

# **European Union citizens' views on development assistance for developing countries, during the recent migrant crisis in Europe**

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## **ABSTRACT**

**Background** Development assistance from governments of high income countries represents the vast majority of international funding for global health. Recent stagnation of this important source of funding may affect attainment of major global health goals. The financial crisis is widely accredited as denting governments' outlay for development aid, as well as citizen's support for aid. Europe has also recently experienced record levels of migration; the so called 'European migration crisis'. This study aims to analyse trends in public attitudes towards development aid in European Union (EU) countries, in the context of the European migrant crisis.

**Methods** Eurobarometer survey data from 2011 (prior to the migrant crisis) and 2015 (at the peak of the crisis) was analysed for 27 EU countries. The outcome variables related to people's levels of support to three statements around the importance of supporting people in developing countries, increasing countries' commitments to aid and willingness to pay extra for products from developing countries. EU Member States were categorised as 'arrival' or 'destination' countries in view of migration routes and numbers of asylum applications per 100,000 population, respectively. Multiple linear regression analysis was performed, adjusting for countries' economic status (gross domestic product per capita).

**Results** In general, support for development aid has increased from 2011 to 2015, but was largely unaffected by migration status when applying the regression model. In 2015, the belief that development assistance is 'very important' was significantly higher in countries where migrants first arrived compared to other EU Member States, with a trend towards this association also apparent in 2011.

**Conclusions** The positive trends in public support for development aid are encouraging in an age where economic hardships at home, as well as the tone of national political discourses and rising right wing populism appear to suggest otherwise.

**Keywords:** Cross-sectional survey – Development aid – Public opinion – Migration

## 1 **BACKGROUND**

2 Despite the rising influence of civil societies and private corporations, governments of  
3 high income countries still provide the vast majority of internationally sourced funding  
4 for global health [1]. While this support from governments, known as Official  
5 Development Assistance for Health (ODA-H), had risen sharply in the first decade of  
6 this century, it has plateaued since 2010 [1]. Furthermore, ODA-H commitments from  
7 European Union Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members of the  
8 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) were  
9 substantially lower in 2014 and 2015 compared to previous years [2]. Still, ODA-H  
10 remains a major determinant of global health outcomes, as it represents a relatively  
11 stable source of funding for major global health programmes. Disease control  
12 programmes, such as malaria control and elimination interventions, and wider health  
13 system strengthening initiatives in developing countries, may only be adequately  
14 supported if the rate of increase returns to levels observed between 2000 and 2010  
15 [3, 4].

16 The European Union (EU) and its Member States are the leading donors of  
17 development aid worldwide. They provided over half the total ODA of OECD DAC  
18 members in 2015 [5]. Health is just one sub-sector of ODA; still other programmes  
19 targeting a range of fields including education, energy, agriculture and environment  
20 can have a major impact on health [6].

21 ODA is a long way off from the vision set for OECD DAC members, which specified a  
22 commitment of 0.7% of their respective gross national incomes (GNI). This target, set  
23 in the 1970s, had been met by just six OECD countries in 2015: Denmark,  
24 Luxembourg, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom [5]. Several

25 socio-political and economic factors are said to have further slowed progress towards  
26 the 0.7% target in many OECD countries [7].

27 Following the global financial crisis of 2008, most EU donor countries have shown  
28 reluctance to increase their development budgets citing prevailing economic  
29 difficulties at home [8]. The amount of money spent on foreign aid has also become a  
30 major feature of the political discourse in European countries, as most recently evident  
31 in the 2017 general election campaigns in the UK [9]. Development programmes have  
32 been drawn into national debates over the merits of development aid or the perceived  
33 profligacy of the aid budget [10]. The recent rise of right-wing and nationalist populism  
34 also casts shadow over the resolve of parliaments across the EU to uphold ODA  
35 commitments [11]. This increased politicisation of foreign aid in turn renders the  
36 exercise of gauging and describing public opinion on the matter critically important [12,  
37 13].

38 Generally, public support for various aspects of European development aid has been  
39 found to be consistently high over the past decades. A survey of 24,999 people in  
40 2004 showed that 91% of European citizens believed helping people in developing  
41 countries to be important [14]. This figure was 88% in 2009, and 89% in 2010, thereby  
42 showing no sign of denting in the face of the financial crisis [15, 16]. On the contrary,  
43 the proportion of EU citizens who show strong support for this issue by indicating their  
44 belief that development aid is 'very important' fell from 53% in 2004 to 39% in 2009  
45 (measured on a scale including the following options: 'very important', 'fairly important',  
46 'not very important', 'not at all important'). Hence, while general support has remained  
47 stable over the years, strong opinions on the matter ('very important') seem to be more  
48 sensitive to changing times. Despite this observation, analysis in most of the extant  
49 literature tends to categorise the 'very important' and 'fairly important' measures

50 together [17, 18], thereby potentially obscuring shifting trends in public perspectives  
51 towards development aid.

52 Besides economic hardships caused by the financial crisis, shifts in public perception  
53 may be associated with the migration crisis that peaked in recent years, especially in  
54 Europe. Surveys deployed as part of the new 2016 European Consensus on  
55 Development highlighted that EU citizens identified the topic of migration as especially  
56 important to address [19]. Worldwide, at the end of 2015, an unprecedented 65.3  
57 million people were forcibly displaced from their homes due to violence, political unrest  
58 or violations of human rights [20]. The number of illegal border crossings into the EU  
59 detected by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in 2015 was  
60 more than six-times greater than the already record-high numbers of 2014. The  
61 majority of migrants were displaced individuals from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, as  
62 well as African countries such as Eritrea and Somalia [21]. Migrants mainly arrive in  
63 south-eastern EU countries, often lacking sufficient food and water and requiring  
64 medical assistance [22]. Many continue their journey, aiming to seek asylum and settle  
65 in Western and Central European nations [21]. This unprecedented flow of migrants  
66 began to feature extensively in the news in the summer and autumn of 2015, and was  
67 labelled the 'European migrant crisis' [23].

68 This study aims to describe recent opinions across the EU on development aid, and  
69 analyse the factors that may be responsible for differences across time and between  
70 countries, comparing the peak year of the migration crisis (2015) with a preceding year  
71 (2011). It is hypothesised that the migrant crisis may have affected EU citizens'  
72 attitudes towards development aid, particularly in countries where migrants arrive or  
73 attempt to settle down permanently. Apart from official European Commission reports,  
74 there is lack of research addressing recent trends in EU citizens' opinions on

75 development aid and any associated factors. This study may fill critical gaps in that  
76 regard.

77

## 78 **METHODS**

### 79 **Data source**

80 Two primary datasets, obtained by TNS Opinion (Brussels), were used in the analysis:  
81 Special Eurobarometer wave 76.1, conducted in September 2011 (n=26,856), and  
82 wave 84.4 from December 2015 (n= 27,672) [24, 25]. The Eurobarometer is a series  
83 of annual surveys gauging public opinion on a number of different socio-political  
84 issues, including development aid. A systematic sampling process, based on  
85 administrative regional units as defined by the European Commission's Nomenclature  
86 of Territorial Units for Statistics Level 2 (NUTS 2), was used in each of the 27 EU  
87 Member States (EU27). This process selected participants aged 15 or above into a  
88 representative sample size as per the countries' population size and regional  
89 population density. Participants were then interviewed face-to-face at home in their  
90 respective national language. Post-stratification and population weights were used to  
91 ensure representativeness of the samples.

92 Other data were drawn from Eurostat, the statistical office of the EU. For each EU  
93 member state, the following figures were obtained for 2011 and 2015: total population  
94 on 1 January, number of asylum applicants, and gross domestic product (GDP) per  
95 capita in Euros (EUR) [26–28]. All datasets were de-identified and publicly available;  
96 hence no ethical approval was required.

97

98 **Measures**

99 The Eurobarometer surveys contained three questions, identical in 2011 and 2015,  
100 which were of interest to this study. Participants were asked “In your opinion, is it very  
101 important, fairly important, not very important or not at all important to help people in  
102 developing countries?”. Answer options included ‘very important’, ‘fairly important’,  
103 ‘not very important’, ‘not at all important’ and ‘don’t know’. In the present study,  
104 responses were grouped to create a binary variable for strong support (‘very important’  
105 vs. other options) and a variable for general support (‘very important’ & ‘fairly  
106 important’ vs. other options).

107 The surveys also included the question “The EU (the European Commission and  
108 Member States) has promised to increase the level of its aid towards developing  
109 countries. Given the current economic situation, which of the following statements best  
110 describes your opinion?”. Response options were ‘we should increase aid to  
111 developing countries beyond what is already promised’, ‘we should keep our promise  
112 to increase aid to developing countries’, ‘we should not increase aid to developing  
113 countries even though it has been promised’, ‘we should reduce aid to developing  
114 countries as we can no longer afford it’ and ‘don’t know’. This was also recoded into a  
115 binary variable for strong support (‘increase beyond promise’ vs. other options) and a  
116 variable for general support (‘increase beyond promise’ & ‘keep promise’ vs. other  
117 options).

118 Participants were also asked “Would you be prepared to pay more for groceries or  
119 products from developing countries to support people living in these countries (for  
120 instance for fair trade products)?”. Possible answers included ‘no, you are not ready  
121 to pay more’, ‘yes, you would be ready to pay up to 5% more’, ‘yes, you would be



122 ready to pay 6 to 10% more', 'yes, you would be ready to pay more than 10% more'  
123 and 'don't know'. For this question, a binary variable to indicate preparedness to pay  
124 any amount for products from developing countries was created ('ready to pay more  
125 for products' vs. 'not ready').

126 These binary variables will henceforth be referred to as 'Development Views'  
127 collectively. Changes between 2011 and 2015 were calculated relative to 2011 values.  
128 The number of asylum applicants was divided by country population to obtain asylum  
129 applicants per 100,000 population. Each country was then classed as 'arrival',  
130 'destination', or 'other EU' country. Arrival countries were defined as any EU Member  
131 State migrants can first enter via the Eastern Mediterranean or Central Mediterranean  
132 routes, as classified by Frontex [21]. These are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta  
133 and Romania. A country was classified as Destination if it was amongst the top ten for  
134 asylum applications per 100,000 population in 2015 [27]. These were Hungary,  
135 Sweden, Austria, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and Denmark. Bulgaria  
136 and Malta, which qualified for both arrival and destination status, were classified as  
137 arrival only, due to the relative importance of their status as ports of entry into the EU  
138 and their low position amongst the top ten countries for asylum applications (tenth and  
139 seventh respectively). All countries not given a status were labelled as 'other EU'. The  
140 migration status was added to the dataset as a categorical variable ('other EU';  
141 'arrival'; 'destination'). Figure 1 shows the migration status of the EU27 Member  
142 States.

143

## 144 **Statistical analysis**

145 Weighted percentages of responses for each of the assessed Eurobarometer  
146 questions were estimated at the national level using the weights provided in the official  
147 dataset to account for the complex sampling design. An ecological analysis with  
148 member state as the unit of analysis was conducted. All data and variables were  
149 collated, and multiple linear regression analysis was performed. For both 2011 and  
150 2015, the Development Views were chosen as dependent variables ('very important',  
151 'increase beyond promise', 'pay more'). Independent variables included migration  
152 status and GDP per capita (per thousand EUR) of the relevant year. Linear regression  
153 models with percentage change of these Development Views from 2011 to 2015 as  
154 the dependent variable were also run; migration status and percentage change in GDP  
155 per capita were used as independent variables. All independent variables were  
156 assessed for statistical significance at  $p < 0.05$ .

157 All statistical analyses were done using STATA Statistical Software, Version 13.1 [29].  
158 Maps were created with QGIS Geographic Information System, Version 2.18.6. [30].  
159 Descriptive results are presented as weighted percentages. Regression results are  
160 shown as beta-coefficients with 95% confidence intervals (CI).

161

## 162 **RESULTS**

163 In the EU27, support for development aid being very important increased by 10.5%,  
164 from 35.9% in 2011 to 39.7% in 2015. The highest proportion of EU citizens who  
165 believe that it is very important to help people in developing countries in 2011 was  
166 found in Cyprus (74.0%), with a low of 19.7% in Estonia. Sweden (70.4%) and Latvia  
167 (15.7%) were highest and lowest in 2015. The greatest relative increases from 2011  
168 to 2015 were found in Romania, Slovenia and Ireland. Citizens of Lithuania, Latvia,

169 Slovakia and Poland were least supportive in 2015 compared to 2011. Table 1  
170 illustrates percentages, and relative change from 2011 to 2015, for all EU countries.

171 Across the EU27 as a whole, a 32.6% increase in the percentage of people in favour  
172 of seeing EU development aid increased beyond what was promised was observed  
173 (12.0% in 2011, 15.9% in 2015). In 2011, levels of support ranged from 24.5% in  
174 Austria to 3.2% in Bulgaria. Respondents in Bulgaria remained least supportive in  
175 2015 (2.6%), while neighbours Romania were most supportive (29.1%) – a relative  
176 increase of 157.8% compared to 2011. Other countries with the greatest increases  
177 included Ireland, Cyprus, Slovenia and Malta. Support of increase beyond the EU's  
178 promise declined the most in Poland, from 14.0% in 2011 to 7.0% in 2015. Table 2  
179 shows percentages for 2011 and 2015, as well as the relative change, for all 27 EU  
180 Member States. For levels of general support, see Supplementary Table 1, Additional  
181 File 1.

182 The EU27 saw a 4.7% relative increase in preparedness of its citizens to pay more for  
183 products from developing countries to support the people living there, from 47.3% in  
184 2011 to 49.5% in 2015. In 2011, the greatest support was found in the Netherlands  
185 (79.4%), and the lowest in Romania (19.4%). In 2015, percentages ranged from 80.3%  
186 in Sweden to 15.5% in Bulgaria. Romania represented the greatest increase (38.0%),  
187 while the biggest declines were seen in Bulgaria (30.3%), Lithuania, Poland and  
188 Greece (25.8%). Figure 2 illustrates levels of preparedness to pay more for products  
189 from developing countries in 2011 and 2015 (also see Supplementary Table 2,  
190 Additional File 1).

191 In 2011, the percentage of citizens who believed helping people in developing  
192 countries to be very important was on average 10.71 percentage points (pp) (-0.68 to

193 22.09) higher in arrival countries compared to other EU countries, representing a  
194 borderline statistically significant association. A 1,000 EUR rise in GDP per capita was  
195 associated with an increase of 0.56pp (0.22 to 0.92) in support. In 2015, the  
196 association between arrival countries and the 'very important' opinion was statistically  
197 significant, with an average of 17.22pp (5.39 to 29.05) higher support. A rise in GDP  
198 per capita was again significantly associated with greater support ( $\beta=0.66$ , 0.32 to  
199 1.00). No significant associations were found between destination status and the three  
200 Development Views in any of the models. Table 3 shows beta-coefficients and p  
201 values, with each of the Development Views as dependent variables. For sensitivity  
202 analyses with alternative classification of Development Views, see Supplementary  
203 Table 3, Additional File 1.

204 Arrival status and GDP per capita were not significantly associated with the proportion  
205 of respondents supporting the EU to increase development aid beyond what is  
206 promised in 2011 (arrival:  $\beta=1.06$ , -3.39 to 5.50; GDP per capita:  $\beta=0.08$ , -0.06 to  
207 0.22). Similarly, in 2015, the level of support for increasing aid beyond what was  
208 promised was not found to be statistically significant with migration status ( $\beta=4.31$ , -  
209 2.55 to 11.18) and GDP per capita ( $\beta=0.12$ , -0.08 to 0.32).

210 Compared to other EU countries, citizens of arrival countries were not prepared to pay  
211 significantly more for products from developing countries in 2011 ( $\beta=1.91$ , -12.14 to  
212 8.33) and in 2015 ( $\beta=0.63$ , -11.13 to 12.38). Association between higher GDP per  
213 capita and willingness to pay more was statistically significant in 2011 (0.81pp, 0.49  
214 to 1.13) and in 2015 (0.90pp, 0.56 to 1.24).

215 Associations between the independent variables and percentage change of all three  
216 Development Views from 2011 to 2015 were non-significant (Table 4). For a sensitivity

217 analysis with alternative classification of Development Views, see Supplementary  
218 Table 4, Additional file 1.

219

## 220 **DISCUSSION**

221 The present study investigated three aspects of EU citizens' attitudes towards  
222 development aid. Across these issues in 2011 and 2015, support was generally  
223 highest in Scandinavia and Western Europe. Lowest percentages were recorded in  
224 some Eastern European nations, particularly Bulgaria and the Baltic States. In the  
225 EU27, from 2011 to 2015, support for all investigated issues increased. In 2015, the  
226 belief that development assistance is 'very important' was significantly higher in  
227 countries where migrants first arrived compared to other EU Member States, with a  
228 trend towards this association also apparent in 2011.

229 In describing strong support for helping people in developing countries ('very  
230 important'), considerable differences in opinions were found between countries. This  
231 finding is consistent with previous reports of Eurobarometer survey results [15, 16].  
232 The high levels of agreement in Sweden, for example, have been explained with  
233 reference to a collective national feeling or social norm regarding the importance of  
234 supporting the poor in developing countries, as well as widespread trust in  
235 governmental institutions spending aid effectively [31]. In contrast, stagnation of  
236 economic development in Latvia and Lithuania [32], may naturally elevate the  
237 importance of helping the poor domestically over assisting those living overseas.

238 A possible effect of migration was only apparent in arrival countries, where there was  
239 higher support for helping people in developing countries compared to other EU

240 countries. This might be because arrival country citizens are more likely to see  
241 migrants in their worst physical states, due to the ordeals of their journeys [33]. When  
242 comparing Italy, which is an arrival country, to other EU countries, press coverage of  
243 migration was more often focused on humanitarian and migrant health themes [23].  
244 These include journey-related injuries, particularly hypothermia-induced problems, as  
245 well as pregnancy related complications due to poor access to healthcare during the  
246 journey and upon arrival in EU communities [34]. Increased exposure of arrival country  
247 citizens to these issues may be a possible factor explaining higher levels of sympathy.

248 On the other hand, feelings towards immigration are generally known to be more  
249 negative in Southern Europe than Western Europe [35]. Therefore, arrival country  
250 citizens may have been more in favour of helping people in developing countries in  
251 the hope this might stave off the influx of migrants. Whether such thoughts are valid is  
252 debatable because of the complex relationship between development assistance and  
253 levels of migration [36]. Respondents' views on the other measures used in the study  
254 (increasing promised levels of aid and spending more on products from developing  
255 countries) are bound to be even more complex, as they are more likely to be affected  
256 by respondents' level of knowledge, as well as economic status and political outlooks.

257 The positive association between GDP per capita and citizens' attitudes towards the  
258 importance of development aid becomes highly interesting in view of varying results  
259 reported in the literature. Several studies have agreed that income and support for  
260 development aid are positively associated in individual-level analyses [37, 38]. When  
261 controlling for individual-level factors though, Paxton & Knack determined that on the  
262 country-level, a US\$1000 increase in GDP per capita of a nation decreased the  
263 probability of its citizens supporting development aid by 4% [38]. GDP per capita may  
264 be influenced extensively by other variables, which could not be controlled for in the

265 present study. In any case, it appears natural to expect that greater proportions of  
266 people in richer countries, owing to purchasing power differentials, are willing to pay  
267 more for products from developing countries to help the people living there.

268 Some important limitations of the present study should be acknowledged. Using  
269 survey data implies risk for selection bias, and face-to-face interviews may evoke a  
270 response bias towards what is socially desirable [39, 40]. Furthermore, Eurobarometer  
271 surveys do not question respondents' knowledge on purpose or amounts of aid [41,  
272 42]. The public tends to overestimate levels of development assistance, with a third of  
273 UK citizens holding the belief that their government spent five to ten percent of its GNI  
274 on aid in 2011; hence it is difficult to gauge how this tendency, as well as the public's  
275 perceptions and knowledge regarding different types of aid may have impacted results  
276 [43]. Studies of citizens' perceptions of national level phenomena can be influenced  
277 by factors that are external or indirectly related to people's experiences of the  
278 phenomenon under study, such as media representation, nature of political discourse,  
279 and the national mood in general. For example, the national mood in different countries  
280 may still be suffering due to residual sentiments, and media representations of these,  
281 around the financial crisis; however, these complex dynamics are difficult to capture  
282 in such a survey. [44, 45]. Methodologically, care was taken to choose arrival countries  
283 based on trends reported by Frontex, and destination countries as per asylum  
284 application statistics provided by Eurostat [27]; other possible methods of designating  
285 migration status might have given different results.

286 The present study draws its main strengths from the consistency of data collection  
287 methods across countries and years. Apart from the Eurobarometer survey results, all  
288 other data used for the analysis were taken from Eurostat, implying that methods of  
289 obtaining this data in 2011 and 2015 were similar. Additionally, the timing of the

290 surveys was suitable; wave 76.1 in September 2011 reflected attitudes prior to major  
291 global increases in forced displacement, and wave 84.4 from December 2015  
292 captured opinions just months after breaking news coverage of the European migrant  
293 crisis.

294

## 295 **CONCLUSIONS**

296 Although relationships between recent migratory trends and opinions on development  
297 aid are not straightforward, policy makers should be encouraged to continue to tie-in  
298 advocacy for development assistance with migration policies. Careful framing and  
299 presentation of such policies might also improve peoples' understanding of how  
300 development aid and migration relate. The general increase in public support for  
301 development aid from 2011 to 2015 should provide impetus for EU institutions and  
302 Member State policy makers to pursue aid targets towards the 0.7% ODA per GNI  
303 mark. At a time of rising popularity of right-wing nationalism in some EU countries, this  
304 could help emphasise core European values such as equity and solidarity, which also  
305 form the very foundations of global accords such as the Sustainable Development  
306 Goals [46]. The consequent natural net increase in ODA-H spending would be critical  
307 for the pursuit of the major Global Health targets in the coming decades.

308

309

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

**DAC:** Development Assistance Committee

**EU:** European Union



**EU27:** The 27 Member States of the European Union

**GDP:** Gross domestic product

**GNI:** Gross national income

**ODA:** Official Development Assistance

**ODA-H:** Official Development Assistance for Health

**OECD:** Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development

## **DECLARATIONS**

### **Ethics approval and consent to participate**

Not applicable.

### **Consent for publication**

Not applicable.

### **Availability of data and material**

The datasets analysed during the current study are available in the GESIS repository:

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(<https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no=5565&db=e&doi=10.4232/1.11847>)

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(<https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no=6644&db=e&doi=10.4232/1.12656>)

### **Competing interests**

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

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### **Author's contributions**

All authors contributed to study conception, data analysis and interpretation. AH drafted the manuscript. FTF and HBT edited drafts of the manuscript. The final manuscript was approved by all authors.

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
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
Figure 1. The 27 EU Member States and their designated Migration Status.



The arrows illustrate the two major paths of migration into the EU by which 'arrival' status was determined: The Eastern Mediterranean route (orange) and Central Mediterranean route (blue).

The map's base-layer was taken from the European Commission's reference data for countries [47].

Figure 2. Percentage of citizens prepared to pay more for products from developing countries, 2011 and 2015.



The map's base-layer was taken from the European Commission's reference data for countries [47].

## TABLES

**Table 1.** Percentage of each EU country's population supporting the Development View 'very important', 2011 and 2015.

Country	Opinion 'very important', 2011 (%, 95% CI)	Opinion 'very important', 2015 (%, 95% CI)	Change in 'very important', 2011-2015 (%)
Austria (AT)	34.7 (31.7 - 37.7)	38.2 (34.9 - 41.6)	10.1
Belgium (BE)	36.2 (33.2 - 39.3)	39.7 (36.6 - 43.0)	9.8
Bulgaria (BG)	23.3 (20.7 - 26.1)	25.2 (22.6 - 28.0)	8.0
Cyprus (CY)	74.0 (70.0 - 77.6)	66.7 (62.1 - 71.1)	-9.8
Czech Republic (CZ)	24.1 (21.6 - 26.8)	25.2 (22.5 - 28.1)	4.5
Denmark (DK)	51.4 (48.1 - 54.8)	46.5 (43.1 - 50.0)	-9.5
Estonia (EE)	19.7 (17.3 - 22.5)	17.3 (14.9 - 20.0)	-12.4
Finland (FI)	38.7 (35.4 - 42.1)	41.2 (37.8 - 44.6)	6.3
France (FR)	35.3 (32.4 - 38.4)	35.9 (32.9 - 38.9)	1.5
Germany (DE)	53.1 (50.2 - 56.0)	52.7 (49.6 - 55.7)	-0.8
Greece (EL)	30.8 (27.9 - 33.8)	40.3 (37.0 - 43.6)	30.8
Hungary (HU)	19.9 (17.4 - 22.6)	21.4 (18.9 - 24.3)	7.9
Ireland (IE)	40.8 (37.7 - 43.9)	58.2 (55.0 - 61.4)	42.9
Italy (IT)	24.8 (22.2 - 27.6)	29.5 (26.5 - 32.8)	19.0
Latvia (LV)	22.7 (20.2 - 25.5)	15.7 (13.4 - 18.3)	-30.8
Lithuania (LT)	28.9 (26.2 - 31.8)	16.8 (14.1 - 19.9)	-41.8
Luxembourg (LU)	59.4 (54.8 - 63.8)	54.5 (49.4 - 59.5)	-8.2
Malta (MT)	46.3 (41.5 - 51.3)	62.0 (57.1 - 66.7)	33.8
Netherlands (NL)	34.2 (30.6 - 38.0)	45.9 (42.6 - 49.3)	34.2
Poland (PL)	31.7 (28.8 - 34.8)	23.8 (21.2 - 26.7)	-24.7
Portugal (PT)	25.8 (23.2 - 28.5)	27.3 (24.6 - 30.2)	5.9
Romania (RO)	28.3 (25.6 - 31.2)	45.9 (42.7 - 49.2)	62.3

Slovakia (SK)	29.1 (26.1 - 32.3)	21.4 (18.9 - 24.2)	-26.3
Slovenia (SI)	20.9 (18.4 - 23.5)	33.4 (30.3 - 36.6)	60.1
Spain (ES)	36.4 (33.4 - 39.5)	46.4 (42.9 - 49.9)	27.5
Sweden (SE)	69.0 (65.7 - 72.2)	70.4 (66.2 - 74.3)	2.0
United Kingdom (UK)	34.9 (32.0 - 37.9)	44.2 (41.1 - 47.4)	26.6
<b>EU27</b>	<b>35.9 (35.0 - 36.8)</b>	<b>39.7 (38.7 - 40.7)</b>	<b>10.5</b>

This table illustrates the percentage of each country's population of opinion that helping people in developing countries is 'very important', 2011 and 2015.

**Table 2.** Percentage of each country's population supporting the Development View 'increase beyond promise', 2011 and 2015.

<b>Country</b>	<b>Opinion 'increase beyond promise', 2011 (%, 95% CI)</b>	<b>Opinion 'increase beyond promise', 2015 (%, 95% CI)</b>	<b>Change in 'increase beyond promise', 2011-2015 (%)</b>
Austria (AT)	24.5 (21.9 - 27.3)	20.0 (17.3 - 22.9)	-18.5
Belgium (BE)	12.2 (10.3 - 14.4)	12.7 (10.6 - 15.1)	4.6
Bulgaria (BG)	3.2 (2.2 - 4.5)	2.6 (1.8 - 3.9)	-17.1
Cyprus (CY)	7.3 (5.3 - 9.9)	22.7 (19.0 - 26.9)	213.4
Czech Republic (CZ)	9.1 (7.5 - 11.0)	7.3 (5.8 - 9.2)	-19.7
Denmark (DK)	14.1 (12.0 - 16.6)	14.2 (12.0 - 16.7)	0.8
Estonia (EE)	5.4 (4.1 - 7.1)	5.8 (4.4 - 7.7)	7.6
Finland (FI)	5.4 (4.1 - 7.2)	5.6 (4.2 - 7.4)	2.3
France (FR)	12.4 (10.5 - 14.7)	19.9 (17.5 - 22.5)	59.8
Germany (DE)	11.8 (10.1 - 13.7)	16.5 (14.3 - 18.9)	40.0
Greece (EL)	12.8 (10.8 - 15.0)	11.3 (9.4 - 13.6)	-11.3
Hungary (HU)	6.2 (4.9 - 8.0)	11.7 (9.7 - 14.0)	86.6
Ireland (IE)	5.8 (4.4 - 7.5)	18.9 (16.5 - 21.6)	226.4
Italy (IT)	16.8 (14.5 - 19.2)	16.2 (13.9 - 18.9)	-3.1
Latvia (LV)	9.7 (8.0 - 11.7)	8.8 (7.0 - 10.9)	-9.3
Lithuania (LT)	5.0 (3.9 - 6.5)	4.8 (3.4 - 6.7)	-3.9
Luxembourg (LU)	12.9 (10.2 - 16.3)	13.1 (10.2 - 16.8)	1.5
Malta (MT)	7.2 (5.1 - 10.1)	15.6 (12.4 - 19.4)	117.1
Netherlands (NL)	8.3 (6.2 - 10.9)	10.7 (8.8 - 12.9)	29.0
Poland (PL)	14.0 (11.9 - 16.4)	7.0 (5.5 - 8.8)	-50.3
Portugal (PT)	8.9 (7.3 - 10.8)	15.9 (13.7 - 18.4)	78.8
Romania (RO)	11.3 (9.5 - 13.4)	29.1 (26.2 - 32.2)	157.8

Slovakia (SK)	7.8 (6.1 - 9.9)	6.7 (5.2 - 8.6)	-13.8
Slovenia (SI)	8.2 (6.6 - 10.0)	19.3 (16.8 - 22.0)	135.6
Spain (ES)	13.7 (11.7 - 16.0)	25.6 (22.7 - 28.8)	87.0
Sweden (SE)	12.7 (10.5 - 15.2)	12.9 (10.2 - 16.0)	1.5
United Kingdom (UK)	8.9 (7.2 - 10.9)	14.2 (12.1 - 16.5)	59.1
<b>EU27</b>	12.0 (11.4 - 12.7)	<b>15.9 (15.2 - 16.7)</b>	<b>32.6</b>

This table illustrates the percentage of each country's population of opinion that development aid should be 'increased beyond promise' of the EU, 2011 and 2015.

**TABLE 3**

**Table 3.** Association of Development Views with migration status and GDP per capita, 2011 & 2015

	Very important 2011		Very important 2015		Increase beyond promise 2011		Increase beyond promise 2015		Pay more 2011		Pay more 2015	
	$\beta$ (95% CI)	p	$\beta$ (95% CI)	p	$\beta$ (95% CI)	p	$\beta$ (95% CI)	p	$\beta$ (95% CI)	p	$\beta$ (95% CI)	p
<i>Migration status</i>												
Other EU country	(referent)											
Arrival country	10.71 (-0.68 to 22.09)	0.064	17.22 (5.39 to 29.05)	0.006	1.06 (-3.39 to 5.50)	0.628	4.31 (-2.55 to 11.18)	0.206	-1.91 (-12.14 to 8.33)	0.704	0.63 (-11.13 to 12.38)	0.913
Destination country	5.04 (-7.20 to 17.28)	0.403	2.19 (-10.04 to 14.42)	0.714	1.99 (-2.79 to 6.77)	0.397	-1.48 (-8.57 to 5.62)	0.671	5.21 (-5.80 to 16.22)	0.338	8.02 (-4.13 to 20.17)	0.185
GDP/ capita (per 1,000 EUR)	0.57 (0.22 to 0.92)	0.003	0.66 (0.32 to 1.00)	0.001	0.08 (-0.06 to 0.22)	0.252	0.12 (-0.08 to 0.32)	0.226	0.81 (0.49 to 1.13)	<0.001	0.90 (0.56 to 1.24)	<0.001

Shown for each covariate are regression coefficient  $\beta$ , 95% CI for  $\beta$ , and p value of statistical significance.  $\beta$  coefficients are adjusted for all variables shown in the table.



**Table 4.** Association of percentage change in Development Views with migration status and percentage change in GDP per capita in the EU, 2011 to 2015

	Percentage change in 'Very important'		Percentage change in 'Increase beyond promise'		Percentage change in 'Pay more'	
	$\beta$ (95% CI)	P	$\beta$ (95% CI)	P	$\beta$ (95% CI)	P
<i>Migration status</i>						
Other EU country	(referent)					
Arrival country	21.00 (-6.00 to 48.00)	0.121	45.90 (-27.37 to 119.17)	0.208	7.80 (-10.17 to 25.77)	0.378
Destination country	-0.52 (-25.52 to 24.49)	0.966	-13.22 (-81.08 to 54.64)	0.691	10.80 (-5.85 to 27.44)	0.193
Percentage change in GDP per capita, 2011 to 2015	0.38 (-0.79 to 1.54)	0.509	2.63 (-0.54 to 5.79)	0.099	0.57 (-0.20 to 1.35)	0.141

Shown for each covariate are regression coefficient  $\beta$ , 95% CI for  $\beta$ , and p-value of statistical significance.