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**Representation of new values of masculinity**

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Sulanam

**Ulama pesantren's intellectual genealogy networks**

M. Bagus Sekar Alam

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## The shifting of meaning of returns for ideological voters

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### Abstract

The trend of money politics in the electoral process also affected ideological voters. There are ways used by ideological voters to reinterpret political money seduction from legislative candidates or non-ideological parties. This paper aims to describe how ideological voters participate in general election contest while attempting to give victory to their ideological party. This paper also illustrates how the ideological voter mobilizers gain votes from their ideological party. In order to understand this phenomenon, this study is based on the 2014 legislative elections held in Wotan Village, Panceng District, Gresik Regency. This location is selected as the object of the study mainly because in this village there are two equally strong community organizations (NU and Muhammadiyah), so the tendency to be ideological to certain ideological parties is very strong. One of the most important findings is that there is an effort to interpret money politics as a political charity, in addition to the emergence of pseudo-pragmatism among these ideological voters.

**Keywords:** Political charity, *money politics*, Islamic parties, ideological parties, ideological voters, beginner voters, millennial generation, legislative election.

### Introduction

The quotes above appeared in several *Whats App* group posts, merely wanting to warn how the contest of power in general elections is the best way to determine the current choices. (Political Journal 2009: 415) In addition to the elections conducted by General Election Commission (KPU) and the government in general, general election was also enthused by various elements of society. The aim is to allow the society to participate in the once-in-five-year election.

The ignorance tendency that has lately symptomatized among the society towards the electoral process also seems to be driven by various disappointments after the electability of certain figures. Thus, this results in a decrease in voter participation in the election contestation, whether at the regional, legislative or national level. The low level of public participation to vote in general election peaked in the 2009 election. Bismar Arianto in his writing said that the number of voters who did not use their voting rights in 2009 election reached 29.1%, far higher than the previous election which reached 15.9% (Journal of Political Science & Governmental Science 2011).

In order to optimize voter participation, General Election Commission and elements of the society carried out various breakthroughs. The dynamics that occurred between voters, general election participants (political parties, regent candidates, governor candidates, president candidates, and legislative candidates), and organizers (General Election Commission/KPU, Election Supervisory Agency/Bawaslu) were also quite diverse. These dynamics also caused various models of fulfillment of needs and desires of the voters (*supply and demand*), which in turn were translated by election contestants by giving something in return to voters, so that in 2014 it could be considered the most blooming time of money-based election ([liputan6.com](http://liputan6.com)\_2017). The political costs of the People's Representative Council Candidates also increased significantly from only 250 million rupiah in 2009 election to 1 billion rupiah in 2014 election.

It seems that the widespread practice of money politics also influences ideological voters. This group of voters, who in the previous period saw voting as part of the struggle, was thought to have undergone a shift from merely choosing certain parties or legislative candidates voluntarily and consciously to voting on consideration of 'material returns' or not giving their votes since 2014.



## **Sulanam: “The shifting of meaning of returns for ideological voters”**

This paper will describe how ideological voters participated in general election contestation while attempting to give victory to their ideological party. This paper also illustrates how the ideological voter mobilizers gained votes for their ideological party. In order to understand this phenomenon, this study is based on the 2014 legislative elections held in Wotan Village, Panceng District, Gresik Regency. This location is selected as the object of the study mainly because in this village there are two equally strong community organizations (NU and Muhammadiyah), so the tendency to be ideological to certain ideological parties is very strong.

### **2014 Legislative elections in NU-Muhammadiyah ideological base**

This village is located 25 Km west of Gresik City. This village in the western region of Gresik Regency-East Java, included in Panceng district, right on the edge of the teak forest on the north Coast of Java Island. Even though it is on the edge of the forest, most of the topography of this village is rocky land, which makes it difficult to plant. Therefore, since the beginning of the 1980s, many of the villagers have made their fortunes migrant workers to Malaysia. The presence of these migrant workers also boosts the economy of the people.

Judging from the fulfillment of religious facilities and educational facilities, this community can be considered to have a high awareness of public interest matters. One of the factors is the existence of two religious organizations – NU and Muhammadiyah– which thrive and are balanced. Hence, it is worth saying that the participation awareness displayed by this community is also influenced by the sentiments of raising each organization.

Each organization, NU and Muhammadiyah, has one mosque and one complex of Islamic education institutions, starting from the level of pre-school (PAUD), kindergarten (TK), elementary school (MI) and junior high school (MTs). In addition, each of these organizations also has TPQ (Al-Qur'an Learning Center for Children) as a place for its children to study the Holy Qur'an in a building that is quite sturdy and grandiose. As the explanation above, this also cannot be separated from the role of migrant workers who always set aside their income to be invested in the development of religious facilities and Islamic education in each organization. Therefore, these two organizations can also be considered to have an important role in developing this village, especially in promoting ideological preservation through the seedbed of knowledge in the world of education. Each organization seems to have the responsibility to assist and direct their people to the path that is in accordance with their respective religious ideals. On the other side, most of the emerging problems ultimately are also associated with the interests of each organization.

Understanding people in this village should not leave the factor of organizational sentiment, including for political matters starting from the contestation of village head election, regional election, to legislative and presidential election. On many occasions, political contestations, -like a natural thing- NU voters will tend to and cast their votes to NU figures. The vice versa, Muhammadiyah voters also cast their votes on Muhammadiyah figures, even though there are some other figures that are also chosen outside the general choice of the majority of these two groups. An informant told us that choosing and winning a figure who shared the same ideology was compulsory and even considered as an honor. “It's not just a matter of supporting the best one, but winning a particular candidate who shares the same ideology with us is a fight for honor”. (MU interview, May 26, 2014)

According to his opinion, this view is also shared by most figures both in NU and Muhammadiyah circles. When it comes to organization sentiments, it seems normal that the followers of this mass organization will immediately provide support to their own candidates. (Interview with the Village Secretary, March 11, 2018)

As illustrated above, given the large number of migrant workers who are not at home when the voting takes place, the facts shown in table 1 below still shows that community participation is quite high. It is noteworthy that from more than 600 heads of household in this village, nearly 85% have family

members who work as migrant workers, some of whom even have more than one family member working as migrant workers, who automatically do not vote in legislative elections. The number of voters (62.64%) in Table 1 is considered quite high when compared to the other similar politics events (Interview with the Head of PPS, Wotan, March 11, 2018).

**Table 1.** Voter Data and Voting Right Users

No.	Gender of Voters	Voter Data	Users	% of Users
1	Male	1,140	560	49.12
2	Female	1,122	857	76.38
<b>total</b>		<b>2,262</b>	<b>1,417</b>	<b>62.64</b>

Source: Processed from Form Model D.1 DPR, 2014 Wotan Village PPS

This is different from the time when the election is directly related to the villagers' daily life, such as village head election. At the time of village head election, given the importance directly felt by the society, the participation rate is also indicated by the large number of migrant workers returning home to vote for certain candidates. Legislative election cannot be equated with village head election. In addition, the boisterous spirit of this election also cannot immediately divide the two groups into the mainstream NU-PKB or Muhammadiyah - PAN parties.

The movement of voting sentiment in this election can be seen from polling stations in the fanatical base of NU-Muhammadiyah. Polling station 7 was the best place to find out how many NU votes were obtained because this polling station is located on the NU base on a Cooperative owned by the NU Educational institution. Meanwhile, the data displayed at polling station 1 or 2 can represent the vote sentiments for Muhammadiyah because this polling station is located on Muhammadiyah base near a Muhammadiyah leader's house.

### **Mobilization of ideological voters by the local success team**

In the context of the legislative election on April 9, 2014, voters were also consciously considering to choose NU (PKB) or Muhammadiyah (PAN) candidates. However, some of the voters also gave votes to candidates from NU and from Muhammadiyah outside the two mainstream parties with special considerations, such as blood ties or family relationship or certain rewards.

Uniquely, as shown in this political fact, in this village, there is also a pattern of voting data carried out by each local success team. This pattern of data collection –which was initially known to be carried out by the success team of a legislative candidate from Golkar party, (Interview NR, 20 May 2014) was eventually carried out by other parties such as Demokrat, PKS, PPP, PKB, PAN, Nasdem, Hanura, and PDIP through each legislative candidate as well.

This data collection pattern was used by the local success teams as the reference data that would later be provided to the candidates in question to calculate the political costs to disburse. Although this village is clearly the basis of NU and Muhammadiyah, a number of candidates from on-mainstream parties also invest politically in this village to gain votes. Of course, the method used to enter this village was by using NU-Muhammadiyah sentiments, and using certain groups outside the NU-Muhammadiyah mainstream.

In the data collection process, the motivation of the local campaign team was quite varied: (1) the success team that was going to lose the vote from the fanatics performed data collection in order to ensure each ideological vote (Interview with MU, May 26, 2014), (2) the not-too-fanatical side collected the data by using organizational interest sentiments, (3) the not-care-much-about NU-Muhammadiyah sentiments did it under the excuse of scrambling the votes. If someone is from NU, he

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will argue that he scrambles Muhammadiyah’s vote, and vice versa. (MU interview, May 26, 2014)  
Table 2 below is a profile of the local success teams working to win the candidates.

**Table2.**  
Profile of the Local Success Team (ST)

No.	Profile of the Local Success Team	Parties and Candidates		
		DPR RI	DPRD Prop.	Regency DPRD
1	NU resident; Chairperson of PKB Branch; Head of an NU educational institution	PKB	Gerindra	PKB
2	Muhammadiyah resident; Golkar Party cadre since the 80s. Head of RT	Golkar		Golkar
3	NU resident; Former treasurer of Fatayat NU Branch	Golkar		
4	NU resident; NU youth figure; village official	Demokrat		
5	Muhammadiyah resident; Muhammadiyah youth figure	PAN		PAN
6	NU resident; a car rental owner	PPP		
7	NU resident; youth figure; a food-stall owner		Golkar	Demokrat
8	Muhammadiyah resident; Muhammadiyah youth leaders		PAN	
9	NU resident; public health service employee			Nasdem
10	NU resident; Head of an NU educational institution			PKB
11	NU resident; former head of the IPNU branch			PKS
12	NU resident; Chairman of Ansor GP branch			PDIP
13	NU resident; related to youth circle			Golkar
14	NU resident; teacher ;IPNU role model			Gerindra
15	Muhammadiyah resident; a food-stall owner			PAN
16	NU resident; a youth			Hanura

Source: processed from the conversations in a coffee shop in front of MTs Tarbiyatus Shibyan, April 6, 2014, April 12, 2014 and May 29, 2014.

Observing the data above, it seems that many NU people were playing with the candidates. They were more easily drawn in the interests of candidates outside the mainstream parties. The data below (tables 3, 4, and 5) will show that the parties – especially the candidates – who worked with the help of local success teams got significantly more votes.

Interestingly, as shown by the data in table2 for the provincial level, PKB did not have a local success team. The local success team working for PKB at the central and district levels was actually joined by Gerindra Party at the provincial level. This certainly influenced the vote acquisition for PKB at the provincial level as shown in table7.

The data collection, from D-3 until early on the day of the election, was given in the form of compensation for the voting in the range of Rp.25,000,- to Rp. 50,000,- for Regional Legislature Candidates, Rp.10,000,- to Rp. 20,000,- for Provincial Parliament candidates and Rp.10,000 for People’s Representative Council Candidates. “This fee cannot be considered as *money politics* because

it is only used as a substitute for the cost of voting at a polling station, which is part of the charity given by the legislative candidate to his voters.”(Interview NR, May 20, 2014)Practically, all voters were mobilized by the local success team through the data collection process.

**Table 3.**

The number of votes for 2014 people’s representative council candidates mobilized by local Success Teams (ST)

No.	Name of Candidate	TPS 1	TPS 2	TPS 3	TPS 4	TPS 5	TPS 6	TPS 7	total
1	Nasdem								
2	PKB								
	1.Candidates with ST	22	13	9	43	30	57	72	246
3	PKS								
4	PDI P								
5	Golkar								
	1.Candidates with ST	12	17	14	5	2	5	12	67
	2.Candidates with ST	4	9	5	1	2	0	1	22
6	Gerindra								
7	Demokrat								
	1.Candidates with ST	1	4	4	0	5	2	0	16
8	PAN								
	1.Candidates with ST	74	40	40	27	13	22	3	219
9	PPP								
	1.Candidates with ST	18	0	4	11	33	20	31	117
10	Hanura								
11	PBB								
12	PKPI								
<b>Votes Mobilized by ST</b>		<b>131</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>687</b>
Total of Valid Votes		194	196	167	181	166	189	180	1,273
Percentage of Mobilized Votes by ST		67.53	42.35	45.51	48.07	51.20	56.08	66.11	53.97

Source: Processed from form D.1 DPR Model, 2014 Wotan Village PPS

Based on the data in table 3 above, the votes of candidates from PKB and PAN occupied the top position. On the bottom line “Percentage of Mobilized Votes by ST ”was the work of the author which indicated the success of the work of the local success team.53.97% of local success teams succeeded in influencing voters to participate in the choices they directed. Each polling station was successfully mobilized with a mobilization percentage between 42.35% - 67.53%.From the data above, TPS 1 and TPS 7 could be considered the most significant polling stations for candidates from ideological parties. TPS 1 contributed 74 votes for PAN candidates and TPS 7 contributed 72 votes for candidates from PKB.

People’s Representative Council election above seems to be different from the vote acquisition mobilized by the local success teams in the election of Provincial Parliament candidates in table 4, where only 43.21% of the success teams succeeded in mobilizing the votes. As displayed in table 2, candidates who had a local success team were only from Gerindra, Golkar and PAN.



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**Table 4.**

The number of votes for 2014 East Java provincial council candidates mobilized by local Success Teams (ST)

No.	Name of Party	TPS 1	TPS 2	TPS 3	TPS 4	TPS 5	TPS 6	TPS 7	Total
1	Nasdem								
2	PKB								
3	PKS								
4	PDI P								
5	Golkar								
	1.Candidates with ST	2	8	6	6	0	2	5	29
6	Gerindra								
	1.Candidate with ST	14	6	3	37	21	42	68	191
7	Demokrat								
8	PAN								
	1.Candidates with ST	92	76	74	28	21	29	10	330
9	PPP								
10	Hanura								
11	PBB								
12	PKPI								
<b>Votes Mobilized by ST</b>		<b>108</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>550</b>
Total of valid votes		194	196	167	181	166	189	180	1,273
Percentage of Mobilized Votes by ST		55.67	45.92	49.70	39.23	25.30	38.62	46.11	43.21

Source: Processed from form model D.1 East Java DPRD, 2014 Wotan Village PPS

Candidates from PKB did not have a local success team, so there was no mass mobilization. Nevertheless, vote acquisition data for PKB party in table 7 shows 194, which is more than 100 votes. PAN Candidates got a significant vote of 330, which was far more than the votes obtained by PAN candidates at the People’s Representative Council level, which were only 219.

By seeing that there were only three candidates using the service of the local success team, it seems that the provincial level was not organized well so that the vote was widespread. The second highest vote acquisition at the provincial level obtained by Gerindra Candidates, as in the explanation above, was because it was managed by the local success team that handled PKB in national level and regency level.

The result is clearly different when the results of mobilization in national and provincial levels are juxtaposed with the results of mobilization at the regency level. In table 5 below, the mobilization contestation carried out by the local success team yielded good results, with 74.31% of the votes successfully mobilized by the success team. The data in table 5 shows that the percentage of voter mobilization in each polling station ranged from 65.61% - 83.23%.

**Table5.**

The number of votes for 2014 Gresik district council candidates by mobilizing local success teams (ST)

No.	Name of Candidate	TPS 1	TPS 2	TPS 3	TPS 4	TPS 5	TPS 6	TPS 7	total
1	Nasdem								
	1.Candidates with ST	6	9	5	0	2	3	0	25
2	PKB								
	1.Candidate with ST	3	1	3	18	21	5	28	79
	2.Candidate with ST	9	1	3	21	20	20	37	111
3	PKS								
	1.Candidates with ST	8	3	2	8	3	0	0	24
4	PDI P								
	1.Candidates with ST	3	0	0	1	3	4	12	23
5	Golkar								
	1.Candidates with ST	1	6	9	1	0	4	3	24
	2.Candidates with ST	2	5	8	3	2	1	1	22
	3.Candidates withST	0	0	6	3	5	0	21	35
6	Gerindra								
	1.Candidate with ST	0	0	2	11	5	5	11	34
7	Demokrat								
	1.Candidate with ST	7	26	11	7	7	10	7	75
	2.Candidate with ST	22	13	11	18	10	40	11	125
8	PAN								
	1.Candidates with ST	77	76	74	31	35	31	4	328
	2.Candidates with ST	3	1	3	3	0	1	2	13
9	PPP								
10	Hanura								
	1.Candidates with ST	10	7	2	1	1	0	7	28
11	PBB								
12	PKPI								
<b>Votes Mobilized by TS</b>		<b>151</b>	<b>148</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>946</b>
Total of Valid Votes		194	196	167	181	166	189	180	1,273
Percentage of Mobilized Votes by ST		77.84	75.51	83.23	69.61	68.67	65.61	80.00	74.31

Source: Processed from form model D.1 DPRD Gresik, 2014 Wotan Village PPS

As shown by the data in table 2, it looks clear that the NU people played more with various candidates outside their mainstream party, PKB. It can be concluded that the large gain of PAN candidates, as many as 328 at the Regency level, showed that Muhammadiyah was far more solid to support one of the legislative candidates. In a rough count, if the community in a village were divided into two mass organizations, NU voters got a portion of 635 and Muhammadiyah voters got a portion of 635 as well. The fact that the votes gained by PAN candidates were superior by pocketing 328 votes showed that there were more Muhammadiyah voters, if compared to NU voters, which only amounted to 190 from 79 plus 111. This calculation was based on vote acquisition mobilized by the local success team, as displayed in table 5.

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It is undeniable that the label of “vote shopping year” (tribunnews.com 2018) in the 2014 election was real. In table 6, it is distinct that PAN and PKB votes remained superior compared to votes for other parties. The high electability for PKB and PAN was also driven by the vote shopping level. The advantage for these two mainstream NU-Muhammadiyah parties was that vote shopping was not too difficult to do. Vote shopping was done solely to bind the exact votes in NU and Muhammadiyah. This would be hard for the parties outside these two mainstream parties. For other parties besides PKB and PAN, this vote shopping expenditure may not be like a political calculation that had been planned when considering that “If all parties give some money, people still want to pick PAN or PKB *rather than* the other parties although they give less amount of money”.(Interview NR, May 20, 2016).

**Table 6.**  
The number of political party votes for people’s representative council, 2014 legislative election

No.	Political Party	TPS 1	TPS 2	TPS 3	TPS 4	TPS 5	TPS 6	TPS 7	total
1	Nasdem	1	15	14	2	3	3	4	42
2	PKB	31	16	15	67	47	81	94	351
3	PKS	4	7	2	5	2	1	0	21
4	PDI P	3	0	1	3	2	2	2	13
5	Golkar	19	35	26	8	7	16	16	127
6	Gerindra	1	0	2	22	10	7	14	56
7	Demokrat	10	33	29	5	14	18	3	112
8	PAN	102	66	66	42	40	35	5	356
9	PPP	20	1	4	22	38	25	42	152
10	Hanura	3	8	1	3	3	0	0	18
11	PBB	0	15	6	2	0	1	0	24
12	PKPI	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Valid votes		194	196	167	181	166	189	180	1,273
Invalid votes		12	23	38	17	13	18	23	144
<b>Total votes</b>		<b>206</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>205</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>203</b>	<b>1,417</b>

Source: Processed from form model D.1 DPR, 2014 Wotan Village PPS

In table 6, PKB, Golkar, Demokrat, PAN and PPP parties got the average votes of above 100. What is noteworthy is that PAN and PKB votes were still solid at 356 (27.97%) for PAN and 351 (27.57%) for PKB in national level. They were followed by PPP with 152 (11.94%), Golkar Party with 127 (9.98%), and Demokrat Party with 112 (8.80%).The total party votes mobilized by the local success team were 1,098 (86.25%).

From these data, PKB and PAN could be considered the dominant parties in the ideological basis of NU and Muhammadiyah. From the mobilized number of 1,098, if the votes for PKB and PAN were accumulated, the number was 707 (64.39%).This number is the ideological votes from the 1,098 mobilized voters.

It is a fact that the national level election is different from the provincial level displayed in table 7 regarding the vote acquisition of political parties, where PKB did not have vote mobilizers. Nevertheless, PKB, with 194 votes, still ranked third after PAN and Gerindra parties. Gaining 194 votes without mobilization could be considered an ideological number.

**Table 7.**

The number of political party votes for east java provincial council,2014 legislative election

No.	Political Party	TPS 1	TPS 2	TPS 3	TPS 4	TPS 5	TPS 6	TPS 7	total
1	Nasdem	2	15	12	3	1	2	5	40
2	PKB	16	5	21	35	46	36	35	194
3	PKS	5	9	1	7	5	2	1	30
4	PDI P	1	1	2	2	1	5	1	13
5	Golkar	4	16	14	8	2	11	14	69
6	Gerindra	20	8	3	52	33	60	80	256
7	Demokrat	11	11	12	9	8	20	8	79
8	PAN	128	119	112	48	49	46	13	515
9	PPP	0	0	2	2	10	2	7	23
10	Hanura	3	3	2	0	2	0	2	12
11	PBB	0	4	2	1	0	0	0	7
12	PKPI	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
Valid votes		190	191	183	167	157	185	167	1,240
Invalid votes		16	28	22	31	22	22	36	177
<b>Total votes</b>		<b>206</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>205</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>203</b>	<b>1,417</b>

Source: Processed from form Model D.1 East Java DPRD, 2014 Wotan Village PPS

From the total mobilized votes, which reached 1,034 votes, the votes for PKB still amounted at 18.76% even though it was not mobilized by the local success team. The votes shifted to the Gerindra Party which rose to the second place with 256 votes (24.76%) and the highest position was obtained by PAN with 515 (49.81%). As explained above (table 2), PKB mobilizers at the provincial level collaborated with Gerindra party so that the votes at the central and district levels choose PKB while the votes at the provincial level were directed to elect Gerindra Party.

Unlike the national and provincial levels, the vote acquisition of political parties at the district level can be considered quite balanced. However, PAN was again in the top position with 422 votes. Nearly significant PAN votes at the national level (356), provincial level (515), and district level (422) showed that Muhammadiyah was more ideological and orderly in providing political support and aspirations to political parties that shared the same ideology with them. This was different from PKB, which was relatively different between the national level (351), provincial level (194), and district level (285).



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**Table 8.**  
Political party votes for Gresik district council, 2014 legislative election

No.	political parties	TPS	TPS	TPS	TPS	TPS	TPS	TPS	Total
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
1	Nasdem	6	20	16	2	4	4	3	55
2	PKB	21	4	12	64	61	45	78	285
3	PKS	9	5	3	9	4	1	0	31
4	PDI P	3	0	1	1	4	5	13	27
5	Golkar	5	15	30	10	9	10	28	107
6	Gerindra	4	1	6	20	14	14	16	75
7	Demokrat	34	47	26	33	18	67	20	245
8	PAN	98	95	97	40	43	40	9	422
9	PPP	0	1	1	1	6	3	3	15
10	Hanura	12	7	3	1	2	0	7	32
11	PBB	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	5
12	PKPI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Valid Votes		193	197	196	181	165	190	177	1,299
Invalid Votes		13	22	9	17	14	17	26	118
<b>Total Votes</b>		<b>206</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>205</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>203</b>	<b>1,417</b>

Source: Processed from form model D.1 DPRD Gresik, 2014 Wotan Village PPS

If you look at the data showing quite solid votes in PAN, it means that NU votes were divided into various parties. This has a positive correlation with the large number of NU residents who became local success teams for a number of candidates from various political parties. Fairly solid votes when juxtaposed with the hard work of the local success team could be found in Golkar Party. At the national level, Golkar Party acquired 127 votes and the acquisition at the district level was 107, indicating that the local success team working to win the party worked well. Data in table 2 concerning the profile of local success team number 2 shows that Golkar Party mobilizers were Muhammadiyah people, who were also cadres of the Golkar Party since the 1980s.

### **Pseudo-pragmatism of ideological voters; from popularity, to electability, to at the “end” consequences**

Based on various explanations above, there are several explanations that can be given related to the above facts. First, there was a shift of meaning regarding the return from money politics to political charity, which was considered as something normal. Second, the presence of a local success team that served to direct and mobilize voters was actually quite effective and solid in contributing to certain candidates. Third, in the context of certain choices, the voluntary sense was still possessed by ideological voters by voting to political parties having the same ideology with them. Fourth, the solidity displayed by Muhammadiyah people was far more maintained than that by NU community. If this is traced back, this was also influenced by the few number of Muhammadiyah cadres who were involved as candidates or certain political party mobilizers. This also means that NU voters were far more easily shaken and more easily spread to other parties.

In the description about the motivations of the local success team above, the way in which local success teams conducted early data collection on the basis of ensuring that ideological votes was part of an effort to fortify ideological voters. Ideological voters were introduced by local success teams to the legislative candidates who shared the same ideas and they ensured that the votes of those ideological

voters did not shift to candidates from other parties. The reward was a sum of money, although it was not as much as that from non-ideological candidates and parties.

The local success team worked from introducing candidates, ensuring that the introduced candidates were truly chosen by the voters by taking the data, then at the “end”, those voters were rewarded in order not to shift their choices to another candidate. This at the “end “process was the one used to avoid vulgar statements of giving money to voters.

## Conclusion

Even though they can still be regarded as ideological voters, this group has shifted its perception of money politics to political charity. They did this only to defend themselves to remain on the path of their ideological party. This intention to shift can be interpreted as an effort to defend themselves amid the onslaught of money politics carried out by parties or candidates outside the ideological party.

The facts above mean that ideological voters also experienced a shift along with the incessant practice of money politics. The advantage was that ideological voters were still loyal to their ideological party. There were constant things, and there were things (behaviors) that developed as a result of changes in overall voter behaviors.

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