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Defining the Authentic Teacher

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	iii
Abstract	iv
Preface	v
Introduction: The Search for Meaningful Teaching	1
Chapter 1: Theories of Authenticity in Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre	26
Chapter 2: William Pinar and Mary Warnock: Autobiography and Authenticity	76
Chapter 3: Nel Noddings and Max van Manen: Engrossment, Tact, and Authenticity	113
Chapter 4: Maxine Greene: Public Spaces, Openings, and Authenticity	154
Chapter 5: Dwayne Huebner: Education, Spirituality, and Authenticity	188
Conclusion: The Synopsis and Meaningful Teaching	218
Bibliography	256

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Abstract

The impetus behind the writing of this dissertation came out of informal interviews held with teachers about their actual practice of teaching. What these interviews revealed was that teachers teach in a kind of "muddledness" and confusion. Mainly this dissertation aims to define a way of being in teaching that gives teaching shape and direction.

The theoretical understanding underlying the research of the dissertation is based in metaphysics and existential thought. Specifically, the content is focussed on the concept of authenticity. Authenticity has particular meaning in philosophical thought. For an understanding of the existential meaning of authenticity I have turned to European philosophy and the thinking of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre. For an understanding of how authenticity in its existential sense relates to the profession of teaching and being a teacher I explore the thinking of six contemporary Anglo-American educational theorists: William Pinar, Mary Warnock, Nel Noddings, Max van Manen, Maxine Greene, and Dwayne Huebner. Through a form of hermeneutics and reflective critical analysis I explore how authenticity is valued in the thinking of each of these six educational theorists. Drawing on the thoughts and insights offered by these selected authors I construct my own model of authenticity in teaching in the conclusion of the dissertation in an approach that I call "the multifaceted Janus face of authenticity."

The dissertation is framed in the language of literature, which supports the methodology. Specifically it is the writings of Virginia Woolf that are used to formulate this investigation into the meaningfulness of teaching.

Preface

Some technical details should be noted in the reading of this dissertation.

I have attempted to represent both genders equally in the language of the dissertation. However, there is some inconsistency. The philosophical discourses of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre use the masculine gender in the texts referred to, as does the educationalist and philosopher Mary Warnock. For the most part, in referencing and quoting these texts, I have retained their language. To do otherwise, I feel, would misrepresent their thoughts and intended meanings. The use of the masculine gender in these sections is not intended to mean that I embrace this tradition.

There are differences between North America and the United Kingdom in the spelling of certain English words. In this dissertation I quote substantially from American texts and in the quoted sections I have used the North American spelling. Everywhere else, however, I have used the Oxford form.

Quotation marks around a single word or phrase are used to indicate to the reader that I acknowledge the multiple meanings that the word or phrase could have.

The use of italics for a single word or phrase is to show that the named author has given a particular meaning to that word or phrase.

Introduction

The Search for Meaningful Teaching

Of course, she said to herself, coming into the room, she had to come here to get something she wanted. First she wanted to sit down in a particular chair under a particular lamp. But she wanted something more, though she did not know, could not think what it was she wanted. (Virginia Woolf: *To the Lighthouse*)

What does it mean to teach? What does it mean to be a teacher? This dissertation seeks to answer these questions. The content of what follows is a result of identified personal feelings of confusion and uncertainty in my own teaching practice and a perceived sense of confusion and muddledness in which other teachers operate, and a desire to come to terms with the profession of teaching. It is also an acknowledgement of a gap existing between teachers and what they teach.

A number of years ago I turned away from teaching. I had

begun a teaching career in the mainstream elementary school system, in Southern Ontario, Canada. It still remains an uneasy memory, that time as a beginning teacher. Even though I tried to teach with intelligence and sensitivity, I suffered much internal conflict and anguish. I enjoyed being with the children; their innocence and spontaneity sustained me through my brief career as an elementary teacher. But those moments of pleasure eventually were outweighed by growing internal conflicts. Thoughts of doubt and uncertainty entered my teaching practice: thoughts about the value of curriculum content, doubts about my approaches to teaching, and uncertainty about the demands and expectations placed on both teachers and students by the established educational systems. Deep feelings of isolation further exacerbated these conflicts associated with teaching and the lack balance between the demands of teaching and my personal life. Eventually the internal turmoil forced me to acknowledge that a deep rift lay between myself and teaching. At that time I was ill equipped to come to terms with these conflicts. Instead, I believed there to be an irreconcilable gap. So I left teaching for a while and left the conflicts unresolved. Even though I acted with what I thought were sincere and good intentions during those early teaching experiences it was not until many years later when I was forced to think more critically about teaching that I started to see myself and the practice of teaching

differently. It was this emptiness felt inwardly that was the impetus for the research and the yearning to give substance to a void that carried the research forward. This dissertation is an attempt at identifying what were the barriers that existed between myself and institutionalised schooling. At the same time, it is an attempt at bridging the distance between teaching and myself.

Through the years I have listened to other teachers talk about their teaching. I have often wondered how these teachers perceive teaching and how they have come to terms with their profession. Could it be that they have an understanding of what it means to teach that I lacked? I recently had the opportunity to explore the inner thoughts of teachers and their understanding of their teaching through a research project in which I was involved related to the implementation of the National Curriculum in England. In 1998 I interviewed twelve Primary School teachers in the Coventry area, who had been teaching for a number of years. Mainly the interviews focussed on their remembered experiences of teaching during the implementation of the National Curriculum in the schools in which they taught. The National Curriculum, which was designed and mandated in 1988 by the then ruling Conservative government, became a standard curriculum for all schools in England. Although the National Curriculum had been somewhat modified in the ten

years preceding the time I carried out the interviews, those modifications had been government-determined. The teachers' ability to recall in detail the changes to the National Curriculum in their classrooms was very apparent in these interviews. Their awareness not only evidenced that the transition to teaching the National Curriculum was a significant event in their teaching histories but also that it was an event that caused them to reflect critically on their profession. What began to surface from my conversations with these teachers and their expressed recollections was that the conflicts and confusion I held about teaching were also present in the thinking of other practising teachers. But the difference was that these teachers worked within the conflicts and uncertainties that I had identified. They did not see it as essential to calling themselves teachers that such conflicts need be resolved. The following analysis of aspects of my conversations with the teachers in the Coventry area reveals the conflicting frame within which teachers operate.

A common feeling held amongst the teachers whom I interviewed was that of resentment towards the government for interfering with what they felt was an aspect of their professionalism. "They [meaning the government] saw us as incompetent," one teacher said. "It was as if we were being told that we weren't doing our job properly," said another.

They resented the fact that they were not asked for input into what the curriculum should be. "The government didn't listen to teachers," "They didn't ever listen to teachers," were some of the opinions voiced. Teaching was seen as a polarised position: on one hand there was a government-designed curriculum, and on the other hand there was a teacher-determined approach to education. One teacher put it this way: "We know what is best for children because we are closer to them."

But amongst these teachers there was a disparity of opinion as to the degree of involvement teachers and government should have in determining what was to be taught and how it was to be taught. All of the teachers whom I interviewed had implemented the National Curriculum in their classrooms. On one level teachers saw the National Curriculum as being very helpful to their practice. It had provided a foundation to their teaching. "It gives staff something concrete on which to plan," one head teacher commented. "There is [sic] consistency and continuity there. Before [the National Curriculum] teachers were just swimming around." "It gave me a structure on which to base my teaching," more than one teacher voiced. On another level teachers saw implementing the government-designed curriculum as something to be taken in one's stride as teacher. "You just get on with it," was one teacher's view. "I think teachers are very good at

adapting to things, and making things fit. That's what they do," was the opinion expressed by one head teacher. Yet, others felt confused and overwhelmed by the demands for changes in their practice. Two of them spoke of how the National Curriculum had caused them great internal turmoil. "I remember the exact moment. I felt I couldn't cope any more. Someone came by my room and asked if I was all right. The National Curriculum ruined my life," she confessed. Another teacher related having a similar experience. "I lost confidence in my teaching," she said.

Another very articulate teacher saw herself and her fellow teachers as now being disaffected in their teaching and the teaching profession becoming fragmented. "The number of teachers in every school now that would rather be doing something else," she said, "is phenomenal. Teachers began to shut their doors and package time to meet overwhelming targets. The amount of material we were asked to cover was massive. There was just too much. There is still too much that we are asked to do. Children are suffering under teachers who have been on overdrive for so long that they don't look backwards. We can't listen to children. No one has time to do that. I'm expected to do so many things which were never in my training. The government has made education a business with targets and 'value for money' rather than a love of working with children and enjoying learning."

The conflicts and tensions that these teachers expressed in dialogue on their profession conveyed varied understandings of teaching. Although often critical of their profession, collectively the teachers held no clear or common answers to their criticisms. They evidenced a confusion as to what form teaching should take. My response to these interviews came in the form of more questions about teaching that went beyond those questions I had posed to myself about my own teaching experiences and beyond an acknowledgement of the disjunction between an inner sense of self and the profession of teaching. These questions were broader in nature revealing conflicts between the self as teacher and the position of teachers to the greater social order: What involvement should government have in education? Who should determine curriculum content? What part should teachers play in curriculum design? What position should teachers take to a curriculum designed by others? Can one call himself or herself a teacher when what is taught and the policies within which one teaches are prescribed by others? Listening closely to the comments of teachers on their profession and to my own inner voice resulted in an awareness that the profession of teaching is in a critical state. Fundamental questions about teaching and the connectedness of teachers to their profession continue to go unanswered by teachers in practice: What does it mean to be a teacher? What does it

mean to teach? Most importantly: How can teachers be "at home" in their profession? Since the time of the interviews I have continued to listen to teachers talk about their profession in both North America and England. From such conversations it has been continually reaffirmed that teachers lack an understanding of their profession and the morass of teaching appears to be growing, on both sides of the Atlantic.

More recently I have returned to teaching and education, initially as a student of education. This re-entry into teaching was driven by survival when my profession as an artist failed to produce sufficient income. With this return to teaching and education came the commitment not to let the internal emptiness overwhelm me as it had in the past. The commitment to teaching stayed but the reason for this commitment changed.

In the academia of education I was drawn to the burgeoning field of qualitative forms of research and contemporary theories of teaching and teacher identity. There exists a body of scholarship concerning teachers' lives and experiences. Educationalists such as Ivor Goodson (*Studying Teachers' Lives*), Pat Sikes (*Life History Research in Educational Settings*), Jennifer Nias (*Primary Teachers Talking*), and others have attempted to bring the

orientations, values, and thoughts of teachers to the foreground. Through revealing the experiences of teachers important insights into teaching and being a teacher are better known. The articulation of aspects of teachers' lives was helpful in reflecting on my own experiences but for me they lacked a necessary overall orientation to teaching and a direction to teaching that I sought. How does one position oneself in teaching in a way that makes teaching personally satisfying?

Some educational theorists named the reasons why teaching might result in feelings of emptiness and alienation. The field of critical educational theory has many facets and the scholarly discourse in this area has resulted in a now vast body of thought. Authors such as Paulo Friere (*Pedagogy of the Oppressed*), Michael Apple (*Cultural Politics and Education*), and Michel Foucault (*Discipline and Punishment*) figure prominently here. Critical theory helped in identifying the conflicts and putting a name to a face but did not give substance to filling the gap. Certainly feminist critical theories of education spoke to me as a female and as a mother who teaches. I explored feminist theory in its many and varied forms through reading such authors as Morweena Griffiths (*Feminisms of the Self*), Jane Miller (*School for Women*), Nel Noddings (*Caring*), and bell hooks (*Teaching to Transgress*). Initially, the argument that

education is constructed by men and that as men they repudiate female sensibilities had merit. To a point these arguments articulated by feminist theorists had resonance with some aspects of my experiences of teaching in practice. But in the end a feminist perspective on education and teaching proved problematic. It was mainly through a close reading of Madeleine Grumet's *Bitter Milk* that I realized the contradictions and limitations of a feminist orientation to teaching. I sought a more holistic and inclusive approach.

As I continued my reading in contemporary educational theory I eventually discovered a number of educationalists who have attempted to give direction and form to teaching. Mainly the educationalists to whom I was most drawn looked to philosophy as a way of understanding the work of teaching. In addition to being critical of present-day education as we know it, they offered alternative approaches to teaching. Although there was no one fixed ideology held collectively amongst this particular group of educationalists, there were certain common themes that appeared in their discourses. It was these commonalities that resulted in the selection of the particular works examined here. Mainly, these theorists valued existentialist thought as the basis on which to build their ideas. Their writings reveal a common focus on past, present, and future, an emphasis on critical and reflective

thought, and a common desire to define teaching within such metaphysical concepts as freedom and growth. Also common to all was an existentialist call to an awakening and to act in conscious awareness. In addition, the discourses of this group of theorists were directed at practising teachers. They implied that changes to meaningful teaching needed to come from within the profession itself, that is, from teachers. It is as a teacher that I have responded to what they have written.

This dissertation is a close reading of the writings of six contemporary educationalists each of whom offers a way for teachers to frame everyday actions and thoughts, while in the practice of teaching. By "close reading" I mean an interpretive explication and an in-depth critical analysis of what was written. The selected educationalists are Nel Noddings, Max van Manen, William Pinar, Dwayne Huebner, Maxine Greene, and Mary Warnock. Within each of the educational projects offered by these theorists I found an insight into teaching that enabled me to come to terms with teaching in practice. These are not the only educational theorists who have attempted to bring existentialist thought into education and teaching. Peter Abbs (*Autobiography in Education*), Van Cleves Morris (*Existentialism and Education*), and Martin Buber (*Between Man and Man*) are other authors who have written on themes of the self and

education. But in the end two incidences colliding at the same time influenced the selection of authors. One was a gentle guiding hand placed firmly on my back by my supervisors who asked that I bring these varying perspectives on authentic teaching together into formulating my own approach to teaching, and the other was the wonder of an epiphany. Through reflection and a personally led desire to formulate a realisable vision of teaching I was able to name the theorists who aided in another all encompassing approach to teaching.

The focus of this research is on alternative approaches to teaching that intend to give meaningfulness to the practice of teaching through understandings of personal, cultural, and social authenticity. This research offers the frame through which I was able to return to teaching, one that sees education as a place for transformation and redirection and teaching as a way for those of us who teach to be closer to our profession.

Methodological and theoretical considerations

The research of this dissertation is in the form of an inquiry. It is an exploration and analysis of six alternative approaches to teaching each of which is based in existential thought. The method for the research is

postmodern in nature in that it does not follow a conventional linear process of explication, analysis, and logical conclusion. Instead, this research turns to phenomenology as a frame for explication and critical analysis. In this phenomenological form of inquiry two separate disciplines, those of art and of education, are brought together and through comparison and contrast certain relevant and important themes related to my thesis are explicated and explored.

Husserl was the father of phenomenology. Martin Heidegger was his dedicated student. Heidegger provides the justification of this research form. Phenomenology focusses on revealing and interpreting events and situations; "unconcealing" was the word Heidegger used. Specific to this research are the philosophical insights he offered on the value of art to phenomenological exploration. In his text *Poetry, Language and Thought* (1963) Heidegger sees the interpretation of works of art as a form of discourse of disclosure (PLT, p. 36). (Heidegger called this "unconcealing" process of a work of art, "setting the work to work" (PLT, p. 36).) In applying art in this way Heidegger sees that a kind of space is created. Heidegger calls such a space "a playing field, a clearing, a *Lichtung*" (p. 53). It is a space that becomes "opened up" through thoughtful dialogue, critical reflection, and exchange of ideas. The approach taken in this research is a form of

critical, reflective dialogue in a mode of exchange of ideas. I have engaged the writings of Virginia Woolf for such a purpose. Woolf's writing, her aesthetics, becomes a way to inquire into educational discourses and the projects of the six theorists. In placing Woolf's work alongside educational discourses an "unconcealing" quality transpires and a kind of space is created. Woolf's writing (her artistic work) provides a platform, "a clearing," for an exploration into the various discourses of the individual educational theorists. The ideas of these various theorists, through description and a kind of critical interpretation, become "opened up"; and through "setting the work to work" Woolf's writing provides a unifying frame to the writing of this dissertation, as well as a way of entering into the diverse projects of each of these contemporary educationalists with the intent of apprehending the content and meaning of the theories of teaching and education they present. The poetics of her text also set a certain tone for the language of the dissertation.

It is not unusual to use aesthetic and artistic forms to serve as the basis for inquiring into educational theory. Engaging aesthetics in research has been done by such educationalists as Maxine Greene (1970, 1994, 1995), Elliot Eisner (1974, 1990, 1998), Elizabeth Vallance (1974), William Pinar (1976, 1988, 1992, 1994) and Madeleine Grumet

(1976, 1988), R. A. Smith (1970), and G. McCutcheon (1992), to name a few. Indeed, a number of such inquiries have turned to the work of Virginia Woolf, referencing her writing and her thoughts to give clarity or verification to theirs: William Pinar (1992, 1995, Madeleine Grumet (1988), Maxine Greene (1995, 1998), Sara Ruddick (1984), Mary Jane Martin (1970, 1985, 1994, 2000), Louise DeSalvo (1980, 1982, 1984, 1989), et al. The methodological structure of this inquiry lies within this existing body of inquiry into education.

I have selected Virginia Woolf's writing rather than some other aesthetic form as the frame of the writing for a number of reasons. Aside from the fact that Woolf's writing has figured prominently in my own life story, her writing has a certain resonance with and relevance to the educational theorists of this inquiry. Her work is often referenced in their writing, specifically in the thinking of William Pinar and Maxine Greene. (We will see the importance her writing plays in the thinking of these theorists in the expositions of their projects.) But she also has a common affinity with the educational theorists selected here. Woolf writes from a strong phenomenological orientation. She writes as a self that sees the world from inside experience. Roger Poole's study of Virginia Woolf and her writing in his *The Unknown Virginia Woolf* (1983) recognises Woolf's strong

phenomenological orientation:

[F]ew critics approach or dare to consider her [Virginia Woolf's] main achievement: the establishment of a new mode of discourse, a new mode of rationality, a new form of deduction and integration, in writing her novels. She is rarely, that is to say, considered as philosophically important, although she obviously follows a phenomenological course in her writing (Poole, p. 282).

The six educationalists whose writings that we are about to explore construct their projects in phenomenology and the turn inwards. Strong phenomenological themes often found in Woolf's writing also exist in the discourses of the contemporary educational theorists; i.e., subjective (inner voices and personal perspectives), intersubjective narratives, transcendence of time and space and transcendence of bodies, a world view from the position of Self at the centre, as well as the interplay between subjectivity and objectivity. Throughout, Virginia Woolf's approach to writing is woven into the educational discourses of this dissertation.

The research began by gathering together the educational theorists that I have named above. The word "gathered" is used here intentionally, to reflect Heidegger's phenomenological approach to reading. He contends, "That which is sustaining and directive in reading is gatheredness [*Sammlung*]... Authentic reading is a gatheredness to that

which, unbeknown to us, has already claimed our 'essence'" (Sallis, Intro., p. 2). It is a gathering of a body of theoretical discourses that had both individually and collectively called to me; they had at some point laid a claim on me as a teacher. The discourses of Nel Noddings, Dwayne Huebner, William Pinar, Max van Manen, Mary Warnock, and Maxine Greene became the data for the research. Although each of these educationalists has written extensively on teaching and education, for this enquiry I have selected one text by each theorist for the explication and critical analysis of their thinking. It is in these selected texts that I found the theories of teaching and education that were most relevant to formulating my own approach to teaching. (The title of each of these texts is given below.)

Certainly, these are not all the educational theorists who have attempted to give an alternative definition to teaching. But these particular authors were selected for a number of reasons. Each of these theorists has directed his or her projects at teachers who are active in the practice of teaching. Mainly the intended readers for their writings are teachers in schools, notably, but not solely, elementary and secondary schools. It is the kind of teaching of mainstream schooling which is where I have situated this inquiry and the search for meaningfulness in teaching. In addition, each of the theorists has founded his or her

thinking in existentialist thought. Themes of freedom, self-actualisation, and positioning the self in relationship to the world are common in their discourses. But each has a different idea of what should be primary in teaching, the self, the students, society in general, or something broader still. Taken together their varying approaches to teaching and education offered a way for me to position myself as teacher in education that is personally satisfying.

Authenticity and aspects of inwardness

As I have stated above this exploration into educational theory is led mainly by a desire to understand what position teachers should hold in teaching. I will argue in the following inquiry that underlying the projects of the six theorists we are about to study is the existentialist view that holds a desire to move towards authenticity to be primary in teaching and in education. There is an established field of authenticity in education as noted by Joseph Petroglia in his brief chapter on the history of authenticity in education (pp. 14-32). There are also varying understanding of authenticity and varying orientations in approaching the topic of self and how the self relates to society. Charles Taylor founds his

definition of authenticity solely in understandings of the self. As it relates to teaching and education John Dewey focusses on authenticity in society and the role of education in bringing society and the individual closer. Along with philosophical understandings of authenticity cognitive psychologists also concern themselves with defining the self (Susan Harter). For this dissertation authenticity is defined in a kind of openness but it is an openness based in philosophical conversations of the self and authenticity, mainly that of existentialism. In existentialist thought authenticity has a particular definition. We will first come to an understanding of the term authenticity in its philosophical sense by exploring the thinking of those philosophers who are associated with defining its philosophical meaning: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre. The constitutional elements of authentic existence are what collectively might be called "aspects of inwardness." These aspects of inwardness are highly integrated concepts related to notions of the self. Mainly inwardness is connected to and calls upon the ability of human beings to reflect, to hold varying perspectives, to imagine, to reason, and to operate in faith and belief. Later, in the exploration of the thinking of the various theorists, I explicate how authenticity and aspects of inwardness exist in each of the projects of the six selected educationalists as they formulate a way for teachers to be

in education.

The structure of the writing

The form of this dissertation has two distinct aspects. As stated above Chapter One is an explication of the term authenticity through the writings of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre. Chapters Two through to Five explicate and critically discuss the theories of six existentialist educationalists. In the conclusion the theories of the six educationalists are brought together in another approach to teaching.

The focus of the research throughout is on authenticity and teaching. It was Martin Heidegger who coined the term "authenticity." Heidegger shifted Kierkegaard's emphasis on stages of becoming through which one must pass in order to achieve selfhood, and his journey to God's eternal blessedness, to an emphasis on the essential aspects of being that move one from an inauthentic existence to authentic being. Authentic being was, for Heidegger, the conscious state of an individual who has been aroused through *Angst* by concerns about everyday existence and questions the meaning of existence. The individual then moves to take responsibility for his life and in doing so

"chooses" his own existence. Sartre furthered Heidegger's thinking in terms of the meaning of authenticity, while bringing a more distinctive moral aspect to authentic being. For Sartre authentic existence is defined against what he calls practices of "Bad Faith." Basically, one who lives in "Bad Faith" is avoiding taking responsibility for oneself and one's existence. The authentic individual, through conscious thought, must rise above this form of existence. I will argue in Chapter One that there is a common narrative underlying the three philosophers' theories of authentic existence. It will be shown throughout the research proper that this existentialist narrative, originally defined by Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre, threads its way through the theories of the educational theorists selected for exploration here. The research will reveal how each of the selected educationalists has built on and expanded the essential narrative of authenticity forged by the three philosophers.

Chapter Two focusses on defining the Self as teacher. For this we will look closely at the educational theories of William Pinar and his method of writing of the self as teacher which he calls *currere* as described in his book *Autobiography: Politics and Sexuality* (1994). Critical debate is then brought to Pinar's method and his focus on the self by comparing his thinking about the self to the

theoretical ideas of Mary Warnock as described in her text *Imagination and Time* (1994) where the self is understood in broader and more universal terms. Mary Warnock's thinking is also challenged in this comparison as consideration is given to the theoretical strength of her ideas and as well as its pragmatic value in terms of teaching and education today.

In Chapter Three the self as teacher is broadened to consider the teacher's relational experience with "the other" in teaching, "the other" here meaning the student. In this chapter Nel Noddings's concept of *engrossment* as described in her text entitled *Caring: a Feminine Approach to Ethics & Moral Education* (1986) and Max van Manen's notion of pedagogical *tact* as detailed in his *Tact of Teaching* (1991) are explicated. Although there are many commonalities held between Noddings and van Manen in their thinking of "the other," underlying this comparison and the differences in their thinking is a conflict in existentialist thought related to how the self is constructed. It is the philosophical debate over which is primary: essence or existence. The value of these two different existentialist positions in terms of meaningful teaching will be discussed and challenged in this chapter.

Chapter Four looks closely at the thinking of Maxine Greene and her focus on self as teacher and the responsibility of

the self, the individual, has to society. In her book *The Dialectic of Freedom* (1988) she expresses a view that present day society accedes to the givens of life, leaving unchallenged and embedded limitations to free speech, while operating in a kind of mindlessness of mechanism and routine behaviours (Greene, p. 2). She desires to change the orientation of teachers to a focus on epistemological concerns as a way of ensuring that individuals (students) become informed, enlightened, and active contributors to what she calls an *authentic public sphere*.

The final exploration into contemporary educational theories and understandings of authenticity in teaching is centred on universality and the thinking of educationalist and theologian Dwayne Huebner. In an article entitled "Education and Spirituality" (1993) Huebner argues that education, meaning mainly curriculum design and teaching, should focus on spiritual journeying. Critical thought is given to Huebner's project of education in spirituality by first comparing his thinking about teaching and education to that of Maxine Greene and her "education for freedom." Then critical thought is given to the notion of "spirituality" and questions are raised as to where and how spirituality has a place in contemporary society. In this section I am merely touching the broad and variegated hand of spirituality through connectedness with some of the main

tenets in existential spirituality.

The Conclusion is a synthesis of the thinking of the six educational theorists we have been exploring in the research. This is also where I offer my own approach to teaching. It is an approach based on aspects of inwardness and authenticity and is built on the thoughts of the theorists we have explored. It is presented here in outline form. It is an outline of a way to be in teaching that is intended to address the shortcomings of each of the theorists' projects noted in the critical analysis of their thinking. The approach that I offer is one which calls upon the narrative structure of authentic existence that I noted in Chapter One and brings together thoughts of the self, the other, the individual's responsibility to society, and universal notions of the self in the construction of authentic teaching practices. It is an approach intended for teachers in practice and one which also addresses the conflict that exists between teachers' autonomy and the educational policies that govern mainstream teaching. How can teachers remain authentic when confronted with policies that contradict their own sense of self? What I offer here is an approach for teachers in mainstream teaching to effect policy change in teaching while remaining true to a certain definition of teaching, and at the same time move mainstream teaching in a direction that brings teaching, the teacher

and what is taught closer together. The Conclusion is a way for teachers to position themselves in their teaching that in some way resolves the confusion and uncertainty in which teachers function today.

Chapter One

Theories of Authenticity in Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre

Of authenticity Gill and Sherman (1963) write, "the concept of the authentic as opposed to the inauthentic life is one of the most original and important contributions of existentialism, precisely because it provides ethical norms genuinely rooted in human ontology" (p. 19). This chapter intends to give some understanding of the term "authentic being" in its philosophical sense. Doing so necessitates a turn to European philosophy and existentialist thought. Here we focus mainly on the thinking of three philosophers who are most closely identified with defining authentic existence: Soren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, and Jean Paul Sartre.

Authenticity in its philosophical sense is fundamental to the thinking of the six educationalists whose theories are

explored in the following chapters. In defining authenticity we enter the world of metaphysics where what is discussed is of an abstract nature. Mainly metaphysics is concerned with the concepts of universality, personal identity, what constitutes human understanding, the nature of being, and the interrelatedness of these concepts. Authenticity in its existentialist meaning is actually a frame for defining the self. It is constituted in what might be called an inner sense of self and calls for engaged reflection, imagination, thoughtful response, and exchange, in its construction and realisation.

I argue in the following explication of authenticity that the defining of authenticity in the thinking of the three philosophers follows a common narrative. Although the structure of the narrative varies with each philosopher, fundamental aspects of the narrative are the same. Authentic existence is presented by each of these philosophers as a possibility for everyone. The individual is called to awaken to a sense of self, of a self that comes to know that one is responsible for naming and defining one's own individuality. The awakened self follows a calling; it is a call to know and to name one's limitations while searching and striving for one's possibilities. Authentic existence as presented in these narratives aims to give definition and direction to one's existence as it calls for a transformation of being.

In a growing sense of self-awareness the self, the individual, aims to realise his or her highest sense of being; that is, knowing the self deeply and also knowing one's sense of place in the world.

We begin with an exploration of how authenticity is defined in the thinking of Soren Kierkegaard.

Kierkegaard and selfhood

The crowd, in fact, is composed of individuals; it must therefore be in every man's power to become what he is, an individual. From becoming an individual no one, no one at all, is excluded, except he who excludes himself by becoming a crowd man (Kierkegaard, cited in Friedman, p. 113).

The term "authentic being" is deeply rooted in the personal experiences of Kierkegaard. Born in 1813, he set the stage and provided the conceptual tools for the field of existentialism that was to follow a century later.

Kierkegaard is known for having exalted the concept of the individual. Standing against the Christian doctrines of his time and the dominance of the bourgeois society into which he was born he desired to define what the individual was and at the same time recognise the power and ability of the individual in determining his own future and sense of existence.

His theory, presented as a series of stages, reflects Kierkegaard's own life struggle and self-determined path to authentic being. Through his own lived experiences and inner anguish Kierkegaard determined there to be three primary stages to ultimate selfhood: the aesthetic stage, the ethical stage, and finally the Christian stage. The truly authentic being needs to go through all of these three stages in order to achieve complete selfhood. What follows is a description of each of the stages. In Kierkegaard's writing each of these stages becomes increasingly more involved, demanding more of one's commitment to being authentic.

The aesthetic stage

The aesthetic stage is the stage of immediacy. The person lives solely for the moment in hedonistic pursuits bringing immediate satisfaction, and readily surrenders to sensuous desire. At this stage self-awareness and a consciousness of self have not yet found expression. The person simply moves from one momentary experience to another without thinking to establish understanding or any continuity among them. His activity is seen as mindless and without reflective intent. He lacks purpose and commitment to anything. He merely lives

for the moment in a ceaseless round of pleasure,
superficiality, and what Kierkegaard calls *absentmindedness*.

Although this immediacy stage does reflect the behaviour of a child, the aesthetic stage, according to Kierkegaard, can become fixed in the adult. In adult life a person can live his entire life not distinguishing himself from or as opposed to the social order of which he is a part. In this instance no true self-consciousness has emerged, and no genuine independent decisions are made. Kierkegaard calls a person in such a mode of existence, the *Crowd Man*. A good example of a *Crowd Man* type would be Anna's brother, Oblonsky, in Leo Tolstoy's novel *Anna Karenina*. Oblonsky is totally absorbed in satisfying his own immediate desires. The meaning of life for Oblonsky is limited to achieving immediate self-satisfaction. Money, women, and social status drive and determine his actions and his relations with others around him. Other characters in the novel are conflicted by life and the societal roles that they are expected to follow, especially Anna. But Oblonsky remains a *Crowd Man*. That is, as a *Crowd Man*, he lives his whole life without ever becoming fully conscious of his own individuality, as being distinct from the social and natural environment of which he is a part. He has no sense of his inner self. According to Kierkegaard, the *Crowd Man* represents the average citizen. In bourgeois society he was

the established man, one who diligently follows the rules laid down by society:

He is a university man, husband and father, an uncommonly competent civil functionary even, a respectable father, very gentle to his wife and carefulness in itself with respect to his children. And a Christian? Well yes, he is that too, after a sort (From *Sickness Unto Death*, cited in Gill and Sherman, 1973, p. 19)

Since he lacks a sense of self-determination, the *Crowd Man* constantly sees himself as being acted upon by forces over which he has little or no control. Although he may appear to act deliberately and freely, in fact the *Crowd Man* is constantly being determined by the world around him. The result is a person who is what Kierkegaard calls *lost to himself*. In this mode of existence one has not yet begun to move toward authentic selfhood. At the immediate pole of the aesthetic stage, life is concentrated in the passing moment, and has no intrinsic relation to, or interest in, past and future. Kierkegaard gives value to one's awareness of past and future, as an essential aspect of the inner being.

Kierkegaard described the aesthetic mode this way: "For the sensual is the momentary. The sensual seeks momentary satisfaction. The more refined it is, the better it knows how to make the moment of enjoyment a little eternity" (from *Either/Or*, cited in Taylor, 1975, p. 153).

The move to authentic selfhood begins while one is still in

the aesthetic stage. One's ability to reflect is also another essential element in naming the self. The individual must come to some conscious awareness of himself. Self-reflection emerges with a deliberate decision to reflect. The development of this decision and the move to self-reflection marks a significant step in the process of individualisation. At the moment of self-reflection a self begins to emerge, the emergence of a self through consciousness. The recognition of the self as a decision-maker is another essential aspect of the inner sense.

The ethical stage

The most significant characteristic of the aesthetic stage is the absence of the exercise of one's freedom of decision-making. In the aesthetic stage one does what society determines one is to do. The fundamental characteristic of the ethical stage is the emergence of decision. Decision-making, according to Kierkegaard, is primary in constituting the individual.

Kierkegaard determines two closely related levels of decision-making. The first level Kierkegaard calls *choosing oneself*. The self does not exist until one chooses oneself. When one chooses oneself, one is on the way to achieving

selfhood and authentic being. The second level, for which the first is a necessary condition, is the deliberate resolution to strive to achieve a goal. Committing to a goal is the second aspect of achieving authentic being. Taken together these two aspects of conscious thought, decision-making and making a deliberate commitment, are what determine individuality.

Kierkegaard in his theoretical pursuit never gave up his Christian faith. But while he acknowledged God as the creator of the individual, he also acknowledged that the creation of the concrete self is always inextricably tied to a social and natural environment. The immediate environment contributes to constituting the self with the self being moulded and shaped by the immediate environment. Moreover, Kierkegaard determined that the effect of the environment on the self is always outside the control of the self. Who one's parents are, other people related to the self, and the historical development of humanity are formative of the self's being but are not determined by the self. However, they are part of the self's actuality. Kierkegaard concluded that for one to choose oneself is to begin to acknowledge those formative aspects, to acknowledge that one has a past, a social and cultural history. Kierkegaard felt that before any further development of the self beyond the environmental can take place, it is necessary to apprehend a sense of

oneself in terms of one's past. The process of choosing one's own self then is to accept the actualities of oneself. This acceptance of oneself must be in Kierkegaard's structure of selfhood a total acceptance, meaning one has to acknowledge one's weaknesses and shortcomings. Kierkegaard describes the process this way: "The individual thus becomes conscious of himself as this definite individual, with these talents, these dispositions, these instincts, these passions, influenced by these definite surroundings, as this definite product of a definite environment. By being conscious of himself in this way, he assumes responsibility for all of this: "Thus at the instant of choosing he is in the most complete isolation, for he withdraws from the surroundings; yet, at the same moment he is in absolute continuity, for he chooses himself as product of his environment and his past. So when he chooses himself as product he can be said to be creating himself" (from *Either/Or*, cited in Taylor, p. 190).

It is in the ethical stage that one chooses oneself and in doing so accepts responsibility for oneself. Kierkegaard contends that it is only on the basis of such self-knowledge and such self-acceptance that responsible decisions can be carried out. In the choice of oneself, one accepts one's "givenness," one's actuality, and it is that upon which one builds. As Kierkegaard writes further in *Either/Or*, "the

choice itself is decisive for the content of the personality, through the choice the personality immerses itself in the thing chosen" (Gill and Sherman, p. 32). Kierkegaard maintained that only when the self understands itself and accepts itself can one proceed to what he names as the second level of decision-making.

The second level of selfhood can be reached while in the ethical stage. It is the deliberate resolve to attempt to realise one's possibilities or to strive to achieve some goal. It is more a commitment manifest in action. It is one's free decision to try to actualise one's own potentialities. Kierkegaard believed that one's possibilities are actualised through the individual's capacity to exercise free will in making decisions. The actualisation of possibilities through decision-making is also the move to developing a self. (This insight is fundamental to authentic being and is repeated in the thinking of both Heidegger and Sartre.) Furthermore, the decisions made condition future possibilities in so far as choice irrevocably closes some possibilities and opens others. In this second stage of ethical being the individual recognises that he is free to define his own historical actuality through his own decisions. Kierkegaard wrote of this stage: "So the ethic's task is to develop out of his concealment and reveal himself in the universal" (from

Either/Or, cited in Taylor, p. 207).

With an awareness of one's actualities it is possible to set goals toward which one strives. The goals which move one towards a fully actualised being, Kierkegaard believed, are set in the form of an image of an ideal self; the ideal self being a picture of perfection formed in one's imagination. By means of the imagination, an individual constructs an ideal self distinguished from his real and actual self. Having imagined an ideal self, one endeavours to actualise this image through a dialectical reflective exchange between the knowledge of one's actual self and the image of an ideal self. The dialectic nature of human existence is also an essential component of developing the inner self and the interplay between dialogue and reflection.

As a consequence of one's decisions which are based in one's actuality and a self-directedness towards one's possibility, one achieves a kind of unity of the self. One's will imparts continuity to the self's being. Continuity is achieved when the multiplicity of the self's desires can be brought together by the individual's will, the centre of the inner self. For the ethical, the unity of the person is the ideal self for which he sets his will and strives to realise.

The ethical ideal is enacted at the moment of decision. At

that moment the present, the past, and the future are joined. One's actualities and one's possibilities are engaged and the unity of the self is conferred upon the self by the self.

The element of dread

The move towards self actualisation in the ethical stage is the place where the dark side of the inner self shows itself and reveals the limits of existence as an ethical being. When one gives in to one's dark side one suffers what Kierkegaard calls *dread*. Dread is most commonly associated with the self's freedom and it is experienced when one is confronted with one's own freedom of decisions. The self is confronted with his future which he sees as comprised of infinite possibilities and at the realisation of the immensity of the burden of responsibility that is connected with this thought he experiences *dread*. Dread for Kierkegaard defines man's sinfulness as it is the result of man's refusal to take responsibility for his decisions. In the ethical stage the self continues to experience *dread* throughout life as one moves from the past into the future through decisions made in the present.

The collapse of the ethical

Kierkegaard determines that the ethical stage is necessary in the achievement of selfhood. One cannot skip this stage. He also recognizes its shortcomings and inevitable collapse. For the ethical person the primary focus is on the self, one's ability to make decisions and one's will to act on decisions. The self is the goal towards which he strives. But Kierkegaard sees that this image of an ideal self based on one's past and one's possibilities is not enough. He turns to the concept of God and universal humanity to further one's self-actualisation. God is the means by which the ethical person secures his vows to remain loyal to the ideal self image, although achieving his own self actualisation is his primary goal. The ethical person has the capacity to fulfil the obligation which he has undertaken, but in practice the achievement of the ideal proves to be very difficult. In practice the ethical stage of existence begins to break down. It breaks down because the ethical self places an ill-founded emphasis on the ideal. The ethical ideal points to ideality as a task and assumes that man is in possession of the conditions required for achieving it, which, as Kierkegaard had previously determined, man is not. The social and environmental consequences are beyond one's control. The standards ethics sets are too ideal for man to fulfil. The result is the collapse of the ethical. The requirements that ethics places

upon the individual are, as Kierkegaard says, "so infinite that the individual always goes bankrupt" (Kierkegaard, from *Either/Or*, cited in Taylor, p. 236).

The ethical individual comes to recognise his inability to achieve his goals and as an ethical person he assumes responsibility for his future. Man's inherent weaknesses make the ideality, the goals for which the ethical strives and upon which the self depends, impossible for the ethical person to accomplish. It is in this bankrupt state that the ethical individual can move towards what Kierkegaard calls the Christian stage and in doing so he also moves towards a realisation of authentic selfhood. The answer to achieving self actualisation, Kierkegaard determines, is in the tenets of Christianity. Also, with the Christian stage, Kierkegaard moves self actualisation away from an insular perspective to one with universal significance.

The Christian stage

For Kierkegaard it is the incarnation of God in Christ that is the focus of achieving authentic selfhood. In Kierkegaard's orientation to Christianity he positions Christ as representing an essential double dimension. The double aspect of Christ is necessary in achieving self

actualisation of the highest order. The Christ figure represents man's sinfulness as well as God's eternal blessedness.

Sin is better understood as a description of the mental state of the individual prior to his own act of sin. This mental state is described by Kierkegaard as *dread*.

Kierkegaard has already defined *dread* as the dread of being responsible for oneself. It is the feeling one has in the face of the self's possible freedom, one's infinite possibilities. "Dread is the psychological state which precedes sin" (Friedman, 1964, p. 370). Sin is a kind of faintness of heart to take responsibility for the self. *Dread* defines man's sins, as it is the result of man's refusal to take responsibility for his decisions.

Kierkegaard defines sinfulness as taking two forms: inherited and actual. In inherited sin Kierkegaard determines that sin as *dread* has a history in the development of humanity. Other human beings influence the actual self coming to form in and through the individual. The self defines his history through his decisions. Therefore if the self's history is affected by others and if humanity is made up of individual selves, then humanity must likewise have a history. The history of humanity is made up of the histories of individuals. Kierkegaard thus argues

that persons are a synthesis of their own individuality, and of humanity as a whole. It is in this way that sin is inherited. Social and cultural traditions have been inherited and have not been thoughtfully challenged in terms of stifling one's possibilities.

Actual sin is related to the particular individual.

Kierkegaard sees actual sin as closer to what he terms *despair*. *Despair* is the failure (or the refusal) of the self to be a self. Kierkegaard defines two forms of despair. The first form is weakness. This form of despair Kierkegaard sees as occurring when one is *not willing* to acknowledge a sense of self. Kierkegaard says one suffers *despair* "at not willing to be oneself; or still lower, despair at willing to be another than himself, wishing for a new self"

(Kierkegaard, from *Sickness unto Death*, cited in Friedman, p. 371). According to Kierkegaard's structure of selfhood, given the self's actualities, the self can, through free decision, strive to realise the possibilities available to it. Decision further defines one's actuality while conditioning one's possibilities. Kierkegaard contends that one must accept this formal structure of the self, and the particular actualities and possibilities of one's own individual self. He regards the failure to do this as weakness. The second form of *despair* occurs when one *desperately wills* to be oneself. Kierkegaard calls this form

of despair *defiance*. Despair in the form of defiance refers to the second essential aspect of selfhood which is acceptance of one's ontological beginning, that of being created by God. If the self is to accept itself, it must acknowledge its ontological dependence on God. We saw in the ethical stage that the self is placed at the centre which inevitably leads to a loss of self. When one sees oneself as created by oneself and not by God Kierkegaard calls this defiance. Kierkegaard writes of this form of *despair*, "The loss of a possibility signifies...that everything has become necessary to man...The determinist or the fatalist is in despair, and in despair he has lost his self, because for him everything is necessary...." (from *Sickness unto Death*, cited in Olson, 1962, p. 142). God, for Kierkegaard, is a place between determinism and fatalism, a place where the words "faith" and "hope" rest. The goal for the self now becomes, in Kierkegaard's structure of selfhood, for the self to achieve a proper equilibrium between oneself and God, between the self's actualities and the self's possibilities, and a view of oneself that unifies one's existence in the present to one's past and one's future. The failure to achieve such equilibrium is a self in *despair*.

According to Kierkegaard, although one's decisions and one's will can move one towards self actualisation, one also needs to acknowledge and accept that one lives one's life before

God, that one has universal connectedness. When one is aware of one's existence before God one recognises both the importance of one's decisions and the consequences of one's decisions. Defining oneself through decisions is defining the self before God. Kierkegaard argues that once one's dependence on and responsibility to God become clear, his *despair* and *sinfulness* then become potential for selfhood. Sin becomes a way to God and a way to self actualisation. The solution of man's dilemma must involve coming to terms with sinfulness. Kierkegaard determines that the possibility of a connectedness to a concept of God is opened up by man's relationship to the incarnate, to Christ, whom Kierkegaard calls *God-Man*.

Kierkegaard speaks of the *eternal blessedness* of God to state a fundamental aspect of what God is. God in essence remains unwavering in his love of humanity and willingness to forgive sin through grace. Because God's will is unwavering, possibilities are open to sinful persons that would otherwise be closed. Most important, through the human capacity of forgiveness of sins the self has access to God's *eternal blessedness*, which I understand as a kind of acceptance of one's limitations that are defined by factors that are outside of one's control. For the self to gain *eternal blessedness*, and therefore a proper relation to God, one must be sustained by the self's constant willing to be

itself. After having sinned the self is offered the possibility of realising one's possibilities through the concept of God's *eternal blessedness*. Only by faithfully responding to God's act of forgiveness, manifest in the human form of Christ, can one go beyond what one can determine for oneself. One believes in the *God-Man* not because of discernible evidence or ascertainable reasons, but by the sheer strength of one's own willing to believe that which cannot be understood.

The moment of incarnation

The historical moment of the incarnation of God in man, of God in Christ, Kierkegaard calls the moment of *Absolute Paradox*. Jesus Christ as *God-man* is both representative of man's sinfulness and temporality and God's *eternal blessedness*, something beyond the temporal and the actual, something that exists in the form of goodness. The incarnation of God in Christ establishes the possibility of atonement for the self. Kierkegaard understands that atonement to be the forgiveness of the individual's sins. Although the incarnation took place at a particular moment in time, it represents God's eternal resolve to love man.

The necessity of faith

The event of God's incarnation in Christ does not by itself accomplish the forgiving of a sinner. Kierkegaard believed that forgiveness can be achieved only through one's faith. "Faith," Kierkegaard deemed, "is the highest passion in man" (from *Fear and Trembling*, cited in Friedman, p. 288). Faith is the expression of a personal relationship with God. Faith is the positive response to God's act of forgiveness in Christ. Faith is a juncture between God's grace and man's wilful activity. The moment of faith is the leap of necessity to believe in the absurd, in the *Absolute Paradox*. Faith is an act of one's own will which is motivated by the self's interest in its *eternal blessedness*. Kierkegaard says, "Faith is essentially this--to hold fast to possibility" (from *Either/Or*, cited in Taylor, p. 324).

Faith entails living in a state of constant internal conflict as one attempts to realise one's possibilities based in one's actualities. In the Christian stage the self reaches the highest degree of individuality and the deepest awareness of the significance of its life through faith. It is in the Christian stage that an equilibrium among the essential components of life can be struck. Such an equilibrium Kierkegaard considered the most authentic form of existence that a person can actualise.

But, alas, the final stage in Kierkegaard's journey to selfhood is not one of bliss. Since one's eternal blessedness is contingent upon one's decisions, Kierkegaard believed that self actualisation cannot be fully realised during one's life. Kierkegaard describes it this way: "When eternity and becoming are put together the result is not rest, but coming into being. ...[S]ince one's eternal blessedness is contingent upon one's decision, it cannot be fully actualised during the self's lifetime. It is always something in the future. As future, it is the possibility that the self's entire existence seeks to actualise. Through the self's decisions, hope is chosen" (from *Either/Or*, cited in Taylor, p. 328). The state of hope is the final stage of one's self-actuality.

A synopsis of the narrative of authenticity in Kierkegaard's way to selfhood

The linear progression of Kierkegaard's stages to selfhood readily lends itself to the narrative structure. Kierkegaard's narrative of authenticity begins inwardly with the individual's deliberate decision to reflect on his sense of being. In the act of self reflection the individual awakens to himself and begins to construct a sense of an

inner self. Before this awakening to oneself one is in the aesthetic stage, existing without self-awareness. In this initial stage the individual exists as part of a crowd. Caught up in the codes and practices of society, he has no identity of his own and he makes no genuine decisions. In the awakened stage the self, led by a growing inner self, moves from the aesthetic to the ethical stage. The individual begins by identifying and accepting his own actualities: his past, his history, and the environment in which he grew up; those aspects of himself which he cannot change. In grasping one's own self in this way the individual has chosen himself. In grasping himself he can now realise his possibilities, based on his actualities. The inner self then chooses a goal for himself, an image of an ideal self, and resolves to achieve that goal. In choosing himself in this way the individual is at the same time confronted with the fact that he is now responsible for his own existence. At the thought that one is responsible for oneself the individual experiences a sense of *dread*. The inner self recoils in *dread* when the core of one's being is confronted with one's freedom in decision-making and the infinite possibilities of his future. In order to continue on the journey to selfhood and authentic being the inner self has to accept the *dread* that accompanies taking responsibility for oneself and one's decision-making power. The journey to selfhood has one more hurdle to overcome. The

individual is confronted with his limitations in realising his desired ideal self. The realisation that he cannot achieve his ideal state results in a kind of loss of faith in himself and his ability to make fully genuine decisions. In order to move beyond this point one needs to find direction in another source that is outside the self. Kierkegaard saw in Christian belief the answer to this need. The individual must look to Christ to achieve selfhood. Christ, as the duality of God and Man (God-Man), represents an essential double-dimension necessary to achieving self-actualisation of the highest order. In this stage the inner self acknowledges and accepts the weaknesses and limitations of the self in taking responsibility for himself and also acknowledges that he must give over to a higher being if full self-actualisation is to be realised. That higher being is God whose fundamental attribute of eternal blessedness provides access to full self-actualisation. When one is aware of one's existence before God one recognises both the importance of one's decisions and the consequences of one's decisions in a universal dimension. Once one's dependence on and responsibility to God become clear, one's despair and sinfulness become the potential for selfhood. Sin becomes a way to God and a way to self-actualisation. Through acknowledging and accepting God's eternal blessedness as manifest in Christ one is able to reach the highest point of self-actualisation. Acknowledgement and acceptance come in

the form of faith, a faith that is enacted through one's own willed commitment to believe. Since one's eternal blessedness, a kind of universal forgiveness of all the sins of mankind, is contingent upon one's decision, complete selfhood cannot be fully actualised during the self's lifetime. Faith, along with hope, places the self in a constant struggle between one's actualities and one's possibilities. This is where Kierkegaard's journey to selfhood ends and begins.

Heidegger and authenticity

Heidegger is more pragmatic in defining authentic existence than Kierkegaard is. Whereas Kierkegaard determined authentic selfhood within the frame of ethics and Christianity, the frame for Heidegger's definition of authenticity is not so clearly distinguished. Moral and spiritual implications can be interpreted in Heidegger's thinking on existence and authenticity but perhaps Heidegger's writing is best understood as an intellectual, rather than personal, response to the human condition. We will see that themes in Kierkegaard's thinking on selfhood recur in Heidegger's definition of authenticity. For Kierkegaard being authentic is a way of life, while Heidegger defines authenticity as a mode of consciousness.

What follows has been based on Heidegger's explication of authenticity given in the text for which he is best known, *Being and Time*. In *Being and Time* Heidegger's complex, and not always easily understood, theory of authentic being is presented and defined through an integrated system of concepts. I have approached the following interpretation of Heidegger's thinking on authenticity by focussing on the fundamental concepts of Heidegger's phenomenology of being as they relate to aspects of inwardness and have defined his theory of authenticity through these concepts.

There is a primary and essential concept defined and named by Heidegger that is instrumental in understanding what Heidegger means by authenticity. That concept is *Dasein*. Here I equate *Dasein* with inwardness. Translated from German, *da* means "there" or "here," and *sein* means "to be." However, as it relates to Heidegger's thinking *Dasein* has most often been translated as "there-being," "to be there," or "being there."

Dasein has no particular determinant meaning. There is no pre-ordained essential nature to *Dasein*. But through *Dasein* we can think about ourselves. *Dasein* reveals the uniqueness of our existence to us. Without *Dasein* one would not know that one exists, or know of one's existence as being

separate from other people and other things. Understanding of being is itself a definite characteristic of *Dasein*. Heidegger's theory of existence and human consciousness is built around the concept of *Dasein*. The following is an outline of the function and form of *Dasein*, how *Dasein* is constructed, and how it works.

One essential aspect of *Dasein* is that it recognises that every human being is perpetually oriented towards his own possibilities: something in the future, something that is not yet. Our present actions are always directed towards our possibilities. We will see that, according to Heidegger, acting on our possibilities can take one of two possible directions: inauthentic existence or authentic existence.

Inauthentic existence

Heidegger describes the ontology of consciousness as "being thrown into the world." For Heidegger, the world already exists before one enters it. In one's "being thrown" into the already existing world one is first lost in its everydayness; in the day-to-day experience of living one does not see oneself as separate from everyone else. He follows the routine paths set out before him; he does what is expected of him. His frame of mind is pre-reflective and

his life is determined by others. Heidegger used the term *das Man* to describe such an existence. *Das Man* is not unlike Kierkegaard's "Crowd man"; he is the embodiment of the anonymous impersonal public. He is caught up in the turbulence of daily chores and assumes the roles that have been predefined for him: the goals, opinions, and desires of prevailing social custom and expectations. *Das Man* represents the general public, but he is one and the public together. *Das Man* for Heidegger is inauthentic existence. Olson (1962), writing on Heidegger's theory of authenticity, sees Heidegger's inauthentic being as representative of the public world which he defines as "the world which groups of human beings share in common" (p. 136).

Characteristic of the inauthentic, Heidegger determines, is a life of superficiality, consisting largely of idle talk, idle curiosity, and ambiguity. In inauthentic existence the emphasis is on the present; all time is primarily present. In Heidegger's inauthentic existence can be seen vestiges of Kierkegaard's aesthetic stage. In this inauthentic existence one's true being, his oneness, his uniqueness, is concealed. As inauthentic, one has not yet begun to strive to attain self-awareness or attempted to realise his own sense of being. He has not yet separated himself from "being-amongst-other-beings," nor started determining "being-for-itself." (These are Heidegger's descriptive phrases.) He has not yet

begun to develop and acknowledge an inner sense of self.

Verfallenheit

An inauthentic existence is a state that Heidegger calls *Verfallenheit* (fallenness). (Fallenness is similar to Kierkegaard's sinfulness.) In this state *Dasein* is seen as being at a low ebb. According to Heidegger the state of fallenness has two forms: subject fallenness (wherein one sees oneself as fated), and object fallenness (wherein people and things become objects of manipulation). Subject fallenness is more clearly related to the concept of *das Man*. One who is in a state of subject fallenness is someone who constantly obeys the commands and expectations of the general public and never thinks to question the source of the commands or why he is doing what he is doing. He does not act on his decisions. When he does act, he does so in concert with the general public. Olson describes Heidegger's fallenness this way: "Fallenness is a state in which the individual constantly obeys commands and prohibitions whose source is unknown and unidentifiable and whose justification he does not bother to inquire into" (p. 136).

Object-fallenness, the second kind of fallenness, is a state of existence in which one sees the world in a superficial

way. It is an alienating world of objects and things to be manipulated, and one's self is an object or instrument of manipulation. It is a world that is indifferent to human existence, a world that is defined within the concepts of precision, efficiency, and standardisation.

In both states of *Verfallenheit*, Heidegger determines, there is an ambiguity to one's sense of self and the way one relates to the world. There is no depth of feeling. One participates in the world with little serious engagement. One's behaviour is determined by habit, society, and a vague sense of what is required. One partly knows what things are but partly does not because he is so caught up in the way other people see him and the way he sees others that he cannot think beyond his immediate perception of the world. He cannot form opinions of his own making and his statements are partly his own and partly those of people in general.

Death

Heidegger determined that it is because one is avoiding the realisation of one's temporal existence that one continues to stay in an inauthentic state. He is avoiding his inevitable end, which is death. When one does come to

contemplate his non-existence, his death, one experiences anxiety (*Angst*). The thought of the temporality of one's existence is too much for him to comprehend so he returns to the safety and security of the world of the public. In not acknowledging his temporality, he wishes to avoid taking responsibility for his life. According to Heidegger, one can remain in an inauthentic frame of mind for one's entire life, avoiding the reality of forthcoming death.

Whereas Kierkegaard saw the emergence of reflection as the first step in moving towards selfhood, Heidegger saw the acceptance of one's future non-existence as the first step towards an authentic way of life. In acknowledging his non-existence the individual also realises his possibilities. Heidegger described it this way: "In our existential projection of an authentic Being-towards-death...we must set forth those items in such a Being which are constitutive for it as an understanding of death--and as such an understanding in the sense of Being towards this possibility without either fleeing it or covering it up. We must characterise Being-towards-death as a Being towards a possibility--indeed, towards a distinctive possibility of Dasein itself" (*Being and Time*, 1993, p. 305).

Anxiety (Angst)

According to Heidegger one feels anxiety at the thought of the unsupported isolated condition in which he finds himself in the world. As in Kierkegaard's emerging ethical being the growing inner self recoils from its own reflection. He starts to doubt the reality of the world. When one confronts his temporality, his death, he realizes that he is the source of his reality. In the state of anxiety the inner self goes one of two ways. He can escape his feelings of vulnerability and uncertainty, the insecurity of existence, by becoming even more deeply engaged in the ordinary, the everyday, the practical, frantically pursuing his inauthentic goals; or he can respond to *the calling* to authentic being and he can begin to take responsibility for his own existence. This latter direction is the beginning of an engaged *Dasein*. As with Kierkegaard, recognizing one's propensity for anxiety in the face of responsibility is an essential aspect of an inner self.

Sorgen

Sorgen is translated from the German as "care" but in Heidegger's use of the term it is generally translated as "concern." *Sorgen* is the concern one has for his existence.

It gives significance to one's life as well as connecting oneself to the world. Concern with the world rests with the thought that "There is something to be done," and such a thought entails thinking about the future. When one accepts that he is responsible for his own life he becomes concerned for his future. His actions are a result of his concern. This is acting out of concern for the self. Concern brings future, past, and present together. Just as Kierkegaard saw will as the unifying factor for human existence, Heidegger sees one's response to one's existence, the expression of concern, as that which unifies existence. It is what unifies one's self and gives coherence to one's life. One's concern in the world is founded on the fact that one is led forward as an essential part of our being. One moves forward from one's condition at any given moment to another condition in the future. Authentic being is defined through the nature of our concern. Concern brings *Dasein* into existence.

Recognising this calling inside of the self (aroused concern) to respond to the world in some way is another aspect of the inner self. Heidegger introduces the thought that one cannot move towards authentic being unless one recognises that one is called to respond to the world. This calling is part of one's individuality, one's uniqueness.

Reflection

Reflection, another aspect of developing an inner self, is the method that brings one's attention to the actuality of the world, and opens one's eyes to one's position in the world, which is first and foremost a position of responsibility for one's own self. Heidegger felt that when one realises the uniqueness of one's position in the world, he will see the force of his own reflective capacity; namely, that he and he alone is responsible for the world having significance. He determines what is valuable in the world. When one sees the truth about oneself, he will realise that people in general, the public, cannot really be the source of that significance. He is alone, and he alone attaches what value he chooses to things. Reflection is engaged *Dasein*.

Transformation

A transformation occurs when one moves from inauthentic to authentic existence. By facing one's death one now sees the insignificance and meaninglessness of one's life of everydayness, of inauthentic existence. One can see that significance and meaningfulness are really one's own responsibility. Instead of a vague, ambiguous, and

superficial engagement with the world one's relation to the world is self-determined, self-directed, and self-defined, thus giving a true meaningfulness to one's existence.

Authentic being

In inauthentic existence one accepts in one's day-to-day life all the standards and beliefs of the general public in which one finds oneself. His own unique possibilities remain unrealised. Only when one confronts "being-towards-death" (Heidegger's phrase) can he begin to realise his true nature and his true potentialities. Authentic being begins by accepting the freedom one has to choose and to act on one's choices. This acceptance appears as if by chance. It is a response to a *calling* experienced in anxiety, when one confronts the temporality of his existence. It is in response to this calling that one moves to reorient oneself to the world. One becomes open to the world. A sense of openness to the world and to one's possibilities is another element of an inner self. One's existence is as a "clearing" (Heidegger's word) in which being can manifest itself. Heidegger states that "Only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark" (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 171). In authentic

existence *Dasein* becomes unconcealed. It is a process of revealing itself to itself.

Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger maintained that an essential aspect of authentic existence is understanding oneself. One begins to claim his authentic existence when one moves to apprehend his past. Through understanding oneself, how one was in the past, one can determine his future possibilities. From knowing himself in the past he knows what he is capable of realising in the future. The future exists as possibilities, things which are *not yet*.

In authentic existence things in the world must lose their solidity and their attraction and apparent importance and one must feel deep alarm at the emptiness which surrounds him. In this state of mind, Heidegger deems, one has to act in faith. But this is not the religious faith of Kierkegaard, a faith in God, in universal grace and goodness. It is faith in knowing that one can realise one's possibilities. It is through faith that one can resolve to realise one's possibilities.

Revealing our uniqueness

The concept of authenticity calls for the necessity for each individual to realise his uniqueness. The following are

three ways, as determined by Heidegger, in which the self reveals itself and its uniqueness of being. Basically, one comes to define oneself through understanding, moods, and critical self-reflecting dialogue. Heidegger sees that the way one thinks in inauthentic existence is rather muddled and confused. Heidegger attempts to give some clarity and meaningfulness to inner reflective thoughts.

Through deep understanding of our existential selves, our past and realisable possibilities, we act in knowing. Our actions in the present reflect this deep knowing. We can discover the meaning of our situation only by considering the way in which we are attuned to the situation, that is, engaged in being. Our attitudes and moods reflect this engagement. Heidegger recognized that we have control over and can affect the frames in which we position our thinking, the moods in which we function. For one not to acknowledge this aspect of the self means one exists in thoughtless action. Part of the human exposure to the world is shown in the characteristic moods that one adopts. Heidegger suggests that by recognising that we are in a certain frame of mind we thereby feel it in a certain way. By considering how we are in the world through our moods and attitudes we can better understand ourselves, see ourselves as unique beings, and affect our existence. Along with moods and attitudes we can think critically about the way we are in the world. With

each action we ask ourselves, "Am I following the crowd or am I doing this because I am in touch with some form of authentic being?" It is a form of critical introspective dialogue about oneself and one's relation to the world.

A synopsis of Heidegger's narrative of authenticity

Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger's narrative on the journey to authenticity is really a story of the emergence and the development of an inner sense of self. This inner sense of self Heidegger calls *Dasein*. The individual begins as if suddenly "thrown into the world" and exists in a pre-reflective state where his thinking and actions are only of the present. The awakening to a sense of inner self through consciousness happens when one is confronted with one's non-existence, one's death. At this point one sees his possibilities and begins to doubt the reality of the world in which he has existed. Seeing life as contingent and temporal one begins to suffer a sense of anxiety. When this state of anxiety occurs a decision needs to be made: either one decides to escape his feelings of vulnerability and uncertainty by becoming more deeply engaged in the ordinary, the everyday, the practical, frantically pursuing his inauthentic goals; or he can respond to *the calling* to authentic being in him and begin to take responsibility for

his own existence. If one chooses the latter he is on the path to authentic existence. With the acceptance of his temporal existence one needs to recognise his concern for himself and his future. Concern manifests itself in one's reflections and actions. In such a mode of existence one is taking responsibility for his temporal existence while at the same time reaching forward to realise his possibilities. One realises that he and he alone gives to life its meaningfulness and significance. The future exists as possibility, as things which are *not yet*, and through faith, through the realisation that one can be responsible for his existence, the individual resolves to realise and reveal his possibilities. Authenticity for Heidegger rests in a mode of critical self-reflection, on-going dialogue, and unfolding understanding and insight. For Heidegger authenticity is living every moment with a kind of intensity, whereby each act is committed in the full awareness of that which constitutes *Dasein*. In authentic being one is engaged in one's sense of knowing and one's actions are poised to reflect the truth of one's being.

Sartre, Bad Faith, and authentic being

Heidegger's definition of authentic being underlies Sartre's orientation to the world and theory of consciousness. We

will see that, like Heidegger, Sartre distinguishes between two worlds: an everyday world of instrumental complexes and a world which lies beyond it, a world of possibilities. Like Heidegger, Sartre distinguishes between two levels of consciousness: one which is lost in the everyday and another (higher) level of consciousness which is experienced as a kind of an awakening to one's existence. (These two themes are also part of Kierkegaard's thinking about selfhood.) Sartre, like Heidegger, defined consciousness within a highly complex integration of concepts. Here, as in the section on Heidegger and his definition of authenticity, I define Sartre's theory of consciousness and his meaning of "Bad Faith" by defining the essential aspects of Bad Faith and authentic being which are also essential aspects of the inner being. The interrelatedness and fusion of these concepts leads to problems in defining each concept as a separate entity.

In order to understand more clearly Sartre's concept of Bad Faith and authentic being it is necessary to understand to some extent Sartre's thinking about consciousness.

Consciousness for Sartre rests within a duality of concepts which are interdependent and mutually contradictory. It is the dualities of nothingness and possibilities, and subjectivity and objectivity that form the basis of his philosophy.

Nothingness is how Sartre describes the distance between one's being and the immediate world, between thought and the objects of thought. According to Sartre one's consciousness of the world exists as an emptiness. Even though consciousness is a gap, a nothingness, it does have attributes, according to Sartre. Consciousness is aware of the distance, the gap, between oneself and the objects that constitute one's world and at the same time one's consciousness is always acting to fill the gap; it is always acting in reference to something in the future. The future is, for Sartre (as it was for Kierkegaard and for Heidegger), one's possibilities. The individual is always acting on his possibilities. It is from this emptiness that the inner self emerges.

When one acts to realise one's possibilities one engages one's consciousness. This acting to realise one's potentialities Sartre called *being-for-itself*. Being-for-itself is an aspect of consciousness that can be seen as the inner self emerging as it searches for self-identity in its quest for completeness. It does this through the possibilities which are presented to it.

Because consciousness exists in nothingness it has no fixed essence. Conscious beings create themselves as they go

along. Sartre believed in the controversial notion that for human beings, existence precedes essence; there is no essential human nature given in advance. One becomes in consciousness whatever one chooses to become by doing and feeling what one chooses to do and feel.

Freedom, according to Sartre, is the key to authentic being. Sartre determined that conscious beings are essentially free. They are free not only to act as they choose, but they are free to see the world under the headings and categories that they choose. They are even free to imagine things which do not exist. This freedom constitutes the gap between thought and object.

Nothingness describes our existence in the present. Although our conscious existence begins as a nothingness it, facilitated through our capacity to make choices, is also freedom and possibilities. Project (both as a verb and as a noun) refers to the for-itself's choice of its way of being and is expressed by action in the light of a future end.

Bad Faith

Bad Faith is the term Sartre uses to describe one's attempt to escape from the *anguish* which one suffers when one is

brought face to face with one's own unbounded freedom. The effect on human beings when they contemplate the implementation of this freedom is, according to Sartre, a feeling of anguish. *Anguish* occurs when one acknowledges the gap between oneself now and one's possibilities. It is a gap for which the individual is responsible. He is the one who chooses his possibilities. But because they are *his* possibilities he suddenly realises the implications and accompanying responsibility of his choices. It is in this realisation that the individual suffers anguish. (We can see commonalities and a similar line of thinking existing between Sartre's *anguish*, Heidegger's *angst*, and Kierkegaard's *dread*.)

Sartre thinks that the burden of this responsibility is more than one can bear. Consequently, one develops tricks and devices for evading it. It is these tricks and devices that Sartre calls acting in *Bad Faith*. Most of one's actions that are related to external demands such as getting up in the morning to go to work, being polite, putting clothes on, Sartre would consider acts of *Bad Faith*.

Sartre determined two main patterns of behaviour when one acts in *Bad Faith*. One way in which people avoid responsibility is by pretending to themselves and others that things could not be otherwise--that they are bound to a

way of life, and they could not escape it even if they wanted to. They feel as if they are fated to their existence. In this case the individual takes no responsibility for what happens to him. He sees himself as a thing which is acted on by others. Sartre called such action "Being-in-itself." Such a person acts in *Bad Faith* because he is pretending that things are inevitable, when they are not. One does not want to think about what is going to happen in the future. There is an acceptance of the situation as it is. One does not want to have to face the responsibility of making a decision to change things. Instead one pretends not to notice. One allows oneself to be treated as an object. In this way one is acting in *Bad Faith*.

The second way of acting in *Bad Faith* according to Sartre occurs when conscious beings pretend to be nothing except a "Being-for-others" (Sartre's term); that is, they act out the roles that people have assigned to them, and they see themselves as whatever it is that people want them to be. Sartre gives the example of a waiter who does not act like himself but acts the way he thinks others would expect a waiter to act. By acting in roles determined by others one protects oneself from having to face one's freedom and take responsibility for one's own existence.

The majority of our actions, Sartre argues, are actions of *Bad Faith*. Normally, we go about our day-to-day existence and one action leads to another. Most of the time we do not stop to think about what we are doing and our existence in relation to the world. It is much more comfortable to go with the flow of life, to think that what happens is inevitable, or to allow others to think for us, rather than face our possibilities. Sartre sees that acts of *Bad Faith* are really forms of a "degradation of consciousness." In his language Sartre is moralizing, seeing existence as having levels of goodness. This bears similarities to Kierkegaard's stages of existence with the Christian stage being the highest level one can reach.

Authentic Being versus Bad Faith

Sartre says, "In bad faith there is no cynical lie nor knowing preparation for deceitful concepts. But the first act of bad faith is to flee what it cannot flee, to flee what it is" (*Being and Nothingness*, p. 115). To be morally responsible for one's existence is, for Sartre, authentic existence. The move to acting authentically is not just a matter of thinking, "I will not allow this to happen to me"; but rather to be authentic one needs to undergo a radical conversion. To develop in selfhood one must undergo a

transformation. A certain kind of courage and a special act of reflection are necessary. It is a kind of reflection and courage that acknowledges and accepts the *anguish* of taking responsibility for one's existence while at the same time moving to grasp one's freedom. An altered perception of oneself in the world brings one to realise that it is I and I alone who am responsible for the things that constitute my existence. I recognise myself as the cause and the reason for my existence.

In order to undergo this conversion, Sartre argues, the individual must negate his past and free himself from the past. This is somewhat different from the theories of Kierkegaard and Heidegger where to acknowledge and accept one's past are essential to authentic being. According to Sartre the individual needs to grasp his freedom and acknowledge the responsibility he has to authentic existence in the future. He must recognise his past for what it is, and see it as an external object. From the perspective of the individual the past is both me and not me. To be free of one's past it is necessary to transcend one's past. There is absolutely nothing that stands between my past and my present. This is the gap. This is where consciousness and the inner self become constituted. Consciousness is constituted in one's relation to the future. One must turn inwards and think, "I need always to look to the future to

define myself." Looking to the future requires an engagement of imagination. This is an important part of Sartre's thinking. For Sartre one's ability to imagine is an essential aspect of developing into a fully actualised human being. According to Sartre, in looking into the future I choose from among my imagined possibilities and whatever I choose makes me what I am. One's imagination affects one's future and one's freedom. In Sartre's thinking the inner self is constituted in imagination and the individual's unwavering commitment to self-fulfilment. The individual must recognise that at every moment he is called upon to transcend his past and make himself anew through his future and the imagined possibilities offered to him. Our future is absolutely open, absolutely undetermined, either by our past self, or by the external world. This is authentic existence: accepting one's unbounded freedom and continually striving toward a fullness of being. But authentic being remains in the position of unrelenting striving. Sartre sees "the world [as a] becoming, conceived as a synthesis of being and of non-being" (*Being and Time*, p. 171). Although the individual is always searching for and at the same time creating the Self he can never possess himself in any sense of totality. A fully actualised being always eludes him. The *being-for-itself* seeks to find the Self but it can never in any finality possess itself. Rather the focus is on maintaining a heightened conscious awareness through engaged aspects of

an inner self.

A synopsis of the narrative of Sartre's authenticity

Sartre's way to authenticity is constructed within dualisms. The awakening of an inner self happens when one is confronted with the fact that he and he alone is responsible for his choices. In confronting this reality one is brought face to face with one's unbounded freedom. At this point one suffers anguish. The inner self cannot accept the responsibility of his choices so he develops ways of evading it. A schism presents itself: Does he act in Bad Faith; that is, does he allow himself to be treated as an object, or does he accede to a world that others have defined for him? Both are acts of Bad Faith. Or does he move to take responsibility for himself and his existence? The decision to take responsibility is made through a combination of courage and reflection, the mainstays of the inner being. Courage is needed to accept the anguish of responsibility and to move towards grasping one's freedom. When the individual accepts that it is he and he alone who is responsible for the things that constitute his existence he begins to move to self-fulfilment. In the acceptance of this idea a radical transformation occurs. The individual frees himself from his past and acknowledges that he is

constituting himself in the future. The commitment to acknowledge and accept one's freedom as being constituted in one's future possibilities must be unwavering if one is to be truly responsible for his existence. The future is absolutely open. Authentic existence is accepting one's unbounded freedom and continually striving toward a fullness of being within one's actualities. Although one is always reaching forward to realise one's possibilities, one can never possess a sense of oneself in any form of totality; a fully actualised self also eludes him. He exists within his limitations and the realisation that there is always more that could be.

Summary of the three philosophies of authenticity

Amongst these three narratives of authentic existence is a common narrative. It is a narrative that aims to give definition and direction to one's existence as it calls for a transformation of being. The common narrative of authentic existence begins with a call to awaken to sense of an inner self, to remain committed to an awakened state of consciousness and a higher sense of being. There is also a call for a commitment to defining, creating and expressing a sense of one's own uniqueness, which is achieved through a heightened sense of awareness of oneself and one's place in

the world. In these narratives of authenticity there is a common desire to unify the self and the world. In this endeavour, consideration is given to one's past, present, and future. Authenticity is realised by an inner self mediating between the self and the outside world through reflection, inquiry, imagination, and reasoned thought which in turn are used to understand, interpret, direct, and shape one's existence; that is, one's relation with the self and the world.

Narratives of Authenticity and Educational Theory

In the chapters following, I describe and explore the projects of the six educationalists selected for this inquiry. It will be shown how authenticity in its philosophical sense and aspects of inwardness lie at the heart of the projects of these theorists. The strong influence of the three existentialists on contemporary educational thought will become apparent in the explication of the thinking of Maxine Greene, Dwayne Huebner, Mary Warnock, William Pinar, Max van Manen, and Nel Noddings. My enquiry will show how these six theorists build on, expand, and challenge the definitions and narratives of authenticity given by Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre as they (the educational theorists) attempt to script their own

definition of authenticity as it relates to education and teaching. The implications of their projects as well as the moral and political concerns that they raise will be revealed and challenged in the following chapters. The concluding chapter will present another approach to teaching in outline form which I have constructed out of the thinking of the educationalists explored here. The narrative of authenticity given above, presented through the philosophies of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre, as it relates to being a good teacher, provides the frame to the approach that I offer.

Chapter Two

William Pinar and Mary Warnock: autobiography and authenticity

The self in Virginia Woolf's writing takes on a kinetic and oscillating dimension where the past is in constant play with the present and interior monologues contrast and blend with outer conversations and dialogues. Through her dynamic aesthetic literary style, through the use of recalled experiences and inner reflections, and through a play between inner and outer perspectives, Woolf succeeds in representing a self that is present but remains slightly outside the grasp of wholeness. It is these aesthetic aspects found in Woolf's writing of the self that have connectedness to the themes and theoretical approaches of the projects of educationalists William Pinar (American) and Mary Warnock (British) and their emphasis on autobiography. For each of these educationalists, autobiographical writing,

that is, forms of scripting the self, are central to their projects.

The focus of this chapter is on autobiographical text and the value of autobiographical writing in the *praxis* of teaching and education. Here we explore the self as an essential component in defining teaching as a profession. We will do this through a close reading of a significant text by William Pinar, *Autobiography: Politics and Sexuality* (1994). Pinar's thinking about the self in teaching will be given critical consideration by comparing and contrasting his notion of self to Mary Warnock's broader understanding of self as defined in her text *Imagination and Time* (1994). The meaning and significance that each gives to inwardness and existential authenticity as it relates to teaching will be drawn out in the explication of their alternative approaches to education and teaching. We will see that both Warnock and Pinar have closer ties to the thinking of Kierkegaard and Sartre than to Heidegger in formulating an understanding of authenticity. Woolf's writings will also be woven into this explication to serve as exemplar to aspects of Pinar's and Warnock's theoretical discourse on modes of autobiography. In the critical analysis of Pinar's and Warnock's thinking the shortcomings in each of their projects in terms of their theoretical bases, the practicability of their projects, and the realisability of

their intentions in the practice of teaching will be offered along with a valuing of both of their approaches to authentic education.

William Pinar: Autobiography and education

In the following analysis of Pinar's approach to teaching I have focussed on how Pinar traces Kierkegaard's narrative of authenticity. I argue that Kierkegaard's ethical stage forms the basis for Pinar's thinking about the self and teaching. I shall also show that literature plays an important part in Pinar's approach to teaching.

As is apparent in reading William Pinar's book *Autobiography: Politics and Sexuality* (1994) the self, the author, is positioned subjectively to the writing. Through his selection of essays, which span a twenty-year-period, Pinar presents varying understandings of and reflections on his relationship with educational practices from a perspective of his own personal experience. The point of view taken in the writing is a form of *distancing*, of the author looking outwards, passing his gaze over his past experiences in education. In this orientation Pinar is

similar to Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard wrote his life and his life was an example of the self searching for meaningful existence. Reflecting the dialogical nature of Kierkegaard's authorship, Pinar scripts his own life in his writing. In each chapter of his book he cites when and where outside structures and tensions have caused him to reflect on his life in education and through a phenomenological explication and engaged reflective mode of writing he attempts to negotiate the self as educator through experiences and situations of personal conflict. Pinar's autobiographical essays draw on literature, personal experience, and inner personal reflections which in turn reveal his own internal struggles as he tries to bridge the gap between dominant practices of education (meaning mainly institutionalised practices of education) and the self.

In formulating his approach to education Pinar stands against what he sees as happening in present practices in education, mainly teaching. He believes the dominant practices of education to be dehumanising, engendering in teachers a sense of alienation, a sense of loss of the self, and fragmented understandings of self. Pinar believes that in order to address what he calls the "psychic deterioration" that presently exists amongst teachers in institutionalised education there is a need to focus on a recovery of self, and he sees an existential orientation to

the world as fundamental in reclaiming the self.

With his concerns regarding alienation and dehumanisation in mind Pinar developed a method that was mainly intended to help practitioners and researchers working in education to move towards a sense of personal identity, self-actualisation, and a sense of self-worth, essential elements of authentic existence. He called the method *currere*. In the chapter in his text "The Method of *Currere*" (first published in 1975) he outlines the content and structure of his method. Pinar sees the foundational parameters of his approach as being rooted in existentialism, phenomenology, and psychoanalysis. He names specific individuals, mainly intellectuals and literary artists, who have played a significant part in influencing his approach to teaching and his own realised sense of selfhood: writers such as Joyce, Proust, Faulkner; existentialists Sartre, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Buber; and psychoanalysts Freud, Jung, and Laing (Pinar, p. 17). He names Virginia Woolf, specifically, as having a particularly significant effect in shaping his orientation to the world. He makes numerous references to Woolf's thoughts and writings throughout his book. For instance, the title of his chapter "Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown," (Pinar, pp 14-17) is the title that Woolf gave to an essay she wrote in which she laid out her manifesto for her modernist approach to writing character. (See Woolf, A

Woman's Essays, ed. Rachel Bowlby, 1992, pp. 69-87.) In this chapter Pinar reveals how Woolf's writing influenced his own orientation to education and his method. Another chapter in Pinar's text is entitled "The Voyage Out" (pp. 101-116). The topics of this chapter, which are the value of self-reflection and a focus on inward growth, are also the themes of Woolf's novel by that name. Pinar's method of *currere* was designed to aid teachers and educational researchers in recovering and shaping a sense of self. At the heart of his method is an existentialist stress on relationality; that is, the relation between the self and the world, specifically the relation between the self and situation-specific events. What follows is an overview of Pinar's *currere* method and how *currere* relates to authenticity.

In Kierkegaard's *ethical stage* the individual begins to move towards selfhood. In the *ethical stage* one has grasped an understanding of oneself in the past, and then, building on this understanding of an essential self, moves towards authentic existence. Kierkegaard's initial steps to self-actuality are reflected in Pinar's *currere* method. Pinar, like Kierkegaard, sees the path to self-actualisation as beginning with a sudden awareness of the self as a separate entity. The self seizes this moment of self-awareness and consciously chooses to move toward one's selfhood. Pinar maps out the steps that follow that moment of enlightenment

in his self-directed *currere* method.

Pinar determines four steps to his method: the *regressive*, the *progressive*, the *analytic*, and the *synthesis*. In the *regressive step*, the first step of his method, the teacher is asked to return to his or her past through bracketing past experiences of schooling in a form of immediate and free association. The remembered experiences of the past are to be captured and revealed in writing (recording them in print), with the intention of forming a kind of picture of the self. Through this *regressing* to the past and recording it in its immediacy, where the author is as observer to events, it is Pinar's belief that habitual and unconscious ways of thinking and acting will be exposed and brought to consciousness (pp 21-24). The *regressive stage* of Pinar's method is an attempt to grasp an understanding of how the self is constituted as an individual. Kierkegaard believed that one could claim one's self through self-reflection and a deep penetration into one's concrete actuality. The *regressive stage* of Pinar's method follows Kierkegaard's thinking in this regard; to reflect upon one's own existence is the initial step for a better understanding of one's true relation to the outside world.

For the second step in Pinar's *currere* method, the *progressive step*, the teacher turns his or her mind to a

form of engaged and directed imagining. In an unrestricted mode of free association of thoughts and images, the author is to envision the self in the future, specifically focussing on one's future intellectual interests or career. It is this image of the self that one constantly holds before oneself. This image is to be the guiding principle underlying one's everyday actions and reflective thought. This image of the self in the future is also to be recorded (Pinar, pp. 24-25). It is an image of oneself determined through one's knowledge of oneself in the past. Here again Pinar reflects Kierkegaard's thinking. Kierkegaard determined that in order to move from the aesthetic stage to the ethical stage one needs to articulate an ethical ideal, an image of an ideal self in the future based on the actualities of one's past.

The third step of Pinar's method is the *analytical*. At this stage one is to consider and give attention to the present--the ideas, interests, people, and settings that constitute one's present situation. This is to be done with a certain sense of detachment; one is to scrutinise objectively the bracketed experiences for "potentially focussed interpretations" (Pinar, p. 26). At this point one starts to compare the "pictures" yielded from engaging in thoughts of the self in the past, the future, and the present by looking for similarities, differences, and common themes. Here one

calls upon one's conscious ability to reason and think things through. One's thinking about the self is further refined in the fourth stage.

The fourth and final stage, the *synthesis*, focusses on what Pinar calls *concreteness* (p. 27). In this stage the author is asked to go through a process of introspective questioning: what is the contribution of my private life to my public life; where are the private and the public complementary; where do they conflict; does one stifle the other? The process of moving through the steps with these questions in mind is to give consideration to areas and times of intellectual growth and feelings of self-fulfilment. These are to be noted in written form as one attempts to embody the self-knowledge that has been gathered. Pinar deems that in this step, mind and body, emotions and behaviour become integrated into a more meaningful whole. He maintains that through the intellectual process, through thinking, reflecting, imagining, and reasoning, the self becomes as "a medium, like the body, through which the Self and the world are accessible to oneself" (Pinar, p. 27).

Just as Kierkegaard attempted to give a unity to existence through an exploration of one's identity in terms of past, present, and future, Pinar attempts to give unity to the

self as teacher through similar exploration of the past, present, and future of the self as teacher, which are brought together through a mode of self-conscious writing. Whereas Kierkegaard developed the notion of selfhood realised in Christian spirituality, with Pinar and his *currere* method, self-actualisation is realised in what is known and what is actual.

In the chapter of his book entitled "The Trial" (pp. 29-63) Pinar presents the theoretical underpinnings of his project and his strong existential orientation. In this chapter Pinar turns to Kafka's *The Trial* and the character K, whom Pinar sees as epitomising the inauthentic educational practitioner, the practitioner who has not awakened in self-consciousness. K, the protagonist of Kafka's story, is arrested, not in the normal sense, by the authorities, but rather he is arrested morally, psychologically, and intellectually in his relation to the world. He is a thoughtless performer of actions, and has become conditioned by economic and cultural forces not to think or "to reclaim his lost subjectivity" (Pinar, p. 41). Pinar sees the story of K as reflective of the rationale behind his (Pinar's) educational project. K can be seen as symbolically reflecting the educational practitioner who is unable to step outside of his unawakened situation. These are teachers who exist in a haze of thinking and acting that reflects a

lack of direction, and for Pinar, exist in a psychically damaged state. Pinar desires individuals in education to move beyond the K state of mind, beyond the unreflective self. Through his method of *currere* he offers a way to do this. It is a method intended to enable an aspect of the self to act as mediator between the self and outside events and at the same time move towards a reclaiming of self. Whereas K was an unthinking, uncritical conformist, Pinar, through his mode of writing the self, wishes teachers to grasp and value their uniqueness. He wishes teachers "to portray singularity, subjectivity, and the process of self-knowing" (Pinar, p. 45). Pinar believes that through his autobiographical form of writing, which he sees as "a form of self-consciousness," teachers can "capture the texture and rhythm of the subjectively existing individual" (p. 44-45). It is a form of self-consciousness that gives to the self an autonomous striving for wholeness, where the past, present, and future are brought together through the self's inner voice and engaged consciousness. Pinar sees teachers who have not reoriented themselves to education and taken on a subjective perspective as being like the character K. In Pinar's thinking the individual needs to direct himself or herself to the determining of his or her own future. This is done by the individual taking responsibility for his or her own life as teacher. In doing this Pinar moves the focus on teaching away from the classroom to a focus on the self. It

is in this way that one formulates a *praxis* of teaching.

Whereas Pinar has revealed the theory behind his project by comparing the content of Kafka's novel *The Trial* to his educational intention, the method of Pinar's project of authentic teaching, that is, its form of articulation, is reflected in Virginia Woolf's approach to writing. How Woolf's writing ties most closely to Pinar's thinking is in the explication of internal thoughts and conflicts held in the minds of Woolf's characters. The writing of the inner thoughts of characters in situations of conflict frequently occurs in Woolf's narratives. An example of such writing is the monologue in the short story "The Lady in the Looking Glass: A Reflection." Here a woman in mid-life is suddenly confronted by her reflection in a mirror and her thoughts express her feelings of valuelessness: "Who am I," "What have I done to give meaning to my life," "What value is my life now" are the questions that an inner self struggles to answer, presented by Woolf in a kind of "stream of consciousness." This same theme is also the focus of Clarissa's thoughts in *Mrs Dalloway*. While walking up Bond Street to pick out flowers for her party Clarissa suddenly catches her own reflection in a shop window. Her unexpected encounter with her own image causes her to reflect:

...[T]his body, with all its capacities, seemed nothing,--nothing at all. She had the oddest sense of being herself invisible; unknown; there being no marrying, no more having children now, but only this

astonishing and rather solemn progress with the rest of them, up Bond Street, this being Mrs. Dalloway; not even Clarissa any more: this being Mrs. Dalloway (Woolf, 1987, p. 25).

What is conveyed through this reflective internal monologue is Clarissa's sense of despair and loss at the person mirrored back to her, as she struggles to value herself when all that society has deemed valuable in a woman's life is now behind her. Woolf's expansive and insightful writing about the self reflects an individual in conflict with the outside world and is written in a mode of self-consciousness that attempts to connect the self with the outside world. Pinar sees this same subjective orientation and form of explication as essential in defining the self as teacher.

Pinar maintains the value of his fluid autobiographical writing is its potential to go beyond the immediate and the individual. He believes that through an exchange of autobiographical experiences with other teachers, commonly held experiences might surface. Through teachers coming together and sharing stories certain benefits may be realised, common existing conflicts might become revealed, and ways in which various individuals resolve such conflicts might be offered that would aid others experiencing similar conflicts. Pinar calls these exchanges "a trans-biographical process" (p. 25). He believes that these exchanges could lead to a "heightened consciousness process" which will

result in individual, and ultimately social, transformation (p. 25).

Underlying Pinar's method is the narrative of authenticity as described in the previous chapter on philosophical thought and theories of authenticity, one which follows closely Kierkegaard's ethical stage. There is an existentialist awakening of the self to the self as one takes responsibility for one's own being as one moves to define and determine one's life as teacher while at the same time constructing one's own individuality. Aspects of inwardness, reflection as one recalls one's life in the past, imagination as one imagines an ideal self in the future, and inquiry and reasoned response as one engages in the decision-making process, are as essential to the realisation of Pinar's authentic teacher as they were to Kierkegaard's ethical being.

Before giving critical consideration of Pinar's approach to education and his use of autobiographical writing I would like to examine the educational project of Mary Warnock and her approach to and value of autobiography and its relation to self identity and education as presented in her text, *Imagination & Time*. Warnock's approach to authenticity in education, which differs significantly from Pinar's, provides a means to think critically about the value of

Pinar's form of autobiography.

Mary Warnock and autobiographical writing

Warnock and Pinar hold certain elements in common on which they each build their projects. Warnock shares Pinar's interest in existentialism and literature. She also shares Pinar's desire to apply insights from these disciplines to the field of education. In the following I focus on how Warnock draws on the narrative of authenticity given in existential thought, mainly that of Sartre, and expands on it in her educational project.

In her text Mary Warnock writes with clarity and accessibility. Whereas Pinar was personable in his tone and brought personal experience into his discourse, Warnock maintains an intellectual distance throughout her writing. She, like Pinar, calls on philosophers and novelists to inform the theoretical foundation of her project. Mainly she focusses on the concept of imagination as it has been defined and valued in the philosophical thinking of Jean Paul Sartre.

In defining and valuing imagination Warnock calls on the revelations of the philosophers Kant, Hume, and Locke and

their insights into imagination and subjectivity, and the writings and insights of the Romantics, mainly Coleridge, Wordsworth, Goethe, and Proust, and their interest in individuality, feelings, and imagination. Mainly, however, it is Sartre's writings on the value of imagination to authentic being that Warnock calls on to found her project for authentic education and teaching. Sartre's existentialist thinking underpins much of her thinking. We will see in this exploration of Warnock's thinking that Warnock takes authenticity beyond the individual and the immediacy of existential thinking to the eternal and universal. Warnock wants society as a whole to awaken to the knowledge that existence is not predetermined, but rather is constructed through the imagination of the self. In this enterprise she holds teachers as central in realising this shift in thinking about the focus of education.

Warnock presents the idea that through human imagination an inner and outer world are created. The inner world is the world of the individual, of thoughts, and of imagination. The outer world is the world of objects, ideas, and others, with which we engage. Imagination is presented as a function of consciousness which straddles the outer and inner worlds. Our knowledge and understanding of the world are constructed through the self, through our mind and body, as we evolve and move through time and space, as the mind and body travel

in relation to the world. The evolving inner self mediates its existence through imagination and feelings as it engages with the outside world. It is through the individual's imagination that we know we have a past, a history. It is through imagination that we conceive of a future. Warnock (1994, p. 2) states that it is through creative imagination that we respond to the world, and seek to understand and to grasp general truths about the world. This imaginative knowing is explicated in the form of descriptive interpretations of experiences, through a kind of writing which is normally found in poetry and novels. This kind of writing Warnock calls "imaginative literature."

("Imaginative literature" is discussed and defined in Warnock's chapter called "Imaginative Interpretations" (pp. 48-63). In this chapter she explains imaginative literature through the history of phenomenology in philosophy.) Warnock describes this kind of writing as having both clarity and depth in the telling and as having the ability to move one to become engaged in the reading. Warnock sees storytelling as giving form to imagination. Telling stories, she determines, is an attempt by each one of us to make sense of our lives and the lives of others. It is a way of framing and unifying our world view. It is through stories, she contends, that we, each of us, know our place in the world. Stories are central to our ability to manage and understand the world.

Warnock links imaginative writing with truth claims. It is the kind of writing, Warnock believes, that embodies the notion of truth. Truth, as Warnock defines it, is a form of writing that is accessible to all and transferable to others in the sense that others can identify with the experience as it is explicated. This is where the authentic is located in Warnock's thinking. Warnock believes that through this form of engaged writing, through "imaginative literature," we come to understand *the other*, through our ability to imagine how things would look when viewed through the eyes of *the other*. Warnock goes on to say that it is through a deep engagement in the stories of others that eternal truths about human existence are realised. The process of realised personal and universal truths is enabled through what Warnock calls the human capacity of *sympathy* (p. 17). She states, "Sympathy, then, is a function of imagination. It functions because we recognize others as members of the species of which we are members. ...There is, then, a strong philosophical tradition which gives to imagination the task of allowing access not only to the natural, external world as a whole, but also the minds and thoughts and feelings of other people" (p. 19-21).

Warnock argues that our ability to have *sympathy* through human imagination has significance beyond the individual and

the immediate. Importantly, she contends, it also speaks to the notion of immortality and continuity of all human existence. Through a form of common language and through *sympathy* with other humans the personal and the momentary can be transformed into the universal and timeless. In this way human beingness has an immortal quality.

It is also through *sympathy*, Warnock contends, that we can grasp commonly held values. Values, she determines, are those things in life held amongst humans as being meaningful and significant to human existence, to sustaining and continuing existence. This includes objects and other animals. Warnock states further that, "[i]f, by the exercise of imagination, we may reach a common understanding of the values we can claim to share with other humans, then the handing on of these values to a new generation must be something of central importance" (p. 173).

Warnock sees the act of writing about the self as an innate human activity which serves man's [Warnock's usage] desire to assert his own personal continuity with the past. From this conclusion she postulates that literature (novels and poetry) can be used to explore experiences of the self and of others. She contends that autobiographical writing and forms of *imaginative literature* are a way of defining human immortality (p. 128). Remembered and written experiences of

the past become valuable, not in their factual accuracy, but in their ability to present themselves as lived and as true. She states that "to claim to remember something is to claim to know what it was like, because I was physically and geographically there and have not forgotten. This is a kind of timeless truth claim" (p.129). Universal connectedness is found here, in a kind of fluid understanding of self that persists through time and space. Autobiographical writings of the kind Warnock intends are attempts to write the lived experiences not only of the author but of others as well. Individuals can sympathise with the described experience, either through having had that experience themselves, or because of the artistic ability of the author in writing the experience. It is a form of what Warnock calls "utterances in a common language" which, in turn, relies on a *sympathy* with other humans for its apprehended meaningfulness and significance (p. 129).

Virginia Woolf's form of writing about lived experiences is in the style that Warnock describes, that of giving to the reader moments of timelessness and truth. I felt a sense of intimate truth when, in *To The Lighthouse*, the narrator (Lily Briscoe/Woolf) describes her somewhat critical perspective of Mr Ramsey (Woolf's father) as I have felt similar feelings towards my own father. Also I experience the kind of sympathy of which Warnock speaks in the

description Woolf renders of Mrs Ramsey with her son and the tender protectiveness that she shows towards him as I too have had such feelings surge in myself towards my own son. These expressed experiences speak to me personally; I know them deeply through transference of mutual feelings, through *sympathy*. But I also experienced the internal conflict of Clarissa in *Mrs Dalloway* who seemed often to be on the verge of some kind of madness or suicide. Yet, I myself have never felt such despair at life. The kind of sympathy where I, as reader, understand such despair, even though I personally have not felt that way, is reached through the aesthetic writing of the author. Woolf's writing, its depth, clarity, and honesty, coming from a kind of personal knowing, is of the type that Warnock sees as capable of evoking *sympathy*.

For Warnock, the success of writing autobiographical accounts is found in the ability of the writer to evoke "the search for truth, through the self and memory and the interpreting imagination" (p. 144). Warnock believes exploring the forms of autobiographical writing that she espouses for the truth value they offer is of the utmost importance. She states, "truths about oneself could transform into truths about the world at large, the individual becoming the medium through which the whole common intelligible world must be explored" (p. 130). Warnock places the self in a fluid universe by reifying the

connectedness of fragments of inner aspects of the self to others in the world.

Thinking further about the notion of universal truths found in imagination and written memories of the past, Warnock turns to thoughts of the future and wonders if there are ways of interpreting the world that have a permanent and lasting validity, and if there are some values that are eternal (p. 151). For Warnock, the future is not a given but is something that we need to ensure. She equates personal identity (autobiography) with universal responsibility in the sense that the individual is connected to the universal in "a one/many relationship" (p. 152). If the self, the individual, is able, through imagination, to determine that things can be eternal and universal, then it seems to follow, Warnock maintains, that individuals, personally, can and should become actively involved in caring for those things they see as valuable and essential in ensuring immortality. She states, "We ought to think about what we do now for the sake of future people" (p. 152). It is from this orientation that Warnock introduces the term *stewardship* (p. 166). It is *stewardship*, meaning social responsibility, that Warnock believes should be the focus of education. Hers is an education for *stewardship*. Warnock contends that a reorientation to education is what is necessary in bringing to the consciousness of the individual the necessity for his

or her involvement in the world and the direction that this engagement should take. She says, "The more we are aware of ourselves as individuals with a limited life-span, members of a species of animal, though with unique powers to conceive of the grandeurs of nature of which we are a part, the more highly we may sense it to be our duty not knowingly to despoil it. It is in recognising that what we do now, how we behave, makes a difference to how things will be in the world to come" (p. 186). The intent of Warnock's education is a strongly moral one, that of educating individuals to take responsibility for the future of human existence and the enhancement of the quality of future existence. She sees the realisation of her project to be the work of education and of teachers. She suggests a way to move education away from the kind of fatalistic mentality that pervades it now and towards recognising and utilising the power of human conscious thought to effect social evolution.

Immortality, morality, and education in Warnock's thinking

Given the significance and importance that Warnock attaches to imagination and forms of autobiography it is not surprising that she would hold imagination and creative expression to be the most important aspects of education and that she should advance these aspects as central to

curriculum content. Engaging children's imagination and encouraging creative expression are essential to her educational project of awakening moral responsibility. She states, "It is only through imagination that things are valued and made important. If we can educate a child's imagination we will give him a place in time. We will allow him to stretch his sense of the present back into the past, both his own individual past, and the past of the world as a whole. But we shall also free him to contemplate the future, his own, and that of the world" (p. 189).

She sees the teaching of history as the most important subject of study in her moral project. Histories, she contends, are concerned with actions and actions are the outcome of human thought and intentions (p. 174). Warnock sees that those past lived experiences which effected change and brought us to where we are today need to be known. History should, she maintains, be the study of the past lived experiences of individuals. Approaching history in this way, she believes, would "make children conscious of their own powers and capacities, raising questions about their freedom to make decisions, and the consequences these decisions have" (p. 174). In Warnock's curriculum for schools children would be encouraged to see that the structures of one's life are not predetermined, but that they (the children) can and do have a part to play in

determining human existence and our future mode of existence. Through explicated narratives from our personal and social histories, Warnock believes, children can learn about human existence and learn to understand the place of human existence in the world, and in doing so become contributing members of the social order, rather than mere ineffectual observers or perceived objects of manipulation. Warnock believes that out of this focus on and approach to history it will be inevitable that concepts of moral value will (and should) be a part of the curriculum, that historical events should be discussed in a form of open dialogue as to their moral and ethical consequences. She states, "Through a kind of dialogue, pupils will learn both that moral views sometimes differ, but that it is nevertheless possible to conceive of and uphold ideals which may be understood and shared" (p. 175). Warnock believes that it is through this kind of what she calls "articulated value-system" (p. 175) that humans can come to think critically about the significance and meaning of their lives and to seek to determine what is significant and meaningful in human existence. It is open discussion and dialogue on shared and common experiences that, she contends, "will make possible a kind of convergence or consensus of values outside the classroom without which a society will be ungovernable" (p. 175). Through an articulated valuing exchange with others, individuals will come to see their

influence and effect. Warnock contends that it is a function of education to explicate and discuss what values are important, what aspects of the self are worth preserving.

Warnock extends her approach to history to other subjects forming a part of traditional curricula. She sees the traditionalists' orientation to curriculum construction as having contributed to individuals seeing the world as immutable and fixed. Warnock believes that education needs to present an historical understanding of areas of study that normally have been taken for granted, such as science, mathematics, literature, music, the visual arts and history itself (p. 174). "It is only through the recognition of how the concepts we now take for granted have arisen out of what went before," Warnock contends, "that we can become able to delineate the framework of thought within which we operate, to examine critically our dogmatic assumptions" (p.174).

Also important to her course of study for education is the tradition of storytelling. Warnock specifically mentions the traditional stories of religion (meaning biblical stories) because "they stand as metaphors of values that the child may thereby come to understand and share" (p. 189). Another aspect of storytelling, Warnock mentions, is that the child should learn to tell himself the story of his own life: "He must learn to give his life a shape, as all story-tellers

do, not live it unreflectingly" (p. 189). Warnock proposes an approach to teaching and knowing that places students and learners in the position of ensuring and moulding a future while scripting their own autobiographies.

Teachers in Warnock's educational project

In order to effect moral action and the realisation of her project Warnock looks to the position of teachers. She argues that "there is no part of a teacher's duty that is more important than the teaching of morals" (p. 187). She sees teachers as having two tasks in teaching morality. One is to speak out against any acts or instances of immoral behaviour (p. 188). The other is to focus on building confidence, and enacting creativity, intellectual excitement, curiosity, "and the wish for truth" in their students (p. 189). It is through the imaginative and creative work of teachers that Warnock sees her project as being realised. Teachers need to facilitate and foster the practice of authenticity in others if they are to be authentic practitioners themselves.

*Similarities and Differences in Pinar's and Warnock's
discourses and projects*

I now return to William Pinar's thinking about the self and teaching and give critical consideration to his project through Mary Warnock's thoughts on autobiography and education. First I compare Pinar's project with Warnock's and then reflect critically on each of their projects in terms of their theoretical bases, the practicability of their proposals, and the possibility of their projects being realised, while focussing on the concepts of authenticity and aspects of inwardness. The intention here is to show both the value and the shortcomings of Pinar's and Warnock's forms of authentic teaching and selfhood.

For both Pinar and Warnock there is a sense of trying to get beneath the surface, of going deeper into understanding the individual and the individual's place in the world. For Pinar this is apparent in his desire to get behind the unthinking self, the self in the taken-for-granted world of everyday educational practices. His existentialist project attempts to define self through aspects of consciousness, that is, of self reflection and imagination. Warnock probes beneath the surface on a grander scale. In her moral educational project she aims to get behind the thoughtlessness of human action, that is, action done

without consideration of the consequences and effects on the human condition in its totality. Warnock wishes the individual to achieve a deeper understanding of human existence and to develop a more meaningful understanding of the significance of the individual in constructing the world. In realising each of their projects Pinar and Warnock both demand a heightened sense of self through an awakened sense of inner thinking.

The concepts of measured time and past, present, and future have significance in understanding aspects of inwardness. Pinar suggests that the individual turn to his or her personal past to reclaim a sense of self and then, through imagination, project an image of oneself into the future in order to direct one's thinking and actions in the present. Pinar's sense of past, present, and future, although not static, presents a linearly constructed sense of time. It is a sense of time that limits his project to the concrete and the actual. For Warnock, on the other hand, the past is not a given dimension but rather something one constructs subjectively. According to Warnock, individuals create a sense of the past through their imagination (memory being an aspect of imagination). The same is true of the future. One's knowing of a future exists only through one's imagination. Warnock also conceives of another dimension of time. She presents the idea of a sense of timelessness,

found in phenomenological storying. Such stories, stories that provoke a sense of what she calls *sympathy*, speak to a sense of human beingness as existing outside of what might be called "clock time." Warnock perceives time as being more fluid and multi-dimensional than does Pinar, and in turn, enabling her to consider eternal aspects of human beingness as well as human immortality. Warnock's approach to the future is not to reconcile the past and future with the present, as Pinar attempts to do, but rather to take on the responsibility for constructing, determining, and ensuring a future through the role of *stewardship*. The past, for Warnock, is to be excavated in order to understand how we are in the present and to effect how we best can be in the future. Although Pinar does attempt to give broader implications to his project with the idea that teachers who come together in open dialogue on common experiences might bring about societal change, his form of subjective writing tends towards solipsism and narcissism. Warnock, on the other hand, looks at autobiographical writings, although established in the personal and particular, as being of prime importance in establishing universal value.

Both Pinar and Warnock see the position of the inner self as a mediating one. Through a grasp of an inner sense of being the inner self aims to condition the outer world while all the time moving towards an authenticity of existence.

Pinar's project aims to move human consciousness into a position of working in-between and in doing so bridging the outside world with the world of the inner self. It is a position of negotiation and mediation realised through inner dialogue with the self. If and when others move to reconceptualising the world in this way, Pinar believes, the outcome will be to subversively erode the dominant oppressive structures of education. Warnock, on the other hand, wishes to effect changes in established traditions of education by calling for a total restructuring of education where the focus of the curriculum and of teaching would reflect both the significance of human imagination (as she defines imagination) and her moral intent. Both Pinar and Warnock see the position of the inner self as a mediating one, a self reflecting on itself with an eye also on the future.

Shortcomings of Pinar's thinking

There are some fundamental weaknesses in Pinar's *currere* method. Mainly the problems lie in the intention of his method of empowering the self to move towards self-actuality. In Pinar's *regressive step* he suggests going back into one's past in a form of "stream of consciousness" writing in order to grasp an understanding of oneself. When

considered closely this approach to knowing oneself has the potential of a misreading of who one is. It is also a method that limits understandings of what constitutes a self. Certain biases and prejudices felt on one day might lead to a certain reading of oneself. When done at a different time and in a different mood a completely different understanding of oneself might be determined. Also, the myriad of experiences that constitute one's life seems too voluminous to refine into an essence of self. Can anyone really come to an understanding of who one is? It seems that one must be open to a broader understanding of self. Certainly the individual can offer understandings and insights into oneself, but the perceptions of others can also aid in this enterprise. In order for the individual to gain a fuller understanding of the self one could and should involve the perceptions of others. Pinar's individual defining himself or herself without taking into account the perspectives of others will lack a sense of connectedness of the self to a world inhabited by others.

Pinar also seems to overlook the fact that individuals are not equally perceptive and articulate. As Warnock points out, literary writers, through their ability as artists, have the ability to provide insights and understandings into lived experiences that the ordinary person, or the less articulate individual, cannot. Literary texts such as

novels, biographies and autobiographies, and poetry are also sources for the kind of language which can best articulate what constitutes one's identity. In order for the self to achieve a fuller understanding of oneself Pinar needs to present a method which allows for the voices of others in determining the self as teacher and at the same time acknowledges the multifariousness of what constitutes a self.

Another shortcoming in Pinar's thinking is related to teaching and the lack of thought that he gives in his reconceptualisation of education to alleviating the physical and psychological burdens of teaching, which have been escalating in recent years. By "burdens" I mean the constant demands being put on teachers from the outside, from administration, from parents and community, and from the government. This is very apparent in England at present with the implementation of the National Curriculum and the resulting new, continual demands on teachers to maintain standards of teaching and of what is prescribed by the National Curriculum. The headline of a recent front-page article in *The Guardian* reads: "Teacher crisis--half plan to quit in 10 years time." This mass exit of teachers from the profession is expected "because they cannot stand the heavy workload, stress and bureaucracy that now accompanies a job in the classroom" (February 29, 2000, p. 1). Although Pinar

offers a way of lessening the stress experienced in teaching through a reconceptualising of one's relation to teaching and to education, his approach has little effect on the actual outside world. A teacher might be able to work through conflicts with the support of an engaged and enlightened consciousness, but in order to continue to teach he or she must be able both physically and mentally to withstand the demands of the educational system. As teachers see themselves as losing more and more of their autonomy they are becoming more and more demoralized and burnt out. In this way I see Pinar's thinking to be not significantly effectual in helping teachers combat the stresses and strains of teaching in today's increasingly conflicting environment of education.

My final criticism of Pinar's project comes out of the reading of Kierkegaard's journey to selfhood and his stages of authentic existence. As I have shown, Pinar's method follows closely Kierkegaard's stages to selfhood, but only as far as Kierkegaard's ethical stage. Kierkegaard's ethical stage is similar to Pinar's *regressive* and *progressive* steps. In Pinar's *progressive* step one is to imagine oneself in the future in the form of an ideal self, the person one is striving to be. This is also the method that Kierkegaard suggests for ethical existence. But Kierkegaard noted the failings of this approach. He saw that having the aim of

working towards an image of oneself in the future holds the danger of ending in a kind of "moral bankruptcy." The future is deeply conditional, affected by social, political, and environmental forces over which the individual has no control. To aim for an ideal state, constructed in one's imagination, is to lay oneself open to the potential for demoralisation. Kierkegaard recognised that a higher level of existence needs to be constructed towards which one must strive, one that is more dependable and consistent than an image of oneself in the future, in order to realise complete self-actualisation. For Kierkegaard that goal was a commitment to Jesus Christ through faith in God's "eternal blessedness." Pinar however does not address this potential pitfall of his method. Kierkegaard believed that a truly authentic existence can only come about if and when we commit and act in faith and belief in God's presence and eternal goodness.

Critical reflections on Mary Warnock's project

The weaknesses of Warnock's approach to teaching and education lie in its idealistic nature and the totality of its intent. To realise Warnock's "education for stewardship" would require a complete transformation of existing social structures. This is not realisable. There is too much that

needs to be changed in order to ensure the moral state that Warnock sees as necessary for authentic existence. Also Warnock's autocratic concept of how the world should be constructed does not allow for other ways of valuing the world. We will see, in the chapters that follow, that the educational theories of Dwayne Huebner and Maxine Greene present other valid ways of thinking about education, teaching, and society which are inclusive of existing world views.

Within Warnock's desired alternative approach to education there is an area of teaching and education that seems obviously underdeveloped, which is essential in the actual practice of teaching. Her project shows a lack of sensitivity to the relationship held between the teacher and the student. Her approach to teaching lacks an understanding of the workings of the mind of the child as it evolves and forms. Instead, the child is merely directed and led to a particular moral orientation. This is also a shortcoming in Pinar's thinking about teaching and what it means to be a teacher. Pinar does not focus on this essential aspect of being a teacher, one's relation to *the other*, the student. (A valuing of the relationship that the teacher has with his or her students in authentic teaching will be discussed in the explorations the thinking of Nel Noddings and Max van Manen.)

Pinar and Warnock each present a challenge to conventional approaches to education in practice and each contributes to a movement towards bridging the gap between the self and teaching by offering a way to make teaching meaningful in *praxis*. Pinar provides a very practical approach to valuing the self, based mainly in Kierkegaard's steps to selfhood, and Warnock, who bases her thinking on Sartre's definition of imagination, adds to the construction of a meaningful *praxis* of teaching through the importance she gives to something above and beyond what we know, a sense of universal being. In these ways both Warnock and Pinar open up an understanding of inwardness and authenticity in their emphasis on and means of scripting the self. In the concluding chapter I give value to both Pinar's and Warnock's understanding of the self and education in my own approach to authentic teaching.

Chapter Three

Nel Noddings and Max van Manen:

Engrossment, Tact, and authenticity

In her critical essay on literary writing in Edwardian society entitled "Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown" Virginia Woolf wrote of the profession of writing:

The writer must get into touch with his [*sic*] reader by putting before him something which he recognizes, which therefore stimulates his imagination, and makes him willing to co-operate in the far more difficult business of intimacy. And it is of the highest importance that this common meeting place should be reached easily, almost instinctively, in the dark, with one's eyes shut. (Virginia Woolf (1991) *A Woman's Essays*, p. 81)

The real skill of the writer, Woolf believes, lies in her/his ability to bring the reader, the writer, and the experiences of the characters about whom she/he writes, together on the page so that the reader is led into the world of her characters. Entering into the thoughts and experiences of "the other" and connecting the self with "the

other" are at the heart of Nel Noddings's and Max van Manen's educational projects. Both of these educationalists argue that in order for authentic teaching to take place the teacher needs to move into the world of the student. It is in this intimacy that the teacher works with the student, directing and shaping the child as he/she learns.

It is the construct and intention of a position of intimacy that will be explored in this inquiry into the theories of Nel Noddings and Max van Manen. An understanding of the theoretical basis for Nel Noddings's form of authentic teaching is derived from a close reading of her *Caring: a feminist approach to ethical teaching*. Van Manen has presented his form of authentic teaching in his *The Tact of Teaching*. It is in these two texts that the details of the theoretical underpinnings of their orientation and approach to the position of teacher in authentic teaching are given.

Noddings and van Manen each hold an existentialist orientation in defining and defending authentic teaching. In the following exploration into each of their theories I will discuss how both Noddings and van Manen build on and in turn expand on the existential narratives of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre given in Chapter One.

Further on, this chapter takes a hermeneutic turn whereby

critical debate will be given to the theories of Noddings and van Manen by comparing each of their theories of teaching in terms of realisability and practicability. As the basis for this critical discussion I argue that the underlying difference between Noddings's and van Manen's thinking rests in a longstanding existential debate, one originating with Sartre and the importance he places on human existence. As was pointed out in the explication of Sartre's narrative of authenticity in Chapter One, Sartre argued against a predetermined individual essence. He maintained that because consciousness exists in nothingness it has no fixed essence. Conscious beings create themselves as they go along. Sartre believed that for human beings, existence precedes essence; there is no essential human nature given in advance. One becomes in consciousness whatever one chooses to become by doing and feeling what one chooses to do and feel. In the critical discussion I present the idea that van Manen's thinking is closer to Sartre in this regard and that Noddings's theoretical basis has closer ties to the way Kierkegaard defines the individual, particularly Kierkegaard's ethical stage.

At the end of this chapter I draw out of van Manen's and Noddings's thinking the ways in which they each contribute to a definition of meaningful teaching.

Nel Noddings and ethical caring

Noddings founds her ethic of care on the concrete experience of life in the everyday and the relation held between one person and another. She presents her ethical orientation as a critical response to what she sees as the dominant practice for determining ethics; that is, ethics defined by abstract principles and rules. She states that this traditional basis for ethical practice is "the language of the father" (p.1). Noddings holds that the relational experience between persons, that of human encounter and response found in innate feelings of care that one has towards the other, is fundamental to human existence and therefore should be the basis for ethical being (p.3). Specifically, she maintains, it is the relation between mother and child that provides the ontology for ethical thinking. It is the caring expressed and received in the mother-child relation that grounds what Noddings calls her "feminine approach to ethics." (This phrase is from the title of her text.)

The way in which Noddings defines the position of the self to "the other" is to divide a definition of caring into two entities: the one-caring, the one cared-for. Noddings holds there to be two essential ethical questions which underlie

the asymmetrical relational experience of the one-caring to the one cared-for: How do I meet the other morally? How do we respond to the other in terms of "goodness" (p.5)?

Noddings begins her ethic of care by defining two kinds of caring: *natural caring* and *ethical caring*. *Natural caring*, she contends, underlies the caring relation and is founded on the interlocking notions of maternity and love. Noddings describes the impetus of natural caring this way: "We love not because we are required to love but because our natural relatedness gives natural birth to love" (p. 6). *Ethical caring*, on the other hand, is defined as requiring a conscious effort that is not needed in natural caring. It is a caring response to the other that is in some way provoked internally; one feels impelled to respond to a demand to care. Noddings defines this initial calling that one feels toward the other as one being impelled and motivated by an innate desire to respond to a demand to care which has been placed on her by the other. Noddings sees ethical caring as a response to a situation heard internally as "I must," as in "I must do something here." It is in this call to care, heard and felt internally, that Noddings moves existential thought beyond the self and in the direction of alterity.

Noddings determines that what sustains and directs one's actions in the authentic caring relation is the image of an

ethical ideal. Everything depends upon the nature and the strength of this ideal image (p. 105). The ethical and caring person needs first to acquire a deep knowing of the self, the one-caring, as well as a deep knowing of the other, the one cared-for. From this deep knowing of oneself and the other the caring person can then construct an image of the self in an ideal state. In authentic existence one's actions are motivated by the image of the *ethical ideal*.

Noddings, in formulating authentic existence in terms of knowing oneself and moving towards an image of the self in an ideal state, reflects, as Pinar's method of *currere* does, Kierkegaard's initial stage of his path to selfhood. Kierkegaard believed that in order to move towards selfhood the individual needs to know himself. Knowing oneself is realised through a deep inquiring into one's past. With this knowledge of oneself one can then work towards determining one's own existence and selfhood as one moves into what Kierkegaard calls the ethical stage. For Noddings both the one-caring and the one cared-for are led and driven by the concept of the ethical ideal (p.5). The ethical ideal guides and shapes one's actions. Where Noddings expands on Kierkegaard's thinking is in her contention that the ethical existence depends not only on knowing oneself deeply, which is where Kierkegaard limits his thinking, but also on knowing the other, the one cared-for.

According to Noddings, the image of an *ethical ideal* has three essential aspects: it should be describable; it is realisable; and it is obtainable in the concrete world. It also has a dynamic aspect. Holding the ethical ideal as something yet to be achieved requires that the one-caring, the teacher, be always in an active relation between the actual self now and a vision of the self in the future. Two fundamental concepts essential to her ethic of care are *engrossment* and what she calls *motivational displacement*. These two aspects of ethical being are highly integrated. *Motivational displacement* is seen as a result of one's ethical orientation toward the other; one's motivation for ethical caring is derived from a feeling of care for the welfare, protection, and enhancement of the one cared-for (p. 23). In this frame of mind there is a displacement of interest from one's own reality to the reality of the other. Noddings describes *motivational displacement* this way: "To be touched, to have aroused in me something that will disturb my own ethical reality, I must see the other's reality as a possibility for my own" (p. 14). *Engrossment*, on the other hand, is when the one-caring accepts the other unconditionally and one's judgment of the other is suspended while being deeply engaged in the interest of the one cared-for. *Engrossment* is a feeling of being connected to the other: I receive the other into myself, and I see and feel

with the other (p. 30). It is in *engrossment* that the one-caring moves into intimate proximity to the one cared-for. This is the point of the greatest intimacy and the apex of authentic caring.

It is while in the state of *engrossment* with the other, Noddings contends, that a split in one's thinking occurs. The teacher assumes a dual perspective as she sees things from both her own pole and that of the one cared-for.

(Noddings uses the feminine gender for the one-caring, and the masculine gender for the one cared-for.) In her position of being ethically responsible, the one-caring aims to preserve and enhance caring in herself as well as in those with whom she comes into contact. She maintains two world views: her own, and that of the one-cared for. Both world views have an ethical ideal to strive towards, but the ethical ideal is different for each.

Authentic caring is dynamic in its construction. One's connectedness to the other is defined as existing in a kind of "back and forth" movement by the teacher: a kind of subjective-objective altered positioning. The one-caring receives the student, and sees and feels with the other. When one apprehends the other in his or her world one is moved to an altered frame of perception. There occurs what Noddings calls a *turning point* (p. 26). This is a shift in

the mental state of the teacher, from that of non-rational, and non-judgmental being with the other, to that of rational and objective thought. In this state of mind the one-caring asks herself: what action is needed here that would move the child towards his ethical ideal? In an objective and rational frame of mind the one-caring looks for the "best self" in the other and works with him to actualise that "best self." But before the moment of action, and Noddings stresses this, a great deal of sensitive and informed judgment is required in order to know when to pull back from being with the other and when to act in the other's best interest. When the decision to act is made, it is made with commitment to the ethical ideal of the one cared-for. In ethical caring the one-caring remains committed to the one cared-for (Noddings, 1984, p.16).

In Noddings's caring ethic the caring relation can only be complete when the one cared-for welcomes and responds to the caring intentions offered to him by the one-caring. Noddings describes it this way: "My caring must be somehow completed in the other if the relation is to be described as caring" (p.4). While in the caring relation the one-caring holds before the child an image of his best possible self; she frames him in that best self image. At the same time she leads the one cared-for to choose himself as an ethical being. But, Noddings maintains, the commitment and the

decision to embrace a particular possibility of the self, must be that of the child. The desire to respond, Noddings believes, is an innate aspect of a child and his feeling of vulnerability in the world. The child responds to the one-caring out of trust, faith, and love for the adult and the desire to be with the parent (p.64). In the trust and love of a caring relation the one cared-for is free to be more fully himself. The freedom, creativity, and spontaneous disclosure of the one cared-for in this nurturing and caring environment can become manifest (p. 74).

According to Noddings three essential and somewhat interrelated aspects are engaged by the one-caring, in nurturing the ethical ideal: dialogue, skill through practice, and confirmation through attribution (pp. 121-122), with dialogue playing the most significant role in the caring relation. Noddings defines two forms of dialogue. There is the internal dialogue of the one-caring. This is a dialogue of inner reflection while the one-caring reflects on her relation with "the other." This form of internal dialogue produces revelations that might assist in realising the caring ideal, both for herself and the one cared-for. The other form of dialogue is external, the actual dialogue between the one-caring and the one-cared for. The one-caring encourages dialogue in the relation and the one cared-for reveals himself in the dialogue. His dialogue provides clues

as to the direction that the one-caring might take in moving the one cared-for towards his ethical ideal.

Practice is also required in the ethical relationship; that is the practice of caring for the other. Noddings states that one must have encounters as well as legitimate opportunities to care, in order to go on caring effectively (p. 123). The one-caring encourages situations for ethical practices for both herself and the one cared-for. The intention of the practices of caring is that both the one-caring and the one-cared for apply ethical caring practices to everyday life, so that the caring becomes a way of being in daily living.

Confirmation, the third aspect of Noddings's ethical caring, involves actions that confirm a sense of one's being. What Noddings means by confirmation is the positive recognition of what one has accomplished in terms of achieving one's ethical ideal. The relation begins with the one-caring always meeting the other positively. She sees the other in the best possible light, so her positive vision of the child is also the image the child sees of himself. In this way the one-caring confirms the child in his ethical ideal.

Confirmation is reinforced through celebration of the repetition of the events of life, the emerging and the passing away of things in life. Celebration of such events

provides opportunities to learn, to share, and to grow.

It is these three aspects of dialogue, practice, and confirmation of life that form and shape the child in the relation and move him towards his ethical ideal. Encouraging and watching out for opportunities for dialogue, for practice, and for confirmation by the one-caring, Noddings contends, nurture and sustain the caring ethic.

But the caring ethic is also enhanced and sustained by what Noddings calls *joy* (p. 132). *Joy*, Noddings says, is not an emotion but rather it is an effect--a mode of consciousness (p. 134). According to Noddings, *joy* is the recognition of fulfilment of the relatedness. It is the feeling which accompanies the realisation of our relatedness to the other. *Joy* causes one to reflect on one's own basic reality; it is the reward for the one-caring. The individual's *joy* enhances both the ethical ideal held by the one-caring and her commitment to it. *Joy* has a certain resonance with Kierkegaard's moment of selfhood where connectedness and completeness are realised in the Eternal Blessedness of God but lacks the universality of Kierkegaard's Christian ethnicity. *Joy* in Noddings's thinking is instead an individual experience.

Limits in ethical caring

Noddings says, "We cannot care for everyone" (p. 86). One way that we determine the limits of our obligation to care for others is by examining the possibility of realising the ethical ideal of the other and the self (p. 86). Limits are put on our caring by the proximity of the one-caring to the one cared-for when the one cared-for is not physically present to the one-caring. The one-caring cannot grasp the other's reality when the other is at a distance, and therefore, cannot determine an *ethical ideal* for that person.

The one-caring as teacher

Noddings transfers her ethical caring project to the practice of teaching. Teaching, Noddings maintains, involves a meeting of the one-caring and the one cared-for in the teacher and student relation. The ethical teacher is first and foremost one caring. She is prepared to put her "motivational energy" in the service of the student (p. 113). Teaching for Noddings means that teaching the student is always more important than teaching the subject, but the teaching of subject material provides an opportunity for ethical caring. The main task of the teacher is to nurture the student's ethical ideal. It is the teacher who bears the

responsibility for the enhancement of the ethical ideal. In her own behaviour she is a model of the ethical practitioner, a model of one-caring. An ethical teacher, Noddings contends, has two major tasks: one is to stretch the student's world by presenting an effective selection of challenges and opportunities from the world in which she lives, the adult life-world; the other is to work co-operatively with the student in his struggle towards competence in that world (p. 178). By placing an emphasis on the essential aspects needed to realise one's ethical ideal, aspects of dialogue, the provision of practice, confirmation of one's ethical self and modelling ethical being, the one-caring as teacher nurtures the other's, the student's, ethical ideal and creates an environment that makes it possible for the one cared-for to recognise and embrace his own ethical ideal. The teacher continually encourages the child to become involved in caring and sharing enterprises. The experiences for caring and sharing are found in everyday life. The teacher continually confirms the student's existence and moves him toward his ethical ideal by offering encouraging comments when he shows through language and action a positive movement towards an ethical life. However, the teacher, in her caring mode does not abandon her own ethical ideal while in pursuit of the ethical ideal of the one cared-for. Noddings suggests that the teacher, in order to sustain her own ethical aim, also needs confirmation from

the larger world of teaching, confirmation in terms of praised work, cooperative enterprises with other teachers, and general encouragement from the everyday dialogue and collegiality among teachers.

Schools that practise ethical caring

Noddings (pp. 197-200) demands that a school be deliberately designed to support caring and caring individuals and she sketches out some essential aspects of a design for a caring school. In caring schools there needs to be an emphasis on talking, sharing, listening, and responding to each other not only within the school but also in participation with parents, the community, and other institutions. She also recommends that there be a move towards the dismantling of the professionalism of teaching and schools as they presently exist. Noddings thinks that in an ethical educational environment the position of teachers should be elevated. Teachers should become involved in administration so as to reduce the separation that now exists between teaching and administration. Teachers should be the ones who develop the rules and guidelines in controlling the conduct and movement of students in schools, and such rules and guidelines should be developed around what the teachers themselves see as being significant in maintaining ethical

practice and a caring school (p. 198).

Noddings's caring frame of mind is an ethical approach to the other, founded on the relational, the interactions that exist between the self as teacher, and "the other," the child, the student. Mainly, Noddings gives importance to teachers, as they are the ones responsible for the ethical pedagogical practise. As ethical persons teachers operate in full realisation of the position that they hold, a position of influence and responsibility to the other, the student, and in full knowledge of the position of vulnerability that the child, the student, has.

Van Manen and pedagogical tact

Noddings's thinking about the asymmetrical relation between the teacher and the student is not unique in contemporary educational theory. Max van Manen, another contemporary educationalist, has also formulated a theoretical approach to teaching based on the relationship between the student and the teacher. At the heart of this relation is something van Manen calls *pedagogical tact*. Pedagogical tact is defined by van Manen as a multifaceted and complex *mindfulness* towards children (p.8). As with Noddings, van Manen's alternative approach integrates theory and practice and everyday experiences. Also, like Noddings, van Manen has

been influenced by thinkers in the field of existentialism. But van Manen places an emphasis on the phenomenological branch of existentialist thought. (In this regard van Manen specifically mentions the influence of educationalist Martinus Langeveld in the "Acknowledgement" in *The Tact of Teaching*.) We will see that van Manen is close to the thinking of Sartre and his understanding of authentic existence where the self is formulated in a play between the present and the future. Like Sartre, van Manen's approach does not subscribe to a formula or predefined method; rather it is an approach determined from within the ebb and flow of everyday experiences. It is the experiences of parenting and teaching that are the focus of van Manen's discourse. The term "pedagogy" has a special meaning for van Manen: it refers only to those types of actions and interactions that are intentionally engaged in by an adult and a child and that are aimed at the maturation and positive development of the child or student (p. 17). A pedagogical relation, van Manen determines, is grounded, ontologically, in a *calling*. It is an innate *calling* that is the pedagogical impulse that gives meaning to the lives of children as well as to one's own existence (p. 216). The parent is drawn/called to the vulnerability of the child, and in turn, the child, when he or she calls out for help, for support, expects to be heard by an adult. This "call and response" relation creates a connectedness, a oneness, between the adult and the child

(p. 25). What makes this relation a pedagogical one is that the adult must do something "right" for the child (p. 40). What is "right" is defined by van Manen as that which reflects concern for the well-being of the child and that which aids in bringing the child into maturity and independence (p. 28); pedagogy is being and living with the child in our presence in such a way as to provide direction and care for his or her life. Van Manen deems that this orientation to the child expresses as well as strengthens positive pedagogical intentions. In his definition of pedagogy van Manen reflects Heidegger's theory of the origin of human consciousness and move toward authenticity, that of "call and response" as an innate aspect of the human condition.

The pedagogical relation between teacher and student must be a two-way intentional relationship. The teacher intends for the student to learn and to grow. In turn, the student needs to have a desire, a willingness, and a preparedness to learn (p.77). It is the construct of how the teacher effects his or her influence over the student that van Manen attempts to define as "pedagogical tact." Van Manen determines that the knowledge necessary for this pedagogical acting is a knowledge that is situation-specific and oriented to the particular child for whom the teacher is concerned (p. 47). Pedagogical knowledge and pedagogical practice are divided

into two kinds, action and reflection; that is, actively living through pedagogical experiences in our everyday routines and motions as teachers in a world with students, and reflectively talking and writing about the experiences, where an effort is made to understand the pedagogical significance and "goodness" of events and happenings in children's lives (p. 41). The knowledge necessary for pedagogical action is found within specific situations in which the adult and child are called together in a concrete way. It is such situations, van Manen deems, that cause us to reflect and to try to interpret and understand what is happening. Life itself, van Manen claims, provides the sources for reflection. He sees life as full of contradictions, tensions, and anomalies, and that these conflicts give life its dynamic impulse while playing a part in shaping and defining existence. For van Manen it is the anomalies experienced in our life with the child, the student, that cause us to reflect on the situation and the relation we have with children. It is in the realisation that such moments of discord define and shape the child and our relationship with the child and are a window for mediation. It is in such moments that one reflects and moves to take responsibility for oneself and responsibility for the other. According to van Manen conflicts and tensions not only challenge us in daily living with children, but also prompt us to question how we should act with children (p.

61). Pedagogical knowledge is gathered from within the ongoing practice of reflecting on and interpreting the world in which we live and act and is founded on a strong orientation and commitment to the well-being of the child. But, according to van Manen, pedagogical knowledge and pedagogical action also come from a deep knowing of the life-world of the situation and existential structure in which parents and teachers find themselves in their relation with children. By the life-world of the situation van Manen means all those aspects that constitute and contribute to the situation. The following are some of the essential aspects of the life-world situation van Manen names from which knowledge can be gleaned and used to inform pedagogical action.

In order for the relation to be pedagogical van Manen maintains that the adult must first and foremost be present to the child. The relation begins with being available and accessible for the child, being attentive to him or her (p. 56). Van Manen deems that "in providing a loving atmosphere of safety and security for children, parents give and teach the very young something without which growing up and living become quite impossible" (p. 57). To provide support to a child means that the adult is reliable and can be counted on to be there in a dependable and continual way (p. 60). Being present to the child also means being open to receiving the

child (p. 86).

In the relational situation, the person in the position of influence, the parent or the professional educator, must also know himself or herself pedagogically. One defines oneself pedagogically in terms of one's commitment to the positive growth of those for whom we are responsible (p. 22).

In a pedagogical situation one must have a sensitive and deep knowledge of the child, his or her life history, background, his or her unique qualities, and the circumstances of his or her existence. This knowledge is gained over time and it is the kind of knowledge that is the result of a dedicated interest in children. The educator needs also to come to understand a child's learning and development in the context of the larger biography of the child (p. 53).

The experience of pedagogy and that which informs pedagogical action is found in the everyday experiences of being with children. Van Manen divides this everyday pedagogical experience into what he sees as three fundamental aspects: the pedagogical relation, the pedagogical situation, and pedagogical action. These three aspects are significantly integrated.

The pedagogical relation consists of the interactive qualities that exist between the parent and the child, between the teacher and the student. Each pedagogical relation is unique in its interrelational qualities. Pedagogical situations occur frequently in the everyday life of parenting and teaching. A pedagogical situation is created through the intention of the parent or educator and the way that the adult is oriented to the child. (Van Manen uses the phrase "through the way that the educator belongs to the child" (p. 72).) These are situations where the parent or the teacher feels concern for the child's welfare and is prompted to reflect on what meaning that particular life experience has for that child (p. 53). The adult or teacher must grasp, analyse, and understand the child's situation and how the child will benefit through the teacher's actions from within the circumstances as they exist. Pedagogical action is seen as mediating the influences of the world for the child. A pedagogical relation and a pedagogical situation come into being through pedagogical action (p. 78). The actions of the parent or the teacher are what mediate between the present and the future of the child or student for whom we (as parents and as teachers) have responsibility and to whom we are oriented pedagogically.

Van Manen focusses on pedagogical action and the pedagogical moment in defining what is the focal point of his theory, that which he calls *pedagogical tact*. The pedagogical moment is realised in pedagogical action. When the child calls the parent or the teacher to respond in a particular situation, the response action is what van Manen calls *pedagogical tact*. Pedagogical tact is acting in the fullness of pedagogical intent in a particular situation. It involves a great degree of sensitivity, coming out of a deep commitment to the child pedagogically; and entails an attuned knowing of when to hold back and when to act. Generally, pedagogical tact can be seen as the art of orchestrating the possible influences of the world of the child. In education, pedagogical tact happens when the child is constantly encouraged by the educator to assume more personal responsibility for learning and growth. The teacher uses the influences of the world as a resource for influencing and directing the child. Van Manen sees the influences as being mediated through many ways: speech, silence, the eyes, and gesture. Creating a certain atmosphere and presenting oneself as example are also ways of mediating the world for the child. Pedagogical tact aims to make a space for the child, protect the vulnerability of the child, strengthen what is good, enhance what is unique, and support personal growth and learning in the child (pp. 172-177).

Pedagogical tact, van Manen continues, is supported and guided by the interrelated aspects of thoughtfulness and understanding. Pedagogical thoughtfulness, according to van Manen, calls for thoughtful reflection. Van Manen goes into some detail defining the pedagogical significance of various forms of reflection: reflection before action, reflection in dialogue, reflection in action, and reflection on action (pp. 98-118). Pedagogical understanding is a kind of understanding that is directed towards the child that supports the child's growth and well-being. Pedagogical understanding is an openness to the child. While receiving the child, the interaction with the child is one of engaged analytical thought and dialogue which is intended to help the child overcome the obstacles that impede or block his or her positive growth and is intended to help a child form a stronger sense of self and to develop a sense of what van Manen calls "personal courage" (p. 91). Through pedagogical understanding the child comes to see how things can be thought through and how feelings such as defeat, fear, or shyness can be overcome (p. 92).

Pedagogical understanding and thoughtfulness, according to van Manen, are encouraged by what van Manen calls sympathy (pp. 96-98). *Sympathy* is described by van Manen as an attunement to the inner life of the child (p. 96). It is a closeness to the child, but it is a closeness that still

retains an awareness of oneself, of one's own inner life, as parent or teacher. *Sympathy* is engaged understanding, whereby one attempts to reach a sense of the inner self of the other.

For one to act in the fullness of pedagogical intention, to do what is best pedagogically, the teacher or adult needs to apply a high level of attentiveness to the pedagogical situation. Van Manen calls this level of attentiveness *pedagogical fitness*. *Pedagogical fitness* is conditioned thinking that is deeply aware of the significant components of the complex existential structure of the situation; it is a frame of mind that is sustained by a deep commitment to the welfare and growth of children.

Pedagogical tact is an ongoing practice of thinking and acting in what van Manen calls pedagogical *mindfulness*. (Van Manen has written about the concept of *mindfulness* in teaching and education in another publication of his, *The Tone of Teaching* (1986).) To be *mindful*, van Manen says, is to reflect the highest order of pedagogy (p. 206). In teaching, embodied mindfulness reflects a strong and passionate interest in life and in the life of others, and an awareness of the immediate and the concrete. It reflects self-discipline as well as a deep knowledge of oneself and of one's limits and capabilities. Van Manen maintains that

"through mindfulness and tact the parent or teacher is able to act improvisationally in an always changing educational situation" (p. 102).

Politics and pedagogical tact

Van Manen acknowledges that there exist in modern society strong external influences which affect children negatively or, as van Manen says, "anti-pedagogically" (p. 211). He calls such influences false tact (pp. 134-137). False tact has a certain resonance with Sartre's Bad Faith. It is the negative influences on the life of individual such that one's life is defined or determined by others in ways that serve the others' interests and desires. Van Manen believes that external negative forces exist that can have the effect of condemning the child to a future of manipulation for the benefit of others. As persons in the position of influence and responsibility, adults, parents, and teachers need to take an active part in the world of children. Van Manen states that "the pedagogical is not political" (p. 212); yet at times, we as educators to our children, have to become involved politically in order "to create the space, conditions, and possibilities for children to grow up and create a world of their own making" (p. 212). To become political is an extension of our pedagogical being. "Thus,"

van Manen states, "pedagogical tact requires of us a certain worldliness, and the moral fibre to stand up for political views in which we believe" (p. 213).

Van Manen, reflecting a Sartrean move to an awakened sense of individual existence, suggests that parents and teachers need to work to defuse the societal blocks that prevent children from realising their fullest potential. We need to guard against a focus on individuality that sees one person as superior or inferior to another, and prevent thoughtless acts by individuals in positions of assumed superiority or authority from intimidating children and repressing their potential being (p. 212).

Alterity and approaches to teaching

Van Manen, like Noddings, expands conventional notions of teaching in a focus on the relational in teaching. I would like to give critical debate to the theories of teaching of Noddings and van Manen explicated here and also discuss the value of each of their projects in terms of meaningful teaching in practice. For this I begin by comparing Noddings's approach to teaching to van Manen's, noting the differences in their underlying existential influences and the shortcomings and advantages of both positions. This

debate is aided by another ongoing debate held between two existential thinkers who differ in the orientation of their philosophies in a way which is analogous to the differences between the ideas of van Manen and Noddings. This is the debate held between Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas. The critical debate between these two philosophical thinkers is relevant to the thinking of van Manen and Noddings as the relational aspect of alterity is the focus of all of their theories. Mainly, the substance of the debate between these two philosophers is found in the criticisms that Levinas brings to Martin Buber's "I-Thou" relational as he (Levinas) attempts to differentiate his own existential thinking on alterity from Buber's. (Buber's "I-Thou, I-It" relational is defined in his *I and Thou* (1937); Levinas's ethical and moral orientation is given in his *Totality and Infinity* (1969).) (The criticism that Levinas brings to Buber's thinking is detailed by Robert Bernasconi in his article " 'Failure of Communication' as a Surplus: Dialogue and Lack of Dialogue between Buber and Levinas" (Bernasconi and Woods, 1988, pp. 100-135).) For the most part it is Bernasconi's insights that have been used here to inform my understanding of the main issues of the debate between Levinas and Buber. Behind the debate between Levinas and Buber is the existential argument which began with Sartre: Which is primary, existence or essence? However, here the argument is moved from a Sartrean focus on the self to a

focus on the relational of the self to "the other." Much could be made of the connections between the intellectual thought and critical dialogue held between Levinas and Buber and the similarities of their thinking to that found in Noddings's and van Manen's educational discourses. But here I discuss the value and the shortcomings of these two existential positions as they relate to the teaching situation and the position of teacher.

Noddings's ethical caring is presented in formal terms in a receptive-response orientation which calls for a kind of back and forth movement. Initially the one-caring is deeply engrossed in the other to the point that she exists temporarily in the world of the one cared-for. Then there is a pulling back from the relation, the turning point, where the child and the relation are viewed objectively and rationally. In this "being with, then standing back" movement there is an element of abandonment of the child when one assumes the objective and rational mode of thinking. Is this what Levinas means when he accuses Buber in his ethical orientation of an I-Thou and I-It split of acts of violence against "the other" (Bernasconi, p.103)? The "turning to and turning away" movement in Noddings's ethical approach could be seen as a violent act. Noddings goes on to talk about a duality of being. The one-caring does not completely withdraw from the relation. The

objective and rational frame of mind occurs while still in engrossment. But there is a sense of cold, rational detachment occurring while in the presence of the other, the one cared-for. Van Manen, on the other hand, with his emphasis on integrated thinking and acting in pedagogical tact has the one in the position of influence as being *always* present to the other as a frame of mind. It is an orientation to the other, the child, the student, that is constant and unconditional, and therefore conveys stability. As van Manen points out, children need to have stability in order to trust and in order to grow (p. 59).

Levinas's theoretical approach to "the other" holds that in order to act ethically and authentically one needs to welcome each person equally into his sphere of existence, and he is critical of Buber "for preferring preference, the 'private relationship,' the 'clandestine nature' of the couple" in his 'I-Thou, I-It' relation" (Bernasconi, p. 103). Van Manen, with his emphasis on pedagogical *mindfulness* and the focus on acting and thinking in the pedagogical moment, has a similar orientation to the one taken by Levinas. Van Manen's approach to the pupils begins first with a particular frame of mind held by the teacher. Van Manen says "the pedagogical love of the educator for these children becomes the precondition for the pedagogical relation to grow" (p. 66). The relation begins with a frame

of mind of the teacher that reflects love, concern, and hope. Instead of focussing on each child individually and welcoming the child into one's presence, as Noddings seems to do, van Manen's pedagogical tact begins with embracing all within a positive frame of mind. Conceptually, van Manen's orientation of being present to all children seems more appropriate in classroom situations, where many are before the teacher at one time, than does Noddings's one-to-one approach. However, being present to the other, the child before you, is also problematic. In large institutions such as secondary schools and some universities where in one day there could be a hundred students, how would it be possible to be genuinely present to each student? Only a superficial presence and caring would be possible.

Noddings bases her ethical approach on the intimate relation between mother and child. This maternal relation is what she sees as essential to her theoretical position. Although she transfers the focus on the relation to that of the one-caring and the one cared-for, it is the mother-child relation that grounds her definition of the ethical relationship that needs to exist between teacher and student. In valuing the mother and child relation and the mothering role, Noddings shows the influence of Nancy Chodorow and her feminist object relation theory. Noddings acknowledges Chodorow's influence on her own feminist

perspective (p. 128). The feminist position is inadequate as it applies only to a particular definition of being female. In placing an emphasis on the relation of mothering, Noddings does not take into consideration the existence of females who cannot be mothers, or who choose not to be, in her defining of feminism. Noddings's feminist theory also creates a hostile and ambiguous orientation to the position of males and male teachers. What role is the male to play in Noddings's caring ethic? The masculine is defined in a negative way in Noddings's thinking, as reflecting dominance and oppression. In order to be acceptable in Noddings's ethical caring project men must take up the nurturing role. But when men assume the role of nurturing and care in Noddings's thinking they deny their masculinity. Buber presents a more inclusive grounding for authentic caring in his "I-Thou" relational theory than Noddings's feminist ideology. Buber says, "In the beginning was the relational" (cited in Bernasconi, p. 101). But Buber, in ontologically grounding his I-Thou, I-It relational, goes back behind the relational and what has been called "feminine alterity," (which is where Noddings's thinking is based) to the prenatal (Bernasconi, p. 101). He identifies the moment of "longing for relation" as the impetus of the relational (Bernasconi, p. 101). This seems closer to where van Manen locates his pedagogical approach ontologically. Van Manen sees the relational as beginning with a calling of the other

and a response to the vulnerability of the other.

Although both Noddings and van Manen give value to a hierarchical structure in their approaches to teaching, that of the teacher being situated above the student, guiding and directing the student in a caring and knowing way, there seems to be, in both Noddings's and van Manen's approaches to the relational, a lack of universal connectedness, the value of a third party, a kind of wise external observer. Levinas says that a relation that is self-sufficient forgets the fact of the universal (Bernasconi, p. 105); the passage from the other to the Other; the passage from ethics to justice (Bernasconi, p. 104). Both Noddings and van Manen hold that one in a position of influence and assumed responsibility directs and guides the relational situation, which is an inherent part of teaching. In such relations what prevents the relation from going in an aberrant direction? The possibility of relational situations moving outside of socially acceptable norms seems greater with Noddings's one-to-one relation, where the bonding to the other is more intimate and longer in duration than van Manen's pedagogical tact approach where the teacher acts in the pedagogical moment. Numerous examples exist of relational situations where the leadership of the one in the position of influence and responsibility to others, while appearing to act in the best interest of those under his or

her influence, has resulted in horrific consequences. For example, Jim Jones and other cult leaders have led their followers to commit mass suicide. (Another such example occurred recently in Uganda where hundreds who belonged to the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments sect died through a supposed mass suicide act of redemption.) In terms of teaching, the novel *The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie* provides an example of how a teacher, in a position of responsibility and influence, while believing that she was acting in the best interests of her students, indoctrinated one of them to choose an action which resulted in her (the student's) death. There needs to be something above the frame of mind of the person in the position of influence of Noddings's and van Manen's thinking in order to ensure that such intimate and interdependent relationships will remain within some sense of social goodness. There seems to be a need for a broader definition of authentic existence than that which exists in a one to the other relational.

Kierkegaard's influence can be seen in Noddings's ethical orientation and her structure for ethical existence which focusses on an ethical ideal. Kierkegaard maintained that the individual in the ethical stage of his journey to selfhood placed an ill-founded emphasis on an ideal image of oneself in the future. The ethical ideal assigns working

toward the ideal state as a task and assumes that man is in possession of the conditions required for achieving it, which, as Kierkegaard had determined, man clearly is not. Future social and environmental conditions are beyond one's control. (This was previously discussed as part of the critical analysis of Pinar's thinking in Chapter Two.) Potentially, striving for the ethical ideal state can result in what Kierkegaard called *moral bankruptcy*. Both the one-caring and the one cared-for in Noddings's ethical project are led and driven by what Noddings calls the *ethical ideal* (p. 5). Noddings contends that everything depends upon the nature and the strength of this ideal (p. 105). The ethical ideal guides and shapes our moral and ethical actions. Kierkegaard points out that we cannot control or determine the future. The future is conditioned by factors that come into play outside of the individual's control. Leading the child and letting the self believe that an ethical ideal is achievable might well result in a sense of inner moral bankruptcy and a loss of faith in one's possibilities and abilities, and in one's will. Noddings sees God in a traditional way, as something abstracted from human existence, an entity that defines and determines human existence (p. 43). Her thinking, like that of Pinar, does not go beyond the ethical stage of Kierkegaard's thinking. She does not look at the triangular configuration for authentic being that exists in Kierkegaard's thinking and in

Buber's: that of self, other, and God.

Noddings's ethical caring and her notion of the ethical ideal short-circuit Kierkegaard's attempt to give a universal dimension to selfhood and authentic being through the image of Jesus Christ and through God's Eternal Blessedness. Both Buber and Levinas, expanding on Kierkegaard's existentialist valuing of a Christian ethic, speak of something that might be called God, something that implies a universal connectedness. This universal "something" has the effect of influencing and shaping the relation between concrete things. For Buber it is the ambiguity of the *Thou* in the *I-Thou* relation, where "Thou" can be interpreted as referring to both a universal other and an immediate other (*tu*, in French). This is similar to Levinas's concept of the face in "the Face of the other" as described in his *Infinity and Totality* (1969). The universal other and the dual meaning of you (Thou/Face) suggest something which is the I and something above the I at the same time. The dual positioning of one in relation to the self and one in relation to many at the same time has the effect of keeping a relation where one is in a position of influence to the other from going off in a direction that is outside of society's norms. (In Chapter Six we will see in the thinking of Dwayne Huebner a valuing of universality in teaching through spirituality.)

As a further criticism of Noddings's and van Manen's alternative approaches to teaching, it appears that neither van Manen or Noddings adequately deals with ensuring the future of each of their projects. According to van Manen there exist external forces that rob children of their identity and uniqueness and their potential. However, the action that he suggests needs to be taken in order to combat this erosion of the individual's humanity seems underdeveloped. Very strong external forces exist both inside and outside schools that work against van Manen's pedagogical ethic. In schools, negative external forces can readily be seen with government increasingly taking over responsibility for schooling and implementing curricula largely limited to preparing individuals to serve the economy (examples of what van Manen calls *false tact*). Even stronger forces exist outside schools where business minds influence the child's mind in a way that serves the objectives of business. Van Manen suggests that parents and teachers who are concerned pedagogically need to become involved in political action in order to protect our children, meaning all children. However, actions taken individually on impulse do not seem sufficient to stop the negative effects of growing external forces that are deeply entrenched in everyday existence.

Noddings sketches out a more detailed and elaborate plan than van Manen does, in order to ensure that her ethical project will be realised. Essentially she calls for a reorganisation of schooling. However, Noddings wrote her text, *Caring*, in 1984. It is difficult to assess the effect of her approach to teaching on school practices, but external forces such as government (politics) and business (economics) appear to have had much more effect on teaching and education in the past fifteen years than any ethic of care. In addition, systems of schooling are deeply entrenched and any desired reorganisation of schooling is doomed to fail unless it addresses in detail what is needed for change and how that change can be realised.

Conclusion

Both Noddings and van Manen share a concern for the child, and their concern is directed toward the child's well-being and future. Each has stated the intentionality of the project is to act towards the other in a way that is "right" and "good" for the other and in such a way as to assist the other in completeness and connectedness to the world. Noddings's understanding of "good" is determined in her definition of what she calls the *ethical ideal*, which is an image of one's best self caring and being cared for, an

image that is realisable and possible in the concrete world. For van Manen, "good" and "right" and an understanding of what is best for the child are defined within the term *pedagogical tact*. The parent or teacher is oriented towards the child's well-being and acts with the intention of ensuring the child's authentic becoming and independence. This is the pedagogical moment fulfilled.

There are also similarities in the way that Noddings and van Manen approach the "other." They both desire a closeness to the other in a deep and meaningful way, a way that is similar to the intent of such writers of fiction as Virginia Woolf. Such closeness requires an act of transcendence where one's frame of thinking moves to embrace the world view of the other. In terms of teaching, the person in the position of influence enters the world of the student, and sees the world from the student's perspective. Noddings calls this act of transcendence *engrossment*; van Manen calls it sympathy. This is a deep connectedness to the other. Noddings describes it this way: "There is invariably a displacement of interest from my own reality to the reality of the other...to be touched, to have aroused in me something that will disturb my own ethical reality, I must see the other's reality as a possibility for my own" (p. 14). Van Manen describes a similar mode of being in the act of what he calls sympathy: "We [not so much] vicariously

live in the other person but...the other person lives in us...[W]e recognize the experience of the other as a possible human experience--and thus as a possible experience of our own selves" (pp. 97-98). With this movement of one's self into a world of the other, both Noddings and van Manen call for a splitting of one's conscious thinking processes, a kind of duality of being, where the teacher enters the world of the other while still retaining her or his own sense of self as a teacher. For both Noddings and van Manen there is the intention of completing oneself in the other in the act of teaching.

Both Noddings and van Manen call on existential sources such as the human ability to reason, to engage in dialogue, to reflect, and to image to inform and fulfil the relational connectedness held between teacher and student. But each applies these sources in different ways in developing their approaches to the other, the child, the student, the one cared-for. For example, Noddings defines two kinds of dialogue: the internal dialogue of thinking and reflecting on actions, and the external dialogue of open exchange that is manifested in the relation. Van Manen emphasises other forms of dialogue such as the everyday conversations with parents and teachers that are associated with the relational situation, and anecdotal accounts detailing concrete situations. Noddings calls on specific forms of reflection,

reflection on one's past and reflection on one's engrossment with the one cared-for, to inform ethical actions. Van Manen cites a multiplicity of modes of reflection to inform pedagogical action and tact.

Another significant similarity between Noddings's and van Manen's approaches to teaching is that both see the person in the position of influence as a mediator. For Noddings the one-caring mediates between the child in the present and his or her ethical ideal and between this inner life of the child and the outside world as it exists in the present. Van Manen also focusses on the inner world of the child and sees the position of teacher as mediating between the inner and outer worlds as he or she brings the child into maturity and independence.

In the concluding chapter of this research I give value to both theoretical approaches, Noddings's "ethical ideal" and van Manen's "pedagogical tact." At the same time I offer another approach to teaching which addresses the shortcomings of each of their theories that I have identified here.

Chapter Four

Maxine Greene: Public Spaces, Openings, and Authenticity

In a section of her autobiography, *Moments of Being* (1976), Virginia Woolf writes about becoming aware of an inner sense of self. She goes back into her remembered experiences and brings to light the moments when she first became aware of a self separate from that of everyday habits and routines. She writes, "As a child then, my days, just as they do now, contained a large proportion of this cotton wool, this non-being [my italics]...[T]hen there was a sudden violent shock..." (p. 79). Woolf then describes the nature of the "shock" she experienced by recounting a number of life-shaping events that occurred in her childhood, and telling how each event contributed to a kind of self awakening in her. She names three events that had a particularly strong effect on the structure of her life. First, she tells of a

physical fight that she had had with her brother and her feelings of hopelessness and powerlessness during this encounter. She describes it as an experience that speaks to a sense of her becoming aware of her physical limitations. Next she recounts an experience of the mind that had happened while she was examining a flower and noticed within its construction "a ring enclosed..." which, she exclaims, is "the real flower; part earth, part flower." Here Woolf is struck by her intellectual ability to form insights and make connections about how things relate to each other. The third "shock" experience Woolf recounts is that of being confronted with her feelings of "absolute despair" when she hears of the suicide of someone she had known. This incident awakened in her an awareness of life's finiteness and of the power of one's will in determining existence. These three events have the effect of bringing Woolf into conscious awareness of a self that exists separate from another form of self, a self lost in the "cotton wool" of everyday existence. For Woolf it was these "shock" experiences that caused the break into an emerging awareness of an inner self, a self that is defined by the possibilities that present themselves, by one's inherent limitations, and by one's ability to give understanding to the relation one has with the world.

Maxine Greene values Woolf's insights into existence and a

sense of inner being. It is the inner emerging self that is found at the basis of Greene's proposed project for education. In her text, *The Dialectic of Freedom* (1988), Greene states that Woolf's named inner self, a self separate from the "cotton wool" of routine and mundane existence, has significance beyond the individual. Greene maintains that its importance lies in the broader cultural and political world of society in general (p.3). Greene's project is a moral one. She wishes to cultivate in individuals certain aspects of inwardness that will serve for the betterment of society as a whole and she sees education and teaching as the means to realising this (p. 3).

This chapter is an examination of Greene's "education for freedom" project and how it furthers a definition of authentic teaching. In this exploration we begin with a close look at Greene's desired orientation to education and the theoretical foundation on which it is based. In the previous chapters we studied a form of authenticity that focussed on the self as teacher with the thinking of William Pinar. This understanding of authenticity was broadened to include "the other," the student and the immediate relational aspect of teaching through the theories of Nel Noddings and Max van Manen. What is considered here is how Greene expands the narrative of existential authenticity, drawing mainly on the thinking of Jean Paul Sartre, and how

she also expands meaningful teaching beyond the self and beyond immediate relational themes. What I argue here is that Greene's ideas and her desire for an emerging moralistic aspect in society are based on an opposing dualist orientation. In the ensuing critical discussion of Greene's thinking I note the significant shortcomings to Greene's proposed form of education. In the conclusion of this chapter I draw out of Greene's thinking what she offers to teachers in terms meaningful *praxis*.

Greene's social-political project

Greene sees society for the most part as living in the haze of *non-being* (a deliberate use of Woolf's language) (p. 3). She describes the actions of individuals in Woolfian language, as being "embedded in a kind of nondescript cotton-wool" (p. 3). The individuals who make up society, Greene believes, are immersed in a kind of taken-for-granted relation to the world. Mostly their everyday actions are dominated by practices of habit and routine, performed in the thoughtlessness of *non-being* (p. 3). Interpreting society in this way (she is specifically referring to American society) Greene sees individuals as not having begun to reach out to define themselves as something more and separate from the everyday. They have not begun to reach

out for their freedom. What exists instead within society, Greene maintains, is a growing lassitude, disinterest, and an absence of care by individuals as they go about their everyday activities (p. 5). Mainly individuals have acceded to the dominant social order, as if it were fixed and somehow predetermined. Individuals, says Greene, have not developed ways of apprehending their freedom; they have not begun to reflect on their choices and on their possibilities. They have not begun, she states, to develop "consciously" (p. 3). Greene describes society's present mode of existence as a life of negative freedom (p. 16). (Greene's *negative freedom* can be compared to Sartre's definition of Bad Faith which is considered more closely later on.)

For Greene, society's practices of *negative freedom* harbour within them what has come to be the commonly held understanding of freedom, where freedom means personal autonomy, that is a valuing of independence and self-reliance. Greene maintains this understanding of freedom has the effect of reinforcing the somnolence of society, the lack of desire to awaken in consciousness and to take responsibility for one's part in shaping the structure and direction of society in which one lives. In her chapter entitled "American Quest. American Dream" (pp. 24-56) Greene traces how freedom as independence and self-reliance evolved

and became cemented in American thinking through the major social and political events of that country's history, beginning with the American Revolution, through the Civil War, industrialisation, the Cold War, Vietnam, and the "counter culture" of the '60s. In recounting this history Greene also shows how the lived experiences of individuals, as depicted in American literature, biographies, and diaries reveal the inadequacies and shortcomings of a definition of freedom as autonomy. For example, she cites the trials and hardships to which Huckleberry Finn was subjected when he tried to realise his freedom by escaping the onslaught of industrialisation; the oppressive and dehumanising conditions of the "mill girls" in N. Cott's *Root of Bitterness* when they sought their freedom in becoming self-sufficient through hard work; Hester in *The Scarlet Letter* who was pushed out of her community and for whom independence and self-sufficiency meant adjunct isolation; and the family in *The Grapes of Wrath* who sought to be independent and self-sufficient but whose thwarted efforts brought only further hardships. Such life stories of hardship, isolation, and oppression reflect another dimension of America's history and its evolution, the underside of a social order that believes itself to be built on freedom for all its citizens.

Greene also cites various philosophical thinkers who

attempted to effect a broader and more democratic understanding of freedom in constitutional policies and in educational practices in America throughout its history. Jefferson, Emerson, Thoreau, and Dewey figure prominently. But, despite the insights of these thinkers, and their moral and democratic desires, Greene determines it was freedom as individual autonomy that evolved and is brandished as the true meaning of freedom in America today. Holding a critical perspective Greene sees this definition of freedom as best serving the interests of commerce and those in positions of control. It is a definition of freedom that, Greene maintains, has resulted in the social inequalities in America today and in what she sees as the moral failure of America (p. 10). Greene maintains that this understanding of freedom, freedom as self-regulating and self-determining, has had the effect of dislocating persons and of alienating persons from their own landscapes and from each other (p. 22).

In order to address the ineffectiveness and inadequacies of what Greene calls *negative freedom*, Greene presents another understanding of freedom. It is a definition of freedom that intends that the preservation of humanity must be the most significant value. In her alternative definition of freedom Greene draws on the philosophical and moral political thoughts of other intellectuals, mainly Jean-Paul Sartre,

Merleau Ponty, John Dewey, and Hannah Arendt. The insights offered by each of these thinkers contributed to her formulating a definition of freedom that has authentic existence as the main objective for all individuals. The way to authentic freedom that Greene presents, in part, follows closely the existentialist thinking of Jean Paul Sartre. Sartre's theory saw individuals as initially being in a stage of non-being where one either accedes to the given, that is, the parameters that society sets for him (Sartre's usage), or he sees himself as fated, as if the direction of life could not be otherwise. Living in a mode of *non-being* is, for Sartre, living in *Bad Faith*. To break from living in *Bad Faith* is to experience one's freedom. When one confronts his *non-being* and begins to take responsibility for his choices then one is taking responsibility for and in turn determining his own existence. When this happens he is moving towards authentic freedom. Freedom is thus constituted by filling the gap between the self and one's relation to the world. It is a gap that is realised through the individual awakening to his inner being and then turning to act in ways that continue to define the self as separate from others as one attempts to bring oneself into a fullness of being. Greene has followed this existential narrative in establishing her political and moral project but her emphasis goes beyond the individual to the creation of an authentic structure of society as a whole. Greene, however,

sees that for a society to begin to move towards what might be called a more genuine understanding of freedom it must start with the individual (p. 5). In this she locates the origin of her project where existential theories of authenticity begin. The individual must first see the blocks to his or her freedom before he or she can move beyond them. Quoting Sartre, Greene writes, "They do not reach out for fulfilment if they do not feel impeded somehow, and if they are not enabled to name the obstacles that stand in their way. At once, the very existence of obstacles depends on the desire to reach toward wider spaces for fulfilment, to expand options, to know alternatives" (p. 5). In order for society to begin to know authentic freedom, Greene states, individuals within society must reach beyond the established and taken-for-granted routines and habits that constitute the day-to-day life within the social order.

Greene's way to freedom is environmentally located; that is, in the situational and in relational experiences of the everyday. Genuine freedom, what Greene calls *authentic freedom*, needs to include the environment in which one finds oneself. In this aspect of her thinking Greene acknowledges the influence of Merleau Ponty and his phenomenological emphasis on the body, the self, and one's relation to one's landscape, and the interplay between the self, the concrete, and lived world. According to Merleau Ponty there is a pre-

existing, evolving landscape, the "primordial landscape," laid down and patterned by perception in the early days of life. In emerging consciousness the maturing child takes in a variety of perspectives of the world so that the child's view of the world at any given time is always going to be partial and contingent on the outside forces that affect his or her inner perceptions (p. 21). Basing her thinking in the philosophical insights of Merleau Ponty. Greene sees *authentic freedom* as being realised in the dialogue that exists in one's emerging and changing relation to the world. Greene states that not to acknowledge one's connectedness to one's environment, to one's community, is to limit one's possibilities and therefore one's freedom (p. 22).

In the thinking of both Sartre and Merleau Ponty, one constitutes oneself dialectically, through reflective thought on the relationality of the subject to object interplay. For Sartre, it is the reflective exchange between one's past and one's future. For Merleau Ponty, it is the dialogue sustained between the objective outside world and the self. Greene brings together both of these modes of reflective dialogue in her project. A self that looks objectively at its own history and future existence and a self that seeks to position itself to the outside world is constituting its freedom, where freedom is a conscious awareness of the self emerging in dialogue, the language of

the relational, of the self to the world (p. 7). Greene sees the dialectic nature of the relational as a way of mediating the world. By focussing on the relational a different orientation to the world is called for. The world and individuals in the world are not viewed as objects. Instead, in Greene's thinking, the self needs to be oriented to the world in such a way that the self is seen as continuously being reconstituted through thought, reflection, action, and choosing.

It is when Greene turns to the insights of American philosopher John Dewey and American intellectual Hannah Arendt that her definition of freedom expands existential understandings of authenticity beyond the self to the domain of society. Both Dewey and Arendt developed critical and philosophical insights related to freedom, democracy, and society. Greene abstracts from Dewey's thinking a way for society to realise its freedom through a focus on the content of education. Dewey saw the human mind as the determinant of society's structure and society's norms and behaviours. The human mind, for Dewey, in its capacity to think and to choose, as well as its capacity to communicate and exchange ideas, can direct the course of future evolution. With social and moral imperatives in mind Dewey believed that individuals in society should be educated to develop their capacity to inquire, to reason, and to

exchange ideas, and opportunities should be given for experimentation and growth (Greene, pp. 42-43). It was Dewey's position that social change could be enacted through informed choosing within a social context (Greene, p. 7). Developing what he called an *articulate public*, Dewey thought, would increase the likelihood of achieving freedom for the broader public. It is these insights given by Dewey that Greene applies to her philosophy, and her emphasis on the need for open and informed minds and the fostering of engaged participation in a public forum. Greene, following Dewey, places education in the foreground, as the way to realise this desired societal order. Through educating the mind to think in reasoned ways with a sense of openness to listening to the perspectives of others and through the reasoned exchange of ideas society can change and grow in moral and democratic ways.

Greene's moral project takes on a more political nature when she turns to the thinking of Hannah Arendt. Critical questions are posed later in this chapter regarding the political direction that Greene intends society and education to take in her proposed moral project. For Arendt, freedom could be realised in public spaces and in a coming together of persons who had a common purpose. The kind of public space that Arendt had in mind reflected what she called the *in-between*, meaning that which exists between

thought and action, between one's actualities and one's possibilities, between areas of resistance and "the not yet" (p. 21). Greene, reflecting Arendt's thinking, states individuals who come together, "who choose themselves as affected and involved" in areas of common conflict and similarity, create spaces of in-between (p. 17). Arendt's public space is as much about a part of social consciousness as it is an intended actuality in the social structure. It is a space that enables, makes room for, a coming together of those who see themselves as affected by, involved in, and mutually connected to a project (Greene, pp. 16-17). Greene calls such a space an *opening*, a space of *unconcealedness* (a deliberate use of Heidegger's term) in the present social order (p. 58). In such moments of coming together, Greene believes, the blocks and the obstacles to freedom become disclosed through exchange and discourse. It is here in public exchange and discourse that an awakening of social consciousness begins. Greene believes that it is here, in open public spaces, that society can awaken to its possibilities and authentic freedom can begin to be realised.

We can see that the authentic public sphere, the mode of "in-between," of which Greene speaks, has a certain resonance with Heidegger's narrative of authenticity and the concept of *Dasein*. *Dasein* questions the world and the self's

relation to the world. For Greene the state of "in-between" realised in *authentic spheres of freedom* is a kind of societal *Dasein*, a kind of public space where people come together in awakened and informed democratic dialogue.

In her text Greene gives examples of *authentic freedom* in practice. In the chapter entitled "Reaching from Private to Public: The Work of Women" (pp. 57-86) Greene gives special attention to particular individuals and groups who have acted to achieve social freedom (Greene's definition of authentic freedom) in the history and literature of America. These individuals and groups have been on the margins of dominant society and have acted to change and affect the environment in which they live. Greene states, "People at the margins make obvious the hegemonic inadequacies and deficiencies" (p. 9). It is in such stories that we "find challenges to our world-view" (p. 22). She notes that such examples of authentic freedom are numerous in the history of American society and politics. But she has focussed mainly on two groups of people who have moved toward authentic freedom: American women and American blacks. Her sources for this retelling are life stories collected from diaries, novels, and autobiographies by and about American women and American blacks spanning the last two hundred years. The examples she gives of some women and of some blacks in the history of America, who formed pockets of resistance and

enacted social and political action, are examples of what Greene calls *spheres of freedom*.

She details the life experiences of certain women in American history who resisted the constraints of domesticity and who saw the limitations of domestic life as an obstacle to fulfilment and personal growth; women who, while still maintaining domestic roles, reached out from "the private sphere of domestic life to the public sphere" (p. 56). The "reaching out" took the form of bringing their plight into public dialogue, and had the effect of expanding the potentiality and possibilities of women "as fully actualised beings" (p. 55). Greene cites such American women as Elizabeth Stanton and Lucietta Mott who organised public meetings related to anti-slavery campaigns and who spoke out publicly about the suffrage of women in the mid-nineteenth century in America; Jane Addams, the renowned social activist who helped others organise their own public actions to achieve their freedom (pp. 73-76), and Daughters of St. Crispin, women shoe workers who forced their way into the Knights of Labor in order to ensure certain rights for women in the work force (p. 86). Greene notes that these women had to fight not only against the male opposition of that time, but also against their own personal feelings of responsibility to their families. But the realisation of the oppressiveness and marginalisation of their situations, or

the situations of others, had impacted on them so strongly that they moved to work towards another reality. Greene sees these women as having acted to realise a mode of *authentic freedom*.

Greene cites similarities existing between the struggle for social freedom of women in American history and the history of slavery in America in the nineteenth century. She says the stories of blacks and black females in particular "shed many kinds of light on the meanings of freedom and the search for freedom" (p. 66). She recounts both real and fictional stories in which blacks struggled against dominant practices and oppression, and strove to retain or reclaim their own identity when they came together collectively and confronted the hegemony of the American constitution. Civil rights activist Frederick Douglass, anti-slavery activist Harriet Tubman, and the renowned social activist Martin Luther King are a few named by Greene who resisted the violations and contempt lodged against them, who named the blocks to their freedom.

In Greene's authentic freedom there is also the realisation that the world is always incomplete, which in turn leaves open the possibility of "the not yet." Freedom for Greene is a mode of existence that is constituted in the relational, the in-between found between oneself and "otherness,"

between oneself and the world, oneself and one's environment, one's inner thinking processes and the concrete world. Authentic public space is a human enterprise intended to empower individuals to reach beyond the immediate sense of self to realise their freedom.

Although Greene's notion of the authentic, like Sartre's, starts with the individual, she moves the responsibility of the individual in constructing his or her own authentic existence to a position where the individual now has a responsibility to effect the construction of the social structures in which he or she finds herself/himself existing. Individuals who make up society, Greene states, must awaken to their freedom; they must see the "cotton wool" of their unreflective, somnolent existence in a taken-for-granted world and act to resist the dominant and oppressive forces that define social structures.

Individuals, Greene believes, need to stand against the power of these institutionalised forces and move to claim their own individuality while at the same time moving towards their freedom (p. 15). In its political and social intent, Greene's definition of authentic freedom is realised within public forums, what Greene calls the *authentic public spheres*. Greene sees authentic public spheres as those spaces where individuals come together in mutual concern, to claim their freedom. The public spheres are constituted by

an informed and articulate exchange between committed and engaged persons and by the inquiring minds of individuals who are open to seeing things from many perspectives. It is an arena of open debate and reasoned thoughtful exchange of ideas in the spirit of mediation and negotiation. Greene states, "It is a kind of space that will enable individuals to exercise one's ability to reflect, to think, to have vision, and to imagine and to engage critical understandings" (p. 17).

In the above I have attempted to give some understanding of Greene's project both in terms of the philosophical provenance on which she founds her thinking and the actualities of how she sees her project enacted in society.

Critical reflections on Greene's "spheres of freedom"

What follows is a critical, reflective response to Greene's definition of authentic existence, and her *spheres of freedom*, noting the contradictions and shortcomings of her desired enterprise. It is argued here that Greene's form of authentic existence falls short of offering a way for individuals to realise a fullness of being. In this hermeneutic turn I question the political direction in which she takes authentic existence. Further on a closer look will be given to the educational aspects of Greene's thinking and

the way her thinking aids in defining meaningful teaching.

At the basis of Greene's thinking and her desired change in the social order is the position of a self defining itself by standing against the dominant and established structures of society and particularly the existing political structures that define and structure existence. It is a way of thinking about existence that is created on an opposing dualism. Instead of allowing existing political structures to determine one's day-to-day existence Greene wishes to subvert and undermine these structures by encouraging political groups of individuals to come together and act for the good of the group as a whole. In structuring her thinking in this way Greene paints present established governmental and legal systems (institutions that are instruments of present political forms) as being without sympathy, and lacking the power to reason and consider different perspectives. This criticism of democratic systems is unfounded. Democratic governmental systems and supporting legal forms are made up of individuals and as such they can respond to the human condition. Governments are constructed on notions of democracy where the concerns of individuals and groups are made public. It is intended within the democratic structure that elected individuals make public the concerns of individuals and groups within their constituencies and that those elected individuals

participate in reasoned exchange within the greater governmental structures that effect change in society. Also, within the legal systems of democratic governments, a courtroom is a public forum where reasoned debate and exchange of ideas are presented within the established rule of law. The intention of the legal system is to enable fair and equal representation for individuals. It is an institution that is not without sympathy and compassion. Judges and jurors make decisions not only on the facts presented but also through considering the plights of individuals within the greater social structure. Greene overlooks this human aspect of existing societal structures and the fact that established democratic systems already contain individuals who are educated in the way Greene desires.

Greene believes that a state can have fully actualised citizens only if there is allowance for groups of individuals to come together and act in supposed goodness and freedom. It is through the political actions of groups that society's grievances can be made public and social change realised. Such groups exist in various societies throughout the world today. And it appears that the number of public demonstrations by such groups is growing, as we hear in the media. We all know the degree of organization that some of these groups can mount in order to have their

voice heard and in order to effect social change; e.g., pro-life groups, animal rights campaigners, environmentalists, various feminist groups. Public opinion is often swayed and public support and sympathy gained by the ways in which these groups present their situation through public demonstration and to the media. This raises the question: Should it be left to the most sophisticated campaigners to determine the morality of society? Other groups of marginalised individuals such as pregnant teenagers, the homeless, those living in poverty, who do not have the resources to be organised or media-wise cannot be equally represented in Greene's proposed social structure. How can these groups of individuals realise their freedom from oppression when there is no one to voice their position? Their marginalisation also needs to be represented in a democratic society which purports to offer freedom for all.

Underlying this critical exploration of Greene's proposed emergence of independent and self-determining groups of individuals who coalesce together to realise their freedom is a concern for the degree of power that Greene gives the strata of balkanised groups she wishes to become established in the social structure. Other critical questions can be raised when thinking further of the consequences of Greene's proposed restructuring of the social order. When people come together for the mutual purpose of acting in their freedom,

and their actions are supposedly democratically agreed upon by the other members of the community in the way Greene suggests, are whatever actions committed by members of the group considered justifiable, or are certain acts of violence acceptable in the name of authentic freedom? What would happen when there is a clash of opposing purposes of different groups of individuals, where both groups have founded their desired purposes on the realisation of authentic freedom? Is Greene's proposed emergence of spheres of individuals in the strata of society really fertile ground for anarchy and violence?

Further concerns about Greene's political project surface when considering the dynamics of groups that come together spontaneously. For this deeper critical exploration of the inner workings of groups I compare Greene's proposed social structure with the underlying themes of a novel by A. S. Byatt entitled *Babel Tower*. The content of *Babel Tower* expresses the same philosophical concerns as Greene's dialectic of freedom. It is a novel about oppression and understandings of freedom, about lived experiences of certain characters in the novel who collide within dominant political and social understandings of rights and freedom. Both Greene's thinking and the origins of *Babel Tower* can be seen to have been formulated on similar philosophical and ideological ideas expressed by the counter-culture movement

of the '60s and '70s which happened both in England and in North America, as well as other places. There are several scenes in the novel which recount the interactions and actions of the members of the Community in the open public theatre, the place where all members gather together to discuss and debate issues relevant to the continuation of their being together in freedom. In the open public arena everyone is invited and encouraged to contribute to these discussions; openness and good will are to be extended to each participant. What the novel reveals is that the actual contributions made by individuals to the public debate are often deeply influenced by personal biases, prejudices, and self-serving desires. Many of the decisions and actions taken, while seemingly consented to by all the members, really are determined by certain individuals and serve the desires and interests of the most articulate, the most intelligent, and/or the most dynamic personality. Often, in *Babel Tower*, it is the personal desires of Culvert, the main character in the novel, that determine the content and direction of the public debate. The discussions served Culvert's ego and his own desires, which at times verged on the perverse, and favoured his love of spectacle and voyeurism. This brings me to question whether Greene's proposed forums of open debate and discussion between people with a common purpose held in the "public space" could realise their democratic intent, considering the inner

dynamics of groups of individuals coming together. Even though individuals have been educated to be meaningful contributors to public discourse, do the deep inherent self-serving intentions (one's sinfulness) held by individuals threaten the democratic process and undermine any stated intention of coming together and making changes for the benefit of all of society? In this theoretical proposal Greene seems to be blind to the realities of group dynamics. Some individuals are more articulate than others. Some are more interested in political debate than others. Some are better able to understand complex concepts than others. Individuals who come together with a mutual purpose also bring with them their own prejudices and biases as well as the self-serving aspects of human nature. How do we know that what is offered and presented for discussion and debate is not intended to serve the desires and egos of certain individuals, rather than to further the moral intent of the group as a whole? What this comparison between Byatt's novel and Greene's thinking points out is that Greene's authentic public spheres are not equal in opportunity, and rather than offering a voice for each person, the voice of the group is really the voice of one or two powerful individuals in the group.

What appears to be lacking in Greene's thinking is a commonly held position among citizens, a higher overarching

frame unifying social existence. In this way Greene's thinking has not gone far enough. She has not given society as a whole a needed focus beyond the realisation of politically active groups of individuals.

There is also a contradictory element in the method Greene uses to present her proposed project. The discourse of her project is decidedly didactic: this is what society must do to realise its freedom. It places the discourse of the didactic before the discourse of dialogue. In presenting her project in this way Greene does not encourage discussion about her proposed ideas nor does she present herself as a model for what she espouses. (Other educationalists in this inquiry seem to live their ideology, for example Max van Manen, William Pinar, and Dwayne Huebner.) Greene's discourse lacks the conviction of her theoretical thinking. It is this didactic position that Greene wishes teachers in general to take in their practice. She desires teachers to become advocates of political action in their students. A discussion of the position of teachers in Greene's education in freedom is given further on.

I would like now to return to how Greene's thinking furthers meaningful teaching. In the following I contend that, despite the criticisms levelled above, Greene's thinking has value in furthering meaningful teaching.

Greene's education for authentic freedom

Greene sees education as the way to realise her existentialist ideal of "authentic public spheres." She believes that education can cultivate the kinds of thinking and orientation necessary for individuals to accept responsibility for what is happening to them and to move to claim their freedom in public action. Through a particular form of education individuals can become informed contributors and active participants in authentic public spheres. Education is a way of preparing people to think about the world in which they live. Greene says, "Through education individuals can be provoked to reach beyond themselves in their intersubjective space. It is through and by means of education that they become empowered to think about what they are doing, to become mindful, to show meaning, to conceptualise, to make varied sense of their lived worlds" (p. 12).

Greene directs her education for freedom mainly at curriculum design and teaching practices. She wishes to fill the gap between the unchallenged, dehumanised, objectifying curriculum that she sees as presently existing in schools

with a curriculum that "reawaken[s] the consciousness to possibilities" (p. 10). The emphasis, she maintains, should be on enabling self-actualisation and on creating thoughtful contributors in democratic public spaces. Greene desires education to focus on developing the ability to recognise the obstacles, the areas of conflict and oppression, that prevent both the individual and society as a whole from moving towards authentic freedom and to be thoughtful contributors to the social order.

In short, in her education for freedom, Greene wishes to create an environment of empowerment to individuals to act to enable social transformation while at the same time enabling individual fulfilment. Greene sees her project as realisable for and incumbent on every citizen. In her democratic enterprise Greene desires each person to both recognise and exercise the contribution the individual makes to the social and political order and she desires every person to be in a better position to exercise his or her contribution through awakened and informed minds.

Greene gives an example of education for freedom in the content of the subject of history. History, she suggests, needs to focus on getting close to the lived experience of events, through reading diaries and other narratives. Also, varied perspectives on past experiences need to be

considered. She feels that this call for a multiplicity of perspectives and engaged imagination would bring forward voices previously silenced, lost or forgotten perspectives and realities. In such a study of history students would be encouraged to reflect on and talk about what happened and make connections with other events in the present as well as the past. The students would then have an informed range of viewpoints from which to challenge the taken-for-granted interpretation of history as well as ways to broaden understanding of human interactions that shape histories over time (p. 127).

Greene places an emphasis on the reflective, the critical, and the imaginative, as this orientation to thinking presents the possibility of opening up new ways of looking at things. In this she gives a primary position to the arts in curriculum design. Greene states that "the arts ought to be, if transformative teaching is our concern, a central part of curriculum" (p. 133). Focussing mainly on the literary arts Greene sees the arts as offering examples of multiplicity, alternatives, and models of individuals who have effected freedom. The arts offer alternatives in their representation of the way others lead their lives and provide a way for knowing others as well knowing oneself. She sees "imaginative fiction" as offering ways to make sense of the world; through engagement with the arts

critical awareness and thoughtfulness can be developed as "literature is where the free flow of the imagination is controlled by criticism and criticisms are transformed into a way of looking at things" (p. 113).

Teaching, education, for authentic freedom

Greene's education for freedom as it would exist in practice is only briefly sketched out in her text. She gives examples of changes in subject content that reflect her desired social reform. She mainly wishes to shift the present emphasis in school curriculum away from the cognitive skills and an emphasis on reasoning (a model of liberal education) to one which places an emphasis on communication, intelligence, reflection, critical debate, and imagination. Greene gives little specific direction to teachers in her proposed education for freedom. She sees that teachers would need to reorient themselves to education in order to be part of the intention of social and political change. Teachers, she holds, need to embody authentic practice. She contends that the ones (teachers) who see the obstacles of their own practice yet remain committed to their vocation have value as exemplars; for, she maintains, "a teacher in search of his/her freedom may be the only kind of teacher who can cause young persons to go in search of their own" (p. 9). When teachers embody authentic teaching they establish a

praxis in teaching. Greene states, "It is also important for an education for freedom to find a way to develop a praxis of educational consequences that opens up spaces necessary for the remaking of a democratic community" (p. 126). She suggests some ways of implementing praxis in schools, mainly by allowing time and space in the school curriculum for discussion, interpretation, and the presentation of multiple perspectives. It is a form of praxis in which one embodies one's incompleteness, and in turn, it is this incompleteness that leaves open the engagement of one's imagination and the realisation of possibilities (p. 122). Such practices support Greene's thought that "there [should always be] a laying open of possibility that suspends the final completion, if any" (p. 10).

Teachers would need to reorient themselves to education in order to be part of the intention of social and political change. This is where Greene transfers her own didactic orientation of the position of teaching to other teachers. In Greene's "teaching for freedom" teachers are to play an active role in encouraging students to become involved politically. The problem in placing the profession of teaching in this political direction is made apparent in the novel, *The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie*. The teacher, Miss Brodie, who is admired and worshipped by "her girls," encourages one of "her girls," who was the most innocent and

credulous of Miss Brodie's select students, to become actively involved in the Spanish Civil War. The girl in her naivety does as Miss Brodie suggests and as a consequence she is killed. In the end Miss Brodie's brightest student turns on her and calls her a fascist. The story highlights the effect of teachers on students and the potential negative consequences when teachers are oriented politically and encourage their students to be. Greene's call for teachers to orient themselves to a desired political structure of society has the danger of moving the position of teacher from that of mediator to that of self-appointed authoritarian.

Though the criticism given previously shows Greene's proposed way to society's freedom as having didactic and exclusionary aspects, there is value in Greene's thinking in considering the fulfilment of teaching. The value is found not in the political nature of her project but in its dialectic nature. In this regard Greene offers a way for teachers to position themselves in teaching that moves authentic teaching beyond that realised in self exploration (Pinar) or that realised in the development of the teacher-student relationship (Noddings and van Manen). Within her political moral project is a way to reach individuals and to affect society as a whole that both broadens authentic existence and opens the possibility for authentic existence

to become a part of everyday life, which, in turn, can do battle with the growing influences and practices of what Sartre calls "Bad Faith."

What is important to the theme of the fulfilment of teaching is that the dialectical nature of Greene's project offers a way of making authentic practices become established as part of the teaching profession. This can be actualised by teachers cultivating in practice dialogical aspects.

Teachers can find spaces and places during the timetable of the teaching day to foster critical thought, imagination, reflection, informed minds, and an openness to listening to others. Teachers can encourage open debate among their students, and offer ways for students to develop listening, reasoning, and speaking skills. They can also find ways in the curriculum to encourage their students to explore the self and "the other" more deeply. They can encourage their students to make connections between their own lived experiences and those of others in order to make sense of their existence and to give value and meaning to the lived experiences of others. The arts, English literature, drama, and the visual arts (often marginalised areas of study in current and conventional forms of curricula) become important as places in the curriculum to encourage and foster critical dialogue, an openness to exchanging ideas and making lived experiences public. The arts offer

opportunities to value human imagination (in existential terms). In this way the arts can bring challenge to the taken-for-granted and traditionally valued understandings of history as well as giving alternative perspectives on the human condition. These ideas, which are the suggestions of Greene in her *Dialectic for Freedom*, are ways for teachers to further the idea of meaningful existence of individuals and in turn to effect social change as students become part of the established structure of society.

But the value I give to Greene's thinking stops before the more political action that Greene suggests, that of individuals educated to becoming awakened to the inner sense of self and coalescing in groups with a common intention of political action. Instead, what can be abstracted from Greene's project is a way to change society and social structures from within. As educated individuals (that is, educated to a form of existential awakening) move from schools into the social structure a kind of "opening of possibilities" occurs. It becomes possible for such individuals to affect the social structure in the everyday situations in which they live as societal beings both within institutionalised social systems and outside of them. Students will become lawyers, politicians, teachers, individuals who will work in social and political systems. With educated minds, educated in the way that Greene

suggests, they will be prepared to act in the "political moment" to realise individual and social freedom. They will find places where they can act to challenge the taken-for-granted practices that limit individual freedom. Educated students will become citizens in general and within everyday human existence they can act to challenge oppressive and unjust practices when such situations present themselves. Therefore it becomes possible to foster and give value to individual freedom and one's place in the sphere of human existence as a whole. Through this form of education, individuals can emerge into society who will become mediators of authentic human existence acting in the spirit of an ongoing dialogue.

It is this aspect of Greene's thinking, the dialogical nature of her authentic freedom, to which I give value as a way of broadening meaningful teaching in the theoretical frame for authentic teaching that I offer in the "Conclusion" of the research.

Chapter Five

Authenticity, Spirituality, and Education

Generally in her writing Virginia Woolf does not concern herself in any significant way with spiritual or religious thoughts. Her writing is mainly secular in nature. However, there are certain passages found in her writing which show her to have a profound curiosity and insight into spiritual ideas and the constitution of the nature of spirituality when her thinking wanders into such areas.

For example, in *Moments of Being* she writes:

Perhaps this is the strongest pleasure known to me. It is the rapture I get when in writing I seem to be discovering what belongs to what; making a scene come right; making a character come together. From this I reach what I might call a philosophy; at any rate it is a constant idea of mine; that behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we--I mean all human beings--are connected with this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work of art. Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about this vast mass that we call the world. But there is no

Shakespeare, there is no Beethoven quartet; certainly and emphatically there is no God; we are the words; we are the music, we are the thing itself. (p. 81)

Here, Woolf reflects on the connection between her art and a certain way of understanding the world. Woolf's vision of a higher order world view is that of a piece of artwork, where completeness and beauty come together. *Hamlet* and a Beethoven quartet, metaphors for her vision, reflect an aesthetic unity and it is a kind of aesthetic unity that she sees as the basis of human existence. Individuals, for Woolf, are as a note of music in a musical composition, or a line in a play; each a part of the composition of the whole, and each connected to the cosmos. For Woolf all human existence has connectedness and that connectedness as aesthetic form holds the truth of existence. This is where philosophy can look to define the meaning of existence.

Another glimpse that Woolf offers into the nature of spirituality can be gleaned from an often-cited passage in *To The Lighthouse*. A long description of a family gathering leads up to what might be called a spiritual moment. The focus of the narration is mainly on Mrs Ramsay. She is seated amongst the rest of the Ramsay family and friends who are gathered together for Sunday dinner, a dinner which Mrs Ramsay has taken great pains to prepare and organise. Reflectively gazing over the activities, the conversations, and interactions of the others at the dinner table, Mrs

Ramsay thinks to herself:

Everything seemed possible. Everything seemed right. Just now (but this cannot last, she thought, dissociating herself from the moment while they were all talking about boots) just now she had reached security; she hovered like a hawk, suspended; like a flag floated in an element of joy which filled every nerve of her body fully and sweetly, not noisily, solemnly rather, for it arose, she thought, looking at them all eating there, from husband and children and friends; all of which rising in this profound stillness, seemed now for no special reason to stay there like a smoke, like a fume rising upwards, holding them safe together. Nothing need be said; nothing could be said. There it was, all around them. It partook, she felt, of eternity; as she had already felt about something different once before that afternoon; there is a coherence in things, a stability; something, she meant, is immune from change, and shines out... in the face of the flowing, the fleeting, the spectral, like a ruby; so that again tonight she had the feeling she had had once today already, of peace, of rest. Of such moments, she thought, the thing is made that remains ever after. This would remain. (pp. 141-142)

In this reflective passage there is an interplay between the temporal and the eternal, and for Mrs Ramsay it is a moment of transcendence as she reaches the state of a self in harmony with the world. Mrs Ramsay has a kind of transcendental experience as she speaks of going beyond (outside of) the immediate self and, with a kind of epiphanic insight, she rests for a moment in contentment and peace. Thoughts of transcendence, of going to a higher level or plane of thought and going beyond earthly time, are a fundamental part of spiritual discourse. Woolf has captured here a moment of spiritual experience.

In these thoughts on spirituality Woolf connects with the thinking of the educationalist (and theologian) Dwayne Huebner. Huebner values concepts of a self connected to the wholeness of the world and moments of transcendence to a state of completeness and peace. These aspects of spirituality are mainstays of Huebner's definition of spirituality. However, where Woolf's writing most strongly resonates with the thinking of Huebner is in a passage by Woolf where spiritual existence is connected to an awareness of an inner sense of self. We find this insight in a passage extracted from one of Woolf's short stories, "The Unwritten Novel" (From Virginia Woolf: *Selected Short Stories*, 1993, pp. 25-38).

But when the self speaks to the self, who is speaking?--the entombed soul, the spirit driven in, in, in to the central catacomb; the self that took the veil and left the world--a coward perhaps, yet somehow beautiful, as it flits with its lantern restlessly up and down the dark corridors (p.34).

The soul, the inner self, that Woolf is referring to in this passage is an ambiguous, yet to be defined, entity. It seems to be something above the common and the mundane, above an unreflective self (what Woolf might call a "cotton wool" existence). The terms "soul" and "spirit" refer to an aspect of inner thinking, a consciousness of self that desires expression. For Dwayne Huebner, it is an awareness of this inner aspect of the self that makes it possible for the self

to become shaped into a spiritual being, an inner self on the journey of self-expression while consciously striving for a spiritual existence, union with the Absolute. For Huebner, having an awareness of the inner self is essential in travelling the path of spiritual existence. In this way Huebner follows the thinking of Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard also saw the way to authentic being as a form of journeying to a higher level of existence. Huebner's project of an education in spirituality intends to draw on the dynamics of an inner self and move individuals towards a form of spirituality where a sense of completeness realised through transcendence and universal connectedness can be realised. In this final exploration into various theories of education and authenticity it is Huebner's thinking about the concept of an inner self directed towards wholeness and fullness of being that I see as offering a way to complete meaningful teaching.

In his article "Education and Spirituality," first published in the *Journal for Curriculum Theory* (1993, vol. 3, pp. 13-34), Huebner does not elaborate on his meaning of spirituality by explicating the influences and philosophical thinking behind his definition as we have found with the other educationalists explored in this inquiry. Instead he appears to take the position of someone acting and living within his own spiritual convictions; his actions, his

writing, reflect his spiritual orientation. From this article it can be discerned that Huebner's definition of spirituality is mainly formulated in four interrelated elements: the relation one has with the world, human imagination, human expression, and aspects of transcendence.

The subject to object relation

Spirituality, for Huebner, is constituted in the relational, the relation held between the self and the "other." That "other" is multi-dimensional and multi-faceted and connects the self to the world. Huebner distinguishes between two understandings of "the other," although the difference between them is somewhat blurred. He says, "[W]e forget, our relationship with and indebtedness to that 'Other' often manifested through the neighbour and the strange" (p. 23). This reference to the "other" is the other of our immediate encounters with other human beings, those individuals with whom we interact every day. But there is another "other" that is more universal in Huebner's thinking. Huebner says, "Hovering is always the absolute 'other' Spirit, that overwhelms us in moments of awe, terror, tragedy, beauty, and peace" (p. 22). This "other" is that which seems to exist above the immediate other. Both relations, the relation that one has with other human beings and the one of a connectedness to some entity beyond the immediate self,

with a higher cosmic existence, are apprehended by the individual and known and embodied inwardly. Huebner states that to enter into a mode of spirituality one must first be open to knowing and seeing the spirituality of both forms of otherness. To live in spirituality means always being open to possibilities and growth in one's encounters with "the other."

Human expression and imagination

Huebner remains conscious of and close to language in defining spirituality. He states critically, "We depend upon the language, practices and materials as if they were the givens with which we have to work" (p. 13). "Our languages, our practices, and the resources we use," Huebner says further, "are merely the embodied or materialized images in which we choose to dwell." He continues, "Other images, in which we could dwell, are currently unembodied in worldly structures and abandoned" (p. 13). Huebner believes that individuals who have not begun to move towards a kind of inner self-expression live in the world as if its structures are immovable. He contends that we have forgotten or suppressed the actuality that imagination is the source of our so-called "givens." Our freedom lies in choosing to acknowledge and engage in those other imagined worlds. He

feels that through language and by calling on human imagination and the individual's ability to re-imagine and articulate another reality, one based in spirituality, a spiritual life-world can be realised (p. 14). Action for Huebner is a form of dialogue which in turn, he sees, is all human expression. Dialogue itself becomes part of the spiritual journeying. A dialogue of the spiritual is both critical of limiting and restrictive forms and open to alternatives and possibilities. It is a state of being open to change and transcendence. Huebner puts it this way: it is "a dialectic of criticism and creation" (p.31). Found in Huebner's emphasis on imagination is the thinking of Sartre. For Sartre authentic existence occurs when one moves into one's possibilities which are formulated in one's imagination. These possibilities are open and yet to be defined. Huebner can be seen to expand on Sartre's definition of imagination and openness by framing one's possibilities in the Ultimate, that of absolute goodness and absolute knowledge.

Transcendence

Huebner states, "The human being dwells in the transcendent, or more appropriately, the transcendent dwells in the human being...the spirit dwells in us" (p. 18). (This resonates

with Virginia Woolf's notion, quoted above, of the spirit in conscious thought that "flits with its lantern restlessly searching and peering up and down the dark corridors.") It is in the mode of transcendence that Huebner locates knowledge and knowing. Huebner sees transcendence as a state of being in which we call upon "our ability to orient ourselves to and through action and dialogue enter into the vastness and moreness of knowing" (p. 19); it is in the state of transcendence that we go beyond what we are at present. Huebner sees knowledge as being ever-expanding: "There is always more to know... We are in front of a vastness..." (p.19). The perspective taken here is that of a self standing on the verge of a vast sea of knowledge and one poised to direct the self through that vastness. Spiritual life is a journey in the course of which one is directed to a sense of completeness, to self-fulfilment. It is a journeying, in spiritual terms, to God; it is a journey sustained by faith and the individual's desire to go beyond, to become more (greater, better, fuller) than what one is now. But the journey's end can never be consummated. There is always more to know. Through dwelling in knowing, through orienting ourselves to an image of the Absolute Other, and seeing life as a journey to that Absolute Other, the self is shaped into a spiritual being. It is a journey sustained and constituted by the individual through critical reflection, imagination, and dialogue (action). In this spiritual

existence one is continually reconstituting oneself, continually transforming.

Huebner and narratives of authenticity

The inter-related aspects that constitute the nature of spirituality in Huebner's thinking can be found in the definitions of authentic existence in existential terms. Huebner connects with the thinking of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre. Kierkegaard's definition of selfhood is realised within a religious (Christian) context and as such within some understanding of spirituality. Both Kierkegaard and Huebner value the sense of an overarching universal other, a higher sense of being. Like Kierkegaard, Huebner employs the idea of God to signify this higher order of existence. Kierkegaard and Huebner understand God as created in the mind and imagination of the self, the conscious mind. Just as Kierkegaard believes religious life to be embodied in thoughts and actions of the individual, Huebner sees spirituality to be embodied in the thoughts and actions of the individual in everyday life. Like Kierkegaard, Huebner reflects that embodiment.

But Huebner's spirituality has closer ties to Heidegger's

and Sartre's modes of authenticity than to Kierkegaard's. Huebner is similar to Heidegger in the way Heidegger defines authenticity, where the self is shaped through reflection and action on one's relation to the already existing world. But Huebner sees one's ever-evolving mode of being as a journey directed toward the Absolute Other, and knowledge of the Absolute Other is constructed in experiences with "the other(s)" we meet in our journeying. In Heidegger's thinking each moment is lived with a kind of intensity; each act is committed in the full awareness of that which constitutes *Dasein*. In authentic being the individual is engaged in a sense of knowing and the actions of authenticity are poised to reflect the truth of one's existence. Huebner's spiritual existence reflects Heidegger's thinking of *Dasein* here. Just as there is no predetermined definition for *Dasein*, Huebner's meaning of spirituality has no predetermined definition. Indeed, a conclusive definition would be contrary to his intended valuing of spirituality. A full spiritual existence for Huebner, like *Dasein*, is a process, a mode of consciousness, and is constituted in aspects of human existence and the ability of human beings to inquire, to reflect, to reason, and to imagine. Huebner's spirituality, like Heidegger's *Dasein*, is embodied, ever-evolving and open to its possibilities, its "not yet." Every human being is perpetually oriented towards his own possibilities.

Despite Huebner's affinity with the thinking of Heidegger it is really Sartre's dualist thinking that underlies Huebner's definition of spiritual existence. For Sartre as for Huebner there is an emphasis on the relational. For Sartre the relational is between oneself and one's freedom. For Huebner the relational is between oneself in the present and the Absolute Other. For Sartre and for Huebner the relational is constructed in the consciousness of the self, through engaged imagination, through a critical orientation to the world, through the relation of one's self to the outside world, and through one's ability to make choices and to act on those choices. Huebner reflects Sartre's move to authentic being in stating that our actions are a result of our ability to make choices, our ability to choose what to do and what not to do, and to imagine our existence in the future. In this way both Sartre and Huebner place an emphasis on human agency as being able to move towards fulfilment. For Sartre, as for Huebner, imagination and freedom are closely linked. One has the ability to imagine other ways of being that don't presently exist and through human agency move towards an alternative form of existence. For Huebner that alternative form is spirituality and life with God where the concept of God and human imagination are intertwined. One constructs a kind of image of God in the mind and through one's will one directs one's actions

towards this divine image.

The following explication of Huebner's education for spirituality emphasises the Sartrean dualism underlying Huebner's project.

Critical thinking and religious belief

In the foregoing I have attempted to give some understanding of Huebner's spirituality by highlighting the interrelated aspects that constitute spirituality and its connection to authentic existence. Huebner sees education as the way for individuals to move towards existential spirituality. The alternative form for education that Huebner offers, one that is based on Sartrean dualism, begins by being critical of the presently established form of education. Huebner sees that a critical orientation is the first step toward embodied spirituality. Donald Cupitt (*Sea of Faith*, 1984), another existentialist theologian, holds a similar perspective to Huebner's. Cupitt has also given importance to critical thinking as an essential aspect of spiritual embodiment. He uses the word "critical-spirituality" (Cupitt, 1984, p. 252) to describe this orientation. Such an orientation has the effect of undermining dominant

structures while at the same time opening the way for an alternative order. It is the dominant structures and practices within education that Huebner wishes to undermine. Huebner applies his "deconstructing while reconstructing" way of thinking in a systematic attack on the present mode of education. While being positioned critically to current practices the "blocks" to spiritual existence become visible. Huebner names the blocks, what he calls "the established pillars of education" (p. 32). At the same time he offers his alternative approach to education which holds spiritual existence as the focus.

Huebner's critical overview of current educational practices

For Huebner language is the telos. It is through language that we can enter into a spiritual world. Huebner begins with the significance of language in thinking critically about educational practices. In his article he states, "How can one talk about education...[and] also talk about spirituality" (p. 13). He sees the language of education and the language of spirituality to be at opposite poles; as education presently exists, the two languages are incongruent. From the perspective of his own spiritual project Huebner criticises the language that guides present educational decision-making. He states that the "language

orientation" of education as it presently exists is "strongly established, embodied in educational architecture, materials, methods, organizations, and teacher education" (p. 13). To talk about education, even critically, is limited because "our very locations and practices are framed by the language tools and images we would like to overcome" (p. 13). Huebner believes that the present practices of education are not only limited but also oppressive, and devaluing to human existence, because human existence is defined within narrow terms. "The journey of the self is short circuited or derailed," he says, "by those who define the ends of life and education in less than ultimate terms. We are always caught in our primate goals (our idols) or in the limitations imposed by others (our enslavements)" (p. 19). He goes on to state that knowledge is restricted by the ruling "principalities and powers" that bring us into their spheres of interest, where we serve their ends (p. 20). Huebner maintains that it is fundamental to an education based in spirituality to be critical of these dominant and oppressive practices. A critical language needs to be adopted and developed, Huebner believes, so that we "notice our traps, our limits, our idols, our slaveries" (p. 23).

Blocks to Spirituality

Huebner most emphatically reflects Sartre's thinking when he maintains that in order for the individual to move towards freedom one needs to note and address the blocks to freedom. Being in a mode of critical consciousness was for Sartre a way of naming the blocks to freedom and one's authentic being. Huebner, also, sees critical reflection as a way of naming the blocks to authentic being, but for Huebner it is important to hold the ability to see the blocks to one's spiritual growth and journeying. Looking more closely at the structures of present-day education, Huebner determines four main "pillars" (Huebner's word) supporting current educational practices. They are the goal of present education, the social/political structure of education, the content of education, and the methods of teaching. Huebner sees the need to undermine these four main pillars of education in order for education to change its present focus. The focus of education should be, he states, "a way of attending to and caring for a great journey--the journey of the self or soul" (p. 18). He critically addresses each of these pillars, revealing their oppressiveness to individual freedom and showing how they are blocks to spiritual journeying. As he does this he also gives another direction for education.

The present goal of education

Huebner states that those who guide educational practice and decision-making are themselves "in the grip of the language of psychology and behavioural sciences," and "a language of ends and objectives" (p. 17). Operating from a positivist orientation and a determinist perspective, those leading education perceive learning in very narrow terms which, Huebner says, hide the fact "that we dwell in a near infinite world, that our possibilities are always more than we realize, and that life is movement, change or journey" (p. 17). The intention of an education based in spirituality would be to embrace the world as a "vastness" and knowledge and knowing as infinite.

The social/political structure of education

Huebner contends that the present social/political structure of education blocks the development of an educational practice that focusses on the journey of the soul. He says, "[T]he journey and the corresponding commitment to God, is restrained, redirected, and derailed by the principalities and powers--the forces that no longer serve God but serve false gods and human beings" (p. 20). He states that the "principalities and powers bring us into their spheres of

interest, where we serve their ends, rather than the ultimate end" (p. 20).

The content of education

It is in the content of education that Huebner reflects the complement to Sartre's *Bad Faith* and that is in an imagined world of freedom and possibilities. Huebner states that, as content, other people are primary as they are sources of criticism and possibilities. Huebner believes the content of what is taught in schools should be about otherness. An education, meaning the content of curriculum, that focusses on spiritual journeying would be "always a consequence of encountering something that is strange and different, something that is not me" (p. 22).

Huebner states:

Others see the world differently, talk differently, act differently. Therefore they are possibilities for me...They point to a different future for me...By being different they bring my particular self under criticism...Other people call attention to a future that is not just a continuation of me, but a possible transformation for me. Through the presence of the "other" my participation in the transcendent becomes visible--the future is open if I will give up the self that is the current me and become other than I am (pp 23-24).

In addition, Huebner contends that "the 'other' as content provides an opportunity to listen and speak with a stranger" (p. 24). He expounds further on the importance of "the

other" to spiritual journeying, showing a certain multi-dimensionality to the evolving self on his or her spiritual journey:

Strangers become neighbours. I have others to listen me into consciousness of self and the world. I have from others the gift of other stories of the great journey... Through the caring act of listening and speaking, I have a chance to participate in the mystery of language. In listening and speaking the transcendent is present as newness comes forth, as forgiveness is given and received, and as the poetic shaping of the world happens (p. 24).

He talks of the value of others' creativity and actions in terms of bodies of knowledge, works of art, technologies, products, and human actions. He suggests posing questions as to the relevance of the creations of others in terms of our own meaning and value; questions such as: "What new possibilities does this offer me? How can my life be different because of it? What new paths, maps, scouts, and co-journeyers are available?" (p. 24).

Spirituality and teaching

Huebner sees that teaching has been restricted to skills and predefined actions. He maintains that teaching should instead be grounded in life, the life of the teacher and the life of the culture and community in which we teach. He states that "[t]he spiritual dimensions of teaching are recognized by acknowledging that teaching is a vocation"; a calling, an inward compulsion. "The teacher is called to a

particular way of living...[He or she is called by] the students, by the content and its communities, and by the institution within which the teacher lives...Each of these calls places demands or obligations on the one who would live the life of a teacher" (pp. 27-28). Huebner believes that this calling by individuals, communities, and institutions is answered by the teacher through a dedication to and love of students and knowing, through stewardship, and through doing the work of justice. "An education based in spirituality must be an affirmation of life," he states, "built on faith and hope and a belief in the possibility of there being a world filled with truth and beauty, joy and suffering, mystery and grace" (p. 28). The teacher mediates the environment for the student and does this in a way that guides the student toward a self-directed fullness of existence, meaning a life in spirituality and a life directed toward the Absolute Other. (It is here, in this aspect of Huebner's thinking about education and the position of teachers in education and spirituality, that I see a way of completing meaningful teaching, which I discuss further on.)

Further aspects to Huebner's educational practices

Huebner holds a very cynical view of evaluation practices

that are presently used in schools, stating that at present "[e]valuation is the act of those already in power to determine the effectiveness of their power" (p. 31). Another essential part in the deconstruction of education as a result of a critical position of present practices is a need for a reconstruction of practices of evaluation. Huebner states that a different approach to evaluation is needed (p. 29). Currently evaluation in education is designed by others, not by the ones being evaluated. Huebner points out that it is mainly the students and teachers who are evaluated by the other "because they are the weakest politically, and most at the mercy of the principalities and powers" (p. 30). An evaluation that reflects his orientation to spirituality would be an integral part of curriculum design. He suggests that curriculum should embrace a "dialectic of creation and criticism" (p. 31). Curriculum should be designed to keep spirituality alive, "filled with the possibilities of transcendence and the promise of life" (p. 31). In order for this to be achieved, Huebner believes, education would have to have as its focus human existence and other human beings. For Huebner evaluation in spirituality would emphasise self-reflection and critical thinking. Concurrently the path of learning would be seen as an evolving self-determined process.

As an additional outcome of a re-orientation to education

where an education in spirituality is the focus Huebner places on the concept of rebirth. Sartre determines that in order to undergo a conversion into one's freedom one must negate the past and free oneself from the past. This in turn is a way for grasping one's freedom and taking responsibility for one's own existence. To transcend one's past it is necessary to be free of one's past. Huebner interprets this Sartrean idea of negating one's past and starting again as a form of rebirth. According to Sartre, one must recognise that at every moment he is called upon to transcend his past and make himself anew through his future and the possibilities offered to him. This is similar to Huebner's thoughts on reincarnation when he says "[W]e are always open to a 'turning,' to forgiveness, redemption and the new being which results. The future is before us as open if we are willing to turn away from what we are and have, if we are willing to let the past in us (the self) die. Life is a journey of constantly encountering the moreness and constantly letting aspects of us die so that the new may be born within us" (p. 18). Huebner gives importance to the concept of the continuity of life and he does this through placing an emphasis on the deeply interconnected concepts of life, death, and reincarnation (p. 18). We move into the transcendent, he says, "by letting go of the personal past so that we become somehow different. The act of letting go signifies the necessity for a faith in the future." In this

sense life is an ever-renewing process.

Huebner's spirituality is a re-orientation to the world that calls for an on-going critical dialogue, engaged imagination, and active human expression that is directed towards the Absolute Other. It is a mode of being that seeks to deconstruct present taken-for-granted structures that determine individual existence while at the same time striving to nurture and sustain a spiritual life. Underlying Huebner's outline for education in spirituality, whereby present-day education is deconstructed and redirected toward one that is based in spirituality, is Sartre's dualist orientation. But Huebner takes Sartre's thinking beyond a focus on the individual to a reorientation for all of society and he does this through his project for education. It is through the present structure of education that Huebner extends Sartre's thinking beyond an emphasis on the self to one that is intends to change society as a whole.

A Hermeneutic Turn

It should be pointed out that Huebner is not unique in his approach to spirituality and his existentialist orientation to spirituality. Aspects of existentialist thinking lend themselves to spiritual and religious thought (Friedman, pp.

239-362). Huebner's orientation to spirituality has strong connections with others who have explored spirituality through existentialist thought, such as Donald Cupitt, Paul Tillich, Nicholas Berdyaev, and Martin Buber. Although these theologians exhibit significant similarities in each of their existentialist positions there are also sometimes subtle, even contradicting differences in their understandings of what spirituality means. Huebner's spirituality, although similar to those mentioned above, is unique. The main difference in Huebner's thinking is the emphasis that Huebner places on education and the way education parallels spiritual existence.

Huebner's mode of education has much appeal to those in education who find themselves overburdened with conflict and confusion. It offers clarity and direction to a profession that is fractured, and demoralising and disempowering to those who are engaged in the application of education, mainly to teachers. (I am thinking mainly of the position of elementary teachers today both in North America and in England.) Huebner's mode of education seems to offer a way of being, a direction for teaching that promises to be individually satisfying while at the same time paving the way for a universal direction realised in a higher order of existence. It is open to, indeed, welcomes the other: people, things, as well as ideas. It addresses the

criticisms of teaching as a demoralising profession, and of teachers having a lack of a sense of connectedness to their profession. Huebner's educational project is one of liberation, personal empowerment, and a deep engagement in educational life. It is intended to free individuals, students and teachers, from limitations imposed upon their understanding and knowing. It is intended to overthrow what Huebner sees as the oppressiveness of current education and its practices of enslavement of individuals to serve others who are in positions of power, to an education that is empowering to all individuals, where everyone plays a part.

While Huebner's project of education for spirituality holds great appeal, I have to question its practicability.

Although Huebner does speak about the entrenched thinking regarding present practices (further entrenched through language) which would make a move to spirituality difficult, I think a spiritual education is more difficult to realise, at least on any grand scale, than Huebner acknowledges.

Mainly the difficulties, as I see them, rest with the term spirituality and not solely in the language of education, which is where Huebner directs his criticisms. Huebner's project requires the conscious thought of individuals and society collectively to accept Huebner's understanding of spirituality before it can begin to effect social action. There exists today a multitude of understandings of

spirituality. The meaning of spirituality in many established and active religious orthodoxies is quite different from Huebner's understanding of spirituality. To expect various religious groups to endorse an understanding of spirituality which differs substantially from their own creeds and dogmas is not, I think, realistic. In addition, within Western culture there has been a significant and growing loss of faith and commitment to established and traditional religions. To overcome the negativity that currently exists towards Christianity (and therefore spirituality) and to have individuals return to another form of spirituality would be difficult in the present growing anti-religious, mainly anti-Christian, climate. Although conceptually Huebner's project has much merit, the divergences of thought about what spirituality means and, in some cases, hostile understanding of spirituality lead me to believe that it is very unlikely that Huebner's spirituality in education would start to take hold in the minds of a significant number of individuals where it needs to be initiated to be effective in changing society's present orientation.

Dwayne Huebner and Maxine Greene

Maxine Greene's project of education for freedom and Dwayne

Huebner's spiritual education have significant areas of thought in common: the aim of each of their projects is to awaken an engaged sense of consciousness. Both Huebner and Greene desire to undermine some form of cultural dominance. For Greene this dominance is the uncritical, unreflective way of being that she sees as presently existing in society as a whole and what she describes as people living under the guise of *negative freedom*. For Huebner the dominant determining forces are the ruling principalities and powers that society has come to take for granted. Both Greene and Huebner call on somewhat subversive means in order to accomplish an undermining of the dominant. They both suggest critical and reflective dialogue. Both Greene and Huebner recognise the power and ability found in human agency, that of individual initiative and engaged imagination and creativity, to bring about change and to affect the direction of one's life, moving one away from the oppressiveness of others, from being manipulated and controlled by others. For both Greene and Huebner consciousness is constituted in an individual's ability to think critically, to reason, to communicate with others, and to imagine. Both see the necessity of a critical orientation in order to see the blocks and walls that impede individual freedom and possibilities. Greene, however, places an emphasis on fostering an informed as well as critical mind, which is intended to result in an informed and aware

individual. Huebner's emphasis is on imagination as a necessary tool for a reorientation to education and to life. Huebner maintains that it is necessary to imagine oneself in a spiritual world in order to move into and exist in that world. Greene sees her education in freedom as an education which ensures that individuals become meaningful contributors to the public sphere and therefore play an active part in the construct of society. Huebner's form of authentic existence differs from this. For Huebner it is an education in aspects of spiritual life that is essential in order to ensure individual freedom. Greene is more didactic than Huebner as she demands an aggressive approach to overcome the blocks to freedom. Huebner, on the other hand, writes as someone on the inside, a kind of spiritual being rather than a forceful advocate. What is important to this dissertation is that Huebner's project of an education in spirituality has something Greene's approach to freedom seems to lack, that being an overarching mode of existence, a "something" above. For Huebner that overarching aspect is the symbol of God, the Absolute Other. This gives a universal aspect to authentic existence.

Completing authentic teaching

In the above critical discourse on Huebner's thinking reasons were given as to why Huebner's project may not be realisable in a significant way in educational practice. However, Huebner's thinking does offer a way for teachers to complete authenticity in teaching. He does this mainly through the notion of an imagined concept of universal goodness and absolute knowledge. This is where authenticity can be completed. In order to combat the demoralising aspect of overwhelming outside negative influences, the teacher can maintain a sense of direction and self-empowerment by remaining committed to an image of universal goodness and absolute knowledge. Through an openness of being more or other than one is presently, an individual, a teacher, in authentic practice, directs his or her actions and thoughts to this higher order of existence. Through aspects of engaged consciousness, that of critical dialogue, imagination, reflection and envisioning an image of universal goodness and connectedness the teacher moves the self and others towards a better, fuller, and more engaged being. Mainly this is done through language, the language of spirituality. The teacher is as mediator in this vision of the world. One's position as teacher, one's relation to one's students, to other teachers, to parents, is framed in a positive mode as one mediates the encounters of one's life

in education toward some form of goodness and possibilities for the other. As well, the teacher looks for opportunities for growth for the self as teacher. It is in this way that Huebner offers a way to complete authenticity in teaching. How Huebner's theory of education completes teaching is detailed in the following concluding chapter, as is the way Huebner connects with the ideas of the other educationalists in this inquiry in defining meaningfulness in teaching.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

A Synopsis of Theories of Authentic and Meaningful Teaching

In the preceding chapters I have explicated and given critical discussion of the theories of six contemporary educationalists each of whom has developed an existentialist approach to teaching. In the explication of each of their theories I have concentrated on the themes of authenticity and aspects of inwardness, and how these themes relate to the practice of teaching and to being a teacher. The meaning of authenticity was derived from existentialist philosophies, specifically the writings of Soren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, and Jean Paul Sartre. It was shown how the theories of educationalists William Pinar, Mary Warnock, Nel Noddings, Max van Manen, Maxine Greene, and Dwayne Huebner built on this existentialist definition of authenticity in formulating their theories of education and how these theorists, in their proposed educational

projects, also challenged and expanded on that definition. Through critical discourse both the value and the shortcomings of the theories of these educationalists and their definitions of meaningful forms of education and teaching were discussed. This conclusion is a kind of synthesis of their ideas. It is also here that I offer another approach to meaningful teaching. Similar to the projects of the theorists we have been studying, it is an approach that is intended to give shape and direction to teaching in everyday practice. It is intended for those teachers who have acknowledged the complexity and morass of the structure within which they teach and who feel lost and confused in their profession. As well as providing a basis for practice I offer here a way for teachers to position themselves in teaching and education. It is a kind of way to be in teaching constructed from the varying forms of authentic practices we have been discussing. Mainly, it calls for an elevated way of thinking about teaching and for an expansion of one's understanding of education and teaching. It is a stratified form that is a simplification and amalgamation of the ideas presented by the educationalists we have been exploring. What is presented in the following is an outline of an alternative perspective to being a teacher. It is the basis for further discussion of authentic teaching and is intended to be filled out through practice and reflection. The approach that I offer has three

main steps.

Steps to heightened pedagogical awareness and the narrative to authentic existence

In the interviews I held with the teachers in Coventry on the changes in their teaching of the National Curriculum mentioned in the "Introduction," it was pointed out that elements of their conversations revealed that teachers allow others to define what being a teacher means. Teachers do this either through acceptance of predesigned methods of teaching and content of what is taught, or by seeing teaching by its nature to be that which is defined by others. In existentialist terms this way of looking at teaching places teaching in a state of *fallenness* (Kierkegaard's term). In a state of *fallenness* one has not begun to move towards one's possibilities; one has not begun to define oneself as teacher. Existentialist philosophy offers a way to move towards personal fulfilment and meaningful teaching through a definition of authenticity.

In Chapter One I argued that the theories of authenticity given by Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre follow a common narrative. These modes of authentic being aim to give definition and direction to one's existence as they call for

a transformation of being. First one must come to desire to see the world differently. Once one chooses to reconstruct one's world view one also takes responsibility for one's existence. At this juncture in one's life story the individual must commit to defining, creating, and expressing a sense of one's own uniqueness. This is done through a heightened sense of awareness of oneself and one's place in the world and through the conscious mind of the individual mediating between the self and the outside world. Existence in all three narratives of authenticity, those of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre, calls for an intense engagement of certain aspects of conscious thought. Mainly it is the human abilities to reflect, to inquire, to imagine, and to reason which are used to understand, interpret, direct, and shape one's existence, one's relation with the self and the world. Authentic existence in existentialist philosophies is a call to awaken to the power of one's thinking, to define one's view of the world, and to remain committed to an awakened state of consciousness and a higher sense of being. The stratified form for authentic teaching that I present follows a similar narrative.

In the explication and inquiry into the varying theories of contemporary education we saw that the theoretical foundation behind each of the projects we explored varied and each of the educationalists provided varying reasons for

why teachers might desire to come to an alternative form of practice. Pinar sees present practices of education and teaching as mainly dehumanising and alienating. He proposes a way of viewing teaching that is aimed at evoking in the individual a form of teaching that is intended to be personally satisfying and fulfilling. In order for authentic practice to take place, according to Pinar, one's conscious thoughts need to be focussed on the self as an individual and on the engagement of aspects of one's thinking. It is how one chooses to define his or her world view that leads to authentic practice. In Pinar's thinking the teacher sees himself or herself as being in the position of mediating between one's inner existence and the outside world of teaching and education while shaping and directing a sense of self.

Nel Noddings, in her feminist ethic of caring, argues against what she sees as a masculine ethic presently dominating the construction and implementation of education. The focus of her thinking is on the intimate relational experiences of human encounter and response. For Noddings it is the caring frame of mind expressed in the mother-child relation that grounds an orientation for thinking about education and determines teaching practices.

Maxine Greene looks at education in broader terms than the

individual and the teacher-student relation. She holds that at present the dominant thinking and actions of individuals, both teachers and students, and of education as a whole lack an awareness and attention to the dynamics of existence and conscious thought, and calls for an orientation to teaching and education that focusses on the metaphysical aspects of freedom and possibilities to be embodied in society through individuals becoming social activists. She sees education as a way of awakening the mind of the individual into conscious awareness, so that he or she becomes a thoughtful, informed, and active participant in the structuring of the society in which he or she lives.

Dwayne Huebner, who bases his thinking on spirituality, is also critical of the dominant forms of education, seeing present systems of education as mainly serving the egos and desires of those in positions of power and authority. He desires a form of education that directly aims to undermine this oppressive structure of education while at the same time reorienting the focus of education and teaching to that of a spiritual journey, where the end of the journey is fulfilment of life through connectedness to the Absolute Other.

The first step

What becomes apparent in these varying forms of authentic teaching and education is that no matter whether one comes from an acknowledgement of disaffectedness in teaching, or from feelings of isolation, or from an awareness of the structure of education as serving others' egos, needs, and desires, or whether one feels a loss of autonomy, or a lack of or a loss of meaning and direction in one's teaching, in order to determine a life in teaching which is meaningful, self-fulfilling, and satisfying one first needs to acknowledge that something is missing in one's present practices. Essential to the different ideologies we discussed is the aspect of being open to realising one's desire for a personally satisfying and meaningful practice of teaching. What is necessary here, in this first step to authentic practice, is the conscious decision to change one's thinking about teaching and to be open and ready to change. In order to move to authentic practice in teaching and education one must start with a particular frame of mind. It is a frame of mind that reflects an essential aspect of Husserl's phenomenological thinking, *epoche* (found in *Cartesian Meditations*, 1960), where one suspends judgement of how things are. In the realm of teaching and education, in order to move to authentic practice, one must give up one's formerly held understanding of the importance

and value of teaching. This is what the theorists we have explored hold in common. The first step in moving towards authentic practice is to acknowledge that authenticity begins with a conscious decision to see teaching differently and to set aside all other understandings of teaching.

But the call to authentic teaching can start even further back than what the theorists we have studied have stated. It really starts with what Heidegger calls "a thrownness." When one first becomes a teacher the individual is "thrown" into the world of teaching as it presently exists. The field of education into which a teacher is "thrown" is full of complexity, confusion, and general "muddledness." This is where teaching begins, and where the beginning of becoming an authentic teacher can be seen to begin.

The second step

Common to each of the projects of the theorists we studied is what I see as the second step in moving toward self-fulfilment in teaching. This step calls for a deep engagement in and commitment to one's pedagogical practice. In order to do this one needs to be purposefully directed towards a higher level of existence in education. What one needs always to keep in mind is that one's orientation is directed through an attitude of journeying, of moving

towards another level or plane of thought. What this involves is an ongoing commitment to refining and improving one's teaching. It is a journey that is self-directed and self-determined. For each of the six theorists in this study the commitment to self-directedness with a vision of some higher state of being is essential to the realisation of each of their projects. In Pinar's project self-actualisation is a commitment to move towards an image of an ideal self in the future. For Noddings the image of an ideal self in the future also forms the basis of her project. One holds this image of the "best self" up as a spectre and remains committed to that image through one's actions and language. It is an image that one holds not only for oneself as teacher but also for one's students. In the thinking of Max van Manen and his pedagogy of tact the ideal state that one needs to reach is a kind of deeply informed sense of knowing where one's thinking is conditioned to be in a state of readiness to act effectively in the pedagogical moment. Maxine Greene and Mary Warnock also desire the individual to develop a kind of informed knowing. Both of their theories give attention to the content of education and the need to bring society as a whole into a higher level of existence. Huebner's authentic existence is realised through a form of education that focusses on aspects of the spiritual life of the individual and on individual self-fulfilment in the image of the Absolute Other. The higher level of existence

to which Huebner wishes the individual to be committed and to move towards is that of the Absolute Other. Each of these projects holds some vision of teaching or teachers in the future. It is a vision to which one must commit and which one must hold firmly in one's mind at all times. The vision is then reflected in one's thoughts and actions. While journeying to a higher level of existence the authentic teacher is always working to be the best teacher one can be, however one might define "best."

The third step

After taking the first step of freeing one's thoughts so that one is open to seeing education and teaching as something more or other than that into which one is thrown, and the second step of committing to being the best one can be as teacher, then one advances to what I see as the third step to authentic practice. Here we enter a complex area of thought. Each of the theories we have studied has contributed to the composition of this aspect of authentic teaching. It is in this area of thought that substance is given to one's thinking in practice while in a mode of self-directedness. This is where autonomy is realised, and one's desire and commitment to change and grow as a teacher are fulfilled. This area of thinking about teaching is best defined as having three interconnected layers. Underlying

each of these three layers is the existential notion of freedom, where freedom is connected to such interrelated themes as personal autonomy, independence, and an allowance for growth. Along with this form of freedom is a conscious acknowledgement of personal and social responsibility for the human condition. To enter into this third phase of authentic teaching requires an engagement of the dynamic aspects of conscious thinking, reflection, and imagination.

The first layer of engaged consciousness is focussed on the inner self as teacher. The second layer is concentrated on the connectedness of the individual (the teacher) to the immediate other in teaching, the student. The third layer of thought focusses on the preservation of some form of societal and universal existence. These three aspects are interconnected, but they are not to be seen as consecutive stages that one passes through in order to realise authenticity, as is the case in Kierkegaard's thinking and his stages to selfhood. Rather they each need to be attended to at the same time and on an ongoing basis. What is really necessary here is a splitting of one's thinking where as an authentic teacher one considers the self, the other, and society in one's actions and thoughts, simultaneously. Collectively the six theorists convey a concern for teaching and education that reflects each of these three layers of thought. But what has been revealed in the exploration of

their projects in the preceding chapters is the question of which is more important: the individual, society, or universal existence. For Huebner and Warnock the universal and eternal are primary. For Greene, it is society that is given importance; for van Manen and Noddings the immediate other, the student, is reified, and for Pinar it is the individual. In the critical analysis of each of these theories none of the theories gives value and importance to all three aspects of human existence. In the critical analysis of their ideologies this is often cited as a shortcoming of their projects. My proposed approach to thinking about teaching and authentic life in teaching addresses this shortcoming. It calls for a particular orientation of the teacher in its realisation. It is an approach which I call "the multifaceted Janus face of authenticity." The *Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English* (p. 727) defines Janus as "the guardian god of doors and beginnings." The Janus face is a moral face of concern and care. It is one that holds vigilance over the human condition and one that not only looks backwards and forwards but also looks in many directions at once. The approach that I suggest calls for teachers to frame their teaching in this way in order to become authentic in their teaching.

The first layer of authentic teaching: knowing the self

We will begin with the first layer of thought, that of the self, and how this initial way of thinking about teaching and being a teacher can be constructed. For this defining of the self I turn to the thinking of William Pinar and his currere method. The most important aspect of Pinar's thinking is that he underlines the existence of a separate aspect of the self, a self that exists outside of the concreteness of time and space, where one reflects on one's position in the world. It is a kind of inner self that is affected and constituted by reflection. It is a self that knows about one's being and that values the individual's capacity to imagine, to reflect, to form intentions, and to act on those intentions. Pinar presents the idea that through engaging these aspects of conscious thought one can free oneself from being defined by others (administrators, teachers, parents, government inspectors, students). It has the existentialist attribute of being able to name an inner self and of taking responsibility for one's existence while attempting to remain above the *Crowd Man* (Kierkegaard) or a self defined by others. In order to achieve this understanding of an inner self, Pinar suggests four steps. He calls the four steps: *the regressive step, the progressive, the analytical, and the synthesis*. Through this method the teacher attempts to grasp an understanding of

one's past which is then applied to realising a vision of one's "ideal self" as teacher in the future. These two aspects of the self, a self in the past and a self in the future, are brought together through reflection and are synthesised in one's actions in the present. Pinar's method gives to the self a sense of autonomy and wholeness, where the past, present, and future are brought together through the self's inner voice and through reflective dialogue. As one reflects and acts on a vision of a self in the future, the self mediates between the individual and the world. What is important in Pinar's project is that in order to move toward authentic existence one needs, at various times in one's life, to focus on engaging the dynamics of thought, that is, reflection, imagination, and inner dialogue, and come to an understanding of an inner self and to giving substantial consideration to how that inner self plays a part in defining the self as teacher.

With his project Pinar offers teachers a way of directing and shaping their own destiny while at the same time acting in an existential awareness of self. However, in my criticism of Pinar's method I mentioned that reflecting on the self solely through the eyes of the self gives only a limited understanding of the self and how one exists. I suggested that being viewed through the eyes of others as teacher could offer a more expanded understanding of the

self. In an expanded understanding of the self as teacher, a teacher could ask for critical comments from students on his or her teaching, and could ask a fellow teacher, a kind of "critical friend," to give an evaluation of his or her teaching practices. Pinar believes that intentionally thinking about the self in existence, the inner dialogue that one holds, needs to be manifest in writing and suggests various forms of writing in this enterprise such as reflective, critical, analytical, and a form of stream of conscious articulation. These forms of language also exist in the visual arts. Virginia Woolf knew this. She knew of the close relation between the visual arts and literary writing through her sister, Vanessa, and her involvement with the artist and art critic Roger Frye, as well as other members of the Bloomsbury Group. In *To the Lighthouse*, Lily Briscoe is painting an impression of Mrs. Ramsey. Lily's reflective, critical, and analytical thoughts are interwoven with the way she applies paint to the canvas. In this section Woolf shows that the acts of writing and of painting can blend in articulation. A kind of stream of consciousness portrait painting, either done by the self or by an artist, is also a way of exploring the self. Another resource for further discovering of the inner self is to talk to an objective but sympathetic friend or other professional person or simply record one's thoughts and play it back. All of these suggestions are intended to have the effect of

distancing the self, of standing back, in order to pull out an inner self. These are all ways of opening up and broadening an understanding of the inner aspects of being. What is important to realise here is the acknowledgement of the existence of an inner self and of coming to a deep understanding of that inner self. This is essential to realising authentic being.

The second layer of authentic teaching: knowing the "other"

A further criticism that I gave to Pinar's project is that he overlooks an essential part of teaching; that is, one's relationship with the immediate other, the student. To address the second shortcoming of Pinar's method we look to the thinking of Nel Noddings and Max van Manen who each have formulated theoretical projects that move beyond the focus of Pinar's thinking on the self. Here we enter the second layer of engaged consciousness. Both Noddings and van Manen call for an expanded vision which includes the immediate "other," in teaching, the student or child who is before us. Noddings's thinking is formulated on an ethic of caring. Her concern is for the future of the child, the student, and in bringing that child to grasp a vision of his or her ideal self in the future. Van Manen also expresses concern for the child before us and for those for whom we have responsibility as parents and as teachers. But his focus is

for the life of the student/child in general. Van Manen's project is concerned with what it means to be a parent or a teacher. Through engaging aspects of conscious thinking van Manen shows that one can bring self-awareness into the practice of teaching where one acts in the best way possible when the pedagogical moment presents itself. For both Noddings and van Manen the teacher or the parent must know himself or herself. This sense of personal selfhood must be realised and acknowledged. But one must also try to know the inner life of the immediate other, the child/student. For Noddings one must know the child, the student, deeply in order to direct that child towards a realisable and attainable goal, an image of an ideal self. For van Manen, one must know the inner child in order to act in the best way possible in the pedagogical moment. Both Noddings and van Manen hold that an essential step to authentic teaching is to be open and welcoming to the other, the student, the child. It is a state of mind that begins in the physical. Through a smile, a look, a gesture, the child is brought into the inner world of the teacher. With the child securely in one's immediate vision the teacher, the parent, then moves toward the inner life of the child. This is done through a kind of intentional splitting of one's thoughts between the self and the other. This sense of splitting of thinking differs slightly between Noddings and van Manen. For Noddings one thinks about oneself and has some image of

the self in the future towards which one works. But through engaged imagination and through a kind of sympathy one also places oneself in the mind of the student/child and tries to see the world through his or her eyes. Noddings suggests that thinking about the self and about the other is achieved through a kind of back and forth movement. There is a time to be fully with the other and see the world through the other's eyes, but there is also a time to pull back and turn to one's sense of self as teacher and consider the relational experience and what best to do to guide and direct the student. For van Manen the splitting is more continuous and engaged than in Noddings's approach. The teacher/parent must always be in a state of readiness, a kind of intensely conditioned pedagogical state of mind, so that one will act in the fullness of the pedagogical moment. What is common to both Noddings and van Manen and their approach to the child/student, is that the teacher mediates between inner and outer worlds, between the world of the self and the world of the child. Whether holding up the image of an ideal self or acting in the fullness of the teachable moment the authentic teacher is always engaged in reflection and always ready to ask himself or herself: "Will this action bring the child closer to developing an understanding of his or her inner self and his or her responsibilities as a maturing person in the world?" So the second layer of thought in the approach to authentic

teaching that I offer here is that along with formulating an understanding of an inner self, one moves beyond the self into the world view of the other, the student. This is done through transcendence, through experiencing the world from the other's point of view. This splitting of one's thinking between the self and the other reflects a notion of self that is fluid, a self that exists between one and the other and moves from past to present and between present and future. The complexity and dynamics of holding a position of intimacy with the other, with one's students, is detailed in the chapter on Noddings and van Manen. One needs to take time to rest in one's own inner thoughts and seek to maintain a healthy inner sense of self and at the same time is ready and willing to move into the inner world of the other, the student.

The third layer of authentic teaching: positioning the self to society

Another criticism that I gave to Pinar's thinking was that a theory which does not address the fact that one cannot control one's future is inadequate. The future is conditioned by many forces beyond the control of the individual. Therefore, to operate with a vision of an ideal self in the future has the possible consequence of one becoming "morally bankrupt" (Kierkegaard's term). Van Manen

and Noddings expand the narrative of authenticity given by Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre, moving it beyond a focus on the self to that of embracing "the other" either through tact (van Manen) or through engrossment (Noddings). But as in Pinar's thinking, Noddings's and van Manen's projects are limited forms of authentic practice. In my criticism of their thinking I pointed out that theories that focus only on the immediate other and the relational experience one has with the immediate other are only isolated enclaves of authentic existence and authentic practice. They have little impact on society as a whole and are vulnerable to being short-circuited by the "principalities and powers" of negative outside forces. To address the shortcomings of the thinking of Pinar, Noddings, and van Manen, I find answers in the thinking of Maxine Greene, Mary Warnock, and Dwayne Huebner. Their theories of education and teaching, although possibly idealistic, offer a way to position thoughts of teaching and education where the notion of authentic teacher moves beyond a focus on the individual to one that is concerned with society's responsibility in relation to authentic existence. It is with the thinking of Warnock and Greene that we enter the third layer of expanded consciousness. The basis on which Warnock and Greene formulate their theories of what education should be is not on the teacher as such as it was with Pinar, Noddings, and van Manen. But rather, Greene and Warnock are both concerned

with epistemology and the content of the curriculum, what one teaches. For Greene, the content of what is to be studied in schools, of what counts as valuable knowledge, and what connects authentic existence to education, should be those things that are related to realising one's freedom, one's possibilities. Education not only needs to focus on informing minds, according to Greene, but it also needs to be about awakening one to aspects of conscious thought and how conscious thoughts affect existence. Through engaging aspects of human thinking processes, it is Greene's belief, individuals will not only become awakened to their own possibilities and freedom but will also become effective and contributing members in the shaping and construction of society. She believes that the content of education should focus on fostering aspects of conscious thought, that of self-reflection, of engaged imagination, of critical discourse, of attentive and thoughtful response, and of moving into the world-view of others. In this way knowledge for Greene is mainly that which leads individuals to become valuable contributors to the organisation of a moral and just society. In order to ensure that education is about doing what is best for human existence, Greene believes education needs to focus on getting close to the lived experience of others, mainly the lived experiences of past events. She suggests this could be done through reading diaries and narratives of the individuals who lived during

previous times and experiences of conflict. Greene also sees a need for multiple perspectives on what happened in the past, so as to bring out voices previously silenced, lost, or forgotten which hold other perspectives of the world and other forms of reality. In such a study of history, students would be encouraged to reflect on and talk about what happened and make connections with other events in the present as well as the past. The students would then have an informed range of viewpoints from which to challenge the taken-for-granted interpretation of history as well as ways to broaden their understanding of human interactions that shape histories over time. This knowledge, Greene contends, would provide individuals with a broader sense of one's place in the world and better equip individuals to hold a meaningful role in public discourses. Maxine Greene brings together a self that looks objectively at its own history and future and a self that seeks to position itself to the outside world in constituting its freedom, where freedom is a conscious awareness of the self emerging in dialogue, the language of the relational, of the self to the world. She sees the dialectic nature of the connectedness held between persons as a way of mediating and at the same time affecting how the world is constructed. In Greene's thinking the individual is oriented to the world in such a way that the self is seen as continuously being reconstituted through thought, reflection, action, and choosing. I maintain that

the value of Greene's thinking is found in the dialectical aspects of teaching that she named. Through focussing on the dialectal and the relational aspects of a self in a world inhabited by others teaching can preserve its meaningfulness as it filters through educational systems into societal behaviours and attitudes.

In Mary Warnock's educational project the main aspects of what counts as meaningful curriculum content are similar to those of Maxine Greene. She also focusses on fostering an awakening and engaging aspects of conscious thought: imagination, reflection, critical response, and transcendence. However, the intent of her educational project is different. Mainly Warnock sees education as a way of addressing the effect that human consciousness now holds in determining the future of the individual and the future of human existence in general. Warnock desires a form of education that puts the responsibility of the future of human existence in the hands of the individual. She wishes to effect a form of education that would bring about an awareness of this responsibility. Warnock, like Greene, gives value to studies of history. Histories, Warnock contends, are concerned with actions, and actions are the outcome of human thought and intentions. She sees that those past lived experiences which effected change and brought us to where we are today need to be known. History, she

maintains, should be the study of the past lived experiences of individuals. In Warnock's form of education historical events should be discussed in a forum of open dialogue in terms of their moral and ethical consequences. It is through this articulated valuing exchange with others that individuals will come to see their influence and effect. Warnock extends her approach to history to other subjects that have traditionally made up curricula. She believes that education needs to present a historical understanding of areas of study such as science, mathematics, literature, music, the visual arts, and even history itself. She also gives value to personal histories in her desired content for education. Warnock relates personal histories to storytelling. She contends that the child should learn to tell himself the story of his (Warnock's usage) own life in order to give his life a self-determined shape. Like Greene, Warnock offers ways to preserve authenticity in teaching by suggesting things teachers can do in their teaching which affect the consciousness of one's students, who will become the individuals who make up society. They suggest ways that teachers through their practice can bring individuals into a kind of existential awakening and concern for society as a whole.

Literary writing is also valued in the curriculum forms desired by both Greene and Warnock. For Greene literary

writing provides material for further reflective and critical dialogue as well as offering other points of view on lived events. Studies in social histories and studies in forms of *imaginative writing* (literary texts) are, for Warnock, the sources necessary for dialogue on universal values. We must search for stories that we hold in common with other cultures, explore those stories for their value and how they might lead to common values that can unite society and give value to, while at the same time preserving, our future existence. Important to the thinking of both Greene and Warnock is a desire to move society as a whole to a higher sense of existence and to bring to conscious awareness the role that individuals play in this move. They both see this project realised through a form of curriculum that challenges taken-for-granted understandings of history and the past and the way that we have traditionally valued the past, and through giving importance to fostering articulate individuals skilled in critical and analytical thought.

I criticised Greene and Warnock in their proposed projects of meaningful teaching and forms of education for not addressing the obvious shortcomings of their projects. Greene and Warnock do not address how one is to overcome the enormous blocks that prevent a society as a whole from moving to authentic existence. Education in the European and

Anglo-American worlds at present is deeply systematised and entrenched, mainly through tradition, and most forms of education are government-led and determined. Although the degree of government influence varies in different countries, states, and provinces, what passes for content in schools is affected more by people in positions of power and influence than by educational theorists. The content of curricula is focussed more on financial and economic concerns than on concern for the human condition. The alternative forms of education offered by Greene and Warnock have little potential to be realised in practice in any kind of fullness. Only a few alternative forms of education have been able to succeed outside the mainstream. Those developed by Maria Montessori and Rudolf Steiner are two that come to mind. But even these forms of education are very marginalised and the original theories behind these approaches to teaching and education have been compromised over time because of external pressures and the desire to remain in existence in some form. Neither Warnock nor Greene gives significant attention to how their forms of education could move education in the direction that is necessary for the realisation of authentic existence in the consciousness of society. Instead their projects place the teacher and authentic education as existing outside mainstream practices. I also criticised their theories for not offering an overarching direction that would more clearly direct

teachers in their practice. This is not to say that teachers should not persist in developing a societal consciousness in the ways Warnock and Greene suggest. Even within the strictures of education today teachers are in a position to broaden authentic practice to effect social consciousness. Teachers can find ways in mainstream schooling and teaching to effect conscious responsibility. They can find time in the daily timetable to cultivate critical debate, and articulation and listening skills in their students. In order to further authentic existence teachers need to see and act on opportunities to explore personal and social histories, offer varying perspectives on social history, and encourage critical debate on issues of moral and ethical concern within the curriculum as it is given and by making time outside of the given curricula.

The final stage to authentic teaching

In the above we have looked at the value and way for authentic practice in terms of the self, in terms of the immediate other of the student, and in terms of society as a whole. It was shown why and how each of these aspects to teaching and education can be brought into everyday practice. Developing a sense of a self was the focus of Pinar's thinking. Based in Pinar's currere I offered a practical way to construct a sense of self as teacher.

Noddings and van Manen detailed how the concept of authentic teacher could be furthered through the focus that each gives to "the other" in teaching, the student, and the teacher-student relational. I have shown that authenticity and inwardness can be developed and fostered beyond a concentration on the self and the other to a practice of society with the thinking of Mary Warnock and Maxine Greene. But I criticised Warnock's and Greene's thinking for not moving beyond groups of individuals taking on the role of determining future existence and for not providing a way to position oneself comfortably to mainstream and dominant practice. To address these shortcomings in their thinking I look to Dwayne Huebner. Huebner presents a way to remain authentic while teaching in mainstream systems of education and he offers an overarching form to teaching. Also, Huebner offers a way to complete meaningfulness in teaching. Huebner's project of authentic practice is mainly constructed around three interrelated aspects of thinking: the individual needs to work subversively in undermining present practices; the individual needs to focus on a higher world of existence; the individual needs to work in faith and hope. Huebner's concern is for the future of the universe as well as the future of the individual. He believes that at present we are existentially enslaved by "principalities and powers" which prevent us from realising a life in goodness. In order to move out of oppressiveness

and a degraded level of existence, Huebner maintains, we need to move towards an imagined spiritual world, a world of absolute good, wholeness, and completeness, and absolute knowledge and knowing. This is an image of existence that is above the image one has for oneself in the future as an ideal self. It is also above the image that a teacher has for "the other," the student. This is where the highest level of existence can be found. It is the realm of ultimate truth. In Huebner's thinking the individual, the teacher, needs to have faith in one's good intentions and in the way one mediates the world of the other through good intentions. The other theorists we studied placed an emphasis on the past, on personal and social histories, but in Huebner's thinking our histories are something we acknowledge but don't embody. The past is something we need to let go of so that we can become somehow different. For Huebner life is a journey of constantly encountering what he calls "the moreness" of existence and constantly letting aspects of us die so that the self may be born within us. In this way Huebner places an emphasis on the eternal and attends to the wholeness of life. He perceives life as an ever-renewing process. What Huebner offers mainly is an overarching image, a universal vision which can direct our actions and thoughts as teachers. This is an awareness of a higher sense of being that is connected to the inner self. One sees oneself as mediating between the outer world and one's connectedness

with the Absolute Other, a kind of holy goodness and absolute knowledge. Teachers need to consciously direct their everyday actions toward the image of the Absolute Other in order to stay beyond and above the "principalities and powers" of a secular world view that constantly threaten to suppress authentic existence. By offering an overarching orientation to existence Huebner brings together the valued thoughts of each of the theories of the educationalists we have been exploring in terms of meaningful teaching.

In the above I have attempted to sketch out an approach whereby teachers can reflect on their teaching while shaping and directing their profession into meaningful practice. I have suggested that there are four steps to securing authenticity in teaching. First one needs to step out of one's present perceptions and the definition of teaching into which one has been thrown, and pass one's gaze over the field of teaching and education in an objective frame of mind. Next, one must commit to directing one's thoughts and actions to a fuller sense of teaching and a higher level of existence. One then moves into constituting what that fuller sense of self might be. I suggested that at this point in becoming an authentic teacher three aspects of thinking about existence and one's place in the world need to be cultivated. One must split one's conscious thinking

processes into three areas. There is an awakening and shaping of an inner sense of self through the interwoven aspects of reflection, dialogue, imagination, and vision. There is a shaping and directing of oneself with the immediate other in pedagogical situations bringing the other, the student, and the self into a fuller sense of being. Imagination, transcendence, and critical reflective dialogue are essential here. The third aspect is to consider the "other" in broader terms where the "other" also becomes a societal other. This third aspect requires acting to alter the content of education so that engaged imagination, dialogue, and critical reflection become part of the curriculum. All three layers of consciousness of human existence need to be attended to and balanced in authentic pedagogical practice. These are the kind of questions one needs to ask oneself in order to maintain authenticity: "Does this situation call for an action that will bring the child into independence and maturity?" "Is there a balance between self and others?" "Am I in touch with my inner self?" "How will this action affect society as a whole?" The self as teacher, the world of the immediate other, and the future well-being of society as a whole, all need to be considered in order for authentic teaching to be realised. One's actions throughout the teaching day should reflect these inner concerns. There is a need to find spaces and places in the teaching day, in the curriculum, to reinforce

and to support one's journey to heightened pedagogical awareness. There is also a need to step outside the pedagogical experience and allow for insights and reflection through periods of isolation and meditation. But mainly the authentic teacher needs to believe in one's own inner self and continually strive for authentic existence. The final stage in authentic practice is a focus on universality, where one acts in the faith and hope in universal goodness and absolute knowledge and one's actions and thoughts reflect a commitment to that highest level of human existence.

The significance of language in pedagogical practice

Language is just as important to authentic practice as the theoretical structure in which it is based. It is through language that the inner self is revealed and known; it is through language that we can transcend time; it is through language that we know the phenomenological world in which we exist; it is language that tells stories and gives existence form. Each of the six educationalists whose ideas we have explored gives significance to the part language plays in the reconstructing of present understandings and practices of teaching and education. Pinar places importance on the

reflective inner dialogue of the self which consists of a kind of stream of consciousness thinking in his currere method. Pinar's focus is mainly on written language. Language is that which brings the self into existence and it is through language that one mediates between one's past and one's future in present existence. Nel Noddings emphasises the language of the feminine, specifically the dialogue between the mother and child, which is seen as the dialogue of caring and nurturing. This is for Noddings the expression of care and concern for "the other" where the other is the child, the student, or the person or persons for whom we feel responsibility. Max van Manen places an emphasis on the language found in the everyday, mainly the language that attempts to articulate the experiences of everyday situations in our interactions and relations with children. He values anecdotal descriptions and informal conversations about what he calls "pedagogical life," that is the life of teaching. These dialogues and conversations reflect the actualities of one's life with children. Van Manen suggests that through interrogating this language insights can be revealed as to what best to do in one's relations with children, when one as teacher is called upon by the child to advance his or her well-being, independence, and development. Maxine Greene desires to establish a language of a critical and thoughtful public in order for individuals to become valuable and contributing members to the moral

fibre of society. Mary Warnock places importance on a kind of phenomenological language, meaning mainly the language of literature, the language of what she terms "imaginative writing." She sees language as a way to transcend time and holds that "imaginative language" is a way to speak to all. It is a form of language that is accessible to all, which in its descriptive nature evokes a kind of sympathy into which one can move. Through discussion and dialogue of what is valuable in the imaginative writing of human experiences we can work towards establishing eternal and universal values. Dwayne Huebner desires individuals to live in the language of spirituality. Part of the language of spirituality is critical reflectiveness. Huebner believes that the language of spirituality would have the effect of undermining the present dominant language of education and teaching which he sees as being oppressive. He contends that we have forgotten or suppressed the actuality that imagination is the source of our so-called "givens" and our languages and practices, and that the resources we use are merely the embodied or materialised images in which we choose to dwell. He sees that freedom of the individual is to be gained through acknowledging and engaging in those other sources. Through language and imagination individuals can live and move in a different reality. As well as being self-determining and self-directing, the language of the spiritual is critical of limiting and restricting forms that block one's spiritual

journeying.

What is important here, derived from the thinking of all the educationalists collectively, is the need to be sensitive to forms of language in one's teaching. Authentic orientation to education and teaching needs to be formulated within a certain grammar. There is a need to question the language of teaching and education in its often taken-for-granted form. Also we need to try to stand above the language of idle conversation and mindlessness, which is a language that is unreflective and uncritical. In order for authentic teaching to take place a language that is expansive and fluid, a language that is closer to the inner life of human existence, needs to be developed. The vocabulary for authentic teaching is constructed in the language of mediation, critical thought, inner reflection, openness to "the other," and a language that accommodates imagination. It is a form of conversing that allows for such non-rational concepts such as hope and faith. The language of authenticity casts a positive light on the self and others with the conscious intention of moving the self, others, and society as a whole towards an image of one's best self.

As I have tried to demonstrate in my analysis of the six theorists, the aesthetic language of Virginia Woolf possesses the attributes of authenticity. Woolf's language

connects with the thinking of each of the educational theories we have explored. Woolf's form of writing connects with the autobiographical aspects of the theories of William Pinar and Mary Warnock. In her stream-of-consciousness style she reveals the inner and lived world of the individual. Woolf's writing is also a form of "imaginative literature" which is the kind of writing that Warnock values in her theory of "education for stewardship" as it is a form of writing that transcends time and gives an eternal aspect to lived experiences. Woolf's language also connects with the thinking of Noddings and van Manen in the emphasis that she places on bringing together minds in order to move into the world of the other. This position of intimacy is what is at the basis of Noddings's and van Manen's forms of teaching. The reflective nature of Woolf's form of writing interrogates the "cotton wool" of the everyday and at the same time seeks to make existence meaningful. This is an important aspect of Maxine Greene's thinking and her "education for freedom" enterprise. Finally, Woolf's writing is expansive enough to embrace spiritual concerns and ideas and in this way she connects with Dwayne Huebner and his project of "education for spirituality." Engaging the language of poetry and aesthetics in the dynamic forms suggested by the various educationists is an integral part of authentic teaching.

Authenticity and embodiment

Another aspect of authentic existence needs to be considered in authentic teaching. It can be called the fifth stage of authentic teaching, the highest form of teaching. It is a way of being in practice that brings together practice and theory. This is a way of being as teacher that reflects an embodiment of all the elements of authenticity we have thus far discussed. In addition to offering ways of thinking and ways of acting as authentic educators, two of the theorists, Dwayne Huebner and Max van Manen, reflect this embodiment in their writing. They are as models of individuals who in the way that they write reflect the ideology that they espouse. They reflect a coming together of thought and action. This is the ultimate in one's search for self-actualisation. When authenticity is embodied it is a way of being that is reflected in one's voice, bodily movements, gestures, facial expressions, eyes. It is a reflection of a deep knowing of oneself and a confident purposefulness in one's position as teacher. When one reaches this state of existence one is as close as one can come to authentic existence.

What I have presented in this conclusion are the structure and attributes of an alternative approach to education and teaching. It is a skeletal frame for authentic practice and should be used as a basis for further discussion. It is an

approach that is constructed out of the thinking of certain contemporary educational theorists. It is a structure on which to focus one's thoughts and actions as teacher. What is important to acknowledge in this outline is that coming to terms with one's practice starts inwardly, with the way one thinks about teaching, and moves to effect the environment in which one teaches. It demands an awakening and an engagement of the elements of conscious thought: imagination, self reflection, response and exchange, and intentionality. It resists passivity and complacency. It values the self as an individual and seeks to preserve this aspect of being through a focus on the particular, on the immediate other, on one's value and place in society, on the universal, and on the eternal. This is a way of looking at teaching and of being in teaching that makes teaching meaningful and personally satisfying. What I have tried to present here is a way of "being at home in teaching."

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