney and Arndt, 2005: 23). Metaphorically speaking, "social politeness is somewhat like a system of social traffic rules, while tact is more a matter of interpersonal driving styles and strategies" (2005: 24).

The main function of tact is to help to avoid threats to face and conflicts in interpersonal communication. To be tactful is considered a conventional way of avoiding threats to face in all cultures (Janney and Arndt, 2005). It involves the

use of interpersonally supportive communicative techniques and strategies. For Arndt and Janney, "interpersonal supportiveness" is what matters in social interaction. They describe it as follows:

> Positive messages have to be accompanied by displays of confidence and involvement in order to avoid creating the impression that they are not positive enough (i.e. covert threats to face); and negative messages have to be accompanied by displays of lack of confidence and uninvolvement in order to avoid creating the impression that they are too negative (i.e. overt threats to face) (Arndt and Janney, 1985: 294).

Politeness is related to *emotive communication*, "in which affective displays are produced consciously and used strategically in a wide variety of social situations to influence others' perceptions and interpretations of conversational events" (Janney and Arndt, 2005: 27). Emotive communication therefore differs from emotional communication in that the former is strategic while the the latter is spontaneous. Emotive communication is oriented to the face needs of the hearer. In line with Brown and Levinson (1978), Janney and Arndt distinguish between two basic face needs, the need to feel unimpeded (*personal face*) and the need to feel accepted (*interpersonal face*). These two needs are often in conflict, both within an individual and between people. Threats to face are the cause of most interpersonal conflicts. This makes people resort to the use of various face-saving strategies. "A conventional way of avoiding threats to face in all cultures is to be tactful" (Janney and Arndt, 2005: 28; Leech, 1977). However, facework as described by Arndt and Janney (1985) does not involve only face-saving, but in fact the whole spectrum of emotive communication, which often poses a threat to face.

Janney and Arndt (2005; cf. Brown and Levinson, 1987) suggest that although tact is a universal form of strategic conflict avoidance, it is culturally based. To be tactful in one's own culture the individual has to take into consideration the culture-specific dynamics of interpersonal relations, and how levels of intimacy and distance, and of power and affiliation, may be signalled in different situations. In intercultural communication settings, differences in these factors may result in breakdowns in emotive communication and serious misunderstandings. Such misunderstandings, they claim, are "probably less a matter of divergent human values that of divergent cultural assumptions about the tactful [behaviour]" (Janney and Arndt, 2005: 32).

Stressing the interpersonal character of politeness and the importance of tact in social interaction, Arndt and Janney react against the "appropriacy-based" approach to politeness, understood as complying with the rules of politeness and *savoir-vivre*. Instead they describe tact as an interpersonally supportive communicative behaviour oriented at maintaining face and good social relations between interactants.

The Theory of Face Management in Close Relationships (Cupach and Metts)

The Theory of Face Management in Close Relationships, as proposed by Cupach and Metts (1994), focuses on the concept of face and is aimed at explaining processes occurring during interaction in close relationships (e.g., between husband and wife, or between lovers). As the authors themselves state, "The theory is not intended to be [...] an all-encompassing grand explanation of social and personal relationships" (1994: 96). It is based on Goffman's (1967) concept of face and Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness. The main assumption of the theory is that the partners "co-construct the interaction episodes that constitute their relationship" (Cupach and Metts, 1994: 96). They negotiate their faces with respect to each other. Each partner, like every participant in social encounters, contributes to the identity which is to be displayed and "reach[es] what Goffman calls a 'working consensus' with regard to the face and behavioral line that each is expected to assume in particular encounters" (1994: 96). Later, as the relationship becomes more intimate, the "working consensus" turns into a *relational culture*, which is co-constructed by the couple. Like culture in its general sense, relational culture provides its members with a set of attitudes, beliefs, values and rules that help define their relationship and tell them how to behave in the presence of each other and of other people. Each relational culture is, according to Cupach and Metts, fluid — it evolves together with the relationship which has created it.

They admit that individuals differ in respect of their face needs, and that they also differ in their personal orientations to relationships. In other words, some people prefer greater autonomy and freedom, while others do not object to much interdependence. Thus, in managing relationships people also have to manage their own conflicting desires for independence and connectedness (cf. O'Driscoll, 1996). At different stages of relationships face is managed in different ways. At the very beginning, Cupach and Metts (1994) claim, individuals try to "put on their best face" to make a good impression. As intimacy in the relationship develops, they mutually support their positive face to increase the solidarity of the relationship. In established relationships, in which the degree of intimacy is at the highest level, "support for positive face is *assumed*" (Cupach and Metts, 1994: 98). In relational culture, acts which would normally be perceived as threatening to face (positive or negative) are not treated as face-threatening.

In their theory of face management, Cupach and Metts distinguish three specific aspects of face (1994: 39–40):
- *social face*, which is the identity that individuals perform in everyday interactions with "role-related individuals and nonintimates,"
- *relational face*, which they assume in potentially relational contexts,

- *relationship-specific face*, which individuals present to a particular other person (e.g., friend, spouse, romantic partner) in the context of that relationship. This aspect of face involves elements of the individuals' relational face as well as elements of their social face.

As members of a relational culture, partners develop interdependent identities, and interacting with other people they "put up a 'relational' front" and present a joint "relational face," which may differ from interaction to interaction, like the face of any individual.

The picture of face and facework in the specific type of close relationship, as presented by Cupach and Metts, focuses on interactions whose main characteristic feature is intimacy. This specific feature conditions the individuals' face which is presented to others as well as all their behaviour oriented to face in the interaction in which their relationship matters.

What makes this theory different from others is that it accounts for the mechanisms of face management only in one type of relationship, namely, intimate relationship. The variability in face management in this particular case depends, apart from the usual factors (i.e. culture-specific norms and values, individual socialization, personality orientations, individual values, and self-construals), on a relational culture which is co-constructed by the two members in the process of the relationship creation. Being a member of the relational culture, the individual "acquires" one more face − a face specific to the particular relationship.

5.3.5. A communicative approach to face

This approach has been put forward by Karen Tracy in her paper "Many faces of facework" (1990). She claims that the models representing sociolinguistic and socio-psychological approaches to face give inadequate attention to the discourse behaviour used to realize face concerns. The communicative approach appears in opposition to them, and is intended to compensate for their limitations. Apart from Tracy's contribution, the communicative approach is taken also by Tae-Seop Lim and John Waite Bowers' (1991) *communication model of facework* and Robyn Penman's (1994) model of facework.

A communicative perspective on face and facework (Tracy)

Tracy stresses the multifunctional character of facework; she says that "facework has many faces" (1990: 221). It can be oriented at self or at other; it can be

used to enhance self or other, to defend self or to attack other. The nature of facework and participants' self and other concerns are often complicated. This can be explained by the fact that:

- Desired identities are often in competition.
- Language serves other purposes than facework.
- The meaning of facework is culture-specific.
- The meaning of facework depends on the situation.

Tracy (1990: 210) proposes an approach which, in her own words, "takes account of the full range of identity concerns people have in interaction and that attends to the ways these concerns are expressed in people's discourse practices." The approach is based on five basic tenets (Tracy, 1990: 217–221):

- Facework refers to the identity implications of messages.
- The face wants (i.e. identity claims) to which people orient are dependent on situation, personality, and culture (cf. Spencer-Oatey, 2005).
- Social situations involve tensions between different aspects of face.
- The level of face-threat in a situation is first and foremost determined by the types of acts people perform.
- All interaction is potentially face-threatening.

Tracy claims that face wants or concerns are not always focal but that they are always immanent. So facework refers to "the ways particular communicative moves speak to the identity claims of self and other in specific social situations" (Tracy, 1990: 217). It is not enough to say that individuals want to be appreciated and approved of by others, because the face wants individuals pursue are context-dependent. Besides, there are also individual differences in identity claims. In addition to contextual and personal differences there are also cultural ones, as people's face wants depend on cultural factors as well. Social situations often involve tensions between cooperation and competition. Individuals are faced with the dilemma of defending their own face or supporting the other's face and threatening their own. A great impact on the level of face threat is made by the choice of a particular act and a discourse variation used in it. However, people cannot feel safe in any social situation, as in every interaction there is a possibility of their face being threatened.

The communicative approach to face and facework, according to Tracy, involves the study of the relationship between discourse and situated identity, as each of them is a key to the understanding of the other.

Solidarity, approbation and tact – a communication model of facework (Lim and Bowers)

Drawing on Brown and Levinson, Lim and Bowers (1991; cf. Domenici and Littlejohn, 2006) formulated their own theory – *a communication model of facework*. The central concept around which the model is created is face. Defining it, Lim (1994: 210; cf. Goffman, 1967) argues that it is "not what one thinks of oneself, but what one thinks others should think of one's worth." The claim for face does not have to necessarily refer to the real opinions of others, but to the manifested opinions of others: "In other words, the bottom line of face want is 'no matter what you really think of me, you must act as if you respected me,' so that the projected image can be preserved" (Lim, 1994: 210).

Lim claims that face is a universal concept, but like Goffman (1967), he adds that "face is in terms of social values" (Lim, 1994: 210), which is as complex as the value system of a society. Thus it differs across cultures, as systems of values do.

The main assumption of Lim and Bower's communication model of facework is that every person has three (rather than two, as Brown and Levinson argued) basic types of face:

- *autonomy-face*, referring to the need to be free from the imposition of others (cf. Brown and Levinson's negative face),
- *fellowship-face*, referring to the need to be approved of (cf. Brown and Levinson's positive face),
- *competence-face*, referring to the need to uphold an image of ability.

These three types of face may be redefined in terms of three basic human wants (Lim, 1994: 211; cf. Brown and Levinson, 1987):

- the want not to be imposed on (autonomy-face),
- the want to be included (fellowship-face),
- the want that their abilities be respected (competence-face).

These face wants are addressed by facework. It involves actions taken to deal with face wants of one and/or the other (Lim, 1994). Lim and Bowers describe three types of facework corresponding to the three types of face (1991: 421; cf. Fant, 1989):

- *tact facework* addressing autonomy-face,
- *solidarity facework* supporting fellowship-face,
- *approbation facework* addressing competence-face.

Tact facework is aimed at maximizing the freedom of action of the other and at minimizing the impositions that restrict it. Solidarity facework is performed to minimize the differences and maximize the commonalities between interactants,

whereas approbation facework minimizes blame and maximizes praise of the other (Lim, 1994). All three types of facework vary in the extent of support given to face. Lim (1994: 213) distinguishes four basic facework strategies differing in the amount of face support:

- *face-giving* (the most supportive), actively promoting the face of the other,
- *withdrawal*, which consists in avoiding threatening the face of the other (cf. Brown and Levinson's off-record politeness),
- *moderation*, which consists in performing the intended face-threatening act but attempts to mitigate the possible face-threat,
- *disregard*, which consists in not paying attention to the face want of the other.

Further, Lim considers different ways of enacting disregard, moderation, and face-giving strategies of tact, solidarity, and approbation, giving examples and discussing different tactics used in these three types of facework.

The degree to which individuals honour the other's face and engage in facework depends on three social factors: relational intimacy, power differences, and the speaker's right to perform a given act in a given situation. It is also influenced by the individuals' intention to renegotiate the nature of their relationship (Lim and Bowers, 1991; Lim, 1994).

Discussing the nature of facework, Lim (1994: 227) makes an attempt to redefine it:

> Facework is not a social requirement that must be always satisfied, but a means of manipulating a given relationship and/or situation. Facework, therefore, should be understood as a reflection of one's relational intentions and action goals.

The facework strategy we choose does not depend solely on our relationship with the other and the situation we are in. But as it is first of all "the product of internal purposes, its value should be measured in terms of effectiveness not appropriateness" (Lim, 1994: 227). What is at issue here is a different approach to facework: unlike Goffman, who claims that "maintenance of face is a condition of interaction" (1967: 12), Lim sees it as a strategic manipulation employed to achieve one's goals. Thus, the picture of social interaction presented by Lim seems to be more gloomy than the ones presented by Goffman and by Brown and Levinson.

Lim and Bowers' (1991; 1994) studies provide some important insights into the nature of facework and interpersonal relationships. There is a clear interdependence between them — the type of facework employed can change the relationship, and the relationship can influence the character of facework. In spite of the clear influence of Goffman (1967) and of Brown and Levinson (1987), Lim and Bowers' model, especially in its different approach to facework, is not devoid of some potential and originality.

Facework as an element of interpersonal communication (Penman)

Robyn Penman (1994) developed a model of facework inspired by Brown and Levinson's politeness theory, which, however, goes beyond the sociolinguistic tradition based on their model. For her, the concepts of face and facework are integral elements of communicative practices. Penman (1994: 19) argues that:

> Face and facework [...] are phenomena that we bring about in [our communicative] activities. And we do so in two ways: in our communicative activities we generate labels of face and facework, and we continue to engage in the actions to which we fit the labels.

Face, or self-identity, can be understood as the psychological ascriptions we take on and negotiate with others during social interaction. As such it is integrally related to the concept of relationship. But there is more to it than that; the concept of face also includes an implicit concept of moral judgement (cf. Goffman, 1967; Earley, 1997). Communicating with others, people constantly have to make moral choices and judgements. The idea of right and wrong is central to the concept of facework. We perform facework all the time, and it is the core of our social selves (cf. Tracy, 1990). The inspiration for this understanding of face and facework Penman draws from the works of John Dewey (1981) and Jürgen Habermas (1975).

The chief assumption of Penman's model of facework is that the main goals of facework are the maintenance of respect for self and avoidance of contempt. Analogously to Brown and Levinson's theory, Penman distinguishes between threats to self-face and threats to other-face, and between positive and negative face. These distinctions lead to four major facework categories:
- Self-Directed Positive and Negative Facework,
- Other-Directed Positive and Negative Facework.

On the basis of the above-mentioned categories, sixteen possible facework options, analogous to Brown and Levinson's strategies, can be discerned: e.g., direct facework strategies oriented towards contempt (cf. Brown and Levinson's bald on record FTAs); direct facework strategies oriented towards respect (cf. some of Brown and Levinson's politeness strategies); less direct facework strategies (cf. Brown and Levinson's "off-record" strategies, some politeness strategies). These strategies are not mutually exclusive. Penman claims that "utterances of actors can be multifunctional" (Penman, 1990: 19; cf. Sifianou and Antonopoulou, 2005). Either different facework strategies can be expressed sequentially in the same utterance, or different strategies can be expressed simultaneously in the same utterance. Thus one may expect multiple goals to be served simultaneously and/or sequentially. Different facework strategies may vary also along the direct-indirect dimension.

According to Penman (1990: 21), the facework effects of the strategies fall into one of the four categories:

- *depreciating and aggravating* self-face or other-face, enacted in a direct, unambiguous and contemptuous manner,
- *threatening* self-face or other-face, brought about by indirect strategies indicating some degree of contempt or lack of respect,
- *protecting* self-face or other-face, brought about by indirect strategies indicating some degree of respect,
- *mitigating* or *enhancing* self-face or other-face, brought about directly by strategies indicating respect.

Thus, Penman's conceptualization of facework can be compared to the concept of relational work in Locher and Watts (2005). It comprises the whole spectrum of face-related activities.

Penman's model of facework gained substantial support from her case study in courtroom discourse (1990), which was based on Wittgenstein's (1968) concept of the language game. Analysing court discourse, Penman noticed that it shows recurrent patterns of communicative behaviour which can be interpreted as two kinds of games, a *fact game* and a *face game*. The fact game involves official communication in court and is concerned with obtaining relevant factual information. It stems from justice morality. The face game, stemming from a different moral order, honour morality, involves unofficial communication, occurs simultaneously with the fact game and is played at the relational level. This unofficial communication is aimed at the two main interactional goals — the maintenance of respect for self and avoidance of contempt.

Penman's concept of face is almost identical with Brown and Levinson's face. What makes them different is the relational character of the former. However, a concept of face which is based on the concept of moral judgements seems to be incomplete, for it lacks other socially and interpersonally relevant bases (e.g., social position). Penman's model of facework, unlike many facework models, involves more than other-directed facework. It includes all possible types of facework, and as such it can account for all communication at the relational level.

This section has provided an overview of the major theoretical approaches to face and facework and has discussed some of the criticisms of these approaches. It has presented a variety of problems encounterd by face researchers and has attested to the importance of the concept of face in the fields of (im)politeness and communication research. Section 5.4. will aim to provide an alternative model of face and facework.

5.4. The Cultural Face Model — an approach to face interpretation and management

The purpose of this chapter is to work towards an alternative model of face and facework. The model I wish to develop is based on three main assumptions:

- Face is created during social interaction.

- Face is both a property of relationships and a property of the individual.

- Face is shaped by culture.

Face is a sociocultural construct. It is created by the participation of other people during social interaction and determined by a system of social values specific for a given culture (Lim, 1994: 210; Goffman, 1967; Chu, 1985: Brown and Levinson, 1987). In other words, face is a complex image of self which is socially constructed and shaped by culture. In a similar vein, Bargiela-Chiappini describes face in the *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics* (2006: 423)

> as a bridging concept between interpersonal interaction and social order in the sense that face, at the micro-level of verbal and nonverbal behaviour, encapsulates and dynamically displays the manifestations of (macro-level) cultural values.

Although the public self-image (face) and the social need to orient oneself to it in interaction are universal, face also has culture-specific constituents. The basic, universal desire inherent in human nature "for a 'good' face" acquires different interpretations in different cultures, because the constituents of "good" are culturally determined (O'Driscoll, 1996: 4); thus there are differences in the content of face (Mao, 1994; Matsumoto, 1988). Moral rules, hierarchies of values and social organization are specific to particular cultures; and as a consequence the image of self created on their basis must also differ.

In this section I am going to present a model of face which tries to explain the cultural variability of face both in its interpretation and management. According to this model, face is a multi-faceted construct which can be analysed at different interrelated levels.

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5.4.1. Face and interaction

There is a close relationship between the process of creation of the self and the character of social interaction (Goffman, 1967). An image of self (face) can be created and presented by the individual only during social interaction. It is intended to be supported by the judgements of other people the individual is interacting with. It is adjusted to the roles he plays in a particular context and the expectations of the others. Thus, face is determined by the participation of others and earned through social interaction (Goffman, 1967; Ho, 1976, 1994; Lim and Bowers, 1991; Mao, 1994).

In Goffman's world of social encounters, "maintenance of face is a condition of interaction" (Goffman, 1967: 12). To be able to interact with others successfully, or at all, the person has to maintain his own face and the face of the other (cf. Holtgraves, 1992). So what is at issue is the interactional order, although individual psychology also matters in social encounters and facework involves also self-presentation (Bargiela-Chiappini 2003). In other words, face management constitutes the main interactional activity; the individual's conduct is aimed both at his own face and the face of the other. And face provides the explanation of his behaviour; it is the key to understanding why interactants behave in one way and not the other.

Face is an interactional phenomenon and its interactional character can be looked at from different perspectives. Its meanings and actions emerge during social interaction in the same way as other "interpretings" formed by participants using language (Arundale, 2006; cf. Holtgraves, 1992). Though he does not deny its interactional character, Arundale sees face in a different way than Goffman. For him, it is rather "an emergent property of relationships" than a social psychological phenomenon (Arundale, 2006: 201). According to Spencer-Oatey (2007: 643):

> [...] face entails making claims about one's attributes that in turn entail the appraisal of others, so in this sense the notion of face cannot be divorced from social interaction.

Face, however, is not only constituted in interaction, the result of self-presentation and a property of relationships emerging during interaction; it is also "constitutive of interaction," constraining language use (Haugh, 2009) and imposing on interactants certain patterns of behaviour.

Undeniably, face is an integral element of social interaction, and it has an impact on what happens between interactants. Individuals entering into social interaction with others become, as Arundale (2006) claims, *persons-in-relationship-to-other-persons*. However, while assuming certain social identities and

performing certain social roles, they do not stop being individuals. Therefore, face cannot be said to be exclusively the property of the emergent relationship between interactants. It is also a property specific to the individuals involved (cf. Holtgraves, 2009). Thus, it should be considered as both a relational and a social-psychological phenomenon.

5.4.2. Face as a property of the individual

Spencer-Oatey (2007: 648; Kopytko, 1993, 1993a) suggests that

> analysing face only in interaction is comparable to studying just one side of a coin. [...] face, like identity, is both social (interactional) and cognitive in nature [...] there are cognitive underpinnings that influence (but do not determine) how face unfolds in interaction.

These cognitive underpinnings are values and expectations. Individuals have different personal value constructs which influence their judgements of their own attributes and those of the others. These can have a strong impact on their face claims and sensitivities (Spencer-Oatey, 2007). And so can expectations, which derive from a wide range of sources, e.g., different conventions of communicative activities, different conceptualizations of role relationships (Spencer-Oatey, 2007), and different personality characteristics (cf. *idiocentric* and *allocentric* types of personality in Triandis *et al.*, 1988).

One of the most important elements of face-related behaviour is self-presentation, whose end-result is the individual's image of self (face). Face is a complex entity which is constructed through the individual's choices and performances (the creation of the image of his "true," "real," or "private" self) (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934), and through self-presentation, which is an activity shaped by "a combination of personality, situational, and audience factors," such as an expression of self, a role-played response to situational pressures, and conformity to the identity expectations of salient others (Schlenker, 2003: 498; Brown, 1998). Thus, a significant part of the individual's face is a complex of attributes the individual wants to be associated with and characterized by. However, creating the self-image is a matter of self-presentation only insofar as it is concerned with establishing the image of oneself in the minds of others (Baumeister, 1982). So the information concerning the individual as a person, provided by his face is always modified by interpersonal relations in which he is with others, social situations in which he interacts with them, and the culture he belongs to. In other words, face is definitely a property of a particular individual, but at the same time it has also an undeniably relational and interactional character. Moreover its content is modified by culture.

5.4.3. Face and culture

It is common knowledge that "culture affects the development of an individual's psychological make-up, which, in turn, affects communication behavior" (Singelis and Brown, 1995: 355). There is a relational sequence of culture, its individual members and the different behaviour patterns they follow. Culture, by influencing the psychological make-up of individuals, shapes their behaviour. Apart from affecting people's value constructs and ways of thinking, cultural experience also conditions the formation of the self (Marsella, 1985; Holland, 1997; Thoits and Virshup, 1997; Hofstede, 1998; Owens and Aronson, 2000). As a consequence, face, which has a central role in interpersonal communication and is a major contributor to behaviour, is also strongly influenced by cultural norms and values (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Marsella et al., 1985; Singelis and Brown, 1995; Spencer-Oatey, 2007). As Ruhi and Işik-Güler (2007: 681) claim, "cultures may foreground different aspects of self toward which people show sensitivity in relational work." Values serve as "the explanatory logic for why people behave the way they behave" (Ruhi and Işik-Güler, 2007: 682). They provide guidance for human activities. Members of different cultures are *face sensitive* to a wide variety of attributes related to different hierarchies of values (Spencer-Oatey, 2007). Different understanding of face across cultures results from differences in cultural values, communication styles and conceptualizations of the self (Chu, 1985; Lim, 1994; Morisaki and Gudykunst, 1994).

Social norms "influence our expectations about behavioural responsibilities so that failure to fulfil these expectations may be perceived as a 'negatively eventful' occurrence, and the result may be face threat and/or face loss" (Spencer-Oatey, 2007: 652; 2005). Thus, the perception of some act as a face threat depends also on people's conceptions of rights and obligations, their conceptualizations of different role relationships and their different interpretations of face-related values. Social norms which are specific to a given culture constitute the social order expressed in interpersonal and inter-group encounters (Bargiela-Chiappini, 2003). All these elements of culture participate in shaping the self and face.

As has been mentioned, face is a complex construct. First, it includes an implicit concept of moral judgement (cf. Goffman, 1967; Penman, 1994; Earley, 1997). Second, it depends on a person's achievements and position in a social hierarchy (Earley, 1997). As social creatures, we cannot exist without other people, and we have face only in their presence. Therefore, face also includes a concept of interpersonal relations. So face is the image of self created on the basis of judgements concerning a person's adherence to moral rules of conduct, his position within a given social structure and the

interpersonal relations he creates with other interactants. Moral rules, social organization and interpersonal relations are specific to a particular culture; thus the image of self created on their basis must also differ across cultures.

5.4.4. The Cultural Face Model — presentation

In order to account for all cultural differences that have an impact on the content of face, I suggest a model of face, which I call the *Cultural Face Model*. The conceptualization of face which is the key concept here stems from the idea of multiple selves (James, 1890; Mead, 1934; Showers and Zeigler-Hill, 2003). Multiplicity of self refers to a self-concept which is represented as a set of self-aspects involving distinct roles, contexts, relationships, activities, traits and states. By analogy to the concept of multiple selves, we can refer to the *multiple faces* of a person, though not necessarily having in mind his distinct social roles. Multiplicity of face refers to different aspects of the person's self-image, related, for example, to his moral integrity, social position and relations with others.

In the Cultural Face Model, face has two dimensions, social and individual. The social dimension of face involves those attributes of the individual's self-image that are socially relevant. According to Ho (1994: 276), the following attributes important for face judgements can be valid in various cultural contexts:

- biographical variables (e.g., age, sex),
- relational attributes based on birth, blood or marriage ties,
- social status indicators based on personal effort or achievement (e.g., educational attainment, occupational status, and income; social connections and influence),
- social status indicators not based on personal effort or achievement (e.g., wealth and/or social connections acquired through marriage),
- formal title, position, or rank acquired through personal effort or through ascription (e.g., inheritance),
- personal reputation based on the amoral (e.g., skill-related or task-oriented) aspects of social performance,
- personal reputation based on moral character, judged on the basis of personal conduct,
- integrity of social being: freedom from stigmata.

In addition to the attributes mentioned above, there are also other attributes important for face judgements — interpersonal aspects of social performance.

They include interpersonal skills and "facework competence," which can be characterized in three dimensions (Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998: 200):

- cultural knowledge which helps the individual to understand other people's cultural perspectives;
- mindfulness in simultaneous attention to one's own and the other's assumptions, cognitions and emotions;
- "communication skills in managing self's and other's face-related concerns," such as identity- and relational-management issues.

An individual competent in facework can be evaluated as behaving appropriately and effectively and as being able to adapt to problematic interpersonal situations. The relative value of all these attributes varies across cultures and depends on the hierarchy of values, social norms and social organization existing in a given culture.

The social dimension of face includes three types of face:

- *Moral Face* — face tied to moral conduct (cf. the Chinese concept of *lian*, Goffman, 1967; Earley, 1997).
- *Prestige Face* — face as a position in a social setting (cf. the Chinese concept of *mianzi*, Earley, 1997).
- *Relational Face* — face tied to interpersonal skills and facework competence, and emerging from the relationship between interactants (cf. Arundale, 2006).

The three constituents of the social dimension of face form a culture-general whole. It can be treated as an empty container which, when filled with some specific cultural content, may constitute the face specific for a given culture.

Face is a complex entity which cannot be considered either as exclusively monadic (see Goffman, 1967) or as exclusively relational (Arundale, 2006). Spencer-Oatey (2007: 654) claims that "face belongs to individuals and to collectives, and yet it also applies to interpersonal relations." It is both a result of self-presentation and purposeful impression management as well as of other types of behaviour (Moral Face and Prestige Face) and a property of an emerging relationship (Relational Face), which is formed during social interaction.

To make this face model truly culture-general, it is necessary to distinguish between situation-specific face (cf. Goffman's (1967) conception of face) and pan-situational face (cf. the Chinese conception of face; Ho, 1994) (Spencer-Oatey, 2005). Moral Face can be both situation-specific and pan-situational, as it can involve a self-image created in a particular social interaction, and a "largely consistent over time" image of self concerned with moral character and the ability to function within a community. Prestige Face is a pan-situational self-image concerned with social status, rank and prestige. Relational Face is situation-specific, as it appears as a result of the interaction between individuals establishing a certain kind of relationship.

Every human being has several basic wants and desires, the desires for proximity and inclusion and for distance, independence and individuation among them. These two desires are socially relevant. The fulfilment of the desires contributes to an individual's face maintenance; disregard for the desires results in his face damage or loss. By analogy to the two desires, the individual dimension of face consists of two complementary elements:

- *Solidarity Face*, resulting from the desire for proximity and inclusion (cf. Durkheim's (1912) positive rites; Goffman's (1967) presentational rituals; Brown and Levinson's (1987) positive face).
- *Autonomy Face*, resulting from the desire for distance, independence and individuation (cf. Durkheim's (1912) negative rites; Goffman's (1967) avoidance rituals; Brown and Levinson's (1987) negative face).

Solidarity Face and Autonomy Face are culture-general concepts; they are not based on any emic concept of face (cf. culture-general connection face and separation face in Arundale (2006)). The two desires for proximity and inclusion and for distance, independence and individuation are inherently present in every individual, in every culture; the cross-cultural difference is only in their intensity (O'Driscoll, 1996). Whether one prevails over the other depends on culture, the context of a situation and the individual characteristics of a person (cf. Mao's (1994) *relative face orientation*; Markus and Kitayama's (1991) *independent* and *interdependent self-construals*).

According to the Cultural Face Model, both dimensions of face and all their constituent elements are culture-general. What makes particular emic concepts of face different from one another is the content of face which depends on cultural context (social organization, social norms, moral rules and a hierarchy of social values).

5.4.5. Types of facework

Facework can be generally defined as "actions which have a bearing on face" (O'Driscoll, 2007: 467). It involves not only threat and support but also actions which routinely address face (O'Driscoll, 2007; Tracy, 1990). Authors differ in their interpretation of the direction of facework. Goffman (1967), admitting that it may be both self-directed and other-directed, puts the main emphasis on self-directed facework and self-presentation. In Brown and Levinson's (1987) model, in which facework is identified with politeness, for obvious reasons politeness is commonly interpreted as sensitivity to other people's feelings, and facework is considered as mainly other-directed. These are, however, only

fragmentary pictures of what can be defined as facework. To adequately maintain face, people have to engage in facework, both self-directed and other-directed (Tracy, 1990; Wood and Kroger, 1994; McGlone and Batchelor, 2003). Participants of social interaction are always involved in some form of facework.

My interpretation of facework is in line with the concept of relational work (Locher and Watts, 2005; cf. Arundale, 2006), involving actions in which individuals engage to negotiate relationships with others. Thus facework comprises:

- *Negatively marked facework*, involving actions threatening or damaging face:
  − actions directed to other-face (impolite or rude behaviour),
  − actions directed to self-face (self-denigrating behaviour),

- *Unmarked facework*, involving actions intended to maintain self and/or other face (unmarked behaviour sustaining the current state of a relationship) (cf. politic behaviour (Watts, 2003; Locher, 2006); Arundale, 2006),

- *Positively marked facework*, involving actions intended to enhance face:
  − actions directed to other-face (polite behaviour),
  − actions directed to self-face (self-praising behaviour, positive self-presentation).

The three types of facework are oriented at the social dimension of face (i.e. Moral Face, Prestige Face and Relational Face) and the individual dimension of face (i.e. Solidarity Face and Autonomy Face). In the social dimension, the use of a facework strategy oriented at one type of face does not preclude the use of a strategy oriented at another type of face. Thus, in addition to being multi-directional, facework may be multi-oriented. Each type of facework may be employed in a different face-orientation (see Fig. 6.).

Fig. 6. The Scope of Facework Orientation

In the individual dimension of face, the use of a facework strategy oriented at one type of face precludes the use of a strategy oriented at the other type of face. Solidarity Face and Autonomy Face constitute a continuum. Facework may involve a move towards one end or the other (see Fig. 7.).

SOLIDARITY FACE ◄─────── **FACEWORK** ───────► **AUTONOMY FACE**

Fig. 7. The Facework Continuum

In line with Watts (2003), I claim that facework cannot be equated with (im)politeness. It is more than that. Linguistic structures that realize facework strategies are by no means always associated with linguistic (im)politeness, although a large number of them may be (cf. Watts, 2003: 93). The (im)polite sense of the utterances often depends on the context of their use. Many utterances which are used to realize unmarked facework are not inherently polite, but help maintain harmony and good relationships between interactants (cf. Ożóg, 1990).

Facework strategies may be realized by actions other than verbal. Nonverbal facework involves gestures, facial expressions and eye contact. It may also consist in absence of any actions (both verbal and nonverbal), which has a bearing on face. Thus, strategies of all types of facework may be realized by:

- verbal actions (e.g., greeting the other with *Good morning* or *Dzień dobry* (Good day)),
- nonverbal actions (e.g., greeting the other with a greeting gesture, e.g., shaking hands, waving a hand, bowing or raising the hat),
- lack of any action (e.g., avoidance of the greeting action when such an action is expected).

Lack of any action, though, is not always intended and interpreted as a negatively marked facework strategy. In some situations, especially when a person's actions pose a threat to his own (usually relational) face (e.g., slips of the tongue, momentary lack of control over bodily reactions, coughing, or dropping things), his interlocutor may pretend not to notice what has happened. Lack of any reaction on his part may at least partly save the person's face and be beneficial for his self-esteem and relations with others.

The above model of facework is culture-general. Facework, like face, is affected both by cultural factors and individual-level factors. As Merkin (2006a: 142) maintains, cultural factors have both "an indirect effect on facework strategy choices when mediated by individual-level factors," and "a *direct* effect on facework strategy choices" (see also Singelis and Brown, 1995; Oetzel and Ting-Toomey, 2003). The choice of actions and linguistic structures that realize facework depends on the hierarchy of cultural values, the social norms, and the character of social relations specific for a particular culture.

5.4.6. The applicability of the Cultural Face Model

To test the applicability of the Cultural Face Model, I present two emic concepts: American face and Polish face (*twarz*), which differ in their interpretation and management. This is caused by different hierarchies of values cherished in these cultures, different social norms, and differences in the character of social relations and in the construction of the social self. I will apply the Cultural Face Model to real life situations and present a number of authentic examples (coming from the Polish and American press and from observation of everyday interactions in Polish and American settings) which show the importance of certain face-sensitive attributes in the two cultures.

Moral Face

Moral Face epitomizes what makes an individual human. Morality is a code of conduct which exists in every culture, in every society. Polish and American cultures have the same European roots, so rightness and honesty of behaviour generally mean the same both for Poles and Americans. Faithfulness to one's ideals and one's friends is of utmost importance in both cultures (see Example 1).

E x a m p l e   1

Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the Law and Justice party, accused Stefan Niesiołowski, the Deputy Speaker of the Sejm, from the Civic Platform party, of having at one time informed on his friends to the communist security services. Niesiołowski was one of the founders of the Ruch organization established in Łódź in 1964, which was the largest opposition group at the end of the Władysław Gomułka government. On May 20, 1970, Ruch organization activists, Niesiołowski included, were arrested the day before their planned arson of the Lenin Museum in Poronin. Referring to Niesiołowski's arrest on this occasion, Kaczyński said:

> *Stefan Niesiołowski sypał już na pierwszym przesłuchaniu. To haniebna sprawa.*
> (Stefan Niesiołowski informed [on other co-members of the Ruch organization] during the first interrogation. This is a disgrace.)

Niesiołowski himself commented on Kaczyński's statement:

> *To potwarz. Nienawiść rzuciła się Kaczyńskiemu na mózg* (*Gazeta Wyborcza*, December 4, 2008).
> (This is a slander. Hatred has made him crazy.)

Informing or reporting on members of one's own group is considered a highly immoral act whose performance leads to a person's face loss, its moral aspect in particular. In this situation, however, no Moral Face loss is involved, as Niesiołowski did not commit the act of reporting on other Ruch activists. His Moral Face is only threatened by Kaczyński's false statement. Although Kaczyński seems to commit himself to the truth of the presented proposition (he refers to a recently published book, *Działania SB wobec organizacji Ruch*), the intention of the speaker is not to present certain historical facts to others, but to damage Niesiołowski's good name and reputation as a man of moral integrity. Thus, the perlocutionary effect of the act committed is that of slander, i.e. an intentional false statement about somebody, which damages the good opinion held of him by other people. Niesiołowski's words uttered in self-defence explicitly define Kaczyński's intention. Referring to Kaczyński's impaired intellectual abilities can be interpreted as a case of defence by means of attack; Niesiołowski by attacking Kaczyński's Prestige Face defends his own Moral Face.

Example 2, coming from American culture, involves Moral Face as well.

Example 2

John McCain, who twice ran for president (2000, 2008), presented himself as a person of high moral standards:

> [*McCain*] *reinvented himself as the scourge of special interests, a crusader for stricter ethics and campaign finance rules, a man of honor chastened by a brush with shame* (*The New York Times*, February 21, 2008).

Aware of the fact that both his political and private life is subject to public scrutiny, he tried to present an image of himself as internally consistent:

> *I would very much like to think that I have never been a man whose favor can be bought. [...] From my earliest youth, I would have considered such a reputation to be the most shameful ignominy imaginable. Yet that is exactly how millions of Americans viewed me for a time, a time that I will forever consider one of the worst experiences of my life* (*The New York Times*, February 21, 2008).

However, last year McCain's Moral Face was threatened twice. First, by his own inconsiderate behaviour:

> *his friendship with Ms. Iseman, a lobbyist for telecommunications companies that had business before the commerce committee, which Mr. McCain once headed* (*The New York Times*, February 20, 2009).

Second, his Moral Face was threatened by the article, "For McCain, Self-Confidence on Ethics Poses Its Own Risk," published in *The New York Times* (February 20, 2009):

> *The article said that in 1999, during a previous presidential run, some top McCain advisers were "convinced the relationship had become romantic," warned Ms. Iseman to steer clear of the senator, and confronted Mr. McCain about the matter.*

According to the article authors, McCain's advisers thought that his behaviour

> *threatened the story of redemption and rectitude that defined his political identity.*

Further, the authors comment on the inconcistency of McCain's image:

> *Even as he has vowed to hold himself to the highest ethical standards, his confidence in his own integrity has sometimes seemed to blind him to potentially embarrassing conflicts of interest.*

They quote the words of a friend of McCain's, which presumably were to defend him, but include also an element of implied criticism:

> *He is essentially an honorable person.*

To defend himself and maintain face, McCain, in a call to Bill Keller, the executive editor of *The New York Times*, made the following statement:

> *I have never betrayed the public trust by doing anything like that.*

In support of McCain, his presidential campaign issued the following statement:

> *It is a shame that The New York Times has lowered its standards to engage in a hit-and-run smear campaign. John McCain has a 24-year record of serving our country with honor and integrity. He has never violated the public trust, never done favors for special interests or lobbyists, and he will not allow a smear campaign to distract from the issues at stake in this election. Americans are sick and tired of this kind of gutter politics, and there is nothing in this story to suggest that John McCain has ever violated the principles that have guided his career.*

The article also threatened the Moral Face of Vicki Iseman, who filed a libel suit against *The New York Times*. On settling the libel action, her attorneys issued a statement in which, justifying their client's right to a good name, they made the following comment:

> *Words have extraordinary power to wreak havoc on the life of a human being. Shakespeare, writing in Othello that "Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, is the immediate jewel of their souls" marked this essential link between our reputation and our humanity. United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, writing centuries later, asserted this same fundamental truth when he wrote that the individual's right to protection of his or her good name "reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being — a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty."* (*The New York Times*, February 20, 2009)

As can be seen, in both cultures moral integrity is a very delicate issue. A threat to Moral Face always evokes strong emotions on the part of the person and his supporters and friends, and requires some action to counteract it.

Prestige Face

In the case of Prestige Face, the differences between American and Polish culture are not great either. One might expect that, as equality is one of the most important values for Americans, and Poles are known for their titular mania and hypersensitivity to social status, the content of Prestige Face will differ in the two cultures. However, both cultures are rather conservative and hierarchical (Triandis, 1995). What makes them different is that Poles try to "be like others" and look similar, stressing in-group solidarity, while Americans want to be distinguished and to "stick out." The desire to be distinguished (e.g., for one's knowledge, competence or social rank) is not alien to Poles, however. Any questioning of the person's right to social recognition for his talent, achievement or work is an attack at his Prestige Face (see Example 3).

E x a m p l e 3

In December 2008 Bogdan Rymanowski, a television journalist (for the private channel TVN), was chosen as Journalist of the Year 2008. Piotr Pacewicz, a *Gazeta Wyborcza* journalist, published a commentary on this event, which he entitled:

> *Rymanowski — niedziennikarz roku.* (Rymanowski — non-journalist of the year.)

The subtitle read:

> *Nagradzajmy dziennikarzy, a nie arbitrów elegancji podczas kłótni w maglu.*
> (Let's give prizes to journalists, not Arbiters of Elegance during arguments in the laundry.)

In the first sentence of the article, Pacewicz writes:

> *Bogdan Rymanowski wyrokiem środowiska dziennikarskiego został Dziennikarzem Roku 2008.*
> (Bogdan Rymanowski by the judgement of the press community became the Journalist of the Year 2008.)

The author uses here an expression more suitable for the court of law than for the hall in which such titles are awarded; this conveys the impression that the title given to Rymanowski should not be considered as an award for his merits but as penalty. Further on in the article the author asks several questions:

> *Za co?! [...] Co takiego ważnego Bogdan Rymanowski ma do przekazania Polakom? Na czym się zna? Jakich wartości broni? Co ujawnia, czego byśmy nie wiedzieli?*
> (What for? [...] What, in particular, does Bogdan Rymanowski have to tell the Poles? What does he know? What values does he defend? What does he reveal that we would not otherwise know?)

> *Gdyby to były wybory „Twarzy Roku" czy „Ekranu 2008" – w porządku. Ale dziennikarz?*
> (If it were a contest for "Face of the Year" or "Screen of the Year 2008," alright. But Journalist?)

In his attack on Rymanowski, Pacewicz even comments ironically upon the laureate's behaviour on receiving the title:

> *Bogdan Rymanowski – co było ujmujące! – stwierdził w środę, że to chyba nie jemu należy się ta nagroda. Rzeczywiście. I nie chodzi o Rymanowskiego jako takiego, lecz o profesję, którą uprawia. Nie określiłbym jej terminem dziennikarstwo* (*Gazeta Wyborcza*, December 19, 2008).
> (Bogdan Rymanowski – how charming! – stated on Wednesday that perhaps he did not deserve this award. Indeed. And it is not about Rymanowski as such, but about the profession that he practises. I would not call it journalism.)

As a reaction to Pacewicz's commentary, the channel TVN 24 cancelled the programme "Skaner polityczny," in which a *Gazeta Wyborcza* journalist was to take part. Another reaction was a commentary by Adam Pieczyński, the editor-in-chief of the channel TVN 24:

> *Może Durczok, Pochanke, Olejnik to po prostu pseudodziennikarze? Tak jak Rymanowski. Tylko sadzają tych gości i rozmawiają z nimi. Niczego nie tłumaczą,*

nie są tak dociekliwi, jak „Gazeta", nie są tak mądrzy jak „Gazeta", nie są tak profesjonalni jak „Gazeta". Tylko jeśli dziennikarze telewizyjni są tak straszni, tak żałośnie nieprofesjonalni, tak trywialnie pokazują rzeczywistość, więc jeśli taka właśnie jest prawda o telewizji — to dlaczego, do licha, tak chętnie oglądają ich widzowie? (tvn24.pl)

(Perhaps Durczok, Pochanke, and Olejnik are also simply pseudo-journalists like Rymanowski. They only give their guests a seat and talk to them. They do not explain anything, they are not as inquisitive as *Gazeta Wyborcza*, they are not as wise as *Gazeta*, they are not as professional as *Gazeta*. But if television journalists are so terrible, so miserably unprofessional, and show reality in such a trivial way; if such is the truth about the television — why, for God's sake, are spectators so willing to watch them?)

Pacewicz's remarks are an example of an attack on Prestige Face. They are an attack on the individual face of Rymanowski as well as on the group face of television journalists. He not only attacks Rymanowski, he criticizes the whole group of television journalists who, in his opinion, unlike press journalists, do not have the necessary skills to perform their job.

The cancellation of the programme and the remarks in response by the editor-in-chief of TVN 24 are oriented at the defence of Prestige Face of the individual (Bogdan Rymanowski) and of the group (television journalists). In the first case, the strategy employed is the "eye-for-an-eye" strategy, consisting of retaliatory actions. In the commentary, Pieczyński expresses solidarity with the attacked: the TVN journalist Rymanowski, other TVN journalists (he names only a few, the best and the most popular) and all television journalists whose professionalism has been implicitly questioned by Pacewicz. He uses here two face-saving strategies, one consisting in comparison with the best (Rymanowski is put in the same category as the leading journalists of TVN) and the argument-based-on-facts strategy, in which real facts are used as arguments against a face threat.

A threat to Prestige Face, in American culture, also requires some action either on the part of the person involved or his supporters (see Example 4).

Example 4

In the article "After Criticism, Paterson Cancels Trip to Davos" (*The New York Times*, January 26, 2009), the author describes the story of Governor David A. Paterson, who "seeking to contain some of the fallout over his administration's handling of the United States Senate appointment, said [...] that he had canceled a trip to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, [...]." Mishandling of the problem damaged the Prestige Face of Paterson and his administration. To counteract the damage he took some redressive steps. He tried to distance himself from members of his administration who had been quoted anonymously saying

that "various problems with Caroline Kennedy sank her bid to become a senator."
He unwillingly admitted that:

> [...] *there've been leaks coming from my administration throughout this entire*
> *process of choosing a senator of contradictory types of information. Now as you*
> *know this is a pretty serious thing, and actually one that I would condemn* (*The*
> *New York Times*, January 26, 2009).

In this way he expressed his disapproval of the incompetence of his
administration. He also added that:

> *I would love to know who is responsible. But at this point, I've been unable to*
> *determine that.*

Referring to his trip to the World Economic Forum, Paterson said:

> *I think I'll stay here. Perhaps it would be a better idea to go at another time, send*
> *a couple of assistants and stay right here with the leaders of the Legislature and*
> *work on the budget.*

The act of cancelling his trip to Davos was a reaction to the criticism of his
administration and an act of redress. Although Paterson was not directly
responsible for the leaks, he found himself responsible for the actions of
members of his administration. His popularity suffered as a result of Ms.
Kennedy's withdrawal from the selection process and the way his administration
handled it. Summing up the whole situation, Paterson said:

> *You have ups and downs in public service, and you have to keep working. You*
> *have to keep trying. You have to keep doing your best. And if you conduct yourself*
> *ethically, I think over a period of time people see that.*

Relational Face

In the social dimension of face, the greatest differences between Polish and
American cultures can be observed in its relational component. They result
from the disparate character of interpersonal and inter-group relations and
different conceptualizations of self. These differences can be best seen in the
opening phase of everyday conversation. As noted in Section 4.5.2., Americans
often turn social interaction into a theatrical show, and this also refers to
greeting rituals (see Example 5). When two persons approach each other, the
moment they have made eye contact they put on a broad, satisfied and friendly
smile. They exchange greetings, addressing each other by their first names / title
+ surname / professional title + surname. First names are used most commonly

even in the case of a wide social distance between interlocutors. The exchange of how-are-you type questions is the next element of the ritual (Jakubowska, 1999). The answers to the questions are positive, and as such they contribute to the "good" self-image of the participants who have to look self-satisfied and successful. Participating in this exchange, the persons show a ritual concern for each other. Greeting rituals, and their component elements — how-are-you type questions in particular — perform several functions. They have a phatic function, as they are used to establish and maintain social contact with the other. By showing willingness to do so, the speaker expresses concern for the other's Solidarity Face. He also performs greeting rituals for pragmatic reasons — to create his own "good" self-image, the image of a person who is worthy of respect and amiable; he engages in greeting rituals to create his Relational Face, the image of a person who knows how to "behave."

E x a m p l e 5

> Sharon: (Department Chair): (smiling) *Good morning*, Paula.
> Paula: (Manager): (smiling) *Good morning, Sharon. How are you?*
> Sharon: *Fine, thanks, and you?*
> Paula: *Oh, I'm alright, thank you.*
> Sharon: *Is there any mail for me?*
> Paula: *I have just left it in your pigeonhole.*
> Sharon: *Thanks.*

Differences in social norms between cultures have an impact on the content of Relational Face. In situations similar to the one presented in Example 5, Poles create their Relational Face in a different way. In Example 6, Polish interactants (work colleagues) behave in a much less theatrical way than Americans do. The greeting ritual performed here consists of the same elements as American greetings. First, Ewa and Iwona exchange greetings proper. To show concern for the other's Solidarity Face and to help create her own Relational Face, Ewa asks a question that may be treated as a how-are-you type question (*Co u ciebie?*). It performs the phatic function; it is "a kind of cross between a greeting, a question and an invitation for the addressee to say something about their current state" (Wierzbicka, 1991: 132). What makes it different from the American how-are-you type question is that it involves more genuine concern for the other. Iwona's answer to this question constitutes a norm in Polish culture; unlike American responses to how-are-you type questions, it includes more detailed information and is not as positive as possible; it is an act of complaining. She tries even to play down the positive fact that she is going for a weekend in the mountains by saying *Daj spokój!* (Leave it alone!).

18*

E x a m p l e   6

> Ewa: *Cześć!* (Hi!)
> Iwona: *Cześć!* (Hi!)
> Ewa: *Co u ciebie?* (What's up?)
> Iwona: *Ach, nic ciekawego. Jestem okropnie zagoniona. Wiesz, koniec semestru,*
> *pełno prac mam do sprawdzenia. Jeszcze wyjeżdżamy na weekend w góry.*
> (Oh, nothing special. I'm terribly busy. You know, it's the end of the
> semester and I have loads of papers to read. And to top it all, we are
> going to the mountains for the weekend.)
> Ewa: *To świetnie!* (That's great!)
> Iwona: *Daj spokój! Nie wiem, w co ręce włożyć.* (Come on! I'm up to here in
> work.)

Examples 5 and 6 show how Relational Face is being built from the very
beginning of everyday interaction. The greeting rituals by means of which
members of the two cultures create their Relational Face do not differ much;
however, due to the differences in hierarchies of values in the two cultures there
are significant differences in face-sensitive attributes. In American culture, these
attributes are *satisfied*, *happy*, *successful* and *friendly*, and they result from the
American predilection for success and a positive way of thinking. In Polish
culture, the positive self-image is often based on a predilection for complaint
and a negative way of thinking.

Relational Face, which every participant creates during social interaction,
has to be adjusted to the context of culture and context of situation. It can
easily be threatened in intercultural communication, when interactants —
members of different cultures — have different standards for creating a "good"
Relational Face. For example, a Pole responding to a how-are-you type question
in a complaining way and making himself look unhappy in American culture
settings would be perceived as unable to control his emotions (and thus
threatening his Relational Face) and, what is worse, as somebody whose life
does not consist exclusively of success (threatening his Prestige Face).

Solidarity Face and Autonomy Face

The two types of face belonging to the individual dimension of face, Solidarity
Face and Autonomy Face, are inherent in every individual, in every culture
(O'Driscoll, 1996). Members of the two cultures pay attention to both of them.
What differs across cultures is the significance attached to Solidarity Face and
Autonomy Face. This also depends on individual characteristics. Members of
the same culture may make different choices or interpret others' interactional
activity in different ways due to individual preferences and different contexts of
situation. Examples 7 and 8 illustrate the host–guest interactions in American

and Polish cultures, respectively. All the participants behave in accordance with the culture-specific rules of politeness. In Example 7, Richard offers Sharon some spaghetti; however, he does not impose anything on her. He gives her freedom of action and choice. Sharon declines his offer. Richard expresses concern for her, saying: *Are you sure?*, checking whether her answer is what she means. Sharon confirms it and gives the reason for her decision, which is accepted. American hosts serve their guests once and expect sincere responses: *No, thank you* generally means a sincere turning down of the offer.

E x a m p l e   7

> Richard: *I'm just making myself spaghetti. Would you like some?*
> Sharon: *No, thanks.*
> Richard: *Are you sure?*
> Sharon: *Yes. I'm not hungry.*
> Richard: *OK.*

In a similar situation (see Example 8), the Polish host, Irena, imposes on her guest by using the word *musieć* (must). She does not give her interlocutor any choice. Such behaviour is sanctioned by customs of Polish hospitality which are based on the assumption that the host knows what is best for his guests. His role, even obligation, is to make his guests eat and drink as much as possible. This is what Irena aims at. The guest's preferences do not count here. Although Danka turns down the offer and gives a reason for her decision, Irena does not stop trying to make her eat. Danka declines the offer twice and finally accepts it. This is a ritual Polish guests follow: turning the offer down with *dziękuję* (no, thank you) repeated several times, before accepting it finally. This ritual can be explained by a timidity and lack of assertiveness which are deeply rooted in Polish culture (Jakubowska, 2004a).

E x a m p l e   8

> Irena: *Zrobiłam pyszną sałatkę. Musisz spróbować.* (I have prepared a delicious salad. You must try it.)
> Danka: *Nie, dziękuję. Dopiero jadłam obiad.* (No, thank you. I have just had lunch.)
> Irena: *Może jednak dasz się skusić?* (Perhaps I can tempt you to it.)
> Danka: *Naprawdę dziękuję.* (No thanks, really.)
> Irena: *Chociaż spróbuj!* (At least taste it!)
> Danka: *To proszę. Ale nie dużo.* (Well, thank you. But only a little.)

The two examples show the differences in the individual dimension of face in the two cultures. In American culture, the maintenance of Autonomy Face,

one's own as well as that of the other, is very important in social interaction. Even concern for the other person's good does not allow the speaker to neglect his desire for distance, independence and individuation, and threaten his Autonomy Face. In Polish culture, this desire is not so strong, and concern for the other person's Automony Face is of secondary importance in situations when other values prevail (e.g., hospitality).

Facework strategies

Each of the aspects of face discussed above is subject to some action on the part of interaction participants. In both cultures, Polish and American, the following facework strategies were observed to be used:

(A1) Negatively marked Moral Face-oriented strategies:
- Questioning the interlocutor's truthfulness and moral integrity

> *You are a liar, a bloody liar!*
>
> *I don't believe a word you say.*
>
> *Nie spodziewałam się po tobie takiego zakłamania.* (I didn't expect such hypocrisy from you.)
>
> *Po prostu kłamiesz w żywe oczy!* (You are simply lying through your teeth!)
>
> *Ty chyba zupełnie nie masz kręgosłupa moralnego!* (You must completely lack any moral fibre!)

- Accusing the interlocutor of some morally wrong action

> *You must have taken my money. Nobody else has been here since Monday.*
>
> *Wziąłeś moją szczotkę. Po co ci ona? Nigdy nie ruszaj nie swoich rzeczy!*
> (You have taken my brush. What for? Never touch things that don't belong to you!)

- Admitting to doing some morally wrong action

> *I did it, I did it. But I did not want to hurt him.*
>
> *No to się przyznam. To ja powiedziałem Joli, że jej ojciec nie jest jej prawdziwym ojcem. Myślałem, że powinna wiedzieć.*
> (Well, I will tell you the truth. I told Jola that her father was not her true father. I thought that she should know.)

■ Boasting about doing some morally wrong action

> *Dla mnie Le Clerk jest najtańszym supermarketem. Tam wszystko waży się samemu. Gdy ważę jabłka czy pomarańcze, najpierw ważę trzy, nalepiam cenę, a potem dokładam jeszcze jedną.*
> (For me, Le Clerk is the cheapest supermarket. There, you have to weigh all the products by yourself. When I weigh apples or oranges, first I weigh three, I put on a price label, and then I add one more (apple or orange).)

This strategy differs from the previous one in that in admitting to doing something wrong the actor evaluates his action as morally wrong, but while boasting about doing it he always evaluates it positively. He thinks others approve of it, too. Thus, in his eyes this action does not damage his Moral Face; it may even enhance his Prestige Face (in his own opinion, he is clever and resourceful). Whether the action really enhances his Prestige Face in the eyes of the others depends on their sense of morality and values they represent. However, this strategy is usually used in situations in which the actor shares the moral code with the other interlocutors; then it has nothing to do with his Moral Face, but is intended to enhance his Prestige Face.

   (A2) Unmarked Moral Face-oriented strategies
The use of this type of facework is hard to observe. A person's moral integrity does not attract much attention in everyday social interaction. Behaviour in accordance with the moral code, by means of which the person maintains his Moral Face, is what is expected. The situation is different, however, when the person tries to enhance his Moral Face or to create it on false pretences.
   The person's Moral Face may be enhanced by his own actions and the actions of other interactants. It may be enhanced indirectly, by the other's action when that implies that the other has a good opinion of the person; or directly, when the other praises him or compliments him on high moral standards.

   (A3) Positively marked Moral Face-oriented strategies:
■ Entrusting the interlocutor with something

> *I entrust her safety to you* (BNC).

> *Jesteś jedyną osobą, której mogę powierzyć moją tajemnicę.*
> (You are the only person to whom I can confide my secret.)

■ Praising the person for high moral standards

> *You're the most trustworthy person I've ever met.*

> *He is a trustworthy, dedicated, and professional assistant I just need.*

> *Nigdy nie wątpiłam w twoją uczciwość.* (I never doubted your honesty.)

> *Ręczę za nią. To osoba godna zaufania.* (I vouch for her. She is a trustworthy person.)

■ Making self-praising comments

> *You can trust me.*

> *You know I'll always do that, Stephen; you can rely on me* (BNC).

> *Możesz mieć do mnie pełne zaufanie*. (You can have complete trust in me.)

> *Myślę, że zasługuję choć na odrobinę twojego zaufania*. (I think that I deserve at least a little of your trust.)

■ Positive self-presentation

To get approval and respect the person is ready to consciously present an image of self which is more desirable than others, and which constitutes what he would like to be rather than what he really is. A commonly employed strategy is the use of disclaimers, in which the positive first part usually expresses a certain value (which the person claims to cherish) and at the same time serves for face-keeping purposes, whereas the second "but-part" expresses a negative property of the other(s) (van Dijk, 1995), e.g.:

> *We have nothing against blacks, but...* (van Dijk, 1995: 145)

> *Jestem wyjątkowo tolerancyjny, ale takiego zachowania nie zniosę*. (I am exceptionally tolerant, but I can't bear such behaviour.)

Other strategies of positive self-presentation include self-other polarization, consisting in favouring of the self and derogation of the other, which involves the association of the self with good values and noble intentions; or self-glorification (van Dijk, 1995). Usually the improvement of the person's image does not go that far; enhancing occurs within reasonable limits. However, the whole presentation process cannot be limited to the person's linguistic production, as it encompasses the whole spectrum of activity he is engaged in during interaction with others.

Prestige Face, like Moral Face, is a result of some actions and choices of the person as well as of his purposeful self-presentation. It is concerned with the person's social status, rank, reputation, competence and skills. Facework oriented at Prestige Face involves the use of the following strategies:

(B1) Negatively marked Prestige Face-oriented strategies:

■ The use of address term improper for a person's position

An improper address term is one which is not suitable for a given addressee, his social position, his relation with the speaker, and for the overall situation of

interaction (e.g., the use of the pronoun *ty* (you) instead of the form *pan/pani* (sir/madam) in Polish culture, or the use of the pronoun *you* instead of *sir/madam* in American culture). What also matters is the political (in)correctness of the term used. This is especially vital in American context, where political correctness is a socially relevant issue. In Polish culture, it is still a new phenomenon which is beginning to gain some importance, although it is often ridiculed. For a majority of Poles, especially those who think traditionally, politically correct forms are considered artificial and foreign to the Polish language.

■ The omission of titles in addressing a person who has the right to them
In Polish culture, the omission of the title in addressing a person who has the right to it constitutes a serious threat to his face. Polish titles include:
- V-form titles, e.g., *pan*, *pani* (sir, madam, or Mr, Mrs/Ms),

  > *Proszę pani, czy mogłaby się pani trochę przesunąć?* (Please ma'am, could you (ma'am) move over a bit?)

- Academic titles, e.g., *profesor* (professor), *doktor* (doctor)

  > *Dzień dobry, panie profesorze.* (Good morning, (Mr) professor.)

- Managerial titles, e.g., *prezes* (president), *dyrektor* (director, manager), *kierownik* (manager):

  > *Pani prezes, czy podać już kawę?* (Ms President, shall I serve coffee?)

- Professional titles, e.g., *sędzia* (judge), *redaktor* (editor), *doktor* (doctor, physician),

  > *Panie redaktorze, nie zgadzam się z panem.* (Mr Editor, I don't agree with you.)

As can be seen from the above examples, all the titles are combined with the forms *pan/pani*. In less formal situations, they can be used alone, e.g., *doktorze*, *kierowniku* (vocative forms). All these titles are necessary elements of social interaction in institutional settings. However, they are not so commonly used as in former times. Due to democratization of politeness in Polish culture, the principles of the use of titles are not so strictly observed. The form *pan/pani* when used reciprocally by young adults is often replaced by the reciprocal T-form — *ty* (you). Academic titles are used mainly when S addresses the superior, receiving *pan/pani* in return. Managerial and professional titles, though, are still widely used, especially in professional person—client interactions.

In American culture, social relations are more democratic and the pronoun *you* is used almost in all contexts. Academic titles (*professor*, *doctor*) are rarely used, and they occur usually in situations when S addresses a superior. The title *doctor* is also used to address physicians and lawyers who are the holders of professional degrees.

> *Good morning, Professor Garrett.*
>
> *How nice to see you, Doctor Johnson* (a physician, Ph.D. or J.D.).
>
> *It does not hurt any more, Doctor/Doc* (a physician).
>
> *Judge Arnold, can I talk to you for a minute?*

The majority of titles can be followed by a surname, although in less formal situations they can be used alone. Generally speaking, the use of titles does not play an important role in shaping social relations in American culture.

■ Questioning the person's competence

> *Are you sure you can do this?*
>
> *Daj! Ja to zrobię. Ty się zupełnie do tego nie nadajesz.* (Give it to me! I'll do it. You're not fit for it at all.)

■ Showing lack of competence or lack of knowledge

> *I don't know how to fix it. You'll have to call someone from PG&E.*
>
> *Sorry, I can't answer your question.*
>
> *Mogę położyć pani tylko gładkie tapety. Nie umiem dopasować wzorków.*
> (I can put up only plain colour wallpaper. I can't adjust patterns.)
>
> Young doctor: *Nie mam pojęcia, co to jest. Musi pani oko zobaczyć ktoś bardziej doświadczony.*
> (I have no idea what it is. You eye must be examined by somebody more experienced.)

■ Questioning one's own competence or group membership

> *I think I'll have to change classes. I don't understand what they are talking about.*
>
> *Math is not my favorite subject.*
>
> *Completnie się do tego nie nadaję.* (I'm not fit for that at all.)
>
> *Ja tu zupełnie nie pasuję. Oni wszyscy są ode mnie mądrzejsi i inteligentniejsi.*
> (I don't fit in here at all. All of them are smarter and more intelligent than I.)

(B2) Unmarked Prestige Face-oriented strategies

In order to maintain balance and harmony in social interaction all participants should behave in a manner suitable to their position in the social setting and that of the others. According to the old saying *noblesse oblige* (nobility obliges), one must act in a fashion that conforms to one's position, and to the reputation one has earned. This refers to appropriateness of behaviour, appearance and language used (register, the use of address terms and titles), which in itself does not attract others' attention. But even a minute error or inconsistency may constitute a threat to the Prestige Face of the person and/or his interlocutor.

(B3) Positively marked Prestige Face-oriented strategies

■ Appointing a person to an important post

> *Dr. Franklin's prestige led Mr. Clinton to select him in 1997 to head the Advisory Board to the President's Initiative on Race, which was formed to promote dialogue about the country's race problems* (*The New York Times*, March 25, 2009).

> *Powołuję Panią do pełnienia funkcji Kierownika Studiów Niestacjonarnych na Kierunku Filologia, Specjalność: Filologia Angielska.*
> (I appoint you to the position of Manager of Extra-mural Programme in Philology, English specialization.)

> *Mianuję Pana na stanowisko adiunkta naukowo-dydaktycznego na czas nieokreślony.*
> (I nominate you to the position of assistant professor (an open-ended contract).)

■ Awarding academic degrees, grants, fellowships, prizes or medals

> *I am pleased to advise you that you have been awarded a Kosciuszko Foundation Fellowship for the Academic Year 2006/2007 at the University of California, Berkeley.*

> *Decyzją Rady Wydziału Filologicznego Uniwersytetu Śląskiego nadano Panu Janowi Kowalskiemu stopień naukowy doktora nauk humanistycznych w zakresie językoznawstwa.*
> (The Philological Faculty Council of the University of Silesia has decided to confer on Mr Jan Kowalski the degree of doctor of the humanities in linguistics.)

■ Praising the person's competence and knowledge

> *You clever boy!*

> *You are clever!*

Ale jesteś zdolna! (How clever you are!)

Ty to jesteś artystka! Świetnie ci to wyszło. (You're an artist! It came out very well.)

Gdzie ty się tego nauczyłaś? (Where have you learnt that?)

■ Making self-praising comments

I feel very fortunate to have made it all the way from there to here. (Kate Winslet's Oscar best actress acceptance speech, www.telegraph.co.uk, February 23, 2009)

Films and life are like clay, waiting for us to mould it. And when you trust your own insides and that becomes achievement, it's a kind of principle that seems to me is at work with everyone. God bless that principle. God bless that potential that we all have for making anything possible if we think we deserve it. I deserve it. (Shirley MacLaine's Oscar best actress acceptance speech, 1983; *The Washington Post*, March 21, 1999).

Przyjmuję tę zaszczytną nagrodę jako wyraz uznania, nie tylko dla mnie, ale dla całego polskiego kina. (Andrzej Wajda's Oscar acceptance speech, 2000, www.wajda.pl)
(I accept this honourable award as an expression of recognition not only of my accomplishments, but of all the accomplishments of Polish cinematography.)

Ja spodziewałem się, że będzie nieźle, bo nieskromnie powiem, mam poczucie, że to niezły film (a Wirtualna Polska interview with Borys Lankosz about his film *Rewers*, on receiving the Złote Lwy award in the Polish Film Festival in Gdynia, 2009, http://film.wp.pl)
(I expected that it wouldn't be bad, because, maybe it will sound immodest, I feel it is a good film.)

(C1) Negatively marked Relational Face-oriented strategies
■ Pretending not to know the person

Policeman: *Are you together?*
Person X: *Oh, no. We have been sitting at the same table. I haven't seen him before.*

A: *Ten pan zaświadczy, że mówię prawdę.* (This man can testify that I'm telling the truth.)
B: *Niech pani da spokój. Ja pani nie znam.* (Leave me alone, ma'am. I don't know you.)

■ Pretending not to notice a person one knows

When someone pretends not to notice the person, turns his head away, does not greet the person or does not reply to his greetings, he first of all threatens their relationship. Such a behaviour damages the actor's Relational Face, as he shows that he lacks facework competence and interpersonal skills. This kind of behaviour also damages the other's Solidarity Face, as his desires for proximity and inclusion are not satisfied.

■ Using a word of address unsuitable for the relationship between the interlocutors

> A: *Oh, hi Tommy.*
> B: *Good morning. Don't call me like that.*
> A: *Sorry, Thomas.*
>
> A: *Wiesz co, Łukasz, zastanówmy się nad tym razem.* (You know, Łukasz, let's think about it together.)
> B: *Nie pamiętam, żebyśmy przeszli na ty.* (I don't remember that I am on first-name terms with you.)
>
> A: *Panie dyrektorze, czy mogę na słówko?* (Mr Director, may I have a word with you?)
> B: *Nie pamiętasz? Wypiliśmy wczoraj bruderszaft.*
>   (Don't you remember? We drank bruderszaft (= got on first-name terms over a drink) yesterday.)

The character of the relationship between people is a very sensitive issue. Any move on the part of either of them, resulting in intended or unintended change in the *status quo*, constitutes a potential threat to their face. The use of an improper word of address is a threat to the other's Autonomy Face, if the term used is to increase familiarity and decrease the distance between the interactants (e.g., the use of T-form instead of V-form in Polish culture; the use of first name or nick name instead of title + surname in American culture); or it is a threat to his Solidarity Face, if the term used is to increase the distance between them (e.g., the use of V-form instead of T-form in Polish culture; the use of title + surname instead of first name or nick name in American culture). In either case, this incompetent face management results in damage or at least threat to the actor's Relational Face. The rank of this threat is relatively greater in Polish culture than in American, because the passage from mutual forms of respect to mutual familiar forms in Polish culture involves a significantly greater change in the degree of familiarity or intimacy between interactants and takes much more time.

(C2) Unmarked Relational Face-oriented strategies

■ Using a word of address suitable for the relationship between the interlocutors

■ Performing everyday rituals (e.g., greetings, farewells, thanks and apologies), when expected and in a form suitable for the situation

■ Making a phatic inquiry (how-are-you-type questions)

> *How are you?*
>
> *Are you OK?*
>
> *How are you doing?*
>
> *How are you feeling?*
> *Are you alright?*
>
> *Jak się masz?* (How are you?)
>
> *Co u ciebie słychać?* (What's up?)
>
> *Wszystko w porządku?* (Is everything alright?)

■ Creating a self-image desirable in a given culture
As presented in Sections 4.5. and 4.6. respectively, the American "good" self-image differs from the Polish "good" self-image. However, the difference between them has recently become less significant. This refers mainly to the self-image presented by the young generation of Poles whose system of values and patterns of behaviour have been influenced by Western culture, American culture in particular. This is also reflected in the content of Relational Face. Young Poles present themselves as self-satisfied, happy and successful. Unlike their parents or grandparents, who still like to complain, they respond to how-are-you type questions in a positive manner:

> *Dziękuję, świetnie*. (Thank you, great.)
>
> *Super, aż się boję zapeszyć.* (Super, I don't want to jinx it.)
>
> *Dziękuję, w porządku*. (Thank you, I'm alright.)
>
> *W porzo*. (inf) (OK)

Young Poles (aged up to late thirties), especially when in larger groups, enhance their Relational Face by loud laughter, broad "American-style" smiles, excessive enthusiasm and controlled outbursts of merriment. Their behaviour, especially exclamations of happiness and excessive compliments, strongly resemble Americans' behaviour and expressions they use for the same purposes:

Super! (Super!)

Bosko! Mamy trzy tygodnie wolnego. (Fantastic! We have three weeks off.)

Wow! (Wow!)

It's awesome!

Wow!

■ Showing willingness to maintain contact with another person

This is my telephone number. Call me when you visit London.

We must meet up some time.

Let's get together again.

We'll be in touch.

Myślę, że się niedługo zobaczymy. (I think we'll meet soon.)

No to będziemy w kontakcie. (Well, we'll be in touch.)

Musimy się kiedyś spotkać. (We must meet up some time.)

■ Seeking agreement/avoiding disagreement with an interlocutor

Isn't your dress gorgeous!

A: *Aren't they a beautiful couple?*
B: *Oh, yes. They are.*

A: *I've lost a library book.*
B: *A library book!*

A: *Prawda jaka zdolna ta moja córka?* (Isn't my daughter clever?)
B: *Tak. Inteligencję odziedziczyła po ojcu.* (Yes. She inherited intelligence from her father.)

A: *Ale samochód, co?* (Some car, isn't it?)
B: *No.* (Yeah!)

A: *Wiesz co mi się dziś przytrafiło? Ukradli mi komórkę w tramwaju.*
(Do you know what happened to me today? My cellphone was stolen in the tram.)
B: *Ukradli ci komórkę? No, to ładnie.* (Your cellphone has been stolen? Well, how nice.)

Seeking agreement and avoiding disagreement is a good way to maintain a good relationship with others and create Relational Face. To do so Americans also engage in small talk and choose safe, uncontroversial topics in conversations.

Establishing and maintaining a good relationship with others is of more importance to them than presenting one's own opinion on some controversial issue.

Poles also employ this strategy to establish and maintain their Relational Face, but for them disagreement does not constitute such a threat to it. Although they do not abstain from discussing controversial topics, in encounters in which interactional goals prevail they prefer to engage in conversations on safe, unimportant, topics like weather.

■ Seeking common ground with the other

Seeking common ground with others helps to build a relationship with them. It contributes to maintaining the actor's Relational Face, and at the same time the other's Solidarity Face, because admitting to having something in common with the other (e.g., sharing with him some values, desires or opinions, or belonging to the same group) the actor satisfies the other's desire for inclusion. In seeking common ground with others, people often resort to gossip (one feels good to be able to engage in ill-natured talk about other people's affairs), joking (to be able to laugh at the same things and people means that we are similar) and complaining (common problems and enemies bring people together). In both cultures, Polish and American, people sometimes gossip, tell jokes and complain. The difference is mainly in the intensity of these practices, which depends not only on culture, but also on the context of the situation and the individual characteristics of a person. Americans rarely complain (see Section 4.5.). In my study, there were not any observed instances of the use of complaining as a common-ground-seeking practice. In Polish culture, this practice is extremely popular, especially among the older generations (see Section 4.6.).

(C3) Positively marked Relational Face-oriented strategies
■ Describing the relationship with the person in positive terms

> *This is my best friend, Camila.*

> *A to mój najlepszy przyjaciel, Marek Wolski z rodziną.*
> (This is my best friend, Marek Wolski, and his family.)

■ Performing the so-called "polite" rituals (e.g., compliments, congratulations and good wishes)

> A: *You look awesome!*
> B: *Thank you.*

> A: *Isn't she sweet?*
> B: *She's adorable!*

A: *Bardzo ładnie wyglądasz w tej sukience*. (You look great in this dress.)
B: *Daj spokój! Taka stara.* (Come on! It's old.)

A: *Super fryzura! Po prostu super!* (A super hairdo! It's just super!)
B: *Dziękuję.* (Thank you.)

Differences in the use of this strategy between Americans and Poles are best seen in the case of compliments and responses to them (see also Jakubowska, 1999). In American compliments, in comparison to Polish compliments, expression of admiration and approval is more exaggerated. Unlike Americans, Poles are reticent in expressing positive comments on others or their belongings. This can be explained by the common belief that compliments are insincere and meant to get someone's favour (this is even reflected in the Polish dictionary definition of *komplement* (compliment) — "polite, often exaggerated praising; flattery" (SJP)). This negative attitude towards compliments together with Polish modesty influence the types of response to compliments Poles most often choose, i.e. self-praise-avoiding responses, which downgrade the praise of the receiver, reject the compliment or disagree with its force (see also Jakubowska, 1999). Nowadays, however, Poles' attitude towards compliments has changed; they take them more lightly and see them as intended to make the other feel good rather than to get his favour. Poles, the young generation in particular, have borrowed the overdone, theatrical ways of approval expression that are typical of Americans, as well as their ways of responding to compliments (acceptance and agreement).

- Other positive comments about the other

> *Taking into consideration everything I said before, I would very sincerely like to support Gary Palmer in his attempts to get the Research Grant, and to warmly recommend him to my American Colleagues.*

> *Mgr Janusz Jaworski jest badaczem o wyraźnie określonym już profilu naukowym; wygłosił szereg kompetentnych i starannie przygotowanych referatów; wziął udział w kilku konferencjach naukowych, w Polsce i za granicą.*
> (Janusz Jaworski, MA, is a researcher of a well defined academic profile; he presented several competent and thoroughly prepared papers; he participated in several academic conferences, in Poland and abroad.)

The Cultural Face model has been applied to real life situations in the two cultures, Polish and American. The model was to provide us with the tools necessary for the analysis of face interpretation and management in different cultures. Thus, the above discussion is divided into two parts, the one devoted to the interpretation of the two emic concepts, *face* and *twarz*; the other devoted to an analysis of facework strategies used in Polish and American cultures. The

analysis of the examples presented in the first part indicates the importance of certain face-sensitive attributes (morality, social position and interpersonal skills) in the overall image of self (face) in the two cultures, and at the same time utilizes the Cultural Face Model. The variety of data sources shows that there is no difference between public figures and ordinary people in the content of these aspects of face (e.g., there is one morality for all members of a given culture; a threat to one's social position is equally detrimental to all, only its social consequences can differ). The analysis of the facework strategies shows parallelisms in face management in the two cultures. Although linguistic realization of particular strategies may differ, the linguistic data coming from both cultures demonstrate striking parallels in facework employed.

What makes the Cultural Face Model different from other face models is that:

- It treats face both as a social and an individual phenomenon.

- The two-level assessment of face allows for the explanation of both cultural differences and similarities in its interpretation and management.

- Apart from "traditional" components (morality and a social position), face includes also the relational component, which is the result of interaction with others.

- Solidarity Face and Autonomy Face are perceived in terms of basic human desires, and as such constitute only one dimension of face.

The model can be a good starting point for further analysis of the concept of face, its interpretation and management in different cultures.

Conclusions

This book is an attempt to describe the concept of face. The resultant picture of face presented here does not pretend to be exhaustive. However, as a representation of such a multi-faceted concept as face it includes elements of diversified character, which like elements of a jigsaw puzzle have to fit with each other to form a whole. That is why I decided to look at the concept of face and investigate it from different perspectives.

First, a cognitive study of the concept of FACE has been carried out. FACE has been treated here as a radial category which has numerous metonymic and metaphoric extensions. FACE is considered a universal category (e.g., Strecker, 1993). Also nearly universal are FACE metonymies and metaphors comprising the cognitive category of FACE. The operation of these metaphors has been subject to analysis in both English-speaking and Polish cultures. All the analysed metaphors and metonymies have been shown to exist in the two cultures. The concept of FACE (i.e. its two folk variations, English FACE and Polish TWARZ) appears to be categorized in much the same way by members of these cultures. The linguistic expressions related to the FACE metaphors display a high degree of equivalence. It can be observed, however, that the word *face* is more broadly used than its Polish equivalent *twarz*. The word *face* can appear in all face-related metaphorical expressions, while the word *twarz* is one among the many words found in Polish face-related metaphorical expressions. Apart from *twarz*, Polish face-related expressions include *oblicze*, *lico*, *czoło*, *nos*, *oczy*, *usta*, *podbródek*, *bezczelny*, *czelność*, *potwarz*, *fasada*, *front* and *przodek*.

The existence of all the FACE metaphors is not only reflected in language, they pervade our thoughts and ways of perception. They are the motive force behind our actions and the key to our attitudes towards others. They govern our everyday life in its many aspects. The truth they carry can be found in folk sayings and philosophical works; it constitutes the basis for various scientific and pseudo-scientific investigations.

Second, the role of the face (part of the body) has been discussed in its treatment across cultures and disciplines. The face (its secrets and revelations) has fascinated both laymen and scholars for centuries. The key to understanding this fascination is a common belief that the face can tell us something about its owner, about his character and his mental and physical state. As a source of useful information, it has been subject to research in many scholarly disciplines (e.g., psychology, philosophy, medicine, sociology, anthropology and criminology) and "sciences" (e.g., physiognomy). One single common conclusion comes out of all these studies: the face is undeniably of the utmost significance for human life. It has various roles and functions:

● It helps to identify the person.
● It is used to communicate, both verbally and nonverbally, and as such is indispensable for interaction with the other.
● Its part (the mouth) participates in the feeding process.
● Its part (the eyes) makes visual perception possible.

Its significance is both biologically and socially justified. In the present study, however, the main focus is on the social functions of the face and the roles it plays in an individual's life. It is possible to distinguish between interpersonal and social functions of the face. In interpersonal relations, it functions as a displayer of emotions; proper control over facial expression is important for the success of social interaction. Depending on the character of relations between interactants, the face becomes more face-like (true) or more mask-like (false). In social interaction, there are always two faces involved, "my" face and the face of the other; they are equally relevant and equally responsible. As the face is said to be an "identity card," everyone looking at it is obliged to identify the other; face-blindness is a social "sin."

The face can also be a determinant of a person's social success or its lack. Certain "types" of face are generally approved of and even welcome (e.g., faces of the "normal" or the beautiful); others meet with suspicion or prejudice (e.g., faces of the "stigmatized" (alcoholics, the mentally ill, members of other races and all those who do not belong to the "normal"). The multitude of functions that the face has constitutes a good explanation for the interest it has evoked.

Third, in order to truly understand the concept of face (the image of self) I have decided to precede its analysis with a presentation of the concept of self as it is understood by psychologists, sociologists and philosophers. A short discussion of the social character of the self and of the relationship between the self and the body has formed the basis for the following analysis of the concept of face.

Fourth, face (the image of self), which is a sociocultural construct, has been investigated. It has been described together with morality and other related

social concepts (pride, dignity, tact respect, (self-)esteem and honour), which like face, are main determinants of interactional dynamics. Next, as the content of face is culture-dependent, the notions of culture and cultural variability have been briefly described and discussed. The dimensions of cultural variability (Hofstede, 1991, 1998, 2001) and the types of self-construals (Markus and Kitayama, 1991) have constituted the basis for the analysis of emic concepts of face. As an example of such an emic concept, the Chinese face (the two concepts *mianzi* and *lian*) has been presented; its central role in social interaction makes it one of the most important values in Chinese culture.

What follows is an analysis of face as a folk concept. The two emic concepts, American *face* and Polish *twarz*, have been described and investigated in a broad context of respective cultures. Cultural experience strongly influences our hierarchies of values and ways of thinking, and they all shape the self and face. The analyses of the two concepts of face have been supported by a discussion of the character of interpersonal relations and the role of facial expressions in the two cultures, which are explanatory of the character of these emic concepts. Although American face and Polish *twarz* display some relevant differences stemming from the different cultural backgrounds, their common European roots mean that the similarities outnumber the differences. This is also related to the transformations which have affected Polish economic, social and cultural life since 1989. American face is a prototypical independent face, resulting from the long-cherished values of independence, freedom, equality and autonomy of the individual; it is shaped by the American lifestyle, which can be characterized by a drive for success and great mobility. Polish face is more difficult to categorize for two reasons:

- Although Polish culture is by many researchers considered collectivistic, the Polish historical tradition is full of contrary examples in which typically individualistic values (e.g., independence, freedom and the autonomy of the individual) prevailed.
- The recent sociocultural changes in Poland have strongly influenced the character of social interaction. The opening of Poland to modern Western culture, American culture in particular, has resulted in great changes in the character of interpersonal relations and self-presentation style.

Thus, Polish face cannot be called either definitely interdependent or definitely independent. Like Polish culture, it has been undergoing some changes in the direction of "westernization" or "Americanization," which have made it a face "in transition." These changes have not, however, influenced the whole population of Poles to the same extent. More interdependent face predominates among the older generation and the less educated, while more independent ("westernized") face predominates among the younger generation, who started their adult life during the last twenty years, and the educated. The comparison of

American face and Polish *twarz* shows that there are differences between them in self-presentation style and components of "good" self-image. The similarities are in the general interpretation of the meaning of the concept, the moral aspect of face and the interpretation of certain situations as face-threatening.

Fifth, face has been presented as an academic concept, a central issue in (im)politeness and (cross-cultural and intercultural) communication studies. After a detailed presentation of Erving Goffman's works on social interaction and his understanding of the concept of face, and an overview of face theories, an alternative theoretical approach to face interpretation and management, the Cultural Face Model, has been proposed. It has been formulated to account for all cultural differences having an impact on the content of face. According to the Cultural Face Model, all the dimensions of face (the individual dimension and the social dimension) and all their constituent elements (Moral Face, Prestige Face and Relational Face, and Solidarity Face and Autonomy Face) are culture-general. What makes particular emic concepts of face different from one another is the content of face, which depends on cultural context.

The presented model of facework is culture-general as well. Facework, like face, is affected both by cultural factors and individual-level factors. The choice of linguistic structures that realize facework strategies depends on the social norms and the character of social relations specific for a particular culture. In my model, facework includes the whole spectrum of "actions which have a bearing on face" (negatively marked facework, unmarked facework and positively marked facework); it is directed to self-face and other-face, and oriented at both dimensions of face. However, facework operates differently in the two dimensions: in the social dimension, each type of facework may be oriented at a different type of face, and the use of a strategy oriented at one type of face does not preclude the use of a strategy oriented at another type of face; in the individual dimension, the use of a strategy oriented at one type of face precludes the use of a strategy oriented at the other type of face. Finally, the applicability of the Cultural Face Model has been tested. It has been applied to real life situations which occured in American and Polish culture. The analysis of the situations threatening Moral Face and Prestige Face shows great similarities in the importance attached to these aspects of face and in the reactions to the threat in the two cultures. Differences can be observed in situations in which Relational Face matters, and in the significance attached to Solidarity Face and Autonomy Face. The analysis of the facework strategies shows great similarities in face management in the two cultures. The Cultural Face Model has proved to be a viable approach to face interpretation and management in different cultures.

The analyses discussed above constitute elements of a picture of the concept of face. The picture is far from being complete, however, it provides the sufficient evidence for the centrality of face in human and social life.

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Subject index

Ewa Bogdanowska-Jakubowska

TWARZ
Perspektywa interdyscyplinarna

S t r e s z c z e n i e

Celem książki jest możliwie najszersze przedstawienie pojęcia twarzy. Omawiane zagadnienie obejmuje zarówno elementy wynikające z fizycznego aspektu twarzy, jak i te związane z jej socjokulturowymi uwarunkowaniami. Mimo że moim zamiarem jest szeroka i gruntowna prezentacja pojęcia, za kwestię kluczową uznałam rolę, jaką odgrywa twarz w interakcjach społecznych. Stykając się z ludźmi, musimy zawsze brać pod uwagę:
• twarz jako część ciała, z jej cechami stałymi i mimiką;
• twarz rozumianą jako wizerunek własny, jaki każdy człowiek tworzy na potrzeby danej interakcji społecznej.

Kulturowy wymiar pojęcia twarzy umożliwia interpretację różnorodnych zachowań ludzkich — zarówno językowych, jak i pozajęzykowych. Tłumaczy również relacje międzyludzkie, które kształtują treść pojęcia twarzy specyficzną dla danej kultury.

Kategoria twarzy znajduje się w centrum zainteresowania wielu dyscyplin naukowych, a w szczególności nauk społecznych: antropologii kulturowej, studiów nad komunikacją (międzykulturową), psychologii (w szczególności psychologii społecznej) oraz socjologii. Twarz jest przedmiotem dociekań filozoficznych. W medycynie traktowana jest jako część ciała ludzkiego, poprzez którą ujawnia się choroba. Rysy twarzy — jako oznaki natury przestępczej — interesują również kryminologów. Powstała nawet „nauka" poświęcona twarzy — fizjonomia. Twarz jako wizerunek własny stała się jednym z głównych przedmiotów socjolingwistycznych badań nad uprzejmością. Obecność omawianego pojęcia w tak wielu dziedzinach badań jest wystarczającym uzasadnieniem przyjęcia perspektywy interdyscyplinarnej.

Twarz nie była dotąd tematem „popularnym" wśród polskich uczonych. Istnieje zaledwie kilka publikacji omawiających to zagadnienie. Zupełnie natomiast brak opracowań dotyczących polskiego rozumienia pojęcia twarzy. Niniejsza rozprawa ma tę lukę wypełnić.

Książka składa się z pięciu rozdziałów oraz wniosków końcowych. Rozdział pierwszy, zatytułowany „Kognitywne studium pojęcia TWARZY w języku angielskim i polskim", poświęcony jest ogólnej prezentacji pojęcia, poprzedzonej semantyczną analizą angielskiego słowa *face* i polskiego słowa *twarz*. W oparciu o założenia językoznawstwa kognitywnego, TWARZ przedstawiona została jako kategoria radialna. W drugiej części rozdziału podjęto próbę kognitywnej analizy metafor i metonimii TWARZY występujących w kulturze anglojęzycznej oraz polskiej.

Rozdział drugi, „Twarz jako część ciała", prezentuje twarz w kategoriach funkcji, jakie pełni ona w życiu człowieka. Rozważany jest wpływ jej wyglądu na relacje z innymi ludźmi i na ogólnie pojętą jakość życia. Ta specyficzna część ciała przez wieki wzbudzała wielkie zainteresowanie, stając się przedmiotem analizy różnych dziedzin naukowych i pseudonaukowych. Różnie też postrzegano i interpretowano twarz w poszczególnych kulturach. Rozdział ten stanowi anali-

zę najczęściej występujących sposobów pojmowania twarzy w wielu dziedzinach wiedzy i w różnych kulturach.

Pozostałe rozdziały traktują o twarzy jako o wizerunku własnym, który jest kreowany w trakcie interakcji społecznej. Analiza społecznego aspektu kategorii twarzy wymagała przede wszystkim rozpatrzenia pojęcia jaźni (self). Nie bez przyczyny bowiem mówi się, że „ja" uzewnętrznia się poprzez twarz. Rozdział trzeci przedstawia jaźń w różnych perspektywach: psychologicznej, socjologicznej i filozoficznej. Pojęcie jaźni stanowi centralny punkt wielu teorii społecznych tłumaczących złożoność doświadczenia ludzkiego oraz zachowań w trakcie interakcji społecznej. Dla pełnego zrozumienia pojęcia jaźni istotne jest również zrozumienie relacji między jaźnią a ciałem.

Rozdział czwarty przedstawia twarz jako pojęcie w potocznym jego rozumieniu. Twarz jako konstrukt społeczny skorelowana tu jest z innymi pojęciami pokrewnymi, istotnymi dla relacji międzyludzkich, takimi jak godność, honor i moralność. Rozumienie pojęcia twarzy oraz zachowania społeczne z niego wynikające podlegają zróżnicowaniu kulturowemu. Dlatego też rozdział ten omawia pojęcie kultury oraz wybrane jego modele, które dostarczają kryteriów niezbędnych do interpretacji tych zachowań. Kultura i doświadczenie kulturowe mają silny wpływ na hierarchię wartości, sposób myślenia oraz relacje społeczne, kształtują one społeczne i indywidualne „ja", jak również twarz (wizerunek własny). Główny element tego rozdziału stanowią analizy rozumienia pojęcia twarzy w trzech różnych kulturach oraz związanych z tym rozumieniem zachowań społecznych. Jako pierwsze przedstawiono chińskie rozumienie twarzy, gdyż Chiny uważane są za pierwotne źródło tego pojęcia. Twarz chińską zaprezentowano na podstawie literatury socjologicznej i językoznawczej. Pozostałe dwie analizy — wykorzystujące materiał empiryczny zgromadzony przez introspekcję, obserwację uczestniczącą, wywiad oraz ankiety przeprowadzone w Stanach Zjednoczonych i w Polsce — dotyczą twarzy angloamerykańskiej i twarzy polskiej. Każda z analiz poprzedzona jest opisem charakteru danej kultury, specyfiki relacji międzyludzkich w niej panujących oraz roli wyrazu twarzy (w szczególności uśmiechu).

Rozdział piąty poświęcony jest teoriom dotyczącym pojęcia twarzy. Na wstępie omówione zostały podstawowe pojęcia teorii interakcji społecznej Ervinga Goffmana (np. 1955, 1959, 1967) wybitnego socjologa amerykańskiego, który jako pierwszy potraktował pojęcie twarzy jako przedmiot badań naukowych. Oryginalne idee Goffmana, a w szczególności jego ujęcie twarzy, stały się inspiracją badań w różnych dziedzinach, takich jak psychologia społeczna, socjologia, studia nad komunikacją międzykulturową czy socjolingwistyka. Przegląd głównych teorii twarzy oraz teorii uprzejmości i komunikacji, w których twarz odgrywa centralną rolę, począwszy od teorii uprzejmości Brown i Levinsona (1987), stanowi kolejny element tego rozdziału. Podrozdział „Model Twarzy Kulturowej — podejście do interpretacji i zarządzania twarzą" stanowi wkład własny autorki w dyskusję na temat teoretycznego pojęcia twarzy. Rozdział kończą rozważania nad możliwościami zastosowania Modelu do analizy interakcji społecznych w kulturze angloamerykańskiej i polskiej.

Uwagi końcowe zawierają wnioski dotyczące charakteru pojęcia twarzy.

Ewa Bogdanowska-Jakubowska

Le visage
Une perspective interdisciplinaire

R é s u m é

Le but de livre est de présenter de manière la plus large possible la notion de visage. La question abordée englobe de même des éléments résultant de l'aspect physique du visage que ceux qui découlent de leur conditionnement socioculturel. Bien que mon objectif soit une présentation profonde de cette notion, j'ai trouvé cruciale le rôle du visage dans les interactions sociales. En regardant les autres nous devons prendre toujours en considération :
• le visage comme une partie du corps, avec ses traits permanents et la mimique ;
• le visage compris comme une image personnelle que chaque homme crée pour une interaction sociale concrète.

La dimension culturelle du visage rend possible une interprétation de divers comportements humains, linguistiques et non-linguistiques. Elle explique également des relations interpersonnelles, qui modèlent l'essentiel de cette notion, spécifique pour une culture donnée.

La catégorie de visage se place au centre d'intérêt de nombreuses disciplines scientifiques, et en particulier des sciences humaines : anthropologie culturelle, études de communication (interculturelles), psychologie (surtout la psychologie sociale) et sociologie. Le visage est l'objet des recherches philosophiques, et dans la médecine il est traité soit comme une partie du corps humain qui extériorise la maladie, soit est soumis aux opérations de chirurgie esthétique. Les traits du visage — comme signes d'instinct criminel — fascinent également les criminologues ; même une pseudo-science, la physiognomonie, consacrée à l'étude du visage, est née. Le visage en tant que l'image personnelle est devenue une des matières sociolinguistiques les plus importantes dans les recherches sur la politesse. La présence du phénomène en question dans des domaines de recherche si nombreux est une justification suffisante d'admettre une perspective pluridisciplinaire.

Le visage n'était pas, jusqu'au présent, un sujet « populaire » des chercheurs polonais. Il existe à peine quelques publications concernant ce problème, néanmoins il n'y a absolument pas d'études sur la perception polonaise de la notion de visage. La dissertation présente cherche à combler ce vide.

Le livre se compose de cinq chapitres et d'une conclusion. Le premier chapitre est consacré à une présentation générale de la notion, précédée par une analyse sémantique du mot anglais *face* et du mot polonais *twarz*. En accord avec les suppositions de la linguistique cognitive, le visage est présentée comme une catégorie radiale. Dans la seconde partie du chapitre l'auteur a entrepris une tentative d'analyser dans la perspective cognitive des métaphores et des métonymies FACE / TWARZ qui apparaissent dans les cultures américaine et polonaise.

Le deuxième chapitre analyse le visage dans le contexte des fonctions qu'il joue dans la vie de l'homme. L'auteur examine l'influence de son aspect physique sur des relations avec d'autres gens et sur la qualité de vie. Cette partie du corps particulière pendant des siècles éveillait un grand in-

térêt en devenant l'objet de recherches de nombreux domaines scientifiques et pseu-do-scientifiques. L'auteur analyse des façons de conceptualiser le visage, présentes le plus souvent dans des cultures et des domaines de science différents.

Les chapitres suivants traitent du visage comme de l'image propre qui est créée au cours de l'interaction sociale. L'analyse de l'aspect social de la catégorie du visage exige avant tout de prendre en considération la notion du moi (*self*) ; on dit souvent, et non sans cause, que le « je » se manifeste à travers le visage. Le troisième chapitre présente le moi dans des perspectives différentes : psychologique, sociologique et philosophique. La notion du moi constitue le point central de nombreuses théories sociales expliquant la complexité de l'expérience humaine et des comportements au cours des interactions sociales. Pour une pleine compréhension de la notion de moi il est important de comprendre la relation entre le moi et le corps.

Le quatrième chapitre présente le visage dans sa conception populaire. Le visage, en tant qu'une construction sociale, est corrélé avec d'autres notions proches, importantes pour des relations interpersonnelles, comme dignité, honneur et moralité. La compréhension de la notion de visage et des comportements sociaux qui en résultent dépendent de la différenciation culturelle ; c'est pourquoi dans ce chapitre l'auteur explique la notion de culture et ses modèles choisis qui fournissent des critères indispensables pour interpréter ces comportements. La culture et l'expérience culturelle influencent profondément la hiérarchie de valeurs, la façon de penser et les relations sociales, elles forment le « je » collectif et individuel aussi que le visage (image propre).

Ensuite l'auteur a présenté des analyses de la conception de visage dans trois cultures différentes ainsi que des comportements sociaux liés avec elles. Dans le premier lieu l'auteur décrit la conception chinoise, car la Chine est considérée comme la source première de cette notion. Le visage chinois est formulé à partir de la littérature sociologique et linguistique. Les autres deux analyses, basées sur le matériel empirique recueilli par l'introspection, grâce à un observateur participant, par l'entretien et des enquêtes menées aux Etats-Unis et en Pologne, concernent le visage anglo-américain et polonais. Chaque analyse est précédée de la description du caractère de la culture donnée, de la spécificité des rapports interpersonnels au sein d'elle, et du rôle de l'expression de visage (en particulier du sourire).

Le cinquième chapitre est consacré aux théories concernant la notion de visage. En premier lieu l'auteur explique des notions de base de la théorie de l'interaction sociale d'Erving Goffman (p. ex. 1955, 1959, 1967), un éminent sociologue américain, qui a placé comme premier le visage dans le cadre de recherches scientifiques. Les idées originales de Goffman, et en particulier sa conception du visage, sont devenues une inspiration pour les recherches dans des domaines comme psychologie sociale, sociologie, études sur communication intra-culturelle ou sociolinguistique. La partie suivante de ce chapitre s'appuie sur une étude des théories où le visage joue le rôle principal, en commençant par la théorie de politesse de Brown et Levinson (1987). Le sous-chapitre « Le Modèle du Visage dans la Culture — approche d'interprétation et de gestion du visage » constitue la proposition de l'auteur dans le débat sur la notion théorique du visage. Le chapitre finit par des réflexions sur l'application possible du Modèle dans une analyse des interactions sociaux dans les cultures anglo-américaine et polonaise.

La partie finale comprend une conclusion sur le caractère de la notion de visage.