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Article Title Page

Exploring the Public Parameter of Police Integrity

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Structured Abstract:

Purpose: This paper explores the contribution of the public component of Klockars' and Kutnjak-Ivkovic's (2004) organizational theory of police integrity to the understanding of police integrity.

Design/methodology/approach: The study employs a modified survey derived from "The Measurement of Police Integrity," instrument developed by Klockars, et al. (2000). Participants are constituted by a convenience sample of first year social studies students at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (n = 186) and 160 South African Police Service non-commissioned officers throughout Gauteng Province, Republic of South Africa.

Findings: Overall, the data present a mixed picture of integrity in the SAPS. The current study is certainly suggestive that the SAPS faces serious challenges to establishing and sustaining integrity and that based on either absolutist or normative criteria the organization falls below desired levels of professional integrity. However, there are also indications that a significant proportion of officers will support efforts of the organization to establish and maintain professional standards of integrity.

Practical Implications: The findings, focused on non-commissioned officers, contributes to a growing body of research across all levels of the South African Police Service. In addition, the research compares results from a non-police sample helping to contextualize the concept of integrity as it exists within the SAPS. More immediate implications relate to the potential for the development of a broad-based integrity plan for the South African Police Service as a whole.

 Originality/value: Previous research employing police only samples has concluded that the South African Police Service is an integrity challenged organization. While the present study agrees that the SAPS faces significant integrity challenges, the use of a comparative non-policing sample also suggests that the Service is having some success in establishing integrity standards, at least in regard to lower level violations of organizational ethical standards.

Keywords: Police, Integrity, South Africa

Article Classification: Research paper

For internal production use only

Running Heads:

Introduction

In the Republic of South Africa corruption among South African Police Service (SAPS) officials has been a constant and troubling issue since the beginning of democratic reforms in the early 1990's and is among the most negative factors influencing the erosion of public trust in the Service (Mattes, 2006). Based on a review of newspaper articles from 1996 and 1997, Sayed and Bruce (1998) concluded that "It seems reasonable to assert that the occurrence of reports on so many different types of corrupt activities in the South African press in little over a year may indicate that police corruption in South Africa is fairly extensive as well as being varied in nature" (p. 11). In 2003, the National Victims of Crime Survey conducted by the Institute for Security Studies' found that the South African public perceived the SAPS to be the second most corrupt public service department in the Country, trumped only by the Traffic Department (van Vuuren, 2004), and in the 2006 Afrobarometer survey it was observed that 48% of South Africans respondents believed that all or most of the police officials in the SAPS were corrupt compared with 36% in 2002 and 38% in 2004. These levels significantly exceeded the perception of corruption existing among South African Revenue Service officials, teachers and school administrators, judges and magistrates, and health workers, for the same years (Mattes and Graham, 2006). According to Faull (2007), these findings imply the existence of a unique political-criminal climate of corruption, both in South Africa and in the region.

By the mid-2000's a myriad of police misconduct reports prompted even the National Police Commissioner to acknowledge that corruption within the agency was problematic as "dockets for criminal court cases go missing" (News24, 2005:online). By 2009, the extent of corruption had reached such level that the Minister of Safety and Security, Nathi Mthethwa, stated, "[T]he public perception that the police are corrupt is correct" (Mail & Guardian online, 2009). Highlighting these concerns was the criminal trial and conviction of former SAPS National Commissioner, Jackie Selebi, on two counts of corruption and one of defeating the ends of justice that served to reinforce the public perception of corruption at all levels of the SAPS.

Underlying the issues identified throughout this discussion is the question of the organizational integrity of the SAPS. In 2008, Helen Zille, leader of the Democratic Alliance party, alleging that there was a "rising tide" of corruption in the SA Police Service also noted that there remained a great many police officers across the country that had remained steadfastly committed to the battle against crime. "These hard-working officers are increasingly undermined by the culture of graft and self-interest which is causing the public to lose faith in the force" (News 24.com, 2008-01-18).

To further explore characteristics of the organizational integrity of the South African Police Service, and its implications for developing organizational policy, this paper compares attitudes of a sample of non-commissioned officers in the SAPS with a convenience sample of criminology students enrolled in a South African national university on measures of organizational integrity developed by Klockars, Ivkovic,

Harver, and Haberfeld (2000). The purpose is to explore the extent to which indicators of integrity/lack of integrity are uniquely associated with the SAPS as opposed to being situated in a larger cultural orientation toward the acceptance/rejection of attitudes supporting organizational corruption.

Literature

The concept of integrity has been defined/described in several ways. In the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2009) integrity is defined as a "firm adherence to a code of especially moral…values" and as synonymous with incorruptibility. Klockars, Ivkovic and Haberfield (2006), specifically relating to police integrity, define it as "the normative inclination among police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation (p. 1)." Delattre (1996), describes it as the "settled disposition, the resolve and determination, the established habit 'of doing right where there is no one to make you do it but yourself'" (p. 325) and goes on to say that "Achieving the habit and disposition of behaving rightly depends on being able to control our own natural passions, being willing to deny ourselves things we may powerfully desire, being prepared to make sacrifices we have strong inclinations not to make" (pp. 325-326). He goes on further to state that, "without such habits of control, we may yield to the temptation to … behave dishonestly when doing so promises pleasure or profit; to behave cravenly when acting with moral or physical courage may risk pain or loss or death; … to abuse power and authority to gratify our impulses" (p. 326). For Delattre, the only thing that is incorruptible is personal character that refuses to be corrupted.

Corruption and integrity

Hypotheses explaining police corruption have fallen into three main positions: the society-at-large hypothesis; the structural or affiliation hypothesis; and, the rotten-apple hypothesis (Delattre, 1996). Pollock (2007) describes these positions as systemic (or societal explanations), institutional (or organizational) explanations, and individual explanations. The most common has been the rotten-apple, or individual, hypothesis thus linking the concept of integrity to the concept of corruption, although when values are widely shared and institutionalized within a policing agency we can consider integrity at the organizational level, thus the characterization of the SAPS as an integrity-challenged agency by Sauerman and Kutnjak-Ivkovic (2008).

Adlam (1982) argues that the concepts of deviance and corruption are intertwined with the concept of integrity in such a way that deviance by officials that lack professional integrity in various instances leads almost invariably to corrupt activities. His is a static view of corruption in that although events, experiences, and social situations change, an individual's basic personality stays the same. According to this perspective, behavior is structured by pre-existing personality traits that are fixed early in life and remain intact. In contrast, Walker (2008) argues that police officials, with limited exceptions, "are honest at the outset of their careers (p. 460)," and thus the rotten-apple explanation is inadequate. Consistent with this view, Delattre (1996) describes a process that helps to explain the transformation from a basically honest to a corrupt police officer:

"(1) If a young person of high ideals but little exposure to realities that challenge

naïve expectations of human decency (2) enters a world that exposes the worst in people and (3) is trained and influenced by senior colleagues who have lost faith in police work, and (4) if the young colleagues who use their work to line their own pockets and (5) if their superiors are unlikely to support efforts to behave honorably, and (6) and likelihood of sanction for corruption is negligible, (7) then the young person will probably accept the status quo and join in corrupt practices, perhaps with initial feelings of shame, but ultimately without remorse" (p. 76).

Closely linked to the institutional/organizational model of corruption is Klockars' and Kutnjak-Ivkovic's (2004) organizational theory of police integrity based on the early work of Herman Goldstein (1975, 1977). Their model is developed along four organizational and occupational dimensions: (1) organizational rules; (2) prevention and control mechanisms; (3) the Code; and, (4) public expectations. As the characteristics of organizations within each of these dimensions vary so to does the likelihood and extent of corruption vary between organizations. The first dimension, organizational rules, is concerned with the how rules governing corruption are established, communicated, and understood. The second dimension (prevention and control mechanisms) addresses the various techniques, mechanisms, in place within an organization, to prevent and control corruption. The third dimension, the Code, addresses the extent to which a "Code of Silence" operates within the organization that informally prohibits or discourages officers from reporting the misconduct of others. And finally, public expectations addresses the influence of a department's external social, economic, and/or political , environment as it/they affect the acceptance/rejection of corruption by a community. To test the efficacy of their model, Klockars, Kutnjak-Ivkovic and Haberfield (2004) developed a survey instrument to measure the extent of integrity among police officials. While the first three dimensions of the model have been researched to a great extent, the fourth dimension has not. We seek to fill part of this gap by comparing a non-policing sample with a police sample.

In light of the background of corruption within the SAPS, questionnaires containing hypothetical cases of police corruption were collected from 379 police supervisors drawn from seven provinces within South Africa during 2005 (Sauerman and Kutnjak-Ivkovic, 2008). Based on the results they concluded that the SAPS was an integrity-challenged organization and suggested that post-apartheid supervisory appointees were more inclined towards acts of questionable integrity in their daily functions as police officials than their predecessor appointees.

Ultimately, interpretation of the degree of integrity in an organization is evaluated by comparing the values and actions of its members against a set of standards defining what is and is not proper behavior for the institution. Kappeler *et al*. (1998) identify four paradigms by which such evaluations have been conducted: statistical definitions; absolutist definitions; reactivist definitions; and, normative definitions. Among these, the reactivist and normative paradigms have the greatest relevance for our study. For example, the normative paradigm is exemplified in the correspondence of the scenarios with prohibitions established by the South African Police Service Discipline Regulations of 2005, Regulation 20 (Sauerman and Ivkovic, 2008) and, with the exception of scenario #1, with the International Chiefs of Police Standards of Conduct (Raines, 2010). From this perspective the prohibitions are the product of the organizational rule-making process

formalizing organizational norms. From the perspective of the reactivist paradigm, member lack of support for the consequences of rule violations (discipline) also indicates an absence of support for the rules themselves about which the consequences, reaction, are administered. A reactive definition also implies the relativity of individual harms, i.e. that some acts are more harmful than others and thus deserving of more severe sanctions. A reactivist interpretation also intersects with the normative perspective in the context of the "code of silence" where the informal norm of not reporting violations by fellow officers inhibits the ability of the organization to properly establish discipline within the organization. Thus, these paradigms will be central to our later interpretation of results and the implications of our findings for organizational policy.

Methods

According to Kappeler, Sluder and Alpert (1998), "Defining what is deviant is akin to defining other socially unacceptable behavior. That is, the task of reaching a definition is often vexing and bewildering to those attempting to articulate what is, as opposed to what is not, deviant" (p. 11). An example of the definitional problem is Barker and Carter's (1986) observation that, "Police deviance is a generic description of police officer activities which are inconsistent with the officers' legal authority, organizational authority, and standards of ethical conduct. It can encompass a plethora of behaviors for which an officer can be disciplined (pp. 1-2)."

In addition to the problem of definition is the problem of measuring corruption once a definition has been accepted. According to Sherman (2008:454), measuring the level of corruption is an extremely difficult task, primarily because it is such a covert crime – it stands to reason that in most corruption cases the perpetrator is also committing a crime. Klockars, *et al*. (2000) expand on the problem this can have for policy makers. They state: "Corruption is extremely difficult to study in a direct, quantitative, and empirical manner. Because most incidents of corruption are never reported or recorded, official data on corruption are best regarded as measures of a police agency's anti-corruption activity, not the actual level of corruption" (Klockars, et al., 2000, p. 2).

A third problem in conducting research into police corruption arises from the fact that "[e]ven with assurances of confidentiality, police officers are unlikely to be willing to report their own or another officer's corrupt activities" (Klockars *et al*., 2000, pp. 2-3). To address these issues, Klockars *et al*. (2004), as noted above, developed a survey instrument to measure the extent of integrity among police officials. Prior to our study the questionnaire had proven successful as a measure of police integrity in over a dozen countries ranging from the United States, England, and Canada, to Japan, Pakistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. It has also been used to measure integrity in the SAPS in three previous studies (see, Newham, 2003; Sauerman and Kutnjak-Ivkovic, 2008; and, Meyer and Reyneke-Tarbitt, 2009).

The research instrument

The instrument employs questions of *fact and opinion* that can be explored directly, without arousing the resistance that direct inquiries about corrupt *behavior* are likely to provoke (Klockars *et al*., 2000, p. 3). The survey consists of eleven scenarios (Table 1)

depicting behaviors that may constitute criminal conduct, violations of official police policy, or general professional standards. Support for this assertion is based on Sauerman and Kutnjak-Ivkovic (2008) who, in their study of integrity among supervisors in the South African Police Service, identified each scenario as describing a violation of one or more definitions of "misconduct" included in the South African Police Service Discipline Regulations of 2005, Regulation 20. In addition, Raines (2010) in her analysis of the Klockars *et al*. data observed that ten (excludes case #1) of the eleven scenarios could be correlated with the International Chiefs of Police Standards of Conduct.

In the Klockars, *et al*. (2000) survey seven questions, corresponding to the organizational/occupational dimensions discussed above, were asked for each scenario. One question evaluates the respondent's knowledge regarding the existence of regulations (organizational rules). A second set asks respondents to indicate how serious such violations would be considered by themselves and by other officers (prevention and control). A third set asks respondents to indicate the likelihood that they would report an observed violation (the Code) as well as the likelihood that other officers would report such an infraction (the Code). Finally respondents were asked what discipline they thought should follow from such an infraction (prevention and control mechanisms) as well as what discipline they thought would most likely follow (prevention and control mechanisms). The fourth dimension, public expectations, however, is not measured by the survey. As a measure of this dimension we employ a sample of South African students enrolled in a first year criminology course at one of the national universities. Because we cannot expect the student sample to be aware of organizational specifics we have modified the original survey (Table 2), by limiting the number of questions asked in the original survey. While we use the same scenarios described in Table 1 we do not ask questions regarding specific awareness of the SAPS regulations nor what discipline would most likely occur within the organization for the specific violations described in the scenarios, In addition, we also omit those questions which ask respondents to indicate, in the case of our student sample, how serious they believe the police in general would perceive the act, and in the case of police respondents, how serious they believe other police would rate the acts. We also omit the question regarding perceptions of whether the police would be likely to report a violation, in the case of the student sample, or the likelihood that other police officials would report a violation for our police sample. Although important, responses to these questions would likely provide only uninformed estimates of what our student sample thinks others believe or would do rather than estimations based on personal observation or experience. They can, however, provide their perspectives on the seriousness of an act and whether they believe they would report an observed violation if they were a police official.

The samples

To gauge public expectations the survey was provided to a convenience sample of first year social studies students at the University of KwaZulu-Natal comprising all race groups, namely African, Indian, white and colored, and made up of both males and

TABLE 1

Case Scenarios (Klockars, et al. (2000)), " The Measurement of Police Integrity," Research in Brief, Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice

Scenario 1.   A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours.

Scenario 2.   A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him.

Scenario 3,*   A police officer stops a motorist for not obeying a red traffic light. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift for half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation.
* Modified to fit SA experience (Kutnjak Ivkovic and Sauerman, 2007)

Scenario 4.   A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of food and liquor.

Scenario 5.   A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are smashed and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes a watch, worth about two days pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been stolen during the burglary.

Scenario 6.   A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the owners of the cars damaged in the accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he receives a payment of 5% of the repair bill from the shop owner.

Scenario 7.   A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work during the coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to tune-up his supervisor's personal car. Evaluate the SUPERVISOR'S behavior.

Scenario 8.   At 2 A.M. a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offense he transports the driver to his home.

Scenario 9.   A police officer finds a bar on his beat which is still serving drinks a half hour past its legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to accept a couple of free drinks from the owner.

Scenario 10.   Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting.

Scenario 11.   A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains the amount of money equivalent to a full-day's pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property, but keeps the money for himself.

Table 2
Questionnaire

a. How serious do YOU consider this behavior to be?

Not at all   Undecided   Very
serious   serious

1	2	3	4	5

b. If a police official engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any, discipline do YOU think <u>SHOULD</u> be followed?

1. NONE   2. VERBAL REPRIMAND

3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND   4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY

5. DEMOTION IN RANK   6. DISMISSAL

c. If you were a police official, do you think YOU would report a fellow police official who engaged in this behavior?

Definitely   Undecided   Definitely
not   yes

1	2	3	4	5

females in the Spring of 2009. All students in the first-year criminology class were invited to participate in the survey. Although we are seeking insight into public perceptions of the seriousness of the acts, the appropriate response to violations, and self-reported likelihood that they would report a violation, for several reasons our sample cannot be considered representative of the general population. The consequence thus poses limitations regarding implications of our findings for the development of policy. However, the student sample does provide a contrast to the police sample and thus broadens the framework for understanding characteristics of attitudes among the police sample related to organizational integrity.

Out of a class size of 288 students, 186 agreed to participate. Those who agreed remained in the lecture hall following the formal lecture. The survey was administered by one of the principal investigators who also attended to queries from students regarding the survey. Due to time limitations, participants only had 45 minutes to complete the questionnaire resulting in some loss of data regarding scenarios 9, 10, and 11, as some participants were unable to complete the entire survey in the allotted time. One-hundred-fifty-nine (85%) of the original 186 participants completed the entire survey while 169 (90.8%) completed ten of the eleven scenarios and 173 (93%) completed nine of the

scenarios. While this loss of data is undesirable we have no reason to believe that there was systematic bias in the characteristics of those who did complete the entire survey versus those who were unable to do so.   And while the sample is not statistically representative of the larger population, we do believe it does approximate important dimensions of attitudes regarding the respondents' own values and their perceptions of integrity among the South African police.

The police sample was from previous research on integrity conducted in 2008 among 160 SAPS non-commissioned officers in Gauteng Province (Meyer and Reyneke-Tarbitt, 2009). Fifty- one (31.9%) of the police officials held the rank of constable, 28 (17.5%) were sergeants, and 78 (48%) held the rank in Inspector. Years of service ranged from less than one year (6.2%) to more than 20 years (19.4%) with almost 70% having been in the SAPS for six or more years and over half (55.6%) having been in the SAPS for ten or more years. One-third of the sample was currently assigned to a very large station (over 500 officers) while 5.6% were serving in very small (<25) stations in rural areas of the Province.   Finally, almost 40% were currently assigned to Patrol while another 20% were in detective/investigative assignments with an additional 20% serving in administrative positions. Overall, three-fourths of the officers in the sample were in non-supervisory positions. This original sample was purposively obtained to expand on the work of Sauerman and Kutnjak-Ivkovic (2008) whose earlier investigation of integrity in the SAPS was specifically directed toward those holding supervisory, mid-management, ranks.

Findings and Discussion

Perceived seriousness of depicted acts
The first question we address is the perceptions of our samples regarding the seriousness of the acts depicted in our scenarios. One observation (Table 3) that we make is that there is a general consistency in the relative rankings of the seriousness of the acts between our student and police samples which is strongly suggestive of a hierarchical ordering of moral evaluations. It is clear that some acts have a higher negative evaluation in regard to moral respectability. However, we also observe several differences between the two groups when we look at the specific evaluation of an act as a serious or very serious violation.

For three of the scenarios, theft from a crime scene, accepting a traffic bribe, and covering a DUI involving another police official the police rate the acts as less serious than our student sample. This is an important disparity as the acts depicted are generally considered more serious violations of an officer's integrity. In contrast, however, in four of the scenarios the police rate the acts depicted as more serious than our student sample. For two of these instances, acceptance of a gift and the running an off-duty security alarm business, the rationale for the prohibition of such acts may have been lost on a non-police sample as such acts may appear quite innocuous and unrelated to larger concerns for graft and corruption among the police. On the level of the comparative seriousness of violations such acts may appear quite benign.

The student sample also indicates a substantially greater acceptance of the improper use of force on a suspect compared with our police sample. This may be indicative of the relatively high frustration with crime and a low tolerance of criminals among the general

South African population. Over the past several years there have been a number of high profile incidents where community members have seriously assaulted suspects and in a couple of incidents community members were responsible for deaths of suspects. In such a context it should not be surprising that citizens would be supportive of extralegal force by police officers. The fourth scenario where the police viewed the act as more serious than the student-sample was in the case of a kick-back for a referral of a citizen to a body shop for car repairs following an accident.

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Table 3
Comparisons of Student and Police Assessments
of the Seriousness of Acts Depicted

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	Perception of student respondents regarding seriousness of act[1]	Perception of police respondents regarding seriousness of act[1]	Difference between police and student respondent assessments of the seriousness of the act
Theft from crime scene	93.2% 1[2]	81.9% 1[2]	-11.3%
Traffic bribe	94.7% 2	81.2% 3	-13.5%
Theft of found property: wallet	76.3% 5	77.5% 4	+.8%
Body-shop kickback	53.7% 8	65.0% 8	+11.3%
Bar bribe: Free drinks	81.1% 3	81.9% 1	+.8%
Supervisor: Holiday for car tune-up	65.1% 6	71.9% 5	+6.8%
Cover-up police DUI accident	77.4% 4	65.7% 7	-11.7%
Street justice: Assault suspect.	58.6% 7	71.9% 5	+13.3%
Free/discount meals	46.2% 9	51.2% 9	+5.0%
Holiday gifts	17.8% 10	48.8% 10	+31.0%
Off-duty business	14.5% 11	47.5% 11	+33.0%

[1] Percent of respondents identifying act as either **serious** or **very serious** violation
[2] Rank order of seriousness. 1 = highest seriousness, 11 = lowest seriousness.

For the remaining four scenarios there was little difference in the perceptions of seriousness although it is interesting that the police considered the abuse of position by a supervisor somewhat more seriously than did the students and as more serious than a kick-back or covering up a DUI accident involving another police official as well as

being as serious as assaulting a suspect, and only somewhat less serious than the keeping of found property. Clearly an abuse of a supervisor's position in which the police official may see him/herself as the victim is considered fairly serious as opposed to the subversion of justice. However, except for the very most serious of the scenarios, overall the police rated the depicted acts as more serious than our student sample. Whether they truly felt that the acceptance of food or liquor as gifts or the acceptance of gratuities were improper it is reasonably clear that, as a whole, given the percentages of officers identifying these acts a serious or very serious, the police responses do evidence an awareness of the contributory potential (a slippery slope) of such acts for corruption. In contrast, however, is the fact that a non-trivial minority of each group did not appraise theft from a crime scene, the acceptance of a monetary traffic bribe, or the acceptance of free drinks as a bribe as constituting serious violations. Clearly, in the case of the last, this creates a serious challenge for the South African Police Service.

Sanctions and violations

As discussed previously, perceptions of the appropriateness of sanctions in the evaluation of police integrity is, in part, an evaluation of the role of accountability for improper/inappropriate use of ones official position. As a matter of moral calculus one is not expected to be able to say on the one hand that an act is morally wrong but on the other hand that one should not be held accountable for the act. However, the appropriateness/fairness of a sanction is also judged by its proportionality to the perceived seriousness of the violation of a proscribed rule or regulation as well as its relationship to the goals of accountability. In contemporary police management accountability is viewed more in the context of discipline as opposed to sanctions where discipline is understood to have both positive and negative dimensions where "positive" discipline is seen as an attempt to change employee behavior without invoking punishment (Glensor, Peak, and Gaines, 1999) and negative discipline (punishment) invoking a punitive response when positive discipline fails or a violation is of a nature that punishment is required in order to maintain the overall integrity of the organization. The need for proportionality in discipline is reflected in Glensor *et al.'s* (1999) observation that:

> "Management must be very careful when recommending and imposing discipline because of its impact on the overall morale of the agency's employees. If employees perceive the recommended discipline as too lenient, a supervisor may be sending the wrong message: The misconduct is insignificant. On the other hand, discipline that is viewed as too harsh may have a demoralizing effect on the officer(s) and other agency employees involved and result in allegations that the leadership is unfair," (p. 213).

These principles appear to be reflected in the responses of both of our samples (Table 4) although the student sample appears substantially more inclined to support more severe sanctions for the most serious violations whereas the police tend to support intermediate sanctions for these violations. For example, in the case of a theft of property from a crime scene 89.8% of the student respondents indicated support for one of the three more severe sanctions (suspension, demotion or dismissal) compared with 66.2% of the police respondents. In the case of a traffic bribe the difference is starker. Almost

80% of the student respondents supported suspension, demotion or dismissal for such a violation compared to 56.2% of the police officials. However, both of these offenses are considered among the three most serious by both groups, the other being the acceptance of free bar drinks for allowing a bar to stay open after hours. In the case of the bar we

Table 4
Comparisons of the Perceived Level of Appropriate Sanctions
by Student and Police Respondents

	Respondents	Appropriate Level of Sanction					
		None	Verbal Rep	Writ Rep	Suspend w/o Pay	Dem	Dis
Theft from crime scene	Students	2.2%	2.2%	5.4%	23.7%	11.3%	**54.8%**
	Police	8.1%	6.2%	18.1%	26.2%	3.8%	**36.2%**
Traffic bribe	Students	1.6%	3.2%	14.0%	**36.0%**	12.9%	**30.6%**
	Police	8.1%	12.5%	**23.1%**	23.1%	6.9%	**26.2%**
Theft of found property: wallet	Students	3.2%	10.2%	18.3%	**25.3%**	11.8%	16.1%
	Police	10.0%	14.4%	**24.4%**	28.8%	5.6%	**16.9%**
Body-shop kickback	Students	17.7%	**21.0%**	20.4%	19.9%	8.6%	10.8%
	Police	11.9%	15.0%	**23.1%**	27.5%	5.6%	**15.6%**
Bar bribe: Free drinks	Students	3.8%	11.3%	**23.1%**	**25.3%**	10.8%	18.8%
	Police	6.9%	**21.1%**	**35.0%**	20.0%	5.0%	11.2%
Supervisor: Holiday for car tune-up	Students	**21.0%**	18.8%	**19.9%**	10.2%	**18.8%**	8.6%
	Police	11.2%	16.9%	**34.4%**	16.2%	11.9%	8.8%
Cover-up police DUI accident	Students	8.6%	15.1%	17.2%	20.4%	11.3%	**24.7%**
	Police	8.1%	**16.2%**	**31.2%**	20.0%	8.1%	**14.4%**
Street justice: Assault suspect.	Students	15.1%	**19.9%**	**24.4%**	10.2%	8.6%	12.9%
	Police	9.4%	26.2%	**31.2%**	20.6%	3.8%	8.8%
Free/discount meals	Students	21.0%	**30.1%**	**28.0%**	7.5%	3.8%	8.6%
	Police	22.5%	**33.1%**	**20.0%**	9.4%	7.5%	6.2%
Holiday gifts	Students	**62.4%**	17.2%	7.5%	4.8%	3.2%	3.2%
	Police	26.9%	**38.1%**	**16.9%**	8.1%	1.9%	7.5%
Off-duty business	Students	**62.4%**	9.7%	12.4%	6.5%	3.8%	4.8%
	Police	**29.4%**	25.3%	**24.4%**	9.4%	4.4%	10.0%

again observe a substantial difference in the level of sanction recommended with 55% of the students supporting one of the three more severe sanctions compared to 36.2% of police respondents.

At the other end of the spectrum fully 8-12% of police respondents recommend no sanctions even for the most serious instances of corruption or dishonesty depicted. These include the scenarios regarding theft from a crime scene, accepting a traffic bribe, theft of found property, acceptance of a kickback, acceptance of free drinks in payment for allowing a bar to stay open after hours, and covering up a DUI involving another police official. Among these violations only in the cases of a body-shop kickback and covering up a DUI is the no sanction option more frequent for the student respondents, and in the case of the cover-up the response rates are actually about the same for the two groups. In the other four instances the no sanction option was selected by student respondents for only two to four percent of the cases.

On the lower end of the seriousness scale we also see stark differences in the recommended sanctions between the student and police samples. Only 17.8% of the student respondents indicated that the acceptance of a holiday gift, and 14.5% that running an off-duty alarm business, were serious or very serious violations. This compares to 48.8% and 47.5% of police respondents, respectively, rating these acts as serious or very serious violations. These differences are very much reflected in the level of sanction deemed appropriate for these acts. In the case of student respondents, 62.4% selected the no sanction option for both scenarios compared to 26.9% of police for accepting holiday gifts and 29.4% for running an off-duty alarm business.

Overall, when we compare Tables 3 and 4 we observe the expected relationship between the perceived seriousness of the act and the level of discipline supported. Harsher responses are reserved, by both the student and police samples, for those scenarios ranked more serious. Having said as much, however, we also observed a general reluctance on the part of the police to impose the harshest sanctions. Only for theft from a crime scene and acceptance of a traffic bribe is dismissal from the SAPS the most frequent response. The student respondents also have an overall stronger punitive stance regarding the more seriously ranked violations. For example, in the case of the theft from a crime scene student respondent's recommended one of the three harsher sanctions 89.8 percent of the time compared with police respondents recommending these sanctions 66.2 percent of the time. In the case of acceptance of a traffic bribe the differences were 77.5 percent for student respondents compared to 57.2 percent for police respondents.

Among the less seriously ranked scenarios, with the exception of free/discounted meals the police took a stronger stance on sanctions. Whereas almost two-thirds of student respondents indicated that no sanction was the most appropriate response to accepting a holiday gift or running an off-duty business approximately one-half of the officers indicated an oral or written reprimand was in order for such violations. In the case of free/discounted meals there was greater agreement between the two groups although the police were slightly more likely to recommend less serious sanctions.

One of the more interesting observations regarding sanctions is in the context of a possible demotion in the case of a supervisor giving a day off to a subordinate for tuning-up the supervisor's car. This is the only scenario for which more than ten percent of the police respondents felt that demotion was the appropriate sanction and appears directly related to the misuse of the supervisor's positional authority. Regardless of the benefit derived by the lower ranking official the police apparently do not define the situation as involving a real choice by the subordinate. It is also interesting that two-thirds of the

police respondents indicated (see Table 5) they would report such a violation, the third highest likelihood among all the scenarios.

Willingness to report: the "code"

A general reluctance or unwillingness of organizational members to report violations of expected standards of conduct poses significant challenges for an organization in its effort to institute and maintain organizational integrity. Such reluctance is indicated for both the police and student samples (see Table 5). Numerous researchers have concluded that among the distinguishing characteristics of the police occupational culture are the values of solidarity and secrecy that function to protect the organization from outside

Table 5
Comparison of Student and Police Officer Assessments of their
Willingness to Report an Observed Violation

	Traffic bribe	Bar bribe:	car tune-up	Crime Scene Theft	Theft of found property	Kickback
Police	71.3%[1] 1[2]	70.0% 2	66.2% 3	66.2% 3	65.6% 5	58.9% 6
Students	76.9% 2	35.0% 9	54.9% 5	82.3% 1[2]	63.4% 4	52.1% 7

	accident cover-up	Street justice:	Free/ discount meals	Off-duty business	Holiday gifts
Police	57.5% 7	56.9% 8	47.5% 9	45.6% 10	39.4% 11
Students	67.2% 3	54.3% 6	36.0% 8	22.1% 10	17.2% 11

[1] Percentage of respondents indicating they would or definitely would report a violation of scenario
[2] Rank order willingness to report a violation of depicted scenario.

scrutiny of deviant practices (Crank, 2004; Kleinig, 1996; Skolnick, 2000). While the existence of a code of silence is generally taken for granted, Barker (2002) reports that some recent research indicates the code may be declining in force and more recently, Rothwell and Baldwin (2007) concluded, based on a study of Georgia (USA) police officers, that the police are "slightly less likely to subscribe to a code of silence than civilian public employees" (p. 627). Rothwell and Baldwin's argument is not that a code of silence does not exist in police organizations but rather that such a code is not uniquely characteristic of a police culture, although they also assert that whistle-blowing may actually be more common in police agencies than in civilian agencies. Our findings provide some support for their perspective.

Overall our results are mixed, with the police sample indicating somewhat greater stated willingness to report violations compared to our student sample. In no case, however, do more than three-fourths of the police respondents indicate they would report an observed violation of any incident whereas four-fifths of the student respondents said they would report a theft from a crime scene and slightly more than three-fourths said

they would report an observed traffic bribe. In contrast, slightly more than one-third of student respondents indicated that they would report the acceptance of free drinks to allow a bar to stay open past its legally required closing time whereas seventy percent of the police officials indicated they would report such an incident.

As is the case with sanctions, both groups indicate a greater likelihood of reporting a violation they view as being more serious. However, the proportion of respondents indicating that they would report violations is consistently less than the proportion of those indicating an act as either a serious or very serious violation. Thus, even in the cases viewed to be the most serious there is a strong evidence of a reticence to inform on others. The police respondents indicate somewhat less willingness to report the more serious violations depicted compared with student respondents but substantially more willing to report the less serious violations. This may be suggestive of two counter-forces working within the SAPS, formal organizational rules and the informal police culture. To the extent that the student respondents are representative of the larger society their reluctance to report violations may be suggestive of a larger cultural value against "whistle-blowing" in which the police sub-cultural value of protecting their own operates. From the data it appears that the SAPS may be having some success in limiting lower level potentially corruptive influences such as the acceptance of gratuities or the receiving of gifts but on more serious levels of corruption the data is suggestive that the informal code not to inform on fellow officers may be acting as an inhibitor to limiting corruption.

A caveat to the above discussion, however, is that one must be cautious in drawing too strong an inference. That police respondents indicate that they would report a violation may be indicative of a tendency to provide the "correct" response to the question rather than an actual likelihood of reporting. On the other hand, the lower rate at which the police indicate a willingness to report violations such as theft from a crime scene, theft of found property, acceptance of a traffic bribe or acceptance of a bar bribe lends credibility to their reported willingness to report lower level violations when compared to our student respondents.

Conclusions

Our purpose in this paper has been to explore the potential contribution of the public component of Klockars' and Kutnjak-Ivkovic's (2004) organizational theory of police integrity to the understanding of police integrity by the use of comparison between a sample of non-commissioned officers in the South African Police Service and a non-police sample of students enrolled in a criminology program at a South African university. It should also be clear that the public component does not establish the criteria for evaluating organizational integrity, the police may certainly be held to a higher standard. As stated by Delattre (1996, p. 68), "Those who serve the public must hold to a higher standard of honesty and care for the public good than the general citizenry does."

Overall, the data present a mixed picture of integrity in the SAPS. On one hand, a non-trivial number of our police respondents, around twenty percent, indicate that even acts such as theft and bribery were not serious violations. In addition, the police respondents are at odds with our student respondents who by a very high degree define such acts as serious or very serious violations. In contrast, the police sample was much

more likely to assess such acts as accepting gifts and gratuities as well as operating an off duty business as more serious than our student respondents. Thus while there should be concern regarding police attitudes toward serious violations of integrity the greater support among the police respondents for prohibitions restricting less serious acts may indicate that the SAPS is having some success through policy, training, and supervision, in gaining support for anti-corruption efforts. And while the police, overall, are quite reluctant to support dismissal from the service, even for serious violations, they do support greater levels of discipline for less serious violations compared with our student sample.

It is also interesting that in eight of the scenarios the self-reported willingness of the police to report violations is higher in the police sample compared with the student sample. This is consistent with Barker's (2002) observation that some recent research indicates the code may be declining in force as well as Rothwell and Baldwin's (2007) conclusion that the police are "slightly less likely to subscribe to a code of silence than civilian public employees" (p. 627). Caution should be taken, however, in that their findings are based on American police samples. It should also be noted that in an earlier study by Meyer and Reyneke-Tarbitt (2009), South African police respondents were observed to be much more likely to state that they would personally report violations compared with their assessment of the likelihood that other police officials would report such violations. This suggests that a self-reported willingness to break the "code" will not necessarily translate into the actual reporting of violations as our data indicates that the "code" is active in the SAPS.

Due to the mixed findings in the present study it appears that Sauerman and Kutnjak-Ivkovic's (2008) characterization of the SAPS as an integrity-challenged agency may have painted with too broad a brush. The current study is certainly suggestive that the SAPS faces serious challenges to establishing and sustaining integrity and that based on either absolutist or normative criteria the organization falls below desired levels of professional integrity. However, there are also indications that a significant proportion of officers will support efforts of the organization to establish and maintain professional standards of integrity.

Implications

Among others, two major implications derive from our findings. First, even though our use of a sample representing the community dimension of Klockars and Kutnjak-Ivkovic's organizational theory of integrity has provided a small window into the greater complexity of police integrity than is revealed by a police sample alone, limitations of generalizing the results from the student sample to the larger society is strongly suggestive of the need for broader evaluations of societal attitudes regarding the acceptability of police behaviors as depicted in the scenarios. The second implication is the significance of the findings for policy development and promulgation in the SAPS, especially as regards the "code." In their research on integrity among non-commissioned officers in the SAPS, Meyer and Reyeneke-Tarbit (2009) noted the interrelationships among the several dimensions of the Klockars', et al. (2000) survey where the stated willingness to report a violation was directly related to perceived seriousness of the acts as well as the perceived appropriateness of discipline for violations. It is clear from the present findings that individuals recruited into the SAPS will arrive with already

established views regarding what are proper and improper behaviors as well as a sense of the relative seriousness those viewed as improper. That these perspectives may conflict with organizational standards is also indicated. In addition, our results strongly suggest that general attitudes supportive of the "code" are already present in our student sample indicating the need to address a culture of integrity early and continuously in recruit training. Overall, our results indicate the value of a comparative non-policing sample in assessing the overall integrity of a police organization and challenges in developing and implementing an effective organizational integrity plan.

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