An Implementation Model For Strategic Organizational Change in Ethiopian Commercial Banks

By

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Declaration

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I declare that AN IMPLEMENTATION MODEL FOR STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN ETHIOPIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS is my own work and that all sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

I further declare that I have not previously submitted this work, or part of it, for examination at UNISA for another qualification or at any other higher education institution.

February 2018

Signature   Date

(MR GM Belay)

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Abstract

The issue of successful implementation of strategic organizational change is not sufficiently addressed in the literature of organizational change even though there is unanimity in reporting a high rate of failure. Moreover, attempts to provide supportive guidelines that enhance implementation success are meager and their validity in nonwestern contexts is disputed. Thus, the present study tried to address the question of how a strategic organizational change can be successfully implemented by developing an implementation model within the context of Ethiopian commercial banks. In Ethiopia, commercial banking is exclusively reserved for nationals. This makes the setting a typical national context from where two commercial banks were included in the present study through maintaining maximum variation in ownership structure. Embedded in each bank, cases of teams which were established to redesign a specific type of business process were identified to theoretically sample participants for the in-depth interviews. Applying an inductive multiple case study strategy, a combination of within-case and cross-case analyses were employed with the support of the ATLAS.ti software. As a result, theoretical propositions were made and an implementation model for strategic organizational change was developed by taking the context of commercial banks in Ethiopia into consideration. The findings indicate that national and organizational contexts demand contextualized approaches to implement strategic organizational change. Although several concepts which are documented in the extant literature were confirmed, original propositions are also made by the present study. A triple helix of initiating, designing, and implementing were emerged as inseparable components of the proposed implementation model for strategic organizational change in a context where cognitive and technical readiness is ensured.

Key Words

Implementation model, strategic change, commercial banks, Ethiopia, actor networking, initiating, designing, power, nonprofit motive, source of initiative, routines, artifacts

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List of Abbreviations

AARP: After Action Review Process

BPR: Business Process Reengineering

BSC: Balanced Scorecard

CAQDA: Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software

CAS: Complex Adaptive Systems

CSR: Case Study Research

GE: General Electric

ILT: Implicit Leadership Theory

NBE: National Bank of Ethiopia

OC: Organizational Change

OD: Organization Development

PD: Primary Document

SS: Six Sigma

TQM: Total Quality Management

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

In this chapter, introductory explanations about the thesis are presented. Background information about the study, the research problem, aims and objectives, rationale of the research, significance of the research, delimitations and scope of the research, limitations of the study, and outlines of the thesis are the sections this chapter is comprised of.

1.2. Background of the Study

Change is being considered as the only constant in this dynamic world. Organizational change is a notion that existed as long as the formal field of management thoughts. The scientific management theory of Taylor early in 1911 can be considered as an initiative to change the way organizations operate and increase efficiency (worker productivity). Since then, various approaches have been proposed as a supplement or as critic to predecessors' works (Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011). Explicit account to the topic is given in the literature since the 1940s. Kurt Lewin is a pioneer contributor to the present day theories and models of change management (Elrod II & Tippet, 2002; Burnes, 2004a, b).

Organizational change can be initiated for different purposes. The magnitude of organizational impacts of change is also different depending on the type of change. This study is concerned with the implementation of organizational change that has organizational wide impact. Strategic change, in addition to the scope refers to "discontinuous changes in an organization's strategy, goals, form of authority and technology" (Wang & Wang, 2017:727). These types of changes are what this research refers to as strategic organizational change.

It is common to hear news of organizational change initiatives in different organizations. Oftentimes, leaders and managers use various tools of organizational change. As a result, these tools that are sought as means of organizational change are now turned to be management fads (Balogun, 2001). However, change initiatives record low rate of success (Pasmore, 2011; Schwarz, 2009; Franken, Edwards, & Lambert, 2009; Brenner, 2008; Gilley, Dixon, & Gilley, 2008; Kazmi, 2008; Dufour & Steane, 2006; Mankins & Steele, 2005; Sterling, 2003).

The implementation of organizational change gained attention as a result of high failure rate in the discourse of organizational change. Jacobs, Witteloostuijn and Christe-Zeyse (2013:773) for example explicitly raised questions of "why do so many organizational change initiatives fail to deliver?" and "how can organizational change processes be implemented in a way that assures success?" The second question is of interest to the present research. While discussing the shortcomings in the literature (of organizational change) in addressing these questions, these authors argue that the literature in organizational change is fragmented.

A search for how intended organizational changes could be realized may have different attributes. As Beer (2011), Pasmore (2011), Stragalas (2010) and other scholars in the field recommend, attention should be given to the problems that persist in the implementation of change initiatives and that hinder the success of the initiative. Worley and Lawler (2010) and Kazmi (2008) claim that managers and supervisors need to have a clear, theoretically sound and practical change implementation framework. This idea implies the possibility of enhancing the success of implementing organizational change through the application of a guideline framed on the basis of a theoretically sound model.

However, organizational change models that are overrepresented in the literature are mostly triggered by the challenges faced by U.S. corporations following the great depression of the 1970 and the accompanying emergence of Japanese companies in the American market. The realization that American companies had been losing grounds for Japanese companies provoked American scholars and served as a turning point for them to embark on turnaround in their businesses. The resultant move led to the emergence of several model of organizational change; but all are targeted towards gaining back the strongholds of the American companies. This indicates how the literature on organizational change is excessively focusing on the American context (Pettigrew, Woodman & Cameron, 2001; Hempel & Martinsons, 2009).

Therefore, this research was conducted with an expectation to have a role in initiating debates on the issue of contextualized models that could be used to guide implementation of strategic organizational change. To do so, the context of commercial banking sector in Ethiopia was selected. Context in this research was considered as an important factor that determines the type of implementation approach that needs to be applied in order to make strategic organizational change effective (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999).

Players in the banking industry of Ethiopia are all domestic as foreign banks are prohibited to enter the country. The biggest players are, thus, state owned banks. There are also private banks operating in the market since the introduction of government's 1994 reform to allow domestic private investor in the financial sector (Bezabih & Desta, 2014). This liberalization effort by the government is, however, yet to be open for foreign banks as well. The government's concern is to give probation to domestic banks so that they will be able to compete with international banks.

In Ethiopia, banking operation is supervised and regulated by the central bank called the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). Besides, the government-owned commercial banks function under the supervision of the government so that it will contribute towards the priority development programs of the government. With this in mind, there were reforms in government-owned banks. The reform programs were basically the same across government banks. Their origin of initiation was also the same (the government). In this study, one of the two government-owned commercial banks is used as one case to deeply investigate its experience in implementing a strategic organizational change.

The number of private commercial banks is relatively greater compared to the government owned ones. But they are smaller in size. Most of the private banks are new to the industry. Only eight of them have longer experience as they were established within a few years period after the 1994's reform. Still, there are new entrants to the market every year. There was no significantly known strategic organizational change project among private banks. Based on the researcher's preliminary investigation, only one of such banks had prior experience in initiating strategic organizational change and hence became the other case of the study.

This research therefore, took cases of two commercial banks' strategic organizational change implementation experiences to inductively develop and propose an implementation model which may be used as a guideline for leading future strategic organizational change endeavors in the sector. The cases represent the context of banking sector in the country which is composed of government-owned and private banks. Chapter Four provides further details on the cases.

1.3. Statement of the Problem

The importance of organizational change has never been disputed in the literature of organizational change. Rather, it is becoming a core organizational capability. Its importance to organizations is increasing because of an alarming increase in the intensity of competition which demands organizational change. "Competitive advantage, organizational renewal, technological transformation, international standards, globalization, innovation and performance" are commonly referred factors that trigger change (Jacobs, Witteloostuijn and Christe-Zeyse, 2013; Imran, Rehman, Aslam & Bilal, 2016: 1098).

In other words, organizations need to be flexible enough to fit to environmental dynamics and to meet changing demands of customers (Wang & Wang, 2017). Thus, organizational change is assumed to have a positive contribution to organizational effectiveness (Appelbaum, St-Pierre & Glavas, 1998).

Accepting the contribution of organizational change to organizational performance naturally leads to embracing some sort of organizational change. However, mere initiation of an organizational change does not guarantee better performance; implementation success does! On the other hand, failure to successfully implement especially strategic organizational change can be as costly as putting the organization to its end. The risk of failure is presumably becoming higher as the environment within which businesses operate is becoming more complex and dynamic today than it was before.

In the literature, it has been indicated that implementation of strategic change is the most difficult phase in strategic change management (Balogun, 2001; Pfeifer & Schimit, 2005). However, the practice of implementing strategic organizational change is far from success. It is still reported to have continued experiencing about 70% failure rate (Packard, 2017; Imran *et al.*, 2016; Jacobs, Witteloostuijn & Christe-Zeyse, 2013: Pasmore, 2011; Schwarz, 2009; Franken *et al.*, 2009; Brenner, 2008).

The low track record of implementation led to a growing demand in having an approach which guides implementation success. Beer and Nohria (2000) pioneered the assertion of 70% failure rate and implied implementation success as a core organizational capability. With this logic, scholars accept organizational change as an integral part of a manager's standard business practices (Appelbaum *et al.*, 1998; Van de Ven & Sun, 2011; Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011).

Converging with Pettigrew *et al.* (2001) to be cognizant of context, Jacobs *et al.*, (2013) attribute the low success rate to lack of development in the theory of change which is faced by the double hurdles of scholarly quality and practical relevance. Jacobs *et al.* (2013:773) further characterizes the literature in organizational change as "debilitating fragmentation". Young (2009) associates this with the literature's focus on comparing change typologies instead of building on common themes. Young's (2009) deliberation is reiterated later by Maes and Van Hootegem (2011) by trying to integrate typologies of dichotomies based on eight dimensions. Reiterating scholars' frequent assertion of seventy percent failure, Young (2009), also calls for the development of change process theory which may serve as a guide for implementation of organizational change.

Propositions are made by Stragalas (2010), Real and Marshal (2005), Worley and Lawler (2010), Kazmi (2008) and Okumus (2003) about the possibility of enhancing the effectiveness of implementing strategic organizational change through applying an appropriate implementation model. Packard (2017) also notes the absence of a dependable framework which may be used as guidance for organizational change research. However, to the best of the researcher's effort, there is no widely known implementation model that is empirically tested across varying contexts and recommended to be applied in order to reduce the possibility of failure.

Besides, recent literature still acknowledges the dearth of literature in implementation of change despite the unanimous report about high rate of failure. Albeit this practical reality, present time organizations even need to be more effective in implementing organizational innovation and change. Lin, Chen and Su (2017) explain the importance of innovativeness and change as a source of competitive advantage among businesses of today which are expected to operate in a more intensified competition and in a more globalized world than ever before. Lin *et al.* (2017) also acknowledge that there is no serious discussion on change implementation.

The issue of modeling organizational change has gained attention in the literature especially since the 1990s. But the emergence of these models did not change the track record of organizational change implementation effectiveness. There is still a problem of low success rate in implementing organizational change (Packard, 2017; Pasmore, 2011; Schwarz, 2009; Franken *et al.*, 2009; Brenner, 2008). Why these models (theories) of implementing organizational change did not solve the problem of high rate of failure implies the need to critically look into the problems of change implementation approaches in the extant literature.

Organizational change (OC) research predominantly focuses on change process (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995) and takes the American context as a background (Hempel & Martinsons, 2009; Pettigrew *et al*., 2001). Applying a list of sequential actions (steps) in implementing change while no contextual congruence is maintained probably limits the usefulness of process theories of change implementation (Hempel & Martinsons, 2009). Pettigrew *et al.* (2001) argue that the effect of national context on organizational change remains unexplored despite the fact that it has been pointed out by different scholars as an important variable in organizational change.

Organizational change literature according to Pettigrew *et al*. (2001), falls short of examination of multiple contexts, international considerations and cross-cultural comparisons. It needs further development in these regards. This idea is also more strictly pronounced by Hempel and Martinsons (2009). They call for attention to more comprehensive international and cross-cultural research and a shift from relying on theories and models which are dominated by American perspectives and evidences. This straightforward application of US framed models to non-US settings faces contextual obstacles. Therefore, as recommended by Hempel and Martinsons (2009), cultural, economic, social and legal contexts should be taken into account when developing a change model.

Even though OC literature is dominated by American perspectives and evidences and has an unwitting tendency to treat context as taken for granted background; practically, organizational change occurs in diverse contexts (Pettigrew *et al*., 2001). Therefore, research needs to be done on "how OC initiatives are influenced by non-western contextual elements" to come up with more comprehensive OC models and theories (Hempel & Martinsons, 2009:460) and improve implementation effectiveness (Stragalas, 2010).

These criticisms to previous works in organizational change do not provide a solution to the practical problem of high rate of failure except pointing out that there are different dimensions of limitations in organizational change theory. Many authors (e.g. Schwarz, 2009; Kazmi, 2008; Dufour & Steane, 2006) agree in the fact that the ineffectiveness of change initiatives is caused by the relatively fragmentary nature of the theory in change implementation. Worley and Lawler (2010); Kazmi (2008) and Okumus (2003) claim that managers and supervisors need to have a clear, theoretically sound and practical change implementation framework. Stragalas (2010:31) emphasized the possibility of reversing the failing track record of change initiatives through "a comprehensive change implementation model." This indicates that the theory of strategic change implementation still needs to be developed well. More attention and efforts are needed to be given to the development of the theory of strategic organizational change implementation. This contributes to enhancing the success rate of strategic organizational change implementation.

This study therefore intends to contribute to the development of organizational change theory by addressing the context theme and developing a strategic change implementation model that is applicable in the context of developing economies specifically in the financial sector. Thus, the question central to this study was:

- How can an implementation model for strategic organizational change be developed with consideration to the context of Ethiopian commercial banks?

1.4. Aims and Objectives of the Study

This research was conducted in search of a model that may serve as a guideline to implement strategic organizational change in commercial banks in Ethiopia on the one side and to develop theoretical propositions in contextual strategic organizational change implementation on the other. The objectives of this research were to:

- Explore contextual factors that influence the implementation of strategic organizational change in the context of commercial banking sector in Ethiopia;
- Develop a strategic organizational change implementation model within the context of commercial banks in Ethiopia; and

- Put forward theoretical propositions in connection with contextual strategic organizational change implementation.

This research was initiated because it was believed that it contributes to the development of knowledge in developing an implementation model for strategic organizational change through inductive procedures based on empirical data in a specific national and industrial context. As it is conducted in a developing economy context, it will add value to the development of organizational change theories in a non-western perspective as literature is dominated by perspectives which took western contexts as common ground (Pettigrew *et al.*, 2001).

1.5. Rationale of the Study

African nations such as Ethiopia need to undertake huge transformations to increase their capacity to participate in the world trade and exploit international opportunities to growth and poverty reduction. This will be realized through nurturing and developing business organizations that will be actively participating in the world trade. The greatest challenge to this end could be competitiveness in the international market. Hence, exerting an effort to change their organization's theory of how to compete (i.e., strategy) which fits to the specific national situations should be expected of leaders in connection with overcoming this challenge.

As the financial sector in Ethiopia is not permitted for foreign firms so far, extant players do not have real experiences of competing with multinational banks. Expected deregulation of the sector in connection with the country's accession to the WTO makes domestic commercial banks of Ethiopia relatively vulnerable to the resultant change in the structure of competition. This implies the potential benefit of strategic organizational change and its successful implementation with respect to enhancing competitiveness of Ethiopian commercial banks. This could be a reason to consider this sector as a setting within which the agenda of strategic organizational change implementation could be a high priority. Therefore, this study on strategic organizational change implementation model for Ethiopian commercial banks is relevant.

Moreover, the dearth of literature and lack of attention towards formulating models and theories of strategic organizational change implementation as compared to theories and models of strategic design and formulation adds to the rationale behind initiating this research.

1.6. Significance of the Study

This study will benefit management practitioners and change managers in the financial sector of Ethiopia by providing a strategic organizational change implementation model that guides implementation of strategic organizational change initiatives to succeed. As the research targets the Ethiopian context in the change implementation literature, potential researchers will get a reference for further or related studies in the context. Moreover, this research is believed to be a contribution to the literature of strategic organizational change implementation trying to develop a model that aims at reducing the rate of implementation failure in strategic change to the attention of scholars. As the study is based on empirical data, it provides commercial bank leaders in Ethiopia with a model that may support them as a guideline during strategic organizational change implementation.

1.7. Scope and Delimitations of the Study

The research is limited to developing a model that may serve as a framework of implementing strategic organizational change in commercial banks in Ethiopia. The study is based on multiple cases of commercial banks that are selected because they undertook strategic organizational change. The implementation of organization wide initiatives aiming at bringing about an organizational transformation was the focus of this study. The proposed model is supposed to be applied by Ethiopian commercial banks in leading future strategic organizational changes. The applicability of this model to other sectors and other contexts is yet to be tested.

1.8. Limitations of the Study

To build context sensitive model of implementing strategic organizational change (Balogun, 2001; Armenakis & Harris, 2009), the present research was designed to be an inductive multiple case study that is based on empirical data from two commercial banks in Ethiopia. Even though the researcher believes that the targeted change initiatives (cases) have unique features that might not be apparent in other business sectors in the country, the focus on a single industry may limit the transferability of the findings of the present study.

The uniqueness of the context is the justification for selecting Ethiopian commercial banking sector. However, despite its contribution in gaining new insights, the selected context is characterized by low intensity of competition. This may limit transferability of findings to other business contexts.

Theory of implementing strategic organizational change is not explicitly represented in the literature (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011). As detailed in Chapter Two, the theory in strategic organizational change implementation needs to develop yet. This caused difficulty in sharpening the propositions (in line with extent theory) that are made by the present study.

Moreover, in terms of level of development, the propositions made by the present research are limited to dealing with only the descriptive (inductive) part of the theory-building cycle in the sense of Carlile and Christenson's (2004) explications of theory building cycle in management research. Propositions require further improvement through deductive researches that are conducted in other contexts before considering the present findings as prescriptive theories (Christensen & Carlile, 2009).

1.9. Organization of the Thesis

Chapter One which is an introductory chapter tries to shed light on what the study is about, and why it is important to conduct it. The second chapter lays the literature foundation of the research. As the present study is conceptual, that is based on model development; Chapter Two tries to examine what similar models in what contexts have already been developed so far, and what reason necessitated the search for the development of new model. How the research was designed and executed is explained in the Third Chapter while the Fourth Chapter describes the cases (commercial banks) that participated in the research.

Chapters Five to Seven are dedicated to the data and concepts that resulted from analyses of the data. In Chapter Five, major categories that were analyzed from the cases are presented. Chapter Six discusses the implications of these emergent categories to the implementation of strategic organizational change against the literatures that are presented in chapter two. Cross-case analyses results are reported in the Seventh Chapter. In this chapter, the emergent propositions which served as inputs to the developed implementation model are presented. The Eighth Chapter deals with conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, a review of literature related to strategic organizational change and its implementation is presented. Reviewing the literature on organizational change is a challenging task because the nature of the topic and the subject on which it applies (i.e., organizations) are very dynamic. The conceptualization of the notions (i.e., change and organizations) is evolving and it now appears to have reached to a tempting level of abandoning all and starting afresh (Nasim & Sushil, 2011); not a simple decision though.

Scholars unequivocally echoed the importance of organizational change on the one hand and low success rate of such changes on the other. It is paradoxical that the change literature is characterized by introductions of applause about the significance of organizational change with respect to ensuring organizational survival and fitness to a dynamic environment while at the same time reporting that only few (not greater than one-third) among those that initiate organizational change succeed in effectively changing.

In specific terms, this chapter reports literature that is reviewed and organized under (1) evolution of basic concepts and theories about organizational change, (2) views of scholars on track records of organizational change initiatives, and (3) selected models of organizational change implementation. In addition, a synthesis of the reviewed literature and concluding remarks are also included in the chapter.

2.2. Fundamental Concepts of Organizational Change

The plethora of views on and explanations about organizational change result in various descriptions about its meanings. For the purpose of this research, only a focused description is presented.

2.2.1. Definition of Strategic Organizational Change

To begin with a simpler assertion, an organizational change is "a difference in form, quality, or state over time in an organizational entity" (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011:60). This implies that organizational change is manifested by an alteration or difference in state of some attributes of an organization. Mills, Dye and Mills (2009:4) define organizational change as "an alteration of a core aspect of an organization's operation." This definition is still about alteration on organizational attributes but qualified as "core". Mills *et al.* (2009) further explicate these aspects to be structure, technology, culture, leadership, goal or human resources of the organization.

A synthesis from the two definitions could be an alteration on core organizational attributes. A possible contemplation triggered by these definitions about organizational change could be diversity of change typologies based on scope of change which is determined by the nature of organizational attributes affected by a specific change. Consistent to such thinking, a specific type of organizational change (i.e., strategic change) is focused on in the present research.

Strategic change refers to the scope of alteration (change) in an organization. As such, it results in changes in the entire character of the organization as opposed to convergent changes in component parts of the organization. According to Rod *et al.* (2009) strategic change fundamentally alters the very character of the organization not simply a difference in some attributes such as structure, strategy, and process.

As Wang and Wang (2017:727) explain, "strategic change occurs when a firm makes difficult-to-reverse corporate and business decisions in its product and market domains, resource allocation, competitive advantages, and core technologies that fundamentally alter the relationship between the organization and its environment."

Strategic organizational change is the reformulation of long term organizational ends on an ongoing basis by taking environmental turbulence into account (Appelbaum *et al.,* 1998). Rajagopalan and Sprietzer (1997) also defined it as an organizational change that brings a change in the content of a firm's strategy. Balogun (2001) defined strategic change as organizational transition encompassing changes in strategy, structure, systems, processes and culture.

From the above definitions by different scholars, Rajagopalan and Sprietzer's (1997) and Balogun's (2001) definition do not qualify as a strategic change in the definition of the others especially by Rod, Ashill and Saunders (2009). As the depth in the explanation on strategic change implementation increases, one hardly identifies convergence in views and discourses.

Besides, scholars can be categorized based on their views as those (e.g. Nelson, 2003; Mento, Jones and Dirndorfer, 2002; Balogun, 2001; Kotter, 1995;) who consider organizational change as a move (process of transformation) from a status quo to a desired state and others (e.g. Appelbaum *et al.*, 1998; Pryor, Taneja, Humphreys, Adnderson & Singleton, 2008 & Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011) who consider change as an integral part of a manager's task and an organization's functions and systems.

A relatively new insight about strategic change comes from the systems perspective to change. According to this perspective, change is considered as a system in itself instead of a process of changing a system. As extensively described by Maes and Van Hootegem (2011), change is a dynamic and complex adaptive system that operates close to the edge of chaos that engenders individual, group, organizational and social effects through fluctuating input and process elements and attributes.

Besides, a paradoxical view of dualities of change and continuity consider strategy and organization as inseparable "single merged duality" (Graetz & Smith, 2010:149). In their article which reviews various philosophies and recommends pluralistic approaches, Graetz and Smith (2010) also posit that organizational change is a natural phenomenon which unfolds continuously in a non-linear complexity. The old views of managing and leading change in a controllable step-by-step process which intends to set a new organizational order (structure, system, and process) do not result in success. Organizations should shift into organizing and strategizing single duality from the old either-or dilemma.

The variations in the meanings of organizational change imply that an account of theoretical underpinnings and their ontological bases could shed light on the divergence in the literature. However, recent literature puts cautionary message not to take side into a single camp; instead to strive to understand the complementary features of paradoxical views. Graetz and Smith (2010:151) assert, "rather than concentrating on one theoretical or philosophical perspective at the expense of competing perspectives, the value to practice is in developing an understanding of the nexus between multiple philosophical perspectives, their differences and commonalities." In the following section, a brief discussion on prominent ones is presented.

2.3. Theoretical Underpinnings behind Organizational Change

The literature on organizational change has roots in some thoughts that have been evolved since antiquity (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005). Two ontological views (i.e., process and substance or thing) which are discussed hereafter are pillars of these evolutions.

2.3.1. Process and Substantive Metaphysics

The knowledge of organizational life can be affected by ontological stance about reality. Because of its nature, the study of organizational change and theories thereof benefits from clarifying alternative worldviews. As Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, and Van de Ven (2013:4) succinctly describe, there are two ontological views—"one a world made of things in which processes represent change in things (grounded in a substantive metaphysics) and the other a world of processes, in which things are reifications of processes … (grounded in process metaphysics)." As Rescher (1996) explicates these views in more detail, process philosophy of Americans has roots in the philosophies of Heraclitus and Democritus back in antiquity. Process ontology views reality as different types of processes by taking examples of sun as a flaming fire and river as an ever-changing flow.

The subject of this research, organizational change, needs to be conceptualized clearly in terms of what accounts for it. The question of whether an organizational change is: (1) a process of change in an already existing organization (i.e., an entity that exists independent of the change), or (2) a process of how an organization evolves over time affects our concepts of how strategic organizational change unfolds. This has logical affiliation with the metaphysics of processes (Langley *et al.*, 2013).

Van de Ven and Poole (2005:6) also discuss the ontology of process into the study of organizational change. They contrast process ontology which posits process as fundamental reality with that of thing (substance) which exists independent of processes as "*a world made of things in which processes represent change in things*, and the other *a world of processes in which things are reifications of processes* [emphasis in original]".

A synthesis from the literature reviewed by Lin *et al.* (2017) indicates the link between management innovation and knowledge management, dynamic capability and complex adaptive systems. These are all consistent with the process theory of change.

There is also an epistemic duality in studying organizational change. There are two categories of approaches to study organizational change: (1) variance and (2) process. These two approaches are presented in the upcoming section.

2.3.2. Process and Variance Theorizing

Based on how organizational change is studied (theorized), there are two epistemologies: (1) variance study and (2) process study. Langley (1999) explains variance and process approaches of studying strategic organizational change in the same way as Van de Ven and Poole (2005) do. According to Langley (1999), process theory affords to explicate organizational change theory as a loop not as a linear cause-effect relationship. This captures the dynamic complexity of organizational reality. The capacity of explaining complex organizational reality in a higher level of abstraction with the help of process theory is also presented by Chiles (2003). On the other hand, a substantive metaphysics of process conceives process as sequences that bring about changes in an organization or its components (as things).

In general, studies of organizational change can be epistemologically categorised into variance or process approaches as Langley *et al.* (2013:6) explain:

> *research questions focusing on how the qualities of an entity (e.g., an individual, group, organization, institution) change over time may be studied from the perspective of a substantive metaphysics in which processes represent changes in things. Other research questions that focus on how processes themselves ("sense making," decision making, performing, identifying, etc.) emerge, develop, grow, and decline are compatible with a process metaphysics in which the focus is on how processes (rather than things) unfold over time.*

In a shorter way, Langley *et al.* (2013:4) summarizes it as "variance theorizing generates *know-what* type of knowledge, [whereas] process theorizing produces *know-how [type of]* knowledge." This indicates the embeddedness of the two metaphysics in the two epistemologies (i.e., variance and process).

Van de Ven and Poole's (2005) expanded explanation combines variance and process approaches and identifies four typologies of approaches of studying organizational change: (1) variance study of change in organization, (2) process study of change in organization, (3) process study of organizing and (4) variance study of organizing. These approaches are repertoire among which to choose depending on the question on hand. However, Van de Ven and Poole (2005) contend that a single approach is not capable of capturing a complete understanding of organizational change compared to the rather pluralistic approach which better combines some or all of the approaches in a single inquiry.

Similarly, Langley *et al*. (2013) discusses about the missing of knowledge because of the underrepresentation of process theorizing in the literature of organization and change. The missing is a result of the incapability of the variance approach to capture reality in the fly. Chiles (2003: 288) strengthens this idea as:

> *[b]ecause process models usually address multiple levels and units of analysis and utilize qualitative (as well as quantitative) analysis techniques to make sense of time-ordered data, they tend to be rich in context, high in complexity, and dynamic in character.*

Chiles (2003:290) warns a risk of overlooking the process view as managers cannot gain complete understanding of organizational realities by only focusing on variance theorizing which dominates the literature:

> *variance and process theorizing offer very different explanations of organizational behavior. They provide educators two very different ways of training managers, and offer managers two very different ways of making sense of the world. Both theoretical orientations must figure into our scholarly conversation about the role of theory in management education. ... By overlooking process theory, we risk sending managers into the workforce ill-prepared to handle the kaleidic reality that awaits them in the new world of business.*

The understanding of organizational phenomena requires managers to be equipped with both variance and process theories as the organizational reality is multifaceted, complex and dynamic in nature. Present reality in organizational systems call even greater attention to process theory compared to variance theory (Chiles, 2003).

A relatively comprehensive account of process theory of organizational change is made by Van de Ven and Poole (1995). In an attempt to explain how and why organizational change unfolds, they identify four motors of organizational change resulting in four different typologies of change theories. As they succinctly explain it in their abstract, the "four theories represent sequences of change events that are driven by different conceptual motors and operate at different organizational levels." They also identify "the circumstances when each theory applies and proposes how interplay among the theories produces a wide variety of more complex theories of change and development in organizational life." (p. 510).

These authors introduced four theories of organizational change: (1) life cycle, (2) teleology, (3) dialectic and (4) evolution. In their explanation in a two dimensional matrix, they used prescription as one dimension of the conditions or motors which trigger the organizational change as explained by each process theory. However, prescription or deterministic approaches (Howes & Quinn, 1978) overlap with the variance theory.

2.3.3. Extension into Systems Perspective and Complexity Theories

Burton-Jones, Mclean, and Monod (2011) add systems approach as a third theory in addition to variance and process. They recommend the possibility of pragmatist approach by combining them. Moreover, implying the addition of the systems perspective into and making three in the repertoire, the application of complexity theory and the notion of complex adaptive systems (Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997) are discussed in connection with the study of organizational change. Van de Ven and Poole (2005) also suggest extension works towards systems theory with an intention to afford explanations of more chaotic organizational realities.

As mentioned earlier, the difference in views about organizations underpin behind the plethora of change typologies. Organizational changes that are planned or emergent, episodic of continuous, fast or slow are common dichotomies in the literature (Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011; Weick & Quinn, 1999; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Mills *et al.*, 2009). However, these added to fragmentation in the literature and ambiguity in understanding and management of organizational change (Jacobs *et al.*, 2013; Marshak, 2002; Barnett & Carol, 1995).

Attempting to contribute towards integrating these divergences, Maes and Van Hootegem (2011) reviewed the literature in the field since the 1970s. They proposed the systems approach and came up with a notion of change as a system in itself. The systems approach gives a holistic view to organizational change and considers organizations as open and complex adaptive systems which operate in a far from equilibrium paradoxical state. This notion connects systems theory with complexity theories.

Burnes (2005) explains complexity theories and their implications for organizational change. As it was explained by other scholars (e.g., Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Marshak, 2002), complexity theory is described to have a potential of explaining organizations that are operating in a rapidly changing world. Burnes (2005) tries to link the notion of applying complexity theory in describing changes in human behaviour in organizations with the evolution of thoughts about organizational change. In doing so, Burnes (2005) reminds us that up to the 1980s, the literature of organizational change was dominated by the planned approach which was greatly influenced by Kurt Lewin's three-step model.

However, following the oil crisis in the 1970s and the emergence of corporate Japan, U.S. companies were challenged by the rapidly changing environment and hence had to search for quick but at the same time fundamental changes. This signalled the emergence of an emergent approach to change instead of planned; and continuous change instead of punctuated equilibrium. The changes are also expected to affect all organizational parts simultaneously and to treat the change as a whole system instead of one-at-a-time type of incremental change. These were the bridges that led organizational change literature into a mention of complexity theory.

Brown and Eisenhardt (1997:1) also discuss continuous change in connection with complexity theory. In their discussion, they build on comparisons between continuous change and punctuated equilibrium model of change (i.e. Weick & Quinn's episodic change); and between incremental and radical change. Their inductive research reveals that innovative projects are associated with "limited structure around responsibilities and priorities with extensive communication and design freedom to create improvisation within current projects." This indicates that innovation requires freedom to help change surf continuously. The limit of freedom is also explicated in line with complexity theory—the blend should be "neither so structured that change cannot occur nor so unstructured that chaos ensues." (p.1)

From this, Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) assert that, an organizational characteristic which they termed as "semistructures" emerged (p.28). Semistructure is in the middle between rigid (mechanistic) structure which does not allow change and organic structure in which there are few or limited orders which lead to a chaotic organization. The other emergent organizational characteristic is links in time. Unlike those in less successful organizations, managers in successfully innovative organizations create a link among past, present and future times. Brown and Eisenhardt (1997:30) argue that "organizational change readily occurs because links in time create the direction, continuity, and tempo of change."

Chaos theory, dissipative structure theory and Complex Adaptive System (CAS) theories are engendered the under the umbrella of complexity theories (Burnes, 2005). While chaos theory and dissipative structure theory are applicable for a whole system; complex adaptive system theory is meant for component parts (on an individual component system basis). Van de Ven and Poole's (1995) typologies which are classified based on the unit of change and model of change combinations can have potential overlap with these complexity theories. Besides, as Marshak (2002) and Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) explain, the emergence of third dimension (i.e. tempo) in addition to unit of change and mode of change on Van de Ven and

Poole's (1995) mode indicates the interlink between the process theories of organizational change and complexity theory.

However, as complexity theory is brought from the natural sciences and it is a mathematical model which is applied for chaotic (extremely complex non linear systems); it is very difficult to conclude that complexity theory is being used in organizational settings in a prescriptive manner. Rather it is a metaphorical level of use. Therefore, it is imperative to address how complexity theory can replace previous organizational change theories. Burnes (2005:87) warns that:

> *[if] organizations are to be re-conceptualised as dynamic non-linear systems capable of continuous transformation through self-organization, advocates of this approach will need to show either that it is more than just a metaphorical device, or that even as such it is able to resolve the problems of managing and changing organizations more effectively than other approaches that are on offer (p.87).*

Stacey (1995) also discusses complexity theory especially by focusing on complex adaptive systems. Burnes (2005) does not contradict with Stacey's (1995) discussion; rather his work is more extensive and ordered in that it tries to take complexity theories as an umbrella under which other component theories can be accounted for. Amongst the communalities is the fact that how complexity theory is applied replacing previously known management approaches is not developed yet: "how this is done is a research program of great importance to strategic management" (Stacey, 1995: 491).

Bernard Burnes also discusses complexity theory in connection with Kurt Lewin's model. He claims the possibility of implementing new concepts of complexity theory in organizational change practices by revisiting Lewin's model and extending on it. The rationale behind this proposal is explained in line with the model's (Lewin's) common grounds with complexity theory that lays the foundation on which to build.

Marshak's (2002) work is a piece which attempts to question the language use of scholars and practitioners of organizational change alike. According to Marshak (2002), there is an absence or lack of precise and unambiguous language to address emerging dynamics of contemporary organizations. Such organizations in the new context need continuous change of whole systems. This kind of change is referred to as "morphing" (Marshak, 2002). "When we combine the dimensions of parts-wholes and episodic-continuous change into a matrix, the emerging nature of contemporary organizational change is suggested" as depicted by the table below (Marshak, 2002:282).

Table 2.1: The four change scenarios

Dimensions	Focus on parts/segments	Focus on patterns/wholes
Episodic change	Periodic Operational Adjustments • Gap analyses • Fix its	Periodic Systemic (Re) Arrangements • Re-engineering • System redesign
Continuous change	Continuous Operational Adaptations • On-going improvements • Kaizen, TQM	Continuous systemic Alignments • On-going organizing • 'Morphing'

Source: Marshak (2002:282)

Morphing is the new language added when the nature of change is continuous and the whole system is affected simultaneously. With this exception, the scenarios identified here are not different from that of Van de Ven and Poole's (1995) pertaining to the units of change (i.e. the dimensions on the columns of table 2.1) and Weick and Quinn's (1999) third dimension of tempo (which refers to episodic-continuous divide). Besides, even the row dimensions are not conceptually different from Van de Ven and Poole's mode of change dimensions of prescribed and constructive. Prescribed (which is programmatic) overlaps with episodic (as it is intentional as per Weick & Quinn's (1999) explanation) and constructive (emergent) matches with Marshak's (2002) continuous.

The motor notion behind the four typologies of change, as explicated by Van de Ven and Poole (1995), could rather have implication about relevant implementation strategies. Moreover, this work does not seem to capture the issue of what will happen to the four typologies of change when the third dimension (i.e., tempo) comes with the increasing environmental dynamism. Van de Ven and Poole's attempt to link dialectical typology with complexity theory could have served as an extension slot for later scholars such as Marshak (2002).

Marshak (2002) also differs from Brown and Eisenhardt's (1997) assertion that continuous changing which demands organizations to be grown with improvisation capabilities instead of being assembled at once. This implies continuous change which evolves through sequences of steps which are situated in different scenario from Marshak's (2002) morphing does.

Brown and Eisenhardt (1997:31) brought other insights into implementation of organizational change and innovation. The first is their assertion that organizations that are capable of continuously improvising "must be grown, not assembled at a single point in time" whereas the second relates to "sequenced steps" to implement the changes or innovations. The third concept which depends on the second one is about "the inimitability of this important capability." As they explicate, imitating such type of change is difficult as it requires knowing the recipe of sequence of steps being an outsider who can only take a snapshot of organizational practices. From these insights, it can be inferred that being capable of implementing a continuous innovation and building an organization which improvises continuously is a core competency which serves as a source of competitive advantage as it is difficult to be imitated by others.

2.3.4. Paradox of Change and Continuity in Organizational Routines

Recent discussions on organizational change are building on the paradox of change and continuity, order and disorder by making use of micro level actions, routines and artifacts (Glaser, 2017) as evolving mechanisms of maintaining changing organizations in a dynamic environment. For example, Bernstein and Barrett (2011) explored the literature and advocated much on the supremacy of dynamic capability over ad hoc problem solving approach. However, dynamic capability which conveys a message about a change in the resource and capability base which serves as a source of competitive advantage is facing contentions from strict scholars in the paradox notion. While acknowledging their notion of "Jazz mindset" being closer to ad hoc problem solving approaches instead of the relatively rigid dynamic capability approaches, Bernstein and Barrett (2011) strive to build on dynamic capability in an apparent intension of making it more dynamic. The view of Bernstein and Barrett (2011:59) intends to stand on the "patterned and practiced performance" in an attempt to maintain order while letting improvisation as a controlled disorder. Therefore, their view is also an addition to the rather metaphoric explication of the application of complexity theory to managing organizational change.

Building on such transitional ideas of making dynamic capabilities even more dynamic, recent scholars (e.g., Bernstein & Barrett, 2011) are bringing conceptual level explanations down to a level closer to operations. This is an attempt to provide the empirical world, which still needs a model through which to guide successful strategic organizational change, with a usable theory.

Wang and Wang's (2017) explicit assertion of the inability of dynamic capability to fit to very dynamic environments marks the shift of organizational change discourse towards closer to operations levels. In what they refer to as "employee-centric" approach, Wang and Wang (2017) proposed ad hoc problem solving approaches instead of dynamic capabilities which do not fit in disruptive change conditions. This is a clear deviance even from Bernstein and Barrett's (2011) transitional view.

In the same vein, Wiedner, Barrett, and Oborn (2017) explain the possibility of more successful strategic change from unexpected places that are not the priority (attention) of top management. Such changes are bottom-up driven resulting from self-initiated efforts by employees or peripheral units of the organization which nurture themselves within the freedom of less top-management attention. Magsaysay and Hechanova (2017) converge on the issue of employee-centric approach to implementing organizational change. Employees' mental model of ideal leader needs to be explored in order to successfully foster employee driven changes to a more successful organizational level routine as a result of leadership intervention which should be guided by what they refer to as Implicit Leadership Theory (ILT).

Magsaysay and Hechanova's (2017) mental model of ideal leadership which intends to orient leader's strategy of change management is another type of mental model notion which adds to that of Van de Ven and Sun's (2011) notion in the action-reflection model. The intent in both works converges in that knowing one's mental model and moving along the flow is an easier strategy for effective change.

Stańczyk-Hugiet, Piórkowska and Stańczyk (2017) offer a platform on which the notion of organizational routines or routines' dynamics (as referred to by Lin *et al.* (2017)) serve as mechanism of maintaining change and stability in organizations—paradox. In doing so, Stańczyk-Hugiet *et al.* (2017) explain about performative and ostensive aspects of routines. These two indicate how routines serve as sources of change and stability. The performative aspect indicates the actions being carried out in the organization. Such actions are evolving as a result of improvisations per individual level; however, they also have demonstrative/manifestive—ostensive aspects. For ostensive patterns to be created, retained and modified, performative aspect is necessary. As interactions of both continue, emergent routines emerge. Through this process, the organization changes to be a changing one.

Lin *et al.* (2017) explain how organizational routines evolve and serve as mechanism of implementing management innovations. According to Lin *et al.* (2017:457), organizational routines are "defined as repetitive, recognizable patterns of interdependent actions involving multiple actors." With reference to implementation of change in general and management innovation in particular, there is no possibility of effectiveness other than changing such routines (Lin *et al.*, 2017). This is also an explanation for the views that consider organizational change as part of management's daily routines. So, effectiveness in changing organizational routines is a mechanism of implementing change in organizations.

Contemporary discussions on change and stability paradox, in connection with emergent routines, are manifestations of how foundational Lawler III and Worley's (2006) built to change model is. In this model, the central idea of successfully implementing organizational change relates to the very design of the organization.

The notion rejects the assumption that organizational effectiveness is the result of stability and replaces it with change. In explaining their idea, Lawler III and Worley (2006) claim that organizations that are built to change can successfully implement change and be kept in a changing state. Such organizations are changing organizations. However, at the center of their built to change model, there is a concept which they refer to as identity. Identity is defined as relative stability. They also coined a notion called temporary advantage in replacement to competitive advantage. The recent use of emergent routines and mechanisms of intentionally influencing them represent similar concepts.

The discourse of evolving or emerging routines as a source of change seems a natural process. However, Glaser (2017) explains how organizational routines can be intentionally influenced by using artifacts. In so doing, Glaser (2017:2126) identified three mechanisms of how routines can be altered—(1) "through dynamic interactions between specific performances of action (i.e., the 'performative' aspect), (2) abstract patterns of action (i.e., the "ostensive" aspect), and (3) human-made objects (i.e., 'artifacts')". The first two converge with the discussion of Stańczyk-Hugiet *et al.* (2017). The third (i.e., artifact) is an addition to the repertoire of attributes of routine dynamics. Artifacts are defined as human made objects that are designed for a particular purpose.

Glaser (2017) furthers the discussion on artifacts by mentioning standard operating procedures, software and signs as examples of artifacts. Through these artifacts, an organization can implement strategic change initiatives (Glaser, 2017). Artifacts, as they are mechanisms of intentionally altering routines, come to the fore in the discussion of change-continuity paradox. Originally, organizational stability used to commonly associate with routines; however, recent literature appears to acknowledge the emergence of routines and dynamic routines as manifestations for routines to serve at the same time as a source of change. The notion of performative aspects and artifacts made the assertion of routines as a source of change and a means of implementation more explicated.

2.4. Common Dimensions of Organizational Change

Organizational change (OC) has basic components that are commonly mentioned in the literature. Various writers (e.g. Nelson, 2003; Walker, Armenakiws & Bernerth, 2007; Pettigrew *et al*., 2001) call these OC components as change factors. These change factors are mostly referred to as: content or substance, context, and process. Hempel and Martinsons (2009), Okumus (2001) and Armenakis and Bedeian (1999) put in outcome as a fourth factor in addition to the above three. Okumus (2001) cited several previous works and extracted four strategic factors—content, context, process, and outcome. Outcome is also described by Hempel and Martinsons (2009) as change criterion or change objective. It represents the intended outcomes of change.

Barnett and Carroll (1995) exerted efforts to give an order to the theory of organizational change about which they felt fragmentation and rare contradictions. Change content (i.e., what is to be changed in the organization) and change process (i.e., how the change unfolds in terms of "speed, the sequence of activities, the decision-making and communication system, the resistance encountered, etc." (p. 219) they assert, have an impact on change outcome and hence content and process are important dimensions of organizational change. Instead of an attempt to rely on only one dimension, considering both content and process is more logical. For example, the assumption that change is an adaptation mechanism whereby the triggering contextual factors predict a content of change implies that implementation in turn calls for different approaches (i.e. process). Therefore, the required content of change should be translated to the context in determining the approach of change. This implies logical interplay (between the two dimensions) of change which is shaped by context.

Besides, scholars such as Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1997) explain two components (i.e., content & process) associating them with schools of thoughts. Van de Ven and Poole (2005) also discussed about process and content literature in organizational change theory. These two coupled with context and outcome represents the commonly referred factors of change (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999; Jacobs *et al.*, 2013; Pettigrew, 1990).

2.4.1. Outcome of Change

Outcome of change is described as criterion against which the success of change is measured (Hempel & Martinsons, 2009; Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999). It represents one or more objectives or intended outcomes at organizational, group or individual level that are expected to result from organizational change initiatives and against which the success of implementation can be measured (Hempel & Martinsons, 2009).

Barnett and Carroll (1995) propose a model which measures the total impact of change content and change process on change outcome. If an organization anticipates a change in strategy, Barnett and Carroll (1995) explain, say from strategy A to strategy B, the total effect of such change can be measured by the difference in the rate of failure when either strategy is applied plus the effect of the process of change from strategy A to B as depicted below:

$$r(B)-r(A)+r(\triangle AB);$$

where r(A) is failure rate associated with strategy A, r(B) is failure rate associated with strategy B, and r(△AB) failure associated with change process.

Figure 2.1: The content and process effects of organizational change from strategy A to strategy B.



Source: *Barnett and Carroll (1995:226)*

As it is understandable from the model, the content effect (i.e., r(B)-r(A)) when the organization changes in strategy from A to B will be negative when the change is for the better. From this explanation, implementation of a strategic change has an impact added to the content effect that determines the total effect of change. This is consistent with the assumption that no matter what the content would be, if the transition fails to deliver it as it is expected to be, the entire outcome of change will be negatively affected.

Barnett and Carroll's (1995) attempt would have contributed much to the efforts of Bunes (2011) towards calling attention of scholarship on the 70 per cent failure rate as the notion of failure can operationally be linked to the measurement of total effect of change. The missing of this opportunity is also evident in Hughes (2011) and the logical challenges on conceptualization of failure too. As sound the arguments of

Hughes (2011) and Burnes (2011) are concerning the issues they raised, they could have made their dictum closer to operational for researchers had they had built on Barnett and Carroll's (1995) model. In the absence of well established measure of change outcome, the judgment about failure rate is not acceptable.

2.4.2. Content of Change

Change content reflects the substance of organizational change (Nelson, 2003; Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999). Content refers to the nature of change to be enacted (Walker *et al*., 2007). There are two content areas of change: (1) the fundamental aspects (structural element) of change and (2) human aspects of change which deals with managing the people side of change (Siegal, Church, Javitch, Waclawski, Burd, Bazigos, Yang, Anderson-Rudolph & Burke, 1996). In short, content or substance of change implies the type and scale of change (Nelson, 2003). According to Hempel and Martinsons (2009); the content of change is described in the literature using dichotomist expressions such as revolutionary/evolutionary, transformational/transactional, and major/minor. Contingency theorists propose a consideration of these dichotomies in an inclusive ('both') manner instead of exclusive ('either- or') approach (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995; Dunphy & Stace, 1988; Kotter and Schlesinger, 1979).

2.4.3. Process of Change

Process refers to the actions to be taken to introduce and implement change (Walker *et al*., 2007; Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999). Lewin's three phases of unfreezing the current behavior, movement from the present state of the firm to the future and refreezing the resultant new set of behaviors (Burnes, 2004a; Elrod II & Tippet, 2002), systems and processes (Siegal *et al*., 1996) are foundations to the change process. Nelson (2003) used "stewardship" as a variation to note this factor to refer to the leadership, coordinating and controlling efforts during the change process.

Theoretical underpinnings of the process notion are already discussed in previous sections.

2.4.4. Context of Change

Context is another common change factor which refers to conditions (forces) that are internal and external to the firm (Walker *et al.*, 2007; Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999). External forces are uncontrollable forces outside the firm. These forces may include the intensity of competition, governmental regulations and rules, technological changes etc.... Resources, knowledge, and managerial capabilities and attitudes and emotions of employees and managers in a firm are among the internal forces constituting context (Pettigrew, 1990). In addition, Nelson (2003) explained that the static contingency model of change should be replaced by the dynamic model of change to incorporate the turbulence of the environment in relation to the past, present and future time dimensions.

Andrew Pettigrew is a renowned scholar on context related discussions. Pettigrew (1990) discusses about the importance of contextualized approaches of organizational change; while Pettigrew *et al.* (2001) made this call more explicit by recommending organizational change research to be international and cross-cultural. The validity of the idea of international and cross-cultural research in organizational change is empirically evidenced later in 2009 by Hempel and Martinsons.

Pettigrew (1990:268) posits that "theoretically sound and practically useful research on change should explore the contexts, content, and process of change together with their interconnection through time." That means these three components of change must be linked. Pettigrew (1990) further suggests contextualist research as a way of responding to the weaknesses of change theories being acontextual. The contextualist approach emphasizes on:

> *the importance of embeddedness, studying change in the context of interconnected levels of analysis [, first]. Secondly, the importance of temporal*

interconnectedness, locating change in past, present, and future time. Thirdly, the need to explore context and action, how context is a product of action and vice versa; and finally the central assumption about causation in this kind of holistic analysis, causation of change is neither linear nor singular-the search for a simple and singular grand theory of change is unlikely to bear fruit (p. 269).

While using the commonly referred change components—content, process and context, Pettigrew (1990) emphasized the impact of context on the theories of organizational change. Pettigrew (1990) proposes extending on the traditional view which is limited to dichotomies—internal and external.

From this explanation, the interplay among the three and the heuristics of embededeness should be captured in the scholarship of organizational change in order to address the issue of changing using the language of "how to". This coincides with Beer's (1992) call for usable theory. Besides, the new processual - contextualist approach includes two key questions: (1) "how many levels of analysis to include in the treatment of context and (2) complexity" (Pettigrew, 1990:698).

The other problem sought is the impact of the U.S. context on theories of management as context is considered as "undiscussed background" (Pettigrew *et al.*, 2001:703). The undiscussed context behind the theories of organizational change is the American business's context. This calls for an account of other national contexts and comparisons to see the homogeneous patterns and the unique features of diverse contexts.

The third and most abstract level of comprehending context in the scholarship of organizational change and hence least studied by researchers relates to temporal and situational features of context. In explaining the extent to which the area is overlooked by scholars, Pettigrew et al. (2001:704) note:

Where does a change agent begin a given change initiative, and what are the varying degrees of receptivity to change in this or that organizational division or *national business context? Even if change agents know about the factors shaping degrees of receptivity to change, how should they customize the content and process of change to reflect the contexts of different parts of their organizations? The pragmatic temporal questions are also largely unstudied and inadequately understood.*

The views of Pettigrew *et al.* (2001) are consistent with Beer's (1992) by echoing that theories of management in general and organizational change in particular have to pass through double hurdles of scholarship and relevance for practice. This requires pluralistic approach in terms of engaging with other social science scholarship, with different levels of context (embeddedness), and with practitioners. Besides, cross-national comparisons should also be considered to reveal similarities and differences therein. The purpose is to strengthen the link between theory-practice dichotomies. This is what leads to a rigorously developed and practically usable theory of organizational change.

The question of relevant theory which is equivalent to Beer's (1992) usable theory also overlaps with what Corley and Gioia (2011) describe as utility. This argument intends to call for more attention in contributions towards practically relevant theories of management.

2.5. Historical Background about Change Management

With an exception of Kurt Lewin's work in the 1940s, the notion of change management is a recent (1990s) phenomenon in the literature of organization and management (Greener & Hughes, 2006). As Greener and Hughes (2006) and Burnes (2004a, b) explain, organizational change before the 1980s was more a concern of organization development (OD) literature than organizational change and management in a form it is being referred to now. This first era of organizational change is characterized by the planned approach for change. Since early 1980s, however, the planned approach has been facing criticisms and in replacement emergent approach gained greater attention (Hughes, 2011; Greener & Hughes, 2006; Burnes, 2005; Burnes, 2004a, b; Marshak, 2002; Weick & Quinn, 1999; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Stacey, 1995). In line with this movement, the processual perspective also widened its frontier towards the systems perspective whereby addressing organizational change as a whole system instead of focusing on individual components is asserted. This expansion was also associated with the use of complexity theories (Burnes, 2005; Burnes, 2004b; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997).

Greener and Hughes (2006) review the strategic change management practices in the 1970s being triggered by intensified competitions because of the emergence of Japanese car manufacturers in the European market. This phenomenon is similar to the experience of American companies during the same period (Burnes, 2004b). The discussion of Greener and Hughes's (2006) is an additional record of the acontextual nature of organizational development and change theories that dominate the literature (Pettigrew *et al.*, 2001).

As explained by different scholars (e.g., Burnes, 2004a, b; Elrod II & Tippet, 2002) and reaffirmed by Mills *et al.* (2009), change management is a phenomenon in the literature of management that emerged following the Second World War especially gaining attention with the seminal work of Kurt Lewin. This is the emergence of it being referred to as change management. However, the emergence of organizational change intentions is the same as the emergence of management theories as their common trigger was the need to change the way organizations used to do (Mills *et al.*, 2009). Lewin's work is connected to the classical theories of management and has footprints in the Organizational Development (OD) movement that gave attention to organizational behavior. This stage was accompanied by the emergence of Japanese corporations in the American market and their strong organizational culture.

The recognition of Japanese strength and outperformance in terms of organizational efficiency resulted in increased attention to Japanese management techniques and organizational change towards adopting these techniques. These led to the management fads which are commonly known as Total Quality Management (TQM), Business Process Reengineering (BPR), Six Sigma (SS), and others.

The aforementioned organizational change techniques gained momentum following the great depression of the 1970 and the accompanying emergence of Japanese companies in the American market and the realization that American companies are losing grounds for Japanese companies which had outsmarting management techniques. This marked the turning point for the Americans to embark on turnaround in their businesses. The resultant move led to the emergence of several model of organizational change; but all are targeted towards gaining back the strongholds of the American companies. This is an indication that the literature on organizational change is excessively focusing on the American context (Pettigrew *et al.*, 2001; Hempel & Martinsons, 2009).

The Total Quality Management (TQM) has interesting history behind its recognition as a quality initiative in America. The originator of TQM, Deming, tried to propagate the idea in the 1950; but the Americans did not hear until his approach proved successful in Japan and Japanese corporations emerged as strong competitors by wining customers from American and European companies. In the 1990s, however, American companies campaigned towards adopting TQM of which only 25% succeeded. As Mills *et al*. (2009) explain this failure rate is because TQM was not for every organization; it may work for some but not for all. This track record of TQM is also evident in BPR—another process oriented organizational change approach which is deviant from TQM as it abandons continuous improvement and proposes radical organization-wide change.

The original contributor of BPR, Michael Hammer, was also concerned on quality and came up with an idea of fundamentally rethinking about organization and radical transformation by avoiding wasteful practices and reconstructing the organization afresh. It focuses on process while giving less attention to people.

Six Sigma (SS) and Balanced Scorecard (BSC) emerged as initiatives both focusing on measurements. Though originally meant for measurement of performance, BSC encompasses strategic management and communication as purposes in addition to performance management (Kaplan & Norton, 1993). In the story behind the emergence of the BSC as an infamous model, Art Schneiderman, a manager at Analogue Devices, contributed the seminal idea while he was assigned in a study which was expected to contribute towards quality improvement. In the same token, SS emerged as a result of an effort to improve quality at Motorola.

All the aforementioned fads are considered as buzzwords by recent scholars who appear to have been curious on the low rate of success. For example Jacobs *et al.*, (2013) raise their concern of why change initiatives often fail and attribute it to the fragmented literature in change management. This converges with Beer, Eisenstat and Spector's (1990) early warning about the inability of programmatic changes in delivering intended outcomes by referring such changes as fallacious. As a mechanism of avoiding buzzwords and enhancing success, they recommend the change process to focus on the work itself instead of abstractions that are often presented with the buzzwords. This marked the beginning of action-oriented approaches and task-alignment strategies as mechanisms of change implementation (Beer, 1992; Armenakis & Harris, 2009; Will, 2015; Magsaysay & Hechanova, 2017).

Beer (1992:111) posits that to fit to a rapidly changing environment, "traditional command and control" organizations should shift "to an adaptive task-driven organization." He explains, actual change is implemented through actual tasks not through useful knowledge. Peters and Waterman's "7s" model can be a useful theory to explain culture; but it is not usable as it offers "no help to managers in making choices about how to sequence interventions in the system" (Beer, 1992:113).

To execute strategic change, actionable knowledge that specifies the process (i.e., sequence of actions to be taken by managers) out of which some specific results are expected must be defined. Beer (1992:115) explains what defines such sequence of actions/intervention is an inductive research:

> *associated with collecting data, diagnosing the organization, inventing a new organization, and developing a sequence of 'hard' and 'soft changes that will permit people not directly involved in the diagnosis or invention to become committed. An action theory of strategic change would also specify the skills that manger need for enacting the action sequence, as well as identifying the inner states they must learn to manage to complete the sequence. Finally, the theory should specify the context required by managers to implement the specified action sequence*.

Documented experiences and data will eventually serve as bases against which evaluation of the action theory, which is developed to guide the action sequence to be taken in order to implement strategic change, is carried out. This suggests the importance of action science. Action science demands joint business-academy action research "to create processes for strategic change that result in the most innovative and best practices for developing a competitive learning organization [in America]" (Beer, 1992:116).

Beer (1992) also emphasizes the challenge from the "normal science" in a form of advocacy against the "action science" which is based on inductively developed theories as less rigorous requiring less skill. However, Beer (1992) argues, to make a contribution to the competitive crisis facing the U.S., nothing less than a transformation of our own assumptions about the production of usable knowledge [notwithstanding the advocacies of the normal science] is required.

This explanation converges with the claim of incompleteness of variance theorizing in explaining organizational change by other scholars (e.g., Langley *et al.*, 2013; Chiles, 2003). The inclusion of process metaphysics is reflected behind the need to capture practical reality on the fly. This is what is needed from practitioners through whom organizational reality is manifested. Without capturing the experiences of those who actually make things happen at different levels throughout an organization, and without taking an account of patterns of events unfolding therein, it is difficult to think of an organization especially in the face of turbulence. This idea is consistent with that of process theorists' (e.g. Van de Ven & Poole, 2005; Langley *et al.*, 2013).

Pettigrew *et al.* (2001:697) claims that organizational change as a field lacks maturity especially in terms of "understanding the dynamics and effects of time, process, discontinuity, and context." With this assumption, they furthered their explanation on the following six issues that demand more development: (1) the examination of multiple contexts and levels of analysis in studying organizational change, (2) the inclusion of time, history, process, and action (3) the link between change processes and organizational performance outcomes, (4) the investigation of international and cross-cultural comparisons in research on organizational change, (5) the study of receptivity, customization, sequencing, pace, and episodic versus continuous change process, and (6) the partnership between scholars and practitioners in studying organizational change.

This is an additional evidence for the need for a non-linear and more complex representation of organizational change as a means to incorporate reality that is beyond the explanatory power of cause-effect relationship of the variance approach.

Armenakis and Harris's (2009) reflection on their research and practices of organizational change over a thirty years period reveal a relatively comprehensive account of organizational change factors. Their focus is an exemplar action-oriented approach to theorizing organizational change showcasing the validity of calls for practitioner-researcher collaborative works to bring practical touch into organizational change theorizing (Woodman, 2014; Beer, 1992; Corley & Gioia, 2011; Pettigrew *et al.*, 2001).

Magsaysay and Hechanova (2017) converge with Armenakis and Harris (2009) by promoting employee-centric approach for greater success in implementing organizational change. Will (2015) is another contributor towards change recipient focus in change implementation. While Armenakis and Harris's (2009) focus is strongest in its employee centric attention, followed by Magsaysay and Hechanova's (2017) approach which gives attention to change leader as perceived by change recipients; Will's (2015) account is one of win-win. Will (2015) focuses on the interests of both the change leader and the change recipient as drives towards more successful change implementation in a way both managers and employees can feel considered. These discussions are reflections of how evolution of change management thought from an "either-or" decision from dichotomies to "both-and" perspectives of maintaining paradox at the same time.

Ever since change management gained attention in the literature of management, the issue of success remained a central challenge for practitioners and academicians alike. Therefore, implementing change which is initiated by an organization is the most difficult stage in the change management process (Mills *et al.*, 2009). The unanimity in reporting 70% failure rate (Beer & Nohria, 2000) is the most salient content one can extract from the literature in organizational change.

An exception to this unanimity is recorded by Hughes (2011) as a response to a special issue of the journal of change management as explained in Burnes (2011). Hughes (2011) argues that, the claims of 70 per cent failure rate are not sufficiently supported by evidences. Moreover, all deviant implementations of programmatic changes such as business process reengineering and total quality management might not necessarily account for failure as "context-dependent nature of organizational change" is neglected (Hughes, 2011:457). Notwithstanding the fact that the 70 per cent failure rate is not supported by an empirical evidence and that there are valid arguments which can challenge the claim (Hughes, 2011), Burnes (2011:447) acknowledges "it would be wrong to deny [the fact] that many organizations do seem to struggle to implement change successfully." The intention is to provoke scholarly debates and contributions towards the question of why change initiatives fail and how organizations can manage change successfully. This does not make the issue of enhancing success in implementing organizational change a least priority to the empirical world.

2.6. Strategic Organizational Change Implementation and Models

The implementation of organizational change gained attention as a result of high failure rate discourse. Jacobs *et al.* (2013:773) for example explicitly raised questions of "Why do so many organizational change initiatives fail to deliver?" and "how can organizational change processes be implemented in a way that assures success?" While discussing the shortcomings in the literature of organizational change in addressing these questions, these authors argue that the literature in organizational change is fragmented.

Consistent with other scholars, Rod *et al.* (2009) also assert (based on a review of the literature) that design of a strategic change is given more attention than implementation of it and hence at least about half of strategic change initiatives do not deliver. Even Burnes (2011) and Hughes (2011) who contest the taken-for-grated claim of 70% failure rate converge with other scholars in acknowledging the fact that so many organizations are struggling to effectively implement change. In the subsequent sections, implementation of organizational change and commonly known models of implementation and/or management of organizational change are presented.

2.6.1. Implementation of Strategic Organizational Changes

The literature on strategic organizational change unanimously acknowledges the difficulty of successfully implementing strategic organizational change that is manifested by high failure rate. The need for scholars' greater curiosity on organizational change theories is an easy conclusion one can draw from reports of high failure rate in the literature for decades on the one side and absence of renowned implementation model on the other. Attempting to curb this, scholars (e.g., Beer, 1992; Lawler III & Worley, 2006; Oakland & Tanner, 2007; Pryor *et al.*, 2008; Graetz & Smith, 2010; Van de Ven & Sun, 2011; Burnes, 2011; Woodman, 2014) used to propose what they refer to as "new framework" or call for new perspectives. However, despite these attempts, the situation is still characterized by high failure rate coupled with fragmented theories.

Woodman (2014) explicates the practice in changing organizations as an art which is related to the knowledge generated by science (i.e., theory). However, such knowledge is a necessary but not sufficient requirement for successful organizational change. The implementation of change is more of a practice than a science. This implies the importance of practicable theories to bridge this duality (Glaser, 2017). Here come the recommendations of Beer (1992), Corley and Gioia (2011) and Pettigrew *et al.* (2001) for the partnership between practitioners and academics. This helps to capture the art of changing organizations into theories of organizational change.

Eventually, practice orientation and duality concepts led to the growing interest in scrutinizing the possibility of implementing strategic organizational change with the help of organizational routines (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Pentland & Feldman, 2008; Graetz & Smith, 2010; Lin *et al.*, 2017; Feldman, Pentland, D'Adderio & Lazaric, 2016).

Nasim and Sushil (2011) identify dilemmas of organizational change based on an extensive review of the literature in the field as (a) planned vs. emergent, (b) static vs. dynamic, (c) incremental vs. revolutionary, (d) piecemeal vs. holistic view and (e) macro vs. micro approaches. These polar views (as referred to by Nasim and Sushil (2011)) were also reviewed by the systems theorists (e.g., Maes and Van Hootegem, 2011) who added other three dimensions to make the entire list eight. These earlier polar views of organizational change are attributed to the low success rate of organizational change implementation as Nasim and Sushil (2011:192-193) assert:

> *This approach to explaining organizational change continued for decades until the inadequacy of the theories was demonstrably, reflected in the poor ratio of change success. While exploring the reasons for the low rate of change success, researchers looked beyond the existing epistemology, paving the way for a new perspective of defining change, calling for balancing the opposing views rather than choosing one over the other. This marked a clear shift from the 'logic of exclusion' of the 'either/or' to the 'logic of inclusion' of the 'and/also', allowing the emergence of ideas like managing both evolutionary and revolutionary changes (theory of punctuated equilibrium), balancing Theory E and theory O, developing strategic ambidexterity to exploit as well as explore, managing continuity to leverage change, etc.*

This is how the concept of managing the paradox of change and continuity emerged as a promising lens to look into the epistemology of organizational change as a way forward. Central to this argument is the possibility of organizational success through the ambidexterity of managing both change and continuity simultaneously—balancing change with continuity through applying the "genius of the AND" as Nasim & Sushil (2011) refer to. Partly, this earlier view of managing paradox also converges with the idea of using complexity theory.

The traditional knowledge about routines was associated with organizational inertia; however, Feldman and Pentland's (2003) explanation about the two faces of routines—ostensive and performative—which make them sources of both continuity and change gave new deliberation to the literature in the paradoxical lens.

Feldman *et al*. (2016:505) define routines as “recognizable repetitive patterns of interdependent action carried out by multiple actors.” They also identify two attributes of routines—(1) they are temporal and (2) they are processes not things; and because of these features, they are dynamic. But, if routines are considered as things (i.e., “standard operating procedures, or machines, or genes, or correlations of inputs and outputs”) (p. 512), it is not acceptable to consider routines as dynamics.

Pentland and Feldman (2008:249) reiterated the need for a shift from the old ontological views of routines as things and rather embrace on the new fact that organizational routines are “generative systems that can produce patterns of action based on local judgment and improvisation by actors.” However, there is a common mistake by managers to view routines as things and to confuse artifacts with routines. Routines have the two attributes; intentionally designed artifact may have an impact on routines only if it is enacted by actants and to an extent that the designed artifact interplays with that of actants design or any emergent routine. “Some amount of improvisation is inherent in the execution of routines. For better or worse, organizational routines have a life of their own” (p. 249).

The change-continuity paradox gained momentum in line with the built-to-last notion and captured scholars’ deliberation up to now. However, Lawler III and Worley’s (2006) call for designing built to change organizations instead of managing change did not get sufficient representation in the literature compared to the paradox lens.

The final reflection of Nasim and Sushil (2011:198) is “a serious deficit of empirical research and actionable framework required for managing the confluence of continuity and change.” In conclusion, they proclaim a need for “a more actionable strategic framework for practitioners at large” basing their rationale on the assertion of 'managing change invariably requires balancing paradoxes' while a "dearth of validated models and frameworks required for managing the duality" (p. 202).

Woodman (2014) extends the explanation on the duality of knowledge and practice (action) by taking change process theory on the one side and change implementation theory on the other. Change process theory explains the dynamics of organizational change whereas implementation is "focused on strategies, procedures, and change techniques—in other words, the specific activities that change agents engage in to create the desired changes in the organization" (p. 466). The art of changing organizations, Woodman (2014) reflects, requires theories; to mean theories should have the utility of guiding actions (i.e. implementation). The proposed solution is to make theories of organizational change usable as also claimed by Beer (1992).

The issue of usability instead of usefulness as Beer (1992) posits, appears to dominate recent literature. Synthesis of the literature indicates that proposals of implementation models (frameworks) also manifest these orientations. To help facilitate the discussion on implementation models in the extant literature, these orientations were also used as factors of categorization.

2.6.2. Strategic organizational Change Implementation Models

Even though there have been evidences in the literature about change implementation models and frameworks since the 1950s (Elrod II & Tippet, 2002), change implementation models gained attention in the 1990s as a result of weak track records of change initiatives. Since then, different authors proposed varieties of models.

In the literature, the great depression of the 1970s and the emergence of Japanese corporations on the American and European markets marked the start of a second phase of development next to what was initiated by Kurt Lewin in late 1940s (Burnes, 2004b; Greener & Hughes, 2006). Following this, the 1980s were characterized by early testing of the changes which emerged in the 1990s as process oriented campaigns and grabbing of management techniques (e.g., BPR, SS, TQM, lean) (Hammer & Champy, 1993; Balogun, 2001). The rationale behind this move was the dynamism of the business environment which made old theories obsolete. Because of acceptability of explanations about the inability of previous organizational change models for the new dynamic and complex environment, several organizations adopted the aforementioned organizational change initiatives (management fads).

Albeit the popularity of these management fads in America and Europe, 50 to 70 percent failure remained the track record of such initiatives (Pasmore, 2011; Schwarz, 2009; Franken *et al*., 2009; Brenner, 2008; Gilley *et al*., 2008; Kazmi, 2008; Oakland & Tanner, 2007; Dufour & Steane, 2006; Mankins & Steele, 2005; Siegal *et al*., 1996). Except a call for better curiosity on rate of failure (Burnes, 2011), no one appeared to report a mechanism which curbs the situation nor does an empirically tested framework of successful implementation gain sufficient representation in the literature. Compared to the pervasive nature of high failure rate in the literature, relatively little is said about successful implementation. Balogun (2001) attributes the poorness of the track record of strategic change implementation to failure to understand the fact that implementation is more challenging than formulation. This implies the need to give greater attention to the issue of successfully implementing changes.

The third phase of development in the literature is characterized by acknowledgement of low rate of success in implementation and recommendation for integrated frameworks of change and paradoxical views (Maes & Hootegerm, 2011; Stragalas, 2010; Parry, Kirsch, Carey & Shaw, 2014; Al-Haddad & Kontour, 2015). The most recent of the developments in the third phase relates to action oriented employee-centric approach and the use of organizational routines (Graetz & Smith, 2010; Bernstein & Barrett, 2011; Magsaysay & Hechanova, 2017; Lin *et al*., 2017). In the upcoming sections, together with the few notoriously cited implementation models, other attempts of scholars to guide the implementation and/or management of organizational change are reviewed.

2.6.2.1. Kurt Lewin's Three-Step Model of Change

Kurt Lewin developed a three-step model of change in 1947. The three steps are: (1) unfreezing, (2) moving and (3) refreezing. The work was published in 1952 (Elrod II & Tippet, 2002; Burnes, 2004a, b). Scholars in change literature (e.g. Young, 2009; Walker *et al*., 2007; Chrusciel & Field, 2006; Siegal *et al*., 1996; Vrakking, 1995) also refer to Lewin's model as the phase model of change.

In the work of Bernard Burnes (2004a) entitled "Kurt Lewin and the Planned Approach to Change: A Re-appraisal", there is an argument about the continued relevance of Lewin's approach despite the criticisms emerged since the 1980s. Before the coming to scene of these criticisms, Burnes (2004a) proclaimed that, Lewin's model dominated the theory and practice of change management especially the planned approach.

In his explanation to show the validity of Lewin's (1947) three-step model, Burnes (2004a) notes that most of the critics that emerged since the 1980s were narrowly analyzing Lewin's work by focusing on only one of his four interdependent models namely: field theory, group dynamics, action research and the three-step model. To understand Lewin's idea, the four concepts should be treated in their totality not separately.

The essence of the four concepts is solving social conflicts at an individual, group, organizational or societal level through changing group behavior. Changing group behavior requires understanding the present situation (field theory) and the forces that determine group behavior (group dynamics) on the basis of which appropriate interventions (actions) are designed (action research) to bring about sustained change with lesser resistance (three-step model). The need to sustain changes elicits Lewin's fourth work—the three-step model of change.

Though Lewin's works were not targeting change in organizational contexts, especially the three-step model to change gained prominence in organizational change research being propagated by the OD movement. During the 1950s to the 1970s, the OD movement focused on group issues and hence the work of Lewin gained dominance in the literature. Since the 1980s OD started to focus on socio-technical systems, organizational culture, organizational learning and radical transformational change (Burnes, 2004a) and hence, Lewin's model for planned change implementation faced several criticisms. Much of these criticisms relate to the rejection of planned approaches to change for reasons that are connected to the greater dynamism and complexity of organizations and their environment. These claims gained momentum with the emergence of the idea of using complexity theory for organizational change management (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Marshak, 2002).

In his other work entitled "Kurt Lewin and complexity theories: back to the future?" Burnes (2004b) compared the works of Kurt Lewin with complexity theories. He, as is the case in his work in 2004a, argued that Lewin's approach shares much more common grounds with complexity theorists than claimed by critics. In his argument, Burnes (2004b) discusses communalities (compatibility) between complexity theories and Lewin's model. For example, Lewin's democratic principles which promote participatory decisions results in a type of change which lets self-organized teams to be innovative so as to keep the organization operate at the edge of chaos.

Moreover, Burnes (2004b) claims that the Lewinian approach, instead of being outmoded as claimed by many supporters of complexity theories, is more comprehensive in that it can help even these theorists in implementing appropriate order generating rules which keep organizations at the edge of chaos. Other step-based models are discussed in the next sub-section.

2.6.2.2. Phase Models of Change

Typical to the phase models are those which are characterized by sequence of actions (steps) through which organization change is expected to pass. For example, Dainty and Kakabadse's (1990) eight-step approach which constituents (1) identifying the need for change, (2) recognition of the need for action, (3) diagnosing the problem, (4) determining change goals, (5) selecting a change program, (6) implementing the change, (7) creating proper climate, and (8) evaluation of change effectiveness is a step-based approach. In this approach, the sixth step is a manifestation of how confusing the literature used to be for practitioners. Implementing is not a single task. Apart from the criticisms the step-based model faced mainly in a way Kurt Lewin's model was criticized as described in the previous section, the absence of integrity and clear pattern made it difficult to capture the exact intent of the models under this category. Other such models from the extant literature are presented in the next sections.

2.6.2.2.1. Twelve levers of change

Howes and Quinn's (1978) twelve lever of change is among the oldest in this category next to Lewin's. Authors claim to have developed it based on review of the literature since the 1950s in an attempt to bridge the gap between what they refer to as 'descriptive' and 'prescriptive' research. In doing so, they identified the distinction between scientific body of knowledge which is mostly descriptive and tries to answer 'what is' and managerial problems which are mostly prescriptive in nature and try to address 'how to.' From what they called "the descriptive body of knowledge on change," they identified twelve variables or levers that managers can manipulate when they introduce an innovation. The following table depicts the twelve levers.

Table 2.2: Twelve levers (framework for guiding the phases of implementation)

A. Phase 1: Set up an Adequate Orientation Environment
1. Set aside enough time for an adequate introduction to the change. a. Identify what will be changed
b. Plan workshops, meetings, and in-service seminars. 2. Make the relative advantage of the change easily visible. a. Package it so that it is easily understood, easily reference, and easily related to performance.
3. Show organization members (users) that their efforts will be supported. a. Identify, obtain, and confirm availability of support services and resources. 4. Show members it will be easy to institutionalize the change and that it will be relatively nonthreatening afterward. a. Clarify the expectation of each member during and after implementation. 5. Show that immediate superiors accept and support the change. 6. Clearly identify the roles and relationships of all who will be involved in the change process. **B. Phase 2: Set up Adequate Support Networks for the Implementation Effort.**
1. Produce and make supportive services available. 2. Set up formal training programs to develop members' roles.
a. Provide in-service training, continuing workshops, seminars, etc. 3. Encourage and reward the use of horizontal and vertical communication channels. 4. Relax standard operating procedures in affected (Changing) units.
5. Integrate change agents, managers, and members. a. Provide frequent and individual contact.
6. Make sure members feel adequately involved. a. Establish problem-solving meetings and shared decision-making norms.

Source Howes and Quinn (1978:73)

The model is named "twelve levers" after the twelve specific tasks that are engendered in the framework. The two phases depicted in the table are about readiness and guideline of action. As such, the work of Howes and Quinn (1978) somehow overlaps with the first two steps in Lewin's model. However, Howes and Quinn's (1978) work can also be taken as a concern to handling the people aspect during planning and implementing organizational change.

2.6.2.2.2. Kotter's eight-steps model

In 1995, Kotter came up with an eight step model. This model is developed by taking into account eight common mistakes managers commit during change implementation and by designing a solution framework for these mistakes. The underlying assumptions of Kotter's (1995) model are: (1) the importance of going through phases (steps) which takes considerable time; and (2) error in any of the steps will lead the change initiative to failure; trying to speed up organizational transformation through skipping a step results in failure.

Figure 2.2: Kotter's (1995) Eight – Step Model

Source: *Kotter (2007:99)*

This work of Kotter (1995) is republished by Harvard Business Review in 2007 as best of 1995. In the 2007 edition, it has been noted that Kotter's work remains state-of-the-art even after a decade. Next to Kurt Lewin's model, Kotter's eight-step model is pervasive in the literature. Several authors try to build on or enhance it. Stragalas (2010) is among such authors. She worked towards the adaptation of the model.

Stragalas (2010) claims the possibility of improving the track record of failure in change through the provision of effective guidance in the form of implementation model and put Kotter's eight-steps model at the center of her investigation. She notes:

> *Typically, organizations have trained managers in change process models rather than change implementation frameworks. Given the track record for failed change interventions, there is an opportunity for organizational development professionals to provide effective guidance through the application of a comprehensive change implementation model . . . (Stragalas, 2010:37).*

With the intention to make Kotter's (1995) model clear for implementation, as its use in guiding implementation of change initiatives is limited despite the fact that it has been validated by researchers, Stragalas (2010) tries to expand and refine the eight steps. These steps are categorized into three stakeholders: (1) leadership, (2) employees, and (3) organization as presented in the following figure.

Figure 2.3: Kotter's enhanced action steps



Source: Adopted from Stragalas (2010:36)

Seijts and Gandz (2017) reappraised Kotter's model and integrated the eight steps with leader characteristics framework. Appelbaum, Habashy, Malo and Shafiq, Hasham (2012) revisited Kotter's framework and proved the existence of valid features in the model that last for a decade and half.

2.6.2.2.3. Change agent phases and change target stages

Armenakis and Bedeian (1999) are better known for their contribution on identifying the four common components of change (i.e., content, context, process, & outcome). In addition, they recommend a model which is fundamentally similar to Lewin's and

Kotter’s works. This model is a sort of operationalizing the concepts in the aforementioned (earlier) models from change agent and change recipient (change target) perspectives. In addition, Armenakis and Bedeian (1999) also reviewed other process models which emerged in the 1990s to develop their model called “change agent phases” and “change target stages” (see the figure on the next page).

Figure 2.4: Change Agent Phases and Change Targets stages



Source: *Armenakis and Bedeian (1999:305)*

2.6.2.2.4. Framework for planned change

Mento, Raymond, and Walter (2002) came up with a framework which they claim to be grounded in both theory and practice and has connections to three other models namely Kotter's strategic eight-step model, Jick's tactical ten-step model and General Electric (GE)'s seven-step model. Their model has twelve steps. These steps are discussed in the following paragraphs. As it is synthesized from the aforementioned works of previous scholars, Mento *et al.*'s (2002) effort is a contribution towards the development of change implementation models. With an intention to have comprehensive ideas from previous models too, the twelve steps of Mento *et al.* (2002) are described hereunder.

Step 1: The idea and its context. The starting point of a change initiative as proposed by Mento *et al.* (2002) is recognizing the change—knowing the need for change, the idea of the change (content of change), and the context within which the change is expected to unfold. This stage has the same purpose as Lewin's unfreezing stage by the end of which organizational actors understand the need for change and engage in a seeking behavior towards change.

Step 2: Define the change initiative. This step involves, based on the change needs of the organization, defining the roles of parties—strategists, implementers and recipients. It is a requisite step as the actual execution is the result of interplay among these actors.

Step 3: Evaluate the climate for change. Context is called for at this stage. The actual content of change to be implemented should fit to the context for the organization to be successful. This requires an evaluation of the environment within which the organization is expected to operate. The results of these analyses will help develop different scenarios under which alternative plans are developed for implementation.

Step 4: Develop a change plan. This stage implies the application of the framework for planned changes. Such types of changes need to be planned in a way the plan specifies goals and detailed responsibilities for strategists, implementers and recipients. The plan should solicit the content and process of change. There should also be a room for flexibility in the plan—the plan should be specific but also flexible. An optimum fit between specificity and flexibility in the plan is required.

Step 5: Find and cultivate a sponsor. A sponsor according to Mento *et al.* (2002:52), is a person(s) who with "sufficient amount of organization power and influence" expresses models and reinforces a change initiative and generates "strategic convergence both vertically down and horizontally across the organization." This sponsor will be more effective if recruited from the "lowest level in the organization to whom all the change recipients report."

Step 6: Prepare your target audience, the recipients of change. "This stage of the change process is best understood from the perspective of the recipients of the change" (p. 53). This is to mean that, the concept of the change should be understood by employees. The natural resistance to change should be handled through helping change recipients understand what the change is and get relieved from their skepticism.

Step 7: Create the cultural fit—making the change last. Designing change initiatives in a way they become consistent with the existing organizational culture increases the success of the initiative. When there is a gap between the corporate culture and the change initiative, culture will impose its impact on the initiative and the success of the initiative will diminish.

Step 8: Develop and choose a change leader team. For the change recipient to accept and act in a way the initiative will be implemented successfully, a leader who can motivate participants towards the vision and put the initiative instrumental in terms of rewarding changed behavior and institutionalizing the change through crafting an appropriate organizational structure is vital. This change leader can play its role better when organized as a team than as an individual.

Step 9: Create small wins for motivation. If we wait for the successful completion of the entire initiative to celebrate resultant achievements, we will continue dropping people being hopeless and naturally turned to be resistors and end up with the big goal not achieved. Therefore, we have to decompose the "big hairy audacious goal" into short-term small wins and measure progress in terms of them. Recognizing the employees involved in those wins will motivate them and become committed. Moreover, updating the sponsor about the small wins will increase his/her confidence in the initiative and is important to get the required resources.

Step 10: Constantly and strategically communicate the change. With the purpose to enhance understanding, reduce confusion and resistance, and increase commitment; a communication which is carefully designed and tailored to the frame of reference of the audience is critical for the full execution of a change initiative.

Step 11: Measure progress of the change effort. This means creating and implementing metrics to measure the progress of the initiative in terms of outcomes related to milestones in the change initiative [effort]. This requires prior definition of change outcomes and corresponding measures against which progress of implementation can be measured.

Step 12: Integrate lessons learned. Here, organizations are advised to document the norms, political systems, written and unwritten rules of work, and procedures so that they cannot forget the past but learn from it. Reflection is sought to be an effective mechanism central to lessons learned. The reflection process will better suit to learning if triggering questions are used. The US army's "After Action Review Process" (AARP) set of questions are recommended by Mento *et al.* (2002:56) to be used for this purpose. The questions are: "(1) What did we set out to do? (2) What actually happened? (3) Why did it happen? And (4) what are we going to do next time?"

Asking these questions and making continuous refinements at all times; not just at the end of the project and hence, taking lessons as they emerge, during encountering problems and proposing solutions throughout the course of the change process is the intent of this step. This last step is a new insight Mento *et al.*, 2002) came up with. It allows revising the plan when there is something that demands so in any of the twelve steps. This has connections to the notion of continuous change.

2.6.2.2.5. The 7-step model of change implementation

Balogun (2001) proposed a seven-step model which is also associated with other cautionary moves (i.e., cultural shift, organizational context assessment, & consideration of the people side). The issue in connection with context which is shaped by culture, organizational specifics, and people sets the condition contingent on which the change to be implemented has to be designed. As such, she developed a relatively well framed implementation model consisting of seven steps as demonstrated in the Figure 2.5:

Figure 2.5: Implementation steps



Source: Adopted from Balogun (2001:3)

To successfully go through these steps within the specific context, which is shaped by the three aforementioned issues, Balogun (2001) proposes to start first with carrying out a cultural shift with a support of her “culture web” framework which helps to understand existing culture and associated barriers to change which in turn is required as an input to design the future desired state of the organization. The culture web (*indicated in Figure 2.6 below*) is designed in a way it defines organizational paradigm in terms of webs of symbols, power structures, organizational structure, controls, routines and stories.

Figure 2.6: Culture web



Source: Adopted from Balogun (2001: 5)

The second one is designing an approach which is sensitive to organizational context. The specifics of the organizational context are supported by her framework called "change kaleidoscope." This framework has three layers of contexts. The outer layer consists of factors that are in the wider context of organizational change. The middle one encompasses time, scope, preservation, diversity, capability, capacity, readiness and power. Whereas design choices, change path, change start point, change style, change interventions and change role are in the inner layer. The inner layer is the micro level which shapes the change implementation operation.

Balogun's change kaleidoscope *(see Figure 2.7)* is a unique attempt to integrate context with change implementation approach.

Figure 2.7: Change kaleidoscope



Source: Balogun (2001: 6)

The third concern is the people aspect. As change cannot be thought about without changing the way managers and employees of an organization are doing businesses, changing the employees must be framed as an integral part of the change.

Here, it can be seen that the choice of appropriate design (approach) to change is dependent on cultural, organizational context and people aspects. This leads to the validity of the idea of having context-sensitive approach to change as the above attributes of context are differing across nations and at the core of the present study.

Balogun's (2001) is a bridge between those who consider the implementation of change as a linear sequence of actions and those who consider it as a contingent, dynamic and non-linear system. Earlier, Beer, Eisenstat and Spector (1990) also raised an issue in connection with programmatic changes in a relatively bold manner by referring to them as "fallacious".

2.6.2.3. Cyclic Models of Organizational Change

Step-based models are oriented towards following a set of steps or sequences of activities. They are mostly parallel to the unfreezing-moving-refreezing triple stages of Lewin. A central assumption behind such propositions is stability of organizations before and after the change. That is, until the need for change arises, organizations operate under state of equilibrium. Then, when the status quo in equilibrium is not fit to changed environmental conditions, organizations plan to change through sequence of steps which ultimately lead to a new status quo (equilibrium).

Models under this section are built based on an assumption which considers change to happen in a loop instead of linear-cause-effect relationship or sequence of steps (Langley, 1999). Gradually, this assumption grew to include an assertion that change is an iterative non-linear complex phenomenon which makes equilibrium impossible (Marshak, 2002). Exemplars of models with such underpinning assumptions are presented in the next sub-sections.

2.6.2.3.1. Oakland and Tanner's (2007) "Figure of Eight"

Oakland and Tanner's (2007) framework is a typical cyclic model which is graphically visualized by a figure which looks like number eight. Using arrow heads, the model indicates a cyclic process through which a successful change unfolds. Intention of the authors is reflected through their recognition of low success rate which ranges between 10% and 30%.

With this in mind Oakland and Tanner (2007) identified four themes from the change literature. The first one is leadership of change. Leadership plays an important role in planning the change through implementing it. The second theme is the need for change. In relation to this, project management approach, which is also proposed by Kazmi (2008), is sought to be the most successful approach to change implementation. Managing the softer side of change (people) which encompasses dealing with organizational culture and effective communication is the third theme recognized by these scholars. This notion is a reappraisal of Balogun (2001). The fourth one is learning. Learning is important in change management. This signals the explicit start-up of the next cycle in a cyclic model.

Based on these four themes from literature, Oakland and Tanner (2007) developed research instruments and applied them to both private and public sector organizations with an attempt to address critical factors for successful change management. An examination of how organizations implement change revealed that process, structure, resources, behavior, system and control are important factors to be considered (Oakland & Tanner, 2007).

Their “new framework” for managing change is the resultant contribution from their work. As depicted in Figure 2.8, it resembles number eight (8) and hence referred to as “the figure of 8” (Oakland & Tanner, 2007: 585). It shows the process through which managing change passes.

Figure 2.8: The organizational change framework

Source: *Oakland and Tanner (2007: 584).*

The authors warn not to delve into the second circle in the figure prior to making an assessment of readiness for change. This approach is similar to the twelve levers model proposed by Howes and Quinn (1978). Armenakis and Harris (2009) also reaffirmed the importance of readiness assessment.

Readiness for change begins by identifying the triggers (drivers) of change. These can be internal or external as summarized by the following table.

Table 2.3: Drives for change

External drivers	Internal drivers
Customer requirements	Improving operational efficiency
Demand from other stakeholders, such as the Government	Need to improve the quality of products and services
Regulatory demand	Process improvement
Market competition	
Shareholders/city	

Source: Oakland and Tanner (2007: 574).

Identifying triggers of change enhances interest in and energy on change. Not only does identifying triggers of change serve as a source of energy, it also sets the context within which appropriate type of leadership and directions can be designed on the basis of which "expectations—values, aims, measured objectives and targets" are set (Oakland & Tanner, 2007:584). Clarity in the type of leadership and directions is prerequisite for a detailed plan of an initiative. The plan should set priorities and indicate strategic objectives and targets. With this, all the people involved will be focused towards the desired end.

For a plan to be implemented there must be a clearly articulated process (prescription) that defines the way people and resources in an organization work. Process defines the "structure, roles, competencies, and resources deployed" (Oakland & Tanner, 2007:585). Then, the organization's system and control come to the scene. The whole thing is a defined context within which people in organizations are expected to behave. This is where managers are systematically trying to influence the behavior of people. As Oakland and Tanner (2007:585) put it, "most people start work for an organization with positive attitudes and behaviors and it is frequently the systems and environment that cause problems and deterioration." Therefore, managers are expected to take care of the process, system and control in a way it positively influences the behavior of people in organizations.

Oakland and Tanner (2007) claim that their organizational change framework is developed with an intention to help practitioners enhance success in implementing change. These authors further claim that, such enhancement in implementation success is manifested by the fact that world class companies are working in consistency with the specifics in the figure of eight model.

2.6.2.4. Process Models of Organizational Change

The term process here should be understood in consistence with the process epistemology discussed earlier. In the work of Van de Ven and Poole (1995), the idea of using models is viewed from a new perspective—having a pool of multiple models of change from which to choose and use as a remedy when a change initiative breaks (fails to deliver). This approach is later described as action and reflection by Van de Ven and Sun (2011).

Van de Ven and Sun (2011) proposed two kinds of strategies to be taken when breakdowns to change occur—action which deals with correcting people or processes in the organization and reflection which focuses on revising the mental model one stands with. The argument of these scholars is that the effectiveness in change implementation will be improved if a greater attention is given to reflection than the practice of taking action strategy. Further, Van de Ven and Sun (2011) argue that the use of action and reflection strategy should consider three things—having multiple mental models of change, having framework for diagnosing weaknesses and breakdowns in the models of change, and being cognizant of the level beyond which process breakdowns cannot be repaired.

The approach of building a repertoire of multiple mental models of change from which change agents can choose as a remedy for process breakdowns as asserted by Van de Ven and Sun (2011:59) “shifts the research agenda on organizational change toward a contingency theory of implementation.” The authors discuss the idea of a shift towards contingency theory of implementation in line with Van de Ven and Poole’s (1995) four process models of change as the ones to be encompassed in the extended repertoire of alternative models from which to choose depending on the type of breakdowns and remedies assumed to best fit to a specific change situation.

A summary of these alternatives and their corresponding fit to expected types of breakdowns is presented in the following table.

Table 2.4: Breakdowns and remedies in process models of organizational change

	Teleology (Planned Change)	Life Cycle (Regulated Change)	Dialectic (Conflictive Change)	Evolution (Competitive Change)
Process cycle	Dissatisfaction, search, goal setting, and implementation	Prescribed sequence of steps or stages of development	Confrontation, conflict and synthesis between opposing interests	Variation, selection and retention among competing units
Situations when model applies (generating mechanism)	Social construction of desired end state; goal consensus	Prefigred program regulated by nature, logic, or rules	Conflict between opposing forces	Competition for scarce resources
Typical breakdowns	⟩ Lack of recognition ⟩ Decision biases ⟩ Groupthink ⟩ Lack of consensus	⟩ Resistance to change ⟩ Lack of compliance ⟩ Monitoring and control	⟩ Destructive conflict ⟩ Power imbalance ⟩ Irresolvable differences	⟩ Requisite variety ⟩ Lack of scarcity
Remedies	⟩ Triggering attention ⟩ Critical thinking ⟩ Consensus building	⟩ Responding to complaints ⟩ Local adoption ⟩ Internalizing mandates	⟩ Conflict management ⟩ Negotiation skills ⟩ Political savvy	⟩ Niche development ⟩ Marketing ⟩ Strategies for competitive advantage

Source: *Van de Ven and Sun (2011: 61).*

Van de Ven and Sun (2011) claim that none of these four process models can adequately address organizational change processes. Therefore, instead of focusing more on applying action strategy of problem solving through changing people or organizational processes, change agents can better succeed in change implementation by dealing with breakdowns through revising mental models of change. They further propose that the implementation of reflective strategy is recommended after it is proved that the breakdowns in implementing change models cannot be corrected or repaired through action strategy.

Contingency theory of change implementation leads to the challenges of complexities of interacting models, agents and changes. That means, understanding the interaction and interdependencies among different changes, among change agents who have different mental models, and among models themselves is required. Van de Ven and Sun (2011) also recommended considering other change models proposed by other scholars such as Huy (2001), Meyer, Creux and Marin, 2007) and Weick and Quinn (1999). The following figure depicts temporal relations among the four process models of Van de Ven and Poole (1995).

Figure 2.9: Temporal relations among change models



Source: (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011: 68; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995: 520)

Another challenge yet to be researched well as proposed by Van de Ven and Sun (2011) is determining the learning cycle of acting to correct breakdowns in the four process models and reflecting to change one's mental model and searching for a fit to the change process that is unfolding in an organization.

2.6.2.5. The System Models of Change

Models under this category are guided by an assumption which considers organizational change as a system in itself. Two examples are presented in the next sections.

2.6.2.5.1. Maes and Van Hootegem's (2011) change system

Maes and Van Hootegem (2011) are the prominent protagonists of the notion of conceptualizing organizational change as a system (instead of a process of changing a system). These authors proposed generic nomenclatures for sets of attributes of change through consolidation of old dichotomist views in the change literature. Their consolidation effort extends to researching the literature on organizational change articles which were published since 1970. As a result, they identified eight dimensions of change attributes as presented in the following table.

Table 2.5: Eight dimensions of change

Dimension	Attributes	
1. Control	Emergent	Planned
2. Scope	Adaptation	Transformation
3. Frequency	Continuous	Discontinuous
4. Stride	Incremental	Revolutionary
5. Time	Long	Short
6. Tempo	Slow	Quick
7. Goal	Open	Strict
8. Style	Participative	Coercive

Source: *Maes and Van Hootegem (2011:209)*

These dimensions are used to describe the process of change as a system. The dichotomist view still persists in this work. As can be seen in the table above, there are two types of changes emerging in a continuum even though there is a more comprehensive characterization. Moreover, Maes and Van Hootegem (2011:192) describe the change models which were developed based on dichotomist view as "cluttered jumble" that do not help in understanding the subject matter.

Despite the fact that the systems approach is more suitable than any other single discipline to understand practical management problems, there was no sufficient attempt to approach change management as a system instead of considering it as a process to change a system (Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011). This is the reason to look for a different theoretical perspective beyond these eight attributes of change—the application of systems approach. This approach considers the management of change as a system with a specific function in organizations. As such, this system has three components: specific inputs, particular system elements and outputs. The following figure portrays this.

Figure 2.10: The systems model of change management



Source: *Maes and Van Hootegem (2011: 216)*

The type of change is affected by individual components and interactions between these components of the change system. These parts are viewed as integrated whole functioning in cooperation with an intention to change the setting of system.

The other insight to change management that comes in connection with the application of systems approach is the notion of considering organizations as Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). This view has roots in complexity theory. This gives several ways to respond to change. Considering change as a complex adaptive system is a holistic approach that reduces tension between dichotomist positions through entertaining planned and emergent, discontinuous and continuous, adaptive and transformative attributes at the same time but to different extents.

This modern view of change systems is described by Maes and Van Hootegem (2011:219) as:

> *In order to produce creative, innovative, continually changeable behavior, the change system must operate far from equilibrium into complexity and paradoxical states of stability and instability, predictability and unpredictability, freedom, and control... Instead of a dichotomistic view requiring an ''either or choice'' ... is convinced that in a complex system paradoxical states are present.*

The presence of the statement about paradox is an important development here. This is how the paradoxical view (Graetz & Smith, 2010) emerged. With this views (paradox, complexity and dynamics), the eight attributes are incorporated in the change system model as presented in figure 2.11.

Figure 2.11: Attributes of the change system



Source: *Maes and Van Hootegem (2011:219).*

Maes and Van Hootegem (2011) proclaimed the change system approach to be given attention by scholars as part of the presently demanding consolidation and integration of previous dichotomist views. Their proposed model, as they say, can be used for empirical research. However, they do not mention whether they have tested it or not. Nor do they discuss how change managers can implement this approach and the model to actually manage change.

2.6.2.5.2. The 5P's Model

A group of five Texas A & M University staff reviewed major change management models, namely: the action research approach, Lewin's 3-step model, Schein's extension of Lewin's model, Lippitt's five-phase model (extension of Lewin's three-step), Kotter's (1996) eight-step model, Mento *et al.*'s (2002) twelve-step model, Jick's ten-step model and Shield's five-step model as summarized in the table below.

Table 2.6: Comparison of selected change models

Action Research Model/Theory Collier, 1945 Lewin, 1946 French, 1969 Schein, 1980	**Lewin's Model (1945) & Schein's Model (1980) (Adaptation of Lewin's Model) *1985 Lippitt, Expanded Lewin**	**Kotter's Model (1996)**	**Jick's Model (2003)**	**Mento/Jones/ Dirmdofer's Model (2002)**	**Shield's Model (1999)**
Identify problem(s)	**Lewin-Step 1** Unfreezing	Establish a sense of urgency	Analyze the organizational need for change	The idea and it's concept	Define the desired result and change plans
Consult with Behavioral Science (OD) Expert	**Schein-Stage 1** need for change; People must be dissatisfied with the present	Form a powerful guiding coalition	Create a shared vision and common direction	Define the change initiative	Create capability and capability to change
Gather Data & Begin Preliminary Diagnosis	**Lewin-Step 2** Moving/Changing	Create a vision	Separate from the past	Evaluate the climate for change	Design innovation solutions
Provide Feedback to Client	**Schein-Step 2** Cognitive	Communicate the vision	Create a sense of urgency	Develop a change plan	Select and deploy
OD expert & client members	**Lewin-Step 3** Refreezing change	Empower others to act	Support a strong leader	Find and cultivate a sponsor	Reinforce & sustain

diagnose problems	to make permanent	on the vision	role		business benefits
OD expert & client jointly plan actions	**Schein-Step 3** Refreezing involves self and others	Plan for and create short term wins	Line up political sponsorship	Prepare target audience, the recipient of change	
Take action	**Schein -**To be permanent, change becomes a part of self, relations with others, & system in which people exist	Consolidate improvements producing more change	Craft an implementation plan	Create the cultural fit-making the change last	
Gather data after action	***Lippitt, Watson, Westley expand Lewin's Model**	Institutionalize new approaches	Develop enabling structures	Develop and choose a change leader team	
Measure & Evaluate results	***After Step 1, add** Establish a change relationship		Communicate, involve people and be honest	Create small wins for motivation	
Feedback results	***After Refreezing, add** Achieve a terminal relationship		Reinforce and institutionalize the change	Constantly and strategically communicate the change	
Re-diagnose	***Lippitt, *et al* Five Phase Change Model (1958)**			Measure progress of the change effort	
New action if necessary				Integrate Lessons learned	

Source: *Pryor, Taneja, Humphreys, Adnderson, and Singleton (2008:8)*

The concepts in these models and theories of change are relevant as claimed by Pryor *et al*. (2008). However, as the speed and complexity of required change is changing in this era, they suggest that change should be a reinvention of the future rather than a response to the present. For this, a systems model which is strategic as well as executable at the tactical level is needed. As Pryor *et al*. (2008) claim, the 5Ps model is sought to serve this purpose. This model is named based on five Ps in the model. They are: purpose, principles, process, people and performance results.

Purpose: As the following figure describes, purpose relates to the directions the changing organization is heading to. There are several variables that need to be addressed in connection with purpose as depicted in *Figure 2.12* below.

Figure 2.12: Purpose (in the 5Ps model)



Source: *Pryor et al. (2008: 14)*

Principles and processes: These are established values and procedures interrelated as they are presented in *Figure 2.13*. Principles refer to shared values, guidelines, philosophies, and agreed upon behaviors (Pryor *et al.*, 2008). These are important forces interlinked with organizational systems and processes and shape people and their performance.

Figure 2.13: Principles and processes (in the 5Ps model)



Source: *Pryor et al. (2008:14)*

People: The people aspect is related to individuals and teams internal or external to an organization having direct or indirect stake in the performance of organizations. The inclusion of people in this model *(Figure 2.14)* can also be considered as a reappraisal of Balogun's (2001) recommendation of giving attention to people.

Figure 2.14: People (in the 5Ps model)



Source: *Pryor et al. (2008:15)*

Performance: This element refers to the progress the firm which is undergoing change is making towards achieving intended outcomes (purpose) of the change initiative. Mento *et al.* (2002) has also an explicit step of measuring the outcome change (progress of change). This part is a significant contribution which can lay the foundation for more curious evaluation of change success (Burnes, 2011).

Figure 2.15: Performance (in the 5Ps Model)



Source: *Pryor et al. (2008:15)*

In general, Pryor *et al.* (2008) try to address the challenges facing change management theory and research for not being comprehensive enough to accommodate all relevant ideas from previous works and not reinventing the future instead of merely responding to the present. The five Ps closely relate to the four fundamental components of organizational change (i.e., outcome, content, process and context). The only difference is the way some of the components are referred to. For example "people" is related to context though context is broader. Moreover, "performance" is connected to outcomes. Content is similar to purpose in the 5Ps model.

2.6.2.6. Implementation through Routine Dynamics

The paradoxical view of organizational change (Graetz & Smith, 2010) underpins behind the approaches of organizational change under this category. Organizational routines, which are known as sources of both stability (inertia) and change (Feldman *et al.*, 2016) are the foci of deliberations within the paradoxical lens.

2.6.2.6.1. Routines for implementation of Management Innovations

Lin, Chen and Su (2017) explain how organizational routines evolve and serve as mechanism of implementing management innovations. According to Lin *et al.* (2017:457), organizational routines are "defined as repetitive, recognizable patterns of interdependent actions involving multiple actors." When implementations of change in general and management innovations in particular are referred to, there is no possibility of effectiveness other than changing organizational routines. This is also an explication for the views that consider organizational change as part of management's daily routines (Appelbaum *et al.*, 1998; Van de Ven & Sun, 2011; Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011). So, effectiveness in changing organizational routines is a mechanism of implementing changes in organizations.

A synthesis from the literature reviewed by Lin *et al.* (2017) indicates the link between management innovation and knowledge management, and dynamic capability and complex adaptive system (Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011). As asserted by Lin *et al.* (2017:461) the notion of organizational routine "leads researchers to suggest routines as sources of not only stability of an organization but also organizational change or innovation."

Existing organizational-routine-dominance phase, new-routine-creation phase, and new-routine-solidification phase are identified as the stages through which organizational routines evolve to serve as sources of organizational change or innovation (Lin *et al.*, 2017). This expression of change in routines follows a pattern which resembles the unfreezing-moving-refreezing phases of planned change representation by Kurt Lewin. The detail of this emergence is depicted in F*igure 2.16* below:

Figure 2.16: The Evolution of organizational routines in management innovation implementation



Source: *Lin et al. (2017:476)*

These similarities with Lewin's three steps *(see the bottom row in the above figure)* are acknowledged by Lin *et al.* (2017:479). However, they also acknowledge a difference in the following way:

> *Kurt Lewin model refers to more general changes and highlights the human behavior aspect of change; while our research focuses on specific change of*

management innovation in the context of organizations and we adopt a cognitive perspective of organizational routines. Therefore, it furthers research of the Kurt Lewin change theory and change model.

Besides, Lin et al. (2017) show *(see first row of figure 2.16)* how the evolution of routines is linked to implementation of change and innovation activities. However, Wang and Wang's (2017:731) argument for a very dynamic environment which results in disruptive changes is that, there is "no routine way to handle such disruptive changes." They even reject the suitability of the dynamic capability as a source of competitive advantage in dynamic environments.

This criticism is similar to that of protagonists of complexity theories on Kurt Lewin's planned approach to change. However, concepts of improvisation and emergence were made to the development of the concept of routines and their characteristics (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Pentland & Feldman, 2008; Feldman *et al.*, 2016).

2.6.2.6.2. Artifacts as Intervening Mechanism of Organizational Routines

Glaser (2017) came up with an enriched idea of emergent change building on the notion of routine dynamics. Organizational routines appear to be sources of both change and stability. When serving as change implementation method, there needs to be a framework which helps to intentionally alter routines and implement strategic organizational change. As Glaser (2017:2128) explains, "organizations often intentionally change their routines in order to implement strategic initiatives".

Therefore, it is imperative for scholars and practitioners alike to look for mechanisms of intentionally altering organizational routines. Effectiveness in changing organizational routines which can ultimately pursue strategic goals is an approach of implementing strategic organizational change. Glaser (2017:2144) addresses how organizations can intentionally change routines in order to "pursue strategic goals and adapt to their environment by developing artifacts." In doing so, Glaser explored a single case and developed a framework of designing organizational artifacts to intentionally alter organizational routines while allowing the dynamics of emergent routines.

As depicted in *Figure 2.17*, the design of artifacts to change organizational routines should consider the impact of existing routines and that of external communities on the implementation of new artifacts. These two determine the intent behind the need for changing organizational routines. Then, the design of new routines starts. Pursuing strategic tasks that are enacted by intentionally designed artifacts is equivalent to implementing strategic organizational change.

Figure 2.17: A theoretical framework explaining how organizations use design performances to change routines



Source: *Glaser (2017:2134)*

The design performance of artifacts should; therefore, be oriented by abstracting grammar of action, exposing assumptions behind the design, distributing the ideas, and appraising outcomes in order to shape the impact of assemblages in a way that is consistent with an intended outcome from a newly designed artifact. In the assemblage, there is interplay among theories, practices, artifacts and actors. Practices are exposed to a confounding impact of existing artifacts and new artifacts. Newly designed artifacts can come from actors and from designers. That means, change in routine dynamics can only be attributed to the intentionally designed artifact to the extent the design performance effectively shapes the assemblage.

2.6.2.7. "Built to Change" Model

Lawler III and Worley's (2006) "Built to Change" model is a relatively unique perspective in that it does not accept the traditional concept of change which refers to variations in an organization's established structures, strategies, systems and so on. Traditional perspectives are guided by an embedded assumption of "stability leads to organizational effectiveness" while that of built to change is "change leads to effectiveness." For Lawler III and Worley (2006), environmental dynamism (1) does not allow such stability to serve as a source of success and (2) such type of organizations cannot successfully change. As a solution, they proposed the built to change (b2change) model *(see figure 2.18)* which assumes change as a source of organizational effectiveness and sets organizations in changing state by building (designing) them to change. Therefore, in such organizations, there is no need to initiate a change project. They are from the very beginning designed in a way they will keep changing.

Figure 2.18: The built to change model



Source: *Lawler III and Worley (2006:27)*

As depicted by the figure, designing, strategizing and creating value are in a continuous motion shaping organizational identity which makes it possible to continuously fit to environmental scenarios based on temporary advantages instead of the old notion of sustainable competitive advantage.

2.7. Conclusion

The literature in organizational change is characterized by evolution of thoughts that can be put in a continuum which is extended between *rigid planned change approach* which promotes organizational inertia (stability) as a source of successful organizational performance and *built to change approach* which lets everything to be a temporary advantage and keeps moving to continuously search for new sets of temporary advantages. There are several views in between. These views are influenced by underlying theoretical assumptions.

Earlier times in the history of change literature were related to Kurt Lewin's three step model and OD theories. Before the 1990s, with the exception of Kurt Lewin's famous three-step model, there was no significant attempt of providing implementation framework to the empirical world. The notion of change implementation framework (model) gained greater attention following the work of

John P. Kotter (1995). Since then, a plethora of proposals of implementation steps or frameworks appeared in the literature. However, little attempt is made to integrate with or build on previous scholars' works. This contributed only to fragmented views and proposals. Because of this, the search for an appropriate framework that guides implementation of organizational change remained being imperative in the literature of strategic organizational change implementation as the high rate of failure is evident in contemporary research as well.

Since the 1970s, because of the emergence of corporate Japan to the American Market, a new debate came to the fore. Rapid transformation instead of slow incremental changes was proclaimed to be appropriate for globalizing dynamic organizations (Burnes, 2004a). However, most of the initiatives which were sought to bring about such transformations ended up with only about 30% success rate (Bunres, 2015; Pasmore, 2011; Schwarz, 2009; Franken, Edwards, & Lambert, 2009; Brenner, 2008; Gilley, Dixon, & Gilley, 2008; Kazmi, 2008; Dufour & Steane, 2006; Mankins & Steele, 2005; Sterling, 2003; Siegal *et al.*, 1996).

The notion of implementation model came out of the realization of high rate of failure. The 1990s are known for such works. Revenaugh (1994), Van de Ven and Poole (1995), Kotter (1995) and Armenakis and Bedeian (1999) are examples. These efforts gave rise to a new thought to have a pool of alternative models among which one that fits the situations best needs to be selected. The low success rate of renowned organizational change tools that were emerged mostly in the 1990s led to some scholars' concern on context.

In the 2000's, the issue of contextual approach to change gained greater attention than it did in the 1980s (Pettigrew *et al.*, 2001). Balogun's (2001) change Kaleidoscope makes her to be among those who proposed comprehensive and context-sensitive approaches to strategic change. In the same year, Pettigrew *et al.* (2001) came up with a strong argument in support of international and cross-cultural approach to organizational change. They called for a research on organizational change to be conducted in a non-US context.

Instead, subsequent efforts of scholars were geared towards integrating or consolidating prior theories and models. Mento *et al*. (2002) is an earlier attempt in this regard. Later, Pryor *et al*. (2008) made a more comprehensive summary of prior efforts of scholars including Mento *et al.*'s (2002). Pryor *et al.* (2008) also transformed the thought into a systems perspective.

As exceptions to the first generation step-based models, cyclic models also emerged in the literature. Appelbaum (1998), Victor and Frankeis (2002), Oakland and Tanner (2007) are examples for this category. These approaches laid the foundation to a systems approach to organizational change. The systems approach to organizational change was made more elaborated later by Maes and Van Hootegem (2011). These authors made a significant contribution with respect to consolidating the dichotomist views which were pervasive in the literature since the 1990s. As also clearly indicated in Figure 2.19, these notions together with complexity theory are metaphorical.

Apart from consolidation efforts (e.g., Mento *et al.*'s, 2002; Pryor *et al.*'s, 2008; and Maes & Van Hootegem's, 2010) there was little attempt to build on previous knowledge. The literature is characterized by fragmented attempts of explaining the same thing (i.e., strategic organizational change) differently. However, consolidation efforts could not exerted simply especially because of varying theoretical assumptions.

The latest views appear to evolve to the level of questioning even the notion of dynamic capability as the environment is too dynamic (Wang & Wang, 2017). As a result, ad hoc problem solving and dynamic routines came to the fore in line with the new paradoxical lens in organizational change literature (Lin, *et al*., 2017; Feldman *et al*., 2016; Nasim & Sushil, 2011; Guiette & Vandenbempt, 2017; Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Pentland & Feldman, 2008).

The literature in organizational change still manifests contradicting theoretical arguments. Sarkar and Osiyevskyy (2017) focus on the evolving inclusion of change and continuity paradox. This oxymoron in organizational change appears to be the latest view in organizational change theory. As Nasim and Sushil (2017:198) reflect, “a serious deficit of empirical research and actionable framework required for managing the confluence of continuity and change.” In conclusion, they proclaim a need for “a more actionable strategic framework for practitioners at large” basing their rationale on the assertion of ‘managing change invariably requires balancing paradoxes’ while a ‘dearth of validated models and frameworks’ required for managing the duality” (p. 202).

All these conceptual disparities are nevertheless converged in noting the high rate of failure in implementing change initiatives. Ironically, yet, implementation is underrepresented in the literature. Only few of the scholars gave attention to framing implementation guidance. Strictly speaking, only Kurt Lewin’s (1947) and Kotter’s (1995) models of implementation remained original contributions that are explicitly recognized as implementation models. The rest are adaptation of these or generic frameworks that in some cases consider implementation only on the fly. A summarized portray of these is given by figure 2. 19.

Figure 2.19: A conceptual framework summarizing major change theories



Source: Own Compilation

As the framework in Figure 2.19 above indicates, while the relatively action oriented and phase oriented models are framed with the help of Lewin's three step model, the relatively latent (conceptual) models that are underpinned by systems and complexity theories are not explicit in the framework. For example Maes and Van Hootegem's (2011) and Van de Vena and Sun's (2011) models are not explicitly observable in the graphic representation. However, especially in the upper part (the parts that are adopted from Lin *et al.,* 2017 and Glaser, 2017) have sophisticated processes that result in the stages that become apparent in the figure.

Apart from these, to the best of the researcher's search effort in databases including EBSCO, Emerald insight, ProQuest, Jstore, and Google scholar, getting an explicit account of differences in national contexts consistent to Pettigrew's *et al.*'s (2001) call was hardly possible. Neither was it possible to get an explicitly reported and recognized implementation model for strategic organizational change.

2.8. Chapter Summary

This chapter attempted to highlight the literature on strategic organizational change and implementation models. In line with this, various theoretical views of organizational change and their evolution were also reviewed in an attempt to explicate the framework within which the theoretical contribution of the present research can be situated. The next chapter presents the research method employed in the present study.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

This chapter explains how the research was conducted. In doing so, the research problem, as it implies the logic behind the research methodology applied in the present research, is encapsulated followed by the paradigmatic orientation underpinned in the overall study. The specific design of the research and associated strategies are also described together with the data type and sources as well as methods of data collection and analyses. Methodological rigor and ethical considerations are also discussed.

3.2. The Research Problem and its Methodological Implication

As stated in the first chapter, the present research intends to develop an implementation model for strategic organizational change in the context of commercial banking sector in Ethiopia. The inquiry was triggered by leanness of salient discussions in the extant literature about an implementation model and the quest for one with a clear contextual domain instead of taking the western (especially American) context as an assumed context (Hempel & Martinsons, 2009; Pettigrew *et al.*, 2001). As a contribution towards accounting contextual influences (Woodside, 2010) into implementation of organizational changes in line with Pettigrew *et al.*'s (2001), this study takes Ethiopian context as an emerging economy case. George Corbishley, Khayesi, Haas and Tihanyi, (2016) called for future research on the area to focus on Africa in the Academy of Management Journal's from the editor's series. Their specific call for scholars has been to "examine how phenomena of relevance to management in Africa extend, or modify our existing management theories [or to] explore how such phenomena enable us to generate theory and frameworks that can shed new light on pressing problems" (George *et al.*, 2016:386).

Within Ethiopia, the context of the financial sector is taken as a typical case (Yin, 2003) since it is a fully regulated sector wherein foreign operators are not allowed to enter as per article 9 of the new Ethiopian Banking Business Proclamation number 592/2008. This makes the selected sector a purely domestic environment resulting from the regulation's control of confounding influences of foreign companies operating in the domestic market. This adds to the extent of variation which increases the chance to encounter anomalies which will help to improve existing theories (Carlile & Christensen, 2004; Christensen & Carlile, 2009).

In other words, in the explanation of what guides organizational changes, the approach of the present research should overcome (1) the dearth of literature on the issue of implementation model which could guide initiatives for strategic organizational change in general and (2) the bias towards the western (especially the American) context by disregarding the context of developing economies such as Africa in particular. Hence, for the investigation of this type of situation, an inductive logic which is underpinned by a "bottom-up" or data-driven approach is preferred to the theory-driven hypothetico-deductive approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009).

This approach helps to address the need to conduct an in-depth examination of cases (Creswell, 2003; Nelson, 2003) which allows the investigation of contextual realities that can be thickly described and richly explained by addressing "how" and "why" questions of instances in the selected context that unfolds during an initiated organizational change in a selected case (Yin, 2009, 2003; Woodside, 2010). Hence, in order to develop an implementation model for strategic organizational change, an investigation of *how* and *why* a strategic organizational change unfolds within the selected context is central to the present research. Such a research requires the use of qualitative Case Study Research (CSR) as several scholars agree (e.g. Woodside, 2010; Yin, 2009; Eisenhardt, 1989).

3.3. Paradigmatic Inclination

Paradigmatic orientations convey the framework within which a research is designed and executed; the results are computed and interpreted. Therefore, the assumptions and inclinations that have possible connections to the present research are highlighted in this section. The attempt is not, however, to claim a strict adherence to a specific paradigm.

As explained by Van de Ven and Poole (2005), research in organizational change is dominated by the variance method which has roots in an ontological assumption of considering organization as a "thing" which can epistemologically be addressed based on a deterministic model which relates a set of independent variables to dependent variable(s). Referring to the variance method as paradigmatically functionalist, Gioia and Pitre (1990) argue that the variance method alone is not sufficient to fully unleash how and why organizational change unfolds. Gioia and Pitre (1990:587) also explain that all organizational phenomena are not suited to the dominant functionalist paradigm and hence force-fitted "functionalist theory-building techniques" should be reconsidered.

Excessive reliance on variance method, as Van de Ven and Poole (2005) explain, has limitations especially when the problem does not need to be addressed that way. They asserted;

> *...researchers tend to conceptualize process problems in variance terms. One can see the "law of the hammer" in operation here: Give a child a hammer, and everything seems made to be hit; give a social scientist variables and the general linear model and everything seems made to be factored, regressed, and fit (p. 13).*

On the other hand, the process ontology considers organization as a “process” which can epistemologically be addressed by employing the process approach. The process approach, as posited by Van de Ven and Poole (2005) applies to a research which tries to study “how” and “why” change unfolds.

As organizational change is by default an indication of dynamism, deterministic approaches fall short of capturing the complex flux in modern organizational systems. It is less logical, thus; to force the naturally fluid phenomena to a deterministic variance model. Therefore, the study of organizational change can be better captured by a more dynamic, flexible and relatively more ambiguity tolerant method—implying an inclination towards process study. However, in the present study, there is no strict adherence to a specific paradigm. As it is fleshed out in the upcoming paragraphs, the connection is pragmatically limited to paradigms which have features that allow the development of theory from empirical data.

Moreover, as (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005) assert, the term “process” has ontological and epistemological meanings as explained in chapter two (Rescher, 1996). As such, variance and process are epistemic typologies within the process ontology (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005; Langley *et al.*, 2013; Langley, 1999; Chiles, 2003). This is the other reason not to dare rejecting variance for ontological rather than epistemological reasons.

“Most often, process studies derive theory…” (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005: 14). Theory building in the context of organizational studies is defined by Gioia and Pitere (1990:587) as “any coherent description or explanation of observed or experienced phenomena.” However, these authors contend the thesis of applying “appropriate” paradigm which may fit to organizational phenomenon that is consistent with the underpinning assumptions of the paradigm (p.587).

The foci of the present study are inductively developing an implementation model for strategic organizational change and the discovery of contextual components from the realities in the commercial banking sector of Ethiopia. The issue of context, when the study involves meaning extraction from data on the basis of which to induce theoretical propositions, requires a departure from reliance on a-priori theoretical framework. The other perspective from which the methodological stance of the present research can be justified is; therefore, addressing the etic-emic dilemma.

As Guba and Lincoln (1994:106) argue, in an inductive theory building approach, the etic-emic dilemma can be addressed by developing "valid theories that are qualitatively grounded" to have real meanings in the emic view. The shortcomings in the extant literature to explicitly address the issue of national context (Pettigriew et al., 2001; Hempel & Martinsons, 2009) and the "unwitting tendency to treat context as undiscussed background" (Pettigrew et al., 2001: 703) presuming the American (western) context as a universal reality; therefore, have led to a search for context-based theory which tries to come up with a model that captures emic (Woodside & Wilson, 2003; Patton, 2002) views of a defined context (Woodside, 2010). The exploration of contextual influences as constructed based on participants' views (i.e., emic views) within the selected context are therefore what the data gathering procedures employed by the present research strived for. Such explorations, especially during the initial stages of data gathering and analysis, are predominantly constructivist (Saldana, 2009).

Lincoln and Guba (2013) also explain the impact of context in changing the reality being in constructivist view. This fits to the assertion that because of the excessively western views in the extant literature, the hypothetico-deductive approach (etic) might fall short of making sense across different national (emic) contexts (Hempel &

Martinsons, 2009; Pettigrew et al., 2001; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). This is how the choice of an inductive theory-building approach (from cases) has been made as part of the paradigmatic orientations in this study. Therefore, at this point, it is logical to assert that the present research has much to do within the interpretive paradigm as its main purpose is to build theory from cases.

For the sake of addressing the research problem better, Eisenhardt's (1989) approach of building theory from case study research is applied in the present research. This approach has roots in grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 1990), in the works of Miles and Huberman (1994), and in Yin's (2009, 2003) case study research approach. The background of the approach is perceived by others (e.g. Tracy, 2013) as positivist/post positivist. Corbin and Strauss (1990) refer to it as symbolic interactionist (pertaining to grounded theory). This orientation is apparent in Eisenhardt's (1989) approach. In her co-authored article (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007:25) too, post positivist orientation is reflected in the assertion about the results of Eisenhardt's (1989) approach which are "objective" because "close adherence to the data keeps researchers honest—the data provide the discipline that mathematics in formal analytical modeling [does]". However, as Gioia and Pitre (1990:47) categorize it, Eisenhardt's (1989) approach of theory building is interpretive. Therefore, as discussed by Tracy (2013), a blurring paradigm approach which uses "concepts and tools from various paradigmatic approaches" is the epistemic category of the present research.

Notwithstanding the fact that the present research significantly resides in the interpretive paradigm, it has to be noted that pragmatic inclination is also manifested by the use of positivist/post positivist tactics (Tracy, 2013) for reducing (or if possible avoiding) researcher bias through employing triangulation and constant comparison techniques (Eisenhardt, 1989) that are backed by Computer

Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) and the use of qualitative data analysis techniques (detailed in the data analysis methods section) proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994).

The researcher's effort to gather data was guided by a "passionate participant's" role of a facilitator (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). However, extraction of meanings from the data corpus involved an interpretive procedure (Saldana, 2009). As this epistemic approach is researcher dependent (Lincoln & Guba, 2013), Eisenhardt's (1989) approach of theory building from case study research is used to benefit from the features that reduce possible researcher influence and let the data contribute the most in the meaning construction. This is further explicated by Carlile and Christenesen (2004).

The pragmatist stance of the present research has various manifestations as described above. Therefore, in its strictest sense, the present research does not stick to and advocate a specific paradigm. Instead, relevant features from different paradigms were pragmatically intermingled.

3.4. Research Design

"A research design is the logic that links the data to be collected (and the conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of the study" (Yin, 2003:19). This logic serves as a blueprint for conducting the research. The design of the present study emanated from an inductive logic to build an implementation model for strategic organizational change in the context of commercial banks in Ethiopia. The rationale for holding this logic is the researcher's intention to search for a context-rich model which should have grounds on empirical data from the target context for the reasons detailed in the first Chapter and in the previous section of this Chapter.

When the phenomenon of study is believed to be context sensitive (i.e., either when contexts are deliberately included in the study or it is very difficult to demarcate the boundary between the context and the phenomenon), case study is an appropriate design of research (Yin, 2009, 2003; Woodside, 2010). Moreover, as Nutt (1986) describes, the study of implementation approaches can better be conducted through retrospective constructions taking cases of implementation practices.

Case study methods do encompass the logic of design, data collection, and analysis methods and therefore are comprehensive research design types (Yin, 2009). On the basis of this premise, Yin (2003) claims that a case study, in addition to the reason for using it (the phenomenon of investigation needs to be studied within a real-life context), allows the collection of data from multiple sources about more variables than those in the data point or being guided by theoretical propositions. In line with the purpose of this research, case study research is useful for modeling (i.e., for theory-building) real world phenomena (Dooley, 2002). With the supportive explanations given so far, this research employed multiple-case study design in line with Eisenhardt's (1989) approach of building theory from case study research (see next section).

As Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) recommend, the use of multiple-case design is appropriate for theory-building research. Multiple-case design is possible by having at least two cases (Yin, 2009). The use of multiple cases has benefits of replication (Yin, 2011, 2009; 2003). The uses of multiple cases to organizational change studies is confluently claimed by different scholars (e.g. Hempel & Martinsons, 2009; Van de Ven & Poole, 2005) to be appropriate. Hempel and Martinsons (2009) also recommended the use of multiple cases for theory (model) development. The use of multiple cases can allow triangulation across-cases and among respondents and handle inconsistencies. Especially when the purpose is theory-building, "multiple-case studies are typically quite rich... and they often have compact and explicit theoretical focus" (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005:14).

As per explanations in the above paragraphs, multiple-case design is appropriate for the present research. The issue of multiple cases can be observed at different levels in the present research (i.e. organizational, team and individual). As fleshed out under the 'selection of cases' section, while the use of two banks makes the present study a multiple-case design, there are also nested layers of cases embedded in each case (Yin, 2011, 2009; Hak & Dul, 2009; Patton, 2002). A graphic representation of the design of the present research is outlined by figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1. Design of the research



Source: *Own compilation*

3.4.1. Building Theory from Case Studies

The approach of Eisenhardt (1989) is cited here as the foundation guideline for devising the strategy of the present research. Other scholars also acknowledge building theory from case study research (e.g. Woodside, 2010; Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012; Van de Ven & Poole, 2005; Hak & Dul; 2009; Woodside & Wilson, 2003; Yin, 2011).

Wacker (1998) classifies theory building research into two as (1) conceptual-analytical and (2) empirical. The later one builds theory based on induction from real world data. Eisenhardt's (1989) work is seminal with respect to clarifying the procedures of inductively building theories from case studies (empirical). This approach is explicitly meant for building theory from cases. As explained by Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007:25), "building theory from case studies is a research strategy that involves using one or more cases to create theoretical constructs, propositions and/or midrange theory from case-based, empirical evidences."

Eisenhardt, Graebner, and Senenshein (2016:1114) assert that building theory from case study is an inductive method which adds to "robustness of emergent theory" and leads to "better theory" by applying comparison techniques. This approach, as Eisenhardt *et al*. (2016:1115) explain, is better at handling implementation processes and addressing research problems that are "related to the 'how' research questions." It provides conceptual insights based on in-depth empirical data from one or a small number of cases (Eisenhardt, *et al*., 2016). The theory developed using this method is the result of relationships emerged from case data.

Empirically speaking, Nutt (1986) used multiple-case study approach to conduct a research that intended to identify implementation tactics. Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) also used Eisenhardt's (1989) approach of building theories from case studies in organizational change research. Moreover, Miles and Huberman (1994) acknowledge that Eisenhardt's (1989) work has provided the best explanation for building theory from qualitative data.

Building theory from cases is a method which "bridges rich qualitative evidence to mainstream deductive research" (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007: 25). As also explained by Carlile and Christenson (2004) and Christenson and Carlile (2009), the inductive part of theory building is half-way in the theory building cycle. The first half of the cycle (i.e. the deductive part) is what Carlile and Christenson (2004) refer to as descriptive. The second cycle builds normative theories, which they also refer to as prescriptive (Christenson & Carlile, 2009) theories, result from the second cycle by building on descriptive theories from the first cycle.

The present theory-building research is confined to the first-half. However, it is designed in a way it benefits from the theory-improvement methods which Carlile and Christensen (2004) refer to as anomaly-seeking. To be specific, the nested research design which "entails how individuals act and interact within group; and how the interaction amongst groups and the companies within which they are embedded" is an anomaly-seeking feature (Carlile & Christensen, 2004) of the present study as detailed in the section which explains case selection.

3.5. Data Sources, Collection and Analyses Methods

3.5.1. Types and Sources of Data

The present research is based on empirical data gathered from two commercial banks in Ethiopia. Within each bank, teams that were established being in charge of designing and implementing initiated strategic organizational changes, individuals who were playing key role during the initiated changes, "gatekeepers" (Lincoln &

Guba, 2013: 66) who informed the researcher about the targeted initiative in their respective bank, and documents (archives) were primary data sources. The details of how cases and individual participants were selected are presented in the next section.

3.5.2. Assumptions and Justifications for Case Selection

The perspectives in line with which case selection tactics that were applied in the present research were decided are explicated in this section in order to complement to readers who are more familiar and adherent to quantitative sampling orientations and practices. According to Patton (2002:46),

> *perhaps nowhere is the difference between quantitative and qualitative methods better captured than in the different strategies, logics, and purposes that distinguish statistical probability sampling from qualitative purposeful sampling. Qualitative inquiry typically focuses on relatively small samples, even single cases… selected purposefully to permit inquiry into and understanding of a phenomenon in depth.*

As can be inferred from the above explanation, the analogy of a case with "sample and universe [in a survey research] is incorrect when dealing with case studies" (Yin, 2009: 86). In case study research, Yin (2009) explains, cases are rather identified purposively based on their importance to make analytic generalizations about some "broader theory" (p. 86). The reason is "cases are selected because they are particularly suitable for illuminating and extending relationships and logic among constructs" (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007:27).

The case selection procedure implemented in the present research followed the logics that are proposed by scholars as appropriate for theory building from qualitative case study research. Therefore, selection of cases was not random; and the number of cases selected did not intend to convey representativeness.

To explain how cases in research such as the present one can be selected, Suri (2011) synthesized approaches of purposive sampling which Patton (2002) proposes for qualitative research. Even though these scholars use the term "sampling", the rationale of sampling for qualitative studies is quite different from that in quantitative sampling. As many scholars (e.g., Yin, 2011, 2009, 2003; Patton, 2002; Suri, 2011; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; Corbin & Strauss, 1990) argue, cases in qualitative research are not meant for representing a population about which to make generalizations based on sample evidences.

Cases are selected when they are fit to the purpose of the research (i.e., when they are information rich) and the number of such cases can be one (i.e., n = 1 as Yin, 2003 explains) or may be several; even it may not be determined in advance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012). Data or theoretical saturation which implies sufficiency of data to build theory and practically speaking time and money determines the number of cases in such kinds of research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 2002). Cases can be individuals, programs, organizations, processes and related phenomena which are put under a study and some could have sub-cases embedded (nested in layers) within (Yin, 2013; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002; Eisenhardt, 1989).

Case selection in the present research passed through several stages. In due course, a combination of purposeful sampling techniques was applied. The first level of selection was the selection of an industry in a specific country's context. The rationale for selecting a specific country's context is discussed in the first chapter in line with Pettigriew *et al.*'s (2001) and Hempel and Martinson's (2009) view. The financial sector in Ethiopia, as it is also discussed in the first Chapter, is particularly important to the study because it represents a purely domestic business environment in the banking sector in the world. This makes the sector a controlled case to explore exclusive context which is expected to intensively illuminate the importance of context in strategic change implementation (Patton, 2002; Suri, 2011). This helps to "discover and comprehend indigenous phenomena" through focusing on a single national context (Sinkovics, Penz & Ghauri, 2008:691).

Secondly, the two banks were selected anticipating literal replication (Yin, 2009) initially. However, actually, bank selection entertained the maximum variation (Patton, 2002) in the banking sector of the country by incorporating a government-owned and a private bank. The inclusion of possible instances, managers of commercial banks in Ethiopia could find themselves in, is an anomaly-seeking design feature (Carlile & Christensen, 2004).

Within each bank, teams established to design and implement strategic organizational change in a specific business process were targeted. As Hak and Dul (2009) explain, these sub-components embedded in each case bank also serve a replication purpose. The selection of core-process and support-process teams within each bank (see details under the selection of teams section) is also in line with the strategy of different cases (Hak & Dul, 2009) which is alternatively referred to as maximum variation by Patton (2002). This strategy of nested design increases the quality of findings (Carlile & Christensen, 2004; Patton, 2002).

Moreover, the inclusion of individual participants was as much as possible guided by the same logic (by including operational workers and managers) which was also an applied logic (by banks) for team establishment. It is with these assumptions the selection of cases and their embedded (nested) components should be judged (Yin, 2011).

3.5.3. Selection of Banks

Among the commercial banks in Ethiopia, two government-owned banks and one private bank were found to be appropriate for the study as they were the only Ethiopian banks which experienced strategic organizational change initiatives based on the researcher's preliminary investigation. To capture the variations (maximum possible for the context), two banks; one from each category were included in the research (Patton, 2002; Suri, 2011). This makes them (the banks) information rich cases with sufficient intensity to conduct a qualitative case study research on the basis of which it is possible to build an implementation model for strategic organizational change in Ethiopian Commercial Banks (Yin, 2003; Patton, 2002; Suri, 2011).

In addition to the technique, the size (number of cases) is also contended by quantitative oriented evaluators. In case study research, however, a single case is methodologically sufficient because the generalizations made from case study findings are generalizations to "theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes" (Yin, 2009: 42). The case in such studies is not a sample; and what generalization refers to in this case is analytic not statistical. However, a "two-case design is stronger than single-case designs" (Yin, 2009: 59). Therefore, the present study is designed as a multiple case research as described by Eisenhardt (1989). As such, the two banks were predetermined (Eisenhardt, 1989).

As multiple case study design was planned a-priori, an advance selection of at least two cases was a requirement. That is why the two cases of commercial banks were selected in advance. This does not mean, however, that the addition of cases is closed. In such type of research, the addition of cases depends on sufficiency of data which is manifested by saturation (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989). In the present study too, the number of cases has been proved to be sufficient based on cross-case analyses results which indicated no need for further inclusion of samples. Achievement of data sufficiency has been enhanced by the application of embedded cases within each bank.

As Hak and Dul (2009) confirm, a multiple-case design for replication purpose in theory building research is guided by the logic of saturation to determine the number of cases. Whereas several embedded cases were considered within each bank for the purpose of replication until the level of saturation within each bank; Hak and Dul's (2009) strategy of different cases has been applied by including a public and a private bank in the set. The inclusion of variations is not only applied by having private and government-owned banks; within each bank, the sub-cases that are described below are also selected based on this logic (Suri, 2011; Patton, 2002).

3.5.3.1. Selection of Teams

The study was focused on nested layers of cases that are embedded (Patton, 2002) within each case bank. In both cases, the initiatives were organized by establishing teams that were responsible to design and implement changes in an identified business process. The business processes were broadly categorized as core and support. Within each category there were teams established to design and implement new business processes. The core-support divide which is salient in both banks, served as a variation across teams and hence representations of both (core and support) were engendered in the selected teams. In each case (process study team), multiple respondents were interviewed to minimize the impacts of memory distortion and memory failure (Eisenhardt, 1989; Nutt, 1986) on the quality of data. This was achieved through the application of triangulation logic.

From bank A, members from all the three core process sub-teams and from four support process sub-teams participated in the in-depth interviews. Besides, those who participated in the selection committee, in the structure team and those who were participating as coordinators at different capacities were also participants in the research.

From bank B, members of those who participated in designing three core processes and those who participated in designing three support processes took part in the in-depth interview. Besides, members of the change management team which was serving as a technical team and members of a committee which was established to evaluate performance of change implementation were participants of the study.

This identification of sub-units (embedded cases) helped to conduct structured investigation and gave means of triangulation. In both banks (A and B) the major division of business processes was between core and support category. Representatives from each were included in the study. Once a process team was selected, multiple participants from the selected team were contacted to find out the truth about how and why changes unfolded with respect to the selected business process. Addition of teams was determined based on saturation of data about how the change was implemented in the case bank. The benefits that are sought to be gained from multiple cases are believed to have been enhanced through the application of embedded cases within each bank.

At this level, the concept of theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989; Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Charmaz, 2006) is more explicitly manifested. This was supported by comparative analysis between core and support teams. Salient constructs across all the teams constituted the findings from each case.

3.5.3.2. Selection of Key Participants

The participants interviewed for this study were "key participants", who were selected purposively because of their experience (as member of teams that were established to design and implement changes, and as coordinators of different teams) during targeted change initiatives in the two banks as conceptualized by Tracy (2013: 141). As Lincoln and Guba (2013) explain, participants (also called "hermeneutic circles") can be identified by the help of "gatekeepers" (p. 66). These logics were applied in the present research to select individuals.

Heads of relevant offices of each bank were contacted first to get information about target initiatives. In preliminary interviews with such individuals (i.e., gatekeepers), data pertaining to the structure of teams and their coordinators, the members of each or at least some teams and their addresses were searched for. Based on the data from gatekeepers and analysis of some archival documents, as part of the preparation for the in-depth interviews, contact lists were prepared. The names in the list were planned as first contacts; when succeeded, served as bases for subsequent selections through snowballing (Patton, 2002; Suri, 2011) which means that once a team member is contacted, the next participant could identified from other members of the same team. Subsequent selections continued through snowballing until the data about the targeted team saturated. "Snowball or chain sampling is … a legitimate strategy as long as the strategy is purposeful" (Morrow, 2005:255). The addition of an individual participant to gather additional data about a team through the application of snowballing continues up to the level of data saturation. This entails theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989; Corbin & Strauss, 1990).

3.5.3.3. Selection of Quotations

Selection of quotations from data corpus gathered from participants is also a decision made by the researcher during the preparation of the report. Quotations are assumed to be powerful in representing participants' voices (Patton, 2002). Moreover, they are empirical evidences on the basis of which the constructions of concepts or categories and their relationships are backed. Therefore, for the development of this report, quotations that were viewed as exemplars of salient and significant ideas of participants with respect to an issue under discussion were selected and presented. The use of the ATLAS.ti software made the selection of quotations more dependable as all the quotations that are linked to a selected category can be easily retrieved in a way comparison can be made amongst all of them. This reduces researcher bias and memory lapse (Eisenhardt, 1989). In addition, to this, the coding procedure implemented in the present research is also an integral part of the logic behind selection of quotation (see the data analysis section).

3.5.4. Data Gathering Procedures

The data sources used in this study were multiple. The first group of sources includes (1) documents (archives) that have information about the change initiatives which helped to gain insights into the change, the participants, the structure and management of teams, and the leaders of the entire initiative; (b) tape-recorded discussions (preliminary interviews) with relevant personnel (gate keepers) that helped the researcher gain insights about changes initiated in each bank, how they were managed, and about the participants; (c) researcher's intuitive observations and researcher's interpretations of observed phenomena which were recorded as field notes and memos; and (d) in-depth interviews that followed the preliminary analyses of data from the aforementioned sources. The final stage of field work was mainly the execution of in-depth interviews as explained in the next paragraphs.

Whenever appropriate, the researcher was flexible to gather data from documents and to take field notes on observations and communications with organization members who were briefly contacted by the researcher during field works. These were persistent throughout the field work. But the volume of data gathered through and the importance of the data to the research problem made in-depth interview the main method of data gathering.

The initial analysis of data which were gathered during the preliminary stages served as an input for the next stage (in-depth interview phase) of each bank. Preparation includes checking the appropriateness of the interview guide to the situation, checking the researcher's level of understanding about the change initiative in order to be able to conduct the in-depth interview in a passionate and empathetically neutral way (Patton, 2002; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Transiting through these preparations, the researcher delved deeper into each case. This helped the researcher to integrate the two phases of data gathering and whenever appropriate to iterate between the two.

Within each team, anomalies among views of different participants provoked probing questions and additional participants in search of clarity and truth through triangulation and further discussions (Carlile & Christenson, 2004). This was a cyclic process which terminates when the researcher recognizes that new ideas are not emerging from new participants (i.e., data saturation).

As reported so far and is usually the case in qualitative research, the analysis process overlapped with the data gathering. The process at this stage was alternating data gathering-analysis iteration. The data gathering in the present study was generally guided by the logic of triangulation from multiple respondents about same process.

The interviewing process applied in the present research is fleshed out in the next section.

3.5.4.1. The Interviewing Procedure

As explained above, before the commencement of the in-depth interview, preliminary interviews with gate keepers and documentary analyses were conducted to gain insights into the overall situation within which the changes were initiated in each bank. This preliminary investigation helped the researcher to get information about who the participants (major actors) were and to know their contact information or physical address so as to be able to prepare a starting list of a few potential participants. Moreover; documentary reviews and discussions with relevant personnel from each bank helped the researcher gain better understanding that put him in a better position to facilitate subsequent in-depth interviews with different participants. In line with the techniques in Eisenhardt's (1989) approach, the in-depth interviews were carried out with a support of an interview guide (Yin, 2009). The interview guide was initially prepared (see annex 2) having questions that were developed based on the research question.

The in-depth interviews were tape-recorded. The sequence of conducting in-depth interviews was decided to be bottom-up in which the interview was conducted first with operational workers and then continued to managers upwards in the hierarchy of their respective bank. The tactic of maintaining the hierarchical sequence was applied within a team (see Chapter Four for details on team composition). This helped the researcher to gain an insight first, and be equipped with more probing strategies as the in-depth interview proceeds to participants who were at higher positions during the pursuit of the initiative and/or during interviewing. Interviews with those in the upper tiers were often more critical as their foci were more conceptual. This is why the researcher had to be more informed about different voices with the help of previous data and running analyses first and then conduct in-depth interviews with participants at higher levels. This helped to benefit from gaining greater insights into conceptual (macroscopic) view (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Besides, the inclusion of various views is an anomaly seeking strategy which normally improves quality of findings (Carlile & Christensen, 2004).

Each interview started with oral introduction about the study and its purpose and subsequently giving a copy of a participant information sheet (see annex 1) in response to which contacted individuals had to express willingness to participate. Prior information about the purpose of the study and promise to take utmost care for the privacy of participants encouraged participants to be willing to freely share their experiences and views. This first contact also served as an opportunity to set an appointment to conduct the interview and if possible to develop the list of team members with additional names which were missing from that which was developed based on information from gate keepers.

Interviews were characterized by free-floating (open) discussions to let any idea emerge with reduced researcher influence. This helped the researcher to be in a better stance to conduct the interview and understand the responses from the emic perspective (Woodside, 2010; Patton, 2002). However, an interview guide was used to maintain focus on the topics that are relevant for addressing the research question. General background conditions about the initiatives targeted by the study, procedures undertaken to initiate and implement the change, success and failure related factors as perceived by participants, and suggestions by participants about important components of a guideline which lead successful implementation had been chosen to be in the interview guide initially (see annex 2).

Each in-depth interview took between 2:00 hours and 3:00 hours per individual participant. The interview session with an individual could be continuous or divided into two or three appointments. As much as possible, interviews were conducted out of office to gain full attention of the participant and to create a friendly environment. However, some participants preferred to use their offices for interview. In most cases interviews were conducted after office hours. During interview sessions, the researcher was a passionate facilitator and used to continue as empathetically neutral as possible (Patton, 2002).

Subsequent interview sessions with participants of the same team were conducted with an intention to triangulate the data from previous interviews. The fact that subsequent interviews were conducted after the researcher gained insights (understanding of emic views) from previous interviews with other member(s) of the same or a similar team, helped the researcher to easily detect anomalies (deviations) and seek for deeper explanations of the deviations through probing questions. Peer debriefings and session summaries were also used to ensure credible data gathering from each team (Lincoln & Guba, 2013; Morrow, 2005). With careful sequencing in order not to destruct an environment of mutual trust, member reflection questions (Tracy, 2013) were used to check the acceptability of data gathered from previous interviews and interpretations thereof. In so doing, the researcher intentionally maintained neutral stance not to judge a respondent for repressing or denying prior ideas gathered from prior sources rather tried to be as open as possible and capture the meanings and ultimately understand what each participant conveyed. This was achieved though conducting constant comparisons across interviews.

The interviewing strategy gradually evolved based on analysis of earlier interviews and researcher's intuition about saturated data and interest to focus the discussion on the most important things. In doing so, the researcher watches if interview questions that were included to gather basic facts (which are descriptive in nature) were gradually losing importance as data about these issues naturally saturates first.

This resulted in the modification of the interview guide by making it focused on concepts that emerged to be salient and by dropping some owing to data saturation.

Later on, the interview guide had to be adjusted for subsequent interviews (see annex 3) based on lessons learnt from previous sessions. The main adjustment was dropping the question about background of initiative as the first few interviews gave sufficient data. The time allocated to gather background related facts declined as the number of interviewees increased. On the other hand, the attention given to the main discussion (i.e., pertaining to how strategic change implementation unfolded and how it should be handled in future change initiatives) increased progressively. This was accelerated by the interviewing sequence (bottom-up) which was explained above. This helped the materialization of more informed discussions with those individuals who had leadership responsibilities during the initiatives. These latter interviews were made to focus on the whole picture; not on a team.

3.5.5. Data Analyses

As the present study is based on qualitative data, the methods of data analyses employed were also qualitative. As explained in section 3.4.4 above, the data analysis process overlapped the field works (data gathering).

The general framework of analysis which was applied in the present research is consistent with Eisenhardt's (1989) recommendation for building theory from case study. Embedded in the approach of Eisenhardt (1989:540) are pattern identification methods from case data. These methods, according to her have two broad categories of analysis—(1) within-case and (2) cross-case analyses. The sequence of implementing them is becoming "intimately familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity" first and then searching for cross-case patterns.

However, the very method of identifying patterns (or concepts) is not explicitly described by Eisenhardt (1989). Because of this, the thinness of details of within-case analysis was overcome by augmented insights from selected features of data analyses methods which are proposed by Miles and Hubernam's (1994) and Corbin and Strauss's (1990). The same is inferred from Eisenhardt's (1989) and Brown and Eisenhardt's (1997) citation of Miles and Huberman as a method of data analysis. Grounded theory method is also acknowledged to have an influence on the inductive theory-building method proposed by Eisenhardt (1989). But the researcher does not claim the use of grounded theory method in its strictest sense. As described in Eisenhardt's (1989) proposed approach, the contribution of Robert K. Yin on case study method is also an underpinning framework of analysis.

Though Eisenhardt's (1989) article explains an entire theory-building project's procedure, the part on within-case analyses of data requires thicker description. For this reason, Yin's (2011) five steps proposal and Braun and Clarke's (2006) six steps proposal were synthesized to develop within-case analyses procedures that were applied in the present research. These procedures are presented in the next section (under phases of data analysis).

Data that were gathered from the sources that are mentioned in the previous sections were analyzed with a support of the ATLAS.ti software. The use of CAQDAS (in this case ATLAS.ti) is an accepted practice in qualitative research (Lewins & Silver, 2007; Yin, 2011; Saldana, 2009; Miles & Huberman, 1994). In addition to the analysis of data, the software supports organization of data (i.e. it organizes primary documents (PDs) in a manner retrieval is easy). As Lewins and Silver (2007:83) explain, "CAQDAS packages provide a range of tools which can be used to facilitate various analytical processes". For future reference too, the data and analyses thereof are saved on the researcher's computer as a copy bundle—ATLAS.ti's feature to create backup of each project (hermeneutic unit).

In their discussion on qualitative data analysis, Miles and Huberman (1994) explain that when the research involves the use of an evolving coding scheme instead of a firm (a-priori) coding scheme, the use of a computer program is advisable. Moreover, Miles and Huberman (1994) categorize ATLAS.ti as a "code-and-retrieve", and as "theory builder", and "conceptual network builder". As the present study is meant for theory building, ATLAS.ti as a theory builder is an appropriate CAQDAS. Moreover, its conceptual network building features play important role in the theming and theory proposition procedure (Saldana, 2009).

3.5.5.1. Phases of Data Analysis

Under this section, details on how, within the aforementioned general framework, data analysis was done through two phases: (1) within-case analyses and (2) cross-case analyses (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the first phase (within-case analyses), five iterative procedures that were augmented by detailed procedures extracted from Yin (2011), Braun and Clarke (2006), Saldana, 2009, and Corbin and Strauss (1990) were applied. The second phase (i.e., cross-case analysis) which was mainly confined to Eisenhardt's (1989) description of tactics is also described. Moreover, Eisenhardt's (1989) techniques that are referred to as shaping hypothesis, enfolding literature and reaching closure were applied in this research to refine the findings that emerged after cross-case analyses.

3.5.5.1.1. Within-case analysis

Although Yin's (2011) and Braun and Clarke's (2006) works were reported with different orientations, procedurally they have things in common. Synthesizing from them and incorporating specific coding procedures (Saldana, 2009; Tracy, 2013;

Miles & Huberman, 1994; Corbin & Strauss, 1990), five iterative procedures of data analyses were applied. They were: (1) *data familiarization* which was implemented through conducting preliminary interviews, documentary (archive) analysis, transcribing interview data (converting the tape-recorded audio files into text), reading and rereading of transcriptions and field notes to gain deep insights into the targeted change initiative in each selected bank; (2) *compiling data into formal database* which encompasses documents (archives), and transcribed data, and uploading them as primary documents (PD) into the ATLAS.ti software; (3) conducting first cycle coding which include initial coding (open coding) and descriptive coding (Saldana, 2009; Corbin & Strauss, 1990); (4) *generating second cycle codes* which include focused coding/selective coding (theoretical coding) (Saldana, 2009; Corbin & Strauss, 1990), and (5) *describing and interpreting coded concepts (results of coding) and their relationships* as grounded within the case data.

In line with Miles and Huberman's (1994) explanation, these steps were "arranged roughly from the descriptive to the explanatory and from the concrete to the more conceptual and abstract" (p. 245). Earlier methods were focused on meaning extractions, and then followed by pattern findings on the bases of which conceptual findings emerged. Details of methods applied in each step are presented in the next paragraphs.

3.5.5.1.1.1. Data familiarization:

Familiarization of data, as it is briefly described above was the first step in the analysis of data gathered from each case (Bank). Familiarization contributed to the researcher's effort to be empathetically neutral (Patton, 2002) through immersion in the studied banks' contexts. Analyses of preliminary discussions with gatekeepers (Lincoln & Guba, 2013) supported by some archival analyses about targeted change initiatives marked the start of this step. Following the analyses of preliminary discussions (interviews) and archives, the researcher headed towards analyzing the data which were gathered from key participants (individuals who participated as change agents during the initiation and implementation of targeted changes either being team members or coordinators of the entire initiative).

Transcribing the audio file (tape-recorded interview data), which was mostly done right after each interview session and before conducting next interviews, was the other method of familiarization. As transcriptions were done by the researcher, subsequent interview sessions were more critical by benefiting from increased insights into the contexts represented by each case (bank).

3.5.5.1.1.2. Compiling data into formal database:

Transcribed data, field notes, and archives constitute the formal database for analysis. Archives and preliminary interview notes were meant mainly to understanding the context, structure and people who participated during the targeted changes in each bank. The structure of data arrangement from the in-depth interviews was different—it was organized around the process teams and change leaders in each bank's context (see Chapter Four for details). This is what Carlile and Christensen (2004) refer to as nested design. The data gathered, transcribed and compiled were saved as separate word documents in different folders. Each document then was uploaded into the ATLAS.ti software as primary document (PD).

Each PD is the basic data source for analysis using ATLAS.ti. Data encoding is equivalent to uploading the transcriptions to the software as the software has a feature which does so. When a PD is added to ATLAS.ti, the software assigns index numbers that identify each text using paragraph numbers and primary document code number within the text (which is equivalent to a data segment or chunk). These index numbers served as references to cite direct quotations from PDs.

This compilation of data with the software support facilitated the data analysis and made retrieval of quotations (chunks) simple during the constant comparisons while coding the data (Saldana, 2009; Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Selecting and copying of exemplar quotations during report preparation was facilitated by the software as it has features which show the data segment (quotation) within the entire data document. This helps to maintain the contextual meanings (emic views) as originally conveyed by respondents which also adds credibility to the data (Lincoln & Guba, 2013).

3.5.5.1.1.3. Coding:

Codes, in this research, refer to labels of concepts or categories about which conceptual frameworks and theoretical propositions are developed (Miles & Huberman, 1994). A group of such concepts around a higher and broader level of abstraction is defined as category in the present research (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The process of generating such codes is termed as coding (Saldana, 2009).

As Lewins and Silver (2007:81) define, "[q]ualitative coding is the process by which segments of data are identified as relating to, or being an example of, a more general idea, instance, theme or category." As also asserted by scholars (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Tracey, 2013) the coding procedure is iterative which results in more abstract and higher level concepts through comparison of emergent concepts with various data sources (triangulation).

Thus, coding requires extracting meanings from the data corpus and labeling that meaning. The techniques applied for the extraction of meanings are inseparably embedded in the coding process. Noting patterns or themes, counting, making contrasts/comparisons, noting relationships, building logical chain of evidences and building conceptual/theoretical coherence as explained by Miles and Huberman

(1994) were techniques of meaning extraction applied in the present research. These techniques were applied as appropriate throughout the data analysis phase of the research.

As the present research is designed with an inductive logic for reasons explained in the previous sections, the coding scheme applied does not have a-priori lists of codes or categories; rather the "grounded" approach or "a-posteriori" method of coding was applied (Miles & Huberman, 1994:58; Sinkovics *et al.*, 2008:704). This type of coding is consistent with the seminal works of Eisenhardt (1989). This approach is also consistent with the coding conventions of Corbin and Strauss (1990). The justification for selecting inductive (grounded) coding approach is because it helps to prove that "the researcher is open to what the site has to say, rather than determined to force-fit the data into preexisting codes" (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 62). This approach, in addition to increasing trustworthiness, fits to the purpose of the study which has much to do with context.

As the present research is inductive, the coding process progressed from generating descriptive codes at the initial stages to more latent or interpretive ones (Miles & Huberman, 1994) in later stages. In line with this, coding in this research went through two phases—initial (first cycle) and focused (second cycle) (Saldana, 2009; Charmaz, 2006).

3.5.5.1.1.3.1. Generating first cycle codes:

This (i.e., initial) stage of coding dealt with the identification, labeling and description of codes and categories. This stage was categorized by being open to let any meaning emerge from the data corps. Its orientation as explained above is descriptive. In so doing, the coding method that is known in the literature as initial or line-by-line or open coding (Saldana, 2009; Charmaz, 2006; Miles & Huberman,

1994) and in vivo coding (Saldana, 2009) were applied with the support of the ATLAS.ti software. Strictly speaking, these two methods are overlapping. Especially in the descriptions of Charmaz (2006) and Corbin and Strauss (1990), in vivo coding is not a separate type of coding; it is rather a technique of selecting participant's word as a code. The broader category of coding is open coding. It is an appropriate method for interview transcripts and inductive methods (Saldana, 2009).

Initial codes were generated through closely reading each primary document and trying to make sense from it; and in due course giving name to (i.e., labeling) each word, line, or segment of data (Charmaz, 2006). This resulted in the list of emergent codes *(see annexes 6 and 7)*. These codes emerged based on close interactions and researcher attempts to deeply understand data. Throughout this process of initial coding, the researcher remained open to take any meaning out of the data. This tactic avoids the risk of overloading researcher's voice (i.e., excessive researcher influence on the analytic process which leads to lack of codes that are fit to the empirical world under study) (Charmaz, 2006).

The code manager of ATLAS.ti keeps records of created codes in an integrated manner and continues adding new ones as the researcher moves across primary documents. With the support of the software in this way, the researcher created the codes by typing words or phrases that are assumed to have as much as possible semantically similar meaning to what they are intended to represent (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Besides, in vivo coding method was applied in the code creation process to maintain the contextual meanings and ensure the emergence of participant's meanings (voice) in the theory building. This also adds credibility.

Coding with a support of ATLAS.ti results in a running list of codes in real time in a way subsequent typing of new codes does not allow duplications through suggestions of previous codes and preventing the researcher from typing same code for more than once. This replaces the preparation of code book (Saldana, 2009). This feature of the software indirectly indicates the point of saturation as per the conceptualization of scholars (e.g., Charmaz, 2006; Eisenhardt, 1989; Corbin & Strauss, 1990).

The creation of line-by-line coding was followed by constant comparisons across interview data from different participants of the same team, across different teams, and between core-process teams and support-process teams. This attempt of looking similarities and differences across similar and different teams (Eisenhardt, 1989) helped to iteratively refine codes. The second phase of constant comparison was characterized by comparing between codes and codes and between codes and data. This helped refining the final list of codes to be retained for further analysis. The whole lot of activities from interviewing through transcription and generating initial codes marked prolonged engagement with data. This adds credibility to the meanings (i.e., emergent concepts and categories) that were labeled using codes.

3.5.5.1.1.3.2. Generating second cycle codes:

Coding at this stage was based on the codes that were generated in the first cycle coding. The intention was to further refine the already created codes and categories and identify patterns through searching for the most frequent (salient) or significant initial codes and deciding to retain initial codes which "make the most analytic sense" (Saldana, 2009). Salient codes are those that are frequently linked to participants' ideas in the data corpus. That means salient codes are well grounded in the data. ATLAS.ti measures this with an index number called groundedness. In addition to being salient, codes should also be significant in their contribution to the whole pattern of relationships that are extracted from the data. This is supported by ATLAS.ti's network view manager (see annex 12 & annex 13) which works with the logic that is accepted by scholars (e.g. Miles & Huberman, 1994; Saldana, 2009; Charmaz, 2006). The number of times a code or category is related to other code or category is measured by the ATLAS.ti to indicate significance as density.

Codes and categories that were already created in the first cycle and extracted because of their salience and significance (not in a statistical sense) as measured by ATLAS.ti's groundedness and density were refined at this stage. This is a manifestation of the iterative process of coding. By its focus on relationships between categories and its attempt to extract more abstract themes and concepts, the second cycle is different from what was described in the previous stage. The focus of the second cycle evolves to be latent (i.e., conceptual) as compared to descriptive in the previous cycle.

Theoretical coding (Saldana, 2009) was the type of second cycle coding which was applied in the present study. Saldana's (2009) descriptions of coding methods are parallel to axial coding and selective coding as explicated by (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Axial coding starts at about the end of the first cycle. ATLAS.ti's code family manager was used to create code families for already created codes in the first cycle coding.

Refinements to the code families (i.e., categories in the second cycle) served as the beginning of the second cycle before it turns its focus on higher level (i.e., latent) abstractions. Theoretical coding or as referred to by grounded theorists (e.g. Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 1990) selective coding was applied in the last coding cycle of the present research. "Focused codes are sort of meta-code" (Miles and Huberman, 1994:69); however, it focuses on the categories "without destructed attention at this time to their properties and dimensions" which is already dealt with in the first cycle (Saldana; 2009: 155).

This last stage in coding is also referred to as focused coding to mean "using the most significant (not in a statistical sense) and/or frequent amongst earlier codes to sift through large amounts of data" Charmaz (2006: 57). This tactic has a positive impact on increasing the voices of participants. That is the rationale behind supporting the method of second-cycle coding in the present study with ATLAS.ti' software.

As a counterintuitive mechanism (Miles & Huberman, 1994), an analysis of codes' salience (measured by groundedness) and importance (measured by density), as referred to by the ATLAS.ti software, were applied to go through the second cycle. Miles and Huberman's (1994) salience and importance is parallel to Charmaz's (2006) significant and frequent as described in the above paragraph. The combination of these measures (see Table 5.1 and Table 5.3) is applied at this stage in the attempt to search for codes which make the most analytic sense (Saldana, 2009).

Through the support of density measures (see Annex 5 & Annex 9), codes that emerge conceptually appealing; and through the support of groundedness measures (see Annex 4 & and Annex 8), codes that are most grounded on the empirical data were selected. These counting features of the software are clearly explicated by Miles and Huberman's (1994:253) assertion to identify a concept that (a) "happens a number of times and (b) consistently happens in specific way."

In general, the two coding cycles applied in the present study balance two things: (1) openness to capture line-by-line all possible meanings from a chunk and to give a chance to each of such extracts and (2) reduce the data so created into fewer more significant or recurrent or important ones without the influence of the analyst's bias in the process.

3.5.5.1.1.4. Describing and interpreting coded concepts and their relationships:

Building logical chain of evidences and making conceptual/theoretical coherence (as described by Miles and Huberman (1994)) describe the techniques used at this stage. As asserted by Miles and Huberman (1994: 260), subsuming particulars into the general and factoring result in identifying "discrete bits of information" were among the methods applied at this stage. However, how these bits make "a more economical whole that, analytically speaking is more than the sum of its parts" (Miles & Huberman, 1994:260) requires building a logical chain of evidence. Graphic representations were used to depict the logic manually or with a CAQDAS Support (Saldana, 2009). The final stage greatly benefited from Saldana's (2009) post-coding and pre-writing strategies of extracting top categories and themes or concepts. Besides, Saldana's (2009) touch test was applied to progress to higher level of abstraction.

In line with descriptions, chains of evidences were compared and contrasted. Direct quotations which were selected from participants' responses were interwoven with the description to increase credibility (Miles & Huberman, 1994). On due course, countervailing evidences were also accounted for and ruled out. This tactic gives sense to the relationships identified. This is done through a series of if-then tactics and anomaly-seeking exercises (Carlile & Christensen, 2004). Raising questions such as "Does this really happen, and what would we logically predict as a consequence—and does that consequence appear in the data?" (Miles & Huberman, 1994:260) leads to what Eisenhardt (1989) refers to as shaping hypothesis whereby provisional propositions had been made about the relationships among the final set of concepts (themes) and refined through iteratively checking if they give good sense of the data. This was done through "dialogue/argumentative method of dialectics" (Lincoln

& Guba, 2013). Refined hypotheses and related explanations backing them were then juxtaposed with extant literature (Eisenhardt, 1998).

This same procedure of within case analysis had been used to every case before the start of cross-case analysis. At the stage of cross-case analysis, the focus of analysis was on the findings of each case. Basically, findings had been compared in search of the final extraction of concepts and relationships.

3.5.5.1.2. Cross-case analysis

The second phase which is the search for cross-case patterns as posited by Eisenhardt (1989) started after the above iterative procedures were completed and results from each case emerged. The remaining procedures were the same as Eisenhardt's (1989) prescription. The specific tactics used to do cross-case analyses at this stage were searching for similarities and differences across paired cases (Eisenhardt, 1989) which were at same time supported by counts (Miles & Huberman, 1994) that were generated by the ATLAS.ti software (see Table 7.1). These tactics of comparisons are meant to reduce researcher bias (Eisenhardt, 1989).

The benefit of multiple case designs is the possibility of replication and comparison of findings across-cases through the application of qualitative analysis techniques (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005). As Eisenhardt (1989) explains, analysis of cross-case patterns can help in avoiding information processing bias that has roots in vividness influences, more elite respondents, and inadvertently dropping disconfirming evidences. Eisenhardt's (1989:540) two tactics of cross-case analysis were applied in the present research. The first tactic, which is selecting "categories or dimensions" and looking for "within-group similarities and intergroup differences", was applied for core process teams and support process teams within each bank. The second tactic, which is selecting “pairs of cases” and listing “similarities and differences”, is more explicit in this report. The second tactic takes the two banks as pair.

Theory is then developed inductively on the basis of emergent “relationships among constructs within and across-cases and their underlying logical arguments” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007:25). As a result of the iterative process described so far, tentative themes (concepts) and relationships or patterns continued emerging in a more and more vivid manner. These emergent themes (constructs), relationships and patterns had to be systematically compared with evidences from each case with an intention to test how they fit to case data. This led to sharpening of definitions of emergent concepts and clarifying their manifestations.

After exhaustively describing the final finding (cross-case analysis result), the research entered another stage – triangulation with theory in the extant literature. In this stage Bacharach’s (1989) and Wacker’s (1998) criteria for good theoretical contribution had been applied. Using these criteria, the research’s proposition about a strategic organizational change implementation model had been made. Finally, Eisenhardt’s (1989) techniques that are referred to as shaping hypothesis, enfolding literature and reaching closure were applied to refine the findings that emerged after cross-case analyses.

3.6. Methodological Rigor

The quality of findings from qualitative research is judged based on methodological rigor. The judgment of rigor in the present study should be viewed within the perspective of the specific research design employed by the study. Eisenhardt’s (1989) approach of building theory from case study research is the research strategy applied. Eisenhardt (1991:627) further explicated its “rigorous methodology and comparative, multiple-case logic.” The use of multiple data sources and triangulation tactics applied in the present research can primarily be considered as indicators of quality (Eisenhardt, 1989, 1991). As procedures prescribed by Eisenhardt (1989) are evident (in the study as can be observed in the previous sections of this report), indicators or research quality and methodological rigor explained thereof also apply for the present study.

This research approach is strong in building empirically grounded theories through rigorous tactics of constant comparisons between emergent theory and data across various sources and cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). This reduces researcher bias to its minimum and results in relatively objective constructs. Meeting methodological rigor "requires being watchful about multiple sources of analytic bias" (Miles & Huberman, 1994:263). The other feature Eisenhardt (1989:547) pinpoints as the strength of her approach is the fact that the output will be a theory which "can be readily measured and hypotheses that can be proven.... [This is because] they have already undergone repeated verification during the theory-building process."

The present research supported by the ATLAS.ti software applied frequency counts of appearance of concepts in the data (i.e., groundedness) and measures of the density (salience) of relationships a concept has with the rest of the concepts or categories (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Charmaz, 2006). The software sorted the emergent categories or concepts in terms of their order of importance so that the top most important ones could not be overlooked. This added to the objectivity of the results. The use of computer programs such as ATLAS.ti helps to reduce biases as it helps to conduct bias minimizing tactics such as if-then tests, and triangulating (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Moreover, as the use of the software documents the interactions of the researcher with the data, it provides an "auditable foot-print" allowing progressive focusing and refinement (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012:827).

In addition to the above measures in connection with empirical research, Eisenhardt (1989) also posits that as a measure of goodness, the theory built must be parsimonious, testable, and logically coherent. CAQDAS can also "facilitate robust theory development through the ongoing renegotiation and updating of theoretical concepts and a constant comparison of theoretical building blocks and empirical evidence (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012:819).

Eisenhardt *et al.* (2016) refer to the approach of building theory from cases as an inductive method. According to these scholars, the use of theoretical sampling which creates "opportunities for comparisons… [adds on the] robustness of emergent theory" (p. 1114). They call for better rigor and quality inductive research contending what they referred to as "rigor mortis" that challenge inductive researchers and ultimately lead to false rigor (Eisenhardt *et al.*, 2016: 1121). As a solution, they propose three criteria for testing rigor: (1) whether the emergent theory is internally coherent and parsimonious, (2) whether constructs or themes are convincingly grounded in compelling data and (3) if the research provides rich and un-expected insights.

Sticking to the distinct nature of the approach proposed by Eisenhardt (1989), the present research can be evaluated in terms of the above three criteria while reviewing all the parts of the report. All the three criteria do not require procedures (steps) in order to test for methodological rigor; rather the features are embedded in all the research tasks that were executed to build theory from cases.

Miles and Huberman (1994) generically explain quality in terms of reduced bias and researcher effect. With respect to reducing these researcher biases and influences on the findings, they proposed several tactics. Effects refer to the influences of outsiders to a group and that of insiders' influence on outsiders. This leads to an interest of preventing “biased observations’ (as a result of the influences) are “confounding” the natural characteristics of the setting with the artificial effects of researcher-native relationship” (Miles & Huberman, 1994:265). This implies two sources of effects on research—(1) researcher and (2) effects of the site.

In terms of reducing investigator effects, the present study has qualities that are consistent with the proposal of Miles and Huberman (1994). These include: staying long on-site which is also referred to as prolonged engagement, unequivocally informing participants about researcher intentions, and conducting some interviews off-site. The preliminary discussions with gatekeepers and archival reviews on the targeted change initiatives in each bank as strategies to gain emic insights which helped the researcher to be empathetic and at the same time to be neutral during in-depth interviews are what can be mentioned as instances here. In addition, the use of participant information sheet with details about the implications and impacts of participating in the research indicates quality as acknowledged by Mile and Huberman (1994). There were also interviews conducted outside the office of participants based on their willingness in order to reduce the impact of the site and give participants more freedom and create a friendliness condition.

As Miles and Huberman (1994) explain, getting feedback from informants is a logical source of corroboration. In the present study, the researcher used earlier conceptualizations of ideas emerged from previous data in exploring more information or refining previous ideas based on data gathered from subsequently contacted participants from the same case and sub-case (embedded case). These peer debriefing methods were used to corroborate through subsequent interviews until the data saturates. These later participants are referred to, in Miles and Huberman (1994:275), as “confidants”. These approaches as affirmed by these authors are other mechanisms of getting feedback from participants.

3.6.1. Methodological Norms

In addition to the approaches discussed so far, to explain the methodological rigor of the present research, criteria that are used to measure goodness of qualitative research are discussed here in order to give complementary information by using the language (i.e., norms) of deductive-orientated readers in viewing methodological rigor of qualitative research (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012).

Quality of a qualitative research can be tested by (1) the "trustworthiness criteria of credibility (paralleling internal validity), transferability (paralleling external validity), dependability (paralleling reliability) and confirmability (paralleling objectivity)" (2) the authenticity criteria of fairness, ontological authenticity, and educative authenticity (Guba & Lincoln, 1994:114). The synthesis of proposals by different scholars (e.g. Patton, 2002; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Lincoln and Guba, 2013; Toma, 2006), thus; results in a set of the two common standards against which quality of qualitative research can be judged—trustworthiness and authenticity.

The tactics applied in the present research are also consistent with some features of trustworthiness and authenticity. However, it has to be noted that not all the criteria for rigor are required to be fulfilled by a single research project; only combinations of those that are relevant to the specific research project need to be applied (Toma, 2006).

3.6.1.1. Trustworthiness

As described above, trustworthiness is among the commonly applied criteria for judging the quality of qualitative research. A research that demonstrates its findings are (1) credible, (2) dependable (3) transferable and (4) confirmable is said to be trustworthy (Patton, 2002; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Lincoln and Guba, 2013; Toma, 2006). In addition, Sinkovics and Alfoldi (2012:819) explain about the use of CAQDAS in enhancing "systematization, trustworthiness, reflexivity and operational effectiveness in qualitative research." Hence, the trustworthiness criteria is fulfilled in the present study by the use of the ATLAS.ti software and also in the ways described below.

3.6.1.2. Credibility

Credibility indicates the quality of data in terms of accurately representing the targeted empirical reality. It also refers to the accuracy of researcher's interpretation in terms of representing meanings of study targets and the researcher's credibility (Toma, 2006). In effect, credibility indicates the degree to which the findings sound true for those with emic views (natives) and for those in the field.

Mechanisms that show whether participants agree in the constructions and interpretations of the researcher can be used to ensure credibility (Toma, 2006). In an attempt to richly describe cases, the present research used several data sources and multiple participants. This enhances credibility (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Eisenhardt *et al.,* 2016). Greater confidence can be built about the credibility of the data and emergent constructions because of the triangulation strategies applied in the research. "Triangulation, in whatever form, increases credibility and quality by countering the concern (or accusation) that a study's findings are simply an artifact of a single method, a single source, or a single investigator's blinders" (Miles & Huberman, 1994:563). The application of theoretical sampling also enhances credibility.

Richness of description (thick description) of the case and its boundaries also serves as a base against which readers (evaluators) can judge the credibility of the interpretations and constructions by the researcher (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The cases selected for the present research are described in a separate section to clearly communicate the reality so that the interpretation process can be judged by the reader for its congruence with the data.

Peer debriefings were also applied as mechanisms of ensuring accuracy of data and researcher understandings (interpretations). As mechanism of ensuring quality, the researcher used to summarize issues for the participant seeking confirmation. Whenever the researcher perceives an emergent need to do so, checking and rechecking the stances of participants was an integral tactic of interviewing. Besides, subsequent interviews were augmented by peer debriefings to ensure the accuracy of previously gathered data or to decide on further data collection towards those which require more effort for saturation.

In line with Miles and Huberman's (1994) recommendations, in the present research, the researcher took time before delving deep into each case and gathered preliminary information and general insights from gatekeepers. With key participants too, giving sufficient information with the help of participant information sheet, getting used to each other, and maintaining rapport were used as strategies to increase credibility (Patton, 2002). Further details about the researcher are provided under the statement of subjectivity section of this report. Audit trial and chain of evidence were also mechanisms that were applied by the researcher as quality (credibility) enhancement tactics (Yin, 2003; Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012). These tactics (i.e., debriefings and audit-trial) are also considered as mechanisms of enhancing dependability.

3.6.1.3. Transferability

In the present research, as it is guided by Eisenhardt's (1989) approach, such analyses techniques as constant comparison methods, triangulation, and frequency counts have been used for the purpose of reducing bias and increasing the transferability of meanings across various boundaries that are rectified through cross-case analysis. To make it more explicit, the fact that the present research employs multiple cases and the attempt to enclose maximum variation (both private and government-owned banks) and the nested cases embedded within each bank which is also consistent with Carlile and Christensen's (2004) anomaly-seeking add value towards transferability of the findings of the present research. In addition, the tactics mentioned in connection with credibility also increase transferability. Thick description of the cases included in the present research also enhances transferability.

3.6.1.4. Authenticity

The researcher actually visited the cases (banks), discussed with concerned personnel, gathered documentary evidences and conducted in-depth interviews. This enabled the researcher to authentically analyze the data and develop the theory based on emic views within the cases through immersion into and prolonged engagement on case data as explicated in the previous sections of this report. Instead of bringing researcher's prior insights into the research, the research is designed in a way the researcher sticks to the data and refrains from influencing the meaning construction process by etic views.

Fair representation of the voices of different participants such as operational workers, middle level managers, and top managers are features of the present research that are consistent with authenticity criteria. This, through triangulation effort, balances voices from multiple participants and fulfils fairness criteria. The fairly adequate use of quotations from these participants is an indicator for an authentic finding and reporting. Above all, the trigger for conducting the present research has much to do with context. The entire research was geared towards understanding how strategic organizational change unfolds in the selected context. This forced the research process to focus on emic perspectives and the results to be authentic.

3.6.2. Ethical Considerations

Ethics is about "how we decide that an action is right, correct, or appropriate" (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 289). As Tracy (2010) explicates, research should meet procedural, situational, relational, exiting, and culturally specific ethical standards. She also adds self-reflexivity and multivocality as parts of ethics.

The present research was conducted in accordance with ethical standards of the University. Data collection was conducted after getting ethical clearance from the university (see annex 11). The standards applied to ensure ethical principles are consistent with the recommendations by Tracy (2010). The following subsections are explanations of ethical considerations considered in conducting the research.

3.6.2.1. Procedural Ethics

Procedural ethics include the standard procedures of causing no harm, avoiding deception, and protecting privacy and getting informed consent. As explained in the previous sections, the present research has features that enhance credibility; and the use of multiple data sources and the report preparation entails authentic multi-vocal tactic. With respect to meeting procedural ethics in the present research; informed consent and confidentiality principles were maintained.

Informed Consent: Participant organizations (banks) and individuals were fully and accurately informed; on the basis of which they gave their consent to participate in the research. Before starting data gathering from a selected bank, a written request of permission was issued to each bank as this was a requirement by the ethics review procedure of the university too. The two participant banks then gave permission letter to allow data gathering. These letters were reviewed by the university but not annexed to this report for confidentiality purpose.

In each bank, relevant personnel (gatekeepers) were contacted in search of gaining insights into the nature of the targeted change initiative. Besides, these first contacts helped the researcher in getting information about who participated in initiating and implementing the change. This resulted in lists of individuals (participants). These lists are securely kept by the researcher in order to keep personal identities confidential. With the help of the lists, individuals were contacted and given sufficient information about what it meant to participate in this study. To maintain consistency in doing so and for audit purpose, a participant information sheet which was also reviewed by the university was prepared (see annex 1) and printed copies were given to each individual participant before getting her/his willingness to participate. No individual was made to give data without her/his willingness.

During interviews with participants, the researcher asked the consent of each participant to take notes and to use tape recorder by explaining the purpose of doing so and how the data will be kept secured from access that compromises privacy and confidentiality.

Confidentiality: Confidentiality issues were given utmost care. The privacy of participant individuals and organizations are protected. As the finding is not targeted to a specific bank, there is no need to disclose the identity of the participant bank. Instead, it is empathetic to protect participant bank's interest by not disclosing its strategy related facts as doing so may have a potential harm to market competition of the participant bank. With this in mind, the research report is written using anonymous representations of participants. The privacy of the participants is so protected that they are secured from any possible harm.

Interviewees were not required to sign or provide informed consent form as their private information was not needed. The researcher faced no dilemma with respect to confidentially protecting identities of participants as interviewees' private information (identity) is not needed for the research. Report of the present study consciously avoided deductive disclosure of participants to prevent unwitting disclosure of private information to those who know the setting.

As part of ensuring confidentiality, paper-based records are kept and will be kept in a secure location and will only be accessible to the researcher. These files will be kept for five years after publication of this report and finally disposed through shredding. Computer-based records are kept in password-protected computer and files to be accessed by only the researcher. Data exchanges with the supervisor did not include private information of participants. Crashing of external storage devices and formatting (erasing the files from) the personal computer will be used to de-identify personal information when the file will no longer be important.

3.6.2.2. Situational Ethics

As Tracy (2010:847) explains, "situational ethics refer to ethical practices that emerge from a reasoned consideration of a context's specific circumstances." Conducting the present research in the context of Ethiopian commercial banks is expected to benefit the banks in terms of recommending an implementation model for strategic organizational change that fits the specific context of banks. This benefit is expected to be anticipated without compromising the interests of participant banks. This can be inferred from the procedural ethics considerations specified in the above section. Besides, this research is initiated to explore context-based constructs and their relationships. On the bases of these relationships, an implementation model for strategic organizational change is built. This very nature of the research poses ethical dilemmas to the researcher.

One is the claim to be made about the specific context and the second is the voice in the making of the claim. Context in the present research refers to the setting within which (it also implies the domain) the emergent model is expected to be valid. The dilemma is whether the breadth encompasses Ethiopia, an emerging economy, the banking sector or the two selected banks. Being in this dilemma, the researcher decided to focus the claim to be analytical (theoretical) as Yin (2011) describes in a sense that constructions from purely national (domestic) context can result in deviant explanations of strategic organizational change implementation by presenting findings juxtaposed with similar concepts from the extant literature. This decision is made compromising the researcher's view that the findings can also be transferred to contexts other than the banking sector. This view of the researcher is influenced by his previous research on the implementation and impact of similar change initiatives in other six public sector organizations.

In claiming to make genuine contribution for the banking sector in Ethiopia with respect to overcoming acontextual theories, "the question of whose voice is heard in any given construction" is the fundamental ethical issue as asserted by Lincoln and Guba (2013:54). In this study, the voices of participants resulted in the most important influence in the construction process. The researcher's voice is kept as minimal as possible through the researcher's utmost care. This is evident in the intensive use of direct quotations in the finding sections of this report. These quotations are selected because they are exemplars of salient concepts or constructions that are grounded in the data. However, care has also been taken in order not to misrepresent the facts being influenced by deliberate or unconscious malconstructions by either the researcher or participants. The use of multiple participants and the support by the ATLAS.ti software in organizing data and facilitating retrieval without memory loss or risk of being overwhelmed by most vivid data or influences of elite participants and to be instead based on groundedness and density measures (counts) were main strategies of fairly representing voices and reducing bias.

However, notwithstanding the probable novelty of some constructs that emerged especially from the private sector bank, the researcher decided to drop them for the sake of protecting the bank against possible interrogations by regulatory bodies. The private sector in Ethiopia struggles for access to finance as government policy is too tight. The private banking sector has devised informal mechanisms of overcoming this. The researcher refrained from reporting them because of the likely speculation about the identity of the participant bank.

3.6.3. Statement of Subjectivity

As an academician and a practitioner, I was exposed to the lessons on different change models and to the practices of organizational change initiatives both in the University I work for and in other organizations in which I conducted research. I perceived common patterns across the initiatives. They have advocates with mantras that are directly copied from a book authored by the contributor of the change model. However, other than the media campaigns propagating the success stories, I felt that witnessing real and sustained changes is difficult. As the media stops the campaigns on a specific type of change model, the reported changes also vanish and gradually organizations regress back to the status quo – a punctuating deep silence. This state then interrupts with a different name of change. The same organizational shock accompanied by media campaigns runs for a while to precede another period of resilience.

My attendance of the PhD proposal development program was an opportunity to explore towards a way through which I was convinced that I could systematically address the issue of why these initiatives are not delivering what they promised. From the literature, I learned that implementation of an organizational change is the most challenging stage and hence, the track record of success is low. I further investigated to learn about the possible reasons behind this. The acontextual practices of change and the skewness of extant literature towards western context fit to my personal quest for why can't the initiatives to the best of my understanding deliver as they are expected.

Especially Pettigrew *et al.*'s (2001) call and the dearth of literature in response to the call triggered me to build a contextual model that can guide change initiatives towards success. From this time onwards, I remained open to explore anything that gives sense with respect to the idea of successful implementation of change. Attempting to observe the issue within national context, I chose the banking sector because it is legally reserved for domestic players only.

Apart from being enthusiastic to develop an implementation model which primarily serves as a guideline for upcoming strategic change initiatives and at the same time to build on the notion of context-based change models, I have no conflicts of interest which challenge me to be biased towards. To overcome the inherent problem of subjectivity in qualitative research, I followed the strategy of immersion into the subject of study (Patton, 2002) and tried to control the etic view's influence on the emic view of participant cases. This effort was backed by the very interest of exploring contextual perspectives which motivated me to study on this subject. Having a stance of exploring the truth as experienced by study participants and inductively developing a model which captures the theory of how a strategic organizational change can be successfully implemented in the specific context represented by the selected cases, I followed specific strategies of reducing investigator influence.

I started the field work by a familiarization strategy through gathering data from documents, and gatekeepers about the targeted change initiatives in each bank. Then I designed procedures which would help me to be immersed in each case and be able to understand emic views. Following these procedures (bottom-up interviewing schedule) I gathered data from nested layers of cases up to the level I felt I reached data saturation. Prior reading of and decision to use Eisenhardt's (1989) recommended approach to remain unbiased and let the data speak contributed a lot in terms of reducing researcher subjectivity.

The coding scheme (the inductive or grounded approach) helped me in giving fair chance to consider all emergent concepts to be represented. Further reductions were supported by computer software (ATLAS.ti). This allowed me view all created codes through an open coding procedure and when need be retrieve all segments of data that are linked to the codes within their origin (text) in the entire data set.

The final selections were done in line with what is proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994) as counting being supported by the software that makes the counting accurate. The counting reflects two dimensions – groundedness (which indicates the number of quotations linked to a code) and density (which indicates the number of times the concept is interconnected to the rest). The combined use of density and groundedness as criteria for selecting concepts for further analysis reduces the researcher's bias to a level that does not practically affect the findings of the study.

Even though the researcher tried to apply several methods to reduce subjectivity, as the researcher in qualitative research is normally a human instrument, it is impossible to avoid the influence of the researcher in the construction process. Hence, during the sense making process, the researcher's background knowledge of some theories in the extant literature could possibly influence the construction.

3.7. Chapter Summary

In this chapter, the methods that were employed to conduct the present study are discussed in line with ontological and epistemological underpinnings. In the chapter, the research problem and how it is linked to the applied research methods was introduced fist. Then the type of research design that was employed in the present research and relevant justifications are discussed. The next chapter describes the cases which were involved in the present research.

CHAPTER FOUR: GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF CASES

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the cases (i.e., commercial banks) that were included in the present study are described. The description intends to provide insights into the types of the banks and the nature of the changes initiated in each bank. The cases described in this chapter were selected based on the logic explained in Chapter Three.

In Ethiopia, the banking sector constitutes both government-owned and private banks. All the government owned banks have commonly experienced some strategic organizational changes in the past decade alone. However, there was no such widely known practice across all private banks. Notwithstanding this fact, as the purpose of this study was to develop an implementation model for strategic organizational change in commercial banks in the country, the sample had to engender representation from private banks too. Only one of the private banks went through an organization-wide change. Therefore, the only private bank which undertook strategic organizational change and one of the two government-owned commercial banks were incorporated as cases of the present study.

The two case banks introduced strategic organizational change which entails business process redesign. The redesigning was executed by teams that were organized based on core and support business process conceptualization. This structure helped the researcher to organize field works based on these nested sub-cases embedded in each bank as depicted by figure 3.1.

The banks' identity is anonymously reported in this study as the name is not required for the purpose of the study. Besides, this approach protects the privacy of case banks. Further details about cases are presented in the subsequent sections.

4.2. General Background of Cases

Banking sector of Ethiopia comprises of the central bank (i.e., National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE)), two government-owned banks and sixteen private banks. Among the tww government-owned banks, one is fully dedicated to finance investments in government's priority areas. Total number of commercial banks is seventeen. For Africa's second most populous nation with 102 million people (World Bank, 2016), the number of banks is very few.

As a result, indigenous informal financial institutions primarily 'Iqquib' are providing services and filling the demand gap. These informal financial institutions have been serving the financial needs of societies and businesses (Misganaw, 2012; Dejenie, 1993) and are continuing doing so. Moreover, transaction cost of getting access to finance from the informal sector is lower (Misganaw, 2012) compared to that of the fully collateral-based commercial banking sector. The World Bank (2017) recommends identifying ways of sustaining financial infrastructure and supporting private investment through credit market as major challenges of the country.

NBE has the authority to give license to and supervise operations of banks and other financial institutions based on the power bestowed to it by the "National Bank of Ethiopia Establishment (as Amended) Proclamation Number 591/2008". This proclamation made amendments to and replaced proclamation number 83/1994 which allowed establishing private banks. Article 3 of the new proclamation reaffirmed the establishment of the central bank declaring: "the National Bank of Ethiopia established by Order No. 30/1963 shall continue to exist as an autonomous institution."

However, Article 9 of the new Ethiopian Banking Business Proclamation number 592/2008 still remains being protectorate. It says, "foreign nationals or organizations [that are] fully or partially owned by foreign nationals may not be allowed to open banks or branch offices or subsidiaries of foreign banks in Ethiopia or acquire the shares of Ethiopian banks." This added to the National Bank's directive which increased the minimum paid-up capital to establish new banking business which slowed down the rate of new bank entry to the market forced the number of banks to remain very few.

The industry in which Ethiopian commercial banks are operating is characterized by the existence of very few players and entry barriers as a result of government's protection of the market from foreign investors and high paid-up capital requirement. This indicates weak intensity of competition among extant firms. In such situations, inefficient operations might not necessarily lead businesses to poor profitability. This indicates greater opportunity of improving operational efficiency by initiating strategic organizational change in such banks. Experiences of two commercial banks in Ethiopia with respect to initiating and implementing strategic organizational change are taken as cases in the present research.

In Ethiopia, several banks have been initiating different types of organizational changes. The differences in nature, source, and scope of initiatives have been more apparent between private and government-owned banks. Generally, government-owned banks have been subjected to organisation-wide changes as the same was demanded by the government. In contrast, practices of organisation-wide initiatives are rare in private banks. With an exception to one private bank which undertook organization-wide change, the rest experience only relatively smaller changes the biggest of which being the adoption of the core banking system. As organization-wide (strategic) change is the target of this study, the changes in government-owned banks and in the only private bank were found being appropriate for the study.

As described in the previous chapter, engendering cases from both government-owned and private banks helped the study to include maximum variations in terms of form of ownership and capture the differences so as to identify patterns that are salient across the entire commercial banking sector of the country. With this intention, one government-owned commercial bank and one private bank which attempted to undertake strategic organizational change were selected for this inductive multiple case study research.

Generally speaking, initiatives in government-owned banks are externally-driven while private sector banks initiate changes internally. Government-owned banks are often skewed towards fulfilling the financing needs of government projects or government priority areas in the private sector while private sector banks may choose to serve the motives of major shareholders who have interests other than making a profit out of the banking business. In both cases, nature of ownership plays an important role in business orientation and hence assumed to have impacts on strategic change implementation.

As participants explained based on their experience, private sector banks may attract the attention of investors whose primary interest is getting rid of difficulties of the financial market and get better access to finance. In private banks, investors have interests other than making money out of the banking business as mentioned before. For example, shareholders may opt to influence bank management to work towards fulfilling their financing needs for their other businesses more often than demanding running a successful banking business. This speculation sounds valid as the banking sector generally falls short of meeting financing demands of the market. It is no wonder banks can still be profitable while primarily serving such interests of their major shareholders. For a bank operating in this kind of environment, getting customer for the credit business is not an issue; fulfilling the demands of applicants is far from sufficient as banks are in short supply.

Getting access to finance through government-owned commercial banks is widely considered as a privilege. A bank can exploit its capacity without a significant effort to get customer. Government's mega projects alone can consume the entire lending capacity of government-owned banks in Ethiopia. Because of this reality, the central bank even forces banks to spend considerable portion of their loan in purchasing government bills.

Because of these, banks are focusing towards deposit mobilization, to minimize liquidity risks and increase their capacity to supply for businesses. These facts were widely expressed by participants from the two case banks. As was commonly mentioned by participant individuals from selected banks, banking business in Ethiopia is a no risk of loss area of investment.

With such prevailing conditions and the level of competition in the government protected banking industry wherein only few players enjoy entry barrier, the success of change is demanded more by the workforce than the management or leaders. The issue of increasing success in implementing strategic organizational change should, therefore, take this reality into account. This is indeed unique.

In the subsequent sections, the change initiatives in banks that are included in this multiple case study are described. The purpose is to provide background information about the kind of changes which were subjects of this study. Therefore, these sections are more descriptive than analytical.

4.3. Case Description: Bank A

Bank A is among the cases included in this study. It is a government owned bank. In this bank, initiatives for strategic change had been instituted five years earlier than data collection time. The purpose of these initiatives was to reorganize the bank using business process re-engineering (BPR).

Changing this bank using BPR passed through two phases as participants refer to. The first phase started following government's announcement about the use of BPR as a tool for organizational reforms. In accordance with the government's directions, bank A had in turn ordered all of its work units to do their own BPR. Then, each department of bank A self-declared BPR which was described by the participants as a functional-based BPR. As participants unequivocally claimed, the functional-based BPR failed to deliver as it was expected except bringing about some quick fixes. As a result, a second phase which was claimed by participants to be a process-based BPR was started. These were the two phases embedded in the entire move towards changing the bank through the application of BPR.

Although important insights were gained from the first phase (functional BPR), the process-based BPR (the second phase), was selected to be the focus of this study as the previous phase had not been well organised and access to data was assumed to be difficult when considered retrospectively. A major drawback, as commonly claimed by the participants of the first phase, was mentioned during in-depth interviews. Recognition of this drawback has served as a springboard to the next phase.

In the process-based BPR in bank A, the first thing that gained the attention of the change leaders was the issue of understanding the change model—BPR and its principles. As an output of this effort, unlike the case in the first phase where each department had to conduct its own BPR study and implement changes, phase two started by first establishing teams to design the anticipated change for the entiere bank in accordance with BPR principles.

Team establishment was not a one-time event. Initially, there was only one such team to handle the task of organizational redesigning. This team started its task by identifying the required processes to undertake the bank's business. It identified two categories in terms of which the bank's processes were classified—core processes and support processes.

Core processes are those processes that are directly related to the bank's commercial banking services to the customer while support processes represent back office operations that facilitate the operational processes of the bank. The team started the task of redesigning the bank first by focusing on the core processes. As a result, the first team identified and named three core processes—Customer accounts and transaction service, trade services and credit services.

At about the end of the redesigning task of the core processes, following the pilot testing results, managers realized the importance of changing the bank's processes entirely and hence initiated similar changes in support processes too. For this purpose, a new process team which was responsible to design support processes was established comprising of members from the prior team. The support process team then identified nine sub-processes. After this team had identified and named the sub-processes, it split into nine sub-teams and continued the operation of redesigning the support processes.

4.3.1. Core Process Teams

The process of changing bank A started by first identifying three core processes namely, customer accounts and transaction services (CATS), credit services, and trade services (TS). Each core process was established as a sub-process by assigning individuals who did the process identification works as members of the core process team. To accomplish the remainder of the tasks of assessing the "as-is" situation, which refers to the old system and designing the "to-be" (the new process), additional members joined each core process sub-team. Then each sub-team started to assess the old system that they referred to as "as-is" through collecting data from the work units that undertook the function(s).

Participants claimed to have followed the BPR principles and supporting tools such as process flow charts throughout the course of assessing the old system. They also had to report their findings regarding the pitfalls of the old systems to a higher body in the bank that was organised for the purpose of undertaking the change. This higher body was known as a steering committee.

There was also a resource person who served as a coordinator of the entire core process team. This person usually served as the representative of the three core sub-processes in presenting deliverables to the steering committee. During the presentations to the steering committee the process teams used to get feedback for further improvements or were told to proceed to the next steps.

Once the study of the “as-is” was approved by the steering committee and the weaknesses and areas of improvements had already been identified in connection with this study, the teams had started generating ideas about perusing the process in a better way. In connection with generating ideas, participants usually mentioned some techniques applied during the brainstorming sessions. Thinking outside the box, wacko idea generation and assumption breaking were mentioned in this regard.

Teams were also moved to a different place from where they resided so team members could work for the project with more concentration being away from their office assignments. This helped members to get to know each other better and maintain improved communication within and even across sub-teams.

Moreover, core-process team members got an opportunity to visit benchmark banks in other countries. Several participants regarded this as a remarkable event during their project work. However, others who were assigned to the support sub-process teams did not get such a chance. How they perceived this will be described in the section that deals with support process teams.

Based on their assessment of the "as-is" and outcomes of benchmarking visits, core process teams designed the "to-be" of bank A. This was a task of designing new core business processes of the bank. Designing the "to-be" passess through same studying and reporting procedure to the steering committee as they did during assessing the "as-is." Through this iterative interaction, the steering committee finally approved the three core business processes. This stage marked the start of implementing the new business processes through pilot-testing on selected branches.

The same core process teams that designed the business processes conducted the pilot-testing of the newly designed banking system in selected branches. They did this test with the selected branches' full participation. The pilot-testing was successful. Participants from the core process sub-teams regarded the pilot-testing important as it proved the feasibility of the new system.

Success of the new system in the branches where it was tested resulted in support from those branches' personnel and greater confidence and attention from bank A's management. Then the bank's management started to think about the importance of changing the bank completely using BPR as a tool. Consequently, the bank decided to initiate similar change in its support processes.

While the support process teams were established and started struggling to redesign the back office services, the core processes prepared policies and procedures along with the required design documents. These documents were inputs for the implementation procedures. Implementation was then started using those documents.

4.3.2. Support Process Teams

As explained above, the idea of redesigning the support processes emerged following positive results of pilot-testing the core processes. A team dedicated to the redesigning of the support business processes was established bearing this responsibility. Similar to what was done with the core processes; this team also started its task by trying to understand BPR and its principles. However, the time allocated to this team to accomplish its task was quite shorter compared to what was given to the core process teams. The bank's leaders were under time pressure while starting this initiative because of the long time consumed by the core processes and the first phase.

Next, the support process team identified and named nine sub-processes. Then the team was divided into these sub-processes. Finally, each sub-process was strengthened with additional new members and the task of redesigning the support sub-processes was started first by giving trainings and distributing reading materials to team members. However, members of these teams perceive, little attention and shorter time was given to the support process team members compared to that of core processes. Being equipped with the ideas about the change model, each sub-team went through the processes of studying the "as-is" and subsequently designed the "to-be" in similar ways as core process teams had done.

Interviewees who had been involved in the design of support processes were rather emotional when talking about their experiences. They perceived the entire matter in their own way. This signals a considerable difference in the way change happened during the two processes at bank A. Therefore, the two processes enabled the researcher to make a comparative analysis of them by treating them as embedded cases at times for the sake of enhancig the quality of within-case analyes results.

4.3.3. Coordinator

The coordinator for both core and support processes was common. He was a resource person responsible for all facilitation services regarding the process designing teams. This person used to serve as a link between the process designing teams and the steering committee. Deliverables had to be evaluated first by the coordinator before being submitted to the steering committee and other parties.

4.3.4. Organizational Structure Designing Team

A team called “organizational structure designing team” was established being composed of selected members from core and support processes study teams. This team prepared an organizational structure based on the newly designed core and support business processes. The team as participants informed the researcher took BPR principles in addition to the proposed changes by each processes study team. However, members of this team were not representative of each process sub-team; only some from core processes and some from support processes were given the chance to join this team. Formally, no document was given to the team as input to design the new structure. Only the participants’ knowledge (based on experience in participating in their respective teams) helped to serve this purpose. The final proposal used to be submitted for approval by the board of directors. The board of directors also played its part in modifying the proposed structure before final approval. Interviewees perceive this procedure to have suffered from information gap to accurately represent the intents of each newly designed business process in the new organizational structure of the bank.

4.3.5. Steering Committee

Core and support process teams described so far used to submit their proposals (interim and final deliverables) to a committee called the “steering committee” through their coordinator. The steering committee was the highest authority in the structure of actors during the change initiative in bank A. It was composed of the bank's president and other higher officers.

The steering committee's role was to recommend total rework, major modifications or minor modifications if not accepted and approved a process teams' deliverable. After approval by this committee, proposals were assumed to be final from the bank's side pending the formal by the board of directors.

4.3.6. Selection Committee

Selection committee was a group established to assign personnel to newly designed business processes. By the time this committee was established, process designing teams were about to finish their task. As the task of redesinging support business processes sequencially emerged after pilot-testing core business processes, the timing of starting assigning personnel to newly created job positions in newly designed business processes was perceived unfaire by members of support business process redisigning sub-teams.

Their argument is that selection should have started after the new processes were fully designed and should have been based on jobs designed for the new processes. They assert, it is illogical to start assigning personnel before finalizing the task of process redesigning as newly designed job were integral to the newly designed processes. This even destructed support processes teams and forced some of them to stop working towards finalizing the design. This implies, assignment of personnel was done with incomplete designs of jobs as the same is a result of fully designed business process. In the absence of a job design, there is no logic to make selection of personnel objective.

On the other hand, a participant from the then selection committee rejected this claim. According to this participant, the selection processes started first on the core processes as this was the order of completion (and of startup as well). However, the support process team members were also targets of the selection. If a member of a support process team that did not finish his/her task was assigned to a core process team, it might have marked the dissolution of the sub-team. This was attributed to the incompleteness of support business process designs.

4.4. Case Description: Bank B

Bank B is a private bank. This bank was selected because of its experience in an organizational wide change. Among other private commercial banks, bank B was found to have been engaged in strategic organizational change called "business process redesigning" that was initiated to intentionally precede its acquisition of the "Core Banking System." The purpose of initiating business process redesign in bank B was laying a good foundation for the technology support (i.e., Core Banking System).

The bank initiated the task of implementing Core Banking System as the same was demanded by NBE. While top management introduced the bank's plan to apply core banking system, experts raised an issue to change the entire organization in a way it fits to the application of the new system. These experts reportedly claimed the inappropriateness of implementing the new system with an old organizational setting. With this idea the experts convinced top management of the bank to deploy an initiative to change the entire bank's ways of doing business. This did not happen without fierce resistance from the top management though. This made the entire process of changing the bank a very challenging journey.

After convincing top management, initiators headed to declaring the idea of redesigning the entire bank's business processes. This was not a simple task, however. In the absence of heartfelt support from top management, introducing the idea by using the buzz word BPR was not found appropriate. Instead, they called it a "process redesigning" initiative. Their intention was to reduce resistance which they were afraid of as the name BPR already earned badmouthing following its application in government banks and other government organizations. Their worries were connected to possibilities of speculations about BPR as it was publicly perceived as a political agenda and as a tool for downsizing. This was partly influenced by government's excessive advocacy on public media and gradual regressions of government organizations back to the status quo after being a onetime subject of applause on the media for their achievements.

The bank, after a full year of implementing the newly designed business process, had established teams to evaluate the actual performance of the change vis-à-vis the newly designed business processes. As bank B's documented evaluation revealed, newly designed business processes of the bank were not fully implemented because of several challenges.

The bank's failure to install the Core Banking System in the entire bank and lack of commitment were among the reasons that were mentioned for implementation failure. Though the new business processes were designed taking the application of the software into consideration; it was found that the use of technology was limited only to the core business processes. Because of this, participants believe, the performance of implementation is better in retail banking operations department as the Core Banking System is installed there than in back office operations. Besides, lack of awareness and failure to align the change to performance evaluation and employee compensation were mentioned as reasons that prevented full implementation.

The report of the change evaluation team on the bank's retail banking operations also confirmed the full installation of core banking system in the process. The report further explains, the overall change initiated in bank B was composed of workflow redesign, branch structure, staff requirement, branch grading, and re-crafting policy and procedure in connection with laying fertile ground for the implementation of the newly acquired technology. The report describes the bank's move towards changing the whole procedure, policies, workflows, rules, regulations, staff placements, structures and related practices as strategic change. This is taken as a rationale for including this bank as a case in this research.

The recommendations forwarded by this team revolve around fully implementing the proposed change. This implies, despite the fact that the purpose of the team is evaluating implementation, as explained by participants; implementation of the change is yet to be commenced. The team proposed (1) selecting pilot branches for full implementation of the new systems and scaling up the practices at selected branches to the entire bank's branches, (2) controlling and following up implementation progress, (3) inter-departmental integration and (4) finally organizational restructuring as remedies for a complete implementation. All these recommendations indicate huge task of implementation is still left over.

However, the bank's management established a team to evaluate the performance of implementing the new system. This implies that the initiated change has already lost momentum even before the intended change was fully implemented. Time will tell whether the bank could reinitiate to exhaustively implement all features of the designed change.

The coordinator of the entire initiative also confessed the incompleteness of implementation. Based on his inadequate evaluation, the coordinator designates fifty percent implementation rate out of what was sought during designing. Both designing team members and the coordinator attributed this problem to lack of top management commitment because of the fact that the idea of the change was first raised by experts.

Thus, this case is perceived by organizational members as unsuccessful in implementing the anticipated change. The evaluation of participants ranges from acknowledging the need for some improvements to considering the initiative as a total disaster. But none considered the initiative to have been successfully and fully implemented. In connection with this fact, this case is assumed to have helped the researcher gain exposure to a polar case in the industry; not in its strictest sense though.

The structure of teams and committees that had roles during the initiative in bank B is a reflection of the sincerity of the bank's top management and maybe owners through the board of directors in carrying out the initiative. The following paragraphs are brief descriptions of each actor.

The approach of redesigning business processes in bank B was done in a way each existing unit of the bank had to redesign its processes. This was pretty much similar to what bank A participants refer to as "functional-based" approach. In this process, not all employees in each unit participate in whatsoever way; only selected ones did. Employees who had no chance to participate in the process redesigning task of their respective department had no exposure to know about the change. Finally, the documents containing redesigned processes of each department were delivered to be implemented. As participants unequivocally agreed up on, no one is interested to refer back to these documents let alone implementing them.

4.4.1. Process Redesigning Teams

As described above, teams which were responsible to do the process redesign for each department were organized parallel to the old structure whereby all departments in the bank were ordered to redesign their own process. As a result, teams of individuals had been established from each old department. After establishment, each team started operation without trainings to help them understand their tasks. There were no external consultants. As there was no prior experience of such type of initiative in other private banks, team members took experiences of government banks as benchmarks. Bank A was among the benchmarks. Besides, there was no time allocated for team assignments. Members had to carry out their regular tasks and side by side work towards team assignment.

4.4.2. Change Management Committee

There was a central committee called "change management committee" which was established to oversee what had been done by each department. The coordinator of this committee was the expert who played the leading role in influencing top management to sponsor the initiative. In this committee, there were members from different departments of the bank such as, organization and management, engineering, branch operations, and corporate planning departments.

This committee played technical roles during the designing stage by evaluating proposals of each department before submission to the steering committee for approval. Based on the comments given by this committee, each department had to make adjustments. However, the change management committee did not have power to forward the final saying on the proposal.

4.4.3. Structure Committee

This committee was responsible to design an organizational structure on the basis of the approved newly designed system proposal document. Logically, the input to the structure redesigning group was the department's proposal; top management's intervention had a role in the nature of structure though. This committee's and the steering committee's recommendations would mean a deviation of whatsoever from the original proposal. This is a second point where possible deviations from proposed designs could emerge. This way, the last version of the change in the business process had been set into implementation.

4.4.4. Steering committee

There was also a steering committee which used to approve proposed designs by each department and the proposed organizational structure. This committee was composed of the top management members of the bank. Therefore, this is indirectly the bank's top management group.

As complained by participants from the change management team and process redesign teams, this committee used to modify proposed designs without convincing or even informing designers. This was one of the sources of resentment on the side of implementers. Besides, possibility for perceptual difference is normal as the change was initiated bottom-up.

4.5. Chapter Summary

This chapter describes the two cases which were involved in the present study. In the description, the sub-components (nested layers) within each case are identified and described. The chapter provides background information about cases and hence, the mentions of cases both in the previous and in the next chapters can better be understood by grasping what is describe in this chapter. The next three chapters are based on data gathered from the cases which are described in this chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE: MAJOR CATEGORIES EMERGED FROM WITHIN CASE ANALYSES OF DATA

5.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the major categories that emerged from the empirical data analyses within each case. Explanations about codes that are retained for further analysis are presented for each case bank sequentially. This chapter lays the foundation for the transition towards reporting on higher level of abstractions on the bases of which final propositions about each case are made (in Chapter Six).

5.2. Results of First Cycle Coding

As discussed in Chapter Three (see section 3.5.5.1), analysis of data went through two phases (i.e., within-case and cross-case). In this chapter, results of within-case analysis are presented while cross-case analyses are discussed in Chapter Seven. To execute within-case analysis (see section 3.5.5.1.1), five iterative steps were employed. Here, the results of the third step (i.e., coding) are discussed. There were two cycles of coding. In the first cycle, initial or line-by-line or open coding (Saldana, 2009; Charmaz, 2006; Miles & Huberman, 1994) and in vivo coding (Saldana, 2009) were applied with the support of the ATLAS.ti software. To help this report convey its messages more vividly, outputs of first cycle coding are annexed *(see Annex 6 and Annex 7)*.

To get the results in annex 6 and annex 7, all primary documents that were added to the ATLAS.ti were coded on a line by line basis. The software has features that support labeling (i.e., coding) each concept that is extracted from the data chunk. Once coding all the primary documents is done, the software results in a list of all written codes as annexed. The lists of codes that were extracted from each bank's data were then sorted by the support of ATLAS.ti mainly using to indexes – density and groundedness. The list of most grounded and densest codes helped to facilitate the reduction of data for further analysis.

Second cycle coding was then executed by applying data reduction techniques through searching for the most frequent (i.e., salient) or significant (i.e., dense) initial codes and deciding to retain initial codes which "make the most analytic sense" (Saldana, 2009). Based on codes that are retained for further analyses, second cycle coding which evolved to be latent (conceptual) compared to descriptive in the previous cycle was executed for each bank as presented in the upcoming sections.

5.3. Major Categories that Emerged from Bank A's Data

To extract major categories for further analyses with the support of ATLAS.ti, groundedness and density measures were used. Then, extraction through a combined use of the top most grounded (see annex 4) and the densest (see annex 5) codes resulted in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Top most grounded and densest codes extracted from bank A's data

No	Grounded	Density
1	Understanding the change model	Personnel selection
2	Separation of designers and implementers	Conflict of self-interest
3	Idea generation capacity	Attitude
4	Perception management	Communication
5	National development level	Contextualization
6	Skepticism	Perception management
7	Conflict of self-interest	Implementation success
8	Office politics	Workforce capacity
9	Deviant implementation	Deviant implementation
10	Transparency	Team relations
11	Positioning personnel selection	Emotional engagement
12	Personnel selection	Timing
13	Balance of attention	Implementation specifications
14	Implementation specifications	Skepticism
15	Team composition	Sustainability

16	Success story	Reducing resistance
17	Cause of failure	Employee morale
18	Change model-context match	Understanding the change model
19	Leadership	Workforce satisfaction
20	Implementation support system	Separation of designers' and implementers
21	Team establishment priority	Implementation of the support system
22	Communication	Office politics
23	Time budgeting	Persuasion
24	Owners of initiatives	Premature implementation
25	Dedicated unit for change	Cross team collaboration
26	Handling knowledge gap	Transparency
27	Team organization	Change model-context match
28	Awareness creation	Aftermath
29	Human element	Unnecessary secrets
30	Team relations	Rumors

Source: *Own compilation*

As can be seen in Table 5.1, there are thirteen common codes in the two groups *(see shaded cells)*. These codes satisfy both groundedness and density criteria. To ensure if an important code which represents vivid ideas as per researcher's judgment is not missing, the lists of most grounded and densest codes were reviewed and as a result, "timing" which is the twelfth code under the densest codes list is included. The rest which are not included in the extracted codes but are related to these codes are also accounted for and shaped the context within which codes in the final set were analyzed. The meanings of these fourteen codes are described in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2: List and description of codes extracted from bank A's data using density and groundedness

No.	Code	Description
1	Understanding change model	Change model refers to Business Process Reengineering (BPR) and efforts to understand what it entails technically are labeled by this code. Specifically, it represents bank A's effort to familiarize technical team members with BPR as a tool before taking action for the second phase taking lesson from its failure to do so in the first phase.
2	Personnel selection	It represents the selection of employees to be assigned to new job positions that are created with newly designed business processes in bank A.
3	Separation of designers and implementers	Bank A's approach to using newly assigned personnel other than those who participated in the technical teams for the implementation of newly designed organizational systems.
4	Conflict of self-interest	Behaviors of actors during the change initiatives that are covertly geared towards serving the actor's own interest. These behaviors were manifested as pseudo-organizational but purely personal.
5	Perception management	Represents change leaders' intervention to shape behaviors that were influenced by actors' perceptions and not necessarily based on facts.
6	Communication	Information exchange between actors during change initiatives.
7	Skepticism	Behaviours that are connected to lack of trust and insufficiency of information and knowledge about the initiative as a whole or some aspects of it.
8	Office politics	Represent behaviors that were triggered by needs to possess control of some attributes of the

		change or the organization to protect one's or a group's interest. These behaviors exhibit how individuals took advantage of formal responsibilities to serve their personal interests.
9	Deviant implementation	The act of implementing something (attribute of the change) apart from what it was designed to be.
10	Transparency	Relates to the act of or the need to making change related things sufficiently visible to the relevant personnel. There were cases of unnecessarily keeping things secret from organizational members; with the needed transparency not being exhibited.
11	Team relations	Interactions within or between teams that were established to study and design new organizational systems at bank A.
12	Implementation specifications	Specific parameters that were part of the newly designed systems. Job designs, performance indicators, procedures and policies that are needed to implement the newly designed business processes.
13	Change model-context match	Relates to how the change tool (in this case BPR) fits into or deviates from the context. Context spans from nationwide realities to organisation-specific facts.
14	Implementation support system	Systems that must be in place to realise the designed attributes of new business processes. Required technologies, infrastructure, information systems, control systems and related matters that ensure the accurate implementation of newly designed organizational systems.
15	Timing	Relates to the amount of time allotted to carryout the change project in bank A and resultant scheduling of major events therof.

5.3.1. Understanding the Change Model

The organizational change investigated in bank A was planned to be carried out using BPR. This happened in two phases. The first one was a failure as everyone in the bank explained. The bank attributed the failure to lack of understanding of the basic principles of BPR. Therefore, taking lessons from this first trial, the second phase was started first by giving training to technical teams as a participant explained it below:

> *…we did it with newly organized teams. The previous one [phase] was more or less functional. We did it again having received training and using newly organized teams. Therefore, the main reason [for initiating the second phase] was the ineffectiveness of the previous initiative because it was not done as per the BPR principles (13:04).*

This idea of shifting from what has been claimed as a functional and failed approach necessitated the issue of starting from understanding the model (i.e., BPR). The remedy taken to make the change effective was starting afresh with an understanding of the change model. A participant explained it in more elaborated way by including the time it took the bank to go through the two phases:

> *I was in the BPR team for about six years; two of which were during the time we were not clear on the concept. But we did something in the name of BPR. But the result was not satisfactory. We initiated another BPR by reviewing the entire concept and rethinking the basic issues. We had been working in this BPR [team] four years now, two of which were for studying and the other two were for implementation (14:2).*

Based on what the participants described using a comparative analysis of two initiatives (i.e., phase one and phase two), misunderstanding or not understanding the change model was one reason that led the first phase to failure.

5.3.2. Skepticism

The fact that the first phase was declared as a failed trial did not convey good message to the old management of the bank. The subsequent initiation of the second phase by the Board of Directors of the bank heightened their speculations. This situation made them skeptical as they were not clear about why the second phase of the initiative was necessitated by the government. A participant described how the act of the government (through the Board of Directors) was perceived:

> *If you ask is the BPR initiated from within the bank? [The answer is] Not at all! It was an inducement from the government. This initiative started in the civil service and spread to the rest of government organizations. This resulted in resistance. There was frustration. There were rumors. Even people at the top management were frustrated as a result of transparency problem (8:81).*

Similarly, employees of the bank perceived the assignment of individual positions as an attempt to promote politically affiliated organizational members while disadvantaging those who were not in this position. The announcements to give trainings on the government's strategies and policies and to use employees' understanding of these policies and strategies as criteria to assign them on the newly designed jobs caused this perception. This increased the emplyees' skepticism about the sincerity of the purpose for initiating the change in the bank. However, they did not apply the test result for the assignment as it has been reported by another participant:

> *While the BPR design was going on, there was a training called policy training. There was a test at the end. The purpose was to use the results as input for the selection committee. But they didn't apply it (4:84).*

This feeling was pervasive among study participants, especially those who did not assume higher positions following the initiated change as they remained skeptic to what the bank did. One participant expressed her resentment in the following way:

> *What this tells me about my assignment is that they didn't do it based on objective criteria… This fact definitely forced me to question the assignment process. This can be taken as proof of the accuracy of rumors. As the bank is owned by the government, they also used the initiative to serve their political interest. These things influenced the assignment of personnel significantly (4:92).*

This participant got involved in the technical teams and supposed to have insider information about how employee assignment took place in the bank. However, she has the feeling lasting for years. Non-members of the technical teams also did not trust their colleagues who were involved in the teams. They had negative attitudes towards what these teams did. One of the participants recounted his experience in the following way:

> *…during the time we were studying BPR, even our friends used to suspect us of doing something bad unto them. They used to say 'what are you conspiring on now?' 'Whose turn is it now?' This is related to attitude. There were and still are people who believe that the BPR is not a change initiative; it is something that is designed to benefit someone while hurting another (8:79).*

Skepticism emerged as a factor that influences both managers and employees. The cause for the managers is related to the involvement of the government (i.e., source of initiative) whereas that of employees is related to the task of employee selection.

5.3.3. Team Relations

Team in this context refers to groups established in bank A to study and design new business processes in the second phase as explained so far. These teams were collectively known as the BPR team within which there were sub-categories—core-process teams and support-process teams. Core process teams were established earlier than the support process teams. These teams had to interact within themselves (team members), with each other (across teams) and with other parties. These interactions are what are referred to as team relations.

Managing team relations requires taking care of the nature of within team and cross-team interactions among team members, team leaders, coordinators, steering committees and the bank's top management including the president.

The nature of within team environment which is mainly defined by team composition shapes the nature of team relations within each team. A participant described the composition of team members as:

> *There were members with three varying background. …it was difficult to have similar level of understanding…. To tell the truth, it was to have different perspectives these people were intentionally diversified; however, whether we like it or not in all processes those who were exposed to the process showed greatest contribution. They used to bring icebreaking ideas for each discussion sessions. …eventually, the team used to be influenced by their idea. The possibility that their ideas got accepted with no or little modifications was so high. Anyway, because members had varying backgrounds we were challenged to reach into consensus easily. Sometimes we went through long debates, other times we nearly quarreled. We usually came up with diversified ideas; later on, as I said the idea of those who were working in the 'as-is' used to emerge as a final point (5:31).*

As described above, in each team, there was an individual who does not have long time experience in the bank, there is another who has experience in other departments than the process under study and the third type is one who has previous experience of the old operations to be redesigned by the team in line with the BPR principle. Although the intention of team diversity was to gain an outsider's insight from the new entrant, a counterpart's view from the different department and to combine all with that of the insider's and to come up with better ideas, dominance by the insider negatively affected the achievement of the intended outcome from each team.

Cross-team relations were also other related issues that came out of the data from bank A. The purpose of cross-team interactions was to design organizational working systems that are integrated with each other. They were used to identify integration points between the business processes and work together to create workable interfaces as described by a participant below:

> *You know, it was related to integration points. Processes which were assumed to have integration points used to get together and deal on that specific integration point. I remember the chairman of the steering committee announcing integration points between teams to discuss on those identified points while we were at Debre Zeyit (4:62).*

Later on, as the designing stage approached the implementation stage, actions taken by different actors started to become meaningful to everyone and developed to a level that affected team relations. The following paragraph indicates how things gradually became negative especially in the eyes of those who had been negatively affected or at least perceived to have been negatively affected by the implementation. One participant explained it as:

Initially it was good. It was participatory. We were working fulltime. Members were from different professions, having diversified experiences and there were various ideas entertained during discussions. There was no facility problem. There was no resource problem. We had experience sharing visits both locally and abroad. Even academicians with strong performance used to be invited to share their views. People from Ethiopian Management Institute gave trainings. We used to read related things. There was no difficulty as such (10:33).

Such participants retained their feeling until the time of the interviews. They were not happy especially about what happened following the establishment of the selection committee (the turning point).

Besides, especially those who had been working with the support processes had other disappointing experiences in connection with the unbalanced amount of attention given to the core and support process teams. They claimed that the attention support process teams received from the bank's management was less than what the core process teams enjoyed. This feeling had a significant impact on team relations and ultimately on team performance.

5.3.4. Personnel Selection

Personnel selection was among the sensitive stages in the implementation of the change initiative in bank A. It was suspected of not being based on objective criteria. Even after several years, several participants were emotional when describing the issue. Such participants expressed their negative feelings about the selection committee and the process of selection.

What the selection committee did was perceived as an action that benefitted some while hurting others. One participant expressed her feelings about the selection process in the following way: "*I do not forget it. It was the worst time because it was by that time things went wrong in my opinion" (8:70).*

A more transparent process of selection and assignment could have resulted in better employee morale as can be understood from what participants explained. Timing was also another factor that worsened the perception of employees. Some factors such as its timing, the lack of transparency, and employees' perception have been mentioned in connection with selection. The fact that employee selection started before the completion of the entire design task, especially with regard to the support processes, increased suspicions. The fact that it was done parallel to the pursuit of process design by process teams was expressed by a participant in the following way:

> *Parallel to this, the selection committee started its operation. There were disappointments following the selection. It was a surprise. We tried to formulate the requirements for each job position as well as possible; it could be refined gradually, though. However, they used exam results of the strategy and policy training, they used attitude, corruption related history etc… as selection criteria. Even it was not known how the members of the selection committee had been selected. They [members of the selection committee] just came to operation. They were working in a room. No one was allowed to walk around that room. …If you are forgotten, then you will lose your position. One had to have someone who knew him/her to be considered for an assignment (10:57).*

Discussing about this issue was a turning point during the interview sessions with participants. Personnel selection was also associated with designer-implementer issues.

Several participants in bank A showed disappointment with the way the assignment of personnel was done. Especially those who were assigned to relatively lower organisational positions strongly criticised the actions of the committee (team) with regard to doing personnel selection. Those who supported the efforts of the selection committee were affected positively by the selection process, while negative reactions were experienced by those who suspected the committee of misusing its powers to favour relatives (of whatsoever type) while harming others.

This process of selection has two directions of implications for the success of implementation. The first one is its direct impact on determining the quality of the assigned personnel whereas the second is the indirect impact it has on the morale of employees who do not accept the procedures. In the latter case, employee morale might not necessarily be affected by whether the selection process is actually manipulated or not. Therefore, it is highly dependent on how employees perceive the selection process.

5.3.5. Perception Management

This concept represents efforts to shape the way organizational members perceive an initiated change. In bank A, as one of the participants explained, the impression people had about BPR impacted their commitment towards implementing it. The following is an excerpt taken from the explanation of a participant about how it was imposed without an internally driven need for change:

> *…when the concept of BPR came, people didn't consider it as a change tool; they instead, perceived that it was imposed by the government (party) to be forcibly implemented in the bank (14:59).*

Several participants from bank A expressed certain kinds of emotions when entering into discussions about the major implementation of related events. For example, personnel selection was among the major events in bank A. As personnel selection affects everyone in an organization and hence, captures everyone's attention, it is imperative to understand how it has to be perceived by the critical mass. In bank A, this event was found to be the most disputed one.

It is clear that the new way of doing which results from strategic change will finally be implemented by those who are selected to assume the newly created positions. There is no other way of implementing a change than through such employees. Therefore, for the implementation to be successful, change leaders have to have a good understanding of the process of employee (change recipient) perceptions and apply properly designed intervention mechanisms.

Several of the participants expressed their doubts about the objectivity of the selection criteria; consequently, they expressed their views at this stage in an emotional way. The researcher realized that this issue was a turning point during the entire process of changing bank A.

5.3.6. Conflict of Self-Interest

Conflict of self-interest relates to feelings, emotions, decisions and actions that are driven by participant's (actor's) self-interest at the expense of organisational objectives and success of implementing the initiated strategic organizational change in bank A. This concept is grounded in facts that are evidenced by participants in connection with the actors' dilemma regarding whether to give priority to organizational purposes or to try to ensure that they would benefit from the actions taken. This dilemma challenged everyone who played a role in designing and implementing the change in bank A.

As a result of actual and perceived partiality and manipulations of the process of changing the bank, there were rumors in bank A. Pertaining to the process team, there were suspicions about intentional inclusion of job specifications to help team members assigned to job positions as a result. A participant explained this issue and how it was challenging to the teams as:

> *…different people might have different interests; but these interests might not necessarily represent the interests of the bank. Yet, they can influence (divert) the change towards their interests. We assumed this to have challenged the team (5:26).*

Another participant who was a member of a process team in bank A admitted that there were instances when the team was challenged through some actual attempts of different people to influence the team so that it would consider their assignments to job positions. As this participant explained:

> *People used to come with self-interest even during some discussion sessions. There were others who used to come to the discussions without being invited and argued why were these changes being made to their units?(8:39).*

More than what the process designing teams did, the selection committee attracted the center of gravity for the rumors and suspicious of unethical practices. Even those in the designing teams (process teams) suspect the selection committee of doing favoritism and serving self-interest.

As a participant from a process team explained, if somebody in the selection committee perceived that the job designs produced by the designing team were not free of conflicting interests, then that person might try to curb the abuse or get his/ her share of the manipulated stake. Moreover, clashes among members were taken as manifestations of infiltrations and tendencies of serving self-interests within the selection committee as a participant describe below:

> *…but I know there were rumors regarding misunderstandings between the two groups. This was especially the case regarding the assignment of people at managerial positions. There were people within the group who had reservations*

about those who were nominated for managerial positions. This eventually grew to the level of clashes of ideas within the group (the committee). This is what I heard in rumors (5:44).

The organizational structure designing team is also one of the suspected parties of serving its self-interest at the expense of organizational interests. The following paragraphs are excerpts from a participant's bold statements about the self-serving actions he perceived about this team:

You know what happened later, especially during the designing of the structure? Several things were kept secret. It was done by some individuals. There was a big problem like in the case of selection. They did like cooking things to serve their personal interest (10:63).

One thing I remember... The structure that prevailed by the time was intended to fit for the interest of those who were engaged. There was a coordinator and team leaders in the team structure for that purpose (10:33).

Conflict of self-interest from the side of managers also challenged the change initiative under investigation. This gradually grew to a level of resisting the change. When we think of resistance against organizational change, it implies that employees are the ones who resist; in bank A it was learnt that, managers including those at the top level were the most resistant ones though it was not in a form of direct confrontation. A participant explained it in the following way:

But the management… [deep breath] initially, they were resistant for the sake of protecting the previous BPR [functional based] as they were involved and got promotions as a result. It took a huge struggle to convince them and bring about transformation. The argument was [between] 'we need only incremental change;' [and] 'no, the previous change was not satisfactory therefore we need radical transformation.' Because they wanted to convey a message that the *previous BPR had only minor weaknesses and therefore we have to make incremental changes (10:36).*

In this ways, the entire implementation process could have been affected. This implies that better change performance could have been realized by identifying such interests and intervening against them. Apart from the above examples, self interest was also a challenge to employees at the operational level. This makes the entire task of implementing a change very difficult.

5.3.7. Office Politics

In a condition that there were perceived or actual tendencies or actions of serving self-interests, office politics can be a means which sponsors these behaviors through misuse of power. In bank A, there were evidences of actual or perceived use of power for serving different interests.

The first source of such power with potential misuse and direct impact on the success of the initiated change could be old management group of bank A. As these groups were skeptic towards the entire initiation of the second phase, obviously, the transition time (during which they remain in power) is the remaining opportunity they have to exploit and ensure that they will continue being influential is office politics.

The second and more source of power which sponsored office politics in bank A originates from the selection committee. It was this committee which selected personnel to be assigned on new positions including top managerial positions. The committee could misuse its responsibility. Besides, even if this misuse did not actually happen, organization members may perceive.

Poor communication between designers and selection committee led members of the technical committee to have a suspicion that the committee could have made arbitrary selections without using objective criteria. Out of the belief that the change process has not been free of office politics, a participant made the following assertion:

> *The other which I think is still critical is 'do not politicize the change'. When you design a change, you present it professionally as to what you are planning to achieve as a result of the change and about how you will be organizing the institution. If you politicize it instead, it would fail because it will not be accepted by all the people in your organization as they obviously would be politically different. This will lead to some supporters and other opponents. To have the support of all, it must be presented purely professionally (5:94).*

What was explicit from participants about committee members was the negative perception they had on the assignment of personnel. Moreover, they continued to have that resentment after several years since then.

5.3.8. Timing

This idea relates to the time allocated to design and implement the change in bank A and the specific point of time when major events were decided to be executed. Unacceptable deadlines and less curiosity in time allocation was reported by the participants from bank A. Time allocation and timing for the execution of the change initiative in bank A had been influenced by several factors.

As the change was externally initiated (by the government), there were also intentions (from the government) to control the progress of the change. As a result, they used to set deadlines authoritatively. The authoritative nature of setting deadlines was a problem which was explained in a level that equates to syndrome.

The deadline refers to government's demand from banks to submit reports within a deadline. So unreasonable were the deadlines that they forced managers of bank A to be unreasonable to allocate time to pursue project tasks and prematurely declare major events even before the completion of predecessor activities. Meeting such deadlines and showing compliance to the order of the government as described took supremacy above making the change effective as a participant explained it below:

> *Other possible reasons for deviation from the plan may relate to ownership of the very concept of change. In our bank's context, initiatives oftentimes do not come from within the bank. They should not be imposed. Besides they come with a deadline which creates frustration and results in rushes to reporting to avoid stigmatization (3:36).*

This indicates how difficult it will be to achieve intended outcomes of an initiative to organizational change in such circumstances. Major milestones that are assumed to be indicators of progression of the initiative may be simply declared irrespective of actual level of performance for the sake of meeting deadlines.

One of the participants also described this situation together with the lack of balanced attention. He explained the premature nature of actions taken before specifications had been fully developed:

> *Even they were not ready to give the same time which means sufficient time as they did to the core [process] to study the support processes. This may be because of time limitation; may be the board ordered them to do it faster. They just ordered us to finish it in a short time. Even we didn't have sufficient time to read all the materials we had; we just read Hammer's book. That's why implementation started before the completion of the design by the support teams (8:47).*

As clearly explained above, the time given to perform tasks at later stages of the initiative was shorter compared to the time given to perform similar tasks at earlier stages. This happened because of the intention of the management to declare full implementation may be within the deadline. As emerged from bank A's data, premature implementation and initial waste of time characterize bank A's experience pertaining to time and timing.

5.3.8.1. Premature Implementation

This concept refers to the timing of executing major milestones before they are actually deemed to be executed at that specific time. Unreasonable deadlines coupled by waste of time at the initial stage of the initiative lead to the decision to execute implementation tasks before the right time (prematurely).

As analyses of data indicated, (1) selection of employees preceding the completion of job design, (2) implementing the new system prior to the completion of preparing policies and procedures and delivery of the entire document are examples of premature implementation. One of the participants in bank A described this together with other factors that led to implementation failure in the following way:

> *Generally speaking, rushing to execute a certain change before knowing what it is and accepting the importance leads to failure. Besides, if there is failure to make relevant concepts clear to all concerned again leads to failure. In addition, failure to translate the change plan into the context leads to implementation failure (3:46).*

Uniformed deadlines that are set irrespective of the time posts in the project plan had impacts on the success of the initiated change in bank A. Besides, when those who were actively engaged in the project (e.g. members of the designing teams) are not informed about why and when the bank takes implementation actions, it affects their commitment to complete unfinished tasks. This in turn results in incomplete design which makes implementation difficult.

5.3.8.2. Initial Waste of Time

The initial stages in initiating the change in bank A were characterized by waste of time and slow buy-in mostly because of lack of understanding and the passive resistance of old management as participants explained. Because of this, the initiative took long time without bringing tangible changes. This led to the suspicion of the sincerity of the purpose [of the change]. One of the participants, working in one of the highest positions of bank A, described this situation in a way that reflected the reason why there was such a waste of time initially:

> *…we could have shortened the time; it took us a long time. One of the reasons for the delay was the fact that management commitment came later; initially, the commitment of management was minimal as the initiative was perceived to be just [an] amendment [to the functional BPR]. It took us a long time to convince the [old] management the need for a complete transformation (13:26).*

As can be understood from the above data, management members were not clear about the intention and scope of the initiative; they chose to systematically resist as a self-defense mechanism. This stage took time until the team members backed by the board chairman's intervention changed the situation.

Implicitly, the reason for the failure of the management of the bank to provide sufficient time was pressure from the board (the initiator). The source of the idea to change the bank was not within the bank. It came from the government. The management of Bank A might have perceived the initiative as not more than fulfilling an order especially at the initial stage. In general, initial waste of time and premature implementation affects timing of the deployment of major initiative related activities (milestones) which in turn affects the success of implementing organizational change.

5.3.9. Transparency

'Transparency' is a concept related to the issue of clearly communicating change matters to the organizational members. The degree of clarity an individual has on events that happen during strategic change implementation affects the way that person perceives them. In bank A, as a result of the lack of transparency, organization members became confused about the general climate of the bank during and after the change. It seems that the need for transparency was not given sufficient attention despite its importance in reducing uncertainty and hence, resistance:

> *You know what happened later especially during designing the structure? Several things kept secret. It was done by some few individuals (10:63).*

> *…now I understand the importance of communication. By then, we used to keep several things secret. These things gave rise to rumours. However, creating awareness to everyone is important. There should be no unit or individual that is categorized as not concerned. As much as possible everyone should know what is going on regarding a change initiative and understand the expected contributions for the success of the institutive (9:155).*

The above segment of data reflects a participant's present feelings on the state of affairs. When keeping things secret is considered the right thing, it means rumors and informal channels can enjoy surveillance without sufficient contestant options. Apart from the desire for keeping unnecessary secrets, making things as transparent as possible is not a simple task especially during radical strategic changes. Proper behavioral intelligence and the appropriate designing of messages to address every affected aspect (every organizational matter as the change is radical transformation) are required:

> *Considering the hugeness [of the bank], the time wouldn't allow. It was difficult; I mean it was not transparent in terms of the parameters used for the selection for example. It was not known whether there were those parameters or not. If I was selected, why I was selected; and why I was not selected, was clearly known [to committee-members]. In terms of manageability it was very difficult to handle things case-by-case with regard to all the people (12:45).*

Transparency is the result of effective communication. As presented next, communication also emerged as an important concept in relation to implementing strategic organizational change in bank A.

5.3.10. Communication

As can be inferred from the above sections, communication is an interlocked theme with others. It is inseparable from most of the themes discussed above. It is impossible to be transparent, to reduce skepticism, to manage perceptions, to have a shared understanding of the change model and to deal with office politics without communication:

> *You have to communicate to the worker why the change is needed, what will follow the change if there are some expected problems, etc… in advance. If you fail to do so, and if the workforce realizes that the change is not of interest to the worker, it will create a problem (5:92).*

> *You cannot bring change forcefully. You may organize several sessions to communicate and give training in order to create awareness across the staff. You need to make them active participants so that they could internalize the concept, and they would also possess a sense of ownership (7:17).*

Participants at bank A, especially those who were in support of the level of communication during the initiative argue the infeasibility of addressing everyone in the organization. They mention time pressures, a large number of employees and to some extent, the need for keeping secrets as reasons for less communication. Others such as the person whose idea is presented in the next quotation propose solutions that make communication easier:

> *I say, arranging for a communication forum as much as possible. It could be via email, might not necessarily be face-to-face. You could use several other media including magazines to tell about what kind of change is going on. What are the bases, what are we heading for, etc… should be made clear. This can even help you protect the change against those who intentionally try to attack. If people know the reality, the one who intentionally misrepresents facts will be ruled out by the majority (7:59).*

However, communication is not a simple exchange of ideas. It has to be carefully designed as it is the primary intervention mechanism at the disposal of change leaders to influence the behavior of organization members in a way that enhances change implementation. Participants expressed their resentment about the way information about major change events was communicated to them:

> *One thing which I do not consider as right was the way results had been communicated. It was done by posting notices at the head office like a grade [academic score] in school. You might even hear about your assignment; or people may tell where you are assigned. The communication channel was not accessible and pure. It could have been better either to email to everyone or the copies to be posted be clear. I myself heard about my assignment after a certain time. We used to hear about the assignment of individuals [in the form of*

rumors]. I think this was one of the things we were lacking. Like I said, there were massive assignments handled haphazardly (12:45).

Communication needs to be designed carefully in terms of its messages and the media and approach of communication. This ensures effectiveness of communication.

5.3.11. The Role of Designers on Implementation

This is one aspect of communication. The parties that were engaged in the design of the new organization (i.e., process teams) had frequent interaction with the steering committee. As a result of these interactions, the outputs from design teams had to be refined before approved to be delivered as final. The final deliverables from these teams of designers were documents containing process designs with details including job design, policies and procedures. These documents had to serve as a roadmap for implementation; and hence the delivery of the documents marks the end of the designers' tasks.

On the other side, those who were supposed to implement the new process (system) on the basis of this document were selected by a committee. In a way, that was not explicit enough for the mass, the selection ended up with processes having some or no members who had participated in the designing process. This means, there was no clear direction to assign process designers to the implementing team. If there is some, it was only arbitrary as described below.

There may be a possibility for a person who participated in the design or study of a new process to be assigned to that same process and work towards implementation. But this was not necessarily the case in all the processes. The designing team produced the 'to-be' document; then the board approved the document and a different team did the assignment [implementation] (8:34).

There was a possibility of having someone who participated in the design also being assigned to work on the implementation of the new system. This helps with a comparative analysis of implementation success with or without the involvement of designers and hence the importance of this issue for implementation success.

The following paragraph is about what would happen if a different person (than the designers) tried to implement a process. It was reported even by the designing team members of corporate communication business process in bank A that the processes had not been changed successfully as described hereunder:

> *It could have been difficult because in the first place most of the support processes had been implemented before the completion [of the design]. When we come here [corporate communication process], this process is operating in a completely different way from what was designed. [Because] the leader of the study team had resigned. Even you could not get the paper [BPR document]. You do not even hear the term BPR here (12:69).*

This is why the issue of designer-implementer emerged during in-depth interviews with participants from bank A. There were arguments both in support and against the idea of separation of designers and implementers. Making conclusion on whether separation is better is risky as the arguments on both sides were strong.

Pro designer-implementer ideas argue for the use of designers as implementers as well. The possibility of a communication break and lack of understanding and even conflicting interests might hamper successful implementation, according to these proponents. The issue was instead to strive to teach others who were not clear about the newly designed organizational system, using those who owned the idea. A participant who got a chance to work for the process to which he participated as a member of the designing team explains:

It is advisable if those who designed the process also implement it because you cannot write everything down. Especially, the redesigning concept could not be recorded fully. Therefore, my presence benefitted the team a lot. I served as a reference during the implementation process. I used to give training to the HR staff. You would also face the challenges of resistance (12:65).

The engagement of designers on the implementation of changes helps to avoid the possibility of an implementation break as a result of misconceiving the designed change. If the designers also implement the change, the designed change will be implemented as intended initially. If there is a deviation, it will be attributed to reasons that are beyond the interest (intentions) of the implementers.

In some cases where there was no one who participated in the designing, the implemented business processes deviated totally from what was proposed by the designing team though it needs further investigation to attribute this difference only to the separation of designers from the implementers. There are other factors which might have contributed to this. For example; the capacity of the designing team was regarded by the participants.

One participant commented about the capacity of her own team with respect to proposing a new system that is significantly different from the previous one. There was also another team that was downplayed by its own members for having members who were neither interested nor competent to design the business process they were assigned for. In such instances, it was very difficult to implement the proposed design per se as it may lead to inappropriate operations. Such types of deviations might not be considered as an implementation failure; and yet, neither can it be considered as a success. Therefore, the idea of assigning designers as implementers to enhance implementation success could be spurious if generalized for all conditions.

Therefore, we can only be cautious about the role this concept plays in the implementation of the changes and other factors that affect the impact of the designer-implementer combination on implementation success. Team capacity, participants' behavioral traits, and other unexplained factors should be taken care of first.

5.3.12. Implementation specification

In the context of the change initiated in bank A (i.e., in the case of planned strategic organizational change), implementation of change requires detailes that specify what needs to be changed how (in what way). As such, the extent to which the anticipated (designed) change is specified is presumed to have an impact on the success of implementation. As emerged from bank A's data, this concept represents designer's effort to provide the neccessary details to those who will implement the change and extends to change managers' use of performance indicators (measures) to follow up progress of implementation and hence implementers' application of the specific guidelines and procedures accompanying the designed change.

Implementation procedures, job design, performance measures and indicators, interim deliverables and the entire document containing the design are parts of the specifications. Without such specifications, implementation will be disordered (i.e., will become out of order and control). In some other instances, especially in the case of back offices (i.e., support business processes) such specifications were not complete in bank A. The following data segment which is quoted from a support process team member's explanation states:

> *As far as I remember, none of the teams especially the support process teams do such things [as implementation manual or procedure]. Practically in our team, there was nothing that we did for the sake of implementation. I do not remember anything that tries to specify things that should be done during*

implementation. Even in the core [business processes], I didn't see such things in the document. The documents are the 'to-be' study document, job description and job specification document, and then policy and procedure documents. There is nothing other than these which are dedicated for implementation details. I went through all the documents but didn't see anything in connection with this (5:70).

It is obvious that the degree of completeness of designs and communicating specifications of the anticipated change relates positively to implementation success. Therefore, it is imperative to have an account of factors related to specifications if one has to take proactive measures and make use of specifications as a mechanism of enhancing the success of implementation.

This means documents produced by technical teams (designers) were the major sources of implementation specifications. Apart from this, there was nothing done with an intention to specify the procedures to implementation. These documents also contain the entire change concept as another participant put it in the following way:

Actually, the team that designed the 'to-be' was in a better position to specify the implementation procedure than an outsider doing it. However, I do not even think that the other external [to the team] body did such things. What they did was they simply read the documents, and tried to reorganize the offices based on what is proposed in the documents. For example, the branches changed to give one window service. For example, the customer account and transaction service is designed to give one window service. The people were simply being dictated about the new process; no document was in place to be used as a guideline to implement the change (5:72).

Based on the above facts, one can expect that implementation activities could logically start following the delivery of these documents produced by designing teams. However, by the time implementation activities especially personnel selection and organizational structure designing started, the degree of completeness of the documents was different for the core and support processes as explained in the previous sections. All teams were not done with preparing and submitting their final document.

The difference helped to understand the benefit of having complete specifications for the new process before starting the implementation task. For example, the following segment of data was taken from an interview with a core process team member. He explained the start of employee selection after the specifications had already been formulated. The explanation clarifies what would happen if the condition was otherwise:

> *As I told you, the fact that several things were complete before the emergence of the diverting thing [related to selection] helped us a lot. It was in a written form. It was recorded and authorized [before that incident]. It was a big thing that contributed a lot to the reification of the change we are witnessing now. Before that time, the interest and vigor of the staff in the team were good; everyone was determined to bring about change. This caused the realization of a better change compared to other organizations (10:84).*

However, this was not the case for all the support processes. Selections started before the specifications were fully prepared and delivered. Because of this, some process teams even terminated their tasks. Corporate communication process designing team of bank A is a typical example for this; and hence, no significant change (as perceived by most participants) was resulted in the back offices.

5.3.13. Implementation Support System

In as much as specifications of the designed change are complete and understood by those who implement the change, implementation can normally be successful. However, from the point of view of management, there needs to be a system which supports the evaluation of progress in implementing the change. Moreover, performance in the newly implemented organizational reality should be measured being supported by a system to reinforce new organizational behaviors. The system issue of implementation is associated with the nature of the processes involved, jobs designed, policies, procedures, infrastructure, communication technology and automation technology.

> *…it [implementation] needs a system. For example, to measure an employee's performance in terms of cycle time, you need to have a system that captures the data while the service provision is going on. In terms of cost, you need to have a system that records the cost in the new process and compare it with the previous one (5:74).*

Implementation of a new change initiative should be supported by a system that is compatible with the desired new organizational operation. If the change targets a reduction in cost, there must be an indicator that measures the costs and there must be a system that records and consolidates performance data. If time is another indicator, measuring time should not be an additional task to the performer; there must be a system that automatically registers time and generates consolidated data when needed. If such a system is not in place, measuring implementation success will suffer to a large extent. In the context of Ethiopia, recording and analyzing performance related data are left to be undertaken manually and ultimately suffer a loss of attention after the campaign period is over. It is understandable how cumbersome it will be to spend a considerable amount of time on such routine matters. This may gradually lead to regression and performance loss. Implementation support system is needed to prevent this. Automation as presented in the data below is among the mechanisms that support implementation.

> *The first is automation. We didn't automate our business until recently. We started to automate in 2014 (G.C.). We bought the core banking system recently. Previously we had been working manually. Now we are operating differently (13:52).*

The above quotation indicates the importance of a supporting system for successful implementation. This insight is gained from the fact that the delay in applying a system that was proposed along with the changed business processes of the bank created challenges. This was manifested in the reduced performance of the bank immediately after the reforms. However, after the application of the proposed system, the bank started to be supported by an increased number of customers as reported by most of the participants. A participant from core business process desinging team and working in a higher positions, summarised the importance of an IT supported system in accelerating the implementation and reducing resistance to change as:

> *People had been saying that we will see if it brings any change because of their experience with the previous BPR. The previous BPR had challenged us a lot. …However, when they saw it practically they understood that we had fundamentally changed the approach during the second phase; and they started to support it. Then people who were working in the operation started to apply for the prompt implementation of the BPR. Especially its IT support accelerated its acceptance. Employees got trained quickly and implemented it swiftly as it made the operation easier for them. The previous operation had been very tedious; you had to look into [paper based] files to process every*

> *transaction be it opening a new account, making payments etc… everything had been manually operated (15:19).*

As participants from bank A explained it, supporting implementation with IT enhances implementation success. They explained it by comparing the level of success they experience before and after the implementation of core banking system.

5.3.14. Change Model-Context Match

Change model is the label given to BPR in the case of bank A. Several organizations globally embark on using such models. However, all organizations cannot be similar to adopt a model without examining the model's fitness to the specific context at hand. Hence, change model-context match, in this study, is a name given to such examinations.

In the case of bank A, process designing teams found out features of business processes that do not fit to the basic principles of the change model. For example, in credit business process they decided not to apply some of the features of the change model as described in the excertp below:

> *The business wing tends to support the customer as this wing is closer to the customer and understands the customer and its business. This means, this same person should not process the customer's request [for loan]. This unit instead submits analysis report to the risk wing. This is for a check and balance. On the basis of this report, the risk wing analyses and decides. This is the bank's policy. This is one of the points where the BPR principles had been compromised (15:4).*

In other core business process of bank A, they also applied a principle called 'four eyes' to have a 'maker-checker' remedy that intends to manage the risk integral to the very nature of the banking business. This, however, creates duplication of efforts which is not acceptable by the change model.

The other feature of the change model that is assumed to have been mismatched to the context is the idea of flat organizational structure. The model recommends a flatter organizational structure by reducing hierarchies. However, this recommendation was ruled out in bank A for the resultant wider span should be backed by a proper automated system. Since bank A's intention to implement the change was not accompanied by automated systems, the recommendation of model's recommendation for flatter organization was not found feasible as it was asserted by on participant as:

> *At that time [referring to the designing stage] we decided on a flatter structure with an assumption that it was possible. When it came to the actual practice, there were problems; that was why we also proposed a different structure. [Because], if it creates an overload for the executive director it will result in inefficiency (6:27).*

Context also refers to the national and sector related situations. The industry is a closed market restricted only to domestic players. The infrastructure, the lifestyle of the society (actual or potential customer), society's access to telecommunication networks and capacity and interest in using technology are also important factors that have to be considered when redesigning the future bank.

5.3.15. Deviant Implementation

This refers to intentional deviations of the implemented changes from what was designed. It happens in a form of remedies to ensure smooth operations instead of sticking to designed change contents when the designed one proved to be less effective or difficult to realise or contextually unfit; or it may also happen as a means of resistance. In the case of deviance as a remedy, for example, some newly designed organisational processes when found to be unrealistic compared to the context, deviating from the design may be put in place. Some could only be realised when supported by required facilities, systems, and skilled manpower that hardly exist in the bank. In this case, implementers choose to do things differently from what has been proposed by the designing teams. Deviance as a form of resistance obviously has no benefit to the success of implementation.

Therefore, deviant implementation has either a positive or a negative impact on the success of change. One has to know why implementation deviates from the anticipated change before concluding whether the change is positive or negative. If there is no system that is put in place to prevent regression and if there is no mechanism to measure whether all the proposed changes are actually implemented, there will be a natural deviation which is often covered up with some sort of improvements on the *status quo*. The following quotation is an exemple for how participants used to cover inability to explain results as per designed performance indicators such as cost, time and quality.

> *If you ask me whether the change is as proposed by the BPR document, again it is difficult for me to respond. However, my personal belief is that the change is not as it was proposed by the document. For example if we measure using delivery time, cost, and quality; I doubt if it is really as it was proposed there. I do not think so. However, still there is a change (5:62).*

This shows the possibility that change outputs that deviate from what has been intended have actually happened, but were left undetected. This kind of deviation cannot even be given attention; instead, covered up with improvements of whatsoever level and type. When it comes to specifically measuring the implemented change, there is no even a system that makes measurement possible. In such situations, however, change may still be reported as successful.

Deviant implementation can have an extended meaning to include the issue of improvisation while taking care of changes thought of *a* priori. Change leaders have to make sure that the deviation is not a result of loss of control or an unconscious departure from the track. In this case, organisations may even devise a new strategy that necessitates different business operations and hence actual deviance from intended change can be observed.

As also explained in the previous section, the discovery of the usefulness of change model to the nature of the business can cause deviant implementation. The banking sector and some of the BPR principles did not match or at least required modifications. For example, the 'maker-checker' principle in bank A emerged against BPR's generalist principle. It increases costs through duplicated efforts. However, the aim was to manage risks.

5.4. Summary of Strategic Change Implementation Experience of Bank A

The fifteen most salient and most important codes capture the full picture of what happened in bank A. Using them and related concepts can give a summarized message about the strategic change implementation practice of bank A.

In this bank, the initiated strategic change happened in two phases owing to the failure of the first one to deliver expected results mainly because of lack of understanding on the tool which is referred to as "change model". Therefore, this issue of understanding the change model stood out from the data corpus. A change model which is adapted or adopted by organizations serves as a tool which guides initiation, design and implementation of changes especially planned ones. Such models should be validated in order to check if they are appropriate for the purpose of initiating a change in a specific organization and its contexts.

As strategic organizational changes usually involve changing technical and social aspects of organizations, carrying out them also requires employing external consultants or assigning teams of internal experts. In bank A, both approaches were used; the primary responsibility of designing the new organizational systems and process being the technical teams. The ways they were established and their interactions within and across teams also emerged as an important and salient issue. This issue is so critical that it determines the content of the change to be implemented and hence the success or failure of the entire initiative. The quality of the design of organizational change depends on the team's understanding of the model, its capacity to generate new ideas, the composition of teams and their relations.

Teams should also rule out conflicting self-interests and show (for those concerned) that their task has been accomplished objectively and professionally. Failure to do so or a perceived lack of objectivity negatively affects the implementation of initiated changes.

Implementation could deviate from what it is planned for different reasons. In bank A, this deviance happened for the better or for the worse in different instances. The lesson gained is that deviance may not necessarily imply failure. The purpose of the initiative, if defined and communicated effectively, should be considered to evaluate this. So long as the deviance meets the purpose, it could be acceptable. However, there were actions of passive resistance from the side of management and tendencies to retain the status quo covering it up with fake reports. These tendencies were associated with the way the change especially the second phase was initiated and the way it was perceived by members of the old management.

As the second phase was initiated after recognition of failure in the first phase which was undertaken under the leadership off old management, it resulted in skepticism. Heightened skepticism, lack of trust and poor communication led to office politics which, backed by self-interest, had challenged the entire process of the initiative in bank A.

Selection of personnel for the newly designed job positions was the most shocking event as per the frequency of mention by participants. This event was a turning point in the entire duration of the initiative. Participants perceive the task of the committee which undertook the selection of personnel negatively as lacking transparency, objectivity and characterized by favoritism. This event could have benefited from proper positioning through a careful communication and clear and objective criteria against which assignments were done.

In general, as became apparent from the experience of bank A, an approach which overcomes the cause of several breakdowns, and which enhances the quality of tasks undertaken by different actors could lead to greater success. In this approach, there are two major foci of intervention—the soft side and the technical side of the organization. Themes that emerged under each of these areas are discussed in detail in the next chapter.

5.5. Major Categories that Emerged from Bank B's Data

The approach followed in extracting categories from bank B's data is a replication of that of bank A as recommended by Eisenhardt (1989). Doing the first cycle coding in the same way as it was explained for bank A, resulted in a list of codes (see annex 7) that were arranged based on their groundedness and density measures (see annex 8 & annex 9). The following table presents the top most grounded and densest codes that were extracted from first cycle codes of bank B data.

Table 5.3: List of codes with highest scores of groundedness and density from bank B's data

NO.	Top most Grounded Codes	No.	Top Densest Codes
1	Non Profit motive	1	Convincing sponsors
2	Conflict of interest	2	Non profit motive
3	Trigger for change	3	Commitment
4	Technology support	4	Resistant management
5	Level of National development	5	Bottom up
6	Lack of leadership	6	Type of ownership
7	Bottom up	7	Lack of competitive pressure
8	Implementation failure	8	Implementation
9	Office politics	9	Unconvinced middle manger
10	Resistant Management	10	Brining supreme power on board
11	Type of ownership	11	Human capacity
12	Owner of initiatives	12	Strategic direction
13	Cause of failure	13	Convincing
14	Failure Story	14	Approach
15	National Context	15	New system design
16	Evaluation	16	Lack of shared vision
17	Lack of top Management Support	17	Power interventions
18	Aligning Benefits to changed behavior	18	Soft side
19	Implementation specification	19	Readiness for change
20	Motivating employees	20	Office politics
21	No compelling reason for change	21	Excessive intervention of board of directors
22	Lack of awareness	22	Trigger for change
23	Communication break	23	Organizational culture
24	Deviant implementation	24	Lack of trust
25	Top management commitment	25	Implementation specification
26	Incomplete change	26	Externally Driven
27	Model specification	27	Rational for change
28	Lack of common interest	28	Lack of ownership
29	Convincing	29	Failure story
30	Guiding principles	30	Perception management

31	Customer needs	31	Conflict of interest
32	Lack of competitive pressure Employee morale, expected nature of competition, awareness creation, power interventions, government intervention, human capacity, pro adoption, team establishment, qualified personnel, naming the initiative	32	Customer needs Lack of integration between actors, contextualization, aligning benefits to changed behavior, lack of integration among actors, implementer commitment, documented design, sincerity of purpose, owner of initiatives, national context

Source: *Own extraction from Atlas.ti outputs*.

The last row in the table above engendered all codes with the same value of the two measures. The inclusion of them affected the list of common codes that had to be considered for further analyses.

In the following table, codes that commonly exist in the list of top most grounded and top densest codes are summarized.

Table 5.4: Common codes based on groundedness and density measures

No.	Code	Description
1	Non Profit motive	This is a concept that represents the agenda of major shareholders who want to implicitly control the bank and get it serve their personal interest. This interest does not include profit the bank makes out of its regular operation. They rather focus on things different from profit.
2	Resistant management	The act of bank B's management resisting the initiated change for the change is initiated bottom-up and not in the best attention and interest of the board of directors and hence top management.
3	Bottom-up	Refers to the change that is initiated by experts in bank B. It indicates that the idea of strategic organizational change in bank B did not come from the top.

4	Type of ownership	It refers to the idea that bank B is a private bank has connections to the sources of challenges to implement strategic organizational change in the prevailing environment of private banking sector in Ethiopia.
5	Weak competitive pressure	Represents low intensity of competition in the banking sector in Ethiopia owing to few number of players and entry barriers backed by government's legislation.
6	Convincing	This is related to expert effort to persuade top management in bank B to accept strategic organizational change in the bank.
7	Power intervention	Power in private banks context refers to the capacity to decide on the resources of the bank and its main source is company ownership. Therefore, those with direct or indirect connection with major stockholders of the bank are in possession of power in bank B. If convinced, those with power have great potential to enhance the success of implementing organizational change
8	Trigger for change	Trigger for change refers to the immediate reason that caused the commencement of the initiative in the bank.
9	Office politics	A rivalry in bank B motivated by a need to seize power or to influence those with power as a result of which to manipulate the bank's management and advance self-interest.
10	Implementation specifications	Design components of the organizational change which specify the content and process of change.
11	Customer needs	Represents what the customer demands from a bank.
12	Failure story	Stories that are related to the failure of the change initiative in bank B.
13	Conflict of interest	These are interests in the context of bank B, especially associated to top management members and major shareholders who have personal interests that conflict with organizational interests.
14	Owner of initiatives	The feeling and perception created in bank B following the bottom-up initiation of the change. This implies the owners of the initiative to be experts of the bank.

15	Aligning benefits to changed behavior	This is a reinforcement mechanism that is recommended to be part of the implementation specification to make the change real.
16	National context	Represents the socio-economic conditions of Ethiopia especially in a way it affects the condition it affects the operation of bank and to the extent it necessitates engaging in a search behavior towards meeting changing environmental pressures.
17	Top management commitment	This idea refers to the level top management of bank B is committed towards implementing the change
18	Naming the initiative	Naming is a strategy used by bank B's experts who initiated the strategic organizational change in the bank. As per this strategy, not identifying an initiative with a name which has not assumed to have positive perception by the majority was among the techniques used to make the change successful through reduced resistance.

Source: *Own compilation*

5.5.1. Source of Initiative

Source of initiative refers to where the idea for changing the bank came from. In bank B, the need for business process redesign came from experts in connection with the bank's announcement to implement core banking system. It was an expert's suggestion finally turned to be a bank wide (strategic) initiative.

For the bank's top management and owners both the acquisition of core banking and business process redesigning were not self-driven. While the application of core banking had been imposed by NBE, processes redesigning had emerged from the bottom in the form of expert suggestion. This fact had led to important concepts that have impacts on implementation. Among these concepts, trigger for change, bottom up, resistant management, owners of initiatives, lack of common interest, and naming the initiative were persistent across the data as indicated above. In the sections below, they are briefly described along with evidences from the data.

5.5.2. Trigger for Change

Trigger for change refers to the immediate reason that caused the commencement of the initiative in the bank. As described above, the NBE's demand to use technology and expert recommendation in making the bank suitable for the new technology through redesigning the old processes triggered the bank to this initiative. The following is a data segment taken from a participant's explanation of the issue:

> *When our leaders came with the idea of implementing core banking, they realized that the bank needs some adjustments so as to be suitable to the new system. However, some of the bank's experts used this opportunity to raise an idea of initiating a bigger change in the bank. This was not a simple task, though. They had to convince top management. The top management was reluctant to accept. With struggle, the idea of undertaking a bigger change gained acceptance eventually (1:3).*

The above explanation indicates that the extent of change anticipated by the management of bank B was not initially big (i.e., strategic). With expert recommendation, the plan to implement a new technology demanded by the central bank and perhaps to make minor adjustments grew up to take a shape of strategic organizational change. Therefore, the triggers for the initiated change were initially government requirements but for the strategic change initiative expert recommendations were significant triggers.

5.5.3. Resistant Management

Even though the application of the technology was not compromised by the top management of bank B for government's sake, the emergent process redesigning agenda had not been welcomed by the top management group. The idea turned to be a change initiative through extended efforts of especially one expert who had previous exposure in handling similar change projects in government banks. This expert had managed to convince top management members with the idea per se. However, as the change demanded commitment, they started to resist indicating how implementation had been challenging. This made the change in the bank incomplete as evidenced in the data. One of the participants who understood this process expressed his idea as follows:

> *However, this initiative was emerged without acceptance by the top management. It failed. It was just a fatal exercise. It took too much time; it costed us a lot… (2:17).*

As expressed by this participant, the fact that the change was initiated bottom-up without top management salute resulted in undesired consequences because of the resistance from the management side. This was somewhat expected by the experts who initiated the idea of business process redesign and convinced the management of the bank. Speculating the possibility of resistance, they even preferred not to name the initiative as the infamous business process reengineering.

5.5.4. Naming the Initiative

Through naming, experts who initiated the change tried to reduce possible resistance from organizational members through intervening in their perception process. They introduced the initiative as business process redesign instead of Business Process Reengineering (BPR). The reason behind doing so was BPR's previous application, performance and low level of acceptance in governmental organizations. Their benchmarks, their plans, and their exposure, imply the idea was to apply BPR, however. One of the experts who participated during the initial stage stated the issue in the following way:

> *As the name BPR might not be liked [by the organizational community], [we said] 'let's simply start it as a structural change that goes bottom up; let's do a process reengineering anyway' (1:4).*

This indicates how naming an initiative matters even though it was not effective in bank B because of the fact that the idea was raised bottom-up. Source of the idea implied ownership of the initiative in the bank and hence management became passive resistant.

Despite experts' effort to make the change effective, management remained at least a passive resistant because the condition in the bank allowed this to happen. In line with this, the categories and codes discussed in the upcoming sections emerged from bank B data.

5.5.5. Lack of Common Interest

As can also be inferred from the above discussions, there was no common interest among organizational members who were expected to act towards designing and implementing the initiative to bring about a real strategic change in bank B. Management, owners, and the workforce had different interests in connection with the initiative. In the absence of common interest, the experience in bank B proved the difficulty of implementing organizational change. The following paragraph is an explanation by a participant regarding the absence of common interest among the major stakeholders.

> *You see, to be changed, there must be some triggering factors. …some banks are changing just because of the National bank's direction…. During such events, the workforce, the management and the board should have common thinking. It all depends on the leader (1:108).*

In the absence of common thinking and interest, initiating a change will be very challenging to realize. Central to the task of creating the interest that makes the change a common agenda to all organizational stakeholders is the leadership. This in the case of bank B has roots in the type and structure of ownership.

5.5.6. Company Ownership

This category contains ideas that emerged from bank B's data and have something to do with the fact that bank B is a private bank. It is owned by private shareholders. Among these shareholders, as shared by participants, some have an implicit interest to control the operations of the bank and have significant pressure (influence) on the leadership of the bank while others are short-sighted and thus focus on dividends at the expense of long term survival and profitability of the bank.

In the presence of such ownership conditions, initiating a strategic change can be influenced in ways that are explained in the next sections.

5.5.6.1. No compelling Reason for Change

As briefly asserted in the previous section, in the ownership condition bank B was in, it was very difficult to have a common compelling reason among owners to necessitate change the bank. As a result, owners did not happen to support in whatsoever means or to commit themselves to change initiatives. Participants perceive that bank business is profitable irrespective of the operational efficiency of the bank. The following is an excerpt taken from the description of a participant about owners:

> *…they get their money [profit]; they are doing whatever they like to. Whether you did it properly or not, whether your morale is affected or not they do not care; because the change from the very beginning didn't come from them. The*

idea should come from the top leaders and major stockholders should agree on it (1:132).

This was an explanation which implies that in the absence of a reason which is as compelling as threat of profitability, owners cannot be curious about the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the bank. In the context where profitability is almost a guarantee; why do they worry to change the bank then? In an attempt to specify the condition in which an initiated change could be successful, this participant recommended buy-in from top leaders and major stockholders.

5.5.6.2. Nonprofit Motive

This is a concept that represents the agenda of major shareholders who want to implicitly control the bank and get it serve their personal interest. This interest does not include the profit the bank makes out of its regular operations. They rather focus on things different from profit. That is why this concept is labeled non profit motive. The following data segment describes this fact.

As far as you get your loan, you do not care if the bank goes bankrupt. Therefore whether or not the manager is visionary is not as such important. Whether the manger can change the bank doesn't matter. As far as the manager serves the shareholder's interest, the manager continues in power. All these facts disturb the theoretically sound approaches of change the rest of the world is working with. There is no dividend and profit issue; the issues of change matters when these issues are valid (5:29).

This explanation makes clear how the condition of ownership and related interests uniquely affect bank business operations. Hence, getting loan for other businesses of an investor (i.e., shareholder of the bank) is in this context identified as one of such nonprofit motives. Credit access is repeatedly mentioned by participants amongst such motives. Owners with such interest focus more on getting loan in whatsoever way including compromising bank's profitability. The above excerpt explicates why managers are reluctant (which was considered as passive resistance) to the change initiated bottom-up in bank B.

The following paragraph shows how much this motive is strong in the private banking sector.

> *For your information, (it might not be important for your study), in our country most of the bank shareholders do not want dividend from their banks; their most important thing for them is being powerful and being able to control the management. By controlling the management their big benefit is credit. This is an inflation era. The biggest thing for them is getting loan not getting divided. There is no capital market like in the rest of the world. Owners do not buy and sell shares. Their most important thing in here is their dominance (5:28).*

This search for credit is not through the normal operation of the bank; it happens through control and manipulation. It is not logical to expect commitment for changing the bank from these stockholders. They systematically control the board of directors so as to get their interest served by the bank. In a bank being led by this kind of board of directors, it is not simple to get the idea of change accepted and its initiation and implementation sponsored. The issue of power and its uses matters in such an environment as one participant put it:

> *The question is does the board allow this to happen? Because the actual board is referred to as shadow board; the real board operates behind the curtain. They have their own interest. They have no shared vision. They may focus on getting loan; if they do not stop this, banks cannot come to the right track. You see, to change these who should have the broader picture? It is the management. Is*

> *there anyone who accepts to change the bank towards this broader picture? Very hardly! (1:140).*

The rivalry within bank owners is to gain control over the board and gain power. For these types of owners the performance efficiency of the bank which may at times necessitate organizational change and competitiveness of the bank, which may in turn demand changing the bank's way of doing business, does not matter much. This implies that the existence of stockholders with nonprofit motives could negatively affect implementation of organizational change. The following data segment is taken from one participant's explanation to show how strong the situation was.

> *You see you can't fully implement. Unless you go through reconciling with the interests that come especially from the board, even you can't survive. You have to compromise (1:82).*

As per this view of a participant, serving nonprofit motives are even threatening the job security of managers and/or employees of the bank. This is because the motive is supported by those who have power.

5.5.7. The External Context

The national and industrial context in which bank B operates also emerged to have an association with the implementation practice. In addition to the issues pertaining to ownership and associated interests described above, customer needs, weak competitive pressure, and national context make up the context in which bank B is operating.

5.5.7.1. Weak Competitive Pressure

As explained in Chapter Four, the banking sector in Ethiopia is characterized by few domestic players enjoying legislative entry barriers. These barriers are preventing foreigners in general and domestic new entrants in a form of increased capital requirement. On the other hand, the country is the second most populous in Africa providing very limited access to credit and saving facilities which in turn gives way to indigenous informal institutions such as "iqquib" as substitute service providers in a relatively lower transaction cost. These are all indicators of low intensity of competition within the industry.

In the absence of competitive pressure, it is very likely that a bank earns profit no matter how it operates. What else could trigger a bank to initiate a risky strategic change business then? One of the participants discussed this issue in the following way:

> *I think one thing that does not motivate many people for change is the fact that the market is not saturated yet. You will make profit whether or not you implement changes successfully. Therefore, you do not bother about change implementation. Now, all commercial banks are profitable; despite this we talk about 6th and 7th rank, still there is money. We are talking about reduction in performance while the bank made around 300 million Birr. They got it without doing strategic things. They got this without treating customers in a different way. You can get profit for simply opening the office (4:33).*

If this is the case, banks will not be motivated to improve the way they do their business. Hence, it is very difficult to get committed top management for an implementation of change as it is not demanded by owners who are making money anyway. The following paragraphs also reinforce the above argument:

> *Our bank is still traditional. We simply lend and get profit. There is no competition. Sometimes you may think "why should they worry?" They are getting money almost certainly. What would improving the system bring (1:103)?*

However, as access to credit is far from the ordinary customer, there is no reason to deposit only. This rather could motivate especially those who have a need for credit access to look for the traditional option. This takes the money which could otherwise have been deposited to banks. This could make mobilizing deposit challenging in the future.

5.5.7.2. Customer Needs

The other direction from which an organization could be triggered for change is when finding innovative ways of satisfying customer needs is a way of survival in business. The question of how pressured Ethiopian banks (to satisfy the needs of their customer through sophisticated banking services) are can indicate the level of commitment the bank management could have to search for innovative banking. One of the interviewees expressed his insight on this issue in the following way:

> *Do not innovate if it is not a must; because why should you prefer more expensive ways to less expensive ones? Our society is non banked society. It is cash society. Having money in a pocket is common in the society (5:38).*

This indicates the level of pressure to innovate for the customer as the important question of the customer is access. There is no easy access to credit even for those who are exposed to a bank.

5.5.7.3. National Context

In addition to customer-related and industry-related issues, national context has also emerged as important factor in shaping the context within which a strategic change can be framed. Participants relate bank operations to the economic development level of nation. As the level of economic development changes, the way banks do their business also changes. The following is an excerpt explaining this:

The quality of banks is dependent on the economic development level of a country. The development level of a country determines the nature and type of a bank product. For example Ethiopian economy is different from the European economy. In such economies there are more than 280 banking products. In Ethiopia, the number of banking products might not even be 100. If you ask what is the difference? [The answer is] the nation's economic development and level of technological development.

For example why are we using the new technology? The economy is developing, and technology is also developing. Therefore, the transformation of banks requires economic and technological development. The society is also demanding more from banks; therefore, [banks] introduced mobile banking, ATM, etc… (2:41-42).

Legislative trends are also important components of national environment in the context of Ethiopian commercial banking sector. For example, government's legislation which demands a fixed percentage of private bank's deposits to be invested in government bills put pressure on private banks. This may trigger private banks to be more active and search for new ways of winning customers to mobilize more deposit. One of the participants expressed his contention regarding government's intervention in the following way:

Ethiopia is importing much of its goods from China. But the government gives the privilege to give banking service to all imports from china to only Commercial Bank of Ethiopia [government owned bank]. What do you say this? This is unfair. The other is the issue of 27% deposit to the National Bank required only from private banks. This is not the case in government banks. This created huge deposit shortage on private banks which in turn creates a problem in giving credits (2:38).

This indicates that one of the possible sources of pressure for banks to look for better ways of attracting customers could be the national legislative frameworks. The other legislative issue raised by participants is also the already existing government restriction on foreign investors to enter the financial sector and the possibility of better performance if this restriction is lifted. In the data segment below, a participant explained other contribution foreign investors could have in addition to intensifying competition and sophisticating bank products.

> *The coming of foreign banks could also benefit in a form of solving hard currency shortage. The government instead of fully preventing them from entering the domestic market can restrict their operation to the foreign exchange and foreign currency related banking services and reduce the present problem in the import-export business. Therefore, for me, the restriction might have a different reason instead (2:39).*

As indicated in the above quotation bank managers are not afraid of foreign banks. Rather they expect better environment following their entry. Moreover, if such changes are expected in the national environment due to global pressures, the national competitive situation will be different from what it is today. This requires strategic approach from the side of the banks; which means another trigger for strategic organizational change.

Others even call for greater competitiveness following expected deregulation. The following data segment is an indicative for such propositions by participants.

> *You device a strategy based on your objectives. What Ethiopian banks have to focus on is the fact that we are in the era of globalization and Ethiopian accession to the WTO may end up with deregulation of the industry. This will make the competition too stiff. Therefore, before the time comes these banks should be prepared in advance different ways (4:46).*

Indicating the need for such a change obviously has impact on the success of implementation through increasing the commitment of top management and owners during change initiatives.

5.5.8. Power

Power in the context of private banks refers to the capacity to decide on the resources of the bank which naturally emanates from ownership of the company. Therefore, those with direct or indirect connection with major stockholders of the bank are in possession of power in bank B. This concept has relevance because if convinced, those with power have great potential to enhance the success of implementing organizational change.

5.5.8.1. Supreme Powers Aboard

The success of implementation in an organizational change is affected by organizational power and in the way power is applied. The impact of power intervention will be either positive or negative on the success of implementation. This is, in fact, an indicator for the need to bring those with the highest power on board during change initiatives as discussed below:

> *…who is the supreme power in that bank? In the case of a private bank it is the shareholders—represented by the board of directors. The leader should get his proposal approved by them. Then the change will be implemented successfully. However, there are several interest groups that will strive to divert the initiative out of track for their own sake. Sometimes, it seems that the purpose of establishment for private banks is to give loan to shareholder (2:67).*

This implies that members who are backed by those with the highest power in the bank can execute what they intend to. In the context of the initiative, the success of implementation needs power intervention. However, there is also rivalry among other interest groups to get those with power in the initiative's side. This leads to office politics.

5.5.8.2. Office Politics

Office politics in bank B is characterized by competition towards winning power that gives capacity to control the bank for the sake of serving different interests. Some of such interests are personal; not organizational. This negatively affects the rate of success in implementing organizational changes. At times, organizational members who are in charge of some change-related tasks might face trial in front of those with power. They have to choose between compromising the quality of change and their job. The following quotation is indicates such concerns:

> *You see, you can't fully implement [the change]. Unless you go through reconciling with the interests that come especially from the board, even you can't survive. You have to compromise (1:82).*

Given this, in bank A, even the idea of changing the bank could have been curbed at its earliest stage. According to one participant, it was due to an expert's selfless effort irrespective of personal threats that the idea persisted.

> *Had it not been for that person's effort, it couldn't have been realized by anyone else. In the top management, nobody listens; however, he has an expert power. Besides, he knows the president. The president trusts him. He is like an advisor [to the president]. He could present same thing even three times until they accept it. He does not quit easily. He continues to convince them (1:21).*

This had happened because of power usage. Those who have power have to be aware of how to use it. Power use could be constructive or destructive. When there are political manipulations, things in connection with power use will be more complicated. The safest way of handling organizational change is trying to get the blessing of the supreme power first and ideally to initiate the changes top down. If the truth is the other way round, change will face fierce resistance from the top as observed in bank B. Apart from implementation failure, such a circumstance hurts those engaged as described by one participant below:

> *This kind of situation even victimizes good individuals; of course we didn't face such a problem. Through this process the anticipated change comes, it's very natural. Later on, when the idea spreads, it becomes bank wide. Even now, there are individuals who oppose the change. You cannot avoid it; but, you can minimize.*
>
> *… In reality while those who are not responsible promote change, people with responsibility keep quite. They are more concerned to their power and the status quo. This is the biggest challenge. It is true (5:19-20).*

The ultimate result of office politics is actions that are taken under the umbrella of those with power. This had happened in bank B in several ways of power interventions. If misused, power can be a challenge for the successful implementation of a change initiative; otherwise it could be an important tool for realizing anticipated organizational changes.

5.5.9. The Human Resource

Ultimately, the implementation of an organizational change affects personnel in one way or another. Obviously, any kind of change initiative cannot be successful without the involvement of people. The issue is how people come on board during organizational change initiatives. It requires proper selection of appropriate personnel and proper intervention to modify the behavior of people in a way that benefits implementation.

5.5.9.1. Personnel Selection

If effectively executed, personnel selection plays an important role for the success of change implementation. Practically, defining and applying merits serve as proxy to identify potentially relevant personnel. Human side refers to the human capacity to execute required tasks with acceptable quality and with required commitment. In bank B, this process of personnel selection has emerged from the data as a relevant concept. Though not as loud as it does in bank A's data, one of the interviewees agree in the idea of merit based selection (in bank B) as presented below:

> *Personnel selection should be merit based; to have personnel having better qualification and better attitude towards customers. Then retaining the experienced personnel is also important. Retention requires being appealing to your workers through competitive remuneration, through freedom in work environment, through empowering them. Working towards continuously upgrading the workforce so as to be competent with new technologies and new approaches is the other thing required (4:51).*

Based on the above data, selection should be backed by retention if the selection of personnel has to contribute for organizational success in general and change implementation in particular.

5.5.9.2. Motivating

During change implementation, making sure there are motivated employees ready to discharge their new change implementation related responsibility is the other issue. Participants from bank B also raised their concern in connection with this concept:

> *You have to do several things when managing changes. Motivating the workforce is part of it. You have to create awareness about the change; you*

have to make things clear. You have to train them and side by side show the benefit they can get from the change (1:137).

In the absence of such efforts, employees will have their own attitude and perception (about the change); which do not necessarily guarantee the required behavioral change.

5.5.10. Attitude

Attitude is the other concept that gained attention during interviews. Interviewees showed their worry on this issue. An excerpt which indicates how attitude is one of the causes for not implementing the anticipated change says:

> *We didn't do a census, but the majority of employees do not have positive attitude towards the change. The majority is change resistant. The reason is there was no proper awareness creation. Besides, there are individuals who became overloaded following the changes in structure; these overloads dissatisfy the employees (6:18).*

This means, change leaders and other involved parties should have sufficiently informed employees about the change and its impact on them. Besides, follow up of actual impacts of the change and taking corrective actions helps to shape employee perception which ultimately influences behavior.

5.5.11. Aligning Benefits with Changed Behavior

The other thing that emerged out of the data is reinforcement related issue. For employees to act to the level required for the implementation of a change there must be a reason that convinces them. From the organization's side, the intervention to this end should revolve around performance evaluation and rewards. Ideally, there must be an alignment between the required behavior and employee benefits. One participant expressed his disappointment about the absence of such practices in bank B in the following way:

> *… If I were them, as the design is complete; I would have devised a strategy to 100% implement the designed change and to help the entire worker accept and own the change. I am very much disappointed for there is no system to follow up and evaluate implementation, to evaluate performance based on the new design and to reward and punish based on performance evaluation. The design is just on the shelf. If you ask the staff what has been changed, what is your role to the implementation, nobody knows (4:57).*

This explanation shows how deviant the implementation is from what was designed. There is no means to communicate what has to be done and how performance is measured and evaluated.

5.5.12. Communication

Communication is implicit behind every other concept that emerged from bank B's data. As can be inferred from the previous discussions, lack of common interest backed by power and politics led to a reluctant if not resistant group of management which made the situation challenging to motivate the entire workforce and bring about the anticipated change. Right from naming the initiative and creating awareness among relevant stakeholders to the stage where every major actor is convinced about the need for the change, the issues emerged from bank B's data are indicators of the need for well designed communication. A participant put it as:

> *You have to convince them [organizational members]. If there is someone who is not convinced, you have to change him/her. This is how you go. People do not simply leave what they get used to. You have to do several things [to*

persuade them]. You have to train [them]. Some follow you early; others follow later. It's a process, it is change; it is not simple… (1:138).

The above explanation shows, implementation could have improved if proper communication had been there to the level it was required.

5.5.13. Commitment

As appeared from the data of bank B, organizational actors in both sides—the management workers—should be committed towards the fruition of an anticipated change. However, the top management in bank B did not initiate the idea of business process redesigning and were reluctant to accept the idea when demanded by experts. This happened because there was no sufficient pressure forcing top management to greater commitment towards implementing the change as explained so far. As per one participant's description in the paragraph below, organizational members were neither convinced nor forced to implement the change:

Change has to be necessitated by a problem. Here there is no problem. What forces us to change then? Of course incentive [to get more] should also have motivated them. People have to believe they will get more by creating more. You have to search a mechanism that makes people restless (1:144).

The above explanation shows how lack of reinforcement creates lack of commitment. In a condition where change is not considered as a necessity, commitment towards it will be low.

5.5.14. Conflict of interest

These are interests in the context of bank B, especially associated to top management members and major shareholders who have personal interests that conflict with organizational interests. This partly affects their level of commitment too as explained in connection with this idea (i.e., nonprofit motive).

Conflict of interest in bank B is manifested in the following data segment quoted from a participant's explanation on the issue.

> *They want to rent their house to the bank at a rate that is higher than the market price. The bank pays an advance payment for five or ten years. …Being a borrower in a high inflation condition is wisdom because the interest rate is negative. The issue is how one can get loan. When you are a major shareholder, you can threaten the management because you have power to step down or even to hire a management member… If you think about profitability, you [will] have to think about efficiency; [this in turn would necessitate organizational change] (5:28).*

As explained in the above quotation, once conflicting and nonprofit benefits are sought by major shareholders, this thinking will affect the decision of both board members and top managers. This is not a favorable condition to have the required commitment towards implementation of change.

5.5.15. Implementation specifications

In addition to the fulfillment of conditions explained so far, successful implementation of organizational change requires having detailed design with specifications of the contents and processes of the anticipated change. These specifications have to serve as guiding principles to handle implementation dynamics that emerge on due course. A participant explained this issue as follows:

> *Then we designed each activity in terms of how it should be performed, what kind of human resource is needed, how long it takes and other efficiency related things. We also examined the number of steps a task passes through before*

> *completion. …we set the goal for the newly redesigned process. Then we set targets for each activity. We also determined a standard level of performance (4:4).*

Once the specifics of the change to be implemented are approved by relevant authorities and documented, the task of implementation is ready to be started. Communicating the specifications and putting them to the disposal of everyone involved should come first. However, bank B's success towards achieving this was not to the level required as a participant explained:

> *Every worker should on the first place be informed about the standard level of performance; then the daily performance of each worker should be registered and at the end of the day summarized and used for performance evaluation. …performance is as usual. Because of this the bank has just incurred a cost to get nothing. Even other banks which didn't initiate a change do better than us. Or current performance is now declined from third level to seventh level. Had our process redesign been effective, our performance would have been improved. Therefore, the initiative is not effective. My personal opinion is it is just wastage (4:19).*

As strongly commented by the above participant, this first step was not an experience that was actually managed by bank B. The common thing everyone mentions is regret and wastage of time and other resources. The story of change implementation in bank B was claimed to have led the bank to failure to implement the initiated change to the level expected.

5.5.16. Failure story

Failure to implement the anticipated change as per the plan was confessed by everyone participant of the study and also witnessed in the reviewed documents.

Among these sources, the implementation evaluation report of the bank which was conducted by taking the most successful department asserts:

> *…this report calls upon organizational members to be committed to fully implement the change. Among the specific findings include the fact that branches are not using standards of performance such as standard service delivery time (SDT), misunderstanding of the proposed changes between front and back offices, unreasonable bisection and disintegration among employees taking the change as a pretext (7:7).*

If the branches which were the ultimate targets of everyone, (as installing the new technology was at the center of the initiative), do not apply what is proposed in the newly redesigned system, it is easy to imagine what would be the case in the rest of the departments. The following is an example of how participants express the failure of the initiated change in bank B in this connection:

> *If you ask me what did the initiative brought to this bank? The answer is definitely nothing. We spent around a year and eight months; but ended up with nothing. Had the change brought an improvement, it should have been reflected in the performance of the bank. However, the bank's performance is declining from time to time. Therefore, the initiative was not successful. Perhaps the one year and eight months we have spent to bring about the change could have benefited the bank more if it were used just for the regular operations. In addition, we incurred costs in relation with the initiative (4:16).*

This is how the initiative was perceived by the study participants by the time the researcher visited the bank. Ideas that appeared pervasive and important as explained at the beginning of this chapter have more levels of abstractions which contributed for the construction of the implementation model which can guide effective implementation.

5.6. Summary of Strategic Change Implementation Practices in Bank B

Bank B represented a case variant to bank A mainly because of differences in the type of ownership. Practice of implementing strategic organizational change has been influenced by this major difference (i.e., ownership type). Literally, the change in bank B was initiated bottom-up by experts through convincing those at the top to sponsor it. However, the extent of persuasion was not strong enough to make them more committed towards bringing about real change in bank B. Moreover, absence of reasons that compellingly provoke the need for change appeared to reduce shareholders' and hence management's commitment towards implementing the initiated change.

To the contrary, experts of the bank were more concerned about making the change effective. To do so, they started their journey through convincing top management of the bank. However, the top management did not continue having firm stand in favor of the change. As the initiative grew up and became demanding, top management commitment became less intense. Passive resistance is what describes the status of top management better.

In a more latent level, implementation practices of strategic organizational change in bank B had been under the influence of organizational interactions powered by political behavior of self-interest driven actors from different stakeholders. Top management was not committed to the initiated change as the same was not the interest of major stockholders who manipulate bank's management through their 'shadow' board as described by participants.

More than what they could get through ensuring effective banking operations, top management members of bank B were presumed by participants to have gotten the acceptance of members of the board of directors through serving nonprofit motives of these members. Therefore, the issue of the change initiated in bank be was not a sincere demand by the bank's board of directors or top management. It was rather triggered by government's directive to use the core banking technology and intensified by bottom-up pressures from bank's experts. Both of these two sources of trigger towards the change are owned by the bank's top management and board of directors.

Therefore, successful implementation of a strategic organizational change requires an assessment of the condition under which power holders operate, their temptation to interfere in the bank's operation with an intention to serve personal interests, vulnerability of influential parties such as the board of directors and top management to be trapped by manipulations from these intervening parties. Office politics comes into play when there is lack of leadership which overcomes these influences and persists in unifying all towards sincere organizational purposes.

Even if the conditions of the bank are found to be in a relatively faire governance condition whereby shareholders' interventions are ruled out, there must be an assessment of other conditions that necessitate change. Since the financial sector of Ethiopia is so protected, competition is less intense which means that banking business in the country is almost certainly profitable and this in turn makes the issue of strategically changing the operation of the bank a less priority to stockholders and managers.

In cases where the assessment results of aforementioned situations reveal the necessity for change, good leadership support and commitment of those with power create favorable condition to initiate change from whatsoever source (i.e., be it bottom-up or top-down). Ideally, even in the absence of these conditions, banks operating in the same environment need to have the requisite capability to be changed. In doing so, change agents need to understand all the above conditions which, if not properly managed, would lead the initiative to failure. Moreover, change agents need to devise a strategy of overcoming them while effectively implementing anticipated strategic organizational changes.

Technical aspects of implementing strategic organizational change will be meaningful when the above issues are considered and properly handled. In this regard, bank B was challenged to use the right approach of initiating, designing and implementing the anticipated strategic organizational change using the right technical tool which results in new business processes in the bank. Bank B's use of old functional departments to design new business processes limited its successfulness in bringing about process orientations to the bank.

Besides, bank B also was challenged in terms of having a complete specification of design components of new business processes so that implementation becomes clear. The extent the change is positioned in the mind of the workers in the bank was also generally poor that they perceived the initiative as a simple change in the names of the old process and nothing more.

5.7. Chapter Summary

This chapter mainly focused on description of major categories that emerged as a result of analyzing the data gathered from the two banks. As the purpose of the study is building data-driven theory, this chapter attempted to indicate the empirical data the present study was based on. The next chapter will focus on the final part of second cycle coding—selective coding and related theoretical propositions.

CHAPTER SIX: DESCRIPTIONS OF EMERGENT THEMES

6.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses about major themes pertaining to the implementation of strategic organizational change. Besides, relationships among major themes that led to the propositions about strategic organizational change implementation within the context of each bank are presented. Based on the results, final theoretical propositions are made and implementation models for strategic organizational change within the contexts of each commercial bank are proposed.

6.2. Themes Extracted from Bank A's Data

In bank A, the strategic organizational change which was targeted by the present study was analyzed based on data gathered pertaining to how the strategic organizational change was initiated, designed and implemented. Codes that were emerged from the primary data sources were further analyzed and resulted in those categories which appeared most salient and most important are described in the previous chapter. In the upcoming sections of this chapter, more latent perspectives of second cycle coding are presented.

6.2.1. Causes of Breakdowns

As the analysis at this stage is focused on concepts that are associated with the implementation of strategic organizational change in bank A, possible causes of breakdowns as conceptualized by Van de Ven and Sun (2011) are among those this chapter focuses on. Breakdowns represent actions or conditions of implementation which deviate from anticipated change (i.e., mental model (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011)). In the case of bank A, the strategic organizational change was anticipated to be designed and implemented in line with BPR principles as explained in Chapter Four and Chapter Five.

The source from which the idea of changing the bank is initiated and the strategy it was communicated, the way the initiated change was conceptualized by different stakeholders who were expected to be interconnected actors throughout the transition period, resistance from management, power use and politics were found to be major causes of breakdown in bank A. How and why these concepts are associated with breakdowns and who should be responsible to search for remedies and prevent change breakdowns by avoiding the conditions under which these causes impede strategic organizational change are discussed in the next sub-sections.

6.2.1.1. Source and strategy of initiating strategic organizational change

In bank A, there was resistance to implement the initiated change though the source of it and the conditions contributing to it appeared different from what is commonly known. Source of initiative and the strategy of communicating the initiative as discussed in the previous chapter are attributed to possibly cause a change breakdown as they resulted in resistant management groups and individuals who followed different tactics to defend the status quo.

In the present study, source of initiation refers to the person or entity who initiated the idea of changing an organization. The fact that the government initiated the change (second phase of BPR) in bank A indicates that government is the source of initiative for the strategic organizational change in the bank. As the reason for the government to take the initiative was failure of the previous initiative, this left management of the bank skeptic about the ultimate intention of the initiation.

The strategy followed by those who initiated the change was not sufficiently designed to convince old management group who presumably considered this act as a sign of government's dissatisfaction by their management. Therefore, members of the old management group tried to defend themselves. This is how the old management perceived the condition. Consequently, the environment was engulfed with lack of trust. These are all relatively underrepresented in the literature as causes of resistance to change.

Besides, individuals (i.e., employees) are presumed to be primary sources of resistance to organizational change (Burnes, 2015). However, as this same author explains, even the seminal works of the theory of change resistance as discussed by Coch and French (1948) recognize organizational setting as a source of resistance instead of an individual. In the present research, a relatively less discussed source that is manager's resistance emerged to play significant role in implementing strategic organizational change. A specific attention is given to the notion of manager's resistance in an article extracted and published from this research (Belay & Mamo, 2016).

6.2.1.2. Skepticism

As a better conceptualization effort, this type of resistance to change is associated with source and strategy of initiating a change which results in skepticism and lack of trust among board of directors (in the case of bank A), those who are assigned to act as change agents (design teams), selection committee and employees resulted in deviant implementation.

6.2.1.3. Perception

This concept represents the way the change initiated in bank A was viewed by employees and managers. As emerged relevant in the context of bank A, the source of initiative and strategy of communicating the initiated change to the presumably change recipient group should be given sufficient attention. It affects the perception of the change recipient (non-initiators). If the act of initiating is negatively perceived, it will lead to lack of readiness to buy into the change. Perception is therefore one of the possible cause of breakdowns.

6.2.1.4. Lacking Management Sponsorship to the Change

This theme represents the notion of management resistance in its strictest sense. From this less common source of resistance, it is logical to recommend the change leaders to manage possible emotions of the old management team and reduce its influence on the initiated change. The ideal solution which could prevent breakdowns is properly communicating the purpose of the change and persuading the management group so that it supports the change. Through careful monitoring, if the intensity of old management's emotion is beyond controllable limits and it is expected to grow to a level of effective resistant force, measures must be taken to minimize or avoid negative influences of such groups.

The ideal condition is to turn extant management group of a changing organization into a change sponsor. Building management's sponsorship to the initiated change should be at the centre of the initiating strategy. Mento *et al*. (2002) underscored this theme as cultivating a change sponsor as one of the important steps in implementing organizational change. The purpose of such possible mechanisms of achieving this could be solving conceptualization problems and increasing acceptance base among the management group.

6.2.1.5. Conceptualization Problems

Conceptualization is related to the way the initiated change is understood by organizational members. It is created through the change leader's communication effort. In bank A, as the initiated change was by default a sign of rejecting the prior effort of existing management group, those who were in charge of leading the second phase could have exploited better level of collaborating through carefully designed communication about what triggered the change, what its scope will be and build a compelling shared reason that necessitated the change. Trigger for change, compelling reason and scope of the change are among the significant categories that emerged from bank A's data as discussed in the previous chapter. Lack of proper positioning of the initiated change could lead to poor conceptualization of the change and this in turn causes breakdowns to the initiated change.

6.2.2. Managing Major Events and Resultant Shocks

Throughout the entire duration of a change implementation project, some events appear important to organizational members. They served as turning points for the general behavioral trends during transition. Specifically, two events—declaration to initiate the second phase BPR and employee selection—were important for both employees and the management group in bank A. These two events resulted in shocks during the transition period as participants described. Different strategies of handling these two events could have changed the whole organizational climate during the transition period.

As explained earlier, the fact that the government (through board of directors) initiated the second phase of BPR in bank A which was taken as a remedy for the failed first phase initiation was not a comfortable message to those who were managing the bank during the time of the first phase BPR initiative.

As the second phase followed a different strategy (i.e., used teams that were established to carry out the design of the new business processes; which is different from the approach of the first phase which involved everyone in old functional departments), those who were not participants remained skeptic and gradually started to device and apply passive resistance strategies. Such resistances were ranging from intentional slowdown of activities to manipulating the change procedure through carefully orchestrated interventions especially during the selection process (at least as perceived by technical team members). Manipulation of the employee selection process in turn resulted in deviant implementation (compared to the design).

For the management group, government's initiation of the second phase was a shock. They were frustrating because the purpose of the second initiative was declared to be failure of the first which by default put them responsible. On the other hand, employee selection, which is the most sensitive stage during strategic organizational change was not at least perceived by organizational members as objective as they expected it to be. Result of the process was described by participants as a shocking event.

If such events are not preconceived by change leaders and accompanied by transparent plans which make consequences especially on those to be affected clear, the environment turns to be stressing. As time goes on, skepticism and lack of trust engulf the environment. This logically leads to a search behavior to come out of it. Such behaviors are obviously deviant. This makes things difficult for change leaders to bring about the desired change. This deviation is different from what Van de Ven and Sun (2011) refer to as reflection to intentionally deviate from the mental model.

Transparency through proper communication could have smoothed out the relations amongst (1) the board, (2) the management group, (3) teams which were established to design the new organizational business processes, (4) the committee which was established to select employees to be assigned on newly created job positions, and (5) the entire workforce. These parties are major actors during change initiatives. Smooth interaction which results from strong leadership and communication enhances organizational change implementation success (see actor networking and interaction among actors).

Major events should therefore be predetermined, and a strategy to organize them properly and to select appropriate timing found important. The execution of such events needs to be preceded by sufficient communication and adequate evaluation of possible reactions. Readiness of the organization to introduce such events should be anticipated in advance and fully assessed. These altogether represent proper timing.

Timing is a central logic. Managers of the change could understand causes of deviant reactions following such major events; however, determining proper timing for these events is more proactive and effective. Especially employee selection was perceived as premature because it started before the finish of preparing job description by the process teams. This resulted in bad perception and lack of integrity. The vast majority of organizational members and especially those who were affected by the event should have been informed and if possible convinced in advance before the execution of the event.

6.2.3. Politics and Power Use

The introduction of an initiative to strategic organizational change especially in the same way as how it was done in bank A (i.e., externally driven by the government) should strive for building a sufficient buy-in from the management and other concerned parties in the organization. Failure to do so results in an office politics which is orchestrated by a management group that is in power and is pretending to support the change while actually jeopardizing it. This condition is very complex as it is submerged in covert behaviors. This is evident in bank A's data.

A successful implementation of organizational change is not expected to happen in such conditions. As discussed previously, building management sponsorship to the initiated change should precede further executions of change implementation activities. The technical aspects of designing, implementing and evaluating a planned change such as the one initiated by bank A can succeed when preceded by sufficient preparatory works to handle the soft side of the organization. Leadership's role at this stage cannot be downplayed. Communication and building collaborative networks amongst major actors and ruling out cause of competitive or conflictive behaviors amongst these parties should come prior to the actual technical activities that are needed to implement a change.

As also discussed in connection with major events, lack of trust which result from poor communication which in turn result in skepticism lead non-participating members to engage in searching for self-defense mechanisms to protect their threatened interests. When the management group is amongst such organizational members, office politics will be a powerful tool and an ultimate manifestation of manager's resistance to organizational change.

6.2.4. Change Leadership, Communication and Networking

Themes discussed so far have negative impacts on implementation of strategic organizational change if not properly handled. Embedded behind these themes, leadership, communication and networking emerged as mechanisms of enhancing implementation effectiveness through overcoming the aforementioned challenges.

6.2.4.1. Leadership

Leadership is generic in that it is also required here as a mechanism of influencing behavior of actors during the change. In this specific context, themes that emerged as a source of change breakdown or as mechanisms of enhancing successful implementation are somewhat connected to interactions of actors. Communication, networking and persuading actors and creating an environment of trust and confidence appeared missing in the time of transition. These indicate the need for a change leadership.

Effective change leadership especially in environments that have potential loss of trust among major actors makes use of well built actor networks that have bases in transparent intents and decisions that are properly conceived and understood by all major actors. These networks make communication more effective. Therefore a change leader needs to nurture an environment of trust during change initiation. The leader should use shared compelling reason for initiating the change. This is consistent to the first step in Lewin's model (Burnes, 2004a). Kotter's (1995) step of creating a sense of urgency and subsequent steps of creating vision and sharing it are also convergent to the need for change leadership that is needed in successfully implementing strategic organizational change in this context. These require networking major actors and fostering effective communication among them.

In the context of bank A, effective leadership could have introduced the initiative to the management group and get sufficient buy-in from them and foster collaborative environment which smoothens the interaction among actors. This made smoothness of interaction among actors an important theme which has potential contribution to effectiveness of strategic organizational change implementation.

6.2.4.2. Actor networking

As an important mechanism to create conducive environment to implement a strategic organizational change, building a strong network of collaboration among major actors is found critical. This idea has been supported by scholars since the beginning of scholarship in change management. For example, Howes and Quinn (1978) explained the importance of integrating the efforts of change agents, managers and members. Stragalas (2010) also proposed collaborative interaction among three stakeholders—leader, employee and organization and discussed on what needs to be done by each in order to implement organizational change in line with Kotter's (1995) eight step model of change.

In bank A, contrary to the aforementioned required conditions among actors, there were weak or no integrations among process teams who designed the new business processes, the committee which was established to select personnel for the newly designed job positions, and those who were assigned to implement new business processes. This indicates leadership gap which otherwise could have created a network among these actors. This situation led to the emergence of another important idea to be considered during change implementation—actor networking. Each actor is then expected to interact over the network.

6.2.4.3. Communication

Communication is the means to ensure effective networking and leadership. Without proper communication, there will be no effective initiation and positioning of a change program. If communication is lacking, intentions of the initiative could not be transparent, the perceptions and emotions of organizational actors could not be managed, and destructive office politics and self-interest triggered behaviors cannot be minimized. Risks of disintegration and dominance of political behavior over change supportive behavior could only be handled through leadership which has to exploit much on communication.

Communication, especially when supported with technology is also the life vessel of process oriented organizations on the basis of which they transfer data that are needed to execute tasks and to evaluate performances (see change model validation and contextualization). As discussed under the change model validation and contextualization section, technology supported communication is an important contributor for implementation success especially in the case of process oriented organizational designs. For example, implementation of BPR (Hammer & Champy, 1993) and Balanced Score Card (BSC) (Kaplan & Norton, 1996, 1992) require an automated environment. In the upcoming technical related themes that were emerged from bank A's data, implementation support system which is assumed to be supported by information and communication technology is also an important interface with this theme—communication.

6.2.5. Change Techniques and Managing Expert Buy-ins

Themes presented so far deal more on the soft side of strategic organizational change implementation. In addition, strategic organizational change implementation requires managing technical aspects of initiating, designing and implementing it. Besides, if the initiated change uses a tool which is referred to in this study as change model, it has to be validated and contextualized. These techniques demand sufficient buy-in of experts.

6.2.5.1. Change Model Validation and Contextualization

Once the purpose and type of a newly initiated change is communicated with an intention to persuade organizational actors (especially managers), it becomes reasonable to discuss on the technical aspects of the initiated change. In planned change initiatives such as the one which took over in bank A, it is common to choose a tool which will be used as a means to conceptualize the change. Such tools are technical and definitely need expertise to use them. The first phase of BPR initiative in bank A is an example of what the consequence of lacking expertise results. Basically, such tools need to be validated and contextualized.

6.2.5.2. Validating the Change Model

The use of a change tool, which is referred to in this study as a change model, is usually associated with planned change. Such change programs rush to use conceptually well developed but not usable change theories (Beer, 1992). This approach is what Beer, Eisenstat and Spector (1990) denounced as fallacious application of top-down introduced change which is conceptualized using buzz words.

If not introduced bottom-up as Beer, Eisenstat and Spector (1990) claim, it appears logical that the conceptualization of changes using models such as the use of BPR in bank A should be validated taking the specific organizational context into consideration. Fitness of the selected change model to the specific organizational context should be evaluated before proceeding to take the implementation actions. This is what the present study refers to as validating the change model.

As a result of validating the change model, communicating the initiative to and getting buy-in from relevant stakeholders becomes more effective. In bank A, participants witnessed the importance of by reporting about the concept of "understanding the change model". As explained in the previous chapter, this effort of understanding the change model gained greatest attention (as it appeared being the most grounded category). This effort was given attention by taking lesson from the failed initiative (which bank A participants refer to as first phase BPR initiative). This failure is mostly attributed to misunderstanding the change model. However, the effort of starting with understanding the change model did not focus on wider base of organizational members. It rather targeted the teams which were established to design the change. This partiality resulted in more skepticism in the side of management and employees as they were not sufficiently informed.

Apart from understanding, validating the change model encompasses efforts of change agents to test if the basic features of the model (BPR in this case) fit to the whole or part of the organization. The importance of validation appeared more meaningful especially in connection with bank A's attempt to introduce flatter organization and one window service in line with BPR recommendations. These two features are examples of how the decision to apply a change model's features without validating their fitness to organizational context creates problems.

6.2.5.3. Contextualizing the Change Model

Change model features especially those that are common in process-oriented designs of organizational systems (same as in BPR initiatives) require automated environment to be executed effectively. This means, when organizational environment is not automated, the way these features should be introduced to such organizations should be tailored (i.e., contextualized) to the specific contextual features. In bank A however, they tried to implement one window service by deploying generalist front line personnel prior to automating. As participants unanimously explained it, the result was longer cycle time (than before the change) and loss of customer. The introduction of core banking system (technology) finally enhanced the performance of core business processes of bank A to reach the level of their designed capacity back offices (which are not supported by automated systems) remained as usual (i.e., no performance improvement following the redesign).

The attempt to make bank A's structure flatter also appeared problematic when implemented. Such structure results in increased span of control. If not supported by technology, it makes things overwhelming to the top management. This was what happened in bank A. As a result, an initially flat structure turned to be nearly as long as the old one following subsequent introduction of several managers and assistants to subordinate vice presidents.

Therefore, evaluating change model's fitness to specific organizational realities and modifying (contextualizing) model features to make the change model fit when they are found unfit, is an obvious logic that makes implementation more effective. In connection with this, other technical aspect of implementing strategic organizational change emerged—putting in place a system which supports the implementation of change (see change techniques and managing expert buy-ins).

Both validation and contextualization of the change model that is selected to be applied to bring about strategic organizational change are integral to the major themes that are discussed next. Initiating an organizational change requires being pre-informed about the selected change model. Designing is naturally guided by the specifications of change model. Implementation should also consider assumptions and requirements of the change model which benefit the most from validation and modification (contextualization). Technical aspects of initiating designing, implementation and systems are fleshed out hereunder.

6.2.5.4. Initiating

Initiating a strategic organizational change has association to themes presented earlier. In addition, it should meet technical requirements especially in the case of planned changes where the concept makes better sense. As discussed in Chapter Two, the most recent conceptualization of change comes from paradoxical view which considers routine dynamics as mechanisms of implementing organizational change and innovation (Graetz & Smith, 2010; Feldman *et al*., 2016; Lin *et al*., 2017; Wang & Wang, 2017). This stage in strategic organizational change remains valid in changes such as the one bank A initiated.

Apart from making its goals transparent and ensuring smooth interaction with major organizational actors as discussed so far (see source and strategy of initiating strategic change), initiating a change should address technical requirements discussed here. This requires expert assessment. As bank A experienced it well in its two phases of implementing BPR, initiating which refers to assessing and communicating the need for change with defined and compelling reasons that justify why, what and how of the initiated change, should be based on a clear organizational stance bold enough to be communicated to and gain acceptance by major organizational actors. Initiating should serve as a stepping stone which serves as a common cause for actors whose collaborative networks need to be built subsequently (see actor networking section).

The outcome of change should also be overseen at this stage. In the absence of defined outcome, whether change is initiated simply following management fads (as explained by Balogun, 2001) or whether a compelling reason is necessitating change cannot be assessed. The second question that must be addressed before passing an initiating decision is whether or not the change model (BPR in this case) serves the change purpose. This requires measurement that is described in terms of defined outcomes.

As explained earlier, this requires model specification. Specifying basic features of the change model (BPR in this case) helps to make comparative analysis between defined change outcomes and model features which are expected to serve as drivers towards those outcomes. An expert assessment and judgment as to whether the specific features of the change model are fit to the expected outcomes of the change to be initiated are purely technical requirements that should precede formal initiating of a strategic organizational change. On the basis of such analysis, which demands expert buy-in; defining the change type, scope, and outcome which justifies the use of a specific change model should serve as foundation for the decision and action of initiating.

6.2.5.5. Designing

Designing is the other technical aspect of change which requires expert buy-in. Technically-backed initiating serves as a spring board for an effective design of an organizational change. In a planned organizational change such as the strategic organizational change in bank A, organizational owners or their agents should define the future of the organization in the same way as a client who wants to construct a house expresses her idea to the designer. The designer then converts the idea into an architectural, structural, electrical etc… components of the design to be implemented by a contractor. Under normal circumstances, construction effectiveness is a function of design accuracy and *completeness*. However, managing the construction can sometimes demand improvements in the design based on practical realities on the site. This is the same as what Van de Ven and Sun's (2011) reflection refers to in implementing organizational change.

Specifying the future organization that is necessitated by present challenges that demand the change comes from the previous stage of initiating. These ideas should now be converted into broader specifications of change. Basically, designing as it emerged from bank A's data, requires: (1) defining the future organization in terms of its components, actors, outcome measures, and follow up and evaluation systems and technologies that support these systems, (2) specifying the transition which includes model specification (adoption or adaptation with specification), designing organizational systems and structures, designing system performance measurement and evaluation systems and (3) specifying rollout decisions and actions. Rollout decisions and actions include checking design completeness, verifying whether personnel selection is done in consistency with design specifications, ensuring if the designer-implementer interlock is normal, assessing appropriateness of timing (avoiding premature implementation) which is explained by aforementioned conditions, having a complete plan of action which specifies the steps or phases and orders, and finally specifying how new routines can be turned on and old routines can be irreversibly abandoned. The specification of the final decision of turning on new routines marks readiness for implementing the designed change which in turn requires specifications as presented next.

6.2.5.6. Implementation and Systems

As explained in the previous section, putting in place the new organizational routines with a support of organizational systems and technologies represents implementation of strategic organizational change. This is how implementation is conceived in the present study.

Initiating, which emerged as one of the major events that appeared demanding careful management especially in connection with its effect on old management group, required expert buy-in to analyze the decision and recommend actions of initiating before actual declaration of the organizational change. In the same token, implementing is full of shocks that demand careful management and hence it should be preceded by expert buy-in to analyze readiness before actions. The following paragraphs present sub-themes that collate around implementing as emerged from bank A’s data.

6.2.5.6.1. Timing

Timing refers to the assessment of whether or not the organization is ready to start enacting new routines in place of old ones. In the previous sub-section, specific aspects of assessing readiness to implement the change were defined being components of design to be specified. Timing is here assessed based on these same specifications (i.e., whether or not design is complete, right personnel is put on the right place, the right technologies are put in place, all human aspects (perceptions, trust, politics etc…) are taken care of). Affirmative responses to these questions can be taken as indicators of readiness and hence appropriate timing to take the strategic change implementation action.

6.2.5.6.2. Deviance tracking

Once the changed organizational routines are enacted to bring about strategic organizational change, implementation success can be measured through assessing the match between designed change and implemented actions based on specifications. To do so, deviance tracking and management systems must be enacted across all organizational systems. Such systems are formal communication systems which also serve as channels of getting performance feedback, measurement, and evaluation. Effective tracking of deviance should also ensure that all new organizational actors and units have access to or are being accessed by the communication network. Once this condition is proved to prevail with the support of experts, the actual tracking of deviance and resultant actions or reflections (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011) can be carried out.

6.3. Proposed Implementation Model for bank A

Implementation of strategic organizational change requires understanding major causes of change breakdown (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011), managing major events together with resultant shocks, being informed with and keeping track of office politics and power use (Kotter, 1995) by extant managers, and strong change leadership (Balogun, 2001; Kotter, 1995) which exploits well developed actor networks through which effective communication (Mento *et al.*, 2002) takes place. Moreover, implementing strategic organizational change requires handling technical aspects which normally benefit from sufficient buy-in of experts. These two groups (i.e., behavioral & technical) of themes are major extractions of bank A's data. An implementation model of strategic organizational change in bank A should therefore be composed of these themes.

Figure 6.1 is an attempt to portray relations among these five major themes and their components. As can be inferred from previous discussions, themes emerged from bank A are interlocked together. These interlock put greater pressure on change management and hence failure to do so threatens success in change implementation.

The implementation of strategic organizational change in bank A took place in a context within which interlocking factors contributed to the unfolding of change in a certain way. Therefore, the proposed implementation model for strategic organizational change which was developed being grounded in bank A's context, explored these interrelations first (as presented so far) and tried to exploit on them (elaborated next).

Figure 6.1. Relations among the major themes emerged from bank A's data



Source: *Own sketch*

As depicted in the figure, implementation of strategic organizational change is interlocked in cyclically linked relations with prior actions and decisions (i.e., initiating and designing of the strategic change). Moreover, an effort of enhancing implementation success needs to be cognizant of causes of breakdowns in order to design and plan actions that lead implementation into success which cannot be achieved without proper initiation and designing. Besides, as major causes of breakdowns are mainly behavioral, management of major events, leadership and communication over well developed network among major actors cannot be ignored.

At the centre of these themes is a flux. Within the flux which finally leads to organisational change, there are forces that can affect the nature of interlink, the pattern of change, and eventually the final destination (i.e., actually implemented change). Figure 6.2 tries to depict the central flux forces by extracting them from figure 6.1.

Figure 6.2: Central interlocking forces that shape strategic organizational change implementation



Source: *Own sketch*

There is a triple helix among initiating, designing, and implementing whereby one offsets the effectiveness of the other. Therefore, implementation of strategic organizational change cannot be effective if something went wrong in any one of the two (i.e., initiating and designing). In other words, effectively implementing strategic organizational change requires proper execution of initiating and complete designing of the anticipated change. This requires leadership that regulates the offsetting impact of one on the other. As a mechanism, the change leader should enact actor networking and communication strategies. These concepts have connections to Balogun's (2001) and Kotter's (1995) explications about the role of change leaders. The cyclic nature is also an account already made by Oakland and Tanner (2007). However, the specific causes that make these interactions smooth (as emerged here) are not explicitly addressed in the extant literature.

Behind each of the three in the figure, there are conditions that enhance or impede smooth interlock among them. Change manager's role is to ensure nothing among these conditions is positioned in such a way that it can disturb the desired interlock among initiating, designing and implementing. The way a change leader handles them can affect the interlock among the three stages either positively or negatively. The total impact of the interaction among the three is what determines the nature and scope of change that results from an initiative as testified by the data gathered from bank A.

Once an organizational change starts to unfold being shaped by those attributes of prevailing organizational condition as presented in a wider spectrum in figure 6.1, and as a result of the interlock among the three in the triple helix depicted by figure 6.2, the organization is set into a continuous flux. The three are interwoven through an infusion of factors (concepts represented by codes and categories) to cause some kind of implemented change; once a change starts to unfold it then starts to serve as a gear that rotates the other two components (initiation and design).

As learnt from the first phase BPR implementation in bank A, the changes that were actually implemented gave rise to the second initiative (which served as the major unit of analysis in this study). Then there is designing. This cyclic interaction among the three continues as far as there is some kind of change even at any scope. Practically, this is what has been happening and is happening at bank A right now. It is expected to continue this way. Therefore, the context within which implementation of strategic organizational change should be framed (modeled) is proposed to be in a complex ever changing interaction with initiating and designing together with corresponding factors' dynamism and inbuilt flexibility that ensures the emergence of a changing organization. The lubricant that facilitates smooth move and prevents the entire change from being stuck is communication.

Figure 6.3 tries to portray the entire organizational context being affected by the flux that results from the infused impact of the triple helix of implementing strategic organizational change. As the issue of concern here is implementation of strategic organizational change, the external environment plays significant role into an organization's context. In bank A too, (1) owners (i.e., the government) played key role in initiating the change, and (2) global trends and management innovations influenced the choice of organizational design change (when BPR was chosen to be applied as a tool). Obviously, a change in an organization results in some output to the external environment. Final proposition of an implementation model for strategic organizational change is made based on cross-case analyses results. More discussions that are enfolding the extant literature are made after the cross-case analyses results are presented.



Figure 6.3: Infused Triple Helix of Strategic Organizational Change Implementation

Source: *Own Sketch*

6.4. Strategic Organizational Change Implementation in Bank B

Based on data gathered from bank B, strategic organizational change implementation has connections to several themes. These themes are related to behavioral and technical aspects of change. In the behavioral side, nature of change triggering forces, level of top management commitment, and strength of change deterrent reasons emerged with important impacts on implementation effectiveness of strategic organizational change in bank B. Moreover, as it is also common in such levels of change initiatives; technical aspects of initiating, designing and implementing change also emerged with important contribution towards implementation success.

In this section, more latent themes that emerged from bank B's data are discussed. In the next sections, implications of these concepts for a successful strategic change implementation as per the reality in bank B are dealt with.

6.4.1. Strength of Triggers of Change

In a planned organizational change, the initiative usually has triggering causes. As emerged from bank B's data, nature of these triggers determines the acceptance of the idea of initiating the change on the first place and the degree of top management commitment once the change is initiated. As indicated in the figure, nonprofit motive, prevalence of competitive pressure in the market and nature of the customer are infused to shape this theme. As discussed in the previous chapter, these ideas are related to the fact that bank B is a private bank. This affects power structure of the bank and hence bank's commitment towards implementing strategic organizational change.

As emerged from bank B's data, if major stock holders who have strong nonprofit motive are actively interfering in the bank's management, the likelihood that the bank's top management will be committed towards successfully implementing the change would be lower than the condition when there is no such interference. The other condition which should be taken into consideration is the strength of market competition in terms of threatening bank's profitability. As explained in the previous chapter, profitability and market competitiveness in this context are somehow different from what is normally known in the field of management. It is very difficult to imagine that an investor could be interested more in gaining control over bank's management than showing concern on profitability. Therefore, as successful implementation of strategic organizational change normally gives sense when the organizational condition is favorable with respect to nonprofit motives and market competitiveness. Achievement of this can benefit the bank and ultimately its stockholders. Implementation in circumstances such as bank B's demand assessing the extent to which business oriented environment is fostered to serve as a strong change trigger.

This idea of assessing business orientation emerges from the fact that major shareholders in private banks in Ethiopia such as bank B might be tempted to serve their hidden personal interests under the shadow of banking business. Therefore, before initiating a change in private banks, the environment has to be examined carefully to make sure that the interests of all shareholders are related to the banking business. This requires taking some actions such as those that are discussed in the upcoming sub-sections.

6.4.1.1. Mitigating Challenges from Nonprofit Motives

Initiating strategic organizational change in the existence of significant nonprofit motive among major shareholders can hinder successful implementation. Therefore, it is logical to check the level of such motives through the following ways:

- Scrutinizing composition of owners with an intention to have an insight about the possibility of dominance as it may serve as a source of power to control the bank's direction and hence realize nonprofit motives at the expense of the bank's performance.

- Evaluating the power of the board of directors with respect to passing decisions right away with no need to have consultations with major shareholders.
- Assessing the power of top management with respect to making big decisions within the agreed upon framework of bank directions or strategies with no need to get blessings from formal members of board of directors or from major shareholders.

6.4.1.2. Stimulating the Bank to Envision a Future that Stretches Beyond the National Boundary

This helps overcome the challenges that are connected to lack of competitive pressure as the domestic banking industry is not saturated yet. If shareholders are motivated to have aspirations of becoming a globally competent bank in real senses, they would not focus on the dormancy of the domestic market. The purpose is to create a feeling of competitive pressure which possibly triggers the organization towards change. This will be achieved through the following measures:

- Targeting the bank's attention towards the global market in order to help shareholders come out of their comfort zone in the dormant domestic banking sector. This makes everyone concerned about how the bank operates, how it should be operating in the future, and what remedial actions should be taken to bridge the gap between the actual performance and the envisioned one.
- Ensuring internally driven change initiatives. The ultimate purpose of the previous measures is to achieve this. One of the major causes of failure in implementing the initiative in bank B was the fact that the change was

initially triggered by the government (in a form of technology use) and augmented by bottom-up-driven strategic organizational change; none of which represented the interest of the people at the top. To ensure that the change is a truly internally driven initiative, owners and top management should be triggered by some factors that necessitate change. Provided that the above conditions are created, the need for competitiveness and performance efficiency could trigger an initiative for a strategic change.

6.4.1.3. Customer Satisfaction

Satisfying customers can also serve as a triggering force towards change. In an environment where market players are very few compared to the size of the market, competition obviously is simple. However, even a slight effort towards satisfying customers irrespective of whether or not competition is strong could force the organization to sincerely consider the need for organizational change. Therefore, focus on customer needs will force the bank to alter the way it does business with the customer. This leads to an authentic initiative for strategic organizational change.

6.4.2. Managing Change Deterrents

The discussions (during in-depth interviews) in bank B were engulfed by failure stories. The practical causes of these failures were discussed in the previous chapter. Here, more latent causes that underpin behind these change breakdowns are discussed being labeled as change deterrents.

6.4.2.1. Managing Impacts of Self-Interest and Office Politics

The prevalence of nonprofit motive among major shareholders and weak competitive pressure in the market can disrupt successful implementation of strategic organizational change. Combined, these forces will lead to conflict of interest and office politics (backed by power). Therefore, the management of these forces helps to reverse the conditions from change deterring into change fostering. The most important mechanism is working towards making the supreme power in the organization a change sponsor. This converges with the idea of Mento *et al.* (2002).

6.4.2.2. Bringing Supreme Powers Aboard

This theme has links with the prevalence of change triggering conditions (in the minds of stockholders). If the interest of shareholders can be generally related to investment returns from bank's successful operations, they will demand the management to ensure this. Bank's top management will be committed towards implementing successful strategic organizational change if it is found critical in terms of fulfilling shareholder interest. In the absence of such condition, top management will give more attention to what these owners (i.e., important sources of power) demand them to do.

Power use plays a determinant role in such circumstances. How those with possession of supreme power in the bank (more likely those with the biggest share) use their power maters where top management focuses on. Therefore, to gain commitment of the bank and its top management during implementation of strategic organizational change, those with supreme power should be convinced to come aboard.

6.4.3. Top Management Commitment

The use of power if shaped this way curbs top management's passive resistance into commitment. Proper use of power also prevents office politics and self-interest from deterring change implementation. Commitment of top management towards change can change the level of implementation success. Top management can give direction and leadership to a change that is initiated and accepted by the bank's shareholders and hence by top management. This condition marks organizational readiness to enter more technical aspects and actions of implementing strategic organizational change as detailed in the next sub-sections.

6.4.4. Initiating

In bank B, technical efforts were started to be exerted when the intention to redesign the bank's business processes was initiated bottom-up. The initiating experts had a burden of persuading those with who have power (in addition to persuading other organizational members). They were consciously doing it even by taking care of the potential negative impact of naming the initiative on the receptivity of the bank community. Despite their effort, they realized latter that the bank's top management was not as committed as they expected.

It emerges logical, therefore, to assess the readiness of the bank towards committing its resources and top management to the initiated change before entering the next level of designing and implementing the change. At the initiating stage, the foundation for a successful implementation of strategic organizational change can be laid through clearing the ground for getting the supreme power aboard. Consequently, the act of initiating a strategic organizational change could get greater receptivity from the organizational community.

6.4.5. Designing

Designing should precede the implementation of a strategic organizational change. For the change to be assessed for implementation success, it is obvious that what is designed should be compared with what is implemented. Therefore, it is clear to oversee the logical interdependence between designing and implementing a strategic organizational change. Moreover design quality has impact on implementation success.

In the context of bank B, the design of the anticipated change was the first technical action taken towards implementing the initiated change. The degree of management commitment was emerged with its real figure there. The simplest approach to implement a business process redesigning is to order every organizational unit to study its own business processes and present the output to a centrally established group. This was not perceived effective by participants as every organizational unit normally has no requisite expertise to carry out the task of designing.

As a means of increasing implementation effectiveness, designing the anticipated change is sought to be complete in terms of specifying the change scope and content and the process of enacting the new routines in line with the who, where and how of doing business. All these require expert buy-in to the process of designing. This is where the bank's top management commitment in deciding on resources and facilities that ensure the participation of experts and all concerned parties in the design becomes important. When implementation is preceded by such kind of designing, it will become more successful than when it is not.

6.4.6. Implementing Mechanisms

The implementation of the change initiated in bank B was not perceived as successful by most of the participants. This was also confirmed by a team which was established to evaluate implementation success. It emerged that lack of success is caused by poor top management commitment. As the change was declared to be discretionally designed and implemented by each old functional department and only later did the management try to adjust organizational structure and deploy personnel thereof, organizational members were not impressed by the proposed strategic organizational change. This reduced their commitment to implement the initiated change.

The other reason observed was absence of a reinforcement mechanism to prevent organizational members from rejecting the new process and maintaining the old process (status quo). Such reinforcements could be more effective and objective if backed by implementation support systems (technologies). Besides, deployment of such systems will irreversibly replace the old with new organizational routines. Details on implementation mechanisms that are emerged from bank B's data are presented in the upcoming sub-sections.

6.4.6.1. Systems that Ensure Implementation of Organizational Change

These systems should be designed and put in place in a way they prevent deviant behavior from organizational actors and ultimately ensure implementation of the anticipated change. The issue of ensuring successful implementation of change has two major phases. The first one is committing everyone for the change. This could be achieved as a result of progressive actions that are described in the previous sections. The second one is the use of regression preventive systems. Strategic organizational change should be implemented in an irreversible way through the support of such systems. The achievement of this requires doing the following:

6.4.6.2. Implementation Specifications

These are specific actions that are required to be undertaken to actually implement the anticipated change. To make the change irreversible, these specifications should be made integral to the organizational system. Organizational policies, directives, bylaws, procedures, manuals, and performance standards that are approved by the appropriate authority and endorsed at relevant organizational unit levels are typical examples of implementation specifications. Out of these specifications, the job designs which engender job descriptions and specifications could also be derived.

6.4.6.3. Performance Measurement and Evaluation

The other important reinforcement mechanism to implement the anticipated change is to measure and evaluate performance as per specifications. This makes implementation specifications at the center of implementers' attention. This could have prevented the failure in bank B which was witnessed in a form of abandoning performance standards and not referring back to them.

6.4.6.4. Reward and Benefits System

The next logical component of the organizational system in this regard is to align benefits and rewards to desired performances based on input from performance measurement and evaluation as presented above.

6.4.6.5. ICT Supported Systems

Implementation will be cumbersome if not unrealistic in the absence of carefully designed information and communication systems. In bank B's departments other than retail banking operations which is supported by the newly installed core banking system, implementation was totally out of control. There is no mechanism either to support or to control implementers. That's how the absence of ICT supported systems makes implementation very difficult and time taking to have a record of performance measures. Besides, it is costly and non-value adding to exert much effort and spend much time in keeping the record of performance which could otherwise be automatically generated as performers do their tasks through the support of ICT.

6.5. Interlink among Major Themes from Bank B's Data

Explanations behind each of these themes are shaped by the codes and categories discussed in the previous chapter. The analyses of interrelations among major codes and categories were supported by ATLAS.ti's network manager. A diagrammatic representation is annexed to this report (see annex 13). As depicted by figure 6.4, implementation of strategic organizational change is interlocked with other themes. Each them can be described in terms of its attributes which were discussed as major codes and categories that emerged from bank B's data.

Figure 6.4: Relations among emergent themes from bank B's data



Source: Own *Sketch*

Apart from its technical link with designing, implementation is intermingled with change deterrents at the centre. In addition, the initiating, designing and implementing natural process in planned change is disrupted by deterrents. The change is initiated bottom-up as discussed in Chapter Four. Then it had to get top management approval. The impact of ownership type and intensity of market competition were also emerged as important themes in the context of bank B.

The strongest force which plays vital role in smoothing out change deterrents and facilitating interaction among major actors who, if convinced to collaborate can bring about strategic organizational change is possession and use of power. The important source of power is company ownership in bank B's context. Therefore, a strong link with major shareholders reflects possession of power. The contribution of power is also addressed by Kotter (1995) and Balogun (2001). Sufficiency of power that is bestowed to actors with responsibility of leading the change is recognized by these authors. However, political motives, as identified through the analyses of bank B's data, have grounds that are unexpectedly supported by top management and even owners of the bank. This is because of the unique context of banking sector in Ethiopia. Context-related contributions of the present research are discussed in more details the next two chapters.

If this power is conditioned towards successful implementation, management resistance can be turned into commitment. Through top management commitment, the human side of the organization will be mobilized towards better efforts to implement change. After shaping the condition in a way that gears behavior towards commitment, technical aspects of the change are also needed. These mainly include the specification of actions to be taken and reinforcement mechanisms tailored towards this end.

6.6. Proposed Implementation Model based on Bank B's Data

As discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, power use, change deterring factors, and initiating and designing techniques were emerged to have impact on implementation success of strategic organizational change in the context of bank B. The interlock among these major themes is shaped by infused interactions amongst specific attributes of each theme as discussed so far and indicated in figure 6.5.

The direction towards which organizational power is applied determines how the initiated strategic organizational change proceeds towards implementation. If applied in the opposite direction for reasons explained above, power may overwhelm change initiators and stop the effort towards implementation. If the opposite is true as depicted in the figure, it supports and accelerates what change initiators' act towards implementing the change. An initial effort exerted to convince supreme power of the bank about the need for change sets the implementation gear on motion and changes the entire organizational context which is represented by the outermost moving arrow encircling everything else in figure 6.5.

In addition to power, the analysis of need for organizational change which is usually associated with competitive position in the market is recorded in the literature. For example Kotter's (1995) first step of establishing a sense of urgency is related to this notion of competitiveness. Balogun's (2001) first step is also about analyzing competitive position. However, the need for change, in the context of bank B, has latent meanings which require context sensitive interpretations. The context requires dealing with top management and intervening owners who have motives to be served prior to serving organizational objectives. The question is how can a change be implemented successfully while these parties are not committed or even resistant? This is what makes the context unique. Detail comparative discussions in line with the literature are given in the next two chapters.

Figure 6.5: Proposed Strategic Organizational Change Implementation Model Based on Bank B's Data



Source: *Own Sketch*

The analogy of the gear simplifies the whole bulk of ideas that underlie behind the dynamics of strategic organizational change phenomenon. The proposition that can be induced about change implementation to be used as an input for the recommended model can easily be made in connection with this analogy. As it can be seen in the figure; source of initiation and organization power are major constructs that explain successful implementation of strategic organizational change in the context of private commercial banks in Ethiopia.

6.7. Chapter Summary

In this chapter, themes that emerged from within case analyses of each bank's data are discussed. In addition to the description of themes, relationships among them were also explained. On the basis of these explanations of relationships among major themes, implementation models are proposed for the contexts of each bank. As the final proposition of an implementation model for strategic organizational change is to be made based on the result of cross-case analyses of data, the proposed models have no detailed explanations. The next chapter deals with cross-case analyses and discusses final themes and their relationships in a way that lays foundation of theoretical propositions. Based on these propositions, the implementation model for strategic organizational change that takes the context of commercial banks in Ethiopia is proposed.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS

7.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the findings from the two case studies are juxtaposed and compared. The purpose is to explain additional insights in a way which is discussed by Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2003) that could otherwise have been overlooked through a single case study. For simplicity purpose, the last sets of concepts that emerged from each case are put side by side as a starting point for the comparative discussion. The next part deals with the final set of constructs and factors together with propositions which served as the input for the proposed implementation model for strategic organizational change.

7.2. Comparison of the final concepts extracted from the two cases' data

Cross-case comparison was started by looking at the final set of extracted items. As presented in Chapter Five, through the prolonged iterative process, categories presented in the following table were extracted from each case to be retained for further analyses and discussions.

Table 7.1: Comparative presentation of emergent categories from bank A's and bank B's data

No.	From Bank A	From Bank B
1	Change model-context match	Aligning benefits to changed behavior
2	Communication	Bottom up
3	Conflict of self interest	Conflict of interest
4	Deviant implementation	Convincing
5	Implementation specifications	Customer needs
6	Implementation support system	Failure story
7	Office politics	Implementation specifications
8	Perception management	Lack of common interest
9	Personnel selection	Lack of competitive pressure
10	Separation of designers and implementers	Naming the initiative
11	Skepticism	National context

12	Team relations	Non Profit motive
13	Transparency	Office politics
14	Understanding Change Model	Owner of initiatives
15	Timing	Power intervention
16		Resistant management
17		Trigger for change
18		Type of ownership
19		Top management commitment

Source: *Own compilation*

The above table juxtaposes (Eisenhardt, 1989) the final list of categories which were retained for further analyses as explained in Chapter Five. Literally, there are only three categories that are common to each list *(see shaded cells)*. However, a closer exploration on the similarities and differences resulted in new insights that are discussed in this chapter.

7.2.1. Similarities

Amongst the final list of items extracted from each case as presented in Table 7.1, the search for similarities results in three identical categories (see shaded cells). There are also concepts that are similar but labeled differently. This happened because the two data sets were analyzed separately in different times. Moreover, during the analysis, the researcher was open to let any concept to emerge from the data instead of forcing the data to fit to a prior list of codes as detailed in Chapter Three. Looking for similarities amongst categories with different labels resulted in additional insights as presented in Table 7.2.

Table 7.2: Links between similar items from bank A's and bank B's data

No	Bank A Item	Corresponding Item from Bank B
1	Understanding change model	-
2	Personnel selection	-
3	Separation of designers and implementers	Bottom up
4	Conflict of self interest	Conflict of interest
5	Perception management	Convincing, Naming the initiative
6	Communication	Convincing
7	Skepticism	Owners of initiatives

8	Office politics	Office politics, Power intervention
9	Deviant implementation	Failure story
10	Team relations	-
11	Implementation specifications	Implementation specifications
12	Change model-context match	Naming the initiative
13	Implementation support system	Aligning benefits with changed behavior,
14	Transparency	-

Source: *Own compilation*

As a result of this closer look, categories that represent ideas about (1) those who participate in initiating change in banks (i.e., employee engagement), (2) about communication with slightly different intentions (such as convincing, perception management), (3) about skepticism among different groups (both top-down and bottom-up directed), (4) about power and politics, (5) about implementation support and failure related issues, and (6) about the use of a specific change model are found common.

Comparative analyses on themes that were emerged from the two cases also results in additional insights. As presented in table 7.3, there were themes that are also common across both cases.

Table 7.3: Comparison of themes emerged from the two cases

No.	Themes from bank A	Themes from bank B
1	Major events and shocks	Strength of trigger of change
2	Causes of breakdowns: - Skepticism - Lack of trust	Change deterrents: - Self-interest - Politics
3	Politics and power use	Supreme power aboard
4	Leadership, networking and communication	Top management commitment
5	Change techniques: - Model validation and contextualization - Initiating, designing and implementing	Initiating
6	Deviance	Designing and implementing techniques

Source: *Own compilation*

Juxtaposing the results from the two cases, it can be seen that themes that are related to (1) causes that lead the initiated change not to deliver as expected (though they are slightly different across-cases), (2) power uses during change initiation and associated politics, and (3) leadership, networking and top management commitment are common across-cases. These themes are related to the behavioral aspects of change.

The two cases have designing and implementing related themes in common. However, initiations of the changes were quite different—one is externally imposed and introduced top-down (bank A) while the other is internally initiated and bottom-up-driven by taking advantage of an external inducement to introduce technology (bank B). Because of these differences in initiation, the environments under which strategic organizational change was implemented in each case were also different demanding different approaches to implementation. As a result, initiation, (though it has technical aspects such as model selection (in bank A) and naming the initiative (in bank B) which requires expert buy-in), is more of a behavioral aspect of change implementation.

Moreover, as it is depicted in Table 7.3, management of major events and resultant shocks and the strength of change triggering forces are not common across the two banks. Change trigger related theme that emerged from bank B is not expected to be common to the other case (a government owned bank) as it is peculiar to private sector banks in most of its features. However, a closer look into more latent concepts behind the differences resulted in new insights as detailed in the upcoming section.

7.2.2. Differences

As presented in Table 7.2, in addition to the four items from bank A that do not match with those form bank B, (i.e, understanding the change model, personnel selection, team relations, and transparency), the following table gives others from bank B that do not match with those of bank A.

Table 7.4: Items form bank B that are not linked to those from bank A

No.	Orphan Items from Bank B	Corresponding Category
1	None profit motive	Company Ownership
2	Type of ownership	Company Ownership
3	Lack of competitive pressure	Context
4	Trigger for change	Source of initiative, Context
5	Customer needs	Context
6	Lack of common interest	Company Ownership
7	National context	Context
8	Top management commitment	Commitment

Source: *Own extractions*

Going back to Table 7.1, these orphan items of bank B do not match with those in bank A either literally or when examined from their latent meanings. To clarify the reasons behind these disjunctions, their corresponding categories which were used to collate similar codes together during the first cycle coding are indicated in Table 7.4 above.

7.2.3. Why differences?

Here, the question to be addressed is why these items do not have corresponding items from the other case? Items that do not have matches in the other case are referred to as orphans *(see Table 7.2 and Table 7.4)*.

From bank A, understanding the change model, personnel selection, team relations, and transparency were found to be orphans. With respect to understanding the change model, the reason for the difference was not because this concept is not valid to the context of bank B. While bank A openly declared to use BPR, bank B chose not to use the name and instead to refer to the initiative as process redesigning. Because of this, the issue of using a model was nonexistent in bank B and hence the category which emerged from bank A found orphan.

In bank B, the change was initiated for the first time. Perhaps, the next move in this bank too will be to restart the initiative with a better understanding of the change as this first attempt is a failed experience. The approach bank B is handling its initiative is very much similar to bank A's failed initiative. Nevertheless, understanding the change model is still valid for bank B's context despite the attention it was given.

As the two banks approached their designing task differently, the issue of team relations did not appear common to both. Besides, in the case of bank B, designing teams had been established in all departments. That means there was equal treatment for team members. Each handled their task in the same way without discriminatory treatments by top management. As a result, there was no need for team interaction and there was no significant team related event to capture the attention of study participants from bank B.

In bank A, however, teams played significant role. Besides, there was a division as core process teams and support process teams. Members of the second group perceived the way management treated the teams as discriminatory. The issue was so hot even during the interview time. This affects the relation across teams; and ultimately negatively affects team performance. In the worst case, there was a support process team that stopped its operation before the completion of the process design document.

This indicates how team relation affects implementation of the change. The solution is to try to gauge the perception of participant parties among each other and make every possible effort to make the interaction smooth and healthy. Even if this theme did not emerge vividly in bank B, it is still valid for any change initiative. More important than not, team relations (interactions) was retained to serve as an input for the developed model.

Personnel selection and transparency are also very important categories in bank A's context but not emerged from bank B. This again does not indicate that these issues are not relevant for change implementation; rather, it shows the difference in the depth of implementing the initiated strategic organizational changes in the banks.

There were also orphans in bank B. As presented in the third column of the above table (table 7.4), the orphan items from bank B were categorized into ownership, context and commitment. These three categories made it easier to understand the reason behind the emergence of these orphans.

Having no correspondence between ownership related items is expected as the two cases have different type of ownership. The other area of difference is context. Context is a category emerged from bank B's data. It has four components namely (1) trigger for change, (2) lack of competitive pressure, (3) national context, and (4) no compelling reason for change.

Except national context, the rest three cannot be common for the two cases. These variations are expected across private and government-owned banks. The reason is again related to ownership structure. Therefore, these differences are also normal. The implication is the reason behind initiating a change in private banks is different from that in government banks.

As clearly emerged from the data, government banks initiate changes following government's direction to do so. Despite the effectiveness question, it is not seen if government bodies do not care for the profitability of the bank as far as their blotted out interests are served. In contrary, there are some private owners who are interested in advancing their personal interest even compromising the bank's profitability. Therefore the soundness of the reasons for initiating a change must be compelling to all shareholders including those with covert interest. Besides, the motivation to serve customer needs will be affected depending on the degree of subordination of individual owner's personal interest to organizational interest.

But why is there a difference in the level of significance of the concept that is labeled as national context? The reason might go to the fact that the market competition is not fair across government and private banks. The national environment is more favorable to government owned banks due to government's directives. Therefore, the impact of national context is not equally important to both banks. The expected outcome will be forcing private banks to come out of their comfort zone and search for new ways of winning customers. This has positive impact on implementation of change as owners and other stakeholders will be more committed.

The third category of different concepts is commitment. Lack of compelling reason and top management's level of commitment are mentioned here. The reason for the difference with respect to no compelling reason is already dealt with. What's left is top management's commitment. In both cases, top management commitment was a problem. The difference lies on the extent of power that confronted less committed management members. In the case of bank B, owners were not interested in the change; therefore, no one cared whether a management member is committed for the change or not. The very reason for this was the source of the initiative. In bank A on the other hand, the change was initiated top-down. Therefore, the strength of top management resistance obviously differs depending on whether the initiative came top-down or bottom-up. This contributed for the difference in the pervasiveness of the proposition made about source of initiative and hence commitment.

7.3. Cross-Case Themes Taken Forward

As a result of cross-case comparisons of major categories and themes in the previous sections, issues that stand valid taking the contextual differences across the two cases into account are presented hereunder.

Table 7.5: Cross-case themes that emerged from cross-case analyses of the two banks

No.	Common Codes/Categories	Corresponding Common Themes
1	Nonprofit motive Market competitive pressure Customer	Strength of change triggering forces
2	Employee selection Initiation	Major events and shocks

3	- Employee involvement - Persuasive communication - Perception management	Ownership of initiative
4	- Skepticism, lack of trust - Self-interest, politics	Causes of Breakdowns/Deterrents
5	--	Power use and politics/Supreme power aboard
6	--	Leadership, actor networking and communication

7	- Model validation and contextualization and naming
	- Designing and implementing
	  - Specifications
	  - Completeness
		Technical aspects of change

8	- Implementation support system
	  - Deviance tracking
	  - Action/reflection
	- Top management commitment
		Deviance

Source: *Own compilation*

As summarized in the above table, major themes *(see the third column)* which are identified as a result of the cross-case analysis are defined. These themes (except the fifth and sixth) also have sub themes as indicated in the second column. It was attempted to make this final set of themes comprehensive to capture important issues that have authentic meanings across-cases. This was done so by going one step back to the categories that were presented in Chapter Five and selecting those which have common meanings across-cases. A brief description of the major ideas represented by each theme is given in the upcoming sub-sections.

7.3.1. Strength of Change Triggering Forces

Planned changes are usually triggered by some forces (Oakland & Tanner, 2007). However, in the case of Ethiopian commercial banking sector, the strength by which these forces are perceived plays an important role in triggering the change. Because of these contextual differences, the commonly known reasons for change (e.g. those identified by Oakland & Tanner, 2007) were found to be relatively weak to trigger a strong need for change. This indicates that if commercial banks are operating in a condition where important stakeholders do not feel (i.e., perceive) a critical need for a strategic organizational change, change triggering factors do not hold true.

Weak market competitive pressure, which does not make profitability a challenge, plays an important role behind this in the case of private banks. In the context of government banks, agency problem contributes for this. Moreover, especially in private banks nonprofit motive makes it difficult to persuade major organizational actors (e.g. major stockholders, top management) about the need for a strategic organizational change. Though the degree may be different, in the context of government owned commercial bank too, making the top management a sponsor to an initiated strategic organizational change was found being very difficult. The question is how a strategic organizational change can be successfully implemented taking the strength of change triggering forces into account.

Therefore, for the context of Ethiopian commercial banking, persuading those who have significant impact on the success of strategic organizational change or assessing if there is sufficient support for strategic organizational change emerged a critical component of addressing the issue of implementation success. It appears that the degree to which a need for a strategic organizational change is perceived by major organizational actors who, if convinced, could have the potential of initiating and/or executing strategic organizational change determines the strength of triggers for change.

The purpose of assessing strength of triggers for change in a context of a specific bank is to gain an insight into the likelihood of getting sufficient buy-in from top management of banks and other important powers (especially share holders in the case of private banks and relevant government officials in the case of government owned banks). If perceived necessity for initiating a strategic organizational change in a bank is low, successful implementation of change requires inducing additional efforts to share the change vision (as Kotter, 1995 recommended) with these parties. The difference here is the fact that the targets of these additional efforts are top management groups and major stockholders which is not the case in other contexts where businesses have to win market competition to be profitable.

In this context, customers and their growing needs are considered as mechanisms of moderating the situations which reduce strength of perceived need for strategic organizational change. Even though market competitive pressure is weak and there is high nonprofit motive among major stockholders, focus on local and global customers and on volume of profit earned by other players in the domestic market can be a justification for private banks while government's reform efforts are already serving as triggering forces to introduce a strategic change. Besides, focusing the attention of Ethiopia's commercial banks on international banking practices as a mechanism of enhancing each bank's readiness for competing with international banks following a possible deregulation of the sector (provided that the country is under WTO accession) can strengthen perceived trigger for change.

7.3.2. Managing Major Events and Resultant Shocks

During strategic organizational change, major events that result in shock to the status quo can affect implementation. There is a possibility for these events to become shocks if they are negatively perceived by key organizational stakeholders. Therefore, these events need to be considered in advance and planned carefully in order to minimize or avoid their negative impact on successful implementation of strategic organizational change.

These themes mainly emerged from analysis of bank A's data. However, they are taken forward because even though bank B's participants did not reveal challenges emanating from such events, their importance is naturally pervasive. Therefore, they are assumed to make sense across both banks.

As detailed in the previous two chapters, especially initiation of the change and selection of personnel were threatening to the status quo in bank A and hence captured the attention of most management members and employees (at least as described by study participants). These shock events lead to behaviors that are most probably not supportive to the initiated change. Resistance to the initiated change was witnessed in bank A for example.

The event of initiating the strategic organizational change faced challenges because of the fact that the initiated changes were not perceived positively by organizational members including top management. The immediate reason for this perception was the absence of feeling of ownership to the initiated change. In the case of bank A, top management was even skeptic about the purpose of the change. This condition made initiation a source of speculations between those who feel no sense of ownership to the initiative and those who act as change agents. The same was true in bank B too. As the change was initiated bottom-up, the management group did not appear to have ownership to the initiated change.

Employee selection and assignment to the newly created job positions was emerged as the other major event that resulted in shocks. Though it was not as important for bank B's participants as it was for those of bank A, employee selection and assignment to newly created job positions following a strategic organizational change is assumed to be a common practice. With this assumption, employee selection is also considered as one of the major events that demand change leader's attention to create conducive environment for implementation.

Taking these two examples of major events that can provoke undesirable behavior in the side of change recipients, it is imperative to see what could be the possible mechanism of managing such events so that they could not deter implementation of strategic organizational change. Prior identification of such events and corresponding preventive mechanisms (i.e., management mechanisms) is important.

Therefore, devising a strategy of preventing shocks should be noted as an issue which is sensitive to each organization's context. Communication, actor networking and leadership were emerged as other big themes and mechanisms that can reduce the impact of unfavorable behavioral reactions. This issue builds on Balogun's (2001) recommendation of identifying causes of barriers to change as a mechanism of enhancing implementation success.

Such reactions usually start with active or passive resistance to what change agents demand from those who feel they do not have ownership to the initiated change. The ideal strategy of initiating should therefore target getting everyone feel involved in the process, making clear the consequences of the initiative, and showing how the initiative does not target anyone's interest. This theme brought the notion of resistant manager into the literature adding to what Burnes (2015) explain about source of change resistance.

7.3.3. Ownership of Initiative

Initiating as one of the major events during strategic organizational change turns to be a shock to the status quo if not properly managed. The most important component of this theme that serves as an important factor which affects implementation of strategic organizational change is the feeling organizational members have about the owner (or source) of the initiative. Ownership of the initiative matters more especially when there is no trust between the perceived owners and non-owners of the initiative. In such situations, non-owners suspect owners of using the initiation as means of attacking non-owners' interests. This is a sufficient ground for a fierce resistance to the initiated change to engulf the organization.

What should the change agent do to succeed in implementing the strategic organizational change then? Employee involvement, persuasive communication and perception management were emerged as sub-themes as a result of cross-case analyses. If effective, involving the majority of employees in different ways during the change initiative helps each employee to understand the purpose of the initiative and possible consequences thereof. Prior information about the need for the initiative and persuasion of major organizational actors also helps to avoid shock following initiating as an event. Perception is an individual behavioral process which does not necessarily need fact-based justification. However, exposing the individual to various attributes of the initiated change will gradually shape and ultimately change the perception including that which is relates to ownership of the initiative.

Mento *et al.* (2002) addressed the need to get sufficient buy-ins from different stakeholders. These authors recommend creating and cultivating sponsors for the change, making target audiences recipients of change, through strategically and continuously communicating the change as mechanisms of overcoming these problems. This is also a major step in Kotter's (1995, 2007) model. However, they did not explain the needs to do these by substantiating the reasons which are discussed here. This indicates how a closely examined context reveals new insights.

7.3.4. Causes of Change Breakdowns/Deterrents

Level of effectiveness of strategic organizational change implementation varies depending on how completely the anticipated components of the change were turned into action or the extent to which outcomes of the stipulated change has been achieved. If anticipated changes happen to serve much less than a newly emerged idea being implemented (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011), specific causes of such failure (that are referred to as causes of change breakdown or deterrents of change) need to be scrutinized.

The importance of indentifying barriers (Balogun, 2001) or change breakdowns (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011) are valid in the case of commercial banking sector in Ethiopia. However, the causes of breakdown are different from what Van de Ven and Sun (2011) identified. In the studied context, in addition to lack of trust and skepticism (as discussed in the previous sub-section), office politics and self-interest were major sources of change breakdown in both cases. These causes are new reasons which can be added to the body of knowledge in organizational change implementation.

7.3.5. Supreme Power Aboard

Power use and politics are conceptually inseparable as there is no office politics without the use of power. In this case too, it is better to note the two possible uses of power—one which is meant for organizational causes and the other which is for personal interests. The second type of use is a misuse of power. Office politics is sponsored by such type of misused power that intentionally manipulates the organization and serves personal or group interests mostly at the expense of organizational interest. This concept refers to office politics. In the two cases of the present study, it acted against the implementation of the initiated changes. What can the change agent do to remain effective in implementing strategic organizational change in the face of organizational circumstances that are under challenge by office politics and self-interests?

Bringing supreme power aboard! However, it is much challenging than said in the specific contexts of the present study. Top management group is among those with significant power possession in organizations. But, if top management is among those who resist the initiated change, how can implementation of strategic organizational change be successful by overcoming change deterrents? This is why the term supreme is used here. If those who are supreme powers in the context of the changing organization are not aboard, and if management is among the resistant group; implementing the change will be an unsuccessful trial.

More important than the efforts to bring about change related actions into practice, change agents' success in bringing supreme power aboard determines implementation effectiveness. If the support of those who have power is not satisfactory, any effort exerted before getting the supreme power aboard will turn to be a waste. This in turn indicates the importance of readiness which is discussed in later sections of this report.

In the literature (e.g. Mento *et al.*, 2002; Kotter, 1995; Balogun, 2001; Oakland & Tanner, 2007), empowering those who will guide (lead the change) is recorded in a straight forward sense. In the case of the present study, however, conditions that made empowerment relevant are linked to the specific contextual features of commercial banks in Ethiopia such as the existence of nonprofit motives, market competitive pressure, and supreme power's support.

7.3.6. Leadership: Actor Networking and Communication

These themes (as described in the previous chapter) are interlocked together. Backed with all conditions that are described in the previous sub-sections, leadership, actor networking and communication play decisive role in creating conducive environment to implement strategic organizational change. All the issues described in the previous sub-sections (i.e., sections 7.3.1 to 7.3.5) need to be integrated and geared towards the direction successful implementation of strategic organizational change requires them to be. This is where leadership plays. In the broader theme of leadership, actor networking and communication are explicit to emphasize their importance for change leadership.

Behind the explanations of the previous sub-sections, there are major actors playing some role. Leadership should influence the behavior of these actors so that they can contribute towards implementation. This, as emerged from the empirical data, can be achieved through building a strong network of actors. They can communicate and coordinate their efforts towards realizing a successful change through this network.

Building such networks can make the interaction among these actors smooth. This is a required condition that must prevail in a changing organization before the technical tasks of implementing a strategic organizational change can be enacted. Actions and interactions among actors are what can bring strategic organizational change into a reality. The network built by the change leader serves as an action-interaction chain.

As the action-interaction chain is assumed to play an important role to define the common interest and brig about commitment by overcoming the challenges of change deterrents, the leader should evaluate issues that are represented by emerged themes so far and examine their implications to the actions and interactions. The health of the action-interaction chain is dependent on the level of influence the leader puts on change deterrents.

Depending on the degree of involvement of teams or groups as major actors during the change initiative, the importance of the chain varies across-cases. To be specific, while action-interaction chain appeared more relevant to bank A (where there were several teams involved), the involvement of supreme power appeared rather more important than the chain in the context of bank B (where there were lesser team involvements).

Team intensive involvements in bank A made the actions to be far from the grass root and hence resulted in weaker perception of ownership to the initiated change. This made the issue of who did what so hot in bank A and it resulted in a need to make things through carefully designed networks of actors. On the other side, the level of commitment towards implementing the change in bank B has been highly dependent on the degree of support from those with real power. Possessors of the highest power in the bank's context, which are labeled as 'supreme powers', need to play leadership role to make the implementation of strategic organizational change effective. That is why major themes that emerged from bank B's data are collated around power.

7.3.7. Technical Aspects of Change

So far, the focus of the discussion was on the soft which is behavioral side of organizational change. Implementation of strategic organizational change also requires taking actions that are carefully designed and articulated. These actions bring actual changes to an organization. However, for these actions to be effective, all what were discussed previously are important requirements.

Technical aspects have groups of themes collated under them. In addition to initiating which is already described, model validation and contextualization (which includes naming), designing the anticipated strategic organizational change, determining implementation specifications and performance outcomes of change are in the first group of technical aspects of change. The more specific and complete these technical aspects the easier the implementation action.

The second group of technical aspects deals with post-implementation monitoring and evaluation activities. The intent is to propose a remedy for or accept as it emerged when implementation is different from the designed contents of strategic organizational change. The action or reflection concept (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011) is pervasive throughout these tasks of implementation.

7.3.7.1. Change Model Validation and Contextualization

In the context of planned approach to change, the use of a model is common. In the present study, the two cases were oriented by a change model (one was explicit in naming the initiative as BPR while the other did not prefer to name it this way as discussed before). The issue about what tool (which is referred to as change model) is fit to the context on hand needs validation before deciding to use a model (such as BPR in this case).

A second concern is to what extent does the change model fit to the specific organization's specific change needs. An attempt to address this issue could lead to discovery of a need to contextualize (modify) some features of the change model so that the mismatch between the model and the context will be ruled out. This second issue overlaps with the designing task. The practice, thought the specific reason differs, is also acknowledged by Balogun (2001) as choice of change design.

7.3.7.2. Designing and implementing

Designing the specific features of the organization which initiated strategic organizational change is the other technical task that has to be done before implementation. In connection with designing, completeness of the design and adequate specifications emerged as salient and important concepts as discussed so far.

Successful implementation of strategic organizational change needs to be guided by complete and specific design. In the absence of such design, it will be difficult to keep track of implementation and detect deviance on the basis of which to take corrective action or to modify design. Implementation needs to be monitored and evaluated based on what is specified in the design.

7.3.7.3. Implementation Deviance and Tracking

Deviance refers to the implementation of change related decisions or actions that deviate from the design. As the intention of the present study is to propose a model that serves as a guideline to implement strategic organizational change, monitoring deviant behavior based on complete and specific design is an important theme to focus on.

Implementation success requires putting in place deviance tracking system. In the absence of such system, change agents will be overwhelmed by too much detail that is needed to keep track of and to analyze. Therefore, implementation needs to be supported by a system which is referred to as implementation support system. This system, especially when supported by information and communication technology (ICT), makes deviance tracking an easy task and helps change agents to act or reflect.

7.4. Final Propositions

Cross-case themes presented in section 7.3 should be conceived appropriately in order to proceed to the discussion of the implementation model for strategic organizational change developed by the present study. To help this conceptualization easier, the interlock among the major themes and sub-themes described so far is portrayed diagrammatically *(see Figure 7.1)*.

Figure 7.1: Interlock among major cross-case themes



Source: *Own Sketch*

As depicted in the figure above, a strategic organizational change can be triggered by forces that may come from (1) market competitive pressure, (2) the government or from (3) customer needs. Or, in the case of an organization that is undertaking some sort of strategic change, feedback on implementation can also serve as a trigger for initiating change.

For the trigger to gain strong perceived importance, defining the need for change and making it a common interest for all relevant stakeholders through proper communication is required. This creates fertile ground for the start of an endeavor to implement a strategic organizational change. This is what a change leader does (see the centre of figure 7.1).

Successful execution of anticipated organizational change also needs detail (i.e., specific) and complete design on the bases of which to enact change related tasks and routines. Implementation also needs technology supported systems.

As a mechanism of ensuring successful interaction among actors who initiate, design and implement strategic organizational change; leadership that exploits on networking and communication is required. Leadership targets are not only ensuring successful implementation but also overcoming challenges from change deterrents. For this, circumstances often require bringing supreme powers on board. Finally, the implemented change needs to be tracked for possible deviations from designed specifications. Replacing the old status quo with new routines often becomes effective when the new routines are backed by automated systems. The application of such systems also supports performance tracking and results in easier control.

In the upcoming paragraphs, propositions that are made about what contributes towards successful implementation of strategic organizational change are presented. For ease of understanding, these propositions are organized with the help of a triple helix of initiating, designing and implementing (see the triangle in fig. 7.1); and linking them with power, leadership, networking and communication with respect to explaining the intricacies among the triple helix while protecting them from deterrents.

7.4.1. Initiating

Initiating, in this study, refers to the act of introducing (or declaring) an organization's plan to undertake a strategic organizational change. Before and after the actual task of initiating, there are issues that deserve the attention of change leaders in order to make the entire initiative successful. Therefore, initiating should be analyzed with respect to important issues before, during, and after the act of declaring the change as detailed in the upcoming sub-sections.

7.4.1.1. Pre-initiating Considerations

At this stage, foundation for smooth action-interaction chain is laid. It starts first by recognizing the need for change through examining internal and external triggers. This recognized need should then be converted into a persuasive message to different actors whose buy-in is required for the smooth execution of the initiative.

Besides, pre-initiating stage should also identify potential confrontations from different individuals or groups who could perceive the initiative from a perspective that threatens their interest which is protected by the status quo. Such perceptions, if not anticipated in advance and mitigated, will lay the foundation for deterrents. A proactive measure is preparing messages with an intention to address these perceptions and ensure sufficient buy-ins from potential actors.

The outcome of successfully initiating strategic organizational change should be ensuring sufficient buy-ins from major actors including (1) owners (or board of directors), (2) top management, (3) employees, and (4) change agents. This is where the leadership of change initiatives starts.

As indicated in Figure 7.1, (1) source of initiative, (2) involvement, (3) transparency, (4) selection and (5) naming of a model (if any) are attributes that emerged from data in connection with pre-initiating preparations. In addition, triggers are related to this theme. The change leader should examine the specific context of the organization in terms of these attributes and components on the basis of which to decide on pre-initiating aspects. That means, initiation should be conditioned to the specific context of the initiating bank. Strength of trigger, source of initiative, and name (label) of the initiative are discussed hereunder.

7.4.1.1.1. Justifying triggers' strength

Strength of triggers is one of the conditions that set pre-initiating context. While there are some who need to be convinced about the need for change for genuine concerns, there are also others with motives that make them either reluctant or resistant to the initiative. Pre-initiative preparations should anticipate possibilities of both types of parties and design the initiating message accordingly. Based on these assumptions, for this pre-initiating stage, the following can be proposed:

Proposition 1a: Initiating can be more effective if backed by strong perceived triggers that are sufficiently justified to persuade those with genuine concerns about the need for change.

This proposition has two important messages—(1) triggering forces must be justified and (2) justification works for those who have genuine concern. The first one converges with what Van de Ven and Sun (2011) discusses; while the second one is peculiar to the context and hence it is a new insight. By referring to genuinely concerned parties, the first proposition implies the existence of others who for some reason need pretexts to denounce the need for the change. An anticipation of such parties could lead to the following propositions:

Proposition 1b: For parties who have motives other than genuine organizational concerns, justifying what necessitates the change is less effective than designing an initiating message (strategy) which ensures supreme power's buy-in.

Better success can result from proactively ensuring the engagement of those with power instead of reacting to the behavior of those with private motives. This is a solution in such circumstances because it requires dealing with parties who posses power or who have affiliations to those with power.

In the specific cases of the present study, the issue of private and usually nonprofit motives appears more authentic in the context of private banks. In the case of the government bank, initiating lacked transparency at least as perceived by old management group who felt threatened by the initiative. Besides, lack of competitive pressure in the banking industry makes the task of justifying the need for change very difficult.

In general, assessing the condition under which change is initiated and tackling challenges of successfully implementing strategic organizational change require understanding the following:

- If there is a nonprofit motive that is strong to the extent it controls organizational power, it is not time to initiate change.
- If business performance related pressure that is triggering change is not significantly perceived because of shortsightedness (e.g., present profitability), formal initiation should be preceded by creating awareness and aligning the initiative with the pressure.
- If there is no competitive pressure to trigger the change, it is not time to initiate a change unless the span of competition is widened and owners or their representatives accepted organizational change as their agenda.
- If the reason for initiating the change is not aligned to the interest of any of the three aforementioned parties (i.e., owners, management and workers), implementing the change will suffer from lack of commitment.

The central idea behind the above explanations is how aligned the change initiative is to the interest of the owners, the management and the workforce of banks. The supremacy of competing self-interest detracts the level of commitment for the initiated change. Therefore, the strength of such interest should be examined using the above indicating conditions (measures). This leads to the next proposition:

Proposition 1c: Nonprofit motives of owners who serve their private interest under the umbrella of a commercial banking business lead to lesser support and commitment towards an initiated strategic organizational change.

The other factor that affects the degree of alignment of bank owners' interest to the performance of the bank is the existence of competitive pressure posed by competitor banks in the market. The absence of this pressure obviously tempts owners to focus on short term benefits (dividends) instead of strategic investments that may necessitate strategic change. Therefore, the following proposition is made:

Proposition 1d: The extent to which market competitiveness affects profitability determines the degree of acceptance of initiated strategic organizational changes.

The source of initiative has also impact on the effectiveness of initiation as described in the next sub-section. This idea affects sense of ownership to the initiated change.

7.4.1.1.2. Source (origin) of initiative

Source (origin) of initiative refers to the party who takes the action of initiating. As a result of this action, this party will be perceived by the other majority (usually referred to as change recipient) as originator or source of the initiative. This notion has implication for implementation success. More explicitly speaking, reactions to an initiated change usually emanate from non-initiators. Therefore, influencing organizational behavior during change initiatives requires understanding *initiator-reactor interface*.

If origin of initiating is distant from top management of the organization in which the change is initiated, formal introduction of the initiative should be preceded by convincing the top management about the importance of the change. This explanation is emerged from the experience of bottom-up driven change that was initiated by experts in one of the cases. In addition, there existed a distance in the case of the initiative that was externally driven by the government.

As a result, the following are explained:

- Externally driven initiative (e.g., by the government) cannot be successful unless there is an effort to make it a shared interest amongst owners, management and employees or there is an effective reinforcement mechanism.
- If the initiative is emerged bottom-up, it will not be successful unless the people at the top (board of directors and top management) accept it and make it their own agenda.

Therefore, the initiator should manage to make the initiative a common agenda to all. The issue is about creating a sense of ownership to the initiated change; and timing is a critical issue. It is better to take this effort before a clear *initiator-reactor* demarcation starts to be perceived. This perception affects the degree of sense of ownership to the initiated change.

Proposition 2a: The degree to which the need for change is shared among owners, management and the workforce of a specific bank at a specific time is affected by who initiated the change.

To make the demarcation between who originated the idea and who did not (i.e., initiator-reactor demarcation) blurred and get wider base of actor buy-in, pre-initiating stage should include analysis of how to get sufficient involvement of others so they will develop a sense of ownership to the initiative. Involvement alone does not bring this result; there must be sufficient transparency in the process. Therefore, the following proposition is made:

Proposition 2b: Involving sufficient number of others who do not originate the idea in a sufficiently transparent process while at the same time striving to blur the demarcation between the two (i.e., initiator-reactor) enhances a sense of ownership to the initiative.

There are also other reasons that affect the perception of organizational actors which need to be taken care of at the pre-initiating stage. As emerged from cases of the present study, the use of a change tool (BPR) in this case needs careful communication.

7.4.1.1.3. Selection and naming a change model

If the trigger for change is justified in connection with the use of a carefully selected tool (i.e., change model), how it should be communicated during initiating makes it part of the pre-initiating preparations. As the use of such tools usually have track records within and outside the initiating organization, positioning them may sometimes require to think over labeling the initiative. In the present study's case, the private bank, as a late adopter (in the context of the banking sector in Ethiopia), it preferred not to use the name BPR as the prior experience of government organizations including the other case bank is perceived to have negative connotations.

Therefore, the selection and use of a certain tool (or change model) should not only serve the change need of the organization but also its implications to perceptions of organizational members should be managed. In doing so, naming plays an important role. The following proposition was generated from these explanations:

Proposition 3: Selection of a change model determines not only the effectiveness of the organization in terms of addressing anticipated (needed) changes but also the perception of organizational actors and hence their reaction to the initiative.

Balogun (2001) extensively addressed the issue of analyzing organizational context as a prerequisite to make strategic change design choice. The aforementioned proposition builds on this and extends on additional factors that determine selection of change model (i.e., design choice) as discussed so far.

7.4.1.2. Post-initiating Considerations

Initiating also requires assessing ex post facto as the pre-initiating things discussed so far are no guarantee to avoid misunderstanding and to blur initiator-reactor demarcation. Pre-initiative efforts definitely reduce negative reaction from non-initiating group. However, it is not expected to achieve no resistance or any other negative reaction. Therefore, after the initiative is declared formally to organizational members, their reactions should be monitored and evaluated in order to devise a strategy which increases implementation success.

7.4.2. Deterrents of Implementing Strategic Organizational Change

Deterrents of implementing strategic organizational change or causes of change breakdown are other important issues which have implications on implementation of strategic organizational change. As indicated in Figure 7.1, office politics, conflict of self interest with organizational interest, lack of trust, and type of bank ownership are major causes of change breakdown. These causes are interlocked each other. Based on this, they are categorized into two groups as described below:

7.4.2.1. Type of Ownership, Conflict of Self-interest and Office Politics

Depending on the type of ownership, each case bank revealed different owner behavior which does not create favorable condition for implementing organizational change. However, ownership appeared as a stronger issue in the case of the private bank compared to that of the government owned bank. As explained in several sections of this report so far, there were nonprofit motives which were shared by several study participants from bank B. These motives are peculiar to each individual shareholder. This created a condition whereby such types of shareholders strive to gain control over the management of the bank in order to get their personal interest served at the expense of bank's interest. These interventions made top management less concerned and committed to the initiated change and more loyal to those shareholders as means of ensuring longer tenure at the top management position.

Intentions of serving self-interest can only be turned into action when they are backed by power holders. As personal interests naturally lead to competition with those who have similar personal interests or with others who have intention of protecting bank's interests; this situation is a fertile ground for office politics. Office politics among different interest groups leads to change breakdown.

In the case of government owned banks, government authorities (as owners of the bank) have interests of political programs getting served by the bank. Such interests were reflected by intentions of assigning personnel who are expected to be loyal to such political programs at the expense of bank's demand to assign best personnel based on merit. This was why personnel selection was one of the major events which resulted in shocks in bank A. They were complaining (at least based on perception) about government's intervention to train political programs and select personnel based on inclinations towards those programs. These, were not recommended by designer teams as criteria of selecting and assigning personnel on the newly created job positions following BPR. An assignment of personnel who is not fit to a position as demanded by designed strategic organizational change results in implementation failure.

7.4.2.2. Perception, Skepticism and Lack of Trust

These groups of causes of breakdowns are related to behaviors of non-owners during change initiatives. These groups include managers and employees. When either a manager or an employee has perception of change related decisions or actions that lead to skepticism, it will erode trust. Lack of trust negatively affects the action-interaction chain and hence leads to change breakdown.

As a mechanism of shaping perception of organizational members in a way they develop trust in those who are acting as change agents, pre-initiating efforts of involving several organizational actors was discussed earlier. In addition, perception management can also be appropriate throughout the change initiative especially prior to and following major events such as employee selection. This can be achieved through strong leadership and networking of different actors in addition to transparency.

7.4.3. Leadership, Power, Networking and Communication

Thus far, behavioral aspects of change were presented. These were areas that demand change leadership. As a tool, the change leader can build networks amongst major actors. These actors can then communicate and collaborate. This results in integrated actions during implementation of strategic organizational change.

7.4.3.1. Change Leadership

Leadership of change plays an important role in directing actors who have role in implementing strategic organizational change towards the organization's strategic direction. An initiative which changes an organization towards an envisioned direction is what differentiates a strategic change from the rest. Therefore, a change leader is an important actor during strategic organizational change. Without a change leader who shows directions and influences behavior of change agents, it is difficult to make a strategic organizational change implementation successful. Leadership plays at the center of everything else as depicted in Figure 7.1.

In the next sub-sections, tools that are required by a change leader are discussed. These tools are the means through which the change leader acts and influences behavior of organizational actors towards anticipated strategic organizational change.

7.4.3.2. Power

A change leader can have influence over change related behavior in the organization during the transition period if backed by sufficient power. Power represents the capacity to decide on required resources, tools and approaches to initiate and implement a strategic organizational change in commercial banks. The rationale to engender this notion in the final list of propositions is related to the fact that the success of implementation has connections with the degree of involvement of those with power. Sufficiency of power sometimes requires the engagement of the highest power (supreme power) in the tasks of initiating and implementing strategic organizational change. It increases the likelihood for the success of implementation. If the change leader has supremacy in power over those who probably can react against the desired change behavior, it will be easier to influence and lead everyone in the organization towards the change.

Major shareholders represent the real source of power in private banks while government officials do possess the controlling power of government banks through their board of directors. The degree to which the board of directors is committed towards the realization of the change affects the top management's and other organizational members' commitment towards the change. Therefore, to enhance implementation success, the following are required to bring supreme power aboard:

- The change must be an interest to owners (government) and hence to the board of directors so that management and the workforce will also share and act towards its implementation.
- There is no misuse or manipulation of power towards covert interests that are dressed up with the anticipated change as a result of office politics.

This concept is somehow related to the source of initiative. If the strategic organizational change for some reasons does not come from those who possess the highest organizational power, bringing them aboard should come before everything else if the change has to be successful. This leads to the proposition presented below.

Proposition 4: The extent to which an initiative for strategic organizational change gains the support of those with power affects the level of implementation success of strategic organizational change.

This proposition implies that the change leader should influence the supreme power to come aboard and build a hierarchy of power throughout the changing organization so that change agents can decide with power wherever it is appropriate with respect to making implementation of strategic change a success. In order to ensure an integrated use of power and actions towards implementing anticipated change, the change leader builds an appropriate network of actors as described next.

7.4.3.3. Actor Networking

Integrating actors is the central role of the change leader. This integration should be based on shared change vision as Kotter (1995) posits. It is towards this shared vision the change leader influences behavior of major actors. To effectively lead actors towards unified direction, all those who share the change vision under the leader's influence must be part of a network. This is what is referred to as actor networking.

Actor networking is a means through which actors collaborate, work in integration and achieve a common strategic change outcome. This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 5: Strategic organizational change implementation requires actors to be unified through a carefully designed network of actors.

7.4.3.4. Communication

A healthy action-interaction chain (actor network) and the involvement of power were emerged as required conditions for the successful implementation of a strategic organizational change in a commercial bank's context in Ethiopia. As depicted by figure 7.1, these two notions are integral parts of the proposed implementation model for strategic organizational change. In the action-interaction chain, important constructs emerged in connection with initiating, designing and implementing stages. There are chains of actions that are interlocked together. For these actions to be executed smoothly there must be a healthy interface among them. This in turn requires smooth interaction among actors. This network of actors over which they interact should be unbroken for a healthy execution of the change initiative.

The chain of actions and interactions must move on in a volatile (unstable) environment and the movement requires each component of the chain to remain intact. While the movement requires energy, smoothness of the movement can be materialized on a lubricated environment. Power and communication play the role of energy and lubricant respectively. In the absence of carefully designed information and communication system, the action-interaction chain will either be stack or broken no matter how engaged the ones with power are.

Proposition 6: Smoothness of interactions among actors that is fostered by effective communication and leadership has affirmative impacts on implementation success of strategic organizational change.

7.4.4. Technical Aspects of Implementing Strategic Organizational Change

The second broad area of implementing strategic organizational change is the technical part (the first being behavioral). Under the technical aspects of implementing strategic organizational change, specific action oriented issues that require expert buy-in are covered. This part broadly includes initiating, designing and implementing strategic organizational change. Because it is strongly intermingled with behavioral aspects too, initiating is presented earlier. Initiating has technical aspects especially with respect to selecting a change model, defining the scope of the change and shaping the initiating messages that need to be communicated to organizational members.

7.4.4.1. Designing

Apart from selecting a model with serves as a change tool, implementing a strategic organizational change is affected by an analysis of the extent to which the change model fits organizational context or otherwise need to be contextualized. These issues and other specifications of the anticipated change need to be designed prior to implementation.

Designing, has different level of dynamism between the two cases. However, it is relevant to both cases. Therefore, it is considered as the other construct for the final propositions that are made by this research. Designing in the first case was stronger as it was executed by teams that were established and were off duty until they finally finished and submitted the design document. In bank B, teams were not established. All old departments had their own team; so there was no serious engagement and concern. However, the design issue is still valid in bank B too even though its experience cannot be taken as a best practice as it was not fruitful.

The result of cross-case analysis reveal that (1) model specification, (2) model validation, (3) model contextualization, and (4) completeness of design are important attributes that affect implementation success of strategic organizational change. In other words, designing is the process of creating the changed organizational system. These attributes of designing are further discussed in the next sub-sections:

7.4.4.1.1.Validating change model's fitness to organizational reality

Designing should make sure that the change model's features that are included in the design are fit to the specific and unique requirements of the bank; which in turn requires understanding the model.

If the change model to be applied (if any) is a simple management fad (as referred to by Balogun, 2001), care should be taken to avoid a single jacket fits all syndrome. The model's fitness should be tested taking the unique requirements of the changing bank into account. The model should fit more to the organization's (i.e., bank's) trigger for change (i.e., purpose) than the organization's requirements fit to the change model. Once the change model is proven to fit organizational requirements, the following should be considered in connection with applying it:

- If the model has been used by other organizations, failure stories might distort perceptions of the initiating bank's community; this requires managing the perceptions.
- The version of the change model (if any) that is to be applied by the initiating bank should be sufficiently understood by all relevant members of the bank so that misunderstandings could not deter successful implementation.

7.4.4.1.2.Contextualizing the change model

This becomes an important component of designing when the results of validating the model indicate a need to modify some features of the model. This modification results in a new model which fits the specific realities of the organization. There were attempts in the two banks to modify the model. The first bank applied maker-checker principle for example (which is different from BPR principles) to meet the specific requirements of the bank. In the second bank too, they tried to follow a modified feature which can fit to the bank's requirements. They even avoided using the name (BPR) despite the fact that they benchmarked organizations which implemented BPR.

7.4.4.1.3.Implementation specification

Central to designing a strategic organizational change is the determination of components of the new organization after the change. These components include: (1) systems and structure of interface among systems, (2) jobs in the new systems together with specifications and descriptions thereof, (3) procedures, (4) and performance measures (indicators). An effective design should specify all material aspects of the strategic organizational change such as the aforementioned ones.

7.4.4.1.4.Completeness

The challenge encountered during designing is the dissolution of designing teams before delivering the complete design document. This happens due to several reasons that disturb the smooth operation of teams. An effective designing task is accomplished when a complete design document is delivered. The above conditions, as clearly explained, lead to the following propositions in connection with designing:

Proposition 7: Executable (effective) strategic organizational change design is a function of setting clear guiding principles that serve as criteria to filter final components of the new organizational system.

Proposition 8: The extent to which the designing team (1) internalizes strategic organizational change requirements that necessitated the initiative, applies the guiding principles in setting change content, (2) identifies features of the selected change model (if any) that fit to the content, and (3) effectively communicates determine the success of designing strategic organizational change.

Proposition 9: Whether or not implementation is started having a complete and specific design document affects level of success in implementing strategic organizational change.

Proposition 10: Successful implementation of a planned strategic organizational change depends on design completeness.

Aforementioned propositions are relatively confirming to the explanations in the extent literature (e.g. Oakland & Tanner, 2007; Balogun, 2001; Mento *et al.*, 2002; Pryor *et al.*, 2008).

7.4.4.2. Implementing

Anticipated benefits of change can only be realized through successful implementation of it. The center of the discussion in this study is implementation. Successful implementation of strategic organizational change requires actions to be taken and conditions to prevail before and after the start of the actual task of implementation. As explained above, rushing to implement strategic organizational change without having complete and specific design leads to premature implementation. The major predecessors are what have been discussed in the previous sections (i.e., initiation and design).

Implementing is the process of executing the anticipated, initiated and designed strategic organizational change. It is manifested by all actions taken in connection with applying newly proposed organizational systems. The assumption here is, even though the success of implementation is immediately caused by these actions, previous conditions that determine the required actions also have contributions.

Completeness, timeliness, and effectiveness can be considered as measures against which the success of implementation in the context under study can be gauged. The following are further explanations about each of these measures:

7.4.4.2.1. Completeness

If an anticipated change is executed as per its design in all aspects of expected change (content of change), it is complete. However; in the investigated context, implementation performance is practically measured in terms of improvement of whatsoever extent irrespective of designed change content. Completeness is assumed to contribute for the enhancement of implementation success. The following can be taken as examples of the attributes that can describe degree of implementation completeness:

- Pervasiveness across all organizational units or operations: If the initiative is a strategic change, all organizational units must be changed in a designed way. Strategic organizational change cannot be complete if appropriate attention is not given to both core and support processes and to all processes within each category.

- Inclusive of both the human and the technical sides: This will prevent the common skewness towards either of the two not both. However, especially handling the soft side of the organization is proved to be demanded during implementation. In the technical side, organizational contexts should be examined in order to avoid implementing changes (or fads) that were tested and known in automated organizational environments unless the organization is also operating in the same environment.

Proposition 11: The degree to which both core and support business processes are changed in both technical and behavioral aspects can explain implementation effectiveness of strategic organizational change.

7.4.4.2.2. Timeliness

If the anticipated change is not fully executed within the designed time framework, it cannot be considered as successfully implemented. Timeliness can be manifested in terms of the point of time the newly designed operation fully commences. The usual excuse is promising "we will finish it" shortly until the issue vanishes from the memory of people. "We will finish it" is not definite and cannot be considered as an indicator of appropriate change leadership.

Proposition 12: The degree to which implementation of strategic organizational change meets scheduled milestones in terms of starting time, duration, and finishing time indicates level of implementation success.

7.4.4.2.3. Effectiveness

The newly executed change should be effective in *all measures of performance* that were predetermined during designing. This issue has links with completeness. It emerged to be worth considering because of the need to challenge the practice of covering up with only some features of achieved effectiveness while failing short of designed change targets. Cycle time, because of its simplicity to measure is usually referred to as an indicator for successful implementation of strategic organizational change. However mere reduction in cycle time does not necessarily indicate complete implementation success as the same may happen due to factors other than the implemented change. Therefore, implementation success has to be measured with other indicators of performance too. For example, cost, service quality and customer satisfaction were among the measures that were included in the design in addition to cycle time. However, participants witnessed that there was no attempt to measure the output of the implemented change in terms of the other performance indicators. The following are proposed as requisite conditions that are needed in order to ensure effectiveness of implementing strategic organizational change:

- Inclusive measures: Successfulness of implementation should be measured using multiple indicators. Even the way time is measured should not be general and haphazard comparison with previous performance; it should be based on planned level of cycle time. If performance standards are set, there must be a mechanism to check if they are met.
- Evaluation: Performance evaluation should be linked to performance measures. It has to be executed in a way it captures all performance indicators; and there must be an information support system for that.
- Benefits: Aligning benefits to performances that are integral to the change that is newly implemented prevents regression as the same will affect the interest of performers.
- Supporting systems: The usually referred reason for failure to include all the performance indicators in evaluating performance is the absence of an implementation support system that virtually generates

performance statistics in a way it is readily available for use by relevant authority. Otherwise the calculation of cost, keeping the records of performance manually, and the non value adding nature of these tasks to the main operation makes it less attractive.

The above explanations and required conditions resulted in the propositions made below:

Proposition 13: Comprehensive performance measurement, backed by supporting organizational and information systems, increases completeness of implementation of strategic organizational change.

Proposition 14: The extent to which performance rewards are aligned to changed behaviors affects implementation success of strategic organizational change.

These propositions also confirm to the general explanation in the extant literature (e.g. Oakland & Tanner, 2007; Balogun, 2001; Mento et al., 2002; Pryor et al., 2008). However, the actual implementation practices in the studied context reveal new insights too. The relatively successful changes in both cases are those which were backed by technology (core banking). The use of software (i.e., artifact) as described by Glaser (2017) made the difference in the effectiveness of change. In the areas where the software was not used (i.e., support processes), implementation did not result in expected outcomes. The inclusion of these new insights is detailed more in the upcoming sub-sections.

7.4.4.2.4. New routines

The extent to which an organization enacts new routines to do business around is also an indication for implementation success provided that these new routines are aligned to the strategic directions (envisioned) and shared at the beginning. Even though routines are known for their contribution of both stability and change, and an attempt is made by Lin *et al.* (2017) to model how routines serve as mechanisms of implementing change and innovation, the extension of these concepts to planned approach of change as also portrayed by the conceptual framework (Figure 2.19) in chapter two is a relatively new insight.

7.4.4.2.5. Systems

A system is what ensures the monitoring and evaluation of change behaviors by change leaders without being overwhelmed by bulks of information and chaos. Besides, supporting systems by technology makes a difference in implementing strategic organizational change as witnessed by especially one of the cases. Systems also provide a means through which performance measurement, evaluation and rewards are aligned to change behaviors to reinforce the change and abandon old practices (prevent regression).

7.5. Proposed Implementation Model for Strategic Organizational Change

The propositions which are presented in the previous sections are explanations an amalgam of which represents a model which serves as a guideline for implementing strategic organizational change in the context of commercial banks in Ethiopia. To show how dynamic and complex implementing a strategic organizational change is, Figure 7.2 is sketched. In this figure, organizational context is indicated by an arrow which encircles the other major change implementation components. The arrow represents dynamism in the context which demands continuous monitoring and adjustment of organizational routines.

Figure 7.2: Implementation Model for Strategic Organizational Change in Ethiopian Commercial Banks /Action-Interaction Chain



Source: Own sketch

There are also external factors that are indicated outside this arrow to represent those which emerged from the empirical data of the present research. It does not mean, however, that there are no other external environmental factors. As implementation is the focus of the present research, those which emerged relating to implementation are focused on. The reset is beyond the scope of this study.

In the centre, an analogy of gears is used to represent the interlock amongst major themes that emerged from the empirical data. They are important components of the explanation of how a strategic organizational change in the context of commercial banks in Ethiopia can be implemented successfully. Leadership, networking, and communication play a role to smoothen the interconnection in the internal environment (i.e. the gear box).

In the present study, implementing strategic organizational change has two major components. One is related to behavior whereas the other is about technique. The first is included to enhance success rate in implementing an initiated strategic change while the second is technically initiating, designing and implementing the anticipated change. To help understand the complexity of the whole components that are indicated in Figure 7.2, these two components are briefly described in the upcoming sections.

7.5.1. Behavioral Aspects of Strategic Organizational Change Implementation

This is related to soft components or softer sides of change implementation as Balogun (2001) and Armenakis and Harris (2009) refer to. In Figure 7.2, components which are within the encircling arrow shape behavioral context under which the anticipated change will be implemented. While the actual organizational movement is analogous to movements of the gears, the environment in the gear box must be favorable for these gears to run smoothly (analogy of lubrication can be thought). Behavioral aspect of implementation encompasses power and lubricants as requisite preconditions to start operating.

In the same token, a bank's readiness to start implementing strategic organizational change (i.e., to move) is determined by (1) whether sufficient power is aboard, and (2) whether strong actors are persuaded and shared the need for change or not (analogous to lubricant). When the answers to these questions are affirmative, it is time. Timing is the central component of behavioral aspect of the implementation model. Readiness is an input for timing.

If gears are put on to move before the box is ready to host a smooth movement, they will be damaged and the entire system will collapse. Similarly, determining the right time to start taking implementation actions must be preceded by organization's behavioral readiness. If implementation actions are taken before the organization is not ready, the possibility of being successful is low. To the contrary, premature implementation emerged to be a cause of resistance and ultimately change breakdown.

There are components of the model (portrayed by Figure 7.3) which determine behavioral readiness of an organization to start enactment implementation actions. The interlock among these components which are depicted by Figure 7.3 determines (1) whether an organization is ready to start implementation actions, or (2) whether there are powerful change deterrents which demand change leader's intervention with supreme power in order to change the condition into readiness, or (3) whether the change leader needs to conceptualize change triggering conditions and strategize for positioning the initiative in the minds of major actors who will serve as first group of change agents once convinced and developed feeling of ownership to the initiative.

Depending on how change triggering forces are conceived and communicated, organizational actors will develop either skepticism or trust. This is just a result of their perception *(see arrows 2 and 4 in Figure 7.3)*. The dilemma between skepticism versus trust which is based on perceived sincerity of change (see arrow 2) or feeling of ownership to the change (see arrow 4) can be manipulated by the change leader who conceptualizes change triggers *(see relationship 3 in Figure 7.3)* and positions the conceived changes into the minds of organizational members *(see arrow 7 in Figure 7.3)* through communication.

Figure 7.3: Behavioral aspects of implementing strategic organizational change



Source: *Own sketch*

The change leader also intervenes in the initiator-reactor dilemma which determines feelings of ownership to the initiated change *(see arrow 6 in Figure 7.3)* which otherwise could be affected by perception *(see relationship 1)*. This dilemma also affects skepticism-trust dilemma *(see relationship 4 in Figure 7.3)*. Skepticism-trust dilemma turns into the dominance of one depending on the strength of perception which leads to skepticism or leader's effectiveness in positioning the change to be a common agenda *(see arrow 7)* which in turn increases sense of ownership *(see relationship 4)*.

In this part of the model, a change leader's role is shaping behavior towards ensuring the supremacy of organizational purpose. The change leader, if effective, shares the envisioned strategic organizational change *(which is depicted as SOC in Figure 7.3)* with sufficient number of major actors in the organization. This is what needs to be achieved as an indicator of behavioral readiness.

Alternatively, when there is leadership vacuum, the initiated change will fail to deliver expected results mainly for two reasons. One is because of genuine misunderstandings and resultant misperceptions on the need for change and lack of sense of ownership to the initiated change which results in lack of commitment. The second reason is the dominance of those who have personal motives. These two causes were emerged as change deterrents.

Formation and strength of change deterrents starts right from when change triggering forces are perceived by organizational actors. Perceived sincerity of change triggers (i.e., perceived existence of genuine compelling reason for initiating a change) determines the level of commitment of organizational actors.

If perception is absence of such triggers, non-initiating organizational actors turn to be skeptic. Depending on the strength of skepticism, the result could be resistance to the initiated change. Strength of skepticism is highly affected by organizational social fabric and degree of trust between initiators and non-initiators. Source of resistance, unlike the unwitting tendency to consider individuals or employees as prime source of resistance, (Burnes, 2015), emerged to be any type of non-initiating party including mangers.

Besides, the extent to which personal motives of some actors dominate organizational cause leads to reaction of different actors to be positive or negative towards the initiated change. If those who need to serve their personal motives dominate, a third path which again starts from change triggering forces leads to change breakdown. This path needs the existence of parties who have personal motives that at any cost to the organization gain supremacy and sponsorship. An example to such motives is nonprofit motive. Such motives search for power sponsorship in order to be served at the expense of organizational purpose during change. If the sponsoring power to these motives overwhelms that of change leader's, office politics jeopardizes the entire initiative through making the change leader weakened. This is why the change leader, especially in conditions where there are parties who have such motives, ensures bringing supreme power aboard even at pre-initiating stage. All the explanations made in connection with pre-initiating make this condition clearer.

Readiness to start the actions of implementation (i.e., timing) is therefore a function of: (1) non-initiating actors' perception, degree of skepticism (or trust) and feeling of ownership which determines whether they share the need for change or not, (2) change leader's effectiveness in conceptualizing change triggers, positioning the need for change in the minds of non-initiators in a way they perceive it positively and persuades them to trust the entire process and to develop a sense of ownership and to share the envisioned change and to become ready to commit themselves towards its implementation, and (3) strength of parties with personal motives who aspire to gain control over the organization and its management and ensure these motives served at the expense of organizational objectives.

The change leader is there to influence the entire behavioral component and ensure readiness before enacting actual tasks of implementation. Once this condition (readiness) prevails, heading towards technical aspects of implementation becomes appropriate. Compared to the major directions that can be extracted from extant literature (see figure 2.19), the proposal made by the present study is unique. The analysis of behavioral readiness makes the present model more dynamic and it is sought to be an original contribution.

7.5.2. Technical Aspects of Strategic Organizational Change Implementation

After the behavioral aspects of implementation are taken care of, the change leader can proceed towards building strong networks of those actors who are convinced and have a shared vision about the change. The leader facilitates collaboration and exploitation of the network among actors. Change agents who are selected among convinced actors should be active in communicating with other actors over the network. Through this way, actor networking lays the foundational structure of communication and collaboration throughout the implementation of an initiated strategic organizational change. The existence of this network also makes monitoring and evaluation of implementation activities easy. Therefore, actor networking, active communication and monitoring and evaluation systems are readiness indicators for starting technical aspects of implementing strategic organizational change.

After ensuring technical readiness of the organization as explained in the above paragraph, executing technical tasks of implementation becomes reasonable. In the absence of such condition, implementation is expected to proceed out of order and expected outcomes of change might not be achieved.

The major components of technical aspects of strategic organizational change implementation are (1) initiating (which is partially behavioral as described earlier), (2) designing and (3) implementing. Behavioral aspects of initiating do not require technical readiness conditions as explained earlier. However, initiating lays the foundation for the other two technical components of implementation and hence requires expert buy-in as early as possible. Initiating is an interfacing juncture between behavioral and technical aspects of the proposed model.

The other two major components of technical aspect of implementation (i.e., designing and implementing) should follow technical readiness. Among these technical components comes the term implementing. In terms of actions, these two components take the initiative to the final stages.

It is apparent that implementing a strategic organizational change is not simply an execution of some tasks. It has to pass through prior conditioning efforts which help the entire organization (represented by networked actors who share a common vision) to head towards an envisioned future. Once this future is clear to sufficient number of major actors who are convinced to commit themselves towards that end (behavioral readiness), actions and interactions should be facilitated through smooth communications over carefully designed networks so that actors can build mutual understandings towards the change activities and put hands on them. Besides, the networks should also be an integral part of the monitoring and evaluation systems. Putting all these in place represents readiness.

Moreover, the two major technical components of implementation come prior to implementing. The proposed model in the present study focuses on these prior components as success enhancers. If implementation starts from the third component alone, there will be no means to ensure strategic organizational change (planned change) implementation success. As indicated in Figure 7.4 b, implementing is affected by prior activities of implementation (i.e., initiating and designing) while the role of leadership is central to all the rest.

Figure 7.4: Technical aspects of implementing strategic organizational change



Source: Own sketch

As indicated in Figure 7.2, power/leadership determines both initiating and designing while implementing is affected by both initiating and designing. Leadership backed by sufficient power creates an environment which is ready to enact changes. Readiness is only a required condition not an end result. The end result should be driven by behavioral components (readiness) and technical components as described in the next sub-sections. The contribution of power, here, is also recognized by Stragalas (2010), Kotter (1995), and Balogun (2001); however, the specific conditions described in the present study as explained so far are different.

7.5.2.1. Initiating

As detailed earlier, initiating affects behavioral aspects. Technically speaking, initiating defines the required need for strategic organizational change based on assessment of change triggering conditions. Such conditions lead to conceptualizing the required type of change and selecting appropriate tools (change model). This stage gives input to designing through an interdependent relation. This relationship is moderated by leadership as designing interfaces with initiating being supported with leader's networking and facilitation efforts. Results of implemented change also serve as triggers for new change implying cyclic relations between initiating and implementing.

7.5.2.2. Designing

Designing lays the foundation for the specific actions to be taken during the final implementation. Concrete actions are means for transforming an organization into a newly sought strategic position and business operation. Especially in a planned change context, designing is what specifies the content and process of change. Designing does the plan. What implementers do is converting the design into action. Whether the actions are appropriate can only be evaluated when there is a complete and specific design. Effective design is one that sufficiently and completely specifies what needs to be implemented. This stage also sets the standards of performance that will be applied to track the progress of implementation. In doing so, designing also encompasses developing systems solutions or identifying standard systems solutions that can be acquired (e.g., recommending the core banking system to support core business processes of banks).

7.5.2.3. Implementing

Implementing is the ultimate means through which anticipated strategic organizational change is converted into a reality. Implementing, in the context of planned approach to change, refers to the actions that are taken in order to transform old organization as per design (plan). A strategic organizational change, if effectively implemented, results in new ways of doing business. That means, new organizational routines and artifacts will replace old ones. As emerged in the present research too, the concept of implementing strategic organizational change encompasses routines (Lin *et al.,* 2017). To explain this stretched view of implementing strategic organizational change, the interlock of implementing with prior technical components and the support of implementation with systems are described in the next sub-sections.

7.5.2.4. Interdependence with prior components

Prior components of the proposed implementation model are those explained as behavioral readiness *(see Figure 7.3)* and technical readiness *(see Figure 7.4)*. Both stages of readiness are requisites for successful implementation of strategic organizational change. Therefore, implementation action should always come next to full analyses of its interdependence with the prior components specified so far.

Implementing, as implicated by technical components part of the model explanation, is affected by direct influences of designing and indirect influences of initiating (as designing intervenes in between). Moreover, initiating has also direct relation with implementing in terms of determining who participates as change agent and involving that selected actor as early as possible to build a sense of ownership (but this is part of the behavioral component). Besides, initiating determines scope of the initiated change which directly affects both designing and implementing. The other relation, which is from a different direction, is connected to the decision to embrace either action or reflection based on performance tracking (deviance tracking) of implementation. That is why the relationship between implementation and initiation is two directional.

In addition to ensuring behavioral and technical readiness prior to enacting implementation tasks, effective implementation should fulfill timeliness and completeness criteria and should be supported by systems which necessitate new routines to replace the old ones. In the absence of such components, it is not possible to manage implementation and make it successful. This means, an effective implementation of strategic organizational change is explained in terms of its completeness (with respect to converting all designed features into reality) and timeliness (done at the right time within the right duration). Completeness emerged as important concept because, organizations tend to implement an initiated change but do not endure exhaustively implementing each and every thing included in the design. Some even tend to regress back to the status quo after a brief period of campaign (Burnes, 2004a). Completeness also indirectly implies scope.

Timeliness has two meanings— (1) accomplishing the task of implementing within the predetermined period and (2) avoiding premature or delayed decisions of implementation. Especially when strategic organizational change is under the supervision of an external party (including members of board of directors), deadline syndrome usually causes implementation breakdown as a result of pre-mature implementation. These notions are all original contributions (see figure 2.19).

7.5.2.4.1. Implementation support systems and routines

In addition to the triple helix (i.e., initiating-designing-implementing interlock) which was explained, an implementation of strategic organizational change needs to be supported by information and communication technology backed systems. The need for this support was evident in the back offices (support business processes of the two case banks). Because of lack of such supports, there was no significant change in support business processes. On the other hand, core business processes realized anticipated changes only after they were supported by the electronic core banking system.

This led to the present study's proposition of a model which ensures accompanying implementations of strategic organizational change with artifacts through which organizational routines can be established. The use of technology is one of such artifacts (Glaser, 2017). In addition to technology, designing other artifacts as means to bring about changes in organizational routines serves as success enhancing component of implementing strategic organizational change.

When actor networking and communications and implementation performance monitoring and evaluation systems are put in place and are supported by information and communication technology, the changing organization is ready to turn the initiative to be more action oriented. When the organization has complete and specific designs in addition to technical readiness, it is time to start the actual task of implementation. In order to ensure that the implemented tasks can bring anticipated changes into reality, there must be strong alignment between all conceptions, networks, communications and new organizational routines which are systematized through the use of artifacts (e.g., ICT based software) as explained by Glaser (2017).

When changes are supported by automated systems or other technologies, old routines will be changed for good and replaced by new ones and hence the organization will be changed irreversibly. The emergence of new routines then, will take the place and further anticipations of changes will continue being focused on those new routines. Therefore, strategic organizational change will continue to be implemented in a form of change in technologies (or other artifacts) in modern organizations.

This is where the present research's findings are linked to the extant literature's contemporary debate on organizational change implementation using organizational routines and artifacts (Wang & Wang, 2017; Line, et al., 2017; Glaser, 2017). This signal's how the proposed implementation model could serve flexibly for both planned change contexts and within the paradoxical views of contemporary literature.

7.6. Enfolding Literature

In this section, the relationship the model proposed by the present study has with extant literature is briefly discussed. To help facilitate the discussion, implementation models that are relevant to strategic organizational change are summarized (see Table 8.1). The summarizing table is presented in the next chapter for simple comparison with the major conclusions that are made based on the present study.

The proposed implementation model has features, when compared to models in the extant literature (see figure 2.19); make it a contribution to the body of knowledge in organizational change implementation. Besides, the proposed implementation model has components that are intentionally incorporated to enhance success while overcoming deterrents. Brief descriptions of some of these features and their links in the literature are presented in the upcoming sub-sections.

7.6.1. Model's Features Pertaining to Behavioral Readiness Assurance

As explained in section 7.5.1, the proposed implementation model has components that deal with behavioral aspects (same as what Balogun, 2001 refers to as softer side) of implementing strategic organizational change. The model focuses on these prior components in an attempt (1) to explore empirical evidences of why implementation fails to an extent low failure rate gained notorious unanimity of scholars and (2) to incorporate mechanisms that overcome deterrents of and enhance success in implementation. The present study contributes to the body of knowledge by incorporating these two into the proposed model.

In the behavioral part (softer side) of the proposed implementation model, analyzing readiness of the organization requires focusing on perception about change triggering forces, source of initiative and power structure. In the literature, the notion of readiness was also addressed by scholars (e.g., Balogun, 2001; Oakland & Tanner, 2007). These authors are also known for giving greater attention to the soft aspect of change implementation. Especially Balogun's (2001) work captures most of the ideas that emerged from the data in the present study.

As explained in section 7.5.1, behavioral readiness of an organization which is initiating a strategic organizational change can be assessed in line with three analytical paths. The first goes through non-initiating actors' perception, degree of skepticism (or trust) and feeling of ownership determining whether these groups buy into the change or not. On this path, underlying factor is source of initiation. Balogun (2001) is the most exhaustive work which describes readiness in terms of softer issues in order to devise a context sensitive strategic change approach. She proposed the cultural web framework. In the framework, several components are included to support managers assess employee readiness. The targets are employees. What emerged in the present research is not exclusively pertinent to employees; rather who initiates the change matters more. This makes the proposed model more flexible and hence more appropriate for more dynamic contexts.

The second analytical path relates to change leader's effectiveness in conceptualizing change triggers, positioning the need for change in the minds of non-initiators in such a way that they will perceive the need for change positively, influencing non-initiators to develop trust in the entire process, developing a sense of ownership and sharing the envisioned change and so that they will accept to buy into the change. This path is analyzed with a scenario which assumes to have a change leader. This scenario matches with Balogun's (2001) explanation to the extent that non-initiators are not composed of top management or someone else with sufficient power (formal or informal) to influence the entire context.

The third path focuses on strength of parties with personal motives who aspire to gain control over the organization and its management and ensure these motives served at the expense of organizational objectives. This part builds on Balogun's (2001) and Oakland and Tanner's (2007) proposal of leadership intervention to influence behavior towards the process of change. However, their explanation does not extend to the extent of politics which requires the involvement of supreme power (i.e., highest power in the organization's context).

Context of behavioral readiness for implementing strategic organizational change does not only require changing employees (i.e., through recruiting new workers) as Balogun (2001) posits; it can also require changing managers (as resistant managers were evident in the cases studied). Therefore, while converging with Balogun's (2001) assertion that changing an organization is about changing people (managers and employees), the notion of initiator-reactor dilemma emerged from the present research is peculiar to the study's context. This is a testimony for Pettigrew's (2001) recommendation to explore national contexts.

With respect to the proposed model's links to the phase models of change, there are also important findings. As discussed in Chapter Two, step-based models of organizational change are dominant in the extent literature. Lewin's three-step model, Kotter's eight step model, and others that enhance or explain these seminal models (e.g., Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999; Mento *et al.*, 2002; Pryor *et al.*, 2008) are recommended sources to gain an insight into these categories of models. Among these models, Lewin (Burnes, 2004a) and Armenakis and Bedeian (1999) gave attention to the issue of analyzing behavioral readiness (i.e., unfreezing) before rushing into the action of implementation. This is to ensure readiness and enact implementation related tasks once the organization is proved to be behaviorally ready. With the exception of the content of what specific conditions should prevail in the specific context to assure readiness, the present research also found out the importance of behavioral readiness.

7.6.2. Technical Readiness Features of the Model

Oakland and Tanner (2007), Balogun (2001) and Armenakis and Bedeian (1999) are among those who discussed readiness. However, they did not address the specific cases of deterrents that destruct organizational readiness. This research, therefore, builds on their notion of the need to assess readiness to change, and extends the notion by bringing insights pertaining to specific areas (i.e., behavioral and technical readiness). In both cases of readiness analysis, the model proposed by the present study is composed of cyclic interrelations. This nature of the model coupled with its flexibility to fit to wider contexts makes the present research a contribution towards Langley *et al.*'s (2013), Lin *et al.*'s (2017) concern for further development on process theorizing (Chiles, 2003) which exploits cyclic loop (Langly, 1999) in order to fit to more dynamic situations.

This part of the proposed model focuses on the effort of the change leader to create networks of actors who are involved as experts from the very beginning of initiating the change and others who have direct and indirect roles in implementing the initiated change. The initiator-reactor interplay encompasses not only top-down but also bottom-up driven initiatives as also posited by Wang and Wang (2017), Magsaysay and Hechanova (2017) as employ-centric approach. However, apart from mentioning operation oriented approaches, none of these works were as explicit as the present study did in terms of making a clear proposition towards the triple helix of initiating-designing-implementing.

The cyclic sequential interaction among the three as depicted in Figure 7.4 results in the implementation of planned strategic organizational change and eventually handles evolving change needs of the organization after the initial (planned) changes are implemented. At this point, the new organizational feature is a function of artifacts (Glaser, 2017). In the absence of use of artifacts (in this case automating software—

core banking), organizations may not bring about significant changes and hence the next change could be similar to the implemented one. This converges with Stańczyk-Hugiet *et al.* (2017) and Lin *et al.*'s (2017) works and generally with authors of organizational routines (e.g. Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Pentland & Feldman, 2008; Graetz & Smith, 2010; Lin *et al.*, 2017; Feldman, Pentland, D'Adderio & Lazaric, 2016).

With respect to (1) passing through two analytical stages (i.e., behavioral and technical readiness) of failure preventive works before actually starting implementation, (2) integrating these failure preventive methods with implementation activities and (3) exploiting post-implementation deviances, there is no convergence to the extent literature. The aforementioned three are important contributions of the present study to the extant body of knowledge in strategic organizational change implementation.

7.7. Definition of Key Terms

Initiating: a bank's act of introducing a specific type of planned strategic organizational change as a means to shift its way of doing business.

Action-interaction chain: the communication network a change leader builds as a result of actor networking.

Initiator-reactor: an organizational actor's cognitive processing of who initiated a change (i.e., source of initiative) and the resultant position that leads to either buying into or reacting against the change.

Timing: the point of time a change related decision or action is enacted.

Implementing: the process of executing an anticipated, initiated, and designed strategic organizational change.

Change breakdown: the happening of an outcome of a change related activity which deviates from the anticipated one.

Deterrent: a variation (in expression) of change breakdown

Behavioral readiness: the stage of readiness which is related to the soft side of the organization. It refers to the state whereby an organization is behaviorally ready to start execution of an anticipated strategic organizational change.

Technical readiness: indicates the state where a change initiating organization puts in place actor networks, communication systems, and other monitoring and evaluating systems and become ready to start executing an anticipated strategic organizational change.

7.8. Chapter Summary

In this chapter, results of cross-case analyses of important themes that emerged from each case (as discussed in Chapter Six) are discussed. Propositions are also made about the relationships among these identified concepts/themes. Based on these relationships (see Figure 7.1) an implementation model which captures most of the important issues that shape implementation is proposed (see Figure 7.2). To facilitate the understanding of the seemingly complex model depicted in Figure 7.2, the two major components of the model—behavioral and technical are also discussed in separate sections (see figure 7.3 & 7.4). These explanations of the components of the model are finally compared with extent literature which also continues to the next chapter. The next chapter briefly presents major conclusions and the contributions of the present research.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1. Introduction

In this chapter, on the bases of findings presented in the previous chapters; the major conclusions made, recommendations forwarded and indications for further research are presented. Detail explanations are not given as the same has already been done in preceding chapters.

8.2. Conclusions

On the basis of the final findings presented in the previous chapters, an implementation model for strategic organizational change is proposed. The underlying assumptions behind including these constructs in the model and proposing the relationship as indicated in figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 are detailed in Chapter Seven.

The objectives of the present study were to:

- Explore contextual factors that influence the implementation of strategic organizational change in the context of commercial banking sector in Ethiopia
- Develop a strategic organizational change implementation model within the context of commercial banks in Ethiopia
- Put forward theoretical propositions in connection with contextual strategic organizational change implementation

How these objectives were responded to in the present research is discussed in this section. With respect to exploring contextual factors that influence implementation of strategic organizational change, the present study undertook within case and cross-case analyses and found out factors that are related to behavioral aspects (see section 7.5.1) and others that are related to technical aspects (see section 7.5.2). These two major groups of factors are major components of the proposed change implementation model as presented in Chapter Seven.

As found out by the present study, implementing strategic organizational change in the context of commercial banks in Ethiopia requires passing through two stages of readiness assurance efforts before embarking on the actual tasks of implementation. The first stage deals with softer side (cognitive and behavioral components) readiness while the second one focuses on ensuring whether the technical side is effectively and smoothly interlinked with the soft one. The final stage of implementation then comes with a triple helix of initiating, designing, and implementing which is moderated and facilitated by power and/or leadership depending on prevailing conditions.

As it was sought right at the beginning of the present research, exploration of the purely domestic context of commercial banking sector in Ethiopia resulted in an implementation model which has unique components. As the model is inductively developed based on data gathered and systematically analyzed, it fits to the empirical context (i.e., commercial banks in Ethiopia).

With respect to addressing the third objective, by developing an implementation model for strategic organizational change in the context of commercial banking sector in Ethiopia, the present study brought forward contributions to the present body of knowledge in strategic organizational change implementation. These contributions can be valid both in the context of implementation in general and context sensitive implementation as referred to by Balogun (2001), Pettigrew *et al*. (2001) and Hempel and Mrtinsons (2009) in particular.

As the issue of implementation is lagging behind that of formulation of strategic organizational change (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011), the proposed implementation model may contribute in stimulating further debates. The fact that the present research was conducted based on inductive data driven approach of building theories from case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989) also makes the present research to serve as a spring board of further scholarly debates and theory development towards the notion of context sensitive implementation model which is sought to contribute towards reducing the high failure rate of implementation which is unanimously reported in the extant literature. The enhanced features of Esenhardt's (1989) within-case analysis are also expected to capture attention of future researchers who will be using this approach.

While Balogun (2001) explicated broadly about how to make a context sensitive strategic change; Pettigrew *et al.* (2001) explicitly asserted the unwitting tendency to consider context as undiscussed background. Despite the length of time since these scholars raised the issue, the literature in strategic organizational change seems to have hardly witnessed significant progress in addressing the issue of context or developing a context sensitive model.

As described in several places in the present report so far, the literature in strategic organizational change is characterized by unanimous report of high (mostly mentioned as 70%) failure rate while it is fragmented with respect to addressing this problem (Jacobs *et al.*, 2013). Until recently, scholars (e.g., Packard, 2017; Imran *et al.*, 2016; Burnes, 2015; Al-Haddad & Kantour, 2015) report this rate of failure. This indicates that the need for further development in the extant body of knowledge in strategic organizational change implementation still exists.

As change models are believed to reverse this high level of implementation failure (Al-Haddad & Kantour, 2015; Stragalas, 2010; Real & Marshal, 2005; Worley & Lawler, 2010; Kazmi, 2008; Okumus, 2003), there were efforts which result in plethora of such models (Ford & Greer, 2005). However, since the 1990s, there were also scholars who (e.g., Beer, 1992; By, 2005; Armenakis & Harris, 2009; Corley & Gioia, 2011; Woodman, 2014), because of the prevalence of high rate of failure, concluded about lack of models with practically proven contribution (usability) towards implementation success.

Extant implementation models are criticized (1) for being programmatic or fallacious or change managerial (i.e., top-down driven) (Guitee & Vandenbempt, 2017; Beer & Eisenstat, 1990), (2) for not being context oriented or data driven (Parry *et al.*, 2014; Pettigrew *et al.*, 2001; Barnett & Carol, 1995), (3) for not being based on scientifically developed knowledge (Woodman, 2014), (4) for not being based on ambiguous language (Marshak, 2002), (5) for not being action-oriented (Armenakis & Harris, 2009), (6) for being disintegrated (Al-Haddad & Kontour, 2015), and (7) for not being employee-centric (Magsaysay & Hechanova, 2017).

Amongst the phase-based models, cyclic models, systems models, and those which have paradoxical orientations which are reviewed in the present study, Balogun's (2001) is found most explicit in using the term strategic change. Besides, Kotter's (1995) model is also reported to be applicable for strategic organizational changes. As Pryor *et al*. (2008) and Mento *et al.* (2002) did extensive review of models including Kotter's (1995), they have components that manifest strategic orientations. Therefore, in terms of relevance, Kotter's (1995) model, others that are significantly based on Kotter's (1995) model (e.g., Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999; Mento *et al*., 2002; Pryor *et al*., 2008) and Balogun's (2001) model are found closer to the issue of implementing strategic organizational change.

Moreover, Van de ven and Poole (1995), Van de Ven and Sun (2011) and the systems model of Maes and Van Hootegem (2011) are significant contributions in the literature of change management. In the most recent literature, models that are based on paradoxical views which consider organizational routines as sources of both change and stability are also becoming apparent. Lin *et al.* (2017) and Glaser (2017) made contributions towards conceptualizing dynamic routines as means of implementing organizational change and artifacts as means of modifying routines. Therefore, with an intention to position the contribution of the present research to the body of knowledge in implementing strategic organizational change, the aforementioned models are summarized in Table 8.1. This table indicates each model's contribution towards addressing issues that are represented by each column.

Following the table, conclusions are made about the model which is developed by the present study pertaining to (1) its contributions in terms of exploring contextual factors that influence implementation of strategic organizational change, (2) its contribution with respect to making propositions that are related to organizational readiness for change, implementation deterring factors, flexibility with respect to accommodating varying contexts, specifying technical procedures and systems of control. This makes the present study's explicit account for preventing implementation failure which is not common in the extant literature. Moreover, the present research's finding that artifacts as mechanisms of altering routines which in turn serve as means of implementing organizational change is discussed in line with the model's relatively new contribution in connection with incorporating technical readiness assurance components.

Table 8.1: Summary of major contributions in the literature of organizational change implementation

Model	Consideration from Context	Readiness enhancers	Implementation deterrents	Flexibility	Procedures	Outcome/control
Kotter's (1995)	Market competitiveness, crisis, opportunities, plan	Empowerment, team, hiring, promoting…	Eight mistakes of managers	Encourages risk taking	Eight sequential steps	Institutionalization, rewards,
Armenakis and Bedeian (1999)	Urgency	Diagnosis, need, vision, plan, empowerment, unfreezing	Denial/resistance	--	3 phases & 3 stages	Institutionalizing, measure, reinforcement
Balogun's (2001)	Organizational culture, organizational context assessment, people	Cultural shift, Cultural web, change kaleidoscope (readiness is a component), people aspect	Barrier to change	Design choice based on contextual variables (see change kaleidoscope)	7 sequential steps, fifth step is phasing of change	Evaluate change outcomes,
Mento *et al.* (2002)	Idea and its context, evaluate climate for change, integrate lessons learned	Defining the initiative, change plan, find & cultivate a sponsor, prepare change recipient, change leader team,	--	plan should be flexible	12 sequential steps	Create cultural fit – make the change last, small wins for motivation, communicate, measure progress, After action review process (AARP)
Oakland and Tanner's (2007) Figure of eight	Culture, structure, process, behavior, organizational resources	Managing the softer side, need for change. Leadership, readiness explicitly indicated, planning	--	Learning	Cyclic processes connecting readiness and implementing	Effective communication, systems & controls
Pryor *et al.* (2008)	Organizational purpose, people	--	--	--	--	Reinvention of the future, performance

Maes and Van Hootegem (2011)	Socio-economic, organizational (strategy, structure, people, culture)	--	--	Change system entertaining eight dimensions of change to integrate them	System model of change	--
Van de Ven and Poole (1995); Van de Ven and Sun (2011)	Analysis of situations when each model applies (breakdowns)	Consensus building, responding to complaints, political savvy, strategies for competitive advantage	Breakdowns (in four motors) examples: lack of consensus, resistance, power imbalance, lack of scarcity	Selection of models from repertoire (based on unit of change – mode of change analysis) Action - reflection	Four typologies of process cycles (dissatisfaction-search-goal setting-implementation; sequence of steps; confrontation-conflict-synthesis; variation-selection-retention)	
Lin *et al.* (2017)	Existing routines, existing behavioral patterns	Stress the unfitness of existing, Stress the fitness of new, Shared schemata, action disposition	Stress the fitness of existing, Focus on similarity between new and existing, Stick to existing behavior	--	Preliminary implementation-deep implementation-new rules and regulations establishment	New routines solidification
Glaser (2017)	External communities, existing routine	Intention to change the routine	Newly designed artifacts by actors (deviance), existing artifacts	Design assemblages	--	Change in routine dynamics

8.2.1. Addressing Context of Change

In terms of addressing context, with the exception of Balogun (2001) sufficient depth of analysis is not apparent in these works (see table 8.1). Balogun (2001) extended her discussion of implementing strategic change to the extent of proposing frameworks of analyzing context especially at an organizational level. Balogun (2001) designed two frameworks which help change managers analyze context at an organizational level. In her two frameworks (i.e., cultural web and change kaleidoscope), she specified context determinant components around which change managers can make analyses. Following these analyses, if the organization is found ready for change, Balogun (2001) recommended seven steps through which strategic change can be implemented.

In general terms, as per the model proposed by the present study, implementation is not viewed as a simple step (sequence) of actions but a very complex *(see Figure 7.2)* interlock of behavioral and technical components that must be systematically analyzed to flexibly accommodate evolving behavioral dynamics and contexts on the bases of which implementation tasks must be shaped. This requires systematically leading interwoven behavioral and technical components towards an envisioned future organization.

Moreover, features of the envisioned organization are not considered by the present study as terminal; rather they will serve as starting context of newly evolved infusion of behaviors, techniques, and systems which in turn will serve as foci of next changes. This way, organizations evolve through a planned change to a system which continues to improvise through exploiting dynamic routines. This means, the model starts by analyzing extant contexts, selecting a change model (design of change), building strong behavioral and technical success enhancers (two stages of readiness) and finally enacting within the newly designed organizational system. This makes the model a hybrid which flexibly accommodates alternating planned strategic changes followed by continuous emergent changes that exploit on organizational artifacts.

National context is the other issue the present research intended to address by exploring on a sector which is reserved for domestic players only. This relatively control domestic environment resulted in the findings that are discussed in previous chapters. How are these findings related to what scholars discuss in the extant literature?

Balogun's (2001) more extensive work which is known for its contributions in terms of addressing context does not encompass contextual factors that are specific to a defined context. They are generic and pertinent to organizational level factors. However, organizational contexts are not merely confided to organizational level factors; the national and industry environment in which the organization operates also affect context. The relevance of an account for national context to design a model for organizational change is posited by Pettigrew *et al.* (2001).

Among the models that are reviewed in the present study and those that are selected being most relevant for the topic of discussion, specific type of contexts such as a nation or an industry were not mentioned to be appropriate settings within which a model can best function. Maes and Van Hootegem's (2011) mention of socio-economic context is among the attempts of specifying (qualifying) context. This expression is still too broad to understand how context interplays with implementation efforts.

In the present study, context appeared to play significant role and hence its representation in the proposed model has new insights as compared to how these authors did. The difference can be attributed to the account of the influence of national context on organizational context in terms of shaping the entire setting under which strategic organizational change is implemented. This builds on Pettigrew *et al.*'s (2001) call for a context sensitive change implementation model.

For a strategic organizational change to be implemented successfully in the context of commercial banking sector in Ethiopia, it is found out that addressing the issue of nonprofit motives of owners (in the private sector case) and political motives of government representatives (members of board of directors) significantly affect success in implementation. Intensity of competition in the market affects the degree of interference of the aforementioned parties (i.e., those who have motives other than organizational objectives) in the management of banks and their value of the need for change. This, in turn, affects their sincerity in committing themselves towards supporting the initiative. This condition is what is broadly addressed in connection with the softer components (cognitive and behavioral aspects) of the proposed change implementation model.

Evolving organizational context represented by the circular arrow in Figure 7.2 is the other feature of how the present study addressed context. The banking sector in Ethiopia is characterized by few players resulting in weak market competition. This reduced pressure on banks to an extent that owners and other authorities do not worry much on profitability as described in Chapter Four. This made readiness for change difficult. On the other hand, service provision in banking business is becoming highly advanced forcing them to adopt at least some of the fundamental technologies. Therefore, banks in Ethiopia are operating under paradoxes of relatively difficult softer side and continuously changing technical (operational side) in line with technological advancement. A strategic change in such kinds of contexts should address both aspects of the context. That is why the proposed model also addresses the issues of artifacts (in line with technology). This made the proposed model more comprehensive compared to what has been done in the literature so far.

8.2.2. Readiness for Change

Readiness is exclusively addressed by Balogun (2001) and Oakland and Tanner (2007). Especially the account of Balogun is similar to what is emerged in the present study. She recommends starting the application of her seven step model once the organizational readiness is ensured which is manifested by emergence of different parties who buy into the change. Implicitly, in her explanation, management is assumed to have a leadership role in achieving this. However, she does not note the possibility of employee initiated changes, manager resistance, and owner interference in her explanation of readiness issue. In the present study, these issues emerged as important components that determine level of an organization's readiness to change. This also builds on Burnes's (2015) contention on the source of resistance to be individuals and in most cases employees. As evident in the present study, the issue of employees is not the only component of readiness assessment efforts. Balogun (2001) also takes the assumption of employee as residents while managers are usually change leaders. The three analytical paths of readiness explained in Chapter Seven are therefore other contributions of the present study to the body of knowledge. These three paths represent six scenarios to which the proposed implementation model is expected to flexibly fit.

8.2.3. Flexibility to Accommodate Varying Contexts

Context emerged as evolving factor in the present research. As explained in Chapter Seven and in the previous sub-sections, softer side of organizational context has emerged to be unavoidably decisive during implementing strategic organizational change. Commercial banks in Ethiopia have relatively static parts (that do not change much following the strategic change initiative) and continuously changing parts that are supported by technology (e.g. core banking, mobile banking, internet banking). In terms of dynamism, the static component is ironically more dynamic as it is politically infused with different interests and powers. This is dynamic because it is shaped by cognitive and behavioral reactions of the people (owners, management, change agents, and employees). It is too soft and dynamic for a change leader to ensure readiness for change through properly functioning over three analytical paths that are driven by alternating (1) skepticism-trust, (2) initiator-reactor, and (3) motive group-organizational group politics. The leader interacts with three paths-six scenarios based on status of the dilemma pertaining to the three paired positions of actors. The leader then has to devise a strategy to effectively influence the behavior of actors and ensure sufficient number of buy-ins into the change. The result of these leadership analyses following the three paths helps to be flexible to accommodate variance in evolving contexts.

The ways flexibility is addressed in the extent literature do not converge exactly with what is described in the above paragraph. For example, Balogun's (2001) which is most explicit and relatively well equipped, described flexibility in line with the change kaleidoscope framework. In the framework, an organization carries out design choices based on several issues including power, time, readiness, scope and capacity. However, the target of flexibility notion is design choice. This is equivalent to the recommendation made by Armenakis and Harris (2009) not to grab change as a passing fad instead of based on analysis about need for change.

In the present research, flexibility starts right from readiness assurance by the leader. The leader is expected to apply the three paths-six scenarios to flexibly apply the one which best fits. This is the other area of contribution by the present study.

8.2.4. Implementation Deterrents

This is also an issue that is related to the three analytical paths. Each path is serving as a change enhancing interlock or as a change deterrent interlock depending on which scenario prevails in the organization. This is how a total of six scenarios can prevail. This section deals with the deterrent side of each path. The purpose is to help the change leader understand prevailing organizational conditions that have potential to deter the initiated change from being implemented effectively. Such understanding helps the leader to devise a strategy of enhancing readiness.

As summarized in Table 8.1, Kottor (1995), Van de Ven and Poole (1995) and Van de Ven and Sun (2011) explicitly accounted for causes of break downs which the present research also refers to as change deterrents. The present research converges with this idea. However, the specific change deterrents identified by the present study are different from those accounted for by the aforementioned authors. The rest of the selected scholars as summarized in Table 8.1, do not consider such factors in their models. The practice of considering these factors also reappeared in the recent scholarship (i.e., Lin *et al.*, 2017 & Glaser, 2017) as the models also become closer to practices. This implies, in practice, understanding specific causes of breakdowns and devising an approach which tackles them makes a difference.

8.2.5. Procedures and Implementation Outcomes

In terms of procedures, extant literature is dominated by sequences of steps (e.g., Lewin's three-step model, Kotter's, eight-step model, Balogun's seven-step model). There are also models that are based on cyclic sequences of steps (e.g., Oakland & Tanner's figure of eight model, Pryor *et al.*'s five Ps model). These procedures in most cases encompass outcome indicators (measures) as means of controlling progress and reinforcing successful practices.

The present study also builds on the importance of such means of measuring progress and devising reinforcement. However, these procedures, in addition to softer side readiness which is discussed so far, require technical side readiness. The change leader lays the foundation which makes a smooth interface between the soft and the technical (hard) side which mainly requires expert buy-in to the process. This second stage of readiness assurance effort recommended by the present research is another contribution to the body of knowledge.

8.2.6. Technical Readiness and the Triple Helix of Initiating-Designing-Implementing

The second stage of readiness assurance is found to be dealing with the technical side of organizational change. In the study context, it was found that when everyone was assigned as designer of required change while the design type (i.e., the change model which is BPR in one of the cases and business process redesigning in the other) is determined prior to the start of relevant analyses, successful implementation becomes hardly possible. Therefore, expert buy-in should be ensured right from the initiating stage. In addition, experts should also be networked with other major actors.

Actor networking and persuasive communication by change leaders should ensure that those who got involved as experts are properly networked with other actors and change related actions and interactions among actors are communicated over this network. This network serves as a chain of actors who take part in the implementation of the initiated change. Ensuring smoothness of the actions and interactions over this chain (network) is required as an indicator of second level of readiness for change—technical readiness. An implementation attempt that starts before these two stages of readiness is emerged as premature implementation. The leader does all these to prevent premature implementation which leads the entire initiative into a trajectory that could not deliver the required change.

The triple helix of initiating, designing and implementing becomes more valid after ensuring readiness. The interface among the three should be strong enough to ensure successful implementation. As depicted in Figure 7.4, there is a cyclic relationship among these major steps indicating the possibility to start other round change initiative following an evaluation result of implemented changes.

Initiating should be technically handled as determining the needed change and selecting the appropriate type of model (design choice) that require interlocked contributions from experts who take part in all the three. This is because the three are related to each other in sequential interdependence logic.

Designing follows from what is specified in the initiating stage. What needs to be changed and using what design method is usually specified by the initiating stage. However, designer should have a smooth interaction with initiators for possible discussion to enhance clarity or for proposals in the contents of what initiators proposed. Chain breakdown may result in a design that does not represent the change need of the organization.

Effectiveness of design is measured in terms of completeness, specificity and timeliness. All of these indicators were emerged from practically faced challenges in the two banks. The impact of technical readiness becomes apparent at this stage. For example, if design is not complete or specific, implementation will obviously be problematic if the interaction between designers and implementers is not smooth. Premature implementation could also destruct not only implementation (as design may not be complete) but also designing (as designers may perceive that their effort is not considered by implementers and stop delivering complete design).

Backed by smooth chain of action and interaction among actors, complete and specific design must be provided to implementers before the actual tasks of implementation are commenced.

Implementation then becomes effective as it is backed by complete design with sufficient specifications and smooth relations with initiators and designers for possible hands on demand on due course. The existence of well functioning chain keeps the triple helix intact and enables the interaction to deliver the desired change. In addition support of technology is proved to ensure irreversibly changing organizational routines as detailed in the next sub-section.

In the extant literature, there is no implementation model which encompasses features that address specific contextual issues and captures technical readiness criteria as proposed by the present study. These features are empirically sound at least in the context of commercial banking sector in Ethiopia. Whether they are valid in other contexts too, needs the attention and efforts of future researchers. Setting the issue for discussion is a contribution by the present study.

8.2.7. Implementing and the Use of Artifacts as Means of Changing Old Routines

Commercial banks in Ethiopia are hybrid organizations. They have very static back offices which did not change much even after the implementation of the studied change initiatives. On the other side, their core business processes are continuously changing by adopting advanced technologies that improve banking service provision.

As a result of adopting new technologies, these banks which are otherwise unable to bring about successful changes despite their efforts to do so managed to effectively transform their service provision routines. Technological packages (e.g., software) are considered as an artifact in the literature (Glaser, 2017). Artifacts appeared in contemporary literature as means of altering organizational routines. Building on Glaser's (2017), the present study extends to a proposition that even in contexts where soft side readiness is difficult to achieve, the use of carefully designed artifacts can effectively change organizational routines. Therefore, in contexts such as the commercial banking sector in Ethiopia, an initiative for planned change can take the inclusion of artifacts in its design as a guarantee to bring about effective changes.

The cyclic interface among the triple helix as depicted in Figure 7.4 is an indication where an initially planned change, after effectively implemented (especially in technologically supported context), will serve as a continuously changing spot. This means, effectively implementing artifact-based change serves as a starting point for the next initiative. This made a purely domestic environment exposed to a global practice. Ironically, static and dynamic organizational units are being witnessed running within same organization. This indicates the impact of artifacts in bring about strategic organizational changes.

An incorporation of this finding in the proposed implementation model made it unique. This model encompasses features that capture specific contextual realities that must be addressed to implement strategic organizational change (planned change); and at the same time, the model flexibly addresses evolving organizational contexts both during and after the implementation of the initial initiative. The two stages of readiness enhancing analyses reflect this. More explicitly, how the model evolves to handle evolving change needs is manifested in its technical component. This makes the proposed model more comprehensive than those in the extant literature.

8.3. Recommendations

Based on the findings of the research, the following recommendations are made:

- The degree of actual or potential consensus among company owners (relevant government body in the case of government-owned banks), the management group and the entire workforce about the need for initiating a change within the initiating organization's reality at that specific time of initiation should come as a prior test for the existence of favorable conditions to initiate and implement strategic organizational change in commercial banks in Ethiopia.

- Technical issues regarding a change should be handled by competent professionals who can contextualize change models into specific organizational requirements that triggered the change; and translate it into implementable design.
- Implementation should be commenced after putting in place necessary organizational systems that prevent regression and enhance completeness of implementation within anticipated time frame and predefined performance level.
- Government, through its central bank, should enhance capacity to regulate bank practices in a way market forces play significant roles and there will be no room for nonprofit motives and no possibility to comfortably make profit out of inefficiency.
- Commercial banks in Ethiopia can enhance effectiveness in implementing strategic organizational change that encompasses the entire organization including support business process through incorporating carefully designed artifacts instead of tempting to apply a passing management fad.

8.4. Recommendations for Further Research

The technical components in the proposed implementation model were developed through exploiting the opportunity of cross-case analysis of core business processes and support business processes (embedded within each bank). The notion of applying organizational routines as means of implementing organizational change and innovation is a recently emerging issue (see Lin *et al.*, 2017 and Feldman *et al.*, 2016). The researcher believes that the notion of dynamic routines and the use of artifacts in changing routines are promising areas of investigation towards developing context sensitive implementation models. Incorporating how artifacts can be designed being aligned to strategic intents of organizations to the model which is proposed by the present research could be an opportunity to extend contributions to the body of knowledge in strategic organizational change implementation.

Moreover, as it can also be noted from the introduction and literature review chapters of this report, there is a need for the development of organizational change theories that take non-western contexts into account. Besides, the notion of implementation model is meagerly represented in the literature of organizational change. The present research lays the foundation for further research specifically in line with the following recommendations to build on or falsify the findings of this research:

- Researchers should give considerable attention to the search for contextualized implementation support tools for a developing economy in general and Ethiopia in particular.
- Researchers can test the generalizability of the proposed model and resultant propositions in other contexts and come up with falsifying or supporting findings which will help to start scholarly debates on the issue.

8.5. Chapter Summary

The present research was initiated with an intention to build a context sensitive implementation model for strategic organizational change. Through an in-depth investigation into the context of commercial banking sector in Ethiopia, it is found that, inductively developing strategic organizational change implementation model based on empirical data reveals new insights on the topic of implementation. In this regard, the implementation model developed by the present research has features that contribute to theory. The flexibility of the model to accommodate evolving contextual dynamics until a planned change is effectively implemented, and the model's evolution to embark on new needs for change which is analyzed based on newly enacted routines through the use of carefully designed artifacts is its major contribution to the theory of strategic organizational change implementation.

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Annexes

Annex 1: Participant Information Sheet

Dear Prospective Participant,

My name is Getahun Mekonnen Belay. I am a PhD student at University of South Africa (UNISA). I am conducting a research as part of fulfilling the requirements to obtain my PhD degree. The title of my research is “Implementation model for strategic organizational change in Ethiopian commercial banks.”

The information you will be providing to me will be used for this research purpose only. You are selected to participate in this study because of your experience during design and/or implementation of the change in your organization. Your role in participating in the research will be to share your idea about the change you have experienced in your organization. The expected duration of the interview will be determined by you. You can stop the discussion at any time and decide to continue at other time for the sake of your convenience. You can also withdraw at any time by your own discretion. Participation is fully dependent on your willingness. Nothing will happen to you as a result of withdrawing from the research.

The purpose of this study is to develop a model that will serve as a framework to guide implementation of strategic organizational changes in banks. The information you will be providing will not be reported in a way it explicitly discloses any information about you and your respective bank. Identity of you and your bank is not needed for this research. Therefore, there is no confidentiality problem. You are not facing privacy related problem as well. No risk of harm is expected as a result of participating in this research. No financial or any kind of compensation or reimbursement will be given to you in response to participating in this research. You will be giving the information to the researcher just to help him conduct the research which will benefit your organization and the banking sector as a whole in the form of information (feedback) to be exchanged in various forms such as summary of research findings, presentation during workshops whichever will be convenient.

The information in the interview notes, audio tapes and transcriptions will not be accessed by anybody other than the researcher (me). I will lock paper based files containing interview notes in my own locker and save electronic documents and audio in a password protected file in my own password protected computer. I will carefully destroy these files to protect you and your organization from any harm (though not expected) after keeping these files for five years in a secured manner for my own future reference purpose only.

I am kindly requesting you to give me information relating to the change in your bank honestly. It is critical for the quality of the research which will have benefits to your bank, other banks and the research community in the field.

Thank you for being willing to participate in the research and giving me your precious time.

Annex 2: Interview Guide (Initial)

A. Background of the initiative and the respondent

1. Have your bank undergone some form of change?
2. What was the scope of your involvement in the initiative?
3. Can the change be identified as a specific type of change? Was it planned?
4. When did it happen?
   a. Complete?
   b. Still in progress?
5. How was the change initiative and its implementation structured?
6. Who should have initiated and led the changes in your bank? And how?
7. What were the strategic issues relating to (driving to) the change initiative?
8. How did you plan (if it was planned) the implementation of the initiative?

B. Details of implementation practices

1. In terms of major milestones (important events, documents produced, outcomes etc...), how do you explain the story of the change initiative in your bank chronologically from its inception to the level it reaches now?
2. How the actual implementation deviates (if it does) from prescribed (planned) one?
   a. Why did you decide to deviate? (If it was a conscious decision) or why did these deviations happen?
   b. How do these deviations from prescribed procedures contribute to the success and/or failure of the change initiative?
3. How do you explain the resultant positive and/or negative outputs and outcomes of the change initiative?

C. Contextual issues

1. With respect to successfully implementing strategic organizational change, what are the important success or failure factors that are unique to the banking sector in Ethiopia? How are these success and/or failure factors related to one another?
2. As compared to sticking to already existing products in the global market, how do you explain the feasibility of innovative banking in the context of commercial banking in Ethiopia? How is this related to implementing a change?

D. Designing an implementation

1. What are the major lessons that can be learned from previous change implementation practices in your bank?
2. If you are given a responsibility to design and successfully implement a strategic organizational change in a commercial bank in Ethiopia, how do you frame a guideline that helps you in actually realizing the initiative in a way it is sought (to walk the talks)?

Annex 3: Interview Guide (Revised/evolved)

A. Background of the initiative and the respondent

1. What was the scope of your involvement in the initiative?
2. How was the change initiative and its implementation structured?
   a. Who were involved in the initiative?
   b. What was the relationship among those who were involved in the initiative?
   c. How do you evaluate this structure?
3. Who should have initiated and lead the changes in your bank? And how?

B. Contextual issues

1. With respect to successfully implementing strategic organizational change, what are the important success or failure factors that are unique to the banking sector in Ethiopia? How are these success and/or failure factors related to one another?
2. As compared to sticking to already existing products in the global market, how do you explain the feasibility of innovative banking in the context of commercial banking in Ethiopia? How is this related to implementing a change?

C. Details of implementation practices

1. In terms of major milestones (important events, documents produced, outcomes etc...), how do you explain the story of the change initiative in your bank chronologically from its inception to the level it reaches now?
2. How the actual implementation deviates (if it does) from prescribed (planned) one?
   a. Why did you decide to deviate? (If it was a conscious decision) or why did these deviations happen?
   b. How do these deviations from prescribed procedures contribute to the success and/or failure of the change initiative?

D. Designing an implementation

1. If you will be given a responsibility to design and successfully implement a strategic organizational change in a commercial bank in Ethiopia, how would you formulate a guideline that helps you in actually realizing the initiative in a way it is sought (to walk the talks)?

2. What are the major lessons that can be learned from previous change implementation practices in your bank?

Annex 4: Top Most Grounded Codes from Bank A's Data Generated by Atlas.ti



Annex 5: Top Densest Codes from Bank A's Data Generated by Atlas.ti



Name	Grounded
Personnel selection~	29
conflict of self interest~	34
Attitude	13
Communication	22
Contextualization~	11
Perception management~	41
implementation success	9
Workforce Capacity	15
Deviant implementation~	31
Team realations	19
Emotional engagement~	10
Timing~	3
Implementation specifications~	27
skepticism	34
Sustainability	5
Reducing resistance	5
Employee morale	12
Understanding change model~	54
Workforce Satisfaction	3
Separation of designers' and implementers	45
Implementation support System~	24
office politics~	33
Persuation	3
Premature implementation	8
Cross team collaboration	7
Transparency~	31
Change model-context match	24
Aftermath	9
unnecessary secretes	1
Rumor	10
Infrastructure	10
Understaning organizational realities	18
Balance of attention~	27

Annex 6: List of Codes, Bank A

Output by Atlas.ti

List of All Codes

Absence of change management system
Accelerated implementation
Access to information
Access to infrastructure
Account for overlooked matters
Adhering to principles reduces resistance
Aftermath
Anticipated level of competition
Application of model principles
Attitude
Autonomous team
Awareness creation
background condition
Background knowledge
Balance of attention
Baseline
Battle
Benefits of sequential team establishment
Best practices
Bias towards the old system
Blending innovation with adoption
Business context
Capacity
capacity building
Capacity of managers
Cause of failure
Challenging the present system
change agents
Change model-context match
Change needs recognition
Changing situations
Clarity of directions
Clear stance
Clearing misconceptions
Collective leadership
Communication
Comparative position across teams
Compensation
Conception stage
Conducive environment for concentration
Confidence level
conflict of self interest
Confounded success
Consensus
Consistency
Constrained idea generation capacity
Content of change
Contextualization
Contextualization challenges
Contextually unfit
contingency
Continuous change
Continuous learning
control
Convert each leader to be a change leader
cost minimization
Cost of reactive corrections
Cover up with other successes
Crisis management
Cross team collaboration
Cross team equity
Cross team evaluation
Cross team integration
Cross team triangulation
Culture
customer feedback
Customer needs
customer perspective
Deadline syndrome
Death Valley
Dedicated unit for change
Degree of completeness
Delay
Deliverables
Designer-implementer exceptional
Designing and Implementing role
Deviant change model
Deviant implementation
Deviant strategic direction
Discontinuous change
Diversity of views

Documented design
Dominance
Emerging structure
Emotional engagement
Employee morale
Ensuring implementation
Erroneous attributes of change to performance improvement
Experience backed speed
Experience gap
experience sharing
Experience survey
External consultant
External factors
Facilities supply
Failed initiative
Fairness of treatment
Feasibly of new system
Feedback
Feeling of unfair treatment
Filtering ideas generated
Financial capacity
Fine-tuning
Fit to the context
Flexibility
Formulating fit strategy
Framework components
Gap analysis
Generating alternatives
Global uniformity of banking business
Goal
Government intervention
Gradual increment of participants
Handling knowledge gap
Handling Oldies
Handling the human resource
Human development
human element
Idea generation
Impact of customer satisfaction
Impact of external intervention
Impact of Implementation success on resistance
Impact of participation
Impact of previous change
Implementation capacity
Implementation controlling unit
Implementation delay
Implementation disorder
Implementation focus
Implementation Procedures
Implementation Schedule/Plan
Implementation sequencing
Implementation specifications
implementation success
Implementation support System
Implementers
Implications to personal interest
Individual dependent performance
Infrastructure
Initial absence of management commitment
Initial number of participants
initial stage of externally imposed initiative
Initial waste of time
Innovating on societal needs
Internal consistency
Internal Relations
International Impacts
Interruption
Introducing the new system
Involvement of Top leaders/board
Irrelevant authority
Job design
Knowledge gap
Lack of motivation
Lack of trust
leadership
Leadership Determination
Leadership development
Learning
Lesson from Failed initiative
Lesson from previous change
Lesser attention to back offices
Lesser attention to implementation than design
Loss of order
Major events
Management commitment

Management style
Manpower first!
Manpower requirement
Manpower utilization
Market segment
Means of new idea generation
Means of understanding existing system
Mentoring leads to success
Merit based selection
Mismatch between reality and mental model
Mobilizing resources
Model-national context fit
Model preconditions
Model Selection
Monitoring
National development level
National environment
National problem
Nature of National competition
Nature of processes
Negative consequences
New generation of workforce
New idea generation
New knowledge and skill requirement
New structure
new system design
No room for further improvement
Non profit motive
Objective criteria
office politics
Organizational culture
Organizational structure
Organizational structure team
Owners of initiatives
ownership
Pain analysis
Participant Commitment
participant entities
participatory
Perception management
Performance indicators
Performance loss
Performance measure
Personnel selection
Persuasion
Phased approach
Pilot testing
Pilot testing benefits
Plan
Political neutralization
Positioning personnel selection
Premature implementation
Premature information release
Preparedness/readiness
Present industry
Present system analysis
Prevention of regression
Priority ranking
Pro adoption strategy
Pro innovative strategy
Process change
Purpose clarity
Quality of team members
Randomness
Rational for a new initiative
Rational for sequential team establishment
Readiness for challenges
Real-time data generation
Reducing bias
Reducing excessive focus on present system
Reducing resistance
Refinement of ideas
Reporting relations
Reporting syndrome
Resistance
Resistant management
Responsiveness to global changes
Reward
Risk minimization
Risk of external advice
Risk of personnel loss
Role ambiguity
Role of authorities
Role of designers on implementation
Rumour
Rushing

Scientifically proven
Scope of participation
security
Self assessment
Self convinced leader
Selflessness
Sense of achievement
Separation of designers' and implementers
service requirements
Shared understanding
Shock
Sincerity of purpose
Situational analysis
skepticism
Skill gap
source of information
Span of supporters
Stakeholder participation
Strategic direction
Success story
Succession management
Supporter base
Sustainability
System
Team building
Team capacity
Team composition
Team Dissolution
Team establishment priory
team establishment
Team management
Team member selection
Team organization
Team relations
Team representation
Team responsibility
Technical structural
Technology
Telecommunications problem
Tenure
Theory-Practice fit
Thinking outside the box
Time budgeting
Timing
Timely decision
Top-down approach
Transparency
Turning point
Turnover
Underpinning assumptions behind the new system
Understanding change model
Understanding organizational realities
Unilateral communication
Unique customer needs
unnecessary secretes
Use of independent party
Voluntary participation
Watching The "rights"
Within team collaboration
Workforce Capacity
Workforce Satisfaction

Annex 7: List of Codes, Bank B

Code Book from Bank B Data

Abandoning Performance Measures
Aligning Benefits to changed behavior
Approach
Approval of designed change
Attitude
Attracting Competent Personnel
Awareness creation
Balanced attention
Blaming Leaders
Bottom up
Bringing Supreme Power on Board
Business Performance Pressure
Capacity of leaders
Capacity of top management
Cause of failure
Coercion
Commitment
Communication break
Competitiveness
Conflict of interest
Content of Change
Contextualization
Contextualization capacity
Continuous change
Convincing
Convincing Sponsors
Cost of unsuccessful Initiative
Creativity
Cross team relations
Cultural change
Customer handling
Customer needs
Dedicated Unit for change management
Deliverables
Designing parties
Deviant implementation
Disastrous Change
Discriminatory treatments
Disorganized initiative
Documented design
Dominance oriented owners
Emerging challenges
Employee Morale
Employee satisfaction
Employee Turnover
Empowering Top management
Empowerment of workers
Evaluation
Excessive intervention of board of directors
Expected nature of competition
Expert power
Externally Driven
Failure story
Failure to take evaluation results
Fear of the unknown
Flexibility
Follow up
Functional approach
Good governance
Government Intervention
Government owned led Competition
Guiding Principles
Human Capacity
Human Element
ICT Infrastructure
Ignored back offices
Impact of functional approach
Impact of Protected Market
Implementation
Implementation failure
Implementation Specification
Implementation support
Implementer commitment
Incomplete change
Injecting a new blood to break the status quo
Involvement of professionals
IT support
Lack of awareness
Lack of common interest
Lack of Competitive Employee Benefits
Lack of Competitive Pressure
Lack of Experience
Lack of expertise in change
Lack of integration between actors
Lack of leadership
Lack of Management Commitment
Lack of ownership
Lack of professionalism
Lack of shared vision
Lack of skilled labor
Lack of top management support
Lack of Training
Lack of trust
Lack of understanding the change model
Leadership Commitment
Learning from best practices
Level of National Development
Managing resistance to change
Misuse of power
Model specification
Motivating employees
Multinational Exposure requirement
Naming the initiative
National Context
Nature of national market
Nature of the industry

Nature or change
New skill requirements
New system design
New System Requirements
No acceptance by top management
No compelling reason to change
No Evaluation and Follow up
No room for innovativeness
Nominal Change management Department
Non Profit Motive
Office politics
Organizational culture
Owner of initiatives
Owners' Awareness
Perception management
Performance efficiency
Personnel Handling
Personnel Selection
Pilot testing
Political legal environment
Positive outputs
Power interventions
Powerless change management Unit
Present system analysis
Private-Government Discrimination
Pro adoption
Pro innovative
Proactive Approach
Process Performance
Qualified Leader
Qualified Personnel
Rational For change
Reaction from resistant management
Reactive to external forces
Readiness for Change
Reducing resistance
Regression
Reporting relations
Resistant Management
Resource allocation
Resource Limitation
Scope of change
Scope of participation
Selfless Leader
Shareholder composition
Short Sighted Owners
Sincerity of Purpose
Soft side
Standards of performance
Steps in the initiative
Strategic direction
Struggle for change
Sustainability
Team establishment
Team member background
Team member commitment
Team Relations
Team responsibility
Technology support
Tenure of management
Top management commitment
Total dissatisfaction
Training
Trigger for change
Type of customer
Type of Ownership
Unconvinced Middle Manager
Understanding the need for change
Unfair competition between private and government banks
Use of Experienced Leader
Using the right professional as bank manager
Worsened Situation

Annex 8: Top most Grounded Codes from Bank B Data Generated by Atlas.ti



Annex 9: Densest Codes from Bank B Data Generated by Atlas.ti

Annex 10: Comparison of Top Grounded and Dense codes from Bank B Data





Annex 11: Ethical Clearance Certificate

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14 January 2014

Ref: # 2013_DBL_018 (FA: Addis Ababa)

Mr Getahun Mekonnen Belay: Student [+251 911 858 790; getahunm@gmail.com]
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GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE (GSBL RERC)

This is to certify that the application for ethics clearance submitted by
Mr Getahun Mekonnen Belay: (student # 72682604) in the fulfilment of a
Doctoral Degree in Business Leadership:

Implementation Model for Strategic Organizational Change in Ethiopian Commercial Banks has received ethics approval

The research ethics application for the abovementioned research project was reviewed by a sub-committee of the GSBL RERC in compliance with the Unisa Policy on Research Ethics, on 10 January 2014 and final approval is granted. The decision will be submitted to the GSBL RERC for ratification on 30 January 2014.

This certificate is valid for the duration of the project. Please be advised that the committee needs to be informed should any part of the research methodology as outlined in the ethics application [2013_DBL_018 FA: Addis Ababa)] change in any way or if any ethical problems are encountered during the course of the study. No field work may be conducted without the necessary permission granted by the identified organisations.

The Graduate School of Business Leadership Research Ethics Review Committee wishes you all the best with this research undertaking.

Kind regards,

RVisagie

Dr RG Visagie
Chairperson of the Research Ethics Review Committee, GSBL, UNISA
+2712-429 2478/ Visagrg@unisa.ac.za

Annex 12: A Network Generated by ATLAS.ti, Bank A



Annex 13: A Network Generated by ATLAS.ti, Bank B