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# **The Provision of Humanitarian Aid in Complex Emergencies: A Case Study of Somalia**

Joanne Rose

PhD

2013

# **The Provision of Humanitarian Aid in Complex Emergencies: A Case Study of Somalia**

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of the requirements of the  
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## **Abstract**

This thesis examines the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Humanitarian assistance is considered as an ideal and the key question is, can it be effective in a chronic emergency? Humanitarian assistance itself is examined in detail and placed in a broader context of ideas of vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity in response to disasters. The thesis is grounded on evidence based evaluation to generate conclusions for programme and project management.

The method taken is one of using conventional social science methods to come to evaluative judgement. The nature of evaluative judgement requires an understanding of the purpose and content of evaluation itself, which is extensively discussed in the methods chapter. The ethics of work in disaster situations is also addressed.

The case material comes from two evaluations namely for Action by Churches Together and Norwegian Church Aid conducted in Somalia in 2006-07. The key findings from the case material is that humanitarian projects in chronic emergencies must be delivered within the cultural context i.e. religion supported delivery. The reasons for this are that such delivery pays attention to the critical role of beneficiaries in ensuring effective and sustainable project implementation. This raises key issues about the validity of the top down delivery of humanitarian assistance as well as an understanding of chronic emergency as development rather than disaster projects.

The thesis concludes with observations on the limitations of evaluation in the context of humanitarian assistance. It reinforces the central directive of humanitarian delivery as 'do no harm' and shows that there are opportunities to 'do some good'.

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## **List of Abbreviations**

ACT	Action by Churches Together
ADRA	Adventist, Development and Relief Agency International
ASEP	Advancement of Small Enterprises Program
DC	District Commissioner
EDP	Emergency Distribution Point
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FOPAG	The Forum for Peace and Governance
GHC	Gedo Health Consortium
HADMA	Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency
HRG	Humanitarian Response Group
IASC	Inter Agency Sectoral Committee
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NMFA	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
KDO	Kulmiye Development Organization
PSAWEN	Puntland State Agency Water, Energy and Natural Resources
SADO	Social Life and Agricultural Development Organisation
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SC UK	Save the Children UK
SDO	Samo Development Organisation
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Timebound Indicators
SSS	Somalia Support Secretariat, formally the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACD)
SWV	Somali Women's Vision
ToR	Terms of Reference
TNG	Transitional National Government
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Watsan	Water and Sanitation
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme

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## **Dedication**

*I lovingly dedicate this thesis to my Mother, Father and husband. Mam, Dad, you put me on the path and showed me the way.....Michael, you kept me on it – always!*

## **Declaration**

I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for any other award and that it is all my own work. I also confirm that this work fully acknowledges opinions, ideas and contributions from the work of others.

Name: Joanne Rose

Signature:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'J. Rose', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Date: 18<sup>th</sup> March 2013

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 The Context

This thesis essentially tries to unpick three recurring themes. These are:

- What is the nature of humanitarian assistance in the 21<sup>st</sup> century? The formal humanitarian principles for humanitarian action are humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence (OCHA, 2010). By definition humanitarian aid must be provided without discrimination as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion and relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs (United Nations, 1991). But is this really what happens? At the present moment almost half of all humanitarian assistance is financed by a combination of the United States Government and the European Commission. Eighteen of the top 20 recipients of humanitarian aid between 2000-2010 were affected by conflict for five or more years. Out of these countries, 14 of them receive long-term assistance, but is this really humanitarian aid (GHA, 2012)?
- What happens in complex emergencies such as the case of Somalia where delivery is clearly hampered by protagonists in that complex emergency; the concerns of acting agencies for their own safety; and the desire of the donors to seek involvement even if it is at a distance. Can the Somali case study provide evidence of sustainability that suggests a transition from emergency assistance to a normal development path?
- The third theme is to ask what is the value of evaluation in humanitarian assistance especially, in such cases where humanitarianism itself is severely compromised. Evaluation always



accepts the policy framework and in the Somali case this policy framework was that western donors would continue funding a low level of assistance in the continuing chronic emergency to explore strands of livelihoods sustainability. Could evaluation findings support such a policy intervention?

## **1.2. Background**

The researcher's background provides an insight into the researchers orientation and thinking. My undergraduate degree was a joint degree in Geography and Environmental Management with an emphasis on sustainable development. On graduation in 2003, I took employment as a Sustainability Planning Policy Officer in a UK Local Authority. I began working internationally through the Netherlands Climate Assistance Programme at ETC UK in 2004. This work was with teams in Mozambique and Tanzania to explore the impacts of climate change and develop programmes and ministerial policies to support community level adaptation to climate change. During this time, I completed an MSc in Clean Technology, which was an engineering based programme that focused on renewable energy technologies. I also spent several years summarising literature and researching climate change mitigation and adaptation for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of Parties under the Kyoto Protocol Agreement, drafting papers on the challenges of developing country adaptation (Conference of Parties 10-12 in Argentina, Canada and Kenya).

I consider myself as someone with three strands to their professional existence. The first is that I am a professional researcher with wide experience of embedded enquiry in both the developed and the developing world. The second is that I consider myself to be an academic, even though my career path at the present moment has not produced the traditional academic post of researcher/teacher; despite this I have a history of peer reviewed publications in the area of natural hazards and climate change, which shows continued engagement with the academy. The third is that I have become and am regarded by others as a senior evaluator who has

actually led evaluations in complex emergencies. Evaluation requires that those who commission the evaluation and the beneficiaries of the programmes under evaluation trust the integrity and judgement of the evaluation leadership. In some sense this thesis lays bare several of the questions that an evaluator must ask of herself.

While conducting my first evaluation of humanitarian aid in Sudan, I began to notice the top down nature of the humanitarian aid compared to the very light and peripheral involvement of the beneficiaries. I asked myself two questions: if the humanitarian organisations withdrew tomorrow, would the beneficiary communities be any better placed to face the next acute emergency? In one-two year's time, would the humanitarian projects implemented have created sustained positive improvements for the local communities? The answer to these questions was mostly 'no', which led to further questions of how can humanitarian aid that has been delivered to communities for years have such little impact or do nothing to break the cycle of chronic-acute crisis within complex emergencies? These questions became the driver behind this research – to understand how we were getting humanitarian aid in chronic complex emergencies so wrong and to strive to develop an alternative approach that would help us to get it right.

I continued to conduct evaluations of humanitarian aid in chronic complex emergencies with the aim of collecting research to answer the above questions and generate a collection of case studies to offer insight into the potential strategies for improving the delivery of humanitarian aid in chronic complex emergencies. An evaluation approach gave the researcher access to all project and programme documentation including confidential documents; access to field and project staff; and access to beneficiaries and project sites. In most chronic complex emergencies, the only point of entry to the field is through either involvement in humanitarian aid delivery or as an evaluator of that aid. Ultimately evaluations provided the vehicle for my PhD fieldwork. All contracting agencies were made aware of this and they were happy for me to tailor the evaluation framework, model and methods accordingly (see Chapter 4 Methodology for further details).

### **1.3. Research Questions**

In conventional doctoral thesis term, there is need to focus on specific questions that can be answered from empirical evidence. These questions are:

1. What involvement or role do beneficiaries and affected populations have in the process of humanitarian interventions?
2. When delivering humanitarian assistance during complex emergencies are interventions relevant and appropriate and if so how?
3. To what extent are humanitarian interventions during complex emergencies effective and sustainable?
4. To what extent can humanitarian aid deliver to long-term emergencies?
  - a. Can these interventions have a real impact?
  - b. If yes, what are the criteria for such projects and how do so many fail to be sustainable or have impact?

### **1.4 Fieldwork and Evaluation Experience**

My fieldwork and evaluation experience began as a member of the second global evaluation for humanitarian assistance, which was commissioned by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. My specific experience within this work was in South Sudan where I examined the SC-UK programme, which was largely focused on water and sanitation. I also evaluated programmes of CARE International and UNICEF. I was a member of the team that produced the overall report to the Dutch Parliament (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). Following this I was asked to join two evaluation teams in Somalia. The first commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the second commissioned by Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). Chapter 5 of this thesis reflects evidence from the evaluation report of Norwegian Church Aid. With this experience behind me I was asked to lead an evaluation team for Action by Churches Together International in Somalia; reflections on this evaluation are contained in Chapter 6 of this thesis. After Somalia the

Norwegian Refugee Council requested me to conduct an evaluation in Liberia consolidating my leadership of evaluation in humanitarian assistance.

I could have presented three separate case studies on Somalia or included the Sudan and Liberian material to examine the issues of humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies and the value of evaluation in these circumstances. I have chosen instead to present the two case studies of Norwegian Church Aid in Somalia and Action by Churches Together in Somalia. I did this because despite the difficulties, these programmes uniquely carried hints of sustainability that were unobtainable in the other Somalia South Sudan and Liberia experiences. Quite consciously I am searching for positive results that reinforce livelihoods.

### **1.5 Thesis Structure**

The structure of this thesis is fairly conventional and as such might limit wider policy discussion. The second chapter considers the nature of humanitarianism itself noting the changes in organisation especially with the rise of complex emergencies. This second chapter takes humanitarian assistance and examines it in the context of the natural hazard paradigm including notions of vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity. Thus, linking the humanitarian assistance debates to the current international engagement with policy response to climate change. The third chapter presents an account of the emergence of the complex emergency in Somalia with an emphasis on the chronic nature of the emergency rather than an acute disaster. It does so by providing an overall account of access to essential services that underpin basic needs. The fourth chapter is a methodological chapter required of a conventional doctoral thesis. However, the exploration of methodological issues is less about methods per se and largely about the challenge of evaluation using existing quantitative and qualitative techniques available to the social sciences. It also clearly raises issues of ethics and safety.

Chapter five is based on the evaluation commissioned by Action by Churches Together. The essential conclusion of this chapter is that under chronic emergencies it is possible to build sustainable projects as long as they are delivered in a specific cultural context i.e. religion supported delivery and embedded within a community that has control of the resources. Chapter six is based on the evaluation commissioned by Norwegian Church Aid and reinforces the message in Chapter five, but in many senses is a more reflective chapter for it is the evaluation, which I led and in which I had to reconsider the issue of community control in complex emergencies. Chapter seven offers a conclusion, but in many senses this conclusion raises more questions than it offers answers. However, the essential conclusion is that chronic emergencies are more akin to development projects where interventions have to be embedded and owned by the local community if they are to be sustainable.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Humanitarian Assistance**

#### **2.1 The Emergence of the Humanitarian System**

Humanitarian assistance is the international efforts provided for people in distress by individuals, organisations or governments where the prime motivation is to prevent and alleviate human suffering (International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1994).

In 1859, a Swiss businessman named Henry Dunant was appalled at the suffering of thousands of men who were left to die due to a lack of care after the Battle of Solferino. He proposed the creation of national relief societies made up of volunteers to provide neutral and impartial help to relieve suffering in times of war. In response to these ideas a committee, which later became the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), was established in Geneva and in 1863 the founding charter of the Red Cross was established. Henry Dunant went on to propose that countries should adopt an international agreement that would recognise the status of medical services and of the wounded on the battlefield (British Red Cross, no date). This agreement, adopted in 1864, became known as the Geneva Convention. These actions marked the beginnings of formal humanitarian movements.

The United Nations (UN), a term coined by Franklin Roosevelt during World War Two in 1942, came into official existence in 1945. Its predecessor – the League of Nations – was an organisation conceived under similar circumstances during the First World War in 1919 (United Nations, 2005). The United Nations original 51 members signed the United Nations Charter with the aim of maintaining international peace and security; achieving international cooperation in solving international problems; and promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion (United Nations, 1945). Since its first coordinated humanitarian relief operations in Europe, following

the devastation and massive displacement of people in the Second World War, the United Nations has been relied upon by the international community to respond to natural and conflict-related disasters that are beyond the capacity of national authorities alone (United Nations, 1999).

There are three fundamental principles of humanitarian intervention that originated from operational humanitarian practice and are reflected to varying degrees in the Charter of the United Nations, International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law (United Nations, 1991a). These three core principles are impartiality, neutrality and independence (OCHA, 2010). Impartiality means no discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, gender or political opinions: humanitarian interventions must be guided solely by needs. Neutrality demands that humanitarian agencies do not take sides in either hostilities or ideological controversy. Showing humanity means human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable. Independence requires that humanitarian agencies retain their autonomy of action (*United Nations, 1991a*). These three principles underlie any humanitarian actions whether in response to conflict-related or natural disasters.

Natural disasters are the consequences of natural hazards, which are naturally occurring physical phenomena caused either by rapid or slow onset events having atmospheric, geologic and hydrologic origins for example, earthquakes, floods, droughts, hurricanes and Tsunamis (UNESCO, 2010). A complex emergency is a

*“humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and what requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing United Nations country program”* (IASC, 1994, p. 8).

Complex emergencies are often exacerbated by natural disasters and require large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance that is hindered by security risks and political and military constraints (WHO, 2002).

Since the early 1990s, there has been both an increase in the number of disasters – both natural and complex – and a change in the nature of emergencies leading to a substantial increase in humanitarian assistance. Natural disasters have increased drastically. During 2000-2009 there were 385 natural disasters, an increase of 233 percent since 1980-1989, and of 67 percent since 1990-1999. The annual death toll for the 2000-decade was 78,000, which is considerably higher than the 43,000 average of the previous decade (UNISDR, 2010; UNISDR and CRED, 2010).

Complex emergencies, characterised by high levels of civilian casualties, deliberate destruction of livelihoods and welfare systems, collapse of the rule of law and large numbers of displaced people, have increased drastically since the end of the Cold War. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, between 1975 and 1985 there were five such emergencies worldwide each year, comparatively by the mid-1990s there were 50 serious armed conflicts ongoing in the world (Hansch, 1995). By 1995 conflict had taken over from drought as the primary cause of famine. The number of serious armed conflicts has decreased slightly and as of 2008 there were 36 armed conflicts ongoing worldwide (UCDP, 2009). However, despite the slight decline in number, more than 740,000 people die each year as a result of armed conflict (Alexander, 2009) and more disasters worldwide are now classified as complex emergencies (Hearns and Deeny, 2007). Internal conflict is the main cause of refugee crises (FAO, 2010) and in 2009 there were more people displaced within their country by conflict and violence than at any point since the mid-1990s. Since 1997 to 2012 the number of refugees worldwide has remained fairly stable fluctuating between 13-16 million, however, an alarming total of 26.4 million people were internally displaced and almost half of these were in five countries – Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan (IDMC and NRC, 2010; UNHCR, 2011).



## **2.2 The Humanitarian System and Actors**

The humanitarian system has undergone numerous changes and reforms over the years in order to improve its response to emergencies and address the changing nature of emergencies. Today, the international humanitarian system consists, principally, of four sets of actors: donor governments, including the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC) and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). Local NGOs and beneficiaries have little voice in the system.

The United Nations (UN) as lead agency has an effective division of labour that sees the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) in charge of the policy and planning framework (ReliefWeb no date); the World Food Programme (WFP) responsible for emergency food delivery and logistics (WFP, 2010); the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible for refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and is the lead agency for shelter (UNHCR, 2010; UNHCR, 2010a); the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) focuses on education and child health (UNICEF, 2010); and the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) is responsible for emergency agriculture, which if successful should mark the end of the emergency and the diminution of the role of WFP.

Ironically, the health sector is the only sector not delivered directly by the UN. This rests largely with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), who arguably are the only two absolute humanitarian organisations (ICRC, 2009 and MSF, 2010). The World Health Organization (WHO) is largely involved with programming and policy, less involved with the management of medical delivery, and not at all involved in medical delivery (WHO, 2006 and United Nations, 1999). Despite this there are three distinct areas in which the UN delivers what can broadly be described as medical interventions – food security (including nutrition), shelter, and water and sanitation.

On-the-ground management of relief remains a contentious subject and is closely tied to the issue of coordination. The United Nations system, through OCHA, is usually responsible for the coordination of ground-level management (United Nations, 1991), increasingly through the 'Cluster Approach'. The Cluster Approach was established in 2005 and identifies a lead agency to coordinate efforts in a specific sector (OneResponse, 2010). The ad hoc, unpredictable nature of many international responses to humanitarian emergencies prompted the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) in 2005 to launch an independent Humanitarian Response Review of the global humanitarian system. The review assessed the humanitarian response capacities of the international humanitarian actors to identify critical gap areas and make recommendations to address them. The review identified the Cluster Approach as a method of addressing the gaps and strengthening the effectiveness of humanitarian response through building partnerships. Moreover the Cluster Approach clarifies the division of labour among organisations and better defines agency roles and responsibilities. The Cluster Approach aims to make the humanitarian community more structured, accountable and professional, so that it can be a better partner for host governments, local authorities and local civil society (HSRU, 2010). In general, however, information sharing for on-the-ground management, and effective coordination, remains the weakest link in humanitarian delivery (Minear, 2002; Stephenson and Kehler, 2004).

### **2.3 Humanitarian Sectors**

The ultimate aim of humanitarian interventions is to reduce the loss of life. In order to survive people need food and water, shelter from the elements and the injured and sick need healthcare. There are other humanitarian sectors such as education and agriculture however, it is ultimately the former four aspects that determine a person's survival. The main issues surrounding the delivery of humanitarian aid in each of these four sectors are discussed briefly below.

### **2.3.1 Health**

Everyone has the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health and everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of themselves and their family, including food, clothing, housing, medical care, and social services (United Nations, 1948).

Disasters usually generate significant impacts on the public health and well-being of affected populations. These impacts can be described as direct (for example, death, injury, or psychological trauma) or indirect (such as increased rates of infectious disease, malnutrition, complications of chronic disease). Conflict obviously produces deaths and injuries on the battlefield, however the indirect, or secondary, public health effects are also catastrophic, with most deaths during complex emergencies occurring due to preventable causes, such as increased rates of infectious diseases and malnutrition (Brennan and Nandy, 2001; Connolly, 2004). In fact, complex emergencies account for more death, disease and disability than all other types of disaster combined (Ormhaug, Meier and Hernes, 2009).

The severity of direct and indirect health impacts and the subsequent need and type of relief operations depend upon several factors. First, the type of emergency or disaster situation: different types of disaster are associated with differing scales and patterns of mortality and morbidity. The public health and medical needs of an affected community will therefore vary according to the type and extent of disaster. Earthquakes, for example, cause many injuries requiring medical care, whereas floods cause relatively few. In general, public health interventions of humanitarian assistance are designed to ensure the greatest health benefits are provided to the greatest number of people.

Second, the ability of existing services and resources of a country to cope greatly determine the level and type of health humanitarian assistance required. Natural disasters can cause serious damage to health facilities, water supply, and sewage systems, having a direct impact on the health of the population dependent on these services. The earthquake that struck Mexico City in 1985, for example, resulted in the collapse of 13 hospitals. In

just three of those buildings, 866 people died, 100 of whom were health personnel. As a result of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the water supply systems of 23 hospitals in Honduras were damaged or destroyed, and 123 health centers were affected and the Asian earthquake in 2005 destroyed 100 hospitals in Pakistan (NWHO, 2005).

Existing health services in most developing countries are already inadequate or unable to cope with current demands, therefore automatically exacerbating the need for health humanitarian aid when an emergency strikes. In complex emergencies, health infrastructure, services, and the staff themselves can be targeted and destroyed (Burkle, 1999). In addition, inadequate food supplies, damaged water and sanitation facilities, lack of shelter, and overcrowding can have the indirect impact of increasing rates of infectious diseases such as cholera, typhoid, and measles.

Third, the current health status of the population can affect the severity of direct and indirect health impacts and the need for humanitarian assistance. Populations already suffering a lack of health services, food shortages, and poor water and sanitation facilities will be inherently weak. These populations are extremely vulnerable to external shocks, and should a disaster occur, injuries are likely to be more severe, casualties higher, and the need for humanitarian assistance greater. Chronic development conditions are the driver for many acute emergencies (Drimie, 2004).

Health humanitarian assistance is delivered largely by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF). Both ICRC and MSF have an extensive range of guidelines they use and follow when implementing relief operations. ICRC, the UN, and most NGOs accept the Sphere Standards (see Box 1) and targets in the delivery of humanitarian aid.

MSF assisted with the establishment of the technical standards and key indicators of the Sphere Standards but prefer to use their own technical standards, which strongly acknowledge the conditionality of intervention by

individual disaster (Giesen, no date). MSF usually use Sphere Standards and indicators as a starting point in collaboration with their own 'Clinical Guidelines'.

### **Box 1 The Sphere Standards**

The Sphere Project was launched in 1997 by a group of humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Sphere is based on two core beliefs: first, that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising from calamity and conflict, and second, that those affected by disaster have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance. These organisations framed a Humanitarian Charter and identified minimum standards to be attained in disaster assistance in key sectors including health, food, shelter and water and sanitation. This process led to the publication of the first Sphere handbook in 2000. The Sphere minimum standards and accompanying key indicators are the most widely acknowledged international standards and have been ratified by over 400 organisations representing 80 countries.

(Source: The Sphere Project, 2010)

### **2.3.2 Food**

Minimum dietary energy requirements are the amount of dietary energy that is considered adequate to meet the energy needs of a person for light activity and good health. This requirement is expressed in kilocalories (Kcal) per day. On average, a healthy adult requires approximately 2,070 kilocalories per day (WHO, FAO and UNU 1985). Although, this varies depending on age, sex, lifestyle, daily level of activity, height, weight, body composition, and current medical status.

It is a human right to have adequate food and be free of hunger (United Nations, 1999a) yet the number of food emergencies has continued to rise from an average of 15 per year during the 1980s to more than 30 per year since the turn of the millennium. In 2009 the number of hungry people grew to more than one billion – the highest on record and the World Food Programme

responded by delivering food aid to 101.8 million people – 84 million of them women and children – across 75 countries (WFP, 2010).

States and non-state actors have responsibilities to fulfill the right to food. There are many situations in which these state obligations, however, are violated for example, the deliberate starvation of populations or the destruction of their livelihoods as a war strategy. President Mugabe of Zimbabwe has on numerous occasions prevented NGOs distributing food aid, which at times has placed most the Zimbabwean population at risk of starvation (Raath, 2008). In these situations, humanitarian actors must aid the populations affected through providing food assistance via methods that respect national law while meeting international human rights obligations.

Natural disasters such as droughts, earthquakes, floods, land/mud slides and volcanic eruptions can severely affect food availability. Standing crops can be completely destroyed, and seed stores along with family food stocks can be totally lost. Similar to most humanitarian needs, the need for food aid depends upon the severity of the disaster.

Access to food and the maintenance of adequate nutritional status are critical determinants of people's survival in an emergency situation. During the first days after a disaster, the extent of damage is often unknown, and communications are difficult. As such no detailed calculations need be made of the precise vitamin, mineral, or protein content in the food distributed in the initial phase, but supplies need to be acceptable, palatable, and provide sufficient energy. During this stage of the emergency it is simply important to provide a minimum of 6.7 to 8.4 megajoules (1,600 to 2,000 kcal) per person per day. At the onset of an emergency, a one-time rapid assessment can be used to identify immediate needs and individuals likely to be most at risk (WHO, 1995). Nutritional surveillance should be initiated soon after, if not immediately (depending on staff and resources available), to identify the nutritional status of the population and provide warning of any deepening crisis (WHO, 2010).

The decision to distribute large amounts of food aid should be based on the most accurate information available. If unnecessarily large quantities of food are brought into an area, recovery can be hindered. Excess food aid can flood the market, depressing prices, and as a result render the crops that were harvestable worthless. This can have serious effects on livelihoods. Farmers unable to make a profit will have insufficient funds to purchase the seeds, tools, or livestock necessary for the next harvest (Gidley, 2005; Shah, 2005). Thus, more developmental aid would be necessary in the form of seeds and tools to restart the local economy and prevent a dependence on relief from emerging. If continued food aid is required after the initial shock of the disaster, an appropriate general ration must be established. There has been a marked shift from an old model of warehousing with food stores sourced externally to a local purchasing model that involves prioritising local and then regional markets (WFP, 2008).

If there is a failure in the general food pipeline or if acute food insecurity or malnutrition is already present amongst the population, a general food ration can prove insufficient or inappropriate. Moderate malnutrition can be addressed through improving the general food ration, ensuring food security, and establishing access to health care, sanitation facilities, and potable water. Measuring malnutrition is detailed in Box 2. Enhancing the general food ration by ‘targeted supplementary feeding’<sup>1</sup> is usually the primary strategy for correction of moderate malnutrition and prevention of severe malnutrition. When rates of malnutrition are high, targeting the moderately malnourished can be inefficient and therefore all individuals meeting certain at-risk criteria (for example, pregnant women and those aged 6–59 months) become eligible for supplementary feeding. This is known as ‘blanket supplementary feeding’ (UNHCR/WFP, 1999).

Severe malnutrition is corrected through therapeutic care. This can be

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<sup>1</sup> The aim of a targeted supplementary feeding programme is to prevent the moderately malnourished becoming severely malnourished and to rehabilitate them. These types of programmes usually provide a food supplement to the general ration for mild and moderately malnourished individuals and for selected pregnant and nursing mothers and other nutritionally at-risk individuals (UNHCR/WFP, 1999).

delivered as 24-hour in-patient care, day care, and home-based care (UNHCR/WFP, 1999). The provision of in-patient care depends on other standards, such as the provision of functioning water and sanitation facilities.

### **Box 2 Measuring Malnutrition**

The World Health Organization (2006a) has developed a series of child growth standards using a range of measurements to provide guidelines for identifying the healthy growth of children. Mid Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) and Body Mass Index (BMI, also referred to as weight for height) are measurements generally taken from children to assess and identify levels of malnutrition. MUAC is a measure of thinness or wasting from the left mid-upper arm. It is only sensitive in children 1–5 years. A MUAC measure of more than 135 mm is normal, and children with an MUAC less than 135 mm are measured using their weight/height ratio to see whether they should enter the malnutrition programme. The weight/height ratio is considered the most reliable indicator in emergencies of the nutritional status of a child. A MUAC of 110–124 mm illustrates moderate malnutrition and less than 110 mm demonstrates severe malnutrition. When measuring MUAC, colored bands are used to help illiterate workers classify children's nutritional status. BMI is an index of weight for height ( $\text{BMI} = \frac{\text{weight (kilograms)}}{\text{height (meters squared)}}$ ), which can identify moderate and acute malnutrition as a measure of wasting. According to the WHO Global Database on Body Mass Index (WHO, 2006a), the normal range is 18.50–24.99; underweight is 18.5; moderate thinness is 16–16.99; and severe thinness is less than 16.

(Source: World Health Organization, 2006a)

Blanket feeding can be used at the start of an emergency, as implementation of a full general food distribution programme takes time. Blanket feeding can also be initiated when there is a severe food crisis or when a significant and persistent deterioration in food availability is expected even prior to nutritional problems arising. Supplementary feeding is usually necessary in a food crisis or famine situation in which malnutrition rates exceed 15 percent. A Therapeutic Feeding Center (TFC) should be established when the absolute



number suffering severe malnutrition exceeds 30 patients and the prevalence of severe malnutrition is above three percent, providing that staff and other resources are available. When the numbers are smaller, it is more appropriate to support existing health structures in the provision of therapeutic feeding care rather than implementing a new programme.

The Sphere Handbook (Sphere Project, 2004) outlines the standards that food aid should meet, according to various levels of need and the severity of the situation. It includes standards and indicators for general nutritional support, moderate malnutrition, and severe malnutrition. There are also standards for the correction of micronutrient deficiencies, but these largely rely on the achievement of standards in health systems and infrastructure and the control of communicable diseases.

Food distribution centres and hospitals treating malnutrition often become quickly overcrowded in times of humanitarian crisis. People camp near them to ensure they have a secure source of food and medical treatment, especially in rural areas in which villages are sparsely populated and the nearest food distribution center can be several miles away.

In 1999, Andre Briend, a French scientist, developed 'Plumpy'nut,' a peanut-based food for use in famine relief. It is a ready-to-use therapeutic food in a foil pouch, which contains 500 kilocalories and weighs only 92 grams. Plumpy'nut can be administered to treat both moderate and severe malnutrition although the majority of aid agencies concentrate Plumpy'nut usage for the treatment of severe malnutrition (MSF, 2007; Gammon, 2009). Once opened, Plumpy'nut has a shelf life of two years, which is advantageous in locations where refrigeration or storage is a problem. Plumpy'nut also allows parents to care for their own children at home as opposed to in crowded hospitals. This both frees up much needed hospital space and returns responsibility and control of feeding children to the parents/guardians (Wines, 2005). The major advantage of Plumpy'nut is that unlike powdered milk given to malnourished children, no water or preparation is necessary, which is important in areas where water supplies may be disrupted, scarce,

contaminated, or unsafe (Getachew, 2007). Plumpy'nut was first used on a large-scale during 2005 for the crisis in Darfur in western Sudan (initially feeding 30,000 children). It has since been used in Ethiopia, Congo, Malawi, and Niger, and according to aid agencies is cutting malnutrition by half (Clayton, 2005). Current projects are under development in Malawi, Ethiopia and Niger to begin producing Plumpy'nut locally, which is essential to reducing costs and building the capacity and resilience of affected populations. Plumpy'nut is now used by many organisations in responding to famine.

### **2.3.3 Shelter**

Hypothermia is a decrease in body temperature to 94 degrees Fahrenheit or lower. At low temperatures the body's organs become less effective and slow down. If body temperature falls below 86 degrees Fahrenheit, organs are likely to stop working and death is probable. Hyperthermia is an increase in body temperature above 99 degrees Fahrenheit (Beers, 2004). When a person's surroundings are hotter than his or her body temperature, heat cramps, heat exhaustion, or heatstroke can occur. Both hypothermia and hyperthermia are preventable. Key aspects of avoiding hypothermia include maintaining a warm environment, wearing several layers of clothes, and eating warm food and fluids. Hyperthermia can be avoided through wearing light clothes that allow air and moisture to pass through easily, replacing fluids and salts lost through sweating, and using shade, air-conditioning or fans.

On 8 October 2005, an earthquake hit South Asia, mostly affecting northern Pakistan. Approximately 73,000 people were killed, over 100,000 people were injured, and 3.3 million people were homeless and in need of shelter as hundreds of thousands of buildings collapsed (Oxfam, 2005). Shortly after the earthquake hit, snow started to fall as the harsh Himalayan winter set in. The UN declared that 210,000 tents and two million sleeping bags were needed immediately to stop people from dying of the cold (OCHA, 2005). Unfortunately, 75 percent of the 400,000 tents rushed to the earthquake zone in the aftermath of the quake were unsuitable for the winter conditions

(USAID, 2005). As a result, most NGOs and INGOs spent their time 'winterizing' the tents and providing materials to build sturdier shelters. Furthermore, only a handful of the camps that were established met the Sphere Standards, and sanitation quickly became a major problem (Lilly, 2006). Cold-related injuries, such as pneumonia, soared as temperatures fell and people, mainly children, began dying as a result (Spry-Leverton, 2005; Miller, 2005).

Shelter, and most importantly appropriate shelter, is a crucial element of humanitarian assistance and a critical determinant for survival in the initial stages of a disaster. The most basic response to the need for shelter is the provision of clothing, blankets, and bedding that maintain health, privacy, and dignity; that is, delivery at a personal level before the delivery of buildings (Sphere Project, 2004a). Beyond survival, shelter is necessary to provide security and personal safety, protection from the climate, and enhanced resistance to ill health and disease. People also require basic goods and supplies to meet their personal hygiene needs, to prepare and eat food, and to provide necessary levels of thermal comfort. The type of aid required to meet these needs is determined by the nature and scale of the disaster, the climatic conditions, local environment, political and security conditions, and the ability of the community to cope.

According to the Sphere Standards (Sphere Project, 2004a), the priority is encouraging affected households to return to the site of their original dwelling when possible, or if this is not possible, the affected populations should settle independently within a host community or with host families. When these options are not possible, affected households should be accommodated in large shelters or temporary camps, also referred to as 'transitional settlements' (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005). The physical planning of these shelters or settlements must use local planning practices when possible and must be able to provide suitable privacy, safe access to water, sanitary facilities, health care, and solid-waste disposal. For longer-term shelters, graveyards, schools, places of worship, meeting points, and recreational areas must be considered. The design of the shelter and materials used

should be familiar to the affected population when possible and provide sufficient thermal comfort, fresh air, and protection from the climate. Dadaab in Kenya is a camp or transitional settlement first established in 1991 when Somali's began crossing the border after fleeing conflict in their country (Care, 2006). Dadaab is now the world's largest transitional settlement and as of mid-2009, 280,000 Somali's were living there after fleeing the ongoing civil unrest in Somalia (Associated Press, 2009).

#### **2.3.4 Water and Sanitation**

A human being on average can survive on three litres of water per day. Basic needs, however, go beyond what we need to drink or ingest through our food for daily survival. It is estimated that one person requires 15 litres per day to maintain a basic standard of personal and domestic hygiene sufficient to maintain health (Sphere Project, 2004b).

Clean water is a basic requirement for life and health. Sufficient and safe water is necessary to prevent death from dehydration, reduce the risk of water-related disease, and provide for cooking, and personal and domestic hygienic requirements. Sanitation has proven equally critical in preventing ill health and is also recognised as a basic human right (Vidar and Mekouar, 2002).

The need for safe water and sanitation becomes elevated in the initial stages of a disaster when people are more vulnerable as a result of injuries, malnourishment, and stress, and diseases are able to spread easily through overcrowding and contaminated water supplies. Preventable diseases such as diarrhea kill more people in chronic emergencies than any other factor, including conflict (Connolly, 2004 and Hargreaves, 2003).

In 1994, for example, approximately one million Rwandans fled conflict and genocide and crossed the border into Zaire, exhausted, hungry, and scared. The small town of Goma in Zaire was overrun with Rwandan refugees, who were forced to settle 25 miles from the nearest water source. The average

available water was evaluated at 200mm<sup>3</sup> per person per day. The initial camp was built on a lava bed, making latrine building almost impossible. Within the first week of arriving, almost 50,000 refugees died as epidemics of cholera and *Shigella dysenteriae* swept through the camps (Goma Epidemiology Group, 1995). This devastating cholera outbreak was a result of inadequate clean water, poor sanitation, a lack of hygiene and the level of health among the refugees.

Every year millions of people receive emergency water and sanitation (WATSAN) aid. The Sphere Handbook details the minimum requirements for this aid, which includes standards and indicators regarding water quality, supply, use, and sanitation facilities.

Simply providing sufficient water and sanitation facilities, however, will not ensure optimal use or impact on public health unless coupled with an understanding of hygiene. The affected population must possess the necessary information, knowledge, and understanding regarding water- and sanitation-related diseases. When this knowledge does not exist, this relies on information exchange between the aid agency and affected community in order to identify the key hygiene problems, existing awareness, and required knowledge to ensure optimal use of water and sanitation facilities (Sphere Project, 2004c). This information enables the design, implementation, and monitoring of water and sanitation aid to have the greatest impact on public health. The Sphere Standards recognise the importance of hygiene promotion and incorporate appropriate standards to ensure that hygiene-promotion messages and activities address key behaviors and any misconceptions.

Initially the delivery of water and sanitation aid was dominated by the provision of clean water, whereas sanitation facilities were often inadequate if not totally absent. Politicians, decision makers, and donors did not consider sanitation to be of equal importance to water supply (De Jong, 2003). They failed to recognise, for example, that while investments in water quality and quantity could reduce deaths from diarrhea by 21 percent, sanitation could reduce these by 37.5 percent and hygiene promotion by 33 percent (WHO,

2004). In recent years, however, research and an expanse of literature and information available have ensured that the importance of sanitation and hygiene has become more internationally recognised:

- In 2005 sanitation was recognised as a basic human right (United Nations, 2005a).
- The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (2000) include a target to halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation.
- The Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council (WSSCC) (1990) was established, which has a special interest in sanitation and hygiene and emphasises the need to view water, sanitation, and hygiene as inseparable. (WSSCC exists under a mandate from the United Nations and is governed by a multi-stakeholder steering committee. It focuses exclusively on people around the world who lack water and sanitation).
- The internationally used Sphere Handbook (2004) has a specific chapter detailing standards for water supply, sanitation, and hygiene promotion.
- The UN declared 2005-2015 the Water for Life Decade to set the world agenda on a greater focus on water-related issues.

Sanitation is becoming recognised as an essential element of humanitarian assistance that is as equally important as supplying clean water, food, and medical care in ensuring the health of populations. Furthermore, these international initiatives, together with an increase in research and publications, have highlighted that water and sanitation must come hand in hand with hygiene promotion to ensure the optimal use of humanitarian aid.

From an end user perspective gender has frequently been raised as a lens to understand the sourcing of water. In a special edition of *Gender, Place and Culture* (2009) however, there is a mixed reaction to how powerful a gender perspective can be in delivering improved water and sanitation. Ahlers and Zwarteveen (2009) and Walker and Robinson argue (2009) that a focus on

‘women’ hides other significant factors in access to water such as class and age and social relations both at household and community scales. Such analysis tends to lead to individualising assumptions that allow neoliberal water and sanitation policies to be developed working against marginalized groups including women.

## **2.4 Vulnerable Groups**

There are a number of vulnerable groups in humanitarian emergencies that usually require special attention and must be considered in all aspects of relief operations. The disabled, elderly, and children are immediately identifiable groups that have special needs such as particular dietary requirements or medical attention. In certain societies women are particularly vulnerable for example, some countries do not allow women to travel alone and without a male relation as an escort women become trapped or at increased risk of attack (Starkey and Sengupta, 2009). Other vulnerable groups can prove more difficult to identify, and their needs and effects upon emergencies appear less apparent; for example, people living with HIV/AIDS and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

### **2.4.1 HIV/AIDS**

In 2011, 1.7 million people died of HIV/AIDS, and the pandemic is turning into a large-scale chronic disaster as estimates indicate 34 million people are now living with HIV/AIDS (amfAR, 2012). Rehabilitating agriculture generally marks the end of emergency aid and a return to development, but the advancing HIV/AIDS epidemic has produced a ‘new variant famine’ in which the lack of healthy labor retards that transition and creates food insecurity (de Waal and Whiteside, 2003).

People living with HIV/AIDS need a nutritious, well-balanced diet. Poor nutrition can reduce medication efficacy and adherence and can accelerate the progression of the disease. A recent USAID study found that, compared to an average adult, people living with HIV/AIDS require 10 to 15 percent more energy and 50 percent more protein per day (FAO, 2003). HIV damages the

immune system, which reduces appetite and the body's ability to absorb nutrients. As a result, the person becomes malnourished, loses weight, and is weakened. One possible sign of the onset of clinical AIDS is a weight loss of about 6–7 kilograms for an adult (WHO and FAO, 2002). Should a person already be underweight, this further weight loss would be extremely damaging.

The spread of HIV/AIDS is also of concern in complex emergencies. The risk of HIV infection is exacerbated by the high incidence of sexual violence and sexual exploitation in conflict situations. Humanitarian interventions must recognise the importance of providing aid appropriate to, and that protects the rights of, people living with HIV/AIDS. Consequently, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC; IASC is a forum involving key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners) has produced '*Guidelines for HIV/AIDS Interventions in Emergency Settings*' (2004), which aims to integrate HIV/AIDS components into all relevant programming areas.

#### **2.4.2 Internally Displaced Persons**

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are people who have been forced from their homes but have not crossed international borders, as a result of, or in order to avoid, the effects of armed conflict or situations of generalised violence. The legal position of IDPs in terms of existing human rights and humanitarian law was established in the United Nations "Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" (1998). Unlike refugees, whose movement across national borders provides them with special status in international law with rights specific to their situation, IDPs have no such entitlement (Bradley, 2012). Humanitarian assistance is thus limited, in principle, to supportive actions undertaken with the consent of the country in question. When governments are unable or unwilling, however, to provide protection to IDPs, humanitarian organisations have sought to assist these groups, grounding their right to provide assistance on existing provisions of international humanitarian law to war victims and on human rights treaties (de Mello and Deng, 1998).



The Kampala Convention, which came into force in December 2012, is a historic milestone and the first of its kind. It is a continental instrument that binds governments in Africa to provide legal protection for the rights and well-being of those forced to flee inside their home countries due to conflict, violence, natural disasters or development projects. The Kampala Convention currently legally binds 15 countries and a total of 37 African countries have signed the convention but are not yet legally bound by its contents. Through the Kampala Convention national authorities must:

- Gather data on and identify IDPs to understand where they are and what they need;
- Provide personal ID documents;
- Trace family members and help to reunite them; and
- Consult with IDPs in decisions related to their needs

(IDMC, 2012).

While 15 countries are now legally bound by the Convention, there is still a long way to go before this is the case for all 53 countries in Africa. The major challenge now lies in transforming the convention into tangible improvements in the rights and wellbeing of IDPs across Africa (Bradley, 2012).

Identification of IDPs, the different groups of displaced persons, and the varying needs of these groups are all issues that need consideration in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. IDP groups can mix among resident communities, gather in camps, disperse throughout a territory, or be mixed with combatants who divert relief supplies and create serious security problems. A special category of IDPs that generates extreme concern to the humanitarian community is demobilised soldiers, as their displacement is not only from their homes but also their livelihoods. Under these circumstances, trauma, mental health, and psychological health problems often occur. Humanitarian organisations must address all these issues while upholding the principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence if humanitarian aid in all sectors is to prove adequate, appropriate, and effective.


## 2.5 Funding Humanitarian Aid

The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) was established in 1991 and facilitated by OCHA with the aim to raise funding and assist organisations in planning, implementing, and monitoring their activities in crisis regions (Coppola, 2007). The CAP has since become the humanitarian sector's main tool for coordination, strategic planning, and programming. Since 1992, over 100 donor countries have provided more than US\$42 billion to address the needs of people in more than 50 countries and regions (CAP, 2010).

Total humanitarian assistance has been generally increasing although, there was a sharp peak in 2005 at US\$13.1 billion compared with previous years and almost trebling that provided in 2004 (see Figure 1 below). The drastic peak in 2005 is largely a result of several major catastrophes including the Asian Tsunami that struck late December 2004, hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August 2005 and the South Asian earthquake in October 2005.

Despite small declines that generally occur after a peak, and as Figure 1 illustrates, overall humanitarian aid budgets have continually increased since the 1980s (Buchanan-Smith and Randel, 2002). With the exception of particularly severe and large-scale natural disasters such as those in 2005, the growth in aid budgets is primarily linked to the predominance of complex emergencies. In 2001, donors contributed US\$2.1 billion in response to 20 complex emergencies, and US\$311 million for 49 natural disasters. Although the number of people and countries affected by natural disasters is greater than for complex emergencies, conflict-related crises usually cause greater loss of life and entail more expensive response operations (*ibid*). There is of course an open question of whether humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies is actually a substitute for effective foreign policy. There remains an ongoing tension between humanitarianism as solely the relief of human suffering and humanitarianism as a tool in the foreign policy armoury (Munslow and O'Dempsey, 2010). This issue will be revisited in the conclusion and discussion section (Chapter 7).

**Figure 1 Global Humanitarian Contributions and Commitments 2000-2012**



\* These figures do not account for charitable donations from individuals or groups, such as churches and they do not capture non-western assistance such as that provided by Islamic entities.

(Source: Financial Tracking Service, 2013)

The critical sectors in any emergency - health, food, shelter, water, and sanitation – are intricately linked and must all be delivered in a humanitarian crisis to ensure the survival and recovery of the affected population. The successful implementation of these sectors during a humanitarian emergency depends upon the levels of funding received. Table 1 illustrates the percentage of CAP requests fulfilled per sector.

**Table 1 Humanitarian Consolidated and Flash Appeal Requirements Met Per Sector**

<b>Sector</b>	<b>% Contributions Met</b>						
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
<b>Food</b>	89%	88%	88%	92%	77%	79%	96%
<b>Health</b>	32%	49%	48%	47%	56%	64%	54%
<b>Shelter and Non-Food Items</b>	27%	41%	51%	54%	55%	37%	39%
<b>Water and Sanitation</b>	30%	44%	53%	49%	47%	46%	45%

(Source: Adapted from OCHA, 2012)

Despite the overall growth in humanitarian funding, 100 percent of humanitarian appeals are rarely met and key sectors remain severely underfunded (Bailey, 2010). Table 1 indicates that food aid appeals are largely met through the CAP whereas health; shelter and Non-Food Items; and water and sanitation appeals rarely receive half of the requested funds. The links between these sectors are clear, and the repercussions of insufficient humanitarian aid in one will detrimentally affect the others for example, a lack of water and sanitation is likely to result in water-borne diseases such as diarrhea, which causes people to lose vital nutrients and become weak and as such need increased food and nutrition and in serious cases they will need medical attention and healthcare.

In response to funding shortfalls, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), a United Nations relief fund, was officially launched in March 2006. The objective of the CERF is to provide urgent and effective humanitarian aid to regions threatened by, or experiencing, a humanitarian crisis. The CERF was adopted in December 2005 and upgrades the loan mechanism under the 1992 Central Emergency Revolving Fund from US\$50 million to approximately US\$450 million. The CERF is administered under the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator in consultation with humanitarian agencies. The CERF is not meant to detract from voluntary contributions to humanitarian programmes, or to replace the

consolidated appeals process or additional funding channels. Rather, it is meant to mitigate the unevenness and delays of voluntary contributions and provide funding to under-supported operations (OCHA, 2006).

## **2.6 Accountability of the Humanitarian System**

The last two decades saw a dramatic expansion in the mechanisms available to the international community to provide humanitarian aid. This included rising aid budgets, the development of specialist UN agencies, military humanitarianism and the massive development of the non-governmental organisation sector (Macrae and Leader, 2000). In essence, although natural disasters and complex emergencies were an old phenomenon, the abilities of humanitarian organisations to respond on such a large scale was revolutionary.

During the 1970s and 1980s humanitarian organisations were largely exempt from serious evaluation or critical analysis (Crisp, 2000). However, the ability to deliver aid in increasingly complex environments; the greater absorption of public and private funding by humanitarian organisations; and increasing ability of the international media to document such emergencies placed growing pressure on the humanitarian system to deliver results and demonstrate accountability. This pressure erupted in 1994 during the Rwandan crisis where 500,000-800,000 people were violently killed over three months and the entire international community failed to respond adequately or timely both before and during the genocide (Sphere Project, 2006). The humanitarian response to the Rwandan genocide was the largest ever conducted at the time and attracted intense media scrutiny, with over 500 journalists monitoring the effort (Eriksson, *et al.* 1996). In order to examine the failings of the humanitarian system in response to the genocide, an evaluation team was established – the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR). With 52 researchers and at a cost of over a million dollars, a five-volume evaluation report was produced. Whilst the Rwanda evaluation was somewhat unique in scale, its approach presented a new standard of good practice in evaluating humanitarian assistance – transparent,

consultative, multidisciplinary and independent (Crisp, 2000). Humanitarian agencies began embracing evaluations with the major humanitarian actors – AusAid (Australian Government Overseas Aid Program), DANIDA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark), ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Office), OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) and UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) – all producing their own evaluation policies, guidelines and manuals. Evaluations of humanitarian efforts are now common practice and have attracted unprecedented levels of donor funding and agency commitment, as well as public and political interest. With a growing number of humanitarian evaluations and a need to demonstrate accountability during the mid-1990s the Active Learning Network of Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) was established.

ALNAP was developed following the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR) as a mechanism to provide a forum on learning, accountability and performance issues for the humanitarian sector. The JEEAR was the most comprehensive system-wide evaluation of an international humanitarian response and its results led to demands for increased professionalisation of the humanitarian sector and its reporting (ALNAP, 2009). ALNAP quickly developed a reputation for developing high-quality tools and analysis on learning and accountability issues for the humanitarian sector. In particular, ALNAP has developed research and tools on the evaluation of humanitarian action and has become a leader for setting good practice in evaluating humanitarian assistance.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Development Assistance Committee (DAC)<sup>2</sup> published a set of evaluative criteria for assessing international development interventions during 1986 (OECD, 1986). These evaluation criteria were adopted by all major development agencies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2006). ALNAP

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<sup>2</sup> DAC is the principal body through which the OECD deals with issues related to co-operation with developing countries.

also adopted these criteria to develop guidance on evaluating humanitarian assistance for the humanitarian sector – Evaluating Humanitarian Action using the OECD-DAC Criteria (ALNAP, 2006). These evaluation criteria are now at the heart of most humanitarian evaluations (see Table 3).

## **2.7 Chronic Complex Emergencies**

Despite rising aid budgets and drastically improved reporting and accountability mechanisms, a number of countries remain in a state of chronic emergency with little progress or improvements evident despite receiving continuous flows of aid. Chronic complex emergencies such as those occurring in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Territories, the Philippines, Somalia and Sudan, are characterised by cumulative stresses that culminate to induce a need for humanitarian assistance (United Nations, 2010). At least 16 of the 36 ongoing complex emergencies in the world have been in this situation for more than a decade (GHA, 2009). These countries are effectively receiving long-term humanitarian assistance. Since 2002, long-term humanitarian assistance has accounted for over half of humanitarian spending and in 2003 and 2004, long-term humanitarian spending accounted for 79 percent and 76 percent respectively (GHA, 2009a). Humanitarian relief procedures and methods were designed to save lives in the face of temporary threats to lives and livelihoods, acute, rapidly onset disasters and one-off events (Schafer, 2002; Longley, Christoplos and Slaymaker, 2006). The provision of aid in contexts of chronic complex emergencies presents significant challenges for existing aid structures and institutions.

Unlike one-off disaster events, chronic complex emergencies have an impoverishing effect as they continuously weaken individuals, households and communities (Buchanan-Smith and Christoplos, 2004). The combined effects of ongoing complex emergencies create much deeper and more complicated problems than one-off disaster events. Livelihoods are gradually destroyed as assets, coping mechanisms and supportive institutions are eventually eroded, devastating societies to generate extreme chronic vulnerability (Kellenberger, 2010). As the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report (GHA, 2008) discusses,

people receiving long-term humanitarian assistance move between endemic food insecurity, chronic poverty and periodic acute crisis. During the height of these acute emergencies, resources for relief are usually generous, however, once the acute emergency subsides, funding evaporates, with little investment having been made to create the necessary conditions for the populations to rebuild resources, reduce their vulnerabilities or become resilient against future crises (Diriba, 2008). Humanitarian responses to chronic complex emergencies generally consist of a series of ad hoc emergency interventions with little attention given to either sustainability or the long-term. Both time and opportunities are lost by not exploiting the relief momentum to create such an enabling environment. This pattern of acute emergency, humanitarian response, then recovery to a state of chronic poverty is a cycle in which vulnerability begets reactive relief efforts that can even further undermine fragile market and social institutions, leaving populations more vulnerable to the next adverse shock than they were to the first (Barrett and Carter, 2002).

Humanitarian assistance is traditionally distinguished from development assistance through its short-term, life-saving characteristics rather than longer-term, poverty reducing developmental assistance that promotes sustainability (GHA, 2009). When emergencies continue for such extended periods of time, conventional relief responses are inadequate and traditional humanitarian and development paradigms are not suitable for guiding an effective approach. Traditional humanitarian aid alone will not eradicate this state of permanent emergency (Duffield, 1994). Humanitarianism has evolved through a context of enormous changes in the politics, economics and technologies of war and peace (Munslow and O'Dempsey, 2010). Despite these changes, humanitarian aid provides relief of the symptoms of disasters but remains to do little to reduce people's vulnerability to disasters and enable them to re-establish their lives and livelihoods (Macrae and Leader, 2000). As Hoffmaster (2006) expressed, relief organisations tend to focus on what they are doing for the person, rather than on persons and their vulnerability in themselves. The needs in chronic complex emergencies differ significantly to those of one-off disaster events and there is no clear and straightforward transition from relief to development (Munslow and O'Dempsey, 2010).



Consequently the nature, delivery and approach of any humanitarian assistance must be different if both immediate humanitarian needs and chronic poverty and vulnerability are to be effectively addressed (Frankenberger, Drinkwater and Maxwell, 2003).

The situation that exists today keeps millions of people living on the edge, vulnerable to even the smallest of shocks (Diriba, 2008). If the most vulnerable people do not gain access to the long-term entitlements and capacities that permit them to avoid a state of humanitarian emergency the need for humanitarian aid will not cease (IFAD, no date).

These arguments are framed by one of the key debates discussed by Barnett and Weiss (2011, 106): “should humanitarianism limit itself to saving lives at immediate risk or be more ambitious?”. Although this dilemma is directed at a specific situation it also relates to broader considerations about global justice. Should humanitarian reform or revolutionise the world? The ICRC for example, does not attempt to transform the world but merely make it less horrible. The ICRC is not anti-war and does not endeavor to eliminate war but rather ensure that combatants abide by certain rules that make armed conflict somewhat less barbaric. In chronic complex emergencies however, this means maintaining a status quo that will see millions of people remain in a state of chronic emergency living on the brink with little to do other than wait for the next acute emergency phase. This is essentially a policy discussion rather than a judgement of what works on the ground at project level.

Emergency relief acknowledges that coming to the rescue is not ambitious, but it is a well-defined goal that can be accomplished. Conversely, if humanitarians set out to tackle the causes, not only do they frequently not know what to do but they also find access to affected populations limited as a result. Nation leaders do not welcome interfering aid agencies yet as Barnett (2011) states, humanitarianism is a mixture of care and control; to make the world a better place requires power. The more that humanitarianism aligns itself with the State, however, the more it sacrifices the humanitarian ideals of neutrality and independence (*ibid.*). Despite this, is not knowing what to do or

that there will be increased muddied waters and challenges enough to do nothing? Or does this mean that it is time to rise to the challenge, work harder and strive further? The policy discussion encourages the drive for a stronger evaluation of what works at project level i.e. delivery on the ground.

While chronic complex emergencies continue, the question arises how should long-term humanitarian assistance differ in its approach from traditional humanitarian aid? How can the cycle of reactive, long-term humanitarian aid and a state of permanent emergency be broken to enable households and communities to secure their basic needs and to maintain their livelihoods and public services, such as health and education? Lautze and Roberts (2003) note, that a focus on sustainability has limited relevance given the challenges of chronic complex emergencies whereas a more appropriate focus would appear to lie in the dual realms of vulnerability and resilience (O'Brien and O'Keefe, 2010). Rather than engaging in ad hoc relief programmes (PAHO, 2004), interventions need to examine longer-term strategies that reduce vulnerability, promote resilience and support and build upon local institutions. In order to reduce the need for long-term humanitarian aid through building resilient households and communities that are less vulnerable to shocks it is necessary to have a thorough understanding of these concepts – vulnerability and resilience - their origins, limitations and the opportunities they offer.

### **2.7.1 Vulnerability**

The concept of vulnerability was introduced within the discourse of natural hazards and disasters in the 1970s by O'Keefe, Westgate and Wisner (1976). These authors insisted that socio-economic conditions are the cause of natural disasters. They highlighted that disaster risk is a combination of the factors that determine the potential for people to be exposed to particular types of natural hazard and fundamentally on how social systems and their associated power relations impact on different social groups (through for example, their class, gender, ethnicity). To understand disasters, it is necessary to understand the type of hazard that might affect people but equally the different levels of vulnerability of different groups of people must

be understood. They concluded that this vulnerability is determined by social systems and power, not by natural forces (Wisner *et al.*, 2003).

Since its introduction to the discourse, the concept of vulnerability has been widely used and subsequently various definitions have emerged, including:

- *“Vulnerability refers to contingencies and stress, and difficulty in coping with them. Vulnerability has thus two sides: an external side of risks, shocks, and stress to which an individual or household is subject; and an internal side which is defenseless, meaning a lack of means to cope without damaging loss”* (Chambers, 1989, p. 33).
- *“Vulnerability is essentially about the human ecology of endangerment...and is embedded in the social geography of settlements and land uses, and the space of distribution of influence in communities and political organisation”* (Hewitt, 1997, p. 143).
- *“...set of characteristics of a group or individual in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard. It involves a combination of factors that determine the degree to which someone’s life and livelihood is at risk by a discrete and identifiable event in nature or society”* (Blakie *et al.*, 1994, p. 9).
- *“Vulnerability has three connotations: it refers to a consequence (e.g. famine) rather than a cause (e.g. drought); it implies an adverse consequence (e.g. households are vulnerable to hunger); and it is a relative term that differentiates among socioeconomic groups or regions, rather than an absolute measure of deprivation”* (Downing, 1991, p. 372).
- *“Vulnerability is the differential capacity of groups and individuals to deal with hazards, based on their positions within physical and social worlds”* (Dow, 1992, p. 4).
- *“Vulnerability may be defined as the probability of an individual, a household or a community falling below a minimum level of welfare (e.g. poverty line), or the probability of suffering physical and socio-economic consequences (such as homelessness or physical injury) as a result of risky events and processes (such as forced eviction, crime*

*or flood) and their inability to effectively cope with such risky events and processes” (UN Habitat, 2007, p. 4).*

- *“Vulnerability is the expected value of the ratio of sensitivity to the state relative to a threshold based on the frequency distribution of the stressors of concern” (Luers, 2005, 214).*
- *“Vulnerability is best defined as an aggregate measure of human welfare that integrates environmental, social, economic and political exposure to a range of potential harmful perturbations. Vulnerability is a multilayered and multidimensional social space defined by the determinate, political, economic and institutional capabilities of people in specific places at specific times” (Bohle, et al. 1994, p. 37-38).*
- *“The conditions determined by physical, social and environmental factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards” (UNISDR, 2004, pp. 382).*

The above list of definitions of vulnerability is by no means exhaustive and simply illustrates the extensive application, interpretation and use of the concept. The original work on vulnerability by O’Keefe *et al.* (1976) was essentially a macro overview of hazards related to poverty paralleled by more recent macro work that relates vulnerability to a lack of security (Munslow and O’Dempsey, 2010); other authors largely work in a micro scale to other independent variables such as gender, age and ethnicity.

There remains no single agreed definition of vulnerability in the field of disasters and emergencies. Liverman (1990) noted that vulnerability has been redefined many times and related or equated to concepts including resilience, marginality, susceptibility, adaptability, fragility and risk. Timmermann (1981) argued that vulnerability is a term of such broad use it is almost useless as a description at the present, except as a rhetorical indicator of areas of greatest concern. Webb and Harinarayan (1999) drew attention to the danger of generalising vulnerability in that levels of vulnerability are not uniform across a group, country or continent. For example, despite an overall trend for women and young children to be the most vulnerable, this does not mean that all

women and children are vulnerable and nor does it mean that no one in other population groups are not vulnerable (Wright and Vesala-Husemann, 2006).

Evidently, there is no single correct or universally agreed conceptualisation of vulnerability that would apply to all contexts (Bogardi, 2006). Despite this, the concept of vulnerability continues to be widely used in the disaster management discourse. Clearly the inability to arrive at a universally accepted definition of vulnerability does not mean we do not recognise its importance in the discourse of disasters and emergencies. As Fussel (2006) notes, the diversity of conceptualisations is seen primarily as a consequence of using the term 'vulnerability' in different policy contexts, referring to different systems exposed to different hazards. Human society is the main focus of most concepts of vulnerability within the disasters discourse; however, vulnerability cannot be adequately viewed without considering surrounding structures, politics and the environment (Birkmann, 2006). As other authors such as Vogel and O'Brien (2004) have stressed, vulnerability is multidimensional and differential as it varies across physical space and among and within social groups; it is scale dependent with regard to time, space and units of analysis such as individual, household, region or system; and it is dynamic, the characteristics and driving forces of vulnerability change over time (Birkmann, 2006). In essence, vulnerability is local, contextual and site specific and as such the concept can only be applied and used effectively at a local level. This is supported by the various definitions of vulnerability illustrated above, whereby the majority refer to vulnerability in the context of an individual, household, community<sup>3</sup> or group.

Understanding the key vulnerabilities that underlie a disaster can help both policy makers and those who provide assistance to identify why a community is unable to cope and then try to ensure those gaps in coping ability are targeted. Disasters magnify vulnerabilities (Comfort *et al.*, 1999) and

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<sup>3</sup> Community is used here to mean some definable aggregation of households, interconnected in some way, and with a limited spatial extent.

recognising and understanding vulnerabilities in the context of disaster management and response is fundamental to attempts at eradicating permanent emergencies and long-term recovery.

### **2.7.2 Resilience**

Resilience is often referred to as simply the flip side of vulnerability, as a resilient system is less vulnerable than a non-resilient system, however, relation does not necessarily imply symmetry (Gallopín, 2006). Mallak (2006) notes, the absence of vulnerability does not make one resilient. Resilience and vulnerability are complex, multidimensional and not unconnected concepts however; they are governed by diametrical assumptions. Vulnerability discourse grounds itself upon real or perceived weaknesses and dependence on external controls in collapsing, often dysfunctional systems; while resilience brings to light existing strengths of substance and function associated with disaster preparedness, responsiveness and flexibility.

When represented on a graph, vulnerability and resilience are perpendicular to one another (one is represented by the 'X' axis and the other represented by the 'Y' axis) (Bogardi, 2006a). While they might interact with respect to their effect on community capacity, they are not directly congruent to or correlated with each other. According to Sapirstein (no date), vulnerability and resilience are measured in different units. Vulnerability is the degree to which people will be impacted by a hazard (natural or human-made). Vulnerability is measured primarily through cost, be it economic or human. In other words, how much will it cost if a hazard occurs in a given community and how many lives will be lost or affected? Resilience, in contrast, is measured by time. Specifically, how long would it take for the community to respond to the event, self organise and incorporate the lessons learned before returning to a (new, more knowledgeable) normal way of functioning (Sapirstein, no date).

Throughout history, people have always been intrigued by stories of individuals who overcome adversity to succeed in life. The systematic study of human resilience however, began only shortly before 1970 and focused

mainly on psychiatry and psychology around young people (Masten, 2001; Masten and Powell, 2003). This research transpired around the same time as ecological resilience theory emerged (Holling, 1973). Ecological resilience was originally defined as the amount of disturbance that an ecosystem could withstand without changing self-organised processes and structures whilst later definitions included ecological resilience as the return time to a stable state following a perturbation (Gunderson, 2000).

From its origins in psychology and ecology, resilience has been applied and used in various disciplines including, environmental science, engineering, management, and organisational behaviour research. As a concept, resilience continues to evolve and be applied to new areas and in recent years it has gained prominence in the field of disaster research and emergency preparedness (Tierney and Bruneau, 2007; IISD, 2010). In a highly resilient system risk is distributed, challenges are commonly understood, and response efforts are coordinated. In low resilient systems, risk has a disproportionate impact on certain sectors, and a society struggles to cope with and rebound from a crisis. The challenge therefore, is in crafting high-resilience societies (Brunner and Giroux, 2009).

As with vulnerability, the international community has no single agreed definition of resilience. In developmental science, individual resilience refers to the processes of, capacity for, or patterns of positive adaptation during or following exposure to adverse experiences that have the potential to disrupt or destroy the successful functioning or development of the person (Masten, Best and Garmezy, 1990). This broad definition covers three distinct phenomena:

1. Achieving better than expected outcomes in high-risk groups of people, sometimes referred to as overcoming the odds;
2. Sustaining competence or maintaining effective functioning under highly adverse conditions, sometimes referred to as stress resistance; and
3. Regaining or attaining effective or normal functioning following a period of exposure to traumatic experiences or conditions of overwhelming

adversity, often described in terms of recovery or bouncing back. This includes recovery after a crisis or catastrophe as well as normalisation onto positive developmental trajectories in response to improved conditions.

(Masten and Obradovic, 2008).

Resilience is the positive capacity of people to respond to, and cope with, stress and catastrophe. It also includes the ability to bounce back to homeostasis after a disruption. However, for disruptive events resilience can be described as bouncing forward. It is a measure of the capacity to move to a new reality that has been brought about by exceptional change (Manyena *et al.*, 2011). It can be used to indicate having an adaptive system that uses exposure to stress to provide resistance to future negative events. In this sense, as Pearson (2010) notes, 'resilience' corresponds to cumulative 'protective factors' and is used in opposition to cumulative 'risk factors'.

The abundance of definitions for "resilience" and the fact this concept is shared by many different disciplines make it particularly difficult to define uniformly. One especially comprehensive definition states resilience as:

*"The ability to face internal or external crisis and not only effectively resolve it but also learn from it, be strengthened by it and emerge transformed by it, both individually and as a group"* (Brenson-Lazan, 2003, p. 5).

The above definition includes four main components: response, self-organisation, learning, and adaptation. These elements necessitate voluntary participation by all involved. As Sapirstein (no date) notes, one cannot force or require an individual, household or community to be resilient. Rather, resilience is the outcome of developing those four components. Moreover these components apply equally to all social units – from individuals, through households to communities or organisations.

In accordance with the four main components of resilience identified above, the determination of resilience largely involves two fundamental judgements:



1. The criteria for judging threats or challenges to a system: whether there has been exposure to significant adversity or risk; and
2. The criteria for judging the adaptation of a system: whether the person or community is functioning effectively and doing what it is supposed to be doing.

(Masten and Coatsworth, 1998, Masten, 2001).

Sapirstein (no date) noted that resilience is developed community by community. Adoption of this decentralised component and bottom-up process is a critical aspect to enhancing social resilience. Evidently, synonymous with vulnerability, resilience is local, contextual and site specific and as such the concept can only be applied usefully at a local level.

As Tobin (1999) argues, disaster resilience is not a new concept in practice and it is linked to community development in the 1970s. It has, however, prompted a new way of conceptualising hazards and their consequences. It suggests building something up rather than simply reducing something (Collins, 2005), which is the case when discussing poverty or vulnerability reduction. Resilience appears to orient interventions beyond the capacity of communities to respond or absorb the impact and integrate the essential and non-essential elements of community systems to adapt and survive shocks. Evidently, as vulnerability and resilience address different albeit related areas, one concept should not be used in lieu of the other. Rather, when responding to chronic complex emergencies both concepts should be applied in order to develop a holistic understanding that can then be used to formulate and deliver an effective response. Hence, to eradicate the need for long-term humanitarian assistance both local resilience should be promoted and vulnerability reduced.

It is often argued that 'all disasters are local', at least in the short-term. In a similar stance, resilience and vulnerability are local, emerging from the actions of individuals and small groups of people in relation to each other and powered by the adaptive systems of human life and development. Larger systems such as governments facilitate this resilience and vulnerability but

are not generally directly available during an unfolding disaster. When a person, household or community is vulnerable or non-resilient, they possess limited capacity to cope with shocks. As ALNAP (Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action) (2003) discusses, external assistance must assess community resilience capacity and complement local coping efforts and recovery planning. In this way, the populations own capacities will be strengthened and they will be better able to carry on effective response and recovery activities long after external assistance has ceased. Both vulnerability and resilience influence adaptive capacity.

### **2.7.3 Adaptive Capacity**

Adaptive capacity in regards to disasters emerges from the natural hazards literature, which is applied to climate change (Klein, Nicholls and Thomalla, 2004). As early as 1980, Butzer considered 'cultural adaptation' (human ingenuity including technological innovation and long-range planning) in light of predicted climate change and its anticipated impacts on world food supply. Societies and economies have been making adaptations for centuries for example, to changing markets, cultures, weather patterns and conflicts. Most communities can cope with or adapt to moderate deviations from the norm, however, exposures involving extreme or prolonged events can lie beyond the coping range, exceeding the adaptive capacity of a community (Adger *et al.*, 2004). When this occurs communities need external support such as government support or humanitarian assistance to aid their return to normal. In the case of chronic complex emergencies, however, a return to normal transpires to a return to a state of chronic poverty and chronic vulnerability. A lack of adaptive capacity amongst the community remains as any capacity has been eroded through the prolonged state of emergency and gradual loss of livelihoods, assets and supporting structures. Thus, no options or capacity to adapt ensures the community remains extremely vulnerable to any future shocks or stresses and the cycle of reactive, long-term humanitarian aid and a state of permanent emergency continues.

One of the main conclusions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's Third Assessment Report (chapter 18) states, planned adaptation strategies have the potential to reduce vulnerability or exploit emerging opportunities even further. According to UN/ISDR (2009), capacity is "a combination of all the strengths, attributes and resources available within a community, society or organisation that can be used to achieve agreed goals". This includes infrastructure and physical means, institutions, societal coping abilities, as well as human knowledge, skills and collective attributes such as societal relationships, leadership and management. The World Health Organization (WHO) indicates that capacity for emergency management consists of "*information, authority, institutions, partnerships*" and the "*plans, resources and procedures to activate them*" (WHO, 2002, p. 19).

Enabling communities to increase this capacity is a major concern in the area of disaster preparedness. 'Capacity building' is a frequently used term in disaster literature. It describes efforts to develop human skills or societal infrastructures within a community to reduce the level of risk, and has also included developing financial, political, and technological resources within a society (UN/ISDR, 2004). Adaptive capacity represents the combination of vulnerability to damages and resilience or ability to cope. According to Dayton-Johnson (2004), it can be understood as a combination of vulnerability and resilience. Adaptive capacity can be defined as the vulnerability of a society before disaster strikes and its resilience after the event. As Seck (2007) notes, "*enhancing adaptive and coping capacity ensures a degree of resilience on the part of the populations that are affected*" (p. 7) and as the IPCC Working Group II (2001) note "*enhancement of adaptive capacity is necessary to reduce vulnerability*" (para. 2).

The Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concentrate their work on climate-related stresses and disasters, however, their work and conclusions of adaptive capacity are transferable throughout the field of disasters and complex emergencies. The authors of the IPCC Third Assessment Report emphasised that adaptive capacity varies significantly from system to system, sector to sector and region to region. Indeed, the

determinants of adaptive capacity include a variety of system, sector, and location specific characteristics:

1. The range of available technological options for adaptation, lack of technology limits the range of adaptive capacity;
2. The availability of resources and their distribution across the population, both the availability of and entitlement to, resources raises adaptive capacity;
3. The structure of critical institutions, the derivative allocation of decision-making authority, and the decision criteria that would be employed. Well-developed social institutions increase adaptive capacity;
4. The stock of human capital including education and personal security. Lack of skilled or trained personnel reduces adaptive capacity;
5. The stock of social capital including kinship and access to social networks;
6. The system's access to risk spreading processes;
7. The ability of decision-makers to manage information, the processes by which these decision-makers determine which information is credible, and the credibility of decision-makers themselves;
8. The public's perceived attribution of the source of stress and the significance of exposure to its local manifestations;
9. Access to economic resources, lack of financial resources limits adaptive capacity; and
10. The infrastructure available, greater variety of infrastructure can enhance adaptive capacity as it provides greater options.

(Adapted from Yohe and Tol, 2002; and Bhadwal, 2006).

As Adger *et al.* (2004) and the IPCC Working Group II (2001) notes, adaptive capacity is context-specific and varies considerably from country to country and community to community, among social groups and individuals over time. The scales of adaptive capacity are not independent: the capacity of a household to cope with a disaster depends to some degree on the enabling environment of the community and the adaptive capacity of the community is reflective of the resources and processes of the surrounding region (Smite

and Pilifsova, 2003). Although, the capacity of individuals to adapt to disasters is a function of their access to resources, the adaptive capacity of societies and communities depends on their ability to act collectively in the face of threats (Adger, *et al.*, 2004).

The concept of adaptive capacity is used to cover a multitude of factors and as with the concepts of vulnerability and resilience there is no general agreement as to what the factors of adaptive capacity constitute (Adger *et al.*, 2004). Broadly speaking, adaptive capacity can be described as the ability of a system, household or community to modify or change its characteristics or behaviour so as to cope with existing, anticipated or sudden external stresses and shocks (*ibid.*)

Lasting change within chronic complex emergencies may take many years to achieve and aid agencies need to be realistic in their objectives. Consideration needs to be taken of resources available, and possible conflicts between the priorities of agencies and those of communities. It is unethical to impose externally designed projects or to commence ambitious plans, only to withdraw while the work is still uncompleted, potentially leaving the community in a worse state than before. The affected community itself possesses knowledge about local needs and capabilities and as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies World Disasters Report (2003) notes, the role of external organisations is not to take over but to enable the community, thereby increasing their capacity to build resilience and take control over the decisions that affect their lives. Capacity building needs to be fostered, and the community enabled to progress to a position of greater preparedness for future eventualities. This involves building long-term capacity and not just coping with immediate issues. According to Wright and Vesala-Husemann (2006), unless underlying vulnerabilities and their relation to disaster preparedness are addressed this process cannot take place.

## **2.8 Conclusions**

In all of this literature some very strong arguments emerge that outline the three key themes detailed in chapter one

The failings of Rwanda (Barnett, 2002) have produced a more focused humanitarianism that has simultaneously removed decision making power from beneficiaries. The Sphere project itself, with its determined technical focus is a prescribed top down method, which can frequently exclude local communities from participation. Evaluations themselves are frequently used to ensure top down control with an emphasis on management by measurement. It can be hard argued therefore that there has been a shift from a focus on duties with an emphasis on deontological ethics to an emphasis on outcome with its implied consequentialist ethics. Perhaps the whole discourse on evaluation itself masks the drift in power towards donors and away from recipients. This raises the question emphasised in the third key theme of what is the value of evaluation in humanitarian assistance?

If the technical issues have been changed in such a way to reinforce top down planning the changes in the philosophical and legal basis for humanitarianism have also significantly altered. Gone is the simple commitment to humanitarian aid with its emphasis on independence, neutrality and impartiality not least because humanitarian agencies have wanted to have a continuity of work that links them to the development agenda through the disaster-development continuum. Embracing the development discourse in the early 21<sup>st</sup> Century requires addressing the human rights discourse, which is frequently at odds with the humanitarian agenda not least because advocacy overrides impartiality. The humanitarian and development agendas have different legal discourses with justiciability stronger in humanitarian law than human rights. Yet these clashes of political and legal philosophies must at all times be open to the importance of local tradition in terms of what is defined as participatory where participation implies local ownership and thus greater opportunity for continuity and sustainability. This presents the

questions raised in key theme one, ultimately, what is the nature of humanitarian assistance in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century?

The development debate itself has heavily critiqued the so-called knowledge production that is gained from processes such as evaluation, of particular importance is the work of Scott (1998) who basically argues that the development of such knowledge is a simplification process. In this simplification process the State is likely to misinterpret action and thus, provide policy options that are inappropriate to the development solution. Seeing like a State essentially is a method of blindness not least because it seeks to obscure ecological and cultural differences that are frequently the basis of sustainable livelihoods. Hence, the second key theme, which seeks to understand whether humanitarian aid can deliver sustainable impacts in a chronic complex emergency.

The field of chronic complex emergencies has complex issues whose factors contribute to vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity. The social levels that may exhibit vulnerability and resilience, and the dynamic aspect of time, change from location to location and specificity to each emergency. Given this, as Buckle, Marsh and Smale (2001) notes, there is little value in adherence to a single definition of vulnerability or resilience. Rather this research accepts that vulnerability is a broad measure of susceptibility to suffer loss or damage. The higher the vulnerability, the greater exposure there is to loss and damage. Resilience is broadly the capacity of a group or organisation to withstand loss or damage or to recover from the impact of an emergency or disaster. The higher the resilience, the less likely damage may be, and the faster and more effective recovery. Additionally, adaptive capacity is broadly the ability of a community to change or modify its behaviour, systems and processes to cope with external stresses and shocks and also remove itself from the zone of risk.

The goal of most humanitarian assistance is to ensure minimal loss of life and livelihoods following a disaster and for the affected population to return to 'normal' within the shortest possible time. This indeed is a positive objective,

however, in chronic complex emergencies there is no return to 'normal' in the cycle of reactive, long-term humanitarian aid and state of permanent emergency. Utilising the concepts of vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity can provide a holistic understanding to inform a humanitarian response that aspires to move people out of the zone of risk altogether and potentially break this cycle.

Communities and people are dynamic, non-linear and complex and as such require a tailored, holistic approach. Yes, during the first stages of an emergency saving lives is the priority, but then and especially during chronic emergencies, humanitarian aid should be designed around and tailored specifically for each community, region and nation with an aim to reduce vulnerability, increase resilience and strengthen adaptive capacity to break the cycle of chronic vulnerability. Given the highly context-specific nature of livelihoods and chronic conflict, there is no blueprint approach to breaking this cycle, however, an understanding of all variables, community participation and capacity building are all essential elements (Longley, Christoplos and Slaymaker, 2003).

This research will draw on the concepts of vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity to examine through an evaluative methodology, the delivery of humanitarian aid in one such chronic complex emergency and assess whether communities can move beyond the state of chronic emergency. The following chapter discusses the selected chronic complex emergency and focus of this research – Somalia.



## Chapter 3

### Somalia

*“For every generalization about Africa, Somalia is always the exception. And Somalis know it”* (Dowden, 2008, p. 93).

After almost two decades of civil war, Somalia is a country today most known for conflict and devastation. But how did Somalia evolve into its current state? The following chapter explores Somalia, its people, its history and most recent events in attempt to understand better the context of delivering humanitarian aid in Somalia and the challenges both humanitarian organisations and the Somali people face.

#### 3.1 Introduction

Somalia is Africa's easternmost country located in the Horn of Africa (see Map 1). It has the longest coastline on the continent, which lies along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. It is bounded by Djibouti in the northwest, Ethiopia in the west, and Kenya in the southwest. With a land mass of 627,339km<sup>2</sup>, it is marginally smaller than Texas in area and has an estimated population of slightly less than 10 million people. The capital city, Mogadishu, is located along the south east coast. Today Somalia is divided into three main areas – Somaliland in the north west, Puntland in the north east and Somalia comprising the south and central areas (Map 5).

**Map 1 Somalia**



(Source: FSAU, 2005)

Somalia's terrain consists largely of plateaus, plains and highlands. The central and southern areas of Somalia are flat whereas the northern part of the country is hilly with the rugged east-west ranges of the Karkaar Mountains in the far north.

Somalia lies at the extremity of the sub-Saharan zone most commonly known as the Sahel, which traverses the continent from Senegal to Somalia. The climate is arid, hot, dry desert with semi-arid conditions generally prevailing at higher altitudes. Mean daily temperatures throughout Somalia range from 30-40°C although temperatures can reach below freezing in the highlands in December (Metz, 1992).

Somalis recognise four seasons, two rainy – Gu and Deyr – and two dry – Jilaal and Xagaa. The Gu rains last from April until June and are followed by the Xagaa drought from July until September. The Deyr rains follow from October to November until the Jilaal dry season from December to March,

which is the harshest season for pastoralists and their herds. Most of the country receives less than 500 millimetres of rain annually. Generally, rainfall takes the form of showers or localised torrential rains and is extremely variable. The arid climate combined with the rainy seasons cause both severe droughts and floods regularly throughout Somalia. Between 1961 and 2004, 18 floods were recorded in Somalia, killing 2,671 people and affecting the lives of almost 1.8 million. In the same period, there were 12 droughts that killed 19,671 people and affected almost four million people (Columbia University, 2005).

## **3.2 The Somali People: Lives and Livelihoods**

### **3.2.1 Clans and Families**

*“Somalia is one of two countries on the continent that has only one race, one ethnic group, one language, one religion and one culture”* (Dowden, 2008, p. 93).


Somali social and political systems are underpinned by a strict, and respected, lineage with divisions along clan, sub-clan and sub-subclan lines. Every Somali child is taught to recite their family’s genealogy through the male line stretching back at least twenty generations (Meredith, 2006). Political allegiances are determined by generation lines and hence, when meeting one another Somalis do not ask each other where they are from but whom they are from (Lewis, 1992).

The council of clan elders is the dominant institution in most locales expected to provide wisdom and build consensus among clan ranks in matters of clan interest especially in times of crisis (UNDP, 1998). All married men can claim to be elders and speak in clan assemblies (known as shir).

There are six major clan families in Somalia as illustrated in Figure 2. Four of these are predominantly pastoral – Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Isaaq – together representing approximately 70 percent of the population. The remaining two clans – Rahanwayn-Digil and Rahanwayn-Mirifle – are agriculturalists and

comprise about 20 percent of the population (see Figure 2). The rest of the population includes the urban and coastal people – the Reer, Hamar/Banadir and Barwanese people of mixed Arab, Persian, Pakistani, Portuguese and Somali heritage; the Bantu riverine agriculturalists; Swahili-speaking Bajuni fishing communities; and Arabs of Yemen, Oman and Zanzibar descent.

**Figure 2 Somali Clan Lineage**



(Source: Menkhaus, 2004)

Note: The clan structure throughout Somalia is extensive and complex and as such there is no formal agreement on the clan and sub-clan structures. The above figure demonstrates a broad overview of the Somali clan structure.

‘Clannism’ has proved to be both a divisive and destructive tool in the hands of political leaders. Most of Somalia’s armed clashes since 1991 have been fought in the name of the clan as tensions erupted over resources and power and political leaders manipulate clannism for their own purposes (World Bank, 2005). Conversely, the clan system has proved a vital source of group protection, social security and customary law in the absence of a functional state. Individual security in the traditional Somali society was dependent on the clans and this situation remains in place today. The clan system has been the safety net of the Somali people since the collapse of the government in 1991 (LandInfo, 2008). Vulnerability and protection in Somalia are therefore,

closely linked to a clan's strength. Although, weak clan's traditionally seek protection from and affiliation to the dominant clans in specific areas. The region of Somaliland is relatively peaceful today and its success is largely attributed to using traditional methods of conflict resolution – using the clan system and Councils of Elders to act as mediators (Yusuf and Mare, 2005).

### **3.2.2 Religion**

The main religion of Somalia is Islam, which has deep roots in Somalia and almost the entire population are Sunni Muslims. Their religious spirit is mixed with elements of Somali's pre-Islamic Cushitic beliefs. Somali's live their lives according to the holy book of Islam, the Qur'an, which influences every aspect of Somali life and as such Islamic identity and Somali identity cannot be separated (Elmi, 2010). Islamic values provide hope and solidarity to cope with the harsh conditions prevalent in the country. They have also been used to build trusted institutions, both commercial and juridical. The most visible sign of the latter are the Islamic Courts based on sharia law. During the recent years of unlawfulness particularly throughout the south and central areas, these courts gained increasing popularity within local communities where they dispense justice in zones where customary law fails to maintain order.

Historically, Somalia was an oral society and therefore, little is known about the when and how Islam was introduced to Somalia. There are two accounts that offer explanations, the first, propounds the notion that Islam began in Somalia before it was founded in Medina – the first Muslim capital city in Islamic history. According to this version, Islam was brought to Somalia by the first cluster of Muslim migrants in the seventh century. The second account links Somali-Islamic emergence to Muslim migration that had grown tremendously after the death of the Prophet Mohamed. The dense population, scarce economic opportunities and harsh climate conditions of Arabia and Persia at that time motivated scores of Muslims to seek material fortunes elsewhere. They also aimed to carry out the Prophet Mohamed's decree of spreading his message, through which they eventually reached Somalia (Abdi, 2010).

Regardless of how Islam entered Somalia, historians largely agree that Somalia's Islam from the time of inception was based on Sufi order (Lewis, 1961). The oldest known Sufi sect adopted by Somalis is the Qadiriyyah, which was founded in Baghdad by Sheikh Abd al Qadir al Jilani (1166 A.D.). The Ahmadiyah-Idrisiyyah was the second Sufi sect in Somalia, which was founded by Ahmad ibn Idris al Fasi (1760-1837) and brought to Somalia by Sheikh Ali Maye Durogba of Merca. All other major Sufi sects are derivatives of Ahmadiyah and Qadirryah.

Modern political Islam did not arise in Somalia until the 1960s, when Somali students mainly those studying at Grand Al Azhar in Egypt were exposed to the teachings and public support for political Islam (Abdi, 2010). Although Somalis retained their traditions more strongly than any other group in Africa, in recent years, their cultural and religious practices have been undermined by Arab Wahabi preachers and Saudi money (Dowden, 2008). Until recently, Somali women played a major role in society, dressed in bright colours and did not cover their heads or arms. Today, Somali women are expected to dress in the full Saudi niqab and obey their men.

Radical Islam, organised by a group known as Al-Shabaab, previously known as Al-Ittihad, is also a growing trend with a presence throughout south and central Somalia (Chazan, 2002). Al-Shabaab are believed to be the largest Islamist militia group in Somalia. They have refused to engage in any peace process and have waged war against Somalia's government. The group aims to implement its own strict interpretation of Islamic or Sharia law in Somalia. Al-Shabaab's senior leadership is affiliated with al-Qaeda and is believed to have trained and fought in Afghanistan. The merger of the two groups was publicly announced in February 2012 by the Al-Shabaab amir and Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of al-Qaeda (National Counterterrorism Center, 2013). Although the Somali government and Ethiopian forces defeated the group in a two-week war between December 2006 and January 2007, al-Shabaab has continued its violent insurgency in southern and central Somalia. The group has exerted temporary and, at times, sustained control over strategic

locations in those areas by recruiting or forcing regional sub-clans and their militias, using guerilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the Somali Transitional Federal Government. Al-Shabaab has begun attacking countries which supply African Union and United Nations peace keeping troops to Somalia, most recently claiming responsibility for a twin bombing attack in Uganda, which killed over 70 people (Al Jazeera, 2010). Al-Shabaab's leaders have ordered their fighters – which include Americans and other Westerners – to attack African Union peace-keeping troops based in Mogadishu. The group gained additional notoriety by blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid from western agencies during the 2011 famine that killed tens of thousands of Somalis (National Counterterrorism Center, 2013).

### **2.3 Economy and Livelihoods**

According to the United Nations (UNEP, 2005), there are roughly 9.5 million people living in Somalia with an average population density of 15 people per square kilometre. The population is predominantly rural (Grundel, 2002) and the majority of livelihoods are dependent upon agriculture, pastoralism and/or fishing. The urban populations are based in major cities and towns (see Map 2) including Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Berbera, Bosasso, Garowe, Galkayo, Kismayo and Baidoa and urbanisation is an increasing trend throughout Somalia (UNICEF, no date, and UNDP, 2001).

## Map 2 Major Cities and Towns in Somalia



Note: Many place names in Somalia are spelt differently, particularly the number of vowels used varies depending on the source for example, Hargeisa or Hargeysa, Bosasso or Boosaaso, Garowe or Garoowe and Galkayo or Galcaio.

(Source: Central Intelligence Agency, 2010).

### 3.3.1 Pastoralism

The livestock sector is the largest contributor to Somali livelihoods with over 65 percent of the population engaged in either nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralism. Livestock and their products account for almost 70 percent of all exports (FSNAU, 2010). This figure has been periodically interrupted through international export bans imposed on Somali livestock such as that imposed by Saudi Arabia in 2000, however, livestock exports continue to remain the largest traded commodity for Somalia (UNOCHA, 2006). Livestock are used to supply local requirements, are shipped to the Arabian Peninsula, and trekked or transported to markets in Kenya and Ethiopia (FAO, World Bank and EU, 2004).



Somali pastoralism largely involves cattle, camel, sheep and goats. Camels are clearly the most valued animals throughout Somalia, which has the largest population and highest density of camels in the world (Farah *et al.*, 2004). The camel plays a vital role in Somali culture and camel herders are given great respect. Somali men own and herd camels whilst women care for sheep and goats. Every male Somali pastoralist aspires to own camels and many believe camels are of greater value than women (Abokor, 1987 and Dowden, 2008).

The camel is uniquely adapted to the hot and arid environments of Somalia and subsequently, contributes significantly to the food security of the nomadic pastoral households. The contribution of camels to the welfare of Somalia is often obscured through a combination of factors. Firstly, the estimates of camel populations are usually inaccurate due to a lack of regular census data and secondly their products seldom enter a formal marketing system, thus, their contribution to subsistence and the national economy tends to be grossly underestimated. Subsequently, less attention has been given to protecting camel herds when planning and implementing both humanitarian interventions and development (Farah *et al.*, 2004).

In addition to their milk, meat and economic value, camels are of great importance to social traditions in Somalia. Camels are used as payment for a bride and compensation for injured parties during tribal feuds. Camels are the only means of payment of blood money to the lineage of the deceased (Hussein, 1993). Somali pastoralists view camels as a banking system and security against drought, disease and various natural disasters that affect other livestock more seriously.

The possession of a certain amount of livestock are primary determinants for survival and success in the demanding environment facing Somali pastoral nomads. The climatic and geographical conditions prompt the Somali pastoral nomads to pursue animal husbandry with constant movement from one location to the next in search of improved pastures and water.

There are no reliable livestock data from recent years although estimates indicate there are 6.2 million camels, 4.6 million cattle and 31.3 million sheep and goats (UNDP, 2001). Nomadic pastoralism is however, under increasing pressure. Growing populations, pressure on pastoral grazing areas and the economic implications resulting from diseases and lack of veterinary services are some of the factors adversely affecting traditional pastoralism in Somalia. The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 resulted in the loss of most animal health services and especially the important function of certification of live animals and products for export (FAO, World Bank and EU, 2004). Subsequently, livestock diseases including Rinderpest and Rift Valley Fever have spread uncontrollably throughout Somalia devastating many herds. This has been compounded by years of inadequate and unreliable water supplies, droughts and floods. The timing and amount of rainfall are crucial for pastoralists. A lack of reliable rainfall over consecutive years have devastated many herds and created the worst drought seen in the horn of Africa for half a century, which resulted in the United Nations declaring a state of famine in Somalia in July 2011 (BBC News, 2011).

### **3.3.2 Agriculture**


Agriculture is an important livelihood activity in Somalia for both subsistence and income generation through crop sales and agricultural labour opportunities. Only 1.6 percent of Somalia's total land area is cultivated, whereas 69 percent is permanent pasture. Somalia's two permanent rivers – the Shabeelle and the Jubba – located in the south-west, support agriculturalists that constitute the country's largest sedentary population (see Map 3). These riverine areas and favourable soil conditions provide a fertile agricultural zone. Agro-pastoralists are found largely in the inter-riverine regions of Bay, Bakol, western Hiran, eastern Gedo, Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba in southern Somalia (UNOCHA, 2006).

There are two main types of agriculture in Somalia, one indigenous and the other introduced by European settlers. The Somalis have traditionally engaged in rain-fed, dry-land farming or in dry-land farming complemented by

irrigation from the waters of the Shabeelle and Jubba rivers.

Commercial crops, largely consisting of bananas and sugarcane, are grown on irrigated land along the two rivers. Bananas constitute the nation's major commercial crop; output was 50,000 tons in 1999, down from 110,000 tons in 1990. Somali and Italian farmers operating the banana farms practice more modern European-style techniques, as do some of the newly created Somali cooperatives. Sugarcane is cultivated at Giohar and Jilib by a state-owned company. Sugarcane production in 1999 totaled some 210,000 tons, down from 500,000 tons in 1985. Somalia is also the world's leading producer of frankincense (Encyclopedia of the Nations, 2013).

### Map 3 Somalia Basic Livelihoods Map



(Source: USAID, 2009)

Between 1975 and 1991, all land was nationalised. Existing customary rights were generally honored, but the state took over large areas of irrigable land in the river valleys. Plantations had to register to obtain a concession grant, with

the value of the land itself excluded from the selling price. In 1993, privatization, which with assistance from Italy (the main market for banana exports) began to help revitalise the agricultural sector. In 2001, agricultural products accounted for approximately 30 percent of exports and 17 percent of imports and there was an agricultural trade surplus of US\$10.2 million (The Encyclopedia of Nations, 2010).

Despite progress in the early 2000s, continuing conflict, drought and flooding over the last decade, has severely damaged Somalia's agriculture sector (USAID, 1998). Consequently, in the last five years Somalia has only been able to meet approximately 30 percent of its food needs. Somalia is now a net importer of cereal with increasing amounts of the country's food needs met through international food aid (Environment News Service, 2010). A number of humanitarian organisations including United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, Islamic Relief and International NGOs such as, Norwegian Church Aid are supporting agriculturalists through various projects such as the provision of seeds and tools; irrigation projects; and training for farmers (FAO, 2009; Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2010). Unfortunately, the continuing conflict in south and central Somalia limits many agricultural activities in these areas.

### **3.3.3 Fishing and Piracy**

The coastal waters of Somalia are rich in fish resources. Originally, subsistence fishing was only practiced by small coastal communities until it was promoted by the government in response to a drought during the 1970s. By 1984, it was estimated that a million people were inhabiting the Somali coast and in 2003, almost US\$3.4 million-worth of fish were exported (WRI, 2003). The Somali fishing sector comprises two distinct parts – the artisanal sector, which operates in inshore areas and accounts for 60 percent of the landings; and the industrial sector, which accounts for 40 percent of the total fishery production (FAO, 2005). The artisanal sector use small boats with landlines, gill nets and long lines. There is an abundance of fish both inshore and offshore including tuna, mackerel, sharks and lobsters. The industrial

sector largely comprises joint ventures involving commercial Somali fishing companies and foreign commercial fishing companies. Italy, Korea, Spain, Japan, Greece and Egypt are some examples of the joint venture initiatives in Somali waters.

The importance of the fishery sector within the overall economy is relatively small. Exports of fishery products account for around three percent of total exports and it contributes only two percent to GDP (FAO, 2005). The importance of the fishery sector for future socio-economic development however, must not be underestimated. The inshore fish stocks are only lightly exploited and the artisanal sector is comparatively less developed than other production systems of the country meaning there is great potential for a steep increase in productivity in the fishing sector.

Since 1991, Somalia's rich fishing resources have been heavily exploited by unlicensed foreign-flagged fishing boats and over fishing has now become a major economic, environmental and social issue. Hundreds of illegal fishing vessels from a variety of nations ply the waters off Somalia and some have even attacked Somali fishermen destroying their boats and equipment (UN, 2005). Somali fishermen documented cases of trawlers pouring boiling water on the fishermen in canoes, their nets cut or destroyed, smaller boats crushed, killing all the occupants, and other abuses suffered as they tried to protect their national fishing territory (Waldo, 2009). A 2005 report from the Marine Resources Assessment Group (MRAG) estimated that the Somali economy loses approximately US\$90 million a year to illegal, unreported and unregulated foreign fishing vessels (UNOCHA, 2006; Fish information and Services, 2010). Estimates from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report this figure as high as US\$300 million a year (Godoy, 2010).

In the early 1990s Somalis began claiming European and Asian companies were dumping toxic and nuclear waste in Somali waters. These claims, of environmental destruction along Somalia's coast were continually disregarded by the United Nations and the regions maritime authorities. Despite international appeals to act on the continued ravaging of the Somali marine

resources and dumping of toxic waste the violations were allowed to continue because it was claimed there was a lack of evidence (Clair, 2011).

In 2004 the 'Asian' Tsunami struck and Somalia was the worst effected country in Africa. In addition to the loss of life and livelihoods, the Tsunami washed toxic waste barrels and containers onto the shores of Puntland (Abdullahi, 2008 and Godoy, 2010). The evidence was finally confirmed by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) "*Somalia has been used as a dumping ground for hazardous waste starting in the early 1990s, and continuing through the civil war.....since the containers came ashore, hundreds of residents have fallen ill, suffering from mouth and abdominal bleeding, skin infections and other ailments*" (Nuttall, UN Spokesman, Abdullahi, 2008, para. 16). The United Nations Environment Programme confirmed uranium radioactive waste; lead and heavy metals like cadmium and mercury; industrial waste; and hospital waste had all been dumped along Somalia's coastline (Clair, 2011). Despite international recognition of the violations occurring the international community failed to act and the offences continue (*ibid.*).

Initially the Somali fishermen used speedboats in attempts to dissuade the dumpers and trawlers but this had little effect. The fishermen became more organised and began arming themselves to scare off foreign vessels. Over time, these groups evolved, modernised their hardware and became more aggressive towards foreign vessels. Since 1991, Somali fishermen have captured Egyptian, Indian, Italian, Kenyan, Korean, Spanish, Taiwanese, Ukrainian and Yemenese illegal fishing trawlers and ransoms of various sizes have been paid for their release (Waldo, 2009). In 2008, Somalis captured a Ukrainian ship accusing European firms of dumping toxic waste off their coast. They demanded US\$8 million in ransom for the ships return that would go towards cleaning up the waste (*ibid.*). Subsequently, the piracy boom began and pirate groups increased in size and number, becoming ever more organised in their attacks. Driven by an anger towards illegal fishing and dumping vessels; the international community for not preventing the illegal fishing or waste dumping; decades of strife, poverty and struggle; and a

mixture of greed and the hope for a better life, Somali waters became rife with Somali pirates. In 2008 and 2009, Somali pirates earned an estimated US\$150 million and over US\$60 million respectively in ransom payments, which is more than Somalia's national budget (Roble, 2010; BBC News, 2008). Ransom payments have continued to increase and in 2011, US\$250 million were paid to pirates (The Independent, 2012). This money is supporting the Somali economy as the pirates use this money to stock up on sheep, goats, water, fuel, rice, milk, spaghetti and cigarettes (Hafner, 2009). The ransom money is filtering down to Somalia's poorest and is buoying up the entire economy of the state (Al-Mutairi, 2003). Consequently, the majority of Somali's support the pirates and see them as a form of national defense of the country's territorial waters (Hari, 2010). The pirates are treated as local heroes for their work in defending their coastline, they are sought after husbands and are well respected in Somali society (The Telegraph, 2009).

Dumping toxic waste, illegal fishing and destroying livelihoods does not justify hostage taking and piracy however,

*“did we expect starving Somalians to stand passively on their beaches, paddling in our nuclear waste, and watch us snatch their fish to eat in restaurants in London and Paris and Rome?”* (Hari, 2009, para. 12)

A NATO mission and EU naval force were launched in 2008 to protect and escort merchant ships in the Gulf of Aden (Sky News, 2008). Various other countries including the US and India also mounted anti-piracy patrols in the area. The 30 or so international anti-piracy naval vessels now surveying these vast waters however, are inadequate and of little deterrent to the Somali pirates (BBC News, 2011a; and Shinn and Adjunct, 2009).

Poverty, war, disease and natural disasters have left few livelihood options for young Somali men and subsequently many are turning to piracy. Piracy has proven lucrative for Somalis and most believe the risks are little in comparison to the rewards.

In order to seriously and sustainably address the issue of piracy in Somalia it is not NATO warships that are needed. The international community must correct its past wrongs and help protect the Somali coastline from illegal fishing and waste dumping. The international community needs to help Somali fishermen reap the full rewards of their resource rich waters and only then will Somali men choose a livelihood of fishing over piracy.

#### **3.3.4 Telecommunications and Services**

Despite the ongoing conflict, the Somali service sector has surprisingly flourished over recent years. Telecommunication firms provide wireless services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the continent (CIA, 2010). In 1991, there were only 8,500 operational fixed telephone lines in Somalia and many of these were completely destroyed during the 1990s. Despite the lack of a functional government or effective economy there are now 68,000 phone lines divided between fixed (48,000) and mobile (20,000). Internet services have an estimated 4,500 subscribers and 18,000 users (Somalia Watch News, 2007).

There is a lack of formal banking systems in Somalia as a result of the conflict and insecurity (Bakonyi and Abdullahi, 2006). Money exchange services occur through an informal, yet highly efficient system known as 'Hawala'. This system has been practiced throughout Somalia for many years and is often used and supported by international organisations. The Somali Diaspora relies heavily upon the Hawala system to transfer funds to family and extended family members both in times of emergency and on a regular basis (Winter, 2004). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the European Commission have both worked with and provided capacity building for Somali Hawala organisations.

The Hawala system handles between US\$500 million and US\$1 billion in remittances annually (CIA, 2005) and is an essential finance mechanism in Somalia for individuals, businesses and international organisations (Vaknin, 2005). The Hawala system is favoured as it costs less than transferring funds



through traditional banking systems, it operates 24 hours a day every day of the year, is completely reliable and involves minimal paperwork. Most importantly however, the Hawala system is exceptionally fast – an individual or organisation can supply money to a Hawala business or trader in London (UK) for example (there are recognised Hawala traders throughout the world); a phone call is made to the local Hawala trader in Somalia; and the funds are delivered or available for collection usually within hours on the same day (Tabacniks, 2009). The system is based entirely on trust, performance and honour of a large network of ‘informal bankers’ (*ibid.*). The Hawala system has proven invaluable during conflicts and disasters in Somalia when the timely release of funds on the ground to mobilise emergency projects is paramount.

### **3.4 Basic Indicators in Somalia**

The following sections provide an overview of Somalia’s human development indicators including health, education, water and sanitation, food and nutrition, and shelter.

#### **3.4.1 Health**

Widespread poverty, civil strife and a lack of resources and skills have placed health standards in Somalia amongst the worst in the world. Average life expectancy is only 47 years (WHO, 2006b). Preventable diseases including diarrhea, respiratory infections and malaria are the main killers of infants and young children, together accounting for over half of all child deaths. Somalia remains among countries with the highest incidence of tuberculosis in the world largely through overcrowded camps or settlements and lack of treatment facilities. Infant and child mortality rates are among the highest in the world and reproductive health is a major problem with high maternal mortality rates (1,044 per 100,00 live births). This places Somali women amongst the most high-risk groups in the world (UNICEF, 2008).

Female genital mutilation (infibulation) and anaemia significantly aggravate the state of Somali women's health. Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)<sup>4</sup> prevalence in Somalia is approximately 95-98 percent and is primarily performed on girls aged 4-11 years old. FGM has severe adverse effects on the physical, mental and psychological health of those who undergo the practice. The consequences are both immediate and lifelong. Despite internationally recognised laws against FGM; proven lack of validation as a religious aspect of Islam; and global advocacy to eradicate the practice, it remains embedded in Somali culture. The practice itself is generally undertaken by untrained midwives who use instruments such as knives, razors or broken glass (UNICEF, no date, a). These instruments are often not sterilised and the practice usually occurs without anesthesia. The short-term consequences can include immediate death as a result of shock, hemorrhage or septicemia. The long-term implications are extensive including, chronic pelvic complications, recurrent urinary retention and infection and complications during child birth. In addition to the direct adverse health effects and psychological impacts, FGM increases a women's biological vulnerability to HIV transmission if exposed to the virus.

FGM can have serious impacts upon men as well as women. In many parts of Somalia it is a disgrace for a man to be unable to deinfibulate his wife. A number of men have committed suicide when they have not been able to achieve deinfibulation whilst others have used corrosive chemicals or razors in attempts to break the skin (ibid.).

The provision of healthcare services in Somalia are largely dependent on UN agencies and NGOs. Unfortunately, high levels of insecurity hinders access to much of the population. It is estimated that only 15 percent of people living in rural areas and 50 percent of people living in urban areas have access to health care (WHO, 2006b). Immunisation rates in Somalia are extremely low

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<sup>4</sup> FGM is defined as procedures involving partial or total removal of female genitalia or other injury to female genital organs. The operation generally involves the total removal of the clitoris, labia minora and severing of the inner side of the labia majora. The sides of the labia majora are then sutured together, leaving a small hole for urine and menstrual discharge to pass (UNICEF, no date).

with great disparities between urban and rural populations. There have been no yellow fever vaccinations for over a decade and only 5 percent of children under one have all six recommended vaccinations (UNICEF, 2008).

A lack of child vaccinations, dangerous traditional practices such as FGM and inadequate health services mean most Somalis have a poor state of health, which increases their susceptibility to illness and disease and their overall vulnerability to shocks.

### **3.4.2 Water and sanitation**

Access to safe water and sanitation facilities is a significant problem in Somalia, aggravated by the destruction and looting of water supply installations during the civil war, the continuing conflict, and a general lack of maintenance. The majority of Somalis access water from shallow wells, rivers and Berkads<sup>5</sup>. As of 2010, only 29 percent of the total population had access to improved water sources throughout the year (UNICEF and WHO, 2012). In many areas of Somalia such as the Galgadud region, the nearest safe<sup>6</sup> water source can be 70km or further from settlement areas. Whilst in other areas boreholes between 170-240m deep are needed to access water. The basic water needs of over three million Somalis are met from water sources that are unprotected and often contaminated with micro-organisms. Approximately 71 percent of the population access their water from unimproved or surface water sources<sup>7</sup> (UN Cluster, 2006; UNICEF and WHO, 2012). During the dry season wells often become saline or contaminated causing severe outbreaks of

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<sup>5</sup> A *berkad* is a traditional human-made reservoir usually filled by rainfall and runoff. They are typically shaded with small bushes, have a capacity of 30 to 400 m<sup>3</sup> and used for both livestock and human consumption. *Berkads* were traditionally privately owned by households and provided a source of income.

<sup>6</sup> Safe drinking water is water with microbial, chemical and physical characteristics that meet WHO guidelines or national drinking water standards. Access to a safe water source is the proportion of people using improved drinking water sources, which can include a household connection, public standpipe, borehole, protected dug well, protected spring and rainwater collection (WHO, 2013).

<sup>7</sup> Unimproved water sources include unprotected dug wells, unprotected springs and water delivered by cart or tanker. Surface water includes water taken directly from rivers, ponds, irrigation channels and other surface sources (UNICEF and WHO, 2012).

diarrhea and other water-related diseases (UNEP, 2005). Acute water shortages and contaminated water sources result in poor health for both humans and livestock, which further contribute to food insecurity.

Only 23 percent of Somalis live in households with access to sanitary means of disposing excreta (UNICEF and WHO, 2012). The majority of the population practice open defecation, which is generally close to dwellings and water sources (*ibid* and European Commission, 2007). Approximately 52 percent of people in urban areas have access to improved sanitation facilities whereas 83 percent of people living in rural areas defecate in open areas and have no access to sanitation facilities (UNICEF and WHO, 2012). A lack of clean water, poor hygiene and environmental sanitation are the main underlying causes of diseases such as cholera and dysentery in Somalia. Cholera is endemic in Somalia with outbreaks occurring annually from December to June, it claims hundreds of lives each year, particularly in densely populated areas (UNICEF, no date, b).

Most of the sanitation facilities in Somalia are pit latrines. Few of the latrines are equipped with septic tanks and two-thirds of these are not managed, which causes contamination of the water table. In areas where displaced people have settled, almost no sanitation facilities exist. This forces most to resort to open defecation on the periphery of peri-urban areas and camps (USAID, 2008). Without access to latrines, many women and girls will only relieve themselves at night. This places them at greater risk of physical attack and sexual violence and many women and girls are raped when they resort to open defecation (UNICEF, 2010a).

A lack of accessible, safe water sources has further negative effects on women and children. Collecting water for the family and household is the responsibility of women whereas taking herds of cattle and camel to watering points is the responsibility of men in Somalia. Many Somali women and children walk long distances each day to collect water. This exposes them to attacks and sexual violence (IDP Project, 2004; Said, 2010) and the time spent collecting water prevents many children, mainly girls, from attending

school and women from engaging in other activities including, agriculture or income generation (Said, 2010; UN Cluster, 2006). In rural areas, women and girls spend two to three hours every day walking to water points that generally have poor quality water (UN Cluster, 2006).

Water is a traditional source of conflict in Somali society due to its scarcity. Conflicts generally occur over water for two reasons. Firstly, when local supplies diminish particularly during dry periods or droughts. This places pressure on pastoralists to water their herds and they are forced to travel long distances to reach water, for which there is fierce competition. Secondly, when a new or displaced group settles in an area where water is scarce, tensions rise between the existing inhabitants and the new group (Mohamed, no date).

A final challenge for water and sanitation in Somalia is the lack of data and knowledge regarding water sources. Many international organisations for example, UNICEF, USAID, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, CARE and Norwegian Church Aid are involved in delivering water and sanitation projects throughout Somalia. Numerous agencies have drilled deep boreholes to provide water for communities. There is however, no understanding of the water table or groundwater levels in Somalia and drilling boreholes as a short-term solution today could exacerbate problems in the future if the water table becomes over exploited without replenishment.

### **3.4.3 Food and nutrition**

Typical Somali foods include injera (a type of bread), muufa (a porridge made of corn), rice, spaghetti, chapatti, goat meat, camel milk and sweet tea (Owens, Piccinin and Lai, 2002). Fruit and vegetables are limited, as crops have been destroyed through years of conflict. Somalia is more dependent on imported food than any other country in Sub-Saharan Africa and millions of Somalis face food insecurity throughout the year (World Bank, 1998).

Food security is defined as “*a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life*” (FAO, 2002, Glossary).

A recent study found that 50 percent of all women living in Somalia, 30 percent of all school-aged children and 60 percent of children under five are suffering anemia and Vitamin A deficiencies (FSNAU, 2010). This is caused by a range of factors including frequent exposure to diseases that are untreated and the consumption of predominantly cereal-based diets that are lacking key vitamins and minerals. Although many children appear healthy, as they are not very thin, these underlying deficiencies mean these children are malnourished. The required nutrient rich foods such as meat, fish and eggs are too expensive for poor households and this is further exacerbated by inadequate health care and a lack of clean water and sanitation facilities (*ibid.*). Drought, flooding and conflict are the main underlying causes of food shortages throughout Somalia.

Somalia is in a chronic nutrition crisis with rates of acute and chronic malnutrition consistently exceeding emergency thresholds. From 1991 to mid-1999, the World Food Program (WFP) distributed 113,310 metric tones of food to an average of 1.3 million beneficiaries a year (IRIN, 2008). The number of people in need of food aid has increased over the years and as of 2012, WFP was providing food aid to 1.5 million people (WFP, 2013). This food aid is in the form of general food distributions to rural, urban and internally displaced people, school feeding for children and nutrition programmes for pregnant women and vulnerable people through ‘food for work’ or ‘food for training’ projects (WFP, 2009). Despite food aid, WFP estimates that more than 2.5 million people remain in crisis throughout Somalia (WFP, 2013)

Food aid has been constantly interrupted in Somalia as a consequence of the conflict and insecurity. Delivering food aid to those malnourished and starving is a challenge in itself for humanitarian organisations. Food aid must face

various warlords and militia roadblocks in order to reach those in need and deliveries are regularly hijacked or stolen (Thomson, 2006 and Rugman, 2009). The situation is currently extremely desperate as WFP were forced to suspend its operations in early 2010 following attacks on its employees in south and central areas. In late 2009, the Islamist military group al-Shabaab, who operate in southern and central Somalia, demanded that all women were removed from UN employment and the payment of US\$20,000 every six months for the protection of each regional UN office in Somalia (Howden, 2010). WFP refused these demands and were subsequently forced to cease operations throughout southern Somalia due to the insecurity for its staff. WFP only resumed full operations in Somalia in January 2013. They conducted an assessment in the southern port of Kismayo in November 2012, which found high levels of malnutrition and food insecurity across the city (WFP, 2013).

Throughout Somalia insecurity and conflict continue to contribute to poor household food security and high rates of malnutrition. WFP is responding through implementing a new model of food distribution. WFP is moving away from general food distributions to a more targeted means of assistance. One critical focus is on nutrition programmes that support the most vulnerable, namely women and children. Through supplementary feeding and, where possible, through health centres, WFP provides specialised nutritional food products to treat and prevent malnutrition. WFP is also however, providing a family ration through this distribution with the understanding there is a likelihood of other family members also suffering malnourishment (WFP, 2012). This family ration provides maximum coverage through a targeted approach by reaching the most vulnerable families.

#### **3.4.4 Education**

During the last two decades, the Somali education system ceased to function (UNFAO, 2005). Somalia has one of the lowest school enrolment rates in the world. Only 20.7 percent of primary school-age children in 2008 were enrolled in schools and only 24 percent of adults are literate (UNDP, 2010).

According to a Survey of Primary Schools in Somalia conducted in 2003-2004, there are 1,172 operating schools with a total enrolment of over 285,574 children (GER) (UNICEF, 2005). Enrolment rates are mainly low as a consequence of the continuing conflict that has displaced many Somalis; the destruction and looting of schools; inability of many parents to afford school fees; and a lack of qualified teachers.

Gender disparities in enrolment rates are high and only slightly over one third (or 37 percent) of pupils are girls at the lower primary school levels. The number of girls attending school decreases further in higher grades. The low enrolment and high drop-out rates of girls in most areas are due to a combination of girls taking on more roles and responsibilities in the household as they grow older and money for education is usually prioritised for boys. Female teachers are also under-represented, making up only about 13 percent of the total number of all teachers (Abdi, Matthews and Yocum, 2009).

The situation is much better in Somaliland in the north west compared to other areas of Somalia. In Somaliland the literacy rate has risen from 20 percent in 1991 to 45 percent in 2009 (IRIN, 2009). School enrollment rose from 1,019 pupils in 1991 to 45,223 by 2009. These successes are due to a number of initiatives in Somaliland including:

- A major awareness raising initiative highlighting the importance of education for boys and girls;
- Construction of many primary schools;
- The construction of technical colleges and vocational schools;
- The development of a constitution stipulating that all primary and secondary education is free. Only contributions are requested from parents to support voluntary teachers.
- School initiatives such as, in the Togdheer region where the school and teachers follow the pastoralists wherever they go.
- A series of boarding schools with feeding programmes that ensure



pastoralists' children are fed while their families are on the move.  
(Source: *ibid*).

WFP began a school feeding programme in Somalia in 2003. Since then, the number of children enrolled in these schools has risen drastically. WFP provides school feeding programmes in approximately 373 schools and reaches 93,000 primary school children. In 2008, attendance in WFP-assisted primary schools in Somalia was 97 percent compared to 92 percent in primary schools as a whole (Lambers, 2009).

There are a number of Koranic schools throughout Somalia focusing on the Qur'an and to some extent the Arabic language. These schools are generally managed with community support and most function under temporary shelters (Afrol News, 2002). There is no government formal education system in Somalia and schools that do exist are locally managed community schools that lack sufficient resources (UNICEF, 2005a). Most schools rely on support from UN agencies, NGOs or Somali Diaspora for funding and resources.

Somalia's Universities are predominantly in the capital Mogadishu and through the wars and recent conflict from al-Shabaab many of them were forced to close their doors or relocate. The University of Somalia was the first to move in 2006 during the Ethiopian invasion, when many students faced harassment by both al-Shabaab militia and Ethiopian troops. The University opened three separate campuses as some students had links to the government and were not able to attend some campuses, and other students had links to al-Shabaab and were not able to cross government lines. Hence, the University established campuses behind all lines of the conflict to ensure access. Student numbers declined during the recent al-Shabaab conflicts however, with improved security and increasing Government control through 2012, enrolment is now increasing (Ali and Mohamed, 2013). Government control means students no longer have the daily threat from al-Shabaab. The biggest barrier to accessing higher education now in Mogadishu are the high fees as most Universities are run by the private sector and scholarships are few.

Despite progress made in Somaliland; school feeding programmes; and most recently in higher education in Mogadishu, the state of primary education in most of Somalia remains desperate. There are a lack of schools, teachers and text books, which is of little surprise as Somalia finds itself at or near the bottom in terms of financial resources available for education (Cummings and van Tonningen, 2003). Ranked as having one of the lowest school enrolment rates in the world, it is unlikely Somalia will achieve the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education by 2015 (UNDP, 2010).

### **3.4.5 Shelter**

According to the World Bank and UNDP (2002) only 24 percent of housing in Somalia can be considered permanent. Nomadic pastoralists construct temporary houses with sticks and sheets as they move (see Figure 3) and the majority of all other buildings are constructed from wooden sticks with a mud infill.

**Figure 3 Typical Nomads Temporary Housing**




(Source: Author, 2007)

Large volumes of people have been forced to flee their homes since the early 1990s as a result of droughts and floods but mostly as a consequence of violence and conflict. These people move to neighbouring countries as refugees or to different areas of Somalia as internally displaced persons

(IDPs). Some reside with extended family members within the host community but most establish themselves in camps around villages and towns. In 2010, the total number of IDPs was estimated at 1.2 million in south-central Somalia, 126,000 in Puntland and 67,000 in Somaliland (see Map 4). Among the total figure are the protracted IDPs, who live in overcrowded settlements mainly in Galkayo and Bosasso. The IDPs construct shelters from cartons, old clothes and broken/rusted tins (United Nations, 2010a). These basic structures fail to provide adequate shelter from the elements and with a lack of sanitation and poor hygiene conditions, communicable diseases such as respiratory tract infections and diarrhea are high. Furthermore, these flimsy shelter structures expose women and children to rape and other serious violations of human rights (UN Habitat, 2009). Fire outbreaks are also common in the IDP settlements as most of the shelters are made of highly flammable materials and these fires spread quickly as the shelters are located too close to each other.

Further exacerbating the situation for IDPs, in July 2010, authorities in the region of Puntland began deporting IDPs – almost 1,000 people were deported within one month. Puntland authorities have since begun issuing identity cards to its citizens with the aim of identifying them from others who arrive from elsewhere in Somalia (UNOCHA, 2010a). Deported with no provisions for shelter or food makes IDPs even more vulnerable.

**Map 4 Somali Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons**




(Source: UNHCR, 2013).

Evidently, the situation that persists in Somalia today is extreme. Complex and natural disasters coupled with the collapse of social services and devastatingly low development indicators have created a desperate situation that has resulted in the classification of Somalia as one of the world's poorest countries. Somalia has been receiving international humanitarian aid for over two decades. It has received over US\$5 billion over the last decade and as Figure 4 below illustrates the amount of humanitarian funding to Somalia has increased significantly from 2002 to 2012. Despite levels of aid and continued

humanitarian efforts from the international community Somalia's human development indicators have not improved. The number of Somali people in need of aid has continually risen throughout the last decade and now almost half of the Somali population is in dire need of humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2009).

**Figure 4 Consolidated Appeals for Somalia from 2002-2012**



(Source: Adapted from Financial Tracking Service, 2012)

In order to fully comprehend the complex current situation in Somalia; the difficulties both Somalis and humanitarian agencies operating in Somalia face; and to even begin planning an effective humanitarian response, it is necessary to firstly understand the cultural and political history and evolution of Somalia.

### **3.5 Somalia's History: Early Somalia**

Between the 7<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> Centuries, immigrant Muslim Arabs and Persians established trading posts along Somalia's Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean coastlines. Mogadishu, the capital, began its existence as a trading station.

British, French and Italian imperialism all played an active role in Somalia during the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. Colonialism did not penetrate Somalia as deep as other parts of Africa however, it did have the effect of imposing an alien political structure – a central state – on a society with a highly decentralised, stateless political tradition (UNDP, 1998). Britain, whose concern was largely to safeguard trade links with its Aden colony, proclaimed protectorate over Somaliland in 1887. France and Britain, after a brief risk of armed confrontation in 1888, agreed on a demarcation line carving out Djibouti from Somalia.

Italy faced opposition in central Somalia from Somali Sultans and armies until they acquired full control over parts of Somalia in 1889. In 1896-97, Italy, after suffering Ethiopian defeats in other areas, granted a large Somali region known as Ogaden to Ethiopia. This arrangement meant many Somali's now found themselves living within Ethiopia's border.

The Somali Dervish Resistance Movement established themselves to resist colonisation and attack by the Europeans and Ethiopians. In 1920, after a quarter of a century of holding the British Empire at bay, the Dervishes were finally defeated as a direct consequence of Britain's new policy of aerial bombardment (Hultman, 1993 and Lukacs, 2007).

A new era of conflict began in 1923 with the arrival of the Italian colony of the first governor appointed by Italy's fascist dictator Mussolini. A vigorous policy was adopted to develop and extend Italian imperial interests, which culminated with the defeat and annexation of Ethiopia in 1936 (Bamber, 2001). In 1925, an area known as Jubaland was detached from Kenya to become the westernmost part of the Italian colony. In 1963, Italian Somaliland was combined with Somali-speaking districts of Ethiopia to form a province of

the newly formed 'Italian East Africa' (BBC News, 2011b). During World War II, Italian forces invaded British Somaliland, however, the British, operating from Kenya retook the region in 1941 and went on to conquer Italian Somaliland. Britain ruled until 1950, when Italian Somaliland became a UN trust territory under Italian control (Farah, 2009).

In 1960 Britain and Italy granted independence to their respective sectors, enabling the two to unite to form the Somali Republic and a civilian government was formed (*ibid.*). The government was faced with a severely underdeveloped economy and with a vocal movement that favoured the creation of a 'Greater Somalia' that would reunite the three large Somali groups trapped in other states – the Somali-dominated areas of Kenya, French Somaliland (now Djibouti), and the Ogaden and Haud regions in Ethiopia.

In 1963 the British granted the Somali-populated Northern Frontier District of Kenya to the Republic of Kenya and consequently Somalia broke diplomatic relations with Britain. The nomadic existence of many Somali herders and the ill-defined frontiers worsened problems. Hostilities between Somalia and Ethiopia erupted in 1964, and Kenya also became involved in the conflict until peace was restored in 1967 (Guardian, 2006).

Failure to make progress in reuniting areas of Somalia was largely due to western support for Ethiopia and Kenya. Subsequently, Somalia sought support from the Soviet Union for military aid. Despite this, Somalia remained a fairly neutral stance in international affairs during the 1960s until 1969 when the President was assassinated and Siad Barre seized power (Dowden, 2008). Siad introduced a brutal Marxist dictatorship, insisting upon the supremacy of party and nation as opposed to the local clan loyalties.

In 1977, with Ethiopia in chaos after the fall of Haile Selassie, Somalia attacked Ethiopian garrisons in the Ogaden region. The Soviet Union, however, betrayed Siad Barre as they viewed the new Ethiopia as a potentially more important new client. In early 1978, the Ethiopian army, using

Soviet equipment and reinforced troops from Cuba recaptured the Ogaden region. The result was mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees over the borders to Somalia (Arabic Translation Services, 2010). In the aftermath of this disaster, clan and regional-based guerrilla groups formed in and around Somalia with the intention of toppling Siad's centralising regime. Siad agreed to allow the US use of air and naval facilities that had been built by the Soviet Union in exchange for military and economic aid.

By 1988, the continuing fighting with guerrilla groups throughout Somalia resulted in full-scale civil war that eventually saw Siad overthrown in 1991. One of the main guerrilla groups was the United Somali Congress whose chairman was General Mohamed Farrah Aidid.

The collapse of the government in 1991 led to one the fastest and largest population displacements ever recorded on the African continent. At the peak of this crisis it was thought more than 800,000 Somalis had fled to neighbouring countries (Mutahi, 2007).

### **3.5.1 During the 1990s**

In 1991, the faction controlling the former British Somaliland, the Somali National movement (SNM), extensively changed matters by declaring its independence as the republic of Somaliland. This was followed in 1998 as Puntland, the north east region of Somalia, declared itself an autonomous state in attempt to avoid the clan warfare engulfing southern Somalia (Garowe Online, 2011 and BBC News, 2011c). Unlike Somaliland, Puntland does not want recognition as an independent entity, instead it aims to be part of a federal Somalia. Map 5 Below illustrates the division of Somalia into Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia as it stands today.



### Map 5 Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia



(Source: BBC, 2010).

In 1992, the conflicts throughout Somalia had destroyed most of the country's crops, which coupled with Africa's worst drought of the century, caused widespread famine. Over half a million people died and contagious diseases spread through refugee camps inside the country. Warring militias looted food flown in by international agencies. The starvation and total breakdown of public services was publicised in the western media and pressure mounted for the UN to act. Consequently, in December 1992, the UN actively intervened sending a force of 35,000 troops in Operation Restore Hope. This briefly restored calm and fifteen warring groups convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for peace talks in 1993. General Mohamed Farrah Aidid however, believed the UN and the US were attempting to impose colonial rule on Somalia (Purvis, 1993). During the Adis Ababa peace talks Aidid said that his faction

*"no longer has any confidence in the leadership of the Secretariat of the UN...from the secretary-general downwards, they have failed time and time again to demonstrate an understanding of the intricate political problems of Somalia".* He believed UN officials to be *"too meddling, too divisive, and too secretive"* (Meisler, 1993, para. 4).

Aidid was a nationalist and believed he would not let his country become an experiment in state building by those ignorant of its political and cultural traditions (Marcus, 1995). Furthermore, these peace building negotiations were fronted by the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who had been a strong supporter of Siad Barre and who had personally ensured (some years earlier) that Aidid was deported from Egypt.

Aidid was the leader of the Habr Gedir clan, the stronger of the two groups seeking control in Mogadishu. He earned that status through toppling the dictator Siad Barre and then completely rooting out Siad's attempted comeback. The UN attempted to marginalise Aidid and create a new political system without him or the Somali National Alliance (SNA) (Peterson, 2000). This was widely resented by Aidid's large following of Somalis.

In 1992, 28,000 US troops opened fire on unarmed Somali protestors. In July 1993 a clan meeting was held at the house of an Aidid official to discuss a peace proposal from the UN's main official, Admiral Jonathan Howe. Many clan members opposed to Aidid were present when the gathering was attacked by a US mission that had been wrongly informed Aidid was inside. Religious leaders and clan elders were slaughtered in one blow and an enraged Somali crowd then killed four journalists who arrived to cover the carnage (PBS, 2013).

US troops began to target Aidid. The US backed the UN to begin "inspections" of Aidid's radio station with an aim of closing it down, while leaving the station run by his rival, Ali Mahdi. Aidid's interior minister warned the US to do so would mean war. An independent UN inquiry later deemed this decision to be "ill-advised" and the "worst time" for this activity. However, UN Pakistani troops went to the radio station and were met by an angry mob of Somalis who attacked. The special "peace" mission of the UN evaporated and this American-approved "inspection" was the largest single-day massacre of UN peacekeeping troops since 1961 (Peterson, 2000). One of the biggest atrocities of this was the dismemberment of the bodies of UN Pakistani troops (Purvis, 1993).

The UN began preparing a counterattack and the hundreds of UNISOM staff – whose mission, ironically had been to rebuild Somalia – were down to less than 50. The US put a \$25,000 bounty on the head of Aidid with the aim of arresting him to try him for war crimes (Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations, 2007). In 1993, after failed previous attempts, President Bill Clinton ordered a force of United States Army Rangers and Special Forces to capture a number of Aidid's officials in Mogadishu. The attempt failed and in one night two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and trapped with two special forces units in the centre of Mogadishu. That night 18 Americans, one Malayan troop, and more than 1,000 Somalis, most of them women and children, were killed. It was the bloodiest battle involving US troops since Vietnam and is most widely known through the 2001 American war film of Black Hawk Down. The US Somalia expedition was the largest concentration of American troops on African soil in history and Somalia received more media coverage in American media in the space of one year than any other African country in history (Kareitha and Kariithi, 2008).

Unfortunately, the situation on the ground deteriorated and in 1994 American and European units in the UN force withdrew due to the unacceptable level of casualties. The situation continued to deteriorate and in 1995, the remaining UN forces evacuated and Aidid declared himself as President of Somalia. President Aidid died of gunshot wounds in 1996. His son, Hussein Mohamed Farrah, who was a US citizen after living there for 16 years and a US marine who had served in Somalia, was selected by the Somali National Alliance (SNA) to become the new president of Somalia. He resigned his position in Cairo, Egypt following a peace process.

At the end of the 1990s, the only remotely stable region was the breakaway republic of Somaliland (Bamber, 2001). Somaliland formed a hybrid system of governance under the Constitution of Somaliland, combining traditional and western institutions. Through a series of inter-clan conferences a clan system of governance was constructed. The constitution separates the government into an executive branch, legislative branch and a judicial branch, all of which

function independently from the others. A traditional Somali council of elders that included wise men from every clan, was formed by the Somali National Movement after the fall of Siad Barre's regime. This council of elders worked with rebel leaders to set up a new government, and was incorporated into the governance structure, becoming the Parliament's House of Elders. In 2002, Somaliland transitioned to a multi-party democracy (Hersi, 2009). The elections were limited to three parties to create ideology as opposed to clan, based elections.

### **Recent Events: 2000-2010**

During 1997-2000 there was no President of Somalia as a result of civil conflict. Eventually an internationally recognised Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed in 2000-2004. The TNG faced steep opposition from the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), which was formed by rival leaders. The TNG suffered both internal threats and disruptive foreign intervention. This resulted in the replacement of the Prime Minister four times in three years and the administrative body reported bankruptcy in 2003 (Janaale Media, 2012). In 2004, an internationally supported National Reconciliation Conference resulted in the creation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia with Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as President. This replaced the TNG and was tasked with moving Somalia out of transition by August 2009 (Hanson, and Keplan, 2008).

The Islamic Courts strongly opposed the TFG and after conflict in 2006 they took control of Somalia's capital, Mogadishu (BBC News, 2006). Somalia's TFG, supported by Ethiopian troops ousted the Islamic Courts in December 2006. The involvement of Ethiopian troops created further resistance towards the TFG. The Islamic Courts leadership moved to Eritrea and in this vacuum of leadership for the resistance, Al-Shabaab through a secretive leadership began slowly taking over its control. Many Somalis joined the fight against the Ethiopian forces and few were aware of or fully understood the objectives of Al-Shabaab. During 2007, the true leaders of Al-Shabaab emerged along with their ties with Al-Qaeda (Dagne, 2011). In 2008, the US Government

designated Al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (National Counterterrorism Center, 2013).

Yusuf remained in power in Somalia until 2008 when he resigned after a fierce power struggle with his Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein who was supported by parliament after Yusuf had tried to sack him. Yusuf was a long ally to Ethiopia and a foe of Somalia's extreme Islamists in the south. His requests for Ethiopia's help in ousting the Islamists were not popular amongst many in Somalia (BBC News, 2008a). Furthermore, he always lacked support as he is from a northern based clan while Mogadishu the capital of Somalia is dominated by the southern Hawiye clan. After an interim period, Shairf Sheikh Ahmed was elected as President in 2009. Mid 2012, Ahmed's term as President of Somalia officially ended, concurrent with the conclusions of the Transitional Federal Government's mandate and the start of the Federal Government of Somalia. Ahmed was succeeded in office by the interim President General Muse Hassan Sheikh Sayid Abdulle. Shortly after, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected as President of Somalia (BBC, 2012).

Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was chosen as the first president of Puntland in 1998 by a delegation of traditional leaders for a three year term. Yusuf is from the Darod clan based in the northern Puntland region. Yusuf's term expired in 2001 after an unsuccessful bid to extend his term. Elections were held however, forces loyal to the former president refused to recognise the result and attacked and captured Garowe the capital of Puntland in late 2001. Clashes continued until 2002 when Yusuf's forces seized the last remaining stronghold and thus, had full control of Puntland. In 2004, Yusuf was elected transitional president of Somalia and as such he gave up the presidency in Puntland to Mohamed Abdi Hashi until January 2005 when Hashi lost a re-election bid in parliament to General Mohamud Muse Hersi (African Elections Database, 2010).

In March 2005, President Muse of Puntland commissioned an airport to be built in the coastal city of Bosaso, which is now complete. In April 2007, Muse held meetings with the Crown Prince of the United Arab Emirates where the

two leaders signed an agreement that established a dedicated livestock quarantine facility to enable the import of livestock from Somalia to UAE. In 2008, Muse signed several agreements with Dubai's Lootah group to support the construction of an airport, seaport and free zone in Bosaso (AMEinfo, 2007). Muse's objective was to improve prosperity, health and education services.

In January 2009, Abdirahman Mohamud Farole ran for President of Puntland in the elections and won. Farole was a previous cabinet member until a dispute with Muse over a deal with an Australian oil company – Range Resources – led to his departure to Australia in 2006. Farole expressed doubts with regard to the agreements legality and described the process as far from transparent. Despite political tensions prior to the voting, the election itself was reportedly peaceful. In an effort to improve transparency, the new president issued a first-ever '100 Days in Office report' (Omar, 2012).

In December 2009, Puntland's parliament introduced a new state flag. The top blue stripe and white centre star symbolising the Flag of Somalia. The centre white stripe representing peace and stability in the region. The bottom green stripe illustrating the natural wealth of the Puntland State of Somalia.

Despite elections and transitional governments, Somalia remains in a state of crisis, with Al-Shabaab and other militias causing constant insecurity and outbreaks of violence. The number of Somali refugees has continued to rise with estimates indicating 1,033,559 Somalis hold refugee status in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen and further afield in Europe and the United States of America. Additionally, there is an estimated 1,360,000 internally displaced people (UNHCR, 2013a) in Somalia. Somalia also has a high number of destitute people, people whose livelihoods have been completely destroyed through conflicts and natural disasters.

### **3.6. Natural disasters**

In addition to the conflicts and violence Somalia suffers from recurrent droughts and floods. During 2011, 42.9 percent of Somalia's population were victims of natural disasters, most of which were a result of droughts with four million Somali's suffering from droughts and consecutive famines (Guha-Sapir, Vos, Below and Ponserre, 2012). Somalia's erratic rainfall causes almost annual droughts, which usually then result in flash floods killing many and displacing thousands.

On the 26<sup>th</sup> December 2004 near the coast of Sumatra in Indonesia, the world's most powerful earthquake in 40 years struck. The earthquake triggered a series of large Tsunami waves across the Indian Ocean. Somalia was the worst affected country in Africa. Approximately 650 kilometres of the Somali coastline primarily between Hafun (Bari region) and Garacad (Mudug region) in the state of Puntland were severely affected (UNEP, 2005). The Tsunami resulted in the death of some 298 people, thousands of homes were destroyed and an estimated 50,000 people were displaced (Preventionweb, 2013; BBC News, 2005). Water and sanitation facilities were destroyed or contaminated, food stores swept away, roads and other infrastructure were damaged and thousands of fishing boats were lost, devastating lives and livelihoods and leaving people vulnerable, exposed and in need of emergency assistance.

Somalia has ranked first in the Failed States Index for the last five years (2007-2012) (Foreign Policy, 2012). A testament not only to the depth of the country's long-running political and humanitarian disaster, but also to the international community's inability to respond effectively. Over two decades of devastating conflicts and natural disasters have left Somalia in a state of chronic humanitarian crisis.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Methodology**

The following chapter discusses the methodological approach and its limitations adopted for this research. This chapter also covers the researcher's positionality and ethics.

#### **4.1 Introduction**

Examining the manner in which humanitarian interventions reduce vulnerability, promote resilience and build adaptive capacity in disaster prone areas can prove problematic. An evaluation approach, which has increasingly become an inherent component of humanitarian interventions, can be utilised by researchers to understand and document the realities of adaptive capacity, resilience and vulnerability of beneficiaries. Studies designed 'externally' or, detached from the intervention will experience difficulties in accessing some data sources such as programme and project documentation, key informants, stakeholders and the affected population.

An evaluation methodology was adopted to assess the extent to which ACT and NCA enhanced or impacted upon the adaptive capacity, resilience and vulnerability of the respective communities. Evaluations have become inherent to development and humanitarian operations largely for the purpose of accountability and lesson learning. Although, humanitarian organisations operating at a field level focus on evaluations less for accountability and more for lessons learnt. Evaluating humanitarian assistance like disaster research, is unique and context specific. Methodologically, evaluations have theoretical similarities, but differ in the design and execution according to the prevailing situations. Evaluations are applied research and as such, utilise findings and explanations of basic research to inform their design and implementation. This creates a number of implications primarily including philosophical and methodological challenges. Evaluations, similar to any other research, are not philosophically neutral. They are constructed upon particular assumptions




surrounding the nature of knowledge, reality and existence. Evaluators rely heavily upon existing social science research methods and methodologies for obtaining information. Hence, some commentators assert there is no single research strategy unique to evaluation research (Robson, 1993) and as such evaluations adopt methods provided in the research field. Evaluation research is distinguished from other forms of social research not through the methods evaluators employ but the purpose to which the methods are put (Babbie, 1995). It is accepted practice, however, that evaluations rarely directly address the issue of 'policy correctness'. This is a failing that will not be allowed in academic review of policy concern.

This chapter is devoted to the discussion of evaluation as a methodology for assessing lessons that can be learnt from humanitarian interventions in their attempts to address adaptive capacity, resilience and vulnerability. This chapter commences with an exploration of the concept, evolution and types of evaluation.

The discussion of evaluation methodology firstly explores the main types of evaluation – formative, summative and process. This is followed by an overview of evaluation models including, goal-based, goal-free and criteria-based models. This study used the summative evaluation with the analysis based on the criteria model to establish the extent to which humanitarian interventions addressed adaptive capacity, resilience and vulnerability. Figure 5 summarises the methodological structure of the study. This chapter then proceeds to examine the philosophical underpinnings that guided this research. The quantitative and qualitative paradigms are discussed in relation to their relevance to the evaluations. Finally, the fieldwork methods and techniques including the associated limitations of each of the case studies are detailed.

**Figure 5 Methodological Structure of Evaluating Humanitarian Interventions**



(Source: Author).

## 4.2 The Evolution of Evaluation

Scriven (1991) describes evaluation as a new discipline but an ancient practice (Scriven, 1991). It is probably the most common form of reasoning used by people and all humans are nascent evaluators (Mathison, 2005). In terms of the evolution of the human race, evaluation is possibly the most important activity that has allowed us to evolve, develop, and survive in an ever-changing environment. Each time we attempt something new – a farming method, a manufacturing process, a medical treatment, a social change programme, a policy, or a new information system – it is important to consider its value (Davidson, 2004). Shadish and Luellen (2005) claim that Chapter One in the Book of Daniel in the Bible's Old Testament describes a quasi-experiment evaluation that sought to establish the effects of a Hebrew versus a Babylonian diet on health (Scriven, 1991).

It was not until the late 20<sup>th</sup> Century however, that the concept of evaluation became popularised. According to Guba and Lincoln (1989), the first published educational research that could be associated with the 'field' of evaluation is Rice's (1987) 'The Futility of the Spelling Grind' research study. Stufflebeam *et al.* (2000) believed the rise of scientific management during the 1920s in order to improve efficiency and productivity witnessed a subsequent increase in use of evaluations in an effort to control the labour process. Tyler's 1942 study on curriculum improvement however, provided the most significant example of evaluation as an emerging distinct mode of inquiry (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). There appears consensus amongst the evaluation literature that Tylers research was the starting point of programme evaluation as we perceive it today (Kenny, 2007).

Evaluation as a mode of inquiry within social sciences has gradually gained acceptance as a legitimate 'research design' process (Sarantakos, 1998). It has largely been categorised as 'applied research', which focuses upon programme, policy issues and problem solving as opposed to basic research that aims to make a substantive, original contribution to knowledge (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2004; and Kenny, 2007). The literature portrays the

emergence of evaluation as a mode of specific inquiry to be located in the 1960s. The development of an array of social programmes and extensive financial investments as a consequence of the 'great society' strategy pursued in the USA aimed at dismantling poverty warranted increased accountability. Subsequently, many of these programmes received allocated funding for evaluations (Cracknell, 2000; Shadish and Luellen, 2005; Guba and Lincoln, 1989, Patton, 1997 and Pawson and Tilley, 2001).

On the development aid front, it was not until the late 1970s that evaluation became an integral component for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) programmes. Development aid budgets and activities were increasing, which generated a need for more systematic audits and accountability. Financial audits evolved into performance audits that in turn evolved into impact and learning focused evaluations (World Bank, no date). On the professional front, methods and theories were as diverse as the professions themselves. In the majority of cases sociologists and psychologists conducted experimental evaluations, educators focused on testing during evaluations, anthropologists used qualitative methods while those from management used management information systems (Shadish and Luellen, 2005).

During the 1970s and 1980s humanitarian organisations were largely exempt from serious evaluation or critical analysis (Crisp, 2000). However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the ability to deliver aid in increasingly complex environments; the greater absorption of public and private funding by humanitarian organisations; and increasing ability of the international media to document such emergencies placed growing pressure on the humanitarian system to deliver results and demonstrate accountability. This pressure erupted in 1994 during the Rwandan crisis, which saw the largest humanitarian effort at that time fail to respond adequately or timely both before and during the genocide (Sphere Project, 2006). In order to examine the failings of the humanitarian response an evaluation team was established – the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR). With 52 researchers and a cost of over a million dollars, a five-volume evaluation

report was produced. Whilst the Rwanda evaluation was somewhat unique in scale, its approach presented a new standard of good practice in evaluating humanitarian assistance (Crisp, 2000). Evaluations of humanitarian efforts have since become common practice and have attracted unprecedented levels of donor funding and agency commitment, as well as public and political interest.

The Active Learning Network of Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) was established in the mid-1990s as a result of the growing number of humanitarian evaluations and a need to demonstrate accountability. ALNAP maintains the most comprehensive evaluations database with over 1,100 evaluation reports, lessons studies, synthesis reports and good practice studies (ALNAP, 2013). This database however, does not illustrate the extent of growth in humanitarian evaluations as it is by no means exhaustive and relies on member and non-member organisations submitting their evaluation reports.

Evaluation has experienced phenomenal growth in recent years and is amongst the fastest growing disciplines in the world (Cracknell, 2000). The growth of evaluation is manifest in the increasing number of evaluation societies, journals, conferences, workshops, training sessions and number of evaluations themselves (Guba and Lincoln, 1982; Cracknell, 2000; O'Keefe *et al.*, 2002). The Americas, Africa, Asia and Europe all now have their own evaluation societies and evaluation societies are continuing to grow and emerge in various countries throughout the world such as the UK, Germany, France, Afghanistan, Australia, Malaysia, Nigeria and South Africa (OECD/DAC, 2011). The growth in evaluations confirms their increasing importance to informing policy and programming.

Evaluation as applied research has long been accepted by scholars including Weiss (1972), Clarke (1999), Shaw (1999), Cracknell (2000) and Patton (2002). The use of the terms 'research', 'applied inquiry', 'systematic collection of information' and 'assessment' denotes that evaluation is a type of applied research that centres upon practical challenges and issues faced by

societies and how these could be addressed (Patton, 2002; Clarke, 1999). Evaluation determines the merit, worth, or value of things. The evaluation process identifies relevant values or standards that apply to what is being evaluated; performs empirical investigation using techniques from the social sciences; and then integrates conclusions with the standards into an overall evaluation or set of evaluations (Scriven, 1991).

Social science research, by contrast, does not aim for or achieve evaluative conclusions. It is restricted to empirical (rather than evaluative) research, and bases its conclusions only on factual results – that is, observed, measured, or calculated data. Social science research does not establish standards or values and then integrate them with factual results to reach evaluative conclusions (Scriven, 2004). Fournier (2005) asserts conclusions made in evaluations encompass both an empirical aspect (that something is the case) and a normative aspect (judgement about the value of something). It is this value feature that distinguishes evaluation from other types of enquiry such as basic research, clinical epidemiology or investigative journalism (*ibid*).

#### **4.3 Definition of Evaluation**

*“Evaluation’ is a multi-faceted concept. It is used in a ‘myriad of contexts, settings and circumstances”* (Clarke, 1999, p. 1). Table 2 provides a list of definitions of evaluation, although, this list is by no means exhaustive. The majority of definitions view evaluation as a deliberate and systematic process of collecting information about an ongoing or completed programme or project. Evaluations are used as a foundation for making judgements about project or programme outcomes, informing policies, and the design and implementation of future programmes. In the context of disasters and humanitarian interventions, evaluation is used to *“improve future aid policy programmes and projects through feedback of lessons learned [and] to provide a basis of accountability, including the provision of information to the public”* (Poletti, 2004, p. 8).

**Table 2 Definitions of Evaluation**

Source	Definition
ALNAP (2006, p. 14)	<i>“Systematic and impartial examination of humanitarian action intended to draw lessons to improve policy and practice and enhance accountability”.</i>
European Commission (2010, p. 5)	Evaluation is the <i>“judgement of interventions according to their results, impacts and needs they aim to satisfy”</i> . The key notion in this definition is that it is a process that <i>culminates in a judgement (or assessment)</i> of an intervention. Moreover, the focus of evaluation is first and foremost on <i>the needs, results and impacts</i> of an intervention.
Fournier (2005, p. 139)	<i>“Evaluation is an applied inquiry process for collecting and synthesising evidence that culminates in conclusions about state of affairs, value, merit, worth, significance, or quality of a programme, product, person, policy, proposal or plan”.</i>
OECD-DAC 1991, p.5)	<i>“An evaluation is an assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfillment of objectives, developmental efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision- making process of both recipients and donors”.</i>
Scriven (1991, p. 1)	<i>“Evaluation is the process of determining the merit, worth and value of things, and evaluations are the product of that process”.</i>
Patton (2002, p. 10)	<i>“Programme evaluation is the systematic collection of information about activities, characteristics, and outcomes of programmes to make judgements about programmes, improve programme effectiveness, and or/inform decisions about future programming”.</i>
Stufflebeam (2001, p. 11).	<i>“A study designed to assist some audience to assess an object’s merit and worth”.</i>

**Table 2 Definitions of Evaluation Continued**

UNDP (2002, p. 6)	<i>“Evaluation is a selective exercise that attempts to systematically and objectively assess progress towards and the achievement of an outcome. Evaluation is not a one-time event, but an exercise involving assessments of differing scope and depth carried out at several points in time in response to evolving needs for evaluative knowledge and learning during the effort to achieve an outcome”.</i>
Weiss (1972) as quoted in Clarke (1999, p. 1-2)	<i>“Evaluation is a type of policy research, designed to help people make wise choices about future programming. Evaluation does not aim to replace decision makers’ experiences and judgement, but rather offers systematic evidence that informs experience and judgement. Evaluation strives for impartiality and fairness. At best, it strives to represent the range of perspectives of those who have a stake in the programme”.</i>
WFP (2008a, p. 6)	<i>An Evaluation “is an assessment that is as systematic and impartial as possible. It focuses on expected and actual accomplishments, examining the results chain, processes, contextual factors and causality to understand achievements or the lack thereof. It aims to determine the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of WFPs activities, operations, strategies and policies, and their contribution to the development and humanitarian processes of countries that receive WFP assistance”.</i>

(Source: Author)

#### **4.3.1 Accountability and Lesson Learning**

Evaluations often originated due to a need for accountability as demonstrated by the 1960s US Government investments in social programmes and the Rwandan Genocide. The Development Assistance Committee defines accountability as an

*“Obligation to demonstrate that work has been conducted in compliance with agreed rules and/or plans. This may require a careful, even legally defensible, demonstration that the work is consistent with the contract terms” (DAC, 2002, p. 15).*



In humanitarian evaluations, programme managers, staff, decision makers and politicians are accountable to communities, citizens, service users, tax payers, advocacy groups, relevant professions, international organisations and donors (OECD/DAC, 1991; Rogers, 2005). According to Rogers (2005), the common form of accountability focuses on meeting targets, outcomes or outputs. Discrepancies are reported between targets and performance to funders with the assumption the information will inform subsequent policy decisions.

The very definition and meaning of evaluating humanitarian assistance creates what Cracknell (2000) refers to as the 'accountability/lesson learning' dichotomy. Cracknell and other authors have highlighted there is an essential tension between these two objectives. Accountability focuses on questions relating to whether humanitarian assistance works or is effective and accountability related concerns in evaluations underlie the interest of donors, governments and the media – all of whom have a justifiable interest in ensuring that aid money is spent effectively and responsibly. Lesson learning however, is focused on understanding why particular activities are more or less successful to improve the effectiveness of future humanitarian relief activities and as such it requires a different evaluation approach (ALNAP, 2001).

This tension is significant because evaluations designed to meet one objective will be of limited use in satisfying the other. In deciding upon a framework for evaluations in humanitarian crises, it is thus necessary to decide which objective is of primary interest, or to accept that different evaluations can and should have a different focus with respect to accountability and lesson learning. In either case, it is necessary to be clear from the outset when designing an evaluation which objective is of primary importance (Poletti, 2004). Patton (1997) stresses who an evaluation is for, and how an evaluation will be used should drive the entire evaluation process from the initial commissioning, through to the execution of the evaluation itself, the analysis and report writing stage, and to the dissemination of the report and subsequent follow-up. Agencies involved in the delivery of

humanitarian relief and indeed this research are focused on lesson learning, as it is vital to improve performance and increase the impact of humanitarian activities.

*“Experience reflected upon is the handmaiden of progress. Evaluation is an integral part of individual and institutional learning. By doing, evaluating and doing again we learn to do better”* (Jean Quesnel, Chairman of the DAC Expert Group on Aid Evaluation, 1993, p. 3).

Terms such as ‘lessons learned’ and ‘informed judgements’ are common themes among the definitions in Table 2, which denotes the role of evaluation in providing lessons for future programmes through feedback (OECD/DAC, 1991). The Development Assistance Committee defines lessons learned as

*“Generalizations based on evaluation experiences with projects, programs, or policies that abstract from the specific circumstances to broader situations. Frequently, lessons highlight strengths or weaknesses in preparation, design, and implementation that affect performance, outcome, and impact”* (DAC, 2002, p. 26).

A key aspect is absent from this definition – there is a focus on the attributes of the ‘lesson’ but not about the process by which it may, eventually, be used. In this sense, they are ‘lessons learned from experience’, as opposed to ‘lessons applied’. Most evaluation professionals would probably acknowledge that their lessons are under-utilised. Spilsbury *et al.* (2007) highlights two key problems underlying this observation: 1) lessons are poorly formulated (low quality); and 2) processes to promote dissemination and uptake of lessons are weak.

A high quality lesson should; succinctly specify the context from which it is derived, establish its relevance beyond that context (where it will be applied and by whom) and suggest some prescription or action. Although lessons are derived from a specific situation, they are intended to have wider relevance. Lessons however, are often regarded as one-off findings that lack supporting

information from other sources (Spilsbury, *et al.* 2007). Lessons that are supported by triangulated evidence command greater credibility among their potential users.

*“The more rigorous the supporting evidence, and the greater the triangulation of supporting sources, the more confidence one has in the significance and meaningfulness of a lesson learned”* (Patton and Millet 1998, p. 14).

Clearly, producing high-quality lessons is necessary but not sufficient to maximise their potential utility. Relying on passive dissemination approaches, for example, by simple dissemination of evaluation reports, is a common but not very effective method of promoting their uptake. As a result, many lessons are destined to be archived in under utilised databases or to languish, unheeded in evaluation reports. Greater emphasis on enhancing the credibility and building the ‘ownership’ of lessons is required. A variety of complementary communication and ‘outreach’ processes are needed to enhance the uptake of lessons by their intended users (Spilsbury *et al.* 2007).

When conducting a lesson learning evaluation it is essential to understand how lessons learned will be used and the extent to which policies and programmes can be influenced. The evaluator and commissioning agency must have a mutual understanding of how lessons learned will be used to drive and focus the evaluation but also to ensure the evaluation results are used effectively. The researcher undertook lengthy discussions with each of the commissioning agencies for this study to ensure seeking and utilising lessons learned were a key objective of each agency; to understand how lessons learned would be used; and how lessons would be fed back to recipients or beneficiaries of the interventions at the local level.

Lessons learned tend to be policy, programme or project oriented in the form of ‘recommendations’. Hence, the focus is often in building the capacity of donors and humanitarian agencies in designing policies and programmes whilst the capacity, resilience or vulnerability of beneficiaries is of peripheral importance, if not of little relevance (Kaiser, 2002 and Hallam, 1998). The

objectives of humanitarian evaluation have hitherto related predominantly to institutional priorities. According to Kaiser (2002) there has been no consideration that beneficiaries might have a role other than as recipients of improved assistance or that there might be value in the evaluation process for beneficiary populations. Involving beneficiaries in the evaluation of humanitarian assistance programmes implies that evaluation objectives are wider than a straightforward attempt to measure programme outputs. Any meaningful evaluation of assistance programmes requires analysis of both the socio-political economy inhabited by those affected by complex emergencies and the survival strategies they employ. Without beneficiary input, evaluation becomes counterproductive (*ibid.*).

Evaluation purpose ranges from lessons learnt for the implementing agency to accountability, including fiscal accountability to the donor. These might be referred to as evaluations for internal purposes and evaluations for external purposes. In the uptake of evaluation especially evaluative capacity within organisations, the tendency has been to establish a purpose that is internal i.e. lessons learnt rather than external accountability.

#### **4.4 Evaluative Criteria**

Among the most widely used definitions of evaluation in the humanitarian sector is the OECD/DAC (1991) definition, which defines evaluation as an assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learnt into the decision-making process of recipients, implementing organisations and donors. In order to establish and gather credible and usable information, evaluation criteria are employed to focus and guide the researcher. Criteria are a central element of any evaluation, whether they are determined at the beginning of the evaluation or emerge during the evaluation process (Davidson, 2004).

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (2011), a criterion is a principle or

standard by which something may be judged or decided. Lacey (2003, p. 71) defines criteria as “*something providing a conclusive way of knowing whether something exists or whether a word is used correctly*”.

The concept of criteria evolves from the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 – 1951), which drew wide philosophical interest although, what Wittgenstein precisely meant by criteria was, and remains disputed (Wellman, 1962 and Lacey, 2003). In evaluations, criteria are used in a rather looser way to include indicators of success or merit (Scriven, 1991). Davidson (2004) states one of the most important activities in establishing a sound evaluation is identifying the evaluative criteria. Using goals or targets to measure performance provides some information but falls short of enabling an evaluator to draw valid conclusions about how well a project or programme is operating (*ibid.*)

During 1991, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD set out broad principles for the evaluation process for DAC members. These principles were refined into five criteria that have been widely utilised in the evaluation of development initiatives – efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and relevance (OECD-DAC, 2000). These criteria were later adapted for evaluation of complex emergencies (OECD-DAC, 1999) to become a set of seven criteria, which are illustrated within Table 2. These criteria have become central to the evaluation of humanitarian action (ALNAP, 2006) and as such, are the criteria adopted for this research. Impact and sustainability are often grouped together however, for the purpose of the evaluations within this research they were believed to each add value and are therefore, illustrated as separate criteria within Table 3.

**Table 3 Evaluation Criteria**

<b>Criterion</b>	<b>Definition</b>	<b>Main Use<sup>8</sup></b>
<b>Relevance or Appropriateness</b>	Relevance is concerned with assessing whether the project is in line with local needs and priorities (as well as donor policy). Appropriateness is the tailoring of humanitarian activities to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability and cost-effectiveness accordingly.	All evaluation types except those with a mainly institutional focus.
<b>Connectedness</b>	Connectedness refers to the need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account.	Evaluations assessing institutional structures and partnerships.
<b>Coherence</b>	The need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is consistency and, in particular, that all policies take into account humanitarian and human-rights considerations.	Joint evaluations, large-scale evaluations and those with a focus on policy.
<b>Coverage</b>	The need to reach major population groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are.	All evaluation types except those with a mainly institutional focus.

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<sup>8</sup> All of the criteria will be useful in most evaluations to some extent however, this column selects evaluation types where each criterion will be particularly useful (ALNAP, 2006).

**Table 3 Evaluation Criteria Continued**

<b>Efficiency</b>	Efficiency measures the outputs – qualitative and quantitative – achieved as a result of inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving an output, to see whether the most efficient approach has been used.	All evaluation types where adequate financial information is available.
<b>Effectiveness</b>	Effectiveness measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criterion of effectiveness is timeliness.	Single-sector or single-agency evaluations.
<b>Impact</b>	Impact looks at the wider effects of the project – social, economic, technical, and environmental – on individuals, gender- and age-groups, communities and institutions. Impacts can be intended and unintended, positive and negative, macro (sector) and micro (household).	Multi-sector, multi- agency evaluations; joint evaluations; sector-wide evaluations.
<b>Sustainability</b>	The extent to which the objectives of an activity will continue (to be reached) after the project assistance is over’.	All evaluation types.

(Source: Adapted from ALNAP, 2006).

Sustainability is not included within the ALNAP list of evaluation criteria. However, based on the researchers experience of conducting evaluations of humanitarian assistance, sustainability is a valuable criteria and one that most donors or agencies contracting evaluations request to be included. Hence, sustainability has been added to the list of evaluation criteria for this research.

To ensure credibility, evaluators and evaluations must uphold certain principles. These key principles are detailed in Table 4.

**Table 4 Evaluation Principles**

<b>Principle</b>	<b>Explanation</b>
<b>Independence and impartiality</b>	Independence, objectivity and impartiality of evaluators and the evaluation process provides the credibility and legitimacy to the evaluation: The evaluation process should be independent and impartial with regard to the activities evaluated and free from any pressure or influence that evaluators may receive. Impartiality enhances the credibility of evaluation and avoids bias, and independence provides legitimacy and helps to reduce the potential for conflicts of interest. The evaluation process should be independent from programme/project delivery and the management of the activities being evaluated. The requirement for independence and impartiality must transcend all stages of the evaluation process including planning, the selection of the evaluation team, conducting the evaluation, formulation of findings and recommendations, and review and finalisation of the report.
<b>Integrity and Honesty</b>	Evaluators must show honesty, integrity, objectivity and fairness in the entire evaluation process. Evaluators should not misrepresent their findings or views of those they interview. Evaluators should not receive any instructions, pressure, or influences from any person, which may distort the objective findings, analysis or conclusions of the evaluation.



**Table 4 Evaluation Principles Continued**

<b>Respect for People</b>	Evaluators respect the rights, security, privacy, dignity and self-worth of respondents, programme participants and other stakeholders. Evaluators must abide by current professional ethics and standards regarding risks that might be engendered to those participating in the evaluation; regarding informed consent for participating in the evaluation; and regarding informing participants about the scope and limits of confidentiality.
<b>Accountability</b>	Evaluators are accountable for the results of the evaluation and for the advice they provide.
<b>Professional Objectivity</b>	Evaluators should maintain professional objectivity when conducting the evaluation. Objectivity is required at all the processes of the evaluation. Evaluators should endeavor to attain the maximum level of objectivity when carrying out evaluations. Conclusions of the evaluations should strictly be based on the factual data and evidence that is collected in a balanced manner. Evaluators should employ an evaluation methodology that allows the collection of data/information, in such a manner that would lead to the most objective analysis and conclusions. In this regard, evaluators should take due account of the need for balance in the regional, gender and other interest groups whose views are reflected in the evaluation exercise.
<b>Neutrality</b>	Evaluators must not further a particular political or religious standpoint nor act as instruments of government foreign policy. Evaluators must portray an objective image of disaster situations.

(Source: Adapted from IFRC, 2011; OECD-DAC, 1991; and UNDOC, no date).

The use of the terms 'impartiality', 'fairness' and 'credibility' denotes how rigorous the methodology should be and as such these values and the key

principles in Table 4 were upheld throughout this research.

#### **4.4.1 Formative evaluation**

Often referred to as a mid-term, real-time, ongoing or intermediate evaluation (Cracknell, 2000), formative evaluation focuses on the process of new programmes. Scriven (1991:168-169) views formative evaluation as typically conducted during the development or improvement of a programme or product. According to ECHO (1999), it is an analysis of the performance of a programme or project during implementation. The focus is on the relevance of its operational objectives relative to its overall objectives, and on matters relating to implementation and management. It describes what the intervention has achieved and what its initial effects have been, using information available. Intermediate evaluation can play a significant role in feeding back to stakeholders, particularly local institutions and communities including for example, aspects that may warrant urgent attention rather than waiting until the end of a project or for a summative evaluation. Europa (2009) explains as a change oriented evaluation approach, formative evaluation is especially attuned to assessing in an ongoing way, any discrepancies between the expected direction and outputs of the programme and what is occurring in reality; analysing strengths and weaknesses; uncovering obstacles, barriers or unexpected opportunities; and identifying midcourse corrections that will enhance the likelihood of the programme's success.

In the context of humanitarian interventions, formative evaluations seek to provide immediate feedback to the delivery agency regarding the status of project activities so where necessary project revisions can be implemented. It provides an important opportunity to assess the project's progress in meeting its objectives while at the same time identifying opportunities to improve. The inter-agency real-time evaluation of the humanitarian response to the Darfur crisis, for example, recommended actions that could be taken to improve the operational response through lessons learnt during the initial phases of the response (Broughton, Maguire, and David-Toweh, 2006).

Patton (2002) views the purpose of formative evaluation as that of forming or shaping a specific policy, programme, group of staff or product without an attempt to generalise findings beyond the setting in which the evaluation occurs. Formative evaluations are analytic (Scriven, 1991) in nature and are designed to produce qualitative and quantitative data and insights during the early phase of an intervention. This includes an assessment of the feasibility of programme implementation; the appropriateness of content, methods, materials, media, and instruments; and the immediate behavioural impact for a defined population. Patton (2002) goes on to assert that formative evaluations tend to rely heavily on qualitative rather than quantitative methods focusing on processes, case studies and implementation.

Formative evaluations are normally conducted by internal or external evaluators or preferably a combination of both (Scriven, 1991). Local stakeholders and beneficiaries are generally involved in most humanitarian evaluations albeit they are rarely used to select evaluative criteria or execute evaluations.

#### **4.4.2 Summative evaluation**

Programme evaluation traces its modern beginnings to the educational testing work of Thorndike and colleagues in the early 1900s and later became referred to as summative evaluation in 1967 by Michael Scriven (Stufflebeam, 1974 and Henry, 2005). Programme evaluation originally focused on measuring the achievement of goals and objectives. Hence, programme evaluation was utilised to establish whether a programme is effective. It is the systematic collection of information about the activities, processes, characteristics, and outcomes of programmes to make judgments about the programme, improve programme effectiveness and/or inform decisions about future programming (Patton, 2002). Programme or summative evaluation contrasts with formative evaluation, which focuses on methods of improving and enhancing programmes rather than rendering definitive judgements about effectiveness (*ibid.*). Also referred to as ex-post or maturity evaluations, they are conducted after the completion of a programme or between phases for

on-going programmes (Cracknell, 2000). Furthermore, summative evaluations are conducted for the benefit of some external audience such as a funding agency, head office or future users (Scriven, 1991).

Both case studies within this research, Act and NCA, fall into the summative evaluation category, as they were end of phases for ongoing programmes. The beneficiaries of the evaluations in the case of this research are mainly the funders and implementing agencies. Summative evaluation is largely concerned with a programme's overall effectiveness and involves the assessment of anticipated (or unanticipated) results or outcomes of a programme. For credibility and impartiality reasons, summative evaluations are normally conducted by a mixture of both internal and external evaluators (Scriven, 1991).

Scriven (1991) warns that summative evaluation should not be confused with outcome evaluation. Summative evaluation focuses on both the process and the outcomes while outcome evaluation focuses on the outcomes. However, as outcomes are examined as part of summative evaluations, this research treats outcome evaluation as a type of summative evaluation.

#### **4.4.2.1 Process Evaluation**

A focus on process involves examining how something happens rather than or in addition to assessing outputs and outcomes. Evaluations vary in their emphasis on process in part as programmes vary in their attention to process. Qualitative inquiry is highly appropriate for studying process because:

- Depicting process requires detailed descriptions of how people engage with each other;
- The experience of process typically varies for different people so their experiences need to be captured in their own words;
- Process is fluid and dynamic so it can not be fairly summarised on a single rating scale at one point in time; and
- Participants' perceptions are a key process consideration.

(Patton, 2002).

Process evaluations aim at elucidating and understanding the internal dynamics of how a programme, organisation or relationship operates. A process evaluation requires sensitivity to both qualitative and quantitative changes in programmes throughout their development, which typically means monitoring and describing the details of the programme's implementation. Process evaluations examine formal activities and anticipated outcomes however, they also investigate informal patterns and unanticipated interactions (ibid). Understanding processes and their impacts were an important component to this research and therefore a combination of summative and process evaluation were employed.

Evaluating impacts can be a complicated exercise; what to count as an impact can be purely objective or subjective. Hence, a clear understanding of what constitutes an outcome or impact must firstly be considered, as one of the key design issues. Box 3 summarises the steps of an impact or outcome evaluation.

### Box 3 Steps of an Impact Evaluation

**Identification:** Noting whatever changes (impacts) have taken place that can be attributed to the intervention. Impacts include short or long-term; proximal or distal; primary or secondary; intended or unintended; positive or negative; and singular, multiple or hierarchical which can be measured at individual, organisational, community levels and policy or governmental levels. Impacts can also be categorised as: technical, economic, socio-cultural, institutional and environmental impacts.

**Measurement:** Trying to quantify or assess the significance of the changes (impacts). Participatory research methods will generally be more appropriate for this purpose.

**Attribution:** Trying to establish causes of the changes, especially the extent to which they can be attributed to the intervention.

**Assessment:** Drawing together all the threads, and forming judgement on the impacts in relation to aid input: making recommendations for future aid activities of a similar kind.

(Source: Adapted from Cracknell (2000, p.240).

Mark (2005) views outcomes or impacts as changes, results, and impacts that are short or long-term; proximal or distal; primary or secondary; intended or unintended; positive or negative; and singular, multiple or hierarchical that can be measured at individual, organisational, community and policy or governmental levels:

- Individual or household level: outcomes can include changes in attitudes, knowledge, skills, daily routines and livelihood strategies while at the organisational level changes can affect policies, practices and capacity.
- Community level: outcomes can include changes in the way communities self-organise for example, in food for work programmes and school feeding programmes to improve school attendance.
- Implementing agency, donor or government level: laws, regulations, policies or funding streams can be altered to ensure sustainability and

support for policies and programmes.

Since outcome or impact evaluation focuses on effects, results or consequences, the key methodology focuses on the determination of causation. In the context of this research, establishing causation simply entails the evaluator determining the relationship between a policy, process, action or resource that is believed to somehow generate an outcome.

#### **4.5 Evaluation Models**

The use of models, also referred to as approaches (Stufflebeam, 2001), has long been recognised in the evaluation field. A model is a simplified or generalised description or representation of reality. The term 'model' is loosely used to refer to a conception or approach or sometimes a method of doing evaluation (Scriven, 1991). Evaluation models provide a framework and structure; offer guidance about the appropriate steps to follow in design; provide direction in dealing with stakeholders; and identify the important issues to consider in undertaking a study. Models provide frameworks, in which evaluators and evaluation users identify and distinguish amongst alternative approaches (Patton, 2002). Numerous academics and researchers have categorised a wide variety of evaluation models (Guba and Lincoln, 1981; Hansen, 2005; Patton, 2002; Shaw, 1999; Stufflebeam, 2001) and the following section explores three models that are common in the evaluation literature: (1) goal-based; (2) goal-free; and (3) criteria-based.

##### **4.5.1 Goal-based evaluation**

Both case studies within this research comprised elements of measuring the extent to which programme and project goals were achieved. A goal may be thought of as a deliberate statement of an intended outcome of a particular programme and operationalised into measurable objectives (Tucker, 2005). Hence, goal-based evaluations measure the extent to which a programme or intervention has achieved clear and specific objectives (Patton, 2002).

Tyler (1949) developed the idea of goal-based evaluation through his work

*Basic Principles in Curriculum and Instruction*. He explained the need to focus on the degree to which objectives are realised (Stufflebeam, Madaus and Kallaghan, 2000). The basic strategy of this approach is to measure if predefined goals are fulfilled or not; to what extent; and how. The approach is deductive and often related to harder measurable goals. This supports the traditional understanding of goal-based evaluations that generally concentrates on technical and economic aspects rather than human and social aspects.

Goals can also be of social or human character. Both case studies within this research largely pertain to social and human goals. Patton (2002) argues that what is measured depends on the character of the goals. Either a quantitative or a qualitative approach could be adopted as there is no imperative relationship between a goal-based approach, and a quantitative process. The fulfillment of these types of goals is preferably expressed in qualitative terms. The qualitative process enables a description of how the goals are fulfilled. Thus, a qualitative approach aims at establishing detailed descriptions. The goal-based evaluation, however, was not selected for this research as it lacks indicators of success or merits interpretation in adaptive capacity, resilience or vulnerability terms, which this research could found itself upon.

#### **4.5.2 Goal-free evaluation**

First proposed by Michael Scriven in the 1970s, the goal-free model implies undertaking fieldwork and gathering data on a broad array of actual effects or outcomes. The aim is to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of searching for 'actual effects' of what is to be evaluated (Patton, 2002). The basic strategy of this approach is inductive and holistic aimed at countering the logic-deductive limitation inherent in the goal-based model. In resilience oriented evaluations, as in the case of ACT and NCA, the actual effects may include the capacity of local institutions and communities enhanced by the project, and measures put in place to enable communities to implement the learning experiences. These are then compared with the observed and the actual needs of programme participants. The goal-free model adopts an



interpretative approach, which is relevant to the case studies within this research. Involving a wide range of stakeholder groups is an essential element and as such this approach is likely to capture unintended effects to inform capacity, resilience and vulnerability programming. The goal-free model was not a logical choice. The major weakness is that the evaluator deliberately attempts to avoid all rhetoric related to programme goals; no discussion about goals is held with staff; no programme documentation is reviewed; only the programme's outcomes and measurable effects are studied. This can also prove a practical obstacle where time or resources for the evaluation are short. The assumption in this study was that the evaluation process can also contribute to the humanitarian interventions through involving the implementers and the targeted communities to learn from both the process and the outcomes of the evaluation. Both case studies involved staff, stakeholders and community members in the evaluation processes.

#### **4.5.3 Criteria-based evaluation**

Criteria have become a central element to any evaluation and both case studies within this research were subject to criteria-based evaluations. Most humanitarian evaluations are assessed using the OECD/DAC criteria as discussed in Table 2 to determine the relevance/appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, connectedness, coherence, coverage, impact and sustainability of the intervention.

Criteria-based approaches include checklists, principles or quality ideals and these are grounded in, and derived from, one or more specific perspectives or theories. Patton (2002) identifies five contrasting sets of criteria for judging the quality of evaluation studies:

1. Traditional scientific;
2. Social constructivist;
3. Artistic and evocative;
4. Critical change; and
5. Standards and principles criteria.

These are explained further within Table 5.

**Table 5 Alternative Criteria for Judging the Quality of Evaluation Studies**

<b>Traditional scientific (positivist)</b>	<b>Social constructivist (relativist)</b>	<b>Artistic and evocative</b>	<b>Critical change criteria (neo-Marxist, some feminist)</b>	<b>Evaluation standards and principles</b>
Objectivity (attempts to minimise bias)	Subjectivity acknowledged and embraced	Opens the world to us in some way	Critical perspectives - increases consciousness of injustice	Utility – if not useful to some audience, then no point in doing it
Validity of the data	Trustworthiness and authenticity – fairness and coverage of others' perspectives	Creativity; Aesthetic quality; Interpretive vitality	Identifies nature and sources of inequalities and injustice	Feasibility – if not practically or politically do- able then no point
Systematic rigour of fieldwork practices	Triangulation (for capturing multiple perspectives)	Flows from self - embedded in lived experience	Represents the perspective of the less powerful	Propriety – fair and ethical
Triangulation (for consistency of findings)	Reflexivity and praxis - understanding one's background and how to act in the world	Stimulating; Provocative	Portrays the ways those with power exercise and benefit from this power	Accuracy

**Table 5 Alternative Criteria for Judging the Quality of Evaluation Studies  
Continued**

Reliability of coding and pattern analysis (multiple coders)	Particularity – doing justice to unique cases	Connects and moves the audience	Engages those with less power respectfully and collaboratively	Systematic inquiry
Correspondence of findings to reality	Contributions to dialogue – encouraging multiple perspectives.	Voice is distinct and expressive	Builds capacity of those involved to take action	Integrity/honesty and respect for people
Strength of evidence supporting causal hypotheses		Feels ‘true’, ‘authentic’ and real’	Identifies potential change - making strategies	Responsibility to general public welfare
Generalisability		Case studies become literary works, blurring of boundaries	Clear historical and values context	
Contributions to theory.		Opens the world to us in some way	Consequential or catalytic validity	

(Adapted from Jones and Sumner, 2007 originally in Patton, 2002)

The evaluator adopted a range of the traditional scientific, social constructivist and critical change criteria. The evaluator strives for causal explanations and generalisability that can be used in combination with qualitative approaches such as the grounded theory adopted for both case studies within this

research. Proponents of the social and constructivist criteria view the world as socially, politically and psychologically constructed and are interested in understanding specific cases within a specific context, rather than in hypothesising generalisations and causes across time and space. The researcher acknowledges the subjectivity of the research and strives for trustworthiness and authenticity. The researcher applies reflexivity and triangulation to capture multiple perspectives. The researcher represents the perspective of the less powerful and engages those with less power respectfully and collaboratively. The researcher also builds capacity of those involved and identifies potential change making strategies.

#### **4.6 Philosophical challenges**

Humanitarian evaluations can be conducted at any stage of a project for the purposes of accountability and lesson learning. As applied research, evaluation aims to produce information to account for the resources used and also contribute to knowledge to reduce failure to future programmes (Clarke, 1999). The evaluation of humanitarian action does not possess a methodology of its own. It relies on social science methodology. This steers itself towards philosophical questions that are dominant in social science research for example, what is an evaluation, is it a science or art; and what constitutes as knowledge in evaluations. These questions are important if lessons learnt from humanitarian evaluations are to contribute knowledge towards reducing vulnerability and building adaptive capacity and disaster resilience.

The methodology for humanitarian evaluations has emerged from the methods for development evaluations, which has grown since the 1970s. The design and implementation of evaluations are based on certain assumptions regarding the nature of knowledge, reality and existence. Clarke (1999) identifies several key elements to knowledge construction. Firstly, there are issues surrounding methods, such as, which techniques and analytical procedures are the most appropriate to use for collecting data, *“different methods may produce contradictory results when applied to the same*

*evaluation problem” (ibid., p. 35).*

Additionally, there are considerations of general methodology that relate to the overall logic of inquiry and cover the general principles through which research tools and techniques are applied. Finally, there are issues regarding ontology that are concerned with the nature of reality and there are questions of epistemology that are connected to knowing and the nature and limits of knowledge. The first two issues concentrate on the practicalities of knowledge construction while the latter two are concerned with the philosophical assumptions underlying research practice.

Evaluations are presented as a practical scientific undertaking and therefore, need a theoretical foundation (Clark, 1999). Consideration needs to be given to wider philosophical issues not merely in the interests of making better methods choices but also in order to develop evaluation theory. There are two major paradigms to theory development, positivism and subjectivism. The positivist paradigm takes an epistemological position known as traditional, conventional, scientific, experimental, (Bryman, 2001), empiricist and hypothetico-deductive. The subjectivist approach adopts an epistemological position referred to as naturalistic, humanistic, constructivist, interpretivist, post-positivist, holistic-deductive and alternative (Clarke, 1999). The positivist paradigm tends to adopt the quantitative methodology while the subjectivist tends to adopt the qualitative methodology. This research did not adopt a purist view of either positivism or subjectivism. Pragmatism or methodological appropriateness (Patton, 2002) was adopted to increase practical methodological options available.

#### **4.6.1 The positivist paradigm**

First proclaimed by Auguste Comte in the 19th Century, the positivist approach has developed various mutations and is associated with a number of disparate philosophical schools of thought (Hughes and Sharrock, 1990). The intellectual debate on the authority of positivism, despite its long journey, remains alive today. Hughes and Sharrock (1990) refer to positivism as

orthodoxy as its legitimacy was unquestioned for some time. Endorsed by John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, and Karl Marx, albeit in various versions, there was a belief that society could follow the same logic of enquiry as that employed by the natural sciences (Hughes and Sharrock, 1990). Hence, the social world can be studied according to the same principles, procedures, ethos and laws as the natural sciences.

As social processes are viewed as subject to casual laws, applying objectivity, rationality and rigorous scientific methods of enquiry to establish truth, it is assumed the researcher can identify regularities and causal relationships of social phenomena. The research process starts with a hypothesis or tentative explanation based on the assumption that the investigator is objective and remains detached from phenomenon under study, (Clarke, 1999). Testing the hypothesis to either accept or disprove it involves collecting facts, while the hypothesis remains fixed throughout the research process. To achieve this, survey methods and experimental designs are employed that limit the interaction that occurs between the researcher and the researched (Clarke, 1999). Research techniques include highly structured questionnaires or interview schedules that contain predetermined, standardised categories into which individuals responses are fitted. Systematic sampling techniques are employed to control bias and ensure internal validity (Bryman, 2001). Box 4 details the scientific method in relation to evaluation.

## Box 4 Evaluation and the Scientific Method

- The evaluator is separate from the practitioners and from the practice supposedly in order to ensure neutrality and objectivity.
- Practice is conceptualised as informed by defined inputs and measurable outcomes.
- Decisions are made about intended outputs depending on their susceptibility to measurement, thus simplifying what may otherwise be complex, diffuse and multi-faceted goals and processes.
- Different interventions are applied to control and experimental groups so that differences in outcomes can be measured and compared, and these differences are related in causal ways to differences in inputs.
- Interventions in the control and experimental groups are controlled for the period of the intervention so that measurements can be made, thus not allowing for practice as a developing and changing process.
- Causal relationships are sought between inputs and outputs.

(Source: Everitt and Hardiker (1996, p. 46-47).

### 4.6.1.1 Experimental Designs and Evaluations

Experimental research designs provide a sound method of arriving at causal explanations in evaluations (Rossi and Freeman, 1993) and are “*strong in terms of internal validity*” (Bryman, 2001, p. 39).

That randomised experimental designs are of proven scientific merit in evaluations is an acceptable view. Thus, logic and rules of scientific method are an indispensable component for establishing the effectiveness of interventions and amounts to identifying relative causality.

In humanitarian evaluations following and during civil conflicts such as Somalia, pre-test, post-test, control group designs can prove problematic considering the nature of interventions. Similarly, it is rather difficult to conduct a pre-test, post-test, control group design in rapid-onset disasters where there is little or no warning. The South East Asian Tsunami in 2004 was a natural

disaster where there was little, if any warning at all. Even, in slow-onset disasters, the treatment in most cases is based on appropriate eligibility criteria, making it impossible to construct a conventional group. Both case studies within this research for example, had clear eligibility criteria as populations without access to clean, safe water and sanitation. Creating a control group would have been problematic but more importantly unethical, as it would involve withholding relief aid to those who met the criteria, which directly conflicts with the purpose of relief aid – to save lives.

Clarke (1999) identifies the following potential limitations of randomised experimental designs:

- Ethical considerations such as withholding beneficial resources from clients in the name of research;
- Comparability, non-random processes can threaten group equivalence;
- The potential for creating inequities between groups; and
- Generating conflict and resentment between experimental and control groups.

Humanitarian agencies would likely object on ethical grounds to randomisation as a method of assigning individuals to treatment and non-treatment groups (Clarke, 1999). How would a humanitarian agency provide clean water to one group in Somalia, while denying another group access to the same service for the purpose of carrying out an experiment to meet evaluation criteria? Furthermore, this creation of inequities between groups would likely generate conflict as a result of resentment among those not receiving aid. In 'complex emergencies' however, the observed effects often occur by chance due to problems of attribution (O'Keefe, Kirkby and Cheetham, 2002 and Buchanan-Smith and Collinson, 2002). Thus, factors operating simultaneously to the programme may cause effects that are not related to it.

Evaluation is about generating evidence of the effectiveness of humanitarian action and the positivist approach provides one of several methods of accomplishing this. Consistent with Everitt and Hardiker (1996), this research



recognised the merit in employing the positivist paradigm in evaluation research. The objective of this research however, was not to establish whether there is a cause-effect relationship but to assess the effects of the programme on adaptive capacity, resilience and vulnerability in the study locations. The limitations of the positivist paradigm form the rationale for the subjectivist paradigm.

#### **4.6.2 The subjectivist paradigm**

Although the case studies had aspects of each of the research paradigms, ACT and NCA predominantly fitted the qualitative approach. The quantitative design was not a logical choice as the aim and nature of this research was not to explain casual relationships but rather to understand complex relationships and meanings between variables. Clarke (1999) asserts that conventional approaches offer little insight into social processes that account for the changes observed. Instead, they encourage evaluators to identify predetermined objective indicators of success, utilise standardised measuring techniques and adopt formal methods of data analysis. Evaluators of humanitarian action do not all reduce human behaviour to mimic that of natural sciences. The study of interpreting and understanding, known as hermeneutics, has become one of the philosophies underpinning humanitarian evaluations. Idealism, phenomenology, postmodernism and critical theory are examples of mutations of hermeneutical philosophy that focus on meaning and reject naturalistic approaches to human behaviour (Graham, 1997).

A constructivist design was more appropriate for this research as this enabled project participants including primary and secondary stakeholders and the evaluator to construct their experiences from their (multiple) social realities. It was not possible, nor desirable, to separate the evaluator (observer) from the project stakeholders and beneficiaries (observed). This is contrary to the positivist view whereby the observer can be independent from the observed. Rather knowledge was viewed as a construction in the minds of individuals. The constructions do not exist outside of the persons who construct them and

are not part of some objective world that exists separate from their constructors (Clarke, 1999). Evaluators following a constructivist stance need to understand and experience the context in which the programme operates. This will enable them to discover the experience of the programme by policy makers, staff and beneficiaries’.

Each of the communities visited for this research were approached by the researcher with an open mind, willingness to learn and open heart. No claims were made to know what answers could possibly arise and this helped reveal the intrinsic aspects of the connectedness of the intervention with the past and the future whilst not imposing limits. The researcher welcomed the complexity or multiple realities as providing a holistic and fertile ground that allowed beneficiaries to be involved in the process, as co-creators, of knowledge creation. This participatory methodology is addressed later in this chapter.

#### **4.7 Limitations of qualitative research**

Qualitative research, as with any methodology, has limitations. Bryman (2001) identifies four major criticisms against the qualitative methodology, all of which can be encountered by evaluation research:

- *Too subjective* – qualitative researchers are said to be too impressionistic and subjective. Evaluation findings rely too much on the evaluator’s often unsystematic views about what is important, which also depend on the personal relationship created between the evaluator and the organisation evaluated.
- *Difficult to replicate* – Reliance upon the evaluator’s ingenuity, absence of standard procedures to follow, dependence on subjective observation and judgement and biases are some of the aspects that make qualitative research difficult to replicate.
- *Problems of generalisation* – respondents in a qualitative study are not meant to be representative of a population like in a quantitative study. Through detailed case studies it can be impossible to know how the findings can be generalised to other settings.

- *Lack of transparency* – It is sometimes difficult to ascertain how the research was conducted. For instance, it is sometimes unclear how participants were selected; how data was collected and catalogued; and how the analysis was conducted to arrive at the conclusions.

(Adapted from Bryman, 2001 and Whipp, 1998)

The researcher views these limitations as not inherent weaknesses of qualitative research. Rather the weaknesses were a manifestation of how the research has been engaged with and documented. It is important here to note that more secure evidence for the overall findings of this thesis derive from the process of exploring two different case study regions within Somalia.

#### **4.8 Participatory evaluation**

Participatory evaluation is a relatively recent (Brisolura, 1998) albeit growing element of participatory approaches through which *“researchers, facilitators, or professional evaluators collaborate in some way with individuals, groups, or communities who have a decided stake in the programme, development project, or other entity being evaluated”* (Cousins and Whitmore, 1998, p. 5).

Participatory evaluation draws on *“many established traditions that have put participation, action research and adult education at the forefront of attempts to emancipate disempowered people”* (Pretty *et al.*, 1995, p. 55).

Participatory evaluation is rooted to Guba and Lincoln’s (1989) ‘fourth generation evaluation’, which they assert is ‘characterised by negotiation between various stakeholders, participation in every stage of the evaluation process and focus on action’ (Estrella and Gaventa, 1998:14). Cousins and Whitmore (1998) proposed two types of participatory evaluation – practical and transformative evaluation. The core premise of the former is that stakeholder participation in evaluation will enhance evaluation relevance, ownership, and thus utilisation. Alternatively, the latter invokes participatory principles and actions to democratise social change (Cousins and Whitmore, 1998). Barakat, Chard and Jones (2005) contrast traditional and participatory

evaluation. They contend that conventional ('top-down') evaluation theory and practice in which aid evaluation, particularly post-war contexts, is exclusively focused upon project accountability and performance. Thus, it largely fails to question the culturally and ideologically determined assumptions of value that underpin post-war reconstruction interventions. Rather, measurable indicators, such as the absence of violent conflict, multiparty elections and the growth of GDP are taken as the sole indicators of success. Hence, criteria of value appear to be based upon assumptions that are determined by the dominant international culture such as, the existence of structures for liberal democracy and a market economy as opposed to talking to the national stakeholders – the people – and engaging in dialogue.

Barakat, Chard and Jones' (2005) participatory evaluations of the post-war and reconstruction efforts in Burundi and Mozambique identified and enabled the understanding of the visible effects of war and reconstruction and the invisible, emotional and attitudinal changes that are determining factors in developing a harmonious nation. The 'invisible' yet crucial, determining factors were only identifiable through the participatory techniques adopted by the evaluators. Table 6 below outlines the main differences between conventional and participatory evaluations.

**Table 6 Differences Between Conventional and Participatory Evaluation**

	<b>Conventional Evaluation</b>	<b>Participatory Evaluation</b>
Who plans and manages the process?	Senior managers, or outside experts	Local people, project staff, managers and other stakeholders, often helped by a facilitator
Role of 'primary stakeholders' (the intended beneficiaries)	Provide information only	Design and adapt the methodology, collect and analyse data, share findings and link them to action.
How success is measured	Externally defined, mainly through quantitative indicators	Internally defined indicators, including more qualitative judgements
Approach	Predetermined	Adaptive

(Source: Institute of Development Studies, 1998).

Table 6 demonstrates that conventional evaluations are completely predetermined and only involve beneficiaries in the process to inform the predetermined, external measures of success. This approach does not consider how beneficiaries themselves would measure success. In comparison, the results and lessons learnt from a participatory evaluation are more likely to be implemented with action taken at the field level. Participatory evaluations through their adaptive nature allow for innovation and the scope to explore holistically the success of interventions outside of externally defined parameters and through a local lens.

Participation and as such, participatory evaluation however, is subjective – it means different things to different people. Table 7 summarises some of the key advantages and challenges of participatory evaluation.

Table 7 below highlights some of the key challenges of participatory evaluation. Through an awareness and understanding of these challenges many of them can be overcome. Gaining confidence and the trust of those involved in the evaluation process is critical to ensure accurate results. This is a key skill for any evaluator and comes through excellent interpersonal skills, an understanding of the local population and experience – all of which the researcher developed over a number of years.

It is important to understand the various political factors, powers and hierarchies in operation in order to know ‘whose’ voice has been heard. Through this, the evaluator can select a range of participants and stakeholders and identify where groups should be separated so that all voices can be heard. This is of particular importance for more vulnerable groups such as women and IDPs.

**Table 7 Advantages and Challenges of Participatory Evaluation**

<b>Advantages</b>	<b>Challenges</b>
Effective for accessing 'hard to reach' groups.	Produces certain types of information
Potentially wide coverage of population	Information may be brief and superficial. The technical knowledge and background of the professional evaluator may not fit with the culture in question.
Participants choose level of involvement	Relationship with researcher may be very brief
Group work is inclusive, and promotes information sharing and education	Presence of others affects personal accounts
Research is emergent and reflects people's own priorities and interests	Information may not address goals of research
Can tailor tools to participants	Selective involvement of participants in verification and analysis. Participants can directly manipulate the data or information provided.
Views participants as experts in problem definition and solutions	Unequal power and representation amongst participants, and between participants and researcher. How does one listen to the voices that have not yet been heard? How much should (or can) an outside evaluator meddle in the affairs of others, especially when these people need to live with the consequences long after the evaluator has left the scene?
Collective solutions emerge organically and involvement of key stakeholders across the social and political arena can reduce tensions.	Social and political factors can effect change to the detriment of the participants

(Source: Adapted from Cousins and Whitmore, 1998, pp. 18; and Pain and Francis, 2003, pp. 50).

#### **4.8.1 Participatory Research Tools**

There is a plethora of research tools available to participatory research including, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, mapping, timelines, oral histories and biographies, seasonal calendars, role plays, Venn diagrams, observations, matrix and pairwise ranking, flowcharts, transects, and pie charts and secondary sources (Fuller, O'Brien and Hope, 2003; Chambers, 2002). The participatory tools employed for this research to aid the researcher in analysing the experience of the interventions are illustrated in Table 8.

Firstly, the researcher examined the range of participatory research tools to find those that would provide the most thorough and accurate information for the research aims of this thesis in the context of local Somali populations. Secondly, the researcher examined those challenges highlighted within Table 7 against the various participatory research tools, identifying the tools most likely to overcome these challenges. Finally, the researcher reviewed each participatory research tool along with its strengths and limitations and identified how the findings of each could be triangulated against other participatory research tools. Through this process, the researcher was able to develop the list of participatory tools for this research as shown in Table 8.

Any research tool will have limitations and weaknesses. Table 8 highlights the limitations of the methods selected for this research. The limitations however, are specific to each research tool and applying the mix of research tools shown in Table 8 will allow for the triangulation of findings therefore, minimising many of the limitations. Oral histories for example, may be biased and rely only on memories, which cannot be cross-checked. Cross-checking these histories however, against focus group discussions and semi-structure interviews will help identify any bias or inaccurate accounts. Similarly, transect walks and mapping provide a snap shot in time but with the detail of oral histories and timelines an in-depth picture can be constructed.

It would be impossible to completely eradicate all limitations from participatory research tools. However, the researcher has a conscious understanding of the limitations of the participatory research tools and has used this awareness throughout the research along with a careful mix of participatory research tools to try and minimise the limitations of the research.



**Table 8 Participatory Research Tools**

<b>Tool</b>	<b>Use</b>	<b>Strengths</b>	<b>Limitations</b>
<b>Oral histories and timelines</b>	The participant relays their history, particularly through remembering key events and lived experiences.	Provide detailed information of experiences and events. Helps to put events in order particularly, in societies where times and dates are rarely used by participants.	Relies on memories and can be biased to the participants views therefore, this method should be triangulated. This method can raise sensitive past issues.
<b>Transect walks</b>	A transect walk is a walk taken by the evaluator through the area of interest, observing, asking, listening, looking and identifying different zones.	Transect walks are simple and can generate cause-effect relationship data. Transects enable the quick identification of social structures, land use, and community assets. They are also an effective method of triangulating data already available.	Only accounts for the currently 'observable' situation and features – a snap shot. Hence, this method should not be used in isolation.

**Table 8 Participatory Research Tools Continued**

<b>Focus group discussions</b>	A group of individuals are selected to discuss and comment on, from personal experience, predetermined topics. Typically groups are 6-12 people. The evaluator facilitates and encourages participants to respond in their own terms, while simultaneously ensuring the focus of the group is maintained. These were also used to triangulate results from background documentation and interviews.	Generate qualitative data efficiently. Allows participants freedom to raise issues that are important to them, rather than merely respond to predetermined questions. Enables the evaluator to directly observe the social processes and dynamics of group interaction. The group provides an element of quality control into the data collection process.	Individuals may suppress or modify their true feelings when in the presence of others. The confidentiality of individual interviews is missing. Individuals may feel inhibited when in a group where participants know one another. They can be dominated by the most powerful members.
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**Table 8 Participatory Research Tools Continued**

<b>Semi-structured interviews</b>	A 'conversation with a purpose' (Dexter, 1970; 136). Standardised questions covering socio-biographical details are followed by open-ended questions designed to elicit more qualitative information. The interviewer is expected to probe for more information by using active listening and encouraging respondents to digress and expand upon their answers. These were also used to triangulate results from background documentation and focus group discussions.	Provides focused, in-depth answers. The semi-structured nature encourages the interviewee to provide more information and allows issues to be raised of importance to the interviewee. Answers can be directly compared between interviewees	The age, sex, race, character, attitude and experience of the interviewer can influence the quality and validity of response data. The evaluator must have the trust and confidence of the interviewee, which can cause problems when time is limited. Answers provided can be biased or manipulated by the interviewee.
<b>Mapping</b>	The evaluator generates maps as a visual resource and to clarify spatial arrangements.	Aids memory stimulation later or when no longer in the field. Mapping can provide new insights through drawing attention to features normally taken for granted by those involved.	Large or complex landscapes can prove difficult to map. Maps provide an overview of the current situation but not cause-effect relationship data.

**Table 8 Participatory Research Tools Continued**

<b>Observations</b>	Spontaneous observations that occur throughout the evaluation process combined with systematic observation whereby observation and recording are conducted according to explicit procedures that permit replication and rules are followed that permit the use of the logic of scientific inference.	Observational fieldwork is essential if the evaluator is to provide a suitably descriptive account of the core features of any programme. Systematic observation can provide new insights through drawing attention to actions and behaviours normally taken for granted by those involved.	Gathering detailed observations can take a long time. The direct involvement of the observer in the situation under investigation can be a potential source of bias. There is the possibility that individuals will modify their behaviour if aware that they are under observation.
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(Source: Dexter, 1970; Clarke, 1999: 72; Reiss, 1971: 4; Guba and Lincoln, 1981; Sudman and Bradburn, 1974; Chambers, 2002)

## **4.9 Data Collection**

Information and data collection was guided by three principles: using multiple sources to allow the triangulation of results; creating a case study database; and maintaining a chain of evidence (de Weerd-Nederhof, 2001). The evaluations were conducted in five stages:

1. Review of project documentation and secondary data
2. Headquarter level interviews and discussions
3. Regional level briefings, interviews and discussions
4. Field visits to the selected towns and villages
5. Debriefings at regional and headquarter level.

Secondary data and project documentation was mostly provided by the organisations under evaluation however, the evaluator also undertook independent research to verify information provided. Headquarters of the organisations evaluated for this research were interviewed as were the donor bodies to discuss how the evaluation results would be utilised; to what extent the results could influence future projects; and any clarification or issues arising from the secondary data provided. These interviews provided insight into how the projects and programmes were viewed from a headquarter perspective and what people operating at this level believed to be occurring on the ground both in terms of the general situation and project specifics.

The organisations evaluated for this research had allocated sufficient resources for the evaluation process to ensure the evaluator could spend sufficient time in the various locations. The evaluations largely adopted participatory, qualitative approaches. The following section summarises the methods used for collecting information for each of the evaluations.

### **4.9.1 Action by Churches Together, Bari and Nugaal, Somalia**

Action by Churches Together (ACT) used a member organisation – Norwegian Church Aid – with experience of operating in Somalia to deliver their humanitarian assistance. The researcher conducted a briefing with field

staff at their regional headquarters in Garowe, Somalia. This briefing ensured the entire field team understood the importance and purpose of the evaluation. Key issues such as confidentiality and impartiality were also discussed. The core evaluation team consisted of the researcher; the head of Norwegian Church Aids operations in Somalia who is well known to the field staff and has a strong working relationship with the researcher through previously working together on evaluations; NCAs technical manager, who has long experience with each of the communities, is able to provide detailed technical knowledge of each project and undertake inspections of projects during the evaluation visits; an independent, highly experienced interpreter who is from a neutral clan and has previously worked with the researcher. The researcher conducted a one day workshop with the core evaluation team. This covered aims, objectives, definitions and key terms/phrases, potential challenges and methods including interviewing techniques, focus group discussions and methods of recording information.

The evaluation team was accompanied by eight security personnel. The number of security personnel were strategically hired to ensure two members were recruited from each of the local leaders and therefore, reduced the risk of threat to the evaluation team.

The researcher was requested to meet with the President of Puntland shortly after arriving in Garowe. This is generally standard protocol to inform the President of the nature of the visit and how the results will be utilised. Ensuring awareness and support from the President and his party also reduces risk of threat to the evaluation team.

Table 9 demonstrates the locations visited and the number of participants at each field site. The evaluator proposed visiting 11 of the 15 sites in which ACT through NCA had developed projects. Sites were selected based on the background documentation and project reports taking into account factors such as the geographical location, socio-economic environment, size of town or village, technical details of the project and when the project was implemented to ensure a representative sample of projects were visited.

**Table 9 NCA Site Visits and Number of Participants**

<b>Town/ Village</b>	<b>Elders Committee</b>	<b>Community Focus Group</b>	<b>Water and Environmental Sanitation Committee</b>	<b>Women's Group</b>	<b>Education Committee</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Aris</b>	5	12	11	10	5	5	48
<b>Badweyn</b>	3	12	5	6	0	5	31
<b>Baq Baq</b>	5	8	11	8	3	5	40
<b>Bender Beyla</b>	10	14	11	12	5	5	57
<b>Budan Buto</b>	3	9	5	8	0	5	30
<b>Dhuudo</b>	5	12	11	10	5	5	48
<b>Dhuur</b>	6	12	11	12	5	5	51
<b>El Dhidir</b>	5	12	11	11	3	5	47
<b>Falah Falah</b>	5	11	11	9	5	5	46
<b>Qundheed</b>	5	10	11	12	0	5	43
<b>Suuj</b>	6	11	11	9	0	5	42

**Table 10 Field Sites**

<b>Town/ Village</b>	<b>Mechanised Diesel Generator</b>	<b>Solar Powered</b>	<b>Berkad</b>	<b>Latrines</b>	<b>WES Committee trained by FOPAG</b>	<b>WES Committee trained by NCA</b>	<b>Members of WES Committee</b>	<b>Region</b>
Bender Beyla	x			0	x		11	Bari
El Dhidir	x			15	x		11	Bari
Aris		x		10	x		11	Bari
Dhuur		x (partial damage)		15	x		11	Bari
Dhuudo		x		26	x		11	Bari
Baq Baq		x (blocked)		20	x		11	Nugaal
Qundheed	x			0		x	11	Bari
Falah Falah	x (stolen)			0		x	11	Bari
Suuj	x (stolen)			10		x	11	Bari
Haji Khayr			x	0		x	5	Bari
Budan Buto			x	0		x	5	Nugaal
Badweyn			x	0		x	5	Bari (Inland)
Gubato			x	0		x	5	Bari
Diilin			x	0		x	5	Bari
Hamhamaa			x	0		x	5	Bari



NCA then advised against visiting one location due to recent violent outbreaks. This violence was investigated by the evaluator who concluded the reports were accurate and therefore, another location was selected. Field visits were restricted to 11 because, given the security risks, it was considered more important to get an in-depth understanding of several communities rather than make superficial visits to every project. Table 10 illustrates the field sites visited with project details. The project sites not visited are in grey. The researcher visited all mechanized and solar powered water projects. The researcher selected two Berkad sites to visit. The researcher was informed all Berkad projects were similar and operational therefore, the researcher opted to only visit two allowing for more in-depth information gathering at these two sites rather than trying to gather a greater number of more superficial information at project sites. Furthermore, superficial information on all the projects already existed in the form of project reports and secondary data. The researcher selected the first Berkad as it was in the Nugaal region and only two of NCAs projects were in Nugaal so this would allow for a geographical comparison. The researcher selected the second Berkad as its inland location enabled the field team to have a tea break at two other Berkad locations. This enabled the researcher to briefly observe that the Berkads were functional and had good quantities of water.

Introductory meetings were held firstly with each Elders Committee. These meetings are extremely important as approval from the Elders Committee allows the evaluation to proceed and ensures all community members will be willing to meet with the evaluation team if requested. Elders Committees comprise some of the oldest and most respected members of the community and as such these meetings would also be used to extract oral histories and timelines both of the Elders personal experiences and that of the village or town. The Elders would also use this opportunity to outline their priorities for the community and future aspirations.

Community meeting focus groups were held with key community members including teachers, businessmen or women and members of the community selected by the community to voice any concerns. These focus groups were

used to gather detailed information surrounding the project implementation. Focus groups were additionally held with the Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) Committees, women's groups and Education Committees. WES committees were established during the projects to assist with implementation and sustainability. A number of towns have well established, active women's groups that meet regularly, other smaller villages have only informal women's groups that only meet during major events. The majority of towns and villages had Education Committees despite some not having functioning schools. Several participants were selected for follow-up semi-structured interviews. These participants were selected based on either the quality or lack of information provided during focus group sessions i.e. participants who raised interesting issues that warranted further in-depth discussion or participants who remained quiet during sessions possibly due to the presence of other more dominant participants.

Observations and transect walks were conducted at each site and during the walks beneficiaries would be selected for interview. These interviews were all semi-structured.

The evaluation team spent three days in each community. The first day was spent in discussions with the Elders Committee and undertaking focus group sessions. The second and third day was spent conducting further focus group sessions, semi-structured interviews and transect walks. A particular effort was made to interview poorer members of the community, women and youths. It is possible to identify poorer members of the community through their dress, lack of footwear and quality of water containers.

Upon completion of the field visits, interviews were conducted with field staff. These interviews were also used to triangulate findings and clarify or address any issues arising from the field visits.

Following the completion of data collection, collation and analysis, the evaluators jointly reviewed the information obtained and identified key issues and outcomes. These were discussed at a one-day feedback session with

field staff and a one-day feedback workshop that was attended by representatives from regional and headquarter level personnel. This enabled further feedback to be collected on initial findings and these were used to support the formulation of recommendations and were incorporated into the final evaluation report.

#### **4.9.1.1 Limitations**

There are a number of limitations to the research conducted during this evaluation. Firstly, only 11 out of 15 project sites were visited, which may not be fully representative of the project experiences. However, participants were viewed as resourceful, experienced and rich in knowledge of their environment. The level of detail gathered from these communities therefore, was considered sufficient to gain an understanding of NCAs projects in the region and their contribution to adaptive capacity, resilience and vulnerability. Hence, understanding the processes that generated the outcomes was fundamental rather than generalising findings. This research is consistent with the social research literature whereby a small sample size with in-depth data is likely to generate rich information from which some conclusions can be drawn (Patton, 2002 and Bryman, 2001).

People selected for interview or to participate in focus group sessions may not have been representative or people with opposing views may have been missed. To avoid this, a range of methods were used for data collection and every method of data collection at each field site was used to triangulate information collected through other methods.

The presence of project staff during focus group discussions and the presence of an interpreter during interviews could have affected participants' freedom of expression. The interpreter was selected specifically for their skills in ensuring both male and female interviewees feel at ease, relaxed and are forthcoming with information. Furthermore, Somali men and women are generally very vocal and the risk of them being silenced or reluctant to speak freely due to the presence of project staff is minimal.

The use of an interpreter poses another challenge as many phrases or words cannot be translated directly from Somali to English and vice versa. The interpreter selected for the evaluation has lived in England for over ten years and has a wealth of experience in translating between Somali and English therefore, the researcher is assured that accurate information was transferred between participants, the interpreter and researcher.

Finally, although not necessarily a limitation, it is worth noting the researchers positionality. A white, British female with a western education could have certain prejudices and albeit unconsciously, could have influenced data collection and analysis. The other two main members of the evaluation team however – An Eritrean and a Kenyan – would have reported any such biases or prejudices.

#### **4.9.2 Norwegian Church Aid, Gedo, Somalia**

Similarly to the ACT evaluation, the evaluation of Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) was conducted in five stages – review of project documentation and secondary data; headquarter level interviews and discussions; regional level briefings, interviews and discussions; field visits to the selected towns and villages; and debriefings at regional and headquarter level.

The core evaluation team consisted of the researcher; an independent evaluator with over 30 years experience, who the researcher has previously worked with on several evaluations; an independent evaluator with over 20 years experience; and an independent, highly experienced interpreter who is from a neutral clan and has previously worked with the researcher. The evaluation team was accompanied by several field staff that had long experience of the projects and communities. The field staff provided community introductions and offered insight on individual projects throughout the field visits. The three evaluators and interpreter had a one day workshop covering the evaluation aims, objectives, definitions and key terms/phrases, potential challenges and methods including interviewing techniques, focus

group discussions and methods of recording information. The three evaluators conducted a briefing with field staff at their regional headquarters in Gedo, Somalia. This briefing ensured the entire field team understood the importance and purpose of the evaluation. Key issues such as confidentiality and impartiality were also discussed.

The evaluation team was accompanied by ten security personnel. The number of security personnel were strategically hired to ensure members were recruited from each of the local leaders therefore, reducing the risks to the evaluation team.

Table 11 below demonstrates the locations visited and the number of participants at each field site. The evaluator's selected eight project sites to visit in collaboration with NCAs programme Director. Sites were selected based on the background documentation and project reports taking into account factors such as the geographical location, socio-economic environment, size of town or village, technical details of the project and when the project was implemented to ensure a representative sample of projects were visited. The security threat at the time of the evaluation was also a consideration in site selection.

**Table 12** below illustrates the field sites visited with project details. The project sites not visited are in grey. There are three food security projects located in Dolo and three in Geedweyne. The researcher visited two food security projects at each location. In Dolo, one of the farmers was away on business and therefore the evaluator made observations on this farm but conducted the research at the other two field sites. Similarly in Geedweyne one of the farmers was getting married so observations were made at that farm and the other two farms were used as research sites. The observations taken gave the researcher further confidence in the quality of information collected at the other project sites. The researcher visited both mechanized water projects and two emergency schools. The researcher selected Pur Puris as a field site as this contained one school and two shallow wells therefore offering the opportunity to collect information on multiple projects.

Research was not possible in Ceel Cadde at the time due to insecurity. The researcher then selected Garbahary as a field site as this location had received an education project but no other projects. There were plans for NCA to begin constructing a mechanized water system in Garbahary and, therefore, it offered an appropriate research site to examine the situation in an area prior to implementation.

**Table 11 NCA Site Visits and Number of Participants**

<b>Site Visited</b>	<b>Elders Committee</b>	<b>Community Focus Groups</b>	<b>WES Committee</b>	<b>Women's Group</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Dolo</b>	4	9	5	10	5	33
<b>Geedweyne</b>	5	8	5	10	5	33
<b>Labahlow</b>	5	10	6	12	5	38
<b>Pur Puris</b>	5	8	5	9	5	32
<b>El Adde</b>	4	12	12	12	5	45
<b>El Godgod</b>	5	8	5	12	5	35
<b>Garbaharey</b>	7	12	5	14	5	43
<b>Qalwo</b>	4	8	0	4	5	21

(Source: Author)

**Table 12 Field Sites**

<b>Town/ Village</b>	<b>Mechanised Water System</b>	<b>Shallow Wells</b>	<b>Latrines</b>	<b>Education Project</b>	<b>Food Security</b>
<b>Dolo</b>			2	x	x2
<b>Geedweyn</b>			2	x	x2
<b>Labahlow</b>		x3	2	x (emergency)	
<b>Pur Puris</b>		x2	2	x	
<b>El Adde</b>	x		10	x	
<b>El Godgod</b>	x		10	x	
<b>Garbahary</b>			4	x	
<b>Qalwo</b>		x1	2	x (emergency)	
<b>Ceel Cadde</b>		x1	2	x	
<b>Bura</b>		x1	2	x	

(Source: Author)



The process and methods of collecting field data were similar to the other evaluation described above. Firstly, introductory meetings were held with each Elders Committee. Again, these meetings were used to extract oral histories and timelines both of the Elders personal experiences and that of the village or town. Secondly focus groups were held with key community members including teachers, businessmen or women, farmers and members of the community selected by the community to voice any concerns; the WES committees; and women's groups. These focus groups were used to gather further detailed information surrounding the project (see section 4.10 Analytical framework for further details).

The majority of the villages visited have informal women's groups that meet on an ad hoc basis. However, these women's groups provide valuable insight into Somali society and the projects and therefore, were a crucial component of the evaluation. The evaluators would generally take it in turn to lead the focus group sessions and where time was restricted they would separate and each hold different focus group sessions. Although, the researcher (as the only female member of the evaluation team), was the only evaluator present during the women's group sessions to encourage an informal atmosphere that would allow participants to freely provide information.

Several participants were selected for follow-up semi-structured interviews. These participants were selected based on either the quality or lack of information provided during focus group sessions i.e. participants who raised interesting issues that warranted further in depth discussion or participants who remained quiet during sessions possibly due to the presence of other more dominant participants.

Observations and transect walks were conducted at each site and during the walks beneficiaries would be selected for interview. These interviews were all semi-structured. A particular effort was made to interview poorer members of the community, women and youths. It is possible to identify poorer members of the community through their dress, lack of footwear and quality of water containers.

The evaluation team spent two-three days in each community. The first day was spent in discussions with the Elders Committee and undertaking focus group sessions. The second and third day was spent conducting further focus group sessions, semi-structured interviews and transect walks.

Upon completion of the field visits, interviews were conducted with field staff including the staff of NCAs local implementing partner. These interviews were also used to triangulate findings and clarify or address any issues arising from the field visits.

Following the completion of data collection, collation and analysis, the evaluators jointly reviewed the information obtained and identified key issues and outcomes. These were discussed at a one-day debriefing session with field staff in Gedo and a one-day debriefing workshop in Nairobi that was attended by representatives from regional and headquarter level personnel. This enabled further feedback to be collected on initial findings and these were used to support the formulation of recommendations and were incorporated into the final evaluation report. Draft reports were issued to all field staff for their comments and feedback and these were also incorporated into the final report.

#### **4.9.3.1 Limitations**

There are a number of limitations to the research conducted during the evaluations several of which are similar to the limitations of the evaluation discussed earlier including, the number of project sites visited; the selection of participants; the presence of project staff and interpreter during focus group discussions and interviews; the use of an interpreter; and the positionality of the researcher. These limitations have already been addressed above within section 4.9.1.1 Limitations.

Tensions in the Gedo region during the evaluation period were high due to the presence of Ethiopian soldiers on the Somali side of the border. Hence, one

of the field visits was reduced from three to two days however, this is not believed to have affected the results as the evaluators were still able to conduct the necessary focus group sessions and interviews.

It was generally felt the participatory approach adopted for each evaluation was very effective for this research. Efforts and enthusiasm of the evaluation teams and field staff and their capacity to grasp both the purpose of the evaluation and the data collection techniques used were impressive. Formulating the recommendations and conclusions was undertaken transparently with each core evaluation team, which promoted confidence in the results that were relevant, appropriate and actionable.

#### **4.10 Analytical framework**

Figure 6 provides an overview of the researchers data collection and analytical framework. The diagram is essentially into the three phases of research. The first field level work was part of the original evaluation fieldwork. The second phase at field level was pulling together a daily workshop to come to evaluative judgements under the researchers leadership. The third phase is a desk review undertaken by the researcher herself. These three phases and methodologies are examined in more detail below.

**Phase I** demonstrates the methods used at each field site. Oral histories were collected from two members of each Elder's Committee. Members of the Elders' Committee were used as these are some of the oldest members of the community and provide both a personal history and then a history of the community, village or town, which offers great insight and depth into the community. Focus group sessions were held with each Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) Committee; a community focus group and the women's committee. Most villages and towns in Somalia have established women's groups, which were used to form the women's focus group. The community group comprised largely of men and included a range of representatives from each wider family group. These groups included representatives from some of the poorest households in each location. Semi-

structured interviews were held with one male and one female member of the WES committee to gain greater insight into the personal accounts of the project and also to help triangulate the findings of the focus group sessions. Three semi-structured interviews were held with beneficiaries at each project site. Transect walks, mapping and observations were conducted at each site and further information on each method can be found in Table 8 Participatory Research Tools


An interpreter was used for the oral histories, semi-structured interviews and focus group sessions. There are a number of limitations of using an interpreter (Jandt, 2003) including the potential loss of conceptual equivalence. This is where the interpretation is not conceptually or technically representative of what the participant has said. Edwards (1998) explains that an incorrect interpretation of one word can lead to different themes emerging and subsequently a different analysis. The researcher does not speak Somali and the participants do not speak English thus, there is no independent validation of the interpretation. These limitations were minimised through a number of measures. Firstly, the interpreter was highly qualified with extensive experience of conducting field evaluations. Secondly, the interpreter had excellent references, was from a neutral clan and had nothing to gain from the evaluation or research findings. Finally, the researcher would observe participant body language and tone of voice to ensure it married with the interpretation given.

**Phase II** demonstrates the use of evaluative criteria. The evaluations for this research were analysed using a framework of the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, which have previously been discussed (see Table 3). Table 13 presents this framework adapted from O’Keefe et al. (2002) and ALNAP (2006, which has been used to assess these case studies. The criteria are grouped into five major categories – relevance/appropriateness; effectiveness; efficiency; impact; and sustainability. Other over-lapping criteria including, coherence, timeliness, coverage, coordination and connectedness were considered sub-issues of these five major criteria. Table 14 summarises the themes for each case study whose results are detailed in Chapter 5 and

Chapter 6. Each evening the evaluation team would hold a workshop to discuss all of the findings from that day and explore them through the evaluative criteria. There are a number of limitations to this process of teamwork. Firstly as the OECD-DAC (1999) discussed there is the potential to disagree over findings. Prior to commencing the fieldwork the team agreed to conduct evening workshops every night in the field. Therefore, if there were any disagreements or uncertainties regarding findings, the team would have the following day to clarify the findings. Secondly as Barry et al. (1999) highlighted there is potential for team members to simply agree with other members to please the team. Finally, any personality clashes amongst team members can significantly hinder the analysis process. All team members were selected for their reputations and experience as quality professionals with excellent research and evaluation skills. It is believed all team members would put integrity and professionalism ahead of simply wanting to please other team members or equally causing disruptions to the teams. Furthermore, all team members agreed ahead of the research that the most important aspect is ensuring the voice of the beneficiaries is heard.

**Phase III** was conducted solely by the researcher once all fieldwork was completed. The researcher analysed and examined all the findings and began grouping exploring them through a number of key themes. This provided an additional level of insight and depth into the findings to ensure the researcher gathered a holistic understanding of the situation on the ground. This phase of analysis is open to subjectivism and misinterpretation by the researcher. These limitations were minimised through the use of mixed methods and multiple data sources in phase I and then the teamwork analysis conducted in Phase II. Hence, the researcher has made every effort to triangulate data sources and findings and minimise all of the research limitations.

**Figure 6 Data Collection and Analytical Framework**



**Table 13 Evaluation Criteria Framework**

<b>Criteria Assessed</b>	<b>What to Measure</b>	<b>Whose Perspective</b>	<b>Methodological Challenge</b>	<b>Key Questions</b>
<b>Relevance or Appropriateness (coherence)</b>	Relevance and appropriateness in relation to local needs, priorities and donor policies. Appropriateness of increasing ownership.	The society including women, men, girls and boys.	Lack of consensus regarding needs and priorities. Understanding the perspective of different stakeholders	Are project aims and methods in keeping with local needs and priorities? Are projects and methods of implementation culturally appropriate?
<b>Efficiency (timeliness and coverage)</b>	The delivery of aid and implementation of projects.	Donor and implementing agency.	What standards to use a reference point.	Were aims achieved within allocated timeframes and deadlines? What were the alternative options for delivery (could it have been quicker, cheaper)?
<b>Effectiveness (coordination)</b>	The achievement of project aims.	Target groups and beneficiaries	Multiple aims; clarifying the extent to which something was effective; examining whether effects were equal across beneficiaries and groups.	To what extent have agreed aims and objectives been achieved or not? What are the reasons for achieving or not achieving agreed aims?

**Table 13 Evaluation Criteria Framework Continued**

<b>Impact</b>	Intended and unintended positive and negative impacts. Wider effects of the project – social, economic, technical and environmental.	The society including individuals, gender and age groups, communities and institutions	Linking cause and effect.	What are the positive and negative effects on individuals, groups and the wider society? What caused these effects (both intended and unintended)?
<b>Sustainability (connectedness)</b>	The longevity of the project and its associated benefits.	The society.	Hypothetical answers.	What is the agency exit strategy? Do beneficiaries have the skills, resources and will to maintain the project?

(Source: Adapted from O’Keefe, 2002 and ALNAP, 2006)



**Table 14 Key Themes**

Research Theme	Assessment Criteria	Source	
		ACT	NCA
Context of research	Literature review	Literature	Literature
The concepts of adaptive capacity, resilience and vulnerability	Literature review	Literature	Literature
Community participation and ownership	Relevance/ appropriateness, effectiveness, impact, sustainability	Project documentation; interviews; focus group sessions with stakeholders including target groups, beneficiaries and implementing partners.	Project documentation; interviews; focus group sessions with stakeholders including target groups, beneficiaries and implementing partners.
Humanitarian Assistance	Relevance/ appropriateness, effectiveness, impact, sustainability	Project documentation; interviews; focus group sessions with stakeholders including target groups, beneficiaries and implementing partners.	Project documentation; interviews; focus group sessions with stakeholders including target groups, beneficiaries and implementing partners.
Somalia: Judgement on the uniqueness of the case	Comparative literature review, against authors' evaluation experience.	Field judgement	Field judgement

**Table 14 Key Themes Continued**

Livelihood security	Relevance/ appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability	Project and secondary literature; interviews; focus group sessions with stakeholders including target groups and beneficiaries. Government policies and other implementing agencies.	Project and secondary literature; interviews; focus group sessions with stakeholders including target groups and beneficiaries. Government policies and other implementing agencies.
Entry and exit strategies	Relevance/ appropriateness, sustainability	Project documentation; interviews; and focus groups with project staff, beneficiaries and implementing partners.	Project documentation; interviews; and focus groups with project staff, beneficiaries and implementing partners.

(Source: Author).

#### **4.11 Ethical Considerations and Positionality**

Involving human participants in exploring the extent to which development and humanitarian interventions promote adaptive capacity and resilience and reduce vulnerability raises numerous ethical issues for example, the right to privacy, confidentiality, personal autonomy, respect and dignity.

The researcher believed the most important aspect of the research to be ‘do no harm’ (Anderson and Woodrow, 1989). Under no circumstances should the research or methods do harm whether physically, mentally or otherwise, or worsen the situation of any participant (Patton, 2002). Social inquiry is predicated on the belief that greater access to well-grounded information will improve rather than threaten the interests of society. Nonetheless, as the Social Research Association (2003) explains, in planning all phases of an inquiry, from design to presentation of findings, social researchers should consider the likely consequences for society at large, groups and categories of persons within it, respondents or other subjects, and possible future research. No generic formula exists for assessing the likely benefit or risk of various types of social inquiry. Social researchers however, must be sensitive to the possible consequences of their work and should as far as possible guard against predictably harmful effects.

Two approaches dominate ethics research – consequentialist and deontological ethics (Peach, 1995). Peach (1995) outlines the differences between these two approaches. Consequentialist, also referred to as a utilitarian or teleological approach, focuses on the results or outcomes of actions. Researchers adopting this approach believe in the utility principle – we should strive to create the greatest possible balance of good over evil in the world. Maximising benefits and minimising harm, and the promotion of human values such as happiness, health, knowledge, self-realisation, perfection or general welfare are central to the consequentialist approaches. The emphasis on ‘good’ over the ‘right’ means utilitarian approaches are largely founded on moral principles such as truth and honesty. This approach however, may result in sacrificing justice in particular situations in the course

of maximising good over evil.

Alternatively, deontological theories are rule-based – adopting the ‘right’ approach in accordance with the laws, prohibitions, prescriptions and norms regardless of whether consequences are of the maximum or minimum good. The problem of deontological approaches is their homogenising and universal assumption that there is one ‘right’ answer for every moral dilemma. The rules may be immoral, unjust or impoverishing to human life. Furthermore, rules can be embroiled in overly formalistic and legalistic arguments with narrow applications of norms to real-life circumstances.

Hence, neither the consequentialist nor deontological approaches can offer a perfect solution to complex moral dilemmas that the researcher may encounter. In this study, both approaches were relevant and applied with careful balance.

The ethics literature on research involving impoverished and vulnerable communities, including disaster-prone communities such as those who participated in the ACT and NCA evaluations, is extensive and continually expanding (for example, Nama and Swartz, 2002; Dickens and Cook, 2003; Collogan *et al.*, 2004; Lott, 2005; Rhodes, 2005; Mackenzie *et al.*, 2007; Flicker *et al.*, 2007; Mfutso-Bengo *et al.*, 2008; and Jesus and Michael, 2009). Ethical guidelines on conducting human research in disaster situations do exist, however, there is no comprehensive global consensus on the matter (Siriwardhana, 2007 and Social Research Association, 2003).

As this study used intrusive data collection methods in the form of interviews and observations, involving personal and interpersonal interactions, there were two main options – a checklist or a consent form – to ensure ethical issues were observed. Consent forms with participants signatures were not considered appropriate due to the high rates of illiteracy throughout the study locations. Consistent with Patton (2002), a checklist of ethical issues based on appropriate moral and legal principles was deemed appropriate. Although existing guidelines were formulated by the developed world there are several

aspects that are universal and hence, can be applied to this research. The researcher developed an ethical guidelines checklist adapted from the Social Research Association (2003), which is illustrated in Table 15.

This checklist was consistent with the Northumbria University Ethics in Research and Consultancy (NUERC) (2007) guidelines. The NUERC guidelines emphasise the application of beneficence 'doing good' and non-maleficence 'not doing harm'; respect for the rights of others; justice and fair treatment of others; and balancing qualitatively different values.

This research material was collected at the invitation of organisations that solicited for the researchers consultancy services. Although in all cases, the participants' consent was sought by the respective organisations, it was the responsibility of the researcher to ensure ethical standards were observed. Similarly, the researcher sought consent from all organisations to use the material for the purpose of a doctoral study. The guidelines demonstrated in Table 15 formed part of a toolkit, which the researcher and evaluation teams adhered to throughout the research process.

**Table 15 Ethical Guidelines Checklist**

<b>Ethical Aspect</b>	<b>Considerations</b>	<b>Explanation</b>	<b>Guidance Notes</b>
<b>Obligations to society</b>	Widening scope	Social researchers should use the possibilities open to them to extend the scope of social enquiry and communicate their findings, for the benefit of the widest possible community.	The evaluation reports were published and available to the wider humanitarian community. The researcher has published articles to ensure the greatest dissemination of results.
	Consider conflicting interests	Social enquiry is predicated on the belief that greater access to well-grounded information will serve rather than threaten the interests of society. Nonetheless, in planning all phases of an inquiry, from design to presentation of findings, social researchers should consider the likely consequences for society at large, groups and categories of persons within it, respondents or other subjects, and possible future research.	The impacts on all members of Somali society – men, women, boys and girls – were thoroughly considered prior to establishing recommendations or publishing information.
	Pursuing objectivity	While social researchers operate within the value systems of their societies, they should attempt to uphold their professional integrity without fear or favour. They must also not engage or collude in selecting methods designed to produce misleading results, or in misrepresenting findings by commission or omission.	The researcher used well known evaluation methods; triangulation of results occurred throughout; and methods, results and discussions were transparent to participants, evaluation teams, field staff and humanitarian organisations involved.

**Table 15 Ethical Guidelines Checklist Continued**

<b>Obligations to funders &amp; employers</b>	Clarify obligations and roles	Social researchers should clarify in advance the respective obligations of employer or funder and social researcher; they should, for example, refer the employer or funder to the relevant parts of a professional code to which they adhere. Reports of findings should (where appropriate) specify their role.	Headquarter level briefings were held with all organisations evaluated to ensure both evaluators and the contractors had shared objectives and understanding of how the results were to be utilised. The researcher always made clear of their adherence to the ‘do no harm’ principle and the core principles of humanitarian intervention – neutrality, impartiality and independence.
	Assessing alternatives impartially	Social researchers should consider the available methods and procedures for addressing a proposed inquiry and should provide the funder or employer with an impartial assessment of the respective merits and demerits of alternatives.	All data collection method options including their strengths and limitations were discussed during initial briefings.
	Guiding privileged information	Social researchers are frequently furnished with information by the funder or employer who may legitimately require it to be kept confidential. Methods and procedures that have been utilised to produce published data should not, however, be kept confidential.	Issues of confidentiality were raised by the researcher during initial briefings and all organisations agreed evaluation reports and findings should be published and transparent provided they do not increase risks or have negative impacts on participants. In such cases, any sensitive material would remain confidential.

**Table 15 Ethical Guidelines Checklist Continued**

<b>Obligations to colleagues</b>	Maintaining confidence in research	Social researchers depend upon the confidence of the public. They should in their work attempt to promote and preserve such confidence without exaggerating the accuracy or explanatory power of their findings.	The researchers methods and results were transparent to other evaluators and humanitarian organisations thus limiting any possibility of exaggeration or misrepresentation of findings.
	Exposing and reviewing their methods and findings	Within the limits of confidentiality requirements social researchers should provide adequate information about their methods to colleagues to permit procedures, techniques and findings to be assessed by others. Such assessments should be directed at the methods themselves rather than at the individuals who selected or used them.	The researchers methods are well known to the humanitarian community and all techniques were transparent to other evaluators and humanitarian organisations.
	Communicating ethical principles	To conduct certain inquiries, social researchers need to collaborate with colleagues in other disciplines. In these cases social researchers should make their own ethical principles clear and take account of the ethical principles of their collaborators.	The researcher always explained the nature and objectives of their research and her ethical principles.
	Ensuring safety and minimising risk of harm to field researchers	Social researchers have a moral obligation to attempt to minimise the risk of physical and/or mental harm to themselves and to their colleagues from the conduct of research. Research managers may, in addition, have a legal obligation in terms of health and safety regulations to ensure that risk to field researchers is minimised.	The safety of field teams was always the priority of the researcher and on several occasions the researcher was required to make evacuation decisions. The researcher followed the security advice of the United Nations, field staff and security guards.



**Table 15 Ethical Guidelines Checklist Continued**

<b>Obligations to Subjects</b>	Avoid undue intrusion	Social researchers must strive to be aware of the intrusive potential of their work. They have no special entitlement to study all phenomena. The advancement of knowledge and the pursuit of information are not themselves sufficient justifications for overriding other social and cultural values.	The researcher maintained the highest respect for participants and the time and information they provided. The researcher was well aware of the sensitive nature of a number of topics discussed.
	Informed consent	Inquiries involving human subjects should be based as far as practicable on the freely given informed consent of subjects. Even if participation is required by law, it should still be as informed as possible. In voluntary inquiries, subjects should not be under the impression that they are required to participate. They should be aware of their entitlement to refuse at any stage for whatever reason and to withdraw data just supplied.	All participants were made aware of the nature of each evaluation and made aware of their right to refusal. Participants were also informed about their right to confidentiality.
	Respecting rights in observation studies	In observation studies, where behaviour patterns are observed without the subject's knowledge, social researchers must take care not to infringe what may be referred to as the "private space" of an individual or group. This will vary from culture to culture. Where practicable, social researchers should attempt to obtain consent. In any event, they should interpret behaviour patterns that appear deliberately to make observation difficult as a tacit refusal of permission to be observed.	Observations throughout this research were conducted in public areas of public daily activities for example collecting water. Thus, the infringement of private space was limited.

**Table 15 Ethical Guidelines Checklist Continued**

<b>Obligations to subjects</b>		To withhold material information from, or to misinform, subjects involves a deceit, whether by omission or commission, temporarily or permanently. Such manipulation will face legitimate censure and must not be contemplated unless it can be justified. Instead, consideration should be given to informing subjects in advance that material information is being withheld, and when or if such information will be disclosed.	
<b>Protecting the interests of subjects</b>	Enabling participation	Social researchers have a responsibility to ensure inclusion in research projects of relevant individuals or groups who might otherwise be excluded for reasons of communication, disability, comprehension or expense.	The researcher made every effort to ensure all relevant individuals and groups were included particularly those often marginalised for example, the elderly, women, girls, IDPs, the disabled and the poorest.

(Source: Adapted from Social Research Association, 2003).

#### **4.11.1 Positionality**

The researcher's positionality was an important consideration of this research. While this research aimed at contributing new knowledge to disaster studies through empirical evidence, the fact that the researcher has not themselves lived through a disaster, mean some biases could have influenced the research process.

There is an expansive body of literature on positionality and reflexivity (for example, England, 1994; Penslar, 1995; Rose, 1997; Maxey, 2005; Sidaway, 2000; Sultana, 2007; Huisman, 2008; and Moser, 2008), which has informed the research process of this study. The literature emphasises the importance of researchers to acknowledge their partiality, subjectivities and biographies through reflexivity. This helps researchers to fully understand their research process, the researched and the research context, particularly in the context of post-structural and post-modern multiple axes of difference, inequalities and geopolitics, which has an impact on knowledge production. Several aspects that were related to the researcher's positionality were considered.

The researcher was contracted through external agencies, with some higher level of Western education, power relations between the researcher and research participants, could have affected access to participants, the outcomes and knowledge production (McCorkel and Myers, 2003). For instance, participants could have framed their responses in an attempt to please the researcher or encourage further humanitarian aid to their village or town. Furthermore, as a female researcher in a Muslim country there was a risk that male participants would not be forthcoming or active. Fortunately, this was not the case; however, evidently the positionality of the researcher could have had an effect on the knowledge production process.

Evaluations are generally undertaken on behalf of funders. The constant exposure to project documentation could manifest in what Allen (2005) refers to as 'docility' whereby the researcher intuitively and uncritically becomes oriented towards satisfying the needs and demands of the funder.

To deal with issues of positionality, the researcher observed a number of strategies. Firstly, the study adopted what Patton (2002) terms 'pragmatism' or 'methodological appropriateness' where a range of multiple methods were employed. Depending on circumstances, group or individual interview techniques were employed including meetings, workshops and focus and open discussions. Consistent with Chacko (2004), active measures including openness about the agenda and activities undertaken, self-disclosure, making conscious accommodations for the research participants' time constraints, mutual sharing of information and explicit recognition of participants' expertise through 'lived' experiences were strategies adopted to equalise the power balance between the researcher and participants.

#### **4.12 Conclusion**

This chapter has outlined the evaluation framework that was used to identify and extract lessons from the evaluations of ACT and NCA to inform and develop adaptive capacity and resilience and reduce vulnerability. The evaluations relied largely on qualitative research techniques to gather in-depth case material and data. The researcher was satisfied with the participatory approach adopted and the effort and enthusiasm of the evaluation teams and field staff and their capacity to grasp both the purpose of the evaluation process and data tools was impressive. Information gathered was always triangulated through adopting a range of methods. The principles of 'do no harm', neutrality, impartiality and independence were at the forefront of each evaluation and upheld throughout the research process. Chapters five and six present the research findings. Although, other project areas are included in one of the case studies such as education and food security, both case studies are heavily focused on water, hygiene and sanitation projects.

## Chapter 5

### Action by Churches Together Programme, Bari and Nugaal, Somalia

#### 5.1 Action by Churches Together

Action by Churches Together (ACT) International was established in 1995 and as of January 2010 became known as the ACT Alliance. ACT is composed of over 100 member organisations working in long-term development and humanitarian aid. ACTs members operate in over 130 countries with approximately 30,000 staff and volunteers and mobilise around US\$1.5 billion per year.

ACTs vision and mission statements comprise of the following:

*“The ACT Alliance works towards a world community where all God’s creation lives with dignity, justice, peace and full respect for human rights and the environment”* (Act Alliance, 2010, para. 2).

*“Members of the alliance work together for positive and sustainable change in the lives of people affected by poverty and injustice through coordinated and effective humanitarian, development and advocacy work. We work with and for people of all faiths and none”* (Act Alliance, 2010, para. 2).

The ACT Alliance is a member of the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP). ACT is a signatory to the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief and is committed to the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. This demonstrates ACTs commitment to the delivery of quality, transparent

interventions that uphold the humanitarian imperative and fundamental principles of humanitarian interventions.

Through its member organisations, ACT implements programmes that aim to:

- Overcome poverty;
- Adapt to changes in the environment and reduce the risk of future disasters;
- Cope with and be better prepared for emergencies;
- Recover from major setbacks due to conflicts or war; and
- Influence governments and other decision makers to fulfill their duties in protecting basic human rights.

Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) is a member of the ACT Alliance and has been operational in Somalia since 1993. Norwegian Church Aid is funded by the ACT Alliance to provide humanitarian aid to the Bari and Nugaal regions of Somalia. They were selected because of their resources, expertise and experience of operating in Somalia. Norwegian Church Aid began work in these areas in 2004 and implements the following programmes:

- Water, sanitation and hygiene;
- Livelihood and trade;
- Religious communities and peace building;
- Women, peace and security; and
- Education.

## 5.2 Bari and Nugaal


Bari and Nugaal are adjoining regions in north eastern and central Puntland respectively. The Bari region is divided into two administrative regions – Bari in the North and Karkaar in the South (see Map 6). Bari is the largest province in Puntland and is bordered by the Sanaag and Sool regions to the west, Nugaal to the south, the Gulf of Aden to the north and the Indian Ocean to the east. Bari consists of six districts – Bossaso, Galgala, Qardho, Iskushuban, Qandala and Bender Beyla – as demonstrated by Map 7.

**Map 6 Puntland, Somalia**



(Source: Weinstein, 2000)

## Map 7 Bari and Nugaal



(Source: Adapted from FSAU, 2005)

Nugaal is one of the smallest administrative regions in Somalia and consists of three main districts – Eyl, Burtinle and Garowe (see Map 7) – and one relatively new and small district – Dongorayo. Nugaal is bordered by Ethiopia and the contested Somaliland region of Sool to the west, Bari region to the North, Mudug region to the South and the Indian Ocean to the East. A major geographic feature of the Nugaal region is the Nugaaleed Valley, a large shallow drainage basin, fed by the Nugaaleed and Dheere rivers during the April-June rainy season.

Throughout Bari and Nugaal the Majerteen are the dominant clan in the region although, Carab Saalax (Meheri), Warsengeli (Maakhirans), Awrtable, Dishishle, Leelkase, Jambeel, and the Madibaan clans also have significant representation in the regions (Somalinet, 2009).

It is estimated that Puntland hosts up to 70,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), most of whom live in congested settlements in and around major cities and towns (OCHA, 2007). Bari and Nugaal have benefited from relative



stability since the establishment of the Puntland state, unlike their neighbouring regions - Sool, Sanaag and Mudug – which have all continuously suffered periods of major conflict and instability. Puntlands relatively peaceful state particularly, during the years of raging civil war in the south have continuously attracted large numbers of IDPs. The rising population in Puntland combined with the number of IDPs in these areas have stretched resources. Furthermore, standards of living for the host populations have been detrimentally impacted as through the extensive traditional Somali family and clan network, hosts are obligated to assist wherever possible.


### **5.2.1 Livelihoods**

Livelihoods in Bari and Nugaal centre around livestock, fishery and agriculture (see Map 8). The majority of people depend on livestock and approximately 65 percent of the Puntland population are nomadic pastoralists and fishermen (Ministry of Planning and Statistics, 2003). Puntland has an eight-month fishing season and during this time the fishing industry provides direct employment for thousands of people as well as indirect employment for many people in coastal enterprises such as hotels, restaurants and shops. Fishing populations are vast and diverse with large populations of yellow fin tuna, groupers, snappers, sharks and rays. The fishing industry is the second highest income earner for the population of Puntland, after livestock.

Livestock production is the main economic activity of Somalia and is dominant throughout Puntland. Accurate livestock population figures are lacking in Puntland however, a survey conducted in collaboration between the Ministry of Planning and Statistics and the World Bank in 2002 indicated there are 20.7 million goats, 9.9 million sheep and 3.6 million camels in Puntland (Ministry of Planning and Statistics, 2003). This sector, however, has been seriously affected over recent years as four years successive droughts and flash floods have caused many livestock to perish. The livestock sector further diminished through trade restrictions, as countries such as Saudi Arabia have placed intermittent bans on the import of Somali livestock making income unreliable (NCA Progress Report, 2005). Subsequently, fishing became a

larger aspect of livelihoods and the fishing industry became increasingly relied upon by more people. The resident coastal communities of Puntland depend heavily upon the commercial fishing of lobsters, shark and kingfish for export. Pre-Tsunami, the majority of households purchased 90-95 percent of their food using income from fishing or fishing related sources. Hence, livelihood options in Bari and Nugaal are limited and consequently, highly susceptible to shocks.

**Map 8 Puntland Livelihoods**



(Source: FSAU, 2009).

The abundance of marine resources and lack of law enforcement made these coastal areas popular for illegal foreign fishing trawlers. This risk of over harvesting one of Puntlands most key natural resources prompted the Puntland State to quickly establish a Ministry of Fisheries with an aim of protecting future fish stocks (Puntland Government, no date). The United

Nations Environment Programme estimates that Somalia loses approximately US\$300 million each year to illegal foreign fishing vessels (Godoy, 2010).

Piracy is a major issue along the Puntland coastline and many pirates claim they are defending their waters from illegal fishing vessels. Reports estimated these pirates earned US\$170 million during 2011, which is greater than Somalia's national budget (Mayton, 2012). This money has contributed substantially to the economy of Puntland, improved living standards and has even been traced down to show it is reaching even the poorest members of society (Harper, 2009). Eyl town in Nugaal is Somalia's main pirate town with the majority of ships captured transported there. As of 2008, over a dozen ships were in captivity held by pirate crews in Eyl (BBC, 2008).

### **5.2.2 Current Situation in Puntland**

In Puntland extreme poverty is defined as the inability of a household to pay costs of a basic monthly food basket from the market, which usually equates to the international standard of extreme poverty of living on less than US\$1 per day. The last socio-economic survey of Puntland was conducted in 2002 by UNDP. The results indicated that 43.2 percent of the population are living in extreme poverty and 30.2 percent of the population are living in moderate poverty, classified as living on less than US\$2 per day (UNDP, 2002). It is of little surprise therefore, that a large proportion of Puntlands population suffers food insecurity and 36 percent of children under five years of age are underweight. As of 2010 only 58 percent of boys and 37 percent of girls in Puntland were enrolled in primary education and only half of these children continue on to secondary education. Adult literacy rates in Puntland are poor and only around 32 percent of adult women are classed as literate (Government of State of Puntland and UNDP Puntland, 2010).

In Puntland, neither wastewater networks nor treatment facilities exist at any level. There is a broad evidence of contamination of water tables particularly near the surface through soil infiltration. Water of acceptable quality (still generally requiring basic treatment) can be found only by drilling deep wells or

boreholes to 150-400m deep. Despite this, the majority of people rely on shallow wells and have no sanitation facilities (Geopolicy, 2012).

The 2004 Asian Tsunami devastated many of Puntlands coastal communities and displaced some 50,000 people (AsiaNews, 2005). Water and sanitation facilities were destroyed or contaminated, food stores swept away, roads and other infrastructure were damaged and hundreds of fishing boats were lost, devastating lives and livelihoods and leaving people vulnerable, exposed and in need of emergency assistance.

*“It was a calm midday, things were all normal. Then the sea disappeared it went three miles back. The beach was full of fish, lobsters and shrimps so everyone ran to the beach to collect the catch. After 15 minutes we heard a roaring noise so loud and terrifying you would not believe it. Then the wave came, we could see it coming towards us. It was 10-15m high and coming straight to our beach. Everyone ran, they ran as fast as they could up the hill. People were screaming and terrified. It destroyed our houses. It destroyed our fishing nets and boats. It destroyed everything. The next day’s people tried to catch fish and lobster for food but there was nothing in the sea. The sea died”* (Village Chief, El Dhirdir, 2007).

The areas most affected by the Tsunami were the Hafun, Bender Beyla and Eyl Districts in the State of Puntland. Prior to the Tsunami, approximately five percent of the population was in a state of humanitarian emergency while 40 percent of the population was facing livelihood crises<sup>9</sup> (NCA Interim report, 2006).

Approximately 600 boats were destroyed by the Tsunami and an estimated 75 percent of fishing equipment was lost or destroyed. The delicate livelihood

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<sup>9</sup> Persons in a humanitarian emergency, who access less than 7.5 litres of water per day, face complete loss of livelihood assets and are unable to meet their dietary needs (this is the second worst humanitarian condition). Persons in acute livelihood crises are able to meet their daily dietary needs through asset stripping and receive little more than 7.5 litres of water per day (this is the third worst humanitarian condition) (NCA, 2005).

strategies in these areas with a heavy reliance on the fishing sector meant coping strategies for survival quickly became limited. The Tsunami struck in December, peak fishing season, making the impact on livelihoods most devastating. Households adopted various coping strategies, which mainly included reducing expenditure on food through reducing meals per day; seeking credit on food and water; securing donations from Diaspora; selling assets; and migrating to urban centres and less affected villages to seek employment. The majority of people affected however, quickly became completely reliant on humanitarian organisations for the provision of food and water.

Immediately after the Tsunami struck people began using salvaged materials to erect temporary shelters. The loss of fish meant food shortages and people became totally reliant upon existing livestock. Water and sanitation was a major issue with the majority of fresh water springs contaminated and no income from fishing left people unable to purchase water trucks. Even when expensive water trucks were successfully purchased they had to travel long, treacherous journeys to reach the coastal towns and many were hijacked along the way whilst others simply broke down due to the poor quality of the roads. The situation swiftly became desperate as many were undernourished and forced to rely on contaminated sources of water, causing cases of water-borne diseases including diarrhea and dysentery to spread rapidly.

### **5.2.1 The Humanitarian Response**

In response to the Tsunami, UN agencies, intergovernmental organisations and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), in cooperation with local government authorities, conducted a multi-sector assessment. The Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency (HADMA, the humanitarian wing of the Puntland Government) and UN OCHA coordinated the response, allocating different Agencies to different areas to avoid overlap and duplication of activities (OCHA, 2005). A Tsunami Task Force was established to facilitate the coordination of the humanitarian response on a daily basis (UNDP, 2005).

The ACT Alliance responded to the Tsunami disaster in Somalia through their implementing partner, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). Norwegian Church Aid, in collaboration with HADMA, selected 15 villages and towns in the Districts of Bender Beyla and Eyl that were in serious need of assistance. NCA initially planned to provide relief services in the fields of water and sanitation, and the provision of fishing equipment. Further assessments and information from the inter-agency coordination forums, however, identified that few Agencies had scheduled relief programmes in the water and sanitation sector in comparison to the fishing sector. Therefore, NCA decided to concentrate all its intervention activities in water and sanitation projects and community capacity building for sustainability.

NCA introduced projects in 15 villages and towns that included: nine mechanised water projects in areas directly affected by the Tsunami and six *berkad*<sup>10</sup> water projects in areas indirectly affected by the Tsunami. The mechanised projects used water pumps at natural springs and then either diesel generators or solar power to pump the water to various points and taps within each of the towns and villages. NCA constructed seven and rehabilitated two mechanised water systems. The towns and villages with mechanised water systems also benefited from improved sanitation that involved the construction of 96 Ventilated Improved Pit (VIP)<sup>11</sup> latrines and one slaughter house. NCA implemented the water and sanitation projects through a mixture of contracting arrangements and in-house construction methods. NCA additionally collaborated with a local implementing partner – The Forum for Peace and Governance (FOPAG) (see Box 5) – to develop a capacity building element at each of the 15 water and sanitation projects.

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<sup>10</sup> A *berkad* is a traditional human-made reservoir usually filled by rainfall and runoff. They are typically shaded with small bushes, have a capacity of 30 to 400 m<sup>3</sup> and used for both livestock and human consumption. Berkads were traditionally privately owned by households and provided a source of income.

<sup>11</sup> A Ventilation Improved Pit latrine is a pit toilet with a ventilation pipe fitted to the pit and a fly screen at the top outlet of the pipe. They overcome the disadvantages of simple pit latrines as the smell is carried upwards by the chimney effect and flies are prevented from leaving the pit and spreading disease.

## Box 5 FOPAG

The Forum for Peace and Governance (FOPAG) is an exclusively indigenous organisation. It was founded in 2001, taking over the Life and Peace Institute's (LPI) Horn of Africa Programme. The LPI has been involved in the Somaliland and Somalia peace building process since 1992. FOPAG was established, owned and governed by the civil society organisations in Somaliland and Somalia in 2001. It is a non-political and non-profit NGO. The institution is community-centred, research and action oriented and operates in both Somaliland and Somalia in affiliation with the IGAD sub-region, focusing on peace and governance and underlying factors that cater for their achievement.

FOPAG's mission is to contribute to the development of a democratic system of governance within the framework of enhanced traditional participatory conflict transformation and peace building processes and mechanisms.

NCA's response to the Tsunami was driven by one overall goal that was underpinned by two main objectives in delivering humanitarian assistance to these areas:

- **Goal:** The aim of the project is to restore human dignity and to restore survival chances for over 44,000 people affected directly or indirectly by the Tsunami by providing clean drinking water for the human population and livestock, and adequate sanitation.
- **Objective A:** Provide clean drinking water to 44,000 affected people in 15 villages in Bender Beyla, Dangoroyo and Eyl Districts.
- **Objective B:** Improve on environmental sustainability, by mobilising and supporting the communities to dig pit latrines in the villages/towns directly affected by the Tsunami.

(Source: NCA, 2006).

### **5.3 Evaluation of ACTs Response**

ACT contracted the researcher to lead an evaluation of their response to the Tsunami disaster. The purpose of the evaluation was to:

- Evaluate the immediate and longer-term impact of the emergency response in order to determine how adequately men, women, children and the most vulnerable people in the affected population were assisted by ACT member NCA;
- Evaluate the sustainability of achievements and impact, including the participation of the assisted communities;
- Assess the degree to which the key goal and objectives (outlined above) have been achieved; and
- Provide learning that may be applied to future operations, including key issues to consider when transitioning between humanitarian assistance to long-term development.

The researcher used the following evaluative criteria for the purpose of this research:

- Relevance and appropriateness;
- Effectiveness;
- Efficiency; and
- Impact and Sustainability

Other criteria used for this evaluation in order to address ACTs purpose of the evaluation were:

- Transparency;
- Accountability;
- Gender sensitivity
- Flexibility; and
- Adherence to Sphere Standards and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Code of Conduct and Code of Conduct on Sexual Exploitation.



NCA's projects are discussed in more detail below. Following this each of the evaluation criteria is taken in turn and the various projects and relief efforts are examined through these criteria. Through the findings and layers of analysis conducted for both case studies the researcher identified an alternative approach to delivering humanitarian aid in chronic complex emergencies: a cohesive dual approach that has a strategy for meeting the acute needs and a strategy for addressing the chronic needs of the community. These strategies must be integrated, flexible, coherent and have synergies so that whatever is implemented in one complements the other.

In addition to an alternative approach the researcher established five themes that provide a structure for grouping findings together that enables a more comprehensive analysis and discussion:

1. The Community;
2. Hardware;
3. Software, Culture and Religion;
4. Local Management; and
5. The most vulnerable.

Following an overview of NCA's humanitarian response, the following findings are grouped accordingly into either one of the five key themes outlined above or the broader strategy for delivering humanitarian aid in chronic complex emergencies.

### **5.3.1 Implementation**

During the peak fishing season pastoralists would normally travel to coastal areas to fish therefore, the total number of people directly and indirectly affected by the Tsunami is difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, both the coastal year-round residents and seasonal fishermen and their families rely on fishing for subsistence and to purchase food and water. The loss of this food source and income combined with the contamination of water sources along the coastline during the peak fishing season was devastating. Villages and towns initially paid what they could for water trucking and when their money quickly

ran out, they relied completely upon humanitarian organisations trucking water to them. Water trucking however, is neither sustainable nor reliable. Hence, NCA implemented 15 water and sanitation projects. Based on the number of projects implemented and the size of the villages and towns, it is estimated that NCA's projects have directly and indirectly affected between 30,000-44,000 people.

#### **5.3.1.1 Water**

NCA's water projects comprised of nine mechanised projects and six *berkad* projects. The six *berkad* sites were implemented in villages indirectly affected by the Tsunami and are fully functional and still providing adequate water supplies to-date. Since installation six of the mechanised projects had been fully functional and were providing safe water to the communities. In two of the mechanised water project sites (Falah Falah and Suuj) the water pumps had been stolen. The communities of Falah Falah and Suuj however, apprehended the thieves and retrieved the stolen pumps. NCA has since assisted the communities in re-installing the pumps. Hence, eight of the nine mechanised water projects are now fully functional.

One of the mechanised water project sites is not functional due to a blockage. The local community want this water source covered to prevent future blockages, however, the nomadic community that rely upon this water point for their livestock do not want it covered. This project has suffered two previous blockages and NCA had removed these. Continuously unblocking the water source is not a sustainable option and therefore, NCA are not planning to remove this blockage until the local community and nomadic community reach an agreement to prevent future blockages or cover the water point. Overall, NCA has succeeded in supplying clean drinking water to 14 of the 15 villages/towns.

#### **5.3.1.2 Sanitation**

NCA constructed 96 Ventilation Improved Pit (VIP) latrines in six locations (Aris, Baq Baq, Dhuudo, Dhuur, El Dhirdir and Suuj). NCA had planned to

construct latrines in the nine locations where they were implementing mechanised water projects. NCA decided early on that it would not be effective or appropriate to construct latrines at the six berkad sites during this phase and that funds would be better spent on the water projects themselves in these areas.

During the early phases of the projects NCA requested a number of communities to begin digging pit latrines and then NCA would later provide the final superstructure. In several locations such as Dhuudo and Baq Baq, the community were requested to dig and prepare 10 pits, however, they actually prepared 26 and 20 pits respectively. A break down in communications amongst NCA staff constructing the pit latrines on the ground and staff at the head office in Puntland resulted in NCA providing the superstructures for all the pits dug in Dhuudo and Baq Baq. This meant resources to construct latrines were not available for a number of other project sites (Bender Beyla, Falah Falah and Qundheed). Thus, in these three locations NCA was unable to fulfill its objective. Table 16 below indicates the number of VIP latrines installed at each project site.

NCA has undertaken a number of measures to prevent this from re-occurring in the future. NCAs Team Leader who made the decision to overspend in some locations has been replaced. NCA Nairobi staff visited Puntland and held workshops and meetings with the staff covering a range of issues including the limitation of funds and resources and the importance of not overspending in one location and the consequences this has on other projects. The town of Bender Beyla is now recovering well from the Tsunami and their fishing economy has stabilised. Subsequently, since NCA implemented the water project and trained a Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) committee particularly covering issues surrounding the importance of good hygiene and sanitation, households began constructing their own latrines without support from NCA. It is estimated that over 100 households in Bender Beyla now have latrines. NCA is continuing its work in Puntland and has planned to construct latrines in the remaining two locations

that did not receive latrines as planned during the initial phase of their operations.

**Table 16 Number of VIP Latrines Implemented**

<b>Location</b>	<b>Number of VIP Latrines Installed</b>
Aris	10
Baq Baq	20
Dhuudo	26
Dhuur	15
El Dhirdir	15
Suuj	10

### **5.3.1.3 Training and Water and Environmental Sanitation Committees**

In addition to the hardware elements of NCAs projects there was an equally important software element to each of the projects. NCA provided training in the 15 villages/towns. In each community a Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) committee was established. At the nine mechanised water projects, 11 community members were trained for the WES committee and at the six berkad water projects, five community members were trained for the WES committee. This training had two aspects, firstly training specific to water and sanitation and secondly training surrounding broader environmental issues including rubbish disposal and the importance of a clean, uncontaminated environment. In all locations visited by the evaluation the environments were clear of most rubbish and in several locations garbage pits had been dug and were being successfully utilised. This indicates the projects are having a much broader positive environmental impact.

NCA initially discussed the roles and responsibilities of a WES committee with the communities and provided criteria to help guide their selection of members. The criteria emphasised that several members should be literate and others should at least be respected, trusted and able to carry out the necessary tasks. NCA also highlighted that as women are the primary

collectors and users of water the WES committee should contain female members, however, NCA did not force this issue or request that WES committees comprised of equal numbers of men and women instead they allowed the communities to decide. All the communities established WES committees and there are female members present on 13 of the 15 committees.

The WES training was intensive over five days and covered many topics including:

- Water management, including establishing and maintaining a payment mechanism;
- Disease transmission and prevention;
- Water source contamination and prevention;
- The importance of good hygiene and how to establish and maintain good hygiene;
- Sanitation and how to establish and maintain good sanitation; and
- The importance of training and educating the wider community on good hygiene, sanitation and environmental health.

In regards to the nine mechanised water projects, all the communities decided that female members of the WES committee should take charge of operating the communal water points and collecting payments as in Somali society women are most trusted with money<sup>12</sup>. Two male members of these WES committees were selected to receive an additional two days of training to become technicians. These men conduct the daily maintenance of the generators, pipes and other equipment and oversee the general running of the water system. Most WES committees (certainly the ones met by the evaluation) meet on a regular basis with their elders committees and village/town Chiefs to discuss current issues and any problems.

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<sup>12</sup> The trustworthiness of women with money was something reiterated at the majority of project sites from village elders and religious leaders.

Initially NCA decided to contract a local NGO to train the WES committees. The Forum for Peace and Governance (FOPAG) was selected and they designed a training manual and training materials. They worked in collaboration with NCAs Community Development Officer. The Community Development Officer identified any gaps in the hygiene and disease transmission elements in the training manual and collaborated with FOPAG to ensure these topics would be effectively covered. FOPAG trained six communities – Baq Baq, Dhuudo, Dhuur, Aris, Bender Beyla and El Dhirdir – and the NCA Community Development Officer was present during each training session to ensure quality and consistency. The Community Development Officer would also identify any weaknesses or specific issues for each community and then ensure these topics were covered thoroughly or in greater detail.

After the completion of the sixth training session, FOPAG received an opportunity for work elsewhere and therefore, could not conduct any further training for NCA. NCAs Community Development Officer hired co-facilitators and used the same resources to train the other communities. Due to the close collaboration with FOPAG, NCAs Community Development Officer was able to provide the remaining communities with the same level and standard of training as FOPAG had provided. The WES committee technicians at each site were all trained by NCAs technician and engineer to assure they had a thorough understanding of their individual water system and would be capable of conducting relevant repairs and maintenance work.

The WES committee training programme established by FOPAG was based upon the Qur'an, local Somali proverbs and Somali poems. These were utilised to illustrate the importance of hygiene and cleanliness. While humankind in general usually considers cleanliness to be a pleasing attribute, Islam insists on it. Box 6 below discusses the importance of sanitation, hygiene and the sustainable use of water in Islam.

## Box 6 Islam and Water

Islam ascribes the most sacred qualities to water as a life-giving, sustaining, and purifying resource. *"It is the origin of all life on earth, the substance from which God created man"* (Qur'an 25:54). The Qur'an emphasises its centrality: *"We made from water every living thing"* (Qur'an 21:30). *"And it is He who created the heavens and the earth in six days, and his Throne was upon water"*. (Qur'an 11:7). In Islam major importance is placed upon purity, cleanliness and good hygiene.

Muslims are required to take care of their personal hygiene by assuring that they are well groomed, and that their bodies, clothing, and surroundings are clean. The Prophet Muhammad reinforced the importance of cleanliness when he said, *"cleanliness is half of faith"*. Islam is the only religion that requires its believers to follow certain hygienic procedures that safeguard the human from infectious diseases.

The word 'water' occurs 66 times in the Qur'an and there are many verses covering how it should be used and managed sustainably for example, *"Don't waste water even if you are on a running river"*. Islam stresses the importance of preventing the pollution of water resources. Urinating in stagnant water, urinating in a place of bathing, urinating on soft ground and discharging wastewater into a water stream are all forbidden acts in Islam. The Prophet Muhammad said: *"No one should bathe in still water, when he is unclean"*.

In the Shariah, there is a responsibility placed on upstream farms to be considerate of downstream users. A farm beside a stream is forbidden to monopolise its water. After withholding a reasonable amount of water for crops, the farmer must release the rest to those downstream. Furthermore, if the water is insufficient for all of the farms along the stream, the needs of the older farms are to be satisfied before the newer farm is permitted to irrigate. This reflects the importance in Islam of using water resources sustainably. According to jurists such as Malik and Ibn Qudamah, these same principles apply to the extraction of groundwater and they said a person has no right to adversely affect his neighbours well by lowering the water table or polluting the aquifer.

(Source: Islamreligion.com, 2011; Kasem, 2007; and Abumoghli, 2010).



Norwegian Church Aids 15 water and sanitation projects that were implemented on behalf of Action by Churches Together are examined below in accordance with the evaluative criteria selected for the purpose of this research – relevance and appropriateness; effectiveness; efficiency; and impact and sustainability.

### **5.3.2 Strategy**

ACT selected Norwegian Church Aid to be its implementing partner in responding to the Tsunami disaster in Somalia. NCA were appointed due to their experience of working in Somalia and understanding of Somali culture and their experience of responding to sudden onset disasters in complex emergencies. The Tsunami disaster caused a loss of livelihoods, housing, infrastructure, services, water sources and food stores for many people. NCA have expertise and skills in most of these sectors – rebuilding livelihoods; shelter; education; water and sanitation; and food security. Hence, NCA were an appropriate organisation to implement ACTs emergency response to the Tsunami disaster.

NCA Somalia has a strong regional headquarters in Nairobi who have the capacity, experience and resources to support an emergency programme in Puntland. NCAs long history in the Gedo region of Somalia meant they had an excellent understanding of the country, the people, religion, traditions and cultures. This enabled NCA to quickly establish a local team and propose an effective response.

### **Key Finding 1**

An organisation that has experience and knowledge of operating in a country or culture is key to ensuring an appropriate emergency response is developed.

Numerous humanitarian organisations responded to the Tsunami in Somalia. Most engaged in providing fishing equipment; food aid and water trucking

services. NCAs decision to respond was immediate and during January 2005 NCA carried out a joint needs assessment with Save the Children UK (SC UK). Unfortunately, this needs assessment was not useful to NCA. The needs assessment contained chapters on food security, health, education and shelter. It highlighted water and sanitation as the most immediate and priority need of the affected communities, but there was no further information provided on water and sanitation and the actual needs of the affected communities. Information from the inter-agency coordination forums, established to coordinate the response to the Tsunami, confirmed water and sanitation as a priority need throughout the region. NCA therefore, decided to concentrate all its efforts in the water and sanitation sector. The decision to focus on implementing water and sanitation projects was definitely appropriate to the needs of the affected population. The needs assessment team from NCA consisted of the Programme Coordinator and a Water and Sanitation Consultant. They were to provide SC UK with the necessary information on water and sanitation, which would be included in the needs assessment report, however, the Water and Sanitation Consultant failed to provide the relevant information and SC UK published the needs assessment without a water and sanitation section. This hampered the timeliness of NCAs response.

The first joint needs assessment conducted by NCA and SC UK did not prove cost effective to NCA and they had to undertake a second needs assessment to identify actual needs in water and sanitation and identify possible project sites. NCA ensured the second needs assessment would be much more efficient through hiring experts in engineering water and sanitation projects and requesting them to design the projects as they conducted the needs assessment. NCA undertook a second needs assessment during April 2005. NCA delayed in undertaking the second needs assessment to ensure they hired appropriate and capable specialists. Subsequently, a separate visit to the project sites to prepare engineering plans and designs was not needed after the needs assessment. This reduced the time between conducting a needs assessment, producing designs and plans, and actual implementation, and therefore, improved the overall efficiency of the programme.

## Key Finding 2

Including appropriate experts to conduct a needs assessment enables realistic proposals and designs to be scoped out during the needs assessment and thus, improves the efficiency of responding to crises.

A number of outside factors hampered the efficiency of NCAs interventions. When the Tsunami struck organisations were not able to enter areas and begin planning projects, as they needed to coordinate with one another first to prevent overlap. Somalia has good telecommunication services and soon after the Tsunami the government were well informed as to which communities had been affected both directly and indirectly. The Government of Puntland is relatively new and inexperienced in managing or coordinating a disaster response. The government established HADMA (Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency) and with assistance from UN OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance) began coordinating the response. This slowed the coordination process but was necessary to ensure a holistic approach was adopted; strong working relationships were developed between the government and the international community; and capacity within the government was strengthened for future emergencies. With government advice from HADMA and several needs assessments, NCA selected its project sites.

Prior to implementation, the Puntland State Agency Water, Energy and Natural Resources (PSAWEN) accompanied NCA to each of the 15 project sites. PSAWEN introduced NCA to the communities, elders committees and local authorities. The reassurance provided by PSAWEN meant communities quickly trusted NCA and were willing to support and actively participate in the projects. These introductory meetings also enabled NCA to discuss in depth with the communities their needs and priorities. In communities where corruption, illegitimate organisations and organisations that fail to deliver promises have been prolific, gaining trust and confidence can prove difficult for organisations. PSAWEN are highly respected amongst local communities

and therefore, through their visible support for NCAs projects, communities trusted NCA from the onset. Consequently, this allowed NCA staff and each of the communities to quickly form strong relationships. This enhanced the efficiency of the projects, as NCA had trust and respect, local communities were willing to actively participate as far as possible in each phase of the project.

### **Key Finding 3**

Efficient implementation of projects with community participation demands trust. Using a trusted third party to introduce communities and organisations helps establish initial trust on both sides.

The security situation in the region means caution must always be taken. Organisations receive regular security briefs and must follow the necessary steps to ensure safety, for example, evacuation procedures must be in place and travel at night particularly outside cities and towns is not advised. The issues of security, coupled with the limited infrastructure in the region, means transporting equipment is a slow and expensive process.

During the initial phase of NCAs response, water pumps and equipment not obtainable in Puntland were purchased in Nairobi and flown to Garowe. The aircrafts and flight operators were not specialised in transporting these goods and several pieces of equipment including a number of generators were damaged during transportation. This caused delays in implementation as NCA Puntland staff had to repair damaged equipment upon arrival before it could be dispatched to project sites. NCA examined the logistics and discovered the required equipment was available in Dubai for shipping direct to Puntland ports. The procurement route was subsequently changed and as a result equipment no longer arrives damaged or in need of repair and thus, the efficiency of NCA operations has improved. The Government of Puntland has also removed taxes on shipping imports of equipment for international NGOs, which further reduced the costs. Other materials were sourced locally

wherever possible to both reduce costs and the time required for procurement.

#### **Key Finding 4**

When procuring materials and equipment all options should be initially examined to ensure the most cost effective option is adopted from the onset. Additionally, should any problems arise with the primary procurement process organisations will already have details of alternative sources and methods of procurement.

NCA has implemented 15 water and sanitation projects. Prior to NCAs interventions these villages and towns were paying what they could for water trucking and when their money ran out they relied completely on humanitarian organisations trucking water to them. The insecurity in the region combined with a lack of roads and other infrastructure caused many problems and made water trucks highly unreliable.

NCAs projects have ensured all members of the community have immediate and reliable access to water, without which life would not be possible. These new water sources are protected and clean resulting in fewer incidences of water related illnesses and since NCAs interventions there have been no serious outbreaks of cholera, dysentery or diarrhea in any of their project sites. Hence, NCAs activities generated immediate health improvements within the communities, increasing resilience and reducing vulnerability, especially amongst the children.

#### **Key Finding 5**

A humanitarian emergency demanded a long-term strategy that addressed underlying vulnerabilities in order to ensure interventions were sustainable.

After the Tsunami fresh water was extremely scarce and several communities informed the evaluation that many conflicts began to erupt over access to

water sources. NCAs water projects ensured all members of the community had access to sufficient quantities of water and as a result, conflicts over water in these towns and villages stopped immediately. The prevention of conflicts can also be attributed to the detailed discussions of ownership and access held between NCA and village/town leaders and representatives from the communities. This is discussed further in section 5.3.3 The Community below.

Where NCA have implemented water and sanitation projects survival chances and human dignity have certainly been improved for men, women and children. In the nine locations with mechanised water point's survival chances and adaptive capacity have been significantly improved as communities sell their water to purchase food and other items.

### **Key Finding 6**

The provision of effective and sustainable water sources have much wider impacts, increasing resilience, reducing vulnerability and promoting the adaptive capacity of communities.

NCA constructed 96 Ventilation Improved Pit (VIP) latrines in six project sites. NCA utilised local labour and local materials to construct these latrines and also encouraged members of the community to build their own. The latrines had a number of immediate impacts. The safe disposal of human waste creates the first barrier to excreta-related diseases reducing transmission through both direct and indirect routes. The provision of appropriate facilities for defecation is essential to the dignity, safety, long-term health and wellbeing of men, women and children. The risk of contracting genital infections, particularly for women, is significantly reduced and it provides a safe place that can be used in daylight, which means women do not have to wait for darkness and as such their risk of attack is greatly lowered. The change from defecating outside to using a latrine has additional indirect long-term benefits, for example, the safe disposal of human excreta improves health enabling more people to work and more children to attend school. As

more people improve their hygiene and standards of cleanliness less families risk contracting preventable diseases and as a result the long-term health and survival chances of families is improved. Additionally, the reduction in outside defecation means contamination of the environment and water sources is reduced.

### **5.3.3 The Community**

NCA involved each communities from the onset. Water and sanitation engineers conducted NCAs second needs assessment and during this process they had a series of discussions with the communities about the effects of the Tsunami and their priorities for the area. In all locations water was flagged as the ultimate priority. The local communities were able to outline their needs, priorities and ideas and then the engineers would discuss how these needs and priorities could be met; ideas put into practice; or alternative options for communities if their initial ideas were not technically feasible. Communities were involved as far as possible in the needs assessments and were kept informed of all ideas and plans. During the planning stage, NCA staff discussed the project designs with the community and the community decided with technical advice from NCA where the systems should be located and in particular where the communal water taps would be placed. The communities then decided how many people they would provide NCA to carry out the manual labour for the projects. They understood the more people who participated the faster the project would be completed and as this was their priority there were many people willing to actively participate. The communities provided most of the manual labour for all the projects, for example, at the mechanised water project sites an average of 50 people from the community provided labour inputs. The high level of community participation throughout each project meant the work was carried out effectively and received the full support of the community.

All communities excluding one, rated water and sanitation as their top priority. The community, which did not, stated their first priority was a new slaughter house and their second priority was water. NCA examined the old slaughter

house and found it in extremely poor condition, furthermore, the existing slaughter house was sited nearby the proposed water source, which could pose potential contamination problems. NCA in collaboration with the community, built a new slaughter house much further away from the water source. Following this they implemented a water and sanitation project with the community. The new slaughter house served a great purpose as it firstly reduced the likelihood of contamination to the water source and secondly demonstrated a bottom up approach with the community as the decision makers and owners of the project. This level of community ownership and decision making powers led to the community investing great energy, time, finances and materials into the water and sanitation project. In essence the community ownership established generated much greater positive impacts with a more sustainable project.

The six communities selected for berkad projects are largely inhabited by pastoralists. However, due to livestock losses over recent years, men in these communities had begun travelling to coastal areas to fish during the peak seasons. The loss of income from fishing as a result of the Tsunami meant few of these pastoralists could afford to purchase water for themselves and their livestock. These communities had previously sourced water from berkads and when the berkads dry up during the long dry season they would purchase water from nearby communities. Pastoralist communities in this region find berkads the most appropriate source of water as they provide an efficient method of watering livestock and require little maintenance, which is ideal when men must often walk their herds for days to find grazing areas.

NCA's decision to implement berkads in these areas was appropriate to both the needs of these communities during an emergency response and the livelihoods of these communities where large numbers of livestock require watering. The new berkads were also appropriate to the surrounding nomadic population who rely on these water sources for their livestock. Boreholes or mechanised water projects would not have been appropriate in these areas as during the peak fishing season many people migrate, which would leave expensive equipment vulnerable to vandalism or theft. This could also



encourage attacks on these communities, which are inhabited mostly by women and children during the peak fishing season who would not be able to defend their water system against thieves or militia groups.

The nine mechanised water projects were developed within coastal communities directly affected by the Tsunami. Most of the communities previously relied on fresh water springs and these were contaminated by the Tsunami. For various reasons berkad projects would not have been acceptable or appropriate in these areas, for example, berkads were not previously used in these communities, few people have significant numbers of livestock in the area and the environment is hilly therefore, it would prove difficult to find a suitable location for a berkad. The nine mechanised water projects were appropriate to their locations and the communities livelihoods and needs.

### **Key Finding 7**

Humanitarian projects must be aligned with community priorities. Projects should be compatible with and complement local livelihoods.

Solar power was selected by NCA in conjunction with the communities for use in four projects. Solar power was opted for in these areas as the solar panels could generate enough power to meet the needs of these smaller towns and villages and using solar power would mean no fuel costs. Communities throughout this region have an understanding of solar power as UNICEF and several other organisations have implemented solar power projects in towns and villages in the past. Unfortunately, two of the solar projects were damaged soon after their implementation. The technology was appropriate to the environment and the need; however, the lack of security in these areas mean the technology is prone to theft and vandalism. Additionally, due to the insecurity in other regions, large numbers of IDPs have since settled in many of these areas causing populations to swell resulting in pressure on the solar powered water projects. Hence, the solar power projects have become less appropriate to these areas than originally envisaged. Despite the benefits of

no fuel costs, the expanding populations as a result of the civil conflict in the south and the general lack of security in these areas mean community solar powered projects are vulnerable and inadequate.

Generators were selected for use in five of the mechanised water projects for two reasons. Firstly, these locations had larger populations and solar panels would be unable to supply sufficient quantities of power to pump water to the various community water points. Secondly, at these locations it is necessary to pump the water over farther distances or have the water pumped up steep hills and cliffs for which solar power would be ineffective. Although generators require regular fuel supplies, they are the most appropriate option for supplying water and adequately meeting the needs of large communities.

Each mechanised water project required a water tank. NCA constructed water tanks that were appropriate to the size of the local communities and the emergency context of the programme. Despite population growth within the communities since the interventions, the water tanks have remained functional and appropriate. Over-sizing water tanks based on possible population movements would have been inefficient and not cost-effective. Furthermore, most communities have been able to extend their water tanks through the profits accrued from selling their water.

NCA prioritised the nine mechanised water project sites as most in need. They decided to complete the nine locations and then begin the six berkad projects. This ensured NCAs staff were not overstretched. The engineers developed an implementation timetable that allowed them to concentrate on one-three locations at any time. This was the most efficient course of action as it enabled the engineers to be present on-site during the majority of implementation work, which allowed them to immediately identify and correct any problems or issues.

When NCAs field staff were more established and a number of the mechanised projects had been completed they hired two local contractors – SWV and KDO – to complete the six berkad projects. SWV and KDO

underwent a thorough tendering process to obtain these contracts. This ensured only reputable and highly capable organisations were hired to undertake activities. Hiring two local contractors meant work was ongoing in more than one location at any one time. Local contractors are often able to source labour and local materials cheaper than an international organisation. NCA staff monitored these projects closely to ensure the contractors fulfilled their agreement and work occurred in a timely fashion. During construction at all berkad sites limestone rock was unexpectedly encountered. This hard rock delayed the projects and both contractors hired specialist equipment to remove the limestone. Despite the problems encountered as a result of the unpredictable limestone rock all the berkad projects were completed successfully, within budget and in good time. Hiring local contractors proved cost-effective and built local capacity.

### **Key Finding 8**

Opportunities for contracting and collaborating with reputable local organisations should always be sought in order to strengthen local capacity and prevent resentment or hostility from local organisations.

NCA Puntland hires vehicles locally as opposed to purchasing their own. During the emergency phases of the response this was highly efficient as there was no time required for the sourcing of appropriate vehicles. In these locations vehicles require high maintenance and breakdown frequently due to the terrain. Through hiring vehicles, NCA did not face these problems or delays, and should a hired vehicle breakdown or require maintenance the local hiring agency would replace the vehicle, and replacements usually occur within the same day. This helps build the capacity of the local vehicle hiring agencies, provides employment for local drivers and is highly cost effective.

To commence their emergency response in Puntland, NCA utilised Somalia's traditional Hawala finance system. This Somali banking system is extremely effective and quick. It is based on trust within clans and has been operational for generations. A payment is made for example, to the appropriate Somali

member or bank in Nairobi (or in most countries throughout the world) and they telephone or email the relevant person in Somalia and the money is released to the agreed contact usually within the same day. This financing method was extremely appropriate given the emergency nature of NCAs response. The Hawala system, however, is expensive with charges as high as five percent. Once NCA were established in Puntland they explored other possibilities and negotiated an improved agreement as a trustworthy NGO. They now receive a charge of only two percent, which is much more cost effective.

### **Key Finding 9**

International organisations need to be flexible and capable, if necessary, of using traditional and local methods in order to implement emergency interventions. NCAs experience and extensive knowledge of the Hawala system enabled them to utilise the system and begin operations in a timely manner, which was critical given the state of emergency.

NCA decided through collaboration with the communities to implement Ventilation Improved Pit (VIP) latrines. These latrines have been constructed and used throughout Somalia and hence the majority of Somalis have seen them before and some already had a good understanding of how they operate. A handful of households (6) had basic pit latrines prior to the Tsunami but these were destroyed. The VIP latrines are simple to construct and the materials are available locally, therefore they are easy to maintain and re-produce. These latrines were appropriate to the needs, livelihoods and resources available to these communities.

After the projects were completed a number of communities contacted NCA in regards to theft or damage of equipment. In Falah Falah and Suuj the water pumps were stolen and they contacted NCA for replacements. NCA explained it was the communities' responsibility and if NCA replaced it this would actually encourage more thefts in more locations in the future. NCA suggested the communities attempt to catch the thieves and retrieve the

pumps. In both Falah Falah and Suuj the communities successfully found the thieves and retrieved the pumps. NCA then re-visited the areas and provided technical support to reinstall the pumps. In Dhuur one of the solar panels was vandalised which has prevented the system operating at full capacity. The community requested a new solar panel from NCA who explained the same issues. Subsequently, this community began saving money and almost has sufficient funds to purchase a generator and NCA have agreed to provide technical assistance for its installation.

### **Key Finding 10**

An organisation that replaces stolen goods without discouraging future thefts is actually encouraging an increase in crime that could create a vicious cycle of thefts and dependence on humanitarian organisations.

Two months after each project was completed PSAWEN accompanied NCA staff to the village or town for a handing-over ceremony. NCA waited two months before handing over projects to ensure there were no immediate problems and this also demonstrated NCAs dedication to each community. During initial discussions with each community it was made clear this was the communities project and they would own it and be responsible for its management. The formal handing over ceremony ensured all members of the community understood they were responsible for the future of their project. This reinforces the issue of ownership and therefore, improves sustainability.

### **Key Finding 11**

Ownership must lie with the community if a project is to prove sustainable and this ownership must be emphasised from the onset and throughout the various phases of the project.

Upon completion of the project in Bender Beyla town the project suffered a number of minor breakdowns, which all required savings to be spent on new

parts. The Mayor of Bender Beyla hosted a community meeting to discuss the likelihood of future problems and the poor outlook for the project as he explained running costs were exceeding payments for water. Three local businessmen offered to establish a private organisation and they would use their own funds to purchase spare parts, fuel and salary payments for the water technicians. The community agreed this was the most sustainable option and now the private organisation – Anjeel – oversee the running costs and management of the project. The WES committee remains active and regularly audit and verify Anjeel's accounts and their work. Anjeel also provide security for the system to prevent theft and vandalism. Anjeel has installed water meters and taps in 180 households and each month collect the payments. This has transformed the lives of these households and greatly raised the standard of living. The most vulnerable households, schools, hospitals and mosques still receive free water. The community is extremely pleased with the system, which has never broken down since Anjeel's takeover. The community also emphasised that water-borne diseases are now uncommon in this area.

The Mayor of Bender Beyla visited Aris town to inform and educate the community of the new system in place in Bender Beyla. The community of Aris later contacted Bender Beyla to enquire whether Anjeel could take over their project. Aris town had also realised their payment scheme was not sufficient to cover any spare parts and the protection of their water system was becoming difficult to police particularly with the increasing number of IDPs in the area. By this time Anjeel were well established and had the capacity to take over the Aris town water project. The Aris community is very pleased with Anjeel's work and say the threat of theft or vandalism is no longer a problem.

In El Dhirdir NCA had originally constructed a floating pontoon on the spring as this maintained low costs and was appropriate under the emergency nature of the programme. The pontoon suffered minor problems particularly during a flood in August 2006, but the communities were able to carry out the necessary repairs. Then a major flood in May 2007 completely blocked the

system and damaged the pontoon. The community had saved US\$800 from the selling of water and intended to purchase a permanent structure to replace the pontoon, however, this money was stolen. In June 2007 the community of El Dhirdir contacted Anjeel and requested them to take over their project. Anjeel have replaced the pontoon with permanent concrete anchor blocks and the spring has been sealed to prevent future contamination from flooding. NCA provided Anjeel with technical assistance for this work. Subsequently, the community of El Dhirdir is extremely pleased with Anjeel's management of their system. The communities' initiative and the handover of the projects to a trustworthy and reliable private organisation combined with the WES committee's oversight and verification of work has greatly improved the sustainability of these projects.

### **Key Finding 12**

Community involvement and ownership is vital for the sustainability of any project. Communities must be able to adapt their projects and develop their own models of management. This should be encouraged and supported by implementing organisations in order for impacts to be long-term.

The berkad projects were constructed with labour inputs from the community and used locally available materials. The berkad projects visited by the evaluation all had sufficient quantities of water for the local communities, which, demonstrates their sustainability despite the lack of rainfall in the region. At these locations the communities had also copied the new design of berkads and replicated them. At both Budan Buto and Badweyn village there was one berkad completed through NCA and a second identical berkad that had been completed later by members of the community who were able to purchase the necessary materials. Communities that continue to develop projects themselves and duplicate the work of an organisation provide a good indication the project has been effective and will be sustainable.

### **Key Finding 13**

Utilising local materials and labour wherever possible in a project improves efficiency and ownership thus, increasing the likelihood and opportunity for that project to be well maintained and duplicated by the community themselves thus, proving more sustainable.

Communities explained in detail to the evaluation the work and various tasks they had undertaken to aid the completion of the project. There were also visible signs the communities had been deeply involved in the implementation. A number of the communities copied NCAs designs and constructed more latrines, additional water tanks and Berkads after NCA left the area. A community that is able to reproduce an organisations work demonstrates their understanding of the original project and their knowledge of the required materials, methods and labour.

### **Key Finding 14**

Active community participation throughout a project is key to improving its effectiveness, ownership and sustainability. Furthermore, this builds local capacity and skills.

It is important in Somali society to respect the traditional roles of both men and women. Upon entering a community NCA staff would always meet first with the village elders committee and village chiefs (all males). This is the correct protocol in Somalia and a sign of respect for the community. An organisation that does not respect this procedure is likely to receive little support from the community. NCA would then be introduced by the elders committee to any education committees, women's committees and the wider community.



### **Key Finding 15**

Following correct local protocols for entering a community is key to the level of participation, ownership and ultimate success of any project in Somalia.

Women are the main collectors and users of water in Somalia. Therefore, it is vital they are included in the decisions surrounding water, as the system will ultimately rely on them to make it work. The women have the best understanding and knowledge of the daily water needs and issues and their input in designing and planning a water system is vital. Thus, NCA involved a number of men and women from the communities throughout the implementation of the projects.

### **Key Finding 16**

The design and key decisions surrounding a project must involve the main intended end users to ensure it is effective and sustainable.

The communities divided the WES committee tasks between the men and women according to what is appropriate in Somali society. The women manage the communal water taps and collect payments as women are generally more trusted with money than men in Somalia; the male water technicians who received two days additional technical training carry out maintenance and minor repairs on the system; and both male and female members of the committee encourage latrine construction and undertake education and awareness raising within the community. The WES committees organise regular meetings with their community, elders and chiefs to raise awareness of issues. Then female members would identify any households not using the appropriate behaviours and visit them to encourage better hygiene and sanitation. In most communities, however, all members of the community adopted good hygiene and sanitation practices due to its importance for their religion. NCA respected and supported the division of labour. These small steps in men and women working together have given

women great respect and emphasised their important role and status within the community.

*“Before women never sat with us and were not included in our meetings now they are always in our meetings. Men and women work very good together”*  
(Village Elder, El Dhirdir town).

### **Key Finding 17**

Including women in projects whilst respecting traditional gender roles ensures their inclusion is accepted and not resented and is more likely to be sustainable.

#### **5.3.4 Hardware**

The five mechanised water projects powered by generators have proven highly effective. They deliver sufficient quantities of clean water to all members of the community. In each of these locations NCA constructed several water taps in various areas of the towns to guarantee accessibility and prevent long queues or conflicts over access to water. Hence, it is highly unlikely any member of these communities would collect water from an alternative unsafe water source.

The solar powered water project in Dhuudo town is operating effectively. The solar panels for the project in Aris town were stolen, however, the community were able to purchase a generator through money saved from selling their water. NCA assisted Aris community to install the generator. The community has also replaced the original two-inch piping with three-inch piping to cope with the new demands as the population grew rapidly in this area during the emergency response. Subsequently, SC UK has established a housing project in Aris that was previously not possible due to a lack of water available to produce the bricks. Hence, this project has proven extremely valuable and effective in this area in meeting the needs for water and improving the lives of the community. The solar powered water project in Dhuur town was partially damaged. One of the solar panels was vandalised. The system is still

operational but not to full capacity and as a result many people have reverted to using unsafe water sources including the nearby river and open shallow wells. Hence, this project has proven less effective in delivering clean water to the community. The community, however, are currently saving for a generator and NCA have agreed to assist with the installation.

The solar powered water project in Baq Baq town is currently not functioning. The nomadic community in this area protested against covering the water source and therefore it was left uncovered. The water source has been contaminated and blocked with rubbish twice and both times NCA assisted in unblocking the water point. The resident community requested the water source to be covered however, the nomadic population continued to protest. Recently the source was blocked again and continuous assistance from NCA would only drain resources and prove unsustainable. NCA have decided not to intervene until the community have reached a decision with the nomadic population as to whether the source will be covered and if not how they can prevent continuous blockages. Hence, the disagreement between the resident community and nomadic community has made this project less effective in delivering safe water to this area.

### **Key Finding 18**

Organisations must recognise when it is no longer effective to implement operations.

In this case, it would have proven more effective for NCA to divert resources from unblocking the water source to opening dialogue and positive engagement between the resident community and nomadic population. Thus, enabling a long-term solution to be sought.

### **Key Finding 19**

To deliver effective projects, organisations need flexibility when delivering humanitarian relief in order to respond to local situations and changing circumstances.

UNICEF and CARE International had both previously assessed the water situation in El Dhirdir and Suuj. They informed the communities it would be impossible to implement an effective and sustainable water system that would be cost-effective and maintainable. In El Dhirdir and Suuj the fresh water springs are at the base of steep cliffs and most organisations believed large and expensive power cables would be necessary. NCAs engineers, however, designed a simple overhead cable system whereby small, inexpensive cables could be utilised.

### **Key Finding 20**

Innovative, quality and skilled staff are key to the effectiveness and wider impact of a project.

These two projects in particular have proven highly effective and have transformed these communities. The daily collection of water was previously lengthy and treacherous costing the lives of many women and children. Since NCAs projects the collection of water is now safe and efficient and children are able to attend school on time. Other international humanitarian organisations including SC UK have since entered these communities and begun building local hospitals and schools, something they could not do previously due to the lack of water available for the construction work. A number of international organisations including UNICEF, have visited these sites to record the details of the engineering work and have begun replicating these systems at similar locations elsewhere in Puntland, which means these projects have had a much wider impact than initially intended.

Traditional berkads are used throughout Somalia, however, their basic open design means risk of contamination and loss of water through evaporation is high. NCA improved the traditional design in consultation with the communities. The improved berkads were covered to reduce contamination and the covering was sloped allowing rainwater to run off into the berkad. The covering also reduces water loss through evaporation. There were a series of channels dug to direct the rainwater into the berkad. These channels all led to a siltation pit, which prevents rubbish, debris, sand and silt from entering the berkad. The berkad projects were all in use and operating effectively. At several locations visited a number of old style berkads were present, however, all these berkads were completely dry. The communities highlighted that without the new berkads the women and children would have to walk long distances each day to collect water that would be mostly contaminated. Thus, NCAs interventions within these locations have proven highly effective as the communities have access to adequate quantities of safe water.

### **Key Finding 21**

Well designed hardware that is appropriate to the local environment and community is critical to any humanitarian project in a chronic complex emergency.

As mentioned in section 5.3.1.2 Sanitation, - three locations – Falah Falah, Qundheed and Bender Beyla – did not receive latrines as planned due to the over installation of latrines in other locations. The proposed sanitation activities in Falah Falah and Qundheed<sup>13</sup> have subsequently not been as effective as originally planned in for example, reducing outside defecation or improved hygiene practices. NCA has maintained a dialogue with these communities and is hoping to deliver VIP latrines in the future, which would greatly enhance the effectiveness of the WES committees and the hygiene and sanitation practices in these areas.

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<sup>13</sup> The hygiene and sanitation situation in Bender Beyla has improved and this is discussed further in section 5.3.1.2 Sanitation

## Key Finding 22

It is important to manage expectations from the onset and ensure boundaries and limitations of any project are clearly discussed with both communities and staff. This avoids disappointment and improves the transparency and communication between organisations and communities.

### 5.3.5 Software, Culture and Religion

In each community a Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) committee was established. The WES committees were selected through lengthy discussions with the communities and the WES committees were trained significantly for their roles. This detailed training has improved the sustainability of each committee. The researcher is aware that short training sessions of one-two days and limited discussions with communities generally produces short-lived committees, which lack the dedication or confidence to continue their work effectively. At the nine mechanised water projects 11 community members were trained for the WES committee and at the six berkad water projects five community members were trained for the WES committee. Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) committees were trained according to the type of project – berkad or mechanised – to ensure they received training that was appropriate and relevant to their needs and situation. At the mechanised water project sites, for example, two members of the WES committee were selected by the community to receive an additional two days training to become technicians and oversee the daily running and maintenance of the equipment. At the berkad sites this training was not necessary and therefore the training focused upon other relevant issues including contamination prevention.

NCA discussed the roles and responsibilities of a Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) committee with each community and provided criteria to help guide their selection of members. These criteria emphasise that several members should be literate and others should at least be respected, trusted and able to carry out the necessary tasks. NCA also highlighted that as women were the primary collectors and users of water the WES committee

should contain female members. NCA did not however, force this issue or request that WES committees contain equal numbers of men and women instead they allowed the communities to decide. Each community established a WES committee and there are female members present on 13 of the 15 committees.

At the nine mechanised water project sites each community decided that female members of the committee should take charge of operating the communal water points and as women in Somali society are most trusted with money they were additionally made responsible for collecting payments. Two men were selected by each community to be the technicians on their WES committees. These men conduct the daily maintenance of the generators, pipes and other equipment. Most WES committees meet on a regular basis with the elders committees and village/town Chiefs to discuss current issues and any problems. This highlights the value of the WES committee to the community and has also proven effective in ensuring that women are represented and active in community debates and discussions.

### **Key Finding 23**

Gender equality is not about having equal numbers of men and women participate. In this context it is about liberation and the ability of both men and women to participate and have their views, opinions and participation to be held of equal value and importance. Adapting traditions and cultures must be for worthwhile reasons; community driven; and facilitated and encouraged respectfully if it is to be effective and sustainable.

### **Key Finding 24**

To create an effective and sustainable committee that is accepted and respected by the community, members must be selected by the community. An organisation can offer guidance and facilitation but the final decision must ultimately lie with the community.

In Somali society women are respected and trusted however, it has not been common practice for women to be on the same committees as men. Thus, NCAs training, which has established WES committees with both men and women present, as part of emergency interventions has proven highly effective. Most importantly the female members of the committee are not tokenistic, they are valued members of the committee who play an active role in discussions and decisions. This was evident throughout the evaluation focus group sessions and observations.

Initially NCA contracted the local NGO FOPAG to train the WES committees. FOPAG trained six communities – Baq Baq, Dhuudo, Dhuur, Aris, Bender Beyla and El Dhirdir. NCAs Community Development Officer identified any particular weak areas in each community such as drinking river water or littering, and then ensured these topics were emphasised or covered in greater detail during the training.

### **Key Finding 25**

Standard training manuals, materials and courses should have a level of flexibility and where necessary be adapted to meet the particular training needs of a group.

NCAs Community Development Officer hired co-facilitators and used the same training manuals and techniques to train the other WES committees. Due to the close collaboration with FOPAG, NCAs Community Development Officer was able to provide the remaining communities with the same level and standard of training as FOPAG had provided. The WES committee technicians were all trained by NCAs technician and engineer to assure they had a thorough understanding of their individual water system and would be capable of conducting relevant repairs and maintenance work.

The WES training was five days with an additional two days training for the technicians at the nine mechanised project sites. The training covered many topics such as, water management including payments; disease transmission



and prevention; sanitation management; good hygiene practices; and community health. Each WES committee was trained according to a programme based heavily upon the Qur'an. Upon understanding the importance of hygiene, water and sanitation to the Qur'an, these issues became of the utmost importance to WES committees. Utilising the Qur'an provided WES committees with the most powerful tool for dictating behaviours and behavioural change in Somali society. Somalis view the Qur'an as not only their religion but their way of life. Relating water, sanitation and hygiene directly to the Qur'an assured instant behavioural change. These new learned behaviours included:

- Washing hands and feet several times a day, especially before meals;
- Only drinking water from safe, clean sources;
- Urinating and defecating far from water sources;
- Managing water resources responsibly and sustainably;
- Those with latrines, wash them daily; and
- Berkads and water points are kept free from rubbish.

The training methods and techniques were appropriate for these projects. This ensured these new topics were placed in a relevant, local context and therefore, the actions and procedures introduced to achieve good hygiene and sanitation was adopted effectively throughout the community. Once WES committees realised the importance of good hygiene and sanitation to their religion as well as to reduce illness and improve health they firstly adopted good hygiene practices themselves to set an example for others and then became highly active in spreading the messages to the rest of their communities. Behavioural changes amongst WES committee members and the wider communities became instantaneously embedded into daily lives and routines as a result of understanding the importance of these changes for their religion. The cultural relevance of the training methods and materials was one of the most significant aspects of NCAs emergency programme.

## **Key Finding 26**

Using traditional, cultural or religious beliefs as a basis for educating and training or techniques to raise awareness of issues is the most appropriate method of educating people. Behavioural change generally takes many years however, educating people through culturally and religiously relevant material generated instantaneous and sustainable behavioural change.

## **Key Finding 27**

Meaningful consultation is about working with communities to support their needs, priorities and ideas and ensuring they influence the design and implementation of a project.

Each community could relay good hygiene behaviours covered in the training to the researcher, for example, the various actions to prevent contamination of water and food and the importance of cleanliness and good sanitation to prevent diseases. More importantly, there were signs evident in all communities visited they had adopted good hygiene and sanitation practices. Dhuudo for example, previously had serious problems with litter, outside defecation and contaminated water sources. Since the establishment of the WES committee a series of garbage pits were created and the area surrounding the water points and nearby river were cleaned. The community informed the evaluation this area had previously suffered greatly from regular outbreaks of cholera, diarrhea and dysentery, however, there have been no serious outbreaks since NCAs interventions.

In El Dhidir, diarrhea, dysentery and genital infections, particularly amongst the women, were extremely common but the women were pleased to highlight that since the hygiene training and establishment of latrines these were no longer major problems. The reduction in number of infections and diseases was a point emphasised by all the communities, which is a good indicator of the effectiveness of these projects. Furthermore, in all the communities visited

with latrines, it was evident they were used, well maintained and regularly cleaned.

The training provided for the technicians ensured they had a good understanding of how their systems operated; were able to carry out daily inspections; and understood how to maintain the equipment. Importantly, NCA provided the technicians with a set of tools, which enabled them to put their new training into practice. Providing people with tools as opposed to training alone is an empowering process. The new technicians have proven effective in most communities; they carry out daily maintenance on the systems and are able to correct minor malfunctions or problems themselves without requesting assistance from outsiders.

### **Key Finding 28**

To effectively empower communities organisations must ensure any training, awareness raising or education can be acted upon and where necessary the appropriate tools are provided to enable the use of this new knowledge.

Overall the WES committees and training they have received has proven effective and with the exception of the Baq Baq WES committee (refer to section 5.3.4 Hardware for further details) they are all active and functioning well.

NCA provide all their staff with regular training. Within the NCA Puntland team, the Team Leader, Technical Project Supervisor, Community Development Officer and Field Accountant have all attended training sessions in Nairobi (Kenya), Bosaaso, Hargaisa or Garowe. Regular training encourages staff development, motivation, staff retention and ultimately improves project quality. NCA Puntland staff echoed these statements and believes their regular training heightens the quality and effectiveness of their work.

## **Key Finding 29**

Continuous staff development and training are key to the effectiveness and quality of any project.

### **5.3.6 Local Management**

NCA worked with each community to establish a local management structure for each project. NCA recognised this as key to ensuring the continued ownership and sustainability of any project.

All communities where NCA implemented latrines had decided to privatise them and had determined which members of the community should have access and ownership to them. This mainly resulted from the large numbers of IDPs entering the towns and villages. The original residents decided the latrines would only be cleaned, well maintained and sustainable if the number of people using them were limited. In most areas there were five households per latrine. This has proven extremely effective. Firstly, the latrines constructed with assistance from NCA are in use and cleaned daily on a rotational basis by the families with access. Secondly, as the materials are inexpensive and available locally this has encouraged other members of the community and IDPs to construct their own latrines. At all locations visited by the evaluation where NCA had implemented latrines the communities had built additional latrines themselves.

## **Key Finding 30**

Beginning with fewer quality projects with comprehensive training and a sound local management system can be more effective, far reaching and sustainable than trying to ensure everyone is included from the onset.

The 15 villages and towns agreed with NCA that schools, hospitals and mosques in their areas should receive free water and this had a number of immediate impacts. This strategy acknowledged the importance of mosques, which secured long-term support for each project from religious leaders. In

addition, clean, free water in schools gives a small incentive for children to attend and they are able to do so more regularly as their health has generally improved and fewer children are sick from water-related illnesses.

### **Key Finding 31**

Taking a community-wide approach and considering cultural priorities ensures a wider impact and that opportunities for indirect benefits are maximised.

After NCAs interventions, communities no longer needed to pay for expensive water trucking and were able to purchase other necessities including food and fishing equipment that had been lost in the Tsunami. At the nine mechanised project sites a payment scheme has been established and people pay on average 1,000 Somali Shillings (US\$ 0.40) per 20 litres of water. This money is utilised to pay for fuel for the generators, spare pieces of equipment to repair breakdowns, and to provide the technicians with an income. The technicians are required to spend large quantities of their time maintaining the systems and must be dedicated to the water system therefore, the communities decided they should receive an income for their work to ensure their positions are sustainable.

Several communities with the new mechanised water sources have been able to sell their water to trucking companies. The profits have been used to purchase fuel and spare parts enhancing the sustainability and long-term impacts of the project. A number of international organisations that were previously unable to introduce any projects within these villages/towns due to a lack of water for construction have now been able to implement activities, for example, Save the Children UK (SC UK) have begun constructing a school in two of the locations and a housing project in another.

## **Key Finding 32**

The implementation of a proper management system in each project location has been central in maintaining the positive impacts of each community and in particular in the mechanized project sites where a payment mechanism is in place this has promoted the adaptive capacity of local communities.

### **5.3.7 The Most Vulnerable**

NCA understood that each community would have a number of more vulnerable members for example, internally displaced persons, female headed households and those who had lost all assets and resources in the Tsunami. Similarly however, this does not mean that each internally displaced person or female headed household is always the most vulnerable. The issue of how to protect the most vulnerable members of each community was raised in dialogue with the Elders Committees and WES committees. Subsequently, each community identified a number of households that would be unable to afford paying for water and therefore, the communities decided that these families will receive free water. In Bender Beyla, for example, the community identified 20 vulnerable households and these households are not charged for water. These community decisions have greatly enhanced the sustainability of the projects and the livelihoods of the most vulnerable.

## **Key Finding 33**

Mechanised water sources require a payment mechanism to secure their sustainability through regular maintenance and repairs. Payment mechanisms, however, must also consider and protect the most vulnerable people.

Water collection is primarily the responsibility of women and children. NCAs mechanised projects included the construction of several communal water points in each village/town. As a result the time taken to collect water has been reduced from almost a whole day to less than a couple of hours during peak demand allowing women and children to focus their efforts on other

activities including income generating activities and more time in school. The water points are in central locations meaning water collection is much safer for women and the risk of attack is reduced. In a number of the towns, in particularly El Dhirdir and Suuj, women had to walk up steep cliffs carrying water from the freshwater springs below. As a consequence, miscarriages were common in these areas and many women and children died carrying water up the steep cliffs. Due to NCAs interventions, the risks to women and children associated with collecting water in these areas have declined and their survival chances have increased.

### **Key Finding 34**

The sighting of water points in any water project is key. Correctly located water points improve safety and water collection efficiency thus, reducing vulnerability and promoting adaptive capacity.

### **5.3.8 Summary**

Chapter 5 provides 34 key findings framed through the key themes laid out in section 5.3 Evaluation of ACTs Response. Upon detailed analysis of the findings and discussion presented, the researcher identifies five main findings that form principles for implementing humanitarian projects and an overarching programme strategy for delivering humanitarian aid in chronic complex emergencies:

- **Project Principle 1: Community Owned**
- **Project Principle 2: Culturally and religiously embedded**
- **Project Principle 3: strong software component**
- **Project Principle 4: Community level management**
- **Project Principle 5: Protection of most vulnerable**
- **Programme: A coherent dual strategy**

### **Project Principle 1: Community Owned**

Projects must be completely owned by local communities. In order to generate this ownership, communities must own the project from its onset, for example they should lead the identification of the type of project to ensure it is in accordance with local needs. Communities should then be involved in designing and locating their project and be involved in all decisions surrounding the project. Communities should be encouraged to provide any inputs possible to the project including financial, materials, labour and hospitality for project staff. This level of involvement and investment instills a sense of community ownership and stewardship over a project thus, increasing the potential for sustainable impacts.

### **Project Principle 2: Culturally and religiously embedded**

Humanitarian projects in chronic complex emergencies should be culturally and religiously embedded. This drastically improves the speed of influence and impact of any project, which is critical to the emergency nature of these projects. Secondly, embedding projects in local cultures and religions upholds the humanitarian ideals and secures the longevity and continued impacts of any project.

### **Project Principle 3: strong software component**

A software component is needed for every humanitarian project and these should be run in parallel to the implementation of any hardware. Software components should be tailored to each community and project and ensure thorough training is provided for those involved.

### **Project Principle 4: Community level management**

Humanitarian projects should implement a community management structure. This clearly defines community members' roles and responsibilities thus, supporting Project Principle 1 but also promotes the sustainability of any project and its impacts. Management systems for example, could include cleaning rotations for latrines and payment mechanisms for water systems, without which such systems would quickly become dysfunctional. Finally, a management structure enhances a communities' ability to organize and problem solve.



**Project Principle 5: Protection of most vulnerable**

Humanitarian projects must protect and promote the resilience and reduce the vulnerability of the most vulnerable members of the community. The identification of the most vulnerable members of the community must be conducted sensitively and always uphold the principle of Do No Harm. Projects with payment mechanisms for example, must incorporate a method for securing access of the most vulnerable to the project resources in order to enhance their resilience and prevent their marginalisation.

**Programme: A coherent dual strategy**

Humanitarian efforts in chronic complex emergencies must incorporate a strategy for addressing both the acute and chronic needs of local populations. These strategies must be coherent, flexible, integrated, complimentary and aim to reduce the vulnerability, enhance the resilience and promote the adaptive capacity of communities.

These principles and strategy are discussed further in Chapter 7, the Conclusions and Discussion section.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Norwegian Church Aid, Gedo, Somalia**

#### **6.1 Norwegian Church Aid**

Norwegian Church Aid is an international non-governmental organisation (NGO) that began in 1947 as a small fundraising drive by Norwegian churches. Today they are one of the Nordic countries' largest aid organisations. Originally, they were engaged solely in short-term emergency response activities. During the 1960s however, it became evident to Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) that large numbers of the world's population live in a state of permanent need and as such they began embarking on long-term development projects. NCA is operational in over 30 countries across Africa, Asia and Central and Latin America (NCA, 2008). They provide emergency assistance in disasters and work for long-term development in local communities. NCA are a member of the Action by Churches Together (ACT) Alliance, one of the world's largest humanitarian alliances. The alliance consists of church-based organisations throughout the world and cooperates with organisations across religious faiths.

Norwegian Church Aid works in three ways:

- Emergency preparedness and response: saving lives to protect people in emergency situations.
- Long-term development aid: supporting local communities to achieve development over time.
- Advocacy: promoting democracy and human rights by influencing decision-making processes.

(NCA, 2008a).


Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) has been operating continuously in Gedo in southern Somalia since 1993, with support from a variety of donors, including

the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The physical, social, economic, political and security environment of Gedo make it one of the world's most demanding environments for humanitarian intervention. Gedo's environment is difficult both for the local population and humanitarian organisations. The scarcity of agencies willing to work in Gedo indicates the difficulty of working there.

## 6.2 Gedo

Gedo is an administrative region (formerly part of the historic Upper Juba Region) in southern Somalia. The Gedo region was created in 1980 and its capital is Garahaarrey. Gedo is bordered by the Ogaden region of Ethiopia to the north, the north eastern province of Kenya to the west and the Somali regions of Bakool to the north east, Bay to the east and Jubbada Dhexe (Middle Juba) to the south (see Map 9 below).

**Map 9 Gedo, Somalia**




(Source: MapZones, 2010)

The Gedo region has one of the most varied landscapes and scenery in Somalia. Two major rivers run through Gedo – the Dawa and the Juba. Red sand is found in all areas although there are white sand dunes across the Jubba Valley. The Daawo and middle regions of Gedo have rocky mountains and gorges that are filled with flowing streams and rivers during the rainy season. The north and western areas have largely red, sandy, flat land.

Gedo consists of seven districts – Baardheere, Balet Hawo, Ceelwaaq, Doolow, Garbahaarreey, Luuq and Buurdhuubo (see Map 10 below). The Marrehan clan are dominant, particularly in southern Gedo however, other clans inhabiting the region include the Rahanweyn, Ogaden, Harti and some Bantu (UNOSOM, 1994).

## Map 10 Gedo Districts




(Source: Baardheere, 2008)

### 6.2.1 Livelihoods

There are an estimated 380,000 people in Gedo. The majority (75 percent) of the population are nomadic pastoralists with camel, cattle, sheep and goats (UNOSOM, 1994). Agriculture is practiced largely along the Juba and Dawa river valleys. In addition to subsistence agriculture, the main products farmed include tobacco, onions and citrus fruits (FSNAU, 2012). Gedo also has strong interregional and international cross-border trade with Kenya and to some extent in Ethiopia (Care, 2008). Map 11 illustrates the main livelihood zones across Gedo.

## Map 11 Gedo Livelihoods



(Source: FSNAU, 2012).

### 6.2.2 Socio-Political Situation in Gedo

The Gedo region has historically been one of the most underdeveloped areas of Somalia, with minimal infrastructure, a weak economic base and only very basic health and education services available to the communities. The region is largely food insecure due to its dependence on erratic rainfall for the production of crops and pasture.

The central Government of Somalia collapsed in 1991 and since then Gedo has been in a state of chronic emergency, with frequent periods of acute emergencies including droughts, floods and conflict. *De facto* governance remains in the hands of local community leaders, who are mostly members of the Marehan Clan. There is ongoing inter and intra-clan conflicts however, largely related to the control of resources.

Gedo's physical environment creates further problems. The insufficiency and unreliability of rain is the most significant of these. Droughts are frequent and, paradoxically, they often end in floods. Major floods occurred on the Juba River in 1993, 1997 and again in 2006; these floods devastated the agricultural system, destroyed irrigation canals and washed away irrigation pumps. In 2005 the early Gu rains were below normal, the late Dehr rains were poor and it was clear that malnutrition was widespread. In October 2005 a nutritional survey by the Red Crescent, Gedo Health Consortium (GHC) and NCA found that in Mother and Child Health centres about one third of children were malnourished with acute malnutrition rates over 20 percent, an indicator of severe nutritional emergency. Therapeutic feeding was necessary and the emergency situation continued into 2006. Drought and food emergency continued into 2006. The scarcity of water sources caused by the droughts and then contamination or destruction of any remaining water sources by the flood led to violent conflict and competition over water, further exacerbating insecurity in the region.

Gedo was one of the worst affected areas and at moderate risk of famine throughout 2006. The communities of Gedo are beset by years of high malnutrition and morbidity rates; chronic food insecurity; localised clan fighting; consecutive bad harvests; national instability; and a continuous stream of IDPs, mostly from Mogadishu.

### **6.2.3 Current Situation in Gedo**

In February 2002, May-June 2004, December-July 2004-05, October 2011 (Mohamed, 2012) sub-clan conflicts in different areas of Gedo led to deaths, injuries, displacement and severe humanitarian need.

Erratic rainfall patterns resulting in regular droughts and floods, coupled with fragile livelihoods that rely heavily on pastoralism and agriculture have created chronic food insecurity in Gedo. Recent studies estimate there are 24,600 malnourished children under the age of 5 years old in Gedo. Conflict

continues between Al-Shabaab and the TFG for control over parts of the region and it is estimated there are currently 99,000 IDPs who require humanitarian support in the region (UNOCHA, 2011).

Access to safe water is a significant problem in Gedo that has been aggravated by the destruction and looting of water supply installations during the civil war; continuing conflict; and a lack of maintenance. Less than 20 percent of the population of Gedo has access to a protected water source or access to an acceptable sanitation facility. Domestic water supplies are met primarily from rivers and unsafe wells. During the dry season, many women estimate they have to walk a round trip of 18km to the nearest water source (Oxfam, 2012). The spread of waterborne disease continues to be a threat for most people particularly those malnourished and without access to health facilities (UNOCHA, 2011).

NCA is one of very few agencies with a long-term presence in Gedo. At times the level of severe violence and conflict in the continuing complex political emergency in Gedo is extreme. Since 1991, there has been no effective territorial or administrative control by any Government or structure of ministries in Gedo. Hence, there has been no overarching body through which NCA could coordinate activities. The lack of government agencies in Gedo also severely threatens the sustainability of interventions since there is no long-term agency to which responsibility can be transferred.

Currently the security risks in the region are linked to external threats and influences associated with the political situation at the national level intertwined with the internal conflict. Three of the five operational districts are controlled by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces and two are under the Al-Shabaab control (UNOCHA, 2012). Guerilla tactics are used by Al-Shabaab with many surprise attacks on towns and mining of roads. This limits humanitarian access and compromises supply chains.

The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is now attempting to extend its control over Gedo and has appointed a new District Commissioner (DC) in



Garbaharey; NCA has established a link with the DC who, during the time of the mission, allocated a plot of land to NCA for the construction of a field office, storage site and accommodation.

### **6.3 Norwegian Church Aid's Interventions**

The principle of do-no-harm and the development of rights-based programmes are priorities underlying all of NCAs interventions in Gedo. NCAs operations in Gedo have three elements. Firstly, longer-term capacity building interventions responding to the continuing chronic state of emergency in Gedo:

- Food security programme: this component targeted six locations including three rain-fed and three riverine farming areas. NCA implemented these projects through two local NGOs – Social Life and Agricultural Development Organisation (SADO) and Advancement of Small Enterprises Program (ASEP).
- Education programme: NCA directly supports 23 schools. NCA hires, trains and pays teachers. They provide learning materials and organise school examinations and certificates. NCA also helped the establishment of community education committees and conducted capacity building to ensure they have the knowledge and skills to undertake their duties.
- Water and sanitation programme: NCA has rehabilitated water systems in two towns – El Gudud and El Adde – with plans to begin work on a third – Burdhubo. This work has included the extension of water distribution pipes and construction of eight water points. NCA have rehabilitated eight shallow wells and have constructed eight VIP latrines in El Gudud and El Adde. NCA have constructed VIP latrines for their 23 primary schools. Water and sanitation committees are established for each water point however, these committees have not yet received training. Training was delayed due to insufficient staff to carry out the training. This has been addressed with the recruitment of two new staff members – a Water Technician and Hygiene and Sanitation Officer.

Secondly, NCA responds to acute emergencies. During 2006, NCA responded to a number of natural and anthropogenic triggered tragedies in Gedo. Severe drought during 2005 continued into 2006, with water resources becoming scarcer leading to conflict between users. In April 2006, the drought ended in a major flood that devastated the livelihoods of farmers along both Juba and Dawa Rivers. Conflict between the Islamic Courts and TNG in Mogadishu led to the displacement of approximately 400,000 people, many of whom fled to Gedo (IDMC, 2007). NCA responded to the drought and then the flood by establishing nine emergency schools with support from UNICEF for the temporary buildings (tents) and teaching materials; distributing food to communities and schools with support from WFP; and trucking 143,000 litres of water to 1,700 households whose supplies had been contaminated or damaged. These emergency activities supplemented NCAs longer-term activities in education, water and sanitation, and food security.

Thirdly, NCA implements cross-cutting activities in HIV/AIDS, gender-based violence, women's empowerment, female genital mutilation (FGM), peace building and capacity building of staff and stakeholder institutions. In its long-term chronic emergency programme NCA focuses on a limited number of activities, avoiding over-extension, seeking synergies between the different areas of activity. This is sought by geographically concentrating the implementation of activities and embedding the cross-cutting issues into all projects for example, a community involved in a water and sanitation project would also be educated on issues of HIV/AIDS and gender based violence.

A key aspect of NCAs strategy is their 14-year history of interventions in the region and the continuity of relations with communities and longer-term planning this has allowed. Thus, in effect the planning of the chronic emergency interventions has been a cumulative and continuous process since 1993. This continued presence has enabled NCA to respond when necessary to acute emergencies such as the droughts, floods and conflicts.

#### **6.4 Evaluation of NCAs Activities in Gedo**

NCA contracted the researcher to participate in an evaluation of the operations in Gedo. The purpose of the evaluation was to determine the impact of the programme on the beneficiary communities given the constraints and the many problems encountered; identify the lessons learnt; and recommend on the best way forward for NCAs interventions in Gedo. The specific objectives of the evaluation were:

- Review the way in which the project was designed and implemented with a view to learning lessons for replication in the future.
- Review the appropriateness of the project's purpose and the results in respect to the core problems faced by the project; taking into account the physical and socio-economic environment in which the project operates.
- Assess the appropriateness and relevance of the methods used by NCA.
- Assess the efficiency of project implementation considering timing, targeting, technical solutions and community involvement.
- Assess the appropriateness of the do-no-harm and rights based strategies used in the programme.
- Assess the perception of the stakeholders in terms of NCAs added value and the level of participation and ownership of projects by the target communities.
- Review the quality of the day-to-day programme management and coordination with local authorities and beneficiaries.

The following evaluative criteria were used for the purpose of this research:

- Relevance and appropriateness;
- Effectiveness;
- Efficiency; and
- Impact and Sustainability

Other criteria used for this evaluation in order to address NCAs purpose of the evaluation included:

- Coordination
- Communication

- Adherence to the Do-No-Harm and Rights based principles
- Cross-cutting issues:
  - HIV/AIDS,
  - Gender and women empowerment and
  - Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)

In the following sections each of the evaluation criteria is taken in turn and the various projects and relief efforts are examined through these criteria. Through the findings and layers of analysis conducted for both case studies the researcher identified an alternative approach to delivering humanitarian aid in chronic complex emergencies: a cohesive dual approach that has a strategy for meeting the acute needs and a strategy for addressing the chronic needs of the community. These strategies must be integrated, flexible, coherent and have synergies so that whatever is implemented in one complements the other.

In addition to an alternative approach the researcher established five themes that provide a structure for grouping findings together that enabled a more comprehensive analysis and discussion:

6. The Community;
7. Hardware;
8. Software, Culture and Religion;
9. Local Management; and
10. The most vulnerable.

The following findings are grouped accordingly into either one of the five key themes outlined above or the broader strategy for delivering humanitarian aid in chronic complex emergencies.

#### **6.4.1 Strategy**

The people of Gedo are living in poverty in a state of chronic humanitarian crisis compounded by episodes of acute emergencies. Structuring the projects as short-term responses to severe emergencies and longer-term

support to the chronic emergency situation that has existed since 1991 is the best approach to humanitarian assistance in this context. If interventions were solely in response to extreme events there would be no development of local capacity to improve responses to future events or reduce their impacts. Each recurrence of an extreme event would (inadvisably) be treated as an isolated event. NCAs interventions in Gedo that are tailored to both the chronic and acute emergencies, are relevant and appropriate to the needs of the people living in Gedo. This approach aims to reduce the vulnerability and enhance the resilience of local communities.

### **Key Finding 35**

Chronic and acute emergencies are connected and impact upon each other and across all sectors. Operating in a chronic complex emergency demands a holistic humanitarian approach that targets both chronic and acute needs.

The high prevalence of moderate malnutrition amongst the population and episodes of outbreaks of acute malnutrition together with a lack of safe water and sanitation facilities in Gedo led NCA to prioritise interventions in food security and water and sanitation. Gedo suffers high levels of illiteracy and NCA acknowledges in order to sustainably improve the resilience and adaptive capacity of future generations then education must be a key component of any interventions hence, the development of their schools and education programme in Gedo.

NCA responds to acute emergencies in Gedo through the provision of non-food item (NFI) kits; emergency education; food aid; and emergency water provision. These are areas where NCA has the skills and experience of delivering in emergency settings. NCA does not for example, deliver emergency healthcare with the exception of water and sanitation and HIV/AIDS. Interventions in water and sanitation are preventive and do not involve curative health, which requires specialist and trained personnel. NCA does not have the skills or experience of operating in the health sector. Strategically NCA has concentrated on a limited range of chronic and acute

activities, which are appropriate to their experience, capacity and capabilities and to the needs of the local population.

### **Key Finding 36**

To deliver an effective humanitarian response, humanitarian organisations should deliver activities where they possess the relevant skills, experience and competency. Equally, to deliver a thorough and adequate response it is important not to overstretch resources.

NCA has dispersed stocks of NFI kits (as discussed earlier) throughout Gedo that enables them to efficiently respond to a range of emergencies, including floods, fires and conflict.

To an extent Somalia is a dual culture with separate men's and women's worlds. NCA has made great efforts to advocate and support the empowerment and protection of women. NCA implements its cross-cutting activities through two methods. Firstly, NCA embeds its cross-cutting issues into all its projects. In their schools, the cross-cutting issues are taught sensitively and age appropriately. In their food security and water and sanitation projects the discussions and training all include the cross-cutting issues. Secondly, NCA targets the various cross-cutting issues in their own right. This dual approach ensured the constant reinforcement of consistent messages and increased the reach of NCAs work on these issues. Including discussions, for example, surrounding FGM and sexual and gender based violence in the training of the agricultural programme and education and water and sanitation committees improved the timeliness of targeting the cross-cutting issues. These committees then carried these messages to the wider community.

### **Key Finding 37**

When implementing a humanitarian project, opportunities to raise awareness of other important issues should be explored and incorporated

where appropriate and feasible.

NCA's field staff are trained and experienced in dealing with various acute emergencies including droughts, floods, fires and conflict. Hence, when an emergency arises NCA can implement an efficient response. This preparedness is appropriate and necessary when implementing projects in Gedo and Somalia.

### **Key Finding 38**

A variety of acute emergencies erupt frequently in Gedo and Somalia and any humanitarian agency operating in these areas should be equipped to adequately respond or cope with these and the impacts they have on the people and their humanitarian activities.

NCA field staff in Gedo have satellite telephones and are in daily contact with their regional Headquarters in Nairobi. When an acute emergency occurs field staff are able to quickly brief the NCA Country and Regional Directors enabling them to jointly establish whether NCA should and can respond and if so how. This regular and reliable communication allows NCA to plan and respond efficiently to acute emergencies in Gedo.

### **Key Finding 39**

Communication between field staff and decision makers is critical to efficiency and effectiveness when responding to an acute emergency.

NCA's main projects and cross-cutting issues are proving highly effective. Through careful analysis of emergencies and need, NCA selected a number of communities to work with in Gedo. The effectiveness of these projects has been on the basis of continuity and intense working as opposed to striving for geographical coverage. NCA has geographically concentrated its projects in Gedo. This prevents overstressing resources and improves the effectiveness and efficiency of each project. Education projects for example, have been

supported by the establishment of clean water sources and improved food security. Through careful logistics planning this has also enabled the efficient transportation of equipment and personnel to and from project sites. This overall strategy is highly effective and any disbursed or isolated project especially regarding the cross-cutting issues would likely have no effect and limited impact.

NCA decided to hire vehicles for their operations in Gedo. The terrain, environment and conflict means vehicles regularly break down. Vehicle hiring companies quickly replace dysfunctional vehicles, which minimises delays to NCA and removes the maintenance and repair costs for vehicles. Furthermore, this supports local hiring companies, which subsequently generates wider support for NCA and their work.

NCA established a local office on the Kenyan side of the border with Gedo. Local and regional staff and goods can generally be efficiently transported across this part of the border. This has secured the supply chain for items not available in Gedo. Additionally, this proves an efficient method of transporting staff to and from Nairobi when needed.

#### **Key Finding 40**

Supply chain security and reliability is critical to the efficiency and effectiveness of any project and opportunities to maintain and improve it should be explored and sought early on.

#### **6.4.2 The Community**

There are no central government agencies operating in Gedo. Despite this, NCA made early contact with the nascent local administrative system, village elders and religious leaders throughout Gedo. This was appropriate to secure wider support and no resistance or resentment towards NCA and their work and also provided an opportunity to sensitise those in power to critical issues. These links are also made in the hope that these bodies may eventually



develop as functioning entities able to provide structures to support the delivery of programmes. NCA were transparent, informing both individuals and groups of their project plans and limitations. This managed expectations, did not raise false hope and has since been the founding of great respect between NCA and the communities of Gedo. Developing these relationships and dialogue demanded time, resources and in some cases delayed the implementation of projects. They were however, vital and provided a solid foundation for NCA to commence work, significantly improving the effectiveness and impact of all NCAs work in Gedo.

#### **Key Finding 41**

Discussions, dialogue and building relationships may impede the timeliness of implementing projects but they are essential to the overall efficiency, effectiveness and impact of a project.

NCA began operations in Gedo through carefully selecting and recruiting local staff. All candidates had to formally apply and were interviewed. NCA recruited skilled, knowledgeable, competent local staff that are trusted amongst local communities. Employing skilled local staff has improved the effectiveness of all the projects and built local capacity. Their local knowledge of the people, environment and context has enabled them to negotiate access to project sites and vulnerable people. Gedo suffers regular outbreaks of conflicts during which other organisations such as the United Nations have evacuated and ceased activities and as a result communities have little confidence or respect for these organisations. NCAs dominant use of local staff however, means they have never stopped or withdrawn activities from Gedo thus, enabling the continuity of its projects which has proven invaluable in gaining respect and trust amongst communities and improving the effectiveness of its projects. The negotiation skills of the local staff has secured their safety and enabled the efficient implementation of their work.

## Key Finding 42

Continued presence and operations particularly, during outbreaks of conflict is critical in gaining much needed respect and trust, which in turn is vital for any successful project in Somalia.

NCA's entry into any community is always firstly through meeting the village elder's committee and village chiefs. As discussed in section 5.3.3 The Community, this is the correct protocol in Somalia and if an organisation were to not follow this procedure they would receive little support for any project from the community.

A crucial element of NCA's strategy is the importance placed on working with the community and facilitating their empowerment through training and advocacy. The elders and religious leaders are critical links in this relation, both in allowing access to beneficiaries and in advocating for changes in the ways in which Gedo society works. It was clear during the research that continuing dialogue and negotiation with the elders and religious leaders is key to progress.

Community participation in all NCA's projects was achieved through careful negotiation with key stakeholders and gatekeepers within the clan and religious systems. It has been essential to have a working relationship with warlords, militias and those involved in sub-clan conflict, even if this is more through dialogue than co-ordination. Such relations depend on the sensitivity and relationships of local NCA staff to powerful groups; some of the local staff are critically important to these relationships. Though there have been tense episodes that could have led to withdrawal, NCA has managed to achieve a successful *modus vivendi* with these potentially disruptive powers, which has enabled them to maintain community access and involvement. The tenacity of NCA in maintaining a presence in Gedo when others such as the UN withdrew during periods of insecurity has been a powerful aid to their credibility and reputation among local communities and has secured their acceptance and support throughout Gedo.

#### **6.4.2.1 Water and Sanitation Programme**

Communities participated throughout the implementation of the water and sanitation projects. To rehabilitate and establish the water systems in El Gudud and El Adde, NCA worked in collaboration with the communities to select locations throughout the towns for the sighting of water points. NCA designed the water points in consultation with the communities to ensure they were appropriate to the various methods of carrying water. For instance, water points throughout the centre of the towns were designed for jerry cans, whilst water points on the outskirts of the town had both water troughs for livestock and points for jerry cans. This has proved very effective as the diffusion of water points throughout the town and separation of water points according to user has reduced waiting times and the likelihood of conflict as large numbers of people and livestock are not congested trying to access one water point. Furthermore, the risk of contamination is reduced as fewer livestock move through the centre of the towns and no longer surround water points where water is sourced for human consumption. The rehabilitation of these mechanised water systems and the design of the water points were appropriate to the needs of these people.

#### **Key Finding 43**

Consultation and the involvement of beneficiaries is crucial when designing and implementing humanitarian projects to deliver effective and sustainable interventions.

Prior to the implementation of these projects NCA held lengthy discussions with the Elders committees and communities to outline their important role in the project and ensure they understood that ultimately the ownership of the water systems lay with each community and therefore, they would be responsible for its management and maintenance. Each town then provided NCA with a list of materials and labour they would supply. NCA used local materials and labour wherever possible. This strategy is appropriate, effective

and necessary to build capacity; promote ownership and sustainability; and reduce the likelihood of needing future support for maintenance and repairs.

NCA implemented eight shallow well projects. The design of the wells was not standardised but rather developed through consultation with local communities and examination of pre-existing structures. Communities will not use shallow wells implemented by external agencies if they perceive their design to be incorrect. Hence, these consultations were important to ensuring the effective use of shallow wells through appropriate and acceptable designs.

#### **Key Finding 44**

Understanding the user group and having beneficiary involvement in designing and decision making for a project is critical to its successful implementation.

The effectiveness of the shallow wells could be improved through minor alterations in well design. The shallow wells constructed in Gedo were not covered. Communities informed NCA they had always used and wanted to continue using uncovered wells as they believe permanently covered wells are 'not good'. A number of uncovered shallow wells however, often silt up during the rainy season particularly with flash floods. Temporarily covering these flood prone wells during the rainy season would prevent this. This would require extensive community consultations to maintain confidence in the water point and reassure that ownership lies with the community, however, the researcher undertook several discussions with one community whose shallow wells had become silted up. The researcher discussed the potential to prevent silting of the wells through temporary covers and communities saw this as an acceptable possibility. Other than one silted well, all other shallow wells implemented by NCA were fully operational and well utilised and as such they have proven effective.

NCA implemented eight community VIP latrines in both El Gudud and El Adde. VIP latrines are recognised and understood by most the population of

Gedo. Despite this, these latrines were largely unused. The researcher discussed this issue with various groups from these towns. The majority of people, particularly the women did not like the idea of using latrines shared by so many people. They would prefer to have one latrine for a small group of families who could all share responsibility for its cleanliness. During implementation, NCAs resources were limited to the supply of eight communal latrines. The implementation of VIP latrines was appropriate to these towns however, the implementation of communal latrines was not appropriate and as such these latrines have not been effective.

#### **Key Finding 45**

Implementing facilities and amenities for beneficiaries does not ensure their use – building hardware alone, even when much needed, can prove ineffective. Local consultation and engagement is vital to the successful design and implementation of any project.

The water and sanitation committees are currently working to encourage people to construct their own latrines.

*“People will make their own VIP latrines, maybe one per six households or something like this. But they will make the latrines now with guidance and help from us as now they will see how important they are. But these communal latrines are no good, people would like to use a latrine used by everyone else”* (WES Committee member, El Adde).

#### **6.4.2.2 Food Security Programme**

Communities were involved extensively throughout each food security project. Each project began through consultations with local leaders, district councils, religious leaders and local community-based associations including women traders’ associations. Beneficiaries were required to provide resources wherever possible. Communities of Bardera and Burdhubo for example, contributed 43 percent of fuel costs and 15 percent of irrigation water pump costs. As a result, expenditures on the project were reduced by US\$ 28,000.

In addition, the farmers provided donkeys and oxen for training while ASEP and SADO provided ox ploughs, sub-soiler, yoke and harnessing equipment. Through encouraging the contributions and inputs of beneficiaries and local organisations NCA has drastically improved the efficiency of its food security programme. Most crucially however, through investing their own resources in a project, the communities are dedicated to these projects and will make every effort to ensure they succeed and continue to succeed.

#### **Key Finding 46**

Local communities must be encouraged to provide resources whether it be financial, labour or other, as this improves the efficiency of the project and increases local ownership and responsibility for the project.

#### **6.4.2.3 Education Programme**

Schools were designed and constructed depending on the size of the community. It was decided permanent schools would be built as part of the capacity building/development programme as these would provide a greater sense of stability and permanence for communities. Also permanent structures were needed to offer a long-term educational environment and allow the education project to function effectively. Materials for construction were sourced locally and local labour was utilised wherever possible. Local men would provide labour and local women would provide meals for all those working on the project. Many communities also constructed semi-permanent buildings at the school sites for the storage of teaching materials and food. This community participation is vital in creating a sense of ownership towards the school. Furthermore, the construction of these additional buildings by the communities demonstrates their commitment and level of ownership over the project. Continuous community involvement and participation throughout the development of each school has improved efficiency, strengthened local capacity and created a sense of community ownership for the school, which improves the likelihood of parents enrolling their children thus, contributing to the impact and sustainability of the project.

The large number of people fleeing Mogadishu includes many teachers and other skilled and professional personnel. Many now live in Gedo either with relatives or in IDP settlements. Subsequently, it has been possible to locally source all teachers for the various schools.

#### **6.4.2.4 Acute Emergencies**

During several droughts, through discussions with NCA, communities constructed water storage pans known locally as Berkads. NCA then contracted private water suppliers to transport water to the communal water pans. Hence, even during acute emergencies, communities were actively involved throughout project implementation. Furthermore, NCA did not undermine local businesses as they utilised local private water suppliers where possible. Using private suppliers meant NCA did not have to purchase or directly hire water trucking vehicles or navigate and negotiate the logistics of distributing water, which made the emergency response highly efficient.

A sense of community ownership over a project is key to its long-term effectiveness and sustainability. It was evident throughout NCAs projects in Gedo that communities held a strong sense of ownership towards their projects. Ownership was expressed partly through the level of participation in committees – Community Education Committees and Water and Sanitation Committees. Both Education and Water and Sanitation Committees take their responsibilities seriously and they are viewed as valuable amongst leaders and the wider community to the development of the village or town. Communities with help and advice from NCA, had selected strong community members including both men and women, to work on the committees. Committees hold weekly meetings and effectively motivate the wider community whenever necessary. Communities feel a greater sense of ownership towards projects such as schools and water and sanitation facilities, as they are continuously involved through the committees and are required to regularly provide inputs to ensure their sustainability. At Garbahare, for example, the community provided the school with a donkey cart so sufficient quantities of water could be collected for the pupils and the

community also paid for a sick teacher to go to hospital.

In all projects community leaders have been involved in discussions and negotiations from the onset. Community members have also participated in projects as far as feasible through the provision of local labour, resources and materials. Consequently, community members and leaders are invested in each project and will continue to actively participate to ensure the continued success of their project.

### **6.4.3 Hardware**

#### **6.4.3.1 Water and Sanitation**

El Gudud and El Adde are large towns that previously had mechanised water systems supplying their water. Various conflicts and a general lack of maintenance, spare parts and repairs eventually made the systems inoperable. NCA rehabilitated these water systems. These towns provide water to the local populations, IDPs and nomadic pastoralists. NCA recognised that through rehabilitating and improving these water systems that large numbers of people would have access to safe water supplies.

NCA implemented eight shallow wells. These were established in villages where the previous shallow wells had been destroyed, contaminated from floods or that had not been deep enough to reach a good quality source of water. Shallow wells are appropriate to the size of these communities whereas mechanised water sources would be too expensive to manage and sustain. Traditionally in Gedo, people use large branches, for ropes to be hauled against, to aid in water extraction from shallow wells. Traditional wells would have stones positioned to steady these branches. NCAs shallow well apron design did not accommodate for this. Users would typically add stones themselves to the apron adapting it for their use. Whilst effective, NCA could further improve their shallow well apron design to accommodate this, for example, see Figure 7 below.



**Figure 7 Shallow well apron design that accommodates traditional Somali water collection method of two large branches to be used effectively.**



(Source: Author, 2007).

#### **6.4.3.2 Food Security Programme**

NCA intervened in food security through the provision of seeds, pesticides, tools, irrigation pumps, fuel and training. NCA supplied kick-start diesel pumps and ploughs. Traditionally these farmers have struggled to irrigate their land due to the erratic rainfall and severe droughts and many have lost tools and harvests through conflicts. Additionally, most farmers would plough their land themselves, which has restricted the amount of land they can work and the number of harvests they can have. Plough demonstrations were given in the fields using ox and donkeys. Initial uptake of using animals with ploughs was limited but after continual training and follow up visits farmers began using animals regularly and seeing the benefits for themselves. The plough

equipment is now proving effective as farmers have adopted the new techniques and are now using donkeys and oxen to plough their fields. The water pumps on the farms visited were operational and proving effective. The farmers appeared highly competent in using the water pumps and ploughs, which suggests training was also effective. NCAs efforts are expected to increase acreage and income profitability and reduce vulnerability to erratic rainfall. The pumps and ploughs are user-friendly, easy to operate and appropriate for the users and the land.

#### **Key Finding 47**

The use of new techniques, practices and hardware is most effective when coupled with initial intensive training and continued coaching and support.

NCA contracted two local organisations - Social Life and Agricultural Development Organisation (SADO) and Advancement of Small Enterprises Program (ASEP) – to implement its food security projects. These organisations had the skills and capacity to carry out this work. NCA contracted two organisations informing them that if they both worked efficiently and effectively, their contracts would be extended however, if one did not work well then their contract would not be extended. This provided NCA with some security, as should one of the organisations have proved to be incompetent, fraudulent or ineffective then the risk was reduced to one project. Whereas, should both organisations prove successful, then NCA has supported the development and built the capacity of two local organisations whilst improving the rate and number of projects possible. Both organisations are working effectively with NCA and this strategy of utilising local organisations to implement projects was appropriate to the capacity and use of NCAs resources. Without these organisations it would have taken NCA much longer to implement these projects.

### **Key Finding 48**

Opportunities to sub-contract local, competent organisations should always be explored to maximise efficiency and increase the impact and sustainability of a project.

A major threat to these farmers remains their reliance on rivers and rainfall in a drought and flood prone region where early warning systems are fairly non-existent.

### **Key Finding 49**

Without sufficient early warning systems for floods and droughts farmers and their families will remain vulnerable.

NCA, SADO and ASEP distributed seeds and tools and trained 140 farmers across six locations on conservation tillage using animal traction. NCA selected farmers in collaboration with communities through discussions. The farmers selected were local people who had farmed all their lives but were in a state of emergency as a result of recent droughts and/or floods. NCA aimed to begin their food security programme with only a small number of locations. This enabled them to ensure these projects received all the necessary time and resources and to ensure both ASEP and SADO were capable and competent in delivering the projects. The farmers are all working effectively and they all stated they have received continuous coaching and support from either SADO or ASEP.

Excessive flooding meant two farmers were unable to exercise the skills learnt or plant seeds effectively during the first season. All farmers have since however, had productive harvests. The food security programme has improved livelihoods through drawing on effective and sustainable farming techniques and tools. The food harvested through these projects is used for both the subsistence of families and for sale. Money collected from selling

harvests is used to purchase future seed stocks and tools thus generating more sustainable livelihoods.

### **Key Finding 50**

Implementing a new programme in a new area generally demands intensive support and resources. Thus, limiting the number and geographical spread of new programmes at any one time ensures the support and resources needed for effective implementation are available.

#### **6.4.3.3 Education Programme**

NCA constructed schools where there were large numbers of children and no existing education facilities. Education facilities are in short supply throughout Somalia and there are few secondary schools or places of higher education across the entire country. NCA hires, trains and pays teachers across 23 schools, nine of which are emergency schools. The lack of any formal education system in Gedo means NCAs education programme is appropriate and vital to ensuring the education of many children. Each school has a feeding programme that is supported through WFP. Many parents in Somalia are reluctant to send their children to school regularly as they are needed to help work, collect water and care for other children. Providing a nutritious meal for children at school creates a major incentive for parents to enroll and send their children, who largely live in a state of chronic food insecurity. The school feeding programme also has much wider impacts. The overall health and nourishment of children is improved, which promotes their resistance to disease and sickness. Similarly, the curriculum itself educates pupils on issues of good hygiene and sanitation, which reduces their risk of disease and infection. Finally, the majority of children in Gedo have seen some level of conflict and many have been through traumatic experiences. The provision of a safe environment for children to learn and be amongst their friends and peers provides much needed stability and security for their mental wellbeing.

## Key Finding 51

Designing and implementing programmes that are complimentary whilst also considering local livelihoods and needs are most effective.

The primary schools have provided a sense of stability and future hope to many people. NCA introduced formal school examinations and certificates to promote the employability; livelihood options; or likelihood of sponsorship for further education in other countries for these pupils. Learning materials supplied were of a good standard and the teachers appeared competent. Teachers are examined and interviewed before they are employed. All classrooms visited were full and pupils all had writing books full of work, which indicates that schools are operating effectively and attendance rates are good. Overall school enrolment rates have rose from 2,030 pupils when the programme began to 4,392 pupils to date, where female enrolment rose from 766 to 1,940 and boys rose from 1,264 to 2,452. The continual increase in enrolment rates demonstrates the effectiveness of NCAs school programme in Gedo.

To construct the schools NCA used local materials and local labour. This increased the experience of the labourers, reduced costs and enables local communities to carry out any future maintenance and repairs needed, which is appropriate to both the context and the need to build local capacity.

The nine emergency schools were planned for six months however, they are still operational to date due to the continued need through further emergencies. The emergency nature of these schools – temporary structures - is appropriate as they are used largely by IDPs and communities affected by floods. The IDPs in the area agreed they would return home once the violence has ceased. However, as the annual and in some cases bi-annual floods and droughts continue to destroy food supplies and resources from the communities and similarly there is no end in sight to the national insecurity, it is appropriate to continue to provide education for these children.

Despite the temporary nature of these schools, NCA constructed two VIP latrines at each school. This was appropriate to support the education of the pupils and provide a safe and hygienic environment.

The education programme and schools have been running effectively for a number of years and have proven sustainable through continued and growing attendance rates. Unfortunately, there are no secondary schools or further educational opportunities available throughout the region, which means the learning and subsequent livelihood options available for these children is limited and will continue to be until secondary or higher education is readily available in the region.

### **Key Finding 52**

Education provides the skills and knowledge needed to maximise employability and livelihood options. Furthermore, the education of children is critical to the development and promotion of peace and diplomacy for any countries future.

Should any secondary school or higher education opportunities however, become available these children will have formal qualifications to assist their applications. In a region where school attendance is generally low this created a further incentive for parents to send their children to school. Pupils with relatives in Mogadishu or Kenya are able to relocate to attend secondary schools, although, these opportunities are few.

#### **6.4.3.4 Acute Emergencies**

Upon notification of an emergency, NCA staff visit the area and meet with community members including the elders and leaders. Those in need of assistance are identified jointly by NCA and the community. NCA then transports and distributes the required number of emergency non-food item (NFI) kits or other necessary resources to the site. Through respecting and utilising the traditional community structures, NCA has been able to effectively access populations and those most in need during emergency situations.

During the evaluation, for example, a fire broke out in an IDP settlement. This settlement, similar to many others, was densely populated with dwellings constructed too close to one another and most were made of wooden sticks and tents. Hence, the fire spread quickly and many (84 households) people lost their homes and belongings. NCA responded through providing 100 non-food item kits. These kits largely contain:

- Plastic sheets;
- Cooking pots;
- Soap and washing powder;
- Matches;
- Blankets; and
- Jerry cans

NCA responded within 24 hours of the fire outbreak. They were able to respond so quickly as they have several stores of emergency NFI kits in warehouses throughout Gedo readily available for such emergencies.

### **Key Finding 53**

In a large area prone to a variety of disasters, having dispersed resources for responding to disasters and staff trained on disaster preparedness and response is key to effectively and efficiently minimising the impact of a disaster on communities and aiding their speedy recovery.

Somalia has been experiencing a decade-long drought. Crops failed in three consecutive seasons, thus exposing an estimated 230,000 residents of Gedo to famine conditions. NCA responded to the 2006 drought by distributing food in the districts of Garbaharey and Burdhubo in partnership with the World Food Programme (WFP). Food aid was appropriate to the famine conditions facing the region.

NCA distributed 6069.17 MT of relief food to 18,327 households (109,962 people). The food distribution was implemented in collaboration with local

communities through existing community structures. Members of these structures received training on relief distribution at each Emergency Distribution Point (EDP). This method of distribution was appropriate to the large scale and speed required. Furthermore, using the existing community structures is appropriate to the local population and creates a sound foundation for working relationships between NCA and local populations.

During the drought NCA supplied 143,000 litres of water to 1,700 households. This was 40 percent of the planned output as the project was terminated midway when fortunately the rains began and water collection was possible. NCA had previously embarked on a water trucking project in response to a severe drought. Each household received 175 litres of water. This project also involved the distribution of water containers and hygiene promotion. Clean water containers and hygiene promotion are important as large numbers of people collecting water from one source increases the risk of contamination. These initial hygiene messages also support the longer-term water and sanitation project, which builds on these principles. No household that received emergency water from NCA reported human or livestock fatalities as a result of water shortages and there were no reported outbreaks of waterborne diseases among the targeted households throughout the operation.

NCA completed the water trucking project successfully under extreme working conditions. Despite the emergency context of the project they were still able to actively involve communities and implement software elements to support and strengthen the hardware components. This project was implemented effectively and efficiently largely as a result of dedicated, experienced, well-informed and high quality local staff. The flexibility embedded into NCAs interventions ensures their responses are appropriate to local needs.

To combat dropout rates in schools during a drought, NCA implemented school-feeding programmes with support from UNICEF. The school feeding programmes ensured 4,351 pupils and 69 teachers received daily nutritious meals. This had a significant impact on the retention of pupils and teachers,



which enabled the education project to continue effectively. NCA, with funding from UNICEF and WFP, has continued the school feeding programme across its schools as it was recognised this vastly improved enrolment and attendance rates. In addition, this provided some level of blanket coverage in this chronically food insecure region.

#### **6.4.4 Software, Culture and Religion**

##### **6.4.4.1 Water and Sanitation Programme**

NCA implemented the water and sanitation hardware elements of its programme and then began training a water and sanitation committee for each project site. Staffing resources due to other emergencies and projects meant the water and sanitation committees were unable to be trained prior to or in parallel to the development of the hardware elements. This initially hampered the effectiveness of the water and sanitation committees. Hygiene and sanitation training are equally important in the prevention of water borne diseases and good health as the supply of safe water. Water and sanitation committees established prior to or in parallel to the construction of water points or latrines can gain hands-on training during construction. They can also draw on the enthusiasm of the positive construction works to drive an awareness raising campaign surrounding the issues of sustainable and clean water use; and good sanitation and hygiene. Trained and active water and sanitation committees may have encouraged the use of latrines. During the evaluation period the water systems were fully functional however, had they have broken down or incurred problems prior to the technical training of members of the water and sanitation committees they would have needed further help from NCA to repair the systems. The lack of training during the implementation of hardware hampered the effectiveness of the water and sanitation projects. This training has now been conducted and the water and sanitation committees are active in their communities. It is hoped they will encourage the construction and use of latrines.

## **Key Finding 54**

Software is as equally important as hardware to the effectiveness of a water and sanitation project and one should not be implemented without the other.

### **6.4.4.2 Education Programme**

The curriculum established at NCAs schools covers the software components of all NCA projects in Gedo, such as:

- Sexually gender-based violence, FGM and HIV/AIDS. This is dealt with age appropriately, for example, younger children are taught the importance of respecting both boys and girls and how violence towards anyone is not acceptable;
- Good hygiene and sanitation behaviours;
- Good land use; and
- Sustainable farming practices.

These cross-cutting issues are key for children in Somalia as they will be the founders of future development and children.

## **Key Finding 55**

Creating synergies across programmes and projects and using continued education to reinforce messages and training greatly enhances the effectiveness and sustainability of any project.

Each school NCA constructed had 2 Ventilation Improved Pit latrines that were used by the majority of pupils. The effective use of latrines in the schools was due to the hygiene and sanitation promotion within the education programme. Hygiene and sanitation was taught to pupils by teachers using the Qur'an. They emphasised the importance of cleanliness and good hygiene through passages in the Qur'an. This method ensured the education was contextually specific and appropriate for the pupils.

## Key Finding 56

To maximise the effectiveness of projects, training and education techniques and resources should draw on local traditions, cultures and religion.

NCA hosted discussions around sexual and gender based violence and female genital mutilation with religious leaders and elders. NCA recognised that without religious support for these issues in a country where religion dictates all aspects of life, no positive steps would be achieved. Conclusions from this dialogue were drawn that the Qur'an does not allow sexual and gender based violence and also there is no requirement in the Qur'an for female genital mutilation. The discussions were intensive and extensive but highly necessary and with the conclusions drawn have provided NCA with a solid foundation and useful tools for moving these messages forward. In particular, NCA uses Sheiks and Imams to engage communities in discussions of female genital mutilation (FGM). The religious leaders are continuing to further discourage FGM through preaching's within Mosques.

NCA additionally held discussions on the cross-cutting issues with elite men. NCA recognised that despite the chronic poverty and conflict, there are a number of elite men throughout Gedo – businessmen and Town or Clan Leaders. NCA understands that to drive behavioural change, education and preaching alone was not sufficient and they needed those in positions of power to lead by example. NCA actively engaged these men to encourage others to treat girls and women respectfully and include them in discussions and decisions that would impact them. NCAs strategy and techniques of addressing the cross-cutting issues through engaging religious leaders and respected and powerful men has proven highly effective and without this higher approval, these projects would not be possible in Somalia. This work is still in its infancy and will take many years to re-educate people around such sensitive issues. In particular, FGM is viewed by many Somali men and women as necessary for any young girl.

## Key Finding 57

Securing religious and elite support for any behavioural and traditional changes is vital in Gedo and throughout Somalia.

NCA's method of addressing the cross-cutting issues through both targeting them each in their own right but also embedding them into the training of all its other projects has greatly improved their impact. Behavioural and traditional change takes time and great effort. Through NCA's continual and consistent messages and training, behavioural changes in regard to the cross-cutting issues are taking place.

Women are important participants in NCA's strategy, both as targets and as agents of change. Gender equality is particularly problematic in Somali society and NCA has adopted a gradualist and incremental approach to changing gender relations in the capacity building element of its programme. NCA's acceptance that it is not possible radically (and meaningfully) to alter gender relations in the short-term is realistic. NCA did not request Water and Sanitation Committees to be gender balanced. Rather they discussed the roles of women in collecting and using water and subsequently communities themselves came to the conclusion that the water and sanitation committees should include some female members. This allowed traditional roles to be respected whilst also enabling a gradual acceptance of women to be involved in decision making. In several villages the elders commented on how proactive and capable the women members of the committee have proven and they are now seeking more women to join the committee. The acceptance of women in discussions, committees and decision making is a big step forward and rather than equality in numbers, NCA focuses on the inclusion of quality female members who can and are influencing decisions. Female membership of committees (though not of the Elders Committee) is now 'normal' in NCA's project areas.

### **Key Finding 58**

Gender equality is not about having equal numbers of men and women participate. In this context it is about liberation and the ability of both men and women to participate and have their views, opinions and participation to be held of equal value and importance. Adapting traditions and cultures must be for worthwhile reasons; community driven; and facilitated and encouraged respectfully if it is to be effective and sustainable.

Such community- and gender-focused appropriate approaches are of course in tune with NCA principles and practices, but in truth they constitute the only approaches that could work in Gedo and Somalia.

### **Key Finding 59**

Improving gender equality in Somalia demands a sensitive and gradual approach that respects Somali culture and finds a balance with Somali tradition.

#### **6.4.5 Local Management**

NCA encourages every community surrounding a school to establish a Community Education Committee. The committee is elected by the community and has both male and female members. Each NCA school has a Community Education Committee and they have received training from NCA to enhance their capacities. Committees hold regular meetings and are responsible for mobilising the wider community when necessary. One area, for example, was suffering a serious outbreak of diarrhea, the committee and in particular the female members, mobilised the community to fetch clean water supplies daily to the school to prevent pupils becoming ill and to ensure attendance rates remained high. This was extremely successful and very few pupils were sick as a result of the community action taken. Community Education Committees enable other members of the community to have a role in their communities and in the education of their children. Most Community

Education Committees would include influential and respected members of the community to ensure the highest level of support for the school.

#### **Key Finding 60**

Community Education Committees are a critical component of education projects in chronic complex emergencies, creating wider support and improving the sustainability of schools.

Water and Sanitation Committees are operational and actively managing water points with established payment mechanisms. NCA discussed the importance of water and sanitation committees and the importance of managing their water system with leaders and elders and as such, committee members were carefully selected by communities and their roles are respected by the wider community, which improves their impact and the sustainability of the water and sanitation project. Water and sanitation committees implemented a payment mechanism for water similar to that discussed in section 5.3.6 Local Management. This money is utilised to pay for fuel for the generators, spare pieces of equipment to repair breakdowns, and to provide the technicians with an income. The technicians are required to spend large quantities of their time maintaining the systems and must be dedicated to the water system therefore, the communities decided they should receive an income for their work to ensure their positions are sustainable. Mosques and schools receive free water as do a certain number of people identified by the community as unable to afford the water payments.

#### **Key Finding 61**

Mechanised water sources require a payment mechanism to secure their sustainability through regular maintenance and repairs. Payment mechanisms, however, must also consider and protect the most vulnerable people.

#### **6.4.6 The Most Vulnerable**

Operating largely through local staff has enabled NCA to build close links and mutual understanding with de facto powers in the communities, principally the committees of elders. Through these relationships it has been possible to gain access to those most vulnerable and in need. These people were identified by the community leaders but then verified by NCA staff. This mode of identification used the communities' knowledge and ensured there was no resentment of an attempt by an outside agency to interfere in community affairs in the tight sub-clan system. Identification of beneficiaries through the sub-clan system carries the risk of nepotism and may be subject to a different communal view of vulnerability and rights. NCA discussed what it means to be vulnerable or in need with village leaders and committee members to generate a shared understanding of who must be identified. It was agreed that once committees and leaders have identified those in need then NCA staff would assess and verify these people. This has proven an effective, efficient, culturally appropriate method.

#### **Key Finding 62**

Identifying beneficiaries is a sensitive process and must be conducted through engaging communities and using appropriate methods to minimise and prevent resentment and nepotism.

NCA has begun working with several FGM practitioners to re-train them as part of their cross-cutting issues project. FGM practitioners, mostly women, have built their livelihoods on carrying out FGM and strongly promote it. Engaging FGM practitioners in the project prevents their marginalisation and loss of livelihood and encourages their wider support – through providing them with an alternative livelihood strategy they are more likely to help support a cultural shift away from the practice of FGM. This work has proven extremely effective and one of the FGM practitioners has since been employed by NCA to raise awareness amongst other FGM practitioners.

## Key Finding 63

When implementing a project, the various lives and livelihoods it effects must be understood to ensure it gains full support and does not marginalise any members of society.

Statistics surrounding HIV/AIDS in Somalia are largely unknown due to the taboo of discussing the topic. NCA advocates for no sex before marriage and then faithfulness when married. Similar to all its cross-cutting issues it embeds these messages and discussions throughout all its operations in Gedo. This has improved the effectiveness of these projects through both increasing their reach and reinforcing good practices.

### 6.4.7 Summary

NCA has succeeded to a considerable extent in the difficult Gedo socio-cultural environment in meeting its current targets and implementing its programmes. Much of the success is due to sound working relations with communities; continued presence and respecting and operating through cultural and religious beliefs, practices and traditions.

Chapter 6 provides 29 key findings framed through the key themes outlined in section 6.4 Evaluation of NCAs Activities in Gedo. Upon detailed analysis of the findings and discussion presented, it is evident the findings support those in Chapter 5 for the five key principles for implementing humanitarian projects and an overarching programme strategy for delivering humanitarian aid in chronic complex emergencies (see section 5.3.8 Summary for further details):

- **Project Principle 1: Community Owned**
- **Project Principle 2: Culturally and religiously embedded**
- **Project Principle 3: strong software component**
- **Project Principle 4: Community level management**
- **Project Principle 5: Protection of most vulnerable**
- **Programme: A coherent dual strategy**



These principles and strategy are discussed further in Chapter 7, the Conclusions and Discussion section.

## **Chapter 7**

### **Conclusions and Discussion**

Changing communities from highly vulnerable to disasters with low levels of resilience and adaptive capacity to that of a community with low vulnerability and high resilience and adaptive capacity to disasters presents major challenges. This will require both humanitarian and development programmes. However, determining the extent to which such interventions enhance resilience and adaptive capacity and reduce vulnerability is a substantive challenge in itself. Evaluation remains one of the approaches that can provide insights in helping us determine the contribution of humanitarian organisations to both the theory and practice of enhancing these variables.

The following chapter draws on the key findings of Chapters 5 and 6. In some cases comparisons and generalisations of the findings from the case studies may be difficult to make given the different spatial, institutional and temporary scales at which they operated. The discussion is, however, guided by the purpose of addressing the research questions initially outlined in Chapter 1:

1. What involvement or role do beneficiaries and affected populations have in the process of humanitarian interventions?
2. When delivering humanitarian assistance during complex emergencies are interventions relevant and appropriate and if so how?
3. To what extent are humanitarian interventions during complex emergencies effective and sustainable?
4. To what extent can humanitarian aid deliver to long-term emergencies?
  - a. Can these interventions have a real impact?
  - b. If yes, what are the criteria for such projects and how do so many fail to be sustainable or have impact?

In order to approach this systematically this chapter is separated into three sections: project level; Somalia; and the evaluation of humanitarian assistance.

## **7.1 Project Level**

### **Research question 1: What involvement or role do beneficiaries and affected populations have in the process of humanitarian interventions?**

Local investment and ownership is needed for the positive impact and sustainability of any humanitarian project. International organisations all advocate for local ownership however, the extent that they actually allow this ownership in practice is debatable. Most projects are allocated to a particular sector such as livelihoods, food security or water and sanitation early on by international staff at a regional or headquarter level. Many of these projects will already have certain elements embedded or designed in before they reach any local community for consultation (CDA, 2008). According to Pouligny (2009) many practitioners would consider there to be a trade-off between the imperative to save lives and deliver aid quickly in order to alleviate the immediate suffering and the need to respect and support local capacity and ensure local ownership. It is only over the last few decades that humanitarian governance has incorporated the views of the local populations – and it is debatable how much energy humanitarians have put into these efforts. Humanitarians offer many reasons why it is difficult to adhere to modern standards of participation, but the implication is that the legitimacy of humanitarian governance does not depend on a process of deliberation, dialogue, or even consent (Barnett, 2011). Humanitarian governance stakes its legitimacy on its purpose.

Several humanitarian programmes, however, including those presented in this research refer to a sense of community involvement and ownership as a key factor to their success (*ibid*; CDA, 2008). Furthermore, beneficiaries are not mere victims and passive recipients of aid. The Sphere Handbook 2011 edition outlines a new standard, which aims for a people centred humanitarian response and emphasises:

*“community self-help, explicit support to community networks and projects and the need to include individual and community action in the response and recovery (Sphere Project, 2011, p. 9).*

Norwegian Church Aid are an international NGO, however, despite this, they followed local protocols and listened to the needs and priorities of each community. NCA actively engaged each local community in the design, implementation and management of their project. Chapter 5 showed how NCA conducted a needs assessment using engineers. These experts engaged in meaningful consultation with communities and as Chapter 5 found, *meaningful consultation is about working with communities to support their needs, priorities and ideas and ensuring they influence the design and implementation of a project.*

Chapters 5 and 6 identify, that it is not only right to involve beneficiaries and local populations in every project but it is essential to the effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of any humanitarian project. Their role should be comprehensive from project design through to its daily operations and management as Chapter 6 found *consultation and the involvement of beneficiaries is crucial when designing and implementing humanitarian projects to deliver effective and sustainable interventions.* Chapter 5 found that *community involvement and ownership is vital for the sustainability of any project. Communities must be able to adapt their projects and develop their own models of management. This should be encouraged and supported by implementing organisations in order for impacts to be long-term.*

Maximising the contributions of beneficiaries and local populations including for example, use of local labour, local materials, financial contributions, provision of meals and accommodation for staff during project implementation were found across Chapters 5-6 to contribute to local support and ownership for each project. Chapter 5 highlighted that *utilising local materials and labour wherever possible in a project increases the likelihood and opportunity for that project to be well maintained and duplicated by the community themselves*

*thus, proving more sustainable.*

**Research Question 2: When delivering humanitarian assistance during complex emergencies are interventions relevant and appropriate and if so how?**

In order to establish whether humanitarian aid delivered in complex emergencies is relevant and appropriate the aid must be appropriate to the delivery organisations capacity and resources and also relevant and appropriate to the needs of the local population (ALNAP, 2006). Both of these issues are highlighted in the OECD-DAC evaluative criteria. In Chapter 5, NCA had planned to implement a project delivering fishing equipment however, through a range of needs assessments it was evident that fishing equipment was to be provided by various organisations whereas water and sanitation were identified as the sector in greatest need. Subsequently, NCA adapted its proposals to concentrate solely on the delivery of water and sanitation in line with local needs.

Ensuring capacity and need however, does not alone establish an appropriate and relevant project. A key and recurrent finding in both case studies (Chapters 5-6) demonstrate the importance of delivering projects in a specific cultural context i.e. religion supported delivery. Norwegian Church Aid is an international NGO with international staff. The NCA Country Director for Somalia is not Somali, however, through his and Norwegian Church Aids experience they understand the importance of allowing the local context to shape their projects. The majority of NCAs field staff were local and their knowledge of Somalia and its people from the onset shaped how NCA engaged stakeholders and local communities. Understanding gained through these processes together with Somali religion and traditions influenced every aspect of NCAs work, which is both appropriate and necessary considering that Islam and the Qur'an influence every aspect of Somali life (Elmi, 2010).

NCA followed local protocols for entering and engaging communities. Chapter

5 found that *following correct local protocols for entering a community is key to the level of participation, ownership and ultimate success of any project in Somalia*. Chapter 6 highlighted that *discussions, dialogue and building relationships [with elders committees and local communities] may impede the timeliness of implementing projects but they are essential to the overall efficiency, effectiveness and impact of a project*. These findings emphasise the importance of working through local systems.

The cultural relevance of the training methods and materials was one of the most significant aspects of Norwegian Church Aids programmes in both Bari and Nugaal (Chapter 5) and Gedo (Chapter 6). Chapter 5 found that *using traditional, cultural or religious beliefs as a basis for educating and training or techniques to raise awareness of issues is the most appropriate method of inducing behavioural change that could otherwise take generations to become embedded*. NCA understood from the onset the importance of Somali traditions and religion and the impact these have on every aspect of Somali life. Hence, they ensured Somali traditions and religion influenced every aspect of their projects from training methods and training materials to engaging and working with various beneficiaries and stakeholders.

Chapters 6 reinforced the importance of religion supported delivery. Chapter 6 found that *to maximise the effectiveness of projects, training and education techniques and resources should draw on local traditions, cultures and religion*.

Evidently, the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of humanitarian projects delivered in Somalia initially rely on the appropriateness and relevance of a project. Subsequently, creating an appropriate and relevant project relies on embedding the project in the people including their religion and traditions as opposed to embedding a project in technology. Islamic identity and Somali identity cannot be separated and as such in order to understand Somali's and

how a project could be established successfully in Somalia it is essential to understand Islam and the Qur'an (Elmi, 2010).

Water and sanitation projects across the world are struggling with how to motivate and sustain behavioural change to prevent open defecation; ensure the use of improved sanitation facilities; and conduct good hygiene behaviours (Mukherjee, 2011; ACTED, 2010). Adomako (2008) emphasises that changing behaviour is a long-term phenomenon, which requires an appropriate approach. The case material presented in this thesis found that behavioural change was immediate and sustainable. Through understanding the local context and using the appropriate motivator – religion – local communities adopted new water, hygiene and sanitation behaviours and practices without hesitation and as these changes are rooted in their religion they will be sustainable.

### **Research Question 3: To what extent are humanitarian interventions during complex emergencies effective and sustainable?**

The previous section evidenced the importance of relevance and appropriateness to creating an efficient, effective and sustainable humanitarian response during a complex emergency. However, relevance and appropriateness alone do not create an effective and sustainable project.

Many water and sanitation projects delivered through humanitarian assistance prove unsustainable. Any water system requires regular maintenance, spare parts and in the case of mechanised water points, fuel. Without continued financial input of the organisation the water systems become dysfunctional. Chapters 5 and 6 found that *mechanised water sources require a payment mechanism to secure their sustainability through regular maintenance and repairs. Payment mechanisms, however, must also consider and protect the most vulnerable people.* Norwegian Church Aid and the local communities discussed these issues and the communities themselves developed a payment mechanism that would cover the operational maintenance of each water system including spare parts whilst also providing free water to schools, mosques and a selection of families that could not afford the payments.

Chapter 6 identified that *local communities must be encouraged to provide resources whether it be financial, labour or other, as this improves the efficiency of the project and increases local ownership and responsibility for the project*. Chapter 5 supports this and found that *utilising local materials and labour wherever possible in a project improves efficiency and increases the likelihood and opportunity for that project to be well maintained and duplicated by the community themselves thus, proving more sustainable*. The more time and resources communities supply for a project the more invested in the project they become. This investment of both time and resources creates a sense of responsibility and ownership towards a project. Communities strive to protect their investments. One could say that communities take on a role of stewardship over a project working to protect, maintain and improve it.

In order to create an effective and sustainable project the case material found that quality software was a crucial component. Chapter 6 demonstrates that *software is equally important as hardware to the effectiveness of a water and sanitation project and one should not be implemented without the other*. Furthermore, *the use of new techniques, practices and hardware is most effective when coupled with initial intensive training and continued coaching and support*. Software implemented through an appropriate cultural context provides the foundation of any project and ensures it becomes embedded throughout the lives of local communities.

Chapter 5 found another key element to achieving an effective and sustainable project is that *the design and key decisions surrounding a project must involve the main intended end users to ensure it is effective and sustainable*. In the case of Somalia and water and sanitation projects, the main end users are women. Traditionally in Somalia women are marginalised and their opinions of less value than a man's. Despite this culture, chapters 5 and 6 found it is possible to meaningfully involve women. Chapter 6 demonstrated that *improving gender equality in Somalia demands a sensitive and gradual approach that respects Somali culture and finds a balance with Somali tradition*. Chapter 5 found that *including women in projects whilst*



*respecting traditional gender roles ensures their inclusion is accepted and not resented and is more likely to be sustainable. Ultimately, gender equality is not about having equal numbers of men and women participate. In this context it is about liberation and the ability for both men and women to participate and have their views, opinions and participation to be held of equal value and importance. Adapting traditions and cultures must be for worthwhile reasons; community driven; and facilitated and encouraged respectfully if it is to be effective and sustainable.*

## **7.2 Somalia**

### **Research Question 4: To what extent can humanitarian aid deliver to long-term emergencies?**

- a. Can these interventions have a real impact?**
- b. If yes, what are the criteria for such projects and how do so many fail to be sustainable or have impact?**

The very nature of chronic emergencies such as, that of Somalia negates a long-term response. Somalia is in a state of chronic humanitarian crisis and therefore, requires projects designed for the long-term that have a multi-hazard perspective that is capable of responding to acute emergencies. The evidence presented in Chapter 5 found that in Somalia the *humanitarian emergency demanded a long-term strategy in order to ensure interventions were sustainable*. This was supported by the findings of Chapter 6, which found that *Chronic and acute emergencies are connected and impact upon each other and across all sectors. Operating in a chronic complex emergency demands a holistic approach to developing and implementing an appropriate humanitarian response*. It would appear that humanitarian projects delivering to long-term emergencies must work from a baseline of addressing a state of crisis and complete deprivation and vulnerability but with an aim of improving adaptive capacity and resilience, which ultimately improves the lives and livelihoods of local communities. This is essentially enabling communities to bounce forward.

The case material presented within this thesis illustrates that it is possible to deliver relevant, appropriate, effective and sustainable humanitarian projects in a chronic complex emergency. Despite this, there is no single recipe for designing and implementing a sustainable humanitarian project within a complex emergency. In order to deliver such projects there are a number of principles that should be embedded from the onset. In turn these principles should be examined by evaluations of humanitarian aid in chronic emergencies to determine the relevance, appropriateness, effectiveness and sustainability of a project or programme. These principles include:

- Community ownership: local populations, beneficiaries and/or stakeholders are and have been involved in the project from the onset including, its design, implementation and management.
- Culturally and religiously embedded: local traditions, culture and religion are embedded throughout the project,
- Software: projects have a robust and adequate software component.
- Management system: The project has an agreed community management system in place. This can range from a rotation for cleaning latrines to a payment mechanism for water systems.
- Protection of vulnerable groups: any project must protect and promote the lives of the most vulnerable members of the community. This must be given consideration when designing any management system.

The above five principles should provide the foundations to any humanitarian project in a chronic emergency in order to achieve a relevant, appropriate, effective and sustainable project. In essence, evaluative criteria need to be adapted to assess how these principles fit within, use or build local systems through for example, using religion and/or local traditions. Evidently, evaluative criteria need to be adapted, developed and implemented through a local lens specific to each evaluation.

### **7.3 Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance**

This research is not intended to replace the richness of the existing concepts of vulnerability, resilience or adaptive capacity, but rather to link these existing

conceptual frameworks to inform the humanitarian response to chronic complex emergencies. Humanitarian actors should play a significant role in implementing relief and response activities in ways that support local response plans and strengthen enabling conditions to enhance resilience and adaptive capacity and reduce vulnerability.

At the beginning of this work three key themes were presented. Firstly, the question was raised as to the nature of humanitarian assistance in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Humanitarian assistance is an ideal. Its delivery often breaches the ideal but that should not compromise the ideal itself. If the principals of humanitarian assistance were not there we would simply have to reinvent the same principles. The failure of the humanitarian community most notably in Rwanda 1993-94 led in a very broad sense to the erection of codes of conduct and standards that has drawn attention away from humanitarian ideals to expressions of physical performance. Although humanitarians might legitimate their presence and activities by seeking the explicit consent and active participation of local peoples, arguably more often they look to universal values. In other words, as Barnett (2011) describes, the roles they represent are not from the West and they are not from the locale, instead they are from the international community. To utilise values associated with a particular time and place is to give humanitarian governance a personality, when in fact it requires a customary quality to generate its moral standing. Humanitarian governance, to be successful, achieves a moral authority that derives not from any special place but rather from a shared humanity. It is not enough to be good; humanitarians also must do good.

This research has demonstrated that it is possible to deliver via NGOs of a different religious persuasion from that of the beneficiaries a sustainable set of projects. What is evident is that instead of management by measure there should be self-management by pleasure i.e. the contours of the project have to reflect the customary communal framework that the beneficiaries themselves so cherish. Having said that, it only applies at project level. At a policy level the State continues to be instrumental in its use of humanitarian assistance certainly not wishing to link disaster and development practices

and budgets. Humanitarian assistance continues to be used as an alternative to foreign policy in failed states. It is important that humanitarian ideals are always restated politically rather than upheld technically. The key issue is to bear witness. But this bearing witness is a witness to human rights based on material necessity of food, shelter, water and disease prevention. This is only possible if there is political recognition of protecting people from harm and simultaneously ensuring that interventions do no harm.

The second question was can anything be effectively done in chronic emergencies? The short answer to this is a qualified affirmative but it is important to emphasise that this is only possible if the beneficiaries have some level of ownership of the interventions. While the emphasis on a technical focus particularly reinforced by the Sphere project and the use of evaluation can lead to a top down process which gives more power to the donors it can be seen that if the cultural norms of a community are the starting point for project implementation there is every chance of a sustainable success. In order to build a useful knowledge, especially in State guided action in chronic emergencies, it is important that the richness of ecological and cultural variation that is the basis of project intervention and beyond that of livelihood construction is taken into account in the design and delivery. Beneficiaries in chronic complex emergencies tend to be IDPs. The recent Kampala Convention, which came into force in December 2012, is a continental instrument and the first of its kind that binds governments to provide legal protection for the rights and wellbeing of those forced to flee inside their home countries due to conflict, violence, natural disasters or development projects. It is yet to be seen however, how this will be effectively implemented especially if the effectiveness depends on local ownership of programme interventions.

The three key themes were also part of the discussion in the literature where the issue of evaluation as a tool which, drifted power towards donors was raised in such a manner that suggested it was not possible to capture the voice of the beneficiaries. While at a policy level this might be true, leading to humanitarian aid serving just as an instrument for the delivery of foreign

policy, at project level it is possible to capture the voice of the beneficiary. In capturing that voice it is also possible to capture the practical issues that underlie the successes, particularly the sustainability of project interventions in chronic emergencies. A key assumption of evaluation namely that the policy itself shall not be questioned must be open to contention in all humanitarian assistance programmes. If the humanitarian ideal is either in jeopardy or is being misused for political purposes then it must be the duty of the evaluator, under the prescription do no harm to raise questions about the abuse of the humanitarian ideal. Finally, all evaluations must be contextualised in specific histories. For the timelines to unfolding emergencies and to rehabilitation are specific to people and place. There seem to be general lessons available in what to avoid but specific lessons in how to commit to progressive social change are still difficult to find. The progress from 'do no harm' to 'do some good' is a hard road. Although, it is the presence of faith that sustains humanitarianism and the possibility of progress, blind faith can be its downfall (Barnett, 2011). Evaluation of humanitarianism can challenge blind faith.

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# Appendix 1

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