

Title	スモールセルネットワークにおけるゲーム理論技術に応じた協調かつ共同な資源マネジメント
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Abstract

The exponential growth in capacity demand and ubiquitous coverage/connectivity requirement of wireless cellular networks has shifted mobile network operators' interest toward base station densification. Base station densification is essential to meet the capacity demand and coverage requirement by massive deployment of small cells by covering areas that are much smaller as compared to the coverage area of macrocell base stations. Small cells are attractive choice for operators due to its low cost and ease of deployment, and flexible coverage capability allowing them to reuse the available spectrum and thus increasing the area spectral efficiency. However, the advantages of small cells could come short whenever neighboring small cells compete to utilize common spectral resources that would result in severe interference. Also, centralized control for resource allocation can be infeasible due to potentially dense and random deployment of small cells either by operators or customers. Hence, radio resource management in small cell networks becomes essential to achieve the expected gains from small cells.

In this regard, I propose a cooperative and collaborative resource management (CCRM) framework that enables cooperative intra-connection among small cells of an operator and collaborative interconnection among multiple operators for proper utilization of network resources (both infrastructures and spectrum). The cooperative resource management performed at the network edge, i.e., among small cell access points, in-cooperates information exchange mechanism among small cells allowing them for distributed resource allocation to mobile stations. The collaboration formation among multiple operators offers users with multi-operator small cells support. This facilitates network users with an extension of network coverage and services availability regardless of their operator's network coverage, and evolves small cells to meet the expectation of a networked society.

To look for distributed resource (subchannel) allocation, first, I study the performance of best-response strategy as a game theoretic solution analyzed under the physical interference model. However, in "traditional" best-response strategy, players are assumed to be coordinated and restricted to take turns while updating their strategies. To overcome these requirements of coordination among players and restricting at most only one player to update their strategy, I model strategy update criteria of players in a game such that multiple players can repeatedly and simultaneously take actions following best-response strategies. Through the proposed algorithms, stochastic best-response distributed subchannel selection (SBDSS) and cooperative best-response distributed subchannel selection (CBDSS), I study for cases and associated limitations when multiple players may update their subchannel allocation strategies that could inevitably speed-up the convergence process to steady-state. In SBDSS, no information exchanges and coordination among players are required and each player updates its strategy of subchannel selection following stochastic best-response. The randomness in strategy updates result in uncoordinated sequential updates and avoids the problem of simultaneous moves that would have resulted in oscillations between some set of strategy profiles. However, this results in a slow convergence to steady-state. To speed-up the convergence, in CBDSS, I assume coordination among neighboring small cells to act cooperatively while best-responding to their strategy. Here, I limit multiple players to update to the same strategy at a given time, such that the number of players who can simultaneously update their strategy is equal to the number of available strategies. This provides notable improvement in terms of rate of convergence to steady-state.

Although the problem of distributed resource allocation can be addressed through the proposed schemes following best-response dynamics, the existence of a steady-state solution, i.e., a pure strategy Nash equilibrium cannot be guaranteed. To guarantee for the existence of a steady-state solution, I utilize the concept of marginal contribution and propose marginal contribution-based best-response (MCBR) algorithm to cope with dynamic and limited information in the small cell network. Here, the objective is to find a distributed subchannel allocation that maximizes the welfare of the small cell network, defined as the total system capacity. MCBR is theoretically proven to be an exact potential game, which is a class of potential game that guarantees convergence to a pure strategy steady-state, i.e., the Nash equilibrium. I also validate the convergence property and evaluate the performance through simulations for various performance metrics.

Finally, to offer multi-operator small cells support, I formalize a mechanism for multi-operator collaboration through negotiation to establish mutual agreement acceptable to each involved party. This provides operators with collaboration

gains, and motivates them to utilize their exclusively owned network resources to serve others' subscribers. Such collaboration would enable subscribers of one operator to utilize other operators' network resources and maintain ubiquitous connectivity. Collaboration, in turn, enables: to enhance service levels to users with improved network resources availability, to avoid situations of under-utilization of radio network resources, to improve revenue generated by serving an increased market share, and to create a bring-your-own-device environment by maintaining small cell network services to subscribers regardless of coverage availability from their operator.

Keywords: Small Cells; Distributed Subchannel Selection; Game Theory; Best-Response Strategy; Simultaneous Move; Cooperative Games; Non-Cooperative Games; Potential Games; Marginal Contribution; Collaboration; Negotiation.