

Department of Social Sciences and International Studies

**Reflective *Habitus* and Crises of the Field:
Status Quo vs Reform in Muhammadiyah in Post-1998 Indonesia**

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Declaration

To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgment has been made.

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university.

Signature :.....

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation aims to determine how support for both the status quo and reform emerged in post-1998 Muhammadiyah, and what caused these tendencies to emerge. To respond to these two research questions, I employ Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of *habitus*, field, and crisis as well as the post-colonial perspective on the emulation of Western culture by non-Western people. I collected various post-1998 works by Muhammadiyah's members on the issue of reform, and interviewed leaders and members of the organisation from Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Malang during my three month period of field research. From my research findings, I determined that members of Muhammadiyah share a reflective predisposition, marked by their inclination to look at the world as an entity that can be rationally understood and acted upon. Their belief in the potential of human rationality leads some members of Muhammadiyah to claim that truth in human life does exist and it has been preserved within the teaching of Muhammadiyah since its inception in 1911. I refer to these members of Muhammadiyah as the supporters of the status quo. The same belief in human rationality convinces other members of the same organisation that the truth does exist but that it is tied to specific contexts and that it is a human obligation to understand these contexts. I refer to these members as the supporters of reform.

I find that the perceptions of Muhammadiyah's members towards what they see as the West plays an important part in shaping their opinions. On the one hand, the supporters of the status quo tend to see the West as an inimical entity that aspires to corrupt, and thus weaken, Islam. Using Bourdieu's vocabulary, what they perceive as a crisis within Muhammadiyah is the weakening of the boundaries of their field by the intrusion of Western perspectives. The solution to the crisis, therefore, is the reconsolidation of these boundaries and the purification and consolidation of Islam as a civilisational entity. On the other hand, the supporters of reform within Muhammadiyah see the West as both an ally in a common struggle of humanity and also a victim of misguided perceptions, as also is Islam. For them, Islam can learn from the West and vice-versa. The crisis of the field perceived by the supporters of reform is, therefore, not the breaking down of the old field's boundaries but the persistence of those boundaries and the refusal of some Muhammadiyah's members to extend those boundaries to encompass new ways of thinking.

DEDICATION

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Whenever I hug him, though, I know why.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

I hope that the next thirteen members of Muhammadiyah's Central Leadership for the period of 2010-2015 will be willing to accommodate Aisyiyah's aspiration to include women in the central leadership.¹

Men and women are surely not the same. Let us not be easily mesmerised with that term "gender" from the West. The women already have Aisyiyah. Aisyiyah was Muhammad's wife. If women wish to be in Muhammadiyah, it means they want to be Muhammad.²

The forty-sixth National Meeting of Muhammadiyah (or *muktamar*, the national meeting of Muhammadiyah to elect its national chairman and formulate the organisation's five-year programmes – see Appendix 1) held in Yogyakarta from the third to the eighth of July of 2010 was considered special for the organisation as it marked its centenary anniversary. Anxiety was widespread in this meeting as to who would be elected as the thirteen people to lead the organisation for the next five years and in what direction these leaders would lead this organisation in the future.

Taking into account the change from what Mulkhan sees as the era of revitalisation of the reform ethos of Ahmad Dahlan (1995-2005) to the era of puritanism in Muhammadiyah (2005-2010),³ the supporters of both views represented in the quotes above had reason to worry. Supporters of each view were consequently active in supporting their causes in the 2010 meeting.

The issue of women's leadership in Muhammadiyah was one of many hotly debated topics in this forum. As described succinctly in the two quotes above, some members wished to see the presence of women in the central leadership while others felt

¹ Syafii Ma'arif, interview, *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, "Muhammadiyah Alami Ketegangan," July 6, 2010.

² Ali Dinar Nurdin, interview, *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, "Masuknya Perempuan Ke PP, Ditentang: Komisi E Bahas Isu Keumatan dan Kebangsaan," July 7, 2010.

³ Abdul Munir Mulkhan, *Jejak Pembaruan Sosial dan Kemanusiaan Kiai Ahmad Dahlan* (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2010), 26-27.

satisfied with the current arrangement: the women already have Aisyiyah as an organisation and therefore do not need to be included in Muhammadiyah's central leadership. This issue arose after a consideration was raised in the Mukhtamar as to whether it was necessary to add another six members to the central leadership of Muhammadiyah and bring the number to nineteen. The newly elected chairwoman of Aisyiyah, Siti Noordjannah Djohantini, in her response to this possibility, urged that among the additional six new leaders of Muhammadiyah, three would be female. At the end of the Mukhtamar, the number of people in the central leadership remained thirteen.

The debate surrounding this issue, however, showcases the continuing schism in the organisation between the support for the status quo and reform that persisted after the 2010 Mukhtamar. While those of the status quo view emphasise the importance of committing Muhammadiyah to the organisation's century-long role in calling on human beings to "do good and avoid dishonour"⁴ and to preserve its traditional achievements,⁵ those bent on reform insist on the need for the organisation to respond to the developments in the study of religious epistemology and philosophy, to search for a more substance-oriented rationality,⁶ and to be more inclusive.⁷

Before elaborating details of my research plan, the first section of this chapter will discuss the relationship between democracy and Islam in post-1998 Indonesia. This section will serve as a context for my discussion of the support for both the status quo and reform within Muhammadiyah.

⁴ Din Syamsuddin, interview, *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, "Politik Muhammadiyah, Politik Harga Diri," July 2, 2010; and Yunahar Ilyas, interview, *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, "Pertahankan Jati Diri, Kian Berkualitas," July 4, 2010. This injunction can be found in various verses of the Qur'an but the one that is most often referred to in Muhammadiyah is Qur'an 3:104. For an example of the use of this verse, see Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Muqqadimmah Anggaran Dasar*, 1961, art. 2.

⁵ Bambang Sudibyo, interview, *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, "Tanpa Tim Sukses, Wajah Baru Surprise," July 7, 2010.


⁶ Dawam Rahardjo and Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, interview, *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, "Pembaruan Sistem Belum Optimal: Muhammadiyah Perlu Lakukan Evaluasi," July 2, 2010.

⁷ Muhammad Kustiawan, interview, *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, "PCIM, Muhammadiyah Wajah Baru," July 8, 2010.

1.1 Background: Democracy and Islam in Post-1998 Indonesia

My main argument in this section is that in the post-1998 Indonesia the interaction between democracy and Islam within national politics has resulted in the convergence of three political tendencies: the support for electoral democracy, the de-Islamisation of formal politics, and the increase in *shariah*-based legislation (See Figure 1.1). The simultaneous presence of these three political trends is unprecedented in Indonesian history as for long period Indonesia was subject to authoritarian rule of the New Order when Islam had little political role. Indonesia once had a democratic political system with the demand for *shariah*-based legislation by Islamic political parties during the era of Parliamentary Democracy (1949 – 1959), although without any significant result with respect to legislations. During the last decade of the New Order period, when Soeharto's regime had grown closer to Islamic groups, Indonesians witnessed a national politics that still shunned religious-based political parties but was supportive of *shariah*-based legislation in an undemocratic environment. While the 1949-1959 Parliamentary Democratic period saw the presence of both democratic procedures and increase in *shariah*-based legislation, as reflected in the demands of Islamic parties in that era to implement the Jakarta Charter with its imposition of Islamic *shariah* on Muslims, the last decade of New Order period showcased a combination between de-Islamisation of formal politics and the increase in *shariah*-based legislation, as reflected in the issuance of various Islam-friendly legislations, most conspicuous of which was the marriage law. The last possible combination – the presence of non-religious political parties in a democratic environment – is the common political character of secular democracies, which never occurred in Indonesia. However, Indonesia had never experienced a political system with the simultaneous presence of these three political trends.

Figure 1.1 Democracy and Islam in Indonesia



1.1.1 Support for Electoral Democracy

While it is too simple to state that Islam is supportive of democracy, historically, the struggle of Islamic movements in Indonesia has often aimed at the creation of a democratic political system. During the struggle for independence, for example, Indonesia’s Islamic movements did not oppose democracy as a political ideology. They even cherished it, as can be discerned from a statement of a famous Islamic leader Agus Salim with respect to the democratic character of Islam.⁸ This democratic attitude can also be related to the appreciation of gender equality when during a meeting of Jong Islamieten Bond, a pre-Independence Islamic youth group in the Dutch Indies, Agus Salim “took off the curtain that separated the male and female attendees”.⁹

The two Islamic political parties, Masyumi and the Nahdlatul Ulama, competed in Indonesia’s first free general election on 29 September 1955. At this election, no competing party received a majority vote, and therefore coalitions were formed. In these coalitions, both the nationalist- and the Islamic-leaning leaders had their turn as prime ministers. A combination of the unsettled debate on national ideology, the incipient state

⁸ Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), 69.

⁹ Luthfi Assyaukanie, *Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), 85.

of the country's democracy, and the grandiose personality of Soekarno contributed to the abolition of the parliamentary democratic system and the start of Guided Democracy in 1959.

While there was no room for democratic politics during both the Guided Democracy and the New Order period, after 1998 Indonesia re-experienced a lively political system with various political parties emerging. After the fall of Soeharto, with the inclusion of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) into the formal democratic political system, Indonesia has seen support from Islamic political groups for democracy, as shown in three consecutive peaceful elections. Moreover, even Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, mostly known for its rejection of democracy and other Western-inspired political systems,¹⁰ has also hinted at the possibility of joining the election and in fact has allowed its members to vote.¹¹

1.1.2 De-Islamisation of Formal Politics

The second trend in Indonesian politics after 1998 is the increasing irrelevance of Islam as the ideological basis of political parties, which I refer to as the de-Islamisation of formal politics. Historically, this is not the first time it happened in Indonesia. Either voluntarily or under external pressure, various political parties in Indonesia had set aside Islam as their formal platform in the country's history. During the New Order era, especially after 1984, Soeharto's authoritarian government forced social and political organisations to accept Pancasila¹² as their basic ideology. For Islamic organisations, this meant the abandonment of Islam as their formal ideology.

¹⁰ Hizbut Tahrir, *Konsepsi Politik Hizbut Tahrir*, Indonesian ed. (Jakarta: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2009), 12-13, 231.

¹¹ Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf, "Between Revolution and Reform: The Future of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia," *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 2, no. 2 (2009): 76.

¹² Approaching the end of Japanese occupation and as a part of its pan-Asia campaign, Japan allowed leaders from the former Dutch Indies archipelago to formulate the basic requirements to build an independent Indonesia. There were ideas on the basic ideology that would base the future free country. The discussions eventually converged on the five principles that are now embodied in Pancasila (which literally means 'Five Bases'); they are belief in one God, just and civilised humanity, unity of Indonesia, public participation through representation, and social justice.

If de-Islamisation occurred during the New Order era under official repression, in the democratic environment after the fall of Soeharto in 1998 the abandonment of Islam as organisational ideology has happened voluntarily and for a different reason. In this light, the acceptance by PKS on 4 February 2008 of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as Indonesia's national ideology and constitution is significant.

PKS started to diversify its political agenda in anticipation of the 2004 General Election. Instead of urging the implementation of *shariah* among Indonesian Muslims, it had tried to increase its popularity to a broader mass and to improve the poor one per cent of votes it gained in the 1999 General Election with its slogan of “*bersih dan peduli*” (“clean and caring”). The party received over 7 per cent of votes in the 2004 Election.

Striving to keep its political relevance in a democratic Indonesia and responding to accusations of sectarianism and proselytising among Muslims, the PKS decided at its National Meeting on 4 February 2008 in Bali to accept Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as its ideology.¹³ By issuing this decision, the party formally abandoned the goal of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. With a similar campaign focus in its effort to further attract voters in the 2009 General Election, PKS managed to receive around 7 per cent of votes. Although still retaining Islam as its basic ideology,¹⁴ this party has developed a political image that respects plurality within the Republic of Indonesia under the 1945 Constitution.¹⁵ Moreover, the party has sometimes prioritised pragmatism over Islamist ideology in its parliamentary activities: it has abandoned the demand to bring back the Jakarta Charter, the initial draft constitution of Indonesia that obliges Muslims to follow the *shariah* law; it has worked with the religiously pluralist Partai Amanat Nasional in forming the Reform Faction after the 1999 General Election; and it endorsed Megawati Soekarno Putri as the nation's first female president in 2001.¹⁶

These moves by PKS are the result of political calculation by this Islamist political party. A trend that started under an authoritarian policy has continued into the

¹³ Abdurrahman Wahid, “Musuh dalam Selimut,” in *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia*, ed. Abdurrahman Wahid (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2009), 186.

¹⁴ Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. *Anggaran Dasar*, 2005, art. 2.

¹⁵ Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, *Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madani: Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan dan Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan PK Sejahtera* (Jakarta: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 2008), 222.

¹⁶ Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), 248, 285, 303.

present democratic era. One probable cause for this might be the political pragmatism introduced by the Soeharto's regime. The developmentalist political agenda brought by this regime had produced citizens who are more attuned towards pragmatic results than ideological, and religious, causes. These same citizens experienced socio-economic mobility under Soeharto's economic programs. Besides the government's economic developmentalist approach, however, a new wave of Islamic thoughts in that authoritarian era should also be given credit.

The late Nurcholish Madjid was influential in making Islamic organisations in Indonesia abandon their Islamist demands. The background of his intellectual work was the failure of political Islam to bring welfare and empowerment to Muslims. He attributed the failure of political Islam to pay attention to the more essential needs of the Muslims to its obsession with the establishment of an Islamic state.¹⁷ He then introduced the term "de-sacralisation" to refer to efforts to return various worldly concepts and institutions to their proper place in Islam. Political Islam's vision of an Islamic state is considered as one of these concepts mistakenly understood as inherent in Islam, and therefore a target of Madjid's de-sacralisation efforts.

The effect of Madjid's concept of de-sacralisation is felt in the present tendency of Islam to relax its political demands. The present unpopularity of Islamic political parties corroborates this argument. This situation may, at first sight, be seen as a showcase of further secularisation of Islam in Indonesian politics. But far from being disengaged from the public life of Indonesians, Islam has become more carefully articulated in Indonesia's socio-cultural life.

1.1.3 Increase in Shariah-based Legislation

Islamic political parties in the post-Soeharto era have relinquished their demand to re-install the Jakarta Charter. However, it does not mean they have totally abandoned their aspiration for *shariah*-based law-making. At present, these parties are directing their efforts at creating legislation that meet their vision of *shariah* at the local level. As we

¹⁷ Martin van Bruinessen, "Nurcholish Madjid: Indonesian Muslim Intellectual," *ISIM Review*, 17 (2006): 22.

have seen in the previous section, there is presently no formal demand from any political party to bring back the Jakarta Charter, a document that obliges Muslims to practice *shariah*. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan is still trying to portray itself as a “champion of *shariah* while downplaying the consequences of its constitutional recognition”.¹⁸ The only party with a consistent demand for this Islamist constitutional change is Partai Bulan Bintang, considered as the descendant of Masyumi in the post-1998 period. But this party did not manage to gather enough votes in the 2009 General Election to pass the electoral threshold. At the national level, Islamic political parties have not been able to work together to put forward this demand effectively¹⁹ and therefore are unlikely to provide any ideological challenge to Pancasila.

The demand for the implementation of *shariah* has not passed away, however, but instead moved to lower levels of governance.²⁰ Interestingly, the supporters of *shariah* by-laws are not only the Islamic-leaning political parties.²¹ The secular-leaning political parties in Indonesia (such as Partai Golkar, Partai Demokrat, and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) may have Pancasila as their basic ideology but have nevertheless tolerated the promulgation and implementation of *shariah* on local levels.²²

There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. At the individual level, more than fifty per cent of parliamentary members elected in the 1999 General Election are alumni of the Islamic Student Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam), an organisation over which the late Nurcholish Madjid presided for two consecutive three-year terms since 1966.²³ Madjid’s thought on the de-sacralisation of political concepts and institutions had motivated HMI’s alumni to join secular-leaning political parties. This migration of HMI alumni has put Islamisation into the agenda of these parties, as can be seen in the rise of conservatism within Golongan Karya (now Partai Golkar) since the late

¹⁸ Bernhard Platzdasch, *Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 325.

¹⁹ Deliar Noer, “Masa Depan Politik Indonesia,” in *Hajatan Demokrasi: Potret Jurnalistik Pemilu Langsung Simpul Islam Indonesia dari Moderat hingga Garis Keras*, ed. Asrori S. Karni (Jakarta: PT Era Media Informasi, 2006), 267.

²⁰ Platzdasch, *Islamism*, 175.

²¹ Asrori S. Karni and Anthony Djafar, “Cuaca Pekat Syariat,” in *Hajatan Demokrasi*, 336-38.

²² Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” *South East Asia Research* 10, no. 2 (2002): 123; and Platzdasch, *Islamism*, 332.

²³ van Bruinessen, “Nurcholish Madjid,” 23.

1980s²⁴ and the efforts of Partai Demokrat and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP) in the Reform era to show their commitment to religion.²⁵ At present, despite the fact that Islam is almost nowhere to be seen in formal politics, it is strongly asserting its importance in shaping the socio-cultural identity of Indonesians.

Another possible explanation is related to the re-introduction of democracy in Indonesia. Democracy demands that politicians satisfy the demands of their electorates. As the late Abdurrahman Wahid asserted, *shariah* is a highly sought-after commodity in the present Indonesian politics²⁶ and therefore has become a tool to boost candidates' popularity in local elections. As moderate as Indonesians are in their voting behaviour, several polling results show a tendency towards more religious attitudes. In a survey conducted in 2007, even though fifty-seven per cent of Indonesian Muslims claim themselves to be secular, thirty-three per cent of Muslims surveyed identify themselves with Islamist values.²⁷ Moreover, a more recent survey in 2009 shows that Indonesians are supportive of the legislation of religious norms in their society.²⁸

In March 2007, fifty-three districts, or more than ten per cent of Indonesia's 499 regencies and municipalities, have reportedly implemented *shariah*-based regulations, an increase from only seven districts four years before. Most of these regulations do not use the term "Islamic" in their title and are issued using non-religious wording in the service of seemingly general moral values.²⁹ The Islamic ambience surrounding them, however, can be felt as these regulations mainly aim at asserting Islamic identities, such as the obligation for women to don veils on their heads.³⁰ Because of their general moral tone, the implementation of these regulations, therefore, does not contradict the 1945 Constitution, especially after the issuance of Law Number 22 in 1999 (amended by Law Number 32 in 2004) granting more autonomy to the regions.

²⁴ van Bruinessen, "Genealogies," 123.

²⁵ Platzdasch, *Islamism*, 332.

²⁶ Wahid, "Musuh dalam Selimut," 141.

²⁷ Lembaga Survei Indonesia, "Trend Orientasi Nilai-nilai Politik Islamis vs Nilai-nilai Politik Sekuler dan Kekuatan Islam Politik," a survey result (2007).

²⁸ Lembaga Survei Indonesia, "Komunalisme dan Populisme Masyarakat Indonesia," a survey result (2009).

²⁹ Platzdasch, *Islamism*, 325.

³⁰ Wahid, "Musuh dalam Selimut," 139-40.

The post-1998 period is thus an interesting time for Indonesia in terms of the relation between Islam and democracy. The country has been a democracy since 1998, with its Islamic-leaning political parties having abandoned the demand to make *shariah* the basic law on the national level regulating the laws of Muslims. The issue of Islamic law, however, has not disappeared from the political scene.

1.2 Research Agenda

In elaborating the convergence of those three political tendencies, I do not mean to imply that all Islamic movements in Indonesia support the simultaneous presence of these three political trends. The Nahdlatul Ulama as the largest Islamic group in Indonesia, for example, has formally stated its objection to the formalisation of *shariah*,³¹ while Laskar Jihad and Pesantren Gentur are intensively against democracy.³² Regardless of these opposing voices, however, the presence of these three political trends is evident.

Where does Muhammadiyah stand in this configuration? As explained in the introduction of this chapter, Muhammadiyah's members tend to be divided in their response to the call for reform in Islam in general and of Muhammadiyah in particular. This dissertation will look at these two opposite tendencies. The first question this dissertation asks is, *how did these two opposite tendencies emerge?* The second, and more ambitious, question is, *why did they emerge?* For the first question I am interested in establishing the process while for the second question I will look at the factors that triggered this process. The remainder of this section will serve as a further elaboration of these two research questions.

My interest in this dissertation is influenced by my observation of the presence of opposing tendencies, namely the scripturalist and the modernist, in revivalist movements across religions. With respect to Christian Reformation, the work of Walsham tells us of the presence of both “desacralization” and “resacralization” tendencies within this movement, one that renders unsound the assumed linkage of the Reformation in Christian

³¹ Ibid., 190.

³² Herry Mohammad and Sujoko, “Syariat Tak Pernah Padam: Eks Laskar Jihad,” in *Hajatan Demokrasi*, 273-78; and G. A. Guritno and Sulhan Syafi'i, “Tiga Generasi Tanpa Warna: Pesantren Gentur,” in *Hajatan Demokrasi*, 295-99.

Europe to the rise of modernism and liberalism.³³ With regard to Muhammadiyah as an Islamic modernist movement, as the Research Significance section in this chapter will show, the opposing tendencies of scripturalism and modernism since the 1980s have interested scholars on Muhammadiyah. Various explanations have been forwarded to explain these tendencies and my dissertation will try to offer an analytical framework that, to the best of my knowledge, has scarcely been used to explain the presence of these two opposing tendencies within Muhammadiyah.

This dissertation employs Pierre Bourdieu's analytical framework in investigating the two opposing tendencies in present-day Muhammadiyah, focusing on the notions of "*habitus*", "field", and "crisis". The next section will supply details on these three terms and how I intend to use them to answer my research questions. In summary, I am interested in using a new perspective to look at an issue that has been characteristic of Muhammadiyah's existence and that has been quite conspicuously present in the post-1998 period. Pierre Bourdieu's analytical framework has never been extensively used to investigate this phenomenon within Muhammadiyah but I believe that this framework may shine further light on it.

The Bourdieusian framework, however, only suffices to answer the first research question. To answer my second question, this framework will be complemented by a post-colonial approach, focusing on the influence culture on Islam in general and Muhammadiyah in particular of what is perceived by Muhammadiyah's members to be Western. This approach will analyse the reaction of Muhammadiyah's members towards the influence of what is often referred to as Western perspectives, examining how this reaction can take the form of both imitation and rejection of the so-called West, and how the dichotomy of domination-resistance becomes blurred through the practices of imitation.

The linking of the Bourdieusian framework with another that accommodates the practice of hybridity has been urged by a number of scholars of his work, such as McNay and Adkins. While McNay argues that Bourdieu's concept of "bounded freedom" linked

³³ Alexandra Walsham, "The Reformation and 'The Disenchantment of the World' Reassessed," *The Historical Journal* 51, no. 2 (2008): 497.

to Bourdieusian framework provides a way to understand how the practice of emulating a dominant structure can contain the potential for resistance,³⁴ Adkins asserts that the potential for ambivalence in the practice of mimicry and hybridity is unfounded in Bourdieu's works and thus needs to be introduced into Bourdieusian framework.³⁵ Regardless of their different readings of Bourdieu, both works suggest the importance of linking a Bourdieusian framework with another one that problematises the dichotomy of dominance and resistance.

There is one important issue that I need to address at the beginning of my dissertation: the use of the terms "puritanism" and "liberalism". This dissertation avoids using these two categories because this kind of categorisation narrows one's discussion of the attitudes of Muhammadiyah's members to their views on the interpretation of scriptures. Support for the status quo might include the tendency to be more scriptural in one's interpretation of religion, but this might not be its only tendency. In the same light, a reformist position might entail a less scriptural reading of the Qur'an but this dissertation does not focus solely on this particular understanding of reform. I will instead use the categories "status quo" and "reform" to refer to the opinions within Muhammadiyah.

1.2.1 Habitus, Field, and Crisis

To explain what the categories of status quo and reform refer to and therefore to help me answer the two research questions explained above, I will refer to the notions of "*habitus*" and "field" in Pierre Bourdieu's work. As mentioned in the previous section, my choice of the Bourdieusian analytical framework is encouraged by what I consider to be its potential to explain the two opposing tendencies in Muhammadiyah.

The first thing we should keep in mind about Bourdieu's works is that his analysis is aimed first and foremost at the rejection of both objectivism and subjectivism in

³⁴ Lois McNay, "Gender, Habitus and the Field: Pierre Bourdieu and the Limits of Reflexivity," *Theory Culture Society* 16, no. 1 (1999): 104-5.

³⁵ Lisa Adkins, "Reflexivity: Freedom or Habit of Gender?" *Theory Culture Society* 20, no. 6 (2003): 37.

understanding human actions.³⁶ Bourdieu's sociology, on the one hand, rejects the assumption that individuals are mere products of the prescribed rules that belong to a social structure. On the other hand, he did not intend to take the structure out of sociology and let the individual gain absolute agency.³⁷ As Bourdieu puts it,

one has to escape from the realism of the structure, to which objectivism, a necessary stage in breaking with primary experience and constructing the objective relationships, necessarily leads when it hypostatizes these relations by treating them as realities already constituted outside of the history of the group – without falling back into subjectivism, which is quite incapable of giving an account of the necessity of the social world. To do this, one has to return to practice....³⁸

From the above quote, we can understand, on the one hand, Bourdieu's suspicion of subjectivism as stemming from what he sees as its disregard of the role of the social world in explaining human "objective relationship". On the other hand, he also objects to objectivism due to its assumption of the existence of social structure outside the life of individuals.

His criticism of these two extreme opposites in social sciences, however, should be understood as a response to the dominance of structuralism in French intellectual milieu in the 1960s and the 1970s. In this light, we can understand his criticism of objectivism as:

fall[ing] into the fetishism of social laws to which objectivism consigns itself when in establishing between structure and practice the relations of the virtual to the actual, of the score to the performance, of essence to existence, it merely substitutes for the creative man of subjectivism a man subjugated to the dead laws of a natural history.³⁹

Also in the light of the dominance of objectivism, we can still discern, despite his criticism of both positions, Bourdieu's partiality in favour of objectivism. Loic Wacquant, considered to be Bourdieu's intellectual pupil, has this to say about the issue:

It should be stressed that, although the two moments of analysis are equally necessary they are not equal: epistemological priority is granted to objectivist rupture over subjectivist understanding. Application of Durkheim's first principle of the "sociological method", the

³⁶ Loic J. D. Wacquant, "Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology," in *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, ed. Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Wacquant, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 5.

³⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 139.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 52.

³⁹ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 84.

systematic rejection of preconceptions, must come before analysis of the practical apprehension of the world from the subjective standpoint.⁴⁰

There are two interesting points in the above quotations. First, to go beyond the objectivism/subjectivism debate, Bourdieu gives emphasis to the concept of practice, which he defined as “the site of the dialectic of ... the objectified products and the incorporated products of historical practice; of structure and *habitus*”.⁴¹ Second, Bourdieusian framework insists on the need for any analysis of practices to be conducted by taking into account social structure. To put it differently, even though Bourdieu’s framework is critical towards both subjectivism and objectivism, it still favours the latter in its treatment of practices.

Before I go any further in my elaboration of Bourdieu’s sociology, let me provide summarised definitions of Bourdieu’s key concepts of practice, *doxa*, field, *habitus*, crisis, and *logos*. Practice is both the mental tendency and physical behaviours of social agents while *doxa* refers to social agents’ predispositions that motivate this practice. Field is the perceived environment in which social agents live, while *habitus* is the whole set of social agents’ predispositions that relate them to their perceived field. *Habitus* creates harmony between social agents’ practices and their environment while a crisis represents the opposite situation, a situation in which social agents’ *habitus* are in conflict with their field due to changed circumstances in their environment. With regard to social sciences, due to the complicated nature of social agents’ practices, scholars task themselves with creating a mental map to explain their subjects’ behaviours. This mental map is called *logos*.

Bourdieu opposes practice to *logos* as he opposes speech (*parole*) to language (*langue*). The task of a grammarian is related to language while that of an orator is related to speech. While a grammarian is concerned with the language in order to codify it, an orator aims at constructing a speech. Associating people and their everyday lives with orators and their speeches, and scholars to grammarians and language, Bourdieu insists that social analysis should be concerned not with the mental map, or *logos*, which scholars tend to produce, but with the actual practice of individuals as understood at the

⁴⁰ Wacquant, “Towards a Social Praxeology,” 11.

⁴¹ Bourdieu, *Logic*, 52.

time it occurs and from the perspective of social agents; or, in other words, practice as bound in temporality.⁴² Due to this bounded nature of practice, individuals should be regarded as social agents rather than subjects, a concept that assumes that human beings have the ultimate freedom to make choices.⁴³ Social agents perpetually face the objective world with their acquired predispositions, which Bourdieu refers to as *doxa*; their practices are the projection of their *doxa* onto the objective world.

Bourdieu provides a number of examples of this generative nature of *habitus*. In his study of the Kabyle Berber society in Algeria, he took the example of the matrimonial strategy employed by the members of the village. A father has three choices to marry his daughter: to a man of lower, equal, or higher status, depending on the father's economic and social circumstances. Each of these decisions, however, has its common origin in his *habitus*, defined in this respect by Bourdieu as "the product of the structures that it tends to reproduce and which implies a 'spontaneous' submission to the established order and to the orders of the guardians of that order".⁴⁴ The principle for these matrimonial strategies, Bourdieu continues,

is neither calculating reason nor the mechanical determinations of economic necessity, but the dispositions inculcated by the conditions of existence, a kind of socially constituted instinct which causes the objectively calculable demands of a particular form of economy to be experienced as an unavoidable call of duty or an irresistible impulse of feeling.⁴⁵

Comprehending practices, therefore, cannot be understood through the building of an "anthropological map" that creates a representation of the mentality of social agents in the forms of rules they submit to,⁴⁶ a system of codification in language, a *logos*. Social agents are not emulators of linguistic codes; they are not practitioners of *logos* since there is not any set of rules to be implemented by social agents. Social agents have:

systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organise practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a

⁴² See McNay, "Gender," 101.

⁴³ Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Wacquant, "The Purpose of Reflexive Sociology," in *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 137.

⁴⁴ Bourdieu, *Logic*, 160.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 161.

⁴⁶ Bourdieu, *Outline*, 2.

conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.⁴⁷

These systems are what Bourdieu calls “*habitus*”. It is, simply put, a set of embodied dispositions that are, in turn, productive of practices. These embodied dispositions are the products of the history of specific social groups, as opposed to the *field* – the objectified history in which social agents find themselves.⁴⁸

Habitus is a generating structure in the sense that it contains a set of predispositions instead of rules. *Doxa* function not in making social agents conduct predetermined tasks in a certain situation, but in acting as body and mental schemata for a set of possible practices. The social world influences the conduct of its agents through the bestowal of those schemata. *Habitus* is therefore creative and inventive but those schemata which *habitus* provides do not come out of a vacuum; they are reproduced within societies.⁴⁹

The realisation of *habitus* in practice, understood as the activation of a set of schemata is not, therefore, a conscious effort on the part of social agents. *Habitus* provides a “feel for the game”, not the game’s rules. In this sense, Bourdieu likens social agents to a gymnast to the extent that gymnasts do not treat their sport as a science of geometry but rather as an arena, a “field”, in which they are accustomed to move in a certain manner, following a certain set of predispositions, a *habitus*.⁵⁰

The embodiment of this *habitus* in the body of social agents marks the presence of social factors within those agents and therefore problematises the attribution of those agents’ practices to their cognitive calculation. *Doxa*, or acquired predispositions, are embodied in the bodies of social agents and not just their minds. The schemata in *habitus* are not only mental but also physical. To put it differently, Bourdieu’s sociology seeks to go beyond the mind/body dichotomy. In order to do this, the body should become the main locus of *habitus*. Because real practice takes the form of bodily movements, human bodies should be regarded as the repository of predispositions. In other words, mental predispositions demonstrate their forms in bodily movements. In its mental representation

⁴⁷ Bourdieu, *Logic*, 53.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 66.

⁴⁹ Bourdieu, *Outline*, 17; and Wacquant, “Towards a Social Praxeology,” 19.

⁵⁰ Bourdieu, *Logic*, 93.

of culture and its neglect of the embodied embeddedness of *habitus*, an anthropological map of culture, therefore, is detached from social agents in its efforts to be able to sufficiently explain their practices.

With the feel for the field, or the “game” if we use a sport metaphor once more, social agents as players do not participate in it to follow the rules; they are in the game because they are born in it. The game is their life and, as for the gymnast described above, they move in the game as they have learned all their lives. To judge whether Bourdieu’s social agents are either conscious or otherwise in their participation in the game is irrelevant. Consciousness in Bourdieu’s understanding is never unconditional. Certainly, participation in the game cannot be conducted unconsciously but consciousness for social agents is always conditional with their *habitus* as its conditioning factor.

There are rules in gymnastics that our gymnast has to obey but for Bourdieu, gymnastics will only become geometry and not a game for the gymnast if he does not embody those rules in their corporeal existence. The competition’s rules should not be seen as rules. The gymnast indeed has to deny the presence of these rules, but simultaneously embodies them, if he wishes to be in the game. In social life, Bourdieu refers to this feel for the game as “learned ignorance” (*docta ignorantia*): “a mode of practical knowledge not comprising of knowledge of its own principles”.⁵¹

The strategy employed by the players in the game, therefore, is not a strategy springing from the calculation of rational actors. Rather, the rationality of the actors is bound to their *habitus*, their understanding of what counts as rational or otherwise as *habitually*-bound. In this respect, *habitus* “is the source of practices which are objectively recognised as strategies without being the product of a genuine strategic intention – which would presuppose at least that they are perceived as one strategy among other possible strategies”.⁵² Elaborating *habitus* further through the perspective of religion, Bourdieu mentions that

rites are practices that are ends in themselves, that are justified by their very performance; things that one does because they are “the done thing”, “the right thing to do”, but also because one

⁵¹ Bourdieu, *Outline*, 19.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 73.

cannot do otherwise, without needing to know why or for whom one does them, or what they mean....⁵³

For social agents, the fact that the game they play is the only game they are aware of frees them from explaining why they do what they do. In other words, the set of predispositions – *doxa* – contained in a *habitus* deems everyday experience for social agents self-evident. *Doxa*, in this regard, can be distinguished from “orthodox or heterodox belief implying awareness and recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs”.⁵⁴

But even if *habitus* should not be seen as a set of rules, it still has a unifying effect on the practices of social agents.⁵⁵ *Habitus* still generates regularity in the practices of social agents sharing it, with regularity defined by Bourdieu as “what recurs with a certain statistically measurable frequency and from the formula which describes it”.⁵⁶ The similar preferences and perceptions shown by social agents belonging to a certain social position⁵⁷ are the enabling structures that produce the regularity of practices among them. The regularity is not a product of a submission to certain rules. Instead, it springs out of a similar system of preferences and perceptions. This system constitutes the *modus operandi* of social agents; this system is their *habitus* and it is an enabling potential for the practices of those agents.

Summarising Bourdieu’s sociological framework so far, we can look at this framework as an effort to avoid extreme opposites of subjectivism, as represented by rational theories, and objectivism or structuralism. Even though his framework is meant to be a more realistic tool to understand social practices, the reality of social practices for Bourdieu still favours objectivism. For him, social practices are influenced by social structure through the operation of *habitus* as a generative structure, and not a conformity-seeking structure.

Employing the concept of *habitus* in analysing religious practices of social agents has resulted in an array of interesting findings. Using the notion of *habitus* in his analysis,

⁵³ Bourdieu, *Logic*, 18.

⁵⁴ Bourdieu, *Outline*, 164.

⁵⁵ Pierre Bourdieu, *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), 8.

⁵⁶ Bourdieu, *Logic*, 40.

⁵⁷ Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*, 25.

Talal Asad criticised the modern idea that “a (religious) practitioner cannot know how to live religiously without being able to articulate that knowledge”.⁵⁸ The modern idea sees religion as a set of explicit rules about how to live a religious life. Modern men thus see religiosity as containing various obligations that one accepts. *Habitus*, by contrast,

is not something one accepts or rejects, it is part of what one essentially is and must do. (The ethics of passionate necessity encompasses tragedy.) Oedipus puts out his own eyes not because his conscience or his god considers that he deserves to be punished for failing to be responsible – or because *he* thinks he does – but because (as he says) he cannot bear the thought of having to look his father and his mother in the eyes when he joins them beyond the grave, or to see his children, “begotten as they were begotten”. He acts as he does necessarily, out of the passion that is his *habitus*.⁵⁹

With regard to the Western way of understanding Islam, Asad’s criticism is directed against the tendency of the modern view to treat questions of morality in Islam beyond the social context and use the historical development of Christianity since the onset of Protestantism as the standard by which to judge Islam. In his view, this comparison is misplaced because, although Islamic law distinguishes between law and ethics, neither term should be understood in its modern, secular sense.⁶⁰ In Asad’s understanding, religion, law, and ethics cannot be perfectly separated and therefore religious behaviours should be understood in terms of the passion, not obligation, that motivates them.

Saba Mahmood’s research on an urban women’s mosque movement in Cairo is another example of the employment of Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus* in analysing religious practices in Muslim communities. Mahmood’s endeavour is aimed at problematising the common understanding of agency as resistance to social norms.⁶¹ Using this understanding, the practice of veiling in women is usually considered as the sign of a lack of agency on their part. Her fieldwork in Cairo, however, shows a different picture. The women who belong to the mosque movement see veiling not as an expression of identity but as “a necessary, if insufficient, condition for attaining the goal

⁵⁸ Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993), 36. On page 75 of his book he explains that *habitus* as a concept originated from Marcell Mauss but was popularised by Bourdieu.

⁵⁹ Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 96.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 248.

⁶¹ Saba Mahmood, “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival,” *Cultural Anthropology* 16, no. 2 (2001): 208.

internal to that practice – namely, the creation of a shy and modest self. The veil in this sense is the means both of *being* and *becoming* a certain kind of person”.⁶² In other words, veiling for these women does not only constitute a reflection of their interiority; it is also the means by which this interiority is acquired.⁶³ The same goes for the practice of the five daily prayers for these women, which they identify as “a key site for purposefully moulding their intentions, emotions, and desires in accord with orthodox standards of Islamic piety”.⁶⁴

In this light, a moral *habitus* can be achieved by conscious practices, either through daily prayers, the veiling of the body, the listening to tape-recorded religious sermons,⁶⁵ or just the practising of general Islamic teachings by new Muslim converts.⁶⁶ The valuable contribution of these works in extending Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus* lies in their treatment of the supposedly pre-reflexive *habitus* as a product of conscious socialisation.

But it would be wrong to conclude that the *habitus* that one either consciously learned or unconsciously acquired, and thus the divergence of Mahmood’s works from Bourdieu’s understanding, will always fit the field which one inhabits. Bourdieu anticipates the potential for a crisis situation to be disruptive of the “quasi-perfect coincidence between objective tendencies and subjective expectations”.⁶⁷ A crisis occurs when there is a gap between one’s *habitus* and field. Social changes introduce transformation to the field. One example of a crisis given by Bourdieu is when a society is undergoing an economic liberalisation in which the expectation arising from an attainment of a level of education in a certain discipline is met with changes in the economy that no longer puts the same value on that particular discipline. In this situation, there is a discrepancy between the qualifications one achieves, along with the position

⁶² Ibid., 215.

⁶³ Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 161.

⁶⁴ Saba Mahmood, “Rehearsed Spontaneity and the Conventionality of Ritual: Disciplines of Salat,” *American Ethnologist* 28, no. 4 (2001): 828.

⁶⁵ Charles Hirschkind, “The Ethics of Listening: Cassette-Sermon Audition in Contemporary Egypt,” *American Ethnologist* 28, no. 3 (2001).

⁶⁶ Daniel Winchester, “Embodying the Faith: Religious Practice and the Making of a Muslim Moral Habitus,” *Social Forces* 86, no. 4 (2008).

⁶⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 234.

one expects from it, and the change in the economy in which there is an increasingly limited number of expected jobs available.

Together with the emerging occupational insecurity that usually accompanies economic liberalisation, this crisis creates a margin of freedom for political action aimed at reopening the space of possibilities.

Symbolic power, which can manipulate hopes and expectation, especially through a more or less inspired and uplifting performative evocation of the future – prophesy, forecast or prediction – can introduce a degree of play into the correspondence between expectations and chances and open up a space of freedom through the more or less voluntarist positing of more or less improbable possibles – utopia, project, programme or plan – which the pure logic of probabilities would lead one to regard as practically excluded.⁶⁸

But before that margin of freedom is able to envision a different future, when once again *habitus* fits the field, social agents will experience a condition that Bourdieu refers to as the “hysteria of *habitus*”, defined as the “incapacity to think historical crises in categories of perception and thought other than those of the past”.⁶⁹

With regard to the case of Muhammadiyah, the above elaboration of works related to the use of the concepts of *habitus*, field, and crisis can provide us with preliminary hypotheses to the research questions this dissertation poses. Related to the question on how two totally opposing tendencies can arise within Muhammadiyah, I would argue that *habitus* as a generative structure allows this difference. Despite the differences between the two tendencies, I would explain that they arise from one shared predisposition among the members of Muhammadiyah; a predisposition which I dub ‘reflective’ and will be explained in the next section.

On the question of why the two tendencies emerged, I suggest that differences in the way each camp perceives a crisis in the field which Muhammadiyah inhabits informs us how each perception of crisis can produce different reactions. The differences between the two camps can be traced to two factors. The first factor is related to each camp’s definition of crisis in Muhammadiyah with respect to the change in their field of life. The second is the solution each of the camp offers to the crisis of the field.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Bourdieu, *Outline*, 83.

This crisis of the field, I propose, is related to the influence of Western cultural and ideological elements in the lives of Muslims. While the status quo camp sees the presence of the West as the cause of the crisis, the reform camp sees it as a symptom of the wider phenomenon of globalisation that is at the heart of this crisis.

Furthermore, to complement this Bourdieusian framework, a post-colonial perspective might be propitiously employed to develop this framework in order to explain the causes of this crisis. In Chapters Six and Seven of this dissertation I argue that the trigger to the emergence of two opposing tendencies in Muhammadiyah is the perception of the organisation's members towards the presence and influence of a Western perspective in the life of Muslims. The elaboration of a post-colonial perspective on the practice of appropriation of what is perceived to be Western culture in Chapter Five will explain how both the emulation and the rejection of the West plays a pivotal part in the mind of non-Western people in forming their hybrid identities.

The simplistic dichotomy of domination-resistance is not relevant here. The story of Muhammadiyah's members in this dissertation demonstrates a more complicated narrative than the naïve associations of the practice of emulation to the act of submission and rejection to resistance. The adoption of a post-colonial perspective can shine a light on this blurred dichotomy and complement the Bourdieusian framework of the crisis of the field: while the proponents of the status quo relate the presence of the West as the cause of the crisis, and of their "hysteria of *habitus*", those of the reform camp critique this "hysteria" and take advantage of the presence of the West to enunciate and criticise their own predispositions and therefore open up a margin of freedom through their various reform projects.

1.2.2 Reflexivity and Reflectivity

Two other key concepts employed in my dissertation are reflexivity and reflectivity. In the previous section I associated what I define as the status quo and reform camps within Muhammadiyah with each of their response to 'hysteria of *habitus*'. This section will serve as a summarised discussion of the concepts of reflexivity and reflectivity, while the full elaboration will be conducted in Chapter Four. The main argument in this section is

as follows: reflectivity is a particular way for social agents to view their field; it is a particular predisposition or *habitus*.

The general definition of reflexivity comes from George Herbert Mead. He defines reflexivity as “the turning back of the experience of the individual upon himself”.⁷⁰ In other words, reflexivity refers to self’s reflection upon him- or herself, or the use of one’s thought to assess oneself. Writing in 2010, almost seventy years after Mead, Mouzelis introduces two forms of reflexivity aimed at giving clarity to the confusion of various scholarly definitions of reflexivity that have come up thus far.⁷¹ Those two types are the cataphatic and apophatic (negative) ones.⁷²

The cataphatic, and the more common, understanding of reflexivity is based on active and means-ends calculation. The self-reflection in this form of reflexivity assumes a rational agent concerned about analysing oneself to achieve a conscious goal, namely a better and more secure self. Examples used by Mouzelis to elaborate this form of reflexivity are taken from Giddens’ works on reflexive modernisation.⁷³ In Mouzelis’s view, Giddens’ theory treats the individual, faced with the decreasing role of the state in the age of reflexive modernisation with respect to the welfare of its citizens, as reliant on himself for his survivability. A rational, means-ends calculation is assumed to be the individual’s natural response to this situation.

The apophatic form of reflexivity assumes a more spontaneous path to reflexivity. With respect to goals and identity, the apophatic reflexivity has these assumptions:

Goals ... are neither pre-given/pre-constituted (as in rational choice theory), nor externally imposed. The same is true about identity formation. Identities are neither ascriptive nor cataphatically constructed.⁷⁴

To put it differently, reflexivity in apophatic sense is intensely related to individual reflexes in the face of situations confronting him. The reason behind social agents’ self-

⁷⁰ George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), 134.

⁷¹ Ray Holland, “Reflexivity,” *Human Relations* 52 (1999): 463.

⁷² Nicos Mouzelis, “Self and Self-Other Reflexivity: Apophatic Dimension,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 13, no.2 (2010): 271-84.

⁷³ For works of Anthony Giddens in relations to his conceptualisation of reflexive modernity, see Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990); Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991); and Anthony Giddens, *The Transformation of Intimacy* (Cambridge: Polity, 1992).

⁷⁴ Mouzelis, 273.

reflection in apophatic reflexivity is more spiritual than rational; the way they reflect upon their own selves is more spontaneous than calculated. The spiritual dimension of this form of reflexivity is obvious when we look at Mouzelis's use of Jiddu Krishnamurti's spiritual writing as an example of apophatic reflexivity.⁷⁵

My usage of the term 'reflexivity' in this dissertation leans more toward the apophatic understanding of this concept. I define reflexivity as the capacity of social agents to immediately view their position within their field and to react almost instinctively to certain things or actions according to their predisposition. With regard to reflectivity, I define it as a particular sort of predisposition that inclines social agents to treat the world as divided between their selves as the subjects of action and their environment as the object of their analyses and actions. In this respect, reflectivity can be seen as one among various predispositions that can form social agents' reflexivity. In other words, the way social agents react immediately to certain objects in their social world (their reflexivity) can take the form of reflectivity.

Bourdieu's understanding of reflexivity is associated with a critical attitude towards one's own predisposition, which falls closer to the cataphatic understanding of the concept. My definition of reflexivity, however, associates social agents' predispositions with human reflexes. Social agents' predispositions, in my understanding, are effected instinctively. This dissertation will use this understanding of reflexivity. It will see reflexivity as social agents' predisposed view of the game in which they live. Social agents – to use Bourdieu's own understanding when he was not talking about reflexivity – are not social scientists. They do not have the luxury of reflecting on their behaviours. Even when they reflect on their predispositions, they do it in a way their predispositions allow them to.

I will further elaborate my understanding of the concepts of reflexivity and reflectivity further in Chapter Four. My usage of this alternative understanding to the relation between reflectivity and reflexivity is to give a background to Chapter Four when

⁷⁵ Four books of Jiddu Krishnamurti examined by Mouzelis are *The Impossible Question* (1972), *Beginnings of Learning* (1975), *The Wholeness of Life* (1978), and *The Ending of Time* (1985). All four books are published in London by Gollanez.

I talk about the reflective predisposition of Muhammadiyah's members that forms their *habitus*.

1.3 Research Significance

Many works have been dedicated to the study of Muhammadiyah as the biggest and the most influential modernist Islamic movement in Indonesia. The first major publication in a canon of studies on Muhammadiyah is Deliar Noer's *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942*.⁷⁶ As its title shows, however, Muhammadiyah is not its sole subject. Noer's is a historical study tracing the emergence and development of various modernist Muslim movements in Indonesia during the last four decades of Dutch rule. The book's attention is on the contribution of these movements to the political cause of anti-colonialism and the construction of Indonesian nationalism.

Four more publications in this cannon touch upon the topic of Muhammadiyah but only in order to explain more general phenomena which form their main focus. Harry J. Benda's *The Crescent and the Rising Sun* investigates the role of Islam in the formation of Indonesian nationalism⁷⁷ with Muhammadiyah as one among various Islamic organisations within that formation. Lance Castles' *Religion, Politics, and Economic Behavior in Java* traces the intermingling between Islam, politics, and economic behaviours in the cigarette industry of Kudus, a town in East Java. In this work, Muhammadiyah, again, is treated as one among various Islamic organisations representing Islam in Kudus.⁷⁸ In a similar manner, Muhammadiyah is among organisations and societal groups in West Sumatra under Taufik Abdullah's investigation in his *School and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra (1927-1933)*⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement*.

⁷⁷ Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), 1.

⁷⁸ Lance Castles, *Religion, Politics, and Economic Behavior in Java: The Kudus Cigarette Industry* (Yale: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1967), 64.

⁷⁹ Taufik Abdullah, *School and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra (1927-1933)* (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, 1971).

and receives an even smaller attention in Kahin's *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*.⁸⁰

Related to the questions this dissertation poses, the first work that touches upon the nature of two seemingly conflicting tendencies in Muhammadiyah is Mitsuo Nakamura's 1976 study *The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town*. In his conclusion on the development of Muhammadiyah's movement in Kotagede, Nakamura argues that Muhammadiyah "looks exclusivistic when viewed from outside, but in fact it is extremely open when you are within.... It looks aggressive and fanatic, but in fact its ways of propagation are gradualist and tolerant".⁸¹ The two seemingly different attitudes in Muhammadiyah in this work are its fanaticism and tolerance.

The work of Alfian also gives attention to the tension between fanaticism and tolerance in Muhammadiyah. In his research on the Muhammadiyah movement during Dutch colonial rule, Alfian finds different characteristics between different Muhammadiyah's branches. The differences can be found between Muhammadiyah in Minangkabau and in Java:

As religious revivalists, Muhammadiyah leaders and activists in Minangkabau were mostly concerned with the purity of the Faith more than with anything else, and this might have caused them to become politically less flexible and religiously more fanatic. Unlike Minangkabau, Muhammadiyah leaders and activists in Java was much more concerned with the way to reconcile the Faith with the modern world.⁸²

⁸⁰ George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952).

⁸¹ Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town* (Michigan: UMI Dissertation Services: 1997), 320-21. Nakamura wrote about the more recent development of Muhammadiyah in the same town, Kotagede, in the second part of the 2012 enlarged edition of the book. In this part of the book, he noticed a recent development in Muhammadiyah movement in Kotagede that gave birth to a stream of Muhammadiyah's members that refer to themselves as part of "Cultural Muhammadiyah" as opposed to "Structural Muhammadiyah" in the leadership hierarchy in Muhammadiyah Kotagede (Nakamura Mitsuo, *The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town, c.1910s-2010*, 2nd enlarged ed. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), 339.) This dual categorisation of Muhammadiyah's members in Kotagede is parallel to my categorisation between the supporters of the reform and status quo camps, respectively. The "Cultural Muhammadiyah" group in Nakamura's study is comparable to the cultural project I discuss in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

⁸² Alfian, *Muhammadiyah: The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989), 353.

Arbiyah Lubis's dissertation on the mode of thought in Muhammadiyah tells a different story. She sees the presence of the tension between modernism and traditionalism in assessing Muhammadiyah's religious outlook, but she insists that despite the modern educational system that the organisation has introduced to Indonesian Muslim communities, the organisation's mode of interpreting Islam allows only a minimum role for human reason, and is therefore more scripturalist.⁸³ The same tone was set by a more recent work by Pradana Boy. He believes that there is presently a struggle between the liberal and conservative wings within the organisation. The conservative group, however, seemed to be able to exert hegemony over the progressive Islamic groups in this organisation at the time of his writing.⁸⁴

After investigating scholarly works on Muhammadiyah related to the issue of contradiction between modernism and puritanism, I will discuss three works which perceive no such contradiction. On the one hand, Alwi Shihab's work on the emergence and development of Muhammadiyah shows us how the fear towards the issue of conversion to Christianity facilitated by the activities of Christian missions has motivated the activities of this organisation since its inception. Anti-Christian sentiment and not modernist aspiration, argues Shihab, is the driving factor in both the establishment of this organisation and its subsequent programs.⁸⁵ Modern methods were only adopted as a tool to resist the efforts of Christian missions. On the other hand, Achmad Jainuri argues that in the period between 1912 and 1942, the formation of Muhammadiyah's ideology resulted in "a particular religious outlook, worldview, and system of ethical values, in which openness, plurality, hard work, rational calculation, and a spirit of liberalism were all encouraged".⁸⁶ In this work, Jainuri establishes the characteristic of Muhammadiyah that is aimed at modernising the Muslims of the Dutch Indies and thus increasing their capacity to compete with other religious groups in performing "good deeds".⁸⁷

⁸³ Arbiyah Lubis, "Pemikiran Muhammadiyah dan Muhammad Abduh (Suatu Perbandingan)" (PhD diss., IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 1989), 290-93.

⁸⁴ Pradana Boy, *Para Pembela Islam: Pertarungan Kelompok Progresif dan Konservatif di Muhammadiyah* (Jakarta: Gramata Publishing, 2009).

⁸⁵ Alwi Shihab, *Membendung Arus: Respons Gerakan Muhammadiyah terhadap Misi Kristen di Indonesia sejak November 1912 hingga Masa Kini* (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1998), 196-97.

⁸⁶ Achmad Jainuri, "The Formation of the Muhammadiyah's Ideology, 1912-1942" (PhD diss., McGill University, 1997), 196.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 167.

Jainuri's comparison between Muhammadiyah and Calvinism is not new. Many observers have recognised similarities between Muhammadiyah and Christian Reformism in their members' sense of mission in life. Peacock's *Muslim Puritans*, for example, finds rational behavioural patterns historically associated with Christian Reformism within individual behaviours of Muslim reformists in Indonesia (Muhammadiyah's members in Yogyakarta in particular), Malaysia, and Singapore. In his conclusion, even though Peacock sees Muslims reformists in these three countries as distinctively and simultaneously Southeast Asia and Islam, and having complex cultural orientation,⁸⁸ he still sees these Muslim reformists' behaviours as affirming the logic of Weber's notion of rationalism.⁸⁹ For Peacock, what distinguishes these Muslim reformists from other Muslims is first and foremost their rational attitude. Like Jainuri, he sees no distinctive contradiction in their behavioural patterns.

My dissertation observes this contradiction within Muhammadiyah, but differs from the works of Nakamura, Alfian, and Lubis in three ways. The first is related to the ground that constitutes the two opposing tendencies. Instead of looking at the two tendencies as comprising of individuals supporting either puritanism or modernism, this dissertation treats the two opposing tendencies with respect to their perception of the need for reform within this organisation. In other words, this dissertation is concerned with status quo and reform as the two opposing camps within Muhammadiyah.

The second difference is related to the source of the two different tendencies. Instead of looking at the two opposing tendencies as emerging from different situations, this dissertation argues that they stem from the same, shared, disposition of the members of Muhammadiyah. The *habitus* shared by the members of this organisation, in its generative capacity, can produce potentially various sets of practices among them. At the moment, this *habitus* facilitates the emergence of two tendencies in the organisation in the forms of the support for either the status quo or reform.

But why does this *habitus* produce these two particular tendencies and not others? This dissertation's third difference from previous works on Muhammadiyah attends to

⁸⁸ James L. Peacock, *Muslim Puritans: Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 200, 206.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 206.

this question in terms of responses to the image of the West as the “Other”. These two different responses result in two different definitions of what constitutes a crisis and the solution to that crisis. While the status quo camp refers to the need for maintaining the present arrangement in Muhammadiyah as the solution, the reform camps sees the need to embrace changes in the field by incorporating foreign methods and values as the way out of the crisis.

In summary, my dissertation offers another perspective on the presence of status quo and reformist tendencies within Muhammadiyah through an elaboration of these three distinctive points: the nature of the two opposite tendencies, the embedded predisposition among the organisation’s members that facilitates these two opposites, and the role of an external factor that causes crisis that in turn invites opposite responses from the organisation’s members.

1.4 Research Methodology

This research will employ a qualitative approach for its data analysis. It will use the preliminary theoretical framework elaborated above to initially shape its research questions.⁹⁰ This research, as it proceeds, will use another perspective, namely the post-colonial one, to complement Bourdieu’s theory of *habitus* and field in order to fit my fieldwork findings better. In so doing, I will treat these theories to create a chain of interconnected thoughts as pertaining to these findings. Consequently, those theories used in this research will serve their purpose by explaining my research findings and not to be employed as a fixed model in order to be tested by these findings.

There are two methods used in my dissertation. The first is what Bryman calls qualitative content analysis.⁹¹ This method identifies the underlying themes in the materials being analysed. With respect to this dissertation, the data will come from the writing of Muhammadiyah’s members in various documents. The documents chosen will be the ones published around the beginning of the Reform period in Indonesian politics in

⁹⁰ John W. Creswell, *Research Designs: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication, 1994), 94.

⁹¹ Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 392.

1998, up to the first year after the 2010 Muktamar. This dissertation chooses to start from the Reform period because the intense debate between the supporters of the status quo and reform projects started around this period and thus explains the intense publication of opinions from both camps since the 1998 Reform. Moreover, in this period Indonesian citizens have experienced more freedom to voice their various opinions. Opinions published during this period are likely to be more honest, straightforward, and varied. The documents published by members of Muhammadiyah in this period can thus be expected to serve as a record of their candid opinions.

The second method I employ is that of active interviews. Unlike the ‘vessel-of-answer’ approach in more traditional interviews, they do not lead informants along a certain course according to a theoretical framework formed in the interviewer’s mind.⁹² The technique of active interviews motivates informants to construct their own narratives and therefore do not see them as fixed repositories of knowledge and experience. In contrast to more traditional interviews, active interviews allow informants to construct aspects of realities in collaboration with the interviewer. The substance of the interviews evolves as informants interact with the interviewer; questions within active interviews evolve in accordance to informants’ responses to previous questions.

Pertaining to the second method, I interviewed 28 leaders and members of Muhammadiyah in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Malang. I chose those three cities due to their central role in the administration of Muhammadiyah. Jakarta and Yogyakarta are two cities where Muhammadiyah has its headquarters, while Malang has the largest Muhammadiyah university in Indonesia. During my fieldwork from 6 June to 6 September 2011, I collected documents for my qualitative content analysis and interviewed not only key leaders of Muhammadiyah but also Muhammadiyah’s members who do not belong to the current leadership of Muhammadiyah but whose opinions are highly respected. Most of my informants in the second category used to be within the leadership rank of Muhammadiyah. I interviewed all of my informants at least once. For key informants, I conducted more in-depth interviews more than once (See Appendix 6).

⁹² Alan Bryman and Robert G. Burgess, *Qualitative Research*, vol. 2 (London: Sage Publication, 1999), 109.

1.5 The Chapters

This dissertation is basically divided into two parts. The first part responds to the first question of this research: *how did two opposite tendencies of status quo and reform occur in Muhammadiyah?* Chapter Two will explain a new way of writing history in Muhammadiyah. This new method uses narrative as the form of writing the organisation's history and therefore creates a history of Muhammadiyah that is focused on its men and women. This chapter is concerned with the issue of narrative and how building the history of Muhammadiyah as a narrative has eventually created a formalisation of the belief in human consciousness and enlightenment surrounding the life of its founding father, Ahmad Dahlan. This belief formalises the Muslim *habitus* in Muhammadiyah.

The issue of *habitus* will be the main concern of both Chapters Three and Four. While Chapter Three will dwell on opinions from the status quo and the reform project camps with regard to the proper roles of this organisation, Chapter Four will explain these opinions in terms of a shared *habitus* among the members of this organisation and how the differences between the two camps can be explained in terms of a shared predisposition. Chapters Two to Four will thus answer the first question of this research.

The second part of this dissertation will address the question of why the two opposing tendencies occur in Muhammadiyah. Chapter Five will start with a significant complementary element to Bourdieu's notions of *habitus* and field. This chapter argues that in order to understand better the sense of crisis as invoked by the change in the field, we need to incorporate the post-colonial concept of 'hybridity' in order to understand better the role which the presence of the West as the "Other" plays in constituting the change in the field. This presence of the West causes both admiration and weariness. This chapter will elaborate the potential effects of the presence of the West in terms of the story of the Buru Quartet written by Pramoedya Ananta Toer.

The next chapter will focus on the perceptions of the proponents of the status quo in Muhammadiyah with regard to the West while Chapter Seven is concerned with the perceptions of the proponents of the other camp in the organisation on the same issue. My

main argument in these two chapters is that the presence of the West as the “Other” has been the main cause for their two different approaches in understanding the ideal roles their organisation should take. The status quo’s sense of crisis as related to the intrusion of the West and the reform projects’ more positive view of the West are the difference that the two camps have in responding to the presence of the West as the “Other”. As Chapters Six and Seven will show, this difference is at the root of their opposite tendencies in responding to the necessity of reform within Muhammadiyah.

CHAPTER TWO

FROM CHRONICLE TO NARRATIVE:

MUHAMMADIYAH'S HISTORY OF ENLIGHTENMENT

In order to explain a new understanding of Muhammadiyah's history, this chapter will focus on the narrative of enlightenment displayed in the book published by the National Office of Muhammadiyah, *The Profile of One Century of Muhammadiyah (Profil 1 Abad Muhammadiyah*,¹ "The Profile" hereafter), as well as other formal publications from the early twenty-first century that, in telling the organisation's history, conspicuously create its narrative of "enlightenment", or "*pencerahan*", a word that has come to be used as code for both the ideological purpose of Muhammadiyah and for the set of principles to which the organisation adheres.

In 2005 the national organisation released a statement affirming that Muhammadiyah's historical role had been to 'enlighten' the Indonesian people.² This is obviously not the first time that the word has made its appearance in official Muhammadiyah circles, but its use within the organisation certainly intensified after this statement was issued. More importantly, the term has also entered popular discourse on the political history of Islam in Indonesia and the role of Muhammadiyah in constructing a national identity: The public prominence of Muhammadiyah has increased particularly since the release in 2010 of the very popular film on its founding father Ahmad Dahlan, bearing the title of *Sang Pencerah*, "The One who Brought Enlightenment".³

¹ Tim Penyusunan dan Penerbitan Profil Muhammadiyah, *Profil 1 Abad Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2010).

² The term seems to have first appeared in official Muhammadiyah circles following its 2005 National Meeting (*Muktamar*) in Malang, when the leadership issued "Statement of Muhammadiyah's Ideas Approaching its First Century" (*Pernyataan Pikiran Muhammadiyah Jelang Satu Abad*). The word "*pencerahan*" can be found on Part A.2 of the document. This document can be found in Suara Muhammadiyah dan Majelis Pendidikan Kader PP Muhammadiyah, ed., *Manhaj Gerakan Muhammadiyah: Ideologi, Khittah, dan Langkah* (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2009), 239-52.

³ *Sang Pencerah: Cerita tentang K. H. Ahmad Dahlan*, prod. Raam Punjabi and dir. Hanung Bramantyo, 120 mins, MVP Pictures, 2010, digital video disc. The scenario of this movie was later made into a novel,

The arguments in this chapter are, firstly, that the story of enlightenment within Muhammadiyah centred on the figure of Ahmad Dahlan as the exemplary Man, a paragon of Islamic character considered worthy of emulation by the organisation's members, had been present within Muhammadiyah long before the publication of *The Profile*. This narrative has served as one of several sources for a unique *habitus* that belongs to Muhammadiyah's members, as will be described in Chapter Four. Secondly, the writing of *The Profile* reproduces and formalises this narrative through a new form of telling Muhammadiyah's history. Thirdly, the need to reproduce this narrative through Muhammadiyah's formal history was encouraged by the perceived threat towards the survival of Muhammadiyah's various charity organisations from the intrusion of The Justice and Prosperous Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera – PKS).

I will elaborate those three arguments above through four sections in this chapter. The first section is a summary of Hayden White's categorisation of annals, chronicle and narrative, which forms the theoretical basis of this chapter; White's categories are used to differentiate the mode of history writing in *The Profile* from that found in previous historical accounts in Muhammadiyah. The second section tells the mode of history-writing in Muhammadiyah that produced chronicles of the organisation's history before the publication of *The Profile*. In its third section, this chapter then turns to the narrative mode of history-writing employed in *The Profile* and a narrative surrounding the ideas of the "exemplary Man", "Transcendental providence", and "enlightenment". The fourth, and last, section explains the reason behind the change from a chronicle towards a narrative mode of history-writing as stemming from a perceived threat from PKS, an Islamist political party widely perceived to be ideologically close to Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood.

2.1 The Change of Mode

The significance of the 2010 publication *The Profile* is that it was amongst the first of several official publications that marked a new way of recounting the history of the

Akmal Naseri Basral, *Sang Pencerah: Novelisasi Kehidupan K. H. Ahmad Dahlan dan Perjuangannya Mendirikan Muhammadiyah* (Jakarta: Mizan Pustaka, 2010).

organisation. Previously, publications such as the 1993 *History of Muhammadiyah Part 1* and the 1995 *History of Muhammadiyah* (hereafter “*Part 1*” and “*The History*”) use what their authors call the method of critical history (*sejarah kritis*).⁴ Sources are checked for their originality, authenticity and scientific accountability, but the two publications are basically a chronology of events. The 2010 publication is similar in many respects, for it contains much of the information contained in both *Part 1* and *The History*. The difference lies in how the story is told.

Perhaps the first indication of this new mode of story-telling can be found in the debate about when the organisation was born. According to *The Profile*, the history of Muhammadiyah did not begin on 12 November 1912, when Ahmad Dahlan proclaimed the birth of the organisation. Nor did it start on the 22 August 1914, when “Raden Dwijoesewoyo ... rose to the podium and read the official [colonial government’s] decree stating that Muhammadiyah had been formally established”.⁵ For *The Profile*, the question of when the history of Muhammadiyah started does not concern the debate over the *de facto* and *de jure* foundation of the organisation for Muhammadiyah’s timeline started in 1868, when “Ahmad Dahlan was born in Kauman District in Yogyakarta with the name of Muhammad Darwis”.⁶ In other words, the history of Muhammadiyah as told in *The Profile* starts with the story of a man.

Whereas the two previous books are simply chronicles of events, we can consider *The Profile* to be a full narrative, for it also explains the significance of those events in terms of moral values they generate. In differentiating a narrative from a chronicle, it is useful at this point to employ the distinctions made by Hayden White. In *The Content of the Form* White explains that a narrative is a story made by “feign(ing) to make the world speak itself and speak itself as a story”.⁷ For White there are three kinds of historical representation: annals, chronicles, and history proper. The annals are a form of historical

⁴ The term appears in both books: Majelis Pustaka Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Sejarah Muhammadiyah Bagian 1* (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 1993) and Majelis Pustaka Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Sejarah Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 1995), on pages 4 and iv respectively. These two texts and the 2010 *Profile* clearly possess the imprimatur of the organisation, for none of these publications provides the details of its authors.

⁵ Tim Penyusunan, 11.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁷ Hayden White, *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987), 2.

representation that completely lacks a narrative. It does not aim to tell a story, but simply consists of a set of events listed chronologically. The chronicle does seem to tell a story and thus strives to achieve a degree of narrativity, but fails to achieve a closure to the story. The full presence of a narrative can be found in the form of what he calls “history proper”, whereby stories have a beginning, middle, and end.⁸ The history proper therefore creates meanings by constructing a story, either a story of the prevailing of humanity over the world (as in a romance) or of the (not-so-promising) fate of humanity in its struggle in the world (as in a comedy, tragedy, or satire).⁹ White’s category of “history proper” is therefore assumed to constitute the full mode of historical representation, for it is only in this mode that a full form of narrative exists.¹⁰

For White, a narrative can take different forms. On the one hand, a “romance” is a narrative which is constructed in such a way that it tells the tale of humanity’s success in overcoming the obstacles people face. It is “fundamentally a drama of self-identification symbolised by the hero’s transcendence of the world of experience, his victory over it, and his final liberation from it”.¹¹ On the other hand, people may fail to realise the goals that they have set themselves. In such cases, the narrative may take the form of a comedy, in which human optimism is only partially vindicated through the prospect of occasional reconciliations of the forces at play in the world.¹² Alternatively, it may take the form of a tragedy, in which there is no victory of humans over the world; the fate of humans at the end of the story is even worse than when the story started.¹³ Or it may take the form of a satire, a story in which the inability of individuals to realise their dreams becomes a sad

⁸ Like White, Kvernbekk defines a narrative as a “beginning-middle-ending structure that configures all elements into a whole” (Tone Kvernbekk, “Truth and Form,” *Interchange* 38, 4 (2007): 307). Jerome Bruner associates a narrative with the telling of the vicissitudes of human intention (Jerome Bruner, *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 17). Elsewhere, Bruner contrasts the verisimilitude (or the “factlikeness” or “truthlikeness”) that it displays in its story to the story’s verifiability as truth (Jerome Bruner, “What is a Narrative Fact?” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 560 (1998): 23).

⁹ Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1973), 8-9.

¹⁰ To provide another categorisation in history writing, in his *Poetics* Aristotle juxtaposes narrative and history. He associates narrative with fiction, history with facts (Kvernbekk, 305). Aristotle’s “history” is thus closer to what White classifies as the annals or chronicle than to narrative.

¹¹ White, *Metahistory*, 8.

¹² *Ibid.*, 9.

¹³ *Ibid.*

reflection of the human condition. A satire becomes a story that treats hopes, possibilities and truths as illusory and unobtainable by human consciousness.¹⁴

For the purposes of this chapter, the issue, then, is to explain why the telling of Muhammadiyah's history moved from the mode of the chronicle to that of a narrative, and what form that narrative takes. However, in order to establish that the history of Muhammadiyah as described in *The Profile* meets the standard of a full narrative in its treatment of both human action and an unspoken transcendental law, we need to appreciate how Muhammadiyah's history was represented in two earlier historical documents.

2.2 The Previous Chronicles

The form of the annals was never used as a mode of historical representation in Muhammadiyah. The history of Muhammadiyah has always been intended as a story with a moral message, even if that lesson lies in the background. Annals cannot achieve this level of story-telling, so the chronicle became the preferred mode.

The first of these official texts, *The History*, was intended to cover four periods in Muhammadiyah's history: 1912 to 1923, when Ahmad Dahlan passed away; 1923 to 1945, when Indonesia achieved its independence; 1945 to 1965, when Soekarno was ousted from office; and 1965 to 1985, when Muhammadiyah held its forty-first national meeting (*Muktamar*) in Surakarta. *Part 1* was written to cover the first period of *The History* and therefore can be considered as a part of *The History*.¹⁵

There are two reasons why both *The History* and *Part 1* are chronicles and do not constitute complete narratives. The first is a lack of a storyline. The division of Muhammadiyah's history into these four periods does not follow one specific criterion. The first period starts when Muhammadiyah was established and ends with the death of

¹⁴ Ibid., 10.

¹⁵ *The History* does not cover the second period due to "the lack of information and data of Muhammadiyah's history, specifically between the time of K. H. Ahmad Dahlan's death in 1923 to 1944" (Majelis Pustaka, *Sejarah*, i). The team of writers intended to cover the second period after the publication of the book, but I can find no evidence of this. Due to the nature of *The History* as a chronicle and thus the lack of a story uniting the facts it presents, the absence of the second period in this document does not pose a problem to the (non-)flow of the facts.

its founder. The remaining three periods correspond to different eras within Indonesian politics. This division might pose no problem to the achievement of a narrative if both books manage to create a storyline out of those periods. But the two documents are more concerned with explaining how each of the political periods affects the dynamics within Muhammadiyah. In the third period, for example, *The History* describes how the ideological battles during Soekarno's rule distorted Muhammadiyah, for the organisation paid most attention to activities that were actually beyond its control.¹⁶

Instead of recounting Muhammadiyah's past as a story where everything works in favour of the expansion and improvement of the organisation, *The History* and *Part 1* are not reluctant to criticise those mistakes perpetrated by members of the organisation. Muhammadiyah is depicted here as a movement with its ups and downs, successes and mistakes. While the two documents praise the organisation's success, they do not imagine its mistakes as somehow working mysteriously to the common good of the nation. An example of this is the treatment in *The History* of the decision at the second national annual meeting of the organisation (Muhammadiyah's Majelis Tanwir) in 1953 to permit Muhammadiyah's members to only vote for Islamic political parties, and thus cancelling the decision of the 1950 Majelis Tanwir allowing Muhammadiyah's members to vote for any political party. *The History* attributes this change to the political interests of Muhammadiyah's elites.¹⁷

The second factor contributing to the failure of *The History* and *Part 1* to form a narrative is due to the indication of the source of authority for their writing of Muhammadiyah's history. Different from *The Profile*, with unstated historical necessity as the source of its authority in telling Muhammadiyah's history, both *The History* and *Part 1* specifically cite the 1985 National Meeting as the authority mandating their writing. Instead of referring to an implicit authority as their reason to exist, both documents opt for an explicit one. In commenting on the rise of Muhammad Yunus Anis to the leadership of Muhammadiyah, to cite one example, *The History* refers to the words of Dr. Ali Akbar in acknowledging that "the choice of (Anis) was the fate from Allah the

¹⁶ Majelis Pustaka, *Sejarah*, 27.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 34.

All Wise”.¹⁸ The mentioning of Allah in this sentence to justify the rise of Anis to the office of Muhammadiyah’s presidency makes explicit the authority underlying the creation of *The History*.

Another admission to the role of mystical event in the history of Muhammadiyah can be found when *Part 1* makes explicit the thought raging in the minds of Dahlan’s students when they saw members of Budi Utomo, the first national organisation among the indigenous population of the Dutch Indies, enthusiastically delivering their speeches on the podium.

“It will be nice if Islam can be explained by way of speech in Javanese just like this. It will certainly be more able to attract the crowd and [Islam] will be better propagated”, *they thought without any prior agreement*.¹⁹ (Emphasis added)

Inspired by this event, Muhammadiyah began to use the podium speech as a method for Islamic propagation. By representing the unspoken thought of those men in words and by making explicit their unspoken agreement, *Part 1* attempts to mark the authority underlying its description of Muhammadiyah’s history. This effort, however, has the consequence of particularising that authority. Instead of an implicit, but universal, authority running through the history that the document tries to portray, the explicitness of its authority directs the readers to a specific transcendental actor making its appearance in specific events.

2.3 The Narrative of Enlightenment within Muhammadiyah

The formal construction of Muhammadiyah’s history in its 2010 publication is quite different from those published in the 1990s. Unlike its two predecessors, *The Profile* focuses on the story of Muhammadiyah’s founding father and its subsequent leaders; its history thus becomes the life stories of its leaders. And the significance of this focus is that these life stories become a story of historical transcendence.

There are three ideas that constitute the narrative of Muhammadiyah’s enlightenment. The first is the notion of the exemplary Man and his consciousness, as

¹⁸ Ibid., 38.

¹⁹ Majelis Pustaka, *Sejarah Muhammadiyah Bagian 1*, 52.

taken from the story of Ahmad Dahlan. The second is the idea of transcendental providence which accompanies this story. The third is the vision of enlightenment which here emerges as the convergence between human consciousness and transcendental providence.

2.3.1 The Man

The most notable feature of Muhammadiyah's official history is that the organisation started with a man with a unique consciousness, one which connects the spiritual heart and the reasoning mind. Ahmad Dahlan becomes the exemplary Man, an iconic figure whose traits are to be emulated by all members of Muhammadiyah. This consciousness also brought the understanding that efforts to bring society out of poverty, ignorance, and backwardness must be managed within an organisation. The organisation built by the Man is thus the vessel in which his character traits are to be emulated by the subsequent leaders of Muhammadiyah.

The contrast between the pre-Muhammadiyah darkness and the light brought by the organisation is established in the first paragraph of *The Profile*.

At the end of the nineteenth century Indonesia was *a nation in darkness*. Following the demise of royal authority throughout the archipelago, the country was destroyed by colonialism, a collective experience for the nation that caused deep trauma and historical damage. This bitter collective experience of a nation repressed by colonialism was felt by the indigenous masses, who were drowning in a sea of both structural and cultural poverty, and of ignorance and backwardness.²⁰ (Emphasis added)

This paragraph is concerned neither with the fact that the territory presently called "Indonesia" was actually then the "Dutch East Indies", nor with the question of whether people living in that territory could be categorised as a nation. Indonesia in this paragraph is an inevitability, a nation historically destined to come into existence.²¹ These two historical inaccuracies do not matter because this paragraph is written with the present as its referent and with the present role of Muhammadiyah within the nation of Indonesia as

²⁰ Tim Penyusunan, 2.

²¹ Indonesia, in this sense, is what might be called a presupposition within the Muhammadiyah narrative of enlightenment. A presupposition is "an implied proposition whose force remains invariant whether the explicit proposition in which it is embedded is true or false" (Jerome Bruner, *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds*, 27).

the object it describes. This historical imprecision is in fact significant, for *The Profile* takes Indonesia and the Indonesian nation for granted, thus focusing on the contribution of Muhammadiyah in dispelling the darkness that prevailed in what would later become the nation.

Born to an elite religious family of the Yogyakarta Palace, Dahlan was, however, no ordinary member of the elite. Like any other boy he enjoyed playing games; he was also skillful in making toys.²² He was educated in a highly religious environment, where his father was a senior religious figure in the Palace of Yogyakarta, one of the two remaining monarchies in Central Java. As a common practice for youth in this environment, Dahlan took his first *haji* pilgrimage at a very young age.²³ What makes him special, however, is his clear-sightedness in comprehending the world around him; not in terms of a paradox between reason and spirituality, but in terms of merging the two through the act of piety.

The Profile asserts that there is no contradiction between reason and spirituality: [Muhammadiyah] was born when Indonesian Muslims were experiencing systematic decay in their daily lives by the loss of Islamic spirituality in handling... rational, worldly matters such as poverty, ignorance, backwardness, etcetera. By means of an institutional and systematic Islamic movement, Muhammadiyah sought to reinvigorate Islamic spirituality within the everyday lives of Indonesian Muslims, who had been marginalised by colonialism for hundreds of years.²⁴ The use of the words “Islamic spirituality”, “rational”, “institutional” and “systematic” in the same sentence in this paragraph might seem curious. Here, it is clearly the intention of *The Profile* to dissolve the contradiction that has so long been identified with the practice of Islam: having an Islamic spirituality is not contrary to the rational mind; being spiritual does not mean refusing to use one’s reason.

In fact, the rational Ahmad Dahlan is a spiritual man, as can be discerned by reading a message in his diary:

You Dahlan, you will certainly come to face great dangers and events, ones that will shock you, ones you must endure. You might be able to get through them safely, or you might perish because of them. You Dahlan, try to imagine that you are alone with Allah when you are facing

²² Tim Penyusunan, 7.

²³ Ibid., 12.

²⁴ Ibid., 4.

death [and] trials, heaven and hell. And of those that you encounter, remember who is the closest to you, and leave the rest behind....²⁵

Dahlan need not fear because Allah is the one who is closest. This assurance does not come from a dream in which some supernatural force comes to Dahlan and tell him his fate. Dahlan comes up with those words himself and writes them down as a reminder to himself. The Man himself comes to this consciousness (*kesadaran*), a consciousness of a kind that leads him to diligently practice religious rituals (*ibadah*), to do good deeds (*amal saleh*), to propagate and defend the religion of Allah, and to lead the Islamic community (*ummat*) in the right direction.²⁶ This consciousness takes him beyond the contradiction between spirituality and rationality; it is both a result of rational thought and heart-felt contemplation.

This particular consciousness also “makes Dahlan aware of the backwardness of Muslims in his homeland”.²⁷ Attaining this level of understanding transforms Dahlan from an ordinary man into the exemplary Man. Importantly, the story of the Man continues, for it was emulated by Dahlan’s successors.²⁸ The spirit of wisdom exemplified by Dahlan lives on in each of these men’s lives. The plots are never the same because the character of every man and the situations they find themselves in are always different. But each of these men finds his own method to address the requirements of his time. For example, the eleventh president of Muhammadiyah Amien Rais is dubbed the “Reformist Intellectual”, while the organisation’s twelfth president Syafi’i Maarif is the

²⁵ Ibid., 13.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ The people whose histories are told in *The Profile* are not only the formal leaders of Muhammadiyah after Dahlan passed away. The leaders whose stories are told in *The Profile* are those men who have contributed to the development of Muhammadiyah. During the colonial period, these men whose leadership had made Muhammadiyah survive the colonial hardships are Kiai Haji Ibrahim, Haji Muhammad Syudja’, Haji Fakhrudin, Kiai Haji Hisyam, Kiyai Raden Haji Hadjid, Kiai Haji Mas Mansur, and Ki Bagus Hadikusumo. During the time of Soekarno’s erratic leadership, Muhammadiyah was blessed with the leadership of Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Buya Haji Ahmad Rasyid Sutan Mansur, Professor Dr. Hamka, Kiai Haji Muhammad Yunus Anis, and Kiai Haji Ahmad Badawi. Ahmad Badawi’s leadership continued throughout the authoritarian rule of Soeharto. After Ahmad Badawi, Muhammadiyah was led by Kiai Haji Faqih Usman, Kiai Haji Abdur Rozak Fachruddin, Haji Djarnawi Hadikusumo, Haji Soedarsono Prodjokusumo, Haji Mohammad Djindar Tamimy, Kiai Haji Ahmad Azhar Basyir, M.A., and Professor Dr. Haji Muhammad Amien Rais. After Amien Rais’s participation in national reform efforts, Muhammadiyah has been led by Professor Dr. Ahmad Syafii Maarif and Professor Dr. Haji Muhammad Sirajuddin Syamsuddin, M.A.

“Egalitarian Humanist Intellectual”.²⁹ Although all should strive to achieve the same general consciousness, the details of where this consciousness leads are determined by specific historical circumstances.

For Muhammadiyah, it is not impossible to emulate the example of a man who lived over a century ago. Indeed, the educational activities of Muhammadiyah today are intended to accurately reflect the open-minded and religious quality of Ahmad Dahlan’s teachings, to educate Indonesian children so that they can gain “broad horizons on rational, worldly affairs without finding it necessary to abandon Islamic spirituality and values”.³⁰ And Dahlan’s personal attributes are to be emulated by others. The Man should be an “independent person who has a direct responsibility to the Creator, but also needs other people in order to become a pious human being”.³¹ The concept of the Man thus emerges from –and repeats – the story of Dahlan and his enlightenment.

2.3.2 Muhammadiyah and Transcendental Providence

The Profile is ostensibly a secular document: it makes no reference to supernatural notions to account for Muhammadiyah’s successes in its first century of existence; it uses words such as “Allah” and “The Creator” (*Sang Pencipta*) very sparingly.³² However, to say that it has left out any role for transcendental providence in its story and has thus completely de-sanctify the history of Muhammadiyah is to miss the point of this 450-page publication. *The Profile* is intensely religious, and a spirit of piety can be felt on each page. In other words, one can still identify the presence of transcendental providence in the story it tells its readers.

God thus still permeates the book, providing historical guidance to the people of Muhammadiyah on how to proceed. Allah’s guidance in this document, however, does not take a supernatural form, but acts through the consciousness of Muhammadiyah’s

²⁹ Ibid., 50-54. *The Profile* gives a predicate to each leader listed in accordance to their personal character, the characteristic of the time of their leadership, as well the characteristic of their leadership.

³⁰ Ibid., 4.

³¹ Ibid., 10.

³² The document evidently uses these two words only once each, on pages 13 and 10 respectively.

leaders, just as in the story of Ahmad Dahlan and the advice he wrote to himself. *The Profile* strives to manifest the Transcendental in the fullness of history.

Just as the history of Muhammadiyah is depicted as the story of rationally-aware people, the success of Muhammadiyah in its historical travails becomes the story of transcendental providence made manifest in the wisdom of its leaders. Again, for Muhammadiyah it is meaningless to contrast human reason to spirituality. By using reason to assess and control the environment, humanity implores God to give guidance – a notion close to the Thomist assertion in Catholicism.³³ Muhammadiyah's capacity to survive and the active role it played in the history of Indonesia as a nation is the result of the consciousness of its leaders, as depicted in Ahmad Dahlan's internal struggles before founding Muhammadiyah.

The idea of Muhammadiyah started from a contemplation, and continued in a struggle of ideas that lasted for quite a long time, ... to give birth to a movement for propagation and renewal, one that can accommodate the need for an awakening (*kebangkitan*) during this dark era of colonialism.³⁴

Although the history of Muhammadiyah is the story of its people, their story never strays far from the story of Transcendental providence. And as this providence is stated indirectly, so is the historical role of Muhammadiyah legitimised by its significant contribution to the development of the nation.

As one of the people's organisations that has now been able to mark its position as the largest modern Islamic organisation in the world, *Muhammadiyah has not only been tested by history, but also has tested history*. [This history proves that] the nation of Indonesia needed the presence of an organisation like Muhammadiyah that was intensely and consistently active in [Islamic] propagation, in the empowerment of society, and in the eradication of poverty and ignorance.³⁵ (Emphasis added)

The importance of Muhammadiyah in the shaping of Indonesian history is established, but not by the use of words referring to God. To the contrary, the authority for this historical role is made anonymous, yet universal. For *The Profile*, the fact that Muhammadiyah has both been tested by as well as influencing Indonesian history is

³³ This is just one of many tenets of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. For a more comprehensive view of Thomist philosophy, see Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1957).

³⁴ Tim Penyusunan, 11.

³⁵ Ibid.

considered sufficient in itself to indicate the presence of a transcendental blessing throughout the 100 years of its existence.

Throughout this century the leaders of Muhammadiyah faced various challenges. Ahmad Dahlan had to face the negative and sometimes violent reaction of traditionalist Islamic religious leaders (*ulama*) who disapproved of his message; Muhammad Syudja' and Hisyam faced the demands of younger members calling for a new generation of leaders; Under Ahmad Azhar Basyir's leadership Muhammadiyah was criticised for ignoring the Sufi dimension of Islam; Syafii Maarif had to promote a spirit of renewal (*tajdid* or *pembaruan*) within an organisation that was seen as stagnant.³⁶

Sometimes controversial moves had to be taken to ensure the survival of the organisation. Muhammad Yunus Anis, for example, decided to join Soekarno's undemocratic national parliament, the "Mutual Self-help Parliament" (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong*), so that Muslims would have some representation in parliament.³⁷ In order to ensure Muhammadiyah's survival during Soeharto's authoritarian rule, Djarnawi Hadikusumo accepted that Pancasila would be the sole ideology of Muhammadiyah in the face of widespread demands that Islam remain the organisation's ideological base.³⁸

Muhammadiyah is thus seen to have survived because of the bravery and wisdom of its leaders. In passing these tests of history, these leaders also offered valuable contributions to Indonesian history. Ahmad Dahlan changed the nation's history with his introduction of a modern Islamic organisation; Muhammad Syudja' made possible large-scale hajj pilgrimages for Indonesian Muslims; Fakhruddin familiarised Indonesian Muslims with modern and improved journalistic methods for Islamic propagation; and Amien Rais's criticism of the rampant authoritarianism and corruption of the Soeharto regime facilitated democratic reform in the late twentieth century Indonesia.

These achievements, among many others mentioned in the book, are often taken as historical proof indicating the presence of transcendental providence in Muhammadiyah's historical role. The fact that this providence was manifest through the

³⁶ Ibid., 49-50.

³⁷ Ibid., 35.

³⁸ Ibid., 2

efforts of the men of Muhammadiyah's leadership does not remove the religious spirit upon which *The Profile* is written. It does, however, show that the history that *The Profile* builds of Muhammadiyah is the history of its people.

2.3.3 Muhammadiyah and the Enlightenment of the Nation

The Profile explains the realisation of this providential role in the various ways it overcame the darkness that existed before Muhammadiyah was established; two of these are relevant here. The first relates to the colonial policies that left the natives of the Indies poor and ignorant. Under colonialism, the indigenous population was marginalised economically by the seizure of farmers' land, a repressive tax system and monetary inflation, while access to modern education was limited to the children of Europeans and native elites.³⁹

The second sense of darkness was found within the minds of the indigenous population. According to *The Profile* the narrow understanding of Islam propagated by most Islamic religious leaders was another form of the darkness. "Islam at that time was understood as something that stands alone, unrelated in any way to the spirit of politics, economics, and other worldly matters."⁴⁰

For *The Profile*, enlightenment thus means opposing both forms of darkness. Accordingly, Muhammadiyah's activities were aimed at educating native children so that they could gain the skills and knowledge necessary to fight ignorance and poverty. In its fight against the darkness, Muhammadiyah has promoted democracy, gender equality, tolerance, and the growth of the middle class.⁴¹ On matters of religion, it eschews the practice of those rituals not prescribed in the Qur'an, promotes the use of the vernacular in religious sermons, and introduced modern methods for determining the *kiblat* (the direction of Mekkah for prayers) and for calculating the start and end of the fasting month.⁴²

³⁹ Ibid., 2-3.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 4.

⁴¹ Ibid., 7-9

⁴² Ibid., 3.

Just as Muhammadiyah in *The Profile* is itself considered to be the result of enlightenment, we can attribute all these social improvements to enlightenment, which can be defined as the convergence of human consciousness and divine providence. Such a consciousness does not necessarily lead to transcendental providence, for only when the transcendent blesses the efforts of conscious men can it bear fruit and transform the world. Enlightenment therefore requires both human consciousness and transcendental blessing. And as we can only understand history from the point of view of human experience, *The Profile* transforms the history of Muhammadiyah into the history of humanity. The presence of transcendental blessings within this history need not be explicitly stated because Muhammadiyah has prevailed over history. Muhammadiyah itself is therefore both the product and the proof of the convergence of human consciousness and transcendental providence.

2.3.4 Muhammadiyah's History as a Narrative

Returning to White's categorisation of historical representation, in "history proper" facts are interpreted so as to construct a story, necessitating the selection of events relevant to the story.⁴³ It is unavoidable that this will entail the exclusion of certain events so as to create a story with a beginning, middle and end, tied together to reach a moralising conclusion.⁴⁴ *The Profile* thus excludes events that it considers unnecessary to its narrative. For example, in 1953 the Majelis Tanwir made an important change to its decision of 1950 that had allowed Muhammadiyah's members to vote for non-Islamic political parties, as had been explained in *The History*. However, this change was evidently considered to be irrelevant – and probably disturbing – by the writers of *The*

⁴³ Hayden White, *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978), 51.

⁴⁴ Scholars of narratives have discussed the truth value in narratives. On the one hand, Mink argues that this value is hard to extract from narratives since the claim of truth in a narrative should be assessed on the basis of the complex form of the narrative itself, and not from each individual statement about events that build the narrative (Louis O. Mink, "Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument," in *The Writing of History*, ed. Robert H. Canary and Henry Kozicki (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 144). Bruner also maintains that it is only the value of verisimilitudes within the narrative that can be assessed, and that this value is determined by its effectiveness in creating an illusion of reality (Jerome Bruner, "What is a Narrative Fact?" 23). On the other hand, Kvernbekk argues that there has to be a way to assess the value of truth in a narrative, even if the way one assesses it must move beyond the correspondence between a narrative and something that exists in the world (Kvernbekk, 313-14).

Profile; the event does not make it into its pages. Rather, the events selected to be written in are the ones consistent with a plot of a romance, a plot where the man struggles in the world and emerges as a winner at the end of the story. The narrative of Ahmad Dahlan is indeed what White defines as romance, with Muhammadiyah as the trophy he receives for prevailing over the tribulations of the times.⁴⁵

This story of victory and enlightenment is repeated in the life histories of the leaders who followed. Indeed, the replication of the story of the Man constitutes the whole story of Muhammadiyah, for its evolution is recounted by describing each individual leader. The stories which are told surrounding the circumstances of each of their births, the adversities they faced in their subsequent struggles to live a pious life, and the wise steps they took for advancing the organisation is a story of its evolution from a modest beginning to a triumphant ending. This history is thus made up of these smaller, yet enlightening, analogies. Muhammadiyah's progress is built up layer-by-layer, with each story building on the victorious story of its predecessor.

The history of Muhammadiyah is thus the history of its leaders, with the story of the first Man as the paragon. The organisation's history should be understood in terms of a history constituted at two levels: that of its leaders and that of the organisation itself. A sharp divide between the two is impossible to draw because the enlightenments that these leaders experience are what Muhammadiyah stands for. The narrative in *The Profile* is, therefore, always told as a story of human beings.

Because it is intended as a complete story, a narrative generally permits us to see the end in its beginning.⁴⁶ In *The Profile* the enlightenment brought by Muhammadiyah starts with the first Man, so the end-point of the history that is presented is to be found in the idea of enlightenment elaborated at the beginning of the story. And it is not just at the

⁴⁵ In analysing Muslim reformists' expressive forms in Yogyakarta, for example, Peacock finds that these Muslims tend to prefer written word over dramatic performance. The stories presented in the expressive forms of these Muslims usually revolve around both a romance (where the protagonists, with their persistence, manage to acquire victory in the form of morally acceptable decision) and a tragedy where their misguidedness brings about their suffering. But even in the form of tragedy, the stories of Muslim reformists always contain moral lessons to be learned; James L. Peacock, *Muslim Puritans: Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 117-28.

⁴⁶ White, *Content*, 24.

end-point of the story; the story of enlightenment is present throughout *The Profile*, whichever era of Muhammadiyah's leadership is examined.⁴⁷

A story is only complete if it has a message to convey, a meaning to discern, some moral values to extract.⁴⁸ And *The Profile* contains so many moral values that it is impossible to list them exhaustively. It is a story of the victory of values such as bravery, rationality and spirituality over cowardice, stupidity and ignorance; a story in which right always trumps wrong.

What is significant about *The Profile*'s notion of morality is the way in which the victory of right over wrong is presented. Unlike *The History* and *Part 1*, the positive outcome that is linked to certain events flows naturally from the story. *The Profile*'s acknowledgement of the wise steps of Muhammadiyah's men occurs not by an explicit reference to God, but by silent allusion to this authority. By choosing to do this, it creates a source of authoritative power that is universal and therefore natural; the unspoken God that blesses Muhammadiyah's history is thus the God of all creatures great and small. The transcendent is thus made immanent. As a consequence, although the history of Muhammadiyah is a particular history of a particular Islamic organisation in Indonesia, it can be read as a story with which all of humanity is familiar.

The elaboration of events describing the effectiveness of Muhammadiyah's leaders in their worldly activities is not of itself evidence of the presence of a transcendental providence. Instead, *The Profile* creates a spectacle confirming that their selfless efforts are the medium through which this transcendental providence confirms its presence. Again, this conclusion is implicit in the document. By disciplining transcendental authority and transforming it into intelligible human actions, *The Profile* has domesticated what White calls the "sublime" and transformed it into the "beautiful".

⁴⁷ This mode of history writing can be said to mark the organisation's aspiration for modernity as an "epoch". Understood as an epoch, modernity has a definite beginning but no ending (Paul Rabinow, *Marking Time* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 2). For Muhammadiyah, the beginning of this epoch coincides with the enlightenment of the exemplary Man, and its subsequent evolution simply involves the emulation of this story of enlightenment.

⁴⁸ White, *Content*, 23.

In the story of Muhammadiyah described by *The Profile*, one can therefore identify the tendency towards positioning humanity at the centre of history.⁴⁹

2.4 Creating a 'Romance', Avoiding a 'Satire'

By 2010 Muhammadiyah had thus decided to present its story not as a chronicle of events but as a narrative, a story which emphasises a moral tale. Why was this new mode selected? As we have seen – and as the two earlier histories recognised – in the past the organisation's political influence has been determined more by the vagaries of political life than the capacity of its leaders to shape political outcomes. Muhammadiyah's history therefore could have easily become what I have called a satire, one in which the ambitious claims of its protagonists are defeated by political realities. Here, I suggest that Muhammadiyah has avoided the possibility of being politically marginalised by presenting its narrative in a particular way.

By the 2000s Muhammadiyah faced challenges on many fronts, but it was the growing socio-political influence of fundamentalist religious movements that had emerged throughout the 1980s and, especially, into the 1990s that caused most concern.⁵⁰ Muhammadiyah grew increasingly uneasy with the expanding influence of such *tarbiyah* movements, especially those related to the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS), as is well recorded.⁵¹ I suggest that it was Muhammadiyah's reaction to the *tarbiyah* movement that best explains the change of the mode in representing the organisation's history.

⁴⁹ White describes how 'history proper' generally disciplines the sublime and changes it into "the beautiful" (*Content*, 69), thus making it intelligible to "reason, understanding, or aesthetic sensibility" (*Content*, 72). In turn, such an effort is a step towards positioning humanity at the centre of history.

⁵⁰ For an example of the conflict between Muhammadiyah and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, a fundamentalist political party, see Syaifudin Zuhri, "From Rituals to Politics: Looking at the Conflict over Al Mutaqqun Mosque in Prambanan" (a paper delivered at the International Research Conference on Muhammadiyah, Malang, Indonesia, November 29-December 2, 2012).

⁵¹ See for example Abdurrahman Wahid, "Musuh dalam Selimut," in *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia*, ed. Abdurrahman Wahid (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2009), 23-26. The word *tarbiyah* here refers to any movement that follows the precepts of Sayid Qutb and the "Islamic Brotherhood", *Ikhwanul Muslimin*. This Arabic word actually means "education" and is used to designate Ikhwanul Movement's model of education through small cell groups, the "*usrah*" (family). Due to this model of educating its cadres, the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera can be categorised as a *tarbiyah* movement; Najwa Shihab and Yanuar Nugroho, "The Ties that Bind: Law, Islamisation and Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)," *Australian Journal of Asian Law* 10, no. 2 (2008): 235.

The first clear indication of this new official position was a decree on the “Consolidation of Muhammadiyah’s Institutions and Charities” issued by the National Office of Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta on 1 December 2006.⁵² Members were instructed to abide directly to the organisation’s ideology.

All Leaders of the Federation [of Muhammadiyah], Majelis and Institutes, Autonomous Organisations, and Muhammadiyah’s Charities, are instructed to uphold the discipline of organisation, to tighten its lines [of command], and to strengthen Muhammadiyah’s ideology and mission.⁵³

Muhammadiyah’s institutions and charities were also instructed to synchronise their activities with Muhammadiyah’s ideology. However, the explicit cause of the anxiety behind this instruction was evidently the encroachment within Muhammadiyah of the Justice and Prosperity Party. With regard to political parties in general and The Justice and Prosperity Party in particular, the decree instructs

all members of Muhammadiyah to realise, understand, and take a critical perspective [of the fact] that all political parties in this country, including political parties which claim [to be] or expand its following propagation activities, such as The Justice and Prosperous Party, are truly political parties.⁵⁴

The singling out of the Justice and Prosperous Party in this decree informs us of Muhammadiyah’s uneasiness towards this party with regard to the latter’s double role as both a political party and a social movement.

A second document indicative of this new official position is a decree of Muhammadiyah’s National Annual Meeting (*Majelis Tanwir*) released in 2007.⁵⁵ This document titled ‘The Revitalization of Muhammadiyah’s Ideology: Consolidation of Faith and Life’s Goals’ is more a statement than a decree. It contains a detailed elaboration of the response to two major internal issues: what ideology means for Muhammadiyah members, and why it is important to uphold that ideology at present. For the first question, the ideology that the document refers to is simply the set of ideological

⁵² Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Surat Keputusan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah Nomor: 149/KEP/I.0/B/2006.

⁵³ Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Surat Keputusan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah Nomor: 149/KEP/I.0/B/2006, Keputusan No.9.

⁵⁴ Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Surat Keputusan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah Nomor: 149/KEP/I.0/B/2006, Keputusan No.3.

⁵⁵ This document can be found in Suara Muhammadiyah dan Majelis Pendidikan Kader PP Muhammadiyah, ed., *Manhaj Gerakan Muhammadiyah*, 253-81.

statements formulated during the life of the organisation. More significantly, the answer to the second question is that the presence of new Islamic movements has the potential to “weaken the internal condition of Muhammadiyah, including the weakening in its ideology”.⁵⁶ The organisation’s answer to this threat – and to ‘revitalise its ideology’ – is to emphasise its detachment from political parties. Section D of the document reminds its readers of the decision taken by the organisation in the years 1971 and 1978 to avoid “organisational attachment with any political party or organisation”.

The context for the decision by Muhammadiyah to avoid delineating its ideological differences with PKS is that the organisation has long recognised that it has similar intellectual sources. *Part 1*, for example, lauded the works of the religious scholars Ibn Taimiyah, Ibn Qoyyim, and Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab.⁵⁷ Another commentary by scholars linked to Muhammadiyah praises Syaikh Hasan al-Bana, the founder of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwanul Muslimin*) as an important reformer within Islamic thought.⁵⁸ Further evidence of a traditional resistance to new ideas is a 2003 study of theological discourse within Muhammadiyah, which finds that the organisation has no official position on religious pluralism or the teachings of various other religions.⁵⁹

This is not to imply that Muhammadiyah has the same ideology as that of the Muslim Brotherhood. But the point is that Muhammadiyah, in its construction of its narrative history, has sought to divert the discussion away from the nature of its ideology. It does this with a publication in which the history of Muhammadiyah is depicted as the history of the consciousness of Ahmad Dahlan and his successors. Instead of passing judgment on whether its ideology is puritanical or not, it deflects the debate in the direction of enlightenment as an event, where many dimensions (of which puritanism

⁵⁶ Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Revitalisasi Ideologi Muhammadiyah: Konsolidasi Bidang Keyakinan dan Cita-cita Hidup*, Bagian B.

⁵⁷ Majelis Pustaka, *Sejarah Muhammadiyah Bagian 1*, 7-8. These three characters are considered as the pioneers of revitalism of puritanism in Islamic thoughts.

⁵⁸ Musthafa Kamal Pasha and Ahmad Adaby Darban, *Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka SM, 2009), 52. The two authors are historians from Jogjakarta who are also active members of Muhammadiyah. Their works are critical towards more progressive ideas within Muhammadiyah.

⁵⁹ Zuly Qodir, “Wajah Islam Pluralis Muhammadiyah: Dari Teologi Praksis ke Teologi Pluralis-Hegemonik,” *Tanwir* 1, 2 (2003): 26.

might be one) are involved.⁶⁰ The Man is a complex creature, but in his complexity he manages to attain a consciousness that leads to enlightenment. The history of Muhammadiyah is thus a romance, in the sense that it completes a journey and tells a story of some moralising conclusion. .

Nevertheless, if Muhammadiyah's members are not alert to this threat, the encroachment from *tarbiyah* movements, especially those linked to the Justice and Prosperity Party, this history could turn into a story of its failure, a satire.⁶¹ To evade this bleak possibility and prevent Muhammadiyah's history turning to irrelevance, its members are reminded that Muhammadiyah is a social movement and a child of enlightenment, the result of the internal psychological struggles of the Man. It is a complex struggle, and one that goes beyond the issue of puritanism. Despite all its complexities, this enlightenment has proven victorious over its challenges.

The publication of *The Profile* is thus intended to confirm Muhammadiyah's victorious journey. While it is possible that it was indeed written to commemorate the hundredth anniversary⁶² of the organisation, as the document itself states, it is very likely that the use of narrative for constructing its history was influenced by the *tarbiyah* threat. If this was not the case, then the old chronicle mode of constructing history could have been maintained; a document celebrating the centenary anniversary in the form of chronicle could have performed this task. Contrary to the view that sees the anniversary

⁶⁰ The presence of both tolerant and scripturalistic tendencies within Muhammadiyah have been a common topic of scholarly works on Muhammadiyah. Examples of such works are Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town* (Michigan: UMI Dissertation Services: 1997) and, more recently, Pradana Boy, *Para Pembela Islam: Pertarungan Kelompok Progresif dan Konservatif di Muhammadiyah* (Jakarta: Gramata Publishing, 2009). Within the present day Muhammadiyah, much has been written to support either the more puritan stance of the organisation (see, for example, Hamid Fahmi Zarkasyi, "Islam sebagai Pandangan Hidup: Kajian Teoretis dalam Merespon Perang Pemikiran," in *Pemikiran Muhammadiyah: Respons terhadap Liberalisasi Islam*, ed. Syamsul Hidayat and Sudarno Shobron (Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta, 2005), 13.) or the more progressive tendency (see, as an example, Muhammad Shofan, "Satu Abad Muhammadiyah: "Matinya Pembaruan" dalam Bingkai "Kembali ke al-Qur'an dan al-Sunnah"," in *Satu Abad Muhammadiyah: Mengkaji Ulang Arah Pembaruan*, ed. Taufik Hidayat and Iqbal Hasanuddin (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2010), xxix.). The same paradox within Protestantism has been discussed in Randall Collins, "The Rise and Fall of Modernism in Politics and Religion," *Acta Sociologica* 35 (1992): 175 and Alexandra Walsham, "The Reformation and 'The Disenchantment of the World' Reassessed," *The Historical Journal* 51, 2 (2008): 497.

⁶¹ White, *Metahistory*, 8, 10.

⁶² According to the Islamic calendar, Muhammadiyah's 100th birthday fell on 25 November 2009.

as the cause for producing this history, the anniversary has been appropriated by the Muhammadiyah leadership as the right occasion to launch its own historical narrative.

2.5 Concluding Comments

As we have seen in the earlier chronicles, the legend of Ahmad Dahlan was always part of the story of how the organisation was established. *The Profile* now adds to this story, providing it with a more fixed plot and tying his life-history more closely to subsequent periods in its history, thereby formalising the story that has always become the acquired predisposition, or *doxa*, of Muhammadiyah members. This formalisation of the narrative of enlightenment within Muhammadiyah which this documents conveys, along with the emphasis on the capacity of human mind to understand the world and act righteously, is the basis of what I describe in Chapter Four as the ‘reflective *habitus*’ within Muhammadiyah.

Besides this narrative, *The Profile* also describes various autonomous organisations and charities within the Muhammadiyah umbrella, as well as listing the addresses of every branch of the organisations. This document is thus certainly intended as a practical guide to teach members what the organisation is all about. And the history that is presented in *The Profile* is a part of this practical guide, for the stories of the men in this document are written to convey to its readers the essence of what it is that constitutes Muhammadiyah – and build a sense of common purpose which will enable it to tame the threat coming from The Justice and Prosperous Party.

This threat is not minor. There was concern in the 2000s within official Muhammadiyah circles that the organisation might splinter along ideological lines and leave it unable to meet the PKS challenge.⁶³ On the one hand, a number of the organisations’ members had encouraged a more progressive approach to social change. Avoiding the word “liberal”, these thinkers and activists advocated “*pembaruan*”, or

⁶³ A good example of a more progressive position within Muhammadiyah is taken by Ahmad Syafii Maarif in “Keniscayaan Kebebasan Berfikir dalam Muhammadiyah,” in *Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah: Refleksi Satu Abad Perjalanan Muhammadiyah*, ed. Ajang Budiman and Pradana Boy (Jakarta: Grafindo, 2010), 130-40. The orthodox response is typified by Hamid Fahmi Zarkasyi, “Islam sebagai Pandangan Hidup,” 13-37.

“renewal”. On the other hand, those who preferred a more orthodox approach used the phrase “*gerakan Islam*”, or “Islamic movement”, to refer to what they believed Muhammadiyah should stand for. The publication of *The Profile* and other books on the organisation’s history as a narrative that focuses on individuals is a reaction to this perceived threat and the danger of an internal split.

As illustrated in *The Profile*, the organisation diverted the discussion rather than allowing the debate to open up discussion on ideological differences. This construction of the story aims at creating a new perspective. With its history now focused on individuals, it aims to show that Muhammadiyah has now gone beyond the distinction between puritanism and renewal:

Since its inception as a federation, Muhammadiyah has shown itself to be consistent in ... pioneering the efforts of purification and renewal. This sort of effort has been difficult because purification is normally opposed to renewal and vice versa.⁶⁴

The final part of *The Profile* is a reminder to its readers of the challenges it faces. To be able to successfully respond to these challenges in its second century, the organisation needs to “understand and then reinterpret history, to provide responses to the problems facing Muslims in entering the second century of the movement”. The optimism that Muhammadiyah will prevail is still alive as one reads the final paragraph of *The Profile*.

This simple book is an effort to assess ourselves in the process of making that optimism come true. At the least this book can turn that optimism into something natural for Muhammadiyah in the midst of historical pessimism. A bit exaggerated but it has been widely known that Muhammadiyah has become big because of that optimism about our future.⁶⁵

As the next chapter shows, however, this optimism might not have been that widely shared. Muhammadiyah is still standing in the midst of various competing ideologies in post-1998 Indonesia and its members are still grasping for what their organisation stands for in the world.

⁶⁴ Tim Penyusunan, ix.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 450.

CHAPTER THREE

THE LIMITS TO FREEDOM: STATUS QUO AND REFORM IN MUHAMMADIYAH

Having described the reproduction of the narrative of enlightenment in Muhammadiyah through the writing of *The Profile*, this chapter will dwell on the perception of Muhammadiyah's members of this narrative: how the idea of enlightenment is interpreted and associated with various theological and social perspectives. As the findings of my field research inform me, this idea of enlightenment has been used as the basis of either the acceptance or rejection of reform. The issue of reform or change, and its necessity, is an important issue that occupies the attention of Muhammadiyah's members, who gather around two opposite views: the supports of status quo and of reform.

My analysis is mainly based on a Bourdieusian framework, with its emphasis on the concepts of "*habitus*" and "crisis", to elaborate what I mean by status quo and reform. I define the status quo as a situation in a society where its members find it difficult to modify and adjust their *habitus* in the face of a perceived crisis. The supporters of the status quo, within this understanding, are social agents who experience a "hysteria of *habitus*", defined as the "incapacity to think historical crises in categories of perception and thought other than those of the past",¹ and insist on keeping their old perceptions and thoughts in the face of a crisis. On the opposite of the same framework, the supporters of the reform camp are social agents who are able to articulate their habitual predispositions, consider the inadequacy of these predispositions, and create "a margin of freedom for political action aimed at reopening the space of possibles [sic]".²

As this chapter will show, while the reform camp does offer a positive prospect for interreligious dialogue, the narrative of the status quo camp tells us an appreciation

¹ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 83.

² Pierre Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 234.

for particular human worldviews. It would be unfair and overly simplistic to say that proponents of the status quo in Muhammadiyah are unwilling to embrace progress. They are not against progress, but they believe that as Muslims they have their own definition of what constitutes progress.

This chapter is a description of the debate between these two points of view; a debate that is aimed at determining the limits to which the members of Muhammadiyah allow religious tradition to lead their lives and, consequently, how their understanding of their religion limits their perception of human freedom. The issue of freedom and submission and the border between the two is what I will elaborate in this chapter.

The supporters of the reform camp define a progressive direction for Muhammadiyah as a move away from the puritan understanding of Islam. By contrast, proponents of the status quo perceive no need to move in this new direction and insist that Muhammadiyah, with its present theology and activities, is on the right track to fulfil the promises of Islam. There is no chronological order in terms of which camp started this debate within the present Muhammadiyah. As my elaboration of previous scholarly works on Muhammadiyah has shown, both puritan and liberal tendencies have always been present within this organisation. The voices supporting each point of view, therefore, have always been there. Taking into consideration the Bourdieusian framework that I employ, however, the supporters of the status quo camp within this organisation, because of their insistence on keeping what they regard as the traditional and specific *habitus* of Muhammadiyah's members, have a more reactive attitude, whereas the proponents of reform have a more evolutionary perspective with respect to change. I therefore start my elaboration with the voices coming from the reform camp and continue with those from the status quo camp in their reaction towards those ideas of reform.

I do not see one camp as better than the other. As my elaboration progresses, I will show that the status quo camp's insistence on the particularity of what they perceive to be the Muslims' *habitus* expresses the limits to what is generally defined as freedom. The opinions of the camp's supporters inform us of the bounded nature of social agents within their environment, or "field". The two camps tell us two different stories of social agents' responses to crisis and both stories are equally valuable. Therefore, rather than

viewing the categorisation between status quo and reforms camps in quantitative terms, I look at these two camps as qualitatively different.

3.1 The Reform Projects

I divide the reform efforts into five different projects. What I mean by a “project” is a vision of members of Muhammadiyah about how their organisation can better tend to the calling of Islam. I created this categorisation in order to make it easier to understand various aspects of their reform efforts. In the next part of this chapter I also refer to the status quo’s supporters as having their own set of projects. Their version of projects, however, has a different meaning. Instead of associating their projects with reform, they relate their projects to maintaining what they understand to be the established way of observing Islam in Muhammadiyah.

It is impossible to be exhaustive with respect to this sort of listing, but these five issues are the ones that have received enormous attention from Muhammadiyah’s members urging the organisation’s reform. I call these efforts the theological, pluralism, socio-economic, cultural, and gender projects. While there is some overlapping of different projects, it is important to look at each of those projects in its specificity.

3.1.1 The Theological Project

This project can be considered the basis for the other reform projects because of its basic insistence on the need for a continuous interpretation of religious texts in the face of a changing world. The ex-chairman of Muhammadiyah, Syafii Ma’arif, in one of his articles describes the exact mood of this whole project when he quotes the Indian Muslim poet and thinker, Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938):

The unmoved beach says: “I have been here for a long time, but I have yet to understand who I am”. The wave, restlessly rolling, promptly replies, “for me, to roll is to become, to stop means that I have not yet become”.³

³ Muhammad Iqbal, *A Message from the East*, trans. M. Hadi Hussain (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1977), 92-93, as cited in A. Syafi’i. Ma’arif, *Islam: Kekuatan Doktrin dan Kegamangan Umat* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1997), 16.

In Ma'arif's point of view, Iqbal is a symbol of a true Muslim in his harsh reaction towards weakness, laziness, helplessness and passivity in the heart of Muslims. In Ma'arif's interpretation of Iqbal, the monotheism of Islam cannot tolerate any idleness, ignorance, slavery, and formalism in religion.⁴

Yet this unfortunate situation is where Muhammadiyah finds itself at the moment, according to proponents of the theological project. Dawam Rahardjo, who used to be among the thirteen national leaders of Muhammadiyah, for example, associates Muhammadiyah with the extreme ideology of Wahabism, as practiced in Saudi Arabia, in its intolerance of other faiths.⁵ Rahardjo blames the current president of Muhammadiyah, Dien Syamsuddin, for this development by making possible the transformation of Muhammadiyah's potential for puritanism into a real fundamentalism.⁶ When interviewed, Rahardjo mentioned three ideas that are inherent in Muhammadiyah's worldview: social responsibility, a modern Western education system, and puritanism. The last idea, however, developed at a much faster pace than the first two. At present, Rahardjo asserts, the puritan side of Muhammadiyah has become the dominant element within the organisation.⁷

The theological project is aimed at reducing the dominance of this puritan tendency. According to Amin Abdullah, there are two methods to do this. The first is improvement in the way Muhammadiyah orients its purification efforts. Muhammadiyah, for the sake of sustaining its relevance among Indonesian Muslims, must widen its purification efforts to also cover social behaviour. Besides the traditional understanding of purification as the cleansing of local cultures from un-Islamic elements, more attention should be given by Muhammadiyah to efforts aimed at reforming people's attitudes so that they will shy away from committing unethical acts, such as corruption.⁸

⁴ Ma'arif, *Islam*, 20.

⁵ M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Mengkaji Ulang Muhammadiyah sebagai Organisasi Islam Berorientasi Pembaruan," in *Satu Abad Muhammadiyah: Mengkaji Ulang Arah Pembaruan*, ed. Taufik Hidayat and Iqbal Hasanuddin (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2010), 3.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁷ M. Dawam Rahardjo, interview by author, Jakarta, June 28, 2011.

⁸ Amin Abdullah, "Manhaj Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam," in *Pengembangan Pemikiran Keislaman Muhammadiyah: Purifikasi & Dinamisasi*, ed. Muhammad Azhar and Hamim Ilyas (Yogyakarta: LPPI UMY, 2000), 12.

The second method is the reconstruction and reinterpretation of Islamic teachings. By reconstruction, Abdullah means the use of new methods to build up Muhammadiyah's religious interpretation:

The logic of the middle ages and its way of thinking need to be clarified by the method and the way of thinking of the sciences which came after them. The emergence of a new scientific approach is usually precipitated by experience of anomalies attached to the old system If Islamic ideas do not wish to lose their relevance, the present thinkers in the field do not need to feel worried when facing new developments within contemporary Islamic studies.⁹

What Abdullah means by the old system is the traditional method of interpreting Islam; for him, this old science is based on the good vs. evil dichotomy of Greek philosophy, one that does not allow an overlapping configuration in which two elements can be present simultaneously.¹⁰ This way of thinking has created antagonism between Muslims and non-Muslims by eliminating the possibility of the presence of non-Islamic elements in Muslims' identity and vice versa. When interviewed, Abdullah again mentioned this need to understand the possibility of a grey area in Islamic spirituality:

But spirituality – the new spirituality – no longer uses the word “religion” because spirituality (*spiritualitas*) ... has a more inclusive approach, which covers ... both the internal and the external within us. We do not feel agitated even when the external penetrates [our identity]. The external is an inseparable part of our internal self.... [When] that is understood, I think we can live a healthy life.¹¹

The importance of the use of contemporary method to understand religion is very often repeated in the theological project. Mohammad Shofan is an ex-lecturer at the Universitas Muhammadiyah Gresik fired by the university rector because of his allegedly un-Islamic attitude of extending a Christmas greeting to Christian readers in a local newspaper.¹² He states that “to study Islam, al-Qur'an is not sufficient without the use of a set of proper methods for interpreting it”.¹³ One of the methods that are worthy of consideration is hermeneutics, defined by Shofan as an approach that performs a

⁹ Ibid., 13.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Amin Abdullah, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011.

¹² Mohammad Shofan, “Natal dan Pluralisme Agama,” in *Menegakkan Pluralisme: Esai-Esai Pemikiran Moh. Shofan dan Refleksi Kritis Kaum Pluralis*, ed. Ali Usman (Yogyakarta: LSAF, 2008), 55-59.

¹³ Mohammad Shofan, “Satu Abad Muhammadiyah: “Matinya Pembaruan” dalam Bingkai “Kembali ke al-Qur'an dan al-Sunnah”,” in *Satu Abad Muhammadiyah*, xxvii.

“scientific operation” (“*operasi ilmiah*”) on the meaning of texts inherent in the Qur’an.¹⁴ This operation includes psychological, sociological, political, and cultural analysis of the text.

Moeslim Abdurrahman compares the act of approaching present issues through various perspectives to looking through the perspective of many windows and drinking from various wells:

Too many windows that need to be looked through and many wells [whose water] needs to be drunk If there is too much “self-blocking”...., shutting oneself [from the world], it is as if there were ghosts everywhere.¹⁵

The willingness on the part of Muslims to be open-minded is not only necessary in terms of adjusting to scientific development, but also for living in an ever-changing world. The use of various scientific methods to study religion will produce new interpretations that are more in tune with the needs of both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. One reason for the justification of reinterpretation efforts is pragmatic. Abdullah cites a concrete example where a reinterpretation is needed for Muslims to survive: Muslims in Bali are reluctant to join the hotel business in the tourists-filled island due to the stigma attached to this business. The fear of allowing the practice of impiety by opening up hotels needs to be addressed by Muhammadiyah. A reinterpretation is needed to allow these Muslims to survive economically.¹⁶

Another reason for the need for reinterpretation is related to changes in people’s mind-sets. Muhammadiyah as a harbinger of modern Islamic organisations needs to adjust itself to changing situations on national and global levels. On the national level, Abdullah mentions the education of women in Indonesia that requires a more women-friendly reinterpretation of the Qur’an.¹⁷ Syafii Ma’arif asserts the need for Muhammadiyah to adjust to the spread of information technology: the increasing demand of our time, thanks to the development in information technology, makes it impossible

¹⁴ Ibid., xxv-xxvi.

¹⁵ Moeslim Abdurrahman, interview by author, Jakarta, July 5, 2011. The English phrase ‘self-blocking’ was used by Abdurrahman during the interview.

¹⁶ Abdullah, “Manhaj Tarjih,” 15.

¹⁷ Amin Abdullah, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011.

for Muhammadiyah to lock itself up in its own puritan world.¹⁸ Global values are to be embraced, not rejected. Muhammadiyah needs to stop its disengagement with developments on the global level¹⁹ and also to try to address global problems.²⁰

Therefore this project rejects the old way of interpreting the Qur'an that treats the book as if the Holy Book, and the interpretation of it, came out of a vacuum. In his criticism of Islamic puritanism, Zakiyuddin Baidhawiy associates this attitude with a sort of foundationalism, namely

a point of view that asserts that knowledge can begin or start from nothingness by accumulating elements of knowledge, which are certain and infallible. Foundationalism in the history of the philosophy of knowledge started with Rene Descartes (1596-1650). He was certain that men can understand everything clearly and vividly.... That certainty is called rationalism. This project has entrapped itself with its subjective claim over certainty.²¹

A subjective reading of the Qur'an makes it difficult for this divine revelation to offer solutions to human problems due to the fact that, in this reading, subjectivity is forced to abandon the textual meaning. The text, in the subjectivist approach, is arbitrarily interpreted according to the taste of the readers. This mode of reading is likened by Shofan to the rape of the text.²²

The theological project aspires to the recognition on the part of the text's interpreters of the "limits" to their interpretation.²³ Absolute certainty over the meaning of the text is wishful thinking. One can only understand texts in relations to the method one uses and the values one wishes to take on board. In the words of Abdullah,

in general, the challenge is how to blend faith, methods, and values. In the centre of these three elements is rationality. If we can blend these three elements, then it will be safe for us to live our religious life in the present era. Otherwise, it will be unbalanced. You can move to either the extreme right or the extreme left ... because faith can be dragged to either extreme right or

¹⁸ A. Syafii Maarif, "Keniscayaan Kebebasan Berpikir dalam Muhammadiyah," in *Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah: Refleksi Satu Abad Perjalanan Muhammadiyah*, ed. Ajang Budiman and Pradana Boy (Jakarta: Grafindo, 2010), 134.

¹⁹ R. Dzuhayatin, "Andai Kiai Dahlan Mengatakan "Aku Serahkan Muhammadiyah Padamu"," in *Satu Abad Muhammadiyah*, 42-43; and Ahmad Juanda, "Muhammadiyah dan Kepedulian Sosial-Ekonomi," in *Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah*, 115.

²⁰ Shofan, "Satu Abad Muhammadiyah," xviii.

²¹ Zakiyuddin Baidhawiy, "Puritanisme dan Etos Keilmuan: Anomali Sebuah Gerakan Tajdid," in *Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah*, 161.


²² Shofan, "Satu Abad Muhammadiyah," xxiii.

²³ Baidhawiy, "Puritanisme," 162.

extreme left if understood without methodology. This will be even more so if we are blind to new values, right? New values [which include] the rise of education, interfaith dialogue. These are the new values, aren't they?²⁴

Figure 3.1 is my visual interpretation of the scheme offered by Abdullah. Let us call this the “triangle of rationality”. In his understanding, rationality is not a fixed notion, a notion as understood by the foundational philosophy explained by Baidhawiy above. For Abdullah, rationality is the balance between faith (the text itself), methods, and values. By defining rationality in this specific way, he tries to bind rationality simultaneously to human intellectual properties, perceptions, and the context in which they live. He eschews the authoritarian, univocal definition of this term. Rationality bounded to the three elements of faith, methods and values, promises, in Abdullah’s understanding, a more productive interpretation of Islam.

Figure 3.1 Amin Abdullah’s Triangle of Rationality



On the one hand, this new comprehension of rationality helps the theological project in justifying the understanding of the Qur’an as a secular (*sekuler*) revelation. This critical attitude of human interpretation of the Qur’an is also shared by other proponents of theological project. Mohammad Shofan, states that “the Qur’an must be seen and interpreted as a living text, and it needs to be continuously re-interpreted and tested by history”.²⁵ Various interpretations of the Qur’an must be allowed to flourish, thus allowing no differentiation between the high culture of the pure interpretation and other interpretations of the low culture.²⁶ On the other hand, this new scheme does not prioritise Cartesian rationality in the interpretation of the text: the newly understood

²⁴ Amin Abdullah, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011.

²⁵ Shofan, “Satu Abad,” xxiv.

²⁶ Baidhawiy, “Puritanisme,” 163.

rationality is now more than just the intellectual property of human beings. It is an activity of balancing this property with both the text and the context that will determine the relevance of Islam for men and women living their daily lives. Both text and rationality are thus made to relate to the profane and contextual to the human environment.

3.1.2 The Pluralism Project

In the context of the present debate within political theory, the term “pluralism” has often been discussed in terms of, and often in contrast to, liberal multiculturalism. Liberal multiculturalism is often regarded as a response to the inadequacy of pluralism as a political project in addressing the demand of minority groups in a multinational state. For Will Kymlicka, a staunch supporter of multiculturalism from Queen’s University of Canada, pluralism still enforces allegedly common values of liberal justice and a national identity, however thin they are, as accepted by various groups within a society.²⁷ Pluralism, in other words, respects cultures of different groups within a society, but still upholds individual civil rights – even when individuals decide to renounce their attachment to their primordial group.²⁸ The main beneficiary in a pluralist society, therefore, is still the individual.

Liberal multiculturalism, by contrast, perceives what are considered as common values and identity within a pluralistic society to be the values and identity of a particular group, most often the dominant one, which has been disguised as a national one. Liberal multiculturalism strives for more than just the protection of basic political and civic rights of individuals and is suspicious of the homogenising tendency of the nation-state and the marginalisation of minority groups.²⁹ It questions the narrative of national values and identity, and exposes this narrative as a particular component of a majority culture that

²⁷ Will Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 271.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 234.

²⁹ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 16, 61, 65.

has been prioritised over those that belong to minority groups.³⁰ The goal of a liberal multicultural state is a citizenship in that state that is inclusive of various cultural groups³¹ and therefore allows those different cultures to form the identities of their individual members without having to be opposed to national identity; a citizenship that is multinational in nature.³²

Within this understanding, multiculturalism trumps pluralism in its respect for various cultures within a society. Pluralism, in its appreciation of these cultures, still prescribes the existence of a unifying identity for members of that society. Reading through the works of the proponents of what I call the pluralism project in Muhammadiyah, however, I find that pluralism, as contrasted to Kymlicka's liberal multiculturalism, is what the proponents of this project aim for in Indonesia. Appreciation for the various religions and cultures within Indonesia, according to supporters of this project, should be accompanied by a common platform for citizenship. These supporters see that pluralism, not multiculturalism, is what Indonesia needs in order to protect the rights of its minority groups. They still see the need for Indonesian society to have a common national identity that takes precedence over the appreciation of various cultures existing within the society. As this dissertation progresses, I will show how we can understand this particular stance in terms of the reform projects' goal of adjusting Islam to modern values of justice and equality and therefore providing an alternative approach to the tendency of the opposite camp to insulate this religion from those modern values.

The pluralism project is aimed at a formulation of Muhammadiyah's theology supportive of tolerance and pluralism.³³ For the proponents of this project, pluralism is more than just an act of recognising plurality. It is an active involvement within a plural world. In the article that cost him his academic position, Shofan states that the ultimate

³⁰ Bashir Bashir and Will Kymlicka, "Introduction: Struggles for Inclusion and Reconciliation in Modern Democracies," in *The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies*, ed. Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5.

³¹ Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, "Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts," in *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*, ed. Willy Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 9.

³² Will Kymlicka, "Multicultural Citizenship within Multinational States," *Ethnicities* 11, no. 3 (2011): 295; and Will Kymlicka, *Multinational Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 17-18.

³³ Zuly Qodir, "Wajah Islam Pluralis Muhammadiyah: Dari Teologi Praksis ke Teologi Pluralis," *Tanwir* 1, no. 2 (2003): 42.

goal of the pluralism effort, which he has been actively propagating, is the creation of *homo multikulturalis* on a more global level, a model of human beings with their conviction that, within a plural environment, there is a need to build a common platform based on the recognition of egalitarianism, equality, and justice.³⁴ Shofan's association of the term *multikulturalis* with a common platform is therefore closer to pluralism than to Kymlicka's liberal multiculturalism.

This project starts from the reality that Muhammadiyah, at present, has no official theology that encourages pluralism. On the one hand, there is a perception of a gap between the present sectarian attitude of Muhammadiyah and the inclusivist legacy of Ahmad Dahlan.³⁵ The Muhammadiyah that we know today, according to this perception, has not been faithful to the ideals exemplified by its founder. On the other hand, the absence of a theology on pluralism in Muhammadiyah is considered natural as this organisation has been occupied, since its inception, with concrete programs aimed at educating and creating welfare for Indonesian Muslims.³⁶ Muhammadiyah's pragmatic occupation with these activities has consumed most of the organisation's energy and resources, therefore resulting in the stagnation of the discourse on theological issues, such as the relation between Islam and other faiths.

An effort was made to codify Muhammadiyah's pluralist theology in *Tafsir Tematik Al-Qur'an tentang Hubungan Sosial Antarumat Beragama* ("Thematic Interpretation of the Qur'an on Social Relations between Religious Communities"), a book published by Majelis Tarjih of Muhammadiyah in 2000. It discusses four issues: the principles regulating the relations between religious communities, the ways to maintain good relations and cooperation among those communities, the Qur'anic description of the 'people of the book' (*ahli kitab*), and inter-religious marriage.³⁷ This first effort at formalising pluralism in Muhammadiyah was halted after rampant protests from sections of Muhammadiyah on the book's allegedly liberal interpretation of the Qur'an.³⁸ The

³⁴ Shofan, "Natal," 59.

³⁵ Mohammad Shofan, "Menakar Obyetifikasi Pluralisme," in *Menegakkan Pluralisme*, 66.

³⁶ Qodir, "Wajah Islam," 36.

³⁷ Abdul Rohim Ghazali, "Pluralisme dan Toleransi dalam Perspektif Muhammadiyah," *Tanwir* 1, no. 2 (2003): 10.

³⁸ Hilman Latief, "Post-Puritanisme Muhammadiyah: Studi Pergulatan Wacana Keagamaan Kaum Muda Muhammadiyah 1995-2002," *Tanwir* 1, no. 2 (2003): 63.

document never made it into a formal theology of Muhammadiyah, thus leaving the organisation still silent on the issue of pluralism.³⁹

However, for the proponents of the pluralism project, the potential to construct such a theology has always existed. The legacy of Ahmad Dahlan was never lost; it just needs to be resurrected. In addition, the pragmatic approach of Muhammadiyah in its social activities is based on the spirit of humanism and tolerance, and is built upon the importance of human reasoning in understanding religion. This spirit contains a potential for the construction of a pluralistic theology.⁴⁰ The pluralism project is, therefore, not a far-fetched aspiration; it is feasible.

As its first step, the proponents of the pluralism project need to clarify the apparent paradox between Muhammadiyah's intense adoption of Western methods and the seemingly anti-Christian attitude of its founding fathers. With respect to Shihab's thesis on the anti-Christian spirit as the main motivation for the establishment of Muhammadiyah, a supporter of this project argued that this antagonistic attitude was caused by the intertwined efforts of Christian missions with Dutch colonialism.⁴¹ If this were true, the anti-Christian motivation was therefore actually caused by the colonial Dutch Indies government and its support for Christian missions. Muhammadiyah's objection towards Christian missions should be perceived not as an anti-Christian attitude but as an anti-colonial one. The social activities of Muhammadiyah during the colonial era should not be seen as hatred towards Christianity but instead as Muhammadiyah's participation in a sort of competition in which the contestants compete with each other in the performance of good deeds for fellow human beings.⁴² In the view of the proponents of this project, the goal of this competition is the betterment of humanity.

The pluralism project relies heavily on the reconstruction and reinterpretation of the theological project.⁴³ In referring to Abdullah's triangle of rationality, I see that the proponents of this project recognise the value of inclusiveness within Muhammadiyah's

³⁹ Mohammad Shofan, interview by author, Jakarta, 24 June 2011. Since this book, there was no serious effort within Muhammadiyah to formalise the organisation's position with respect to pluralism.

⁴⁰ Qodir, "Wajah Islam," 34, 42.

⁴¹ Ghazali, "Pluralisme," 8.

⁴² Latief, "Post-Puritanisme Muhammadiyah," 83.

⁴³ Qodir, "Wajah Islam," 35.

reading of the holy text. Islamic morality needs to be measured, to use Abdullah's term, "with a higher yardstick".⁴⁴ The assessment of Islamic morality cannot be conducted only in terms of the standard it uses to treat fellow Muslims. This new yardstick needs to encompass the way that morality views and treats non-Muslims. In Abdullah's words, "if ... morality only applies to your [Muhammadiyah's members'] own community, it means that you have failed because you will face another community. The modern world means that the elements of other communities are present within [our own community]".⁴⁵

For this project, interpreting Islam entails the inclusion of people of other convictions. For Shofan, Islam means peace, so Muslims are expected to live a peaceful life with everyone, regardless of their religion. With regard to various religions' claims to truth, Shofan believes that the Qur'an teaches Muslims not to place the stigma of "infidels" on anyone else, Muslims and non-Muslim alike,⁴⁶ and instead to appreciate individual freedom to choose a religion, to accept the existence of other religions, and to admit to the unity of messages among various prophets across religions.⁴⁷

The pluralism project thus urges Muslims to be inclusive. This inclusiveness means that one needs to not only be tolerant of the beliefs of other people, but also learn from those beliefs and use them as resources to be critical of one's own religion.⁴⁸ In this regard, the discussion of pluralism is related to globalisation.⁴⁹ For Moeslim Abdurrahman, one of the consequences of globalisation is that one cannot assess the truth of what one says and does according to one's own standard: "our truth is now related to the truth of other people; [it is] a global truth".⁵⁰ On the influence of tradition in affecting one's religious behaviour, he states, "there is no singular Muslim, there is no singular

⁴⁴ Amin Abdullah, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011.

⁴⁵ Amin Abdullah, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011.

⁴⁶ Mohammad Shofan, interview by author, Jakarta, June 24, 2011.

⁴⁷ Mohammad Shofan, "Menuju Pluralisme Global," in *Menegakkan Pluralisme*, 74-75.

⁴⁸ Mohammad Shofan, "Membumikan Pluralisme: Dari Wawasan Etis-Normatif menuju Pluralisme Global," in *Menegakkan Pluralisme*, 163.

⁴⁹ I see globalisation as entailing various processes, some of which are increased movement of people, increased exposure to foreign values, restructuring of governance, and increased of international economic activities; see David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, "Globalization," *Global Governance* 5 (1999): 483-96.

⁵⁰ Moeslim Abdurrahman, interview by author, Jakarta, July 5, 2011. In this context, Abdurrahman tends to define globalisation as increased exposure to foreign values but in some parts of this interview, he also refers globalisation to the increased international economic activities that entail the rolling back of welfare state system.

Christian because, in life, we borrow from each other”.⁵¹ This project, understandably, is highly critical of the repressive practice of Islam in some countries, especially in Saudi Arabia. As Shofan asks rhetorically when responding to a question of human rights, “Can [the Saudis] be allowed to live with their own rules without being involved in international norms?”⁵²

An appreciation of Islam for the pluralism project needs to be conducted through the process of subjecting this religion to various tests. It is no longer sufficient to appreciate Islam on the ideological level; it needs to be put under the scrutiny of modern interpretive methods.⁵³ In other words, the relevance of Islam needs to be justified not only by the Muslim community but also by people of other convictions. By subjecting it to more global values, Muslims make Islam significant on the global level.⁵⁴ This sense of confidence is obvious in this project; it is optimistic about the future of Islam. This project is sanguine about the prospect of Islam’s embracing the “Other”. In welcoming the “Other”, this project believes that Islam will shine brightly, as the religion for all humanity.

In summary, the pluralism project aims at neither the subjecting of religions to relativism⁵⁵ nor mere tolerance. “Pluralism is beyond tolerance; instead, it can be perceived as a militant tolerance.”⁵⁶ It does not only mean being considerate towards other religions, but also involves having a constructive dialogue with them. It means to move from “harmonious coexistence” to “meaningful cooperation”.⁵⁷

3.1.3 The Socio-Economic Project

What I mean by the socio-economic project is the project concerned with the underprivileged section of the society. Poverty and marginalisation are two recurring themes in discussions within this project. In one of his articles on the politics of

⁵¹ Moeslim Abdurrahman, interview by author, Jakarta, July 5, 2011.

⁵² Mohammad Shofan, interview by author, Jakarta, June 24, 2011.

⁵³ Latief, “Post-Puritanisme Muhammadiyah,” 93.

⁵⁴ Shofan, “Menakar,” 71.

⁵⁵ Syafii Anwar, interview by author, Jakarta, June 24, 2011.

⁵⁶ Mohammad Shofan, interview by author, Jakarta, June 24, 2011.

⁵⁷ Latief, “Post-Puritanisme Muhammadiyah,” 95.

empowerment in Indonesia, Moeslim Abdurrahman starts his discussion on these two issues by stating his disappointment with the present political system in Indonesia, which is democratic but with minimal participation of the people from the lower socio-economic level. With regard to a public discussion in an election campaign, he states that the debates within the programs in public media are designed and controlled by the programmers, or the advertiser for the [political] candidates. They discussed the “grand” political issues, such as issues of national economy and macro level policies on education, which are abstract for the people of the lower socio-economic level. People themselves, in this sort of debate, act more as spectators, even though sometime they are given room to participate, such as by text messages –as if they were taking part in Indonesian Idol.⁵⁸

Neither do non-governmental organisations play any significant part in overcoming it within this unfortunate arrangement. Instead, they discuss the issue of poverty under the rubric of civil society.⁵⁹ Elsewhere, Abdurrahman has written that

nowadays, non-governmental organisations seem to be more interested in fighting for the rights of people as citizens and consumers rather than advancing the rights of people suffering as workers or as lower-class citizens.⁶⁰

Abdurrahman calls this situation “hyper-modernity”, where life no longer centres on state and politics but, instead, on the issue of money, consumption, pleasure, technology and war; a life where community has lost its meaning. The issue of poverty is no longer making headlines in a society where everybody is only out for himself.

For the socio-economic project, poverty is a form of violence. The violence is perpetrated by blocking people’s access to the fulfilment of their various needs. These needs include not only physical ones but also access to education and the right to live a secure life. Juanda calls this sort of violence “economic abuse”.⁶¹ Added to this abuse is a globalisation that, according to Tuhuleley, entails privatisation of the provision of basic services for citizens as the government sits unmoved by the plight of people.⁶² The result

⁵⁸ Moeslim Abdurrahman, “Politik Umat, Politik Pemberdayaan,” in *Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah*, 55.

⁵⁹ Moeslim Abdurrahman, interview by author, Jakarta, July 5, 2011.

⁶⁰ Abdurrahman, “Politik Umat,” 69.

⁶¹ Juanda, “Muhammadiyah dan Kepedulian Sosial-Ekonomi,” 111.

⁶² Said Tuhuleley, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 20, 2011; See also Said Tuhuleley, “Muhammadiyah dan Pemihakan Sosial: Suatu Keniscayaan,” in *Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah*, 85.

of this globalization, for Tuhuleley, is rampant poverty and a rapidly growing income gap between the poor majority and the elite.⁶³

Where does Muhammadiyah stand in this wretched situation? *The Profile* mentions that one of the missions of this organisation is to build and develop Indonesia's middle class.⁶⁴ But some doubt its effectiveness in eradicating poverty and in advancing the interests of Indonesia's underprivileged citizens to become members of the nation's middle class. Alka argues that even though Muhammadiyah has been active in administering a variety of social charities, these charities have yet to benefit the urban poor.⁶⁵

Juanda asserts that despite its origin as a social movement for helping the poor, Muhammadiyah in its centenary anniversary has seen the thriving of its charities to benefit only the upper-middle class section of society.⁶⁶ Said Tuhuleley, the head of Muhammadiyah's Majelis Pengembangan Masyarakat (The Council for Social Development), one of the councils within Muhammadiyah's national structure, admits that there has long been a gap between social activism in the time of Ahmad Dahlan and today's activism. With regard to the charitable work in Muhammadiyah's early years, it had been a long time since Muhammadiyah left that activity. It has since been only performed through routine works of its institutions, especially its educational institutions, and not coordinated by [the central leadership of] Muhammadiyah. Because it had been abandoned for too long, [many] branches in Muhammadiyah do not understand that it is one of the duties of this organisation.⁶⁷

The effort to revive this spirit of activism began in 2000 with the establishment of a national institute (*lembaga*) in Muhammadiyah's national structure that deals with issues affecting peasants and fishermen. This institute was upgraded into Majelis Pengembangan Masyarakat (The Council for Social Development) in 2005. Tuhuleley has been the head of both the section and the council since 2000.

⁶³ Tuhuleley, "Muhammadiyah dan Pemihakan Sosial," 87.

⁶⁴ Tim Penyusunan dan Penerbitan Profil Muhammadiyah, *Profil 1 Abad Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2010), 9.

⁶⁵ David Krisna Alka, "Ihwal Muhammadiyah dan Kaum Miskin Kota," in *Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah*, 122.

⁶⁶ Juanda, "Muhammadiyah dan Kepedulian Sosial-Ekonomi," 114.

⁶⁷ Said Tuhuleley, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 20, 2011.

The resurrection of the socio-economic project in Muhammadiyah, for Tuhuleley, began soon after. He acknowledges some limits in the work of this council (*majelis*), especially with regard to the lack of awareness from the members of Muhammadiyah of the necessity to do this charity work as part of their duties. The socio-economic project in Muhammadiyah, therefore, is a project to revive the spirit of charity among its members. To do this, Tuhuleley argues, requires that Muhammadiyah's members return to the one-hundred-and-seventh chapter (*sura*) of the Qur'an, titled "al-Maun" ("Charity"), one of the chapters within the Holy Book given much attention by Ahmad Dahlan when he taught his students.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate
Has thou seen him who cries lies to the Doom?
That is he who repulses the orphan
and urges not the feeding of the needy.
So woe to those that pray
and are heedless of their prayers,
to those who make display
and refuse charity.⁶⁸

Based on this *sura*, and the teaching of Ahmad Dahlan and Sayyid Qutb, Tuhuleley argues for an addition to the definition of "infidels" in order to sensitise Muhammadiyah's members to the issue of poverty: those claiming themselves to be Muslims but pay no heed to the plight of the orphans and the poor should also be considered infidels.⁶⁹ Amin Abdullah's advice on the need for Muhammadiyah to widen its target of purification efforts to the domain of social ethics can be understood as a step towards inculcating this spirit of social responsibility among its members.

In the same spirit, Moeslim Abdurrahman sees the need to perceive repressive and unequal social structure as a form of idolatry that Muslims should resist, and to see poverty (*kefakiran*) as a form of sin (*kekufuran*) and therefore to be eradicated.⁷⁰ By contrast, he looks at social justice as the highest form of piety.⁷¹ These analogies are

⁶⁸ Qur'an 107:1-7; The English translation is taken from Arthur J. Arberry, trans., *The Koran Interpreted* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 662.

⁶⁹ Tuhuleley, "Muhammadiyah dan Pemihakan Sosial," 78-79.

⁷⁰ Abdurrahman, "Politik Umat," 75-76.

⁷¹ Moeslim Abdurrahman, interview by author, Jakarta, July 5, 2011.

created to turn the problem of poverty and social marginalisation into a topic worthy of religious discussions. Islam is made relevant in addressing the plight of the people; religions are transformed into a set of values to counter the marginalising tendency of capitalism. Abdurrahman, however, does not opt for the sectarian solution to the problem, as imagined by those with a more fundamentalist reading of the Qur'an. Instead, he chooses to emphasise the humanistic potential of Islam. This potential comes in the form of values that can be used as a part of a counter-hegemonic attack on capitalism. Islam, in this regard, can bring out the best aspects of Muslim society in its response to globalisation. Those aspects of Islam are freedom, justice, and a sense of community.⁷²

3.1.4 The Cultural Project

The inclination among some Muhammadiyah's members to look at the world through a framework of binary oppositions is the main concern for the cultural project of the reform camp. The opposition of the modern to the traditional Islam, of the truly devout to the syncretic Muslims, the religious to the secular, and of the scriptural Islam to its liberal counterpart is considered by this project to be counterproductive to the organisation's propagation activities.⁷³ These sets of binary oppositions have narrowed the meaning of the organisation's Islamic propagation directed only towards the spread of scriptural Islam. Therefore, Muhammadiyah has been seen as unappreciative of local culture, for local cultures are perceived to be marred by pre-Islamic religious elements. For the proponents of the pluralism project, this black-and-white way of thinking has taken its toll in the form of puritanical attitudes towards local culture.

The spirit of religious purification in this organisation has set it aside from the majority in society by creating for itself a high culture that is elitist in nature.⁷⁴ This "high culture" ("*budaya besar*") is then again made to exist opposite the "low culture" ("*budaya kecil*") that belongs to the peasants, the traditional Muslims (as opposed to

⁷² Abdurrahman, "Politik Umat," 70-71.

⁷³ M. Subhan Setowara, "Muhammadiyah dan Apresiasi Budaya Lokal," in *Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah*, 224-25.

⁷⁴ Syamsul Arifin, "Elaborasi Dakwah Kultural sebagai Gerakan Sosial," in *Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah*, 217.

modern Muslims), the syncretic, and the secular.⁷⁵ There are two victims of Muhammadiyah's alleged puritanism: the local culture and, to use the term used by the proponents of the socio-economic project, "lower-class citizens".

Muhammadiyah's fear of the polluting effects of un-Islamic elements in local culture is in line with its traditional method of thinking. Kuntowijoyo refers to this method as the "substantive" as opposed to the "symbolic". Emotional Islam, which provides spirituality and sense of community, is limited in Muhammadiyah. "The culture of spiritualism is consciously eliminated, whose result is a religion that is felt 'dry' by society that [in fact] wishes for a sense of being part of a community."⁷⁶ For Kuntowijoyo, members of Muhammadiyah have fallen victim to the organisation's unfriendliness towards local culture. This way of practising Islam is unacceptable for proponents of the cultural project.

There are two visions in this cultural project; both are based on the notion of the need for Muhammadiyah to embrace local cultures. They differ, however, on how to treat its object after that embrace. The first is what I call the interventionist vision. This vision sees no need to fear local culture with its rich, and allegedly un-Islamic, symbols. The argument for this vision is that these symbols often have uses that are synchronous with Islamic teachings. The practitioners of local cultures, however, often do not understand the Islamic meaning of those symbols. This vision imagines the presence of two layers within a culture: the outer, physical, appearance, and the hidden meaning. The task for Muhammadiyah is to awaken people to the hidden meaning of their culture, so that they are not bound to its mythical symbols but grasp its true and rational meaning. The two-layered assumption of this vision requires this organisation to intervene in the way people attach meaning to the symbols present in their local culture. Demythologisation is the first step of this intervention:

We do not need to regard those symbols as taboo as long as we are able to Islamize the values lying behind them. It is often the case that there must be demythologisation, desacralisation, and demythification of those symbols in order for them to be assimilated into the lap of Islamic culture.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Setowara, "Muhammadiyah dan Apresiasi Budaya Lokal," 225.

⁷⁶ Kuntowijoyo, "Islam dan Budaya Lokal," in *Pengembangan Pemikiran Keislaman Muhammadiyah*, 296.

⁷⁷ Syafiq A. Mughni, "Kebudayaan dalam Islam," in *Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah*, 204.

This vision is different from the second one, which I call the *laissez-faire* vision. The main proponent of this vision is Kuntowijoyo and he advocates a non-interventionist attitude towards local culture. A case he uses as an example to explain his position is the performance of a shadow puppet play during the forty-second Muktamar of Muhammadiyah in 1990. The story told in this performance is the “Wayang Sadat”, a story of Sunan Kalijaga, one of the nine holy saints who brought Islam to Java in his struggle to seek knowledge. In the original story, Sunan Kalijaga, in his search for knowledge, meditated intensely on a river bank until his skin was covered in moss. In the original story, he is also depicted as mastering a supernatural power that he uses when he had to fight his enemies. In order to purify the story for the national meeting (*muktamar*), instead of portraying Sunan Kalijaga as meditating, the puppeteer showed a scene in which Sunan Kalijaga was actually studying Islamic scriptures. Instead of the myth of Kalijaga’s supernatural power, the puppeteer instead represents the saint as well-trained in religiously-sanctioned martial arts.⁷⁸

To the Islamisation of the above story, Kuntowijoyo responds by saying that “if myths need to be made into history, and spectacles into lessons learned, *wayang* will be dried out. As a spectacle, it will be uninteresting; as a history, it will not be based on facts”.⁷⁹ To the tendency of the rationalization of local culture, he exclaims, “it will be odd if we want everything to make sense!”⁸⁰ For Kuntowijoyo, arts are the expression of the whole of human properties; they are not only the expression of human reasoning. In his words, “to look at everything as a product of human reasoning is like reducing humanity, like having no faith in the all-embracing power of God”.⁸¹

Islam is liberating and therefore Islamic purification need not cover all things under the sun. For Kuntowijoyo, there are things that need to be kept as they are, things which do not require reinterpretation. Culture and arts are examples of these things. For him, this is the only way to maintain Islam as a liberating element for humanity:

⁷⁸ Kuntowijoyo, “Islam dan Budaya Lokal,” 292.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 293.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.,

I think what we really need is a new substance to [add to] the efforts of purification ... so that we will be spared from the need to make things up. Religion should be protected in order that it does not become a burden for humanity. Do not let Islam stop being a liberator!⁸²

Muhammadiyah has responded to this call from the cultural project. This response took the form of the document *Dakwah Kultural Muhammadiyah* (Muhammadiyah's Method of Islamic Propagation through Culture), a product of the 2002 Tanwir Meeting in Denpasar. This document has been celebrated as a sign of cultural reform within Muhammadiyah. The culturally sensitive method of Islamic propagation elaborated in the document is perceived to

take the side of a universal humanist values, accept local wisdom and intelligence ... by heeding the uniqueness of humans both individually and socially. The way of Islamic propagation, with this method, is made "easy" and "enjoyable" for the upholding of Islamic values in life with its various social, economic, political, and cultural aspects.⁸³

The assumption in this document is that Islamic propagation need not be antagonistic towards local culture. Within the arts,

aesthetics is enchanting because it also contains the truth as long as this aesthetics is attached to the All Righteous. Therefore, arts in Islam creates the synergy between the dimensions of aesthetics – ethics – truth. For that reason, aesthetics cannot be separated from ethics (venerable morality) and are always joined to the effort to bring truth to life.⁸⁴

On the need for intervening in local culture in the interest of Islamic propagation, the document is understandably closer to the interventionist vision of the cultural project. In appreciating local culture, the document states that

it does not mean that culturally sensitive Islamic propagation maintains or justifies the elements that are *syirik* [the quality of worshipping any being other than God], *bidah* [the quality of adding unnecessary elements to the prescribed rituals], *tahayul* [the quality of superstition], and *khurafat* [the quality of attributing Islamic nature to non-Islamic practices]. On the contrary, this mode of propagation understands and responds to these elements by subjecting them to the activities of Islamic propagation.⁸⁵

To do this, the new method of propagation needs to differentiate, within culture, those elements that are Islamic in nature and therefore universal, absolute, and everlasting; and

⁸² Ibid., 299.

⁸³ Baidhawiy, "Puritanisme," 171-72.

⁸⁴ Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Dakwah Kultural Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2004), 61.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 27.

those elements which are of human making, and are therefore particular, relative, and temporal.⁸⁶ Here again we find the tendency to dissect cultures into smaller, more comprehensible, sections. In this act of partitioning, culture is demythologised; it is made acceptable to rationality by being stripped to its most basic elements. Culture is turned into a human construct, or rather, it is made to realize its nature as human conventions; it is disenchanted by being cleansed of the magical aura that used to surround it. Within the seeming act of appreciation, this document domesticates culture.

The domestication does not stop here. After differentiating between the Islamic and the conventional – human-made – elements of culture, the second element of this domestication is to be further dissected into those that are *ma'ruf* (in accordance with what the Qur'an refers to as "good") and those that are not yet *ma'ruf*.⁸⁷ With regard to those that belong to the first category, Muhammadiyah needs to develop them for the interest of Islamic propagation. With regard to the second category, it is the task of Muhammadiyah to 'intervene' (*'melakukan intervensi'*) by transforming the content of those elements and develop them further until they manage to reach the category of *ma'ruf*, and can be used for the interest of Islamic propagation.⁸⁸

In this sense, "the local culture [is] both the method ... and the target of Islamic propagation".⁸⁹ Local culture, again, is the target of purification. This is certainly not the cultural project that the *laissez faire* vision imagines. Amin Abdullah argues that it is important to put human reasoning aside when one talks about local cultures and rely on "the feeling of the people" in appreciating them:

Human reasoning can cause problems because, to some extent, human beings cannot rely only on their reason; the feeling of the people is also important.... We cannot just abandon the feeling of the people. In looking at local culture, the feeling of the people must be involved. That is what a considerate person would do. In wisdom, various aspects need to be taken on board.⁹⁰

While the interventionist vision regards the cultural project as a struggle to spread a rational approach to local culture among Muhammadiyah's members,⁹¹ the cultural

⁸⁶ Ibid., 39.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 62-63.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 63.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 38.

⁹⁰ Amin Abdullah, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011.

⁹¹ Baidhawiy, "Puritanisme," 171.

project envisioned by the proponents of *laissez-faire* vision rejects this tendency to rationalise culture. Their project is to give room for local culture to at least maintain its presence in society. In Kuntowijoyo's words,

what Muhammadiyah needs to do is create a forum to uphold social solidarity (*silaturahmi*) for ... communities. Arts ... are one of the possible [tools to bring back] the spiritual culture [in Muhammadiyah] that due to a [puritan] concern have been abolished.⁹²

Kuntowijoyo reckons that it is natural for human beings to require both the substantive and symbolic aspects of religions.⁹³ The breathing room for local culture is what the *laissez-faire* vision hopes for, while religious purification is what the interventionist vision is aimed at.

3.1.5 The Gender Project

In my previous description of the theological project, Amin Abdullah mentions the need to adapt to the fact that these days women have experienced higher levels of education. This fact requires Muslims to understand Islam in a way that is friendlier towards women. The gender project aims exactly at this: Muhammadiyah, and also Islam, needs to understand that women have the same potential to contribute to the advancement of society as do men.

This project does not, in any case, stipulate that Islam is opposed to the empowerment of women. For the proponents of this project, as for proponents of the previous four projects, the Islam that we know is always Islam as a product of human interpretation. Any case of repression against women in the name of Islam, therefore, is based on a puritanical reading of this religion. For the gender project, Islam in itself contains a high appreciation for women. Siti Chamamah Soeratno, for example, believes that the coming of Islam had brought with it a civilising mission. Islam teaches human beings to embrace morality. "Humans," says Soeratno, "are fortunate with the coming of

⁹² Kuntowijoyo, "Islam dan Budaya Lokal," 297.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 296.

Islam,” and that “the most fortunate of human beings with the coming of Islam are women”.⁹⁴

Islam, for this project, has many reasons to be proud of its achievement in uplifting the status and role of women. If pre-Islamic Arabia was marked by the subjugation of women by men, the Prophet Muhammad introduced various teaching that places women in a much better position. For example, Islam introduced the limitation of how many wives a man can take. The conditions that entitle a man to take more than one wife, however, are so difficult for any man to fulfil that the truly prescribed form of marriage in Islam is monogamy. In terms of the chance for women to fulfil their potential, Islam has not set any limitation. The prime examples of this are the wives of the Prophet who were given all the opportunity to develop themselves, including being a leader.⁹⁵

Within Muhammadiyah specifically, this spirit of gender equality has been present since its inception. Retelling the story of Ahmad Dahlan, Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin explains Dahlan’s view on the empowerment of women:

Just imagine that in his time Kiai Dahlan was threatened just because he was supporting Muslim girls to ride bicycles. He told them to change their clothing, to don a wide dress [so that they will be able to ride bicycles], just like Dutch girls.⁹⁶

Dahlan’s attention to the empowerment of Muslim girls is also obvious in his insistence on their education. He pioneered general education for girls in his neighbourhood in the Kauman, where most of Yogyakarta’s *santri* live; he even sent some of his female students to study at Dutch public schools.⁹⁷ Another formal publication of Muhammadiyah, *The Heroines (Srikandi-Srikandi)* tells the story of how Ahmad Dahlan

did not only establish Muhammadiyah. He also paid great attention to the life of women. In Kyai Dahlan’s view, women have equal rights to men to participate to advance their society and religion. Besides doing their jobs as household mothers, women can also be active in the

⁹⁴ Siti Chamamah Soeratno, “Fiqh Perempuan di Wilayah Publik: Perspektif Muhammadiyah,” in *Wacana Fiqh Perempuan*, ed. Wawan Gunawan and Evie Shofia Inayati (Yogyakarta: Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam PP Muhammadiyah, 2005), 71.

⁹⁵ Siti Aisyah, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 30, 2011.

⁹⁶ Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011.

⁹⁷ Mu’arif and Hajar Nur Setyowati, *Srikandi-Srikandi Aisyiyah* (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2011), 11-13.

development of the society. This brilliant idea of Kyai Dahlan was born a century ago when the society of Kauman still looked at women just as *konco wingking* (“a companion at the back”, which only takes care of the household).⁹⁸

The above statement sounds as if Dahlan had supported a double role for women: those of both public and domestic worlds; and as if Dahlan’s insistence on the necessity for women to be involved in social activism on top of their domestic chores⁹⁹ had testified to his support for this double role. The gender project, however, understands this insistence in terms of Dahlan’s social environment where women had not been given the opportunities that they have now. The fact of Dahlan’s progressive vision for the role of women is an achievement to be measured in the context of his time.

The gender project, therefore, is a project to contextualise gender discourse in Muhammadiyah. It is not meant to judge the level of gender sensitivity of past leaders of Muhammadiyah. It is more interested in making Islam, as understood in Muhammadiyah, relevant and significant in addressing various issues affecting women. The main concern for this project is the gap between the official discourse on gender in Muhammadiyah and the reality of the present lives of Muhammadiyah’s female members. As Dzuhayatin notes, in reality, the jobs held by the organisation’s female members are no less demanding than those of their male counterparts. It is even often the case that the wives in Muhammadiyah-affiliated households play a more financially significant role in sustaining the family’s livelihood than the husbands.¹⁰⁰ The official documents in Muhammadiyah elaborating the proper role of women, however, are still focused on their role as good wives and mothers, regardless of the fact that they are dynamic, active, and independent women in the work place.

For the proponents of the gender project, the evolving values with regard to women and the reality of the lives that they endure are two reasons why Muhammadiyah needs to build its official gender conception, a conception that is expected to be more accommodating towards women’s needs. A religious reinterpretation of the proper roles of women in the present time has become necessary and for the first time

⁹⁸ Ibid., 10.

⁹⁹ Siti Noordjannah Djohantini, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 28, 2011.

¹⁰⁰ Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, “Wacana Perempuan dalam Muhammadiyah,” *Inovasi* special edition (2005): 56.

Muhammadiyah has facilitated a discussion on this theme, its result published in the 2005 book *Wacana Fiqh Perempuan dalam Perspektif Muhammadiyah* (“Muhammadiyah’s Perspective on the Discourse in the Islamic Jurisprudence on Women”).¹⁰¹ This book is the first effort at bringing the debates on the issue of gender to public realm. Even though it is not an official document, as this is a compilation of opinions on this issue among Muhammadiyah’s members, both male and female, it is still considered an important step in forwarding the gender project in the organisation.

The opinions contained in the book have various views with regard to the issue of women in Islam. There are opinions that advocate the need for the reinterpretation of the Qur’an in order to adjust Islam to the present world.¹⁰² But there are also those who are content with the present treatment of women by Islam in its puritan interpretation.¹⁰³ Moreover, the papers in the book do not only concern themselves with the development of the discourse on gender in Muhammadiyah but are also critical towards the status and role of women within various national legislations, especially with regard to the issue of marriage.

The gender project endeavours to include the progressive gender perspective in Muhammadiyah and to make this organisation more sensitive towards the evolving global discourse on this issue.¹⁰⁴ With respect to various perspectives on feminism, especially those developing in the West, the proponents of this project seem to see no contradiction with what they themselves are doing in Muhammadiyah. Siti Aisyah regards feminism as a response to the marginalization of women:

[Feminism] is really a struggle to increase the value [of women]. So it is actually [responding to] social problems. I think there is no problem in that. Besides, there were developments in the form of Islamic feminism. Now, if feminism is defined as [the efforts] to put women in an equal status with men, it is exactly what Islam does.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Wawan Gunawan and Evie Shofia Inayati, ed., *Wacana Fiqh Perempuan* (Yogyakarta: Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam PP Muhammadiyah, 2005).

¹⁰² An example of this opinion is Lies Marcoes Natsir, “Mencari Fiqh Pembela Kaum Perempuan,” in *Wacana Fiqh Perempuan*, 77-87.

¹⁰³ An example of this opinion is Isnawati Rais, “Perempuan dalam Fiqh Munahakat: Perspektif Muhammadiyah,” in *Wacana Fiqh Perempuan*, 133-72.

¹⁰⁴ Tri Hastuti Nur Rochimah, “Refleksi Gerakan Perempuan di Muhammadiyah,” *Inovasi* special edition (2005): 49.

¹⁰⁵ Siti Aisyah, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 30, 2011.

The same tone came from the President of Aisyiyah at the time this research was conducted, Siti Noordjannah Djohantini, who sees the values inherent in feminism as parallel to those in Islam. Both feminism and Islam strive to disentangle social and cultural constructions to achieve justice for both men and women. Differences in strategies of various movements employed to achieve this goal are natural as each faces different situations.¹⁰⁶

The gender project, just as the other reform projects, is thus not a unitary program. It is constituted by various opinions of members of Muhammadiyah in search of the relevance of Islam with respect to women. The proponents of this project are not interested in establishing a fixed formula to address gender issues in both Muhammadiyah and Indonesia. They realise that the discourse needs to be revitalised time and again to meet the evolving problems of women. It is natural, therefore, to expect them to champion the cause of the continuous reinterpretation of the text.¹⁰⁷

* * *

As a summary of what I have elaborated so far about the efforts of the reformists in Muhammadiyah, there are two things that underlie all the five projects. The first is that reform projects rely heavily on the reconstruction and reinterpretation of Islam. Islam, understood by the reform camp, is always Islam perceived. The way Muslims understand Islam will determine the way they behave. In order to keep Islam significant as a mind-set today, therefore, it is of utmost importance for Muslims to embrace modern methods of interpreting Islam's holy texts. The second underlying theme in the five reform projects is the necessity for Muslims to take into account the context in which Muslims live their lives. Islam exists to guide Muslims in their daily lives. The interpretation of Islam, therefore, should not be blind to the present environment in which Muslims live. Contextualisation is what Islam needs in order to be relevant to the lives of Muslims.

¹⁰⁶ Siti Noordjannah Djohantini, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 28, 2011.

¹⁰⁷ Siti Chamamah Soeratno, "Fiqh Perempuan," 73.

3.2 The Status Quo Projects

Contrary to the proponents of the various reform projects, the proponents of the status quo wish Muhammadiyah to stay on its present, familiar, course. What Muhammadiyah has accomplished, for the proponents of the status quo, has been in accordance with the requirements of Islam. Reconstruction and reinterpretation, therefore, are unnecessary because the danger of straying off the path of Islam as the result of reconstruction and reinterpretation is real. The status quo is puritan when it comes to the defence of the present interpretation of Islam within Muhammadiyah. But there is much more to the story of the status quo. Its insistence on the adequacy of the traditional interpretation of Islam is a story of how human beings are bound to their familiar cultural milieu.

The status quo camp has projects with which they urge Muhammadiyah to engage. Contrary to the reformist projects, these projects are aimed at keeping Muhammadiyah on the organisation's traditional path of what they perceive to be the true calling of the organisation. These projects, however, are not blind to the development of new global values, as I will suggest in the last part of this section.

3.2.1 The Project of Islamic Defence

This project is a response to the projects by the proponents of the reform camp. Perceiving an attack from the reformist camp, this project wishes to bring Muhammadiyah's members back to the true path of Islam. The project's first argument against its more progressive adversary is that Islam is not just a set of values. Islam, for this project, means the act of self-surrender to a concrete, well-defined, set of rules.¹⁰⁸ In Islam, the outer and physical – exoteric – dimension is no less important than the esoteric dimension.

¹⁰⁸ Syamsul Anwar, "Makna dan Konsep Islam secara Etimologis dan Terminologis," in *Pemikiran Muhammadiyah: Respons terhadap Liberalisasi Islam*, ed. Syamsul Hidayat and Sudarno Shobron (Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press, 2005), 10.

Within Islam, the *syariat* (exoteric) aspect is very important. The forms of rituals are the very basis of Islam. Islam does not separate exoteric from esoteric aspects. Islam strongly rejects any forms of rituals other than those used as examples by the Prophet Muhammad.¹⁰⁹

The same person who writes the above, moreover, argues that those Muslims who plan to create an Islam without its *shariah* aspect should just leave Islam instead.¹¹⁰ In Husaini's opinion, stripping Islam of its exoteric aspect will ruin the basic meaning of the religion itself. Islam will not be Islam without its exoteric aspect.¹¹¹

The project's second argument is related to the fact that the concreteness of Islam is well maintained by the purity of the Qur'an in which "there has been no intervention whatsoever by humans in terms of its choice of words, the construction of its sentences, let alone the interpretation of its meanings and messages".¹¹² With the revelation of Islam completed at the time of the Prophet Muhammad, the perfect nature of Islam consequently requires no further development or growth.¹¹³ The revelation of the Qur'an is thus permanent; what Muslims need is only elaboration of the Holy Book.

With respect to the interpretation of the Qur'an, this project strongly opposes hermeneutical methods. With the originality of the Holy Book maintained, its proponents believe, there is no need for an interpretation that takes into account factors surrounding the process of the writing of the Qur'an. Contrary to the theological project of the reformist camp, this project asserts that in order to acquire the true meaning of their Holy Book, Muslims need only to redirect any interpretation of the Book back onto the Book itself.¹¹⁴ Instead of adopting the method of hermeneutics in interpreting the Qur'an, this project urges Muslims to be proud in this Islamic method of interpretation, the

¹⁰⁹ Adian Husaini, "Muhammadiyah, Free Mason, dan Paham Lintas Agama," in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah: Istiqomah Membendung Kristenisasi & Liberalisasi*, ed. Fathurrahman Kamal et al. (Yogyakarta: Majelis Tabligh dan Dakwah Khusus PP Muhammadiyah, 2010), 93.

¹¹⁰ Adian Husaini, *Islam Liberal, Pluralisme Agama & Diabolisme Intelektual* (Surabaya: Risalah Gusti, 2005), 118.

¹¹¹ Adian Husaini is the president of the hard-line Dewan Dakwan Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesia's Committee for Islamic Propagation) and a member of Majelis Tabligh (Propagation Committee) of the National Office of Muhammadiyah.

¹¹² Musthafa Kamal Pasha and Ahmad Adaby Darban, *Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka SM, 2009), 207.

¹¹³ Hamid Fahmi Zarkasyi, "Islam sebagai Pandangan Hidup: Kajian Teoretis dalam Merespon Perang Pemikiran," in *Pemikiran Muhammadiyah*, 21.

¹¹⁴ Pasha and Darban, *Muhammadiyah Sebagai Gerakan Islam*, 207.

interpretation based on the monotheistic nature of Islam.¹¹⁵ Any interpretation of the Qur'an risks becoming insidious (*bathil*) unless it is based on this method. If an interpretation is performed without using this method, the interpreters risk becoming infidels (*kafir*) who act as if they were studying the Qur'an while in reality they doubt its authenticity and, furthermore, defile it.¹¹⁶ Since the Qur'an has an eternal message for human beings, any interpretation of the Qur'an can only be considered as reviving and not renewing its meaning.¹¹⁷

The project's third argument is Islam's status as a worldview, as an ideology that "has key concepts that originate from its own tradition and are diametrically different from the concepts of other worldviews".¹¹⁸ Some of those key concepts are: its view of reality and truth as the result of human beings' perception of both the visible and the invisible world; Islam's reliance on both transcendental revelation and the support of human's reasoning; and its central concept of God. The project's belief in the distinctiveness of the Islamic worldview puts Islam in a different place from other religions, civilisations, and cultures.

This first project for defending the status quo is clearly aimed at defending Islam from other ideologies, values, and methods of interpretation, especially those coming from the Western world. This emphasis on the distinctiveness of Islam is to keep Muslims from being attracted by Western ideologies, values and methods by creating a sense of pride among Muslims and a sense of the adequacy of Islam in addressing their present needs.

3.2.2 The Rescue Project

This second project urges that a further religious purification become Muhammadiyah's main concern:

As an organisation for Islamic propagation, it is only proper that Muhammadiyah takes as its main concern the issues of *keimanan* [faith] and *akidah* [morality] more than the issues of

¹¹⁵ Husaini, "Muhammadiyah," 90.

¹¹⁶ Syamsul Hidayat, "Penodaan dan Manipulasi Penafsiran terhadap Al-Qur'an," in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah*, 32.

¹¹⁷ Amien Rais, "Pluralisme Kebablasan (Interview with M. Amien Rais)", in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah*, 100.

¹¹⁸ Zarkasyi, "Islam sebagai Pandangan Hidup," 36-37.

politics, economy, education, and other social issues. It is because Islamic morality is the foundation to uphold other good deeds. There can be no good deeds without the right foundation of faith.¹¹⁹

The main concern for this project is that under the guise of Muhammadiyah's slogan of reform or renewal (*tajdid*), some members try to "uproot this organisation from its foundation, and even to move it away from its vision and mission as a movement for Islamic propagation and *amar maruf nahi munkar* (a movement that calls people to do good deeds and avoid dishonour)".¹²⁰

For the proponents of the rescue project, it is only natural for Muhammadiyah to be consistent (*istiqomah*) in fighting superstitious belief and syncretism among Indonesian Muslims, as coined in the term "the illness of TBC"¹²¹ by the proponents of this project. To create a true Islamic society is the only aspiration deemed to be in accordance with the legacy of Ahmad Dahlan. For the proponents of this project, the main method to reach this aspiration is through the eradication of un-Islamic elements, which mainly refer to the influence of "pre-Islamic" local cultures, from the life of Muhammadiyah's members.

What does the figure of Ahmad Dahlan stand for in the eyes of the proponents of this project? The first image of Ahmad Dahlan for them denies any inclination, on the part of Dahlan, to either pluralism or liberalism. According to Adian Husaini, the proponents of reform in Muhammadiyah have unfairly misinterpreted his legacy:

Since its inception in 1912 the founder and the leaders of Muhammadiyah might have never thought that one day there would emerge from within this organisation a wide range of thoughts that [would] ruin the construction of Islam. Truth be told, this is now no longer the case. There are so many ideas disseminated by institutions and members of Muhammadiyah that are odd and considered unreasonable by Muslims. It is not unusual that those ideas are claimed as part of Muhammadiyah's teaching with the misuse of the name of the organisation's founder, K.H. Ahmad Dahlan – as if the founder of Muhammadiyah had been a figure supporting pluralism.¹²²

¹¹⁹ Husaini, *Islam Liberal*, 121.

¹²⁰ Fathurrahman Kamal et al., "Kata Pengantar," in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah*, vii.

¹²¹ TBC is the Indonesian term for tuberculosis. But here the acronym is used to refer to *takhayul* (superstitious belief), *bidah* (the unlawful addition to Islamic rituals), and *churafat* (the insertion of non-Islamic rituals into the religion).

¹²² Husaini, *Islam Liberal*, 111.

Husaini is equally critical of the efforts of the reform project to depict Dahlan as a supporter of liberalism.¹²³

For the supporters of this rescue project, Ahmad Dahlan stands for the intelligent selection of what the West has to offer. “The people of Muhammadiyah”, argues a proponent of this project,

should be able to follow the organisation’s founder ... [in his selective attitude of] taking what is good from the West ... and combatting [the West’s] Christian culture, Christian thoughts, and Christian lifestyle. KHA Dahlan had been consistent towards Islam even though he took a lot of Western methods in propagating Islam and developing the value of human beings.¹²⁴

This project argues that in Muhammadiyah, this selective attitude towards non-Islamic elements in the society has to be maintained. They argue that any effort of reform must follow Islamic ideology,¹²⁵ the Qur’an and the Hadith,¹²⁶ and the Islamic morality (*akidah*).¹²⁷

For this project, two rules apply. First, with regard to pure rituals (*ibadah mahdlah*), there will be no contextualisation. This means that neither addition nor subtraction can be applied to the prescribed rituals. Second, with regard to those things outside the pure rituals, contextualisation is allowed as long as it is based on the ideal of morality in Islam.¹²⁸ Saleh Daulay, the president of the youth wing of Muhammadiyah, Pemuda Muhammadiyah (“The Youth of Muhammadiyah”), refers to these two elements in Islam as ideology and social life, respectively, for which the same rules apply.¹²⁹

With regard to these two rules, on the one hand, the logic of Islamic puritanism applies to matters of ideology. The proponents of this rescue project admit that Muhammadiyah adopts a Salafist approach in its ideological framework. The works of Ibnu Taimiyah, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab, and Rasyid Ridla influence

¹²³ Husaini, *Islam Liberal*, 128.

¹²⁴ M. Syukriyanto, “Istiqamah dalam Bermuhammadiyah,” in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah*, 5.

¹²⁵ Saleh Daulay, interview by author, Jakarta, June 13, 2011.

¹²⁶ Masyitoh Chosnan, interview by author, Jakarta, July 7, 2011.

¹²⁷ Oneng Nurul Bariyah, interview by author, Jakarta, July 12, 2011.

¹²⁸ M. Saad Ibrahim, “Orisinalitas, Kontinuitas, Perubahan, dan Diskontinuitas: Aspek-aspek Metodologis Kajian Islam,” in *Pemikiran Muhammadiyah*, 194.

¹²⁹ Saleh Daulay, interview by author, Jakarta, June 13, 2011.

Muhammadiyah's understanding of Islamic morality and rituals.¹³⁰ On the other hand, with regard to social life, Muhammadiyah is allowed to adopt Western modernism.¹³¹ For proponents of the status quo, there was never an unconditional adoption of Western modernism, neither was there an all-out puritanism in Muhammadiyah.

The proponents of the status quo do not intend to isolate Muhammadiyah from global problems facing humanity. Muhammadiyah needs to be active in discussing various issues facing human's civilisation. The ex-chairman of Muhammadiyah, the man who was also the speaker of Indonesia's national parliament in 1999 to 2004, Amien Rais, for example, urges Muhammadiyah to bring together its members to discuss the issue of Islam, as well as those issues of global warming, globalisation, and the future of human civilisation. The discussion hopefully can help Muhammadiyah understand its position amidst global changes. According to Rais, however, Muhammadiyah's involvement with regard to these issues should always be based on the puritan understanding of the Qur'an and the Sunnah.¹³²

The rescue project is therefore aimed at bringing back Muhammadiyah and its members to what they perceive to be the original understanding of the Qur'an. Muhammadiyah needs to wake up to the fact that at the moment the gravest danger facing this organisation, and the most perilous act of disbelief likely to be committed by its members, is the propagation of Western ideologies of secularism, pluralism, and liberalism.¹³³ The project usually refers to this set of ideology as "the disease of *sipilis*".¹³⁴

This project sees many members of Muhammadiyah as suffering from a feeling of uncertainty when they are facing the West:

This nervousness and confusion are marked by an inferiority complex that has stricken some of Muhammadiyah's members and leaders, especially when they are facing Western civilisation and modernisation. They then feel confident if they adopt the secular Western approaches and

¹³⁰ Dien Syamsuddin, "Kata Pengantar: Pemikiran Islam Muhammadiyah dalam Pusaran Zaman," in *Pemikiran Muhammadiyah*, viii-ix.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, xi.

¹³² Rais, "Pluralisme Keablasan," 99.

¹³³ Zaini Munir, "Liberalisasi Syari'at Islam," in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah*, 75.

¹³⁴ The word "sipilis" is an Indonesian term to refer to the disease of syphilis. The word is used by proponents of the rescue project to explain the destructiveness of the ideologies of secularism, pluralism and liberalism.

methods because those approaches and methods are considered advanced, progressive, transformative, liberating. They therefore adopt these things unconditionally. At the same time, they feel phobic [and] unconfident in upholding organic Islamic thinking, the thinking that began and developed from a Muslim worldview, with its source in Al-Qur'an and Sunnah and in the richness of Muslim intellectuality.¹³⁵

The proponents of this project urge the Western-influenced members of Muhammadiyah to “repent and admit to their mistakes, study Islam better, and to think more clearly and more modestly”.¹³⁶ As we have seen, they liken this Western-influenced attitude of the proponents of the reform projects in Muhammadiyah to a disease¹³⁷ and urge a more selective attitude towards the West if this organisation is to cure itself.¹³⁸

3.2.3 The Status Quo's Rejection of Global Values

For the proponents of the status quo, the struggle to bring Muhammadiyah back to the right path is an ideological war between Islam and the globalising values of the West. Responding to the globalising mission of the West, there are three arguments. First of all, they see Muslims as people who are supposed to be ruled by an Islamic worldview. This worldview is specific and different from other worldviews, including from the Western one. In this regard, Muslims should be given the freedom to live according to their religious precepts, even when these precepts are contradictory to a Western worldview.¹³⁹

This contradiction, however, does not mean that it is impossible for Muslim worldviews to have some overlap with a Western worldview in terms of the values they cherish. With regard to plurality, for example, this project believes that Islam is basically a religion that respects plurality. Even though Islam has its own claim as the only true religion of God, and has at time seemed lenient and at other times assertive towards minorities,¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ Syamsul Hidayat, “Prolog: Respon Muhammadiyah terhadap “Liberalisme Islam”,” in *Pemikiran Muhammadiyah*, xiv.

¹³⁶ Husaini, *Islam Liberal*, 132.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 125.

¹³⁸ Syukriyanto, “Istiqamah,” 4.

¹³⁹ Husaini, “Muhammadiyah,” 84.

¹⁴⁰ Husaini, *Islam Liberal*, 112.

it does not mean that the followers of Islam are allowed to be exclusive, to isolate themselves, to be rigid and intolerant Tolerance towards the beliefs of others is an obligation in the teaching of Islam.¹⁴¹

In Husaini's words,

the belief in the truth and the distinctiveness of Islam does not make it right for Muslims to be intolerant towards believers of other faiths. Muslims are also expected to honour other faiths, even though their faith claims that the only truth lies within their own religion.¹⁴²

It is important to explain the meanings this project attaches to the words "plurality" and "pluralism". While "plurality" (*pluralitas*) for its proponents refers to the recognition of the reality of the existence of a variety of religions in a society without the need to consider the truth claims of all religions relative, "pluralism" (*pluralisme*) is defined as the ideology that considers the validity of all religions to be relative.¹⁴³ For the supporters of the status quo, while Islam acknowledges plurality, it utterly rejects pluralism.¹⁴⁴

The project's second argument is that the Western worldview is also a particular one, just like Islam. The ideology of secularism, for example, was born out of the historical trauma of Western society of the violence perpetrated by its organised religions.¹⁴⁵ Secularism is a product of a specific history of the West that required it to eventually separate religions from public life. Pluralism and gender equality are other examples of specifically Western conceptions.¹⁴⁶

The proponents of reform in Muhammadiyah, despite their jargon of free thinking, are considered to be the slaves of Western texts. When they criticise the puritan reading of the Qur'an by the proponents of the status quo, argue the project's supporters, they are actually upholding, among others, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Declaration of Independence.¹⁴⁷ In so doing, they treat those

¹⁴¹ Pasha and Darban, *Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam*, 199.

¹⁴² Husaini, "Muhammadiyah," 79.

¹⁴³ Fathurrahman Kamal, "Pluralisme Agama dalam Timbangan Muhammadiyah," in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah*, 108.

¹⁴⁴ Pasha and Darban, *Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam*, 195.

¹⁴⁵ Adian Husaini, "Mendiskusikan Kembali Makna Islam," in *Pemikiran Muhammadiyah*, 55.

¹⁴⁶ On pluralism, see Kamal, "Pluralisme Agama," 110. On gender equality, see Okrisal Eka Putra and Adian Husaini, "Menguji Konsep Kesetaraan Gender," in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah*, 220.

¹⁴⁷ Husaini, *Islam Liberal*, 116-17.

documents as their Holy Scripture¹⁴⁸ and position the standard of the implementation of human rights and gender equality above that of the Holy Book.¹⁴⁹

The third argument of this project is that despite the particularity of the origin of its concepts, the West and its supporters among Muslims are forcing these concepts onto the Muslim community. “The jargon of plurality and pluralism upheld [by those Muslims bent on supporting liberalism in Islam] are nothing but lip service because ... these people are constructing an hegemony over [those with] different views.”¹⁵⁰ For the supporter of the status quo, it is hypocritical of the West to refuse the specific nature of its ideology, while it forces its ideas of pluralism, human rights and gender onto Muhammadiyah in particular and onto Islam in general.¹⁵¹ For the proponents of the status quo, their fight is a cultural war against the hegemony of Western values.

3.3 Concluding Comments: On the Limits to Freedom

The supporters of the status quo camp are not against progress, but they believe that, as Muslims, they have their own definition of what constitutes progress. Their project recognises the particularity of any human worldview. Their criticism of the hegemony of the worldview coming from the West originates from their recognition of the particularity of any human worldview. The project for the status quo also admits to the particularity of the Islamic worldview and it is aimed at maintaining the purity of this worldview against the penetration of Western ways of thinking.

The idea of freedom accompanying the penetration of the Western worldview into Islam, for the project, is nonsensical. Firstly, the freedom that the West has been busily campaigning for is an empty concept because even the supposedly modern West has never been consistent in applying this concept in its own society.

¹⁴⁸ Munir, “Liberalisasi Syari’at Islam,” 73.

¹⁴⁹ Syakir Jamaluddin, “Mengantisipasi Liberalisasi Pemahaman Hadis,” in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah*, 55.

¹⁵⁰ Hidayat, “Prolog,” xxi.

¹⁵¹ Kamal, “Pluralisme Agama,” 110; and Putra and Husaini, 220.

At the moment, modern humans also discriminate against each other with respect to place of birth and blood connection. Just because someone was born in America, for example, he is given different rights from those who happened not to be born there.¹⁵²

This perceived hypocrisy of the West points to the impossibility of humans reaching the sort of freedom that the West imagines.

Secondly, this project's rejection of any possibility of humans implementing ultimate freedom is based on the fact that humans are creatures who are constantly bound by their worldview, either Islamic or otherwise. It is the nature of human beings to follow a certain worldview. In this regard, for supporters of the status quo camp, to be free means subjecting oneself to a certain text, a certain worldview. To aim for freedom in accordance with the Western standard, therefore, is no more liberating than to submit to Islam.

The project's criticism of the proponents of various reform projects in Muhammadiyah is directed towards their perceived blindness to the bounded nature of human beings. For the status quo, their adversary's utopian idea of human beings reaching freedom is a sign of their naivety and ignorance of the true human nature. For this project, Islam is one worldview among various worldviews, but this fact does not make it less meaningful for Muslims to rely on their religion's claim of truth – as the Americans are supposed to find the ultimate truth of humanity in their worship of the idea of freedom. In arguing their case, the proponents of the status quo have showcased the limits to human freedom.

Their assumption of the naivety of the reform projects, however, may be somewhat misdirected. The proponents of Muhammadiyah's reform projects never aim for the liberation of the Islamic worldview from the particularity of its origin and development. It is the view of the reform projects that every interpretation of Islam is bound to certain contexts, and therefore it is obligatory for interpreters of Islam to understand the limits of their interpretation.¹⁵³ In the minds of the supporters of the reform camp, Islam should be subjected to more rigorous standards by inviting other

¹⁵² Husaini, "Muhammadiyah," 87.

¹⁵³ Baidhawiy, "Puritanisme," 162.

scientific methods in the discourse. They do not see their call for the need to reconstruct Islam as an effort to liberate this religion from its particularity.

On the contrary, it is their view that by reconstructing itself, Islam will be subject to more particularities. Shofan, for example, asserts the need to interpret Islam through the basis of adequate knowledge. This knowledge is the factor that should bind Islam to a particularity. His association of the puritan reading of the Qur'an to the acts of religious authoritarianism and rape¹⁵⁴ should be understood as the inclination to subject Islam to a reliable and scientifically accountable interpretation. It is indeed the ambition of the theological project to make Islam responsive to the changes in scientific methods of religious interpretation. The relevance of Islam as the target of this project is achieved through subjecting Islam to more than one particular method.

The need to employ various methods and thus to subject Islam to various particular interpretations should be understood in terms of the reform project's emphasis on the need to reinterpret Islam by considering the challenges faced by Muslims. The changing world has brought in a need to incorporate new values when one interprets Islam. Once again, the proponents of the reform camp subject Islam to a higher standard. While in the reconstruction effort Islam is subjected to various methods, in the reinterpretation of Islam the evolving needs of human beings in an ever changing world are its binding factors. Amin Abdullah's triangle of rationality is the scheme for reform projects in their endeavours to subject Islam to a more rigorous interpretation.

Instead of aiming at the uprooting of Islam from its particular history and environment, we have seen that the five reform projects are equally committed to the bounded, and therefore limited, reading of Islam. Despite the parochial nature of every possible interpretation of Islam, the reform projects do not suggest that Muslims should be content with the traditional interpretations of the Qur'an. Being bound does not mean being willingly entrapped in an old interpretation. The limits to freedom in the interpretation of the Qur'an should not stop Islam from being sensitive and responsive to changing times and context, even though the new interpretation will still be bound.

¹⁵⁴ Shofan, "Satu Abad Muhammadiyah," xxiii.

For the reform camp, because the West is a particular entity in the history of humanity, this does not mean Islam cannot learn and benefit from that particularity. Because Islam is particular, this does mean that it can isolate itself from other particularities. The particular nature of each human worldview for the reform projects, therefore, should not be an excuse to keep from interacting with other worldviews. It is not the aim of the reform projects to construct an interpretation of Islam that will be valid across the whole of human history and human society. But since every interpretation is particular, so goes the argument in this camp, why should Muslims shy away from other particularities when dealing with their particular space and time?

Their differences notwithstanding, I will argue in the next chapter that they own the same set of predispositions, or *habitus*. I call this predisposition reflective, as summarised in Chapter One. Like any predisposition, the reflective predisposition is also productive of varied actions. In the case of Muhammadiyah, the same reflective predisposition has generated both the status quo and reformist tendencies among its members. Chapter Four will elaborate this generative capacity of *habitus* amongst Muhammadiyah's members.

CHAPTER FOUR

HABITUS AND REFLEXIVITY IN MUHAMMADIYAH

In the previous chapter we have seen the current schism among Muhammadiyah's members with regard to whether Muhammadiyah needs reform, and, if one responds affirmatively to this question, where reform should be directed. As explained in Chapter One, I have used the categories of "status quo" and "reform" to refer to the two camps within the organisation and avoided the commonly used labels of "puritan" and "liberal" to describe the characters of the two opposing groups within this organisation. I avoided the second categorisation because it is not directly related to the issue of transformation in Muhammadiyah, which is the subject of my dissertation.

From the elaboration in the previous chapter, both the status quo and reform camps show their awareness of other worldviews outside Islam. Within the status quo camp, there is an appreciation of the distinctiveness of divergent worldviews. This appreciation of the particularity of each human worldview is also obvious in the reform camp. Its insistence on the needs to understand Islam beyond the familiar method of interpretation should be read as an endeavour to strengthen the particularity of Islam. The differences between the two camps lie, therefore, not in their acknowledgement of the distinctiveness of Islam but on whether that particularity should be left alone or reformed. These two camps have put forward the particularity of Islam as currently the main topic of debate in Muhammadiyah and, in so doing, they put their understanding of Islam to the test.

This attitude from both camps is similar to Rabinow's understanding of the process of thinking. For Rabinow, 'thinking' is the process of detaching oneself from what one does and of transforming one's understanding into an object of one's question.¹ On the same topic, Lash talks about 'reflexivity' as the activity of reflecting on everyday

¹ Paul Rabinow, *Anthropos Today: Reflections on Modern Equipment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 47-48.

experiences, of making one's everyday experience the object of one's thoughts.² In other words, reflexivity involves the process of questioning the familiar. In Adkins's words, "reflexivity must therefore be understood to involve reflection on the unthought and unconscious categories of thought".³

This chapter is aimed at further elaborating the positions of the status quo and reform with respect to their reflexivity. In this chapter, the reflexivity of both camps will be put under scrutiny; the purpose of this scrutiny is to establish the notion that reflexivity can be used to explain either transformative practices or a conservative stance.⁴ These two contradictory possibilities in the course of reflexivity can be comprehended if one understands reflexivity not as a purely cognitive activity but as a process that is bound to the everyday practices of individuals.

Just to remind us about the theoretical discussion in Chapter One, for Bourdieu, *habitus* is a set of predispositions that facilitate social agents' behaviours in their environment, or the field. These predispositions are treated by Bourdieu as containing possibilities of various actions and not rigid rules that social agents are obliged to obey. With respect to reflexivity, I define it as the capacity of social agents to put these predispositions in practice reflexively.⁵ I have started the discussion on reflexivity and reflectivity in the first chapter of this dissertation. This chapter will elaborate these concepts further before going to the topic of Muslims' *habitus* in Muhammadiyah.

² Scott Lash, "Reflexivity and Its Doubles: Structure, Aesthetics, Community," in *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, ed. Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), 140.

³ Lisa Adkins, "Reflexivity: Freedom or Habit of Gender," *Theory Culture Society* 20, no. 6 (2003), 25.

⁴ This position is taken, for example, in Lois McNay, "Gender, *Habitus* and the Field: Pierre Bourdieu and the Limits of Reflexivity," *Theory Culture Society* 16, no. 1 (1999): 111.

⁵ The cataphatic, active, form of reflexivity has been criticised for giving too much emphasis on social agents' rationality and their modernist preoccupation, and not enough attention to the emotional aspects of reflexivity; see, respectively, Nicos Mouzelis, "Self and Self-Other Reflexivity: Apophatic Dimension," *European Journal of Social Theory* 13, no.2 (2010): 274; and Anthony Elliott, "Beck's Sociology of Risk: A Critical Assessment," *Sociology* 36 (2002): 311. The apophatic, negative, form of reflexivity has been criticised for abandoning political aspect of reflexivity; See Marry Holmes, "The Emotionalization of Reflexivity," *Sociology* 44 (2010): 139-54.

4.1 Reflexivity and Reflectivity Revisited

In Chapter One I define reflexivity as the capacity of social agents to immediately view their position within their field and to react almost instinctively to certain things or actions according to their predisposition. I define reflectivity as a particular sort of predisposition that inclines social agents to treat the world as divided between their selves as the subjects of action and their environment as the object of their analyses and actions. By making these two definitions, I employ Scott Lash's later understanding of these two terms.⁶ This understanding of the concept of reflexivity is different from his earlier one and also that of Adkins.⁷ In Lash's earlier definition and also Adkin's, reflexivity is social agents' reflection and evaluation of their (previously unspoken) predispositions. This definition could be traced back to Bourdieu's reflexive sociology⁸ that associates reflexivity with social agents' critical attitude towards their predispositions. In this regard, Lash's earlier definition, as well as Adkins' and Bourdieu's, tilts more towards the cataphatic form of reflexivity.

Bourdieu's seemingly cataphatic perception of reflexivity is related to his treatment of the concept of strategy. Bourdieu had a tendency to contrast the concept of "strategy" to that of "rule".⁹ While rules are what social scientists extract from the behaviours of social agents, strategies are how social agents behave in real lives. Rules are analytical concepts while strategies are the tools of social agents. These tools, however, are perceived by social agents not as tools consciously employed but as predispositions naturally practiced.

Is there a place for strategy in *habitus*? Bourdieu answered this question with an affirmative. Considering the definition of *habitus* that incorporates the important role of both the social structure and the agency of individuals, however, a strategy must be understood as the way social agents approach the game based on a bounded perception

⁶ Scott Lash, "Reflexivity as Non-Linearity," *Theory Culture Society* 20, no. 2 (2003): 51.

⁷ Lash, "Reflexivity and Its Doubles," 140; and Adkins, "Reflexivity," 25.

⁸ Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Wacquant, ed., *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).

⁹ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 9.

towards the game. In Saba Mahmood's work mentioned earlier in Chapter One,¹⁰ those women who belong to a Mosque movement in Cairo do not see any possibility of a life outside what they understand to be orthodox Islam. The practice of veiling is therefore a physical predisposition. This predisposition is so embodied in their being to the extent that these women would feel uncomfortable leaving home without donning their veils. Moreover, the practice of veiling is also a strategy that is aimed at creating a moral predisposition, which inculcates a certain moral and religious inclination in these women.

To attribute the label of determinism to Bourdieu's sociology¹¹ is therefore incorrect if strategising is defined as a bounded practice. In Bourdieu's understanding, there are never any interest-based strategies that are not bound to agents' *habitus* because, for example, even disinterestedness shown towards the act of chivalry in some communities or in the search for unbiased knowledge among intellectuals is an "interest in disinterestedness":¹² interest that is so specific to some games that it needs to take the form of disinterestedness. It is, in other words, a strategy with regard to specific games or fields. With this in mind, strategies are always bound to the game; they are always bound to the feeling for the game.

Bourdieu's tendency to prioritise the concept of strategy in his analysis cannot be detached from his critique of structuralism in anthropology with its penchant for creating a cultural map as a representation of the mentality of social agents. In constructing a set of rules for gift exchange among some communities, for example, some anthropologists abolish the time dimension in the process. This jettisoning of the time factor has the consequence of discounting the strategy that the social agents in question have with respect to the gift exchange.¹³ Bourdieu's sociology is aimed at bringing the agents' strategy back into the analysis of the social world. Whether an agent reciprocates the gift soon after he receives it, or whether he delays in replying the gift, is a strategy either to maintain or increase his position in the whole economy of pride, an economy that assumes the feeling for the game on his part.

¹⁰ Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

¹¹ One such attribution can be found in Hugo Gorringer and Irene Rafanell, "The Embodiment of Caste: Oppression, Protest and Change," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): 100.

¹² Pierre Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 83.

¹³ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 106.

It is the same strategy that is criticised by Michel deCerteu when he contradicts it with the concept of *tactic*. In deCerteu's view, Bourdieu's sociology puts too much emphasis on social agents' ability to reflect on their environment. For deCerteu, strategy means "the calculus of force-relationships which becomes possible when a subject of will and power...can be isolated from an 'environment'", while tactic is defined as "a calculus which cannot count on a 'proper' (a spatial or institutional localization), nor thus a borderline distinguishing the other as a visible totality".¹⁴ Furthermore, he likens a strategy as "taking a trick" in a card game on the assumption that there is some defined playing space and "the rules that accord the value to the deal and certain options to the players".¹⁵ DeCerteu's practice of everyday life assumes tactic, *not* strategy, as the calculus in the life of social agents and therefore puts Bourdieu's *habitus*, contrary to the mainstream critique of Bourdieu, on the side of the rationalist wing in sociology. Not all deCerteu's assumption of Bourdieu's strategy is founded in the latter's works. Bourdieu's conditional understanding of strategy, for example, does not accord "will and power"¹⁶ to social agents understood as factors "isolated"¹⁷ from agents' environment. DeCerteu's critique towards Bourdieu's works, however, shows us Bourdieu's intention to provide agency with a role in his analysis, even if this role is a conditional one.

The conditionality of strategy along with the practice of strategising in Bourdieu's sociology has often been criticised as deterministic and dismissive of the chance of meaningful freedom for social agents. Karakayali, for example, considers Bourdieu's works as so occupied with setting the right epistemological mood for sociologists in doing their sociological work that it does not give enough room for the role of imagination and imagination's contribution to the discussion on the possibility for any social transformation.¹⁸ Another criticism of Bourdieu's work comes from Myles. He sees Bourdieu's tendency to avoid the subjectivism of social agents as causing him the inevitable new dualism in his works: common sense, as embedded in the feeling for the

¹⁴ Michel deCerteu, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), xix.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 53.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Nedim Karakayali, "Reading Bourdieu with Adorno: The Limits of Critical Theory and Reflexive Sociology," *Sociology* 38, no. 2 (2004): 358.

game, versus reflexivity.¹⁹ This issue of Bourdieu's tendency towards structuralism, and thus its limitation in explaining social transformation, has also been brought by Gorringe and Rafanell in their discussion on the issue of the protests by the *dalit* ("the untouchables") communities in India.²⁰

To do justice to these critics, Bourdieu never really gives meaningful attention to the topic of reflexivity in his sociology except when he turns his attention to the sociology of sociologists, or intellectuals in general. The only time a hint of reflexivity arises is when he describes the situation of crisis in society. Bourdieu likens this crisis to a hysteria, "when the environment with which they are actually confronted is too distant from that to which they are objectively fitted",²¹ when there is "a structural lag between opportunities and the dispositions to grasp them which is the cause of missed opportunities and, in particular, of the frequently observed incapacity to think historical crises in categories of perception and thought other than those of the past".²² Yet even during this gap between *habitus* and the field, Bourdieu only attributes "a margin of freedom" for social agents to make explicit their unquestioned predispositions, or to transform *doxa* into rules, to reflect on them, and eventually to open "political action aimed at reopening the space of possibles [sic]".²³

It is a mood entirely different from when he discusses the importance of reflexivity in doing sociology. In *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Bourdieu warns sociologists of their tendency toward "epistemocentrism" associated with scholarly viewpoints. Sociologists, in the eyes of Bourdieu, need to be aware of the situatedness of sociology in a wider academic field, along with the implicated forces working in this field. Furthermore, they need to be conscious to the claim of universality that their works strive to achieve, while in reality the practices of social agents they try to explain are *not* their own practices.²⁴ Reflexive sociology means a sociology that is aware of

¹⁹ John F. Myles, "From Doxa to Experience: Issues in Bourdieu's Adoption of Husserlian Phenomenology," *Theory Culture Society* 21, no. 2 (2004): 97.

²⁰ Gorringe and Rafanell, "The Embodiment of Caste," 112.

²¹ Bourdieu, *Outline*, 78.

²² *Ibid.*, 83.

²³ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 234.

²⁴ Pierre Bourdieu, "The Practice of Reflexive Sociology (The Paris Workshop)," in *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 254.

unconscious predispositions operating within its field, such as the predispositions to claim the monopoly of the universal.²⁵

The works that are appreciative of reflexivity in Bourdieu's writings are therefore focused on reflexivity as specifically targeted at the academic milieu. Schubert, for example, has this to say about Bourdieu:

Bourdieu is inviting us to join him in a rigorous scientific method in which our own positions as social scientists are foregrounded. Bourdieu shows the academic how much of the self is social. He shows us just how much of what we see and feel is a consequence of where we stand in relations to others in the social space.²⁶

Bourdieu's intention is not to take the science out of sociology; his project is not a deconstructive one.²⁷ By contrast, he envisions reflexivity in sociology as the tool to strengthen its epistemological stance. Reflexivity urges sociologists to be critical towards their implicit assumptions in doing sociology. The final, expected, outcome of reflexive sociology is the recognition that "ours [sociologists' work] is not the ultimate or the final word, it is rather just a social scientific word".²⁸ In a similar vein, Frangie sees in Bourdieu's reflexivity "the principle that links the epistemological security of the social scientific endeavour to the practices of socio-analysis of the researcher as a cultural producer and to the analyses of the conditions of possibility of sociology as a discipline"²⁹ that should be appreciated as a way to transform one's gaze as a person of science. Crossley, however, despite his appreciation of Bourdieu's works as a "persuasive and highly sophisticated approach to social analysis", criticised him as unclear in his explanation about how *habitus* "shapes and indeed constitutes human subjectivity".³⁰ Crossley's critique notwithstanding, these works are generally appreciative of Bourdieu's emphasis on the importance of reflexivity in practising social sciences.

²⁵ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 70.

²⁶ J. Daniel Schubert, "From a Politics of Transgression toward an Ethics of Reflexivity: Foucault, Bourdieu, and Academic Practice," *American Behavioral Scientist* 38, no. 7 (1995): 1010.

²⁷ Loic J. D. Wacquant, "Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology," in *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, ed. Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Wacquant, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 36.

²⁸ Schubert, "From a Politics of Transgression," 1013.

²⁹ Samer Frangie, "Bourdieu's Reflexive Politics: Socio-Analysis, Biography and Self-Creation," *European Journal of Social Theory* 12, no. 2 (2009): 221.

³⁰ Nick Crossley, "The Phenomenological Habitus and Its Construction," *Theory and Society* 30, no. 1 (2001): 117-18.

Some works have been dedicated to the effort to *insert* reflexivity into Bourdieu's understanding of *habitus*. Sweetman, for example, argues for the possibility of the creation of "habitual reflexivity" or "reflexive habitus" where "a reflexive orientation towards the contemporary environment may itself be regarded as a form of habitus".³¹ Social agents in this sort of *habitus* are depicted as constantly monitoring themselves. The possibility of the construction of this *habitus*, however, is especially related to the emergence of what Ulrich Beck calls the epoch of second, late, reflexive modernisation,³² with its trait of individualization of risk as welfare states retreat from the lives of their citizens.³³ Taking Bourdieu's analysis, however, Binkley asserts that the reflexivity in reflexive modernisation cannot be understood as the total freedom of social agents in living their lives. Instead, he argues for an analysis on the dynamism between reflexive self-awareness and pre-reflexive dispositions of conducts to better understand reflexivity.³⁴ For both Sweetman and Binkley, however, reflexivity in Bourdieu's sociology is still problematical in two ways. First, reflexivity does not belong to all societies across time and space. It only arises when there is a crisis, such as the retreat of the welfare state. Second, even if it arises in a time of crisis, reflexivity is not incorporated in *habitus* as a general concept, and thus the diametrical opposition between *habitus* and reflexivity. Any effort at combining the two notions together, therefore, can be achieved only through hybridisation.³⁵

In this section I would argue, based on my reading on Bourdieu's works, that reflexivity is a part of *habitus* and that therefore it can be found in any society. To do that, I will firstly need to borrow Lash's conceptualization of reflectivity and reflexivity. On the one hand, "to reflect", he tells us, "is to somehow subsume the object under the subject of knowledge. Reflection presumes apodictic knowledge and certainty. It presumes a dualism, a scientific attitude in which the subject is in one realm, the object of

³¹ Paul Sweetman, "Twenty-first Century Dis-Ease? Habitual Reflexivity or the Reflexive Habitus," *The Sociological Review* (2003):543.

³² Ulrich Beck, Wolfgang Bonns, and Christoph Lau, "The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme," *Theory Culture Society* 20, no. 2 (2003): 1-2.

³³ Sam Binkley, "Governmentality, Temporality and Practice: From the Individualization of Risk to the 'Contradictory Movement of the Soul'," *Time & Society* 18, no. 1 (2009): 88.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 102.

³⁵ Matthew Adams, "Hybridizing Habitus and Reflexivity: Towards an Understanding of Contemporary Identity?" *Sociology* 40, no. 3 (2006): 511.

knowledge in another”. On the other hand, reflexivity, he suggests while modifying Beck’s definition of reflexivity, “has more to do with reflex than reflection. Reflexes are indeterminate. They are immediate. They do not in any sense subsume”.³⁶ If reflectivity entails the division between subject and object, for Lash, reflexivity is about the demise of this distinction.

Comparing Lash’s reflexivity with Bourdieu’s *habitus*, we come up with a sense of strategy that is based neither on perfect knowledge of the situation and of the game, nor on the situatedness of social agents outside their environment. Our environment, reflexively understood, is not the object over which we exert our power. On the contrary, we live in the world while the world lives in us. Following this line of thinking, the resource that we have in order to participate in the game, therefore, is not knowledge but feeling for the game. Discussion on reflexivity, therefore, needs to be situated “in-the-world”³⁷ as well as heeding the deeply embedded aspects of *habitus* within social agents.³⁸

From my elaboration above of Bourdieu’s notions of *habitus* and reflexivity, and Lash’s differentiation between reflexivity and reflectivity, it clear that what is meant by strategy contained within the concept of *habitus* is parallel to reflexivity; and that reflexivity is a bounded act of strategising. In this regard, reflexivity belongs to *habitus* in general. In contrast, reflectivity can be defined as strategising *as if* social agents have the perfect capability to delimit themselves from their environment as their object of gaze and, upon the separation of themselves from their object, *as if* they have perfect knowledge to act upon their environment. An *illusio*, understood by Bourdieu as “a fundamental belief in the interest of the game and the value of the stake which is inherent in that membership”,³⁹ although coming in the forms of different suppositions in specific *habitus*, is a common characteristic of all *habitus*. The notion of human capacity that belongs to reflectivity is not special when compared to other *illusio* belonging to other *habitus*. It is neither more nor less mythical than the perception of the natural differences

³⁶ Scott Lash, “Reflexivity as Non-Linearity,” 51.

³⁷ Adkins, “Reflexivity,” 23.

³⁸ McNay, “Gender,” 95.

³⁹ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 11.

between sexes among the Kabyles Berber of Algeria and therefore their prescription for sexual division of labour.⁴⁰

4.2 Muslim Habitus in Muhammadiyah

One of my elaborations in Chapter One shows that reflexivity is the *general* property of *habitus* and that reflectivity, with its assumption of the perfect capacity of social agents, is only one possible sort of predisposition in a *habitus*. Reflectivity is just a *doxa*, or acquired predisposition, with which social agents see and take care of their positions within the field.

This section of the chapter will establish *reflectivity* as the predisposition that is shared by Muhammadiyah's members. In other words, the Muslim *habitus* of Muhammadiyah is marked by the penchant to think of oneself as a rational actor capable of comprehending the laws of nature. It should be understood that by employing the concept of *habitus* in explaining the practices of Muhammadiyah's members, I do not intend to establish a *mentality* of those members, one which constitutes a common rule of behaviour and results in the similarity of those behaviours among them. Rather, my goal is to find a shared predisposition among them and, since *habitus* is also a generative structure, I aim to show that this shared predisposition is a potential that facilitates various sorts of practices, even those that conflict with each other, as demonstrated by different viewpoints from the proponents of reform and those of the status quo.

4.2.1 The Sources of Muhammadiyah's Reflective Predisposition

Before dwelling on the reflective predisposition within both camps in Muhammadiyah, let me explain the sources of this predisposition. The first source of reflective predisposition among Muhammadiyah's members is the myth of enlightenment elaborated in Chapter Two. The axiom in this myth is the power of reason to help human beings attain enlightenment, as exemplified in the life story of the exemplary Man. Human reason is a reliable tool to find truth contained in the universe; it enables human

⁴⁰ Bourdieu, *Logic*, 146.

beings to *reflect* on their environment and to *take action* on it as a sign of Muslims' obligation to Allah. The contradiction between human reason and human spiritual quest is disputed by this myth because it teaches Muhammadiyah's members that the use of human reason can lead them to achieve Islamic spirituality. Consequently, the quality of *reflectivity* is a highly valued trait in Muhammadiyah because this organisation, as perceived by its members, is built and maintained by the consciousness of Dahlan and his successors.

The second source of the reflective predisposition of Muhammadiyah's members is the teaching of Ahmad Dahlan himself. This teaching is recorded in the document *The Seven Philosophical Teachings of Ahmad Dahlan*⁴¹ by one of his students, Hadjid. It is possible to categorise these teachings into three tenets that I think are symptomatic of reflectivity. Firstly, there is the need to perpetually reflect on one's own intention in life. The good life is the life well planned; humans need to use their reason to think about the ultimate goal of one's life. For Muslims, it is of utmost importance to recognise one's intention in life and whether that intention has been guided to attain happiness in the afterlife. This self-directed questioning has as its target the correct behaviours of Muslims, the behaviours that are constantly and consciously projected towards the interest of life after death.

Secondly, there is reliance on the capacity of human beings to attain the ultimate truth of life. This second tenet is based on the notion of the capability of human beings to "empty their hearts" of their old habits and of their perception of self-claimed truth.⁴² The ultimate truth is achievable only if individuals use their rationality and overcome their misguidedness. This effort, though, should be conducted in steps according to each individual's clarity of thought.

Finally, there is confidence in the capacity of human beings to choose to follow the truth. As a continuation of the second tenet, this tenet warns Muslims of the fragile condition of human beings in the face of their own vicious desires and the consequent tendency to embrace the evil and reject the good. Awareness of this fragility should be

⁴¹ K. R. H. Hadjid, *Pelajaran KHA Dahlan: 7 Falsafah Ajaran & 17 Kelompok Ayat Al-Qur'an* (Yogyakarta: Lembaga Pustaka dan Informasi Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2008).

⁴² *Ibid.*, 19.

followed up with the change of one's heart to follow the truth, which is Islam. As Dahlan emphasized in one of his teachings by quoting the thirtieth verse of the Ar-Rum Chapter of the Qur'an:

So direct your face toward the religion, inclining to truth. [Adhere to] the *fitrah* [true nature] of Allah upon which He has created [all] people. No change should there be in the creation of Allah . That is the correct religion, but most people do not know.⁴³

For Dahlan, the only religion that hones the potential for good within human beings is Islam. Human beings are born holy. Unfortunately, they turn unholy in later life by vicious desires. The only way to regain their holiness is Islam.

Within Muhammadiyah, reason and religion in this set of predispositions are compatible with each other. The right reflection will eventually lead a person to the true path of Islam. As in the case of any *illusio*, however, it is built upon a certain set of assumptions. One might want to criticise the idea of human reason and refer to it as a myth but, for Muhammadiyah's members, the idea of human reason is self-evident. In this light, *consciousness* and *enlightenment*, as I have elaborated in the first chapter with regard to the concept of the exemplary Man, are historical facts.

The third source of reflective predispositions within Muhammadiyah is the method employed in this organisation to socialise the members of its missions. According to Asep Purnama Bachtiar, the head of Majelis Pendidikan Kader (Council for Cadre Education) within Muhammadiyah's national leadership, various programs of this committee are aimed at developing a critical attitude in Muhammadiyah's members through the employment of the method of dialogues and discussions.⁴⁴ The inculcation of a critical attitude through the committee's programs is expected to equip the organisation's members with the capacity for independent reasoning and therefore enable them to solve the problems faced by Muhammadiyah's branches in which they work. The myth of the power of human reason to reflect and to take appropriate actions on their environment – *reflectivity* – is perpetuated through the programs of the committee in charge of educating the organisation's cadres.

⁴³ Qur'an 30:30; quoted in Hadjid, 27.

⁴⁴ Asep Purnama Bachtiar, interview by author, Yogyakarta, August 3, 2011.

4.2.2 Reflectivity in the Status Quo and Reform Camps

There is a general appreciation of the myth of enlightenment among Muhammadiyah's members. For example, both Muhammad Shofan and Masyitoh Chosnan, whose arguments I place in the reform and status quo camps respectively, spoke highly of the film "Sang Pencerah"⁴⁵ in which the myth of enlightenment is brought to life. Shofan admired the modernising efforts of Dahlan depicted in this film, while Chosnan focused her appreciation on Dahlan's adoption of a modern Western school system.⁴⁶ Both, however, were equally appreciative of the idea of Muhammadiyah as a product of enlightenment.

This section of this chapter will elaborate the reflective predisposition of Muhammadiyah's members, as based on the myth of Dahlan's enlightenment, across the two camps. As points of reference, the five reform projects will be used to see how the supporters of both the status quo and reform camps are reflectively predisposed.

With respect to the interpretation of the Qur'an, the proponents of the theological project of the reform camp see the text as an object which can help Muslims understand the truth, even if this truth is bound to a certain time and place. The proponents of the status quo do use a distinctive method in understanding religion but their treatment of the text as an object to be analysed is no different from that of the proponents of the theological project. The use of human reasoning in the practice of Qur'anic interpretation can be found within both positions. The divergence lies only in the method each side employs. While the proponents of the status quo see the need for any analysis of the Qur'an to be brought back to the text itself, those of the reform camp urge any analysis to take into account other factors surrounding the process of the writing of the text. For the status quo camp, reason must be bound to the Qur'an. For the reform camp, reason should be bound to extra-textual factors.

With regard to issue of pluralism, it is clear that the proponents of the status quo see this issue in terms of the opposition between Muslims and non-Muslims. The status

⁴⁵ *Sang Pencerah: Cerita tentang K. H. Ahmad Dahlan*, prod. Raam Punjabi and dir. Hanung Bramantyo, 120 mins, MVP Pictures, 2010, digital video disc.

⁴⁶ Muhammad Shofan, interview by author, Jakarta, June 24, 2011; and Masyitoh Chosnan, interview by author, Jakarta, July 7, 2011.

quo is satisfied with the status accorded to non-Muslims in a Muslim-majority society as understood through their interpretation of Islam. There is no repression towards non-Muslims in this society, just a qualitative difference in terms of the roles accorded to the minority. The differentiation of the insiders versus the outsiders is obvious within this position. The pluralism project, however, does not see the need for relativism, either. This project is not aimed at dissolving differences between existing religions; instead, it targets cooperation among *different* religious groups.

On the issue of poverty that is the focus of the socio-economic project, the status quo's stance is that Muhammadiyah "cannot stop on the al-Ma'un theology of the 1900s but needs to build the al-Ma'un theology, with its emphasis on the need for Muslims to care for the poor and the marginalised, in the twenty-first century when the number of the poor in Indonesia has reached more than 32 million souls".⁴⁷ The role of human reasoning to build a formula of social empowerment that is attuned to the change of time is appreciated. The distinction of this position with that of the socio-economic project lies in its insistence that Muhammadiyah should stay consistent with the purity of the Qur'an and the Sunnah in building the new understanding of al-Ma'un verse on charity.

With regard to the cultural project, especially the issue of local culture, naturally the proponents of the status quo are extremely cautious. They are relentless in their differentiation between the pure Islamic and the syncretic rituals. The proponents of the reform, on the contrary, take a more liberal stance. Their more relaxed response, however, should be understood in light of the meaning they attach to it. Amin Abdullah, for example, understands the rituals before the start of the fasting month by the villagers in Java as a symbol of their welcoming the fasting month and a reminder to prepare oneself for the holy month.⁴⁸ Instead of being troubled by the possible un-Islamic nature of the ritual, Abdullah argues for the need to find the meaning of the ritual, which he deems as no doubt Islamic. The use of reason and the critical analysis of local culture as one's object, for the proponents of the reform camp, can help in understanding the Islamic meaning embedded in it.

⁴⁷ M. Syukriyanto, "Istiqamah dalam Bermuhammadiyah," in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah: Istiqomah Membendung Kristenisasi & Liberalisasi*, ed. Fathurrahman Kamal et al. (Yogyakarta: Majelis Tabligh dan Dakwah Khusus PP Muhammadiyah, 2010), 11.

⁴⁸ Amin Abdullah, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011.

Various modernist polarisations – between the past and the present, between meaning and symbol, and between religion and custom⁴⁹ – are still extant even within the cultural project of the reform camp. The supporters of this particular project never abandon these modernist categorisations. Unlike their status quo counterpart, however, they take a friendlier approach toward the differences these categorisations produce. Instead of being critical or even confrontational, they are appreciative of what supporters of the status quo camp consider un-Islamic. Regardless of what nominal Muslims actually think when they perform what they consider to be an Islamic ritual, the supporters of the cultural project insist on going beneath the layers of the rituals to find the true meaning of those rituals. Even within the cultural project, the line between symbol and meaning must be established.

Another aspect of the cultural project is its critical stance towards Sufism. With its modernist outlook, Muhammadiyah has been often seen as an Islamic organisation that rejects a more spiritual practice of Islam, or what is often referred to as Sufism. The organisation's modernist character, argues Howell, often puts its members in opposition to nominal, or *abangan*, Muslims with their more spiritual and less scriptural practices of Islam.⁵⁰ I also found this tendency when I interviewed Muhammadiyah's members during my field research. As an example, with respect to the revival of Sufism in the urban setting, such as Ary Ginanjar's Emotional and Spiritual Quotient (ESQ) program, Dawam Rahardjo, whose opinions tend to fall within the reform camp, mentioned that he is not too fond of the method used in this program. He argues that being conditioned to cry in order to repent might be useful for some Muslims who are yet to acquire the proper religious knowledge.⁵¹ Masyitoh Chosnan, whose opinions generally support the status quo camp, would prefer the method of providing a rational understanding in religious education compared to the emotionally-charged method of the ESQ program.⁵²

⁴⁹ For an explanation about these polarisations and how they specifically relate to modernist critique towards oratorical method of Islamic propagation (*dakwah*) and the practice of grave visits in West Java respectively, see Julian Millie, "Oratorical Innovation and Audience Heterogeneity in Islamic West Java," *Indonesia* 93 (2012): 142; and Julian Millie, "Supplicating, Naming, Offering: *Tawassul in West Java*," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 39, no. 1 (2008): 108.

⁵⁰ Julia Day Howell, "Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 60, no. 3 (2001): 706.

⁵¹ M. Dawam Rahardjo, interview by author, Jakarta, June 28, 2011.

⁵² Masyitoh Chosnan, interview by author, Jakarta, July 7, 2011.

Having said this, Chosnan wrote her doctoral dissertation on Sufism in Muhammadiyah, especially related to the life of the organisation's longest serving leader, Abdurrazaq Fakhruddin. In her dissertation, which she then rewrote into a book, she argues that Muhammadiyah has never opposed Sufism. This organisation, however, is critical of the un-Islamic elements added to Sufism.⁵³ For Chosnan, Sufism should be understood mainly in terms of noble morality (*akhlak mulia*). In Muhammadiyah, this morality-related Sufism (*tasawuf akhlaqi*) has always been emphasised and supported.⁵⁴

This emphasis on the ethical aspect of Sufism and how it requires "careful, reasoned judgement and honest assessment" can also be found in Hamka's elaboration of Sufism, as argued by Howell.⁵⁵ Considered to be one of the leaders of Muhammadiyah and a prolific writer, Hamka was always appreciative of Sufism. Hamka's understanding of Sufistic practices, however, is related heavily to "a subtle examination of personal motivation."⁵⁶ What Howell refers to as Salafist Sufism, with Hamka as one among its supporters, tries to bring back the spiritual element of Islam into what Kuntowijoyo refers to as dry practices of scripturalist Islam. Especially related to Muhammadiyah as the largest modernist Islamic organisation in Indonesia, the supporters of this stream of Sufism within it have a cautious approach towards what can be considered as the proper Sufistic practices. This careful approach, along with the emphasis of Salafist Sufis within Muhammadiyah on the role of reason in morality-based Sufism, informs us of the enduring presence of reflective predisposition among Muhammadiyah's members.

Moving from the issue of Sufism to the gender project, we can still find the symptoms of reflectivity. Generally, the women in Muhammadiyah tend to accept veiling as an obligation for Muslim women that is prescribed in the Qur'an. The form of the veil, however, is not prescribed in the text. Women, therefore, are allowed to be fashionable in their wearing of the veil. In the words of Abidah Muflihati, the chairwoman of Naswiatul Aisyiyah, the female youth wing of Muhammadiyah,

⁵³ Masyitoh Chosnan, *Permata Tasawuf Muhammadiyah: Meneladani Spiritual Leadership AR. Fakhruddin* (Ciputat: UMJ Press, 2009), 19, 53.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 10, 19.

⁵⁵ Julia Day Howell, "Indonesia's Salafist Sufis," *Modern Asian Studies* 44, no. 5 (2010): 1039.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

with regard to the fashion, it is related to culture. Therefore, it is not a problem whether a female Muslim wants to wear a long veil, the veil that covers the whole body, the veil only for the upper part of her body, the veil along with a pair of pants, as long as the injunction that her *aurat* be covered is fulfilled. I think that this is the dress code for every female Muslim.⁵⁷

This view on veiling is also shared by Djohantini, who is critical of the association of Islamic dress with that which belongs to Middle Eastern cultures.⁵⁸ Siti Aisyah adds that as long as the clothes are not too tight, they are acceptable to the standard of Islam.⁵⁹ Dzuhayatin has a slightly different view on this issue. She asserts that nobody can force a woman to veil her head. For Dzuhayatin, veiling is a matter of choice for each of the women involved. She herself admits that sometime she wears a very loose veil in public. For her, veiling has become a habit and she would feel uncomfortable in going outside her house without veiling. Nevertheless, she recognises that this is her habit and not necessarily that of other women.⁶⁰ Regardless of this difference among them, however, Muhammadiyah's women of the reform projects have a relaxed stance towards the forms of veil appropriate for female Muslims. As proponents of the cultural project highlight the search for a deeper and Islamic meaning of local culture, these women of the gender project emphasise the inner meaning of the practice of veiling more than the outer form and styles of veils.

This emphasis on the meaning and the purpose of Islamic rituals and dress code is also shared by Masyitoh Chosnan, the current rector of Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta and the first female rector in the history of Muhammadiyah universities. Despite her status-quo perspective which I elaborated in the previous chapter, she emphasises rational understanding rather than emotionally-charged rituals whenever she is asked to deliver religious sermons.⁶¹ Abidah Muflihati, whose opinion I categorise as pro-reform, understood that rituals do not necessarily translate into good morality. What is required to obtain good morality, she asserts, is a religious understanding on top of the practices of

⁵⁷ Abidah Muflihati, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 26, 2011.

⁵⁸ Siti Noordjannah Djohantini, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 28, 2011.

⁵⁹ Siti Aisyah, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 30, 2011.

⁶⁰ Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011.

⁶¹ Masyitoh Chosnan, interview by author, Jakarta, July 7, 2011.

Islamic rituals: “Good morality comes first. If a Muslim has good morality..., rituals will have effect. Without good morality, rituals will not have any influence”.⁶²

The attitudes of Muhammadiyah’s members on Islamic rituals are good example of how reflectively predisposed they are in their worldview. To put it differently, we can say that the basic predisposition of Muhammadiyah’s members is based on reflectivity. The mental predisposition that emphasises the capacity of human beings as subjects who are constantly aware of their environment is the foundation of Muhammadiyah’s *habitus*. In summary, I see reflectivity as the marker of the *habitus* of Muhammadiyah’s members. The way they view their position amidst their field, their reflexivity, takes the form of reflective predispositions.

4.3 Reflexivity in Muhammadiyah


In this section, I portray the relations between *habitus* and reflexivity in a form of an Euler diagram containing reflexivity as a subset of *habitus*. Reflexivity, understood as the overview that a social agent has of his position with regard to the game he is in, is a part of *habitus*. Figure 4.1 shows this relation between reflexivity and *habitus* and how Muhammadiyah’s members stand in relation to progressive reading of the texts (as represented by the horizontal axis) and political activity (represented by the vertical axis).

As shown in this figure, Muhammadiyah’s members vary in their level of progressive interpretation of the texts and political activity despite sharing the same *habitus*. For example, some members of Muhammadiyah consider the further empowerment of women as an urgent task of Muhammadiyah, while others see the issue of women’s empowerment is already settled and that the more urgent issue for Muhammadiyah to address is the youth’s increasing access to pornography. With respect to the level of political activity, some members of Muhammadiyah see the need for Muhammadiyah’s members in their personal capacity to join political parties in order to forward the organisation’s ideals while others see the efficacy of Muhammadiyah’s work as stemming its organisation’s neutrality in the face of political parties. From my

⁶² Abidah Muflihati, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 26, 2011.

elaboration of Chapter Three, the proponents of the status quo sit closer to the puritanism extreme compared to their counterparts, the supporters of reform projects.

Figure 4.1 *Habitus and Reflexivity*



In addition to this relation between the *habitus* and reflexivity of Muhammadiyah's members, the same figure also displays the relation between the field of Muhammadiyah's members and the fields of other Muslims with respect to the same two categories of levels of progressivism and political activity. From my descriptions of various reform and status quo projects within Muhammadiyah in the previous chapter and of the reflective predisposition of its members earlier in this chapter, I would put Muhammadiyah's members roughly in between of these two categories. Muslims other than Muhammadiyah's members have their own *habitus*, as well as their way of assessing their positions in social world (reflexivity). There are Muslims who are more progressive than Muhammadiyah's members, as there are Muslims who are more puritan. Similarly, in terms of political activity, some other Muslims are more politically active and others are less so.

On the level of progressive interpretation of texts, the supporters of the status quo within Muhammadiyah stand closer to the more puritan extreme and thus have an overlapping field with more puritan Muslims, such as those in Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (The Council for Indonesia's Islamic Propagation). The supporters of the reform camp, on the contrary, are closer to the more progressive side and share the field with more progressive Muslims, such as Jaringan Islam Liberal (Network of Liberal Islam) championed by figures such as Ulil Abshar Abdalla. In terms of the interpretation of the Qur'an, for example, the proponents of the reform camp support a more progressive reading of the holy text while their counterparts insist on the maintaining of a puritanical reading of the text.

4.3.1 Crisis and Intensified Reflexivity

In the face of criticism from the proponents of reform, however, the supporters of the status quo cannot ignore the presence of other fields outside their own, especially of those Muslims of more progressive leanings. They need to include the expansion of the field in which Muhammadiyah lives when they explain their position. The refusal to engage in the debates with the critics would result in a perception of anathema of the status quo's stance to the dynamics of the world. The status quo's involvement in the debate is the camp's response to what Bourdieu refers to as a crisis – a situation which requires an intensification of their reflexivity.

The remaining chapters of this dissertation will deal with the expansion of the perceived field that that may instigate a sense of crisis within Muhammadiyah. As proceeding chapters will show, while the proponents of reform urge this organisation to embrace the crisis and therefore accept the need for reform, the supporters of the status quo aim at avoiding the crisis.

For the remainder of this chapter I will formulate the positions of both the status quo and the reform projects within the framework of *habitus* and reflexivity. As I conclude in the previous chapter, the proponents of the status quo justify their reading of Islam not only in terms of their traditional interpretation of Islam but also with regard to various issues brought forward by the supporters of reform. The supporters of the status

quo are forced to speak in terms of issues such as the reinterpretation of the Qur'an, pluralism, marginalisation, culture, and gender: the sort of issues that were not part of the status quo's vocabulary two decades ago. Moreover, the supporters of the status quo have been compelled to justify their position in these terms. The result of this process of subjection becomes an apologia for the status quo. They do not concur with the precepts of the reform projects, but in no way is their apologia insignificant.

Eventually, the proponents of the status quo have to talk, for example, about the status and role of women in Islam. The commonly accepted assumptions they have about this issue are made explicit through their apologia. This articulation is not limited only to the issue of status and role of women but it illustrates a more general perspective on change. For each issue brought forward by the reform projects, they are measuring their position in terms of the standard set by these projects. With respect to the issue of women's right to legal ownership of property, for example, Isnawati Rais asserts that Europe was a late comer since Islam has acknowledged this right ever since its inception in the seventh century, compared to Europe's acknowledgement of the same rights only a century ago.⁶³ With regard to the idea of tolerance, the supporters of the status quo regard it as an intrinsic characteristic of Islam.⁶⁴ In the status quo's apologia, we can see that there is a measuring of one's self against the standard that belongs to the "Other".

At first glance, the position of the reform projects in Muhammadiyah seems to be the opposite of the status quo. As the previous chapter has shown, however, the proponents of reform projects in Muhammadiyah are aware of the particularity of Islam and also that of other cultures; their idea of subjecting Islam to more than one perspective cannot be seen as a disregard for Islam's distinctiveness. Their projects are the extension of the field but with recognition of their own *habitus*. Moreover, the proponents of reform still rely on the common vocabulary in Islam and especially Muhammadiyah. For example, Moeslim Abdurrahman's redefinition of evil (*kekufuran*) as the attitude of remaining idle towards poverty and his redefinition of idolatry as one's submission to an

⁶³ Isnawati Rais, "Perempuan dalam Fiqh Munahakat: Perspektif Muhammadiyah," in *Wacana Fiqh Perempuan*, ed. Wawan Gunawan and Evie Shofia Inayati (Yogyakarta: Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam PP Muhammadiyah, 2005), 142.

⁶⁴ Musthafa Kamal Pasha and Ahmad Adaby Darban, *Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka SM, 2009), 199.

unjust social structure⁶⁵ mirror the common categorisation in Muhammadiyah between good and evil. By making this claim, Abdurrahman keeps his attachment to the familiar environment of Muhammadiyah while forwarding his agenda of making poverty an issue of religious significance.

It has to be admitted that the proponents of reform projects sometime criticise the traditional reflectivity within Muhammadiyah showcased in the narrative of the enlightenment in Muhammadiyah's history, as I have elaborated in the second chapter. Baidhawiy, for example, disapproves of rationalism understood as the certainty that "men can understand anything clearly and vividly, and take it as real and build knowledge upon that understanding".⁶⁶ The response from the supporters of the reform projects, nevertheless, is not an abandonment of rationality. As Amin Abdullah's triangle of rationality shows, the reinterpretation project of Islam still sees the need for Muslims to use their rationality. However, the use of this capacity should aim to cover a wider frame. Other methods should complement the use of Muslims' rationality, including the development of new social values. In other words, reform projects do not aim at the dissolution of rationality. Instead, they strive for a bounded rationality.

In this understanding, the reform project of Muhammadiyah can be discerned as an intensified reflexivity in the face of a crisis. This intensification of reflexivity entails the articulation of reflectivity as a predisposition in Muhammadiyah, namely the making explicit of one's *habitus*. Upon this articulation, however, the proponents of the reform projects' proposed reflexivity continues to assume the rationality of social agents. This new reflexivity is not a rupture with the old; they do not even see it as a new reflexivity. The proponents of the reform projects claim to hold to the legacy of Ahmad Dahlan in forwarding their arguments. Shofan, for example, sees Dahlan as a religious teacher who practiced hermeneutical methods in his understanding of Islam during his time, albeit this method had not yet been intellectually identified in Dahlan's time. Shofan argues that the

⁶⁵ Moeslim Abdurrahman, "Politik Umat, Politik Pemberdayaan," in *Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah: Refleksi Satu Abad Perjalanan Muhammadiyah*, ed. Ajang Budiman and Pradana Boy (Jakarta: Grafindo, 2010), 68, 75.

⁶⁶ Zakiyuddin Baidhawiy, "Puritanisme dan Etos Keilmuan: Anomali Sebuah Gerakan Tajdid," in *Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah*, 161.

reform camp within Muhammadiyah *only* continues this practice.⁶⁷ The proponents of the status quo, he asserts, have caused stagnation within the organisation because they have lost the “*élan vital*” of Dahlan’s teaching, one based on the need for perpetual adjustment to the changing world.⁶⁸ For Shofan, reflexivity within Muhammadiyah is always in tune with change and progress.

The propagation of this seemingly new reflexivity by the proponents of the reform camp is actually an act of resurrecting the old reflexivity that had been lost during the course of the organisation’s history. This newly exhumed reflexivity is based not only on the articulation of reflectivity, along with the idea of rational social agents assumed by reflectivity, but also on the need to bind it further and to hold it accountable to a higher standard and make it relevant to new situations. The reform project’s proposed reflexivity does not jettison the old reflectivity. On the contrary, it *extends* it further.

4.4 Concluding Comments

Based on my elaboration of the *habitus* of Muhammadiyah’s members discussed above, we have seen that reflexivity is the everyday practice of social agents and that a crisis has intensified this reflexivity. Within this intensification, social agents articulate their previously unstated predispositions and question their compatibility with the changing field as the result of the crisis. This intensified reflexivity should be understood as an extension, and *not* a rupture, of the previous one.⁶⁹

Reflexivity is always tied to *habitus*. In Muhammadiyah, the predisposition of its members is that of reflectivity, which is based on the notion of human consciousness and the ability of that consciousness to help them reach the truth in life. This reflectivity is narrated through the story of enlightenment and the exemplary Man. The telling of this story socialises Muhammadiyah’s members to a shared predisposition of reflectivity, just

⁶⁷ Muhammad Shofan, “Satu Abad Muhammadiyah: “Matinya Pembaruan” dalam Bingkai “Kembali ke al-Qur’an dan al-Sunnah”,” in *Satu Abad Muhammadiyah: Mengkaji Ulang Arah Pembaruan*, ed. Taufik Hidayat and Iqbal Hasanuddin (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2010), xxvii.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, xii.

⁶⁹ This argument is contrary to other analyses of the notion of *habitus*, such as Adkins who suggests that reflexivity entails the questioning of the familiar. (“Reflexivity,” 25.)

as proverbs and sayings in the Kabyle Berber society in North Africa help share a predisposition towards temporal distribution of activities.⁷⁰

Using the example of the *habitus* and reflexivity among Muhammadiyah's members, I have shown that Bourdieu do not ignore the issue of reflexivity in his elaboration of the *habitus* of those social agents who do not belong to the academic field. Bourdieu was always aware of the inherence of reflexivity in *habitus* but he refused to refer the meaning of reflexivity to a form of rationality. Freedom, for Bourdieu, is always regulated.

The remaining chapters of this dissertation will elaborate further the issue of reflexivity with regard to the change, or extension, of the field that Muhammadiyah's members find themselves in. These changes are related to the presence of the "Other" in Muhammadiyah, changes that might attract different responses in the form of support for, or rejection of, reform within it. Their attitudes towards the presence of the "Other", nonetheless, following Wacquant's elaboration of Bourdieu's sociology, cannot be simply categorised within the dichotomous framework of resistance and submission.⁷¹ With regard to the dichotomy of domination-resistance, we have McNay, on the one hand, who argues that Bourdieu's concept of bounded freedom provides a way to understand how the practice of emulating the dominant structure (the practice of "mimicry" and "hybridity") can contain the potential for resistance.⁷² On the other hand, we also have Adkins who asserts that the potential for ambivalence in the practice of mimicry and hybridity is unfounded in Bourdieu's works.⁷³ Regardless of their different readings of Bourdieu, both works nevertheless offer an outline for direction that can benefit scholarship on *habitus* and reflexivity.

Summarising the debate on the direction of Bourdieusian perspective above, what we need to forward the study of *habitus* and reflexivity is the coupling of Bourdieusian perspective with a post-colonial one. The following chapters will take this direction. Chapter Five will discuss the case for mimicry and hybridity in the Indonesian context

⁷⁰ Pierre Bourdieu, *Logic*, 200.

⁷¹ Loic J. D. Wacquant, "Towards a Social Praxeology," 24.

⁷² McNay, "Gender," 104-5.

⁷³ Adkins, "Reflexivity," 37.

within the story of the Buru Quartet by Pramoedya Ananta Toer. This discussion of Pramoedya's works will then become the basis for an examination of the extension of the field as experienced by Muhammadiyah's members. The combination of Pramoedya's post-colonial perspective and Bourdieu's sociology will then provide a better understanding of the issue of domination and resistance in Muhammadiyah.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE APPROPRIATION OF THE WEST: PRAMOEDYA ANANTA TOER'S BURU TETRALOGY AND ANTI-COLONIAL RESISTANCE

I concluded the previous chapter with a suggestion that the Bourdieusian perspective could be enriched with a post-colonial perspective. The coupling of this perspective with a post-colonial perspective might offer a more comprehensive viewpoint for the understanding of two ideas. The first is on the emergence of the sense of crisis by relating it to the presence of another ideology, another way of life, another perspective – or what I generally refer to in this dissertation as the “Other”. For both the protagonist of Pramoedya’s tetralogy and Muhammadiyah’s members, what they consider to be Western culture has always been a source of both admiration and fear, something which they both desire and avoid. For them, the West is the strong “Other” that requires their attention due to its influence on their old, familiar, environment. This chapter will dwell on the perception of the West that belongs to the main character in the tetralogy. It will also elaborate how this perception creates, contributes, and presents a solution to the crisis of the field that he faces when old Javanese tradition into which he was born meets modern Dutch culture. In the following two chapters, I will turn to the present-day Muhammadiyah and describe how its members relate the presence of the West to their perceived crisis.

The second idea is on how the emulation of the “Other” cannot be simply categorised as a submission to the “Other”. How the tetralogy’s main character uses what he considers to be a modern European perspective for an anti-colonial cause is an example of how the imitation of the “Other” can be used to both criticise and resist it. My analysis of the story in the tetralogy will become the basic framework to analyse the present-day Muhammadiyah with regard to its members’ stance on the usage of Western influence and their judgement about whether this usage is appropriate to forward the

organisation's goals. These two ideas based on the coupling of the Bourdieusian perspective with a post-colonial one will benefit the first perspective through the elaboration of a crisis situation in relation to the presence of the "Other". On the other hand, the post-colonial perspective might be enriched through the linkage between the identification of self, as opposed to the "Other", in terms of the emergence of a crisis within which the "Other" seems to encroach upon one's familiar field.

This chapter might be seen as a theoretical digression in the course of my dissertation, although a useful one due to its theoretical significance. It will serve as a background in answering the second question of my research, namely why Muhammadiyah's members can have two opposing views with regard to change within the organisation. The answer to this question will be provided in the next two chapters of this dissertation. However, the elaboration of a post-colonial perspective discussed in this chapter will provide the theoretical basis for these two chapters.

Pramoedya did not mention Muhammadiyah in any of his works. In the third book of the Tetralogy, *Jejak Langkah*, he did mention Syarikat Islam as the first indigenous organisation in the Dutch Indies pioneered by the main protagonist of the story but not Muhammadiyah. I choose the Tetralogy as a theoretical foreground in assessing how Muhammadiyah engages with the "Other" not because of Pramoedya's view on Muhammadiyah but for the similarity of its story line with what is occurring in Muhammadiyah. As a further theoretical elaboration of Muhammadiyah's *habitus*, this chapter should be seen as a facilitating mechanism. In this chapter I will fashion the story of Minke, the main protagonist in the Buru Quartet, into an example of how the presence of the colonial Dutch as a strong "Other" creates doubts about the relevance of the culture of his forefathers; a sense of crisis facilitated through the presence of a strong "Other". Also in this chapter I will show how Minke emulates the Dutch way of life in order to fight the repressive aspect of Dutch colonial rule. In doing so, I will provide a theoretical basis for my analysis of the perception of crisis among Muhammadiyah's members in the proceeding chapters.

I use the term “East” and “West” in this chapter to represent the colonised and the colonial elements in the story of Buru Quartet. The first term is used to refer to non-Western societies that are generally colonised by Western countries.

5.1 On the Fascination with Dutch Shoes

Let me start my elaboration of Pramoedya’s work by quoting the dramatic scene when the protagonist of his Buru Tetralogy, like a prodigal son, is brought by force by a police officer to pay homage to his father, who has recently been promoted to be a regent (*bupati*), a Javanese aristocrat appointed to govern a district:

The officer starts to treat me improperly, gesturing that I take off my shoes and socks. A start of a great torture....

“Yes, walk on your knees, Your Highness”, he says as if he were pulling a buffalo out of a mud pool....

And I start to walk the almost ten-meter distance while swearing in more than three languages.

...

From where I am prostrating, I can see a pair of slippers moving slowly. Inside those slippers is a pair of clean feet. The feet of a male. Over those feet, a batik fabric folded in wide strips. (*BM*, 180-81)¹

This is the story of a conflict between Javanese slippers (*selop*) and Dutch shoes. Raden Mas Minke, our protagonist, is the son of a Javanese noble. Considered as the smartest among his siblings, he is sent to a Dutch school established mainly for the children of European descent in Surabaya. Being in love with the West and its achievements, he admires both Queen Wilhelmina and the Dutch shoes, and learns to loathe the feudal Javanese tradition.

And yet, faced with his father’s slippers, he is enervated. His European education suddenly becomes useless as this father figure sitting on a rocking chair in front of him touches his uncovered head with a whip made for horse-riding. He despises this

¹ I use the first edition of Buru Tetralogy published by Lentera Dipantara. I am aware of the translation of Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s works by Max Lane but in this chapter I choose to refer to the original Indonesian version translated into English by myself. For the purpose of referencing, I use the abbreviations *BM* for *Bumi Manusia* (This Earth of Mankind), *ASB* for *Anak Semua Bangsa* (Child of All Nations), *JL* for *Jejak Langkah* (Footsteps), and *RK* for *Rumah Kaca* (House of Glass). *Bumi Manusia* was published in 2005 while the remaining three were published in 2006.

repressive Javanese tradition but does not have the power to fight back. The only possible way to retaliate is to become more Western than he already is, at least after he leaves his father's place.

However, as he comes to enrol at STOVIA, the Dutch Indies medical college in Batavia, he experiences a shock when he is told that he has to abandon his European clothing for a traditional head cover, a Javanese shirt, and a batik fabric to cover the lower part of his body. And he is allowed no shoes. Each student is obliged to wear his traditional clothing (there are no women in the college). Differences must be established in a colonial environment one way or another. It makes him realise his status in the colonial world.

Good bye, European attire! First I take off my shoes, trousers, socks. To replace my hat, I am using a *destar* [head cover made of fabric folded into a triangular shape] now, which I have not worn for a few years. These noble feet, usually covered in socks and shoes, are now naked like chicken feet. And the floor feels cold; it sucks out my warm blood. (*JL*, 14)

The impertinent colonial reality forces Minke to what Fanon called “lactification”,² a desire to become White and possess whiteness. His brown skin has failed him in becoming a true White, but he can at least dress as a White man. He can go even further in trying to possess whiteness. If not a pure White, one half is sufficient. Annelis Mellema, a Eurasian girl, is what he needs to add an extra tinge of whiteness to his self. Yet in the first book of the tetralogy, even this goddess-like wife is taken away by court order, leaving him with nothing but his shoes to flaunt.

In the next quote from the tetralogy, one can see how shoes and other attire were being turned into a symbol of hybridity when worn by the indigenous people. The shoes are, for the indigenous population, both masks and swords. They function not only as a tool to deny their brownness, but also as a “strategic reversal of the process of domination”.³ As masks, shoes give the impression of being modern for the users. As swords, they are annoyance to both the indigenous and colonial elites.

There is an indigenous master who was jealous of the behaviour of an indigenous man, whom he considered as imitating European people in the way he dresses and acts. Abdoel Moeis, who was too naïve to realise that people could carry any malignant intent in their hearts. ...

² Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 29.

³ Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 159.

As he could no longer hold his anger, the indigenous master ordered his men to teach the impertinent Moeis a lesson.

And with that the bashing started. The conclusion of the story: With clothes torn, his bicycle wrecked, lying down on the side of the street with shoes gone, the man crawled to a police station in the early evening. The police did not do anything about it. The man then left the station crawling, and was later taken to a hospital by bypassers. (*JL*, 532-33)

A hybrid not by race but by clothing preference, Abdoel Moeis and his shoes have raised a colonial sentiment, a sentiment not necessarily based on a white/brown duality but definitely on a slave/master distinction. His behaviour represents chaos in the delineation within colonial society: because while the Europeans were forever higher than the indigenous population, there were still indigenous masters for the rest of the indigenous people: a pecking order with common indigenous people always on the bottom rung. The contention about the practice of hybridity occurred not between different colours, but between the oppressed and their oppressor.

For Abdoel Moeis's story tells another tale of the shoes; this piece of clothing no longer stands only as an objection towards the repressive, feudal, Javanese tradition. It is now symbolically a locus of the fight against both Brown and White repressions. The shoes beneath the feet of the indigenous people have created ambivalence for oppressors of all colours.

With that news Dutch Indies indigenous people started to realise: shoes are no noble things, no longer a sign of a god or a priest as in the stories of *wayang*, not a sacred thing to be worshipped. They are no more than foot protectors [protecting them] from worms and shattered glasses, crooked thorns, sharp pebbles, dog excrement. Everybody can and may buy shoes without any Dutch Indies law able to forbid it, as long as one has the money. Shoes are not signs of Europeaness or of Christianity. They are not a sign of how close one is to the Dutch authority, so the masters do not need to be jealous of the common people with their shoes, or issue an order to bash [those common people who wear shoes].

A miniscule event! Really small! And it transformed everything. Look, as if being encouraged, even when the court case on Abdoel Moeis's bashing has not been settled, shoe stores are already being flooded by buyers and young people start to stroll bravely around the street wearing their new shoes... (*JL*, 537)

The "Dutch shoes" then become everybody's shoes. For the indigenous rulers, this means the undermining of the traditional authority of the gods and the priests. For the colonial rulers, the popular usage of shoes by the indigenous people is not only for the sake of

imitating the West but also for their comfort and functions; both are utilitarian.

Demystification brings forth significant questioning of feudal authority and makes Western culture affordable for the indigenous people.

However, this fascination with the Dutch shoes must be brought to a halt. After his government-imposed exile in the Moluccas, when he is about to leave his ship which just landed in Surabaya,

Raden Mas Minke sits with his batik dress while smoking slowly. His head cover looks old, as well as his white Javanese shirt and batik dress. His right foot leans on his left one. And he is wearing a new pair of *selop*. His moustache is still thick, dark, and combed upwards. He looks much older than when he left [for exile]. (RK, 529) (Emphasis added)

This chapter analyses the significance of the transformation of Dutch shoes into plain shoes, and their relation to the Javanese *selop*. It aims at analysing the act of appropriation of the West by the East when the East decides to steal the West and make it its own; when bare feet don those shoes.

The next section tries to put the purpose of this chapter into the wider context of postcolonial studies. It is aimed not at surveying the literature on postcolonial studies, but at describing one form of everyday resistance in a colonial environment. The third part dwells further on how the appropriation takes place by taking the example of the Buru Tetralogy. This act of appropriation creates hybridity and thus poses a threat to the elite establishment. This will be described in the fourth part. The last part summarises the discussion in previous parts.

Some important notes before I continue with my reading of the tetralogy: First, my purpose in writing this chapter is to create a framework for the next chapters in my dissertation with regard to the emergence of a crisis within Muhammadiyah that prompted a response from the organisation's members, as we have seen in the previous two chapters.

Second, I will create this framework by treating the four novels as a purely fictional work, even though they resemble the life of Raden Mas Tirta Adhi Soerjo, the pioneer of journalism in the Dutch Indies. As a consequence, I am not concerned about

the historical accuracy of the events in the novels, as was done by Shiraishi with regard to Toer's biography of Soerjo in *Sang Pemula*.⁴

Third, I will treat the tetralogy as a world in itself. The focus on the story of the tetralogy means that I will not treat the tetralogy as a text that should be reflected back to the real world as perceived by Pramoedya. The anti-colonial resistance that I will elaborate in the remainder of this chapter is what Minke and the other characters *do* in the story and not what Pramoedya intended to do by writing it. In this regard, this chapter is different to works, such as Tong's and Bahari's, which emphasise the literary dimension of the resistance inherent in the tetralogy.⁵ This chapter is, furthermore, not concerned with the assertions made by both Maier and Day, in contrast to Tong and Bahari, that the tetralogy has become a part of mainstream Indonesian literature by putting forward the message of universal humanism and the victory of dull political necessity over the language of creative intimacy.⁶

Finally, my chapter should be regarded as an effort to "clear (another) space for a new critical reading" of a "well known work".⁷ Its contemporary value lies not in finding an aspect that has been overlooked by previous works, but in further indulging in Pramoedya's ambivalence when he talked about Western civilisations. In "My Apologies, in the Name of Experience", for example, he showed both admiration and contempt for the West.⁸ Seen in this light, it is natural that, on the one hand, writers such as Tong and Bahari perceive the mood of resistance against the dominant order in the tetralogy. On the other hand, reading the same work, Maier and Day come up with a totally different

⁴ Takashi Shiraishi, "Reading Pramoedya Ananta Toer's "Sang Pemula" (The Pioneer)," *Indonesia* 44 (1987): 129-40.

⁵ See Sebastian Tong, "Unexpected Convergences: Bakhtin's Novelistic Discourse and Pramoedya Ananta Toer's 'Epic' Novels," *World Literature Today* 73, no. 3 (1999): 481-84; Razif Bahari, "Remembering History, W/Righting History: Piecing the Past in Pramoedya Ananta Toer's Buru Tetralogy," *Indonesia* 75 (2003): 61-90; Razif Bahari, "Reading Pramoedya Ananta Toer's Buru Tetralogy: The Genre of the Novel, Language and the Colonial Subject," *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 40, no. 1 (2006): 57-83; and Razif Bahari, *Pramoedya Postcolonially: (Re-)Viewing History, Gender and Identity in the Buru Tetralogy* (Denpasar: Pustaka Larasan, 2007).

⁶ See Henk Maier, "Stammer and the Creaking Door: the Malay Writings of Pramoedya Ananta Toer," in *Clearing a Space: Postcolonial Readings of Modern Indonesian Literature*, ed. Keith Foulcher and Tony Day (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), 81; and Tony Day, "Between Eating and Shitting: Figures of Intimacy, Storytelling and Isolation in Some Early Tales by Pramoedya Ananta Toer," in *Clearing a Space*, 234.

⁷ Tony Day and Keith Foulcher, "Postcolonial Readings of Modern Indonesian Literature: Introductory Remarks," in *Clearing a Space*, 2.

⁸ Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "My Apologies, in the Name of Experience," *Indonesia* 61 (1996): 3-5, 11.

conclusion: that this work is Pramoedya's yielding to the overwhelming state project of Indonesian nation-building. This ambivalence in the work of Pramoedya between admiration and contempt for the West, between emulation as a form of adulation and of resistance, is what this chapter is concerned with. In other words, it is aimed at elaborating the presence in Dutch shoes of both resistance and submission.

5.2 Anti-colonial Resistance when Theft is the Only Alternative

If I am to create a context of postcolonial studies for this chapter, starting from the work of Jack Goody may not seem to be an auspicious step to take. This is because of his criticism of how postcolonialism and postmodernism "frequently fall into" a trap of "a hidden ethnocentric risk".⁹ According to Goody's work, it is a tendency for all human societies, not only the West, to display ethnocentric attitudes in order to define their culture. The pride of a society lies in creating an image of achievements uniquely its own. Consequently, the fact that these achievements may happen after the importation of foreign factors must be concealed.

Goody refers to this concealment as an act of theft; in the case of the West, the theft occurs in two ways: the underplaying of the history of the rest of the world, and the imposition of its own historical concepts and periodisation over the rest of the world. The West's exclusive claim of its institutions, towns, universities, humanism, democracy, individualism, and even love is debunked in Goody's *The Theft of History*. What the West takes as its unique achievements is in fact learned through contacts with the non-West.

It is the idea of the theft that makes Goody's work fit into the general context of postcolonial studies. Colonialism steals; the impoverishment of the East comes after the plundering of its land and natural resources. Furthermore, through the working of what Said described as "Orientalist social sciences", post-Independence non-Western societies are attuned towards progress defined by the West as modernity.¹⁰

⁹ Jack Goody, *The Theft of History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5.

¹⁰ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 107.

This Foucauldian hegemony that Orientalism exercises does not allow an independent East's depiction of the West, free of the West/Other dualism. The East, considered as ignorant and thus incapable of grasping the way the material world works, hates the West for its licentious, dull, mechanistic, and atheistic attitudes. The West's cities, merchants, minds, and emotions have become the targets of the East's jealousy.¹¹ Even when the East looks at the West, it does this in its irrational, myth-bound way. This is the first meaning of Occidentalism: the progressive West in the eyes of the envious East.

The second meaning is concerned with the implicit assumption the West has of itself when it is practising Orientalism.¹² The Occident in this second definition becomes what the Orient does not have. In other words, the West tries to define its rational, progressive self through the denial of these same traits to the East. To figure out what the West stands for is to find what is absent in the East, namely rationality. The West becomes what the East is not. While our first understanding of Occidentalism supposedly comes from the East, the second definition originates from the assumptions the West has of itself that is perpetuated through the negation of the same traits for the East. This second definition of Occidentalism is thus intertwined with the practice of Orientalism.

The theft does not stop here. Through its rationalism, the West likes to consider itself to have achieved the highest possible form of social and political system. The faculty of human minds is now consciously directed to values and ideologies. Antiquity, claimed by the West as uniquely its own, left a repository of polis, democracy, freedom and the rule of law¹³ that was exhumed during the Enlightenment. "When conceptualized as a project", argues Venn, "the Enlightenment invariably calls up, and merges into, the concept of modernity as a project".¹⁴ Since modernity as a project is considered to be a

¹¹ Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies* (London: Penguin Books, 2004).

¹² See Boaventura De Sousa Santos, "A Non-Occidental West?: Learned Ignorance and Ecology of Knowledge," *Theory Culture Society* 26 (2009): 105; James G. Carrier, "Occidentalism: The World Turned Upside-down," *American Ethnologist* 19, no. 2 (1992): 197; and James G. Carrier, "Introduction," in *Occidentalism: Images of the West*, ed. James G. Carrier (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 23.

¹³ Goody, *The Theft of History*, 26.

¹⁴ Couze Venn, "The Enlightenment," *Theory Culture Society* 23 (2006): 478.

universal one, by now a definition of good society with all its ideals¹⁵ has also been stolen by the West. The pain does not lie only in the act of theft itself, but also in the monopoly of the use of the stolen goods.

And so the East is left only with two options: renting the stolen goods or finding a substitute for them. They both come with risks. On the one hand, you can rent the stolen goods but they will never be yours. As Fanon argued, no matter how hard one tries to emulate the Western way of life, the non-White will always be identified as a person with colour and it is the colour that defines who you are more than the amount of the West you have assimilated into your self.¹⁶ For the people of the East, the West always sees them as people of colour. One will always be a never-complete self; almost complete, but not quite.¹⁷

On the other hand, by trying to find the substitute for the stolen goods, the non-West refuses any contact with it. So instead of becoming an “exceptional nigger”, he opts to become a “filthy nigger”,¹⁸ and thus confirming the duality of East/West once more.¹⁹ Lapses towards irrationality and fundamentalism²⁰ in the envious reaction of non-Western people towards the West are considered normal and logical consequences of dissatisfaction with the West, the sorts of lapses the West “cannot fully comprehend”.²¹ These reactions are considered normal by the West since they come from the myth-bound East. With its rational self, the West never completely understands these irrational behaviours. The only explanation the West can think of for these behaviours is that they are inherent in the Eastern self: the East is irrational because it is non-Western.

Using a different categorisation but with the same conclusion, Coronil lists three possible modalities of Occidental representation. The first of the three is the dissolution

¹⁵ Akeel Bilgrami, “Occidentalism, the Very Idea: An Essay on Enlightenment and Enchantment,” *Critical Enquiry* 32 (2006): 411.

¹⁶ Fanon, *Black Skin*, 97.

¹⁷ Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, 122.

¹⁸ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 158.

¹⁹ On the post-colonial literature that encourages this Euro-centric dualism, see Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-colonial Literatures* (London: Routledge, 1989), 21.

²⁰ Couze Venn, “World Dis/Order: On Some Fundamental Questions,” *Theory Culture Society* 19 (2002): 129.

²¹ Mervyn F. Bendle, “Trajectories of Anti-globalism,” *Journal of Sociology* 38 (2002): 220.

of the “Other” by the Self where the opposition between the East and the West is resolved “by absorbing non-Western peoples into an expanding and victorious West”.²² The East, after the process of absorption, is reduced to a mirror image of the West. I refer this process as assimilation. The second modality is where the “Other” is incorporated into the Self. In this modality, the East is allowed to keep itself as an entity but it is only allowed to operate within a system created and introduced by the West, such as the global liberal economy. In this system the exotic “Other” is kept alive, yet domesticated, contributing its exotic goods and services to the service of a global economy.

The last modality, where the Self allows itself to be disturbed by the presence of the “Other”, seems to be a benign one since the East and its characteristics is praised as something that the West lacks. In this modality, rationality is highly valued but myth-bound and spiritual life is also needed to balance the rational, Western, self. I see the second and third modality as part of “nativism”. But both assimilation and nativism are problematic, as also argued by Courville.²³ Assimilation and nativism’s refusal of the liquidation of the East/West distinction encourages the practice of taking for granted the distinction between the two categories. Rejecting “a Self-centered standpoint from which difference is turned into Otherness either through Self-confirming objectification or Self-questioning exoticization”, Coronil argues that

just as Orientalist accounts are partial not because of their inherent incompleteness, representations of the non-Western culture have colonising effects not because they depict diversity. What makes a difference is not the inscription of difference but the kind of difference it makes.²⁴

The “black and white” difference, where the Self is totally opposite to the “Other”, and where there is no possibility of overlapping characteristics in-between, is what Coronil is concerned about in his discussion on Western representations of non-Western culture. To make the situation more alarming, while the difference might have been created by the West, it is not the only one that sustains it. In their modernisation efforts, for example, both Japan and Turkey have maintained this differentiation by

²² Fernando Coronil, “Beyond Occidentalism: Toward Nonimperial Geohistorical Categories,” *Cultural Anthropology* 11, no. 1 (1996): 58.

²³ Mathieu E. Courville, “Genealogies of Postcolonialism: A Slight Return from Said and Foucault back to Fanon and Sartre,” *Studies in Religion* 36 (2007): 228.

²⁴ Coronil, “Beyond Occidentalism,” 73.

claiming themselves as not being part of Asia, and instead heading towards the West and acting as role models for other Asian countries.²⁵

Considering the negative effects of this dualism in the essentialisation of identities, it is important to look for an alternative mode of engagement. This bipolar situation containing only two nodes of engagement with the West (either assimilation or rejection) must give way to a tripolar situation where on top of the two previous nodes is a third one representing another possibility: one where the old dualism is purposefully eroded. There might be many possibilities of the mode of engaging the West in this manner but this chapter focuses on what I call the appropriation of the West, where the East grabs the West and dons its shoes.

Why appropriation? Why theft? There are two reasons. The first is because, with reference to Goody, societies steal from each other all the time. Culture, civilisation, values, even technology are imitable and modifiable. Problems arise when in an environment of unbalanced power relations, one society denies access to these items to another society. The second reason, still keeping in mind the imbalanced power relations between the East and the West, is that theft is often the only available alternative.

To illustrate this point further, we can consider James C. Scott's arguments in *Weapons of the Weak*.²⁶ One important argument in Scott's work is his broad definition of resistance. What counts as resistance, in his definition, lies in the intention and not the consequences. In his research in Sedaka village in the state of Kedah, Malaysia, the village poor resisted the repressive economic system, not with violence, but with activities such as petty stealing from rich people. Scott mentions five reasons for the poor peasants to avoid open confrontation.²⁷

The first reason is that exploitation is exercised indirectly. The poor are not totally impoverished. They are left out of the production process, but old customs such as regular donations to paupers during various Islamic holidays are still maintained. The second reason is that there is an overlapping class structure that prevents hatred towards

²⁵ Alastair Bonnett, *The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 69-71.

²⁶ James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 295, 242-48.

only certain people. The villagers are still related one to another, one way or another. This condition disperses resentment. The third reason is that the poor can still vote with their feet; in the face of unbearable exploitation, they can leave the village in order to look for a better livelihood. The fourth reason is the fear of repression. The wealthy have money at their disposal to do this. The last reason is related to the fact that the poor always manage to physically survive in the village, no matter how meagerly. Open confrontation is, thus, often avoidable in this situation.

I argue that Scott's explanation for non-violent resistance in Sedaka can be used to explain the story of resistance by the protagonist of the Tetralogy, namely Minke, through what I call the appropriation of the West. This mode of anti-colonial resistance then will be used to reflect on what is occurring in Muhammadiyah at the moment. I will start this elaboration from the beginning of the story in the Tetralogy.

5.3 Appropriation of the West

Following the story of Minke in the Tetralogy, one can discern three stages in his search for humanity among the indigenous population of the Dutch Indies. The first stage is when he despises this population and sees the West as everything the East is not. In this stage Minke is mesmerised by the progress made in the West and sees no possibility of the East achieving the same progress. After experiencing how the indigenous people of the Dutch Indies in particular, and non-Western people in general, strive for their independence, in the second stage Minke understands that freedom is everywhere longed for. At this stage, Minke starts to be critical of the West and optimistic at the same time of the potential of the East in achieving the same progress.

In the final stage of the Tetralogy, Minke takes an active role in employing Western methods and tools to empower the indigenous population of the East Indies. Through the use of journalism, modern organisation, and boycott, he finds out that methods and tools emerging in the West can be used and manipulated to benefit the colonial subject. It is at this stage that appropriation of the West takes its form.

5.3.1 *The First Stage: When the West is the Teacher*

On the cover of the first edition of the tetralogy published by Lentera Dipantara, I notice that something is out of place. The picture shows a four-wheeled cart pulled by two horses. On the cart are two women and two men. The women are Annelis, Minke's first wife, and Nyai Ontosoroh, her mother, while the two men are Darsam (the plantation's head of the security) and Minke. In this picture Minke is depicted as wearing a set of Javanese clothes, complete with a pair of *selop*. While it may have not been the intention of the artist who drew that picture to depict in detail the clothing of the characters of the book, I think a European style of clothing would suit Minke's character better in *Bumi Manusia*, the first book of the Tetralogy.

Bumi Manusia begins by describing Minke's admiration for the Netherland's Queen Wilhelmina and the West she represents. The West, with its science and technology, has bewitched this brown-skinned man and made him believe that he is different from the rest of the indigenous people of Java. This book describes this West-enchanted stage of Minke's life:

Science and knowledge, which I received from the school and whose manifestation in life I see with my own eyes, has made me a little different from most of my people. I am not even sure that I may have violated my physical form as a Javanese. And it is the life that I have experienced as a Javanese who has European knowledge that has encouraged me to write. (*BM*, 12)

About the tradition of walking on one's knees to show one's respect for nobility, he says, truly, my school friends will laugh at me if they see this drama of how a human being, used to walking upright on his own two legs, now has to walk on half of his legs, with the help of his two hands. Oh, God, my ancestors, why did you create such a tradition, one that insults the dignity of your own offspring? Did this never occur to you, you outrageous ancestors! ... How could you pass down such a tradition? (*BM*, 181)

When asked by his mother if he wants to become a regent in the future, Minke answers,

"No, Mother, I do not want to."

"No? That's strange. Well, you do whatever you like. [But] what do you want to be in the future?"

After you graduate, surely you could be anything you want."

"I only want to be a free man, neither taking nor giving orders, Mother."

"Huh? Will there ever be such a time, my son? This is the first I have heard of it."

Just like when I was a kid, I enthusiastically explain to her what the teachers told me in school. About Miss Magda Peters with her enchanting story: the story of the French Revolution, its meanings, its principles.

Mother just laughs and does not criticise me. Just like when I was a kid. (*BM*, 190)

Freedom is what the French Revolution means to Minke. For him, there is no other reference to freedom other than that found in European history. In the feudalistic Javanese society freedom is a luxury not to be found in the indigenous vocabulary. It has to be understood by wearing a pair of spectacles borrowed from some foreign land. Progress happens in Europe, and it brings freedom. Freedom is European. And to write about freedom is to write in a European language, even when the European court system ridicules him as a witness in the trial of the murder of his Dutch father-in-law.

How I have disappointed you, Mother, for I do not have the skills to write in Javanese verses. My life has seen so much trouble, it is overwhelmed, Mother, and it cannot be captured through my ancestors' verses. (*BM*, 441)

Of his self-claimed inability to write in Javanese, his mother retorts,

“Now, if you were still a Javanese, you would always be able to write in Javanese. You write in Dutch, my son, because you no longer want to be a Javanese. You write for the Dutch. Why do you care about them so much? They also drink and eat from the land of Java. You do not eat or drink from the Dutch land. So, why do you care about them so much?” (*BM*, 460)

Approaching the end of the first book, Minke's school-mate Jan Daperste decides to become a Javanese instead of following his adopted Dutch parents back to the Netherlands. He changes his name to Panji Darman. And as decided by the Dutch Indies court for Europeans, Annelis Mellema is to be taken to the Netherlands and placed under the care of her pure Dutch stepbrother until she is legally an adult. Upon leaving Java, Annelis chooses to use the same suitcase that had been brought by her mother Nyai Ontosoroh when she was about to enter the Mellema residence as a concubine. Choices are made: both Jan and Annelis refuse to be considered Europeans.

The Europe that he worships has brought his world down. Even when he has not been aware of any alternative to Europe, he feels that a disturbance was growing in the colonial system.

I no longer understand anything. I suddenly hear my own cry, Mother, your son has lost the fight. Your beloved son did not run away, Mother; he is not a criminal, even when he could not defend the rights of his own wife, your daughter-in-law. Are we indigenous people this weak in

the face of Europe? Europe! You, my teacher, is this what you do? You have made my wife, who does not know much about you, lose her faith in her own small world – a world without security and a future for herself. (*BM*, 534)

Annelis dies in the Netherlands under the care of strangers employed by the Mellemas.

5.3.2 The Second Stage: When One Finds the West in the East

Europe remains a teacher to Minke because it was from Europe that he first learned the idea of humanity. As the story progresses, however, he manages to find the East fighting for its humanity. He learns that while Europe introduced the concept of humanity, humanity is everywhere longed for. There are two main ideas in the second book of the tetralogy: colonialism recognises no colour; nor does humanity.

The first non-Western society that captures Minke's attention is Japan. In *Bumi Manusia* Japan enters the story as an entity that did not fit the late nineteenth and early twentieth century global situation, where Whites dominated non-Whites. Intellectually, however, Minke is still unsure of how to understand Japan. (*BM*, 169-70) In *Anak Semua Bangsa*, this nation raises a sense of Asian pride in Minke's heart (*ASB*, 65) for its role in disrupting the colonial situation in the Dutch Indies. As Minke explains,

Japan is becoming more interesting. This magnificent nation becomes more and more inspiring. In my old notes I wrote: the Netherlands and Japan signed an amity agreement about fifty years ago. One-by-one the Europeans started to look at this Asian nation as an exception. And about five years ago I read in an article: Japan has entered the colonial competition. Not wanting to be left behind by the White nations, it has itself joined in the partitioning of the world. It started attacking Manchuria, China, Chinese territory. And the Netherlands, and so then the Dutch Indies, declared its neutrality in the on-going war. Neutral! Neutral towards an aggressive friend! A sort of neutrality that has really helped the Japanese. And no one came to the aid of the victims. I can imagine a small kid, smart and strong, stealing the belongings of an old nation infested by all kinds of diseases – an old giant lying helplessly on his bed. (*ASB*, 56)

... If I may conclude: there is a sense of restlessness among the Dutch. It is as if they have lost faith in their own strength. How can it be that a nation of big and tall people can be so scared of a nation that it dislikes and despises? I do not understand. I can only sense that there is something troubling the Europeans.... (*ASB*, 64)

For the Japanese, humanity means being on a par with, if not at a higher level than, the West. For the Chinese, it is how to survive Europe by providing a modern education for its youth and creating a republic out of a crumbling empire. In several conversations with Khouw Ah Soe, a member of China's youth group sent to Java to recruit support among the overseas Chinese for a new Chinese republic, Minke learns about the aspirations of the Chinese. Says Khouw Ah Soe,

It will all be in vain if we have to be governed by a stupid and corrupt but powerful Old Group and follow them to become stupid and corrupt to maintain power. Useless, Sir. No matter how smart a person is, if he is inside a stupid kind of power, he will become stupid as well, Sir. (*ASB*, 88)

Therefore, overseas Chinese youth must be prepared to receive a modern education. A large, very large, amount of money must be collected.... Modern schools must be built, now and in the future. Otherwise, the nation of our own ancestors will be ravaged by the Japanese, as Africa has been swallowed up by the British. (*ASB*, 119)

And from Khouw Ah Soe, Minke also learns about the Philippines and their fights against Spanish colonialism.

The Philippines Revolution broke out. It aimed at getting rid of the Spaniards from the Philippines. In my mind I can see educated Filipinos leading their uneducated fellow men...in attacks on Spanish barracks.... Even my imagination cannot do justice to the scene. They were not led by individuals. But by...a collective plan.... And they fought. The whole country, in my imagination, was rising. Marching, leaving their homes to fight. To live or die. The Spanish in the Philippines were getting cornered. And the Filipino indigenous people chose their first president: Emilio Aguinaldo. The year was 1897! The first republic in Asia. (*ASB*, 420)

The Dutch Indies have not reached that stage, but Minke can find humanism in the stories of the people he meets, people who are fighting for their rights and dignities.

Two characters are given extra attention in Minke's stories: Surati and Trunodongso. The first is a female teenager who is about to be handed over as a mistress to a sugar factory director in Tulangan, a Dutch man with a bloated stomach named Frits Homerus Vlekkenbaaij, or 'Plikemboh' in Javanese tongue. Understanding the risk to her family of refusing the request, she agrees to become Plikemboh's concubine. Before submitting herself to him, however, she goes to a village that is infested with chicken pox. She consciously contracts the disease in the hope of giving it to Plikemboh when he

takes her. Three days after her journey to the disease-stricken nearby village, she is in front of Plikemboh's door.

She came [up the stairs] with Plikemboh by her side, submitting herself to be brought into a room – a room which forever will become the divide between being a virgin and a concubine.

Take, take everything you can from me, she thought, and die instantly.

When she arrived, the pox had started to show its rage. Her strength had been sucked completely out of her body. From the moment she laid on Plikemboh's bed, she could not rise. And it happened so fast that Plikemboh contracted the disease.

In the last few days both of them just laid on the bed, waiting for death to come. (*ASB*, 227)

Plikemboh dies but Surati survives with scars all over her body. She has won the fight for her dignity; the ugly scars are her trophy.

Resistance can mean different things to different people. For Trunodongso, it is about the physical survival of his wife and children. A farmer whose best land had been bought by a Dutch sugar factory at the lowest price is left only the most unproductive of his land. For the factory's extension, the local colonial administration is after this meager piece of land as well. When Minke visits him, his household is on a high alert to defend their land – with violence, if necessary.

If he could refuse to give away his farmland, why did he not refuse to give away his rice fields?

It is because the farm is his last livelihood. He has to defend it with his life. Otherwise, his family have to live on the streets. (*ASB*, 244)

This man is very interesting. Unlike most farmers, he has courage to speak his mind. Yes, even if he does it tortuously and is not able to give a straightforward answer. I think he is a farmer with quite a personality. And he likes to answer more than he likes to be questioned. (*ASB*, 253)

Minke's heroes are not Javanese princes or kings with their high palace culture, but an ugly girl with scars and a hungry farmer with his family. Just as Gandhi brought the periphery of the Indian traditional social order to its centre,²⁸ Minke brings the marginalised in Javanese society to the centre of his definition of the Javanese spirit. Javanese high culture has no relevance in Minke's search for humanity among his people. In his particular emphasis on Surati and Trunodongso's brave acts, Minke re-defines what culture means for the Javanese. For him, culture no longer stands for a set of sanctioned rituals and mannerisms. Culture, at least one worthy of appreciation, now refers to one's sense of dignity and attitude towards repression. His contact with the

²⁸ Ashis Nandy, *Bonfire of Creeds: The Essential Ashis Nandy* (India: Oxford University Press, 2004), 69.

Western world has made him curious about the other side of the Javanese culture, a dimension which had not been the main focus when people talked about Java as a socio-cultural category. The West has now sensitised him to look for Javanese pride and rage targeted at repression perpetrated by both the Whites and the Browns. The hybrid East is on its way to making its fiery appearance. And as it strives to achieve its sense of humanity, the repressors have shown themselves more clearly, and they bear no particular colour.²⁹

After Minke remarries, this time to a Chinese girl who was previously engaged to Khouw Ah Soe, a conversation with her spoils his admiration for the Japanese.

“What is there to admire?”, she says in a cold tone. “Whether a Russian or a Japanese victory, it is not a victory for humanity. If Russia is to lose the war, its loss is not a loss of humanity, either. Both are wolves attacking their prey”. ...

“Minke, I think it is no coincidence that you told me about [the venereal bacteria of] *treponema palladium* – I hope I’m pronouncing it correctly – and *gonococcus*. These are British and Japanese imperialism. Both of them are turning this world into a sick body.” (JL, 202)

In this second book of the tetralogy, Minke has actually come to a conclusion. He verbalises this conclusion when he is about to start writing Trunodongso’s story: “But the first line did not go as I had planned: Atrocity comes from all nations and at all times”. (ASB, 248)

With regard to Europe, it needs to be repositioned as it has simultaneously become both a teacher and a greedy monster:

The power of Europe....– it is a giant who gets hungrier as he eats more. All of the sudden I am imagining Buto Ijo, the giant in a story passed down by my ancestors. ...

And now I have learned my lesson: White power is greedy no matter where it is....

Greedy! Greedy! Not only a word, its meaning is now ringing out as it strikes my brain.... No...

I still need European teachers.... Only with your strength can people confront you. (ASB, 419-22)

²⁹ See, as an example, John Pemberton’s work on the contribution of the contact between the Javanese courts and the colonial Dutch to the creation of what we now understand as the Javanese culture and the repression of common indigenous population within the Dutch colonial system in *On the Subject of ‘Java’* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 51-53.

The West now represents colonialism and one can only face up to the West by using its methods. In learning from the West, however, one should know how to “refuse Europe’s diseases”. (ASB, 105)

A nation used to be able to live safely in a desert or a jungle. It cannot do that anymore. Modern science has uprooted everyone from their security and peace. As both social and individual creatures, humans can no longer feel safe. They are always chased, because modern science has provided them with the inspiration and the desire to control both nature and their fellow human beings at the same time. There is no power that can stop this lust for power except for science itself, the one that is more potent – in the hands of wiser human beings. (ASB, 123)

The way forward is not to abandon the West but to refashion what it has to offer, in a wiser manner.

5.3.3 The Third Stage: When the West is Faced with Itself

Eventhough our protagonist chooses to refashion the West instead of abandoning it, in the third book of the Tetralogy there is a tendency among the colonial subject to dismiss as lip service the claimed universal values offered by the West, such as human rights and democracy. The West is often considered hypocritical due to the double standard it applies to its own people and those of the colony; justice and freedom often only apply to Westerners but not the indigenous people. It is thus easier for non-Westerners to dismiss those values simply as lip service and instead to focus only on imitating Western science and technology; to appropriate the West means to master its science and technology in order to decolonise oneself. This stance is represented by Nyai Ontosoroh’s character who “thinks that the modern age brings no gift other than progress in tools (*peralatan*) and methods (*cara*)”. (ASB, 279)

But for Minke the West simultaneously means values, methods, as well as its colonial propensity. In his engagement with the West Minke is exposed to all three elements. All three are available for appropriation, but for Minke, the task of the colonised is to take the first two, mould them to one’s need and use them to confront the colonial aspect of the West. It is within the conflict between the first two and the colonial aspects that the act of appropriation is located.

Since the West most often does not realise the presence of its colonial propensity, contrasting its own values to its own actions terrifies it. When the lofty ideals it thinks it bears upon its shoulders are turned against itself, it trembles. This is what happens when Maurits Mellema is scolded for the death of Annelis under his supposed care. He comes to Nyai Ontosoroh with the intention of bringing back the late Annelis's old suitcase and her belongings, but is greeted with protests and cries. He is blamed for being unjust and greedy in his acts and for causing Annelis's death.

Lieutenant Colonel Engineer Mellema now looks like a giant toddler being scolded by his mother. He has even lost the spirit to leave this place. The big suitcase beside his foot is left untouched.... Engineer Maurits Mellema then points at the suitcase. But no sound comes from his mouth. The end of his finger is shaking. He turns his back on us, walking heavily, leaving the front chamber. His left hand is holding his sword holster.... He looks small, meaningless. ... "Murderer! Murderer of your own step-sister!"... "Animal!" ... (ASB, 531-35)

The terrible agony of the colonial Dutch comes to when they are accused of betraying their own grand ideals. It is imperative for the colonised, therefore, to recognise these ideals and use them to evaluate the West. Moreover, for Minke the values that he has learned from the French Revolution belong not only to the West. The pain for the colonised is thus inflicted not when the West behaves hypocritically by betraying its own ideals, but when the West acts against humanity and universal values. By absorbing these values, Minke admits that he acts unlike any other Javanese. His admission does not come in an arrogant self-aggrandisement, but with sadness, a sense that there is no turning back from the modern dream which he has made his own. His own mother would find it hard to recognise her own son. In a conversation with her (her name is never stated anywhere in the whole tetralogy), we can find her expressing this sentiment:

"Do not believe so much in the French Revolution. What did you say are its slogans? Equality, Fraternity, Liberty? If these are all true, son, where is the place for the Dutch in Java?" ...

I am sorry, Mother. I have taken a different path and made a different choice. I will write a long letter in Javanese to you. Verbally, I cannot do it. You are right, Mother, you are looking at a son whom you have not recognised anymore, except for his name.... (JL, 87)³⁰

³⁰ It is interesting to compare this modern dream of Minke with that of Dr. Soetomo who was occupied with "how to proceed into the colonial Western world without imitation; at a deeper level, how to imitate one's forebears without imitating them". (Benedict Anderson, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 267.) Closer to Dr. Soetomo than to Minke is

Western ideals are no longer owned solely by the West.

As for the Western methods, Minke lists three items: modern science, modern organisation, and modern gadgets. (*JL*, 257) In the tetralogy, there are at least three modern methods that Minke focuses on: journalism, modern organisation, and boycott. While in the first two stages of treating the West as a teacher and finding the West in the East, Minke had been occupied with comprehending what the West means and separating its methods and values from its colonial propensity, in this last stage he uses those methods and values to counter the colonial Dutch. In the remainder of this section we will see how Minke uses these three modern methods.

5.3.3.1 *Journalism*

Minke's fondness for writing has brought him to the world of journalism. When he was still studying in high school he had started to write for a Dutch newspaper which he later found out was funded by the sugar industry. (*ASB*: 386) His articles to the newspaper are initially about the social landscape of Surabaya and its surroundings, and are imbued with the spirit of the French Revolution. He had also sent some articles explaining his position on the trial of his father-in-law's murder. These articles were published in the newspaper with the endorsement of its chief editor. But when Minke starts to write about the colonial economic situation, the reception is not so friendly.

His article on Trunodongso's plight is refused. Upon this rude refusal, his friends and Nyai Ontosoroh suggest that he write in *Melayu* (the Malay language). At first, he is resistant to that idea because he considers the Malay language as a motley construction of words from other languages; a lowly language form. His change of mind comes with a realisation that the indigenous people of the Dutch Indies have never had a publication of their own. The use of the Malay language in his articles starts with the publication of *Medan Priyayi* ("The Field of the Nobility"), a publishing wing of the first indigenous organisation, *Syarikat Priyayi*.

Gandhi's anti-colonial ideology that he took from both Hindu and Christian teachings. (Nandy, *Bonfire of Creeds*, 452.)

Not only does Minke use the Malay in this weekly; he also opts for the vernacular form of the language to gain a better reception among the indigenous population of the Dutch Indies, who are mostly unaware of the scholarly form of *Melayu*. At this stage he has set a clearer target for his struggle: the enlightenment of his fellow indigenous people. Medan Priyayi is made into a newspaper that familiarises the colonised with their rights. The unspoken assumption of the newspaper is that the Dutch Indies government has restored the rights of the indigenous people by issuing laws to safeguard their interests. This is the same logic that is used in the implementation of the Ethical Policies³¹ with the aim of compensating the indigenous population for the profits the Dutch had collected during their colonisation of the archipelago.

The violations of the rights of the indigenous population, therefore, are supposedly accidental. They are considered mere accidents in the Dutch Indies colonial situation. Medan Priyayi's mission is to bring these violations to light and to bring justice for the indigenous people. Lawyers are hired to help answer readers' questions regarding their struggle for justice. This newspaper certainly provides fresh air for its readers but as the story progresses, there is a sense of a limit to what it can do to really advance their welfare. In a letter to Minke, Nyai Ontosoroh criticises Minke's journalistic work.

Tend to every claim that demands justice. They trust only you to deal with their cases....

However, if you keep doing this service, you would be nothing but a servant to the Government, [funding the service] with your own money. It is not only ridiculous, but also sad for a man like you. Newspapers! Life is not only about laws and regulations!" (*JL*, 300)

Unlike Bahari's analysis of Minke's use of Dutch,³² I argue that, on the one hand, Minke's works in Dutch are pleas for the colonial system to be truthful to its civilising mission. Minke's work in Malay, on the other hand, begins his efforts to delegitimise this system. This is not easy, for he often finds himself trapped in the colonial structure and thus only perpetuates the colonial system with his Malay writings, as stated above by Nyai Ontosoroh. However, his eventual use of Malay helps him play the role of an

³¹ The Ethical Policy was issued in 1901 during Queen Wilhelmina's reign. It consisted of three programmes – education, irrigation, and migrations – that serves both the ethical consideration of the Dutch government (these programmes were thought to be the compensation by the Dutch for their "debt of honour" to the indigenous people of the archipelago) and its economic interest (these programmes serve to expand Dutch plantation in Indonesia along with the available labour). See Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 17-18.

³² Bahari, "Reading Pramoedya Ananta Toer's *Buru Tetralogy*," 75.

interlocutor between Western ideas and the indigenous people, a facilitator of the reproduction of hybridity. His writings in Malay, in this context, cannot but be political:³³ its usage by the population of the East Indies had turned it into a medium for anti-colonial propaganda and, consequently, for imagining the creation of an East Indies nation.³⁴

5.3.3.2 *Modern organisation*

Minke then realises that his journalistic work has to go hand-in-hand with organisational work. There are two organisations which Minke establishes: *Syarikat Priyayi* and *Syarikat Dagang Islam*. The members of the first organisation come mainly from the nobility. Minke's reason for this is the fact that most educated indigenes in Indonesia came from this background. They are the ones who are both permitted and can afford access to modern education and, therefore, an organisation for the nobility might become a pioneer for further organising efforts for the indigenous people. As explained above, Minke has no intention of making the nobility and their high culture the base for the future nation of the Dutch Indies.

But *Syarikat Priyayi*, whose members are supposedly independent, is a far cry from a modern organisation. (*JL*, 554) It turns out that the nobility joins the organisation because of orders from their superiors. They are not aware of the importance of self-organising for the colonised; a feudal mentality still dominates the organisation. A financial fraud also contributes to the failure of this organisation, but the main lesson for Minke is the hopelessness of the nobility.

³³ Maier, "Stammer and the Creaking Door," 66.

³⁴ The use of Malay (later to be known as "Indonesian language") by Pramoedya after Independence, however, was problematic. In the fifties Pramoedya supported the use of local languages in Indonesian literature for they provide the vocabulary that can convey one's feelings more intimately (Day, "Between Eating and Shitting," 219-25.). His eventual preference for a standardised Indonesian language in his works some decades after, the writing of the Tetralogy is one, thus can be seen as a sign of his acceptance of the reality of Indonesia's post-colonial situation where the old, "language of family" needs to give way to the mechanic, dull Indonesian language in order for the nation to exist, and where the intimacy of ordinary people needs to give way to a universal humanism (Day, "Between Eating and Shitting," 234.), a choice more or less parallel to his move from the stammering Malay to the canonical Indonesian (Maier, "Stammer and the Creaking Door," 80-82.) and from the Bohemian *Gelanggang* circle of writers to the communist-affiliated, social-realist Institute of People's Culture/LEKRA (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat); See Martina Heinschke, "Between *Gelanggang* and LEKRA: Pramoedya's Developing Literary Concepts," *Indonesia* 61 (1996): 166.

I once offered to hold a conference. A supportive response never came. At the moment organisational fees cannot be collected anymore. Expenses started to come out of people's personal pockets. This organisation is ill. And the nobility would rather occupy themselves with dances and gambling. Fees eventually stopped coming. Members of the nobility returned to their previous attitudes. (*JL*, 321)

More and more organisations appear within the colonial environment. These organisations, however, are based on a single ethnic grouping. The Javanese are grouped in Budi Oetomo, as do other ethnicities in each of their organisations. This fact gravely concerns Minke.

The goal to create a pluralistic nation ... will be forgotten. People will not care if those coming from other ethnic groups – be it Bali or Sumba or Minangkabau – are being oppressed by the Dutch, or by a neighbouring nation. It looks like [Governor General] Van Heutsz with his weapons and canons will be able to unite and consolidate the Dutch Indies territory. Responding to this surge in colonial power, isn't it logical for the colonised ethnic groups of the Dutch Indies to unite? (*JL*, 390)

His choice of a common denominator for the new and modern organisation falls on Islam, the religion of the majority of the Dutch Indies population. Minke is trying to be realistic with his choice. By choosing Muslim traders as the base for the newly formed *Syarikat Dagang Islam* (*JL*, 394), he does not mean to use the organisation as a tool for racial competition. (*JL*, 604) His choice to have Muslim merchants form the base of the organisation is intended to strike at the economic foundation of Dutch colonialism. He does not mean it as an exclusivistic organisation only for merchants. His commitment to a multi-ethnic nation remains. Through his responses to the incidents of intra-organisational conflict, such the Arabs versus the indigenous members, or merchants versus farmers, or conflicts with the Chinese (*JL*, 543, 626, 604), Minke's has shown his commitment to this national vision.

5.3.3.3 Boycott as an economic method

The ultimate aim of having a press and a modern, non-elitist, organisation for the indigenous people is to forward their interests in a colonial system. The advantages of a widely read publication and a big organisation come when a coordinated boycott is needed.

Minke is first introduced to the method of boycott when a group of Chinese traders in Surabaya decides to boycott the sales of merchandise from big European merchant companies. (*JL*, 395-96) The boycott is triggered by an insulting dismissal of a Chinese merchant from the premises of a European company. Initiated by the organisation Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan, all Chinese traders in Surabaya refuse to buy merchandise from big European companies. Within a few months, the European company is closed down. Three more European companies then meet the same fate.

Using the same tactic, he coordinates boycotts in sugar cane plantations. He learns about the farmers' plight from the news he receives for Medan Priyayi. His mode of boycott involves spreading phosphor powder on cane leaves. With the help of sunlight, the plantations that have robbed farmers of their livelihood have their precious commodities burned so that they are of no use even after the fire stops. The boycott stops only with the coming of the rainy season. (*JL*, 651)

The choice of boycott is taken by Minke because of his concern for the real material needs of the indigenous people. He also shows his concern for the Dutch Indies nationalism, but for Minke, the real needs of the people come first before what he considers an abstract notion. (*JL*, 650) It is for this reason that he uses Syarikat Dagang Islam mainly to advance the economic interests of its members and not necessarily to develop the idea of nationalism. For Minke, destabilising the colonial system must start with its economic interests.

5.4 The Hybridity that Disturbs the Colonial System

We should not therefore be content to delve into the people's past to find concrete examples to counter colonialism's endeavours to distort and depreciate.³⁵

Small holders, petty tenants, and landless laborers are continually using the values and rationale of that earlier social order to press their claims and disparage the claims of their opponents.³⁶

There are two related arguments posed so far in this chapter. The first is that the colonial context provides a few alternatives for resistance, and the one that is most likely is the

³⁵ Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 168.

³⁶ Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, 336.

emulation of the West to resist the West, or what I call the “appropriation of the West”. The second is that this appropriation has created a sort of hybridity in the characters of the colonised, and that this disturbs the colonial system.

Referring to Scott’s arguments and learning from the story of colonialism in the *Buru Tetralogy*, there are at least four reasons why the world of the Dutch Indies managed to avoid violence as its main mode of anti-colonial resistance and make the appropriation of the West the most likely form. The first reason is that the colonial Dutch did not totally exploit the colonised. The Ethical Policies introduced by the Dutch social democrats in the archipelago had opened up possibilities for social mobility. Wider opportunities for a modern education meant that there were still chances to climb the colonial ladder.

The second reason is related to various forms of exploitation in the colonial Dutch Indies. The Europeans often ruled over the indigenous people through indigenous elites. The additional presence of Chinese and Arabs in the colonial situation manages to act as a buffer against a solely targeted resistance on the Dutch. The third reason is related to the opportunity to move out of one area to another and find a new livelihood. For indigenous elites, the chance to leave for the Netherlands was always open, provided that they could afford the sea passage. For others, the internal migration program within the territory of the Dutch Indies was provided as a part of Ethical Policies.

The fourth reason is the fear of repression of the colonial apparatus. The hegemony of the Dutch Indies administration, both in ideational and material senses, acts as a deterrent for the colonised to wage open confrontation. And I focus on this fourth reason to explain why the colonial context left the colonised with appropriation of the West as the only available alternative for resistance.

Open confrontation with a colonial power means facing the colonial army and its weaponry. While the imminent danger to one’s survival of doing this is clear, the Gramscian sense of Dutch hegemony means that the colonised are also limited in their imagination of possible modes of resistance. Just as the peasants in Scott’s work “do not

simply vacillate between blind submission and homicidal rage”,³⁷ so do the colonised in the *Buru Tetralogy* opt for everyday forms of resistance through the appropriation of the West. Colonialism does show its most dominating grip in its act of colonising the mind of the colonised,³⁸ but in doing this it has provided them with a weapon to challenge it.³⁹ At first glance, the fact that appropriation as the only available mode of resistance might look like a weakness on the part of the indigenous population but as we will see below, appropriation creates hybrids that serve as a strong disturbance to the whole colonial discourse.

The colonised might have been tempted at some stage of their resistance to look for the pure or original national culture on which they could base their struggle but upon finding out that the colonial situation has transformed the so-called national culture into what Fanon called a state of rigid and petrified atrophy,⁴⁰ they are left with no choice but to abandon the dream of a nativistic revival. They are now faced with the question of what “type of social relations they will establish and their idea of the future of humanity”.⁴¹ It is naïve to expect the colonised to be content with the colonial situation, but it is equally difficult to imagine that they would jettison the West in their search for humanity.

Moreover, it is not Darsam’s machetes that makes Maurits Mellema tremble in front of an indigenous mistress and a brown-skinned Javanese man, but the reference to European ideals of justice, equality, and compassion. It is not the image of an irrational indigenous person that shocks Maurits Mellema; it is the inculcation of the West within the colonised that speaks to his conscience. Since the West has always been simplistic in its treatment of the lethargic and ignorant indigene, the presence of Westernised indigenous people who are aware of the plight of their people wakes it up from its comfortable colonial slumber. When the Westernised indigenous people surface to show how they do not fit the categorisation within “the colonial sanctuary” (*JL*, 579), the West is forced to reconstruct that colonial situation.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 304.

³⁸ Couze Venn, “Altered States: Post-Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism and Transmodern Societies,” *Theory Culture Society* 19 (2002): 68.

³⁹ Gyan Prakash, “Orientalism Now,” *History and Theory* 34, no. 3 (1995): 205-6.

⁴⁰ Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 172.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 169.

A new bureau thus had to be established within the colonial administration to deal with the symptoms of this appropriation of the West by the colonised. This bureau is charged with the task of creating a new and neater understanding of the colonial situation inside a *rumah kaca* (“house of glass”). It is this fourth novel in the Tetralogy that gives us a portrait of how the colonial government is disturbed by the presence of the colonial hybrids as the products of the appropriation of the West with their “irresolvable” and “borderline” culture whose identity can only be understood as a “disjunctive temporality” of “cultural displacement”.⁴²

Unlike the previous three novels, the voice in *Rumah Kaca* is not of Minke but Jacques Pangemanann, a colonial agent assigned to this newly established bureau. His background as a Christian native – adopted by French parents, educated at the Sorbonne, married to a French woman, and his choice to come back to the Dutch Indies upon the completion of his studies speaks further of the multi-coloured situation in the colonial world. His soul, torn between the European ideals in which he has been educated and the colonial reality in which he finds himself, tells a story of ambivalence within the colonial system.

Rumah Kaca is Pangemanann’s way of apologising to Minke, of whose exile he had approved. It is a story of his haplessness in the face of the colonial system, and his role in mending the fissures in the colonial discourse in the face of the West-appropriators. The ambivalence between his support for European ideals and the reality of his job is clear in his comments regarding the activities of Minke.

Firstly: Minke’s activities are not illegal. There is no law that can stop his activities, neither the colonial law nor the law of the Netherlands. But every movement in the Dutch Indies that can lead to the concentration of power will always be a danger to colonial administration. ...

Secondly: Minke’s activities are natural for any indigene in any colony, even more so for those who have been introduced to European knowledge and science. His acts are the logical consequence of knowledge and science. He is the bearer of new elements in the life of the indigenous people, the reflection of the awareness of European knowledge. The fruits of European education and teaching in any colony will be the same: trouble for the colonial administration. ...

⁴² Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, 322.

The shock comes when I have to face the fact that I have come to a conclusion: Minke with his [Syarikat Dagang Islam] moves too fast and unpredictably. This sort of concentration of power is a sword of [Damocles]. This is a kind of situation that will have to be confronted beyond the law. (RK, 14-15)

The only way to deal with these activities is through extra-legal procedures because the colonial Dutch do not intend to have their laws used to betray their own ideals. Moreover, legal channels will not be able to stop those bent on appropriation since their activities are conducted in accordance with the colonial law. In its efforts to keep the Dutch East Indies in a stable colonial structure (RK, 101), Minke must be sent into exile.

But his exile does not stop the development of modern journalism and organisation among the indigenous people. On the contrary, the publication of newspapers and magazines flourish, as well as modern organisations. (RK, 352, 471) Arranging them in a house of glass has become more and more difficult. Syarikat Dagang Islam does not die with Minke out of the picture. Its reduced reliance on individual factors, for Pangemanann, marks the sign of a modern organisation among the population. (RK, 217)

Unlike previous groupings among the indigenous people in their fight against colonialism, modern organisations depend not on violence but on the “mouth and pen” in their effort to create a nation out of the Dutch Indies. (RK, 512) Violence might have worked for traditional resistance, such as the one applied to fight Pitung, the leader of a violent indigenous rebel group around Batavia, and his men (RK, 73), but it would be inappropriate to use it to deal with legal organisations.

New colonial categorisations are needed for these modern organisations. In the colonial mindset, there are only two kinds of organisations: those that are dangerous and those that are tame. The dangerous kinds are ideologically opposed to the perpetuation of Dutch power over the archipelago and able to speak in the language of the masses. Syarikat Dagang Islam used to be a danger for the colonial Dutch in its ability to relate to the needs of its members and its anti-colonial policies. It used to be dangerous precisely because of its embodiment of the West in the interests of the colonised, a form of hybridity that challenges the existence of the colonial system.

Boedi Moeljo attracts a large number of members from the Javanese community, but it is cooperative in its approach on the colonial Dutch. (*RK*, 459-60) Indische Partij, with its goal of overturning the dominance of the Whites and their descendants, and which later renamed itself Insulinde, is considered arrogant and unable to interact with the indigenous majority. (*RK*, 243) For this sort of organisation, the colonial administration reacts either by spoiling its leaders with colonial privileges or by simply ignoring them. (*RK*, 626, 221)

For Syarikat Dagang Islam, it is a totally different story. Its leader has to be exiled and its image marred (*RK*, 221) while a new leader who is sympathetic to the colonial cause is elected. (*RK*, 224) Pangemanann is fascinated with the achievement of hybridised indigenous people, as can be seen in his comments on Minke's so-called spiritual pupil, Wardi, and on Nyai Ontosoroh.

I cannot imagine in the future the result of European influence in its both constructive and destructive capacity. A village boy, after only a few years of living with an educated indigenous man, has been able to absorb European ways of writing, and then challenge Europe. He never once mentioned [mythical stories surrounding the Javanese] world that are filled with tales of ghosts and demons. He only talks about his writing and his activities. What will happen in the next quarter of a century, if European education and human contacts become more widespread, and transportation networks become denser, eliminating distances and gaps between the indigenous people?

That writing also reminds me of Minke's texts on Nyai Ontosoroh, a pure Javanese girl who was illiterate. For more than ten years she had been a mistress [of a Dutch man], was then able to control a big company with European methods, and then according to this text, chose French citizenship, instead of being a citizen of the Dutch Indies with no legal certainty. Consciously! Not just because she was married to Jean Marais. (*RK*, 341)

He had this to say about Minke:

A Javanese who has rid himself of Javanism can mean nothing but a man who has understood the world of Javanese illusions and abandoned them. He'd prefer to face the world as it is and accept it and develop it as it is. A Javanese who is no longer Javanistic is nothing other than a revolutionary in my lifetime. ... (*RK*, 549)

Pangemanann's fascination, however, only seems to be founded on the individual level and not on the mass level. On his success in taming most anti-colonial organisations in the Dutch Indies, this colonial agent brags,

[Semaoen]⁴³ believes too much in the effectiveness of Europe's teachings. He never saw...that the indigenous people are not Europeans, who are always well organised. The people here are in darkness, caught up in their own thoughts, so that everything European thrown at them will create new chaos and internal conflicts. (*RK*, 611)

The appropriation of the West seems to be on the verge of losing the colonial battle, with the hybrids either exiled or unable to convey their anti-colonial messages to the masses. For a period of time they manage to send the colonial Dutch into a spasmodic state, but a 'spasm' only lasts for a short period of time. The colonial power seems to recover soon after. Through the establishment of a bureau of which Pangemanann is a staff, the colonial government manages to once again tame indigenous resistance and recover from the shock caused by Western-minded indigenous population, or a hybrid, of which Minke is one.

Let us consider two possible sorts of spasms wrought upon the colonial system, first by the indigenes' rejection of the West – and, second, by the hybridity the appropriation creates. I will argue that each spasm has its unique source and impact on the colonial system. While the first spasm makes the colonial system tremble out of fear and fascination, the spasm coming from the appearance of hybridity devastates the survival of colonial categories.

An example of the act of rejection by indigenous people of anything Western is the story of Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the leader the Haitian revolution for independence and the source of myth in the minds of Haitians. Once a slave of a White Frenchman, Dessalines fought the White army to create a Haiti that is for the "blacks" only, the word referring to the Negroes and other people who are sympathetic to their fight. In covering his body with magic talismans and surrounding himself with sorcerers and magicians, he defied any notion of Western rationality. His hatred for the Whites and the exploitation they represent is widely known. The idea of the Black supremacy that he espoused made him a national hero and his life story became part of voodoo history, one where "purity

⁴³ Semaun is one of the young Indonesian intellectuals in the story who was to become the leader of the Indonesian Communist Party. But Pangemanann's general assessment in this sentence refers not only to Semaun but to educated indigenous people in general.

and defilement became mutually adaptable” and is used to “destroy the illusions of mastery, circumventing and confounding *any* master narrative”.⁴⁴

The history of Dessalines within the Haitian anti-colonial counter-narrative is an act of total rejection of the West as the standard by which the “Other” is to be assessed. In Dessalines’ story of resistance, the Whites and their narratives would be subject to the Blacks. The tremor that Dessalines brought to the colonial system came from his obsession with the abolition of the Whites, in both their discursive and bodily presence, and the inauguration of the Blacks as the new master of the land. The White/Black racial dichotomy no longer corresponds to Good/Bad dualism where the White is associated with the good and vice versa. The Dessalinian dichotomy is where Black equals Good as opposed to White equals Bad.

The first spasm for the colonial system comes with the realisation of its categorisation of humans into Self and Other, Civil and Savage. The colonial compartmentalisation of races is created with the imagination of the “Other” as everything that is in contrast to the Self. However, when the imagination comes to life, when the cannibals actually do what they are supposed to do, it turns into a nightmare – although not without some fascination on the part of the colonial system.⁴⁵ This is a sort of fascination that arrives as one’s dream (or nightmare) comes true. The second spasm for the colonial system, however, does not share the same source. It disturbs the colonial structure by refusing to give in to the dichotomy of West and East, and therefore by rejecting the identification of one’s character based on one’s skin colour.

The appropriation of the West in Pramoedya’s tetralogy starts with the dissection of the West into its various parts: values, methods, and its colonial tendency. By firstly identifying the aspects of the West that are worthy of appropriation, the tetralogy then finds them also in the East, especially in Java.⁴⁶ At this stage the demystification of the

⁴⁴ Joan Dayan, “Haiti, History, and the Gods,” in *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements*, ed. Gyan Prakash (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 77, 80, 81, 92, 93. (Emphasis in original)

⁴⁵ Gananath Obeyesekere, ““British Canibals”: Contemplation of an Event in the Death and Resurrection of James Cook, Explorer,” in *Identities*, ed. Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates Jr. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 15.

⁴⁶ Keith Foulcher, ““Bumi Manusia and “Anak Semua Bangsa”: Pramoedya Ananta Toer Enters the 1980s,” *Indonesia* 32 (1981): 12.

West is intensifying. The identification of the colonial characteristics of both white and brown skins completes the process. The dichotomy is no longer between the West and the East, but between the coloniser and the colonised.

If Westernisation is parallel to modernisation, it is tempting to see hybridity as multiple modernities, a notion of how the project of modernity does not only give way to different interpretations of its “core transcendental visions and basic ontological conceptions” but also to “the possibility of multiple visions that could, in fact, be contested”.⁴⁷ The erosion of the East/West dichotomy as a result of appropriation of the West by the East also implies that the compartmentalisation of the modern against the traditional be abandoned. To refer to the notion of “multiple modernities” when one speaks of hybridity, however, becomes counter-productive because the hybrids are simply an entity desiring to be neither exoticised nor modernised; they refuse to play the colonial game. In the eyes of the hybrid, both exoticisation and modernisation are authoritarian in their attempt to lock people into neat displays in colonial museums where purity is the prime target, even if this display is cloaked in the rhetoric of safeguarding tradition.⁴⁸ In other words, hybridity refuses rigid categorisation of identity and opts for an ever evolving one.

Moreover, exociticism is entailed in the modernity project itself. According to Arnason, modernity is torn between “two equally basic cultural premises: on the one hand, the vision of infinitely expanding rational mastery; on the other hand, the individual and collective aspiration to autonomy and creativity”.⁴⁹ Therefore, even though “colonialism ... has been a necessary condition of possibility for the initiation of the project of homogenization and transformation of cultures to produce a cosmopolitan culture”,⁵⁰ it desperately needs the East to retain its “orientalness” in order to justify colonisers’ civilising mission, as well as to be faithful to the idea of pluralism in

⁴⁷ Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” *Daedalus* 129, no. 1 (2000): 4.

⁴⁸ See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006), 181. As an example of this colonial attitude towards the Native Americans in particular, see Ruth B. Phillips, “Why Not Tourist Art? Significant Silences in Native American Museum Representations,” in *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements*, ed. Gyan Prakash (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 101.

⁴⁹ Johann P. Arnason, “Communism and Modernity,” *Daedalus* 129, no. 1 (2000): 65.

⁵⁰ Venn, “World Dis/Order,” 68.

modernity. Colonialism needs to walk between the universal and the plural aspects of modernity. It needs them both in sustaining its exploitation, either materially or morally. The fate of the colonial system hangs on the essentialisation of identities, either traditional or modern but *not* in-between; the hybrids are forever a menace to its assignment of identities among the colonised.

5.5 Concluding Comments: Appropriation as a Story of Failure?

The appropriation by non-Western societies of specific themes and institutional patterns of the original Western modern civilization societies entailed the continuous selection, reinterpretation, and reformulation of these imported ideas. These brought about continual innovation, with new cultural and political programs emerging, exhibiting novel ideologies and institutional patterns. The cultural and institutional programs that unfolded in these societies were characterized particularly by a tension between conceptions of themselves as part of the modern world and ambivalent attitudes toward modernity in general and toward the West in particular.⁵¹

Minke: I did not realise that I was bare-footed. (*JL*: 721)

At the end of *Jejak Langkah*, our non-White Orientalist Jacques Pangemanann forces Minke to leave his house immediately for exile. Minke is given no time to write a letter to his wife explaining his situation. He can only send his message through his housemaid. Being rushed, he does not even realise that he has left his house bare-footed – as neither a Westerner nor a Javanese aristocrat.

The Buru Tetralogy can be read as a story of failure, a failure of the East's appropriation efforts because the West would do anything to send the East back to its place within the colonial dualism. With its power, the colonial power strips Minke of his shoes, having to return from his exile wearing his *selop*, before passing away in Batavia without proper acknowledgement as the founder of the first modern indigenous organisation in the Dutch Indies, Syarikat Dagang Islam.

Before being stripped of his shoes, however, Minke has witnessed his first wife Annelis taken from his side to die in the Netherlands. His second wife, Ang San Mei, dies of hepatitis. His third wife is never allowed to return to her husband. Each of his wives

⁵¹ Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," 15.

inspires him to see how the East could steal the West but Minke is not permitted to keep a reminder of how he can find the West in the East. Approaching the end of the third book of the Tetralogy, Minke finds out that he is sterile. (*JL*, 590)

Has the East lost the battle?

Not only did the West refuse to award the East with a part of itself, the East showed its capacity of catching West's colonial disease. In the treatment of the Papuans, for example, consecutive political regimes in Indonesia have behaved like a colonial power. Just as the West did to the East, so have various Indonesian administrations forcefully incorporated West Papua into its territory, its people into a homogenising culture, and its resources into the wealth of the imagined communities called "Indonesia".⁵² With respect to Japan, between the early twentieth century and the end of World War II, it intensely used anti-colonial rhetoric to gather domestic support for its colonial expansion abroad.⁵³

But does the East have another option?

I have mentioned in early section of this chapter that there are three possibilities for the East to respond to the colonial system: submission, rejection, and appropriation. While total rejection of the West is possible, by so doing the East only perpetuates the patronising dualism created by the West. In denying itself the possibility of emulating the West to fight the West, it allows the West to define it, to speak for it, and therefore to mute it.

By appropriating the West, the East refuses to be defined by the West. It learns from the West but does not succumb to it. By appropriating the West, the East wipes off the mythical ambience surrounding the West in order to see the West as it really is. Moreover, in Minke's situation where the East has been acquainted with the West, the East does not possess the luxury of imagining things beyond the West. Appropriation is a way of accepting the superiority of the West in order to change the balance. The hybridity created out of the act of appropriation is the only response from the colonised to really

⁵² Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 177-78.

⁵³ Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 193.

disturb the West because hybridity defies the colonial categorisation of the man and the savage, the colonial fantasy of the inextricable fusion between the biological and the cultural.⁵⁴

With respect to the questions of whether the East has lost the battle or whether it has another choice other than appropriating the West, my answer is, firstly, no: the East has not lost the battle because the idea of hybridity allows it to see the contemporary world as “a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs”.⁵⁵ There are many pieces of the West to be appropriated and appraised by the East that make what seems to be a failure looks just like the result of an experiment. Secondly, if we are to assume that societies are in constant contact with each other, we have to say, no, the East has no other option but to steal from the West, and vice versa. The East will thus be influenced by the West and it will certainly influence the West. For example, as India’s modern democracy is a product of “the encounter between Western modernity and the cultural traditions and historical experiences of these societies”, the idea of modernity itself is evolving as a result of various encounters between different societies.⁵⁶

Thus the West is always open for dissection and selection as long as one is willing to see beyond the rigid distinction in opposition to the East. The East, in its contact with the West, chooses the most appropriate aspects of the West for appropriation. Minke steals from the West in his effort to resurrect the long interred humanity of the indigenous people of the Dutch Indies. The story of Minke’s life is one about overcoming the narrative of victimhood and coming up with a “creative and powerful opposition to the powerful”,⁵⁷ even when it means engaging the (powerful) West and its narratives.

In this story, we can see that Minke faces a crisis situation with regard to his familiar field and the way he responds to the crisis. To return to our analysis of the present-day Muhammadiyah, the organisation’s members are also facing a crisis with

⁵⁴ See Robert J. C. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race* (London: Routledge, 2002), 121; and Alastair Bonnett, “The Metropolist and White Modernity,” *Ethnicities* 2 (2002): 351.

⁵⁵ Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” 2.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁵⁷ Akeel Bilgrami, “What is a Muslim? Fundamental Commitment and Cultural Identity,” in *Identities*, ed. Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates Jr. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 219.

respect to the presence of a perceived strong “Other”. In the next two chapters I will draw a comparison between the situation of crisis that Minke perceives with the situation faced by members of Muhammadiyah, along with the comparison between Minke’s response to the crisis and those of the proponents of both the status quo and reform.

CHAPTER SIX

THE STATUS QUO CAMP'S PERCEPTION OF THE WEST

In the previous chapter I discussed what hybridity means with regard to the story of Minke, the protagonist in the Buru Quartet, and explained how hybridity defies the dichotomy of resistance and dominance. For both the colonial power and the indigenes of the Dutch Indies, hybridity can be an indication of either dominance or resistance, of either emulation or opposition, and of mimicry in its capacity both to revere and to deprecate. In this chapter and the next, I will use this type of resistance, the one that I refer to as “the appropriation of the West”, to examine what is happening to the present-day Muhammadiyah. Against this typology, I will measure how Muhammadiyah’s members deal with the presence of what they refer to as the West.

In this dissertation I use two typologies in categorising the perceptions of Muhammadiyah’s members: those supporting the status quo and those supporting reform. I define the proponents of the status quo as Muhammadiyah’s members who associate the presence of Western influence with a crisis within their organisation. This presence is perceived to be dangerous and should thus be scrutinised. For these supporters, Western influence is not to be emulated unconditionally and should be subjected to what they understand to be the right Islamic perspective. This response from the proponents of the status quo camp is an example of what Bourdieu refers to as “hysteria of *habitus*”, a condition where social agents are unable to look at the changing world without employing the lens of their old, familiar *habitus*.¹

I define the proponents of the reform camp as having the opposite characteristics from those of the status quo. Firstly, the supporters of the reform camp are those who see the crisis that Muhammadiyah is currently facing as coming from globalisation; and as globalisation occurs in all parts of the world, it affects Muslim as well as Western societies. Secondly, the supporters of the reform camp are those who believe that in order

¹ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 83.

to find a solution to the crisis, or to mitigate its effects, Muslims should be willing to engage with various perspectives, including Western ones. In this regard, the supporters of the reform camp address their “hysteria of *habitus*” and envision a “margin of freedom”² which allows them to imagine reform projects that will help Muhammadiyah deal with a crisis situation.

This chapter will elaborate the status quo’s view of the West while the next chapter will deal with the view of the reform projects. In each chapter I will, firstly, look at various images that each camp has with regard to the West. I will then analyse these images by reflecting them to the practice of appropriation as explained in the previous chapter and note their differences from Minke’s images of Europe.

From the particular way each camp views the West, I would argue that each has developed its own unique sense of crisis. My analysis will continue by looking at the particular sense of crisis that belongs to each camp and how each sense of crisis relates to a unique perception of change in their field. As we have seen, I define the term “field” in this dissertation as the world in which social agents live. It is therefore a bounded and contextual term with boundaries that depend on the extent to which social agents are able and willing to limit the scope of their environment. By so doing, I maintain this discussion’s association with Bourdieusian sociology.

My main conclusion in both Chapters Six and Seven is that while the proponents of the status quo see the crisis of Muhammadiyah as defined by the penetration of Western worldviews into the minds of the organisation’s members, the proponents of reform projects see the crisis that Muhammadiyah is currently facing as caused by globalisation – with both the East and the West as its victims. It is, in other words, a global crisis. These different senses of crisis then contribute to each camp’s insistence on, respectively, the importance of maintaining the status quo or of conducting reform, as was explained in Chapters Three and Four.

Before comparing the images of the West that the status quo and reform camps have at the end of Chapter Seven, I begin my analysis with the status quo’s perceptions of

² Pierre Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 234.

the West and how they are deeply associated with their understanding to be a crisis facing Muslims in general and Muhammadiyah's members in particular.

6.1 The (Un)Democratic West

I will start this section with Dahrendorf's definition of democracy and use it to understand how the supporters of the status quo camp in Muhammadiyah view democracy both in Western countries and in Indonesia. I choose Dahrendorf's definitions of democracy because I find them, especially his insistence on the malleability of democracy, relevant to the discussion of democracy among the supporters of the status quo camp.

In his 1980 article on the seeming ungovernability of democracies, Ralf Dahrendorf contrasts effectiveness and legitimacy in democratic governments.³ In his view, democracy is a system that provides legitimacy to governments, and not necessarily effectiveness. With regards to legitimacy, governments need it for two reasons. The first is to satisfy their citizens' need of general moral imperatives, such as respect for human rights. The second reason is more local. Governments need to be considered as the embodiment of values that are local in nature and particular to the group of people they govern. For Dahrendorf, democracy as a method of establishing governments satisfies the second, local, reason due to the variety of ways that a democracy can be implemented. In this article, Dahrendorf perceives democracy as a general tool that needs to be particularised according to local context before it can be implemented.

In a later article, Dahrendorf defines democracy as "an ensemble of institutions aimed at giving legitimacy to the exercise of political power by providing a coherent response to three key questions".⁴ Those three questions are: how can we achieve change in our society without violence; how can we, through a system of checks and balances, control those who are in power in a way that gives us assurance that they will not abuse it; and how can citizens have a voice in the exercise of power? If these three questions are

³ Ralf Dahrendorf, "Effectiveness and Legitimacy: On the "Governability" of Democracies," *The Political Quarterly* 51, no. 4 (1980): 397.

⁴ Ralf Dahrendorf, "A Definition of Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 4 (2003): 103.

restated respectively as the right to a peaceful life, the right to equal treatment in the face of law, and the right to political involvement, democracy can be seen, by referring to Dahrendorf's two functions of democratic legitimacy above, as a tool to bring legitimacy to government on the general level.

In these two articles, Dahrendorf only refers to democracy in the Western world. His general definition of democracy, however, can also be used to assess the situation of democracy in the non-Western world. With regard to the relations between the Western world and democracy, for example, the proponents of the status quo acknowledge that the West as a civilisation did manage to formalise a form of government that we can now call democracy, which is distinct from other political systems. The basic idea of democracy, however, does not belong only to the West. According to the chairman of Pemuda Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Youth), Saleh Daulay, Islam, in its insistence that Muslims practice *shura* (public deliberation) as a method to reach decisions on public matters, contains in itself the spirit of democracy. For him, Islam is compatible with democracy.⁵

On the relation between democracy and Islam, Robert Hefner points at two perspectives in Western discourse. The first perspective sees that there is no resonance between democracy and civil liberty anywhere in Islam.⁶ This thought dominated Western political thinking in the 1970s and 1980s. The second perspective sees that the success of democratisation efforts in any Muslim population will depend significantly on local resources and how, by using these resources, people approach their social and political organisations.⁷ There are three implications to this second perspective: first, Muslim societies must not be viewed as monolithic and that each society's response to democracy must be analysed in its own terms. Second, an interaction between local and global aspects plays an important part in determining the form the relation between Islam and democracy takes. Thirdly, democracy is more than just parliament and general elections. It also involves people's culture and perspective of society and politics. The third and last implication resonates well with Daulay's opinion on democracy, for Daulay

⁵ Saleh Daulay, interview by author, Jakarta, June 13, 2011.

⁶ Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 4.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

sees democracy as a term coined by Western civilisation to refer to a certain mode of government. This particular mode of government, therefore, may not belong only to the West.

This viewpoint is also shared by Pasha and Darban, members of Muhammadiyah from Yogyakarta, who assert that “Islam teaches the use of the principles of democracy in government”.⁸ For them, this assertion does not come only from Muslims but also from Western observers of Islam. With respect to Dahrendorf’s three functions of democracy, and from the point of view of the proponents of the status quo, Islam never objects to these functions. Throughout the history of Islam, for Pasha and Darban, some Muslims rulers are seen to have deviated from the democratic method of governing in Islam and therefore led their societies into decadence.⁹

In the eyes of the proponents of the status quo, Islam agrees on the basic rules of democracy such as public deliberation and public elections. The three functions that Dahrendorf defines as the grounds for the establishment of democracy are shared by the proponents of the status quo. For these supporters, every society should be allowed to determine details of how these three functions will be implemented. Within the status quo camp, democracy serves a general guidance for the inclusion of public deliberation in political processes. For the proponents of this camp, democracy in its bare form contains no ideology and therefore should be implemented contextually.

Daulay likens democracy to a text that “can be translated and interpreted by anyone according to one’s taste and faith”.¹⁰ For him, there is no fixed interpretation of what democracy should be. Even among Western countries, argues Daulay, one will find different practices of democracy. There is no need for the West, therefore, to dictate its version of democracy on Indonesia because democracy is a method that can suit various perspectives.

As each society has its own unique “nature, culture, and history”, Daulay argues that Indonesia does not need to imitate an interpretation of democracy that comes from

⁸ Musthafa Kamal Pasha and Ahmad Adaby Darban, *Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka SM, 2009), 15.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Saleh Daulay, interview by author, Jakarta, June 13, 2011.

the West. Indonesian democracy, argues Daulay, respects religions. With regard to the case of the ban on the Ahmadiyah sect,¹¹ as an example, the West should not see it as a result of an undemocratic system. The ban on Ahmadiyah is caused by the sect's persistence in claiming its teachings as Islamic while at the same time bluntly acknowledging the presence of another prophet after Muhammad. This teaching of Ahmadiyah is an insult to Muslims, so, based on the respect for religions in Indonesian democracy as attributed by the proponents of the status quo, it is only natural that Indonesian Muslims demand that either the government ban this sect or that it admit to the un-Islamic nature of its teachings, stop using the label "Islam", and create an entirely new religion. In the eyes of the proponents of the status quo, as the sect refuses to do this, it was only imperative for the government to issue the ban. Thus, the banning came out of a democratic process. For the supporters of the status quo, this is a democracy, Indonesian-style, in its respect for religions.

In general, the status quo camp believes that respect for religion is considered as an indispensable element to the proper functioning of a democracy. A good democracy, for one of the proponents of the status quo camp, is based on the fulfilment of three conditions on the part of citizens and leaders alike: good morality, consciousness of one's obligation (and not just preoccupation with one's rights), and the willingness to respect opinions different from one's own. Unless these three conditions are met, democracy is not better than any other method of government.¹²

Yet, according to the proponents of the status quo, Western democracy has abandoned these three conditions for the sake of majority votes. Because of the trauma caused by the hegemony of the Church during the Dark Ages, Western democracy sees no need to include morality in the application of democracy.¹³ As a result, religion is separated from politics; it is sent to the private realm and is not allowed to intervene into

¹¹ Fitri, Eras Poke, Heru Andriyanto and Antara, "Regional Indonesian Politicians to Ban or Curb Ahmadiyah," *The Jakarta Globe*, February 26, 2011, <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/regional-indonesian-politicians-to-ban-or-curb-ahmadiyah/425228> (accessed December 11, 2012).

¹² M. Syukriyanto, "Istiqamah dalam Bermuhammadiyah," in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah: Istiqamah Membendung Kristenisasi & Liberalisasi*, ed. Fathurrahman Kamal et al. (Yogyakarta: Majelis Tabligh dan Dakwah Khusus PP Muhammadiyah, 2010), 5.

¹³ Adian Husaini, "Mendiskusikan Kembali Makna Islam," in *Pemikiran Muhammadiyah: Respons terhadap Liberalisasi Islam*, ed. Syamsul Hidayat and Sudarno Shobron (Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press, 2005), 55.

public matters. Consequently, in the eyes of the supporters of the status quo camp, secularism has become such an inseparable part of Western democracy that it is thus almost impossible to talk about Western democracy without assuming the presence of secularism.

And with secularism comes pluralism, which treats every religion on the same level and considers each as having the same divine message. The status quo sees pluralism as an ideology caused by the softening of the Christians' religiosity at the dusk of religious conflicts in the history of Europe in the seventeenth century. With the intention not to repeat the same catastrophe, religions are cast aside, with their claims to salvation tamed, if not made entirely irrelevant for public life.

Furthermore, for the proponents of the status quo, the West has no intention to keep secularism and pluralism to itself. It considers Islam as a religion that is still prone to fanaticism, and therefore needs to be domesticated under the discourse of secularism and pluralism. In the project of secularism and pluralism conducted by Western-leaning Muslims, the West aims at the accomplishment of two goals simultaneously: the transformation of Islam in the image of the West and, consequently, an Islam that is friendly towards the West.¹⁴

The narcissistic and hegemonic West is what the status quo can discern from what it understands as the West's energetic efforts to transform Islam in Indonesia. Through the funding of various non-governmental organisations and think-tanks in Indonesia,¹⁵ the proponents of the status quo camp believe that the West is trying to create an Islam that is non-exclusive in its claim to salvation and the one that acknowledges the presence of salvation outside Islam.¹⁶ A fervent supporter of the status quo camp, Adian Husaini, calls this effort "brainwashing".¹⁷ In forcing its perspective on others and disregarding

¹⁴ Adian Husaini, "Muhammadiyah, Free Mason, dan Paham Lintas Agama," in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah*, 78.

¹⁵ Amien Rais, "Pluralisme Kebablasan (Interview with M. Amien Rais)," in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah*, 97; and Syamsul Hidayat et al., *Studi Kemuhammadiyah: Kajian Historis, Ideologis dan Organisasi* (Surakarta: Lembaga Pengembangan Ilmu-Ilmu Dasar Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta, 2010), 189. "Pluralisme Kebablasan" can be translated into English as "Pluralism that Has Gone Too Far".

¹⁶ Pasha and Darban, *Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam*, 194.

¹⁷ Adian Husaini, *Islam Liberal, Pluralisme Agama & Diabolisme Intelektual* (Surabaya: Risalah Gusti, 2005), 133.

other ways of life, the democratic West is considered undemocratic by the proponents of the status quo.

Unfortunately, by defining Indonesian democracy with regard to the country's respect for religions and by justifying the banning of religious teaching, namely Ahmadiyah, on the basis of a democratic argument, the proponents of the status quo have allowed no further contestation on the meaning of Indonesian democracy. Indonesian democracy, as any other democracy in the world, is an evolving system. This evolution is precipitated by the fact that societies change, as do their values and therefore their interpretation of democracy. For the proponents of the status quo, however, Indonesian democracy never changes in its respect for religions and its consequent prohibition of disrespectful acts against religions. Since Ahmadiyah, in their eyes, denies the basic teaching of Islam and thus insults the feeling of Muslims, it is only natural that the Indonesian government, in the name of Indonesian democracy, bans it. In doing this, it can be seen that while accusing the West of forcing its definition of democracy onto Muslims, the proponents of the status quo are committing the same mistake by enforcing their own definition of Indonesian democracy on their fellow citizens.

6.2 The Christian West

Secularism and pluralism notwithstanding, the status quo still sees the West as the representation of Christianity. There are two reasons why the proponents of this camp keep the image of the Christian West. The first is related to the history of contact between Christianity and Islam. On a more global level, this contact is epitomised in the image of the Crusades. The proponents of the status quo believe that the Crusades were caused mainly by the hatred of Christians towards Muslims. Pasha and Darban, for example, keep repeating the benign nature of Muslim soldiers during the Crusades as opposed to the barbarism of Christian soldiers in their telling of the story of the Crusades.¹⁸

The Crusades, however, are not just past history for the supporters of the status quo camp. The recent war on terror by George W. Bush, for the status quo, is a more

¹⁸ Pasha and Darban, *Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam*, 16-22.

recent Crusade on the part of the Christian West.¹⁹ On the global level, argue Pasha and Darban, the Christian West is conducting a war on Muslims on two fronts. The war is waged through the penetration of secularist and pluralist thoughts on Muslims' minds while still maintaining the spirit of its Christian Crusades in its physical war on what it sees as terrorism.

On the national level, the Christian West has never stopped its evangelistic efforts in Indonesia. The most favoured quote used by the proponents of status quo in establishing this notion is an assertion made by former Indonesian foreign minister and a scholar on Muhammadiyah, Alwi Shihab, that the main goal for the establishment of Muhammadiyah by Ahmad Dahlan was to defend Muslims from the efforts of Christian missions. Below is a quote from Shihab's book as used in an article written by two proponents of the status quo:

The presence of Christian missions, their penetration into this nation and their influence were the main factors triggering the emergence of the fiery religious spirit of KH Ahmad Dahlan, which eventually drove him to establish Muhammadiyah. The presence and penetration of Christianity was first and foremost the result of Dutch colonial efforts in facilitating the spirit of Christian missions.²⁰

It is believed within the status quo camp that ever since the inception of its colonial rule in Indonesia, the Dutch had always been supportive of the idea of Christianisation of the natives of the archipelago. As part of its colonial mission, Christianisation was aimed both at "saving the lost sheep" among the Dutch Indies population and at creating loyal Christian subjects who would serve the interest of the Dutch Crown.²¹ It is believed by the supporters of the status quo that Christian missions were mostly supported during the administration of Governor General Idenburg from

¹⁹ Ibid., 23.

²⁰ Alwi Shihab, *Membendung Arus: Respons Gerakan Muhammadiyah terhadap Misi Kristen di Indonesia sejak November 1912 hingga Masa Kini* (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1998), 195; This paragraph has often been quoted to support the status quo's stance with respect to the relation between Muhammadiyah and Christianity. One of these quotations can be found in Arif Wibowo and Mohammad Damami, "Misi Kristen melalui Budaya Jawa: Tantangan bagi Muhammadiyah," in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah*, 200. The title of Wiboso and Damami's article can be translated into English as "Christian Missions through Javanese Culture: Challenges for Muhammadiyah".

²¹ Pasha and Darban, *Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam*, 104.

1909 to 1916 with his *Kristening Politik* program. It was during his rule that Ahmad Dahlan established Muhammadiyah.²²

Ahmad Dahlan's initiative and the establishment of Muhammadiyah should be understood as a reaction towards the efforts of Christian missions in the Dutch Indies, argue the proponents of the status quo. Reflecting on the seriousness of the situation in the Indies, Dahlan is quoted as saying that "even though Islam will never vanish from the face of the earth, it is still possible that Islam will be obliterated completely from the face of the Dutch Indies".²³ Ahmad Dahlan could not stand idly in the face of this threat to Islam.

For the supporters of the status quo, the Christian West was aware of the potential of Islam as an anti-colonial force in the East Indies. From its colonial history, the Christian Dutch had learned that the worst threat to its colonial rule had always been the natives' Islamic spirit and that the centre of anti-colonial resistance in the East Indies has always been the *santri* communities,²⁴ due to their religious fervour against what the members of these communities saw as oppressive infidels. In the face of that threat, the Dutch employed the famous orientalist, Snouck Hurgronje, to advise the colonial government on how to weaken this potential. He recommended the "policy of association" to deal with this problem. With this policy, the natives would have been introduced to and intensively familiarised with Western culture and religion in the hope of steering them away from Islam.²⁵ The end result would not necessarily have been the abandonment of Islam by the natives; it is always sufficient for the Christian West if the indigenous Muslims hesitate about their choice of Islam and their pre-Islamic cultures.²⁶ In the eyes of the supporters of this camp, even until today, the Christian West still sees the opposing binary between Islam and the pre-Islamic associations of Javanese culture (*budaya Jawa*) as a necessity.²⁷

²² Ibid.

²³ Hidayat et al., *Studi Kemuhammadiyah*, 48.

²⁴ Pasha and Darban, *Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam*, 74.

²⁵ Hidayat et al., *Studi Kemuhammadiyah*, 51.

²⁶ Wibowo and Damami, "Misi Kristen melalui Budaya Jawa," 213.

²⁷ Ibid., 212.

If the first reason to maintain a negative image of the Christian West is to make Muslims aware of the on-going efforts of Christianisation of Indonesian Muslims, the second reason is that the status quo finds an ally in this image of the Christian West when it opposes both secularism and pluralism. For the status quo camp, the Christian West is both an enemy and an ally in its fight against efforts to undermine Islam. In arguing against pluralism, for example, Pasha and Darban refer not only to the voices among Muslims that see in this idea an irreverent tendency towards Islam's claim to salvation but also to the voices among Christians who still insist on its exclusive claim to salvation through faith in Jesus Christ.²⁸ What might be considered a sort of "unholy" alliance with the Christian West can also be found in the story told within this camp of how the Catholic Church had rejected pluralism.²⁹

In mentioning the above narrative about the tension between the Catholic Church and pluralism, Husaini states that it is natural for every religion to have an exclusive claim to salvation. Thus, for Pasha and Darban, pluralism as an ideology that undermines this exclusive claim is abnormal. There is a part of Western societies that understands this argument, namely those Christians with a more extreme leaning. To strengthen this argument, Husaini and other proponents of the status quo camp do not hesitate to use the opinions of these Christians and establish the "unholy" alliance with this stream of Christianity.

6.3 The Permissive West

For the status quo, the Western worldview is confused about how to properly position God and men. In its denial of the existence of ultimate morality, the permissive West has put men in a role that is supposed to be given to God. In the words of one of the supporters of the status quo,

Human beings, in the Western worldview, have ultimate freedom. They can rule their own lives and obtain the authority to determine for themselves what is good and what is bad. Even God has no say in this determining [good and bad].³⁰

²⁸ Pasha and Darban, *Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam*, 202-3.

²⁹ Husaini, "Muhammadiyah, Free Mason," 84.

³⁰ Zaini Munir, "Liberalisasi Syari'at Islam," in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah*, 74.

In the eyes of the proponents of the status quo, the Western societies have an understanding that human beings' ultimate freedom can only be reached if they manage to overcome the repressive power of social norms, of religion, and of God: only when God is made irrelevant in determining the values that human beings hold to be important, then human beings can claim their happiness. The source of happiness for Westerners, argue the proponents of the status quo, is when they are able to oppose social norms. The dichotomy of domination/resistance for the West in its definition of freedom and happiness is the source of the status quo's criticism of the West. The West, for example, cannot understand that for some women the acts of dedicating oneself to one's husband is a source of their happiness.³¹

The West and its tendency to consider different roles attributed to different sexes as differences in terms of hierarchy is, for the status quo, misguided. The status quo employs a qualitative perspective in looking at different roles given to men and women in Islam. These roles, its proponents argue, should not be regarded as differences in terms of hierarchy, as if those accorded to men are higher than those accorded to women, but instead as different roles prescribed with regard to different biological endowments. Two supporters of the status quo camp, for example, quote a Muslim woman of the same conviction:

A feminist once told me, "There is not one single verse in the Qur'an that states that only men can lead *shalat* [prayer]. My goal is to persuade women to want to lead prayers and to persuade people to accept women as *imam* [leader] of prayer, even though the prayer is held in a mosque". She added, "I have taught this to my daughter, so that she can be an *imam* in a *shalat* among men. Otherwise, women will continue to be repressed by men". I then told her that I did contrary to what she did. If my husband were not at home, I taught my son, who was 12 years old then, to be an *imam* in front of me. However, I did not feel even for a bit that my son can oppress me. As a matter of fact, my son is even more scared of me than of my husband because I spend more time at home. And of course, I have more authority in front of my children than my husband does.³²

The roles prescribed to women and men are not meant to give a higher position to men compared to women. Islam is fully aware of the nature of women and men. It

³¹ Okrisal Eka Putra and Adian Husaini, "Menguji Konsep Kesetaraan Gender," in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah*, 223.

³² Putra and Husaini, "Menguji Konsep Kesetaraan Gender," 228.

therefore assigns different roles for each of them. In other words, the roles prescribed by Islam to each sex are in accordance to what nature has endowed them. The donning of veil for women, as an example for the status quo, is a natural thing to do in order for them to “guard their dignity”.³³ In terms of marriage, the natural kind is that between a man and a woman. Homosexuality is therefore considered as “contradicting one’s nature” (“*menyalahi kodrat*”).³⁴

To be moral is to live according to what nature, and consequently Islam, has prescribed. Putra and Husaini, for example, argue that the differentiation between gender and sex, as suggested by Western feminism, contradicts the existence of nature since everything is up for deconstruction in feminism. If everything is a cultural construction, they argue, “the limits and roles of being ‘men’ and ‘women’ cease to exist”.³⁵ With this extreme viewpoint on the issue of gender, argue the proponents of the status quo, there is consequently no need to differentiate men and women any longer. Sexual division of labour is made irrelevant and men, as a sex that is considered a leader in human societies, cannot automatically assume this role. For the proponents of the status quo, this situation means chaos due to the lack of prescribed roles for men and women in society.

The status quo sees feminism as an idea that supports an unnatural mode of life for human beings, such as the abandonment of a family life and support for abortion and free sex.³⁶ Morality, for the proponents of the status quo, means living a family life, experiencing sex only within the institution of marriage, and respecting life. This moral life is perceived to be under attack by the power of international funding supporting programs that aim at deconstructing the concepts of Muslim family and society. One such program that receives considerable attention from Putra and Husaini is the Program for Gender Equality and Justice within the Ministry for the Empowerment of Women.³⁷ For Putra and Husaini, this program aims at incorporating foreign immoral views on marriage and society into the fabric of Indonesian society.³⁸

³³ Saleh Daulay, interview by author, Jakarta, June 13, 2011.

³⁴ Oneng Nurul Bariyah, interview by author, Jakarta, July 12, 2011.

³⁵ Putra and Husaini, “Menguji Konsep Kesetaraan Gender,” 226.

³⁶ Hidayat et al, *Studi Kemuhammadiyah*, 138.

³⁷ Putra and Husaini, “Menguji Konsep Kesetaraan Gender,” 218.

³⁸ *Ibid*, 223.

6.4 The Scientific West

Saleh Daulay asserts that God manifests His greatness in two things. The first sign of His greatness is what he calls *kauniyah*, the texts of the Qur'an. The second sign is *kauliyah*, the universe. Since it is the task of Muslims to understand His greatness, they are obliged to understand how the universe works as well.

Muhammadiyah considers that these two signs have an equal importance in showing the greatness of Allah. Therefore, the development in science and technology, in social sciences and natural sciences, are equally important for expressing the greatness of Allah and serving Him. There is no contradiction between religious sciences from those sciences considered as secular. That is why for Muhammadiyah, exact sciences, physics, chemistry, mathematics, etcetera are also the sciences of God.³⁹

Islam is not against science. For Islam, science provides another way besides religion to find the truth of the universe. In fact, in the course of history, Islam has been a religion "pregnant with the teachings that encourage the growth of science".⁴⁰ The decadence of Muslims in the face of the progress of the West was not caused by Islam but by the misunderstanding of Islam by most Muslims. It is therefore not unnatural that Muslim philosophers such as al-Afghani and Abduh were appreciative towards the progress of science in the West, and learned from it.

For the proponents of the status quo, the process of learning from the West, however, must be conducted selectively. Jamaluddin al-Afghani, an example they pose, warned Muslims not to accept the materialism of Western science. According to Pasha and Darban, he instead urged Muslims to take Western methods but imbue them with Islamic ethics.⁴¹ Ahmad Dahlan is the prime example of this selective borrowing from the West. In emulating the Western method of modern education, for example, Dahlan was careful to take what is good and leave behind its un-Islamic aspects.⁴²

³⁹ Saleh Daulay, interview by author, June 13, 2011.

⁴⁰ Hamid Fahmi Zarkasyi, "Islam sebagai Pandangan Hidup: Kajian Teoretis dalam Merespon Perang Pemikiran," in *Pemikiran Muhammadiyah*, 25.

⁴¹ Pasha and Darban, "Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam," 43.

⁴² Syukriyanto, "Istiqamah," 5.

The appropriation of the Western method, in the case of the status quo, should then be conducted conditionally. What Muhammadiyah can learn from the West is therefore limited to its methods, while it should jettison its values. Even when it comes to Western methods, Muhammadiyah should practise caution not to ruin the foundations of Islam for the sake of employing a certain Western method. In this light, it is logical to expect the proponents of the status quo to be critical of the employment of hermeneutical methods for interpreting texts.⁴³ While being appreciative of the Western method of natural science, the status quo is critical of its humanities and social sciences due to their potential to undermine Islamic values and perspectives.

The image of the scientific West, for the status quo, must not bedazzle Muslims and make them imitate the West unconditionally. Muslims should be proud that their religion is highly supportive of the development of science. Science for Muslims, however, is a science that is in accordance to what the Qur'an prescribes. The scientific West and its material achievements should be appreciated, but Muslims should know better than to learn from it unconditionally.

6.5 The Hegemonic West

Within those four images of an (un)democratic, Christian, permissive, and scientific West, the status quo see examples of ideals and values that should be critiqued by Muslims. Except for the image of the Christian West with its exclusive claim to salvation, the proponents of the status quo view the West as something that Islam should avoid. As long as the West keeps its ideology to itself, the supporters of the status quo see no problem. In their eyes, however, the West is unwilling to do this and instead aims at exporting its culture to non-Western societies.

For the proponents of the status quo, this extension of Western influence has resulted in a global clash of worldviews. The status quo puts a high emphasis on the idea of *ghazwul fikri* ("clash of worldviews"), an affirmative response to the thesis of the clash

⁴³ Syamsul Hidayat, "Penodaan dan Manipulasi Penafsiran terhadap Al-Qur'an," in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah*, 33.

of civilisations.⁴⁴ For Muhammadiyah, argue the proponents of the status quo, the reality of the existence of various worldviews makes this clash inevitable. The following quote comes from a text book on the study of Muhammadiyah used by undergraduate students in various Muhammadiyah universities. The section on *ghazwul fikri* is part of the last chapter of this book on the social roles of Muhammadiyah.

The image of *ghazwul fikri*, or clash of civilisations, might be an unpleasant scenario for many people, but this image reflects reality. The reality is that human beings are separated into various nations and civilisations. Because each civilisation has its own distinctive characteristic, the way people who belong to those different civilisations think will be different. If the way people of one civilisation think, or their viewpoint or moral values, is imported from or exported to other civilisations, it is certain that a chaos would occur within this civilisation. On a social level it will create a cultural shock and clash of perspectives. On the individual level it will cause conceptual confusion, and on the civilisational level it will cause a clash of civilisations or, to be more exact, a clash of worldviews.⁴⁵

On the one hand, the proponents of status quo see the diametrical differences between Islamic and Western worldviews explained in the book as an inevitable cause of the clash between the two civilisations. In other words, the clash of civilisations is a *natural* thing to happen amidst these differences. According to the book, the Islamic worldview is based simultaneously on revelation (as contained in the Qur'an and the Hadith), human reasoning, experience and intuition, while that of the West is characterised by rationality, speculation, and philosophies. In terms of approach, the Islamic worldview uses the principle of *tauhid* (Islamic understanding of the unity of the universe under the rule of one God), while the Western worldview uses a dichotomous approach, where materialism is opposed to idealism. The Islamic worldview is depicted as emphasising authenticity of revelation and is therefore closed to new interpretations, while the Western worldview is open-ended and ever-changing. Islamic worldviews contain the elements of the concept of God, the concept of revelation, human beings, science, religion, values and morality, while the Western worldview has the elements of

⁴⁴ Hidayat et al., *Studi Kemuhammadiyah*, 176; when discussing the clash of civilisations, Hidayat and other supporters of the status quo camp mainly refer to Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisation and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). An earlier use of the term "clash of civilisations" can be found in Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic* 266, no. 3 (1990): 47-60.

⁴⁵ Hidayat et al., *Studi Kemuhammadiyah*, 177.

religion, morality, philosophy, politics, freedom, equality and individualism. From these differences, the proponents of the status quo camp argue that the Islamic worldview puts religion as the basis for the entirety of its civilisation, while the Western worldview sees religion as only one element, among many, that builds civilisation.⁴⁶ Considering these differences, it is always certain that Islamic and Western worldviews, upon contact with each other, will clash.

On the other hand, the notion of the clash of civilisations as mainly promoted by Samuel Huntington, for the status quo, is a part of the many efforts of the West to repress Islam. In this sense, the notion of the clash of civilisations is formulated by the West *to justify* its programs of transforming Islam into a religion that is more Western-friendly. One proponent of the status quo says that “the present, rampant, discourse on religious pluralism is a new perspective that is produced as a result of the modern West’s cultural and intellectual penetration into Islam”.⁴⁷ For the status quo, the natural clash of civilisations has been turned into a legitimation for the West to launch its attack on the Islamic worldview. The present clash of civilisation between Islam and the West, therefore, is conducted on an uneven playing field.

The Western worldview is intruding into the Islamic world, but the opposite is not happening. The motivating factor for this intrusion is the Western world’s fear of the rise of Islam.

Reality shows that at the end of the twentieth century the Islamic world started to rise and wake up from its long sleep. This phenomenon created fear in the Western world. This fear was marked by, among others, the view of Huntington that puts Islam as the biggest enemy of capitalism after the end of the Cold War.⁴⁸

The main goal for the West in the present clash of civilisations is the disunity of Islam:

To anticipate the rise of the Islamic world, the West started to spread the issue of democracy in the form of *Islam Liberal* [Liberal Islam]. They created all kinds of terms to lure the Islamic world into their traps. Purposefully, the West also created a number of dichotomies, such as traditional-Islam/modern-Islam, moderate-Islam/fundamentalist-Islam, legalistic-formalistic-

⁴⁶ Ibid., 178.

⁴⁷ Fathurrahman Kamal, “Pluralisme Agama dalam Timbangan Muhammadiyah,” in *1 Abad Muhammadiyah*, 110.

⁴⁸ Pasha and Darban, *Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam*, 208.

Islam/normative-substantive-Islam, cultural-Islam/structural-Islam, inclusive-Islam/exclusive-Islam.⁴⁹

To do this, the West floods the Islamic world with a considerable amount of funding.⁵⁰ This funding is given to various non-governmental organisations and think tanks that are willing to accommodate the agenda of the West in creating a friendlier Islam. In Muhammadiyah, one of the funding sources that intruded into it came from The Asia Foundation for the publication of *Jurnal Tanwir* (“The Journal of Enlightenment”) by Pusat Studi Agama dan Peradaban (“The Centre for the Study of Religion and Civilisation”).⁵¹ The dominance of Liberal Islam over the true Islam is the goal of this funding:

Therefore it is fair to say that the problem of the Liberal Islam is rooted in the idea of Western democracy. Other thoughts as its derivatives are obviously based on this concept of democracy, such as the prescriptions for the separation of religion from the state, for women’s rights to political leadership and power, for freedom in the interpretation of religious texts, for freedom of thoughts and opinions, for religious tolerance, dialogue, and inclusivity, for pluralism, for religious democracy, etcetera.⁵²

For the proponents of the status quo, Western societies have used democracy to an extent that it is no longer just a general tool of governance but an ideology that supports the eradication of religions from public life and the permissiveness of human beings. It is this ideological democracy, argue the proponents of the status quo, which the West is keenly spreading towards non-Western societies, particularly the Muslim ones.

The status quo, moreover, does not expect the West to be consistent in dealing with Islam. On the one hand, the West tries to deconstruct Muslims’ morality in order to follow the precepts of the West.⁵³ On the other hand, the West is setting double standards in dealing with Muslims. Ever since colonial times,

every feeling and aspiration of Muslims has been insulted and misrepresented by the Christians.

What the Europeans call ‘nationalism’ and ‘patriotism’ in their own countries, if it is found in the

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ See Rais, “Pluralisme Kebablasan,” 97; and Hidayat et al., *Studi Kemuhammadiyah*, 189.

⁵¹ Husaini, *Islam Liberal*, 122.

⁵² Pasha and Darban, *Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam*, 208.

⁵³ Putra and Husaini, “Menguji Konsep Kesetaraan Gender,” 223.

East, it is dubbed “fanaticism”. And what is called ‘pride’, ‘honour’ and ‘national glory’, is dubbed ‘chauvinism’ if it is found in the East.⁵⁴

The Western efforts in transforming Islam are, for the status quo, both interventionist and hypocritical.

6.6 Concluding Comments: Status Quo’s Crisis of the Field

This hypocrisy of which the status quo accuses the West is to an extent comparable to what Minke experiences when he is faced with the discrepancy between Western ideals and the reality of the Dutch rule in the East Indies. Minke’s uneasiness comes after he sees that the West that he admires has contradicted its own ideals when dealing with the indigenous people. The comparable similarity between Minke and Muhammadiyah’s status quo, however, stops at this allegation of hypocrisy.

While Minke sees the hypocrisy of the West in terms of its universal ideas of freedom and justice, the proponents of the status quo in Muhammadiyah see this hypocrisy in terms of the particularistic elements of Western culture: of nationalism and patriotism. While Minke urges the West to be true to these universal ideas in dealing with the indigenous people, Muhammadiyah’s status quo longs for a West that acknowledges its own particularity as it also appreciates the particularity of others. What is worthy of being universalised by the West, for the status quo, is the appreciation of the particularism of each civilisation, starting with its own. It is not surprising, therefore, that among the various images the status quo has of the West, the only one that it can positively relate to is the image of the Christian West with its exclusive claim to salvation through its faith in Jesus Christ.

On another note, the act of appropriation prescribed in the story of Minke is different from the appropriation by the proponents of the status quo in Muhammadiyah. For Minke, the East can emulate the West in terms of both methods and values. Minke’s appropriation is extensive, while the appropriation by the proponents of the status quo is minimal. Islam, for them, can only benefit by emulating Western methods, *not* its values. In terms of methods, nevertheless, Muslims should be careful not to appropriate any

⁵⁴ Pasha and Darban, *Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam*, 73.


method that will be detrimental to the foundations of Islam. The appropriation of the West by the status quo is highly selective.

The West, for the proponents of the status quo, needs to understand that what it has considered to be universal values are actually particular ones that were the products of its specific histories. Its insistence on spreading them is thus misguided for two reasons. First, as has been explained, the specificity of its values will not be welcomed by people with another set of values. A fiercer clash of civilisations is unavoidable if the West keeps pushing its agenda of universalisation. Second, what the West considers as its own achievement worthy to be universalised has in fact been achieved by other civilisations as well. The basic principle of government by the people in democracy, for example, is also recognised in Islam, as well as the principles of science and the empowerment of women, among others. The West should understand the possibility of qualitative differences between civilisations. Islamic democracy, as well as Islamic discourse on scientific progress and Islamic dictates on the role for women, for example, does not necessarily coincide with what the West understands. The West, nevertheless, needs to appreciate these qualitative differences and let Islam develop on its own course.

By way of conclusion, the proponents of the status quo in Muhammadiyah perceive the crisis in their organisation as stemming from the hegemony of the Western worldview over the Islamic worldview. The fear invoked by this sense crisis is caused by the perceived intrusion of the Western worldview into the Islamic field. Unlike the story of Minke, the enemy for the status quo is neither injustice nor oppression: it is the West itself with its hegemonic, universalising, and therefore unjust and oppressive, tendencies.

With regard to Bourdieu's sociology, the status quo perceives its familiar field as being threatened by the intrusion of Western values. The camp's supporters see their familiar field as being threatened and their field's boundaries as under threat of being destroyed by the presence of Western influence. With the fear of the intrusion of the Western worldview into their own, the proponents of the status quo are experiencing an uncertainty to the boundaries of their old and familiar field. With respect to this experience of uncertainty, Figure 6.1 provides a visual description of the status quo's perceived crisis and the impact of this crisis on their old *habitus*.

Figure 6.1 The Status Quo's Crisis of the Field



The efforts of the West, through the works of highly-funded non-governmental organisations, blur the limit of the status quo's field through the intrusion of the Western worldview. The boundaries of the familiar field are therefore no longer firmly established. With the intrusion of the Western worldview, the old boundaries are being shaken and undermined. In this respect, the proponents of the status quo are experiencing what Bourdieu calls "hysteria of *habitus*", a term that refers to an inability of social agents to adjust their predispositions, as part of their *habitus*, to the changing field. For social agents with hysteria of *habitus*, the solution for this crisis lies only in the consolidation of their old field. The status quo's fight at the moment is therefore aimed at reconsolidating the limits of their old, familiar, field.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE REFORM CAMP'S PERCEPTION OF THE WEST

The West is not necessarily bad. The Middle East is not necessarily good....¹

As we have seen in Chapter 3, we can identify five distinct reform projects in Muhammadiyah, which I refer to as the theological, pluralism, socio-economic, cultural, and gender projects. In the above quote, Mohammad Shofan, a former lecturer of Muhammadiyah University in Gresik who was expelled because of publication of his reformist writing in a local newspaper, implies that some ideas on reform in Muhammadiyah do come from the West. Contrary to the status quo camp, Shofan sees the presence of the West as an invigorating source of energy for a reinterpretation of Islam. Reinterpretation, for him, does not mean the abandonment of Islamic practices and duties. He asserts that there is no proof that reform projects are transforming Islamic practices. In fact, reinterpretation strives to give relevance to Islamic rituals and if, in updating the relevance of Islam, the proponents of reform borrow Western methods, this should be welcomed and not rejected. The main focus of reinterpretation should be on the relevance of Islam, not the origin of the method it employs. Indeed, should the methods used in the Middle East for reinterpreting Islam bring irrelevance and not relevance to Islam, Muslims should still be critical of that method, even though the Middle East is the birth place of Islam.

The argument in this chapter is that the proponents of the reform camp in Muhammadiyah have a different sense of crisis compared to their status quo counterparts. Contrary to the latter, the reform projects do not see the West as an enemy. As a civilisational entity, the West has many faces that should be properly understood before one can judge its contribution to humanity.

¹ Mohammad Shofan, interview by author, Jakarta, June 24, 2011.

In this respect, reform projects have a set of more diverse images of the West; most are positive but there is a negative one as well. The West cannot be easily categorised as the enemy of Islam. At best, the West should be considered as one source of knowledge, among many, from which Islam can learn.

7.1 The Comrade West

The supporters of the reform projects in Muhammadiyah see the West as a partner in a search for a better world. To give one example, the gender project sees Western feminism as its partner in its efforts to empower women and to liberate them from socially sanctioned oppression. The current chairwoman of the female wing of Muhammadiyah, Aisyiyah, comments,

I see that there is no contradiction [between Islam and feminism]. Feminism is in tune with the values inherent in Islam on how to see women. The real point [of feminism] is the struggle to bring about justice for women. This struggle [includes] the removing of oppressive social and cultural constructs in order to create a sense of justice for both men and women, as expressed in programs of gender mainstreaming.... If we look at feminism from the perspective of Islam, there is no problem. Whatever stream of feminism one belongs to, whether radical or otherwise, it is only a matter of strategy. Every group, every person, will take note of [their environment] and accordingly set the right strategy [for that environment].²

The goals for both Western feminism and the gender project of the reform camp are one and the same: the liberation of women from oppressive social constructs. The West, with its specific situation, requires a specific interpretation by feminist movements in order to achieve this goal, while specific situations in Islam require a contextual strategy from Muslims.

For the proponents of the reform camp, the West is not an enemy that should be fought. The West is a comrade in a common struggle for the creation of a just world. The proponents of this camp see the West as having gone through various changes. In this regard, Dzuhayatin, one of the women championing the cause of a gender-sensitive Muhammadiyah, regards Christianity, of which Muhammadiyah had been critical during the time of the organisation's inception, as a religion that has gone through the same

² Siti Noordjannah Djohantini, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 28, 2011.

struggle that Muhammadiyah finds itself in at the moment. Christianity was confronted with secularism and only managed to make peace with it after a long and arduous process.³

The result of this process is Christianity's stance that secularism must not be seen as a threat to religion and that secularism should not be responded to negatively. Yet even at present, Christianity's struggle with secularism in the West cannot be said to have been completely resolved. The emergence of militant anti-religious sentiment in some parts of Europe is an example of the tasks that the West needs to resolve.⁴ For the reform projects, both Islam and Christianity in the West are in the same boat in their common struggle in a changing world.

The critical attitude of Muhammadiyah towards Christian missions in the early twentieth century can no longer be used to justify the organisation's anti-Christian spirit. The emulation of the Dutch method of Christian education and health services by Muhammadiyah in its early years should be considered as the organisation's participation in the performance of good deeds. Haedar Nashir, as quoted in an article titled "The Pluralis Islamic Face of Muhammadiyah: From a Theology of Praxis to a Theology of Pluralism", comments,

[Muhammadiyah] opposed Christian missions by emulating what they had done, such as by establishing schools, hospitals, and orphanages. At this point I think Muhammadiyah's resistance to Christian missions should be understood not as resistance in a violent sense.⁵

In this respect, it is inaccurate to see Muhammadiyah as an anti-Christian movement. What Muhammadiyah has done is compete with the Christian West to perform good deeds for fellow human beings. Syamsul Arifin, as quoted in an article titled "Post-Puritanism Muhammadiyah", goes further by saying that this competition eventually can

³ Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, "Andai Kiai Dahlan Mengatakan 'Aku Serahkan Muhammadiyah Padamu'," in *Satu Abad Muhammadiyah: Mengkaji Ulang Arah Pembaruan*, ed. Taufik Hidayat and Iqbal Hasanuddin (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2010), 42.

⁴ As an example of this sentiment, Dzuhayatin mentions the case of extreme secular ideology movement in France. (Ibid, 43.)

⁵ Zuly Qodir, "Wajah Islam Pluralis Muhammadiyah: Dari Teologi Praksis ke Teologi Pluralis," *Tanwir* 1, no. 2 (2003): 22.

be considered as a form of cooperation between religious communities in their contribution to the creation of “a true brotherhood”.⁶

Moeslim Abdurrahman adds to this debate by asserting that it is of no use to worry about Christianisation or Islamisation at the present moment since both conversion efforts occur simultaneously. Abdurrahman urges Muhammadiyah’s leaders to understand this fact and use their reason to respond to it. He also states that what should be the main concern for all humanity at the moment are the negative effects of globalisation that not only hurt Muslims:

It is necessary to understand that the injustice brought by globalisation is happening everywhere, not only among Muslims. There are Muslims who are being marginalised, as there are also Muslims who are oppressing other people, Muslims who are rich, and Muslims who are hungry. The problem is not whether you are a Muslim or non-Muslim; we are all part of human civilisation. The unjust process of globalisation, I think, should be transformed collectively – and not only for Muslims.⁷

Abdurrahman disagrees with the idea of a “clash of civilisations”. From the above quote we can understand that he thinks of civilisation as a general concept comprising Muslims and non-Muslims alike. As he said in the same interview, “from the start [of the idea of a clash of civilisations], I have considered it to be polemical and I do not agree with the notion that we can label something as either West or East”. Responding to the tendency of the proponents of the status quo to treat this idea as reality, he argues that this tendency is caused by the fear that Muslims will lose their Islamic identity in their admiration for what they consider as “the West”. More specifically, this fear is based on Muhammadiyah’s confusion on where to position Islam in the face of the seemingly diminishing relevance of religion in human lives. This fear, for Abdurrahman, will not benefit human civilisation. Instead, one has to embrace as many sources of knowledge as possible.

⁶ Hilman Latief, “Post-Puritanisme Muhammadiyah: Studi Pergulatan Wacana Keagamaan Kaum Muda Muhammadiyah 1995-2002,” *Tanwir* 1, no. 2 (2003): 83.

⁷ Moeslim Abdurrahman, interview by author, Jakarta, July 5, 2011.

There are too many windows that need to be looked through and too many wells [whose water] needs to be drunk.... If there is too much “self-blocking”..., shutting oneself off [from the world], it is as if there were ghosts everywhere.⁸

What Abdurrahman means by “self-blocking” in the above quote is the act of consciously isolating oneself from the world. Some Muslims isolate themselves because they are scared that foreign worldviews might make them lose their faith. Isolation, for Abdurrahman, is not the answer. As globalisation is a phenomenon affecting all parts of the globe and all human communities, the correct and proportionate response is to invite as many people as comrades and as many methods as possible into humanity’s common struggle.

7.2 The West as a Teacher

As mentioned at the start of this chapter, reform projects adopt many thoughts and concepts from Western philosophical vocabularies, such as liberalism, pluralism and gender, in their arguments for the need of transformation in Muhammadiyah. With respect to the importance of learning from Western civilisation, on the one hand, Shofan believes that there are many positive aspects from Western culture that can be borrowed for the progress of the Islamic world. On the other hand, Abdurrahman reminds us that learning from Western culture is as imperative as learning from any other culture in the world. The uniqueness of the West, however, lies in the fact that it has dealt earlier with those issues presently affecting Islam in general and Muhammadiyah specifically.

History has shown that many Muslim thinkers have looked to the West when they imagined a civilised and progressive community. For example, Ali Jinnah and Mohammad Iqbal, the founders of Pakistan and modernist Muslim figures *par excellence*, took the West as the model for their political ideas.⁹ (Emphasis in original)

What Shofan means by Western-inspired political ideas are no other than the secularism in which religions are not allowed to intimidate the lives of human beings. Islam, for Shofan, already contains the idea of secularism. The presence of the West that has already experienced secularism only sensitises Muslims to secularism in Islam.

⁸ Moeslim Abdurrahman, interview by author, Jakarta, July 5, 2011. The term “self-blocking” here comes from Abdurrahman. The meaning of this term is close to “self-screening”.

⁹ Mohammad Shofan, “Satu Abad Muhammadiyah: ‘Matinya Pembaruan’ dalam Bingkai ‘Kembali ke al-Qur’an dan al-Sunnah’,” in *Satu Abad Muhammadiyah*, xxvi.

Secularism is really about the separation between worldly affairs and religious affairs...and Islam teaches this separation. For an example, there is a *hadist* that says, “work in the world as if you will live forever, and serve your God as if you will die tomorrow”. Muslims must not only work diligently with regard to worldly affairs, but also imagine that they may die tomorrow so that [they] will be sincere in [their] religious practices. This is what most Muslims do not understand.¹⁰

Besides secularism, the West also teaches Islam about liberalism and again sensitises Muslims to the potential of a liberal Islam. Shofan has this to say with regard to this idea:

Liberalism emerged as a reaction towards the situation at the time of its birth. Liberalism was born from the Renaissance and the Enlightenment.... With regard to Islam, the ideology of liberalism is used as a language to represent the “West”, to remind Muslims about the West, and to invite Islam to join the liberal, free, and rational world. As a reaction to the situation surrounding its birth, Liberal Islam offers an approach that is non-rigid and non-scriptural for presenting progressive Islamic ideas. The ideology that it offers starts from an acknowledgement of the situation at present.¹¹

For the proponents of reform projects, the Western Enlightenment has become the property of all humanity, including Muslims. The projects are highly appreciative of the idea of the Enlightenment. For its proponents, the myth of enlightenment in the history of Muhammadiyah as well as any idea of reform in the organisation is similar to the specific event of the Enlightenment in Europe a few centuries ago.¹²

The difference between the proponents of reform projects and those of the status quo is obvious. As explained in the previous chapter, the latter views the birth of secularism and pluralism in the history of the West as a defensive reaction to the trauma of the church’s totalitarianism, while the proponents of the reform projects see the Enlightenment that gave birth to both secularism and pluralism as a positive event. Consequently, the proponents of the status quo would like to see the West keep its idea of the Enlightenment to itself while those of the reform projects see the universalisation of that idea as a good thing.

¹⁰ Mohammad Shofan, interview by author, Jakarta, June 24, 2011.

¹¹ Shofan, “Satu Abad Muhammadiyah,” xxix.

¹² Iqbal Hasanuddin, “Kritik dan Utopia: Telaah atas Gagasan M. Dawam Rahardjo,” in *Satu Abad Muhammadiyah*, 57.

7.3 The Misguided West

The reform projects' admiration of the West, however, does not come unconditionally. In this third image of the West, the proponents of the reform projects see that there are some negative aspects of the West that need to be addressed. This criticism does not make the proponents of the reform projects see the West as their enemy. On the contrary, the "disease" from which the West suffers is considered the disease of the whole of humanity and therefore needs to be tackled together. Furthermore, these proponents see the West's disease as affecting Islam as well.

The first critique from the reform projects is related to colonialism in the West's history. With regard to the Dutch Indies, the presence of colonialism had benefitted the efforts of Christian missions in the archipelago and simultaneously marginalising Islam. The unfair treatment of Islam under colonialism had planted the seed for anti-Christian sentiment in Muhammadiyah. Ahmad Dahlan complained about this colonial bias:

Muslims can also ask for subsidies for their schools as long as they fulfil the same requirements as Christians. However, to establish elementary schools or schools for teachers, conditions are set that make it difficult for Muslims to do this.... Our land is the land of Islam but both the Catholics and the Protestants are given better opportunity to propagate their religions. They get a lot of money, a lot of subsidies. They think of this land as their own.¹³

For the proponents of the reform projects, Christianity is not the enemy of Islam. Colonialism, as the local context when Muslims had first contact with Christianity in the Dutch Indies, is another case. The history of colonialism tainted what could have been a harmonious relationship between Muslims and Christians. As a result of this entanglement of colonialism and Christianity, the violence and oppression of colonialism has also been associated with Christianity whenever the history of Muhammadiyah is concerned.¹⁴

The second critique is directed towards the issue of modernity. Western modernity is considered to be neglectful of the question of spiritualism. The proponents of the reform camp find in Western modernity the tendency to view religions as a thing of

¹³ As quoted in Latief, "Post-Puritanisme Muhammadiyah," 49.

¹⁴ Abdul Rohim Ghazali, "Pluralisme dan Toleransi dalam Perspektif Muhammadiyah," *Tanwir* 1, no. 2 (2003): 8.

the past and therefore of no relevance to progress, as explained in an article titled “Why is Muhammadiyah’s Modernity Put in Doubt?”.¹⁵ As a result, Western modernity is considered to be misguided while irreligiosity is seen as leading human beings astray. An anecdote from a proponent of the reform projects below might explain the projects’ assumption of the spiritual aridity of Western modernity:

As an example, many of those who believe in secularism and have a huge amount of wealth are confused about what to do with their wealth as they grow old. It is not rare to find these people eventually make a will with detailed instructions of what to do with their funerals and how to use their money to take care of their pet dogs until they die.¹⁶

Modernity is also considered to be exclusivist in its claim for the truth. The proponents of the reform camp see modernity as “Euro-centric” and mainly concerned with the generalisation of the history of humanity in accordance with the standardised history of Europe and the Western world in general.¹⁷ Dzuhayatin asserts that “there is one thing about modernity that is now in need of a review: its exclusive claim to validity”.¹⁸ Modernity’s truth claim, based on the convergence of the ideas of positivism and empiricism,¹⁹ is considered by Dzuhayatin to be an ailment that has kept it from engaging other points of view.

This “disease” has also affected Muhammadiyah in its efforts to emulate the West. Among the proponents of the reform projects there is doubt about the appropriateness of keeping the label “modern” for Muhammadiyah as an organisation. There are two factors that underpin this doubt. The first is the perception that at present Muhammadiyah is no longer representing Islamic modernity, an identity that has so often been attributed to this movement, as explained by Dawam Rahardjo in his article titled

¹⁵ M. Saad Ibrahim, “Mengapa Modernitas Muhammadiyah Digugat?” in *Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah: Refleksi Satu Abad Perjalanan Muhammadiyah*, ed. Ajang Budiman and Pradana Boy (Jakarta: Grafindo, 2010), 30.

¹⁶ Muhadjir Effendy, “Membincang Modernisme Muhammadiyah,” in *Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah*, 23.

¹⁷ Dzuhayatin, “Andai Kiai Dahlan Mengatakan,” 39.

¹⁸ Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011. Dzuhayatin is a strong supporter for gender reform efforts in Muhammadiyah and is critical towards the label “modern” often attached to the organisation. Due to her strong stance with respect to reform efforts in Muhammadiyah, Dzuhayatin is often dubbed the “Lioness of Muhammadiyah”.

¹⁹ Ibrahim, “Mengapa Modernitas Muhammadiyah Digugat?” 30.

“Revisiting Muhammadiyah as an Islamic Organisation Oriented towards Renewal”.²⁰ If modernity is defined as a state of mind that is oriented towards progress, the present Muhammadiyah is far from it. The dominance of the pro-status quo viewpoints in Muhammadiyah, for Dzuhayatin, has brought stagnation within this organisation.²¹ In her view, Muhammadiyah is *not* modern.

Furthermore, the proponents of the reform camp are not certain that it is modernity that Muhammadiyah should try to attain. The factor reinforcing this doubt is related to the general disease of modernity in its exclusivist claim to the truth. For the proponents of the reform projects, this exclusivist claim is not much different from the puritan tendency present within Muhammadiyah today. Instead of modernity with its right/wrong dichotomy, argues Dzuhayatin, this organisation should assess any opinion in terms of what is relevant for Muslims at a certain time and place. Dzuhayatin gives an example when she explains her opinion of Amina Wadud, an American feminist Muslim famous for her encouragement for Muslim women to lead Islamic prayers, “If I were asked if Indonesia should join Amina Wadud in allowing women to be leaders in prayers, I would suggest that we firstly consider whether this issue [of allowing women to be *imam*] is relevant for Indonesia.”²²

The third critique of the reform projects of the West is related to what they see as its misconception of Islam. With regard to the issue of terrorism particularly, the West has often simplified Islam as a religion that promotes terrorism. On the American “War on Terror”, Qodir argues that

the accusation that the 11 September incident was related to Islam as a “religious institution” is certainly unacceptable for Muslims. This notion, coming from the United States of America, of

²⁰ M. Dawam Rahardjo, “Mengkaji Ulang Muhammadiyah sebagai Organisasi Islam Berorientasi Pembaruan,” in *Satu Abad Muhammadiyah*, 16.

²¹ Dzuhayatin, “Andai Kiai Dahlan Mengatakan,” 37.

²² Dzuhayatin, interview by author, Yogyakarta, July 29, 2011. Dr. Amina Wadud is an American female Muslim scholar who has written many works on the status and role of women in Islam. One of her assertions is the permissibility of women to become leaders (*imam*) in a prayer (*shalat*); see Trisha Sertori, “Dr. Amina Wadud: For a Progressive Islam,” *The Jakarta Post*, November 19, 2009, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/11/19/dr-amina-wadud-for-a-progressive-islam.html>.

the new chapter of the Crusades (the Second Crusade)²³ by George W. Bush is considered a “cheap issue” that is aimed at discrediting Islam, even after this notion was corrected.²⁴

In fact, Qodir continues, Islam is a religion of tolerance, a religion that appreciates all human beings regardless of their religion and ethnicity. Islam is a religion that loves peace. Islam does not recognise discrimination. As a matter of fact, Islam is a religion that defends the weak and the oppressed, and a religion that strives to liberate human beings from ignorance and poverty. Therefore, it is unacceptable that Islam is considered a religion that spreads terror and does not appreciate pluralism.²⁵

For supporters of the reform projects, the true Islam respects the same values as Western civilisation. The problem lies in the perception of the West towards Islam. Islam does not need to change or justify itself to the West. Islam, if practiced truthfully, acknowledges the plurality of human beings. What need to be changed are Western perceptions of Islam.

7.4 Concluding Comments: Reform's Crisis of the Field

Unlike the status quo, the reform projects thus have a more varied set of images of the West. In the first two images the West is depicted positively, both as teacher and comrade for Islam. As a teacher, the West has much to offer Islam. Learning about the West's Enlightenment might help Islam understand how to cope with the present world. Pluralism, secularism, and liberalism as the products of the West's Enlightenment have been worthy insights from which Islam can learn. In the context of Indonesia, where plurality is a reality, Muslims should be willing to engage in a dialogue with other religious communities on how to construct a social system that would allow each community to flourish and consequently contribute to the progress of the nation. For reform projects, the set of pluralism, secularism, and liberalism, as understood from the Indonesian perspective and contextualised in the spirit of Islam, can provide a way out of the religious tension that has marred Indonesia's post-1998 history.

²³ In this quote Qodir generalised eight (or sometimes nine) Crusades focused on Jerusalem during the Middle Ages as the First Crusade and the War on Terrorism as the Second Crusade.

²⁴ Qodir, “Wajah Islam Pluralis Muhammadiyah,” 13.

²⁵ Ibid., 13-14.

Also unlike the status quo, the reform projects do not recognise the validity of the notion of a clash of civilisations. The proponents of the reform projects indeed use the word “West” in expressing their opinions, but the use of this word is intended to show that beneficial results can also come from foreign lands and foreign perspectives. By using this word, the proponents of the reform projects assert that the West and its foreignness are worthy of appropriation by Muslims in their common search for the universal good.

The comrade West is not different from Islam in its struggle to find what constitutes a good life for humanity. For the reform projects, the West and Islam are in a common struggle in their search. As Muslims are trying to find their place in a world that pays less and less attention to spirituality, the West is facing the same challenge. The place of religion in this evolving world is a question that is faced equally by both the West and Islam. In this light, we can understand that despite its misperception, the West should not be considered an enemy. The misconception of the West is a misconception of all humanity. Muslims can learn from these mistakes – as the West is also struggling to overcome the effects of these mistakes.

In the face of globalisation, the differences between the West and Islam dissolve and any faith in the notion of the clash of civilisations is doubtful. Within the ongoing process of globalisation and the rolling back of the welfare state system, both Muslims and non-Muslims alike are affected by the rampant individualisation of risk.²⁶ Moeslim Abdurrahman’s work tells us that the effects of globalisation in the form of privatisation are not only experienced by the people of the Western world. In this regard, Abdurrahman extends the notion of late modernity²⁷ to a non-European terrain²⁸ with its trait of individualization of risk as welfare states retreat from the lives of their citizens.²⁹ At stake in this process of globalisation, argues Abdurrahman, is the relevance of community life.

²⁶ Sam Binkley, “Governmentality, Temporality and Practice: From the Individualization of Risk to the ‘Contradictory Movement of the Soul’,” *Time & Society* 18, no. 1 (2009): 88.

²⁷ Ulrich Beck, Wolfgang Bonns, and Christoph Lau, “The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme,” *Theory Culture Society* 20, no. 2 (2003): 7.

²⁸ Moeslim Abdurrahman, “Politik Umat, Politik Pemberdayaan,” in *Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah*, 73.

²⁹ Binkley, 88.

Compared to the status quo, the reform projects are closer to the appropriation of the West as exemplified by the life of Minke. The West at one point is a teacher for the reform projects, while at another it makes the latter realise that the universal values offered by the West are not its exclusive property. On contact with the West, Muslims should derive as many benefits as possible. In this light, I characterise the appropriation of the West by the reform projects as *extensive*.

If one would visually depict the differences between the status quo and reform projects in terms of their assessment of the worthiness of the West for appropriation, one can achieve it with two different diagrams. Figure 7.1 shows how the status quo sees the almost diametrical differences between Islam and the West. Intersection between the two exists but it is kept to a minimum. The situation with the reform projects is different. This camp sees both Islam and the West as identities with indistinct borders. The borders between the two are always open for rearrangement. The possibility for intersection between the two is wider than the status quo's and therefore provides ample space for the renewal and reinterpretation of Islam.

The enemy of the reform projects, as Minke also realised, is not the West but injustice and oppression. In the *Buru Tetralogy*, the injustice and oppression that Minke faces are the result of the colonial policies of the West. During the time of the proponents of the reform projects, these two vices are brought in by a new form of globalisation. Poverty, marginalisation, hedonism, consumerism, and socio-economic gaps are some of the negative effects of globalisation that both Islam and the West need to address at present.

Figure 7.1 Status Quo's Islam vs. West





Figure 7.2 Reform's Fluid Identity




In terms of Bourdieu's notions, globalisation has brought the challenge of the extension of the field. With this change, it is impossible for Muslims to isolate themselves in their old, familiar, field. Similar to the status quo, the reform projects see the boundaries of the old field as disintegrating. Contrary to the status quo, however, the reform projects see this process not as an intrusion but a necessity to adjust to a new globalised condition; the breaking down of the old field's limit is caused by a changing world, not by the hegemonic invasion of a Western worldview. The transformation of the old field, for the proponents of these projects, is therefore unavoidable. Any effort to reconsolidate the old field and therefore to detach oneself from on-going changes in the field is counterproductive. Instead of insisting on reconsolidating the old field, Muslims should accept and adapt to this extension of their field.

As Figure 7.3 shows, the crisis of Muhammadiyah for the reform projects does not lie in the extension of the field but on the stubbornness of the old field to relocate its boundaries. The old boundaries should be extended in order to adapt to the reality of the globalising world. By expanding the limit of one's field, it is more likely that a solution to the challenges of globalisation can be found. In this respect, while the response of the status quo to the disintegration of the old field springs from a "hysteria", that of the reform camp arises from "a margin of freedom" that allows its proponents to envision a Muhammadiyah that is progressive.

This freedom, however, should be understood in a Bourdieusian way: it is bound to the reflective *habitus* of Muhammadiyah's members. As explained in Chapter Four, this boundedness can be discerned from the reform projects' insistence on the relevance of rationality in their search for the solution to globalisation's negative effects, as well as on the reform projects' maintenance of old vocabularies, such as "infidels" and "idols" – albeit with new meanings attached – to convey their message.

Figure 7.3 The Reform Project's Crisis of the Field



With regard to the issue of the changing field, both camps realise the existence of other fields belonging to other communities. The distinctive response from the proponents of the reform projects, however, lies in their willingness to embrace the expansion of their field as a necessity. For the reform camp, the expansion of the field's limits is a double movement on the part of the particularity of Islam. On the one hand, Islam, by accepting the newly extended field, is subjected to a higher standard of assessment. The solution that can come out of accepting the newly extended field will go beyond the particularity of Islam because of its inclusion of other ways of thinking, especially those coming from the West.

On the other hand, the subjection of Islam to a more diverse set of benchmarks does not mean that Muslims should abandon the particularity of Islam. Instead, it will bring to it a higher level of relevance. By engaging in a wider field, the reform projects assert, Muslims will have a greater chance of bringing Islamic particularity into wider relevance; and by this engagement, Islam will be transformed into a religion of more universal significance. The way forward for Muslims should be to work together with the West and other particularities, and not against them. By doing so, Islam and its particularity can contribute to finding the solutions to the challenges presented by the present world.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

There are two main theses elaborated throughout preceding chapters. The first one is related to the place of *habitus* as a generative structure in Muhammadiyah. Defined as a set of predispositions shared by members of a society, the Muslim *habitus* in Muhammadiyah contains the potential for generating a set of practices among its members. Both the proponents of the status quo and those of reform projects have their own distinct definition of what constitutes true Islamic practices; however, these different practices stem from a shared predisposition, a predisposition that is reflective in nature.

The second thesis extends the first one by relating a crisis within the field of a society to the presence of what is considered to be a foreign element. The presence of the “Other” in the once familiar field necessitates a response from that society. As expected, the proponents of the status quo have a response to this change in the field that is different from the supporters of reform projects. How each of the camps perceives crisis in their field in turn determines how they respond to the idea of reform within Muhammadiyah.

This chapter will review research findings surrounding those two theses. The first part of this chapter will summarise the arguments of each chapter, followed by my responses to the two research questions posed at the beginning of my research. The last part will suggest a useful direction for future research in relation to the study of both Muhammadiyah and the discourse of *habitus*.

8.1 Summary of the Arguments

After setting the background for my research in Chapter One, this dissertation continues by establishing the basic predisposition of members of Muhammadiyah in Chapter Two. There are three basic mental predispositions that constitute Muslim *habitus* in

Muhammadiyah, which I argued in Chapters Two and Four are exemplified by the life of Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah whom I dub “the exemplary Man”, and his experience of enlightenment (*pencerahan*). The first predisposition is belief in human capacity to reflect on one’s environment and to gain consciousness of one’s basic missions in the world. The second predisposition is belief in the presence of divine providence in the daily lives of human beings, with this presence manifest through the fruit of human actions. The third predisposition is faith in the possibility for human beings to attain enlightenment when God acknowledges the worth of human effort.

Understanding Muhammadiyah’s history thus requires us to comprehend the emphasis that history places on both human actions and God’s deliverance. As Chapter Two shows, the history of Muhammadiyah as formalised in *The Profile* perfectly reflects the three ideas mentioned above. These three ideas did not emerge for the first time in *The Profile*. In his Seven Philosophical Teachings, recorded by his youngest student Hadjid, Dahlan himself, as the exemplary Man, taught that the capacity of human reason to understand the truth is not contradictory to divine revelation.¹ In Dahlan’s seven philosophical teachings, both divine revelation and human reason are parallel channels to reach the truth.

The assumption of human ability to get a clear understanding of one’s environment is a symptom of what I call reflectivity in Muhammadiyah. Chapter Three, which deals with both reform and status quo projects, is an introduction to the discussion on reflectivity in Muhammadiyah. Faith in human reason as the key to progress is evident in both camps; the choice to support either the status quo or reform projects is based on the use of what each camp considers to be the acceptable method in interpreting the Qur’an. In expounding both camps’ opinions with respect to the need for reform, I have also shown how each camp realises the limits to its freedom in interpreting the Qur’an. While the proponents of the status quo urge a more restricted method in this interpretation, the supporters of reform projects see the status quo’s methodical restriction as a refusal to bind Islam to a higher standard, a standard that is set not by the traditionalist religious scholars but by people of different conviction, namely the West.

¹ See K. R. H. Hadjid, *Pelajaran KHA Dahlan: 7 Falsafah Ajaran & 17 Kelompok Ayat Al-Qur’an* (Yogyakarta: Lembaga Pustaka dan Informasi Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2008), 26-27.

Notwithstanding their differences, both camps acknowledge the limits to human interpretation of the text as well as the limits to human freedom. In other words, both the status quo and reform camps admit to the boundedness of human interpretation to a particular *habitus*.

The idea of a bounded freedom resonates well with Bourdieu's understanding of the concept of *habitus*. Employing Bourdieu's sociology, the fourth chapter of this dissertation is an explicit elaboration of the reflective predisposition in Muhammadiyah. Reading this chapter, one should relate it to my earlier elaboration in Chapter One on the difference between reflectivity and reflexivity. What I mean by reflectivity is the assumption of social agents' capacity to treat themselves as autonomous of their environments. With this capacity, it is assumed that human beings will be able to analyse their environment in a rational manner and to determine what is to be executed within that environment.

Meanwhile, reflexivity is the capacity of human beings to analyse their surroundings by always assuming one's position within, not outside, that environment. Bourdieu refers to this environment as the field. Reflexivity belongs to each and every *habitus*. The strategy a social agent employs to live in the field cannot be separated from his/her predisposition. How one perceives the game one plays inside the field, to use a sports analogy, depends on one's *habitus*. In the case of Muhammadiyah, the *habitus* of its members is marked by the *illusio* of reflectivity. It is reflectivity, and the assumption of human rational capacities that goes with it, which predisposes Muhammadiyah's members to a certain set of practices, and not others. To put it differently, the spontaneous predisposition of Muhammadiyah's members, or their reflexivity, is tied to their reflective inclination.

As the next wave of works on *habitus*² suggests, the next direction in the study of reflexivity and *habitus* should include the notion of hybridity in order to understand better the complex relations between *habitus* and social resistance. Following this

² See, for example, Loic J. D. Wacquant, "Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology," in *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Wacquant (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 24; Lois McNay, "Gender, Habitus and the Field" *Theory Culture Society* 16, no. 1 (1999): 104-5; and Lisa Adkins, "Reflexivity: Freedom or Habit of Gender," *Theory Culture Society* 20, no. 6 (2003): 37.

suggestion, the next three chapters of my dissertation extend the issue of *habitus* in Muhammadiyah to the topic of hybridity. These chapters are consequently concerned with the images of the West that both the proponents of the status quo and reform projects harbour, and how these images contribute to each camp's responses to the presence of the West. These responses, in turn, influence their perception of the crisis of their field.

Employing Bourdieu's analysis again, I argue that the status quo's fear of the intrusion of the West and the reform projects' anxiety over globalisation are caused by a crisis of the field, a crisis that refers to the gap between the *objective* situation of the field and one's subjective expectation of the field to which one is predisposed by one's *habitus*.³ In the case of Muhammadiyah, it is the presence of the West that serves as a catalyst for the change in the field.

Before dwelling on various images of the West that belong to each camp in Chapters Six and Seven, Chapter Five provides an elaboration of the notion of hybridity. Taking the example of the story of the Buru Quartet of Pramoedya Ananta Toer, this chapter argues that in the presence of the dominant West, the non-West has to adapt itself to the methods and values of the West in order to use them to resist colonialism. The story of Minke as the main protagonist in this quartet is an example of how, through emulating Western methods of modern organisation and journalism and through appropriating its values of justice and freedom, the indigenous people managed to create a fissure in the colonial discourse.

The story of the Buru Tetralogy represents the breaking down of the opposition between submission and resistance, and also of the contradiction between self and the "Other". The appropriation of the West and the abandoning by the indigenous people of their traditional worldview, on the one hand, can be seen as submission to Western ways of thinking. On the other hand, this emulation is targeted at attacking colonialism, and thus can also be considered an act of resistance. This resistance, however, is not directed toward the West as the enemy. On the contrary, it is directed at colonialism. The West is simultaneously an ally in the struggle against injustice and also a colonial enemy at the

³ Pierre Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 234.

moment the indigenous people decide to employ a Western worldview in their anti-colonial struggle. The contradiction between self and “Other” is blurred in this act of appropriation. It is this contradiction in the attitudes of the Buru Quartet’s protagonist towards the West that will be the basis of my elaboration of the status quo and reform camps’ perceptions of the West in the next two chapters.

Chapter Six discusses the status quo camp’s images of the West. Perceived as (un)democratic, Christian, permissive, scientific, and hegemonic, the West for the status quo is all that Islam needs to avoid. Among these mostly negative images of the West, however, the status quo finds an ally in a particular stream of Christianity that still persists in its exclusive claim of salvation through faith in Jesus Christ. The appropriation by the status quo is, therefore, minimal and highly selective. Instead of a more extensive appropriation of Western civilisation, the proponents of the status quo limit their appropriation to Western scientific methods while warning Muslims of the danger of importing Western values. Even this appropriation of Western methods is conditional on the provision that these methods will not create any confusion among Muslims with respect to the foundations of Islam.

The proponents of reform projects, contrary to those of the status quo, suggest an extensive appropriation of Western methods and values. Their image of the West as a teacher provides a reason for their argument that Islam should benefit from a more open world and learn from other civilisations, including the West. This position assumes no subordinate position of Islam to the West because the proponents of the reform projects believe that civilisations can learn from each other. Furthermore, the image of the West as an ally in the struggle for a better world for humanity sees the West as being in the same boat as Islam. In this situation, it is counterproductive to fight each other and lose sight of the real adversary that humanity is facing. The proponents of reform projects are still critical about the hegemonic and materialistic potential of the West, but this criticism does not stop them from engaging the West in their struggle for a more just world.

Chapters Six and Seven suggest how different views of the “Other” have created a different sense of crisis of the field for both camps. As it sees the West as a threat to Islam, the status quo camp perceives the intrusion of the Western worldview as the cause

of the crisis in their field; they perceive their field to be under threat of disintegration due to this intrusion. To escape the crisis, the proponents of the status quo urge Muhammadiyah to assert the particularity of Islam against the Western worldview and, by so doing, reconsolidate their organisation's old and familiar field.

Things are different within the reform camp. The enemy of Islam for this camp is not the West but the negative effects of globalisation. These negative effects affect not only Muslims because the Western world is facing the same challenges. For the proponents of reform projects, the solution to the crisis of the field is not isolation but the inclusion of as many perspectives as possible in humanity's common struggle. Learning from the West should give Muslims a new perspective that is useful for addressing problems in their societies. The crisis of the field for this camp, therefore, is not the disintegration of the old field but the persistence of the boundaries surrounding that field. For them, the solution to the crisis is to extend the old field to cover other perspectives. By so doing, they believe Muslims will be able to create a new relevance for Islam as a religion for all humanity; in other words, a religion from which all humanity can take inspiration.

8.2 Research Findings

This dissertation started with two research questions: How did two opposite tendencies favouring status quo and reform emerge in post-1998 Muhammadiyah, and, secondly, why did they emerge? With respect to the first question, the first part of this dissertation (from the second to the fourth chapters), suggests that the reflective predisposition that belongs to the *habitus* of this organisation's members is the source of these two different views. The myth of the capacity of human beings for reflectivity in Muhammadiyah, with its treasured concept of the exemplary Man in its narrative of enlightenment, is at the root of the support for both the status quo and reform projects. The support for both camps is based on faith in human consciousness, belief in how this consciousness creates sensitivity in the mind of Muhammadiyah's members towards their environment and how, eventually, this sensitivity guides the organisation's members to the true path of Islam.

The proponents of the status quo direct this sensitivity to a focus on the correct Islamic practices. They see their environment as a realm to be analysed in terms of the Islamic worldview. Islam, as they understand it, is the religion based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah with Muhammadiyah as the embodiment of the scriptural spirit of Islam. The proponents of this camp see the distinctiveness of Muhammadiyah as arising from the event of enlightenment, along with the story of the exemplary Man's consciousness, within the history of this organisation. This distinctiveness is what makes Muhammadiyah different from other Islamic organisations, such as the Justice and Prosperous Party, even when that party also shares its puritan tendency.

For the status quo camp, Muslims' reflection on their environment will eventually lead to an assessment of the Islamic nature of that environment. If it is already Islamic, religious propagation is needed to maintain this condition; if it is not yet Islamic, propagation is necessary to win it over to an Islamic worldview. Consequently, what the proponents of the status quo are most concerned about are those who claim to be Muslims but have yet to implement the Islamic worldview as a guide to their daily lives. These self-professed Muslims are either still practising pre-Islamic rituals or are admirers of the West to the extent that they are willing to deconstruct Islam. Both syncretic and Western-minded Muslims are no less the target of Islamic propagation than non-Muslims. Since its inception, Muhammadiyah has occupied itself with this issue of Islamisation of those self-professed Muslims. For the supporters of the status quo, staying on this course of undertaking is the best way that Muhammadiyah could proceed in the future and keep its relevance as an Islamic movement. The maintenance of the status quo is the worthy goal to be reached by Muhammadiyah.

Across both camps, reflectivity is seen as entailing criticism directed at the spiritual practices of Islam. It is built on the assumption that if human beings try hard enough, they will be able to think rationally and objectively. It is indeed one of the traits of the proponents of reform projects in Muhammadiyah to be more appreciative towards Muslims' local culture, especially when it comes to the cultural project within this camp. This appreciation, however, is limited to respecting this local culture that the proponents of the status quo often refer to as un-Islamic, and to the understanding that different human beings attach different meanings to different symbols. This appreciation from the

proponents of the reform projects towards local culture does not necessitate participation in assigning the same meaning to the same symbol. It is purely an anthropological appreciation that is aimed at excavating the affects dedicated to a symbol in order to arrive at a deeper meaning of a symbol, a meaning that may not necessarily be shared by members of other societies. Even though this deeper meaning of the symbols often turns out to be Islamic, the proponents of reform projects see them as an expression of local, and therefore particular, culture.

In summary, with respect to the first research question, namely how both the status quo and reformist tendencies emerged in Muhammadiyah, this dissertation sees reflectivity as the basic mental predisposition that builds Muslim *habitus* in Muhammadiyah. This predisposition is shared by members of this organisation and, since *habitus* is a generative structure, it can give rise to various practices of the people who share this particular *habitus*. In the case of the present day Muhammadiyah, the reflective predisposition has resulted in two different stances on how Muhammadiyah should proceed. Whereas the proponents of the status quo emphasise the importance of maintaining Muhammadiyah on its present course in the face of the widespread influence of Western cultures, the supporters of reform projects see the need for the organisation to transform itself in order to adapt to changing circumstances. For the latter, it is the task of Muhammadiyah to be more inclusive and to engage itself with foreign elements because, they argue, one can also find Islam in the worldview of the “Other”. Both camps are reflective in their view of the present environment of Muhammadiyah but come up with two opposing conclusions.

With respect to the second research question of why the two opposite tendencies in Muhammadiyah emerged, my answer is that different perceptions of crisis cause these two opposite tendencies to occur, as elaborated from Chapters Five to Seven. There is a tendency among some members of the organisation to fear the changing circumstances in the world that allow for the intrusion of a Western worldview, one which in their opinion is totally opposite to the Islamic worldview. For this group, the crisis that Muhammadiyah is facing at the moment is the fragility of the limits of the old field. Meanwhile, for another group of Muhammadiyah’s members, what this organisation needs to be cautious about is the negative effects of globalisation. The West, in the

opinion of the second group, should not be seen as a threat for Muhammadiyah and Islam, but should instead be taken on board as an ally in the common struggle of humanity. While the first group urges the consolidation of the old field, the second group recommends the total breaking down of the limit of the old field to make way for the extension of this field.

In providing this answer to the second question driving my research, I see the need to draw on a scholarly development on the employment of reflexivity to enrich Bourdieu's conception of *habitus*. Different from those works that see reflexivity as a late comer in social agents' *habitus*,⁴ I see reflexivity as the capacity of social agents to perceive the field, and their positions in the field, along with the necessary "feel for the game". As explained in Chapter 4, this dissertation sees reflexivity as based on the *habitus* of social agents. Any image of reflexivity founded on the assumption that social agents can take themselves out of their environment and therefore perfectly reflect upon their unconscious minds is a myth of reflection. A social agent can hold on to this assumption of *reflectivity*, as the explication of the reflective mental predisposition of Muhammadiyah's members in this dissertation tells us. However, we have to bear in mind that this assumption is part of the *illusio* that constitutes his *habitus*. This notion is no less mythical than, for example, the traditional belief in the social differentiation between sexes that belongs to the Kabyle Berber community in Algeria.⁵ Reflexivity is always bound; and because of this boundedness, reflexivity belongs to all *habitus*.

What happens during times of crisis is the intensification of reflexivity in order to make sense of the changes in the field. In the case of Muhammadiyah, this intensifying reflexivity due to the perception of the changing world results in two opposite alleged solutions. The first solution is the maintenance of the status quo, while the second solution demands reforms within the organisation. These opposite responses from the status quo and reform camps inform us that reflexivity does not necessarily produce

⁴ See, for example, Paul Sweetman, "Twenty-first Century Dis-Ease? Habitual Reflexivity or the Reflexive Habitus," *The Sociological Review* (2001):543; and Sam Binkley, "Governmentality, Temporality and Practice: From the Individualization of Risk to the 'Contradictory Movement of the Soul'," *Time & Society* 18, no. 1 (2009): 88.

⁵ Bourdieu, *Logic of Practice*, 146.

reform.⁶ In the face of crisis, some social agents might opt to return to their old way of life while others might demand a reform. In the case of Muhammadiyah, while the status quo camp aims for the reconsolidation of the old field, the reform camp imagines a reform as a solution to the crisis in the field. Different from the status quo camp's experience, the intensification of reflexivity during what is perceived to be a crisis situation within the reform camp allows the proponents of this camp to imagine a "utopia, project, programme, or plan".⁷

While the supporters of the status quo camp insist on the maintenance of their familiar *habitus*, the solutions that the proponents of the reform camp offer are neither based on the transformation of their old *habitus*. These solutions are still thought of dependently on the basis of reflective mental predisposition that belongs to the *habitus* of Muhammadiyah's members. As I explained above, even in their efforts to be more inclusive of the cultural "Other", the proponents of reform projects still rely on their reflective tendency to base their argument. This point proves that reflexivity does not entail a rupture to the old *habitus* but is simply a continuation of it. It is reflexivity that is being used by the reform camp to formulate its solution to the crisis.

Another new direction that this dissertation has taken in terms of our understanding of *habitus* is the issue of hybridity. The inclusion of what is commonly recognised as a concept from post-colonial theories is useful in problematising an important question in the recent development in the study of reflexivity: does resistance necessarily mean rejection of the dominant system? By taking an example from the story of the Buru Quartet, I would answer this question with a negative. In my exposition of the story, in the face of a dominant system, the underprivileged can choose to emulate the methods and values inherent in the dominant system and use it to resist this system.

8.3 Possible Directions for Future Research

Based on the findings of my research as elaborated above, there are some notes that can be made with respect to the implications of these findings to the general study on Islam in

⁶ See McNay, "Gender," 111.

⁷ Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 234.

Indonesia. The first note is related to the issue of the present convergence of democracy, the de-Islamisation of formal politics, and increased demand for Islamic law in Indonesia, as discussed in Chapter One. It is clear from the findings in this research that Muhammadiyah's members, regardless for which camp they throw their support, agree that democracy is the only legitimate way to obtain power in Indonesia. Although differing on details of how democracy should be implemented, the supporters of both camps agree on the importance of the rule of people contained in a democratic system.

On the issue of de-Islamisation of formal politics, during the course of its history Muhammadiyah had shown various approaches. It had been a supporter of MASYUMI (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia), the Islamist political party whose emergence can be traced back to the Japanese occupation, until its dissolution in 1960. In 1950, however, the organisation allowed its members to vote for non-Islamic parties, with the proviso that their votes strengthen Islamic, and especially Muhammadiyah's, aspirations, before changing this decision in 1953 to allow its members to vote only for Islamic parties.⁸ After the dissolution of MASYUMI, Muhammadiyah decided that it would be politically independent. It upheld this decision until PARMUSI, an Islamic political party deemed as MASYUMI's successor, was established in 1967. After the amalgamation of various Islamic political parties, one of which was PARMUSI, into Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (The United Development Party) in 1975, Muhammadiyah once again stated its political independence. Since 1985 Muhammadiyah has accepted Pancasila as its ideological base and thus abandoned Islam as the ideological base of its constitution. This policy continued to the present-day Muhammadiyah: since 1985 Muhammadiyah has maintained this independence and been supportive of further de-Islamisation of Indonesia's formal politics.

Through its support for MASYUMI from 1945 to 1960, Muhammadiyah had been demanding the establishment of an Islamic state, along with the implementation of *shariah* law for Indonesian Muslims. The present-day Muhammadiyah, however, has renounced this demand. Its support of Pancasila since 1985 has been accompanied by support for a pluralistic Indonesia. The support for this stance has mainly come from the

⁸ Majelis Pustaka Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Sejarah Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 1995), 26, 34.

reform camp. The supporters of the status quo camp, nevertheless, have accepted the fact of a pluralistic Indonesia. They still have some qualms when it comes to religious groups claiming to be Islamic but veer off from what they perceive to be the basic teachings of Islam, one of which is Ahmadiyah (See Chapter Three). Their demand is for the government to ban Ahmadiyah. In general, nevertheless, Muhammadiyah does not demand the implementation of *shariah* law in Indonesia. With respect to the present convergence of democracy, de-Islamisation of formal politics, and increasing demand for *shariah* law in Indonesia, therefore, Muhammadiyah's members from both camps are supportive only of the first two trends.

The second note is on the relationship between Islam and civil society. With respect to this relation, Muhammadiyah has been hailed as one among various civil society movements in Indonesia. Three characteristics of Muhammadiyah support this assertion: its cherished charity activities that are independent of government's intervention; the 'bottom-up' approach of the establishment of Muhammadiyah's *ranting* (village level) offices that encourages civic participation; and the organisation's independence of any political interests.⁹ Based on these three characteristics and opinions of the proponents of both camps within the organisation about the independent and civic roles of Muhammadiyah in the present Indonesia, Muhammadiyah can fairly be seen as a civil society organisation that is based on religion. In this context, civil society is not only a Western aspiration.¹⁰ Non-Western societies produce their own civil society organisations that are, by definition, independent from political interests but at the same time can be dependent on religious sentiment as the motivating factor.

In addition to Muhammadiyah's role in the dynamics of civil society movements in Indonesia, and this will be my third note, is the organisation's contribution towards democracy through their involvement in civil society movements. The presence of a civil

⁹ M. Amin Abdullah, "Muhammadiyah's Experience in Promoting Civil Society on the Eve of the 21st Century," in *Islam and Civil Society in Southeast Asia*, eds. Nakamura Mitsuo, Sharon Siddique, and Omar Farouk Bajunid (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 44-45.

¹⁰ Chris Hann insists that a non-Western model of civil society is possible; see Chris Hann, "Introduction: Political Society and Civil Anthropology," in *Civil Society: Challenging Western Models*, eds. Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn (London: Routledge, 1996), 1-26; cf. Serif Mardin, "Civil Society and Islam," in *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), 278.

society movement undoubtedly is not the only ingredient for a more democratic society,¹¹ but the process of democratisation can be helped by the presence of these movements. In the case of Indonesia, various Islamic civil society organisations have proven to play a positive role towards the country's democracy. In one observation, for example, Hefner finds that Indonesian Muslims contribute to the general democratic process through the pluralistic aspiration of their civic organisations.¹² This contribution, according to Hefner again, puts Indonesia as a harbinger in the establishment of a democratic Islam.¹³

By way of conclusion, despite their differences, the supporters of both the status quo and reform camps have placed Muhammadiyah as an Islamic organisation sympathetic towards a democratic system for Indonesia. In each of their responses towards changes and other perspectives, both camps have shown that democracy is not a monolithic system and that it is a system that has to be established and maintained by taking advantage of local environments. As a civil society organisation, Muhammadiyah has proven to be able to put forward an Islam that is adaptable to both the Indonesian context and, particularly for the proponents of the reform camp, Western value systems.

The differences between the two camps on various issues, nonetheless, cannot be underestimated. Which camp is going to be victorious in their competition for influence in Muhammadiyah? Is the reform camp going to fail in its invitation for a reciprocal learning between civilisations? This dissertation argues that the answers to these questions will depend on which version of crisis will eventually take place. To put it differently, how severe the incidence of each version of the crises as evoked by each camp is, and the extensive impacts felt of each version of crisis on Muhammadiyah, will determine which camp will prevail in the future.

Since this thesis does not develop a definite answer to the questions above, I will instead try to propose propitious directions for future research that might help us

¹¹ See Mitsuo Nakamura, "Introduction," in *Islam and Civil Society in Southeast Asia*, eds. Nakamura Mitsuo, Sharon Siddique, and Omar Farouk Bajunid (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 13-14; and Robert W. Hefner, "Introduction: Modernity and the Remaking of Muslim Politics," in *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization*, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 16.

¹² Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3-4.

¹³ Robert W. Hefner, "Asian and Middle Eastern Islam," *Revue des Sciences Politiques* 32 (2011): 196.

understand better the issue of *habitus*, Muhammadiyah, and also the general Indonesian studies. With respect to the study of *habitus*, future research would be more enlightening if it would elaborate the issue of hybridity further. Especially with respect to the relations between hybridity and *habitus*, it would be interesting if one could trace the presence of the old *habitus* within the practices of hybridity. Which predisposition would tend to slip away and which predisposition social agents would tend to keep during the time of crisis, as marked by the increasingly intense presence of the “Other” and its values and methods, are two topics that will shine a further light on the relation between *habitus* and hybridity.

In the study of Muhammadiyah, a wider opportunity to problematise the contradiction between the organisation’s tendency towards both puritanism and modernism should be encouraged. Based on the findings in this research, I would suggest that the incorporation of the concept of *habitus* can explain this ambiguity, but other concepts will also contribute toward explaining this contradiction that has puzzled scholars of revivalist movements, in Christianity and Islam alike.

The third direction that I would like to suggest, the one that has been implicit during the course of my research, is that future scholarly works on Indonesia should take into account the place of ambiguity. Traditional approaches that perceive Indonesians as unique and distinct from other human beings, namely the Westerners,¹⁴ should be abandoned to give place to those works that see the potential for Indonesians to learn from other civilisations. As the example of Muhammadiyah tells us, social agents cannot escape contact with different worldviews. Engagement with the “Other” is unavoidable in the modern world, particularly in a world of advanced information technology. With respect to Muhammadiyah, even its status quo camp cannot expect total isolation and therefore must, to some extent, respond to challenges posed by the Western worldview, albeit in a defensive way. Any worthy direction for further research in Indonesian studies must take into account this fact if it wishes to retain its relevance in a changing world. To borrow from the Foucauldian vocabulary, by opting for this direction, scholars will


¹⁴ As example of these approaches, see Anderson’s idea of power in Javanese culture (Benedict Anderson, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 72.); and Geertz’s symbolic and abstract Indonesian Islam (Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 116.)

perceive Indonesians as social agents whose identities are always in the process of “constitution” instead of being in a fixed state and thus only waiting to be “discovered.”¹⁵

¹⁵ Michel Foucault, “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self,” in *Religion and Culture: Michel Foucault*, ed. Jeremy R. Carrette (New York: Routledge, 1999), 168. One work in Indonesian studies that uses this non-essentialist approach is Simon Philpott’s with its emphasis on understanding Indonesian identity as being in a constant process of making and remaking; see *Rethinking Indonesia: Postcolonial Theory, Authoritarianism and Identity* (London: Macmillan, 2000), 147.

Appendix 1

Muhammadiyah's Organisational Structure*



Legend:

- Executive hierarchy
- .-.-.- Technical and administrative hierarchy
- .-.-.- Supervisory hierarchy

* Modified from the organisational chart of Muhammadiyah, Lembaga Pustaka dan Informasi Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Profil 1 Abad Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2010), 110.

** Pimpinan is the executive body of Muhammadiyah. Its members are elected through Muktamar (of national level) or musyawarah (of lower levels). At national level, Muhammadiyah also has an annual meeting called Tanwir. At Tanwir, Muhammadiyah conducts annual organisational evaluations and formulates annual programmes.

Appendix 2

Autonomous Organisations within Muhammadiyah*

Autonomous organisations within Muhammadiyah are organisations that were established by Muhammadiyah and, with guidance and supervision, are given rights and obligations to manage their own administration to guide particular members of Muhammadiyah and in particular sectors in order to achieve Muhammadiyah's missions. There are at the moment seven autonomous organisations within Muhammadiyah. These autonomous organisations can be located at every level of Muhammadiyah's offices. Below are summary of each autonomous organisation within Muhammadiyah.

1. Aisyiyah

Ahmad Dahlan and his first wife established Sapa Tresna, a Qur'anic-study group for girls and elderly women in the Kauman District of Yogyakarta. Sapa Tresna then was changed into Aisyiyah in 1917. In its development, this organisation became an organisation for mature female members of Muhammadiyah. It has been active in collecting resources from its members to build schools and health clinics. At the moment, this organisation has 33 Pimpinan Wilayah, 370 Pimpinan Daerah, 2,332 Pimpinan Cabang, and 6,924 Pimpinan Ranting (See Appendix 1). Aisyiyah runs 4,560 educational institutions across Indonesia, 280 health clinics, 459 social welfare institutions such as orphanages, 503 economic institutions, and 3,785 social development institutions such as *badan zakat* (alms-collection agencies).

2. Pemuda Muhammadiyah

Pemuda Muhammadiyah was established on 2 May 1932 with the goal of building a resilient youth of Muhammadiyah. Its vision has been to prepare Indonesian youth for diverse challenges. There are five basic principles in Pemuda Muhammadiyah movement: *tauhid* (the principle of the unity of universe under one God), the right moral system based on divine revelation, faith-based actions, justice, and the importance of mastery of science. Various programmes are implemented to meet the organisation's vision.

3. Nasyiatul Aisyiyah

Different from Aisyiyah, Nasyiatul Aisyiyah focuses on younger female members of Muhammadiyah. There is no strict age limit to differentiate Aisyiyah and Nasyiatul Aisyiyah. The younger female members of Muhammadiyah, however, tend to join Nasyiatul Aisyiyah. It was established in 1919 initially as Siswa Praja with the purpose of inculcating sense of unity among young female members of Muhammadiyah, to teach good morality, and to better understand Islam. This name was changed in 1929 into Aisyiyah Urusan Siswa Praja and into Nasyiatul Aisyiyah in 1931. During this time, Nasyiatul Aisyiyah was still part of Aisyiyah. In 1957 Aisyiyah was made autonomous of Aisyiyah and became one of the autonomous

* Summarised from Lembaga Pustaka dan Informasi Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Profil 1 Abad Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2010), 120-54.

organisations within Muhammadiyah. Since then Nasyyatul Aisyiyah has developed various programmes to empower the younger female youth of Muhammadiyah.

4. Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah

Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah was established on 18 July 1961 with the goal of strengthening Muhammadiyah's movement through the empowerment of its youth, especially those studying up to the high school level. The effort to empower student members of Muhammadiyah was actually started long before Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah was built. In 1919 Siswo Projo was established for students in Madrassah Mu'allimin in Yogyakarta. In 1926 Gabungan Keluarga Pelajar Muhammadiyah was built in Malang and Surakarta. In 1933 the scout organisation of Muhammadiyah, Hizbul Wathan (Army of the Nation – now a separate autonomous organisation) was built. The 1960 Mukhtar of Pemuda Muhammadiyah decided to establish a separate organisation to better tend to the needs and context of student members of Muhammadiyah. Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah was established in 1961 as the implementation of this decision. This organisation now has its branches all over Indonesia.

5. Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah

Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah was established on 14 March 1964, eight years after Muhammadiyah decided to build a higher learning institute. The aspiration to empower student members of Muhammadiyah was first announced in 1936 Mukhtar in Betawi (now Jakarta) but had not been taken seriously until 1961 when in its Jakarta Mukhtar Muhammadiyah decided to establish an autonomous organisation within Muhammadiyah to accommodate its student members. Before 1964 it was assumed that the empowerment of Muhammadiyah's student members was handed over to Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Student Organisation), a nation-based organisation for Islamic students in Indonesia without any organisational linkage to Muhammadiyah. The structural leadership network for Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah is similar to Muhammadiyah except for the village level. Instead of Pimpinan Ranting, Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah refers to it as Komisariat.

6. Tapak Suci Muhammadiyah

Tapak Suci (Holy Palms) Muhammadiyah is an autonomous organisation that teaches Islam-condoned martial art skills to its members. The history of Tapak Suci started with a martial art in Pesantren Binorong, Banjarnegara with its famous teacher, Busyro Syuhada. Avoiding the search from Dutch colonial administration following his violent resistance, he took refuge in Kauman. In Kauman, he taught the youth martial art. A few of his students then built their own martial art organisation called Perguruan Cikauman. A few more martial art organisation, Perguruan Seranoman and Perguruan Kasegu, were built in 1930 and 1951 respectively. Perguruan Tapak Suci was established in 1960 to consolidate various martial art organisations in the neighbourhood. It was not until 1967 that Perguruan Tapak Suci was admitted as an autonomous organisation within Muhammadiyah. At the moment Tapak Suci focuses on the sports side of martial art. During its history, however, it was heavily involved in anti-communist activities.

7. Hizbul Wathan

Hizbul Wathan is a scout organisation within Muhammadiyah. Its main goal is to inculcate discipline in its members according to Islamic teachings. This organisation was established after Ahmad Dahlan saw the activities of boy scouts in Mangkunegaran Palace in Solo. These boy scouts were part of Javaansche Padvinder Organisatie, a Dutch-initiated scout movement in the Mangkunegaran Palace. *Padvinder* (scout in Dutch) method was chosen by Dahlan to give extra-curricular activities for students. During its history, Hizbul Wathan was invited several times to join the Dutch *padvinder* organisation but refused most likely for anti-colonial reason. There was a disagreement about whether Hizbul Wathan was established in 1919 or 1921. However, during its history this scout organisation has contributed to the education of various prominent Indonesian profiles, such as General Soedirman and Soeharto.

Appendix 3

List of Muhammadiyah Chairmen *

No.	Fora	Locations of Fora	Years	Presidents
1	1 st Year Meeting	Yogyakarta	1912	Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan (1 st Chairman)
2	2 nd Year Meeting	Yogyakarta	1913	Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
3	3 rd Year Meeting	Yogyakarta	1914	Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
4	4 th Year Meeting	Yogyakarta	1915	Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
5	5 th Year Meeting	Yogyakarta	1916	Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
6	6 th Year Meeting	Yogyakarta	1917	Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
7	7 th Year Meeting	Yogyakarta	1918	Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
8	8 th Year Meeting	Yogyakarta	1919	Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
9	9 th Year Meeting	Yogyakarta	1920	Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
10	10 th Year Meeting	Yogyakarta	1921	Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
11	11 th Year Meeting	Yogyakarta	1922	Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan
12	12 th Year Meeting	Yogyakarta	1923	Kiai Haji Ibrahim (2 nd Chairman)
13	13 th Year Meeting	Yogyakarta	1924	Kiai Haji Ibrahim
14	14 th Year Meeting	Yogyakarta	1925	Kiai Haji Ibrahim
15	15 th Annual Congress	Surabaya	1926	Kiai Haji Ibrahim
16	16 th Annual Congress	Pekalongan	1927	Kiai Haji Ibrahim
17	17 th Annual Congress	Yogyakarta	1928	Kiai Haji Ibrahim
18	18 th Annual Congress	Surabaya	1929	Kiai Haji Ibrahim
19	19 th Annual Congress	Minangkabau	1930	Kiai Haji Ibrahim
20	20 th Annual Congress	Yogyakarta	1931	Kiai Haji Ibrahim
21	21 st Annual Congress	Makassar	1932	Kiai Haji Ibrahim
22	22 nd Annual Congress	Semarang	1933	Kiai Haji Ibrahim
23	23 rd Annual Congress	Yogyakarta	1934	Kiai Haji Ibrahim
24	24 th Annual Congress	Banjarmasin	1935	Kiai Haji Ibrahim
25	25 th Annual Congress	Jakarta	1936	Kiai Haji Ibrahim
26	26 th Annual Congress	Yogyakarta	1937	Kiai Haji Mas Mansyur (3 rd Chairman)
27	27 th Annual Congress	Malang	1938	Kiai Haji Mas Mansyur
28	28 th Annual Congress	Medan	1939	Kiai Haji Mas Mansyur
29	29 th Annual Congress	Yogyakarta	1940	Kiai Haji Mas Mansyur
30	30 th Annual Congress	Purwokerto	1941	Kiai Haji Mas Mansyur
31	Emergency Muktamar	Yogyakarta	1944	Ki Bagus Hadikusuma (4 th Chairman)
32	All-Java Congregation	Yogyakarta	1946	Ki Bagus Hadikusuma
33	31 st Muktamar	Yogyakarta	1950	Ki Bagus Hadikusuma
34	32 nd Muktamar	Purwokerto	1953	Ki Bagus Hadikusuma
35	33 rd Muktamar	Yogyakarta	1956	Buya AR Sutan Mansur

* Based on Lembaga Pustaka dan Informasi Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Profil 1 Abad Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2010), 56.

				(5 th Chairman)
36	34 th Muktamar	Palembang	1959	H. M. Yunus Anis (6 th Chairman)
37	35 th Muktamar	Jakarta	1962	Kiai Haji Ahmad Badawi (7 th Chairman)
38	36 th Muktamar	Bandung	1965	Kiai Haji Ahmad Badawi
39	37 th Muktamar	Yogyakarta	1968 1968	Kiai Haji Faqih Usman (8 th Chairman) Kiai Haji AR Fachruddin (9 th Chairman)
40	38 th Muktamar	Ujung Pandang	1971	Kiai Haji AR Fachruddin
41	39 th Muktamar	Padang	1974	Kiai Haji AR Fachruddin
42	40 th Muktamar	Surabaya	1978	Kiai Haji AR Fachruddin
43	41 st Muktamar	Surakarta	1985	Kiai Haji AR Fachruddin
44	42 nd Muktamar	Yogyakarta	1990	Kiai Haji A. Azhar Basyir (10 th Chairman)
45	43 rd Muktamar	Banda Aceh	1995 1998	Prof. Dr. H. M. Amien Rais (11 th Chairman) Prof. Dr. H. A. Syafii Maarif (12 th Chairman)
46	44 th Muktamar	Jakarta	2000	Prof. Dr. H. A. Syafii Maarif
47	45 th Muktamar	Malang	2005	Prof. Dr. H. M. Dien Syamsuddin (13 th Chairman)
48	46 th Muktamar	Yogyakarta	2010	Prof. Dr. H. M. Dien Syamsuddin

Appendix 4

List of Important Documents in Muhammadiyah

No.	Name of Documents	Authorising / Publishing Body	Time of Issuance / Publication and Present Status
1	Tuntunan Mencapai Istri Islam yang Berarti (Guidance to Become Meaningful Muslim Wives)	Kongres Muhammadiyah Bagian Aisyiyah	1939 – Effective
2	Muqaddimah Anggaran Dasar Muhammadiyah (Preamble to Muhammadiyah's Constitution)	Sidang Tanwir Muhammadiyah	1961 – Effective
3	Adabul Mar'ah fil Islam (Civilised Women in Islam)	Majelis Tarjih Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah	1975 – Effective
4	Tuntunan Menuju Keluarga Sakinah (Guidance towards Islam-approved Families)	Pimpinan Pusat Aisyiyah	1989 – Effective
5	Tafsir Tematik Al-Qur'an tentang Hubungan Sosial Antarumat Beragama (Thematic Interpretation of the Qur'an on Social Relations between Religious Communities)	Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah	2000 – No longer effective
6	Dakwah Kultural Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah's Cultural Propagation)	Sidang Tanwir Muhammadiyah	2002 and 2003 – Effective
7	Fiqh Perempuan dalam Perspektif Muhammadiyah (Interpretation of Roles of Women in Muhammadiyah's Perspective)	Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah	2005 – Effective
8	Surat Keputusan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah Nomor: 149/KEP/I.0/B/2006 tentang Kebijakan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah mengenai Konsolidasi Organisasi dan Amal Usaha Muhammadiyah (Decision of National Leadership of Muhammadiyah Number: 149/KEP/I.0/B/2006 on Consolidation of Muhammadiyah's Institutions and Charities)	Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah	13 November 2006 – Effective
9	Revitalisasi Ideologi Muhammadiyah: Konsolidasi Bidang Keyakinan dan Cita-cita Hidup	Sidang Tanwir Muhammadiyah	2007 – Effective
10	Profil 1 Abad Muhammadiyah	Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah	2010 – Effective

SURAT KEPUTUSAN PIMPINAN PUSAT MUHAMMADIYAH

Nomor: 149/KEP/I.0/B/2006

Tentang:

**KEBIJAKAN PIMPINAN PUSAT MUHAMMADIYAH MENGENAI
KONSOLIDASI ORGANISASI DAN AMAL USAHA MUHAMMADIYAH**

MENIMBANG :

1. Bahwa Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam sejak kelahirannya hingga saat ini tetap istiqamah dan terus bergerak tidak mengenal lelah dalam melaksanakan dakwah dan tajdid melalui berbagai usaha (amal usaha, program, dan kegiatan) yang dilakukannya dengan maksud dan tujuan menjunjung tinggi Agama Islam sehingga terwujud masyarakat Islam yang sebenar-benarnya;
2. Bahwa Muhammadiyah merupakan organisasi (persyarikatan) Islam yang memiliki prinsip-prinsip, sistem, dan kedaulatan yang mengikat bagi segenap anggotanya dan harus dihormati oleh siapapun sebagaimana hak-hak organisasi yang bersifat independen dan memiliki hak hidup di negeri ini;
3. Bahwa Muhammadiyah sebagai organisasi dalam menjalankan misi dan usahanya harus bergerak dalam satu barisan yang kokoh sebagaimana perintah Allah dalam Al-Quran Surat Ash-Shaf (61) ayat 4, yang artinya "Sesungguhnya Allah menyukai orang yang berperang dijalan-Nya dalam barisan yang teratur seakan-akan mereka seperti suatu bangunan yang tersusun kokoh";
4. Bahwa Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam yang cukup tua dan besar sangat menghargai ukhuwah, kerjasama, toleransi, dan sikap saling menghormati dengan seluruh kekuatan/kelompok lain dalam masyarakat, lebih-lebih dengan sesama komponen umat Islam, karena itu Muhammadiyah pun berhak untuk dihormati oleh siapapun serta memiliki hak serta keabsahan untuk bebas dari segala campur-tangan, pengaruh, dan kepentingan pihak manapun yang dapat mengganggu keutuhan serta kelangsungan gerakannya;

MENINGGAT :

1. Al-Quran dan As-Sunnah sebagai sumber Ajaran Islam;
2. AD/ART Muhammadiyah serta aturan-aturan lainnya yang berlaku dalam Persyarikatan sebagai landasan konstitusional;

3. Keputusan Tarjih, Muqaddimah AD Muhammadiyah, Kepribadian Muhammadiyah, Matan Keyakinan dan Cita-cita Hidup Muhammadiyah, Khittah Muhammadiyah, Pedoman Hidup Islami Warga Muhammadiyah, dan prinsip-prinsip ideal lainnya dalam Muhammadiyah;
4. Keputusan Mukhtar Muhammadiyah ke-45 tahun 2005;

MEMPERHATIKAN :

Keputusan Rapat Pleno Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah yang dilaksanakan pada hari Senin tanggal 22 Syawal 1427 H / 13 November 2006 M

MEMUTUSKAN :

MENETAPKAN : KEPUTUSAN PIMPINAN PUSAT MUHAMMADIYAH TENTANG KEBIJAKAN PIMPINAN PUSAT MUHAMMADIYAH MENGENAI KONSOLIDASI ORGANISASI DAN AMAL USAHA MUHAMMADIYAH sebagai berikut:

1. Muhammadiyah dengan seluruh anggota, pimpinan, amal usaha, organisasi otonom, majelis dan lembaga, sekretariat/kantor, dan berbagai lini/struktur organisasi serta segala usaha yang berada di dalamnya harus bebas dari berbagai paham, misi, dan kepentingan pihak lain yang secara langsung maupun tidak langsung, terbuka maupun terselubung, dapat merugikan dan merusak Persyarikatan Muhammadiyah.
2. Secara khusus seluruh anggota dan lini organisasi Persyarikatan termasuk di lingkungan amal usaha Muhammadiyah harus bebas dari pengaruh, misi, infiltrasi, dan kepentingan partai politik yang selama ini mengusung misi dakwah atau partai politik bersayap dakwah, di samping bebas dari misi/kepentingan partai politik dan organisasi lainnya sebagaimana kebijakan Khittah Muhammadiyah. Hal tersebut karena selain telah menjadikan kegiatan dakwah dengan institusi/pranata umat Islam seperti masjid dan lain-lain sebagai alat/sarana politik, juga secara nyata-nyata telah menimbulkan sikap mendua di sebagian kalangan Muhammadiyah, termasuk dalam melaksanakan Hari Raya Idul Fitri/Idul Adha, serta menjadikan Muhammadiyah sebagai sarana politik partai yang bersangkutan dan lebih jauh lagi dapat menimbulkan pengerosan dan mengganggu keutuhan organisasi.
3. Segenap anggota Muhammadiyah perlu menyadari, memahami, dan bersikap kritis bahwa seluruh partai politik di negeri ini, termasuk partai politik yang mengklaim diri atau mengembangkan sayap/kegiatan dakwah seperti Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) adalah benar-benar partai politik. Setiap partai politik berorientasi meraih kekuasaan politik. Karena itu, dalam menghadapi partai politik mana pun kita harus tetap berpijak pada Khittah Muhammadiyah dan harus membebaskan diri dari, serta tidak menghimpitkan diri dengan misi, kepentingan, kegiatan, dan tujuan partai politik tersebut.
4. Seluruh anggota Muhammadiyah di seluruh lini Persyarikatan, termasuk yang berada di Amal Usaha, dituntut komitmen, integritas, loyalitas, pengkhidmatan, dan kiprah yang penuh

dan optimal dalam menjalankan usaha-usaha, menjaga dan berpedoman pada prinsip-prinsip, membela kepentingan, serta memajukan dan memperjuangkan Muhammadiyah menuju pada pencapaian tujuannya. Jika memiliki kelebihan materi/harta, pikiran, tenaga, relasi/hubungan, jaringan, dan rizki Allah lainnya maka kerahkan/jariyahkan secara maksimal untuk membesarkan, mengembangkan, dan menyempurnakan gerakan Muhammadiyah serta seluruh amal usaha, program, dan kegiatannya sehingga semakin mendekati pencapaian tujuan Muhammadiyah.

5. Seluruh institusi dalam Muhammadiyah termasuk amal usaha, masjid/mushalla, fasilitas milik Persyarikatan, dan kegiatan-kegiatan yang berada di dalamnya tidak boleh digunakan untuk kegiatan-kegiatan partai politik mana pun. Larangan tersebut berlaku untuk kegiatan-kegiatan yang diindikasikan dan memiliki kaitan dengan kegiatan/kepentingan partai politik, termasuk kegiatan-kegiatan yang mengatasnamakan atau memakai simbol-simbol keagamaan/dakwah seperti pengajian dan pembinaan keumatan, yang terkait dan memiliki hubungan dengan partai politik mana pun. Maksimalkan/optimalkan seluruh institusi milik Muhammadiyah tersebut untuk sebesar-besarnya dan sebenar-benarnya bagi kepentingan Muhammadiyah.

6. Seluruh anggota Muhammadiyah diminta untuk menghormati dan menaati Keputusan Muktamar ke-45 tahun 2005 di Malang, yang menyatakan "Menolak upaya-upaya untuk mendirikan parpol yang memakai atau menggunakan nama atau simbol-simbol Persyarikatan Muhammadiyah." (Lihat Lampiran I Tanfidz Keputusan Muktamar Muhammadiyah Ke 45 di Malang: Keputusan Muktamar ke-45 tentang Laporan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah Periode 2000-2005, VI. Bidang Politik poin 1).

7. Seluruh media massa yang berada di lingkungan Persyarikatan diminta untuk benar-benar menyuarakan paham, misi, dan kepentingan Muhammadiyah serta menjadi wahana untuk sosialisasi paham, pandangan, keputusan, kebijakan, kegiatan, dan syiar Muhammadiyah serta menjauhkan diri dari paham, misi, dan kepentingan organisasi/gerakan lain.

8. Sebagai langkah konsolidasi sekaligus pencegahan dan penguatan gerakan, seluruh jajaran Pimpinan Persyarikatan, Majelis/Lembaga, Organisasi Otonom, dan Amal Usaha diinstruksikan untuk melaksanakan berbagai kegiatan pembinaan keagamaan, kemuhammadiyah, dan hal-hal yang menyangkut organisasi secara luas. Kegiatan-kegiatan tersebut antara lain sosialisasi dan pengamalan putusan-putusan Tarjih, Darul Arqam, Baitul Arqam, Gerakan Jamaah dan Dakwah Jamaah, Up-Grading, Refreshing, pengajian-pengajian umum dan khusus, pembinaan jamaah, pengelolaan kegiatan-kegiatan masjid dan mushalla, sosialisasi dan pengamalan Pedoman Hidup Islami Warga Muhammadiyah, peningkatan silaturahmi, dan kegiatan-kegiatan pembinaan lainnya yang dilakukan secara sistematis, intensif, berkesinambungan, dan terorganisasi dengan sebaik-baiknya. Secara khusus ditugaskan kepada Majelis Tarjih dan Tajdid, Majelis Tabligh dan Dakwah Khusus, dan Majelis Pendidikan Kader dengan melibatkan Majelis/Lembaga, Organisasi Otonom, dan Amal

Usaha terkait untuk melaksanakan kegiatan-kegiatan tersebut secara terpadu di bawah koordinasi Pimpinan Persyarikatan di masing-masing tingkatan.

9. Segenap Pimpinan Peryarikatan, Majelis dan Lembaga, Organisasi Otonom, dan Amal Usaha Muhammadiyah diinstruksikan untuk menegakkan disiplin organisasi, merapatkan barisan/langkah, dan mengokohkan ideologi serta misi Muhammadiyah sebagaimana diatur dalam AD/ART dan peraturan-peraturan organisasi serta telah menjadi prinsip-prinsip Muhammadiyah seperti keputusan Tarjih, Muqaddimah Anggaran Dasar, Kepribadian, Matan Keyakinan dan Cita-cita Hidup, Khittah Perjuangan, dan Pedoman Hidup Islami Warga Muhammadiyah serta keputusan-keputusan Muktamar Muhammadiyah.

10. Pimpinan Peryarikatan, Majelis dan Lembaga, Organisasi Otonom, dan Amal Usaha Muhammadiyah diinstruksikan untuk mengambil kebijakan dan tindakan-tindakan yang tegas dalam menegakkan misi, aturan, dan prinsip-prinsip Muhammadadiyah serta dalam mencegah dan menyelamatkan Muhammadiyah dari berbagai tindakan yang merugikan Persyarikatan sebagaimana disebutkan di atas.

Yogyakarta, 10 Zulqa'dah 1427 H

01 Desember 2006 M

Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah

Ketua Umum,

Prof. Dr. H. M. Din Syamsuddin, M.A.

Sekretaris Umum,

Drs. H. A. Rosyad Sholeh

Appendix 6

List of Interviewees*

No.	Name of Interviewees	Organisational Position (at the Date of Interview, unless otherwise stated)	Place of Interview	Date of Interview
1	Abidah Mufllihati	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chairwoman, Pimpinan Pusat Nasyyiatul Aisyiyah 	Yogyakarta	19 July 2011 26 July 2011
2	Abdul Mu'ti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secretary, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 	Jakarta	23 June 2011
3	Asep Purnama Bahtiar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chairman, Majelis Pendidikan Kader Pengurus Pusat Muhammadiyah 	Yogyakarta	25 July 2011
4	Erni Zuhriyati	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lecturer, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta • Co-Chairwoman, Pimpinan Pusat Nasyyiatul Aisyiyah 	Yogyakarta	26 July 2011
5	Fajar Riza Ul Haq	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Executive Director, Maarif Institute 	Jakarta	12 July 2011
6	Gunawan Hidayat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chairman, Pengurus Pusat Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah 1999-2001 • Secretary General, Pengurus Pusat Pemuda Muhammadiyah 2006-2010 	Jakarta	21 June 2011
7	Haedar Nashir	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Co-Chairman, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 	Yogyakarta	29 July 2011
8	Hajriyanto Y. Thohari	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chairperman, Badan Pengurus Lembaga Amil Zakat Infaq dan Shodaqoh Muhammadiyah • Vice-Secretary General, Pengurus Pusat Muhammadiyah 2000-2005 • Chairman, Pengurus Pusat Pemuda Muhammadiyah 1993-1998 	Jakarta	21 June 2011
9	Masyitoh Chusnan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rector, Universitas Muhammadiyah Jakarta 	Jakarta	7 July 2011
10	Moeslim Abdurrahman	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chairman, Lembaga Pemberdayaan Buruh Tani dan 	Jakarta	5 July 2011

* This list is structured alphabetically according to interviewees' first names.

		Nelayan Pengurus Pusat Muhammadiyah 2000-2005		
11	M. Amin Abdullah	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chairman, Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam, Pengurus Pusat Muhammadiyah 2000-2005 	Yogyakarta	29 July 2011
12	M. Dawam Rahardjo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chairman, Majelis Ekonomi Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 1995-2000 Co-Chairman, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 2000-2005 	Jakarta	28 June 2011
13	Mohammad Shofan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ex-lecturer, Universitas Muhammadiyah Gresik 	Jakarta	24 June 2011
14	Noorkamilah	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lecturer, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta Coordinator for Propagation Department, Pengurus Pusat Nasyiatul Aisyiyah 	Yogyakarta	2 August 2011
15	Oneng Nurul Bariyah	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Member, Majelis Tarjih, Pengurus Wilayah Jakarta 	Jakarta	12 July 2011
16	Rizal Sukma	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chairman, Lembaga Hubungan Luar Negeri Pengurus Pusat Muhammadiyah 	Jakarta	4 July 2011
17	Said Tuhuleley	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chairman, Majelis Pengembangan Masyarakat, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 	Yogyakarta	30 July 2011
18	Saleh P. Daulay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chairman, Pengurus Pusat Pemuda Muhammadiyah 	Jakarta	13 June 2011
19	Siti Aisyah	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Co-Chairwoman, Pengurus Pusat Aisyiyah 	Yogyakarta	30 July 2011
20	Siti Noordjannah Djohantini	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chairwoman, Pengurus Pusat Aisyiyah 	Yogyakarta	28 July 2011
21	Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Member, Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 2000-2005 Member, Research and Development Institution, Pimpinan Pusat Aisyiyah 2005-2010 	Yogyakarta	29 July 2011
22	Slamet Nur Achmad Effendy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chairman, Pengurus Pusat Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah 	Jakarta	17 June 2011
23	Sudibyo Markus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Member, Institute for Foreign Affairs, Pengurus Pusat Muhammadiyah 	Jakarta	30 June 2011
24	Sugiarti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lecturer, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang 	Malang	16 August 2011

25	Ton Abdillah Has	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chairman, Pengurus Pusat Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah 	Jakarta	16 June 2011
26	Tri Sulistyaningsih	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lecturer, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang 	Malang	13 August 2011
27	Vina Salviana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lecturer, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang 	Malang	16 August 2011
28	Wuri Rahmawati	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Member, Majelis Pengembangan Masyarakat, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 	Yogyakarta	23 July 2011 30 July 2011

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