

I. Articles

Exploring Support for Terrorism Among Muslims

by Adrian Cherney and Jenny Povey

Abstract

In this paper we examine factors that influence support for terrorism, using the PEW 2010 Global Attitudes Survey. We assess aggregate results, drawing on items fielded to all Muslim respondents to identify broad factors that appear to indicate likely support for suicide terrorism. Results from a logistic regression model suggest that being female, having an educational degree, a commitment to certain Muslim beliefs and values, and being a member of the Shi'a minority might be probable indicators of support for terrorism. Some of the results were also counterintuitive. We consider the implications of our findings for understanding passive and active support for terrorism among Muslim communities.

Introduction

The question of Muslim support for Islamist-inspired terrorism has generated a public and political debate as to whether support for terrorism is rooted in Muslim religiosity and faith, particularly through the concept of *jihad*, which is sometimes interpreted as providing justification for violence against civilians.[1] Scholars have challenged such views, arguing that it distorts Islamic beliefs and principles.[2] In addition, empirical research has shed light on the complexity of attitudinal support for terrorism among Muslims, with some studies indicating it is shaped by a range of factors, least of which necessarily relate to religiosity or Islamic faith[3].

Given the saliency of the issue, it is important that debates and policies on terrorism are anchored in an informed understanding about why some Muslims may have sympathy and support for terrorism. This is not an insignificant issue because, as Sageman argues, the fight against terrorists groups such Al-Qaeda, is largely about winning over the “hearts and minds” of Muslim communities.[4] Doing so requires an understanding of the content of Muslim beliefs as well as factors that shape such attitudes.[5] Also examining support for terrorism can provide insights into whether terrorism is tolerated by co-religious groups. Such implicit support might be able to provide a “cloak of legitimacy” for terrorists and their causes, providing fertile ground for radicalisation, allowing terrorists to conduct operations more frequently and with greater ease.

Research on support for terrorism within Muslim-dominated countries has mainly relied on public polling survey data.[6] There are methodological limitations with such public polling data[7]; one needs to be careful with concluding that results translate into an accurate measure of

active support for terrorism itself. Despite this caveat, such polling data can provide a useful proxy for measuring passive support for Islamist-inspired terrorism (i.e. ideological or attitudinal), given the challenges of conducting large-scale survey work on terrorism.[8]

In this article we examine support for terrorism among Muslims using data from the 2010 PEW Global Attitudes survey (the most recent available PEW data at the time of writing). Our aim is to contribute to the growing understanding about what influences Muslim support for terrorism and examine if there are any significant commonalities. It has been argued that the content of people's beliefs about salient issues can be quite uniform, with this being the case for groups of particular religious orientations.[9] The PEW global attitudes survey consists of a twenty-two-nation survey conducted in April and May 2010.[10] The survey specifically includes countries that are predominantly Muslim (e.g. Indonesia and Pakistan), or countries with large Muslim minorities. The PEW survey collects data on socio-economic indicators, but also asks questions on a range of social, political and religious issues, including whether Muslim respondents judge suicide terrorism as justifiable (used as the dependent variable measure of support for terrorism in this study). Not all survey items are fielded to all respondents; there is some variation in the types of questions asked across countries e.g. relating to attitudes towards national political issues. Previous published research on support for terrorism among Muslims has relied on earlier PEW datasets than the one drawn on in this article. Such research has mainly examined variations between Muslim countries when it comes to, for example, the link between socio-economic conditions and support for terrorism.[11] In this article we look at overall aggregate results, and draw on particular items that were asked of all Muslim respondents. This will ensure consistency across the sample and increase our overall sample size. We do recognise that such an analysis can obscure variations between groups of respondents, but our aim is to identify general consistencies across Muslim respondents. In the next section we outline the method underpinning this study and describe our different variables, providing a justification for their selection and relevance to judgments about terrorism. Results from a logistic regression model are then presented and discussed. We then discuss the implications of our results and conclude by contemplating what our results mean for understanding passive and active support for terrorism.

Current Study and Survey Items

Data

As stated, this article employs data from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2010. Although this dataset represents a very general survey of respondents in 22 countries across the globe (n=24,790), this analysis draws specifically on the data from 7 countries that are classified in the Pew dataset as Muslim dominated, namely: Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey; together they comprised 8,003 respondents. More specifically, the analysis

uses the data of respondents who are Muslim in these Muslim countries. The final dataset used for the analyses comprised of 6,998 respondents.

Dependent Variable:

All Muslims in Muslim countries were asked the following question: *Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified or never justified?* Responses to this question comprise the outcome variable in this analyses. Responses ranged from one through to four (1 = “Often Justified,” 2 = “Sometimes Justified,” 3 = “Rarely Justified,” and 4 = “Never Justified.”). For purposes of descriptive statistics, this variable was recoded such that higher values indicate higher levels of support for this tactic. Thus, upon recoding, this variable took the values of: 4 = “Often Justified,” 3 = “Sometimes Justified,” 2 = “Rarely Justified,” and 1 = “Never Justified.” For purposes of the regression analysis only, this measure was recoded as dichotomous variable (0 = Never Justified and 1 = Ever Justified) and analysed by using logistic regression.

Independent Variables:

Studies on support for terrorism have generally categorised variables that impact on levels of support under five broad headings: social and demographic factors; economic and political factors; Islamic commitment and faith; institutional and political trust and foreign policy positions.[12] While we were limited in the number of variables we could include in our model, given the fact that we only selected items asked across all Muslim respondents, we have aimed to include items that in one way or another tap into factors across these five topic areas.

Important demographic variables such as “sex” (male = 0, female = 1), “age” (continuous 18–85) and “marital status” (all other = 0, married = 1) were included in the model due to the fact that the conventional wisdom is that young, unmarried males are the most likely candidates for participating in a terrorist campaign.[13] However, it should be noted that 71 percent of the respondents were married. While males and females were equally represented (50% for both), 69 percent of the male respondents were married and so were 73 percent of the women. The model also included employment status (unemployed = 0, employed = 1), children under 18 years living at home (no children =1, 1-3 children =2, 4 or more children = 3), and education (incomplete secondary or less =1, complete secondary = 2, complete tertiary =3).

Six indices were created and included in our model as independent variables. The items used in each index were determined by factor analyses, with each index comprising a 1-factor solution. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for these independent variables are presented in Table 1.

The *Religious Extremism* index is comprised of two items tapping how concerned respondents were with, firstly the rise of extremism in their own country and, secondly the rise of extremism in the world. The responses were recoded as a dichotomous variable (0 = concerned and 1 = not concerned). The index religious extremism is comprised of the mean score for these two items. The aim here is to understand how certain political and ideological positions influence support for terrorism, the assumption being that Muslims concerned about religious extremism are more likely to reject terrorism than those that do not.

The *Conservative Muslim* index is comprised of four items, tapping whether respondents are in favour or oppose making each of the following items law in their country: (1) segregation of men and women in the workplace; (2) punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery; (3) stoning people who commit adultery; and (4) death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion. The responses were recoded as a dichotomous variable (0 = oppose and 1 = favour). The index *Conservative Muslim* is comprised of the mean score for these four items. The reason for including this item is that arguments have been presented that fundamentalist Muslim values and beliefs influence support for terrorism, promoted in particular through the “clash of civilisations” thesis and arguments that literal and narrow interpretations of Islamic doctrine are antithetical to Western secular values.[14] Bernard argues that Muslim *fundamentalists* reject democratic values and desire an authoritarian state that implements Islamic law and morality. [15] This allegedly leads to sympathy for violent acts that aim to defend Islam, such as suicide terrorism.[16]

The empirical reality of such positions needs to be tested so as to ensure there is an informed debate about what might generate support for terrorism. Similar propositions led us to select the next two variables - *Women shouldn't have rights* and *Religious observance* variables. The *Women shouldn't have rights* index is comprised of two items, tapping agreement or disagreement to two statements regarding women's rights (1) women should have the right to decide whether or not they wish to wear a veil; and (2) women should be able to work outside the home. The responses were recoded as a dichotomous variable (0 = agree and 1 = disagree). This index is comprised of the mean score for these two items. The *Religious Observance* index is comprised of two items, observance to pray and fasting, with each item measured on a different frequency scale. How frequently a respondent prayed was measured on a 7-point scale, ranging from hardly ever to five times a day. This item was recoded into occasional observance (codes 1-4 = 0) and religious observance (codes 5-7 = 1). How frequently a respondent fasted was measured on a 4-point scale, ranging from hardly ever to always during Ramadan and other religious holidays. This item was recoded into occasional observance (codes 1-2 = 0) and religious observance (codes 3-4 = 1). The index religious observance is comprised of the mean score for these two items.

Dissatisfaction with US foreign policy and its perceived injustices towards Muslims is also argued as potentially being relevant to why some Muslims may support terrorism. [17] There have been efforts to shift such perceptions by the current US administration [18] and in this regard we included an *Obama International Policy* index, comprised of six items tapping the approval or disapproval of the way President Barack Obama deals with the following six issues: (1) international policies; (2) the world economic crisis; (3) the situation in Afghanistan; (4) Iran; (5) the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians; (6) the situation in Iraq. The responses were recoded as dichotomous variable (0 = disapprove and 1 = approve). The index *Obama International Policy* is comprised of the mean score for these six items.

The link between poverty and terrorism is a popular explanation for the root causes of terrorism. However, it has been discredited by a number of studies. [19] Other explanations point to assessments of societal or national well-being as more relevant to influencing support for terrorism, via judgments about one's societal, economic and political circumstances.[20] Hence it is more about relative, than absolute deprivation that matters when influencing approval for terrorist attacks. While not a perfect measure of this issue, we included an *Economic and Political Situation in one's own Country* index, comprised of three items. The items were recoded as dichotomous variables (0 = good and 1 = bad) and tap (1) how respondents feel things are going in their country; (2) the current economic situation in their country; (3) how good a job their government is doing in dealing with the economy. The index *Economic and Political Situation in one's own Country* is comprised of the mean score for these three items.

Six other dummy variables were used in the model: member of Sunni or Shi'a Muslim group; importance of religion; the role of political Islam; whether there is a struggle between modernists and fundamentalists; tension between Sunnis and Shia's seen as a problem; and US military threat to your country.

Table 1: Internal Reliability Coefficients (Cronbach's alpha = CA) for variables

Name of variable	n	No. of items in a scale	CA
Religious extremism	6097	2	0.66
Conservative Muslim	6011	4	0.80
Women shouldn't have the right to choose to wear a veil or work outside the home	6574	2	0.62
Religious observance	6586	2	0.45
Obama international policy	4113	6	0.87
Economic and political situation in own country	6223	3	0.76

Data Analysis and Results

The dependent variable (support for terrorism) is measured dichotomously. A binary logistic regression (LR) model was used to explore a number of possible predictors while including a number of control variables. The results of the logistic regression are presented in Table 2. Among the demographic variables explored in this model (age, gender, marital status, children in the household, education), only gender and educational status turned out to be significant. These results suggest that the likelihood of a Muslim woman supporting terrorism, compared to a Muslim man, was approximately one fourth (22%). Muslims with graduate or post-graduate qualifications were 28 percent more likely to support terrorism than those who had not completed secondary schooling.

Four of the six indices were significant predictors for support of terrorism: religious extremism, women shouldn't have rights, religious observance, and Obama's international policy. These indices are continuous, thus the odds ratio refers to a unit change, more specifically a unit denotes 1 for each of the six indices. Muslims who are not concerned with the rise of extremism in their own country and the world are 61 percent more likely to support terrorism than Muslims who are concerned. Muslims who do not support women's rights to wear a veil or work outside the home are 15 percent more likely to support terrorism than Muslims who do support Muslim women to have such rights. Muslims who actively observe religious rituals such as praying and fasting are 44 percent more likely to support terrorism than Muslims that occasionally observe these religious rituals. Muslims who approve of the way President Barack Obama deals with various international policy issues are 53 per cent more (sic!) likely to support terrorism than Muslims who disapprove of the way he deals with these issues. Members of the Shi'a Muslim

group are 109 per cent more likely to support terrorism than members of the Sunni Muslim group.

Two variables had a negative relationship with terrorism support, such as: perceived struggle between modernists and fundamentalists and tension between Sunni’s and Shi’a’s in the Muslim world is not seen as a problem. Muslims who perceive there to be a struggle in their country between groups who want to modernize the country and Islamic fundamentalists, are 23 per cent less likely to support terrorism than Muslims who do not think there is a struggle between these factions. Muslim's who indicated that the tension between Sunni and Shi’a is not a problem, are 48 per cent less likely to support terrorism than Muslims who indicated that the tension between these groups is a problem.

Table 2: Logistic Regression Results for the Support for Terrorism

	B	SE	95% CI for Odds Ratio		
			Lower	Odds Ratio	Upper
Religious extremism	0.48***	(0.11)	1.31	1.61	1.98
Conservative Muslim	-0.06	(0.12)	0.74	0.94	1.19
Women shouldn't have the right to choose to wear a veil or work outside the home	0.14*	(0.05)	1.03	1.15	1.28
Religious observance	0.37*	(0.15)	1.08	1.44	1.92
Obama's international policy	0.43**	(0.15)	1.15	1.53	2.05
Economic & political situation own country	0.00	(0.10)	0.81	1.00	1.23
Muslim group	-	-	-	-	-
Sunni	-	-	-	-	-
Shi'a	0.74***	(0.15)	1.57	2.09	2.78
Importance of religion	-	-	-	-	-
Important	-	-	-	-	-
Unimportant	0.15	(0.23)	0.74	1.16	1.82
Political Islam	-	-	-	-	-
Good	-	-	-	-	-
Bad	-0.14	(0.08)	0.73	0.87	1.02
Struggle between modernists & fundamentalists	-	-	-	-	-
No struggle	-	-	-	-	-
Struggle	-0.40***	(0.08)	0.57	0.67	0.78
Tension between Sunnis & Shias	-	-	-	-	-
Problem	-	-	-	-	-
Not a problem	-0.66***	(0.09)	0.43	0.52	0.62
US military threat to your country one day	-	-	-	-	-

Worried	-	-	-	-	-
Not worried	-0.11	(0.08)	0.76	0.89	1.05
Gender	-	-	-	-	-
Male	-	-	-	-	-
Female	0.20*	(0.10)	1.01	1.22	1.48
Age	0.00	(0.00)	1.00	1.00	1.01
Employment status	-	-	-	-	-
Unemployed	-	-	-	-	-
Employed	0.18	(0.10)	0.99	1.20	1.45
Marital status	-	-	-	-	-
All other	-	-	-	-	-
Married	-0.08	(0.11)	0.75	0.93	1.14
Children under 18 living in the household	-	-	-	-	-
No children	-	-	-	-	-
1-3 children	0.15	(0.12)	0.93	1.17	1.47
4 or more children	0.21	(0.14)	0.94	1.24	1.62
Education	-	-	-	-	-
Incomplete secondary/high or less	-	-	-	-	-
Complete secondary/high	-0.05	(0.09)	0.79	0.95	1.14
Graduate/Postgraduate	0.25*	(0.12)	1.01	1.28	1.62
Constant	-1.02***	(0.27)	0.21	0.36	0.61
Observations	3074				
Pseudo R ²	0.05				
Log likelihood	-1960.674				
chi2 (df=20)	210.09				
<i>Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001</i>					

Discussion and Conclusion

In summary: among the demographic variables explored in this model only gender and educational status turned out to be important. Four of the six indices were significant predictors for support of terrorism: religious extremism seen as a problem, women shouldn't have rights to choose to wear a veil or work outside the home, religious observance, and Obama's international policy.

The Obama international policy result was somewhat counter-intuitive, in that despite approving of how US President Obama was dealing with various international policy issues, some Muslim respondents still reported they supported terrorists' acts. Hence, while perceptions may be improving among Muslims about how the US might be addressing certain political issues, this may not translate into attitudinal opposition against terrorism – which is a central aim

of US attempts to win the “hearts and minds” of people in Muslim-dominated countries.[21] This conundrum maybe the outcome of other factors that have not been measured here, such as the historical legacy of US foreign policy decisions or the perceived victimisation of Muslims by local and foreign governments, that maybe more difficult to shift despite the efforts of one well-intentioned US president.

One of the more significant factors influencing support for terrorism was being a member of the Shi’a Muslim group as opposed to Sunni. One explanation for this is that our dependent variable measure of support for terrorism (justification of suicide bombing) potentially taps into beliefs about martyrdom, which have a strong tradition and legacy among Shi’a Muslims, and have been identified as promoting support for radicalisation and Islamic fundamentalism among Shi’ite minorities.[22] However, the validity of such results would need to be verified by additional data gathered from Muslim communities that having sizeable Shi’a populations, such as India, Bahrain, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

Our results indicate that neither economic and political judgments, nor low levels of formal education appear to influence support for terrorism, raising doubt about the link between socio-economic conditions and the perceived legitimacy of terrorists acts.[23] Two particular results are worth stressing here: (i) the fact that particular values (attitudes on women’s rights – i.e. wearing the veil and working outside the home) and (ii) religious divisions (i.e. identifying as a Shi’a Muslim) did influence support for terrorism.

The implications of these results can be interpreted in a number of ways. One would be to conclude – as many political leaders and media commentators do – that the results show there is something inherently conservative and fundamentalist about Islam that generates support for violent jihad and antipathy towards Western secular values. It follows then that one solution lies in policy responses that promote a “moderate” form of Islam that encourages tolerance and a more liberal interpretation of the Quran. This is problematic, because it should not be up to governments to dictate what form of Islam Muslim people should follow – they should be free to decide for themselves. This does not mean that normative values derived from belief systems among Muslims should not be contended with or challenged when aiming to combat terrorism – the question is how can this be done in a way that does not isolate Muslim communities. This is important to consider because there is an intense debate among Muslims and Islamic scholars as to how elements of the Quran should be interpreted, for instance around the meaning of jihad [24]. Hence while there may be uniformity in the saliency of certain Islamic beliefs (e.g. jihad as a moral and spiritual battle) it does not mean that this will be expressed in similar ways i.e. used to legitimise violence.

Perhaps one solution lies in recognising the types of “sacred values” that underpin Muslim beliefs.[25] Sacred values are morally generated positions that produce devotion to core principles such as the importance of family, country, religion, honour, justice and collective

identity. While they can often have their basis in religion, they can also be derived from core secular values e.g. fairness and reciprocity.[26] What is important is that sacred values drive behaviour in ways that trump individual calculations of self-interest. As Atran and colleagues have argued and shown, the most intractable political disputes and extreme behaviours are the outcome of sacred values, such as those underlying the Israeli and Palestinian conflict.[27] Our results are potentially the manifestation of the impact of sacred values on support for terrorism, namely Shi'a beliefs that have traditionally celebrated martyrdom as a sacred duty and beliefs relating to the female Muslim duty to wear the hijab and remain within the home. Rather than criticise such values or rail against their manifestation, a more productive response is to recognise their inviolability and respect the right of Muslims to have such beliefs, because this can actually lead to concessions on the behalf of those that hold such values.[28] The problem is that this is something that Western governments and their constituencies have found difficult to do when it comes to addressing the problem of terrorism. Our results show that what drives support for terrorism is multifaceted, and that shifting the "hearts and minds" of Muslims about the legitimacy of terrorism must reflect this complexity in a way that does not isolate Muslim communities.

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Notes

[1] See C. Bernard (2004). 'Five pillars of democracy: How the West can promote an Islamic reformation'. *Rand Spring Review*, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 10-13.

<http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/spring2004/pillars.html> (accessed on Nov 7, 2012); S. Huntington. (1996) *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York: Simon & Schuster; R. Jackson, (2007) 'Constructing Enemies: 'Islamic Terrorism' in Political and Academic Discourse', *Government and Opposition*, 42: 394-426. B. Lewis (1990) 'The roots of Muslim rage: Why so many Muslims deeply resent the West and why their bitterness will not be easily mollified'. *Atlantic Monthly*, 266 (September); pp. 47-60.

[2] J.L. Esposito (2011) *What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam*, 2nd Edition, Oxford: University Press. Scholars similarly point out that Islamic fundamentalism also distort Islamic principles to justify their actions. For instance Hafez (2010) argues that Islamic extremists utilize tactics of redefining social identities, so that some Muslims are no longer considered members of the protected in-group, justifying the use of violence against fellow Muslims (which is in violation of the Quran). By focusing teachings on the meaning and importance of piety, Jihadi

Salafists use accusations of apostasy as a means of legitimising attacks on other Muslims. – M.M. Hafez (2010). 'The Alchemy of Martyrdom: Jihadi Salafism and Debates over Suicide Bombings in the Muslim World', *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 38, pp. 364-378.

[3] G. Blair, N. Malhorta and J.N. Shapiro. (2013) 'Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan', *American Journal of Political Science*, 57 (1), pp. 30-48; G. Chiozza (2011) 'Winning Hearts and Minds: The Political Sociology of Popular Support for Suicide Bombings', Working Paper, Vanderbilt University; C.C. Fair and B. Shepherd (2006) 'Who Supports Terrorism: Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, pp. 51-74; C.C. Fair, N. Malhotra, and J.N. Shapiro (2012). 'Faith or Doctrine? Religion and Support for Political Violence in Pakistan', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 76 (4), pp. 688-720; J. Ginges, I. Hansen and A. Norenzayan (2009) 'Religion and Support for Suicide Attacks', *Psychological Science* 20 (2), pp. 224-230; K. Kaltenenthaler, W.J. Miller, S. Ceccoli and R. Gelleny (2010). 'The Sources of Pakistani Attitudes towards Religiously Motivated Terrorism', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 33 (9), pp. 815-835; S. Haddad and J.H. Khashan (2002). 'Islam and Terrorism: Lebanese Muslim and Views on September 11', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (6), pp. 812-828; J. Jo (2011) 'Who Sympathizes with Osama bin Laden? Revisiting the Hearts and Minds of Pakistani and Indonesian Muslim People', *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, advanced access, first published on-line 15 Dec. 2011; G. LaFree, and N.A. Morris (2012). 'Does Legitimacy Matter? Attitudes Towards Anti-American Violence in Egypt, Morocco and Indonesia', *Crime and Delinquency* 58 (5), pp. 689-719; M. Mousseau (2011). 'Urban Poverty and Support for Islamist Terror: Survey Results of Muslims in Fourteen Countries', *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (1), pp. 35-47; J.N. Shapiro and C.C. Fair (2009). 'Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan', *International Security* 34 (3), pp. 79-118.

[4] M. Sageman (2008). *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; see also: S. Atran (2003). 'Genesis of Suicide Terrorism', *Science*, 299 (5612), pp. 1534-1539.

[5] C.C. Fair, N. Malhotra, and J.N. Shapiro (2012); Q. Wiktorowicz (2005). *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

[6] E.g. see Fair and Shepherd (2006); Kaltenenthaler et al 2010. Haddad and Khashan 2002 op cit. ;Jo (2011) op cit. ; C. McCauley and S. Scheckter (2011). 'Reactions to the War on Terrorism: Origin- Group Differences in the 2007 Pew Poll of U.S. Muslims'. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 5 (1), pp. 38-54; M. Mousseau (2011); Shafiq, M.N. and A.H. Sinno (2010) 'Education, Income and Support for Suicide Bombing: Evidence from Six Muslim Countries', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54 (1), pp 146-178; Shapiro and Fair (2009); Tessler, M. and Robbins, M.D.H. (2007) "What Leads Some Ordinary Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United States", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51 (2), pp. 305-328.

[7] W. Bullock, K. Imai and J.N. Shapiro (2011). 'Statistical Analysis of Endorsement Experiments: Measuring Support for Militant Groups in Pakistan', *Political Analysis* 19, pp. 363-384. Blair, Fair, Malhorta and Shapiro (2013); Fair, Malhotra and J.N. Shapiro (2012).

[8] Ramsey (2012) 'Public Opinion Research and Evidence-Based Counterinsurgency', in: C. Lum and L.W. Kennedy (Eds.), *Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy*, 301 Springer Series on Evidence-Based Crime Policy, pp. 301-342. Also the public availability of such polling data, e.g. the PEW Global Attitudes survey (see <http://www.pewglobal.org>) does provide capacity for researchers to examine attitudes towards terrorism using large data sets, particularly in situations where large scale survey work is financially prohibitive.

[9] S. Atran (2002) *In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion*, Oxford University Press, New York. A. Scott, and J. Henrich. "The Evolution of Religion: How Cognitive By-Products, Adaptive Learning Heuristics, Ritual Displays, and Group Competition Generate Deep Commitments to Prosocial Religions." *Biological Theory Integrating Development, Evolution, and Cognition*, 5 (1), pp. 18-30.

[10] See <http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/2010/>.

[11] E.g. Fair and Shepherd (2006); Jo (2011); McCauley and Scheckter (2011).

[12] See Paul (2010), op. cit.

[13] Tessler and Robbins (2007), op. cit.

[14] Bernard (2004), op. cit.; S. Huntington (1996). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

[15] Bernard (2004), op. cit.

[16] Tessler and Robbins (2007).

[17] G.L. Bowen. (2011) 'Has outreach to the Muslim world by the Obama administration had an impact on Muslim attitudes toward terrorists and terrorism?' *Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs Journal*, 15 (1),; G. Kepel (2004); B. Lewis (1990).

[18] Bowen (2011), op. cit.

[19] E.g. Krueger (2007), op. cit.

[20] Tessler and Robbins (2007), op. cit.

[21] Bowen (2011), op. cit.

[22] J. Esposito (2011); B. Hoffman (1995) 'Holy terror': The implications of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 18 (4), pp. 271-284; R. Israeli (2002). 'A Manual of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 14 (4) , pp. 23-40.

[23] See J. Piazza. (2006) 'Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18:1, pp.159-177.

[24] J. Zeidan (2001) "The Islamic Fundamentalists View of Life as a Perennial Battle", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 5 (4), pp. 26-53.

[25] See S. Atran, op. cit.; S. Axelrod and R. Davis (2007). 'Sacred Barriers to Conflict Resolution', *Science*, 317, pp. 1039-1040; S. Atran and R. Axelrod (2008). 'Reframing Sacred Values', *Negotiation Journal*, 24 (3), pp. 221-246.

[26] S. Atran and S. Axelrod (2008), op. cit.

[27] See Atran, Axelrod and Davis (2007), op. cit.

[28] Ibid.