

Singapore Management University

Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Lee Kong Chian School of Business

2008

Values, Ideologies, and Frames of Reference in Employment Relations

John W. BUDD University of Minnesota

Devasheesh P. BHAVE Singapore Management University, dbhave@smu.edu.sg

Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research



Part of the Labor Relations Commons, and the Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons

Citation

BUDD, John W. and BHAVE, Devasheesh P.. Values, Ideologies, and Frames of Reference in Employment Relations. (2008). SAGE Handbook of Industrial Relations. 92-113. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business.

Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3678

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.

CHAPTER 5

VALUES, IDEOLOGIES, AND FRAMES OF REFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS

John W. Budd

Devasheesh Bhave

Industrial Relations Center
University of Minnesota
3-300 Carlson School of Management
321 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455-0438

jbudd@csom.umn.edu dbhave@csom.umn.edu (612) 624-0357 (612) 626-8301 fax: (612) 624-8360

Revised Version Date: July 18, 2006

We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Nick Bacon and Jack Fiorito.

Employment relations—which form most of the 20th century was called industrial relations, and what some now call human resources and industrial relations—is a multidisciplinary field studying all aspects of work and the employment relationship (Ackers and Wilkinson, 2003; Budd, 2004; Kaufm an, 2004). A multidisciplinary approach means that competing values and assumptions underlie the analyses, policies, and practices of employment relations scholars, practitioners, and policymakers. Unfortunately, these underlying beliefs are often implicit rather than explicit, or, with the longstanding focus on how industrial relations processes work, sometimes ignored altogether. But understanding the employment relationship, corporate human resource management practices, labor union strategies, and work-related public policies and laws requires understanding how values and assumptions form the ideologies and frames of reference used by scholars, practitioners, and policymakers.

According to Kochan and Katz, "The prim ary thread running through industrial relations research and policy prescriptions is that labor is more than a commodity...and more than a set of human resources" and "a critical assumption underlying industrial relations research is that there is an inherent conflict of interest between employees and employers" that comes from a "clash of economic interests" (1988: 6). From this perspective, labor unions and go vernment policies such as minimum wage laws are seen as socially be neficial because they can moderate the unequal bargaining power between employees and employers. This passage, therefore, is a good illustration of the importance of underlying values and assumptions in employment relations. At the same time, it only describes one perspective (the pluralist perspective). In contrast, labor unions and government regulations are seen as detrimental when one assumes that perfectly competitive labor markets are optimal (an egoist perspective), as unnecessary when employers and employees are viewed as always having common interests (a unitarist perspective), and as

insufficient when one sees the employment relationship as an unequal power relation e mbedded in greater social and political inequalities (a critical perspective). These four views of unions and government regulation—harmful, unnecessary, socially beneficial, and insufficient—are firmly rooted in four different theories on the employment relationship that embody different values and assumptions (Budd, 2005).

These four key theories are the eg oist, unitarist, pluralist, and critical models of the employment relationship. They serve as the central ideo logies and frames of reference for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers who deal with all aspects of work. These ideologies and frames of reference are packages of values and assumptions pertaining to the interests of the parties to the employment relationship—that is, the needs, wants, and aspirations of em ployees, employers, and the state—and the degree to which these interests are compatible. Outlining the important conceptualizations of these interests is therefore a major part of this chapter. The section that follows this discussion considers the different assumptions about the compatibility of these interests and integrates this analys is with a description of the four key theories. The importance of these values, assum ptions, ideologies, and frames of reference are then explored. But first, these important concepts need to be defined.

DEFINING CONCEPTS

Values, ideology, and fram e of reference ar e dangerous terms. Everyone has their own

¹ The broad scope and concise length of this review precludes a detailed examination of significant variations and details within the theories and perspectives outlined here. For example, Godard (1992: 244; 2005) includes a fifth model based on a pluralist economic and political system which is "far more egalitarian in opportunities and outcomes and which provides workers with far greater rights" than in what he terms the orthodox pluralist perspective. While these two views perhaps envision different reforms and ideal institutions, they are rooted in similar assumptions and values so we consider them as one model. The interested reader is referred to the references cited herein and to the othe rehapters of this Handbook form ore nuanced discussions of various theories and perspectives.

view of what these terms m ean and it's common to use these terms without defining them. The term ideology is particularly problem atic in being used in m any different ways (e.g., see Eagleton, 1994). Figure 5.1 summarizes ou r definitions.² At the center of our discussion are theories of the employment relationship—coherent models of how the employment relationship works. Each theory is built upon a collection of values and assumptions. Values are fundamental principles that ought to be true, such as the belief that labor s hould be treated as more than a commodity. Assumptions are beliefs about human behavior and the nature of various institutions such as markets, laws, corporations, and unions that are presum ed to be true, such as the belief that there is an inherent conflict of interest in the employment relationship. Depending on how each theory is used, it can serve as an ideology or a frame of reference.

Thelen and Withall define fram e of re ference as a "concep tual structure of generalizations or contexts, postulates about what is essential, assumptions of what is valuable, attitudes about what is possible, and ideas about what will work effectively" in which each individual "perceives and interprets events" "(1949: 159). Fox not es more simply that actors "perceive and define social phenomena" (1974: 271) through frames of reference. More recently, *The Norton Dictionary of Modern Thought* defines frame of reference as "the context, viewpoint, or set of presuppositions or of evaluative criteria within which a person's perception and thinking seem always to occur, and which constrains selectively the course and outcome of these activities" (Bullock and Trombley, 1999: 334). In other words, a frame of reference "determines judgment, which in turn determines subsequent behavior" (Fox, 1966: 2). The them es of

_

² It should be emphasized that Figure 5.1 is intended to capture our definitions; it is not presented as a theoretical model of the determinants of any of the components of the figure. The popularity of an ideology, for exam ple, might shape values and assumptions. While it's important to understand the determinants of dominant ideologies, such theoretical issues are beyond the scope of what Figure 5.1 is intended to portray.

perception, evaluation, and individual action in these defin itions are central to our definition of frame of reference.³ More specifically, we define frame of reference as a theory used to guide and evaluate behaviors, outcomes, and institutions. To distinguish ideology from frame of reference, we adopt a definition of ideology that emphasizes public exposition rather than private evaluation. More specifically, we define ideology as a theory that is used to advocate and justify behaviors, outcomes, and institutions. This is consistent with *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*: "the most important usage [of ideology] in contemporary philosophy and politics" is as "a collection of beliefs and values held by an individual or group for other than purely epistemic reasons" (Honderich, 2005: 419) and with Fox's (1966: 5) "instrument of persuasion" function of ideology.⁴

In other words, a frame of reference is how one sees the world; an ideology is how one wants others to see the world. When a decline in union density troubles a policymaker because of a concern for protecting employees when employers have greater bargaining power, the pluralist model is being used as a frame of reference. When business leaders deploy the egoist model of the employment relationship to call for deregulating labor law and to just ify relocating jobs to low wage countries, this model is being used as an ideology (the liberal market ideology). Admittedly, one's ideology and frame of reference might involve the same underlying theory—for example, a radical scholar might evaluate outcomes and advocate for reforms using a frame of reference and an ideology both based on a Marxist conception of the employment relationship. But our definitions allow for the possibility that individuals preach from one ideology while practicing another. In particular, an important belief in some schools of Marxist thought is that

³ These them es are also consistent with the construct of framing in psychology (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986) and collective action frames in sociology (Benford and Snow, 2000).

ideology serves as a false consciousness in which the dominant class uses ideology to disguise their control. Managerial statem ents emphasizing individualism, cooperation, and competition are therefore seen as a strategy to legitimize a hierarchical and unequal workplace and to promote the continued managerial control of work (Bendix, 1956; Fox, 1966; Anthony, 1977; Kunda, 1992). A definition of ideology theref ore needs to distinguish itself from frame of reference and allow for the *possibility* that actors say one thing, but do another. At the same time, it is important to remember that ideologies and frames of reference draw upon the same theories of the employment relationship. It is to those theories that we now turn, starting with a discussion of the various assumptions and values about the interests of the parties to the employment relationship.

EMPLOYEE INTERESTS

Employees are obviously a critical part of the employment relationship. But what do employees want to get out of work? Intellectually, how should we model employees as actors in the employment relationship (Kaufman, 1999)? Employees have diverse interests (C iulla 2000; Kelloway et al., 2004; Kelly 1998). But the four theories of the employment relationship emphasize some interests over the others. It is therefore instructive to consider four categories of employee interests: survival and income; equity and voice; fulfillment and social identity; and power and control.

Survival and Income

butcher animals, cut firewood, and build basic shelters as many as 2.5 m illion years ago. In modern societies, wage and salary income is the means to purchase the basic neces sities of life.

Most people need to work to survive. Our ancient ancestors used basic stone tools to

⁴ Definitions of ideology that em phasize assessment and understanding (e.g., Godard, 1995) are

In its most primal state, then, a worker's interest is survival. This survival imperative is reflected in Maslow's (1943) model of work m otivation based on a hierarchy of needs in which individuals are posited to first seek the satisfaction of physiological needs before pursuing other desires and is also reflected in W heeler's (1985) model in which workplace conflict stems from the deprivation of necessary material resources. Both Adam Smith (1776/2003) and Karl Marx (1844/1988) also hypothesized that wages for common laborers would fall to levels that just support subsistence so individuals end up working simply to survive.

In a more contemporary vein, one of the key foundations of m ainstream neoclassical economics is modeling individuals as seeking to maximize their personal utility functions (Varian, 1984). Utility is generally seen as dependent on consumption which means that work is an activity tolerated by indivi duals to earn income to buy goods, services, and leisure (Killingsworth, 1983). As a purely income-e-earning activity, labor is viewed as any other commodity and is exchanged through impersonal transactions as determined by supply and demand (Kaufman, 2005). At its core, then, neoclassical economics equates employees' interests to income; while not typically see in as mere survival, the implications for the employment relationship are largely the same because the focal point of work is the self-interested acquisition of material or pecuniary benefits.

Equity and Voice

An alternative conceptualization of employee interests is that em ployees not only want income, but also seek fairness. This is perhap s most simply demonstrated by organized labor's longtime pursuit of "a fair day's pay for a fair day's work." Hum an resource management scholars and industrial-organizational psychologists also believe that fairness is a critical

frames of reference under our definitions.

_

dimension of employment. For example, Adams's (1965) equity theory has been widely applied to employment issues. Most simply, workers are posited to reduce work effort if they feel that they are working harder than others who are paid the same. More generally, organizational justice—that is, employee perceptions of and reactions to fairness—has become a key construct in the human resource management and industrial-organizational psychology literatures (Folger and Cropanzano, 1998).

For others, the concern with fairness is root ed more in human dignity and liberty than in the behavioral sciences. The International Labor Organization's (IL O) 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, for example, asserts that

All human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity.

To this end, the ILO promotes labor standards pertaining to equal pay for equal work, reasonable working hours, periodic paid holidays, unem ployment and disability insurance, the right to form labor unions, and many other aspects of work. As human dignity is a critical theological concept, the Catholic Church through papal encyclicals such as *Rerum Novarum* and other major religions advocate similar standards and rein force fairness as an employee interest in the employment relationship (Budd, 2004; Peccoud, 2004). E thical theories in the A ristotelian and Kantian traditions also support the importance of respecting human dignity in the employment relationship (Bowie, 1999; Budd, 2004; Solomon, 1992). In fact, basic labor standards are increasingly argued to be human rights (Adams, 2001; Gross, 1998; Wheeler, 1994).

Such standards have traditionally been grouped together under a broad heading of equity (e.g., Barbash, 1987). More recently, Budd (2 004) articulates the key employee interests as equity and voice where equity is fair employment standards for both material outcomes (such as

wages and safety) and personal treatm ent (especially nondiscrimination) and voice is the ability to have meaningful input into decisions. A similar distinction in the research on justice in the behavioral sciences is between distributive and procedural justice—that is, between fairness in outcomes and in procedures (Folger and Cropanzano, 1998). Whether seen as equity and voice or as distributive and procedural justice, the implication for employee interests is the same—survival and income are too narrow as the bas is of employee interests; rather, employees seek fairness not only in work-related outcomes, but also in how these outcomes are produced.

Fulfillment and Social Identity

Another view of employee interests is based on the premise that individuals use work to provide psychological fulfillment and social identity. This is clearly reflected in the large eliterature in psychology on work motivation that emphasizes intrinsic work rewards over pay and other extrinsic rewards (Donova n, 2001; Latham and Pinder, 2005). Perhaps most famously, Maslow (1943) theorized that workers seek love, esteem, and self-actualization after their physiological and security needs are met. Thus, work provides employees with a basic outlet to channel their intrinsic motivation for achievement of desired objectives and personal fulfillment—or more simply, joy in work (Deman, 1929). A parallel stream of research in psychology examines the psychological importance of paid work. Building on Freud's claim that man's strongest link to reality is work, Jahoda (1982) argues that employment provides psychological fulfillment by providing time structure boundaries, a wider spectrum of social activities than those provided by family life, and involvement in a broader collective endeavor.

Similar themes are echoed by theorists in other disciplines (Ciulla, 2000; Leidner, 2006; Muirhead, 2004). In fact, Karl Marx, Em ile Durkheim, and Max Weber all emphasize the importance of fulfillment through their concern with the loss of human dignity that accompanied

the denial of human fulfillment in the then-emerging modern employment relationship (Hodson, 2001). For Marx (1844/1988), the defining feature—of being human is freely working to create things, but under capitalism, workers do not control the means of production and are therefore alienated from their labor, and denied their—essential dignity as humans. Durkheim (1893/1933) sees the division of lab or as eroding social norms and therefore allowing the exploitation of workers while Weber (1925/1978) sees the bureaucracy of modern corporations as undermining dignity and fulfillment through the depersonalization of work.

The importance of work for individual fulfillment and dignity is also believed to pro vide the foundation for the importance of work for creating social identities and spiritual fulfillment. To help define them selves and where they fit in to society, people class ify themselves in occupational groupings (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1987; Ashforth and Mael, 1989). In other words, work contributes to employees' development of their self-concept by providing them with a social identity and thus another meaning to their employment beyond that of pay. On a spiritual level, as famously articulated by Weber (1904/1976), the Protestant work ethic is based on Martin Luther's concept of work as a "calling" (serving God by doing good work in whatever occupation you are suited for) and molded by John Calvin into a belief that hard work is the path to salvation. In Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism, work also serves a higher motive that allows fulfillment of duty towards God such that individuals' interests in work are other than solely economic (Ali, 1988; Schumacher, 1974; Nord, et al., 1990).

Power and Control

A fourth perspective on employee interests is the belief that workers seek power and control in the workplace. Recall from the previous section that for Marx and some other theorists, "labor in the sense of free productive activity is the essence of human life" (Singer,

2000: 35). Meaningful work is the erefore seen as critical for fulfillment and dignity, but under capitalism, workers are alienated because the product of their labor does not belong to them, they have no control over what is produced and how it is produced, and work becomes less of a social activity (Hodson, 2001; Marx, 1844/1988). To achieve dignity, a key worker interest is power: "the ability of an individual or group to contro I his (their) physical and social environment; and, as part of this process, the ability to inf luence the decisions which are and are not taken by others" (Hyman, 1975: 26).

Power and control can be pursued in various ways. Around the turn of the 20th century in the United States, craft unions developed work ru les pertaining to appren ticeship standards, ownership over specific job duties, exclusion of undesirable or unskilled job duties, work allocation procedures, and othe r standards (P erlman, 1928). These work rules were often established unilaterally by the unions and enforced by having m embers refuse to work on any other terms and by fining or expelling m embers who undermined these standards (Montgomery, 1979). Today, some element of power and control are pursued by workers through various forms of solidarity and resistance (such as reduced work effort, absenteeism, and sabotage) (Edwards, 1986; Hodson, 2001; Kelly, 1998). Political theories in which capitalism is seen a s inferior to socialism or syndicalism are at least partly root ed in a perception that workers lack sufficient power and control in a capitalist society. In addition to class struggles between labor and capital, struggles for workplace power and control can also take place along gender and racial lines (Amott and Matthaei, 1996; Delgado and Stefancic, 2001; Gottfried, 2006; Lustig, 2004). Lastly, employment relations theories that embrace employees' interests in power and control are often derived from a belief that the primary employer interest is power and control over the workplace; this is discussed below.

EMPLOYER INTERESTS

One of the primary actors in the modern employment relationship is the employer. It is typical to see the employer's interests as those of shareholders, executives, and managers, or alternatively as those of the organization as a entity in its own right (which might be peculiar except that U.S. law treats a co rporation as a person with its own rights and obligations). We except that U.S. law treats a co rporation as a person with its own rights and obligations). generally follow these approaches, but it should be noted that there is some danger in treating an employer as a monolithic entity. Executives or managers might have their own goals independent of those of the organization or the shareholders which can lead to princ ipal-agent problems in which the agent does not always act in the bes t interests of the principal that hired him or her (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When we speak of the employer's interests, we are referring to the organ ization's interests which will also be assumed to be consistent with the interests of the shareh olders, executives, and managers. To the extent th at executives and managers are agents that follow their self-interest rather than the organization's interests, the reader is referred back to the p revious section on employee interests. After all, executives and managers are also em ployees in the employment relationship—they are hired, fired, and are concerned with income, fulfillment, and the like.

In modeling the employment relationship, there are three primary views on the interests of employers. The first is profit maximization—a firm's objective is to structure work so as to generate the highest profit level possible to the exclusive benefit of the firm's owners. The second broadens the objective of profit meximization to include consideration of other stakeholders such as employees. And the theorem irreduced in the pursuit of power and control ove memployees that goes beyond that necessary to maximize profits in some technical sense. In the first conceptualization, profit maxime ization is seen as legitimented. In the second

conceptualization, the pursuit of profits is legitimate when tempered by a respect for the interests of other stakeholders. In the thir d view, a primacy of profits over other concerns is rejected as illegitimate.

Before turning to each of these conceptualizations, the reader is reminded to not confuse employer strategies with employer interests. In practice, we observe a multitude of employment conditions ranging from abusive sweatshops to workplaces with generously-rewarded employees that have extensive decision-making authority. This does not mean that there are a large num ber of employer interests; rather, this diversity reflects a multitude of strategies for pursuing the three basic employer interests: profit m aximization, stakeholder value, or power and control.

Moreover, these three interests are not intended to simply capture how employers express their interests; rather we are also considering different ways of conceptualizing or modeling employer interests. Employers likely state that they are pursuing profits in a legitimate fashion or balancing the needs of various stakeholders while radical scholars will see employers as pursuing their interests through a more critical lens. The discussion here is intended to capture this wide range of alternatives.

Profit Maximization

In economic thought, firm s are assumed to maximize profits (the difference between revenue and costs) (Varian, 1984). Different types of workers are hired up to the point at which hiring one more worker costs more than the revenue generated. There are differing views on the extent to which labor markets are competitive, to which transaction costs are important, and to which there are prin cipal-agent problems between workers and firm s because of asymm etric information (such as the firm—not being able to—perfectly observe worker effort), but these complications do not change the basic foundation—that each firm's objective is to maximize

profits (Manning, 2003; W achter, 2004). The real-w orld importance of profit m aximization is reflected in the Anglo-American shareholder model of corporate govern ance. In this sys tem, shareholders are residual claimants and everyone else is seen as receiving fixed payments for their services, such as wages and salaries. Since e shareholders single-handedly bear the risk of making a profit or loss, they are seen as the key group and economic performance will be optimized when corporate decisions maximize shareholder value (B lair, 1995). Maxim izing profits and shareholder value therefore go hand in hand.

Many features of the modern em ployment relationship are linked to the profit motive. Frederick Winslow Taylor's development of scientific management in the ear ly 20th century through carefully studying work tasks and scient ifically determining the one best way of driven by the pursuit of greater efficiency, and therefore completing a task can be seen as profitability (Kanigel, 1997). As articulated by Weber (1919/1946), the rise of the bureaucratic organizational form was a ration al solution to decision -making problems in the face of significant organizational complexity (March and Simon, 1958). The bureaucratic form of organization is therefore geared towards the profit motive that is the prime employer interest. The contemporary movement away from the narrowly-defined tasks of Taylorism and the iron cage of Weber's bureaucracy reflects an attempt to boost profitability by creating more flexible employment practices (Applebaum and Batt, 1994). Layoffs, outsourcing, moving production to low-wage countries, and reducing employee benefits are also all done in the pursuit of enhancing profitability for the benefit of shareholders.

Stakeholder Value

Note carefully that the shareholder model of corporate governance assum es that labor markets are perfectly competitive. As such, employees face little risk—if managers mismanage

the business and it goes bankrupt, the assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets means that workers who lose their jobs can alway s find equivalent jobs elsewhere at no cos t. Shareholders, however, lose their investment so the shareholder model holds managers liable for serving shareholder interests. But what if labor m arkets are no t perfectly competitive? Employees invest their own hum an capital in a corporation and therefore, just like shareholders, make significant contributions and face risky returns (Blair, 1995). Employees might not be able to recoup their investm ent or costlessly find an equivalent job elsewhere if the business is mismanaged. As a result, stakeholder theory asserts that all stakeholders—not only shareholders and owners, but also em ployees, customers, suppliers, local communities, and others—are sufficiently affected by corporate action s to deserve the right to be considered in corporate decision-making. Stakeholder theory can also be rooted in propert y rights: even in the United States with strong restrictions against harm ing others, property rights are not unlimited, so, the argument goes, a corporation must take multiple interests into account (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). In other words, a corporation does not exist just for the benefit of shareholders, and should be operated for the benefit of all those w ho have a stake in it. Supporters of stakeholder theory believe that shareholders deserve a fair rate of return, but also that the ideal of maximizing shareholder value without regard for other interests (as in the shareholder model) rests on questionable f oundations and should not be used to elevate the im portance of corporations over other stakeholders (Ghoshal, 2005).

In this vein, then, the interest of employeers in the employment relationship should be serving the interests of shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders. In the United States, 32 states have constituency statutes in which company directors are explicitly allowed to consider interests beyond those of the shareholders (Adams and Matheson, 2000). In Europe,

codetermination policies institutionalize stakeholder theory by requiring employee representation on corporate boards of directors while social norms in Japan also foster a concern for stakeholder value (Jacoby, 2001, 2005).

Power and Control

For another set of employment relations scholars, characterizing the interest of employers simply as profit m aximization, or even as incr easing stakeholder value, is too benign. Rather, employer interests are modeled as seeking pow er and control over labor. This dom inance serves not only to boost profits, but to prom ote capital accumulation, the am assing of wealth, and sociopolitical control (including, in the extreme, preventing a workers' revolution) by the owners of capital.

For Marx, this dominance is an integral feature of capitalism. As capitalists control the means of production, they are able to extract labor's surplus value which further empowers the capitalists at the expense of workers, not only in the economic arena, but in the sociopolitical realm as well. Rather than employers benignly seeking profit maximization by competing for workers in neutral labor markets, employers are seen as controlling and dominating labor through their superior economic and sociopolitical power (Hyman, 1975). In this vein, corporations are seen as using their political clout to promote their own interests by obtaining government subsidies and contracts and by shaping legislation that placates workers enough to avoid a broader working class threat while channeling labor conflict into tightly-regulated channels preferred by business rather than labor (e.g., witness the U.S. restrictions on secondary boycotts) (Domhoff, 1990).

In the workplace, the deskilling and division of labor that accompany Taylorism are not seen as a win-win s ituation in which labor works m ore efficiently, but rather as m anagerial

strategies to decompose both skilled craft and clerical occupations into simplified, routine, low-skilled jobs in order to gain control over the workplace (Braverman, 1974; Montgomery, 1979). Bureaucracy is not seen simply as an efficient structure for managing complexity; rather, bureaucracy is seen as a strategy to routinize all aspects of management and to consolidate the power to establish rules and procedures in order to control the operations of an entire organization (Edwards, 1979). More generally, labor process theory emphasizes the importance of control mechanisms in the workplace (Thompson and Newsome, 2004). In addition to issues of control along class (labor and capital) lines, control methods can also occur along gender, racial, and ethnic lines, such as with occupational sex segregation (Greene, 2003). All of these are examples where employer interests are modeled as power and control beyond that needed to benignly pursue profits.

STATE INTERESTS

The third major actor in the employment relationship is the state. The state has five roles in the employment relationship (G odard, 2005). In the regulative role, laws regulate workers, unions, and companies. In the em ployer role, the state is a public sector organization with its own employees. In the facilitative role, the state establishes so cial norms and provides support services for the em ployment relationship. The structural role consists of economic policies that shape the economic environment. And in the constitutive role, the state determines how the employment relationship is constituted by the type of economic system embraced by the state (such as a market-based capitalist economy). But what are the interests of the state in the employment relationship that determine how the state acts in these five roles? In other words, what is the state trying to achieve? We present three broad alternatives: a focus on freedom and the rule of law, an interest in promoting equitable outcomes, and an objective to support the

domination of the elite. As with the discuss ion of employer interests, these three interests are intended to capture different ways of conceptua lizing or modeling state interests; they do not simply describe how the state expresses its interests.

In all three conceptualizations of the state's interests, it's possible that the state does not have independent interests; rath er, its policies m ight simply mediate the political pressures of workers and employers in a pluralistic model or reflect and implement the political wishes of the dominant class in a Marxist m odel. For example, promoting freedom and the rule of law m ight be seen as an extension of employer interests, not an independent interest of the state. However, some research emphasizes the possibility of autonomous state action, especially as rooted in international connections of state officials, the need to maintain domestic stability, and the ability of government officials to use resources to pursue their own ends (Skocpol, 1985). In employment relations circles, it is widely be lieved that the anti-union policies of the Reagan administration and Thatcher government were more aggressive than would have been dictated if these administrations were simply reflecting bu siness lobbying. Either as reflections or as independent interests, we believe the following three categories are instructive.

Freedom and the Rule of Law

In the liberal market paradigm, the interest of the state is in protecting freedom and the rule of law. As applied to the em ployment relationship, the law's role is to promote and protect the operation of free markets with voluntary exchange between companies, investors, consumers, and workers. In the United States, this view manifests itself in an emphasis on common law principles that support economic transactions, especially well-defined property rights, liberty of contract, and the law of torts to protect against property damage (Posner, 1986). As captured by a report from the Bush administration:

By providing a legal f oundation for tran sactions, the government makes the market system reliable: it gives people certainty about what they can trade and keep, and it allows people to establish terms of trade that will be honored by both sellers and buyers. The absence of a ny one of these elements—competition, enforceable property rights, or an ability to form mutually advantageous contracts—can result in in efficiency and lower living standards (Council of Economic Advisors, 2004: 149).

Equitable Outcomes

In pluralist political thought, the state responds to the power of competing interest groups and, in the variant most relevant here, enforces existing rules while also ensuring fair outcomes (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987; Faulks, 1999). An alternative vision of the state's interest in the employment relationship is therefore the promotion of equitable outcomes. As articulated by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, two of the founders of industrial relations, the state must balance various interests:

...industrial administration is, in the democratic state, a more complicated matter than is naively imagined by the old-fashioned capitalist, demanding the "right to manage his own business in his own way." ... In the interests of the community as a whole, no one of the interm inable series of decisions can be allowed to run counter to the consensus of expert opinion representing the consumers on the one hand, the producers on the other, and the nation that is param ount over both (1897: 821-23).

In contrast to liberal m arket proponents then, in this paradigm there is greater support for government intervention to reduce m arket imperfections (such as unem ployment), to equalize bargaining power between employers and employees through unionization and social safety nets, and to provide workers with gr eater voice through works councils. At an international level, there is support for the Internat ional Labour Organization and its promotion of labor standards. For those that see labor rights as human rights, the state has the responsibility to guarantee these rights.

Dominance of the Elite

A third vie w on the in terests of the state in the em ployment relationship is that the capitalist state p erpetuates the do minance of the ruling class. This view is most clearly articulated in Marxist thought in which social change is driven by capitalism rather than the behavior of the state so that the state is viewed as an instrument of the capitalists who are then society's ruling class (Faulks, 1999; Pierson, 1996). Even though the state appears to be acting autonomously and neutrally, given its role of protect ion of ownership it is in effect intertwined with particular economic interests (Hyman, 1975; King, 1986). To wit, Kelly (1998) discusses how government repression of strikers and the protection of strike replacements reduces the effectiveness of collective action and thereby favors capital over labor.

THE (IN)COMPATABILITY OF INTERESTS

The framework developed in this chapter a sserts that the ideologies and fram es of reference of employment relations are rooted in two key dimensions: the interests of the parties to the em ployment relationship and the degree of compatibility of these interests. The compatibility or inco mpatibility of interests, in turn, depends on how m arkets and the employment relationship work. Now that the in terests have been described, consider four different views on the compatibility of these interests and the nature of the employment relationship:

- 1. Employers and employees freely pursue their own self -interest in competitive labor markets; when these interests align, they consummate an econom ic transaction, when they do not align, they keep searching for mutually-beneficial exchanges.
- 2. Although labor markets might not be perfect, employers and employees share a unity of interests, especially in that tre ating employees well improves the company's bottom

line and vice versa.

- 3. Employers and employees interact as unequals with some shared and some conflicting interests, but these conflicts are economic in nature and limited to the employment relationship.
- 4. Employers and employees interact as unequals with significant power differentials that are pervasive through all social relations.

These differing views on the compatibility or incompatibility of the interests of em ployers and employees, as possibly shaped, mediated, or reflected by the interests of the state, define the four theories that underlie the essential ideologies and frames of reference for most employment relations scholars, policy makers, and practitioners—the egoist, unitarist, pluralist, and critical employment relationships (see Table 5.1).

The Egoist Employment Relationship

The egoist employment relationship is rooted in the pursuit of individual self-interest by rational agents in econ omic markets. Labor is conceptualized as a commodity like any other productive resource. Employees are seen as interested in income while firm so pursue profit maximization. The state promotes economic transactions through protecting property rights and enforcing contracts. As such, there isn't a conflict between employers and employees; rather, they simply engage in voluntary, mutually-beneficial transactions to buy and sell units of productive labor based on the what them arket will bear. Wages are never too low or too high, they simply reflect each worker's productive contributions. If workers and employers are equal in terms of economic power, legal expertise and protections, and political influence, then neoclassical economic theory shows that abuses and exploitation are prevented by perfect competition in the labor market.

Employment-at-will—that is, the right to hire and fire, or take a job and quit, at anytim e for any reason—is a key feature of the egoi st employment relationship. Employers and y explicit or im plicit agreement involving any employees should be able to enter into an mutually-agreeable terms and conditions of employment, including compensation, hours, duration of employment, job duties, and the like. In the interest s of both economic optimization and individual freedom, e mployers and em ployees should likewise be able to end thes e arrangements when conditions or preferences change, or if a better deal com es along (Epstein, 1984). Labor unions and governm ent-mandated labor standards are seen as interfering with the invisible hand of the free m arket and distort em ployment and output levels throughout the economic system (Reynolds, 1984). Unions are also seen as interfering with the discipline of the market by protecting lazy workers. Note carefu lly that the ego ist employment relationship critically depends on embracing a value system in which efficiency is the primary objective of the employment relationship and whatever the market bears is best.

The three remaining theories place less emphasis on market determinism; markets are seen as useful for allocating scarce resources to productive uses, but as also imperfect because of information problems, mobility and transactions costs, un equal access to financial and leg al resources, the importance of behavioral concerns such as fairness or social pressure in individual decision-making, and other real-world complications (Manning, 2003). The three remaining theories are also rooted in a different set of values (based on embracing different employee interests), especially in that workers are seen as hum an beings with psychological and physical needs and aspirations, and in the last two theories, with moral worth and democratic rights, too.

The Unitarist Employment Relationship

The second theory em braces a unitarist view of the em ployment relationship—the right

employment policies and practices will align the interests of employers and employees (Bacon, 2003; Fox, 1974; Lewin, 2001). In other words, labor and management have a unity of interests; any conflict in practice stems from poor employment practices. This frame of reference underlies contemporary human resource managem ent which focuses on crea ting policies that simultaneously benefit employers (through their in terest in profit maximization) and employees (through their interest in fulfillment) (Pfeffer, 1998; Ulrich and Brockbank, 2005).

In practice, there are a num ber of variants of the hum an resource management model ranging from hierarchical, paternal istic approaches to high-comm itment approaches to strategic approaches (Applebaum and Batt, 1994; Katz and Darbishire, 2000). The underlying comm on denominator, however, is the attempt to devise human resources policies that are seen as aligning the interests of em ployees and employers. Some common examples include valid and reliable selection measures to hire and promote employees; training and development opportunities; respectful methods of supervision; com pensation that provides more than a living wage while also rewarding performance; benef its that fo ster personal growth, security, and work-life balance; and informal or formal dispute resolution procedures. As reflected by the emphasis on employees' interest in fulfillment, psychology is arguably the dominant disciplinary influence in the unitarist camp.

The unitarist em phasis is generally on indi vidual rather than colle ctive identities, behaviors, and practices. In f act, in the unitarist em ployment relationship, labor unions and government-mandated labor standards are unnece ssary. If companies are following the hum an resource management school's ideas of effective management, then workers will be satisfied and

⁵ So-called low road strategies rooted in low wages and managerial control are better captured by the egoist theory of the employment relationship in that they are rooted in a narrow conception of employee interests and in an emphasis on what the labor market will bear.

will not support a union nor need mandated lab or standards. Such institutions are also largely seen as unnecessary because the unitarist view emphasizes fulfillment and intrinsic rewards. The role of the state is limited—while some scholars advocate government policies to promote high-performance work practices (e.g., Levine, 1995), hu man resources professionals are more likely to lobby against rather than for additional regul—ation; instead, the state's role is seen as promoting the rule of law and econom—ic transactions because this serves organization—al performance. As with the other theories, this—perspective—is roo ted—in specific values and assumptions pertaining to the interests of the em ployment relationship and the nature of conflict within this relationship, and is—often used as an im-portant ideology and frame—of reference by employment relations actors.

The Pluralist Employment Relationship

The pluralist employment relationship consists of workers and em ployers bargaining in imperfect labor m arkets in the p resence of pluralist conflict—that is, in an em ployment relationship consisting of multiple, sometimes-conflicting interests (employers might want lower labor costs, flexibility, and an intens e pace of work while employees might want h igher wages, employment security, and a safe work environm ent) as well as shared interests (such as quality products, productive workers, and profitable companies) (Clegg, 1975; Fox, 1974).

The pluralist view of conflict is intim ately related to a belief that labor m arkets are not perfectly competitive. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, John R. Commons, and other early institutionalists attributed the exploitive Angl o-American employment conditions of the early twentieth century to the superior power of large corporations over individual em ployees (Kaufman, 1997). This power advantage was believed to be rooted in market imperfections such as isolated company towns, mobility costs, lack of family savings or other resources, segmented

markets, and excess labor supply. Moreover, a core pluralist value is the re jection that labor is simply a commodity (Kaufman, 2005) and therefore that labor is entitled to equity and voice in the employment relationship (Budd, 2004). As such, the role of the state is to promote equitable outcomes. Because inequitable outcomes are seen as stemming from imperfect labor markets and unequal bargaining power, unions and mandated labor standards are viewed as mechanisms for leveling the playing field between employers and employees thereby promoting the optimal operation of markets rather than interfering with it (as predicted by theories rooted in competitive markets). Also, because of the belief that there are at least some conflicts of interests, the pluralist industrial relations school rejects the unitarist reliance on corporate self-interest and goodwill to protect workers. Rather, labor unions are seen as a productive counterweight to corporate power; social insurance and mandated minimum standards also help protect all workers against the vagaries of the business cycle and corporate power.

The Critical Employment Relationship

The critical employment relationship is r ooted in the power and control interests of employers and employees and therefore sees the employment relationship as a struggle for power and control (Gall, 2003; Hym an, 1975, 2006). The sc hools of thought subscribing to this fra me of reference can be grouped to gether under the umbrella of critical industrial relations and encompass Marxist, feminist, and other sociological theories based on the division and control of labor. While sharing the view that labor is more than just a commodity, unlike the pluralist view in which employer-employee conflict is confined to the employment relationship, the critical perspective is that employment relations conflict is part of a broader societal clash between competing groups (Kelly, 1998). A Marxist perspective assumes that employer-employee conflict is one element of unequal power relations between the capitalist and work ing classes

throughout society. A feminist perspective focuses on unequal power relations between men and women; a critical race perspective emphasizes segr egation and control along racial lines (Am ott and Matthaei, 1996; Delgado and Stefancic, 2001; Gottfried, 2006; Greene, 2003; Lustig, 2004).

In the critical employment relationship, the labor market is not seen as a neutral forum for matching self-interested workers with se lf-interested firms (as in the ego ist employment relationship); rather it is seen as a socially -based instrument of power and control (Hym an, 1975). The em ployment relationship is therefore not a voluntary exchange but rather is a contested exchange (Bowles and Gintis, 1990). Because of the socially-rooted, ongoing conflict between labor and capital, hum an resource management practices are not seen as methods for aligning worker and employer interests, but rather as disguised rh etoric that quietly undermines labor power and perpetuates the dom inance of capital (L egge, 1995). Strong, militant labor unions are seen as im portant advocates for work ers' interests in the workplace and in the political arena. But ultimately, relying on collective bargaining to advance workers' interests is inadequate because of the stru ctural inequalities that perv ade the workplace and the greate r socio-political context. That conflict between competing groups is not limited to the employment relationship also means that the state is largely concerned with perpetuating the dominance of the powerful group, whether it be capit alists, men, or a dom inant ethnic group. As with the other theories, the key to understanding the critical em ployment relationship is through an analysis of the interests of the employment relations actors paired with an understanding of how the parties interact and the extent to which the various interests are compatible.

FROM THEORY TO IDEOLOGY AND FRAME OF REFERENCE

Ideologies and fram es of reference rela ted to work and e mployment relations are pervasive, from portrayals of labor in the pain tings of Victorian England to the coverage of

contemporary events in the mainstream media (Barringer, 2005; Martin, 2004). Under Mao, the authoritarian communist regime in China until the la te 1970s emphasized unitarist employment themes because communism is supposed to resolv e the conflicts of inte rest believed to be inherent in capitalism (Taylor, et al., 2003). In the Western workplace, business executives and managers use ideology to legitim atize employment practices (Anthony, 1977; Bendix, 1956; Kunda and Ailon-Souday, 2005); unions and workers use ideology to justify their own behaviors and actions. The various actors use their fram es of reference to evalu ate the ideo logies and actions of others. When another's ideology is unconvincing (because it is rejected by your frame of reference), it is tempting to dismiss that ideology as hollow rhetoric to support a special interest. We believe, however, that it is more instructive to see these ideologies (and frames of reference) as rooted in the four theories of the employment relationship. Depending on the application, all four theories can serve as an ideology and as a frame of reference. Many of the examples used here f ollow the rest of the lite rature and focus on managerial ideologies and frames of reference, but it again bears em phasizing that all e mployment relations actors have ideologies and fram es of reference. This is implicit in Dunlop's (1 958) assertion that an employment relations system is stable only if the actors share a common ideology.

Management discourse currently emphasi zes market ideals (Kunda and Ailon-Souday, 2005). The ideal corporation is portrayed as a nimble network of e mpowered entrepreneurial work groups that focus on core competencies; ex cess layers of management are supposed to be downsized; low value added activities are supposed to be outsourced. This ideology is grounded in the egoist employment relationship model and its laissez-faire ideals. Scholars that believe the values and assumptions that underlie the egoist model and use it as their frame of reference see the calls for more flexible business organizations as legitimate and wise. The power of the four

models is in illum inating alternative perspectives. Scholars that analyze the employment relationship through a critical frame of reference see this market-based ideology as a mechanism of control that causes workers to buy into a syst em that doesn't serve their interests because employer and employee interests are fundamentally opposed.

Similarly, unitarist corporate ideologies are seen as valid frames of reference by unitarist actors, but are seen as disguised coercion and union busting by actors who look at hum an resources policies through the lenses of pluralist and critical frames of reference. Differing views on labor unions—from harmful to unnecessary to beneficial to inadequate—are clearly rooted in the four frames of reference presented here (Budd, 2005). Contrasting perspectives on ownership and control rights also flow from these frames of reference. In the egoist model, property rights are paramount so a firm 's owners should have complete control rights. In the pluralist model, stakeholders merit full consideration, and in the critical model, even stakehold er rights are insufficient to overcome the structural inequalities of capitalism. In advocating such positions, the underlying theories are being used as ideologies; in evaluating ownership and control rights, the underlying theories are being employed as frames of reference.

The importance of ideologies and frames of reference is also apparent in the legal arena. In the United States, for exam ple, the *Lochner*-era Supreme Court in the early 19 00s is well-known for striking down labor and employment laws on the basis that they interfered with the liberty of contract. In the critical frame of reference, the liberty of contract might be viewed as a rhetorical justification for rulings that favored capital, but there is some evidence that judges truly believed that liberty of contract benefited capital and labor as in the egois t frame of reference (Forbath, 1985). As a second example, Dannin (2006) shows how contemporary U.S. judges decide labor law cases us ing common law principles pertaining to property rights as the

basis for their legal analyses. This is consistent with their legal training so it is not surprising that it forms the basis of their egoist frame of reference.

Empirical work on ideologies and fram es of reference is rare, but a few studies support the approach outlined here. In sur veys of U.S. and Canadian em ployment relations scholars, Godard (1992, 1995) finds that significant fractions of scholars use each of our four theories as a frame of reference. Mo reover the evaluations of different em ployment relations issues are consistent within a frame which supports the co herence of these models. Godard (1997) further finds that managerial ideologies/frames of reference are an important determinant of managerial actions pertaining to employment relations. Kochan, Katz, and McKersie (1986) ascribe the rise of the nonunion em ployment relationship in the United States larg ely to managerial frames of reference. Poole et al. (2005) find that the attit udes of British m anagers are linked to broader political and economic trends while Barley and Kunda (1992) pres ent qualitative evidence that U.S. managerial ideologies differ between ec onomic expansions and contractions. There are likely many other complex factors that determ ine what ideology is dom inant, how ideology shapes frames of reference and values, and m any other important questions. There is therefore a need for more research on the dynamics of ideologies and frames of reference. For employment relations, the starting point is the four theories presented here.

CONCLUSION: VALUES AT WORK

The chapter presents f our theories as a starting point for understanding the major perspectives within the study and practice of employment relations. When these theories are used to analyze employment relations and to determ ine one's actions, they become the four key frames of reference in employment relations. When these theories are employed to advocate a certain viewpoint, they become the central ideo logies in the field. Distinguishing between

ideologies and frames of reference allows us to readily analyze situations in which some actors express one view but other actors see those actions differently. Union leaders may express an ideology of employee voice and balancing interests; employers may see this in their frame of reference as rhetoric covering up the union's selfish pursuit of better wages for union members at the expense of others. Rooting these ideologies and frames of reference in four theories of the employment relationship allows us to readily appreciate where these differing ideologies and frames of reference are coming from. Continuing with the previous example, the union leader's ideology might be rooted in a pluralist model whereas the employer's frame of reference is an egoist or unitarist model.

The postmodern em phasis on discourse un derscores the im portance of explicitly recognizing the power of language in the world of work (Burrell, 2006; Hearn and Michelson, 2006). By rooting the analysis of employment relations ideologies and frames of reference in the four theories of the employment relationship, it becomes apparent that clashes in discourse and practice between different ideologies or fram es of reference stem from divergent underlying values and assumptions, especially as they pertain to the interests of the parties in the modern employment relationship. One of the key values of employment relations outside the egoist model is that labor is more than just a commodity (Kaufm an, 2005). In contrast, in the egoist model one of the key values is that laissez-fair e market outcomes have particular worth because they are produced by voluntary free exchange. These differing values go a long way toward explaining divergent ideologies and fra mes of reference in employm ent relations and approaching employment relations in this way reveals these underlying differences.

Values and ideologies are defined here (and elsewhere) with a large normative component—they represent principles and systems that *ought* to be true. Adherents to the egoist

model lobby for the deregulation of the employment relationship. Believers in the unitarist model argue that companies should use certain hum an resources practices. Subscribers to the pluralist theory support public policy reforms that make it easier for workers to unionize. Adherents to the critical school seek more fundamental changes in ownership and control rights. But at the same time, it is essential to recognize the theoretical or analytical aspects that are rooted in the values and assumptions of employment relations. The egoist model predicts that market-based relationships maximize welfare. The unitarist model implies that providing opportunities for individual fulfillment boosts employee productivity. The pluralist model hypothesizes that unions can improve productivity. The critical model predicts that managers will pursue strategies that increase their control in the workplace. Contrary to the characterization of even some employment relations scholars (e.g., Kochan, 1998), values do not comprise just the norm ative foundations of the field; rather, values and assumptions under lie views on how the employment relationship works analytically as much as how it should work norm atively (Budd, Gomez, and Meltz, 2004).

On both a normative and positive level, as the support for various values and assumptions wax and wane, the four ideologies and fra mes of reference exhibit an u neven trajectory during the development of the field and practice of Anglo-American employment relations (Ackers and Wilkinson, 2005; Kaufm an, 1993; 2004). The egoist employment relationship was fir mly cemented by the end of the 19th century in the United States with the development of the employment-at-will doctrine and the rejection of mandated labor standards on the grounds that it interfered with free contracting. Cycles of economic depressions and widespread sweatshop working conditions, however, sparked the development of Marx's views on work and capitalism in the mid-1800s, and the later development of the pluralist model around the turn of the 20th

century, and the c reation of the u nitarist model shortly thereafter. The pluralist model was embraced on an international scale with the creation of the International Labour Organization at the end of World W ar I. During the 1920s, the four m odels competed for dominance, but the Great Depression discredited the egoist and unitarist m odels in the United States. During the 1930s, then, the New Deal policies of the Roosevelt administration were rooted in the pluralist model. In Great Britain, the centrality of the pluralist model was reflected in the *Donovan Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations* in the 1960s. Fast forward to the 21st century and we see that with the rise of the liberal market paradigm, the egoist model has made a comeback; its ideology is certainly spoken with the loudest voice in popular discourse. In spite of ideas for revitalizing pluralist (Ackers, 2002; Budd, 2004) and critical (Kelly, 1998) employment relations, the field is in flux as the pluralist and critical models face significant challenges from the egoist and unitarist perspectives (Ackers and Wilkinson, 2003, 2005; Kaufman, 2004).

With respect to evalua ting corporate policies or shaping public polic y, competition among these ideologies and fram es of reference are to be expected since—as illustrated here—the models embrace different visions of the interests of the employment relationship and of their compatibility or incompatibility. But as an intellectual endeavor, the diversity of employment relations is both a strength and a weakness. It is a weakness when adherents of different views are isolated and talk p ast each oth er. It is a strength when diverse perspectives can help us understand the complex issues inherent across the entire spectrum of the world of work. To foster this strength, competing and shared values, ideologies, and frames of reference must be given explicit recognition in our scholarship and discourse. For those new to the field, a true

understanding of e mployment relations requires an appreciation for the diverse values, ideologies, and frames of reference in the world of work.

REFERENCES

- Ackers, Peter (2002) "Refram ing Employment Relations: The Case for Neo-Pluralism ," *Industrial Relations Journal*, 33(1): 2-19.
- Ackers, Peter and W ilkinson, Adrian (eds.) (2003) *Understanding Work and Employment: Industrial Relations in Transition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ackers, Peter and Wilkinson, Adrian (2005) "British Industrial Relations Paradigm: A Critical Outline History and Prognosis," *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 47(4): 443-56.
- Adams, Edward S. and Matheson, John H. (2000) "A Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency Concerns," *Emory Law Journal*, 49(4): 1085-1135.
- Adams, Stacy J. (1965) "Inequity in Social Exchange," in Leonard Berkowitz (ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 2*, New York: Academic Press. pp. 267-99.
- Adams, Roy J. (2001) "Choice or Voice? Rethinking American Labor Policy in Light of the International Human Rights Consensus," *Employee Rights and Employment Policy Journal* 5 (2): 521-48.
- Ali, Abbas (1988) "Scaling an Islamic Work Ethic," *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 128(5): 575-583.
- Amott, Teresa and Matthaei, Julie (eds.) (1996) *Race, Gender, and Work: A Multicultural Economic History of Women in the United States*. Rev. ed. Boston: South End Press.
- Anthony, P.D. (1977) *The Ideology of Work*. London: Tavistock.
- Applebaum, Eileen and Batt, Rosem ary (1994) *The New American Work place: Transforming Work Systems in the United States*. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
- Ashforth, Blake E. and Mael, Fred (1989). "Social Identity Theory and the Organization," *Academy of Management Review*, 14(1): 20-39.
- Bacon, Nick (2003) "Hum an Resource Management and Industrial Relations," in P eter Ackers and Adrian Wilkinson, (eds.), *Understanding Work and Employment: Industrial Relations in Transition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 71-88.
- Barbash, Jack (1987) "Like Natu re, Industrial Relations Abhors a Vacuum: The Case of the Union-Free Strategy," *Industrial Relations/Relations Industrielles*, 42(1): 168-79.
- Barley, Stephen and Kunda, Gideon (1992) "Des ign and Devotion: Surges of Rational and Normative Ideologies of Control in Manag erial Discourse," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 37(3): 363-99.

- Barringer, Tim (2005) *Men at Work: Art and Labour in Victorian B* ritain. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Bendix, Reinhard (1956) Work and Authority in Industry. New York: Harper & Row.
- Benford, Robert D. and Snow, Da vid A. (2000) "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26: 611-39.
- Blair, Margaret M. (1995) Ownership and Control: Rethinki ng Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- Bowie, Norman E. (1999) *Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective* . Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
- Bowles, Samuel and Gintis, Herbert (1990) "Contested Exchange: New Microfoundations for the Political Economy of Capitalism," *Politics and Society*, 18(2): 165-222.
- Braverman, Harry (1974) Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Budd, John W. (2004) *Employment with a Human Face: Balancing Efficiency, Equity, and Voice*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Budd, John W. (2005) Labor Relations: Striking a Balance. Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
- Budd, John W., Gomez, Rafael and. Meltz, No ah M (2004) "W hy a Ba lance is Best: The Pluralist Industrial Relations Paradigm of Ba lancing Competing Interests," in Bruce E. Kaufman (ed.), *Theoretical Perspectives on Work and the Employment Relationship*, Champaign, IL: Industrial Relations Research Association. pp. 195-227.
- Bullock, Alan and Trombley, Stephen (eds) (1999) *The Norton Dictionary of Modern Thought* . 2nd rev. ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company
- Burrell, Gibson (2006) "Foucauldian and Postmode rn Thought and the Analysis of Work," in Marek Korczynski, Randy Hodson, and Paul Edwards (eds.), *Social Theory at Work*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 155-81.
- Ciulla, Joanne B. (2000) *The Working Life: The Promise and Betrayal of Modern Work*. New York: Three Rivers Press.
- Clegg, H.A. (1975) "Pluralism in Industrial Relations," *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 13(3): 309-16.
- Council of Economic Advisors (2004) *Economic Report of the President*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Dannin, Ellen. (2006) *Taking Back the Workers' Law: How to Fight the Assault on Labor Rights*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Delgado, Richard and Stefancic, Jean (2001) *Critical Race Theory: An Introduction*. New York: New York University Press.
- De Man, Hendrik (1929) Joy in Work. Tr. Eden and Cedar Paul. New York: Henry Holt.
- Domhoff, William G. (1990) *The Power Elite and the S tate: How Policy is Made in America*. New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
- Donaldson, Thomas and Preston, Lee E. (1995) "The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications," *Academy of Management Review*, 20(1): 65-91.
- Donovan, John J. (2001) "W ork Motivation," in Neil Anderson, et al. (eds.), *Handbook of Industrial, Work, and Organizational Psychology, Volume 2.* London: Sage. pp. 53-76.
- Dunleavy, Patrick and O'Leary, Brendan (1987) *Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy*. London: Macmillian Education.
- Dunlop, John T. (1958) *Industrial Relations Systems*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Durkheim, Emile (1893/1933) *The Division of Labor in Society* . Tr. George Simpson. New York: Macmillan.
- Eagleton, Terry (1994) Ideology. New York: Longman.
- Edwards, P.K. (1986) Conflict at Work: A Materialist Analysis of Workplace Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
- Edwards, Richard (1979) Contested Terrain. New York: Basic Books.
- Epstein, Richard A. (1984) "In Defense of the Contract at Will," *University of Chicago Law Review*, 51(4): 947-82.
- Fama, Eugene (1980) "Agency Problem s and the Theory of the Firm," *Journal of Political Economy*, 88(2): 288-307.
- Faulks, Keith (1999) *Political Sociology: A Critical Introduction* . Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Folger, Robert and Cropanzano, R ussell (1998) *Organizational Justice and Human Resource Management*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Forbath William E. (1985) "The A mbiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gild ed Age," *Wisconsin Law Review*, 1985(4): 767-817.
- Fox, Alan (1966) "Industrial Soci ology and Industrial Relations," *Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations Research P apers 3*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

- Fox, Alan (1974) Beyond Contract: Work, Po wer and Trust Relations. London: Farber and Farber.
- Gall, Gregor (2003) "Marxism and Industrial Relations," in Peter Ackers and Adrian W ilkinson (eds.), *Understanding Work and Employment: I ndustrial Relations in T ransition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 316-324.
- Ghoshal, Sumantra (2005) "Bad Managem ent Theories are Destroying Good Managem ent Practices," *Academy of Management Learning and Education*, 4(1): 75-91.
- Godard, John (1992) "Contem porary Industrial Re lations Ideologies: A Study of Canadian Academics," *Relations Industrielles*, 47(2): 239-66.
- Godard, John (1995) "The Ideolo gies of U.S. and Canadian IR Scholars: A Comparative Analysis and Construct Validation," *Journal of Labor Research*, 16(2): 127-47.
- Godard, John (1997) "Whither Strategic Choice: Do Managerial IR Ideologies Matter?," *Industrial Relations*, 36(2): 206-28.
- Godard, John (2005) *Industrial Relations, the Economy, and Society*. 3rd ed. Concord, Ontario: Captus Press.
- Gottfried, Heidi (2006) "Feminist Theories of Work," in Marek Korczynski, Randy Hodson, and Paul Edwards (eds.), *Social Theory at Work*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 121-54.
- Greene, Anne-Marie (2003) "W omen and Industrial Relations," in Peter Ackers and Adrian Wilkinson, (eds.), *Understanding Work and Employment: Industrial Relations in Transition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 305-315.
- Gross, James A. (1998) "The Broken Promises of the National Labor Relations Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Act: Conflicting Values and Conceptions of Rights and Justice," *Chicago-Kent Law Review*, 73(1): 351-87.
- Hearn, Mark and Michelson, Grant (eds.) (2006) *Rethinking Work: Time, Space, and Discourse*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
- Hodson, Randy (2001) Dignity at Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Honderich, Ted (ed.) (2005) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hyman, Richard (1975) Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction. London: Macmillan.
- Hyman, Richard (2006) "Marxist Thought and the Analysis of Work," in Marek Korczynski, Randy Hodson, and Paul Edwards (eds.), *Social Theory at Work*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 26-55.

- Jacoby, Sanford M. (2001) "Em ployee Representation and Corporate Governance: A Missing Link," *University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law*, 3(3): 449-89.
- Jacoby, Sanford M. (2005) The Embedded Corporation: Corporate Governance and Employment Relations in Japan and the United States . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- Jahoda, Marie (1982) *Employment and Une mployment: A Social-Psychological Analysis*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Jensen, Michael C. and Meckling, William H. (1976) "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure," *Journal of Financial Economics*, 3(4):305-60.
- Kanigel, Robert (1997) The One Best Way: Frederick Wins low Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency. New York, Penguin.
- Katz, Harry C. and Darbishire, Owen (2000). *Converging Divergences: Worldwide Changes in Employment Systems*. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
- Kaufman, Bruce E. (1993) *The Origins and Evolution of the Fiel d of Industrial Relations in the United States*. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
- Kaufman, Bruce E. (1997) "Labor Markets and Em ployment Regulation: The View of the 'Old' Institutionalists," in Bruce E. Kaufm an (ed.), *Government Regulation of the Employment Relationship*, Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association. pp. 11-55.
- Kaufman, Bruce E. (1999) "Expanding the Be havioral Foundations of Labor Economics," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 52(3): 361–92.
- Kaufman, Bruce E. (2004) *The Global Evolution of Industrial Relations: Events, Ideas, and the IIRA*. Geneva: International Labour Office.
- Kaufman, Bruce E. (2005) "The So cial Welfare Objectives and Et hical Principles of Industrial Relations," in John W. Budd and James G. Scoville (eds.), *The Ethics of Human Resources and Industrial Relations*. Champaign, IL: Labor and Employment Relations Association. pp. 23-59.
- Kelloway, Kevin E., Gallagher, Daniel G. and Barling, Julian (2004) "Work, Em ployment, and the Individual," in Bruce E. Kaufm an (ed.), *Theoretical Perspectives on Work and the Employment Relationship*. Champaign, IL: Industrial Relations Research Association. pp. 105-131.
- Kelly, John (1998) *Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism and Long Waves*. London: Routledge.

- Killingsworth, Mark R. (1983) *Labor Supply*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- King, Roger (1986). *The State in Modern Society: New Direction s in Politica l Sociology*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.
- Kochan, Thomas A. (1998) "W hat is Distinctive About Industrial Relations Research?," in George Strauss and Keith W hitfield (eds.), *Researching the World of Work: Strategies and Methods in Studying Industrial Relations*. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press. pp. 31-45.
- Kochan, Thomas A. and. Katz, Harry C. (1988) *Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations:* From Theory to Policy and Practice. 2nd ed. Homewood, IL.: Irwin.
- Kochan, Thomas A., Katz, Harry C. and McKersie, Robert B. (1986) *The Transformation of American Industrial Relations*. New York: Basic Books.
- Kunda, Gideon (1992) Engineering Culture: Control and Commitment in a High-Tech Corporation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Kunda, Gideon and Ailon-Souday, Galit (2 005), "New Designs: Design and Devotion Revisited," in Stephen Ackroyd, et al. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Work and Organization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 200-219.
- Latham, Gary P. and Pinder, Craig C. (2005) "Work Motivation Theory and Research at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century," *Annual Review of Psychology*, 56: 485–516.
- Legge, Karen (1995) *Human Resource Management: R hetorics and Realities*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.
- Leidner, Robin (2006) "Identity and Work," in Marek Korczynski, Randy Hodson, and Paul Edwards (eds.), *Social Theory at Work*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 424-63.
- Levine, David I. (1995) Reinventing the Workplace: How Bu siness and Employees Can Both Win. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
- Lewin, David (2001) "IR and HR Perspectives on Workplace Conflict: What Can Each Learn from the Other?," *Human Resource Management Review*, 11(4): 453–85.
- Locke, Edwin A., and Latham, Gary P. (1990) *A Theory of Goal Setting and Task Performance*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Lustig, Jeffrey R. (2004) "The Tangled Knot of Race and Class in Am erica," in Michael Zweig (ed.), What"s Class Got To Do With It? A Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 45-60.
- Manning, Alan (2003) *Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- March, James G and Simon, Herbert A. (1958) *Organizations*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Martin, Christopher R. (2004) Framed! Labor and the Corporate Media. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press
- Marx, Karl (1844/1988) *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. Tr. Martin Millig an Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
- Maslow, Abraham H. (1943) "A Theory of Hum an Motivation," *Psychological Review*, 50(4): 370-96.
- McClelland, Peter D. (1990) The American Search for Justice. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
- Montgomery, David (1979) Workers' Control in America: St udies in the History of Work, Technology, and Labor Struggles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Muirhead, Russell (2004) Just Work. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Nord, Walter R., Brief, Arthur P., Atieh, Jennifer M., and Doherty, Elizabeth M. (1990) "Studying Meanings of Work: The Case of Work Values," in Arthur P. Brief and Walter R. Nord (eds.), *Meanings of Occupational Work*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. pp. 21-64.
- Peccoud, Dominique (ed.) (2004) *Philosophical and Sp iritual Perspectives on Decent Work.* Geneva: International Labour Office.
- Perlman, Selig (1928) A Theory of the Labor Movement. New York: Macmillan.
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey (1998) *The Human Equation: Building Profits by Putting People First.* Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- Pierson, C. (1996) The Modern State. New York: Routledge.
- Poole, Michael, Mansfield, Roger, Gould-Williams, Julian, and Mende s, Priya (2005) "British Managers' Attitudes and Behavior in I ndustrial Relations: A Twenty-Year Study, " *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 43(1): 117-34.
- Posner, Richard A. (1986) Economic Analysis of Law. 3rd ed. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Reynolds, Morgan O. (1984) *Power and Pr ivilege: Labor Unions in America*. New York: Universe Books.
- Schumacher, E. F. (1974) "Economics from the Buddhist Point of View," *Management Review*, 63(5): 39-42.
- Singer, Peter (2000) Marx: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Skocpol, Theda. (1985) "Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rues chemeyer, and Theda Sko cpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 3-37.
- Smith, Adam (1776/2003) *An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Solomon, Robert C. (1992) *Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Tajfel, Henri (1978) "Social Cate gorization, Social Identity, and Social Comparison," in Henri Tajfel (ed.), *Differentiation Between Social Groups*, New York: Academic Press. pp.61-76.
- Taylor, Bill, Kai, Chang, and Qi, Li (2004) *Industrial Relations in China*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Thelen, Herbert and Withall, John (1949) "Three Frames of Reference: The Description of Climate," *Human Relations*, 2(2):159-76.
- Thompson, Paul and Newsom e, Kirsty (2004) "Labor Process Theory, Work, and the Employment Relation," in Bruce E. Kaufm an (ed.), *Theoretical Perspectives on Work an d the Employment Relationship*. Champaign, IL: Industrial Relations Research Association. pp. 133-62.
- Turner, John.C. (1987) *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel (1986) "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice," *Science*, 211(4481): 453-58.
- Ulrich, Dave and Brockbank, W ayne (2005) *The HR Value Propo sition*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- Varian, Hal. R (1985) Microeconomic Analysis. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
- Wachter, Michael L. (2004) "T heories of the Em ployment Relationship: Choosing Between Norms and Contracts," in Bruce E. Kaufman (ed.), *Theoretical Perspectives on Work and the Employment Relationship*. Champaign, IL: Industrial Relations Research Association. pp. 163-193.
- Webb, Sidney, and Webb, Beatrice (1897) *Industrial Democracy*. London: Longmans, Green, and Co.
- Weber, Max (1919/1946) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Tr. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

- Weber, Max (1904/1976) Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism . Tr. Talcott Parsons. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Weber, Max (1925/1978) *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Tr. E. Fischoff. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds.), Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wheeler, Hoyt N. (1985) *Industrial Conflict: An Integrative Theory* . Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Wheeler, Hoyt N. (1994) "Em ployee Rights as Human Rights," in Jacques Rojot and Hoyt Wheeler (eds.) *Employee Rights and Industrial Justice*, special issue of *Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations*, 28: 9-18.

Frame of Ideology Reference Justification / Internal Guide Call for Actions for Action and and Outcomes Evaluation Theories of the **Employment** Relationship Behavioral and Values Institutional Assumptions

Figure 5.1: Defining Ideology and Frame of Reference

Note: This diagram provides schematic definitions, not a causal model.

Table 5.1: Four Theories of the Employment Relationship

Theory	Employer Interests	Employee Interests	State Interests	Key Beliefs
Egoist	Profit-Maximization	Utility-Maximization (Survival and Income)	Freedom Rule of Law	Freedom and individual self- interest yield optimal outcomes through free market transactions
Unitarist	Profit-Maximization	Fulfillment	Freedom Rule of Law	Corporate policies can align the interests of employers and employees
Pluralist	Profit-Maximization or Stakeholder Value	Equity Voice	Equitable Outcomes	Optimal outcomes are achieved when there is a balance between employer and employee interests
<u>Critical</u>				
Political Economy	Power and Control	Power and Control	Dominance of the Elite	Capital dominates labor in the employment relationship and in broader societal institutions
Feminist	Power and Control	Power and Control	Dominance of the Elite	Male concerns dominate female concerns in the employment relationship and in broader societal institutions
Race	Power and Control	Power and Control	Dominance of the Elite	Concerns of one ethnic group dominate other group's concerns in the employment relationship and in broader societal institutions