

A New Reading of Kant's Second Analogy in the Light of Lovejoy's Criticism

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I, Xiang Nong Hu, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Abstract

In his article “On Kant’s Reply to Hume” (1906), Arthur Lovejoy raises four interconnected objections to Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy. In general, Lovejoy argues that (i) Kant fails to establish that the principle of causality is the basis of the distinction between subjective and objective perceptions of change; (ii) Kant fails to establish that the principle of causality is the basis of the distinction between perceptions of stationary and moving objects; (iii) due to point (i) and (ii), what Kant proves in the Second Analogy has nothing to do with the principle of causality. Therefore, Kant commits the *non-sequitur* when he concludes that by appealing to the principle of causality, we know *a priori* that the same kind of antecedent will always be followed by the same kind of consequent; (iv) because of the *non-sequitur*, Kant fails to respond to Hume’s skepticism about particular causal principles. In this thesis, I defend Kant from Lovejoy’s objections, in the light of which a new interpretation of the Second Analogy will also be provided. I argue that, in contrast to what Lovejoy claims, Kant successfully demonstrates in the Second Analogy that the principle of causality is not only the distinguishing criterion between subjective and objective perceptions of change but is also the distinguishing criterion between perceptions of stationary and moving objects. In addition, the conclusion of the Second Analogy is just a re-statement of what Kant proves, which can be put as a transcendental argument that suggests that the principle of causality is the necessary condition of the possibility of occurrence (experience of objective successions/moving objects), which does not commit any *non-sequitur*. Consequently, as far as Kant himself is concerned, this transcendental argument is sufficient to respond to Hume’s skepticism concerning the principle of causality (both general and particular).

Impact Statement

This study provides a new way of interpreting the Second Analogy. In addition, the conclusion of this study opens up a new way for future studies to approach the question concerning how Kant replies to Hume's skepticism concerning the apriority of the principle of causality.

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Introduction

Despite philosophers generally agreeing that Kant is, after Plato and Aristotle, the most significant figure in the history of Western philosophy, they are unable to reach a consensus on whether such a preeminent philosopher ever makes a valid argument in the “Second Analogy of Experience” in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Today, around 230 years after the first publication of the *Critique*, it is almost impossible to exhaustively gather and discuss all the criticisms of the Second Analogy, but this by no means suggests that we should simply put them aside. On the contrary, it appears to me that it is still worthwhile to examine some of the most serious and typical criticisms of the Second Analogy, and to consider whether the problems brought up by such criticisms have been properly addressed. The purpose of doing this is not just about preserving or restoring the dignity of Kant; instead, during the process of examining and responding to criticisms, we can expect to discover some previously neglected details that can contribute to a better understanding of the Second Analogy, which in turn will help us to deal with one of the most classical but unresolved problems therein, i.e. how does Kant respond to Hume’s skepticism concerning the principle of causality, which doubts the universality and necessity of both general and particular causal principles.

The criticisms of the Second Analogy that I will consider in this thesis are those raised by Arthur Lovejoy in “On Kant’s Reply to Hume.” Despite the article first being published in 1906, and despite Lovejoy’s criticisms being particularly severe (for example, he calls Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy “one of the most spectacular examples of the *non-sequitur* which are to be found in the history of philosophy”¹), as far as I am aware,

¹ Arthur O. Lovejoy, “On Kant’s Reply to Hume,” in *Kant: Disputed Questions*, ed. Moltke S. Gram (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), 303.

Lovejoy's criticisms have not yet drawn enough attention or have received adequate responses. My aims in this thesis, therefore, are to thoroughly examine Lovejoy's criticisms of the Second Analogy, provide responses to them through which a re-interpretation of the Second Analogy will also be made, and consider how my reading of the Second Analogy can be inspirational in answering the age-old question of how Kant responds to Hume's skepticism.

This thesis will be divided into five sections. The first two sections will introduce the background of the study by means of a detailed analysis of Lovejoy's article. In Section One, I look at Lovejoy's interpretation of the Second Analogy. In Section Two, I look at four interrelated objections that Lovejoy makes, based on his interpretation of the Second Analogy, against the validity of Kant's argument. In general, the first objection is that, in contrast to what Kant claims, the principle of causality does not serve as the basis of the distinction between subjective and objective perceptions of change. The second objection suggests that we also do not need the principle of causality to make the distinction between perceptions of stationary objects (e.g. a stationary house) and perceptions of moving objects (e.g. a moving ship), so Kant's proof in the Second Analogy actually shows nothing about the principle of causality. Then, the third objection suggests that Kant commits the *non-sequitur* when he concludes that by appealing to the principle of causality, we know *a priori* that "if the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows,"² which, according to Lovejoy, means that we can rely on the principle of causality to know *a priori* that a particular type of antecedent will, in all instances, be followed by the same type of consequent. Finally, in the fourth objection, Lovejoy claims that Kant fails offer a proper response to Hume's skepticism about the principle of causality due to the *non-sequitur* he commits in the Second Analogy.

² Ibid., A198/B243-244, 310.

In Section Three, I consider a preliminary question concerning how the Second Analogy should be approached under the general framework of the *Critique*. I argue that Lovejoy tends to read the Second Analogy independently from the general context of the *Critique*, whereas my opinion is that the Second Analogy should be embedded in the *Critique* (in particular, in the Transcendental Analytic) and be interpreted by taking its general context into account. This will become the fundamental assumption under which I will interpret the Second Analogy and respond to Lovejoy in the following sections.

In Section Four, I provide my responses to Lovejoy's objections against Kant. In response to Lovejoy's first objection, I argue that Lovejoy misinterprets what Kant means by "subjective" and "objective." In the context of the Second Analogy, "subjective" and "objective" do not refer to dreaming and waking states or veridical and non-veridical experiences as Lovejoy claims; rather, they are indications of whether the synthesis of sensible/empirical representations is in accordance with rules. That is to say, "subjective" indicates a rule-less synthesis of sensible representations, whereas "objective" indicates a rule-governed synthesis of sensible representations. According to this interpretation, the principle of causality, as a rule of synthesis, does serve as the distinguishing criterion between subjective and objective perceptions of change.

In response to the second objection, I argue that the principle of causality is also the basis of the distinction between perceptions of stationary and moving objects because as a pure principle of our understanding, the principle of causality determines our conceptual order, i.e. the principle makes the way that we conceptually synthesize the sensible representations determinate and irreversible. Therefore, in the case of, for instance, perceiving a ship sailing downstream, we have to synthesize the manifold of representations in a determinate way, such that the ship's position downstream follows the ship's position upstream, unlike in the case of, for instance, perceiving a stationary house where we can

synthesize the different parts of the house, as sensible representations in any order, as long as the outcome is in accordance with the concept of the house in general.

As far as the third objection is concerned, I will show in Section Two that Lovejoy actually brings up two different problems when he tries to show why Kant commits the *non-sequitur*. The first problem is the third objection itself, i.e. Kant commits the *non-sequitur*, and the second problem is what I will call the “subject-reality” problem, which concerns the gap between what we perceive or believe and how things really are. For the reason that Lovejoy embeds the subject-reality problem into the third objection, I will not treat it as independent from the third objection. Nevertheless, the subject-reality problem still requires a separate response, so I will divide my response to Lovejoy’s third objection into two parts and address the *non-sequitur* and the subject-reality problem in turn.

In the first part of my response to the third objection, I argue that in the Second Analogy, Kant does not aim to prove the apriority of particular causal principles and does not conclude that we can draw necessary connections between two particular kinds of events; Lovejoy unfairly attributes this conclusion to Kant due to his own misunderstanding of Kant’s original conclusion. I will show that Lovejoy’s misunderstanding is caused by his misconception of the meaning of “determinate occurrence” in Kant’s conclusion and is misled by the presupposition he takes, which suggests that Kant aims to respond to Hume’s skepticism about necessary particular causal connections in the Second Analogy. I argue that “determinate occurrence” means an occurrence that takes place in accordance with the principle of causality, and Kant actually agrees with Hume that particular causal principles are not *a priori*, which means that Kant has no intention of directly responding to Hume’s skepticism about the apriority of particular causal principles in the Second Analogy. Therefore, the conclusion of the Second Analogy does not have to concern the apriority of particular causal principles. Following this line of interpretation, Kant’s conclusion, “if the

state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows,” is just a restatement of the well-established thesis of the Second Analogy: that the principle of causality is the necessary condition for the possibility of cognizing occurrence, which is not a *non-sequitur*.

In the second part of my response to the third objection, which concerns the subject-reality problem, I will first examine some of the discussions of this issue made by previous scholars and will argue that transcendental idealism is the key to solving this problem. By referring to transcendental idealism, Kant makes a distinction between objects as appearances and objects as things in themselves and is concerned only with objects as appearances in the Second Analogy. As an appearance, reality is not entirely independent of us; rather, it requires the rules of synthesis provided by our understanding in order to be cognizable. Therefore, if we take reality as reality *for us* in accordance with the idea of transcendental idealism, there will be no gap between ourselves and reality.

Finally, regarding the fourth objection, after the discussion made in previous sections, it will be obvious by this point that Lovejoy’s description of Hume’s skepticism concerning causality is inaccurate. It will be shown in my response to the third objection that Hume actually doubts both general and particular principles of causality, not just the particular principles of causality, as Lovejoy claims. Therefore, the fourth objection should be restated as: Kant fails to offer a proper response to Hume’s skepticism about general and particular causal principles due to the *non-sequitur* he commits in the Second Analogy. In response to this objection, it will follow naturally from previous discussions that Kant does not commit the *non-sequitur* in the Second Analogy, and he actually agrees with Hume that particular causal principles do not express apriority. In regard to the general causal principle, Kant’s response to Hume is in the form of a transcendental argument, which states that the general principle of causality is a necessary condition of the possibility of experience. Therefore, if

Hume acknowledges the possibility of experience, then, as its necessary condition, Hume must also acknowledge the possibility of the general principle of causality. In the context of the *Critique*, as far as Kant himself is concerned, this is a proper response to Hume's skepticism.

In Section Five, I will briefly comment on the effectiveness of using transcendental argument as a response to Humean skepticism by considering how Hume could possibly argue in response to Kant, which will serve as my concluding remarks demonstrating how my re-interpretation of the Second Analogy in the light of Lovejoy's criticism can be inspirational to answer the age-old question concerning how Kant responds to Hume.

§1. Lovejoy's Interpretation of the Second Analogy

Let us start by looking at Lovejoy's interpretation of the Second Analogy and his objections to Kant based on his interpretation. For this purpose, I will not offer my own opinions and argue against Lovejoy in this and next sections but will just describe Lovejoy's argument.

According to Lovejoy, Kant's main concern in the Second Analogy is expressed in the following passage: "The apprehension of the manifold of appearances is always successive. The representations of the parts succeed one another. Whether they also succeed in the object is a second point of reflection, which is not contained in the first."³ That is, any series of distinct representations, regardless of what states of affairs they represent, always succeed one another, and the sequences of our perceptions of those representations are accordingly always successive as well, but we cannot infer from that successiveness of

³ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A189/B234, 305.

representations or perceptions of representations themselves whether these successions are simply successions in our own perceptions, or if they also represent successions in the represented object itself. Lovejoy considers this to be a “psychological conundrum” faced by Kant, which poses the underlying question, “[h]ow is it that we are able, in a series of apprehensions that are constantly successive, to recognize that some of these successions in apprehension correspond to and represent successions in the objects apprehended, and that others do not?”⁴

Although Lovejoy does not further elaborate this “psychological conundrum,” we can rely on Paul Guyer’s analysis of the above-quoted passage from the Second Analogy (A189/B234) to get a better sense of why Kant finds that question particularly puzzling. As Guyer points out, the underlying premise of Kant’s argument is that “time cannot be directly perceived, or that, at the very least, *objective* temporal relations are not simply given in passive apprehension.”⁵ This corresponds to what Kant says in B233 that “time cannot be perceived in itself, nor can what precedes and what follows in objects be as it were empirically determined in relation to it.”⁶ This premise comprises three assumptions. First, representations indeed have a temporal order, but because the temporal order of the representations is always the same, i.e. successive, so we cannot rely on the temporal order of the representations to determine whether or not they represent objective changes. Second, it is obvious that individual representations, each taken and being perceived in isolation, can tell us nothing about the relations of what they represent over any extended time. In other words, “the successive states of affairs which may – or may not – be represented by successive representations cannot be judged to be successive on the basis of separate perceptions of

⁴ Lovejoy, “On Kant’s Reply to Hume,” 294.

⁵ Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 244.

⁶ Kant, *Critique*, B233, 304.

temporal positions of each.”⁷ Third, “the temporal order of the objective states of affairs cannot be determined by any direct access to *the objects* either, for it is of course only *by* the representations that the objects are given.”⁸ Thus, what these assumptions suggest is that representations themselves cannot determine the order of the states of affairs they represent, but we have no other access to objects other than representations. So, how can the order of representations be objectively determined and be distinguished from mere subjective successions? The determination must be grounded on something other than representations, but what is it?

By following this line of interpretation, Lovejoy takes the famous contrast between perceptions of an unchanging house and of a moving ship, which I will refer to as the house and ship examples, introduced by Kant at A190-192/B235-237 as illustrations of this “psychological conundrum.” To summarize briefly, the house example is this: suppose that we see a house, and we shift our attention from the window to the rooftop. The sequence of our perceptions of these different parts of the house is successive, but we realize that these successions are only successions in our perceptions and not successions in the house itself, for we know that the window and the rooftop do not temporally come after one another, and the house does not undergo any change while we shift our attention from the window to the rooftop. On the other hand, the ship example illustrates a scenario where we see a ship sailing downstream; our perceptions are again successive in the way that our perception of the ship’s position downstream follows the perception of its position upstream. Unlike the situation in the house example, however, in this case we realize that there are successions in both our perceptions and the object itself. In other words, succession in our perceptions in this case

⁷ Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, 244.

⁸ *Ibid.*

correspond to succession in the ship we perceive; there is not only succession in our perceptions, but also perception of successions in the object.

Lovejoy believes that what Kant intends to demonstrate via the house and ship examples is that although the sequences of perceptions in both examples are successive, we can distinguish subjective successions in our perceptions from objectively valid successions in the object because of the principle of causality. In other words, the principle of causality is the answer to the “psychological conundrum” as it makes the order of representations determined. The principle of causality does not come from the representations themselves; rather, it is an *a priori* principle supplied by us, by our own understanding. This principle, according to Kant, suggests that “[e]verything that happens (begins to be) presupposes something which it follows in accordance with a rule,”⁹ or, as in the second edition of the *Critique*, “[a]ll alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect.”¹⁰ It “makes the order of perceptions that follow one another (in the apprehension of this appearance) necessary.”¹¹

As far as the house and ship examples are concerned, the principle of causality is recognized in the ship example, but not in the house example, which makes the order of perceptions in the ship example determined and irreversible, thus contrasting with the undetermined and reversible order of perceptions in the house example. As Kant says, in the case of perceiving a moving ship, “if in the case of an appearance that contains a happening I call the preceding state of perception *A* and the following one *B*, then *B* can only follow *A* in apprehension, but the perception *A* cannot follow but only precede *B*.”¹² By realizing the irreversibility of the sequence of perceptions, which in turn is possible because of the principle of causality, we can distinguish objective perceptions of change from merely

⁹ Kant, *Critique*, A189, 304.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, B232, 304.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, A193/B238, 307.

¹² *Ibid.*, A192/B237, 306.

subjective ones. Conversely, without the recognition of the principle of causality, “we could not make the distinction between the two kinds of experience, therefore all experience of the objective kind must conform to the rule, which is therefore certain and necessary *a priori*.”¹³ In other words, the principle of causality is the necessary condition of the apprehension of something that objectively happens, which Kant calls “occurrence.”¹⁴

In addition to determining the order of perceptions and thus helping us to make the distinction between subjective and objective perceptions of change, by the same principle, we can also know that “if the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows.”¹⁵ In Lovejoy’s opinion, what Kant means to suggest here is, “every event has some determinate antecedent and that it can be certainly known *a priori* that the same kind of antecedent will in all instances be followed by the same kind of consequent.”¹⁶ According to this interpretation, in the case where we see a ship sailing downstream, Kant would say that we can know *a priori* that the ship’s position upstream is a determinate antecedent of the ship’s position downstream in all instances of ship sailing; whenever we see a ship upstream, we can infer that it will be followed by the same consequent, i.e. the ship downstream.

§2. Lovejoy’s Four Objections to Kant’s Argument in the Second Analogy

Based on the above interpretation of the Second Analogy, Lovejoy proceeds to raise objections against the validity of Kant’s argument. In fact, Lovejoy does not draw clear lines between those objections, nor number them accordingly, but, by closely reading and re-

¹³ Lovejoy, “On Kant’s Reply to Hume,” 295.

¹⁴ Kant, *Critique*, A192/B237, 306. I will use “occurrence” throughout the rest of the essay in place of “event,” which is used by Lovejoy and many others.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, A198/B243-244, 310.

¹⁶ Lovejoy, “On Kant’s Reply to Hume,” 301.

organizing his argument, I identify four objections. As we will see in this section, these four objections are highly inter-connected in the way that the problem associated with the second objection is brought out by the first objection; the third objection is then raised because of the first two objections; and the fourth objection is, in turn, raised based on the third objection.

2.1. The First Objection

In general, the first objection suggests that, although Kant intends to show via the house and ship examples that the principle of causality is the criterion by means of which we can distinguish objective successions in the object from subjective successions in our own perceptions, what these two examples really demonstrate is that the principle rather serves as “the basis of the distinction between perceptions of change and perceptions of permanence, no matter whether the perceptions be ‘objective’ or purely illusory.”¹⁷

Lovejoy starts the objection with the following statement,

Kant is attempting, as we have seen, to rest the case for the validity of the [principle of causality] upon the supposed necessity of assuming that principle as the basis of the distinction between merely subjective, and objectively valid, perceptions of change, between veridical representations and “mere dream.”¹⁸

Apparently, Lovejoy takes “subjective” to indicate “mere dream” or, as he later says, “hallucinatory representations” and “subjective play of my imagination,”¹⁹ which do not veridically represent changes in objects, and takes “objective” to indicate “veridical representations” of objects, i.e. alterations of states of objects that we perceive in a conscious state.

By defining “subjective” and “objective” in this way, Lovejoy then argues that there is not just one, but two distinctions concerning human perceptions that need to be made in the

¹⁷ Ibid., 296.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

context of the Second Analogy. The first is a general distinction between “objective and subjective perceptions of change,”²⁰ i.e. a distinction between perceptions of change that take place in reality and those that take place in a mere dream. The second is “another distinction which runs cross-wise through *both* objective and subjective perceptions of change.”²¹ By “another distinction,” Lovejoy refers to the distinction between perceptions of moving objects and perceptions of stationary objects, that is, in the case of the Second Analogy, the distinction between perceptions of a moving ship and perceptions of a house. So, what the second distinction concerns is that, regardless of whether our perceptions are veridical or non-veridical, i.e. whether we are in or out of a dream, we still need to be able to make a distinction between perceptions of moving and of stationary objects.

As Lovejoy says, the principle of causality is obviously not the basis of the first kind of distinction, for no one will concede that we can distinguish veridical experiences from non-veridical ones by invoking a notion of causation. On the other hand, the principle can serve as the basis of the second kind of distinction. Generally, we have no difficulty in differentiating between our perceptions of a house and of a moving ship both in and out of a dream, as Lovejoy points out,

But manifestly we do make this distinction [between perceptions of moving objects and of stationary objects] both in our dreams and out of them, both in our most ‘objective’ and veridical judgements of perception and in our private imaginings and hallucinatory representations. It is, at all events, not the common experience that in dreams one is incapable of picking out, within the universal successiveness of one’s subjective representations, those series of perceptions that are representations of moving objects, and those that are not.²²

Lovejoy believes that what Kant would suggest is that we can easily make this distinction between perceptions of moving and of stationary objects both in and out of our dreams because of the principle of causality, which makes the order of perceptions that follow one

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 297.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*, 296.

another determined and necessary. That is, by recognizing the principle of causality, the sequence of perceptions of moving objects is fixed and irreversible, contrasting with perceptions of stationary objects, where the sequence of perceptions is undetermined and reversible, as illustrated by the ship and house examples respectively.

However, Lovejoy says, “[c]onsequently even if we should attach any value to Kant’s argument that we could not know that the ship moves while the house is stationary, without a knowledge of the principle of causal connection,”²³ in contrast to what Kant originally has thought, this argument by no means shows that the principle of causality is the distinguishing criterion between objective and subjective perceptions of change, when “objective” and “subjective” are taken as indications of waking and dreaming states; instead, as mentioned above, “the principle really comes to figure rather as the basis of the distinction *between perceptions of change and perceptions of permanence, no matter whether the perceptions be ‘objective’ or purely illusory.*”²⁴

2.2. The Second Objection

Lovejoy does acknowledge at this point that Kant’s argument, at least, shows that the principle of causality serves as the basis of the distinction between perceptions of moving objects and perceptions of stationary objects. In his second objection to Kant, however, Lovejoy even denies this proposition. In Lovejoy’s opinion, the principle of causality does not play a role in making the distinction between perceptions of moving and stationary objects either.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid. Lovejoy uses “perceptions of moving objects” and “perceptions of change” interchangeably and uses “perceptions of stationary objects” and “perceptions of permanence” interchangeably.

Lovejoy contends that in demonstrating the principle of causality by using the house and ship examples as illustrations, Kant makes “explicit something that is contained in the *meaning* of the complex concept of a changing single object, as over against a ‘permanent manifold’,” but what he shows “has nothing to do with the law of causality or the Principle of Sufficient Reason.”²⁵ In other words, Lovejoy believes that what the house and ship examples really tell us is that we can differentiate perceptions of change and perceptions of permanence simply by attending to the meanings of “changing single object” and “permanent manifold,” without appealing to the principle of causality.

Lovejoy’s view is that in cases where we perceive or just assume that we perceive a “changing single object,” this “single object” or “one object” already implies the determinateness and irreversibility of the sequence of perceptions. This is due to the fact that by knowing or assuming that we are dealing with one object, our attention is fixed and remains constant. Although an object, such as a ship, contains different parts, and our attention may shift between these different parts, as long as we take these parts as a whole that designates a single object, our attention is fixed and remains constant in regard to this wholeness and oneness. Therefore, any change in perceptions cannot be the result of shifts in our attention, but must be the result of changes in the object itself, i.e. “whatever differences appear from moment to moment in the presented content must belong to the object,”²⁶ which are independent of the attention of the perceiver. Consequently, the sequence of our perceptions must follow and correspond to the sequence of changes in the object, which cannot be reversed at our will. On the other hand, when we know or assume that we perceive a “permanent manifold,” i.e. a manifold of different stationary objects, we realize that changes in perceptions must be caused by shifts in our own attention when we successively

²⁵ Ibid., 299-300.

²⁶ Ibid., 300.

attend to these different objects, since we know that these objects themselves do not undergo any change. Thus, “the order of the succession of the perceptions is conceived to be determined purely by the order of changes in the subject’s attention,” which can be reversed or put into any different order at the perceiver’s will.²⁷

As far as Lovejoy is concerned, “[i]n actual perception (not, of course, in mere sensation), so long as our attention to a *given* object be continuous, objects are directly given as moving or stationary, as altering or retaining their original sensible qualities.”²⁸ It is true that all sequences of perceptions are successive, but what is required to distinguish between perceptions of a changing object and of a stationary object is simply that our mind has the ability to fix attention upon an object. In this way, according to Lovejoy, we can then “perceive the successive spatial relations of that chosen object of attention to other visible or tangible objects, and to remember and compare these perceptions from moment to moment.”²⁹ In the case of perceiving a moving object, we realize that the object is moving because we are able to fix attention on the object and notice that it is moving *in relation to* other objects. Any change in perceptions must be caused by the moving of the object itself, so the order of the perceptions of that object is “determined by something ‘in the object’,”³⁰ and is thus irreversible. On the other hand, in the case of perceiving a stationary object, we realize that the object remains constant because we are able to fix attention on the object and notice that it is not moving *in relation to* other objects; if there was any inconsistency in perceptions, it must be because we shift our attention onto another object, and the corresponding order of perceptions is therefore random and reversible.

Therefore, Lovejoy claims, we do not need the principle of causality in order to determine the order of perceptions and to make the distinction between perceptions of change

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., 297.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid., 300.

and of permanence. What Kant simply reveals through “his illustrations of the irreversibility of the sequence of our perceptions of a moving ship and the indeterminateness of the sequence of our perceptions of the parts of a house”³¹ is nothing more than the obvious difference between the meanings of a “changing single object” and a “permanent manifold.”

2.3. The Third Objection

From here, Lovejoy proceeds to make the third objection. Lovejoy’s argument here is that the previous two objections have demonstrated that Kant’s proof in the Second Analogy has nothing to do with the principle of causality. What Lovejoy thinks Kant tells us via the house and ship examples is,

That we cannot conceive or define any one object as changing without implying that the sequence of perceptions which would have been had by any subject fixedly attending to that object would have been determined by something “in the object,” and could not at the time have been had by the subject in any reverse order.³²

Moreover, in the case of perceiving a moving object, it shows that “those external phenomena are disconnected from, and independent of, that species of causal process which I know inwardly as intentional or purposive control of attention.”³³ Lovejoy then argues that Kant moves, from this point about the causal independence of volition and external phenomena, to a conclusion about a causal connection between the external phenomena. Therefore, the conclusion proclaimed by Kant in the Second Analogy cannot be justified by what he proves, i.e. Kant commits a *non-sequitur* when he concludes that by relying on the principle of causality, we know *a priori* that a particular type of antecedent will in all instances be followed by the same type of consequent.

³¹ Ibid., 299-300.

³² Ibid., 300.

³³ Ibid., 302.

The fallacy in Kant's conclusion can also be revealed by appealing to the ship example. When we see the ship sailing downstream, the ship's position upstream is indeed the antecedent of the ship's position downstream, but this sequence of ship sailing applies only to this particular ship on this particular occasion and does not apply to all occurrences of the same kind. On other occasions, the ship may sail from left to right, downstream to upstream, or in other different directions, in which case the sequence will no longer be "upstream-downstream." In other words, for the sequence "upstream-downstream" to be universally and necessarily valid as a particular causal principle, the ship must always sail in this way, and, conversely, we must be able to infer that a ship will invariably and necessarily be downstream at the next moment whenever we see a ship upstream. This is obviously inconsistent with common experience, let alone that the ship example in the Second Analogy has nothing whatsoever to do with the principle of causality, as shown by the first and second objections.

It should be noted at this point that in the passage where Lovejoy makes a distinction between "I" and "those external phenomena," he actually brings up (maybe unintentionally) another problem of Kant's argument in addition to the *non-sequitur*, which is the problem that concerns the gap between what we, as the subjects, perceive or believe and how things really are. As we will see later, this problem has also attracted an extraordinary amount of scholarly attention, and it has been more thoroughly and elaborately discussed by, for example, P. F. Strawson and Barry Stroud.³⁴ But since I am concerned only with Lovejoy's own criticism of Kant at this point, I will leave other discussions of this "subject-reality" problem aside for now.

³⁴ P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (Routledge: London, 1966), 133-140; Barry Stroud, "Transcendental Arguments," *The Journal of Philosophy* 65, no. 9 (1968): 241-256.

For the reasons illustrated above, Lovejoy accuses Kant of committing the following *non-sequitur*: “[b]ut all this has no relation to the law of universal and uniform causation, for the manifest reason that a proof of the *irreversibility* of the sequence of my perceptions in a *single instance* of a phenomenon is not equivalent to a proof of the necessary *uniformity* of the sequence of my perceptions in *repeated instances* of a given *kind* of phenomenon.”³⁵

2.4. The Fourth Objection

Right after accusing Kant of committing the *non-sequitur*, Lovejoy proceeds to raise the fourth and final objection in the following words: “[y]et it is the latter alone that Hume denied and that Kant desires to establish.”³⁶ “The latter” refers to “the necessary uniformity of the sequence of my perceptions in repeated instances of a given kind of phenomenon” in the passage I quoted in the previous section. So, what the fourth objection means is that, in Lovejoy’s view, Hume called into question the existence of any necessary particular causal principle, i.e. causal principles that necessarily and uniformly connect two particular kinds of occurrence, and what Kant “was called upon to prove”³⁷ and aimed to prove in the Second Analogy is exactly what Hume had denied. However, due to the *non-sequitur*, Kant obviously fails to prove that particular causal principles exist, which at the same time indicates that Kant fails to respond to Hume’s skepticism concerning particular causal principles.

§3. How the Second Analogy Should Be Approached?

³⁵ Lovejoy, “On Kant’s Reply to Hume,” 300-301.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 301.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 303.

Before directly engaging with Lovejoy's interpretation of and objections to the Second Analogy, I will in the first instance consider a preliminary question that concerns how the Second Analogy should be approached. The question is that does the Second Analogy contain a stand-alone argument that can be appreciated without appealing to other parts of the *Critique*, or do we have to embed the Second Analogy in the context of the *Critique* in order to properly understand it? My answer to this question will become the fundamental assumption that I will take in my responses to Lovejoy.

Generally speaking, in my view, the Second Analogy should be embedded in the *Critique* (the Transcendental Analytic in particular) and be interpreted against this more general context. That is, we should make references to other arguments that Kant makes before and after the Second Analogy in order to understand the Second Analogy properly. However, it appears to me that this is in contrast with Lovejoy, for Lovejoy takes the opposite approach and believes that the Second Analogy can be detached from the *Critique* and interpreted without appealing to its context. Problems associated with Lovejoy's approach will be gradually revealed in the following two sections; at present, I will just elaborate why I take Lovejoy as having adopted that approach, and why I prefer the opposite.

The first reason why I think Lovejoy separates the Second Analogy from the rest of the *Critique* is simply that, throughout the article, Lovejoy never refers to any other parts of the *Critique* apart from the Second Analogy itself when he interprets and raises his objections to it. This becomes prominent when Lovejoy equalizes "subjective" with mere dreams and illusions and "objective" with veridical experiences. Lovejoy never explains why he takes "subjective" and "objective" in such a way; it seems that for Lovejoy, it is obvious that "subjective" and "objective" represent dreaming and waking states in the context of the Second Analogy. However, the problem is precisely that Kant neither indicates that "subjective" and "objective" should be understood in the way Lovejoy suggests nor gives any

straight definition of “subjective” and “objective” in the Second Analogy. Therefore, it appears that Lovejoy defines “subjective” and “objective” according to their literal and commonsensical meanings. For when we use these terms in our daily lives or when these terms are used in other contexts, “subjective” can be used to indicate something that is subject to personal feelings and opinions, which may be illusory and distorted and cannot accurately reflect the objective world; on the other hand, “objective” can be used to indicate something that is uninfluenced by personal feelings and opinions: something veridical.

I will show in next section that in order to accurately define “subjective” and “objective” in the context of the Second Analogy, we need to go back to look at the Transcendental Deduction, where Kant explicitly discusses problems associated with objectivity, and if we do so, it will become clear that Lovejoy misunderstands “subjective” and “objective.” It is precisely because of his misconceptions of these terms that he raises the first objection, which is also invalid. However, since I am concerned only with the question why I think Lovejoy reads the Second Analogy independently from its general context, it is sufficient just to notice at this point that Lovejoy does not refer to other parts of the Transcendental Analytic to analyze “subjective” and “objective” as they appear in the Second Analogy; rather, he abruptly gives his own definitions of these two important terms.

Another evidence that reveals Lovejoy’s approach to the Second Analogy can be found in his aforementioned third objection to the Second Analogy, i.e. the objection that Kant commits the *non-sequitur*. In raising this objection, Lovejoy seems to exclude transcendental idealism as the ultimate assumption of Kant’s argument from the Second Analogy. By transcendental idealism, Kant means the following:

I understand by the **transcendental idealism** of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not

determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves.³⁸

Or,

We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that everything intuited in space and time, hence all objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are represented, as extended beings or series of alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself. This doctrine I call **transcendental idealism**.³⁹

As these passages suggest, by transcendental idealism, Kant draws a sharp distinction between objects as they appear to us or “objects of an experience possible for us” and objects as things in themselves. As humans with space and time as pure forms of intuition, we have knowledge only of objects as appearances but not of objects as things in themselves; objects that we cognize in experience are objects as they appear to us but not objects as things in themselves. Moreover, Kant thinks that our mind plays an important role in the constitutions of objects as appearances. That is, what we originally perceive is only a manifold of sensible representations, and it is only through our mind’s synthesis of the representations according to the concept of an object in general that objects of experience become cognizable.⁴⁰ In that sense, objects as appearances are not purely objective and independent from the subject.

The spirit of transcendental idealism gets expressed in the following passage in the Second Analogy:

If appearances were things in themselves, then no human being would be able to assess from the succession of representations how the manifold is combined in the object. For we have to do only with our representations; how things in themselves may be (without regard to representations through which they affect us) is entirely beyond our cognitive sphere. . . . the appearances are not things in themselves, and nevertheless are the only thing that can be given to us for cognition, . . .⁴¹

³⁸ Kant, *Critique*, A369, 426.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, A491/B519, 511.

⁴⁰ See the A edition of the Transcendental Deduction, especially A103-A110. I will return to this point in section 4.1.

⁴¹ Kant, *Critique*, A190/B235, 306.

Kant makes it clear in this passage that appearances and things in themselves should be clearly distinguished from one another and not be confused, and, in the Second Analogy, he is concerned only with affairs associated with objects as appearances, since “how things in themselves may be is entirely beyond our cognitive sphere” and will remain unknown to us; the underlying assumption at work here is exactly that of transcendental idealism.

However, in the passage that I quoted in Section 2.3, Lovejoy downplays, if not completely ignores, transcendental idealism. For Lovejoy treats changes in objects as “externally given changes” with which the subject has nothing to do, except from passively perceiving them; the “external phenomena” are “completely disconnected from, and independent of” the activities of the subject’s mind. All these phrases indicate that Lovejoy makes an absolute distinction between the subject and the object. For Lovejoy, objects are completely independent of the subject, and the subject plays no active role in the constitutions of objects but is merely a passive perceiver being sensibly stimulated by the objects. Again, since I am concerned only with the question of how Lovejoy approaches the Second Analogy in this section, I will not assess the validity of that approach at this point. Nevertheless, it is clear that Lovejoy does not take transcendental idealism into account when he interprets the Second Analogy.

What can be argued further from here is that given that transcendental idealism assumes space and time as our pure forms of intuition, which receives a full discussion in the Transcendental Aesthetic; and given that the success of Transcendental Deduction also depends on transcendental idealism, as Kant says that “[p]ure concepts of the understanding are therefore possible, indeed necessary *a priori* in relation to experience, only because our cognition has to do with nothing but appearances, whose possibility lies in ourselves.”⁴² Thus excluding transcendental idealism from the Second Analogy at the same time alienates the

⁴² Ibid., A130, 244.

Second Analogy from those preceding chapters, for in this case the argument in the Second Analogy is no longer working under the same assumption as those of the preceding chapters.

The last piece of evidence that reveals Lovejoy's approach to the Second Analogy can be seen in his attitudes towards how to read the Second Analogy as a response to Hume's skepticism about causal principles. In the introduction of the article, Lovejoy states that "Kant's *only* reasons" for defending the principle of causality "are to be found in the argument of the Second Analogy,"⁴³ which suggests that, in Lovejoy's opinion, the Second Analogy *alone* constitutes Kant's answer to Hume. This presupposition then affects Lovejoy's interpretation of the thesis of the Second Analogy since, as Lovejoy says, "[y]et if the thesis of the Second Analogy – that 'every event follows upon an antecedent event according to a rule' – is meant to have any relevancy to Hume's problem, it should mean that every event has some determinate antecedent and that it can be certainly known a priori that the same kind of antecedent will in all instances be followed by the same kind of consequent."⁴⁴ Without drawing any textual support from the Second Analogy, the presupposition that the Second Analogy constitutes Kant's answer to Hume seems to be the sole reason behind such an interpretation. In other words, the logic behind Lovejoy's interpretation must be something like this: the Second Analogy is the only place in the *Critique* where Kant aims to answer Hume's skepticism about causal principles, so the thesis of the Second Analogy must be a theory that Hume denies but Kant aims to establish, i.e. a proof of the universality and necessity of particular causal principles. By assigning a unique task to Kant's argument in the Second Analogy, Lovejoy simultaneously excludes the possibility that the Second Analogy needs to work together with other parts of the *Critique* in order to provide a proper response to Hume, and the possibility that the Second Analogy is

⁴³ Lovejoy, "On Kant's Reply to Hume," 286. My emphasis.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

not concerned or not just concerned with establishing the universality and necessity of particular causal principles. Instead, Lovejoy detaches the Second Analogy from its general context and argues that if the Second Analogy alone did not offer an adequate response to Hume, it would then be sufficient to conclude that Kant ultimately fails to respond to Hume, and thus that the Second Analogy contains a flawed argument.

For the reasons illustrated above, I believe that Lovejoy, in his “On Kant’s Reply to Hume,” tends to treat the Second Analogy as a stand-alone piece of argument that can be approached without making references to other arguments in other parts of the *Critique*. I will now turn to discuss why I would like to take the opposite approach that the Second Analogy should be embedded in the *Critique* (the Transcendental Analytic in particular) and be read against this more general context.

The first thing that needs to be noticed is that, as Graham Bird rightly points out, “Kant begins [the Second Analogy] by recalling, and presupposing, the resources he claims to have established in the First Analogy with respect to substance, and he goes on in the Second Analogy to extend the argument to [occurrences].”⁴⁵ This suggests that (i) without what has been established in the First Analogy, we cannot proceed to consider what has been discussed in the Second Analogy; (ii) the argument made in the Second Analogy is an extension of the argument made in the First Analogy. If we can find textual support for both propositions, then it cannot be doubted that the Second Analogy should be read in conjunction the First Analogy.

Let us start with proposition (i). In short, what has been established in the First Analogy, as already mentioned by Bird, is with respect to substance. As the title of the First Analogy suggests, Kant aims to demonstrate in the First Analogy the “[p]rinciple of the

⁴⁵ Graham Bird, “Kant’s Transcendental Arguments,” in *Reading Kant*, ed. Eva Schaper and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 27.

persistence of substance,” which is that “[a]ll appearances contain that which persists (**substance**) as the object itself, and that which can change as its mere determination, i.e., a way in which the object exists”;⁴⁶ or, as Kant rephrases it in the second edition, “[i]n all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.”⁴⁷ That is, during an “alteration,” which is defined by Kant as “a way of existing that succeeds another way of existing of the very same object,” the substance is that which persists; what changes is only the state of the substance.⁴⁸ A substance as such is “the substratum” of all appearances, and by “substratum,” Kant means the “persistent form of inner intuition,” i.e. time.⁴⁹ This does not mean that substance is time, but substance is “the empirical representation” of time, and that “by which alone all time-determination is possible.”⁵⁰ This means that since time itself cannot be perceived, it is only through a substance and changes in states of the substance (different appearances in relation to the substance) that the persistence of time itself, together with different temporal relations such as succession and simultaneity, can be perceived by us. Therefore, the persistence of substance is the condition of the possibility of understanding causality, for causality suggests a particular pattern of changes in states of the substance and requires succession of time as its schema.⁵¹ In the second edition of the *Critique*, Kant adds a “preliminary reminder” before the main discussion of the Second Analogy (B233), in which he reminds the reader of what alteration is, and of the fact that the substance itself does not undergo any alteration. Then, it is only by presupposing that which has already been established in the First Analogy, that

⁴⁶ Kant, *Critique*, A182, 299.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, B224, 299.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, A187/B230, 303.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, B225, 300.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, A182-3/B226, 300.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, A144/B183, 275.

Kant proceeds to consider why the order of some alterations is objectively determined, whereas others are not, as a “second point for reflection.”⁵²

As far as proposition (ii) is concerned, the argument that extends from the First Analogy to the Second Analogy is a proof of the relevant principle based on the characteristics of time. In the First Analogy, Kant’s proof of the persistence of substance, in its most succinct form, runs like this: time persists, but the persistence of time cannot be perceived and experienced by itself; rather, we can only experience the persistence of time in objects of perception. Therefore, there must be an abiding substratum that empirically represents the persistence of time and through which alone perceptions of changes in appearances are possible; such a substratum is substance. A similar line of argument can be found in the Second Analogy as well, where Kant argues that it is a necessary law of time that “the preceding time necessarily determines the following time (in that I cannot arrive at the following time except by passing through the preceding one).”⁵³ However, just as in the case of the persistence of time discussed in the First Analogy, the succession of time cannot be experienced in and by itself; so we must instead encounter the successiveness of time in appearances. Therefore, there must be an “indispensable law of the empirical representation” corresponding to the temporal series by which “the appearances of the past time determine every existence in the following time” and cannot be reversed, which refers to the principle of causality.⁵⁴

Now, by taking the First and Second Analogies together and thus embedding the Second Analogy in the “Analogies of Experience” in general, the next question that emerges is what these Analogies as a whole aim to demonstrate. The short answer provided by Kant is

⁵² Ibid., A189/B234, 305.

⁵³ Ibid., A199/B244, 310.

⁵⁴ Ibid. This argument is identified by Kemp Smith as the “Fourth Proof” of the principle of causality in the Second Analogy. For Kemp Smith’s argument, see Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1918), 375.

that all Analogies (including the Third Analogy as well) intend to show that “[e]xperience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions.”⁵⁵ This principle brings us further back to the Transcendental Deduction, since the idea conveyed by this principle corresponds to the central thesis of the Transcendental Deduction, which is that,

[A]ll experience contains in addition to the intuition of the senses, through which something is given, a **concept** of an object that is given in intuition, or appears; hence concepts of objects in general lie at the ground of all experiential cognition as *a priori* conditions; consequently the objective validity of the categories, as *a priori* concepts, rests on the fact that through them alone is experience possible (as far as the form of thinking is concerned).⁵⁶

This suggests that pure, or *a priori*, concepts of understanding, i.e. categories, make the connection of perceptions necessary; experience is possible only through pure concepts of understanding.

One may wonder at this point that if the central theses of the Transcendental Deduction and the Analogies are exactly the same, then why the Analogies are still needed? In other words, if the Transcendental Deduction has already successfully established the condition of the possibility of experience, then the Analogies would appear to be redundant. The answer to this question lies in the fact that although both the Transcendental Deduction and the Analogies are concerned with conditions of experiential cognitions, the Transcendental Deduction is on pure *concepts* of understanding, whereas the Analogies exposit what can be called as pure *principles* of understanding, or pure principles of experience, given that these principles are applied directly to empirical representations. It is true that both pure concepts and pure principles are conditions of experiences, and each pure concept corresponds to a pure principle, but the difference is that pure concepts cannot be applied directly to empirical representations; they must be “schematized” and become pure principles first before they can be employed to synthesize empirical representations.

⁵⁵ Kant, *Critique*, B218, 295.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, A93/B126, 224.

In order to explain this more clearly, let us consider the structure of the Transcendental Analytic. The Transcendental Analytic is divided into two books, the first book is the Analytic of Concepts, where the Transcendental Deduction takes place, and the second book is the Analytic of Principles, which contains the Analogies. In the Analytic of Concepts, Kant is concerned with an “**analysis of the faculty of understanding** itself, in order to research the possibility of *a priori* concepts by seeking them only in the understanding as their birthplace and analyzing its pure use in general.”⁵⁷ However, it is not at this place that Kant considers the use of pure concepts in experience; we will pursue pure concepts in the human understanding, but we need to wait “until the opportunity of experience” comes and then see how the pure concepts can be “finally developed and exhibited in their clarity by the very same understanding.”⁵⁸ This is a task to be finished in the Analytic of Principles, where Kant says: “The analytic of principles will accordingly be solely a canon for the power of judgement that teaches it to apply to appearances the concepts of the understanding, which contain the condition for rules *a priori*.”⁵⁹ This suggests that pure concepts are the conditions for pure rules or principles; pure concepts become pure principles when they are applied to empirical representations (as appearances).

The Analytic of Principles is in turn divided into three chapters, and it is in the first chapter, “On the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding,” that Kant answers the questions why pure concepts need to become pure principles when they are applied to empirical representations and how pure concepts can become pure principles. Kant notes that in order to subsume an object under a concept, the representation of the object has to be homogeneous with the concept. For example, we can subsume plate under the concept of circle because “the empirical concept of a **plate** has homogeneity with the pure geometrical

⁵⁷ Ibid., A65-6/B90, 202.

⁵⁸ Ibid., A66/B91, 203.

⁵⁹ Ibid., A132/B171, 267.

concept of a **circle**, for the roundness that is thought in the former can be intuited in the latter.”⁶⁰ However, in the case of empirical representations and pure concepts of understanding, the subsumption of the former under the latter and the application of the latter to the former are impossible because empirical representations are entirely unhomogeneous with pure concepts, for pure concepts are entirely *a priori* but we cannot encounter anything *a priori* in empirical representations. Therefore, Kant argues, we need a “third thing, which must stand in homogeneity with the category [pure concept] on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter.”⁶¹ As a mediating representation, this third thing must have something in common with both sides, i.e. it must be pure on the one hand and empirical on the other.

Kant calls such a representation the “transcendental schema” of pure concepts of understanding, and it is nothing but “transcendental time-determination,” for time is “homogeneous with the **category** (which constitutes its unity) insofar as it is **universal** and rests on a rule *a priori*. But it is on the other hand homogeneous with the **appearance** insofar as **time** is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold”;⁶² i.e. as discussed in the Transcendental Aesthetics, time is the pure form of empirical intuitions. By taking time as the schema of pure concepts, not only pure concepts, after being schematized, can be applied to empirical representations, but the use of pure concepts is also restricted; that is, the schematized pure concepts can only be employed in human experiences and applied to objects as appearances, where time and space are the pure forms of intuition. Thus, it is in the light of the schema, the use of pure concepts of understanding for the synthesis of empirical representations is authorized, and concepts become principles. It is after all these discussions

⁶⁰ Ibid., A137/B176, 271.

⁶¹ Ibid., A138/B177, 272.

⁶² Ibid., A138-9/B177-8, 272.

that Kant proceeds to the Analogies in the second chapter of the *Analytic of Principles*, where the pure principles derived from the corresponding pure concepts received full elaboration.

In the case of the Second Analogy, the pure concept behind the principle of causality is “Causality and Dependence,”⁶³ and the schema of causality is the succession of time, as Kant says: “The schema of the cause and of the causality of a thing in general is the real upon which, whenever it is posited, something else always follows. It therefore consists in the succession of the manifold insofar as it is subject to a rule.”⁶⁴ The pure concept of “Causality and Dependence” becomes the principle of causality when it gets schematized and applied to the empirical manifolds. Therefore, it is not accidental that the thesis of the Analogies corresponds to that of the Transcendental Deduction, since it is in the Transcendental Deduction that Kant first discovers the pure concept corresponds to the principle of causality and explains our lawful (*quid juris*) possession of such pure concept.

In addition to this consistency in thesis, another evidence that reveals the integration of the Analogies (the Second Analogy in particular) and the Transcendental Deduction can be found in the Transcendental Deduction where Kant says:

I take, e.g., the concept of cause, which signifies a particular kind of synthesis, in which given something *A* something entirely different *B* is posited according to a rule. It is not clear *a priori* why appearances should contain anything of this sort (one cannot adduce experiences for the proof, for the objective validity of this *a priori* concept must be able to be demonstrated), and it is therefore *a priori* doubtful whether such a concept is not perhaps entirely empty and finds no object anywhere among the appearances.⁶⁵

In this passage, Kant uses the concept of cause to illustrate the problem of why experiences must be governed by such *a priori* concepts of our understanding, a problem not yet solved at this point but to be discussed and solved in the Second Analogy by answering what Lovejoy calls the “psychological conundrum” mentioned in Section One. To some extent, Kant

⁶³ Ibid., A80/B106, 212.

⁶⁴ Ibid., A144/B183, 275.

⁶⁵ Ibid., A90/B122, 222.

already has the Second Analogy in mind when he is still at the stage of the Transcendental Deduction.

There are still more passages in the Transcendental Deduction that can serve as ties to bind the Transcendental Deduction and the Second Analogy together, but they cannot be discussed without simultaneously refuting Lovejoy's criticisms of the Second Analogy, which is beyond the scope of the current section. So, I think this is a good point to conclude this section and move forward. Based on what has been discussed, I believe that, in contrast to Lovejoy, the Second Analogy should be read together with the Transcendental Deduction, Schematism, and the First Analogy, which, taken together, more or less constitute the entire Transcendental Analytic. In addition, with the principle of transcendental idealism and the idea that time is the pure form of our inner intuition as underlying assumptions, the Second Analogy should really be embedded in the *Critique* and interpreted by taking into account this general context. Ironically, however, in the process of sorting out the preliminary question of how to approach the Second Analogy, more problems regarding the meanings of certain terms and principles and concerning the problems of Lovejoy's approach have been brought to light, which I will keep in mind and gradually address throughout the rest of the thesis.

§4. Responses to Lovejoy

Recall from Section Two, Lovejoy raised four inter-connected objections against the validity of Kant's argument in the Second Analogy, which can be summarized as follows: (i) Kant fails to prove that the principle of causality is the basis of the distinction between subjective and objective perceptions of change. (ii) Kant fails to prove that the principle of causality is the basis of the distinction between perceptions of change/moving objects and of

permanence/stationary objects. (iii) Kant commits the *non-sequitur* when he concludes that we can know *a priori* that a particular type of antecedent will in all instances be followed by the same type of consequent. (iv) Kant fails to respond to Hume's skepticism concerning particular causal principles.

Despite Lovejoy's criticisms being particularly severe, they have not yet drawn enough attention or have received adequate responses. To my knowledge, Henry Allison and Lewis White Beck have each tried to offer a response to Lovejoy. In general, Allison and Beck identify the *non-sequitur* that Lovejoy claims to find in the Second Analogy with another *non-sequitur* that Strawson claims to find in the same text.⁶⁶ As a result, they believe that Lovejoy and Strawson can be responded to at the same time with the same response, and for some reason, both of them place much more emphasis on the Strawson-*non-sequitur* instead of the Lovejoy-*non-sequitur*, probably with the underlying thought that if we could adequately respond to Strawson, Lovejoy would be automatically responded to as well.

I believe that their responses are inadequate, precisely because they conflate the two *non-sequiturs*. The *non-sequitur* Strawson has in mind is different from that of Lovejoy, since, as Van Cleve puts it, "the fallacy [Lovejoy] blames on Kant consists in supposing that what hold of perceptions on one occasion holds of them on all, rather than in supposing (as in Strawson's fallacy) that what holds of perceptions holds of their objects." As mentioned in section 2.3, Lovejoy just implicitly indicated the subject-reality problem raised by Strawson, but the major part of his criticism has nothing to do with the subject-reality problem. Therefore, a response to the Strawson-*non-sequitur* alone will not suffice to defend Kant from the Lovejoy-*non-sequitur*. Consequently, Allison and Beck fail to defend Kant properly and entirely from Lovejoy's criticisms.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (Routledge: London, 1966), 133-140.

⁶⁷ For more detailed discussions, see Henry E. Allison, "Kant's Non-Sequitur: An Examination of the Lovejoy Strawson Critique of the Second Analogy," *Kant-Studien* 62, no. 3 (1971): 367-377; Lewis White

I will now re-examine Lovejoy's objections and try to defend Kant properly from them. The general strategy is to reveal the problems in Lovejoy's arguments by focusing on and re-interpreting Kant's arguments in the Second Analogy.

4.1. Response to the First Objection

Starting with the first objection. Recall that, for Lovejoy, Kant fails to establish the principle of causality as the basis of the distinction between subjective and objective perceptions of change, when "subjective" and "objective" are taken as indications of dreaming and waking states. In my opinion, this argument is problematic because it rests on a misunderstanding of "subjective" and "objective"; when these terms are used by Kant in the context of the Second Analogy, they do not refer to dreaming and waking states.

As mentioned in Section Three, there is simply no textual support to define "subjective" and "objective" in the way Lovejoy suggests, for Kant neither indicates that they should be interpreted in that way nor clearly defines them in the Second Analogy. More importantly, if Lovejoy was correct, this would suggest that Kant is concerned with the problem of distinguishing dream and reality in the Second Analogy, which is inconsistent with the theme of the Analogies. The Analogies of Experience are three analogies of *veridical* experience, for Kant defines experience at the start of the Analogies as "an empirical cognition, i.e., a cognition that determines an object through perceptions."⁶⁸

Certainly, we can claim that we also have experiences in dreams, but such experiences are by no means empirical cognitions, for we do not determine the objects in our dreams through

Beck, "Six Short Pieces on the Second Analogy of Experience," in *Essays on Hume and Kant* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 130-164; James Van Cleve, *Problems from Kant* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 127n15; P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (Routledge: London, 1966), 133-140. I will also come back and examine these texts later in section 4.4, where I address the subject-reality problem.

⁶⁸ Kant, *Critique*, A176/B218, 295.

perceptions; rather, the objects in our dreams are created by ourselves, maybe out of our imagination, that do not require the presence of the physical objects. Thus, by defining experience as an empirical cognition, Kant makes it clear that in the three Analogies, he concerns only with affairs in reality.

The point that Kant concerns solely with veridical experience can also be supported by Kant's use of the term "appearance" in the Second Analogy. One may have already noticed from the previous discussion that, as far as my discussion is concerned, the term "appearance" has two different meanings in the context of the *Critique*. On the one hand, it refers to objects as appearances, in contrast to objects as things in themselves, as we have seen in the analysis of transcendental idealism. On the other hand, it is used interchangeably with empirical or sensible representations/intuitions, in cases where the objects as appearances designated by the empirical representations have not yet been determined. For example, in the Schematism, Kant says: "Now it is clear that there must be a third thing, which must stand in homogeneity with the category [pure concept] on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter."⁶⁹ As we will see later, Kant believes that the constitutions of objects as appearances require both empirical representations and concepts (pure and empirical). Therefore, if the appearance in this statement meant an object as appearance, it would indicate that the category has already been applied to and contained in the appearance; that is, the appearance would have been in homogeneity with the category already, and the third thing would no longer be needed, which is obviously in contrast to what Kant means to suggest. So, the appearance in the above statement cannot mean the object as appearance but must refer to the manifold of empirical representations, for at this point, the appearance is still entirely *a posteriori* in nature and has nothing in common with the category.

⁶⁹ Ibid., A138/B177, 272.

In the Second Analogy, I believe that when Kant uses the term “appearance,” he means the empirical representation rather than the object as appearance. This is mainly because the Second Analogy presupposes what has been established in the First Analogy, i.e. substance, and continues to consider only the alterations of the states of the substance, not the substance itself. For example, Kant states that “I perceive that appearances succeed one another, i.e., that a state of things exists at one time the opposite of which existed in the previous state”;⁷⁰ and, in what Lovejoy calls the “psychological conundrum,” “[t]he apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive. . . . Whether they also succeed in the object is the second point of reflection, which is not contained in the first.”⁷¹ In the first statement, appearance clearly refers to the “state of things,” not the things themselves, and in the second statement, Kant draws a distinction between appearance and the object as appearance.⁷²

Taking appearance as empirical representation instead of object as appearance does not mean Kant takes non-veridical experience into account. On the contrary, as empirical representation, the use of the term “appearance” suggests that Kant is only concerned with veridical experience. The definition of empirical representation or empirical intuition can be found in the Transcendental Aesthetics, where Kant writes,

In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is **intuition**. This, however, takes place only insofar as the object is given to us. . . . The capacity (receptivity) to acquire *representations* through the way in which we are affected by objects is called **sensibility**. Objects are therefore **given** to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us **intuitions**. . . . The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is **sensation**. That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called **empirical**.⁷³

⁷⁰ Ibid., B233, 304.

⁷¹ Ibid., A189/B234, 305.

⁷² Recall from the Section Three that the transcendental idealism is underlying assumption of Kant’s argument here, so the object is object as appearance, not object as thing in itself.

⁷³ Kant, *Critique*, A19-20/B33-34, 172.

Thus, we need to perceive and be sensibly stimulated by a physical object in order to obtain empirical representations/intuitions, which will not take place in dreams.

In addition, Kant says in the Second Analogy that appearances are “the only thing that can be given to us for cognition.”⁷⁴ The term “given” indicates that the source of appearances is other than the subject. Appearances are accordingly not something that can be dreamed, imagined, or created by us for cognition; rather, they are given to us as empirical intuitions for cognition by external objects. This point gets further illustrated in the house and ship examples. In describing these two scenarios, Kant uses phrases such as “a house that stands before me,” “something happens,” “a reality,” and “be empirically perceived,”⁷⁵ all of which indicate that Kant has two real-life scenarios in mind, in which we actually perceive a stationary house and a ship sailing downstream. Although what Kant argues may be insufficient to appease those who are particularly concerned with the distinction between dream and reality, as far as Kant himself is concerned, I think it is sufficient enough to demonstrate that Kant is not concerned with non-veridical experience in the Second Analogy.

In my view, in the context of the Second Analogy, “subjective” and “objective” are indications of whether the synthesis of empirical representations is in accordance with rules. That is, in what Kant calls a “subjective sequence of apprehension,” there are no rules that determine how we should synthesize our perceptions, but in an “objective sequence of appearance,” the synthesis of perceptions is in accordance with rules, and the resulting appearance of the synthesis corresponds to an object.

In order to fully demonstrate this, we need to return to and examine the second section of the A edition of the Transcendental Deduction, where Kant first considers problems associated with objectivity. As we will see, the concerns and arguments in this

⁷⁴ Ibid., A190/B235, 306. Italics added.

⁷⁵ Ibid., A192/B237-238, 306-307.

section are later reformulated when Kant introduces the house example in the Second Analogy; for this reason, the house example can be used as an illustration of what Kant discusses in this section of the Transcendental Deduction. Therefore, it is helpful if we read this section of the Transcendental Deduction and the relevant parts of the Second Analogy comparatively.

First, consider the following two passages from the Transcendental Deduction and the Second Analogy respectively:

And here then it is necessary to make understood what is meant by the expression “an object of representations.” We have said above that appearances themselves are nothing but sensible representations, which must not be regraded in themselves, in the same way, as objects (outside the power of representation). What does one mean, then, if one speaks of an object corresponding to and therefore also distinct from the cognition? It is easy to see that this object must be thought of only as something in general = X , since outside of our cognition we have nothing that we could set over against this cognition as corresponding to it.⁷⁶

Now one can, to be sure, call everything, and even every representation, insofar as one is conscious of it, an object; only what this word is to mean in the case of appearances, not insofar as they are (as representations) objects, but rather only insofar as they designate an object, requires a deeper investigation.⁷⁷

In both passages, Kant is concerned with the same question: what do we mean when we speak of an “object”? When we interact with the external world, what we originally acquire is a manifold of appearances in the form of sensible representations, which, as mentioned above, are the only things that are given to us for cognitions. Then, by being given these sensible representations, we speak of an “object.” Therefore, such an object must, first of all, correspond to these representations, for these representations are what the object refers to. Second, the object must at the same time be distinct from any single representation or a mere sum of these representations. For example, if we take a house as an object, and take the different parts of the house to represent sensible representations, then it is obvious that when

⁷⁶ Ibid., A104, 231.

⁷⁷ Ibid., A189-190/B234-235, 305.

we speak of the house, we are referring to the door, the window, and the rooftop that we see in a particular place; however, the house is different from any of these single parts of the house, or a mere sum of these parts. Suppose we place the door, the window, and the rooftop next to each other, this assemblage is certainly different from the house.

Surely, as Kant claims, we can still call everything or every representation an object, but only in the sense that the object corresponds to the representation, and the representation designates an object, not in the sense that these representations are objects themselves, since they are, after all, distinct from the objects they represent. Therefore, in any circumstances, with regard to any manifold of representations, when we speak of an object, we mean something in general, a “X,” that corresponds to the representations, while at the same time remaining distinct from them.

Upon further reflections, Kant notices another important characteristic of the *X*, which is that once the *X* is posited, it instills necessity to the way we synthesize representations, as Kant states that,

We find, however, that our thought of the relation of all cognition to its object carries something of necessity with it, since namely the latter is regarded as that which is opposed to our cognitions being determined at pleasure or arbitrarily rather than being determined *a priori*, since insofar as they are to relate to an object our cognitions must also necessarily agree with each other in relation to it, i.e., they must have that unity that constitutes the concept of an object.⁷⁸

Here that which lies in the successive apprehension is considered as representation, but the appearance that is given to me, in spite of the fact that it is nothing more than a sum of these representations, is considered as their object, with which my concept, which I draw from the representations of apprehension, is to agree.⁷⁹

The meanings of these two passages can be more easily understood by taking the house example as an illustration. When we perceive a house, we apprehend the different parts of the house as sensible representations successively, and the appearance that is given to us is

⁷⁸ Ibid., A104-105, 231.

⁷⁹ Ibid., A191/B236, 306.

simply a sum of these representations.⁸⁰ As long as we consider and recognize that these representations designate an object, which is a house in this case, then the way in which we synthesize these representations cannot be randomly determined. We cannot, for instance, put the rooftop under the door; instead, we must combine the different parts of the house according to the concept of house, so that the resulting appearance agrees with the house as an object. Thus, for example, in the case of seeing a regular house, in order for its appearance to correspond to the house as an object, we must combine the different parts of the house in a determined manner, such that the door and the window are embedded in the wall, the window is slightly above the door, and the roof is at the very top of the house, etc. In this way, the concept of house makes one way of combining the different parts of the house (as sensible representations) necessary; the appearance that corresponds to the house brought about by this synthesis is unique and distinct from any other random appearances, and our cognition of the house first becomes possible because of its concept.

In prior discussions, it has been mentioned several times that Kant believes that our mind, or consciousness, plays an important role in the constitution of objects. This point also gets fully explained at this place by appealing to the *X*. Kant argues that “[e]very necessity has a transcendental condition as its ground”;⁸¹ and by “transcendental condition,” Kant means something that is prior to experience through which experience becomes possible. Given that the *X* instills necessity to the empirical representations, so the *X* must have a transcendental ground. According to Kant, this transcendental ground of the *X* is the “transcendental apperception,” which is our “pure, original, unchanging consciousness” that synthesizes the manifold of empirical representations into one experience in accordance with

⁸⁰ This is not entirely accurate, for the different parts of the house are not undetermined sensible representations; rather, they are objects as appearances just like the house itself, which contain concepts that serve as rules of synthesis. Therefore, the house example at this place should be taken as a metaphor for the sake of clarification, which suggests us to *suppose* that the different parts of the house are sensible representations, and the house is the object of appearance that these representations represent.

⁸¹ Kant, *Critique*, A106, 232.

rules. In other words, it is we ourselves that supply and apply the *X*, as a rule of synthesis, to the empirical representations and make experiences of objects possible. This does not mean that the *X* alone, as the pure concept of “transcendental object,”⁸² makes experiences possible. In fact, neither the empirical representations nor the *X* can make experiences possible on its own; empirical representations without the *X* would remain as a manifold of undetermined representations, but unrestricted use of the *X* without or beyond empirical representations will lead to illusion. Rather, the empirical representations and the rules of synthesis must work together in order to constitute objects and make objective experiences possible.

Thus, when the term “object” or “objective” appears in the Transcendental Deduction and the Second Analogy, it indicates a necessary way of synthesis of empirical representations according to concepts or principles. Despite “subjective” not being explicitly defined, given the context, it is simply the opposite of “objective,” i.e. “our cognitions being determined at pleasure or arbitrarily,”⁸³ in which case a rule of synthesis is lacking.

Similar to the concept of house, the principle of causality, i.e. everything that happens presupposes something which it follows, which derives from the pure concept of “Causality and Dependence,” is also a rule of synthesis. When we perceive a moving object, we acquire a manifold of representations just like when we perceive a house, the principle of causality makes one way of combining these representations determined and necessary, and the occurrence brought about by this synthesis agrees with the moving object and is unique and distinct from any other random occurrences.

The function of the principle of causality can be illustrated by the ship example. When we perceive a ship sailing downstream, we originally only have a manifold of discrete

⁸² Ibid., A109, 233.

⁸³ Ibid., A104, 231.

images that each represents the ship's position at a particular place along the ship's path, from upstream to downstream, at a particular instant; it is only with the help of the principle of causality that we can synthesize these discrete images into a consistent whole in a determinate way that represents the movement of a ship from upstream to downstream as an occurrence. It is true that the principle of causality is not the only rule of synthesis that is involved in the cognition of the moving ship, since, for example, the principle of substance is also required in order to constitute the ship, as the object of experience, by synthesizing the different parts of the ship in a determinate way, nevertheless the principle of causality is no doubt one of the conditions of the possibility of cognizing the occurrence as such; it is especially required to capture the *movement* of the object and make our perceptions of the representations to be *temporally determined*. These will become clearer when we proceed to the following section.

By taking "subjective" and "objective" as indications of the existence of rules of synthesis, some people might disagree with my way of reading the house and ship examples because, according to this new definition of "subjective" and "objective," both examples become illustrations of "objective sequence of appearance," since rules of synthesis are present in both cases. However, according to some commentators, the house example should be an illustration of "subjective sequence of apprehension," in contrast to the ship example, which represents an "objective sequence of appearance," as Kant himself also contrasts these examples at several instances in the Second Analogy.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ For example, see Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 365, where Kemp Smith states that "[w]hen we apprehend any very large object, such as a house, though we do so by successively perceiving the different parts of it, we never think of regarding these successive perceptions as representing anything successive in the house. On the other hand, when we apprehend successive events in time, such as the successive positions of a ship sailing downstream, we do regard the succession of our experiences as representing objective succession in what is apprehended. Kant therefore feels justified in taking as fact, that we have the power of distinguishing between subjective and objective succession, *i.e.* between sequences which are determined by the order of our attentive experience and sequences which are given as such. It is this fact affords Kant a precise method of formulating the problem of the second Analogy, viz. *how consciousness of objective change, as distinguished from subjective succession, is possible?*" Also, see Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, 244-246, where Guyer treats Kant's argument in A190-193/B235-238 as a consistent whole,

It appears to me that this reading of the house and ship examples confuses “subjective sequence of apprehension” with subjective sequence of perceptions and confuses “objective sequence of appearance” with objective sequence of perceptions. In other words, according to this interpretation, the order of perceptions in a “subjective sequence of apprehension” is definitely subjective and undetermined, and conversely, the order of perceptions in an “objective sequence of appearance” is definitely objective and determined. However, it should be clear from what I have argued, in the context of the Second Analogy, the existence of rules of synthesis is the only criterion for distinguishing an “objective sequence of appearance” from a “subjective sequence of apprehension,” and the order of perceptions does not play a role in making this distinction; it is possible that in an “objective sequence of appearance,” the order of perceptions is undetermined and reversible just like our perceptions of a stationary house. By this interpretation, both the house and ship examples should represent “objective sequence of appearance,” since there are rules of synthesis involved in both cases.

It is true that there are instances in the Second Analogy where Kant contrasts the two examples by emphasizing their difference in terms of the order of perceptions, but this does not go against the idea of taking both examples as representing “objective sequence of appearance,” since there is no contradiction in taking both examples as representing “objective sequence of appearance,” while at the same time representing two different kinds of “objective sequence of appearance.” It has been demonstrated that a rule of synthesis serves as the sole basis of the distinction between a “subjective sequence of apprehension” and an “objective sequence of appearance,” so the house and ship examples cannot be contrasted at this level, and Kant certainly does not contrast them at this level, since both

indicating that the house and ship examples correspond to “subjective sequence of apprehension” and “objective sequence of appearance” respectively.

contain rules of synthesis that classify them under “objective sequence of appearance.”

Nevertheless, they can still be contrasted under the same category, since the rules of synthesis involved in these two examples are different, i.e. in the house example, it is the concept of a house, but in the ship example, it is the principle of causality. These two different rules of synthesis in turn determine whether our sequences of perceptions in these two cases are irreversible or not, which I will elaborate in more detail in next section.

For these reasons, I believe that there is no problem in categorizing both the house and ship examples under “objective sequence of appearance,” in contrast to “subjective sequence of apprehension.” Also, since the key difference between “subjective” and “objective” lies in whether there are rules determining the synthesis of the empirical representations, and “objective” first becomes possible because of such rules, Kant’s argument that the principle of causality, as a rule of synthesis, is the basis of the distinction between “subjective sequence of apprehension” and “objective sequence of appearance” is theoretically coherent, in contrast to what Lovejoy claims.

4.2. Response to the Second Objection

Lovejoy’s second objection suggests that the principle of causality is not required for making the distinction between perceptions of permanence and perceptions of change, and that Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy establishes nothing about the principle of causality. As it has been shown in the previous section that the principle of causality serves as the basis of the distinction between “subjective sequence of apprehension” and “objective sequence of appearance,” the latter half of the second objection has already been refuted.

As far as the criticism that the principle of causality does not play a role in distinguishing perceptions of permanence and perceptions of change is concerned, I argue

that Kant could respond to Lovejoy by pointing out that the alternative theory, provided by Lovejoy himself regarding the distinction between perceptions of stationary and of moving objects, actually presupposes Kant's theory. As a result, Lovejoy's argument fails to be an objection to Kant.

Recall from Section 2.2 that the reason Lovejoy believes we do not need the principle of causality to make the distinction between perceptions of stationary and moving objects is because he argues and believes that the distinction can be drawn simply by attending to the meanings of "permanent manifold" and "changing single object."

Before considering what Kant could say in response to this argument, we first need to fix a problem associated with Lovejoy's terminology. The problem is that the term "manifold" appears to be ambiguous. Based on what has been discussed in Section 2.2, it is clear that Lovejoy uses "permanent manifold" in referring to the house example; in which case it appears to me that there can be three different possible meanings of this term: (i) it means the house in the house example; (ii) it means the different parts of the house as a manifold of stationary objects; and (iii) it means the different parts of the house as a manifold of empirical representations. In my opinion, however, none of them will lead to a correct reading of the house example.

When Kant uses the term "manifold" in the Second Analogy, he means a manifold of empirical representations that has not yet been synthesized in accordance with rules, that is, the object designated by the manifold of representations has not been identified by us. Therefore, it would be inadequate if this term was used to refer to the house in the house example because the house in that case is not a permanent manifold of representations; rather, it is a permanent *object*.

As mentioned in Section 2.2, what Lovejoy actually means by "permanent manifold" is a permanent manifold of stationary objects, which in the context of the house example is to

treat the different parts of the house as a manifold of stationary objects. This is correct in the sense that in real life, we do regard each of the different parts of the house as an object, but it is misleading to read the house example in this way in the Second Analogy. As discussed in the previous section, what the house example supposes to illustrate is that the rule-governed synthesis of the different parts of the house is the way through which the house becomes the object of experiential cognition; in which case, the different parts of the house should be treated as the empirical representations of the house, but not as objects. If they were regarded as objects, then the house example would demonstrate how a manifold of smaller objects compose a bigger object, which is clearly not what this example means to suggest. Besides, when we read the house example comparatively with the ship example, we compare the house as a single stationary object, with the ship as a single moving object; not the different parts of the house, each as a stationary object, with the ship.

So, how about we just take “manifold” to mean the different parts of the house as a manifold of empirical representations, which is consistent with the text. The problem with this, however, is that if this was the case, then there would be no grounds to compare the “permanent manifold” with the “single moving object,” since on what grounds can we compare a manifold of undetermined empirical representations with an object?

I think the problem is not with how to interpret “manifold,” but is instead with the use of the term itself. This term should either be more specific or simply avoided. The more accurate expression of “permanent manifold” in Lovejoy’s argument should be “permanent manifold of empirical representations that designates a single object,” or we can just replace it with “permanent single object.”

After making this clear, let us proceed to consider how Kant could respond to Lovejoy’s argument. Kant could start by asking Lovejoy: “what do you mean when you speak of ‘object’”? And “how do objects become cognizable to us in the first place”? – which

are questions that Kant has asked himself in the Transcendental Deduction. As we have seen in the previous section, the answer to these questions that Kant himself gave is that when we speak of “object,” we mean something in general that corresponds to, yet is distinct from the empirical representations we perceive, which becomes cognizable to us when we synthesize the empirical representations in accordance with rules.

Another similar question that Kant could ask Lovejoy is “how do you know that some objects exist simultaneously”? This question can be asked because, in Lovejoy’s opinion, after we fix our attention on the single object the next step is to compare this object with other surrounding objects in order to determine whether this object is stationary or moving, i.e. we know the object is moving or stationary by observing its relationship to other simultaneously existing objects. The cognition of simultaneity, according to Kant, is impossible without the principle of simultaneity, which is established in the Third Analogy, suggesting that “[a]ll substances, insofar as they are simultaneous, stand in thoroughgoing community (i.e., interaction with one another)”; or, “[a]ll substances, insofar as they can be perceived in space as simultaneous, are in thoroughgoing interaction.”⁸⁵ Similar to the principle of causality, the principle of simultaneity is the necessary condition of the possibility of cognizing simultaneously existing objects.

The next question is: will Lovejoy agree with Kant’s answers to these questions? We do not know since Lovejoy neither acknowledges his agreement with Kant nor offers different answers. However, from Kant’s point of view, he would argue that Lovejoy has to agree with his answers because those are the only ways that we can cognize and have experience of objects; the rules of synthesis are the *necessary* conditions of the possibility of objects and the experience of objects. Of course, this does not mean there really are no alternative answers to those questions, since Kant might be mistaken, but any alternative

⁸⁵ Kant, *Critique*, A211/B256, 316.

answer would require one to adopt a theory of objectivity and experience that is different from that of Kant, which does not rely on the rules of synthesis to explain our ability to acquire objects and experiences. Then, what would concern us would be how to evaluate and choose between two competing theories of objectivity and experience, which is beyond the scope of this current discussion and is obviously not what Lovejoy does or aims to do in his criticism of Kant. He simply does not offer any different answers to those questions or introduce any alternative theories of objectivity and experience.

Without a well-developed alternative theory of objectivity and experience at hand, Lovejoy is vulnerable to the claim that he has to adopt the Kantian theory of objectivity and experience. In addition, what makes Lovejoy even more vulnerable is that Kant could argue that Lovejoy actually assumes the unity of synthesis for cognizing a single object. Recall that Lovejoy's argument rests on the fact that we are able to identify a single object and then fix our attention on this single object. In the case of the moving ship, although the ship contains different parts, such as the deck, the cabin, and the funnel, we can cognize it as a moving single object, because according to Lovejoy we are able to fix our attention on the ship as a whole and notice that it is moving in relation to other objects, which implies that we must first be able to synthesize the different parts of the ship into a single object. This unity of synthesis, as the necessary condition for cognizing the ship and the movement of the ship, is exactly what Kant wants to establish in the Transcendental Deduction. Therefore, although Lovejoy originally aims to offer a different explanation of our cognition of the moving ship, he unintentionally slips back into the theoretical framework set up by Kant in the Transcendental Deduction.

As a result, Kant would not disagree with Lovejoy that we can make the distinction between perceptions of stationary and moving objects by analyzing the meanings of "permanent single object" and "moving single object"; it is which part of the phrases we

should pay attention to that requires further investigation. In both phrases, the “object,” be it either a house or a ship, refers to the rule-governed synthesis of a manifold of empirical representations. The difference between the two phrases, rather, lies in whether the object is “permanent” or “moving.” The rules of synthesis required to cognize moving objects are different from those required to cognize stationary ones.

This brings us back to the point that was left over from the last section, where I argued that both the house and ship examples represent “objective sequence of appearance,” but they can still be contrasted under the same category because they represent two different kinds of objective sequence of appearances, which involve different rules of synthesis. More specifically, the house example represents an objective sequence of appearance of a stationary object, whereas the ship example represents an objective sequence of appearance of a moving object. The rule of synthesis that is involved in the ship example, but not in the house example, is the principle of causality, which makes the cognition of the “moving” or the movement of the ship possible and thus distinguishes it as a different kind of experience from the experience of seeing the stationary house.

The reason why the principle of causality can help us in making this distinction is because it introduces a kind of irreversibility. By irreversibility, I do not mean that the principle of causality makes the order of our perceptions irreversible like many other commentators have suggested; rather, I agree with Henry Allison that,

[I]rreversibility does not refer to a given perceptual order, which we can inspect and then infer that it is somehow determined by the object; it refers rather to the conceptual *ordering* of the understanding through which it determines the thought of an object (in this case objective succession).⁸⁶

That is, the principle of causality makes the way that we *think* an occurrence (objective succession) determinate and irreversible: it makes the way that we synthesize the perceptions

⁸⁶ Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 251.

of the empirical representations determinate and irreversible. This is because the principle of causality, which derives from the pure concept “Causality and Dependence,” with the order of time as its schema, introduces the successiveness and irreversibility of time to our conceptual order; unlike, for instance, the principle of substance, which only considers the content but not the order of time when it is used to synthesize the empirical manifolds.

Surely, those who believe that it is our perceptual order that is made irreversible by the principle of causality will disagree with Allison and my interpretation; but I insist that their reading is inadequate, and it is more contextually consistent to take irreversibility as referring to our conceptual order. First of all, consider the order of our perceptions in the house and ship examples. In both cases, our perceptual orders are irreversible, simply because time itself is always irreversible. It is true that in the ship example, if we see the ship at A at time t_1 and at B at time t_2 , then our perceptual order must be $A-B$ and cannot be $B-A$. However, this is equally true in the house example, in which case if we see, for instance, the door of the house at time t_1 and the window at time t_2 , then as long as the observation actually takes place in this order, our perceptual order must be door-window and cannot be window-door because time is irreversible, in that we cannot go back from t_2 to t_1 and start the observation all over again. In fact, this is precisely what concerns Kant in the Second Analogy, that we cannot know whether the successiveness pertains to the object itself simply by attending to the order of our perceptions of the object because our perceptual order is always successive and irreversible, which is in turn due to the fact that time is always successive and irreversible. Therefore, it would really be pointless and redundant if the irreversibility introduced by the principle of causality was again in respect to our perceptual order; we do not need the principle of causality in order to know the successiveness of our perceptual order, and the principle in this case would not help us in any way to solve what Lovejoy calls the “psychological conundrum.” Second, we should not forget that the

principle of causality is a pure principle of *our* understanding. This suggests that when it synthesizes the perceptions of empirical representations, it does not change or determine the empirical representations or our perceptions of them; rather, it is a matter of how we, as the subjects, *think* the empirical representations and our perceptions of them.

For these reasons, I believe that the principle of causality makes the order of our thinking but not our perceptions of the empirical representations irreversible. By this understanding, what the ship example demonstrates is that,

[I]f I judge that I am perceiving a change in the position of the ship from point *A* at t_1 to point *B* at t_2 , then I must also think the order of my perceptions as determined, that is, I must think this order as *A-B* rather than *B-A*. One can, of course, imagine a different order of perceptions; but doing so one is imaging a different event, for example, a ship sailing in the opposite direction.⁸⁷

Conversely, the house example demonstrates that if we judge that we are perceiving a stationary house from the door at t_1 to the window at t_2 , despite the order of our perceptions being irreversible, we do not need to *think* it as determined and irreversible, that is, we can conceptually combine them as door-window or window-door; the order of the synthesis does not affect our cognition of the house as the object.

In my opinion, this is also what Kant means when he says, “I still have to show what sort of combination in time pertains to the manifold in the appearance itself even though the representation of it in apprehension is always successive.”⁸⁸ In the house example, our apprehension of the house is successive, but this successiveness does not pertain to the house itself because when we synthesize the manifolds by the concept of house, this concept does not introduce a determined conceptual order of synthesis; since no matter how we perceive the house, either from the door to the window or from the window to the door, as long as these different parts of the house are synthesized in the right manner (e.g. the door and the

⁸⁷ Ibid., 250.

⁸⁸ Kant, *Critique*, A190/B235.

window are embedded in the wall and the roof is at the very top), then the resulting appearance will agree with the house as an object. On the other hand, in the ship case, our apprehension of the moving ship is successive, and this successiveness also pertains to the ship itself because when we synthesize the manifolds by the principle of causality, the principle does introduce a determined conceptual order of synthesis; that is, the cause precedes the effect. Therefore, in order for the occurrence to agree with the moving object, the order of our perceptions becomes fixed once the principle of causality is employed during the synthesis. Only by attending to the nature of the rule of synthesis can we determine the order of perceptions and thus make the distinction between perceptions of stationary objects and perceptions of moving objects.

4.3. Response to the Third Objection

Let us now proceed to examine Lovejoy's third objection, which contends that Kant commits the *non-sequitur* in the Second Analogy when he concludes that in the virtue of the principle of causality, we know *a priori* that a particular type of antecedent will in all instances be followed by the same type of consequent. Recall from Section 2.3 that Lovejoy reaches this conclusion in two different ways: (i) it naturally follows from the first two objections that Kant's proof in the Second Analogy has nothing to do with the principle of causality, so any conclusion regards the apriority of the principle of causality based on that irrelevant proof must be invalid. (ii) Even if Kant was right, what he merely shows is that we need the principle of causality to connect the different states of the object, but this does not prove that the object itself is governed by that principle. As mentioned above, point (ii) actually brings up another problem, which I refer to as the subject-reality problem, that concerns the gap between what we perceive or believe and how things really are. Despite

Lovejoy embeds the subject-reality problem into the third objection, this problem still requires a separate response. For this reason, I will only deal with point (i) in this section and leave the response to point (ii) for the next section.

Although point (i) suggests that the third objection is, in large part, based on the first two objections, adequate responses to the first two objections do not automatically respond to the third objection. This is because even if Kant has successfully established that the principle of causality is the basis of the distinction between subjective and objective perceptions of change, and is also the basis of the distinction between perceptions of stationary and moving objects, he would still not be able to conclude from here that we know *a priori* that a particular kind of antecedent will in all instances be followed by the same kind of consequent; the fallacy of this conclusion can be easily revealed by observing occurrences in real life, as Lovejoy points out. Therefore, if this was Kant's conclusion, then the *non-sequitur* would persist.

It appears to me, however, that Lovejoy unfairly attributes this conclusion to Kant due to his own misunderstanding of Kant's original conclusion. In my opinion, in contrast to what Lovejoy suggests, Kant's conclusion "if the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows" does not mean that if the *same kind* of state that precedes is posited then the *same kind* of occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows. Rather, I argue that this conclusion suggests nothing more than the well-established thesis of the Second Analogy, which is that the principle of causality is the necessary condition of the possibility of occurrence.

In fact, Lovejoy does not explicitly explain why he interprets Kant's conclusion in the way he did, but given the general context of his article I think there are at least two possible reasons behind that way of interpretation. First, Lovejoy takes "determinate occurrence" to mean "determinate kind of occurrence." Lovejoy argues that if the thesis of the Second

Analogy is meant to respond to Hume, then “it should mean that every event has some determinate antecedent and that it can be entirely known *a priori* that the same kind of antecedent will in all instances be followed by the same kind of consequent.”⁸⁹ Clearly, in this passage, Lovejoy equalizes “determinate antecedent” with “the same kind of antecedent.” Therefore, if “determinate” means “the same kind of,” then a determinate occurrence should mean “the same kind of occurrence,” that is, an occurrence that always takes place with the same kind of antecedent and the same kind of consequent. Second, we have seen that Lovejoy treats the Second Analogy as a piece of work dedicated to responding to Hume’s skepticism about necessary particular causal principles. By taking this as a presupposition, Lovejoy would inevitably believe that Kant’s conclusion in the Second Analogy aims to establish the apriority of particular causal connections between two particular types of states; because only then can the thesis of the Second Analogy have any relevancy to Hume’s problem.

In correspondence to these two reasons, we can also examine in two different ways why Lovejoy’s interpretation of Kant’s conclusion is wrong. First, there is no textual evidence, and thus is very inconsistent with the context to take “determinate occurrence” as “the same kind of occurrence.” Instead, the “determinate occurrence” in Kant’s conclusion means an occurrence that takes place in accordance with the principle of causality. Second, Lovejoy’s presupposition that Kant responds to Hume’s skepticism about particular causal principle is misleading. In my view, Kant never aims to directly respond to Hume by proving that there are *a priori* particular causal principles. On the contrary, to some extent Kant actually agrees with Hume that particular causal principles are not *a priori*. Therefore, the thesis of the Second Analogy does not have to establish the apriority of particular causal

⁸⁹ Lovejoy, “On Kant’s Reply to Hume,” 301.

principles in order to have any relevancy to Hume's problem. Let us now look at each of them in turn.

According to Norman Kemp Smith, the Second Analogy contains six proofs of the thesis that "[e]verything that happens (begins to be) presupposes something which it follows in accordance with a rule" or "[a]ll alternations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect."⁹⁰ Kant's conclusion, quoted by Lovejoy (A198/B243-244), is the conclusion of the third proof (A196-199/B241-244) which, in Kemp Smith's opinion, is a restatement of the first (A189-194/B234-239) and second proof (A194-196/B239-241).⁹¹ I do not entirely agree with Kemp Smith's division of the Second Analogy for I believe that the third proof starts at A197/B242 instead of A196/B241.⁹² However, I agree with him that the third proof is a reformulation of the arguments that Kant makes in the first and second proof. For this reason, we can read the conclusions of the three proofs comparatively and see if this could yield a better understanding of "determinate occurrence."

Here are the three conclusions:

This connection [the connection of the manifold in the object] must therefore consist in the order of the manifold of appearance in accordance with which the apprehension of one thing (that which happens) follows that of the other (which precedes) **in accordance with a rule**. Only thereby can I be justified in saying of the appearance itself, and not merely of my apprehension, that a sequence is to be encountered in it, which is to say as much as that I cannot arrange the apprehension otherwise than in exactly this sequence.⁹³

If, therefore, we experience that something happens, then we always presuppose that something else precedes it, which it follows in accordance with a rule. . . . Therefore I always make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective with respect to a rule in accordance with which the appearances in their sequence, i.e., as they occur, are determined through the preceding state, and only under this presupposition alone is the experience of something that happens even possible.⁹⁴

Thus if I perceive that something happens, then the first thing contained in this representation is that something precedes, for it is just in relation to this that the

⁹⁰ Kant, *Critique*, A189/B232, 304.

⁹¹ Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 371-375.

⁹² I will return to this point later.

⁹³ Kant, *Critique*, A193/B238, 307.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, A195/B240, 308.

appearance acquires its temporal relation, that, namely, of existing after a preceding time in which it did not. But it can only acquire its determinate temporal position in this relation through something being presupposed in the preceding state on which it always follows, i.e., follows in accordance with a rule: from which it results, first, that I cannot reverse the series and place that which happens prior to that which it follows; and, second, that if the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows.⁹⁵

“In accordance with a rule” is the phrase that appears in all three conclusions. Given the context, the “rule” refers to the principle of causality, which as the third conclusion suggests has two functions. The first function is to determine our conceptual order, thus we “cannot reverse the series and place that which happens prior to that which it follows,” or, as the first conclusion puts it, we “cannot arrange the apprehension otherwise than in exactly this sequence”; which is what we discussed in the previous section. The problem now lies in the second function of the principle of causality, where Kant speaks of “determinate occurrence.”

As the second function, it is supposed to be different from the first function. In my opinion, however, we should not be confused by the term “second”; that is, the so-called second function of the principle of causality is actually the same as the first function. The difference between the first and second function is that “I” is missing from the second function, so the second function seems to have nothing to do with the subject and are concerned solely with the states of the object. However, as we have seen in Section Three, transcendental idealism is one of the most fundamental assumptions of Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy, which holds that the constitutions of objects as appearances are not entirely independent of the subject; it is only through our mind’s synthesis of the representations in accordance with rules that objects as appearances become cognizable. Therefore, when the second function states that “if the state that precedes is posited,” it actually means that “if the state of *the object as appearance* that precedes is posited *by us*.” From this perspective, the second function is just a different expression of the first function in

⁹⁵ Ibid., A198-199/B243-244, 310.

the sense that it re-describes the function of the principle of causality from the perspective of the object as appearance, while the subject is hiding behind the scene. By following this line of thought, “determinate” should refer to the irreversibility of the conceptual order, and “determinate occurrence” indicates an occurrence with a determinate order of states, i.e. the order of what precedes and what follows is fixed and it is impossible to conceptually synthesize the occurrence in a different way. In other words, what Kant means to suggest is that when “the state that precedes is posited,” the occurrence will inevitably and necessarily take place in a determinate way due to the irreversibility of the conceptual order imposed by the principle of causality.

We can also examine this by comparing the content of the three conclusions. In all three conclusions, the parts before Kant says “in accordance with a rule” carry more or less the same meaning, but the meanings of the parts after this phrase appear to be different. In the latter part of the first conclusion, Kant emphasizes the role of the subject: that it is “I” who “cannot arrange the apprehension otherwise than in exactly this sequence,” which corresponds to the first function of the principle of causality in the third conclusion that “I cannot reverse the series and place that which happens prior to that which it follows.” On the other hand, the latter half of the second conclusion downplays the role of the subject; instead, it emphasizes the importance of the “preceding state,” through which the occurrence is determined, which corresponds to the second function of the principle of causality in the third conclusion that “if the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows.” Given what Kant argues at A189-194/B234-239 and A194-196/B239-241, I think Kemp Smith is right that the second proof is just the first proof “developed in indirect fashion”⁹⁶ without using any examples as illustrations. As a result, the conclusions of these two proofs should express the same idea as well, especially when the

⁹⁶ Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 374.

first halves (before “in accordance with a rule”) of the two conclusions seem to have the same meaning. This simultaneously suggests that the two functions of the principle of causality in the third conclusion express the same idea, which is that the principle of causality determines our conceptual order and thus makes the occurrence determinate and cognizable.

Recall that Lovejoy uses the ship example to illustrate the fallacy of the conclusion that he attributes to Kant, and this provides us with another way to see Lovejoy’s misunderstandings of both the ship example and “determinate occurrence.” The logic behind Lovejoy’s argument goes something like this: the ship example illustrates a determinate occurrence and illustrates a necessary connection between two particular states of the ship, i.e. the ship’s position upstream (antecedent) and the ship’s position downstream (consequent). Therefore, a determinate occurrence is the same as a necessary connection between a particular type of antecedent and a particular type of consequent; therefore, Kant’s conclusion “if the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows” means that we can know *a priori* that a particular type of antecedent will in all instances be followed by the same type of consequent, which is fallacious.

Lovejoy is right in saying that the ship example is a case of determinate occurrence, but he is wrong to read the ship example as if it depicted nothing more than a necessary connection between two particular states of the ship and could generalize that in all instances, the ship would always sail in this way. Kant tells us the purpose of using the ship example at A196-197/B241-242; that is, after the second proof ends and before the third proof begins:

It is therefore important to show by an example that even in experience we never ascribe sequence (of an occurrence, in which something happens that previously did not exist) to the object, and distinguish it from the subjective sequence of our apprehension, except when a rule is the ground that necessitates us to observe this order of the perceptions rather than another, indeed that it is really this necessitation that first makes possible the representation of a succession in the object.⁹⁷

⁹⁷ Kant, *Critique*, A196-197/B241-242, 309.

This passage makes it clear that what the ship example shows is that the principle of causality “necessitates” our conceptual order and “first makes possible the representation of a succession in the object,” which is just a restatement of what we have discussed in the previous section. In other words, what the ship example is supposed to demonstrate is not the apriority of the particular causal principle “the ship upstream causes the ship downstream”; rather, it is an illustration of the transcendental argument that the general transcendental principle of causality is the necessary condition of the possibility of occurrences. It is true that the ship may sail in different directions on other occasions, but as long as we can synthesize the movement of the ship in accordance with the principle of causality, we can always perceive a “determinate occurrence” by conceptually connecting the different states of the ship in a determinate and irreversible order, regardless of where the ship sails. Just like in real life, we are able to cognize the ship sailing downstream as a determinate occurrence in the way that the ship upstream precedes the ship downstream. We can also cognize the ship sailing upstream as a determinate occurrence as well, i.e. the ship downstream precedes the ship upstream.

In fact, Kant himself is aware that illustrations and examples may cause confusion, for he says in the A edition of the preface that he finds it “inadvisable” to swell the book with examples and illustrations because “[f]or the aids to clarity help in the **parts** but often confuse in the whole, since the reader cannot quickly enough attain a survey of the **whole**; and all their bright colors paint over and make unrecognizable the articulation or structure of the system, which yet matters most when it comes to judging its unity and soundness.”⁹⁸ Ironically, however, the ship example, as one of the very few examples and illustrations that Kant uses for clarification in the *Critique*, confuses Lovejoy “in the whole.” When we accurately grasp the whole, it becomes clear that the ship example, as a case of “determinate

⁹⁸ Ibid., A xix, 104.

occurrence,” illustrates the function of the principle of causality as the rule that necessitates our conceptual order and makes the cognition of the occurrence possible. In other words, a “determinate occurrence” is an occurrence that takes place in accordance with the principle of causality, and Kant’s conclusion “if the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows,” suggests the function of the principle of causality as the necessary condition of the possibility of occurrence.

Let us now examine the second reason for Lovejoy’s interpretation of Kant’s conclusion. In his article “A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant,” Lewis White Beck notices that Hume raises two different questions concerning necessary connection: “Firstly, For what reason we pronounce it *necessary*, that every thing whose existence has a beginning, shou’d also have a cause? Secondly, Why we conclude, that such particular causes must *necessarily* have such particular effects; and what is the nature of that *inference* we draw from the one to the other, and of the *belief* we repose in it?”⁹⁹ Then Beck writes:

I shall simplify and restate these by referring to them respectively as the question (a) why every event necessarily has some cause, and (b) why the same cause necessarily has the same effect? Still more briefly, I shall refer to the two principles Hume is investigating as (a) every-event-some-cause, and (b) same-cause-same-effect.¹⁰⁰

If we adopt Beck’s terminology, Lovejoy will presuppose that Kant aims to respond to question (b) by demonstrating the apriority of principle (b) in the Second Analogy, so the conclusion of the Second Analogy must be the establishment of an *a priori* principle (b), i.e. an *a priori* particular causal principle.

At the moment, we should not rush to conclude that Lovejoy’s presupposition is misleading. Instead, let us say his presupposition is debatable, as many commentators believe that Kant actually never intends to respond to Hume’s skepticism about necessary particular

⁹⁹ David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 1.3.2, 78.

¹⁰⁰ Lewis White Beck, “A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant,” in *Essays on Hume and Kant* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 120.

causal connections and never intends to establish the apriority of particular causal principles. For example, Beck argues that “[i]t has often been objected that Kant’s Second Analogy does nothing to support the principle same-cause-same-effect. This is true, but it was not Kant’s purpose there to support that principle; he was concerned only with the principle every-event-some-cause.”¹⁰¹ Allison agrees with Beck that “[f]ollowing Lewis White Beck, we shall call the former the ‘every-event-some-cause’ principle and the latter the ‘same-cause-same-effect’ principle. . . . In both editions [of the Second Analogy] the goal is to establish the every-event-some-cause principle.”¹⁰² A similar point is raised by Bird where he claims that there is “a natural tendency to suppose that any disagreement between Kant and Hume over ‘cause’ must arise over question (2), that is, over the analysis of particular causal claims,” but in fact, Kant only deals with question (1), i.e. the question concerning the apriority of the general causal principle, and not question (2).¹⁰³ This interpretation is also supported by Otfried Höffe, as he argues that,

Kant’s principle of causality does not assert the predictability of events but rather their explainability. His second analogy does not say that every event has completely predictable effects but that events which are to be considered objective are due neither to supernatural intervention nor to subjective hallucinations. They can always be explained as the effect of certain causes even though science in its present form may not yet have the required explanations. . . . In any case, Kant’s principle of causality provides no information as to the sort of laws in which causal connections are to be grasped in physics and no information as to the content of such laws.¹⁰⁴

Höffe’s opinion is that Kant’s principle of causality is a general transcendental principle that makes our perceptions and explanations of occurrences possible, i.e. we know that every occurrence necessarily has some cause and explains the occurrence as the effect of a certain cause only because we put the principle of causality into occurrence, and occurrence is first brought about through the principle of causality. However, the principle is not “a principle of

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 126.

¹⁰² Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, 246-247.

¹⁰³ Bird, “Kant’s Transcendental Arguments,” 31-32.

¹⁰⁴ Otfried Höffe, *Immanuel Kant*, trans. Marshall Farrier (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 103.

natural science”¹⁰⁵ that tells us exactly what causes what. We cannot rely on the principle of causality to make predications of occurrences or draw necessary connections between different particular states of the object.

On the other hand, Michael Friedman, for instance, supports Lovejoy’s presupposition, for he argues that “[w]hat does it mean for A to be the cause of B? As I overserved in I, Kant appears clearly to hold that there must be a law or regularity in virtue of which all events of the same kind as A are followed by the same kind as B.”¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, “the universal causal principle must assert the existence of particular causal laws or uniformities as well. Moreover, if the universal causal principle asserts the existence of particular causal laws or uniformities, it must also assert their necessity.”¹⁰⁷

The problem now is to evaluate these two kinds of readings of the Second Analogy and see which one conforms with Kant’s original intention. It appears to me that the interpretation proposed by Beck, Allison, Bird, and Höffe, which holds that Kant only establishes the principle of causality as the transcendental condition of occurrence but does not intend to prove the apriority of particular causal principles, is correct; whereas Friedman misconceives the purpose of Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy. At the same time, this suggests that Lovejoy’s presupposition, which is the thesis of Friedman’s argument, is also misleading.

In order to better demonstrate this point, let us examine Friedman’s argument in more detail. Friedman believes that Kant makes it explicitly clear in the Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General, which is the section right after the three Analogies, that the general transcendental principle of causality is the grounds of the possibility of particular principles of causality, as Kant states that,

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Michael Friedman, “Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 170.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 171.

Now there is no existence that could be cognized as necessary under the condition of other given appearances except the existence of effects from given causes in accordance with laws of causality. Thus it is not the existence of things (substances) but of their state of which alone we can cognize the necessity, and moreover only from other states, which are given in perception, in accordance with empirical laws of causality. . . . Necessity therefore concerns only the relations of appearances in accordance with dynamical law of causality, and the possibility grounded upon it of inferring *a priori* from some given existence (a cause) to another existence (the effect).¹⁰⁸

According to Friedman, this passage tells us that “‘empirical laws of causality’ – in accordance with which alone any particular effect can be ‘inferred *a priori*’ from any particular cause – are very closely linked with the universal transcendental principle of causality (*‘the dynamical law of causality’*).”¹⁰⁹ As the last sentence suggests, the possibility of “‘inferring *a priori* from some given existence (a cause) to another existence (the effect)” is grounded upon the general principle of causality.

Then, Friedman argues that it is precisely because of this kind of grounding that “even empirical laws too somehow count as necessary,”¹¹⁰ for Kant says that,

Even laws of nature, if they are considered as principles of the empirical use of the understanding, at the same time carry with them an expression of necessity, thus at least the presumption of determination by grounds that are *a priori* and valid prior to all experience.¹¹¹

In addition, Friedman notices that this point is made again in the concluding remarks of the Analogies, that,

There are therefore certain laws, and indeed *a priori*, which first make a nature possible; the empirical laws can only obtain and be found by means of experience, and indeed in accord with its original laws, in accordance with which experience itself first becomes possible.”¹¹²

According to Friedman, both passages suggest that although particular causal principles, such as empirical laws, “can only obtain and be found by means of experience,” they are also the

¹⁰⁸ Kant, *Critique*, A227-228/B279-280, 329.

¹⁰⁹ Friedman, “Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science,” 171.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 172.

¹¹¹ Kant, *Critique*, A159/B198, 283.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, A216/B263, 320.

necessary conditions of the possibility of experience because they are derived from the general transcendental principle of causality, which is their “original law.” Therefore, as transcendental principles, particular causal principles are “necessary and *a priori* in a derivative sense” and are not obtained solely by empirical means.¹¹³

Friedman believes that Kant affirms this in the Second Analogy when he says:

To be sure, it seems as if this contradicts everything that has always been said about the course of the use of our understanding, according to which it is only through the perception and comparison of sequences of many occurrences on preceding appearances that we are led to discover a rule, in accordance with which certain occurrences always follow certain appearances, and are thereby first prompted to form the concept of cause. On such a footing this concept would be merely empirical, and the rule that it supplies, that everything that happens has a cause, would be just as contingent as the experience itself: its universality and necessity would then be merely feigned, and would have no true universal validity, since they would not be grounded *a priori* but only on induction. But the case is the same here as with other pure *a priori* representations (e.g., space and time) that we can extract as clear concepts from experience only because we have put them into experience, and experience is hence first brought about through them.¹¹⁴

For Friedman, Kant explicitly states in this passage that a rule “in accordance with which certain occurrences always follow certain appearances,” which clearly refers to a particular principle of causality and has a necessity and universal validity that would not be explained if it was merely empirical and grounded on induction. Therefore, just like the general principle of causality, particular causal laws must also be *a priori*.

According to Friedman’s interpretation, it becomes reasonable for Kant to conclude that we can rely on particular principles of causality in order to draw necessary connections between particular kinds of occurrences and particular kinds of preceding appearances. Even if this was not what Kant’s conclusion means to suggest, it would still be reasonable to assign this conclusion to Kant. If this was the case, then Kant would commit the *non-sequitur*, because all the proofs in the Second Analogy that we have examined so far have nothing to

¹¹³ Friedman, “Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science,” 174.

¹¹⁴ Kant, *Critique*, A195-196/B240-241, 308-309.

do with particular causal laws, and, as Friedman points out, Kant never explains “[h]ow do the transcendental principles inject necessity into empirical laws of nature so as to secure them a more than merely inductive status? *How* do judgments that merely record observed regularities or uniformities become truly and ‘strictly’ universal via the addition of the concept of causality?”¹¹⁵

However, Kant does not need to answer these questions because they are meaningless due to Friedman’s misinterpretation of the relationship between general and particular principles of causality. It is true that the general principle of causality is the ground of particular causal principles in the sense that the former is the form of the latter, but this kind of grounding by no means injects necessity and apriority into particular causal principles.

Kant argues that,

To be sure, empirical laws, as such, can by no means derive their origin from the pure understanding, just as the immeasurable manifoldness of the appearances cannot be adequately conceived through the pure form of sensible intuition, But all empirical laws are only particular determinations of the pure laws of the understanding, under which and in accordance with whose norm they are first possible, and the appearances assume a lawful form, just as, regardless of the variety of their empirical form, all appearances must nevertheless always be in accord with the pure form of sensibility.¹¹⁶

That is to say, time and space are the pure forms of empirical representations, so whenever we perceive a manifold of empirical representations, we perceive them in time and space.

Similarly, the general principle of causality as a pure law of our understanding is the form of particular causal principles as empirical laws, so whenever we causally connect two particular kinds of occurrences, the connection assumes the general principle of causality.

However, just as time and space do not give birth to empirical representations, so empirical representations cannot be derived from time and space. In the case of causality, empirical and in particular causal principles cannot be derived from the pure and general causal principle.

¹¹⁵ Friedman, “Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science,” 175.

¹¹⁶ Kant, *Critique*, A127-128, 242-243.

In other words, although the form of particular causal principles is pure, the contents of them are empirical; a particular causal principle is a composition of both *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements. Can we say, therefore, that particular causal principles are necessary and *a priori*? As far as Kant is concerned, the answer should be negative. Just like in the case of experience, which contains *a priori* elements such as the schematized pure concepts of understanding, and time and space as the pure forms of empirical intuitions, we will not make the paradoxical claim that experience is *a priori*, it would be awkward for us to say that particular causal principles are *a priori* simply because they contain *a priori* elements. Surely, we can say that the form of particular principles of causality is *a priori*, but this by no means suggests that particular principles of causality themselves are *a priori*, for this apriority belongs solely to their form, i.e. the general principle of causality.

In fact, Kant agrees with Hume that empirical and particular causal laws must be derived from experiences. He says:

Particular laws, because they concern empirically determined appearances, **cannot be completely derived** from the categories, although they all stand under them. Experience must be added in order to come to know particular laws **at all**; but about experience in general, and about what can be cognized as an object of experience, only those *a priori* laws offer instruction.¹¹⁷

In addition,

Now how in general anything can be altered, how it is possible that upon a state in one point of time an opposite one could follow in the next – of these we have *a priori* not the least concept. For this acquaintance with actual forces is required, which can only be given empirically, e.g., acquaintance with moving forces, or, what comes to the same thing, with certain successive appearances (as motions) which indicate such forces. But the form of such an alteration, the condition under which alone it, as the arising of another state can occur (whatever the content, i.e., the state, that is altered might be), consequently the succession of the states itself (that which has happened), can still be considered *a priori* according to the law of causality and the conditions of time.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ Ibid., B165, 264.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., A206-207/B252, 314.

Here, Kant explicitly affirms that despite particular laws standing under *a priori* laws, “experience must be added” and “acquaintance with actual forces is required in order to come to know particular laws **at all**,” and of particular laws “we have *a priori* not the least concept.” The term “acquaintance” indicates Kant’s belief that particular laws can only be obtained by repeatedly observing and thereby becoming acquainted with “certain successive appearances.” This coincides with Hume’s argument that the idea of necessary connection can only arise from observations of constant conjunctions of two appearances. That is, if we constantly see that state *A* precedes state *B*, this kind of experience will give rise to a new internal impression in our mind; hence, the next time we see *A*, we will, as a kind of “habit,” associate *B* with *A* and think that *B* necessarily follows *A* and is caused by *A*.¹¹⁹

Kant further reviews his agreement and disagreement with Hume in A766/B794:

Thus if wax that was previously firm melts, I can cognize *a priori* that something must have preceded (e.g., the warmth of the sun) on which this has followed in accordance with a constant law, though without experience, to be sure, I could **determinately** cognize neither the cause from the effect nor the effect from the cause *a priori* and without instruction from experience. He [Hume] therefore falsely inferred from the contingency of our determination **in accordance with the law** the contingency of **the law** itself. . . . thereby, however, he made a principle of affinity, which has its seat in the understanding and asserts necessary connection, into a rule of association, which is found merely in the imitative imagination and which can present only contingent combinations, not objective ones at all.¹²⁰

Kant makes it clear in this passage that he has no intention of disagreeing with Hume, and that particular causal principles are not *a priori*. Where he disagrees with Hume is with the inference that Hume draws from the contingency of particular causal principles, which claims that the general and transcendental causal principle, as the form of particular causal principles, also lacks universality and necessity.

Now, if we look back at Friedman’s interpretation, it will not be hard to discover that even those passages quoted by Friedman will support our current interpretation. For instance,

¹¹⁹ Hume, *Treatise*, 1.3.14, 205-223.

¹²⁰ Kant, *Critique*, A766/B794, 657.

Kant says that “[n]ecessity therefore concerns *only* the relations of appearances in accordance with dynamical law of causality,” and “the empirical laws can *only* obtain and be found by means of experience.”¹²¹ Although the principle that Kant has in mind at A195-196/B240-241, i.e. the rule “in accordance with which certain occurrences always follow certain appearances,” seems to be the particular principle of causality. He says later that “the rule that it supplies” is that “everything that happens has a cause,” which clearly refers to the general principle of causality; that is, it is the general principle of causality, not the particular principle of causality, that has a necessity and universal validity that would not be obtained if it was not grounded *a priori*.

To sum up, we have shown that Kant is not concerned with proving the apriority of what Beck calls the “same-cause-same-effect” principle. On the contrary, Kant to some extent agrees with Hume that particular causal laws are not *a priori*, and thereby do not express necessity and universality despite their form, i.e. the transcendental and general principle of causality, is *a priori*. This does not only suggest that Friedman misinterprets what Kant intends to prove in the Second Analogy, but at the same time also suggests that Lovejoy’s presupposition is misleading, since Lovejoy’s presupposition is exactly the same as the thesis of Friedman’s argument, i.e. Kant aims to establish the apriority of particular causal principles in the Second Analogy. Consequently, the conclusion of the Second Analogy does not need to establish the apriority of particular principles of causality in order to have any relevancy to Hume’s problem. In addition, according to our interpretation of “determinate occurrence,” Kant does not indicate the possibility of drawing any necessary connections between two particular types of occurrences. Instead, the conclusion “if the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows” is just a restatement of the conclusion of the transcendental argument that the principle of

¹²¹ My emphasis.

causality is the necessary condition of the possibility of occurrence (objective sequence of appearances). As we have examined in 4.1 and 4.2, this conclusion is what Kant aims to prove in the Second Analogy; therefore, Kant does not commit any *non-sequitur* when his immediate conclusion simply affirms his proof.

4.4. The Subject-Reality Problem

Let us now consider the second problem brought up by Lovejoy's argument, which is what I refer to as the subject-reality problem concerning the gap between our subjective perceptions and beliefs and objective reality. Although Lovejoy thinks of this problem simply as another demonstration of the *non-sequitur* that he claims Kant commits to in the Second Analogy, the subject-reality problem attracts the attention of many later scholars, and gradually becomes an independent objection to the Second Analogy and transcendental argument in general.

Two of the most representative reformulations of the subject-reality problem are made by P.F. Strawson and Barry Stroud. In his analysis of the Second Analogy, Strawson also claims that from the point where Kant demonstrates the principle of causality as the necessary condition of perceiving the ship sailing downstream as an occurrence, "the argument proceeds by a *non sequitur* of numbing grossness."¹²² This is because Kant abruptly jumps from his proof that the order of our perceptions of two states *A* and *B* is determinate and necessary, to the conclusion that "the transition or change from *A* to *B* as *itself* necessary."¹²³ According to Strawson, this is in turn because Kant conflates two different senses of "necessity," i.e. "conceptual necessity" and "causal necessity," and

¹²² Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, 137.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 138.

“play[s] on the notion of necessity to confuse us.”¹²⁴ That is to say, what Kant shows is that it is conceptually necessary that we connect our perceptions of different states of the object in a determinate way, but this does not mean that the different states of the object themselves are causally and necessarily governed by a rule.

Stroud’s argument is slightly different from that of Strawson. Stroud starts by considering the problem of using transcendental argument as a response to Humean skeptics. We have already used the phrase “transcendental argument” several times in previous sections but have not clearly defined it. As Stroud points out, despite Kant using the term “transcendental,” he never uses the phrase “transcendental argument” and never regards his argument as a “transcendental argument.” This phrase was invented and used by later scholars¹²⁵ to refer to a particular kind of argument that bears the form “*X* is the necessary condition of the possibility of *Y*.” That is, a transcendental argument claims that “one thing (*X*) is a necessary condition for the possibility of something else (*Y*), so that (it is said) the latter cannot be obtained without the former.”¹²⁶

According to Paul Franks, this kind of argument has an “internal relation”¹²⁷ to skepticism because the question concerning the possibility of something *X* that a transcendental argument tends to solve is usually brought up by skeptics. That is, skeptics doubt the possibility of *X*, whereas transcendental philosophers want to refute them by demonstrating that *X* is in fact possible. So, the question that transcendental philosophers should consider is “how is *X* possible?” In answering this question, transcendental philosophers start with something else, *Y*, which is something that even skeptics will not or

¹²⁴ Ibid. 138-139.

¹²⁵ According to Stroud’s research, the earliest use of “transcendental argument” is by J. L. Austin in “Are There A Priori Concepts?” See Barry Stroud, “The Goal of Transcendental Argument,” in *Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects*, ed. Robert Stern (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 155-172.

¹²⁶ Robert Stern, introduction to *Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects*, 1-11, ed. Robert Stern (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 3.

¹²⁷ Paul Franks, “Transcendental Arguments, Reason, and Scepticism: Contemporary Debates and the Origins of Post-Kantianism,” in *Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects*, ed. Robert Stern (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 113.

cannot doubt its possibility. Then, by developing a valid transcendental argument, which shows that *X* is the necessary condition of *Y*, i.e. the possibility of *Y* cannot be obtained without the possibility of *X*, at the same time it shows that *X* must be possible, and the skeptics cannot deny the possibility of *X* while acknowledging the possibility of *Y*.

In the case of the Second Analogy, the transcendental argument that Kant makes is that “the principle of causality is the necessary condition of occurrence (experience of objective successions).” The *X* in this case is the principle of causality, and *Y* is occurrence. Since Hume (or the skeptics that Kant has in mind when he writes the Second Analogy) does not deny the possibility of occurrence, then, according to the logic of transcendental argument, they cannot deny the possibility of the principle of causality, given that occurrence is impossible without the principle of causality as its necessary condition. As Eckart Förster puts it, the transcendental argument that Kant makes does not, strictly speaking, demonstrate “the *falsity* of the sceptic’s position”; rather, it shows “the pointlessness, or idleness” of skepticism in the sense that a skeptic like Hume will inevitably make a paradoxical claim when he acknowledges occurrence on the one hand, while denying the necessary condition for the possibility of thinking or speaking of occurrence.¹²⁸

However, Stroud argues that in any transcendental argument, “for any candidate *S*,” “the skeptic can always very plausibly insist that it is enough to make language possible if we *believe* that *S* is true, or if it looks for all the world as if it is, but that *S* needn’t actually be true.”¹²⁹ That is, in the case of the Second Analogy, the skeptics can insist that we need to believe the possibility and truth of the principle of causality in order to make sense of occurrence, but the principle of causality itself need not actually be true, for it is just a pure principle of *our* understanding that may not reflect the truth of the objective world that is

¹²⁸ Eckart Förster, “How Are Transcendental Arguments Possible?” in *Reading Kant*, ed. Eva Schaper and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 18.

¹²⁹ Stroud, “Transcendental Arguments,” 255.

independent of us. As Ralph C. S. Walker puts it, “there seems to be a difference between establishing that everyone must believe [the principle of causality] to be true and justified, and establishing that [the principle of causality] actually is true and justified. This applies whether [the principle of causality] itself makes a claim about the world independent of us, or only a claim about what we must believe or think.”¹³⁰

Although this criticism is slightly different from that of Strawson, for Strawson’s criticism concerns the gap between our perceptions and reality, Stroud’s criticism concerns the gap between our beliefs and reality; they do belong to the same camp in the sense that both criticisms concern the gap between the subject and the objective world. Based on what we have discussed above, they are apparently valid criticisms of the Second Analogy, for what Kant demonstrates in the Second Analogy is that the principle of causality is *our* rule of synthesis of the representations and it is the rule of *our* understanding that determines *our* conceptual order, which seems to have nothing to do with the objective reality.

Before proceeding to offer my response to this subject-reality problem, let us first consider some responses from previous scholars. Robert Stern argues that the subject-reality problem does not impede Kant’s transcendental argument in the Second Analogy from having anti-skeptical value:

[F]or, I hold, they can still be employed against a form of scepticism which questions whether our beliefs are even rational or justified, where this sceptic accepts that he cannot establish the latter claim merely by showing that they could be false, or are based on belief-forming methods that could be unreliable. I will therefore suggest that to refute this second form of skepticism, we do not need the ambitious kind of transcendental argument that has proved so problematic, and that a more modest approach can suffice, where the conclusion to be established is merely used to help us justify the belief in question, by showing that we are entitled to hold it, even if we could be mistaken in so doing.¹³¹

¹³⁰ Ralph C. S. Walker, “Transcendental Arguments and Scepticism,” in *Reading Kant*, ed. Eva Schaper and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 68.

¹³¹ Robert Stern, “On Kant’s Response to Hume: The Second Analogy as Transcendental Argument,” in *Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects*, ed. Robert Stern (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 47.

In a nutshell, Stern believes that the supposed targets of Kant's transcendental argument in the Second Analogy are not the "epistemic skeptics" who claim that "we fail to know anything (global scepticism), or to have some sort of knowledge in past (local scepticism), where knowledge is held to require *certainty*."¹³² Instead, the skeptics that Kant intends to respond to in the Second Analogy are the "justificatory skeptics" "who merely asks to be shown that in believing *p*, we can give grounds that *by our own lights* we are entitled to appeal to in this context, in accordance with our doxastic norms, to make the belief reasonable (if not certain)."¹³³ In this case, Stern argues, the transcendental argument in the Second Analogy does not have to take the ambitious form and be "truth-directed," i.e. to establish the truth and certainty of the principle of causality in order to respond to the epistemic skeptics; rather, it can take a more modest form and be "belief-directed," that is, we can simply accept that there is a gap between the subject and reality, and "simply *accept* that the only conclusion we are entitled to draw from the Second Analogy is that we must merely *believe* that A caused B, if we are to apply any sort of temporal determination to these states, and thus to treat A–B as an event at all."¹³⁴

In Stern's opinion, this modest and belief-directed transcendental argument is sufficient on its own to respond to the justificatory skepticism, as long as it shows that our belief of the principle of causality conforms to any one of our "deepest logical and intellectual standards and procedures." Then, Stern argues that one of our "deepest logical and intellectual standards and procedures" that we can appeal to in this case is "coherence," that is, "if *S*'s belief-set is more coherent with the belief that *p* as a member than without it or with any alternative, then this belief is justified for *S*."¹³⁵ To test whether a belief *p* belongs to

¹³² Ibid., 48.

¹³³ Ibid., 52.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 51.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 54.

a person's belief-set, and makes that belief-set more coherent is what Stern calls "the test of coherence," and,

[O]n this account, the aim of the Second Analogy would be to produce an argument to show that our belief in causal determination has a justification, insofar as that belief is required, in order for us to take a sequence of representations α - β to be evidence for the event A-B, and not some other event B-A, or no event at all, and thus to include such propositions within our belief-system.¹³⁶

As far as Stern is concerned, once the principle of causality passes "the test of coherence," the belief-directed transcendental argument in the Second Analogy can be used as a response to justificatory skepticism.

However, Stern's solution to the subject-reality problem is shown to be problematic by Mark Sacks. First of all, Sacks argues that things like "the test of coherence," "belief-set," and "deepest logical and intellectual standards and procedures" are ambiguous, for "in every case of genuinely mistaken (minimally considered) belief there precisely are grounds that the believers can give which by their own light they are entitled to appeal to in this context to make the belief reasonable (if not certain)."¹³⁷ In other words, beliefs and "logical and intellectual standards and procedures" are highly subjective; everyone has their own belief-system that may contain quite different beliefs. Consequently, for every belief, regardless of how awkward or mistaken it may be, as long as the person genuinely believes it, he or she can always find internal justification for their mistaken belief and can make it internally coherent with their belief-system. Equally, the person can claim that his or her belief-set is more coherent with the mistaken belief as a member of the belief-set.

Sacks argues that this kind of personal and mistaken beliefs makes justificatory skepticism pointless. For instance, suppose that a man sincerely believes that being photographed will take away his soul, it would appear to be pointless and, to some extent,

¹³⁶ Ibid., 56.

¹³⁷ Mark Sacks, "Transcendental Arguments and the Inference to Reality: A Reply to Stern," in *Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects*, ed. Robert Stern (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 71.

even ridiculous to raise a serious skeptical objection against that belief. On the other hand, the man can respond to a justificatory skeptical challenge of his belief simply by claiming that he runs a “test of coherence” and finds out that his belief-set (maybe a set of beliefs instilled by a religion) is more coherent with this belief as a member than without it. Therefore, if, according to Stern’s definition, justificatory skeptics merely ask to be shown that we can give justifications that by our own lights we are entitled to believe something *p*, then, in Sack’s opinion, justificatory skepticism and the responses to it can hardly form serious philosophical discussions. As Sacks says: “As its stands, then, the strictly perspectival notion of internal justification at work seems too weak for a form of scepticism based on it to have any bite, or—what comes to the same thing—for the abundance of easy answers to such ‘sceptical challenges’ to carry any real anti-sceptical weight.”¹³⁸ This suggests that it is unlikely that the skepticism that Kant intends to respond to in the Second Analogy is justificatory skepticism, and it is also very unlikely that Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy is just an internal justification of our belief in the principle of causality, in the same sense as the man finds an internal justification for his belief in “photographing taking away one’s soul.”

In addition, Sacks argues, based on what Kant says in the Second Analogy, we can make the stronger claim that Kant does not merely provide an internal justification for our belief in the principle of causality, and Stern’s interpretation cannot be an adequate reconstruction of what Kant should have said. Sacks insists that although the principle of causality is a pure principle of our understanding, it does interact with and apply to the external world, i.e. we employ the principle of causality to synthesize empirical representations, which are entirely external to us and *a posteriori*. We do not merely *believe*

¹³⁸ Ibid.

the principle of causality as a necessary condition of occurrence, but we actually *experience* the principle of causality as a necessary condition of occurrence.¹³⁹

Another response to the subject-reality problem is provided by Ralph C. S. Walker. According to Walker, the subject-reality problem can be avoided if we reconstruct Kant's transcendental argument in a "second-personal" way. Walker believes that we often take transcendental arguments in what he calls a "third-personal" way, that is, we often detach transcendental arguments from their contexts. In this way, we treat transcendental arguments just as arguments with a particular kind of form ("P; but Q is a necessary condition of P; so Q"¹⁴⁰), but like all other arguments, we think transcendental arguments try to establish something, some objective facts that can be approached without attending to the contexts by which such arguments are first made.

Walker argues that this way of approaching transcendental arguments is improper; rather, we should understand them in a "second-personal" way. "To take an argument second-personally is to place it in the context of trying to convince an interlocutor of something," and "the advantage of taking Kant's [transcendental arguments] second-personally is that it enables us to see why the premisses should take the form they do and why the arguments should be effective."¹⁴¹ This suggests that we should treat transcendental arguments primarily as responses to skeptics in the context of philosophical discussions. We can imagine there are skeptics and transcendental philosophers who are talking to and arguing with each other. In Walker's opinion, this will help us understanding why

¹³⁹ Ibid., 75-77. Although Sacks does not point this out, I believe that his point can be supported by the following passage from the Second Analogy: "But the case is the same here as with other pure *a priori* representations (e.g., space and time) that we can extract as clear concepts from experience only because we have put them into experience, and experience is hence first brought about through them. Of course the logical clarity of this representation of a rule determining the series of occurrences, as that of a concept of cause, is only possible if we have made use of it in experience, but a consideration of it, as the condition of the synthetic unity of the appearances in time, was nevertheless the ground of experience itself, and therefore preceded it *a priori*." See, Kant, *Critique*, A196/B241, 308-309.

¹⁴⁰ Ralph C. S. Walker, "Induction and Transcendental Argument," in *Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects*, ed. Robert Stern (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 20.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

transcendental arguments start with premisses such as there is experience or some kind of knowledge such as the law of non-contradiction. This is because, from a second-personal stance, in order for skeptics to engage with and form proper philosophical conversations with anyone who accepts those premisses, they have to acknowledge the truth of those premisses as well, otherwise they are just boring people whose points are uninteresting and cannot be argued with. Suppose that someone denies the law of non-contradiction and is always happy to contradict oneself, how can such a person be argued with or refuted?

Of course, as Walker says, the point that the skeptics who deny those premisses cannot be argued with does not immediately prove that,

[The skeptics] might not be thinking or applying concepts in some other way, following different rules governed by a different logic. Nor does it follow that laws like the law of non-contradiction must match the way the world is. All that follows is that we must take it for granted that they do, to the extent of relying firmly on the assumption that they do, and being unable to enter into debate with anyone who does not reply on that assumption.¹⁴²

In addition,

Of course very few people never contradict themselves. It is not the occasional contradiction that puts someone beyond the reach of argument. To say that people rely on the law of non-contradiction is not to say they always stick to it, but that they try to, and that when they fail—if they detect the failure—they recognize the need to put things right. Such principles must serve as norms, which people must recognize as guiding their thought. It is the people who do not give them this normative role who are beyond the reach of argument, and whose position is uninteresting; if indeed there are any such people.¹⁴³

The argument still holds if we replace “the law of non-contradiction” in these passages with “the principle of causality.” That is, according to Walker’s interpretation, if we understand Kant’s transcendental argument in the Second Analogy second-personally, it will become clear that what Kant emphasizes is that the skeptics cannot deny the normative role of the principle of causality without rendering their arguments pointless. In this way, the subject-

¹⁴² Ibid., 21.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

reality problem would no longer bother us because despite the principle of causality may not match the way the world is, it still cannot be denied.

Graham Bird, however, finds Walker's solution to the subject-reality problem unsatisfactory. Bird points out that "[o]ne puzzle about the third-second person distinction arises from the fact that the *same* formal argument is involved in both cases,"¹⁴⁴ as both third-personal and second-personal transcendental arguments start with the same premisses and proceed in the same way ("P; but Q is a necessary condition of P; so Q"). The only difference between these two types of transcendental argument is that "if we leave it as a third-person argument the sceptic can just refuse to play the game of argument at all, and then he becomes invulnerable. The second-person account, however, adds to the basic argument the point that by refusing to accept the premisses the sceptic buys that invulnerability."¹⁴⁵ In other words, in Bird's view, the real difference between the third- and second-personal transcendental argument is not that the second-personal argument invites the skeptics into the discussion, but it is that the second-personal argument "adds a further comment on the status of the premisses namely that they cannot be denied without rendering the argument pointless."¹⁴⁶ So, regardless of whether the skeptics play the game of argument, the second-personal argument will make their arguments uninteresting and pointless if they deny the premisses.

According to Bird, the problem with reconstructing Kant's transcendental argument second-personally is that because the form of the second-personal argument is still the same with the third-personal argument, this reconstruction avoids the subject-reality problem instead of solving it. It is possible for the skeptics to acknowledge the premisses while denying that those premisses reflect reality; as Walker himself also points out that principles such as the law of non-contradiction may not match the way the world is. Therefore, the

¹⁴⁴ Graham Bird, "Kant and the Problem of Induction: A Reply to Walker," in *Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects*, ed. Robert Stern (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 37.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

impossibility of denying the premisses does not fundamentally eliminate the subject-reality problem. Consequently, “although it is clear that [Walker] thinks such arguments succeed against the sceptic because there is no serious alternative to what the sceptic doubts, it is not clear whether it succeeds to the extent of showing that the beliefs (or practices) which the sceptic doubts are true (or truth-yielding).”¹⁴⁷

There may be other responses to the subject-reality problem, but it is not our task here to exhaustively search and discuss them. I feel that the responses and counter-responses provided by Stern, Sacks, Walker, and Bird are sufficient to demonstrate the extent to which the subject-reality problem attracts scholarly attention. I will now turn to offering my own response to the subject-reality problem. In general, I believe that the subject-reality problem can be solved by appealing to the idea of transcendental idealism.

As Sacks points out, the transcendental argument Kant makes in the Second Analogy concludes with “the vindication of beliefs about the external world,”¹⁴⁸ for the principle of causality is not only the pure principle of our understanding that determines our conceptual order, but it can also be applied to the external world, i.e. the manifold of empirical representations, and synthesize the empirical representations in a determined way. This, Sacks argues, has already presupposed that we successfully bridge the subject-reality gap.¹⁴⁹

The reason behind such presupposition, or the reason that validates such presupposition, in my opinion, is the idea of transcendental idealism. As we have discussed in Section Three, by transcendental idealism Kant draws a distinction between objects as appearances, and objects as things in themselves. Things in themselves are unknowable to us, and Kant is only concerned with objects as appearances in the Second Analogy. He says that,

If appearances were things in themselves, then no human being would be able to assess from the succession of representations how the manifold is combined in the object. For we have to do only with our representations; how things in themselves

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Sacks, “Transcendental Arguments and the Inference to Reality,” 73.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

may be (without regard to representations through which they affect us) is entirely beyond our cognitive sphere.¹⁵⁰

As appearances, the constitutions of the objects are not entirely independent of us. That is, what we originally perceive is only a manifold of empirical representations, and it is only through our mind's synthesis of the representations in accordance with the concept of an object in general that objects as appearances become cognizable, as we have seen in Transcendental Deduction.

What this indicates is that for Kant, there is actually no gap between subject and reality if we take reality as the external world composed by objects as appearances, because in this case, reality is not independent of us. In a sense, we can say that we make reality possible by supplying rules of synthesis: reality is the reality for us. On the other hand, if we take reality as the external world that is composed by things in themselves and is entirely independent of us, Kant would suggest that reality in this sense is unknowable to us and is beyond the concern of the Second Analogy and the Transcendental Analytic in general. In other words, if reality represents a world of things in themselves, there may be a gap between subject and reality, but such a gap does not pose a problem since what concerns us is the reality for us, i.e. a world of objects as appearances.

The problem that Lovejoy, Strawson, and Stroud have, therefore, is that they raise their criticisms from a "realistic" point of view, according to which "A and B and the substance of which they are states are ontologically real, independent of any construction; they are not mere phenomena 'under a law given them by understanding,'" ¹⁵¹ which does not take transcendental idealism into account. If we bear transcendental idealism in mind and deal only with objects as appearances, the subject-reality problem no longer threatens the validity of Kant's argument. This certainly does not mean we have to embrace transcendental

¹⁵⁰ Kant, *Critique*, A190/B235, 305-306.

¹⁵¹ Beck, "Six Short Pieces on the Second Analogy of Experience," 151.

idealism and the Kantian view of reality; rather, what this suggests is that in the context of Transcendental Analytic, “transcendental idealism has emerged as seemingly the only way of safeguarding a form of [inference to reality]” and “Kant’s central transcendental arguments, if they are to deliver what they promise, do seem to require underpinning by transcendental idealism.”¹⁵²

4.5. Response to the Fourth Objection

Finally, Lovejoy’s fourth objection to the Second Analogy contends that due to the *non-sequitur*, Kant fails to respond to Hume’s skepticism concerning particular causal principles. Now, based on what has been discussed above, it should become clear at this point that Lovejoy wrongly describes Hume’s skepticism about the principle of causality, for Lovejoy only mentions Hume’s skepticism about particular causal principles, but not the general causal principle. As was made clear in Section 4.3, Hume actually doubts the universality and necessity of both general and particular causal principles. Therefore, for the fourth objection to even make sense, it should be rephrased as follows: due to the *non-sequitur*, Kant fails to respond to Hume’s skepticism about general and particular principles of causality.

After all the previous discussions, the problem of this objection should also become obvious at this point. First of all, Kant does not commit the *non-sequitur* in the Second Analogy. As regards to his response to Hume, Kant actually agrees with Hume that particular and empirical causal laws can only be known *a posteriori*, and thus do not express universality and necessity. Where Kant disagrees with Hume is with regard to the general and

¹⁵² Sacks, “Transcendental Arguments and the Inference to Reality,” 79.

transcendental causal principle, which Hume claims to be *a posteriori* as well, whereas Kant believes it to be *a priori*.

The formal response to Hume regarding the general principle of causality is the central transcendental argument of the Second Analogy, which claims that the (general) principle of causality is the condition of the possibility of occurrence. This suggests that given that (as Kant believes) Hume acknowledges the possibility of empirical causal principles and occurrence, as their necessary condition he must also acknowledge the possibility and apriority of the general principle of causality. As far as Kant himself is concerned, this is a proper and sufficient response to Hume's skepticism.

§5. Concluding Remarks: The Fourth Objection and Beyond

So far, we have responded to Lovejoy's four objections against the validity of Kant's argument in the Second Analogy, through which the Second Analogy itself has also been re-interpreted. According to this new interpretation, what Kant demonstrates in the Second Analogy is that the principle of causality, like other rules of synthesis, is the basis of the distinction between the "subjective sequence of apprehension" and the "objective sequence of appearance." Then, within the "objective sequence of appearance," the principle of causality further helps us to distinguish between perceptions of stationary objects and perceptions of moving objects (occurrences) by determining our conceptual order. In other words, the principle of causality is the necessary condition of the possibility for our cognitions of occurrences. This argument can be directed as a response to Hume's skepticism about the principle of causality in the way that as long as Hume acknowledges occurrence, he must also acknowledge its necessary condition, i.e. the principle of causality.

However, as mentioned in the previous section, the effectiveness of using transcendental argument as a response to Hume is conditional, in the sense that within the context of the *Critique*, transcendental argument is sufficient to respond to Humean skepticism. Whether transcendental argument is truly effective in responding to Humean skepticism remains debatable. Due to space limitations, in this final section, I will only briefly make some comments on this question by considering one possible way by which Hume could respond to Kant, which I hope will be helpful for future research on this topic.

Recall from Section 4.4 that Stroud argues that “the skeptic can always very plausibly insist that it is enough to make language possible if we *believe* that *S* is true, or if it looks for all the world as if it is, but that *S* needn’t actually be true.”¹⁵³ I think that this argument suggests two possible ways by which a skeptic like Hume can challenge a transcendental argument. First, the skeptic could argue that even if the subject believes *S* is true, there may still be a gap between belief and reality; this is the subject-reality problem that we have discussed and resolved in Section 4.4. Second, the skeptic could deny the transcendental argument by simply refusing to accept the truth of *S*. This means that in the case of the Second Analogy, the *S* in the transcendental argument is “occurrence.” It may be true that Hume does not deny occurrence, but his conception of occurrence may be very different from that of Kant. That suggests that although Hume does not deny “Humean occurrence,” he may still deny “Kantian occurrence,” thus refusing to even accept *S*, which will make him impervious to the transcendental argument that Kant makes in the Second Analogy. Consequently, in order to answer Hume, Kant probably needs another transcendental argument that shows that Humean occurrence is impossible without presupposing Kantian occurrence as a necessary condition. This, in my opinion, is a possible direction to expand upon what I have argued in this thesis.

¹⁵³ Stroud, “Transcendental Arguments,” 255.

Finally, to sum up, all of Lovejoy's criticisms of the Second Analogy are invalid due to Lovejoy's misunderstanding of the original text. In the Second Analogy, Kant successfully demonstrates that the principle of causality is the basis of the distinction between (i) "subjective sequence of apprehension" and "objective sequence of appearance"; and (ii) perceptions of stationary objects and moving objects and concludes with the transcendental argument that the principle of causality is the necessary condition of the possibility of occurrence, which does not commit any *non-sequitur*. In regard to Hume's skepticism, Kant agrees with Hume that particular principles of causality are not *a priori*, whereas he disagrees with Hume that the general principle of causality is not *a priori* either. As a necessary condition of the possibility of occurrence, Kant believes that Hume should not doubt the apriority of the general principle of causality if Hume does not doubt the possibility of occurrence.

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