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Leibniz on Hope

Abstract: G. W. Leibniz famously proclaimed that this is the best of all possible worlds. One of the properties of the best world is its increasing perfection. He gave a prominent role in his discussion of emotions to hope, which is related to intellectual activity such as curiosity and courage, which in turn is essential for the practice of science and the promotion of the common good. Leibniz regarded hope as a process in which minute perceptions in the mind, that is, unconscious promises or signs of a future pleasure, or joy, of the mind may accumulate to an expectation that we become aware of, the passion of hope. Related to a moral instinct of striving for joy and avoiding sorrow, hope motivates us to promote perfection, which produces joy in us and eventually leads to happiness.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) famously proclaimed that this is the best of all possible worlds. He never thought, however, that it would be defined as a static collection of substances in a perfect pre-established harmony. At all times the monads are undergoing a dynamic change. Furthermore, he thought (although his opinions on the topic varied at different times¹) that the world as a whole could increase in perfection. Given this dynamic essence of the best of all possible worlds, it is no wonder that Leibniz gave an important role in his discussion of emotions to hope which, along with joy and love, he regards as a basic constituent of intellectual and moral advancement. Hope supports our approaching perfection which, according to Leibniz, is the goal of human action. In this paper I will first discuss Leibniz's general theory of emotions and then the characteristics of hope, its relation to joy and the place of hope and joy in Leibniz's perfectionism.

Disquiet and Passions

My point of departure is Leibniz's *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain* or *New Essays on Human Understanding*, book II, chapter xx, where he shows how emotions arise and how they affect our deliberation. The work, written in

1 See Phemister 2006.

1704, is a critique in dialogue form of John Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690).²

In E II, xx Locke relates good and evil with pleasure and pain (§ 2) and argues that passions are modes of pleasure and pain. For Locke, pleasure and pain are simple ideas of sensation and reflection and they are known by experience. Pleasure activates and motivates men's actions and can be found in objects and thoughts (§ 3). Pain has an opposing effect – we try to avoid it the best we can although it is often produced by the same ideas and objects as pleasure (§ 4).

Leibniz can agree with the basic subjective character of pleasure and pain, although his conceptual framework is different. For him, pleasure and pain are notable perceptions which affect us. But they are not simple ideas, as they are built from aggregates or condensations of minute and confused perceptions.³ A single unconscious, minute perception does not have much effect on its own but a larger whole of minute perceptions may become notable and capture our attention.

According to Locke, men are driven to actions by the present uneasiness they feel which is caused by the absence of some certain good they draw their delight from.⁴ Positive emotion such as love or joy is a delight of the mind whereas hate or sorrow is described as uneasiness. Uneasiness to Locke is equivalent to desire in the sense that if man has no desire for a certain good, he or she does not feel uneasiness. In this case one feels mere *velleity* or wish which is an almost indifferent state. Also, if the desired good is impossible to obtain, the uneasiness is “cured”. Uneasiness is for Locke the leading motive for men's actions and constitutes their passions (E II, xx, § 3–6).

In his answer in NE, II, xx, § 6 Leibniz again relies on his doctrine of minute perceptions which constitute desire. Against Locke's uneasiness Leibniz offers his own disquiet (*inquiétude*) which is more of a disposition to suffer

2 I use the following abbreviations: E refers to Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Locke 1975), NE to Leibniz's *New Essays on Human Understanding* (Leibniz 1981 (RB; page numbers of RB are identical to A VI, 6 or Leibniz 1923-)), CSM to Descartes 1984, GP to Leibniz 1880 and AG to Leibniz 1989.

3 Leibniz's term for these minute perceptions is *petit perception*, little perception. He introduced this doctrine in his 1684 work *Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas*. The concept of minute or little perceptions of which we are not aware can be traced back to Thomas Aquinas, but Leibniz seems to be the first to apply it systematically. See Kulstad & Carlin 2008, sec. 5.

4 Later in the *Essay* Locke argues that in us there are many uneasinesses always soliciting and ready to determine the will, but the greatest and most pressing wins (E II, xxi, § 47; E, 263).

rather than the suffering itself which Locke discusses.⁵ The nuance in meaning proves to be of great importance when Leibniz argues that *inquiétude* fits fairly well with “the nature of the thing itself”, but uneasiness (signifying suffering which is understood as displeasure) does not. This is because desire is not the suffering itself, but a disposition to suffering. In other words, a desire has to be evident to be a real suffering. It has to be attended.

If you take “uneasiness” or disquiet to be a genuine displeasure, then I do not agree that is all that spurs us on. What usually drives us are those minute insensible perceptions which could be called sufferings that we cannot become aware of, if the notion of suffering did not involve awareness (NE II, xxi, § 36; RB, 188).

The insensible perceptions or “little urges” are usually not noted at all, which Leibniz finds a good thing – in the opposite situation we would constantly feel restless. He also argues that the unconscious nature of most of our dispositions enable us to act quickly when needed, because our mind is not troubled by the multiplicity of distinct perceptions (NE, II, xx, § 6). However, the minute perceptions can combine and make themselves known within the whole, forming a clear, but confused perception of pleasure, pain and the like.⁶ As examples Leibniz mentions the roar of the sea which is formed by the sound of each wave put together (NE, Preface; RB, 54) and Socrates in Plato’s *Phaedo* who eventually becomes aware that his foot is itching (II, xx, § 6; RB, 165).

Whereas for Locke pleasure or pain is a state, Leibniz thinks that they are formed eventually as processes where the minute perceptions cumulate and finally form a notable pleasure or pain which is attended and which might lead the will into action.

[...] Nature has given us the spurs of desire in the form of the rudiments or elements of suffering, semi-suffering one might say, or...of minute sufferings of which we cannot be aware. This lets us enjoy the benefit of discomfort without enduring its inconveniences; whereas our continual victory over these semi-sufferings [...] provides us with many semi-pleasures; and the continuation and accumulation of these [...] eventually becomes a whole, genuine pleasure (NE II, xx, § 6; RB, 165).

⁵ Leibniz’s choice of the term is related to Pierre Coste’s French translation of Locke’s *Essay*. Coste translates uneasiness as *inquiétude* which is not a strictly literal translation, signifying a state where man is not quite at ease, lacking tranquillity of the soul. Later in II, xx, § 6 Leibniz defines disquiet as “imperceptible little urges which keep us constantly in suspense.”

⁶ Clear, but confused perception is defined in *Meditations* as follows: “[clear cognition] is confused when I cannot enumerate one by one marks sufficient for differentiating a thing from others, even though the thing does indeed have such marks and requisites into which its notion can be resolved” (GP IV, 422; AG, 24).

Against Locke Leibniz argues that we do not feel uneasiness all the time – our perceptions of suffering are mostly minute semi-sufferings and only when they accumulate and form a clear, but confused perception or genuine suffering, we became aware of them. At the end of § 6 Leibniz employs the metaphor of a clock, where a continual balance (in German, *Unruhe*, that is, disquiet) exists. The clock can be taken as a model of our bodies which can never be at ease. Each tiny change affects the other parts of the body and forces it to restore its former balance. Thus there is a perpetual conflict which makes up the constant disquiet of the clock/body.⁷

The semi-sufferings which eventually form genuine suffering can be overcome. When we gain victory over these minute sufferings, each in turn, we get semi-pleasures which eventually form a genuine pleasure when the number or effect of semi-pleasures exceeds the number or effect of semi-sufferings. Thus Leibniz regards pleasure or pain as a sum of inclinations aligned in a certain direction. When the direction is to the good, we get pleasure and when the direction is to the evil, we get pain. They are also related to the clarity of perceptions – the more clear perceptions we have, the more pleasure we can get and the more confused perceptions we have, the more suffering will ensue. Pleasure and pain come in degrees and there is no complete change.⁸

This account of tiny aids, imperceptible little escapes and releases of thwarted endeavour [*tendance*], which finally generate notable pleasure, also provides a somewhat more distinct knowledge of our inevitably confused ideas of pleasure and of pain; just as the sensation of warmth or of light results from many tiny motions [...] (NE II, xx, § 6, RB,165)

For Locke, passions are modes of pleasure and pain and are constituted by uneasiness or delight. Pain or uneasiness is the ultimate motivator, but passion gives our actions and thoughts a direction, the goal to strive towards.⁹ Locke thinks that the notion of unconscious pleasure and pain is simply absurd (E II, i, § 1) and does not regard desires and volitions as opposed forces like Descartes does (*Passions of the soul* I, § 17; CSM I, 335). Because uneasiness usually takes the form of a passion, the will is determined by it. The only way

⁷ Leibniz often speaks of the body as an automata or a machine. See, for example. Leibniz's comments on note L to Bayle's *Dictionnaire*, article *Rorarius* (GP IV, 533–54), written around the same time as NE, and *Monadology*, § 64.

⁸ This is very typical of Leibniz's world-view. He frequently says that nature makes no leaps – change is gradual and always consists of several intermediary steps. For the continuum in nature, see Leibniz's letter to *Nouvelles de la république des lettres*, July, 1687 (reply to Malebranche), GP III, 51–55.

⁹ Bradfield 2002, 86. As we will see a little later, this description fits Leibniz's theory of passions also despite major differences in Locke's and Leibniz's epistemology.

for the will to be active is its ability to suspend or postpone action to examine evidence for or against some action.¹⁰

Leibniz explains different passions in different ways in points 7–17 of NE, II, xx, although the basic components are in all cases the minute perceptions. While Locke's uneasiness is at worst a pressing, violent and conscious striving for some known absent good, Leibniz's spurs of desire are just some general restlessness: "These impulses are like so many little springs trying to unwind and so driving our machine along" (NE II, xx, § 6; RB, 166). However, disquiet is an essential part of all passions: "Disquiet occurs not merely in uncomfortable passions such as aversion, fear, anger, envy, shame, but also in their opposites, love, hope, calmness, generosity and pride" (NE II, xxi, § 39; RB, 192). It is always related to pleasure or pain or perfection or imperfection:

I believe that fundamentally pleasure is a sense of perfection, and pain a sense of imperfection, each being notable enough for one to become aware of it. For the minute insensible perceptions of some perfection or imperfection, which I have spoken of several times and which are as it were components of pleasure and of pain, constitute inclinations and propensities but not outright passions. So there are insensible inclinations of which we are not aware (NE II, xxi, § 41; RB, 194).

Let us distinguish between two kinds of impulses, disquiet and passions. Their difference is related to their object. Minute perceptions are related to pleasure or pain and they form disquiet consisting of semi-pleasures or semi-sufferings which is a general disposition, restlessness without a clear object. These components of pleasure and pain are related to perfection and imperfection much the same way as in Spinoza's philosophy (I will return to this theme later). The disquiet may find an object and become a known inclination or passion related to that object.¹¹ This is when mere disquiet transforms itself into a passion with a clear object.

In itself this scheme is similar to Locke's view of uneasiness and passions, but epistemologically the change is from unconscious cognition to conscious cognition. The question is one of degree, not of kind. When disquiet becomes strong or pressing enough, one becomes aware of it and it becomes a passion. *In Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas* Leibniz argues that affections of the mind are clear and distinct notions:

10 This doctrine, added to later editions of the *Essay*, was influenced by Malebranche (Vienne 1991), but is regarded as problematic in the context of Locke's philosophy both by Leibniz (NE II, xxi, § 47) and many contemporary commentators (see Lowe 2005, 135, and Magri 2000, 64).

11 According to Leibniz, with passions and inclinations, we at least know what we want (II, xx, § 6; RB, 166).

A distinct concept, however, is the kind of notion which assayers have of gold: one, namely, which enables them to distinguish gold from all other bodies by sufficient marks and observations. We usually have such concepts about objects common to many senses, such as number, magnitude and figure, and also about many affections of the mind such as hope and fear; in a word, about all concepts of which we have a nominal definition which is nothing but the enumeration of sufficient marks (GP IV, 423; AG, 24).

Thus Leibniz classifies passions, such as hope and fear, as clear and distinct cognition which can be recognized and distinguished from other states of the mind. Furthermore, being clear and distinct cognition, it can be apperceived by the human mind. In this way they are very different from inclinations formed by disquiet which are at most clear but confused perceptions, like colours or flavours (G IV, 426). Disquiet does affect our deliberation, but it does not lead us directly into action.

Hope

Although Leibniz mentions hope as an example of a passion or affection in *Meditations*, his remarks on the emotion are scarce. In a memoir *De affectibus* from 1679 Leibniz follows the Scholastic definition of hope as a “good opinion of the future” (A VI, 4, 1416). While this definition is in line with his later views, he discusses it more fully and adds some qualifications in NE, II, xx.

In E II, xx, § 9–10 Locke argues that the soul is content when it thinks of a probable future enjoyment of a pleasant thing, that is, pleasure. This emotion is hope which is connected to delight. Fear is the opposite. It rises in the form of uneasiness when we think of future evil. Locke’s view of hope and fear are consistent with his views of joy and sorrow. Hope is a state of delight which follows from beliefs concerning future pleasures. If the belief is strong enough (there is high probability of attaining the good), it leads us to action.

Theophilus, Leibniz’s representative in NE is at first neutral, but soon brings out a very strong disagreement. True to his general account of joy and sorrow, disquiet is not only related to displeasure but also to pleasure. Thus he argues that there is disquiet both in fear and hope. When the representative of Locke, Philalethes, presents a definition of hope as the contentment of the soul which thinks ‘of a probable future enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight’ (E, 231), Theophilus says:

If disquiet signifies displeasure, I grant that it always accompanies fear; but taking it for that undetectable spur which urges us on, it is also relevant of hope. The Stoics took the passions to be beliefs: thus for them hope was the belief in a future good, and fear the belief in a future evil. But I would rather say that the passions are not contentment or

displeasures or beliefs, but endeavours – or rather modifications of endeavour [*tendence*] – which arise from beliefs or opinions and are accompanied by pleasure or displeasures (NE II, xx, § 9, RB. p. 167).

Leibniz takes hope (and passions in general) to be related to desire (*tendence*; Remnant and Bennett translate it as endeavour¹²), which arises from beliefs or opinions rather than as beliefs as the Stoics (and Locke with them) thought.¹³ At this point it is useful to look at § 10. There Leibniz says: “Despair, viewed as passion, will be a kind of strong endeavour which is utterly thwarted, resulting in violent conflict and much displeasure” (RB, 167). If this is applied to its opposite, one might say that hope is an endeavour, a general desire which brings about pleasure. In Leibniz’s words, it is an “undetected spur which urges us on” (RB, 167).

Applying the scheme from an earlier section, we get the following picture: the minute promises or signs of a future pleasure (semi-pleasures) may accumulate to that of an expectation which motivates us to strive for the good represented by it. The disquiet receives a direction or a goal and turns from disquiet into a passion. In this way Leibniz can show that Locke’s uneasiness is not necessarily a bad thing – the disquiet can be constitutive of positive passions and can drive us to advance perfection and our own happiness.

Thus we can distinguish between different degrees of hope. The signs of hope which are singular semi-pleasures give us promises of the future good, forming a positive disquiet of hope, but when semi-pleasures accumulate and converge in an apperceived expectation of some future good, leading us to a certain object, a clear and distinct idea or a passion of hope arises, invokes the will and leads to action. In this way hope can be understood as a disposition which has as an object some future good.

With his theory of disquiet Leibniz can combine the traditional view that hope includes a belief or an opinion concerning a future good with his dynamical world-view. Hope is a spur which is built up from minute little perceptions

¹² Translating *tendence* as endeavour is problematic as Remnant and Bennett note in Leibniz 1996, lxi. The reason for this is that Leibniz uses the word in the meaning of tendency or inclination of the mind, but also in the sense of *conatus*, a general desire or striving. I use both endeavour (referring to general striving) and desires or inclinations (referring to singular dispositions in the human soul). In addition, Leibniz distinguishes between ‘appetitions’ and ‘volitions’ as we will see a little later.

¹³ Leibniz is probably referring here to Chrysippus who introduced the idea that an emotion is an evaluative belief (*doxa*) or judgement (*krisis*) that there is good or bad at hand, accompanied by the judgement that it is right or proper to react emotionally. The first judgement identifies a contingent object as good or bad, and the second is an assent to a hormetic thought which is typically associated with seeing an object in this light. Knuuttila 2004, 53.

and urges us on. Whereas in Locke's model men fight the constant uneasiness they feel and this restless state is seldom overcome by delight, in Leibniz's system the positive disquiet of hope can keep us alert, motivate our efforts at developing ourselves and give us mental rewards. When it grows strong enough, it can turn into a proper emotion of hope.

From the present-day perspective Leibniz's conception of hope seems feasible, provided one accepts the perfectionist, God-centred framework to which it is unavoidably connected. His conception of hope is also original with respect to his contemporaries. For example, in II, § 58 of his *Passions of the Soul*, Descartes argues that hope is the possibility to acquire a good and when hope is extreme, it changes to confidence (CSM I, 375). Locke clearly shares this view along with Malebranche (*The Search After Truth* V, 10, Malebranche 1997, 394). These philosophers follow the influential Stoic conception of passions as beliefs. Another common view is the Cartesian doctrine that we are always aware of everything we perceive at each moment. The Leibnizian disquiet, being a process which is founded mostly on unconscious little perceptions is clearly something different.

Although Leibniz has similar views on the relation of action and perfection with Spinoza, as we will shortly see, the latter relates the affect of hope to anticipation and defines it as an inconstant joy which has arisen from the image of a future or past thing whose outcome we doubt. When the doubt involved in the affect is removed, hope becomes confidence and fear, in turn, despair (*Ethics* 3p18, Schol. 1; Spinoza 1994, 164–165). The difference from Leibniz is clear – the anticipation is still an inconstant, uncertain state rather than a gradual process with encouraging signs.

Perhaps closest to Leibniz's views is Hobbes who thought hope to be an appetite for a future pleasure which requires an expectation that it can be reached (*The Elements of Law, Part I: Human Nature*; Hobbes 1994, 52–53). However, for Leibniz future pleasure is related to perfection and this view is very different from Hobbes'view according to which the will is determined by the last desire or aversion in deliberation (Hobbes 1994, 71).

Hope and Joy

Hope is essentially related to joy which is the most important emotion for Leibniz. Between hope and joy there seems to be a very close union, a kind of symbiosis. In a short youthful dialogue *Persuading a Sceptic* (1679–1681) Leibniz emphasizes the continuity of hope and its close relation to joy:

After moderate joy the most beautiful and useful emotion is hope, or rather that uniform and durable joy, which is nothing but well grounded hope, since other joys are fleeting whereas the joy of hope is continuous. I have noticed that only hope sustains courage as well as curiosity: as long as it is reduced by annoyances, old age, illness, bothering reflections about misery and the alleged vanity of human things – *à dieu* our noble enterprises, *à Dieu* our beautiful researchers.¹⁴

Here hope is presented as constitutive of joy which Leibniz describes as well-grounded hope. Joy coming from hope is continuous while joy coming from sensual pleasures such as food and drink is fleeting. This is because hope is related to intellectual activity such as curiosity and courage which again is essential for the practice of science and promoting the common good. This activity, again, is related to metaphysical perfection.

According to Leibniz, when our suffering is eventually overcome by pleasure, our whole disposition changes from sadness to joy which Leibniz defines as the pleasure of the mind or a sentiment of increase in perfection. Joy is an intellectual feeling and when we receive it, we move from being passive to being active, from imperfection to perfection. This change can be eventual or sudden, depending on the situation. For example, if I have lost the key to my apartment, I feel sadness. When I suddenly find it again, my mood changes quickly from sadness to joy. An example of a long-term process would be a deep depression where one eventually moves from sadness and passivity to joy and activity.

Whereas joy and hope are regarded as passions of the soul, they are special kinds of passions leading to the good – following Descartes one might say that they are intellectual passions which lead us to action and perfection.¹⁵ Like hope, joy can be understood as either a positive disquiet or a passion. It can be a passion which has a clear object such as some event which can bring us joy, say, an act of charity. On the other hand, we may receive joy from less clear reasons – we can feel joyful even when we do not have a clear reason for it.¹⁶

¹⁴ *Conversation between Father Emery the Hermit and the Marquis of Pianese, Minister of State of Savoy, which has yielded a Remarkable Change in this Minister's Life*, in Leibniz 2006, 192.

¹⁵ For Descartes, intellectual joy and sadness are not passions, properly speaking, for they come into the soul by the action of the soul itself and not by the action of the body (*Passions of the soul* II, 147–148, CSM I, 381–382).

¹⁶ “[Joy] appears to me to signify a state in which pleasure predominates in us; for during the deepest sorrow and amidst sharpest anguish one can have some pleasure, e.g., from drinking or from hearing music, although displeasure dominates; and similarly in the midst of the most acute agony the mind can be joyful, as happened with martyrs” (NE II, xx, § 7; RB, 166. See also *De publica felicitate*, Leibniz 1948, 613).

Leibniz's argument is close to Spinoza's which was that when our power to maintain self-preservation increases, we would feel joy (pleasure) and when it decreases we would feel sadness (pain). In his definition of joy [*laetitia*] Spinoza argues that moving from inadequate ideas (smaller perfection) to adequate ideas (greater perfection) increases our power and consequently our joy; therefore we should increase our knowledge of God or nature (*Ethics* III, P11, Scholium; Spinoza 1994, 161). The joy comes in degrees – the more adequate ideas we have, the more perfect we will become and the more we will understand God or nature. Leibniz's argument is, again, very similar.¹⁷ He says that joy makes men alert, active and hopeful of further success (NE II, xx, § 8) and therefore it leads us to action and perfection. The more active the substance, the more it receives joy and pleasure and the more there is hope for future pleasures. Passion or suffering in an ideal case can be turned eventually to action and pleasure:

[...] if we take 'action' to be an endeavor towards perfection, and 'passion' to be the opposite, then genuine substances are active only when their perceptions ... are becoming better developed and more distinct, just as they are passive only when their perceptions are becoming more confused. Consequently, in substances which are capable of pleasure and pain every action is a move towards pleasure, every passion a move towards pain (NE II, xxi, § 72; RB, 210).

Hope as a rational appetite

Finally, I would like to return to the dynamical character of Leibniz's conception of hope and discuss some implications of it for Leibniz's ethics. We have seen that for Leibniz passions are not beliefs as in the Stoics, but rather are conscious desires which arise from them. Whereas the Stoics saw passions as false judgements or disturbances of the mind which prevent happiness, Leibniz regards them as both negative and positive endeavours. The Stoic term for hope is appetite (*epithumia*) which is defined by Pseudo-Andronicus as follows: "Appetite is an irrational reaching out, or pursuit of an expected good" (Knuuttila 2004, 51–52). For Leibniz, hope is more like a rational striving for a lasting pleasure or happiness.¹⁸

¹⁷ There is one major difference, however, which is related to their different metaphysics. According to Leibniz, action within the pre-established harmony signifies that one substance affects another and passion that a substance is affected by another substance (See *Monadology*, § 49–51 and *Principles of Nature and Grace*, § 3).

¹⁸ However, as Rutherford shows, Leibniz's conception of hope can be compared to the Stoic rational desire (*boulêsis*) which is a good emotional state (Rutherford 2003, 81).

As moral progress is a central aspect of Leibnizian ethics, it is no wonder he did not like Stoic ethics, although he comes fairly close to their views in many ways. As Donald Rutherford has pointed out, Leibniz's main argument against the Neostoic currents in Descartes and Spinoza is based on the fact that the Stoic ethics consists of patience without hope. The gist of the argument is directed to the theological framework – when there is no divine justice but mere destiny (*fatum Stoicum*), there is no hope that virtue will be rewarded and the present state may seem unbearable (Rutherford 2003, 64–67). Whereas Leibniz regards happiness as a continual systematic process, he thinks that in Stoicism a lasting happiness is not possible, as there is no guarantee that destiny allows it to last. When one has hope or a reasonable expectation of happiness as a result of a virtuous life, one is motivated to act virtuously.¹⁹

As we saw, the rational striving for pleasure in Leibniz's system is founded on the “undetectable spur which urges us on”. The corresponding endeavour to this appetite in the soul is will.

Volition is the effort or endeavour [*conatus*] to move towards what one finds good and away from what one finds bad, the endeavour arising immediately out of one's awareness of those things. This definition has as a corollary the famous axiom that from will and power together, action follows; since any endeavour results in action unless it is prevented (NE II, xxi, § 5; RB, 72).

Our will is always directed to the good we are aware of and corresponds to primitive active force and substantial form in Leibnizian metaphysics.²⁰ The disquiet, when it is related to pleasure leads eventually to action when a person becomes aware of it.²¹ In this sense the “intellectual” disquiet (consisting of semi-pleasures) which is related to intellectual passions is a rational striving

19 The same kind of criticism applies to ancient Stoicism which Leibniz describes in his fifth letter to Clarke (§ 13): “The Stoical fate will have a man be quiet because he must have patience whether he will or not, since it is impossible to resist the course of things. But 'tis agreed that there is a *fatum Christianum*, a certain destiny of everything, regulated by the foreknowledge and providence of God” (GP VII, 391; Leibniz 1969, 697).

20 “It is true that active power is sometimes understood in a fuller sense, in which it comprises not just a mere faculty but also an endeavour; and that is how I take it in my theorizing about dynamics” (NE II, xxi, § 1; RB, 169).

21 Pauline Phemister offers a somewhat similar reading with the difference that she discusses in terms of appetites and distinguishes between noticeable appetites such as the desire for food and true volitions which are rational or distinct appetites. It seems to me that this view can be understood as being in agreement with the picture I have presented (Phemister 2005, 248).

for perfection. We might call this kind of striving ‘appetition’, following Leibniz’s argument in NE, II, xxi, § 5:

There are other efforts, arising from insensible perceptions, which we are not aware of; I prefer to call these “appetitions” rather than volitions, for one describes as “voluntary” only actions one can be aware of and can reflect upon whether they arise from some consideration of good and bad; though there are also appetitions of which one can be aware (RB, 173).

The difference between disquiet and volition is thus that, whereas the former are usually unconscious, the latter is something we are aware of. Hope as an intellectual disquiet can be considered as a rational appetite in the sense that it leads us eventually to joy or pleasure of the mind. It can grow in us and when it finds an object, fix our will to it and lead to a passion which mediated by the will leads to action. One has to note, however, that there is a constant conflict between different kinds of impulses in the human mind and there is a threat that our positive inclinations are endangered by more confused desires which draw the will to wrong goals. Leibniz describes the situation in NE, II, xxi, § 39:

Various perceptions and inclinations combine to produce a complete volition: it is the result of the conflict amongst them. There are some, imperceptible in themselves, which add up to a disquiet which impels us without our seeing why. There are some which join forces to carry us towards or away from some object, in which case there is desire or fear, also accompanied by disquiet but not always one amounting to pleasure or displeasure. Finally, there are some impulses which are accompanied by actual pleasure or suffering” (NE xxi, § 39; RB, 192).

There are still some components in Leibniz’s moral psychology which need to be taken into account. He argues that there is within us an innate principle of pursuing joy and avoiding sorrow which is known by instinct. This principle is a disposition to do good and to love other human beings. The principle is not a truth of reason in the sense that it can be reached by finite analysis since it is based on inner experience and confused cognition. The material provided by the principle is thus very different from other innate ideas like the idea of God (NE I, 1, § 1) which are clear and distinct ideas. In itself it could be compared with animal instincts, since animals strive for the good that is suitable for them (NE III, xi, § 8). In what follows I will refer to the innate principle as moral instinct.

Whereas the will concerns only endeavours we are aware of, the moral instinct offers us only confused, minute perceptions of pleasure and pain. Thus it can be seen as constitutive of disquiet and explains why we in general strive towards pleasure or joy and hope instead of suffering or pain. As we saw,

pleasure is a feeling of perfection and in this way the moral instinct guides us to strive for perfection. However, if our perceptions of pleasure and pain are confused cognition, it is difficult to see how they can affect our will which concerns things we are aware of (in Leibniz's words, "[endeavour] arising immediately out of one's awareness of those things")? Is the accumulation of minute perceptions enough to explain this leap from (mostly unconscious) appetitions to apperceived volitions? I think an answer can be found in Leibniz's letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte, written two years before NE (also called *On What Is Independent Of Sense And Of Matter*, GP VI, 499–508):

[...] In order to conceive numbers and even shapes distinctly and to build sciences from them, we must reach something which sense cannot furnish but which the understanding adds to it. Since therefore our soul compares the numbers and the shapes of colours, for example, with the number and shapes discovered by touch, there must be an *internal sense* where the perceptions of these different external senses are found united. This is called the *imagination*, which comprises at once the *concepts of particular senses*, which are *clear but confused*, and the *concepts of the common sense*, which are *clear and distinct*" (GP VI, 501; Leibniz 1969, 548).

When we explain the feeling of perfection which is the essence of hope and joy, we must look at the internal sense or imagination. As we remember from the description of clear and distinct ideas in *Meditation*, they (including hope and fear) are objects common to many senses. Leibniz argues that besides sensible and imaginable (numbers and shapes, for example), there is that which is only intelligible, since it is the object of understanding alone (GP VI, 501). The distinction leads to a further classification into three levels of concepts:

- 1) sensible only (objects produced by each sense in particular)
- 2) at once sensible and intelligible (appertain to common sense)
- 3) intelligible only (belong to the understanding)

To the first category one can classify the clear, but confused perceptions of sounds, colours, flavours and the like.²² The second level of concepts consists of the concepts of the internal sense, which are common in the perceptions of the external senses. Concepts, which are intelligible only are beyond our imagination and are related to our reason. When we consider metaphysical perfection, it is clearly sensible in the sense that it is felt as something, that is, pleasure of the mind. It is a sentiment which is a feeling rather than an object of the understanding; it brings about a harmonious feeling. However, it

²² In NE IV, vi, § 7 Leibniz argues that these kinds of perceptions should be called images rather than qualities or ideas. RB, 404.

can be argued that perfection must be more than mere feeling since it motivates us morally. Thus feeling perfection is not only sensible, but also intelligible. It is related to our innate ideas, especially the clear and distinct idea of God and his perfections. Perceiving perfection corresponds with the innate ideas and can affect our volitions.²³ Leibniz wrote to Bayle:

The most abstract thoughts need some imagination: and when we consider what confused thoughts (which invariably accompany the most distinct that we can have) are (such as those of colours, odours, tastes, of heat, of cold etc.) we realize that they always involve the infinite, and not only what happens in our body but also, by means of it, what happens elsewhere.²⁴

The increase in universal perfection produces pleasure and decreases pain. When the intellect finds that an appetite promises future pleasure, the moral instinct is directed to it or “recommends” it. Similarly, when we feel pain our moral instinct “tells” us in the form of mental pain that the deed we are about to do is to be avoided. For example, if I find that my act of charity produces pleasure in my mind, this affects my future volitions and can bring about a virtuous habit to help my fellow men which promote the universal process of perfection. The process is in line with Leibniz’s general definition of substance as including only perception and appetite, the latter striving for “better” perceptions, that is, more clear and distinct perceptions, avoiding confused and obscure perceptions.

The goal of moral action is happiness which is founded on continual or enduring joy.²⁵ Hope is needed to ground this joy by sustaining courage and curiosity as we saw in the previous section. When we act in a virtuous manner, our reward is joy which is at its strongest when its source is universal perfection. This perception gives rise to love in us and when we promote the common good, the object of our love is the Monarch of the Kingdom of grace, that is,

23 In NE I, ii, § 10 Theophilus argues: ‘I take it, sir, that you fundamentally agree with me about these natural instincts for what is upright and good; although you will perhaps say, as you did about the instincts which lead [us] towards joy and happiness, that these impressions are not innate truths. But I have already replied that every feeling is the perception of an innate truth, though very often a confused one as are the experiences of the outer senses. Thus innate truths can be distinguished from the natural light (which contains only what is distinctly knowable) as a genus should be distinguished from its species, since innate truths comprise instincts as well as the natural light’ (RB, 94).

24 Reply to the comments in the second edition of M. Bayle’s *Critical Dictionary*, in the article *Rorarius*, concerning the system of pre-established harmony (1702, G IV, 563–564; Leibniz 1998, 250).

25 *laetitia*; see Leibniz’s letter to Wolff 18. 5. 1715; AG, 233.

God.²⁶ Similarly, we feel mental pain when we perceive disharmony or a decrease in universal perfection. The good we have done is reflected in the world as increasing perfection and this can be considered as a positive sign or promise which gives us hope and motivates us to act virtuously. Perfection is perceived clearly, but confusedly as a harmonious feeling or beauty which Leibniz defines as perceiving variety within unity.²⁷ The source for this feeling is God who has all the perfections.²⁸

In the Leibnizian framework the perception of perfection creates joy or pleasure of the mind in us and strengthens our hope which provides a continuous objective for our joy. Joy, again, increases our activity, power and freedom – in other words, well-being, both mental and physical. Eventually, the process of continuing and increasing joy can bring us lasting pleasure or happiness (see NE II, xxi, § 51). Likewise, acting according to wrong goals can weaken our hope and lead us to despair which brings pain and jeopardizes our happiness.

By developing one's use of reason the moral agent can replace one's negative passions by positive passions or bad habits by good habits which lead us to virtue.²⁹ Like Aristotle, Leibniz recommends a thorough moral education for men to become virtuous (NE, II, xxi, § 35). Hope for a future good arises out of our daily little victories, successes of semi-pleasures against semi-sufferings. Like joy, hope has to be cultivated; otherwise it may change into despair which destroys our hope. When we strive for the good systematically, we can gather hope which leads us to action and happiness. Hope can thus be considered as a rational appetite in human life.

26 In a very Augustinian manner Leibniz argues in *Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason*, § 18: "...for the love of God also fulfills our hopes and leads us down the road of supreme happiness" (GP VI, 606; AG, 213).

27 "Consonances please, since agreement is easily observable in them [...] Agreement is sought in variety, and the more easily it is observed there, the more it pleases; and in this consists the feeling of perfection" (AG, 233). See also GP VII, 290.

28 "Knowledge of reasons perfects us because it teaches us universal and eternal truths, which are manifested in the perfect Being [...] One need not shun at all pleasures which are born of intelligence or of reasons, as one penetrates the reason of the reason of perfections, that is to say as one sees them flow from their source, which is the absolutely perfect Being [...] God, who has done everything perfectly, cannot fail to arrange everything thus, to elevate created being to the perfection of which they are capable through union with him, which can subsist only through the spirit" (*Felicity*, Leibniz 1988, 83–84).

29 On the process of self-perfection, see Roinila 2006.

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