

DEAN ACHESON AND THE TURKISH-AMERICAN ALLIANCE, 1945-1953

by

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ABSTRACT

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Key Words: Dean Acheson, Turkey, the United States, the Truman Doctrine, NATO

The early Cold War historiography on Turkish-American relations has long been dominated by chronological narratives that explained post-WWII developments in relations between the two countries either through an ideological account, or through an attempt to identify which officials, usually on the U.S. side, pushed for and promoted closer ties between the two states. This dissertation, based on research performed in the U.S. National Archives in College Park, Maryland and the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri, breaks with the traditional post-WWII historiography on Turkish-American relations by focusing on one official, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in order to provide a more comprehensive account of how Turkish-U.S. relations developed between 1945 and 1953. Through concentration on Acheson's life, character, career, and approach to diplomacy, this dissertation explores the decisions that Acheson took concerning U.S. relations with Turkey, and his interactions with Turkish officials, especially Turkish Ambassador to the U.S. Feridun Cemal Erkin. Additionally, the text focuses on the postwar U.S. political and social context in order to provide a more complete examination of the factors which Secretary Acheson considered while formulating policies towards Turkey that eventually resulted in Turkish accession to NATO. Ultimately, this thesis provides a new conceptual framework for post-WWII Turkish-U.S. events, and concludes that Acheson was the single most important U.S. official responsible for developments in post-WWII Turkish-American affairs. Furthermore, the U.S. Congress is identified as the single greatest impediment, on the U.S. side, to faster development in Turkish-U.S. relations after WWII.

ÖZET

DEAN ACHESON VE TÜRK-AMERİKAN İTTİFAKI, 1945-1953

Adam McConnel

Tarih Doktora Programı

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Cemil Koçak

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dean Acheson, Türkiye, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Truman Doktrini, NATO

Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri üzerine yazılan erken Soğuk Savaş tarih literatürü uzun zamandır kronolojik anlatıma dayalı metinlerin hâkimiyetinde olmuştur. Bu metinlerin büyük çoğunluğu, II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası Türk-Amerikan münasebetlerindeki gelişmeleri ya ideolojik bir bakış açısıyla açıklamaya çalışmıştır ya da hangi resmi görevlilerin (çoğu zaman ABD tarafında) bu iki devlet arasında daha yakın ilişkiler kurulmasını istediği ve lehine çalıştığı üzerine odaklanmıştır. Bu tez, ABD'nin Maryland eyaletinin College Park kasabasındaki devlet arşivlerinde ve Missouri eyaletinin Independence kasabasındaki Harry S. Truman Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kütüphanesi'nde yapılan araştırmalardan elde edilen yeni bilgilerle yazılmıştır. Ayrıca tez, Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri üzerine yazılmış mevcut tarih literatüründen, bir resmi şahsa, ABD Dışişleri Bakanı Dean Acheson'a, odaklanmasıyla benzerlerinden ayrılıyor. Böylece 1945-1953 arasında Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerindeki gelişmeleri açıklayan daha kapsamlı bir anlatım sağlıyor. Tez, Acheson'un hayatı, şahsiyeti, kariyeri ve diplomasiye yaklaşımına odaklanırken, Acheson'un oluşturduğu Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri ile ilgili kararlarını anlamaya yönelik yeni bir yaklaşımı ortaya koyuyor. Ayrıca bu tez, Acheson ile dönemin ABD Türkiye Büyükelçisi Feridun Cemal Erkin arasındaki resmi görüşmeleri de ele alıyor. Böylece, bu tez ABD'nin II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası siyasal ve sosyal durumunu anlatırken, Dışişleri Bakanı Acheson'un kararlarını oluştururken göz önüne aldığı faktörlere ve Türkiye'nin NATO'ya katılmasıyla sonuçlanan sürece de daha kapsayıcı bir bakış sunuyor. Sonuç olarak tez hem II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri için

yeni bir çerçeve sunuyor, hem de Acheson'un bu ilişkilerin gelişmesinden sorumlu en önemli şahıs olduğunu ortaya koyuyor. Ayrıca tez II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin hızlı gelişmesini engelleyen en önemli unsurun ABD Kongresi olduğunu da tespit ediyor.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADA: Americans for Democratic Action

AMAT: the American Mission for Aid to Turkey

AVC: the American Veterans Committee

BEW: the U.S. Board of Economic Warfare

CIA: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

CIO: the Congress of Industrial Organizations

DAC: the Democratic Advisory Council

ECA: the Economic Cooperation Administration

EPU: the European Payments Union

ERP: the European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan)

FDR: U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt

FRUS: Foreign Relations of the United States

JAMMAT: the Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey

JCS: the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

JIS: the U.S. Joint Intelligence Staff

JSSC: the U.S. Joint Strategic Survey Committee

JWPC: the U.S. Joint War Plans Committee

MDAA: the Mutual Defense Assistance Act

MEC: the Middle East Command

MEDO: the Middle East Defense Organization

MSA: Mutual Security Aid

NARA: the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration

NAC: the North Atlantic Council

NAT: the North Atlantic Treaty

NATO: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSC: the U.S. National Security Council

OEEC: the Organization for European Economic Co-operation

PCA: the Progressive Citizens of America

SANACC: the U.S. State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee

SWNCC: the U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

UDA: the Union for Democratic Action

U.K.: the United Kingdom

U.N.: the United Nations

UNECE: the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

UNRRA: the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

U.S.: the United States

USSR: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WWI: World War One

WWII: World War Two

1.0. INTRODUCTION

It is always the case that the one who is not your friend will request your neutrality, and the one who is your friend will request your armed support.... But when you boldly declare your support for one side, then if that side conquers, even though the victor is powerful and you are at his mercy, he is under an obligation to you and he has committed himself to friendly ties with you.... But when such an alliance cannot be avoided... then the prince should support one side or another for the reasons given above. Then, no government should ever imagine that it can adopt a safe course; rather, it should regard all possible courses of action as risky. This is the way things are... Prudence consists in being able to assess the nature of a particular threat and in accepting the lesser evil.¹

Niccolò Machiavelli's *The Prince* has been an essential text for practitioners and students of politics since its publication in the early 16th century. Despite the brevity of Machiavelli's book, the controversies surrounding it have endured for the supposedly amoral behaviors that he recommends. In actuality, the essence of the text is simple, that politicians act according to the realities of the situations that confront them, not according to preconceived ideals.

This study concerns an American diplomatic and political figure who identified with that realist political tradition, and whose decisions gave shape to the world that exists today. Dean Acheson, who acted as Assistant Secretary of State from 1945 to 1947 and United States Secretary of State from 1949 to early 1953, more than any other person, even President Truman, had decisive roles in the formulation and implementation of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and ultimately, the admission of the Turkish Republic to that ostensibly Western European alliance. This thesis will define exactly what role Acheson played in what was, if considered according to contemporary conditions, a surprising development, the acceptance of the Turkish Republic

¹ Machiavelli, Niccolò. *The Prince*. George Bull, transl. London: Penguin Books, 2003. p. 73.

into the alliance that defined the Cold War's dominant power bloc. That decision was certainly fateful for the Turkish side. Without considering other hypothetical results, Turkey was launched onto a new track of rapid cultural, economic, political, and social change, nearly as radical as the changes that had occurred in the 1920s. Dean Acheson was more responsible for the U.S. decisions in the process that led to Turkish accession to NATO than any other U.S. official.

1.1. America Post-WWII

The United States (U.S.), after WWII, confronted an unprecedented situation: human history's most potent and productive economy also possessed previously unseen military strength and a weapon capable of unimaginable devastation. This strength was derived from the U.S.' large and industrially-organized population, natural resources, and political and cultural system, which enabled the productive resources of the population and territory to create great wealth for the state and a large percentage of its citizens. Industrialization, which started in Great Britain in the latter half of the 18th Century, had previously created new sources of economic, political, and military strength for the 19th Century British, French, and German states, and in the 20th Century, for Japan. The fearful conflagrations of the early 20th Century, however, served to destroy much of those states' power. Those same disastrous wars pushed the U.S.' productive capacities to new levels, resulting in enormous economic and military strength, as well as the political power that flowed from those capabilities.²

The U.S. embarked on its industrialization process in the 19th Century, primarily after the Civil War destroyed the political power of the agrarian Southern states that had rebelled

² Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000*. New York: Random House, 1987. pp. 151-169, 182-191, 209-215, 219-232, 242-249, 275-291, 303-320.

against the mercantile and already industrializing Northern states. U.S. industrialization was largely completed by the end of the 19th Century, as the U.S. began to expand its power overseas. In terms of economic production, the U.S. had no rival by 1914, but chose to largely withdraw from international affairs after WWI. After WWII, the U.S. faced no serious economic or military competitor, not even the one other Great Power that emerged from WWII with a semblance of economic and military strength, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Consequently, the U.S. leadership knew that they had a singular opportunity to reshape the world's economy, politics, and power in hopes of creating a more stable and less violent global system that would be more likely to bring lasting prosperity to the world's peoples.³

Naturally, the degree of success that the U.S. leadership achieved in pursuing such a project has been the subject of countless studies over the past 60 years. One thing does seem undeniable, however: for better or for worse, the world system and essentially all human societies have been affected by the preponderance of U.S. strength since WWII, as well as by the international institutions (such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank) founded through U.S. efforts, the vision of international economic relations that the U.S. promoted, and the cultural mentalities and items the U.S. exported to the world's societies during the same period.

1.2. The Turkish Republic

The Turkish Republic, founded in the early 1920s, was heir to the Ottoman state in most respects, and the problems confronting that new republic were largely the same as those that

³ Kennedy pp. 242-249, 275-291, 327-333, 357-372; Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992. p. 5.

had faced the extinguished Ottoman state. The Ottoman political elite, by the end of the 18th Century, had begun to identify economic, military, and political reforms that seemed necessary to maintain military and political competition with European states. The first Ottoman attempts to industrialize, for example, were actually carried out in the first decades of the 19th Century, but were largely unsuccessful. By WWI, the Ottoman economy had achieved some minor successes in creating industrial enterprises, but was still almost totally dominated by agriculture. The reasons for this continued dependence on agriculture were many and varied, but the result was that the Ottomans did not possess the military strength, productive capacity, or technology of its wartime opponents. In fact, even though Ottoman soldiers fought tenaciously on multiple fronts in the conflict, the successes that were achieved by the Ottomans during WWI largely depended on the military leadership, technology, and weapons of their German allies.

The Turkish Republic was proclaimed by the Turkish Parliament on 29 October 1923, following the successful conclusion of the struggle to eject post-WWI occupying forces from Anatolia and İstanbul. Led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), the remaining Ottoman bureaucratic, intellectual, and military elites who shared his vision embarked upon the creation of a nation-state, and upon the complex cultural, economic, governmental, and social engineering that this project entailed.⁴ Over a span of time from the beginning of WWII to the Cold War's inception, those same Turkish elites, now led by Mustafa Kemal's collaborator İsmet İnönü, chose to pursue an alliance with the United States.

For the past 60 years the interaction between Turkey and the United States has been especially intense, but the relationship extends back nearly to the U.S.'s foundation in the late 18th century. Exchange between Turkey and the U.S. has had a long period of time to mature

⁴ Hasan Bülent Kahraman. *Türk Siyasetinin Yapısal Analizi, Vol. I: Kavramlar, Kuramlar, Kurumlar*. İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2008. *Passim*, but pp. 188-197, 241-248 can be referred to as a summary.

as, over the past one hundred-plus years, a large portion of the Turkish elite has been educated by U.S.-style schools such as Robert College, and as greater numbers of Turkish students began to receive education in the U.S. Previous to that period, American Protestant missionaries had worked in many areas of Anatolia and the Levant, bringing new ideas and cultural items to the local inhabitants, and founding schools which eventually became institutions such as Bosphorus University and Robert College.

After WWII, the Turkish Republic and the United States embarked on a deeper, multifaceted relationship that served the interests of both and eventually became a military alliance. Even though the American presence in Turkish society was not new, the depth and extent to which the two states, and consequently their societies, would become intertwined was entirely novel. For reasons of power, the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. has often been dominated by the U.S., but Turkish governments and citizens have always preserved their individuality and interests, even to the point of political tension with their prodigious partner.

The reasons that moved Turkish elites to choose the United States as an ally are still the subject of historiographical speculation, and concrete information would shed a great deal of light on why Turkish statesmen have made certain decisions at key conjunctures in their interactions with the U.S. Some issues are clear, such as the Turkish need for U.S. financial and technological aid for its industrialization project, as well as military reinforcement against the Soviet threat. However, because the official Turkish documents for the era are still unavailable to researchers, this study focuses on the U.S. side of the relationship. Hopefully, in the near future more balanced studies, making full use of the archives of both states, will be possible.

1.2.1. From the Barbary Corsairs to WWII

Turkey, whether as the Ottoman Empire or as the Turkish Republic, has interacted with the government, citizens, economy, and military of the United States since the late 18th century. The United States' first overseas military venture was, in a *de facto* manner, a conflict with the Ottoman state since the Barbary corsairs of North Africa were technically subjects of the Ottoman *Padişah*. Other than those two little-known Barbary Wars (1801-1805, 1815-1816⁵), United States relations with the Ottoman Empire, throughout the 19th century, were generally limited to low-level trade and missionary activity amongst the Empire's Christian subjects. For a short period in the 1830s, American military officers directed Mahmut II's shipyard and the rebuilding of the Ottoman Navy following the disaster at Navarino⁶; U.S. officers also aided Khedive Ismail, yet again under the *de facto* sovereignty of the Ottoman

⁵ For more information on these conflicts, see: Field, James A. *America and the Mediterranean World 1776-1882*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969; Herring, George. *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. For an interesting historical-adventure approach to the First Barbary War, see: Zacks, Richard *The Pirate Coast: Thomas Jefferson, the First Marines, and the Secret Mission of 1805*. New York: Hyperion, 2005. For more information on Ottoman-American relations in the 18th and 19th centuries, see: Armaoğlu, Fahir. *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri (Açıklamalı)*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi: Ankara, 1991; Aydın, Mustafa and Çağrı Erhan, eds. *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present, Future*. London: Routledge, 2004; Criss, Nur Bilge, et al., eds. *American Turkish Encounters: Politics and Culture, 1830-1989*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011; Curti, Merle and Kendall Birr. *Prelude to Point Four: American Technical Missions Overseas 1838-1938*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1954; Danacıoğlu, Esra. "Anadolu'da Birkaç Amerikalı Misyoner (1820-1850)." *Toplumsal Tarih*. No. 120, Aralık 2003. pp. 76-79; Earle, Edward Mead. "American Missions in the Near East." *Foreign Affairs*. April 1929, Vol. 7 Issue 3. pp. 398-417; Erhan, Çağrı. *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*. Ankara: İmge Kitapevi Yayınları, 2001; Howard, Harry N. "The Bicentennial in American-Turkish Relations." *Middle East Journal*. 30:3. 1976:Summer. pp. 291-310; Köprülü, Orhan F. "Tarihte Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri." *Belleten*. LI/200; Macar, Elçin. "Ortadoğu Yardım Örgütü." *Toplumsal Tarih*. No. 120, Aralık 2003. pp. 80-85; Özbek, Pınar. "US-Turkish Relations and the Effects of American Missionary Activities on US Foreign Policy Towards Turkey." *Review of Armenian Studies*. No. 17. 2008. pp. 93-116.

⁶ See: Field, op. cit., pp. 165-175.

Empire, during the 1870s.⁷

World War I saw the United States and the Ottoman Empire on opposing sides after the U.S. entered the war in 1917. Even though the two states never fought, official relations were severed in 1917 and not fully restored until 1927. During that ten-year period unofficial relations continued, at the civilian level of Commissioner, and on the military level of Rear Admiral. Consequently, Rear Admiral Mark Bristol, High Commissioner of the U.S. delegation in Turkey after August 1919, became an important factor in preserving Turkish-American relations between 1918 and 1927.⁸

During the same period, the increasing global stature of the U.S. garnered attention in Turkey, both negative and positive. The 1915 Armenian Deportations and Massacres issue, taken up by the Armenian diaspora and its supporters in the U.S., caused political problems throughout the 1920s and 1930s, prevented Congressional ratification of the Lausanne

⁷ Ibid. pp. 389-435.

⁸ Details can be found in: Trask, Roger. *The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939*. The University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1971. pp. 28-60, as well as in: DeNovo, John A. *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939*. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1963. pp. 88-166, 210-274. More information concerning Turkish-American relations from the end of WWI to 1928 can be found in: Armaoğlu, op. cit.; Aydın and Erhan, op. cit.; Bölükbaşı, Suha. "The Evolution of a Close Relationship: Turkish-American Relations Between 1917-1960." *Foreign Policy (Ankara)*. Vol. XVI. 1991. Nos. 1-2. pp. 80-104; Daniel, Robert L. "The Armenian Question and American-Turkish Relations, 1914-1927." *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. Vol. 46, No. 2. Sep., 1959. pp. 252-275; Daniel, Robert L., "The United States and the Turkish Republic Before World War II: The Cultural Dimension." *Middle East Journal*. 21:1. 1967:Winter. pp.52-63; Grew, Joseph C. *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945, Vol.I*. London: Hammond & Hammond Co. Ltd., 1953; Harris, George S. and Nur Bilge Criss, eds. *Studies in Atatürk's Turkey: The American Dimension*. Leiden: Brill, 2009; Hurewitz, J.C. *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record: 1914-1956, Vol. II*. D. Van Nostrand and Co., Inc.: Princeton, N.J., 1956; Oran, Baskın, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası, Cilt I: 1919-1980*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004; Yale, William. "Ambassador Henry Morgenthau's Special Mission of 1917." *World Politics*. Vol. 1, No. 3. Apr., 1949. pp. 308-320; Yalman, Ahmed Emin. *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerimiz ve Geçirdiklerimiz, 2. Cilt: 1922-1971*. İstanbul: Pera Turizm ve Ticaret A.Ş., 1997; Yılmaz, Şuhnaz. "Challenging the Stereotypes: Turkish-American Relations in the Inter-War Era." *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 42, No. 2. March 2006. pp. 223-237.

Treaty, and delayed official U.S. recognition of the nationalist Turkish government. On the part of the Turkish Nationalist government in Ankara, their attempts to attract U.S. investment in Turkey broadly failed.⁹

The 1930s, on the other hand, witnessed an increase in mutual interest, especially on the Turkish side. The first official U.S. Ambassador to the Turkish Republic, Joseph Grew, was a strong proponent of the Turkish Nationalist project, but the historical conjuncture in the U.S. (the Great Depression, the Nye Committee Senate investigations into the U.S.' WWI munitions industry, strong isolationist public sentiment) made realizing the Turkish need for financial and military aid impossible. Grew had first interacted with members of the Turkish nationalist leadership during the Lausanne Treaty negotiations, and was favorably impressed.¹⁰ Grew's positive opinion continued during his tenure as U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, and to the extent that he even participated in a pro-Turkish film intended for American audiences; in this film Grew stood side-by-side with Mustafa Kemal as first the Turkish President, then the U.S. Ambassador, addressed speeches extolling the progress of the Turkish nation to the viewers.¹¹ Despite such attempts to increase the stature of Turkey in American eyes, overall progress in Turkish-U.S. relations was sparse during the 1930s, and consisted mostly of technical aid and training provided by U.S. advisors. On the other hand, enough progress was made by the end of the decade for the completion of a Turkish-

⁹ For information concerning the Chester Project, the Lausanne Treaty, and the Armenian opposition, see: DeNovo, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-166, 210-243; Trask, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-64, 94-98.

¹⁰ The difference between Grew's initial impressions of the Turkish Lausanne Delegation and his later descriptions are stark. See. Grew, *op. cit.*, pp. 491-511, 535-539, 549-553, 562-570. As early as the Lausanne Treaty negotiations, the Turkish Nationalist leadership had expressed interest in trade agreements with the U.S., see: Grew, *op. cit.*, pp. 534-535, 586-605.

¹¹ This film can easily be found, in fragments or as a whole, on the Internet. For example: http://www.tccb.gov.tr/sayfa/ata_ozel/video/ (accessed on 17 December 2012).

American Trade Agreement in April 1939.¹²

1.2.2. WWII: A Deepening Mutual Interaction

WWII did not produce an immediate official change in the relationship between the two nations, but both sides began to show signs of heightened awareness of, interest in, and even need for aid from the other. The Turkish government was, from the onset of the war, sympathetic towards the Allied cause,¹³ but not in an overt and public manner that might

¹² This treaty was intended as a replacement for the previous 1929 Treaty of Ankara. See: DeNovo, op. cit., pp. 238-243; Trask, op. cit., pp. 108-126. For the texts of the two treaties, see: Armaoğlu, op. cit., pp. 113-124 (in Turkish). For more information on Turkish-American relations during the 1930s, see: Armaoğlu, Fahir. "Atatürk Döneminde Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri." *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*. Vol. 13, No. 38. 1997; Bali, Rifat, ed. *American Diplomats in Turkey: Oral History Transcripts (1928-1997), Vol. I*. İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık Ticaret Ltd. Şkt., 2011; Bali, Rifat N., ed. *U.S. Diplomatic Documents on Turkey Volume IV: New Documents on Atatürk -- Atatürk as Viewed through the Eyes of American Diplomats*. İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2007; Bölükbaşı, op. cit.; Carpenter-Kılınç, Sarah. *Turkish National Education and Political Transition: 1939-1960: Evolving Perceptions of Schooling*. VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2009. Ch. II; Curti, op. cit.; Daniel, Robert L., "The United States and the Turkish Republic Before World War II: The Cultural Dimension." *Middle East Journal*. 21:1. 1967:Winter. pp.52-63; Grew, Joseph C. *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945, Vol.II*. London: Hammond & Hammond Co. Ltd., 1953. pp. 707-919; Harris and Criss, op. cit.; Howard, op. cit.; Howard, Harry N. "The United States and Turkey: American Policy in the Straits Question (1914-1963)." *Balkan Studies*. 4. 1963; McConnel, Adam. *The Approach of Turkish-American Accord: The Portrayal of the United States in Ulus Gazetesi during World War II*. Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr Müller, 2009. pp. 20-36; "Roosevelt Lauds Atatürk's Regime: Turkish President, in Reply, ...". *New York Times*. Aug. 1, 1937; Tekeli, İlhan ve Selim İlkin. *Cumhuriyetin Harcı: Köktenci Modernitenin Ekonomik Politikasının Gelişimi*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010. p. 204; Trask, Roger R. "The United States and Turkish Nationalism: Investments and Technical Aid during the Atatürk Era." *The Business History Review*. Vol. 38, No. 1, International Government-Business Issue. Spring 1964. pp. 58-77; Yalman, op. cit.; Yılmaz, Şuhnaz, op. cit.

¹³ The newspaper most closely tied to the ruling *CHP* (Republican People's Party), *Ulus*, was consistently pro-American from at least the beginning of 1939. See: McConnel, op. cit., pp. 55-92. Turkey also concluded a mutual aid pact with Britain and France in October 1939. The attitude of the Turkish leadership during WWII has long been a subject of both academic and political debate, but in the past ten years, awareness of Turkey's pro-Allied stance throughout the war has increased. This thesis will take this matter in hand during the following chapters. Some U.S. citizens living in İstanbul before the war were already aware that the Turkish leadership was going to unusual lengths to appeal to the U.S. political elite

disconcert the Nazi leadership. The Turkish military was in no way prepared for industrial, total war¹⁴ and, therefore, the Turkish leadership had to be extremely wary of provoking a military that was, from May 1941, perched on its doorstep.¹⁵ At the same time, Turkey had to

and U.S. citizens; see: Freely, John. *A Bridge of Culture: Robert-College-Boğaziçi University*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2009. pp. 278-279.

¹⁴ Shown in dramatic terms by a January 1943 memorandum prepared for President Roosevelt. This memorandum detailed the capabilities of the contemporary Turkish military; according to its information, the Turkish military was composed of 42 infantry divisions, three mountain divisions, three cavalry divisions, and one armored brigade. The memorandum then goes on to explain that, because of a "... critical shortage of supporting artillery, modern anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery and armored units," in order for the Turkish Army to provide effective resistance to a hypothetical Axis invasion, the Turkish military's minimum requirements were three field artillery brigades, three heavy anti-aircraft regiments, six light anti-aircraft battalions, nine machine gun batteries, nine anti-tank battalions, three air support groups, one armored division, and the necessary weapons for all of these groups. That is, the Turkish military had to be equipped from top-to-bottom for the nature of WWII military operations. This memorandum was found in Record Group 218: Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1941 - 1977, Geographic File 1942-1945, Box 204, CCS 381 Turkey (1-18-43) Sec. 1, in a file labeled "Allied Plans Relating to Turkey," in the NARA Archives at College Park, Maryland. The memorandum has "1-1-43" handwritten on it, as well as a filing stamp indicating 5 February 1943, but no author of the memorandum is credited. Two copies exist in the same file. See also: Parker, John and Charles Smith. *Modern Turkey*. London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1940. pp. 205- 220; Tunçay, Mete. "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın Başlarında (1939-1941) Türk Ordusu." *Tarih ve Toplum*. S. 35, Kasım 1986. pp. 34-41.

¹⁵ For more information on Turkey's WWII foreign policy, see: Koçak, Cemil. *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945), Cilt I & II*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003; see also: Acikalın, Cevat. "Turkey's International Relations." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*. Vol. 23, No. 4, October 1947. pp. 477-491; Alvarez, David J. "The Embassy of Laurence A. Steinhardt: Aspects of Allied-Turkish Relations, 1942-1945." *East European Quarterly*. Vol. IX, No. 1. 1975. pp. 39-52; Armaoğlu, Fahir. "İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye." *A.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*. Vol. 13, No. 2. 1958. pp. 139-179; Ataöv, Türkkaya. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-1945*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1965; Athanassopoulou, Ekavi. *Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952*. Frank Cass: London, 1999. pp. 15-44; Beitzell, Robert. *The Uneasy Alliance: America, Britain, and Russia, 1941-1943*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972; Deringil, Selim. *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An Active Neutrality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; Dost-Niyego, Pınar. "Yeni Belgeler Işında Kahire Konferansı (4-8 Aralık 1943): II. Dünya Savaşı'nda İngiltere ve Amerika'nın Türkiye Rekabeti." *Toplumsal Tarih*. No. 205, Ocak 2011. pp. 80-87; Edip, Halide. "Turkey and Her Allies." *Foreign Affairs*. Apr. 1940, Vol. 18 Issue 3. pp. 442-449; Gürün, Kamuran. *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri, 1920-1953*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi: Ankara, 1991; Hale, William. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*. Frank Cass Publishers: London, 2000; Howard, Harry. *Turkey, the Straits, and U.S. Policy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. pp. 161-209; Hurewitz, J.C. *Middle East Dilemmas: The Background of United States Policy*. New York: Harper and Brothers,

maneuver according to the terms of the military agreements it had made with Great Britain and France after the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939; in June 1941, after the Nazi occupation of Greece, Ankara also signed a friendship and non-aggression pact with the Germans.¹⁶

1953. pp. 187-195; Kılıç, Altemur. *Turkey and the World*. Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959; Kirk, George. *The Middle East in the War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952. pp. 443-466; Langer, William L. and S. Everett Gleason. *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1953. pp. 112-116, 393-418, 510-514, 798-801; Millman, Brock. "Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy 1934-42." *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 31, No. 3, Jul., 1995. pp. 483-508; Oran, Baskın. "İç ve Dış Politika İlişkisi Açısından İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye'de Siyasal Hayat ve Sağ-Sol Akımlar." *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi (SBFD)*. Cilt XXIV, no.3 (Eylül 1969), pp. 227-275; Oran, Baskın, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası, Cilt I: 1919-1980*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004. pp. 385-476; Özgüldür, Yavuz. *Türk-Alman İlişkileri: 1923-1945*. Genelkurmay Basımevi: Ankara, 1993; Tamkoç, Metin. *The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976. pp. 202-227; Thomas, Lewis V. and Richard N. Frye. *The United States and Turkey and Iran*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1951. pp. 88-112; Toynbee, Arnold and Veronica, eds. *The War and the Neutrals*. London: Oxford University Press, 1956. pp. 345-366; Ülman, A. Haluk. "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler (1923-1968), I." *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*. Vol. XXIII, No. 3, Eylül 1968. pp. 241-273; Vali, Ferenc A. *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971; VanderLippe, John M. "A Cautious Balance: The Question of Turkey in World War II." *Historian*. Fall 2001, Vol. 64, Issue 1, pp. 63-80; Vere-Hodge, Edward Reginald. "Turkish Foreign Policy, 1918-1948." PhD Dissertation, No. 69, University of Geneva. Ambilly-Annemasse, 1950; Weber, Frank G. *The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War*. St Louis, Missouri, 1979; Weisband, Edward. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics*. Princeton University Press: USA, 1973.

¹⁶ The Turkish-German Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact has been used to argue that Turkey had pro-Nazi tendencies during the war, or that the Turkish leadership would have joined the Axis if it became expedient to do so. Such an event never came to pass, so this is an essentially futile claim. However, the Pact had the effect that the Turkish leadership desired: the Germans did not invade. Furthermore, the Germans did not want to invade Turkey, which would have been a militarily untenable project at that point in the war. The Pact with Turkey was signed only four days before the launch of Operation Barbarossa, and the Nazis had already devoted far more men, equipment, and weapons to Greece than had originally been planned. In sum, Turkish officials, whose main aim was to avoid hostilities, were still able to tell both the Allies and the Axis what they wanted to hear. For more details concerning the Turkish-German Non-Aggression Pact, see: *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* 1941, Vol. 3, pp. 814-936, *passim*. See also: Barkay, Gül İnanc. *ABD Diplomasinde Türkiye, 1940-1943*. Aydoğan Matbaacılık: İstanbul, 2001. pp. 51-60; Deringil op. cit., pp. 141-145; Koçak, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 547-597; McConnel, op. cit., pp. 66-70; Millman, op. cit.

Initially, WWII appeared to be the Turkish leadership's worst-case scenario as the Nazis allied with Russia, Turkey's traditional regional enemy, then in the guise of the Soviet Union. Operation Barbarossa came as great relief to Ankara and, step-by-step, as the war progressed and the Germans were driven back towards Central Europe, Turkey became more and more explicitly friendly to the Allies. By 1943, the Turkish government was providing covert support to the Allies, and the Allies were providing materials, vehicles, planes, and training to Turkey.¹⁷ 1944 was marked by increasingly acrimonious negotiations between the Allies, especially the British and the Soviets, and the Turkish leadership regarding Turkey's entry into the war.¹⁸ In August 1944, however, the Turkish government severed ties with the Nazis. The same was done in regard to Japan in January 1945. On 23 February 1945, Turkey declared war on Germany, but never became militarily involved in the conflict.

Throughout the war, Turkish relations with the United States developed an ever-increasing depth, especially as concerns about the Soviet leadership's ultimate aims became more pressing than the Nazi threat. Until December 1941, relations between Turkey and the U.S. had focused on the issues of chromite supplies, with the aim of increasing those going to the Allies and decreasing those going to Germany, Turkish-U.S. commerce and Turkish inclusion in the Lend-Lease Program, and possible U.S. support for a South Balkan security pact

¹⁷ Numerous JCS documents illustrate this reality, as do *FRUS* documents. See, for example: NARA, RG 218, Geographic file Box 204: CCS 381 Turkey (1-18-43) Sec. 1, "Allied Plans Relating to Turkey" and CCS 400.3295 Turkey (2-17-42), "Lend-Lease Supplies for Turkey"; *FRUS* 1943, Vol. 4, pp. 1057-1064, 1071-1077, 1086-1167 *passim*;. See also: Cossaboom, Robert and Gary Leiser. "Adana Station 1943-45: Prelude to the Post-war American Military Presence in Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 34, No. 1. 1998. pp. 73-86; Howard, *Turkey, the Straits, and U.S. Policy*, pp. 161-209; Leiser, Gary. "The Turkish Air Force, 1939-45: The Rise of a Minor Power." *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 26, No. 3, Jul., 1990. pp. 383-395; VanderLippe, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

¹⁸ The issue of Turkish entry into the war is still a debated topic. In addition to texts listed above in Note 15, the *FRUS* documents from 1944 detail the diplomatic exchanges and events regarding Turkey's relations with the Allies in 1944, and possible Turkish entry into hostilities. See: *FRUS* 1944, Vol. 5, pp. 814-915 *passim*.

including Turkey.¹⁹ The chrome issue was determined by the Turkish need to maintain its own delicate economic balance, as well as appease the desires of the Allies and the Germans. Turkish-U.S. trade remained tied to the conflict of interest between British and American commercial aims. The Balkan security pact idea was, in the course of events, eliminated by the Italian, and subsequent German, invasion of Greece, and the parallel Nazi assumption of control in Bulgaria.

After the U.S. entered the war in December 1941, the Turkish government took steps to indicate its favorable inclination towards not only the Allies, but specifically towards the U.S. This attitude was not limited to purely military matters. In the press, in public events, in trade, the Turkish government looked for ways to express its preference without entering into excessive risk of Nazi invasion or attack.²⁰ In 1942-1943, the U.S. began to assert its own

¹⁹ See: Barkay, op. cit., pp. 25-40, 51-77; *FRUS* 1940, Vol. 3, pp. 944-990 *passim*; *FRUS* 1941, Vol. 3, pp. 814- 974 *passim*.

²⁰ For more information regarding Turkish-American relations during WWII, see: Alvarez, David J. *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey, 1943-1946*. Thessaloniki: The Institute for Balkan Studies, 1980. pp. 23-53; Alvarez, "The Embassy of Laurence A. Steinhardt: Aspects of Allied-Turkish Relations, 1942-1945," pp. 39-52; Bali, *American Diplomats in Turkey: Oral History Transcripts (1928-1997), Vol. I*, pp. 29-34; Bali, Rıfat N. "II. Dünya Savaş Yıllarında Türkiye'de Amerikan Propagandası." *Toplumsal Tarih*. Şubat 2007, Sayı 158. pp. 74-75; Barkay, op. cit., *passim*; Bölükbaşı, "The Evolution of a Close Relationship: Turkish-American Relations Between 1917-1960," pp. 80-104; Bryson, Thomas A. *American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1784-1975: A Survey*. Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1977. pp. 131-133; Cossaboom, op. cit.; DeNovo, John A. "The Culbertson Economic Mission and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1944-1945." *The Journal of American History*. Vol. 63, No. 4. Mar., 1977. pp. 913-936; Dost-Niyego, Pınar. "Amerika'nın Türk Politikasının Oluşumu Üzerine Yeni bir Okuma." *Tarih ve Toplum - Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, n. 13, Güz 2011; Dost-Niyego, "Yeni Belgeler Işığında Kahire Konferansı (4-8 Aralık 1943): II. Dünya Savaşı'nda İngiltere ve Amerika'nın Türkiye Rekabeti," pp. 80-87; Erkin, Feridun Cemal. "Türkiye'nin Savaşa Katılması için Kahire'de Yapılan Müzakereler (1943)." *Belleten*. Vol. 43, No. 170. 1979. pp. 427-455; *FRUS* 1939, Vol. 4, pp. 849-892, *passim*; *FRUS* 1940, Vol. 3, pp. 944-1008, *passim*; *FRUS* 1941, Vol. 3, pp. 814-974, *passim*; *FRUS* 1942, Vol. 4, pp. 677-835, *passim*; *FRUS* 1943, Vol. 4, pp. 1057-1167, *passim*; *FRUS* 1944, Vol. 5, pp. 814-917, *passim*; *FRUS* 1945, Vol. 8, pp. 1219-1309, *passim*, 1311; Howard, *Turkey, the Straits, and U.S. Policy*, pp. 161-209; Hull, Cordell. *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II*. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1948. pp. 928-932, 1365-1376; Hurewitz, *Middle East Dilemmas: The Background of United States Policy*, pp. 187-198; Kazdal, Mustafa Nebil. "Trade Relations Between the United

right to interact with the Turkish government on non-military issues, a not-so-subtle violation of the British opinion that Turkey belonged in the British sphere of influence.²¹ Towards the end of 1943 and into 1944, British and U.S. views on the necessity of Turkish bellicosity also reflected divergence as, during the same period, Turkish authorities showed a marked desire to deal directly with the U.S. instead of the British.²²

As 1944 wore on, the Turkish-American relationship also began to take on new complexities. A partnership that had, in 1940, been based mostly on commerce and strategy, began to take on moral and ethical aspects by 1944. In the middle of 1943, for example, the issue of how the Nazis were paying the Turkish government for commodities was broached; gold from Swiss banks was utilized by the Germans for this purpose, and the source of that gold was already under examination.²³ The effort to track gold and other valuables looted by the Nazis

States and Turkey, 1919-1944.” Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Indiana University, 1946. pp. 170-186; Kurat, Yuluğ Tekin. “Kahire Konferansı Tutanakları (4-7 Aralık 1943) ve Türkiye’yi Savaşa Sokma Girişimleri.” *Bellekten*. Vol. XLVII, no. 185. 1983. pp. 295-338; Leahy, William D. *I Was There*. New York: Whittlesey House, 1950. pp. 39, 42, 158-159, 173, 190, 214, 245-246, 286; Lukes, Igor. “Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt: From New York To Prague.” *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 17: 523–545. 2006. pp. 523-545; McConnel, op. cit., pp. 55-92; Sözüöz, Necati. *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerine Genel Bir Bakış*. İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1992. pp. 23-41; Sulzberger, Cyrus L. *A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries (1934-1954)*. USA: The Macmillan Co., 1969. pp. 74-78, 216-218; Ülman, Haluk. *Türk-Amerikan . Diplomatik Münasebetleri, 1939-1947*. Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1961; Walker, Joshua. “World War II: The Foundation of the Modern American-Turkish Relationship, 1939-1947.” *American Turkish Encounters: Politics and Culture, 1830-1989*. Nur Bilge Criss, et al., eds. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011. pp. 163-179.

²¹ Churchill and FDR’s infamous January 1943 Casablanca Conference agreement, which allowed Churchill to “play the cards” in Turkey, resulted in tension between the two sides as to exactly how much freedom the U.S. had to interact directly with the Turkish government. Turkish officials also greeted with “consternation” the news that they would be dealing directly only with the British. Lend-Lease Aid going to Turkey was mostly forwarded to Turkey by the British. See: *FRUS* 1943, Vol. 4, pp. 1064-1071, 1087-1095, 1099-1100.

²² Roosevelt tended to sympathize with the Turkish position. See: Sherwood, Robert E. *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948. pp. 781, 799-800.

²³ *FRUS* 1943, Vol. 4: pp. 1137-1140, “The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State,” signed “Winant,” and dated 9 July 1943; pp. 1144-1145, “The

took on a more official dimension in 1944. According to documents found in the College Park National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) records, on 26 February 1944, the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey presented to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs a copy of the declaration released on 22 February 1944 by Henry Morgenthau, the U.S. Treasury Secretary. That declaration concerned the use by the German government of looted gold and other assets to pay for international transactions. The same document goes on to explain that in October 1944, the U.S. Ambassador had subsequently provided a second note to the Turkish government, this time concerned with Resolution VI of the Bretton Woods Agreement and the need for the Turkish government to enact controls warranted by the Agreement.²⁴ The issue of German assets in Turkey, whether financial, industrial, or technical, would remain a subject of focus in U.S. government relations with Turkey until at least 1947. Thus, in addition to the wrangling concerning Turkish entry into the war, chromium shipments to Germany, cessation of official relations with the German government, and material aid to Turkey from the Allies, new issues related to more subtle financial and ethical aspects of the struggle against the Nazis began to take on greater importance.

1945 began with the Turkish cessation of official ties with Japan and, one month later, declaration of war against Germany and Japan. These developments were quickly overshadowed in March when the Soviet government informed the Turkish government of the Soviet intention to not renew the 1925 Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and

Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant),” signed “Hull,” and dated 30 July 1943.

²⁴ This document was found in RG 84, Turkey, Classified General Records 1936-1958, Box 15. The file folder was labelled “Safehaven Conf. (Jan.-July) 1945.” The document, dated 30 July 1945, does not credit an author, but Edwin Wilson, then U.S. Ambassador, may be the writer. The document is marked as a “draft,” and there is no indication that it was finalized or forwarded to the Turkish authorities. This author found no “final” or “sent” version of the document.

Neutrality. This provided confirmation of long-standing Turkish suspicion towards the ulterior aims of wartime Soviet attitudes towards Turkey. For Turkish-American relations, the war's remaining months were dominated by apprehensions concerning Soviet intentions towards Turkey, and further negotiations concerning the Lend-Lease agreement between Turkey and the U.S., as well as deciding how much of the Lend-Lease Aid would come from the U.S. and Britain respectively.²⁵

1.2.3. The Truman Doctrine, The Marshall Plan, and the Emergence of the Cold War

Franklin Delano Roosevelt's (FDR) death on 12 April 1945, and Vice President Harry S. Truman's accession to the United States Presidency, created broad uncertainties for U.S. policies towards its foreign partners. Initially, the main concern was whether the new President would continue FDR's policies, especially towards the USSR. Despite Truman's famous stormy first meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, U.S. policy towards the USSR remained largely what it had been under FDR. Only over time, and through increasing irritation and dismay sparked by Soviet actions, did Truman change to more confrontational policies.²⁶

²⁵ See: *FRUS* 1945, Vol. 8, pp. 1293-1309 *passim*.

²⁶ For what is now the historiographical consensus, see: Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. pp. 198-243; Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992. pp. 25-36. For other details and perspectives on both the above paragraph and the following summary of the early Cold War years, see (because of the breadth of the literature on the Cold War, this list is limited to significant books): Almond, Gabriel A. *The American People and Foreign Policy*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968; Bernstein, Barton. J., ed. *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970; Brown, L. Carl ed. *Centerstage: American Diplomacy since World War II*. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1990; Brown, Seyom. *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan*. Columbia University Press: New York, 1983; Crockatt, Richard. *The United States and the Cold War, 1941-53*.

Through the end of 1945 and into 1946, relations between the U.S. and the USSR continued to worsen as a combination of conflicting security interests, ideological differences, and mutual incomprehension grew first into tension, then aggressive posturing. The opening United Nations Conference in San Francisco had the effect of turning U.S. public opinion against the Soviets²⁷; the hard bargaining at the Potsdam Conference and the first uses of the atomic bomb increased both sides' mistrust of the other's intentions²⁸; the September 1945

East Sussex, U.K.: British Association for American Studies, 1989; Davis, Lynn Etheridge. *The Cold War Begins: Soviet-American Conflict over Eastern Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974; Donovan, Robert. *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1945-1948*. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1996; Feis, Herbert. *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1970; Gaddis, John Lewis. *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1997; Gormly, James L. *The Collapse of the Grand Alliance, 1945-1948*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987; Gormly, James L. *From Potsdam to the Cold War: Big Three Diplomacy 1945-1947*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1990; Halle, Louis J. *The Cold War as History*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991; Ingram, Kenneth. *History of the Cold War*. London: Darwen Finlayson, Ltd., 1955; Lacey, Michael J., ed. *The Truman Presidency*. New York: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Cambridge University Press, 1989; LaFeber, Walter. *America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945-1966*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967; Leffler, Melvyn P. *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War*. New York: Hill and Wang, 2008; Leffler, Melvyn P. *The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1994. pp. 20-83; Mastny, Vojtech. *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996; Neilson, Keith and Ronald G. Haycock. *The Cold War and Defense*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990; Offner, Arnold A. *Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002; Paterson, Thomas G. *On Every Front: The Making and Unmaking of the Cold War*. Revised ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1992; Paterson, Thomas G. *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973; Reynolds, David. *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives*. London: Yale University Press, 1994; de Senarclens, Pierre. *From Yalta to the Iron Curtain: The Great Powers and the Origins of the Cold War*. Amanda Pingree, transl. Oxford: Berg Publishers Ltd., 1995; William Appleman Williams. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1972. pp. 202-293; Yergin, Daniel. *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1977.

²⁷ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 224-230.

²⁸ For the Potsdam Conference, see: Feis, Herbert. *Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960. pp. 155-324; *FRUS 1945: The Conference at Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) Vols. 1 and 2*; see also: Gaddis,

London Conference of Foreign Ministers exacerbated these trends when essentially no agreements could be reached.²⁹ At the December 1945 Moscow Conference some compromises were reached through superficial concessions, but the political atmosphere in the U.S. had changed since the previous summer, and Secretary of State Byrnes found his Moscow accomplishments attacked by both the press and Congress.³⁰

The consequences of the stumbling 1945 conferences led, through additional tensions and disagreements, to the Cold War's emergence in 1946. As of March 1946, the Truman Administration, in response to domestic pressure, observed Soviet behaviors, George Kennan's "Long Telegram," the crisis over Iran, and other factors, began to see the Soviets as potential enemies rather than as contentious allies.³¹ After further experiences with contradictory Soviet negotiating behavior in Germany, intransigence in the U.N., and renewed threats towards Turkey, the U.S. resigned itself to more assertive unilateral activity: "... American leaders, by the summer of 1946, simply were no longer willing to trust the Russians."³²

After casting aside the need for full bilateral cooperation with the Soviets, however, the Truman Administration then confronted an American public, and its Congressional representatives, who did not necessarily see the same reality or embrace the same opinion concerning U.S. postwar aims. The Truman Administration, as well as the State Department

The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, pp. 239-254; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 37-38.

²⁹ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 263-268; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 38-40. See also: *FRUS* 1945, Vol. 2, pp. 99-559 *passim*.

³⁰ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 279-283; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 47-49, 53-54, 87-88, 104. See also: *FRUS* 1945, Vol. 2, pp. 560-826 *passim*.

³¹ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 283-315; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 100-104, 106-140. See also: *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 2, pp. 1-87 *passim*.

³² Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 316-337, quote from p. 335. See also: *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 2, pp. 88-492 *passim*.

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had determined that the Soviets should be understood as an opponent and competitor for global influence during 1946, but the U.S. public did not see foreign policy as an important issue in the 1946 elections.³³ After the 1946 elections and the resulting Republican control of Congress, the Truman Administration needed to convince the U.S. public and Congress that the USSR constituted a serious enough threat to warrant the expenditures necessary for deterrence.³⁴

Subsequently, when the British government informed their American counterparts in February 1947 that the British government could no longer foot the bill for Eastern Mediterranean security, U.S officials recognized the opportunity to forge a new, more active peace time foreign policy, implicitly aimed at the USSR, and with the consent of Congress and general domestic opinion.³⁵ The Truman Doctrine, declared by the President to a special joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947, intended to sway the American public into supporting a more activist foreign policy, and the expenditures it would mandate.³⁶

Furthermore, the contemporary economic crisis in Western Europe, and the potential for Soviet allies to exploit that crisis, gave Truman the opportunity to create a broader aid program after Congress had been convinced of the need for the aid to Greece and Turkey. In order to provide desperately needed aid to Western Europe's economies and move towards the unification of the non-Soviet zones in occupied Germany, a second statement of Truman's activist foreign policy came in George Marshall's June 1947 address to Harvard's graduating class. This proposal offered broad economic aid to European countries, both in

³³ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p. 140.

³⁴ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 141-142.

³⁵ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 337-352; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 142-146.

³⁶ The support of key members of Congress, especially Michigan Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Arthur Vandenberg, had been secured in the days before Truman's speech. Vandenberg's support would prove sufficient to overcome the more stridently isolationist elements in both Houses of Congress.

the Western and Eastern occupied zones, that offered plans and budgets for their needs.³⁷

The Marshall Plan was a strategic success for U.S. policy makers because the Soviet leadership had to display its true intentions in accepting or declining the program. When the Soviets rejected the Plan, and then embarked on a strident campaign to persuade its satellites to take the same action, the conflict between U.S. and Soviet intentions became overt. No longer would U.S. officials be concerned with negotiating policy towards the economic and political issues still facing Western Europe. The Soviets would be left to deal with their satellites as they were able, but any Soviet involvement in the Western zone would be rejected.³⁸

Ultimately, the Marshall Plan and its promulgation to Western Europe helped pave the way to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The primacy of economic worries in Europe, which led U.S. officials to formulation of the Marshall Plan, also led to the British initiative that became NATO. By mid-1947 U.S. officials realized that the U.S., British, and French occupation zones in Germany needed unification in order to stimulate Europe's general economic recovery. French officials, understandably, saw the re-vitalization of the German economy as a worst-case scenario, and opposed the idea. In order to overcome French concerns, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin developed, over several months, the idea of a Western European security pact that would include the U.S. and Canada. This concept was formally presented to the French and Benelux governments in early 1948, and resulted in the Brussels Treaty, the precursor to NATO.³⁹ The U.S. initially reacted slowly because of the domestic election-year political atmosphere, but after the Berlin Crisis erupted in June 1948, U.S. officials immediately moved to formulate the agreements that officially

³⁷ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 157-164.

³⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 182-186.

³⁹ *Ibid.* pp. 199, 202-203, 208.

established NATO in 1949.⁴⁰

In substance, NATO was designed to create Western European confidence in U.S. resolve to stay in Europe in order to defend against a hypothetical Soviet invasion. However, it also was meant to soothe French worries that the German economic recovery needed for the resurrection of Western European societies threatened French security and sovereignty. Thus, NATO embodied the U.S. attempt to overcome a variety of economic, military, and strategic puzzles in Western Europe.⁴¹

On the other hand, because NATO's formation as a military alliance was originally just as important for its psychological and strategic dimensions, logic mandated inclusion of other regional actors crucial to the Western European periphery, especially once Italy was admitted to the alliance. Even though U.S. officials generally saw the strategic necessity of Turkish inclusion in NATO, limited U.S. resources made such a step unviable until well into 1951.⁴²

In early 1951, U.S. officials' fear of neutralist sentiment in the Eastern Mediterranean, the strategic need to protect that region's oil reserves and NATO's southern flank, and the U.S.' general trend towards greater threat projection in light of the ongoing Korean War made Greek and Turkish admission to NATO propitious. After Secretary of State Acheson proposed the two countries' inclusion in July 1951, Turkey and Greece were officially admitted to NATO in February 1952.⁴³

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 208-213, 217-218.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* pp. 218-219.

⁴² *Ibid.* pp. 234-235, 237-239, 289-290, 353, 419-420, 424-425.

⁴³ *Ibid.* p. 425, 476.

1.3. Turkey in U.S. Post-War Foreign Policy

The long process that brought Turkey into NATO started, at the very latest,⁴⁴ towards the end of WWII. After Harry S. Truman assumed the U.S. Presidency, and WWII was brought to a victorious conclusion, Turkey did not recede as an issue in U.S. foreign policy; on the contrary, as the months passed, Turkey's place in U.S. postwar global strategy became increasingly salient. As U.S. leaders grappled with the difficulties and responsibilities of their hegemonic international stature, the Turkish leadership endeavored to bring Turkey's importance, interests, needs, and potential role to Washington's attention⁴⁵; as events conspired, and geopolitical Great Power politics turned into the Cold War, U.S. officials became more aware of Turkey's vital place in U.S. strategy.

Ankara's efforts, ironically, were greatly aided by its traditional enemy, Moscow. By issuing vaguely threatening demands for both land (a return to the pre-1923 Turkish-Soviet border in North East Anatolia) and bases in the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits, the Soviet leadership succeeded in providing an argument for increased strategic aid to Turkey; this argument was eagerly taken up by both the Turkish leadership and those in the U.S. government who supported granting more aid to Turkey.

For American officials, Turkey's immediate importance stemmed from geography. The Turkish Straits, i.e. the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, have been strategic waterways since antiquity, but the global bipolar situation that emerged from WWII also made Turkey important for other reasons related to geopolitical military strategy. At the Potsdam

⁴⁴ As mentioned above, Turkey was a *de facto* Ally throughout WWII.

⁴⁵ This effort began as early as August 1945. See, for example, the 24 August 1945 conversation between Turkish Ambassador to the U.S., Ragıp Baydur, and Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, George Allen: *FRUS* 1945, Vol. 8. pp. 1239-1241, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen)."

Conference, the issue of the Turkish Straits was brought up for discussion, but in light of the British position concerning Suez, and the U.S. position towards Panama, no headway was achieved.⁴⁶ At that point, U.S. officials also still expected the Eastern Mediterranean to be a part of Britain's sphere of influence.⁴⁷

In the waning months of 1945, it became clear that a Soviet invasion of Turkey was not imminent, but U.S. officials began to see Turkey much more in terms of regional and geopolitical strategy.⁴⁸ By January 1946, President Truman was convinced that the Soviets wanted to dominate Turkey, and he expressed determination to prevent the Soviets from such a venture.⁴⁹

As the months passed in 1946, and U.S. officials became more irritated by Soviet intransigence at the negotiating table, U.S. planners and military officials became further convinced that Turkey held a vital strategic place in U.S. plans for a possible conflict with the Soviet Union. Turkey's fundamental importance came from its close proximity to the USSR, its ability to brunt a first Soviet attack and harry Soviet attempts to extend a hypothetical conflict into the greater Eastern Mediterranean, and to potentially counterattack into critical areas containing the Soviet military-industrial heartland and natural resources.⁵⁰

The first major result of this new focus on Turkey's strategic value (coupled with British inability to cover its military and political responsibilities in the Eastern Mediterranean) was the aid to Greece and Turkey announced by President Truman in March 1947. Aid to Turkey was subsequently included in the Marshall Plan, and large amounts of U.S. military,

⁴⁶ Feis, *Between War and Peace*, pp. 291-301.

⁴⁷ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 54, 61-63, 73-75, 77-79.

⁴⁸ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 77-79.

⁴⁹ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, p. 289; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p. 48.

⁵⁰ This evaluation is detailed in: Leffler, Melvyn P. "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952." *The Journal of American History*. Vol. 71, No. 4. Mar., 1985. pp. 811-816.

economic, and material aid began to arrive in a nation which was barely known in the U.S. political classes ten years previously.

In the years following 1947, until Turkey's inclusion in NATO in 1952, U.S. planners struggled to balance their quickly expanding military and strategic responsibilities, in which Turkey played the role of "linchpin between Europe and the Middle East,"⁵¹ with the resources they had at their disposal. Turkish officials desired not only more aid in order to provide material military support against a potential Soviet assault, but also guarantees that the U.S. would support Turkey in such an event. Even though many U.S. planners and officials supported the inclusion of Turkey in NATO after its inception and formation in 1948-1949, and military aid was provided to Turkey in order to bolster its fighting capacity, questions concerning available resources prevented a greater U.S. commitment.⁵²

In the increasingly fraught global situation after the outbreak of the Korean War,⁵³ U.S. planners feared that not giving concrete commitments to Turkey could result in Turkish neutrality, which would create a greater power void in the strategically vital Eastern Mediterranean. This concern finally created the political will in 1951 to convince both U.S. planners and hesitant NATO allies to offer membership to Turkey, along with Greece.⁵⁴

1.4. Historiography on Post-WWII Turkish-American Relations

The academic literature, and especially historiography, on Turkish-American relations in the 1945-1952 era (and in general) has never been extensive despite the real importance that the

⁵¹ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p. 419.

⁵² Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 289-290, 353, 419-420.

⁵³ The Turkish government sent a brigade of Turkish soldiers to join the U.N. forces in Korea. Turkey suffered more than 2800 casualties, including more than 700 dead, in that conflict.

⁵⁴ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 424-425.

relationship has maintained for both sides since WWII. A variety of reasons exist for this analytical paucity. On the Turkish side, the dominant problem has always been access to government documents, or rather the lack thereof. Even today, access to the official documents of the post-WWII era is non-existent. On the U.S. side, the main problem has been a lack of interest in, or awareness of, the Cold War role that Turkey played in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has always been a country that few Americans knew detailed information about, and the information that was known was marked by prejudice since Americans have maintained their own versions of the “Terrible Turk” myth.⁵⁵ Furthermore, no important works on Turkish-American relations written by an author who is not a citizen of either country exist. The result is a historiography that does not do justice to the two nations’ actual relationship.

1.4.1. Turkish Scholars

Over the past 60 years, the Turkish scholars⁵⁶ working on Turkish-American relations can be divided into three generations, but the overall analytical focus remained on politics, often with heavy ideological coloring. During the late 1950s through the early 1970s, the first academic generation to focus on Turkish-American relations emerged and was dominated by the professors at Ankara University’s Political Sciences Faculty. The main figures were

⁵⁵ Yılmaz, Şuhnaz, “Challenging the Stereotypes: Turkish-American Relations in the Inter-War Era,” pp. 223-237. For the Turkish version of this article, see: Yılmaz, Şuhnaz. “Korkunç Türk İmajı ile Mücadele.” *Toplumsal Tarih*. No. 120, Aralık 2003. pp. 86-91. A survey of Turkish Studies in the U.S. can be found in: Reed, Howard A. “Perspectives on the Evolution of Turkish Studies in North America since 1946.” *The Middle East Journal*. Vol. 51, No. 1. Winter 1997. pp. 15-31.

⁵⁶ In the years after WWII, Turkish diplomats wrote a series of articles on Turkish foreign policy in order to convince the U.S. political elite of the genuine nature of Turkey’s social and political transformation. These articles were usually written in English or French and published in important journals or newspapers. Those articles cannot be considered academic, however.

Fahir Armaođlu, Türkkiye Ataöv, Mehmet Gönübol, Oral Sander, and A. Haluk Ülman. These academicians did not write solely on Turkish-American relations, but their analyses of Turkish-U.S. affairs have remained some of the best that Turkish academia offers for the topic. These men also saw schooling in the U.S., but usually at a later stage in their education. These authors' writings are characterized, as suggested by their status as political scientists, by an emphasis on the political aspects of Turkish-American relations.

The first Turkish academic text to directly address Turkish-American relations was written by Akdes Nimet Kurat. This book, *Türk-Amerikan Müsaebetlerine Kısa Bir Bakış (1800-1959)*,⁵⁷ is brief (only 60 pages), and devotes only five pages to WWII and after. Given the novelty of this subject at the time, though, this well-researched and densely composed text constituted a strong precedent for academic study of Turkish-American relations.

A major Turkish academic text dealing primarily with postwar Turkish-U.S. relations was not written until Türkkiye Ataöv's *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*.⁵⁸ This text is a product of 1960s Leftist intellectual currents, especially Marxism-Leninism, and the specific forms they took in the Turkish context. As a result, the most striking aspect of this text is the direct influence on Ataöv's analysis exercised by William Appleman Williams's *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, the founding text of the U.S. Cold War revisionist history school. Here, an important detail is the fact that Ataöv received his Political Science/International Relations PhD from Syracuse University the same year Williams's book was published, in 1959. Williams's book was an immediate influence on academic thought concerning the Cold War, and Ataöv must have been aware of the attention Williams's book attracted. Ataöv's text was published ten years later, in 1969. Ataöv also quotes Gar Alperovitz and David Horowitz⁵⁹ liberally in his book, but the foundation of Ataöv's discussion is Williams translated into

⁵⁷ Ankara: Dođuş Ltd. Şirketi Matbaası, 1959.

⁵⁸ Aydınlık Yayınları: Ankara, 1969.

⁵⁹ Both writers published important early revisionist texts in 1965.

Turkish. The second chapter of Ataöv's text, for example, is essentially a broad summary of the second, third, and fourth chapters of Williams's book.⁶⁰ The remainder of Ataöv's text frequently refers to the Open Door Policy, and attributes American foreign policy to economic factors, which is the key aspect of Williams's criticism of U.S. foreign policy.⁶¹ In sum, Ataöv defines NATO as a tool with which the U.S. has gained access to other economies, and asserts that Turkey exposed itself to exploitation by entering that alliance.⁶²

Consequently, the influence that Ataöv's book has had on the approach that two generations of Turkish leftists have taken towards Turkish-American relations must be noted. Even today, this author has experienced Turkish civilians telling him to read Ataöv's book. One chapter of Ataöv's book was also published as an article in the journal of Ankara University's Political Science Faculty; at that time A.U.'s was the most influential political science faculty in Turkey, and its journal the key publication in Turkish academia.⁶³

Fahir Armaoğlu published on Turkish-U.S. relations as early as 1966. His article "Turkey and the United States: A New Alliance" analyzes changes in the international system, such as the Moscow-Beijing alliance's dissolution or Cyprus, and in domestic Turkish politics, such as the 27 May 1960 coup. In his view, those changes required the Turkish-U.S. alliance formed after WWII to become more "flexible" and oriented towards NATO in order to create conditions conducive to mutual harmony.⁶⁴ Twenty-five years later, Armaoğlu also published what has become an essential source for studying Turkish-American relations, a

⁶⁰ pp. 9-19 in Ataöv and pp. 58-161 in Williams.

⁶¹ Ataöv pp. 1-19, 117, 144-154, 160-161, 203, 211-212, 273-295.

⁶² pp. 211-217.

⁶³ "Marshall Planından NATO'nun Kuruluşuna Kadar 'Soğuk Harp.'" *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*. Vol. XXIII, No. 3, Eylül 1968. pp. 275-310. Ataöv wrote another, more inflammatory article on the Turkey-NATO-U.S. triangle: "Türkiye, Amerika'nin Tekelinde Olan NATO'dan Çıkacaktır!" *Forum*. Cilt 20, No 335. 15 Mart 1968. pp. 12-14.

⁶⁴ "Turkey and the United States: A New Alliance." *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*. Vol. VI, 1965. pp. 1-15.

collection of primary documents concerning Turkish-U.S. relations, and commentary on those documents.⁶⁵ Oral Sander, Armaoğlu's student, published his main works on Turkish-American relations in the late 1970s. His *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964*⁶⁶ focuses on politics, is less dogmatic than Ataöv's text, and ends with a call for "flexibility" in Turkish-U.S. relations that is clearly adapted from Armaoğlu.⁶⁷

Neither A. Haluk Ülman nor Mehmet Gönlübol, who sometimes collaborated on articles concerning Turkish foreign policy, wrote extensively on Turkish-American relations, but what they did write was early and important. Ülman's *Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri 1939-1947*⁶⁸ was the first Turkish academic text to focus on Turkish-U.S. relations during WWII and after. Ülman's book, like Kurat's, is concise (only 141 pages). Mostly a summary of the political interactions between the Turkish and U.S. governments during WWII, the author concludes that Turkish-U.S. relations did not truly begin to develop until after the war, and that the economic aid provided by the U.S. had greatly benefitted the Turkish economy.⁶⁹

Ten years after Ülman published his text, Gönlübol published an article on Turkish-U.S. relations that indirectly criticizes the ideological stance taken by Ataöv.⁷⁰ Another lengthy Gönlübol article on Turkish-NATO relations is also an indirect answer to Ataöv's book.⁷¹ That article begins by focusing on the Cyprus issue, but continues to explore the foundation

⁶⁵ *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri (Açıklamalı)*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi: Ankara, 1991.

⁶⁶ Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgileri Fakültesi Yayınları, 1979.

⁶⁷ pp. 246-247.

⁶⁸ Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1961. Ülman served as a parliamentarian for the CHP in the 1970s.

⁶⁹ pp. 125-131.

⁷⁰ Gönlübol, Mehmet. "Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri: Genel bir Değerlendirme." *Foreign Policy (Ankara)*. Vol. 1 (4), December 1971. pp. 5-18. Gönlübol lightens his stance by stating that criticism of Turkey's involvement in NATO has made it possible to see the costs as well as the benefits of Turkey's alliance with the U.S. See: pp. 12-16.

⁷¹ "NATO and Turkey: An Overall Appraisal." *The Turkish Yearbook*. Vol. XI, 1971. pp. 1-38.

of NATO, why Turkey was admitted, the effects that Turkey's admission to NATO had on the country, and the contemporary Turkish debates concerning the United States and NATO.

Starting in the mid-1970s, another generation of Turkish scholars began to examine post-WWII Turkish-American relations. This generation again is dominated by political scientists, but has weaker ties to Ankara University. The main names of this generation include Burcu Bostanoğlu, Nur Bilge Criss, Füsün Türkmen, and Nasuh Uslu. This generation's writings are similar to the previous generation's in that none of the scholars focus exclusively on Turkish-American relations, and that political aspects of the Turkish-American relationship remain in the forefront of their analyses. Of the three, Criss has written most consistently on Turkish-American relations, but generally as journal articles or book chapters.⁷² Türkmen, on the other hand, did not write on Turkish-U.S. relations until the past decade, but has produced a book-length work titled *Kırılğan İttifaktan "Model Ortaklığa": Türkiye ABD İlişkileri*⁷³; in addition to articles.

Nasuh Uslu, however, composed what is still the most comprehensive treatment of postwar Turkish-American relations, titled simply *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*.⁷⁴ Drawing heavily on political science theory, Uslu provides detailed narratives on all major points of interest in Turkish-U.S. relations between 1947 and the end of the 1990s. For the 1947-1952 period,

⁷² See, for example: Criss, *American Turkish Encounters: Politics and Culture, 1830-1989*, or Harris and Criss, *Studies in Atatürk's Turkey: The American Dimension*.

⁷³ İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2012. This work seems to be a textbook intended for university-level classes rather than an academic study, although the author states in the Introduction that her aim is to provide new approaches to analyzing Turkish-American relations as well as to explore certain chosen issues in depth. From that standpoint, the text is similar to Bostanoğlu's book (explained below, but written ten years before Türkmen's). Furthermore, there are serious problems with the manner in which references are shown in the book. The Works Cited section at the end shows no primary sources, but the footnotes in the text itself show primary sources, as well as a myriad of other sources not listed in the Works Cited section. The author explains in the Introduction that this is due to the "number and variety" of references (p. 14).

⁷⁴ 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları: Ankara, 2000. Uslu's text was translated to English with small additions, and published as *The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003 -- The History of a Distinctive Alliance*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2003.

Uslu provides a largely chronological and political summary of the events that led to Turkey's admission to NATO; this summary depends almost exclusively on a narrow selection of secondary literature for its narrative, and does not show any primary sources as references.⁷⁵ The problem this leads to is evident in Uslu's conclusion, where he states that the essential reason for the formation of the Turkish-American alliance was the Soviet threat.⁷⁶ By the middle of the 1980s, that assertion had come under some doubt, as is evident from the debate that occurred between Bruce Kuniholm and Melvyn Leffler on that issue (described below). Although Uslu does refer to the strategic dimension of U.S. thinking about Turkey, he does not mention the controversy surrounding the exact nature of the Soviet threat towards Turkey or refer to Leffler's texts. Consequently, Uslu's explanation of the reasons for, and the initial years of, the Turkish-U.S. alliance is shallow since it does not refer to authors and issues that would give it causal and explanatory depth.

Burcu Bostanoğlu also produced a large work on postwar Turkish-American relations, and its method of composition is similar to Uslu's. Bostanoğlu used few primary sources while composing *Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası*⁷⁷ and mostly summarized from a variety of secondary sources. The first 200-plus pages of Bostanoğlu's book are focused on international relations and political science theory; then 100 more pages are devoted to a historical summary of U.S. foreign policy. As a result, the author does not actually take Turkish-U.S. relations in hand until page 323. Only 50 pages actually discuss that topic in a general manner, after which the rest of the text analyzes only three specific issues -- Korea,

⁷⁵ Uslu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, pp. 104-106.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* p. 373.

⁷⁷ Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1999. The primary sources are difficult to identify because they have not been given a separate section in the Works Cited section at the end of the text. The primary sources that were used are somewhat random: two volumes from the 1950 *FRUS* series and two volumes (from 1974 and 1983) of the Congressional records. Several books containing primary documents and commentary on those documents were also cited.

Cyprus, and the First Gulf War -- in light of the Turkish-U.S. dynamic. Consequently, Bostanoğlu's text is not so much an attempt to create new information, but rather to create a new theoretical framework for understanding Turkish-American relations.

In the past ten-to-fifteen years new voices have appeared amongst the Turkish scholars writing on post-WWII Turkish-American relations. Gül İnanç (Barkay), Selin Bölme, Pınar Dost-Niyego, Barın Kayaoğlu, Burçak Keskin-Kozat, and Şuhnaz Yılmaz are the most notable of these, and have produced the most important academic analyses of post-WWII Turkish-American relations to appear in the Turkish literature since the 1960s. These scholars are more diverse than the previous generations⁷⁸ and do not focus exclusively on Turkish-U.S. relations, but the work produced by these scholars is generally stronger academically in comparison to the previous generations, and often can be referred to as broader historical analysis rather than simply as political science.

Gül İnanç (Barkay), for example, composed the first academic Turkish text to attempt a thorough analysis of the WWII-era U.S. *FRUS* documents concerning Turkey. This work, titled *ABD Diplomasisinde Türkiye, 1940-1943*⁷⁹ unfortunately covers only four of the war years, but was a strong step forward for Turkish academic analysis of Turkish-U.S. relations. Şuhnaz Yılmaz has written a number of important articles on Turkish-U.S. relations, and will publish a book-length study on Turkish-American relations between 1800 and 1952 in late 2014. İnanç and Yılmaz have also collaborated on articles.⁸⁰ Dost-Niyego, Kayaoğlu, and Keskin-Kozat have all contributed strong theses and scholarly articles or book chapters to the

⁷⁸ Keskin-Kozat, for example, is a sociologist, and Dost-Niyego, İnanç, and Kayaoğlu are historians.

⁷⁹ Aydoğan Matbaacılık: İstanbul, 2001.

⁸⁰ İnanç, Gül and Şuhnaz Yılmaz. "Gunboat Diplomacy: Turkey, USA and the Advent of the Cold War." *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 48, No. 3. May 2012. pp. 401–411.

subject.⁸¹

Other than İnanç, Selin Bölme is the only academician from this generation who has a book-length study to her name. Bölme's *İncirlik Üssü: ABD'nin Üs Politikası ve Türkiye*⁸² is a welcome addition to the literature on post-WWII Turkish-American relations, and is, on several counts, the best single book that a Turkish academician has produced on the subject. The academic quality of the text is strong, and extensive research was performed in several archives; many of the documents presented in the text are presented for the first time in a scholarly work on Turkish-American relations. The footnote citations and Works Cited section are at international standards for academic scholarship.

Bölme's text, unfortunately, does suffer from a problem that has long plagued Turkish scholarship on relations with the U.S., an excessive focus on politics. The results of this emphasis are weaknesses in historiography and explanation. To begin with, the first nearly 150 pages of the study are devoted to various aspects of general political theory concerning military bases, and then specifically the American approach to military bases. This emphasis on theory is unnecessary in a published academic text of this sort.

After the theoretical sections, the author devotes more than 50 pages to the WWII and post-WWII developments that led to Turkey's NATO accession and the establishment of İncirlik A.F.B. Bölme cites a great number of archival documents while explaining the process.⁸³ For a subject with a literature as extensive as that on the early Cold War, Bölme cites almost

⁸¹ See, for example: Dost-Niyego, Pınar. "Amerika'nın Türk Politikasının Oluşumu Üzerine Yeni bir Okuma." *Tarih ve Toplum - Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, n. 13, Güz 2011; Kayaoğlu, Barın. "Cold War in the Aegean: Strategic Imperatives, Democratic Rhetoric: The United States and Turkey, 1945 – 52." *Cold War History*. Vol. 9, No. 3, August 2009. pp. 321–345; Keskin-Kozat, Burçak. "Reinterpreting Turkey's Marshall Plan: Of Machines, Experts, and Technical Knowledge," in Criss, Nur Bilge, et al., eds. *American Turkish Encounters: Politics and Culture, 1830-1989*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011. pp. 182-218.

⁸² İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012.

⁸³ *Ibid.* pp. 156-207

none of the major secondary texts on the subject, which leaves her narrative open to errors of fact as well as weak in terms of explanatory power. For example, on pages 159-160, Bölme states that the establishment of U.S. policy against proposed Soviet bases in the Turkish straits dates from August 1946. If Bölme had referred to Leffler's *A Preponderance of Power*, though, she would have noted that U.S. policy opposing Soviet bases in the Turkish straits was formulated in July 1945.⁸⁴ Bölme also attributes that change to President Truman's being convinced by a State-War-Navy Memorandum to actively oppose Soviet expansionist aims; in fact, Truman had already switched to a more aggressive attitude after the December 1945 Moscow Conference, memorably declaring, "I'm tired [of] babying the Soviets."⁸⁵

Beyond the issue of historical data is the fact that Bölme's focus on politics deprives the text of what should be a strong focus, i.e. explaining in a comprehensive manner the context in which Turkey and the U.S. cemented a military and political alliance, won Turkey entrance to NATO, and made the decision to build İncirlik A.F.B. As an illustration, focusing on İncirlik A.F.B. would fit neatly into Melvyn Leffler's Grand Strategy policy framework,⁸⁶ which focuses on power and the need for bases abroad to exert that power overseas. Bölme, however, does not formulate such a framework for her discussion and, instead, provides a narrowly political narrative for the occurrences she describes. Consequently, the reader does not understand, for instance, exactly how or when U.S. public opinion became supportive of a

⁸⁴ p. 78. The Leffler text that Bölme does utilize is "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952," mentioned above, Note 50. Leffler's article, while highly important, does not contain the same amount of detail that *A Preponderance of Power*, or other early Cold War studies, contains.

⁸⁵ Bölme, op. cit., p. 159. For Truman quote, see: Messer, Robert L. *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982. pp. 156-166. Messer concludes that Truman probably did not actually say those words to Secretary Byrnes, but he did write them down.

⁸⁶ See Note 50.

more active role in Europe, or how the Truman administration convinced Congress to provide aid to Turkey and Greece in March 1947, or for the Marshall Plan.⁸⁷ Bölme utilizes some excellent and important primary source materials, but without stronger foundation in the secondary source material, the discussion of İncirlik A.F.B in the early Cold War era depends mostly on *FRUS* documents and NARA Records Groups 59 and 531, and presents little secondary literature context for the reader. Thus, the reader does not obtain a more comprehensive understanding of İncirlik A.F.B.'s place in the U.S.'s overall policy-making, or in the historical juncture, from Bölme's discussion.⁸⁸

Most likely, the reason for the weakness elaborated in the previous paragraph again stems from politics, but in this case the author's politics. Bölme's text displays hints of the continuing influence that ideology, especially the economic determinism (Leninism) sourced in William Appleman Williams via Türküya Ataöv, stills holds in much Turkish scholarly work on Turkish-American relations. In the conclusion, Bölme explains the overall understanding of İncirlik A.F.B. that her text has related to the reader. The interesting aspect of this explanation is the prominence that the author gives to economic factors: "... aynı zamanda Amerikan askeri gücünün gölgesini hissettirerek kapitalist ekonominin sağlıklı bir

⁸⁷ Bölme briefly mentions these issues on 160, 162-163, but does not explain them. These issues are explained in the secondary literature; see: Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, pp. xii-xvi, 73, 84-86, 92-106; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 143-146; Quester, George H. "Origins of the Cold War: Some Clues from Public Opinion." *Political Science Quarterly*. Vol. 93, No. 4. Winter, 1978-1979. pp. 647-663.

⁸⁸ Texts that Bölme could have consulted (and pages that are relevant specifically to Turkey) include: Henderson, Nicholas. *The Birth of NATO*. Boulder, Westview Press, 1983. pp. 105-107; Ismay, Lionel Hastings. *NATO: The First Five Years, 1949-1954*. Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht, 1955. pp. 39-40; Kuniholm, Bruce. *The Near East Connection: Greece and Turkey in the Reconstruction and Security of Europe, 1946-1952*. Hellenic College Press: Brookline, Massachusetts, 1984; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 289-290, 353, 419-420, 424-426, 476; McGhee, George C. *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets*. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990 (cited elsewhere in Bölme's text but not in reference to the process of Turkish accession to NATO); Saray, Mehmet. *Sovyet Tehdidi Karşısında Türkiye'nin NATO'ya Girişi: III. Cumhurbaşkanı Celal Bayar'ın Hatıraları ve Belgeler*. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2000.

şekilde işleminde etkili olmuşlardır.”⁸⁹ This could have been taken directly from Lenin, and reflects the same ideology first articulated by Williams, and then transferred to the Turkish context by Ataöv. Bölme apparently cites Ataöv’s book only once,⁹⁰ but the economic interpretation of U.S. hegemony and need for overseas bases is strongly informed by an intellectual stance that, in regard to the issues of NATO and İncirlik A.F.B., goes back to Ataöv. Even the edition of Ataöv’s book that Bölme cites is interesting: *Amerika, NATO, ve Türkiye* was first published in 1969, but Bölme cites a 2006 reissue of the book by İleri Yayınları, a Kemalist-left publishing house in İstanbul.⁹¹ The ideology behind this publishing house, as well as those who consider themselves Kemalist-leftists, is similar to Ataöv’s.

Finally, a number of other Turkish writers, both scholarly and non-scholarly, have written on Turkish-U.S. relations even if it was not their main professional focus. Scholars like Çağrı Erhan and Hakan Yılmaz can be provided as examples. Erhan’s most important work on Turkish-American relations covers only through WWI, and he has written articles on post-WWII Turkish-American relations, but most of his academic work has concentrated on other aspects of Turkish politics.⁹² Yılmaz has also written articles on postwar Turkish-U.S. relations from time-to-time, even though this subject is not one that he has focused on.⁹³

⁸⁹ Op. cit., p. 403: “... at the same time, imposing the long shadow of American military strength was effective in ensuring the capitalist economy’s continued healthy functioning” (author’s translation). This conclusion was anticipated by the book’s introduction, in which the author asserts that İncirlik A.F.B. was a vehicle through which the U.S. could pressure Turkey into making economic, military, and domestic and foreign policy decisions that the U.S. approved of; in this respect, according to the author, Turkey was one aspect of the U.S.’s project to control and shape the world in order to preserve its own interests: p. 23.

⁹⁰ The citation on p. 236 is an “op. cit.,” but the previous reference is not apparent.

⁹¹ <http://www.turksolu.org/kitap/>

⁹² See: “Ortaya Çıkışı ve Uygulanışıyla Marshall Planı.” *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*. Vol. 51, No. 1. Fall 1996. pp. 275-287; *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2001.

⁹³ See: “American Perspectives on Turkey: An Evaluation of the Declassified U.S. Documents between 1947 and 1960.” *New Perspectives on Turkey*. No. 25. Fall 2001. pp.

Turkish scholars have authored a number of interesting MA and PhD theses on post-WWII Turkish-American relations, as well.⁹⁴ One other writer that can be mentioned in this context is Rifat Bali.⁹⁵ Even though he is not a professional academic, and his main emphasis is not Turkish-American relations, Bali has compiled and edited several important volumes of U.S. official documents concerning Turkey.⁹⁶

1.4.2. U.S. Scholars

U.S. scholars writing on post-WWII Turkish-American relations should be classified into general tendencies rather than generations. The first tendency that can be identified is a stance that, directly or indirectly, urges more cooperation or interaction between the United States and Turkey, usually for fundamentally political reasons. Since WWII, the majority of American writers on Turkish-U.S. relations have adopted this stance. The first U.S. authors

77-101; “Democratization from above in Response to the International Context: Turkey, 1945-1950.” *New Perspectives on Turkey*. No. 17, Fall 1997. pp. 1-37.

⁹⁴ See, for example: Erdem, Murat. “Türk-Amerikan Kültürel İlişkileri: 1945-1960 Döneminde Türkiye’de Yayınlanmış Siyasi Mizah Dergilerinde Amerika ve Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Yansımaları.” Unpublished MA Thesis, Ege Üniversitesi, 1999; Gürbüz, Mehmet Vedat. “An Overview of Turkish-American Relations and Impact on Turkish Economy, Military, Economy, and Democracy, 1945-1952.” PhD Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2002; Yıldırım, Umut. “The Representation and the Perception of the United States in Turkey (1946-1961).” Unpublished MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2002.

⁹⁵ Other writers on postwar Turkish-American relations that can be mentioned although they are not important academic figures include: Akalın, Cüneyt. *Soğuk Savaş ABD ve Türkiye-1: Olaylar-Belgeler (1945-1952)*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2003; Behramoğlu, Namık Kemal. *Türkiye Amerikan İlişkileri (Demokrat Parti Dönemi)*. İstanbul: Yar Yayınları, 1973; Çamlı, İbrahim. *Dünya, Amerika, Türkiye*. İstanbul: Köprü Yayınları, 1966; Orkunt, Sezai. *Türkiye-ABD Askeri İlişkileri*. Milliyet Yayın A.Ş. Yayınları, 1978; Sözüöz, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerine Genel Bir Bakış*; Tunçkanat, Haydar. *İkili Anlaşmaların İçyüzü*. Ekim Yayınevi: Ankara, 1970; Uzunoglu, Nurettin. *American Aid to Turkey, 1947-1963*. İstanbul: Acar Matbaacılık Yayıncılık Hizmetleri, 2003; Üstün, Nevzat. *Türkiye’deki Amerika*. İstanbul: Var Yayınevi, 1967. Several of these texts display the ideological tenor of Turkey’s contemporary domestic political debates.

⁹⁶ See, for example: *American Diplomats in Turkey: Oral History Transcripts (1928-1997), Vol. I; An Overview of the Turkish Press Through the Reports of American Diplomats (1925-1962)*. İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık Ticaret Ltd. Şkt., 2011.

to bring attention to Turkish-U.S. relations after WWII were generally writing in response to the developing Cold War atmosphere, and were usually not interested in Turkish-U.S. relations *per se* but rather as an issue that deserved attention in light of the perceived Soviet threat.

In the ten-to-fifteen years after WWII, a spate of journal articles appeared that were authored by writers who could be presented as experts on the subject, and who urged more U.S. attention and assistance to Turkey.⁹⁷ An excellent illustration of this trend is Walter Livingston Wright Jr.'s "Truths About Turkey," originally published in the most influential foreign policy journal of the era, *Foreign Affairs*.⁹⁸ This article contains many standard themes⁹⁹ seen in other similar commentary: the Ottoman Empire was brutal and backwards, but now far in the past; Turkey is not yet a complete democracy, but is on its way; Turkey deserves our help for both their desire to become "Western" and their resistance to the Soviets. Wright also states that he is writing against figures who have "disparaged" the aid

⁹⁷ Matthew Jacobs notes that Mustafa Kemal, during those years, was proffered by "Middle East specialists" as an example of "the type of leader they hoped to see rise to power in states across the region": *Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918-1967*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011. pp. 8-9 (quote), 84-86.

⁹⁸ Vol. 26, No. 2, January 1948. pp. 349-359. Wright refers specifically to a 1947 article published in *The Nation* by British scholar and politician Harold Laski. Laski, writing only two weeks after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, condemns British cooperation with the U.S. on ideological grounds; see: Laski, Harold J. "Britain Without Empire." *The Nation*. 29 March 1947. pp. 353-356. Wright was President of İstanbul's Robert College from 1935-1944. Laski, a Marxist academician, served as the Chairman of the British Labour Party from 1945-1946.

⁹⁹ As well as inaccurate or questionable judgments: on page 532, Wright states that Mustafa Kemal "could have won in free elections by tremendous majorities," which is now understood as erroneous. In fact, massive popular opposition to Mustafa Kemal's radical top-down social reform projects made second parties untenable during his lifetime. See: Koçak, Cemil. *İktidar ve Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006. pp. 668-686; Zürcher, Erik J. *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 2003. pp. 186-187.

program for Turkey. Other similar articles¹⁰⁰ seem to indicate that the level of opposition to the idea of aiding Turkey was strong enough to create concern. This issue will be more thoroughly examined below.

After 1960, U.S. writers also began to produce books urging more cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. Well-known authors on Turkish-U.S. relations include George S. Harris, Harry Howard, and George C. McGhee. George S. Harris is a historian who has led a double career, one in the State Department and one in the academy. His most well-known work is *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*.¹⁰¹ This text, like the articles mentioned above, is a largely political and military account of Turkish-American relations. Covering the period from WWII until the early 1970s, the only section which really attempts to move into subjects outside of politics is the chapter on the 1950-1960 Menderes government, which touches briefly on economic, educational, and developmental aspects of the young alliance between Turkey and the U.S.;

¹⁰⁰ Examples include: Howard, Harry N. "The United States and the Problem of the Turkish Straits: A Reference Article." *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 1, 1947. pp. 59-72; Lerner, Daniel and Richard D. Robinson. "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force." *World Politics*. Vol. 13, No. 1. Oct., 1960. pp. 19-44; McGhee, George. "Turkey Joins the West." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 32, no. 3, 1954. pp. 617-630; O'Ballance, E. "The Turkish Contribution." *Military Review*. Vol. 35. August 1955. pp. 89-96 (the author is British but the publication is American); Padelford, Norman J. "Solutions to the Problem of the Turkish Straits: A Brief Appraisal." *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 2, No. 2. Apr., 1948. pp. 175-190; Peretz, Don. "United States Aid in the Middle East." *Current History*. Vol. 33, no. 192, August 1957. pp. 95-100; Psomiades, Harry J. "Turkey: Progress and Problems." *Middle Eastern Affairs*. March 1957. pp. 90-97; Spain, James. "Middle East Defense: A New Approach." *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 8, no. 3, Summer 1954. pp. 251-266; Thomas, Lewis V. "Turkey: Partner of the West." *Foreign Policy Bulletin*. August 1952. pp. 5-7; Xydis, Stephen G. "The 1945 Crisis over the Turkish Straits." *Balkan Studies*. 1 (1960). pp. 65-90. One book also fits into this category: edited by former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, and featuring a lengthy section on Turkey written by Princeton professor Lewis V. Thomas, *The United States and Turkey and Iran* features an introduction that addresses the American voter directly. Interestingly, the book is dedicated to Walter Livingston Wright, Jr. Another version of this type of text is Altemur Kılıç's *Turkey and the World*, which features a Turkish author writing about Turkey, in English, and specifically for the American voting public.

¹⁰¹ American Enterprise Institute: Washington D.C., 1972.

the eighth chapter also devotes three pages to the Peace Corps's activities in Turkey and Turkish public reaction to that project.¹⁰²

Harry Howard, like Harris, was an academic who led nearly parallel lives in academia and the State Department. Howard did spend nearly twenty straight years in the State Department between 1942 and the 1960s after starting out in academia, but afterwards alternated between academic and official responsibilities. Howard wrote many articles touching on the issue of Turkish-American relations, but the primary text that he authored was *Turkey, the Straits, and U.S. Policy*.¹⁰³ This book mostly concerns the eras before WWII, reaching that conflict only on page 161. The era after WWII begins on page 210, leaving 70 pages for the discussion of U.S. policy towards the Turkish straits in the Cold War era. Howard's book, as is natural for the subject, is a mostly political discussion of the topic, but it is also one of the key texts written on the Straits.

George C. McGhee, on the other hand, spent most of this career in the State Department even though his first profession was as a petroleum engineer. McGhee was a critical figure in the State Department in the years after WWII, became an expert on the Eastern Mediterranean, and served as U.S Ambassador to Turkey in 1952-1953. His most important book is *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets*.¹⁰⁴ This text is, as one would assume given the fact that McGhee had a long career in the State Department, a study that focuses primarily on the geostrategic and political aspects of the Turkish-American relationship in the 1940s and 1950s. McGhee explains in the book's introduction that the main primary sources that he used were from files that he collected while a State Department officer, composed of documents that he had

¹⁰² Ibid. pp. 49-97; 188-191.

¹⁰³ Relevant articles authored by Howard, in addition to the article mentioned above in Note 100, include: "The Bicentennial in American-Turkish Relations," and "The United States and Turkey: American Policy in the Straits Question (1914-1963)."

¹⁰⁴ London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990.

considered important at the time; little additional research was completed for the text. Correspondingly, McGhee gives attention to policy-making and diplomacy in the contemporary political and military environment, but does not stray far from those limits. McGhee is also concerned with supporting Bruce Kuniholm's perspective in Kuniholm's 1981-1985 debate with Melvyn Leffler over post-WWII U.S. policy-making in the Eastern Mediterranean.¹⁰⁵ McGhee's book is consequently more important for his personal perspective and reflections concerning Turkish-U.S. relations in the post-war period, and the bureaucratic and diplomatic anecdotes that he presents for his narrative.

One other prominent example of government officials who authored important texts pertaining to Turkish-U.S. relations is Max Weston Thornburg, who wrote important studies on Turkey and Turkish-American issues in the years following WWII as a part of his official capacities. Like McGhee, Thornburg came to government service from the petroleum industry. After WWII, Thornburg headed a research project, sponsored by The Twentieth Century Fund, concerning Turkey's economy. The effort resulted in *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal*, published in 1949 and which has remained a standard, if controversial, reference concerning the Turkish economy of the time.¹⁰⁶ Thornburg later authored a study, *People and Policy in the Middle East: A Study of Social and Political Change as a Basis for United States Policy*,¹⁰⁷ in which many sections deal directly with Turkey. As is evident from the title, the book is explicitly intended to recommend ways to implement U.S. policy in the

¹⁰⁵ See pp. xiii-xiv, 5-6, 14-18, 43. On p. 17, McGhee pointedly uses Kuniholm's "war of nerves" phrase that became an object of conflicting definition in the Kuniholm-Leffler argument. This topic will be mentioned in more detail below; see also Notes 121-124.

¹⁰⁶ Thornburg, Max, Graham Spry, and George Soule. *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal*. Lord Baltimore Press: Baltimore, Maryland, 1949. Some of the report's recommendations reinforced U.S. policy-makers' notions, while it rankled Turkish feelings concerning sovereignty; see: VanderLippe, John M. *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950*. State University of New York Press: Albany, N.Y., 2005. p. 178.

¹⁰⁷ W.W. Norton and Co., Inc.: New York, 1964.

Eastern Mediterranean, and its intended audience is those who are charged with formulating and carrying out that policy.

The other main tendency in U.S. texts on Turkish-American relations is, as one may guess, exactly the opposite of the first, to urge less cooperation or interaction between the two states, and again based on fundamentally political grounds. These texts, which are far less numerous than the previous group, are often the products of anti-Turkish lobbies in the U.S., such as the Armenian or Greek lobbies, or from sympathy for those communities, but have just as often come from the left-of-center in U.S. politics.¹⁰⁸

Van Coufoudakis, for example, was born in Greece but is a U.S. citizen. In a long academic career, he achieved the position of Dean Emeritus at Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne, as well as Rector Emeritus at the University of Nicosia in Cyprus. Coufoudakis's works are numerous and focus mostly on the Greece-Turkey-United States triangle, with specific attention on the Cyprus problem. As an illustration of Coufoudakis's perspective, his most recent book, published in 2008, is titled *International Aggression and Violations of Human Rights: The Case of Turkey in Cyprus*.¹⁰⁹ In 1981 Coufoudakis wrote a journal article focused on the post-WWII Turkish-U.S. alliance¹¹⁰; the first historiographical reference the reader encounters is to the vehemently anti-Turkish Frank Weber text that will be described in the following paragraph. Moreover, despite the article's title, the writer

¹⁰⁸ This tendency, which has roots in post-WWII domestic U.S. politics, will be analyzed in more detail below. The left-of-center in U.S. domestic politics has historically sympathized with the Armenian and Greek causes, but there are other, ideological bases for the anti-Turkish sentiment. In 1946-1948, Wallace sympathizers and opponents of a more active U.S. foreign policy seem to have identified Turkey as a non-democratic state (true until 1950) that was looking to freeload off of U.S. largesse. This idea melded with the already present "Terrible Turk" stereotype to create anti-Turkish sentiment in the U.S. left-of-center that has continued to the present.

¹⁰⁹ Minneapolis: Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, University of Minnesota, 2008.

¹¹⁰ "Turkey and the United States: The Problems and Prospects of a Post-war Alliance." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*. Vol. 9, No. 2. 1981. pp. 179-196.

focuses more on the Cyprus issue and the problems that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s between Turkey and the U.S. The author generally blames the Turkish side for those problems and presents a predominantly negative image of Turkey.

One other example can further illustrate the anti-Turkish perspective. Frank G. Weber's study, titled *The Evasive Neutral*, is an examination of Turkey's WWII foreign policy that mostly relies on British and German archival materials, with little reference to the secondary literature on the related topics.¹¹¹ An Emeritus Professor at Temple University, Weber characterizes Turkish foreign policy during WWII as "perplexing and infuriating," "timorous," founded on "bad faith," and ultimately successful because of "mere chance."¹¹² The single positive outcome noted by Weber is that Turkish behavior during WWII emasculated Nazi diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean, rendering it "limp, sterile, and sour."¹¹³ While portraying the Turkish leadership as sympathetic to the Nazis while Germany seemed to be winning the war, Weber essentially summarizes the content of Nazi diplomatic reports. Large sections of the text thus seem to simply reflect the German perspective with little or no critical evaluation; the same is true when the author focuses on the British side.¹¹⁴ The author closes the text by stating that Turkish war time diplomacy "... was a brilliant accomplishment by all standards except those of honesty and integrity."¹¹⁵ In summary, even though there is a strain of anti-Turkish academic work in the U.S., little of that work focuses specifically on the 1945-1952 period in which the Turkish-American alliance was founded.

Another interesting aspect of the U.S. literature concerning relations with Turkey is the apparent randomness of the authors and the subjects focused on. Rarely does one come

¹¹¹ *The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War*. Despite the extensive literature available for WWII, the author lists only five pages of secondary source references for a text of more than 200 pages.

¹¹² *Ibid.* pp. vii-viii.

¹¹³ *Ibid.* p. ix.

¹¹⁴ See, for example: *Ibid.* pp. 142-176.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 219.

across a U.S. scholar that has devoted a major portion of her or his career to U.S. relations with Turkey. Instead, a number of scholars have, for one reason or another, spent a period of time working on Turkish-U.S. relations and then moved on to other subjects. A prominent example is David J. Alvarez. Professor Alvarez, who still teaches at St. Mary's College of California, began his academic career by composing several excellent texts on Turkish-American relations.¹¹⁶ After those publications, Alvarez turned to different subjects and has apparently never returned to the issue of Turkish-U.S. relations. Robert Cossaboom and Gary Leiser have also written important articles on Turkish-U.S. issues, but to which they did not add later studies.¹¹⁷

Bruce Robellet Kuniholm is another well-known academic who has contributed canonical texts to Turkish-American relations, but much of what he has published was not on that subject; conversely, most of what he has published does have relevancy to Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean. Kuniholm started out as a teacher at Istanbul's Robert College and, after extensive education, published the essential text, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*.¹¹⁸ As is evident from the title, Kuniholm's study addresses Turkey's neighbors in addition, so much of the text is not devoted solely to Turkey. The sections of the text that are devoted to Turkey comprise the single most important piece of research on post-WWII Turkish-U.S. relations even though it is actually focused on the larger Cold War environment. Much of the post-WWII years' official documentation became available to researchers in the early-to-middle

¹¹⁶ *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey, 1943-1946*; "The Embassy of Laurence A. Steinhardt: Aspects of Allied-Turkish Relations, 1942-1945"; "The Missouri Visit to Turkey: An Alternative Perspective on Cold War Diplomacy." *Balkan Studies*. Vol. 15, No. 2. 1974. pp. 225-236.

¹¹⁷ Cossaboom and Leiser, "Adana Station 1943-45: Prelude to the Post-war American Military Presence in Turkey"; Leiser, "The Turkish Air Force, 1939-45: The Rise of a Minor Power."

¹¹⁸ Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J., 1994.

1970s, which made Kuniholm's research groundbreaking. Additionally, Kuniholm's original research was augmented by the excellent academic standards of his writing. On the other hand, Kuniholm is clearly a diplomatic historian, so the result is a text that sticks close to the diplomatic aspects of his subject, and rarely ventures into broader economic, military, domestic political, or social topics.

Kuniholm has produced numerous articles on Turkey, but only a handful directly address Turkish-U.S. relations. Of the other relevant texts, "The Near East Connection: Greece and Turkey in the Reconstruction and Security of Europe, 1946-1952" is the most interesting. Originally a presentation to the Hellenic Studies Program at Ball State University, this slim volume essentially picks up where the story in *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East* leaves off, and only with Turkey and Greece. The text then provides an explanation of how U.S. relations with both countries developed until they were admitted to NATO in 1952. This text also shows signs of Melvyn Leffler's attacks (described below) as it gives much more attention to security strategy and military planning than *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East* does.¹¹⁹ According to Kuniholm's website at Duke University's Sanford School of Public Policy, he is now working on a book specifically dealing with Turkish-American relations.¹²⁰

Melvyn Leffler can also be mentioned here since several of his works are vital for understanding the foundations of postwar Turkish-U.S. relations. Leffler is one of the

¹¹⁹ Kuniholm, Bruce. *The Near East Connection: Greece and Turkey in the Reconstruction and Security of Europe, 1946-1952*. Hellenic College Press: Brookline, Massachusetts, 1984. One other Kuniholm text should be mentioned: "Loy Henderson, Dean Acheson, and the Origins of the Truman Doctrine" in *Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy*. Douglas Brinkley, ed London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1993. pp. 73-108. In that book chapter Kuniholm continued to argue against Leffler, so his main concern is to provide evidence of Soviet pressure against Turkey in the regional context of 1946-1947; Kuniholm also devotes significant attention to the role that Dean Acheson played in the Truman Administration's decisions concerning Turkey and the region during the same time frame.

¹²⁰ <http://fds.duke.edu/db/Sanford/faculty/bruce.kuniholm/publications>. Accessed on 25 August 2013.

preeminent Cold War historians, and he came to writing on Turkey through the attempt to define exactly how strategic imperatives in the Eastern Mediterranean informed the decisions of U.S. policy makers in the early Cold War era. In regard to Turkey, and the Eastern Mediterranean in general, Leffler asserts that the dictating motivation for U.S. policy makers was security strategy, not Soviet behavior. Authors such as Gaddis and Kuniholm, on the other hand, emphasize Soviet behavior as the spur for U.S. policy makers.

This difference in approach resulted in a series of exchanges between Leffler on the one hand, and Bruce Kuniholm and John L. Gaddis on the other, in 1981-1985. Kuniholm published *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East* in 1980, and Leffler's scathing review of it appeared in *Reviews in American History* in 1981.¹²¹ Leffler subsequently presented a paper decidedly critical of Kuniholm's book to the Organization of American Historians in 1983.¹²² The following year Leffler published another article on American national security strategy, to which both Gaddis and Kuniholm were invited to respond; Leffler also wrote a lengthy response to their criticisms.¹²³

The debate between these three eminent historians warrants comment since their arguments are highly relevant to this study. All three of the historians involved pursued their perspective by focusing on what they considered to be the primary actor in the issue: Kuniholm utilized mostly U.S. State Department documents and focused on diplomacy in order to formulate his arguments; Gaddis focused on strategy but asserted that Soviet actions towards Turkey did indeed warrant the steps that resulted in containment; Leffler also pointed

¹²¹ "From Cold War to Cold War in the Near East." *Reviews in American History*, Vol. 9, No. 1, March 1981. pp. 124-130.

¹²² "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952."

¹²³ "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48." *American Historical Review*. April 1984. pp. 346-400. Leffler's original article, the responses from Gaddis and Kuniholm, and Leffler's countering response were all published in the same issue.

to strategy but asserted that Soviet behavior in fact did not warrant the U.S.'s stringent response, and that a variety of other factors caused U.S. officials to move unilaterally towards containment. An objective mid-1990s summary of this tempest explains that the issues at stake when the terse debate took place still had not received a conclusive treatment. That author continues to mention that the fundamental difference between Gaddis and Leffler boils down to who receives the blame for initiating the Cold War: Gaddis indicts the Soviets, but Leffler says that, because the U.S. was the only real actor, U.S. officials took actions to preserve U.S. security that had the effect of starting the Cold War.¹²⁴

This writer's view is that, of the three scholars, Melvyn Leffler marshaled the most comprehensive evidence, composed the argument with the greatest explanatory power, and utilized the soundest logic. For this reason, the discussion in this study will reflect Leffler's perspective on Soviet behavior towards Turkey post-WWII, and will place the strategic calculations of U.S. officials within the larger cultural, economic, military, and political historical juncture which created the Turkish-American alliance.

During that nearly four-year debate with Kuniholm and Gaddis, Leffler produced several articles that, amongst other issues, concerned Turkish-U.S. relations in the early Cold War. "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952," for instance, is one of the key texts on post-WWII Turkish-American relations, and provides a wealth of archival documents for scholars interested in Turkish-American relations. However, that article is also Leffler's only publication that focuses specifically on the Turkish-U.S relationship. Because Turkey was not Leffler's main focus, only when the greater Cold War context required attention to Turkish-American relations did he focus on

¹²⁴ Stephanson, Anders. "The United States," in Reynolds, David. *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives*. London: Yale University Press, 1994. pp. 45-47.

that issue in later works.¹²⁵

Dankwart A. Rustow was also a scholar who did not focus specifically on Turkey, but whose interests brought him to the subject, and resulted in a major text on Turkish-U.S. relations. Technically a political scientist and a sociologist, Rustow was interested in how developing states can make the transition to democratic systems. This focus led him to Turkey's democratization process. In addition to several articles that dealt with Turkey and Turkish-U.S. relations, in 1987 Rustow published *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally*.¹²⁶

Amongst the works discussed in this section, Rustow's is an exception, possibly because he was a sociologist in addition to being a political scientist. Many authors, of course, have written about the various aspects of Turkish society and the changes it has experienced over the past 100 years. Rustow's text is important for this study because it covers a wide variety of issues related to Turkish society, including culture, education, economy, religion, technology, and women's rights, *in the context of Turkish-U.S. relations*, which is something rare in the literature on the Turkish Republic. Another important aspect of *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally* is the fact that the author utilized the expertise of many intellectuals concerned with Turkish-American relations in both countries, and interviewed a number of figures from the Turkish intellectual and political elite, including Prime Minister Turgut Özal, while composing the book.

This author has found the lack of serious academic attention, outside of political science, to the issue of Turkish-U.S. relations remarkable when even today many Turkish people, especially from the elite classes, refer condescendingly to their own country as "the 51st

¹²⁵ In Leffler's *A Preponderance of Power*, for example, several sections of the text focus on Turkish-U.S. relations; see: pp. 77-81, 121-127, 142-146, *et al.*

¹²⁶ Rustow, Dankwart A. "Defense of the Near East." *Foreign Affairs*. Jan. 1956, Vol. 34, Issue 2. pp. 271-286; "Turkey's Travails." *Foreign Affairs*. Fall 1979, Vol. 58 Issue 1. pp. 82-102; *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1987.

State.” Such phrases suggest a far deeper relationship than just politics, but even in a canonical sociology text such as *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*,¹²⁷ almost no attention is given to the interaction between Turkish and American culture. An architectural chapter of *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, for instance, refers specifically to important İstanbul architectural projects designed by U.S. firms, and even mentions the Americanizing “aspirations” of Turkish society, but makes no effort to analyze exactly how, why, or from where this trend emerged.¹²⁸ The competition between Anglophile (predominantly the American cultural version) and Francophile segments of the Turkish elite is another topic in dire need of academic analysis.

Thus, Rustow’s text is welcome simply for the fact that he takes in hand subjects outside of the usual political science realm. The fifth and sixth chapters of Rustow’s book do focus on political facets of the Turkish-U.S. relationship, but the discussion in other chapters frequently refers to Turkey’s interactions with the U.S. and to the post-WWII period. Possibly the book’s main weakness is its brevity, only 126 pages of text, when a much more detailed exploration of the subject would have been apt.

Other examples of prominent scholars who devoted a great deal of their career to Turkey and Turkish-U.S. relations are figures like Richard D. Robinson and John VanderLippe. Robinson, as Howard Reed explains in a 1997 journal article, spent much of his early academic career either in Turkey or writing about Turkey and its interaction with the U.S.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Bozdoğan, Sibal and Reşat Kasaba, eds. *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997.

¹²⁸ Ibid. p. 141. Neither “America” nor “United States” appear in the book’s index despite one chapter mentioning that Orhan Gencebay, the founder of the Turkish Arabesk style of pop music, resorted to playing Elvis Presley on the bağlama in order to legitimize the instrument as appropriate for popular music (p. 215).

¹²⁹ Op. cit. Robinson, who spent the late 1940s in Turkey on an Institute of Current World Affairs (ICWA) scholarship, is an extremely interesting, little-known figure who deserves more scholarly attention for his contribution to Turkish-American studies. The reports mentioned by Reed are now fully available on-line through the ICWA website. See also:

VanderLippe, an associate professor at the New School, recently published a major contribution to the scholarship on the İsmet İnönü era of Turkish politics.¹³⁰

Overall, U.S. scholars focusing on Turkish-U.S. relations are extremely few in number, and the number of academic works produced by those academicians corresponds.¹³¹ Apparently, the fact that Turkey is simply one of the many states that the U.S. had established closer relations with since WWII contributed to the lack of attention paid to it by American scholars. From Turkey's perspective, the U.S. was the predominant international actor, the nature of the relationship was new, and the other states around it were either old enemies or unstable. The result has been relatively much greater production from Turkish academia on Turkish-U.S. relations. Another consequence is that U.S. texts on Turkish-American relations in the post-WWII era are rarely academic historiography, but instead are geared towards the foreign policies that Turkey and the U.S. have instituted towards each other. Thus, in the literature on Turkish-American relations, Turkish authors have been more numerous as well as more prolific, whereas U.S. authors on the subject have tended to compose academically stronger texts. Both sets of authors are preoccupied with the subject's politics to the neglect of the many other issues that comprise Turkish-U.S. relations.¹³²

Robinson, Richard D. *The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1963.

¹³⁰ Referenced above in Note 106.

¹³¹ There are a handful of works on Turkish-American relations not mentioned in the above discussion because they do not discuss the immediate post-WWII era. The number of such works is not large, however, and they generally fall into the "pro-Turkish" category of works mentioned above. Usually the focus is on defining and remedying whatever problems have been identified in the political/military relationship between the two states. On the other hand, even in terms of MA and PhD theses, few U.S. citizens have written theses concerning post-WWII Turkish-American relations that are as interesting as the Gürbüz thesis mentioned above in Note 94. Two examples are: Garrett, James Madison III. "Assistance to Turkey as an Instrument of United States Foreign Policy, with Emphasis on Military Assistance: 1947-1955." PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 1960; Overman, Edwin Scott. "American Aid and the Economy of Turkey." PhD Thesis, The Ohio State University, 1953.

¹³² For further information about texts on Turkish-American relations, dated bibliographies that compile sources on Turkey exist. See, for example: Bodurgil, Abraham, ed. *Turkey*,

1.5. Aims

As should be apparent from the above discussion of the literature concerning Turkish-U.S. relations, this subject lacks serious historiographical analysis. Most of the extant works are general, focus superficially on momentary political trends, and do little to enable readers to understand the fundamental factors that have moved relations between these two states since WWII. The result is a notable inability on the part of most contemporary commentators to speak or write in a consistent, incisive, or fruitful manner on Turkish-U.S. affairs. Only recently, on the Turkish side of the equation, have hopeful signs of new analytical approaches emerged.

Accordingly, this study's essential purpose is to explore a new route to understanding Turkish-U.S. relations by focusing on the main State Department figure in the post-WWII era, Dean Acheson. More specifically, this study aims to examine a figure who had vital influence not only on post-WWII formulation of policy towards the Turkish Republic, but also on how that policy became practice. In the following chapters, aspects of Acheson's responsibilities, relationships with other U.S. and Turkish officials, attitudes and motivations towards issues concerning U.S. foreign policy and Turkey, and personality will be discussed in an attempt to define more precisely and fundamentally what calculations went into U.S. policy towards Turkey in the 1945-1952 period. Identifying and analyzing other factors influencing Acheson's decisions concerning Turkey, such as U.S. public opinion and the views of Congressional leaders, are additional elements informing this study's conclusions. Looking at former Secretary of State Acheson will aid in understanding more clearly and definitively how the State Department made policy towards Turkey, what the State

Politics, and Government: A Bibliography 1938-1975. Washington: Library of Congress, 1978; Tamkoç, Metin. *A Bibliography on the Foreign Relations of the Republic of Turkey, 1919-1967.* Ankara: İdare İlimler Fakültesi, 1968.

Department knew about Turkey, and what the opinions of State Department officials concerning Turkey and its importance to the U.S. were.

Melvyn Leffler's now-canonical text on the early Cold War, *A Preponderance of Power*, provides one of the starting points for this study's analysis, and illustrates clearly why Acheson, while certainly not the only possible candidate, is a crucial and appropriate figure to research. In the Introduction to his text, Leffler explains the role of power in the thinking of post-WWII officials:

... military officials and their civilian superiors in the Pentagon operated from assumptions that attributed primacy to geopolitical configurations of power and to war making capabilities. Military planners assumed that if war erupted it would be protracted; the side that had superior industrial and technological capabilities would prevail. In peacetime, therefore, it was essential to thwart the Kremlin from gaining control of critical industrial infrastructure, skilled labor, raw materials, and forward bases. The United States had to retain allies across the oceans.... Subsequently, the most important National Security Council (NSC) papers of the Truman administration incorporated a geostrategic vision.... Power was defined in terms of the control of resources, industrial infrastructure, and overseas bases.... The task of American policymakers, the CIA advised, was to keep "the still widely dispersed power resources of Europe and Asia from being drawn together into a single Soviet power structure".... Winning the loyalty of peoples on the periphery was part of a "sociological" security dilemma whose solution would thwart Communist inroads and Soviet efforts to gain domination over the "Eurasian littoral."¹³³

From 1945-1949, Acheson either was an important policy-maker in the State Department (as Under Secretary) or an activist working to win domestic support for the Truman Administration's foreign policies; from 1949-1953, Acheson was the single person most charged with the execution of the strategy described by Leffler. Although the relevance of such a strategy to a study of the U.S.' post-war alliance with the Turkish Republic is self-evident, Leffler's text only concerns U.S. policy-makers and the early Cold War years in general. This study, on the other hand, is interested in delving further into the details of how one policy-maker, Dean Acheson, was involved in making and carrying out policy towards Turkey. Acheson operated with the assumptions concerning geostrategy and power

¹³³ pp. 11-12.

elaborated in Leffler's text, but that fact elucidates neither how U.S. policy towards Turkey was formulated, nor the factors affecting that formulation, in the vital years between 1945 and 1952.

In order to provide more comprehensive and precise information concerning early Cold War U.S. policy towards Turkey, this study will thus focus on the following key questions:

A) What role did Dean Acheson play in the formulation and practice of U.S. policy towards the Turkish Republic during the Truman Administration?

Because a comprehensive examination of all the figures involved in formulating U.S. policy towards Turkey is not possible within the confines of this study, one key figure will be focused on. Acheson contributed a fundamental influence on U.S. policy towards Turkey during the period in question, but despite the clear utility of looking at Acheson in the context of Turkish-U.S. affairs, no such analysis has previously been attempted. This analysis will therefore provide a new approach to the subject.

B) What did Dean Acheson know or think about the Turkish government and/or its people?

This information will come from two main sources. The first source is the clues that can be gleaned from official documents regarding how Acheson approached the Turkish issue, and the two most important sources for Acheson's public documents are the NARA archives in College Park, Maryland and the Acheson Papers at the Truman Library in Independence, Missouri. This researcher visited both of those archives in order to obtain relevant documents. The published FRUS records comprise another important source of official documents relevant to Acheson's public service career. The other primary source for information about Acheson's personal views is the books and articles that Acheson wrote

about his life and his views on political issues.¹³⁴

C) What motivated Acheson while he formulated and/or carried out policy towards the Turkish Republic?

This issue naturally requires a certain amount of informed speculation. The same sources used for Question B will be turned to for this issue, but some inductive reasoning must also be utilized since humans, including politicians and those serving in official capacities, do not always state their motivations openly. For this reason different aspects of Acheson's youth, upbringing, social status, education and experiences will be mentioned in connection to his official capacities in formulating policy.

D) What were the concrete results of the decisions that Acheson took and the policies he formulated or contributed to?

Even though this study focuses on the post-WWII era, the nature of the relationship established between Turkey and the U.S. has often fluctuated and transformed. This author's view is that the foundation established in 1945-1952 is the reason for both the successes and failures that the alliance has experienced in the intervening 60 years. Suggestions for a more profound understanding of the relationship will be included in the final section of this study.

A primary reason for this writer's interest in Turkish-American relations is the evident effect that the U.S. has had on the trajectory of the Turkish economy, military, and society over the

¹³⁴ Two collections of Acheson's personal letters have been released: Acheson, Dean and Harry S. Truman. *Affection and Trust: The Personal Correspondence of Harry S. Truman and Dean Acheson, 1953-1971*. David McCullough, ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010, and McLellan, David S. and David C. Acheson, eds. *Among Friends: Personal Letters of Dean Acheson*. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1980. Both books contain essentially no information relevant to Acheson's views concerning Turkey. The Dean Gooderham Acheson Papers at the Yale University Library predominantly features documents from Acheson's post-State Department life. This scholar has not yet been able to perform research in the Acheson Papers at the Yale Library.

past 60 years. Turkey is now in the later stages of industrialization, and its economic, military, and political clout is growing quickly. Many factors have contributed to Turkey's development since WWII, but the influence of the United States manifests itself widely and variously in Turkish society, especially on the cultural, economic, and technological levels. Turkish society has reacted to this influence in manifold and discrete ways, from full embrace to utter rejection; these stances have often taken more tangible forms in the political conflicts that gripped Turkish society in the tumultuous decades since Turkey first held free, fair, and transparent elections in 1950. To what extent those elections were the result of a need to present a truly democratic face for its republican superpower ally, which was then in the process of forming its own Delian League, is still debated by historians.¹³⁵ Answers to the questions enumerated above will shed new light on whether U.S. officials saw the Turkish political system as a real factor in their policy deliberations.

The process that led to the admission of Turkey to NATO is also known in general terms, but mostly in relation to the contemporary international political situation; much less is understood about how this decision worked itself out, in specific relation to Turkey, in the U.S. political and military bureaucracy of the time. Turkey was a nation that received little official U.S. attention even in the late 1930s. What U.S. officials knew about Turkey, what their opinions about Turkey were, what factors influenced their decisions and to what extent, and which officials were more important in the final decision to admit Turkey to NATO are largely unstudied and unknown subjects, but the result of which has had important regional and global ramifications over the past 60 years. Recent development in Turkish culture, diplomacy, economy, state, military, and society suggest that these consequences will gain

¹³⁵ For some commentary already provided for this issue, see: Kayaoğlu, op. cit.; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)*, Cilt I, II. pp. 13-139, 275-363, 545-564; Loğoğlu, Dr. O. Faruk. *İsmet İnönü and the Making of Modern Turkey*. Ankara: İnönü Vakfı, 1997. pp. 111-158; VanderLippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950*, passim.

gravity in the coming decades. Therefore, understanding the roots of these changes will help academic analysis of the processes that have brought Turkey to where it is today.

Ultimately, this dissertation advances a new and more in-depth perspective on the foundation of the post-WWII Turkish-U.S. alliance. Implicit in this study's conclusions are new routes for analyses of both the successes and failures in bilateral relations between the two states over the past 60-plus years.

Finally, this author hopes to avoid the political pitfalls that many previous authors on this subject fell into to a greater or lesser extent. To this author's mind, the most encouraging sign in recent Turkish-U.S. studies is the emergence of a handful of scholars who are *politically neutral* and *academic*. Deeper comprehension of the true ramifications of the Turkish-American relationship can be attained only through non-partisan analysis of its many historical manifestations.

Several notes on archival sources for Turkish-U.S. relations in the WWII and post-WWII era are apropos. The most important is that the archival materials available in the U.S. are vast and largely uninspected. This writer has gone through his own learning process in the College Park NARA archives. As I became familiar with the organization of those archives, and at the same time scanned the materials from NARA that have been used in other authors' texts, the realization of how great the potential material for studies of Turkish-U.S. relations actually is dawned on me. This study, for example, utilizes two of the Record Groups from the College Park archives. However, dozens of other Record Groups are relevant to research on Turkish-U.S. relations, and to-date, no academic text on the subject has even approached a comprehensive examination of the possible NARA sources. Hopefully, the archival potential present for scholars of Turkish-U.S. relations will convince more to devote their effort to academic studies of the topic, and to remain in academia.

A complicating aspect of Turkish-U.S. relations is the vast amount of documents that are still inaccessible to researchers, and on both sides of the issue. Better-known is the fact that the vast majority of official Turkish documents from the WWII and post-WWII era are still unavailable to researchers. In NARA, however, a great percentage (approximately twenty percent) of the most interesting documents are still classified, especially in files dated 1947 and later.¹³⁶ The Freedom of Information Act will open other sources of information to scholars of Turkish-U.S. relations who can wrest new documents from official files.

¹³⁶ The same is true in the Truman Library. This author's applications to de-classify documents in both College Park and the Truman Library did not conclude with great success.

2.0. FORMULATING AND CONDUCTING U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE TURKISH REPUBLIC: DEAN ACHESON, 1945-1953

Before examining Dean Acheson, the official that this study is focused on, providing the reader background that will serve to emphasize why Acheson had a vital role in formulating and implementing policy towards the Turkish Republic after WWII is essential. Consequently, the following two chapters will focus on Harry S. Truman's term as U.S. President, and the approach that he took towards conducting American foreign policy while negotiating with other actors, especially in the U.S. Congress and the U.S. public, who had their own passionately-held views concerning the correct course for the country to take as it took on its new role as the world's preeminent economic, political, and military power.

2.0.1. President Truman's Cabinet, Foreign Policy, and Domestic Public Opinion

This chapter will focus on the attitude that U.S. President Harry S. Truman took towards foreign policy. The underlying aim is to elucidate how U.S. foreign policy was formulated and implemented during Harry S. Truman's Presidency in anticipation of discussing Dean Acheson's premier role in that effort.

2.0.1.1. Truman's Focus on Domestic Affairs and Economy

A commonplace statement amongst historians writing about Harry S. Truman is the observation that he not only was not well-prepared to conduct U.S. foreign policy upon Franklin Delano Roosevelt's (FDR) death in April 1945, he also was not terribly confident towards or interested in that aspect of his new job. Truman's experiences as an elected

official had made him an excellent party man, someone who knew the details of how politics, from the grassroots to the U.S. Senate, worked, and how to get results from that system. In other words, Truman knew, and was comfortable, only with domestic politics.

Born into a rural Missouri family, Truman's life had included work as a farmer, a clerk, an officer during WWI, and a haberdasher in Kansas City. His formal education did not extend beyond the high school level, except for some night classes in law. His knowledge of history came not from school, but from his extensive reading on the subject.¹

Truman's entrance into Missouri politics also was not auspicious. His first foray came after Mike Pendergast (brother to the infamous Tom) convinced him to run for judge of Jackson County, Missouri in the early 1920s. Truman won, but then lost two years later, following which, in 1926, he ran for and won (with the support of Tom Pendergast) the position of presiding judge. Through this position, and his steadfast ability to stay clear of the corruption that riddled Missouri politics at the time, Truman gradually built his reputation and popularity during the late 1920s and early 1930s. Despite his connection to, and the public's association of him with, Tom Pendergast's Democratic Party political machine-*cum*-racket in Kansas City, Truman was noted for his rectitude and constant pursuit of the public good.²

2.0.1.1.1. Senate experiences

In 1934, Truman again benefitted from his connection to Tom Pendergast. Pendergast's unsavory business affairs caused leading Missouri Democrats to turn down his offer of

¹ Donovan, Robert. *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1945-1948*. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1996. pp. xxii, xv-xvi; Gosnell, Harold F. *Truman's Crises: A Political Biography of Harry S. Truman*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. pp. 5, 10, 15, 28-33, 43-44, 52-57.

² Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, p. ix; Gosnell pp. 33-34, 83-94. Gosnell attributes Truman's first political foray to Jim Pendergast, Mike Pendergast's son.

support during that year's Missouri Senate seat election. Thus, he turned to Truman as a candidate who could offer voters a clean reputation; Truman then won a divided race in the Democratic primary and easily rode the Depression-era anti-Republican tide to victory against the incumbent.³

Truman continued his same honest political activities in Washington D.C. During his first term, from 1934-1940, Missouri Senator Truman had to avoid appearing to be either Pendergast's puppet or a faceless FDR advocate who had forgotten his home state's needs. Truman pursued his own political goals, independently, when he felt it conformed to his ideals, but made sure that patronage went to Missouri, and to Pendergast, when necessary or desirable. At the same time, Truman did not always fall in line with FDR's wishes. Even though Truman was a freshman Senator, and thus stayed reticent in Senate proceedings, he did become closely involved in certain issues, and gained expertise in topics related to transportation. He also paid close attention to farm and labor topics, which were important to two of his main constituencies. At the end of Truman's first term, Pendergast's Kansas City political machine was broken up and Truman, who refused to repent of his ties to the disgraced boss, even resented FDR for impinging on Truman's prerogatives as a Missouri Senator. In the 1940 Senatorial race, Truman would have a strong, but independent record to present to the voters as a balance to the tarnish of his connections to Pendergast.⁴

Despite the downswing in Democratic Party political fortunes towards the end of the 1930s, Truman won the 1940 Missouri Senatorial contest by following a strategy similar to that of his 1934 campaign. In the Democratic primary, Truman again faced a split competition, which allowed him to play to his own strengths, especially his Senate record as a loyal New Dealer and the various special interests, such as the farm and labor vote, that comprised the

³ Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, p. x; Gosnell pp. 95-111.

⁴ Gosnell pp. 112-137.

Missouri voting population. After a narrow 8,000 vote victory in the primary, brought about through energetic campaigning, strong organization, and superior strategy, Truman defeated his Republican opponent in the general election. Truman's sensitivity to Missouri's voters and the issues important to them proved more important than the stigma of his association with the Pendergast machine.⁵

As Truman's second term as Missouri Senator began, the deepening crisis overseas started to assume greater importance in U.S. politics. Truman's greatest role in the following four years was a direct result of that crisis, but in keeping with his political expertise and preference, that task focused on a domestic concern, the defense industry and its organization for the war effort. As chairman of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, popularly known as the Truman Committee, Truman found a role that finally garnered him positive national attention. His activities as head of the Special Committee helped save lives and billions of dollars, and got him on the cover of *Time* magazine in 1943. In sum, Truman's reputation as "watchdog of the treasury," built through the Special Committee chairmanship, made him a candidate for Vice-President in 1944.⁶

2.0.1.1.2. U.S. Vice-President

In the run up to the 1944 election, the question of who would run with FDR as his Vice-Presidential nominee threatened to rend the Democratic Party in half. Henry A. Wallace was the Vice-President and, even though FDR's adamant support for Wallace in 1940 had ensured Wallace's nomination, Wallace had made powerful enemies in the intervening four years. Conservative factions in the Democratic Party demanded anyone but Wallace, and an ailing

⁵ Ibid. pp. 138-153.

⁶ Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, p. x-xii; Gosnell pp. 154-168.

FDR, whom Wallace had aggravated while performing his capacities as chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare and presiding officer of the Senate, declined to fight for Wallace's renomination. Despite Wallace's real popularity with the Democratic Party's voting base and the 1944 Democratic Convention's delegates, Truman emerged as a compromise candidate between the liberal, New Dealer wing of the Democratic Party and the more conservative business, city boss, and Southern wing. Organized labor, though pro-Wallace, remembered Truman's record and played an important role in swinging to Truman. For his part, Truman denied wanting the nomination up until the last moment, when he was convinced that FDR indeed preferred to have him as his running mate.⁷

The choice of Truman as FDR's running mate was, in reality, a pragmatic choice for the Democrats, since the most important characteristic that Truman possessed was that he would not lose FDR any voters, and might win him some votes in Missouri. Truman would also be largely alone during the campaign since work relating to the war effort was overwhelming for the ailing President; Truman and FDR met only one time in order to discuss campaign strategy, and FDR made only a handful of, albeit highly effective, speeches. Truman's speeches during the campaign gave little attention to U.S. foreign policy even if he did touch on isolationism from time-to-time. Mostly, he stayed close to the domestic issues that he knew well. In addition to the alienation of the Democrat Party's liberal wing, the other important political result from the 1944 election was the fact that the tide seemed to have turned against isolationism in U.S. domestic politics.⁸

⁷ Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, pp. x-xiii; Gosnell pp. 178- 195; Hamby, Alonzo L. *Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. pp. 278-284.

⁸ Divine, Robert A. *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II*. New York: Atheneum, 1967. pp. 182-183, 211-213, 233-242; Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, p. xii; Gosnell pp. 195-208, 236; Hamby, *Man of the People*, pp. 284-286; Blum, John Morton, ed. *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973. p. 390.

Truman's accession to the Vice-Presidency did not bring added responsibilities to Truman, nor did it bring him closer to FDR's inner circle of advisors. Even though Truman's ten years of Senate experience would have made him a valuable asset to the President, he rarely saw FDR during the eighty-plus days that he served as Vice-President. This also meant that Truman had no experience with the administration's foreign policy or the manner in which it was devised and carried out. On the day that FDR died and he was sworn in as President, Truman was still ignorant of the atomic bomb project, a topic concerning which, only weeks later, he would be making momentous decisions. Even though Truman had been active in the Senate as per his duties as Vice-President, he knew nothing of FDR's handling of foreign policy. For example, the reality of what had transpired at Yalta was a mystery to Truman despite his role in enabling FDR's well-known speech to Congress on that conference.⁹

As is clear from the above synopsis of Truman's early life and political career to 1945, his experiences were almost exclusively related to domestic American concerns. However, Truman's focus on such issues is understandable considering his background and the opportunities available to someone born into a rural Missouri farming family near the end of the 19th century. Those issues and experiences were principal factors that enabled Truman to create a long and successful political career.

2.0.1.2. Truman's Relationship with the State Department

The most important Cabinet officer is the Secretary of State. He is the direct representative of the President for all foreign Ambassadors. He is also in charge of American Ambassadors to foreign countries. He must not only be well informed on world affairs, but he must be a man who can distinguish the wheat from the chaff in

⁹ Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, pp. xiii-xiv, 10, 13; Gosnell pp. 209-214. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p. 26; Truman, Harry S. *Memoirs, Volume 1: Year of Decisions, 1945*. Printed in the U.K. For Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd. by Richard Clay and Co., Ltd.: Bungay, Suffolk, 1955. pp. 2-3, 10-11, 22-27.

the reports that come from all these countries.

The President, of course, must be prepared to support his Cabinet members when they need backing. This is especially true with regard to the Secretary of State. It is immensely important that these two men -- the President and the Secretary of State -- understand each other completely and that they know what their respective roles are. The Secretary of State should never at any time come to think that he is the man in the White House, and the President should not try to be the Secretary of State.¹⁰

Thus, as Harry S. Truman assumed his duties as U.S. President, foreign policy was an entirely new endeavor for him, but because of the historical circumstances, foreign policy was the predominant issue facing U.S. decision-makers. To Truman's credit, he was aware of his lack of international affairs expertise. With no comprehensive university education, and his sole foray abroad consisting of his wartime experiences, Truman got most of his knowledge of foreign peoples and cultures from his readings on history. Throughout not only his political career, but his life, Truman had been immersed in issues that were almost exclusively domestic, local, and provincial.¹¹ For this reason Truman desired, when possible, to give most of his attention to the domestic issues that he knew best, and leave foreign policy to those who were intimately familiar with FDR's ideas and intentions.¹² This meant that Truman's Secretary of State would receive much greater freedom of decision and action than those who had filled that position in the past had enjoyed.

Truman's first term as President, coming at the conclusion of humankind's most devastating conflict and at the dawn of what was to become the Cold War, was consequently replete with foreign policy quandaries. In order to make up for his shortfall in foreign policy experience and knowledge, Truman would work as tenaciously as he always had in order to make

¹⁰ Truman, *Memoirs, Volume 1*, p. 255.

¹¹ His wartime experience, while important for his character's maturation, did not spark great interest in foreign affairs. See: Donald, Aida D. *Citizen Soldier: A Life of Harry S. Truman*. New York: Basic Books, 2012. pp. 31-34, 65-68; Gosnell pp. 51, 57.

¹² Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, pp. 36-37; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p. 27; Truman, *Memoirs, Volume 1*, pp. 12-13.

informed decisions as best he could. Upon Truman's assumption of the Presidency, FDR's last Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, was fully engaged with preparations for the San Francisco Conference of the nascent United Nations (U.N.), so Under Secretary Joseph Grew, former U.S. Ambassador to both Japan and Turkey, was Acting Secretary. Truman went to Stettinius and Grew, as well as many others in both the civilian and military administration, for a crash course in the foreign policy issues facing the United States at that time. This inexperience and openness, however, also led him to being easily swayed by those from whom he sought advice. The initial results were the inauspicious first encounter with Molotov, the premature cut in Lend-Lease shipments, and tension with British Prime Minister Churchill. After the conclusion of the San Francisco U.N. Conference, Truman officially appointed James F. Byrnes, to whom he felt a personal debt, as Secretary of State even though Byrnes also had little experience with foreign relations. Truman's aversion to the State Department's professional diplomats probably played a role in his appointment of Byrnes.¹³

Immediately after Byrnes replaced Stettinius, Truman and his new Secretary of State headed to Germany for the Big Three meeting in Potsdam. Truman did not actually want to attend the meeting, but felt that the situation warranted a trip across the Atlantic. In any event, Potsdam was the only summit meeting that Truman attended as President. Truman prepared for the conference with his customary heavy work load, interspersed with socializing and relaxation, while crossing the Atlantic. At the conference Stalin, possibly seeking to utilize Truman's inexperience, moved that Truman be made the conference's chairman. Truman then depended on his advisors to carry out that role. For his part, Truman misjudged Stalin's true nature, but by the end of the conference had begun to feel apprehension towards his ally.

¹³ Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, p. 17,39-44, 53-54; Gosnell pp. 236-247; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 26-30; Truman, *Memoirs, Volume 1*, pp. 14, 22-27, 32.

Potsdam's results have been debated thoroughly by historians. To be brief, some agreements made on key issues eventually disintegrated, and other issues were left undecided. From Truman's standpoint, the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which Truman immediately proposed in the Conference's opening session, would allow him to devote his attention to domestic priorities. In fact, the account of Potsdam in Truman's memoirs gives the reader a lively impression of Truman's unease, and his desire to return back to Washington and the domestic issues with which he felt more comfortable. The day that Truman termed his "best day" (26 July 1945) at the Conference featured no negotiations and was, instead, spent in Frankfurt inspecting American forces in and around the city.¹⁴

In the months following Potsdam, Truman actualized his dislike for diplomacy by giving Byrnes a free rein with which to conduct U.S. foreign relations, including with the USSR. This situation continued from July 1945 until January 1946, when Congressional, public, and State Department pressure, coupled with Truman's annoyance at not being fully informed concerning foreign policy activity and decisions, resulted in Truman's assertion of his authority in diplomatic decisions. In his memoirs, Truman begins his explanation of the fall out with Byrnes by stating that FDR had given Byrnes excessive freedom to act in Byrnes's wartime capacity as head of the Offices of Economic Stabilization and War Mobilization; he follows with a restatement of how he believed the relationship between the President and the Secretary of State should be conducted, emphasizing that the President made decisions while the Secretary advised. He then launches into a five-page grievance concerning Byrnes's impropriety in executing U.S. foreign policy in the last half of 1946, culminating in the famous "my dear Jim" letter that ended with "I'm tired of babying the Soviets." After this confrontation, Truman asserts that Byrnes began to behave in a manner befitting Truman's

¹⁴ Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, pp. 72-89 ; Feis, *Between War and Peace*, pp. 316-324; Gosnell pp. 247-252; Hamby, *Man of the People*, pp. 314-315; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p.38; Truman, *Memoirs, Volume 1*, pp. 268-276, 320-323.

conception of a Secretary of State, but then came to Truman several months later complaining that health problems would force him to resign. Truman convinced him to stay on for the coming Council of Foreign Ministers conferences, but for the rest of 1946, Byrnes's foreign policies were more closely coordinated with the President.¹⁵

When Truman reports that Byrnes wanted to resign, he also states that he already had a replacement in mind, General George C. Marshall. Correspondingly, Truman appointed Marshall Secretary of State as soon as Marshall returned from China, where he directed the unsuccessful attempt to broker peace between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists. Truman's relationship with Marshall was more productive than that with Byrnes. Besides the fact that Truman did not, as he had done with Byrnes, offer the position to Marshall out of a feeling of personal guilt, the main reason for Marshall's successful tenure was that Marshall was a man of entirely different stature than Byrnes. At that time, as he still is today, Marshall was considered one of America's foremost military and political figures, and the immense respect he was accorded was unlike that given to any other contemporary leader. Marshall's announcement to the press, upon arrival in Washington D.C. to take on his new job, that his position would be non-political and that he would not become involved in political issues served only to increase reverence for his personality. That announcement also eased Marshall's relationship with Truman, since rumors that Marshall might be a Presidential candidate for the 1948 election were rife. The advantages that Marshall provided to Truman were that the two men understood the President-Secretary of State relationship similarly, and that Marshall would command respect in the hostile, Republican-dominated

¹⁵Byrnes, James F. *All in One Lifetime*. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1958. pp. 186, 343-347, 351, 353-356, 387-388; Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, pp. 155-162, 185-193; Gosnell, pp. 299-310; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 38-40, 44-49; Truman, *Memoirs, Volume 1*, pp. 486-493.

80th Congress.¹⁶

In the event, Truman's choice of Marshall was fortuitous given the crisis that erupted almost immediately upon Marshall's assuming his duties as Secretary of State. Little more than a month after Marshall was confirmed by the Senate, the British government informed the U.S. State Department that British finances could no longer bear the burden of aid to Greece and Turkey. The response devised by the Truman administration was, first, a new position on foreign policy, later termed the Truman Doctrine, and a program of economic aid to states in need, called the Marshall Plan after the Secretary of State who announced it to the world in June 1947; the respect that even a Republican Congress felt for Marshall ensured that the Marshall Plan, with Truman keeping a safe distance, passed easily. Throughout the remainder of Marshall's term as Secretary, Truman would follow a similar strategy, letting Marshall's prestige win over legislators, citizens, and foreign leaders who otherwise may have been estranged by Truman or by their dislike of Truman. Marshall was beset by various foreign crises during all of his two years leading the State Department. He performed his duties calmly, unflinchingly, and masterfully, and in the process resurrected the State Department's reputation, which emerged from WWII in the military's shadow and stumbled through Byrnes's term as Secretary.¹⁷

Marshall's age, the stresses of the position, and his health eventually wore down his ability and desire to continue in the office. Even before becoming Secretary of State, Marshall had attempted to retire from public life, only to be called back to service. After Truman's successful 1948 reelection run, Marshall underwent kidney surgery and Dean Acheson, who

¹⁶ Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, pp 266-67; Pogue, Forrest C. *George C. Marshall: Statesman*. New York: Viking, 1987. pp. 144-151; Stoler, Mark A. *George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century*. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989. pp. 153-158; Truman, *Memoirs, Volume 1*, pp. 493-494.

¹⁷ Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, pp. 354-355; Gosnell pp.343-344; Pogue pp. 151-157, 160-412; Stoler pp. 154-155, 159-173.

had earned Truman's attention and trust as Under Secretary of State, accepted the offer to succeed Marshall.¹⁸

Dean Acheson assumed his duties in early 1949, after serving as Under Secretary of State for Byrnes and for part of Marshall's term. In actuality, Acheson spent much of his Under Secretary stint as Acting Secretary of State while Secretary Byrnes was out of the country for conferences. Acheson's term will be described in detail below, so this section will suffice with a short summary focused on Acheson's relationship with President Truman.

The main advantages that Acheson brought to the position of Secretary were that he had worked with Truman previously, had won his trust, knew what Truman expected from his Secretary of State, could fulfill that role completely, and even possessed an established reputation as a diplomat. Despite the apparent dissimilarities between Acheson and Truman, the two would develop a close working relationship and mutual respect that would endure for the remainder of their lives. Conceivably, the fact that neither one of the men came from elite families and both had a similar fondness for rural life enabled the two men to forge their bond, even though Acheson had gained entrance to elite East Coast society through education and profession,. Furthermore, Acheson took over the post of Secretary of State at pivotal point in world history: the Berlin Crisis was at its height, China was falling to the Communists, NATO's foundation was only several months away, and the Korean War would break out a year later. Acheson and Truman worked their way through all of these overwhelming emergencies together. After both retired from public life, they continued to write each other letters filled with the regard that each felt for the other.¹⁹

¹⁸ Pogue pp. 413-415; Stoler pp. 173-174.

¹⁹ Donovan, Robert J. *Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1949-1953*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1982. pp. 34-36, 39-52, 66-88; Gosnell pp. 416, 427-438, 461-482. See also: Acheson, Dean and Harry S. Truman. *Affection and Trust: The*

Thus, at the conclusion of his Presidency, Truman's relationship with the State Department was certainly better than it had been in 1945, and the reason for that improvement is found in the second and third appointments that he made to the Secretary of State post. As always, Truman learned quickly what kind of person got the results that he was looking for. Consequently, his second and third choices for State Department leadership are acclaimed as two of the greatest to fill that office. Those two men enabled Truman to focus on domestic priorities while knowing that he would receive close consultation and cooperation on foreign policy when the need arose.

2.0.1.3. Truman's Relationship with Congress

Through much of his more than seven years as President, Truman had a difficult relationship with Congress, especially in regard to the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. Various negative adjectives could accurately describe Truman's interactions with Congress, such as antagonistic, acrimonious, or confrontational, despite the fact that Truman enjoyed a Democratic majority in both houses of Congress for all but two years of his Presidential term. That Truman had spent ten years in that legislative body, and knew many of the members of Congress closely and personally, did not change the reality that the interests and perspectives of the Executive branch of the U.S. government are not always shared by the Legislative branch. In the foreign policy realm, the President thinks in terms of the nation's long-term interests while Congress thinks first of its local voting constituents. In order to carry out foreign policy, the President depends on the Secretary of State to implement policy, but the Secretary must also convince Congress to support the Executive's programs by underwriting

Personal Correspondence of Harry S. Truman and Dean Acheson, 1953-1971. David McCullough, ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010.

the necessary legislation.²⁰ Throughout Truman's term in office, he and his Secretaries of State experienced enormous difficulties in convincing Congress to support their foreign policy prescriptions.

One of Truman's first actions as President was to communicate with Congress both informally and formally, in an attempt to establish open communication and goodwill. The honeymoon did not last long. The appointment of James Byrnes as Secretary of State, for example, immediately created tension with important Senate leaders. By June 1945, leading members of Congress began to attack his decisions. After that initial grace period, Truman never again experienced simple relations with Congress.²¹

2.0.1.3.1. 79th Congress: 1945-1946

Truman acceded to the Presidency several months after the 79th Congress had convened and both the Senate and the House of Representatives were controlled by the Democrats. Several features of this Congress should be noted, which will also bear on the discussion of the following three Congresses. The first is that the most powerful Congressional committee in regard to foreign policy is the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; as he had since 1941, Texas Democratic Senator Tom Connally, who had served on the WWII-era Truman Committee, headed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. From the end of WWII to 1950, the most vocal figure on the Committee was its Senior Republican member, Michigan Senator Arthur Vandenberg. Vandenberg's influence on Republican votes for foreign policy issues was so vital that Dean Acheson would talk of the need to obtain the Vandenberg "seal

²⁰ The relevance of this point to U.S. relations with Turkey will be explored in more detail below.

²¹ Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, pp. 16-19, 62; Gosnell p. 246.

of approval” for foreign relations legislation introduced to the Senate.²²

A second important aspect of the 79th Congress was the continuing bipartisan agreement concerning foreign relations. The understanding that foreign policy in a time of crisis should be off-limits to politicking was reached by FDR and some Republican members of Congress during 1944. Although foreign policy did briefly emerge as an issue during the 1944 Presidential campaign, the bipartisan agreement had held, and then was cemented by Arthur Vandenberg’s 10 January 1944 speech openly declaring his support for greater U.S. involvement abroad.²³

Finally, Congressional members’ political fealties during Truman’s entire Presidency may be misleading to the incautious. A Democratic majority reigned in Congress during the 79th, 81st, and 82nd Congresses, but many of those Democrats were Southerners, popularly known as “Dixiecrats.” This meant that, even though nominally Democrats, those Congressional members may vote with the Republican Party on certain domestic issues, especially concerning race or other regional interests and concerns. Complicating the situation was the reality that, if the Southern Democrats voted with the Republicans, the Republicans had *de facto* majorities in both the Senate and the House in the 79th Congress. On the other hand, Southern Democrats were more likely to vote with the Democratic Party on international subjects.²⁴

²² Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969. pp. 71-72, 223-225, 317; Chace, James. *Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. pp. 95-96.

²³ Vandenberg, Arthur H. Jr. ed. *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952. pp. 90-107, 126-145; Westerfield, H. Bradford. *Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea*. New York: Octagon Books, 1972. pp. 159-178.

²⁴ Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, pp. 107-126; Gosnell pp. 260-261; Westerfield pp. 45-47. This invisible conservative majority in Congress had existed since 1938, when dismay concerning FDR’s “court-packing” attempt and the 1937 economic downturn resulted in

As mentioned, President Truman's initial efforts to create a positive working atmosphere between the Executive and Legislative branches had been welcomed warmly. By the time Congress met after the 1945 summer recess, however, the war had ended and the issues pressing members of Congress had wholly changed. Furthermore, criticisms asserting that Truman was not his own man had emerged. In order to establish his own Presidential authority and create distance between FDR's legacy and his own administration, Truman presented a 21-point plan which he regarded his "Fair Deal." This domestic policy initiative met with partial success and partial failure as only about half of the plan's proposals were eventually passed. For their part, Republican Congress members interpreted the plan as the reignition of the antagonistic relations between the Executive and Legislative branches that had existed during FDR's era. Overall, Executive cooperation with Congress became difficult. Throughout 1946, the situation remained the same as Truman was forced to constantly cajole, and sometimes berate, Congress into working on the legislation that he desired.²⁵

Truman's relations with Congress also took a turn for the worse on the foreign policy front. By the closing months of 1945, Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes were already concerned about potential Senate reaction to their foreign policy decisions. In a 19 October 1945 memorandum to President Truman concerning a message to the Turkish government about Soviet demands on the Turkish Straits, Byrnes mentions that he had chatted with John Foster Dulles on the way to the London Foreign Ministers conference. The result of the conversation was that he thought it necessary to confer with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations about an issue proposed for the message that would entail U.S. commitments abroad. This note is interesting because Dulles was not a Senator at the time.

large losses in both Congressional houses; see: Brinkley, Alan. *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War*. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1995. pp. 102-103.

²⁵ Gosnell p. 260-282.

Dulles had gone to the London Conference as an advisor on the strength of his foreign affairs knowledge. He had also been Thomas Dewey's foreign affairs advisor during Dewey's 1944 Presidential campaign and an advisor to the U.S. delegation (which included Arthur Vandenberg) at the 1945 San Francisco U.N. Conference. In other words, Byrnes thought that Dulles had enough influence with Vandenberg, or shared such similar opinions, that the issue in the message could cause difficulties with Senators powerful in the Foreign Relations Committee. Since the Democrats had control not only of the Senate but also the Committee on Foreign Relations, Byrnes's message awakens doubts about the confidence that Truman and Byrnes had in their foreign policy decisions, and in their relations with Congress.²⁶

The reality was that those doubts were well-founded. Congress's recommencement in autumn 1945 had brought not only domestic, but foreign policy concerns as well. Soviet actions in summer of 1945 and after brought rising press reaction and pressure from within Truman's Administration. Congressional leaders, most importantly Arthur Vandenberg, felt increasing concern about Secretary Byrnes' approach to cooperation with the Soviets. After Byrnes's controversial return from the December 1945 Moscow Conference, Truman began to give more direct attention to foreign policy while continuing the policy of bipartisan foreign policy deliberations.²⁷

As 1946 dawned, criticism of Byrnes's handling of the Moscow Conference, Soviet behavior, Stalin's 9 February 1946 speech, and the continuing issues of sharing atomic knowledge with, and making a loan to, the Soviets inspired an aggressive speech from Arthur Vandenberg. Rhetorically asking the Senate "What is Russia up to now?," Vandenberg urged the President's administration to take a firmer stance towards the USSR. The next day,

²⁶ This document can be found in *FRUS* 1945, Vol. 8, pp. 1255-1256. The same document is also found at the Truman Library in Truman's Personal Secretary's File, Subject File 1940-1953 under Foreign Affairs File: Telegrams, Box 166, in the file labelled "Turkey."

²⁷ Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, pp. 155-162; Vandenberg pp. 224-236.

Byrnes also gave a speech indicating that U.S. policy towards the Soviets would feature less flexibility and more expectations. Disillusionment and pressure began to force a change in the tenor of U.S. foreign policy. Congress played its role in this development not only through Senator Vandenberg's oratory, but also through the various political factors shaping Congressional votes. The essential development for foreign policy was that, if President Truman wanted to pursue the policies that he and the Secretary of State thought necessary, he had to pay close attention to the mood in Congress. During 1946 this increasingly meant vocal, overt opposition to Soviet actions, and eventually identifying the USSR as the new enemy. Frustration with and distrust of Soviet actions during the mid-1946 Paris Council of Foreign Ministers Conferences also helped drive the Truman Administration towards this conclusion.²⁸

As the mid-term elections drew near in 1946, Truman was besieged by a number of domestic and foreign conundrums that affected his relationship with Congress. Problems with demobilization, the domestic economy, labor, Southern Democrats, and accusations of Communist infiltration in the U.S. government all hovered around the Truman Administration. Overall his public popularity had plunged dramatically in the space of just one year. The omens did not bode well for his relationship with the 80th Congress.²⁹

2.0.1.3.2. 80th Congress: 1947-1948

The 80th Congress, even though it featured the only Republican majorities that Truman would face, and even though Truman would label it the "Do Nothing Congress" during his 1948

²⁸ Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, pp. 185-189, 196; Gosnell pp. 281, 311-318; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 106-110, 116-121; Vandenberg pp. 242-251.

²⁹ Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, pp. 229-238; Hartman, Susan M. *Truman and the 80th Congress*. Columbia, Miss.: University of Missouri Press, 1971. pp. 3-8.

campaign, passed some of the most important legislation in U.S. history. Truman devoted entire chapters in his memoirs to describing the difficulties he experienced in working with Congress on both domestic and foreign policies, but he reserved special ire for the 80th Congress, even providing a list detailing that convention's malfeasance.³⁰

During the 80th Congress, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was led by Republican Michigan Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who had already become a prominent figure in the Committee during the previous Congress. So prominent, in fact, that he spent nearly two-thirds of 1946 abroad attending conferences. Even though he spent not a single day campaigning for reelection, he achieved victory in the 1946 by a margin of more than 500,000 votes.³¹

Vandenberg and Tom Connally, who was now the minority leader in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, were both included in foreign policy deliberations and conferences by the Truman Administration. This effort was directly intended to enable and continue in the 80th Congress the bipartisan foreign policy that had emerged from WWII. Vandenberg, for his part, wanted to continue the bipartisan foreign policy, and he would dominate Senate foreign policy concerns during the 80th Congress. Vandenberg also succeeded in having Ohio Senator Robert Taft, the most prominent Senate Republican in relation to domestic issues, added to the White House's conferrals with the Senate on foreign policy. For the first half of 1947, relative cooperation existed between the Executive and Congress.³²

Immediately upon convention, the 80th Congress was beset by foreign policy issues of

³⁰ Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, pp. 399, 402-403, 407-408, 417, 422; Truman, Harry S. *Memoirs, Volume 2: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953*. Printed in the U.K. For Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd. by Richard Clay and Co., Ltd.: Bungay, Suffolk, 1955. pp. 18-48, 181-186, 220-221.

³¹ Vandenberg pp. 304-317.

³² Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, pp. 257-263; Gosnell pp. 258-261; Hartman p. 27; Vandenberg pp. 318-336, 373-398.

unprecedented importance. The first arrival was the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, then the Marshall Plan through the second half of the 1947 and into 1948. Truman, despite the Republican majority in Congress, had success in ensuring these historical initiatives' enactment. Added to these Congressional issues were various foreign crises in China, Europe, Palestine, and elsewhere. Largely because of the care that the White House and State Departments showed in collaborating with Vandenberg, Taft, and the rest of Congress, as well as the immense respect that Marshall commanded, foreign policy issues did not become sectarian during the 80th Congress.³³

Truman's domestic policy, in contrast, was met by tendentious Republican obstruction after May 1947. Despite the numerous domestic scandals that grew in proportion as the weeks and months passed, Truman adroitly focused attention on Congress in the 1948 campaign. Quietly, Truman and his advisors had worked out a Congressional strategy, geared towards the 1948 campaign, directly after the 1946 mid-term elections. In the end, the plan succeeded, helped by Republican inability to unite and Dewey's hesitation to attack foreign policy issues. The 1948 election season was remarkable in that Truman was able to make Congress's record over the previous two years a significant issue.³⁴

2.0.1.3.3. 81st Congress: 1949-1950

The 1948 Presidential election featured not only the miraculous Truman victory. Truman also brought Congress with him, and the 81st Congress thus featured a return to Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress. Tom Connally once again assumed leadership of the

³³ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 212-219, 226-235; Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, pp. 266-291; Gosnell pp. 343-365; Hartman pp. 47-70, 105-112, 116-121, 159-185.

³⁴ Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, pp. 347-356; Gosnell pp. 319-340; Hartman pp. 16-21, 29-35, 71-104, 112-116, 121-158, 186-217.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with Arthur Vandenberg returning to minority leader status. Vandenberg did retain his Senate preeminence in foreign affairs. Another advantage for Truman was Dean Acheson's return to the State Department in order to fill Marshall's place as Secretary of State. Acheson already had years of experience working with Congress, and had established his reputation. Acheson would prove extremely capable as Secretary of State, but his stature would suffer domestically because of the McCarthy-era Communist witch hunts. That period gained its name from the activities of Joseph McCarthy, who represented Wisconsin in the Senate from 1947-1957.³⁵

During 1949-1950, Truman would once again face stringent Congressional obstruction on domestic policy despite the apparent Democratic majorities. Overall, most of the President's major initiatives, especially concerning agriculture, civil rights, and welfare, saw little or no success in Congress.³⁶

Foreign policy during the 81st Congress, as was the case during the 80th Congress, was again marked by momentous developments. Shortly after assuming his new post, Secretary Acheson was charged with finalizing the North Atlantic Treaty, the founding document of NATO, and guiding the treaty to Congressional ratification. Other foreign policy issues remained vital -- China, the continuing Berlin Crisis, Soviet attainment of atomic weapons, and the outbreak of the Korean War occupied Truman and Acheson's foreign policy deliberations. Until 1950, foreign policy was implemented with bipartisan support from Congress.³⁷

Unfortunately, domestic U.S. politics meant the death of bipartisan foreign policy in 1950.

³⁵ Donovan, *Tumultuous Years*, pp. 24-27, 31-39, 133-136, 176-183, 189-213; Gosnell p. 416.

³⁶ Donovan, *Tumultuous Years*, pp. 22-24, 125-127, 131-132; Gosnell pp. 439-452.

³⁷ Donovan, *Tumultuous Years*, pp. 27-31, 39-52, 74-104, 136-138, 241-247; Gosnell pp. 427-438.

The most important factor was Arthur Vandenberg's contraction of cancer, which debilitated him in 1949, and finally took him out of Congress in 1950. Without Vandenberg's steady hand, Senate Republicans fell under the divisive sway of Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft. 1950 was again the mid-term election year, so Taft took the initiative to lead a broad attack on the Truman Administration. Truman and Acheson successfully fended off the initial broadsides, but the conviction of Alger Hiss and the arrest of Klaus Fuchs gave Republicans endless material with which to attack the Administration as soft on communism. Following those scandals, Joseph McCarthy began to assail various Truman Administration figures, including Secretary of State Dean Acheson, as communists or communist sympathizers. This meant that U.S. foreign policy also came under extreme criticism. Despite the efforts of Truman and Acheson, bipartisan foreign policy became more and more difficult to maintain. The decision to commit U.S. forces to Korea without Congressional approval exacerbated the decline towards a partisan foreign policy.³⁸

By the 1950 mid-term elections, a confluence of domestic and foreign developments damaged Truman's fortunes and caused a serious deterioration in his relationship with Congress. After triumph in the 1948 campaign, Democratic majorities were reduced in both houses of Congress. The final two years of Truman's presidency were to be trying, and his relationship with Congress contentious.³⁹

2.0.1.3.4. 82nd Congress: 1951-1952

The 82nd Congress again convened with reduced Democratic majorities in both the Senate

³⁸ Donovan, *Tumultuous Years*, pp. 162-170, 214-224; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 341-344; Vandenberg pp. 486, 501, 515, 517-518, 546-547, 562-564. The Vandenberg Diaries do claim that contemporary newspapers had identified a breakdown in bipartisanship by the middle of 1949.

³⁹ Donovan, *Tumultuous Years*, pp. 295-298; Gosnell pp. 453-458.

and the House, and Tom Connally once again heading the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The reduction in Democratic legislators also meant that the Republican-Dixiecrat majorities grew in both houses. Immediately after the new Congress convened, Senator Taft gave notice that Congress's *modus operandi* had changed by assaulting President Truman's foreign policy in Korea and elsewhere.⁴⁰

Even during the last two years of his Presidency, Truman worked to maintain positive relations with Congress despite his increasing frustration. In recognition of the Congressional reality, Truman set a new tone in his inaugural speech, emphasizing the perilous international situation rather than his Fair Deal domestic program. Afterwards, domestic priorities would be tied to the communist threat, security, and/or the Korean War if possible since those issues guaranteed favorable treatment from Congress. Of course, not all domestic economic and social problems could be tied to the Communist threat, and even some that were, such as the national uproar over Truman's firing of General Douglas MacArthur, hurt Truman's domestic approval. Senator Taft took the MacArthur issue to the extreme by suggesting President Truman's impeachment, but the issue was not raised in the Senate. Scandals continued to erupt. By the end of Truman's term as President, few of his Fair Deal proposals were enacted by Congress.⁴¹

In foreign relations, the Korean War would remain the dominant issue facing the Truman Administration. On the subjects of foreign policy and security, the Korean War made a more ambitious defense spending program possible. The presence of armed conflict with the Soviet bloc also made appropriations for European defense feasible.⁴²

At the beginning of the 1952 Congressional term, Truman once again promoted a bipartisan

⁴⁰ Donovan, *Tumultuous Years*, pp. 321-323; Gosnell pp. 483-484.

⁴¹ Donovan, *Tumultuous Years*, pp. 340-391; Gosnell pp. 484-496.

⁴² Donovan, *Tumultuous Years*, pp. 322-324; Gosnell pp. 485-486.

approach to foreign policy and emphasized the Communist threat, but his own missteps and domestic troubles crippled the effectiveness of his efforts. Despite the political situation, he continued to fight for Congressional bills and work as hard as he always had.⁴³

Overall, President Truman's difficult relationship with Congress had important repercussions in the years that followed his administration, for the Cold War in general, and for U.S.-Turkish relations specifically. Richard Freeland's controversial and ground-breaking academic study *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*⁴⁴ convincingly argues the thesis that the Truman Administration's inability to convince Congress that tariffs, and economic protectionism in general, would fundamentally hinder Europe's post-WWII economic, military, and political recovery forced a change in focus from economic aid to military aid. For the same reason, the European Recovery Program was allowed to prematurely expire and the administration began to focus on European rearmament through NATO.⁴⁵ In other words, intransigent stances from Congress forced the Truman Administration into a foreign policy towards Europe somewhat different from their original intention; in order to convince Congress to support the necessary legislation, the Truman Administration was forced to emphasize the Communist Threat. Foreign policy in general was forced towards the right side of the political spectrum.⁴⁶ This emphasis, in turn, framed the context in which the Turkish Republic came to the attention of a broad swath of the American public.⁴⁷ Aid to Turkey, and eventually alliance with Turkey, became closely

⁴³ Cochran, Bert. *Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency*. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973. pp. 344-352; Gosnell pp. 490-491; Hamby, Alonzo L. *Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. pp. 606-607.

⁴⁴ Freeland, Richard M. *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security 1946-1948*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 319-334.

⁴⁶ Hamby, Alonzo L. *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. pp. 423-440.

⁴⁷ Freeland pp. 82-101.

associated with the effort to thwart the Soviet Union, for better or for worse.

2.0.1.4. President Truman's Relationship with the U.S. Military

The issue of President Truman's relationship with the military is not easy to divide into chronological periods or trends because the issues that caused interaction between the Executive branch and the military services did not alter fundamentally from the end of WWII to the culmination of Truman's Presidency. Since this summary is not intended to be comprehensive, all of the various subjects or even regions that the Executive-military relationship concerned in the 1945-1953 period will not be mentioned. Instead, the discussion will be limited to only the most important developments, i.e. the effort to unify the armed forces and the post-WWII military planning that eventually turned into global strategic military preparation as the Cold War emerged. Both of these issues will be examined with their overall relevancy to Turkish-U.S. relations in mind.

To begin with, as in his relations with Congress, President Truman had some advantages with which he could approach his relationship with the branches of the U.S. armed forces. Foremost was his status as a WWI veteran who had served with distinction in that conflict. His experience as a soldier enabled him to understand more fully the way of life and the mentality of soldiers as well as develop leadership and organizational skills. That background also facilitated Truman's cultivation of strong relationships with Missouri veterans groups in Jackson County and across the state.⁴⁸

An additional advantage was Truman's experience in the Senate. During his second term, Truman gained membership in the Senate Military Committee. He immediately grasped the opportunity to launch a committee charged with investigating the defense industry, later

⁴⁸ Donald pp. 31-64; Gosnell pp. 142, 146.

given the moniker “Truman Committee,” that gave Truman’s name national prominence. That committee would also provide Truman with insight into how the U.S. military’s organization might be improved under increased civilian authority.⁴⁹

Truman was highly aware of both his military-related experiences and the manner in which those experiences could help him improve the capacities of the U.S. military as President. In his memoirs, Truman described his Senatorial and Presidential relationship with military officials thus:

From the time I became President I made it plain, in my relations with the military, that I was interested in the details of actual administration as much as the larger objectives. I had implicit faith and trust in Marshall, but I took the position that the President, as the Commander in Chief, had to know everything that was going on. I had had just enough experience to know that if you are not careful, the military will hedge you in.

It had long been customary for the ‘high brass’ in the Army and Navy to ‘take over’ the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy as well as the military committees of the two Houses. I knew this for I had been on the military committee in the Senate....

I should make it clear that these very capable officers did not try to get around the President on major policies. The Chiefs of Staff were always most cooperative. But on the administrative level the military usually tried to take over, especially in the management of purchases where vast sums of money were being spent. I knew, for example, that Army and Navy professionals seldom had any idea of the value of money.⁵⁰

Though Truman had a deeply personal connection to the military, his professional responsibilities were primary because he tried to deal honestly with the requirements of his duties. As a politician, as a legislator, and as the President he had come to be aware of problems in the military hierarchy, especially the lack of a unified military command. To that end, he embarked upon the project of forging a single command mechanism for the U.S. armed forces. This project would greatly complicate his relationship with the various

⁴⁹ Hamby, *Man of the People*, pp. 248-260; May, Ernest R. “Cold War and Defense,” in Neilson, Keith and Ronald G. Haycock. *The Cold War and Defense*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990. pp. 36-37.

⁵⁰ *Memoirs, Volume 1*, pp. 91-92.

branches of the military as the branches competed for authority and funding.⁵¹

2.0.1.4.1. Unification of the U.S. Armed Forces

Consequently, Truman experienced a number of bureaucratic, legislative, and personal battles with the military. Subjects such as demobilization, control of the atomic bomb, and universal military training all became difficult and disputed issues in the years following WWII. The most contested of all these issues was the unification of the military branches under what would become the Defense Department. Some steps towards unifying the military's command structure had already been taken during WWII. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), for example, were a wartime innovation that grew out of a need for better coordination with the British. The JCS also featured planning functions in the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) and the Joint Staff Planners. Towards the end of the war, another military coordinating committee, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), was created in order to facilitate cross-department postwar policy planning. This committee featured a number of subcommittees, including one dealing with the Near and Middle East.⁵²

An important aspect of the Truman Administration's postwar planning problems was the fact that the issues were multifaceted, neither purely political nor purely military. For that reason, political decisions also needed input from the military in order to ensure more comprehensive and prescient decisions. The June 1945 Soviet note to the Turkish government, for example, inspired geostrategic military questions, and the JCS provided suitable advice for the Truman

⁵¹ Gosnell pp. 283-285, 286; Truman, *Memoirs, Volume 2*, pp. 49-64.

⁵² Schnabel, James F. *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. I: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1945-1947*. Washington D.C.: Office of Joint History, 1996. pp. 1-2, 4-5.

Administration's response.⁵³

According to Truman, late summer 1945 also provided the first opportunity to begin moving towards unification of the military command structures. The end of hostilities, in course, forced the various armed forces branches to begin efforts to preserve as much as possible of the resources and authority that they had been given, out of necessity, during the war. Because the total would be much more limited than during the war, however, each branch would naturally attempt to emphasize its own importance relative to the others. To that end, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal asked for permanent increases in strength for the Navy and Marines, and suggested a cabinet-level civilian-military coordinating committee.⁵⁴

Forrestal's initiative set off a chain reaction which resulted in Truman's December 1945 message to Congress that, amongst other things, recommended the unification of all the armed forces into a single Department of Defense. The interservice struggles over turf continued for more than a year before Secretary Forrestal and Secretary of the War Department James Patterson were able to agree on a comprehensive plan. The Congressional legislation for this plan, called the National Security Act of 1947, was finally approved in late July 1947, nearly two years after Secretary Forrestal set events in motion. Through this act the JCS was accorded official legal status.⁵⁵

In addition to founding the Department of Defense, the National Security Act of 1947 established several other U.S. governmental organizations that would have immediate bearing on U.S. policy towards Turkey. The first was the National Security Council (NSC),

⁵³ Ibid. pp. 26-28.

⁵⁴ Sander, Alfred D. "Truman and the National Security Council: 1945-1947." *The Journal of American History*. Vol. 59, No. 2. Sept. 1972. pp. 370-372; Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. 2, p. 51.

⁵⁵ May pp. 29-33; Sander pp. 374-387; Stevenson, Charles A. "Underlying Assumptions of the National Security Act of 1947." *Joint Force Quarterly*. No. 48, 1st Quarter 2008. pp. 129-133; Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. 2, pp. 51-55.

comprised of the President, the Secretary of State, and the heads of the Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments, amongst others. Furthermore, under the aegis of the NSC was, for the first time, a comprehensive peacetime foreign intelligence gathering organization, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).⁵⁶

Efforts to streamline the new Department of Defense resulted in more conflict amongst the military branches, including the famous “Admirals’ Revolt” of 1949. The attempt to impose unity and cooperation on the U.S. military branches even claimed a victim, Secretary of the Defense James Forrestal, who suffered emotional instability from the stress associated with the project and committed suicide in 1949. Eventually, the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 brought more clarity to the Defense Department’s command structure. For Truman, working with the military on the issues of funding and organization became more and more difficult as his term progressed. Even though the effort to reorganize the U.S. defense establishment took several years of energy and turbulent relations with the U.S. military, Truman eventually achieved most of his goals.⁵⁷

2.0.1.5. Truman, Strategic Planning, and the Turkish Republic

Truman’s efforts towards reorganizing the armed forces had several different vital aims, but the most important for the Turkish Republic, in historical hindsight, would be the increased coordination of strategic planning functions. As Truman asserts in his memoirs, the National

⁵⁶ Stevenson pp. 130, 132; Truman, *Memoirs, Vol. 2*, pp. 55, 62-64.

⁵⁷ Donovan, *Tumultuous Years*, pp. 53-65, 105-113; Lewis, Andrew L. “The Revolt of the Admirals.” Unpublished paper. Air University, Air Command and Staff College. April 1998. pp. 27-35; May, op. cit., pp. 33-54; McFarland, Keith D. “The 1949 Revolt of the Admirals.” *Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College*. Vol. XI, no. 2. June 1981. pp. 55-62; Meilinger, Philip S. “The Admirals’ Revolt of 1949: Lessons for Today.” *Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College*. September 1989. pp. 81-95; Truman, *Memoirs, Vol. 2*, pp. 55-57, 62-64.

Security Act of 1947 was an essential military and intelligence reform. The Act officially established the JCS and the NSC, and greatly aided communication amongst the various branches of government that were concerned with national security.⁵⁸

2.0.1.5.1. The 1947 National Security Act

Already during WWII, U.S. military planning had undergone a metamorphosis from narrow, isolationist attitudes to awareness of modern warfare's global nature. This transition was given urgency by the failures, difficulties, and hurdles that U.S. military planning encountered when the U.S. joined the hostilities, but also by the fact that, for the first time, the U.S. military had to plan on a truly worldwide scale. The JCS and the JSSC, from their conception, were planning and coordination bodies charged with advising on matters that touched both the military and political spheres. In the closing years of the war, the JCS began to produce strategic studies formulating the military's opinion towards various issues that also had political ramifications.⁵⁹

An interesting element in the wartime JSSC planning and strategy studies was the approval given to cooperation with the Soviet Union. Positive relations with the Soviets, and granting the USSR a sphere of interest in Southeast Europe, was originally emphasized by the JSSC as necessary for both prosecuting the war and securing the postwar peace. In early 1945, this

⁵⁸ Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. 2, pp. 55-56, 62-64.

⁵⁹ Etzold, Thomas H. and John Lewis Gaddis. *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978. pp. 1-2; McLauchlan, Gregory. "World War II and the Transformation of the U.S. State: The Wartime Foundations of U.S. Hegemony." *Sociological Inquiry*. Vol. 67, no.1. February 1997. p. 7; Pach, Chester J. Jr. *Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945-1950*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991. p. 17; Schnabel pp. 1-2; Stoler, Mark. "From Continentalism to Globalism: General Stanley D. Embick, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and the Military View of American National Policy during the Second World War." *Diplomatic History*. Vol. 6, No. 3. 1982. pp. 303-304, 307-310.

interpretation began to change when the JSSC asserted that Soviet control of Europe did not accord with U.S. interests. Concurrently, by the end of 1945, JSSC strategic papers had openly embraced a global perception of U.S. security needs. Also important was the recognition that foreign military assistance would be an aspect of military-political policy; the establishment of a SWNCC subcommittee responsible for policy towards foreign military assistance, called the Rearmament Subcommittee, would prove ineffective in the growing interservice rivalries for funding. The result was that planning for foreign military assistance would remain uncoordinated for many years.⁶⁰

From the end of WWII until the 1947 National Security Act, the JCS continued to function as advisors to the Truman Administration on the military aspects of political issues, even though they did not have an officially-defined role. Also playing an advisory role on military and political matters was the SWNCC, which had been constituted in late 1944 in response to organizational difficulties experienced with policy towards Europe. After WWII, both the JCS and SWNCC saw expansion in their duties and size. As the Cold War emerged, the need for more comprehensive coordination of military, intelligence, and policy issues became urgent. The perceived Soviet threat greatly motivated the Truman Administration's legislative push for military-political coordination, which resulted in the aforementioned National Security Act of 1947.⁶¹

Once granted official status in the military-political decision-making hierarchy, both the JCS and SWNCC retained vital functions. The JCS kept its direct access to the President even though it was technically now subordinated to the Department of Defense. The JSSC also

⁶⁰ Gaddis, John Lewis. "The Insecurities of Victory: The United States and the Perception of the Soviet Threat after World War II," in Lacey, Michael J., ed. *The Truman Presidency*. New York: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Cambridge University Press, 1989. pp. 242-255; Pach pp. 14-15, 22; Stoler, "From Continentalism to Globalism," pp. 312-320.

⁶¹ Etzold and Gaddis pp. 5-8.

retained its role as policy planning advisor to the JCS. The SWNCC underwent a title change in order to reflect changes brought about through the reorganization of the U.S. military branches; thus, the Air Force was added and the “W” dropped as the group became the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC). SANACC became directly connected to the NSC, along with the CIA.⁶²

After 1947, political and military objectives were more successfully balanced in the policy recommendations prepared by the NSC, while rivalries amongst the services still hampered greater efficiency in the JCS. In all, the NSC did not realize its potential as policy-recommending institution until 1950 and the eruption of the Korean War, when President Truman was forced to seek more help in conducting U.S. military operations.⁶³

In sum, the organizational initiatives pursued by President Truman resulted in more unified and coordinated military branches as well as greater communication between the political decision-makers and the military-intelligence branches of the government. In these initiatives, Truman was generally successful in creating a more organized and efficient political-military communication apparatus despite the infighting and turf battles the process inaugurated.

2.0.1.5.2. U.S. military strategic planning and the Turkish Republic

Finally, the post-WWII push for military-political coordination also had implications for U.S. conceptions of the Turkish Republic. Overall, the most important change that occurred in U.S. planning was the development of a more global concern for U.S. security. Awareness of the military implications of airpower, long-distance power projection and weapons delivery,

⁶² Etzold and Gaddis pp. 8-11, 14-17.

⁶³ Etzold and Gaddis pp. 19-22; May p. 17; Sander pp. 369, 387-388.

aircraft carriers, and in August 1945, atomic weapons, served to force a redefinition in U.S. strategic thinking. As mentioned above, the JSSC, during 1945, had begun to redefine U.S. interests in relation to the other main power that emerged from WWII, the Soviet Union. This change in U.S. planners' conception of the USSR would, by extension, bear directly upon the U.S. military's strategic judgment of the Turkish Republic. As a result, the military side of official U.S. planning was originally more forceful in identifying that Turkey was important to U.S. strategic aims, and that Turkey should be provided U.S. assistance of all forms in order to develop its capacity to resist Soviet encroachment and ensure Turkey's adherence to the U.S.-led Western bloc.⁶⁴

As early as 1943, studies produced by the JSSC addressed issues related to the Turkish Republic, and furthermore identified the U.S. need for international bases in regard to overall national defense planning. Later, the JCS began looking at tactical issues concerning Turkey in the months immediately after the European stage of WWII came to a close. One of the JCS's roles was to help develop U.S. military strategy and contingency planning; in that capacity, the JCS were important in identifying Turkey as a strategically vital country for the U.S. soon after WWII. For the Potsdam Conference, for instance, the JCS and JSSC contributed (contradictory) opinions concerning the strategic importance of the Turkish Straits. In October 1945, a subcommittee of the JCS, the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS), composed a report that explicitly connected Soviet behavior, Turkish sovereignty and geostrategic importance, and U.S. security. The same concerns were reiterated in JCS reports

⁶⁴ Gaddis, "The Insecurities of Victory: The United States and the Perception of the Soviet Threat after World War II," pp. 236-242; McLauchlan pp. 10-14; Rearden, Stephen L. *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vol. I: The Formative Years 1947-1950*. Washington D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984. p. 169.

and communications in early 1946.⁶⁵

One issue that concerned U.S. military planners was the need for foreign military assistance and overseas bases. In late 1945, the SWNCC, at the request of the Navy and War Departments, began looking at the interrelated military assistance and basing rights questions, and presented its report in January 1946 as SWNCC 202/2. That report approved arms assistance for “almost every independent nation except Germany and Japan,” and noted U.S. strategic concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean. That report was weakened by the fact that the authors provided no overall strategic goals or framework into which their recommendations could be placed or understood. This failing was a symptom of a larger problem, the manner in which the Truman Administration might justify sending various types of military assistance to nations outside of the Western Hemisphere. This deficiency proved fatal in Congress for initial Truman Administration attempts to provide military assistance to Turkey, which had requested U.S. military advisors in late 1945. After minor changes, SWNCC 202/2 was approved by the Navy, State, and War Departments in March 1946, and became the Truman Administration’s first post-WWII policy statement on foreign military assistance. However, the only aid forthcoming to Ankara was several small Eximbank loans in late 1945 and the first half of 1946 as the U.S. military proved to be ahead of the State Department on the issue of providing military aid to Turkey.⁶⁶

In a similar time frame, the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) also began developing comprehensive war plans that focused on the Eastern Mediterranean as the region most likely to ignite a new world war. These reports were initially not submitted to the JCS, but were later used by the Joint Staff Planners, the committee providing the link between the JWPC

⁶⁵ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 78-79; Rubin, Barry. *The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1947: The Road to the Cold War*. London: Frank Cass, 1980. pp. 204-207; Schnabel pp. 26-28; Stoler, “From Continentalism to Globalism,” pp. 307-310.

⁶⁶ Pach pp. 22-25, 28, 97-98, 256 n. 34.

and the JCS, to create strategic war estimates that discussed Turkey's possible role. In March 1946 the JCS sent a note to Secretary of State Byrnes explaining, among other things, Turkey's importance to U.S. national security. The same month, the JWPC began a series of war plans titled PINCHER. This was the first war plan developed by the JCS. The initial installment of this series, compiled in March-April 1946, illustrated the increasing importance that U.S. military planners were attributing to the Caucasus Mountains-Black Sea area as a base for hypothetical U.S. offensives against the primary Soviet industrial regions. The PINCHER series would eventually include a study specifically on the Eastern Mediterranean. Other reports featuring Turkey also appeared. A 26 July 1946 JCS report attempted to predict Soviet behavior and the resistance that the Turkish military might be able to assert if the USSR were to invade. The JCS's August 1946 "Griddle" study focused on Turkey as well.⁶⁷

Not until the midpoint of 1946, in the aftermath of the 7 August Soviet note to Turkey concerning the Montreux Agreement, did the U.S. State Department catch up to the U.S. military in recognizing the urgency of aiding Turkey militarily as well as economically. Even though the 15 August 1946 meeting between Truman and a variety of military and civilian officials now looks like a critical juncture in the U.S. attitude towards Turkey, the trends that resulted in that transition had been initiated long before, especially on the military side. The JCS followed up that historical meeting with a 23 August 1946 note urging arms sales to Turkey, which was defined as "the most important military factor" in the Eastern Mediterranean. If the Soviets gained a base on the Turkish Straits, it would be tantamount to Soviet "military dominance" of Turkey and the eventual decline of U.S. influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The same JCS memorandum also helped to press upon civilian

⁶⁷ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 124-125; Pach p. 95; Rubin pp. 211-212, 213-214; Schnabel pp. 48-52, 70-75.

officials the necessity of providing military aid to Turkey.⁶⁸

Earlier in 1946 U.S. military planners had begun the work of convincing civilian officials that Turkey was of vital importance to U.S. security. Leffler, for example, describes how the U.S. Army's main planner, General George Lincoln, used his position as advisor to Secretary of State Byrnes at the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers to communicate the Eastern Mediterranean's essence to U.S. security. Overall, as military planners developed their strategic concepts and as U.S.-Soviet relations worsened during 1946, the U.S. military's recommendations were central in bringing Turkey's importance to overall U.S. security planning to U.S. civilian official attention. What must be noted is that this interest did not develop from direct threat of Soviet force against Turkey, despite the emphasis that has been given to the 1945 and 1946 Soviet notes to Ankara concerning the Montreux Convention, the Turkish Straits and bases, and Kars and Ardahan. Instead, U.S. military planners recognized the strategic importance that Turkey held in a region that featured "power vacuums" that could, at some future point, be exploited by the USSR for military advantage. The JCS began to push for economic and military aid to Turkey as a possible strategic partner.⁶⁹

By late 1946, the Truman Administration removed limitations on military assistance going to Turkey (along with Greece and Iran), a subject that both military and civilian officials now agreed upon. Accordingly, military planners continued to emphasize Turkey: a 6 November 1946 SWNCC subcommittee discussed aid for Greece and Turkey. By the end of 1946, conviction of Turkey's vital importance to U.S. security was evident in the highest civilian officials as Secretary of State Byrnes declared Turkey a U.S. "outpost." Eventually, the basic text for President Truman's 12 March 1947 "Truman Doctrine" speech came from a State-

⁶⁸ Pach pp. 98-101; Rubin p. 214; Schnabel pp. 52-56.

⁶⁹ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 122, 124-125; Leffler, Melvyn P. "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952." *The Journal of American History*. Vol. 71, No. 4. Mar., 1985. p. 811, 813-814. Quote is from Leffler p. 124.

War-Navy subcommittee tasked with preparing foreign policy information.⁷⁰

Another issue that Truman had to think about was foreign aid for the U.S.'s economically ailing allies in Europe. This was not an issue of purely humanitarian nature. U.S. planners saw the state of Europe's economies as crucial to keeping Western Europe out of the Soviet camp. Furthermore, military and civilian officials now concurred on the need to aid states in the Eastern Mediterranean, such as Turkey. However, in order to provide that aid, both the public and Congress had to be convinced of the aid's necessity.

Therefore, the next important turning point occurred in February 1947, when the U.K. government informed the State Department that Britain no longer had the resources to police the Eastern Mediterranean. Interestingly, in the weeks before the British note, U.S. military planners completed further studies that highlighted Turkish importance to U.S. military strategy. The JCS committee Joint Logistics Plans, for example, created an overview of Turkish airfields suitable for U.S. military purposes. The Joint Staff Planners also provided an outline war plan to the JCS that again featured Turkey's potential role if hostilities broke out between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.⁷¹

The British note thus provided the impetus that would make funding the plans related to Turkey more possible. The flurry of activity that resulted from the British note first produced the Truman Doctrine which, in addition to approving large amounts of aid to Greece and Turkey, justified the provision of aid to countries around the world in order to combat the communist threat. The aid to Turkey approved through the Truman Doctrine initiative began in July 1947 after agreement upon a bilateral aid package. Subsequently, the American Mission for Aid to Turkey (AMAT) was set up, which featured U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force advising bodies, but overall joint civilian and military supervision. The second result

⁷⁰ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p. 127; Pach p. 113; Rubin p. 224.

⁷¹ Rubin p. 225; Schnabel pp. 77-80.

was the Marshall Plan, which proposed large amounts of aid to other European countries. Congress was convinced through the crisis atmosphere and bipartisan lobbying to approve both plans. Thus, new precedents were established for the provision of U.S. financial and military aid abroad. On the other hand, Congress remained an impediment to action since it had put strict limits on that aid. From now on, however, the State Department would be more forceful than the soldiers in pushing for military assistance to the Turkish Republic.⁷²

The Marshall Plan always encountered some measure of opposition from Congress. Heavy lobbying and circumstances helped get the original European Recovery Program (ERP) passed, but it was slated for a life of only four years. Furthermore, since the ERP was an economic plan, the Truman Administration also had to create methods of providing military aid to allies. By 1949, large amounts of foreign military aid had gained Congressional approval, but that aid was not connected to a comprehensive plan. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA), signed into law in October 1949, was the first global U.S. military assistance program since WWII's Lend-Lease program. From that Act, Turkey would receive additional military equipment after the JCS had indicated a need for \$100 million in aid for Turkey. U.S. administration and supervision of its Turkish program would continue under joint civilian and military control, but now shared between the State Department and the Defense Department. The MDAA would also result in the renaming of the Turkish program as Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT). The name change reflected the merging of the separate U.S. military branches under the Defense Department aegis. According to Rearden, U.S. military officials were the true directors of the U.S. military aid program in Turkey.⁷³

⁷² Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 199-200; Pach p. 129; Rearden p. 164.

⁷³ Brown, William Adams, Jr. and Redvers Opie. *American Foreign Assistance*. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1953. pp. 422- 423, 426-429, 439-504; Byrne, Richard Daniel. "The United States and Mutual Security, 1949-1952." Unpublished PhD Thesis, The

The AMAT and JAMMAT programs embarked on a top-to-bottom armaments, reorganization, and construction program for the Turkish military. The only essential asset that the Turkish military featured was the quality of its soldiers. Outside of men, the Turkish military had to be equipped and trained in every way for modern warfare. Because of the wide spectrum of aid necessary for the resurrection of Turkish military might, economic and military aid were often intertwined. Basic infrastructure such as roads, airfields, and harbors had to be constructed in order for the Turkish military to be able to transport and use the equipment flowing in from the U.S. Armaments also began to arrive as in 1948, for example, the U.S. provided hundreds of aircraft to the Turkish air force. The Turkish navy also received aid and naval war plans were developed that included cooperation with Turkish forces.⁷⁴

In terms of overall war planning, U.S. military officials were concerned about differences in strategic thought between themselves and their Turkish counterparts. For that reason, U.S. military advisors took steps to ensure that not only the plans, but the strategic concepts and even military mentality of the Turkish forces would be more compatible with those of the U.S. A thorough implementation of that approach was thwarted until 1952 by the lack of resources available to the U.S., as well as by a lack of full JCS and State Department support for cementing a closer alliance with Turkey. During 1950 and 1951, the State Department and lower-level U.S. military officials played a stronger role in promoting the alliance with Turkey that eventually resulted in Turkish admission to NATO. Upper-level U.S. military officials, specifically the JCS, did not relent until May 1951.⁷⁵

The Korean War awakened a new awareness of U.S. vulnerability in policy makers. By

University of Iowa, 1987. pp. 13-15, 18-27; Pach pp. 198-199, 213-214, 223; Rearden p. 164. For details concerning Lend-Lease, see: Brown and Opie pp. 30-71.

⁷⁴ Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War," pp. 817-818; Rearden p. 165-167.

⁷⁵ Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War," pp. 818-824.

1950, Truman Administration officials sensed that Congress would not extend the ERP (Marshall Plan) beyond its four-year life. The Korean War added urgency to this concern: in essence, the war made Soviet intentions seem even more aggressive and sinister. This meant that greater urgency was needed in the build-up of Western European defensive capabilities. Without U.S. aid, that increased pace in military preparation appeared impossible. The solution devised by the Truman Administration was to link economic aid with military aid. The result was the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which authorized economic, military and technical aid, and under Title II of its provisions, provided \$400 million aid to Greece, Turkey, and Iran. In effect, the Mutual Security Act combined the Marshall Plan and the MDAA, and superseded both by creating an agency that oversaw all forms of U.S. foreign aid.⁷⁶

Consequently, the role that U.S. military planning played in focusing official U.S. concern, both civilian and military, on the Turkish Republic's integral importance to global U.S. security is clear. Even though a year lapsed before both the civilian and military sides of the U.S. government recognized Turkey's potential security role, that span of time may have been longer without U.S. military planners pushing for that awareness.

2.0.1.5.3. Summary

President Truman's relationship with the U.S. military was not as comfortable as one might assume considering Truman's personal history and political views. Reforms in the military's hierarchy, supported by Truman, aided the military's command, control, and planning structure. Those reforms did not emerge quickly or easily, and caused numerous political scandals as well as military and bureaucratic infighting. However, from the military's

⁷⁶ Brown and Opie pp. 505-539; Byrne pp. 73, 81-85, 87-88, 100-102, 109-111.

enhanced planning facilities came strategic recommendations that not only enabled the Truman Administration to more effectively shape foreign policy, those recommendations also emphasized Turkey's importance to U.S. national security, and aided efforts to provide assistance to Turkey. Eventually those labors would be one factor that led to Turkey's accession to NATO. Thus, military matters had the effect of focusing more attention on Turkey, and on Turkey's importance to U.S. security, than might have been the case otherwise.

2.0.1.6. Truman's Knowledge of the Turkish Republic

Because this study focuses on explaining how Dean Acheson figured in the conduct of U.S. relations with Turkey during the Truman Administration, dwelling briefly on Truman's knowledge of that country is appropriate. All of the indications are that, despite Truman's heavy reading in history, his knowledge of Turkey was minimal. Even though Truman mentions that the Turkish Ambassador, H. Ragıp Baydur, was one of the first foreign emissaries to meet him after he became the President,⁷⁷ Truman gives little indication that he knew a great deal about the country. Certainly, from his background, there was little reason for him to have specific knowledge of a nation so far removed from the issues of Jackson County, Missouri.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Truman, *Memoirs, Volume 1*, p. 68. Truman noted that Baydur came to the White House on 19 April 1945.

⁷⁸ Joseph M. Jones, in *The Fifteen Weeks*, includes an anecdote from Acheson in which he explains Truman's surprising knowledge of the Middle East and Central Asia. After an extended pronouncement on both regions' history and the various attempts of the Great Powers to possess the Turkish Straits, President Truman answered Mrs. Acheson's query about where his knowledge came from by explaining that he always had glasses, which meant that, as a child, he read books instead of playing sports outside; see: Jones, Joseph M. *The Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947)*. New York: The Viking Press, 1955. pp. 65-66.

Truman mentions Turkey several times in his memoirs, but provides no interpretive comment that would enable a historian to speculate about Truman's conception of that country and culture. During the Potsdam Conference, the issue of Soviet demands towards Turkey came up, but Truman had little to say while Churchill and Stalin dominated the discussion. Instead, Truman, when the issue of revising the Montreux Convention was forwarded, deferred the issue for further study. When Soviet territorial demands towards Turkey were taken in hand, and the issue of the Turkish Straits entered the conversation, Truman responded with a general comment on European history and waterways, and then averred that the territorial issue was a problem that concerned only Turkey and Russia, and the Straits issue was an international problem that could be dealt with through mutual agreement to revise the Montreux Convention. When the Turkish Straits was brought up again later on in the Conference, Truman did not express additional knowledge of the issue. As a whole, Truman played little role in the discussions that touched on Turkey. Later in the year, when asked by the press about his proposal for the Turkish Straits, Truman stated that the issue was in the hands of the Council of Foreign Ministers; at another point, he indicated a purely strategic understanding of the Straits.⁷⁹

Truman also discusses Turkey in relation to his description of why the U.S. government became more suspicious, and consequently more firm and less conciliatory, towards the USSR in 1946. Truman prefaces this discussion by stating that, in 1946's early months, the USSR "threatened the peace of the world." Then he goes on to explain the events, and his reactions to, Soviet behavior that led to the March 1946 crisis concerning Iran, which he saw Turkey as connected to. After the section concerning Iran, he turns to Turkey, which he describes in the historical context of ancient Russian designs on the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits. After reiterating what occurred at Potsdam in relation to the Turkish

⁷⁹ *Memoirs, Volume 1*, pp. 302-305; *FRUS* 1945, Vol.8, p. 1246, n. 59 and p. 1253, n. 65.

Straits, Truman summarizes the events surrounding the July 1946 Soviet diplomatic note to Turkey proposing a revision in the control regime over the Straits; this was, in reality, an extension of the conversations on the topic at Potsdam, but Truman interprets the note in the context of mid-1946 and increasing suspicions concerning Russia's designs on its neighbors. He wraps up his discussion of the issue by noting communications between the Turkish government and the U.S. government concerning the incident, U.S. attempts to shore up Turkish morale, and the reality of Turkey's military and economic condition. At the end of the section, Truman blames the Soviets for Turkey's tenuous situation.⁸⁰

Several pages later, Truman summarizes the reports hastily prepared after the February 1947 British diplomatic note stating their intention to discontinue economic aid to the Eastern Mediterranean. The reports were presented to him on 26 February 1947 by Secretary of State George Marshall and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson; General Eisenhower provided a study from the JCS. Truman couches the studies' conclusions in ideological terms, stating that providing aid to Greece and Turkey meant valiant risk, taken in order to aid free peoples in their struggle against the forces of oppression. The next day Truman, flanked by Marshall and Acheson, convened with Congressional leaders to explain the situation; the most important attendees were Arthur Vandenberg, having just assumed chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Tom Connally, the past and future leader of the same Committee. In that meeting, the Congressional leaders were successfully convinced of the necessity of aiding Greece and Turkey in Britain's place, and to support the financial outlays that this would entail. In the remainder of his memoirs' second volume, Truman mentions Turkey only in passing connection to other issues. At one point he does provide an

⁸⁰ *Memoirs, Volume 2*, pp. 98-103. As mentioned above, Leffler notes that the flurry of activity that the Soviet note inspired stemmed from strategic imperatives, not from any imminent Soviet military threat towards Turkey; see: *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 123-125.

interesting comment: while discussing the context for the Point Four Program, he mentions specifically that U.S. aid to Turkey involved technical training for Turkish heavy-machinery operators and advice for the Turkish Department of Roads and Bridges on “organization and procedures.”⁸¹

In general, Truman’s discussion of Turkey, and the early 1947 crisis which led to the Truman Doctrine, does not reveal any special knowledge or interest that he might have had in Turkey. He never mentions the names of any Turkish political figures (other than Baydur), for example, nor does he provide any anecdotes concerning the country, its people, or its leaders. Rather, his ideas seem easily attributable to his penchant to read history and then connect that history to maps in a strategic manner. The well-known anecdote about how Truman gave a lecture to his advisors on the strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean is an excellent illustration of how and why Truman would have given attention to Turkey.⁸²

In other Truman documents provided to historians, a different picture of Truman’s knowledge concerning the Turkish Republic does not emerge. In his post-politics life-long correspondence with Dean Acheson, for instance, Truman mentioned Turkey twice, and then only to point out the justness of his ideas. Truman’s private papers also contain only a handful of references to Turkey and, similar to his letters to Acheson, occur only when he defends actions or views that he held during his Presidency.⁸³ In addition to his memoirs and personal papers, several other archival sources are relevant to Truman’s knowledge of Turkey.

⁸¹ *Memoirs, Volume 2*, pp. 106, 108-109, 243-245.

⁸² Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 195-196; Jones pp. 63-64.

⁸³ Acheson and Truman. pp. 29, 128, 280. On page 29, in a letter from 1953, Truman uses an aphorism, “working like a Turk,” to describe the hard labor he was putting into a book. Ferrell, Robert H., ed. *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman*. Columbia, Miss.: University of Missouri Press, 1980. pp. 132, 250, 270-271, 280, 304, 344, 368.

2.0.1.6.1 *Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes

Documents published in the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* volumes for Truman's Presidency provide remarkably sparse material for divining what President Truman's personal ideas concerning the Turkish Republic were. This is true despite the importance of the issues that gripped U.S. foreign policy during his term as the Chief Executive. Truman's policy was to trust his Secretary of State to inform about important developments and get his opinion for decisions that affected policy. For that reason, in the *FRUS* records there are numerous notes stating to the effect that "President Truman informed the Secretary that he had read the memorandum, agreed fully with the proposed course of action, and instructed the Secretary to take the action(s) necessary to carry out the policy." Consequently, Truman's opinion concerning Turkey is observed only in the rare case that a diplomatic announcement was required.

Amongst the *FRUS* documents, the closest that the researcher comes to obtaining Truman's personal opinion concerning Turkey is in 1949, when he sent a personal message to Turkey's President İsmet İnönü. To be sure, the message is formal and diplomatic, but Truman was someone who expressed what was on his mind. The message is dated 26 April 1949, and was given to the Turkish Foreign Minister, Necmettin Sadak, to forward to President İnönü. One portion of the message repeats some of the text of the 12 March 1947 Truman Doctrine speech, and emphasizes that the sentiments expressed -- especially the description of Turkey as a free people threatened by external enemies -- were Truman's own feelings, not only U.S. government policy. The message ends by asserting that the North Atlantic Pact was intended to provide security for the signees, which would also benefit Turkey, and that U.S. concern

for Turkey's security was in no way diminished.⁸⁴

2.0.1.6.2. President Truman's public papers

President Truman's public pronouncements, almost by definition, also do not provide insight into his own opinions concerning Turkey. Starting in 1945, Turkey did appear as a topic in his speeches, but never took on the character of a subject that he spoke effusively about. Key word scans of those papers are interesting only for the fact that, in the vast majority of cases in which Turkey appeared in President Truman's public pronouncements, it was as a part of the phrase "Greece and Turkey."

In a 27 January 1949 press conference, Truman made an interesting observation in response to a question concerning the Point Four Program that he had announced during his recent inauguration speech. Truman explained that the Point Four Program was an idea that had been developing since the Aid to Greece and Turkey program was designed, and that since the Greece-Turkey aid issue he had spent "most of my time going over to that globe back there, trying to figure out ways to make peace in the world." This comment fits exactly into what we know of how Truman read information and then applied that information to tools, such as maps, in order to formulate policy.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ *FRUS* 1949, Vol. 6, pp. 1656-1657.

⁸⁵ *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman. Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President. 1949: January 1 to December 31, 1949.* Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1961. p. 118. One other speech, which President Truman recorded for broadcast in Turkey on 29 October 1948, the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Turkish Republic, is included in the President's public papers for 1948. A copy of that speech, plus the various versions and changes that were made during its preparation, can be found in the Truman Library, and will be discussed below.

2.0.1.6.3. Documents concerning Turkey in Truman's Presidential Files at the Truman Library

In Truman's Presidential files at the Truman library, essentially all of the materials that relate to Turkey are reports provided to Truman by various officials, often concerning the strategic significance of the country to U.S. foreign policy and the assistance needed to aid the Turkish government.⁸⁶ These reports would provide information of a similar type to the historical reading that Truman had obtained over the years, and that he applied to his analysis of foreign policy problems.

Because of the limited information that we have concerning Truman's personal knowledge of Turkey while he was President, dwelling on some of the exceptional events or documents is appropriate. Two groups of documents at the Truman files provide more interesting knowledge -- and more importantly, proof -- concerning what President Truman knew or thought about the Turkish Republic, its leaders, and its people. President Truman's Official File (OF) contains several resources that are relevant to this route of inquiry. OF File 86 contains documents relating to Turkey. The folder marked simply "OF 86" contains the general documents, but three other files, "OF 86-A Endorsements for Ambassador to Turkey," "OF 86-B American Mission for Aid to Turkey," and "OF 86 Miscellaneous" all contain documents that show direct attention from President Truman.

⁸⁶ For example, the Psychological Strategy Board files, Box 9, File 091 "Turkey," contains nothing but withdrawal notices. From the same files Box 24 (334 NSC to 334 Panel "L") contains only informational files provided to Truman in 1952 and consisting of memorandums on psychological strategy for Turkey (and other states). The Personal Secretary's Files (PSF) contain more interesting materials, but still of the same sort. In the Subject File 1940-1953 under Foreign Affairs File: Telegrams, Box 166, in the folder labeled "Turkey," is a stapled group of papers which are memorandums concerning the Turkish President (until May 1950) İsmet İnönü, but all are informational. The same folder also contains lengthy general information reports on Turkey. Given Truman's reading habits, it seems likely that he read these reports, although it cannot be proven since none of them seem to have been written on. Two more PSF boxes, 214 and 215 in the Intelligence File, 1946-1953, Central Intelligence Reports File, contain folders on Turkey with the same sort of informational CIA reports.

In “OF 86,” for instance, one stapled group of papers is Truman’s radio address to the Turkish people on the occasion of the 25th foundation of the Turkish Republic, 29 October 1948. Truman did not write the speech, but he marked it for reading ease when he recorded the speech for transmission. At the end of the first paragraph, Turkish President İnönü is referred to, and written in pencil above İnönü’s name is “Inonu,” i.e. it was a reminder of how Truman should pronounce the Turkish President’s name. Other markings are commas to indicate pauses and a “u” written above the “ü” in the name “Atatürk.” A slightly earlier copy of the same speech has Truman’s textual changes handwritten on the copy along with his signature, indicating that the changed version could be used for press distribution in Turkey. In that signed version of the text, the names of President İnönü and Atatürk are not marked for pronunciation. The information in the speech’s text is largely ideological, stressing the shared values and mutual cooperation of the two countries, along with general historical reflections. The rest of the files in OF 86 contain documents on a smattering of topics, and none enlighten us concerning Truman’s thoughts about or understanding of Turkey.

Finally, the Confidential File (CF) at the Truman Library also has many documents that concern Turkey. Boxes 26, 29, 38, and 56 contain documents concerning the provision of aid to Turkey in 1951-1952, the admission of Turkey to NATO, and other topics. Some of these documents have been published in the *FRUS* series, but some have not. Most importantly, almost none of these documents reflect Truman’s ideas about Turkey, and the few that do are diplomatic in nature. It should be noted that this discussion of the documents at the Truman Library is not exhaustive, but comprises a strong cross-section of the available material. More materials related to Truman’s views on Turkey may also exist at the National Archives

in College Park, Maryland.⁸⁷

One other interesting document is found not in Truman's files, but in Dean Acheson's papers at the Truman Library. In an 18 November 1949 conversation between President Truman, Secretary Acheson, and the Shah of Iran, the Shah began to probe for ways to request aid -- both equipment and financing for equipment -- from the U.S. The Shah brought up the possibility of Lend-Lease for Iran, or even inclusion in the Marshall Plan. When the Shah was informed that the Marshall Plan applied only to countries in Europe,

[t]his led the Shah to observe that he did not think Turkey was a country in Europe. The President pointed out that Turkey had been considered to be in this capacity, partly for geographical reasons, but primarily because of the prior legislation providing aid for Greece and Turkey which arose out of special circumstances and which was incorporated into the Marshall Plan legislation.⁸⁸

The rationalization that the President uses to separate Iran and Turkey, even though they are geographically neighbors, is interesting. Truman was not able to provide a more fundamental or persuasive reason for defining Turkey as eligible for Marshall Plan aid.

2.0.1.7. Summary: Truman and the Turkish Republic

In light of all of the above, Truman's knowledge of Turkey does not seem to have been extensive when he became President, and given his preference to leave foreign affairs to his Secretary of State, the idea of Truman expending large effort to expand his knowledge of Turkey seems unlikely. The information that Truman knew about Turkey came mostly from situations that required him to give attention to Turkey while President, and from the advice, information, or recommendations on strategy that officials in the civilian and military

⁸⁷ In September 2013, the Truman Library declassified a large number of documents, more than 5000, a large percentage of which have potential relevance to Turkey.

⁸⁸ Box 66: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in "October-November 1949" folder.

administration offered to him. His strong reading habits, and the numerous governmental reports containing information about Turkey that crossed his desk while President, mean that he must have acquired a great deal of factual knowledge about Turkey in the course of performing his duties. However, that information does not seem to have translated into any more interest about Turkey since none of the documents in the files, his correspondence with officials, or letters to friends reflect strong or interested ideas about that country. These appearances, coupled with the fact that Truman depended greatly on the State Department for foreign policy, makes the U.S. Secretary of State far more important than President Truman for our understanding of how U.S. policy towards Turkey was formulated and carried out during the 1945-1953 Truman Administration.

2.1. U.S. PUBLIC OPINION, FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

The third section of this study examines U.S. public opinion towards foreign policy in general, and the Turkish Republic specifically, during the Truman Administration. Before looking closely at the 1948 Presidential election, a watershed in the history of the U.S. Democratic Party, the general foreign policy attitudes of the American populace will be examined, as well as their ideas concerning U.S. aid for the Turkish Republic. After analyzing the 1948 election for its relevance to U.S. public opinion towards Turkey, some general conclusions will be presented in order to once again anticipate the following two chapters that concern Dean Acheson.

Additionally, this chapter will venture a thesis concerning another phenomenon stemming from the subjects examined in the following pages. That issue is the general hostility that U.S. liberals, progressives, and militant leftists displayed towards the Turkish Republic, and towards the policy of U.S. aid for that country, during the Cold War. For that reason, the author will devote space to exploring exactly how the U.S. political atmosphere in the late 1940s may have contributed to the formation of long-term impressions about the Turkish Republic amongst American liberals specifically, and amongst U.S. citizens more generally, at the end of the chapter.

2.1.1. Shifts in U.S. Public Opinions Concerning U.S. Foreign Policy, 1945-1953

2.1.1.1. Primary Intellectual Shifts

While examining shifts in U.S. public opinion during the late 1940s and early 1950s, a brief explanation of the contemporary intellectual trends in U.S. society is appropriate. As is well

understood, the Franklin D. Roosevelt era in U.S. politics is generally referred to as the “New Deal,” after the economic program that he inaugurated in an attempt to bring the U.S. out of the Great Depression. Economically, that attempt was a mixed success, but it had long-term consequences for U.S. intellectual and political culture.¹

The New Deal itself emerged from the liberal wing of U.S. political traditions, but was more of a transitional phase between the classical economic liberalism of the 19th Century and the individual-centered liberalism that emerged especially in the 1960s. This last incarnation is the “liberalism” that Americans now generally associate with the term today. As for the liberalism of the Roosevelt and Truman eras, Alan Brinkley has termed it “reform liberalism,” and associates it with the period from the first decades of the 20th Century to the years after WWII.²

Reform liberalism, because it was a transitional phenomenon, is necessarily difficult to define precisely. The contemporary adherents of reform liberalism initially referred to themselves as progressives, and many different concepts and ideas were associated with the movement. Several key tenets embraced by the academicians, activists, artists, civil officials, intellectuals, journalists, and politicians (i.e. mostly social and professional elites) who identified themselves as reform liberals can be identified, though. One is the necessity to ensure the welfare of individuals, and to protect the powerless from the excesses of the powerful, especially from the monopolistic capitalists of the early 20th Century. A second concept was the need for the government to intervene into the economy when necessary, and in order for the government to take action, the state (which Americans generally refer to as the “federal government”) needed to possess the institutions and power that would enable the

¹ Brinkley, Alan. *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War*. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1995. pp. 3-4.

² Brinkley, *The End of Reform*, pp. 8-11; Hamby, Alonzo L. *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. pp. xiii-xvi.

Executive to act quickly and decisively. This was the issue upon which the most divisive legislative battles were fought during FDR's tenure as President.³

Those battles had several vital consequences as FDR's administration engaged in WWII, and then as Harry Truman assumed power after FDR's death. To begin with, at exactly the same moment that the U.S. emerged as the primary economic and military force on the global stage, U.S. political elites were engaged in intense debates about the basic structure of the U.S. economy and state. These arguments were conducted not only through the election process, but also through the press, through the judiciary, and through the Congressional struggles that consumed so much of both FDR's and Truman's energy and time.⁴

Secondly, after 1938, the Republican Party's national fortunes began a long upswing that would not be exhausted until Dwight Eisenhower's eight years as President in the 1950s. The continuing conservative political trend meant that, during WWII, many of the New Deal's programs and initiatives were dismantled by a Congress aggressively hostile to FDR. Many of the officials associated with the New Deal, such as Thomas Corcoran, Thurman Arnold, and Leon Henderson, either left government or were forced out of their positions by 1944. In their place came figures with more conservative ideas, like Jesse Jones, who took over as Secretary of Commerce for Harry Hopkins in 1940.⁵ The replacement of liberals by conservative officials continued under President Truman.

Third, the liberals themselves experienced a broad change in the focus of their political concerns. Whereas in the 1930s liberals generally accepted a need to regulate corporations and to attack monopolistic organizations, during WWII these concepts fell out of favor. In their place, liberals began to favor fiscal regulation, and an emphasis on the government's

³ Brinkley, *The End of Reform*, pp. 9-10, 13, 17-23; Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal*, pp. xiv-xx.

⁴ Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal*, pp. 3-12.

⁵ Brinkley, *The End of Reform*, pp. 140-154; Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal*, pp. 30-33.

role in manipulating the national economy when necessary. Part of this change came from the realization, brought upon them by the massive conflict with the centralized states of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, and by increasing awareness of the actual nature of Soviet state and society, that state decision-making powers did not always result in increased freedom for the citizens. Another change in attitude resulted from close cooperation with figures from the business world while managing the massive increases in industrial output for the war effort. The coordination of that industrial output created ties between industrial corporations and the military, which eventually changed the complexion of the U.S. economy. The failure of federal agencies to prevent this development, as well as the emergence of a massive economic sector, the infamous “military-industrial complex,”⁶ that government agencies would have great difficulty regulating, further decreased liberal hopes that government could prove an effective regulator and planner for the national economy. Increasingly, liberals began to focus on increased consumption, as well as fiscal policy, as the solution to U.S. economic problems, rather than regulation of the producers.⁷

By 1945, then, the U.S. national political scene looked quite different than it had in the 1930s. The labor movement, which had worked to establish itself as a political alternative in the 1930s, during WWII largely abandoned radical programs in order to forge a moderate alliance with the Democratic Party and the liberals. U.S. liberals, as a broad political definition, had lost most of their influence within the federal government and also moderated their views on how the economic and social problems that faced the country could be solved. The Democratic Party, despite the fact that it retained the Presidency and apparently

⁶ This term is in quotations because it did not gain wide prominence until the Eisenhower Presidency.

⁷ Brinkley, *The End of Reform*, pp. 136, 154-164, 170-200; Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal*, pp. 9-22; Pells, Richard H. *The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s*. Hanover, New Hampshire: Wesleyan University Press, 1989. pp. 26-37.

controlled Congress, emerged from the war greatly weakened and facing not only an adverse political tide but also a reevaluation of its professed ideological platform.⁸

Between the end of WWII and the Republican victory in 1952's Presidential Election, the Democratic Party was forced to shed some political baggage in response to the changing American political atmosphere; at the same time, new alliances were forged. This enabled the Democrats to preserve a narrow victory in the 1948 Presidential election and would establish the Party's long-term post-WWII course. The most important elements that broke away from the Democratic Party were the militant leftists and uncompromising New Dealers who formed Henry Wallace's hope for the 1948 campaign. The Southern Democrats, who would gain the appellation "Dixiecrats" from Strom Thurmond's 1948 splinter party, would also largely desert the Democratic collaboration.

On the other hand, the Democratic Party forged a strong compact with moderate, pragmatic labor groups, with African-Americans (and other minorities) in the first salvos of the civil rights struggle, and with the dwindling community of progressive farmers. Along with that new coalition also came some new issues to replace the concepts that had ceased to dominate liberal discussions. The domestic concerns, already mentioned, were concentrated on fiscal policy to manipulate the economy when necessary in order to create full employment and high levels of consumption (fundamentally Keynesian) and on civil rights. Internationally, and most importantly for this study, liberals became internationalists and supporters of the effort to stymie Soviet expansionism; in essence, as the increasingly conservative U.S. voting population also became more and more disturbed by the USSR's behavior, the Democratic Party was forced to adjust its ideological platform.⁹ Most liberals and leftists were able to

⁸ Brinkley, *The End of Reform*, pp. 201-268 Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal*, pp. 33-38.

⁹ Brinkley, *The End of Reform*, pp. 265-217; Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal*, pp. 12-22; Pells pp. 37-40. Expectations among U.S. citizens that the U.S. and the USSR would be able to cooperate after WWII, though never high in the first place, declined dramatically in the last

make the same adjustment, but some would not.

Liberal intellectuals were not automatic supporters of the Truman Presidency, for several reasons. To begin with, Truman was not a visionary, but rather a pragmatic machine politician whose success rested on toil and compromise. This meant that Truman would not always stick to ideals that liberals approved of. In foreign policy, liberals were greatly disappointed in Truman's refusal to accept a *modus vivendi* with the Soviets. More superficially, liberals were looking for strong leadership from the Democratic Party but found little to be impressed by in Truman's subdued, awkward public presence.¹⁰

As the Cold War emerged in the years following WWII and the U.S. left-of-center fragmented into bickering, competing elements, several trends manifested themselves. Some liberal elites, despite their overt ideological independence, became steadfast proponents of the American system, but remained on the left side of the political spectrum. Others migrated to the right of the political spectrum, sometimes by long, tortuous routes. Some of those intellectuals began their "long march" by setting out to battle "neutralism" amongst intellectuals -- both American and Western European -- in much the same way that U.S. military planners focused their worries on regional power vacuums. Most staked out a position of varying intellectual emphasis near the political center.¹¹

Naturally, no mention of the early 1950s in relation to U.S. intellectual culture can omit reference to Joseph McCarthy and his opportunistic, self-glorifying, and divisive quest to expose and expel Communists, real and imagined, from American government and society wherever they may have lurked. Ironically, Harry Truman gave some of the initial impetus to

half of 1945 and during 1946; see: Buckley, Gary J. "American Public Opinion and the Origins of the Cold War: A Speculative Reassessment." *Mid-America: An Historical Review*. Vol. 60. Jan. 1978. pp. 37-42.

¹⁰ Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal*, pp. 41-51; Pells pp. 56-63.

¹¹ Pells pp. 71-83; 96-107; 117-147.

the anti-Communist witch hunts of the late 1940s and early 1950s, but the U.S. Congress had featured a House committee, the House Committee on Un-American Activities, tasked with identifying potential subversive elements since 1938; in 1945 it became a standing committee. In 1947, shortly after proclaiming the Truman Doctrine, President Truman authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation to examine the fidelity of both current and potential federal government employees.¹²

Few U.S. liberal intellectuals stood firm against the campaign to root out ideological opponents in its original incarnation. Then, the revelation that some Communists, like Alger Hiss, had indeed been active at the highest levels of government increased popular belief that a threat existed. Consequently, the first five years of the 1950s marked a dreadful era in American intellectual and political history as many former leftists either gave compromising testimony to the McCarthy-era investigation panels or found themselves involved in cerebral contortions to justify some aspect of the identification, public shaming, black-listing, and even executions (Ethel and Julius Rosenberg) that occurred.¹³

No matter the tinge of the personal ideological preferences, by the 1950s most U.S. liberal intellectuals had moved away from the ideals of the 1930s, and embraced some sort of accommodation with the U.S. economic, political, and social system. New fears, such as that of the awesome power inherent in modern states and the potential of mass movements to gain control of that power for nightmarish and destructive ends, forced liberals towards compromise and defense of what Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. labeled “the vital center” in politics. Fear moderated the triumphal possibilities that the war had provided to the U.S.¹⁴

¹² Pells pp. 265-266.

¹³ Pells pp. 267-339.

¹⁴ Brinkley, Alan. *Liberalism and Its Discontents*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. pp. 105-109, 133-134.

2.1.1.2. U.S. Public Opinion Trends 1945-1953

Against this general backdrop, public perceptions were also undergoing change. Public opinion polling, in the 1930s and 1940s, was emerging as an important tool with which politicians could measure public reaction to current events and political policies. During and after WWII, the U.S. federal administration turned to public opinion polls in an attempt to discern more clearly what the American people thought about topics relevant to WWII and its aftermath.¹⁵

The single most important development of the WWII and post-WWII eras in U.S. foreign policy was the change in U.S. attitudes from a predominantly isolationist to a predominantly interventionist, or activist, mindset. This metamorphosis was led by the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations, but world events provided large amounts of legitimacy for the administrations' chosen path. The first great deviation from isolationism occurred early in WWII as the public, over a period of two years, grew to favor the Lend-Lease Plan; by 1944 strong support for active American participation in international organizations emerged. In relation to trade, U.S. citizens were not as favorably inclined towards U.S. participation or compromise in order to facilitate world trade, but significant majorities of the population did favor the idea of an international body to regulate trade and hypothetical U.S. membership in such an organization. Majorities also, in an abstract manner, favored increased U.S. buying and selling of products internationally. U.S. citizens came to accept more U.S. international involvement during the war, but more importantly, once that shift transpired, U.S. public opinion remained firmly in support of U.S. international activism for more than twenty

¹⁵ Foster, H. Schuyler. *Activism Replaces Isolationism: U.S. Public Attitudes, 1940-1975*. Washington D.C.: Foxhall Press, 1983. pp. 8-14.

years.¹⁶

Of the foreign policy issues that faced U.S. citizens after WWII, U.S. relations with the Soviet Union eventually proved to be the most important. Before the war most U.S. citizens did not have a favorable opinion of the Soviet Union, and developments during the war would alter that perception only slightly. Predictably, after the Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941 and the subsequent U.S. entry into the war after the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor, U.S. citizens did begin to feel more strongly that the U.S. and the Soviets would cooperate to preserve peace at the conflict's conclusion, but that positive feeling appeared, at the most, among only 50 percent of the population. After the war, that opinion declined quickly. This generally negative attitude towards the Soviet Union was undoubtedly compounded by the fact that most U.S. citizens had little concrete, factual information about the USSR, even near the war's conclusion. In general, U.S. citizen attitudes towards Russia reflected the advances and reverses of the Allied war effort or issues related directly to U.S.-Soviet relations. Interestingly, opinion poll data also indicated that, as late as 1944, upper- and middle-class Americans, as well as Americans well-informed about the Soviet Union, felt greater trust and optimism towards the USSR than Americans with lower income levels and less information concerning the USSR.¹⁷

After WWII's conclusion, American attitudes towards the Soviet Union turned progressively more negative. In June 1945, a large majority of Americans expressed a desire for the USSR

¹⁶ Cantril, Hadley. "Opinion Trends in World War II: Some Guides to Interpretation." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*. Vol. 12, No. 1. Spring, 1948. pp. 35, 39; Field, Harry H. and Louise M. Van Patten. "If the American People Made the Peace." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*. Vol. 8, No. 4. Winter, 1944-1945. pp. 501-506; Foster pp. 19-28, 375, 377-378, 384-387. Foster also notes, on pp. 6-11, that the more education an individual has seen, the more likely they are to pay attention to, and have accurate information concerning, foreign affairs. Furthermore, greater education is also associated with greater support for active international policies.

¹⁷ Buckley pp. 35-42; Field and Van Patten pp. 501-502; Cantril pp. 30-33, 35, 39; Walsh, Warren B. "What the American People Think of Russia." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*. Vol. 8, No. 4. Winter, 1944-1945. pp. 513-522.

to join the effort against Japan. Similarly, shortly after the war's conclusion Americans still held positive views of what was achieved at Yalta, and even disapproved of the anti-Russian tone of Churchill's March 1946 Iron Curtain speech. By 1949, however, U.S. citizens' feelings had turned overwhelmingly to distrust of the Soviet Union. One poll, taken between March and May 1947, attempted a psychological analysis of respondents' opinions. That poll's results reflected generally negative opinions towards, as well as expectations of, Russia. Gallup polls, taken in a similar time frame, indicated developing American apprehension that the Soviets were expansionist. Additionally, Americans began to feel that Russia was winning what had, by the late 1940s, already been labeled the "Cold War." Not surprisingly, U.S. citizens also began to support both increased expenditures to promote the U.S. perspective internationally and curbed sales of U.S. manufactures and resources to Russia (although there was a shift in attitudes concerning mutual trade between the U.S. and Russia in the second half of the 1950s).¹⁸

Harry Truman mentions in his memoirs that isolationism began to sprout anew as the war drew to a close in 1945. However, this isolationism would never again display the strength that it had before the war. By 1949, when the NATO pact was finalized, clear majorities of U.S. citizens had decided that the U.S. role in the world affairs was justified and suitable,

¹⁸ Buckley pp. 37-38; Smith, M. Brewster. "The Personal Setting of Public Opinions: A Study of Attitudes Toward Russia." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*. Vol. 11, No. 4. Winter, 1947-1948. pp. 507-523; Erskine, Hazel Gaudet. "The Cold War: Report From the Polls." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*. Vol. 25, No. 2. Summer, 1961. pp. 302-303, 306-307; Foster pp. 53-56; Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. pp. 320-321; Quester, George H. "Origins of the Cold War: Some Clues from Public Opinion." *Political Science Quarterly*. Vol. 93, No. 4. Winter, 1978-1979. pp. 647-650, 656-663; Strunk, Mildred. "The Quarter's Polls." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*. Vol. 12, No. 3. Autumn, 1948. pp. 548-549; Strunk, Mildred. "The Quarter's Polls." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*. Vol. 14, No. 3. Autumn 1950. p. 609.

despite the massive changes in foreign policies that the previous four years had entailed.¹⁹

Finally, public concern about foreign policy was an issue in the 1948 Presidential election, but only a minor one. The party that based its existence on a foreign policy issue, the Progressive Party of Henry Wallace, garnered only slightly more than one million votes out of the nearly 50 million that were cast. This party, and its leader, will be explored in more depth below in order to elucidate the era's, and U.S. public opinion's, relevance to official U.S. policy towards Turkey in the postwar years. The most important issues in the 1948 election proved to be domestic, civil rights and labor rights, the topics which Harry Truman rode to victory.²⁰

2.1.2. U.S. Public Opinion Polls Concerning U.S. Aid to Turkey

Even though U.S. officials recognized relatively soon after WWII that Turkey would become an important U.S. concern, they were confronted with a highly problematic dilemma. At a time when Congress was overtly and vocally attempting to erect every sort of obstacle to the Truman Administration's policies, and when the U.S. public, tentatively expressing a newborn support for more active U.S. foreign policies, was unsure of the Administration's direction or of the world political situation, how would Administration officials be able to convince the American people that a need to send to Turkey not only economic aid, but also military aid, existed?

In the face of such a situation, public opinion polls became one way that U.S. officials could judge what U.S. citizens knew about Turkey and whether support for aiding that country was

¹⁹ Foster pp. 65-67; Truman, Harry S. *Memoirs, Volume 1: Year of Decisions, 1945*. Printed in the U.K. for Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd. by Richard Clay and Co., Ltd.: Bungay, Suffolk, 1955. p. 101.

²⁰ Ross, Irwin. *The Loneliest Campaign: The Truman Victory of 1948*. New York: The New American Library, 1968. pp. 6-7.

present. U.S. officials, both civilian and military, recognized in 1946 that US citizens knew little about Turkey and thus would be unlikely to understand its importance or support sending it aid. Subsequently, Truman Administration officials apparently sponsored campaigns to inform the press and leaders of public opinion about Turkey, and about issues related to Turkey, in order to inject desirable information into the U.S. public space. James Forrestal, for example, referred to at least two separate occasions -- the August 1946 crisis concerning the Soviet Dardanelles note, and the February-March 1947 Greek-Turkish aid crisis -- when such decisions were taken.²¹

As a result, the Truman Administration commenced successful public information campaigns to inform the public about the necessity for aid programs for Turkey. Because of the suddenness with which the Eastern Mediterranean crisis burst onto the American public's consciousness, no time for a broad informational effort to support the Greece-Turkey aid proposal existed, but newspaper editors across the country supported it. Thus, some time passed before the Truman Administration's informational efforts would have their full effect. Directly after the March 1947 pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine and the aid to Greece and Turkey, U.S. citizens' views on the proposal were mixed, and Gallup statistics showed slightly less support for Turkey. American Institute of Public Opinion data showed that aid

²¹ Foster pp. 44-45; Leffler, Melvyn P. "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952." *The Journal of American History*. Vol. 71, No. 4. Mar., 1985. p. 812; Millis, Walter, ed. *The Forrestal Diaries*. New York: The Viking Press, 1951. pp. 191-193, 250-253; Schnabel, James F. *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. I: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1945-1947*. Washington D.C.: Office of Joint History, 1996. p. 53. Forrestal also expressed an interesting evaluation of public opinion in the aftermath of the Truman Doctrine speech, stating in a State-War-Navy meeting his worry that U.S. citizens felt that the U.N. could handle a problem like the Greek-Turkish issue. He thought that the source of this erroneous perception was the excessive stress given to the U.N.'s capabilities. Forrestal's concerns apparently came from remarks that Senator Vandenberg said in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting, attended by Forrestal, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Secretary of War Robert Patterson, the day after the Truman Doctrine speech. That meeting discussed the Greek-Turkish aid project; see: Millis pp. 256-258.

to Greece and Turkey was supported by a majority of both Democrats and Republicans, and by larger percentages of the highly-educated. However, when the questions asked of respondents separated Greece and Turkey, Turkey consistently saw less support than Greece (the questions being the same otherwise). A small majority thought that providing economic aid to Greece and Turkey would not make war with the USSR more likely, but a small majority also thought that military aid to those countries would make U.S.-Soviet conflict more likely. Only a minority of Americans thought that the Turkish government was supported by its own citizens, but most had no opinion on the issue. Support for military aid to both Greece and Turkey emerged only later.²²

A clear example of the importance that the Truman Administration gave to public opinion polls is found in President Truman's Confidential File at the Truman Library archives. Attached to a memorandum dated 16 April 1947 is a confidential copy of public opinion data recently gathered by Elmo Roper.²³ The memorandum was written by Presidential Assistant John Steelman and intended for Dean Acheson, the Acting Secretary of State, and for President Truman. The memorandum has a note, written in Truman's hand, at the bottom of the page indicating that he and Acheson had discussed the memorandum. Also attached to the memorandum is a letter from Elmo Roper, dated 10 April 1947, explaining that the data included with the letter (in booklet form) was collected according to the specifications that Steelman's office had expressed to Roper and Earl Newsom. As Roper explains, the poll's intent was "to find out the words and arguments people use in describing their reactions" to

²² Foster pp. 41-45, 378-379; "The Quarter's Polls." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*. Vol. 11, No. 2. Summer, 1947. pp. 285-286. No author was listed for the "The Quarter's Polls" feature in the Summer 1947 edition of the *The Public Opinion Quarterly*.

²³ Elmo Roper was one of the founders of the public opinion polling science in the 1930s and 1940s, and had gained national prominence by correctly, and accurately, predicting FDR's victories in the 1936, 1940, and 1944 Presidential elections. After the opinion poll disaster in 1948's Presidential election, he would play a leading role in reconstructing opinion polling's reputation.

the Greece-Turkey aid proposal. The poll's foreword states that the data compiled was drawn from a representative survey of more than 500 people in eleven different U.S. cities and towns on 28 and 29 March 1947, including cities like Birmingham (Alabama), Brockton (Massachusetts), Clarksburg (West Virginia), Cleveland (Ohio), Fort Worth (Texas), and Sioux Falls (South Dakota).²⁴

In summarizing the poll's conclusions, Roper says that "well over a majority" of the respondents favor the Greek-Turkey aid proposal either completely or with reservations, but that a large minority, around 25 percent of the public, are opposed to the proposal either completely or with reservations. Another ten-to-fifteen percent of the public had not formed definite ideas concerning the Greece-Turkey aid plan. The most common objection to the proposal was that such schemes should be carried out through the U.N.; the most commonly expressed approval for the plan was that it would combat Communism. Roper cautions that because of the small size of the sample, the percentages derived from the data should not be trusted as totally accurate. Furthermore, the poll's intent was to identify the vocabulary and logic used by people to justify their ideas concerning the Greek-Turkish initiative rather than to identify what percentage of the population had certain opinions.²⁵

The most interesting aspect of the Roper data is the responses that specifically referred to Turkey. Because the pollsters were aiming to collect information about the citizens' ideas, they made it possible for people to express their answers in more detailed fashion, and they then compiled those answers into general categories. As an illustration, when those who expressed some level of dissatisfaction with the Greek-Turkish aid plan were asked to

²⁴ The memorandum and Roper poll booklet was found in Box 38 of President Truman's Confidential File, State Department Correspondence 1946-1947. The data itself is in a leather-bound booklet of nearly 50 pages. The cities included in the poll are listed on p. 1 of the booklet.

²⁵ This information is derived from both the 10 April 1947 letter from Roper to Steelman and from the foreword to the poll booklet.

elaborate on exactly what they disliked, no more than five percent thought that Turkey did not need or deserve aid. When those who responded favorably to the proposal were asked why they thought the initiative was formulated, again very few people thought that Greece and Turkey's help during the war provided the reason, no more than four percent. When those who expressed opposition to the plan were asked what would make the proposal palatable, only a minute percentage, 1.4, stated that removing Turkey from the aid package would convince them.²⁶

The Roper poll information is interesting because it shows clearly that Turkey was not a major issue driving U.S. citizens' views of President Truman's provision of aid to Greece and Turkey. Whether they were for or against the proposal, few U.S. citizens were swayed by the presence of Turkey in the program. This suggests that in the 1948 election, Turkey could not have been an issue about which many U.S. citizens cared, and indeed Turkey rarely appeared in that year's election campaign rhetoric. The one candidate who tried to make Turkey an issue in the campaign was Henry Wallace, but because the Roper survey does not make clear the political allegiances of the citizens that were polled, assuming a connection between those who supported Wallace, i.e. the militant left wing, and those whose views concerning President Truman's Greece-Turkey aid package were determined by Turkey's inclusion does not appear warranted, even if it is a distinct possibility.²⁷

In June 1947 the Marshall Plan was suggested by the Secretary of State, and public opinion, though already somewhat prepared by the commotion that surrounded the Truman Doctrine and the aid to Greece and Turkey, showed only hesitant acceptance, or even awareness, of that initiative. Initial press reaction to the proposed plan was overwhelmingly positive, and governmental information activities, in tandem with efforts from the press and national and

²⁶ The information in this paragraph comes from pp. 7, 29, and 38 of the Roper poll booklet.

²⁷ The 1948 Wallace campaign will be discussed in more detail below.

local figures, eventually attained a 70% approval rating for the Marshall Plan after one year.²⁸

Polls later in 1947 and in 1948 showed a continuing increase in support for aid to Turkey. Opinion surveys from February 1948 showed a nearly twenty percent increase in support for U.S. military aid to Turkey. Although, in data gathered in early 1948, U.S. citizens evinced by far the least awareness that the U.S. had more than 1,000 soldiers in Turkey from amongst the six countries (France, Germany, Greece, Japan, Palestine, and Turkey) that the U.S. had that many soldiers in.²⁹

By mid-1948, U.S. public opinion had shifted to a slight majority favoring sending soldiers to Turkey in the event that the country was in danger of falling into the Soviet orbit, and the percentages in favor were within four percentage points of the views expressed on the same issue with regard to France, Italy, and Greece. Nearly 30 percent of respondents opposed sending soldiers to Turkey, again essentially the same as in regard to the other three countries mentioned. Thus, in one year's time, ten-to-twenty percent of the U.S. population positively altered its opinion in regard to the idea of aiding Turkey militarily or sending American soldiers to Turkey, and those polled in 1948 made no fundamental distinction between Turkey and other Western European states.³⁰

Consequently, the polling information that exists for U.S. public opinions concerning Turkey in the years 1945-1952 generally focuses on the narrow issues of U.S. economic and military aid to that country. Judging from the small number of people whose opinions hinged on the presence of Turkey in those years' political debates, few Americans of that time were strongly focused on Turkey as a political issue. This appearance is further underlined by the lack of opinion poll data concerning U.S. views on Turkey after 1948.

²⁸ Foster pp. 45- 50.

²⁹ Strunk, Mildred. "The Quarter's Polls." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*. Vol. 12, No. 3. Autumn, 1948. pp. 541-544, 554, 577.

³⁰ Quester pp. 660-661.

2.1.3. The 1948 Presidential Campaign, Henry A. Wallace and Anti-Communism, and Turkey

The 1948 Presidential Campaign was notable for the ideological split that occurred in the Democratic Party over the New Deal's legacy. Harry Truman, ideologically, was not the same kind of Democrat as FDR. This difference manifested itself most clearly in foreign policy, where Truman's initial tendency to embrace FDR's accommodations to the Soviets had given way to intense suspicion of Soviet intentions, and then to outright opposition to Moscow's attitudes as the Cold War emerged in 1946. That change in foreign policy angered the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, who had expected Truman to continue FDR's policy of compromise with Stalin. Consequently, after the resounding Republican victory in the 1946 midterm elections, Truman appeared beleaguered as confident Republicans attacked him from the right and a swath of previously loyal Democrats derided him from the left. It was precisely those disillusioned liberal Democrats who provided most of the support for Henry Wallace's 1948 Progressive Party candidacy for the U.S. Presidency.³¹

The "seeds of revolt," as Harold Gosnell put it, were cast into the furrow during the 1944 election campaign, when FDR refused to openly state that he did not want Henry A. Wallace to be his Vice Presidential candidate. Instead, he vacillated, and left the decision to the "Byzantine" intrigues of the Democratic Party bosses. In the Democratic Convention, held in mid-July 1944, Wallace came out ahead on the first ballot, but then was decisively defeated on the second. As mentioned above in Chapter Two, the Democratic business interests, Southern Democrats, and city bosses were opposed to Wallace on ideological grounds, while the New Dealer segment of the party, the liberals and progressives, supported Wallace. Wallace, according to contemporary polls, enjoyed great popularity with the Democratic

³¹ Ross pp. 9-10; Westerfield, H. Bradford. *Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea*. New York: Octagon Books, 1972. pp. 296-297.

rank-and-file, but that powerful opposition defeated his nomination. Two major results came out of this development: first, Harry S. Truman, a more pragmatic and realistic politician than Wallace, became U.S. President upon FDR's death nine months later; second, the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, disgusted and bitter at the machinations which defeated their man, became estranged from the organization, and consequently gave rise to the Progressive Party experiment, led by Wallace, in the 1948 Presidential election.³²

The four years between the 1944 and 1948 elections were a landmark in the Democratic Party's 20th Century history. The coalition of voting blocs that gave FDR victory in four presidential elections was a complex patchwork of interests that, in retrospect, was kept together only by FDR's political abilities. One essential segment was a block of voters that would today be termed "leftists": progressives, liberals, and left wing idealists of all stripes, including avowed socialists and Communists. Several public organizations represented this group in U.S. politics during the 1940s, especially the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). Because the CIO had strong local organizations, it provided vital grassroots work to supply votes for the 1944 Presidential election. Concurrently, strong Communist influence existed in the CIO's organizational hierarchy and membership.³³

As 1945 passed into 1946, and the Truman Administration's policies towards the Soviet Union became, step-by-step, more antagonistic, the liberal voting bloc of the Democratic Party began to react. The left wing of the Democratic Party had expected Truman to continue FDR's policy of compromise with Stalin, so their disappointment grew as the months passed in late 1945 and early 1946. Winston Churchill's famous "Iron Curtain" speech of March

³² Blum, John Morton, ed. *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973. pp. 31-36, 360-371; Gosnell, Harold F. *Truman's Crises: A Political Biography of Harry S. Truman*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. p. 194; MacDougall, Curtis. D. *Gideon's Army, Vol. 1: The Components of the Decision*. New York: Marzani and Munsell, 1965. pp. 5-11; Walton, Richard J. *Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, and the Cold War*. New York: The Viking Press, 1976. pp. 15-22.

³³ Westerfield p. 212.

1946 elicited fury from the liberal wing of the Democratic Party since President Truman appeared to have approved the speech's hostile tone. By the middle of 1946, the Democratic Party liberals were loudly criticizing the Truman Administration's foreign policy. The Truman Administration figure who most clearly represented the Democratic liberals was Secretary of Commerce Henry Agard Wallace.³⁴

2.1.3.1. Who Was Henry A. Wallace?

Today, Henry Wallace is barely remembered in U.S. society even though he was a prominent figure of the 1930s and 1940s. In fact, during those decades Wallace was the most important and influential Democratic politician after FDR, and Wallace's importance to U.S. liberals and progressives in the 1930s and 1940s is difficult to overstate. In his memoirs, for example, Wallace attributes the following to Eleanor Roosevelt in the wake of the 1944 election:

When I saw Mrs. Roosevelt, she told me that the liberals looked on me as the outstanding symbol of liberalism in the United States. She said that any program they worked up ought to be passed on by me. She said that she was going out to the CIO convention on November 20 and she wanted to know whether I would head up a greatly broadened PAC [political action committee]. She felt that Sidney Hillman was not suitable for heading up such a broad liberal organization.³⁵

Wallace does not give the reader reason to think that he exaggerated or distorted Mrs. Roosevelt's words, especially since he explains that, later the same day, he called Mrs. Roosevelt and told her that he could not take on such a role because it would damage the cause of both the Democratic Party and American liberalism. Interestingly, today Eleanor Roosevelt is well remembered for the liberal and progressive causes that she fought for, while

³⁴ Hamby, Alonzo L. "Henry A. Wallace, the Liberals, and Soviet-American Relations." *The Review of Politics*. Vol. 30, No. 2. April 1968. p. 156; Westerfield pp. 212-213.

³⁵ Blum pp. 390-391.

Wallace is largely neglected, but at the time, Wallace was a major force in U.S. politics.³⁶

2.1.3.2. Wallace's Biography

Henry Agard Wallace was born into a rural Iowa family steeped in scientific farming, Calvinist religion, and agrarian progressivism in 1888. Wallace displayed an early proclivity for science and plants, and was encouraged in that pursuit by George Washington Carver, whom he met at Iowa State Agricultural College, where Wallace's father taught. Wallace consequently became absorbed in improving farm technology and yields, and researched in fields as diverse as demography, economics, genetics, and mathematics. In the 1920s, Wallace's father, Henry C. Wallace, served as Secretary of Agriculture under both Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge. During the same decade, the younger Henry Wallace put his scientific endeavors to use in the market and founded a highly successful hybrid seed company. Wallace also became editor of the Wallace family's widely-read weekly *Wallaces' Farmer*.³⁷

At the same time, Wallace was developing his political views. Wallace's upbringing in a household that espoused non-doctrinaire Calvinist and progressive agrarian ideals, along with his scientific mindset, made Wallace an adherent of Thorstein Veblen's argument that the production of abundant food was held back by monopolist capitalist industry. Wallace, like Veblen, advocated the power of technology to create a better society, and opposed monopolistic practices. This perspective also led him to support internationalism and oppose tariffs. However, because of their rural viewpoint and the U.S. political atmosphere in the early 20th Century, Wallace's family found much to criticize in both of the major U.S.

³⁶ Walton pp. 3-4, 7-9, 23, 31-32, 50, 119.

³⁷ Blum pp. 4-8, 10; MacDougall p. 83; Walker, Samuel J. *Henry A. Wallace and American Foreign Policy*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976. pp. 3-8; Walton p. 4.

political parties. In 1912 they supported Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Party. Wallace originally registered as a Republican but disliked their agricultural policies, so he supported Robert M. La Follette and the Progressive Party in 1924, and even promoted the formation of a third party in 1928. Although Wallace was an internationalist for most of his life, during the 1920s he professed isolationist views. While writing editorials for *Wallaces' Farmer*, Wallace developed cogent opinions on economic and political issues related to agriculture, which also brought him to FDR's attention; their first meeting occurred after the 1932 Democratic Party Convention. Wallace served for a full term as Secretary of Agriculture before he changed his party affiliation to Democrat.³⁸

2.1.3.3. Secretary of Agriculture, 1932-1940

During the 1932 election campaign, Franklin Roosevelt turned to Wallace for advice concerning farm issues. Wallace's name, by that time, was associated with agricultural expertise through his own accomplishments, through the family farm weekly, and through his father's stint as Secretary of Agriculture. Wallace's moderate reform ideology also fit well with Roosevelt's. Henry Wallace was highly successful as Secretary of Agriculture, especially when the importance of farm policy to alleviating the Great Depression's effects on farmers is considered. At the time, he was considered one of the most effective Agricultural Secretaries to have held the office. Both his position and his achievements subsequently made Wallace a frontrunner for the Vice Presidency in 1940.³⁹

³⁸ Blum pp. 6, 8-11, 13-15; MacDougall pp. 87-89, 90; Walker pp. 6-8, 10-21, 24-32; Walton pp. 4-7.

³⁹ Blum pp. 12, 15-20; MacDougall pp. 89-90; Walker pp. 35-47.

2.1.3.4. U.S. Vice President, 1940-1944

FDR chose Wallace as his 1940 Vice Presidential candidate for several reasons. First of all, John Nance Garner, FDR's Vice President during the first two terms of his Presidency, was a Southern Democrat, and served to maintain that important bloc of Democratic votes. Garner had openly opposed some of FDR's policies during the second term, however, and FDR decided that he wanted a more liberal Vice Presidential candidate. Wallace was certainly that. Despite the fact that Wallace was not one of the "New Dealers," as those figures close to FDR were referred to, FDR forced the 1940 Democratic Convention to accept his choice of Wallace as running mate, and even threatened to withdraw his own candidacy if Wallace was not accepted.⁴⁰

The zenith of Wallace's political influence occurred in 1940-1944 while serving as the U.S. Vice President. Initially, FDR gave Wallace few responsibilities, but as the global conflict widened to include the U.S., the need for war preparation gained urgency. Correspondingly, Wallace was made chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW), which developed into one of the most important wartime governmental agencies. For eighteen months, Wallace put his ideals to work for the war effort. Along with his BEW duties, Wallace also spoke publicly on various issues confronting the nation. During WWII, Wallace's pronouncements on foreign policy reflected what was understood as the U.S. liberal attitude towards a variety of issues, a perspective that has been described as a "worldwide New Deal" that, at the same time, turned a blind eye to "the nature of the Soviet state." His ideas concerning the postwar peace meant that national states should be willing to transfer some

⁴⁰ Blum pp. 20-22; Walker p. 73; Walton pp. 7-8.

sovereignty to an empowered U.N.⁴¹

While performing his responsibilities as BEW chairman, Wallace allowed his religiously-tinged zeal to overcome more pragmatic, political judgment, which resulted in clashes with Secretary of Commerce Jesse Jones and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, two powerful administration conservatives. This conflict played out in public, and the resulting scandal embarrassed FDR and forced him to replace the BEW with another newly-created agency, the Office of Economic Warfare, in mid-1943. Wallace was not asked to head the new office, and went back to his Vice Presidential duties and public speaking.⁴² The series of events which resulted in Harry Truman being nominated as FDR's 1944 Vice Presidential candidate was described above. Wallace's term as Vice President ended in January 1945, and FDR made him Secretary of Commerce, in place of his antagonist Jones, a month later.

2.1.3.5. Secretary of Commerce, 1945-1946

Wallace's conflict with Truman did not occur immediately upon Truman's accession to the Presidency. Truman kept Wallace on as Secretary of Commerce, the position to which FDR had appointed Wallace, with Truman doing the hatchet work.⁴³ Wallace's Commerce Secretary duties were domestic, but it was his opinions concerning foreign policy that caused his conclusive rift with President Truman.

By the last quarter of 1945, Wallace began to voice opinions concerning foreign policy as he grew concerned that President Truman would not conduct a policy of reconciliation with the

⁴¹ Blum pp. 22-25, 28-31; Hamby, "Henry A. Wallace," pp. 154-155; MacDougall pp. 91-94; Walker pp. 76-79, 83-94; Walton pp. 8-9, 10-15.

⁴² Blum pp. 26-28; Hamby, "Henry A. Wallace," pp. 155; Walker pp. 94-97, 111-114; Walton pp. 9-10.

⁴³ FDR asked Truman to use his position in the Senate to ensure Wallace's nomination as Secretary of Commerce; Truman complied: Gosnell pp. 210-211.

Soviets. In the beginning of 1946, Wallace began to express his opinions concerning U.S. foreign policy with more volume, and also bluntly criticized Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech. After Churchill's speech, Wallace sent a letter to Truman concerning steps that the new U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, Walter Bedell Smith, could take to reverse the worsening relations between the two countries; Truman politely thanked Wallace for the note and then filed it away. In July 1946 Wallace took it upon himself to pen a lengthy letter to President Truman again expressing concerns about the direction of U.S. foreign policy towards the USSR. Then, in September of the same year, Wallace and Truman experienced a misunderstanding concerning a Wallace speech that seemingly criticized the U.S. approach to relations with the USSR. In the ensuing hubbub, Byrnes, who was trying to conduct the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers meetings while Wallace's publicly expressed opinions undermined his negotiating stances, threatened to resign unless Wallace was ousted from the Cabinet; Wallace, for his part, agreed to cease pronouncing on foreign policy only until the Paris talks had concluded. Truman, under pressure from Byrnes, decided to demand Wallace's resignation. Wallace did so, and proceeded to continue his foreign policy speeches from the public sphere.⁴⁴

Here, it should be noted that Wallace was not an advocate for the Soviet system. Rather, he supported Soviet-American cooperation and promoted a number of other idealistic approaches to U.S. foreign policy according to what was understood, at the time, as liberal prescriptions for those problems. One scholar notes that the speech which led to Wallace's resignation from Truman's cabinet departed in significant ways from contemporary liberal

⁴⁴ Blum pp. 37-46; Byrnes, James F. *All in One Lifetime*. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1958. pp. 370-376; Donovan, Robert. *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1945-1948*. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1996. pp. 219- 228; Hamby, "Henry A. Wallace," pp. 157-159; MacDougall pp. 59-80; Truman, Harry S. *Memoirs, Volume 1*, pp. 496-502; Walker pp. 117-130, 132-146, 149-159; Walton pp. 25-30, 50-51, 80-82, 89-95, 98-116, 125-127, 129-130.

thought because it accepted Soviet and American spheres-of-influence, a Realist concept; correspondingly, Wallace did not speak glowingly of Soviet society in the September speech, which caused concern amongst his Communist adherents. Truman's ejection of Wallace from the Administration sparked outrage from the U.S. left, and convinced liberals that Truman had finally rejected the New Deal. Wallace would soon become editor of the *New Republic*, a flagship publication of the American liberal left.⁴⁵

2.1.3.6. Wallace's Third-Party Campaign for the Presidency, 1947-1948

Wallace would not remain attached to Realist ideas. Instead, ideology -- his own as well as that of his advisors -- would dominate Wallace's understanding of the contemporary political environment in 1947 and 1948. Liberals who did not agree with Wallace's stances, mostly more moderate, pragmatic, and realistic liberals, formed the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) a progressive, but anti-Communist political organization. The ADA, formed in early January 1947, had a precursor, the Union for Democratic Action (UDA). During WWII, the UDA was the only prominent liberal group to remain anti-Communist. Though this stance caused friction between the UDA and other liberal and leftist groups during the war, after the war other liberals, disenchanted with the Communists' behavior domestically and Soviet actions in general, slowly began to move towards the UDA's position. That trend was cemented by the worsening international situation in 1946 and the disheartening result of that year's elections. The ADA, in the words of one scholar, was comprised mostly of

⁴⁵ Gillon, Steven M. *Politics and Vision: The ADA and American Liberalism, 1947-1985*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. pp. 8-9; Hamby, "Henry A. Wallace," pp. 157, 160-161; Walker pp. 149-162, 178-179; Walton pp. 124-125. The *New Republic*, during WWII and in the years following (and even today), was a magazine catering to the U.S. liberal elite. After Wallace resigned from its editorship in order to run for President, the *New Republic* moderated its ideology and moved towards the Americans for Democratic Action-type of liberal reader; see: Pells pp. 10-12, 104-107.

“middle- or upper-middle class” men with college education who supported New Deal policies, and was never able to attract significant working-class or minority support. ADA members, though remaining dedicated to reform, understood and backed the necessity for “bargaining and compromise” in relation to national politics. Eleanor Roosevelt was the ADA’s most visible original member. The foundation of the ADA, coming one week after the foundation of the Progressive Citizens of America, also made the split in the U.S. liberal community official. One author termed this development, and the following two years, as “nothing less than a civil war amongst the liberals of America.” The ADA, subsequently, would campaign vigorously against Wallace throughout the 1948 election year.⁴⁶

Despite the widening rift in the American liberal community, Wallace remained convinced until late 1947 that the correct path to expressing his ideals nationally was from within the Democratic Party, and through an effort to move the Democratic Party towards more progressive ideals. Because Wallace’s potential support came from sectors of the voting population that supported the Democratic Party, President Truman’s advisors were forced to monitor Wallace’s activities closely during 1947. Consequently, for most of 1947, Truman did not respond publicly to Wallace’s attacks on his administration’s foreign policy, but some of Truman’s political decisions reflected a desire to solidify sections of voters that the Democrats thought Wallace threatened.⁴⁷

One of the key issues that marked the division between ADA liberals and Wallace supporters was the Truman Doctrine and the provision of aid to Greece and Turkey. The primary group representing leftist liberals, the Progressive Citizens of America (PCA), had emerged in late

⁴⁶ Blum pp. 47-48; Gillon pp. ix-x, 10-21, 23-25, 52; MacDougall pp. 121-122; Walton p. 75-76; Westerfield pp. 218-220; Yarnell, Allen. *Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. pp. 40, 87-107. Quote from Walton p. 288. The UDA had been formed in 1941 by a number of leading liberals, former Communists, and union figures; see: Gillon pp. 9-10.

⁴⁷ Yarnell pp. 15-25.

December 1946 from the merger of two competing liberal organizations. The PCA was further to the political left of the ADA: the ADA had emphatically condemned Communism and Communist involvement in its organization, but the PCA had refused to take the same step. The PCA, directly after President Truman's 12 March 1947 speech, condemned it as a first step towards global annihilation, whereas 250 delegates to the ADA's 30 March 1947 organizational conference "overwhelmingly approved" the President's initiative. Later in the month, when President Truman also announced the beginning of a program to investigate the loyalty of Federal employees, the PCA immediately attacked the proposal and the ADA approved it. In short, ADA liberals understood that, while the Greek and Turkish governments may not have measured up to U.S. democratic ideals, the alternative was far worse and U.S. influence would work for better ends. Even then, many prominent liberals, such as Elliot Roosevelt, Samuel Grafton, Fiorello LaGuardia, and Freda Kirchwey, did not like the idea of supporting the "reactionary" Greek and Turkish governments. Wallace echoed that general sentiment, but accomplished this by abandoning the brief flirtation with Realism that he experienced in September 1946. As Hamby explains, Wallace depended on moral and political ideals for his arguments, not on pragmatic evaluations of U.S. strategy.⁴⁸

Wallace voiced his opposition to the Truman Doctrine the day after Truman's historical Congressional address. Wallace's speech is notable for several reasons. The most prominent is the fact that he lambasts the idea of providing aid to Turkey in a speech that was broadcast nationwide on NBC. Here is an excerpt of the speech as provided in Richard J. Walton's study:

Americans agree with President Truman that we must aid the people beside whom we fought.... Why are we speaking only of \$400 million when the need is far greater? Why is \$150 million of those \$400 million to be given to Turkey which

⁴⁸ Foster pp. 42-43; Gillon pp. 25-27, 29; Hamby, "Henry A. Wallace," pp. 163-165; MacDougall pp. 112-120, 128, 130-131; Walton p. 75-76, 152-157; Westerfield pp. 219-220. Wallace spoke at the PCA's inaugural convention; see: MacDougall pp. 114-117.

was no ally of ours and which is in no urgent need of food and supplies?

All Americans agree with President Truman that freedom is the most cherished of human goals, and should be helped to grow in all countries. These same Americans ask: How does support given to the undemocratic governments of Greece and Turkey aid the cause of freedom?

Turkey is a nation which fought against us in the First World War and which in this war refused to help the United Nations. Turkey fattened herself off the Germans and the allies by offering her vital supplies of chrome to the highest bidder. Out of these sales she built up a gold reserve of a quarter of a billion dollars. Turkish neutrality lengthened the war by months. Turkey was a haven for Nazi leaders at the war's end. It is utter nonsense to assert today that the Turkish government is representative or democratic. Turkish sources say that the \$150 million that President Truman proposes to give Turkey is to be used to maintain her army of a million men -- equivalent to 7 million men in terms of the United States.

I strongly recommend economic aid to Greece....⁴⁹

This speech's significance comes from the fact that Wallace was the favorite of the ideological, progressive left wing of the Democrat Party. His ideas both provided direction to and reflected the general trend amongst his supporters. This means that the ideas presented in this speech concerning Turkey either had wide currency amongst Wallace's supporters or gained currency through his expression of them. In the excerpt supplied by Walton's book, Wallace used the terms "reactionary," "remote," "no ally of ours," "undemocratic," and a post-WWII "haven for Nazi leaders," to describe his conception of the Turkish government. MacDougall notes that Wallace "... particularly scored the \$150 million earmarked for Turkey, no ally of the United States in either war...". Walton adds that Wallace's speech "touched many Americans" who responded with a wave of letters to Wallace.⁵⁰

A second interesting aspect of Wallace's speech is that even though much of what he states concerning the Turkish leadership's behavior during WWII is inaccurate, those same inaccuracies became common knowledge amongst U.S. progressives, and carried on into the future. To compound the problem, Wallace displays no knowledge of the transformation

⁴⁹ Walton pp. 145-146. The PCA published the full text of Wallace's speech in newspapers across the country; see: MacDougall p. 129.

⁵⁰ MacDougall pp. 128-129; Walker pp. 168- 169; Walton pp. 145-149. MacDougall's acceptance of Wallace's characterization is important since MacDougall himself was a prominent liberal journalist and professor at Northwestern University, and ran as a progressive Illinois Senatorial candidate in 1948.

then taking place in Turkish politics. Without going into details, in 1945 Turkish politics was opened to second parties for the first time since 1930, and Turkey's first multi-party election since 1930, though admittedly corrupt, had been held in 1946. Turkish society had experienced broad, top-down reforms in the 1920s and 1930s, and more reforms were initiated in the immediate aftermath of WWII. Wallace does not indicate knowledge of these facts, but that information would also have weakened his argument.

Wallace's criticism of the Truman Doctrine continued throughout 1947 as he used his position at the *New Republic* to repeatedly attack the Greek-Turkish aid program and, eventually, the Marshall Plan. After Wallace returned from an April 1947 speaking trip to Europe, which he also used to attack the Greek-Turkish aid initiative, he set out on a cross-country speaking tour sponsored by the *New Republic* and the PCA.⁵¹

Early 1947 also marked the final few months that Dean Acheson served as Under Secretary of State, and one lengthy memorandum that came to Acheson's desk in mid-April detailed the proceedings at one of Wallace's PCA-sponsored speaking events, held in New York's Madison Square Garden on 31 March 1947, immediately before Wallace traveled to Europe.⁵² The aim of the New York meeting was to criticize the Truman Doctrine and promote Wallace. The memorandum's author was Chester Kerr, who had attended the ADA

⁵¹ Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal*, pp. 197-198; Pells pp. 63-67; Ross p. 147; Walker pp. 173-175; Yarnell p. 89. The week that Wallace became editor of the *New Republic*, the publication began a series of articles that attacked Truman Administration policy towards the Soviet Union and argued, among other things, that Soviet demands for bases on the Turkish Straits were justified: see Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal*, p. 196. The readership of the *New Republic* would increase dramatically during the year that Wallace was its editor, from 40,000 to 100,000 -- see Pells p. 65. Details concerning Wallace's April 1947 trip to Europe can be found in MacDougall pp. 131-142.

⁵² Found in the Truman Library, Dean Acheson Papers, Box 27: "Assistant Secretary and Under Secretary of State File, 1941-1947," in a dossier labeled "Correspondence: Undersecretary of State, 1945-1947 [1 of 2]." See also: Walker p. 169. The PCA had decided to hold the meeting as a direct response to the Truman Doctrine in the days after 12 March 1947, and purposefully utilized a more "show-style technique" to organize the event; see: MacDougall p. 129.

conference in Washington the day before.⁵³

Kerr's description of the PCA rally betrays the indignation of the East Coast liberal elite, aghast at the attitudes and methods of the PCA, the more populist, working-class, and militant version of the ADA. Working from sneer-to-sneer, Kerr contemptuously retells the event's entertainments, which included appearances from a "Who's Who" of the contemporary American radical left -- Lillian Hellman, Helen Keller, Zero Mostel, and Elliott Roosevelt -- and topped off by a speech from Henry Wallace. Kerr notes that about 18,000 people attended the rally and that copies of *The Nation*, the U.S.'s longest-running leftist publication, were being sold to the attendees.

For the purposes of this study, the interesting aspect of the rally is Kerr's aside concerning one speaker, identified as John Randolph.⁵⁴ Randolph, according to Kerr, was "... for housing and for the people of Greece, was against Turkey, and 'tired of fighting.'"⁵⁵ The differentiation between Greece and Turkey catches the eye. Even in Wallace's 13 March 1947 speech, he said more positive things concerning Greece even though Greece still featured a monarch. Why does Turkey deserve blanket opposition, but not Greece?

Other speakers at the Madison Square Garden rally formulated their own methods of deriding the Greek-Turkish aid program. Harlow Shapley, a Harvard astronomy professor, asserted that the motivating force behind the aid package was oil companies, and illustrated his point with a regrettable punning explanation of how Greece ("grease") and Turkey (known to

⁵³ Presumably, this is the same Chester Kerr who worked for the publisher Harcourt, Brace before WWII, the Office of War Information during WWII, and then for Reynal and Hitchcock before it was absorbed by Harcourt, Brace in 1948. This would explain why Kerr, in the memorandum, refers to Wallace as the editor of *The New Republic*, instead of as the former Vice President. With Kerr was Charles G. Bolte, who was among the ADA's founders and head of the American Veterans Committee (AVC), the only liberal veterans' organization. For background on the AVC, see: MacDougall pp. 124-125.

⁵⁴ Kerr identifies Randolph as a war veteran and aspiring actor; apparently, this is the same John Randolph who was later blacklisted during the Joseph McCarthy era.

⁵⁵ p. 3 of the document referenced in Note 52.

Americans more as a food) were, in his view, symbolic of the real catalysts, i.e. oil companies and manufacturers, behind the Truman Doctrine. Elliot Roosevelt characterized the Truman Doctrine as a betrayal of his father's legacy. Wallace also focused on the alleged oil interests behind the Truman Doctrine. Thus, several of the speakers linked aid to Turkey with oil company interests, a favorite topic of the militant U.S. left since WWII. Shortly after the New York conference, Idaho Senator Glen Taylor, who would become Wallace's Vice-Presidential candidate in 1948, also told a national radio audience that the Greek-Turkish aid program was about oil.⁵⁶

While Wallace was in Europe, other PCA members provided statements to support the perspective Wallace expressed abroad. On 10 April 1947, PCA members criticized the Greek-Turkish aid program to a national radio audience. One of the speakers, Eugene I. Johnson, described the Greek and Turkish governments as anti-union and those countries' elections as "one-party or military affairs."⁵⁷

Wallace's cross-country speaking tour, which began in May, was intended as the U.S. sequel to his tour in Europe, and it continued for two months. Walton mentions that, according to contemporary media reports, Wallace spoke to around 100,000 people during his May-June 1947 tour. Such attendance figures made the event surprisingly successful, especially since the attendees were charged an entrance fee. At some of the venues, the same "show-style" used in the 31 March 1947 New York rally was applied for maximum effect. Wallace's tour attracted a great deal of attention from the U.S. press, most of which was derogatory and dismissive, excepting those media sources that felt sympathy for Wallace's ideals.

⁵⁶ MacDougall pp. 129-130, 145.

⁵⁷ MacDougall p. 134. Because the Turkish government took the first steps towards state-sponsored industrialization only in the 1930s and WWII then put on hold any other economic initiatives that the government had planned, the level of industrialization attained by 1947 was extremely low. Therefore, unions would have been non-existent for the simple reason that there were so few workers to unionize. The Turkish political system had also been opened to second parties in late 1945.

Democratic Party officials conceded that Wallace's tour was effective and well-organized, and that the citizens attending Wallace's rallies were not just "rabid left wingers," but also conservatives and isolationists. The political spectrum covered by the attendees was thus worrying for the Democratic Party. Wallace's opposition to the Greek-Turkish aid program was a prominent feature of his comments throughout the tour.⁵⁸

The tour wrapped up with a large rally in Washington D.C. on 14 June 1947, a week after Secretary of State Marshall's famous address at Harvard; this was also Wallace's first return to Washington since he left the Commerce Secretary's position. By the time Wallace got to Washington, the intensity of anti-Wallace sentiment from the political right resulted in judicial initiatives from Congress to have the rally banned. The day of the rally, Wallace held a press conference in which he once again connected the Greek-Turkish aid issue to oil.⁵⁹

During the spring of 1947 large crowds of people had turned out to listen to Wallace speak, but the situation changed after the Marshall Plan was announced. Because the Marshall Plan focused on economic aid, it appealed to liberal sensibilities, which opposed military aid. The ADA supported the Marshall Plan not only because it matched the ADA's liberal platform, but also because it presented a clear and attention-grabbing issue which could be utilized to separate the ADA from the PCA for progressives. Wallace originally expressed positive feelings towards the Marshall Plan, but by mid-July 1947, after the USSR rejected the Plan, Wallace focused more on the need to go through the U.N., portrayed the Marshall Plan "as the Truman Doctrine in disguise," and continued to group Turkey in with several other states as "reactionary regimes." Such stances meant that Wallace, who had already embraced foreign policy opinions different than those of the majority of U.S. citizens, began to lose his liberal support. Gradually, distance between Wallace's foreign policy ideas and the majority

⁵⁸ MacDougall pp. 152-166; Walton p. 157; Yarnell pp. 22-23.

⁵⁹ MacDougall pp. 166-170.

of U.S liberals appeared. In the end, only one prominent New Dealer, Rexford Tugwell, supported Wallace's Presidential bid.⁶⁰

For his part, Dean Acheson lent his name and reputation to the Administration's efforts to promote the Marshall Plan and battle Wallace's efforts to discredit President Truman's major foreign policy initiatives. Acheson would eventually be an active member of the Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery, and would speak widely in the effort to ensure its passage by Congress. Acheson's activities in 1947-1948 to aid the Truman Administration will be described in more detail below.⁶¹

The issue of Greek-Turkish aid did surface at times during Wallace's campaign. On 29 December 1947 Wallace announced his decision to run for the Presidency in Chicago. In the speech Wallace gave on the occasion, he mentioned Turkey specifically as a part of foreign military aid that he opposed, and that the aid was directly responsible for domestic inflation. He also asserted that the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan would divide Europe into antagonistic halves. Wallace's opposition to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan would remain his stance throughout the 1948 election season, but at certain points he expressed support for U.S. aid to certain foreign states, apparently based on his estimation of whether the government was "reactionary" or not. From the beginning of the campaign, Wallace's support amongst labor was suspect as U.S. labor organizations were already

⁶⁰ Gillon pp. 30-31; Hamby, "Henry A. Wallace," pp. 165-168; MacDougall pp. 170-172, 185; Walker pp. 175-179; Yarnell pp. 104-106.

⁶¹ Materials prepared by the ADA and supporting the Marshall Plan can be found in the Acheson Papers in the Truman Library, specifically Box 4: Political and Governmental File, in the folder labeled "Committee for the Marshall Plan: Press Releases [1 of 2]." There are also three folders titled "Marshall Plan Correspondence, 1947-1948." The materials from this file date from the last months of 1947 and early 1948. The extensive materials present in the folder include a 31 December 1947 letter from Joseph Grew to Acheson that contained materials Grew had used in a radio appearance to support the Marshall Plan, and the program of the 5 March 1948 Conference on the European Recovery Program held in Washington D.C., which was organized by the Committee for the Marshall Plan and for which Acheson chaired a bipartisan Congressional meeting.

splitting into pro- and anti-Communist camps and hesitant to support the PCA's third-party effort, while even Wallace recognized the essentially "middle-class" character of his organization. Wallace's candidacy was supported publicly by the PCA, but the infrastructure for Wallace's campaign would be quietly provided by the (U.S.) Communist Party. Despite the fact that Wallace had spent 1947 as its editor, the *New Republic* opposed Wallace's campaign and Wallace resigned as editor in January 1948, though he continued to pen a weekly column for several months.⁶²

On 19 March 1948, in a radio address intended as a response to President Truman and broadcast on all three major U.S. radio stations, Wallace averred that the U.S. was interfering in (among other nations) Turkey's domestic politics. March 1948 was the point at which Truman looked most doomed as Democratic figures across the country deserted him in droves, and the effort to convince Dwight Eisenhower to run for the Democratic nomination emerged. Not until Truman began to improve his public appearances in April 1948, and then aided by the surprising success of his June 1948 "whistle-stop" train tour, did Truman begin to affect public perceptions by presenting himself as a man of the people and a battler. Truman's campaign strategy was also based partially on appealing to ADA-type liberals in order to undercut Wallace's support.⁶³

The same period, winter and spring of 1948, was the moment when Wallace appeared the strongest. A broad section of the U.S. left turned out to support, and give money to, Wallace's cross-country campaign. Wallace's rallies were a mix of theater and revival meetings, and were well-received by his audiences as he continued to criticize the Truman Administration's foreign policies. However, the press coverage of his efforts steadily turned negative as rumors about the depth of Communist involvement in his campaign propagated

⁶² MacDougall pp. 247-249, 302; Ross pp. 149-153; Walker pp. 182-185; Walton pp. 181-182.

⁶³ Gillon pp. 36-38; Ross pp. 72-89; Walton pp. 205-210.

and as international events such as the coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Crisis caused the campaign difficulties. Because Wallace refused to publicly criticize the Soviet Union, his reactions to the Czech and Berlin developments seemed to respond to Soviet leads rather than to his own evaluations.⁶⁴

All three of the parties held their conventions in Philadelphia in June-July 1948, with the Progressive Party's held last, in late July. The Progressive Party convention's attendees were generally younger than those at the established parties' conventions; each session of the Wallace supporters' convention opened with community singing accompanied by acoustic guitar. The convention itself was marked by a series of gaffes that left the Progressive Party (as it was officially named during the convention) vulnerable to the charge of Communist sympathies. The convention platform adopted by the Progressive Party specifically attacked the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and urged "the ending of American 'military and economic intervention' in Greece, Turkey, and China," while labeling the same countries "corrupt, fascist." Moreover, the 1945 Soviet demands on Turkey seemed to emerge in another aspect of the progressive party platform: one article favored a "unified homeland" for several nations, including Armenia. In sum, even Wallace accepted the similarity between the Progressive Party's platform and that of the (U.S.) Communist Party.⁶⁵

During the 1948 campaign, bipartisan support was still publicly maintained by both of the major parties. For that reason, the foreign policy planks of the Democrats and the Republicans strongly resembled each other; the Democratic plank mentioned Turkey directly

⁶⁴ Ross pp. 153-157; Yarnell pp. 76-77. The minutes of an 18 March 1948 Committee for the Marshall Plan Executive Committee, found in the Truman Library's Dean Acheson Papers, Box 4, Political and Governmental File, in the dossier titled "Committee for the Marshall Plan: Minutes of Executive Committee, 1947-1948," include an alarmed statement that Henry Wallace's recent trip to California had elicited an amount of negative Marshall Plan mail to Congress "much greater" than the incoming amount of positive Marshall Plan mail.

⁶⁵ Gillon p. 51; Ross pp. 141, 157-162; Smith, Richard Norton. *Thomas E. Dewey and His Times*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982. p. 509; Yarnell p. 67.

in relation to the Truman Doctrine. Actually, moderate Congressional Republicans had also supported the Greece-Turkey aid package and the Marshall Plan. On the other hand, the fact that the Progressive Party based its existence on a foreign policy issue, the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union, added a complicating factor to that equation. The same issue would, throughout 1948, cause even further splintering amongst U.S. liberals, progressives, and leftists, the components of the Democratic Party's left wing. Because Wallace refused to repudiate his Communist supporters, he lost almost all of his anti-Communist liberal support during the course of the election campaign.⁶⁶

After the summer conventions, the election campaign moved into its final phase. Throughout September and October, Truman's energetic campaigning continued to win support, while Dewey's calm style failed to inspire voters. Wallace's campaign lost steam, as did Strom Thurmond's Dixiecrats.⁶⁷ By September labor had largely abandoned Wallace and pledged to Truman after being reluctant to support Truman only three months earlier. Recognizing the trend, Truman referred to the Wallace Progressives rarely during the last three months of the campaign. Wallace's brave trip through the South did not change the fact that the civil rights issue belonged to Truman and the Democrats. Although Truman lost several Southern states and some of the traditional Northeast Democratic states, and despite the votes lost to Wallace and Thurmond (Thurmond ended up with a slightly larger vote tally than Wallace), Truman's appeals to civil rights, labor, and the farm vote carried him on Election Day. Overall, the Democratic Party proved itself as the majority party in U.S. politics.⁶⁸

On Election Day 1948, besides assuming that Thomas Dewey would win decisively, pollsters

⁶⁶ Pells pp. 108-116; Smith, *Thomas E. Dewey and His Times*, p. 517; Westerfield pp. 296-300, 306-315.

⁶⁷ For the "Dixiecrats," see above, Section 2.1.1.1.

⁶⁸ MacDougall pp. 172-179; Ross pp. 178, 224-227, 245-266; Smith, *Thomas E. Dewey and His Times*, p. 509; Walker p. 198; Yarnell pp. 79-85.

had surmised that Wallace would receive nearly ten percent of the vote in traditionally Democratic areas. These predictions proved erroneous. Elmo Roper's poll stating that foreign policy was the campaign's most important issue was as mistaken as his polls concerning the candidates.⁶⁹

In the end, Wallace's refusal to disassociate himself from the Communists and his inability to appeal to a large swath of the U.S. voting public, especially the liberals that should have comprised his natural voting base, ensured that his vote total remained small in the 1948 Presidential election. Wallace's vote tally was so small, in fact, that he was not able to deprive Truman of victory, even though the result was, in some places, closer than appearances would suggest. In Wallace's home state Iowa, he earned only 12,000 votes. The election results, in essence, showed that the Democratic Party did not need total support from either liberals or Southern Democrats in order to win a national election. Furthermore, a platform that showed any sympathy for the Soviet Union was decisively defeated.⁷⁰

Immediately after the disastrous 1948 campaign, Wallace continued to criticize the Truman Administration's foreign policies because the Progressive Party's stated aim was to build a third party for the U.S. political system. For example, Wallace publicly opposed both President Truman's Point Four Program and the formation of NATO. As time passed, however, Wallace began to reconsider his foreign policy views and, with the outbreak of the Korean War, came to support President Truman's decision to involve U.S. forces in the conflict.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Gillon p. 56; Smith, *Thomas E. Dewey and His Times*, pp. 42, 505, 523-524. As early as December 1946, polls indicated that Wallace could depend on only about ten percent of the population for votes, and that was long before the division in the liberal community became so acrimonious, and before disenchantment with Wallace's ties to Communists became more tangible and widespread; see: MacDougall p. 103.

⁷⁰ Gillon p. 54; Westerfield pp. 314-316, 322-324.

⁷¹ Walker pp. 206-207; Yarnell pp. 112-113.

For the purposes of this study, three essential points need to be emphasized. The first is that Harry Truman won the 1948 election on domestic issues and by making the 80th Congress an feature of the campaign trail; foreign policy difficulties were not what swayed voters towards or away from Truman. As the aphorism goes, “all politics are local.”⁷²

Another important note is that Henry Wallace did make foreign policy his most important issue. Even though he lost on the issue, many, if not most, of the people who voted for him were an important bloc of the cultural and intellectual elite. Some of the issues foremost in their minds were the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and that meant that Turkey, in a direct manner, was introduced to many progressive, leftist Americans *as a political issue*. This author finds the Wallace campaign’s negative and political portrayal of Turkey to be a convincing explanation as to how Turkey came to receive generally hostile treatment from the U.S. left throughout, and even after, the Cold War.⁷³

Consequently, much of the post-WWII U.S. dialogue concerning Turkey is of the “glass half full or glass half empty” variety. For reasons connected to domestic U.S. politics, various commentators either supported or opposed aiding the Turkish Republic. Most of the commentary cannot be termed “well-informed” since obtaining precise, up-to-date information concerning Turkey would have been difficult for U.S. citizens at that time. Few Americans had direct experience with or had travelled to Turkey. On the other hand, the lack of common public knowledge about Turkey mandated that various U.S. officials, or people connected to the official viewpoint, write articles extolling the Turkish Republic’s progress in

⁷² Gillon p. 56; Yarnell pp. 62-86.

⁷³ The one fascinating exception is that of the (predominantly) Jewish intellectuals, also leftists, who founded *Commentary* magazine after WWII. The intellectuals associated with this journal would eventually migrate to the right wing of U.S. politics and be labeled “Neo-Conservatives.” The Neo-Conservatives are notable for their generally positive support for the Turkish-U.S. alliance. Again, this does not ignore the events during the Cold War that contributed to the maintenance of such an image, but the foundation of that perception was most likely cemented in the years following WWII, when Turkey was an issue that a large number of Americans suddenly encountered for the first time.

the years after WWII and as the Cold War replaced Soviet-American cooperation. This effort can be seen, at the very least, as a holding effort by U.S. officials to counteract the perspective on Turkey promoted by Wallace and other U.S. leftists who opposed the Truman Administration's foreign policies.

The article authored by Walter Livingston Wright Jr. and mentioned above in Chapter One is an example of that phenomenon.⁷⁴ Written for the most influential foreign policy journal of the time, and appearing in January 1948, i.e. in the middle of the push to pass the Marshall Plan through Congress, Wright's article is clearly material meant to persuade any influential elites that might be wavering. Furthermore, the article was written in reaction to an article in *The Nation* from Harold Laski, a Marxist scholar and British politician. Even today, *The Nation* is a left-of-center publication, and Laski portrayed Turkey as a "partially feudal dictatorship" in the context of condemning U.S. imperial projection into the Mediterranean. Context is again important since Laski's article was published on 29 March 1947, only days before Wallace flew to London to begin the Western European speaking tour which he used to attack Truman Administration foreign policies, and which inspired angry denunciations from across the U.S. political spectrum. Wright's article was published at almost the same moment that Wallace announced his decision to run for President. For that reason, Wright refers to Wallace directly, and to Wallace's claim that Turkey could not be trusted during the war and so did not deserve U.S. aid. Wright rebuts Wallace's statement strongly and then denounces the inaccuracy of Wallace's assertions. In other words, Wright's article is manifestly polemical, and intended for an educated audience at the beginning of an election year.

Finally, if foreign policy was not the determining issue in the 1948 election, and if Turkey was an issue that received only limited attention, why did certain segments of the American

⁷⁴ See Section 1.4.2.

progressive left develop anti-Turkish opinions? Why did the State Department still give attention to Turkey as a topic for debate in the domestic political sphere? Why did articles reiterating Turkey's fealty to Western ideals repeatedly appear in policy journals in the ten-to-fifteen years following WWII?

The overall problem, in relation to Turkey, that comes out of the U.S. political atmosphere in the late 1940s is that Turkey was not a vital aspect of the debates surrounding, first, the Truman Doctrine, and then the Marshall Plan. Turkey does appear in the debates immediately following the pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine, but then seems to recede, only to appear from time-to-time when the more militant U.S. left wanted to express opposition to what they saw as the betrayal of the New Deal, increasing U.S. belligerence towards the USSR, and U.S. interventionism. Furthermore, Turkey was sometimes seen in a more negative light than Greece in relation to the same aid packages. The reasons for these phenomena are difficult to ascertain and await further research for elucidation. This study's concluding chapter will also discuss the topic further.⁷⁵

2.1.4. Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the U.S. public's perception of the Turkish Republic in the years following WWII, and in the U.S. cultural and political context that existed at the time. In relation to this theme, several trends can be identified. The first is that, even though most U.S. citizens did not possess a great amount of information

⁷⁵ A reason that quickly comes to mind is prejudice, whether based on the "Terrible Turk" image or on the Armenian and Greek issues. However, these phenomena, which were more important in the 1920s, do not provide satisfactory explanations for post-WWII anti-Turkish sentiment. The most important U.S. Armenian anti-Turkish campaigner of the 1920s, Vahan Cardashian, died in the mid-1930s, more than ten years before the Truman Doctrine. U.S. public perception of Turkey is a topic that needs much research.

concerning Turkey, there was a small, but culturally and politically significant section of the voting population that opposed providing aid to Turkey. This perspective was largely liberal in character, even left wing, and saw the Truman Doctrine as a campaign to preserve U.S. economic and military strength against the USSR. In the same period of time, that liberal perspective was undergoing broad change as liberals were forced to adapt to the realities of U.S. hegemony abroad and a conservative political trend at home. Consequently, the liberal coalition that existed during the New Deal's apogee in the 1930s splintered as WWII drew to a close. Those who maintained idealistic evaluations of how the U.S. should interact with the USSR were more likely to oppose the Truman Doctrine, the Greece-Turkey aid package, and the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan elicited greater support from U.S. liberals, but the more ideological and militant leftists saw the Marshall Plan as a continuation of the Truman Doctrine's anti-Soviet effort. The pro-Wallace and anti-Marshall Plan perspective was decisively rejected by American voters in 1948.

However, the failure of Wallace's crusade also meant less space in the Democratic Party for idealists and visionaries, whether intellectual or otherwise. This was a reflection of the new reality, that the U.S. would be a world power, and domestic politics began to reflect this fact. Realpolitik became the salient motivating force behind the foreign policy of both the major U.S. political parties. The rise of realpolitik meant the demise of left wing politics in the U.S. as an important force, and the experience of Henry Wallace's movement in 1944 and 1948 heralded this development. The U.S. left did not totally disappear, naturally, but was exiled to the academy, to publications with extremely limited readerships, and to small pockets of resistance in places such as New York, San Francisco, and Seattle, to reappear in somewhat different costume during the turmoil that accompanied U.S. involvement in Vietnam during the 1960s and early 1970s.

Even though this liberal and left wing voting bloc may have been small in number, they had

influence on U.S. public opinion. This bloc was comprised of academics, cultural figures, entertainers, and even, in the case of Henry Wallace, prominent politicians. Thus, their influence was strong enough to cause concern amongst government officials who were trying to portray Turkey as a steadfast friend in the effort to rebuild the world after WWII and to preserve U.S. security. Concern amongst administration officials and certain cultural figures about the U.S. public's lack of knowledge about Turkey, and that public opinion might be swayed by anti-Turkish sentiments emanating from the liberal left, was a second trend stemming from U.S. public perceptions of Turkey in the 1945-1952 period.

Third, because the segment of voters that opposed U.S. aid to Turkey was so small, and because most Americans knew so little about Turkey, U.S. aid to that country never became an overriding, polarizing issue for the voters. Probably this was just as well for U.S. officials since they were unsure of how to portray the developing relationship with Turkey to the U.S. public. Consequently, the information that did appear in the U.S. public space was largely either newspaper reports concerning events of note in Turkey, or academic articles, such as the Walter Livingston Wright, Jr. article mentioned above,⁷⁶ intended for a largely intellectual audience closely concerned with foreign relations.

Two implications for U.S. domestic attitudes towards Turkey result. Primarily, this meant that opposition to a closer relationship with Turkey came from the liberal or left wing intellectual classes, who retained an essentially political interpretation of U.S. support for the Turkish Republic that was formulated for them in 1947-1948 by Wallace, and then lingered on as ideology. Second, domestic opposition to U.S. support for Turkey has been, since WWII, ideologically-based, and not founded on military-strategic calculations or arguments concerning the effect of U.S. aid and influence on Turkish society. Because few people, even intellectuals, knew concrete information about, or had direct experience of, the Turkish

⁷⁶ See Sections 1.4.2. and 2.1.3.6.

Republic, arguments about U.S. support for that state were necessarily couched in the political rhetoric of the Cold War.

This fundamentally political attitude of U.S. liberals and progressives towards Turkey can be criticized in several ways. Foremost is the general lack of self-examination concerning what U.S. intellectuals knew about the Turkish Republic.⁷⁷ As an illustration, one of the authors quoted extensively in this chapter, even though an Ivy League graduate, widely published, and a university educator, is still able to state offhand that “Turkey had aided the Nazis in the war.”⁷⁸ The same author, whose book was published in 1976, is overtly sympathetic to the liberal left cause in the text cited. Another author, a Harvard graduate, an emeritus professor at the University of Texas, and an erudite scholar of U.S. 20th century intellectual history, mistakenly writes that Turkey was, like Greece, suffering a civil war after WWII (!).⁷⁹ If America’s intellectual and professional elites are prone to such basic factual errors concerning Turkey, then what can be expected of wider U.S. society?

Furthermore, Wallace supporters and anti-Turkish liberals were, in essence, allowing a domestic U.S. political controversy to color their evaluation and perception of a foreign country. The decision to provide American aid to Turkey and other countries was a decision made by the U.S. government, and no other actor; the people who made the decision to provide that aid were U.S. citizens. Wallace, on the other hand, justified his arguments against providing aid to Turkey through reference to the Turkish government’s supposed behavior during WWII, or to the hue of Turkey’s political system. In other words, U.S. liberals who opposed the provision of aid to Turkey conflated a domestic political issue with

⁷⁷ This is not to suggest that the same was not true of U.S. intellectuals’ knowledge of other countries; a lack of knowledge about foreign countries was a general difficulty that the U.S. had in formulating ideas about countries around the globe that the U.S. suddenly became interested in during the early Cold War years. Equally true is that some U.S. liberal intellectuals were knowledgeable about Turkey, but they were extremely few in number.

⁷⁸ Walton p. 295.

⁷⁹ Pells p. 65. This error appeared in the *second* edition of the text.

the reality of a different culture, a different society, on the other side of the planet, which happened to be important to U.S. foreign policy in the historical juncture, and about which they possessed limited or erroneous information. Wildly inaccurate claims, such as the accusation that Turkey harbored Nazis at the end of WWII,⁸⁰ were the clearest expression of this logical fallacy.

The 1948 U.S. Presidential election was a turning point in U.S. political history. It was the first Presidential election held after the emergence of the Cold War and the identification of the USSR as a competitor, enemy even, rather than as an ally. For the first time civil rights and labor were vital campaign issues. The Democrats cemented their claim to being the party which represented the American masses. The liberal left wing of the Democratic Party was forced to moderate its political demands or become politically obsolete. Most of all, however, the Democratic Party's 1948 victory led to President Truman's appointment of Dean Acheson as Secretary of State.⁸¹

⁸⁰ See Section 2.1.3.6.

⁸¹ Ross pp. 6-7.

2.2 DEAN ACHESON, THE FORMULATION OF POST-WWII U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

The final two sections of this study will be devoted to exploring the relationship between Dean Acheson and the U.S. decision to pursue a post-WWII alliance with the Turkish Republic. Chapter 2.3 is generally descriptive and explores the information that this researcher has gathered in order to more completely understand the different facts of Acheson's character, his relationship with President Truman, and the policy context in which Acheson constructed the eventual Turkish-American alliance.

Chapter 2.4 is more analytical in nature. That chapter's aim is to define the extent to which Acheson was responsible for the trajectory of Turkish-U.S. relations after WWII. As a result, it focuses on Acheson's activities as Under Secretary of State in 1945-1947 and as Secretary of State from 1949 to 1953.

During Truman's Presidency, four different men served as the Secretary of State: Edward Stettinius, James Byrnes, George Marshall, and Dean Acheson. Even though any of these men would be worthwhile examining for their opinions on Turkish-U.S. relations, Dean Acheson is the most interesting for several reasons. First, Acheson not only was the longest-serving of the four Truman Administration Secretaries of State, he was also Under Secretary of State for Stettinius and Byrnes, and for the first six months of Marshall's tenure. By the time Acheson became Secretary of State in January 1949, he had already spent 6.5 years near the summit of State Department decision-making.¹

Furthermore, Acheson was the Secretary of State when NATO was officially formed in 1949,

¹ In February 1941, Acheson began his third stint in a government post, and his first in the State Department, as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Until mid-1947 he would remain employed in the State Department.

when the Mutual Defense Assistance Act was passed by Congress, when the Mutual Security Act became law, and when the decision to admit Turkey to NATO was made. All of the above situations mean that Acheson had intimate knowledge of the bureaucratic decision-making processes that resulted in the Turkish-U.S. alliance. His relevance for this topic does require caveats because he was at the top of the State Department's decision-making hierarchy for most of the 1945-1952 period, which means that he may not have had strong involvement in lower-level policy-formulation. What this means is that recommendations on policy were formulated by lower-level State Department officials and then brought to Acheson for action. How much involvement Acheson had in the deliberations of lower-level officials would have changed according to the topic and situation, even though Acheson was known for his work ethic and rapport with those working under him. Acheson's perspective must be understood in that context. This also means that the military side of planning was outside of Acheson's direct experience. However, because of the essential role that he played in the 1945-1952 State Department, Acheson's role in Turkish-American relations is vital. At this point it is worth quoting at length how Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas' history of six key figures in the post-WWII U.S. government, men who later came to represent the American "Establishment," describes Acheson:

[Acheson] entitled his memoirs *Present at the Creation*, and though he was rarely accused of excess modesty, the phrase actually understates his role. Indeed, he was the architect of the creation he describes, a man who was more responsible for the Truman Doctrine than President Truman and more responsible for the Marshall Plan than General Marshall.²

That explanation alone makes clear that understanding Acheson is essential for comprehending how postwar U.S. policy towards the Turkey was formulated and expressed. In congruence with that aim, the discussion below of Acheson's biographical information, his relationship with President Truman, and his influence on U.S. foreign policy after WWII will

² Isaacson, Walter and Evan Thomas. *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made*. Boston: Faber and Faber, 1986. p. 22.

focus on issues relevant to discussing his involvement in U.S. relations with the Turkish Republic, and should not be construed as a comprehensive exploration of Acheson's biography, character, or political experiences.

2.2.1. Acheson's Biography, Personality, and Positions during Truman's Tenure

2.2.1.1. Acheson's Youth, Education, and Legal Career

Dean Gooderham Acheson was born into a religious Scotch-Canadian family in Connecticut during the last decade of the 19th Century. His father was an Episcopal pastor and his family was, during his youth, of modest, although increasing, means. From his parents he acquired British manners as well as the Anglophile bearing that would mark his adult personality. Acheson's childhood was marked by a freedom that ended when his father enrolled him in Groton, a rigorous private school run by an Episcopal clergyman, which educated mostly the children of the U.S. Eastern seaboard Brahmins. At Groton, Acheson studied a curriculum modeled on that of British public schools, which emphasized the Classics, English, European history, some quantitative sciences such as chemistry, mathematics, and physics, and religion. The other outstanding component of a Groton education was athletics. Acheson felt constricted by Groton's rigidly structured system, did not excel academically, and acquired a reputation as a free spirit. From Groton, Acheson acquired an understanding (if not actual practice) of discipline, but worldly experience also augmented and tempered his natural rebelliousness and self-confidence. Despite Groton's ordered system, or maybe because of it, Acheson professed an attachment to strong democratic ideals at an early age and disclaimed the arrogant attitudes of American elites. Acheson's progressive political ideas further set

him apart from the other, more conservative Groton pupils.³

After Groton, Acheson went on to Yale, where he was known more for his wit and social activities than for academic achievement. Acheson's aversion to study at Yale seems to have been a reaction to the strictly ordered life he experienced at Groton, as well as a subconscious desire to mingle with the wealthy scions that comprised his peers. For his efforts he was tapped for Scroll and Key, the second-most prestigious senior society at Yale. Acheson also continued to cultivate an interest in contemporary progressive politics, and he included the Young Turks amongst his sources of inspiration.⁴

Consequently, it was not until Harvard Law School that Acheson found his intellectual calling, as well as the sphere of activity through which he might express his ideals. Acheson began Harvard Law School in much the same manner as he had conducted his life at Yale, but this changed in his second year. In the first term, Acheson took a class from Felix Frankfurter, which permanently altered his attitude towards intellectual endeavors. Acheson learned from Frankfurter the power of ideas, and their potential to bring about social change. To put it simply, Frankfurter inspired Acheson, and through Frankfurter, Acheson saw that the law was an intellectual exercise through which he could realize his goals and beliefs. Furthermore, Frankfurter was a proponent of law as the practical application of experience to

³ Acheson, Dean. *Morning and Noon*. Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Co., 1965. pp. 1-39; Chace, James. *Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. pp. 15-25; Isaacson and Thomas pp. 50-57; McLellan, David S. *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years*. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1976. pp. 1-9. Joseph Grew, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Sumner Welles also graduated from Groton.

⁴ Acheson, Dean. *A Democrat Looks at His Party*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. p. 13-14; Chace pp.29-34; McLellan pp. 9-11; By "Young Turks," Acheson of course meant the military officers and bureaucrats of the *İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*, or Committee of Union and Progress, who had assumed *de facto* control of the Ottoman Empire in 1908 with a program promising broad reform of the Empire. However, some of the U.S. Progressives of Acheson's youth may have also adopted the moniker "Young Turks," so it is possible that the reference was to them. Either way, it signaled that Acheson was aware of Turkey from an early age.

relevant problems and issues. That is, he did not see law as an abstract, logical process, detached from the realities of human society, and Acheson readily absorbed this perspective. For Acheson, the realization of his own intellectual prowess, combined with this understanding of the legal profession, coincided with and magnified his beliefs concerning how a person should conduct a just and productive life:

... the law held even more for Acheson: he saw its evolution as a mirror of the economic and philosophical forces that ordered a community; when those forces changed, he came to believe, so too should the laws.⁵

Finally, the friendship that Acheson developed with Frankfurter would have great impact on Acheson's career, since it was through Frankfurter that Acheson became clerk to Supreme Court Associate Justice Louis Brandeis. In order to take that opportunity, Acheson and his young family moved to Washington D.C. in 1919.⁶

As Brandeis's clerk, Acheson continued to develop his ideas concerning law and society, and his intellectual abilities. According to Acheson's biographers, Brandeis had several formative influences on Acheson, and his stature bolstered ideas that had already begun to blossom in Acheson's mind. Brandeis, first of all, believed that the powerless in society deserved the law's protection, but also understood the need for large business structures. For that reason government had to play the role of referee, and establish the middle ground upon which the economy and society would be able to function more successfully. This of course agreed with Acheson's pragmatic democratic attitude. On the other hand, Brandeis did not believe that the law should be set in stone, forever unchangeable. Even though certain eternal moral truths did exist, the law should respond to the changing needs of society, and no one ideology or system of belief could provide a guide for society. Finally, Brandeis also perceived an educative aspect of law, a function which could promote understanding and

⁵ Isaacson and Thomas p. 87.

⁶ Chace pp. 37-40, 44; Isaacson and Thomas pp. 85-90; McLellan pp. 11-14.

compromise in the conflicts that society experienced.⁷

Acheson, however, considered a different mentor, whom he encountered through his association with Justice Brandeis, as the “greatest” man that he had met: Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Holmes was also on the Supreme Court, and Brandeis and Holmes lived close to each other. As a result, Acheson was able to spend significant time with Holmes, from whom he absorbed knowledge; Acheson even took notes on their conversations.⁸

Holmes, of course, is widely considered one of greatest jurists that the United States has produced, and his influence is still strongly felt in the U.S. legal profession. For Acheson, Holmes was akin to a deity. Holmes’s opinions concerning the function of law in society also shaped and reinforced Acheson’s. For Holmes, the essence of the law was pragmatism, and the needs of contemporary society provided guidance for the law. The implication of this was that Congress and state legislatures had the right to legislate as they saw fit. Another implication was that one’s own ideology should not color one’s legal judgments, and that a case should be decided according to the facts of that case, not according to “general principles.” For Holmes, as well as for Acheson, legal judgments depended on “rationalism and restraint.”⁹

The ideals that Acheson began to develop at Harvard Law, and under the influence of Frankfurter, Brandeis, and Holmes, found their outlet not only in his practice of the law. In his second year of clerking for Brandeis, Acheson toyed with the idea of becoming a labor lawyer, but ended up in a young Washington D.C. firm named Covington and Burling.

⁷ Acheson, *Morning and Noon*, pp. 50-54, 78-103; Chace pp. 43-46; McLellan pp. 15-17, 18-20.

⁸ Chace p. 47; McLellan pp. 17-19. Chace treats Holmes as the last strongly formative influence on Acheson while McLellan asserts that Brandeis was more important. In *Morning and Noon*, Acheson gives more attention to Brandeis, to whom he devotes an entire chapter.

⁹ Chace pp. 47-49.

Subsequently, Acheson worked as a lawyer in Washington D.C. throughout the 1920s, and steadily built his reputation as a brilliant appellate lawyer who could rescue cases given up as hopeless by others. By the end of the 1920s, Acheson also began to dabble in politics as a means of expressing his ideals outside of his profession. During Acheson's youth, American progressives were inspired by the Republican Party of Theodore Roosevelt. The 1920s Republican Party of Presidents Harding and Coolidge had diverged from earlier progressive values and become isolationist, against U.S. participation in the League of Nations, anti-labor, and trade protectionist. For Acheson, this meant a swing to the Democratic Party. Acheson expanded his social contacts through his professional and political activities, and associated with Senator Robert M. La Follette Sr. through one of the social clubs of which he was a member.¹⁰

Because his liberal ideals and somewhat caustic personality would never be palatable to a majority, Acheson quickly understood that elected office would not be a career possibility for him. However, he had identified other routes through which he could take part in the nation's political life, and campaigned energetically on behalf of the local Democratic Party beginning in the latter half of the 1920s. His campaigning, his acquaintances, and his reputation all gained him closer access to the leaders of the Democratic Party, but it was especially Felix Frankfurter, one of FDR's closest advisors, who brought Acheson to the new President's attention shortly after he was inaugurated in 1933.¹¹

Thus, Acheson's first position in public service came during the initial Franklin Roosevelt Administration. Initially denied the position of solicitor general by a grudge that the Attorney General held against his father, Acheson was picked to fill the position of Under Secretary of the Treasury, which he assumed in May 1933. This office immediately became

¹⁰ Acheson, *Morning and Noon*, pp. 54-56, 123-160; Chace pp. 51, 55, 56-57, 59; McLellan pp. 20-22;

¹¹ Chace pp. 59-62; McLellan pp. 23-26.

more complicated when the Secretary of the Treasury, William Woodin, fell ill, and Acheson, a lawyer with little experience in finance, became Acting Secretary of the Treasury. The situation did not last for an extended period of time as Acheson clashed with FDR over a legal formality: he argued that the President had no legal right to buy gold at a price above that established by law, whereas FDR wanted him to simply accept the necessity of the move and approve it. After a strenuous fight, Acheson followed the President's orders, but the struggle, coupled with press leaks, resulted in Acheson's resignation from the Treasury in November 1933. Acheson's insistence on the letter of the law cost him his first government position.¹²

That first difficult experience piqued Acheson's interest in public service, but his willingness to stand up to FDR also won Acheson a sound reputation in Washington legal circles. Over the following few years, Acheson continued his excellence as an appellate lawyer and his political efforts for the Democratic Party. At the same time, his ideas concerning the correct behavior for government officials also experienced change. In 1937, only four years after his principled stand against Roosevelt on the gold price issue, Acheson felt sympathy for FDR's position in the famous "court-packing" episode. In 1938, while eulogizing Supreme Court Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, Acheson echoed Cardozo's assertion of the government's right to pursue "legitimate ends by methods honestly conceived and rationally chosen." Acheson's perception of law -- that it functioned through pragmatic reason and in response to society's needs -- found its political reflection in FDR's policies. In sum, Acheson had become a New Dealer even if he was reluctant to state as much.¹³

Circumstance again brought Acheson back to FDR's attention. In January 1939, FDR nominated Acheson's Harvard Law mentor, Felix Frankfurter, to the Supreme Court.

¹² Acheson, *Morning and Noon*, pp. 161-194; Chace pp. 61-68; McLellan pp. 24, 26-29.

¹³ Acheson, *Morning and Noon*, pp. 195-201; Chace pp. 69-71; McLellan pp. 34-35.

Frankfurter almost immediately asked Acheson, who had remained his close friend over the previous twenty years, to act as counsel during Frankfurter's confirmation hearings in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee. After the successful conclusion of the hearings, Frankfurter took Acheson with him to the White House in order to pass on the good news to FDR. Only weeks later, FDR offered Acheson several positions that Acheson insisted on turning down; Acheson eventually relented and consented to serving on (and eventually chair) the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. This committee was charged with examining the due process granted to civilians who had violated some aspect of the new federal regulatory laws. After FDR's third electoral victory in 1940 and the conclusion of his duties on the Attorney General's Committee, Acheson accepted the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. With U.S. inclusion in WWII's hostilities less than a year away, Acheson entered the State Department.¹⁴

2.2.1.2. Acheson's Experience in the Wartime State Department

The State Department was largely an ineffectual institution during WWII, but there was one aspect of the Department's operations that proved exceedingly important: postwar planning for new economic institutions. As Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Acheson quickly found himself in the midst of the postwar planning effort, and charged with duties of historical importance.

Even before taking on his new position, Acheson anticipated that world-historical changes would result from the new conflict. In a speech he gave at Yale's Davenport College in November 1939, Acheson anticipated that the U.S. would be forced to assume Britain's position in the world, and that this meant that the U.S. would have to accept the necessity for increased military power and realistic foreign policies. His suggestion was that Britain's role

¹⁴ Acheson, *Morning and Noon*, pp. 201-227; Chace pp. 74-77; McLellan pp. 35-37.

as the 19th Century hegemon had fundamentally weakened, which meant that the world system suffered from the lack of a power which could impose order and provide economic resources to improve life standards of people overseas. In historical hindsight, the implications are clear. Acheson went on to suggest a postwar international trade and monetary system largely comparable to what would be established by the Bretton Woods accords in 1944. The essential concepts behind the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO are also apparent. In other words, Acheson already understood the fundamental difficulties facing the international community, and had begun to explore remedies for those problems. In another speech, Acheson stated that the U.S. should use its industrial might to provide food and arms to America's friends overseas.¹⁵

Acheson's ideas did not remain as only words. During 1940, Acheson became a public defender of FDR's effort to deliver surplus U.S. military vessels to Britain, and led an initiative to establish legal grounds for the President's idea. This, of course, was a completely different attitude than Acheson had shown as Under Secretary of the Treasury in 1933. Acheson's belief in the need to make decisions according to the facts and needs of a situation had triumphed over his attention to the letter of the law. Furthermore, Acheson's efforts to promote the Lend-Lease Program as well as his public support for the President's unprecedented third term were main factors that brought about Acheson's appointment to the State Department.¹⁶

Acheson's first important duties in the State Department came while serving as the Department's representative on a State, Treasury, and Justice Department joint policy committee known as the Foreign Funds Control Committee. Throughout 1941, Acheson was

¹⁵ Chace p. 78; McLellan pp. 38-39. The explanation of Acheson's ideas concerning international financial institutions should not be understood as suggesting that he was the only person who had, or formulated, such concepts.

¹⁶ Chace pp. 79-80; McLellan pp. 39-43.

closely involved in government deliberations over economic policies towards Japan. The same year, Acheson was involved in negotiating the terms of the Lend-Lease agreement with Britain's representative, John Maynard Keynes (even though the program started before any agreements were signed). Acheson's experiences with both the Japanese embargo and negotiating Lend-Lease prepared him thoroughly for his responsibilities at the Bretton Woods negotiations.¹⁷

In 1942-1943, Acheson's responsibilities revolved around aspects of economic warfare, a field of battle that emerged during WWII. This meant that Acheson paid close attention to methods of curbing overland trade between European neutrals and Germany. Naturally, this brought Turkey to Acheson's attention, but in his memoirs he mentions Turkey in relation to this topic only in passing. In addition to economic warfare, Acheson was the U.S. representative to the negotiations that created the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). The experience with the UNRRA and the need for Congressional approval taught Acheson vital lessons about interacting with Congress in general, and with Arthur Vandenberg, the senior Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, specifically. The UNRRA talks also provided Acheson first experiences in dealing with Soviet representatives.¹⁸ In the future, Acheson's ability to work with Vandenberg and Congress would prove important on countless occasions.

After the successful launching of the UNRRA in November 1943, Acheson was assigned to lead the State Department delegation at the July 1944 Bretton Woods negotiations. His

¹⁷ Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969. pp. 16-20, 22-34; Chace pp. 83-87, 89-92; McLellan p. 46-49.

¹⁸ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 48-72, 76-80; Chace pp. 93-97; McLellan pp. 45-46. The relevance of Acheson's responsibilities to Turkey are clear, but Chace and McLellan make no mention of Turkey. Acheson mentions Turkey directly twice in the two chapters that he devotes to WWII economic warfare in the foreign context. Interestingly, Acheson claims credit for an April 1944 Cordell Hull speech which had, as one result, Turkey's cessation of chromite shipments to Germany; that speech's composition and delivery are described on pp. 55-57 of *Present at the Creation*, and Turkey is mentioned again on p. 59.

primary responsibilities were related to the World Bank (known at the time as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), and Acheson ended up as chairman of the bank's drafting commission. Acheson was then given primary responsibility for lobbying Congress to pass the Bretton Woods agreements, as well as the legislation concerning the United Nations, during late 1944 and the first half of 1945. These duties came after he was given a new title, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations and International Conferences during the State Department changes that followed the 1944 Presidential Election. All of these war time experiences with issues concerning the international economic order impressed upon Acheson the connections between economic and political problems.¹⁹

After FDR's death in April 1945, Harry S. Truman's accession to the Presidency, and the successful July 1945 passage of the Bretton Woods agreements by Congress, Acheson intended to resign in order to return to civilian life and his more lucrative legal career. President Truman had other ideas.²⁰

2.2.1.3. Acheson's Post-State Department Career

Because Acheson's duties and accomplishments during President Truman's term in office will be explored in great detail below, this account of his biography will pass briefly over his 1945-1953 years in the State Department. Here, simply mentioning that Acheson stayed in the Under Secretary of State position until July 1947, and was the Secretary of State from January 1949 to January of 1953 is sufficient. In the year-and-a-half that he spent out of government office in 1947-1948, Acheson remained connected to politics, and gave

¹⁹ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 81-84, 88-112; Chace pp. 97, 99-103; McLellan pp. 49, 54-55.

²⁰ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 113-115; Chace pp. 104-109; McLellan pp. 55-56.

public speeches in support of the Marshall Plan.

After his term as Secretary of State expired with the inauguration of Dwight Eisenhower in 1953, Acheson returned to his law practice. Because Acheson had acquired a controversial reputation, he did not make a grand re-entry into the legal community. The various controversies of his tenure as Secretary, as well as the constant attacks of Joseph McCarthy and other conservative Congressional members, had made Acheson someone that many Washington D.C. figures did not want to be seen with, and that conservative clients would not prefer as legal representation.²¹

Consequently, Acheson would not withdraw totally from politics. By the end of 1953, Acheson began to publicly criticize the foreign policy of the Eisenhower Administration as well as to counter attack against Senator Joseph McCarthy. Acheson also began to author books and journal articles on political themes, such as *Power and Diplomacy*, which was a direct criticism of Eisenhower and Dulles's foreign policies, and "The Illusion of Disengagement," published in *Foreign Affairs* the same year as *Power and Diplomacy*, but intended as a response to George Kennan's foreign policy prescriptions.²²

On the other hand, Acheson did not limit his public pronouncements to criticisms of the Republican Party or of other foreign policy thinkers with which he had disagreements. Acheson wanted to aid his party, the Democrats, as it went through a changing of the guard in the mid-to-late 1950s. To that end, Acheson wrote another book, titled *A Democrat Looks at His Party*, in 1955, and another similarly-themed volume called *A Citizen Looks at Congress*, in 1956. These books foreshadowed the role that Acheson would assume as the Democratic

²¹ Chace pp. 368-369.

²² Acheson, Dean. *Power and Diplomacy*. New York: Atheneum, 1963. Originally published in 1958, Acheson mentions Turkey only in passing in this text; Acheson, Dean. "The Illusion of Disengagement." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 36, No. 3. April 1958. pp. 371-382; Chace pp. 371-373, 375-377; McLellan pp. 415-416.

Party looked for guidance heading into the 1960 Presidential Election, and as John F. Kennedy emerged victorious from that contest.²³

In the aftermath of President Eisenhower's 1956 reelection, the Democratic Party embarked on an effort to refashion itself and change some of the ideology that it projected. To that end, it formed a Democratic Advisory Council (DAC) to formulate policy, and which contained a foreign policy committee. Acheson was chosen to lead that committee and utilized the position to continue his criticisms of the Eisenhower Administration's conduct of foreign affairs. John F. Kennedy, who preferred Acheson's foreign policy views to those of the more dovish Adlai Stevenson, joined the DAC in late 1959. Acheson also gave testimony critical of the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy to Congress.²⁴

During Kennedy's 1960 campaign and afterwards, Kennedy went to Acheson frequently for advice on foreign policy and other questions. Immediately after the election, Kennedy even went to Acheson's house to ask him about cabinet appointments, including the Secretary of State post. Through these initial approaches, Acheson later became a key advisor during the 1961 Berlin crisis (which resulted in the Berlin Wall's construction) and the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis, during which Acheson acted as Kennedy's personal envoy to the French and West German leaders.²⁵

After Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, Lyndon Johnson became President and likewise immediately turned to Acheson for advice on foreign policy matters. The first major task that Johnson asked Acheson to work on was the mid-1964 effort to negotiate a solution to the Cyprus problem. Like so many other attempts to solve that quandary, the plan

²³ Acheson, Dean. *A Citizen Looks at Congress*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1957; Acheson, Dean. *A Democrat Looks at His Party*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955; Chace pp. 374-375, 377-378.

²⁴ Chace pp. 377-379; McLellan pp. 414-415.

²⁵ Chace pp. 381-406; McLellan pp. 416-423.

developed by Acheson was destined to eventual failure. Acheson was also involved in the 1966 crisis that surrounded French withdrawal from NATO.²⁶

The most pressing problem that President Johnson faced, of course, was Vietnam. Vietnam had already been an issue while Acheson was Secretary of State, and U.S. involvement in Vietnam deepened as the 1950s became the 1960s. Acheson had originally seen U.S. support for the French as the only viable option for U.S. policy, which led to ever-increasing American commitments. In early 1965, Johnson's Under Secretary of State, George Ball, approached Acheson to develop a plan for reaching a settlement of the issue. That plan was unsuccessful, but Acheson remained one of the figures that Johnson turned to for advice concerning Vietnam once the situation became more dire in 1967.²⁷

Johnson eventually decided not to run for reelection in 1968, and in his place Richard Nixon, who had been one of Acheson's primary antagonists during the period that Acheson served as Secretary of State, was elected over the candidate that Acheson favored, Hubert Humphrey. Even though Nixon was a Republican, he immediately turned to Acheson for advice on policy issues, specifically Vietnam. Until early 1970, Nixon seemed to follow Acheson's advice to steadily decrease U.S. involvement in Vietnam, but Nixon's decision in April 1970 to extend the war in Cambodia ended Acheson's willingness to work with the President on the issue. Acheson did help lobby Congress to pass Nixon's anti-ballistic missile program. In May of 1971 Acheson provided aid on a different issue as he spearheaded an effort to defeat a Congressional move towards drastically reducing U.S. troop contributions to NATO.

²⁶ Chace pp. 410-417; McLellan pp. 423-426; interestingly, Chace writes that the reason Acheson was asked to pursue the Cyprus negotiations was that he was "a legendary figure in both Athens and Ankara because of his role in creating the Truman Doctrine" (p. 413). If this is the case, why has none of the historiography on Turkish-U.S. relations focused on Acheson?

²⁷ Chace pp. 418- 428; McLellan pp. 426-428.

Later that same year in October, Acheson died after suffering a stroke.²⁸ For nearly 40 years after his first foray into politics as FDR's Under Secretary of the Treasury, Acheson had remained closely involved in the vital political issues that faced the country.

2.2.1.4. Acheson's Personality

Despite the number of biographies and studies that have dwelt on Acheson's character and mentality, providing a concise summary of his personality is not easy, nor is it conducive to brevity. On the other hand, one advantage for scholars is the fact that Acheson wrote extensively about his life and opinions after the conclusion of his term in government; these tests comprise a rich source of information on Acheson's ideas and personality for scholars examining his life or his career in public office. As a result, the following paragraphs will relate the features of Acheson's character and mentality that appear, to this author, as more relevant to an understanding of Acheson's role in Turkish-U.S. relations after WWII.

2.2.1.4.1. Acheson's character

In terms of character, several aspects of Acheson's personality are relevant to studying his role in Turkish relations with the U.S. The first is the fact that, despite his elite schooling, Acheson was not born into the U.S. East Coast elite. Acheson, as he describes in the memoir *Morning and Noon*, spent an idyllic childhood in rural Connecticut, comprised of the shared romantic activities and experiences that Americans know from authors like Mark Twain and Ray Bradbury. Acheson termed his childhood a "golden age" of "pristine, unorganized,

²⁸ Chace pp. 429-437

amoral freedom.”²⁹

That pristine freedom was destined to be shattered by Acheson’s experiences at Groton, which the reader understands from Acheson’s explanation as a shocking and “painful” encounter with strict order imposed by authority. Thus, Acheson became highly aware of the conflict between the utopian freedom of childhood and the oppressive organization of the adult world. He admitted to his rebellion and understood the consequences of fighting the system. For that reason he had doubts about the adult world. In order to pursue those doubts, or maybe to fight them off, he spent the summer after his graduation from Groton working in railroad construction in Central Ontario’s taiga.³⁰

His experiences both as a child and in the summer after he graduated from Groton taught Acheson much about the realities of human life, but also cemented the desire and energy that he felt to be a part of that world. These encounters further meant that he was aware of those people in the world who did not have the advantages and privileges that he did. His sympathetic but realistic descriptions of the laborers that he worked with that summer of 1911, some apparently from Bulgaria and barely proficient in English,³¹ make abundantly clear what he learned about humankind:

... the men, simple, illiterate.... were also our friends. It would be misleading to overstress their simple virtue. They were hot-tempered and on occasion violent. The knife wounds for which they begged antiseptics and bandages did not appear to be self-inflicted or accidental.... We had, however, devised enough of a common language to learn the main outlines of their lives and hopes.... These men had done more for me than they would ever know and, in doing it, had become a part of me. They had given me new eagerness for experience. The simple, extroverted pattern of their lives had revived a sense of freedom amidst uncoerced order.... They had restored to me a priceless possession, joy in life. Never again was I to lose it or doubt

²⁹ Acheson, *Morning and Noon*, pp. 1-24. Quote from p. 24. Mark Twain’s books *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer* and *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*, and Ray Bradbury’s book *Dandelion Wine*, all portray the American ideals of rural childhood in the 19th and early 20th Centuries.

³⁰ Acheson, *Morning and Noon*, pp. 26-27. Quote from p. 26.

³¹ Acheson, *Morning and Noon*, p. 34.

it.³²

That is the description of a person who gave attention to other peoples' perspectives, who could feel the ramifications of the policies that he formulated and carried out as Secretary of State, and who understood that his actions had impact on the lives of others. He had achieved reconciliation with the adult world.

Acheson's upbringing and later experiences would mold the ideals with which he conducted his affairs and interactions with other people. Even though his father was an Episcopal minister, Acheson's life was not excessively dominated by religion. This most likely came from his father's example, who was well-read in theological matters, but chose to emphasize "ethics and conduct" in his sermons. From his father he learned basic codes of behavior, to bear hardship quietly, to take responsibility, to be useful to others.³³ The code of conduct that Acheson developed would even cause him political problems later as his emphasis on loyalty, and unwillingness to betray those to whom he had given his loyalty, would be used against him, just as his adamant refusal to repudiate Alger Hiss was.³⁴ At the same time, that loyalty would form the basis for his relationship with Harry S. Truman.

In sum, Acheson was a person capable of analyzing his own ideas and prejudices, and of reflecting on his relationship to other people and situations that he encountered. Despite the apparent inconsistency of some of his attitudes, such as towards the white governments of Southern Africa,³⁵ Acheson was clearly not a person who would simply dismiss the

³² Ibid. pp. 36-37.

³³ Ibid. pp. 17-19. Quote from p. 18.

³⁴ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 250-253, 358-361; Bundy, McGeorge, ed. *The Pattern of Responsibility*. Clifton, N. J.: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1972. pp. 220-233; Chace pp. 193-196; McLellan pp. 219-222.

³⁵ Acheson, in the late 1960s, felt that economic sanctions should not be utilized in an attempt to force foreign governments to change their domestic political policies, and he referred specifically to Rhodesia and other countries in Southern Africa controlled by white governments; see: Acheson, Dean. *Grapes from Thorns*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1972. pp. 171-193.

viewpoint, needs, or situation of, for example, Turkish people and their government. He would however, make a realistic, fact-based assessment of Turkish needs according to U.S. interests and the nation that he represented. Acheson's law-influenced approach to problem-solving mandated such an attitude.

2.2.1.4.2. Acheson's mental approach to law and diplomacy

No doubt exists about Acheson's intellectual capacities. Despite his poor showing at both Groton and Yale, his youthful rebellion and social pursuits masked a mind searching for the right motivation and subject. In the study and practice of law, he found the object of his search.

During Harvard Law, Acheson was strongly influenced by Felix Frankfurter and, through Frankfurter, eventually came to have close interactions with both Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes, two of the towering figures in U.S. jurisprudence history. These doyens of the legal profession left lasting impressions on Acheson's beliefs concerning how law and society interact. Acheson, while evaluating the Supreme Court judges that he encountered as Brandeis's clerk, explained the qualities he felt made those men great. Most fundamentally, law was an exercise of reason necessary for the maintenance and progress of society, and he described the judges he admired in terms of their approach to law:

Their minds, as judges, were not only open but disciplined and controlled, and their exercise of power was limited and restrained, by the law as it existed in the precedents. Here lay both the value and the limitation of their prior judicial experience in preparing them to exercise the functions of our highest court.³⁶

Clearly, those men also prepared Acheson, his approach to law, and eventually his approach to diplomacy. The same description, "open but disciplined and controlled" is an excellent

³⁶ Acheson, *Morning and Noon*, p. 69.

summary of Acheson's term in the State Department.³⁷

Later in the same text, Acheson describes in detail the ethos with which Louis Brandeis approached his cases, and the historian can recognize the essential similarity to the manner in which Acheson approached diplomacy. He explains that Brandeis,

... sought continuously to make the case before him as concrete as possible, to develop fully all the facts involved in the dispute and, beyond them, the great body of factual knowledge which surrounded the particular episode.³⁸

The State Department that developed under Acheson's terms as Under Secretary and Secretary of State enabled Acheson to do the same as Brandeis suggested, but in the realm of diplomacy. Immediately following his description of the justices' admirable attributes, Acheson turns to his contemporary Supreme Court, that of the mid-1960s, and criticizes what he calls the "activism" of the justices:

A present vogue in judicial practice and theory is to turn from the ideal of restraint in the exercise of judicial powers, from restraint imposed by respect for precedent and predictability in the law, as well as from deference to legislative and executive judgments and prerogatives in the constitutional field, to a more "activist" and "result-minded" role.... What seems to me novel is the self-consciousness of the "activism" both in constitutional decisions and in less far-reaching but still important ones applying historic statutes and common law conceptions.... He may conscientiously be seeking to administer justice, but it is personal justice... not that described on the lintel of the Supreme Court Building, "Equal Justice Under Law."³⁹

Again, this reflection summarizes in a highly effective manner the approach that Acheson took towards diplomacy. Acheson did not believe that pursuit of an ethical or moral ideal was appropriate or even possible for the Secretary of State. Indeed, he criticized his successor, John Foster Dulles, for exactly that behavior. The Secretary of State had to focus on the interests of the country, and those interests, determined through evaluation of each

³⁷ For Acheson's own thoughts on the legal profession and the proper approach for judges and legal professionals, see: Acheson, Dean. *Fragments of My Fleece*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1971. pp. 116-154.

³⁸ Acheson, *Morning and Noon*, pp. 83-84.

³⁹ Acheson, *Morning and Noon*, p. 69.

case according to its own facts, resulted in the policies formulated. This attitude is why Acheson is understood by diplomatic historians as a realist, but Acheson's perception of diplomacy was firmly rooted in his legal training.⁴⁰ Notably, this attitude would also have made Acheson's approach to Turkey freer from the prejudices or idealistic expectations of his time, and based more concretely in U.S. interests.

Despite his legal training, a profession notorious for producing conservative, cautious mindsets, Acheson remained a life-long liberal. Much of the public perceived him differently by the end of his life, but Acheson always described himself as a Democrat and a liberal. When appointed Under Secretary of State by Byrnes in summer 1945, Acheson was praised by the liberal press, and was focused on positively by liberals evaluating Truman's appointments to the State Department. The following years of McCarthyite attacks, the controversies surrounding his foreign policies, and the changing expectations of U.S. society would dramatically affect public perception. In the 1960s, Acheson would be seen as one of the archetypical members of the "Establishment."⁴¹

Acheson's own attitudes would contribute to the public's negative perception of him that eventually developed. Acheson's realist outlook, and lawyer's approach to analysis and argument, resulted in a lack of tolerance for anything that he interpreted as an attempt to escape from the reality of human existence and interaction. Acheson was famously impatient with those who did not see reality as he did, and saw action as preferable to introspection. This was a source of his intellectual disagreement with George Kennan. This also meant, for

⁴⁰ Chace pp. 260-261, 358-360, 373; Isaacson and Thomas pp. 563, 581; McMahon, Robert J. *Dean Acheson: The Creator of an American World Order*. Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009. pp. 213-216. According to Chace, Acheson's 1958 book *Power and Diplomacy*, is essentially an anti-Dulles tract; see: Chace p. 373.

⁴¹ Acheson, *Morning and Noon*, pp. 104-122; Beisner, Robert L. *Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. p. 24; Hamby, Alonzo L. *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. p. 89; Isaacson and Thomas pp. 26-31; McLellan pp. 407-409; McMahon pp. 2-3.

instance, that he dismissed the importance of the U.N. and thought that the campaign to sell the U.N. to the American people created exaggerated expectations. This did not mean that he treated the U.N. dismissively while Secretary of State. He worked with and through the U.N. when he thought it appropriate or useful, and skirted the U.N. when he thought necessary -- the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO are illustrations of such circumstances. On the other hand, this meant that Acheson saw direct solutions negotiated between two countries as more appropriate and useful.⁴²

As a result, Acheson's character and legal perspective are vital in order to understand more completely how and why he pursued the foreign policy prescriptions that he did as Secretary of State. Even though he was a brilliant, disciplined, and hard-working lawyer, trained by several of the greatest jurists in U.S. history, and focused on determining solutions for problems through factual analysis, Acheson remained a flexible pragmatist who understood that American society was changing, and that change meant gradual development of legal precedents. His comfort with both received wisdom and moral or ideological absolutes meant that even near the end of his life, Acheson could state, "I was a strong partisan and I still am. I still believe that the dissenters were right and the majority of the Court were wrong," with total conviction. Acheson would apply the same realistic logic, as well as pragmatism, to diplomacy.⁴³

2.2.2. Acheson's Relationship with President Truman

Before Harry Truman became President, Acheson had had little time to develop definite ideas

⁴² Chace pp. 107-108; McLellan pp. 49-52, 407-410; Smith, Gaddis. *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Vol. XVI: Dean Acheson*. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1972. pp. 417-419.

⁴³ Acheson, *Morning and Noon*, p. 77.

about how effective a President Truman might be, and whether he could work with the President on a personal level. In order to show his readers the development that his relationship with President Truman underwent, Acheson recounted his initial estimate of the new President, which he had included in a letter he penned to his son at the end of April 1945. Those first reflections are interesting for the conflict in Acheson's evaluation of the President as "straightforward, decisive, simple, entirely honest" but also "limited." However, he immediately states that it is a "blessing" that Truman was in the position to become President and not Henry Wallace, and that he thought Truman would "learn fast and inspire confidence."⁴⁴

Acheson formulated those feelings after a meeting that, by chance, occurred only two days before FDR's death. Acheson explains that this was the first meeting that he could remember in which he had a long conversation with Harry Truman. That encounter had apparently left Acheson with a highly positive, but somewhat colorless impression. In the days and weeks after that first real encounter, Acheson's account portrays a new atmosphere of decisiveness, efficiency, and follow-through in the new White House administration, and Acheson's daughter even contributed a quote (though ultimately unused) for Truman's concluding speech at the San Francisco United Nations Conference.⁴⁵ Overall, the two men seemed to get along well, but as yet had no reason to form a closer bond. Truman would make that decision in the month after the Potsdam Conference. After accepting the Under Secretary position, Acheson would be able, by the middle of September 1945, to write that he was getting full support from the President and that he liked Truman "a great deal."⁴⁶

Exactly how Truman became aware of Acheson's abilities, why he initially accepted

⁴⁴ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 104; Chace p. 105. The quotes are from Acheson p. 104.

⁴⁵ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 104-105.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p. 123.

Acheson's resignation, and why Truman then recalled Acheson with alacrity all seem to be a mystery that no biographer of Acheson has yet solved. Truman did not explain the situation in his memoirs and Acheson did not venture any guesses in his. Whatever the reason, Truman's abrupt decision to reverse his acceptance of Acheson's resignation made the following seven years of Acheson's service to U.S. foreign policy possible.

Historians generally agree that Truman and Acheson, despite their apparent differences, had an extraordinarily close and trusting relationship. That relationship had several foundations, the most important of which were reciprocal respect and trust. Both men saw the essence of the other and embraced their compatibility, were attracted to politics but held similar behavioral and ethical ideals for those engaged in that pursuit, and held fast to those ideals in relation to the other. While Secretary, Acheson told Truman that they "have always spoken the truth to one another and we always will." Truman returned the sentiment several years later, while writing his memoirs, when he told Acheson "you are one man who can say to me what you please anytime, anywhere on any subject." Such a relationship has rarely been observed amongst political actors in any society in any age.⁴⁷

Another cornerstone on which Truman and Acheson's relationship rested was a clear division of responsibilities, which both men respected absolutely and did their utmost to fulfill. Unlike FDR, Truman was not in the habit of sending his personal emissaries to foreign dignitaries, nor did Truman maintain personal advisors for foreign policy matters. This meant that other figures would not confuse the lines of communication between the Secretary and the President, thereby making the source of foreign policy more clear and eliminating possible sources of mistrust. For his part, Acheson was careful to defer important decisions to the President and consult consistently and openly with the President on whatever matters

⁴⁷ Acheson, Dean and Harry S. Truman. *Affection and Trust: The Personal Correspondence of Harry S. Truman and Dean Acheson, 1953-1971*. David McCullough, ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010. pp. ix-xv. Quotes on pp. xii and xiii; McMahon pp. 212-213.

were undergoing consideration. Acheson was also the President's essential source for foreign policy information because, at that point, no other U.S. government institutions had developed that capacity to the extent of the State Department. This also meant that, when necessary, the two men defended the other both in private and in public. Until the end of his life, Acheson referred to Truman as "Boss."⁴⁸

The last factor which facilitated Truman and Acheson's relationship might be termed rapport. By all accounts, Acheson and Truman had a similar sense of humor and they struggled in a similar manner with an obstreperous Congress and vicious, at times slanderous, political opposition. They understood what the other faced and could sympathize with the other's difficulties. Acheson appreciated Truman's decisiveness and no-nonsense approach; Truman was grateful for Acheson's loyalty and brilliant mind. Because Truman trusted Acheson's decisions and Acheson knew that he had Truman's support, both were able to carry out their tasks and initiatives, in relation to the international problems that faced the U.S., with a maximum of mutual agreement and understanding.⁴⁹

The most important sign of how well Truman and Acheson worked together, and how much respect they had for each other, was the friendship, expressed through their numerous letters to each other, which lasted after their term in government to the end of their lives. The author of the Introduction to the collection of Truman and Acheson's letters states that the only precedent for such a lengthy exchange of correspondence between former national leaders is the Thomas Jefferson-John Adams letters.⁵⁰

This author's estimation is that, even though a lot is sometimes made of the British, even

⁴⁸ Smith pp. 392-394; Acheson and Truman pp. 306-307 (as examples).

⁴⁹ Smith p. 393.

⁵⁰ Acheson and Truman p. xi. McCullough provides a detailed exploration of exactly why Truman and Acheson had such a strong working relationship and remained friends until the end of their lives.

aristocratic airs that Acheson put on, Acheson and Truman's relationship was facilitated by their roots in rural American culture. Acheson's elite education did not seem to change the value that he gave to his origins, and this was reflected in the manner that he raised his children, taking them to their Maryland farm as often as possible, and educating them in the traditions that he knew. Possibly, this shared rural experience enabled Truman and Acheson to understand one another, and construct a camaraderie that had lasting importance not only for the U.S., but also, through the foreign policies pursued during Acheson's service to the Truman Administration, for the world.⁵¹

2.2.3. Acheson and the Formulation of U.S. Foreign Policy during Truman's Tenure

The quality of the professional relationship that existed between Truman and Acheson displays clearly that U.S. foreign policy was in Dean Acheson's hands while he served as Secretary of State. In other words, Dean Acheson's understanding of U.S. foreign policy interests effectively functioned as the U.S. understanding of its foreign policy interests between 1949 and 1953.

Consequently, a discussion of Dean Acheson's importance to the formulation of U.S. postwar policy can begin with a reference to Alan Brinkley's description of the general conception that Americans had of what the war would bring to the world. To be brief, Americans understood that the world that would emerge from the war would be fundamentally different than the one which had plunged itself into two global catastrophes in the previous three decades. However, only a few had the opportunity to devise and carry out decisions that would directly shape that world. Acheson was one of those people. As mentioned above, Acheson grasped, long before the U.S. entered WWII, that the international situation that

⁵¹ See: Acheson and Truman, *passim*.

would result from the war would be fundamentally new, and would provide both immense opportunities and grave dangers to the U.S. Coming from the liberal internationalist side of the American political spectrum, Acheson knew well that his work in the State Department would have particular importance in that world-historical juncture, and he made that perception overt through the title of his memoirs.⁵² He was able to bring this understanding to bear on policy problems during the war, and began his stint as Under Secretary of State with the same strong convictions. His realistic awareness of the world situation, of U.S. strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities, and of fundamental U.S. interests, would guide his decisions from 1945 to 1953.

Another unusual characteristic of Acheson's term in the State Department was the fact that Acheson had great experience as the State Department's leader even before he was appointed Secretary. As Under Secretary of State, Acheson's role was no less pronounced than it would be later as Secretary. Gaddis Smith, writing in 1972, comments on the vital role that Acheson played as Under Secretary of State:

Never in American history has the second-ranking officer of the Department of State exerted as much influence on foreign policy as did Under Secretary of State Acheson from August 1945 through June 1947. He was the balance wheel, the coordinator, the provider of continuity and sense of direction during an extraordinarily baffling time. His ideas and direction contributed substantially and continuously to the sharpening and hardening of American policy toward the Soviet Union in an era now recognized as the unequivocal outbreak of the Cold War.⁵³

Therefore, the vital nature of the role that Acheson played even as Under Secretary cannot be ignored. Moreover, even though the role that Acheson played as Secretary is explicit, one should not forget the unusual mutual understanding with which President Truman and

⁵² Acheson, *Morning and Noon*, pp. 104-122; Brinkley, Alan. *Liberalism and Its Discontents*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. p. 94; McMahon p. 211. Acheson titled his State Department memoirs *Present at the Creation* in reference to a quote, attributed to Alphonso X of Spain: "Had I been present at the creation I would have given some useful hints for the better ordering of the universe." Acheson indeed was a main architect of the postwar international order.

⁵³ Smith p. 25.

Secretary Acheson approached their collaboration. Acheson, simply, had nearly complete control over the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy from January 1949 to January 1953. Especially in light of the changes which the State Department's prestige, operational capacity, and influence on the President have been subjected to in the decades since the early 1950s, the unique nature of Secretary Acheson's term in office must be recognized.⁵⁴

Under Secretary, and then Secretary, Acheson's impact on U.S. foreign policy thus came from several sources. Foremost is the fact that Acheson was the Acting Secretary of State for a great deal of time in 1945-1947. Secretary Byrnes, for example, was away from Washington for 350 of the 562 days that he spent as Secretary. When Byrnes was absent, Acheson was Acting Secretary. Of the five months that Acheson served as Under Secretary for George Marshall, he spent two of them as Acting Secretary. As Acting Secretary, Acheson fulfilled all of the normal functions of the Secretary of State position: "meeting regularly with the President, attending Cabinet meetings, delivering the important testimony before Congress, giving major speeches."⁵⁵ As Acting Secretary, Acheson essentially had a trial run with the responsibilities of the Secretary, and knew intimately the difficulties faced by the Secretary well before he assumed the office.

Second, while Secretary, Acheson was able to fulfill his duties with the knowledge that Truman trusted him implicitly and appreciated his methods. Acheson had won President

⁵⁴ Beisner pp. 1-2; Isaacson and Thomas pp. 736-741; Smith p. 392. Isaacson and Thomas describe in some detail the difference in not only who was formulating U.S. foreign policy by the 1970s, but also in the character and aims of those policy-makers. The gist is that men like Acheson (the "Wise Men" that figure in Isaacson and Thomas's book) were elites, but elites dedicated to public service, not to the promotion of their personal interests and careers. Acheson also stated that, by 1946, he had come to the conclusion that too many of the career foreign service officers thought they were in charge of foreign policy formulation, when in fact that responsibility was solely the Secretary of State's; see: Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 162-163.

⁵⁵ Smith pp. 25-26. Quote from p. 26.

Truman's trust, as described above. Both agreed on the necessity for negotiation from strength and "total diplomacy," but it was Acheson's responsibility to carry out this understanding.⁵⁶

Finally, on the basic level of bureaucracy, Acheson was the main force that helped bring the State Department out of the doldrums into which it had fallen during FDR's Presidency. One of the first innovations that Acheson introduced after becoming Under Secretary was the daily 9.30 meeting of the Assistant Secretaries, in which the Department's work was delegated and ongoing concerns tracked. Later, upon the prescriptions of the Hoover Commission, for which Acheson served as vice-chairman, the State Department was reorganized to expand the number of Assistant Secretaries and define their responsibilities more exactly. Under Acheson's terms as Under Secretary and then Secretary of State, the morale of, and prestige accorded to, career foreign service officers improved, lines of authority and communication within the State Department were better-defined, and Department staff were protected by Acheson from political attack.⁵⁷

To summarize, Dean Acheson's importance to U.S. foreign policy in the 1945-1953 period is derived from several different aspects of his terms as Under Secretary, and then Secretary, of State. First of all, he had a vision of the role that the U.S. needed to play in the postwar world, and he had definite ideas about how that vision could be realized. Additionally, he played an important role in policy formation and implementation not only as Secretary but even while Under Secretary of State. As Under Secretary of State he fulfilled the role of Secretary for long periods of time, and operated with the full capacities and responsibilities of the Secretary. Third, his power over foreign policy was cemented by his close relationship

⁵⁶ Hamby, Alonzo L. *Liberalism and Its Challengers: From FDR to Bush*, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. p. 80.

⁵⁷ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 129; Beisner pp. 80, 109-112; Foster, H. Schuyler. *Activism Replaces Isolationism: U.S. Public Attitudes, 1940-1975*. Washington D.C.: Foxhall Press, 1983. pp. 69-78; McLellan pp. 44-45, 59-60, 136; Smith pp. 395-400.

with, and the trust granted by, President Truman.

Finally, the resurrection of bureaucratic organization, of lines of responsibility and communication, and of policy creation that took place largely at Acheson's initiative once again made the State Department the primary U.S. foreign policy engine of the U.S. government. Acheson, as a result, was the captain of a retooled, modified, strengthened, and improved foreign policy vehicle. As Smith observes, no other 20th Century U.S. Secretary of State wielded the power that Acheson did.⁵⁸ This brings the discussion to the actual issues that Acheson faced during his service in one of human history's most critical intersections.

2.2.3.1. Major Foreign Policy Issues for Acheson's Tenure in 1945-1947 and 1949-1953

Naturally, the years in which Acheson served at the top of the State Department hierarchy were defined by the multitude of fundamental economic, military, and political dilemmas faced by the U.S. government. Gaddis Smith, in the Preface to his study of Acheson's State Department years, summarized the unprecedented events that pressed upon U.S. foreign policy between 1949 and 1953, and to which it fell to Secretary Acheson to formulate the U.S. response. His list includes the North Atlantic treaty's mediation and Congressional authorization, Western Europe's economic rehabilitation and rearmament, West Germany's emergence and inclusion in European defense arrangements, the Soviet Union's attainment of atomic weapons, thermonuclear weapons, the assumption of control in China by Mao's Communist armies, the failure of efforts to reach a mutual understanding with those Maoist forces, the Korean War, the emergence of Indochina as an issue in U.S. foreign policy, attempts to find a remedy for the decline of British power in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the extended process of negotiating various issues with the Soviet Union throughout the

⁵⁸ Smith p. 391.

period.⁵⁹ However, some details can be added to the overall picture in order to make the overwhelming nature of what Acheson confronted more clear.

Acheson was appointed Under Secretary of State in August 1945, after the Potsdam Conference and upon the retirement of Joseph Grew. As Under Secretary in the following tumultuous period, Acheson's performance brought him attention and, perhaps most importantly, won him President Truman's trust.

2.2.3.1.1. August 1945-June 1947

As Under Secretary of State between August 1945 and August 1947, Acheson was often given specific responsibilities that added enormously to his normal duties. The first of these issues was international control of atomic energy, for which Acheson worked on a U.S. proposal that became known as the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan. The second major issue was China, and Acheson took on the role of personal envoy between General Marshall and President Truman in December 1945. That role lasted throughout 1946. The last major issue was the developing situation in Palestine and of Jewish immigration to Palestine, which Secretary Byrnes, according to Acheson, treated as a hot potato that he tried to pass to Acheson.⁶⁰

Acheson also confronted a number of other problems, lesser in magnitude but important nonetheless, during his first year as Under Secretary. One author adds the general U.S. official struggle to comprehend and then formulate a response to Soviet behavior in 1945-1946, the issue of a loan to Britain in 1946, and the crisis over Iran early that same year; Acheson interacted directly with all of those issues. In August 1946, Acheson was forced to

⁵⁹ Smith pp. xi-xii.

⁶⁰ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 123-125, 139-156, 169-182, 202-211; Smith pp. 35-43.

deal directly with major issues related to Turkey as a result of the 7 August note from the Soviet Union, which demanded Soviet participation in defense of the Turkish Straits.⁶¹ Issues relating to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan will be related below.

2.2.3.1.2. July 1947-December 1948

On 30 June 1947, Acheson was replaced as Under Secretary of State by Robert Lovett. Even though Acheson, at that point, had left the State Department, he did not leave politics. Within several months, Acheson began providing speeches and radio appearances for the Citizens' Committee for the Marshall Plan. Acheson also testified before Congress in order to support the Marshall Plan. At the same time, Acheson served in what was popularly referred to as the "Hoover Commission," the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the United States Government, which did not actually complete its work until mid-1949.⁶²

2.2.3.1.3. January 1949-January 1953

Immediately upon his reentry to the State Department in January 1949, Acheson was confronted with an imposing docket of international issues. Gaddis Smith long ago provided an effective, case-by-case summary of the primary issues that Secretary Acheson labored on from 1949 to 1953. They include (in the order of Gaddis's treatment) the negotiations surrounding the North Atlantic Treaty and the treaty's passage through Congress; the issues surrounding Germany, the emergence of West Germany (i.e. the Federal Republic of Germany), and Soviet pressures related to that process; China and its "loss" to Mao's Communists; Russia's development of an atomic bomb and the resulting U.S. decision to

⁶¹ Smith pp. 29-35.

⁶² Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 240-244; Chace pp. 183-186; McLellan pp. 135-136.

develop a fusion, or hydrogen, bomb.⁶³ All of those situations occurred before June 1950.

On 25 June 1950, the North Korean army attacked South Korea. The resulting conflict would not be concluded during Acheson's term in office, but would remain a critical problem, especially after the setbacks that the U.S. effort suffered in 1950 and the controversy surrounding President Truman's removal of General Douglas MacArthur from command of the U.N. forces in Korea. West Germany's rearmament and relationship to NATO, the conclusion of the U.S. occupation of Japan and defense of the Western Pacific, the worsening situation in Southeast Asia, Palestine and Israel, Iran, and Egypt all constituted further strains on Acheson's energy and abilities. Other, more minor matters during Acheson's term were Latin America, Yugoslavia's careful distancing from the Soviet Union and its dispute with Italy over Trieste, U.S. economic and military aid for Franco's Spain, U.S. efforts to convince colonial powers to disengage from their possessions (with certain exceptions), India, the general issue of U.S. foreign aid, and the U.S. relationship with the U.N. Added to all of the international issues was the domestic U.S. political situation as Acheson was under intense attack from Congress, especially Joseph McCarthy, and public opinion for most of his term as Secretary.⁶⁴

An essential lesson that a scholar focused on Turkish-American relations should take away from a study of the questions that Dean Acheson wrestled with while Secretary of State is that Turkey was only one of the multitude of extremely difficult, even intractable, international problems that Acheson faced. Furthermore, Turkey, even though its geographical position and staunchly anti-Soviet government put it in the forefront of the State Department's field of vision, was not as important as the problems that the U.S. faced in its relations with the USSR, China, and Western Europe. From time-to-time Turkey did emerge

⁶³ Smith pp. 59-171 *passim*.

⁶⁴ Foster, H. Schuyler. *Activism Replaces Isolationism: U.S. Public Attitudes, 1940-1975*. Washington D.C.: Foxhall Press, 1983. pp. 70-78, 377; Smith pp. 172-387 *passim*.

as a pressing issue, such as in August 1946 and February-March 1947, but generally it was not the most urgent or difficult concern for the State Department. Turkey was only one aspect of problems that had global scope for the Secretary of State. On the other hand, from August 1945-June 1947 Acheson was arguably more important than any other U.S. official for the development of U.S. policy towards Turkey, and because of his position, in 1949-1953 Acheson was the sole figure responsible for making the final decisions on U.S. policy towards Turkey. Acheson developed policies and made decisions concerning Turkey within the global scope of his foreign policy vision and the factors affecting that vision.

Consequently, Dean Acheson's impact on U.S. foreign policy from 1945-1953 is not in dispute. Not only is Acheson now seen as one of U.S. history's greatest Secretaries of State, but also the historical juncture and the issues which Acheson confronted were unprecedented.⁶⁵ Gaddis Smith summarized his view of Acheson's overall record as follows:

Dean Acheson was the principal author and manager of American foreign policy during the presidency of Harry S. Truman. As Under Secretary of State... he provided intellectual balance and coordination during the unstable transition between a time of war against Germany and Japan and Cold War against the Soviet Union. As Secretary of State... he, more than any other man, suggested the courses which the President ordered for the nation during the most dangerous phase of the Cold War.⁶⁶

The decisions that Acheson made and the policies he pursued continue to shape global international relations. What has not been examined in depth, however, is the impact that Acheson had on Turkish-U.S. relations, or the factors that affected Acheson's decisions concerning Turkey. This study's next section focuses on that issue.

⁶⁵ McMahan pp. 209-210.

⁶⁶ Smith p. xi.

2.3. DEAN ACHESON AND U.S POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY, 1945-1953

SENATOR SMITH: Are we adopting a policy where we say the United States of America will be interested all over the world in any country that is seeking democratic freedom?

SECRETARY ACHESON: I think that what the President said was much more limited than what you now suggest to me, and very clear indeed. He proposed that we should give this aid to Greece and Turkey. He pointed out that here were two countries which had constitutional systems which were founded on democratic principles which were struggling to maintain those systems. He said it was to our interest that all peoples who had free governments and democracies, that were moving towards human freedoms, should not be coerced into giving up those institutions, and that whatever help we could extend would be in accordance with our policy.¹

This chapter will focus on Dean Acheson's activities and decisions relating to Turkish-U.S. relations in the 1945-1953 period. In a largely chronological manner, and with reference to primary documents from Acheson's memoirs, the *FRUS* series, and the Truman Library, Dean Acheson's role in Turkish-U.S. relations during the period in question will be explored in detail by focusing on the communications and messages that Acheson generated while performing his responsibilities. Messages sent by other officials to Acheson while he was Acting Secretary will not be examined in depth since determining whether Acheson read those messages, and what effect those messages may have had on his thinking about Turkey, is usually not possible. Only when Acheson clearly is responding to a certain previous communication (or communications) will such messages be focused on in the analysis below.

¹ Jones, Joseph M. *The Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947)*. New York: The Viking Press, 1955. p. 191. These comments were spoken by Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson in testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 13 March 1947. Acheson's testimony concerned President Truman's proposed aid to Greece and Turkey.

2.3.1. August 1945-December 1945

Dean Acheson, after being convinced by President Truman and Secretary Byrnes, took the oath of office as Under Secretary of State on 27 August 1945 in a recess appointment, and would be officially confirmed by the Senate in late September 1945. Within two weeks of taking his oath, Acheson would already be complaining in letters to his daughter about the amount of work and the disorganization in the State Department. Furthermore, for essentially all of September 1945, and the first week of October, Acheson was already Acting Secretary.²

In the *FRUS* documents, the first 1945 incident in which Acheson directly deals with issues relating to Turkey occurs in September 1945, when Secretary Byrnes was in England for the London Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. Sent on 20 September to Edwin C. Wilson, the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, this message was forwarded before Acheson was officially confirmed by the Senate on 24 September. The message was a response to the U.S. Ankara embassy's worried query concerning President Truman's course of action on the Straits issue, and explained that the U.S., as agreed at Potsdam, would discuss the Straits issue with the Turkish government, but did not plan to broach the subject at the ongoing London Council meeting. The same message mentions that the U.S. government's suggestions to the Turkish government on the Straits issue would be forthcoming in the near future.³

The next message from Acheson on an issue regarding Turkey appears in December 1945, when Acheson was again Acting Secretary while Byrnes was in Moscow for the next Council

² Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969. pp. 122-128. Byrnes states that he left for England on 5 September 1945; see: Byrnes, James F. *Speaking Frankly*. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947. p. 92.

³ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 126-127; *FRUS* 1945, Vol. 8, p. 1247. "The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)," signed "Acheson." President Truman's suggestions for the Straits issue were sent to Ankara in late October.

of Foreign Ministers meeting. The interesting aspect of this message is that, in contrast to the September message, it shows a slightly deeper involvement in the issue at hand, i.e. Turkey, and the events occurring there. This conclusion proceeds from the fact that Acheson's message was the response to a telegram, sent to Washington by Edwin Wilson, explaining that the Istanbul Soviet Consulate had begun to recruit local Armenians to become Soviet citizens and emigrate to the USSR. Wilson also requested that his information be forwarded to U.S. embassies in other countries with sizeable Armenian populations, and requested that he be kept informed about the situation in those other countries.⁴

The situation was a direct continuation of the Soviet Union's efforts to apply pressure on Turkey concerning the Kars and Ardahan regions in Northeast Anatolia, in this case to create a population problem in Soviet Armenia by registering external Armenians as Soviet nationals and then urging them to emigrate to Soviet Armenia; that situation could then be utilized to push for territorial concessions from Turkey. In turn, those efforts stemmed from the diplomatic notes Moscow had forwarded to Turkey earlier in 1945 denouncing the Soviet-Turkish Friendship and Neutrality Treaty, and demanding renegotiation of the 1921 Turkish-Soviet and 1936 Montreux Treaties. When Acheson had assumed the Under Secretary position in August, Soviet pressure on Turkey had been continuing for several months. Acheson's response also shows that he almost certainly had read Wilson's telegram and was sensitive to the general situation. Acheson succinctly summarizes the problem and requests that the embassies report to Washington on Soviet activities concerning Armenians in their countries.⁵

⁴ *FRUS* 1945, Vol. 8, pp. 1284-1285, telegram dated 19 December 1945 "The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State," signed "Wilson."

⁵ *FRUS* 1945, Vol. 8, p. 1285, circular telegram dated 21 December 1945, "The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives in Europe and the Middle East," signed "Acheson." For the *FRUS* records on the previous Soviet notes, see: *FRUS* 1945, Vol. 8, pp. 1219-1293 *passim*.

In the week following Acheson's note, Wilson sent several more telegrams providing updates on that specific issue and some other occurrences in Turkish-Soviet relations. Meanwhile, Byrnes returned from the Moscow Conference on 29 December 1945. That same day, Acting Secretary Acheson saw the Turkish Ambassador to Turkey, Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur, in a scheduled meeting at the State Department, despite the fact that it was a Saturday. One other State Department official, from the Near East and African Affairs desk, was also present.⁶

Ambassador Baydur requested the meeting in order to learn from the State Department exactly what issues affecting Turkey had been discussed by the Foreign Ministers in Moscow, and he began the meeting by expressing that wish. Acheson responded by explaining that Secretary Byrnes had arrived in the U.S. only that morning and, since he had not yet had the opportunity to discuss the Moscow Conference with Secretary Byrnes, the only information he had was the same information from the press that Ambassador Baydur had. Ambassador Baydur then asked about Acheson's opinion on the recent Soviet demands concerning the Trabzon-Ardahan area in Northeast Anatolia. Acheson's response is interesting because it was entirely aimed, both directly and indirectly, at urging Turkish officials to not engage in any rash behavior. First, Acheson said that the personnel in the State Department charged with observing Turkish affairs were watching the USSR's actions closely, but then warned that, in order for the United Nations organization to be effective, smaller nations needed to avoid "unilateral action." This also meant that Turkish officials needed to ensure that no domestic "incident or manifestation" of the tension felt by the Turkish side should be allowed to happen, and reminded Ambassador Baydur that the strain

⁶ *FRUS* 1945, Vol. 8, pp. 1287-1289, "Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near East Affairs (Jones)." Jones is assumed to be Joseph M. Jones, author of *The Fifteen Weeks*.

on Turkish-Soviet relations involved issues of concern to the entire international community.⁷

Ambassador Baydur responded to Acheson's polite reminders by thanking him for the concern that Acheson expressed, but then asserted that it was "very difficult for the Turkish people to contain themselves" while under fierce and unjustified pressure from the Soviet Union. He continued to argue that the "defense of the Turkish position in the Turkish press and in the Turkish parliament" was only that, and no belligerent intent could be construed from it. Acheson expressed agreement with Ambassador Baydur's last statement, and the meeting concluded with the Turkish Ambassador's request for follow-up information from the State Department concerning what was discussed at the Moscow conference.⁸

Consequently, at the end of 1945, both Secretary Byrnes and Under Secretary Acheson had dealt directly with Turkish-U.S. relations since the beginning of their terms. Secretary Byrnes's communications on the subject are generally curt when directed towards U.S. foreign service officers, but become much more verbose when directed to President Truman. Acheson's communications are also short, but more detailed, and they evince attention to and knowledge of the issue in question. By contrast, in his memoirs Acheson does not specifically mention Turkey in relation to his term as Under Secretary until well into the material concerning 1946. Acheson apparently thought that the various, and more ominous, international problems that he worked on in his first months as Under Secretary deserved

⁷ Ibid. pp. 1287-1288. Quotes from p. 1288. A footnote on the bottom of p. 1288 explains that, on 2 January 1946, the head of the State Department's Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Loy Henderson, sent a memorandum to Acheson explaining that the three powers did not collectively discuss Turkey at the conference, and then mentions an addendum to the note stating that Acheson had telephoned Ambassador Baydur with that news.

⁸ Ibid. pp. 1288-1289. Quotes from p. 1288. The interesting aspect of Ambassador Baydur's comments is that Acheson, according to the memorandum, had not specifically mentioned any incidents or comments from the Turkish press or parliament. If the information in the memorandum is correct, this means that Ambassador Baydur assumed that Acheson had implicitly referred to such incidents. The telegrams received from Ambassador Wilson over the previous week, at least those included in the *FRUS* documents, also do not refer to any such specific incidents.

greater attention. The other important features of U.S. officials' continuing conversation about Turkey in 1945 are that Turkey's strategic importance is already manifest and assumed, and that the idea of a security guarantee for Turkey had already emerged, even if the political atmosphere rendered the idea moot. As is clear from the *FRUS* records, Congress was the issue that immediately loomed over the conversation once the idea of aid or a security guarantee for Turkey was suggested.⁹

2.3.2. January 1946-July 1946

January 1946 saw a continuation of the trends in Turkish-U.S. relations -- and Under Secretary Acheson's role in regard to that subject -- that had concluded 1945. The *FRUS*

⁹ Byrnes did at least devote several pages in one of his memoirs to the Turkish-Soviet issue; see: Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 300-303. In a later memoir, Byrnes would claim, while relating the New York Council of Foreign Ministers meetings of November-December 1946, that he had been "seriously concerned" about the Soviet stance vis-à-vis Turkey "for some time"; see: Byrnes, James F. *All in One Lifetime*. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1958. p. 384. By far the longest 1945 statements that Secretary Byrnes drafted concerning Turkish issues were the memorandums Byrnes sent to President Truman concerning the Montreux problem. The first letter was attached to a policy recommendation on the Montreux Treaty sent in early September 1945, two days before Byrnes went to London. In that note Byrnes famously stated that the U.S. should not support demilitarization of the Straits without providing Turkey with a military guarantee that, first, the U.S. must be willing to fulfill, and second, must be approved by Congress. The second memorandum, sent two weeks after Byrnes returned from London, also ended with the warning that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would have to be consulted if a more stringent approach was to be taken towards the Straits issue. For Byrnes's letters to Truman see: 1945 *FRUS*, Vol. 8, pp. 1242-1245, 1255-1256. "Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman," 3 September 1945 and 19 October 1945 (both memorandums have the same title). In December 1945, the State Department drafted a memorandum, intended for the U.S. delegation at the January 1946 London United Nations General Assembly, on the U.S. position towards the Turkish Straits. This document openly stated the seriousness and multiple aspects of U.S. interests in the Turkish Straits, and included a subtitle specifically on that topic; see: *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 801-804, "Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State." Finally, other 1945 State Department proposals for aid to Turkey foundered on the Congressional rocks and only paltry assistance sums were eventually offered to Turkey; see: Pach, Chester J. Jr. *Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945-1950*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991. pp. 97, 236 n. 34.

records concerning Turkey in 1946 are divided into two main subjects, U.S. communications and efforts concerning Turkish-Soviet issues, and Truman Administration initiatives to identify means through which aid could be provided to Turkey. Both subjects feature messages from Under Secretary Acheson since he spent much of 1946 as Acting Secretary while Secretary Byrnes attended the January United Nations General Assembly in London and the various conferences surrounding the peace negotiations in April-December. As Acheson suggests in his memoirs, even the first few weeks of 1946 indicated that his role was becoming more difficult and involved.¹⁰

During the London Conference, and after receiving more messages from the U.S. Ambassador in Ankara on the ongoing tensions between Turkey and the USSR, Acheson sent a brief message, dated 10 January 1946, to assuage Turkish fears that the U.S. may have brought new proposals concerning the Turkish Straits issue to the London conference. Acheson reiterated that an international conference on the Montreux Treaty was advisable and that the U.S. would attend such a conference.¹¹

Before the end of January, Acheson would initiate possibly the most important event in Turkish-U.S. relations prior to March 1947. At some point in the previous several weeks, Turkish Ambassador Baydur had forwarded a request to the State Department for the return of Münir Ertegün's body. Ertegün was Baydur's predecessor and, at the time of his death in 1944, had been a senior Washington diplomat. His remains had been interred temporarily in Arlington Cemetery. Exactly to whom Ambassador Baydur expressed that wish is not apparent, but on 25 January Acting Secretary Acheson drafted a memorandum for President Truman requesting that Ertegün's remains, in accordance with diplomatic tradition, be

¹⁰ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 149; Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime*, pp. 347-348, 357-371, 376-383, 385-386; Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 123-155 *passim*;

¹¹ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, p. 808, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)," signed "[Acheson]."

returned to Turkey aboard a cruiser. President Truman approved and returned the request the same day. The memorandum makes no mention of the current political situation and refers only to diplomatic tradition as the reason for the action. Even though the return of Ambassador Erteğün's remains was apparently not conceived as a political gesture, Turkish people came to understand the event as symbolic of U.S. support for Turkey against Soviet pressure because the USS *Missouri* eventually carried Ambassador Erteğün's remains to Istanbul. Thus, an event that came to hold a prominent place in the development of post-WWII Turkish-American relations seems to have been initiated, on the U.S. side, by Acheson. Certainly, he was the official who asked the President directly to approve the action, once the Navy indicated that ships were available. This event was later given great importance by various contemporary observers and historians, but in his memoirs, Acheson mentions the event only in passing while relating the events of August 1946, and does not mention Münir Erteğün's name. This implies that the person primarily responsible for the event did not consider it of lasting importance. The attention the USS *Missouri*'s visit garnered was likely caused by the tenor of the message that President İnönü sent to President Truman, which Truman subsequently released to the press. The fervent pitch of the domestic Turkish press coverage, and the manner in which Turkish officials utilized the event in a tense international atmosphere during and following the crisis over Iran, provided additional incitement.¹²

¹² Acheson's memorandum is found in President Truman's Official File at the Truman Library, in OF 86; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 195; Alvarez, David. "The Missouri Visit to Turkey: An Alternative Perspective on Cold War Diplomacy." *Balkan Studies*. Vol. 15, No. 2. 1974. p. 233; İnanç, Gül and Şuhnaz Yılmaz. "Gunboat Diplomacy: Turkey, USA and the Advent of the Cold War." *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 48, No. 3. May 2012. pp. 404-407. İnanç and Yılmaz, drawing on documents from the Turkish Foreign Ministry, place Baydur's visit to the State Department in late 1945, but they do not mention the month. Copies of the messages sent to each other by the American and Turkish Presidents concerning the return of Ambassador Erteğün's remains are attached to the same group of documents that includes Acheson's original message. The 25 January 1946 memo was first

The next point at which Acheson was forced to return to Turkish affairs occurred several months later, in June 1946. Acheson's expertise on international financial issues had been formed during his experiences as a lawyer, as Acting Secretary of the Treasury, and then in the State Department during WWII while engaged with economic warfare issues. In June 1946, financial aspects of the effort to provide Exim (Export-Import) Bank loans to Turkey came to Acheson's attention while Secretary Byrnes was abroad for conferences. The Turkish government had, since the previous fall, been requesting aid in the form of both loans and equipment or vehicles. To those ends, a settlement of the outstanding Turkish Lend-Lease debts was achieved in early 1946, but negotiations over the amount that the Exim Bank would offer to Turkey continued into summer 1946.¹³

On 21 June 1946, Acting Secretary Acheson sent a lengthy, detailed reply to a Turkish government request, forwarded by Ambassador Wilson, for a larger Exim Bank sum. Over the previous several months, the Turkish government had worked strenuously to obtain more than the \$25 million offered to them. The essence of Acheson's message is that, despite the impression that Turkish officials had, the Exim Bank did not have hundreds of millions of dollars to disburse as development aid, and that development projects such as Turkish

identified by David Alvarez, but his analysis was concerned with a different aspect of Turkish-U.S. relations, so he did not dwell on the implications of the memorandum other than to note that the memorandum is the only evidence (available at the time) that Truman was involved in sending the remains of Ertegün back to Turkey on a naval ship. In April 1946, after the USS *Missouri* arrived in Istanbul, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Wilson sent a message to Washington elaborating the effects that he felt the occasion had engendered; see: *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 822-823, "The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State," signed "Wilson" and dated 12 April 1946.

¹³ For information concerning the Turkish Lend-Lease settlement see *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7: p. 901, "The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)," signed "Byrnes" and dated 28 January 1946; p. 903, "The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)," signed "Byrnes" and dated 15 March 1946; pp. 904-905, "The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State," signed "Wilson" and dated 2 May 1946; p. 905, "The American Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Saka)," signed "Edwin C. Wilson" and dated 2 May 1946; p. 906, "The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State," signed "Wilson" and dated 4 May 1946.

officials proposed should be funded through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In the same vein, he stresses that a loan of more than \$25 million was impossible and that Turkish officials had been informed of this repeatedly. Finally, Acheson mentioned that a credit for an airport project would be separate from any Exim Bank loan, that the Maritime Commission might soon have surplus ships useful to Turkish needs and available for a credit amounting to 25 percent of the price, and that other countries which suffered large-scale destruction during the war would receive lending priority.¹⁴

In the following two weeks, Acheson would again send messages to the Ankara Embassy concerning the same topic. On 27 June 1946, Ambassador Wilson told the State Department that the Turkish government had been informed of the limitations on the Exim Bank loan.¹⁵ Several days later, Acheson was able to send confirmation to Ankara that the Exim Bank loan had been approved for the \$25 million previously suggested.¹⁶ The same communication mentioned that press reports of a \$100 million loan were an “irresponsible misinterpretation” of information that the Associated Press had obtained from the State Department. Thus, not only was Acting Secretary Acheson working to satisfy both sides of the Exim Bank loan (i.e. the Turkish government and the lending agency), he was also fighting off malicious press reports apparently intended to exacerbate confusion surrounding the problem. One week later Acheson had to repeat the same information in a telegram to the U.S. Ankara embassy because the telegram sent on 3 July was apparently garbled during transmission, and the details of exactly what the various sides of the agreement would be responsible for still were

¹⁴ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 909-910, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson),” signed “Acheson.”

¹⁵ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, p. 910, “The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State,” signed “Wilson” and dated 27 June 1946;

¹⁶ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, p. 911, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson),” signed “Acheson” and dated 3 July 1946.

not fully clarified for Turkish officials.¹⁷ After the August 1946 crisis in the Turkish-U.S.-USSR triangle, the financial aspect of U.S. aid to Turkey would slowly merge into the military and political aspects. That process of change would manifest itself first in the Truman Doctrine and its aid to Greece and Turkey, and then would make Turkey a beneficiary of the Marshall Plan.

2.3.3. August 1946

At 17.30 on 7 August 1946, Soviet Chargé Fedor Orekhov handed to Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson a diplomatic note which repeated the content of a note also transmitted to the Turkish government earlier that day. The note explained that the Soviets wished to convene a conference amongst the three powers and Turkey to revise the Montreux Treaty. The key Soviet demand was that Turkey and the Soviet Union would establish “joint means of defense” for the Turkish Straits.¹⁸ This development caused an immediate outburst of frenetic activity in the State Department as U.S. officials raced to formulate their response; at the center of this activity was the initial recipient of the Soviet note, Acting Secretary Acheson.¹⁹ Because the August 1946 Soviet diplomatic note to Turkey has been discussed in many other scholarly works, this discussion will focus on Acheson.

As far back as February-March of 1946, the State Department had been engaged in internal discussion concerning policy towards Turkey. For months Edwin Wilson had argued, under the influence of Feridun Cemal Erkin, that Soviet inquiries concerning the Straits were merely a stepping stone to Moscow’s true aim, political domination of Turkey. How

¹⁷ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, p. 911, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson),” signed “Acheson” and dated 10 July 1946.

¹⁸ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 827-829, “The Soviet Chargé (Orekhov) to the Acting Secretary of State.” Note 49 on p. 827 provides the details of how and when the note was given to Acheson.

¹⁹ Jones pp. 61-63.

influential Wilson's efforts were is unclear, but the actions taken by U.S. officials in August 1946 seem to reflect Wilson's opinion.²⁰

Acheson, in his memoirs, begins his narrative of the State Department reaction to the Soviet note with the famous 15 August 1946 White House meeting of top Truman Administration officials. Acheson explains that the President had instructed him to prepare, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Navy and War Departments, as well as with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), recommendations on how to respond to the Soviet note. This information is echoed in a 13 August 1946 telegram to Ambassador Wilson in Ankara asking for his ideas concerning two previous Department telegrams related to the issue. In the same message, Acheson also mentioned that the Department was giving "close study" to the Soviet note and that the "magnitude" of the issue pushed the Department to get input from the Navy and War

²⁰ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 820-822, "The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State," signed "Wilson" and dated 23 March 1946. Note 38 on p. 822 mentions a July message in which Secretary Byrnes tells Wilson that the Ambassador's comments had been referenced during the policy statement's revision, and asks for further comment. That message is not included in the *FRUS* documents, but the scholar can assume that the policy statement still had not been completed by July 1946, only weeks before the August 1946 Soviet note to Ankara. The final policy statement, prepared by the State Department's Near East and Africa Affairs desk, was not released for wider reading in the State Department until October 1946; see: Kuniholm, Bruce R. *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J., 1994. pp. 356-378; and *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 893-897, "Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)" signed "L[oy] W. H[enderson]," dated 21 October 1946, and marked "top secret." Kuniholm mentions Erkin's influence on p. 356. Wilson's arguments correspond well with Melvyn Leffler's broader arguments based in Grand Strategy, and provide a clear rationale for understanding apparently innocuous Soviet requests concerning the Turkish Straits as an attempt to pry open the door to Soviet political control over the Turkish state; see: Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992. pp. 123-125. Other authors have noted that the State Department became more concerned with questions of strategy and geopolitics after WWII; see: McLauchlan, Gregory. "World War II and the Transformation of the U.S. State: The Wartime Foundations of U.S. Hegemony." *Sociological Inquiry*. Vol. 67, no.1. February 1997. p. 14. Also worth noting is that Acheson was a famously industrious person, and it seems likely (but admittedly speculative) that Acheson read some of Wilson's telegrams concerning Soviet designs on Turkey. Acheson, in accordance with his professional ethos, would have read as much information as he deemed necessary in order to gain the facts pertinent to a decision.

Departments.²¹

Acheson's position as Acting Secretary made him a primary actor in the 15 August 1946 White House meeting, but Acheson's increasing involvement in U.S. interactions with Turkey had prepared him to fulfill that role. In that fateful meeting, Acting Secretary Acheson was accompanied by Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, Under Secretary of War Kenneth Royall, and the JCS. Their recommendations were to be open with the Soviets, but to insist "at all costs" that defense of the Turkish Straits should be an exclusively Turkish project; the interpretation was that the ultimate Soviet goal was political domination of the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean. In order to impress upon all, and specifically Soviet, Turkish, British, and French officials, the "deadly earnest" nature of U.S. determination, a naval force should be sent to join the USS *Missouri* in the Mediterranean. President Truman made clear that he understood the potential results of these steps, and efforts to inform the U.S. public of the Administration's decisions on the Straits matter were agreed upon.²² U.S. geostrategy now placed Turkey in the focus of U.S. concerns.

Immediately after the White House meeting ended with President Truman's assent to the recommendations offered, Acheson sent a telegram containing the text of the policy memorandum agreed upon in the White House meeting to Secretary Byrnes in Paris. The telegram informs Secretary Byrnes that the Department was now at work preparing a draft reply for the Turkish government on the U.S. attitude towards the Soviet note, and that the

²¹ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 195; *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, p. 838, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)," signed "Acheson" and dated 13 August 1946.

²² Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 195-196; Jones pp. 63-64; Millis, Walter, ed. *The Forrestal Diaries*. New York: The Viking Press, 1951. p. 192. Forrestal's diary makes clear the leading role that Acheson took in the White House meeting, during which Acheson referred to the Soviet note as a "trial balloon." For specific examples of new press trends, apparently instigated by Acheson and other U.S. officials, after the 15 August meeting, see: Leffler, Melvyn P. "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952." *The Journal of American History*. Vol. 71, No. 4. Mar., 1985. p. 812.

President asked specifically for his comments on the agreed-upon policy memorandum. The most striking aspect of the memorandum is the emphasis given to Turkey's central position in U.S. interests, and Turkey's need for U.S. support:

We, therefore, feel that it is in the vital interests of the United States that the Soviet Union should not by force or through threat of force succeed in its unilateral plans with regard to the Dardanelles and Turkey. If Turkey under pressure should agree to the Soviet proposals, any case which we might later present in opposition to the Soviet plan before the United Nations or to the world public would be materially weakened; but the Turkish government insists that it has faith in the United Nations system and that it will resist by force Soviet efforts to secure bases in Turkish territory even if Turkey has to fight alone. While this may be the present Turkish position, we are frankly doubtful whether Turkey will continue to adhere to this determination without assurance of support from the United States.²³

Following that statement, the memorandum asserts that the U.S. must make clear to the USSR its determination to resort, if necessary, to arms in order to defend its interests, and to "resist with all means at our disposal" if the Soviets were to launch hostilities against Turkey.²⁴ Consequently, the U.S. position vis-à-vis Turkey was finally clear, but exactly what kinds of aid, and how that aid would be provided, would be determined in the following months and years. The various aspects of the U.S. effort to aid Turkey would begin to converge and, throughout the entire process, Under Secretary Acheson would remain at the forefront of U.S. policy-formation and decision-making towards Turkey.

The day following the White House meeting, 16 August 1946, Acheson sent a memorandum to President Truman concerning the Turkish-Soviet issue. This memorandum explains that, as per President Truman's instructions, Secretary Byrnes had been informed of the previous

²³ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, p. 841.

²⁴ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 840-842, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris," signed "Acheson"; Millis, p. 192. The original of Acheson's telegram is in the College Park NARA archives, Record Group 84, in Box 1 of the "Top Secret General Records, 1947-1949" materials from the U.S. Ankara Embassy, numbered 030-800, in a file folder labeled "800 Political Affairs 45-1948." The folder originally was labeled "47-1948" but the "47" had been crossed out and "45" written in pencil. Forrestal stated that the White House meeting took place at 3.30 in the afternoon, and Acheson's telegram to Byrnes was sent at 6.00 pm.

day's meeting's results and asked for his comments. The Secretary's remarks had arrived as well as his suggestions for the official State Department proposal that would be sent to the Turkish government. The memorandum then asks for the President's approval of the Department's communication to the Turkish government concerning the Soviet note, and for sending a note to the Soviet government concerning the same issue. Finally, Acheson asks whether publishing the U.S. note to the Soviet Union, but not the U.S. note to the Turkish government also meets with the President's approval. All of Acheson's suggestions were approved by President Truman.²⁵

The communication that Acheson proposed to send to the Turkish government is also included in the *FRUS* documents. Apparently, Acheson and the President were working with haste because the telegram to Ambassador Wilson is marked as being sent at 1.00 pm, which means that Acheson's memorandum, explained in the previous paragraph, had been sent and approval from the President obtained in the morning. The official communication to the Turkish government enclosed with the telegram states that the U.S. government remained committed to its opinion, expressed to the Turkish government in November 1945, that the Turkish Straits were not a matter that concerned only the Black Sea littoral powers, that defenses on the Turkish Straits should not be an issue of Turkish-Soviet cooperation, and that the U.S. would gladly participate in a conference aimed at renegotiating the Montreux Treaty. The text of Acheson's telegram explains in detail what Ambassador Wilson should say to Turkish officials, including that the message to the Turkish government had been composed at the highest levels of the U.S. government, that the Turkish government should adopt a "reasonable, but firm" stance towards the Soviets, and that any agreement to a conference on the Montreux Treaty implied only agreement to examine possible changes to the Montreux

²⁵ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, p. 843, "Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman," signed "Dean Acheson" and dated 16 August 1946. Note 65 on the same page indicates that President Truman had stamped his approval on the memorandum.

regime.²⁶

The next day, Acting Secretary Acheson sent another message to Secretary Byrnes in Paris. This telegram informed the Secretary of the Department's course of action in reference to the Straits issue, and that the Department had obtained the President's approval for the text of the note to the Soviets and for provision of the note to the press at an appropriate hour. Consequently, the Secretary's views were also requested because of the matter's magnitude. Secretary Byrnes relayed his comments the same day, and one day later Ambassador Wilson sent a telegram summarizing a conversation with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Hasan Saka, in which Saka stated that the Turkish government would follow the U.S. government's suggestions concerning the Soviet note and a possible Montreux Treaty conference.²⁷

The result of this flurry of telegrams was the diplomatic note that Acheson forwarded to the Soviet Chargé on 19 August 1946. This note, as is well-known, stated the U.S. government's rejection of the Soviet views that the Turkish Straits were a matter that concerned only the Black Sea littoral powers and that defense of the Straits should be a joint Turkish-Soviet project. The same note also emphasized the United Nations' relevance to such matters of international importance and agreed to the proposal for an international conference charged with revising some of the Montreux Treaty's specifications.²⁸ For two weeks, Acting Secretary Acheson had been deeply and directly involved in formulating U.S. policy and response towards the Straits issue. In his memoirs, Acheson also summarized the events that occurred after the 15 August White House meeting, and mentions specifically what he told

²⁶ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 843-844, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)," signed "Acheson" and dated 16 August 1946.

²⁷ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, p. 845, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris," signed "Acheson" and dated 17 August 1946. For the Byrnes and Wilson telegrams see: *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 846-847.

²⁸ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 847-848, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Chargé (Orekhov)," signed "Dean Acheson" and dated 19 August 1946.

the press.²⁹ After this point, Turkish-U.S relations would be a topic that imposed increasing strains on his duties as Under Secretary of State, and the most intensive months were still in the future.

The final document from August 1946 that illustrates Acheson's personal involvement in Turkish-U.S. affairs is a memorandum of conversation dated several days after the official U.S. response to the Soviet Straits note was forwarded to the Soviet Chargé in Washington. On 20 August 1946 the British Ambassador to the U.S., Lord Inverchapel, requested a meeting with the Acting Secretary, and the resulting conversation served to underline the gravity of the entire process that U.S. officials at the highest governmental levels had engaged in since the 7 August Soviet note. Inverchapel began by noting that Loy Henderson and H. Freeman Mathews both had recent conversations with British officials in which they indicated that the U.S. took an extremely grave attitude towards the Straits issue and "was prepared to see this matter through to the end"³⁰; these words had apparently inspired talk of war in London. Acheson explained that the U.S. position on the Straits matter resulted from agreement amongst the State, Navy, and War Departments, and was approved by President Truman. The essence of the situation was that the Administration had decided to treat the issue with the utmost seriousness in order to impress upon other actors the need to approach the matter with the same calm and reasoned attitude, so that rash or unexamined actions would not be taken. However, because Congress and public opinion were the fundamental long-term factors that would determine the course of U.S. policy, the Department had also

²⁹ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 196. On pp. 199-200 in his memoirs, Acheson strangely backtracks chronologically and provides an abbreviated review of the events that led up to the August 1946 dénouement in the Turkey-U.S.-USSR triangle. He devotes only one paragraph to the topic and mentions mostly the Armenian and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republics' claims on Northeastern Anatolia.

³⁰ In Acheson's 15 August telegram to Byrnes (see Note 24), he mentions that President Truman was prepared to pursue the policy recommendations "to the end," which is apparently the source of these comments.

communicated those sentiments to the press in hopes that the press would approach the issue with the same “solemnity and restraint.”³¹ In all, this exchange expresses well the influence that Acheson held over those vital two weeks in August 1946. Acheson’s approach to law was the same calm, rational, serious, and studied attitude. Furthermore, in attaching such great stakes to the Turkish Straits and Turkish sovereignty, the U.S. declared its interest in Turkish affairs. Acheson’s lawyerly attitude towards decision-making guided the process that resulted in that declaration.

In September 1946’s final days, Acting Secretary Acheson continued to receive telegrams and memorandums concerning Turkish issues from Ambassador Wilson and other sources. On 27 August, for example, Acheson informed Ambassador Wilson that the \$25 million Eximbank credits for Turkey had received approval, what the probable interest rate on the loan would be, and through which ministries the Turkish government told the bank it intended to utilize the funds.³²

The most important communication of late August 1946, however, came from the Secretary of War and the Acting Secretary of the Navy. This message included a memorandum from the JCS evaluating the strategic military significance of the Turkish Straits. After explaining the military implications of hypothetical Soviet bases on the Straits (that Soviet bases in the Straits would eventually reduce Turkey to the status of Soviet satellite), the memorandum’s authors wrote what would become its most repeated sentence: “Strategically Turkey is the most important military factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.” Afterwards, the memorandum moves on to the dire potential results of Turkey’s reduction to Moscow’s puppet, and then concludes by recommending that the U.S. encourage Turkish

³¹ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 849-850, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State,” signed “Dean Acheson” and dated 20 August 1946.

³² *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 911-912, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson),” signed “Acheson” and dated 27 August 1946. For other communications on the 1946 Eximbank loan issue, see Notes 13-17 above.

purchase of non-military U.S. supplies useful for reinforcing the Turkish economy and military, give permission for Turkish purchase of U.S. weapons as well as military aircraft and equipment, and send technicians and officers.³³ Again, noting Acheson's work habits, he almost certainly read that memorandum and would have added its content to the facts with which he evaluated the steps that the Truman Administration would take towards its relations with Turkey over the following months.

2.3.4. September 1946-January 1947

Between September 1946 and February 1947, when the crisis that resulted in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan erupted, Acheson would remain involved in the ongoing development of Turkey-U.S. affairs. In late September 1946, the USSR once again sent a diplomatic note concerning the Turkish Straits to the Turkish government, in essence a continuation of the dialogue Moscow initiated in August. On 30 September, Acting Secretary Acheson conveyed to Secretary Byrnes's Press Assistant the Department's public stance towards the new Soviet note, that it would be handled by the Navy, State, and War Departments in the same manner as the August Soviet note had been.³⁴

From 4-8 October 1946, Acting Secretary Acheson authored another group of telegrams, apparently after the State Department's official response to the Soviet note had been formulated. The first note, on 4 October, informed Secretary Byrnes that the State and Navy Departments agreed on the desirability of the U.S. warship *Randolph* visiting two Turkish

³³ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 856-858, "The Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Acting Secretary of the Navy (Kenney) to the Acting Secretary of State," dated 28 August 1948.

³⁴ For the text of the Soviet note, see: *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 860-866, "The Chargé in Turkey (Bursley) to the Secretary of State," signed "Bursley" and dated 26 September 1946. For Acheson's 30 September note, see: *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 868-869, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)," signed "Acheson."

ports, Izmir and Marmaris. Interestingly, Acheson suggests that the *Randolph's* calling at these ports and others in the Eastern Mediterranean would help establish such visits as a “routine matter rather than as diplomatic or political gestures” since the U.S. was in the process of establishing a long-term naval presence in the Mediterranean. The implication, that Acheson did not see the USS *Missouri's* visit to İstanbul as a diplomatic gesture, is clear. Acheson also thought that the recent Soviet note did not warrant a change in the *Randolph's* schedule in light of Izmir's being a “considerable distance” from the Dardanelles.³⁵

The following day, Acheson forwarded to the U.S. Ankara embassy the State Department's draft reply to the new Soviet note. The draft was succinct, stating that the U.S. position, as expressed in August, was unchanged, that the discussions in Potsdam had foreseen mutual discussion of the Turkish Straits issue by the powers, not by one of the powers with Turkey directly, that Turkey should be solely responsible for the Straits' defense, and that any aggressive threat against the Straits would be referred to the U.N. Security Council. Acheson added that the Department would not be sending any advice or comments to the Turkish government until they had the Turkish government's draft reply and comments from Secretary Byrnes.³⁶

After receiving Secretary Byrnes' assent, Acheson sent the note to President Truman on 8 October for approval, noting that Secretary Byrnes and the Secretaries of the Navy and War had also approved the message. He explained to the President that the note, once approved and forwarded to Moscow, would be sent to Ankara, all the Montreux Treaty signatory states, and released to the press. These steps were necessary because the note's content was directed more towards the Soviet government, the Department desired to avoid giving the impression

³⁵ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, p. 871, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris,” signed “Acheson” and dated 4 October 1946.

³⁶ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 872-873, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Turkey (Bursley),” signed “Acheson” and dated 5 October 1946. According to Note 91 on p. 872, the same draft was sent to Secretary Byrnes in Paris.

that the U.S. was using the Turkish government as a tool to prod the Soviets, and the press would “undoubtedly” speculate inaccurately on the message if it was not made public. The President’s approval was obtained, apparently in the morning, and the note was forwarded to Moscow at noon the same day; the U.S. embassy in Ankara was informed later in the evening. The only notable aspect of the note sent to the Soviets was that Acheson used first person possessive several times in stating “my Govt.” Acheson’s message to Ankara explained to the U.S. Chargé that the Turkish government should be informed of the steps the U.S. government had taken, asked for the Turkish reply’s final version so that it could be given to the U.S. press, and approved of the “non-provocative and temperate tone” of the draft Turkish reply.³⁷

After the intense work that the State Department devoted to the August and September 1946 Soviet diplomatic notes to the Turkish government, and in the wake of the JCS’s late August 1946 strategic evaluation of Turkey and the Near East and Africa desk’s October 1946 political policy evaluation of Turkey, the State Department’s efforts on different economic, military, and political issues related to Turkey began to converge. During 1946’s remaining months, the other *FRUS* documents that Acheson authored were placed under an economic heading, but in reality those communications began to embrace aspects of diplomatic, military, and political strategy as well as economic aid.³⁸

³⁷ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 873-874, “Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman,” signed “Dean Acheson” and dated 8 October 1946. For the note to Moscow, see: *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 874-875, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith),” signed “Acheson” and dated 8 October 1946. For the note to Ankara, see: *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, p. 875, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Turkey (Bursley),” signed “Acheson” and dated 8 October 1946. Note 98 on p. 875 mentions that a copy of the same telegram was sent to Secretary Byrnes.

³⁸ The title that the *FRUS* editors gave to the second section (of a total of two) of the 1946 documents related to Turkey is “Interest of the United States in Finding Ways and Means to Aid Turkey.” Naturally, “aid” can have more than just an economic meaning, but not until after the events of August-September-October 1946 did the documents focus more on the military aspect of aid. Until that point, the aid conversation had concerned mostly the Exim

The merging of various U.S. strategic interests related to Turkey is reflected in the first *FRUS* document sent by Acheson after the late September-early October 1946 response to the Soviet note. On 8 November, the Under Secretary composed a lengthy and detailed telegram to the U.S. Ambassador in Turkey; notable for the knowledge of and sensitivity towards Turkey that Acheson displays, the message takes in hand the problem of providing military aid to Turkey. Acheson opens the message by explaining that “a number” of meetings had been held to discuss the “delicate question of the providing of arms and military supplies to Turkey” since Secretary Byrnes’ return in late October. He then goes on to describe the quandary in which the State Department found itself, that the U.S. needed to reassure Turkey that its sovereignty was a matter of more than superficial importance to the U.S., but that providing such assurances had to be done in a tactful manner which would not give fuel to rumors in the U.S. and abroad that the U.S. was trying to provoke the USSR through Turkey, or to instigate Turkish-Russian hostilities. Consequently, the State Department had decided to defer this problem to the British, and to direct the supply of weapons and other military supplies to Turkey through British channels. He requested that the personnel at the U.S. embassy be informed of this situation so that uniform answers could be supplied to Turkish officials if they approached those personnel with requests for military aid. In case some Turkish requests for certain types of military aid could not be fulfilled by the British, the U.S. would consider indirectly or directly providing that aid, but that would not be the preferred option. Acheson then provided a summary of the State Department’s policy towards Turkey at that juncture, a policy which would be dramatically changed four months later:

Bank loans and the settlement of Lend-Lease claims. Supplies or vehicles with potential military uses had cropped up in the dialogue from time-to-time, but were not a main object of consideration. Overall, the dialogue is dominated by fears about how Soviet officials will interpret any sort of aid the U.S. provides to Turkey. For these documents, see: *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 899-916 *passim*.

We feel sure that in the various discussions which may arise in this connection with appropriate Turkish officials, you will be able to make it clear that our reluctance to furnish arms and military equipment direct is not due to any unwillingness on our part openly to support Turkey in its efforts to retain its independence and territorial integrity but rather to our feeling that in the world situation the wiser course would be for the Turks to look to the British.

In sum, the U.S. had decided that Turkey should receive U.S. military aid, but the current political situation made such an act extremely problematic. Acheson closed the message with reference to the Turkish request that the Turkish warship *Yavus* be refurbished for modern warfare, and mentioned that the British would be asked to carry out this task.³⁹

In the weeks following Acheson's 8 November message, he would author several more communications concerning U.S. efforts to provide aid to the Turkish government as concerns about the Turkish economy became graver. On 13 November, Acheson, as Acting Secretary, sent a telegram to Wilson indicating that approval had been obtained for a credit which would fund the sale of six ships to Turkey. On 15 November, Acheson sent another telegram to Ambassador Wilson; this message gently scolds the embassy's Economic Affairs Counselor Edward Lawson for not providing prompt details on his discussions with British representatives in Ankara concerning the Turkish economy (apparently information had arrived in Washington from British channels and not from Lawson). The message also includes topic suggestions, including details on the current state of the Turkish economy, what kinds of and how much assistance are needed for the Turkish economy, and which Turkish governmental projects, whether ongoing or planned, will need foreign assistance or

³⁹ *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 916-917, "The Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)," signed "Dean Acheson" and dated 8 November 1946. The long quote is from p. 917. Secretary Byrnes mentions in his memoirs that he had returned from Paris approximately a week before the 5 November 1946 U.S. midterm elections; see: Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime*, p. 379. Acheson's message came only three days after the Democrats' massive defeat in the 1946 midterm elections. The hostile political atmosphere must have affected the State Department's calculations in regard to Turkey. The *Yavus* is assumed to be the same ship that was originally the German warship *Goeben*. For a highly informative description of the domestic U.S. political atmosphere after the 1946 midterm elections, see: Jones pp. 89-99. For a summary of how fundamentally U.S. policy towards foreign military aid changed in late 1946 and early 1947, see: Pach p. 108.

purchases. Acheson closes the telegram by mentioning that information on all of these points will be helpful for the State Department's plans regarding a program of Turkish economic aid, which was already under development. Before the end of 1946, Acheson's only other telegram included in the *FRUS* documents on Turkish issues was to relay a message concerning economic aid for Turkey from Loy Henderson to Ambassador Wilson.⁴⁰

In January 1947, Acheson did not author any new messages concerning Turkish affairs. George C. Marshall became Secretary of State on 21 January, and Acheson agreed to stay on for six more months in order to ease the transition for Secretary Marshall. Acheson, in his memoirs, refers to the choice of Marshall for Secretary of State as "an act of God" at an extremely ominous historical juncture. Acheson also describes his 21 January meeting with Marshall after the new Secretary had taken the oath of office. In that conversation, Marshall told Acheson that he would be the Secretary's "chief of staff" and all Department business "... would come to the Secretary through the Under Secretary with his recommendation unless the Under Secretary chose to decide the matter himself." Years later, Acheson would state that, "... for the first time in the history of the State Department, there was a line of command." Acheson's importance to policy formation in the State Department thus increased another order of magnitude.⁴¹

⁴⁰ For the ship sale credit, see: *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, p. 919, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)," signed "Acheson" and dated 13 November 1946. For the 15 November message, see: *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, p. 919-920, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)," signed "Acheson." For Henderson's message, see: *FRUS* 1946, Vol. 7, p. 923, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)," signed "Acheson" and dated 12 December 1946.

⁴¹ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 212-213; Jones pp. 106-107, 110-113; Pogue, Forrest C. *George C. Marshall: Statesman*. New York: Viking, 1987. pp. 146-149.

2.3.5. February 1947

Under Secretary Acheson's first 1947 message on Turkish issues was dated 24 February, after Britain informed the U.S. government that responsibility for aid to Greece and Turkey was henceforth on American shoulders. The British notes triggered a vigorous and months-long bureaucratic process resulting in striking and historical U.S. foreign policy events. Most obvious are the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, but both initiatives also meant fundamental changes in the U.S. relationship with the Turkish Republic. Throughout all of these developments, Dean Acheson led the State Department's response.

The span of time from late February 1947 to early June 1947 was most famously described in Joseph M. Jones's *The Fifteen Weeks*.⁴² This study's analysis of that period will thus follow Jones's analysis and add information from the *FRUS* documents when necessary, since Jones composed his book long before the *FRUS* documents were available. Jones's text also makes clear how vital Acheson was to the unfolding process that created a new place for the Turkish Republic in U.S. foreign policy. Acheson, in his memoirs, refers to the February 1947 Greece-Turkey situation as "my crisis."⁴³

The British notes were forwarded to the State Department on 21 January, the previous Friday, but Secretary Marshall had left Washington early that day. As a result the State Department, under Acheson's direction, had the weekend to prepare memorandums on the various matters that the British notes affected directly. Clark Clifford mentions that Acheson called the President once the contents of the British notes was known, and the first concern identified was that support would have to come from Congress in order to obtain the funds necessary to

⁴² Jones, Joseph M. *The Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947)*. New York: The Viking Press, 1955.

⁴³ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 219.

aid Greece and Turkey. As for Acheson's 24 February note to Secretary Marshall, the language which he uses is notable for its lack of ambiguity: independent Greece and Turkey "will not survive" without aid, which means that the rest of the Eastern Mediterranean "will fall under Russian control." Finally, the memorandum asserts that the Navy, State, Treasury, and War Departments need to examine the problem posthaste, make recommendations, and then discuss the matter with Congressional leaders; all of this process should be completed within one week.⁴⁴

Joseph Jones states that during the single week from 21-28 February 1947, the realization that responsibility for leadership in the Eastern Mediterranean specifically, and in the world more generally, had been passed to the United States, infused the State Department with a singleness of purpose. During that week, a series of meetings at the highest administration levels set U.S. foreign policy on a new course. Two aspects of Jones's narrative are most important for this study. The first is the fact, emphasized repeatedly by Jones, that Acheson was at the helm of this week-long process. Acheson's role culminated in his celebrated exposition at a meeting with Congressional leaders on Thursday, 27 February 1947. In this meeting, Secretary Marshall's presentation was not forceful or clear enough to persuade Congressional members focused on their parochial tariff and budget interests. Acheson took the stage and, using the rhetorical skills he had developed in the courts, gave a powerful presentation of the historical moment that the United States faced. His performance ensured Congressional support for what became the Truman Doctrine. The other vital action that

⁴⁴ *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 44-45, "Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State," signed "Dean Acheson." Note 1 on p. 44 suggests that, even though Acheson was the author of the memorandum, it was intended to be labeled as from the Secretary to the President. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 217-219; Clifford, Clark. *Counsel to the President: A Memoir*. New York: Random House, 1991. p. 131. Jones pp. 3-8, 129-134; Pach p. 109. Jones mentions on p. 112 that Marshall usually gave Acheson responsibility for briefing President Truman on policy matters, and emphasizes on p. 132 how well Acheson, as well as Henderson and Hickerson, knew the issues related to the Greece-Turkey situation.

Acheson took was to inform the press unofficially of what was occurring; in essence, Acheson kick-started the public relations campaign that the Administration would have to implement in order to win public support for the new foreign policy reality dawning on U.S. citizens in the following weeks and months.⁴⁵

During that same week, only one other document authored by Acheson is included in the *FRUS* records even though Acheson's comments are included in several others. This memorandum was authored on 27 February for Loy Henderson after the morning meeting with Congressional leaders. In the memorandum, Acheson explains that the aid to Greece and Turkey has been approved by the President, the Secretaries of Navy, State, and War, and Congressional leaders, and then lists what steps need to be taken by the Office of Near East and African Affairs, which will coordinate the actions described in the memorandum's text. Other than coordinating communications with the British, the appropriate U.S. ambassadors, and the relevant departments, the most important tasks listed are preparing Congressional legislation for the aid program, preparing Presidential speeches to Congress and the U.S. public, and initiating a public information campaign to support the legislation and new foreign policy course.⁴⁶

2.3.6. March-June 1947

Over the three-plus months that followed 21-28 February 1947, Under Secretary Acheson's

⁴⁵ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 219; Jones pp. 129-147. Pogue pp. 161-165. Pogue notes that there is a problem in the 27 February meeting's historical record because neither Truman's memoirs nor Vandenberg's diaries mention Acheson's comments in that meeting, whereas both Acheson and Jones give great attention to what Acheson said.

⁴⁶ *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 63-64, "Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)," signed "Dean Acheson." For all of the *FRUS* documents related to the events of 21-28 February 1947, see: *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 32-71 *passim*.

efforts to construct the novel U.S. geopolitical role in the wake of Great Britain's retreat focused on two separate tasks (in addition to the normal day-to-day tasks that Acheson, as Acting Secretary for most of March and April 1947, had to fulfill). The first of these tasks was to direct and advise the State Department's work in developing speeches and policy papers. The most important of these was the Truman Doctrine speech itself, which was written in the State Department, and the main arguments of which were composed by Acheson from the contributions of State Department staff. Jones summarizes the drafting of the Truman Doctrine speech thus:

The State Department drafted the message. The White House pointed it up and stylized it for presidential delivery. Acheson, using the contributions of many, selected the major lines of argument, phrased a number of parts, and edited the whole closely.

That is, the decisions which determined the eventual content and form of the Truman Doctrine address were made almost exclusively by Acheson. Even though the speech's drafting went on for nearly two weeks, from 28 February to 10 March 1948, and a number of individuals also contributed to writing the content, Acheson controlled the speech's essence.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 220-223; Clifford pp. 133-137; Jones pp. 148-170; Millis pp. 250-252; Pach pp. 113-115. Quote from Jones p. 148. Clifford, in Notes 2,3, and 5 on p. 679, asserts the role that he and the White House played in drafting the Truman Doctrine speech, and is of the opinion that no one person could be credited with the speech's "paternity." Jones is clear and seemingly open about the role that others played in the speech's drafting, but that did not seem to satisfy Clifford. For some of the other issues that Acheson paid personal attention to connection with the Truman Doctrine effort, see: *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, p. 71, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)," signed "Dean Acheson" and dated 1 March 1947, and two Aide-Mémoires, on pp. 72-73, included with that memorandum; *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, p. 79, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State," unsigned and dated 4 March 1947, and an Aide-Mémoire, on pp. 79-81, included with that memorandum; *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, p. 95, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey," signed "Acheson" and dated 5 March 1947; *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, p. 98-99, "The Acting Secretary of State to President Truman," unsigned and undated; *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 99-100, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Berlin," signed "Dean Acheson" and dated 7 March 1947; *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, p. 105, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of

While the effort to finalize the Truman Doctrine speech continued, Acheson also launched the bureaucratic processes that would result in the Marshall Plan. On 5 March 1947, Acheson asked the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) to study the question of whether other countries in the world were also in need of aid similar to that offered through the Greece-Turkey aid program. The essential problem was to identify other situations, resulting from the decline in Great Britain's strength and the changed world conditions, in which nations might need aid, and to provide that aid before a crisis point was reached. According to Jones, this was the period in which State Department thinking and planning became truly global. Furthermore, most of the countries identified as potential aid candidates by the SWNCC studies were in Europe. In another early March Cabinet meeting, Acheson apparently foresaw the need for committees of U.S. experts to travel to countries that the U.S. proposed to aid in order to understand their needs more comprehensively.⁴⁸

State," signed "Dean Acheson" and dated 8 March 1947; *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 109-110, "Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, March 12, 1947, 10:30 a.m."; *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 116-117, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State," signed "Dean Acheson" and dated 14 March 1947; *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 121-123, "Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Public Affairs (Russell)," signed "Francis H. Russell" and dated 17 March 1947 (describes process of Truman Doctrine speech's drafting);

⁴⁸ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 226-227; Jones pp. 199-206; Millis p. 252, 263-264. For Acheson's requests that resulted in the SWNCC reports, see: *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 94-95, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson)," signed "Dean Acheson" and dated 5 March 1947; *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, p. 96, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson)," signed "Dean Acheson" and dated 6 March 1947. For the effects of the SWNCC reports on not only the Marshall Plan speech but other aspects of U.S. policy, see: Pach 117-131. Pach explains that the reports requested by Acheson became SWNCC 360, a report which revealed the new global propensities in both civilian and military foreign policy thought, saw military aid as a "major, continuing instrument" for U.S. foreign policy, and made the connection between military aid and U.S. national security. The report urged expansion of U.S. military aid to foreign states and identified Turkey as a country which needed (or might soon require) emergency military aid. Military officials agreed heartily with this report. The SWNCC committee also formulated a priority list in which nations were listed according to the urgency that they required military aid from the U.S.; Turkey was placed second on this list, behind Greece. After these reports, and after the Truman Doctrine, the main impediment to increased aid to Turkey would be Congress. A speculative July 1947 SWNCC report listed Turkey among the nations with which "goodwill

The SWNCC studies that Acheson initiated would serve as the basic material for two important speeches. The first was Acheson's speech to the Delta Council on 8 May 1947, and the second would be Secretary Marshall's Harvard commencement address on 5 June. President Truman asked Acheson to give the Delta Council speech on 7 April, so Acheson convened a meeting with Francis Russell and Joseph Jones to discuss what he should say. Jones had been working on one of the SWNCC committees carrying out economic studies related to Acheson's original 5 March directive. Drawing on those studies, Jones explained to Acheson, in more concrete terms, a situation with which Acheson was generally familiar: the abilities of several important European countries, especially Great Britain and France, to buy U.S. goods would be exhausted soon, U.S. public concern over the situation in Europe was swelling rapidly, the Soviets were dead set against allowing Germany to function in a manner that would contribute to European recovery, and reaction to the ideological content of the Truman Doctrine was gaining energy and proponents. Consequently, Acheson's speech would focus on the economic dimension of foreign countries' need for U.S. aid, and the determination of the Truman Administration to use the vast resources of the U.S. economy to provide that aid. In effect, Acheson's speech became a preliminary statement of the Marshall Plan.⁴⁹

The Marshall Plan speech drew on several sources, but Secretary Marshall had told Acheson that he wanted to speak on a topic similar to that of Acheson's Delta Council speech. Joseph

and a common military orientation" needed to be established in order to preserve military collaboration during a potential war with the USSR, but that this would not include a large increase in military aid because Congress probably would not approve the financial aid necessary for many of the nations to buy the military aid from the U.S. The financial aspect of the problem is exactly what the Marshall Plan was intended to address. This period of change was also the point at which State Department officials became more aggressive than the service branches in promoting foreign military aid. McLauchlan, on pp. 14-17, summarizes some of the trends that contributed to this metamorphosis in the State Department's mentality.

⁴⁹ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 227-230; Clifford pp. 143-144; Jones pp. 206- 213, 232-233, 239.

Jones was again charged with writing a first draft of Marshall's speech in mid-May 1947. As Jones explains, the primary problem that faced the State Department in May 1947, and to which the Marshall Plan speech would provide an answer, was how to provide aid to European countries that would not ask for that aid. In the two months that had passed since the Truman Doctrine speech, U.S. public opinion had come to support the provision of aid to Europe, so this was no longer the main difficulty. Thus, the other main concern was to provide that aid without specifying an ideological motivation and without dividing Europe by not including the USSR amongst the countries to which aid was offered. Even though Acheson was actually against using the Harvard commencement speech to announce the U.S. offer of European aid, Marshall persisted. Acheson then made sure that British press representatives paid close attention to Marshall's speech. Even though Acheson's contribution to Marshall's address was not as fundamental as that for the Truman Doctrine speech, the ideas, data, and policy analysis that went into the speech had been largely generated during the bureaucratic process initiated by Acheson two months previously.⁵⁰

The second area which Acheson was most involved in was the effort to convince Congress not only to pass legislation granting the necessary authority and financial resources to the Administration, but also to act with alacrity and purpose. For this objective Acheson would, in addition to normal Capitol Hill lobbying efforts, spend much time testifying before Congressional committees in March 1947. Acheson's first appearance in support of the Greece-Turkey aid program came the day after President Truman's speech, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In that appearance Acheson explained that aid to Greece and Turkey were interlocking issues in which the succumbing of one to Soviet influence would inevitably result in the same fate for the other. Acheson also described Turkey's economic and military situation to the committee. Eventually, Acheson would provide extensive

⁵⁰ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 230-234; Clifford pp. 144-145; Jones pp. 239-256.

testimony to committees from both Houses of Congress, and the legislation, after being passed through Congress, was signed into law by President Truman on 22 May.⁵¹

An essential aspect of convincing Congress was the public relations effort to inform the American people of exactly what kind of crisis faced the country and why that crisis necessitated aiding countries on the opposite side of the world. During the early stages of the Truman Doctrine's composition, Acheson had spoken off-the-record with press representatives, and slightly later President Truman delegated responsibility to a small group of officials, including Acheson, for communicating the Administration's new foreign policy design to the press and public opinion leaders. In the month or so before Marshall's address, Acheson, Marshall, and other political figures foreshadowed some aspects of the Marshall Plan in their public comments, and in the weeks leading up to 5 June, Acheson and other officials began to give more specific information to the press concerning what foreign policy developments were on the horizon.⁵²

In regard to Turkey, Jones explains that the Administration faced a specific problem in explaining Turkey's inclusion in the new aid initiative to the public. He states that Turkey needed both economic and military aid but, because Turkey's situation was not as dire as

⁵¹ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 223-225; Jones pp. 188-198; Millis pp. 256-258. See also: *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, p. 116, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Moscow," signed "Acheson" and dated 13 March 1947; *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 120-121, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Moscow," signed "Dean Acheson" and dated 15 March 1947; *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 130-131, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey," signed "Acheson" and dated 24 March 1947; *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, p. 132, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Vandenberg)," signed "Dean Acheson" and dated 28 March 1947; *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 132-133, "The Acting Secretary of State to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.," signed "Dean Acheson" and dated 28 March 1947; *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, p. 138, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Moscow," signed "Dean Acheson" and dated 3 April 1947; *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 143-144, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Moscow," signed "Acheson" and dated 12 April 1947; *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 147-148, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Moscow," signed "Acheson" and dated 18 April 1947.

⁵² Jones pp. 144-145, 163, 168, 237-238; Millis p. 252.

Greece's, military aid would help the country resist Soviet pressure until economic aid from international institutions could be obtained. After the decision to aid Turkey primarily with military aid was made, officials then chose to downplay the Turkish aspect in Truman's 12 March speech. Two reasons are provided for this. First was the fact that U.S. citizens may have been excessively alarmed by the peacetime provision of military aid to a country that was not at war. Second was the need to avoid provoking the Soviet government. Consequently, even though the Turkish aspect of the aid "was not concealed," it also was not accorded excessive prominence.⁵³

After the President's 12 March Congressional speech, one difficulty that Jones mentions, and asserts that the State Department "fully anticipated," was the fact that Turkey was not a democracy in the sense that Americans understood. The result was that Turkey's apparent lack of democracy became an issue that the opposition used to attack the Greece-Turkey aid program. Most importantly, Jones states that only the "best-informed experts" knew accurate information about the changes occurring in Turkey and understood their implications. Naturally, such people were, at that time, few in number. Even though Jones's evaluation of the Turkish government in 1947 is somewhat optimistic, he summarizes the situation realistically, saying that for a person to support aiding Turkey on democratic terms "required full information and a certain amount of faith."⁵⁴

In anticipation of retirement from the State Department, Acheson began to withdraw from policy-formation activities around the beginning of June 1947. This step was yet another reflection of the strong ethical stance that Acheson displayed towards his work. Clifford later would characterized the months of February-June 1947 as the period when Acheson was "the

⁵³ Jones pp. 162-163.

⁵⁴ Jones pp. 185, 187. Jones describes Turkey's political situation in 1947 as being "on the threshold of democracy," neglects the corrupt nature of the 1946 election, and uses the adjective "flourishing" to describe the state of the Turkish opposition press.

most important” of the U.S. officials guiding U.S. foreign policy into uncharted territory, and near the pinnacle of his prestige. Concurrently, Acheson was the primary steering factor as Turkish-American relations gained new, more complex, and ultimately more challenging dimensions.⁵⁵

2.3.7. July 1947-December 1948

After returning to civilian life at the beginning of July 1947, Acheson did not disassociate himself from the ongoing efforts to inform the public about the Marshall Plan. Instead, during the year-and-a-half that Acheson spent away from the State Department in 1947-1948, he remained highly active in promoting important foreign policy initiatives, especially those related to the Marshall Plan, known officially as the European Recovery Program (ERP). Even before the summer of 1947 ended, Acheson had taken on an “operational responsibility” in the Citizens’ Committee for the Marshall Plan, a group of outstanding figures who lent their voices to the effort to pass the ERP.⁵⁶

Acheson’s papers at the Truman Library provide some insight into how he remained connected to issues affecting Turkish-American relations even while he was out of the State Department. From these documents the researcher can observe both Acheson’s efforts in support of the Marshall Plan and the information to which he had access as a part of that endeavor. This discussion will use a handful of examples in order to illustrate both what Acheson did and to what extent the information that Acheson either generated or had access to was relevant to U.S. policy towards Turkey.

In Fall 1947, Acheson became a featured speaker and radio guest in the ongoing public

⁵⁵ Clifford p. 140; Jones p. 112

⁵⁶ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 240.

debate concerning the Marshall Plan. On 14 October 1947, Acheson appeared on ABC (the American Broadcasting Company) Radio's "Town Meeting" program in order to debate Henry J. Taylor on the merits of the Marshall Plan. Max Lerner, a prominent liberal Democrat of the time, also appeared. Henry J. Taylor gave an opposing presentation speech which referred specifically to Greece because he had travelled in Greece, but not Turkey. Acheson's presentation against Taylor and for the ERP did not mention Turkey, nor do the materials prepared for him for the debate; the question-and-answer session also did not include Turkey. In the same period, Acheson also traveled across the U.S. to provide local support for the Marshall Plan.⁵⁷

Acheson's papers at the Truman Library contain many documents that illustrate what information Acheson utilized or had access to in regard to his role in the Committee for the Marshall Plan. One inclusion is the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)⁵⁸ publication "Toward Total Peace: A Liberal Foreign Policy for the United States," which describes the political controversy over the Truman Doctrine as one in which two sides promoted a view that served their ends. The "pro" side needed a political crisis to push through unpopular foreign aid; the "con" side needed an issue to energize political opposition to the Truman Administration. The tract continues to explain that the aid package for Greece and Turkey was not an innovation in American foreign policy, and states specifically that it continued FDR's ideals. The tract, to illustrate its perspective, provides FDR's famous "Quarantine

⁵⁷ An announcement for this program, the materials that Acheson used to prepare for the program, and transcripts of the debate and the question-and-answer session afterwards can be found in Box 8 of the Truman Library's Acheson Papers, in the folder labeled "Marshall Plan Talks: California, Washington, Minnesota trip, 1947 [2 of 2]." The same file contains materials and transcripts of other Acheson speaking engagements from late 1947, and none of the materials mention Turkey.

⁵⁸ More details on the ADA can be found in Chapter 3 of this study.

Speech,”⁵⁹ and asserts that the ideas expounded by FDR in that address applied equally to Greece and Turkey in 1947. Following that, the tract refers to George Kennan’s equally famous “Long Telegram” of February 1946 as additional support.⁶⁰

Another pamphlet in the same file, called “The Marshall Plan or Else...” does discuss Turkey in relation to the Marshall Plan. The tract’s author, Livingston Hartley, uses precisely the approach developed in the State Department in 1946-1947 to argue, on pp. 3-4, that lack of support for Turkey (and other regional states) would ensure that Soviet influence increased in the Eastern Mediterranean and that U.S. access to Arabian oil might be endangered. Both this tract, and the ADA pamphlet mentioned in the previous paragraph, reflect ideas about the Marshall Plan of which the Truman Administration would already have approved, so they were probably not so much for Acheson’s reading as to provide examples of the pro-Marshall Plan information being provided to the public in late 1947.⁶¹

Another indication of how closely Acheson remained connected to Truman Administration efforts to promote the Marshall Plan and its passage through Congress is the letter sent by W.W. (Walt Whitman) Rostow to Acheson on 20 February 1948. At that time, Rostow was

⁵⁹ The “Quarantine Speech” elicited a vehement reaction from several isolationist arms of the U.S. media, but overall media and public response was later shown to be positive; see: Borg, Dorothy. “Notes on Roosevelt’s ‘Quarantine’ Speech.” *Political Science Quarterly*. Vol. 72, No. 3. Sep., 1957. pp. 425-433.

⁶⁰ “Toward Total Peace” is found in Box 4 “Political and Governmental File, 1933-1971” of the Truman Library’s Acheson Papers, in a file labeled “Committee for the Marshall Plan: Press Releases [1 of 2].” The pages referring specifically to the Truman Doctrine and aid to Greece and Turkey are 25-27. The ADA’s supporters are listed prominently on the tract’s cover and include Archibald MacLeish (a former university buddy of Dean Acheson), Reinhold Niebuhr, Eleanor Roosevelt, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Adlai Stevenson, and Sumner Welles. The other materials in the folder come from late 1947, and the ADA tract was apparently published in early December 1947.

⁶¹ Box 4 “Political and Governmental File, 1933-1971” of the Truman Library’s Acheson Papers, in a file labeled “Committee for the Marshall Plan: Press Releases [1 of 2].” Dependable information on Livingston Hartley is difficult to locate, but he apparently was a former State Department official; he is listed as a “Writer” on the attendee list for a March 1948 Committee for the Marshall Plan conference in Washington D.C. “The Marshall Plan or Else...” was published in December 1947 or January 1948.

in Geneva, Switzerland, acting as an aide to the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe's (UNECE) Executive Secretary; the commission was charged with developing the Marshall Plan. Rostow begins the letter by stating that, because Acheson was "responsible for giving this baby a chance to come to life," Rostow thought that the current circumstances warranted Acheson's using his influence to ensure that the Marshall Plan stayed on course. Rostow foresees two results at that juncture, that the Marshall Plan would either be conjoined with, and made complementary to, the UNECE's operations, or the Marshall Plan would be used to "break" the UNECE. For this reason, Rostow opines that a "quiet indication from the United States" that the European structure handling the Marshall Plan should not make the UNECE or a larger European agreement unworkable would have an important positive effect before the upcoming Paris negotiations. The unstated implication of the letter is that Acheson was known to have the connections necessary for such an indication to be secured. Interestingly, the report included with Rostow's letter mentions Greece only once and Turkey not at all.⁶²

In the spring of 1948, Acheson continued his activities in support of the Marshall Plan. On 5 March, the Committee for the Marshall Plan held a Conference for the European Recovery Program in order to lobby for the Plan's passage. The Conference's morning session featured Acheson chairing a bipartisan meeting of Congressional leaders. Acheson was obviously chosen for this task since he knew most Congress members on a first-name basis and had long experience lobbying Congress for various State Department causes. Acheson was also a speaker in the Conference's Executive Session, which was held in the afternoon after a

⁶² This document was found in the Truman Library's Acheson Papers, in the Assistant Secretary and Under Secretary of State File, 1941-1949, Box 28, in a folder labeled "State Department: General 1948." Four days previous to this letter, Rostow had prepared a detailed summary of progress in the various committees working on Marshall Plan issues in Geneva; that summary was enclosed with Rostow's letter to Acheson and can be found in the same Box and folder in the Truman Library's Acheson papers.

luncheon speech by Secretary of State Marshall. However, the Conference's program gives no indication that Turkey was a subject of discussion.⁶³

Eventually, the conclusion that Turkey was not an important subject of the debate around the Marshall Plan in late 1947-early 1948 becomes difficult to escape. Probably this indicates general public acceptance of the need to aid Turkey. From Acheson's correspondence with various officials, and his own speeches, it also seems clear that the aid to Greece and Turkey, while important, was not the most pressing issue of the day. On 10 March 1948, for example, Acheson gave a speech in Philadelphia concerning U.S. foreign policy; in a letter five days later, he mentioned to George McGhee that time limitations on the speech had kept him from touching on the "Greek-Turkish question," the result of which was that he "... could only re-emphasize the basic need and urgency of the European Recovery Plan itself." Obviously, if the issue of Greek-Turkish aid were more pressing, Acheson would have made time for the topic in his speech.⁶⁴

The atmosphere in the Committee for the Marshall Plan, of which Acheson was an Executive Committee member, also suggested that the issue of aid to Greece and Turkey had receded in importance. The minutes of a Committee for the Marshall Plan Executive Committee meeting, held a week after Acheson's Philadelphia speech, include the comment that packaging aid to China, Turkey and Greece in the ERP plan would no longer pose legislative

⁶³ Found in Box 4: "Political and Governmental File, 1933-1971" of the Acheson Papers held at the Truman Library, in a folder labeled "Committee for the Marshall Plan: Correspondence, 1947-1948 [3 of 3]." See also: Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 241.

⁶⁴ A photocopy of this letter was found in Box 4: "Political and Governmental File, 1933-1971" of the Acheson Papers held at the Truman Library. The file in which the letter was found is labeled "Committee for the Marshall Plan: Correspondence, 1947-1948 [3 of 3]." The letter is dated March 15, 1948 and addressed to George McGhee. A copy of McGhee's suggested inclusions concerning the Greece-Turkey aid is found in Box 8: "Political and Governmental File, 1933-1971" of the Truman Library's Acheson Papers, in a file titled "Marshall Plan Talks: Philadelphia Bulletin Forum, 10 March 1948." Why the two documents, which were originally composed as a whole, were filed separately is not apparent. See also: Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 241.

difficulties, and continues to state that Senator Vandenberg was “trying to report a Greek-Turkish aid bill out next week.”⁶⁵ This suggests that opposition to the Greece-Turkish aid in the Senate had been overcome. The impression is strengthened by the minutes of a subsequent meeting of the same Executive Committee. One simple sentence near the end states that the House had endorsed the Senate’s “China-Greece-Turkey aid bill.”⁶⁶ The topic had become a footnote to the meeting’s discussions. The ERP program was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Truman on 3 April 1948.

Acheson explains that, near November 1948’s conclusion, President Truman requested a visit from Acheson. Acheson thought nothing of the matter since he had remained in contact with the President on other responsibilities that Acheson maintained. As a result, he was “utterly speechless” when Truman asked him to replace George Marshall as Secretary of State.⁶⁷

2.3.8. January 1949-January 1953: Secretary of State Dean Acheson

2.3.8.1. 1949

Upon assuming the position of Secretary of State on 21 January 1949, Acheson’s involvement in relations with, and policy towards, Turkey resumed almost as if he had not been away for the previous eighteen months. Because the final agreement for the North Atlantic defense arrangement was only two months away, Turkish-American relations were of course focused on that topic.

⁶⁵ Found in Box 4: “Political and Governmental File, 1933-1971” of the Acheson Papers held at the Truman Library, in a folder labeled “Committee for the Marshall Plan: Minutes of Executive Committee, 1947-1948.” The minutes are dated March 18, 1948 and place the meeting in New York City’s Roosevelt Hotel.

⁶⁶ Ibid. The minutes are dated April 2, 1948 and place the meeting in the Biltmore Hotel in New York City.

⁶⁷ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 249.

In February, Turkish Ambassador to the U.S. Feridun Cemal Erkin called on Acheson's office in the first official conversation between the two after Acheson's becoming Secretary of State.⁶⁸ At the conversation's beginning, Erkin stated that the Turkish government had decided that, even though a Turkish role in the Atlantic Pact was not possible, it was "interested in the possibility of a Mediterranean pact in which Turkey could and should play a leading role." Erkin continued to explain that Turkey did not want a declaration from the North Atlantic Pact participants because it would not add anything to the Anglo-Turkish alliance or the Truman Doctrine, and instead possibly weaken Turkey's position since the Pact included countries such as "Luxembourg and Holland." Instead, if any declaration were included with the Pact announcement, Erkin wanted it to come solely from the U.S. since the Turkish government's real desire was to strengthen its relationship with the U.S. Turkish President İsmet İnönü had apparently raised the issue of high-level military discussions with Admiral Richard L. Conolly,⁶⁹ but they agreed that a political agreement needed to precede such talks. Acheson then remarked that his reading of the NATO Pact negotiations minutes made it clear that the countries involved intended no decrease in attention to the security of states, such as Turkey, that were not included in the Pact, that the Pact countries intended

⁶⁸ The Truman Library's Acheson Papers, Box 65: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in "January-February 1949" folder. See also: *FRUS* 1949, Vol. 4, pp. 117-120, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State," dated 17 February 1949. The conversation was also attended by John D. Jernegan, Head of the Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs Office, which had been created in 1948. This is the first conversation between Acheson and Erkin after Acheson became Secretary of State that this researcher has been able to identify. In Erkin's memoirs, he states that he began the conversation with congratulations for Acheson, but explains that he and Acheson had long been acquainted through their previous government responsibilities; see: Erkin, Feridun Cemal. *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl: Anılar-Yorumlar, II. Cilt, 1. Kısım*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992. p. 49.

⁶⁹ Admiral Richard L. Conolly visited Ankara on 31 January-2 February 1947 for discussions with Turkish officials, including President İsmet İnönü and Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak; see: *FRUS* 1947, Vol. 6, pp. 1640-1642, "The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State," signed "Wadsworth" and dated 3 February 1949. See also Notes 1-8 on pp. 1640-1641, which provide interesting details concerning the discussions between Admiral Conolly's group and Turkish officials. President İnönü apparently expected a more concrete and mutual military agreement than what the U.S. delegation was prepared to offer.

some sort of declaration to that effect, and that Erkin's comments clarified his ideas on the matter. Acheson continued to state that the essential hurdle to considering a new regional grouping, such as the one broached by Erkin, was Congress; the alternative to NATO had been a global security organization, but such a project would elicit great opposition from people who would see it as a rival to the U.N. Acheson explained that even consideration of a Mediterranean security group "would complicate things to an impossible extent, especially with relation to Congress." The result, Acheson went on to say, is that he had to be able, while presenting the NATO Pact, to tell Congress that there were no other regional security arrangements in development. Acheson hastily added that none of what he had explained precluded further regional security projects, but the issue needed to wait for a more propitious moment. Later, in response to more probing from Ambassador Erkin, Acheson averred that at the current juncture, he "... was simply not able... to say that we would consider or would not consider the creation of a Mediterranean pact," and asserted that a Turkey-U.S. agreement was unnecessary for the USSR to understand that the U.S. would "inevitably become involved" in the event of Soviet aggression against any state in Turkey's region.

Acheson's memoirs reflect a slightly different understanding of his Spring 1949 meetings with Turkish representatives than the memorandum related in the previous paragraph would suggest. Acheson described Turkish officials as displaying "considerable agitation" over their exclusion from the Pact, and that their "painful sense of abandonment" continued until Turkey was finally admitted to NATO in 1952. The statements attributed to Ambassador Erkin in the previous memorandum do not seem to indicate agitation since he actually rejects Turkish inclusion in the Pact. On the other hand, Erkin is clearly eager to see a declaration of U.S. support for Turkish sovereignty.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 279. Erkin's memoirs relate the same 17 February meeting in detail, and the essence of the reports prepared by both parties is similar, to the

Acheson's worries about Congressional support for the North Atlantic defense organization proposal were not exaggerated. In his memoirs, he notes in detail the efforts he carried out in early 1949 to coax votes from reluctant Senators and Representatives, writing that, in February alone, he met four times with top-ranking Senators. Ten days after Acheson's meeting with Ambassador Erkin, on 28 February 1949, Acheson conversed with several Senators concerning the North Atlantic mutual defense treaty then nearing completion. Tom Connally, the current Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Arthur Vandenberg, the previous Chairman of the same committee, were part of the conversation, along with Walter F. George, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. According to the Senators, even the inclusion of Italy in the Pact would create problems in the Senate. They also pointed out that the Pact would cause unspecified difficulties in regard to Greece and Turkey.⁷¹

Other issues related to Turkey and the North Atlantic pact occupied Acheson's time. An important problem was how to reassure the Turkish government and public that, even though Turkey was not going to be taken into the new defense organization, the U.S. still remained committed to Turkey's sovereignty and defense. Ambassador Erkin expressed concern about

point that several sentences reported by both sides are nearly identical. Importantly, what both sides reported that Erkin said to the press after the meeting corroborates. Some other details do differ, however. Erkin generally stresses the close, serious attention that Secretary Acheson gave to the Ambassador's views, including his emotional responses, whereas Acheson's report is marked by normal diplomatic detachment. Erkin begins his comments by explaining the Turkish government's response to Turkey's inclusion in the Pact being "not possible" (*imkânsız*), while Acheson's minutes record Ambassador Erkin as saying that the Turkish government had decided it "... could not appropriately participate in the North Atlantic arrangement." Erkin's account also makes clear that Congress, especially the Senate, was Acheson's primary concern; see: Erkin pp. 49-51. It should be noted that Erkin's memoirs were composed well after the *FRUS* documents were made available, but he does not seem to have used the *FRUS* documents while writing or without disclosing the reference. Most likely he was able to utilize the Turkish Foreign Ministry's archives.

⁷¹ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 277, 279. The Memorandum of Conversation is located in the Truman Library's Acheson Papers, Box 65: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in the "January-February 1949" folder.

that issue in his 17 February conversation with Acheson, and a statement or speech from U.S. sources had been proposed as a possible solution. On 9 March British Ambassador to the U.S., Sir Oliver Franks, called on Secretary Acheson. During the conversation Franks asked about a possible special statement concerning British and American interest in Greece, Turkey, and Iran; Acheson explained that he would probably give a speech, on or near the same date a draft of the NATO charter would be made public, which would emphasize the U.S.' commitment to those countries' sovereignty. Secretary Acheson had also discussed this speech's content, as well as whether such a statement should be made at all, with Ambassador Erkin in their 17 February conversation, but in terms of a hypothetical statement that would reiterate the Pact's interest in Turkey's sovereignty. Ambassador Franks, however, brought up the possibility of a signed declaration concerning Greece, Turkey, and Iran, which Acheson dismissed with alacrity, saying that "constitutional problems," i.e. Congressional difficulties, would be incited by any such signed statement.⁷²

That conversation was followed-up on 15 March when Franks brought to Acheson a proposed statement on Greece and Turkey from British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. Franks noted that Iran would not be included in Bevin's speech concerning the NATO Pact draft, and that Turkey "in particular" was known to desire a pact, "ratified by the U.S. Senate binding the U.S., and Great Britain, to go to war if Turkey should be attacked." At the end of the conversation, Acheson noted that he had already given Turkish officials assurance that a special mention of U.S. concern for Turkish sovereignty would be made upon the release of the NATO Charter draft, and that he knew the Turkish side would be "gravely disappointed" if such an announcement were not made. Franks said that he understood that Bevin had

⁷² Located in the Truman Library's Acheson Papers, Box 65: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in the "March 1949" folder; see also: *FRUS* 1949, Vol. 4, pp. 177-178, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State," dated 9 March 1949 and signed "For the Secretary C.H. Humelsine." The original document in the Truman Library archives does not have the Humelsine signature.

provided similar reassurances to Turkish officials.⁷³

The consummation of the North Atlantic Treaty at the beginning of April 1949 inspired other reflections on the important place that Turkey had come to occupy in U.S. foreign policy. Three days after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949, Secretary Acheson and President Truman met with the British and French Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors in a farewell chat. During the meeting, the topic of the 1947 decision to aid Greece and Turkey came up, which Acheson described as “the turning point.” Acheson explains that Truman’s stance on Turkey, after the Soviets had “threatened” Turkey, signaled “the administration to go ahead.”⁷⁴

Five days following that conversation, on 12 April 1949, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Necmeddin (Necmettin) Sadak, as well as Ambassador Erkin, called on Secretary Acheson. Erkin states in his memoirs that he specifically counseled Sadak to postpone his trip to the U.S. until the situation surrounding the formation of the North Atlantic Pact had settled and better consultations with U.S. officials could be obtained. This advice was ignored and Sadak’s journey occurred within a month of the treaty’s signing, for the ostensible purpose of Sadak’s joining United Nations General Assembly meetings. Erkin also indicates that State Department officials were not pleased by the timing of Sadak’s visit. Sadak was accompanied by a wordy thank you note from Turkish President İsmet İnönü.⁷⁵

⁷³ Located in the Truman Library’s Acheson Papers, Box 65: “Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953” in the “March 1949” folder. An excerpt from Bevin’s proposed speech is included with the Memorandum, and strongly asserts British support for Greek and Turkish sovereignty. Erkin relates the basic ideas of the statement that Acheson did eventually make upon the North Atlantic Treaty’s signing; see: Erkin pp. 63-64.

⁷⁴ Located in the Truman Library’s Acheson Papers, Box 65: “Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953” in the “April 1949” folder.

⁷⁵ Erkin p. 63. Turan, İlhan, hazırlayan. *İsmet İnönü: Konuşma, Demeç, Makale, Mesaj ve Söyleşiler 1944-1950*. Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları, 2003. p. 261. For an English translation of İnönü’s message, see: *FRUS* 1949, Vol. 6, p. 1646, “The

In contrast to the summary that Erkin provided for his initial meeting with Acheson, the Turkish Ambassador's version of Sadak's one-and-a-half hour conference with the Secretary of State is far briefer than the minutes kept by Acheson, which runs to seven pages and contains great detail. The first interesting aspect of the conversation is Sadak's reference to Fall 1948 negotiations in Ankara with the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors, during which Turkish officials asked about Turkey's potential inclusion in the proposed North Atlantic defense organization. Sadak explained that, in response, Turkish officials were told Italy would not be included, and that the Turkish government duly informed both the Turkish parliament and the Turkish public of the purely geographical nature of the proposed North Atlantic Treaty. The understanding was that another organization would be arranged for the Mediterranean. Sadak continued to explain that, when it turned out that not only Italy but also the French possessions in North Africa would be included amongst the treaty nations, the Turkish government's plans were completely overturned, and the Turkish public felt great confusion about whether the Western states were actually concerned with Turkey's security. Sadak then enumerated some of the "heavy sacrifices" that the Turkish state and people had endured since 1945, and closed his opening remarks by asking what he should tell the Turkish parliament and people about the U.S. government's attitudes towards Turkish security concerns.

Secretary Acheson responded by stating that the U.S. government took the issue of Turkish security so seriously that he, as Under Secretary of State, had devoted nearly an entire week in 1946 to that issue after Moscow's note proposing Soviet bases in the Straits. According to the Secretary, President Truman had directed Acheson to hold meetings with the Secretaries of War and Navy, and with the Army, Navy, and Air Force Chiefs of Staff. Those

President of Turkey (İnönü) to President Truman," signed "İsmet İnönü" and dated 31 March 1949.

consultations resulted in agreement that the USSR intended to establish hegemony over Turkey, "... and that this would be contrary to the vital interests of the U.S." Furthermore, the decision to support Turkey was made knowing that the Soviets may be provoked by the action, but the President considered "... this the most important decision he had made subsequent to the bombing of Hiroshima."⁷⁶

Secretary Acheson continued with more brief summaries of recent developments that affected Turkish-U.S. ties, mentioning specifically the statement that President Truman released in October 1948 in commemoration of the Turkish Independence Day, and the Secretary's own comments concerning the recently signed North Atlantic Pact. He concluded this explanation by saying that he had discussed with President Truman the importance of Turkey to U.S. interests "a dozen to twenty times," and that Turkey's exclusion from the pact in no way diminished that reality. Towards the end of these statements, Acheson's tone betrays some exasperation.

Despite Acheson's comments, Sadak continued to press, asking that if Turkey were as important to U.S. interests as the Secretary had asserted, then why had Turkey been excluded from the Pact? Would it be possible for the Turkish Foreign Minister to obtain reassurance from the Secretary that hypothetical aggression against Turkey would be countered by U.S. force? Acheson replied that the statements provided over the previous several years by both the President and the Secretary, past and present military assistance provided by the U.S. to Turkey, and the U.S.-funded economic assistance to the entire Eastern Mediterranean should be sufficient to convince the Turkish public of U.S. intentions. Finally, the U.S. would not stop examining the international situation in Turkey's region, but rather continue to pay close attention to developments there.

⁷⁶ See Note 77.

To this answer, Sadak again pressed for more specific information: could the Foreign Minister assume that the U.S. would stand with Turkey if Turkey suffered aggression, and was it possible that Turkey could be brought into a "... contractual security arrangement with the U.S. in the near future"? To these inquiries the Secretary replied, first, that the Foreign Minister had assessed the situation accurately, but that the Secretary could not make commitments for the U.S. government. Moreover, further security pacts would depend on developments in the region, and on Soviet behavior.

Sadak then made one further query. The Foreign Minister asked whether steps towards bringing Turkey into a security pact with the U.S. might be taken in a short period of time, specifically one year. Secretary Acheson replied that this was extremely unlikely because such arrangements needed time for development, and that he did not want to give an excessively positive impression to the Minister. Foreign Minister Sadak, in saying farewell, demurred that he "... 'might' be able to render a 'fairly optimistic' report" when he returned to Ankara.⁷⁷

This conversation between Secretary Acheson and Turkish Foreign Minister Sadak is important for several reasons. First is the close attention which Secretary Acheson is clearly giving to issues involving Turkey. Acheson is able to speak in detail, and with full comprehension and command of the subject. Secretary Acheson probably had prepared for the meeting by reviewing developments in Turkish-U.S. affairs over the past four years, but

⁷⁷ Located in the Truman Library's Acheson Papers, Box 65: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in "April 1949" folder. Also in: *FRUS* 1949, Vol. 6, pp. 1647-1653, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State," dated 12 April 1949. Secretary Acheson's comment concerning how important Truman felt the 1946 decision to aid Turkey was also caught Erkin's attention. Naturally, Sadak's closing remark seems peevish and was not mentioned by Erkin. Erkin does include in his account the three impressions he received from Sadak's conversation with Acheson: the United States had great interest towards Turkey, the North Atlantic pact would have serious difficulty in the U.S. Senate, and Acheson was sure that, after the Pact was ratified, it would deter Soviet aggression; see: Erkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.

his statements reveal a depth of interest and knowledge that cannot have come from a simple document review. Furthermore, even though Acheson does not betray subjective ideas on the subject, that U.S. relations with Turkey are of more than just passing importance is clear from his statements. Comparing the importance of the decision to aid Turkey with the importance of the decision to use the atomic bomb is not a statement that can be taken lightly. Acheson was obviously serious. This point is reinforced in the *FRUS* records, where a footnote reveals that Acheson, in a subsequent meeting with other U.S. officials, expressed concern about Sadak's fears and said that he seemed to have been able to assuage some of the Turkish minister's anxieties. That meeting had ended with a decision that "... very careful attention would have to be paid to the problem of Turkey in all our discussions." The implications of this statement are not totally clear, but the genuine concern that U.S. officials, and Secretary Acheson specifically, felt towards the U.S. relationship with Turkey is apparent.⁷⁸

Secretary Acheson would have numerous opportunities to provide that "careful attention" to U.S. relations with Turkey over the following four years. Three days after his encounter with Foreign Minister Sadak, Secretary Acheson submitted a report to the National Security Council (NSC) in which he recommended against asking the Turkish government for permission to build airfields or stockpile aviation fuel in Turkey. The report explains that, even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff had determined that such actions accorded with U.S. strategic interests, the potential to provoke more aggressive Soviet behaviors towards Turkey, and the lack of U.S. ability to counter those potential behaviors, made U.S. airfields and fuel stockpiles in Turkey "unwise" until circumstances changed.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ See: *FRUS* 1949, Vol. 6, p. 1653, Note 13.

⁷⁹ See: *FRUS* 1949, Vol. 6, pp. 1654-1655, "Report by the Secretary of State to the National Security Council," dated 15 April 1949. This report is labeled "NSC 36/1." See also: Rearden, Stephen L. *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vol. I: The Formative Years 1947-1950*. Washington D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984. pp. 167-168.

Subsequently, on 19 April 1949, Acheson discussed with President Truman the possible dire repercussions (not specified) of cuts in aid to Greece, Turkey, and Iran. The reader receives the impression that Acheson was trying to convince the President to not cut those programs.⁸⁰ The same day, Secretary Acheson was also called upon by the Colombian Foreign Minister, Minister of Defense, and Ambassador to the United States. The discussion focused on Colombia's various needs for aid, specifically weapons and loans. When the subject of obtaining that aid arose, however, Secretary Acheson explained that previous attempts by the Truman Administration to gain approval from Congress for weapons transfers had met with failure. Furthermore, because the U.S. was currently running a deficit, Congress was likely to provide aid for only "... the areas where the pressure is the greatest, that is the Middle East (Turkey, Iran, Greece)." Not only does Acheson state that the Middle East was a focal point in the administration's concerns, he even puts Turkey, Greece, and Iran ahead of Western Europe as an area of worry.⁸¹

From the previous three documents, the route that Acheson had to follow in regard to Turkey was clearly delineated. On the one hand, Acheson wanted to preserve, as much as possible, the aid that the U.S. already provided to Turkey; on the other hand, he also knew that the U.S. ability to support Turkey was in reality severely limited because of the difficulty of obtaining funds from Congress. For this reason, steps that might inspire hostile actions toward Turkey by the Soviets had to be avoided.

Ten days later a communication from Acheson to the U.S. Ankara embassy displayed some of the other difficulties that the Department encountered while trying to provide aid to Turkey. This telegram mentions that Ambassador Erkin had requested additional aid under the Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA), but that Organization for European Economic Co-

⁸⁰ Located in the Truman Library's Acheson Papers, Box 65: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in the "April 1949" folder.

⁸¹ Ibid.

operation (OEEC) countries would be unhappy about providing aid to Turkey since it would reduce their own share. Secretary Acheson replied that OEEC would actually be open to the Turkish requests, but that Turkish officials needed to formulate acceptable proposals. More specifically, the Turkish side needed to have staff that could “assemble and present [a] thoroughly documented case,” and “present sufficient facts in proper form.”⁸² In other words, the issue in this case was not the aid itself but that Turkish proposals were not composed correctly and were not supported by the necessary information. Simply, Turkish officials needed to be able to write a convincing proposal.

A few days later, the trends in State Department policy towards Turkey that had been developing for months, if not years, were distilled into a policy statement on Turkey that, even if Acheson did not compose, must have been accepted by the Secretary. The opening paragraphs of the text state that the two main policies that the U.S. would follow towards Turkey were, first, a “peacetime policy of military and economic assistance” meant to shore up Turkish sovereignty and enhance Turkish military power, and second, to further the Turkish government’s “determined and successful efforts to achieve a fuller democracy and a more productive economy,” which would naturally have the extra salutary effect of countering Soviet influence in the region. The main text of the statement ranges over the history and current status of U.S. political and economic policies towards Turkey, Turkey’s relations with other states, and then an analysis at the statement’s end. The concluding analysis is interesting for a variety of reasons; it begins by stating that U.S. “moral and material” support has buttressed Turkey’s will to resist, and warns that the U.S. “... should therefore be especially vigilant not to allow any situation to arise which might weaken Turkey’s intention to resist.” The explanation then, in essence, repeats the concerns that both

⁸² *FRUS* 1949, Vol. 6, pp. 1659-1660, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey, signed ”Acheson” and dated 29 April 1949.

Ambassador Erkin and Foreign Minister Sadak had expressed to Secretary Acheson in the previous months, that the exclusion of Turkey from the North Atlantic defense organization gave the impression that the U.S. was no longer interested in Turkish security issues. The report's conclusion then offers six recommendations to broaden U.S. support for Turkey: 1) continued effort to counter Soviet actions against Turkey; 2) further military aid to Turkey; 3) consideration for Turkish admission to NATO or another regional security arrangement; 4) effort to gain further economic aid for Turkey; 5) use of the Point Four program to provide more aid to Turkey; and 6) information efforts to educate the U.S. public about U.S. interests and initiatives in Turkey. As should be clear, the most important article on that list is the third. In that item, the State Department indicates its official support for a security guarantee for Turkey, even if advanced at a moment when conditions were not ripe for such a proposition to be put to Congress.⁸³

After the flurry of activity concerning U.S. relations with Turkey in the first half of 1949, the State Department was forced to turn its attention to other issues. Turkey did, at times, cause Acheson further concern, and that attention illustrates the care that Secretary Acheson gave to the topic. In late June 1949, for example, Acheson sent an inquiry to the U.S. Ankara embassy asking for further information about an Associated Press report, apparently excessive, that implied some sort of revolutionary situation in Turkey. Another telegram sent by the Secretary the following day touches on various issues related to the economic aid

⁸³ *FRUS* 1949 Vol. 6, pp. 1660-1670, "Department of State Policy Statement" dated 5 May 1949. Acheson mentions, in his memoirs, that during the Senate hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty he told the Senate panel interrogating him that any new member's admission to the North Atlantic Treaty created, in effect, a new treaty between the U.S. and that state. This statement took place in the same general time frame in which the policy statement on Turkey was circulated; see: Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 285.

being offered to Turkey.⁸⁴

The other major issue, also related to Turkey, that occupied Acheson in the second half of 1949 was the Mutual Defense Assistance Act⁸⁵ legislation. Acheson devotes several pages to this program in his memoirs, and is careful to note the various political and bureaucratic trends which gave rise to the initiative. In essence, the Program was intended to coordinate U.S. military aid and give the Executive more flexibility in distributing that aid. Turkey was included in the second category of states that would receive aid under the program, but which countries would receive aid was not an object of contention. Most of Acheson's narrative concerns the great and extended wrestling match between the Administration and Congress over the legislation.⁸⁶

2.3.8.2. 1950

Secretary Acheson began 1950 with a series of press conferences and foreign policy speeches starting in February and continuing throughout the spring. Those speeches were meant to explain the Truman Administration's foreign policies, in the wake of the (then secret) National Security Council Report 68 and the decision to develop the hydrogen bomb, against the various domestic criticisms that were being raised in opposition. In his memoirs, Acheson states that one of the themes he reiterated during those speeches was the fact that some "purists" were demanding that the U.S. deal only with states that they had determined to be "true-blue" democracies; naturally, U.S. support for Turkey was the target of such critics' displeasure, and Acheson mentions Turkey specifically in that context. Acheson

⁸⁴ *FRUS* 1949, Vol. 6, pp. 1674-1675, "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey," signed "Acheson" and dated 30 June 1949; *FRUS* 1949, Vol. 6, p. 1675, "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey," signed "Acheson" and dated 1 July 1949.

⁸⁵ Described above in Section 2.0.1.5.2.

⁸⁶ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 307-312.

points out that such critics were often “curiously hopeful about the Russian future” and, in yet another reflection of his lawyerly approach to analysis, labeled such mentalities as “escapism” intended to avoid dealing with the facts existing in the world. Overall, he states that the strategic goal of the U.S. was to “diminish further the possibility of war” by supporting the non-Soviet bloc economically, militarily, and politically.⁸⁷

Possibly because Secretary Acheson had more intensive speaking responsibilities in the first half of 1950 in addition to the other pressing political matters, the *FRUS* series documents for that period feature his messages on issues related to Turkey less often than was the case in early 1949. After the outbreak of the Korean War in June, messages relating to Turkish-U.S. issues would once again become frequent. Secretary Acheson’s first 1950 message on Turkish issues in the *FRUS* documents is dated 1 March. This telegram indicates that some discord or misunderstanding had begun to creep into the utilization of the aid provided to Turkey under the Mutual Defense Aid Program. Whether that aid was being implemented by Turkish officials seemed to be unclear and an object of disagreement.⁸⁸

Concerns and issues related to the deepening relationship between the U.S. and Turkey would continue to arise throughout 1950. On 31 March, Secretary Acheson sent another note to Ankara, but this telegram was on an entirely new problem: heroin. This message mentions that most of the heroin fueling an increase in urban U.S. use is coming from Turkey, and that the U.S. administration would like to send an agent from the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics to work with Istanbul police on identifying traffickers.⁸⁹ As is well known, heroin would be a thorn in the side of Turkish-American relations until the 1970s, but the problem appeared during Acheson’s tenure in the State Department. Additionally, heroin was a topic that could

⁸⁷ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 379-381.

⁸⁸ *FRUS* 1950, Vol. 5, p. 1235, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey,” signed “Acheson.”

⁸⁹ *FRUS* 1950, Vol. 5, pp. 1247-1248, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey,” signed “Acheson.”

be added to the general trend then beginning to manifest itself in relations between the two countries. As the connection between the two countries strengthened and interaction became more profound, the issues that both sides faced in relation to the other became more complicated, detailed, and subject to technical dispute. Secretary Acheson's messages also reflect that development.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, however, a flurry of action would once again envelope Turkey-U.S. affairs. Acheson noted in his memoirs that, after the first week of the crisis had passed, and the major decisions that first week entailed, his attention became divided between the ongoing conflict and the other concerns that conflict elicited. In that context he specifically refers to the "... fear of our European allies that our absorption in the desperate battle going on in Korea might dilute our attention to their security."⁹⁰

The first major Korea-related event affecting Turkish-U.S. matters would be Turkey's provision of soldiers to support the U.N. effort to counter the North Korean attack. On 13 July 1950, less than three weeks after the North Korean offensive began, Secretary Acheson discussed the issue of Turkish soldiers with Defense Secretary Louis Johnson in a telephone conversation. Secretary Acheson mentions that the idea of requesting soldiers from several governments, including Turkey, had been put to the JCS, and that the JCS were considering the matter. Secretary Acheson, on 19 August, would inform Ambassador Erkin that the U.S. had accepted a Turkish offer to send soldiers to fight in Korea.⁹¹

Two weeks after his conversation with Secretary Johnson, Acheson would forward to Ankara

⁹⁰ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 416.

⁹¹ Located in the Truman Library's Acheson Papers, Box 67: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in "July 1950" folder; *FRUS* 1950, Vol. 5, p. 1296, "The Secretary of State to the Turkish Ambassador (Erkin)," unsigned and dated 19 August 1950. Acheson, who was on vacation in upstate New York on 19 August, writes that he kept in contact with the Department while away; see: Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 424-425, 445.

one of the most extensive and technically complicated telegrams that he had yet composed on issues related to Turkey. This message also reflected the heightened energy and anxiety of the first months after armed conflict began in Korea. The telegram's opening lines confirmed the concerns forwarded to U.S. authorities by Turkish officials, stating that Turkish national defense had to be accorded the highest priority and that the Turkish armed forces needed to be reorganized. The rest of the message focused on various aspects of the main difficulty, which was efficient and economical use of the aid being provided to Turkey. One issue was the expansion of the Turkish officer corps and military technicians; another was how Turkish officials intended to meet the financial costs of carrying out the reforms; a third was whether more economic aid might be provided to Turkey by the ECA. The telegram ends by explaining that, even though the State Department recognized the dual nature (development and military) of Turkish needs, the situation that had recently developed (i.e. Korea) would mandate greater military expenditures and less development investment.⁹²

The issue of U.S. military aid to foreign governments became even more pressing after the Korean War's eruption, and Congress, frightened by the conflict's implications, began to respond far more positively to Truman Administration requests to fund U.S. economic and military foreign aid. On 10 August, a group of Congressional members looking for an opportunity to harangue Secretary Acheson concerning various aspects of U.S. foreign policy attended a meeting with Administration officials in Acheson's State Department office. The Memorandum on the meeting runs to fourteen pages, but Acheson did not see the meeting as important enough to mention in his memoirs. In the days before that meeting, however, the Secretary penned a letter to "Jim" -- apparently Under Secretary James Webb -- which

⁹² *FRUS* 1950, Vol. 5, pp. 1284-1285, "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey," signed "Acheson" and dated 26 July 1950. In messages such as this one, Acheson began to show a tendency to use abbreviations, which gives the message a feeling of haste and urgency. Whether this was purposeful or simply reflected a change in how the State Department transmitted telegrams is not known to this author.

suggested the lines of counterattack that the Department could adopt against assaults on the Administration's foreign policy. The letter may have been an exercise in developing strategy for the 10 August meeting with Congressional members, but he also mentions November, so it is possible that it was intended to suggest campaign strategy for the midterm elections later that year. Some of Acheson's responses to the Senators in the 10 August meeting echo concepts he described in the letter; the electoral strategy possibility is supported by his statement on the letter's third page that he would simply write down his ideas and leave their "adaptation to the political arena to others." The important aspect of the letter is that Acheson defends the Administration's foreign policy record passionately, and mentions Turkey several times while defending the policy's effectiveness. Acheson's focus on Turkey in order to defend Administration policy illustrates the extent to which Turkey was at the forefront of deliberation during his term.⁹³

A few days after Secretary Acheson returned from his vacation to upstate New York, Turkish Ambassador Erkin came to Acheson's office to renew their conversations on Turkish-American issues. The Memorandum of Conversation begins with the note that this was Erkin's first interaction with the State Department since he returned from Ankara.⁹⁴ Erkin, in

⁹³ Both documents are located in the Truman Library's Acheson Papers, Box 67: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in "August 1950" folder. The hand-written letter is dated only August 1950, but from its position in the archival folder, the fact that Secretary Acheson was on vacation from 11-21 August 1950, and the attacks on Administration foreign policy in the 10 August meeting, it seems likely that the letter was written in the first ten days of the month. Turkey is mentioned specifically on pp. 5 and 9, but the list on pp. 5-6 is notable because half of the items involve Turkey. Turkey was mentioned several times during Acheson's meeting with the Congressional delegation, but Turkey was not a focus of the discussion.

⁹⁴ Located in Truman Library's Acheson Papers, Box 67: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in "August 1950" folder; also in *FRUS* 1950, Vol. 5, pp. 1300-1302, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State," dated 25 August 1950. The 1950 *FRUS* text of this Memorandum includes the footnote that Erkin was away from Washington from 16 June to 15 August 1950. He was recalled to Ankara in the aftermath of the May 1950 election, and was consequently absent from Washington for two months.

his memoirs, explains that he had gone to Ankara at the end of June because of the new administration in Turkey; the elections were held on 14 May 1950. The possibility that his position as Ambassador to the U.S. would be terminated was clear.⁹⁵ However, the new Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, and the new President, Celal Bayar, wanted Erkin to remain as Ambassador to the U.S. While in Turkey, most of Erkin's interactions with the new administration revolved around the sudden war in Korea and the issue of sending Turkish forces there.⁹⁶

Acheson's Memorandum mentions that the meeting took place upon Erkin's request, and that Erkin began by stating two important matters upon which Turkey desired more urgent action, the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) and Turkey's need for additional economic aid. According to Acheson's Memorandum, much of the conversation was taken up by Erkin's reiteration of recent efforts on the part of the Turkish state to gain inclusion to the NAT and greater funds from the ECA. Acheson's responses seemed formal and cool, and he reminded Ambassador Erkin of past U.S. efforts to aid Turkey, adding that the U.S. would be conferring with the British and the French governments in September on the issue of Turkey's admission to the NAT. Overall, Acheson and the other Department representatives that attended the meeting politely parried all of Erkin's inquiries.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Erkin pp. 147-148.

⁹⁶ Ibid. pp. 148-150.

⁹⁷ In the conversation, Erkin mentions that the Italian, French, and Canadian governments had agreed in principle to Turkey's admission to the NAT if the U.S. consented. Ten days after Acheson's conversation with Ambassador Erkin, Acheson informed the Canadian Ambassador to the U.S. that he "felt that we could not take Turkey into the NAT at this time," but did not explain his reasoning; see: Truman Library's Acheson Papers, Box 67: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in the "September 1950" folder, dated 7 September 1950. The reason, however, may be traceable to a conversation that Acheson had with President Truman on 28 August, during which Truman told Acheson that inducing Congress "... at this time or in the immediate future to consider, much less to enact, substantial economic aid measures for South Asia and the Middle East" was "utterly impossible"; see the Truman Library's Acheson Papers, Box 67: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in the

Erkin's memoirs, on this occasion, devote more attention to the meeting, recounting the conversation in detail over nearly three pages and differing from Acheson's Memorandum in a variety of ways. However, Erkin again omits the fact that he requested the meeting, instead commenting that the attendance of McGhee and Rountree indicated the importance that the meeting carried with the Americans. Another interesting aspect of Erkin's account is that the issues he says he emphasized to Acheson often depend on what he claims he experienced in Turkey only days before. In the immediately preceding section of his memoir, though, he makes literally no mention of the phenomenon -- being bombarded by questions concerning whether the U.S. would consummate a security pact with Turkey -- that he relates to Acheson. Moreover, he makes little mention of the economic aspect of his visit.⁹⁸

One week after Erkin's visit, Acheson sent another telegram to the U.S. Ankara embassy concerning yet another minor issue that had cropped up over the previous months. Acheson's message conveys the caution with which the Administration had begun to approach communications with the Turkish government in order to prevent misunderstandings. The problem was whether or not the Turkish straits should be mined. Turkey had asked for advice on the matter and Acheson's response shows extreme concern lest the Turkish side misunderstands or over interprets the answer provided by the State Department. Acheson wants also to avoid any U.S. responsibility for the decision. The conclusion is that Acheson wants Turkish officials to make their own decision on, and be responsible for any

"August 1950" folder. Certainly, whether President Truman was including Turkey in his definition of "Middle East" can be questioned, but the difficult situation that the Administration faced in Congress is unquestionable. Finally, one day after Acheson's conversation with the Canadian Ambassador, the JCS recommended that Turkey and Greece be granted associate status to NATO until the defense of the original Treaty states had been assured, at which point Turkey and Greece's full membership in the organization could be considered; see: *FRUS* 1950, Vol. 5, pp. 1306-1309, "Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)," dated 9 September 1950.

⁹⁸ Erkin pp. 156-159. On pp. 160-162 Erkin sympathetically explains some of the difficulties, especially those stemming from Congress, plaguing the U.S. State Department, and Acheson specifically, in 1950.

repercussions of, mining the Straits.⁹⁹

On 19 September, Acheson again conversed with Ambassador Erkin, on this occasion in New York. In this case, Acheson had invited Erkin to meet with him, and the purpose was to inform Erkin of the North Atlantic Council's decision concerning whether Turkey should be granted member status. This meeting came ten days after the JCS recommended associate status and eventual consideration of full member status for Turkey and Greece.¹⁰⁰ The Council decided that, at the current juncture, it could only offer Turkey association with defense planning for the Mediterranean, and Ambassador Erkin was predictably upset by this result. After Secretary Acheson related the Council's suggestion, the remaining conversation was mostly devoted to Erkin stating how and in what ways the Council's decision would be unfavorably received in Ankara and by the Turkish citizenry, while Acheson tried to assuage his feelings, asked him to look on the bright side, and attempted to convince him that the USSR would not be encouraged to more aggressive action towards Turkey. Towards the end of the discussion, Acheson urged that "... the Turks not get nervous like the French and talk about commitments," and reminded Erkin that the proposal was, in actuality, a positive offer that the Turkish government should accept.¹⁰¹

Erkin's account of the conversation differs significantly from Acheson's. Erkin skips over Acheson's prefatory remarks to the heart of the matter, the *note verbale* that contained the Council's offer. After reading the note, Erkin told Acheson that, in essence, Turkey was

⁹⁹ *FRUS* 1950, Vol. 5, p. 1305, "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey," signed "Acheson" and dated 1 September 1950.

¹⁰⁰ See above, Note 97. The Council's decision to offer Turkey only an associate status at the New York meeting reflected the JCS's recommendations.

¹⁰¹ *FRUS* 1950, Vol. 3, p. 333-335, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State," signed "Acheson" and dated 19 September 1950. After Erkin's visit, Acheson sent a telegram to James Webb, who was Acting Secretary of State while Acheson was at the North Atlantic Council meetings. In that telegram he recounted the details of his conversation with Ambassador Erkin; see: *FRUS* 1950, Vol. 5, p. 1320-1322, "The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State," signed "Acheson" and dated 19 September 1950.

being asked to participate in the Western Mediterranean's defense, but when a potential conflict spread to the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey would be abandoned to its fate (*kaderine bırakılacak*). For this reason, it was not possible for him to recommend to his government acceptance of the offer. Erkin then describes how Acheson, in a softened voice and urging him with his name (*Haydi Erkin*), asserted that this was a strong start, and that he knew that Erkin would not desert him halfway to their journey's destination. Following this, Acheson took him by the arm (apparently in the Turkish style) and walked him to the door of his office. Convinced, Erkin recommended to the Turkish government that the Council's offer be accepted, and it eventually was. Several pages later, Erkin relates that he learned, from unnamed sources, that in the North Atlantic Council meeting in which the decision to grant Turkey only associate status was made, only two Ministers, Acheson and Italy's Count Sforza, defended Turkey's inclusion. Erkin is unclear on exactly what Acheson may have defended, though.¹⁰²

Later in 1950, sensitivity to public statements again caused a wrinkle in Turkish-U.S. relations when Omar Bradley published an article in *Reader's Digest* aimed at explaining U.S. foreign policy to the average American citizen. Instead, Bradley managed to create a stir amongst Turkish military and civilian officials, who wondered whether Bradley's reference to Turkey as a potential local conflict area indicated that Turkey no longer figured in U.S. global defense strategy. Subsequently, alarmed Turkish officers met Bradley for clarifications on 14 November, after which Acheson sent a telegram to the U.S. embassy in Ankara explaining that the Turkish officers' fears had been mollified and the various subjects

¹⁰² Erkin pp. 185-186, 189. Acheson's memoirs do not mention the issue of Turkey in connection to the September 1950 North Atlantic Council meetings; see: Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 441-445.

discussed in order to achieve that end.¹⁰³ Before the end of the year, Secretary Acheson would write two more telegrams to the U.S. Ankara embassy on completely different subjects, one concerning the influx of Bulgarian Turkish refugees to Turkey and their ramifications for Turkey's economic aid requirements, and another concerning the details of the pact that Turkey signed with Britain and France in October 1939.¹⁰⁴ In sum, 1950 was a year in which Turkish-American relations acquired novel topics and complexities that demanded more detailed knowledge and attention from Secretary Acheson, despite the several years of attention he had already given to the subject.

2.3.8.3. 1951

1951 would see the culmination of the long process, starting as far back as 1941, which saw the Turkish Republic emerge as a strategically important state in U.S. foreign policy's new geopolitical scope, develop through different stages, and result in the accession of Turkey to NATO, making Turkey an official military ally of the United States. Similar to the manner in which the British notes of 21 February 1947 provided the crisis that enabled the Truman Administration to justify sending large amounts of aid to Greece and Turkey, and then to many other countries in Europe, the Korean War would force Congress and the smaller NATO nations to confront the steps mandated by the world situation more realistically. Acheson would not author as much material on Turkish issues in 1951, but his role again

¹⁰³ For the Bradley article, see: Bradley, Omar. "U.S. Military Policy: 1950." *Reader's Digest*. Vol. 57, No. 342, October 1950. pp. 143-154. For Acheson's telegram, see: *FRUS* 1950, Vol. 5, p. 1332, "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey," signed "Acheson" and dated 15 November 1950.

¹⁰⁴ For the telegram concerning Bulgarian Turkish refugees, see: *FRUS* 1950, Vol. 5, p. 1333-1334, "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey," signed "Acheson" and dated 30 November 1950. For the telegram concerning the 1939 Turkish-British-French Treaty, see: *FRUS* 1950, Vol. 5, p. 1335-1337, "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey," signed "Acheson" and dated 11 December 1950.

would be key as the main figure who argued with, cajoled, and finally prodded reluctant NATO and Congressional members to accede to Turkey's NATO membership.

Acheson states in his memoirs that the first half of 1951 was an especially trying period, but that naturally referred to the extreme controversies that erupted over the Truman Administration's prosecution of the war in Korea and the dismissal of General MacArthur. He also describes a policy review that he initiated in January 1951, eventually resulting in agreement from General Marshall (the Secretary of Defense), the JCS, and President Truman, that Greek and Turkish defense of the Eastern Mediterranean should be organized through NATO. Ambassador Erkin's memoirs provide the first example of Acheson's attention to Turkish issues in 1951. According to Erkin, on 16 February 1951, Acheson told a Senate committee that Turkish soldiers had distinguished themselves in Korea, and that the Administration had realized the importance of deepening North Atlantic planning cooperation and relations with Turkey and Greece.¹⁰⁵

On 27 April 1951 Ambassador Erkin once again traveled to the State Department for talks with Secretary Acheson. Acheson's Memorandum of Conversation is much longer than Erkin's account, and differences in the two narratives begin with the reason given for the meeting.¹⁰⁶ Erkin states that he was called to the State Department by Acheson, but Acheson's notes give the impression that Erkin requested the meeting. In Acheson's memorandum, Erkin begins by saying that he had come to talk with Acheson because he had been called back to Ankara for consultation, and that there were two essential issues that he would be asked to clarify. The first issue brought up was Turkey's request for a security pact. According to Erkin, "the Turkish people" were feeling increased anxiety concerning

¹⁰⁵ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 499, 562-563; Erkin pp. 211-212.

¹⁰⁶ Located in Truman Library's Acheson Papers, Box 68: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in "April 1951" folder. See also: *FRUS* 1951, Vol. 5, pp. 1144-1146, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State."

the lack of a definite answer, whether positive or negative, to the Turkish request for a mutual security agreement.

Acheson's response was lengthy and detailed. The Secretary stressed that the U.S. was well aware of Turkey's security needs, and that both the U.S.'s awareness of the Soviet threat, and the service rendered by Turkish forces in Korea, had greatly aided the Turkish case in regard to domestic U.S. political opinion. Acheson went on to elaborate other issues affecting the feasibility of a security pact with Turkey (and Greece as a matter of course). Those factors included the stances of the U.S.'s European allies, the attitudes of Egypt and Iran, the tense domestic political situation created by President Truman's dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur, and when the atmosphere might be auspicious for "a new policy decision."

Erkin then asked Acheson about those diplomatic concerns, specifically the Conference of Foreign Ministers and the North Atlantic Council. The Secretary's reply made it clear that the Conference of Foreign Ministers did not have a strong bearing on the U.S. attitude towards the issue of a security arrangement between the U.S. and Turkey; as for the North Atlantic Council, Secretary Acheson asserted that he had not personally talked with other Council ministers about that issue, and that he did not know the current opinion of the other Council governments either. Acheson concluded his response by mentioning that "... conditions had changed significantly since September 1950, when the question of Turkey's inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty was last discussed." The Secretary then reiterated that many issues need to be analyzed in regard to such a mutual pact, but that the situation was not negative.

The second issue that Erkin inquired about was the problem of financial aid, expressing a need for prompt action because of Turkey's difficult situation. Secretary Acheson explained that the 1952 foreign aid figures would soon be under discussion, but that it was too early to

know how much aid would be provided to Turkey. In general, Acheson's tone seems stressed, as if he is explaining something that has already been explained several times.

Erkin's version of the meeting could not be more different and, unlike previous conversations, in which Acheson and Erkin's disagreement on who invited whom for the discussion is the most serious distinction, the essence of this particular conversation was different in both versions, and presents a serious problem for the researcher. Erkin asserts that Acheson revealed to him at this meeting that the Administration had decided to support Greece and Turkey's full membership in the North Atlantic defense organization. Moreover, according to Erkin, Acheson explained that a pro-Turkey feeling had developed in Congress which made the new stance possible, that the Administration had taken the step unilaterally and without consulting the other North Atlantic Treaty ministers, and that the news was top secret, but would be publicized in two weeks. Thus, Erkin had permission to tell only the Turkish President. Erkin also presents Acheson's emotional state as being totally different than what Acheson's Memorandum suggests; in Erkin's account, Acheson's behavior is that of the happy conspirator, relaying joyful news to a comrade. In contrast to Acheson's version, Erkin reports that he did not say anything about his trip to Ankara until the end of the meeting.¹⁰⁷

The researcher wonders whether Cemal Erkin, writing 30 years after the events he describes, may have confused this meeting with a later conversation. However, the events happening at that moment in the Administration leave doubt, because three days after the 27 April meeting, Acheson asked President Truman about the issue of a mutual security arrangement for Turkey and Greece. President Truman referred to a paper, presumably the NSC policy

¹⁰⁷ Erkin pp. 224-226. Erkin states that this meeting took place in the last week of April 1951 but does not provide an exact date.

proposal that would be circulated ten days later,¹⁰⁸ and said that he approved discussion of the Greek and Turkish security problem outlined in that paper, asserting his agreement "... that the North Atlantic Treaty organization was the best arrangement into which to bring Greece and Turkey." The Memorandum comprises what the Secretary told his assistant, Lucius Battle, had transpired during the conversation; Battle was apparently not present for the conversation.¹⁰⁹

Furthermore, a week after the 30 April Memorandum, Secretary Acheson and President Truman discussed Greek and Turkish admission to NATO again. Acheson noted that if a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting did not result from the Paris discussions going on at that time, then the U.S. should "... begin confidential talks with the British and French looking toward a proposal to admit Greece and Turkey to NATO," and urged haste. In response, President Truman referred to their conversation the previous week, stated that he had been ruminating on the subject, and told Acheson to continue with the actions he had

¹⁰⁸ See: *FRUS* 1951, Vol. 5, pp. 1148-1151, "Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council." The proposal is undated, but Note 1, beginning on p. 1148 and continuing for several pages, provides an abundance of detail about the Proposal's composition and approval. This Proposal was one of the ultimate results of Acheson's policy review, which he says he initiated in January 1951, but Note 1 also says that a policy review on Turkey had been initiated in October 1950 by the NSC. Note 1 further explains that the text of the Proposal was complete by early May, more than two weeks before it was officially approved by President Truman. Thus, even though the dates do not match exactly, it is conceivable that President Truman had unofficially agreed with the content of the proposal before 30 April. Admittedly, this is speculation for which the only evidence is Ambassador Erkin's account of his 27 April encounter with Secretary Acheson. Finally, the conversation with Acheson took place on 27 April, and Erkin states in his memoirs that he left by plane for Turkey the following day (*ertesi gün*). However, the *FRUS* 1951 records show that Erkin met U.S. officials for discussions on 30 April; see the memorandum and telegram in Vol. 5 on pp. 1146-1147 authored by U.S. officials.

¹⁰⁹ Located in the Truman Library's Acheson Papers, Box 68: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in the "April 1951" folder and dated 30 April 1951.

suggested.¹¹⁰ Consequently, the highest levels of the U.S. government had agreed, by the end of April 1951, to bring Turkey into NATO, and it was Acheson who brought this issue to President Truman for approval. Now the challenge would be to convince America's allies in NATO to take the same step.¹¹¹

Some allies proved more amenable to, even enthusiastic about, the idea of Turkish and Greek admission to NATO than others. The Italians, for instance, expressed open acceptance in their conversations with Secretary Acheson.¹¹² The British, on the other hand, proved more difficult, and Acheson, in his memoirs, repeatedly expressed his frustration with Foreign Minister Herbert Morrison on a variety of issues. On 31 July, Secretary Acheson had a telephone conversation with Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, in which they discussed the topic of British intransigence concerning the September 1951 NATO Council meeting. The British were insisting that the Middle East Command (MEC) issue be settled before Greece and Turkey's admission to NATO; Secretary Acheson retorted that "the real central point is Greece and Turkey," because without Turkey an MEC was impossible, and Turkey refused to discuss participation in an MEC until being made a full NATO member. Consequently, Acheson continued, the only issue the British should be focused on at the moment was what kind of offer will be made to Turkey on admission to NATO. Acheson and Lovett concluded the conversation with an agreement to express to the other NATO

¹¹⁰ Located in the Truman Library's Acheson Papers, Box 69: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in the "May 1951" folder and dated 7 May 1951.

¹¹¹ In order to be clear, the discussion that follows of the effort to convince the other NATO members to accept Turkey should not be construed as simply Secretary Acheson's work. A number of other U.S. officials were heavily involved in that effort, but Acheson, as the Secretary of State, was the leader of the effort and made the primary decisions on strategy for bringing about the desired end.

¹¹² See the Memorandums of Conversation between Italian Ambassador Tarchiani and Secretary Acheson located in the Truman Library's Acheson Papers, Box 69: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in the "May 1951" folder and dated 18 May 1951, and in the "June 1951" folder and dated 22 June 1951. Erkin claims that Ambassador Tarchiani told him similar information; see: Erkin pp. 234-235.

members “firm intentions” towards a decision to admit Greece and Turkey to NATO.¹¹³ Three days later, Secretary Acheson told the ECA’s William Foster that the U.S. delegation’s focus at the Ottawa NATO meeting would be to “keep the discussion to Greece and Turkey and economic progress” and no other subject would be dwelled upon except in an “exploratory” manner.¹¹⁴ By the beginning of September, the British had been convinced to soften their position on Greek-Turkish admission to NATO and the formation of an MEC, but Danish and Norwegian opposition remained strong.¹¹⁵

The 1951 Ottawa North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting continued for six days, from 15-20 September. In his memoirs, Acheson describes the meeting as possibly the most exhausting of the NAC conventions, and explains in a general manner that “after much private exhortation” the NAC voted at the conference’s conclusion to invite Greece and Turkey to join NATO.¹¹⁶ Examples of that “exhortation” are in the minutes that the delegation took of their meetings with their NATO partners. On 17 September, for example, Secretary Acheson spent a great deal of energy trying to soothe small NATO states’ concerns about how Turkish forces would be utilized. In one of the conference’s meetings, Acheson explained that Turkish forces would not be scattered, that all Turkish territory would be included in NATO,

¹¹³ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 504-505, 562-565, 569; Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 69: “Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953” in the “July 1951” folder and dated 31 July 1951. Morrison had replaced Ernest Bevin as Foreign Minister in early 1951 after Bevin’s health problems forced his resignation.

¹¹⁴ Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 69: “Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953” in the “August 1951” folder and dated 3 August 1951.

¹¹⁵ Information concerning the British stance towards Turkish NATO accession and the MEC is located in the Truman Library’s Acheson Papers, Box 77: “Topic Index Cards Re State Department Documents File, 1949-1953” in “MEDO” folder, dated 1 September 1951. For the Danish and Norwegian resistance to Turkey’s NATO accession, see the Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary Acheson, Charles Bohlen, and the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul Van Zeeland in the Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 69: “Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953” in the “September 1951” folder and dated 7 September 1951.

¹¹⁶ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 569-571.

and that an MEC would also be established that would allow non-NATO regional countries to associate themselves with NATO in a flexible manner. Secretary Acheson then enumerated four points concerning Greek-Turkish accession to NATO: the defense of Greece and Turkey would be completely under the control of NATO; NATO would not be involved in the defense of other regional countries; other regional countries would not be involved in NATO defense arrangements; an MEC would be established for the forces defending Turkey and the Middle East area.¹¹⁷

The next day Secretary Acheson resumed his efforts. In the continuation of the previous day's discussions, Acheson stated that all the NATO states agreed on the need to "associate" Greece and Turkey with the defense of the West. The problem was how to get a reciprocal guarantee from Greece and Turkey. Acheson explained that simply creating a Mediterranean Pact for Greece and Turkey was unwieldy, and taking Greece and Turkey into NATO was a much more simple arrangement.¹¹⁸

Once the admission of Turkey and Greece to NATO was secured, the next step was to fit Turkey into the command structure. This required more arm-twisting of various allies. The British, for example, were concerned with protecting their command positions. Acheson was forced, at one point during the Ottawa conference, to soothe British fears about the command under which Turkey would be integrated. British Foreign Secretary Morrison complained to Acheson that Turkish officials would only accept the MEC if they were fully integrated in SACEUR (Supreme Allied Command Europe), and that the British Cabinet had only assented to Turkish NATO accession because of the understanding that Turkey would be in MEC.

¹¹⁷ Truman Library's Acheson Papers, Box 77: "Topic Index Cards Re State Department Documents File, 1949-1953" in "MEDO" folder, dated 17 September 1951 and noted as "US MIN 5."

¹¹⁸ Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 77: "Topic Index Cards Re State Department Documents File, 1949-1953" in "MEDO" folder, dated 18 September 1951 and noted as "US MIN 6."

Acheson tried to allay his concern by saying that the Turkish focus on the MEC was also a U.S. priority. Various controversies over command arrangements in NATO and the proposed MEC would go on for many months.¹¹⁹

Secretary Acheson's September 1951 efforts affected Turkish-American relations in other fundamental ways. Today, if there is one U.S. Ambassador to Turkey since WWII who is remembered as a great friend of the Turkish people, and for working tirelessly to solidify Turkish-U.S. relations, that person would be George McGhee. George McGhee, after important posts in the State Department's Near East and African Affairs Division that made him a prime architect of the developing post-WWII Turkey-U.S. alliance, served as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from January 1952 to June 1953.¹²⁰ On 27 September 1951, a week after the NAT Council voted to offer admission to Greece and Turkey, Secretary Acheson recommended McGhee to President Truman as outgoing Ambassador George Wadsworth's replacement. According to Acheson's Memorandum of Conversation, Truman consented to the McGhee appointment if both Acheson and McGhee desired it.¹²¹

On the domestic front, even though the NAT Council had approved Turkish accession to the North Atlantic defense organization, Secretary Acheson still had to convince Congress to approve the step, since new members of NATO were considered new U.S. military allies. Congress adjourned in mid-October 1951, and a few days before adjournment, Secretary Acheson inquired with Senate Secretary Leslie Biffle about when Congress looked to adjourn

¹¹⁹ Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 77: "Topic Index Cards Re State Department Documents File, 1949-1953" in "MEDO" folder, dated 22 September 1951 and noted as "Telegram to Ankara 227"; see also: Ibid., dated 27 November 1951 and noted as "Rome NATO Mtg., Nov. 1951," a Memorandum of Conversation amongst U.S., U.K., and French officials. Secretary Acheson was present at the meeting.

¹²⁰ Today, the George McGhee Center in Alanya, Turkey serves as a continuing testament to the effort that McGhee devoted to developing U.S. relations with the Turkish Republic.

¹²¹ Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 69: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in the "September 1951" folder and dated 27 September 1951.

and whether bringing Greece and Turkey's NATO membership confirmation to the Senate before adjournment would be advisable. During his conversation with Biffle, Acheson stated that, under the current conditions, bringing the matter to the Senate would be "unwise," and Biffle concurred, opining that it would be "disturbing."¹²² Thus, confirmation of Greece and Turkey as NATO allies had to wait until January 1952 and a new Congressional session.

Interestingly, a week after Acheson decided to not broach the Greece-Turkey confirmation issue with the Senate, Ambassador Erkin came to Acheson's office in order to express gratitude from the Turkish government for the U.S. government's efforts in ensuring Turkish accession to NATO. In that conversation, Secretary Acheson told Ambassador Erkin that, due to delays in the legislative processes in other NATO members, Congress had adjourned before the State Department was able to send Turkey's confirmation for approval. However, no difficulties were expected when Congress resumed deliberations in January. Erkin also mentions this meeting in his memoirs and his account is different only in the details. Erkin refers specifically to France and Denmark as the states which had experienced some legislative delays, and devotes an entire paragraph to what he and Acheson discussed in relation to the situation in the Arab countries, whereas Acheson covered that subject with only an adverb clause.¹²³

Other Turkish officials also expressed their good wishes to Acheson in the months after the successful Ottawa NATO meetings. In November 1951, at the sixth U.N. General Assembly meetings in Paris, Secretary Acheson conversed with Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü. Köprülü expressed thanks for the U.S.'s "sincere cooperation" in all Turkey-related issues.

¹²² Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 69: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in the "October 1951" folder and dated 16 October 1951.

¹²³ Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 69: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in the "October 1951" folder and dated 23 October 1951; Erkin, Feridun Cemal. *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl: Anılar-Yorumlar, II. Cilt, 2. Kısım*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992. pp. 339-340.

Acheson replied that cooperation with Turkey was not only important to mutual defense but also to the prevention of war, and that Turkey served as a defensive “umbrella” for the entire Near East. The Secretary added that Turkish strength was vital in light of the weakness of the region’s other states.¹²⁴

Following the Paris U.N. assembly was the Rome NATO Council meeting, and there again Acheson discussed mutual issues with Turkish officials. Because Turkey had been granted admission to NATO, but was not yet an official member, a Turkish observer was allowed to participate in the proceedings. The representative that the Turkish government chose to send was a former Turkish Ambassador to the U.S., Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur, who was at that time Ambassador to Italy. Presumably, Acheson and Baydur were well acquainted from Baydur’s term in Washington.

During the Rome meetings, Ambassador Baydur mentioned to Secretary Acheson that his government had received information indicating that the U.K. supported putting Turkish forces under the MEC and a British commander, and the U.S. supported splitting Turkish forces under a Western command under Eisenhower and an Eastern command connected to the MEC and British officer. Baydur stated that having a political association with NATO and having its military forces attached to MEC, with which Turkey had no contractual agreement, would be impossible for Turkey because it would create both domestic political discord and inspire new diplomatic difficulties with the USSR. Secretary Acheson attempted to reassure Ambassador Baydur by stating that the U.S. was highly attuned to Turkish desires to be included in the NATO command structure, and that both the State and Defense Departments had “carefully considered” the Turkish aide-memoir on the issue raised by the

¹²⁴ Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 77: “Topic Index Cards Re State Department Documents File, 1949-1953” in “MEDO” folder, dated 12 November 1951, and labeled “Paris Talks, Nov. 1951.” See also: Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 576-587. Secretary Acheson went directly from the Paris U.N Assembly to the late November 1951 Rome NATO Council meetings.

Ambassador. Acheson also stressed that the eventual decision on the issue would certainly be similar to what the Turkish government desired, and that nothing would be finalized without “a complete exchange of views with Turkey.” Finally, he mentioned that he had not understood that U.S. military planners wanted to put Turkish forces under two separate commands. Baydur concluded the conversation by explaining that Turkey was not against the MEC concept, but that the correct time to deal with that body would only be after Turkey’s political and military responsibilities in NATO were clear.¹²⁵

Consequently, as 1951, a turning point in the history of Turkey-U.S relations, came to a close, the spectrum of issues that the two states confronted in their mutual relations continued to widen and develop unanticipated dimensions. Other messages from Acheson reflected this reality. In May 1951, Secretary Acheson sent a telegram to the U.S. embassy in Ankara featuring minute details of ongoing negotiations and planning concerning Turkish economic and military aid programs. The message was not composed by Acheson but it was sent under his name, which means that he had read and agreed on its content. That telegram is the most complex and involved message that Acheson had sent concerning Turkish issues. Later in the year, that telegram was followed by other messages concerning continuing negotiations on economic aid matters, and again featuring minute details of the issues involved.¹²⁶ From this point on, the U.S. government’s dialogue with the Turkish state would no longer be dominated by relatively simple issues such as whether the Turkish Central Bank had enough exchange to pay for U.S. imports. Henceforth, relations between the two states would be

¹²⁵ Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 77: “Topic Index Cards Re State Department Documents File, 1949-1953” in “MEDO” folder, dated 29 November 1951, and labeled “Rome NATO Mtg., Nov. 1951.”

¹²⁶ See: *FRUS* 1951, Vol. 5: pp. 1164-1166, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey,” signed “Acheson” and dated 18 May 1951; pp. 1189-1190, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey,” signed “Acheson” and dated 26 December 1951; p. 1191, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey,” signed “Acheson” and dated 28 December 1951.

close, dominated by intense negotiations and the sensitivities of both sides, and prone to misunderstandings and periods of tension stemming from those sensitivities. Secretary Acheson, the single most important U.S. author of, and participant in, the development of post-WWII Turkish-American relations, would be involved for one more year as the new alliance solidified.

2.3.8.4. 1952

For Secretary Acheson and Turkish-U.S. affairs, 1952 opened as 1951 had closed, overshadowed by the continuing discord over the proposed Middle East Command. At the beginning of January Winston Churchill, once again the British Prime Minister, arrived in Washington D.C. for negotiations, and the MEC issue was a topic that occupied attention since it was connected to the decline of British military power. During a conversation with President Truman and other U.S. officials, including Secretary Acheson, Churchill explained that loss of British control in India meant fewer resources for the British military while the Suez Canal zone was a burden resting solely on the British. The U.S. four-power (U.S., U.K., France, Turkey) MEC proposal was clearly the best solution so far for the Canal issue, he continued, but Turkey would contribute “more wholeheartedly” under Eisenhower than under the MEC. Furthermore, British command of the MEC should not be understood as a *quid pro quo* for concessions on other NATO-related issues. Secretary Acheson replied that the U.S. saw the MEC structure as imperative, and even though Greece and Turkey would have to be integrated into NATO before much work on MEC could be finished, he wanted to underline the importance the project held for the U.S. Acheson also mentioned that the U.S. no longer thought that the “two hat” approach would work for coordinating MEC-NATO command and communication, so the two commands would need to be distinct. Several

other officials then added their observations on the matter. In sum, the discussions on the MEC issue comprised a delicate interplay between the sensitivities of the British and Turkish sides against an American view of what the military and strategic necessities were.¹²⁷

Soon after Prime Minister Churchill's visit to Washington, the Lisbon NATO meetings, at which Turkey and Greece would formally be admitted to NATO, took place. The most notable aspect of Acheson's account of the February 1952 Lisbon NAT Council meeting is that he makes no mention of Greece and Turkey's accession to the organization. This omission is interesting because he was one of the main factors, if not the factor, that enabled the event to transpire. On the other hand, the MEC issue and other subjects related to Turkey would continue to occupy Secretary Acheson's time throughout 1952. One of those, aviation fuel stockpiling in Turkey, was an issue that had been put on hold in 1949. Now that Turkey was a NATO member, fuel stockpiling in Turkey was no longer seen as a potentially sensitive issue, and Secretary Acheson gave his assent to the move. Acheson also responded favorably to official Turkish inquiries about whether the State Department could help the Turkish government contract with U.S. companies in order to develop potential Turkish petroleum resources.¹²⁸

By mid-year the quagmire surrounding the MEC issue had not lessened. In June, Secretary Acheson went to London both for discussions and to accept an honorary degree from Oxford.

The day after a Doctorate in Civil Law was conferred upon the Secretary, he once again

¹²⁷ Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 77: "Topic Index Cards Re State Department Documents File, 1949-1953" in "MEDO" folder, dated 8 January 1952, and labeled "Truman-Churchill Talks, Jan. 1952 (TCT MIN-3, Jan. 9, 1952)." The note does have two separate dates indicated. Turkish officials were not present at this discussion, but both U.S. and British officials evince strong awareness of Turkish views on the matters discussed. See also: Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 594-603.

¹²⁸ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 622-628; *FRUS* 1952-1954, Vol. 8, pp. 881-883, "Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)," signed "Dean Acheson" and dated 17 April 1952; *FRUS* 1952-1954, Vol. 8, pp. 893-894, "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey," signed "Acheson" and dated 3 June 1952.

delved into talks on the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO).¹²⁹ In discussions between U.S. and British officials on proposed changes for MEDO, Secretary Acheson went into detail on why the U.S. vision of the NATO-MEDO command structure was preferable. Acheson then explained that the U.S. also foresaw a Military Representatives Committee, composed of all MEDO participants, to which would be attached a Planning Group (doing the organization's real work) under the command of a U.K. officer who, once the military capabilities of the organization were developed, would be the same person as the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East. Acheson continued to state that Turkey would have to be included in any such group since Turkey was essential for MEDO's legitimacy and ability to provide six divisions of soldiers, and that MEDO should be established even if no Arab state decided to participate.¹³⁰

The difficulties with MEDO even followed Secretary Acheson to Hawaii for an August 1952 ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty Organization) Council meeting. Secretary Acheson, in response to questions from Australian and New Zealand officials about the viability and aims of MEDO, explained that "great reliance" was being placed on Turkey and the U.K. for Eastern Mediterranean defense.¹³¹ Despite the great efforts that Acheson and many other U.S., U.K., French, and Turkish officials gave to the MEDO project, it was doomed to failure when the Democrats were defeated in the 1952 U.S. Presidential election

¹²⁹ The idea of a Middle East Command had been replaced in early 1952 by the MEDO concept, developed by Paul Nitze; see: Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 481-485.

¹³⁰ Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 77: "Topic Index Cards Re State Department Documents File, 1949-1953" in "MEDO" folder, dated 26 June 1952, and labeled "Ministerial Talks in London, June 1952 (MTL US-UK MIN-3, 7/14/52)." For the original document, see: Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 70: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in "July 1952" folder. Acheson also mentions the consultations in his memoirs; see: Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 660-662.

¹³¹ Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 77: "Topic Index Cards Re State Department Documents File, 1949-1953" in "MEDO" folder, dated 5 August 1952, and labeled "Anzus Meeting, Aug. 1952 (HON MIN-3, 9/3/52)"; see also: Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 686-689.

and the Eisenhower Administration chose not to pursue MEDO further.

As Secretary Acheson's term in office drew to a close, he continued to give close attention to the details of Turkish-U.S. issues. In late September 1952 Ambassador Erkin once again called on Acheson at the State Department, this time to examine the new complexities of an old theme, Turkey's exchange difficulties. In this discussion, Erkin gave a long exposition of Turkey's current economic situation, the reasons for the current difficulties in meeting their European Payments Union (EPU) responsibilities, and the steps the Turkish government had taken in attempting to remedy the situation. Despite everything, and also because of some apparent disagreements between the Mutual Security Aid (MSA) administration and the EPU, Turkey would need funds in order to meet their September 1952 EPU payments. Erkin went to Secretary Acheson even though he did not have any authority over the MSA; instead, Erkin hoped that Acheson's influence could provoke action from the MSA.¹³²

Erkin once again included the same conversation in his memoirs, and his account generally agrees with Acheson's Memorandum of Conversation. There are at least two important differences, however. First, Acheson does not mention the Aide-Mémoire that Erkin brought with him, and which is attached to the Memorandum in the archival copy. Erkin, referring to it as a *muhtıra*, mentions that he gave Acheson the Aide-Mémoire. Secondly, Erkin explains that Acheson was obviously well-prepared for their meeting, and made pointed criticisms of how Turkey had utilized some of the previous economic aid provided by the U.S. In fact, Erkin reveals more of Acheson's criticisms than does Acheson's Memorandum of Conversation, and Erkin especially notes Acheson's indication that the manner in which the Turkish government had used some of Marshall Plan aid could cause problems for the Administration in Congress. As a result, Erkin writes that he did not feel optimistic after the

¹³² Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 71: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in the "September 1952" folder and dated 22 September 1952.

conversation with Acheson.¹³³

That Acheson took Erkin's request seriously is evident from the message sent by Henry A. Byroade to Secretary Acheson two weeks later. In that note, Byroade explains the actions taken in response to Erkin's requests, and that the MSA had granted additional aid to Turkey in order to cover Turkey's EPU problem for September 1952. He also mentions that MSA officials, the U.S. Ankara embassy, and Turkish government representatives were working together on Turkey's financial needs for the 1953 fiscal year.¹³⁴

2.3.9. Conclusion

In January 1953, Acheson stepped down as Secretary of State and John Foster Dulles took his place; thus ended Dean Acheson's ability to directly shape U.S. policy towards Turkey. Even though Acheson would not remain distant from politics, would advise President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis (partially sparked by the U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey), and even take on responsibilities concerning the Cyprus situation in the 1960s, he would never again have decisive responsibility for the course of Turkish-U.S. relations.

One other detail deserves comment at the end of this extensive exposition of Acheson's involvement with U.S. policy towards Turkey. Despite the great attention that Acheson was forced to give to U.S. relations with Turkey over a span of six years, in some ways it is

¹³³ Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl 2. Kısım*, pp. 384-386. On p. 385 Erkin explains Acheson's comments: "... *Amerikan yardımının ödemeler açığını kapatmakta kullanılması... Hükümetin Kongreye izah etmekte aciz kalacağını söyledi*" ("... he said that using the American aid to make the payments would be difficult for the Administration to explain to Congress" -- author's translation).

¹³⁴ Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 71: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953" in the "September 1952" folder and dated 8 October 1952. Though this document was dated 8 October 1952, it was found in the "September 1952" folder directly underneath, but not stapled to, the Memorandum of Conversation that detailed Secretary Acheson and Ambassador Erkin's 22 September 1952 consultation.

difficult to know exactly how well Acheson was informed concerning Turkey. Amongst all of the documents related in the preceding pages, Acheson does not once express a subjective opinion concerning Turkey or Turkish issues. Acheson met many times with Turkish officials and engaged in lengthy conversations and negotiations with them. The Acheson Papers in the Truman Library contain lengthy reports on multiple aspects -- economy, history, military, politics, society -- related to Turkey, U.S. aid to Turkey, the Greece-Turkey aid program, and the Marshall Plan. These reports, despite being a fountain of information on the contemporary Turkish situation, show little sign of being read since no notes or markings were written on the original copies.¹³⁵ On the other hand, because these documents were compiled by government officials, it can be assumed that this information represents general data about Turkey that the U.S. government possessed and utilized. Acheson, moreover, was known for his work habits, and his approach to any problem was to gain the information necessary to make decisions concerning that problem. In his capacity as Secretary of State, Acheson at the least had access to extensive State Department information concerning Turkey and could draw upon it when necessary.

In *The Pattern of Responsibility*,¹³⁶ McGeorge Bundy devoted several pages to explaining Acheson's attitude towards the Marshall Plan and Turkey. Bundy's book was published in

¹³⁵ These reports, which were public documents at the time, can be found in Box 7: "Political and Governmental File, 1933-1971," in two folders marked "Marshall Plan: Reports, Greece and Turkey" [1 & 2]. One report, titled "Greece and Turkey, Background Material Political, Economic and Military: Budget Presentation Fiscal Year 1949," features more than 100 pages on Turkey. The copies in the file are photocopies of the originals. Even though these reports are generally well-researched, they also contain some information that is inaccurate. For instance, the same Fiscal Year 1949 dossier, dated 8 February 1948, asserts that Turkey is "almost homogeneous racially, linguistically and traditionally" on page TU-A-I-10. The "Chronology of Significant Dates in Recent Turkish History" (pages TU-A-I-15-41) begins only with 1918. The sources of information for this report are not attributed. Another file, titled "Marshall Plan: Reports, Miscellaneous" contains a lengthy IMF report on the Marshall Plan.

¹³⁶ Bundy, McGeorge, ed. *The Pattern of Responsibility*. Clifton, N. J.: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1972.

1952 as an attempt to defend Acheson against some of the political rhetoric that was aimed at both Acheson's record as Secretary of State and his character.¹³⁷ In the other parts of the text, Turkey is rarely mentioned, but the six pages that the editor devoted to the Marshall Plan provide informative interpretation of Acheson's ideas concerning Turkey.

The only conclusion that can be drawn from Bundy's analysis is that Greece took primary importance in both Acheson's thinking and Bundy's explanation. Turkey is always mentioned secondary to Greece, and the attention which Acheson and Bundy give to the separate nations does not seem derived from simple alphabetical order. Bundy also gives more space to Acheson's commentary towards Greece.¹³⁸ Since Bundy relied on Acheson's public statements concerning Turkey, it is also not surprising that Acheson provided no subjective statements, and instead explained Turkey only in relation to defending U.S. interests.

¹³⁷ Ibid. pp. v-xiii.

¹³⁸ Ibid. pp. 139-145. McBundy asserts on p. 140 that the quotes he includes in the narrative represent Acheson's "general pattern of... thinking on both Greece and Turkey."

3.0. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

We, as a people, have always accepted and encouraged the undeniable right of a people to determine its own political destiny. It is our own faith and the foundation of our own political freedom. If this is valid for us, it must be equally valid for other people. There could be no 'ifs' attached to this right, unless we were to backslide on our political creed. But the real problem, as I saw it in its application to immediate events, was not one of principle. We accepted the principle of political freedom as our own and believed that it should apply elsewhere as well. The real problem was that of procedure and method.¹

Harry Truman's words above are an appropriate preface to the final portion of this study for several reasons. Foremost is the fact that the alliance forged between the Turkish Republic and the United States after WWII is an example of the ideology that Truman elaborates. Even though Machiavelli's realism, explained in the quote that opens this dissertation, continues to be the actuality under which international politics operates, America's idealism concerning certain values has molded decisions its politicians have made. Whereas the Turkish-U.S. alliance certainly was an alliance based on interests, a fundamental feature of the era is the fact that U.S. politicians in general, and Dean Acheson in particular, identified Turkey as a nation determined to create its own political destiny, and to resist any power intending to impose a destiny upon it.²

¹ Truman, *Memoirs, Volume 1*, p. 156.

² An example of Acheson's comments on Turkish political aspirations: "... the Greeks and the Turks were determined to maintain their independence. There were a lot of Greeks and Turks that did not like their government. There were a lot that did. But they were united in a common belief that they preferred it to any form of government that might be imposed upon them from outside. ... It has been suggested by some people that the Greek and Turkish Governments were not our kind of democracy and therefore we should not have given them our aid. Of course, they do not have exactly the same kind of institutions that we do. But we are not dealing with a situation where we can go from one country to another... and see whether everything... is exactly, in all its details, the kind that we would like to have either for them or for us" (Bundy, McGeorge, ed. *The Pattern of Responsibility*. Clifton, N. J.: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1972. p. 143). Interestingly Bundy, writing in mid-1951,

Furthermore, Truman speaks of “procedure and method.” This study’s Introduction, in Section 1.5., offered a quote from Melvyn Leffler’s *Preponderance of Power* as an example of the geopolitical strategy that U.S. planners developed in the years following WWII, and as the Administration began to comprehend the Soviet Union as a competitor rather than as a cohort. That strategic perspective had many authors, but the Truman Administration was responsible for creating the “procedure and method,” i.e. policy, from that geopolitical strategy. Responsibility for conducting the Truman Administration’s Turkish policy, and for ensuring that U.S. policy towards Turkey corroborated with the U.S.’ Grand Strategic interests, burdened one man, Dean Acheson, more than any other. As Under Secretary of State, and then as Secretary of State, Acheson pursued policies towards the Turkish Republic that he saw as being in the fundamental interests of the U.S. His decisions shaped the process that resulted in Turkish accession to NATO and the creation of a formal alliance between the two states.

Acheson’s role in formulating and conducting postwar U.S. policy towards Turkey is also a main component of the answers to a set of questions this scholar has been interested in since first traveling to the Turkish Republic nearly twenty years ago. The first of that set is *how* the Turkish-U.S. relationship occurred after WWII. Obviously, this study does not dwell on the Turkish side of the equation, so it is not appropriate to dwell on that aspect here. For the United States, however, it is clear that more went into the calculation than simply defending the Northern Tier. After understanding the answer to the first, largely chronological question, curiosity led this researcher to an obvious subsequent problem: if Turkey was so clearly vital to U.S. strategic interests after WWII, then why did so much time, nearly two years, elapse

mentions on p. 140 that Congress was focused simply on expenditure, and apparently not interested in the justification: “... in all of Acheson’s appearances before Congressional committees, he was never questioned about the wisdom or even the magnitude of the Greek-Turkish aid program”; see: Bundy pp. 139-145.

before the U.S. began sending aid to Turkey? This was the key question for this researcher, and the answer has many facets.

To begin with, the Truman Administration believed it would be able to work with the Soviet Union until late 1945. Until that point, Secretary Byrnes and President Truman thought that aiding Turkey would aggravate Stalin and make cooperation more difficult. In late 1945 the Truman Administration began to understand the international situation differently, and even tried to get aid to Turkey passed by Congress in January 1946. At that time the Administration did not have the narrative that it needed to convince Congress that aid to Turkey was necessary. Furthermore, the Truman Administration did actually begin to provide small amounts of aid through Eximbank loans in early 1946, but Congressional resistance -- some of which was based on isolationism, some on financial concerns, some on hatred of the Democratic Party, FDR, and the New Deal -- to providing economic and military aid abroad remained adamant until 1947.

Complicating matters for the Truman Administration was the fact that in 1945-1947 U.S. public opinion concerning Turkey was either negligible, due to a lack of information about the country, or negative. This made sure that Congress would not feel urgency in providing aid to Turkey. During 1946, however, world events and decisions within the Truman Administration began to mold a narrative that the Administration could eventually use in order to sell the concept of aiding Turkey to Congress and to the U.S. public. The British withdrawal from the Eastern Mediterranean in early 1947 provided the crisis, opportunity, talking point, and the inflection point (in today's jargon) that enabled the Administration to sell the Greece and Turkey aid package to Congress. The Administration's case was strongly aided by U.S. military planners, who had slowly built up a body of plans and studies which indicated Turkey's strategic importance to the U.S. During the entire period from 1945-1947, and beyond, military recommendations concerning Turkey would remain useful in

convincing bureaucrats and Congress that Turkey deserved attention. Finally, Dean Acheson was at the confluence of most of these factors, and was a key figure bringing the narrative's different strands together into the account that the Administration would utilize to convince Congress to pass the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the 1951 Mutual Security Aid package, and Turkey's accession to NATO.

The points enumerated in the previous two paragraphs also explain the path that brought this dissertation's focus to Dean Acheson. Despite the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey still was not cemented since aid was an inherently unstable and short-term remedy for the step that could create a stable, long-term partnership, that is, a military alliance. Only one person, other than President Truman, remained in a position that affected directly the development of Turkish-U.S. relations throughout the 1945-1953 period. Even though global security conditions demanded that the U.S. form a partnership with Turkey, it is unclear how smoothly that process would have unfolded without Dean Acheson.

3.1. A New Framework for Post-WWII Turkish-U.S. Relations

This dissertation's first contribution to the literature on Turkish-U.S. relations is a novel framework for understanding the different phases that U.S. officials passed through in 1945-1952 while trying to formulate a response to the emerging Cold War atmosphere and Turkey's role within that situation. Phase I of this framework continued from March 1945, when the USSR informed the Turkish government that they wanted to renegotiate the Turkish-Soviet Friendship Agreement, until at least the end of 1945 and further into 1946, but no later than August 1946. This period I will term "Discovery/Identification" and marks the period of time in which U.S. officials, both civilian and military, went through a process of

realization that Turkey was fundamentally important to U.S. international security objectives. This period can possibly be extended back to 1939 and the Turkish-American Mutual Trade Agreement signed only months before the outbreak of WWII, but FDR's declaration in November 1941 that Turkey was vital to U.S. interests and then, only days before Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, Turkey's inclusion in the Lend-Lease Program, may comprise a more definite starting point.

Phase II of the scheme begins in August 1946 with the Soviet diplomatic note to Turkey, Acheson's initiation and direction of the State Department response, and the famous White House meeting in which President Truman gave a lecture on the strategic significance of the Eastern Mediterranean. The main result of this meeting for Turkish-U.S. relations was that Turkey finally was declared a strategic interest of the U.S. that needed assistance, despite the absence of a violent conflict that would provide a clear rationalization for that aid, by the highest levels of the U.S. government. The JCS memorandum stating Turkey's importance to U.S. security later the same month illustrated that the U.S. military had reached the same conclusion. The following months were spent determining exactly what aid Turkey needed and finding a way to provide that aid. The British note of February 1947 was the trigger that enabled the envisioned action to be taken. Because of the heightened awareness of Turkey's needs, coupled with the overall perception of a growing Soviet threat to U.S. interests, I have titled this period "Alarm."

Phase III begins with the February-March 1947 process which resulted first in the Truman Doctrine and then in General Marshall's June 1947 announcement of U.S. willingness to provide massive economic aid for Europe's recovery process. The result of both initiatives was unprecedented amounts of U.S. economic, military, and technical aid for Turkey, and the subsequent direct contact and interchange between large numbers of Turkish and American citizens. This phase continued throughout the following several years as the European

Recovery Plan was joined by the 1949 Mutual Defense Assistance Act, and then both were subsumed into the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (submitted to Congress in May 1951). I have termed this period “Action-Aid” because the U.S. government finally found the means to take action in order to provide several different kinds of aid to Turkey, but this aid was provided outside of the support that Turkish officials desired more than any other, a military alliance with a security guarantee.

Phase IV overlaps with the end of Phase III since the U.S. effort to bring Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty began in mid-1950, but was not realized until the Ottawa NATO meeting of September 1951, with formal accession occurring in February 1952. I refer to this final period with the title “Action-Alliance,” as is easily evident to the reader, because the U.S. government finally assented to a more fundamental and rooted relationship with Turkey through a military alliance. This phase has, in reality, continued to the present despite the tensions and misunderstandings that occurred over the past 60 years.

In sum, the scheme looks thus:

Phase I, Discovery/Identification: (1941) March 1945-August 1946

Phase II, Alarm: August 1946-21 February 1947

Phase III, Action-Aid: 21 February 1947-August 1950/January-April 1951

Phase IV, Action-Alliance: Mid-1950/Early 1951-February 1952

3.2. Dean Acheson and U.S. Policy towards Turkey, 1945-1953

This author’s primary argument is that, in the changes that precipitated each of the initial phases in Turkish-U.S. relations, Dean Acheson was not only a figure who played a leading role in the second, third, and fourth of the periods outlined in Section 3.1, but he also made

the decisions or directed the official processes that inaugurated each of those three phases. Others in the military or civilian hierarchy may have developed the basic ideas (although those also came from Acheson just as often) that promoted the development of Turkish-U.S. relations, but it was clearly Acheson in 1946, 1947, and 1950-1951, who played the key role in pushing the development of new dimensions in U.S. policy towards the Turkish Republic. As Acting Secretary, and then as Secretary of State, he took public responsibility for those decisions and developments.

Furthermore, Acheson, as a top-level political appointee, was responsible for making decisions and taking responsibility for those decisions in a manner that lower-level officials in the State Department never were. The outstanding texts on Turkish-U.S. relations, written by authors such as Ekavi Athanassopoulou, George Harris, Bruce Kuniholm, and George C. McGhee, have tended to focus on the role that lower-level officials in the State Department played. This is eminently understandable as there was a motivation to understand who exactly “discovered” the fact that Turkey would be essential to U.S. security after WWII, and who exactly was the key person who pushed for the decisions that resulted in the provision of massive amounts of economic, military, and technical aid to Turkey, and eventually the formation of a military alliance between the U.S. and Turkey. Those are interesting and enlightening historical issues worthy of examination.

As an illustration, in McGhee’s text the author lists the figures that he feels were the most important actors in the events and decisions that led to the Truman Doctrine. He asserts that President Truman and Secretary Marshall were the most important movers, followed by a group that included Acheson as well as Will Clayton and Loy Henderson. My argument is that Acheson, because of the style of leadership that Truman and Marshall utilized, and because Acheson’s actions overshadowed those of Clayton and Henderson, was the most important. I also suspect, from the manner in which McGhee wrote his book, that he may

have tried to downplay Acheson's role; while discussing the Truman Doctrine, McGhee emphasizes Clayton's contributions. My opinion agrees with that of Walter Isaacson, who stated that Acheson was the key figure involved in both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. McGhee quotes Isaacson's book, so he must have been aware of Isaacson's claim, and may in fact be responding to it. McGhee may also be responding to Joseph Jones: Jones, in the chapter on the officials he deems the primary Marshall Plan actors, listed Truman, Marshall, and Acheson (in that order) as the main actors while not mentioning Henderson at all, and only briefly mentioned a number of other officials like Forrestal, Patterson, Harriman, Clayton, and Vandenberg. Jones does discuss Henderson's role at other points in the book.³

Even though one or two officials, such as Loy Henderson or George McGhee, may be prominent in certain key junctures, they were not the people who made the final decisions.⁴ While those individuals' initiatives were important, and at points may have even been sufficient factors, their actions or opinions were usually only one factor amongst the many factors that were considered when higher-level officials made the final decisions. I am interested in the reasoning and the personalities of the people who did make those final

³ Jones, Joseph M. *The Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947)*. New York: The Viking Press, 1955. pp. 100-125; McGhee, George. *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets*. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990. pp. 26-29. Kuniholm also stresses the role that Henderson played in the development of U.S. policy towards Turkey although, by the early 1990s, he was forced to give increasing attention to Acheson; see: Kuniholm, Bruce R. "Loy Henderson, Dean Acheson, and the Origins of the Truman Doctrine" in *Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy*. Douglas Brinkley, ed London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1993. pp. 73-108.

⁴ This is all the more important in light of the fact that FDR had already, in late 1941, declared Turkey vital to the U.S.'s security and worthy of aid in the form of Lend-Lease. Another vital aspect of this issue is that figures such as Loy Henderson attempted, in late 1945 and early 1946, to assert more career foreign officer influence over State Department policy-making. Acheson describes the struggle over the issue in largely neutral terms, and mentions Henderson as one of the main actors; see: Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 157-163. On pp. 162-163, Acheson states that control over foreign policy resided solely in the President and the Secretary of State.

decisions because those judgments, made in the broader perspective of Grand Strategy and interaction with the U.S. domestic political sphere, provided the foundation for the relationship between the Turkish Republic and the United States that exists today. Understanding their reasoning in 1945-1952 can help us understand the relationship today more clearly. In parallel, understanding Dean Acheson's reasoning concerning Turkish-U.S. issues can enlighten the fundamental issues upon which the relationship was founded.

The importance of Acheson to the formulation and conduct of U.S. policy towards Turkey in the 1945-1953 era makes not only his decisions, but also his personality, important. That is, understanding how Acheson approached foreign policy issues and made decisions can enlighten the processes that resulted in Turkey's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952. At least two of Acheson's characteristics must be noted. The first is his lawyer's approach to problem-solving. Even though previous sections in this study explain Acheson's legal training and the effect this had on his mentality and approach to life, Acheson also explicitly stated that this was the case. Shortly after Acheson assumed the Secretary of State position, in an interview with the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvard N. Lange, Acheson explained:

Being a lawyer, I have resorted to the techniques with which lawyers are familiar, of having argument before me, of getting various people to present various views very strongly, so far as the limits of my mind. I can't think of things unless somebody argues. I think we have considered all the matters that you brought before us carefully and sympathetically. I came to some conclusions myself and I have talked those over fully with the President, so that what I say I know reflects his views.⁵

Consequently, no need to speculate on how deeply Acheson was influenced by his legal training actually exists. Not only did he accept the importance of his legal training to his approach to diplomacy, he openly spoke of it in official interviews with foreign dignitaries.

⁵ PDF of this Memorandum of Conversation, dated 11 February 1949, downloaded from http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/achesonmemos/index.php on 28 September 2013.

Thus, the influence of Felix Frankfurter, Louis Brandeis, and Oliver Wendell Holmes lived on in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy under Dean Acheson.

The second vital personal characteristic that Acheson brought to foreign policy formulation was his realist's approach to diplomacy and power. Even though Acheson was a life-long liberal and devoted to the Democratic Party, Acheson took a different approach to foreign policy. In terms of foreign policy, Acheson was a classic realist, and saw relations between states in terms of power dynamics. As an American, Acheson wanted to promote U.S. ideals abroad, but in the end, the response that would protect and further U.S. interests and security was the path that Acheson preferred. This is the mentality that convinced him of Turkey's strategic importance to the U.S. Acheson, as is exemplified by quotes included above, knew that demanding the same idealistic conditions from every government with which the U.S. founded relations or supported, was impossible and would not protect U.S. interests. Consequently, Acheson chose to support Greece and Turkey with increased aid, but not the Chinese nationalists. Acheson also, fatefully, chose to support the French in Vietnam, even though the French presence in Southeast Asia was a colonial remnant distasteful to essentially all of the U.S. political classes.

The essential concept that Acheson focused on was creating what was referred to as "situations of strength."⁶ The approach is wholly strategic in nature. Once the Soviet Union was identified as expansionist and inherently hostile to the U.S. economic, political, and social systems, then the problem became how to prevent the Soviet Union from increasing its influence over other societies, with the long term aim of pulling those countries closer to the Soviet Union's example, and eventually to combine the economic and military capacity of

⁶ For an extended discussion of Acheson and the concept of "situations of strength," see: Leffler, Melvyn P. "Negotiating from Strength: Acheson, the Russians, and American Power" in *Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy*. Douglas Brinkley, ed London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1993. pp. 176-210.

those societies with the Soviet Union's. Here, it must be stressed that this was a multifaceted issue that contained not only economic or political questions, but also cultural and social aspects; this is why Mao did not remain Moscow's ally for an extended period of time.

As U.S. officials evaluated countries on the Soviet Union's perimeter, they identified that some of them were strongly anti-Soviet both in terms of politics and in terms of military strength. Turkey was the prime example of such a country outside of Western Europe. Other countries could be evaluated as pro-Soviet, again both in terms of politics and military strength. Eastern Europe, as the years passed after WWII, fell more and more into that identification.

Eastern Europe, in fact, was the example to U.S. officials of what might happen to a state if the Soviet Union was allowed to increase its cultural, economic, military, or political influence. For this reason, they saw the need to build up "situations of strength," i.e. states which were strongly anti-Soviet both in terms of politics and military strength. Inexorably, this logic meant that Turkey must be supported through a variety of aid types, especially economic and military aid, in order to cement Turkey's status as a situation of strength for the U.S. Thus Turkey, along with Greece, was the first state to receive large amounts of U.S. military aid after WWII, and would eventually be admitted to NATO despite the various protests brought up by several member states. Those protests were not based on fundamental issues, and were eventually overcome through Acheson's persuasion and the overwhelming strategic logic of Turkey's inclusion in the alliance.⁷

3.3. Congress and U.S. Policy towards Turkey, 1945-1952

A logical implication of the previous two sections is the third essential contribution of this

⁷ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 419-420, 424-426, 502-506.

study: the main hurdle to founding closer ties between Turkey and the United States after WWII was the U.S. Congress and the prevailing political atmosphere in the United States. This study explicitly rejects assertions that various other bureaucratic issues or personal ambitions, whether of civilian or military officials, were fundamental reasons for the tardy nature of the Turkish-U.S. alliance. In fact by the end of 1945 the highest levels of the U.S. government, whether the President, the State Department, or the military, had understood the essential desirability of providing economic and military aid to Turkey. The problem was not ignorance, or bureaucratic sluggishness, or lack of official will. The problem was that the ability, in the form of Congressional approval for the financial resources that would make a broader economic or military aid program possible, did not exist. Both Congressional personnel and public opinion rendered this a moot point until new world events created a more favorable American political atmosphere.

The official records at several key junctures make explicit the importance that policy-makers were forced to concede to Congress. The often-cited August-September 1945 State Department memorandum on the Turkish Straits reveals this problem at an early stage. Secretary Byrnes, in that message, supplies a chain of logic: demilitarization of the Straits is possible if we provide a security guarantee to Turkey; a security guarantee to Turkey is only possible if we are prepared to back that guarantee with the means to fulfill it; the means to fulfill such a guarantee will have to come from Congress.⁸ By the time Byrnes authored that memorandum, the Congressional mood had begun to turn against President Truman and, thereafter, only in moments of crisis would President Truman be able to easily push foreign aid packages through Congress. The February 1947 British notes and the Korean War, among other foreign dilemmas, provided the situations that made Congress more compliant

⁸ *FRUS* 1945, Vol. 8, pp. 1242-1243, "Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman," dated 3 September 1945 and signed "J[ames] F. B[yrnes]."

towards providing aid to Turkey.

From time-to-time figures on both the civilian and military sides of the U.S. government did try to make fundamental arguments against the provision of aid to Turkey or a military alliance with Turkey, but such assertions were uncommon. Those figures asserted that Turkey was not fundamentally important to U.S. strategy or security, or that Turkey was not the sort of state to which U.S. aid should be supplied. By far the most widely cited reason for opposition to the development of the U.S. relationship with Turkey, however, was a lack of resources stemming from Congressional intransigence or the public's mood. This brings up the next important dimension of the Truman Administration's relationship with Congress.

Second, stemming directly from the Congressional reality was the importance of the Truman Administration's relations with Congress. The Administration had to maintain strong relations with Congress, and influence public opinion as positively as possible, in order to ensure the passage of its desired legislation and budget requests. The person who most often appeared before Congress to defend the Administration's foreign policy was, naturally, the person most directly responsible for formulating that policy, the Secretary of State. Consequently, Dean Acheson's fundamental importance to Turkish-U.S. relations hinged not only on his awareness of Turkish importance to U.S. foreign policy and strategy, and the decisions that he made in order to implement the course that he, with President Truman's consent, had chosen. Acheson also was the person who went in front of Congress, and into the public eye, in order to explain what the Truman Administration's foreign policy was, and the rationale for its actions in regard to foreign countries. That is, Acheson was responsible to the public and to Congress for U.S. foreign policy, and specifically for U.S. policy towards Turkey, in a manner that no other official was, especially during Acheson's term as Secretary of State. This was true even in 1945-1947 when Acheson spent much of that period as Acting Secretary.

Acheson, in his memoirs, emphasized the interaction between the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. government, and devoted great attention to explaining his relations with Congress, and the importance of Congress to the success of his policies. Throughout *Present at the Creation*, Acheson frequently returns to the topics of his relations with Congress in general, with specific members of Congress, and the impact of local politics on Congressional voting behavior. At one point, Acheson devotes several pages solely to explaining Congress's role in policy-making, and his own relations with the institution. His conclusions can be succinctly summarized in two points. First, Acheson emphasizes that, for Congress, politics is a domestic endeavor. Because the Secretary of State is inherently concerned with foreign policy, most Congressional members see the State Department as dealing with superfluous issues. When a foreign policy issue does impinge on local U.S. politics, usually it is understood in a negative light. The implications of the first point provide the second point, that the interests and perspectives of the U.S. federal government's Executive and Legislative branches are in fundamental conflict in regard to foreign policy issues. Acheson emphasizes that this is a natural, planned aspect of the U.S. political system, but it also means that the Executive branch, while devising and carrying out foreign policy, can encounter hurdles and attitudes of the most implacable sort, based on mentalities sourced in local politics and sectional interests. Thus, U.S. foreign policy truly becomes, as Bismarck suggested, "the art of the possible."⁹

Other authors express an evaluation of Congress's relationship to foreign policy that closely follows Acheson's sentiments. Douglas Southall Freeman, writing in the Introduction to McGeorge Bundy's analysis of Acheson's record as Secretary of State, asserted:

Co-operation with Congress may be... more difficult for the Secretary of State than for the head of any other Department.... In the Senate, not more than two or three members usually profess any specialized knowledge of such a matter as oil

⁹ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 99-101.

production, flood control, or the like, but nearly always there are at least twenty who consider themselves experts on foreign affairs. Senator William E. Borah, ambitious to run the State Department from the floor of Congress, has had many successors in spirit.¹⁰

Of course, one could argue that nothing else would be expected from a book authored by a State Department veteran, but historians provide similar perspectives. One of the eminent authorities on the early Cold War era, historian Melvyn Leffler, also points to the importance of the Truman Administration's relations with Congress. Throughout *A Preponderance of Power*, Leffler refers to the difficulties that the Truman Administration experienced with Congress. In the text's conclusion, while summarizing the difficulties that the Truman Administration faced in formulating policy, Leffler mentions specifically the parochial concerns of Congress members and their unwillingness to approve foreign aid.¹¹

At least one doctoral thesis has also been authored on the subject of Congress and the early Cold War era. That study not only expresses clearly how powerful Congress was during 1946-1948, but takes the interpretation further to suggest that Congress, at certain points, even led U.S. foreign policy. The author also emphasizes the power and influence Arthur Vandenberg had over foreign policy issues, and mentions that foreign leaders eventually understood and tried to work with the influence that Congress had over U.S. foreign policy.¹²

Turkey was one of those foreign states that had to learn how to interact with Congress and its control over the U.S. government's financial resources. Turkish Ambassador to the U.S. Feridun Cemal Erkin understood the importance Congress held for U.S. policy towards Turkey, and he devotes much space in his memoirs to explaining his lobbying efforts with

¹⁰ Bundy, McGeorge, ed. *The Pattern of Responsibility*. Clifton, N. J.: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1972. p. xix.

¹¹ For an example of Truman's Congressional difficulties, see: Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 105-106; the reference from the book's conclusion is on p. 509.

¹² Edwards, Lee. "Congress and the Origins of the Cold War: 1946-1948." Unpublished PhD Thesis, The Catholic University of America, 1986. pp. 3-4, 237-238, 249-251, 257-259, 260-261.

Congress. Numerous times during the two volumes, Erkin reflects on which Congressional members he was able to establish positive relations with, those who did not view Turkey as favorably, and the results of the interplay between the pro- and anti-Turkish politicians.¹³

However, equally clear is the fact that most analyses of Turkish-U.S. relations do not devote a great deal of attention to the issue of Congressional influence on U.S. policy towards Turkey. Even in the most important texts written on the subject, such as Athanassopoulou's *Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests*, Kuniholm's *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, and McGhee's *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, little attention, if any, is given to the role that Congress and U.S. public opinion played in controlling what the U.S. government's Executive could and could not do in terms of policy in the years following WWII.

Furthermore, the main works written on the topic of Turkish accession to NATO (Athanassopoulou, Harris, McGhee) stress the difference between the U.S. aid given to Turkey under the Truman Doctrine and then under the Marshall Plan, and the act of giving Turkey a security guarantee in the form of a formal military alliance. Those authors argue that the U.S. favored the aid but did not favor the alliance until 1951. However, James Byrnes referred to a security guarantee for Turkey in September 1945. In a State Department policy recommendation dated 5 May 1949, hidden at the end of the report and in a very short sentence, is the recommendation that Turkish accession to NATO be considered.¹⁴ When McGhee does refer to Congress in his book, the Congressional mood's importance to policy is clear: the last interesting episode in McGhee's book is his accounts of the meetings with

¹³ In the index to Erkin's two volumes on his term in Washington, there are nearly ninety references under the heading "Kongre (ABD)." For specific examples of his discussion of Congressional relations, see, Erkin pp. 26-31, 76-77, 137-139, 211-212.

¹⁴ *FRUS* 1949 Vol. 6, p. 1660-1670, "Department of State Policy Statement," dated 5 May 1949. The recommendation to support Turkey's effort to join the North Atlantic Pact is on 1670.

high-level Turkish officials held in the months after he became U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. In the narrative of his discussion with Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü, Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, and Foreign Ministry General Secretary Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, McGhee says that he explained the “tremendous pressure” on Congress to decrease expenditures. He also emphasized that, under the circumstances, Turkish aid amounts had been comparatively large.¹⁵

Thus, at the risk of excessive repetition, that the Truman Administration early saw the need to provide aid to Turkey, and even pursue a military alliance with Turkey, but knew that the atmosphere in Congress made this unrealistic, is essential to understanding how U.S. relations with Turkey developed after WWII. Only following the outbreak of the Korean War and increased Congressional acquiescence to the Administration’s foreign policy ideas and plans did the alliance with Turkey become something that could be realistically suggested to Congress. In the end, Secretary Acheson still waited until early-1951 to take strong steps towards making Turkish admission to NATO State Department policy.

For many years there has been a strong Turkish caucus in Congress, and attention to issues affecting Turkey in Congress has grown since the 1980s. However, in analyses of the Turkish-U.S. alliance after WWII, Congress is neglected, to the detriment of our understanding of what actors and interests went into the foundation of that relationship. President Truman did not have the luxury of making the same mistake. His main worry was Congress itself, and in maintaining relations with Congress that would enable him to achieve as much of his domestic agenda as possible. Logic dictated that, even though foreign policy was supposedly carried out in a spirit of bipartisanship with Congress, President Truman had to tread lightly when needed and pick his fights carefully.

¹⁵ McGhee pp. 105-107.

Generally, the other texts on Turkish-U.S. relations provide explanations that focus on the actions of individuals. This study, by focusing on Dean Acheson, presents a similar focus, but one that attempts to place Acheson within the wider political and social trends of the time. That also explains this study's emphasis on Congress, since Congress reflects the larger political and social trends in the U.S. The individual views of U.S. officials, whether pro- or anti-Turkey, were unlikely to have determining influence over U.S. policy towards Turkey unless the individual was a key decision-maker. Moreover, that lower-level officials did not see the same overall picture as higher-level officials is suggested by McGhee's account of the November 1949 Middle East Chiefs of Mission Conference, which published a conclusion contradicting the spirit of the May 1949 State Department policy statement concerning Turkey: "We see no present need for U.S. association with any regional military or mutual defense pacts to assure greater protection against aggression." This statement turns attention to the intentions and opinions of higher-level State Department officials such as Secretary Acheson, since the May policy statement had his approval, whereas the report from the November Middle East Chiefs Conference did not need higher approval.¹⁶ After explaining his role in the February 1951 Middle East Chiefs of Staff Conference, in securing U.S. military representation at that conference, and in arguing for the extension of a security guarantee to Turkey, McGhee notes that it was Secretary Acheson who took the conference's recommendations to Defense Secretary Marshall, and then to President Truman.¹⁷

In late 1950, the JCS also stated that Turkish accession to the North Atlantic Treaty should be considered at the appropriate time; this is not, in substance, different than what Acheson had been telling Erkin since early 1949. Both Acheson and McGhee stressed the fact that NATO did not have the military wherewithal to protect even those countries that were already in the

¹⁶ McGhee p. 60-62, 66-67. Quote from p. 67.

¹⁷ McGhee pp. 78-85.

organization, and that the question of Turkish admission needed to wait until that ability existed. Naturally, the primary reason that such abilities did not exist, on the American side, was the reluctance of Congress to increase foreign aid and defense spending; only the outbreak of the Korean War changed Congressional attitudes.¹⁸

Even after the Korean War's start, the Administration did not feel sure of potential Congressional responses to proposals on Greek-Turkish issues. In 1951 the issue of Greece and Turkey's admission to NATO was raised, and the Truman Administration once again felt compelled to defend the concept. Secretary of State Acheson and the State Department provided off-the-record conferences to important U.S. figures in order to inform and convince those figures that U.S. foreign policy was heading in the right direction. A January 1951 memorandum details the topics of one such meeting, including recommendations on topics for Acheson's speech (taken from a similar speech given a month before); another memorandum contains a newspaper clipping from a columnist for the *Detroit News* who had discussed the Greece and Turkey problem in terms amenable to the administration's views, i.e. supporting the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO, and details the arrangements for the Secretary's luncheon with representatives from the Detroit-area press.¹⁹ Finally, Turkey's admission to NATO, granted at the September 1951 Ottawa NATO conference, was not even sufficient to ensure friendly Congressional treatment since Acheson did not want to disturb Congress with the issue until after it reconvened in January 1952.

¹⁸ *FRUS* 1950 Vol. 5, pp. 1306-1309, "Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)," signed "A.C. Davis" and dated 9 September 1950; p. 1315, "Editorial Note."

¹⁹ These memoranda are located in the Truman Library's Acheson Papers, Box 58: "Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; General Correspondence File, 1945-1953," in a folder titled "Correspondence Regarding Speaking Engagements: 1951-1952."

3.4. The U.S. Political Left and Turkey

Finally, these observations suggest an answer for a question that has long perplexed this scholar. Throughout the Cold War, and not simply a cumulative effect of the Cyprus intervention, the release of *Midnight Express*, and the 1980 Turkish military coup, U.S. liberals and progressives maintained an overall negative opinion of Turkey, of the Turkish state, and of U.S. aid for that state. Part of that distaste must be found in the Cold War's partisan politics: the U.S. government was opposed to the USSR, and U.S. progressives and leftists, across an entire spectrum of differences in beliefs, argued that a different approach, more conciliatory than containment or rollback, needed to be followed in dealing with the world's other Great Power. Because the Turkish Republic was allied with the U.S. government in resisting the USSR, some U.S. leftists harbored a dislike for Turkey as a state and as a country beginning in 1947 at the latest.

Naturally, there were other issues that U.S. progressives and liberals could refer to in support of their attitude. Turkish conflict with the Greeks, the 1915 deportations and massacres of Ottoman Armenians, the Turkish stance towards Cyprus and the 1974 Turkish invasion of that island, and the Turkish state's reputation for human rights violations all contributed to this phenomenon at one time or another. Before the 1945-1953 period, the Armenian and Greek issues were known or understood by only a minute fragment of the U.S. population, and were more salient in the 1920s and 1930s, so those issues cannot have accounted for the much wider anti-Turkish feeling that developed amongst the U.S. left during the Cold War. Thus, the Cyprus and human rights issues were simply phenomena that reinforced a previously formulated impression. This is why the 1945-1953 period is key: a much wider segment of the U.S. left was introduced to Turkey, with the negative interpretation supplied by Henry Wallace (and others around him), in a highly charged ideological atmosphere, and

with results that left many embittered and disillusioned but unwilling to renounce interpretations they had absorbed from the Wallace crusade or other contemporary progressive or leftist sources. That is, the essence of the issue was idealism and politics, and the Turkish state appeared to support a project that left-wing U.S. liberals, progressives, and militants disagreed with.

This author's theory is that this negative perception of Turkey, constructed in the agitated ideological environment of the late 1940s and early 1950s, was perpetuated as the actors in those years' public policy battles exited politics and entered academia or the media. As they expressed their political interpretation in the following years and decades, they also reiterated and reinforced the negative understanding of Turkey's role in the Cold War. Another way to express this, in contemporary argot, would be that the anti-Turkish meme in U.S. society was formulated in the post-WWII political atmosphere and continued its low-level existence at least through the end of the Cold War.²⁰ Data to lend empirical support to this hypothesis may be obtained through evaluation of the material concerning Turkey published in periodicals such as the *Nation*, the *New Republic*, the *Progressive*, the *Daily Worker* (and its descendents), and others. For academia, the data would be more difficult to obtain since Turkey is a topic about which very few U.S. academicians have written. As noted above in Chapter One, most of those in U.S. academia who wrote about Turkey in the past 65 years did so in order to promote that country against a perceived adverse conception. This dissertation provides an explanation for why that anti-Turkey sentiment existed.

²⁰ This is not to suggest that nothing happened during the Cold War to reinforce the negative impression of Turkey. Just the opposite, after the highly positive developments in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Turkish state and military did much to cripple their image internationally during the Cold War: three coups, the 6-7 September pogroms in 1955, the forced emigration of most of the remaining Greek population in the early 1960s, and the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 all left lasting black marks on international evaluation of the Turkish state and of Turkish society. However, those events by themselves do not provide a persuasive explanation for an overall attitude held amongst people with a certain political leaning, especially when one notes the long time span that those events occurred within.

However, because a negative perception of Turkey was a political attitude rather than a widespread subject of academic discussion and writing, the amount of proof that exists, or might be obtained, for the hypothesis is doubtful, although a recent study on U.S. policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean touches on similar issues. Matthew Jacobs explains that there were two ahistorical assumptions that dominated U.S. thinking about the Eastern Mediterranean in the 19th and early 20th Centuries. The first tendency was to project ideal religious, political, and social visions, whether from the past or of the future, onto the Eastern Mediterranean; those visions were fundamentally American in content. The second was to understand those envisioned Eastern Mediterranean societies as unchanging, rendering the local societies incapable of transformation, and requiring American intervention to effect change. To this researcher, Dean Acheson's pragmatism and realism appears as a step towards overcoming the assumptions described by Jacobs. The late 1940s U.S. left, following Wallace's interpretation, used the already present negative conception of Turkey as backwards and despotic, the first tendency described by Jacobs, in order to argue against helping Turkey, while academic and political writers of the same era turned to the second tendency Jacobs mentions in order to superficially promote cooperation with Turkey. The process of overcoming these assumptions continues today.²¹

²¹ Jacobs pp. 20-21. See also: Jacobs, Matthew F. "The Perils and Promise of Islam: The United States and the Muslim Middle East in the Early Cold War." *Diplomatic History*. Sep. 2006, Vol. 30 Issue 4. pp. 705-739.

3.5. Conclusion

The only state strong enough to furnish the leadership in this effort was the United States. Both its government and its people responded vigorously to the press of necessity. The steps which were taken are well known and need not be recalled here. The important thing is that they were successful in bringing about a common sense of purpose, certainly in Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere, and to a large extent were effective in giving opportunity to those nations in Asia and Africa which were just coming to the point where they were free to pursue their national destinies undirected from the outside.

Since the war, therefore, the foreign policy of the United States has become, by necessity a positive and activist one. It has been one of attempting to draw together, through various groupings, that Western area which must be the center of a free and open world system, and of taking the leading part in providing it with military security, and with a developing economy in which trade could grow and industrial productivity could be developed, both in areas which were already industrially advanced and those which were at the threshold. At the same time it was an essential part of this policy to produce the maximum degree of cohesion throughout the whole non-Communist area, through political policies which would make for integration and strength rather than for exploitation.

Various aspects of this effort—the military, the economic, the political—I have attempted to describe in some detail elsewhere. I have there pointed out the interdependence of the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe; how the power factors involved make it essential that this part of the world shall stand firmly united; how, without the American connection, it is impossible to maintain independent national life in Western Europe; and how, without Western Europe, the power factors would turn disastrously against the United States.

Broadly speaking, these conceptions have for the past decade or more had wide acceptance both in this country and throughout the Western world. They have been successful beyond the dream of those who first advocated them. They are beginning to bear the most valuable fruit.²²

Dean Acheson's words provide a germane preface to this dissertation's final section. Acheson is this study's main focus, but the vision expressed by Acheson's words, which implicitly included Turkey since, in 1945, Turkey was clearly a country which had only recently won the right to be "free to pursue [its] national destin[y] undirected from the outside," is striking. Acheson understood the value that Turkish people, as well as many others, saw in the right to national determination.

²² Acheson, Dean. "The Illusion of Disengagement." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 36, No. 3. April 1958. pp. 372-373.

Most importantly, however, is what Acheson suggests in the quote's last sentence, that the postwar efforts to create a better, more peaceful, and more prosperous world system had begun "to bear fruit" in Western Europe. Acheson refers specifically to Western Europe in that paragraph, but his description in the previous paragraphs had also mentioned societies outside of Western Europe that benefitted from America's efforts. When Acheson wrote that article, Turkey may not have seemed the best example to offer in support of his assertion. Important changes were occurring in Turkish society nonetheless, and support from the United States, even though not the sole factor in those changes, was a fundamental facilitating factor.

What should be noted is that the importance of Turkey as a situation of strength has not waned since the conclusion of the Cold War. Turkey's military importance to NATO and its situation in the nexus of Southeast Europe, Southwest Asia, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Northeast Africa is overt and needs no elaboration. As countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe have, since the Cold War's conclusion, been broken off one-by-one from the Russian orbit, as Arab states and the Horn of Africa have been wracked by internal political disorder, as Iraq and Afghanistan have been subjected to U.S. or NATO occupation, Turkey's steadfast NATO member status has provided a regional island of stability.

Turkey's function as a situation of strength extends beyond the political and military dimensions. Turkey is also a strengthening democracy that is in the last stages of industrialization and state formation. Turkey's increasing life standards, growing economy, cultural influence, developing tolerance for internal ethnic, religious, and social minorities, and expanding infrastructural and technical capacity in a variety of sectors (business, energy, government, manufacturing, transportation) all project an example to other regional and developing societies that has part of its roots in the alliance formed with the U.S. after WWII.

In this way, Turkey can be defined as not only a military or political situation of strength, but also as a cultural, economic, industrial, social, and technological situation of strength. As such, Turkey's strategic importance to the U.S., to Europe, and to NATO will not decrease in the foreseeable future.

In short, Dean Acheson's efforts in the years after WWII to convince U.S. officials, politicians, and society that Turkey was a country worthy of U.S. economic, military, and technical aid are, as he suggested so long ago, coming to fruition. Naturally, the U.S. deserves only part of the accolades for the development. Turkish people and politicians are the ones who have grasped that opportunity to make positive, progressive steps towards a more democratic and more prosperous future.

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