



Normative Power vs. Political Interest:

EU Aid Selectivity beyond the European Consensus on Development, 2008-13¹

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the 'governance turn' in the development policies of the European Union, represented in particular by the adoption of the 'European Consensus on Development' in 2005. The main assumption inherent in the EU approach to development is that the quality of governance in developing countries is a crucial (co-) determinant of development outcomes. The analysis concerns the allocation of funds (over €50 billion during the 2007-13 period) through the EU's main policy instruments: the European Development Fund, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, and the Development Cooperation Instrument. The paper attempts to establish whether any dominant explanation, or combination of explanations, given in the literature on development assistance, is able to account for the allocation of those parts of the funds that are meant to be spent on governance reform. Three explanatory models of development assistance are tested, revolving around notions of normative power Europe, donor interest and recipient need. The findings of the empirical analyses emphasise the role of donor-interest variables, but show that recipient needs play a (seemingly subordinate) role in decisions on EU aid allocation. Normative frameworks appear to take a back seat to both political donor interests and recipient needs.

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1. Introduction

Similar to most other providers of international development assistance, the European Union has been subject to the 'governance turn' of the late 1990s. Policy documents produced by the European Commission and Council around 2000 show a clear embrace of ideas on 'good governance' that had been produced by the World Bank in the final decade of the previous century. As such, the European Union supported the 'Post-Washington Consensus' that replaced the market fundamentalism of the previous era.

Good governance was seen, by the main EU institutions, as a fundamental principle of its development policy, in service of the main policy objective: 'to reduce and, eventually, to eradicate poverty' (European Council and Commission 2000: point 6). Good governance, alongside the protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, was accorded prime importance particularly to enhance the effectiveness of its poverty-reduction efforts. As it was phrased in a communication by the European Commission:

Poverty reduction, the main objective of the European Community's development policy, will only be sustainably achieved where there are functioning participatory democracies and accountable governments. Corrupt and autocratic governments are likely to misuse development assistance either to maintain repression or for private enrichment at the expense of their populations. (European Commission 2001b: 4)

Possibly the broadest statement on the issue is given in the European Consensus on Development, a landmark document of EU development assistance policy that signalled agreement among member states and EU institutions on its basic principles (cf. Carbone 2007: 55-6). The Consensus referred to the EU's emphasis of the promotion of 'common values' in its policies towards third countries, which would be 'respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice' (European Parliament, Council and Commission 2006: C46/3). A more recent statement, issued at the launch of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in January 2011, emphasised the continuity in EU thinking over the first decade of this century. At this occasion, David O'Sullivan (2011: 7), Chief Operating Officer of the newly established EEAS, indicated that the promotion of human rights and good governance would be 'the silver thread running through everything we do'.

An influential interpretation of the motivations of the European Union revolves around the idea of 'normative power Europe'. The idea that the EU is primarily a normative power implies that European relations with other parts of the world are motivated by normative ideas concerning democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Critics of the notion of normative power Europe point out that the impact of political norms in European external relations is limited, and that the norms serve to legitimise political agendas that are otherwise determined by political interests.

The relative impact of norms and interests on European aid allocations has received surprisingly little attention among quantitative researchers, despite the fact that the European Union has become a significant provider of foreign assistance. This paper aims to assess which factors – normative power, political interest or recipient need – seem to influence the allocation of development assistance to the EU's partner countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the so-called neighbourhood.

Previous empirical research on aid allocation has consistently found that governance-related considerations appear to exert limited to negligible influence on the actual selectivity of development assistance (e.g., Neumayer 2003, Hout 2007, Clist 2011). Yet, Gordon Crawford in his study on so-called 'political aid', reported some impact of political selectivity on EU aid allocations, in particular with regard to the promotion of democracy. Crawford noted that the EU tended to support, in particular, the strengthening of electoral processes and of civil and political rights, while providing less assistance to processes related to government accountability and democracy (Crawford 2001: 150-1).

The paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses some salient aspects of the EU's development policy and its focus on aspects of 'good governance'. Section 3 outlines the theoretical perspectives and formulates some hypotheses on the allocation of EU aid funds. Section 4 discusses the methodology and data used in the paper. Section 5 contains the analysis of allocations according to the recent CSPs. The final section formulates some conclusions on the allocation of EU development assistance and the debate about aid selectivity.

2. EU Development Policy and 'Good Governance'

Since the end of the Cold War, European Union development assistance policies have been targeting three main 'arenas': the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (or ACP) countries; the European 'neighbourhood'; and other developing countries. The first arena consists mainly of former colonies of the EU's member states and has been regulated by a sequence of conventions and agreements, named after the African cities where these were concluded: Yaoundé (1964-1976), Lomé (1976-2003) and Cotonou (since 2003). Development assistance to the ACP group is financed from the European Development Fund (EDF), which contains €22.7 billion for the 2008-13 period and is currently in its tenth quinquennial round. The second arena includes countries in North Africa, the Mediterranean rim of the Middle East and countries that were part of the former Soviet Union and are west of the Ural Mountains and in the Caucasus. The financing instrument is the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), holding €11.2 billion for the 2007-13 period. The third arena is a more or less residual group, consisting of countries in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East, plus the Central Asian former Soviet republics and South Africa. Policies for this group are currently being financed from the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), which amounts to €16.9 billion, to be spent from 2007 until 2013.

The aid relationship between the European Union and partner developing countries is structured by the so-called Country Strategy Paper (CSP). The CSP contains the EU's medium-term strategy for the provision of development assistance on the basis of a country's official national policy priorities. The latter have usually been laid down in a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), required for support from the World Bank and IMF. The so-called Multiannual or National Indicative Programme (MIP/NIP) serves as a financial operationalisation of the CSP.

The legal-institutional framework of EU development cooperation changed considerably with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2011. The establishment of the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (who also serves as one of the vice-presidents of the European Commission), the creation of the European External Action Service and the merger of two separate Directorates-General into DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DEVCO in short) have been the most obvious changes in the area of development policy. The restructuring resulted, according to

two analysts, in 'a complex programming process' (van Seters and Klavert 2011: 3). The European Council decided in July 2010 to reorganise policy-making responsibilities on development cooperation by making the EEAS responsible for preparing decision making in the Commission on country allocations, CSPs and MIPs (European Council 2010: article 9.3). Notwithstanding these responsibilities, the Commissioners for Development and Neighbourhood Policy have retained their powers, as 'any proposals' on the three development instruments that were mentioned above would need to be made jointly by the relevant departments of the EEAS and those of DG DEVCO 'under the responsibility of the Commissioner' and 'submitted jointly with the High Representative for adoption by the Commission' (European Council 2010: articles 9.4 and 9.5).

Building on an earlier statement of the European Council and the Commission (2000), the first major steps toward including a governance dimension in EU development assistance were set in 2003. A communication drafted by the European Commission, as well as ensuing conclusions formulated by the European Council, stressed the centrality of proper governance arrangements to securing positive development outcomes. The Commission, which interpreted governance primarily in terms of rules and processes guiding interest articulation, resource management and the exercise of power, argued that '[the] way public functions are carried out, public resources are managed and public regulatory powers are exercised is the major issue to be addressed in that context. The real value of the concept of governance is that it provides a terminology that is more pragmatic than democracy, human rights, etc.' (European Commission 2003: 3). The Commission and the Council agreed that good governance policies should not be 'one-size-fits-all', but rather recognised the distinction between 'effective partnerships' where conventional tools for governance reform would be feasible and 'difficult partnerships and post-conflict situations' (fragile states) that necessitate the adoption of more targeted approaches (European Commission 2003: 18; European Council 2003b: 4).

In an attempt to operationalise the governance approach adopted by the Council and Commission, the EuropeAid Cooperation Office drafted a handbook on promoting good governance. The Handbook argued that 'it is now recognised by all actors that governance, i.e. the state's ability to serve the citizens, is a key component of policies and reforms for poverty reduction and that good governance is key to the sustainable achievement of

development objectives and to the effectiveness of development assistance' (EuropeAid Cooperation Office 2004: 5).' The handbook distinguished six 'core concerns' of good governance (EuropeAid Cooperation Office 2004: 8):

- democratisation and elections;
- promotion and protection of human rights;
- strengthening of the rule of law;
- enhancement of the role of civil society;
- reform of public administration, the civil service and public finance management;
- decentralisation and capacity building of local government.

EuropeAid argued that such core concerns would all warrant attention in their own right, but that attention for proper governance would also need to be 'mainstreamed'. For this to be done, the office formulated six 'guiding principles' that should be applied in a 'horizontal' fashion to ensure that 'all project and programmes, at every phase of their development, promote good governance practices': participation and ownership, equity, organisational adequacy, transparency and accountability, conflict prevention, and anti-corruption (EuropeAid Cooperation Office 2004: 9-10).

The 'European Consensus on Development', adopted by the European Council, Parliament and Commission in December 2005, contained a reaffirmation of the EU's orientation to governance: the document emphasised the promotion of governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms among the EU's nine central activities, as it argued the Union had a 'comparative advantage' in these areas (European Parliament, Council and Commission 2006: C46/11, 13-14).³ In this particular area,

³ The other areas were: trade and regional integration; environment and sustainable management of natural resources; infrastructure, communications and transport; water and energy; rural development, territorial planning, agriculture and food security; conflict prevention and fragile states; human development; and social cohesion and employment (European Parliament, Council and Commission 2006: C46/11-15).

[t]he Community⁴ will actively promote a participatory in-country dialogue on governance, in areas such as anti-corruption, public sector reform, access to justice and reform of the judicial system. ... With a view to improved legitimacy and accountability of country-driven reforms, the Community will ... also support decentralisation and local authorities, the strengthening of the role of Parliaments, promote human security of the poor, and the strengthening of national processes to ensure free, fair and transparent elections. The Community will promote democratic governance principles in relation to financial, tax and judicial matters.’ (European Parliament, Council and Commission 2006: C46/13-14)

As a follow-up to the European Consensus, the European Commission published a communication in which it announced a more ‘incentive-based approach’ to governance in the context of its most important development relationship, namely its partnership with the group of ACP countries. As part of its so-called ‘Governance Initiative’, the Commission introduced a ‘governance incentive tranche’ during the tenth round of the EDF, amounting to €2.7 billion, or roughly 12 per cent of the funds made available for the 2008-13 period. The funds were distributed as ‘additional financial support to countries adopting or ready to commit themselves to a plan that contains ambitious, credible measures and reforms’ (European Commission 2006d: 10; European Commission 2009: 3-6).⁵ In a similar vein, the ENPI for the 2007-10 period contained €50 million for a ‘governance facility’ (European Commission 2008b: 5). Of the three main instruments of EU development assistance, the DCI was the only one that did not contain an incentive-oriented mechanism; the DCI only expressed the intention of mainstreaming the attention for governance, democracy and human rights into various thematic programmes (European Parliament and Council 2006: L378/46).

⁴ This terminology stems from the pre-Lisbon constitutional framework, when development cooperation, as per the Treaty of Maastricht, was part of the first ‘pillar’ of the European Union, and was regulated by title XX, articles 177-181 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.

⁵ (Molenaers and Nijs 2009, Molenaers and Nijs 2011) have presented critical analyses of the implementation of the governance incentive tranche. Also, a review done by the European Commission (2009: 9-12) highlights some of the difficulties, in particular regarding the size of the incentives involved. According to the Commission (2009: 12), ‘the incentive created by the tranche is primarily political: encouragement for the partner country to engage in a political dialogue on governance and to formalise its political commitment for reform in a “contract”.’

In order to monitor the state and progress of governance reform in partner countries, and allocate funds, the Commission established a 'governance profile', consisting of nine indicators that should enable the establishment of the 'level' and 'trend' of the performance of aid-recipient countries. The profile contains the following elements: political/democratic governance, political governance/rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, economic governance, internal and external security, social governance, international and regional context, and quality of partnership (European Commission 2006a: 13-29).

The latest communication on development policy published by the Commission focused on 'development impact'. This communication reiterated the Commission's focus on human rights, democracy and good governance among the EU's 'policy priorities' (European Commission 2011: 4-5), while emphasising that EU aid should be directed towards those countries with the greatest need for development assistance and countries where aid could have the biggest impact, such as fragile states. The communication also stressed 'incentives for results-oriented reform', for instance by introducing a clearer link to country performance with regard to its institutional reforms and policies and by suggesting a connection between the allocation of general budget support and a country's governance situation (European Commission 2011: 5, 9-10).

Arguably in recognition of the fact that democratisation and the protection of human rights are not well taken care of by partner governments in the developing world, the EU established the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in 2006. The instrument was a follow-up to operations 'contributing to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms', started in 1999 (European Council 1999a, 1999b). The EIDHR, with an allocation of €472 million for the three-year period from 2011 to 2013, aim to support civil-society organisations in organising education, training and research activities in the areas of human rights and democratisation, as well as provide support to election observation missions (European Commission 2010b: 5, 10, 36).

Since the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003, fragile states⁶ have occupied a special place in European development policy. The approach to fragile states was a clear case of the fusion of the development and security agendas of the European Union (European Council 2003a). State fragility was interpreted, in its operational features, as a phenomenon with clear governance overtones. According to the Commission (2007: 8), '[f]ragility is often triggered by governance shortcomings and failures, in form of lack of political legitimacy compounded by very limited institutional capacities linked to poverty'. In 2007, the European Council requested the Commission to choose a set of pilot countries to get experience with the EU response to fragile states. The Commission selected six countries (Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Timor-Leste and Yemen), where lessons should be learnt for a more comprehensive approach, to be laid down in an *Action Plan for Situations of Fragility and Conflict* (European Commission 2010). To date, the preparation of the action plan has not proceeded as expected, as the newly created European External Action Service and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy appear to have had little direct interest in taking forward the fragile states approach (Castillejo 2011: 169).

Since the turn of the century, the European Union has been adopting comprehensive 'strategic frameworks' for the traditional arenas of its development policy that were outlined above (Latin America, Asia, Central Asia and the European Neighbourhood), as well as, in the case of the ACP, specific sub-regions within the grouping.⁷ Without exception, these documents include statements on the promotion of good governance, usually in the context of democratisation, the protection of human rights and strengthening of the rule of law. In many cases, regionally specific elements are included in the concept of good governance, thereby illustrating the elasticity of the term. The most comprehensive notion of governance is represented in the Africa-EU partnership document of 2007, which, apart from the

⁶ State fragility was defined by the European Council in reference to 'weak or failing structures and to situations where the social contract is broken due to the State's incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions, meet its obligations and responsibilities regarding the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, security and safety of its population, poverty reduction, service delivery, the transparent and equitable management of resources and access to power' (European Council 2007b: 2).

⁷ The latter approach has led some commentators to talk about a 'regionalisation' of the EU's approach to the ACP group (van Seters and Klavert 2011: 14).

conventional elements, mentions aspects such as gender equality, the management of natural resources, human security and corporate social responsibility (European Council 2007a: 8). Other dimensions brought under the rubric of good governance include (European Commission 2001a: 18; 2005: 8; 2006b: 6, 25; 2006c: 6-10; 2008a: 3, 10; European Commission and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011: 6, 11; European Council 2007c: 20, 23; 2010: 20; European External Action Service 2011: 7):

- the strengthening of civil society (Asia, the Caribbean, the Pacific Islands and the Mediterranean);
- taxation and fiscal policy making (Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific Islands);
- forestry management (Central Asia and the Pacific Islands);
- post-conflict reconstruction and conflict resolution (the Pacific Islands and the Sahel);
- economic reforms (the Mediterranean);
- the energy sector (Central Asia)
- financial management (Latin America);
- fisheries policy (the Pacific Islands); and
- water governance (Central Asia).

3. Theoretical Approaches

The theory of 'normative power Europe' clearly sets the European Union apart from other actors in the field of foreign policy and development assistance. This approach, which is drawing on some important liberal notions of foreign policy-making, focuses on the importance of ideas to development aid policies. In the scholarly literature on aid, Carol Lancaster (2007: 18-19) has emphasised that ideas, next to institutions, interests and organisations, are among the central domestic political influences on aid giving. According to her, 'worldviews' ('widely shared values [based on culture, religion, ideology] about what is right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate in public and private life') and 'principled beliefs' or 'norms' ('collective expectations about the proper behavior for a given identity')

are important factors in the shaping of and decision making on foreign aid (Lancaster 2007: 18).

The theory of normative power Europe focuses on the desire to promote democracy, human rights and good governance in the developing world with the help of EU aid policies. The underlying ideal is that of a liberal-democratic form of government, where the state is mainly an impartial arbiter between contending forces that regulates the struggle among interests on the basis of well-defined and protected individual rights (cf. Williams 2008: 13-14, Youngs 2010: 2-4). The concept of 'normative power Europe' was coined as an attempt to re-interpret the factors motivating the actions of the European Union (the original formulation was Manners 2002, a more recent interpretation is Sicurelli 2010: 13-32). According to Manners (2002: 242-3), the *acquis communautaire* and the *acquis politique* contain five 'core norms' (peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms) and four 'minor norms' (social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance). On this basis, he claims that

not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly ... this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics. ... Thus my presentation of the EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it – that the EU can be *conceptualized* as a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU *acts* to change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it – that the EU *should* act to extend its norms into the international system. (Manners 2002: 252)

In opposition to the notion of normative power Europe, other scholars have emphasised that political interests are shaping EU development assistance policies. Scholars emphasising political interests draw on a body of literature on development assistance more generally in which 'donor interests' are placed centrally. Many studies performed since the end of the 1970s, including McKinlay and Little's original work on aid allocation, have reported findings pointing at the prevalence of foreign policy interests in the explanation of development aid relationships (McKinlay and Little 1979, cf. McKinlay and Little 1978a, McKinlay and Little 1978b). Donor interest models relate development assistance, or foreign aid more generally, to the foreign policy objectives of a donor government. In this sense, the

model draws on classical realist notions of foreign policy making and international politics that see aid as one of the instruments of foreign policy. Thus, following the seminal work of realist scholar Hans Morgenthau, aid needs to be interpreted as 'an integral part of the political policies of the giving country' and thus subject to the policy objectives of that country (Morgenthau 1962: 309, cf. Pakenham 1966). Empirical research on aid has tended to include variables on trade relations or colonial ties as indicators of donor interest (e.g., Dollar and Levin 2006).

In relation to the EU's development policy, several sets of interests can be seen to dominate the discourse regarding the motivations for providing aid. First, as analysed in Ravenhill's classical study on 'collective clientelism', the countries of the European Community, and later the European Union, have used the benefits provided to the ACP countries, concluded at Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou, as instruments to maintain their influence in the former European colonies (Ravenhill 1985: 324-33). The ACP countries' trading capacities have recently, for instance through the focus on the establishment of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), received most attention.

Next to trade interests, security considerations have started to play a role in EU development policies, particularly since '9/11'. As indicated above, the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003 (European Council 2003a) was a sign that the European Council perceived the danger of state fragility as a potential threat to the security interests of the European Union. The reconstruction of state capacities and security sector reform are the most important objectives of EU policies.

A different type of security considerations has entered the discourse on the EU's relationship to its 'neighbourhood'. Despite the use of this convivial term in reference to the countries on the European rim, the issue of migration has been 'securitised' in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy, one of the overt aims of which is to reduce illegal immigration into the European Union. The enhancement of the security capacity of neighbourhood countries was made into a conditionality for EU support through the neighbourhood instrument (Kausch and Youngs 2009: 965-8, cf. Buzan et al. 1998: 23-6).

Finally, some authors have emphasised the use of development assistance for bringing about public sector reform, creating property rights and liberalising and opening up the economy as part of the neo-liberal ('Post-Washington Consensus') agenda that aims at

reorganising, and limiting the role of, the state in the economy of developing countries. This interpretation (Williams 2008: 88-9, Craig and Porter 2005: 95-121, Hout and Robison 2009: 2-5, Hout 2007) has analysed the emphasis on good governance over the past fifteen years as a reflection of a more fundamental desire to bringing about market-oriented social transformation. Key instruments are seen to be the limiting of the role of the state (by liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of the economy) and the establishment and protection of property rights as the main way of supporting citizens' participation in the market. Instead of seeing the normative orientation to political reform in developing countries as a sign of moral conviction, analysts do not take the official policy at face value. Rather, as in a recent publication on the issue, authors provide 'a critical assessment of how norms can work to rationalise policy agendas which tangibly fall short of their nominal ethical objectives' (Langan 2012: 249). In the same vein, Chandler (2010) has analysed the EU's purposes in its relationship with various countries in South Eastern Europe, which aspire EU membership, as a situation of 'post-liberal governance'. He argued that the EU has imposed conditionalities on the states of the Balkans in order to 'reproduce' itself in the region (Chandler 2010: 80). Similarly, two analysts of the current attention for state building have claimed recently that this approach is intimately linked to development and that it can be interpreted as 'the repackaging of a long-term agenda for entrenching neoliberalism as the organising principle of developing economies and polities and the furthering of a putative "liberal peace"' (Marquette and Beswick 2011: 1705).

In addition to the normative power and political interest explanations of EU aid, a third explanation can be distinguished, again drawing on McKinlay and Little's classical work in the field. The so-called recipient need model takes a radically different starting point as compared to the donor interest approach. Informed by idealist views on international politics, models based on recipient need have stressed humanitarian motives related to conceptions of international justice and have emphasised that donor countries aim to improve the quality of life, in particular of the poor, in developing countries. Poverty reduction has generally been taken to be the main response to recipient need, and empirical studies have commonly been using gross national income or product *per capita* as the best proxy for the level of poverty (Clist 2011: 1726-8, e.g., Dollar and Levin 2006: 2037). Important studies, such as those by Dollar and Levin (2006) and more recently Clist (2011),

have found evidence of the influence of recipient needs, but continue to report the influence of donor interests, suggesting a much less neat distinction between the two types of motivations.


4. Research Design and Data

On the basis of the discussion of differing explanations of development assistance and the role of the EU in section 3, it is plausible to assume that the allocation of governance-related support by the EU cannot be captured neatly in one explanatory model. The allocation of EU assistance for governance is made up of a variety of categories, including:

- aid for improving the business environment;
- aid for improving the security sector;
- aid for border control and regulation of migration;
- aid for public sector reform;
- aid for political governance (human rights, civil society, elections and formal political institutions).

The following analyses test the hypothesis that the different components of governance-related support can be ranged on a continuum, where political interests are the main explanatory factor on one end and normative power is the main explanatory factor on the other end. The continuum that is researched can be pictured as follows:

Figure 1 Continuum of Categories of EU Governance-related Assistance



The analysis of this paper focuses on one of the three key instruments that the EU has available in its 'tool box for external action', namely assistance, conditionality and political dialogue. This paper relates to the financial assistance provided to 126 countries (see Appendices A and B), ranging from middle-income to least developed, that qualify for support under the EU's three main instruments: the European Development Fund (the ACP countries), the Development Cooperation Instrument (countries in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (the countries on Europe's southern, eastern and south eastern rim).⁸

Data on EU assistance were obtained from the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and/or the Multi-annual or National Indicative Programme (MIP or NIP) agreed between the European Commission and its partner governments. The analysis focuses on the allocations made for the period from 2007 to 2013. The reason for opting for an analysis of allocations rather than disbursements is that most scholars focusing on assistance agree that the former are generally a better approximation of donor intentions than realised payments, since various causes may lead to differences between allocations and actual disbursements.⁹

Unclear or vagueness in the Multi-annual or National Indicative Programmes about programme categories implied that, in some cases, additional assumptions needed to be made on the allocation of budgets to specific governance activities. In those cases where the MIP/NIP mentioned only broad governance categories without specifying the allocations to those targeted categories in more detail, allocations were assumed to be spread equally over the categories mentioned in the MIP/NIP. For the purpose of the current analyses, data on allocations to governance programmes were classified into seven categories of support of, respectively, human rights activities; public sector and public administration reform; decentralisation and local governance; public finance management; judicial reform and support to the justice sector; civil society and non-state actors; and elections and formal political institutions.

⁸ The analysis excludes seven countries for which no Country Strategy Paper or Multi-annual or National Indicative Programme was available: Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Guinea, Russia, South Sudan, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

⁹ The fragmentation and unclarity of allocations under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) have prompted me to leave out this instrument from the ensuing analyses. See: European Commission (2012c).

Following previous analyses of aid selectivity (e.g., Neumayer 2003; Hout 2007; Clist 2011), a two-stage model is used to determine the impact of a set of explanatory variables on aid eligibility (the first stage) and the level of aid allocations (the second stage). The two stages reflect the analytical distinction between two types of decisions regarding the allocation of aid: which countries are selected for aid programmes and which are not (eligibility stage) and how much aid is allocated to countries that are considered eligible (level stage)? Aid eligibility is measured as a binary variable for the various categories of aid mentioned above. Aid level is measured as the absolute amount of aid for governance reform allocated to recipient countries. Because of the skewed distribution of aid allocation, logarithmic transformation was applied to the dependent variables expressing the level of aid.

The explanatory variables are expressed by a range of indicators, which relate to the different theoretical perspectives that were discussed in section 3. In order to assess the impact of the notion of normative power Europe, an indicator has been included that measures the change in civil and political freedom in the period preceding the EU allocations for the 2007-13 period. Political interests are measured by two variables: EU economic interest and the change in economic freedom in the period preceding the 2007-13 allocations. Average per capita income and Least Developed Country (LDC) status are included as proxies for recipient needs. State fragility, ACP group membership, ENPI membership and countries' location in sub-Saharan African are included to assess the impact of specific country characteristics. Finally, size of the population is included as a control variable for the size of the country.

Data on the first five indicators have been included for 2007, if available. The final two indicators express changes over the five year period preceding the allocation (2003-7).

Appendix A lists the sources of the indicators:

- *Wealth or poverty level*, measured as GDP per capita in purchasing power parity, and expressed in constant prices of 2005;
- *EU economic interest*, measured as the value of exports in millions of euros;
- *Country size*, measured as the size of the population in millions;
- *State fragility*, as measured by the Fund for Peace's *Failed States Index 2007*. The index includes 114 out of EU's 126 partner developing countries (with missing data mainly

concerning smaller [island] states). A higher score on the index reflects that a country has more characteristics of state fragility.

- *Least Developed Country status*, as reported in UNCTAD's *Least Developed Countries Report 2007*. The criteria for inclusion among the least developed countries are: low income (three-year average gross national income per capita below \$900), limited human assets (measured with indicators on nutrition, health, school enrolment and literacy) and economic vulnerability (measured with indicators of natural shocks, trade shocks, exposure to shocks, economic smallness and economic remoteness).
- *Change in civil and political freedom, 2003-7*, calculated as the absolute change in country scores on Freedom House's political rights and civil liberties index, which ranges between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).
- *Change in economic freedom, 2003-7*, calculated as the change in country scores on regulatory quality, taken from the World Bank's *Worldwide Governance Indicators*. The indicator of regulatory quality captures 'perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development'.

In order to correct the skewed distribution of the data on income/poverty level, EU economic interest and country size, these three variables were entered into the analyses after logarithmic transformation.

The eligibility and level stages are analysed by performing two variants of regression analysis, based on the measurement levels of the dependent variables. The analysis of the eligibility stage is performed with logistic regression, while for the level stage ordinary least-squares regression is applied. The analyses of the level stage include only recipient countries, that is, countries that have been included as aid partners at the eligibility stage.

5. Analysis of EU Allocation Patterns

This section reports on the findings of the analysis of allocations to a variety of governance instruments in EU external assistance policies in the 2007-13 period. The next two sub-sections discuss the results of the analysis of the eligibility and level stages.

5.1 Eligibility for EU Governance-related Assistance

Table 1 summarises the findings of the logistic regression analyses related to eligibility for EU governance-related assistance. Results are presented for six dependent variables. The regression of total governance aid on the set of independent variables serves as a reference point for the analysis of other dependent variables, all of which are categories within total EU assistance for governance purposes. Each of the analyses starts with the presentation of a full model, containing all independent variables that were discussed in the previous section. Subsequent estimations relate to reduced models, from which variables have been omitted that demonstrated too high levels of multicollinearity. The discussion of the analyses in this section focuses on the reduced models (2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12).

The analysis of the allocation of total governance aid (equation 2) shows that governance aid can be explained moderately well using the model specified here. Overall governance aid seems to be a function of a variety of considerations, reflecting the generally held idea in the aid allocation literature that donor interest and recipient needs models should be combined. The eligibility for governance-related assistance can be understood to a large extent in terms of recipient needs, as GDP per capita is the most important explanatory factor. Donor political interests appear to be influential alongside the recipient need variable, illustrated by the positive impact of the interaction term of ACP group membership and EU trade relationships, and the impact of ENPI membership. This finding indicates that ACP group members that have a high level of trade with the EU, as well as partners in the European Neighbourhood are significantly more frequently represented among recipients of governance assistance than other countries.

Analysis of the eligibility for assistance to the business environment (equation 4) seems to corroborate the impact of political interests on the allocation of aid in support of market-oriented reform. Countries that had experienced a reform in the regulatory framework of the economy in the years preceding the EU allocations for the 2007-13 period, had a significantly greater chance to be included in EU aid for business-related reform. The only other significant variable in this equation relates to ACP membership, indicating that ACP countries generally had a lesser chance of obtaining this form of assistance from the EU.

Eligibility for assistance aimed at supporting homeland security and migration controls in EU partner countries is quite well explained by the model of equation 6, in that over 91 per

cent of the cases is correctly classified. It appears that none of the independent variables, with the exception of ENPI membership, exerts any significance influence on eligibility for this type of aid. The explanation for the inclusion and exclusion of countries for assistance for strengthening border controls and curbing migration flows seems to revolve around direct political interests of the European Union related to the protection of its borders.

In a similar way, eligibility of assistance for security governance in aid-recipient countries seems to be guided by a clear definition of the EU's political interests. Equation 8 indicates that one variable clearly dominates in the explanation of security-sector governance aid. The decision to include countries among the recipients of this type of foreign assistance appears to be guided primarily by the assessment on the part of the EU of countries' state fragility. The understanding of state fragility as a security problem was highlighted in the discussion, in previous sections, of Europe's security strategy. It is plausible to assume that notions of security related to fragile states have continued to cast their shadow over the allocations of EU aid in the 2007-13 period.

Aid for public sector reform and for political governance were assumed above to represent the normative power side of the aid continuum. Equation 10 indicates that the normative inspiration may indeed have had some influence in the decision-making on the partners the EU has wished to include for support for public sector reform. It is clear that the strengthening of civil and political freedom in particular countries has had an important influence on the decision to select those countries. As indicated by coefficient related to the indicator on GDP per capita, eligibility decisions on public sector support do also seem to reflect considerations of recipient needs. Finally, countries in the European Neighbourhood appear to have been included among aid recipients with some priority.

Decisions on eligibility for political governance assistance (related to allocations for human rights, elections and rule of law) seem to have been less clearly influenced by normative considerations, given the weak impact of civil and political freedoms. Recipient needs appear to have been a clearer guide, as in the case of public sector reform, as well as ENPI membership. Further, ACP membership appears to have had a positive influence on inclusion among recipients of this category of aid.

Table 1 *Eligibility for Governance-related Assistance*

	Dependent variable					
	Governance aid (total)		Aid for business environment		Aid for homeland security and migration controls	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GDP/cap (log)	-2.87	-2.96***	-.02		-1.86	.18
Population (log)	-.47		1.06		-.49	
EU trade (log)	.71		-1.10		1.02	
Civil and political freedom	-1.10*	-.98	.39	.43	.16	-.16
Economic freedom	-1.45	-.46	.18	1.15*	-.24	-.44
ACP membership	1.46		-1.35	-.85*	-16.64	
ENPI membership	1.76	2.28**	2.01**	1.10	3.03*	1.65*
Fragile state	.08**		.01		-.08*	-.04
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.15		1.14		17.85	
Least developed country	-.93		-1.78**	-.62	.89	
Interaction ACP/EU trade		.77***			6.00	-.12
Constant	3.44	11.07***	1.77	.26		
					111	113
N	111	118	111	122	90.1	91.2
Correctly classified (per cent)	85.6	79.7	72.1	68.0	.29	.14
R ²	.51	.39	.31	.22	9.49	6.76
					(.30)	(.56)
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ^2	10.56	7.37	4.31	8.79	-1.86	.18
(p-value)	(.23)	(.50)	(.83)	(.36)		

Notes: Variables in columns 2, 4 and 6 have been removed because of high multicollinearity ($r > .40$).

Reported R² is Nagelkerke's pseudo R² at eligibility stage, and adjusted R² at level stage.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$. P-values are given in brackets for the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ^2 test.

Table 1 (continued)

	Dependent variable					
	Aid for security governance	Aid for public sector reform	Aid for political governance			
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
GDP/cap (log)	-1.40		-3.09*	-3.54***	-1.29	-1.77***
Population (log)	-.73		-1.03		.19	
EU trade (log)	.65		1.24	.37	-.02	
Civil and political freedom	.07	.04	-1.48**	-1.05*	-.25	-.25
Economic freedom	-.03	.70	-.87	-.91	-.95	-.15
ACP membership	-1.72	-1.01*	.82		1.27	1.33***
ENPI membership	-.13		2.33**	2.33**	1.96**	1.89***
Fragile state	.08***	.11***	.09**		.05*	
Sub-Saharan Africa	.45		1.58		.87	
Least developed country	-.90		-.30		-.72	
Constant	-3.57	-9.42***			.06	5.89***
			1.52	12.04***		
N	111	113			111	118
Correctly classified (per cent)	83.8	85.0	111	118	71.2	70.3
R ²	.26	.27	81.1	76.3	.38	.28
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ^2	27.67	8.84	.59	.45	12.68	7.53
(p-value)	(.01)	(.36)			(.12)	(.48)

Notes: Variables in columns 8, 10 and 12 have been removed because of high multicollinearity ($r > .40$).

Reported R² is Nagelkerke's pseudo R² at eligibility stage, and adjusted R² at level stage.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. P-values are given in brackets for the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ^2 test.

5.2 Level of EU Governance-related Assistance

Table 2 provides a summary of the analyses on the level of EU governance-related allocations. As in the previous sub-section, results are presented on the basis of two model specifications.

With regard to the allocation of total governance aid, which is the reference point for subsequent analyses, the impact of a number of variables is clearly evident. In this analysis, as in all subsequent ones related to the level of allocations, population size is an important consideration. It is hardly surprising that larger countries tend to receive larger shares of governance-related support. The impact on the level of allocations of a set of other variables confirms that again a mix of considerations seems to be at play in the decision making on aid: the positive impact of sub-Saharan Africa on the allocation signals the importance of recipient-need concerns, while both the impact of changes in economic freedom and ENPI membership are reflections of political interests in the context of EU decision making.

As in the case of the eligibility for business-oriented assistance, the analysis of the allocation of funds for the business environment shows a clear bias towards political interests. The interaction term of EU trade and ENPI membership in equation 16 leads to the conclusion that important trading partners in the European Neighbourhood receive significantly more funds for strengthening their business environment than other countries. This finding probably reflects the attention, in EU circles, to creating susceptible business environments in the neighbouring countries for trade and investment. Interestingly, aid for the business environment also seems to be influenced, though rather weakly, by changes in civil and political freedom. It is difficult to gauge the implications of this finding, but one may surmise that the interrelationship between enabling business environments and political stability has influenced allocation decisions in this domain.

The analysis of the level of aid for strengthening homeland security and border controls (equation 18) leads to a very similar conclusion as the one on eligibility. It appears that ENPI membership exerts an overriding influence on allocations to homeland and border governance – after all, the ENPI countries are close to the EU's borders and are generally seen as important transmission points for migrants aspiring to enter into the European Union. State fragility appears to have a (rather weak) influence next to ENPI membership. One assumption regarding the influence of this variable could be that fragile states are seen

as potential sources of migrants, and thus have a strategic similarity with the countries of the European Neighbourhood .

While the logic of eligibility for security-sector governance could be understood primarily in the attention for the security threats emanating from fragile states, the level of allocations for security governance cannot be interpreted along the same lines. Overall, the model specified in equation 20 has a very low R^2 value, and only the control variable of country size appears to have a significant influence.

Aid levels for public sector reform and for political governance (equations 22 and 24) tend to reflect a mixture of political interest and recipient-need factors. Decisions on assistance to the public sector and political governance programmes appear to be influenced primarily by ENPI membership. Support to public sector reform programmes seems to reflect the political interests of the European Union, which prefers that the Neighbourhood countries put their political house in order to be stable and effective partners. To a lesser extent, recipient countries' needs seem to play a role in allocation decisions. This factor is expressed in the impact of per capita GDP on public sector assistance and of Least Developed Country status on political governance support.

Table 2 *Level of Governance-related Assistance*

	Dependent variable					
	Governance aid (total)		Aid for business environment		Aid for homeland security and migration controls	
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
GDP/cap (log)	-.04		-.51	-.17		
Population (log)	.26	.24***	.16	.41***		.27*
EU trade (log)	-.07		.15			
Civil and political freedom	-.09	-.15	-.32**	-.22*		-.11
Economic freedom	.55*	.69**	-.30	-.18		
ACP membership	.21		-.03			
ENPI membership	1.04***	.91***	.47*			.68***
Fragile state	.01	.01	-.00			.02*
Sub-Saharan Africa	.17	.39***	.12			
Least developed country	.28		-.33			
Interaction EU trade-ENPI membership				.17***		
Constant	-.27	-.10	2.62*	1.38**		-1.10
N	86	87	47	51		10
R ²	.43	.42	.42	.53	n/a	.78
F value	7.30***	11.48***	4.36***	12.40***	n/a	9.12**

Notes: Variables in columns 14, 16 and 18 have been removed because of high multicollinearity ($r > .40$).

Reported R² is Nagelkerke's pseudo R² at eligibility stage, and adjusted R² at level stage.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. P-values are given in brackets for the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ^2 test.

Table 2 (continued)

	Dependent variable					
	Aid for security governance		Aid for public sector reform		Aid for political governance	
	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
GDP/cap (log)	.55	.10	-.17	-.24*	.51*	
Population (log)	.39	.25**	.37**	.37***	.53***	.45***
EU trade (log)	-.32		.05		-.02	
Civil and political freedom	-.22	-.14	-.06	-.08	.06	.04
Economic freedom	.01	-.23	.44	.35	.31	.06
ACP membership	-.33		.19		.21	
ENPI membership	-.20		.69***	.63***	.75***	.66***
Fragile state	-.00		-.00		.00	
Sub-Saharan Africa	.51		-.04		.11	
Least developed country	-.14		.08		.54***	.32***
Constant	.11	.73	1.18	1.61***	-1.87	.21**
N	24	25	74	75	69	75
R ²	n/a	.12	.41	.45	.54	.63
F value	.52	1.79	6.11***	13.08***	8.76***	25.68***

Notes: Variables in columns 20, 22 and 24 have been removed because of high multicollinearity ($r > .40$).

Reported R² is Nagelkerke's pseudo R² at eligibility stage, and adjusted R² at level stage.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$. P-values are given in brackets for the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ^2 test.

6. Conclusions

This paper has attempted to provide an interpretation of the 'governance turn' that is witnessed in the development policies adopted by the European Union during the first decade of this century, more in particular since the adoption of the 'European Consensus on Development'. Governance reform, captured in the notion of 'good governance' was shown to be an important element in the EU's policies on poverty reduction across the developing world.

The discussion of the evolution of notions of good governance and development at the level of the European Union demonstrated that the quality of governance in countries was seen to be a vital (co-)determinant of development outcomes. Governance, according to a handbook published by the EuropeAid Cooperation Office in 2004, relates to at least six main dimensions: democratisation and elections, human rights, the rule of law, the role of civil society, public sector reform and public finance management, and decentralisation and local government. In relation to the assumed impact of good or bad governance on development processes, the EU felt that the allocation of a substantial part of its development budget would be warranted to foster positive change in developing countries.

The focus of this paper has not been on the level of policy formulation, but rather on the allocation of funds through the EU's main policy instruments: the European Development Fund for countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the European Neighbourhood Partnership and Instrument for countries on the southern, eastern and south eastern 'rim' of the European Union, and the Development Cooperation Instrument for countries in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. The central research question of the paper was whether any dominant explanation, or combination of explanations, provided in the literature on development assistance, would be able to account for the distribution of over €50 billion in assistance provided by the European Commission over the 2007-13 period. Three sets of explanations have been placed centrally: donor interest models, recipient need interpretations and the theory of normative power Europe.

The empirical analysis in the second half of the paper involved an estimation of various models, using logistic regression for the eligibility stage and OLS for the level stage of aid allocations by the European Union. The variables used in the models were derived from

three main theoretical perspectives on aid giving: the theory of normative power Europe, the donor interest model and the recipient need perspective.

The empirical analyses reported in this paper lead to the conclusion that the concept of normative power Europe has only limited relevance for the explanation of European aid allocations in the 2007-13 period. The key variable reflecting this concept appeared to play a major role only in one of the six model estimations at the eligibility stage, and one of the estimations at the level stage. Political interests seemed to play a far greater role in the explanations, as variants of interests were among the main effects at both the eligibility and level stages. Recipient needs turned out to be important mainly at the eligibility stage, implying that the level of development of partner countries plays an important role in the selection process initiated by the European Commission.

Donor interests have been the red thread running through all the different aid modalities implemented by the European Union in the period under analysis. These interests seem to have taken different forms in different programmes. The focus on the countries of the European Neighbourhood stood out in many analyses, both at the eligibility and the level stage. ENPI membership appeared to be among the major explanatory variables both for the choice of partners and the level of allocations in relation to total governance aid, homeland security and migration, assistance for public sector reform and political governance. Economic interests, operationalised as trade relations between the EU and developing countries, have been found to be associated with the choice of aid recipients in relation to overall governance aid. Improvements in regulatory quality appeared to play its expected role in the allocation of aid for the improvement of the business environment, both at the eligibility and the level stage. The decision to include countries in EU programmes for security sector reform appeared to be influenced to an important extent by state fragility.

It would be one-sided, however, if the account of EU aid programmes were limited to a discussion of donor interests. Considerations of recipient needs do also appear clearly in EU development assistance frameworks, although they often seem to take a back seat to economic and political interests. Analyses show that per capita income, least developed country status and location in sub-Saharan Africa played a role in explanations of total governance aid, aid for public-sector reform and political governance programmes, but always in conjunction with donor interest variables.

Finally, the variables that were used to test the impact of normative frameworks on the selection of countries for aid programmes and the specific allocation patterns, did not lend much support to explanations of EU aid allocation centred on the concept of normative power Europe. The indicator of civil and political freedom played only a marginal role in the explanations of EU development assistance, and was found to be significant only in the case of eligibility for aid for public-sector reform.

The current paper set out to analyse whether explanatory models of development assistance, formulated primarily for application to bilateral donors, would work in the context of EU aid. This paper seems to demonstrate that similar logics can be applied to the EU as to other donors. More work needs to be done, particularly for analysing the impact of ideas and normative frameworks on EU aid.

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Appendix A: Countries and data

Countries in the analysis

The analyses in the paper include all countries (1) with a relationship with the European Union under one of the three development-related instruments: the European Development Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for the 2007-13 period, and (2) with a Country Strategy Paper.

The following 126 countries met the criteria and were included in the analyses: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, The Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, People's Republic of China, Colombia, the Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, The Philippines, Rwanda, Samoa, São Tomé e Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and The Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia.

Aid data

Data on the allocations of EU aid to recipient countries were obtained from CSPs and MIPs/NIPs for the countries mentioned above, through the website of the DG Development and Cooperation–EuropeAid (European Commission 2012e) or the European External Action Service (2012).

Other data: definitions and sources

ACP group membership: Source: European Commission (2012a and 2012b).

ENPI membership: Source: European Commission (2012d).

State fragility: Fund for Peace's Failed States Index 2007. Source: Fund for Peace (2007).

Wealth/poverty level: GDP per capita in purchasing power parity, 2007, constant prices (2005 international dollars). Source: World Bank (2012), series NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD.

Country size: Population in millions. Source: World Bank (2012), series SP.POP.TOTL.

EU economic interest: EU27 exports in millions of euros (2007). Source: Eurostat (2012).

Least Developed Country status: Source: UNCTAD (2007: iii).

Change in civil and political freedom: The absolute change in average scores on the political rights and civil liberties index between 2003 and 2007. Source: Freedom House (2012).

Change in economic freedom: The absolute change in the average score for regulatory quality between 2003 and 2007. Source: World Bank (2011).

Appendix B: EU aid allocations under 10th EDF, ENPI or DCI, 2007-13

	2007-10	2011-13	2007/8-13	Total
Afghanistan	610.0	600.0		1210.0
Algeria	220.0	172.0		392.0
Angola			214.0	214.0
Antigua and Barbuda			3.4	3.4
Argentina			65.0	65.0
Armenia	98.4	157.3		255.7
Azerbaijan	92.0	122.5		214.5
Bahamas			4.7	4.7
Bangladesh	205.0	198.0		403.0
Barbados			0.2	0.2
Belarus	–	56.7		56.7
Belize			11.8	11.8
Benin			334.0	334.0
Bhutan	8.0	6.0		14.0
Bolivia	134.0	115.0		249.0
Botswana			73.0	73.0
Brazil	39.65	21.35		61.0
Burkina Faso			529.0	529.0
Burundi			188.0	188.0
Cambodia			152.0	152.0
Cameroon			239.0	239.0
Cape Verde			51.0	51.0
Central African Republic			137.0	137.0
Chad			299.0	299.0
Chile			41.0	41.0
China	128.0			128.0
Colombia	104.0	59.0		163.0
Comoros			45.0	45.0
Congo, Democratic Republic			514.0	514.0
Congo, Republic			85.0	85.0
Cook Islands			3.0	3.0
Costa Rica			34.0	34.0
Cuba	–	20.0		20.0
Djibouti			40.5	40.5
Dominica			5.7	5.7
Dominican Republic			179.0	179.0
Ecuador	75.0	66.0		141.0
Egypt	558.0	449.3		1,007.3
El Salvador	72.6	48.4		121.0
Eritrea			122.0	122.0
Ethiopia			644.0	644.0
Gabon			49.0	49.0
Gambia			76.0	76.0
Georgia	120.4	180.3		300.7
Ghana			367.0	367.0
Grenada			6.0	6.0
Guatemala	87.9	47.1		135.0
Guinea-Bissau			100.0	100.0

Guyana			51.0	51.0
Haiti			291.0	291.0
Honduras	127.5	95.5		223.0
India	260.0	210.0		470.0
Indonesia	248.0	200.0		448.0
Iraq	65,8	58.7		124,5
Israel	8.0	6.0		14.0
Ivory Coast			218.0	218.0
Jamaica			110.0	110.0
Jordan	265.0	223.0		488.0
Kenya			383.0	383.0
Kiribati			12.7	12.7
Laos	33.0	36.0		69.0
Lebanon	187.0	150.0		337.0
Lesotho			136.0	136.0
Liberia			150.0	150.0
Libya		60.0		60.0
Madagascar			577.0	577.0
Malawi			436.0	436.0
Malaysia			17.0	17.0
Maldives	4.0	6.0		10.0
Mali			533.0	533.0
Marshall Islands			5.3	5.3
Mauritania			156.0	156.0
Mauritius			51.0	51.0
Mexico			55.0	55.0
Micronesia			8.3	8.3
Moldova	209.7	273.1		482.8
Mongolia	14.0	15.0		29.0
Morocco	654.0	580.5		1,234.5
Mozambique			622.0	622.0
Myanmar	65.0	33.0		98.0
Namibia			103.0	103.0
Nauru			2.7	2.7
Nepal	60.0	60.0		120.0
Nicaragua	114.4	99.6		214.0
Niger			458.0	458.0
Nigeria			677.0	677.0
Niue			3.0	3.0
Pakistan	200.0	198.0		398.0
Palau			2.9	2.9
Panama	14.5	23.5		38.0
Papua New Guinea			130.0	130.0
Paraguay	64.0	53.0		117.0
Peru	85.8	49.2		135.0
Philippines	61.0	69.0		130.0
Rwanda			290.0	290.0
Samoa			30.0	30.0
São Tomé e Príncipe			17.1	17.1
Senegal			288.0	288.0
Seychelles			5.9	5.9

Sierra Leone			242.0	242.0
Solomon Islands			13.2	13.2
Somalia			212.0	212.0
South Africa			980.0	980.0
Sri Lanka	52.0	60.0 ¹⁰		112.0
St Kitts and Nevis			4.5	4.5
St Lucia			8.1	8.1
St Vincent and The Grenadines			7.8	7.8
Suriname			19.8	19.8
Swaziland			63.0	63.0
Syria	130.0	129.0		259.0
Tanzania			555.0	555.0
Thailand	8.0	9.0		17.0
Timor-Leste			63.0	63.0
Togo			123.0	123.0
Tonga			5.9	5.9
Trinidad and Tobago			25.5	25.5
Tunisia	300.0	240.0		540.0
Tuvalu			5.0	5.0
Uganda			439.0	439.0
Ukraine	494.0	470.0		964.0
Uruguay			31.0	31.0
Vanuatu			21.6	21.6
Venezuela			40.0	40.0
Vietnam	160.0	144.0		304.0
Yemen	60.0	- ¹¹		60.0
Zambia			475.0	475.0

¹⁰ The 2011-13 period has not been considered for Sri Lanka, as no Multiannual Indicative Programme seemed to be available for the period beyond 2010.

¹¹ The 2011-13 period has not been considered for Yemen, as no Multiannual Indicative Programme seemed to be available for the period beyond 2010.