

**AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN
SOMALIA'S ROLE IN CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN
SOMALIA**

Olivia Victoria Davies

213571331

Submitted in part fulfilment of the academic requirements for the degree of Master of Social Sciences (Political Science) in the School of Social Sciences, College of Humanities, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban.

Supervisor: Dr. Sagie Narsiah

2015

DECLARATION

I Olivia Victoria Davies declare that

- (i) This research reported in this dissertation/thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original research.
- (ii) This dissertation/thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any university.
- (iii) This dissertation/thesis does not contain other person's data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sources from other persons.
- (iv) This dissertation/thesis does not contain other person's writings, unless specifically acknowledged as being sources from other researchers.

Where other written sources have been quoted, then:

- a) Their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them has been referenced;
- b) Where their exact words have been used, their writing has been placed inside quotation marks, and referenced.
- (v) Where I have reproduced a publication of which I am author, co-author or editor, I have indicated in detail which part of the publication was actually written by myself alone and have fully referenced such publications.
- (vi) This dissertation/thesis does not contain text, graphics or table copied and pasted from the internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source being detailed in the dissertation/thesis and in the References sections.

Signed:

Abstract

Somalia has experienced protracted conflict since 1991. A number of peace enforcement operations were undertaken to bring stability to the country but they encountered difficult conditions resulting to the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces. Following the struggle for control of Somalia among armed groups, countries closer to Somalia were forced to intervene because their security was threatened. During this period, there was a continental arrangement to conduct peace operations in Africa. As a result, an African Union (AU) Peace Support Operations (PSOs) was deployed in Somalia. The mission called the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) came at a time when Somalia had undergone a series of peace and reconciliation conferences, and had to ensure that the activities of armed groups was curbed in order to bring stability to Somalia. Although the mission has faced a significant number of challenges, it is important to take note of its achievements. AMISOM has managed to recruit peacekeepers from a range of African countries to fight against the militant group called Al-Shabaab. In March 2011 it started a military campaign to support the then Transitional Federal Government (TGF) forces to retake Mogadishu and the whole of Somalia from Al-Shabaab. This initiative illustrates that the mission is making an effort to articulate and push the extension of state authority in Somalia, in an effort to bring stability to the state. Given the prospect of the mission to succeed, it is important that the root causes are addressed in order to avoid a relapse into violent conflict. This research employs the use of conflict transformation theory, to assess AMISOM's contribution to Somalia's conflict transformation, by looking at transformative elements or activities that are addressing the root causes of the conflict. The use of this theoretical argument will help to determine the extent to which AMISOM has contributed to Somalia's conflict transformation. AMISOM is the lead player in transforming the conflict. It is important for the mission to analyse its role; its successes; to reflect on gaps; and redesign approaches. This may be required so that a relapse into violence may be avoided. The aim of the research therefore is to examine AMISOM's contribution to ending the conflict in Somalia, with reference to its role in addressing the root causes of the conflict directly or indirectly as it implements its mandate. The main objectives of the research are to examine AMISOM's contribution to ending the conflict in Somalia, identify initiatives which AMISOM can undertake to transform the conflict and provide concrete recommendations on the role of AMISOM in transforming the conflict in Somalia. At the end of the study, the research finds that AMISOM has brought some amount of stability to Mogadishu, where ordinary populations are conducting businesses on normal basis. The research also finds that the mission's activities are largely focused on counter-

insurgency strategies; the expansion of Somalia's state authority, capacity building of security forces, civil service, and the protection of the government.

Acknowledgement

First of all I would like to thank God for his supernatural love, guidance and support that has seen me through the completion of this Masters Degree. Secondly, I would like to thank my Supervisor, Dr. Sagie Narsiah, for this oversight and inputs that makes this study a success. His insightful and valuable comments and ideas were of immense help during the writing process, and the positive feedback he provided served to keep me focused and motivated. I would also like to thank Mr. Memela at the Department of Political Sciences who made my two years of postgraduate studies so encouraging. I would also like to acknowledge ACCORD for the valuable opportunity it's provided to me over the past two years of my study. Special thanks to my friends: Ms. Finda Bandor Jenkins, Mr. and Mrs. Zinurine Alghali, Ms. Irene Limo, Ms. Barbara Mohale, Mrs. Dorcas Ettang and Adeyemo Adetoyese who supported me through diverse challenges encountered during this academic process. Finally, I want to thank my husband – Mr. Arnold Ajax for his sacrifices in ensuring I obtain quality education.

Table of Contents

Declaration	I
Abstract	II
Acknowledgement	III
Table of Contents	IV
List of Figure	V
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms	VI
Chapter One	13
1. Introduction	13
1.1 Background and Content of the Study	13
1.2 Purpose of the Study	15
1.3 Research Problem	15
1.4 Rationale or Significance of Research	17
1.5 Aims and Objectives of Research	18
1.6 Research Questions	18
1.7 Limitation of the Study	19
1.8 Structure of the Dissertation	19
Chapter Two	20
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework	20
2.1 Introduction	20
2.2 The Literature Review	20
2.3 The Changing Nature of Peacekeeping Operations	21
2.4 AU Peacekeeping	22
2.5 The AU and its Peace Operations Experiences	24
2.6 AMISOM Concept of Operations	26
2.7 Peacebuilding and State-building Perception for AMISOM	26
2.7.1 The Legacy of State-building in Somalia	29
2.7.2 The Context of Statebuilding in Somalia	30
2.7.3 Human Security and Statebuilding in Somalia	33
2.7.4 The Challenges to State-building in Somalia	34
2.7.5 Success Stories on Conflict Transformation Initiatives	38
2.8 Theoretical Framework	41
2.8.1 Agent of Conflict Transformation	45
2.8.2 Reflection of Conflict Transformation in Somalia's State-building	46
2.8.3 The Relevance of Conflict Transformation Theory to the Research	47

2.9 Conclusion	49
Chapter Three	50
3. Research Methodology	50
3.1 Introduction	50
3.2 Research Methodology	50
3.2.1 Research Design	54
3.2.2 Choosing of Sample Size	54
3.3.3 Research Instrument	55
3.3.4 Data Collection Procedure	55
3.3.5 Ethical Considerations	55
3.3.6 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria	56
3.3.7 Data Analysis Procedure	56
Chapter Four	57
4. Study Area	57
4.1 Introduction	57
4.2 Brief History and Background to the Conflict in Somalia	56
4.3 Brief Background of Dominant Somalia Warring Faction	62
4.4 The Formation of the Somali TFG	64
4.5 AU Intervention in Somalia: From IGASOM to AMISOM	66
4.6 Political Tension between 2007 – 2012	69
4.7 The Current (2013-2014) State of Security in Somalia	71
4.8 The Political State	72
4.8.1 Security Situation: The Threat Posed by Al-Shaabab	75
4.8.2 The Humanitarian Situation	76
4.8.3 The Deployment of Forces	77
4.9 A Chronology of Somalia’s Conflict Transformation Processes	78
4.10 Conclusion	85
Chapter Five	86
5. Findings of the Research	86
5.1 Introduction	86
5.2 AMISOM Contribution to Conflict Transformation in Somalia	85
5.3 Developing Local Capacity to Improve Security	87
5.4 Enhancing Good Governance in Somalia	88
5.5 Strengthening Conditions and Structures Conducive to Sustainable Peace	90
5.6 AMISOM Mandate that Addresses the Root Causes of the Somali Conflict	91
5.7 Current Focus of AMISOM in Contributing to Peace in Somalia	92
5.8 The Extent of AMISOMs Contribution to Conflict Transformation in Somalia	93

5.8.1 Main Challenges to AMISOMs Conflict Transformation Efforts in Somalia	95
5.8.2 Relevance of Conflict Transformation in Addressing the Conflicts Root Causes	96
5.9 Progress in the Implementation of AMISOMs Mandate	98
5.9.1 Support to the Somali National Security Forces	98
5.9.2 Creation on Conditions for the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance	100
5.9.3 Support to the Public and Civil Service of Somalia	101
5.10 Conclusion	102
Chapter Six	103
6. Conclusion and Recommendation	103
6.1 Introduction	103
6.2 AMISOMs Role in Somalia	103
6.3 Recommendations for Addressing the Conflict in Somalia	106
6.4 Conclusion	109
Bibliography	

List of Figures

Figure 1: Map Showing the Figures of Refugees in the Somali Region

Figure 2: Map Showing Somalia's Resources that have been Affected by the Conflict

Figure 3: Somalia's Ethnic Groups and Clan Identify

Figure 4: The Regions of Somalia

Figure 5: Major Clan Family in Somalia

Figure 6: Areas under Al-Shabaab's Control

Figure 8: Map Showing Major Somali Clan Affiliation and Identity

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACCORD	African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Dispute
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AIAI	Alitihaad al Islamiya
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ARS	Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AU-IBAR	AU Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources
CAAC	Children Associated with Armed Conflict
CAR	Central African Republic
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CONOPs	Concept of Operations
CVDF	Captured and Voluntary Disengaged Fighters
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DIFID	Department of International Development United Kingdom
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EASF	East African Standby Force
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States Standby Force
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African State
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defence Forces
ESF	Economic Community of West African States Standby Force
EU	European Union
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FPU	Formed Police Units
HoM	Head of Mission
HQ	Head Quarters
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICU	Islamic Court Union
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	Inter-governmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission to Somalia
IJA	Interim Jubba Administration

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPOs	Individual Police Officers
JCM	Joint Coordination Mechanism
KA IPTC	Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Center
MINUSCA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in CAR
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MISCA	African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic
MOCC	Military Operations Coordination Committee
MONUC	United Nations Missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NARC	North African Regional Capability
NFD	Northern Frontier District
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
NRC	National Reconciliation Commission
NSC	National Salvation Council
NSC	National Security Council
NSF	National Security Forces
NSSP	National Security Stabilization Programme
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OEDC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PoC	Protection of Civilians
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSOs	Peace Support Operations
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RMs	Regional Mechanisms
RRA	Rahanweyn Resistance Army
RSFs	Regional Standby Forces
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAF	Somali Armed Forces
SAF	Somali Armed Forces
SEMG	Somalia-Eritrea Monitoring Group
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SICC	Somali Islamic Courts Council
SLT	Police Senior Leadership Team
SMP-AH	Standard Methods and Procedures in Animal Health

SNA	Somali National Army
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SNM	Somali National Movement
SNRC	Somali National Reconciliation Conference
SNSF	Somalia National Security Forces
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRCC	Special Representative of the Chair Person of the AU Commission
SRRC	Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SSF	SADC Standby Force
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TFIs	Transitional Federal Institutions
TNC	Transitional National Charter
TNC	Transitional National Council
TNG	Transitional National Government
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations Missions in Darfur
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNMIS	United Nations Missions in Sudan
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operations in Somalia I
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operations in Somalia II
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
USA	United States of America
USC	United Somali Congress
USC- SNA	United Somali Congress – Somali National Alliance
USSR’s	United Socialist Soviet Republic

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Background and Content of the Study

Somalia has been in conflict since 26th January 1991 when a coalition of clan-based armed opposition groups ousted the nation's long-standing military government of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre. Various clans began competing for influence in the power vacuum that followed. There was an aborted UN peacekeeping attempt in the mid- 1990s to restore order. A period of decentralization ensued, characterized by a return to customary and religious law in many areas as well as the establishment of autonomous regional governments in the northern part of the country. In the south, armed factions led by a militia group called the United Somali Congress (USC) and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, in particular, clashed as each sought to exert authority over the capital (Menkhaus, 2003)

According to Africa Watch (1990), the conflict has claimed the lives of more than 50,000 people, and left thousands as refugees. The conflict has also affected the infrastructural development in the health, education and economic sectors of Somalia. In an attempt to curb the conflict during the early 1990s, the UN established the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM I) in April 1992, to provide humanitarian and relief support to victims of the conflict. Due to the rising security threat against UN personnel, UNOSOM I was transformed into UNOSOM II in May 1993, to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance, and the rebuilding of the economic, social and political life of the people. However, UNOSOM II was unable to disarm the warlords due to the divisions among the armed groups. This led to the establishment of multiple armed factions (Clarke, 1993). This led to an increased attack on UN peacekeepers, and civilians that forced the mission to withdraw in March 1997. UNOSOM II assisted in saving lives by securing food supplies. It facilitated some local agreements that improved security, reopened the airport and seaport in Mogadishu, capital of Somalia and supported the revival of key services, and the creation of local NGOs. It also provided employment and injected huge resources into the economy. This benefitted a new business class, in the main. However, the mission was unable to mediate an end to hostilities or disarm armed factions. UN-facilitated peace conferences in Addis Ababa in 1993 and Kenya in 1994 did not engender a process of national reconciliation and state revival (Conciliation Resources, 2010). The Inter-governmental Authority on

Development (IGAD), which Somalia is a member of, established the Inter-governmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) in September 2006, which took on the responsibility of mitigating the conflict until the AU could take over. Efforts by the IGASOM to bring stability to the country, failed to achieve the desired outcome.

These efforts failed because seemingly there was an overall lack of knowledge and understanding of the Somali clan system, and peacemaking leadership in the Somali society (Adam, 2008). Furthermore, neighboring countries, especially Ethiopia and Kenya, in some way contributed to Somalia's internal animosities, coupled with the fact that international aid agencies had multiple layers of interests in the region (Moller, 2009). Also, some aid agencies had veiled interests in the continuation of the Somali crisis. These include the continuation of humanitarian work in Somalia and its neighboring countries, whilst serving the political interest of the countries they represented (Mahmood, 2011). AMISOM was then established by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 8960) (2007) to maintain stability, and transform the conflict, by rebuilding the state. Despite the role AMISOM has played, stability in the country is still fragile as the root causes of the conflict remain largely unaddressed.

Most scholars (Daniels, 2012; Harper, 2010; and Greg, 2013), in their research on the conflict in Somalia, and the subsequent disintegration of the state, have mentioned three root causes. These are: the colonial legacy; clan system; and economic factors. Somalia was subjected to colonialism, which partitioned the country into five parts, namely, British Somaliland in the north, Italian Somalia in the south, the French Somali coast in Djibouti, Ogaden in the west and the NFD (Abdullahi, 1997). The subsequent attempt to reintegrate these different Somali inhabited parts led the state, which emerged in 1960, to enter into conflict with neighboring states such as Kenya and Ethiopia. These conflicts led Somalia to eventually disintegrate.

Somalia is a lineage-based society, in which virtually all members of society enjoy membership in a patrimonial clan-family. Each clan-family is in turn subdivided by clan, sub-clan, and sub-sub-clan, all on the basis of a Somali's extended family tree (Mansur, 1995:123). Depending on circumstances, different levels of lineage identity can be mobilized politically, making Somali clan system very fluid and unstable in nature (Elmi, 2010:47).

While clannism has long hindered internal cohesion through division and fragmentation, competition for land, power and cattle has resulted in deep seated clashes. In order to address these root causes, significant change is required in the cultural and political construct of the country. Though AMISOM with support from the UN is striving to liberate the state from its dominant armed group – Al-Shaabab, and restore legitimate political control, efforts to address internal cohesion between clan members is still a challenge.

According to I. M. Lewis (1980), various schools of thought explained the causes of the conflict in Somalia: the primordial or ancient hatreds, the constructionist perspective, and the instrumental schools. The primordial school argues that clan identity is the main cause that initiates, escalate, and perpetrate the conflict. The constructionist perspective, which is best articulated by Catherine Besteman (1999), argues that the cultural construction of racial stratification configured the patterns of violence, but the conflict is rooted in the political economy of class and regional dynamics. On the other hand, the instrumentalist school argues that clan identity is used to obtain resources and power that fuel the conflict (Mansur, 1995:117). However, Ismail (1992), and Besteman (1996), have reduced them to two namely; ‘traditionalist’ and ‘transformationist’. The traditionalist view lays emphasis on ancient clan hatred, while the transformationist view supports the constructionist perspective, (Karanja, 2009) and also added that all the peacemaking interventions that have been implemented over the years have been based on either one or a combination of these schools of thought.

1.2 Purpose of the Study

This research employs the theory of conflict transformation to explore the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM’s) contribution to conflict resolution in Somalia. The study is needed to clarify whether the AU is currently using the right approach to end the conflict. The study will also provide recommendations targeted at the AU for a way forward in bringing lasting peace to Somalia.

1.3 Research Problem:

Though AMISOMs focus is on peace enforcement operations, it has undertaken a series of tasks to extend state authority and protect civilians. With the ongoing perception among Somalis and practitioners that peace enforcement operations in Somalia might not bring absolute peace, it is imperative to promote key aspects of conflict transformation – in particular building relationships and addressing root causes. While one may question the possibility to undertake this approach in the midst of combat operations, it is, however, a

viable option. For instance, ordinary Somalis can be invited to large forums where their views and concerns will be heard and taken into consideration.

Situated in the horn of Africa, Somalia is at the crossroads between the African and Arab cultures, controlling the passage to the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and access to the port of Djibouti (Torransano 1995: 9-12). Ethnically homogeneous (Somalis), Somali society is distinct from other multi-ethnic sub-Saharan African societies with the exception of Burundi and Rwanda. The population of approximately 10 million is made up of six major clan families: the Darod, the Isaaq, the Dir and the Hawiye, the Rahanwein, and the Digil (Torransano, 1995: 9). These clans are made up of family trail and tribes. The clan families usually have a similar ancestral genesis and they are interconnected through intricate networks of social relationships (Ssereo, 2003: 1), which extend over clan territories marked with fluid borders, within the national territory. Protracted conflict spurred into the country in the 1990s, when the government of President Siad Barre was overthrown in January 1991. Several guerrilla groups that fought against Siad Barre's regime gained control over different parts of the country. In subsequent months, factionalism within these groups, lack of control by these groups over armed forces within their regions, and the emergence of new military and political groups challenging existing spheres of influence created a situation in which few regions of Somalia are free from ethnic and political hostility. Corruption, nepotism and the competition for resources and alliance helped to fuel the conflict.

As a result of the fighting to overthrow Siad Barre, and the subsequent hostilities, there are an estimated 1.5 million Somali refugees in the horn of Africa and Kenya (UNHCR, 2013: 1). As tensions rose, political groups degenerated into warlordism and rival factions. A series of military interventions ensued with little or no progress. In recent years, security has improved, as the country now has a democratic federal government in place. However, security and humanitarian conditions are still complex. Competition for power and resources still continues unabated, coupled with clan politics and the uncertainties posed by Al-Shaabab. These factors have posed a key threat to peace in Somalia. Noting that military efforts have been undertaken for so long, there is a possibility that military action cannot bring a permanent solution to the conflict in Somalia. In this light, it is possible that a change in attitude and behavior triggered by relationship building, trust and understanding can touch the fundamental construct of the people's ideology to bring an end to violent conflict. These

views put forward by conflict transformation theorists can address the root causes of the conflict in parallel to the need to strengthen security and state institutions.

1.4 Rationale or Significance of Research

In order to end the conflict in Somalia and prevent further violence, the international community established AMISOM. This has accomplished a lot through various mandates, and models of support. As a consequence, many civilians or ordinary Somalis are less prone to attacks which are under AMISOM's areas of control. These mandates include the renewal of AMISOM's mandate in 2013 and the establishment of the UNSOM by UNSCR 2102. The models of support are the various forms of contribution – financial and logistical from troop contributing countries, and the international community. AMISOM has been operational for seven years and even though progress has been made in helping the TFG take control of most parts of Somalia, the mission is still faced with continued challenges of counter attacks by Al-Shabaab, and the violence from clan rivalries. As a result, the effectiveness of the mission is threatened. These challenges could also lead to an eventual take-over by the UN because of the need for robust peacekeeping.

The conflict between Al-Shabaab and the Somali government is currently ongoing, and a UN mission has been authorized to work alongside AMISOM with the mandate to protect civilians and stabilize the security situation in the country. This research will analyse AMISOM's progress in Somalia, particularly in addressing the root causes using the conflict transformation theory. The research will then provide recommendations targeted at the AU for a way forward in bringing lasting peace in Somalia. The research will also help to clarify whether the AU is currently using the right approach to end the conflict in Somalia.

Although Peacock (2011), Mugisha (2011), and Hull and Svensson (2008), undertake an in-depth analysis of the root causes of the conflict, and the challenges and progress of the mission; their research does not focus on addressing these root causes. Perhaps, this is because stability and security was a priority at that time. For Hull and Svensson (2008), analysis of the conflict was needed in order to find an alternative to ending the conflict. This research argues for a conflict transformation approach that emphasizes the need to address the root causes of the conflict as the key focus for the restoration of stability. Since AMISOM has a peace enforcement mandate, the research will also analyse the progress of its

operations in rebuilding governance and security structures as per its mandate, and recommend relevant approaches to bringing stability in Somalia.

As the lead player in transforming the conflict, it is important for the mission to analyse its role amidst the successes to reflect on gaps, and redesign better approaches for future efforts. This will impede a relapse into violence.

1.5 Aims and Objectives of Research

The aim of this research is to examine AMISOM's contribution to ending the conflict in Somalia, with reference to its role in addressing the root causes of the conflict directly or indirectly as it implements its mandate, using the conflict transformation theory. This theory which forms the basis of the argument of this research stresses the importance of transforming relationships and interests which is aimed at fostering long-term peace and stability by addressing the root causes of conflict. The research will provide concrete recommendations on the way forward to conflict transformation in Somalia. The recommendations will be useful to help actors in their effort to resolve the conflict.

The main objectives of this study are to:

- Examine AMISOM's contributions to ending the conflict in Somalia.
- Identify and map the nature and role of the mission in conflict transformation efforts
- Develop initiatives which AMISOM can undertake to effectively transform the conflict in Somalia
- Provide concrete recommendations on the role of AMISOM in transforming the conflict in Somalia

1.6 Research Questions

Though AMISOM in support of the UN is striving to end violent conflict in Somalia from the dominant armed group – Al-Shabaab and restore legitimate political control, efforts to address clannism and other root causes remain a challenge. The country will likely remain in partial anarchy if the root causes are not addressed. Thus, the research seeks to answer the following questions:

- To what extent has AMISOM contributed to conflict transformation efforts in Somalia?
- Considering AMISOM peace enforcement options, what role should it play in conflict transformation efforts in Somalia?

- What initiatives should AMISOM pursue in undertaking conflict transformation efforts in Somalia?
- What are the gaps and limitations that inhibit AMISOM from contributing to conflict transformation efforts in Somalia?

1.7 Limitation of the Study

This study required travel to Somalia to conduct field research and obtain relevant data. However, conducting interviews with the relevant respondents proved challenging as some respondents were not available for interviews considering they were away on tactical and unsafe missions. However, because of the event of limited resources and unavailability of key respondents; the study relied on secondary sources to fill in information where interviewees were unavailable. The implications of this is that the research may have difficulties finding all the relevant information needed, as the availability of certain types of information on Somalia, such as current progress made by AMISOM is limited. This lack of sufficient data impeded evidence to showcase a strong hypothesis on the need to address the root causes of the conflict.

1.8 Structure of the Dissertation

1. Chapter One: This chapter focuses on the introduction to the research. This includes: the rationale and relevance of the research, the hypothesis, research questions, objectives, the research problem and significance of the study. It also provides an overview of the structure of the research, as well as the limitations of the study.
2. Chapter Two: This chapter consists of the literature review and theoretical framework. The review included a comprehensive analysis on broader peacekeeping, peace enforcement operations and state-building in Somalia. The theoretical framework will unpack conflict transformation and discuss its relevance and applicability to the study.
3. Chapter Three: This chapter explains the research methodology and contextualizes Somalia and the conflict.
4. Chapter Four: This chapter analyses the result and findings of the research. It discussed the data collected, and explains the key findings and conclusions drawn from the data.
5. Chapter Five: This chapter consists of the conclusion and recommendations from the research findings.

Chapter Two

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

This chapter consists of the literature review and theoretical framework. The review includes a comprehensive discourse on broader peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations. The comprehensive review on broader peacekeeping and peace enforcements are central to the research as it navigates the various shifts that have occurred in peacekeeping operations since its evolution from a traditional to a multidimensional peace operation. It provides an understanding of the broader PSOs context in which AMISOM is operating. The review also discusses a new model for peace operations looking at AU peacekeeping, to unfold the source of the regional framework for peace operations in Somalia. Since AMISOM is under the umbrella of a regional organisation – the AU, the composition and experiences of the AU in peacekeeping is relevant to understanding the nature and mandate in which AMISOM is operating. Thus, the chapter reviews the civilian component of the AU, the AU’s peace operations experiences and the AMISOM Concept of operations (CONOPs). Noting that the context of the conflict in Somalia has been going on for years, and that several peace-building and conflict transformation attempt as well as state-building efforts has been established and underway in the midst of AMISOMs operation, the chapter reviews the concept of state-building and peace-building to clearly establish where AMISOM stands between the two for the purpose of the analysis of the findings in chapter four. This chapter discusses the context of state-building in Somalia, its link to human security and the critical controversy to state-building in Somalia. It also examines the legacy state-building has had in Somalia. The theoretical framework adopted for this research is the Conflict Transformation Theory. Conflict transformation is portrayed as an interconnected process of effectively changing relationships, attitudes, behavior, interests and dynamics in conflict-sensitive settings. Importantly, “it also addresses underlying structures, cultures and institutions that encourage and condition violent political and social conflict” (Galtung, 1995:1). This chapter also unpacked conflict transformation, and established its relevance and applicability to the study. It unpacked the meaning and understanding of conflict transformation; the relevance of the theory to the research, and agents of transformation in protracted social conflict.

2.2 The Literature Review

2.3 The Changing Nature of Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping has evolved to take on new strategies, and approaches in modern conflict. This is because, short term operations of restoring stability and security has proven to address violence for a short period of time, while conflict often re-escalates. This has been a challenge for UN peacekeeping mostly in intra-state conflict. Due to these lessons learnt, peacekeeping has to accompany programmes designed to prevent the re-occurrence of conflict. Though every context is different, peacekeeping has adopted a multidimensional approach, where it implements its mandate through an integration of military, police and civilian role. As a result of this multidimensionality, peacekeeping has moved from what is termed traditional, which includes, creating of buffer zones, maintaining military presence, cease fire, and assist parties to reach an agreement. Peacekeeping now encompasses roles such as restoring the states' ability to provide security and maintain public order, strengthening rule of law and respect for human rights, supporting election processes, promoting social and economic recovery, including the resettlement of refugees (Geuhenno, 2008: 7). Also, peacekeepers undertake early peace-building roles such as Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of combatants, security sector reforms, establishing a protective environment for civilians (Holt and Taylor 2009:33), restoration and extension of state authority, and clearing of land mines. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations may support the restoration and extension of state authority by creating an enabling security environment, providing support to the restoration and extension of state authority which may include efforts to develop political participation, as well as operational support to the immediate activities of state institutions.

This research follows a lineage of studies that attempt to proffer an alternative solution and approach to transforming the conflict in Somalia. Peacock (2011) argued that the solution to the Somali conflict can no longer be sought solely through AMISOM. Instead, a significant focus must be placed on a political solution which includes: building the institutions of the AU and re-engaging the international community, to strengthening the armed forces of Somalia. While this assertion could not address the root causes of the conflict, strengthening of the AU's institutions will boost its PSOs in Somalia. In Peacock's research on the successes and challenges of AMISOM, he questioned the extent to which AMISOM has contributed to political stability in Somalia, and concluded that the mission cannot resolve the conflict on its own considering the numerous difficulties. These difficulties include a series of operational challenges which stemmed from the problematic nature of the AU institutional

environment, the series of attacks launched against AMISOM troops, and the lack of resources available to the mission. Hull and Svensson (2008), in their effort to assess AMISOMs role and capability to maintain stability in Somalia put forward another theoretical debate in 2008 that looks at questions on whether the AU will be able to maintain the concept of African solutions to African problems. They concluded that the AU will only be able to maintain the concept of African solutions and conduct successful peace operations with support from the international community. Without it, no progress can be made (Hull & Svensson, 2008:35-49).

Moreover, Mugisha (2011), in his quest to assess the challenges of Somalia, concluded that the essential element for success of the mission is the support of the public to the TFG. In order for this support to be attained, fundamental root causes of the conflict should be addressed. Bruton (2010) advances a strategy of “constructive disengagement” in addressing the security challenge in Somalia. Notably, he called for the United States to signal that it will accept an Islamist authority in Somalia—including AL-Shabaab, as long as it does not impede international humanitarian activities, and refrains from both regional aggression and support for international jihad.

Johan Galtung (2005) focuses on conflict transformation theory in his empirical research as an option for ending violent conflict. In his view, the goal of conflict transformation is peace; the capacity to handle conflict creatively and non-violently. He concluded that the vision of a sustainable outcome acceptable to all parties may transform the conflict long before any agreement. By this, he argues that outside parties can withdraw, while the actual parties start to build their own conflict transformation capacity. The goal is not any final solution, but to transform the conflict and build the capacity for the parties themselves to handle the conflict non-violently and creatively (Galtung, 2000:5). Elmi (2010) explores the benefit of using education for social change in Somalia. He argues that education can be a vehicle for long-term social transformation. Elmi, (2010) further envisaged that even though there is a general lack of resources to boost the educational system in Somalia, education can play a key role in transforming the conflict.

2.4 AU Peacekeeping

The Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) was established on 25 May 1963 by the adoption of the OAU Charter by representatives of 32 African governments. The aims of the OAU were:

to promote the unity and solidarity of African States; co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; promote international co-operation, and co-ordinate, and harmonize members' political, diplomatic, economic, educational, cultural, health, welfare, scientific, technical and defence policies (DIRCO, 2014). Whereas the OAU was guided by the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of member states, the AU established at the Fourth Extraordinary session of the OAU Assembly in Libya in 2002 in acknowledgement that the scourge of conflict in Africa posed a major challenge to socio-economic development on the continent, has the right to intervene in the affairs of member states when situations concerning war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity prevail (AU Constitutive Act, 2002). Though the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security lies with the UN, chapter eight of the UN Charter makes provision for regional arrangements to settle disputes (Charter of the United Nations, 1945). Article 54 of the UN Charter indicates that ‘‘the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements by regional agencies - for Africa, the AU, for the maintenance of international peace and security’’ (UNDPKO, 1999: 6). To this end, a UN peacekeeping operation is guided by the following legal frameworks: UN Charter, peacekeeping mandates, International law, other legal documents, National law, Internal UN rules and guidelines, mission rules and directives. Whereas African-led peace operations are guided by: AU Policy Framework for the establishment of the ASF, and the Military Staff Committee (MSC), the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), Protocol relating to the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), the ASF Peace Support Operations (PSOs) Doctrine and other Communiqué relating to the AU PSC.

APSA is holistic, as it consists of the following interconnected decision making bodies that support peace and security on the continent. As noted by Kasumba and De Coning (2010), APSA represents Africa's common framework to deal with peace and security issues, following lessons learnt from the Rwandan genocide. According to Okumu and Jaye, the AU PSC has the mandate to resolve conflict by deploying peace support missions through the ASF. The ASF consists of standby multidisciplinary contingents stationed in their countries of origin. The concept of a standby capacity is not intended to have a standing army in Africa, but rather a standby arrangement that consists of contributions from AU member states and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs).

The standby capacity for Africa is important for a rapid response to conflict linked to the ASF six deployment scenario most especially in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly (Okumu & Jaye, 2010). The Regional Standby Forces (RSFs) that makes up the ASF include: the East African Standby Force (EASF), the Economic Community of West African States Standby Force (ESF), the North African Regional Capability (NARC), the SADC Standby Force (SSF), and the Economic Community of Central African States Standby Force (ECCAS). The AU PSC has undertaken peacekeeping missions in Sudan, Darfur, Burundi, Somalia, Central African Republic, Mali and the Comores.

The ASF PSOs doctrine clearly illustrated the AU PSOs strategic context, concepts and direction. According to this doctrine, the AU envisions a continent united in preventing and acting against conflict. This gives the AU the responsibility to capacitate itself with the operational structures to intervene where there is a threat to peace. In as much as unity among states is the center of this planning, the AU recognized the sovereign rights of states to decide whether or not they want to participate in multidimensional peace operations (ASF Doctrine, 2006). Under the AU grand strategy for peace and security on the continent, the AU peace mission planning processes at all levels must strive to identify the real underlying causes of a conflict, and identify associated dependencies and linkages in the ‘cause and effect’ analysis. Having perceived that the PSOs environment will be complex, and the heads of civilian components and commanders at all levels must endeavor to identify where power and influence resides, and also understand societal perceptions, the mission can create the environment for reconstruction by other agencies. It is also important to note that under this grand strategy, care must be taken to prevent the undermining effect of negative perception (ASF Doctrine, 2006).

2.5 The AU and its Peace Operations Experiences

The AU has worked closely with RMs to coordinate all its peace operations. The lessons drawn from past and present AU peace operations indicated that AU-led peacekeeping operations in Burundi, Sudan and Somalia, face financial and logistical challenges. In the evolving roles of the AU and RMs (2010), Wafula and Jaye (2010) noted that the key challenge facing the AU in its peace operations is peace-building and post conflict reconstruction as envisaged by the Brahimi report in 2002 (Okumu and Jaye, 2010:19). Despite this challenge, the AU and its Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have

significantly increased their capacity to undertake and manage peace operations in recent years. The AU took the lead in peace operations in Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia. The AU continues to put the relevant policy frameworks and structures in place to build its capacity. As Bakwesegha (1993) noted, Africa now has a more comprehensive peace and security architecture in place, but many of the new structures needs to be operational (Bakwesegha, 1993). One key operational framework that the AU has put in place to carry out an effective peace support operation is related to the Protection of Civilians (PoC). Having noted that PSOs in Africa are increasingly tasked with the PoC, and the ability of PSOs to deliver in this respect is closely linked to the legitimacy and credibility of the mission, the AU seeks to put the relevant modalities in place. The AU in 2012 developed draft guidelines for the PoC within its operations. The guidelines are intended to assist the PSC in preparing for PSOs, and in the development of mandates and additional strategic documents. The guidelines aim to provide guidance on developing a consistent and effective strategy to implement protection objectives, in coordination with external protection actors, the host state, and local communities (Lamamra, 2012:4). The draft guidelines contains perceptions from the draft United Nations Missions in Sudan (UNMIS) PoC Strategy Concept, (2009); the United Nations Missions in Darfur (UNAMID) Mission Directive No 2009/01: PoC in Darfur; the United Nations Missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)/Protection Cluster Protection in Practice: Practical Protection Handbook for Peacekeepers; the Draft Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces and Security Services of West Africa adopted by the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) Committee of Experts, (2006); the Aide-Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the PoC in Armed Conflict annexed to the Statement by the President of the Security Council, (2009), and Security Council Resolution 1894 (2009) adopted by the Security Council at its 6216th meeting on 11 November 2009, (UN Doc. S/RES/1894, 2009). Whereas these draft guidelines are generic, the AU will narrow it down to suit the context of a mission specific PoC strategy. Currently, the AU is working towards a mission specific PoC strategy for AMISOM. While the AU has become an important peace operations actor on the African continent, a major feature of its peace operations is its reliance on international support. This is fairly because the AU is comprised of African countries that are the least developed countries in the world, and they are often faced with severe economic backlog. Thus, the AU's ability to finance its own peace operations is limited (Gelot et al, 2012: 11).

The success of AU peace operations is largely dependent on cooperation with the UN. Both the UN Security Council and the PSC of the AU have a vested interest in conducting more effective peace operations in Africa. These operations are once again in high demand with possible new deployments in Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and Sudan. AU deployments have also increased largely due to AU-UN collaboration in Somalia and Mali. In February 2012, the UN Security Council endorsed the expansion of the UN support package for AMISOM, and increased its uniformed personnel from 12,000 to 17,731 (Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 2). Despite the proliferation of UN-AU coordination mechanisms and a growing mutual recognition that each institution has its comparative advantages, there is still significant scope for enhancing collaboration between the AU, its RECs, and training institutions, for effective PSOs in Africa. As such, cooperation and harmonization of best practices is seen as effective for all AU peace operations (Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 2).

2.6 AMISOM Concept of Operations

The AMISOM Concept of Operations (CONOPs) indicated that AMISOM should initially deploy, control and stabilize the security situation in Mogadishu. The CONOPs are indications that direct the operational work of the mission. The CONOPs indicated that the operations of AMISOM will be conducted in three phases. Phase I which is the deployment phase is the initial deployment of 9 infantry battalions to Sector 2, which is Mogadishu. This will involve execution by the Head of the mission's military component. The AMISOM Force Commander will ensure the mounting of the AMISOM Head Quarters (HQ), and also provide for a secure and safe environment in and around Mogadishu, thereby providing for the conditions to execute Phase 2 and allow the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) to relocate to Somalia. Phase II is the expansion of the mission by deployment of predominantly military units to other sectors. Phase III is the consolidation phase, and involves the comprehensive execution of AMISOM's mandate and key tasks as decided by the AU PSC. Phase IV is the redeployment/exit phase which will coincide with a foreseen handover to the UN (AMISOM, 2008). To this end, phase III of AMISOM operation is critical to state-building in Somalia as well as to the overall success of the mission.

2.7 The Peace-building and State-building Concepts and Perception of AMISOM

For the purpose of this research, it is important to distinguish the term nation-building from state-building. Calls and Cousens (2007) define state-building as actions undertaken, usually

by national actors, to forge a sense of common nationhood, usually in order to overcome ethnic, sectarian or communal differences; to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty; and to mobilise a population behind a parallel state-building project (Call and Cousens, 2007: 1-10). According to this definition, the concept of nation-building may seem to be relevant to peace-building as well as state-building, but Calls and Cousens (2007) believe that the two concepts are different. Similarly, a clear understanding needs to be put forward between peace building and state-building (United Nations, 2007). Whereas Fukuyama's (2004), Fritz and Menocal's, (2007) definition of state-building focuses on building and strengthening of government institutions, the research will slightly shift away from this concept. In the context of Somalia, this research will adopt the definition of state-building put forward by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). According to the OECD, state-building is a

“purposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups” (OECD, 2008:13).

The OECD placed particular emphasis on state-society negotiation and the fact that state-building strategies need to appreciate that states are comprised of more than formal institutions. A significant point to note is that successful state-building will almost always be driven by domestic action, but it can be considerably facilitated by well-targeted and responsive international assistance. This will require state and international communities understanding of the historical movements and moments that have shaped a conflict state, recognizing that the nature of the state is dynamic, and appreciating that the bargains and relationships that affect comparative weakness, fragility or failure are continually shifting and renewing (OECD, 2008:14). Understanding these concepts is very helpful to define the type of design AMISOM will implement in assisting the FGS to build state institutions. UNSC Resolution 2125 (2013) emphasized the need for AMISOM to strengthening state institutions, economic and social development, and respect for human rights, and the rule of law as necessary elements to create the conditions for a durable eradication of piracy and armed robbery on the Somalian coast. It further emphasized that Somalia's long-term security rests with the effective development of the Somali NSF by Somali authorities. To this end, AMISOM is working towards building state institutions in Somalia that is consistent with the OECD definition of state-building. The mission has even tended to engage in activities much more than what is stipulated in its mandate. Therefore, whilst AMISOM is

working towards building the peace with support from other actors on the ground, it tends to focus on building the state as well. In describing whether AMISOMs is undertaking peace-building or state-building roles, a distinctive overlap is portrayed. Barnette and Zurcher noted that “standing behind peace-building is state building” (Barnett and Zurcher, 2009: 26). In that light, states exist where there are government institutions like the Judiciary, Parliament, public service departments, and a well-coordinated executive, ruling a state, and have the capacity to command force and implement policies (Giddens, 1993: 309). State-building requires that state institutions replace state elites in governing key areas of the state. Within this context, the state should be better placed to provide its local population with the essential elements of goods and services, with no barrier (Waldner, 1999:2). The International Dialogue on Peace-building and State-building (2010) concluded that peace-building and state-building can contribute to overcoming conflict and fragility through different perspectives and approaches. AMISOM as a mission could be trapped between the use of this two concepts. In De Coning’s et al. conference proceedings on critical perspectives on contemporary peace-building: Towards change in Concepts and Approaches, it acknowledges that a major flaw in current peace-building in general is the use of approaches that are likely to favor institution or state-building rather than nation-building, reconciliation, social concerns, a focus on efficiency rather than effectiveness and the lack of local ownership (De Coning et al., 2010:11). AMISOM can assess its activities to detect if any of these flaws are evident, and draw up key lessons to design its peace-building and state-building activities to achieve effectiveness. The need for this is that, peace-building has mostly fallen short of creating positive peace as a result of an ambiguous expectation of transforming all the odds of a society – an attempt that took other continents centuries to achieve. Also, the lack of local support structures, and the devastating effects of continuous armed conflict as determinants that affects the success of peacekeeping operations (Chesterman, 2004: 5) are to be taken into consideration in AMISOMs operation. Consequently, as Peace-builders strive to motivate the liberalization of the state from armed conflict, conflict parties may be keen to continue their struggle for legitimacy (Paris (2004: 2). This argument can likely relate to AMISOM’s force operation in the sense that, despite efforts to re-build liberated areas, Al-Shaabab is continuously pushing to gain supremacy and recognition. Considering this, it is important to examine the strategies of any action intended to build peace and the consequences it would yield. In that sense, there should be a connection between what key peace-builders want to achieve, the environment which they want to create, and the outcome of the interaction (Lake and Powell, 1999: 20). However,

complexities are evident in such proposed interactions. Peace-builders can implement activities that can result in positive or negative outcomes for citizens in a particular country. Barnett and Zurcher noted that peace-builders can have specific targets that are opposed by government elites especially when peace-builders attempt to promote political inclusivity that makes room for opposition or rivals. The result of this can be devastating to peace-building and state-building if government elites choose to react using intimidation and violence. Although Barnett and Zurcher noted that at the extreme, the elite might cooperate considering the potential manpower and resources that peace-builders have (Barnett and Zurcher, 2009: 32). This research would add that there is a likely possibility in certain contexts where elites may not need such resources, and thus may not cooperate. The essential pattern of peace-building here will be that of a compromised peace-building, where local elites and peace-builders jointly determine areas where assistance is needed, thus limiting peace-builders to implement in certain areas that are intended to build the state (Barnette and Zurcher, 1999: 33). However, Goodhand and Sedra (2006:3) noted that peace-builders and international support actors are likely to present conditionality's or criteria that may urge local elites to accept new reforms to gain international support (Goodhand and Sedra, 1999: 3).

In most cases, peace-building operations can be successful in bringing an end to violent conflict (Michael and Sambanis, 2006). This is because comprehensive peace-building is meant to address the root causes of conflict, and build the required capacity needed by the state to foster conditions for a lasting positive peace. In societies experiencing intractable conflict, conditions for the development of institutions, intellectual tools and civic culture will likely promote individual and group ownership to resolve their differences (Barnett and Zurcher, 2009).

2.7.1 The Legacy of State-building in Somalia

At the time of the colonial era, the Italian and British colonial leaders or administrations did not put in place the necessary institutions and foundation for a strong central government. When independence was attained in 1960, the government that ensued was unable to strengthen its position. Also, those decentralised clan and sub-clan pastoral structures that specifies Somali cultural traits were seen as fundamentally different to a unified organized country or state. Pham (2012) noted that

“During unification very little thought was apparently given, either by enthused Somali nationalists or their international supporters, as to whether the European-style centralized state that was hastily created was necessarily appropriate for the diffuse nature of Somali society” (Pham, 2012:10).

As a result of an unintended exclusion of traditional or local clan-based governance structures, the Somali idea of clan unification was presumed to fail. On the other hand, local operations of clan and sub-clan have caused the implementation of top-down western methods of governance more challenging in Somalia. According to Menkhaus (2006), “the inability to form a viable government over the past two decades has earned Somalia the dubious distinction of being the world’s foremost graveyard of externally sponsored state-building initiatives” (Menkhaus, 2006:74).

An example of a successful traditionally based stability in Somalia is evident in Somaliland. Doornbos (2002) indicated that “although it lacks international recognition, Somaliland is one typical example of a functioning sovereign state in the Horn of Africa. The unrecognized state of Somaliland has now functioned since 1991 as a self-sustaining state, and has repeatedly received positive attention from the international media for the way it has embarked upon post-conflict reconstruction” (Doornbos, 2002:95). Kibble (2001) further noted that “this is largely due to the bottom up approach at state building that derives its legitimacy from local clan elders and the local ownership of civil institutions, including stable economic, political, security and social welfare institutions (Kibble, 2001:18). Compared to international attempts at imposing western style government on Somalia, Kibble (2001) indicated that “the Somaliland ‘nation building’ process was more bottoms-up, and does function as a state” (Kibble, 2001:18). Furthermore, Byrne (2013) specified that “the methods for state formation in Somaliland may provide the best model for stabilization efforts in greater Somalia” (Byrne, 2013: 122). He noted that “it is clear that development in Somalia must focus on bottom-up, organic growth rather than the imposition of institutions from above” (Byrne, 2013:122). In essence, Somaliland has left a landmark legacy on relevance of bottom-up approach to Somalia state-building.

2.7.2 The Context of State-building in Somalia

“After two decades of conflict, Somalia is the world’s most fragile state” (Brookings Global Economy and Development, 2008). Brookings Global Economy and Development (2008)

further noted that “Somalia has known periods of stability and security over decades, and some parts of it remain relatively free of violence. Multiple levels of armed conflict and insecurity exist and are increasing in some parts of the country. These include localised communal clashes over resources, political clashes over control of the state and its resources, regional involvement sometimes through proxies, and violence fuelled by global ideologies” (Brookings Global Economy and Development, 2008:1) . In terms of the effects of conflict, UNHCR 2011 noted that “the effects of the conflict are far-reaching: 1.36 million people are internally displaced, and 43% of the population lives on less than \$1 a day” (UNHCR, 2011).




Figure 1: Map showing the figures of refugees in the Somali Region

Figure 1 above shows that the region has recorded over 10.4 million IDPs in Somalia. The unemployment rate is above 60% (Somalia Joint Strategy Paper, 2008-2013). According to the United Nations (2011), “women and girls suffered disproportionately – a woman in Somalia has a 1 in 12 chance of dying during her reproductive years” (United Nations Somalia, 2011). DIFID (2011) indicated that “years of conflict, drought and flooding have caused a prolonged humanitarian crisis leading to 2.3 million people estimated to be in need of emergency support” (DIFID, 2011: 1). The instability in Somalia also presented has wider regional and economic ramifications that affected the resources of Somalia. Figure 2 below shows the resources of Somalia that were affected by the conflict.




Figure 2: Map showing Somalia’s resources that have been affected by the conflict

According to DIFID (2011), “It presents risks to regional stability, including in Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. It is the source of serious threats to the United Kingdom (UK) and elsewhere from terrorism, piracy and migration. Somalia is a priority country for the UK’s National Security Council (NSC)” (DIFID, 2011:1). According to Shay (2014), “Security was the subject of an international conference hosted by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK) in London in February 2012 at which partners agreed on a package of commitments to support Somalia through and beyond the critical transition period in 2012, and to reduce the threat it represents” (Shay, 2014: 22-25). As indicated by Department of International Development United Kingdom (DIFID’s, 2011) “it work is a core element of the UK government strategy for Somalia, which recognizes that the underlying causes of instability need to be addressed. Somalia is often thought of as three zones, with different characteristics. Semi-autonomous Puntland (about 2 million people) has government institutions of its own and a degree of stability, though no aspirations for independence. Like the rest of south-central Somalia, (about 3.5 million people) it continues to suffer from insecurity, criminality and the impact of piracy” (DIFID, 2011: 1). For DIFID, (2011), “despite the absence of central government institutions, effective development programmes are possible, particularly where local government functions effectively in the case of

Puntland and Somaliland” (DIFID, 2011). On another point of view, Shay (2014) indicated that “the current signs in Somaliland (about 2 million people) are more positive. The promising government there could maintain progress which might help foster stability for the rest of Somalia. Although the risk of spill over or displaced threats from the south is prevalent, Somaliland currently offers more opportunities for working with the government” (Shay, 2014: 24).

2.7.3 Human Security and State-building in Somalia

From a theoretical standpoint, the concept of human security is best explained by the contrasting views of the neo-realist and post-modernist thinkers. The Neorealists argued that state security is paramount as it is the guardian of the nation and if the state is secure, the people are at peace (Buzan, 1991: 146). This approach focuses on the military capability of the state to deter external aggression, and to provide internal security. However, some point out that the state could be a security threat itself to its own citizens and the security of the state itself does not guarantee human security and freedom. In this context, the postmodernists propose a broadened conceptualization of security that embraces individuals and groups (Booth, 2005a). In this sense, the target is not the state but the person. IIDEA (2006) indicated that “this argument forces the state to not only concentrate on the defence of the country but also the protection of the citizens and the well-being of the society. This means that security is not only physical security from harm or threats but also security risk from lack of human rights and any threat to human dignity and wellbeing such as hunger, and lack of economic opportunity” (IIDEA, 2006: 6). However, Querine (2011) argued that “both sides recognized the importance of the strength and capability of the state to provide security. This means that there is an agreement that a weak state cannot defend its territory and provide human security” (Querine, 2011:2). In Querine’s (2011)’s view, “Somalia has been weakened by years of civil war and the type of security approach that is likely focused on is state security” (Querine, 2011:2). In order to achieve state security goals, the government of Somalia, the AU and the UN are engaged in creating robust institutions. Wade (1990) suggested robust institution “that can provide public services that are resilient to internal politicians and economic challenges, as well as external economic pressures” (Wade, 1990:22-23). Lewis (2002) provides possible relevant ideas to the current institutional formation in Somalia. He noted that “states historical processes produce organic relations between political and civil society” (Lewis, 2002: 39-56). According to Lewis (2002), “this means that through conflicts and negotiations, the particular interests of the different groups

in society will be merged at the political level, where national interests are portrayed in the state machinery, providing intellectual and moral unity” (Lewis 2002:40). Considering that is unity is a desired goal for society, Abdi (2012) buttress that “the emergence of state institutions will likely be responsive to societal needs and legitimacy. In the historical context of Somalia, post-colonial institutions were distant and unresponsive to the needs of average citizens due to a lack of vision, lack of government resources and delivery capacity. During the cold war, the state was marked by strong institutions with better economic development but also engaged in violence, exclusion and nepotism” (Abdi, 2012:5). Ssereo (2003) also provide some supporting statement to the view put forward by Abdi (2012). Ssereo (2003) noted that “since the collapse of the state in 1991, the new institutions that emerged were tribally based, as clan politics had been the norm for the past years. Tribal or clan politics has been considered as greed, but effectively employs the concept of tribal grievances to make the most on perceived inequalities, exclusion or oppression” (Ssereo, 2003: 27-39). Whereas there may be other arguments that tend to support clan politics in Somalia, Lesson (2007) thinks that the clannish politicians who have emerged “have wrecked the country as they have demolished many of the social and political institutions that unified the country, including institution of Somali citizenry (Lesson 2007:304). He further noted that clan politicians sometimes constitute clan identity and “sometimes clan based regional identity, leaving the people divided and in conflict. To solidify this process, clan politics continue to push for the re-construction of a clan based constitutional system that legalizes tribal territories. Such a proposition is enshrined in the provisional constitution” (Lesson, 2007: 694).

2.7.4 The Challenges to State-building in Somalia

State-building activities have long been underway in an effort to bring peace to Somalia. In October 2002, hundreds of Somali political personnel “gathered for a national reconciliation conference in the Kenyan town of Eldoret” (International Crisis Group, 2002”. This meeting which had international sponsors was among the several attempts to restore Somalia since 1991. According to the International Crisis Group, 2002), the Eldoret initiative enables “several improvements over previous efforts, including more unified support from external actors; more comprehensive representation of armed factions; and an agenda which emphasizes a long-term process focused on the resolution of key issues of conflict as against power-sharing (International Crisis Group, 2002). Despite these commendable descriptions, the process experienced lots of challenges which threaten to undermine the peace process (International Crisis Group, 2002). In an effort to examine the strategy towards state-building

in Somalia, it is important to address the issues separately. Ken (2003) believes that part of the challenge encountered when analyzing issues in Somalia “is the tendency to combine Somalia’s multiple crises into a single issue” (Ken, 2003:2). Specifically, he noted that the three distinct issues in Somalia – state collapse, armed conflict, and lawlessness must be separated in order to better understand and analyse them (Ken, 2003: 2). In the case of Somalia, Clapham, (1996) noted that “in almost every instance of state collapse, a weak, nominal central government has managed to maintain juridical sovereignty most likely because of advice from other states” (Clapham, 1996: 22). These interim judicial authorities are hardly successful. In the past, Somalia’s inability to put together even the most minimalist central administration over the course of twelve years ranked the country among the world’s failed states (Esty and Gurr, 1999: 68). Ken (2013) argued that “the complete and sustained collapse of the central government in Somalia has created or contributed to numerous problems, but it is not inherently linked to other crises in Somalia, such as criminality and armed conflict” (Ken, 2003:20). Despite these challenges, the example of Puntland has shown that some part of Somalia has repeatedly enjoyed “relatively high levels of peace, reconciliation, security, and lawfulness despite the absence of a central authority” (Ken, 2003: 3). However, the Pillars of Peace Somali Programme (2010) argued that “this is not to argue that a central state is unnecessary, but emphasize that one cannot attribute all of Somalia’s complex problems to the collapse of the central government” (Pillars of Peace Somali Programme, 2010: 36). Ken (2003) further noted an effect to this, he noted that “one consequence to this observation is that strategies to address problems such as criminality and armed conflict in Somalia which have a framework that presume that a revived central government is the solution, are likely to result in failure” (Ken, 2003:3). As such, in as much as Somalia is deemed a failed state, care needs to be taken for one not to assume that the state is unstable because of its failed nature (Armed Conflicts Report, 2009: 5).

Similarly, Menkhaus (2007) argued that “an attempt to revive a central state structure has actually exacerbated armed conflicts. State-building and peace-building in his view are two separate and in some instance mutually complicated venture in Somalia” (Menkhaus, 2007:40). For Menkhaus, “this is so because the revival of a state structure is viewed in Somali quarters as a zero-sum game, creating winners and losers in a game with potentially very high stakes” (Menkhaus 1997:58). A key lesson from the behaviors of clans was put forward by the UN (2002d). “Clans which gain control over a central government will use

such control to accrue economic resources at the expense of others and to wield the law”. (UN, 2002d: 28-32). This clan patronage is likely some experiences Somalis have witnessed, which according to the UN “tends to produce conflict rather than peace whenever an effort is made to negotiate the establishment of a national government”(UN, 2002d: 28-32) . The figure below shows Somalia’s ethnic group and clan family.




Figure 3: Somalia ethnic groups and clan family

For example, “the spate of armed clashes which in 2002 rendered south-central Somalia more insecure and inaccessible than at any time in the past ten years was partly linked to political tension in anticipation of the IGAD peace talks” (UN, 2002a: 6). The Figure below shows the regions of Somalia.




Figure 4: The Regions of Somalia

According to Menkhaus (1999), “the Somali crisis likely reflects the interests and objectives of key actors; thus, the creation of modern government institutions can likely be successful if all the actors are involved and actually benefitted from the building process (Menkhaus 1999: 7). As the case of Somali Land, Upsall (2014) thought that “Somaliland’s attempts at state-building have proven to be comparatively successful and should be viewed as a model for successful state creation in third world or tribal type states” (Upsall, 2014: 1). The attempt came from the bottom to the top. In Somalia, Upsall (2014) argued that “a top-down approach to state-building has been ineffective, and a lack of government structure at the time of independence created an environment in which clan based fracturing of the government was inevitable” (Upsall, 2014:1). Whilst this may be true, such approach has its own challenges. Seth (2010) indicated that “the biggest challenge to implementing a new paradigm of governance may lie not within Somalia itself, but within an international community that has repeatedly shown an inability to adapt a top-down approach to fragile states” (Seth, 2010:94). To substantiate this view, Gordon’s (2012) analysis, explained that “according to the Failed States Index compiled by the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy, Somalia has been the number one failed state in the world since 2008. The 2011 Ibrahim Index of African Governance rates Somalia an 8 out of 100, making it a state with no ability to create or implement policies that promote the wellbeing of people within its borders”

(Gordon & Gordon, 2012, p.103). Walls (2009) indicated that “there have been at least sixteen attempts since 1991 to reconcile Somalia” (Walls, 2009, p.372). During those times, Walls (2009) noted that “no representative government controlled the entire territory of Somalia, or sustained a prolonged continuation” (Walls, 2009:3). In the past, several armed group’s controls some part of Somalia. Menkhaus (2006) that “Southern Somalia, the area formerly known as Italian Somaliland, is claimed by several groups, none of which maintains control over more than a few square miles, and in the case of the internationally recognized TNG and its successor, the TFG, only a few areas beyond the capital Mogadishu have been successfully controlled” (Menkhaus, 2006 p.92). Upsall (2014) also indicated that “multiple internationally supported transitional governments have been unable to take control of the country’s territory and repeated foreign interventions has been limited to provide stability” (Upsall, 2014: 1). Whilst these transitional governments are mostly imposed from the top, Byrne (2013) thinks that “Top-down approaches to government formation are likely based on the assumption that Somalia as a whole is a failed state based on a Westphalian model” (Byrne, 2013: 112). Byrne noted that “this narrative of a failed state “occludes the reality of the situation, and is harmful to attempt to encourage development from within the country” (Byrne, 2013). Debiel, et. al (2009) also believed that “the success story in neighboring Somaliland, which has led to a locally legitimate and organically grown government, has largely been ignored by international actors” (Debiel et al, 2009:38). He mentioned that “In states with little or no functioning government, there is evidence that social and political structures are characterized by ‘hybrid political orders’ which blend ‘traditional and modern norms and practices’” (Debiel et al, 2009:38). This argument or idea was also supported by Jhazbhay (2009). He noted that “Somaliland has used traditional practices to create a sustainable modern government by blending “modernity and tradition” into a functioning state (Jhazbhay, 2009:51).

2.7.5 Success Stories on conflict Transformation Initiatives

Constitutionally, the Somali constitution recognized the Somaliland Guurti, or House of Elders, which represents the major clans. It also ensures balance within the clan system. As cited in the Somaliland constitution, the Somaliland Guurti system is responsible for

“review (of) the legislation passed by the House of Representatives before it is forwarded to the President; and shall have special responsibility for passing laws relating to religion, traditions (culture) and security” (the Constitution of Somaliland, 2006:21).

The constitution gives significant power to clan elders. Walls (2009) indicated that “In 1993, as part of the overall strategy of decentralization of the Somaliland government, the president deferred to the Guurti to assume responsibility for mediating disputes between the government and opposition groups” (Walls, 2009: 383). Walls (2009) further pointed out that, “In taking this action, he effectively transferred responsibility for negotiating a transition to civilian government, to a traditionally based civilian Guurti” (Walls, 2009: 383).

The ceding of executive power to the Guurti system showed clans that the Somaliland government was not going to be a system similar to previous Somali regimes.

Kaplan (2008) noted that,

“Somaliland’s evolution shows that states should look inward for their resources and institutional models and adopt political structures and processes that reflect the history, complexity, and particularity of their peoples and environments” (Kaplan, 2008: 144).

Somaliland returned to its independence after the collapse of the government in 1991. According to Walls (2009), this came about “after the conference at Burao where clan representatives met in the centre of Isaaq Somaliland to agree on six resolutions to bring an end to the conflict in northern Somalia with separate administration from Mogadishu” (Walls, 2009:379). After the Burao conference, inter-clan conflict was resolved successfully by representatives of clan elders from different conflicting groups, substantiating the fact that conflict transformation was successful and achievable at inter-clan level. Byrne (2013) states that “It is notable that the principle of ‘forgetting’ grievances rather than calculating and enforcing compensation payments was applied in each of the Somaliland peace-building processes” (Byrne, 2013:121).

There, it is important to note the key lesson or direction reconciliation takes in the case of Somaliland. While this seems successful, clan reconciliation failed in other parts of Somalia and it is mostly because parties to the reconciliation conferences lack the intent to achieve peace and a stable government. In the case of the success in Somaliland, Jhazbhay (2009) noted that,

“In a very real sense, the clan elders have served to guarantee peace and security in Somaliland in that, they are the nation’s ultimate fallback as an ‘insurance policy’ against descent into anarchy” (Jhazbhay, 2009:58).

Biggar (2002) also agree that the clan leaders in this example “were also able to create a viable agreement that favours all sides to the conflict politically” (Biggar (2002:168).

Localised systems of governance have, in some places and at some points in time, provided a surprising degree of stability, despite the absence of the state. Menkhaus (2000) noted:

“Notwithstanding the general perception of Somalia as “anarchic”, basic law and order is in fact the norm in most locations... much of the Somali countryside - especially Somaliland, Puntland, and pockets of southern Somalia - is safer for local residents than is the case in neighbouring countries. There are, to be sure, shifting zones of very dangerous banditry and criminality in places like Jowhar, the lower Jubba valley, and parts of Mogadishu. It is also true that both Somali nationals and foreigners associated with an international organization or a profitable business are frequent targets of kidnapping for ransom, especially in Mogadishu. But it is important not to confuse the security problems of international aid agencies with security problems for average residents” (Menkhaus, 2000: 9)

For instance, UNOSOM’s withdrawal in March 1995 did not, as many feared, result in a return to whole-scale extreme fighting. Violent conflicts did continue after, but armed clashes became shorter, more localized, and was generally minimized (Philip, 2005:551). Doornbos (2001) mentioned that the reasons for this was that “UN military intervention had helped to curtail the intense conflict between the major factions, and those factions and clans that had gained traction during the first years focused on consolidating their gains” (Doornbos, 2001: 192). Also, the community-based peace processes study done in south-central Somalia by Interpeace and Center for Research and Dialogue (2008) highlighted that “UNOSOM supported a number of local peace initiatives, by providing good offices and mediation support. Some of which had a positive impact. One of such UNOSOM supported regional initiative was in Kismayo in 1994, involving the Somali National Alliance (SNA), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and representatives of nineteen clans from Middle and Lower Jubba regions (with the exception of the Absame

sub-clan which signed the agreement later)” (Center for Research and Dialogue, 2008:18). A significant example of a successful localised reconciliation process at regional level is the Wajid Peace Conference in 2006, through which the agreement reached between two political factions concerned led to social reconciliation between the clans, with positive implications for the national process. (Center for Research and Dialogue, 2008: 19).

Another likely success story is the Somali National Reconciliation Conference hosted by Kenya from October 2002 to late 2004. It represented the first sustained effort by regional states (under the aegis of IGAD) to broker peace in Somalia, by reconciling the Transitional National Government (TNG) and the opposition SRRC. Unlike many of the past conference, it was designed to address real conflict issues rather than focus exclusively on power-sharing deals (Tavolato, 2004:12). The talks began in the town of Eldoret before being relocated in February 2003 to Mbagathi, outside Kenya’s capital Nairobi – making it known as “the Mbagathi process”. The process culminated in the endorsement of a Transitional Federal Charter, the creation of Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and the election of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as transitional president, which ushered in the second phase of the transitional arrangements in 2004, including “the establishment of security, and drafting of a constitution”(Andrews, 2013: 2). Though this peace process might not achieve the desired outcome, it does lay the foundation for state-building.

2.8 Theoretical Framework

This research utilized both John Paul Lederach’s and Johan Galtung’s conflict transformation ideas. Conflict transformation according to the Berghof glossary “is still a relatively new and distinct term in the global discourse on conflict and peace-building. Conflict transformation views the existence of conflicts as a valuably indispensable part of social change and development, but does not see violence as inevitable in the relations and interaction between conflicting parties” (Berghof Glossary, 2012: 7). Further, the Berghof Foundation asserts that “Conflict transformation does not see the resolution of conflicts as the most important or ultimate goal of engagement. Instead, it aims to establish constructive relations among the conflicting actors, and helps create the structures that are needed for lasting peace” (Berghof Foundation, 2012: 7). Korpen et al, (2008) explains how conflict transformation can create lasting peace. He noted that “Conflict transformation does so by influencing the root causes of conflicts in such a way that sustainable non-violent strategies can prevail. Secondly, the concept of conflict transformation builds on a systemic and inclusive approach to conflicts

which takes account of their interdependent dimensions, and dynamic nature. This perspective impacts on the manner in which, common sense are used to define and describe phenomena of social change and transformation” (Korpen, et al, 2008: 12). In the field of conflict transformation, precise terminology can help to better understand the root causes and the nature of conflicts. Korpen et al, (2008) indicated that “It can also help in shaping theoretical and conceptual approaches to peace, and in developing appropriate political and social strategies” (Korpen, et al, 2008: 12). The theoretical framework will focus more on understanding conflict transformation as it relates to the relevance of this study.

In navigating the concept of conflict transformation, Diana (2010) put forward that “Conflict transformation is best described as a complex process of constructively changing relationships, attitudes, behavior, interests and discourses in violence-prone conflict settings. Importantly, it also addresses underlying structures, cultures and institutions that encourage and condition violent political and social conflict” (Diana, 2010: 22). Diana (2010) also noted that “the term is used in the works of several authors in peace and conflict studies for example, Adam Curle, Johan Galtung, Louis Kriesberg, Kumar Rupesinghe, Raimo Vayrynen, among others. However, it has been elaborated most specifically in the works of John Paul Lederach and Diana Francis” (Diana, 2010: 22). Dudouet (2011) expound on the concept further, by indicating that “It is a multidimensional, non-linear and unpredictable process involving many different actors in moving from latent and overt violence to structural and cultural peace” (Dudouet, 2011: 237-264). Hunt, (1994) noted that Conflict Transformation speaks specifically to situations of protracted and asymmetric conflict involving social justice issues. As such, “In protracted settings, the theory is an approach that calls for long-term engagement and political skill” (Hunt, 1994: 216). He also noted that “this theory is a conceptualization from the field in order to make it more relevant to contemporary asymmetric conflicts” (Hunt, 1994: 216). Asymmetric conflict is a vivid characteristic of contemporary armed conflict. It is marked by inequalities of power and status, violence, and often protracted in nature (GeiB, 2006: 757). The theory of conflict transformation draws its analogy from other conflict management theories that are also building blocks to it. Since attitudes and behavior changed immensely in a transformational process during conflict, (Bodtker and Jameson, 2009) the theory proposed the same change in behavior after armed conflict (Galtung, 1996: 70-126). Conflict transformation attempts to address incompatibility which arises between parties, by eliminating the conflict through transcending the contradiction, compromise, and by associating or disassociating with actors (Galtung 1996:

116). Conflict transformation is also related to Azer's work (1990) on protracted social conflict. Azer's work focused on the genesis and maintenance of protracted conflict. According to Azer's (1990) work, the theory of protracted social conflict traces the "formation of protracted conflict which ranges from the historical context, the denial of basic human needs of access, identity and security, as well as through the roles played out by different entities" (Azer, 1990: 20 - 90).

Conflict transformation also involves a range of actors with different strategies but one objective. Actors usually involved in conflict transformation are divided into four groups.

- "States and inter-governmental organizations
- Development and humanitarian organizations
- International NGOs concerned with conflict prevention and transformation
- Parties to the conflict and other relevant groups within the affected societies" (Miall, 2004:12)

For Somalia, the four major categories of actors above are fully operational, each relevant, and contributing or playing out differently in the country. In as much as all actors are playing an important role, "state and international actors are among the most influential of the actors" (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 21). This means that in Somalia, the actors are quite important in influencing all initiatives for transforming the conflict. Since conflict interplays around global, regional, and societal conflict parties, conflict transformation theory proposes the mapping of these actors and their involvement as crucial to peace-building (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 21). For instance, at the global level, the most common cause of conflict is the post-colonial legacy. At the regional level, the most common cause of conflict is spill-overs. At the state or societal level, ethnicity is among the known cause. At the level of conflicting parties, disagreement between groups within the state is a major cause (Scherrer, 1994: 74). What is important here is the context and the relationship between the actors of a conflict. In an effort to transform conflict, interaction with the society and among these groups is key (Galtung, 1996: 212). During this period of conflict transformation in Somalia, "poor relationships between clans or groups may pose a great threat to escalating the conflict, and will remain a major hindrance to peace-building efforts even after the violence is over" (Dabiel, T. et al 2009). The theory of conflict transformation emphasizes a careful consideration in taking heed of the needs of all conflicting parties for a successful peace-building effort (Diamond, 1994: 3). Conflict transformation takes place in

different forms. These include context transformation, structural transformation, actor transformation, issue transformation and personal transformations (Mitchelle, 2000: 1-23). Mitchelle (2000) demonstrated that context transformation speaks to “changes in the context of conflict that can change each party’s perception of the conflict situation, as well as their motives. Structural transformation speaks to the structure of the conflict; the set of actors, their issues, incompatible goals and relationships to the society; economy and state within which conflict is embedded” (Mitchelle, 2000: 1-23). Lederach (1995) indicated that “Conflict Transformation proposes that asymmetric conflict can only be transformed with balanced and incontestable relationships” (Lederach, 1995: 12). Issue transformation concerns the reformulation of positions maintained by parties to a conflict. Mitchelle (2000) expound that “this is very important for parties to redefine or reframe those positions in order to reach compromises or resolutions” (Mitchelle, 2000: 1-23). Another key type of conflict transformation is Actor Transformation. (Holtzman, et al 1998) explains that Actor transformation speaks to the necessity of “actors to change their goals or alter their general approach to conflict as and when necessary to support conflict transformation processes” (Holtzman, Elwan and Scott, 1998: 22). While actor transformation is very important, personal transformation is crucial to capture the will or commitment of an individual or leaders or group to make a relevant decision that may be essential to transforming the conflict (Curle, 1987). Further to these assertions, Burton 1996: 20 identifies several principles which form the backbone of a conflict transformation process:

- Conflict should not be regarded as an isolated event that can be resolved or managed but as an integral part of society’s on-going evolution and development.
- Conflicts should not be understood solely as an inherently negative and destructive occurrence but rather, as a potentially positive and productive force of change if harnessed constructively.
- Conflict transformation goes beyond merely seeking to contain and manage conflict, it instead seek to transform root causes of a particular conflict.
- Conflict transformation is a long term gradual and complex process requiring sustained engagement and interaction.
- Conflict transformation is not just an approach and set of techniques but a way of thinking about and understanding conflict itself.
- Conflict transformation is particularly intended for intractable conflicts, with deep rooted issues.

In explaining the evolution of the practice of conflict transformation, Mitchell, (1994) unfold that the practice of conflict transformation theory “has developed over the past decade. As a new approach, it can be differentiated from conflict management and conflict resolution, although they all shared similar school of thought” (Mitchell, 1994: 136). “Conflict transformation is thus a comprehensive approach, addressing a range of dimensions (micro to macro issues, local to global levels, grassroots to elite actors, and short-term to long term). It aims to develop capacity, and to support structural change, rather than to facilitate outcomes or deliver settlements. It seeks to engage with conflict, which usually extend beyond the site of fighting (Berghof Glossary, 2012). Though the theory is a promising one, it lacks an adequate explanation to capture the emerging threats to conflicts, and the formation of new actors and new issues. Thus the theory needs to be broadened (Berghof Handbook Dialogue No 6, 2013).

2.8.1 Agents of Conflict Transformation

Conflict transformation speaks to approaches that seek to encourage wider social change through transforming the antagonistic relationship between the parties to the conflict. Based on the understanding that conflicts do not simply occur due to incompatible interests and unmet needs, it situates them in the historically and socially defined relations between the collective identities of the parties to the conflict (Zistel, 2008). In any setting of protracted conflict, there are agents of violent change or resistance but also agents of peaceful change. Any process of conflict transformation must find and connect the drivers of peaceful change, in which Francis (2002) elaborated as constituency building (Francis, 2002:33). It has become clear that “conflict transformation efforts need actors such as, governments and non-state actors; women and men; conflict parties and peace envoys” (Mitchell, 1993: 147). Irrespective of the need for external actors to serve as agents of transformation, Berghof (2012) reminds practitioners to be “mindful that peace is made from within the society in conflict rather than by external experts and interveners, even when the latter may bring much needed and welcome ideas and support” (Berghof Glossary, 2012: 7). In recognition of the importance of culture as a means of generating and resolving conflicts in conflict transformation, traditional approaches to terminating conflicts have become increasingly popular in contemporary reconciliation. If effective, they provide people affected by violent conflict with the means to solve their own problems. Therefore, traditional practice highlights the need and relevance of the socio-political community to assert itself, its identity and its

control of its norms in a conflict setting, not necessarily to be seen as key breakers of violence (Museveni, 1997: 58).

2.8.2 Reflection of Conflict Transformation in Somalia's State-building

Somalia has seen tremendous international support to bring an end to the conflict through a series of consultative meetings between different groups in the Somali parliament. In the past, various strong individuals attempted to establish a unified government but the peace processes were all flawed by the lack of trust with no relationship to bind agreements. The peace processes often lacks a bottom-up and clan legitimized approach where traditional authorities could have made a huge difference. Ahmed & Green (1999) highlighted that “unlike the internationally backed attempts at state building, conflict resolution processes in the north has always been the responsibility of elders who have authority to represent their clans” (Ahmed & Green, 1999:123). The earlier Somali transitional federal government that was formed were also not respecting rule of law in their state building efforts. They see it as a western phenomenon. There were complaints of mismanagement of public funds, which largely contributed to destroying the already managed relationship which has constrained Somalia's unity (Leeson, 2007). Since Somalia's state building efforts were driven by western approach, the approach did not place much emphasis on transforming relationships at clan or local level for a long time (Ahmed & Green, 1999).

Therefore, the most influential arm of the local community hardly trusts the transitional governments in place. They were basically seen as western oriented. Whilst traditional communities or clan rivalry are often seen as a major cause of the conflict, they can also be a major player in Somalia's state-building processes if conflict transformation is embedded with a focus on transforming clan rivalry. Martin Doornbos states, “the issue is neither the provisional government nor the parliament that has been recognized by a number of important political groups and stakeholders” (Doornbos, 1990:.93).

Moreover, despite the presence of AMISOM and the international support to state building in Somalia, conflict transformation should be at the centre of these operations. A situation where armed groups representing clans would need to have a rethink of the true meaning of Somalia's rich culture, and how trusting and accepting one another as family would benefit everyone despite the atrocities that have been committed by certain sect. Byrne (2013), believes that “a top down solution does give room for such to happen in Somalia, noting that

top down institutions cannot be sensitive to the requirements and structures of society (Byrne, 2013:122). In reality, conflict transformation is more likely to bridge social contrast between state and citizen than a state-building process that does little in bridging this gap (Leonard & Samantar, 2011). In realizing the importance of inclusivity, AMISOM adopted a series of conflict transformation approaches to its implementation in the form of activities that fits into the mission's mandate. It recognized that "clan elders have been the catalysts for ending violence between clans and sub-clans and providing security for and legitimacy to the government in Somaliland. As such, elders, merchants, women's groups and other genuine stakeholders, are participating in workshops and seminars organized by AMISOM as compared to latter years when there were not included (AMISOM, 2014). For example, Upsall, (2014) noted that "Somaliland succeeded with the approach where the former TFG failed. Currently, Somaliland has a constitution, a functioning representative government and security forces which protect a defined territory. The population of Somaliland recognizes the government as legitimate and has sent emissaries to foreign capitals, even if those same foreign capitals do not officially recognize the existence of Somaliland for political reasons" (Upsall, 2014: 3).

Similarly, IGAD authorized a bottom-up approach that is inclusive of elders, merchants, women's groups and other genuine stakeholders who could participate in Somalia's peace process (IGAD, 2001: 41). This follows on from its proposal to include grassroots organizations in Somali peace processes. Though the Arta conference did not have a successful impact, its flaws highlight the essence and positive impact a dedicated and focused conflict transformation effort may bring if applied earnestly (Interpeace, 2009:49).

2.8.3 The Relevance of Conflict Transformation Theory to the Research

The theory of conflict transformation ideally proposed the relevance of addressing root causes as the baseline to achieve sustainable peace, and avoid a relapse into violent conflict. While this assertion forms the basis of the arguments in this research, it also means that for Somalia, the root causes of the conflict would need to be addressed to avoid recurring conflict, and further prevent the waste of resources that have been used to bring stability to the country. Ideally, conflict transformation theory aim is for a change in the fundamental relationships, social structures and contextual conditions that give rise to the conflict. Considering the causes of the conflict in Somalia, It may be difficult to resolve conflicts between parties using diplomacy for instance when issues relating to the conflict concern

fundamental asymmetries, such as dominance over minorities by majorities, or similar power relations between groups stratified by class, ethnicity or beliefs (Miall, 2004). While conflict resolution is useful, it may be problematic for a non-western context where sustainable outcomes of negotiations cannot be guaranteed due to the potential slip in the rule of law. The unpredictability of this situation makes conflict transformation a better option for Somalia. In contrast, approaches to conflict transformation expound a little bit further, in that they recognize that conflicts occurred not only through incompatible goals and unequal structures, but that these are outcomes of historical processes which define the identities of the parties involved, and which calls for more substantial social change (Reimann, 2004: 13) as suggested in this research on AMISOMs' contributions.

When Somalia's armed extremist groups resort to violent repression and rebellion as a strategy to send a message, conflict can be very destructive. According to Galtung, (1996), "this destructive conflict revolves around a distorted pattern of governance, and a militarized form of politics, which in turn leads to the further denial of basic needs. This has resulted into a protracted cycle of institutional deformation and destructive conflict" (Galtung 1996: 90). With the existence of sufficient capacity in governance and society; and a supportive international environment, the state and its warring parties may have resorted to political confrontation, which is a pattern of constructive conflict that promotes decision-making capacity, strengthens autonomous development, and sustains civil rather than military politics (Lederach, 1995: 201-22). This will gradually promote access to basic needs. Constructive conflict reaction in Somalia is gradually paving the way to address entrenched patterns of conflict, and reveal the actual pillars that keep fuelling or aiding the conflict through conflict transformation. Conflict transformation thus goes beyond structural and behavioral justifications, but Vayrynen (1991) suggests how "patterns of conflict interact with satisfying the interest of all" (Vayrynen, 1991: 4). Conflict transformation emphasized the importance of studying how conflicts are transformed within society. Such study needs careful analysis of the situation, and the dynamics of anything that influences peace in that environment (Vayrynen, 1991: 4). While Mitchell (2000) and Vayrynen (1991) proposed four types of conflict transformation approaches may be useful to employ in the Somali conflict (Vayrynen, 1991: 5), Rupesinghe (1995,1998) argument for a multi-track conflict transformation intervention is much more context specific to the Somali conflict. Rupesinghe's multi-track approach to conflict transformation proposes "the building of peace constituencies at the grassroots level, and the civil society level, including also creating peace

alliances with any groups that are able to bring about change” (Rupesinghe, 1995: 8). In the case of Somalia, the clans could be such groups (Rupesinghe, 1995: 8). Thus, Rupesinghe (1995) and Vayrnen (1991) idea of conflict transformation forms a fine pattern that can be utilized and analysed to address some of the issues posing a great challenge to the stabilization of Somalia. One key advantage of the theory is that, it provides the research with a broader perspective to understand how the Somali conflict can be best resolved. Vayrnen (1999) envisaged this view also. Conflict transformation requires a process training that envisions cultural knowledge as a key resource in both the creation and development of models appropriate to a given setting (Lederach, 1995: 10). Conflict transformation is a long process inspired by peace, justice, truth and mercy (Lederach’s 1997). It speaks to key dimensions of changing processes that are required in a protracted social, political and religious conflict to attain cultural universality. This changing process ranges from “personal, structural, relational, and cultural aspects of the conflict” (Lederach, 1995: 68). Generally, the theory of conflict transformation proposes a comprehensive peace process, which should address all aspects of a conflict.

2.9.1 Conclusion

In an attempt to reunify Somaliland, history on reconciliation has shown that Inter-clan dialogue can build the pillars of peace. These inter-clan dialogues are epitome of the agents of change identified under the theoretical framework of this chapter. After the fall of Siad Barre, most of the northern part of Somalia came under the control of the Somali National Movement (SNM). Inter-clan dialogue was then facilitated to encourage clans that fell within the minority (Farah & Lewis, 1997). In the case of Somaliland, peace-building is celebrated mainly because the building of peace started at the grassroots level, where meetings between clans has a unanimous support for a particular political entity – the SNM, which was key in bringing down the one time Somali dictator – Mohamed Siad Barre (Tahir, 2013: 1). For the larger parts of Somalia, Weber (2008) identified few failed attempts, as well as possible obstacles for state-building in Somalia. These include, imposed government, marginalization, and support for one faction over another (Weber A, 2008: 1). The direction in which the larger Somalia develops will depend partly on the strategies applied to its state-building process. A bottom-up approach with the intension to transform and build relationships, institutions, civil society, political parties and leadership is a possible strategy that could work. The continuous focus on the above, and the effort to address any inequality or disagreement among groups will likely help to stabilize and unite Somalia.

Chapter Three

Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter consists of the research methodology and contextualizes the history of Somalia. It provides a detailed account of Somalia's geographic characteristics – its people, religion, and trade history. It also analyses colonial occupation, and its effects on the socio-political structure of the state. It also details the background of the conflict under the leadership of Major General Mohamed Said Barre, and the formation of different political organizations or alliances. This information is very important to understand the nature of the conflict between individuals, clans and warlords. The chapter also sheds light on the historical background of dominant Somali warring factions to understand their initial motives and purposes as opposed to contemporary times. The relevance of this is to capture the underlying interest of these factions, and the reasons for their transformation and persistent fighting. This chapter looks at the events that happened during the first phase of the formation of the Somali TFG, and the dynamics of power play that further complicated the peace process, leading to the intervention of African regional forces (IGASOM and AMISOM). The chapter also examines the current political, humanitarian and security situation to assess progress made by the federal government with support from AMISOM in decentralization, and the promotion of reconciliation, development and protection of the Somali community.

3.2 Research Methodology

A research methodology includes the research designs, population and sample, data collection procedures, data analysis procedures and measurement of variables. The sample of individuals consisted of 12 AMISOM personnel, and 8 practitioners and experts selected from NGOs supporting AMISOMs operations. This study utilized a qualitative research method. Qualitative research is aimed at gaining a deep understanding of a specific organization or event, rather than surface description of a large sample of a population. It is aimed at providing an explicit rendering of the structure, order, and broad patterns found among a group of participants. It is also called ethnomethodology or field research. It generates data about human groups in social settings.

Qualitative research does not introduce treatments or manipulate variables, or impose the researcher's operational definitions of variables on the participants. Rather, it lets the meaning

emerge from the participants. It is more flexible in that it can adjust to any setting. One common advantage of qualitative research is that concepts, data collection tools, and data collection methods can be adjusted as the research progresses.

Qualitative research aims to get a better understanding through first-hand experience, truthful reporting, and quotations of actual conversations. It aims to understand how the participants derive meaning from their surroundings, and how their meaning influences their behaviour (Mugenda, 2003). Qualitative research is characterised by its aims, which relate to understanding some aspect of social life, and its methods which (in general) generate words, rather than numbers, as data for analysis. In situations where little is known, it is often better to start with qualitative methods (interviews, focus groups, etc) in all behavioural research. It can help with generating hypotheses that can then be tested by quantitative methods. For instance, in an area where we had no idea what kinds of issue were acting as barriers to peace, it would be difficult to design a survey to cover the main factors (Patton, 2002). Qualitative methods generally aim to understand the experiences and attitudes of individual and groups in a particular community.

These methods aim to answer questions about the ‘what’, ‘how’ or ‘why’ of a phenomenon rather than ‘how many’ or ‘how much’, which are answered by quantitative methods. If the aim is to understand how a community or individuals within it perceive a particular issue, then qualitative methods are often appropriate. Qualitative research is about finding out not just what people think, but why they think it. It’s about getting people to talk about their opinions so one can understand their motivations and feelings. Face-to-face interviews and group discussions are the best way to get this kind of in-depth feedback. Qualitative research can be valuable when you are developing new products or coming up with new recommendations for a particular initiative. Qualitative research can also use observation as a data collection method. Observation is the selection and recording of behaviours of people in their environment. Observation is useful for generating in-depth descriptions of organizations or events, for obtaining information that is otherwise inaccessible, and for conducting research when other methods are inadequate.

This research focused on two conceptual and empirical findings. First, being that the conflict in Somalia has lasted for decades and the possibility of the continuation of violence is high (Elmi, 2010:35), it is important to research an approach that can be best utilized to bring

stability to Somalia. Secondly, whereas peace agreements and PSOs options seems challenging in ending the conflict, it is important to find out how conflict transformation efforts can be employed alongside AMISOM's PSOs to bring stability in Somalia. For example, the first empirical finding assessed the extent to which AMISOM has contributed to Somalia's conflict transformation. There has been many activities undertaken by the mission, some often beyond the framework of the current mandate to contribute to the peace. From these findings, the research analysed whether AMISOMs approaches are best placed to support conflict transformation efforts in Somalia or whether there is a need for other options or emphasis on a particular area of support. The second conceptual and empirical findings that this research attempted to look at how conflict transformation could work effectively alongside the current mandate of AMISOM. Based on the findings above, the mission does not have a specific mandate for conflict transformation (AMISOM, 2014), but rather its current mandate is geared towards a key goal of transforming the conflict in Somalia. Many see the operations of AMISOM as a peace enforcement operation; however, at the strategic level of the mission management structure, it is clear that the mission is a peace support operation which encompasses peace enforcement as well as peacekeeping and peace-building (Bruton, EB 2014:40). PSOs thus give room for broader conflict transformation engagements.

The research used two main methods for analysis:

Secondary data: The research utilized qualitative analysis, and thus makes use of interviews, workshop reports, text books, online articles, news update, website information, organizational publications, UN resolutions, and AU communiqués. In summary, primary and secondary sources were utilized, to provide content analysis, and textual criticism from historical studies. Moreover, secondary data is used to clarify and understand the Somalia Administrative and government structures. For, example, Somalia has 18 administrative regions (plural – NA, singular – gobolka). These include: Awdal, Bakool, Banaadir, Bari, Bay, Galguduud, Gedo, Hiiran, Jubbada Dhexe (Middle Jubba, Jubbada Hoose (Lower Jubba), Mudug, Nugaal, Sanaag, Shabeellaha Dhexe (Middle Shabeelle), Shabellaha Hoose (Lower Shabeela), Sool, Togdheer, and Woqooyi Galbeed (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015). Somalia's government is composed of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches. The Executive consisted of the chief of state, head of government, and a cabinet. The Legislature is composed of a bi-cameral National Parliament consisting of the house of the people of the federal parliament – a 275 seats, elected by the Somali citizens, and the upper house of the federal parliament – a 54 seats, elected by people of the federal member

states; while the Judiciary consist of 5 judges including the chief judge and deputy chief judge. However, under the terms of the 2004 Transitional National Charter (TNC), a supreme court based in Mogadishu and an appeal court were established; yet most regions have reverted to local forms of conflict resolution, either secular traditional Somali customary law, or sharia Islamic law. Other sub-ordinate courts are: federal member state level courts; military courts; and sharia (Islamic) courts (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015).

Primary data: Data collection consisted of key informant interviews (KIIs) which was administered to 20 peace and conflict practitioners via email, phone calls and face to face meetings. The informant interviewees included those working within the mission area, and are familiar with the work of AMISOM, and those personnel whose institutions (eg. The African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Dispute (ACCORD), the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), and the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) are working closely with AMISOM. The information obtained from the respondents are mostly consistent with those obtain from the desk top research conducted during the literature review. It verifies variables that are linked to the desktop findings on the causes of the Somali conflict, the impact of the conflict and the security gain made by AMISOM in Somalia. Thus, it enhances reliability and sustainability of the data collected in this research.

The data obtained from the respondents helps verify how the theory used to support the research analysis, is relevant to the research. The responses help to analyse the relevant data that helps the research to meet its objectives. The key information interviews conducted helps to shape the ideas and perceptions of the information gather to culminate it into a very good findings and recommendations.

How is qualitative research utilized in this research?

The research used a combination of both primary and secondary methods of data collection to achieve a comprehensive quality of the information gathered. The purpose of conducting research is geared towards developing and evaluating concepts and theories, Zikmud (1986). This research utilized qualitative analysis by conducting an extensive review of several existing literatures on the history of Somalia, the nature of the Somali conflict, the root causes of the conflict, the history of past attempt to stabilize Somalia and the theory that best support the argument of the research. The research also utilized interview tools such as

questionnaire, and observation to gather relevant opinion from practitioners working on peace and security issues in Somalia. The questionnaires were designed to get an in-depth understanding of the situation of Somalia, the work of AMISOM, the support of the FGS and obtain relevant information on the successes and challenges AMISOM faces in transforming the conflict in Somalia. The questionnaire consisted of 8 questions, which encouraged respondents to think and come up with relevant possible recommendations to improve the existing work of AMISOM. The questionnaire was administered to AMISOM personnel, AU personnel and partner institutions that supports the work of AMISOM.

3.2.1 Research Design

Research design basically includes the collection, measurement and analysis of data. They further state that qualitative research is a descriptive, non-numerical way to collect and interpret information; it investigates how people react, work, live and manage their daily lives. Descriptive designs are used in preliminary and explanatory studies to allow the researcher to gather information, summarize, present and interpret it for the purpose of classification. In order to meet the required goal of the research (Luck and Ruben, 1992):

The researcher chose a descriptive research design because it allowed for analysis of different variables and at the same time allowed the researcher to evaluate the extent to which AMISOM has contributed to Somalia's conflict transformation. Thematic areas in which AMISOM has contributed to, such as security, support to the extension of state authority, management of disengaged fighters, humanitarian assistance and capacity building were identified and analysed to see how far AMISOM has successes in these areas

3.2.2 Sample Size

Qualitative research typically starts with a specific group, type of individual, event, or process. In this sense, the research chooses specific individuals within the AMISOM organizational structure who have experience in the operations of AMISOM in Somalia. These individuals identified and selected for the research have an in-depth understanding of peace and security issues, and in particular in specific areas the mission has had success in. These areas include governance, security sector reform and the protection of civilians. Since the research required individuals with an in-depth understanding of the activities of AMISOM in Somalia, there are many individuals working in and out of the mission area who will be able to provide such information. However, it will not be possible to interview every

one of these individuals. Therefore, 20 individuals were selected within and outside AMISOM, who had in-depth understanding of the operation of AMISOM and the conflict in Somalia. Therefore, 20 individuals were selected for interviews. The sample of individuals consisted of 12 AMISOM Personnel, and 8 practitioners and experts selected from NGOs supporting AMISOMs operations in Somalia.

3.3.3 Research Instrument

The researcher developed a semi structured Interview questionnaire (SIQ) which sought information related to the causes of the conflict, the key focus of AMISOM in contributing to peace in Somalia, the aspects of AMISOMs mandate that speaks towards the missions role in addressing the conflict, and the major contribution of the mission in stabilizing the country, The questionnaire focuses on open ended questions that will give insight on the themes the questionnaire seeks to achieve. It also enabled the researcher to interact more with the respondents and evaluate the information given whether reliable or not. All the respondents agreed to be interviewed on a voluntary basis.

3.3.4 Data Collection Procedure

The procedure included seeking consent from participants before conducting interviews. Primary data was obtained from field research using interviews, conducted via phone calls, emails and face to face interviews. The interviews were conducted using a semi-structured questionnaire. This method involved the use of closed and open ended questions. The questionnaire was divided into four sections, which addressed the research objectives. This was considered sufficient because participants were purposively selected on their experiences in the Somali conflict, and in the work of the mission. This group was considered homogenous to provide information on the role of AMISOM in Somalia's conflict transformation. For the purpose of confidentiality and anonymity, codes were used to conceal the identities of the participants as requested by the interviewees. While the secondary data was gathered from books, reports, journals, newspapers, publications, magazines and online sources.

3.3.5 Ethical Considerations

Ethics and norms governing humans play a critical role in maintaining harmony in the society. It is the responsibility of the researcher to assess the possibility of harm to research participants and minimize the same Ferrel & Fraedrich, (2008).

The main Ethical Considerations included: -

1. **Informed Consent** – The questionnaire had a separate informed consent explanation which had the options of; not to participate if not willing or to withdraw the participation any time without loss of benefits in appendix 2.
2. **Confidentiality** – All questionnaires were coded to enhance confidentiality.

3.3.6 Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria

The respondents were approached for informed consent. All those who declined consent or withdraw their consent were excluded.

3.3.7 Data Analysis Procedure

Data analysis is the process of structuring and giving meaning to the information collected. The research presents its findings by identifying key areas AMISOM has contributed in transforming the conflict in Somalia. It utilized a narrative analysis to ascertain whether AMISOM is using the right approach to ending the conflict in Somalia.

Chapter Four

Study Area

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an in-depth contextual background on the history of Somalia looking at brief background on Somalia's dominant armed groups, their objectives, and the United Nations, African Union (AU) and Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) interventions in an attempt to bring stability to the country in the 1990s.

4.2 Brief History and Background to the Conflict in Somalia

In the early 1990s when the Soviet Union disintegrated, many people expected that peace in a unipolar world would prevail. Instead, many intra-state wars broke out in different parts of the globe. Different factions, identity groups and regions challenged existing states' monopoly over violence (Weiss, 1995:3). As a result, a number of states collapsed and many others to this day remain precipitously on the verge of failing. Liberia, Congo, Cambodia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and the former Yugoslavia, are examples of states that experienced total collapse (Dallmeyer, 1996: 23). According to Lewis (2002), Somalia, is situated in the Horn of Africa, and lies along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. "It is surrounded by Djibouti in the northwest, Ethiopia in the west, and Kenya in the southwest" (Lewis, 2002:1). "Generally arid and barren, Somalia has two chief rivers, the Shebelle and the Juba" (Mohamed 2013:1). Somalia occupies a land area of about "246,199 sq miles (637,657 sq km). Somalia's population as of 2011 estimates a total of 9,925,640 (growth rate: 1.6%); birth rate: 42.7/1000; infant mortality rate: 105.56/1000; life expectancy: 50.4" (Somalia Community, 2014). The dominant languages spoken are Somali (official), Arabic, English and Italian. The population of Somalia is mostly Muslim who follow the Shafi'i Suni school of thought (Mukhtar, 1995:1). It is comprised of clan families and major sub clans as indicated in Figure 5 below.




Figure 5: Major Clan Family in Somalia

According to Lewis (1965), the Somali-speaking people form one of the largest single ethnic blocks in Africa. Though they are sparsely located, they occupy a great territory covering almost 400, 000 square miles in the north-east, facing Arabia. Its stretches from the Awash valley in the north-west, through to the periphery of the Ethiopian highlands and the Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean coasts down to the Tana River in northern Kenya (Lewis, 1965:3). Today, this region is split unto four separate parts in the Horn of Africa. In Djibouti, Somalis make up about half the local population. In Ethiopia, there are about 1 million Somalis. In the Somali region itself, the strength of the Somalis is about 3, 250,000 (Lewis, 1965:2). Outside this region, Somalis are settled as traders and merchants in many of the towns and ports of East Africa, and the Middle East. For instance, Somalis are notable in Aden, the Gulf States and throughout Saudi Arabia. Afar off inland Somalia, the sea life-style of many Somalis has led to the establishment of small immigrant communities in the European ports of Marseilles, Naples, London, and Cardiff (Kusow, 1995:84). The Somali People are mostly Nomads or Pastoralists. In most cases, they are being forced by the exigencies of their demanding climate and environment to move with their cattle to distant places in an endless search for pasture and water (Lewis, 1965:2). Lewis, further indicated that the northern coastal plains which extends from the lava-strewn deserts of the Republic of Djibouti alongside the Gulf of Aden shore to Cape Guardafui are mostly arid, which usually affects Nomads and

Pastoralists. For example, within this area, the annual rain fall exceeds three inches, and is concentrated in the comparatively cool months from October – January. Despite the heat and low rainfall, the run-off from the mountain ensures that water is usually easily obtainable only a few feet below the Gunabs sandy soil (Lewis, 1965:2). With these water resources, coupled with pastures which spring up after the autumn rains, this region provides the winter quarters for the most northerly Somali clans. Apart from the banks of the Jubba and Shabelle rivers, the only source of water is rain. Given these instances, Somalis usually share water as per the amount available at that time. In most cases, there is less water during the dry season, and that is when conflicts are likely to occur (Kusou, 1995:99).

In the early 600s, Arab tribes established the sultanate of Adel on the Gulf of Aden coast. Some years later, the sultanate of Adel disintegrated into small states in the 1500s. This led the Arab and Persian traders to establish trading posts from the 7th to the 10th century, “along the coast of present-day Somalia” (BBC News, 2011). According to BBC News (2011), “the Somali Nomadic tribes, who occupied the interior, occasionally began to push into Ethiopian territory. In the 16th century, Turkish rule extended to the northern coast, and the Sultans of Zanzibar gained control in the south” (BBC News, 2011) as they continued their trade. In 1840, The British annexed Aden, across the Red Sea in present-day Yemen. They began to trade with Somalis in present-day Somaliland, mostly in order to import meat for their sailors. This trade contact initiated the first interactions between the people of Somaliland and the Europeans. According to Alex (2008), after the British occupation of Aden in 1839, the Somali coast became its source of food (Alex, 2008). In 1860s, France acquired foothold on the Somali coast, later to become Djibouti. The French established a coal-mining station in 1862 at the site of Djibouti, and the Italians planted a settlement in Eritrea (Cassanelli, 1982:3). Threatened by the growing European presence in the region, Egypt laid claim to Somaliland's coastal towns such as Seyla and Berbera in the early 1970s. In 1875, Egypt occupied towns on the Somali coast and parts of the interior for a longer period. Cassanelli (1982) noted that “Egypt, which for a time claimed Turkish rights in the area, was succeeded by Britain” (Cassanelli, 1982: 3). In 1887, Britain proclaimed a protectorate over Somaliland, while Anglo-French agreement defined the boundary between Somali possessions of the two countries in 1888. Following this, Italy set up a protectorate in central Somalia in 1889, later consolidated with territory in the south ceded by the Sultan of Zanzibar (BBC News, 2011). The British and an Italian protectorate occupied what is now Somalia by 1920. In 1925, territory east of the Jubba River was detached from Kenya to

become the westernmost part of the Italian protectorate. To further broaden the Italian protectorate, the English powers combined with Somali-speaking parts of Ethiopia to form a province of Italian East Africa in 1939 (BBC News, 2011).

In 1940, the Italians occupied British Somaliland, while in 1941 the British occupied Italian Somalia. According to Nelson, (1982), “the British ruled the entire area until 1941, with Italy returning in 1950 to serve as UN trustee for its former territory. By 1960, Britain and Italy granted independence to their respective sectors, enabling British Somaliland and Italian Somalia to join as the United Republic of Somalia on July 1, 1960” (Nelson, 1982: 2). Aden Abdullah Osman Daar was then elected president. Foreign diplomacy was prevalent until “Somalia broke diplomatic relations with Britain in 1963 when the British granted the Somali-populated Northern Frontier District of Kenya to the Republic of Kenya” (Nelson, 1982: 2). The diplomatic relations with Britain was restored in 1968 at a time when political tension with Ethiopia began to rise. Somalia was then plunged into a border dispute with Ethiopia, which affected the relationship of both countries. During that time, a democratic presidential election was held in 1967 which saw Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke emerge victorious over Aden Abdullah Osman Daar (Cerulli, 1957- 1964:3). On October 15, 1969, President Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated, and the army seized power, dissolving the legislature and arresting all government leaders. The assassination was likely as a result of division and dissatisfaction within the SAF (Africa Watch Report 1990: 2). Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, who took over as president of a renamed Somali Democratic Republic, leaned heavily toward the USSR’s support to run the country. In 1970, Barre declared Somalia a socialist state, and nationalised the economy. Whilst Somalia was operating as a socialist state, it joined the Arab League in 1974 and suffered from a severe drought that caused widespread starvation (BBC News, 2011). In 1977, Somalia openly backed rebels who invaded the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia - the Ogaden Desert, with the hope of claiming the territory. Somali forces were pushed out of Ogaden, with the help of Soviet advisers and Cuban troops. Barre in turn expelled Soviet advisers and solicited support from the US (Infoplease, 2005). According to the US Department of States (2013) estimates, “Somalia acknowledged defeat in an eight-month war against the Ethiopians that year, having lost much of its 32,000-man army and most of its tanks and planes” (US Department of State, 2013). From 1978 – 1981, opposition to Barre's regime began to emerge after he excluded members of the Mijertyn and Isaq clans from government positions, which were filled with people from his own Marehan clan. Barre’s dictatorship

avored members of his own clan (US Department of State, 2013). In the 1980s, Somalis in less favored clans began to chafe under the government's rule. Barre's ruthlessness could not suppress the opposition, which in 1990 began to unify against him (BBC News, 2005). After joining forces, the combined group of rebels overthrew Barre from Mogadishu in January 1991. No central government re-emerged to take the place of the overthrown government, and the US closed its embassy that same year, although the two countries never broke off diplomatic relations (US Department of State, 2013). The country descended into chaos, and a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions began to unfold. Drysdale (1994) noted that "when, President Siad Barre fled the country in late Jan 1991, his departure left Somalia in the hands of a number of clan-based guerrilla groups, none of which trusted the other (Drysdale, 1994:38). Power struggles between clan warlords - Mohamed Farah Aideded, and Ali Mahdi Mohamed killed and wounded thousands of civilians (Drysdale, 1994, p. 38). Throughout south-central Somali, Hirsh and Oakley (1995) indicated that looting and criminality by armed gangs and militia led to massive displacement, eventually resulting in a catastrophic famine that claimed an estimated 250,000 lives (Hirsh and Oakley, 1995: 5). Eventually, the destructive battle divided Mogadishu into two parts, and a "Green Line" was drawn between the two warring sub-clan factions (Clerk, 1993: 211). While the armed militia of Ali Mahdii controlled the north of the capital, that of General Aideded controlled the areas in the south, such as the airport and seaport. The split of the USC alliance resulted in the emergence of the Somali National Alliance (SNA). This new alliance was formed by General Aideded to counter Ali Mahdi and his forces. As a result, the two Mogadishu-controlled militias resumed fierce clashes with each other, causing further destruction and more social havoc, particularly in the southern part of the country (Africa Watch, 1992:7). During the last months of 1991, neutral traditional elders made repeated attempts to mediate a cease-fire, and reconcile the warring militias, but they also failed. Consequently, as the conflict in the south remained unabated, northern Somalia seceded. The leadership of the SNM in the north of the country declared the political independence of the region from the rest of the country. Northern Somalia then became the Republic of Somaliland. In fact, the SNM unilateral declaration of political independence for northern Somalia also contributed further to the disintegration of the state. Lyons and Ahmed Samatar (1995:23) noted that "the SNM's actions contributed to the dissolution of Somalia as a nation-state, the destruction of pan-Somalism, and the acceleration of the balkanisation of northeast Africa". The power struggle led to the declaration of a unilateral independence of former British Somaliland in 1991.

4.3 Brief Background of Dominant Somali Warring Faction

The ICU– The phenomenon of the Islamic courts in Somalia first appeared in the North of Mogadishu in August 1994. Islamic clerics from the locally powerful Abgal sub-clan of the Hawiye (Somalia largest and currently most powerful clan) founded the first fully functioning sharia court. The enforcement of the court judgements depended on militias recruited from the local clan. The Islamic courts were part of a clan power in Mogadishu. They served the Hawiye clans and earned the support of the Hawiye business clans of Mogadishu with the aim to provide security (Marchal, 2004:114--145) Right from the beginning, political infighting, rivalry and disunity characterised groups in Somalia. The Islamic courts were a huge success in dealing with criminality in north Mogadishu. However, when it became clear that Shiekh Ali Dheere was becoming a rival source of authority to the Abgal Warlord – entrepreneur Ali Mahdi, the latter demoted him and dismantled the courts (Hassan and Barnes, 2007: 6-8). The court was later established in the south of Mogadishu in May 1998 by the Saleban sub-clan of the Haber Gedir. After some time, other clans began to establish their own Islamic courts. Thought still motivated in local clan power, the Islamic courts in the south was far more advanced than the former court in the North. In 2000, the various independent Islamic courts of south Mogadishu formed a joint Islamic court council with Sheik Hassan Mohamed Addeh and the chairman of the Ifka Halene court as its head. They combined their respective court militias to create an Hawiye military force. The Joint Islamic court extended their presence beyond Mogadishu. Ethiopia saw the rise and growing influence of the court as a threat to their security, invaded Mogadishu and defeated the ICU insurgency (Hassan and Barnes, 2007: 7). This brief history of the ICU is a clear indication that if Somalis are united for one cause, it can be accomplished. It also shows that in an effort to transform conflict in a divided society, all relevant groups should be involved, with concrete efforts to transform relationships amongst groups, and a suitable federal system in place to win the hearts and minds of the people with to ensure lasting peace.

Al-Shabaab – Historically, Al-Shabaab is a fundamentalist faction within the ICU – a youth group, formed in the early 1990s as a militant remnant of a previous Somali Islamist Organization – AIAI (Wise, 2011:3). Al-Shabaab is one of the most feared and powerful militant jihadist outfits in Africa, and the only military force visible to fight the invasion of Ethiopia in 2006, following the collapse of the ICU. Al-Shabaab was formed as a Sharia court militia in Mogadishu in the 1990s, and then served as the militant wing of the ICU - a powerful force in southern Somalia that controlled most part of Somalia prior to the invasion

of Ethiopian forces in December 2006. Al-Shabaab leaders included committed jihadists, some of whom had served with the Afghan mujahideen. Until the Ethiopian occupation, the group answered to Hassan Dahir Aweys, a major figure in the ICU (Menkhaus and Boueck, 2010:1-3). While the Ethiopian intervention was designed to fight against the Somali Islamist threat, and support the TFG formed in 2004, Al-Shabaab was able to successfully conflate its radical Islamism with Somali nationalism. By 2008, Al-Shabaab regained control of much of southern Somalia—and inflicted heavy casualties on the TFG (Menkhaus, 2009:5). According to Wise (2011) he noted that

“Even though the group was founded several years earlier, the period between the Ethiopian invasion of December 24 2006 and early 2008 marked the true emergence of Al-Shabaab. Prior to the invasion, Al-Shabaab had been little more than a bit player within the larger ICU, largely serving the courts. Many militant Wahhabi leaders such as Aden Hashi Ayro decided to stay and fight as part of Al-Shabaab” (Wise, 2011:4)

While the TFG was being formed in Kenya in 2004, heavy fighting characterised Mogadishu due to competition amongst warlords. As a result, robbery, rape, murder, destruction of infrastructure and ethnic cleansing became the order of the day (Human Rights Watch, 2008:4). From the analysis above, it is important to note however that violent conflict in Somalia between 2004-2006 was not solely motivated against the TFG, but was also motivated by greed, dominance and control amongst warlords because unity was completely absent. In summary, the target and motives of Al-Shabaab became unclear, as they kept changing their focus. Menkhaus and Boueck noted that:

“But when Ethiopia withdrew in January 2009 after the two-year insurgency, Al-Shabaab lost the two things that it defined itself as being against—the Ethiopian occupation and leader of the Transitional Federal Government, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, who was pressured to resign. Still, the new coalition in the transitional government was unable to take advantage and Al-Shabaab successfully recast itself as a resistance to the African Union peacekeeping force. The terrorist group painted the peacekeepers as armed infidels occupying Somalia and portrayed the transitional government as apostates and puppets of the West” (Menkhaus and Boueck, 2010:1).

Al-Shabaab is currently the main warring faction fighting against AU troops and the present Somali government.

4.4 The Formation of the Somali Transitional Federal Government

After the death of Mohamed Farah Aideed, tensions began to rise when the Puntland region of Somalia declared autonomy in 1998. In line with the establishment of Puntland in 1998, regional dynamics began to play out when Ethiopia and the West shifted their policies in Somalia to a building block approach which aimed to revive the state of Somalia through a federation of regional governments (Interpeace, 2008: 15). Though this was a promising approach, Interpeace (2008) noted that,

“Ethiopia developed alliances with Somali factions for its own security, and to deny openings for Eritrea. The result of Ethiopia’s regional interest almost threatened Somali security when in 1999 the RRA, backed by Ethiopia, took control of the southern regions of Bay and Bakool, and established a regional administration with aspirations to extend its interests into Gedo and Lower Shabelle” (Interpeace, 2008:15).

This likely contributed to further resentments, but “an all-Hawiye peace conference in Belet Wein also raised hopes of reconciliation within the Hawiye clan-family at the time” (Interpeace, 2008: 15). According to Interpeace (2008), “these developments coincided with a period of economic growth and reconstruction in many areas in Somalia, as well as economic integration between the Somali regions” (Interpeace, 2008). According to Interpeace (2008),

“This period also saw the growing influence of Islamic courts, which provided much desired security and law in southern Somalia; Islamic charities, particularly in Mogadishu and Lower Shabelle; and an emergent civil society” (Interpeace, 2008:15).

Whilst some Somalis saw this building block approach from Ethiopia as harmful, it marked the beginning for a change in regional and international intervention. In August 2000, a parliament convened in Arta, Djibouti and elected Somalia's first transitional government that experienced national and international support (Doornbos, 2001: 192-198). Since the understanding of the applicability of conflict transformation was low, other armed groups who felt dissatisfied with the first attempt at reconciling Somalia went out of control. According to the (BBC 2001), remnant armed groups from various clans and pro-government allies built up resentment against each other, and efforts by the Somali authorities to unite these groups failed. Thus, in April 2001, Somali warlords, backed by Ethiopia, declined to support the transitional administration. Severe fighting and drought broke out in 2001 resulting to the UN appealing for food aid to half a million people (Zaphod, 2001). After the

governments first year in office, it still controlled only 10% of the country. In August 2003, its mandate expired. New talks by the Somali Parliament to establish a TFG began in October 2003 which resulted in the inauguration of “a 275 member transitional parliament for a five year term in August 2004” (Dagne, 2011:1). The establishment of the transitional mechanism which prepared the country for a stable and democratic future was absolutely essential. During this transition, emphasis was placed on the transformation

“of essential services, complete disarmament, restoration of peace and domestic tranquillity, and on the attainment of reconciliation of the Somali people. Emphasis was also placed on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic infrastructure, and on the building of democratic institutions” (USIP, 1993: 3).

According to USIP (1993), “this prepared the country to enter a constitutional phase in which the institutions of democratic governance, rule of law, decentralization of power, protection of human rights and individual liberties, and the safeguarding of the integrity of the Somali Republic are all in place” (USIP, 1993:3). The new TFG, “however, spent its first year operating from Kenya as Somalia remained too violent and unstable to enter, but it eventually settled in the provincial town of Baidoa” (AMISOM, 2014). This was because the security situation within Somalia was unstable. In the meantime, the establishment of a TFG saw the return of Somali government officials from exile – a promising attempt for further reconciliation. The establishment of the TFG constitutes the first attempt in the restoration of national institutions to Somalia. For instance, for the first time in February 2006, the Transitional Parliament met in the town of Baidoa since it was formed in 2004 (ICSMUN, 2013) to discuss matters of state security. The TFG was recognized internationally as well as locally, but made a mistake by failing “to follow through on the reconciliation efforts that began in Arta for a government of national unity” (ICSMUN, 2013). The TFG began to face difficulties when ICU began to wage a serious violent campaign throughout Somalia, until the US and Ethiopian military intervention in 2006 which helped drive out the rival ICU in Mogadishu, and strengthen the TFG’s rule. After this defeat, the ICU split into several different factions. Some of the more radical elements, including Al-Shabaab, regrouped to continue their insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military’s presence in Somalia (AMISOM, 2014). The other groups were mostly unaccounted for, leaving room for more resentment and violent reprisal against the TFG. According to Infoplease (2005),

“In May 2006, the country's worst outbreak of violence in 10 years began, with Islamist militias, called the SICC, engaged in a fierce battle against rival warlords. The Somali Islamic Courts Council (SICC) seized control of the capital Mogadishu, and established control in much of the south on 6th June 2006” (Infoplease, 2005).

The TFG, led by President Abdullahi Yusuf, “spent months engaging in unsuccessful peace negotiations with the SICC” (Infoplease, 2005). In the meantime, neighbouring Ethiopia, considered SICC a threat to regional security, and began to launch air strikes against the Islamists. Ethiopia later “announced that its troops would remain in the country until stability was assured and a functional central government was established. Somalia's 15 years of anarchy experienced a little bit of calm at that time” (Infoplease, 2005).

4.5 AU Intervention in Somalia: From IGASOM to AMISOM

As a body responsible for international peace and security, the UN decided to assist Somalia through regional arrangements in mitigating conflicts in Africa. On December 6, 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1725,

“reiterating its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia through the Transitional Federal Charter, and stressing the importance of broad-based and representative institutions and of an inclusive political process, as envisaged in the Transitional Federal Charter” (UN Security Council Resolution 1725: 1)”.

The Resolution 1725 further called for all member states, in particular those in the region, to refrain from any action in contravention of the arms embargo and related measures, and should take all actions necessary to prevent such contravention. Moreover, the Resolution expresses its willingness to engage with all parties in Somalia who are committed to achieving a political settlement through peaceful and inclusive dialogue, including the ICU (UN Security Council Resolution 1725: 1). Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, the Security Council, decided on plans for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission of IGAD in Somalia (IGASOM). Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN authorized IGAD and the AU to establish IGASOM - a protection and training mission with the mandate to monitor the progress of the TFG, ensure security and training of the Somali security apparatus on 6 December 2006.

These mandates were drawn from the relevant elements of the mandate and concept of operations specified in the deployment plan for IGASOM (UN Security Council Resolution 1725: 2). Despite the strong support IGASOM had from the AU, it could not establish a strong security hold for the TFG, because member states were not willing to support the mission openly. Also, most of the belligerents in Somalia were averse to peacekeeping operations as well (Mays, 2009:16). The challenges faced by IGASOM have a direct link to the role played by regional countries. Ethiopia's interest at some point prevented Somalia to be free from certain warlords. Elmi (2010) noted that in 2006, the ICU emerged and defeated most of Somali warlords. The greater part of Somalia was pacified, for example, the Lower Shabella, Hiran and Middle Shabella region. These achievements gained by the ICU made them very famous in Somalia. Ethiopia on the other hand perceived the move by ICU a threat to national security, and sent thousands of Ethiopian troops to capture Mogadishu (Elmi, 2010:95). Elmi also noted that Ethiopia had been actively involved militarily and politically in Somalia's internal affairs since 1991, and should there be an interim government is formed in Somalia, Ethiopia would support warlords leading to destabilization during the transition (Elmi, 2010:96). To buttress this, Elmi and Barise stated:

‘When Ali Mahdi was chosen to head an interim government in 1992, Ethiopia supported his main rival, General Aideed. When Aideed became stronger and created his own administration in 1994, Ethiopia supported Ali Mahdi and his groups. When all Somali groups signed the Cairo Accord, Ethiopia recruited Abdullahi Yusuf and Aden Abdullahi Nur. When Somalis formed the TNG, Ethiopia organized all the opposition, helped then create the SRRC (Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Committee) and provided military aid to subvert the TNG’ (Elmi and Barise, 2006: 42).

Similarly, Kenya on the other hand sided with Ethiopia in 1964 and 1967 against Somalia over the Ogaden region. Kenya saw Somalia as an aggressor state when it's signed a mutual defence pact with Ethiopia against Somalia in the 1960s (Elmi, 2010:97). Thus, issues of regional interest have always clouded a fair and sincere regional intervention to end the conflict in Somalia - except that of Djibouti which was relatively different (Internal Conflict and International Action, 1996: 603-628). The focus on member states interest rather than on alleviating violent conflict in Somalia resulted in a number of civilian casualties. Factional violence in Mogadishu between the UIC in 2006-2007, killed hundreds of civilians and displaced many more people. The surge in violence was due to conflict between militia loyal

to the ICU, and a self-proclaimed anti-terrorism coalition backed by powerful local warlords (Dagne, 2007: 8). The inability of the TFG to establish effective control allowed warlords and clan factions to dominate many parts of Somalia until January 2007, when according to Goodspeed (2006), “the US launched airstrikes on the retreating Islamists, who they believed included three members of al-Qaeda suspected of being involved in the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam” (Goodspeed, 2006: 6). According to Elmi (2010), the fighting created a humanitarian crisis, with thousands of Somalis fleeing the fighting in Mogadishu in just two months (Elmi, 2010:85). Interpeace (2008) highlighted that “efforts by the TFG and Ethiopia to impose their authority through force, provoked violent resistance from a mixture of Mogadishu-based clan militia, and the remnants of the militant wing of the ICU – Al Shabaab al Mujahidiin (the Mujahideen Youth Movement) (Interpeace, 2008: 17). Interpeace (2008) indicated that,

“during 2007 alone, fighting between the TFG and the insurgency caused the deaths of several thousand civilians, the displacement of up to 700,000 people from Mogadishu, and widespread destruction of the city” (Interpeace, 2008: 17).

In February 2007, the UN Security Council Resolution 8960 authorized the AU to deploy a peacekeeping mission in support of Somalia’s TFIs. Few months later, AMISOM was deployed in Mogadishu.

AMISOM is an active peacekeeping mission operated by the AU with the approval of the UN. It was created by the AU’s PSC on 19th January 2007 with an initial six month mandate. AMISOM is mandated to conduct PSOs in Somalia, and to stabilize the situation in the country in order to create conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities, and an immediate take over by the UN. The mission was expected to support dialogue and reconciliation by working with all relevant stakeholders, and protect key infrastructure and TFIs. The mission was also to assist Somalia in the implementation of its NSSP, provide security, and facilitate humanitarian assistance (Communiqué of the AU, 2007).

At the time of the missions deployment, there were roughly 6,000 peacekeepers deployed under AMISOM out of a total authorized strength of 8,000 (UN Security Council, 2007). As a result, Al-Shabaab gained military victories by taking control of key towns and ports in both central and southern Somalia throughout 2007 and 2008. At the end of 2008, the rebels had captured Baidoa, but not Mogadishu. AMISOM further noted that in January 2009; the

Ethiopian troops withdrew from the country, leaving behind AU peacekeeping force as the only protector for the TFG (AMISOM, 2005).

4.6 Political Tension between 2007-2012

The period 2007-2008 saw heightened political tension in Somalia as efforts to support dialogue and reconciliation gathered steam. Abdille and Botha, (2014) indicated that “Al-Shabaab, the militant wing of SICC, began gaining strength as it allied itself with al-Qaeda and won the support of many local warlords, primarily in the south. The group has raised alarms in the US over concern that its brand of militant Islam would spread throughout eastern Africa and beyond (Abdille and Botha, 2014: 13). Al-Shabaab has transformed itself into an army, with the intelligence capability to carry out massive attacks. They force people to give out information through intimidation, bribery, and murder, “by banning many forms of technology, while continuing to wage war against the transitional government” (Abdille and Botha, 2014: 13). Al-Shabaab took advantage of the power vacuum and weak transitional government (AMISOM, 2008). They were able to control almost all of southern Somalia by February 2009 (AMISOM, 2008). The height of political tension was triggered when Al-Shabaab perceived AMISOM as proxies of the US, and member states contributing troops to AMISOM were not willing to contribute troops in the fight against terror. Al-Shabaab began waging serious fight against AMISOM, without understanding that the primary purpose for which AMISOM was deployed was to facilitate dialogue and reconciliation. Thus, in a state of doubt and fear, AMISOM found itself involved in serious combat operations within this period (Hayatou and Sturman, 2010: 71). Political tension was also exacerbated by different interests within the TFG during the period of dialogue and reconciliation. For instance, under President Yusuf (2004-2008), Interpeace (2008) indicated that Prime Minister Ali Muhammed Ghedi resigned in October 2007 after a political disagreement. He was succeeded by Nur Hassan Hessein of the Abgaal sub-clan of the Hawiye from November 2007. However, he was dismissed by President Yusuf in December 2008 because, according to Interpeace (2008),

“he had failed to accomplish his duties. It was not clear, however, whether Yusuf had the authority to make such a constitutional change. The following day, Parliament passed a vote of no confidence in support of Hussein. Despite the vote, President Yusuf appointed Muhammad Mahmud Guled Gamadhere as Prime Minister. Guled later resigned, noting that he did not want to be seen as a stumbling block to the peace process which was going well at the time” (Interpeace, 2008:16).

As a result of the power struggle that emerged, President Yusuf also resigned. The inability by the TFG to manage the diverse interests of multiple groups and factions was very challenging. As a result, most of the peace processes undertaken left out certain groups.

The Djibouti dialogue and reconciliation peace process unfolded four rounds of talks in 2008. It resulted in a series of agreements signed between the TFG and the ARS-Djibouti faction on 9 June, 26 October, and 25 November, respectively. Ethiopia supported the talks politically, and placed heavy pressure on President Yusuf of the TFG to embrace the accord. President Yusuf rejected the accord and resigned, paving the way for the formation of a new government. The peace accord called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and a cessation of hostilities came into effect on 26 October 2006. The move by President Yusuf was detrimental to the peace process, and again the lack of representation of a larger number of Islamic opposition in the Djibouti peace process severely affected reconciliation in Somalia for quite a long period of time as Al-Shabaab and the ARS-Asmara faction – Eritrean based (led by the influential Hassan Dahir Aweys) condemned the agreement, and Al-Shabaab intensified its violent insurgency in Mogadishu (Kasaija, 2009:269-74).

With Ethiopia pulling out, and the continuous threat posed by Al-Shabaab, the subsequent resignation of presidents of the TFG affected the transformation of conflict, and increased political insecurity. Kingsley (2010) noted that “Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke, who has been criticized for failing to defeat Al – Shabaab, and who has been at odds with President Ahmed, resigned in September 2010. He was succeeded by Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed” (Kingsley, 2012: 35).

Kingsley further provided a historical process of power change in Somalia. He noted that “In June 2011, Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed resigned. This allowed Abdiweli Mohamed Ali to become acting Prime Minister. This was approved by parliament and he was sworn in on June 28, 2011” (Kingsley, 2012: 35). Dagne (2010) also explained that “after more than 19 years and 14 attempts at forming an internationally recognized central government, the Somali parliament held its inaugural session on August 2012, rife with disorganization, corruption, and concerns for the safety of the participants. The swearing in took place at the airport in Mogadishu, and was watched over by AU troops” (Dagne, 2010:1). According to the Somali community,

“this landmark occasion was followed by the election of former labor Minister - Mohamed Osman Jawa as speaker. In September 2012, parliament elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, an advocate for civil rights, as president. President Hassan prevailed over incumbent Sharif Sheikh Ahmed in the second round of voting” (Somali Community, 1993).

According to the Somali Community,

“many observers expressed hope and optimism that Hassan, who is considered above corruption, would set the country on a path toward stability, unify the TFG, and promote conflict transformation” (Somali Community, 1993).

Since disorganization and disunity within the TFG was not addressed before the inaugural session in August 2012, the impact of this disunity became visible in a short while. President – Hassan Mohamud survived an assassination attempt a few days later by a member of Al - Shabaab (Roggio, 2010:1). The Somali government with the help of AMISOM and Kenyan forces decided to launch an attack against Al-Shabaab, and took over Somalia's port city of Kismayu (Roggio, 2010:1). The city was the last stronghold of Al-Shabaab - a very vital port used to finance their campaign. This was a major victory for President Hassan Mohamud’s government under the TFG.

4.7 The current (2013-2014) state of Security in Somalia: Political, Humanitarian and Security Dimensions

“Somalia is currently emerging from over twenty years (1991-2012) of state collapse and underdevelopment. As a result, many Somalis are determined to rebuild the country and work towards sustainable peace” (AMISOM, 2014). However, Mohamud (2013) indicated that “there are persisting security challenges despite recent military gains against Al-Shabaab” (Mohamud, 2013:1). With the election of Somalia’s new federal president on 16 September 2012, Mohamud (2013) indicated that Mr. Hassan Sheik Mohamud outlined his vision for Somalia for the next four years. In his vision, he underscores that security was a priority area to address in a country that is suffering from environmental, economic, social, and political malaise” (Mohamud, 2013:1). Somalia is currently faced with a number of security threats that can be contextualized into social and cultural perspectives. One key security threat is the challenge posed by Al-Shabaab. President Hassan Sheik Mohamud focused on this aspect during his speech on 6 September 2012. In this speech, the New York Times (2012) reported that the president offered Al-Shabaab an opportunity for “political dialogue while at the same

time made it clear that all options were on the table - including military action” (The New York Times, 2012). The president also highlighted the need for judicial and democratic reforms as a critical factor in an attempt to restore security in Somalia. As a result, Somalia is currently going through basic institutional, economic, cultural and social reforms amidst the fight against Al-Shabaab.

4.8 The Political State

From February 2013, the political and security situation in Somalia seems to have improved. The FGS is working towards the efforts to implement its Six-Pillar Plan adopted in October 2012, (IOM, 2011). The six pillar plan indicated key areas of focus. These include: “security and rule of law, economic recovery, dialogue and reconciliation, service delivery, building collaborative international relations, and regaining the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia” (IOM, 2011). During the opening of the second session of his parliament last year - 2 March 2013, Abdi Farah Shirdon – the Somali Prime Minister presented on the government’s progress report. According to DIFID (2012), “the report highlighted that the security situation has improved, marked by the recovery of major towns from Al - Shabaab and the reduction of piracy off the coast of Somalia. It also outlined reforms in the judiciary, with the adoption, of a Justice Sector Action Plan for the period 2013 - 2015” (DIFID, 2012). Furthermore, “the report covered steps taken to improve the provision of social services, notably a three-year plan to enrol 1 million children in school, and the standardization of the education curriculum in Somalia” (DIFID, 2012). The report also highlighted that “the Prime Minister indicated that the FGS had presented a number of bills to Parliament, including draft laws on oil production, fishing, toxic waste, the protection of Somali waters, the media and civil aviation” (DIFID, 2012). The National Stabilization Plan (2013) adopted in February 2013 is a key strategy put forward by the government to expend its administration. To implement this plan, the Prime Minister initiated a national listening tour in the country between February-March 2013. During this time, the African Union (2013) reported that “he visited major towns in Galgaduud, Puntland, Lower Juba, Gedo and Middle Shabelle regions”. This visit included “a roadmap on the establishment of local administrations across the country, particularly in those towns that have been recovered from Al - Shabaab by the SNSF, with the support of AMISOM” (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013: 2).

In the Communiqué of the PSC at its 375th meeting in May 2013, the Commission of the Chair Person on the situation of Somalia stated that

‘the Prime Minister’s ‘listening tours’ have been largely successful, and tangible progress has been recorded, as shown by the issuance by the government, on 4 February, of a decree regarding the formation of a new interim administration for the Bay region and the appointment, on 8 April 2013, of a new administration for Hiran region’ (Addis Ababa. African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013: 2).

Despite the success, the process of establishing a regional administration for Jubbaland faces serious challenges. These include disagreements over how federalism should be implemented, and who should drive the process (IRIN 2013). IGAD, (2013) reported that “this process began in Nairobi in June 2012, with a meeting that brought together participants from Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo regions, under the aegis of the Grand Stabilization Plan adopted by IGAD on 27 January 2012” (IGAD, 2013). The African Union Peace and Security Council (2013) noted that “following the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the FGS declared that the processes to establish local administrations should be led from Mogadishu, and should be more inclusive” (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013: 2). While this option tends to be favoured by many Somalis, care should also be taken when operationalising decentralization. Somalia under the TFG has a long history of disagreement by which relationships between groups can easily be affected negatively. This is because federalism may not be effective in responding to security threats, and sometimes can create a slow decision making process which may complicate relationships between individuals, and further promote division (Hague and Harrop 2013: 262). Menkhaus (2007) noted that

“political decentralization has the potential to degenerate into armed conflict or even ethnic cleansing if not executed with considerable sensitivity to local realities” (Menkhaus, 2007:85).

The FGS has and is trying to unify some self-governing parts of Somalia into its state administration. This was illustrated on 28 February 2013, when more than 500 delegates of the Jubbaland political clan “gathered in Kismayo, Lower Juba region, to discuss and plan the proposed formation of the Jubbaland state” (Nordlund and Skeppstrom, 2014). Nordlund & Skeppstrom (2014) further noted that “the Somali prime minister then travelled to Kismayo and informed the Jubbaland politicians, clans, and religious leaders that the Jubbaland state

conference was unconstitutional” (Nordlund & Skeppstrom, 2014:5-20). The Prime Minister then proposed to the political leaders that

“the Kismayo air and sea ports must be handed over to the FGS, and all militias be integrated into the SNSF. Further, the FGS insisted that all areas still under Al-Shabaab control in the region be recovered before the state can be formed, on the understanding that it will thereafter appoint regional governors for Middle and Lower Juba, and Gedo” (Nordlund and Skeppstrom, 2014: 18).

Though the offer was contested, the IGAD Heads of State and Governments reiterated

“the need for all ongoing processes to establish regional administrations to be anchored on a set of principles, namely: leadership by the FGS; respect for the provisional Constitution of Somalia; inclusive consultative process; and fight against Al-Shabaab as the primary focus of the FGS, AMISOM, and regional and international partners” (Nordlund and Skeppstrom, 2014: 18).

The contested stance pulled off by clan politicians formally led to the establishment of the Jubbaland state on 15 May 2013. According to the African Union Peace and Security Council (2013),

“Raas Kamboni was selected as militia leader, while Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam *aka* Madobe, as its president. Shortly thereafter, former Minister of Defense - Colonel Barre Adam Shire Hirrale, declared himself president of Jubbaland. This development raised concerns that fighting could erupt between supporters of the rival presidents if an agreement was not swiftly reached to resolve this standoff. In an effort to defuse tension, and following the decision by the 21st extraordinary summit of the IGAD Heads of State and Government, a high-level fact-finding and confidence building mission travelled to Mogadishu and Kismayo from 16 to 19 May 2013” (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013: 3).

According to IGAD (2013), the IGAD Heads of State and Government acknowledged the report of the fact-finding mission, and were satisfied with the agreement by stakeholders to respect the Somali provisional constitution, to accept the government’s leadership, and to conduct the process in an all-inclusive manner, and in a way that helped in the fight against Al-Shabaab (IGAD, 2013: 3). Further, the FGS deemed it necessary to embark on conflict transformation processes with a focus on reconciliation and integration of different militias into a unified national command of the SNA. The African Union (2013) reported that the

reconciliation effort was successful, as members of parliament abandoned the vote of confidence against the Prime Minister, but at the same time stressed the importance to improve governance in the country (African Union, 2013). According to the African Union (2013), “the FGS has taken steps to enhance financial transparency and accountability, especially through the establishment of a special finance facility with the assistance of Norway” (African Union, 2013). Also, the African Union noted that “International institutions like the IMF have renewed their relations with Somalia. The FGS is also engaging other partners in order to mobilise more development assistance” (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013: 3). Since the country has made significant progress, the need for sustained commitment by international partners to support conflict transformation efforts is paramount.

4.8.1 Security Situation: The Threat Posed by AL-Shabaab

The security situation in Somalia is still very fragile, but continues to improve. AMISOM (2014b) reported that “In March 2013, AMISOM forces and the SNSF recovered the last stretch of the 240 km Mogadishu-Baidoa road from Al-Shabaab. Since then, efforts have focused on consolidating control over the recovered towns” (AMISOM, 2014 b and c). However, the FGS is faced with both operational and resource limitations, to the extent that it is difficult to further recover more territory from Al-Shabaab. An example of this challenge is demonstrated “when the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF), in anticipation of AMISOM deployment in Sector 3 as stipulated in the mission’s operational benchmarks, withdrew from Huduur in Bakool region on 17 March 2013” (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013:5). However, because of a lack of enablers (helicopters), AMISOM and the FGS were unable to deploy its forces to fill the gap (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013: 5). The African Union Peace and Security Council (2013) noted that “Al-Shabaab insurgents then seized the opportunity and retook the town” (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013:6). According to the AU Commission (2013), the following key towns remain under the control of Al - Shabaab: “the port city of Barawe, in Sector 1; Jamaame, Jilib and Buale, in Sector 2; Baardheere and Dinsoor, in Sector 3; and Bulo Burto, in Sector 4” (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013: 5). The withdrawal of ENDF often resulted in tension in the region, as civilian population always flee the area, fearing a rise of Al-Shabaab activities (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013: 5). Despite this, the security situation has seemed to stabilize in recent times.

According to the Chair Person on the situation of Somalia, “the threat posed by Al-Shabaab has decreased, because of power struggles within the hierarchy of the group, and the successive defeats it has suffered, as a result of the military operations by the SNSF, AMISOM, and the ENDF” (United Nations, 2013:3). Despite this progress, a lot still needs to be done to defeat Al-Shabaab. The United Nations, (2013) reported that “Al-Shabaab has launched a number of probing and asymmetrical attacks against AMISOM, Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF) and ENDF positions” (United Nations, 2013:3). These operations have currently increased, as Al-Shabaab supporters are using subtle means in the communities to ferment clan rivalry, political disagreement, and an absence of local administration (Addis Ababa. African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013: 5). On the other hand, AMISOM (2014) noted that “Al-Shabaab continues to enjoy the freedom to organize, train and access logistics, including weapons and munitions in areas under their control” (AMISOM, 2014). Al-Shabaab is not the only threat to security. The relationship between the FGS and its regional administrators represents a danger from both a political and a security perspective. There have been clashes between different militias related with the government and the Interim Jubba Administration (IJA), respectively over control of Kismayo, because Kismayo is a major source of revenue for everyone (Nordlund and Skeppstrom, 2014:21).

4.8.2 The Humanitarian Situation

According to the UN (OCHA, 2014), “Somalia’s humanitarian crisis remains among the largest and most complex in the world. Despite recent modest improvements in food security, an estimated 2.9 million people will need immediate life-saving and livelihood support in the next six months compared to 3.2 million people in late 2013” (OCHA, 2014). OCHA, (2014) reported that “decades of internal conflict have also led to more than 1 million people living as displaced persons across the country, the majority in southern and central areas within Somalia” (OCHA, 2014). The United Nations Radio reported that “poor and inadequate basic social services like education and health also continue to undermine the resilience of the people. Sobering statistics show that Somalia is among the top five countries in the world when it comes to the prevalence of child malnutrition and under-five mortality. One in seven children under the age of five is estimated to be acutely malnourished” (United Nations Radio, 2013:11). OCHA noted that “more than 50,000 of these children are severely malnourished and stand the risk of dying without sustained assistance” (OCHA, 2013).

According to OCHA, “this number could double in subsequent years” (OCHA, 2013). In 2014, OCHA reported that

“one in every 10 Somali children die before their first birthday and one of every 12 women die due to pregnancy related causes. Millions of Somalis remain vulnerable to disease outbreaks due to the absence of or weak state of health, water supply, sanitation and hygiene services. Also, only 30 per cent have safe access to water” (OCHA, 2014).

OCHA (2014) also reported that “there is no protective environment for vulnerable people particularly women, girls and children. As a result, gender-based violence and violations against children are common and the level of response provided to survivors is low” (OCHA, 2014). The United Nations (2013) indicated that “despite the efforts of humanitarian agencies and other actors, the current humanitarian response remains inadequate, partly because of access restrictions and funding gaps from the UN agencies” (United Nations, 2013:12). In the African Peace and Security Council Report (2013), it was stated that “although the security situation is improving, there are a number of security incidents which continue to restrict access, and thus, affect the delivery of assistance to the needy population” (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013: 7). As of February 2014, the UN noted that the humanitarian situation in Somalia is still posing a challenge, as people continue to be displaced because of heavy rainfall. However, the mission provided relief supplies to affected population (United Nations, 2014:6)

4.8.3 The Deployment of Forces

AMISOM is currently engaging in efforts to develop and implements its protection of civilian’s strategy into the operations of the mission. The Mission has drafted a “Mission-wide Protection of Civilians Strategy which was approved in May 2013” (AU PoC Draft Guidelines, 2010). The strategy “provides a comprehensive mission-wide approach towards mainstreaming protection considerations into all aspects of AMISOM operations” (AU PoC Draft Guidelines, 2010). As a part of the missions’ efforts to strengthen the protection of civilians in its areas of operations, AMISOM has establishment a “Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC), as outlined in UN Security Council resolutions 2036(2012) and 2093(2013)” (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013: 13). The main goal for the establishment of CCTARC is to save children’s lives and ensure civilians affected by conflict are recognized and helped, thereby contributing to the wellbeing

of the Somali population, and the success of the mission. CCTARC will provide AMISOM with the capacity to track and record incidents of allegations of civilian harm, providing accurate trends and data on civilian casualties; respond to individual incidents, ensuring that civilians receive recognition and amends losses while dispelling allegations and analysing information gathered to support the mission (Centre for Civilians in Conflict, 2011: 1). In the wake of the mission's increase of troop and police personnel, the conduct of combat operations will be carefully monitored to protect civilians, and avoid any complication towards conflict transformation. The mission has also increased its uniform strength to further strengthen security stabilization for conflict transformation to be effective.

According to the UN (2014),

“the force strength of AMISOM military component deployed across the four sectors stands at 22,056, out of the authorized 22,126, due to rotations. The troop in theatre are composed as follows: 6,220 Ugandan soldiers; 5,338 Burundian soldiers; 3,664 Kenyan soldiers; 1,000 Djiboutian soldiers; 850 Sierra Leoneans; 75 Force Headquarters Staff Officers, and 4,395 Ethiopian troops, who integrated AMISOM command and control on 1 January 2014” (United Nations, 2014:6).

The strength of the police component stands at 514 consisting of 230 Individual Police Officers, “279 elements in the FPU from Nigeria and Uganda, as well as 5 officers that make up the Police Senior Leadership Team” (United Nations, 2014:6). A police detachment of 12 IPOs each has been deployed in Baidoa and Baletwyne, while another detachment of 12 IPOs is on standby for deployment to Kismayo. The civilian personnel strength includes 52 local and international staff, as well as 45 Somali Language Assistants supporting the Mission. (United Nations, 2014: 6). The coordination mechanisms outlined in the strategic concept of operation for AMISOM, namely “the Joint Coordination Mechanism (JCM), and the Military Operations Coordination Committee (MOCC), will continue to provide the platform for guidance and coordination for the mission at the strategic level” (United Nations, 2014:6). In conclusion, Somalia continues to face a number of security threats. While the political situation seems stable, the prevalent of security threats makes the country still volatile.

4.9 A Chronology of Somalia's Conflict Transformation Processes

The 1991 Political Reconciliation

The first attempt to settle the violent conflict that broke out in Somalia in 1991 did not focus on transforming the relationship between the warring parties. It follows a win-lose solution

that was not ideal for the pattern of conflict at that time. Wheeler and Roberts, (2002) noted that “following the removal of Siad Barre in 1991, the first two international reconciliation meetings that took place in Djibouti in June and July 1991, was aimed at re-establishing a Somali government” (Wheeler & Roberts, 2002: 8). On July 15, 1991, six Somali factions agreed to a two-year interim government under the provisions of the old 1961 constitution, with Ali Mahdi Muhammad of the Hawiye clan as President, and Umar Arteh Ghalib of the Isaaq clan as Prime Minister. The new government had to be reorganized because the country had slid into anarchy (Wheeler & Roberts, 2002: 8). There was also no formal infrastructure left, and the Somali armed forces had been disbanded. Since relationships were not transformed among parties, factional fighting between clans prevented the new government from establishing control. There was no provision made for the other party, neither was there a provision for addressing relationships. Thus, the new government was immediately rejected by General Muhammad Farah Aideed, which resulted in a bloody civil war in Mogadishu and the south. One reason for the failure of this reconciliation attempt was that, General Mohammad Farah Aideed opposed the presidency of Ali Mahdi Muhammad and eventually organized an armed faction of the United Somali Congress (USC). Compounding that challenge was “the opposition of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)” (Wheeler & Roberts, 2002) who, believing they were disenfranchised by the provisional government, aligned themselves against the USC resulting in fighting between the various factions and clans, and control of Kismayo and Baidoa became an objective. The populations of both urban areas suffered greatly from the fighting and the deprivation they endured as a result of the interdiction of their markets and distribution system (Wheeler & Roberts, 2002: 8). Also, major international partners like AMISOM were not in Somalia at the time to facilitate dialogue between important players, therefore, there was no strong partner to influence what was put into writing to reflect the benefit of all.

Conference on National Reconciliation 1993

The United Nations (1996) noted that “on 27 March 1993, fifteen parties in the Somali civil war signed two agreements for national reconciliation and disarmament - an agreement to hold an informal preparatory meeting on national reconciliation, followed by the 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement made at the Conference on National Reconciliation” (United Nations, 1996: 264-266). The National Reconciliation Conference agreed on the appointment, by the

Transitional National Council (TNC), “a Transitional Charter Drafting Committee to support the conference” (United Nations, 1996: 264-266). The Committee was guided by

“the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and by Somali traditional ethics. The conference agreed that the TNC would appoint a peace delegation composed of political movements and other social elements to travel to all parts of the country for the purpose of advancing the peace and reconciliation process” United Nations, 1996: 264-266.

According to USIP (1996), the TNC

“appointed a National Committee to bring about reconciliation, and seek solutions to outstanding political problems with the Somali National Movement (SNM), and also called upon the international community and in particular on neighboring states to facilitate the efforts at reconciliation by providing moral and material support” (USIP, 1996:6).

The principal problem with this reconciliation was that, “it left critical issues unresolved related to the transitional process. No real division of labor was established between the TNC, Regional Councils, and District Councils, which invited power tussles” (Interpeace, 2009:33). There was also a major lack of representation of the transitional governing bodies. Interpeace (2009) indicated that

“the agreement presumes, for instance, the inclusion of the five regions of Somaliland in the Transitional National Charter, ignoring the fact that Somaliland had announced a unilateral secession in May 1991, and was not a party to the national reconciliation talks. Later, fighting broke out in Kismayo which resulted in the failure of the agreement” (Interpeace, 2009: 33).

National Salvation Council 1997

In an attempt to navigate AMISOMs contributions in Somali reconciliation, AMISOM (2015) indicated that “from November 1996 to January 1997, a conference on national reconciliation was held in Sodere, Ethiopia. It created a 41-member National Salvation Council (NSC) charged with the responsibility of organizing a transitional government. The conference was, however, boycotted by Hussein Farrah Aideed - a leader of his father’s faction following

Gen. Aideed's death" (AMISOM, 2015). AMISOM noted that "a similar conference in Sana'a, Yemen, did not include all the parties of the conflict, and was rejected by those not attending" (AMISOM, 2015). These scenarios specifically showcased the relevance of conflict transformation which focused on transforming complex relationships between parties in a conflict environment.

Cairo Peace Conference / Cairo Declaration 1997

Conciliation Resources (2010) also reported that

"a fourth reconciliation meeting in Cairo, Egypt, in December 1997 saw 28 signatories to the ensuing agreement, including both Ali Mahdi and Hussein Farrah Aideed. The Cairo Declaration provided for a 13-person Council of presidents, a prime minister, and a national assembly, but left the country without a national leader" (Conciliation Resources, 2010:12).

These reconciliation efforts in Somalia were hindered by competition between these parties (Conciliation Resources, 2010:12).

Somalia National Peace Conference 2000

The conference was attended by "810 delegates representing each of the Somali clans from inside Somalia, and the diaspora. It was opened on 15 June 2000 by Djibouti President Guelleh. The aim of this conference was to draft an interim charter as the basis for governance in post-conflict Somalia" (Porto and Engel, 2014:224). This peace conference "was a series of meetings held in Arta, Djibouti, from 20 April – 5 May 2000. In contrast to previous reconciliation meetings, the Arta conference included extensive participation by unarmed civic leaders – intellectuals, clans, religious leaders and members of the business community" (Interpeace, 2009:34). Porto and Engel (2014) indicated that "It culminated with the Arta Declaration and the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) - the first Somali government since 1991 to secure a measure of international recognition, and enabled Somalia to reoccupy its seat at the UN and in regional bodies" (Porto and Engel, 2014:224). According to Porto and Engel (2014), "the TNG was opposed by a rival pan-Somali governmental movement, known as the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), which is made up of warlords from different regions of the country" (Porto and Engel, 2014:224). This attempt at reconciling Somalia was again limited by the lack of involvement of all parties. Interpeace noted that,

“While the Arta process provided space, for the first time, for civil society representatives, its most critical setback was the failure to engage key armed groups, who later became spoilers. Although the emerging Islamic courts, the business community, armed clans, and even some armed factions, such as the RRA, were among the major actors that participated in the process, the common factor shared by those participated in the Arta process was that the absence of many of the key armed faction leaders, and of regional and local administrative entities made the new government extremely vulnerable to spoilers. These groups prevented the TNG from establishing its authority in Mogadishu, let alone the rest of the country” (Interpeace, 2009: 48).

Somali Reconciliation Conference 2002

In an effort to reconcile the TNG with its SRRC adversaries, IGAD launched a fresh national reconciliation process before the TNG mandate had ended. This process eventually developed into a sixth major Somali reconciliation meeting - the Somali National Reconciliation Conference, held in Eldoret, Kenya, in October 2002. It produced a ceasefire agreement signed by 24 faction leaders stipulating the need to create a federal structure, and reversing the unitary structure established at Arta (Porto and Engel, 2014:224).

National Reconciliation Conference 2003

AMISOM reported that “the 15th Somali National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) was held in Nairobi, Kenya, in September 2003. The Initiative to convene the conference was endorsed by the IGAD summit of 2003, and supported by the AU, the Arab League and the UN. At the conference, the TNG and the SRRC were reconciled, and a new united movement subsequently developed” (AMISOM, 2015). AMISOM (2015) further noted that “the Conference was successfully concluded with the formal adoption of a Federal Transitional Charter” (AMISOM, 2015). As noted by the UN in October 2003, by mid-September 2003, developments at the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference at Mbagathi, Kenya led to an impasse over the contested adoption of the Charter. Some of the leaders, including the president of the TNG, Abdiqassim, Colonel Barre Aden Shire (JVA), Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade of the (RRA), Osman Hassan Ali (“Atto”) and Musse Sudi (“Yalahow”) rejected the Charter, and returned to Somalia. On 30 September 2003, a group of them announced the

formation of the NSC consisting of “12 factions under the chairmanship of Musse Sudi) (United Nations, 2003:3). On 7 October 2003, the NSC signed a memorandum of understanding with the president of the Transitional National Government (TNG), in which it acknowledged the continuance in office of the TNG. The signatories also announced their intention to convene a new national reconciliation conference separate from the one at Mbagathi (United Nations, 2003:3).

Nairobi Conference 2004

The looming danger of a divisive outcome to the Mbagathi conference triggered concern from a number of quarters. International observers, including the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) lobbied the Kenyan government to restore inclusivity of the process – an epitome of conflict transformation. After nearly three weeks of arduous bargaining, the Safari Park Declaration was signed on “29 January 2004. The agreement called for the establishment of Transitional Federal Institutions as well as elections” (International Crisis Group, 2004:11). Confusion later occurred with this agreement where 17 leaders and four of the eight signatories of the agreement rejected the outcome. IGAD then stepped in to plan the final phase of the national reconciliation conference. According to the International Crisis Group (2004), “this was followed by the inauguration of a Transitional Federal Parliament in August 2004, election of a president in 2004, and finally the granting of the vote of confidence to a prime minister and the establishment of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in early 2005” (International Crisis Group, 2004:11).

National Reconciliation Conference 2007

In an attempt to address the ongoing factional conflict and establish peace and stability in the South Central region of Somalia, the TFG organized a national reconciliation conference. More than 1,300 people from Somalia’s regions and clans, including from the Somali diaspora were invited to participate. As a way of learning from the short falls of other reconciliation conferences, the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) made an effort to make the conference as inclusive as possible. For this reason, a significant amount of time was spent in different regions of Somalia to ensure the inclusion of all clans, sub-clans, minority groups, and dissidents. As a result of further division and diverse interest amongst groups, XHCP (2007) noted that offshoots of the “Islamic Court Union (ICU) and opposition leaders held a separate meeting in Asmara, Eritrea, where they joined forces to fight the TFG under the banner of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS)” (XHCP, 2007:2).

The Djibouti Peace Process 2008

Dersso (2008) noted that,

“he Djibouti peace process is a 2008 peace accord signed in neighboring Djibouti between the TFG and the ARS. It is meant to pave the way for the cessation of all armed conflict across the country” (Dersso, 2009: 7). The agreement attempted to transform the relationship between conflicting parties to the extent that all 11 paragraphs contained in the agreement “expanded the parliament to include representatives of the opposition alliance and civil society” (Dersso, 2009: 7).

Thus, Dersso (2009) noted that,

“The element of the involvement of variety conflicting actors and an attempt to transform their relationship is a direct application of conflict transformation. Thus, the first phase of the Djibouti talks resulted in agreement on the formation of a new TFG in early 2009. This included the expansion of the Parliament from 275 to 550 members, to bring in ARS parliamentarians, and an expanded cabinet. It also requested the UN to deploy an international stabilization force from countries that are friends of Somalia - excluding the neighboring countries, and the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia” (Dersso, 2009: 7).

According to AMISOM (2015), “the Djibouti process had the support of the international community, including the UN, the AU, the EU, and the US” (AMISOM, 2015). The AU – represented by AMISOM played a critical role in the facilitation of representatives from conflict parties and civil society organizations, thus contributing greatly to the Somalian conflict transformation processes. The Djibouti process which represented the first conflict transformation effort attempts to settle a protracted conflict seems a success to unify Somalia, when relationships were transformed and built. While there were other earlier attempts to unify Somalia, it also represents “the first universally known step in the broader process of political settlement and peacemaking in Somalia, as to builds upon the achievements of the earlier efforts” (Dersso, 2009: 7). One challenge this process encountered was to cement the gains that have been made, and to draw others into a constructive dialogue and out of a cycle of violence (Dersso, 2009: 7).

4.10 Conclusion

By reviewing the background and nature of the conflict in Somalia, this chapter brings to light the importance of the unity of community structures to bring stability in the country. The people of Somalia have suffered immensely for decade, many lives have been lost, many children, and aged have been deprived of their right to survival and heritage. It is evident that a fundamental change in attitude and behaviour is needed to bring about lasting peace.

Whilst building relationships between antagonist groups is one part of solving the problem according to the theory of conflict transformation, building state institutions through the support of International actors represents another.

Chapter Five

Findings of the Research

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will present and interpret the research findings. The aim of this study was to examine AMISOM's contribution to ending the conflict in Somalia, with reference to its role in addressing the root causes of the conflict directly or indirectly as it implements its mandate.

This chapter analyses the research findings based on the key thematic areas the research questionnaire was centered on. These include: AMISOMs contributions to Conflict Transformation Efforts in Somalia; AMISOMs mandate that address the root causes of the Somali conflict; current focus of AMISOM in contributing to peace; the extent of AMISOMs contribution to conflict transformation in Somalia; main challenges to AMISOMs conflict transformation efforts in Somalia; relevance of conflict transformation in addressing the conflicts root causes; and progress in the implementation of AMISOMs mandate It then proceeded to assess the current progress made by AMISOM in contributing to conflict transformation in Somalia, by linking conflict transformation theory to the work AMISOM is currently doing that is focused on conflict transformation.

5.2 AMISOMs Contribution to Conflict Transformation Efforts in Somalia

Improvement in Security

It is very common to see the local population of Somalia now sipping coffee, eating at restaurants or strolling amongst stands selling sweets and ice cream late into the evening. About 90% of Somalia was under the control of Al-Shabaab. In most cases, there is relative stability in those areas. Today AMISOM forces controls 80% of the country, while 20% is under the control of Al-Shabaab. Respondent D provided a vivid example to this. She noted that:

“in March 2014, Somali government forces supported by AMISOM troops began military operations in Baidoa, the capital city of Bay. AMISOM forces made significant gains against the extremist group by liberating the towns that they had once controlled. AMISOM and SNA liberated 6 strategic towns: Hudur, Rabdhure, Ted, Weel dheyn and Burdhubow cities in Bakool and Gedo regions in Sector 3, and Buulo Burde in Hiraaan region”.

Buule Burde, is a significant triumph for AMISOM as it was a strategic town for Al-Shaabaab, as it served as their supply nerve centre and was home to hundreds of the Al-Shabaab fighters. The areas that are still under the control of Al-Shabaab are indicated in figure 6 below.



Figure 6: Areas under Al-Shabaab’s control

According to respondent A, “security stabilization in Somalia is considered as the top priority approach in bringing stability to Somalia”. Without stability in security, there will hardly be any attempt to address the root causes of the conflict. The research finds that AMISOM has brought some amount of stability to Mogadishu, where ordinary populations are conducting businesses on normal bases.

5.3 Developing Local Capacity to Improve Security

Respondent B highlighted that in 2013 alone,

“AMISOM trained more than 1000 Somali Police Officers in Specialized Police Order Management Training as well as in other specialized areas on policing such as Basic Criminal Investigation”. The respondent further noted that, AMISOM is consistently providing advice, mentoring and monitoring of the Somalia Police Force, to transform it to a credible organization. “AMISOM continues to advise, train, mentor and monitor the Somali Police Force in a bid to transform them”(Interview with respondent B, 2015)

Respondent I gave a clear example of how AMISOM have built the capacity of the Somali National Army. Respondent I noted that “96 Army Officers graduated from a platoon Commander and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) training course. More than 4000, Somali troops have been trained so far on standard military training”. According to respondent I, “the trainings have proved very effective in building local capacity of Somalis to be able to maintain law and order in the country. The Somali military are now well equipped to protect the geographical territory of Somalia, as well as to prevent human right violations”. These have been the most successful effective initiatives the mission has undertaken since its inception. Respondent I further expound to say that, “today, Somalia’s security sector is full of well-trained police and military forces capable to own the peace process”. It is therefore the opinion of this research that the approach by AMISOM to build the capacity of Somalia’s security forces directly addresses the issue of military repression which is amongst the major root causes of the Somali conflict. With these trainings, the Somali military and police component have been equipped with well know international standard of operations that is based on integrity and the necessity to safeguard the wellbeing of ordinary Somalis. The security sectors (police and military are likely grounded on how to conduct hostilities in line with international humanitarian law for example. This will enable them to protect the life of civilians during and after a conflict. The research finds that AMISOM has undertaken series of training and capacity building initiative to empower the Somali police and military personnel.

5.4 Enhancing Good Governance in Somalia

Respondent A noted that “in 2012, AMISOM supported the swearing in of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud peacefully by providing essential security during the pre and post-election phases”. Most importantly, Respondent C noted that “the AMISOM Political Affairs Unit advices the Somali government in dialogue and reconciliation efforts with other stakeholders in Somalia”.

According to respondents E and F and G, AMISOM has and continues to mobilise clan elders, religious and political leaders, including Members of Parliament, to resolve “political differences, improve security and support the FGS, particularly in Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Lower Jubba, Bay and Hiraaan regions” (Interviews with respondents, July 2015). Respondent G noted that in the Hiraaan region for example,

“AMISOM Political and Civil Affairs Officers worked closely with members of parliament in the formation of the Hiraan Council of Elders. Also, AMISOM facilitated a formal engagement between federal legislators from the Hiraan region, the local administration and population. AMISOM further engaged the youth population in the region, through the Hilaal Centre for Youth Development, to facilitate their participation in political and development issues in the region” (Interviews with respondent D, 2015).

Respondents D also indicated that “AMISOM has continued to support dialogue amongst the various political actors in the country. Drawing lessons from the experiences of the transitional era, AMISOM Political Unit continues to engage with all political stakeholders in order to avoid a repeat of the continual problems that characterized the TFG” (Interview with respondent D, July 2015). Members of the TFG often fight against each other based on clan difference. Such political infighting often poses a challenge to regional or inter-clan dialogue.

Respondent H further alluded that “AMISOM donated equipment to the Somalia government as part of their effort to help authorities re-establish functioning state institutions and deliver services to the Somali people”. However, this approach has only work effectively in certain regions in Mogadishu. The reason for this was expounded by Respondent H who noted that “the FGS state institutions need further support to be able to deliver essential health, education and infrastructural amenities to areas recovered from Al-Shabaab. This is one key approach that has proved to bring stability in many of the areas under AMISOM control”. The research finds that the approach of AMISOM support to the FGS to be able to provide basic social amenities to civilians under regions controlled by the government should continue, because without the contributions of AMISOM, the TFG will not exist. In examining the root causes of the Somali conflict, the research finds that AMISOM’s approach to building governance structures and reconciling political elites or entities within Somalia is an approach that directly addresses issues of clan differences. The dialogue and reconciliation initiatives foster social cohesion and inter-clan dialogue that has helped many regions within South and Central Somalia to unify. The research finds that AMISOM support to Somalia’s major governance transformation is an attempt to establish a functioning state in Somalia. The research also finds that AMISOM does not only support Somalia in the establishment of a strong government by providing security, it also provides support in terms of providing political guidance, monitoring, training, and advising the Somalia civil service sector. The research finds that this approach has so far enhanced inter-clan dialogue and

reconciliation in many of the areas recovered from Al-Shabaab. Since conflict transformation suggests a pattern of satisfying the needs of all actors, the research finds that the mission has at the strategic political level worked towards this. AMISOM has and continues to support dialogue and reconciliation efforts at all levels in the country. These include “local and regional levels, as well as areas recovered from Al-Shabaab” (Interview with respondents H July 2015). According to the respondents, AMISOM has and continues to mobilize clan elders, religious and political leaders including parliamentarians to resolve their political differences, improve security and support the FGS.

5.5 Strengthening Conditions and Structures Conducive to Sustainable Peace

In strengthening conditions and structures conducive to sustainable peace, the research finds that AMISOM specifically established a Civil Affairs Unit within AMISOM in 2008 to support reconciliation efforts in Somalia, and extend the authority of the state. According to respondent I and K, noted that “AMISOM constructed primary schools to support school enrollment of youth and children in Wadajir District of Mogadishu”, the respondent further noted that the AMISOM Civil Affairs Unit is working closely with the local authorities in the recovered areas. Examples are: Afgoye, Johwar and Marka. AMISOM is meeting elders and leaders in these areas to map out ways to enhance restoration of local administration. The research finds that such quick impact projects have been very successful in transforming regions from conflict to stability. This is because the people that live in the regions developed confidence in AMISOM and in the FGS because they provided essential facilities for their wellbeing. Based on the responses of the various respondents, example: “as part of the missions continued community engagement, AMISOM Civil Affairs donated non-food items to the population in Bula-Gaduug town in the lower Juba region. A total of 250 families benefitted from the donations as part of the quick impact project implemented by AMISOM”, the research finds that support to the local population through quick impact project has been very beneficial to both AMISOM and the Somali people in terms of fostering conflict transformation. The research also finds that the absence of essential services within key regions in Somalia escalated conflict in many areas. Therefore, the approach of the mission to support the population through the provision of basic needs in the regions is addressing the root causes of the conflict and also serves as a deterrent to future violence. The research finds that AMISOM should do more in this regard.

State Formation and Federalism Process: Respondent D noted that “the Federal Government of Somalia has extended consultations with support from AMISOM on the draft Citizenship bill to the diaspora in London. Officials led by the Federal Minister of State, Interior and Federalism Mr. Abdirashid Xidig met with the Somali diaspora to collect their views on the proposed law”. According to respondent D, a state formation process is underway in the central region, while initial discussions have been launched regarding the formation of the remaining federal state covering the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions. As these states are being established, demands for support in the form of capacity-building are increasing. Ensuring inclusivity in the political process remains critical. Respondent D noted that “Regional and local community reconciliation efforts will also need to be strengthened”. The research finds that Progress has also been made in the state formation and federalism process. Two Interim Regional Administrations (IRAs) have been formed in Jubbaland and in South West according to respondent D. It is of the opinion of this research that these approaches to conflict transformation undertaken by the mission can be employed or strengthened alongside AMISOM’s PSOs to bring stability in Somalia.

5.6 AMISOMs Mandate that Addresses the Root Causes of the Somali Conflict

AMISOM, as a multidimensional Peace Support Operation, is mandated to:

1. Take all necessary measures, as appropriate, and in coordination with the Somalia National Defence and Public Safety Institutions, to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups,
2. Assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the FGS over its national territory,
3. Assist the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, through support, as appropriate, in the areas of security, including the protection of Somali institutions and key infrastructure, governance, rule of law and delivery of basic services,
4. Provide, within its capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support for the enhancement of the capacity of the Somalia State institutions, particularly the National Defence, Public Safety and Public Service Institutions,
5. Support the FGS in establishing the required institutions and conducive conditions for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections by 2016, in accordance with the Provisional Constitution,

6. Liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate, as may be required and within its capabilities, humanitarian assistance in Somalia, as well as the resettlement of internally displaced persons and the return of refugees,
7. Facilitate coordinated support by relevant AU institutions and structures towards the stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia, and
8. Provide protection to AU and UN personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defense.

According to respondent H and K, “paragraph three and four of AMISOMs mandate speaks towards assisting the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, through support as appropriate, in the areas of security, including the protection of Somali institutions and key infrastructure, governance, rule of law, delivery of basic services, and providing, within its capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support for the enhancement of the capacity of the Somali state institutions, particularly the National Defence, Public Safety and Public Service Institutions” (Interviews with respondents H and K, February 2015). The mission has undertaken a series of activities in implementing these specific mandates as highlighted under topic 5.1 - progress in the implementation of AMISOMs mandate. The research finds that paragraph six of AMISOMs mandate indicates that AMISOM should liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate, as may be required and within its capabilities, humanitarian assistance in Somalia, as well as the resettlement of internally displaced persons and the return of refugees.

Based on the search findings from respondents A, and B, AMISOM seems to be doing a little bit less in this regard. Respondent A and B noted that “AMISOMs focus on institutional building and the provision of security to UN and AU personnel does not create a major impact on the people of Somalia. The Somali institutions have been in place before the collapse of the state”. Therefore, AMISOM should instill in the Somali people the values of the institutions rather than Institution building because people have lost confidence in the institutions – thus AMISOM should focus on building the confidence of the people in the institutions and not building the institutions. As such, its humanitarian assistance package should be well delivered to vulnerable population to instill such trust.

5.7 Current Focus of AMISOM in Contributing to Peace in Somalia

According to respondent I, the current focus of AMISOM is on stabilization and integration of the community. Community integration precedes stabilization, followed by conflict transformation. This is because there is no longer active conflict and the need for building community cohesion is essential to ensure that community denounces armed groups. However, AMISOM's focus is still centered on providing support to the FGS in its efforts to stabilize the country, and foster political dialogue and reconciliation; reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; and providing humanitarian assistance to returning refugees and IDPs (Interview, with respondent I, February 2015). In this sense, AMISOM is also focused on military insurgency to gain territory, and curb Al-Shabaab from the rest of Somalia. In essence, AMISOMs current focus seems to be supporting the FGS in making its government stronger in Somalia. For instance, AMISOM continues to train the Galmudug regional assembly members, and help them to create a parliamentary and legislative assembly. AMISOM trains the Galmudug legislators to establish strong institutions capable of serving the public effectively. Further, AMISOM usually trained newly recruited soldiers in Baidoa, to execute their duties diligently, and to fight against element that threatens the countries security and stability. More than 200 recruited soldiers completed a 6 months para-military training. The mission also continues to donate office equipment to the Somali police force for use in maintaining law and order in Mogadishu's Hodan district. The missions focus on conflict transformation is farfetched, as the rift between the FGS and the regional administration of Puntland and Somaliland is wide, and remains fragile.

5.8 The Extent of AMISOMs Contribution to Conflict Transformation in Somalia

Whereas respondents noted some positive contribution of the mission in Somalia's conflict transformation, respondent A, D and F were very objective to this process. They noted that "clan differences will always occur and can be resolved with time. However, such differences only get complicated when arms are involved". Therefore, they thought that the success of the mission in reconciling certain clans should be seen as a marginal success. The respondents further noted that AMISOM has no disarmament mandate. The mission has no clear mandate to reconcile human relations. Its mandate is also not clear regarding livelihood support to the people. However, In addressing the issues of clan differences and support to conflict transformation, respondent A noted that "the mission has the mandate to 'foster political dialogue and reconciliation' which involves relationship transformation, however, the achievement of AMISOM in the regard has been limited" (Respondent A, 2015).

According to many respondents, the mandate of AMISOM is stabilization focused which does not necessarily speak towards addressing the root causes of the conflict. Respondent A further eluded that “this would serve as major flaws in AMISOMs conflict transformation efforts after stabilization”. Whereas this could be the case for AMISOM, it is often a major existing gap in all peace operations in Africa.

Whilst the above mandate speaks towards addressing the root causes of the conflict, the research finds that the mission’s sole mandate is a counter insurgency strategy that supports a counter insurgency approach in Somalia. A counter insurgency approach does not necessarily address the root causes of the conflict. To buttress this, the mission has a huge budget to support the military component of the mission, but that does not apply similarly to the civilian component that can really interact with the community and undertake peace-building tasks aimed at transforming relationships by addressing inequalities. The mandated civilian personnel strength of AMISOM is 70, however, 38 international staff and 18 Nairobi and Mogadishu based civilian staffs has been deployed. The limited number of civilian personnel deployed in the mission could reduce the mission’s ability to substantially build institutions that may address the root causes of the conflict, and transform the peace. However, respondent G and H comment that “the current focus of the mission also does not seem to largely emphasize on building relationships amongst clans and regional administrations, thus limiting conflict transformation in Somalia” (Interviews with respondent G and H, April 2015).

Somalia will conduct elections in 2016, whether the elections will constitute a big problem to the peace process is not clear. The conduct of elections could be seen as a success and that AMISOMs mandate has been implemented successfully, but respondent A and K cautioned that “elections would not heal the effect of armed insurgency on the people of Somalia” (Interviews with respondent A-K January 2015). This is mainly because the relationship and trust between Somali people and the state institutions has not been reconciled. The mission has played diverse role in facilitating various peace processes, political dialogue and reconciliation meetings and conferences in places like Djibouti, Kenya and Egypt. It needs to do more at the local and regional level. The focus of AMISOM in making or building a government for Somalia without addressing the root causes of the conflict will form a big fundamental gap to the Somali peace process. There are limited structures on the ground for reconciliation that will address the nature or magnitude of the Somali conflict.

5.8.1 Main Challenges to AMISOMs Conflict Transformation Efforts in Somalia

According to all respondents interviewed, AMISOM has successfully altered the aggression of armed groups, and have captured most of the strongholds of Al-Shabaab. Whilst this is a success, it is a military solution which does not have durable sustainability. Respondent K noted that “there is the possibility of defeating Al-Shabaab today, but the possibility of them coming back tomorrow should not be overlooked”. Armed groups are now operating under cover which require long time coordinated strategy to dispense atrocities from their parts. While this is a success, it has further complicated AMISOMs approach to protect civilians, in the sense that despite the fact that Al-Shabaab has been pushed into hiding, the mission cannot easily identify and altered potentially planned attacks targeting the civilian population (Interviews with AMISOM – respondent J and K, March 2015).

According to the data collected from various respondents, Al-Shabaab retains the capacity to disrupt the political process by frequently targeting the FGS, regional administrations, and Somali security forces, AMISOM, the UN and civilians. Despite the territorial gains made by AMISOM and the SNA, Al-Shabaab is still in control of a number of key locations. The group is currently concentrated in the Juba Valley corridor, as well as in the Hiraaan and Galgaduud regions

Inadequate resources: “ACCORD and AMISOM noted that ‘ the civilian component who have the function to transform the conflict and build relationships for peace is the least supported in the missions budget. They noted that the civilian component is not implementing many conflict transformation activities because of lack of funding’”. Based on the data obtained from the interviews with ACCORD and AMISOM, Item 6 in the missions mandate above has been challenging to implement because of lack of resources. Somalia needs medical kits, economic revitalization, livelihood support, and compensation to those who lost properties, social services like schools and well trained teachers. The respondents noted that the mission has not sufficiently supported these under its humanitarian mandate. Therefore, when Somalia comes out of conflict, its education system for instance will not be at the same level with the global community. AMISOM does not have the resources to build hospitals for rape victims and those who have sustained everlasting injuries. According to the mission’s mandate, AMISOM should coordinate and find the required resources, but this coordination is difficult because of economic challenges on the continent (Interviews with ACCORD and KAIPTC, 2015).

Also, there is the lack of resources to implement some of the tasks the mission was given to carry out. These are Civil Affairs related functions. The mission has a very good mandate to support conflict transformation efforts but have no resources to fully implement tasks that are to be performed by civilian personnel. About 80-90% of the budget goes to the functions of the military component, leaving little room for supporting relevant institutions and administrative structures relevant to bring an end to insurgencies.

Respondent E noted that:

“there is also the continued presence of armed groups and recurring violent activities; limited progress on the political front in terms of dialogue and reconciliation of the key actors; and the weak institutions of state to take ownership of the support provided by the mission” (Interview with respondent E, March, 2015).

This is causing major setbacks for the mission in its conflict transformation efforts.

Further, there is the issue of the mandate problem, wherein the mission does not have a specific mandate to address root causes of conflict. Also, the different regional and international interests and the lack of a common approach to the peace process are major challenges to AMISOMs conflict transformation efforts in Somalia.

The research finds that the mission is also challenged in the stabilization phase of its operations. Most of the areas liberated from Al-Shabaab needed extended good governance from government - putting in place legitimate credible structures to give people water, food, education and relief supply. This is an area where emphasis should be placed to ensure the security, stability and transformation of liberated areas.

5.8.2 Relevance of Conflict Transformation in Addressing the Conflict’s Root Causes

Responses gathered from respondents within ACCORD indicated that “being an African mission, it is easy for AMISOM to relate to the Somali people in contrast to previous UN missions in Somalia. This relationship has contributed to build success for AMISOM, as the troops comprised African troops” (Interview with ACCORD, 2015). ACCORD further indicated that “the only group that does not want AMISOM in Somalia i {are] armed groups that do not want the mission to integrate the people”. Thus, having relationships transformed among Somalis can be very beneficial to sustain the progress that AMISOM has made so far in curbing insurgencies. If the relationships are not built, there will be no likelihood for stable

peace to be attained even after the elections. This is also equal to a bottom-up approach in conflict transformation theory. If the bottom-up approach is applied - focusing on capacity building, infrastructure development, improving livelihoods of the community, and peace advocacy is undertaken, then the conflict will likely be transformed for a long term.

Respondents from APSTA noted that “AMISOM has not fully cultivated positive relationships between the entire core Somali regional administration, yet the mission is working towards merging these administration with the FGS” (Interview with APSTA, 2015). They further indicated that “The Puntland administration on the other hand does not want to merge with the FGS. This is mainly because the regional administration does not want to seek blessings from the FGS in Mogadishu for all their engagements in the diaspora”. This rift is a potential gap that will serve as a gateway for Al-Shabaab to emerge. Wherever minority groups are isolated, Al-Shabaab will emerge from these groups. This further explains that minority clan structures needs to be integrated into bigger clans and benefit equally in all spheres. Al-Shabaabs are local Somalis fighting their way through. Therefore, the transformation of relationships, trust and unity between the FGS and the regional administration will promote conflict transformation which can address the conflict and deter potential future security relapse (Interviews, with APSTA 2015). The research tested conflict transformation theory and its relevance in addressing the root causes of the conflict. It finds that the aspect of the relationship between the mission and the people have contributed to the success of the mission so far.

One reason why this research agreed that conflict transformation in the form of relationship building is a strong option for addressing the conflict in Somalia is demonstrated in the case study put forward by respondent J. Respondent J noted that the

“disputed Sool Region continues to experience tension after Somaliland forces seized Taleex town on 12 June 2014, and disrupted a conference organized by leaders, elders and supporters of the self-declared Khatumo State” (Interviews with respondent J, 2014).

In response, the Puntland government reinforced its military presence in the contested region. The “Khatumo” leaders in Sool then relocated to Saaxdheer - an area in the Sool region. Respondent J noted that,

“On 14 August 2014, Ali Khalif Galayr was elected as the new President of the “Khatumo State”. Relations between the FGS and Puntland remain strained as

Puntland announced a freeze on all cooperative relations and activities with the FGS in reaction to the signing of the Agreement on State formation in Galguduud and Mudug on 31 July 2014” (Interview with respondent J, 2014).

Respondent J also noted that:

“on 2 August 2014, the President of Puntland - Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas, suspended co-operation with the FGS and withdrew 10 Parliamentarians following the Government’s endorsement of the new “Central State” in Mudug and Galgudud regions. Puntland officials objected to the announcement by the FGS government of an administration for Mudug and Galguduud, which is located in Puntland, and has been at peace in the past 16 years because, Puntland managed to address the root causes of their conflict” (Interview with respondent J, December 2014).

It is the opinion of the research that this disagreement between the FGS and regional administrations in Somalia is not healthy in the attempt to build a unified Somalia. Also, the FGS attempt to form one government for Somalia seem to be contested by Puntland and Somaliland – who have largely steered their own affairs in a long time. In such a complex and dynamic environment, trust is required between all varying parties to come to an agreed framework on how Somalia should be governed. With the complexity of the situation, an agreed framework on how Somalia should be governed is highly unlikely to hold, as any disloyalty, or mistrust between groups or individual would lead to an unfriendly decision, actions or policies. In this case, all parties to the welfare of Somalia should start to work on building relationships building and trust for sustainable peace. Therefore, conflict transformation is relevant in the Somalia context.

5.9 Progress in the Implementation of AMISOMs Mandate

AMISOMs mandate is clearly explained in “paragraph 9 of communiqué (PSC/PR/COMM (CCCLVI), and in the first paragraph of UN Security Council Resolution 2093 (2013) (AMISOM, 2013). The research finds that AMISOM has made sustained progress towards the implementation of its mandate and of the view that AMISOM has contributed to the following conflict transformation processes in Somalia as identified by all respondents:

5.9.1 Support to Somalia National Security Forces

Based on the findings from the literature on the root causes of the Somali conflict, it was found that military repression and division on clan based affiliation was among the causes. In an effort to transform this root cause, AMISOM has and continued to support the SNSF in

building their capacity through training, mentoring and operational guidance. The mission has trained forces drawn “mainly from the rank and file of the SNSF, thus leaving knowledge gaps in junior and middle leadership positions” (Interview with respondent K, 2015). In order to fill these gaps, AMISOM has begun working with the FGS and other partners to undertake the training of a new corps of junior officers to assume platoon and company command positions in the SNSF (Interview with AMISOM – respondent K, 2015). Respondents B also noted that:

“With respect to the Somalia Police Force (SPF), the AMISOM police component continues to support the reform, restructuring, re-organisation and professionalization of the Somali Police Force (SPF) through various programmes and activities. AMISOM police, including the Formed Police Units (FPUs), worked closely with the SPF at various police establishments in Mogadishu, to mentor, train and advise Somali police officers on a wide range of policing issues, including human rights and the management of crime” (Interview with AMISOM – respondent B, 2014).

Recognizing the importance of mitigating security challenges, as well as the need for skills transfer in managing police operations to the Somalia Police Force (SPF), the research finds that “the AMISOM police component, established and equipped a Joint Police Operations and Coordination Centre (JPOCC), to effectively co-locate AMISOM police and the SPF” (Interview with respondent B, 2015).

Based on the analysis of the research findings, the co-location has enhanced the conduct and coordination of police operations in Mogadishu and its environs. Respondent B noted that “the JPOCC facilitated joint public safety and security activities in Mogadishu and environs, during which several suspects were detained and illegal weapons and ammunition recovered and handed over to the SPF” (Interview with AMISOM – respondent B, 2015). These actions have contributed to preventing possible attacks from Al-Shabaab and other criminal activities, thereby building the confidence of the population in the ability of the FGS to ensure the security of lives and property. AMISOM FPUs have also started the 24- hour joint confidence-building and public reassurance joint patrols with the SPF in Mogadishu, which has contributed significantly to improved security situation in the city.

According to interviews conducted with the Somali Police,

“AMISOM has equipped all police stations and directorates in Mogadishu with computers, furniture and police registers which have served to enhance the daily workings of the SPF. With regard to training support, AMISOM police have conducted a Public Order Management course in Djibouti for 200 SPF officers, in partnership with the Italian Carabinieri and financial support from the Italian government. This course enhanced the performance of the SPF in the conduct of day and night time patrols, stop and search, and barricade and search operations. A similar training was also conducted for 871 SPF Officers at General Kahiye Police Training Academy in Mogadishu, wherein the officers, who are being trained with support from AMISOM police, will be deployed in Mogadishu and other locations across the country. The mission has done a lot in building the capacity of the security sector not only in security measures, but also in database management and best practices inherent in police reforms” (Interviews with respondents I, J & K).

5.9.2 Creation of Conditions for the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance

The research finds that poverty, illiteracy and youth unemployment are amongst the root causes of the conflict in Somalia. 70% of respondent indicated these as amongst the root causes of the conflict. In responding to this and also the humanitarian impact of the conflict, the research finds that AMISOM continued to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, “by coordinating humanitarian activities and cooperating with UN humanitarian agencies and other actors working to ensure greater access” (Interviews with respondents D&F, 2015). According to respondent D and F,

“the mission has secured humanitarian entry points, enabling humanitarian actors to address the needs of the Somali population in areas under government control” (Interviews with respondent D&F, 2015).

The figure below shows areas under AMISOM’s control in Somalia.




Figure 7: Areas in Somalia under AMISOM’s control

Respondent H noted that

“in coordination with the UN humanitarian agencies, AMISOM has also facilitated the voluntary return and resettlement of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and continues to provide lifesaving support to the needy population, especially to those areas where humanitarian actors are absent or have limited access” (Interview with Respondent H, 2015).

These supports include provision of potable water, basic healthcare services and basic social services. Respondent H noted that,

“during the recent flooding in Jowhar, AMISOM donated medicines to the Governor of Middle Shabelle for distribution to those affected by the floods. In promoting hygiene and humanitarian assistance, AMISOM has also closely worked with the Mayor of Mogadishu to rehabilitate four water wells in Hamar Weyne, Hamar Jabjab, Wadajir and Dharkenley Districts of Mogadishu” (Interview with respondents H, 2015).

5.9.3 Support to the Public and Civil Service of Somalia

Whilst building relationships between antagonist groups is one part of solving the problem according to the theory of conflict transformation, building state institutions through the support of International actors represents another. In contributing to Somalia’s existing state building processes, Respondent I noted that “AMISOM has supported the public and civil

service institutions of Somalia by facilitating basic and refresher training of 120 civil servants comprised of secretaries, administrative officers and protocol officers” (Interview with respondent I, 2015). These efforts have helped to improve the working conditions of the civil service sector, and facilitated an increase in public service delivery (Interview with respondent I, 2015).

5.10 Conclusion

The AMISOMs mission’s activities are largely focused on counter-insurgency strategies; the expansion of the FGS state authority, capacity building of security forces, civil service, and the protection of the FGS. Thus, whereas the mission also works with local authorities and civil society in reconciliation processes, its engagements in this regard are minimal. With the dynamic political, social and cultural strata of Somalia, the mission would need to engage in conflict transformation on a larger scale with the varying administration of Somalia, in order to build trust and reach a mutually beneficial decision of how Somalia would be governed. The research also finds that the missions focus is ideally not on addressing the root causes of the conflict even though it engages with it to some extent. Therefore, the missions CONOPs or mandate should be revised to include a specific task to support the transformation of potential conflict relationships that build trust, and address relevant concerns aimed at building a unified Somalia. The mission is also undertaking minimal role in addressing the root causes of the conflict. As such, the missions mandate and CONOPs should also create an opportunity for activities that address the root causes of the conflict. The research hypotheses was justified, in the sense that it put forward a substantiated fact that showcased the necessity for conflict transformation efforts for larger Somalia to enjoy long-term stability like its counterparts in Somaliland and Puntland.

Chapter Six

Conclusion and Recommendation

6.1 Introduction

This chapter assess whether the aim and objective of the study were met. It also summarizes the concluding remarks of the research, and highlights concrete recommendations targeted to the AU on possible options to conflict transformation that could bring an end to the Somali conflict.

The aim of this research was to examine AMISOM's contribution to ending the conflict in Somalia, with reference to its role in addressing the root causes of the conflict directly or indirectly as it implements its mandate, using the conflict transformation theory. The main objectives of this study were to:

- Examine AMISOM's contributions to ending the conflict in Somalia.
- Identify and map the nature and role of the mission in conflict transformation efforts
- Develop initiatives which AMISOM can undertake to effectively transform the conflict in Somalia
- Provide concrete recommendations on the role of AMISOM in transforming the conflict in Somalia

This chapter is organized in the following sequence. Introduction to the chapter, the aim and objectives of the research, concluding summary of AMISOM's role in Somalia, the recommendations proffered to the AU on addressing the conflict in Somalia, and finally, the conclusion.

6.2 AMISOM's Role in Somalia

The research was able to examine AMISOM's contributions in bringing an end to the Somali conflict, through the findings identified. The findings showcased that AMISOM has taken control of most part of Somalia, and has brought stability and peace to those areas under its control. Furthermore, the civilians that are living in areas under the control of AMISOM have access to basic humanitarian assistance, and trading has resumed in most parts of the country. The analysis from the literature review provided a solid basis to understand the role and responsibilities of relevant actors that are complementing the efforts to AMISOM in keeping the peace as well as in addressing the root causes of the conflict. Thus, the findings build on from the literature review which indicated that though the mission's mandate does not aim to

directly address the root causes of the conflict, it does address some root causes of the conflict indirectly through the empowering of Somali security forces, reconciliation of different clans and regions and the extension of state and traditional authorities. The research has its lineage from the literature review and theoretical framework that proffer an alternative solution and approach to transforming the conflict in Somalia through institution building, strengthening of security forces and through conflict transformation or reconciliation. Based on this analogy, the research was able to meet its second objective which aims to identify and map out the nature and role of AMISOM in conflict transformation in Somalia. It finds that AMISOM has and continues to support reconciliation meetings and governance reform in Somalia. Based on the relevance of the theoretical framework on the research, the research was able to utilize conflict transformation theory, approaches, lessons and applicability to suggest or recommend on reconciliation or relationship building AMISOM can undertake to at the Somali regional and administrative level. The analysis from the literature review, theoretical framework, study area, and research findings provided a strong support from which the research draws most of its recommendations from. The methodology of the research also supported quality data gathering which makes the research achieve its stated objectives. Based on the findings from the research, the four research questions were successfully answered. The findings explore the extent to which AMISOM has contributed to conflict transformation in Somalia, it highlights the role AMISOM should play in conflict transformation and also identified the gaps and limitations that inhibit AMISOM from contributing to conflict transformation in Somalia. The existence of these empirical findings in the research satisfied the objectives of the study.

The research finds that AMISOM has brought some amount of stability to Mogadishu, where ordinary populations are conducting businesses on normal bases. Overall, the situation in Somalia continues to progress positively. The Somali people and leaders should capitalize on the security gains made by AMISOM, the Somali security forces and their allies (AMISOM) and the Ethiopian troops, to further peace and prosperity. The Government of Somalia must utilize the current security progress as an opportunity to focus on transforming the conflict. By reviewing the background and nature of the conflict in Somalia, this chapter brings to light the importance of the unity of community structures to bring stability in the country. The people of Somalia have suffered immensely for a decade, many lives have been lost, many children, and aged have been deprived of their right to survival and heritage. It is evident that a fundamental change in attitude and behaviour is needed to bring about lasting peace. To

address this fundamental change, the root causes of the conflict should be addressed. Therefore, the objective of this study, which is geared towards assessing AMISOMs contributions to ending the conflict and maps the need for more focus on conflict transformation, was met.

“The joint AMISOM and SNA operations have resulted in the recovery of sixteen districts, but seven districts remain under Al-Shabaab’s influence, and their recovery will be the main objective in the next military phase from 2015. While applauding the successes recorded so far, it is necessary to also take stock of the challenges that AMISOM and the FGS continue to face going forward” (Summary of research findings, 2015). Therefore, topics illustrated in this research provided highlights on the current state of security in Somalia, the contributions of AMISOM to bring stability to Somalia, and the challenges faced by the mission in transforming the Somali conflict. These topics help to unpack reasons for the focus on conflict transformation in the process of stabilization.

Therefore, it is the view of the research that the mission’s activities are largely focused on counter-insurgency strategies; the expansion of the FGS state authority, capacity building of security forces, civil service, and the protection of the FGS. Thus, whereas the mission also works with local authorities and civil society in reconciliation processes, its engagements in this regard is minimal. With the dynamic political, social and cultural strata of Somalia, the mission would need to engage in conflict transformation in a larger scale with the varying administration of Somalia, in order to build trust and reach a mutually beneficial decision of how Somalia would be governed. The research also finds that the missions focus is ideally not on addressing the root causes of the conflict even though it engages with it to some extent. Therefore, the missions CONOPs or mandate should be revised to include a specific task to support the transformation of potential conflict relationships that build trust, and address relevant concerns aimed at building a unified Somalia. The mission is also undertaking minimal role in addressing the root causes of the conflict. As such, the missions mandate and CONOPs should also create an opportunity for activities that address the root causes of the conflict. The research hypotheses was justified, in the sense that it put forward a substantiated fact that showcased the necessity for addressing the root causes of the conflict for larger Somalia to enjoy long-term stability like its counterparts in Somaliland and Puntland.

6.3 Recommendations for Addressing the Conflict in Somalia

Despite the peace enforcement role of the mission, the mission can be involved at the strategic political level in the reconciliation efforts between the various parties to the conflict. The mission can provide technical support to state institutions involved in conflict transformation activities, and create conducive environment for political processes in facilitating trust building and relationship between clans and armed groups. Further, as part of this facilitation processes, the mission can work with all stakeholders to support dialogue and reconciliation, facilitate efforts aimed at the development and the re-establishment of governance structures, rule of law institutions and the restoration of both physical and social infrastructure of Somalia. AMISOM can further provide support to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed groups as well as security sector reform processes. The AU should focus on more robust peace enforcements and a simultaneous bottom-up conflict transformation approach with a broader focus on improving the life of Somalis.

Engagement with local leadership: AMISOM should focus its engagement at the grassroots level and speak to the local leadership on ways to start planning and working together as one Somali community; and more particularly on how to rebuild Somalia without focusing on elections. Elections will likely deter AMISOM on focusing on the humanitarian needs of the people in an attempt to address the underlying causes of the conflict.

Political dialogue: the parties to the conflict must agree through a political dialogue to stop fighting. Without this, all the interventions would be addressing the effects of the conflict or its immediate causes and not the root causes. Puntland and Somaliland who have declared independence need to come back to the negotiation table and agree for those regions to be part of Somalia. All the areas occupied by Al-Sbabaab should be recaptured to extend state authority to every part of Somalia. The institutions of the state need to be further strengthened to be more effective.

The establishment of Somali Regional Administration: AMISOM should established regional administration in Somalia that is able to influence the society. The regional administration available so far that have been able to maintain peace in certain areas is set up by Somalis themselves. These are Puntland, Somaliland, Khatumo, Mugug and South Western state. The research supported Menkhaus (2006) suggestion that

“decentralised government would also end a trend started by the Italians of attempting to bring together disparate parts under a strong central government. Advocates of some form of decentralised, federal or even confederal systems claimed that only a decentralized approach can guarantee local communities protection from a

central state dominated by another lineage by giving the clans more responsibility in local government, ownership of projects, and their results are shared by the communities at the local level. Focusing the ownership of projects at a local level creates strong local government institutions, which become reactive and sensitive to what the citizens need when compared to a top-down western government style” ” (Menkhaus, 2006: p.83).

However, decentralization has its advantages and challenges as seen in several examples throughout Africa (Barrett, Mude, & Omiti, 2007). According to Garcia & Sunil (2008), “proponents of decentralization will argue that it brings government accountability, community empowerment, and efficiency in the use of public services as well as an improved local and national governance” (Garcia & Sunil, 2008: P.8).

Increased donor support: the lack of donor support to the civilian component of the mission is limiting conflict transformation effort. Civilian functions like Civil Affairs roles should have been instrumental to support AMISOM in establishing relevant regional administration and support local institutions in Somalia. The lack of resources to support relevant civil affairs roles and functions should be corrected in order to support reconciliation and local institution building in Somalia. AMISOM should pursue these efforts in order to address the conflict.

Utilizing relevant policy frameworks: the AU policy framework for post-conflict reconstruction should be implemented in Somalia to support conflict transformation and peace. This also speaks to the utilization of expertise in Africa, as well as learning from the experiences of Rwanda to support conflict transformation in Somalia.

Reformation of Somalia’s Decentralization System: According to Upsall (2014), the Somali “government should provide an excellent point of departure for an attempt at creating a stable, functioning and decentralized government” (Upsall, 2014). Experience in the past has shown that an attempt to reform states decentralization often ends up with lesser results. Gordon Crawford and Christof Hartmann’s (2008) analysis of four decentralization case studies in Ghana, Uganda, Malawi and Tanzania concluded on this (Gordon et al, 2008: 240). Crawford & Hartmann (2008) noted that “three out of four had generally negative results” (Crawford & Hartmann, 2008: 234). This does not necessarily mean that will be the case for Somalia. As explained by Crawford & Hartmann (2008) seem to be a “complex reform system requiring comprehensive changes in political, administrative and fiscal structures” (Crawford & Hartmann, 2008: 235). According to Upsall (2014), “It is precisely because these changes occurred within an existing government, which is the reason why

decentralization has proved to be so difficult, and often have less than desirable results. In the case of Somaliland the lack of functioning government should provide an excellent point of embarkation for an attempt at creating a stable, functioning and decentralized government” (Upsall, K.C, 2014).

AMISOM continues to make progress despite the numerous challenges it faces. It is critical therefore, that all stakeholders to the peace process in Somali continue their efforts in supporting Somalia, while the international community should enhance its support to Somalia.

According to the findings from AMISOM respondents,

“the Roadmap adopted by the FGS demonstrates its commitment to complement and to build upon the security gains made by the joint AMISOM and SNA military operations. The political leadership of Somalia and all other stakeholders should continue to show selfless leadership, and resolve unity of purpose to consolidate the progress made. In this regard, it is critical for the government to undertake adequate sensitization on the stabilization strategy and state building process under the local government Act and provisional federal constitution. Recent outreach efforts and the positive outcomes of the engagements by the President and the Speaker of Parliament in Baidoa, as well as the Prime Minister’s engagements in Bulo Burto, Jowhar and Kismayo, are vivid demonstrations of how effective such sensitization could be in facilitating peace-building and state-building. At the same time, efforts to ensure constructive engagement between the FGS and Puntland should be encouraged” (Interview with AMISOM, 2015).

The FGS would need sufficient civilian capacity and financial support to undertake this. AMISOM noted that

“The FGS has to be given adequate financial and other support to implement its Vision 2016 agenda. At the first meeting of the High-level Partnership Forum (HLPF) on the implementation of Somalia New Deal Compact, held in Mogadishu on 24 February 2014, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud appealed to partners to fulfil their pledged support, in order to enable the government implement its commitments under the Compact. The FGS

needs financial resources to implement its Roadmap, including the stabilization and establishment of state authority across the country, as well as in the newly recovered areas, ahead of the general elections in 2016” (AMISOM, 2015).

Significant progress has been made in Somalia both at the political and security fronts. At the same time, the Somali stakeholders should be urged to stay on course and to demonstrate the required unity of purpose and action, in order to address all outstanding issues and fulfil the aspirations of their people for peace, security and stability.

6.4 Conclusion

AMISOM continues its effort to stabilize Somalia as it battles to ensure security throughout the country. During this period of conflict transformation in Somalia, poor relationship between clans, groups or individuals may pose a great threat to escalating the conflict, and will remain a major hindrance to peace-building efforts even after violence is over. For instance, some members of the Issaq Clan in Somaliand thinks they are part of Puntland which is mainly a Darod Clan entity. This struggle for identify and affiliation is creating further divide. The figure below indicated major Somali clan affiliation and identify.




Figure 8: Maps showing major Somali clan affiliation and identity

According to a respondent, Somaliland is at peace not because of a well-functioning administrative and relationship system, but because top leaders from Somaliland are leaders of Al-Shabaab, and it is made up of one clan – thus limiting competition and rivalry. Also, all the clans from Somali are member of the FGS, and they are all competing for their interest. The theory of conflict transformation emphasizes a careful consideration in taking heed of the needs of all conflicting parties for a successful peace-building effort. Thus, conflict transformation attempts to address incompatibility which arises between parties as the process of stabilization continues. The recommendations above are all linked to conflict transformation theory which this research utilized to justify the need to address causes of the conflict, and transform relationships as was done in Somaliland and Puntland that have a remarkable success story.

Bibliography:

Abdullahi, A. 1997. *Colonial Policies and the Failure of Somali Secessionism in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya Colony*. Grahamstown: Rhodes University Press.

Adam, H. 2008. *From Tyranny to Anarchy*. Asmara: The Red Sea Press.

Abdi, D. 2012. *Security in Somalia Can It be achieved? Hiiran* [Online] Available at: <http://www.hiiraan.com/op4/2012/oct/26553/security_in_somalia_can_it_be_achieved.aspx> [Accessed 8th August 2014].

African Union. 2002. Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Addis Ababa: [Online] Available from: <<http://www1.uneca.org/Portals/ngm/Documents/Conventions%20and%20Resolutions/constitution.pdf>> [Accessed 17 March 2015].

Ahmed, I. I. & Green, R. H. 1999. The heritage of war and state collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-level effects, external interventions and reconstruction. *Third World Quarterly*, 20 (1), 113-127.

Andrew, A.A. 2013. *Long Walk to Restoration: Lessons from Somalia's Transition Process*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. pp.2. [Online] Available from <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SitRep2013_9July-Asamoah.pdf>. [Accessed 31 January 2015].

Armed Conflict Report. 2009. *Kenya (1991 – first combat deaths)* [Online] Available at:<http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/country/armed_conflict_report/Kenya.pdf> [Accessed 16 March 2015].> pp. 5.

Azer, E. 1990. *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict*. Hampshire: Dartmouth. pp. 20-90.

Abdile, M. & Botha, A. 2014. *Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies and Finn Church Aid. Pp. 13.[Online] Available from <<http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf>>. [Accessed 23 March 2014].

Addis Ababa. Peace and Security Council. 2013. *African Union Commission (2013). Communique of the 356th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union Commission (PSC/PR/COMM(CCCLVI))*. Pp.2-19. [Online] Available at: <<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-comm-356-somalia-27-feb-2013.pdf>> [Accessed 20 March 2015].

Addis Ababa. Peace and Security Council. 2013. *African Union Peace and Security Council. (2013). Communique of the Peace and Security Council at its 375th Meeting in May*. Addis Ababa: pp. 2. [Online]. Available at: <<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-379-com-somalia-13-06-2013-3-2-.pdf>> [Accessed 20 March 2015].

Africa Watch Report. 1990. *A government at war with its own people. Somalia, testimonies about the killing and the conflict in the north*. London: Africa Watch. pp. 1.

AMISOM. 2014c. *AMISOM and Somali National Army captures Eel Buur town* [Online]: AMISOM Media Monitoring: Available at: <<http://www.africanewshub.com/news/1204376-amisom-and-somali-national-army-capture-eel-buur-town>> [Accessed 2 August 2014].

AMISOM. 2014b. *AMISOM and Somali National Army drive Al Shabaab out of six towns*. [Online] Available at: < <http://amisom-au.org/2014/03/amisom-and-somali-national-armydrive-al-shabaab-out-of-six-towns/> > [Accessed 15 Jan 2014].

AMISOM. 2014. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). *Brief History of Somalia*. [Online] Available from: <http://amisom-au.org/about-somalia/brief-history/>. [Accessed 3rd March 2014].

AMISOM. 2014. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). *AMISOM concludes training in community based policing for Somali Police*. [Online]. Available at: <<http://amisom-au.org/2014/03/amisom-concludes-training-in-community-based-policing->

[for-somali-police-force/](#)> [Accessed 10 March 2014).

AMISOM. 2014. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). *AMISOM Police Provide Specialist Public Order Management Training to the Somali Police Force in Djibouti*. [online]. Available at: <http://amisom-au.org/2013/06/amisom-police-provide-specialist-public-order-management-training-to-the-somali-police-force/>. [Accessed 11 March 2014].

Africa Watch. 1992. *Somalia: a Fight to the Finish?* News from Africa Watch, vol 4. Africa Watch, 13 February, pp. 7.

Africa Watch. 1990. *Somalia: A Government at War with its own*. The African Watch Committee. pp. 2-11.

Bradbury, M. & Healy, S. 2010. *Endless War, a brief history of the Somali Conflict*. ACCORD Issue 21. [Online] Available at: http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/accord%2021_3Endless%20war_a%20brief%20history_2010_ENG.pdf [Accessed: 4th February].

Barnette, M. & Zurcher, C. 2009. *The Peacebuilders Contract. How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood in the Dilemmas of Statebuilding, Confronting the contradictions of Post-war peace operations*. New York: Routledge. pp. 23-24.

Bekwesegha, C. J. 1993. The need to strengthen regional organizations: A rejoinder. *Security Dialogue* 24(4), 377-81.

Berghof Foundation Operations. 2012. Berghof Glossary on Conflict Transformation. Berlin, Germany: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. pp. 7.

Berghof Handbook. 2008. *A Systemic Approach to Conflict Transformation. Exploring Strengths and Limitations*. (Berghof Handbook Dialogue No. 6.) Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. pp 11-41.

Biggar, N. 2002. Peace and justice: A limited reconciliation. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 5(2), 167-179.

Bodtker, M. A. and Jameson K. J. 2001. Emotion in Conflict Formation and its Transformation: Application to Organizational Conflict Management. *The International Journal of Conflict Management*, 12 (3), 25.

Booth, K. 2005a. *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*. Boulder: Lynne Reiner. pp.9.

Boutellis A, & Williams, P. D. 2013. *Peace Operations: The African Union and the United Nations: Towards more effective partnerships*. New York: International Peace Institute. P2.

Burton, J. 1996. *Conflict Resolution, Its Language and Processes*. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.

Buzan B. 1991. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-cold war Era*. Hamel Hempstead: Harvester Publishing. 2nd edn. pp. 146.

Byrne, M. 2013. The failed state and failed state-building: How can a move away from the failed state discourse inform development in Somalia? London: *Birkbeck Law Review*, 1(1), 111-134.

Byrne, M. 2013. The failed state and failed state-building: How can a move away from the failed state discourse inform development in Somalia? *Birkbeck Law Review*, 1(1), 122-123.

Byrne, M. 2013. The failed state and failed state-building: How can a move away from the failed state discourse inform development in Somalia? *Birkbeck Law Review*, 1(1), 111-134.

Byrne, M. 2013. The failed state and failed state-building: How can a move away from the failed state discourse inform development in Somalia? *Birkbeck Law Review*, 1(1), 121.

Berghof, Glossary. 2012. *Conflict Transformation*. Germany: Berghof Foundation Operations GMBH.

Besteman, C. 1996. "Representing Violence and 'Othering' Somalia. *Cultural Anthropology* 11 (1),120-133.

Barrett, C. et al. 2007. *Decentralization and the Social Economics of Development: Lessons from Kenya*. Wallingford, GBR: CABI Publishing.

Center for Research and Dialogue. 2008. Community-based peace processes in Somalia. Somalia: Center for Research and Dialogue. [Online] Available from <<http://www.interpeace.org/publications/somali-region/59-community-based-peace-processes-in-south-central-somalia-english/file>> [Accessed on: 2 February 2015]. pp. 18.

Centre for Civilian in Conflict. 2011. *Civilian Casualty, Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell*. [Online] Available at: <<http://somalianngoconsortium.org/docs/key/4/2013/1372191101.pdf>> [Accessed on 11 March 2014].

Cerulli, E. 1957–1964. *Somalia, scritti vari editi ed inediti: A cura dell'Amministrazione fiduciaria italiana della Somalia*. (3) Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato. pp.3.

Clarke, W. S. 1993. *Testing the Worlds Resolve in Somalia*. In Kelly J.M. Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations. Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.

Clarke, W.S. 1993. Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia. pp.48. [Online] Available at: <<http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/1993/1983%20clarke.pdf>> [Accessed 23 March 2015].

Chesterman, S. 2004. *You, the People: The United Nations Transitional Administration, and Statebuilding*. New York. Oxford University Press. pp. 5.

Clapham, C. 1996. *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Conciliation Resources. 2010. *Who's peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali International Peacemaking*. London: Conciliation Resources. pp.10.

Cassanelli, V. L, 1982. *The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a*

Pastoral People, 1600-1900. University of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia.

Central Intelligence Agency, 2015. *The World Fact Book*. Available from: <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html>> [Accessed on 28 February 2015].

Clarke, W. S. 1993. *Testing the Worlds Resolve in Somalia*. In: Kelly, J. ed. Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations. Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. Netherlands.

Conciliation Resources, 2010. *Who's peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali International Peacemaking*. London. Conciliation Resources. pp.11.

Cassanelli, L. V. 1982. *The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600–1900*. Ethnohistory. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press.pp.328.

Cassanelli, V.L. 1982. *The Shaping of the Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 2.

Crawford, G. and Hartmann, C. 2008. *Decentralization in Africa: A pathway out of poverty and conflict?* Amsterdam, NLD: Amsterdam University Press.

DIFID. 2012. *Operation Plan for Somalia*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67414/somali-a-2011.pdf> [Accessed: 3rd March 2014].

Doornbos, M. 2001. Somalië: botsende scenario's voor politieke reconstructie. *Internationale Spectator*, jaargang 55 (4), 192-198.

Dagne, T. 2010. ‘*Somalia: current condictions and prospects for a lasting peace*’ [Online]. Congregational research service. Available at<<http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/19904.pdf>> [Accessed 30 June

2014].

Dagne, T. 2007. *Somalia: Current Conditions and prospect for a Lasting Peace*. Congressional research services for Congress. pp. 8. [Online] Available at: <<http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33911.pdf>> [Accessed 20 March 2015].

Durshe, A. 2000. *Security in Somalia: Can it be achieved?* [Online] Available at: <<http://www.radiofreesomalia.com/Security%20IN%20Somalia%20by%20Abdi%20Dirshe.pdf>> [Accessed: 27th February 2014].

Dagne, T. 2011. *Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospect for a Lasting Peace*. Congregational Research Service. [Online]. Available at: <<http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33911.pdf>> [Accessed 18 March 2015].

Dallmeyer, G. D. 1996. *National Perspective on International Intervention: From the Outside Looking In Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*. New York: ST. Martins Press, INC. pp. 23.

Drysdale, J. 1994. *Whatever Happened to Somalia? A Tale of Tragic Blunders*. London: HAAN Associates. pp. 38.

Davies, J.C. 1969 *The J-curve of rising and declining satisfactions as a cause of some great revolutions and a contained rebellion*. American Sociologist Review, 39 (4), 607-610.

De Coning, C. et al. 2015. *Strategic Options for the Future of African Peace Operations 2015- 2025*. Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

De Coning, et al. 2010. *Conference Proceedings Critical Perspectives on Contemporary Peace-building: Towards a change in concepts and Approaches*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. pp.11.

Debiel, T. et al. 2009. Local state-building in Afghanistan and Somaliland. *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Science*, 21(1), 38-44.

Department for International Development. 2012. *Department for International Development (DIFID) Operational Plan 2011-2015*. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67414/somalia-2011.pdf [Accessed 25 November 2014].

Dersso, A. S. 2009. *The Somalia Conflict Implications for Peacemaking and Peacekeeping efforts*. South Africa: Institute of Security Studies. pp. 7.

Diamond, L. 1994. On Developing a Common Vocabulary: The Conflict Continuum.” *Peace Builder*, 1 (4), 3-6.

Doornbos, M. 2001. Somalië: botsende scenario's voor politieke reconstructie, jaargang. *Internationale Spectator*: 55 (4), 192-198.

Doornbos, M. 2002. Somalia: Alternative scenarios for political reconstruction. *African Affairs* 101(402), 95.

Doornbos, M. 2002. Somalia: Alternative scenarios for political reconstruction. *African Affairs* 101(402) 93-107.

Doyle, M. & Nicholas, S. 2006. *Making War and Building Peace. United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Dudouet, V. 2011. *Nonviolent Resistance in Power Asymmetries*. In: Beatrix Austin, Martina Fischer and Hans J. Gießmann eds. *Advancing Conflict Transformation. The Berghof Handbook II*. Opladen – Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich, 2011, 237-264.

Daniels, C. 2012. *Somali Piracy and Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*. USA: Scarecrow Press Inc.

Derek, L. 1993. *Theory of Social Domain*. London: Council for Exceptional Children Reston.

Eliason, J. 2006. *Democracy, Conflict and Human Security. Policy Summary: key Findings*

and Recommendations. *International IDEA*. Stockholm Sweden: [Online] Available at <<http://www.idea.int/publications/dchs/upload/Inlaga.pdf>> [Accessed 12 September 2014].

Esty, D. C. et al. 1999. “*State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II*” In *Environmental Change and Security Report*. [Online] Washington DC: Wilson Cente. Pp.. 68. Available at: <<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Phase2.pdf>> [Accessed 4 August 2014].

Elmi, A & A. B. 2006. *The Somali Conflict: Root Causes, obstacles and peace-building Strategies*. *African Security Review* 15 (1), 42.

Elmi, A. & Barise, A. 2010. *The Somali Conflict: Root causes, obstacles and peace-building strategies*. Routledge. [Online] Available at: <<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2006.9627386#preview>> [Accessed 20 March 2015].

Elmi, A. A. 2010. *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peace building*. London. Pluto Press. pp34.

Elmi, A.A. 2010. *The Role of Regional Countries and Organizations in the Somali Conflict in Understanding the Somalia Conflagration*. New York: St Martin’s Press. pp. 95.

Emli, A. & Barise. 2006. *The Somali Conflict: Root Causes, Obstacles, and Peace-building Strategie*. New York: African Security Review 15, (1). pp. 42.

Elmi, A. A. and Barise, A. D. 2010. *The Somali Conflict: Root Causes, Obstacles and Peace-building Strategies*. *African Security Review* 15(1). 2006. [Online] Available from <<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2006.9627386?journalCode=rasr20#preview>> [Accessed 20 September 2014]. pp. 32-54.

Elmi, A.A. 2010. *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration, Identity, Political Islam and Peace-building*. New York: Pluto Press. pp 14-35.

Francis, D. 2010. *From Pacification to Peace-building. A Global Call to Transformation*.

London: Pluto Press. pp. 22

Fransic, D. 2002. *People, Peace and Power Conflict Transformation in Action*. London: Pluto Press. pp. 29.

Fransic, D. 2002. *People, Peace and Power Conflict Transformation in Action*. London: Pluto Press. pp.33.

Friedrichs, R. 2011. *Cote D'Ivoire: UN Peacekeeping Impartiality and Protection of Civilians*. *STIMSOM (2011)* [Online] Available at: <<http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/cote-divoire-un-peacekeeping-impartiality-and-protection-of-civilians/>> [Accessed 5th April 2014].

Galtung J. 2002. *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means*. Paper presented at a world public forum on 26 November, 2012 in Switzerland. Available from: <<http://wpfdc.org/community/18220-johan-galtung-founder-director-galtung-institut-for-peace-theory-and-peace-practice-founder-transcend-international-network-switzerland>> [Accessed on 27 November 2013].

Galtung, J. &Tschudi, F. 2002. *Crafting Peace: On the Psychology of the TRANSCEND Approach*. In: *Searching for Peace: The Road to TRANSCEND*, 2nd ed. London: Pluto Press. Pp. 5-10.

Galtung, J. 1969. 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research': *Journal of Peace Research*. 27 (3), 5-10.

Galtung, J. 2001. *After Violence, Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Resolution: Coping with visible and invisible effect of war and violence*. New York: Lexington Books, London.

Galtung, J.1996. "Peace by Peaceful Means" *Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: Sage.

Gesheker L. C. 1992. *Anti-Colonialism and Class Formation: The Eastern Horn of Africa before 1950*. Paper presented at Somali Studies Conference, in Boston.

Ghali, B. 1992. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. Report of the Secretary – General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council in January 1992. New York: United Nations. Available from: < http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf> [Accessed on 27 November 2013].

Gali, B.B. 1996. *The United Nations and Somalia. 1992-1996. The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume 8*. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information .pp. 85.

Galot, L. et al. 2012. *Supporting African Peace Operations*. Policy Dialogue No.8. The NORDIC African Institute. United Kingdom: pp 11.

Galtung, G. 1996. *Peace by Peaceful Means*. London: Sage Publications. Pp. 212.

Galtung, J. 1996. *Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: Sage Publications. pp . 70-126.

Galtung, J. 1996. *Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: Sage Publications. pp. 90.

Galtung, J. 1996.. *Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: Sage Publications. pp. 116.

GeiB, R. 2006. Asymmetric Conflict Structures. *Journal onInternational Review of the Red Cross*. 88 (864), 757.

Geuhenno, J. 2008. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines*. New York: UN DPKO.

Ghali, B. B. 1995. *Agenda for Peace*. [Online] New York: United Nations Department of Public Information. Available at: <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2952431>> [Accessed 15 July 2014]. pp. 56-57.

Giddens, A. 1993. *Sociology*, 2nd. ed. New York: Polity Press. pp. 309.

Goodhand, J. & Sedra, M. 2006. *Afghanistan Peace Conditionalities Study*. London. Department for International Development. pp. 5.

Gordon, A. A. & Gordon, D. L. (2012). *Understanding contemporary Africa 5th ed.* London: Rienner Publishers. pp. 103.

Genrich, A. 2012. *Transcript of Eastern Africa Continued*. [Online] Available at: <<http://prezi.com/cexxi5q3fk/eastern-africa-continued/>> [Accessed 5th March 2014].

Gesheter, C.L. 1992. *Anti-Colonialism and Class Formation: The Eastern Horn of Africa before 1950*. Paper presented at Somali Studies Conference. Boston, United States. pp. 2.

Garcia, M.R. & Sunil, A. 2008. *Achieving better service delivery through decentralization in Ethiopia*. Herndon, VA: World Bank Publications.

Gordon, A.A. & Gordon, D.L. 2012. *Understanding contemporary Africa 5th ed.* London: Rienner Publishers.

Harper, M. 2010. “*Getting Somalia Wrong? War and Hope in a Shattered State*”. Washington: Council on Foreign Relations.

Harrington, D. 2010. *The meaning and End of Fundamentalism and the Emergency of Islam*. *Journal of Religion and Society* 12 (4) pp1-10.

Hull, C. & Svensson, E. 2008. *African Union Mission in Somalia. Exemplifying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges*. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency.

Hull, C. & Svensson, E. 2008. *The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Exemplifying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges*. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency.

Hanlon, Q. 2011. *Adapting America's Security Paradigm and Security Agenda*. National Strategy Information Centre. National Defence University. pp. 2. [Online] Available at <<http://www.strategycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Weak-States-and-Their-Opportunistic-Means.pdf>>. [Accessed 20 September 2014].

Holt V, and Taylor, G. 2009. *Protecting Civilians in Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, setbacks and Remaining challenges*. New York: DPKO.

Holtzman, S. et al. 1998. *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Hunt, E. 1994. *Problem solving*. In R. J. Sternberg (ed.), *Thinking and problem solving*. pp. 215–232.

Hiiraan. 1999-2014. *Communique of the 21st Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of IGAD*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2013/May/29181/communique_of_the_21st_extraordinary_summit_of_heads_of_state_and_government_of_igad.aspx> [Accessed 8th March 2014].

Hirsch, L. J. & Oakley B. R. 1995. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Peace. pp.157.

Holleman, C. 2008. *Conflict, Economic Crisis and Drought*. The Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, (40) [Online] Available at: <<http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-40/conflict-economic-crisis-and-drought-a-humanitarian-emergency-out-of-control>> [Accessed 15 April 2015].

Hirsch, J. L. & Oakley, R. B. 1995. “*Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*”. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press. pp. 5.

Human Right Watch. 2008. ‘*So Much To Fear*’ *War Crimes and the Devastation of Somalia*. [Online] Available at: <<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia1208webwcover.pdf>> [Accessed 23 March 2014].

Hirsh, J. & Oakley, R. 1995. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peace-building*. United State: United State Institute of Peace. pp.2.

Human Rights Watch. 2013. *Criminal Reprisals: Kenyan Police and Military Abuses Against Ethnic Somalis*. USA: [Online] Available at: <<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0512webwcover.pdf>> [Accessed 23 March 2015]. pp. 38.

Hayatou, A. & Sturman, K. 2010. *The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: from Design to Reality In Ulf Engel & Joao Gomes Porto (eds.)*, Farnham UK: Africa's News Peace and Security Achitechure. Ashgate. pp. 71.

Hirsh, J. & Oakley, R. 1995. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peace-building*. United State. United State Institute of Peace. pp.2.

Hassan, H. & Barnes. C. 2007. *The Rise and Fall of Moghadishu Islamic Courts* [Online] Chatham House: Available at <<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/bpsomalia0407.pdf>> [Accessed 20 September 2014]. pp. 6-8.

Human Rights Watch. 2008. *“So Much to Fear” War Crimes and the Devastation of Somalia*. New York: Human Rights Watch. pp. 4.

Hague, R. & H, M., 2013. *Comparative Government and Politics. An Introduction*. 9th eds. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Pp. 262.

Hoehne, M.V. 2010. Political Representation in Somalia: Citizenship, Clannism and Territoriality. In: Bradbury, M. and Healy, S. eds. *Accord 21: Whose Peace is it anyway? Connecting Somalia and International Peacemaking*. [Online] Available from<http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord%2021_10Political%20representation%20in%20Somalia_2010_ENG.pdf> [Accessed 12 January 2015].

ICG. 2002. International Crisis Group (ICG). *Salvaging Somalia's Chance for Peace. ICG Africa Briefing, Nairobi/Brussels 9 December.* [Online]. Available at: <<http://www.crisisweb.org>> [Accessed 1 May 2014].

ICG. 2004. International Crisis Group (ICG) Biting the Somali Bullet No 79. [Online] Available at: < <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/Biting%20the%20Somali%20Bullet.pdf>> [Accessed 21 January 2015]. pp.11.

Interpeace. 2009. *A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988.* Nairobi: The Center for Research and Dialogue. pp.33.

Interpeace. 2009. *A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988.* Nairobi: The Center for Research and Dialogue. pp.49.

Interpeace. 2008. *A History of Mediation in Somalia Since 1988 Somalia.* Center for Research for Dialogue Series. pp. 15. [Online] Available at <<http://www.interpeace.org/publications/somali-region/60-a-history-of-mediation-in-somalia-since-1988-english/file>> [Accessed 23 March 2015].

IGAD. 2013. The Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). *UN Special Representatives Statement on the IGAD Grand Stabilization Plan for South Central Somalia.* [Online] Available at: <http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=546:un-special-representatives-statement-on-the-igad-grand-stabilization-plan-for-south-central-somalia&catid=66:somalia&Itemid=179> [Accessed 8th March 2014].

Infoplease. 2005. *Maps, History, Geography, Government, culture and fact.* [Online] Available at: <<http://www.infoplease.com/country/somalia.html>> [Accessed 7th February 2014].

IGAD. 2013. Intergovernmental Authority on Development. *Communique of the 22nd Extraordinary session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the situation in*

Somalia. Addis Ababa: Pp.3. [Online] Available at:
<http://igad.int/attachments/620_Communique%20of%20the%2022nd%20IGAD%20extra-ordinary%20Summit.pdf> [Accessed 20 March 2015].

Interpeace. 2008. *A History of Mediation in Somalia Since 1988*. Center for Research for Dialogue Series. pp. 16-17. [Online] Available at<
<http://www.interpeace.org/publications/somali-region/60-a-history-of-mediation-in-somalia-since-1988-english/file>> [Accessed 23 March 2015].

IGAD. 2008. *Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 24th Ordinary Session of IGAD Council of Ministers 17 - 18 March 2005*. Nairobi: Available at<
http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/mincommar05.pdf>
[Accessed 8 August 2014].

IRIN. 2013. Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN). *Briefing: Somalia, federalism and Jubaland*. [Online] Available at:
<<http://www.irinnews.org/report/97860/briefing-somalia-federalism-and-jubaland>>
[Accessed 27 March 2014].

Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. 2013. *Global Figures: Conflict and Violence-Induced displacement*. [Online] Available from< <http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures>> [Accessed 15 February 2015].

Jeffrey A. F. & Andrew K. 1994. "[A Survey of Empirical Research on Nominal Exchange Rates](#)," *NBER Working Papers* 4865. Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Pp.1-76.

Jick, T. 1983. Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: Triangulation in action. In Van Maanen, J., (ed.), *Qualitative Methodology*. Oslo: Sage. 50-100.

Jhazbhay, I. 2003. Somaliland: Africa's best kept secret, a challenge to the international community? *African Security Review* 12(4), 58.

Jhazbhay, I. 2003. Somaliland: Africa's best kept secret, a challenge to the international community? *African Security Review* 12(4), 77-82.

John, L. H. & Robert B. O. 1995. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on
Kaplan, S. 2008. The remarkable story of Somaliland. *Journal of Democracy*, 19(3), 143-157.

Jeffrey, C. J. 1993. *Debacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response*, In Loris Fisler Damrosch, ed. *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*. New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1993. pp. 211.

Kaufmann, C. 1996. "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars". United State: MIT Press.

Kaplan, S. 2010. *Rethinking State-building in a Failed State*. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies. pp. 94. Available at: <http://sethkaplan.org/onlinedoc/TWQ,%20Rethinking%20State-building,%201.10.pdf>> [Accessed 14 November 2014].

Menkhaus, K. 1996. International Peace-building and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation. *International Peacekeeping*, 3(1), 42-67.

Kibble, S. 2001. Somaliland: Surviving without recognition; Somalia: Recognized but failing? *International Relations*, 15(5), 18.

Kidist, M. 2009. *The Role of Regional and International Organizations in Resolving the Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD*. Addis Ababa: Fridrivh Elbert Stiftung. pp 27.

Korpen, D. et al. 2008. *A Systemic Approach to Conflict Transformation Exploring Strengths and Weaknesses*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. pp. 12.

Kingsley, C. 2012. *A Vet in Somalia*. United Kingdom: Xlibris Cooperation. pp.35.

Kasaija, P. A. 2009. The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia, 2008-2009. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 28(3), 269-74.

Kusow, A. 1994. *Peace and Stability in Somalia: Problems and Prospects*. UFAHAMU. XXII (I & II). pp. 25.

Lake, D. & Powell, R. 1999. *Strategic Choice and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 20.

Langholtz, J. H. 2008. *The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War: 1945 to 1987*. USA: Peace Operations Training Institute. pp4.

Lederach, J. P. 1995. *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*. New York: Syracuse University Press. pp. 12.

Lederach, J. P. 1997. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Lederach, P.L. 1995. *Conflict Transformation in Protracted Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive Framework*. In Kumar Rupesinghe (ed) *Conflict Transformation*. Basingstoke: Macmillan. pp. 201-22.

Leonard, D.K. and Samantar, M.S. 2011. What does the Somali experience teach us about the social contract and the state? *Development and Change*, 42(2), 559-584.

Lesson, P. 2007. Better off Stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse. *Journal of Comparative Economics*. 35: 689-710. Available at: http://www.peterleeson.com/Better_Off_Stateless.pdf [Accessed 20 March 2015].

Lesson, P. 2007. Better off Stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse. *Journal of Comparative Economics*. 35: 689-710. Available at: http://www.peterleeson.com/Better_Off_Stateless.pdf [Accessed 20 March 2015].

Lewis, D. 2002. Civil Society in African Contexts. Reflections on the Usefulness of a Concept. *Development and Change*, 33 (4), 569-86.

Lederach, J. P. 1995. *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*. New York: Syracuse University Press.

Lederach, J. P. 1997. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Lewis, I. M. 1994. *Blood and Bone: The call of Kinship in Somali Society*. Lawrenceville NJ Red Sea Press.

Lewis, I. M. 1980. *Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*. London: Longman.

Lewis, I. M. 2002. *A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*. (4), Eastern Africa Studies. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. pp. 1.

Lacy, M. 2006. *In Somalia, Islamic Militias Fight Culture Wars*. [Online]. New York Times. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/19/world/Africa/19Somalia.html?pagewanted=1> [Accessed 15 June 2014].

Lewis, I.M. 2004. 'Visible and invisible differences: The Somali paradox'. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 74(4), 489–515.

Lewis, I.M. 1961. *A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*. London: International African Institute Oxford University Press. pp. 7-21.

Lewis, I.M. 1961. *A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*. London: International African Institute Oxford University Press. pp. 1.

Lesson, P. 2007. *Better off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government Collapse*.

Journal of Comparative Economics, 35, Available from <
http://www.peterleeson.com/better_off_stateless.pdf>Pp. 689-710> [Accessed 14 January
2015].

Mansur, A. 1995. *The Nature of the Somali Clan System*. In A.J, Ahmed. (ed). *The Invention of Somalia*. Lawrenceville: NJ. Red Sea Press. pp. 117-133.

Mansur, O. A. 1995. *Contrary to a Nation: The cancer of The State*. Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press. pp. 113.

Mansur, O. A. 1995. *Contrary to a Nation: The cancer of The State*. Lawrenceville. The Red Sea Press. pp. 122.

Menkhaus, K. 1997. '*International Peace-building and the Dynamics of Local and National Peace-building in Somalia*. In: Clerke, W. & Herbs, J. eds. *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*. Boulder; Westview Press. pp. 42-63.

Menkhaus, K. 2000. Traditional Conflict Management in Contemporary Somalia. In I. W. Zartman(ed) *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict 'Medicine'*, London: Lynne Rienner. pp. 9.

Menkhaus, K. 2003. *Protracted State Collapse in Somalia: A Rediagnosis*. New York: Review of African Political Economy. pp 3.

Menkhaus, K. 2006. Governance without government in Somalia: Spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping. *International Security*, 31(3), 74-106.

Menkhaus, Ken. 1999. *Hiran Region*. Studies on Governance. Series no. 7. Nairobi: United Nations Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS).

Meyer, J. & Brown, B. 1997 Institutional Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony. *American Journal of Sociology*. 83, 50.

Mial, H. 2004. *Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task*. Berlin: Berghof

Publications. pp.12.

Miall, H. 2004. *Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task*. Berlin: Berghof Center Constructive Conflict Management. pp.10.

Miall, H. et al. 1999. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. Great Britain: Cambridge Polity Press. pp. 21.

Michael, D. & Sambanis, M. 2006. *Making War and Building Peace. United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton: University Press.

Mitchell, C. 1994. Conflict Research. In: Groom A.J.R and Light, M. eds. *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory*. London: Pinter. pp. 136.

Mitchell, Christopher. 2002. "Beyond Resolution: What Does Conflict Transformation Actually Transform?" *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 9 (1), 1-23.

Mohamed, A.A. 2002. *State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa: The Case of Somalia (1960-2001)*. M. Sos.Sc. thesis. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research.

Munro, J. E. 2012. *Multinatlidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges*. Geneva: GCSP Geneva.Papers. pp. 19.

Museveni, K. Y. 1997. *Sowing the Mustered Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda*. London: Macmillan Press. Pp. 58.

Mahmood, O. O. 2011. *The root Causes of the United Nations Failure in Somalia*. Bloomington: I Universe.

Mbugua, K. 2009. *Background and Critical Analysis of the Conflict in Somalia*. ACCORD. Durban.

Menkhaus, K. 2003. *State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts*, Review of African Political Economy. 30 (97), 405-422.

Miall, H. 2001. *Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task*. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre.

Mills, G. 2013. *Somalia, Fixing Africa's Most failed State*. Tafelberg;. Capetown.

Mohamed, A. N. 2003. *Nonviolence and Peace-building in Islam: Theory and Practice*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

Mohamed, I. W. 1995. 'Islam is the solution to the Somali problems'' The Himolo Somali Newspaper, 1 June, p. 2. Hadrawi.

Mohamud, K. 2004. *The limit of clan politics*. Allego.com, 29 January. Available from: <<http://www.allgedo.com/2013/01/29/clan-federalism-tears-somalia-apart/>> [Accessed on 8th October 2013].

Moller, B. 2009. *The Somali Conflict The Role of External Actors*. Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Mugisha, N. 2011. The Way Forward in Somalia. London: *Royal United Service Institute Journal*. 156 (3), 26-33.

Mansur, O. A. 1995. *The Nature of the Somali Clan System*, In A.J. Ahmed (ed), *The Invention of Somalia*. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press. pp. 117-133.

Mansur, O. A. 1995. *Contrary to a Nation: The cancer of The State*. Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press. pp. 115.

Mohamed, H. E. 2014. *President of the Federal Republic Speech to the IOM Council*. [Online] Available at: <<http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/About-IOM/governing-bodies/en/council/101/H-E-Hassan-Sh-Mohamud-President-of-the-Somali-Republic.pdf>> [Accessed 5th March 2014].

Mohamed, E. A. 2013. *Managing Shared Basins in the Juba and Shabella Rivers and Downstream Effects in Somalia*. Sweden: Horizon Research Publishing. pp.1.

Mansur, O. A. 1995. *Contrary to a Nation: The cancer of The State*. Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press. pp.113.

Mansur, O. A. 1995). *Contrary to a Nation: The cancer of The State*. Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press. pp. 107.

Mays, T. 2009. *The African Union African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Why did it successfully deploy following the failure of the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM)?* [Online] Available at<<http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/theses/mays.pdf>> [Accessed 6 February 2015] pp. 16.

Monogabay.com. 2013. *Somalia – Government: The country Study Series 1988-1999*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/somalia/GOVERNMENT.html> [Accessed 14 March 2014].

Menkhaus, K. 1996. International Peace-building and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia. *International Peacekeeping* 3, (1), 42-67.

Menkhaus, K. & Boucek, C. 2010. *Terrorism out of Somalia*. [Online]: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at: <<http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/23/terrorism-out-of-somalia>> pp. 1-3.

Menkhaus, K. 2009. *Violent Islamic Extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America*. [Online] United State Senate. pp. 5. Available at: <www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/031109menkhaus> [Accessed 23 March 2015].

Marchal, R. 2004. *Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War: Before and after September 11*. In: Alex de Waal eds, *Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*. London: Hurst. pp.114-145.

Mugenda, O. & Mugenda, G. A. 2003. *Research methods, Qualitative and quantitative Approaches*. Nairobi. African Center for Technological Studies. (ACTS) 2003 Press.

Mohamoud, S. H. P. 2013. *The Future of Governance in Somalia, speech to Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)*. Washington DC: [Online] Available at: <<http://bit.ly/Yz2ffi>> [Accessed 15 March 2013].

Major Buer. F. E. 2001. *Master of Military Studies United Nations Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) and United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II): A comparative Analysis of offensive Air Support*. pp. 4.

Menkhaus, K. 2007. Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building and the Politics of Coping, In *International Security*, 31 (3), pp. 84.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. *No Redress: Somalia's Forgotten Minorities*. [Online] Minority Rights Group International. Available at <<http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=10370>> [Accessed 12 March 2015].

Markovitz. 1995. *Camels, Intellectuals, Origins, AND Dance in the Invention of Somalia: A Commentary*. Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press. pp. 65.

Majid, N. and Dowell, S. 2012. Hidden Dimension of the Somalia Famine. *Global Food Security*, 1.. Available from <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2012.07.003> > [Accessed 15 February 2015]. pp 36-42.

Mukhtar, M. H. and Kusow, A. 1993. *Bottom-up Approach in Reconciliation in the Inter-river Regions of Somalia*. A Visiting Mission Report. August-September, 1993. pp. 2.

Musau, S. 2013. *Clans and Clannism's Control Over Weak Political Institutions*. The ITCPM International Commentary. 4 (34). pp.14.

Menkhaus, K. 2006. Governance without government in Somalia: Spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping. *International Security*, 31(3), 74-106.

Nicolaides, D. 2008. *Employing Conflict Transformation Theory in Understanding the Cyprus Problem*. M. Arts. Thesis. Austria, the European University Centre for Peace Studies in Austria.

Nelson, H. D. 1982. *Somalia: A Country Study*. (3) ed. Area Handbooks. Washington, DC: American University. pp.2.

Njoku, R. C. 2013. *The History of Somalia*. California: Library of Congress Publications. pp. 40.

Nordlund, P. & Skeppstrom, E. 2014. *State Formation in Somalia Challenges for Implementing the Somali Compact*. Sweden: [Online]. Swedish Ministry of Defence. pp.8. Available at: <<http://www.foi.se/Documents/Skeppstr%C3%B6m%20and%20Nordlund,%20Security,%20Stabilisation%20and%20State%20Formation%20in%20Somalia,%20FOI-R--3899-SE,%202014.pdf>> [Accessed 15 July 2014].

Oliver, F.G. 2002. *The other Side of Peacekeeping: Enforcement and who should do it?* In Langholtz H, Kondoch, B, and Wells, A. (eds) *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations, Volume 8*. Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill N.V. pp 99-117.

Okumu, W. and Jaye, T. 2010. *Peacekeeping in Africa: The Evolving Roles of the African Union and Regional Mechanisms*. Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Pp.13.

OCHA, 2014. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). *Humanitarian Bulletin Somalia*. January 2014. [Online] Available at: <<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20Somalia%20Humanitarian%20Bulletin%20January%202014.pdf>> [Accessed 9th March 2014].

Osman, A.A. n.d. *Cultural Diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reality?* pp. 95.

Paris, R. 2004. *At Wars End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Peace. pp. 157.
- Pham, J.P. 2012. *The Somaliland exception: Lessons on post-conflict state building from the part of the former Somalia that works*. *Marine Corps University Journal*, 3(1), 1-33
- Phillipp, E.C. 2005. *Somalia – A Very Special Case*. In A. Von Bogdandy & R. Wolfrum, (eds), *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, (9). Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill N.V. Pp. 551.
- Pillars of Peace Somali Programme.2010. *Democracy in Somaliland: Challenges and Opportunities*. Available at: <http://www.interpeace.org/documents/publications/somali-region/220-pillars-of-peace-somali-programme-english/file>> pp. 36.
- Porto, G.H. & Engel, U. 2014. *The African Union and African Security*. In *Routledge Handbook of African Security* by Hentz J. J. USA and Canada: Routledge. pp. 224.
- Reconciliation in Somalia. *International Peacekeeping* 3 (1), 42-67.
- Peacock, E. 2011. *African Union Mission In Somalia: The Mission, Its Successes and Challenges and Way forward*. Colombia: University of British Colombia.
- Piralla, C. 1992. *Cited by Donstella Lorch, In Shooting in Somalia. Reflect Tension for US Troops*. New York Times. pp. 12.
- Peter, G. 2006. *Somalia Looking Like Pre-Taliban Afghanistan: U.S. Backed Warlords, Al Qaeda-Linked Thugs Kill Dozens*. National Post. News Services. pp. 6.
- Reimann, C.2004. *Assessing the State-of-the-Art in Conflict Transformation*. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien. pp.13.
- Repesinghe, K. 1998. *Civil Wars, Civil Peace: An Introduction to Conflict Resolution*. London: Pluto Press. pp. 3.
- Republic of Somaliland. 2011. *Somaliland national vision 2030*. [Online] Available at: <http://somalilandgov.com/new/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/somaliland-vision-2030.pdf>> [Accessed on 16 February 2015].

Rice, E.S & Patrick, S. 2008. *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World*. [Online] Washington: The Brookings Institution. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2008/2/weak-states-index/02_weak_states_index.pdf [Accessed: 7th March 2014]. pp. 39.

Ross, H. M. & Rothman J. 1999. Issues of Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Resolution. In Ross, M. & Rothman, J. eds, *Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Resolution. Theorizing Success and Failure*. Basingstoke/ London: Macmillan. pp. 1022.

Rupesinghe, K. 1995. *Conflict Transformation*. In Kumar Rupesinghe, ed. *Conflict Transformation*. New York: St. Martin's Press. pp. 8.

Roland, M. 2007. *Somalia: A new Front Against Terrorism*. Crisis in the Horn of Africa, 5 Fenraury. Available from: <<http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/marchal/>>. [Accessed on 8 September 2013].

Rotberg, R. 1996. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

RBC RADIO. 2014. *Somalia: An estimated 2.9 million people will need immediate life-saving and livelihood support*. [Online] Available at: <<http://www.raxanreeb.com/2014/02/somalia-an-estimated-2-9-million-people-will-need-immediate-life-saving-and-livelihood-support/>> [Accessed 10th April 2014].

Refugee International. 2015. *Somalia: Current Humanitarian Condition*. [Online] Available from< <http://refugeesinternational.org/where-we-work/africa/somalia>> [Accessed 18 February 2015].

Scherrer, C. 1994. *Ethno-Nationalismus als globales phanomen: Zur krise der staaten in der Dritten Welt und der fruheren UDSSR Duisburg*. Germany: Gerhard – Mercator-Universitat.

Shay, S. 2014. *Somalia in Transition since 2006*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Somalia. 2013. *Somalia Joint Strategy Paper (2008-2013)*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/pdgcs/documentazione/AttiConvegna/2007-10-15_JspSomalia0813.pdf> [Accessed 7th March 2013]. pp.17.

Ssereo, F. 2003. Clanpolitics, Clan-democracy and Conflict Regulation in Africa: The Experience of Somalia. *Global Review of Ethnopolitics*. 2(3-4); 25-40. [Online] Available at: < http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics/archive/volume_II/issue_3-4/ssereo.pdf> [Accessed on 16 March 2015].

Schwartz, S. 2008. *What is Islamofascism?* TCS Daily, 16 August. Center for Islamic Pluralism. Available from: <http://www.ideasinactiontv.com/tcs_daily/2006/08/what-is-islamofascism.html> [Accessed on 8th October 2013].

Sisk, T.D. 1996. *Power-Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press. 38.

Stephan, M. and Erica, C. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. 1990. *Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, canons, and evaluative criteria*. New York: Human Science Press Inc.

Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. 1990. *Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, canons, and evaluative criteria*. New York. Human Science Press Inc.

Strauss, A. 1987. *Qualitative analysis for social scientists*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Svensson, E. 2008. *The African Mission in Burundi, Lessons Learned from the African Union's first Peace Operation*. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency.

Svensson, E. 2008. *The African Mission in Burundi, Lessons Learned from the African Union's first Peace Operation*. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency.

Somali Community. 1993. *History of Somalia*. [Online] Available at: <<http://www.somalicommunityofwindsor.ca/membershipregistration/>> [Accessed 5th March 2014].

Samatar, I. A. 1989. *The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia, 1884-1986*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Samatar, A. I. 1993. Undersiege: Blood, Power, and the Somali State. In: Nyong'o, P. Anyang' ed. *Arms and Daggers in the Hearts of Africa*, 67-100. Nairobi: Arrucian Academy of Science.

Ssereo, F. 2003. Clan Politics, Clan-democracy and Conflict Resolution in Africa: The experience of Somalia. *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* (2), 3-4. Available from: http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics/archive/volume_II/issue_3-4/ssereo.pdf. [Accessed: 26 March 2014]. pp. 25-40.

Somalia NGO Consortium. 2015. *Somalia Advocacy Analysis 2014/2015*. [Online] Available from < <http://somalianngoconsortium.org/docs/key/17/2015/1421925013.pdf>> [Accessed on 15 February 2015].

Taiser, M. A. and Robert, O. M. 2004 *Conclusion: the Long and Difficult Road to Peace*. Canada: University of Toronto Press.

Tahir, I. A. 2013 *Does Successful Peace-building Lead to Successful Statebuilding?* United Kingdom: University of Sussex. pp. 1.

Tavolato .U. 2004. *Somalia Djibouti To Mbagathi: Making or Breaking Peace?* Somalia: [Online] Available from< http://www.centrostudionati.org/documenti/PEACE_PROCESS_IN_SOMALIA.pdf> [Accessed 31 January 2015]. pp. 12.

The British Field Manual. 1994. *Director General Land Warfare, Army Field Manual: Wider Peacekeeping*. United Kingdom: British Army. pp 1-2.

The Somali Compact. 2013. The Federal Government of Somalia [Online] Available at <<http://www.pbsdialogue.org/The%20Somali%20Compact.pdf>> [Accessed on 18 March 2014].

The United Nations. 1996. *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996*. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996). pp. 34.

The United States Institute for Peace. 1993. *Addis Ababa Agreement Concluded at the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia*. [Online] Available at: <www.USIP.org> [Accessed 15 January 2015]. pp. 3.

The Guardian (UK). 2012. *Kenyan Muslims Fear the Worst Over Proposals to Boost Police Powers*. The Guardian, 27th September, 2012.

The New York Times. 2012. *Somalia President is Inaugurated four Days After Assassination Attempt*. [Online] Available at: <<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/world/africa/hassan-sheik-mohamud-inaugurated-as-somalias-president.html>> [Accessed 5th March 2014].

TWN. 2011. *Third World Resurgence*. [Online] Available from: <http://www.twinside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/2011/251-252/cover04.htm>. [Accessed 7th February 2014].

UN DPKO. 1999. *Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations: Suggested Principles and Mechanisms*. New York. Lessons Learnt Unit. pp. 6.

UNECA. 2010. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) Ten Year Capacity Building Programme for the African UNION Available from: http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-documents/RCM/rcm12/au-ten-year-capacity-program_eng.pdf. [Accessed 16 May 2014]. pp. 4.

United Nations High Commission for Refugee. 2011. *Global Trend 2011. A year of Crisis*. [Online] Geneva: UNHCR. Available at: <<http://www.unhcr.org/4fd6f87f9.pdf>> [Accessed: 7th March 2014]. pp. 20.

United Nations. 1945. *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice* (1945). [Online] Available at: <
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>> [Accessed 15 January 2015].

United Nations. 1945. *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*. San Francisco: United State of America. pp. 8-11.

United Nations. 1996. *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996. The United Nations Blue Books Series*, 8. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information. pp. 264-266.

United Nations. 2013. *United Nations Resolution 2125 (2013) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7061st Meeting on 18 November*. [Online] Available at:
<<http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11177.doc.htm>> [Accessed 25 October 2014].

United Nations. 2015. *History of the United Nations* [Online] Available at:
<<https://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/>> [Accessed 1 January 2015].

Upsall, C. K. 2014. *Statebuilding in Somalia in the Image of Somaliland: A Bottom-up Approach* vol 6 (3) Sweden: Norwich University. [Online] Available at<
<http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/880/3/state-building-in-somalia-in-the-image-of-somaliland-a-bottom-up-approach>> [Accessed on 22 January 2015].

USIP. 1996. United State Institute for Peace (USIP) *Addis Ababa Agreement concluded at the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, 27 March 1993*. [Online]. Available at: <<http://www.usip.org/category/countries/somalia?page=5>> [Accessed 17 March 2015].

United Nations High Commission for Refugee, 2013. *United Nations High Commission for Refugee (UNHCR). Somali Refugee in the Region*. Available from:<
<http://www.unhcr.org/519625e49.html>. [Accessed on 29 January 2015].

United Nations. 2013. *United Nations Security Council Resolution 2093*. [Online] [Accessed 10 March 2014].

United Nations. 2013. *United Nations Security Council Resolution 2102. Adopted by the Security Council at its 6959th Meeting on 2 May 2013.* [Online] Available at: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2102.pdf> [Online] [Accessed 11 March 2014].

United Nations. 2013. *Security Council SC/10931/6929th Meeting. Sets out Terms for Reconfiguration of UN Presence following Assessment Mission* [Online] Available at: <<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10931.doc.htm>> [Accessed 11 March 2014].

United Nations. 2012. *Security Council Special Report to the Secretary-General on Somalia 31st January 2012.* Available at <http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/SecurityCouncilMonitor/Reports/Somalia/amisom_s_2012_74.pdf>

United Nations. 2007. *United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1744 (2007) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5633rd Meeting.* [Online] New York: UN Security Council. [Accessed 5th March 2014].

United State Department of State Office of the Historian. 2013. *Somalia from 1992-1993.* [Online] Available at: <<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/somalia>> [Accessed 8th May 2014].

United Nations. 2013. *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia* [Online] Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/709> [Accessed 13 February 2014]. pp. 3-12.

United Nations. 2014. *Report of the Secretary General on Somalia* [Online] Available at: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_100.pdf> [Accessed 15 February 2015]. pp. 6.

Upsall, C. K. 2014. *Statebuilding in Somalia in the Image of Somaliland: A Bottom-up Approach* vol 6 (3) Sweden: Norwich University. [Online] Available at <

<http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/880/3/state-building-in-somalia-in-the-image-of-somaliland-a-bottom-up-approach>> [Accessed on 22 January 2015].

Vayrynen, R. 1991. *To Settle or to Transform? Perspective on the Resolution of National and International Conflict*. In *new Directions of Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*, ed. London: Sage Publications. Pp. 1-25.

Väyrynen, R. 1999. *From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Transformation: A Critical View*. In *Ho-Won Jeong, ed., The New Agenda for Peace Research*. Brookfield: Ashgate Publishing.

Williams, P. 2008. Keeping the Peace in Africa: Why 'African' Solutions are not Enough. *Journal on Ethics & International Affairs*. 22 (3), 309-239.

Williams, P. 2009. Into the Mogadishu Maelstrom: The African Union Mission in Somalia. *Journal on International Peacekeeping*. 16 (4), 514-530.

Williams, P. 2009. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: evaluating an embryonic international institution. *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 47 (4), 603-626.

Waal, d. A. & Omaar, R. 1993. *Somalia: Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment*. London: African Rights, pp. 20-27.

Wade, R. 1990. *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government*. In *East Asian Industrialization*. London: Princeton University Press. pp. 22-23.

Waldner, D. 1999. *Statebuilding and Late Development*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 2.

Walls, M. 2009. The emergence of a Somali state: Building peace from civil war in Somaliland. *Journal of African Affairs*, 108(432), 371-389.

Walter S. C. 1993. Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia. [Online] Available at: <<http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/1993/1983%20clarke.pdf>> [Accessed 17 March 2015]. pp : 48

Weber, A. 2008. State Building in Somalia: Challenges in a Zone of Crisis, In *Hot Spot Horn of Africa Revisited: Approaches to Make Sense of Conflict*. Lit Verlag, Berlin: pp. 1.

Weber, A. 2008. *Statebuilding in Somalia: Challenges in a Zone of Crisis*. In *Hot Spot Horn of Africa Revisited: Approaches to make sense of conflict*. Lit Verlag, Berlin: African Studies.

Wheeler, E.D. and Roberts, C. 2002. *Doorway to Hell: Disaster in Somalia*. USA: Consolidated Press. pp 8.

Wall, de. A. 1998. US War Crimes in Somalia. *New Left Review* (30), 131-44.

Wise, R. 2011. *AL SHABAAB*. Washington: [Online]: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Pp. 3-4. Available at: <http://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf>. [Accessed 15 January 2015].

XARUNTA HORMARINTA CILMIBAARISTA PUNTLAND. 2007. *Reconciliation Conference Puntland Delegation Induction Workshop Report*. Somalia: Puntland Development and Research Center. pp.2.

Zakaria, F. 2003. *The Future of Freedom Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad 1st ed*. New York: WW. Norton & Co.

Zistel-Buckley. S. 2008. *Conflict Transformation and Social Change in Uganda remembering after violence*. London: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. pp 21.

Zadhop. 2001. *Famine Headlines Worldwide 2000/2001*. [Online] Available at: <http://considerthefuture.com/Poverty/PovertyArticles/pov2_famine.html> [Accessed 14 May 2014].