

# EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT



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A3-0077/94

## REPORT

of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security  
on enlargement and neutrality

Rapporteur: Mr Martin HOLZFUSS

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PE 206.084/fin.  
DE - Or. DE

\* Consultation procedure  
simple majority

\*\*I Cooperation procedure (first reading)  
simple majority

\*\*II Cooperation procedure (second reading)  
simple majority to approve the common position  
absolute majority of Parliament's component Members to reject or amend the common position

\*\*\* Assent procedure  
absolute majority of Parliament's component Members to give assent  
except for simple majority under Articles 8a, 105, 106, 130d and 228 EC

\*\*\*\*I Codecision procedure (first reading)  
simple majority

\*\*\*\*II Codecision procedure (second reading)  
simple majority to approve the common position  
absolute majority of Parliament's component Members either to adopt a declaration of intent  
to reject the common position, or to amend or confirm the rejection of the common position

\*\*\*\*III Codecision procedure (third reading)  
simple majority to approve the joint text  
absolute majority of Parliament's component Members to reject the Council text

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At the sitting of 11 February 1993 the President of the European Parliament announced that he had referred the motions for resolutions tabled by Mr Langer on Community enlargement and neutrality (B3-1547/92) and by Mr Poettering and others on expansion and neutrality (B3-1550/92) pursuant to Rule 45 (formerly Rule 63) of the Rules of Procedure to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security as the committee responsible.

At its meeting of 18 March 1993 the committee decided to draw up a report.

At its meeting of 23 March 1993 it appointed Mr Martin Holzfuss rapporteur.

The Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament considered the draft report at its meetings of 30 June and 23 September 1993.

The committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 3 December 1993 and 16 February 1994.

At the latter meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 24 votes to 6, with 1 abstention.

The following took part in the vote: Baron Crespo, chairman; Holzfuss, rapporteur; Aglietta, Balfe, Cheysson, I. Christensen (for Canavarro), Delorozoy, Dillen, Fernandez Albor, Forte, Gaibisso, Guermeur, Habsburg, Lacaze, Lagakos (for Bonetti), Langer, Lenz, Llorca Vilaplana, McMillan-Scott, Oostlander (for Bethell), Penders, Pesmazoglou, Poettering, Prag (for Catherwood), Pucci (for Gawronski), Robles Piquer (for Jepsen), Rossetti (for Occhetto), Roth (for Onesta), Sakellariou, Titley and Trivelli.

The report was tabled on 17 February 1994.

The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the part-session at which the report is to be considered.

A  
Motion for a resolution

Resolution on enlargement and neutrality

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the motions for resolutions by
  - (a) Mr Langer on Community enlargement and neutrality (B3-1547/92) and
  - (b) Mr Poettering and others on expansion and neutrality (B3-1550/92),
- having regard to its resolution of 15 May 1991 on Community enlargement and relations with other European countries<sup>1</sup>,
- having regard to its resolution of 10 June 1991 on the outlook for a European security policy: the significance of a European security policy and its institutional implications for European Political Union<sup>2</sup>,
- having regard to its resolution of 20 January 1993 on the structure and strategy for the European Union<sup>3</sup> with regard to its enlargement and the creation of a Europe-wide order<sup>3</sup>,
- having regard to its resolution of 10 February 1993 on the enlargement of the Community<sup>4</sup>,
- having regard to its resolution of 27 May 1993 on developments in East-West relations in Europe and their impact on European security<sup>5</sup>,
- having regard to its resolution of 15 July 1993 on enlargement<sup>6</sup>,
- having regard to Written Question No. 2408/92 of 6 October 1992 addressed to the Council of the European Community concerning Austrian neutrality<sup>7</sup>,
- having regard to Written Question No. 2728/92 of 21 December 1992 addressed to the Commission of the European Community concerning the enlargement of the Community and foreign and security policy<sup>8</sup>,
- having regard to Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure,

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<sup>1</sup> OJ No. C 158, 17.6.1991, p. 54

<sup>2</sup> OJ No. C 183, 15.7.1991, p. 18

<sup>3</sup> OJ No. C 42, 15.2.1993, p. 124

<sup>4</sup> OJ No. C 72, 15.3.1993, p. 69

<sup>5</sup> OJ No. C 176, 28.6.1993, p. 185

<sup>6</sup> B3-1017, 1018 and 1043/93 (see minutes of this date)

<sup>7</sup> OJ No. C 86, 26.3.1993, p. 20

<sup>8</sup> OJ No. C 99, 7.4.1993, p. 19

- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security (A3-0077/94),
- A. mindful of the Commission's opinions on the applications for membership received from Austria (1 August 1991, SEC(91) 1590 final), Sweden (31 July 1992, SEC(92) 1582 final), Finland (4 November 1992, SEC(92) 2048 final) and Norway (24 March 1993, COM(93) 142 final) and of the applications for membership from Cyprus and Malta,
- B. mindful of the conclusions drawn by the European Council meeting in Copenhagen (21/22 June 1993) concerning the Community's enlargement,
- C. whereas the European Parliament has repeatedly adopted the position that the accession of new Member States to the European Community will require further reforms of the Community system, especially with regard to the deepening of the principles and objectives on which Political Union is based (see, for example, the resolution of 7 April 1992 on the results of the intergovernmental conferences, A3-0123/92),
- D. whereas Article J.4(1) of the Treaty on European Union states that the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) includes the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence,
- E. convinced that a common foreign, security and defence policy must be seen primarily as a policy of preventing conflicts and maintaining peace and that military considerations and measures must be regarded as a last resort,
- F. appreciating the wide experience and the extremely positive contribution by certain applicant countries to maintaining peace and reducing conflicts in the past within international organizations, in terms both of manpower and of civilian and military resources, and taking the view that the European Union could usefully take advantage of this to widen significantly its own field of action in this area,
- G. whereas, in view of the growing number of trouble spots in and outside Europe, there is a greater need than ever for the European Union to use its political and economic weight to prevent and resolve conflicts,
- H. whereas their geopolitical position and their history give the applicant countries special opportunities and tasks in the shaping of relations with the European Union's eastern neighbours that are positive and maintain peace,
- I. whereas all four countries with which accession negotiations are currently being conducted have made it clear that they accept the Community's legal status and the provisions of the Treaty on European Union which concern the common foreign and security policy,
- J. whereas Article J.10 of the Treaty on European Union provides for the possibility of reviewing the provisions concerning the common foreign and security policy with the aim of deepening the integration process,
- K. whereas, with the exception of Norway, none of the applicant countries with which negotiations are currently being conducted belongs to a security alliance,

- L. whereas the provisions of Finland's, Austria's, Norway's and Sweden's legislation relevant to security policy differ significantly, which must be taken into account during the accession negotiations,
- M. whereas all four countries have shown a strong commitment to the CSCE process and to the UN peacekeeping forces in the past,
- N. whereas other countries, such as Malta and Cyprus, have submitted official applications for membership and various countries in Central and Eastern Europe, chief among them the Visegrad countries, have also expressed a definite interest in membership of the European Union; whereas the prospect of full membership of these countries is mentioned in the preambles to the European agreements concluded with them,
- O. convinced that the conception and substance of neutrality should be redefined now that the East-West confrontation has come to an end,
- P. aware that Austria's neutral status may pose problems during the accession negotiations with respect, for example, to participation in joint measures and joint action pursuant to Title V, Article J.1(3) of the Treaty on European Union,
- Q. aware that, in a number of recent statements, the Austrian Government has clearly expressed its desire to participate unconditionally in the future development of the CFSP,
- R. aware that not all the Member States of the present European Union have the same security links with WEU, for example, and that even before the Union's enlargement this may pose problems for the elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications,
- S. convinced that the neutral applicant countries too should see the European Union's security and defence policy dimension as a positive element in the process of European integration,
- T. whereas the public of certain countries seeking accession may be reluctant to see their country participating in the development of the defence policy dimension within the framework of the European Union,
- U. convinced that the enlargement of the European Union must entail institutional reforms aimed at deepening the process of Community-building within the framework of the European Union if the Union's capacity to function is to be maintained,
- V. convinced that the framing of a common foreign, security and defence policy is and remains an essential goal for the development of the European Union,
- 1. Believes that enlargement must lead to the strengthening of the European Union's internal cohesion and the enhancement of its capacity for effective action under the foreign and security policy;
- 2. Welcomes the fact that all the applicant countries with which negotiations have begun are prepared to accept the provisions of the Treaty on European Union concerning the common foreign and security policy without qualification;

3. Appreciates the contribution made by Norway to security policy within the Atlantic Alliance, and the numerous security and peace initiatives by the other three applicant countries through their active peace policy in the context of the CSCE and the UN and as mediators between conflicting parties in the field of international relations;
4. Is aware that the security status of Finland, Austria, Norway and Sweden differs in quality and scope and that this must be taken into account during the accession negotiations;
5. Emphasizes the need for uniform criteria to be applied when the compatibility of the security status of applicant countries with the provisions on the common foreign and security policy is appraised and for future accession negotiations to be based on the same criteria;
6. Emphasizes the need for the applicant countries to be able to participate fully and actively in the foreign and security policy for which the Treaty on European Union provides as soon as they accede to the European Community;
7. Hopes that on their accession the applicant countries will accept fully and unconditionally all the goals of the Treaty on European Union, the provisions of Title V and the relevant declarations annexed to the Treaty;
8. Urges that during the accession negotiations an intensive dialogue be held between the institutions of the European Union and the applicant countries on the development of a common foreign and security policy;
9. Is convinced that the full involvement of the applicant countries in the common foreign and security policy after their accession would contribute to the stabilization of peace and security throughout the continent of Europe;
10. Is of the opinion that the development of a common security and defence policy within the framework of the European Union is also in the intrinsic security interests of the applicant countries;
11. Notes that the possible accession of countries which are traditionally neutral and yet make a very active contribution to the peace operations of non-partisan international organizations is an opportunity which must be seized by the European Union to increase its own contribution to such operations and to create operative civilian bodies and structures for the prevention, reduction, mediation and settlement of conflicts;
12. Would welcome it if, after their accession, all the applicant countries participated actively and constructively in the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence;
13. Would welcome it if the public in the applicant countries shared the conviction that a common foreign, security and defence policy is commensurate with their own security interests and is an essential ingredient of a European Union;

14. Believes that a common defence within the framework of the European Union must be purely defensive in nature and should include mutual assistance obligations similar to those set out in the provisions of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty;
15. Emphasizes, in view of the growing number of trouble spots requiring internationally coordinated action, the need for the European Union to be able to act as a peacekeeping and peace-making force in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter;
16. Welcomes the fact that various applicant countries have participated actively and with commitment in the CSCE process and in United Nations peacekeeping missions on many occasions in the past and believes that this augurs well for the European Union's ability to pursue an active common policy of preventing and resolving conflicts in the future under the CFSP;
17. Would welcome it if the countries with which accession negotiations are being conducted participated in peacekeeping or peace-making missions of the European Union, possibly even before their accession and as far as their constitutions allow;
18. Suggests that it should be considered whether and to what extent countries with which accession negotiations are being conducted might participate in joint action pursuant to Article J.1(3) of the Treaty on European Union even before their accession;
19. Would welcome it if the applicant countries examined, where necessary, the provisions of their constitutions for their compatibility with the development of a common defence within the framework of the European Union and arranged for any amendments that may be needed to be made;
20. Points out that the provisions of Title V, Article J.4(2) of the Treaty on European Union make Western European Union responsible during a transitional period for the elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions of the European Union which have defence implications and would therefore welcome it if the applicant countries considered the legal and political possibility of participating in WEU's activities pending their accession to the European Union;
21. Would welcome it if all Member States of the European Union which do not yet belong to WEU took steps to become full members of WEU, which forms an integral part of the European Union pursuant to Title V, Article J.4(2), in order to further the cohesion of the Union as a whole and to counteract a 'Europe à la carte';
22. Considers that there is no point in countries which cannot also become full members of the European Union becoming full members of the WEU;
23. Sees simultaneous membership of WEU, NATO and the CSCE as a useful complement for present and future Member States of the European Union;
24. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the parliaments of the Member States, the parliaments and governments of Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Malta, Norway and Sweden and the CSCE, WEU and NATO secretariats.



B  
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

I. THE CURRENT SITUATION

1. Finland, Austria and Sweden, three of the four countries with which the Member States of the European Union are currently conducting accession negotiations, are historically neutral states, which may make it difficult for them to adopt the provisions on the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in the Treaty on European Union.

2. However, the end of the cold war and the collapse of the USSR has sparked a lively debate in the neutral EFTA countries on a redefinition of the old concept of neutrality, which was based on a bipolar world order and is therefore obsolete. The historically neutral countries feared that the dynamism of European integration might pass them by because of their status.

3. Discussions with the ambassadors of the four applicant countries to the European Community have made it clear that even the three countries which do not belong a military alliance are prepared to accept without reservation the legal status of the Community and the provisions of the Union Treaty that concern foreign, security and defence policy.

4. This is also true of Article J.1 of the Union Treaty, which requires the Union and its Member States to define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, and of Article J.4, which states that the CFSP includes all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.

5. However, it must be pointed out that, although the Treaty provisions set a clear objective, they remain non-binding in essence and in their practical implications. Despite this, leading representatives of all four applicant countries have expressed their countries' unequivocal willingness to participate positively and constructively in the development of the European Union's security and defence policy dimension.

II. AUSTRIA

1. Austria is the only EFTA country seeking EC membership to have referred in its application to the neutrality enshrined in its constitution: 'Austria submits this application on the understanding that its internationally recognized status of permanent neutrality, based on the Federal and Constitutional Law of 26 October 1955 will be maintained and that, as a member of the European Communities by virtue of the Treaty of Accession, it will be able to fulfil its legal obligations arising out of its status as a permanently neutral State and to continue its policy of neutrality as a specific contribution towards the maintenance of peace and security in Europe.'

2. Austria's neutrality is due to the division of Europe after the Second World War and the existence of two heavily armed military alliances. For small, relatively weak states at the interface between East and West it was more expedient to act as a buffer between the power blocs than to be an outpost of an alliance.

3. Austria's neutrality is enshrined in its constitution. However, it is not - as assumed in many quarters - based on the State Treaty that brought the country independence after ten years of occupation but on the Federal and Constitutional Law. Nonetheless, the State Treaty was signed by the victorious powers in anticipation of such a declaration of neutrality. With the notification of the Law on Neutrality to each state with which Austria maintains diplomatic relations, its neutral status was enshrined in international law.

4. A permanently neutral state commits itself to neutrality in any conceivable military conflict. The Austrian Law on Neutrality refers explicitly to three obligations: the negative obligations of neither belonging to a military alliance nor consenting to the presence of foreign troops on its territory and the positive obligation of defending its neutrality by every available means.

5. As Austrian neutrality is based on an internal constitutional law, Austria is free to interpret and shape its neutrality. The reservation about neutrality expressed in the application for membership should be seen in the light of the fact that the geopolitical situation had not yet changed at the time of the application. Since that time the Federal Government has largely qualified this reservation in numerous official statements. The memorandum of November 1991 states: 'Austria knows that the security of Europe and its own security are inseparable. ... The manifest interdependence that marks our time does not allow for any policy of self-isolation.' And six months later: 'Austria identifies fully with the goals of the European Union's common foreign and security policy and will participate in this policy and its continued dynamic development actively and in solidarity.' The opening statement at the accession negotiations contains a similar passage.

6. Austria has already distanced itself from a strict policy of neutrality: during the Gulf war the allies were permitted to transport war material over and across Austrian territory. Whether problems might arise in the case of economic sanctions not backed by an appropriate UN Security Council resolution is doubtful, since the 'anticipatory effect' construct, which was never enshrined in law, has become obsolete.

7. As neutrality is firmly rooted in Austria's self-image as part of its identity, it is still very popular with the people. Its abandonment, which would not require a referendum, is therefore unlikely for the time being. 'Austria submitted its application as a neutral state, ... and we will join the Community as a neutral state,' Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky said shortly before the accession negotiations began. In Austria's view neutrality was compatible with a future CSFP; not even the Community knew precisely what form this policy would take.

8. From a political viewpoint, he felt Austria's permanent neutrality might be a problem. Firstly, the compatibility of Austrian neutrality with the current Treaty provisions (Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, the imposition of economic sanctions) was questionable; secondly, Austria would have to guarantee that it was legally able to fulfil the obligations of a future common foreign and security policy. However, these problems were unlikely to be insurmountable.

9. An unreservedly open position on the development of the CSFP and Austria's involvement in it was recently adopted by Federal President Klesstil before the Collège d'Europe in Bruges (28 September 1993). He made it clear that, following the sweeping changes in Europe, the Austrian Government had converted its policy of neutrality into a 'policy of solidarity'. He also emphasized that

the Austrian Government accepted the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on security and defence without reservation and that Austria intended to participate actively and constructively in the future development of the European Union's security and defence dimension.

### III. FINLAND

1. On 18 March 1992 the Republic of Finland became the third EFTA country to submit an application for membership of the European Community. In view of the changes in the geopolitical situation the application made no reference to Finland's traditional policy of neutrality.

2. Since the early 1990s the Finnish policy of neutrality has changed significantly. It is now confined to non-participation in military alliances and the maintenance of an independent defence. Finland has declared that it is willing to participate in a common foreign and security policy without reservation, to recognize the goals of the Maastricht Treaty that relate to the adoption of a common defence (policy) and to play a constructive part in its implementation. As with the other candidates, the Commission recommends that binding assurances be obtained regarding the political willingness and legal means needed for the fulfilment of all future obligations.

3. Finland did not become independent until 1917. After the hostilities between Finland and the USSR during the Second World War, Finland was forced to cede Karelia (12% of its pre-war territory) to the USSR. In 1948 the two countries signed a treaty of friendship, which was last extended in 1983. The Soviet Union did not withdraw from the Finnish naval base at Porkkala near Helsinki until 1956.

4. Virtually no other country had so sensitive a neutral status as Finland. Given its peripheral location and its 1 300-km frontier with the former USSR, it did not want to be drawn into any kind of conflict. Finnish neutrality was accompanied by a serious restriction of its freedom of action in the foreign policy sphere, which explains the extreme caution with which Helsinki always acted on the world political stage. Finland's neutrality is not enshrined in its constitution.

5. In 1990 Finland cancelled the treaty of friendship with the USSR. It was officially replaced with a new treaty in early 1992. Finland's overriding foreign policy objective continues to be a guarantee of stability and security in Northern Europe. It is generally agreed in Finland that this objective can be achieved today only through joint action with other European countries. Finland's thoughts in this connection have always turned first to options within the CSCE framework. The Finnish Government has therefore regarded participation in joint sanctions endorsed neither by the UN nor by the CSCE as highly problematical. As the accession negotiations progress, however, such reservations appear to be waning.

6. In his opening address at the beginning of the negotiations Trade Minister Salolainen said: 'The Finnish policy of neutrality pivots on freedom from military alliances and independent self-defence.' Initially, these reservations were indeed always put forward. It would now seem, however, that they have been overcome. Both President Koivisto and Foreign Minister Vayrynen have expressed the view that Finland's participation in a common defence policy of the European Union within the WEU or NATO framework cannot be ruled out. Even the

abandonment of neutrality, which would not be difficult in purely legal terms, has been contemplated. For the moment, however, Finland is unable and unwilling to commit itself in this respect. In general, the security and defence policy aspects are unlikely to be an obstacle to Finland's membership of the European Union.

#### IV. NORWAY

1. On 25 November 1992, when the Commission's opinions on Austria's, Sweden's and Finland's applications had already been published, the Kingdom of Norway presented its application for membership of the European Communities.

2. In the security and foreign policy sphere Norway differs fundamentally from its EFTA partners. As a founding member of NATO and an associate member of Western European Union, Norway raises no doubts in the Commission's mind in this regard.

3. Discussions with Norway's permanent representative to the European Community have confirmed that the security and defence policy aspects of the European Union do not pose any problems for Norway's membership of the Union. It should be pointed out, however, that the general election held in Norway in September 1993 again showed that the public have generally far greater reservations about the development of the European Union than the ruling political forces.

#### V. SWEDEN

1. The Kingdom of Sweden submitted its application for membership of the European Communities on 1 July 1991. The application made no reference to Sweden's traditional policy of neutrality. This should be seen in the light of the political changes in the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe, already well advanced at that time.

2. In the political sphere Sweden now intends, according to official statements, to participate in a common foreign and security policy without reservation. Some doubts persist about a common defence (policy) if this meant joining a military alliance. However, a debate that appears to be characterized by growing acceptance in this respect, in the major political parties at least, has begun in Sweden.

3. The traditional Swedish policy of neutrality differs from Austria's and Finland's in that it has a long history: Sweden has not been drawn into a military conflict since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Given this positive experience with neutrality, Sweden saw no reason to abandon it until the early 1990s. Swedish neutrality was, moreover, seen as a kind of safeguard for Finland and so made an important contribution to stability in the Scandinavian region. Sweden's neutrality is not enshrined in its constitution. The aim of its neutrality is not to belong to any military alliance in peacetime so that it may remain neutral in wartime.

4. The general political consensus in Sweden today is that the neutrality question must not be allowed to stand in the way of EC membership. In November 1991 the Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, which includes representatives of all Sweden's major parties, declared that EC membership was compatible with Swedish neutrality. Neutrality was a political option which should be reviewed

whenever major new steps had to be taken in foreign policy. For the Swedish Prime Minister, Carl Bildt, the traditional policy of neutrality is no obstacle to EC membership, since Sweden would pursue a European, not a neutral foreign policy. In March 1992 he said: 'We are convinced and committed Europeans when it comes to being involved in and assisting with the development of new structures of European cooperation, particularly in the security sphere.'

5. Sweden has thus reduced its historical neutrality to independent defence of the country and to not belonging to any military alliances. The former Prime Minister, Ingvar Carlsson, said on this subject in September 1992: 'Our freedom from military alliances continues. Only Sweden will defend Swedish territory. But if the question is whether changes may occur in the future, the answer is yes.' These reservations about membership of a military alliance do in fact appear to have become less pronounced of late. Articles in the press reveal that Sweden could now well imagine joining WEU. In purely constitutional terms this step would not pose any problems, but whether the public would agree is as questionable in Sweden as in the other applicant countries.

6. Today, there is no doubt about the Swedish Government's willingness to participate fully and without reservation in the CSFP. Only recently Prime Minister Carl Bildt expressed unqualified support for the continued development of the CSFP in a speech before the Paul-Henri Spaak Foundation in Brussels, (16 September 1993), when he said that this policy in particular must and would be strengthened by enlargement and that Sweden was prepared to make its contribution to this process 'on grounds of idealism and self-interest'. Whether this means that Sweden will join WEU remains an open question at present, since it makes sense for a decision on this question to be delayed until after Sweden's accession to the European Union. The Swedish Government is, however, fully conscious of WEU's greater role in international peacekeeping efforts and has already taken initial steps to make a contribution in this context.

7. The Swedes are well aware that the CFSP is intended as the forerunner of a common defence policy, with a common defence as the ultimate goal. According to official statements, Sweden has no intention of putting any obstacles in the Union's way as it pursues this goal. This position was recently reaffirmed by the Swedish Defence Minister, Anders Björck, before the North Atlantic Assembly in Copenhagen (9 October 1993), when he said that the term 'neutrality' was now giving way in official usage in Sweden to the phrase 'foreign policy with a European identity.'

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

1. Historical neutrality is not seen in the applicant countries as posing a serious problem for their accession. They regard this issue as having been largely clarified by the declarations of intent which they were asked to make and have already delivered. As Member States, they could participate in the framing of the actual CSFP without any reservations. The present, Belgian President-in-Office of the Council, Willy Claes, appeared to take the same view when he said: 'We will not demand assurances on something that is not in the Maastricht Treaty.' The applicant countries would not be required to join a military institution at this stage.

2. The applicant countries' basic, constructive attitude towards the CFSP also includes an explicit assurance that they will not follow Denmark's example and

insist on derogations allowing them to opt out of the consideration of security and defence policy questions within the European Union. In the rapporteur's opinion, the applicant countries thus satisfy the main criteria on which membership of the European Union should be based where the provisions of Title V of the Union Treaty are concerned.

3. Under the new Treaty provisions Western European Union (WEU) is requested by the Union to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council will, in agreement with the WEU institutions, adopt the necessary practical arrangements. A problem that might arise in this context is that Finland, Austria and Sweden are neither members of WEU at present, nor do they have observer or associate status. Only Norway, being an associate member of WEU, may attend the meetings of the WEU Council, its working parties and its subsidiary institutions.

4. Although the rapporteur considers the full involvement of all the applicant countries in WEU desirable, he feels that this should not be made a requirement for accession to the European Union, especially as three of the European Union's Member States - Denmark, Ireland and, for the moment, Greece - are not yet full members of WEU. In taking this view, he is applying the principle that no more should be required of applicant countries than of members of a community. Another factor to be considered is that at present the public in the applicant countries is hardly likely to be persuaded that WEU membership is absolutely essential for accession to the European Union. In view of the mutual assistance clause in the WEU Treaty (Article V), Austria's membership of WEU would also raise constitutional problems, and the other three applicants would currently find it politically difficult to gain acceptance for accession to WEU. The question of new members joining WEU should therefore be clarified at a later stage, either at the conference to be held in 1996 to review the provisions of the Union Treaty concerning the CFSP or in 1998, when, after 50 years of the Brussels Treaty, the relevant members of the Union will in any case have to decide whether or not to remain members of WEU.

5. At the same time, it seems appropriate and feasible at the present stage for the applicant countries to participate in WEU's activities on the basis of a UN or CSCE mandate. Sweden has shown the way in exemplary fashion in this context by assigning Swedish units to the mission being coordinated by WEU to enforce the Danube embargo imposed in connection with the hostilities in the former Yugoslavia.

6. In more general terms it should be acknowledged that not only Norway (the mediating role played by its government in the conclusion of the Jericho/Gaza agreement between Rabin and Arafat being an outstanding example in Norway's case) but the three traditionally neutral applicant countries too have distinguished themselves in the past by their impressive commitment to peace, security and cooperation in Europe and the rest of the world. This is true of their involvement in the establishment and development of the CSCE and in UN peacekeeping missions, diplomatic mediation between belligerents and measures to narrow the 'North-South gap'. Such names as Urho Kekkonen, Bruno Kreisky and Olof Palme bear witness to the traditions of these countries in the peace and security policy sphere, which will certainly benefit the European Union's foreign and security policy profile if it is joined by these countries.

7. Nor should it be forgotten that the end of the East-West conflict has given rise to new tasks and challenges in the countries of Central, Eastern, North-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, which need to be tackled energetically by the

European Union. In this context the applicant countries, given their history, their geographical location and their standing in these countries, are predestined to play an outstanding role as members of the European Union and so to help Europe to continue growing together, to narrow the prosperity gap between West and East and to prevent our Eastern neighbours from being paralysed by ethnic conflicts, internal disputes and economic crises as they seek to find themselves economically and politically.

23 December 1992

B3-1547/92

## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure

by Mr LANGER

on Community enlargement and neutrality

### The European Parliament,

- A. having regard to the applications or intentions of a number of historically neutral states to join the European Communities,
- B. having regard to the fact that the Community already has one neutral state, Ireland, amongst its members,
- C. having regard to the objective of a common European foreign and security policy, as set out in the Maastricht Treaty,
- D. having regard to the growing demands for international peace-keeping, including the use of military methods, under the aegis of the UN and the CSCE,
- E. whereas in a number of countries desirous of joining the Community the citizens place great importance on retaining their neutrality,
  1. Affirms that a common foreign and security policy does not necessarily entail military integration or the surrender of neutrality, as the example of Ireland proves;
  2. Considers that a substantial commitment as part of an international peace-keeping and peace-creating civilian and military corps could be a viable alternative, also in the context of European Union, to simply abandoning the traditional neutrality policy;
  3. Calls for these and other possible options to be given careful and critical consideration and is prepared to contribute to this;
  4. Wishes to see, before entering into membership negotiations, a detailed discussion on the compatibility of neutrality with membership of the European Union.



23 December 1993

B3-1550/92

## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure

by the following Members: POETTERING, BALFE, HOLZFUSS and  
SAKELLARIOU

on expansion and neutrality

### The European Parliament,

- A. whereas a number of historically neutral countries have applied for membership of the European Community,
- B. having regard to Title I of the Treaty on European Union in which the Member States resolve to pursue a common foreign and security policy, leading eventually to a common defence policy,
- C. having regard to the reluctance, on the part of large sections of the population in several countries seeking membership, to abandon the principle of neutrality and non-intervention as the condition for full membership of the European Community,
  1. Believes that any new application for membership of the Community must be considered in the light of the intention to define a common foreign and defence policy;
  2. Seeks a full discussion, prior to the opening of negotiations on accession, of the compatibility of the principle of neutrality with membership of a European Union;
  3. Believes, in this context, that there is a need to define the conditions which have to be satisfied before traditionally neutral states can participate in the common foreign and security policy.

