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Publics in history

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Are the concepts of *civil society* and the *public sphere* "morally admirable but analytically useless," as some skeptics have argued?[1] In this article, we seek to prove such skeptics wrong. We outline a program for empirical research that proceeds from current work on those topics, much of it theoretical and normative; our argument unfolds in several steps. First, we aim systematically to inject the idea of an associational *civil society*, distinguished theoretically from economic and political institutions, into debates in sociological analysis. Civil society has, in our view, been rendered a residual category within currently influential trends in empirical research that focus instead upon one or both of two "master processes" in modern history: state formation and capitalist development. Our aim here is not to propose a new associational determinism to stand alongside and to compete with alternative political and economic determinisms, but rather, to carve out a new conceptual space for civil and associational relationships (and for the "publics" that emerge from within this space) and thereby to open up new ways of analyzing the *complex and reciprocal determinations* that obtain among associational life, the modern administrative-bureaucratic state, and the capitalist economy.[2]

Second, we explore in greater detail the different categories of *networks of publicity* that are rooted within civil society, networks that, more specifically, aim to extend the sway of (certain tendencies within) associational life over and across the major institutional sectors of modern society. In particular, we examine three distinct "interfaces" of publicity: one with the state ("political publics"), another with the economy ("economic publics"), and one that is reflexive: communicative networks that turn critical attention back upon and, ideally but not necessarily, aim further to democratize civil society itself ("civil publics"). (It is necessary to discuss civil society *before* turning to

publicity precisely because of the intricacies of the relationship between the two concepts.) Along the way, we consider the internal differentiation of publics along two dimensions, one reflecting power asymmetries and the other a continuum of time-space distanciation. In addition, we discuss the implications of our conceptualization of publics for the study of social movements.

Third, we lay out a series of propositions for converting this two-fold model of institutional spheres and extra-institutional ("interstitial") networks of publicity into a systematic program for empirical research. (This endeavor takes up the latter half of our article.) Drawing upon a lengthy tradition of inquiry into the multiple contexts of empirical social action,[3] we outline a new multidimensional approach to the study of publicity, one that analytically disaggregates publics into their three constituent dimensions – patterns of relationships at the levels of social structure, culture, and social psychology – as well as into different modalities of human agency. We cross-fertilize this approach with ideas and techniques from currently influential "relational" schools of research,[4] yielding four empirical strategies for the investigation of interactional patterns within and across publics:

- The social-structural context of action: social-network analysis.
- The cultural context of action: the new cultural sociology and cultural history; discourse analysis; and sociolinguistics.
- The social-psychological context of action: object-relations psychoanalysis; the new literature on trust and other recent work on collective emotional transactions and group dynamics.
- Human agency: new approaches to identifying agentic orientations and temporal frameworks.

We show how these modes of inquiry might fruitfully be applied to the empirical study of publics (both singular and plural) across a wide range of historical and institutional settings. We examine how public actors engage with their relational contexts often in widely varying ways (including within social movements), in the process helping both to reproduce and to transform the networks of publicity within which they find themselves, as well as (ultimately) the state, economy, and civil society itself.

The following substantive issues emerge for us as particularly salient: Can changes in economic or political organizations, or even both, conduce to democracy in the absence of a self-organized citizenry, or an

autonomous associational realm (civil society)? Is the existence of an autonomous civil society itself sufficient for democratization, or is it more a question of what kinds of bridging structures, mediating practices, and channels for communication will prevail there? How are institutions within the economy, state, or civil society affected (in democratic or anti-democratic ways) by emergent patterns of alliance or conflict among public networks? How do the social-structural, cultural, or social-psychological dimensions of such networks constrain and enable public actors' relations with one another and their capacities to influence institutional settings? And what role do the "micro-dynamics" of public actors' engagements with one another and with their situational contexts, and (in turn) the "macro-dynamics" of singular and multiple publics' interactions with large-scale social institutions, play in historical struggles over democratization?

We contend that the research program and conceptual synthesis we are presenting here are long overdue, since for many years now the upsurge of interest among political sociologists in ideas from the Habermasian tradition of critical theory (which helped to reintroduce the concepts of civil society and the public sphere into sociological inquiry) has, with but occasional exceptions, failed to leave much of a mark upon long-established currents in historical-comparative sociology and social-movement theory. In part, this is due to the institutional topographies that historical-comparative sociologists and social-movement researchers themselves have relied upon for guidance, but in part also to the inability of analysts interested in civil society and publicity to move beyond the normative level by incorporating research techniques and insights from empirical sociology. A renovated approach to the study of publics in history will thus not only fill an important void in the literature on civil society and the public sphere, but also introduce in a more compelling way the promising insights of this largely normative tradition into empirically oriented social and historical inquiry.[5]

Civil society and publicity

Since their resurgence in the 1960s, historical-comparative sociology and social-movement research have been largely oriented around two master concepts: the administrative-bureaucratic state and capitalist social relations. Throughout this period, classes and class conflict have been the guiding notions behind a good deal of Marxist scholarship, on such

fundamental issues as state-building, democratization, and capitalist development.[6] States as autonomous organizations with their own distinctive goals and interests – and the complex interactions of these states with economic actors and class structures – have also been critical concerns for the new "state-centered" sociology.[7] Charles Tilly's programmatic remarks in *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* aptly summarize the current state of the field: "In the case of Western countries over the last few hundred years, the program [of the new historical-comparative sociology and of social-movement research] begins by recognizing that the development of capitalism and the formation of powerful, connected national states dominated all other social processes and shaped all social structures.... It goes on by following the creation and destruction of different sorts of structures by capitalism and statemaking, then tracing the relationship of other processes ... to capitalism and statemaking."[8]

Not included in this research program – at least not *explicitly* – has been another important context for social interaction, located "in between" states and economic relations (of production as well as exchange), and organized around the principles of solidarity and (democratic) communication: the associational networks of civil society.

In what follows, we survey some highly influential approaches in historical-comparative sociology and social-movement research that, while pointing in the direction of civil society, still treat it as a residual category. Our aim is not to suggest that no useful research has been conducted into the dynamics of civil society in these various approaches (such is hardly the case), but rather, to demonstrate how these research agendas say a great deal about civil society, but without ever specifically employing that category. In later sections, we begin to argue for an alternative approach to institutions and extra-institutional processes. Such an approach deliberately reserves an important place for civil society (and for publics) alongside states and economies and thereby allows for greater precision in empirical research, as well as for enhanced normative leverage in the critique of undemocratic historical developments.

Dualistic perspectives and their limitations

One set of researchers approaches the analysis of non-state and non-economic networks of interaction from a point of view based in devel-

opments in the modern capitalist economy. By focusing upon class-based shared experiences and ways of life, neo-Marxist writers such as E. P. Thompson rewardingly shift attention away from "purely" economic developments in the direction of "working-class institutions – trade unions, friendly societies, educational and religious movements, political organizations, periodicals – [as well as] working-class intellectual traditions, working-class community patterns, and a working-class structure of feeling."[9] Going further, Ira Katznelson and Aristide Zolberg disaggregate the "unsorted kitbag of findings" left by Thompson's synthesis of structure and agency by suggesting a four-fold distinction among "levels of class" that allows "us to specify more precisely the points of connection *between* the structure of class relations at the macroeconomic level; the lived experience of class in the workplace and in the residence community; groups of people disposed to act in class ways; and class-based collective action."[10] Despite its positive recognition of the relevance of associational life, however, class formation in this model still encompasses *all* aspects of the social organization of life, thereby foreclosing the possibility of analyzing linkages (possibly of tension and contradiction) between economy-based relationships and *alternative* modalities of civil association. At a still deeper level, moreover, the Katznelson-Zolberg model – much like the class-based strategy of Thompson himself – continues to regard capitalist development as the primary determinant of all historical change.[11] Jean Cohen's verdict here is absolutely compelling: economy-centered researchers, while recognizing civil society (and publics) *empirically* as crucial elements in the historical equation, *analytically* submerge them within the unfolding class dynamics of the capitalist system by obscuring "the complex character of the social sphere" and reducing it to "the surface expression of relations of production, as class relations."[12]

From the opposite direction, meanwhile, state-centered researchers such as Theda Skocpol increasingly call attention to the "explanatory centrality [of states] ... as potent and autonomous organizational actors."[13] They raise the Weberian questions of state autonomy and state capacity vis-à-vis "the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society,"[14] as well as the Tocquevillean question of how state structures and activities help to shape the "societal" realm itself.[15] While highly useful for explaining certain kinds of historical problems, this state-centered analytical strategy (like its class-oriented counterpart) still often undertheorizes the potentially important distinction (within its broad, overarching category of "society") between *economic* class structures, on the one hand, and *associational* relations of social life,

on the other. It remains content to take the dichotomy of "state vs. society" as its theoretical point of departure, without disaggregating "society" itself into its distinct analytical components. In both paradigms, "societal" groups are seen as oriented more toward the accumulation of economic benefits (through markets) or special privileges and entitlements (through state policies) than *also* (or *potentially*) the expansion of free spaces for popular participation, voluntary association, and self-expression. "With respect to all that is nonstate," note two recent critics, "the new [statist] paradigm [continues] the reductionist tendency of Marxism and neo-Marxism by identifying class relations and interests as the key to ... collective action. Moreover, the legal, associational, cultural, and public spheres of society have no theoretical place in this analysis."[16]

Countering the blind-spots of both economy- and state-centered perspectives, a third set of researchers thematize precisely these "free spaces" of popular participation. Focusing upon the "vast middle ground of communal activity, between private life and large-scale institutions," Sara Evans and Harry Boyte identify free spaces "by their roots in community, the dense, rich networks of daily life; by their autonomy; and by their public or quasi-public character as participatory environments which nurture values associated with citizenship and a vision of the common good."[17] They draw upon civic republican concepts to emphasize the cultivation of "public vitality," "egalitarianism," and "democratic values" that outweigh pure class interest or the pursuit of state power. This notion of extra-institutional free spaces informs a great deal of recent social-movement research, on everything from the "sequestered social spaces" and "local movement centers" of the civil rights movement[18] to the women-only spaces of the feminist movement,[19] as well as various kinds of "spatial preserves" or "protected spaces" within Communist or Islamic fundamentalist states.[20]

Despite these positive and empirically fruitful moves beyond the limitations of the former perspectives, however, the free spaces approach itself remains trapped within some of the same dualistic presuppositions that privilege class relations or state organization. Free spaces putatively emerge out of a Habermasian lifeworld consisting of communal traditions, psychological orientations, and "direct, face-to-face, and egalitarian relationships."[21] Thus, they differ qualitatively and conceptually from the impersonal macro-institutions of state and economy. Such a theorization forecloses the possibility of exploring on an equal footing the linkages and tensions among the state, economy, and asso-

ciational modes of social organization, not to mention the complex dynamics that might obtain within and between different kinds of free spaces. Although they take a stab at differentiating the "richness and vitality of public life in free spaces" from the "static and thin quality of 'public' in reactionary protests," Evans and Boyte also undertheorize the actual structural make-up of associational life, in all its social-structural, cultural, and social-psychological dimensions. They offer little actual guidance for empirical research.[22]

Civil society and democracy

Following upon a line of theorists of structural differentiation from G. W. F. Hegel, Emile Durkheim, and Talcott Parsons to Jürgen Habermas, we contend that the state, economy, and civil society are realms of social life whose relative independence from one another constitutes one of the principal hallmarks of modernity. Many of the dynamics of contemporary society are captured in the relations among these empirically interpenetrating and yet analytically distinct institutional domains. In particular, we focus upon the institutional sector that, metaphorically speaking, lies "in between" the state and economy. Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato provide the best point of departure for such a venture; in their important treatise, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, they define civil society as a domain of interaction revolving around the following organizing key principles: "(1) *Plurality*: families, informal groups, and voluntary associations whose plurality and autonomy allow for a variety of forms of life; (2) *Publicity*: institutions of culture and communication; (3) *Privacy*: a domain of individual self-development and moral choice; and (4) *Legality*: structures of general laws and basic rights needed to demarcate plurality, privacy, and publicity from at least the state and, tendentially, the economy."[23] Each of these four dimensions varies independently of the others, and may be more or less democratic in different civil societies. (We foreground the ideas of plurality, privacy, and legality in the present section and have much more to say about publicity in the remainder of the article.) The growth and contraction of civil society occurs unevenly, at different rates in each of its constituent elements, and at sub-national as well as national levels. Hence the rich texture of variation we find in democratic societies, both past and present.

The above conceptualization of civil society is certainly controversial. In the lengthy history of the term (a history we shall not recapitulate

here, given its extensive treatment elsewhere[24]), the concept has variously been defined to include all of social life under conditions of liberal democracy (e.g., nineteenth-century England as a "civil society"); all of social life outside of the state, but including the capitalist economy; less expansively, the realm of sociability (or the "lifeworld"); and, finally, the "societal community," as it has been conceptualized by Parsons. Our own theory, much like that of Cohen and Arato, stakes out an intermediate position relative to these others; it sees civil society as an institutional complex narrower than society as a whole (and *excluding* the economy), but broader than "the social" or "lifeworld" taken alone: civil society entails "a particular angle of looking at this [life]world from the point of view of conscious association building and associational life."[25] We also define civil society more broadly than Parsons's societal community; in fact, for us, civil society encompasses *both* his "integrative" and "latent pattern maintenance" subsystems – domains that, together with the state and economy, constitute Parsons's celebrated four-fold model of the social system. These two categories include both "willed communities"[26] and voluntary associations, on the one hand, and families, schools, churches, and other cultural or socializing institutions, on the other.[27]

Important for the proper conceptualization of civil society is the notion of "fundamental rights," which serve to reaffirm and stabilize the relative autonomy gained by civil society vis-à-vis the state and economy, as well as to safeguard democratic advances achieved within civil society itself.[28] By fundamental rights, we mean rights that are "fully actionable, limitable only by another right, and universal in [their] application (i.e., not related to the characteristics of a particular group but pertaining to individuals as such)."[29] Such rights are "created and defended from below," often by social movements emerging from within civil society, and are distinct from entitlements, benefits, or privileges, including some (but not all) of T. H. Marshall's "social rights," whose "exercise does not depend primarily on the free activity of their beneficiaries."[30] While guaranteed by positive law and enforced by state power, they owe their origins and validity ultimately to civil society itself: "In the domain of rights, law secures and stabilizes what has been achieved by social actors in civil society."[31] By implication, then, the state, while not the ultimate source of fundamental rights, is not inherently their enemy, either; it is no more an evil to be kept at bay than civil society is itself necessarily a good. Often, in fact, "civil society, [if] left to itself, generates radically unequal power relationships, which only state power can challenge.... [T]he state is an indispensable agent

– even if the associational networks also, always, resist the organizing impulses of state bureaucrats."[32]

The concept of fundamental rights helps to situate the empirical analysis of civil society against a backdrop of normative perspectives on liberalism and citizenship, from within moral and political philosophy. Indeed, there is a deep elective affinity between the civil society concept and ideas of democracy that stand similarly halfway between normative and empirical points of view. Tilly provides one such "intermediate" conceptualization of democracy, as "broad and relatively equal citizenship with (a) binding consultation of citizens in regard to state personnel and policies as well as (b) protection of citizens from arbitrary state action."[33] This goes a long way toward clarifying both normative standards against which to judge prevailing arrangements within civil society (since, once again, such arrangements may fall well short of being fully democratic) *and* empirical points of reference for comparative institutional analysis. Tilly's perspective, however, still calls for modification in two major respects. First, it must be emphasized that democracy is desirable at *subnational* as well as national levels (and in non-state settings): in trade unions, clubs, and churches, no less than in the polity as a whole. And second, it must be stressed that social life ideally fosters in citizens heightened degrees of civic commitment, reflexivity, and critically informed judgment – key elements (neglected by Tilly) in any satisfactory view of democracy. (We shall touch upon this again below, in our discussions of social psychology and agency.[34]) Robert Dahl's classic distinction between "polyarchy" and "full democracy" fills a crucial void here in Tilly's still-too-empiricist, insufficiently normative formulation.[35] So, too, does Habermas's proceduralist view of democracy as a "multiplicity of communicative forms of rational political will-formation, [such as] fairly regulated bargaining processes and … various forms of argumentation, including pragmatic, ethical, and moral discourses." For Habermas, "'dialogical' and 'instrumental' politics … interpenetrate in the medium of deliberations of various kinds."[36]

As a unique bridging concept between the normative and the empirical, the notion of civil society plays several potentially important roles in historical-comparative sociology and social-movement analysis, roles that complement (and, in many respects, parallel) those of the state and capitalist economy. For one thing, it allows historical researchers to explore the variable autonomy of actors within civil society (past and present) vis-à-vis both the economy (and class structure) and

the state. Indeed, it becomes possible to elaborate histories of the legal and associational structures of civil society that extend as far back as the medieval period and that complement existing histories of state formation and capitalist development. Margaret Somers even suggests that in certain parts of rural England, "[t]he pastoral rural political geography" inherited from the twelfth to thirteenth centuries "was independent from elites, and pastoral associational life was autonomous and solidaristic."[37] The history of medieval cities is also relevant here, for it was precisely in these urbanized contexts – "islands within the feudal sea" – that "new ideas and practices could develop," as outgrowths of "an acephalous world in which liberties were both widespread and firmly codified in a legal system that privileged corporate rights."[38] Indeed, the development of an autonomous legal system (together with rights of privacy) constitutes yet another key element in the story of civil society's emergence.[39]

The civil society idea also makes possible the elaboration of crossnational comparisons even in the present day, comparisons focusing not only upon the self-defense of civil society vis-à-vis the state and capitalism, but also upon the internal democratization of civil society itself. Perhaps an analogue might even be developed here to Skocpol's influential research program on state structures, such that one could highlight the themes of civil autonomy and capacity, as well as how civil structures and activities help to (re-)shape the state and economy in turn. The lineaments of such an agenda can already be seen in recent writings on the voluntary sector "between states and markets" in Western Europe, the United States, Israel, and Japan,[40] as well as in more specialized literatures on civil society in many and varied regions of the world: Western Europe,[41] China,[42] the former Soviet bloc,[43] Latin America,[44] the Middle East,[45] and the United States.[46]

The concept of publicity

"Public sphere and civil society," as Craig Calhoun trenchantly observes, "are not precisely equivalent concepts."[47] The "public sphere," to which we now turn, connotes a somewhat narrower, more interstitial mode of association than does the master concept of civil society. Several ways of conceptualizing it are now prevalent, which we draw upon and recombine in new ways.

In the Habermasian perspective, first set forth in a classic work of 1962, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*,[48] publics signify rational-critical argumentation and collective will-formation regarding the paths along which the state, economy, and civil society itself are to develop. "By 'the public sphere' we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens…. Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion … about matters of general interest."[49] In Cohen and Arato's four-fold definition of civil society (quoted above), publicity entails the moment of open communication and popular participation through which alternative directions for social life are collectively reflected upon and adjudicated. Habermas's idea of the public sphere as the "operationalization of civil society's capacity for self-organization"[50] plays an important role in our own account below.

Another more recent conceptualization of publics distinguishes it even more sharply from the idea of civil society, while also providing a counterweight to Habermas's vision of a singular and universalistic public sphere. Nancy Fraser points out that actors communicate in different ways, depending upon their gender, race, class, ethnicity, and cultural backgrounds, practical differences evocative of Pierre Bourdieu's notion of "habitus."[51] The capacity for rational-critical debate, from this perspective, is a kind of "linguistic capital" not equally available to all participants in a discursive field; speakers "lacking the legitimate competence are *de facto* excluded from the social domains in which this competence is required, or are condemned to silence."[52] In contrast, more "performative" theories of publicity emphasize the corporeality of speaking, the symbolic dimensions of communication (including conflict, contradiction, and unpredictability), and a broader spectrum of types of communicative action: dramaturgical, artistic, expressive.[53] In relation to self-identified "black publics," for example, Paul Gilroy stresses "dramaturgy, enunciation, and gesture – the pre- and anti-discursive constituents of black metacommunication" – as major elements in the creation of black counterdiscourses.[54] Performative theories of publicity also highlight the "dispersal of the agon," or multiple locations or moments of public debate,[55] thereby providing links with historical analyses of working-class and non-literate publics[56] whose symbol-laden festivals, rowdy demonstrations, or irreverent word-play are largely overlooked in rational-critical understandings of public claim-making.

A third conceptualization of publicity further multiplies the locales of embodied public interaction, while additionally downplaying the normative overtones of Habermasian analyses. Harrison White defines publics as "interstitial social spaces which ease transitions between specific domains.... [A]ll publics are alike in decoupling actors from the pattern of specific relations and understandings embedded with[in] any particular domain and network."[57] As liminal moments of transition between more stable "network-domains," a kind of "anti-structure,"[58] publics provide mechanisms for switching in and out of more established modalities of sociocultural interaction. White distinguishes among several distinct types of publics;[59] whereas his constructs are not necessarily tied to any theory of democracy or rational-critical communication, they do reinforce the notion that publics are interstitial, widely varying in scope, size, and timing, and, above all, dynamic and interactional, rather than singular, reified entities. Publics not only permit collective direction-setting and problem-solving within civil society and other institutional spheres, but also serve crucial bridging functions between distinct networks configured over wide spatial as well as temporal spectrums.

Our own understanding of publics derives significant features from all three of these analytical perspectives. We define publics as open-ended flows of communication that enable socially distant interlocutors to bridge social-network positions, formulate collective orientations, and generate psychical "working alliances," in pursuit of influence over issues of common concern.[60] Publics are not simply "spaces" or "worlds" where politics is discussed, as the popular "public sphere" idea suggests, but rather, interstitial *networks* of individuals and groups acting as citizens. States, economies, and civil societies may all be relatively "bounded" and stable complexes of institutions, but publicity is emergent: "Societies have never been sufficiently institutionalized to prevent interstitial emergence.... [U]nderneath, human beings are [always] tunneling ahead to achieve their goals, forming new networks, extending old ones, and emerging most clearly into our view with rival configurations."[61] Accordingly, public interactions can be said to transpire within a wide range of locales, from the *agora* to the salon, street, or cyberspace. Rather than "a space in any topographical ... sense," a network of publicity can emerge within "a private dining room in which people gather to hear a "samizdat" or in which dissidents meet with foreigners.... [A] field or a forest can also become public space if it is the object and location of an action in concert, of a demonstration to stop the construction of a highway or a military air

base."[62] Of course, networks of publicity – precisely insofar as they are *networks* – can also be said to exhibit relatively stable features (in certain historical cases more than others). For this reason, one theorist has even dubbed them "extra-institutional institutions."[63] (We explore this in greater detail below.) But the key point here is that publics stand in a dynamic and dialogical relationship to the relatively more institutionalized domains of social life.

Importantly for our purposes, publics can even emerge within the interstices of the state or economy (as well as of civil society), as webs of critical discourse, public communication, and cooperative decision-making through which actors seek to extend the influence of certain tendencies already extant within civil society within and across more established institutions and institutional sectors. "[T]he mere existence (however inadequate) of parliaments and other forms of workshop self-management, codetermination, and collective bargaining," note Cohen and Arato, "indicates that publics can be constructed even within [state and economic] institutions.... These would and in some cases do constitute receptors for societal influence within the belly of the whale, as it were.... [T]he political issue is how to introduce public spaces into state and economic institutions ... by establishing continuity with a network of societal communication consisting of public spheres, associations, and movements."[64]

In our view, however, publics are not only relational and interstitial; they are also (frequently) multiple. Fraser makes clear that a "post-bourgeois" model of publicity requires a plurality of competing "subaltern counterpublics," which she defines as "parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs."[65] These multiple publics need not be deemed mere "enclaves" – "which is not to deny that they are often involuntarily enclav*ed*"[66] – because by their very nature they imply (at least in part) a publicist orientation. "[T]o interact discursively as a member of [a] public, subaltern or otherwise, is to aspire to disseminate one's discourse to ever widening arenas.... [H]owever limited a public may be in its empirical manifestation at any given time, its members understand themselves as part of a potentially wider public, ... "the public at large".... On the one hand, [subaltern counterpublics] function as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment; on the other hand, they also function as bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed toward wider publics. It is precisely in the dialectic between

these two functions that their emancipatory potential resides." (Notice the close correspondence here to Evans and Boyte's concept of "free spaces.") In light of this insight, the challenge becomes to formulate a new "critical political sociology of a form of public life in which multiple but unequal publics participate."[67]

Arrays of publicity

In subsequent sections, we lay out some of the key features of precisely such a political sociology. In the meantime, however, we offer three sets of distinctions that might help to provide an initial orientation toward the broad range of publics before us. The first of these regards power differences among public actors – and draws upon ideas from the performative model of publicity. Historical research often differentiates publics according to social class: the notion of "plebeian publics" even appears in the preface to Habermas's work on the bourgeois public sphere in Europe, although Habermas implies that the former flickered only briefly (and inconsequentially) during the French Revolution and British Chartism and largely dismisses them from his analysis. The work of Oskar Negt, Alexander Kluge, Gunther Lottes, and Geoff Eley has done much to bring questions of power asymmetries (and concepts such as plebeian or proletarian publicity) more squarely into discussions of publicity.[68] It has become the basis for a radical rethinking of the history of publicity in Europe and elsewhere, one that takes into account not only working-class participation in politics and class struggle, but also (increasingly), other anti-hegemonic formations such as "black counterpublics."[69] In what follows, we draw heavily upon this new approach, even as we aim to extend it well beyond its initial preoccupation with social-class differences. Specifically, we thematize power asymmetries that are grounded in the social-structural, cultural, as well as social-psychological contexts of action, which constrain and enable public action targeting variously the state, economy, as well as civil society itself (more on these distinctions below). We admit such asymmetries into the heart of our model because we recognize that "ideal speech situations"[70] simply do not exist empirically, and that in fact democratic progress will require working across multiple differences to achieve procedurally valid agreements.

The second continuum along which we distinguish publics – here drawing upon White's model of interstitial publics – is that of time-space distanciation.[71] We find it empirically useful to categorize publics in

terms of the "reach" they exercise across time and space, with some publics operating on a face-to-face basis, others extending access to unknown "outsiders" or "strangers," and others, the most far-reaching (and long-lasting) of all, using print or symbolic communication to disseminate information not only through spatially extensive networks, but also over long periods of time. (The related but distinct issues of timing and temporal turning-points are discussed below in the section on "agency.") Modern history has been deeply influenced by the rise of new technologies, sites, and media of communicative interaction. Historians have explored the emergence of a literary public sphere, the commodification of news, the development of "print cultures," the expansion of reading publics, and the impact of all of the above upon "imagined communities."[72] They have shown how literate publics based on technologies that increased time- and space-distanciation between speakers (authors), and audience (readers) were crucial to the development of both the modern individual self and the modern state and economy. (The rise of the new electronic media is merely the latest chapter in this ongoing story.[73]) This changing time-space distanciation of publicity has been a spur to intense contestation over the uneven spread of literacy, language rights for minority groups, access to different communication channels, and civil capacities for meeting, speaking, publishing, and broadcasting. How and where public communication occurs reveals a history of changing institutional settings that materially shaped the nature of publics and the power of human actors to utilize publicity.

Let us now introduce a third major categorial schema that intersects the two sets of distinctions delineated above. We contend that through networks of publicity the communicative impulses of (certain tendencies within) civil society have an impact upon the state and economy, as well as reflexively back upon civil society itself. Publics, in other words, are grounded within civil society (and often, although not always, concern themselves with its internal democratization), but can also mediate in two other directions, one aiming to influence political, and the other, economic structures.[74] (Cohen and Arato make this point about publics channelling influence between civil society, on the one hand, and the state and economy, on the other, through their concepts of "political" and "economic societies."[75]) Analytically distinguishing political from economic publics in this fashion enables us to show how certain publics ideally struggle to democratize state decision-making, while others are more concerned with justice and fairness in economic affairs. Only after drawing these distinctions are

we prepared to grasp a third kind of public, through which civil society has an impact communicatively back upon itself. Civil publics ideally seek a "communicative opening-up of the sacred core of traditions, norms, and authority [within civil society itself] to processes of questioning and the replacement of conventionally based normative consensus by one that is 'communicatively' grounded."[76]

Political, economic, and civil publics are open-ended flows of communication that enable socially distant interlocutors to bridge network positions, formulate collective orientations, and generate psychical working alliances in pursuit of influence over issues of common political, economic, or civil concern, respectively. Settings for political publicity include parliaments; political parties; political clubs or associations; public meetings and expressions of public opinion such as petitions; political publications; political claim-making through rallies, demonstrations, and marches; and more subversive actions such as civil disobedience, symbolic direct action, and non-violent actions (e.g., hunger strikes).[77] Economic publics encompass all matrices of communication that mediate between civil society and the economy, including unions; collective bargaining and grievance procedures; workers' associations and forms of cooperation; moral or social economies; and structures of influence over corporate governance, consumer rights, and standards for exchange, banking, or accounting.[78] Civil publics entail the communicative networks through which members of families, voluntary associations, and religious and educational organizations reflect back upon these institutions, make decisions regarding them, and self-consciously seek to shape them in concert with others, including through social movements, popular "cultures of resistance," and the development of new media or new genres of association and communication.[79] In each case, these publics are arrayed over interactional milieux stratified by power asymmetries based upon political dominance, class stratification, or status hierarchies, and enjoy varying degrees of spatial and temporal reach and complexity.

In the accompanying table, we situate the many varieties of publics that are described both by political theorists and empirical researchers through the organizing device of an array of publicity defined on one axis by asymmetries of power (ranging from subaltern to elite) and on the other by time-space distanciation (ranging from face-to-face to time-space distanced). This conceptual mapping allows us to depict a relational field within which a wide range of approaches to publics can be differentiated and compared, whether normative or descriptive, con-

Table 1. Array of political, economic, and civil publics

	Subaltern	Intermediary openings	Elite
Political			
Face-to-face	Subaltern counterpublics as "parallel discursive arenas"	Tocquevillean associational networks, networks of publicity within political parties, parliamentary publics	Political cliques, power elites, higher circles, policy networks
Locally mediated	Networks of subversive advocacy and resistance through direct action, civil disobedience, hunger strikes	Publicity through marches, demonstrations, rallies, symbolic mobilizations	Networks of publicity through official political rituals and parades
Time-space distanced	Publicity through subversive print: radical manifestoes, pamphlets, banned publications, *samizdat*	Publicity through political claim-making texts such as petitions and published resolutions	Publicity through transparency in government: official publications, open archives, printed proceedings
Economic			
Face-to-face	Worker cooperatives, worker self-management, workplace democracy, rotating savings or credit associations	Publicity through unions, collective bargaining, open general meetings	Economic cliques, old-boy networks, upper-class clubs, inner circles
Locally mediated	Publicity through strikes, consumer boycotts, symbolic protest actions within proletarian publics	Publicity concerned with shareholder/consumer influence, fair trade practices, cooperative banking	Business groups, industrial associations, corporate directorate interlocks, publics of shareholders
Time-space distanced	Publicity through labor-oriented publications and self-reflexive social economies	Publicity through public accounting, open disclosure, advertising standards, consumer information	Publicity through business/financial publications, trade agreements, communication within monopolies
Civil			
Face-to-face	Free spaces	Publicity through reflexive self-presentation, alternative lifestyles, bodily self-fashioning	Elite social clubs, literary salons, conference networks
Locally mediated	Publicity through popular cultures of resistance	Submerged networks and multi-organizational fields of social movements	Publicity through civic rituals and symbolic status classification of insiders/outsiders
Time-space distanced	Underground communication networks, subaltern reading publics, subversive artistic publics	Publicity through alternative press, independent publishers, publicly-owned media	Publicity in mainstream press, public institutions

temporary or historical. Within this framework, one can begin to think about how each zone of publicity relates to the others, either by ties, by the absence of ties, or by more indirect relational patternings. Not only is there a continuum of locations on the two dimensions shown, moreover, each public may also contain multiple orientations toward political, economic, or civil institutions; varied internal structures of social, symbolic, and psychical ties; and multiple repertoires of strategic, dramaturgic, or expressive modes of communication. As we turn to address challenges for future research, we shall be exploring the relational contexts that create this complex architecture of publicity, as well as the human agency that drives it.

Of course, in the complicated and messy interactions so often encountered in history, collective actors typically target multiple institutional domains simultaneously, or else enter into coalitions with other actors whose goals are quite distinct from their own. Thus, forms of collective action within political and economic networks, aimed at expanded inclusion within the polity or enhancement of economic or political benefits, may often be found in tandem empirically with modes of reflexive publicity concerned more with questioning established social roles and identities within civil society itself. "The goal of the civil rights movement," for example, "was not only acquiring civil rights but also modernizing civil society in the sense of undoing traditional structures of domination, exclusion, and inequality rooted in social institutions, norms, collective identities, and cultural values based on racial and class prejudice. And the feminist movement ... takes clear aim at patriarchal institutions in civil society and works for cultural and normative change as much as for political and economic power."[80] One crucial implication here is that political, economic, and civil publics interpenetrate and have always done so to some extent. Even at the height of prototype movements for political inclusion in Europe and America during the early nineteenth century, one "saw an efflorescence of ... social movements that challenged the public/private distinction and brought identity politics into the forefront of the public sphere: utopian socialism, abolitionism, religious revival."[81] As events unfolded, publicity surged ahead through multiple publics: political publics sought state democratization; economic publics promoted new principles of economic association, cooperation, and collective ownership; and civil publics sought to transform domestic arrangements, expand access to education, or democratize religious practices. Campaigns such as the abolitionist movement targeted all three institutional settings, while also forging ahead in the development of new techniques of public

communication that would bridge the spatial and temporal divides between far-flung Atlantic empires and their many colonies.

These qualifications notwithstanding, however, the significant point remains that one grasps most fully the complexities of what is at stake in publicity and collective action when one distinguishes analytically among the various targets at which it may be oriented and the different institutional interstices within which it may surreptitiously take root and eventually emerge. This stands as one of the most important of all implications of the civil society and public sphere literatures for present-day empirical research in sociology.

Challenges for future research

Thus far, we have depicted the administrative-bureaucratic state, capitalist economy, and civil society as structurally differentiated institutional sectors that are more or less autonomous from one another (depending upon widely varying and historically contingent circumstances), and that can be studied theoretically as well as empirically in terms of their structural interrelations. Hence, the first sections of our article were primarily concerned with the elaboration of a topographical model of modern society. In subsequent sections, we shifted toward a discussion of publics as more interstitial, emergent phenomena through which actors seek influence over the state, economy, and civil society itself. In this second half of the article, we introduce a new and quite different analytical framework, one that cuts directly across the schemas presented earlier. We argue that institutional complexes – and publics themselves – can also be approached from the vantage-point of structure, action, and agency. In fact, we present a model of three analytically differentiated *relational contexts* that, together with *human agency*, channel action within and across these various institutional sectors and networks of interaction.

We argue that social action is located within and simultaneously shaped by a *plurality* of relational or structural "environments": the social-structural, cultural, and social-psychological. Action is enabled and channeled at one and the same time by all three of these trans-personal contexts, each of which operates according to its own partly independent logic, overlapping and intersecting with the others in ways that call for careful empirical study.[82] In developing this schema, we follow in some respects upon a tradition of thought that goes back at

least as far as Parsons;[83] however, we cross-fertilize this approach with insights from the new relational perspectives currently being developed by empirical researchers in the network-analytic tradition.[84] Certainly, this line of thinking provides the unifying matrix, the central thematics, for all that follows. We contend that the structuring contexts of action (as well as agency) can be reconceptualized in relational terms, that we can speak of all such elements using the same relational language. (In light of our especially keen concern for human agency, we term this analytical strategy *relational pragmatics*.) The central insight here is that the very units involved in social action derive their meaning, identity, and significance from the changing positions they fill within ongoing transactions. The dynamic unfolding of the transaction itself becomes the primary unit of analysis rather than the constituent elements themselves. Such a notion allows us to move beyond the essentialism, reification, and categorical thinking that hinder so much sociological thinking today.

The analysis of publicity, in fact, can gain much from a relational approach that focuses upon multiplex ties within several distinct contexts of action. In the pages that follow, accordingly, we consider how such an approach can help to analyze differences in the constitution of individual publics, as well as interactions among multiple publics. The latter are particularly important: as Miriam Hansen puts it, "the question of what constitutes a [public or] counterpublic cannot be answered in any singular, foundational manner but [rather] is a matter of relationality, of conjunctural shifts and alliances, of making connections with other publics and other types of publicity."[85] Actual publics must be understood as ever-changing, emergent, and multiple, since the interplay of public expansion, contraction, and reaction to new situations continually elicits new genres of communication, new styles of contestation, new solidarities or enmities, and new settings for interaction. The empirical research strategies (all of them relational) considered below promise to further such understanding. New research can surely build upon the strengths of existing post-Habermasian perspectives: their stress upon the plurality of publics, their interest in the contention of groups with unequal social power, their expanded sense of the locales of publicity, and, in some cases, their explicit normative commitments. But the real challenge facing studies of publicity now entails finding ways to analyze the temporal flow of structure, action, and agency within multiple, intersecting, and dynamic public networks.[86]

We term the *social-structural* context of action all those social networks that constitute an interpersonal, interorganizational, or transnational setting of action. This is the familiar terrain of social-network analysis, a set of research strategies and techniques that examines how such elements as friendship, money, or information flow through figurations of social ties – and not always in a symmetrical fashion. Eschewing approaches that begin with preconstituted individuals or groups, as well as perspectives based upon statistical (variable-based) analyses, network researchers pursue transactional studies of patterned social relationships. They adhere to what has been called an "anti-categorical imperative,"[87] rejecting the primacy of attributional categories and other substantives in favor of dynamic "observable processes-in-relations."[88] In one prominent social-network strategy, social "structure is described in terms of the typical relations in which individuals are involved and the extent to which actors are connected within cohesive primary groups as cliques."[89] Using such an approach, it becomes possible to explore the topographies of relations within and among publics, relations interstitial vis-à-vis bounded communities or institutions. One does not have to presume either a unitary reified public sphere or a bipolar structure of "hegemonic/subaltern"; there may, in fact, be far more complex formations extant than either unitary or bipolar, whose formal features such an approach might be helpful in determining. (The basic insights of social-network analysis, it should be pointed out, can also be used profitably in a *metaphorical* fashion. Formalization merely adds power and precision to a social-structural analysis; it is by no means required or even always feasible.)

Consider the prevalent notion that publicity "strengthens" through increases in the intensity of association, public debate, and decision-making. Without being self-consciously operationalized in network-analytic terms, this notion has become central to many studies of intra- and cross-national variation in levels of democratic participation. Alfred Stepan, for example, suggests that the 1970s democratization movement in Brazil "saw not only the formation of numerous new social movements but intricate and creative horizontal relations of civil society with itself, relations that helped interweave the weft and warp of civil society and give it a more variegated, more resistant fabric."[90] Robert Putnam also suggests that variations in network density help to explain differences in civic and political life in various regions of Italy: "Networks of civic engagement are an essential form

of social capital: The denser such networks in a community, the more likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit."[91] Both Stepan and Putnam contend that densely interlinked publics generate greater degrees of trust, participation, and democracy. The methodologies of social-network analysis allow such ideas to be more systematically investigated, by measuring the density of a network's fabric – i.e., the thickness or looseness of its weave. Defining density as "the proportion of possible lines that are actually present" between nodes of a network, one can inquire more specifically into the relationship between thickness of weave in networks of publicity and not only their internal vitality, but also their capacity to influence political or economic decision-making, or else to have an impact back upon civil society itself.[92] (Bear in mind that the nodes in question may be either individuals in the case of singular publics, or publics themselves in the case of configurations of multiple publics; of course, the latter may in turn be political, economic, *or* civil.)

Other research possibilities are also opened up by the study of connectivity in networks of publicity. One can, for instance, inquire into the routes that link various nodes within a network – the various "walks" or "paths" along which goods, resources, or even positions might flow within singular or among multiple publics – as well as their "lengths" and "distances." In this way, one can more adequately chart the possibilities for communication available within different public configurations.[93] Such possibilities are not feasible in approaches that simply classify publics according to attributional categories such as plebeian or bourgeois.[94] One can also determine the "reachability" of specific nodes from other nodes within a network (i.e., whether there is a path linking them) and, relatedly, the "connectedness" or "disconnectedness" of the network as a whole (i.e., whether all pairs of nodes within it are reachable). A set of connected nodes that is disconnected from the rest of the network is termed a "component," and is important because it suggests a sort of "island" of publicity cut off from all other such matrices within a larger whole.[95] In addition, one can isolate specific nodes or lines ("cutpoints" or "bridges") that are crucial to the overall connectivity of the network insofar as their removal creates new components within it.[96] And one can look for the most "central" nodes within a network, the points or nodes that are most "extensively involved in relationships with other nodes."[97] Several different network techniques exist for measuring actor centrality.[98]

Network-analytic ideas and techniques are also useful for inquiring into the "cohesive subgroups" that typically emerge within networks of publicity. "Cohesive subgroups are subsets of actors among whom there are relatively strong, direct, intense, frequent, or positive ties."[99] Studies of cohesion can reveal the ways in which boundaries develop among such formations that discourage the open-endedness required for publicity – for example, boundaries between clusters or "cliques" of individuals within singular publics, or between multiple publics divided by class, race, and so forth (e.g., working-class whites, inner-city African-Americans, Asian-American shopkeepers). As Calhoun observes, for "nearly any imaginable case there will be clusters of relatively greater density of communication within the looser overall field…. For any such cluster we must ask … how it is internally organized [and] how it retains its boundaries and relatively greater internal cohesion in relation to the larger public."[100] Here again, simplistic conceptions of publics as unitary or as bipolar are superseded. In the case of singular publics, cohesion studies can make possible the analysis of subgroups defined in terms of a number of different methodological criteria.[101] Cohesion defined in terms of any one of these criteria implies formations marked by a high degree of mutual influence and pressures toward uniformity in beliefs, attitudes, or even social psychology.

The same holds in the case of multiple publics or of the multiorganizational fields so often found in the analysis of social movements. One major advantage of an approach that emphasizes not only the strength or density of ties, but also cohesive subgroups, is that it avoids reducing "variations in network structure to a dichotomization between horizontal (democratic) and vertical (undemocratic) ties, with the former defined simply by density of participation." This bears especially upon Putnam's study, which "eclipses the multiplicity of forms of communication within and across networks, and especially the bridging function of civic networks, [the latter possibly being] more important than 'density' for understanding the development of diverse 'projects of citizenship.'"[102] Several studies suggest that a deep structure of bridging within and among publics (i.e., a pattern of dispersed centrality and numerous bridges between clusters) is more likely to be influential (and possibly even more democratic) than a dense but homogeneous public, since the former allows for a more diverse range of participants engaged in communicative transactions. For example, Aldon Morris's work on the civil rights movement explores how "the pace, location, and volume of protest in various communities [were] directly dependent on the quality and distribution of local movement centers" and on the

clusters surrounding them.[103] And Naomi Rosenthal et al.'s work on women's reform movements in nineteenth-century New York State similarly shows how variations in reform activity depended heavily upon changing patterns of ties among social-movement organizations.[104]

Yet another potentially illuminating line of research using network-analytic ideas and techniques focuses not upon the density, connectivity, and so forth, of social networks, but rather, upon network positions and role structures. The former refers to "equivalence classes" or "collections of actors who are involved in relations in similar ways," while the latter entails "patterns or associations among relations that link actors or positions."[105] In such a strategy, "network structure is described as interlocked, differentially prestigious status/role-sets, in terms of which actors in a system are stratified."[106] Such an approach is desirable for the examination of singular publics because it allows for both a partitioning of these publics into classes of structurally equivalent individuals and for a modeling of both the relations and the "*inter*relations among relations" linking these equivalence classes.[107] An analysis of network positions and role structures is also implied by Fraser's discussion of multiple publics, with its heavy reliance upon metaphors of parallelism and opposition. Certain sets of publics within a matrix of multiple publics will be structurally equivalent to one another by virtue of their similar relations to all other publics within that network. And since networks themselves are multirelational, certain bundles of relations will also tend to link these "positions." Combining Fraser's insights with positional and role analysis, we can study "the way in which relations among the members of a social system [e.g., publics within a field of multiple publics] occur in characteristic bundles and how these bundles of relations interlock and determine one another."[108]

One final strategy for social-structural inquiry into networks of publicity, one that also opens out onto the question of agency and dynamic processes, is suggested by the concept of "structural holes," originally conceived by Ronald Burt as "the separation[s] between nonredundant contacts." Such contacts are "disconnected ... either directly, in the sense that they have no direct contact with one another, or indirectly, in the sense that one has contacts that exclude the others."[109] Burt observes that actors "with relationships free of structural holes at their own end and rich in structural holes at the other end are structurally autonomous ... [and] best positioned for the information and control benefits that a network can provide."[110] In her work on Brazilian youth

politics during the 1992 impeachment crisis, Ann Mische illustrates this point by showing how the multiple affiliations of public actors in overlapping organizations and political sectors (e.g., political parties, religious groups, community organizations, or professional associations) created complex cleavage structures as well as bridging opportunities; in the bridging of civil coalitions, a critical role was played by "inter-locutors" able to construct "articulatory bridges" across partially seg-mented network sub-contexts.[111] Enhanced capacities for the self-organization and influence of public actors vis-à-vis state and economic actors can also be shown to flow to those with networks optimized for structural holes.[112] A sensitivity to the absences (and not only the presences) within social networks opens up in these ways exciting avenues for empirical inquiry into active processes of network con-struction and optimization.

Central to all of these strategies, of course, is the issue of power. Power is not a thing "possessed" by particular actors or publics, but rather, an effect of the very ways in which social networks are organized. Cut-points (as defined above) both within and among publics, for example, are significant sites of power because they represent sensitive junctures within flows of public communication, junctures marked by a special or enhanced vulnerability. Nodes of centrality are similarly important because those occupying them are uniquely positioned to extend their influence to others within their environments. If (singular or multiple) publics are too densely woven around a single central point, they may also fail to attain to maximal influence upon their targeted institu-tion(s); even with high degrees of trust, participation, and democracy, influence may actually decrease under conditions of excess central-ization. And finally, as shown above, structural holes are important because power as information and control accrues to those actors (individual or collective) who can recognize and exploit them within their public networks – can recognize "gaps and overlaps that can be used for agency, solidarity, and the fashioning of a common future."[113]

Publics in the cultural context of action

Relational approaches to the sociological study of *culture* are not nearly so well developed as those concerned with networks of social relationships. Yet they share many of the same basic assumptions, beginning with the notion that cultural formations entail not individual "attitudes" or "values," much less disembodied "systems," but rather,

bundles of social communications, relations, or transactions. A rich plurality of such formations (even conflicting ones) can be found in most empirical fields of action, formations that actors are able to draw upon creatively and self-consciously to manipulate, just as a social-structural context encompasses multiple, intersecting circles of inter-action in the Simmelian sense.[114] Studies of publics in history have much to gain from analyzing such formations, for, as we shall see, the latter often play a highly significant role in structuring communication flows within and across publics. Many of the leading figures in the study of publicity, however, have thus far failed to integrate culture fully into their thinking and still adhere to the reductionist view (a final vestige of their neo-Marxism?) that social structure is the key to public interactions. Indeed, as Calhoun points out, there is a remark-able "thinness of attention [in Habermas] to matters of culture and the construction of identity"; similarly, in Alexander's words, "because Cohen and Arato identify 'the discourse of civil society' with 'conscious' argument and association, they understand it in a highly limiting way.... [Nor do they] theorize solidarity realistically."[115] Separating culture from social structure – that is, insisting upon their *analytic* autonomy[116] – helps to overcome these theoretical and empirical defi-cits and allows for added precision in the analysis of publicity. Cultural and social structures might well constrain and enable action in different, even incompatible ways. While in an empirical sense, they often do fit together closely, analytically they must be kept distinct.[117]

Some new relational methodologies in the cultural field do draw ex-plicitly upon the network-analytic strategies discussed above. One line of work features cohesion analysis, measuring the ties between "focal concepts" and other symbols within "semantic networks" in terms of their "density," "conductivity," and "consensus."[118] It suggests potential network mappings of the actual discursive schemas of specific sub-groups (of individual persons or of publics) and also of numerous such sub-groups in mutual interaction. Another line of work, meanwhile, pursues a structural equivalence approach to determining the formal structure of "discourse roles" within classificatory schemas, rhetorics, or other sets of cultural practices.[119] Such an approach could well be used to map changing classifications of "public/private" or "citizen/ alien," revealing the underlying moral meanings and contested under-standings of these central social categories as they are enacted within institutional practices and transformed over time.

Still other contributions draw inspiration from non-network literatures and yet remain deeply compatible with network-analytic, relational ways of thinking. Alexander, for example, draws heavily upon Saussurian linguistics in illustrating how, in a number of episodes throughout American history, a linguistic code of democracy supplied "structured categories of pure and impure into which every member, or potential member, of civil society [was] made to fit.... [T]here is no civil discourse," as he puts it, "that does not conceptualize the world into those who deserve inclusion and those who do not."[120] He and Philip Smith examine the binary structures that allowed certain social actors to be tarred with the brush of "pollution" and thereby to be effectively shunted off from the legitimate terrain of public action.[121] And Marc Steinberg turns more to the "dialogic" approach of Mikhail Bakhtin in mapping out the "discursive repertoires" of silk weavers and their capitalist opponents in early nineteenth-century London.[122] Bakhtin is highly significant for our own purposes as well, since his dialogism is not only eminently relational (not to mention processual), but also deeply compatible morally and practically with the ideals of publicity and open communication.[123]

At least implicitly, empirical researchers have already done much to uncover the role of culture in structuring or channeling public action. Much of their work explores the exclusionary impact of linguistic formations. For example, Mustafa Emirbayer shows how civil publics seeking school reform during the antebellum and Progressive eras were structured in part by discourses of "virtue" and "corruption," in which opponents of educational change became depicted as partisan and self-interested, as standing "outside" the sacred center of American moral culture.[124] And Somers, building in part upon Keith Baker's important work on political culture, charts the internal relational structure of the "Anglo-American citizenship complex" so dominant in Western political thought since the seventeenth century. The latter was a "meta-narrative," she notes, whose internal "demarcations ... hardened through social naturalism into temporal, spatial, and epistemological divides with respect to the only possible preconditions for democratization and freedom"; as such, these demarcations made possible invidious distinctions between "traditionalist" and "modern" forces in political life.[125] Somers's work is important for demonstrating the centrality for cultural analysis of narrativity, defined in relational terms as "constellations of relationships ... embedded in time and space, constituted by ... causal emplotment."[126]

Others employ a more practice-oriented conception of culture to show how rational-critical debate of the sort championed by Habermas is specific only to empowered speech communities, insofar as it revolves around an individualized and universalistic orientation toward others, a tenor of self-mastery and objectivity, and capacities for instrumental rationality and contained debate. Joan Landes, for example, argues that the very genres of speaking that pervaded republican publics in France (during the period studied by Habermas) served to exclude women by promoting an imagery of fraternal brotherhood and "masculine" rationality, as opposed to the "femininity" and "corrupt softness" of the aristocratic salon. Implicit gender exclusions were embedded in these rationalist/universalist discourses, which were "framed from the very outset by masculinist interests and assumptions." [127] Michael Warner argues that conventions of public discourse in colonial America privileged certain speakers over others, insofar as "printing constituted a specifically white community; in this sense it was more than a neutral medium that whites simply managed to monopolize." [128] And Negt and Kluge show how official publics reject the dialogic modes of expression and thinking-out-loud that they claim are displayed by workers: "Within the context of the bourgeois public sphere, above all in school, and on television, [these are] seen as a digression and [are] immediately rejected." [129] These sociolinguistic approaches to public communication recognize that stratification is always embedded in linguistic competences, class codes, dialects, structures of diglossia and multilingualism, and even bodily comportment and gesture. [130]

There are, of course, inclusionary effects as well that can be attributed to culture, for the very same repertoires, genres, and idioms that exclude certain actors from public life can also justify the belongingness of others. In fact, cultural formations often provide useful means of bridging distances among the latter, who might otherwise have been sharply separated by social-structural (or social-psychological) barriers. [131] Accordingly, it becomes important to analyze the linguistic (as well as other) aspects of tie construction within singular publics, as well as of coalition-building among multiple publics. An important example of symbolic bridging efforts is found in social-movement theory's concept of "framing," as "the conscious and strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action." [132] Here, as before, the oppositions set up by culture are not "real" in any simplistic sense. "Actors are not intrinsically either worthy or moral: they

are determined to be so by being placed in certain positions on the grid of civil culture."[133] (Once again, one encounters here the idea of structural equivalence.)

From a more practice-oriented point of view, one might also direct attention to the inclusionary effects of "group styles," "the taken-for-granted [patterns of interaction] that groups enact as they share texts."[134] According to Nina Eliasoph and Paul Lichterman, such practices are "not just random improvisations on shared themes, 'codes,' 'tools,' or 'languages,'" but are themselves patterned and structured ways of inflecting the very meanings of linguistic formations and potentially every bit as crucial in determining inclusion (as well as exclusion) as those linguistic formations themselves.[135] Sharing a group style or practice might allow individuals or publics to work together even when occupying discrepant positions within social-structural (or social-psychological) networks – not to mention also networks of a cultural-linguistic nature.

Public actors often seek to appropriate and transform cultural structures – with all their inclusionary and exclusionary effects – through public contention over meaning. It is relevant here that a single cultural formation may conduce to more than one interpretation. Ron Jacobs shows, for example, how in response to the Rodney King crisis of 1991, quite different publics crystallized around competing versions of the self-same discourse of "American democracy."[136] Mutually opposed visions of purity and pollution, with contradictory implications for inclusion and exclusion, came to structure action within and among these publics. Along the same lines, Mimi Sheller argues that responses to Haiti's revolution of 1804 differed among European diplomatic circles, elite white publics in neighboring colonies, and Afro-Caribbean publics; each network of political communication assigned its own moral meanings to the "black republic."[137] "Discourse is essentially double-voiced or *heteroglossic*, to use Bakhtin's term … [it] calls forth potentially divergent and often contradictory moral evaluations of the world."[138] Some of the most significant divisions within the cultural context of public action, in fact, can emerge among rival interpretations of a public language – alternative ways of assigning meaning to its core terms or ideals – rather than among altogether different languages or conceptual structures. On the other hand, public actors may also consciously attempt to delegitimate an existing conceptual formation by attacking its core terms, revealing contradictions, and offering alternatives. Here, deconstructive approaches are useful, for

they "undermine or disperse what have been taken to be ... texts' clear, normative, and intended meanings ... bringing to the surface the partially suppressed multiplicity of voices that always coexist in a text."[139] Now, the challenge becomes to avoid regarding cultural formations not only as static and singular, but also as internally coherent or unitary.[140]

This leads us to the important question of power within cultural formations. Often, power is seen as residing exclusively "outside" of culture: i.e., within social structure (in the way in which social networks are themselves configured). While this is true to an extent, power is also to be found "within" cultural formations; it flows from occupancy of certain privileged symbolic positions or nodes within them. As Francois Furet points out in his study of the French Revolution, "Power was a matter of establishing just *who* represented the people, or equality, or the nation: victory was in the hands of those who were capable of occupying and keeping that symbolic position."[141] If culture is much like a web or network (or a multiplicity of different and perhaps competing networks) of symbolic elements, then power derives (partially) from the capacity to identify with or to "speak in the name of" especially highly valued ideals within such matrices.[142] Individual and collective agency relate closely to this: social actors pursue power understood in these terms just as they pursue the goods, resources, and positions available within social networks. Actors "are constantly working with [language] and on it, playing at its margins, exploiting its possibilities, and extending the play of its potential meanings, as they pursue [such] purposes and projects."[143]

Publics in the social-psychological context of action

What we designate as the *social-psychological* context of action encompasses all those structures that constrain and enable action by channeling flows and investments of psychical energy. It includes relatively long-lasting, durable matrices of attachment and emotional solidarity, as well as negatively toned currents of hostility and aggression. The nodes in these processes-in-relations are not "positions" (as in the social-structural context), or "symbols" (as in the cultural), but rather "objects": that is to say, whole persons, aspects of persons, fantasized substitutes for persons, or ideals. As Sigmund Freud himself argues in his monograph on *Group Psychology*, in place of the father one might just as well find a leader, the nation, or some abstract principles.[144] Several points should be underscored here: (1) the social-

psychological context, no less than the others, is fundamentally *trans-personal* in nature, rather than a context of merely individual psychological dynamics; in this respect, we differ from Parsons and his followers, all of whom distinguish among culture, society, and *individual personality*; (2) psychical currents circulate through sets of *trans-actions* among groups and individuals; Randall Collins even uses the metaphor of an "emotional economy" to designate the rules governing such transactions;[15] (3) collective psychical investments are not always fully available to conscious awareness; and (4) such flows can be negative rather than positive in nature; many crucial psychical interactions are even driven by hate or aggression rather than by love.

Promising as they are, such social-psychological insights have all too rarely been followed up by analysts of publicity. Recent agendas for research have replicated the general trend in sociology (both theoretical and empirical) *away from* thinking systematically about collective psychical configurations. What one commentator suggests in respect to nationalism applies just as well to social action within and across publics: "Descriptions ... note [its] passion, indeed the very pages crackle with it. But these descriptions do little to conceptualize, analyze, or interpret it."[146] Whenever experts on publicity do acknowledge its social-psychological dimensions, they typically characterize them as "cultural" phenomena on the same level as frames, genres, or discourses, or else as aspects of "agency," instead of seeing them as structures with *autonomous* logics that constrain and enable public action. Perhaps the very concern of many such writers with rational-critical communication leads them away from theorizing the non-rational sides of publicity: that is, its group dynamics, leader-follower ambivalences, unconscious reenactments of a "family romance," and so forth.

Yet, within the social-psychological literature, exemplary models of inquiry do exist that can help to guide such research; many even feature the network-analytic strategies discussed above. Certain cohesion studies, for example, investigate patterns of psychical ties among group members.[147] And analyses of structural equivalence explore patterns of relationships among positions within affectual networks.[148] In a less formalized way, other useful writings can be categorized in terms of Freud's key insight that group formations "are dominated by emotional ties of two kinds": those between group members and their leaders ("idealization") and those among members themselves ("identification").[149] This formula itself can be seen as a point of departure (in metaphorical fashion) for inquiries investigating both cohesion and

structural equivalence. In the former category, analysts explore the idea that group solidarity rests in part upon aim-inhibited (i.e., not overtly sexual) libidinal ties of collective identification among group members.[150] And in the category of structural equivalence, research into group dynamics and charismatic leadership shows how mechanisms of projective identification set up *unconscious role structures* within a group that constrain and enable members' actions, including those of the group leaders themselves.[151] Exciting developments in other areas, such as the recent sociological literature on trust, are also highly relevant to the study of publics, as we shall see.[152]

Within singular publics, bonds of identification are crucial for providing the foundational matrices of mutual attachment and trust without which no public dialogue could long persist, certainly not without devolving into unbridled conflict. Psychoanalytic theory sheds some light upon this aspect; as Freud puts it, "social feeling is based upon the reversal of what was first a hostile feeling into a positively-toned tie in the nature of an identification."[153] One can, in fact, adapt to the study of publics the Freudian notion of a "working alliance." As elaborated by W. R. Bion in his idea of a "work group,"[154] this implies a constellation of social actors held together by a common commitment to the constructive engagement and solving of problems, despite grave differences requiring ongoing dialogue and disputation. One can also analyze the mechanisms of displacement and projection through which psychical ambivalences and aggressions within publics are shifted onto alternative publics: the exclusionary processes that make inclusion itself possible.[155] Freudian theory, however, is only of partial usefulness here, for despite such elaborations, its tendency is ultimately to depict bonds of identification as regressive and deindividuating. (Freud's own elitism in politics is closely linked to this presupposition.) More useful, perhaps, is the aforementioned new work on trust in civil society.

Some sociological thinkers have said of trust that it is "the concept at the heart of a theory of civil society," that to "call for the establishment of civil society without taking the fundamental terms of trust … into consideration is but an empty rhetorical exercise."[156] This idea applies all the more powerfully to publics of various sorts. For the latter, maybe by virtue of their interstitial character, often exhibit high degrees of internal tension, insecurity, and dispute, and may also come under intense pressures from other publics, as well as from the better established social institutions – political, economic, or civil – which

they aim to transform. (This is especially true of counterpublics.) Thus, their very survival typically requires the existence of baseline sentiments of mutuality and solidarity – ultimately, *psychical* bonds – among various members.[157] Recent studies by James Coleman, Ronald Burt and Marc Knez, and others help to demonstrate how such configurations or systems of trust can be mapped out in ways analogous to both social and cultural networks.[158] These studies, however, belong to a highly individualistic "interest paradigm"; their methodological innovations can more profitably be deployed within an alternative theoretical framework that belongs instead to the tradition of "moral sympathy" that extends back to early-modern British moral philosophy.[159] Many recent sociological studies of trust draw heavily upon this tradition in analyzing the role played by social sentiments such as sympathy, empathy, and altruism in holding publics together, even in the face of powerful centripetal tendencies.[160]

Social-psychological considerations are also useful for better understanding leader-follower dynamics within singular publics. Bion notes the presence of such dynamics within large-scale social institutions such as the church, army, and aristocracy.[161] This list could easily be expanded to include publics as well, for leaders often come to assume important psychical functions within such groups.[162] Normative theorists' focus upon the rational-critical aspects of public communication ought not to erase from view the prevalence of such unconscious processes in publics of all kinds. Most speculatively, leaders need not even be part of publics themselves in order to help structure psychical relations *within* those publics. Political publics during the French Revolution, for example, were structured in large part by their shared unconcious relations with an "absent" King. As Lynn Hunt shows in *The Family Romance of the French Revolution*, the killing of the King and the unconscious attempt to set up in his place a "new family romance of fraternity" influenced the internal workings of a variety of publics – and ultimately shaped the course of the Great Revolution itself.[163] And, as Emirbayer shows in "Halcyon Days," a study of a protest movement at the New School for Social Research, the psychical field centered around that university's powerful president did much to structure relations both within and among the various publics that arose during that movement's heyday.[164]

The social-psychological point of view also has crucial implications for the sociological analysis of multiple publics. It allows us better to understand, for example, the collective emotional configurations that

serve to tie multiple publics closer together. Bonds of mutual identification, however "weak" (in Mark Granovetter's sense), can overcome (at times) even divisions within the social-structural or cultural contexts of action and help to establish clusters of publics that would not otherwise have formed. What Freud says about the civilizing process in general applies to multiple publics in particular: "The love which founded the family continues to operate in civilization … in its modified form as aim-inhibited affection. [As such], it continues to carry on its function of binding together considerable numbers of people, and it does so in a more intensive fashion than can be effected through the interest of work in common."[165] One can also turn to the literature on trust for an alternative grounding for this idea of a working alliance among publics. For structures of trust help to coordinate divergent publics and provide the matrices within which their heterogeneous interests and identities can be funneled into a common commitment. While still not analyzed empirically with the same methodological precision as social or even cultural networks, these bonds of identification and mutual trust are nonetheless appealing research objects, since they do much to facilitate the extension of networks of publicity across both time and space.[166]

On the other hand, psychical, non-rational forces can also sometimes help to keep various publics – political, economic, and civil – sharply separated from one another and even in conflict, despite the presence of social-structural and cultural formations that might otherwise have allowed their coming together. (Ethnic and racial differences, for example, often create profound rifts between otherwise compatible networks of publicity.[167]) Collective feelings of paranoia and aggression can drive publics far apart; "what mobilizes conflict [in these cases] – the energy of mobilized groups – are emotions."[168] Positive affects can split apart from negative ones, the latter being rechanneled onto external, collective objects now deemed hateful and aggressive. "It becomes necessary … periodically to purge the body politic of those elements which pollute it"[169] – for example, through appeals for "public order" and unity. What is striking and unexplainable within the terms of social-structural or cultural structures alone is precisely this gratuitous and surplus aggression (even cruelty) among publics, or between publics and more established institutional settings and complexes.

At stake in all of these flows and investments of psychical energy, needless to say, is power. For power derives not only from location within social-structural and cultural networks, but also from posi-

tioning within specifically social-psychological matrices. Just as power within the social-structural context of action depends upon occupancy of privileged nodal points within flows of information or material resources, or within the cultural context upon who "speaks in the name of the people," so, too, does power within the social-psychological domain depend upon an actor's location within networks of trust and identification. "Those who hold trust hold power."[170] Thus, psychical matrices are potentially no less important for the study of power hierarchies and of struggles within and across publics (and between publics and more established institutions) than are structures within the other two relational contexts of action.

Publics and human agency

While transpersonal, relational contexts – social-structural, cultural, and social-psychological – both constrain and enable action, they cannot themselves completely determine its nature and direction. Empirical social action is a synthetic product of the channeling influences of the structuring contexts of action, on the one hand, and of *human agency*, on the other.[171] We define agency, following Emirbayer and Mische, as the "engagement by actors of different structural contexts, which … both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations."[172]

Let us begin with the internal and individual-level *micro*-dynamics of publicity. It is through *risky, pragmatic* micro-exchanges among individuals – contentious engagement – rather than behind the safe, solitary "veil of ignorance" idealized by certain philosophers,[173] that bridges are forged between socially distant interlocutors and more democratic decisions potentially reached. Emirbayer and Mische hold that the concept of agency can be differentiated into a "chordal triad" consisting of three principal tones or orientations, any one of which might selectively be emphasized within a given field of action; each orientation is a dominant "tone" with the others *also present in a subordinate capacity*. The three categories – *iteration, projectivity, and practical evaluation* – refer to the past-, future-, and present-oriented modalities of agency, respectively. It is the interplay of these three elements over the course of collective problem-solving that helps to determine what kinds of publics will arise within different transactional settings.

Iteration, to begin with, refers to "the selective reactivation of past patterns of thought and action, as routinely incorporated in practical activity, thereby giving stability and order to social universes and helping to sustain identities, interactions, and institutions over time."[174] Exemplary are the kinds of periodic or cyclical public activities often referred to as "public rituals." The opening of a parliamentary session, a commemoration of a historical event, a civic parade, or the erection of a monument to fallen heroes: all are instances of publicity that symbolically communicate an agentic orientation toward preserving tradition, enshrining memories, and reproducing stable identities through reactivation and remembrance. Performative and expressive types of publicity are found not only within political rituals, but also within economic life (e.g., from strikers' picket lines to monumental corporate headquarters) and within civil life (from old school ties to bodily decorations signifying inclusion in alternative communities).[175]

While publics often feature the iterational moment, with its accentuation of the repetitive and taken-for-granted dimensions of action, publicity also involves "a creative, future- and/or present-oriented, solving of problems." The *projective* orientation of agency encompasses "the imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action, in which received structures of thought and action may be creatively reconfigured in relation to actors' hopes, fears, and desires for the future."[176] Within publics, projectivity is found most frequently in those protected spaces where subaltern actors formulate and debate their own collective visions of a transformed future: for example, in Fraser's "parallel arenas of counterdiscourse"; Gilroy's black counterpublics; moral crusades of the nineteenth century; or the millenarian movements common to post-slavery and post-colonial societies.[177] Subaltern publics not only disembed participants from conventional networks of family or workplace, but they also engage in contention with other publics, thereby enhancing their members' opportunities for imaginative experimentation and "cognitive liberation."[178]

Finally, the element of *practical evaluation* entails "the capacity of actors to make practical and normative judgments among alternative possible trajectories of action, in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of presently evolving situations."[179] Habermas's rational-critical publics are the epitome of this agentic orientation, insofar as they are spaces for pragmatic decision-making and problem-solving in the present moment. Many theorists of republican virtue have devoted special attention to this element, exploring the ways in which

involvement in common affairs helps to cultivate in citizens certain capacities and dispositions toward public-spiritedness, civic commitment, and good judgment or "intelligence." From this perspective, practical evaluation means a more or less explicit deliberation (in common) over alternative means and ends.[180] Practical evaluation, however, also opens out onto wider problems of improvisation and timing,[181] tactics of resistance and ruse,[182] and (local action).[183] Choice "can be a matter of tacit adjustment or adaptation to changing contingencies ... as well as the product of articulable explicit reasoning."[184] For any contention or collective decision-making to take place in publics, there must be some degree of movement across arrays of hierarchically clustered sub-networks.[185] An important challenge for empirical research is thus to show how practical maneuvering within and across publics, *in addition to rational-critical deliberation and discourse*, takes advantage of structural opportunities for breaking old ties or for fashioning new social-network ties, symbolic alignments, and psychical resonances among previously unallied actors.[186]

Let us turn now to the *macro*-dynamics of publicity, *the actual impact of publics (singular as well as multiple) upon already established institutions or institutional sectors.* Here again, the concept of agency serves as a kind of lynchpin, allowing us to see how empirical social action – both constrained and enabled by a variety of structural contexts simultaneously – dynamically reconfigures those contexts in interactive response to changing, problematic situations.[187] In addition to mapping out the different kinds of structures – multiple, intersecting, sometimes overlapping – within which social action unfolds, sociological analyses ought to study the agentic processes through which actors engage with and potentially transform such structures. The concepts of iteration, projectivity, and practical evaluation play a role here no less critical than they did in the study of the micro-dynamics of publicity: they allow us to disaggregate agentic engagements into their different analytic modalities. But now the relevant interactions of public actors are no longer exclusively with one another; the array of publics has a fractal geometry, for as we "zoom out," we can see the same principles shaping engagement and contestation with political, economic, and civil actors as well. Thus, "Solidarity" activists in Communist Poland challenged the state bureaucracy by promoting iterational orientations that reactivated past patterns of Christian solidarity. Revolutionary movements are known for their projective reconfiguration of existing institutions and practices through future-oriented invention of new calendars, names, and public rituals. And a practical-evaluative, often

highly tactical orientation is seen in the macro-dynamics of civil and political rights movements in post-slavery societies: e.g., in black counterpublics engaged with shifting arrays of political, economic, and civil actors.[188]

One way in which to analyze the macro-dynamics of publicity might be to select particular (sequences of) "events" or "turning points" *in-and-through* which the state, economy, or civil society itself are transformed and to examine therein the complex interplay among structural contexts, empirical social action, and agency. For example, since all institutions encompass – are in part constituted by – a cultural dimension, one might examine particularly important historical junctures (events or event sequences) in which, through a series of public meetings or open communications in the mass media, public actors call into question and transform an official state-policy discourse. In this example, publics might expose the incoherences at the core of this official discourse, taking advantage of its heteroglossic nature, as discussed above, or else creatively recombine elements from two or more extant idioms to produce a new legitimating discourse in terms of which state policies might be organized. A growing body of theoretical literature addresses such pivotal moments: Andrew Abbott, for example, in his discussion of turning points as "causally central shifts of regime,"[189] or William Sewell, Jr. and Marshall Sahlins in their examinations of events as "that relatively rare subclass of happenings that significantly transform structures,"[190] as "disruptions" to "the going order of things."[191] Sahlins adds yet another useful concept to the mix, that of "the structure of the conjuncture," to underscore the "dialectic of ... heterogeneous" orders of structure and agency that unfolds within events – "with the effect of a structural synergy."[192] Such notions help to keep our attention focused squarely upon interactional junctures within which far-reaching changes are attempted in the structuring of institutionalized social practices.

Conclusion

As we have seen, publics not only mediate among a plurality of institutional sectors and encompass the social-structural, cultural, and social-psychological contexts of action, but they also involve a broad array of agentic possibilities. The efficacy of publicity depends upon a complex combination of these several elements. The study of publics in history, we conclude, must always bear in mind all of these various dimensions.

The approach that we have put forward accordingly draws upon a wide range of insights from political science, cultural studies, and social psychology – as well as sociology – all of which touch upon aspects of public interaction and its impacts upon democratization. In this way, we aspire to set forth a more truly synthetic paradigm and research agenda for the empirical study of publicity.

But let us mention a few disclaimers here as well. The analytical framework that we have presented is intended solely as a "sensitizing" framework,[193] a matrix of concepts and distinctions, systematically interconnected, that we believe might prove useful for the development of conjunctural causal explanations of enhanced analytical power and specificity. Moreover, this article represents only an early, provisional attempt to elaborate such a framework; hence, we present our ideas here only in bold strokes, without extensive empirical illustration. And finally, our schema is necessarily complicated; most empirical research, however ambitious, will not be able to take into account – nor need it take into account – every one of its many facets.

Despite these disclaimers, our theoretical framework already carries with it a number of important implications. Analytically, its key payoff is to have laid out a wide array of possibilities – to have opened up new questions and prevented the conflation of old ones – and thereby to have avoided the foreclosure of otherwise promising research options. Surely, an encompassing frame of reference remains critical for sharpening the causal statements that analysts of publicity will generate and for broadening the range of causal mechanisms that their research will identify. As Skocpol points out, social thinkers need always to "give sufficient analytic weight to the conjunctural, unfolding interactions of originally separately determined processes."[194] Our schema allows precisely for such conjunctural arguments to be elaborated regarding historical causation and resonates with calls for ever more comprehensive analytic strategies in sociological studies.

On a normative level as well, our framework holds important implications for students of publicity. It suggests that the effects or outcomes of public interactions will potentially be found in all three of our relational contexts of action: in the cultural and social-psychological environments no less than in the social-structural. A normatively desirable outcome of historical transformations will surely entail the democratization of all three of these structural contexts; that is, the most promising changes in social structure will meet with setbacks in the

long run if not also accompanied by complementary changes in cultural discourse and in collective psychical commitments. Crucial as well, at the level of agency, will be the cultivation of dispositions toward democratic reflection, deliberation, and action – toward civic virtue and "intelligence" in the full pragmatist sense of the term. The challenges facing democratic actors are even more daunting than most analysts of publicity have heretofore realized. But for all that, those challenges are, in the present day, no less urgent and compelling.

Acknowledgments

Notes

1. C. Tilly, "Civil Society and Revolutions," paper delivered at "Conference on Civil Society," New School for Social Research, April 1992.
2. A parallel may be seen here to the persistent misinterpretation of Theda Skocpol's programmatic statement, "Bringing the State Back In" (in P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol, editors, *Bringing the State Back In* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985], 3–43), as itself an attempt to introduce "state determinism" to historical analysis. Skocpol's point is, rather, to insist on the *potential* autonomy and causal significance of the state in particular historical junctures.
3. T. Parsons and E. A. Shils, editors, *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951); T. Parsons, in collaboration with R. F. Bales and E. A. Shils, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (New York: Free Press, 1953); J. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vols. 1 and 2, translated by T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1984, 1987); B. Barber, "Neofunctionalism and the Theory of the Social System," in P. Colomy, editor, *The Dynamics of Social Systems* (London: Sage, 1992), 36–55; and especially, J. C. Alexander, *Action and Its Environments* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); see also

M. Emirbayer and J. Goodwin, "Symbols, Positions, Objects," *History and Theory* 35 (1996): 358–374; M. Emirbayer, "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (1997): 281–317; M. Emirbayer, *Relational Pragmatics*, unpublished manuscript.

4. Emirbayer, "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology."

5. Of less concern to us in the present context is the opposite aim: that of redressing overly *empiricist* usages of these concepts in social-scientific research. These usages include two major "colonizations" of the term "public": the commodification of "publicity" when its meaning is reduced to advertising; and the bureaucratization of "public opinion" when its meaning is reduced to static measurements produced by random polling.

6. B. Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon, 1966); P. Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: New Left, 1974); I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World-system*, vol. 1 (San Diego: Academic, 1974).

7. T. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, editors, *Bringing the State Back In*.

8. C. Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* (New York: Russell Sage, 1984), 14–15.

9. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage, 1966), 194.

10. I. Katznelson, "Working-Class Formation," in I. Katznelson and A. R. Zolberg, editors, *Working-Class Formation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 21.

11. As Margaret Somers argues, "each theory defines *a priori* the *same independent variable* – proletarianization and capitalist society. This leaves for empirical research only the historical variations of this process" (M. R. Somers, "Narrativity, Narrative Identity, and Social Action," *Social Science History* 16 [1992]: 597). For an extension of these arguments, see M. R. Somers, "Class Formation and Capitalism," *European Journal of Sociology* 37 (1996): 180–202; for a critique specifically of Thompson's work on this score, see W. H. Sewell, Jr., "How Classes Are Made," in H. J. Kaye and K. McClelland, editors, *E. P. Thompson* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 50–77; for broader critiques of Thompson in regard to gender and race dynamics, see J. W. Scott, "Women in *The Making of the English Working Class*," in *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 68–90; R. D. G. Kelley, *Race Rebels* (New York: Free Press, 1996).

12. J. L. Cohen, *Class and Civil Society* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), 51. This is also true even of those who explicitly employ the category of civil society, while still subsuming it within a Marxist analytical framework (e.g., D. Rueschemeyer, E. H. Stephens, and J. D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992]).

13. Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 6.

14. Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 9.

15. Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In*; T. Skocpol, *Protecting Solders and Mothers* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1992); J. Goodwin, "State-Centered Approaches to Social Revolutions," in J. Foran, editor, *Theorising Revolutions* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 11–37.

16. J. L. Cohen and A. Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1992), 1–2.

17. S. Evans and H. Boyte, *Free Spaces* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), 20, 202. The idea of democratic free spaces is also implicit in James Scott's notion of "hidden transcripts" (e.g., in *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990]).

18. A. D. Morris, *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement* (New York: Free Press, 1984); D. McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Kelley, *Race Rebels*; T. W. Hunter, *To Joy 'My Freedom'* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1997).

19. S. Evans, *Personal Politics* (New York: Vintage, 1979); C. Mueller, "Collective Identities and the Mobilization of the U.S. Women's Movement, 1960–1970," in E. Larana, H. Johnston, and J. R. Gusfield, editors, *New Social Movements* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 234–263; N. Whittier, *Feminist Generations* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995); V. Taylor and N. Whittier, "Analytical Approaches to Social Movement Culture," in H. Johnston and B. Klandermans, editors, *Social Movements and Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 163–187.

20. C. Calhoun, *Neither Gods nor Emperors* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); R. Fantasia and E. L. Hirsch, "Culture in Rebellion," in H. Johnston and B. Klandermans, editors, *Social Movements and Culture*, 144–159.

21. Evans and Boyte, *Free Spaces*, 191.

22. For a similar critique and useful overview of the free spaces literature, see F. Polletta, "'Free Spaces in Recent Social Movement Theorizing,' paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Toronto, 1997.

23. Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, 346. The inclusion of family life, relatively invisible in dichotomous "state vs. economy" approaches, is important here: "[I]f conceived of in egalitarian terms, [the family provides] an experience of horizontal solidarity, collective identity, and equal participation to the autonomous individuals comprising it ... [one that is] fundamental for the other associations of civil society and for the ultimate development of civic virtue and responsibility with respect to the polity" (Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, 631 n. 48).

24. See, e.g., J. Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society* (London and New York: Verso, 1988); C. Taylor, "Modes of Civil Society," *Public Culture* 3 (1990): 95–118; E. H. Shils, "The Virtue of Civil Society," *Government and Opposition* 26 (1991): 3–20; Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*; A. B. Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society* (New York: Free Press, 1992); K. Tester, *Civil Society* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992); K. Kumar, "Civil Society," *British Journal of Sociology* 42 (1993): 375–395; E. Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty* (New York: Allen Lane, 1994); J. A. Hall, "In Search of Civil Society," in J. A. Hall, editor, *Civil Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 1–31; J. Schmidt, "Civil Society and Social Things," *Social Research* 62 (1996): 899–932; J. C. Alexander, "The Paradoxes of Civil Society," *International Sociology* 12 (1997): 115–133.

25. Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, x.

26. J. Weintraub, "Virtue, Community, and the Sociology of Liberty," Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1979.

27. For some other similar usages, see D. Bell, "'American Exceptionalism' Revisited," *The Public Interest* 95 (1989): 38–56; A. Wolfe, *Whose Keeper?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); R. Wuthnow, "The Voluntary Sector," in R. Wuthnow, editor, *Between States and Markets* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 3–29.

28. This idea is crucial for at least two reasons. First, it affirms the structural differentiation of civil society from the state and economy, thereby pointing away from political ideologies (e.g., Marxism) that call for a program of *de*-differentiation. And second, it allows distinctions to be drawn among different civil societies themselves (i.e., "more" vs. "less democratic"): "civil society" thus becomes not a normative ideal, but rather, an object of moral and political contestation. (Hence, Michael Walzer's call for a stance of *"critical* associationalism"; see M. Walzer, "The Civil Society Argument," in C. Mouffe, editor, *Dimensions of Radical Democracy* [London and New York: Verso, 1992], 105; emphasis added.)

29. Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, 706 n. 64. See also J. Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, translated by W. Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).

30. T. H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class," in *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 71–135.

31. Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, 442, 446, 414.

32. Walzer, "The Civil Society Argument," 104.

33. C. Tilly, "Democracy is a Lake," in G. R. Andrews and H. Chapman, editors, *The Social Construction of Democracy, 1870–1990* (Washington Square: New York University Press, 1995), 370.

34. As John Dewey pointed out, democracy demands the internal reconstruction of local communities, voluntary associations, and other forums for citizenly participation within civil society: it also demands the cultivation of individual capacities, virtues, and dispositions, foremost among which is "embodied intelligence," the capacity to render informed, responsible judgments with regard to public affairs (J. Dewey, *The Public and its Problems*, in J. A. Boydston, editor, *John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925–1953*, vol. 2 [Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988], 325, 328). Here Dewey's insights correspond closely to those of republican virtue theorists such as H. Arendt (*The Human Condition* [Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1958]; *On Revolution* [Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990]); see also Weintraub, "Virtue, Community, and the Sociology of Liberty."

35. R. A. Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971).

36. J. Habermas, "Three Normative Models of Democracy," *Constellations* 1 (1994): 5–6. An additional point not often satisfactorily understood by any of the above is that binding consultation must be stretched to encompass not only legalistic procedures, but also the more psychical, expressive, and aesthetic dimensions of practical communicative interactions: the form or style of consultation is always culturally negotiated and contested in more or less democratic ways.

37. M. R. Somers, "Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere," *American Sociological Review* 58 (1993): 594–595.

38. Hall, "In Search of Civil Society," 4; see also M. Weber, "The City," in G. Roth and C. Wittich, editors, *Economy and Society,* vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978): 1212–1372.

39. See Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 2, 357ff; G. Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978); R. M. Unger, *Law in Modern Society* (New York and London: Free Press, 1976). In constructing such histories, of course, it is important to avoid the pitfalls of teleological or "retrospective" reasoning.

40. Wuthnow, editor, *Between States and Markets*. See also Hall, *Civil Society,* and C. Hann and E. Dunn, editors, *Civil Society* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).

41. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*; Wolfe, *Whose Keeper?*; V. M. Perez-Diaz, *The Return of Civil Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

42. C. Calhoun, "Civil Society and the Public Sphere," *Public Culture* 5 (1993): 267–280; Calhoun, *Neither Gods nor Emperors*; F. Wakeman, "The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate," *Modern China* 19 (1993): 108–138; T. Brook and B. M. Frolic, editors, *Civil Society in China* (Armonk, N.Y., and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).

43. G. Ekiert, "Democratization Processes in East Central Europe," *British Journal of Political Science* (1991): 285–313; A. Arato, *From Neo-Marxism to Democratic Theory* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993).

44. A. C. Stepan, "State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America," in Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, editors, *Bringing the State Back In*, 317–343; A. C. Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); A. C. Stepan, editor, *Democratizing Brazil* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); G. O'Donnell and P. C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, Vol. 4 (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); F. H. Cardoso, "Associated-Dependent Development and Democratic Theory," in A. C. Stepan, editor, *Democratizing Brazil*, 299–326.

45. Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty*; A. R. Norton, editor, *Civil Society in the Middle East*, 2 vols. (New York: Brill, 1985); J. Schwedler, editor, *Toward Civil Society in the Middle East?* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

46. Wolfe, *Whose Keeper?*; R. N. Bellah, R. Madsen, W. M. Sullivan, A. Swidler, and S. M. Tipton, *The Good Society* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991). Ironically, not all of these regions actually feature a self-conscious, explicit discourse regarding civil society. However, the civil society notion still does help to make sense of them, for, while adapted from the discourses of actors in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, and while retaining a hermeneutic quality even in more scholarly usages (i.e., an interest in the self-conscious *targets* of actors' collective efforts), it also has vitally to do with institutional activities and formations, *objectively* understood. This bestows upon the idea of civil society a distinctly observer-centered quality, one that renders it extremely useful for wide-ranging empirical applications.

47. Calhoun, "Civil Society and the Public Sphere," 269.

48. J. Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, translated by Thomas Burger, with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).

49. J. Habermas, "The Public Sphere," *New German Critique* 3 (1974): 49.

50. Calhoun, "Civil Society and the Public Sphere," 273.

51. N. Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere," in C. Calhoun, editor, *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1992), 109–142.

52. P. Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, translated by G. Raymond and M. Adamson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 55.

53. Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere"; Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society*; M. Hansen, "Unstable Mixtures, Dilated Spheres," *Public Culture* 5 (1993): 179–212; I. M. Young, "Impartiality and the Civic Public," in S. Benhabib and D. Cornell, editors, *Feminism as Critique* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987): 56–76.

54. P. Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic* (London and New York: Verso, 1993), 75.

55. B. Honig, "Toward an Agonistic Feminism," in J. Butler and J. W. Scott, editors, *Feminists Theorize the Political* (New York and London: Routledge, 1992): 215–235.

56. See, e.g., Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*; M. P. Ryan,

Women in Public (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); M. P. Ryan, "Gender and Public Access," in Calhoun, editor, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, 259–288.

57. H. C. White, "Where Do Languages Come From?," *Pre-Print Series*, Paul F. Lazarsfeld Center for the Social Sciences, Columbia University (1995), 4.

58. V. Turner, *The Ritual Process* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969).

59. These include *rally*, "wherein existing networks and co-texts are … repliced in strategic efforts by actors"; *salon*, "a sophisticated mode/setting of discourse not tied to ongoing pragmatic concerns or identities"; and *subway*, a "public of minimal presence, minimal interchange, and maximal decoupling from 'co-text' and network – the street public" (H. C. White, "Network Switchings and Bayesian Forks," *Social Research* 62 [1996]: 1055).

60. We explain below (in the section on "Publics in the Social-Psychological Context of Action") what we mean by "working alliances."

61. M. Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 16. Mann goes on to observe, "[Such networks are always] outrunning the existing level of institutionalization. This may happen as a direct challenge to existing institutions, or it may happen unintentionally and 'interstitially' – between their interstices and around their edges – creating new relations and institutions that have unanticipated consequences for the old" (*The Sources of Social Power*, 15).

62. S. Benhabib, "Models of Public Space," in Calhoun, editor, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, 78.

63. M. Postone, "Political Theory and Historical Analysis," in Calhoun, editor, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, 166.

64. Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, 479–480. A similar idea is to be found in Habermas's *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, 209, 231–232.

65. N. Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere," 123.

66. Ibid., 124.

67. Ibid., 128.

68. O. Negt and A. Kluge, *Public Sphere and Experience*, translated by P. Labanyi, J. O. Daniel, and A. Oksiloff (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993; see also the useful "Foreword" by M. Hansen); G. Lottes, *Politische Aufklarung und plebejisches Publikum* (Munich, 1979); G. Eley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures," in Calhoun, editor, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*: 289–339. Eley stresses that "Habermas's concentration on *Offentlichkeit* as a specifically *bourgeois* category subsumes forms of popular democratic mobilization that were always already present as contending and subversive alternatives to the classical liberal organization of civil society in which Habermas's ideal of the public sphere is confined" ("Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures," 330–331).

69. See, e.g., E. B. Higginbotham, *Righteous Discontent* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); E. B. Brown, "Negotiating and Transforming the Public Sphere," in The Black Sphere Collective, editors, *The Black Public Sphere* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995): 111–150; Kelley, *Race Rebels*; M. Sheller, "Democracy After Slavery," Ph.D. dissertation, New School for Social Research, 1997.

70. This phrase is closely associated with Habermasian theory. See, e.g., Habermas, *The Theory of Communciative Action*, vols. 1 and 2.

71. A. Giddens, The *Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).

72. B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London and New York: Verso, 1983); R. Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988); Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*; M. Warner, *The Letters of the Republic* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1990).

73. See S. Lash and J. Urry, *Economies of Signs and Space* (London: Sage Publications, 1994).

74. For a useful discussion of "influence," see T. Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence," in *Sociological Theory and Modern Society* (New York: Free Press, 1967), 355–382.

75. Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*. Somers, too, points out that popular public spheres must "mediate between civil society and the towering forces of nation-states and national markets" ("Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere," 589).

76. Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, 435. All three types of publicity feature some combination or other of strategic and communicative action (in Habermas's terminology).

77. Political publics thus include actual spaces of publicity within political institutions, public actions that make claims upon those decision-making entities, and networks of print and informational exchange that keep the workings of those institutions in the public eye. On the elite aspects of political publics in particular, see C. W. Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); G. W. Domhoff, *The Higher Circles* (New York: Random House, 1970); and D. Knoke, et al., *Comparing Policy Networks* (Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

78. In addition to the aforementioned analyses of proletarian publics (e.g., O. Negt and A. Kluge, *Public Sphere and Experience*; G. Lottes, *Politische Aufklarung*; G. Eley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures"), we draw upon work on public influence and democratization within the workplace, household, and international development arena (e.g., S. Webb and B. Webb, *Industrial Democracy* [New York: Sentry, 1965]; S. M. Lipset, M. Trow, and J. S. Coleman, *Union Democracy* [Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962]; L. Beneria and M. Roldan, *The Crossroads of Class and Gender* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986]. In respect to elite economic publics, relevant work includes M. Useem, *The Inner Circle* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); C. Kono, D. Palmer, R. Friedland, and M. Zafonte, "Lost in Space," *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (1988): 863–911.

79. In addition to the work on free spaces discussed above, performance-centered studies of identity and embodiment (e.g., J. Butler, *Gender Trouble* [New York: Routledge, 1990]) and analyses of symbolic classification struggles (e.g., M. Lamont and M. Fournier, editors, *Cultivating Differences* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992]) are also relevant to the study of civil publics. Relevant as well are the literature on popular cultures of resistance (e.g., Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*; S. Mintz, *Caribbean Transformations* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1989]) and the literature on new social movements (e.g., A. Melucci, *Nomads of the Present*, edited by J. Keane and P. Mier [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989]; A. Touraine, *The Voice and the Eye*, translated by A. Duff [Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981]).

80. Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, 508.

81. Calhoun, "Civil Society and the Public Sphere," 275; see also C. Calhoun, "'New Social Movements' of the Early Nineteenth Century," *Social Science History* 17 (1993): 385–427.

82. Thus, neither institutions nor extra-institutional configurations such as publics are merely "social" phenomena, somehow standing apart from alternative elements such as symbols and affects. Each must be viewed as actions channeled through matrices of cultural and psychical *as well as* social relationships. The modern state, for example, encompasses practices that are both constrained and enabled by cultural structures (e.g., conceptual schemata used to generate and justify policy recommendations); social-psychological structures (e.g., patterns of psychical investments in hierarchy, accountability, or even bureaucratic rivalries within and across state agencies); *and* social-structural matrices (e.g., network patterns of ties among various managers and state bureaus).

83. See the references in note no. 3. Alexander speaks best for this Parsonsian tradition in claiming that action is "a 'flow' within symbolic, social, and psychological environments. These environments interpenetrate within the concrete empirical actor." We differ from many in this line (excluding Alexander himself) primarily in not *prioritizing* the three contexts of action in any sort of hierarchy, "cybernetic" or otherwise; in addition, we differ from *all* of the aforementioned thinkers in not conceptualizing the third context, the social-psychological, as a matrix of merely individual psychological dynamics, or "personality." More on this second point below.

84. See Emirbayer, "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology." Our own "relational turn" is not so much a sharp break with the former thinkers as it is a selective emphasis upon (and explicit development of) elements already present in at least some of their writings.

85. Hansen, "Unstable Mixtures, Dilated Spheres," 210.

86. Since publics are intrinsically "relational" – i.e., entailing modes of engagement with political, economic, or civil institutions – they must be situated as well within their multi-institutional contexts.

87. M. Emirbayer and J. Goodwin, "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency," *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (1994): 1411–1454.

88. H. C. White, "Can Mathematics be Social?," *Sociological Forum* 12 (1997): 60.

89. R. S. Burt, "Models of Network Structure," *Annual Review of Sociology* 6 (1980): 81.

90. Stepan, *Democratizing Brazil*, xii.

91. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, 173.

92. S. Wasserman and K. Faust, *Social Network Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 101.

93. "A *walk* is a sequence of nodes and lines, starting and ending with nodes, in which each node is incident with the lines following and preceding it in the sequence.... A *path* is a walk in which all nodes and lines are distinct.... The *length* of a path is the number of lines in it.... [*Distance* is] the shortest path between two nodes" (Wasserman and Faust, *Social Network Analysis*, 105, 107, 110).

94. C. Wright Mills, for example, uses network terminology to describe the American public as bifurcated between myriad "primary publics" consisting of "little circles of face-to-face citizens discussing their public business" and the dominant "flow of influence" controlled locally by "opinion leaders" and nationally by the mass media. Mills enriches this network imagery with allusions to both power asymmetries and time-space distanciation. See Mills, "Mass Media and Public Opinion," in I. L. Horowitz, editor, *Power, Politics, and People* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 586, 593–594.

95. Wasserman and Faust, *Social Network Analysis*, 107, 109–110.

96. "A node, n_i, is a *cutpoint* if the number of components in the graph [or network]

that contains n_i is fewer than the number of components in the subgraph that results from deleting $_i$ from the graph.... A *bridge* is a line such that the graph containing the line has fewer components than the subgraph that is obtained after the line is removed" (Wasserman and Faust, *Social Network Analysis*, 112–113, 114). See also M. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 81 (1973): 1287–1303.

97. Wasserman and Faust, *Social Network Analysis*, 173.

98. See Wasserman and Faust, *Social Network Analysis*, ch. 5. Although the preceding discussion concerns nondirectional ties, analogous concepts and measures do also exist for "directed graphs" or networks.

99. Wasserman and Faust, *Social Network Analysis*, 249.

100. C. Calhoun, "Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere," in Calhoun, editor, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, 37–38.

101. In terms of decreasing strictness, these criteria are as follows: "Subgroups based on mutuality of ties require that all pairs of subgroup members 'choose' each other (or are adjacent); subgroups based on reachability require that all subgroup members be reachable to each other, but not necessarily adjacent; subgroups based on numerous ties require that subgroup members have ties to many others within the subgroup; and subgroups based on the relative density or frequency of ties require that subgroups be relatively cohesive when compared to the remainder of the network" (Wasserman and Faust, *Social Network Analysis*, 252).

102. A. Mische, "Projecting Democracy," *International Journal of Social History* 40 (1996): 140.

103. In many parts of the U.S., "diverse and interlocking networks were capable of being politicized and coordinated through existing movement centers" (clustered around the leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr.), but were less effective in the Deep South where high levels of repression meant "the absence of dense networks of movement centers" (Morris, *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement*, 284, 199, 205).

104. Specifically, Rosenthal et al. show how social-network analysis can "(1) map the interconnections between organizations, (2) measure the intensity and directionality of those interconnections, (3) illuminate clusters of proximate organizations, and (4) identify groups central to the clusters" (N. Rosenthal, M. Fingrutd, M. Ethier, R. Karant, and D. McDonald, "Social Movements and Network Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology* 90 [1985]: 1022).

105. Wasserman and Faust, *Social Network Analysis*, 426.

106. Burt, "Models of Network Structure," 81.

107. F. Lorrain and H. White, "Structural Equivalence of Individuals in Social Networks," *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 1 (1971): 49.

108. Lorrain and White, "Structural Equivalence of Individuals in Social Networks," 49.

109. R. S. Burt, *Structural Holes* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1992), 18.

110. Burt, *Structural Holes*, 45.

111. Mische, "Projecting Democracy."

112. These would be networks penetrating the state or economy that maximize non-redundant contacts and that reach through the latter into "separate, and therefore more diverse, social worlds of network benefits" (Burt, *Structural Holes*, 21).

113. Hansen, "Unstable Mixtures, Dilated Spheres," 212.

114. J. G. A. Pocock, *Politics, Language and Time* (New York: Atheneum, 1973); W. H. Sewell, Jr., *Work and Revolution in France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); W. H. Sewell, Jr., "Ideologies and Social Revolutions," *Journal of*

Modern History 57 (1985): 57–85; T. Skocpol, "Cultural Idioms and Political Ideologies in the Revolutionary Reconstruction of State Power," *Journal of Modern History* 57 (1985): 86–96; K. M. Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); K. M. Baker, "Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France," in Calhoun, editor, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*: 181–212.

115. Calhoun, "Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere," 34; J. C. Alexander, "The Return to Civil Society," *Contemporary Sociology* 22 (1993): 801–802; see also Alexander, "The Paradoxes of Civil Society."

116. A. Kane, "Cultural Analysis in Historical Sociology," *Sociological Theory* 9 (1991): 53–69.

117. See M. S. Archer, *Culture and Agency* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); A. Swidler, "Culture in Action," *American Sociological Review* 51 (1986): 273–286.

118. K. M. Carley and D. S. Kaufer, "Semantic Connectivity," *Communication Theory* 3 (1993): 183–213; K. M. Carley, "Extracting Culture through Textual Analysis," *Poetics* 22 (1994): 291–312.

119. J. W. Mohr, "Soldiers, Mothers, Tramps and Others," *Poetics* 22 (1994): 327–357.

120. J. C. Alexander, "Citizen and Enemy as Symbolic Classification," in M. Lamont and M. Fournier, editors, *Cultivating Differences* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 290, 291.

121. J. C. Alexander and P. Smith, "The Discourse of American Civil Society," *Theory and Society* 22 (1991): 151–207.

122. M. W. Steinberg, "The Dialogue of Struggle," *Social Science History* 18 (1994): 505–542.

123. See M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, edited by M. Holquist, translated by C. Emerson and M. Holquist (Austin: University of Texas, 1981); M. Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, edited by C. Emerson and M. Holquist, translated by V. W. McGee (Austin: University of Texas, 1986); V. N. Volosinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, translated by L. Matejka and I. R. Titunik (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1986).

124. M. Emirbayer, "The Shaping of a Virtuous Citizenry," *Studies in American Political Development* 6 (1992): 391–419; M. Emirbayer, "Beyond Structuralism and Voluntarism," *Theory and Society* 21 (1992): 621–664.

125. M. R. Somers, "What's Political or Cultural about Political Culture and the Public Sphere?' *Sociological Theory* 13 (1995): 113–144; M. R. Somers, "Narrating and Naturalizing Civil Society and Citizenship Theory," *Sociological Theory* 13 (1995): 229–274; see also Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution.*

126. Somers, "Narrativity, Narrative Identity, and Social Action," 601 (italics deleted). For a similar line of argument, see H. White, *Identity and Control* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

127. J. B. Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), 40.

128. Warner, *The Letters of the Republic*, 12.

129. Negt and Kluge, *Public Sphere and Experience*, 46.

130. Young, "Impartiality and the Civic Public"; C. Cooper, *Noises in the Blood* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995); F. Fanon, "The Negro and Language," in *Black Skin, White Masks*, translated by C. L. Markmann (New York: Grove, 1967): 17–40; P. P. Giglioli, editor, *Language and Social Context* (New York: Penguin, 1985).

131. For a powerful discussion of this point, see R. C. Post, "The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse," *Harvard Law Review* 103 (1990): 603–686.

132. D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. Zald, editors, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 6. See also D. A. Snow, et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* (1986): 464–481; D. A. Snow and R. D. Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in A. D. Morris and C. M. Mueller, editors, *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992): 133–155; M. W. Steinberg, "Toward a Dialogic Analysis of Social Movement Culture," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Social Science History Association, New Orleans, 1996.

133. Alexander, "Citizen and Enemy as Symbolic Classification," 291.

134. N. Eliasoph and P. Lichterman, "The Meaningfulness of Style in Civil Life," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York City, 1996, 2.

135. Eliasoph and Lichterman, "The Meaningfulness of Style in Civic Life," 10.

136. R. N. Jacobs, "Civil Society and Crisis," *American Journal of Sociology* 101 (1996): 1238–1272.

137. M. Sheller, "The Haytian Fear," forthcoming in P. B. Vanderlippe and J. R. Feagin, editors, *Race and Ethnic Relations from a Global Perspective*, vol. 6 of *Research in Politics and Society* (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1998).

138. M. W. Steinberg, "Toward a Dialogic Analysis of Social Movement Culture," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Social Science History Association, New Orleans, 1996, 17–18.

139. W. H. Sewell, Jr., *A Rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994), 33. See also D. LaCapra, "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts," in D. LaCapra and S. L. Kaplan, editors, *Modern European Intellectual History* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1982), 47–85.

140. A number of historians focus upon these struggles over meaning without explicitly theorizing their location within networks of publicity. See, e.g., F. E. Mallon, *Peasant and Nation* (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1995); L. d'Anjou, *Social Movements and Culture Change* (Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, 1996); B. F. Williams, *Stains on My Name, War in My Veins* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1991).

141. F. Furet, "The French Revolution is Over," in *Interpreting the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 48.

142. See Furet, "The French Revolution is Over," 46–61. Of course, in many cases this type of power overlaps with social-structural power (i.e., that deriving from occupying privileged positions within social networks), although in other cases it does not, or does so only imperfectly, which makes for interesting and multi-layered contestations over power.

143. Baker, *Interpreting the French Revolution*, 6.

144. S. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, translated by J. Strachey (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1959).

145. The emotions, from this point of view, inhere not in "'entities' that have been located in individuals, such as ... 'attitudes,'" but rather in "*situational* ways of acting in conversational encounters" (R. Collins, "On the Microfoundations of Macrosociology," *American Journal of Sociology* 86 [1981]: 1010).

146. T. J. Scheff, "Emotions and Identity," in C. Calhoun, editor, *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity* (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), 282.

147. See, e.g., J. Moreno, *Who Shall Survive?* (New York: Beacon Press, 1934).

148. See, e.g., R. L. Breiger and J. G. Ennis, "Personae and Social Roles," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 42 (1979): 262–270.

149. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, 40.

150. See, e.g., P. Slater, "On Social Regression," *American Sociological Review* 28 (1963): 339–364; L. A. Coser, *Greedy Institutions* (New York: Free Press, 1974); J. Goodwin, "The Libidinal Constitution of a High-Risk Social Movement," *American Sociological Review* 62 (1997): 53–69.

151. It is striking to what degree Freud's own "sociogram" of the bonds linking leaders and followers – and of the bonds of identification among followers themselves – suggests network-analytic concepts such as "social position" and "equivalence classes." See Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, 61.

152. B. Barber, *The Logic and Limits of Trust* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1983); S. N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger, *Patrons, Clients, and Friends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); D. Gambetta, editor, *Trust* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988); N. Luhmann, "Familiarity, Confidence, Trust," in Gambetta, editor, *Trust*: 94–107; B. A. Misztal, *Trust in Modern Societies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Polity Press, 1996); A. Seligman, *The Problem of Trust* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). Closely related to this work on trust is the growing literature on social capital; for an excellent review of the latter, see M. Woolcock, "Social Capital and Economic Development," *Theory and Society* 27/2 (1998): 151–208.

153. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, 67.

154. W. R. Bion, *Experiences in Groups* (London and New York: Routledge, 1961).

155. Freud spoke of these processes in terms of the "narcissism of minor differences": Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, 41–43; S. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, translated by J. Strachey (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1961), ch. V.

156. Wolfe, *Whose Keeper?*, 204; Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society*, 182.

157. Supplementary devices also help to hold publics together, which Freudian theory does help to illuminate. Trust, for example, is often reinforced and stabilized by defense mechanisms such as repression and reaction formation, which serve to "mobilize … positive feelings within the members to counter the rivalrous ones (L. Balter, "Leaderless Groups," *International Review of Psycho-Analysis* 5 [1978]: 332). Still other control mechanisms may also come into play when regressive tendencies other than aggression (e.g., toward narcissistic withdrawal or resexualization of group ties) threaten to destabilize publics as effective working alliances.

158. J. S. Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), chs. 5, 8; R. S. Burt and M. Knez, "Kinds of Third-Party Effects on Trust," *Rationality and Society* 7 (1995): 255–292.

159. See Silver, "'Trust' in Social and Political Theory," in G. D. Suttles and M. N. Zald, editors, *The Challenge of Social Control* (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1985): 52–67; "Friendship and Trust as Moral Ideals," *European Journal of Sociology* 30 (1989): 274–297; "Friendship in Commercial Society," *American Journal of Sociology* 95 (1990): 1474–1504. The phrase "interest paradigm" derives from A. O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

160. Wolfe, *Whose Keeper?*; Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society*.

161. Bion, *Experiences in Groups*.

162. In some cases, these leaders are psychically "split apart" according to their differ-

ent attributes, such "that one member may become the fearful leader, another the enraged leader, still another the desiring leader, and so forth" (C. F. Alford, *Group Psychology and Political Theory* [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994], 53).

163. L. Hunt, *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992).

164. M. Emirbayer, "Halcyon Days," unpublished manuscript (Department of Sociology, New School for Social Research, 1998).

165. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 57.

166. Some promising leads in this regard, especially relevant to the study of publics in social movements, are to be found in M. Diani, "Social Movements and Social Capital," *Mobilization* 2 (1997): 129–147.

167. As Mary Ryan shows of nineteenth century "civic culture" in the United States, it was at times profoundly "driven by contest, struggle, loss, and gain, and it remained riddled with inequities and productive of violent disagreements," often on the verge of "Civic Wars" (M. Ryan, *Civic Wars* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997], 228).

168. R. Collins, "Stratification, Emotional Energy, and the Transient Emotions," in T. D. Kemper, editor, *Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); 27–28.

169. E. Sagan, *The Honey and the Hemlock* (New York: Basic, 1991), 18.

170. J. D. Lewis and A. J. Weigert, "Social Atomism, Holism, and Trust," *Sociological Quarterly* 26 (1985): 459.

171. We concur with Alexander, in fact, that the "identification of actor and agency" renders one "guilty of [the fallacy of] misplaced concreteness.... [A]ctors per se are much more than, and much less than, 'agents' [alone]" (J. Alexander, "Some Remarks on 'Agency' in Recent Sociological Theory," *Perspectives* [Newsletter of the Theory Section of the American Sociological Association] 15 [1992]: 1).

172. M. Emirbayer and A. Mische, "What is Agency?" *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (1998): 970.

173. J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

174. Emirbayer and Mische, "What is Agency?" 971.

175. It should be noted that iterational modes of public transactions are rarely lacking in contention. When Irish gays and lesbians march in the St. Patrick's Day parade in New York City, for example, they challenge the symbolic constitution of a unitary "Irish" identity, an identity also contested in the parades of Loyalist Orangemen in Northern Ireland.

176. Emirbayer and Mische, "What is Agency?" 971.

177. J. Comaroff and J. Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Sheller, "Democracy after Slavery"; R. D. E. Burton, *Afro-Creole* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997); D. J. Austin-Broos, *Jamaica Genesis* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

178. McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*.

179. Emirbayer and Mische, "What is Agency?" 971.

180. Classic statements include Arendt, *The Human Condition*; and Arendt, *On Revolution*. More recent writings by sociologists include Bellah, et al., *The Good Society*; A. Etzioni, *The New Golden Rule* (New York: Basic Books, 1996); Weintraub, "Virtue, Community, and the Sociology of Liberty."

181. P. Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, translated by Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).

182. M. De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, translated by S. Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); J. C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance.*

183. E. M. Leifer, "Interaction Preludes to Role Setting," *American Sociological Review* 53 (1988): 865–878.

184. Emirbayer and Mische, "What is Agency?" 999.

185. Of course, certain individuals and publics are better positioned than others to develop capacities for effective and prudential judgment.

186. One should bear in mind that these three typical tendencies in public action hardly stand in a pure, one-to-one relationship to the three orientations of agency; the latter are, after all, analytical dimensions to be found to varying degrees in *all* concrete instances of public action. We are speaking here only of the "dominant" tones in what has been called the chordal triad of agency.

187. We shift perhaps confusingly between allusions to changing relational (or structural) contexts of action – and to institutional complexes. This is only an apparent contradiction, however, since institutional complexes are themselves nothing other than bundles of empirical social action, ordered or channeled through social-structural, cultural, and social-psychological patternings. To change one or more of the latter is thus to change the institution itself. One merely adds theoretical precision through the notion of relational or structural contexts, inasmuch as that notion allows for a more careful specification of the analytic level (or levels) at which relevant changes are occurring.

188. R. Laba, *The Roots of Solidarity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution*; Sheller, "Democracy after Slavery."

189. A Abbott, "On the Concept of Turning Point," *Comparative Social Research* 16 (1997): 93.

190. W. H. Sewell, Jr., "Three Temporalities," in T. J. McDonald, editor, *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 31.

191. M. Sahlins, "The Return of the Event, Again," in A. Biersack, editor, *Clio in Oceania* (Washington: Smithsonian, 1991), 45.

192. Sahlins, "The Return of the Event, Again," 47, 68. See also M. Sahlins, *Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1981); M. Sahlins, *Islands of History* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

193. This is a paraphrase of Herbert Blumer's phrase "sensitizing concepts," in *Symbolic Interactionism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961).

194. T. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions,* 320 n. 16.