



# super diversity

Maurice Crul  
Jens Schneider  
Frans Lelie

# **Super-diversity**

A new perspective on integration

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**Maurice Crul, Jens Schneider and Frans Lelie**

**VU University Press  
Amsterdam**

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**"I am worse at what I do best, for this gift I feel blessed"**  
(Kurt Cobain, Nirvana)

**This book is dedicated to my 91-year-old mother Ans Crul-Bos.  
In her unique, inimitable way she taught me to approach everyone  
without prejudice.**

*Maurice Crul*

# Preface

This book was written in the dark days of the Dutch coalition government of Rutte, Verhagen and Wilders. It was a time during which one constantly had to explain to foreign colleagues what had happened to the Netherlands. We are now in the post-Wilders period; not because the Netherlands has changed, but because Wilders committed political suicide. No party will risk entering into a coalition with his party any time in the near future. Wilders seems to be losing his stranglehold on the integration debate, and the open wounds that his populist rhetoric inflicted on Dutch society are slowly healing. However, no reply has been formulated to challenge his vision. The polarisation that Wilders tried to bring about has left us with a strangely empty, nauseous feeling. It is time to fill this emptiness with a new vision of integration. The actor Nasriddin Dchar was one of the first with the courage to publicly break away from this path of exclusion when receiving his award for the film *Rabat*:

*“This Golden Calf award stands for dreams. That it is important to dream (.....) This calf also stands for overcoming fears, and unfortunately, the Netherlands is afraid. We are being injected with fear. A few months ago, I read an article in which Minister Verhagen stated that ‘the fear of foreigners’ is all too easy to understand; well, Mr Verhagen and Geert Wilders along with you and all your supporters: I am a Dutchman, and I am very proud of my Moroccan blood. I am a Muslim, and I’m standing here with a frigging Golden Calf award in my hand. This calf stands for love. Love and passion. Because without love and passion, this film would never have been made.”*

This book was also born of passion, but it would not have been possible without generous subsidies from the King Baudouin Foundation in Belgium, The Orange Foundation in the Netherlands and the Volkswagen Foundation in Germany. Our German friends from the vw Foundation had also supported us earlier as major sponsors of the TIES study, an international study of the second generation in Europe which provides the empirical basis for this book. The Expertise Centre for Higher Education (ECHO), whose mission is to promote the participation of students with a migrant background in higher education, hosted this project and as sponsor of the



chair for education and diversity of the main author, Maurice Crul, it has also been closely involved with the creation and distribution of this book.

We are grateful to many people for their altruistic contribution to this project. In particular, we would like to thank Miriyam Aouragh, Wim Willems, Mary Tupan-Wenno, Jan Hoogeveen and Marjon Bolwijn for their illuminating comments and suggestions for earlier versions of this book. Thanks to their efforts, this book's message comes across with greater clarity. We would also like to thank Semra Çelebi, Serdar Manavoglu and Murat Isik for their moving personal contributions in the form of the essays they have written for this book. Super-diversity also includes five film portraits by Elsbeth Dijkstra and Frans Lelie. We would like to thank Elsbeth for her contribution to this cinematic adventure, as well as the stars of these short film portraits – Youness Bourimech, Bilinc Ercan, Muhammet Yilmaz, Miriyam Aouragh and Halil Karaaslan – for their enthusiastic cooperation. Finally, we would like to thank Annelies Vlasblom for her stunning graphic design work for *Super-diversity*, and Jan Oegema of the vU University Press for his faith in this publication.

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## Chapter 1

# A new perspective on integration

The current debate on integration has reached an impasse. Multiculturalism has been discredited as an idea, while at the same time, multi-ethnic cities have become a reality everywhere. It is time for what the Dutch sociologist Justus Uitermark coined a 'post-multi-cultural strategy' (Nicholls and Uitermark 2013). A new vision of integration, offering an alternative to the policy of exclusion advocated by the right-wing populists and to the tired old demands for migrants and their children to assimilate. Our new vision is based on the emancipation of the second generation (the children born in Europe to first generation migrants). We will show that socially successful young people from this second generation represent the most progressive forces within their own communities. It is they who are tackling the themes that have brought multiculturalism under attack: gender equality and the right to decide about your own sexuality. It is they who are fighting for the rights of girls to continue their education, and they are breaking down the obstacles that have prevented women from entering the employment market. They demand the freedom to choose their life partner and the right to decide about their own sexuality.

A fundamental element of our argument is that progressive values will be embraced as a result of social and economic advances, and not because people are forced to assimilate. The power and energy that is emerging as a result of the emancipation process which is underway within the second generation is the driving force behind what we will call the scenario of empowerment and hope.

We will argue that in those European countries where the second generation is receiving educational opportunities and equal treatment, developments are underway that will lead to a powerful and visible emancipation movement among the second generation.

The most important question is therefore: where and under what conditions can the emancipation of the second generation develop most effectively? Which context provides the best environment for this emancipation? However, we must also ask: where is the lack of social advance creating division and contributing to a negative

scenario? An important conclusion is that policy choices concerning education, the labour market and housing can all help to steer towards a positive outcome.

## **Tram 51**

I was waiting for tram 51 at the stop for the vU (Free University Amsterdam). This tram, which travels straight through Amsterdam, represents a microcosm of our new metropolitan society. Beside me stood a student wearing a green headscarf and a black dress over her jeans, speaking Turkish into her smart phone. Once aboard the tram, I could hear two boys behind me, both with short haircuts, speaking in a mixture of Moroccan and Dutch. Just across the aisle, an African woman holding a little boy on her lap was struggling to keep the boisterous youngster in his seat. Finally, an older Chinese woman, who had difficulty walking, headed straight to the unoccupied seat beside the door. This tram journey through New West, Old South and the Nieuwmarkt revealed a different type of urban diversity at each stop. At Amstel station, two boys got off the tram, still discussing the business economics lecture they were about to attend at Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences, which is located beside the station. The old Chinese woman got off at Nieuwmarkt station, where her grandson was waiting for her on the platform. On arrival at the last stop the energetic little boy impatiently dragged his African mother from the tram towards Central Station.

According to data released by Amsterdam city council on 1 January 2011, Amsterdam is one of the European cities destined to officially become what is known as a majority-minority city, following in the footsteps of world cities such as New York, Sao Paolo, Toronto and Sydney. Today, only 49.7% of Amsterdam's population is of native Dutch origin. The other half originates from no fewer than 176 countries. Partly thanks to a host of films and television series, we see New York as a vibrant metropolitan melting pot. Everyone who has actually visited the city has been fascinated by the diverse atmospheres in the distinct neighbourhoods which together define the city's cosmopolitan nature. European cities are slowly approaching the same degree of diversity. Their main difference to New York is that in Europe, there is a clear, ethnically defined majority group in the large cities. However, they have already lost, or are soon about to lose, their numerical majority position. Soon, everyone living in a large European city will belong to an ethnic minority group, just as they do in New York. The speed at which European cities are changing and the immense diversity of nationalities that populate these cities are unique in our history. Historians like to remind us that the European cities and regions of the past were also extremely heterogeneous. Examples of this include the cities in Germany's



Ruhr region, to which Polish migrants flocked during the First World War and, further back in time, Amsterdam, which became home to Huguenots from France and Sephardic Jews from Spain (Lucassen 2005). However, never before have so many people from so many different parts of the world come to western European cities within such a short period. They have arrived in numbers which have, as is the case with Amsterdam, turned the old majority groups into a minority in just two generations.

Returning to the view offered by the culturally diverse travellers in the tram, it is also clear that the old majority group has not been replaced by a single new majority group. Those who are described as ‘allochthones’ in one country, as ‘migrants’ in another, and as ethnic minorities in yet another, form an extremely heterogeneous group. The cultural and social differences between them are often larger than their differences to the old majority group. For example, there is a gigantic difference in cultural and religious background between Ghanaian Amsterdammers and Turkish Amsterdammers; you only have to visit a religious service of each of these groups to realise that it is impossible to regard them as a homogenous group.

Never before has our urban population been so diverse in terms of culture, ethnicity and religion. When you add the older distinctions of rich and poor or old and young to this diversity, you arrive at the image of diversity reflected by the passengers of tram 51. The result of this exponential increase in diversity has been described by the American anthropologist Steven Vertovec (Vertovec 2007) with the striking term ‘super-diversity’.

## **Integration in a city of minorities**

Our ways of thinking about who is integrated and who is not will have to be radically adjusted in the light of the new majority-minority cities. In a society where one group forms a clear majority, minorities are expected to adapt to the opinions and customs of the dominant group. If there is no longer an ethnic majority group, everyone will have to adapt to everyone else. Diversity will become the new norm. This will require one of the largest psychological shifts of our time. Some members of the old majority group will fiercely resist the loss of their dominant position. For others, however, the city’s diversity will hold a powerful appeal.

But how can we imagine the idea that ‘everyone must adapt to everyone else’ in concrete terms? Primary school is an environment where this new metropolitan reality can already be clearly seen. The present-day primary school population in any large western European city cannot be compared to that of thirty or forty years ago. Children from the old majority group are already well in the minority at many prima-

ry schools, particularly those in older inner city neighbourhoods, or, depending on the city, in suburbs where affordable housing can be found. Children from all ethnic groups who are starting at such a school must integrate into the new diverse ethnic reality. The challenge of feeling at home in such a super-diverse schoolroom will be equal for all children, irrespective of their ethnic origin.

Another example from education illustrates the idea of ‘integration for everyone’ in more detail. Many higher education students of native parentage move from small towns to the cities to study. They live in affordable neighbourhoods, where many migrants and their children also live. These students of native Dutch parentage, coming as they do from more homogenous small villages and towns, experience more integration problems, and logically feel less at home in their new neighbourhood than the ‘migrant’ youngsters who have lived there all their lives.

Many students of native parentage also live far away from their familiar network, while youngsters of the second generation often have a close and extended network of family and friends in their neighbourhood and city.

The idea of the “established person of native parentage” and “the newcomers of migrant parentage” no longer applies in the big cities. In many neighbourhoods, the young people of the second generation are more likely to be the ‘born and bred’ group than other young city dwellers from the old majority group (Crul et al. 2012). Increasingly, these second generation youngsters form the most integrated group in the city. They can be found on the street from an early age, and in the process they make the neighbourhood and the city their own. From early childhood, the boys play football in the squares and the girls, along with older residents, are the neighbourhood library’s most dedicated users. At secondary school, they expand their horizons by finding a job in the supermarket or delivering pizzas on their motor scooters. As students, they discover night life and the shops in the city centre. In Amsterdam, the group that has lived longest in the city already consists of women of Moroccan descent. This is an important starting point for a new vision regarding integration.

## **New York: The second and third generation inherits the city**

The American researchers Phil Kasinitz, John Mollenkopf, Mary Waters and Jennifer Holdaway gave their book on the children of migrants (the second and third generation) in New York an unambiguous title: ‘Inheriting the City’ (Kasinitz et al. 2008). In New York, the second generation and their children will form the new majority and ‘inherit’ the city from the inhabitants who shaped it before them. New Yorkers are well accustomed to rapid changes in population groups within their neighbourhoods, in the subway travelling to work, and on the work floor. This is characteristic of the



city's dynamic nature and, for New Yorkers, it is a fact of life. Each migrant group has bequeathed the city a new cooking smell, a new skin colour and a new identity. The migration history of their families is part of every New Yorker's self-awareness.

If we look at the history of American cities though, we can see that this does not mean that the old majority group (English Protestants) gave up its dominant position just like that when the new migrants arrived. For example, at the beginning of the last century, the Germans in Philadelphia and the Catholic Irish in Boston were variously and colourfully depicted as a threat to the English protestant way of life. East European Jews were kept out of public positions and denied access to elite universities such as Harvard or Princeton for many years. Change only took place slowly. For a long time, the WASP – White Anglo-Saxon Protestant – was seen as being 'the only real American.' Judaism and Catholicism only became part of the American Mainstream after a long struggle (Alba et al. 2012).

The diversity of a city like New York provides us Europeans with an interesting taste of the future. Cities like Paris, Berlin, Brussels and Amsterdam are rapidly developing in the same direction. With their much more developed welfare states, European cities will create their own version of New York. At the same time, European cities do not have the same open attitude towards migrants as do American cities. These differences may mean that the second generation in European cities has more social and economic opportunities, but they also pose specific social and cultural challenges. In many European countries, members of the second and even third generation are still referred to as 'migrants.' It is much more difficult for the second generation in the Netherlands to claim Dutch identity than it is for the children of migrants on the other side of the Atlantic to feel American.

## **'Eurabia'**

This parallel with the history of American cities raises the question of who will inherit Europe's major cities. Right-wing populist politicians in Europe are ever more vociferous in their cries that 'the Muslims' are going to take over European cities and islamise them. Authors holding such views use the term Eurabia to describe this dystopia. They see Muslims as a threat to the 'Judeo-Christian' tradition, and migrants and their children as the vanguard of an exploding ethnic socio-economic underclass. According to these modern prophets of doom, the cocktail of Islam and the formation of an underclass is a ticking time bomb. Their dystopian visions alternate between images of unemployed youth descending into crime and reducing cities to a state of chaos and the image of young men hulled in djellabas and brandishing the Koran, preaching hate against western society.

In the 1980s, labour migrants were the natural allies of the working class as far as social democrats and socialists on the left were concerned. They represented the modern embodiment of exploitation and oppression. You could say that this romanticising blinded the 'left' to who the migrants actually were. To a certain degree, this is expressed by Max Frisch's famous sentence: 'We asked for hands to do the work, but we got people.' The new workers generally came from rural areas, were religious, held traditional opinions about gender roles and were, as a rule, proud of their origins. These were all values which were being abandoned to an increasing degree by social democratic and socialist movements during this period.

At the same time, the post-war generation of left-wing intellectual writers, academics and artists continued to stress the dangers of a belief in the superiority of western civilisation, as a result of their determination that fascism should never be allowed to rise again. Cultural relativism – the idea that all cultures and religions are equal – became the foundation on which multiculturalism was based. Nurturing understanding for, or at least requiring a degree of tolerance towards 'non-western' cultural and religious customs was the rule. This school of thought was increasingly put to the test when some people, acting in the name of the same religious or cultural customs, threatened the rights of other minorities (Kurds, Turkish Christians or Aleviets), women or homosexuals. In fact, tolerance was asked for intolerance, all in the name of multiculturalism. This seriously undermined support for the idea of multiculturalism. Writers, politicians and academics (for example, Oriana Fallaci in Italy, Alain Finkielkraut in France, Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands and Thelo Sarazin in Germany), members of the post-war left-wing intellectual generation, began to express their uneasiness about cultural relativism in books and the opinion pages of the media. A number of them went a step further by also engaging politically with the right with their plea to defend 'western' values against conservative religious Islam.

In the meantime, the crisis concerning multiculturalism has prompted the populist right to seamlessly appropriate a number of traditional progressive emancipation themes. They have embraced the rights of women and homosexuals as if they had never held conservative views on these matters in the first place. This provoked the following wry observation from a cynical commentator in Austria: 'mit dem Islam wir jetzt alle Feministen geworden sind!' Dutch sociologist Halleh Ghorashi calls this the culturalisation of the emancipation of migrant women (Ghorashi 2006).

## The paradox within the integration debate

The paradoxical developments described above come together in Europe's major cities. Multiculturalism as an idea is under fire from both left and right, while in the meantime, the city as a place consisting only of minorities is already becoming manifest reality. In some cities, this demographic turning point has already been reached, and it will happen in other cities within the next five to ten years.

What is the political response to this development? The answer from right-wing populists is simple: this must not be allowed to happen. The flow of migration must be stopped. The electoral gains of right-wing populist parties in many European countries are an expression of support for this position. The solution that the right-wing populists offer their supporters is, however, a spurious one: even if further immigration were halted this instant, the present demographic make-up of the large cities will inevitably lead to a majority of minorities. Right-wing populists deny this reality. They have no answer to the question of how people from different backgrounds can live together in this new reality.

Meanwhile, mainstream politicians advocate ever more vigorously the setting of 'national norms and values' with which 'newcomers' must comply. This call to assimilation comes not only from conservative parties, but also increasingly often from progressive politicians. They demand the adoption of progressive values such as equality between men and women and the separation of church and state. But how can the old majority group enforce such assimilation in everyday situations when they have lost their numerical dominance? Two thirds of the young inhabitants of the large cities already have an immigrant background. Seen from this perspective, the increasingly loud clamour from mainstream politicians for assimilation often has a hollow and populist ring. These calls do not represent any vision of what integration means in an increasingly diverse society; instead they look more like a desperate attempt to counter the political rhetoric of right-wing populists. In practice the result of these calls to assimilate is that an increasing number of citizens with a migrant background feels excluded and unwelcome. These demands are becoming ever more far-reaching. Nowadays, it is as if the second and third generation can only be considered to be truly integrated if they repudiate their origins and renounce Islam. Not surprisingly, this has provoked much anger and resistance among them.

## Thinking outside the box

Political leaders, policy makers and researchers in different European countries generally formulate their approach to integration within their own national conceptual framework. Integration practices just a few miles away across the border often go unnoticed. This seriously limits thinking about successful integration practices. To look beyond the border allows for a remarkably clear view. The Turkish second generation is the most suitable group to identify successful practices. With more than four million people, Turks are the largest group with a migrant background in western Europe. They are an ideal group for international comparison because they have settled in almost all western European countries in significant numbers. Turkish immigrants are spread from Sweden and Norway in northern Europe to France in southern Europe and Switzerland and Austria in central Europe.

Originally from small villages in central Anatolia, the shores of the Black Sea and the Aegean coast, they were sent by recruitment agencies to the Volvo factories in Stockholm, the mines in France and Belgium, the shipyards in Rotterdam and Hamburg and the machine and car factories in Berlin and Amsterdam.

The children of Turkish migrant workers in Europe were born into broadly comparable situations. The ways in which these different countries shaped their integration, however, varied significantly. By comparing young people whose parents have comparable cultural and geographical backgrounds (migrants from Turkey) with the same starting position (all born in Europe to parents with a very low average level of education), we could gain valuable insights.

The differences in the results between countries are quite remarkable. In Sweden, for example, six times as many of the Turkish second generation go on to higher education than in Germany. In both cases they are the children of migrant workers, who in some cases even came from the same villages, but in one country they are studying to become engineers or accountants, while in the other, their chances of entering higher education are practically non-existent. What are these two countries doing differently?

In the following chapter we will show that ways of structuring education and organising the transition to the labour market are the real reasons for these differences. The European countries take very varied approaches which, in practice, lead to very varied outcomes. The fact that politicians, policy makers and researchers continue to focus solely on their own country blinds us to important success stories beyond our national boundaries. An international comparison can make successful practices visible. Looking across borders like this gives us practical pointers that we can use to develop a new perspective on integration.

## **Future scenarios for the large European cities**

In his book 'The Geo-politics of Emotion', the French political scientist Dominique Moïsi (2009) sketches a number of possible scenarios for the future. We have taken two of these scenarios in a slightly adapted form to describe the situations in various European cities. Here, we will contrast the scenario of 'empowerment and hope' against the scenario of 'fear and humiliation.' In the scenario of 'fear and humiliation' groups in the city retreat into themselves and society becomes increasingly polarised along ethnic dividing lines. Members of the old majority group feel threatened, and this is expressed in fear and massive support for right-wing populist parties; at the same time, the group of migrant parentage feels excluded and humiliated as second-class citizens. In contrast to this, the scenario of empowerment and hope shows a future in which different ethnic groups are able to break down the divisions between them and whereby equality and emancipation are the most important outcomes.

Which factors lead to a scenario of empowerment and hope and which to a scenario of fear and humiliation? The degree to which the second generation attains socio-economic and socio-cultural emancipation is crucial. We will show that the scenario of empowerment and hope is likely where there are more equal opportunities for migrants and their children. The combination of ambition and motivation among the children of migrants, and the opportunities they are offered, often give rise to spectacular forms of inter-generational upward mobility in the second generation. Girls born to illiterate mothers work their way up to become doctors or lawyers. The most pronounced form of upward social mobility is from mother to daughter. This form of upward mobility is also having the greatest effect. In contrast to this, in countries where there are scant opportunities, a large part of the second generation adopts a marginal position and a feeling of being misjudged and humiliated dominates.

The outcome of the scenario also depends largely on how open a society is. A less positive scenario prevails if it is difficult for the upwardly socially mobile second generation to identify with society. Humiliating the most successful members of the second generation may have extremely negative consequences. Every time they are discriminated against when they apply for a job, or refused entrance to a nightclub by the bouncers, their resistance and aversion to the society they perceive as excluding them increases.

An important indication of the direction in which a city is developing can be found in how the various ethnic groups treat each other and which space they give each other. In our study, we found two groups which display a strong expression of the scenario of fear and humiliation. One group consists of very religiously conservative second generation young people who have turned away from society; the other

Figure 1

Turkish second generation with low-educated parents:

Statement: It is unnatural for women in leading positions to exercise authority over men. Percentage answering: agree or completely agree





Figure 2

**Turkish second generation with low-educated parents:  
Statement: Women should not work outside the home if they have small children. Percentage answering: disagree or completely disagree**



**low educated** **highly educated**

Highly educated Turkish (69%) and Moroccan (71%) women of the second generation from low-educated families in the Netherlands are just as likely to demand the right to work as highly educated women of Dutch origin from low-educated families (70%).

group – young right-wing populists who do not feel at home in today’s multi-ethnic metropolitan reality – is its counterpart in many respects. It is striking how many characteristics these groups have in common. Both think that their own culture or religion is superior to that of the other and prefer only to mix within their own group. The size of the two groups varies from city to city and is an important barometer for predicting the future scenario of fear and humiliation.

In contrast to this are groups that represent the scenario of empowerment and hope. The most important of these groups consists of young people who identify strongly with society as a whole and who have friendships outside their own ethnic group. The second generation is taking the lead in this respect. One of our respondents aptly called this second generation of young people the ‘hinge generation’. Another smaller but important group is formed by young adults of native parentage who have mixed groups of friends. They know these peers through school or work.

The American philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2012) states that inter-ethnic friendships are crucial to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts and discrimination in a society. The dense network of contacts outside one’s own group that is woven by inter-ethnic friendships in everyday life at school, work and during free time is essential to social cohesion in a city. Thanks to this network, ideas and opinions can be exchanged between groups and superficial perceptions that groups often have of each other can be replaced by a more nuanced picture. It is the exchange between these groups that creates a new, hybrid metropolitan culture.

## **Emancipation follows on from social mobility**

Central to our argument is the group of successful second generation youth. In Europe, one in five of them is enrolled in higher education. Despite this, politicians and policy makers continue to focus on problem youths, even though it is these successful young people who currently hold the key to a scenario of hope and empowerment – especially well-educated young women. Highly educated second generation women are fundamental to both the socio-economic and socio-cultural emancipation of the second generation. Socio-cultural emancipation follows in the wake of the socio-economic leap forwards. No matter which part of Europe they grew up in, highly educated young people of the second generation are leading the emancipation of the second generation. For example, the vast majority of them rejected the statement that women with young children should not work outside the home. They did so twice as often as members of the second generation who had attained a low level of education. It is not entirely surprising that highly educated women are the greatest advocates of the idea that mothers of young children should be able to work.




Highly educated Turkish (69%) and Moroccan (71%) women of the second generation from low-educated families in the Netherlands are just as likely to demand the right to work as highly educated women of Dutch origin from low-educated families (70%). In the Netherlands, only 9% of highly educated second generation women with a partner choose not to work. Only a very small minority takes heed of the fact that some husbands, who are often somewhat more conservative, would prefer them not to work but instead stay at home to take care of the children. The most common Dutch polder compromise in second generation families with young children is that the women work three or four days per week, and it is noticeable that some men work even more when they have children.

The power and energy that develops within the second generation during this process of emancipation is generating a scenario of empowerment and hope. We will demonstrate that in the European countries where the second generation has been given educational opportunities and equal treatment, a development is set in motion that leads to a strong, visible emancipation movement among the second generation. Our central argument is that emancipation will not result from pressure to assimilate by the majority group, but will be the consequence of social mobility within one's own group. In every country, it is the highly educated young adults of the second generation who are propagating the most progressive opinions within their own community. This certainly applies to highly educated women, but also to highly educated men. For instance, they unanimously support sexual equality in the employment market. Whereas low-educated young people of the second generation (especially the men) often find it difficult to accept having a woman in charge, this attitude is scarcely ever found among highly educated young people of the second generation. In cities where emancipation is taking hold, a growing group is becoming intolerant of intolerance. Emancipation is the answer to the problematic side of multiculturalism that requires tolerance for all cultural customs, including those that are intolerant towards others.

The biggest break that highly educated young people of the second generation are making with the traditions within their own community concerns the topic of family honour and virginity. Virginity is still the norm for young, low-educated members of the Turkish second generation, but highly educated young people are more openly demanding the right to make decisions about their own sexuality. A large majority of them in every country said they found it acceptable to have sex before marriage, either in any circumstances, or subject to certain conditions. In Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, approximately half of them said that it is acceptable under any circumstances. These are all young people who grew up in low-educated labour migrant families. With this statement, they are strongly distancing themselves from the predominant traditional opinions about sexuality within their communities.



Figure 3

**Turkish second generation with low-educated parents:  
Sex before marriage is acceptable**



  
low  
educatde

  
highly  
educated



In Sweden there are very few low-educated second generation Turks. Some did not answer the question; therefore the numbers are too low for analyses.

In countries where the second generation is low educated, the husband is often the only breadwinner in the family. It is very difficult for families with just one income to make ends meet. Highly educated women are entering the job market in great numbers and by doing so they are making it possible for their families to gain access to the middle class. The socio-economic emancipation of women is crucial to a scenario of empowerment and hope.

## Chapter 2

# Emancipation of the second generation

**The emancipation of the second generation will result in a scenario of hope and empowerment in the large cities: this is the core message of our story. To accompany this book, we have also made five short film portraits entitled 'Pathways 2 Success'.**

The original target group for these films was prospective students, but when we had finished the films, we realised that many adults could also relate to them, and that they too found them inspiring and thought provoking. You will find a summary of each film here, but you can also watch the films through the [URL](#), or by scanning the QR code with your smart phone. In these films, five people who personify the energy generated by the children of migrants tell their story. They are the engines powering processes of change. They are all inspiring, modern pioneers who have swum against the tide to shape their own lives. Maybe the difference between them and their contemporaries from the individualistic generation of the 1990s is that they do not live just for themselves; each one has a message that they want to pass on to the next generation. This is how emancipation works in practice. Meet these young adults who are shaping change in their community by reading a short version of their film portraits. You can also jump to the movies by following the [url](#) or scanning the QR-code with your smartphone.

# Hamburg



## Bilinc Ercan

**Bilinc Ercan, 31 years old, born and bred in Hamburg, obtained her PhD in law the day before this interview.**

**M**y mother showed me that women can achieve anything. She grew up in a village in Anatolia, without a mother. Her brothers were both teachers in the village. My mother was the first girl from the entire village to go to school. It was a school with 300 or 400 boys and she was the first girl! She had said 'I want to go to school', and her brother replied, 'OK, if that is what you really want, I'll take you.' It is so important to have somebody to support you. After her, more

and more girls went to school. They saw 'OK, a girl can do it too!' My mother was my example, so going to school was a given for me. I went to Altona secondary school and sat my university entrance exams there in 1999.

I realise how in German society, my Turkish background makes me deal with the fact that I am different. I used to sit in the bus to school, thinking 'Is he looking at me because I look different?' It was all in my mind, I have to admit,

but these thoughts were also reinforced by several incidents, such as the time we were stopped by the police. They suddenly appeared and said ‘Can you show us your ID? You don’t look like you live here.’ I felt uneasy, discriminated against.

## **‘My mother showed me that women can achieve anything.’**

We are of Turkish descent, we are the third generation. We grew up in this country, the country belongs as much to us as to anyone else. This also means that we identify with this country. But German society must also allow us to identify with this country. And that is what I have set as my goal. I decided to study law, because I associate that with justice.



I think that it is important for young people of migrant descent to free themselves from what other people think of them. If you have a goal, don’t let negative thoughts hold you back. If someone gives you the feeling you are inferior, let go of it, free yourself from it! Just do your thing. Don’t take it all too seriously. I just went up to my professor and said that I wanted to do my PhD. So I started and yesterday, I obtained my PhD. You can accomplish things that first made you wonder ‘How can I ever manage this?’ But you can do a lot, if you keep at it. You just need people to support you”.



Watch the movie:  
[www.elitesproject.eu/educational-kit/english/hamburg](http://www.elitesproject.eu/educational-kit/english/hamburg)

# Paris



## Youness Bourimech

**32 years old, owns a company in the Bondy neighbourhood, a banlieu of Paris.**

**T**his suburb, Bondy, is my turf. My parents left Morocco to come here. I grew up in this suburb.

There was a bakery, a football field and a school. That was it, it was my entire world. My luck changed when I was 20 and I met my wife who was living in Paris. Only 4 miles from home, lay one of the most beautiful cities in the world! But I grew up here, and that's why I'm still here. I started in the first class in primary school. I was never kept back a year, but I was still sent to lower-level

vocational school. We had no idea what kind of professions existed. Here in the suburbs, there were only three subjects to choose from: sales, marketing and secretarial administration. They simply fill these three classes with the kids that are there. They don't try to find out what talents a kid may have. This is dumb, because if a kid pursues a subject that he likes, everyone wins – not just the child, but the whole society. I wanted to become a sport teacher. But then, I went to the sport faculty and found out that

there were 4,000 applications for just 400 spaces. Other applicants had the right preparatory training, so that was difficult.


Then, I set up my first cleaning company. My sister did the administration, and I took care of the business side. Shortly after we started, our customers started asking if we could do more. Now I have started a breeding ground for businesses, right here where I grew up, together with a friend I grew up with. Yes, in my business I work in the service of sport one hundred percent. Competitiveness, competition, the rules of the game: these are things you openly have to respect. In sport, religion is not an issue. In sport, everyone is the same. You wear a T-shirt, shorts, everyone is the same.

I have employees in my company, but I call them my partners. We're in this adventure together. Don't forget where you come from, that's my motto. I never forget that I started off cleaning toilets. I'd do it again tomorrow, if I had to. That's right, you must not forget where

you came from. I'm sticking around, right here in my neighbourhood. We will move up together. We are raising standards. We are lucky, because for years, this was a terrible neighbourhood, totally rundown and very poor. It was also full of many nationalities. This is valuable, because that's how the

**'If a kid pursues a subject that he likes, everyone wins.'**

world is. This neighbourhood has many empty industrial premises. I'm waiting it out. Paris is four miles away. We have everything here: we are close to the motorway, and there is a business airport nearby. I have everything here. I'm patient, and slowly but surely you will see all the things that will be happening here in ten years.



Watch the movie:  
[www.elitesproject.eu/educational-kit/english/paris](http://www.elitesproject.eu/educational-kit/english/paris)



# Rotterdam



## Halil Karaaslan

**24 years old, is a social studies teacher in his hometown Rotterdam.**

I don't think I had a vision of what I'd be doing in the future, but rather a sense of what I hoped to be doing. I teach at Lebanon secondary school, with a lot of love and passion. I try to pass on what I missed out on when I was a pupil. School didn't motivate me to continue studying.

In my adolescence, I was like a little philosopher. All kinds of thoughts filled my head. I felt somewhat advanced in my thinking, I wanted more. The awakening came when I realised what

I needed school for: to accomplish what I wanted. I had well-meaning friends around me saying, 'Hey, don't you do enough already?' In that sense, I noticed that friends could also get in the way of my goals. I now tell people that at certain points in your life, you must dare to distance yourself from some people. They may be your closest friends, even your family. I know for a fact that some pupils have families who are anything but encouraging. I rather missed out on a role model at school. What really inspired me was Bruce

Lee and what he accomplished. People tend to overlook the fact that Bruce Lee was also a philosopher, because he had actually studied philosophy. One of his quotes that really inspires me is ‘The key to immortality is first living a life that is worth remembering.’ That is what has always driven me, whether I can mean something for one person, or for ten, one thousand or a million. It is a positive form of pride, when you can say ‘I can leave this world with a sense of peace, because I know that I did something worthwhile for other people.’ Bruce Lee acted as a bridge between east and west. I have the same idea, I bring people together.

I help people to understand each other better. This doesn’t mean that they always have to agree with each other, but that they can understand each other’s choices. I play a role in this dynamic. I think that it’s important that pupils voice their opinions in my class.

But emotions and feelings are also welcome in the classroom. During debates – which occur quite often in my class – I notice how my background

## **‘I felt somewhat advanced in my thinking.’**

allows me to say some things more easily than my colleagues can. You can only achieve something when you can dredge up someone’s deepest feelings. This can be very extreme in some cases, but if you can grasp that and then enter into a dialogue together, that’s when you get somewhere”.



Watch the movie:  
[www.elitesproject.eu/educational-kit/english/rotterdam](http://www.elitesproject.eu/educational-kit/english/rotterdam)

# Amsterdam



## Miriyam Aouragh

**39 years old, has a PhD in Anthropology. She works in Oxford, England and has just won the prestigious Leverhulm research scholarship.**

I'm a researcher and I also teach. I teach students about the role the media and the internet play in politics and political movements in the Middle East. I now work at Oxford University. Well, I would never have thought that a Moroccan from East Amsterdam would ever have anything to do with a place like this. But you grow into it, and in doing so you see how the psychological barrier, the thought that 'this is not for the likes of you', can be overcome.

My father is a typical first-generation migrant. He opened his own butcher's shop in Amsterdam. I think that he also thought at first that being independent and having your own business was not for the likes of us. That we were brought here to do the dirty work, and that's how the cards are dealt. But he did it.

I did not follow a straight path from primary school to academic track secondary school to university. I took what used to be called a step-by-step

route. So I worked my way up from the very lowest level of secondary education. After primary school, I went from lower vocational track secondary school, to middle vocational education, progressing on to higher vocational education before finally reaching university. I then explored the academic world.

## **‘Do something out of the ordinary.’**

This journey took at least 10, 15 years. This is a common experience for many children of migrants. Language deficiencies are often mistaken for a lack of intelligence. I had to find out and explore a lot more for myself. I was lucky that during my studies at vU University, there was a very good teacher in the anthropology department, who made me feel that she really believed in me. Validation can be very empowering.

That experience at vU University was crucial.

I think that it is important not to put a deadline on your dreams. It’s not true that you must have everything figured out by the time you are 30. Dare to set your sights beyond the Netherlands. The Netherlands is not the world, it isn’t even the centre of Europe. The Netherlands is actually just a small country and the world doesn’t revolve around it. So cross that border. Do something out of the ordinary. Later on, you’ll look back and say ‘I have done something different’. And being different from the mainstream is actually rather cool”.



Watch the movie:  
[www.elitesproject.eu/educational-kit/english/amsterdam](http://www.elitesproject.eu/educational-kit/english/amsterdam)

# Brussels



## Muhammet Yilmaz

**36 years old, works as a lobbyist in Brussels.**

It's a fact that your background, your family and your family's network make all the difference. They open doors for you. In fact, they don't just open doors – they open up your world. I missed out on that, a network of people with a background in higher education, or with brothers, sisters or friends in higher education. I lacked that indeed. Fortunately, I received encouragement and inspiration from my teachers. They set me on the path to modern sciences and I graduated in mathematical economics. After that,

I got certified as a genetic lab assistant. But then I asked myself – what now? I ended up in a school in Antwerp, where I taught for two years. During that time, I met a couple of Turkish entrepreneurs who, along with a few young people, had taken the initiative to set up an after-school tutoring programme. They asked me if I would be interested in helping out, as they needed a coordinator. That was a very compelling experience for me. You learn to deal with people, and you develop leadership skills, but in doing so, you also find soul


mates. These are people in the same situation as yourself, who think like you. I wish that I'd had that when I was young. If so, I would have followed a different educational track.

## **'For me, networking means making friends.'**

Networking is very important nowadays. It does not just happen though your study or work. It is also the other things that you do. Learn a musical instrument, write poems, go mountain climbing! Try something different. It will help you to overcome psychological barriers. It will also help to broaden your network, so that you don't just stick to the people from secondary school and university. Instead you will also have many other people in your life – people with different interests, people who can enrich you with their knowledge and their experiences. For me, net-

working means making friends. People who can help me to solve problems, including personal ones. My network is broad, really very broad. It can range from assistants or interns working at the European parliament to a Belgian minister. Is this opportunistic? No, most definitely not. It's give and take. If they need something, they can also call upon me.

When I first got to know my present colleague, he had just set up a new company. He represented 13,000 businesses from Turkey and organised exchanges and lobbies. Basically, we are trying to build a bridge between Ankara and Brussels, and between Turkish public opinion, the Turkish business world and European institutions. I think that our generation is a hinge generation. It is a generation that will ensure that the Belgian-Turkish community finds both its identity and its place in society.



Watch the movie:  
[www.elitesproject.eu/educational-kit/english/brussels](http://www.elitesproject.eu/educational-kit/english/brussels)

## Chapter 3

# Education as the key to emancipation

In the 1960s and 70s, companies and governments brought migrant workers to the large European cities to perform the unskilled work in factories, mines and harbours that European workers no longer wanted to do. The most important criteria for recruitment was that the workers must be young, healthy and uneducated. The effects of this recruitment strategy can still be felt today. Most first generation Turkish, Moroccan, Yugoslavian and Italian migrants had no more than a primary school education. The majority of the first generation Turkish and Moroccan women who arrived later came from the same villages as their husbands. Many of them had never had the opportunity to go to school and were effectively illiterate. Such a low level of education is scarcely to be found among their generational peers from the European working class; it is usually only to be found in multi-problem families where long-term unemployment, and sometimes alcoholism or criminality, are part of everyday life, but this is where the comparison ends. Because of their parents' educational level, the children of these migrant workers started life from an extremely disadvantaged position.

### **The fiasco caused by thinking 'they won't stay for long'**

Temporary migration: this was the motto of both employers and the government when the labour migrants arrived. As far as they were concerned, the workers were here as guests and would leave again. Part of this plan was that the children of married workers would grow up in Turkey and Morocco. After all, their father would be returning home soon. All European countries had more or less the same policy in that regard. In the same period, however, Turkish workers were being actively recruited by another country: Australia. A popular joke among Turks at that time was that many guest workers thought they were signing up for Austria (Avusturya), only to find out that they were bound for Australia (Avustralya). The spelling of the

words Austria and Australia in Turkish may be similar, but their migration politics were a world apart. In contrast to Austria, guest workers in Australia were allowed to take their wives and children with them straight away. This was a logical decision from the perspective of an immigration country like Australia: the reasoning was that migrants could only really settle in a country – learn the language, invest in and build a future – if they were not separated from their family. European countries did not see themselves as immigration countries, and delayed for a long time before they finally gave permission for migrant workers to be reunited with their wives and children.

The consequences of this choice can still be felt to the present day. Children born in Turkey had become teenagers during the eight to ten years they had spent waiting. They had gone to school in Turkey and learnt the language there. They were brought to western Europe in the middle of puberty and sent to school here without any preparation. The atmosphere of acute crisis that the arrival of these children in large numbers caused in schools has been comprehensively described in all European countries. Teachers tried to help these young people as best as they could with the limited tools at their disposal. In addition to the huge obstacle of language, children entered schools with different levels of knowledge and from a totally different school system.

Europe's late family reunification policy has exacted a high price. This so-called 'in-between generation' left school early, never learnt to speak the language without an accent and often did not stand a chance on the employment market. In many regards, they are a lost generation. In Australia, there is practically no such thing as an 'in-between generation': most young people of Turkish descent went to school there from an early age (Inglis 2011).

## **The balance after fifty years of labour migration**

It is now, more than fifty years after the beginning of labour migration, possible to draw up the balance for the in-between and second generation. Everywhere in Europe politicians seem convinced: integration policy has failed. Inadequate mastery of the language, major cultural differences and the low socio-economic position of the first generation are pointed to as the causes of the 'failed integration of the children of immigrants'. These are exactly the characteristics which were required of the migrants when they were recruited by employers and governments in the first place. The major challenges involved in educating children whose parents could offer them little or no support are the direct consequence of choices that were made by governments and employers on the basis of somewhat short-sighted economic motives.



Having stated this, the question is then whether society has reacted appropriately and whether the right methods have been applied to create good educational opportunities for the children of migrants. It is now possible to make an evaluation of what the government could have done: western European countries have taken very varied approaches to how the children of migrants enter and progress through the education system. This makes international comparisons possible regarding both policy and outcomes. It also allows us to accurately pinpoint the countries in Europe where educational integration has been most successful. Where are children of migrants doing well and where do they form a marginalised group in the education system? To find the answer, we have reversed the usual question: our question is not why migrants are not integrating, but why societies either succeed or fail in including migrants and their children.

On the basis of educational outcomes for the Turkish second generation in Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland and France, we can rank these countries in order. To enable a fair comparison between the different countries, we have only compared young people from poorly-educated Turkish migrant workers' families. We have deliberately kept the children of political asylum seekers (who came to Europe after the coup in Turkey) out of the comparison. Because their parents have a different migration history and are generally better educated, including them would distort the comparison.

## **Optimists versus pessimists**

The results of the research into the Turkish second generation in Europe reveal that many of its members are falling behind others of their age group in educational terms (Crul et al. 2012). Many of them have been kept back a year in primary school, they are over-represented in lower and middle vocational education and many leave education early. All these negative indicators show a clear over-representation compared to children whose parents do not have a migrant background.

At the same time, however, considerable progress has been recorded. In the 1970s and 1980s the first encounters with migrant children were a true educational disaster. In the Netherlands, for example, three-quarters of pupils of Turkish descent left school early. The situation in other countries was similar. Thirty years on, less than a third of this group in the Netherlands leaves school early. In the Netherlands today, the group that is following or has followed higher education is the same size as the group of early school leavers. An important aspect of this progress is as a result of the extra facilities that schools have developed for the children of migrants. However, much time was lost before an effective approach was devised. A lot went wrong,

particularly in the beginning. For example, funds were used to purchase new materials for teaching a second language (one's mother tongue is referred to as one's first language) but there was often no extra training to help teachers work efficiently with these tools.

Through time, most schools have become more successful in finding the right tools to tackle language and maths problems. They have also slowly adapted their structure to accommodate the arrival of new groups of pupils. Smaller classrooms, which have been introduced at many schools with a high proportion of children with immigrant backgrounds, allow teachers to give pupils more individual attention. An increasing number of children receive extra lessons in their second language during extended school hours. Nowadays, auxiliary educational staff from diverse ethnic groups are used in many countries to build an extra bridge between the school and parents with a migrant background. In short, primary and secondary schools, most of which have been working with migrant children for more than thirty years now, have made radical adjustments.

In media discussions about the educational performance of migrant children, the glass is often either half empty or half full. Sometimes, the increasing success of the second generation is emphasised, while at other times, focus never strays from the large group of early school leavers. A chasm has opened up in the debate between the optimists and the pessimists. The optimists emphasise the progress that has been made, while the pessimists point out the problems. In reality, however, these two situations exist side-by-side. This dichotomy is distorting our view of reality. By focusing purely on success stories, the optimists are sweeping the problems of a significant group of young people under the carpet, but by focusing purely on young people at risk, the pessimists are doing a disservice to the growing numbers of young people who are succeeding in spite of considerable disadvantages. Both developments are important to our evaluation of differences in outcomes between countries.

## **Progress in the second generation is crucial**

American research shows that the progress made by the second generation is crucial to the generations that follow them. If there is stagnation in the second generation, there is a greater risk that the third generation will also fail. The feeling that American researchers describe as 'immigrant optimism' can disappear if there is a sense of failure among the second generation (Kasinitz et al. 2008). The first generation has taken the risky step of moving to a strange country with the aim of making a better life for themselves and their family. If the first generation does not manage to achieve this goal, hope is vested in the next generation. The message that many

migrants pass on to their children is: 'Don't be like us! Get an education, and learn a profession so that you don't have to do unskilled, strenuous or dirty work your entire life' (Coenen 2001). In the interviews, successful young people from the second generation described how they were expected to fulfil their family's dreams. Their ambitions are high – in some cases unrealistically so. Those from the second generation who leave school early cannot generally meet these expectations. The question is whether they will pass on an optimistic message about the opportunities offered by education to their children. It seems more likely that their own failed school career will have made them sceptical about education as a vehicle for social mobility. Their low social standing gives the third generation a particularly disadvantaged starting position. These children will grow up in the poorest neighbourhoods and go to the worst schools. This potentially negative scenario illustrates why the success of the second generation is so crucially important for the future.

## **Leaving school early**

We compare the school outcomes of the Turkish second generation using the largest European comparative study into second generation migrant youth in European cities. In the TIES project ten thousand young adults aged between 18 and 35 were interviewed. These young people were ethnic Turks, Moroccans and former Yugoslavians from the second generation and a comparison group of young people whose parents were born in the eight participating European countries ([www.tiesproject.eu](http://www.tiesproject.eu)). The second generation respondents all have the same starting position (all born in Europe) and all come from labour migrant families with parents who have only attained a low level of education. In each country, the results were collected in the two cities with the largest Turkish population. These cities are Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the Netherlands, Brussels and Antwerp in Belgium, and Paris and Strasbourg in France. Two hundred and fifty young people from the Turkish second generation were interviewed in each city.

We start our systematic international comparison with early school leavers and then compare the group of students in higher education. In Europe, there is a great deal of focus on early school leavers, and rightly so, as there is a clear correlation between leaving school early and unemployment, criminality and poverty. In European statistics, early school leavers are clearly defined as young people whose highest educational achievement is a certificate of lower vocational education. Using this definition reveals huge differences between countries.

Figure 4

**Turkish second generation with low-educated parents:  
Early school leavers**



Many second generation Turks in Germany and Austria encounter problems obtaining a work experience place. This is how they then become the earliest school leavers in Europe.

Girls sometimes leave school as early as the age of 16 in Germany and Austria. They are then expected to help out in the home. This prepares them for their role as a housewife. At this young age, the girls have little room to break free from traditional gender patterns. The majority of these girls will never enter the labour market.

The results are depicted in the infographic on the previous page for each country, but please note that these outcomes were produced on the basis of two cities taken together.

At almost a third, the number of early school leavers among the Turkish second generation in Belgium, Germany and Austria is very high. The Turkish second generation in France, Switzerland and Sweden achieve a much higher score, according to the EU definition. Our comparative analyses showed that the migrant-related policy adopted by the different countries did not, in fact, play a decisive role. In France, for example, girls are forbidden to wear headscarves at school, while they are allowed to do so in Germany. Such matters may affect how welcome the children of migrants feel at school, but it is clear that they do not influence whether or not they drop out early or go on to higher education. We have a prosaic explanation: the gaping differences are mainly the result of how education is organised for the entire population in the different countries. Despite European unity, educational opportunities still vary greatly from country to country.

The Netherlands is one of the countries with a rather high percentage of early school leavers. This is caused by a strange anomaly in the transition to middle vocational training in the Netherlands. While the most successful and studious pupils remain within the structured learning environment of secondary school until they are eighteen, the pupils with the lowest results and the greatest learning difficulties are discharged from their familiar secondary school environment and moved to large, complex educational institutions for middle vocational training at the age of sixteen. The timing of this crucial transition coincides with the end of their compulsory full-time education. The important guiding role played by teachers who have known the youngsters since they were twelve is over: instead these students and their parents must take responsibility for themselves. Consequently, it is mainly the lowest middle vocational tracks (MBO 1 and 2) that suffer the highest levels of absenteeism and an enormous drop-out rate (Crul et al. 2008).

Many Turkish second generation pupils in German and Austrian cities leave school after obtaining their *Hauptschule* diploma (comparable to the two lowest tracks of secondary education). Leaving school at the age of 15 or 16 makes them the youngest school leavers in Europe. *Hauptschule* pupils are supposed to go on to a work experience place, in which students spend most of their time obtaining work experience within a company. It is difficult for many young people of the Turkish second generation to obtain such a work experience place, and so they leave education altogether at a very early age. Their main problem is that they, with the support of their parents, are responsible for obtaining their own work experience place, and it is often difficult to find an employer who is prepared to accept them. Their parents usually do not have the right contacts to be able to help much, and discrimination by employ-

ers also plays an important role. Because the transition to the employment market depends so heavily on access to a work experience placement, leaving school early has far-reaching consequences. It often results in boys experiencing long periods of unemployment and girls not entering the employment market at all.

In France and Sweden, the group with the lowest educational qualifications stays in the education system for at least two or three years longer than their peers in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. In France, they obtain a BEP or CAP diploma for vocational education, while in Sweden, they obtain a *gymnasium* school diploma (Swedish *gymnasium* has many more vocational subjects, and is therefore not the same as Dutch *gymnasium*) at the age of eighteen. They are not therefore early school leavers according to the EU definition. These are, however, very general diplomas, and only provide access to unskilled work. In Sweden and France, pupils are generally expected to go on to post-secondary or university education after obtaining their *lyceum* or *gymnasium* diploma. Young people who do not continue their education have no practical work experience and employers regard them as being virtually uneducated.

## **It doesn't have to be this way!**

The European comparison shows that early school leaving is accompanied by a problematic transition (usually at the end of compulsory schooling) to the next educational level. In nearly all cases, something goes wrong in the transition from lower secondary education to further education (with or without a work experience placement). One country that has made efforts to improve this is Switzerland, where many young second generation Turks follow lower vocational education. As in Germany, they often do not manage to find a work experience placement on their own. In Switzerland, however, these young people are not just left to their own devices, but are enrolled in a *Brückenangbot* course, a 'bridging' period that lasts one or two years, depending on their needs. These youngsters receive intensive training and coaching to help them find a work experience placement. The *Brückenangbot* solution is surprisingly simple. This bridging period works very effectively and the pupils go on to find a work experience placement relatively easily.

The VM2 experiment in the Netherlands was also launched with this objective in mind. VM2 is an educational route that lasts six years. It combines four years of lower secondary education (vmbo) with a two-year middle vocational course that is intended to result in a qualification that will provide access to the job market (MBO-2 diploma). VM2 schools provide a seamless educational route, without transitions, within the structured environment of secondary school. In short, it is comparable to the learning environment that is already available to the most academically successful pupils in the Netherlands. The first evaluation study (2011-2012) shows that it works. Four times as many young people who followed a VM2 education obtained a start qualification within the set period as young people from the control group who followed the usual educational route (Schoonhoven et al. 2012).

A high percentage of early school leavers is not some kind of unavoidable phenomenon which just happens to affect us. Everywhere in Europe, attempts have been made to help the children of migrants with learning disadvantages fit into the school system. In countries where either the facilities on offer (*Brückenangebot*) or the school system (VM2 schools) have been adjusted to the needs of the pupils, considerable progress has been achieved.

The children of migrants represent the most vulnerable group in the education system. Their drop-out rates are the first indication that the system is failing. Tackling faults in the system will also help other vulnerable groups whose problems are less visible. A quarter of Hauptschule (lower vocational education) pupils of German origin also fail to find an internship placement: a *Brückenangebot* would also provide a solution to their problems.


## **Successful against all expectations**

Considering that these young people all started off in the same position (all born in Europe), and grew up in similar Turkish working class families, the results are very different. The most striking problem in Germany is the extremely low degree of social mobility, with children advancing their social status very little from that of their parents. In comparison, the situation in France and Sweden looks spectacular.

But why are these differences so immense? The divergence begins with nursery school and the age at which children go to primary school. In France, the Turkish second generation youngsters in our study had already been attending nursery school (*Maternelle*) at two or three years of age. In Austria, children do not, on average, enter a learning environment until three years later. The Turkish second generation youngsters in Austria spoke fluent Turkish when they entered primary school at the age of six, but scarcely any German. The Turkish children in France spoke

Figure 5

**Turkish second generation with low-educated parents: percentage in higher education and percentage that followed pre-university education at secondary school**



Turkish-Austrian kids start school latest, at the age of 6, and are selected earliest, at the age of 10.

In France, all children attend Maternelle (Kindergarten) from age 2 or 3 where they learn French as a second language.



French fluently when they started primary school, because they had already learnt it at nursery school. Children in Germany and Austria only spend half days at school, while in France, children stay at school all day. The German and Austrian education systems select children for further education at a very early age. Children who start school at the age of six are selected for either vocational education or pre-university education at the age of ten. So, in contrast to other countries, not only do Turkish second generation children in Germany and Austria enter school with the greatest language developmental delay, but they also have the least time to catch up. This explains why only 11 and 18% respectively of children in these countries go on to follow secondary education that provides access to university later on. Opposed to this in Sweden, Belgium and France, about half of the Turkish second generation follow an academic track.

In Austria, some young people enter higher vocational education after middle vocational education by an indirect route. In Germany this is almost unheard of. In our study, we found practically no one who had managed to enter higher education by way of lower vocational education. The system is virtually impenetrable. Therefore the fate of most second generation Turkish youngsters in Germany is sealed at the age of ten.

Germany fortunately is also the country which is currently implementing the most far-reaching reforms in education. In many of its constituent states, great efforts are being made with regard to nursery education. An increasing number of primary and secondary schools are switching to providing lessons all day. In Berlin and other cities, there are now *Gesamtschulen*, in which *Hauptschule* and *Realschule* (and, sometimes, *Gymnasium*) are now being housed in one building; something which will make it easier to switch from one form of education to another.

What is striking in Belgium is the high percentage in pre-university education and the low numbers who actually go on to higher education. This typically Belgian phenomenon is known as 'the waterfall system'. The early start at nursery school (two or three years of age) is favourable for those entering pre-university education and in the first part of secondary education. The problems for the young people of the Turkish second generation do not usually start until the latter half of secondary school. Young people who cannot achieve the scores (based on the average score) required for pre-university education (TSO and ASO) are often advised to choose a lower stream. The waterfall system forces twice as many Turkish second generation youngsters as young people of Belgian descent to drop down into lower vocational education. It appears that a crucial factor is the amount of practical support that parents can give with school work. Many Turkish parents are unable to give adequate support.

In The Netherlands, we see an opposite trend: upstreaming. The Dutch practice of selecting children at an early age is partially compensated for by giving them the opportunity to go on to higher education. The majority (three quarters) of young people from the Turkish second generation enter lower vocational education (VMBO) at the age of twelve. Many of these young people continue on through middle vocational education (MBO) to higher vocational education (hbo, part of the tertiary education system). This means that the Netherlands and Austria are Europe's champion "upstreamers". Half of all Turkish second generation youngsters who enter higher education, do so through this indirect route (Crul et al. 2008).

Whenever possible, children of migrants seize the second chance that upstreaming affords them with both hands. They take this route twice as often as the children of Dutch parents. This is a path which demands a great deal of perseverance and ambition, because it takes three years longer to cross the finishing line.

## **Punished for your low-educated parents**


As well as the fact that the various school systems offer different opportunities and throw up different obstacles, each school system also requires a different level of involvement from parents. The system of half-day schooling in Germany and Austria, for example, is severely disadvantageous to children whose parents cannot provide any help with language and maths. Teachers in Germany and Austria expect parents to actively help their children with their homework and to encourage them to read and write in German. These are all tasks that Turkish parents of the first generation are only able to fulfil to a limited extent. Nowhere in Europe is the negative impact of this lack of parental help on children's school results as marked as in Germany and Austria. In other words, in no other country are children of Turkish parents punished so harshly for having low-educated parents. If, as a second generation Turkish child in Germany or Austria, your parents cannot check your homework, your chances of gaining access to pre-university education (*Gymnasium*) are practically non-existent (6% and 10% respectively).

In sharp contrast to this, four out of ten Turkish second generation children in France, whose parents are no better able to check their homework, do go on to pre-academic education.

When the Swedish model is analysed in more detail, we see that there is, in fact, a negative relationship between the help and efforts of the parents and the educational results of their children. In Sweden, parents are not expected to provide practical support to their children: this is provided at school. We discovered that in Sweden, children with learning difficulties received help from their parents more often, and

Figure 6

**Turkish second generation with low-educated parents who take an indirect route, through upstreaming, to higher education**



Children from migrant families use this lengthy step-by-step route twice as often as children of Dutch descent.

that these parents had more contact with teachers. Further analysis revealed that parents do not come into the picture in Sweden unless the child has serious learning difficulties or behavioural problems. Only then are they required to make extra efforts or provide more support. For an average pupil in Sweden, parental support is not a pre-condition for entering pre-university secondary education.

In addition to practical help with homework, school success is also determined by knowledge of the school system. The Dutch secondary school system is one of the most complicated in Europe, with no fewer than six different routes. Only the two highest of these give direct access to higher education. In principal, lower vocational education at the highest level (vmbo theoretical) can also allow indirect access to higher education, through middle vocational training (mbo), but the chances of actually succeeding by this route is three times lower than through the direct route. Not all six of the school routes are represented in every secondary school. If a pupil goes to a school that only provides lower vocational tracks, their chances of going on to the types of secondary education that offer access to university decline significantly. If a child chooses the wrong school, they are likely to take much longer to reach higher education; or what is more usually the case, they will not enter higher education at all. Knowledge and insight when choosing a school are therefore of crucial importance. It is hardly surprising that things often go wrong for the children of less educated migrant parents.

The degree of help and support expected from parents also plays an important role in whether or not a child leaves school early. The strongest effects of this can be seen in Germany and Austria. If parents in these countries are barely able to discuss school with their children or have no contact with teachers, there is a 50% chance that their children will leave school early!

## Snakes and ladders

Every school system has factors which either help or hinder children – like snakes and ladders (Crul et al. 2009). These are often the characteristics which will determine whether or not young people from the Turkish second generation will be successful. They are often the very same characteristics that obstruct the progress of children from other working class families. With migrant children, however, these problems become hugely magnified: not allowing children to go to school until the age of six is not good for children from working class families, but it is even worse for the children of migrants. For them, it is crucially important that they acquire their second language at an early age. Without pre-school education, the children of labour migrants start off with an enormous language development delay. Half school days and early selection only ensure that they are at a clear disadvantage by the age of ten. If, however, school systems offer extra opportunities, the children of migrants make much more use of them. Young people of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in the Netherlands enter higher education through the longer indirect route of vocational education much more often than children from native Dutch families. These children of labour migrants must persevere for longer and be prepared to invest more in their education.

What all the educational factors which work out positively for the second generation have in common is that they prepare these youngsters for the next stage of their school career. Attending pre-school, or getting off to an early start at nursery school, prepares them for primary school by improving their second language skills. Postponing selection gives them more time to catch up before they have to sit the crucial examinations which will give them access to further education. The alternative, longer route by means of vocational education, gives talented pupils who were selected too early extra time to catch up. The general rule seems to be that investing extra time at the beginning (early start at nursery school or postponing selection) removes the need for significantly more time-consuming investments later on in the school career (for example, by upstreaming).

Our international comparison has turned prevailing ideas about the conditions for successful integration upside down: the strong emphasis in the integration debate on the characteristics of parents appears to only partly explain why children succeed or fail at school. The school system is at least as important, if not more so. The differences in outcomes from country to country are often greater than the differences in outcomes between pupils of native parentage and pupils of migrant parentage within one country.

This insight is important for our new perspective on integration. It is only possible to ‘work on’ parents to a limited extent. Efforts to educate uneducated parents from

the first generation, or to teach them the national language, have had only limited results. We can, however, on the basis of international comparison, adjust our school system to give children of low-educated migrants an equal chance of success. Each country has specific problems to tackle. The dramatically low rate of young people entering pre-university education in Austria can only be effectively reversed if children enter pre-school education at a much younger age. Practices in France, where children start nursery school at the age of two, clearly have a positive effect. Vocational education in Germany would benefit from creating more varied opportunities to progress to higher vocational education, as is the case in the Netherlands. Dutch vocational education, in its turn, could take a leaf from Switzerland's book, and tackle drop-out rates in MBO-1 and 2 by coaching young people to find work experience placements. Even countries that come out of the comparison relatively well could still learn a great deal from the practices in other countries. An example of this is Sweden, which achieves high scores in every international study of school results. It is striking, however, that many pupils who have followed pre-university education do not go on to higher education and, in fact, end up in low-skilled jobs. For these young people, the German system of work experience placements could be an important supplement to the Swedish school system, which at present pays little attention to the employment market.

## Chapter 4

# Success in the labour market

Today, between half and two thirds of the young people under 18 in the largest European cities have a migrant background. The cities that succeed in harnessing the potential of these young people will have a tremendous competitive edge over the cities which fail to do so. The future of cities is therefore closely linked to the socio-economic emancipation of the second and third generation.

In the next few years, the baby boom generation – born immediately after the Second World War – will be retiring from the employment market in massive numbers. The second generation will take over a significant proportion of their jobs, especially in the large cities. The sociologist Richard Alba speaks of *non zero sum mobility* (Alba 2009): the children of migrants will fill the vacancies appearing in the employment market without the need to compete with established employees. Are there already examples of countries in Europe where such an optimistic scenario is unfolding?

In a city like Stockholm or Paris, this move into the middle and higher sectors of the employment market is already visible. Berlin may be a world city, like Paris, but as we have already seen, it is extremely difficult to enter the professional job market through higher education. Clearly, the likelihood of an optimistic scenario in the employment market is strongly related to the educational opportunities offered to the second generation.

### **From checkout girl to branch manager!**

Early school leavers from the second generation were the first to enter the employment market because they had spent the least time in school. These early school leavers have dominated perceptions of the second generation for a long time. Often these young people went to work in large supermarkets, either operating the till or filling shelves. Delivering pizzas on a souped-up scooter was a cooler alternative for

boys, but all of these jobs were the kind of work that reinforced the stereotypical image of low-educated migrant youth.

Today, the better educated of the second generation, who studied for longer, are entering the employment market. Not only is the checkout girl of Moroccan descent, but the manager probably is too. In municipal agencies, women of migrant parentage are no longer just the cleaners, young second generation women – with or without a headscarf – are increasingly to be found behind the counters. There are some examples of young people from the second generation in top jobs, but they are still few and far between. Highly-educated young people from the second generation are mainly to be found in certain sectors: ICT, the business sector, welfare and the legal sector. Young lawyers, account managers and policy assistants of Turkish or Moroccan descent increasingly form the backbone of the staff in the offices at the centre of power in Europe's major cities.

## **Differences between the countries with regard to positions in the labour market**

In the chapter on education, we gave an overview of the results based on countries. In this chapter, we will present the results for each city. In contrast to education, the situation in the employment market varies greatly between small and large cities. We will only focus here on the capital cities of six countries.


The table on the next page shows the group of young adults with a job at the highest level (professional position). The educational differences that we saw between countries were also evident here. The percentage of young people with a professional job is three times as high in Paris (25%) and Stockholm (20%) as it is in Berlin (8%).

The differences visible in the job market are less pronounced than might have been expected on the basis of educational achievement. To recap: six to seven times as many children enter higher education in France and Sweden as in Germany. This smaller difference can partially be explained by the fact that many of the second generation youngsters in our study in France and Sweden are still studying – students study for longer in these countries – and have yet to enter the employment market. The differences between the countries will therefore increase in the future. This, however, is not the only explanation. In France and Sweden, where many people have a certificate of higher education, such a certificate does not have the same value as it does in Germany, where fewer people follow a university education. Therefore, young educated people from the second generation face much stiffer competition in France and Sweden. In such a situation, it is often the second generation youngsters who lose out when they apply for a job that fits their qualifications.



Figure 7

Turkish second generation with low-educated parents:  
percentage with professional jobs



In Amsterdam, almost half of second-generation Turkish professionals work in a managerial position.

A significant middle class is developing among the second generation in Paris, Stockholm and Amsterdam.



Because of this, many of them must accept work for which they are over-qualified.

The Turkish second generation ends up in a wide variety of jobs, depending on the character and opportunities of the national or urban employment market. In Sweden, for example, many highly educated women from the Turkish second generation work for the government, because this country has a comprehensive welfare state, where the care and welfare sectors offer many employment opportunities. In France, a country with a much smaller welfare state, women from the Turkish second generation work in the commercial sector much more often than in Sweden. In the Netherlands, the image of Turkish second generation professionals is largely determined by their high levels of participation in higher vocational education. Members of the second generation in the Netherlands therefore occupy professions requiring a university education, such as medicine, economics or psychology, much less often than their peers in France or Sweden.

The members of the Turkish second generation working at the bottom of the employment market vary greatly, both with regard to their numbers and the type of job they do. It is striking how often male early school leavers in Strasbourg end up in the construction industry. Every country seems to have its own, specific, Turkish niches. It is noticeable, for example, that their counterparts in Stockholm often work in the security sector or as taxi drivers. In Belgium, low-educated men often work in the Turkish trade sector. Not only do they serve in Turkish shops, but they may often own a small supermarket or restaurant. In Amsterdam, there is clearly a niche for low-educated boys handling baggage and freight traffic at Schiphol airport. It is heavy work with irregular hours, but it pays relatively well. These different niche sectors typically appear to be a Turkish safety net for boys who have not done well at school, and access to these jobs is usually through a close Turkish network.

We will now zoom in to take a closer look at Turkish second generation youngsters in three European cities. The wide range of their positions in the job market illustrates how the opportunities offered to the second generation have had an impact on the development of the entire Turkish community within each city. Every country seems to have created its own much commented on 'integration problems in the employment market' by producing its own particular brand of this problem through its education system and employment market.

## Stockholm

The positive effects of high university entrance rates are clearly visible in Stockholm. One in four young people from the Turkish second generation work in well-paid professional jobs. Some even work at management level, and are in charge of staff. Others work as engineers or university-educated teachers. In other words, a distinct Turkish-Swedish middle class is developing in Stockholm.

The situation in Stockholm is also typified by a significant group of young people from the Turkish second generation who only have a *Gymnasium* diploma. Some of them do relatively well in administrative jobs or semi-skilled sales positions. The greatest variety can be seen among young people who have mainly followed vocational subjects at *Gymnasium*. Some of them do technical jobs for which they receive further training, or complete a short extra course to train as a nurse or dental assistant. Another group does not engage in further training or education. This group often finds work in the security branch or in basic sales positions in supermarkets or shops, not using their vocation-oriented *Gymnasium* diploma in the job market.

## Amsterdam

Most of the Turkish parents of the second generation in Amsterdam performed heavy, unskilled work. Many of the fathers worked in the Ford factory in Amsterdam and a significant group of mothers were cleaners. Among the children of these parents, we found only one woman who worked as a cleaner and only one in twenty of the men worked in a factory. There is, therefore, a world of difference between the working lives of the Turkish second generation in Amsterdam and those of their parents.

The Turkish second generation in the Netherlands is strongly represented in higher vocational education (HBO). This explains their high concentration in professions to which this qualification gives access. They often work in the youth, welfare and education sectors. They are primary and secondary school teachers, counsellors in supporting positions in schools or are employed in parent and child centres. The health care sector is also a very popular choice. One in ten of these working second generation Turkish women is a chemist, medical or dental assistant or a nurse.

The Turkish second generation women employed in these sectors often work with children or patients with a migrant background. The growing numbers of pupils, patients and clients with a migrant background using the education, health care and welfare systems is an added reason for employing these second generation professionals. They possess extra language and cultural skills which are enormously useful

to such organisations. The participation of these women in the job market is therefore of great social importance.

Men perform a much broader range of jobs, very different to the jobs performed by women. It is noticeable how often well-educated men from the Turkish second generation work in occupations such as consultancy, publication management or software engineering. They frequently earn sizeable incomes, usually much higher than those of the highly-educated women.


## **Berlin**

The high incidence of Turkish second generation women working in the youth, welfare and education sectors in Amsterdam and Stockholm is not to be found in Berlin. Only one in ten of the women working in Berlin are to be found in these sectors. Indirectly, this means that these sectors lack the specific expertise they bring to their work. The most commonly found profession amongst Turkish women in Berlin is that of hairdresser. One in eight working women from the second generation can be found in this profession. This is possibly the best indication of the difference between their position and the position of Turkish second generation women in Stockholm and Amsterdam. The number of women in the middle category is much smaller than in the other two cities, and those working in the more prestigious jobs in Berlin can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

Turkish second generation men are much more likely to follow in their father's footsteps than second generation men in Amsterdam or Stockholm. Three out of ten Turkish second generation men in Berlin work in a factory, in the building trades or in municipal horticulture. Together with salesmen in shops and staff in the hospital-ity industry, they make up half to two thirds of the male working population. Only a small group of men have achieved economic advancement, often through trade, especially by selling mobile phones or other electronic goods.

Figure 8

Turkish second generation women with low-educated parents who are not active in the employment market



## Emancipation through the job market

The overwhelming majority of Turkish second generation women (79% and 80%) in Paris and Stockholm works. And they usually work full-time, particularly in Sweden. In contrast to this 43% of the women in Berlin and 42% in Vienna do not participate in the job market at all. The differences are even greater when we look at women with children. In Stockholm, having children has scarcely any effect on their participation in the employment market, but in Germany and Austria the impact is huge: two thirds of second-generation women with young children do not have a paid job. They care for their husband and children and live the same life as their mothers in many ways.

How can these immense differences between countries be explained? In Germany and Austria, public debate points to conservative attitudes within the Turkish community regarding the role of women. But one only has to look at the differences between the countries to realise that this argument does not hold. If it is correct, why do so many women work in France and Sweden?

The most likely explanation appears to lie in how child care is organised within a country. Here also, the negative characteristics of the general facilities in a country have a stronger impact on the second generation. The much more conservative welfare arrangements regarding work and income in Germany and Austria exclude second generation Turkish women from the employment market even more so than they do less educated women of native parentage. Or, to turn the argument around, progressive arrangements in Sweden and France are enabling second generation women to break out of conservative role patterns within the Turkish community – and these women are grasping this opportunity with both hands.

In Germany and Austria, the combination of inadequate child-care facilities for young children and school days finishing at 1 pm at primary school seriously obstructs participation in the job market. Another important factor is the relatively low level of education found in Turkish second generation women in Germany and Austria in comparison with other countries, typified by them leaving school at a very early age. Girls, who sometimes leave school at the age of sixteen, are immediately put to work by their mothers doing family chores. This is seen as a practical preparation for their future role as a wife. This means that from an early age, these girls have little opportunity to break out of this traditional pattern. In most cases, they never enter the job market. This is an important difference compared to the other countries.

The Swedish child care system is the most favourable for Turkish second generation women and, as a result, the overwhelming majority of them are active in the job market. In Sweden, as much as possible is done to ensure that women, even those

with very young children, can work. After all, the extensive Swedish welfare system can only be funded if both men and women work full-time. This childcare policy has multiple benefits: young children benefit from early immersion in the Swedish language and early interaction with children of Swedish descent, while at the same time, women are emancipating themselves through work. State-financed childcare effectively pays for itself, and offers a channel for mobility for the second generation and their children.

In the Netherlands, parents have to pay most of the costs of childcare themselves. The income from a part-time job on the minimum wage is scarcely enough to cover the cost of childcare. Only one Dutch-Turkish woman with young children and without higher educational qualifications from our study chose to work. The job market participation percentages for Turkish second generation women with children in the Netherlands are therefore closer to those of Germany and Austria than to Sweden.

## **Working married women make the difference!**

Up to now, we have mainly looked at the individual social mobility of men and women of the second generation. We will now extend our view to include families. The degree to which both partners have paid work varies greatly from country to country.

The young Turkish-Swedish families in Stockholm are the ones who most often have a double income, with both partners working in more than two thirds of the cases. Social mobility in large cities is increasingly determined by the family income earned jointly by both partners. The degree to which Turkish women enter the job market is therefore decisive for the income situation: it determines the disposable income and the amount which can be spent on luxury goods, whether the children in the family have their own computer, and the area in which they can buy or rent a house.

While the Turkish second generation in Stockholm opts for the Scandinavian model of double earners, the majority of the Turkish second generation in Berlin and Vienna 'chooses' the traditional model of the male breadwinner. The trend in the other countries is that the man works full-time, while the woman works part-time. The most advantageous financial position is, not surprisingly, a Turkish second generation woman who works full-time and has a working partner. In the Netherlands, this yields, on average, a net monthly income of €2,700. Such an income gives access to the middle class of urban society. Net family income drops by about €1,200 per month if the woman does not work. This is a gigantic difference! We

Figure 9

**Figure 9 Turkish second generation women born to low-educated parents: number of incomes in their households**

- both partners have a paid job
- 1 income from work

● no income from work



Amsterdam

Berlin

Paris

Stockholm

Vienna

Zurich



Family income drops by a net average of €1200 if the woman does not work.



found the same trend in France, Austria and Sweden, countries strongly variant in many other respects. In short, working women make a real difference.

A higher joint income enables families to improve their position in the housing market. Second generation families in which both partners work are more likely to own their house and live in a middle-class neighbourhood. The nature of their mobility in the housing market is partly determined by local or national housing policy. Double earners in Amsterdam often buy a new apartment accessible to starters in the housing market in a typical migrant neighbourhood. The opportunity to do so is facilitated by the policy of large-scale urban renovation in these Amsterdam neighbourhoods. In contrast, double earners in Stockholm are leaving similar traditionally migrant neighbourhoods, which lack high-quality, affordable housing, and are renting or buying apartments in more mixed middle class neighbourhoods. In Berlin, a higher family income provides the opportunity to move to larger and better maintained rented homes. In Belgium, the first generation often bought their own homes, as they had to prove that they had 'suitable living space' in order to qualify for family reunification. The main disadvantage of these homes now is that they are often located in poor migrant neighbourhoods. The upwardly mobile second generation is choosing to leave these neighbourhoods and buy a house in the mixed neighbourhoods on the edge of the city.

In all cases, upward mobility in the housing market means the children of the second generation will have a better starting position: they are much more likely to have their own room, live in a safer neighbourhood and go to the mixed schools which achieve better educational results. By contributing to the family income, working mothers are ensuring that the third generation has the opportunity to escape from poor migrant neighbourhoods and schools with poor performance rates.

## **Discrimination in the labour market**

Unlike the first generation, the second generation was born, bred and educated in Europe. So in theory they should not really encounter any extra obstacles to finding a job. Unfortunately, reality does not bear this out. In all the countries studied, members of the second generation are typically to be found working in jobs for which they are over-qualified, and are more likely to be unemployed than young people of native parentage, even if they are exactly the same age and have the same qualifications.

We show a few of the most striking results here. In Germany, young people of the Turkish second generation (25-29) who have completed vocational education and a trainee internship are found in unskilled occupations twice as often as young

people with a German background of the same age and level of education. In the Netherlands, highly-educated young people from the Turkish second generation are unemployed four times as often as young people in the same age group of Dutch descent with the same level of education. In Belgium, highly educated young people of native parentage work in jobs that match their qualifications twice as often as young Turkish-Belgians of the same age and with the same qualifications. In Sweden young people from the Turkish second generation with a *Gymnasium* diploma are unemployed five times as often as young people of Swedish parentage with exactly the same diploma. And young early school leavers of native parentage in Austria find skilled work twice as often as young second generation Turks with the same basic level of education.

There is increasing, credible evidence of racism and discrimination toward the young people of the second generation. Several studies have shown that when application letters and CVs, identical in every respect apart from the name being changed, were sent, Peter was invited for an interview, but Youssef was not. Using this method, occupational psychologist Eva Darous discovered that candidates whose name did not sound Dutch had 22% less chance of selection than candidates with a Dutch-sounding name.

In large cities, employers in the bottom segment of the job market are finding it more difficult to refuse young people of migrant parentage because they are, quite simply, all that is available on the labour market. Unfortunately, this option to exclude is still open to employers at the top end of the employment market. It is dispiriting and shocking to conclude that this means it is precisely the most successful and dedicated young people from the second generation who are being confronted with discrimination most often.

Half of the young people of the Turkish second generation in the TIES study reported that they had experienced discrimination when looking for a job. Women wearing a headscarf occupy a special position: they are more often unemployed than women who do not wear a headscarf, and reported experiencing discrimination twice as often when looking for a job. The figures for reported incidents of discrimination are underestimated rather than overestimated. In-depth interviews with highly educated young people from the second generation show that most professionals are reluctant to attribute rejection to discrimination (Rezaï et al. 2012).

Why is so little attention paid to this problem? There is much argument about the lower educational performance of children of migrants in many countries. Indeed it is often cited as the most important factor for claiming that the integration policy has failed. In comparison, the discussion of discrimination in the employment market is peculiarly half-hearted. The very final taboo in the integration debate would appear to be the discussion of discrimination and racism.

## **Increasing unemployment**

The increase in unemployment among young people of migrant parentage represents a major unknown factor for the future. The relatively moderate unemployment figures from the TIES survey provide a picture of a given point in time, exactly at the start of the financial crisis. Since then, the unemployment figures have risen dramatically. In the Netherlands 1 in 3 young people of Turkish or Moroccan descent are currently unemployed. Their numbers have tripled within the space of five years (Forum 2012).

In comparison to the other countries, the situation in France is the most worrying. Even at the time of the TIES survey, considering the relatively high education level of the Turkish second generation in France, unemployment within the group was very high at 16%. In no other country is the transition from school to work as problematic as in France. This is not just a problem for young people of migrant parentage, youth unemployment for those of native parentage is among the highest in Europe. Many young French-Turks are unemployed for a long time after leaving school. As we have seen everywhere else, it is the school leavers who are hardest hit by the economic crisis, and the children of migrants who are hit hardest of all.

## **Ethnic underclass or modern yuppies**

What have we learnt about the position of the Turkish second generation in the various cities? In which cities is an 'ethnic underclass' developing and where do we find the first group of Turkish yuppies buying expensive apartments? Almost half of the married Swedish-Turkish respondents in Stockholm said that they 'could live comfortably'. This statement was also made by a third of the married Turkish second generation in France and one in five respondents in Switzerland. These figures were significantly lower in all the other countries. In Austria, for example, only 5% said that they could live comfortably and 15% said this in Germany. Austria is also the country where the largest group – 15% – said that they often could not make ends meet on the family budget.

The picture that arises from these different European countries is very illuminating. The Turkish second generations in Sweden and France do well in education, and reasonably well to well in the job market, mainly thanks to the high participation rate of women. There is a significant number of highly educated double earners in France and Sweden and these numbers are set to increase in the future. The position of the Turkish second generation in Germany and Austria is the exact opposite.

Performance at school lags far behind, many women do not enter the employment market and many men do minimally-skilled or unskilled work.

In the social debate on integration, the host country is usually viewed as a given, static factor. The magnifying glass is nearly always focused on the groups of migrants: why do they drop out of education, why don't women participate in the employment market? But if we compare young people with the same background (parents born in Turkey) and the same starting position (all born in Europe to low-educated parents) a very different picture emerges. It becomes apparent that the way in which the host society is organised plays an enormous role. The gigantic differences in results arising from differences in the various education systems and care arrangements begin to show us what a successful integration policy should look like.

It is also striking that while the social debate on migrants and their children often focuses on boys, this European comparison in effect demonstrates the crucial role played by young women. One can sum this up by saying that the societies which offer these second generation women good educational opportunities and the possibility of combining work with caring for their family through subsidised childcare, illustrate the positive side of this story. Countries that fail to do this are creating a potential underclass, and unfortunately the consequences of this failure will also manifest themselves in the third generation.

## **Emancipation of the second generation**

There is significant social mobility in some countries. The upwardly mobile group is also undergoing an important emancipation. Girls from the Turkish second generation who obtain their pre-university (vwo) diploma will be strongly motivated to go on to university, having already invested six years in secondary education. Once at university, these girls focus on their studies rather than on finding a marriage partner, and parents also accept a university study as a legitimate reason for postponing marriage. After investing so much in their study, students actually want to do something with it. By this time they are at an age where they can demand more control over their lives. A girl leaving school at sixteen is much less able to assert herself. Our research (Crul et al. 2012) shows that many young women postpone marriage and children after university because they want to concentrate on their career. The essence of this story is that emancipation does not result from voluntary or forced assimilation into the national norm: it is the result of individual development and making the most of the opportunities you are given.

The socially and economically successful second generation differentiates itself sharply in its opinions on all sorts of social topics. In all the cities, they represent

the most progressive part of their community, with both men and women being the strongest defenders of a woman's right to work, and they have the most liberal ideas about sex before marriage. In France, highly educated Turkish second generation men and women are twice as likely as their less well-educated counterparts to think that women should be able to work if they have young children. They are also twice as likely to think that it is not a problem at all if a woman has a higher position than men at work. This trend is the same in all the countries in the study.

In the introduction to this book, we said that the integration debate was stuck in a blind alley. On the one hand, right wing populists refuse to acknowledge the demographic reality, and on the other hand the established parties have put assimilation – an idea that has been superseded by the demographic reality – at the heart of their political programmes. The progressive parties defend their political agenda of assimilation on the basis of progressive values, such as gender equality and the right of women to make decisions concerning their own sexuality. They also suggest that newcomers and their children must be brought into the 'modern age' – by force if necessary. Emancipation cannot be achieved by force or coercion. You cannot compel women to become emancipated because this is the norm upheld by the dominant group any more than you can force men to alter their views about sexuality. By demanding assimilation with progressive values, 'The Left' has in fact thrown the core idea – the belief that these progressive values have as much to offer migrants and their children as they do to everyone – of emancipation overboard. We have seen that wherever the children of migrants have been given the opportunity to develop themselves, and where they are treated equally, they embrace progressive values with conviction. In places where they are marginalised, they will embrace values that are often even more conservative than those of their parents.

## Chapter 5

# Generation MiX

In a number of countries, the educational system offers important opportunities for emancipation. The rising middle classes of Turkish descent in Stockholm and Paris are evidence of this. The pronounced inequality in other countries is creating a large group of marginalised people. This is an important starting point for the two scenarios of the future that we want to present to the reader in this chapter. We have used the ideas of the French political scientist Dominique Moïsi.

In his 'Geopolitics of Emotions' (2009), Moïsi sketches a number of possible future scenarios which we have used in a somewhat adjusted form. The first is one of humiliation and fear, in which groups retreat further into themselves and society becomes more and more polarised. This unappealing scenario represents one end of the spectrum. In contrast to this, Moïsi also sketched a scenario of empowerment and hope, in which different ethnic groups are able to break down the barriers dividing them from each other and whereby equality and emancipation are the most positive results.

This ideal scenario of empowerment and hope is the future destiny of the cities which offer equal opportunities to newcomers and their children, where racism is actively dealt with and where there is an open atmosphere, focused on the wider world outside. Here we see, for instance, how migrants and their children identify with the country and the city they live in. The doom scenario of fear and humiliation will be found in cities where new groups and their children are given few opportunities for upward mobility and where racism and discrimination are rife. People living in these cities will be much more inward-looking and will retreat into their own ethnic groups much more often.

The period of transition to a *majority-minority city* will have a major influence on the direction of the future scenarios. It is an important turning point. The fact that the group of native parentage must inevitably lose its dominant position provides a potential opportunity to evolve into a more equal society; one which becomes fairer due to shifts in power and in which respect grows between ethnic groups. However, in cities where social inequality coincides with ethnic dividing lines, this turning point can lead to even more polarisation. The middle class derived from the old

majority group is often the first to retreat into a voluntarily chosen ghetto. They send their children to 'white' schools and move out of the 'migrant' neighbourhoods.

## **Amsterdam**

In a popular Dutch TV game show, a young woman with a Moroccan first and last name was asked where she came from. Her answer was "Amsterdam." "Yes," said the game show hostess, "but where do you come from?" "The Netherlands", answered the young woman. With just a hint of irritation in her voice, the hostess said: "Okay, but where were you born?" The Moroccan-Dutch woman remained unperturbed and answered dryly: "The Netherlands, that's where I was born and that's where I grew up".


The media often talks about *newcomers* who must integrate into society. When they do this they are often referring to both migrants and their children. Obviously this term is more appropriate when talking about the first generation, because they came from a foreign country and had to find a new place in society, though for some of them this was many years ago. Their children, however, are increasingly likely to have been born and bred in Germany, France or the Netherlands. They have belonged to these societies from the day they were born. As Dutch sociologist Willem Schinkel states, they do not stand outside society, but instead form an integral part of it (Schinkel 2007).

Despite this, many people (as illustrated above) still often label this second generation as migrants or newcomers. In contrast to the United States, in Europe it is much more difficult to claim German, Dutch or French identity. For example, in the US, you might describe yourself as Italian-American or African-American. Because everyone except the original Native-Americans has come to the United States from somewhere else, everyone accepts this way of identifying yourself. You don't have to choose whether you are more Italian or more American, you can still describe yourself as an American, even if you place a strong emphasis on your Italian roots (Schneider et al., 2012). In fact, part of what makes you an American is your family's history. Now obviously America has been recognised as a land of migration for centuries, whereas European countries have only just now awakened from a state of denial to realise that they are also immigration countries. Without wanting to idealise the American situation, we can learn much from how the United States has dealt with ethnic and religious differences for hundreds of years.


In Europe, identity is presented increasingly often as a choice between two loyalties. "Is your Turkish background important to you? If so, you cannot really be Dutch or German". People are also questioned in this way in many studies: "Do you feel

Figure 10

**Turkish second generation with low-educated parents:  
Strong or very strong national and local identification**



The Turkish second generation in Berlin identifies most strongly with its neighbourhood, but least strongly with its city and country. This is perhaps the strongest proof of their marginal position.



The largest Turkish second generation group who identify very weakly or not at all with the national identity is found in Vienna.



more Turkish or more Dutch?” In the TIES survey mentioned earlier, these questions were separated from each other. So we asked: “To what extent do you feel Turkish” and “To what extent do you feel Dutch”. It then emerges that in all countries the group that feels both identities equally strongly is much larger than the group that feels very Turkish, but hardly at all Dutch (or French, etc.). In Europe, as in America, the second generation feels most comfortable if they are able to identify strongly with both identities.

As was made clear by our example from the game show, national identity (I am German, French, etc) is the identity that is most difficult for the second generation to claim. Local or urban identity is usually more open and accessible (I’m an Amsterdammer). It seems that urban identity can provide the second generation with an alternative by means of which they can feel at home. It is easier for a young person from the second generation to identify themselves as a citizen of Amsterdam, than as Dutch. This is also due to the fact that the second generation often stays in the city where they were born and bred: between eighty and ninety per cent of our respondents had spent their entire lives in the city where we interviewed them. For young people from the former majority group this percentage varies per city, but on average it is around twenty to thirty per cent lower. They typically moved to the city at a later age, so it is often the young people of native parentage who are actually newcomers to the city.

When we examined urban identity, we saw the same differences between countries that we had already seen when examining national identity. The Austrian-Turkish young people in Vienna identified least strongly with the city. The young people of the Turkish second generation in Berlin had the second lowest score: only a minority felt strongly that they were Berliners. In Stockholm and Zürich, the Turkish second generation had a strong feeling of belonging to their city. They felt this twice as often as the young people in Vienna.

Young people of the second generation are strongly rooted in that even deeper layer of the city: their own neighbourhood. They often still live in the neighbourhood where they grew up, and where many of their friends and family still live. Sometimes their children even go to their old primary school. The DNA of the neighbourhood is closely interwoven in their lives. They speak the local dialect and have shaped the local youth culture of their cities and neighbourhoods to an important extent. Out of all the cities, Berlin was the place where the Turkish second generation identified most strongly with their neighbourhood (75%). The discrepancy between their weak feelings of belonging to their country and city and strong identification with their neighbourhood is perhaps the best proof that the Turkish second generation occupies a marginal position in Germany. They feel at home in Kreuzberg, but are not accepted as Berliners or Germans.

This limited identification with national and local identity in Berlin and Vienna is a first warning sign of a possible future scenario of fear and humiliation. Conversely, the positive outcomes in Zurich, Paris and Stockholm are early indicators of a future scenario of empowerment and hope.

In all the countries studied, there was a strong correlation between the feeling of belonging and social mobility. The higher their level of education, the more people identified with national and urban identity. Women who did not enter the job market and unemployed people had the weakest feelings of identification. Instead, they scored very highly on identification with their Turkish identity, which they seemed to be retreating into.

## **Interethnic friendships**

The second indication of a scenario of hope is the degree to which interethnic friendships are formed in the cities. In the scenario of fear and humiliation, people retreat into their own communities. This is most commonly seen in Berlin and Vienna but is less common in Stockholm and Paris.

The group which is retreating most into itself is made up of young people with conservative religious convictions who advocate a political role for Islam. For example, they answered the question of whether or not Islam is the only political authority with 'agree' or 'strongly agree'. Nearly everyone in this group prays regularly. A quarter of them pray five times a day. Nearly all attend a mosque regularly (every Friday or more often). This group is largest in Berlin (28%) and, unsurprisingly, smallest in Stockholm (6%) and Zurich (5%).

In general, these young people hold extremely conservative opinions about the role of men and women. In Germany, for example, two thirds of them thought that women in managerial positions should not be allowed to be in charge of men, and three quarters thought that women shouldn't work if they have young children. In general, they held rather negative views regarding others of their age group with a native German background. Although this group is small, it is quite high-profile and often features in the media and political debates. Its members are strongly overrepresented in the group of young people who leave education early. The absence of any chance for social mobility seems to be what drives them to embrace a conservative form of Islam, as this provides an alternative identity from which they can derive both a sense of self worth and the respect of others.


The group of native descent who do not have a mixed circle of friends includes a sub-group which is retreating into itself and avoids interaction. Their answer to the question of how they perceived other cultures was "threatening" or 'very threatening'.

Figure 11

Turkish second generation with low-educated parents who adhere to conservative branches of Islam and young people of native parentage who view other cultures as threatening or very threatening



Xenophobes from the old majority group and strictly religious Muslims both hold similar conservative opinions on the position of women.



Polarisation of ethnic groups which exclude each other is greatest in Berlin and Vienna.

The largest group to express this opinion was found in Vienna (20%), followed by Berlin (18%). The group is smallest in Stockholm (6%). The dynamics in the group of young people of native parentage who view other cultures as a threat resembles that of the religiously conservative young people of the second generation in many ways. They share a number of characteristics: they are most at ease within their own group, and like the young religious conservatives of the second generation, they hold traditional opinions on the role of women and the distribution of tasks within the family. More than half of these young people of native parentage in Germany (the country where this group is largest) is opposed to women with young children working outside the home. So, in many respects, the opinions of this sub-group with native parentage are closer to those of the religiously conservative young people of the Turkish second generation than they are to those held by other young people of native parentage. These intolerant groups are two sides of the same coin. Despite the fact that they share so many of the same views, they prefer to avoid each other as much as possible. Three quarters of the young people of native parentage who view other cultures as a threat would like to leave their neighbourhood because: "there are too many migrant families living there". The vast majority of them do not want to send their children to schools that have a significant number of migrant pupils, and they deliberately avoid entertainment venues frequented by young people of migrant parentage. The attitude of these two groups in the super-diverse city is characterised by an oppositional attitude to diversity: oppositional diversity. It is because of these two groups that multiculturalism is under attack. Tolerance for their ideas leads to intolerance in society.

The young people from both the groups described above marginalise themselves by shutting themselves up in their own ethnic group. It is likely that positions of power and influence will remain in the hands of the old majority group for some time to come. This may be giving this sub-group of young people of native parentage the feeling that, despite demographic changes, the group of native parentage will retain control of the system. This is a delusion. When the baby boomers leave the employment market they will undoubtedly be replaced by a much more ethnically diverse layer of managers and policy makers.

In the near future, the support network on which these young people depend will shrink and be less able to provide influence and opportunities. They will then lack this advantageous connection to work and, consequently, a better future for their children. These two groups are the visible protagonists of the scenario of fear and humiliation. It appears that this scenario is already becoming a reality in Vienna and Berlin, where these groups represent a significant proportion of the urban youth.

## The scenario of hope

Television programme makers like to set up debates in which sharply opposing views are expounded by clearly recognisable stereotypes. An imam who condemns homosexuality in debate with a right-wing populist fits well within such a concept. Such debates, however, reinforce the perception that the barriers dividing ethnic groups are more or less insurmountable, and that everyone operates solely within their own ethnic group. 'Normal' young people (both second generation and those of native parentage) who interact with each other every day are considered less interesting for the purposes of such a television formula. However, this group is much larger than those groups which are retreating into their own ethnic enclave.

We found the greatest diversity of friends among the young people of the second generation. Once more, these young people are found most often in Paris, Stockholm and Zurich and least often in Berlin and Vienna.

When asked to identify their three best friends, they include young people of native parentage, young Muslims from other ethnic groups, and also African or Asian youngsters who are not Muslim. You can see these 'super-diverse groups' anywhere that young people spend their leisure time, such as bars and clubs, shopping centres and playing fields. The majority of these young people have at least one young person of native parentage among their three best friends.


We call them Generation MiX. An Amsterdam radio station was the first to embody this group of metropolitan youngsters. These young people make it a point of pride to speak in an Amsterdam accent embroidered with street slang derived from Morocco, Turkey and Suriname. In the FunX programme CritiX, these young people discuss topical matters which are sometimes, but more usually not, connected to their ethnic background. These programmes are made by young people from different ethnic backgrounds, but they approach each other primarily as citizens of Amsterdam, not as the children of migrants.

In all the cities, it is young people of native parentage who appear to be the most strongly segregated. One would expect to see this in the young people who view other cultures as a threat, but this is also true of the vast majority of other young people of native parentage. Although they live in extremely diverse cities where approximately half those in their age group have a different ethnic background, the vast majority socialise exclusively within their own ethnic group. It would seem that many young people of native parentage have 'an integration problem' in the super-diverse cities.

The American philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2012) describes *civic friendship* as an important tool for breaking down ethnic dividing lines. According to Nussbaum, interethnic friendships teach people to view the world from a new perspective. This concerns what the Indian social geographer Ash Amin calls elective affinities:

Figure 12

**Turkish second generation with low-educated parents and people of native parentage: ethnically mixed groups of friends**



People with mixed groups of friends are more tolerant and are less likely to experience other ethnic groups as threatening.



People of native parentage are most likely to remain within their own ethnic group.

self-chosen friendships (Amin, 2012). The friendship makes it possible for them to see the other, without experiencing his or her 'otherness' as a threat. Can any proof be found of this abstract philosophy? We first focussed on the pioneers among the young people of native parentage, those who have mixed groups of friends. Are these young people of native parentage more open and tolerant towards the multi ethnic society, as Nussbaum claims? Has crossing ethnic group boundaries made them less afraid of other cultures, religions and customs? In short, is a scenario of hope unfolding in cities where many young people of native parentage have interethnic friendships?

Only a limited number of young people of native parentage said a Turkish friend was one of his or her three best friends. In some countries, however, this group was large enough to allow us to attempt to identify their characteristics. A characteristic we found is that the respondents of native parentage had the same level of education as their Turkish friend. Some knew each other from their study and others had met through work. In contrast to their friends of Turkish descent, the vast majority of the young people of native parentage are not religious. As well as crossing ethnic lines, these friendships also break down boundaries in the area of beliefs.

But do these friendships lead young people of native parentage to adopt a different view of the Turkish community as a whole? Or do they see the Turkish-Dutch or Turkish-German friend as the exception – the good Turk – leaving their attitude towards the rest of the Turkish community unaltered? We asked all who participated in the study how 'warm' or 'cold' they felt towards different ethnic groups. Most of the young people with a Turkish friend said they had 'warm or very warm' feelings towards the Turkish community as a whole. In France and the Netherlands, young people of native parentage who did not have any Turkish friends expressed 'cold' feelings towards the Turkish population twice as often, and in Germany, these sentiments were expressed eight times as often.

A friendship with a young person of Turkish descent is often reflected in different behaviour and choices. They go to places frequented by young people of migrant descent twice as often and send their children to mixed schools one and a half times more often than respondents of native descent who did not have any Turkish friends. Interestingly, these two groups also perceive mutual relationships between the two communities differently. The group with Turkish friends were more likely to say that relations with the Turkish community are good, and said less often that they had deteriorated in recent years. People who did not have any contact with individuals from other cultures were the most likely to think that relations between these two groups had deteriorated.

The group of people of native descent who have someone of Turkish descent among their three best friends is still rather small. This raises the question of wheth-

er the idea that interethnic contact always builds a bridge between different groups also applies to young people whose mixed group of friends does not include anyone of Turkish descent? Do they have a different take on the multi-ethnic society? How do they see the Turkish community? We therefore compared young people with and without a mixed group of friends who were all living in a similar housing situation; namely in a neighbourhood where half or more residents has a migrant background. The respondents who only had friends of native parentage saw the multi-ethnic society as a threat much more often than respondents of native parentage who had friends from a different ethnic group. The differences between the two groups were greatest in Germany and Austria. It appears that living in a mixed neighbourhood without having contact with people from a different ethnic group leads to feelings of unease. The results also showed that, even if they do not have any Turkish friends, people who had a mixed group of friends had a more positive attitude to people of Turkish descent. Friendships outside one's own ethnic group also make people more tolerant towards groups with which they do not have any intimate contact.

## **The hinge generation**

From a metropolitan perspective, the second generation is the best equipped to function in cities as they become ever more diverse. They are what one of our respondents appropriately called the *hinge generation*. These young people are accustomed to moving between their own community and a variety of other ethnic groups from an early age. The vast majority of young people from the second generation have a mixed group of friends. We will now concentrate on their friendships with young people of native parentage.

Young people from the Turkish second generation with friends of native parentage are found at all educational levels except the very lowest levels. Those with a high level of education and a job are the ones who most often have friends of native parentage. This is logical, because they move in circles where people of native parentage predominate. Less well-educated second generation men and women who are not active in the employment market are less likely to have friends of native parentage. Young people of the second generation and their friends usually have a similar level of education; so equality also appears to be an important condition for interethnic friendship.

Depending on the city, between one in five and one in three young people from the Turkish second generation said that their best friend was of native parentage. What characterises these young people? What sets them apart from others of the



second generation, and do they, in common with the young people of native parentage who have a mixed circle of friends, also have a different attitude to society? The vast majority of these young people whose best friend is of native parentage said that they were religious. They attach a great deal of importance to their religious identity and are upset if someone says something negative about their religion. It is not the case, therefore, that they are able to bridge cultural differences because they do not attach any value to religion. However, they do seem to have a different approach to their religion. Nearly all those in this group see religion as a private matter. Just a quarter of them pray regularly. Only a few go to the mosque every week. Most of them 'usually' eat Halal, depending on the situation. Hardly any women from this group wear a headscarf.

It seems that whether or not someone is Muslim is not what determines how sharply they define ethnic boundaries, but rather the way in which they interpret their religion. Complying less strictly with religious rules allows more space for friendship with non-religious people of native parentage.

It is striking that there is often a link between having a best friend of native parentage and the answers to questions concerning identity and feelings of belonging. Nearly everyone in this group identified strongly with the national identity. If this group is compared with the group whose three best friends have a Turkish background, the contrast is immediately obvious. It would seem that friendship is also a way of making it easier to identify yourself as Dutch or German.

Of the young people of the Turkish second generation in Amsterdam with a best friend of Dutch origin, 55% said that they felt 'strongly' or 'very strongly' Dutch, and only 9% felt 'hardly' or 'not at all' Dutch. Only one third of those whose three best friends were of Turkish descent felt 'strongly' or 'very strongly' Dutch, and 30% of them felt 'hardly' or 'not at all' Dutch. We saw the same pattern in every city.

Most of the group with a best friend of native parentage also identified 'strongly' or 'very strongly' with being Turkish. It is therefore not the case that they have substituted their identity. The friendship with a person of native parentage has significant consequences for how they view the old majority population as a whole: the vast majority of them had warm feelings towards the old majority population. Once more, there are sharp contrasts between this group and the group that only had friends of Turkish origin. In most countries, people whose best friend was of native parentage had warm feelings towards the population of native decent as a whole twice as often. Just as with young people of native parentage with a Turkish friend, the friendship with someone of native parentage determines how they see the group as a whole.

In contrast to the young people who define their identity by adopting an oppositional attitude to diversity (oppositional diversity) the young people described above have chosen to have a mixed group of friends. We call this elective diversity. Elective

diversity has an important impact on social cohesion and the social climate in a city.

In addition to these groups, there is another significant group. While members of this group are not opposed to diversity, they also do not choose to have a mixed group of friends. They have a pragmatic attitude to diversity (pragmatic diversity). They do not have either positive or negative feelings about the super-diverse city. They merely accept it as a reality in their living environment or at their work.

There is a convincing correlation between the high incidence of interethnic contact in Stockholm and Paris and the high social mobility of the second generation in both these cities. For example, highly-educated members of the Turkish second generation in Paris have friends of native parentage twice as often as members of the Turkish second generation with a lower level of educational attainment. These young people are three times as likely to only have Turkish friends. The biggest differences can be seen in Berlin: second generation migrants who reach higher education – and unfortunately they are few and far between in the German education system – logically find themselves in a predominantly native German environment. In terms of numbers, young people in Berlin who have followed a work placement programme are the largest group likely to have friends of native parentage, as they get to know these young people at school and in their work placements.

In most situations, being of equal standing is important. In Paris and Stockholm they are generally people who have jobs of equal standing appropriate to their higher level of education, while in Berlin, it more often involves people working together at the middle level. Another important factor that emerges is the participation of women in the employment market. Women who do not participate in the employment market less often have any friends of native parentage.

The success factors we identified in education and the employment market also affect social relationships. Increased opportunities result in more mixing. Most large cities in Europe have already become cities where everyone is a minority, especially when it comes to the younger generation. If we consider both the friendships of the second generation and young people of native parentage, approximately half of these inner circle friendships cross ethnic dividing lines. A close network woven by these young people, and incorporating many ethnic groups, pervades each of these cities. This has an important effect on how they experience the multi-ethnic society and how they identify themselves. The mutual relationships between the various ethnic groups are, to a significant extent, a reflection of these individual interethnic friendships.

The second generation lives in the most diverse neighbourhoods in the city. They are the leaders when it comes to inter-ethnic contacts. The situation of young people of native origin will become more like that of a minority group in the future. In that way, European cities are becoming like American cities. From a statistical point of

view, the chance that young people of native origin will develop friendships across ethnic dividing lines is increasing.

## **Future scenarios for the cities**

Interethnic friendships represent a crucial foundation for a scenario of empowerment and hope. Conversely, the absence of these friendships will create a breeding ground for fear and humiliation. We can see this most strongly in the young people who interpret their Islamic faith in a conservative manner, and in those young people of native parentage who perceive the multicultural society as a threat. Neither have any desire whatsoever to mix with other groups. The polarisation which exists between these two groups is dangerous and represents a real threat to the living environment in the city.

Those with the most diverse group of friendships which bridge the cultural chasm are the least likely to view the diversity of the city as a threat. They identify more strongly with their city, feel more at ease, and also participate in the entertainment circuit, their children's school and at work more comfortably. What's more, they do so without repudiating or substituting their ethnic background.

We are convinced that the importance of elective diversity is under-acknowledged as a factor for social cohesion within cities. Although they are generally invisible, these friendships are the lines of connection which link people in the city to each other. They explain why there are so few ethnic conflicts in these increasingly diverse cities. Together, the people who connect with each other are a vital counterbalance to the groups that strive for polarisation.

## **The majority-minority city as opportunity**

On 1 January 2011, Amsterdam crossed the magical line to become a majority-minority city. At that point, only 49.7% of the population of Amsterdam was of Dutch descent (O&S, Amsterdam in Figures 2011). Since then, Amsterdammers of Dutch descent have been an ethnic minority group, just like all the other ethnic minority groups in the city. This milestone was kept out of the news completely. If it had made the news, it would probably have been reported in a negative manner. We argue, however, that it is precisely this new situation that will provide the opportunities necessary for creating a fairer and more equal society. Unlike traditional migration countries, the dominance of the established cultural group presents an increasing obstacle to social cohesion and equality for the various ethnic groups in the cities. In

practice, the increasingly vociferous demands for even the second and third generation to assimilate is leading to increased exclusion. This exclusion is founded on the basis of the comfortable position of the existing majority group. This dominance is now slowly drawing to an end. The process is slow because the old majority group still holds many of the positions of power, but many of those occupying these positions belong to the baby boom generation. The changing of the guard which is approaching as this generation retires may initiate a totally new dynamic within a very short space of time. In organisations where the old majority group reaches a simultaneous numerical tipping point, both with regard to staff and customer numbers, opportunities will arise for a new climate. This is not some distant prospect or the product of utopian thinking, it is the concrete result of the new demographic structure of our cities.

The power of numbers is a strongly underestimated element in the development of a more equal society, and for combating discrimination and exclusion. Given a situation in which everyone in a particular workplace is of native parentage, expressing discriminatory remarks may draw criticism from colleagues of native parentage, but such remarks can never be challenged by the actual victims of discrimination, simply because they have no presence in that workplace. In working environments where only one or two employees are of migrant parentage, they occupy a vulnerable position. If, however, a quarter or a third of the staff is of migrant parentage, there is a definite change in the balance of power from this point on. Once half or more employees in a workplace are of migrant origin, it will be the employees of native parentage who make discriminatory or exclusory remarks who will, themselves, become marginalised. That is the power of numbers.

A majority-minority city provides opportunities for establishing a more equal society. This will not happen by itself. It is up to all of us, in schools, companies, sports clubs and other social settings to create this new future. Interethnic friendships are crucial to this transformation. This is a change which will certainly be accompanied by conflicts and disillusion, but there is no way back. Demographic developments point in only one direction: more diversity.



Four Essays

# **My Identity**



New Dutch

# Murat Isik

**I was born in Turkey, but I grew up in the Bijlmermeer district of Amsterdam. Just before the coup in 1980, when I was two years old, my parents, sister and I moved from Izmir to Germany, where we tried to build a new life in the prosperous port city of Hamburg. My father applied for political asylum.**

It was the early 1980s, and although hundreds of thousands of Turks were living legally in Germany, we were not welcome. We launched several appeal proceedings, but the German state would not be moved, and we had to leave. My main memory of that time is that we had no home. In Turkey, our precarious financial situation had forced us to live with my grandmother and in Hamburg we stayed with friends and family. We were always moving from house to house. Sometimes we would stay somewhere for a few weeks, at other times we would move on after just a few days. When I look back on that time now, it is as if we were fugitives.

Fortunately, when we had to leave Germany my father decided to go not to England or Scandinavia, but to the Netherlands. He had heard positive stories about Amsterdam, which were soon proved to be true, because on the very day he arrived he found a large flat in the Bijlmermeer neighbourhood. My mother, sister and I joined him a few weeks later in the winter of 1983. For the first time in our lives we had our own house – and what a house! All at once, in that foreign country, we had a spacious apartment with three bedrooms, an enormous living room and a bathroom that was bigger than the rooms we had slept in in Hamburg. Our flat also had central heating, a luxury we had never experienced before, and the balconies at both the front and back of the flat were so broad and long that I could play football and ride my bicycle on them. Amsterdam fulfilled its promise immediately.

I went to nursery school for about three months before starting the first class of primary school (now known as class 3), where I was told that I had a language defi-



ciency. My teacher told my mother that she should encourage me to read more and advised us to go to the library. My mother didn't need telling twice: the next day she dragged me and my sister to the library in Ganzenhoef. It was the beginning of her life's project – to make sure that my sister and I were able to study to the highest level so that later on we would obtain a good position in this hospitable country so full of opportunities. Everything else had to take second place.

I was full of excitement that day as I took out four children's books about the animal kingdom at the lending counter, and I have been an avid reader ever since. I entered into a wondrous world that aroused my curiosity with every new page. I looked forward to Fridays because that was the day that our mother took us to the library. A year later, my love of reading received another boost when I discovered the cartoon books packed with Marvel superheroes at the market. Before long, I was buying 50 cent comics about the Hulk, Spiderman and the X-men. Not only had my language deficiency disappeared by now, but I also excelled at reading aloud.

Even back then, the Bijlmer was a multicultural neighbourhood. I had friends from Surinam, India, Pakistan, Ghana, and even two Turkish friends, as well as Dutch friends. We played football and cycled until dark in our car-free, child-friendly neighbourhood amongst all those parks and fields.

Thanks to the mixed population of the neighbourhood, my sister and I grew up outside the main Turkish community. My parents maintain that they raised us like this on purpose because they wanted to shield us from the suffocating tentacles of social control. I think, however, that it was pure coincidence with a dash of good luck that we ended up in such a mixed neighbourhood.

In the late 1980s, satellite dishes arrived in the Netherlands. All of a sudden, Turkish TV stations could reach into Turkish-Dutch living rooms. As a child, I thought that this was an exciting idea; dozens of Turkish channels to supplement the rather sparse programming that was then available. But my parents resolutely refused to buy a satellite dish. They were afraid that we would only watch the Turkish channels and that our Dutch would deteriorate. As a result, both the Dutch evening news programme and Studio Sport were spared the competition of their Turkish counterparts.

On a beautiful spring day in 1989, we were granted Dutch citizenship. After signing several important looking documents in front of an official from the city hall, my mother looked at me, her eyes shining. With a smile that concealed more than mere relief she said 'We have become naturalised, my son. Now we will definitely be allowed to stay here.'

I felt immediately that this was a special moment, that all our worries belonged to the past. That evening, the Dutch football team played an international match

against Germany. While my hero Marco van Basten fought a bitter duel against his arch enemy Jürgen Kohler, I sat on the sofa, muttering: 'I'm naturalised. I'm Dutch now.'

As time went by, I became increasingly aware that we really had it good in the Netherlands. I was fourteen when, in the summer of 1991, we returned to Turkey for the first time. I saw then that my family there lived in poverty and that my cousins would never have the same opportunities that I had. I felt very guilty, but at the same time, I felt aware that I was privileged. It broke my heart when, at the age of sixteen, I learnt that I earned more with my silly little part-time job in a supermarket than my uncle did as a builder. He was well over fifty, but despite his worn-out body he was still working from dawn to dusk in order to give his children a better future.

In the meantime, my sister and I were still working to achieve my mother's dream. Naturally, my father also wanted us to study, but it was my mother who expressed this wish out loud time and time again. We worked hard to get through the academic track of secondary school (vwo) and we both went on to study at the University of Amsterdam, where my sister read communication studies and I read law. We both got our degrees.

I got a job as a lawyer and began to write and publish short stories. My first novel, 'Verloren Grond', was published by Anthos this year. It's a family history set in Turkey. I received an award – the Bronzen Uil Publieksprijs – for it. My book is now in its seventh print in five months. Since my debut, people have started asking me more about my Turkish background. This doesn't really surprise me; I was born in Turkey and wrote a novel set there. But if, as happened recently in an interview in *NRC Handelsblad*<sup>1</sup>, I am described as a Turkish writer I say something about it because I am a Dutch writer. Of course I have a Turkish background and I also have a Turkish passport, but I feel Dutch first and foremost. I dream, think and write in Dutch. I am rooted here, this is my country.

Nowadays, however, when I look at young Dutch people with a Turkish background it strikes me that many are now turning their focus towards Turkey. They use Facebook and Twitter in Turkish, often listen to Turkish music and seize the opportunity to spend a few days in Istanbul or Bodrum during every holiday. Although they were born here, a great many of them see Turkey as the 'promised land', the country of opportunity. They feel very strongly that not only their roots, but also their future lie in Turkey.

I'm trying to understand this. Of course, Turkey's economy is doing very well at the moment, while in Europe we are struggling with the consequences of the Euro crisis. Many highly educated young people therefore think that their diplomas are worth

<sup>1</sup> A quality Dutch broadsheet newspaper

more in Turkey than they are here, and that they will be more welcome in the higher echelons of the business community there than here in the Netherlands.

But are they not over-romanticising Turkey? How well do they really know the country other than as a place to enjoy great holidays? I think they would find that real life there is a lot harder than the idealised picture they cherish of their parent's home country. Of course, there is nothing wrong with looking for adventure and working abroad for a year for experience and the chance to develop yourself – I would even recommend it. What I have far more difficulty with is when people romanticise and idealise a country that is still developing, a country that is struggling with long-term conflicts. Many Dutch Turks who move to Turkey with the idea of making it there find that it is a terribly disappointing experience. They cannot get used to the harder mentality, the hierarchy in the workplace, the long working hours, the different etiquette, the fact that despite their heritage they are still viewed as a 'foreigner', and that Turkey is less democratic than the Netherlands. Maybe what is even more important is the fact that it is often only then that they realise that they are much more Dutch than they would ever have thought possible.

Despite all this, they continue to yearn for Turkey. This is because something else is going on, something which probably weighs more heavily than the factors mentioned above. Young people who are now in their twenties grew up in politically turbulent years. After the 11th of September attacks in New York, the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, and in particular, the rise of Wilders, who has managed to make right-wing populism salonfähig, a lot has changed both in the Netherlands and in Europe. People have begun to talk more and more often in terms of 'us' and 'them', and Muslims in particular have been given an unreasonably hard time. In politics, the media, the internet and even on the street a harsher climate has developed in which it has suddenly become acceptable to express questionable and previously suppressed feelings freely. On the Internet, in particular, commentators unashamedly vent their spleen about 'migrants who don't belong here and who should go back to their own country on a camel'. Often, this virtual rabble try to outdo each other when it comes to the vileness of their insults.

I grew up in a different time. The word 'allochtoon'<sup>2</sup> was never used when I was growing up. I think I was referred to as a migrant or guest worker. I was also called a Mohammedan, even though I was not given a religious upbringing. These terms were only replaced much later by that damned word, 'allochtoon'. This word quickly came to symbolise everything that was wrong with the multicultural society. Allochtoon

<sup>2</sup> Not only migrants but their children and even grandchildren who were born here are referred to as 'allochtonen' in the Netherlands. In recent years, this word has gained a negative connotation

became a synonym for being poorly integrated, unable to speak the language properly, unemployed, living on welfare benefits, owning a satellite dish and possibly even being a religious fanatic. An allochtoon was someone who had no prospects, and if too many lived in one neighbourhood, people were quick to call it a ghetto.

After 2001, something happened that I would never have thought possible: the Netherlands became increasingly right-wing and populist. Something that had only seemed possible in Austria and Denmark was happening in my own country: whole sections of the population were being openly excluded; not just occasionally, but time and time again. The most surprising thing was that the established parties did not have a clue about how to combat the populists. They had no answers. Therefore, they decided to become more right-wing themselves. Parties like the VVD and CDA made an enormous step to 'the wrong side,' attempting to benefit from the harsh populist wind that was raging through our country. In his first speech as prime minister, Rutte said 'Let us give this beautiful country back to the Dutch.' Minister Verhagen went a step further a few weeks later when he said that he 'understood the fear that people had of foreigners.'

I wondered what was going on in my country. When I couldn't find an answer, something happened which I could never have foreseen: I began silently to wonder if this was still my country, if I still saw a future for myself in a country where I was constantly referred to as an 'allochtoon,' and even worse, a country where whole groups of people were structurally excluded in an increasingly harsh way. I found myself dreaming more and more about San Francisco, a city where I had studied for six months in 2001 with a great deal of pleasure. I told myself that although there were many points on which you could criticise America, immigrants are welcomed there (at least if they are legal); they are acknowledged as being American and they belong there. My uneasiness about the Netherlands continued to grow, and that really upset me. I was annoyed that a few incompetent politicians could burden me with such a negative feeling about my own country and succeed in eroding my feelings of being at home here. What gave them the right to do this? Were they really incapable of realising that the future of our country was at stake? And how must the new Dutch citizens in working class neighbourhoods feel if even I – a successful and loyal new Netherlander – had begun to ask critical questions about my Dutchness?

At the same time, I realised that a time must come when this harsh wind would die down again. I counted on people realising that parties like the PVV cannot offer any solutions in a country where approximately half of the population of its four major cities has a migrant background. Fortunately, the results of the last elections confirmed that feeling: populism received a setback and I recovered much of my faith and positive feeling.

I can imagine that it will take longer for many young Dutch people with a Turkish background to recover their faith in society and the feeling that they belong here. Most of their youth has been overshadowed by negative newspaper headlines such as 'Islamic voting cattle' and the 'head rag tax'<sup>3</sup> which caused some of them to feel that they did not really belong anywhere.

However, there are also positive developments: an increasing number of young Dutch Turks are studying at colleges of higher education and universities and are finding well-paid jobs afterwards. This is very important, because the feeling that they can make a career here is essential for a positive perspective and a feeling of belonging. What would help enormously would be a statement from the government that reinforces this feeling. I think, for example, that they could scrap the word 'allochtoon', at least to refer to the new generation who were born in the Netherlands and who have a Dutch passport. It may be difficult for someone who has never been referred to as an allochtoon to imagine how it feels to have that word thrown at them and so they might easily underestimate the effect that such a measure would have. But I can assure them that it matters a great deal whether you are referred to as an allochtoon or a new Dutchman (a much better alternative). This is something that the government could do, at least to start off with, and it is something that they should do in order to make this group feel more at home.

In their turn, young Dutch people with a Turkish background could take a step towards boosting this process by making a greater effort to embrace the Netherlands – which, after all, is their native country – and, by referring to themselves as Dutch. They do not have to conceal the fact that they have warm feelings towards Turkey; the one does not have to exclude the other. However, I would also like to say to them, don't let yourself be excluded by the word 'allochtoon': focus, grab the chances that you undeniably have here, and don't let the populists influence your thinking. Show that this is also your country! The Netherlands needs you and you need the Netherlands – much more than you may realise at this point.

<sup>3</sup> This term, which Geert Wilders used to refer to headscarves has a particularly offensive tone in Dutch as he used the word 'kop', which is used to describe an animal's head, instead of the word 'hoofd' which denotes a human's head.

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# Semra Çelebi

**My father always told us “If a Dutch person asks you what you are, say that you are Turkish. If a Turk asks you what you are say you are Kurdish” I related this in a panel discussion held in Berlin in 2007, on which there were three other students: a Bulgarian student from Romania, an Algerian student from Paris, and a Turkish student from Berlin. I noticed that the Berlin-Turkish student felt very Turkish, the Algerian Parisian felt totally French and I was somewhere in the middle.**

## **Barneveld: The only Turkish girl**

When I was following my academic track secondary education at the Protestant Johannes Fontanus College, I did my best to resemble my Dutch friends of native parentage as closely as possible. I was the only migrant and the only Muslim in the class. I also wore a headscarf. Almost every year, I gave a speech about Islam to the class during Bible studies in which I let everyone ask me questions about Islam. I joined in with the playback show at school, took my headscarf off for gym classes and even sang a duet in the school play. In addition to all this, I had lessons in the Koran every weekend in the mosque with all the other Turkish Muslim children. But even during these Sunday classes I was the odd one out. I didn't live in a Turkish neighbourhood, I ate sauerkraut at home and when I spoke Dutch, I used too many 'difficult' words. In short, I was different in both worlds because of religion, use of language and customs. I felt different, but enormously accepted; in fact people could not get around me.

In those days I was active in the Islamic conservative organisation Milli Görüs (2001-2004), and often participated in debates about the integration of minorities in the Netherlands. I was very involved and was always defending my viewpoint: “Integration is not assimilation – join in, but keep your own identity!” I was convinced



that I had totally worked out my own identity. I was a Turkish Muslim. I got angry with people who compared headscarves to the old fashioned punk hairdos. I studied law at the University of Utrecht and did well. I went to England as an Erasmus student, looking for freedom in that way. My parents thought that studying was more important than anything else, as long as we kept to the values and standards of Islam. If we ‘went too far’ the adventure would soon be over. My father was very firm on that point. I was given many opportunities and I made good use of them. During my internship at the European Parliament in 2007, however, I began to ask myself what exactly my values and standards were.

## **Amsterdam: it doesn't matter what I am**

I moved to Amsterdam later in 2007. It's my place of refuge – my Amsterdam – far away from the social control imposed by both Christians and Muslims in Barneveld. Away from the bourgeois, away from religion. Here is where I began my life as a Muslim without a headscarf; it's where I began to follow my own path and to explore my boundaries. Who am I? What do I want? Who do I want to be? Am I still a Muslim or not? And who do I see as being a Muslim? Am I a Dutch Turk or a Turkish Dutchwoman? Actually, it doesn't really matter what I am in Amsterdam, because everyone is different here. There is no homogeneity. People are surprised to hear that I lived in the expensive Vossiusstraat, but I am firmly convinced that this neighbourhood will also have a Turkish bakery on the corner one day. I do not represent anything. I don't fit in a pigeon hole. I don't want to assimilate into the Netherlands by adopting a broader range of values and norms, because I don't believe in that.

I believe in universal standards and values: the values of equality and freedom without hurting other people; without taking it to excess. I am who I am. I'm Semra and I am a proud citizen of Amsterdam.

*Semra Çelebi is a citizen of Amsterdam, feminist & fashion lover, and a graduate lawyer. As Diversity Advisor Amsterdam, she is responsible for developing young talent within the municipality of Amsterdam. She organised the inspiring conference Pioniers van Toen & Nu (Pioneers Past and Present) as part of the celebrations to mark 400 years of relations between Turkey and the Netherlands.*





## Turk and Gay

# Serdar Manavoglu

**Many Dutch homosexuals think that Turkish homosexuals should just give up their Turkish identity, if it's causing so much bother, and become happy Dutch homosexuals. But in a collective culture like the Turkish one, you can't just choose your homosexual identity for yourself; it also involves your family and the people you know.**

It is official: for the first time, a Turkish boat participated in the Amsterdam Gay Pride regatta. It was an extraordinary event. Anyone could have predicted that the participation of a Turkish Boat in the Pride would cause a commotion in the Turkish community, but even I didn't expect so much fuss. I am Turkish, Dutch, an Amsterdammer and a gay man. I'm also a partner, brother, swimmer, political science graduate, an events programmer for the Paradiso and much more...

This is just natural for me. At least, it is now. It really wasn't easy, after studying and working as a policy official for Amsterdam City Council, to switch to working in the Dutch cultural world so that my Turkish roots, my close connections with both Amsterdam and Istanbul and my homosexuality could all be reflected in my work. It was even more difficult to make my sexual orientation and ethnic identity known in my own environment. I had the necessary discussions with family and friends before I went ahead. I've been lucky in love, as I have a fantastic partner who supports me. Eventually, everyone realised that I was still the same Serdar they had always known, and maybe this is why I can bring so much enthusiasm to my work when it involves connecting Istanbul and Amsterdam, Turks and non-Turks. Also, the fact that I make this connection with music, dance and the performing arts – and by raising social issues and taboos – may be a factor. Although, when I'm programming events for Paradiso, I primarily want to share new forms of art and content with new target groups, it is also about me expressing what I consider to be 'myself'. My Turkish and my homosexual identity are inextricably bound. That is not, or at least not yet, natu-

ral in everyone's eyes. This is exactly what having a Turkish boat on the Amsterdam canals during Gay Pride was expressing. And that, of course, made waves.

Those who were recognised from photos of the boat were jeered and cursed at. The politicians who sailed on the boat were pilloried in the social media, and people were urged not to vote for them. Some Turkish people simply don't believe that it is possible to be both Turkish and gay. These people think that you can choose. They see homosexuality as a feature of the modern age, and believe that, as a Turkish homosexual, you have rejected your Turkish identity. You have become a 'real Dutchman', out of control and degraded.

On the other hand, many Dutch homosexuals also seem to think that there is a choice to be made. In their view, perhaps Turkish homosexuals should give up their Turkish identity and traditions if they want to come out of the closet and become happy individuals. This is obviously not really a choice for many Turkish Dutch homosexuals, because how can you give up an ethnic identity and replace it with a sexual identity?

Thanks to this one-dimensional view of homosexuality and identity, many Turkish homosexuals (who are often married to heterosexual partners) are not only in the closet but are also having to cope with feeling torn in two opposite directions. Our most important slogan on the Turkish boat was 'My honour, whose shame?' In a collective culture like the Turkish culture, your choice of identity is not only yours to make; it also involves your family and the people you know. This is what causes this feeling of being torn between your sexuality and your culture. For many Turkish homosexuals, the negative reactions that they experience are not the worst thing they have to cope with. They hold their heads up high, strengthened by the thought that they have chosen for a life in the sun, instead of in the shadows. But the idea that your father is longer welcome in the coffee house – that you have shamed your family – can be soul destroying.

It seems to be very upsetting for some Turks to see a Turkish homosexual with the Turkish flag, or to read that a Turkish homosexual describes himself as Muslim. It is as if these people think that they are the only ones with a right to pride or religious faith. Comments such as 'Homosexuals wear the blood of martyrs on a decadent boat' were made on Turkish Dutch websites and Facebook pages. And it did not stop there: some people were even threatened because they had been on the boat. It is shocking to see young Dutch Turks apparently trying to outdo each other in patriotism, and using respect for the flag as their measure of this dubious virtue. According to them, anything which deviates from this should be verbally assassinated (and literally assassinated too, according to some of them). Gays and the Turkish flag are incompatible.

Why should I have to choose between my ethnic and cultural identity and my sexual identity? At the end of the day, everyone has to decide upon his or her identity and life, even if other people have a problem with that decision or think that there is only one way in which it is acceptable to live. You must then decide not to allow other people to restrict your choices, and to shape your own emancipation. It helps if you have role models who have already been faced with this decision and have dared to make this choice for themselves.

Turkish gays who had been scared to be tagged on Facebook photos with their friends – scared to be recognised as a homosexual – stood on the Turkish boat posing for the cameras, singing along at the top of their lungs to Zeki Muren, the star of Turkish classical music, whose number *Yarali Gonu* (tortured heart) was played over and over again. Zeki Muren lived his entire life in the closet, but these young people want to live out in the open. The Turkish boat made them visible. Turkish Dutch gays had never felt so welcome or so proud of the Netherlands. Some friends of mine stood on the canal-side, cheering, together with an older couple from Amsterdam. This older couple said that it was the first time they had had real contact with Turks. That is really quite strange when you think about it, what a weird and wonderful world.

In the days after Gay Pride, we were deluged with declarations of support and messages from hundreds of young Turkish homosexuals, both at home and abroad. Turks from Turkey who were here on holiday stood along the canals to watch, together with their Dutch-Turkish friends. In October, I visited Turkey to organise the Pink Amsterdam festival in Istanbul. Everyone knew what we had done in Amsterdam. The success of the Turkish boat was way beyond our wildest dreams. In Turkey, homosexuality is generally allowed if it is possible to turn a blind eye to it. There is a growing gay nightlife scene in Istanbul, but nothing, or hardly anything, in the rest of the country. There are also a number of active gay rights organisations. However, Turkish television broadcasts shows presented by drag queens. This was our inspiration for the satellite dishes that decorated the side of the Turkish boat. But even if homosexuality is a visible phenomenon on the streets of Istanbul, and on television, homosexuals get a rough deal from the law. Their basic human rights are still being violated. You can be sacked because of your sexual orientation, assuming you ever manage to get a job in the first place. A landlord can refuse you a house, or as happened recently, intolerant neighbours can drive you out of your house by violent means and the police will not help, or will only offer minimum assistance, because they do not want to be seen to take the side of a homosexual against a supposedly honourable family with children.

The reactions in Istanbul to our initiative with the Turkish boat during Gay Pride made me realise what it was all about for the first time. We had really let people see



something: ourselves and our choices. Maybe, just maybe, as Dutch Turks we can also be proud of our tolerant fellow Dutch Turkish citizens; and they can be proud of us.

*Serdar Manavoglu works as a programme organiser for Paradiso. Under the flag of Pera, a foundation that he set up himself, he organises events with contemporary artists, musicians and DJs from Istanbul and Amsterdam. He is the initiator of Pink Istanbul and co-organiser of the Turkish Boat. The Turkish Boat was an initiative of D. Fil, Stichting Elance and Pink Istanbul.*

This article was published earlier in a slightly different form in the Volkskrant.







## Super-diversity

# Maurice Crul

**In this book, I have stated that European cities are following American cities in the sense that they are becoming majority-minority cities with super-diverse populations. This transformation of the city, which has taken place over the past fifty years, has run in parallel with my own life. It is part of my personal history, first in The Hague, and later in Amsterdam.**

I grew up in what is now a suburb of The Hague. I was born in 1961, on the fifth and highest floor of a typical post-war block of flats, as the second child in my family. My sister had already taken possession of the only children's room in the flat, and so my bed was a fold-out bed in the dining room. I mostly played outdoors during the day and when it got dark I went indoors to play under the dining table or in the living room, close to the coal-fired heater. When bedtime came, I was first put to bed in my parent's bed, and then transferred to my own fold-out bed in the dining room later in the evening.

By the 1980s, this kind of flat in Amsterdam New West, or the Zuilen neighbourhood in Utrecht, usually housed a much larger Turkish or Moroccan family. I often visited such flats in the 1990s to conduct interviews with Turkish and Moroccan youngsters of the second generation. I saw how their parents had found ingenious ways to create three or four sleeping spaces for their daughters in rooms that I recognised as being exactly like my sister's bedroom. As had been the case with me, the dining room provided a sleeping space for the boys. Complete with their satellite dishes, these flats symbolised segregation in the Dutch housing market.

Back then, my neighbourhood was mainly home to young, lower-middle class families. We played in the courtyards and rode our scooters around two, four or eight blocks of flats. This was the kind of diversity I knew in my early childhood. We knew that the people who lived in the houses on the other side of the stream belonged to a higher social class, but I also knew children from my football team

whose pronounced Hague accent proclaimed their working class background. At primary school, ethnic diversity only became visible in the last year groups, when children who had come directly from Suriname joined our class. One Surinamese boy, Ulrick, became one of my best friends. I never went to his house, but he sometimes visited mine. My mother never remarked upon his dark skin or his Surinamese background (or at least I don't remember her ever doing so) but she was worried about his school career. Ulrick was clever, but his Dutch vocabulary and language skills were limited. Just like me, Ulrick was a fanatical street footballer. We usually hung around the school's football yard with other boys after school. I lost touch with Ulrick because he went to a non-academic, vocational school and I went to a class that gave me access to an academic track.

At my secondary school, ethnic diversity was represented by the Indonesian boys and girls. The most popular among the boys played in a band, something which gave them enormous status. My Chinese Dutch Indonesian secondary school friend Richard was at the other end of the spectrum. He didn't belong anywhere and he looked like a nerd. Richard's mother was illiterate. I often visited Richard's house because he lived close to school. He always told his mother to leave the room rather gruffly whenever we arrived. His attitude never failed to shock me, but I put it down to a kind of shame. Just like me, Richard was passionately interested in 'politics', a topic we had discovered during social studies lessons. A group of pupils who were interested in left-wing political topics slowly grew up around us. This group was very diverse in terms of age, clothing style, and level of education. Political commitment was our binding factor.

I have lived in Amsterdam now for more than twenty years. My own circle of friends and colleagues is diverse with a slight Moroccan and Turkish accent, which can be explained by my involvement in Moroccan and Turkish student associations in the early 1990s: I grew up and became an adult along with this group. The young pioneers from those days are now prominent in business circles or have become successful in other ways; as head teachers, psychiatrists or lawyers. I have known them now for almost twenty years. Some have changed from being left-wing activists and become active believers, while others have lost their religious faith even more. Almost all of them have become proud parents.

As a convinced atheist, I have often discussed religion with them. The way in which most of them practise their religion comes very close to what I would call humanism. You live for others, not just for yourself, you are hospitable and you help people if you can. This is not just what they say; this is what they do. This is characteristic of the older second generation. When I first got to know them in the 1990s they were in sharp contrast to the individualistic Dutch youngsters of the time, many of whom seemed to think they were the centre of the universe. The younger second genera-

tion, who often have parents who grew up partially in the Netherlands, are more like the Dutch. They are individualistic and seem to have much in common with their opportunistic Dutch contemporaries. I admit that I have mixed feelings about this form of assimilation.

Living in New York in 2009-2010 because of a fellowship, I had my first experience of being a migrant, after studying the phenomenon for twenty years. I only had problems adapting for the first week, mainly regarding practical matters. Where can I find an affordable supermarket? How do I turn the shower on? I was confused. Was this the large rift that migration opened up? Because of my salary I got, unlike many migrants, all opportunities to participate fully. I enjoyed the stimulating intellectual climate to the full and felt relieved to be away from the claustrophobic Netherlands of Wilders. New Yorkers were open towards me. They may have asked where I came from, but it wasn't because they wanted to know when I would be leaving again. They assumed that I wanted to stay in New York because they were proud of the magnetic attraction that their city has for people.

My best insight into today's super-diverse city is provided for me by my 22-year-old son and 11-year old daughter (choosing two cohorts is an occupational disability). They have grown up in a super-diverse city since early childhood. At the neighbourhood crèche in the Staatsliedenbuurt district, our son was one of the few children with blond hair. When it was Eid, he came home with sweets. At secondary school, he appropriated the language of the street, a vocabulary largely derived from Surinamese and Moroccan words. His girlfriends have reflected the many different colours of the city.

But what does my ethnic identity mean to me? Our family goes to Turkey nearly every year for a week of sunshine. In the plane, I always instinctively look around at my countrymen and wonder what I have in common with these people. Do I feel a connection with them on the basis of our shared ethnic background? Do I share something with them? Am I a typical Dutchman? At the same time, I am a fanatical supporter of the Dutch national football team and foreign academic colleagues say that I am typically Dutch in my directness. Zygmund Bauman would characterise this as a liquid identity. My Dutch identity solidifies temporarily during the World Cup, but liquefies again on the plane to Turkey. In most situations and for the most important parts of my life, identities other than my ethnic identity are more important. My identity as an academic, my identity as a father involved in my daughter's super-diverse football team, my metropolitan Amsterdam or even New York identity, because actually, I feel homesick for New York.

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In 2011, Amsterdam became a *majority-minority city*. The inhabitants of Dutch descent officially became a minority. Only one in three young people under the age of fifteen is of native parentage. In short: big cities in the Netherlands and in other West-European countries are becoming super-diverse. So far, however, no intellectual perspective has been formulated in response to this development.

*Super-diversity* offers a new perspective within the integration debate by defining the conditions required for a scenario of hope for today's large multi-ethnic cities. We are standing at the crossroads: this international comparison shows how a hopeful future is dawning in those cities which provide education and employment opportunities for the children of immigrants. The successful second generation is taking the lead when it comes to emancipation. Highly-educated young people are advocating gender equality in their community, as well as the individual's right to decide about their sexuality.

The super-diversity perspective sheds new light on today's urban society. It is the perspective of a growing group of city dwellers who are decidedly intolerant of intolerance and the limitation of personal freedom. We are proposing a progressive alternative to the problematic aspects of multiculturalism that demanded tolerance for all cultural opinions and customs, even those which propagated intolerance towards others.

