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Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications

James Albrecht[1]
Pieter Gautier[2]
Susan Vroman[1]

[1] Department of Economics, Georgetown University, Washington,
[2] Faculty of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, and Tinbergen Institute.

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James Albrecht
Department of Economics
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C. 20057

Pieter A. Gautier
Free University Amsterdam
Tinbergen Institute

Susan Vroman
Department of Economics
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C. 20057

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1   Introduction

In this paper, we construct an equilibrium model of directed search in a large labor market in which unemployed workers make multiple job applications. What we mean by equilibrium directed search is a matching process in which job seekers, observing the wages posted at all vacancies, send their applications to the vacancies that they find most attractive. At the same time, each vacancy, when it chooses its wage posting, takes into account that its posted wage influences the number of applicants it can expect to attract. We assume that each unemployed worker makes a fixed number of applications, a. Each vacancy (among those receiving applications) then chooses one applicant to whom it offers its job. When $a > 1$, there is a possibility that more than one vacancy will want to hire the same worker. In this case, we assume that the vacancies in question compete for this worker's services. The introduction of multiple applications adds realism to the directed search model, and, in addition, can affect the efficiency properties of equilibrium.

In the benchmark competitive search equilibrium model of directed search (Moen 1997 or the extended version in Mortensen and Wright 2002), equilibrium is constrained Pareto efficient. We show that changing the basic directed search model to allow workers to make more than one application results in equilibria that are not constrained efficient. This means there is a role for labor market policy in the directed search framework.

When $a = 1$, our model is essentially the limiting version of Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) (hereafter BSW) translated to a labor market setting. BSW derive a unique symmetric equilibrium in which (in the labor market version) all vacancies post a wage between zero (the monopsony wage) and one (the competitive wage). The value of this common posted wage depends on the number of unemployed, u, and the number of vacancies, v, in the market. Letting $u, v \to \infty$ with $v/u = \theta$, the equilibrium posted wage is an increasing function of θ. BSW do not consider normative questions. Moen's result is that in a large labor market, directed search implements what he calls competitive search equilibrium. Competitive search equilibrium is constrained efficient in the following sense. Assume there is a cost per vacancy created. A social planner would choose a level of vacancy creation – or, in a large labor market, a level of labor market tightness, θ, – to trade off the cost of vacancy creation against the benefit of making it easier for workers to match in an optimal fashion. Moen shows that the θ the social planner would choose is the same as the one that arises in competitive search equilibrium. (Shimer 1995 independently derives a similar result.) Using a different approach, we also show that equilibrium in a directed search model is constrained efficient in a large labor market when $a = 1$. More importantly, however, we show that if each worker makes a finite number of multiple applications, that is, if $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$, then equilibrium in a directed search model is **not** constrained efficient. Specifically, too many vacancies are posted (θ is too high) in free-entry equilibrium relative to the constrained efficient level. Equivalently, vacancies pay the workers who take their jobs too low a wage on average.

Our model is also related to Julien, Kennes, and King (2000) (hereafter JKK). JKK assume that each unemployed worker posts a minimum wage at which he or she is willing to work, i.e., a "reserve wage," and that each vacancy, observing all posted reserve wages, then makes an offer to one worker. If more than one vacancy wants to hire the same worker, then, as in our model, there is *ex post* competition for that worker's services. This is equivalent to a model in which each worker applies to every vacancy, i.e., $a = v$, sending the same reserve wage in each application. Each vacancy then chooses one worker at random to whom it offers a job. If a worker

has more than one offer, then there is competition for his or her services. In a finite labor market, JKK show that the unique, symmetric equilibrium reserve wage lies between the monopsony and competitive levels. There is thus equilibrium wage dispersion in their model. Those workers who receive only one offer are employed at the reserve wage, while those who receive multiple offers are employed at the competitive wage. In the limiting labor market version of JKK, the symmetric equilibrium reserve wage converges to zero, and free-entry equilibrium is again constrained efficient.

In our model, when $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$, all vacancies post the monopsony wage in the unique symmetric equilibrium. As in JKK, this leads to equilibrium wage dispersion. Some workers (those who receive exactly one offer) are employed at the monopsony wage, and some workers (those who receive multiple offers) have their wages bid up to the competitive level. The key difference between our model and both BSW and JKK, however, is that free-entry equilibrium is inefficient. When $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$, there is excessive vacancy creation.

The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we derive our basic positive results in a single-period framework. Specifically, treating θ as given, we derive the matching function and the symmetric equilibrium posted wage. In Section 3, we endogenize θ by allowing for free entry of vacancies. This lets us compare the free-entry equilibrium level of θ to the constrained efficient level (the two values of θ are the same when $a = 1$, different when $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$, and the same once again as $a \to \infty$). In Section 4, we present a steady-state version of our model for the case of $a \in \{2, .., A\}$. The key to the steady-state analysis is that a worker who receives only one offer in the current period has the option to reject that offer in favor of waiting for a future period in which more than one vacancy bids for his or her services. Allowing for free entry of vacancies, this leads to a tractable model in which labor market tightness and the equilibrium wage distribution are determined simultaneously. The normative results that we derived in the single-period model continue to hold in the steady-state setting. In Section 5, we consider three extensions. Specifically, (i) we allow workers to choose how many applications to make, (ii) we relax the assumption that each vacancy can consider only one worker's application, and (iii) we allow vacancies to follow strategies that rule out Bertrand competition. These extensions, while of interest in their own right, also serve as robustness checks – our basic result that the free-entry equilibrium value of θ is too high when $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$ continues to hold. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.

2 The Basic Model

We consider a game played by u homogeneous unemployed workers and (the owners of) v homogeneous vacancies. This game has several stages:

1. Each vacancy posts a wage.

2. Each unemployed worker observes all posted wages and then submits a applications with no more than one application going to any one vacancy.

3. Each vacancy that receives at least 1 application randomly selects one to process. Any excess applications are returned as rejections.

4. A vacancy with a processed application offers the applicant the posted wage. If more than one vacancy makes an offer to a particular worker, then those vacancies bid against one another for that worker's services.

5. A worker with one offer can accept or reject that offer. A worker with more than one offer can accept one of the offers or reject all of them.

Workers who fail to match with a vacancy and vacancies that fail to match with a worker receive payoffs of zero. The payoff for a worker who matches with a vacancy is w, where w is the wage that he or she is paid. A vacancy that hires a worker at a wage of w receives a payoff of $1 - w$.

This is a model of directed search in the sense that workers observe all wage postings and direct their applications to vacancies with attractive wages and/or where relatively little competition is expected. We assume that vacancies cannot pay less than their posted wages. If they could, this would not be a model of directed search.

Before we analyze this game, some comments on the underlying assumptions are in order. First, we are treating a as a parameter of the search technology; that is, the number of applications is taken as given. In general, $a \in \{1, 2, ..., A\}$. Second, we assume that it takes a period for a vacancy to process an application. This is why vacancies return excess applications as rejections. This processing-time assumption captures the idea that when workers apply for several jobs at the same time, firms can waste time and effort pursuing applicants who ultimately go elsewhere. Finally, we assume that two or more vacancies that select the same applicant engage in *ex post* Bertrand competition for that worker. This means that workers who receive more than one offer have their wages bid up to $w = 1$, the competitive wage. In Section 5, we consider the implications of relaxing each of these

assumptions. We show that endogenizing a, allowing vacancies to process more than one application, and allowing vacancies that are competing for an applicant to pursue a different tie-breaking strategy do not reverse our main results.

We consider symmetric equilibria in which all vacancies post the same wage and all workers use the same strategy to direct their applications. We do this in a large labor market in which we let $u, v \to \infty$ with $v/u = \theta$ keeping $a \in \{1, 2, ..., A\}$ fixed. We show that for each (θ, a) combination there is a unique symmetric equilibrium and we derive the corresponding equilibrium matching probability and posted wage. Assuming (for the moment) the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, we begin with the matching probability.

Let $M(u, v; a)$ be the expected number of matches in a labor market with u unemployed workers and v vacancies when each unemployed worker submits a applications. Then $m(\theta; a) = \lim\limits_{u,v \to \infty, v/u = \theta} \dfrac{M(u, v; a)}{u}$ is the matching probability for an unemployed worker in a large labor market.

Proposition 1 *Let $u, v \to \infty$ with $v/u = \theta$ and $a \in \{1, ..., A\}$ fixed. The probability that a worker finds a job converges to*

$$m(\theta; a) = 1 - (1 - \frac{\theta}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta}))^a. \tag{1}$$

The proof is given in Albrecht et. al. (2004); see also Philip (2003). In Appendix A, we sketch the idea of the proof to clarify the relationship between our matching probability and the finite-market matching functions presented in BSW (the standard urn-ball matching function) and JKK (the urn-ball matching function with the roles of u and v reversed).

For use below, we note the following properties of $m(\theta; a)$:
(i) $m(\theta; a)$ is increasing and concave in θ,

$$\lim_{\theta \to 0} m(\theta; a) = 0, \text{ and } \lim_{\theta \to \infty} m(\theta; a) = 1;$$

(ii) $\dfrac{m(\theta; a)}{\theta}$ is decreasing in θ,[1]

$$\lim_{\theta \to 0} \frac{m(\theta; a)}{\theta} = 1, \text{ and } \lim_{\theta \to \infty} \frac{m(\theta; a)}{\theta} = 0.$$

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[1] Interestingly, $\dfrac{m(\theta; a)}{\theta}$ is not convex in θ, as can be seen immediately by considering the case of $a = 1$. The properties of $m(\theta; a)$ and $\dfrac{m(\theta; a)}{\theta}$ given in (i) and (ii) are the minimal ones required for our normative results in Sections 3 and 4 below.

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The effect of a on $m(\theta; a)$ is less clearcut. Treating a as a continuous variable, we find that $m_a(\theta; a) \gtrless 0$ as $\dfrac{a}{1-q}\dfrac{\partial q}{\partial a} - \ln(1-q) \gtrless 0$ where $q = \dfrac{\theta}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta})$. For moderately large values of θ ($\theta > \frac{1}{2}$, approximately), $m(\theta; a)$ first increases and then decreases with a. This nonmonotonicity reflects the double coordination problem that arises when workers apply to more than one but not all vacancies. The first coordination problem is the standard one associated with urn-ball matching, namely, that some vacancies can receive applications from more than one worker, while others receive none. With multiple applications, there is a second coordination problem, this time among vacancies. When workers apply for more than one job at a time, some workers can receive offers from more than one vacancy, while others receive none. Ultimately, a worker can only take one job, and the vacancies that "lose the race" for a worker will have wasted time and effort while considering his or her application. The matching function derived in BSW captures only the urn-ball friction, while the one derived in JKK captures only the multiple-application friction. Our matching probability incorporates both these frictions, and the interaction between these two frictions provides new insights.

Proposition 1 and its implications are only interesting if a symmetric equilibrium exists. We now turn to the existence question.

Proposition 2 *Consider a large labor market in which* $u, v \to \infty$ *with* $v/u = \theta$. *There is a unique symmetric equilibrium to the wage-posting game. When* $a = 1$, *all vacancies post a wage of*

$$w(\theta; 1) = \frac{e^{-1/\theta}}{\theta(1 - e^{-1/\theta})}. \tag{2}$$

When $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$, $w(\theta; a) = 0$, *and the fraction of wages paid that are equal to one is*

$$\gamma(\theta; a) = \frac{1 - (1 - \frac{\theta}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta}))^a - \theta(1 - e^{-a/\theta})(1 - \frac{\theta}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta}))^{a-1}}{1 - (1 - \frac{\theta}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta}))^a}. \tag{3}$$

The proof is given in Appendix B. The basic idea is as follows. To prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, we show that $w(\theta; 1)$ has the property that if all vacancies, with the possible exception of a "potential deviant," post that wage, then it is also in the interest of the deviant to

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post that wage. When $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$, then no matter what the common wage posted by other vacancies, it is always in the interest of the deviant to undercut that common wage. This forces the wage down to the monopsony level, which in our single-period model is $w = 0$.

The equilibrium wage for the case of $a = 1$ is equal to one minus the price given in Proposition 3 in BSW – again with the appropriate notational change. The tradeoff that leads to a well-behaved equilibrium wage, $w \in (0, 1)$, when $a = 1$ is the standard one in equilibrium search theory. To see this, note that the profit for a deviant (D) from offering w' rather than the common posted wage, w, can be written as:

$$\pi(w'; w) = (1-w')P[\text{D gets at least one application}]P[\text{selected applicant has no other offer}],$$

where the third term vanishes in the $a = 1$ case. As any particular vacancy increases its posted wage, holding the wages posted at other vacancies constant, the profit that this vacancy generates conditional on attracting an applicant, $(1 - w')$, decreases. At the same time, however, the probability that it will attract at least one applicant also increases. This tradeoff varies smoothly with θ; so the equilibrium wage varies smoothly between zero and one. Thus, as emphasized in BSW (p. 1069), there is a sense in which frictions "smooth" the operation of the labor market.

When $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$, no matter what the value of θ, the posted wage collapses to the monopsony level (as in Diamond (1971)). The intuition for this result is based on the change in the tradeoff underlying equilibrium wage determination. The profit for the deviant vacancy conditional on hiring a worker, $(1 - w')$, decreases as in the $a = 1$ case. The probability that D attracts at least one applicant also increases, but not as much as in the $a = 1$ case. This is the key to the result, since the third term is unaffected by changes in w'. The reason that this probability increases less when $a = 2$ or more is that $w' > w$ is relatively less attractive to workers than when $a = 1$. In the $a = 1$ case, receiving w' means doing better than at any other vacancy. When $a = 2$ or more, the worker has the possibility of multiple offers and receiving the competitive wage. When $w' > w$, the probability of multiple offers is lower when applying to D than to the nondeviants since D is relatively more attractive. This effect is absent in the $a = 1$ case so applying to the deviant is less attractive when $a = 2$ or more. This explains why the equilibrium wage is lower than when $a = 1$. Essentially, the cost of increasing the posted wage is the same as in the case of $a = 1$; the expected benefit is lower. The reason the equilibrium wage is driven to the monopsony level is that posting a wage $w' < w$ is always attractive. First, as in the

$a = 1$ case, it raises the profit earned if the applicant is hired at w'. Second, it decreases the probability of attracting at least one applicant, but at a decreasing rate. This is the consequence of the benefit of multiple offers to workers. Applying to the deviant and being offered this job implies a lower wage if this is the only offer and the competitive wage if the worker receives multiple offers. Since the probability of receiving multiple offers is higher when applying to D (since its wage is otherwise less attractive), the probability of getting the competitive wage is greater. As the common wage falls, the cost of applying to the deviant remains the same, but this latter benefit rises. Thus, the decrease in the probability of the deviant getting at least one application is reduced as the common wage falls and it is always profitable to undercut the common wage.

Interestingly, when $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$, the equilibrium outcome in our directed search model is the same as the outcome one would find in a random search model in which workers make multiple applications and vacancies engage in Bertrand competition when their candidates have multiple offers. If workers do not observe posted wages, they apply at random to a vacancies in symmetric equilibrium, and the matching rate is the same as in our model. In addition, vacancies pay the monopsony wage in this random search model, unless a worker has multiple offers, in which case Bertrand competition drives the wage to the competitive level. Thus, allowing for multiple applications erases the difference between directed and random search in terms of outcomes in contrast to the case of $a = 1$. To the best of our knowledge, no random search model with multiple applications and Bertrand competition exists in the literature, but it would be straightforward to construct such a model. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) is the most closely related model. In their model, wage offers arrive at Poisson rates to both the unemployed and the employed. If a worker who is already employed receives another offer, then that worker's current employer and prospective new employer engage in Bertrand competition for his or her services. In the homogeneous worker/homogeneous firm version of their model, this leads to a two-point distribution of wages paid, namely, the monopsony wage and the competitive wage, as in our model.

Finally, despite the fact that the posted equilibrium wage in our model is zero when $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$, there is still a sense in which "the wage" varies smoothly with θ. The expected fraction of wages paid that are equal to one, $\gamma(\theta; a)$, has the following properties:

(i) $\gamma(\theta; a)$ is increasing in θ and in a;

(ii) $\lim_{\theta \to 0} \gamma(\theta; a) = 0$ and $\lim_{\theta \to \infty} \gamma(\theta; a) = 1$.

The fact that γ is increasing in θ is exactly as one would expect – as the labor market gets tighter, the chance that an individual worker gets multiple offers increases. To understand why γ is also increasing in a, it is important to remember that $\gamma(\theta; a)$ is the expected wage for those workers who match with a vacancy; in particular, those workers who fail to match are not treated as receiving a wage of zero. Finally, defining $\gamma(\theta) = \lim_{a \to \infty} \gamma(\theta; a)$, we can show

$$\gamma(\theta) = \frac{1 - e^{-\theta} - \theta e^{-\theta}}{1 - e^{-\theta}}. \tag{4}$$

This is the expected wage in a large labor market when each worker sends out an arbitrarily large number of applications.

3 Efficiency

We now turn to the question of constrained efficiency. The result suggested by the efficiency of competitive search equilibrium holds in our setting when $a = 1$; however, when workers make a fixed number of multiple applications, this result breaks down.

Suppose vacancies are set up at the beginning of the period and that each vacancy is created at cost c_v. The efficient level of labor market tightness[2] is determined as the solution to

$$\max_{\theta > 0} m(\theta; a) - c_v \theta.$$

The first-order condition for this maximization is

$$c_v = m_\theta(\theta^*; a). \tag{5}$$

The equilibrium level of labor market tightness is determined by free entry. When $a = 1$, this means

$$c_v = \frac{m(\theta^{**}; 1)}{\theta^{**}} (1 - w(\theta^{**}; 1)), \tag{6}$$

whereas for $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$, the condition is

$$c_v = \frac{m(\theta^{**}; a)}{\theta^{**}} (1 - \gamma(\theta^{**}; a)). \tag{7}$$

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[2]In a finite labor market with u given, the social planner chooses v to maximize $M(u, v; a) - cv$, i.e., expected output (equal to the expected number of matches since each match produces an output of 1) minus the vacancy creation costs. Dividing the maximand by u and letting $u, v \to \infty$ with $v/u = \theta$ gives the maximand in the text.

Equations (6) and (7) reflect the condition that entry (vacancy creation) occurs up to the point that the cost of vacancy creation is just offset by the value of owning a vacancy. This value equals the probability of hiring a worker times the expected surplus generated by a hire – equal to 1 minus the posted wage when $a = 1$ and to 1 minus the expected wage when $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$.

Note that θ^* denotes the constrained Pareto efficient level of labor market tightness and θ^{**} denotes the equilibrium level of labor market tightness. At issue is the relationship between θ^* and θ^{**}.

Proposition 3 *Let $u, v \to \infty$ with $v/u = \theta$ and $a \in \{1, ..., A\}$ fixed. For $a = 1$, $\theta^* = \theta^{**}$. For $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$, $\theta^{**} > \theta^*$.*

Proof. Differentiating equation (1) with respect to θ gives

$$m_\theta(\theta; a) = (1 - \frac{\theta}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta}))^{a-1}(1 - e^{-a/\theta} - \frac{a}{\theta}e^{-a/\theta}). \qquad (8)$$

For the case of $a = 1$, substituting this into equation (5) gives an implicit expression for θ^*,

$$c_v = 1 - e^{-1/\theta^*} - \frac{1}{\theta^*}e^{-1/\theta^*}.$$

Using equations (1) and (2) in equation (6) gives an implicit expression for θ^{**},

$$\frac{m(\theta^{**}; 1)}{\theta^{**}}(1 - w(\theta^{**}; 1)) = 1 - e^{-1/\theta^{**}} - \frac{1}{\theta^{**}}e^{-1/\theta^{**}}.$$

Thus, equations (5) and (6) imply $\theta^* = \theta^{**}$ when $a = 1$.

When $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$, equation (8) implies that θ^* solves

$$c_v = (1 - \frac{\theta^*}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta^*}))^{a-1}(1 - e^{-a/\theta^*} - \frac{a}{\theta^*}e^{-a/\theta^*}), \qquad (9)$$

whereas, using equations (1) and (3), θ^{**} (equation 7) solves

$$c_v = (1 - \frac{\theta^{**}}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta^{**}}))^{a-1}(1 - e^{-a/\theta^{**}}). \qquad (10)$$

The right-hand sides of both (9) and (10) are decreasing in θ. Since the right-hand side of (10) is greater than that of (9) for all $\theta > 0$, it follows that $\theta^{**} > \theta^*$. ∎

Posting a vacancy has the standard congestion and thick-market effects in our model – adding one more vacancy makes it more difficult for the incumbent vacancies to find workers but makes it easier for the unemployed

to generate offers. A striking result of the competitive search equilibrium literature is that adding one more vacancy causes the wage to adjust in such a way as to balance these external effects correctly. One way to interpret this result is that competition leads to a wage that is the one that would satisfy the Hosios (1990) condition in a Nash bargaining model. Equivalently, one can say (Moen, 1997, p. 387) that the competitive search equilibrium wage has the property that the marginal rate of substitution between labor market tightness and the wage is the same for vacancies as for workers. The first part of Proposition 3 shows that this result holds when one uses an explicit urn-ball ($a = 1$) microfoundation for the matching function. However, when workers make multiple applications, the result that $\theta^{**} > \theta^*$ indicates that the equilibrium level of vacancy creation is too high. Equivalently, the equilibrium expected wage is below the level that would be indicated by the Hosios condition. The effects of the marginal vacancy are more complicated with multiple applications than in the urn-ball model. Adding one more vacancy makes it less likely that each incumbent vacancy attracts any applicants but, conditional on attracting an applicant, makes it more likely that the incumbent vacancy "wins the race" for that applicant. Adding another vacancy to the market puts upward pressure on the (expected) wage but not to the extent required to achieve the efficient level of entry.

It is interesting to note that the equilibrium outcome is again Pareto efficient when we let $a \to \infty$. To see this, note that

$$m(\theta) = \lim_{a \to \infty} m(\theta; a) = 1 - e^{-\theta}$$

and

$$\gamma(\theta) = \lim_{a \to \infty} \gamma(\theta; a) = \frac{1 - e^{-\theta} - \theta e^{-\theta}}{1 - e^{-\theta}}$$

and substitute these into the efficiency and equilibrium conditions. This result is Proposition 2.5 in JKK.

In a companion paper, Julien, Kennes, and King (2002) show that equilibrium in a finite labor market with $a = v$ is also constrained efficient if one *assumes* a particular wage determination mechanism; namely, vacancies offering jobs to workers who have no other offers receive all of the surplus ($w = 0$) but vacancies offering jobs to workers who do have other offers receive none of the surplus ($w = 1$). Julien, Kennes, and King (2002) interpret this result in terms of what they call the Mortensen rule (Mortensen 1982) – that efficiency in matching is attained if the "initiator" of the match gets the total surplus. By mimicking our proof of Proposition 2, we can show that this assumed wage determination mechanism is in fact the symmetric

equilibrium outcome in a directed search model with wage posting when $a = v$ in a finite labor market.

The intuition for why we find constrained efficiency with $a = 1$ and as $a \to \infty$ but not with a fixed, finite number of multiple applications is that with $a = 1$ and as $a \to \infty$, only one coordination problem affects the operation of the labor market, whereas with a fixed $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$, the urn-ball and the multiple applications coordination problems operate simultaneously. Adjusting the wage can only solve one coordination problem at a time. Specifically, the social planner opens vacancies as long as the marginal benefit exceeds c_v, while the market opens vacancies as long as the average benefit exceeds c_v. When $a = 1$, the average benefit of a vacancy equals the marginal benefit. When $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$, the average benefit exceeds the marginal benefit. Each additional vacancy increases the number of matches by reducing the first coordination friction, the one that workers impose on each other, but at the same time it increases the second coordination friction, the one that vacancies impose on each other. Both the market and the social planner internalize the first effect, but the second effect is not internalized by the market. When workers apply to all vacancies, the first coordination friction is absent, but the second coordination friction reaches a maximum. In this special case, the average benefit of a vacancy once again equals the marginal benefit. This case can be viewed as one in which each vacancy randomly applies to one worker. As noted above, as $a \to \infty$, the matching function becomes $m(\theta) = 1 - e^{-\theta}$. The average benefit is the total number of workers who receive exactly one offer divided by the total number of vacancies, $\frac{m(\theta)}{\theta}(1 - \gamma(\theta))$, which is identical to the RHS of equation (7). In the limit as $a \to \infty$, this is $e^{-\theta}$, which is also $m_\theta(\theta)$.[3]

4 Steady State

We now turn to steady-state analysis for a labor market with directed search and multiple applications. We work with the limiting case in which $u, v \to \infty$ with $v/u = \theta$ and $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$ fixed. Since only the ratio of v to u matters

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[3]The intuition for constrained efficiency in a large labor market when $a = 1$ is quite different from the intuition for the finite labor market case when $a = v$. In the former, constrained efficiency is a result of competition, and competition requires a labor market sufficiently large that individual vacancies have negligible market power. When $a = v$, constrained efficiency is a result of perfect monopoly power – the entire surplus goes to the vacancy if there is no competition for the applicant it selects and to the worker if he or she winds up having the monopoly power. The monopoly intuition does not require that the labor market be large.

in the limiting case, we normalize the labor force to 1; thus, u is interpreted as the unemployment rate.

In steady-state, workers flow into employment with probabililty $m(\theta; a)$ per period. We assume that matches break up exogenously with probability δ, giving the countervailing flow back into unemployment. Similarly, jobs move from vacant to filled with probability $\dfrac{m(\theta; a)}{\theta}$ and back again with probability δ. Steady-state analysis thus allows us to endogenize vacancies and unemployment. More importantly, moving to the steady state means that those unemployed who fail to find an acceptable job in the current period can wait and apply again in the future. In the case of $a = 1$, this is not particularly interesting since, in equilibrium, there is no gain to waiting. However, with multiple applications, the ability of the unemployed to hold out for a situation in which vacancies engage in Bertrand competition for their services, albeit at the cost of delay, implies a positive reservation wage. This leads to a simple and appealing model in which labor market tightness and the reservation wage are simultaneously determined. On the one hand, the lower is the reservation wage of the unemployed, the more vacancies firms want to create. On the other, as the labor market becomes tighter, i.e., as θ increases, the unemployed respond by increasing their reservation wage.

The analysis proceeds as follows. Suppose the unemployed set a reservation wage R. With multiple applications, the wage-posting problem for a vacancy is qualitatively the same as in the one-period game. Whatever common wage might be posted at other vacancies, each individual vacancy has the incentive to undercut. In the one-period game, this implies a monopsony wage of $w = 0$; in the steady state, this same mechanism implies a dynamic monopsony wage of $w = R$.[4] To avoid complicated dynamics, we assume that a vacancy that fails to hire its candidate in period t cannot carry its queue of remaining applicants (if any) over to the next period. Similarly, workers start with a new application round in each period, i.e., their earlier applications are no longer on file.[5] This implies that the probability that an unemployed worker finds a job in any period and the probability that he or she is hired at the competitive wage, conditional on finding a job, are the

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[4]We restrict our attention to stationary strategies (as do JKK in their dynamic extension). That is, we rule out reputation mechanisms that might avert bidding wars. Since any two vacancies that might consider avoiding a bidding war today interact directly in any future period with probability zero, this seems reasonable. We consider a mechanism that rules out Bertrand competition in a static setting in Section 5.3 below.

[5]A similar assumption is made in the standard random search model, namely, that a worker and firm whose match is destroyed do not subsequently remember each other.

same as in the single-period model; i.e., equations (1) and (3) for $m(\theta; a)$ and $\gamma(\theta; a)$ continue to apply.

We begin by examining the value functions for jobs and for workers. A job can be in one of three states – vacant, filled paying the competitive wage, and filled paying R. Let V, $J(1)$, and $J(R)$ be the corresponding values. The value of a vacancy is

$$V = -c_v + \frac{1}{1+r}\{\frac{m(\theta; a)}{\theta}[\gamma(\theta; a)J(1) + (1 - \gamma(\theta; a))J(R)] + (1 - \frac{m(\theta; a)}{\theta})V\}.$$

Maintaining a vacancy entails a cost c_v, which is incurred at the start of each period. Moving to the end of the period, and thus discounting at rate r, the vacancy has hired a worker with probability $\dfrac{m(\theta; a)}{\theta}$. With probability $\gamma(\theta; a)$, the worker who was hired had his or her wage bid up to the competitive level, thus implying a value of $J(1)$. With probability $1 - \gamma(\theta; a)$ the worker was hired at $w = R$, thus implying a value of $J(R)$. Finally, with probability $1 - \dfrac{m(\theta; a)}{\theta}$, the vacancy failed to hire, in which case the value V is retained.

Free entry implies $V = 0$ so the analysis for vacancies remains the same; that is, free entry turns the dynamic game into one that is essentially static for vacancies. Given $V = 0$, there is no incentive for vacancies competing for a worker to drop out of the Bertrand competition before the wage is bid up to $w = 1$ (thus justifying the notation $J(1)$). This in turn implies that we also have $J(1) = 0$. Inserting these equilibrium conditions into the expression for V gives

$$\frac{m(\theta; a)}{\theta}(1 - \gamma(\theta; a))J(R) = c_v(1 + r).$$

At the same time, the value of employing a worker at $w = R$ is

$$J(R) = (1 - R) + \frac{1}{1+r}[(1 - \delta)J(R) + \delta V].$$

Again using $V = 0$, we have

$$J(R) = \frac{1 + r}{r + \delta}(1 - R).$$

Combining these equations gives the first steady-state equilibrium condition,

$$c_v = \frac{m(\theta; a)}{\theta}(1 - \gamma(\theta; a))\frac{1 - R}{r + \delta}. \tag{11}$$

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A worker also passes through three states – unemployed, employed at the competitive wage, and employed at R. The value of unemployment is defined by

$$U = \frac{1}{1+r}\{m(\theta; a)[\gamma(\theta; a)N(1) + (1 - \gamma(\theta; a))N(R)] + (1 - m(\theta; a))U\},$$

where $N(1)$ and $N(R)$ are the values of employment at $w = 1$ and $w = R$, respectively. These latter two values are in turn defined by

$$N(1) = 1 + \frac{1}{1+r}\{(1-\delta)N(1) + \delta U\}$$

$$N(R) = R + \frac{1}{1+r}\{(1-\delta)N(R) + \delta U\}.$$

The reservation wage property, i.e., $N(R) = U$, then implies

$$U = \frac{1+r}{r}R$$

$$N(1) = \frac{(1+r)}{r(r+\delta)}(r + \delta R).$$

Inserting these expressions into the expression for U and rearranging gives the second steady-state equilibrium condition,

$$R = \frac{m(\theta; a)\gamma(\theta; a)}{r + \delta + m(\theta; a)\gamma(\theta; a)}. \tag{12}$$

The final equation for the steady-state equilibrium is the standard flow (Beveridge curve) condition for unemployment. Since the labor force is normalized to 1, this is

$$u = \frac{\delta}{\delta + m(\theta; a)}. \tag{13}$$

Equations (12) and (13) show that, as is common in this class of models, once labor market tightness (θ) is determined, the other endogenous variables – in this case, R and u – are easily determined. Using equation (12) to eliminate R from equation (11) gives the equation that determines the steady-state equilibrium value of θ, namely,

$$c_v = \frac{m(\theta^{**}; a)}{\theta^{**}} \frac{1 - \gamma(\theta^{**}; a)}{r + \delta + m(\theta^{**}; a)\gamma(\theta^{**}; a)}. \tag{14}$$

Using our results on the properties of $m(\theta; a)$ and $\gamma(\theta; a)$, we can show that the right-hand side of equation (14) equals $\dfrac{1}{r+\delta}$ as $\theta \to 0$, that it goes to

zero as $\theta \to \infty$, and that its derivative with respect to θ is negative for all $\theta > 0$. Equation (14) thus has a unique solution for each $c_v \in (0, \frac{1}{r + \delta}]$.

The natural next step is to compare equilibrium steady-state labor market tightness with the constrained efficient value of θ. The planner's problem is to choose the level of labor market tightness that maximizes the discounted value of output net of vacancy costs for an infinitely-lived economy.[6] That is, the planner's problem is to maximize

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+r}\right)^t (1 - u_t - c_v \theta_t u_t)$$

subject to

$$u_{t+1} - u_t = m(\theta_t; a)u_t - \delta(1 - u_t)$$

with u_0 given.

The current-value Hamiltonian for this problem is

$$H(\theta, u) = 1 - u - c_v \theta u + \lambda[m(\theta; a)u - \delta(1 - u)]$$

with necessary conditions

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial \theta} = -c_v u + \lambda m_\theta(\theta; a)u = 0$$

$$r\dot{\lambda} = -\frac{\partial H}{\partial u} + r\lambda = 1 + c_v \theta - \lambda[r + \delta + m(\theta; a)].$$

Evaluating at the steady-state, and eliminating λ, gives

$$c_v = \frac{(1 + c_v \theta^*)m_\theta(\theta^*; a)}{r + \delta + m(\theta^*; a)}. \tag{15}$$

Now we can compare the levels of labor market tightness implied by equations (14) and (15). Using equations (1) and (3), equation (14) can be rewritten as

$$c_v(r + \delta + m(\theta^{**}; a)) = (1 + c_v \theta^{**})(1 - \frac{\theta^{**}}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta^{**}}))^{a-1}(1 - e^{-a/\theta^{**}}). \tag{16}$$

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[6]We consider only stationary solutions, but this is not likely to be restrictive in our model. There are two standard reasons why a nonstationary solution might be optimal. First, as shown in Shimer and Smith (2001), a nonstationary solution can be optimal in a matching model with two-sided heterogeneity when agents' characteristics are complements in production. A nonstationary solution may also be optimal if there are increasing returns to scale in the matching function. Neither of these features is present in our model.

Using equation (8), equation (15) can be rewritten as

$$c_v\left(r+\delta+m(\theta^*;a)\right)=(1+c_v\theta^*)(1-\frac{\theta^*}{a}(1-e^{-a/\theta^*}))^{a-1}(1-e^{-a/\theta^*}-\frac{a}{\theta^*}e^{-a/\theta^*}).$$
(17)

As in the single-period analysis, θ^* is the constrained efficient level of labor market tightness, i.e., the value of θ that solves equation (15), and θ^{**} is the equilibrium level of labor market tightness, i.e., the value of θ that solves equation (14). Comparing equations (16) and (17) yields the following:

Proposition 4 *Let $u,v\rightarrow\infty$ with $v/u=\theta$ and $a\in\{2,...,A\}$ fixed. Then in steady state, $\theta^{**}>\theta^*$.*

Proposition 4 indicates that, as in the single-period analysis, when the unemployed make a fixed number of multiple applications per period ($a\in\{2,...,A\}$), equilibrium is constrained inefficient. Specifically, there is too much vacancy creation. This result holds even though the ability of the unemployed to reject offers in favor of waiting for a more favorable outcome in some future period implies a dynamic monopsony wage above the single-period monopsony wage of zero.

Finally, note that the marginal benefit (MB) of opening a vacancy, the RHS of equation (17), is $\frac{(1-e^{-a/\theta}-\frac{a}{\theta}e^{-a/\theta})}{(1-e^{-a/\theta})}$ times the average benefit (AB) , the RHS of equation (16). This ratio is the same in the one-period model and is equal to the probability that a firm receives 2 or more applications conditional on receiving at least 1 application. Call this conditional probability P. Each additional vacancy attracts applications from other vacancies and consequently increases the probability that multiple vacancies must compete for the same candidate, the second coordination problem. The extent of this negative externality is proportional to P. As a increases, both the MB and the AB increase but the MB increases faster, and in the limit as $a\rightarrow\infty$, $P\rightarrow1$ and MB=AB. This does not mean that the labor market becomes more efficient. To the contrary, the matching rate goes down. Increasing a simply makes the planner's problem more difficult. In the next section, we endogenize a and show that workers typically apply to too many jobs.

5   Extensions and Robustness Checks

In this section, we focus on three simplifying assumptions that we made in our basic model. These assumptions are: (i) that the number of applications sent out by each worker is a parameter of the search technology, (ii) that

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each vacancy can process at most one application per period, and (iii) that two or more vacancies competing for the same worker engage in Bertrand competition for that worker's services. Accordingly, we examine what happens to our results if (i) the number of applications per worker is a choice variable, (ii) each vacancy can process at most two applications, and (iii) vacancies pursue strategies that rule out Bertrand competition.

5.1 Endogenous a

We have assumed that each worker makes a applications, where $a \in \{1, 2, ..., A\}$ is exogenously given. Since the equilibrium level of labor market tightness is efficient when $a = 1$ but inefficient when $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$, it is natural to ask whether – and under what circumstances – workers would choose to make only one application or more than one. In addressing this question, we consider only pure-strategy symmetric equilibria in application strategies. That is, assuming that all other workers make a applications, under what conditions (taking into account how firms react to all workers choosing a) is it in the individual worker's interest also to choose a? Our objective is to determine whether our inefficiency results are robust with respect to endogenizing a in this way.

To make endogenizing a an interesting problem, there must be a cost associated with applications, so we assume that each application costs c_a to submit. In the one-shot game, there are then only 2 exogenous parameters, the cost of posting a vacancy, c_v, and the cost of submitting an application, c_a. We need only consider $0 \leq c_v \leq 1$ and $0 \leq c_a \leq 1$ since worker output equals 1 and if $c_v > 1$, no firm would post a vacancy, and if $c_a > 1$, no worker would make an application. Thus for each (c_v, c_a) in the unit square we can ask (i) what are the free-entry equilibrium values of θ and a and (ii) what values of θ and a would a social planner choose?

We start with the equilibrium problem and ask: For what values of (c_v, c_a) is $a = 1$ consistent with equilibrium? For what values of (c_v, c_a) is $a = 2$ consistent with equilibrium? Etc. We address this question numerically as follows.

Consider a candidate equilibrium in which all workers make a applications. Then, for each θ, we know what wage vacancies choose to post (from equation (2) if $a = 1$; zero if $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$), and we know $m(\theta; a)$. We pick a value of c_v from a grid over $(0, 1)$. From the free-entry condition (equation (6) if $a = 1$; equation (7) otherwise), there is a corresponding implied value of θ. We then ask, using the value of θ implied by the free-entry condition, for what values of c_a is an individual worker's expected payoff

maximized by choosing to send out the same number of applications as all other workers do? We answer this numerically by comparing the expected payoff associated with choosing a when all other workers also choose a with those associated with choosing $a-1, a-2, ...$ and $a+1, a+2, ...$, etc.[7] For the particular c_v that we chose, this gives us a range of values for c_a. We then repeat for the next value of c_v, etc. The outcome of this algorithm is the set of (c_v, c_a) combinations in the unit square that are consistent with a pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium in which all workers make a applications. We carry out this process for a wide range of values for a.

Next, we address the social planner's problem. Given (c_v, c_a), the natural social planner problem is

$$\max_{\theta, a} m(\theta; a) - c_v \theta - c_a a,$$

where $\theta \geq 0$ and $a \in \{0, 1, 2, ...\}$. We know this problem is concave in θ for a given a. Thus, if (θ^*, a^*) solves the social planner problem, we must have

$$c_v = m_\theta(\theta^*; a^*),$$

and $\theta^* = \theta^*(a^*; c_v)$ has a unique solution. We can plug this back into the social planner's objective and maximize numerically with respect to a. This gives a^* (and θ^*) as functions of (c_v, c_a). We can then compare the equilibrium unit square with the social planner unit square.

The qualitative results of this exercise are as follows. First, although there are many parameter configurations for which the equilibrium number of applications, a^{**}, equals 1, this outcome requires relatively high values of c_a. Second, the equilibrium number of applications increases as c_a falls (as one would expect). Third, there are parameter configurations that admit multiple equilibria. This reflects a complementarity between workers' and firms' strategies. For example, if all workers choose $a = 1$, then vacancies post a positive wage, $w(\theta; 1) > 0$. For some values of θ (equivalently, for some values of c_v) it is not worthwhile for workers to submit a second application. On the other hand, if all workers choose $a = 2$, then $w = 0$, and it cannot be worthwhile for a worker to deviate to $a = 1$. Fourth, there are many parameter configurations for which no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists. One parameter region in which this is the case is the set of (c_v, c_a) combinations in which individual workers would prefer not to send out any

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[7]This comparison can be carried out in a finite number of steps since the maximum number of applications a worker might make is limited by the requirement that the total cost of submitting applications be less than one.

applications when all other workers choose $a = 1$. This occurs when both c_v and c_a are relatively high. There are, however, other (c_v, c_a) combinations for which no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists. Fifth, for relatively low values of c_a, there are parameter regions with unique equilibria at $a^{**} = 2$, $a^{**} = 3$, etc.

In the parameter regions in which a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium (or equilibria) exists, we find $a^{**} \geq a^*$. Specifically, there are parameter configurations for which $a^* = a^{**} = 1$ (where $a^{**} = 1$ may either be unique or one of two or more equilibrium possibilities). However, when $a^{**} \geq 2$, we find $a^{**} > a^*$. This occurs when c_v and c_a are low relative to the output produced by a match. That is, for what we view as reasonable values of c_v and c_a, the equilibrium number of applications exceeds the socially optimal value. The reason is simply that individual workers, when deciding how many applications to submit, fail to take into account the externality they impose on other workers. The countervailing externality that one might expect – that an increase in worker applications should make it easier for firms to fill their vacancies – does not obtain because of the coordination failure among vacancies.

Finally, endogenizing a does not affect our basic efficiency result for labor market tightness. For (c_v, c_a) combinations such that $a^* = a^{**} = 1$, we, of course, have $\theta^* = \theta^{**}$. For parameter configurations such that $a^{**} > a^*$, we typically find $\theta^{**} > \theta^*$. For a small set of parameter configurations, however, we find $\theta^{**} < \theta^*$. This appears at first glance to be inconsistent with Proposition 3, but note that in that Proposition, we imposed the restriction that $a^* = a^{**}$, which need not hold when we endogenize a. In any event, the bottom line of this exercise is clear. The assumption that a is an exogenous parameter of the search technology, which we made in order to make our basic model as transparent as possible, is not driving our results on the inefficiency effects of multiple applications.

5.2 Shortlisting

Our inefficiency result is based on a double coordination failure. Not only are workers unable to coordinate in terms of where they send their applications, but vacancies are unable to coordinate in terms of which applicants they try to hire. In our basic model, we represented the coordination failure among vacancies in a clean but extreme way. A natural question is the extent to which our results depend on our assumption that each vacancy could pursue at most one applicant.

To address this question, we now consider a version of the basic one-shot

model in which each vacancy can make up to two offers. Specifically, we assume that vacancies form "short lists" as follows. If two or more workers apply to a vacancy, the vacancy selects two applicants at random and rejects the others. It selects one of its chosen applicants to receive its first-round offer. The other applicant, if she is not hired by another vacancy in the first round, gets a second-round offer in the event that the vacancy doesn't hire in the first round. If only one worker applies to a vacancy, then that worker gets the vacancy's first-round offer. To keep the algebra as simple as possible, we analyze this model for the case of $a = 2$.

This extension makes our model far more difficult. The basic reason is that when a worker thinks about applying to a vacancy that is deviating from the putative equilibrium wage, the indifference condition becomes considerably more complicated. A worker's application strategy affects the probabilities of being placed on 0, 1, or 2 short lists; the worker could be in first or second place on these short lists, etc. In addition, an intermediate wage arises in this model. Consider two vacancies competing for the same applicant in the first round. If either or both of these vacancies has a second-round candidate, then Bertrand competition in the first round stops before the competitive level.

Our analysis of shortlisting follows the same road map that we used for our basic model. We first derive the matching probability, assuming a symmetric equilibrium posted wage. Second, taking θ as given, we derive the symmetric equilibrium wage posting strategy for vacancies. Finally, we characterize the free-entry equilibrium level of labor market tightness and the corresponding constrained efficient level and compare the two. The central result of our analysis still holds – the equilibrium level of θ exceeds the efficient level.

Because the details of the shortlisting extension are very tedious, we present the analysis in Appendix C. Here, in the text, we simply summarize and comment on our results.

We begin with the matching probability. Assuming the existence of a symmetric equilibrium posted wage, that is, assuming that all vacancies are equally attractive *ex ante*, the probability that a worker finds a job is

$$m(\theta) = 1 - (1 - q_1)^2 (1 - q_2)^2, \tag{18}$$

where q_1 is the probability that an application leads to a first-round offer and q_2 is the probability that an application leads to a second-round offer given that it does not generate a first-round offer. An explanation of the form of $m(\theta)$ and expressions for q_1 and q_2 are given in Appendix C. Note

that the probability that an application leads to a first-round offer is the same as the probability that the application would have generated an offer had there been only one round; i.e., $q_1 = q$ (from the basic model). The obvious result thus follows, namely, for each value of θ, shortlisting increases the probability that a worker finds a job.

From the social planner's perspective, the only effect of shortlisting is to change the form of $m(\theta)$. The effect on equilibrium is, however, much more complicated. For low values of θ, the equilibrium analysis is qualitatively similar to the one we carried out for our basic model. All vacancies post a wage of zero. Bertrand competition for an applicant who has two first-round offers either drives the wage to the competitive level (if neither of the competing vacancies has a second-round candidate) or to the intermediate wage (if at least one of the vacancies has a second-round candidate). An applicant who, having failed to get any first-round offers, gets a single second-round offer receives the monopsony wage (zero). An applicant who gets two second-round offers receives a wage of one.

For higher values of θ (the cutoff value is approximately $\theta = 0.42$), there are multiple equilibria. For example, when $\theta = 1$, any wage in the interval $[0.20, 0.23]$ (approximately) is consistent with equilibrium. The reason for multiple equilibria has to do with the discontinuity in the derivative of expected profit with respect to the potential deviant's wage at the equilibrium wage. The reason that $w = 0$ is not an equilibrium posted wage for higher values of θ has to do with the change in application incentives implied by shortlisting. In our basic model, a worker whose application is accepted by more than one vacancy necessarily receives a wage of one, and workers are willing to apply to vacancies posting $w = 0$ in hopes of hitting the jackpot. With shortlisting, however, a worker can wind up with the posted wage even if both of her applications are accepted – specifically, if she is first on one vacancy's short list and second on the other's. (When θ is low, $w = 0$ arises even with shortlisting due to a lack of competition among vacancies.)

Whether θ is low, so $w = 0$ is the unique posted wage, or θ is high, so there are multiple equilibria, workers can receive three different wages – the posted wage, the intermediate wage, and the competitive wage. The intermediate wage, s, is determined by

$$1 - s = (1 - q_1)(1 - q_2)(1 - w). \tag{19}$$

The left-hand side of this expression is the profit that a vacancy realizes if it hires its first-round candidate at wage s. The right-hand side is the expected profit for a vacancy that received two applications should it choose

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to proceed to the second round. With probability $1-q_1$ the vacancy's second-place candidate will still be available after the first round. Conditional on still being available, this candidate will fail to get a competing second round offer with probability $1 - q_2$. The vacancy then realizes a profit of $1 - w$.

For each value of θ, the next step is to compute the expected profit of a vacancy, say $\pi(\theta)$. When there are multiple equilibria, we use the highest possible equilibrium wage. At this wage, $\pi(\theta)$ is at its lowest possible level; hence the incentive to create vacancies is as small as possible. The free-entry equilibrium value of labor market tightness, θ^{**}, is determined by

$$c_v = \pi(\theta^{**}),$$

which is analogous to equation (7) in our basic model. The efficient value of labor market tightness, θ^*, is determined by

$$c_v = m'(\theta^*),$$

precisely as in the basic model. The only effect of shortlisting is to change the form of $m(\cdot)$.

It is straightforward to compute $m'(\theta)$ and $\pi(\theta)$ numerically. Both of these functions are positive and decreasing in θ, and $\pi(\theta) > m'(\theta)$ for each $\theta > 0$. Equivalently, $\theta^{**} > \theta^*$. That is, the central result of our basic model, namely, that there is excessive vacancy creation in free-entry equilibrium, continues to hold when we extend our model to allow for shortlisting.

There are, of course, other ways to relax the assumption that each vacancy can process at most one application. We feel, however, that we have done so in a reasonable and realistic way. The fact that $\theta^{**} > \theta^*$ continues to hold when we allow for shortlisting suggests that our result on the inefficiency of competitive search equilibrium when workers make multiple applications is robust to the assumption that vacancies can consider at most one application. When a firm opens a vacancy, it does not internalize the cost that it imposes on other vacancies (the second coordination problem). Even if we were to allow vacancies to make their shortlists longer, they can still lose all their candidates to competitors. In other words, shortlisting reduces the second coordination problem but does not eliminate it.

5.3   Offer-Beating Strategies

In our basic model, we assumed that if a worker received offers from two or more vacancies, those vacancies would then engage in Bertrand competition for the worker's services. Although the Bertrand assumption is standard in

the literature, it can be debated in our environment. A vacancy that is about to lose a worker to a rival should be indifferent between letting the worker take the other job versus entering into Bertrand competition. After all, both policies, conceding or competing, lead to the same zero-profit outcome.

Simply assuming that each vacancy announces a common wage w and then refuses to engage in *ex post* bidding is, of course, not satisfactory.[8] If all vacancies were to follow such a strategy, then a deviant could profit by increasing its wage offer whenever its chosen applicant had other offers. This leads us to consider offer-beating strategies.

We define such strategies as follows:

1. Post w.

2. If all other vacancies pursuing the same applicant post w or less, continue to offer w.

3. If at least one other vacancy pursuing the same applicant posts $w' > w$ or makes a counteroffer $w' > w$, make a counteroffer above w'. If one or more rivals makes a counteroffer to the counteroffer, respond in kind; i.e., engage in Bertrand competition.

Of course, these strategies only are relevant when workers make more than one application.

Offer-beating strategies are analogous to the price-beating strategies that have been used in the industrial organization literature to rule out Bertrand competition in prices. Price-beating strategies are sometimes used in that literature as a foundation for "kinked demand curves" (e.g., Tirole 1988, pp. 243-45). Typically, there is a continuum of price-beating Nash equilibria – absent any consideration of equilibrium refinements, there is a continuum of prices at which the demand curve can kink.

We begin our analysis of offer-beating equilibria taking θ as given. We first show that for each θ, there is a continuum of offer-beating Nash equilibria. These are indexed by w, where w ranges from the monopsony level (zero) to an upper bound that is increasing in θ. The more difficult it is

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[8] If one were nonetheless simply to assume that *ex post* bidding is not allowed, then there would be no common equilibrium posted wage. Suppose all vacancies post a wage of w. Then, assuming that a worker who has multiple offers accepts the highest one and so long as w is not too close to one, it is in the interest of any one vacancy to post a slightly higher wage. Once w is sufficiently close to one, a vacancy can profit by lowering its wage to the minimum level consistent with attracting one or more applications with some positive probability.

for vacancies to attract workers at any given wage, i.e., the higher is θ, the greater is the range of wages that can be supported as offer-beating Nash equilibria. In terms of choosing among these equilibria, a common offer-beating strategy with $w = 0$ is the obvious focal point. Nonetheless, we continue to consider all the possible offer-beating Nash equilibria. We do this to emphasize the scope of our second result – when we allow for free entry, i.e., when we endogenize θ, all of these equilibria are inefficient. In particular, all exhibit excess vacancy creation.

Proposition 5 *Let* $\overline{w}(\theta; a) = \dfrac{a}{\theta} \dfrac{e^{-a/\theta}}{1 - e^{-a/\theta}}$. *There exists a continuum of symmetric offer-beating Nash equilibria indexed by* $w \in [0, \overline{w}(\theta; a)]$.

The strategy of proof is simple. We first show that if all vacancies follow an offer-beating strategy at any common posted wage w, it is never in the interest of any one vacancy to post a higher wage, w'. Posting a higher wage increases the probability of attracting an applicant. This is beneficial only if that applicant receives no other offers. We place an upper bound on the expected benefit associated with an upward deviation in the posted wage by supposing that an arbitrarily small increase in the posted wage above w attracts one or more applicants with probability one. Nevertheless, it is not profitable to post $w' > w$. The increase in the probability of attracting an applicant is outweighed by the decrease in the probability that the vacancy will receive a positive profit from that worker. Second, we check that a downward deviation, i.e., $w' < w$, is not profitable. This is the case for all $w \in [0, \overline{w}(\theta; a)]$. The argument is essentially the same as the one we used for the case of $a = 1$ in the proof of Proposition 2. The details are given in Appendix D.

The next step is to allow for free entry. Suppose all vacancies follow an offer-beating strategy with a posted wage of w. The equilibrium value of θ is then determined as usual by

$$c_v = \frac{m(\theta)}{\theta}(1 - w).$$

Now, however, any $w \in [0, \overline{w}(\theta; a)]$ is consistent with symmetric Nash equilibrium, so there is a corresponding range of θ that is consistent with free-entry equilibrium. The lowest possible equilibrium level of labor market tightness is the one associated with $\overline{w}(\theta; a)$. Call this lowest possible equi-

librium value of labor market tightness θ^{**}. Then θ^{**} solves

$$c_v = \frac{1 - \left(1 - \dfrac{\theta^{**}}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta^{**}})\right)^a}{\theta^{**}} \left(1 - \frac{a}{\theta^{**}}\frac{e^{-a/\theta^{**}}}{\left(1 - e^{-a/\theta^{**}}\right)}\right).$$

As usual, let $q = \dfrac{\theta}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta})$. The free-entry condition is then

$$c_v = \frac{1 - (1-q)^a}{aq}(1 - e^{-a/\theta^{**}} - \frac{a}{\theta^{**}}e^{-a/\theta^{**}}). \qquad (20)$$

The planner's problem is unchanged, so the efficient level of labor market tightness, θ^*, is again the solution to

$$c_v = (1 - \frac{\theta^*}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta^*}))^{a-1}(1 - e^{-a/\theta^*} - \frac{a}{\theta^*}e^{-a/\theta^*}),$$

cf., equation (9). This condition can be rewritten as

$$c_v = (1-q)^{a-1}(1 - e^{-a/\theta^*} - \frac{a}{\theta^*}e^{-a/\theta^*}). \qquad (21)$$

Since $1 - (1-q)^a > aq(1-q)^{a-1}$ so long as $a \geq 2$ (by the properties of the binomial), the right hand side of (20) is greater than the right hand side of (21) for each $\theta > 0$. That is, $\theta^{**} > \theta^*$. We thus have:

Proposition 6 *There is excessive vacancy creation in any symmetric offer-beating Nash equilibrium.*

The point of Proposition 6 is clear. The inefficiency associated with multiple applications is not an artifact of assuming *ex post* Bertrand competition for applicants. Offer-beating strategies are a particular alternative to Bertrand competition. They create rents for vacancies which are absent in a competitive environment. In a free-entry equilibrium, these rents translate into excessive entry and wages that are too low. In fact, any strategy that reduces competition will have this effect.

6   Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we construct an equilibrium search model of a large labor market in which workers, after observing all posted wages, submit a fixed number of applications, $a \in \{1, ...A\}$, to the vacancies that they find most

attractive. We derive the symmetric equilibrium matching probability and the common posted wage. When $a = 1$, our analysis is a large labor market version of BSW. However, when $a \in \{2, ...A\}$, i.e., when workers make multiple applications, the symmetric equilibrium of our model is radically different. With multiple applications, the match probability in our model reflects the interplay of two coordination failures – an urn-ball failure among workers and a multiple-application failure among vacancies. In addition, when workers make more than one application, all vacancies post the monopsony wage, but there is dispersion in wages paid. Workers who receive only one job offer are paid the monopsony wage, but those who receive multiple offers get the competitive wage. When workers make a single application or when they apply to an arbitrarily large number of vacancies, equilibrium is constrained efficient; but when workers make a finite number of multiple applications, too many vacancies are posted. These results, both positive and normative, carry over from the single-period model to a steady-state framework and they are robust with respect to reasonable variations in our key assumptions.

Directed search is an appealing way to model equilibrium unemployment and wage dispersion. In reality, workers do direct their applications to attractive vacancies, but unemployment nonetheless persists as a result of coordination failures on both sides of the labor market. In addition, those workers who are lucky enough to generate competition for their services do in fact have their wages bid up. The contribution of our paper is to show that these realistic features can be captured in a tractable equilibrium model and, more importantly, that when these features are incorporated, equilibrium is not constrained efficient.

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Appendices

A Proof of Proposition 1

We now sketch the proof of Proposition 1. The full proof is given in Albrecht et. al. (2004). We compute $m(\theta; a)$ as follows. The probability that a worker finds a job is one minus the probability that he or she gets no job offers. Consider a worker who applies to a vacancies, and let the random variables $X_1, X_2, ..., X_a$ be the number of competitors that he or she has at vacancy 1, vacancy 2, ..., vacancy a. The probability that the worker gets no job offers can be expressed as

$$\sum ... \sum \frac{x_1}{x_1 + 1} \frac{x_2}{x_2 + 1} ... \frac{x_a}{x_a + 1} P[X_1 = x_1, X_2 = x_2, ...X_a = x_a].$$

In general, the random variables $X_1, X_2, ..., X_a$ are not independent, making the computation of the joint probability a difficult one. (Albrecht et. al. 2004 and Philip 2003 give an expression for the joint probability.) The intuition for dependence is simple. Consider, for example, a labor market in which u and v are small and in which each worker makes $a = 2$ applications. Then, if a worker has relatively many competitors at the first vacancy to which he or she applies, it is more likely that his or her second application has relatively few competitors. The key to Proposition 1 is that this dependence vanishes in the limit. In the limit, the fact that a worker has an unexpectedly large number of competitors at one vacancy says nothing about the number of competitors he or she faces elsewhere. The joint probability then equals the product of the marginals, and the probability that a worker gets at least one offer can be computed as $1 - \left(\sum \frac{x}{x+1} P[X = x] \right)^a$. As $u, v \to \infty$ with $v/u = \theta$, the number of competitors an applicant faces at any particular vacancy, X, converges in distribution to a Poisson $\left(\frac{a}{\theta}\right)$ random variable. A straightforward computation then gives equation (1).

If $a = 1$, there is no problem of dependence. The number of competitors that a worker has at the vacancy to which he or she applies is a $bin(u-1, \frac{1}{v})$ random variable. The probability that a worker gets an offer is then

$$1 - \sum_{x=0}^{u-1} \frac{x}{x+1} \binom{u-1}{x} \left(\frac{1}{v}\right)^x \left(1 - \frac{1}{v}\right)^{u-1-x} = \frac{v}{u} \left[1 - (1 - \frac{1}{v})^u\right].$$

With a change in notation, this result is the same as the one given in BSW. Taking the limit of this matching probability as $u, v \to \infty$ with $v/u = \theta$ gives $m(\theta; 1) = \theta(1 - e^{-1/\theta})$, as equation (1) implies. The case of $a = v$

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is the polar opposite. In this case, $X_1 = X_2 = ... = X_a = u - 1$ with probability one, so the probability a worker gets an offer is $1 - \left(\frac{u-1}{u}\right)^v$, as in JKK. Taking the limit as $u, v \to \infty$ with $v/u = \theta$ gives

$$m(\theta) = 1 - e^{-\theta}.$$

The same expression can be derived by taking the limit of $m(\theta; a)$ as $a \to \infty$ in equation (1).

B Proof of Proposition 2

As discussed in the text, we need to show that when $a = 1$, the wage $w(\theta; 1)$ has the property that if all vacancies, with the possible exception of a potential deviant (D), post that wage, then it is also in D's interest to post $w(\theta; 1)$. When $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$, we need to show that no matter what common wage is posted by other vacancies, it is always in D's interest to undercut, thus driving $w(\theta; a)$ to zero.

Suppose D posts a wage of w' and that each nondeviant vacancy (N) posts w. Then D's expected profit is

$$\pi(w'; w) = (1-w')P[\text{D gets at least one application}]P[\text{selected applicant has no other offer}]$$

Let k be the probability that any one worker applies to D. In symmetric equilibrium, k must be the same for all workers. As $u \to \infty$, k must go to zero; otherwise, any applicant to D would have an infinity of competitors and therefore would get the job at D with probability zero. We let $u \to \infty$ and $k \to 0$ in such a way that $ku = \xi$ stays constant; thus, in a large labor market, the number of applications sent to D is a Poisson (ξ) random variable. We therefore have

$$P[\text{D gets at least one application}] = 1 - e^{-\xi}.$$

The parameter ξ depends on w', w and θ through an indifference condition, which we develop below. Finally, the last term on the right-hand side of $\pi(w'; w)$ can be written as

$$P[\text{selected applicant has no other offer}] = (1 - q^N)^{a-1},$$

where q^N is the probability that any one application to an N vacancy leads to an offer. We thus have

$$\pi(w'; w) = (1 - w')(1 - e^{-\xi})(1 - q^N)^{a-1}.$$

The parameter ξ determines the probability (call it q^D) that a worker who applies to D gets an offer from that vacancy, as follows:

$$q^D = \sum_{x=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{x+1} \frac{e^{-\xi}\xi^x}{x!} = \frac{1}{\xi}(1 - e^{-\xi}).$$

To understand this expression, note that (i) a worker who has x competitors at D gets the offer from D with probability $\dfrac{1}{x+1}$ and (ii) the number of competitors faced by a worker who applies to D is Poisson (ξ). The probability that an application to an N vacancy leads to an offer is derived in a similar fashion:

$$q^N = \sum_{x=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{x+1} \frac{e^{-a/\theta}(\frac{a}{\theta})^x}{x!} = \frac{\theta}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta}).$$

The number of potential competitors at an N vacancy goes to infinity, the probability that any one potential competitor applies to the N vacancy in question goes to zero, and the product of these two terms goes to a/θ, so the number of competitors faced by an applicant to an N vacancy is Poisson ($\frac{a}{\theta}$). Note that q^N does not depend on w'.

We now develop the indifference condition, which defines ξ as a function of w' given w and θ. Each worker must be indifferent between sending all a applications to N vacancies versus sending 1 application to D and the other $a-1$ to N vacancies. The expected payoff from sending all applications to N vacancies depends on neither ξ nor w' and can thus be treated as a constant. The expected payoff from sending one application to D and the others to N vacancies does, of course, depend on ξ and w'.

The possible payoffs for a worker who sends 1 application to D and the other $a - 1$ to N vacancies are

(i) 1 if 2 or more applications are accepted.
    This occurs with probability

$$\begin{aligned} &q^D(1 - (1 - q^N)^{a-1}) + (1 - q^D)(1 - (1 - q^N)^{a-1} - (a - 1)q^N(1 - q^N)^{a-2}) \\ = \ &1 - (1 - q^N)^{a-1} - (1 - q^D)(a - 1)q^N(1 - q^N)^{a-2}. \end{aligned}$$

(ii) w' if only the application to D is successful.
    This occurs with probability $q^D(1 - q^N)^{a-1}$.

(iii) w if the application to D is unsuccessful and only one application to N is successful.

This occurs with probability $(1 - q^D)(a-1)q^N(1-q^N)^{a-2}$.

(iv) 0 if no applications are successful.

This occurs with probability $(1 - q^D)(1 - q^N)^{a-1}$

The expected payoff for a worker who sends 1 application to D and $a - 1$ to N is thus

$$1-(1-q^N)^{a-1}-(1-q^D)(a-1)q^N(1-q^N)^{a-2}+w'q^D(1-q^N)^{a-1}+w(1-q^D)(a-1)q^N(1-q^N)^{a-2}.$$

Equating this to the expected payoff from applying only to N vacancies implicitly defines $\xi(w'; w, \theta)$. Differentiating with respect to w', taking into account that $\dfrac{dq^D}{d\xi} = -\dfrac{1 - e^{-\xi} - \xi e^{-\xi}}{\xi^2}$, and substituting for q^D and q^N gives

$$\frac{d\xi}{dw'} = \frac{\xi(1 - e^{-\xi})(1 - \frac{\theta}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta}))}{(1 - e^{-\xi} - \xi e^{-\xi})\left((a - 1)\frac{\theta}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta})(1 - w) + w'(1 - \frac{\theta}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta}))\right)}$$

Since $1 - e^{-x} - xe^{-x} > 0$ for all $x > 0$ and $1 \geq w$, we have $\dfrac{d\xi}{dw'} > 0$ (as expected) and $\dfrac{d^2\xi}{dw'^2} < 0$.

Turning back to D's optimization problem, $\pi(w'; w)$ is proportional to $(1 - w')(1 - e^{-\xi})$. Maximizing with respect to w', the first-order (Kuhn-Tucker) condition is

$$-(1 - e^{-\xi}) + (1 - w')e^{-\xi}\frac{d\xi}{dw'} \leq 0 \text{ with equality if } w' > 0.$$

Note that if there is an interior solution, the second-order condition holds.

We are interested in the possibility of an interior solution at $w' = w$. Consider first the case of $a = 1$. If $w' = w$, then $\xi = 1/\theta$. Substituting and solving gives

$$w(\theta; 1) = \frac{e^{-1/\theta}}{\theta(1 - e^{-1/\theta})},$$

as given in equation (2).

Consider next the case of $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$. In this case $w' = w$ implies $\xi = a/\theta$. Substituting the expression for $\dfrac{d\xi}{dw'}$ into the Kuhn-Tucker condition gives

$$\frac{(1 - w)\xi e^{-\xi}(1 - \frac{1}{\xi}(1 - e^{-\xi}))}{(1 - e^{-\xi} - \xi e^{-\xi})\left((a - 1)\frac{1}{\xi}(1 - e^{-\xi})(1 - w) + w(1 - \frac{1}{\xi}(1 - e^{-\xi}))\right)} \leq 1$$

This can be rewritten as

$$\frac{\xi^2 e^{-\xi} + (a-2)\xi e^{-\xi}(1-e^{-\xi}) - (a-1)^2(1-e^{-\xi})^2}{(1-e^{-\xi})} \le w(\xi - a(1-e^{-\xi}) + (a-1)^2\xi(1-e^{-\xi})^2)$$

Only a corner solution exists with $w(\theta; a) = 0$ if this is a strict inequality.

Note that as $\xi \to 0$, the $RHS \to 0$ and, using L'Hôpital's Rule, so does the LHS. Note also that

$$\frac{dRHS}{d\xi} = w(1 - ae^{-\xi} + (a-1)^2(1-e^{-\xi})^2 + 2(a-1)^2\xi(1-e^{-\xi})e^{-\xi}) > 0,$$

while

$$\frac{dLHS}{d\xi} = \frac{-e^{-\xi}((1-e^{-\xi})^2((a-1)(a-2) + \xi(a-2)) + (1-e^{-\xi}-\xi)^2}{(1-e^{-\xi})^2},$$

which is negative for $a \in \{2, ..., A\}$. Thus, in this case, we have a corner solution with $w(\theta; a) = 0$.

Finally to derive $\gamma(\theta; a)$, note that in symmetric equilibrium $q^N = q^D \equiv q = \frac{\theta}{a}(1 - e^{-a/\theta})$. A fraction $1 - (1-q)^a$ of all workers get a job. A fraction $1 - (1-q)^a - a(1-q)^{a-1}$ of all workers receive multiple offers. Thus, a fraction

$$\frac{1 - (1-q)^a - a(1-q)^{a-1}}{1 - (1-q)^a}$$

of the workers who find a job receive the competitive wage. Substituting for q gives equation (3). QED

C   Shortlisting

C.1   Derivation of the matching probability

We first derive $m(\theta)$ for a worker (call her A). Let q_1 be the probability that an application leads to a first-round offer. Let q_2 be the probability that an application would lead to a second round offer given it does not generate a first-round offer. Recall that we are assuming that workers make two applications. We then have

$$m(\theta) = 1 - (1-q_1)^2 + (1-q_1)^2(1-(1-q_2)^2) = 1 - (1-q_1)^2(1-q_2)^2. \quad (22)$$

The probability that A gets an offer in the first round is $1 - (1-q_1)^2$. The probability that she gets an offer in the second round is the probability that

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she fails to get a first-round offer, $(1 - q_1)^2$, times the probability of getting a second-round offer conditional on not having received an offer in the first round, $1 - (1 - q_2)^2$.

The calculation of q_1 is as before. Suppose A applies to vacancy V. Let Y be the number of other applications to V. Y is Poisson $(2/\theta)$. Then

$$q_1 = \sum_{y=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{y+1} P[Y = y] = \frac{\theta}{2}(1 - e^{-2/\theta}). \qquad (23)$$

Now suppose A applies to V and doesn't get a first-round offer (neither from V nor from the other vacancy to which she applies). The probability that A gets a second-round offer from V is q_2.

To compute q_2 some notation is useful. Let $C_1 = 1$ if A gets a 1st-round offer from V; 0 otherwise. Thus, $P[C_1 = 1] = q_1$. Similarly, let $C_2 = 1$ if A gets a second-round offer from V; 0 otherwise. Assuming that A did not get a first-round offer from the other vacancy to which she applied (in which case, the following computations are not relevant), we have

$$q_2 = P[C_2 = 1 | C_1 = 0].$$

Suppose $C_1 = 0$. Then V made a first-round offer to some other worker – call him B. In order for A to get a second-round offer from V, it must be that V failed to hire B in the first round. This can occur in two ways. First, B gets a second first-round offer, and the vacancy (call it V^*) making this other offer has no second-round candidate. This occurs with probability $e^{-2/\theta}$.[9] Second, B gets a second first-round offer, the vacancy making the offer has a second-round candidate, and B chooses the other vacancy. This occurs with probability

$$q_1 \frac{1 - \frac{e^{-2/\theta}}{q_1}}{2} = (q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})/2.$$

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[9]B gets the other first-round offer with probability q_1. Let $C_1 = 1$ if B gets a first-round offer from V^*, and let Y be the number of workers in addition to B who applied to V^*. Then V^* has no second candidate on its short list if $Y = 0$. Using Bayes Law,

$$P[Y = 0 | C_1 = 1] = \frac{P[C_1 = 1 | Y = 0] P[Y = 0]}{P[C_1 = 1]} = \frac{e^{-2/\theta}}{q_1}.$$

We thus have

$$P[C_1 = 1 \text{ and } Y = 0] = q_1 \frac{e^{-2/\theta}}{q_1} = e^{-2/\theta}.$$

The probability that V fails to hire in the first round is thus

$$e^{-2/\theta} + \frac{q_1 - e^{-2/\theta}}{2} = \frac{q_1 + e^{-2/\theta}}{2}.$$

Next, given that A is not first on V's short list, what is the probability that she is second? If y applicants other than A applied to V, and if one of those applicants was chosen to be first on V's short list, then there are $y - 1$ remaining applicants with whom A is competing for second place. Given y, the probability that A is second is thus $1/y$. To find the probability that A is second on V's short list, given that she is not first, we need to sum this conditional probability against the probability mass function for Y. We know that unconditionally, Y is Poisson $(2/\theta)$. We also know that V did not make an offer to A in the first round, i.e., $C_1 = 0$. So,

$$
\begin{aligned}
P[Y &= y|C_1 = 0] = \frac{P[C_1 = 0|Y = y]P[Y = y]}{P[C_1 = 0]} \\
&= \frac{\frac{y}{y+1}e^{-2/\theta}(\frac{2}{\theta})^y/y!}{1 - q_1} = \frac{ye^{-2/\theta}(\frac{2}{\theta})^y/(y+1)!}{1 - q_1} \quad \text{for } y = 0, 1, ...
\end{aligned}
$$

The probability that A is second on V's short list given that she was not first is then

$$\sum_{y=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{y}P[Y = y|C_1 = 0] = \sum_{y=1}^{\infty} \frac{e^{-2/\theta}(\frac{2}{\theta})^y/(y+1)!}{1 - q_1} = \frac{q_1 - e^{-2/\theta}}{1 - q_1}$$

and

$$q_2 = P[C_2 = 1|C_1 = 0] = \left(\frac{q_1 + e^{-2/\theta}}{2}\right)\left(\frac{q_1 - e^{-2/\theta}}{1 - q_1}\right). \tag{24}$$

Substitution then gives $m(\theta)$.

C.2   Expected Profit for a Vacancy

The efficient level of labor market tightness is determined as before by $c_v = m_\theta(\theta^*)$. That is, from the social planner's perspective, the only effect of allowing for shortlisting is to change the form of $m(\theta)$. We want to compare the efficient level of labor market tightness, θ^*, with the corresponding free-entry equilibrium value, θ^{**}. Assuming for now the existence of a symmetric equilibrium posted wage, the free-entry value of labor market tightness is determined by $c_v = \pi(w(\theta^{**}))$, where $w(\theta)$ is the symmetric equilibrium

posted wage given labor market tightness θ and $\pi(w(\theta))$ is expected profit net of the cost of vacancy creation for a vacancy that posts the equilibrium wage in a market with labor market tightness θ. In this subsection, we derive the general form of $\pi(\cdot)$.

Suppose all vacancies post w. The number of applications that any one vacancy receives is Poisson with parameter $2/\theta$. Vacancy V gets no applications (and thus no profit) with probability $e^{-2/\theta}$; it receives one application (and thus has only one applicant on its short list) with probability $\frac{2}{\theta}e^{-2/\theta}$; it receives two or more applications (and thus has two applicants on its short list) with probability $1 - e^{-2/\theta} - \frac{2}{\theta}e^{-2/\theta}$.

Suppose V has only one applicant (again, call her A) on its short list. With probability $1 - q_1$, A does not receive a competing offer in the first round, in which case V's profit is $1 - w$.[10] With probability q_1, A has a competing first-round offer. The other vacancy (V^*) has only this applicant, i.e., no one in second place on its short list, with probability $\frac{e^{-2/\theta}}{q_1}$.[11] In this case, the two vacancies drive the wage to 1 (and profit to zero) through Bertrand competition. With probability $1 - \frac{e^{-2/\theta}}{q_1}$, however, V^* has a second-round choice. In this case, Bertrand competition pushes the wage to s, the maximum wage V^* is willing to pay rather than dropping out to proceed to the second round, and V realizes a profit of $1 - s$.

This highest wage, s, that a vacancy with two applicants on its short list is willing to pay in the first round is determined by

$$1 - s = (1 - q_1)(1 - q_2)(1 - w). \tag{25}$$

The right-hand side can be understood as follows. With probability $1 - q_1$, a vacancy's second-place candidate is still available after the first round. Conditional on still being available, she fails to get a competing second-round offer with probability $1 - q_2$. The vacancy then realizes a profit of $1 - w$.

Summarizing, a vacancy has only one applicant on its short list with probability $\frac{2}{\theta}e^{-2/\theta}$. In this case, the vacancy's expected profit is

$$(1 - q_1)(1 - w) + (q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})(1 - s).$$

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[10] A accepts any $w \geq 0$. Were she instead to hold out in hopes of receiving a second-round offer from the other vacancy to which she applied, she could not do better than w. The reason is that there cannot be competition for A's services in the second round. Of course, if workers each make $a > 2$ applications, then there is a nontrivial first-round reservation wage problem for workers. It would be straightforward, but algebraically tedious, to add this feature.

[11] The derivation is given in footnote 9.

Now suppose V receives two or more applications. V's first-round choice (again, call her A) fails to get a competing first-round offer with probability $1 - q_1$, in which case V's profit is $1 - w$. With probability q_1, A does receive a competing first-round offer. The other vacancy competing for A (call it V*) has no second-round candidate with probability $\frac{e^{-2/\theta}}{q_1}$. In this case, V is outbid and proceeds to the second round. V's second-round choice (call him B) is still available with probability $1 - q_1$. Given that he is still available, B receives no competing second round offer with probability $1 - q_2$, and V's profit is $1 - w$. If B does receive a competing second-round offer, then Bertrand competition drives profit to zero. Alternatively, with probability $1 - \frac{e^{-2/\theta}}{q_1}$, V* does have a second applicant on its short list. Both V and V* are willing to bid the wage up to s. V then gets A with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ and realizes profit $1 - s$. With probability $\frac{1}{2}$, V fails to get A and proceeds to its second-round choice (again, call him B). As before, B is still available in the second round with probability $1 - q_1$; given that he is still available, B receives no competing second round offer with probability $1 - q_2$; and V gets profit $1 - w$.

Summarizing, a vacancy has two applicants on its short list with probability $1 - e^{-2/\theta} - \frac{2}{\theta}e^{-2/\theta}$. In this case, the vacancy's expected profit is

$$(1 - q_1)(1 - w) + q_1(1 - s).$$

We can now compute the expected profit for a vacancy that posts the same wage w as all other vacancies:

$$\pi(w) = \left(1 - e^{-2/\theta}\right)\left[(1 - q_1)(1 - w) + q_1(1 - s)\right] - \tfrac{2}{\theta}e^{-4/\theta}(1 - s) \quad (26)$$

C.3 Derivation of the Equilibrium Wage

C.3.1 Deviations

Suppose all vacancies, save possibly one, post w. Suppose a deviant (D) posts w'. A deviation to w' changes the worker application intensity to D from $2/\theta$ to ξ. The indifference condition giving $\xi = \xi(w'; w)$ is given below.

Consider the deviant posting w' and receiving applications at rate ξ. D receives exactly one application with probability $\xi e^{-\xi}$. With probability $1 - q_1$, D's applicant (again, call her A) does not have a competing first-round offer. In this case, D's profit is $1 - w'$. With probability q_1, A has a competing first-round offer. With probability $\frac{e^{-2/\theta}}{q_1}$, the competing vacancy (V*) has no second-round candidate, and Bertrand competition drives profit

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to zero. With probability $1 - \frac{e^{-2/\theta}}{q_1}$, V* has a second-round candidate, and D realizes profit $1 - s$. Summarizing, D receives expected profit

$$(1 - q_1)(1 - w') + (q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})(1 - s)$$

with probability $\xi e^{-\xi}$.

D receives 2 or more applications with probability $1 - e^{-\xi} - \xi e^{-\xi}$. D's first-round choice fails to get a competing first-round offer with probability $1 - q_1$, in which case D's profit is again $1 - w'$. With probability q_1, A has another first-round offer. V* has no second-round candidate with probability $\frac{e^{-2/\theta}}{q_1}$, and D is thus outbid and proceeds to the second round. D's second-round choice (B) is still available with probability $1 - q_1$. Given that B is still available, he does not receive a competing second-round offer with probability $1 - q_2$, and D gets profit $1 - w'$. If B does receive a second-round offer, Bertrand competition drives profit to zero.

Now suppose V* has a second-round choice. This occurs with probability $1 - \frac{e^{-2/\theta}}{q_1}$. In this case, D wins the race for A ($s' > s$) if $w' > w$. D's profit is then $1 - s$. If $w' < w$, D loses the race and turns to its second-round candidate (B). B is still available with probability $1 - q_1$; given that he is still available, he receives no competing second-round offer with probability $1 - q_2$; and D gets profit $1 - w'$.

Note that with 2 or more applicants, D's expected profit (as a function of w') depends on whether w' is greater or less than w. Specifically, if $w' > w$, D receives expected profit

$$(1 - q_1)(1 - w') + e^{-2/\theta}(1 - s') + (q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})(1 - s),$$

while if $w' < w$, D receives expected profit

$$(1 - q_1)(1 - w') + q_1(1 - s').$$

Summarizing, if $w' > w$,

$$\pi^+(w'; w) = \left(1 - e^{-\xi}\right)[(1-q_1)(1-w')+(q_1-e^{-2/\theta})(1-s)]+\left(1 - e^{-\xi} - \xi e^{-\xi}\right)e^{-2/\theta}(1-s').$$

If $w' < w$,

$$\pi^-(w'; w) = \left(1 - e^{-\xi}\right)(1-q_1)(1-w')+\xi e^{-\xi}(q_1-e^{-2/\theta})(1-s)+\left(1 - e^{-\xi} - \xi e^{-\xi}\right)q_1(1-s').$$

To derive $\xi = \xi(w'; w)$, we now turn to the indifference condition.

C.3.2 Indifference Condition

An applicant (A) should be indifferent between sending both applications to nondeviant (N) vacancies versus sending one application to N and the other to D when the arrival intensity is $2/\theta$ at any N vacancy and ξ at D. Consider an application to an N vacancy. A is first on N's short list with probability q_1. She is second on N's short list with probability $q_1 - e^{-2/\theta}$. (A is not first on N's short list with probability $1 - q_1$. Conditional on not being first, she is second with probability $\frac{q_1 - e^{-2/\theta}}{1 - q_1}$.) Finally, she is out of the running at N with probability $1 - 2q_1 + e^{-2/\theta}$. Similarly, if A applies to D, she is first on D's short list with probability $q_1^D = \frac{1}{\xi}(1 - e^{-\xi})$, she is second on D's short list with probability $q_1^D - e^{-\xi}$, and she is out of the running at D with probability $1 - 2q_1^D + e^{-\xi}$.

Suppose A sends one application to D and one to N. There are 9 possibilities to consider.

1. A is first on both short lists. This occurs with probability $q_1^D q_1$. If neither D nor N has a second candidate, A's payoff is 1. Given that A is first on both short lists, this occurs with probability $\frac{e^{-\xi} e^{-2/\theta}}{q_1^D q_1}$. If D has a second candidate but N does not, A's payoff is s'. This occurs with probability $\frac{(q_1^D - e^{-\xi}) e^{-2/\theta}}{q_1^D q_1}$. If N has a second candidate, but D does not, A's payoff is s. This occurs with probability $\frac{e^{-\xi}(q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})}{q_1^D q_1}$. If both vacancies have second candidates, A's payoff is s if $w' > w$ and s' if $w > w'$. The probability that both D and N have second candidates is $\frac{(q_1^D - e^{-\xi})(q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})}{q_1^D q_1}$.

2. A is first on D's short list and second on N's. This occurs with probability $q_1^D(q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})$, and A's payoff is w'.[12]

3. A is first on D's short list and out of the running at N. This occurs with probability $q_1^D(1 - 2q_1 + e^{-2/\theta})$, and A's payoff is again w'.

4. A is second on D's short list and first on N's. This occurs with probability $(q_1^D - e^{-\xi})q_1$, and A's payoff is w.

5. A is second on both short lists. This occurs with probability $(q_1^D - e^{-\xi})(q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})$.

---

[12] We evaluate the derivative of $\xi(w'; w)$ at $w' = w$, so we need not consider the case in which w' is "considerably less than" w. Were that the case, A might prefer to reject w' in hopes of getting a second round offer from N.

a. $w' > w$. The probability that A gets a second-round offer from D is $e^{-2/\theta}$. This follows because D hires its first-round candidate if that person has no other offer (probability $1-q_1$) or if that person has another offer and the competing vacancy has a second applicant (probability $q_1 - e^{-2/\theta}$). Thus D fails to hire its first-round candidate and makes a second-round offer to A with probability $1-(1-q_1+q_1-e^{-2/\theta}) = e^{-2/\theta}$. The probability that A gets a second-round offer from N is $\frac{q_1+e^{-2/\theta}}{2}$. N hires its first-round candidate if that person does not have another first-round offer (probability $1 - q_1$) or if that person has another offer, the other vacancy has a second-round candidate, and the applicant chooses N (probability $\dfrac{1}{2} \times (q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})$). There are now 4 possibilities. First, A receives a second-round offer neither from D nor from N. In this case, A's payoff is zero. Second, A receives a second-round offer from D but not from N. This occurs with probability $e^{-2/\theta}(1 - \frac{q_1+e^{-2/\theta}}{2})$, and A receives payoff w'. Third, A receives a second-round offer from N but not from D. This occurs with probability $\frac{q_1+e^{-2/\theta}}{2}(1 - e^{-2/\theta})$, and A receives payoff w. Finally, A receives second-round offers from both D and N. This occurs with probability $\frac{e^{-2/\theta}(q_1+e^{-2/\theta})}{2}$, and A receives payoff 1. Thus, when $w' > w$, A's expected payoff in the event that she is second on both short lists is
$$e^{-2/\theta}(1 - \tfrac{q_1+e^{-2/\theta}}{2})w' + \tfrac{q_1+e^{-2/\theta}}{2}(1 - e^{-2/\theta})w + \tfrac{e^{-2/\theta}(q_1+e^{-2/\theta})}{2}.$$

b. $w' < w$. In this case, the probability that D makes a second-round offer is q_1 since the only way that D can succeed in the first round is if its candidate does not have another offer (probability $1 - q_1$). The probability that A gets a second-round offer from N is again $\frac{q_1+e^{-2/\theta}}{2}$. With probability $q_1(1 - \frac{q_1+e^{-2/\theta}}{2})$, A gets a second-round offer from D but not from N. In this case, A's payoff is w'. With probability $(1 - q_1)\frac{q_1+e^{-2/\theta}}{2}$, D hires in the first round, but N does not. In this case, A's payoff is w. Finally, with probability $\frac{q_1(q_1+e^{-2/\theta})}{2}$, both D and N make second-round offers to A and A's payoff is 1. Summarizing, if $w' < w$, A's expected payoff is $q_1(1 - \frac{q_1+e^{-2/\theta}}{2})w' + (1 - q_1)\frac{q_1+e^{-2/\theta}}{2}w + \frac{q_1(q_1+e^{-2/\theta})}{2}$.

6. A is second on D's short list and out of the running at N. This occurs with probability $(q_1^D - e^{-\xi})(1 - 2q_1 + e^{-2/\theta})$. If $w' > w$, D hires in the first round with probability $1 - e^{-2/\theta}$ and A's payoff is zero. With probability $e^{-2/\theta}$, A's payoff is w'. If $w' < w$, D fails to hire in the first

round with probability q_1. In this case, A's payoff is w'.

7. A is out of the running at D and first on N's short list. This occurs with probability $(1 - 2q_1^D + e^{-\xi})q_1$. In this case, A's payoff is w.

8. A is out of the running at D and second on N's short list. This occurs with probability $(1 - 2q_1^D + e^{-\xi})(q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})$. N hires its first-round candidate with probability $1 - \frac{(q_1 + e^{-2/\theta})}{2}$ and A's payoff is zero. Alternatively, N fails to hire on the first round with probability $\frac{(q_1 + e^{-2/\theta})}{2}$, in which case A's payoff is w.

9. Finally, A is out of the running at both D and N. This occurs with probability $(1 - 2q_1^D + e^{-\xi})(1 - 2q_1 + e^{-2/\theta})$, and in this case, A's payoff is zero.

The discussion above is summarized in the following table, which presents the expected payoff for a worker who sends one application to D and one to N for each of the nine possible outcomes associated with that application strategy.

D	N	Probability	Expected Payoff ($w' > w$)
1	1	$q_1^D q_1$	$\frac{e^{-\xi}e^{-2/\theta}}{q_1^D q_1} + \frac{(q_1^D - e^{-\xi})e^{-2/\theta}}{q_1^D q_1} s' + \frac{q_1^D(q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})}{q_1^D q_1} s$
1	2	$q_1^D(q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})$	w'
1	x	$q_1^D(1 - 2q_1 + e^{-2/\theta})$	w'
2	1	$(q_1^D - e^{-\xi})q_1$	w
2	2	$(q_1^D - e^{-\xi})(q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})$	$\frac{e^{-2/\theta}(2 - q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})w'}{2} + \frac{(q_1 + e^{-2/\theta})(1 - e^{-2/\theta})w}{2} + \frac{e^{-2/\theta}(q_1 + e^{-2/\theta})}{2}$
2	x	$(q_1^D - e^{-\xi})(1 - 2q_1 + e^{-2/\theta})$	$w'e^{-2/\theta}$
x	1	$(1 - 2q_1^D + e^{-\xi})q_1$	w
x	2	$(1 - 2q_1^D + e^{-\xi})(q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})$	$\frac{(q_1 + e^{-2/\theta})}{2}w$
x	x	$(1 - 2q_1^D + e^{-\xi})(1 - 2q_1 + e^{-2/\theta})$	0

D	N	Probability	Expected Payoff ($w' < w$)
1	1	$q_1^D q_1$	$\frac{e^{-\xi}e^{-2/\theta}}{q_1^D q_1} + \frac{(q_1^D - e^{-\xi})q_1}{q_1^D q_1}s' + \frac{e^{-\xi}(q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})}{q_1^D q_1}s$
1	2	$q_1^D(q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})$	w'
1	x	$q_1^D(1 - 2q_1 + e^{-2/\theta})$	w'
2	1	$(q_1^D - e^{-\xi})q_1$	w
2	2	$(q_1^D - e^{-\xi})(q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})$	$q_1(1 - \frac{q_1 + e^{-2/\theta}}{2})w' + (1 - q_1)\frac{q_1 + e^{-2/\theta}}{2}w + \frac{q_1(q_1 + e^{-2/\theta})}{2}$
2	x	$(q_1^D - e^{-\xi})(1 - 2q_1 + e^{-2/\theta})$	$q_1 w'$
x	1	$(1 - 2q_1^D + e^{-\xi})q_1$	w
x	2	$(1 - 2q_1^D + e^{-\xi})(q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})$	$\frac{(q_1 + e^{-2/\theta})}{2}w$
x	x	$(1 - 2q_1^D + e^{-\xi})(1 - 2q_1 + e^{-2/\theta})$	0

We can now compute the value of sending one application to D and one to N, i.e., a (D,N) strategy, for any w', w pair. The table indicates that the form of this value differs according to whether $w' > w$ or vice versa.

Indifference between sending one application to D and one to N versus sending both applications to N vacancies defines $\xi(w', w)$. We want to find how the application intensity to D varies with small deviations from w, first for the case in which the deviant's wage is above the wage offered by the N vacancies and then for the case of $w' < w$. That is, we want to find $\frac{\partial \xi^+(w', w)}{\partial w'}|_{w'=w}$ and $\frac{\partial \xi^-(w', w)}{\partial w'}|_{w'=w}$, the right-hand and left-hand side derivatives of the application intensity, evaluated at $w' = w$.

We begin with $\frac{\partial \xi^+(w', w)}{\partial w'}|_{w'=w}$. The expected payoff from a (D,N) strategy when $w' > w$ is found using the figures in the top panel of the table and can be written as:

$$e^{-\xi}e^{-2/\theta} + (q_1^D - e^{-\xi})e^{-2/\theta}s' + q_1^D(q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})s + (q_1^D - e^{-\xi})(1 - q_1)e^{-2/\theta}q_2$$
$$+w'\{q_1^D(1 - q_1)(1 + e^{-2/\theta}(1 - q_2)) - e^{-\xi}e^{-2/\theta}(1 - q_1)(1 - q_2)\}$$
$$+w\{q_1(1 - q_1^D) + (1 - q_1^D - e^{-2/\theta}(q_1^D - e^{-\xi}))(1 - q_1)q_2\}$$

The application intensity ξ is found by equating the individual's expected payoff from a (D,N) strategy to the expected payoff from applying to two N vacancies. We find $\frac{\partial \xi^+(w', w)}{\partial w'}$ by taking the derivatives of both sides with respect to w'. Since the expected payoff from applying to two N vacancies does not depend on w', this entails equating the derivative of the expected payoff from a (D,N) strategy with respect to w' to zero and solving for $\frac{\partial \xi^+(w', w)}{\partial w'}$.

This gives: $\frac{\partial \xi^+(w',w)}{\partial w'}|_{w'=w} =$

$$\frac{(1-q_1)[q_1+2e^{-2/\theta}(1-q_2)(q_1-e^{-2/\theta})]}{e^{-4/\theta}(1-q_1)[(1-2q_2)-w(2-3q_2)]-\frac{\partial q_1^D}{\partial \xi}[q_1(q_2+q_1(1-q_2))+(1-q_1)q_2e^{-2/\theta}+w((1-q_1)e^{-2/\theta}-q_1+(1-q_1^2)(1-q_2))]}$$

Next, we find $\frac{\partial \xi^-(w',w)}{\partial w'}|_{w'=w}$. The procedure is the same, but we must take into account the differences in the expected payoff a (D,N) strategy when $w > w'$. The expected payoff is now found using the figures in the bottom panel of the table and can be written as:

$$e^{-\xi}e^{-2/\theta} + e^{-\xi}(q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})s + q_1(q_1^D - e^{-\xi})s' + q_1(q_1^D - e^{-\xi})(1-q_1)q_2]$$
$$+w'(1-q_1)[q_1^D + q_1(q_1^D - e^{-\xi})(1-q_2)]$$
$$+w[q_1(1-q_1^D) + q_2(1-q_1)(1-q_1^D - q_1(q_1^D - e^{-\xi}))].$$

Setting the derivative of this with respect to w' equal to zero allows us to find
$\frac{\partial \xi^-(w',w)}{\partial w'}|_{w'=w} =$

$$\frac{(1-q_1)q_1(1+2(q_1-e^{-2/\theta})(1-q_2))}{e^{-2/\theta}(1-q_1)(e^{-2/\theta}-q_2(q_1+e^{-2/\theta}))-w((q_1+e^{-2/\theta})(1-q_2)-q_1q_2))-\frac{\partial q_1^D}{\partial \xi}(q_1^2+2q_1q_2(1-q_1)+w((3q_1-2)q_1q_2-2q_1^2+1-q_2))}$$

C.3.3 Equilibrium with Shortlisting

We seek a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium posted wage. That is, we seek a posted wage w with the property that if all other vacancies post w, an individual vacancy neither has an incentive to post a higher wage nor a lower wage. If all vacancies post w, then there will be three wages paid in equilibrium, namely, w, s, and 1.

Recall that for $w' > w$,

$$\pi^+(w';w) = \left(1 - e^{-\xi}\right)[(1-q_1)(1-w')+(q_1-e^{-2/\theta})(1-s)]+\left(1 - e^{-\xi} - \xi e^{-\xi}\right)e^{-2/\theta}(1-s').$$

The right-hand side derivative of profit is

$$\frac{\partial \pi^+(w',w)}{\partial w'} = \left(e^{-\xi}\left((1-q_1)(1-w')+(q_1-e^{-2/\theta})(1-s)\right)+\xi e^{-\xi}e^{-2/\theta}(1-s')\right)\frac{\partial \xi^+(w';w)}{\partial w'}$$
$$-\left(1-e^{-\xi}\right)(1-q_1)-\left(1-e^{-\xi}-\xi e^{-\xi}\right)e^{-2/\theta}(1-q_1)(1-q_2).$$

Evaluating at $w' = w$ gives

$$\frac{\partial \pi^+(w',w)}{\partial w'} = \left(e^{-2/\theta}\left((1-q_1)(1-w)+(q_1-e^{-2/\theta})(1-s)\right)+\frac{2}{\theta}e^{-4/\theta}(1-s)\right)\frac{\partial \xi^+(w;w)}{\partial w'}$$
$$-\left(1-e^{-2/\theta}\right)(1-q_1)-\left(1-e^{-2/\theta}-\frac{2}{\theta}e^{-2/\theta}\right)e^{-2/\theta}(1-q_1)(1-q_2).$$

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We find the left-hand side derivative in a similar fashion. For $w' < w$,

$$\pi^-(w'; w) = \left(1 - e^{-\xi}\right)(1-q_1)(1-w') + \xi e^{-\xi}(q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})(1-s) + \left(1 - e^{-\xi} - \xi e^{-\xi}\right) q_1(1-s'),$$

so

$$\frac{\partial \pi^-(w',w)}{\partial w'} = \left(\begin{array}{c} e^{-\xi}\left((1-q_1)(1-w') + q_1(1-s) + (q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})(1-s) - q_1(1-s')\right) \\ -\xi e^{-\xi}\left((q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})(1-s) - q_1(1-s')\right) \end{array} \right) \frac{\partial \xi^-(w';w)}{\partial w'}$$

$$- \left(1 - e^{-\xi}\right)\left((1-q_1) + q_1(1-q_1)(1-q_2)\right) + \xi e^{-\xi} q_1(1-q_1)(1-q_2).$$

Evaluating at $w' = w$ gives

$$\frac{\partial \pi^-(w,w)}{\partial w'} = \left(e^{-2/\theta}\left((1-q_1)(1-w) + (q_1 - e^{-2/\theta})(1-s)\right) + \frac{2}{\theta}e^{-4/\theta}(1-s)\right) \frac{\partial \xi^-(w;w)}{\partial w'}$$

$$-(1 - e^{-2/\theta})(1-q_1) - q_1(1 - e^{-2/\theta} - \frac{2}{\theta}e^{-2/\theta})(1-q_1)(1-q_2).$$

Given θ, a posted wage w is a symmetric Nash equilibrium if $\frac{\partial \pi^+(w',w)}{\partial w'}|_{w'=w} \leq 0$ and $\frac{\partial \pi^-(w',w)}{\partial w'}|_{w'=w} \geq 0$.

We investigate the nature of equilibrium numerically. For θ below approximately 0.42, both derivatives are negative for all $w \in [0,1]$. Thus, for these values of θ, the unique pure-strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium is $w = 0$. For θ above this cutoff level, there exists a range of w such that both inequalities are satisfied. The range of equilibrium posted wages goes from about 0.01 to about 0.04 when $\theta = 0.5$. When $\theta = 2$, there is again a range of equilibrium posted wages, this time from about $w = 0.36$ to about $w = 0.71$. We have repeated this exercise for many values of θ, and the result is always qualitatively the same. The left-hand side derivative of profit with respect to the deviant wage, evaluated at the common wage, is always greater than the corresponding right-hand side derivative. Both derivatives are positive at $w = 0$ and both are negative (and equal to each other) at $w = 1$. Thus, given θ above the cutoff level, there is a continuum of equilibria, ranging from the wage at which $\frac{\partial \pi^+(w',w)}{\partial w'}|_{w'=w} = 0$ to the one at which $\frac{\partial \pi^-(w',w)}{\partial w'}|_{w'=w} = 0$.

C.4 Efficiency

The final step is to investigate the relationship between the equilibrium and efficient levels of θ. We show numerically that there is excessive vacancy creation in equilibrium; that is, $\theta^{**} > \theta^*$.

As in Section 3, θ^* is defined by $c_v = m_\theta(\theta^*)$, where the derivative $m_\theta(\theta)$ is now computed using equation (22) and the definitions of q_1 and q_2, which

Figure 1: $\pi(w(\theta))$ (upper curve) and $m_\theta(\theta)$ (lower curve)

are given in equations (23) and (24). The equilibrium value, θ^{**} is defined by the free-entry condition, $c_v = \pi(w(\theta^{**}))$, where $w(\theta)$ is an equilibrium wage given θ. As noted above, for θ below the cutoff level, $w(\theta) = 0$. For θ above the cutoff level, we focus on $w^-(\theta)$, that is, the wage that, given θ, solves $\frac{\partial \pi^-(w',w)}{\partial w'}|_{w'=w} = 0$. Given θ, this is the highest possible equilibrium wage.

In Figure 1, we plot $m_\theta(\theta)$ and $\pi(w^-(\theta))$ against θ. As in Section 3, $\pi(w^-(\theta)) > m_\theta(\theta)$ for each value of θ. Equivalently, $\theta^{**} > \theta^*$.

D Offer-Beating strategies

Proof of Proposition 5: Expected profit in a symmetric offer-beating equilibrium in which all vacancies post w is

$$\pi(w) = (1-w)(1-e^{-a/\theta})(\frac{1-(1-q)^a}{aq}), \qquad \text{where } q = \frac{\theta}{a}(1-e^{-a/\theta}).$$

The first term in $\pi(w)$ is profit for a vacancy that hires a worker at w, the second term is the probability the vacancy receives at least one application, and the third term is the probability that the vacancy hires conditional

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on receiving at least one application. The derivation of the third term is as follows. Consider an applicant selected by a particular vacancy. The number of other offers this applicant has is $bin(a - 1, q)$. Given that all vacancies follow the offer-beating strategy, i.e., do not engage in Bertrand competition, the probability that the vacancy in question succeeds in hiring the applicant is then

$$\sum_{x=0}^{a-1} \frac{1}{x+1} \binom{a-1}{x} q^x (1-q)^{a-1-x} = \frac{1 - (1-q)^a}{aq}.$$

We first consider the expected profit associated with an upward deviation, i.e., a posted wage of $w' > w$. We bound this expected profit, which we call $\pi^+(w'; w)$, by noting that an upward deviation can increase the hiring probability to at most 1 and that profit conditional on hiring the worker, $1 - w'$, is less than $1 - w$. The deviant makes a profit on its applicant only if all the other applications that the applicant makes are rejected. This occurs with probability $(1 - q)^{a-1}$. If the applicant has one or more other offers, the offer-beating strategy followed by the other vacancies calls for Bertrand competition since $w' > w$. We thus have

$$\pi^+(w'; w) < (1 - w) \cdot 1 \cdot (1 - q)^{a-1}.$$

The fact that no vacancy wants to make an upward deviation then follows from

$$(1-q)^{a-1} < (1 - e^{-a/\theta})(\frac{1 - (1-q)^a}{aq}) = \frac{1 - (1-q)^a}{\theta},$$

which holds for $a \geq 2$.

To verify this, rewrite the inequality as

$$y(a, q) = \frac{1 - (1-q)^a}{\theta} - (1-q)^{a-1} > 0.$$

Let $x = \frac{a}{\theta}$, so $q(x) = \frac{1 - e^{-x}}{x}$, and define $z(x, a) = ay(a, q)$ or

$$z(x, a) = x(1 - (1-q)^a) - a(1-q)^{a-1}.$$

We want to show that $z(x, a) > 0$ for all $x > 0$ and $a \geq 2$. This is done by induction. First,

$$z(x, 2) = \frac{1 - e^{-2x} - 2xe^{-2x}}{x}.$$

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Using L'Hôpital's Rule, $z(0,2) = 0$. Since the numerator of $z(x,2)$ is positive for all $x > 0$, it follows that $z(x,2) > 0$.

Now suppose $z(x,b) > 0$ for some integer $b > 0$. We have

$$
\begin{aligned}
z(x, b+1) &= x(1 - (1-q)^{b+1}) - (b+1)(1-q)^b \\
&= \left(x(1 - (1-q)^b) - b(1-q)^{b-1} \right)(1-q) + xq - (1-q)^b \\
&= z(x,b)(1-q) + xq - (1-q)^b.
\end{aligned}
$$

Thus,

$$
\begin{aligned}
z(x, b+1) &> xq - (1-q)^b = 1 - e^{-x} - (1-q)^b \\
&> 1 - e^{-x} - (1-q) = q - e^{-x} = \frac{1 - e^{-x} - xe^{-x}}{x}.
\end{aligned}
$$

It is straightforward to show (mimicking the argument that $z(x,2) > 0$ for all $x > 0$) that this final term is positive for all $x > 0$. Thus, $z(x,b) > 0 \Longrightarrow z(x, b+1) > 0$, and our proof by induction is complete.

Next, we consider the expected profit associated with a downward deviation, i.e., a posted wage of $w' < w$. To develop an expression for this expectation, $\pi^-(w'; w)$, we mimic the argument given in the proof of Proposition 2. Specifically, suppose workers apply to the deviant (D) with Poisson intensity ξ, where ξ is determined by an indifference condition to be given below. Then

$$
\pi^-(w'; w) = (1 - w')(1 - e^{-\xi})(1-q)^{a-1}.
$$

The second term is the probability that D gets at least one application, and the third term is the probability that D's chosen applicant has no other offers. Note that the final term is independent of w'.

The condition determining ξ is that each worker be indifferent between sending all a applications to nondeviants (N) versus $a - 1$ applications to N and one application to D. The expected payoff to the first strategy depends on neither w' nor ξ. The expected payoff to the second strategy is

$$
q^D(1-q)^{a-1}w' + (1 - (1-q)^{a-1})w,
$$

where

$$
q^D = \frac{1 - e^{-\xi}}{\xi}
$$

is the probability that a worker's application to D is accepted. The first term in this expected payoff is the probability that the worker gets the offer from D but no offers from N; in this case, the payoff is w'. The second term

is the probability of at least one offer from N; in this case the expected payoff is w. Equating these two expected payoffs defines ξ as a function of w'. Using

$$\frac{dq^D}{d\xi} = \frac{-\left(1 - e^{-\xi} - \xi e^{-\xi}\right)}{\xi^2},$$

it is straightforward to derive

$$\frac{d\xi}{dw'} = \frac{\xi(1 - e^{-\xi})}{w'\left(1 - e^{-\xi} - \xi e^{-\xi}\right)}.$$

Finally,

$$\frac{d\pi^-(w'; w)}{dw'} = \left[-(1 - e^{-\xi}) + (1 - w')e^{-\xi}\frac{d\xi}{dw'}\right](1 - q)^{a-1}.$$

This derivative is nonnegative, i.e., D has no incentive to post $w' < w$, so long as

$$w'\left(1 - e^{-\xi} - \xi e^{-\xi}\right) \leq (1 - w')\xi e^{-\xi}, \text{ i.e.,}$$

$$w' \leq \frac{\xi e^{-\xi}}{1 - e^{-\xi}}.$$

Evaluating at $w' = w$, D has no incentive to undercut the common wage w so long as $w \leq \frac{a}{\theta}\frac{e^{-a/\theta}}{1 - e^{-a/\theta}}$. QED.