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## **Towards Behavioral Aesthetics**

### Abstract

This article presents a new approach to studying aesthetics by weaving together a thread of ideas based on investigating the problematics of the philosophy of art from a behavioral paradigm in order to exceed the margins of aesthetics. I claim that it makes no sense to ask if something is art, but rather we should be looking out into the manners in which art subsists, consists, and insists itself. Several notions of what I call behavioral aesthetics are proposed such as observation, aesthetic experience and aesthetic conditioning, behavioral materialism, out-comes, behavioral memory and replication or acquisition, interaction and intra-action, emotional engineering, artificial instincts, aesthetic dissonance, and the problem of measurement. The proposed goal of behavioral aesthetics consists in studying the process of individuation as constitutive of art with the methods of Bernard Stiegler's general organology and genealogy of the sensible. The article presents a behavioral stance as a borderline mode for approaching the genealogy of aesthetics. I mostly refer to Tania Bruguera's Behavior Art School and Wright Judson's Behavioral Art, and the paradigm of new materialism, notably agential realism of Karan Barad.

### Keywords

Transductive Relationships, Individuation, General Organology, Art and Behavior, New Materialism

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## Introduction

The first draft of this article was presented at a conference organized by the International Association for Aesthetics entitled *Margins, Futures and Tasks of Aesthetics* held in Helsinki on July 5–7, 2018. The aim was to present a margin of aesthetics in order to show a new way of approaching it. To be at a margin is to be at a limit, and my goal was to go beyond it. I proposed a future of behavioral aesthetics since various paths and philosophies have been edging the field of aesthetics towards a more collaborative and vital interdisciplinary study, such as in embodied aesthetics, applied aesthetics, or neuroaesthetics, whereas scattered interest in the relationship between behavior and aesthetics can move the field into a new understanding of art as behavior. This was motivated by the circumstance that I have attempted to frame what I called behavioral aesthetics in 2015 for my B.A. thesis entitled *The Axiology of Music: Systemic Irrationality in Judging the Performance of Music*, and later in 2017 I examined the question of the relationship between pharmakon and music for my M.A. dissertation titled *The Significance of Music with Reference to Plato and the Notion of "Pharmakon"*, during which I became acquainted with the philosophy of Bernard Stiegler, whose writing has had a significant impact on my interpretation and approach to behaviorism and aesthetics. Additional motivation arose from the condition of residing in an era of digital humanities, where the effects of Big Data and A.I. imply that information technology focuses, collects, manages and models the behaviors, habits, and actions of users, as witnessed during the 2018 US joint senate committee hearing of Mark Zuckerberg.

At first, instead of asking "what is art" I asked a series of other questions pertaining to what art, media, and culture do? How is technology a mirror of culture? Do symbols and representations also regulate our judgements, behaviors and habits? How do behaviors shape art and its theory? Can we learn new forms of beauty? Can we engineer an emotion? Of course, these problems are not new: the Greek ethos addressed them, as does advertising. Ancient suspicions and modern marketing intensified by new media show that there is indeed what appears to be an effect on human behavior, which now has been digitally measured and steered as never before. The point of this article is to explore some fundamental notions of behavioral aesthetics such as a deconstruction of the problem between subjective experience and observable behavior (so an external/internal dichotomy), which in turn requires a new thinking of relationships like interaction, and thus it is aimed at cultivating a different interpretation of aesthetics and behaviorism.

Methodological behaviorism, as proposed by John B. Watson, applied a dualistic assumption that divides the behaviors of an individual into public (or overt) and private (or covert) events. It is focused on public events and studies them in a naturalistic and empirical manner. Then, in order to account for private thoughts and feelings, Burrhus Fredric Skinner's radical behaviorism acknowledged private events as internal processes of an organism that should also be studied. Other schools of behaviorism such as the teleological (Howard Rachlin, post-Skinnerian, purpose-driven,) the psychological (Arthur W. Staats, emphasizing human learning, personality,) or Jacob R. Kantor's interbehaviorism are variations on this theme of interactions between organisms and their milieu. This includes the advent of Behaviorology in the early twenty-first century. According to the International Behaviorology Institute, "Behaviorologists study the functional relations between behavior and its independent variables in the behavior-determining environment" (2017, para. 7) as an autonomous natural science incompatible with psychology and opposing all untestable and unmeasurable explanations for behavior.

However, the act of measurement itself may produce several problems. Aleksandr A. Fedorov argues that Behaviorology is compatible with Marxist dialectical materialism in the form of behavioral materialism, while stressing the non-mechanistic interdependence and constant flow of matter. I would like to point out Fedrov's account of the model of interaction. He states:

Interaction is a dialectical category that rejects the stereotyped notion that cause and consequence are two invariably adversarial poles. Either of interacting sides is the cause of another one and consequence of simultaneous influence of the opposite side. Therefore, we can suppose that selection by consequences is a dialectical model of behavior determination. A consequence of a certain behavior (change in the environment) is simultaneously the cause of that this behavior will happen more often or rarely. Nevertheless, we have to remember that causality and interaction are not interchangeable (Fedorov 2010, 178).

In other words, what triggers a behavior and the out-comes (as in coming-out or revelation) of a behavior are not separate, and interaction (a functional interdependence) is not synonymous with causality, i.e. cause-and-effect like reflex machines. For instance, two improvising musicians are in an interactive situation, not a mechanistic one (even if one player is Shimon the robotic marimba player guided by artificial intelligence and using "interestingness" algorithms a.k.a. association rule learning.) Outcomes nudge triggers, and triggers sway outcomes. Operant conditioning is a form of selection

within the milieu of an organism, and thus a form of behavioral memory itself, which I understand, following Bernard Stiegler, as an exosomatic function. It is dependent upon interacting relationships such as between an organism, the introduction of rewards and punishment, and environmental stimuli. In turn, environmental stimuli shape the organism's perception, both epigenetically (which informs neuroplasticity) and through heredity or phylogenetically (which transforms DNA). For example, one consequence of creating good (or participating in the admiration of—which is a form of surprise) art is praise (or companionship, which are both forms of environmental exchange,) which is also a reason that increases the probability that such behavior will repeat itself over again. Being praised for practicing scales and arpeggios is a reward that can at once be a cause and consequence of artistic behavior, notwithstanding the biological mechanism or drive that music uses to release mood-enhancing effects. The latter can be overridden by stress or music performance anxiety (anticipating measurement and observation) conditioned by worries about perfection, competition and an aroused somatic state cognitively interpreted as stage fright, which means that music is indeed a pharmakon—a poison and a remedy.

Fedrov's account is quite similar to Karan Barad's concept (where a concept itself is understood as a specific material arrangement) of intra-action (Barad 2007, 33), where matter is performative in and for itself. Fedrov's argument that cause and consequence are interdependent and simultaneously changing corresponds with Barad's account that agency is entangled and mutually co-constituted. Intra-action, a part of the methodology of agential realism, asserts agency as emergent from a relationship of mutual entanglements. This means that the distinction between private and public events as independent actions is inadequate and comes from a false dichotomy. Such an approach allows for a new materialistic behaviorism, since the act of measurement is an additional problem. The act of measuring behavior is itself a behavior and at once an influence that transforms and deforms observed behavior. This can be evidenced by the observer effect a.k.a. The Hawthorne effect (Schwartz *et al.* 2013). The Behaviorologist's rigorous naturalistic approach cannot account for what Barad's new materialism shows: measurement disturbs objects, it changes its ontology and behavior. What this means is that it is ontologically indeterminate of what an object is. Additionally, Yuk Hui has pointed out that Barad's critique of agency as complete individuals preceding relationships and representations is analogous to Gilbert Simondon's problematic of individuation (as the becoming of matter) and Gaston Bachelard's concept of relativity, notably pheno-

menotechnics (Hui 2014). In short, individuals are an effect, not a cause. They are emergent from a process of individuation. The same can be said of art.

The philosophy of art has traditionally been centered around the idea that the artworld is made up of individuals possessing intrinsic characteristics and whose activities are a representation of these characteristics. The goal of behavioral aesthetics would then consist in the reinterpretation of art not as a creation of individual works, but as a matter or effect of individuation. For this purpose, I think, the framework of Bernard's Stiegler's genealogy of aesthetics and method of general organology can be applied. Accordingly, aesthetics would be concerned with entangled relationships on various scales of magnitude: physiology, technics, and society. The point of this article is to re-think dichotomic behaviorisms (private/public events, organism/environment, measurable/unmeasurable) within the terms of a transductive relationship, which is to say that the terms of a relationship are mutually constitutive and characterized by inventiveness.

The first section presents a peripheral mode of thinking about aesthetics in accordance with a behavioral stance. Next, I review different thinkers, who have tried to think of aesthetics in terms of behavior. Then, I develop Behavioral Art and Digital Technology, and finally I elaborate the transductive relationship between behavior and digital objects.

### Thinking about a Behavioral Stance

We, humans, function in a world that is constantly shaping who we are, as well as, how we perceive reality, both in its material manifestation and its abstract conceptualization or imagined order, which is fundamentally symbolic. Of course, the reverse also holds some truth, in fact, humanity has shaped and reshaped not only its environment, so each habitat is reshaped in accordance with the needs of humans and their organizations, but in such a way that the entire planet has felt the impact of human habituation, which has resulted in the significant proposal of contemporary geological time in 2016 called the Anthropocene as apocalyptic for *homo sapiens*, where human agencies are upgraded as a species and simultaneously downgraded into contextual interactions.<sup>1</sup> This can be described as a relationship, which

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<sup>1</sup> For more on how "agency in the age of the Anthropocene is complex and kaleidoscopic, distributed and global." See: Sullivan 2016.

is not only evolutionary, but one that constitutes the conditions, the entities, and the ways in which perception itself takes place. In other words, it is a general contextualization of human activity within the framework of wide-ranging natural and cultural forces (Sullivan 2016, 292). With this in mind, it is necessary to think not only about how perception is continuously wrought in a process that gives rise to sensory experience and its conditions, but also about its workings, or to view it by what it makes us do, which I shall call a behavioral stance.

An example of this kind of thinking follows. The very existence of the sun has facilitated conditions, which have allowed for the very first living thing to differentiate cells that specialize in function, in this case that of being capable of sensing light, which has led to the rise of the plant and animal kingdom, the evolution of eyes, the aesthetics of sexual selection or the behavior constitutive of the arms race between predators and prey. Each organism's specialized functions not only allow it to feel the world, its *milieu*, in its own singular way, but their incompleteness or lack of immobile essence also allows for the possible differentiation of new organs, which facilitate different sensory experience and thus movements or behaviors. Eventually, these organs gave rise to the forces of technics, such as tool use by animals like birds, primates, fish, and insects. Figuratively, the working of sunlight's energy moves illuminated matter on Earth into the cycle of life and death.

Analogically this framework allows for a *vocational* generalization: that we—philosophers, aestheticians and artists—function in an hyper-industrialized social reality, where the means of symbolic production are being exponentially subject to automatization via new media and disconnected from a general intimate contribution to symbolic orders. Meanwhile, the artworld is constantly re-shaping the identity of art and its conditions of reception, both in terms of matter and theory, especially since the layperson is confused and alienated by artistic practice as evidenced by low-brow criticism of modern art in popular culture as ugly, bad, or meaningless (and they are right in the sense that it has become an art symbolically *disconnected* from their individuation). It should be noted that the artworld is more shy of its relationship with the entertainment industry than it is with the investment industry, and thus misunderstood, mysterious, and ephemeral art has been exploited by speculative financialization.<sup>2</sup> Complementarily through marketing, a dominant imagined social narrative has shaped the arena of art in ac-

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<sup>2</sup> A critique of the artworld, which should be read alongside Stiegler's *Symbolic Misery and notion of Aesthetic War*, can be found in Le Brun (2018).

cordance with artificial desires, which are artificial absences, to such an extent that the artworld has adapted to the impact of social habituation, which resulted in curious connections between financial interests and the commodification of art itself. It is responsible for shaping all actors or agents within the emergent conditions of the symbolic relationship, and at the same time, allows us to be capable of perceiving some objects, while simultaneously masking others. An example of this is the auction stunt by Banksy, which has failed to counter the behavior of instrumentalization.

Through the framework of general organology it can be said that the very presence of artistic media, such as the canvas, the human voice, or the infrastructure built to house artworks, also has undergone a process of differentiation, which conditioned the rise of the various chronological classifications of different fields of art, such as music, poetry, painting, dancing, and so on. This was made possible by the ability to differentiate (or individuate) between various aspects of sensory experience, such as by classifying art in accordance with each organ like sight and seeing, the difference between hearing and listening, the movements and experiences of the living body, which do not exclude touch and touching, smell and smelling, taste and tasting, and so forth. Yet this capacity to classify and categorize is forever incomplete, since we can also observe synesthetic phenomena that arise thanks to the plasticity of the brain, such as seeing sound, hearing through touch or sight, or tasting through smell, or the use of technology in order to modify the senses, etc. Moreover, human behavior in regard to the dynamic cultural perception of Beauty is also conditioned by political struggle between moving others and moving oneself. This may be understood by examining the use of cosmetics, perfumes, fashion, or the way a person "carries" themselves, and also includes acts of creativity, which usually are acts of repetition, recycling or re-creation, but also the use of language, rhetoric, song, or the transmission of ideas between minds, which demand recognition. Now, each specialized theory of art and the specialization of particular artists, which is not understood simply as professionalization, allow themselves to feel the world through and with others, the artistic milieu.

The above sketch of a behavioral stance draws a problematic overview to questions about what art does, about its workings, or behavior that it has wrought. It is a question that demands an interdisciplinary and general overview, including but not limited to, an analytical or narrow professionalization that may remain blind to other connected domains of this particular field of behavior that art is rooted in. Behavior itself is a question that can be viewed physically in terms of inorganic organized matter, which "behaves"

without regard to consciousness and its artifacts. But simultaneously, behavior also involves the biological processes underlying organic organized matter, which ultimately form the conditions of consciousness and its artifacts, such as reflective and unreflective behaviors. This is fundamentally a problem of aesthetics, understood as sense perception, sensibility, or sentience. Taking this into consideration, the methods of aestheticians should not shy away from empirical studies, or even a critique of them, and need to “push” the boundaries of aesthetic philosophy into new desired symbolic orders. And this is so, even if this going-beyond requires a dose of absurdity, or platonic divine madness, which is sterile without an imagination or the thinking of behavior in terms of its contingency and interpretability.

The behavioral dimension of aesthetics is one that incorporates the entire corpus of human artifacts with meaningful engagement between a symbolic object and the practices it evokes, such as scandal, commitment, or playing make-believe. This dimension is of course not only spatial or temporal, but also relational. Behavior is an organization-of and habituation-to action. In turn, aesthetics supports a co-navigation of the rowboat of art to a new marina of doing. This then challenges the knowledge we have taken with us from the place of departure. What is shared by art and aesthetics is the fact that it is fundamentally action-based,<sup>3</sup> that humans behave as if an entity called art does in fact exist, at least in imagination, just as humans act as if limited liability companies existed as organic beings. From the old strictly materialistic perspective foreign to intra-action, such existence claims are unanswerable metaphysical questions, since no direct traces of limited liability companies lead to giant physical entities themselves. Yet, the traces all constitute what is part of human culture, which is a system of *sensing* organized action.

Can behavior consist of exact homogenous objects not open to interpretation, but rather replicable and measurable, which we can call “objective” with scare quotes? Such unstably fixed “objective” forms of ontological speculation of course do in fact come into imaginary being depending upon the social relationships between many individuals and individuals with themselves. An example is that of interpreting sexual behavior, which is never universally “objective,” since affect necessarily overrides rationality and

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<sup>3</sup> This draws from the notion of imagined orders developed throughout Harari (2015) and Donald Brook’s observation that “Art is an illumination that enables actions to be performed that performers of these actions had not previously known to be possible. It is found everywhere, and it can’t be purposefully made” (Brook 2015, para. 27).



“distanced” judgement or measurement. And once a change in any relationship occurs, which is marked by a change in action or behavior, the very existence of shared “objectivity” is jeopardized. To put it another way, Plato’s worries about the influence of music on behavior is no longer viewed to be “objective” information. Or, there is nothing in a bell’s ring itself, its nature so to speak, that causes a dog to drool, and similarly, the Dorian mode alone does not hide any discoverable “objective” explanation for why Plato drew the conclusion that it is appropriate for supplementing masculinity with the bravado of that mode. This all illustrates the question of behavioral interpretability, readability, accident, and contingency.

Summarizing, a behavioral stance needs to be adopted in order to gain new knowledge on the processes joining being with having, of self-control or performing the action of being. So, it is important to think of aesthetics in terms of behavior. In turn, such an adaptation should provide aestheticians with the can-do to generate know-how in regard to not only art, but knowledge on how to work and live, which is thinking itself, from which art and aesthetics diversify. Knowledge itself is most certainly not a product of thinking per se, which is to say that thinking results from a process supplemented by training and discipline, or education, inasmuch as the nervous system is complemented by a host of abstract technical objects, such as ideas, and instruments, such as notation or money. Accordingly, thinking is part of a system of behavior that involves brains engaged in a way of sharing intersubjective communicable and replicable information with mnemonic devices of recall and prediction, or memes. In this sense, behavior is a system of thinking rooted in the previously mentioned *aisthesis* (ancient greek: αἴσθησις,) since human action and behavior is regulated by brains, muscle memory, social norms, and technological supports, such as books and the learned capability of reading and writing. Every instance of copying behavior, or a technical support since all technics is mimetic, is imperfect, and some variation occurs, which creates a modified or imperfect copy, and subsequent replication under selection pressure inevitably repeats itself, which leads to the emergence of spontaneous design, meanwhile unsuccessful replicators die out.

### **A Behavioral Out-look**

The Cuban Cátedra Arte de Conducta (Behavior Art School) founded by Tania Bruguera and implemented in 2002 was one of the first schools of art to primarily focus on behavior as a methodological out-look, which I under-

stand as perceiving beyond boundaries, where the medium was that of Behavior Art and Useful Art, but it closed in 2009 in fear of sharing the fate of many other art and antiart movements, which is institutionalization. In 2003, during the Arteamérica Debates she asked: "If behavior is an element of knowledge which becomes a ruling institution which at times is pigeonholed as knowledge, then why not turn it [behavior] into a methodological resource? Why not work with it [behavior] and turn it [behavior] into a method to work on knowledge?" (Bruguera 2003, para 28). I think this proposal can be applied not only artistically, but also philosophically and in the discipline of aesthetics.

Most philosophers would probably say that their field of business deals with thinking. In the section above I have myself tried to present a literary illustration of the act of thinking about a behavioral stance. If behavior is to be a method to work on knowledge, then it should be noted that thinking itself is not exempt from action and entanglement. Derek Melser in *The Act of Thinking* (2004) has argued that the process of thinking itself is an action or put simply, something that people do. So, thinking may be adaptable to behavior-like terms. However, it cannot be reduced to neurological measurement. One of the significant aspects of art is its capability to arouse emotion, understood as a social construct. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the research of Lisa Feldman Barrett, whose Theory of Constructed Emotions (Barrett, 2017, 30) shows that identical emotion categories, such as fear, love, etc., involve different, varied bodily responses. Difference is the norm since experience and behaviors are constructed *ad hoc* at the moment by biological processes in the brain and body. In my opinion, emotional engineering (the *de facto* workings of the aesthetic industry—from the fine arts to advertisement and entertainment) is then a reality, since both artists and businesses strive to make emotional connections with others through various aesthetic and technological means. Thus, the development of language and art is also a development of human experience (as behavioral discovery) and hold the possibility of creating a diversity of emotions. The fact that one human adaptive survival trait consists in living within social groups means that everyday competing concepts like disgust or appreciation are cultural instruments that prescribe situation-specific actions that allow for communication as well as for influencing the behavior of others. What is called culture could also be re-named as a set of artificial instincts (Harari 2015, 206). A change in the concepts of an individual permits a change in behavior. Harari has extensively written about social reality as a force that has been driven by imagined hierarchies, which allow for the mass cooperation of

strangers. Barrett then adds a deeper biological significance: “Social reality implies that we are all partly responsible for one another’s behavior, not in a fluffy, lets-all-blame-society sort of way, but a very real brain-wiring way” (Barrett 2017, 155). Thus, the concepts and social realities artists and aestheticians disseminate are of greater weight than we may suppose. This provides an understanding that an ontology of art is in fact a relationship of *différance*. It makes no sense to ask if something is art, but rather we should be looking out into the manners in which art subsists, consists, and insists itself.

Some scholarship does resemble a behavioral stance, such as the approach taken by Jennifer Hall in her dissertation *Interactive Art and the Action of Behavioral Aesthetics in Embodied Philosophy*. Instead of a strict naturalistic or empirical approach, a multidisciplinary philosophical one is given. She describes what emerges from the process of interactive aesthetic engagement. Her take on behavioral aesthetics is through identifying organic systems associated with aesthetic behaviors and experience. She writes:

Behavioral aesthetics can be defined as biological and post-biological elements that make up a bodily gesture. Because parts of the aesthetic behavior may be sourced from biological forms and other parts may not, interactive art has little need to define actions of the organism through the distinctions of living or nonliving. Instead, actions that are created within the interacting system may also be regarded as a gesture of the organism. Behavioral aesthetics dislocates traditional notions of subjectivity as the center or purpose of art (Hall 2014, 24).

So, action is the point of emphasis, which can be also developed as an intra-action, since actions have the capability of changing an organism’s relationship to its environment and vice versa, it “provides outputs from the organism to the environment” (Hall 2014, 74). Putting it another way: “Behaviors are the conditions in which any action may be critiqued for the ability of an object to work within, relate to, and expand from the site in which it is located” (Hall 2014, 75).

### **Behavioral Art and Digital Technology**

Bernard Stiegler’s distinction in *Symbolic Misery* between *artistic experience* (or experiment,) which leads to a discovery of a new way of feeling or aesthetics, and *aesthetic conditioning*, which is of the kind of stimulus-response that are impulsive controls of desire like that of marketing, should also be taken into consideration. The ways of feeling and experiencing the world can be exploited and navigated in a manner that depletes aesthetic inquiries.

In 2017 Wright Judson (judsoN [sic!]) published “Behavioral Art: Introducing Ontogeny into Computation,” where the challenges of art are applied to human cognition with the use of new media. For Judson, “Behavioral Art (BA) is the practice of employing artistic experimentations during the investigation of human behaviors and motivations” (Judson 2014, 1). He temporarily abandons aesthetics, since he is more interested in developing Behavioral Art as a programming tool for answering the question of what is not interpreted as art, and why. This is an example of using behavior as a method from which knowledge can be wrought. When thinking about A.I., we should keep in mind that machine learning occurs without any “thinking,” being merely an information system guided by digital behaviors.

Ethical concerns, however, must be included. Digital Technology is an invention of humanity, but replicators such as Susan Blackmore’s tremes (techno-memes) have slipped out of human jurisdiction. In an era of digital humanities, the effects of Big Data and A.I. mean that information technology constitutes, focuses, collects, manages and models the behaviors, habits, agency, and actions of us, the human users of such technology. The aim is to create a closed model that is riskily static, since it is a model that reinforces human biases and prejudices as Cathy O’Neil has shown throughout *Weapons of Math Destruction* (2016). In this regard, I propose a future of behavioral aesthetics, which would be assigned with the task of teaching a new way of seeing: that behavior can be unmanageable, unmeasurable and incalculable, it resists quantification and modifies an individual’s agency. It can be used to both understand such conditionings as well as a means to re-condition ourselves in the struggle against behavioral nudges and the commodified art market itself, be it fine art or mass media.

With this, I am referring to Tania Bruguera, who stated:

Artists are elements in society who are aware of the symbolic connotations of acts and gestures, they are students of meanings. Human beings talk through their behavior and this is the means they have to express and they are an element of society aware of the symbolic meanings and transcendence of their acts. To be artistic is to be aware of this process, of behavior being their means of expression and of using it in an insurmountable way. And what receives the name of artistic sensitivity is being open to and mindful of new combinations of meanings. Power works with metaphors, while it is in behavior where society does its most fervent work of modeling meanings, it is also the battlefield of the means through which it expresses and the results of those battles are offered (Braguera 2003, para 16).

Technology has always deeply reconfigured and revolutionized societies and the works they produce. This is especially true of the industrial revolution and the creation of mass culture and its art forms. New media has transformed society yet again and it is changing the way we deal with creation. Human “users’ are no longer simply passive consumers, but what some call prosumers, producers of content, which is a contributive form of participating in what is consumed. Such seemingly “contributive economies” that are in fact exploitative-by-design include YouTube, InstaGram, BandCamp. Others, such as Bernard Stiegler and Ars Industrialis or *l’Institut de Recherche et d’Innovation* in Paris are taking steps in order to counteract the aesthetic conditioning of consumers by market drives, which is a behavioral problematic, especially in terms of addictive behavior. We can gain better insight into creating a future for aesthetics with digital tools now available, as is exemplified by the behaviors of the users of the Internet or as in the Behavioral Art of judsoN. This is information collected anyways by Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Alphabet a.k.a. Google via machine learning algorithms for advertisement and marketing.

In this regard we may also ask, how is technology a mirror of culture (Gladstone 2017, 28). The creators of art and media are also those who have to deal with the corporality and sensibilities of other people. However, it must be disseminated in such a way that it resonates with those who are immersed in a certain environment. If it does not meet this condition, then those artifacts never enter the cultural realm and remain in the necromass of unsuccessful replicators. What Victor Tausk called “the influencing machine” (Gladstone 2011, xv-xxi) is the condition of what art does: instead of prosumers, we deal with the phenomena of Instagram *influencers*. It can make us *see*, produce thoughts and feelings, movements, sensations and bodily processes. In Steigler’s terms, we may say that the work of an artist is to produce organs with which we perceive, such as the eye.

### **Behavior Transforming Technical Objects, which in Turn Transform Behavior**

Behavior may be understood in terms of or as the movement of organic organized matter by technological objects, or inorganic organized matter, such as the sound of a ring and a response of answering a phone. Some behaviors are genetic, such as instincts and predispositions, while others are learned, passed down from one generation to the next. The environment hosts replicable behaviors, which can be copied and transmitted, like customs. Just as

any other animal, humans have instinctual reflexes written in their DNA, which is expressed and modified in various unique environments. We also have behavior that is learned, which means that through observation, technological and cultural conditioning, behavioral acquisition takes place. For instance, the view: males act “like men” and behave aggressively whereas females as “women” and act submissively, sets up a patriarchal imagined order, and consequently reinforces behaviors accordant with that view. Other behavior is transmitted through technical objects, such as a musical instrument. Playing the guitar requires the necessity of adopting a diet beneficial for strong fingernails, getting into the habit of taking care of them and the instrument, as well as getting into the habit of regularly setting the aim of surpassing the limits of one’s own abilities, aided with written texts on performance methods, a practice regimen, or training programs and a metronome.

In terms of the philosophy of art, a piece of music is not *in the notes*, neither the sounds nor the sheet music, even though each duplicate is more-or-less exact. Each piece is constituted through the habits of the interpreter or performer, its media, and the habits of reception. What is aesthetically then experienced is a specialization of the body, such as ears and hands, with the simultaneous expansion of structured joy, which results from being able to reach performance aims, or an immense frustration from not being able to behaviorally adopt a regimen that permits one to not only play a piece, but to exceed one’s skills and capabilities. This renders any performed piece of music as technical, since the positive and negative powers of the formative media can be the basis for creating aesthetic dissonance, where a frustrated lover of music is stuck in a malignant behavioral loop: it is to be able to perform a piece “objectively” as “beautifully,” but at the price of learning a personal revulsion to it, since the negative frustrated state of being not-able-to *imprints* itself onto the music *through* the retentions and protentions, memories of past frustrations and obstacles, which are “retained” in the music and in the body, which anticipates mistakes. The aesthetic experience is thus accidental, a performer does not have the foresight to see that their favorite piece of music, before being learned, will soon be transformed into one that is disliked by the means of practice. The same goes for *exact* repetitions, let’s say a ringtone. A favorite tune, which becomes associated as a stimulus of a phone call, soon transforms its musical qualities from ones of excitement to those of dread and annoyance. It is in fact a misery that is symbolic, behaviorally conditioned, or unreflexively done.

Each repetition of behavior is on the one hand a limited calculation, but on the other, it's experienced as a crisis of identity if the repeated behavior itself is a basis of recontextualizing the self. This can happen from learning to play a song, but it also needs to be noted that it is not the same as unreflexively performed behaviors, such as mindlessly smoking through sheer habituation or checking a smartphone every time it beeps. The same behavior has varied contexts, and the social and technological environments open up space for acting differently, even if the drives have been previously exploited. What is learned can also be unlearned. The meaning of behavior is not fixed, although its significance can become temporarily and socially fixed, so it is a temporal and technical object. A stimulus may produce reproducible behaviors in exact laboratory-like conditions, but the meaning of a particular behavior is ultimately situational and hierarchical. This is to some extent incorporated into the narrative of a subject's identity, who usually desires to have their actions accord with previous personal behavior.

## Conclusion

Through intra-action or transductive relationships, conditions of behavior manifest themselves, as a cause and consequence or as its out-come, within which the agency to act is constituted, thus a significant component of the process that leads to the resulting individual's aesthetic sensibility, which transcends drives. It can be said that new paths and philosophers are moving the field of aesthetics towards a more collaborative and important interdisciplinary study. Behavior in my understanding is a broad composition of being and having. One path of exceeding the margins of aesthetics, understood as a categorization of art objects, is moving towards behavioral aesthetics, which doubles as a technique to work on desire and *savoir-faire*. All behavior is performative, since it is subject to observation and measurement by others and the self as other. Behavior, as an intertwining of environment and organism, is significant because with it the entire world transforms. Through behavior, more precisely thanks to its learning function, perceptions change, which includes a new way of seeing and not only appreciating a shared beauty, but bringing it to life. It is something that resists entropic closed systems, and something that can challenge thoughtlessness, which is what most art activism has been striving to embody in some regard. Modern tools amplify not only the aesthetic possibilities of contributing to a greater corpus of democratized art, but also allow for a common reflection towards

new forms of entrancing discovery, which is a revelation of ways of doing not perceived as possible before. Hence, I've been striving to expand the philosophy of art's limits towards behavioral aesthetics.

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