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A PARACONSISTENT LOGIC FOR THE THEORY OF QUASI-TRUTH

Mikenberg, da Costa and Chuaqui [1] introduce a formal definition of pragmatic truth, later called quasi-truth by da Costa. This concept can be considered as a generalization for partial contexts of Tarski's correspondence characterization of truth. In this talk, based on models, by defining the mathematical concepts of partial relation and partial structure (that extend the concepts of relation and structure respectively), we will present the formal definition of quasi-truth. By using a special semantic approach, we will present an appropriate logic that can be used as the underlying logic for theories whose truth conception is da Costa's quasi-truth. A Kripke model semantics can be delineated for this logic and among some fundamental results we have that it is a kind of discussive paraconsistent modal logic. The three major interpretations of the notion of truth – the correspondence, the coherence and the pragmatic accounts – can be put together in the formal framework we have delineated. Finally, we argue that the concept of quasi-truth offers a way of accommodating the incompleteness inherent to scientific representations and can be considered as the truth conception inherent to scientific theories.

REFERENCES

1. Mikenberg I., da Costa N. C. A., Chuaqui R. *Pragmatic truth and approximation to truth* // J. of Symbolic Logic. – 1986. – V. 51 – № 1. – P. 201–221.