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### Making space for free subjects

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ARTICLE

## Making space for free subjects Squatting, resistance, and the possibility of ethics

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Anthropologists working on ethics have emphasized the importance of freedom for the becoming of ethical subjects. While some have therefore aligned themselves with the later work of Foucault, his earlier work has been identified as part of a “science of unfreedom” antithetical to the study of ethics. In this article, I suggest that the “early Foucault” can nevertheless be relevant for the anthropology of ethics, specifically by looking at contexts where freedom is not a given, but has to be actively created through the overcoming of conditions of unfreedom. Drawing on Faubion’s discussion of ethical subject positions, as well as Foucault’s work on disciplinary architectures, I discuss how subject positions, ethical and otherwise, are also and especially produced through practices of ordering material and symbolic space. Different socio-spatial orders can therefore either be designed to impede the flourishing of free ethical subjects, or to facilitate it.

Keywords: ethics, subject position, space and place, territoriality, squatting, homelessness

### Introduction

Anthropology’s recent “ethical turn” has seen a revival of interest in questions of morality and ethics. Within the fast-growing literature on the ethical dimension of human life, a number of approaches have emerged, concerning themselves with the embeddedness of ethics in everyday life (Lambek 2010; Das 2015), with extraordinary moments of ethical crisis (Zigon 2007; Faubion 2011), the experiential dimension of the ethical (Csordas 1990, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2008; Desjarlais and Throop 2011), moral reasoning (Sykes 2012), and moral narratives (Mattingly 1998, 2010; Faubion 2001; Zigon 2012), to name just a few. While it is impossible to do justice to all these contributions in this article, I will draw specifically on a set of approaches that galvanize around the notion of the ethical subject, and the various ways that individuals cultivate the kind of self they associate with ideas of “the good” (Laidlaw 2002, 2013; Widlok 2004; Hirschkind 2006; Lambek 2008; Mahmood 2011; Mattingly 2012). As Laidlaw relates, a number of anthropologists working in this vein have found the “neo-Aristotelian” approach exemplified in the work of Michel Foucault par-

ticularly ingenious to their efforts (e.g., in different ways, Hirschkind 2006; Zigon 2007; Mahmood 2011; Mattingly 2012), as it specifically speaks to the notion of ethical becoming as a “technology of the self.” One of the most prominent examples of such work in recent years is certainly James Faubion’s *An anthropology of ethics* (2011). In a decisive development of Foucauldian ethics, Faubion argues that becoming an ethical subject is not only a matter of cultivating particular virtues or dispositions, but also involves actors gradually aligning themselves with particular “ethically marked subject positions” (2011: 14), i.e. becoming occupants of predefined standpoints within a given network of symbolic relationships. “Ethical autopoiesis,” in this view, is therefore to a degree circumscribed by the availability of such socially produced subject positions to the individual, thus situating individual freedom within an “encompassing web” (Robbins 2012) of social relations.

In this article, I would like to take up the notion of subject “positions” in what is perhaps a more literal sense than the one Faubion has in mind: I want to talk about the ways that (ethical) subjects are produced by positioning bodies in material and symbolic space. I will draw on





ethnographic data taken from my research with homeless people and squatters, conducted between 2010 and 2012 in Bristol, England, to illustrate this argument. The limitations of format do not allow me to provide a comprehensive introduction to my field site here, for which I therefore have to refer the reader to my forthcoming book. However, to briefly contextualize, my fieldwork was conducted around the time that squatting in England was turned from a civil dispute into a criminal offence. Before this change in law in 2012, squatting had, for practical purposes, been considered “legal,” and the ongoing housing crisis across England, in concert with post-2008 austerity, meant that for thousands of people, squatting was a last-resort measure to alleviate pressing housing need. My field site at the time harbored a lively community of several hundred squatters, connected in an ever-shifting network of dwellings, vehicle sites, and social spaces, which specifically understood itself as a self-help network for homeless and precariously housed people. As squatters viewed it, squatting was a remedy for homelessness in the simple sense that as soon as a homeless person took possession of a squat, they were no longer homeless, and thus, passively at the mercy of the elements as much as their fellow man. Instead, they became “a squatter,” that is to say, a person who by virtue of actively taking occupation of a space had deliberately taken on a new social identity and position. “A squatter,” in this view, was therefore not simply another variety of homeless person (as the responsible social services would have it), they were an entirely different breed: someone who through deliberately resisting their exclusion from shelter had turned themselves not just into a dweller, but effectively, a rebel. This transformation of homeless people into squatters was inexorably tied up with their physical occupation of the space of the squat, and therefore aptly serves to illustrate how assuming a particular spatial position can, quite literally, translate into assuming a particular subject position.

Faubion’s understanding of the term “subject position” certainly goes beyond such a “geographical” interpretation. At the same time, however, one also does not have to stray too far from Foucault’s work on ethics to find a well-known example of what I mean by this. Before turning his attention to what he calls “power relations” between free subjects, Foucault devoted a great part of his work to thinking about their opposite, namely relations of domination and the various discourses and practices that subjugate the embodied self. A special role in these processes of subjugation falls to what has come

to be widely known as “disciplinary architectures” (Foucault 2012) i.e. socio-spatial arrangements that are designed to produce particular kinds of subjectivities and social relations. Foucault argues that such architectures, found for example in prisons, hospitals, barracks, etc., act as technologies of power, epitomized in an emblematic example that has become the namesake for loci of discipline as such: the Panopticon. The concept is so well known that it hardly requires much of an explanation: a Panopticon, as originally devised by Jeremy Bentham, is a type of architectural arrangement which distributes bodies in space in such a way that they become subject to constant and unbroken surveillance. It therefore produces, by virtue of its spatial properties, a range of literal and figurative subject positions within a disciplinary discourse comprised of brick-and-mortar as much as of language and practice. For the interned, occupancy of both the architecture and the discursive subject positions it imposes is quite clearly a matter of coercion rather than choice—their behavior options are starkly restricted and scripted through the relation to the other imposed by the spatial properties of the inhabited space. Moreover, while the original Panopticon was a specific architectural innovation, its internal logic—as Foucault himself shows—can be easily transposed between, and enacted in, different socio-material spaces. When taken as an abstract ordering principle, Panopticism can thus equally come to characterize a workplace, a school or even a “home.” The Panopticon is therefore what in this article I will call a “socio-spatial configuration,” i.e. an assemblage of spatial and social properties and practices that produce particular subject positions and their interrelations. Such an ideal configuration is not only transposable between different contexts, as the term “Panopticism” indicates, but it is also what different systems theories refer to as “scalable”: as a principle or model, it can be applied to social systems of any size. In the following, I will argue that such abstract, transposable configurations are not limited to disciplinary architectures, but rather, that subject “positions,” ethical or otherwise, can also and especially be understood as literally constructed and enacted through spatial practices.

Admittedly, while discussions of disciplinary architectures have a long tradition in the social sciences, they may appear oddly placed in the context of anthropological discussions of ethics. As anthropologists have convincingly argued, the study of ethics fundamentally requires moving beyond the “science of unfreedom” approach characterizing Foucault’s early work (Laidlaw



2014), and a Panopticon could therefore be seen as a space antithetical to ethics—where the majority of individuals are in a state of being totally controlled by outside forces, the emergence of free ethical subjects appears to be at the very least severely restricted. Indeed, if ethics first and foremost requires self-governance, and those who are not free to govern themselves, such as slaves or the “inmates” of a Panopticon, are therefore restricted in their possibility of becoming occupants of ethical subject positions, then the “early Foucault” with his emphasis on domination would have little to contribute to our understanding of ethics. However, even before turning his interest away from domination and toward the free subject, Foucault was not content to think of disciplinary structures simply as inescapable sites of total control—he was careful to note that even in the most repressive settings, resistance always remains an option. Through the concept of resistance, even in a Panopticon-like disciplinary architecture, an element of freedom remains a possibility—at the same time, however, this potential must be realized in struggle against the disciplinary architecture itself, and the literal and discursive positionality it imposes upon body and experience. In the context of disciplinary architectures, one could therefore say that the possibility of being ethical itself becomes the focus of a struggle—the possibility of freedom depends on the overcoming of conditions of unfreedom. Resistance against conditions of unfreedom, if not part of the “ethical proper,” can therefore be seen at least as one of its conditions of possibility, and could thus be called a “proto-ethical” practice.

The Panopticon, while emblematic, is certainly an extreme example of a spatial order: most spaces humans inhabit do not, on the face of it, encourage such stark power differentials. Thinking of architectures of power not so much in terms of concrete sites, such as a specific prison, but rather as transposable and scalable discursive assemblages involving material objects, practices and subject positions, however, allows us to think of them not as “things” but rather, as qualities or tendencies which can characterize specific socio-material settings to a greater or lesser degree. At the same time, the fact that Panopticism is hardly the only way to organize human inhabitation of space also poses the question of what other possible configurations there can be, and what qualities or tendencies they impose on socio-spatial relating. If architectures of power are inimical to the emergence of free subjects, then what kind of socio-spatial configuration would encourage it, and what do people do in or-

der to resist spatially mediated power in order to create conditions under which free ethical subjects can flourish? In the following, I want to address this question by thinking not so much about how people become ethical subjects, but rather, how they produce the conditions of possibility for this to be possible: how they manipulate material and symbolic space in order to allow for free ethical subjects to *potentially* emerge, not only in the context of specific disciplinary architectures, but rather, in the context of inhabited space more generally.

The connection between squatting and freedom—most commonly understood as the absence of political oppression—has been noted in the small but growing literature on squatting as a practice. Most commonly, this literature makes a distinction between squatting in the global south—mostly in the form of illicit land occupations—and the kind I am talking about here, namely the occupation of empty buildings in the cities of the West. Different squatting scholars have approached the subject from the perspective of legal and political theory (Cobb 2012, 2014; Dee 2014; Waring 2014; O’Mahony, O’Mahony, and Hickey 2014), social policy (Reeve and Batty 2011; Reeve 2014), the securitisation of the nation state (Manjikian 2013), and activist networks and social movements (Squatting Europe Kollektive 2013; Cattaneo and Martínez 2014; Dadusc 2014; Dadusc and Dee 2014; Kadir 2016; Milligan 2016). Notably, this literature often makes a distinction between the “vulnerable homeless” and so-called “lifestyle squatters” (e.g. Prujit 2013; Cattaneo and Martínez 2014; critical: Middleton 2014), a.k.a. “political squatters,” echoing a political discourse that has fairly consistently attempted to delegitimize squatting by driving a conceptual wedge between the “deserving” homeless and “undeserving” political activists. As some scholars have noted, however, this distinction is not uncontroversial—in Britain, squatting movements since World War II have consisted of both those in need of shelter and those committed to political change (Ward 1976; Reeve 2014). As I expand upon elsewhere (Grohmann forthcoming), in my field site this distinction did not only not apply, but rather, was actively challenged by those who saw squatting as a practical solution to homelessness. Moreover, however, the connection between squatting and freedom within the community I studied was not limited to simply the idea of being free from oppression, although that certainly figured into it. Included in the idea of freedom was also the notion that the act of ordering space, in and of itself, could produce new and more equal social relations.



## Making space

Squatters were most often organized in small groups of 3–10 people called “crews” who moved into empty properties and stayed there until evicted, which, depending on the owner, could take anywhere between a few days and several years. While until 2012, some squats enjoyed decades-long quiet due to an absent or disinterested owner, most crews had to move into a new space several times a year, necessitating the explicit or implicit creation of, and adherence to, some kind of mutually accepted normative framework on how the newly acquired space should be distributed. Since squatting crews did not necessarily adhere to the kinds of social relations expected of the inhabitants the houses were built for—for example, they rarely fit the description of a nuclear family who would need a master bedroom, children’s bedrooms and a space to eat together—they most often had to make up their own rules about how the space should be used. In concert with the frequent moves that squatter crews, including the one I was part of during my fieldwork, were subjected to, meant that with every new architecture, the rules of inhabitation had to potentially be re-negotiated. The first squat I moved into when I arrived in the field, for example, operated a form of seniority principle—since the house was larger than the original crew who had “broken” (i.e. opened) it, additional people had subsequently moved in one after another, and it was generally assumed that this temporal difference translated into a difference in degree of authority. The implicit assumption was that the person who lived there the longest had the highest investment in the space, and thus their voice was given more weight in collective decision making. At least in our crew, this construction of “authority” was bound up not so much with a belief in leaders, but rather, with a peculiar understanding of being considerate toward the connection of personal identity and place—the person who lived in the house the longest was seen to be most strongly entangled with the space, it was his or her “home,” in the sense of an extension of personhood, more than that of whoever came later. When this squat was eventually evicted, we moved into a new building as a group, and the differences that had structured the crew along temporal lines were wiped out—we were now all “equal” regarding the duration of our connection with the place, and each had as much to lose as any. This move was the first of a total of 13 within the space of a year, a number that, although relatively high, was not unusual for squat-

ting crews, and each new squat was therefore to an extent *terra nullius* as far as entitlement to occupancy was concerned.

This recurring need to allocate space without causing social friction (along with the need to house as many people as possible) was one of the reasons many squats attempted to devise formal policies to organize social relations within them (another reason was, as mentioned above, that while squatters acknowledged that squatting was, for many, born out of acute material deprivation, it was also understood as a political practice aimed at creating social relations based in equality and freedom). Most squatters subscribed to a more or less theoretically founded version of anarchist politics, at the core of which was a belief in radical egalitarianism and communal decision making. While fulfilling a need for shelter, many squats were therefore also intended as social laboratories where such egalitarian relationships could flourish. By far the most common strategy of achieving this was to adopt a code of conduct widely known in leftist-activist circles as a “Safe Space Policy.” These policies set out, often in writing, that discrimination of any kind on the basis of gender, race, sexuality, age, disability, and a number of other identity categories was prohibited. Safe Space policies (or, acknowledging the impossibility of a totally safe space, “Safe(r) Space policies”) could often be found printed out and displayed publicly within a squat, but where such systems of rules were not explicitly displayed, squats within the network usually involved an expectation that anyone who used the space adhere, at minimum, to the proscription of “sexism,” “racism,” and other such forms of discrimination based on identity.

The concept of “Safe Space” has come to a certain notoriety among academics in recent years, largely owing to its adoption by various student groups on university campuses. Campus “Safe Spaces” have come under fire because, as their critics claim, they have come to be used as a means to silence political dissent and curb free speech. The controversy has produced curious alliances between feminists, conservatives, religious people of different stripes, and self-proclaimed “free-thinkers” who worry about the suppression of science and reason. Tracing these debates would require a book of its own; however, it is worth noting that despite the widespread moral outrage and ridicule campus “Safe Spaces” have recently attracted, the concept itself is much older and, for most of its history, was relatively uncontroversial among those committed to social equality. Vaughan Bell, a neuroscientist and psychologist, traces its history to the work of



psychologist Kurt Lewin, a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany who went on to become director of the Center for Group Dynamics at MIT. Lewin—inventor of now ubiquitous concepts such as “social dynamics” and “feedback”—developed a range of self-technologies for corporate managers, including a form of group discussion called “sensitivity training” (Bell 2015). It was designed to enable managers to address their own shortcomings through structured employee feedback, and therefore required an atmosphere in which concerns and criticism could be freely expressed to the boss’s face (in the 1940s not a common occurrence). It was therefore necessary to establish a set of shared rules that enabled every participant to express themselves without fear of later repercussions—one could thus say that the first “Safe Space” was created to facilitate speaking truth to power. It was only during the 1960s that feminist and gay and lesbian groups adopted the concept to refer to a space in which normally marginalized standpoints could be expressed free from political repression, and “Safe Spaces” did not become ubiquitous on university campuses until the second decade of the twenty-first century.

Squatters on the whole subscribed to the 1960s view that “Safe Spaces” were not primarily intended as safeguards against ideological contamination, but rather, were designed to prevent forms of violence which were seen as pervasive in “mainstream society.” BHAM,<sup>1</sup> the largest publicly visible association of squatters in Bristol, state on their flyer: “we operate a safe space policy at our meetings, this means we do not allow racist, sexist, homophobic or any type of discriminatory behaviour.” In this negative formulation, “Safe Space” refers to a set of behaviors that are forbidden on the basis that they are seen as common forms of structural oppression. Another group, running a semi-public social center, uses a more positive formulation: its purpose is “providing a space that is equally welcoming to everyone (except cops, fascists, etc.) irrespective of age, race, gender, background, sexuality and (dis)ability.” This somewhat convoluted wording points to the contradictory nature of “Safe Spaces”; while on the one hand intended for “everyone,” it was also assumed that some (here, “cops and fascists”) had to be excluded so that “everyone” could feel welcome. At the same time, while “everyone” would appear to be as inclusive as one could be, “Safe Space” policies usually also expressed their sup-

port of a sometimes impressively high number of individually named identity categories. To an extent, this was due to the fact that some areas of presumed discrimination were not as clear-cut as others, and “Safe Space” policies therefore also implicitly communicated a group’s position of specific issues. For example, while one group included “race, gender, sexuality, age, ability, religion” in its list of supported categories, “religion” was notably absent in a number of other versions. Within anarchist politics, religion is often regarded with suspicion, as it is seen as one form of social domination among many (as the saying goes: “No Gods, No Masters”), and the fact that at the same time some people experience discrimination *because of* their religious beliefs made this a complex and often contentious issue.

On the other hand, the listing of individual “modes of oppression” can be understood as a political statement that each of the supported groups was recognized in its particularity, while at the same time, they all were assumed to have something in common—namely the very fact that they warranted protection through a formal policy. In the context of squatting, “Safe Space” policies were thus essentially codified versions of an anarchist ethics of mutual aid and protection—the fact that ostensibly disparate groups such as gays and lesbians, people of color, the disabled, and Muslims, were protected under the same policy pointed toward the underlying assumption that what they shared in common was precisely a vulnerability to the sort of thing the policy protected them from. As the Bristol Anarchist Federation put it: “gender, sexuality, age, physical ability, social class, skin colour and being part of a specific ethnic group are all used as excuses for society undertaking and accepting a catalogue of abuses against people.”<sup>2</sup> Inherent in this view is an understanding of social power that acknowledges particular identity categories not as an essential feature of the oppressed, but as “excuses” in the eye of the oppressor. “Safe Spaces” were thus designed not so much to protect particular identity groups, but rather, as a practical critique of the binary logic of domination that was seen to produce them in the first place. One could call it an “intersectional” approach in that it acknowledged that domination functioned along multiple axes. It remained, however, firmly situated at the very point of intersection, where all axes of oppression came down to the

1. Bristol Housing Action Movement

2. Author anonymous, <http://floaker.net/2013/03/31/organised-safer-space-2/>, accessed 17 December 2013.



same principle: domination and subjugation. It was, in this sense, anarchist ethics in its purest form—instead of a formal application of the theories of Stirner or Proudhon, this was, at least in principle, a radical ethics of direct action against any and all forms of institutionalized social power of people over one another. In contrast to what is (perhaps unfairly) claimed of campus “Safe Spaces,” the logic of these spaces was therefore only superficially related to “identity politics,” in the sense of the partisan interests of specific groups. Underlying the acknowledgement of these interests was a peculiar form of moral universalism, based on a shared vulnerability to the harmful effects of social power.

In practice, “Safe Space” policies were most often invoked in the context of gender relations; more precisely, in instances of sexual assault. Women were by far the largest recognized “oppressed” group within the squatting network, while other groups (such as people of color) were relatively underrepresented. For this reason, as the anonymous Anarchist Federation writer puts it, “while [discriminatory] cultural norms can be seen wherever oppression takes place . . . the most pervasive and widespread of these affecting all our radical spaces today are carried over from our dominant culture’s acceptance of rape and sexual violence.” Preventing such violence—and where it could not be prevented, at least retrospectively keeping the victim safe from repeatedly having to face the perpetrator—thus was the most frequent reason “Safe Space” policies were enacted in practice. In these instances, the moral order implied in “Safe Spaces” thus most clearly appeared in its specifically spatial dimension—it was assumed that the power the perpetrator held over the victim also and especially consisted in him<sup>3</sup> occupying space that was, for this reason, not accessible to the victim. The ethical imperative in this situation was thus to balance the scales by affirming the victim’s right to occupy space, and removing the threat. In one instance, the following statement was publicly issued by a number of radical groups:

Following notification from [a social center] that X. has been banned from the centre and its activities due to allegations of a serious sexual assault, an emergency meeting of individuals and radical groups in Bristol was held. As individuals and networks opposed to domination

3. Theoretically, this also applied to female perpetrators of sexual violence and male victims, although in practice, no such constellation ever occurred within my field site.

and oppression, including but not exclusive to misogyny, sexual violence, bullying and intimidation, it was agreed that X. would be excluded from involvement with the projects, organisations and groups named below. These groups will also, where they are able, take steps to exclude him from public events and actions in which they take part.

Squatter’s “Safe Space” policies were thus instruments for configuring socio-spatial relationships in such a way that they tended toward more equal power relations. I say “tended toward” rather than “represented” since (as the notion of “SafeR Space” acknowledges), it was accepted that enacting such a policy merely gave momentum to change, it did not, in and of itself, implement a new fixed state of being. In producing and maintaining this momentum, however, squatters pursued a clear agenda: they aimed to address injustice specifically by regulating access to, and control over, material and symbolic space across a range of concrete settings. “Safe Space” in this context was therefore not a term applied to specific places as much as it was what I have called a socio-spatial configuration—a culturally scripted pattern of symbolically and materially ordering space, which could be superimposed upon any number of locales, and made a specific place instantly recognizable as a particular type of space. Moreover, the rationale for imposing this spatial order was not so different from Foucault’s discussion of disciplinary architectures: the relations of oppression characterizing the “mainstream” were seen to create spaces in which some were exposed to the coercive control of others—women, for example, were seen to inhabit a space characterized by the threat of a sexually aggressive male gaze, and consequently had to monitor their own behavior in the style of a Panopticon inmate in order to anticipate and avoid this aggression. This, it was acknowledged, limited and restricted their spatial and social repertoire, and thus, their freedom. In so far as “Safe Space” pointed to a specific spatial configuration, it was therefore set up as a counterbalance to another configuration which one aimed to overcome—a spatial order of freedom set against a spatial order of “oppression.”

One could, of course, accuse these anarchists of subscribing to an outdated, overly binary worldview, which sorts people into pairs of “oppressors” and “oppressed” without much concern for nuance. This binary absolutism sits somewhat uncomfortably with the view, more or less hegemonic in the social sciences today, that power



lies within the network, and actors are always to a degree exerting power as much as they are subject to it. Surely, the argument goes, while relations of absolute domination may still be found in the most repressive of prisons or in the context of “modern slavery,” normal human affairs are, on the whole, not a matter of brute-force power of some over others. In concert with the fact that these squatters were not exotic Others from some remote place far away, but active participants in the same Western cultural context as the author of this article, this poses a certain dilemma for the ethnographer: without the option of escaping into notions of radical alterity, what to make of the fact that these people held views about the way society is organized that fly in the face of how “we” have learned to think about the very same social context? It would certainly be an option to simply assert that they were wrong—that they had fallen prey to ideological figures not applicable to the time and place in which they lived, and that perhaps precisely therein lay a reason they were excluded from what they called the “mainstream.” In order to do justice to them, and take their worldview as seriously as the ethics of ethnography demand, I do, however, want to make an alternative suggestion: that they were not mistaken about how society works so much as they had access to a dimension of it that members of the “mainstream” are sheltered from precisely due to that status.

In doing so, I hope to also remain faithful to the Foucauldian tradition in the anthropology of ethics, without, however, using it as a way of diagnosing my respondents with holding an “incorrect” idea of power. Rather, I want to retrace the great philosopher’s own steps backwards to where he was coming from before turning his attention to freedom: as many commentators have noted, Foucault did not disavow his theory of domination in favor of a theory of the self-governing subject so much as he underwent a shift in emphasis (see Rabinow 1986). At no point, however, did he revise his earlier idea that disciplinary relations of domination can and do characterize certain human relations, and it is thus interesting to ask whether and how we could think of them not as a sphere separate from and unrelated to the ethical, but rather, as underlying and complementing it, while at the same time forming its conceptual antithesis. “Sub-ethical” relations of domination would then not appear as irrelevant to the study of ethics, but rather, as one of its central problems—where domination rules and freedom is restricted, so is the emergence of ethical relations; and the overcoming of domination is then a necessary

condition of possibility for ethics to emerge. Resistance, if not an ethical practice as such, is thus at the very least “proto-ethical” in that it aims to even the social playing field in such a way that moving into ethical subject positions proper becomes an option for those who previously were restricted from it.

This view appears to sit well with how squatters saw the world: they too acknowledged that within social space, relations of domination exist between certain subject positions (specified in terms of gender, “race,” etc.) and at the same time, that the ideal space would be one where these relations have been overcome and all subjects have the opportunity to become self-governing and free. Pointedly speaking, they saw the world as a prison, and their resistance (a term that they readily embraced) as aimed against the disciplinary nature of a society in which they saw themselves very much as inmates. Like a resisting prisoner, they aimed to remove themselves as far as possible from the control of this disciplinary apparatus and its totalitarian eye, by creating spaces in which its proponents had no place (“no cops, no fascists”). Their alternative vision was an ideal of a “good space” in which the deadlock of oppressive pairs of subject positions was broken, and people could therefore relate as free subjects. One could therefore say that anarchist practice in this context formed an angle or turning point between the “older” and the “newer” Foucault—where the philosopher merely shifted his focus, squatters were busy shifting reality from its present state as a prison to a desired state as an association of free ethical beings.

But what are we to make of the anarchist claim that society is characterized by relations of brute-force, spatially mediated domination that requires remedial policy? Panopticism, while helpful to explain how subject positions are spatially produced, also has its limits in thinking about what the concrete space of unfreedom squatters tried to overcome looked like. Even the most pessimistic political theory of “mainstream society” as a disciplinary apparatus cannot seriously claim that, on the whole, it fixes people in space and subjects them to total and inescapable control (and not even the most ardent anarchist claimed such a thing). Similarly, while “the state” was a natural staple of anarchist critique, the relations of domination that “Safe Space” policies were designed to address were by no means limited to resistance against the state and its organs such as the police, although these were certainly part of it. On the whole, the power that anarchists aimed to address was not situated solely in disciplinary structures or “institutions





of biopower,” however widely one may want to define these terms. Rather, it was to be found in immediate spatial relations of bodies among each other, such as when one violent individual, most likely without any institutional power whatsoever, could single-handedly block access to a particular space for others through his mere presence. Power here was very much flowing between individuals, but at the same time, it did so by virtue of them being assigned to particular groups or subject positions (unjustly so, if anarchists were to be believed). So how can we frame this relationship between political categories and individual embodiment to understand how squatters arrived at their binary view of power?

In the second part of this article, I would like to discuss this question, drawing on the work of an anthropologist who is more readily associated with the cognitive side of the discipline: Maurice Bloch. In his 2008 article “Why religion is nothing special but is central,” Bloch discusses the difference between human and non-human primates by suggesting a distinction between two different but interrelated spheres of the social. One, which he calls the “transcendental social” “consists of essentialised roles or groups” (2008: 2056), comparable to the notion of “imagined communities.” This sphere, Bloch argues, is exclusive to *homo sapiens*, and makes it possible to assign individuals to abstract social positions that exist separately from the individuals themselves. This notion shows some parallels to the idea of “subject positions” as transcendental symbolic loci, which, too, exist independently of the specific individuals occupying them. Next to this, Bloch argues, there exists a sphere he calls the “transactional social,” which consists in immediate, embodied relations between individuals, based on power differentials (2008). This level, according to Bloch, is shared between humans and other primates, and essentially comes down to the direct enactment of dominance hierarchies. The term “subject position” here only applies in the most unsophisticated (and certainly un-Foucauldian) of senses: that of an individual with a first-person perspective being positioned in space relative to another. It was precisely this immediacy, however, that the anarchist approach to spatial justice addressed: while justifying its interventions into the nature of relationships between groups who were defined in terms of the “transcendental social,” the practical application of “Safe Space” rules most often came down to physically regulating access to space, and thus played out very much in terms of transactional relations.

I want to suggest that Bloch’s distinction can help to illuminate a peculiar feature of the spatial construction of subject positions; in the context of spatial relations, the interaction between the transcendental and the transactional social is very much a two-way road. On the one hand, it is not difficult to see how access to space is regulated according to transcendental assignments: a person’s belonging to a particular group also means that they are assigned the spatial entitlement associated with this group. Squatters recognized this in assuming that particular persons, by virtue of being “women,” “migrants,” “queers,” etc., were subject to a contested claim to space, which consequently had to be defended. At the same time, however, the reverse also applies: transcendental subject positions are constructed, to a certain extent, according to the *de facto* position of bodies in space relative to one another. The seniority principle I encountered in my first squat, for example, constructed transcendental authority according to the length of time a specific body had dwelled within a specific building relative to the others. In terms of spatiality, therefore, the transactional and transcendental spheres of human relating can be seen to be mutually co-constitutive: transcendental assignments follow *de facto* control over space as much as control over space is granted according to transcendental assignments. In order to understand the binary view of power which squatters held, it is therefore helpful to start not from the way they constructed binary relations between transcendental subject positions, but rather, from the other end: the way that these subject positions themselves were constructed according to the degree of transactional spatial power they implied. What this means becomes clearer when we replace “transactional spatial power” with a more familiar term: human territoriality.

### Beyond territoriality

“Territory” is most often considered a “juridico-political” (Foucault 1976) concept, associated with theories of the state and of political and military power. In its most basic sense, however, territoriality can be taken to mean simply “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area . . . this delimitation becomes a territory only when its boundaries are used to affect behaviour by controlling access” (Sack 1986: 19). What distinguishes the notion of territory from that of mere space



is therefore, on the one hand, the element of bordering, which involves the interruption of the continuity of space in the shape of a strict demarcation of inside and outside, and the subdivision and ordering of the inside. On the other hand, “territory” is an active social form—its maintenance involves effort in the exercise of control over boundaries and internal structure, as territory is always potentially contested. Most importantly, as implied in Sack’s definition, “territory” is space delimited for a particular *purpose*: that of exercising control over others. Territory thus implies social power, not in the egalitarian sense of Foucault’s power relations between free subjects, but quite in the binary sense that squatters understood “oppression.” The subject positions it produces are, on the one hand, “insiders” and “outsiders” and, on the other hand, those who control the territory and those who are being controlled. Territory, understood as a socio-spatial configuration, is thus based on a dual logic of internment and exclusion: in so far as it produces outsiders, it excludes, in so far as it establishes internal hierarchy, it interns the “insiders” under the control of the territorial actor. As a mechanism to distribute spatial entitlement, territory thus works to concentrate this entitlement in the hands of those who control both access as well as internal power relations.

As Sack argues, territorial behavior can be designed to benefit those controlled (e.g. a parent limiting the spatial range of a child to keep it safe), or to harm them. But whether benign or malevolent, by turning on the factor of control over access, territoriality crucially involves the production of space as a scarce resource, and thus has the potential to engender competition between territorial actors. In non-human animals, this is fairly uncontroversial—rank in many species is crucially negotiated through controlling access to space. In chimpanzees, for example, dominant individuals not only pick the most favorable feeding and resting spots (and hold on to them), they also control the spatial position of subordinates through body language, vocalization, and, where territorial claims are challenged, physical aggression, thus banishing lower-ranking animals to the social and spatial periphery of the group (Murray, Mane, and Pusey 2007). But territorial control not only means limiting access to specific places—it also means controlling other’s ways of traversing space. Where a dominant individual’s chosen trajectory from A to B intersects with that of a subordinate, the dominant will claim his right to keep moving in a straight line, while it falls upon the subordinate to negotiate a detour in order to avoid a

collision followed by chastisement. The lower the rank, therefore, the more an animal must adapt the position of his body in space relative to that of more powerful individuals, which also involves anticipating their future movements to plan his own. Dominant animals thus function somewhat like black holes of social power—their very presence warps and bends the spatial and temporal trajectories of subordinates, like centers of gravity in the fabric of social space-time.

Human primates, as anthropologists are well aware, are in contrast entangled in complex symbolic systems which appear to have removed them far from the physically enacted dominance hierarchies of other species. It would certainly be mistaken to reduce human territoriality to mere animal instinct, or to imply that underneath the cultural “fluff,” we are just apes jockeying for rank. However, as Bloch’s transactional/transcendental model implies, our capacity to produce “culture” as a transcendental system of meaning does not mean that we have entirely left these forms of interaction behind (Bloch 2008). Following Bloch, in humans, the remnants of dominance hierarchies therefore co-exist with enduring cultural “superstructures,” and there is no *a priori* reason to assume that one takes precedence over the other. There is equally no reason to assume that these domains should be entirely separate, and that recurring patterns of dominance and subordination would therefore not also find expression on a symbolic level, or conversely, that symbolic power relations would not also impact the relationship between individual bodies. This is especially true when it comes to the ordering of space according to status—it is, for example, widely accepted among *homo sapiens* that the highest-ranking individual in any social context should be assigned the most favorable sitting spot. A human towering over others on a throne, or in the executive chair at the head of the boardroom table, affirms social status as effectively as any chimpanzee’s insistence on occupying the tallest rock around.

Human ways of negotiating such spatial assignments among themselves are, at a basic bodily level, equally similar to those of non-human animals—eye contact oftentimes establishes whether or not a claim to control over space will be made or contested (think two drivers gauging each other’s willingness to give way at a crossing), and where it is, bodily posturing and vocalization (“get out of my way”) are used to pull rank. If one went out in Bristol city center on a Friday or Saturday night, one could thus observe a ritual which can be found in



similar form in many places: mostly young men, under the influence of copious amounts of alcohol, were wandering around looking for a physical confrontation. One very effective strategy of finding it consisted in picking a potential opponent, walking into his path, and then to just keep walking as if his body was not there, so that one bumped into him. This ritual had the function of establishing rank by challenging the opponent's spatial position, and to drive home the message that he better watch where he was putting his body since a more dominant male was demanding right of way. As with all self-respecting primates, the gesture was reliably understood as a challenge, and if it was accepted, the combatants would keep pounding at each other until the police arrived.

These territorial displays on a bodily level are not coincidentally also rituals of masculinity on a symbolic level, and they therefore illustrate how bodies are assigned to the transcendental category "gender" in terms of transactional territoriality. In so far as territoriality establishes rank, and men, on the whole, socially rank higher than women, cultural ideas of masculinity have often involved elements of territorial dominance. The ritual of "walking into" another man also worked as an insult because it rested on the assumption that a "real man" should be capable of defending his turf, first and foremost that of his own body. As Brace (1997: 144) notes, masculinity is inherently bound up with the idea of sovereign control over the territory of the body, and male anxiety about boundary loss and invasion therefore finds its expression in homophobic fears of potential penetration. Women, on the other hand, were traditionally seen not so much as territorial actors as they were seen as territories—their bodies are constructed as uninhabited spaces, hollow and quite literally full of holes, and thus fit to be penetrated, invaded, and colonized. While men occupy space, women thus are occupied, and, quite frequently, they have to defend their inhabitation of their bodies against the "rights" of other residents, such as unborn fetuses. Bloch's somewhat cavalier assertion that "we" go "in and out of each other's bodies . . . like in birth and sex" (2013) therefore only tells half the truth—it is *women's* bodies that are here frequented like hotels, and it is precisely this presumed permeability and hollowness, that makes a body feminized.<sup>4</sup>

4. Gay males, then, are demeaned because of the suspicion that the boundaries of their bodies might be equally permeable, putting them closer to women than to 'real men,' and thus assigning them a lower social status.

At the same time, men determine women's position in, and trajectory through, space in myriads of different ways, and their culturally scripted way of spatial relating is designed to not only establish, but reinforce dominance hierarchies. This concerns, for example, the traditional fixation of female bodies within the space of the "home," but also the gendering of bodies through their positioning in public spaces. Many of the forms of "everyday sexism" that have become the subject of public debate in recent years affect women's spatial existence—the neologism "manspreading," for example, refers to the phenomenon of men routinely taking up more space on public transport than their bodies require, thus limiting women's access to seats. Another neologism, "manslamming," has been coined to describe the observation that, once women deliberately stop moving out of men's way in public, inevitable collisions ensue—just as the dominant individuals among other primates expect to move from A to B in a straight line, so too do human men, and women must therefore adjust their trajectory or "slam" into them. Finally, ubiquitous forms of gendered violence such as street harassment and the ever-present threat of sexual assault mean that women must plan their movement through space according to the presence of potentially dangerous male bodies—men thus become "centres of social gravity" warping women's experience of space and time, not so much because "space is gendered" as has often been said (e.g. Massey 2013), but because gender, as a social hierarchy, is also and especially spatially produced.

Gendered identities can therefore be said to be spatially constructed in a double sense—in the sense of gendered bodies being constructed *as* particular kinds of spaces, and in the sense of the kind of position and trajectory assigned to them *within* larger spatial configurations. At the same time, gender illustrates the mutual co-constitution of transactional and transcendental relations: belonging to the transcendental category "men" entails certain spatial entitlements, but conversely, possessing spatial entitlement is also what makes one a "man." What goes for gender equally goes for "race." Although, ideologically speaking, "race" is a very different figure, a central element of racializing bodies is not only to spatially segregate them from the dominant group, but to simultaneously assign them a less desirable (and thus subordinate) spatial position, be it at the back of the bus or in the "ghetto." In gendering and racializing bodies, physically enacted dominance hierarchies therefore coincide with cultural narratives of un-



equal symbolic value, and both work to reinforce one another. Gender and “race” as particular instances of transcendental categories here point to an underlying principle—our cultural forms are never wholly divorced from our existence as embodied animals, also and especially when it comes to the fundamental need of humans to be able to occupy space. Space is thus intimately connected to power precisely because, in controlling access, territorial actors also control a resource essential to physical survival.

Granted, in Western nations most of us—certainly most anthropologists—are far removed from survival concerns when it comes to their occupancy of space. However, one only has to walk the streets of almost any Western city to find out what happens to those for whom the transcendental layer of culture recedes and leaves the body physically and symbolically exposed: we usually refer to them as “homeless.” As Tanya Luhrmann (2006, 2007, 2008) observes, street-homeless people (from whom squatters were only one step removed by virtue of their very squatting), in the widespread absence of protection through the state, often adopt a certain aggressive style of interaction in order to protect themselves from assault. Luhrmann compares this to “the ‘code of honour’ commonly found among nomadic peoples, pastoralists and ranchers . . . (who), because they are isolated . . . have few others to help to defend them. In such poorly policed settings, physical survival may depend upon an ability to defend one’s turf so aggressively . . . that the trouble slinks away” (2008: 17). Crucially, this behavior is necessitated in large part by the absence of transcendental social institutions designed to intervene on behalf of the attacked, such as the state, the police, or the legal system, be it because such institutions do not exist, as for the pastoralist, or because individuals have no access to them, as for the homeless. In Bloch’s terms, the homeless therefore have lost access to the level of the transcendental social, and are reduced to enacting transactional dominance hierarchies in much the same way as other primates.<sup>5</sup>

The notion of territoriality can therefore here illuminate two things: one is that, while on the level of the transcendental, power relations between subject posi-

tions may be as complex and nuanced as we, as anthropologists, are used to framing them, on the level of the transactional they are, in fact, very much binary: in the context of dominance hierarchies, one can be the top-ape or the bottom-ape but not much in between. On the other hand, as Luhrmann’s example shows, there are situations even in the midst of our “advanced” Western societies, where transcendental assignments are de facto stripped away and people are reduced to “bare territoriality”: homelessness as a phenomenon epitomizes this state. Given that squatters, their utopian ideas notwithstanding, saw their practices also very much as a reaction to the desperate absence of shelter, it is therefore not difficult to understand how they would arrive at an idea of power in line with the binary nature of territorial dominance hierarchies—they were, in fact, the very people whose political and economic position reduced them to the necessity of defending their physical “turf” against territorial aggression. Moreover, while their political analysis took into account both levels—the transactional and the transcendental—their practice addressed the problem “bottom up”: “Safe Space” policies, while framed in terms of transcendental groups, effectively regulated territorial relations between concrete bodies.

In a sense, “Safe Space” practices thus replaced the absent (and in any case, undesired) protection of the state with an “alternative transcendental”—an imagined community based on a moral notion of solidarity in the light of shared vulnerability to territorial exposure. In enforcing rules that essentially prohibited the establishment of physical or symbolic dominance hierarchies (not always successfully, but *qua* intention), it thus pre-empted the necessity for individuals to assert themselves against territorial challenge. In this sense, “Safe Space” policies paradoxically had the effect of turning squats into something like diminutive versions of the territorial state: they bundled individual territorial claims into a collective venture, and thus channeled aggressive energy away from competition on the inside, and into the defense against the outside. The state, of course, consists of a multitude of complex layers of social relations, of which the basic logic of territoriality is just one, in so far as it involves a collective form of territorial practice. However, one of its central legitimizing claims is that it serves as the idealized expression of the collective territorial interests of its citizens. In the same way as it ensures individual claims to property, it also works to assure individual entitlements to space through mutual contractual

5. I am not aware that Bloch has specifically addressed homelessness in this context in his writing. I do, however, recall attending a talk by him at the LSE in 2014 where he explicitly made this point.



obligation, on the understanding that all participants must take part in defending the outer boundary. Seen from the outside, such states can thus commonly be observed to behave much like territorial individuals, defending their turf through aggressive posturing while on the inside, a more or less functional ordering regime ensures that every body is in its proper place. In the part-incident, part-intentional absence of the state, squatters therefore began to do the same. The difference lay mostly in the nature of the internal ordering mechanism: whereas squats actively worked to undermine the emergence of internal hierarchies, the state most often does the opposite.

The construction of “Safe Spaces” can thus, once again, be seen as a “transformational device” between two distinct but interrelated states of being: just as it serves as a mediator between a Foucauldian state of domination and free subject relations, so too does it work to transform Bloch’s binary dominance hierarchies into transcendental human relations, in the absence of the symbolic ordering mechanism of the state. Granted, fleshing out the continuities and differences between Foucault’s and Bloch’s models would require careful theorization that is beyond the scope of this paper. We can, however, observe some obvious commonalities between them: both models imply that human relations can reflect an extreme of absolute, embodied and enacted power differentials, as well as an opposite pole of free human relating, in which the Foucauldian may recognize the sphere of the ethical, and the “Blochian” the realm of the genuinely human. Combining these views, one could therefore speak of two spheres of spatial relating: a “transactional-territorial” sphere, and a “transcendental-ethical” one. In the context of spatiality, these two realms may again be recognizable as what I have called socio-spatial configurations: assemblages of material objects (including the body), practices and beliefs that produce specific socio-spatial positions and the type of relationship between them. As we have seen, these configurations are transposable and scalable—just as the logic of territorial behavior may apply to a pastoralist’s small field as much as to a nation state, so too can a “Safe Space” be declared—in theory—on a space of any size. At the same time, these two spatial orders produce fundamentally different types of social power—where territoriality always tends toward domination, an egalitarian spatial order, such as implied in “Safe Space” approaches, implies the opposite, namely a tendency toward freedom. The deliberate invocation of a “Safe Space” configuration was

therefore a political act, not only because it protected a specific, acutely threatened social group, but also because, in the aforementioned moral universalism of anarchist ethics, it was designed to counterbalance (spatial) inequality as such. For each instance of a “Safe Space,” it therefore had to be determined who, at present, was at the receiving end of territorial subjugation—and in the heat of everyday resistance, that could, occasionally, become quite a complex question.

To illustrate this with a final example: In “my” first squat, our crew had shared the house with a man, I will here call him Tariq, who was reluctant to share more about his background than that he had come from North Africa and had no intention to return there. It was generally assumed that he was a so-called “illegal” (i.e. undocumented migrant), but nobody cared enough about immigration law to investigate the matter. Tariq eventually drifted away and was not seen for several weeks, but as soon as we had moved into our new squat, he turned up at our door one evening and asked to be allowed to move in. Since the squat was spacious enough, he was admitted, but it soon emerged that he had since developed a cocaine habit, and the drug caused him (or gave him license to) systematically mistreat those around him. To the particular chagrin of the female squatters, he appeared to have decided that it was women’s role to keep the house clean, cook for him, and generally wait on his whim, which he noisily and aggressively demanded. This situation persisted for a few weeks, until one day Tariq crossed the line with a female squatter by transgressing on the space of her body without consent, and a “Safe Space” was officially invoked. Tariq was summoned to a house meeting (a full assembly, reflecting the gravity of the situation), confronted with his behavior, and, since no promise of betterment was forthcoming, asked to remove himself from the squat while being offered an alternative place to sleep. He did not take well to this, in his view, unjust and despotic decision, stomped back to his room in a flurry of anger, locking himself in, and as the afternoon progressed, drank himself into a rage and periodically stepped outside his door to shout abuse at everyone present. As it had become fairly obvious that he would not leave voluntarily, squatters from nearby houses were summoned to assist with the eviction.

Around nightfall, the situation had escalated to such an extent that Tariq was angrily pacing up and down the corridor, brandishing an axe and threatening to kill anyone who dared come near him. At the other end of



the building, a small mob of twenty squatters armed with assorted blunt objects huddled in a corner, trying to summon the courage to disarm him. Once in a while, one of the group would venture across the yard to try and talk sense into Tariq, only to come back unharmed but without result. The standoff lasted until, finally, one of our crew, more sensitive to the threat of violence than others, lost his nerve and phoned for the police. As he announced their imminent arrival, a shower of abuse rained upon him from both sides of the battlefield. “You f\*\*\*\*\* idiot” someone shouted, “Tariq is illegal!” In an instant, the weapons vanished on both sides, and when the police rang the doorbell a few minutes later, they encountered a scene of blissful tranquility, as squatters sat around a table drinking tea. The police in general had no particular interest in squatters’ internal conflicts, and so just grumbled something about wasting their time and climbed back into their vehicle. During their short appearance, someone had thankfully hidden Tariq’s axe out of sight, and thus disarmed, he realized his battle was lost. Presumably both placated and intimidated by his narrow escape from the law, he packed his things and was eventually assisted in carrying his belongings to a friend’s house nearby.

This incident illustrates how our two spatial configurations—the transactional-territorial and the transcendental-ethical—can overlay each other in a single physical space, and how actors can quickly change register from the enactment of a “Safe Space” to that of a “territory” and back again. The first to emerge as a territorial actor was Tariq—his attempts to control those inside the space of the squat, so they would comply with his demands, coincided with his bid to exert control over the spaces of women’s bodies. This resulted in the invocation of a “Safe Space” and the moral order implied in it: in order to counterbalance this display of territorial dominance, and to protect those who were most spatially vulnerable (in this case the women), the person who behaved in a territorial way had to be removed. This territorial conflict was interrupted by the arrival of a more powerful territorial actor, namely the state, in the shape of the police. Spontaneously and without much debate, the squat therefore reverted to “Safe Space” mode, and sided with the one who, in this configuration, was the most spatially vulnerable, only this time it was Tariq who was in need of protection vis-à-vis the state. Finally, once the police were gone, the squat effortlessly switched registers once again, to re-establish the original “Safe Space” and remove Tariq to protect the women. In this interaction,

the logic of “Safe Space” and the logic of territory thus came into direct conflict, as both patterns were alternately imposed on the space of the squat in short order. Depending on which paradigm dominated, individual actors such as Tariq thus occupied different and contradictory subject positions: from a territorial aggressor threatening others’ spatial entitlement, he transformed into the spatially vulnerable party in need of protection, and back again. At the same time, these pattern switches involved jumps in scale—depending on how the relevant space was defined, the pattern was scaled up to include the territory of the state, or down to include only the inside of the squat. Moreover, the enactment of the pattern was strangely hybrid: in order to establish the moral order of a “Safe Space,” squatters had to paradoxically act in a territorial fashion. This paradox reflects the same contradiction that plagued squats more generally: despite their egalitarian and open principles, they were still surrounded by a hostile outside which made defense a de facto necessity, and they were thus always suspended in a precarious balance between the two types of symbolic order.

## Conclusion

I began this paper with the Panopticon as a well-known example of how subjectivities are also and especially spatially produced. As the Foucauldian distinction between “domination” and “power” implies, this does not mean that these subjectivities are necessarily synonymous with what anthropologists of ethics, such as Faubion, have referred to as “ethically marked subject positions.” Rather, whether or not such distinctly ethical subject positions can emerge is very much a question of what type of spatial configuration one is dealing with. In trying to tease out what this approach can contribute to the anthropological study of ethics, I have suggested looking at practices, exemplified in the “Safe Space” policies used by squatters. These are designed to inhibit the emergence of a particular kind of spatial order—which, following Bloch, I have called a transactional-territorial order—and facilitate the emergence of another, which I have called “transcendental-ethical,” and which, according to Bloch, separates human from non-human primates. As the Panopticon itself shows, most of the spaces humans inhabit are not examples of one or the other of these configurations in their pure form—they are blends, or more precisely, they show inherent tendencies toward one as much as the other. To which side they fall, in any given moment,





is very much a matter of the extent to which actors enforce one or the other tendency on a space. Even a Panopticon, with its distinct tendency toward relations of domination, can be “flipped” to become a space in which free ethical subjects can potentially flourish by enhancing the degree of freedom and self-governance available to its inhabitants. This involves an agreement by all participants to resist the emergence of dominance hierarchies and to co-operate in balancing the distribution of social power; in other words, solidarity. In referring to abstract identity categories (essentialized roles), squatters thus established who this solidarity should apply to (namely those assumed to be the weakest territorial actor). Their practice, however, addressed this problem by radically distributing control over material space, and thus overthrowing the transactional order.

What I have aimed to demonstrate is thus that if we take seriously the notion of freedom as a precondition for ethics, then we must also ask how people go about producing this freedom in the first place. Self-governance is not always self-evident; it has to be socially produced, or in many cases, fought for. For want of a better term, I have therefore called such practices “proto-ethical”—they may not fit the bill for notions such as the “auto-poietic subject,” or the deliberate assuming of specifically *ethical* subject positions. By creating the conditions that are required for actors to engage in such things, however, they create spaces in which ethical life becomes a possibility, and they aim to expand this possibility to as many people as possible. This involves creating a symbolic space in which specific essentialized roles are not as important as the quality of the relations between them—the logic of “Safe Spaces” implied, after all, that what identity category one fills is secondary, as long as one was territorially disadvantaged. Finally, speaking with Bloch, homo sapiens could thus also be seen to be the only species involved in actively undermining its own inherent dominance hierarchies—which would make anarchism a uniquely human phenomenon indeed.

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