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Tiivistelmä-Referat-Abstract

This paper studies post-conflict peacebuilding in relation to non-state armed groups, notably insurgencies. Peacebuilding in general refers to long-term policies that have as their end-goal a just and self-sustaining peace. The view taken of peacebuilding here is state-centered: strengthening a legitimate and accountable state is the best way to protect individuals. The focus is on outside intervention. Also, security is a key concept.

The framework advances by 1.) analysing the nature of the problem and the main security threats to peace posed by non-state armed groups, and 2.) examines the current policy-options to these problems, and sees what is effective and what is problematic. The assumption is that there is a common model of peacebuilding, that is not necessarily effective. This is referred to as 'rule-of-thumb peacebuilding. This paper uses literature review as its methods. A number of different types of sources were chosen: theoretical literature on conflicts and peacebuilding including statistical and qualitative research, articles by authoritative experts on each subject, policy handbooks by experts, lessons learned reports, as well as commissioned evaluations.

Non-state armed groups are analyzed through their means (capacity) and end-goals. Gangs, organized crime, paramilitary groups, private military companies and insurgencies are examined. While all of these contest the monopoly of violence of the state, only insurgencies pose an existential threat both with respect to its means and end-goals. Yet one of the central findings is that non-state armed groups today have converging interests, and thanks to globalization new weaker but more resilient forms of insurgency emerge relatively easily. These groups can have an interest in the continuation of conflict. Of the different policy-option, I analyze DDR, conflict resolution methods, monitoring, arms control measures, sanctions, counterinsurgency and the pros and cons of interventions in general. Generally, policies could be differentiated between ones that focused on the existing armed group, and ones that focus on changing the environment that enabled them to come about.

Key problems found with the commonly applied methods of peacebuilding, or 'rule-of-thumb' peacebuilding, were related to power-sharing arrangements and elections, as well as the attention given to short-term results. Additionally, a longer presence of outside monitoring of the peace process would seem to enhance the sustainability of post-conflict peace. Finally, interventions themselves can also be problematic: they can spread corruption and weaken the connection between the government and the people.

Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan ei-valtiollisia aseistautuneita ryhmiä ja rauhanrakentamista konfliktinjälkeisessä tilanteessa. Rauhanrakentamisella viitataan kaikkeen pitkäkestoiseen toimintaan, jonka ensisijaisena tavoitteena on kestävä ja oikeudenmukainen rauha. Rauhanrakentamista tarkastellaan tässä tutkimuksessa valtiokeskeisesti: oikeudenmukainen valtio, joka on vastuussa kansalaisilleen, takaa parhaiten yksilöiden turvallisuuden. Pääpaino on ulkopuolisten väliintuloissa. Turvallisuus toimii jäsentävänä käsitteenä.

Tutkimusasetelma on kaksiosainen: ensiksi pyritään ymmärtämään ongelman luonne ja löytämään keskeiset turvallisuusongelmat ja toiseksi tarkastelemaan käytettyjä toimintamalleja sekä katsomaan mikä on koettu toimivaksi ja mitkä ovat olleet keskeiset ongelmat. Oletuksena on, että on olemassa yleinen rauhanrakentamisen malli, jota käytetään, mutta joka ei välttämättä aina tuota haluttuja tuloksia. Metodologiana toimii kirjallisuuskatsaus. Aineisto koostuu sekä kvantitatiivisista että kvalitatiivisista teoreettisista töistä konflikteista ja rauhanrakentamisesta, eri aiheiden asiantuntijoiden kirjoituksista, kenttäasiantuntijoiden laatimista ohjekirjoista, 'lessons learned' -julkaisuista sekä eri ohjelmien ulkoisista arvioinneista.

Muita tietoja-Övriga uppgifter-Additional information

Effective Peacebuilding in a Post-Conflict Environment: Problems and Solutions with Non-State Armed Groups

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1. Introduction

This paper examines post-conflict peacebuilding through outside intervention in relation to non-state armed groups, notably insurgencies. It gives a general overview of different problems concerning non-state armed groups, and an evaluation of the current policies applied to them. No case studies are used. Since it is peacebuilding that is being studied, issues are analyzed through a security perspective.

The first section of the paper introduces the central themes, and shows why non-state armed groups and peacebuilding are important subjects to study.

1.1. Internal conflicts and non-state armed groups

Why are non-state armed groups significant for post-conflict peacebuilding? Today's conflicts are predominantly internal: 2008 was the fifth year running, when no major interstate conflicts were active[1]. This does not mean that interstate conflicts will not occur; global military expenditure in 2008, for example, rose by 4%[2]. Yet compared to interstate conflicts and relations between states, the focus on internal conflicts is relatively new, and our knowledge of effective policy tools, also for the post-conflict stage, is not well developed[3]. It should be noted that while not all internal conflicts become 'internationalized' - that is spill over to other states, for example when troops move over uncontrolled borders, or other states are directly implicated with one of the conflicting parties – practically all internal conflicts have some level of outside involvement, for example through the financial backing of one party. Additionally, all internal conflicts are dependent on the global environment today, through finances, arms procurement and so forth.

Internal conflicts by definition involve one or more non-state armed groups. Non-state armed groups thus merit special attention. There are many types of different non-state armed groups: gangs, militias, paramilitaries, warlords, organized crime, private military companies and insurgencies. This study will examine gangs, organized crime, private military companies, paramilitaries and insurgencies. The focus will be on the

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[1] It should be noted troops from other states did aid governments in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq.
[2] SIPRI 2009b.
[3] Krasner, Stephen 2007.

potential security threat they might pose for post-conflict peace, and the linkages between different kinds of groups. Understanding linkages between different groups, also in relation to the state, is essential for comprehending the conflict and post-conflict environments of today. I will analyze these groups through their means and end-goals. Militias and warlords will not be examined – I consider them to be a combination of the same logics that are behind gangs, paramilitaries, organized crime, and in the case of some warlords, localized insurgencies. The logics driving militias and warlords will be analyzed through these groups.

The most serious threat to post-conflict peace however is posed by old or emerging insurgencies – this will be the main focus of this paper. On the 'solution' -side, the focus will be uniquely on insurgencies. This paper will use the words insurgency, rebellion and guerrilla synonymously. For purpose of this paper, terrorism is considered a specific tactic that can be used by insurgents – not a type of organisation.

It should be noted that insurgency is today intimately related to asymmetric warfare. Some guerrilla forces ultimately aim to confront the regular state armed forces in conventional warfare to overthrow the government, but only after having built up their forces to the necessary strength. However, all insurgencies begin as small groups using guerrilla tactics – essentially meaning asymmetric warfare, which refers to disparity of power between warring parties. This weaker position is often compensated by insurgents by hiding amongst and relying on the civilian population.

While one might at first think that rebel organisations are not a central problem in the *post*-conflict situation, this paper argues that this is a mistaken assumption. Rebel organisations are problematic in two different ways. First, the old rebel organisation(s) must be dealt with, and can form a powerful political block that may return to or threaten the use of violence to achieve its interests in the post-conflict environment. Organizational structures and wartime interests are rarely dismantled. Signing a peace agreement is only the beginning of integrating groups into civilian life, which encourages them to forsake the use of violence to pursue their interests. Yet this only manages the effects of the initial root causes for the emergence of insurgent groups. On a second and deeper level, the environment that encourages and makes possible the forming of rebel groups has to be dealt with, which is no easy task. Simply dismantling

rebel organizations will create power vacuums, where new predatory groups will step in. Establishing the *legitimate* monopoly of violence of the state in these areas, as well as controlling the enabling factors such as available sources of finance and population discontent are essential for sustainable peace. Root causes need to be tackled.

Most of the current intrastate conflicts include more than one rebel group. The trend of splintering rebel groups affects the nature of today's conflicts. It "tends to protract conflict by weakening the ability of any one party to attain outright military victory, creating multiple centres of violence within a country and provoking competition between groups, usually reflected in an increased intensity of violence"[4]. Multiple groups that are badly organized also make conflict resolution more complicated.

This paper argues that the variety of different insurgent groups is immense, and it is questionable whether they should be conflated into one category. At one extreme are small, dispersed, loosely connected groups inspired by a common ideology and without a clear leadership structure, such as al-Qaeda. At the other extreme are highly organized, hierarchical transnational organizations participating in politics and producing social services, such as Hezbollah. Secondly I argue that, through the use of terrorist tactics, cheap weapons, available global finances, and cooperation and information exchange between insurgent groups – phenomena enabled by globalization – the threshold for the emergence of a low-level insurgency has become relatively low. Thirdly, the mutually reinforcing linkages between different non-state (and state) armed groups create power and economic interests against peace ('spoilers'). Many groups can maintain their position and power in the system thanks to a chaotic environment, and profit heavily for example from illicit trade. Fourthly, many of today's conflict resolution tools pose inherent problems for self-sustaining peace that need to be recognized. Fifth, since many of the problems generating today's conflicts have been enabled by globalization, the responses equally require global action.

Because of the predominance of internal conflicts today, the lack of developed and effective policy tools, the links between different kinds of non-state armed groups, and the specific problems for post-conflict peacebuilding they pose, non-state armed groups

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[4] Dwan, Renata & Holmqvist, Caroline 2005. p.90.

- notably insurgent organizations - merit special attention. This is why they are the focus of this study.

1.2. Post-conflict peacebuilding

Post-war reconstruction is not a new idea, but the extent to which it is understood as preventing return to conflict and the extent to which it is practiced and applied as a standard policy tool is new. The concept of building structures for a self-sustaining peace is also new.

A recent comparative quantitative study produced by the World Bank points out that 40% of post-conflict situations experience a reversion to conflict within the first decade[5]. This risk is twice as high as for pre-conflict situations[6]. Indeed, if rebellion is difficult to organize and does not emerge everywhere, then post-conflict societies have by definition proven to be places where these conditions exist[7]. Thus, a post-conflict environment is vulnerable for two reasons: it has the conditions that enabled the conflict, and it has inherited certain structures from the active conflict phase. To quote Collier on the renewal of conflict: "Civil war is fuelled partly by the circumstances that account for the initial resort to large-scale violence, and partly by forces generated once violence has started and that tend to perpetuate it. We refer to the initial circumstances as the root causes and the perpetuating forces as the conflict trap"[8]. Both need to be dealt with for peace to be sustainable.

There is a growing awareness of the importance of peacebuilding efforts, however one calls them, in post-conflict situations. The founding of the Peacebuilding Commission by the United Nations, and the appearance of peacebuilding efforts in the policy-guidelines of various major international organizations, such as the World Bank, the EU [9], the OECD[10], attest to this. The implementation of these policies on the ground in post-

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[5] Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2007.
[6] Collier, Paul 2007. p.213.
[7] Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2008. p.464.
[8] Collier, Paul & al. 2003. p53–83.
[9] See for example: European Security and Defence Policy, Civilian Crisis Management.
[10] the OECD DAC guidelines.

conflict operations by a variety of different actors is also evident. What is meant by peacebuilding efforts?

Peacebuilding is generally considered to begin after the end of conflict. It is then different from peacemaking, which aims at the cessation of ongoing conflict. Peacemaking is implemented at earlier stages of the conflict cycle, for example through peacekeeping and mediation, whereas peacebuilding refers to longer-term actions in later cycles of conflict, when its intensity is lower. Often, a ten-year period after the signing of a peace agreement is used. Policies used for conflict prevention also apply for post-conflict peacebuilding[11], but are insufficient, as the risk of regression to conflict is much higher. The logic of post-conflict situations also differs from pre-conflict ones, notably due to structures established during the conflict period. Existing organized armed groups, availability of arms, culture of predation and impunity and lack of economically viable options are some of these.

Peacebuilding has as its end-goal a self-sustaining peace. 'Self-sustaining' implies a kind of peace that would last without, and make possible the withdrawal of, the intervening third party. Peacebuilding also reflects our reconceptualization of peace itself from 'negative peace', meaning peace as absence of war, to 'positive peace' which implies structures of peace in a society. Structures of peace, refers to institutions (broadly speaking) in society that make possible the resolution of conflicts in society in non-violent ways. Thus, peace *building* implies that peace has content. Symmetrically, it aims at diffusing the structures in a society that caused the conflict and its manifestation through violence in the first place. These are often called the 'root causes' of conflict. This means changing society in a fundamental way. The notion of 'conflict transformation' emphasises this point. It should be noted, that by 'third-party', I mean all the different and uncoordinated outside actors engaged in intervention efforts in one country.

Peacebuilding can then be seen as ultimately aiming at what Karl Deutsch has called a 'security community'. A security community is a group of people which has become integrated. Integration refers to the attainment, within a territory, of a sense of community, and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to

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[11] Collier, Paul 2007. p.213.

assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population. Sense of community implies a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least the point that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change. Peaceful change means the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale violence. For Deutsch, the security community can be, but isn't necessarily, a state[12]. However, peacebuilding efforts today focus exclusively on establishing a state that is at peace– some refer to it as state or nation-building. Others prefer to emphasise creating institutions of governance. Yet it is clear from Deutsch's definition, that the change is a qualitatively profound one – it must be a phenomenon that includes the community and individual level, not just a solution of political structure.

Generally speaking, we could say that peacebuilding captures two aspects for policy: length and depth. The slow realization that the mere cessation of hostilities does not guarantee lasting peace, has forced policymakers to consider long-term policies for peace. It is evident from experience that this has not been the standard when we consider the planned (or unplanned) length of many of the past third-party interventions. Also, mere power mediation is not sufficient if policies aim at deeply changing society. As a DCAF report states: "What the peacebuilding concept captures, however, is the emerging consensus that the transition from armed conflict to self-sustaining peace requires more than physical security and reconstruction. It addresses, rather, the political, social and economic transformation of a society after conflict: in other words, the root causes of conflict"[13].

It should be noted that applying the term 'peacebuilding' for this study, imposes an inherent difficulty. The term has a double role: peacebuilding as an official policy (and possibly institutionally established), and as a 'grouping term' for long term, transformative activities, that have as their end-goal self-sustaining peace. The focus in this study is naturally on the latter. Peacebuilding as such, is not necessarily the official term employed in all official policies. This study will use peacebuilding as a 'grouping

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[12] Deutsch, Karl 1969. p. 5.
[13] DCAF 2005. p.17

term', and so what is called reconstruction, reconciliation, civilian crisis management, state-building can also partially fall under peacebuilding.

Thirdly, peacebuilding, although a recent policy concept, already has content. A general policy model for peacebuilding exists. The study mentioned above made for the World Bank states that, although there are 'enormous differences among post-conflict situations' and that 'generalization is dangerous', there exists conventional wisdom on peacebuilding that is consistently applied for planning missions. It could be considered as a pre-existing policy-model. 'Conventional wisdom' emphasises how practitioner-led the field is. Peacebuilding has mostly been 'learned by doing', and both academia and codified policy have lagged behind[14]. This raises two questions: is this model correct, and can it be applied generically from situation to situation? I will call this 'rule-of-thumb' peacebuilding.

To summarize, in this paper, by 'peacebuilding' we can then understand four different things. First, peacebuilding can refer to an official and declared part of policy or strategy. Secondly, peacebuilding can be a 'grouping term', for all long-term policy in post-conflict situations that have as their end-goal self-sustaining peace. Thirdly, it can mean the 'conventional wisdom' peacebuilding, in other words, the rule of thumb for what is today understood by practitioners as peacebuilding policies that work. This could crudely be compared to a template that is identically applied from conflict to conflict, with little emphasis on local context. The last sense in which peacebuilding can be understood could be coined 'effective peacebuilding'. With this term I emphasise the on-the-ground empirical requirements for self-sustaining peace. These are, of course, partly unknown, but ideally guide the formation of policy. This end-goal for peacebuilding will be the focus of this study, notably by looking at policy handbooks, evaluations and critical articles by experts. To summarize, peacebuilding can refer to official policy, it can be a grouping term for different post-conflict peace-oriented activities (many actors use different terms), conventional wisdom or 'rule-of-thumb' peacebuilding by practitioners, and lastly policies that are guided by needs on the ground and are effective – which is the focus of this paper. Namely, I am going to try to compare 'rule-of-thumb' peacebuilding and effective peacebuilding.

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[14] Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2007.

A word should be said about the different concepts used by different actors. Peacebuilding is a concept mainly used by the UN. Much of what has been said above applies to the UN conceptualization of peacebuilding. The UN especially emphasises the complementarity of different policy tools for achieving peace, and in some cases everything from peacekeeping to development aid is included in 'peacebuilding'[15]. The EU more often speaks of 'civilian crisis management,' which is a negative definition with relation to all action that is non-military in the post-conflict phase. In practice, the EU has focused on police missions, with an increasing importance also in rule of law missions and Security Sector Reform. The EU's concept is focused almost uniquely on the state[16]. The US and Canada often speak of stabilization and reconstruction, which is a relatively new term and is in part a reaction to the post-invasion reality of Iraq and Afghanistan. It refers mainly to capacity building, that is, creating a reserve pool of experts from different areas. It also seeks to emphasise the importance of civilian tasks, where the military has often been given the leading role. Stabilization and reconstruction is also referred to as nation-building[17]. Lastly, NATO speaks of civil-military cooperation ('CIMIC'). This term however purely refers to the cooperation between military and civilian elements, and is not limited only to post-conflict situations, but also disaster relief for NATO. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan have however become a platform for talking about what could be understood as peacebuilding for NATO itself, as well as for dialogue between NATO and other actors[18]. Civil-military cooperation can also be associated with the 'comprehensive approach', which emphasises strategic cooperation and coordination between all sectors (military, development, reconstruction, humanitarian)[19]. An analogous term, but at the national level of each government is the 'whole of government' term (WGA), that emphasises coordination between different sectors of government - something that has been lacking in many interventions.

All of these terms however have in common that they are policies that have as their end-goal a self-sustaining and just peace. While it need not be the case, the reality is that today all actors focus on achieving a legitimate and effective state-structure into post-

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[15] Saxén, Niklas 2008.
[16] Saxén, Niklas 2008b.
[17] Saxén, Niklas 2008c.
[18] Comprehensive Approach Seminar (CAS), Helsinki 2008.
[19] Saxén, Niklas 2008c.

conflict countries. As an example of an alternative approach, conflict transformation is often referred to as the bottom-up transformation of society, often specifically through civil society. Lastly, there are differences in whether the military is understood as doing 'peacebuilding' as well, and to what extent. This paper takes the standpoint that the military does have a function in peacebuilding, notably in reforming the military of a country, peacekeeping, and possible counterinsurgency operations if this is necessary. The remainder of this paper will only use the term peacebuilding.

Why has peacebuilding become such a major policy issue? The immediate post-Cold War period changed the conflict environment in significant ways: as conflicts between states declined, intrastate conflicts accounted for the large majority of conflicts as well as battle-related deaths; more than twice as many conflicts began yearly than in any other decade since the 1950s; during the 1990s more conflicts also ended than began than in previous periods; and contrary to the Cold War period, most wars ended in negotiated settlement rather than military victory by one side. At the same time, 44% of negotiated settlements failed within the first five years and conflict began again[20]. The end of the Cold War also saw a weakening of the concept of state sovereignty, in the sense of non-interference in internal affairs. Interventions became more acceptable, and where during the Cold War they were part of the realpolitik of states, interventions were now perceived as more 'neutral', and done to promote human rights[21]. This was later followed with what was termed the 'human security' paradigm, which saw a shift towards guaranteeing security to individual citizens rather than the state[22]. The 'responsibility to protect' (or R2P) doctrine also emerged, which argues that it is "the responsibility of states, and where they fail the international community, to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes"[23].

These changes in the international system were accompanied by new demands and responses by the UN, which in turn generated reflection on peacebuilding. Whereas in 1988 there were 10,000 people serving in seven operations, in 1994 there were 17

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[20] Human Security Brief 2007. p.33-35.
[21] Thakur, Ramesh & Albert Schnabel 2001. p.11-14.
[22] " The traditional goal of 'national security' has been the defence of the state from external threats. The focus of human security, by contrast, is the protection of individiuals ---. In its broadest formulations the human security agenda also encompasses economic insecurity and 'threats to human dignity'." Human Security Report, 2006.
[23] icg.org: Responsibility to Protect.

peacekeeping operations numbering 87,000 persons[24]. Although the number of conflicts has decreased after 2000, in 2007 there were 130,000 people serving in UN peacekeeping operations[25].

The nature of peacekeeping missions also changed. Previous 'first generation' peacekeeping missions primarily monitored and supervised ceasefires. They were placed between opposing sides with the consent of both, and were not mandated to use force. Missions were intended to run for as long as negotiations produced peace agreements. During the 1990s, peacekeeping operations were increasingly a part of internal conflicts and became a part of the actual peace deals, in order to guarantee post-conflict stability. Missions included more robust mandates for use of force, and were not necessarily neutral anymore. Internal conflicts were also "complex emergencies", where state structures had possibly collapsed, there was large-scale targeting of civilians, irregular forces, and extensive human rights abuses - all of which presented a whole different set of problems to tackle. In turn, this placed pressure on UN peacekeeping operations to include such tasks as DDR, policing, human rights monitoring, organizing elections and administration. The most extensive examples were the situations in Kosovo and East Timor, where the UN completely administered territories and conducted state-building. The increasing complexity of missions and their tasks came as a result of the understanding that peace could not be achieved without security on the ground, which was in turn dependent on law and order. UN peacekeeping failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica were examined by the Brahimi report in 2000, which made peacebuilding a UN priority[26]. As stated in the report:

> "[T]raditional peacekeeping, which treats the symptoms rather than sources of conflict, has no built in exit strategy and associated peacemaking was often slow to make progress. --- Since the end of the cold war, United Nations peacekeeping has often combined with peace-building in complex peace operations deployed into settings of intra-State conflict. --- Moreover, the complexity of the tasks assigned to these missions and the volatility of the situation on the ground tend to increase together. --- When complex peace operations do go into the field, it is the task of the operation's peacekeepers to maintain a secure local environment for peacebuilding, and the peacebuilders' task to support the political, social and economic changes that create a secure environment that is self-sustaining."[27]

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[24] Thakur, Ramesh & Albert Schnabel 2001. p.12.
[25] un.org 2009. Honouring 60 Years of United Nations Peacekeeping.
[26] Thakur, Ramesh & Albert Schnabel 2001. p.10-17.
[27] Brahimi Report 2000. p.3-5.

These are the origins of peacebuilding. In essence, it has been an essential answer to involvement into more complex conflict and post-conflict environments. Much of this paper goes on to explain what it is in practice and substance today, vis-à-vis non-state actors.

To summarize, there are a number of factors that make effective peacebuilding an important object of study. To begin with, peace, and thus (effective) operations towards that end, can and should be seen as a value in itself. Concretely, this ideology is today manifested in the policies for 'human security', which take the human individual, and not the nation-state, as the object of security. The challenge to national sovereignty after the Cold War, especially through the notion of protecting the individual, is what has justified even forceful third-party interventions inside states. As I already mentioned, the growing realization that mere cessation of hostilities is insufficient, has made the question of what exactly constitutes effective peacebuilding more acute. In addition to being ethically and politically pertinent, peacebuilding is scientifically underdeveloped. As a field of study it is relevantly new, and there is little consensus on what makes for effective peacebuilding. Thus, an analysis of the current policies in different areas of post-conflict peacebuilding sheds light on their difficulties and interconnectivity. At best, it will uncover commonalities in necessities for peacebuilding, where 'there are enormous differences among post-conflict situations', and at worst it will show the limitations of generalizing about conflicts. While there are studies that compare different cases around a specific post-conflict problem or policy, and there are comparative statistical studies on post-conflict environments and policies generally, I am not aware of any study looking at both problems and policy-solutions qualitatively on a general level, nor of any looking specifically at non-state armed groups.

1.2.1. Rule-of-thumb peacebuilding

Understanding the model of commonly used peacebuilding methods or what I termed 'rule of thumb' peacebuilding is essential for answering my following research questions: What are the policy-options for [peacebuilding], notably through international outside intervention? What are the problems with these policies? What

solutions have proven <u>effective</u>? In this study, the rule-of-thumb model is thus what is compared to 'effective peacebuilding' or on-the-ground requirements.

On the basis of the literature read for this study, I have drawn the following table, which I believe to accurately represent both the most commonly used methods of conflict management and their sequencing. This model includes not just peacebuilding methods used in the post-conflict phase, but also describes peacemaking and other conflict management methods in the active conflict phase. This is why it is called 'common *conflict management* methods'. Some methods can be used both during the active conflict phase and in the post-conflict phase for peacebuilding (see 3. Solutions to problems posed by insurgencies). Generally, everything from 'ceasefire' onwards could be considered as peacebuilding, and representing the 'rule-of-thumb' peacebuilding model:

Table 1. Common conflict management methods

Third-party	Peacemaking	Mediation		Monitor implemen-tation	
Prevention	Intervene or not	Ceasefire	Negotiations	Peace process	Peace-building
Key variables	Military victory / war exhaustion		Power-sharing unity goverment	DDR / SSR, Transitional government, constitution	Elections, tackling displace-menent
Pre-conflict	**Active conflict**	**Armed clashes stop - 'negative peace'**		**Building of lasting peace - 'positive peace'**	

As an example Collier, Hoeffler and Söderblom give a description of the typical peacebuilding model. They argue that the most common tasks are sequenced as follows: 1.) a negotiated settlement (rather than letting them fight it out), 2.) light presence of peacekeeping troops, 3.) a new constitution, aimed at pump-priming democracy, and possibly decentralizing power, although preferring a unified state, 4.) setting up or strengthening governance structures, according to the 'light footprint' approach, leaving the economy on the back burner. 5.) post-conflict elections, to help reduce tensions, 6.)

withdrawal of peacekeeping troops, often after elections, since there is a supposition that elections will reduce tensions[28]. Alternatively, Stedman describes a 'standard care regimen for dealing with civil wars' as including: mediating, getting a peace agreement, putting a peacekeeping force on the ground, DDR, and "a number of other tasks"[29]. While I found a degree of consensus on the different methods and tasks, I found less descriptions on the sequencing.

1.3. Research questions

Having explained and justified the objects of my research, I move to specific research questions. My general research question is what makes for effective post-conflict peacebuilding? As already mentioned, I am starting from the working hypothesis, that there is a 'rule-of-thumb' set of peacebuilding policies that is generically applied, due to the field being practitioner-led and academic research just now catching up. My working hypothesis is that **the conventional and 'rule-of-thumb' peacebuilding model applied today has significant problems, and may not in all cases be 'effective peacebuilding'**. While this is not a very brave hypothesis, it is the guideline for this work. It poses two sub-questions: 1.) Is this model of peacebuilding correct? 2.) Can it be applied identically from context to context? I have operationalized the general question "What makes for effective post-conflict peacebuilding?" into the following variables, that will be the basis for analysis in this paper:

1.) What are the main security problems with non-state armed groups, and especially insurgencies for a self-sustaining peace in the post-conflict period?

2.) What are the policy-options for these problems, notably through international outside intervention?

> a.) What are the problems with these policies, and what
>
> has proven effective (solutions)?

An additional question that is also implicitly posed is:

- What are the typical features of today's post-conflict environments?

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28 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2007.
29 Stedman, Stephen 2006.

1.4. Framework for analysis

While many theoretical debates are relevant to this paper, for example when discussing peacebuilding, I prefer calling my framework an analytical one rather than a theoretical one. The less theoretically oriented approach stems form my research question: what makes for effective peacebuilding? I have chosen to study this question by first examining what the main problems on the ground are. As a question of delimiting the possible objects of study, I have chosen non-state armed groups, for reasons explained above. They are an inherent feature of today's internal conflicts. Non-state armed groups are then further broken down into specific security problems. Thus, the point of view is essentially a security one, since this is the issue for peacebuilding. From these field-level problems, I begin to examine the different policies applied to these problems, and looking at what is successful and what is problematic. This is done notably from the view of an international outside intervention. While it may sound counter-intuitive, and is a definite limitation of this study, this framework has the result of not examining interventions in themselves on a macro-level, as a whole, since it is primarily focused on specific problems and corresponding policy-efforts. Thus, it should be noted that my research questions do bear theoretical underpinnings.

Notably, the implicit approach taken throughout this whole study could be characterized as carrots and sticks. The frame of analysis is rather simple: there are given actors, who have certain amounts of power and given interests, and pursue both. Following the rational-actor model, actors form strategies accordingly. Rhetorics and ideology, for example, are mostly from derivatives of interests. Consequently, I assume that policies have an effect on actors, by affecting their interests and relative power - through 'carrots and sticks'. This simple model allows for analysis of complex issues.

There are a number of key variables for this study. First, there are the geographical variables: local, national, regional and international (or global) level. Many of the phenomena in this paper relate to all these levels. This variable is then relevant for actors, the possible phenomenon and policy-answers, which can all be placed at one or more geographical level. However, only the most pertinent level for each individual problem will be analysed. Another key variable is, naturally, the actors involved. These are policy implementers, notably outside interveners and the objects of the policies. This

is an implicitly condescending approach that gives priority to interveners. However, I hope I amply compensate for this by giving plenty of agency to the objects of the policies and by questioning the simplicity of such a view in each case. Probably the most important variable for this paper is whether the problems that are dealt with are either root causes, or effects of root causes of conflict. Respectively, it is pertinent to analyse whether policies tackle effects or causes of conflict. The presumption is that root causes need to be dealt with for a self-sustaining peace to be possible. Again, this is done implicitly throughout much of the paper. There is unfortunately no temporal variable in this paper to look for differences in the post-conflict period due to lack of space.

1.5. Key concepts

The key concepts of my analytical framework are the following:

Internal conflict (also intrastate conflict, civil war). An internal conflict is a conflict where there are two or more parties to the conflict within a country, and there are over 25 battle-related deaths a year. This is the lowest possible threshold, and I use it to include low-intensity conflicts as well. This is used by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Other options would include a minimum of 100 deaths, and still another uses a 1000 deaths, which is defined as war[30]. A minimum of five percent of deaths have to have been incurred by each side - otherwise it would be massacre or genocide[31]. Instead of this criteria, many datasets however only require effective organization from both sides of the conflict. Note that it is only civil *war* after the 1000 mark has been reached. It should be noted that an intrastate war can also be waged by two or more non-state armed groups. This issue is unfortunately largely neglected in this paper.

Post-conflict. This generally refers to the period after the signing of a peace agreement. Optionally, it can also be described as a function of conflict intensity. A country is in the post-conflict phase, when no battle-related deaths exceeding the threshold mentioned occur for consecutive years. This is in fact a negative definition in relation to relapse into conflict. This is the definition taken here, since battle-related deaths are a better

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[30] Eck, Christine 2005. p.11
[31] Collier, Paul & al. 2003. p.11.

proxy of cessation of hostilities than a peace agreement, which in itself guarantees little, except sometimes a consequent peacekeeping mission. There can for example be peace through a ceasefire without any agreement. A figure that is often cited, is the first decade of peace being post-conflict[32]. The post-conflict phase has a very high risk of reversion to conflict, and has certain structures inherited from the active conflict phase, of which non-state armed groups are some. As an example of an alternative view, the Bloomfield-Leiss Conflict Model subdivides the post-conflict phase into post-hostilities conflict (where military options still exist), post-hostilities dispute (where the dispute remains unsettled) and settlement (where the parties create or accept conflict resolution) [33].

Peacebuilding. There is no clear consensus on the definition of peacebuilding, and the activities it refers to. The definition taken in this paper is that peacebuilding refers to all the different longer-term activities conducted in the post-conflict phase, that have as their primary goal the building of a just and self-sustaining peace with an emphasis on civilian efforts. This excludes humanitarian aid and development aid that have different (but complementary) primary goals. It does not exclude peacekeeping or counterinsurgency, but places the accent on non-military efforts. While the post-conflict period was above defined as a decade, many peacebuilding efforts, such as statebuilding efforts need a longer time. Additionally, key terms in this paper are rule-of-thumb peacebuilding, referring to the practitioner formulated approach, and effective peacebuilding, which is the optimal answer to the needs on the ground. For what the rule of thumb peacebuilding looks like, see Table 1. in section 1.3.1.

Non-state armed groups. This is another negative definition, that includes all organized armed groups that are not regular armed forces of the state, such as: gangs, organized crime, militias, paramilitaries, warlords, private military companies (PMCs) and insurgencies. **Gangs** can be defined as loose groups that have informal ownership of small urban spaces through a local monopoly of force. They provide some measure of entrepreneurial opportunity as well as local prestige and warrior-glamour; they frequently act as neighbourhood militias to police public spaces, enforce or resist ethnic

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[32] Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2007. p.465.
[33] Eck, Christine 2005. p.19.

and racial borders[34]. **Organized crime** can be defined as groups organized primarily to make economic gains in different illicit markets. They often rely on use of violence, which can give them a comparative advantage in licit markets as well. **Militias** are armed 'self-defence' groups of civilians that can support government, parties or local rulers. They can be volunteers, and do not specifically aim to take over the state or secede, but are significant for political patronage networks in many countries. A **paramilitary** group refers primarily to the type of organization and tasks the group is meant to conduct, which are military in nature. They can belong to or be connected to the regular armed forces or police, but do not have same status as regular military. While these can be a part of the police forces, this paper is mainly concerned with irregular or non-official forces with a military character, that often have unofficial ties to the government and either the armed forces or police. **Warlords** are individuals who autonomously control a territory through military power. The term is often used in the context of weak or collapsed states today. **Private military companies (PMCs)** (also private military firms, PMFs, or private security companies, PSCs) are private business entities that provide different kinds military and/or security services from combat to supply activities, and some of them are transnational in nature.

Insurgencies (used here synonymously with rebellion, guerrilla, insurrection). An insurgency can be defined as an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Political power is the central issue in insurgencies - to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate. It can have one of two goals: to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within a single state, or to break away from state control and form an autonomous entity or ungoverned space that they can control[35]. Insurgencies are strongly associated with asymmetric warfare, where there is a disparity of power between opposing sides. Though it is used synonymously here, 'guerrilla' also refers to a specific set of military tactics associated with asymmetric warfare. Terrorism is also a military tactic, where the target of violence, often civilians, are struck to create fear in order to have a political effect on the actual target. Of the different non-state armed

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34 Adapted from: Hagedorn, John 2008.
35 US Army 2006. p.1,2.

groups, insurgencies are the main focus of this paper, since they by definition pose by far the most significant threat to post-conflict peace.

Outside intervention - an outside intervention in the context of this paper, refers to any intervention, be it military, humanitarian or civilian crisis management that claims to be done to establish peace in a given country. It is by definition international, but is not necessarily - although it most often is - multilateral. UN integrated missions are a typical example of the kinds of multiactor interventions referred to in this paper that combine peacekeeping, peacebuilding, development and possibly humanitarian efforts.

1.6. Methodology and data

This study uses qualitative analysis based on existing literature. Pre-existing data was largely available, and because of the number of different issues and the macro-level at which they were analysed, there would have been little value added in either fieldwork or individual expert interviews. All data is thus at least secondary. As already described, the theoretical literature was read intensively to thematically pick out salient problems in today's post-conflict environments, of which non-state armed groups, and insurgencies in particular were chosen. The state, an entity and subject on its own, is not analyzed in this paper. 'Non-state armed groups' was further divided into sub-problems. After this, literature concerning policy-options to the different problems were examined. Literature for each section was read almost until the saturation point, when there was confidence in having a grasp of the main arguments and authorities of each issue.

The data can respectively be divided in two. The first part, concerning post-conflict problems, examined theoretical literature on post-conflict environments. Comparative statistical studies, which in the last ten years have developed intensely, were favoured. The most used among these were the work of Paul Collier and his colleagues, notably "Breaking the Conflict Trap", a World Bank policy research report. Collier is a professor of economics at Oxford and has worked as director of the Development Research Group of the World Bank. Other sources providing quantitative analyses were the Journal of Peace Research and the SIPRI Yearbook publications. After having looked at the most

salient problems, the particular themes were explored through works by the most quoted authors, most respected NGOs or think-tanks, and other qualitative sources.

Secondly, with respect to the different policies, the data used was somewhat different. Although the authoritative experts still held a key place, they were complemented with policy handbooks by experts (leading opinions on what works), lessons learned reports (analyses on what works and what does not), as well as commissioned evaluations (often commissioned when there is a problem or lack of knowledge, and are intended to be critical). Reports by people or organisations that at the time of writing were involved in policy-making were given less attention, as these are often diplomatic compromises with less self-critique. In some places, quantitative studies were informative as well, notably in looking at the risks different policy-options have incurred in the past. Thus, for each subject, different sources were used to increase the validity of the study.

Methodologically speaking, there was a problem of defining the audience. Three potential audiences were possible: 1.) the general public, 2.) academic readers, and 3.) conflict management experts. My goal was to be able to write to all of these, which in turn is reflected in the presentation of both the problems and solutions. Evidently, this lead to some difficult compromises. Each issue was thus presented by 1.) giving a descriptive and lengthy introduction, 2.) nonetheless, using a scientific approach, and 3.) key tensions reflected in cutting-edge analyses were mulled over.

1.7. Weaknesses

The subject, the framework of analysis and the methodology of this paper pose a number of weaknesses for this study.

First, this paper is a generalization of different post-conflict environments. It is important to ask whether it is meaningful to generalize on conflicts that can be immensely different. I believe that it is, if we acknowledge that this is a limited approach - there are some general tendencies in post-conflict environments, but they are *always* expressed locally and are context-dependent. Secondly, there is a problem with generalization and peacebuilding. While this study aims at being critical of a

peacebuilding model that is generically applied, because of lack of case studies, it cannot but result in giving a description of peacebuilding that is general. This is essentially a question of choice, where priority was given to a holistic and comprehensive view of different peacebuilding problems and policies together, while neglecting case studies. I have tried to make up for this by giving examples, being critical and emphasising - indeed one of the key findings of this paper - that all policies are context-dependent.

The second big problem stems from the amount of problems and policies analysed. Breadth has been favoured over depth. Analyses are necessarily superficial, even though a lot of effort has been put into understanding each issue deeply and giving a correct overview. Lastly, the frame of analysis is inherently political, since current peacebuilding favours the state against rebels. Studying how to build peace is also a political departure point.

There is a danger of tautology due to used data. I am trying to be critical of the practitioner-led conventional rule-of-thumb model of peacebuilding, by analysing data that is largely produced by practitioners. I hope to make up for this by being critical, using other kinds of sources, and relying on the academic work available.

Lastly, in retrospect I can say that some key themes have been undeservingly left out. Peacekeeping is almost absent. I, wrongly, presumed peacekeeping mainly to be done during the active conflict phase, whereas for example Collier et al. find that lengthy *post-conflict* peacekeeping reduces risks of reversion considerably[36]. The role of drafting new constitutions is also absent. Militias, I have come to realize, play a central role in post-conflict patronage politics, especially for electoral politics. Optionally, their role as local self-defence groups gives them a character of their own, and may grant them special legitimacy[37]. Warlords are also left out, whereas they play a significant role in collapsed states. I presumed, somewhat correctly, that these two share the same logics or part of the logics, of the other non-state armed groups that are described here. Truth commissions and transitional justice, and other social reconciliation methods are missing. The lack of any temporal analysis is also a major weakness. Conflicts between

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[36] Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2008.
[37] See for example lashkars in Pakistan: latimes.com 26th October 2009.

different non-state armed groups are another neglected subject. Secessionist conflicts also get little attention, and it is a good question how they would play out in my state/non-state framework, notably when becoming states of their own in the post-conflict period. Probably state-related peacebuilding policies, not treated in this paper, would then apply. Additionally, I would like to add, that the difference between non-state armed groups and state armed groups is less clear than I present it in this paper: for example, non-state armed groups are often expected to enter politics in the post-conflict phase, in effect becoming state-actors. Lastly, there is a conceptual difference between policies (applied) and solutions (effective action), that is not as clear as it should be in my analysis.

1.8. The state-centric approach and weak states

While the state is not the object of study in this paper, both the subject and the perspective taken in this paper demand a brief comment about it. The subject is peacebuilding and non-state actors; the inseparable second half of the peacebuilding coin is the state. More importantly however, the perspective of this paper explicitly favours the state. One reason for this is that almost all peacebuilding policies today are aimed at setting up a functioning and legitimate state structure (however realistic this is). This is unsurprising, since the weightiest interventions are conducted by states, or organizations representing and upholding a system of states such as the UN. Additionally, it is often the Western liberal democratic and capitalist version of the state that is the end-goal of peacebuilding. By following this mould, this paper is extremely uncritical.

Another reason why I want to mention states, is to make the reader aware that the state, as Westerners understand it, probably does not exist in post-conflict areas nor in most of the regions of the world for that matter. This section is essential for answering the research question on what today's post-conflict environments look like. The misconception of the universality of effective First World states even in political sciences is exemplified in leading currents of International Relations, where 'the state' is a given unit and departure point in the international system. Weber's definition of the state is probably the most famous one. According to it, an organization is a state: "if and

insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim on the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence in the enforcement of its order"[38]. This is probably the way many people think about states in the West. However, for example during an internal conflict this formulation - monopoly of violence - does not by definition hold. Furthermore, it can be argued that the majority of states do not actually control the entire territory accorded to them by internationally recognized borders[39]. Lastly and perhaps most importantly from the point of view of peacebuilding, while Weber's mention of 'legitimacy' might have been a non-normative observation, this criteria probably holds for very few of the post-conflict entities we designate as states. Weber's definition is however applicable as a desirable end-goal from the point of view of the definition of peacebuilding taken by this paper – a normative 'should-be'. I will cursorily point to some ideas which will hopefully help the reader to think about differences between what we call states, notably when thinking about post-conflict peacebuilding.

Sovereignty is a concept we link to states as inherent. Stephen Krasner argues that there are three different attributes to sovereignty, that often get confused: 1.) international legal sovereignty. This means states mutually recognize each other and enables states to join international organizations, and sign legally binding treaties. 2.) Westphalian sovereignty. This implies non-intervention into the internal affairs of other states. This is the political sense in which sovereignty is often used: each state is independent and autonomous, is not subject to external authority and can make its own internal rules. 3.) Domestic sovereignty. This refers to the political internal order in a country and its degree of effectiveness[40]. Essentially, this refers to what Weber alluded to as accepted monopoly of use of force. All states do not have all three of these attributes of sovereignty. As already mentioned, the principle of non-intervention, while it has never been absolute, is today not supremely important especially in areas affected by conflict. Many post-conflict states (notably their governments) can be described as having international legal sovereignty, which grants them some international legitimacy, some

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[38] Weber, Max 1968. p. 154
[39] See for example: Failed State Index 2009. While this measurement takes into account a multitude of factors and is mainly aimed at assessing the risk of collapse or conflict, it is indicative that out of 177 only 13 countries are listed as 'sustainable', and 46 as either 'sustainable' or 'moderate' (out of 4 categories).
[40] Krasner, Stephen 2007.

support from other states, a seat at the UN and probably access to foreign aid. But they do not have effective domestic sovereignty.

Tilly analyses the formation of the modern European state since 990AD. His analysis describes political organizations, states, that are vastly different from the notion of today's Western state. He differentiates between states and *national* states. National states are states that govern multiple contiguous regions and their cities by means of centralized, differentiated and autonomous structures - what I have termed here the Western conception of the state. He concludes however, that these have been rare and only very recently became the dominant way of organizing states. States, on the other hand, are 'coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories'. This looser definition allows for many different kinds of organizations that have competed for dominance in Europe until recently, for example city-states, empires, theocracies and federations. Tilly goes on to show how the form of European states have today is the result of an arduous competition between different organizations through warfare and struggling to set up the means for it (both military and financial).

Tribute-taking empires had large military apparatuses, but left local administration to regional power-holders who had considerable autonomy. These empires were the dominant form in regions where there were relatively few means (both men and military capabilities such as weapons), but these means were concentrated in few hands. War was waged by rulers for loot, and consequent tribute to the centre. City-states and urban federations on the other hand tend to form systems of fragmented sovereignty, where each holds some means of coercion and no one is supreme, and capital is concentrated and accumulated in cities. Temporary coalitions and consultative institutions are important in such situations[41]. Thus the monopoly of violence, and notably the way of making money by it, which in turn was used to sustain the monopoly, could be organized in many different ways. I think that through this lens, it is already easier to understand events in many conflict and post-conflict states, where alliances are struck and power battles fought between different elites, warlords, local militias, urban centres, organized criminals and insurgencies. Tilly's state has four core functions without which

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[41] Tilly, Charles 1990. p. 1-3, 19-21, 65.

it cannot exist: 1.) statemaking – attacking and checking competitors within the territory claimed by the state, 2.) warmaking – attacking rivals outside its territories, 3.) protection – attacking and checking rivals of the ruler's most important allies, inside and/or outside the territory, 4.) extraction – acquiring the means for the above (finances, resources, labour)[42].

Tilly also examines the Third World states and their armies, at the time they became independent of colonialism. He argues that: "on average, [they] were following coercion intensive paths to statehood. The departing colonial powers left little accumulated capital behind them, but bequeathed to their successor states' military forces drawn from and modelled on the repressive forces they had previously established to maintain their own local administration. Relatively well equipped and trained armed forces then specialized in control of civilian population and in combat against insurgents rather than interstate war. --- Third World armies commonly resisted civilian control. --- To the extent that their states generated revenues by selling commodities on the international market, bought arms overseas, and received military aid from great powers, furthermore, the armed forces enjoyed insulation from reliance on taxation and conscription authorized by civilian governments"[43].

Clapham and Reno both offer us a complex image of post-Cold War Third World states. Like Tilly, Clapham notes that states are not always an achievable form of political organization, or at least not easily, since they are expensive both in economic and organizational terms, because they require the military capacity to defend themselves and extract the necessary resources from the population. He goes on to analyze the eroding effects on state sovereignty (in terms of control) of African states through increased dependency of and intrusion by the international system. Government control is limited by electoral democratic as well as human rights requirements, outside observers such as NGOs, dependency on foreign aid and debt repayment. Additionally, insurgents are now being accorded many of the same rights in the international arena as are governments – notably with international mediation, that places government and insurgents on an equal footing. Effectively in some places, governments control only the capital area. With respect to governments, the public character of the state is

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[42] Ibid. p.96.
[43] Ibid. p.199-201.

questionable in many places. Many rulers have used states as personal fiefdoms for themselves and their clique. Using the state structures to participate in trade, both licit and illicit, for personal profit is not uncommon. Thus Clapham states that while there are wide differences in the different combinations of these factors African states take, the notion of statehood in the many senses it is used (public institution, sovereign entity both internally and externally), should essentially be considered a relative concept and as a question of degree – not of existence or non-existence[44].

I would like to add that the link between Third World governments and extraction of resources from their population may not be the most pertinent relationship for rulers today, and that rulers too might be insulated, notably through natural resources. The Economist for example writes on the extensive international sanctions imposed on the Guinean military junta, following a massacre of opposition protesters in September 2009: "Guinea, which is rich in bauxite and gold, is said to be set to earn $7 billion in return for mineral and oil rights, recently granted to a Chinese company, so it could get by without the help from its old friends in the West. Captain Camara has yet to declare his candidacy in a presidential election due in January. In fact, he has not said whether there will be an election at all"[45].

Reno goes further in formulating what he calls the 'Shadow State'. Some African governments use the facade of official state institutions and internationally recognized sovereignty to manipulate external actors' access to internal markets, both legal and illegal. The Shadow State however is where the real power is, essentially being a form of personal rule. These rulers participate in lucrative illicit commerce which forms their foundation for patronage and power. This commerce is often associated with, causes, and prolongs conflict. Rulers may even have an interest against formal institutions, which can acquire interests and powers of their own. According to Reno, personal rule is exercised by arming youths to intimidate economic and political opponents. Thus, "a range of activities that are commonly defined as corruption and evasion of government authority, or as consequences of incompetent and bad policies, actually grows out of the purposeful strategies of rulers". Additionally, the strategy can include "abandoning

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[44] Clapham, Cristopher 1998.
[45] The Economist 7th-13th November 2009. p.44.

attempts to control territory within formally recognized borders"[46]. Hentz for example argues, that in Africa wars move fluidly across borders, since in practice borders are often either poorly implemented or non-existent in practice[47].

In general, states that have weak governance, whatever the reason may be, are in today's discourse referred to as 'weak states', 'failed states' and 'collapsed states'. 'Uncontrolled areas' are also often referred to when speaking of territories where governments are absent. What weakens or may collapse a state – supposing that there was a stronger state to begin with – is beyond the scope of this paper[48].

Weak states have become the centre of the discussion for security issues today. The US 2002 National Security Strategy identifies weak states as a source of new threats[49]. To quote just one of innumerable studies, Fearon and Laitin state that:

> "Increasingly, however, the major powers must worry about bad 'externalities' that result from the combination of the scientific revolution and political disorder, economic collapse, and anger in the third world. These externalities include risks of catastrophic terrorism using WMD, refugee flows, health threats, enhanced drug smuggling networks, and disruption of oil supplies. Major powers can also suffer from destabilizing consequences of protracted civil wars for whole regions, as neighboring states are weakened or regional incentives for weapons acquisition and proliferation increase. Finally, the major powers have faced significant and justified pressures for intervention on humanitarian grounds as well"[50].

State failure can be defined as the non-performance of key state functions. This broad definition however leaves the problematic question of what are the core functions of the state. 'Failure' as a term is also normative, whereas 'weak' is more descriptive and useful. State collapse, a much deeper (and quite rare) kind of weakness is often linked to

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[46] Reno, William 2000. p.433-435.

[47] Hentz, James 2007.

[48] For example, the Failed State Index used a four-step process to analyze country risks of conflict or collapse (two different things, to my mind): (1) rating 12 social, economic, and political/military indicators; (2) assessing the capabilities of five core state institutions considered essential for sustaining security; (3) identifying idiosyncratic factors and surprises; and (4) placing countries on a conflict map that shows the risk history of countries being analyzed. Demonstrating the complexity of the issue, the twelve different indicators are: Social Indicators - 1. Mounting Demographic Pressures, 2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies, 3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia, 4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight; Economic Indicators - 5. Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines, 6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline; Political Indicators - 7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State, 8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services, 9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights, 10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State", 11. Rise of Factionalized Elites, 12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors.

[49] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002.

[50] Fearon, James & Laitin, David 2004.

institutional bankruptcy. An often used definition by Zartman defines state collapse as: "a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power,) law, and political order have fallen apart"[51].

In light of this, the response formulated by the Western World has been to 're-build' the states in their mirror image. Essentially, a state would have the legitimate monopoly of violence over its territory, be democratic and respect human rights, and have functioning legislative, judicial and penal systems. Often, such peacebuilding efforts are planned for a span of five to ten years. How realistic this is, considering it took European states hundreds of years to develop such institutions, is questionable. Whether it is possible at all, is also a good question.

1.8.1. The dichotomy between state and non-state armed groups

I wish to draw attention to two aspects of relations between state and non-state armed groups: 1.) the fact that the reality on the ground puts into question the implicit perspective in this division, and that 2.) it is an inherently political division, that is not neutral, and has clear implications for peacebuilding.

While it does not apply to all cases, Policzer's argument questions the simple conceptualization between state and non-state armed groups, and the way it is commonly used: "Contrary to the dichotomy it predicts, there is a great deal of overlap between states and non-state armed groups. In some cases, non-state groups look and behave like would-be states, with administrations that provide services to populations under their de facto control. In other cases, de jure states are such in name only, having dismantled their bureaucracies (or failed to build it in the first place), and operating as a series of loosely connected networks. --- In many cases, the only difference between states and nonstate groups is international recognition"[52].

Looking at the realities on the ground, state and non-state armed groups can differ quite little. This is certainly not the case in all situations, but for example according to one study both sides were culpable when examining the war crime of one-sided violence

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[51] Clapham, Cristopher 2003. p.26.
[52] Policzer, Pablo 2002. p.2.

against civilians. Government forces were responsible for the most deadly acts, rebels for a greater number of acts[53]. Both can have the monopoly of violence in certain areas, extract resources to uphold this monopoly from the population or territory, often enforce some kind of legal code, and possibly provide 'public' services to the populace. While it is clear that this description does not hold for all non-state armed groups, it blurs the distinction in practice between the two. Certainly, both can be 'predatory' - employing means of violence and coercion for personal benefits.

There are at least two significant ways in which governments can differ from non-state armed groups in theory. First, they have internationally recognized sovereignty, granting them certain benefits. To continue to profit from these benefits, internationally recognized governments are likely to be more dependent on legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. Secondly, governments can be elected, and again in theory, answerable to their electorate. Yet as I have described above, this is not necessarily the case for all governments. On the other hand, many - though not all - insurgent groups do seek international legitimacy and recognition, since they wish to one day become either a part of the legitimate government or a legitimate government on their own. Additionally, many insurgent groups might be partly internationally recognized. For example, numerous states recognized the state of Palestine in 1988 after the PLO proclamation of independence. Non-state armed groups have foreign policies and some have diplomatic relations with states[54]. Insurgent groups can also be highly dependent on the population for cover, resources, recruitment and information, leading some of them to treat the civilian population well (although in practice most groups use both coercion and co-optation of the population).

Politically, the division between state and non-state armed groups is significant. This is well captured by Clapham, describing the Cold War period and internationally recognized sovereignty: "--- the conventions of juridical statehood continued to impose certain limits on external intervention. Most critically, the principle of juridical statehood helped to define whoever held power in the capital as the 'government' of the state concerned, and correspondingly to define the insurgent movements as 'rebels'. This in turn gave the 'government' greatly enhanced access to external aid". With the

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[53] Stepanova, Ekaterina 2009.
[54] Clapham, Cristopher 1998. p.152.

ending of the Cold War however, this has changed somewhat: "Instead of regarding one party as representing the state, and the others as opposing it, external mediators came to conceive all the parties as subsisting on a more or less equal footing; their function in turn was no longer to protect those who could claim (under the rules of 'negative sovereignty') to represent the state, but rather to achieve a political settlement through recognition of all the competing parties, and the articulation of some constitutional structure which would encompass them. In the process, the international standing of insurgents was greatly enhanced". Reflecting this process, power-sharing agreements between governments and rebels, also dealt with in this paper, are a key peacebuilding policy-tool today.

The point is however, that if we exclude supporting purely secessionist movements, the international strategy is to take the rebels *into* the government, and possibly support the elimination of the factions that refuse to do so. For secessionist movements, the aim is still statebuilding, looking at Kosovo as an example. While it is not as clear-cut as I suggest here, I think it is useful to think of the division between state and non-state armed groups as significant in the sense that it implies two sets of *different* policy-tools. For non-state armed groups, it will include co-optation into power-sharing agreements and unity governments or elimination, DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - dismantling instruments of coersion) and possible amnesty or reduced sentences for crimes committed during the conflict[55]. For the government however the key policy-tools are good governance, respect for human rights, SSR (security sector reform - strengthening the instruments of coercion, while making them more accountable), and possibly a partial DDR to reduce the size of the army. This is essentially the perspective from which peacebuilding is conducted today, and treated in this paper.

1.8.2. Security Sector Reform

While the state is not the object of study of this paper, the reform of the security sector of the state is referred to so many times that it needs a short description. Security Sector Reform (SSR) has becomes one of the most central peacebuilding policies. The EU for

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[55] Some actors do attempt to increase respect for human rights and humanitarian law by insurgents. The ICRC for example is actively involved in disseminating IHL to non-state armed gorups.

example, focuses the majority of its civilian crisis management efforts in actions falling under SSR[56].

The SSR can be understood in broad or narrow terms in relation to the actors it concerns. The narrower definition would mainly include the core security actors and their reform: police, defence and intelligence. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) uses this term. The broader definition includes four types of actors and their reform: core security actors, management and oversight bodies, justice and rule of law, and non-statutory (unofficial) security forces. The term is relatively new, and there is no absolute consensus on the definition. Other UN bodies for example use justice and security reform (JSSR), and the DPKO uses 'rule of law' for activities that are related to police, penal, justice or other law enforcement agencies.

According to the OECD, an SSR aims at: "transforming the security system, which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and thus contributing to a well-functioning security framework". The view taken in this paper is that the objective of an SSR is to guarantee that the state has the legitimate monopoly of violence in its territory. The OECD additionally notes that there are three central challenges to SSR: providing an institutional framework for the security sector, strengthening the governance of the different parts of the security sector, and assuring that security forces are both capable and accountable to civil authorities. Testifying to the broadness of the tasks involved, UN integrated missions for example have mandates that include: "police and defence reform, restructuring, training and operational support; assistance in the restoration and reform of judicial and prison systems; support for the restoration of state authority and administrative capacities at central and local levels; good governance; support for civil society; and assistance to constitutional processes"[57].

While SSR can also be conducted in peaceful societies, SSR in post-conflict environments poses its own challenges. David Law for example differentiates between situations where the security sector has to be reconstructed and those where it has to be

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[56] consilium.europa.eu: EU Operations.
[57] Hänggi, Heiner & Scherrer, Vicenza 2007. p.1, 3-5.

built from scratch, such as in Kosovo. Whereas in peaceful environments the focus is on institutional reform, in post-conflict settings notably if violence is still high, the primary concern is security and actual reform can only be conducted in more peaceful areas. The focus on security, and the lead role that is given to the military, often results in the military reform taking undesirable precedence over police, judicial, penal, legislative and institutional reform in the long run. An overly military approach in providing law and order in detriment to communal policing tends to alienate the population and delegitimize the emerging security forces. Also, efficiency of the security forces has often been favoured over accountability. The reality of security forces in conflict areas also needs to be recognized. Looking at six case studies, Law finds that already before conflicts occurred, different security sector jurisdictions could be characterized as fiercely competing over scarce resources, not being under the control of the civilian administration but rather an elite, and whereas the population saw them as threats to rather than providers of security, the security forces' main interest was in controlling, not protecting, the civilian population. Also, the problem of transferring responsibility to locals (the exit strategy and condition for sustainability) in the immediate aftermath of conflicts poses two problems: 1.) a lack of capacity, and 2.) many of the potential actors have been heavily involved in the conflict, and thus represent certain factions possibly responsible for war crimes, and SSR may actually entrench their power[58].

All parts of the security sector are interrelated and interdependent, and their reform needs to be synchronized. In Afghanistan, where each sector was initially given to a lead country, people caught by the Afghan police sometimes had to be let go, because there were no courts to try them in[59]. Importantly for post-conflict peacebuilding, SSR can include the integration of former rebel combatants into the new security sector. This type of power-sharing has however, has proven to be extremely difficult[60]. Security sector posts also tend to be among the most contested and sought for[61]. Additional problems with respect to the international actors have included lack of overall strategic planning, lack of inter-institutional coordination and decision-making processes among different actors, and lack of long-term commitment by donors[62].

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[58] Law, David 2006.
[59] Sedra, Mark 2004. p.13-14.
[60] See for example, The Economist 7th May 2009.
[61] See for example: Sedra, Mark 2002. p.9-11.
[62] Law, David 2006.

Ultimately, SSR is intended to complement the broader governance and administration reforms linked to statebuilding, effectively guaranteeing the state's capacity to levy taxes, which in turn guarantees the sustainability of the reforms[63]. This exit strategy, has however proven extremely difficult. David Law writes that: "Expectations about the ability of external actors to restore more or less functioning security sectors, where they have long been absent or where they did not exist pre-conflict, need to be tempered by a strong dose of realism. To assume that they can, in half a generation or so, build structures securing the accountability of the security sector, where little or none existed pre-conflict, is unrealistic"[64].

1.9. Intervention - why it is not a solution to every problem

This paper takes as the point of departure that there is an outside intervention in a post-conflict environment. There are however a number of arguments against interventions as well. Naturally, the type of intervention can also vary a lot. It is possible for example to talk of a forceful intervention by peacekeepers to stop warring factions - peacemaking - or it is possible to talk only of the post-conflict peacebuilding efforts by outsiders. These two types of interventions are responses to different problems and use different tools, which shape the terms of the argument over whether such an intervention should or should not be made. Perhaps the most common type of intervention combines both, with peacekeepers having a less forceful role in monitoring the implementation of a peace agreement combined with other overall peacebuilding efforts. Because the basis for the analytical framework of this paper is 'from-problem-to-solution', the macro-level analysis of interventions is given very little attention. I will here however outline some general problems with interventions.

Three general, somewhat overlapping, arguments are pertinent. First, it can be argued that there are simply situations that no type of outside intervention, no matter the resources, design or mandate, can resolve[65].

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[63] Ruohomäki, Olli 2009.
[64] Law, David 2006. p.15-16.
[65] For example: Stedman (2006), an expert on peacebuilding for the UN, for example has created a difficulty score for post-conflict peacebuilding. The variables that make achieving a sustainable peace harder are: 1.) having over two parties implementing the peace agreement, 2.) presence of easily tradeable

Secondly, all interventions are not equal - some interventions are consciously incapable of resolving the crisis at hand. Notably, interventions that are political tokens, in the sense that since 'something' needs to be done, not least in the eyes of the public in Western countries, 'something' is done. The interventions in Rwanda in the 1990's culminating in the genocide-period are a good example[66]. Interventions with too little resources and lacking a strong enough mandate can at worst deflect attention from what would really be needed, diminish faith in peace dividends and invite spoilers.

Stedman for example looks at dollars spent per UN peacekeeping mission by regions, and notes that the cost of missions to Europe is "significantly higher" than to Africa, Latin America, the Middle East or the Caribbean. While he states that his analysis is only tentative, since he doesn't look at funding by regional organizations or member states, nor differences in costs by region, it points to the fact that all places will not get the same treatment (again, situations and need for treatment vary as well). Not all places are as likely to get an intervention in the first place: the UN also responds quicker to conflicts in Europe than in Africa or Asia, and less frequently in powerful states with large armies[67].

Interventions can also be badly designed simply because it is not known what is effective. As I pointed out, there is a rule-of-thumb model for post-conflict peacebuilding. Questioning it, Collier, Hoeffler and Söderblom write that the premises underlying current peacebuilding:

> "--- are not explicitly derived from political or economic theory, but rather have emerged over the past 15 years of practitioner experience. We suggest that, to an extent, they contrast with theory-based hypotheses. --- The predominant learning process has been practitioner-based. Because it is a recent phenomenon, academic research has taken time to address the subject. --- [C]urrently policy addresses post-conflict risks primarily through political design. Underlying this is an implicit theory of the causes of conflict which gives precedence to motivation and, in particular, to grievances based on political exclusion.--- Unpalatable as it may be, peace appears to depend upon an external military presence sustaining a gradual economic recovery, with political design playing a somewhat subsidiary role."

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valuable commodities, 3.) large warring parties, 4.) secessionist conflicts, 5.) spoilers, 6.) neighbours hostile to agreement, 7.) a collapsed state, 8.) weak peace agreement. Stedman's argument is that while more difficult cases will not necessarily fail, they will require more coercive strategies and more resources.
[66] UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004. p.70.
[67] Gilligan, Michael & Stedman, Stephen 2003.

Lastly, interventions have some known possible bad effects. These might outweigh any possible positive effects that an intervention could achieve. The principle of "first, do no harm", which refers specifically to taking responsibility for the unintended consequences of outside action, is relevant here. I am primarily concerned with post-conflict peacebuilding (for the merits of not intervening in the active conflict phase, see 3.3. To intervene or not). I will take the example of massive long-term interventions in which the negative effects become most visible. These kinds of interventions involve a 'sustained transitional administration', massive statebuilding, possibly a weak or collapsed state, and sometimes outside interveners exercising key government functions such as policing, judging and administration. Even in these cases however, the goal is to build up local capacity for the intervention to end one day ('exit strategy').

An extreme example of an administration supported, and largely built, by outsiders is the Palestinian Authority (PA). While it is dangerous to generalize from this example, since in effect the Israeli occupation places a cap on the development of this administration as well as the Palestinian economy, the personalized rule and massive inflows of cash for a long period of time bring out some instructive negative examples. Anne Le More writes of the PA, that:

> "its functioning has also been almost entirely reliant on funds remitted by Israel or charitably made available by donors. It should be re-emphasized that from its establishment to this day, the PA has never been able to contribute its own resources to public investment and the provision of public services. --- This raises issues of acute vulnerability and sustainability, especially given heavy demographic pressures, and has been exposed most forcefully following the decision of Western donors to suspend direct cash flows to the PA after 2006. ---
> [Arafat and his clique] spent the ensuing decade [after the Oslo agreements] competing against one another for favours - both internally as part of Arafat's patronage system and with the Israeli for movement permits, security transactions, and business deals, etc. - to maintain positions of power and to build their own wealth. Thus --- the Palestinian regime which emerged --- after 1994 was authoritarian, unaccountable and repressive"[68].

Le Billon also concludes that "although aid can foster governance", massive aid can sever the taxation-representation nexus, which refers to the leverage that populations have over governments dependent on them for revenue. Effectively, the aid donors become the most important constituency for governments[69]. Weinstein for example argues that in some cases, letting groups compete with each other (of which war is one

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[68] Le More, Anne 2008. p.168-169.
[69] Le Billon, Philippe 2005. p.80.

form) without intervening will lead to 'autonomous recovery'. "Autonomous recovery elevates strong leaders who are able to secure the resources necessary to win wars and have the power to implement far-reaching policy reforms. --- [It] offers internal incentives for institution-building when the conditions are right"[70].

Massive amounts of aid also have a debilitating effect on the economy in many ways. The 'Dutch Disease' causes inflation and strengthens the local currency, as well as draws investment and labour to the sectors receiving the aid (in this case, the civil service). Strengthening the local currency hurts export industries and rising prices will cause poverty for those left outside the 'aid-sectors'[71]. Higher wages in the civil service and foreign NGOs draw labour away from the private sector, further dampening the prospects for economic recovery, in turn further lowering incentives for the government to depend on taxation for revenue[72]. The economy matters: Collier, Hoeffler and Söderblom find that economic recovery, when compared with other factors commonly believed to be significant, is one of the factors that statistically most reduces the risk of a return to conflict[73].

Massive investment in a country's reconstruction also poses high risks of corruption. Corruption in turn may lead to:

> "--- the entrenchment of an imbalanced power or political status quo inherited from the conflict. As the groups empowered by the outcome of the war sustain dominant political and economic positions through corruption, they may prevent the redistribution of power, and stifle adequate checks and balances. Finally, post-conflict mismanagement and embezzlement of reconstruction assistance can also delegitimise the local government and lead to social unrest. Corruption facilitates criminality and persisting violence in post-conflict societies by compromising the conduct and independence of the police and judiciary, and through the recycling of former combatants into the private militias of corrupt politicians or organised crime."[74]

Fearon and Laitin note that there is a tendency of 'mission creep', that is for missions to be unable to exit in areas where state administrative, police and military capacities have been low. Missions that were initially planned as relatively simple peacekeeping missions end up requiring long-term statebuilding functions. This is notably the case

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[70] Weinstein, Jeremy 2005. p.5.
[71] Ebrahim-zadeh, Christine 2003.
[72] Le Billon, Philippe 2005. p.80.
[73] Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2008.
[74] Le Billon, Philippe 2005. p.76.

with conflicts involving protracted insurgencies. This sort of "sustained transitional authority" has been labelled by many as occupation and imperialism. Fearon and Laitin note that most interventions differ however from imperialism in being multilateral, often seeking legitimacy through an approval by the UN and being finite in time, that is, desiring to exit as quickly as possible[75]. Yet prolonged and sustained outside governance structures, aided by outside military forces, can raise serious legitimacy questions. This is especially the case when insurgencies resurface, military responses are stepped up and civilian casualties rise, installed rulers are perceived as puppets promoting their own factions, and corruption is rife. The situation in Afghanistan after the re-election of President Hamid Karzai in 2009 is a good example.

In light of these arguments, why is it sensible to intervene? First, it is morally the right thing to do. Today's conflicts affect not only fighters but innocent civilians who need to be protected by outsiders as their own governments either will not or cannot. Secondly, conflicts tend to be self-perpetuating downward spirals, 'conflict traps'. Every year of conflict is 'development in reverse', with effects far outlasting the war. Countries with weak economies in turn tend to fall back into conflict more easily[76]. In a statistical comparative study, Collier et al. argue that: "Our central argument can be stated briefly: the key root of conflict is the failure of economic development. Countries with low, stagnant and unequally distributed per capita incomes that have remained dependent on primary commodities for their exports face dangerously high risks of prolonged conflict"[77]. Thus Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom for example conclude that: "given the enormously high costs of conflict, the risk-reductions that economic reconstruction and military peacekeeping provide are likely to be very cost-effective"[78]. Lastly, outside intervention helps fighting parties overcome commitment problems - it enables them to reach better outcomes than they could by themselves. Walter states that: " Negotiations fail because combatants cannot credibly promise to abide by terms that create numerous opportunities for exploitation after the treaty is signed ---. Only if a third party is willing to enforce or verify demobilization, and only if the combatants are willing to extend power-sharing guarantees, will promises to abide by the original terms be credible and

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[75] Fearon, James & Laitin, David 2004.
[76] Collier, Paul & al. 2003. p.13-32.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2008. p.473.

negotiations succeed"[79]. Still, interventions need to be backed by the sufficient resources, assessment of the depth of the tasks at hand, a realistic time frame and sobriety on the inherent problems of such efforts, with the know-how and willingness to address them.

2. Non-state armed groups and problems for peacebuilding in post-conflict environments

This section deals with one type of structure inherited from the conflict phase that make peace more fragile compared to the pre-conflict stage: organized violence not pertaining to the state. While there is organized non-state violence in peacetimes, internal conflicts by definition imply higher intensity and a qualitative difference. The main focus is on insurgency. Implicit problems with thinking in terms of state and non-state organized violence have been addressed above (see 1.9.1. The dichotomy between state and non-state armed groups). The function of this section then is to explain in detail the type of problem non-state armed groups are for self-sustaining peace.

Organizing an armed threat against the state is a daunting task. Since this is relational in terms of power, it will also depend on the strength of the state. It requires organization, recruitment, finance, armament, secrecy, often a doctrine and lastly all these need to be in place to counter and survive attacks by government forces. The rebel forces need to be viable. Rebellions or insurgencies do not occur everywhere. There is then, an entry threshold to the market of use of violence[80]. The striking fact about a post-conflict situation is, that we can assume that there are already individuals who have the know-how and means to pass this threshold and organize rebellion. We can already assume that the country possesses the inherent factors (natural resources, geography, ethnic divides) that make rebellion likely in the first place, and secondly the factors acquired during the conflict phase (networks and technical know-how, weapons, finances).

Finally, non-state armed groups includes a huge range of different terms and phenomena: rebellion, insurgency, terrorists, gangs, militias, paramilitary, guerrilla, organised crime, and warlords. Is it meaningful to group these together - do they have

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[79] Walter, Barbara 2001. p.5-6.
[80] Weinstein, Jeremy 2005b. p.602.

enough in common to be analysed as one category? Essentially all these groups have one thing in common: they all challenge the monopoly of violence of the state. This means that 1) they use violence for specific objectives, which is why they are often also called entrepreneurs of violence, and 2) they are willing to confront the machinery of violence of the state with violence.

Our focus is on sustainability of peace, and so the key question is which of these phenomena actually pose a significant threat to peace, and which of them pose the most significant threats. A rebellion is often defined as a group trying to overtake the state or parts of the territory through use of violence. It would then by definition pose an existential threat to the stability or integrity of the state. Note that this line of thinking makes the state, and not necessarily for example the population, the primary object of security. The argument is of course, that securing a stable state is the means to securing individuals. As I stated above though, this line of argument has big holes in it.

Table 2. Definitions of non-state armed groups

Insurgency	An organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Political power is the central issue in insurgencies, --- to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate. One of two goals: to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within a single state, or to break away from state control and form an autonomous entity or ungoverned space that they can control.[81]
Rebellion	Used synonymously with insurgency.
Guerrilla	Same as rebellion or insurgency, but focus of term is on tactics used: 'guerrilla warfare', referring to non-conventional asymmetrical warfare.
Terrorism	Focus on means (asymmetrical warfare tactics), specifically "acts with the aim of seriously intimidating a population or of unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or with the aim of seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or social structures of a country or international organisation"[82]. Political scientists usually note that the target of the attack, often civilians, is other than the intended political target, often the government. This creates pressure on the government or rulers by instilling fear in the population. Also states can use terrorism, for example to create fear and quiescence in the population (state-terrorism). Terrorism is also a legal category.

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[81] US Army 2006. p.1,2.
[82] Pejic, Jelena 2004. p.72-73.

Private military companies, PMCs	Private business entities that provide military and/or security services. These include armed guards and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel[83]. Also supply or logistics providers are PMCs. Today some are transnational corporations. Also called private military firms (PMFs) or contractors, and private security companies (PSC) and mercenaries (somewhat different).
Coup d'état	Small group of plotters - leaders and a militant cadre from inside the government, usually military - replace state leaders and seize control of government structures with little support from the people at large. Often secretive approach. Can also exploit revolutionary situation[84]. While they pose a significant threat, these are state-actors and will not be dealt with in this paper.
Paramilitaries	Refers primarily to the type of organization and tasks the group is meant to conduct. These are military in nature. They can belong to or be connected to the regular armed forces or police, but do not have same status as regular military. This can then mean two separate things: 1. a part of the police, such as the French Gendarmerie, that has a more military structure and capabilities, and is connected to both the Ministry of Interior and Defence[85], or 2. Irregular or non-official forces with a military character, that often have unofficial ties to the government and either the armed forces or police. Sometimes used synonymously with militia.
Warlords	Individuals autonomously controlling a territory through military power. Often used in the context of weak or collapsed states today.
Organised crime	Groups organized primarily to make economic gains in different illicit markets. Often rely on use of violence, which can give them a comparative advantage in licit markets as well.
Militias	Armed 'self-defence' groups of civilians. Can support government, parties or local rulers. Can be volunteers. Do not specifically aim to take over state or secede. Can be significant for patronage politics.
Gangs	Informal ownership of small urban spaces through a local monopoly of force. Also provide some measure of entrepreneurial opportunity as well as local prestige and warrior-glamour; frequently act as neighbourhood militias to police public spaces, enforce or resist ethnic and racial borders. Institutionalized gangs are intergenerational and have acquired complex set of beliefs around them[86].

If we accept that the state is the vehicle for peace and the security of the individuals living in its territory, these groups must be analysed by looking at how likely they are to engage in military confrontation with the state's armed forces. There are two reasons

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[83] Swiss Government & ICRC 2008.
[84] US Army 2006. p.5.
[85] Lutterbeck, Derek 2004.
[86] Adapted from: Hagedorn, John 2008.

why groups that pose a more existential threat to the state (overtake it or secede from it) are more dangerous for civilians: they are likely to try to militarily confront the state to take it over, and conversely the state is bound to answer any existential threat with force, building up conflict intensity. Irregular armed groups can also fight each other.

I pose a number of questions in relation to non-state armed groups from a security perspective. What kind of military capacity do these different forms of organized violence have? This is the perspective from which they are analysed in this paper. I will also observe the size and level of organization of the different groups - what level of conflict can they militarily cause and sustain? Obviously, there is huge variation in groups, and overlap between groups. Another way I differentiate between non-state armed groups is by looking at their objectives. Objectives should be distinguished between instrumental ones and final ones. I will thus estimate the threat to peace by different groups, through the threat posed to the state, as a function of **means** and final **goals**. Lastly, it is necessary to ask how likely it is that one type of group will change into another or be used for more threatening action.

I will proceed by types of groups first, and then through key requirements for organized violence – namely weapons, recruits and finance. I come to the conclusion that groups that have the characteristics of insurgency pose the biggest threat to a sustainable post-conflict peace. Thus, most of the analysis will be done from the point of view of insurgencies, although all armed groups require weapons, finances, etc. In the next section, I analyse how the different issues regarding insurgencies can be countered through today's peacebuilding policies.

2.1. Gangs

Gangs are not a post-conflict phenomena, but largely associated with urbanization and increasingly alienated (economically and socially) young men seeking power and respect. Gangs combine neighbourhood (small urban territories) with identity and possible sources of income (especially illicit). Gangs can reinforce ethnic divides if this is a source of identity for them, especially since gangs tend to oppose each other as they compete for urban spaces. Although groups can have a codified system of organization,

this is not necessary and at least it is not a hierarchical military type that would be capable of conducting large scale military operations threatening the state. There is huge variation within this type of group: from small local unorganized youths, to gangs present in many countries with a capability to oppose state forces in their neighbourhoods, of which the MS-13 is an example. The MS-13 has been identified as one of seven Priority Groups of the FBI's National Gang Strategy. Even of this level of group the FBI states, that: "based upon available intelligence ---, the MS-13 in the United States is still a loosely structured street gang; --- Gang members affiliate themselves into groups known as cliques. Each clique will have a local leader called the "shot caller." There is no evidence to support the existence of a single leader or governing authority which is directing the daily activity of all MS-13 cliques in the United States"[87]. The primary objective of these groups is not political, reformist or anti-state, even if revolutionary rhetoric may be used. The focus is on control of neighbourhoods, identity, and income[88]. What is the significance of such groups for conflict?

There are three aspects. First, gangs can be a formidable recruitment base: they are made up of angry young men with a disposition to use violence for some economic incentive. Secondly, they can be taken into the rebellion effort either by incorporating them or as allies. For example, the RUF of Sierra Leone both actively recruited poor uneducated youths from urban areas[89] and allied with the West Side Boys gang, that then took part in the military effort[90]. Lastly, gangs can be used by politicians to build up power and patronage networks based on use of violence[91] or in electoral periods to intimidate opponents and buy blocks of votes.

Gangs however, almost never start changing into rebellion movements on their own. Gangs thus usually lack the means organizationally, although they have already succeeded in acquiring weapons and recruiting. Their objectives are also ill-suited for independent rebellion, but they can have an interest in rebellion that promises loot. It

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[87] Swecker, Chris 20th April 2005.
[88] Hagedorn, John 2008.
[89] Weinstein, Jeremy & Humphreys Macartan 2004. p.18-21.
[90] independent.co.uk 11th September 2000.
[91] Reno, William 2001.

should be noted that some scholars link gangs with insurgencies, because they contest the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state[92].

2.2. Organised crime

Organised crime is not a uniquely post-conflict phenomenon, but international organised crime can be the result of conflict. This is especially the case when new groups form, or existing groups move to profit from, illicit economies, of which drug trade and control of borders are obvious examples. These groups can then have an interest in the continuation of conflict, as their revenues may be dependent upon the disorder. These would be 'spoilers' to the peace process. Their final goal however is economic gain, and they use violence to gain comparative advantages in markets.

In general, the maintenance of a relatively weak state is in the interests of organized crime. In an article on collapsed states and international terrorists, the Economist writes that terrorists: "need to be able to travel, communicate and transfer funds; they need to be within reach of functioning population centres. [In his new book] Stewart Patrick --- argues --- that international terrorists do not find the most failed states particularly attractive; they prefer "weak but moderately functional" states. The shell of state sovereignty protects them from outside intervention, but state weakness gives them space to operate autonomously"[93]. The same could be said of organized crime.

If persistent organized crime emerges, self-perpetuating economic systems can develop, with increased implication by state officials, and the merging of interests of these two[94]. For example in an interview, a Guatemalan official postulated that organized crime passes through three stages: the **formation phase**; the **parasitical phase** in which organized criminals extract rents in the form of extortion and security provision; and finally when organized crime is successful, it forms a **symbiotic relationship with the state**[95].

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[92] Manwaring, Max 2005. p.V
[93] The Economist Jan 29th 2009.
[94] Sung, Hung-En 2004.
[95] Richani, Nazih 2007. p.28.

Essentially then, organized crime does not attempt to overthrow the state, but be parasitic. In this function it may try to infiltrate and corrupt the state. Organized crime does raise levels of violence and does compete with the state for the monopoly of violence. Yet a key difference needs to be made between groups whose economic gain is based on conflict itself, such as arms traffickers, and groups who profit the most from weak states with relatively low conflict intensity. The first group has an interest in the continuation or restart of conflict, and will pose a threat to peace to the degree that it is capable of disturbing it.

If the state attempts to establish a monopoly of use of force by going against organized crime groups, this may lead to conflict. This may further force organized crime to seek a more military structure to counter the existential threat posed by the state. This would also be the case when organized crime groups compete with each other. Examples include the drug cartels in Colombia, or the current conflict between the state of Mexico and the drug cartels.

Specific attention needs to be given to the relationship between drug trade and organized crime for two reasons. First, most known organized crime groups engage in drug dealing. Drugs generate more profits than any other form of trafficking[96] and constitutes the world's second largest market[97]. Secondly, organizations often have to control or at least have access to territories in order to sustainably trade drugs: either for growing crops or accessing transit points, especially borders. Territoriality will make this activity more conflict-prone, and profitability will raise competition, finances, and level of organization.

Groups participate in many other types of economic activity. For example in Central Asia, organized crime groups practice racketeering, control of prostitution, infiltration of the banking system and oil industry, cattle rustling, car theft, trafficking in wildlife and in precious metals, defrauding states of resources, agricultural products and manufactured goods, smuggling, tax evasion, tax fraud, trafficking in firearms, as well as trafficking in women, and organs[98].

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[96] UNODC 2007. p.170.
[97] Engvall, Johan 2006. p. 827.
[98] UNODC 2007b.

While traditionally large organized crime groups have been viewed as highly structured and hierarchical, today there is increasing emphasis on flexible structures involving networks of skilled individuals. According to Europol: "many groups are in practice loose networks of relatively independent members that coalesce around one or more prominent criminals. These networks take up tasks of varying structure, length and complexity according to the demand and concrete profits"[99]. Naturally, there are wide differences in scale of size and organization between groups[100].

Considering that conflict situations can either give rise to or make possible the spreading of organized crime, and that the politically and economically weak conditions in post-conflict situations favour them, organized crime is positively affected by conflict. The key questions are 1) how do they undermine state capacity, and 2) can they start a conflict?

Over time, organized crime becomes entrenched. Criminal groups will seek to contact or infiltrate the state and its officials through corruption. This leads to impunity of criminals. Officials also benefit from the capacity of criminals to intimidate political rivals and consolidate their power. Eventually, interests will converge. Impunity and weaker law enforcement further decrease the opportunity costs of crime (anticipated gain weighed against the probability and severity of punishment)[101]. Corruption also undermines faith in state institutions, such as police, politicians and judicial institution, affecting the legitimacy of the state[102]. Corruption is essentially a form of extra taxation on the poor, but additionally "when there is corruption, key drivers in the fight against poverty, such as political accountability, transparency and inclusiveness, are significantly undermined and at times even absent". Corruption marginalizes the socially excluded by reducing their access to political rights, and increases income inequalities by creating market failures[103]. It weakens the state's redistributive capacities especially in sectors such as healthcare, education and social benefits, further undermining the legitimacy of the state[104]. Weakened distributive capacities can increase

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[99] Europol 2006.
[100] See for example: UNODC 2007b. Or also OCTAs by EUROPOL.
[101] Richani, Nazih 2007.
[102] See for example: Jane's Intelligence Review 1st March 2007.
[103] Transparency International 2008.
[104] Richani, Nazih 2007.

the amount of people for whom crime is the only viable source of income. The World Bank has stated that corruption is 'the greatest obstacle to reducing poverty'[105]. At the level of society, there is an acculturation to the use of violence[106].

It is fair to say that organized crime can increase the likelihood of conflict indirectly by undermining the state. This lowers the threshold for the emergence of armed groups. Organized crime also dampens the economy[107], which some scholars argue increases the likeliness of civil war. It should also be noted though, that in many poor countries there can be an initial boost in the economy - indeed, superior profits are one of the reasons farmers choose to cultivate drugs for example. Presence of organized crime means that there are weapons, specialists of violence, networks, weapons and finances for mid-scale use of armed action. Generally though, this might not be of a military nature nor of a scale to existentially threaten the state. Again, this is generally not the objective of organized crime groups. What is the likelihood that these groups will engage in conflict either against each other or the state?

The dynamics between organized crime and conflict can be illustrated by shortly looking at **Mexico**. Mexico is the world's twelfth largest economy and Latin America's second biggest[108]. It ranks 51st on the Human Development Index with 'High Human Development'[109]. On the Fund for Peace "Failed State Index" it ranks somewhat above the median, placing it in 'Warning', the second worst category out of four[110]. It is fair to say Mexico is not a collapsed or weak state.

Yet there are an estimated seven drug cartels in Mexico, and 90% of the cocaine consumed in North America transits through Mexico[111]. According to the International Crisis Group, daily commerce in drugs between Mexico and the U.S. is close to $900 million[112]. Organized criminal groups also practice a variety of other trades.

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[105] See worldbank.org : Anticorruption.
[106] See for example: : Jane's Intelligence Review 1st March 2007.
[107] Sung, Hung-En 2004. p.115.
[108] World Bank, 2009.
[109] UNDP 2009.
[110] The Fund for Peace 2009.
[111] Cook, Colleen 2007.
[112] ICG 2008. p. 26.

Though originally hired to work for Colombian cartels, the Mexican ones have now become independent operators. They "often have a dynastic character, involving multiple family members at the top of the command structure"[113]. During the 1990's organized crime grew more sophisticated and entrenched on all levels. Before President Fox's active engagement against organized crime in 2000, "the authorities sought to keep the negative effects, in particular violence, to a minimum by 'administering drug-trafficking'. This meant that central and regional government officials more often than not turned a blind eye, whether for profit or to maintain tranquillity"[114]. During the late 1990's the Gulf Cartel recruited special unit soldiers from the Mexican army for protection and intimidation of other cartels. This prompted other cartels to form groups of their own with military capacity, with today perhaps over a hundred fighters[115]. While Mexican cartels have been very hierarchically organized, there is a growing emphasis on cell-based structures especially in response to law-enforcement efforts[116], which have shown resilience even if the cartel heads are captured[117].

Cartels have both penetrated and confronted the state. For example in 1997 an army general named as Mexico's top anti-drug official was found to be working for the traffickers. Last year two officials from the attorney-general's office were arrested for passing information to one of the cartels for 450 000$ a month: these included the official in charge of assigning police to organised-crime investigations, and one of his deputies in charge of intelligence[118]. In 2009, it was the turn of the prosecutor in charge of organized crime to be arrested[119]. Cartels "exert influence, through intimidation and bribes, over Mexico's federal, state and municipal police, lawmakers, governors, mayors and judges"[120].

Between December 2006 and March 2009, more than 800 police officers and soldiers have been killed in Mexico. In 2006, President Calderone launched 45 000 army troops against traffickers - since then 10 000 people have died in drug related violence. Police

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[113] UNODC 2007. p.181.
[114] ICG 2008.
[115] Grayson, George 2008.
[116] ICG 2008.
[117] UNODC 2007.
[118] The Economist 30th October 2008.
[119] The Economist 5th March 2009.
[120] ICG 2008. p.24.

say criminals are armed with rocket-launchers, grenades, machineguns and armor-piercing sniper rifles[121].

Cartels also fight each other. Captures of heads of cartels and other efforts against them have increased turf wars between the cartels themselves[122]. Sixty percent of killings take place in just three areas where the drug trade is concentrated, and four fifths of these are inter-gang killings[123].

The attorney general stated in an interview that the objective is not to end drug-trafficking, "because that is unachievable". Rather, it is "to take back from organised criminal groups the economic power and armament they've established in the past 20 years, to take away their capacity to undermine institutions and to contest the state's monopoly of force."[124]

The case of Mexico demonstrates that organized criminal groups can take part in a conflict in certain cases where protection of economic interests or the group's existence requires use of armed force both against the state or competitors. Lastly, it should be noted, that rebel groups that finance themselves with illicit activities can in time turn into organized criminal groups, aiming primarily to make economic gain. Many argue this is the case with the FARC today.

2.3. Paramilitaries

Paramilitary means an armed group with a military-like structure and capability to carry out some military tasks. This can mean two different things: 1.) official, militarily organized police, such as the French Gendarmerie, or 2.) unofficial armed groups, that nonetheless have unofficial ties to the government and support their policies - for example anti-leftist groups in Latin America. The focus here is on the latter.

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[121] The Economist 5th March 2009.
[122] ICG 2008. p.25.
[123] The Economist 5th March 2009.
[124] Ibid.

Official paramilitaries are described by Lutterbeck as: "Security agencies which occupy an intermediary position between internal and external security forces", referring to the police and army respectively. These kinds of units can be under the Ministry of Defence (or also Interior). They can recruit from the military, be assigned such tasks as riot-policing, fighting organized crime, and border control, have a number of war-time tasks, and possess heavier weaponry such as light infantry weapons or tanks in some cases.[125] But, they are tasked with internal security against their own population. In general, it can be said that official paramilitary units can mainly affect large-scale conflict by delegitimizing the state by excessive repression. Being part of the state however, they fall outside this study.

Non-official paramilitary groups are a higher risk. Latin America has seen many unofficial rightist counter-guerrilla groups, such as the death squads under military juntas or the AUC in Colombia. These groups are often aligned with or formed by government officials or members of the armed forces, and can receive training by them. They are often formed to perform tasks that would not be considered legal. During the military junta in Argentina, various unofficial 'task forces' were set up to capture, torture and kill people, which were either directly linked to military and police structures[126] or individuals in power[127]. The AUC in Colombia began as militias against the leftist forces to protect big landowners, with the help of politicians and the military. Later, these groups grew increasingly powerful and guided by narcotrafficking. The state negotiated a DDR with them, later putting some of their leaders in jail and extraditing them to the U.S[128]. The AUC is also responsible for wide-scale human-rights abuses.

These kinds of groups are potentially similar in character to rebel groups, although they are more often 'pro-state'. If they have illegal economic interests, they can view the state in the same way as organized crime. Unofficial paramilitaries will be part of any post-conflict situation where the state or certain officials have set them up and made use of them during the conflict.

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[125] Lutterbeck, Derek 2004.
[126] nuncamas.org
[127] For example the 'Triple A'. See: agenciapulsar.org 27th December 2006.
[128] ICG 2003. And: ICG 2007b.

2.4. PMCs

Private military companies (also called private security companies or firms) are "profit-driven organizations that trade in professional services intricately linked to conflict and warfare", as compared to public regular armed forces of the state. PMCs are often also referred to as mercenaries. 'Mercenary' is however also a legal term, and the practice is banned by international law. As one author states: "the term 'mercenary' is a loaded, subjective one, carrying lots of emotional baggage and connotations". Comparing to PMCs, mercenaries are usually temporary groupings of individual soldiers, often hired in non-transparent ways to avoid legal prosecution[129].

PMCs on the other hand perform 'complex multiservice tasks', that common mercenaries could not[130]. Today's PMCs are a new phenomenon in being large and extremely transnational corporations. A company can be based in one country, recruit in other countries and actually operate in yet another place[131]. Their scale and use is also incomparable to the past.

The rise of PMCs can be attributed to three factors: the end of the Cold War that led to the downsizing of many armed forces resulting in smaller armies and large numbers of skilled soldiers looking for work; at the same time conflicts in the Third World became messier and the demand for intervention rose, while Western governments became increasingly reluctant to intervene; and lastly a general trend in privatizing government functions – including the military ones[132]. Anna Leander argues that the incapacity of - especially African - states' public means of regulating violence (weak states) has led to a wide acceptance of privatizing the use of violence, that contrasts strongly with the trend during previous centuries[133]. These factors and the wide use of PMCs have institutionalized them as strategic options for governments, making them a phenomenon that is here to stay.

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[129] Schreir, Fred & Caparini, Marina 2005. p.15-18.
[130] Ibid.
[131] Swiss Government & ICRC 2008.
[132] Singer, P.W. 2005.
[133] Leander, Anna 2003.

PMCs are often divided into three categories according to the services that they provide: "Military provider firms (also known as "private security firms"), which offer tactical military assistance, including actual combat services, to clients; military consulting firms, which employ retired officers to provide strategic advice and military training; and military support firms, which provide logistics, intelligence, and maintenance services to armed forces, allowing the latter's soldiers to concentrate on combat and reducing their government's need to recruit more troops or call up more reserves"[134].

PMCs offer a number of benefits. Firstly, they are willing to enter places where governments might not be willing to send their troops, and can be deployed much faster. This also means that NGOs, International Organisations (including the UN), other public actors and private companies can work in areas where they could not without the protection offered by PMCs. Privatized violence can also be cheaper - they only need to be paid for the job they do, while standing armies need to be held up permanently[135]. While privatization can make PMCs a cheaper alternative through competition, experience has shown that many governments have failed to use PMCs in a way that would take advantage of this - the US' use of PMCs in Iraq being the prime example. Singer explains the economics behind PMCs: "PMFs use public funds to offer soldiers higher pay, and then charge the government at an even higher rate, all for services provided by the human capital that the military itself originally helped build"[136]. Also, for many poor governments, the fact that many PMCs are willing to work for promises of concessions for mining or oil makes them a viable option. For democratically responsible governments, PMCs make engagement in conflict politically less costly than sending their own troops to war[137]. As already mentioned, outsourcing for example the supply and logistics functions frees limited government resources, that can be focused on the most important tasks.

While there clear advantages to PMCs, they also pose a number of very serious problems, which we can divide into legal ones, and problems associated to the privatization of violence. These two are interconnected.

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[134] Singer, P.W. 2005.
[135] Leander, Anna 2003. p.4.
[136] Singer, P.W. 2005.
[137] Leander, Anna 2003. p.4-5.

Firstly, states, although purchasing the service, cannot know that their decisions will be implemented in the same way as they would with regular armed forces. PMCs can simply decide not fulfill their contract and pull away, for example under heavy fighting, as happened in Iraq in 2004. During the Sadr uprising, many supply companies suspended operations, which caused fuel and ammunition stocks to dwindle[138]. PMCs work for profit, which means they can offer their services to the highest bidder. They have for example been employed by: "dictatorships, rebel groups, drug cartels, and, prior to September 11, 2001, at least two al Qaeda-linked jihadi groups"[139]. They thus cannot be considered a substitute for regular armed forces. While many large transnational companies may be somewhat inhibited from gross misconduct, because they rely on a good reputation for clients, this phenomenon essentially creates a large global pool of private military force open to anyone with the right amount of money. This is a substantial change in the global system.

Because the use of private contractors may make the use of violence politically less expensive, this depoliticization undermines the level of democracy involved in decision-making by circumventing the need for legislative and public approval. Privatization also undermines the accountability for use of violence. Since PMCs are very poorly regulated, the chain of command is partly external to the government, making monitoring more difficult. Lastly, governments can to a certain extent deny responsibility for the actions of private companies[140].

Anna Leander describes the ways in which PMCs as a phenomenon pose more fundamental problems to state authority and the state system. PMCs, as opposed to regular armed forces, are profit-seeking. It is in their interest to have more perceived insecurity because this increases demand for their services, in the same way as arms suppliers might have an interest in conflict where they supply weapons to both sides. There is also some evidence of the linking up of broader economic interests and PMCs (such as in the case of advance mining concessions). PMCs offer a comparative advantage in the use of violence, and this can be especially useful in conflict areas. "The linking up of interests [of the PMCs and firms operating in conflict areas] is likely to

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[138] Singer, P.W. 2008.
[139] Singer, P.W. 2005.
[140] Ibid.

create powerful structures which favour the reliance on private security". Also, relying on PMCs relieves states from the duty to create responsible and effective institutions for the use of force. This is especially true of governments that do not actually seek a monopoly of violence, but merely over sectors or areas of economic interest. Lastly, in the long run the reliance on non-governmental use of violence will lessen the need for the public's approval of government actions, resulting in loss of legitimacy[141].

It should be noted that there are extreme differences in both governments and PMCs worldwide, and it is thus "impossible to make any generalisation on the relationship between PMCs and state authority"[142].

As already mentioned, the **legislative** framework for PMCs is fairly weak. There is an absence of regulation, oversight and enforcement. Many of these feed into the problems stated above. As an example, in 2005, not a single one of the private contractors that had been working in Iraq since 2003 had been prosecuted or punished for a crime. While there is an International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, up until the end of 2007 only 30 countries had signed it[143], and the Convention has been criticized as being insufficient for dealing either with mercenaries or PMCs[144]. Additionally, according to the ICRC: "to be a mercenary, an employee of a PMSC has to fulfil so many criteria that most of them do not fall under the definition"[145].

The ICRC insists however, that International Humanitarian Law applies to PMCs. Thus, there is a clear obligation for both the state that hires PMCs and the states in which they operate to enforce IHL[146]. But for example with respect to bringing the companies and employees to justice, few countries have legal systems that allow punishment for crimes committed outside the country, and many of the countries where PMCs operate may not have a functioning justice system to begin with[147]. The ICRC acknowledges that: "where the law falls short is in the field of national or international control over the services

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[141] Leander, Anna 2003. p.5-12.
[142] Ibid.
[143] UN 2007.
[144] Schreir, Fred & Caparini, Marina 2005. p.150.
[145] icrc.org 2008.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Francioni, Francesco 2008.

PMCs/PSCs may provide and of the administrative processes, if any, which they must respect in order to be allowed to operate. There is no international regulatory framework specifically focusing on this industry and its activities"[148]. Also, in practice the enforcement of IHL with respect to PMCs has proven difficult[149].

Essentially, what is needed is an international solution to a transnational problem, and ensuring implementation at the national level. The ICRC for example calls for a system that specifically prohibits certain activities (for example direct participation in hostilities, effectively keeping some core functions as the monopoly of states[150]); a licence system requiring PMCs to train their staff in IHL, adopting standard operating procedures and rules of engagement respecting IHL, proper disciplinary measures; a requirement for an authorization of every contract judged on a case by case basis and appropriate sanctions for PMCs that operate without such an authorization[151]. There should be clear criteria on vetting and selecting procedure of staff[152]. Such a system is especially crucial for post-conflict situations where PMCs operate, as IHL applies only during an armed conflict[153].

From a more political perspective, the UN working group on mercenaries has stated the matter clearly: "States must make a clear distinction between those private companies which offer security services in strict compliance with imperative norms, regulations and accountability, such as respect for the principle of the State's monopoly on the use of the force, and those recruiting, training, hiring or financing mercenaries to operate in zones of armed conflict, whose activities should be criminalized"[154].

To conclude, it is difficult if not impossible to state any general effects that PMCs can have on a conflict and post-conflict situation, because of the variation in the kinds of PMCs out there and the tasks they perform. Yet as an unregulated transnational system with high mobility and an extremely skilled corps, PMCs provide considerable military power to any party with money. This is a worrisome and destabilizing factor in the

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[148] icrc.org 2008.
[149] Singer, P.W. 2005.
[150] Ibid.
[151] icrc.org 2008.
[152] UN 2007. p.22.
[153] Swiss Government & ICRC 2008.
[154] UN 2007. p.19.

international system. As already mentioned, there is potential for strong coupled interests with firms that can profit from licit war- and post-war-economies. For example future extraction rights in exchange for intervention provide negative incentives against peace in post-conflict environments for PMCs. There have also been various instances where other non-state armed groups have made use of PMCs. PMCs also offer a number of positive services, such as protection for actors in dangerous environments unavailable elsewhere, and they are here to stay. Regulation and a clear permit system are needed.

2.5. Rebellion

Since 2008 was the fifth year running without interstate wars (excludes presence of foreign troops supporting one party in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia), the main focus of this work is on rebellions. Rebellions do not only account for civil war, but also for internationalized civil war. These last years have seen a fragmentation of such groups, especially in weak states. Much of this violence is increasingly directed at civilians[155]. Rebellion will here be used interchangeably with insurgency and insurrection. I use the term guerilla-warfare as a tactic used by these groups.

There is a wide literature on rebel movements. Roughly, there are two focus points: literature that mainly looks at the external environment of the rebel group, looking at what kind conditions make rebellion more likely, and literature that looks at the inner organization of rebel movements. I will proceed in two parts: 1.) strategy of guerrilla war, 2.) key aspects of a rebel group, which will include both traits of rebel-groups as well as conditions that favour rebellion. Much of what will be said here also applies to the previously mentioned armed groups.

2.5.1. Strategy of guerrilla war

I will mainly here rely on Ernesto Che Guevara's "Guerrilla Warfare", based on his experience of the Cuban revolution. This is known as the 'focoist' approach, bearing

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[155] SIPRI Yearbook 2009.

resemblance to the Maoist approach. I will then go on to describe newer types of insurgency strategies.

Essential to this approach is 1.) the slow build-up of the rebel forces during the guerrilla war stage in a remote area with weak state control, until 2.) a balance of power is reached and it can conduct conventional warfare, and 3.) overthrow the state. Until this point, direct fights are avoided, and "no battle shall be fought unless it will be won". This means that guerrilla warfare essentially relies on asymmetric warfare and secrecy. The build-up is based on seeking legitimacy with the population by explaining the ideology of the revolution. Essentially the first group, or nucleus, will create the conditions for a popular revolution by growing in the areas it operates, because people will support it and join in. At the operational level, everything is conducted in small squads[156]. This focoist approach is focused more on military achievements, whereas the Maoist approach emphasises simultaneous political build-up[157].

The political side of such a strategy is the ultimate objective, and without popular support, the rebellion cannot succeed[158]. As the U.S. counterinsurgency manual states: "Political power is the central issue in insurgencies, --- to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate"[159]. For the conditions to be feasible, all peaceful ways of seeking change must be perceived as exhausted. While Guevara spoke of rural rebellion, many of today's insurgencies are urban or a combination of both[160].

Initially then, rebel groups succeed by creating disorder and they can often blame the government for the sufferings of the people. However, as they get more areas under their control, they must take on administrative responsibilities and the propaganda field between rebels and state becomes more levelled[161]. While Guevara speaks of the acceptance of the locals as the most important thing, many rebellions have in fact relied heavily on coercion of the local population[162].

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[156] Guevara, Ernesto Che 1968.
[157] Schofield, Julia & Iqbal Mumtaz 2005.
[158] Guevara, Ernesto Che 1968.
[159] US Army 2006. p.13.
[160] Kilcullen, David 2006. p.7.
[161] US Army 2006. Chapter 1.
[162] Millen, Raymond 2008.

Although this approach is often quoted, rebel groups have adopted many different strategies and evolved. The type of 'classic' rebellion of the 20th century described above is based on a hierarchical organization. Today, many rebel groups have shifted towards more cell-based structures, where the extent of decentralization and independence of cells can be considerable. This makes it considerably harder to defeat the rebels. Decentralization makes coordination of the groups harder for the rebels themselves, and there can be a fragmentation of armed groups[163].

The evolution of the media, and especially the internet, has increased the importance of the media for rebel movements for psychological warfare, which is essentially linked to the broader political objectives of the rebellion. This is one reason why terrorism is efficient[164]. Hitting soft targets - civilians - is militarily easy with a powerful communicative impact. This means that: "almost any tactical action can have immediate strategic impact"[165]. Guevara for example spoke against the use of terrorism, since it might delegitimize the rebellion[166]. Kilcullen, a strategist at the US State Department, says that additionally: "internet-based financial transfers, training and recruitment, clandestine communication, planning and intelligence capabilities allow insurgents to exploit virtual sanctuary for more than just propaganda"[167]. It is possible that globalization has lowered the operating threshold for small groups. I will discuss these new aspects of rebellion at the end.

2.5.2. Key aspects of a rebel group

The key aspects for a rebel group to function are:

- financing
- recruitment
- weapons and ammunition
- organization
- motivation for fighting

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[163] Metz, Steven 2007.
[164] Ibid.
[165] Kilcullen, David 2006. p. 6.
[166] Guevara, Ernesto Che 1968. p.16.
[167] Kilcullen, David 2006. p. 3.

- favourable physical and political environment

and also important attributes:

- leadership
- internal/external support
- an ideology or narrative

While they are analysed here in the context of insurgency, some of these aspects can apply to other non-state armed groups - namely weapons and finances. Yet the scale for insurgencies is different, and the other key aspects may be qualitatively very different.

2.5.2.1. Financing

Paul Collier concludes that for a rebellion to be possible in the first place, financial and military feasibility are the two most important things. "A rebel army is hugely more expensive than a political party and faces far more acute organizational difficulties of raising voluntary contributions from within the country"[168]. Rebellion is expensive, but once established it provides a considerable comparative economic advantage - use of force[169].

There are many sources of finance that have been used by rebel groups. Note, that not all means are available to all rebellions, and in some areas rebellion is not financially feasible and will never come into existence.

Groups with force of arms and control of territories can practice any profitable illegal activity. Some, such as the drug trade, are extremely profitable. This is similar to the practices described above with organized crime (see 2.2 Organized crime). It has been noted, that although 'greed' (referring to economic profit) may not be the initial objective of the rebellion, with time it may well take over as the primary objective[170]. This is especially the case when practices are illegal - the group may eventually have no interest in being a legitimate member of the international community, either by taking

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[168] Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Rohner, Dominic 2008.
[169] Ibid. p.75
[170] Collier, Paul & al. 2003. p.79

over the state or seceding into an autonomous territory. The source of funding is then essential in shaping the nature of the rebel group[171].

Another source of finance are natural resources such as oil (tapping of pipelines and bunkering of oil, kidnapping and ransoming of oil workers, or extortion rackets against oil companies), diamonds, other gems, timber, etc. Natural resources are in a specific area, and so territorial control for financial gain can be the sole objective of rebels, instead of a means to an end[172].

Rebels can also depend on foreign assistance - from states, businesses or civilians. Iran for example finances and also trains Hamas[173] and Hezbollah[174]. Companies can finance rebels for example against promises of mining concessions in case of victory[175]. Especially diasporas have been known to finance rebel groups, for example through remittances[176]. Wealthy individuals may also play a key role[177]. Lastly, locals can be taxed or extorted money or provisions for protection. This can however be a very slow method of building up finances[178]. In contrast to illicit activities or natural resources, taxing local population at least in theory makes armed groups more dependent and thus accountable to the local population.

In 2001, the RAND Corporation conducted a study on post-Cold War insurgencies and external support. While states were still the biggest form of external support, all other non-state contributors had become increasingly important, especially diasporas. Foreign guerrilla movements, religious organizations, wealthy individuals, and

Table 3. Forms of support for insurgencies

Form of Support	States	Diasporas	Refugees	Other Non-state
Money	●	●		○
Safe Haven	●		○	○
Diplomatic Backing	●	◐		
Arms	●	○		◐
Training	●	○		○
Intelligence		○		
Direct Mil Support	●		◐	○
Inspiration	◐	○		○

● Significant contribution   ◐ Limited contribution   ○ Minor contribution

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[171] Weinstein, Jeremy 2005b.
[172] Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Rohner, Dominic 2008. p.16
[173] ICG 2008b. p.18
[174] Metz, Steven 2007. p.19
[175] Collier, Paul & al. 2003. p.77
[176] Ibid. p.68-79.
[177] Ibid. p.73
[178] Weinstein, Jeremy 2005b. p.619.

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even human rights groups ('other non-state') were also important[179]. Kilcullen states that new insurgencies' emphasis on videotaped attacks, is specifically intended for fundraising purposes[180].

2.5.2.2. *Weapons and ammunition*

All rebel groups need at the minimum weapons and ammunition. Explosive devices are also increasingly used. The focus here is on small arms and light weapons, because they are so common. For example, between 1989 and 1996, small arms were the most commonly used weapons in conflicts, and in 2003 small arms and light weapons together accounted for 60-90% of direct conflict related deaths, depending on the conflict[181]. "They are relatively inexpensive, portable and easy to use, and are effortlessly recycled from one conflict or violent community to the next. --- An assault rifle, for example, can be operational for 20 to 40 years with little maintenance"[182]. Affordability and mobility make small arms and light weapons attractive to rebel groups. Because of their durability, weapons need to be considered as one of the main peacebuilding problems in post-conflict environments. It should be noted that the impact of the quantity and quality of weapons on conflict has been studied mainly through case studies. There is little comparative statistical work[183]. There are conflicting views as to the global availability of weapons to non-state armed groups[184].

> **SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW)** are portable weapons made or modified to military specifications for use as lethal instruments of war. Small arms include revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines; sub-machine guns; assault rifles; and light machine guns.
>
> Light weapons are weapons intended for use by several members of armed or security forces serving as a crew, including: heavy machine guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-aircraft guns; portable anti-tank guns; recoilless rifles; portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems; and mortars of calibres less than 100mm.

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[179] RAND Corporation 2001.

[180] Kilcullen, David 2006. p. 7.

[181] SAS 2005. p.230

[182] IRIN 2006. p.3

[183] Killicoat, Stephen 2006. p.22

[184] Marsh, Nicholas 2007. p.58

What kinds of small arms and light weapons do rebels use? Of the estimated 500 million firearms worldwide (not only rebel groups), 100 million belong to the Kalashnikov assault rifle family. The Kalashnikov was not patented, and so could be freely copied, and was also relatively freely distributed by the Soviet Bloc during the Cold War. In a statistical study of the prices of AK-47s, Killicoat finds that the weapon is much cheaper in war-affected countries, and especially and increasingly cheap in Africa (four times cheaper than average). He states that the AK-47 variable is also a strong proxy for the price of conflict-specific capital in general. At least regional trade (and trade barriers) as well as neighbours' military spending correlated with its price[185]. Apart from the Kalashnikov, there is considerable regional variation depending especially on what arms friendly states sponsor, or what arms the state armed forces use, since this is the most common source of weapons for insurgents[186].

Ammunition is also key. Unlike weapons, ammunition cannot be used twice and stockpiles are quickly depleted. It has been shown that the supply of ammunition affects the intensity of the conflict; and that the type of ammunition can determine what kinds of weapons are used, and thus to some extent the tactics that are available to armed groups[187]. As for weapons, lack of ammunition may force the rebel groups to shift away from primary military targets to attacks intended to acquire ammunition[188].

Light weapons differ from small arms, because they have superior explosive power, technological sophistication and greater range. Additionally, one can differentiate between unguided and guided light weapons. According to the Small Arms Survey: "Light weapons are becoming more lethal, more portable, less expensive, and more durable, increasing the prospect of their proliferation, especially to non-state armed groups. Armed groups have obtained numerous guided weapons and produce unguided weapons of increasing sophistication, including rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, grenade launchers, explosively formed projectiles, and man-portable rockets"[189]. For example, many guided weapons that were considered advanced in the 1980's are now widely produced. If it is true that there is an increasing transfer of technology, drop in

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[185] Killicoat, Stephen 2006.
[186] Marsh, Nicholas 2007.
[187] Pézard, Stéphanie 2006. p.135, 136.
[188] SAS 2005b. p.18
[189] SAS 2008.

prices, and increase in availability[190], and that the nature of conflict is indeed shaped by the kinds of weapons that are available especially to non-state armed groups[191], we can expect changes in the kind of intrastate warfare that will be waged in the future. Non-state groups will tend to possess increased firepower. Thanks to enhanced possibilities for communication between rebel groups today, there is also an increase in the exchange of technology and tactics[192].

Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) are unguided explosives propelled by a rocket, that can be used by one person. RPGs are: "designed specifically for close combat operations. This reliable, simple and affordable weapon poses a serious threat to even the heaviest tanks, when used by determined fighters, in urban and guerrilla warfare"[193]. Mortars consist of a tube, a base and a shell. The tube is placed at an angle, providing a high-arching ballistic trajectory, which makes it possible to reach targets that cannot be hit with direct fire, such as bunkers. While mortars can be larger as well, small ones are portable, offering great mobility. While they are relatively simple to produce, mortars are not extremely accurate[194]. Man-portable air-defence systems, or MANPADS are small, light, weapons that launch guided surface-to air missiles against targets in the air. Because of the advanced technology involved, they are produced in relatively few countries, but have nonetheless proliferated and are also available to non-state armed groups. MANPADS are the focus of exceptionally tight international regulation[195].

Improvised explosive devices (IED) merit special attention. In an analysis of terrorist groups, the CSIS states that: "In terms of tactics, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are the weapon of choice ---"[196]. For example, in Baghdad in 2007, IED attacks were only just surpassed by mortar attacks as the most common form of major violent incidents[197]. IEDs do not require highly technical knowledge and the materials can be common agricultural or medical supplies. Lack of a standard formula makes detection very difficult. IEDs can even be built to stop a tank. A common tactic is to attack the

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[190] Ibid.
[191] SAS 2005. p.182
[192] Metz, Steven 2007. p.41
[193] defense-update.com 2004.
[194] fas.org 1998. Military Analysis Network. Mortars.
[195] SAS 2004. Chapter 3.
[196] CSIS 2008.
[197] CSIS 2008b. p.32

most vulnerable vehicle in a convoy combined with an ambush of small arms fire. "Total protection of vehicles against IED is virtually impossible"[198]. Kilcullen states that tactically, IED attacks require fewer fighters to produce the same lethality[199].

While SALW are the weapons commonly used by insurgent groups, Nicholas Marsh argues that: "if insurgents seek to win decisive military engagements against government forces, they will need to augment their forces with heavier weapon systems". This is crucial for the phase when insurgents seek to achieve a balance of power with regular armed forces and hold on to conquered territory. Some researches claim that at this stage, the right weapons will be more decisive than the population's support[200].

There are a variety of **sources for weapons** available to rebel groups. The armed groups may get weapons by taking them from their own government forces, for example by attacking weapons storages or through corruption. The former is one of the most common ways for insurgents to arm themselves. Insurgents can manufacture weapons themselves, but until now this has been an insufficient source by itself for rebel groups. Groups can also receive weapons from a friendly government. Lastly, there is arms trade on the black market that can be divided into two categories: 1.) "ant trade" is done on a small scale, for example through individual small shipments, or 2.) illegal arms dealers and brokers transport large numbers of arms internationally, for example by ship or airplane. Entering large-scale arms trade requires considerable finances, thus having an entry-threshold. Attacking government storages can be easier, depending on their security[201]. Killicoat's study of the prices of Kalashnikovs suggested that the situation of neighbouring countries has a strong influence[202]. Generally, as a conflict is drawn out, weapons procurement methods get more sophisticated, diverse and entrenched[203].

Marsh argues that the availability of weapons, and the amount of control over their distribution by military leaders, will affect the way rebellion is organized, by affecting the height of the entry barrier for different groups. A large amount of loose weapons will

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[198] defense-update.com 2004b.
[199] Kilcullen, David 2006. p. 8.
[200] Marsh, Nicholas 2007. p.56
[201] Ibid.
[202] Killicoat, Stephen 2006. p.21
[203] SAS 2005. p.159

result in many fragmented uncoordinated groups. As is the case for finance, the source of weapons may affect the objectives of the rebel groups, if they are supplied by an outside benefactor with own objectives [204]. In a post-conflict environment there will also most likely be plenty of weapons in civilian hands, weapons caches, and people with the know-how and networks to restart arms procurement if they consider it necessary.

2.5.2.3. Organization

Many studies treat rebellion as one category, even while implicitly recognizing that there are different ways to organize rebellion. However, the way a rebellion is organized will have a significant impact on the kind of conflict that is waged, and especially determines the possible solutions to such conflicts. One central variable is the level of effective hierarchy, and thus unity in a rebellion. The variation is well exemplified in the following quote from Metz's study on insurgencies:

> "Militias vary greatly in organizational complexity. Some, like Hezbollah, may be highly complex, with great internal specialization and formal methods for recruitment, training, indoctrination, and even professional development. They may have suborganizations for planning, intelligence and counterintelligence, financial activities, social services, and so forth. They are likely to offer 'career' progression within the organization. Others, like some of the African militias, are closer to a gang in structure, with little organizational complexity other than a hierarchy of power and informal methods for recruitment, indoctrination, and training. Complex militias are likely to be more effective at attaining objectives. Simple ones are likely to be more resilient"[205].

There are also several authors who argue, that there is a new kind of insurgency, owing to a globalized world. These are organized into loose cells, often based on ethnic loyalty or other more permanent identity-base, grouped by loose ideologies, using today's communication technology to coordinate, but also compete with each other. They would have less ambitious political goals and might not even be looking at overthrowing the state, but profiting from the chaos of conflict[206]. Kilcullen writes that : "Modern insurgents operate more like a self-synchronizing swarm of independent, but cooperating cells, than like a formal organization"[207]. It should be emphasized that the threshold, especially financially, for the creation of a gang based on looting, extraction

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[204] Marsh, Nicholas 2007.
[205] Metz, Steven 2007. p. 18.
[206] See for example: Metz, Steven 2007. And Kilcullen, David 2006.
[207] Kilcullen, David 2006. p.5.

or illicit trade is low, while the build-up of an organization such as the Hezbollah or the LTTE is much more demanding.

Metz argues that the major change has happened in the context where rebellion occurs: the spaces the state does not occupy and where complex conflicts occur. "The dynamics of contemporary insurgency are more like a violent and competitive market than war in the traditional sense where clear and discrete combatants seek strategic victory". This brings about complex networks of all different kinds of non-state armed groups, that rely more on coercion than mass support. This results in a logic that favours a form of organizing where: "decentralized, networked organizations [are] more survivable. No single node is vital. They may not have a 'centre of gravity'". Resources, decision-making authority and information are diffused[208]. It is clear that conflicts with such parties will result in protracted low-intensity warfare, with no apparent end in sight, as no-one has overall responsibility and parties have an interest in the conflict itself, not any change it would seek to achieve. This is one of the key findings of this study, and considerably complexifies our understanding of insurgencies.

There are also things that are organizationally common to most rebellions. The US counterinsurgency manual lists the following:

- Movement leaders.
- Combatants (main, regional, and local forces, including militias).
- Political cadre (also called militants or the party).
- Auxiliaries (active followers who provide important support services).
- Mass base (the bulk of the membership).

Many rebel movements separate the political cadre, responsible for the political strategy of the movement and aiding the leaders, which operates openly to communicate with the population, and the military wing, which has to operate secretly. Auxiliaries provide support (such as supply) services, but do not participate in combat. The mass base is the supporting populace (in a people's war). The importance (or existence) of each varies

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[208] Metz, Steven 2007.

from rebellion to rebellion. Many rebellions organize around pre-existing forms of organizing, for example from their tribe or ethnicity[209].

2.5.2.4. Motivation and recruitment

Motivation has been one of the most talked-about academic topics for rebellion. Motivation is significant, as it explains why rebel groups form and persist (motivation may change over time), what their objectives are and what possible solutions there might be. It will also affect the character of the conflict - a 'people's war' will differ from one based on economic gain (greed). The 'greed or grievance' discussion has been a debate on whether political or economic reasons are a more important motivation for rebel groups. Murshed and Tadjoeddin summarize the issue:

> "Greed and grievance. The former reflects elite competition over valuable natural resource rents. The latter argues that relative deprivation and the grievance it produces fuels conflict. Central to grievance are concepts of inter-ethnic or horizontal inequality. Identity formation is also crucial to intra-state conflict, as it overcomes the collective action problem. Conflict can rarely be explained by greed alone, yet, the greed versus grievance hypotheses may be complementary explanations for conflict. --- Grievances and horizontal inequalities may be better at explaining why conflicts begin, but not necessarily why they persist. Neither the presence of greed or grievance is sufficient for the outbreak of violent conflict, something which requires institutional breakdown ---."[210]

A further development to this has been the 'feasibility hypothesis' developed by Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, arguing that wherever a rebellion is militarily and financially feasible, it will occur - irrespective of motivation[211]. This question is extremely important, since our understanding of what are the actually significant factors for the rise of rebel groups will also define our approaches to preventing and dealing with them.

In their paper, Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner proceeded to test the following hypothesis: factors that are important for the financial and militarily feasibility of rebellion, but are unimportant for motivation decisively increase the risk of civil war. They argued that they found three variables that proxied feasibility, and were harder to confuse with greed or grievance. Countries under the French security umbrella were less at risk of

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[209] US Army 2006. p.18.

[210] Murshed, Syed & Tadjoeddin, Mohammad 2009. p.1.

[211] Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Rohner, Dominic 2008.

conflict, since this would increase the threshold for a rebellion to be militarily feasible. Mountainous terrain increased risk of conflict, since this would allow hiding places for rural rebellions, making it militarily more feasible. Lastly, the greater the size of the male population of the ages 15-29, the demographic group that most commonly takes part in conflict, makes rebellion more likely, since it makes recruitment easier. They state that: "motivation is indeterminate, being supplied by whatever agenda happens to be adopted by the first social entrepreneur to occupy the viable niche, or itself endogenous to the opportunities thereby opened for illegal income"[212].

Motivation is more likely to correspond with objectives that are 1.) attainable during the conflict (more certain and immediate to be achieved), instead of after the conflict (longer-term, more uncertain), and 2.) in the interests of the rebel leaders who are in power, rather than the population under its control. This points towards economic interests being more likely to motivate rebellion than political ones, and social exclusion being used as a tool by rebel leaders[213]. If this is true, it is highly questionable whether giving rebel leaders a place in government through power-sharing arrangements will solve underlying political grievances of the disadvantaged groups they are thought to represent (see 3.5.1. Power-sharing). Additionally, it is reasonable to question how much a rebellion motivated by economic gain would differ from organized crime. While the end-goals may converge, the military capacity and organization of a rebel group will be unique. Convergence of insurgency and organized crime and questioning the representativeness of rebel leaders in some cases are two key observations made in this study.

Weinstein looks at how the resource-environment in which a rebel group arises affects their recruitment, and thus the character and motivation of the group. In a resource-rich environment, rebel leaders will find it easy to recruit as they can promise immediate benefits. In these situations however, the rebel leaders will not be able to effectively distinguish from recruits committed to their cause, and ones who are profit-seeking opportunists. Conversely, in "resource-poor environments, leaders attract new recruits by drawing on social ties to make credible promises about the private rewards that will come with victory". Also some immediate non-material rewards exist in these cases:

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[212] Ibid.
[213] Ibid.

status, empowerment, honour, affirmation of identity. Additionally, reputation through social ties also places more pressure on the soldier's performance and thus the quality of his/her motivation through self-selection[214].

Thus while in theory groups can recruit with either social or economic endowments, there are generally various groups or leaders competing to come on top in the same area. Because economic endowments will guarantee more recruits faster than social ones, in an environment where they are available, these groups will dominate. The theory thus holds that the resource environment will actually determine the character of the rebellion that will emerge, irrespective of the initial motivation of leaders[215]. It is clear that motivation and recruitment - an essential element for the viability-threshold of a rebel group - are interlinked.

Three other themes are salient for rebel recruitment: 'angry young men', child soldiers, and drugs. 'Angry young men' refers to the fact that men between 15-29 are demographically most prone to armed violence as well as being the victims of it. This does not mean all young men are prone to crime for example: "a mere 6–7 per cent of young men commit 50–70 per cent of all crime and 60–85 per cent of all serious and violent crime". Large unemployment and rapid demographic growth create "a large pool of idle young men with few prospects and little to lose". With increasing urbanization and deterioration of traditional ways of living and authorities, men seek status, power and affirmation through violence. In many cultures using weapons can be part of the cultural role of a man[216]. While many studies find that more young men in a population will increase the risk of conflict (especially combined with economic stagnation)[217], only a small number of these participate in conflict. Demographic factors alone are not a sufficient explanation[218].

Drugs are also common in a conflict in other ways beyond finance. The leadership of irregular groups may recruit fighters via intoxication or addiction; use the promise of drugs to their fighters as a reward; encourage drug use as a motivation for atrocities

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[214] Weinstein, Jeremy 2005b.
[215] Ibid.
[216] SAS 2006. Chapter 12.
[217] Urdal, Henrik 2004. p.1.
[218] SAS 2006. p.300

against civilians. Long-term intense drug use among fighters may lead to command and control becoming problematic or nonexistent[219].

While many governments also employ child soldiers, the 'vast majority' are employed by non-state armed groups. Between 2004-2007 child soldiers were recruited in at least 24 countries, and have even been used for suicide attacks for example by Palestinian groups[220]. Children are particularly easy to recruit, often at gunpoint, although many join voluntarily too. A Congolese rebel officer described boys as good soldiers because "they obey orders; they are not concerned with getting back to their wife and family; and they don't know fear"[221]. Sometimes children (and other soldiers) are forced to commit an atrocity in their own village[222] to prevent defection. Children then alleviate two central problems of rebel recruitment: getting people to join and keeping them from defecting[223]. According to Foreign Policy: "Accounts from the field tell of soldiers who are near free to recruit, cheap to feed, and quick to follow orders. They aptly learn how to employ brutal tactics". Childhood is a particularly important stage in human development - a post-conflict situation where child soldiers have been used will include part of a generation permanently traumatised by, but grown into, conflict[224].

In an article, Mueller describes how in an environment with a low military threshold for irregular fighters (he is mainly concerned with paramilitaries), it is enough to find a small number of opportunist sadist psychopaths to terrorize the civilian population into fear and control. Two percent of any population will enjoy killing. Drinking and drug abuse is also common in such situations - this helps some people overcome their barriers. Such groups have been used by armies to commit atrocities. Rebel groups can do the same. In areas where there is minimal or no state presence, they can be the actual rebel group. In cases where there is lack of control, violence will often fall along ethnic lines. Looting and extortion in such a situation are also incentives. "Ethnic warfare can be very banal: a desperate condition where life becomes debased by the predations of

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[219] Kan, Paul 2008. p.4.
[220] Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2008.
[221] Gates, Scott 2002.128.
[222] Machel, Graca 1996. p.14.
[223] Gates, Scott 2002. p.111.
[224] Gates, Scott & Reich, Simon 2009.

remarkably small groups of violent marauders who purport to operate in the name of some imagined community"[225].

It is clear that the number and quality of the recruits is determined by the type of rebellion in question. A rebellion seeking to overthrow the state will need to militarily match the state (which may in turn vary in power), while one based on predation in an area where the state is absent will have a very low threshold. Numbers cited on the initial sizes of different rebellions range from under a hundred to several hundred, with successful rebellions growing to several thousand, some even a hundred thousand[226]. Guevara even states that it is better for a guerrilla group to begin small (50-100 men), or at least divide into small separate groups, so as not to attract too much attention[227].

If we come back to the new kind of insurgencies, it is worth asking what their overall strategic objective is. Whereas the classic objective of insurgency was to take over the state or secede territorially, Policzer writes that today: "many non-state groups have no interest in being a state. This --- is also a signal that many groups have opted to forego the benefits of statehood (such as international recognition of sovereignty) in order to avoid the costs associated with it, such as having to build and finance an administration"
[228]. One could also add the restrictive costs of international legitimacy. The objective then may be to merely weaken the state, or keep it weak. An additional objective may be getting approval from the global audience the insurgency is targeting for support, such as the diaspora or other sympathetic insurgent groups (rather than the local population)
[229]. In areas where the state is weak, conflict may be waged to establish the authority of one's own tribe or ethnicity, or to merely profit from a conflict economy - these two do not exclude each other.

2.5.2.5. Favourable physical and political context

The question of what are the physical and political conditions that make rebellion more likely is one that has received considerable academic attention. It is impossible here to

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[225] Mueller, John 2000.
[226] See for example, Weinstein, Jeremy 2005b.
[227] Guevara, Ernesto Che 1968. p.112.
[228] Policzer, Pablo 2002.
[229] Kilcullen, David 2006.

go through all of them, but I will list some key findings. It should be noted that even these suggestions are extremely contested.

Millen notes that "government pathologies, and not insurgent strategy, are the major determinant of insurgent success". He argues that what makes rebellions successful is a government that 1.) pursues policies that are viewed as unjust, 2.) represses and consequently radicalizes politically mobilized groups, 3.) uses state violence against these that is severe but not overwhelming enough, 4.) lacks presence especially through policing, and lastly 5.) practices policies that alienate pro-government elites into siding with the rebels[230]. Reagan and Norton compare protest and rebellion, and find that whereas state repression reduces the risk of protest, it will increase the likelihood of rebellion[231]. This supports the notion that a repressive government response is significant, but that there also needs to be space to contest the monopoly of violence - autocracies are fairly good at preventing rebellion[232]. The findings by Collier et al. mentioned above, that the French security umbrella reduces the risk of rebellion by making it militarily more difficult, support the idea that a strong state deters rebellion. They however found the level of political rights and checks and balances to be statistically insignificant overall, putting into question the effect unjust policies might have[233].

Some physical factors that have been found to correlate with the likelihood of rebellion are also related to state capacity or control of territory. It would seem that small countries are more likely to experience rebellions that try to take over the state, and larger countries face rebellions seeking secession. This implies that large countries will have hinterlands with discontented groups, where the state might not be able to project itself. These groups have a better chance of seeking secession than trying to take over the entire country. Conversely, in smaller countries the government is physically closer both for capturing, but also repress the group directly, making the government the strategically viable target[234]. Also as mentioned, it has been argued by many scholars

[230] Millen, Raymond 2008.
[231] Regan, Patrick and Norton, Daniel 2005. p.331.
[232] Buhaug, Halvard 2006. p.696.
[233] Collier Paul, Hoeffler Anke, Dominic Rohrer 2008.
[234] Ibid.

that mountainous terrain increases the likelihood of rebellion - although forest cover has not been found to be significant[235].

Another physical attribute that has been intensely studied - and disputed - is the presence of primary commodities that are exportable (such as oil, gemstones, and timber). These have generally been found to correlate with a higher risk of rebellion, although it depends on how much money is being made. Larger wealth decreases risk - it has been suggested that at this level governments can buy off opponents. Collier et al. suggest the risk is generally increased by primary commodities, because rebels can either finance themselves from resources during conflict, or this can even be their initial motivation for getting into conflict[236]. This has been contested by Fearon, who claims that only oil is statistically significant, and this is not a source of start-up finance, but an ultimate prize of conflict[237]. Snyder argues that exports that are easily lootable (lucrative, easy-to-transport resources, such as gems, tropical timber, and illicit drugs), and thus accessible for funding by rebels, can increase the likelihood for rebellion. But they can substantially decrease it if the extraction is institutionalized, effective and organized so that both the government and private entities share the profits[238].

Large population size has been found increase the likelihood of rebellion, although the level of the effect is contested. The effect of ethnic fragmentation is extremely contested. It had been presumed to be one of the root causes of conflicts, but quantitative studies have had difficulty finding any correlation. Buhaug claims this is because ethnic diversity makes *secessionist* rebellion more likely, and that this variable has been previously omitted[239]. In a newer study, Collier et al. found that if ethno-linguistic *and* religious fractionalization are disaggregated, it multiplies the possibilities that two person in a society belong to different groups. This was turned into an index (what they term as social fractionalization) that correlates with the likelihood of conflict [240].

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[235] Ibid.
[236] Ibid.
[237] Fearon, James 2005.
[238] Snyder, Richard 2006.
[239] Buhaug, Halvard 2006.
[240] Collier Paul, Hoeffler Anke, Dominic Rohrer 2008. p.38

Lastly, economic conditions have been shown to correlate strongly with conflict, notably: level, growth, and structure of income. It has mainly been argued that these affect the opportunity costs for recruitment by rebels, state capacity, general discontent, and perceived differences between social groups[241].

2.5.2.6. Leadership and narrative

Leadership is important. Weinstein writes that: "Rebel organizations are reflective of the voluntary and purposive behaviour of their leaders: the organizers mobilize initial recruits, define the agenda of the movement, and have great latitude to determine the structure and approach of the guerrilla army". Yet he also states that any leadership is constrained by the conditions they work in, and by competition between different groups for essential resources[242]. Personality, charisma and efficient use of the rebel group's narrative are important. Leadership may be held through religious, clan or tribal authority[243].

Narrative is the way the rebellion tries to gain legitimacy for its cause from its target groups (such as its sources of support and funding and the local population), as well as recruit soldiers. The narrative advances alternatives to existing conditions. This includes either material or non-material benefits arising from rebellion. Narratives are thus often based on grievances. They also often aim at collective identity-building[244]. Collier et al. state that: "While for purposes of propaganda rebel leaders are indeed likely to explain their motivation in terms of grievances, other plausible motivations for organized private violence would include predation and sadism"[245]. Thus, while grievances may be real and the narrative authentic, any narrative is essentially a political tool. Even so, when looking at peace negotiations in 2008, 85% of armed groups did not base their actions on a clear political ideology, but rather on territorial demands or control over natural resources[246].

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[241] Ibid.
[242] Weinstein, Jeremy 2005b. p.618.
[243] US Army 2006. p.12.
[244] Ibid. p.26.
[245] Collier Paul, Hoeffler Anke, Dominic Rohrer 2008. p.7.
[246] ECP 2009. p.12.

3. Solutions to problems posed by insurgencies

In the previous section I concluded that of the different non-state armed groups, with respect to means (capacity) and end-goals, insurgencies pose the most significant threat to peace. I also analyzed the central security problems with insurgencies, effectively answering the first part of my research question. I will proceed to analyze different policy options used with respect to insurgencies, and answer the second part of my research question: What are the policy options for these problems, notably through international outside intervention? What are the problems with these policies, and what has proven effective (solutions)?

3.1. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) has now become part of the standard post-conflict package[247], as one of the key tools to deal with non-state armed groups. It should be noted that a DDR can also be implemented when downsizing the regular armed forces (this comprised one third of the cases in 2007). DDRs almost always follow a peace agreement, an agreement to a ceasefire or a memorandum of understanding - in effect, an attempt to stop hostilities. Today, DDRs are also often mentioned in the agreements themselves[248]. This is recommended by policy experts, although many argue that it is not done with enough detail[249]. DDR is a long-term peacebuilding tool. It complements peace negotiations and the resulting agreements by acting as a confidence-building project between former conflicting parties, as well as building confidence in the peace process itself[250]. This is elaborated below. Lastly, a DDR can be part of a power-sharing process between conflicting parties, where the state armed forces are restructured so that some of the non-state fighters are incorporated and some state forces are demobilized, although this has proven to be very difficult[251].

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[247] Pouligny, Béatrice 2004. p.14
[248] ECP 2008. p.1.
[249] Pouligny, Béatrice 2004. p.14
[250] Douglas, Ian; Gleichmann, Colin; Odenwald, Michael; Steenkeen, Kees & Wilkinson, Adrian 2004. p.17.
[251] ECP 2009. p.20.

Motivation for non-state armed groups to demobilize can include war exhaustion, fear of defeat, confidence that interests can be pursued equally well or better through non-violent means, guarantees of amnesty or reduced sentences for crimes, and the promise of peace dividends.

A DDR is a program with three interrelated parts: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants. While the parts are interrelated, they can also be implemented independently - there can for example be a disarmament program alone, or a demobilization and reintegration without disarmament[252].

While DDR is often viewed as a policy-tool, often even a neutral one, it is essentially a project of social engineering and politics. In her report Pouligny for example goes to great lengths to show how a DDR is deeply embedded in local cultural, political and historical conditions, and that a program's success is dependent on understanding and adapting to these. DDR 'is not a culturally neutral process'[253]. A comparative study by the Escola de Cultura de Pau that tracks all current DDR programs states that lessons learned cannot be directly applied from country to country. They conclude that DDR is not just a tool, but a context-dependent process[254].

A DDR program is also part of post-conflict politics, because it can substantially change the balance of power in a society. While the apparent aim of a DDR program is to integrate former combatants into a peaceful civilian life, it is in fact part of a much broader attempt to demilitarize society. A DDR program and its success is therefore linked to a possible Security Sector Reform (SSR), which aims to reform and establish the legitimate authority of the state over internal security, namely through the police and military[255]. A DDR program in Colombia for example demobilized former paramilitaries, but only partially. It also failed to establish a government presence and monopoly of use of force in these areas, while not solving the underlying cause of drug trafficking. This resulted in a resurgence of new paramilitary groups that formed business alliances with organized crime groups[256]. In post-conflict societies the general

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[252] Pouligny, Béatrice 2004.
[253] Ibid. p.12.
[254] ECP 2008. p.32.
[255] Pouligny, Béatrice 2004. p.15-16.
[256] ICG 2007b.

fabric of society is torn by distrust, and different armed groups pose security dilemmas to each other. Since they face acute commitment problems with both disarming and the peace process, a DDR program both depends on other confidence building measures, and is a confidence-building measure in itself[257]. DDR programs build confidence by communicating benevolent intentions between opposing parties, and supporting the peace process as a viable alternative to violent strategies.

3.1.1. Disarmament

As stated, DDR programs have three parts, of which the first is disarmament. The UN Framework for DDR programs defines disarmament as: "the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes"[258]. There have also been demobilizations without disarmament. While the main stated goal is often disarming combatants, a disarmament program should be accompanied by more general policies aiming at the reduction of weapons in a post-conflict society, contributing to the overall aim of demilitarizing society (see 3.8. arms control measures). Some say disarmament should have as its final goal the changing of attitudes towards weapons in a society[259].

Disarming is a significant risk for combatants and can create power asymmetries. If not taken into account, this may lead to a destabilization of the situation[260]. Disarmament, together with grouping former combatants into camps for the next phases of DDR program can be done in stages, where groups disarm one at a time. Because of the risk it implies, groups rarely disarm completely. For example looking at eight DDR programs that were ongoing in 2007, under half a weapon per person had been turned in on average, though there was a great deal of variation between programs[261]. Turning in a functioning weapon can be a prerequisite for a combatant being accepted into a DDR

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[257] Douglas, Ian; Gleichmann, Colin; Odenwald, Michael; Steenkeen, Kees & Wilkinson, Adrian 2004. p.47, 95.
[258] unddr.org 2006. p.2.
[259] Pouligny, Béatrice 2004. p.5.
[260] Ibid. p.5.
[261] ECP 2008. p.26.

program, although in 2008 only 2 of 15 ongoing programs required a weapon[262]. Disarmament, together with demobilization, are the cheapest stages of a DDR program [263].

Pouligny lists the steps of disarmament as: (1) a weapons survey or weapons disclosures (often, in the past, the parties to the conflict have submitted weapons inventories which have usually been taken at face value); (2) weapons collection; (3) weapons storage; (4) weapons destruction; (5) weapons redistribution to national security forces[264]. Destroying weapons often also has symbolic value, and can be done publicly. Weapons storage is key in preventing weapons from being diverted to new use. An important post-conflict task relating to the disarmament of a society is mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance[265].

3.1.2. Demobilization

The UN defines demobilization as: "the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion"[266]. Though optional, demobilization is often done by gathering combatants into camps where they can hand in their weapon. Alternatively mobile units can go to the combatants[267]. In exchange for demobilizing, they receive counselling, vocational training and/or economic assistance[268]. Gathered in camps and disarmed, combatants are vulnerable - the security of the camps is key, and should preferably be provided by neutral third parties[269]. Demobilization can also be done in phases. A handbook

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[262] ECP 2009b. p.7.
[263] ECP 2008. p.1.
[264] Pouligny, Béatrice 2004. p.5.
[265] Douglas, Ian; Gleichmann, Colin; Odenwald, Michael; Steenkeen, Kees & Wilkinson, Adrian 2004. p.42.
[266] unddr.org 2006. p.2.
[267] Eronen, Oskari 2009.
[268] Pouligny, Béatrice 2004. p.5.
[269] Douglas, Ian; Gleichmann, Colin; Odenwald, Michael; Steenkeen, Kees & Wilkinson, Adrian 2004. p.47.

developed by practitioners recommends that the time combatants have to spend in camps should be as short as possible to achieve the necessary goals (e.g. counselling and training)[270]. It should be noted that demobilization can also occur through 'self-demobilization': groups dissipate on their own (rather than as part of a program), because there is no longer any need or obligation to be part of an armed group[271], for example after a peace accord.

Pouligny states that the essential steps to demobilization are: (1) planning; (2) encampment; (3) registration; (4) disarmament; (5) pre-discharge orientation; (6) final discharge of ex-combatants.

One key question is how to identify who is a combatant and who is not. Relevant criteria include having a weapon, being listed as a combatant either through an objective evaluation of the armed group or a subjective one made by the group itself, and an explicit commitment to the peace agreement or DDR. The weapons criteria can lead to the exclusion of vulnerable groups such as women, as not all members of an armed group carry weapons. Generally women and children have often been neglected in DDR processes[272], perhaps because they are not considered as serious a security threat as adult male combatants. Yet for example in 2007 almost 11% of demobilized combatants were children[273]. Being listed as a combatant was clearly the most used criteria in the DDRs that were ongoing in 2008[274]. There is a general tendency to inflate the numbers of troops by commanders in order to obtain more benefits during the negotiations, while during demobilization some troops are often left in the bush as a security guarantee[275]. In 2007, only 68% of troops listed for demobilization actually did so[276].

Part of the demobilization phase is reinsertion. The UN defines reinsertion as: "the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families, and can include transitional safety

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[270] Ibid. p.51.
[271] Ibid. p.48.
[272] Pouligny, Béatrice 2004. p.8.
[273] ECP 2008. p.1.
[274] ECP 2009b. p.7.
[275] Pouligny, Béatrice 2004. p.9.
[276] ECP 2008. p.20.

allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year"[277]. Some authors have also regarded reinsertion as part of the reintegration process[278]. When looking at the benefits offered after demobilizing, programs can be differentiated into groups that offer benefits for half a year, and ones that do this for a year or more[279]. I will deal with reinsertion as part of reintegration, while keeping in mind that the main difference is the time-span of problems and corresponding benefits.

3.1.3. Reintegration

Reintegration is the process of former combatants learning to lead a civilian way of life. While during disarmament and demobilization the unit of reference for the program is the armed group and individual combatants, and possibly their families, for reintegration it is the community into which the combatants are to reintegrate. Reintegration is a relational process between combatants and community. Both the importance of the community and the depth of the reintegration phase are well captured by Pouligny:

> "When violence and fear have become a way of life, when war has become an ordinary condition and no longer exceptional, everyday life has been changed. Such a devastating fragmentation of social ties and individual conscience may contribute to the paralysis of social rehabilitation as well as of peacebuilding intervention, even after war is supposed to be over. In other words, it may obstruct the reconstruction of a possible everyday life in communities that have lived through a long siege of violence and poverty"[280].

The first year is a critical phase, and while attention is also paid to these deeper issues of reintegration, **reinsertion** efforts are done in parallel. This refers to short-term benefits aimed at providing the basic means for a livelihood to combatants and their families. These can include transportation, possibly accommodation, food, civilian clothing, a

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[277] unddr.org 2006. p.2.
[278] See for example Douglas, Ian; Gleichmann, Colin; Odenwald, Michael; Steenkeen, Kees & Wilkinson, Adrian 2004.
[279] ECP 2008. p.4.
[280] Pouligny, Béatrice 2004. p.10.

short term job, or seeds and tools[281]. There have been good experiences with Quick Impact Projects (QIP), that combine local community members working with the former combatants to build something useful for the community. This both builds trust between combatants and the community, and ensures the combatants are perceived as useful to the community. Land issues can also be a major problem[282]. In the long-term however, the goal is self-sustainability for the combatants. Vocational training, microcredit or grants in accordance with a market analysis, and both community and combatant needs assessments are key components for success[283]. Benefits can be divided according to their function into services that substitute for participation in armed conflict, for example economic benefits, and reconciliatory services like psychosocial assistance that aim to accommodate ex-combatants to communities[284]. It should be noted that local communities that have suffered from the conflict may view the benefits given to combatants as a reward for their deeds, and create resentment.

In the short- and long-term, providing the combatants with benefits is: "based on the widespread notion that demobilised persons will retake up arms unless options for their reintegration are not perceptibly better than life as a combatant". Four main areas have been identified where former combatants may feel they are losing out by not fighting: physical security, economic security, political influence and social prestige[285].

In the long run, reintegration will require the evolution of functional communities. In addition to psychosocial assistance, combatants and communities may need to use other tools of peacebuilding, also at regional and national levels. Some of these include indictments to reimplement the rule of law and confidence in the state, and condemnations of human rights abuses; truth commissions that facilitate a culture where atrocities are condemned; and reparations to victims and relatives, often as a consequence of transitional justice. The goal of these is often reconciliation. Reconciliation poses the problem of forgetting vs. remembering for societies: while justice can have a healing effect for the victims, it can also stir up resentment between

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[281] Eronen, Oskari 2009.
[282] Douglas, Ian; Gleichmann, Colin; Odenwald, Michael; Steenkeen, Kees & Wilkinson, Adrian 2004. p.61.
[283] Ibid. p.85.
[284] ECP 2008. p.28.
[285] Ibid. p.27.

combatants and communities[286]. Additionally, the leaders that have signed peace agreements as well as individual combatants can be responsible for war crimes. Yet without giving them power and amnesty, peace may not be achievable[287].

The reinsertion and reintegration phases are the longest ones in a DDR program, making up an estimated 60-80% of the total costs of a program[288]. Yet they often suffer from donor fatigue or merely lack of attention[289].

In conclusion, DDR is a significant part of the peacebuilding kit. Armed struggle has "created new networks of solidarity, new social structures, new strategies of survival, and new diffused and profoundly internalized relational models" for combatants, and these persist in the post-conflict phase, increasing the risk of return to conflict. Ultimately, even a successful DDR cannot dismantle these skills and relations acquired by combatants; the success of demobilization relies on the peace dividends being perceived as greater than the advantages of taking up arms again. As depicted by the Colombian example, a DDR program also does not stand alone. It is dependent on other root causes of the conflict being tackled, as well as the guarantee that no power vacuum exists that can be filled by new entrepreneurs of violence.

3.2. Negotiations, mediation, and peace agreements form part of peacebuilding too

Since the focus of this paper is specifically on post-conflict environments, one would intuitively be tempted to exclude peace agreements, negotiations and other strategies that have already been completed at the post-conflict phase. However, there are many ways to arrive at the end of an armed conflict, and they produce different kinds of post-conflict environments. Also, while in theory conflicts can be described as advancing neatly from one 'phase' to another, the reality is that certain methods are always context-dependent. For example in 2008, there were a number of situations where no armed clashes were taking place, but parties to the conflict had yet to reach an agreement and had disputes pending. "Thus, the negotiations are relevant for preventing the beginning

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[286] Ibid. p.14.
[287] Pouligny, Béatrice 2004. p.9.
[288] ECP 2008. p.2.
[289] Pouligny, Béatrice 2004. p.20.

or resurgence of new armed confrontations"[290], and since they are a *de facto* part of the post-conflict policy toolkit, they need to be examined as well. Most importantly, negotiations are often needed in the post-conflict phase, because of its volatility, lack of trust between the parties, and the need to resolve snags in the peace process[291].

This paper will examine these conflict resolution[292] strategies from the perspective of transforming the relationship between warring parties towards a more peaceful one. It should be noted that this does not mean that the strategies themselves are necessarily peaceful, since victory and submission of the other party, even through outside intervention, can also bring peace. Even though most of the literature and practice used for this analysis is based on relations between state and non-state actors, they are also applicable to conflicts between non-state armed groups. For example in the Gaza Strip Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which have often fought each other[293], have both coordinated militarily[294] and are said to be considering a merger[295].

Table 4. Common conflict management methods

Third-party	Peacemaking	Mediation		Monitor implementation	
Prevention	Intervene or not	Ceasefire	Negotiations	Peace process	Peace-building
Key variables	Military victory / war exhaustion		Power-sharing unity goverment	DDR / SSR, Transitional government, constitution	Elections, tackling displacement
Pre-conflict	**Active conflict**	**Armed clashes stop - 'negative peace'**		**Building of lasting peace - 'positive peace'**	

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[290] ECP 2009. p.9.
[291] See for example ICG 2009. p.1-3.
[292] Conflict resolution refers to resolving disputes between parties at conflict - focus is on engaging the main actors, especially leaders. In violent conflicts it is often used during the active conflict phase to stop the fighting. This is different from peacebuilding, which is often used for more long-term and deeper processes to achieve a lasting peace.
[293] ICG 2009b. p.27.
[294] Ibid. p.2.
[295] haaretz.com 1st July 2009.

Combining the perspective of pacifying relations between conflicting parties and the concept of positive peace, I have defined the peace process as a goal-oriented political process involving all stakeholders. The ultimate goal is a deep self-sustaining peace (positive definition), where the majority of the people concerned agree that disputes should be solved in a non-violent way, and structures exist to support this and restrain actors that do not. The stakeholders can be either supportive of the process or not (spoilers). Essential to the process is the building of trust between parties, notably for disarming, in order to demilitarize politics. As a concept, 'peace process' has two components: 1.) It is a perspective taken from the point of view of the political end-goal, 2.) There has to be a substantial attempt towards peace by some stakeholders, and it must be a declared goal, often expressed through willingness to negotiate or eventually a peace agreement.

3.3. To intervene or not

The debate on intervention/non-intervention here is not related to state sovereignty, and whether 'humanitarian interventions' in general are justifiable. Rather, it points to which option better guarantees long-term peace, and thus the security of individuals: letting war run its course, or intervention to prevent more civilians from being killed. Both are thus linked to the idea of human security and not state security, where the object whose security is to be protected is not the state, but individuals.

Luttwak laid out the argument in his article 'Give War a Chance' in 1999, stating that war "can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. This can happen when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively. Either way the key is that the fighting must continue until a resolution is reached. Hopes of military success must fade for accommodation to become more attractive than further combat". He goes on to argue, that by freezing the situation, internationally sponsored ceasefires only give the sides a breather to gather strength and rearm – thereby avoiding war exhaustion[296].

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[296] Luttwak, Edward 1999. p.1.

The second argument, in favour of intervention, can be divided into two. The first one is well summed up in arguments for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Quoting the International Crisis Group:

> **"What is R2P?**
> The responsibility of states, and where they fail the international community, to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes.
> **Why does R2P matter?**
> Because it's the right thing to do: our common humanity demands that the world never again sees another Holocaust, Cambodia, Rwanda or Bosnia.
> Because it's in every country's interest: states that can't or won't stop internal mass atrocity crimes are states that can't or won't stop terrorism, weapons proliferation, the spread of health pandemics and other global risks.
> **What kind of action does R2P require?**
> Overwhelmingly, prevention: through measures aimed in particular at building state capacity, remedying grievances, and ensuring the rule of law.
> But if prevention fails, R2P requires whatever measures – economic, political, diplomatic, legal, security or in the last resort military – become necessary to stop mass atrocity crimes occurring"[297].

Thus, immediately stopping atrocities such as killings, mass rape, the destruction of infrastructure, forced displacement, the spread of malnutrition and protecting civilians is the overriding imperative, not least morally. Secondly, it is argued that there are techniques to stop warring parties during the active conflict phase and make peace - namely negotiations, mediation and power-sharing arrangements. I will deal with these later, and focus here on the arguments for why war should be given a chance, and why many argue it is the superior option to power-sharing arrangements.

Luttwak's argument has been developed by many researchers, and received support from statistical studies. Licklider finds that of the civil wars between 1945-1993, 85% of the wars that ended with military victory did not recur, while the figure for the ones ended by negotiations was only 50%. However, the type of war matters. In political-economic wars, negotiations are about as sustainable, while in identity-based wars military victories are superior, but more likely to result in genocide-like atrocities after peace[298]. Preventing such atrocities is one of the arguments for power-sharing. Toft, examining conflicts between 1940-2000, finds that only 12% of wars ending in military victory recurred, while the figure for negotiated settlements was 29%, suggesting military victory is three times as stable as negotiated settlements[299].

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[297] icg.org: Responsibility to Protect.
[298] Licklider, Roy 1999.
[299] Toft, Monica 2005. p.13.

The main argument for supporting (passively/actively) the military victory of one side is that when one side is effectively defeated, its capacity to restart conflict is reduced to a minimum (often referred to as the Wagner hypothesis). Naturally, there are very few cases where the enemy is completely destroyed[300], and as I have tried to argue, the threshold for low-intensity asymmetric warfare in post-conflict environments today is relatively low. There will probably be low-intensity violence in any case. The more nuanced argument is that states facing internal conflicts must be suffering major internal problems, that need to be resolved in the post-conflict stage. Whereas negotiated settlements produce notoriously dysfunctional governments with divided groups using veto powers to safeguard their interests, a consolidated government resulting from the victory of one side is better able to implement the difficult but necessary structural changes[301]. These arguments then, rely on the political nature of root causes of conflict.

Jeremy Weinstein has developed Luttwak's argument further in a compelling article. He however states that the conditions under which war will produce 'autonomous recovery' – the development of strong institutions and leaders capable of sustaining peace without outside intervention - are rare and difficult to create. "*Sometimes* it makes sense not to intervene, or to intervene actively on behalf of one side". This is because while intervention can sometimes stop mass killings, it may bring to halt processes of internal institutional change, of which warfare is a symptom. In the long run, this will save more lives. Weinstein argues that war generates stable, self-sustaining, and representative institutional arrangements[302].

War, then, is a healthy competition between groups to have the monopoly in providing public goods, and the winner is the group that can most effectively combine generating resources, mobilizing them and turning them into power. Power is projected territorially against other competing groups - something Weinstein sees as an ongoing struggle in many weak states in the Third World, where governments are incapable of projecting complete control. Thus, both the recruitment and mobilization of human resources requires a convincing ideology, as well as the capacity to extract capital from people.

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[300] Toft, Monica 2005. p.30-31.
[301] Licklider, Roy 1999. p.685.
[302] Weinstein, Jeremy 2005.

Both elements tend to create a dependency of rulers on the ruled. Weinstein's theoretical framework separately examines two key features of state-building 1.) capacity- and 2.) legitimacy-building by placing them on an axis according to whether their source is internal (domestic) or external. Where both capacity and legitimacy are completely externally provided, there is an occupation; where they are both internally derived, there is autonomous recovery. Weinstein then argues that: "for war-making to lead to state-making, there must be a significant threat to the survival of the group or state, a strong domestic revenue imperative, and no external means to reduce the cost of fighting for survival". He however acknowledges that this is the case for few Third World countries today[303]. Tull for example argues that most internal wars in Africa are actually not strictly speaking internal - outside support often accounts for their self-sustaining character[304].

Interestingly, Weinstein claims that these conditions are best met by rebel groups operating in areas where they cannot finance themselves through natural resources. However, rebel victories also often produce leaders who are better at waging war than leading a state, resulting in monolithic parties and authoritarian rule - characteristics necessary for a rebel organization. "These tendencies --- might be seen as potential costs of non-intervention, but costs that must be weighed against the benefits"[305]. A statistical study by Toft finds that in general rebel victories tend to be both more stable, and have a better democratization effect[306]. Yet Weinstein also recognizes that rebel groups as well as governments may draw revenues from natural resources or illicit traffic, and have easy access to cheap weapons. Both of these cut the connection between waging war and the consent of the people from whom revenues would be extracted. He states that: "a serious commitment to state-building in the developing world will require concerted action to increase the costs of warfare"[307]. Thus, 'letting them fight it out' is a policy alternative - negotiated settlements have their own set of weaknesses described here later. Notably, nearly half of them fail within the first decade.

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[303] Ibid.
[304] Tull, Denis & Mehler, Andreas 2005. p.395.
[305] Weinstein, Jeremy 2005. p.21.
[306] Toft, Monica 2005. p.26, 31.
[307] Weinstein, Jeremy 2005. p.30.

An additional point against 'letting them fight it out' is made by Paul Collier & al. in a wide World Bank study. They argue that since conflict is development in reverse, the longer a war lasts, the higher will be the negative secondary consequences in the post-conflict environment. "Once disease has set in, a country may need years of peace to revert to its preconflict morbidity and mortality rates. Similarly, once an economy has experienced a wave of capital flight and emigration, this tends to continue once a conflict is over. In addition, the regional escalation in military expenditure can persist ---. In many cases, most costs of civil war occur only once they are over. --- Thus, in practice, the attitude let them fight it out among themselves gives licence to a few thousand combatants and a few dozen of their leaders to inflict widespread misery on millions of others"[308].

3.4. Ceasefires

In general a truce, a ceasefire, a cessation of hostilities and an armistice are all attempts to halt armed clashes as measures of good faith to build trust, and possibly communicate a credible desire for negotiation. All these measures, however, can also be used to buy time to rearm[309]. This was for example one of the central arguments expressed by Israel against the ceasefire with Hamas, that ended with Operation Cast Lead at the end of 2008[310]. Ceasefires are extremely fragile, since they are easily violated for example by factions that disagree with them, and implementation is difficult to monitor. Also, unclear definitions of the term used to signify a ceasefire, and lack of detail of its conditions, can lead to a breaking down of dialogue[311]. What are the meanings of the different terms used for halting armed clashes?

There are cursory differences between the concepts, namely in the depth of detail and issues they cover, and the level of formalization. However, the concepts are essentially context-dependent, meaning that they will reflect whatever conditions are negotiated by the different parties, and how they are implemented on the ground. Concepts can also

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[308] Collier, Paul & al. 2003. p.3.
[309] ECP 2007.
[310] icg.org 2009.
[311] ECP 2007.

evolve during one conflict, or a different concept can be adopted to get a fresh start. The Escola de Cultura de Pau gives the following definitions[312]:

Table 5. Definitions for different types of attempts to halt armed clashes

Truce	Informal, parties enter talks, usually a short action in the battlefield e.g. evacuation of civilians.
Ending of hostilities	Temporary suspension of all violence (incl. kidnappings etc.), does not include shifts in positions in the field. Usually at the beginning of the process, for a humanitarian action or gesture of good will, possibly to invite to negotiate. Can be unilateral, in hope of reciprocation.
Ceasefire	Involves negotiations. At the beginning of a process, it will resemble a cessation of hostilities, but does not tackle root causes, unstable. But further on during the process, it will be more detailed and wide, might involve retreating and grouping forces to agreed locations. In this case resembles an armistice. Agreement on behaviour, not issues.
Armistice	A capitulation, or can also mean the imposing of an end to hostilities (more permanent), e.g. Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

There are certain key variables to ceasefires. Temporally, they can be either temporary with a declared beginning and ending date, either for humanitarian purposes or to put pressure on negotiations and renewal when they expire, or they can be indefinite. Temporary ceasefires can also be for specific events, such as the one negotiated between the government and some Taliban factions for the Afghan 2009 presidential elections[313]. Indefinite ceasefires are usually unilateral, either for strategic reasons or to express a desire for a long-term halt to hostilities. Thus, a ceasefire can be unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral if more parties are involved. Usually the declaration of a bilateral ceasefire is preceded by some form of contact - though it can also be the result of reciprocating unilateral ones. Ceasefires are also common between non-state armed groups. Additionally, they may be imposed by outside actors, such as the UN. Ceasefires are not necessarily declared, they can also be informal or "de facto" ceasefires. Lastly, they may be confined to certain areas, for example to create safe zones for civilians[314].

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[312] Ibid. p.4-5.
[313] guardian.co.uk 13th August 2009.
[314] ECP 2007.

It is common for negotiation processes to need repeated declarations of a ceasefire as well as numerous agreements. Violations of ceasefires have been one of the most common reasons for the breakdown of peace negotiations in recent years[315]. It should be noted that there are also cases of negotiations being realised without a ceasefire. The agreements increasingly include not only military aspects, but ones designed to assist the civilian population. Most ceasefire agreements will include the following elements: 1) the identification and definition of prohibited actions; 2) separation of armed forces; 3) verification, supervision and control mechanisms; 4) grouping of forces to barracks, if there is to be a demobilization. Of these elements, the separation of forces is the most important. It can include the definition of: security zones for a mediating third party physically separating the forces, coordination zones (for example for troop movement), the number of troops and types of allowed armament, as well as the methods for verification of these, and the mapping of mined zones[316].

The main difficulties in implementing a ceasefire are the formation of dissenting factions (splinter-groups) and possible reluctance on the side of the armed forces, who are either unable to accept peace with their former enemies or fear for their jobs in the advent of peace. As already mentioned, there can also be fear of the ceasefire being a strategic ploy to build up forces[317]. Ceasefires reflect the security-dilemmas and difficulties of building trust that are inherent to the peace process. While I have mainly described ceasefires as the beginning of a process for negotiations, ceasefires and stalemates between parties (where sides are unable to defeat each other militarily) can, by themselves, eventually lead to peace. According to Toft, they ended a fifth of conflicts in the 1990s. Her study also suggests that ceasefires tend to produce a more sustaining peace than negotiations and power-sharing do. "Stalemates/ceasefires result in situations where both sides remain organized as separate political and military entities, poised to take up the fight if it comes to that". There is no agreement for a unity government. She argues that generally the sustainability of post-conflict peace hinges both on the benefits of sticking to peace as well as the harms that would result from reverting to violence for both sides. Toft's argument is that negotiated settlements

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[315] ECP 2009. And, ECP 2007.
[316] ECP 2007. p.14-17.
[317] Ibid. p.17.

provide benefits, but little possibilities for coercion[318]. In a ceasefire however, it is clear that the sides keep their coercive capabilities.

3.5. Negotiations

"Negotiation is understood as meaning the process in which two or more clashing parties (either countries or internal stakeholders from the same country) agree to discuss their differences within a concerted framework in order to seek a satisfactory solution to their demands. This negotiation can take place either directly or through facilitation by third parties". Successful negotiations commonly form a process beginning with informal contacts, towards more formal ones, with the form of contact increasing in the extent it is binding, beginning with explorations and ending with negotiations and an agreement. Negotiations can be I-track, referring to meetings between the official leaders of groups, or II-track negotiation, referring to unofficial representatives of the leaders, that can benefit from a less charged atmosphere, and who then communicate possible solutions to leaders[319]. It is important to note, and it is one of the main points of this paper, that the singing of a peace agreement is only the beginning of a long peace process and peacebuilding[320]. Indeed, 40% of post-conflict situations revert to conflict within the first decade[321]. Additionally, negotiations continue to form part of the post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in order to resolve disputes that arise between parties.

The Escola de Cultura de Pau states that negotiations in conflicts fall into five categories or models (although they can also combine more than one), depending on the end-goals pursued: a) **Demobilisation and reinsertion**; b) **Political, military or economic power-sharing**; c) **Exchange** (peace for democracy, peace for land, peace for withdrawal, peace for recognition of rights, etc.); d) **Confidence-building measures**; e) **Formulas for self-government or an "intermediate political architecture"**[322]. The main focus here will be on power-sharing arrangements, because 1.) today: "externally-driven state-building efforts tend to set in place mediated agreements that bring warring

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[318] Toft, Monica 2005.
[319] Fisher, Ronald 2007.
[320] ECP 2009. p.9.
[321] Collier, Paul 2007. p.213.
[322] ECP 2009. p.10.

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parties into power-sharing arrangements"[323], and 2.) power-sharing arrangements actually incorporate the other categories. Internationally mediated agreements today often have a demobilisation component. Exchanges are also inherently related to power-sharing as are many forms of autonomy (although secession cannot be considered a power-sharing arrangement). Confidence-building measures are a part of most peace agreements, and power-sharing itself is intended to be a confidence building measure. It should be noted, that not all negotiations result in power-sharing. For example in the case of the AUC in Colombia, the deal that was struck led to the unilateral demobilization of the AUC, in exchange for amnesty or reduced sentences for confessing their crimes and turning in their weapons.

Why and when would warring parties come to the negotiating table? Many of these conditions have already been listed with respect to ceasefires. The parties in conflict might have reached a hurting stalemate, where neither side is capable of defeating the other, and there is war-fatigue. The parties may be forced to negotiate with each other by outsiders[324]. There may also be a shift in the balance of power, prompting negotiations. One side may achieve military victory - yet even in these cases, the enemy is rarely completely destroyed, forcing the sides to deal with each other[325]. Negotiation can also be a strategy to buy time to rearm, or simply to benefit materially from outside aid before reverting to conflict[326]. Participating in negotiations can also be used to increase international standing[327].

Another central question that has received academic attention, affecting the parties' willingness to negotiate and their ability to come to a compromise, is the divisibility of the stakes under negotiation. In these studies, negotiations are viewed as a means to resolve the distribution of political goods[328]. The more divisible the stakes, the easier it is to come to a compromise; the more total, or absolute are the goals of the different sides, the more difficult it is. Issues are indivisible when: "neither side can get most of what it wants without depriving the other of most of what it wants". For example complete control of a country, the elimination of a rival, or the revolutionary overthrow

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[323] Weinstein, Jeremy 2005. p.27.
[324] Catano, James 2007.
[325] Toft, Monica 2005. p.30.
[326] Tull, Denis & Mehler, Andreas 2005. p.392.
[327] ECP 2009. p.10.
[328] Vaughan, Frank 2007.

of a hated political, economic, or social system have been mentioned as less divisible issues[329].

Monitoring peace negotiations in 2008, the ECP found that the main reason for crises were: lack of trust in the mediators, the lack of a ceasefire and splits within the armed groups. The ECP also found that of the conflicts they studied, only 7.5% ended in military victory, and 81% had negotiations underway. This leads them to suggest that the "vast majority of conflicts end at the negotiating table". Also, conflicts in this decade have opened up negotiations earlier, and reached an agreement quicker[330]. It should be noted, that while the ECP's study examines more recent conflicts, Toft's study puts the number for military victories during the 1990's at 39% of conflicts[331].

3.5.1. Power-sharing agreements

Commonly, **power-sharing agreements** aim to set up a unity government between former warring parties[332]. The usual format promoted by the international community is a transitional government that is in place until elections are held, at a date set in the agreement. In theory, this provides for a peaceful transition of power[333]. As Catano states: "power sharing provisions have developed into the international community's preferred manner for structuring post-conflict governments ---"[334]. Power-sharing provides a number of benefits, but it has also been heavily criticized.

Firstly, the apparent attraction of power-sharing arrangements is their capacity to get the groups to stop fighting and reach a compromise. Considering that civilians are the ones who overwhelmingly suffer from today's wars, there are strong moral arguments for not letting "war run its course". It should be noted though, that plenty of authors argue that in the long run, this would guarantee a more sustainable peace in many conflicts (see 3.3. To intervene or not). Secondly, power-sharing arrangements "minimize problems of state-building in the post-conflict environment with respect to balancing, dividing and

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[329] Walter, Barbara 2001. p.12-13.
[330] ECP 2009.
[331] Toft, Monica 2005. p.11.
[332] ECP 2009. p.20.
[333] Tull, Denis & Mehler, Andreas 2005. p.386
[334] Catano, James 2007b.

distributing not only power, but also burden and responsibility ---"[335]. Notably, such arrangements are supposed to guarantee that groups are able to protect their interests as they commit to non-violence[336].

The idea behind power-sharing arrangements is that by accommodating rebel movements, the political context can be demilitarized. This, and working in a unity government, is thought to promote moderate, compromise-seeking behaviour based on cooperation, and a perception that all parties benefit from pursuing political ends by non-violent means[337]. Increased dialogue, and having an overview of the parties' own interests by being in the decision-making process, both reduce political, economic, social and military uncertainties[338]. What kinds of issues are dealt with in power-sharing arrangements, and which agreements succeed?

Power-sharing agreements can concern many different sectors. Hartzell and Hoddie analyze agreements according to whether they provide power-sharing provisions for political, territorial, military or economic sectors. They argue that power-sharing agreements are about defining how decisions will be made in a new polity, but also about who will have access to state resources. As the main political concerns they list electoral proportional representation, administrative proportional representation, and executive proportional representation. Territorial issues relate to the division of autonomy between central and local governments. Economic issues concern the capacity to allocate state resources, whereas military power-sharing mainly deals with the police and the army. While their article does little to criticize power-sharing in itself, they find that of the different power-sharing arrangements they analyze, the ones with a higher number of power-sharing provisions in different sectors, and enforced externally, are the ones that have best guaranteed sustained peace. They speculate that this is because: "the failure of any one aspect of power sharing may not necessarily result in groups becoming permanently marginalized or unable to provide for their own security" [339]. Catano lists similar key issues: a shared executive with divided powers, guaranteed political representation, assured allocation of bureaucratic jobs, certain allocation of

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[335] Ibid.
[336] Hartzell, Caroline & Hoddie, Matthew 2003. p.319.
[337] Tull, Denis & Mehler, Andreas 2005. p.387.
[338] Catano, James 2007b.
[339] Hartzell, Caroline & Hoddie, Matthew 2003.

resources, the decentralization of society, and assured recognition of ethnic, cultural or other interests[340].

Yet Barbara Walter points out, that: "the biggest challenge facing civil war opponents at the negotiating table, therefore, is not how to resolve disagreements over land reform, majority rule, or any of the underlying grievances that started the war. --- The greatest challenge is to design a treaty that convinces the combatants to shed their partisan armies and surrender conquered territory even though such steps will increase their vulnerability and limit their ability to enforce the treaty's other terms". This is why I think that even when an agreement is reached, and parties enter a unity government, their power bases in the new polity will still be based on their armed organizations. In essence, even if demobilized and reintegrated, their former conflict organizations will remain the source of their power and coercion to achieve their interests, by threatening to revert to conflict, or using low-level violence. As Tull and Mehler argue, many rebels who enter government will actually not change their behaviour, but profit from both their wartime economies and government resources[341]. Additionally, a power-sharing agreement institutionalizes the people who are professionals at using violence for political ends, and given their power bases, it is debatable whether parties will come to view non-violent politics as a positive-sum game, where both parties benefit from cooperation. While in theory elections will ultimately enable a change of power in society, the truth is that the groups will consolidate their power bases and future electoral success while in government. Elections have often been set as the defining milestone for many outside interventions. Yet the calming effect of elections has come into question. Collier et al. for example find that a pre-election calm is followed by post-election violence that in total increases the risk of reversion[342]. All in all, mere elections do not guarantee a peaceful transition of power. Contending for power by elections often seems to be ultimately resolved through use of political violence between opposing factions, outside mediation and pressure, and some form of power-sharing. This has happened in countries that are not even in a post-conflict situation, such as in Kenya after the 2007 elections[343] and in Zimbabwe, where conclusive

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[340] Catano, James 2007b.

[341] Tull, Denis & Mehler, Andreas 2005. p.393.

[342] Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2007. p.470-471.

[343] washingtonpost.com 7th March 2008.

elections were prevented through violence[344]. Elections do not necessarily make for effective peacebuilding. Achieving security, and rule of law are better guarantees for peace, and thus eventual democratization as well. This is one of the key findings of this study.

Looking at 23 peace agreements that included pledges to found a transitional government, the ECP notes that in 70% of cases the coalition governments have not worked[345]. Additionally, power-sharing will sideline any non-violent opposition there has been. Using power-sharing as a policy tool has prompted many opposition parties to arm themselves in the hope of getting a seat in the government, and created an incentive structure for would-be rebels[346]. Setting up quotas for public offices and government will also lock in place differences between communities, especially in ethnic contexts, since these will be the base for political competition.

Thus, Toft's argument is compelling. A truly completed power-sharing arrangement, that would actually demilitarize politics, would leave both parties with benefits from peace, but with little capacity to harm or coerce groups that defect or become spoilers. Walter states that: "--- it is almost impossible for the combatants themselves to arrange credible guarantees on the terms of the settlement. Negotiations frequently do not fail because the conditions on the ground are not 'ripe for resolution,'.--- Adversaries often compromise on the basic issues underlying their conflict ---. Negotiations fail because combatants cannot credibly promise to abide by terms that create numerous opportunities for exploitation after the treaty is signed ---. Only if a third party is willing to enforce or verify demobilization, and only if the combatants are willing to extend power-sharing guarantees, will promises to abide by the original terms be credible and negotiations succeed"[347]. This is why Toft argues that the long-term presence of an outside actor, with both the will and means to prevent defection, is what is needed to support power-sharing agreements. This is also what Hartzell and Hoddie's statistical study finds. Yet at the end of the day, a self-sustaining peace can only be guaranteed by a democratically controlled domestic security sector into which both parties are integrated, again emphasizing the importance of SSR. In conclusion, it is one of the key

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[344] news.bbc.co.uk 30th January 2009.
[345] ECP 2009. p.11.
[346] Tull, Denis & Mehler, Andreas 2005.
[347] Walter, Barbara 2001. p.5-6.

findings of this study, that power-sharing arrangements inherently pose a number of security problems, are themselves extremely fragile, and will benefit from third party monitoring or enforcement. The fact that they are often combined with quick elections does not necessarily pacify the situation nor necessarily guarantee representation.

3.6. Mediation

Roughly, there are three ways to peacefully resolve a conflict: 1) direct negotiations between parties, 2) various forms of mediation, good offices and conciliation, 3) binding methods of third-party intervention (e.g. arbitration, adjudication)[348]. I will focus here on mediation, which is a central tool the international community uses for facilitating negotiations between conflicting parties. It is thus a technique to increase positive outcomes in negotiations. While it is often used in the context of peace negotiations, an outside party monitoring the implementation of a peace agreement will also be acting as a mediating agent. Bercovitch defines mediation as "a complex and dynamic interaction between mediators who have resources and interests in the conflict or its outcome, and the protagonists [of the conflict] or their representatives". Mediation is by definition a voluntary process: the parties to the conflict retain control over the outcomes, although the mediator may set the agenda. It may be conducted by an individual, a state, or an organization or institution[349].

There are many reasons why mediation is effective. Empirically, Walter notes that: "civil war combatants almost always chose to return to war unless a third party stepped in to enforce or verify a post-treaty transition. If a third party assisted with implementation, negotiations almost always succeeded, regardless of the initial goals, ideology, or ethnicity of the participants. If a third party did not, these talks almost always failed"[350]. Essentially, mediators enter a conflict so that the parties may reach a more optimal outcome than they would on their own.

While much of the literature reviewed describes a mediator as neutral and having no decision-making power, a mediator is always part of the relationship between the parties

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[348] Bercovitch, Jacob 2007. p.164.
[349] Ibid.
[350] Walter, Barbara 2001. p.3.

through the very act of mediating and having his/her own interests. How neutral or forceful a mediator is in actuality will vary. All mediators consciously or unconsciously bring with them their own ideas, resources, interests and assumptions of both the conflict and the party they represent, to the negotiation table. The mediator's role can vary from being a representative of a third party, being expected to invent options, performing monitoring functions, or being a scapegoat for failure. The following table, adapted from Bercovitch, shows the kinds of tasks and roles the mediator can play aiming at enabling the parties to achieve outcomes they could not on their own[351]:

Table 6. Roles and tasks of a mediator

Strategies	Tactics
Communication-facilitation	Clarify situation
	Develop rapport with parties
	Make parties aware of relevant information
	Rehearse each party in appropriate behaviour
	Clarify what parties intend to communicate
	Avoid taking sides
Procedural	Establish protocol
	Delineate forthcoming agenda
	Separate parties
	Strike a power balance
	Provide direction and act as spokesman for weaker party
	Reduce tensions
	Move from simple to more complex issues
	Keep discussion focused on issues
	Summarize the agreement
	Act as sounding board for propositions and tactics
Directive (more forceful)	Help a party undo a commitment
	Suggest trade-offs
	Help parties save face
	Contrive a prominent position
	Reward parties' concessions

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[351] Bercovitch, Jacob 2007.

Highlight costs of non-agreement

Claim authorship for party's proposals

Offer carrots or threaten with sticks

Threaten to quit or bring in an arbitrator

Bring third party ultimatums to the interaction/negotiation

We can see that the central functions of mediation are facilitating communication and building trust, providing the actual context for negotiations, and bringing in carrots and sticks. Bercovitch notes that while all mediation is context-dependent, two key issues affecting success are proper timing and a power-parity (a hurting stalemate, where neither side can defeat the other, but the human and economic costs of war continue to rise). Severe internal disorganization of parties hinders success. Some evidence also points to more forceful techniques of mediation being effective - though not in all cases [352]. There has been an increase in mediation of conflicts - while during the Cold-War period, there was mediation in approximately 30% of conflicts, the post-Cold War figure is 64%. During the whole period, 62% of cases that asked for mediation reached an agreement, while of the ones without mediation only 27% did[353]. This may also indicate that seeking mediation reflects commitment to the process on both sides[354].

3.7. Monitoring implementation of the peace process

The entire peace process is one of building trust between the conflicting parties, by creating carrots for keeping with the process and sticks for breaking with it. The peace agreement is only a piece of paper until actual implementation begins - a process with dangers and many snags. As Walter pointed out in what she termed the 'credible commitment theory', it may quite simply be impossible for combatants to credibly promise to abide by treaties that create numerous opportunities for exploitation[355]. One example is the demobilisation phase. Another is the difficulty of truly engaging in a unity government and relinquishing violence as the base of power. As with mediation in

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[352] Bercovitch, Jacob 2007.
[353] ECP 2007. p.17.
[354] Bercovitch, Jacob 2007. p.183.
[355] Walter, Barbara 2001.

negotiations, outside monitoring and implementation can assist the sides in achieving better results than they could by themselves.

Monitoring refers to the methodology of observing, monitoring and reporting. A mission can be primarily a monitoring mission or have monitoring as one of its components. The EU concept paper for monitoring missions for example states that monitoring differs from other conflict management methods by its 1.) lack of a coercive deterrent capacity, 2.) tendency to lack an inspective capacity, 3.) uninvolvement in implementing programmes. Missions are impartial and reactive rather than proactive[356]. Monitoring can be military or civilian. There are a wide number of objects of monitoring: borders, established security zones, cantonment sites for ex-combatants, weapons stockpiles, human rights, the judiciary, elections and so forth. Monitoring missions can often be part of a peace agreement. Producing information is the key task, meant to guarantee objective assessments of the situation on the ground to both parties. Thus the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia for example is: "monitoring the implementation by both parties of the peace agreements ---. One important step in this respect was the withdrawal of Russian armed forces from the adjacent areas ---. EUMM also monitors the Georgian police in taking over executive power in these areas. --- Its presence in Georgia [aims] to help normalize and stabilize the situation on the ground. EUMM reports on the human rights situation, the respect of international humanitarian law, rule of law and security situation, as well as the return of internally displaced persons and refugees"[357]. Monitoring can also involve low-level mediation between parties. While monitoring is generally considered non-coercive, with respect to the implementation of peace processes, more forceful strategies can also lead parties to beneficial compromises (see 3.6. Mediation).

Hartzell and Hoddie find that the presence of a third-party enforcer after the signing of a peace agreement reduces the risk of failure by 83%[358]. If we take a peacekeeping force as a proxy for enforcing an outside presence, Fortna finds that their presence in civil wars in the post-Cold War period reduces the risk of reversion by 84%[359].

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[356] Council of the European Union 2003. p.4-6.
[357] eumm.eu.
[358] Hartzell, Caroline & Hoddie, Matthew 2003. p.327.
[359] Fortna, Virginia 2004. p.285.

At the end of the day however, a self-sustaining peace will require building up local capacity. This will also be the exit strategy for outside intervention. The available local capacity varies greatly in post-conflict environments (see 1.9. The state-centric approach and weak states), and will partly determine the need for capacity-building by outsiders. In post-conflict environments the capacity of the state to provide security is often the most acute issue. Yet either weakness or factionalism of the state security sector may have been a cause of the conflict, emphasizing the importance of a proper SSR[360]. Thus today, instead of mere monitoring, many outside interventions include complex state-building activities. Yet such interventions have risks and negative effects of their own (see 1.10. Intervention - why it is not a solution to every problem). What statistical studies seem to support is a phased transition with a sizeable legitimate outside force for a considerable portion of the post-conflict phase[361], while local capacity is developed as intensely as possible with an appreciation that this takes time. The 'light footprint' approach for example, emphasizes that since outside interventions are temporary, missions should do their best not to undermine local structures of governance, and give as much ownership over the state-building process as possible to the locals[362]. Economic development also reduces the risk of reversion[363].

3.8. Arms control measures

Arms control measures can target and have an effect on both state and non-state actors. While the disarmament of non-state armed groups through DDR has been analyzed above, I will here look at arms control measures for post-conflict societies more generally. The two are, as mentioned, complementary. Broadly speaking, DDR addresses the effects of the conflict by disarming groups, whereas arms control measures affect the causes of conflict, by reducing the availability of weapons and affecting the potential conflict environment. The focus is on small arms and light weapons. Roughly, arms control measures can be divided into two categories: supply- and demand-oriented[364].

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[360] Fearon, James & Laitin, David 2004. p.36-37.
[361] Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke 2004. p.4.
[362] CMI 2004. p. 4, 11.
[363] Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke 2004.
[364] smallarmssurvey.org : Practical Disarmament.

3.8.1. Supply-side measures

Supply-side measures have been the main focus of international efforts to control the flow of arms. These include export and import controls, marking and tracing, reigning in brokers, and measures to take illegal weapons out of circulation. Each one of these measures aims to reduce the availability (supply) of weapons by affecting some or all parts of the chain from 'production' to 'end-use'. The chain can be described as follows: Production --> Stockpiles and stockpile management --> Brokering --> Trade and transfer --> End-use[365].

The main international actor is the UN with its Programme of Action (PoA) on SALW process. There is currently a process in the UN to develop an international legally binding **arms trade treaty (ATT)**, which has the support of most member states[366]. The ATT is intended to give a global set of common standards for import, export and transfer of conventional arms. While opposed by some, the idea is to anchor the treaty in the states' obligation to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights standards, as well as to prevent threats to global security. Effectively, transfer would not be allowed to parties or areas where there would be a substantial risk of abuse, either with respect to irresponsible end-users or diversion[367].

Most of the world's SALW **production** is legal, that is, with the consent of the host-nation. Thus the diversion into illegal traffic happens at other points in the chain. In a small number of cases however, illegal production can also have a considerable effect locally[368]. With respect to production, one of the central issues to counter proliferation is the transfer of technology. All major arms producers have licensed out production of weapons they have developed and also produce themselves. This poses two different problems: first it increases the global know-how to produce weapons (information is a good that cannot be retrieved), and it increases the risk of unlicensed, and thus illicit production. Proliferation of technology is significant. The Small Arms Survey (SAS) found that with respect to small arms, there were only 17 countries where the original

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[365] Atwood, David; Glatz, Anne-Kathrin & Muggah, Robert 2006. p.4-5.
[366] Amnesty International, Instituto Sou Da Paz, Oxfam, Project Ploughshares, Saferworld & Albert Schweitzer Institute 2009.
[367] Amnesty International 2008. p.4-11.
[368] smallarmssurvey.org : Producers.

technology was developed, while production with or without a license was taking place in 52 countries. Taking into account countries and companies where the technology had been transferred, only 57% of these arms were being produced under a license. Often, production continues after licences have expired.

With respect to light weapons, there has also been a proliferation of technology and lethality. The ratio of licensed to unlicensed production is 31 countries to 26. Many non-state armed groups today produce their own unguided light weapons, such as rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, grenade launchers and IEDs, and have acquired guided weapons[369]. Thus, proliferation of technology and diversion are key issues.

Another factor increasing undesirable proliferation in addition to the diversion of technology, is irresponsible exports by producers who have received the technology. One response is tougher enforcement of intellectual property rights laws to stem unlicensed production. The SAS however estimates that the most effective way to prevent irresponsible exports is through tougher export control measures, namely by obliging states to grant licenses for production in the same manner as direct transfers of small arms. They should be: "refused if there is a significant risk that the transferred technology or weapons to be produced under licence would be diverted or misused by the recipient"[370].

According to Saferworld: "the great majority of illicit or unauthorised SALW have been sourced from diversion from authorised official or civilian holdings, through loss, theft, corruption or neglect". **Diversion from stockpiles** can occur at any stage of the process, be it waiting for shipment, during the transfer (the weakest point), or from stocks of an authorised end user (most common source for insurgencies). Key loopholes in the process are the lack of risk assessments by exporting countries on whether the receiving countries have the capacity to store weapons safely, and the low cooperation between the two actors on the issue. A 2009 Saferworld report estimates that there is a: "reasonably strong normative framework for international action to enhance stockpile

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[369] SAS 2008.
[370] SAS 2007.

security issues", but that awareness amongst the relevant national officials is disturbingly low[371].

There are both legal and illegal **arms transfers**. With respect to legal ones, the policies that are promoted focus on more responsible export policies and prevention of diversion to illicit markets. Capturing illegal transfers focuses on law-enforcement efforts.

Arms brokers are middlemen that can either find suppliers for their clients, buy weapons from suppliers and then sell them onwards, or organize the transfers themselves. Evidence suggests that arms brokers have procured weapons to many irresponsible end-users that could not have obtained weapons from a government-authorised entity. Despite clear evidence of brokers often being involved in diversions to illegal markets, they are still fairly commonly used, because most states have no effective legal and regulatory measures in this area[372]. Evidence suggests that most of the big dealing by arms traffickers is done by relatively few individuals, who combine both licit and illicit trade[373]. While there are some regional agreements, most of these are voluntary (with the exception of the EU). Most of these agreements are based on a system of licensing individual transactions as well as national registries of the brokers used, which reflects a consensus on the kind of system needed. Saferworld estimates that, if implemented, such measures would considerably reduce the risk of diversion by brokers[374].

End-user certificates (EUC) declare that the weapons are intended for the buyer only, and they will not be reshipped elsewhere. In practice, these documents have often been copied, forged or provided by corrupt government officials. The fact that the system relies solely on paper end-user certificates, and that their authenticity is seldom checked, leaves the system open for abuse. As of January 2009, only 68 states reported having some kind of EUC-system, of which half were in Europe. While there seems to be an international consensus on the need for a system in general, this is not case for its

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[371] Saferworld 2009. p.71-73.
[372] Saferworld 2009. p.43-45.
[373] Griffiths, Hugh & Wilkinson, Adrian 2007.
[374] Saferworld 2009. p.43-45.

possible content or procedures. Saferworld suggests that a risk assessment and licensing system would be the best guarantees against misuse[375].

A further way to prevent the entry of arms to areas where they might be misused is through **arms embargoes**. Their effectiveness has however come into question - of the UN arms embargoes between 1990-2006, every single one has been violated. SIPRI estimates that only in a quarter of the cases did the embargo affect the behaviour of the target. Key factors were the level of support by the Security Council members for the embargo, the presence of U.N. peacekeepers, and the level of cooperation and border control of the neighbouring states[376]. A report by Control Arms states that the main problems are the impunity of sanction busters, and lack of resources and mandate of the UN Sanctions Committee and UN Investigative teams. This lack of UN capability forces it to rely on Member States for monitoring, where national controls are often inadequate or inexistent. Additionally, Control Arms argues that arms embargoes are often imposed too late, when conflict areas are already flush with arms[377].

Instruments aiming to make arms dealing more transparent include the **Wassenaar Arrangement, The UN Register of Conventional Arms, and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)**[378]. The Wassenaar Arrangement is a multilateral export control regime consisting of arms exporting countries and covering a range of different weapons, not just SALW. It is not however binding, in the sense that implementation is fully up to signatory states. The main focus is on providing transparency for arms exports and to prevent diversion[379]. Its data is not public. The UN Register of Conventional Arms keeps track of arms exports on the basis of data submitted to them by Member States. In 2006, 50 states participated every year, 170 had participated once or more and 25 had never done so. In 2003, reporting SALW sales was also officially recommended, but in 2004 for example, only 6 states reported such information[380]. One expert considers that even of the states that do submit data, many do so incompletely[381].

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[375] Ibid. p.36-39.
[376] SIPRI 2007.
[377] Control Arms 2006.
[378] Also known as the 'International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons'.
[379] wassenaar.org : Introduction.
[380] United Nations Register of Conventional Arms 2007. p.30-31.
[381] Wood, Brian 2006. p.4.

The ITI is a result of the UN Programme of Action, adopted in 2005. It is a politically, but not legally, binding instrument, that sets out ways in which weapons should be marked. Ammunitions and explosives were excluded from the ITI, which has been considered one of its major deficiencies. Additionally, it only commits states to marking weapons at the manufacturing level, leaving import markings, and marking the use by government forces, on a voluntary basis. This leaves tracing highly dependent on importers for accurate record-keeping[382].

3.8.2. Demand-reduction

Demand-reduction is one set of policy-strategies aimed at the reduction of SALW that has received less attention, according to the Small Arms Survey. Demand reduction is a necessary complement to supply reduction, as: "interventions to restrict the supply of weapons will only succeed if factors driving demand are carefully diagnosed and acted upon"[383]. Demand reduction is significant in the sense that its object is the society as a whole, not just security forces or non-state armed groups. Most of the world's firearms are held by civilians[384].

Demand reduction is based on understanding individual and group motivations and resources (both monetary and non-monetary) for weapons acquisition. With respect to motivation, security can be a powerful motivation for acquiring weapons. An approach where weapons are reduced but security is not provided by the state can render communities more vulnerable, and create shifts in the balance of power. For example in societies where the state security forces are absent, or conversely are predatory, there tends to be higher misuse of civilian firearms. This emphasizes the complementarity of SSR and disarmament (see 1.9.2. Security Sector Reform). Demand can also be affected by socially constructed norms on status or manhood. The extent of resources needed for acquiring weapons will depend on their price, which in turn is also affected by the supply of weapons in a given society. Thus, "demand is also a function of real and relative prices, which can act as a constraint on the realization of preferences". Disarmament programs can thus be aimed at changing the norms surrounding weapons,

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[382] McDonald, Glenn 2006.
[383] Atwood, David; Glatz, Anne-Kathrin & Muggah, Robert 2006. p.xv
[384] smallarmssurvey.org: Issue Areas: Measures and Initiatives.

providing better security at the community level, and offering development projects (but not cash) in return for firearms. These elements are interdependent. Practitioners have found that programs based on the local level that include an assessment of the needs of the population have been most successful. This contrasts with the often top-down supply-side approach[385].

In addition to demand reduction, misuse of civilian firearms can be managed through regulation of possession, ownership, storage, carrying, and use of small arms and light weapons[386].

In conclusion, arms control measures aim at reducing the availability of weapons in post-conflict areas as well as the demand for them, changing one of the key facilitators of rebellion. On the supply-side, key policies are focused on creating regulatory systems located at the global level, tighter controls and cooperation at the regional level, and effective implementation of regulation at the national level. Demand reduction is important at the national and local level.

3.9. Sanctions

Sanctions are a group of policy tools, that can be used to target states, non-state groups, or individuals, with the aim of achieving specific political objectives. These objectives may include punishing or weakening a target, signalling disapproval, inducing a change in policy, or bringing about regime change. Often, there are multiple objectives, although one may be overriding, and objectives can vary greatly in ambition. While this study is mainly concerned with sanctions aiming to have a positive impact on peace, sanctions can also be used to pave the way for war[387].

Sanctions can be divided into economic and non-economic ones. Economic ones can include restrictions on trading, services, or financial relations[388]. These could be implemented in the form of a freeze on funds and assets, a ban on transactions, the

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[385] Atwood, David; Glatz, Anne-Kathrin & Muggah, Robert 2006.
[386] smallarmssurvey.org: Issue Areas: Measures and Initiatives.
[387] House of Lords, Select Committee of Economic Affairs 2007. p.7-8.
[388] Ibid. p.7.

imposition of investment restrictions, restrictions on trade in certain commodities (especially 'conflict-resources' such as diamonds or timber) and restrictions on aid[389]. Non-economic sanctions can for example include arms embargoes (see in 3.8.1. Supply-side measures), restrictions on the use of technologies or equipment (notably military), travel bans, air traffic constraints, diplomatic constraints, and restrictions on culture and sports. Sanctions can be used together with other tools of foreign policy, such as diplomacy, economic or political incentives, and the threatened or actual use of force. Studies find that it is crucial to use many kinds of sanctions, as well as accompany them with other mentioned policy tools in order to achieve the stated political objectives. For example, economic sanctions alone fare poorly[390].

Other key elements determining the effectiveness of sanctions are monitoring and implementation, 'naming and shaming' strategies, and punitive elements for sanction busters. 'Naming and shaming' strategies are usually effective only on parties that seek legitimacy from the international community[391].

Sanctions can also be roughly divided into the older comprehensive sanctions, that are generally applied to a country as a whole, and the newer targeted or 'smart' sanctions. Comprehensive sanctions, especially economic ones, were found to cause great suffering among the general population of the country, even if sanctions included a planned exemption for humanitarian assistance, while political leaders could often isolate themselves from the intended harms[392]. Targeted sanctions on the other hand are intended to be directed at individuals (government officials, rebel leaders), companies and organizations, or restrict trade in key commodities. Thus, asset freezing, travel bans and naming and shaming are intended to have a targeted effect on the people assumed to have the decision-making power. Restricting trade in key commodities (also known as targeted commodity sanctions) however, will necessarily have an impact on the overall population as well, as it affects entire sectors of the economy[393].

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[389] Confédération Suisse, SECO.
[390] House of Lords, Select Committee of Economic Affairs 2007. p.5-8.
[391] Ibid.p.26.
[392] Ibid. p.14-21.
[393] Ibid. p.31.

Sanctions can be imposed by an international organization, of which the UN is the most important actor, accompanied by the growing importance of the EU; a group of states; or individual states[394]. One way to think about sanctions is illustrated in Table 7.

Table 7. Sanctions: key actors and actions

International organization deciding to impose sanctions, e.g. UN Security Council, and relevant committees/panels of experts - *what kinds of sanctions & objectives*

Other countries, especially neighbours - *implement/bust sanctions*

Target country/group/individual - *behaviour*

I will shortly present the two most discussed forms of sanctions: financial ones - namely asset freezing - and targeted commodity sanctions. I will finish with an example, which highlights the importance of a regional approach.

Targeted commodity sanctions, when used as a peacebuilding approach, are intended to cut off the access of warring parties to external markets for a specific product that is used to fund war. The specific commodities talked about here are also referred to as **'conflict-resources'**. According to a leading NGO, Global Witness, the UN had passed targeted sanctions on natural resource exports six times up until 2006 (all directed at either diamonds or timber), while the NGO estimated that in reality a very wide range of resources finance conflicts worldwide[395]. Thus, a specific resource, like diamonds, may or may not be a conflict resource depending on the context and its use.

One of the most famous regimes controlling a resource that can fuel conflicts is the Kimberley Process (KP), which manages international trade in rough diamonds. The main idea is that members (states) using the KP diamond certification scheme for legitimate diamonds will not trade with non-members. Due to the fact that the majority of trading countries became members, in practice any country wishing to trade in diamonds needs to voluntarily become a member[396]. While the KP is a relative success,

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[394] House of Commons, International Development Committee 2006.
[395] Global Witness 2006. p.14 & 4.
[396] Smillie, Ian 2005.

some experts estimate that it would be impossible to create a similar process for each natural resource. They argue that it would be more fruitful to have a common definition for conflict resources and making judgements on a case-by-case basis, with a permanent body for oversight[397]. Regulating the trade of any resource will depend on the resource itself (how easy is it to smuggle, geographical concentration for control, costs of extraction) and character of the industry (how much of it operates underground, are there a few big players or many dispersed ones, how sensitive it is to public image)[398].

There is currently no official definition of 'conflict-resources', which significantly complicates efforts to target sanctions. States have, under international law, the right to use available resources for self-defence. Global Witness argues that a natural resource should be considered a conflict resource, and defined as such, when it is used to finance illegitimate conflicts *where there are breaches of international humanitarian law or human rights* [399].

It is important to note, that companies trading in conflict resources can also be complicit and liable for crimes committed in conflict zones. While the monitoring of such companies is today often up to *ad hoc* UN Panels of experts or relevant NGOs, punitive measures are up to the states in which such companies are based. These kinds of measures, while not constituting sanctions as such, have targeted a wider range of natural resources[400]. In conclusion, these measures regulating potential conflict resources have two peacebuilding end-goals: 1. preventing illicit exploitation of natural resources, and 2. guaranteeing transparent and proper management of revenues[401]. Depending on who is trading in conflict resources, sanctions will thus ideally affect parties for whom the conflict guarantees continued access to resources (spoilers), the general finances of non-state armed groups (feasibility), or states in breach of IHL or human rights, or the level of corruption in states (legitimacy).

Financial sanctions can be general, such as sanctions against North Korea (comprehensive sanctions), or targeted sanctions against individuals or groups, whether

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[397] House of Commons, International Development Committee 2006. p.34-35.
[398] Global Witness 2006. p.3. And Smillie, Ian 2005. p.1-3.
[399] Global Witness 2006.
[400] House of Commons, International Development Committee 2006. p.34-40.
[401] Global Witness 2006. p.16.

state or non-state (smart sanctions). The UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee, US and EU have extensive lists of targeted individuals, of which many are included on the basis of counter-terrorism[402].

Financial sanctions and monitoring serve two purposes: 1. freezing assets, but more notably transactions (which is likely to be a much larger sum), and 2. collecting intelligence by observing transactions. As stated by expert Peter Fitzgerald: "at their core, economic sanctions are controls that are directed primarily at, and implemented by, banks and financial institutions". It is therefore through the lens of the financial sector that much of the implementability of economic sanctions need to be addressed: whether the demands on self-surveillance imposed on banks are realistic; whether banks will calculate that it is more profitable to monitor transactions effectively, or 'pay' for failures when caught; whether banks will be penalized for revealing mistakes after the fact[403].

One of the central problems today associated with financial sanctions on persons is the current lack of due process guarantees for listed individuals and organizations[404]. Secondly, there is relatively little evidence on whether or not financial sanctions -targeted or general - are effective. A report commissioned by the House of Lords concluded that:

> "Economic sanctions used in isolation from other policy instruments are extremely unlikely to force a target to make major policy changes, especially where relations between the states involved are hostile more generally.--- Even when economic sanctions are combined effectively with other foreign policy instruments, on most occasions they play a subordinate role to those other instruments. Economic sanctions can be counter-productive in a variety of ways, including when more vigorous coercion in the form of force is needed but is forestalled by those making inflated claims for the value of sanctions as an alternative. Sanctions may also be counter-productive when what is required is a much greater emphasis on economic, diplomatic and security incentives"[405].

Lastly, I will give an **example** to highlight the importance of the regional dimension. In 2001, the UNSC imposed sanctions on Liberia, including a ban on rough diamonds, timber, arms trade and a travel ban for key individuals involved. Key members of the Liberian government and armed forces had been trading weapons with the RUF-rebel

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[402] House of Commons, International Development Committee 2006. p.24.
[403] Fitzgerald, Peter 2007.
[404] Lopez, George; Cortright, David; Millar Alistair & Gerber-Stellingwerf, Linda 2009.
[405] House of Commons, International Development Committee 2006. p.35-36.

group in Sierra Leone for rough diamonds. The result of the bans was pushing the arms and diamond economies further underground, but successfully limiting the trade in illegal rough diamonds. However, some neighbouring countries that did not produce diamonds, began exporting diamonds (supposedly smuggled from or through Liberia). The travel bans were bypassed by using multiple passports, including diplomatic ones, also granted to known smugglers. Government forces reportedly patrolled with new weapons during the ban. The sanctions also had severe negative effects on the Liberian economy as a whole, for example by discouraging foreign investment. Yet at least to some degree, the Panel of Experts' report of 2002 considered that the circumstances had changed since 2001, in that the Liberian government claimed that it had disassociated itself from the RUF, and the Panel viewed that the continuation of sanctions ought to be reviewed[406]. An independent evaluation by the Uppsala University in 2006 deemed that while all the sanctions had experienced problems, on a general level they had all had a positive stabilizing effect. Interestingly, the evaluation also recommended extending sanctions further into the post-conflict phase, to give space for the government to establish control over key sectors (notably natural resources)[407].

In conclusion, sanctions form a combination of tools for either putting pressure on groups to change their behaviour (e.g. 'naming and shaming') or limiting their capability to aggravate conflict (e.g. conflict resource sanctions, arms embargoes). While 'smart' sanctions are being increasingly used, many forms of sanctions (e.g. conflict resource sanctions) do have negative effects on the civilian population as well. Sanctions will work best when subordinated to other foreign-policy tools, meaning that they need to have clear political objectives and an exit strategy. For example, it can be more fruitful to threaten sanctions instead of directly imposing them, giving the target the possibility to change behaviour without losing face. Again, monitoring, evaluation, implementation and punitive measures are key. Sanctions might also play a positive post-conflict role in giving time to establish reponsible state-control over conflict-resources.

3.10. Counterinsurgency

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[406] Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia 2002.
[407] Wallensteen, Peter; Eriksson, Mikael & Strandow, Daniel 2006. p.7-15.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) refers mostly to the military effort against insurgency or non-state armed groups. Counterinsurgency differs significantly from conventional warfare in two ways. Firstly, it differs in the weight accorded to the political efforts over military ones for achieving overall success. Secondly, insurgency is asymmetric warfare with the guerrilla tactics used by insurgents, including terrorism. Most importantly, fighters are often indistinguishable from civilians and use this to their benefit. Moreover, insurgent operations are conducted covertly and direct confrontation is avoided by insurgents, unless they calculate they will win. These conditions impose very specific tactics for counterinsurgency warfare. Counterinsurgency is a delicate tool, that can be counterproductive in many cases. I will focus on the general theory on counterinsurgency and its strategic considerations, leaving the tactical level aside.

As a peacebuilding effort by outsiders, counterinsurgency involves roughly four actors whose roles and relations may vary according to their interests in the conflict: the host-nation and its COIN capabilities (HN), the insurgents, the outside actors, and the general population. The analysis here is based mainly on texts examining US, British and Israeli counterinsurgency experiences, all of which reflect different military or strategic cultures. While the US has previous counterinsurgency experience, for example from Vietnam, in Iraq and Afghanistan it has had to 'relearn' counterinsurgency. US counterinsurgency is always based on the idea of it being an outside intervening force supporting a host-nation, with a heavy emphasis on purely military action against insurgent forces. British counterinsurgency comes from a wide experience from colonial eras and Northern Ireland, emphasizing a more political, small-unit approach aiming to engage the local populace. The Israeli approach stems from the acceptance of a permanent asymmetric threat in its proximity as well as long-term occupation with no outside intervention. As a result, it is less focused on the political aspect or winning 'the hearts and minds' of the passive population in order to achieve a self-sustaining peace, as it is on militarily reducing the insurgent threat to a minimum. It should again be noted, that the frame of analysis taken here is not neutral, but strictly pro-government and anti-insurgent.

3.10.1. General theory and strategic considerations

While Clausewitz stated that war is the continuation of politics by other means, the interdependence of the two, and importance of the political, is even greater in counterinsurgency. As the US counterinsurgency manual states: "Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate," and when balancing military and political goals, "political factors have primacy in COIN"[408]. Or, as Israeli Major-General Yaakov Amidror concludes when putting forward the concept of 'sufficient victory' and 'temporary victory' (compared to total victory):

> "Temporary victory and sufficient victory do not provide a solution to the ideological conflict that forms the basis of the armed struggle and terror. As long as any reason whatsoever exists – political, national, ethnic, economic, religious, ideological, or an amalgam of all these ---, one must expect terror to continue or to be renewed. A military effort cannot be expected to solve a problem of historical dimensions. --- Nonetheless, one must reemphasize: a political solution is not the affair of the army, and efforts to obtain it cannot be divorced from the obligation to fight determinedly against any attempt
> by the enemy to secure achievements through violence."[409]

The primacy of political factors over immediate military goals is linked to the asymmetric nature of counterinsurgency efforts, and the fact that it is often impossible to distinguish insurgent from civilian. The environment in these conflicts is often described as having a small minority of the population supporting government efforts, a small minority supporting the insurgents, and crucially, a passive majority. The counterinsurgents aim to co-opt willing factions of the insurgency, destroy the rest, and most importantly tip as much of the passive majority onto their side as possible. Winning over the passive majority is tied to two central issues: 1) legitimacy of the counterinsurgency effort, most crucially that of the host-nation and its forces that will stay behind after outsiders leave, and 2) perception of victory - most people will side with who they think will win in the long run. While tied to real achievements, both are essentially questions of perception. As stated by the chief strategist on counterterrorism at the US State Department, David Kilcullen: "--- information is the basis for all other activities. This is because perception is crucial in developing control and influence over population groups. Substantive security, political and economic measures are critical but to be effective they must rest upon, and integrate with a broader information strategy"[410]. This is also reflected in the insurgent tactics in asymmetric warfare, as:

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[408] US Army 2006. p.13, 34.
[409] Amidror, Yaakov 2007. p.8.
[410] Kilcullen, David 2006b. p.4.

"terrorist and guerrilla attacks are usually planned to achieve the greatest political and informational impact with the lowest amount of risk to insurgents"[411].

Essentially, there is often a tension between the military goal of destroying the insurgents, and the political goal of winning the hearts and minds of the people in COIN. The US COIN manual for example notes that: "Clearly, killing or capturing insurgents will be necessary ---. However, killing every insurgent is normally impossible. Attempting to do so can also be counterproductive in some cases; it risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge"[412]. This is exemplified in the British counterinsurgency approach of 'minimum use of force', or 'escalation of force' for Americans, which refers to using the least amount of force possible to achieve the set out goals, while not limiting the right to self-defence. Additionally, it means taking these factors into account already when considering a mission, and weighing whether what is required to achieve a certain military goal will do more harm than good for the overall political goal. Excessive use of force that alienates the civilian population will also negatively affect collecting intelligence from human sources, which is extremely important for COIN. It should be noted, that while Israelis note the importance of separating insurgents from their civilian support base, they do not employ minimum use of force. Quite to the opposite, they rely on deterrence: "generally speaking, a small country like Israel can deal with terrorism and guerrilla organizations only if its response is not proportional and is carried out in such a way as to convince the other side that it too has something to lose"[413].

It is important to note, that it is the host-nation that has to have the capacity to defeat insurgencies in the long run, even if outsiders have helped defeating it initially. People will side with who they think will win in the long run, which is for example a very current question for people in Afghanistan. A successful counterinsurgency and self-sustaining peace is ultimately dependent on developing host-nation capability. This is in effect the exit strategy for outsiders.

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[411] US Army 2006. p.74.
[412] Ibid. p.35.
[413] Amidror, Yaakov 2007. p.38, 39.

According to the US counterinsurgency manual, the overall objective then is for the host-nation to regain control. This is a much more comprehensive goal than suppressing the insurgency militarily or even achieving stability. One could crudely divide the goals into three progressive stages: 1) defeating and clearing an area of insurgents, 2) achieving a hold over the area, 3) establishing host-nation control over the area. This 'clear and hold' or 'clear-hold-build' strategy begins in key areas, from where it is expanded geographically. Primacy is given to providing security for the population in the area under control, preferably through host-nation police patrolling, if or when this capacity exists. A sustained effort to minimize insurgent activity is essential, as is preventing reprisals for cooperation. At the tactical level, population control measures in the area are performed. Secondly, basic services such as food, water and electricity are given attention. Thirdly, longer term host-nation institutions are set up, most notably the security sector to achieve the rule of law. These are all linked to building confidence in the victory and legitimacy of the host-nation. This is a very long-term approach. While clear-hold-build approaches are employed in certain areas, it may not be possible to enter all insurgent strongholds. In these cases, there is nonetheless a need to attack, disrupt insurgent capability and leave, which in turn will temporarily reduce attacks on cleared areas[414].

One example of the difficulties of clearing, holding and building can be seen in Afghanistan. A documentary filmed in 2007 of an American military base in Kandahar with two dozen soldiers near rural stronghold Taliban areas describes a small base that has an area of operations containing over a 100 villages, some a day's drive away. The American soldiers can listen into the Taliban fighters constantly reporting their positions farther out from the villages, and possibly from inside the villages as well, as they enter to inspect. While inspecting, they also give medical aid and distribute food. One day during the filming of the documentary, village elders from all over the region come to the American base, risking Taliban retribution, to ask the soldiers for either their protection and presence in exchange for cooperation, or to ask the Americans not to make their villages the battlefield. As it is presented in the documentary, with the forces at their disposal, it is clear that it is not possible for the Americans to actually protect the villagers from the Taliban[415]. Overall, this shows the amount of troops, either

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[414] US Army 2006. p.120-127.
[415] National Geographic 2007.

by outsiders or the host-nation government that would be needed to control even areas that might be welcoming. Many argue that in Iraq a surge of forces helped reduce the level of the insurgency. The Afghan insurgency however is largely a rural one in a country 1½ times larger, and would require a much larger presence. Yet neither foreign troop levels or domestic capabilities are as of November 2009 anywhere close to Iraq even after troop reductions there[416].

By examining Israeli experiences in counterinsurgency Major-General Amidror argues that six conditions need to be met, without which defeating 'terrorism' is impossible. He uses the term terrorism largely as a synonym for insurgency, with an emphasis on terrorist attacks inside Israel proper. These conditions are 1.) a political decision to deal with terrorism, and the stomach to bear the political costs, with a clear goal - defeating terrorism - and mandate for the security forces. Amidror argues that what is possible to achieve by military, and not political, means is a 'sufficient victory'. "This is a victory that does not produce many years of tranquillity, but rather achieves only a 'repressed quiet', requiring the investment of continuous effort to preserve it. The terror is not destroyed but is contained at a minimal level, with constant efforts to prevent its eruption". He argues that this is what the Israeli army has achieved in the West Bank after the second intifada. 2.) Controlling the territory. This refers to the ability to operate effectively over the entire area in question. For this, it is necessary to 'clear' the area of insurgents, and have highly mobile troops that can make decisions independently (this compensates for permanent presence within dense urban areas). Control is also achieved by controlling the movement of people through checkpoints and roadblocks. It should be noted, that Israel has no intention of policing or setting up a government apparatus in the areas under its control, nor of assisting the 'host-nation' to build these capabilities. 3.) Relevant intelligence. Without relevant intelligence, insurgents cannot be fought, and gathering intelligence, notably human intelligence, is linked to controlling territory. 4.) Isolating the territory within which the insurgency takes place. To operate, insurgencies need safe havens in neighbouring countries, weapons, financial backing, and recruits (both regular soldiers and experts). These all need to be cut off. 5.) Cooperation between intelligence and operations. This means effective cooperation between different intelligence agencies such as the military, police, internal and external intelligence agencies, and delegation of decision-making and intelligence gathering to lower ranks in

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[416] The Economist 17th-23rd October 2009. p.31.

the field where there are constant encounters with the insurgency. It also requires timeliness and the capacity to act on intelligence, which can have a short life-span. 6.) Separating the civilian population from terrorist entities. Today's insurgencies are dependent on the fear, passiveness or cooperation of the civilian population. COIN aims to sever this connection, which is again linked to the control of the territory. Especially important in this effort, is preventing collateral damage. The separation can result from making efforts to spare civilians, creating a conflict of interest between civilians and insurgents, or enabling and creating a willingness among the civilians to take up arms against insurgents, for example through the use of citizens' militias[417]. It should be highlighted again, that the Israeli approach does not aim so much at achieving control of a territory for the population in that territory, as it is on militarily reducing the threat of insurgency. Notably, it prefers deterrence over 'hearts and minds'.

Lastly, texts examining American, British and Israeli counterinsurgency doctrine all concur that the essentials are: a) primacy of the political over the military, b) the adaptability of the effort due to a constantly changing environment, c) the importance of control of territory in all meanings of the word, d) the necessity to operate in small units with high mobility and extensive powers delegated to lower ranks in the field for decision-making, e) the supreme importance of intelligence, f) and good relations with the civilian population to facilitate the above.

In conclusion, counterinsurgency is unfortunately a necessary part of post-conflict operations in many cases, where some other rebel groups do not join in the peace process, or hard-line factions splinter as a result of the peace process and become spoilers. Counterinsurgency capability of the host-nation is also key to prevent resurgence. Yet, counterinsurgency is messy at best, with an inherent tension between political goals of winning the hearts and minds of the populace, and the military goals of defeating indistinguishable rebels. It is just one tool that should be submitted to the overall political process, and because of its often delegitimizing effect, should be used sparingly.

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[417] Amidror, Yaakov 2007.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, I wish to summarize the answers this paper gives to my research questions, and present its central findings. Whether what I termed 'rule-of-thumb' peacebuilding corresponds with effective peacebuilding merits some space. I will deal with it last, since it brings together all the results of the paper. One of my questions was: "What are the typical features of today's post-conflict environments?" While this was not my central question, these features have been described all along the paper, and some remarks are included in this conclusion. I also asked whether the **'rule of thumb' model could be applied from one post-conflict setting to another**. Because of the research framework, I cannot conclusively answer this second question. There are no comparative case studies - I study general policy analyses, which in turn can only result in a general, non-comparative study. This may give the mistaken impression, that conflicts and effective peacebuilding policies are identical from case to case.

Firstly, however, all policy-analyses, regardless of the issue in question, emphasized context-dependency. Further, they emphasized the need for policies to be inclusive, often based on needs assessments and adapting to local culture. This was especially important for policies engaged at the local level. This points to a.) differences in situations, and respectively differences in applicability of policies, and b.) the fact that it is the locals who will ultimately determine the success of peacebuilding. Secondly, especially with respect to non-state armed groups, the analyses of the problems themselves described immensely different contexts, suggesting that what might work in one case, might not in another.

This points to what I suggested in presenting the research framework: while it is questionable how much should be generalized about conflicts, there are some clear logics that are common to most post-conflict environments and peacebuilding environments. These however are always tied to the local culture, and take on local expression, with each post-conflict situation having its own particularities.

One of my central research questions was: **what are the main security problems posed by non-state armed groups**? By analysing the means and end-goals of different

kinds of groups, I concluded that for both, insurgents posed the most existential threat to the state. The legitimate state structure in turn was posited as the instrument to guarantee the security of individuals. Of the different non-state armed groups, gangs could be used as proxies for violence towards political goals by other actors, organized crime could militarize and question the monopoly of violence of the state, and PMCs could be tools of organized violence for groups with wealth. However, only insurgency was specifically militarily structured and had as its aim either taking over the state or seceding from it. Militias, paramilitaries and warlords had some, but not all, of the threatening aspects of insurgencies.

A more detailed analysis of **today's insurgencies** gave a **more complex** picture however. First, it is evident that there are converging interests between different non-state armed groups and that they are increasingly cooperating and creating networks. Secondly, many of today's insurgencies have little resemblance with the classical insurgency aiming to take over the state. Some are cell-based, loosely coordinated groups, maintaining their power through low-intensity conflict. They may instead be seeking to pursue the interest of their own faction (ethnic group, tribe, or other) through violence, using their territories or simply their networks to profit from illicit trade, which is in turn dependent on a chaotic environment. Their interests are contrary to the peace process (spoilers) and they aim to derail it if possible.

I have further argued that the **threshold** (or feasibility) for such groups is **low**: availability of SALW and low prices, ruined economies with a large demographic of young men providing cheap recruits, the exchange of information on tactics by different groups, an increase in the lethality of different asymmetric tactics, the increased political effect of terrorism through increased media coverage, the lower requirement for group size compared to traditional military organizations, access to international markets for funding and possibly export of conflict resources or narcotics (an end in itself for some groups), and advanced global underground networks - all enable easier formation. Many of these factors can be linked to globalization. Yet it should be noted, that while the sources of key requirements for organized armed violence are new (global networks and markets), the question should be asked if and how these differ from the Cold War period. During the Cold War, weapons, finances and training, as well direct

military support, were provided by the superpowers - what are the quantitative and qualitative differences with the phenomena described in this study?

Secondly, I asked **what were the main policy-options open to outside interveners with respect to non-state armed groups, what worked, and what was problematic**. The focus was purely on insurgencies, since these posed the greatest threat. Peacebuilding solutions for insurgencies focus on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programs, mediation and negotiation, possible amnesties and power-sharing agreements, sanctions, arms control measures, limiting access to finances, and possibly counterinsurgency (COIN). Peacekeeping, unfortunately left out of this paper, would seem to be key. Roughly said, DDR, mediation and negotiation, power-sharing, sanctions and COIN largely deal with the effects of conflict - the existence of non-state armed groups. Targeted commodity sanctions and better control over conflict resources, arms embargoes and arms control measures, and limiting access to finances in general, all aim to address the environments that enable insurgent groups to appear; in some sense, the root causes of conflict. Security Sector Reform, while relating to the state, is also an essential part of preventing the resurgence of rebel groups.

It should be noted that quite few of these address the political root causes, that is grievances, that are often thought to be at the root of conflict (with the exception of DDR and power-sharing). Arguably, the rule-of-thumb peacebuilding model is designed to address just these, notably by 1.) supposing that insurgents represent interests of groups that have political grievances, and that these interests are represented once insurgents gain access to power, and 2.) general grievances will be addressed when the state capacity has been built up, and eventual democratic elections will guarantee that the interests of most people will be represented. This paper questioned whether a.) insurgent leaders genuinely represent the interests of a larger group, and b.) how well power-sharing arrangements combined with elections will guarantee representation in the long run. The policies that are intended to make the state in general more inclusive and accountable are not handled in this paper, because firstly the subject of this paper, non-state armed groups, excludes the state, and secondly the perspective taken of peacebuilding suggests a different set of policies for the state and for non-state armed

groups. This may give the false impression that resolving political root causes - grievances - is not central to peacebuilding.

Coming back to the global nature of many of the problems described above, many of the policy answers that are required are also global. New global structures need to be set up, and it is in the interest of most of us to prevent global 'public bads'. Here, international law and treaties, and notably effective implementation at national levels, would seem to be key. The regional level was also central to many problems and respective solutions, notably to trafficking, cross-border warfare, and outside involvement in internal warfare. Internal conflicts are also a regional threat.

Finally I will assess the **'rule-of thumb' peacebuilding model more generally**, and its possible problems (this was my working hypothesis). I have described the model as follows:

First, I will make some points on the general theory behind the model. Again, this model largely deals with conflict as having political root causes (grievances), that can be solved through solutions of political architecture (namely, sharing power). While it does address some deeper social and political problems, namely through elections, the main focus is on the existing insurgent group and the government. This is of course the most urgent problem, but I argue that the attention given to this in relation to more comprehensive and longer-term measures is counterproductive. Focusing on visible achievements (peace agreements, power-sharing arrangements, constitutions, elections)

in the immediate post-conflict phase takes attention away from the long-term problems of effectively implementing the changes these are meant to bring about. In this model, the factor that does more generally affect the environment that enables insurgent groups to come about, is the Security Sector Reform. I assumed insurgencies were relational vis-à-vis the strength of government forces.

Secondly, I have mainly examined the different policy components in this model, and described a number of inherent problems. To my mind, the most prominent ones involved power-sharing. 1.) Power-sharing arrangements are shaky, and especially their implementation is extremely difficult and full of commitment problems, notably with respect to the violence machinery of the state; 2.) It institutionalizes experts in the use of violence, whose power base was founded on organizations of violence. It is unlikely that these people would give up this base of power; 3.) It sidelines any non-violent opposition that might exist, and creates incentives for using armed rebellion as a way of achieving power, notably for opposition groups; 4.) While elections are supposed to guarantee a peaceful transition of power, positions in government can be used to consolidate positions ahead of elections. Violence is also often used to intimidate opponents. Additionally, not all rebel leaders necessarily represent group interests, possibly leaving underlying grievances unresolved. Whether there is a possible formula for power-sharing that would help overcome most of these problems, or they are inherent to any arrangement, is beyond the scope of this paper. Other key problems were the apparently negative effects of the post-election period, and the light and too short presence of international peacekeepers. Lastly, the short time perspective and expectations of quick results, as well as lack of attention to longer-term tasks (not least by donors), such as the reintegration phase of the ex-combatants, make achieving self-sustaining results difficult. There is now fortunately a consensus that merely drawing up a constitution and organizing elections, implementing a quick DDR and SSR, and then withdrawing the intervention, will not bring a self-sustaining peace.

What might be needed for **more effective peacebuilding**? First of all, many of the studies quoted in this paper emphasize the need for a longer presence of peacekeeping troops with a sufficient mandate and troop strength to deter spoilers. Parallel to this, the implementation of the political side of the peace process is enhanced by long-term and perhaps more forceful outside monitoring - this would include mediation for the

problems that will occur. Thus, what are often listed as tools for the active conflict phase need to be continued in the post-conflict phase, as the mere silencing of guns does not mean that any of the underlying structural problems have been dealt with. One of the key findings was that one aspect of the peace process, notably disarmament, is also a security dilemma for the two parties, and conversely, the peace process is about building trust. An external security guarantee for a considerable amount of time helps conflicting parties overcome security dilemmas and reach a more optimal solution than they could on their own. At the same time, local capacity in governance and the security sector need to be built up, however by emphasizing quality (accountability) over quantity, and by also placing importance on policing. Policing is what most directly affects the population and provides for rule-of-law, and overly military responses can delegitimize the government. At the same time, there should be capacity, first international then local, to deal with post-conflict low-intensity violence. In general, the SSR needs to include all different sectors, and needs to emphasize accountability.

With respect to power-sharing, it is clear that places in government need to be guaranteed to non-violent opposition in a quantity that guarantees effective power. This leaves open the possibility of solving other grievances through non-violent ways. This needs to be enforced by outsiders, as it is unlikely parties negotiating will willingly give up power. Elections should eventually be held, but perhaps not right away, with an eye on guaranteeing equal opportunities for parties not in the transitional government, as well as the potential for consequent post-election violence as a means to contest election results. Another option would be to have no power-sharing agreement, but merely disarm and reintegrate insurgent groups by enticing them with amnesties and generous peace dividends. An additional tool is the decentralization of power for groups who are located in a certain territory, guaranteeing them a degree of autonomy.

In general however, in the long-term the environment should be made as unfavourable to insurgencies as possible. Economic growth for example, raises the costs of recruitment and gives potential fighters peace dividends in the regular job market. Economic growth and poverty reduction are thus also important. This is of course hard to achieve without first having security. Displacement needs to be dealt with. Additionally, creating a 'domestic revenue imperative' or the 'taxation-representation nexus', is extremely important for effective governance in the long run. Thus, foreign

aid donors should ideally not be the government's main constituency further down the line. This is also tied to creating responsible management structures for natural resources in post-conflict areas, since this can also cut the government's dependency on taxing the population. Corruption needs to be avoided, as it will lead to a culture of patronage and delegitimization of the government. Thus, it needs to be remembered that massive long-term interventions can also be the source of both corruption with loose use of money, and the lack of a taxation-representation nexus. While this study did not focus on interventions as a whole, but rather on separate issue areas, it was apparent from the majority of texts that outside interventions continue to be plagued with coordination problems in multiactor environments, even though this has been the center of attention for quite some time. It is one of the key conclusions of this study that peacebuilding is social engineering. This implies that as in ecology, a change in one part of the system will affect the whole system. In addition to testifying to its complexity, it also means that all peacebuilding activities are linked and optimally complementary. Thus there needs to be planning and coordination of all programmes at the strategic level for peacebuilding intervention to be more effective. Finally, with extreme reservation, I would like to say that it needs to be weighed out, whether the intervention intended (and all interventions are not equal) will actually do more good than harm[418].

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[418] For an article supporting many of the conclusions drawn in this paper, see: Ashdown, Paddy 2007.

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<u>**Annex I. Conflict management dictionary**</u>
As defined in this paper

Arms brokers are middlemen that can either find suppliers for their clients - the receivers -, buy weapons from suppliers and then sell them onwards, or can also organize the transfers themselves.

Ceasefire - an agreement that regulates the military behaviour of actors without resolving any underlying issues (which would make it a peace agreement).

Conflict resolution - strand of theory and practice in dealing with conflicts. Refers to resolving disputes between parties at conflict. In conflicts it is often used during the active conflict phase to stop the fighting. Key tools include negotiations, mediation and sometimes peacemaking. Conflicts are between two parties, and can be resolved by creating a win-win situation out of their interests.

Conflict-resource - any resource (although diamonds and timber are the most famous) when it is used to finance illegitimate conflicts, where there are breaches of international humanitarian law or human rights.

Conflict transformation - strand of theory and practice in dealing with conflicts. Builds on the idea of resolving deep root causes of conflict, especially injustices and inequalities, that are embedded in society by transforming the discourses and perceptions that create conflicting positions. Often referred to as the bottom-up transformation of society, especially through civil society.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, DDR - a program with three interrelated parts: disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating of former combatants. They can also be implemented independently. DDR is one of the most important long-term peacebuilding tools in relation to insurgencies (can also be conducted to state forces). A DDR communicates goodwill and builds confidence between opposing parties and their intentions, as well as in the peace process itself as a viable alternative to violent strategies. **Disarmament** is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and includes the development of responsible arms management programmes. **Demobilization** is the controlled discharge of combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. Troops are gathered into camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). **Reintegration** is the process of former combatants learning to lead a civilian way of life, and is a relational process between combatants and community. This is the longest part of the process. As part of this, reinsertion refers to short-term benefits aimed at providing the basic means for a livelihood to combatants and their families. The long-term goal is self-sustainability for the combatants. Often vocational training, microcredit or grants are given. DDR is based on the notion that demobilised persons will retake up arms unless options for their reintegration are not perceptibly better than life as a combatant.

Displaced persons. These are civilians who have fled or been forced to flee their homes because of conflict, and have not returned during the post-conflict period. While people can be displaced for a number of reasons, for example environmental ones, this paper is strictly concerned with conflict-induced displacement. Displaced persons contains two

categories: 1.) **internally displaced persons (IDPs)** - people who have moved within their country, and 2.) **refugees** - who have crossed an international border. Both groups are unique in being especially vulnerable in a number of ways.

Diversion - weapons are diverted, when they are transferred from authorized possession to unauthorized and illegal ones.

Do no harm -approach - Originates from the humanitarian field: to minimize the harm that one may be inadvertently doing simply by being present and providing assistance. For example, when aid is used as an instrument of war by denying access or attacking convoys; aid is an indirect part of the dynamics of the conflict because it creates jobs, gives incomes in form of taxes, etc; or aid exacerbates the root causes of the conflict by securing rebel activities. In this paper, I use it to emphasize that all interventions have (negative) effects, since interventions are also a player in the conflict relationship.

Ending of hostilities - Temporary suspension of all violence (incl. kidnappings etc.), does not include shifts in positions in the field. Usually at the beginning of the process, for a humanitarian action or gesture of good will, possibly to invite to negotiate.

Feasibility hypothesis - Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner suggest that "where rebellion is feasible, it will occur", key variables being military and economic feasibility.

Gangs - loose groups that have informal ownership of small urban spaces through a local monopoly of force. They provide some measure of entrepreneurial opportunity as well as local prestige and warrior-glamour; they frequently act as neighbourhood militias to police public spaces, enforce or resist ethnic and racial borders.

Human security - A post-Cold War security paradigm. Whereas the traditional goal of 'national security' has been the defence of the state from external threats, the focus of human security, by contrast, is the protection of individuals. Closely associated with the weakening of state sovereignty in the sense of non-intervention in internal affairs, and used to justify outside interventions.

Humanitarian law - is a subset of international law that comes into force when there is an armed conflict. It seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare. International humanitarian law is also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict. Generally speaking, it does not apply to post-conflict situations.

Humanitarian space - The conceptual 'space' in which humanitarian actors work. Often used to emphasize that a distinction needs to be made between military and humanitarian actors. By adhering to the key operating principles of neutrality and impartiality, and distinguishing themselves from the military, humanitarian actors create a working space that guarantees their safety, as well as capacity to operate effectively.

Hurting stalemate - neither side is capable of defeating the other, both human and economic costs are rising on both sides, and there is war-fatigue.

IEDs - improvised explosive devices - non-standardized explosive devices, types of bombs, used in asymmetric warfare. Can be made from common medical or agricultural supplies, and are hard to detect because of variation.

Intensity of conflict - often measured in battle-related deaths.

Insurgencies (also rebellion, guerrilla, insurrection). An organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Can have one of two goals: to overthrow the existing government, or to break away from state control and form an autonomous entity or ungoverned space that they can control. Insurgencies are strongly associated with asymmetric warfare, where there is a disparity of power between opposing sides.

Internal conflict (also intrastate conflict, civil war) - An internal conflict is a conflict where there are two or more parties to the conflict within a country. Different threshold vary from over 25 battle-related deaths a year, a minimum of 100 deaths, to a 1000 deaths (a war). A minimum of five percent of deaths have to have been incurred by each side - otherwise it would be massacre or genocide. Note that it is only civil *war* after the 1000 mark has been reached. Intrastate war can also be waged by two or more non-state armed groups.

Internationalized internal conflict - an internal conflict becomes internationalized when another country becomes involved, either directly by invasion or indirectly by actively supporting one of the factions. Indirect support can include sending arms, providing training and advisers, or use of own territory for launching attacks. Also in applies in conflict spillover.

Mediation - a central tool used for facilitating negotiations between conflicting parties to increase positive outcomes in negotiations. Can help achieve results parties could not on their own due to lack of trust. It is a voluntary process: the parties to the conflict retain control over the outcomes, although the mediator may set the agenda. Varies in neutrality/forcefulness.

Militias are armed 'self-defence' groups of civilians, that can support government, parties or local rulers. They can be volunteers, and do not specifically aim to take over the state or secede, but are significant for political patronage networks in many countries.

Negotiations - process in which two or more clashing parties agree to discuss their differences within a concerted framework in order to seek a satisfactory solution to their demands. This negotiation can take place either directly or through facilitation by third parties (mediation). Often used in relation with processes that result in a peace agreements. Negotiations can be I-track, referring to meetings between the official leaders of groups, or II-track negotiation, referring to unofficial representatives who then communicate possible solutions to leaders.

Non-state armed groups - all organized armed groups, that are not regular armed forces of the state such as: gangs, organized crime, militias, paramilitaries, warlords, private military companies (PMCs) and insurgencies.

One-sided violence - The use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year. Targeting has to be direct and intended at civilians.

Organized crime can be defined as groups organized primarily to make economic gains in different illicit markets. They often rely on use of violence, which can give them a comparative advantage in licit markets as well.

Outside intervention - (here) any international intervention, be it military, humanitarian or civilian crisis management that claims to be done to establish peace in a given country. Often multilateral, and combines different activities, e.g. peacekeeping, peacebuilding, development and possibly humanitarian efforts.

Paramilitaries - refers primarily to the type of organization and tasks the group is meant to conduct, which are military in nature. Can be 1.) part of the regular armed forces or police, but do not have same status as regular military, or 2.) irregular or non-official forces with a military character, that often have unofficial ties to the government and either the armed forces or police.

Peace - Negative peace: the absence of conflict. **Positive peace:** A society with structures of peace. These are institutions (broadly speaking) that make possible the resolution of conflicts in non-violent ways. Also implies dismantling the structures that cause conflict and its manifestation through violence in the first place. These are often called the 'root causes' of conflict

Peace agreement - an agreement between parties that on paper, resolves underlying issues and stops hostilities and thus the conflict.

Peace dividends - originally meant the additional resources obtained through defence cuts after the Cold War (guns vs. butter). Here it refers to any benefit (economic or otherwise) that comes to a party from peace in contrast to continued conflict.

Peace process - A goal-oriented political process involving all stakeholders. The ultimate goal is a deep self-sustaining peace (positive definition), where the majority of the people concerned agree that disputes should be solved in a non-violent way, and structures exist to support this and restrain actors that do not. Stakeholders can be either supportive of the process or not (spoilers). Essential to the process is building trust between parties, notably for disarming, in order to demilitarize politics. Has two components: 1.) It is a perspective taken from the point of view of the political end-goal, 2.) There has to be a substantial attempt towards peace by some stakeholders, and it must be a declared goal, often expressed through willingness to negotiate or eventually a peace agreement.

Peacebuilding - refers to all the different longer-term activities conducted in the post-conflict phase, that have as their primary goal the building of a just and self-sustaining peace with an emphasis on civilian efforts. This excludes humanitarian aid and development aid that have different primary goals. It does not exclude peacekeeping or counterinsurgency, but places the accent on non-military efforts.

Post-conflict - Generally refers to the period after the signing of a peace agreement. Optionally, it can also be described as a function of conflict intensity. A country is in the post-conflict phase, when no battle-related deaths exceeding the threshold mentioned occur for consecutive years. This is in fact a negative definition in relation to relapse into conflict. This is the definition taken here, since battle-related deaths are a better proxy of cessation of hostilities than a peace agreement, which in itself guarantees little, except sometimes a consequent peacekeeping mission. There can for example be peace through a ceasefire without any agreement. A figure that is often sited, is the first decade of peace being post-conflict. The post-conflict phase has a very high risk of reversion to conflict, and has certain structures inherited from the active conflict phase, of which non-state armed groups are some.

Power-sharing agreements - agreements that bring warring parties into power-sharing arrangements, often mediated by outsiders. Commonly, aim to set up a unity government between former warring parties that is transitional until elections are held, which are also set in the agreement. Key components include posts and quotas in different branches of the state, and the control over the state's organisations of violence are often the most debated. The agreement can also include a demobilisation component, forms of autonomy for regions and confidence-building measures. The aim is to end the conflict, and demilitarize politics by making parties participate in non-violent politics together.

Private military companies (PMCs) (also private military firms, PMFs, or private security companies, PSCs) - private business entities that provide different kinds military and/or security services from combat to supply activities, and some of them are transnational in nature.

Responsibility to protect, R2P - the responsibility of states, and where they fail the international community, to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes. An operationalization of the human security paradigm.

Reversion - a return to active conflict.

Sanctions - a group of policy-tools, that can be used to target states, non-state groups or individuals, with the aim of achieving specific political objectives. These objectives may include punishing or weakening a target, signalling disapproval, inducing a change in policy, or bringing about regime change. Sanctions can be divided into economic and non-economic ones. Economic ones can include restrictions on trading, service or financial relations, for example: freezing funds and assets, a ban on transactions, imposing investment restrictions, restricting trade in certain commodities (especially 'conflict-resources' such as diamonds or timber, also known as **targeted commodity sanctions**) and restrictions on aid. Non-economic sanctions can for example include arms embargoes, restrictions on the use of technologies or equipment (notably military), travel bans, air traffic constraints, diplomatic constraints, cultural and sport restrictions.

Secession, secessionist conflict - one party to the conflict is looking to secede from the state within which war is waged, and form an independent state. Can also result in forms of autonomy.

Security dilemma - a game-theoretic model, where both sides are unsure of the others intentions, and arm up to increase their security. This leads the other side to do the same, leading to a cycle that effectively decreases the security of both.

Security sector reform - narrowly understood, the reform concerns the core security actors and their reform: police, defence and intelligence, and broadly four types of actors and their reform: core security actors, management and oversight bodies, justice and rule of law, and non-statutory (unofficial) security forces. The broader definition is used in this paper. The objective of an SSR is to guarantee that the state has the legitimate monopoly of violence in its territory. The reform aims at building up the capacity and accountability of the security sector.

Spillover - a conflict in one country spills over to other countries, for example through rebel movement. Then becomes internationalized internal conflict, and have in some cases led to regional wars.

Spoilers - leaders and parties who believe that peace threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.

Terrorism - military tactic of asymmetric warfare, where the target of violence, often civilians, are struck to create fear in order to have a political effect on the actual target.

Wagner hypothesis - civil wars that end by military victory produce a more lasting peace than negotiated endings, since military victory guarantees the losing party's organizational structure has been destroyed. In negotiated settlements, both sides retain their capacity to fight.

Warlords - individuals who autonomously control a territory through military power. Often used in the context of weak or collapsed states today.