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**The law in Anzac Day: an exploration of the  
commemorative narrative and its implication in  
the enactment of community**

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PhD thesis, University of Kent

July 2017

## Abstract

This research considers the contributory role played by the Anzac commemorative programme in Australia in determining a conception of Australian identity. It is suggested that the commemoration of Anzac Day propagates an exclusion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders from the Australian national community, however nebulous the definition of Australian-ness may be. Bound up in this exploration of the exclusivity of Anzac Day are interrogations of time, memory, historical authority, and expectation.

The interrogation of such themes is framed by an approach that draws on actor-network theory (ANT) and new materialism, both of which are identified as a useful means for articulating the way in which a commemorative programme is able to participate in effecting an exclusionary community identity. In particular, ANT and new materialism are invoked in order to articulate the complexity and situatedness of time. Approaching time in the manner facilitated by materiality-inflected methodologies enables an accentuation of the situatedness of memory and expectation. For instance, it is argued that rationalized temporalities, synchronicity, and calibration are folded into memorializations and commemorative expectations in order to effect an exclusion.

Moreover, the methodological approach used in this thesis allows questions of truth, knowledge, and relativism to be engaged with. This enables a critique of simple and exclusionary historical authority around which commemorations are built to be developed. The challenge to the facticity of 'a historical truth' builds on the approach

taken when identifying the contingent enactment of memory, exemplifying that historical authority is also a political actor implicated in an exclusionary commemorative narrative and not an unequivocal fact.

By demonstrating the role played by the complexity, situatedness, and multiplicity of the aforementioned themes in the development of an Anzac Day commemorative programme, it is possible to understand how a mnemonic narrative is a contested site of legal and political significance.

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# Chapter I

## Introduction

This thesis is an exploration of exclusion. It investigates the role a commemorative narrative, specifically Anzac Day,<sup>1</sup> plays in distinguishing between those who are included and those who are excluded from recognition within the Australian national community, however it is defined. Section 1 of this chapter addresses, briefly, the background to this current investigation. It seeks to explain why an exploration of exclusion from a perceived idea of Australian national identity is useful to engage in. Moreover, it identifies why Anzac Day, specifically, is considered as an important object of research. This section briefly exemplifies that the sense of what Australian identity 'is', however elusively it is defined, is a product of a number of actors, including Anzac Day commemoration. This section suggests that Anzac Day commemoration has a role in determining the boundaries of a 'community' and, thus, is juridically significant. Section 2 sets out the research questions that frame the ensuing investigation.

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<sup>1</sup> Anzac Day is the commemoration of the Australian soldiery. It is named after the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (The Anzacs). The history and significance of Anzac Day is briefly set out below, then developed further in Chapter Two.



## Background

In 1967, Australia crossed an important threshold regarding its treatment of and relationship to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. 1967 was the year that Australians were solicited for their views on changes to the Australian Constitution with the legal status of Aboriginal Australians in question. The subject of the referendum was determined by the Constitution Alteration (Aboriginals) Act 1967 to be the alteration of Section 51 and repeal of Section 127 of the Constitution. Section 51 of the Constitution originally provided that:

The Parliament [of Australia] shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:

(xxvi) the people of any race, *other than the aboriginal race in any State*, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws (emphasis added).

Section 127 provided that:

In reckoning the numbers of people of the Commonwealth, or of a State or other part of the Commonwealth, aboriginal natives shall not be counted.

These two sections demonstrate the explicit legal exclusion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders from legal recognition in Australia. Each of the Australian legislatures was entreated to ignore Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders.

The 1967 Act and subsequent referendum changed this situation. The Australian people voted, overwhelmingly, to carry the question put to them by a margin of 90.77%

to 9.23% (Commonwealth of Australia 2014).<sup>2</sup> This resulted in Royal Assent being given to the removal of the italicized clause in Section 51 (above) and the complete repeal of Section 127. Consequently, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders were recognized as citizens of the Australian Commonwealth. This thesis concerns the exclusion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders from the Australian national community, and it would appear that this referendum result neatly and hastily satisfies this investigation. Unfortunately, such an act did not end pervasive inequalities nor did it herald the unremitting inclusivity of the Australian people.<sup>3</sup>

There has been a dearth of progress in relation to education opportunities (Demosthenous 2012), access to resources (eg MacPherson et al 2016; O'Neill 2016) and socio-economic status. The latter comes in spite of government programmes to assist Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, not least because such programmes are at the whim of economic policy which heralds the retreat of the welfare state and the rhetoric of individualism (see eg Altman and Sanders 1995; Walter 2016). Indeed, recognition in 'law' can only go so far. More to the point, any concession that legislation, definitively, offers a resolution to a particular iniquity such as social and political exclusion depends on a narrow and optimistic understanding of law. As Maggie Walter

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<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the turnout for the referendum was 93.84%. Of course, Australia has a long established system of compulsory voting which explains this figure but it does demonstrate the assuredness of the decision.

<sup>3</sup> This extends beyond the not insignificant figure of 8.67% of enrolled votes who, at the time, voted against legal recognition. Nor, of course, do the questions of recognition and the legislative remit of the Australian Parliament satisfy the more general problem associated with recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders within the colonizers' legal framework. Indeed, the referendum fits comfortably alongside the troubling 'integration policy' advanced in the 1960s. Neither point is subject to discussion within this thesis.

(2016) has pointed out, there is a dynamism that one must acknowledge in the creation and *reproduction* of exclusion.

As such, the gap between legal recognition of Aboriginal Australians as citizens and the sense that there is some way to go before inequalities are resolved establishes my interest in the law that exists beyond the law.<sup>4</sup> This extends to the idea that the formal institution of 'law' and legal decision can conceal pervasive inequalities if relied upon as a weather vane. Therefore, this thesis is set out as a revelatory project. It is not, of course, set out to reveal that law permeates realms beyond recognizable decision making institutions, or that exclusions still befall Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. Rather, it sets out to investigate where else the 'extra'-legal distinction between inclusion within a community and exclusion from it arises.

A subset of this question is the establishment of what one may be excluded from. Correspondingly, what one means by community needs to be ascertained. In this thesis, community is not directly defined. Rather, it is left purposefully nebulous; the 'community' identified is, broadly speaking, the Australian national community. As such, the exclusion being explored in this thesis is the exclusion from being identified as Australian. Of course, there are a number of attempted definitions of what is meant by community. However, as Tony Blackshaw (2010) points out, such definitions are vague and community is now an imprecise, overused, and an uncritically positive term. Indeed, we have succumbed to definitions of community as, variously, 'remarkable . . . transcendent . . . wholesome . . . a warm summer's day . . . gentle tranquillity itself . . . morally improving . . . the family . . . home . . . bigger than individuals' (2010: 21).

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<sup>4</sup> Or, perhaps, not the law 'beyond' the law but the law that is revealed to us in its opening up to more expansive and uninhibited methods which seek to divulge law's pervasiveness (see eg Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2015) in the workaday or taken for granted.

A sense of community, then, can be thought of as the perception of warmth, belonging, and superiority. Compatible with this understanding of community are the 'ready-made outlets for prejudice and excessive emotionalism' (2010: 21) of community, too. Indeed, the bounded community can be identified as the foundation for bigotry, violence, and fear (see eg Ojakangas 2003; Esposito 2013). In this respect, then, such a definition of community leaves us with an impression of community that it begets exclusion as well as inclusion. The process by which this occurs is brought into question within this thesis. For instance, how does the 'Australian national community' come to be defined and, thus, come to exclude? This is where the attention of this thesis turns to Anzac Day.

Anzac Day is observed on 25<sup>th</sup> April every year. It commemorates the day that the Australian Commonwealth first engaged in conflict during World War One (WWI) in 1915. It is as important as Bastille Day in France or Independence Day in the United States of America. A legend of the Anzacs revolves around the suggestion that the landing of Australian troops at Gallipoli on the morning of the 25<sup>th</sup> April heralded the birth of the Australian nation and, thus, a sense of Australian-ness. How Anzac Day is promulgated, defined, and empowered as one factor in the determination of the Australian national identity forms the basis for this current investigation. How, for instance, is Anzac Day implicated in the determination of one 'community' as progressive, relevant, and embraced as right and another as regressive, irrelevant, and omitted from recognition? More specifically in relation to Australia, how is aboriginality sustained as an anachronism in Anzac commemoration? Or, at the very least, what is deployed to retain a sense of begrudging accommodation, rather than inclusion, of the aboriginal population in Australian commemorative practices (eg Spillman 1997)?

Commemorations have often been addressed as a medium for the accentuation of particular values over others, the separating of 'A' from 'not-A' (Assmann 2011: 105). Furthermore, the synchronicity offered as a feature of an annual and programmed commemorative event offers an opportunity for calibration, a process by which a community can be imagined (see Anderson 2006). Moreover, there is a perceived power in group memories (Halbwachs 1992) and traditions (Hobsbawm 1983a) which allows one to understand how certain regularized events can *effect* social orders. As such, the capacity for a commemorative pattern to 'operate to produce certain subjects as "recognizable" persons and to make others decidedly more difficult to recognize' (Butler 2009: 6) needs to be explored.

However, this thesis does not intend to explore the nature or effects of this exclusion. Rather, it aims to substantiate the means by which commemorative sites buttress one sense of identity or community as normative and coherent over others. In other words, it seeks to explore *how* commemorative patterns come to be identifiable as having such boundary-constituting capacities. As such, the narrative of revelation that has led to the identification of Anzac Day as complicit in the formation of community identification also determines the methodological approach adopted in this thesis. The importance of exploring the process by which something comes to be recognizable as having particular capacities opens up this thesis to actor-network theory (ANT) and new materialism. The former offers a vocabulary that facilitates an exploration of otherwise well-established or taken for granted things. As such, ANT offers the means for addressing the variety of actors enrolled in the process of exclusion.

The latter buttresses the usefulness of ANT by working, like ANT, to identify that things as we know them are relationally arrived at and do not, correspondingly, exhibit a self-contained essence. Addressing the enactment of a thing as a product of relations

between non-essential entities means one must acknowledge the complexity of a thing and the relations that have come to make it what it is. Such a methodological position requests that one traces how things come to be, inclusive of human, non-human, material, and non-material actors. In other words, ANT and new materialism offer the tools for explaining that a single story is a product of a blend of heterogeneous elements. As such, this thesis seeks to accentuate the way various temporalizations, materials, and ideologies, for example, act on Anzac Day in order to effect it as an actor with the capacity to contribute to a juridical and political exclusion.

The identification of Anzac Day as a significant object of research, then, serves two separate functions. First, it facilitates the exploration of exclusion and a determination of what is deployed in the construction of a sense of community. Second, there are key elements of the Anzac story that can be interrogated on the basis of a methodological perspective that embraces complexity and relationality. For instance, memory, expectations, a sense of historical authenticity and authority, and time are each implicated in the Anzac commemorative story. As such, the exploration of Anzac Day offers the possibility of making a contribution to the respective literatures in each field.

The study of memory and its link to identity is a field encountered in this thesis. Indeed, this link is pivotal to the identification of Anzac Day as a participant in the generation of a particular community identity. However, the opening up of this thesis to ANT and new materialism offers an opportunity to re-imagine how memory comes to be defined and implicated in the story of commemorative traditions and identity formation. What is more, the exploration of memory sits comfortably alongside the exploration of historical authority. These two literatures can be brought together a consideration of truth and relativism, the questioning of which is approached in both ANT and new

materialist literature. Questions of the authority and facticity of truth can be brought into conversation with the authenticity of memory, resulting in a challenge to each.

Running through any investigation of memory and history is an appreciation of time. As such, this thesis considers literature that engages with theorizations of time in light of the adopted methodological approach in order to offer a constructive way of bringing memory and history together. For instance, the theorization of time's multiplicity makes it possible to situate memory and history non-linearly. If time's non-singularity and non-rationality can be identified, the notion that both memory and history are means of *recollecting* 'the past' is called into question. Engaging the theorization of time on the basis of a theoretical and methodological position that seeks to emphasize the situational enactment of things, one can address 'time' as a contingent product. Consequently, this disposition towards time opens up a critical position for thinking about memory and history.

Such an attitude towards time also inflects the exploration of the role expectation plays in the Anzac Day commemorative pattern and, thus, in the promulgation of an exclusion. It will become clear that expectation is an operative concern in relation to the commemoration of Anzac Day. Indeed, synchronicity and calibration are processes which encapsulate how expectation, memory, and community can be thought to converge. Again, the notion of time's complexity and situatedness frames how one can approach the subject of expectation, adding texture to it beyond thinking of it in terms of 'anticipation'.

An important element of this investigation, then, is a consideration of how expectation can be thought of as an important aspect of a commemorative narrative. This consideration thereby bridges the theorization of time and the consideration of the character of 'memory' and 'authority' and allows an exploration of the role a

commemorative narrative can play in the enactment of an identifiable community. The subsequent exploration of this point is framed by the following questions.

### **Research questions**

The problematization of the strict legal inclusion of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population within the Australian citizenry was considered above. It prompted a foundational question of the law beyond the law that determines the categorization of inclusion and exclusion. This can be reframed in light of the focus on Anzac Day: what does the story of Anzac commemoration tell us about how inclusions and exclusions are effected? This general question prompts a subset of relevant questions. The identification of memory, expectation, and a sense of historical truth as important elements of a commemorative story requires exploration: in what way are memory, expectation, and a sense of historical truth involved in the Anzac story? Furthermore, the relationship of each memory, expectation, and historical fact with time prompts another set of related questions.

Initially, one must question the theorization of time. More specifically, how does a particular theorization of time allow us to understand how and where memory is implicated in an exclusionary commemorative narrative? The same must also be asked of expectation and historical 'truth'. An additional question can be asked, if not answered directly. Indeed, the underlying concern of this thesis is to explore and rethink Anzac Day as a juridical actor. As such, the question that informs this thesis and underpins other questions is: how does the implication of each aforementioned element in the Anzac story allow us to re-articulate Anzac Day in meaningful ways?

Associated with this last question is a methodological enquiry. One demonstrable issue with ANT is that it is readily censured for its own lack of criticality. This criticism is



encountered in Chapter Three. However, it is important to briefly mention here, as such criticism determines the ancillary question in relation to the purpose of ANT: how can one engage with ANT in relation to the retelling of the Anzac story in a way that demonstrates the critical potential of the methodology? The argument I will make in relation to this final question is that a composite methodology that relates ANT and new materialism does offer a critical tool with which to engage the matter of political exclusion. ANT is critical to the extent that it is revelatory and allows for a more attentive description of what participates in a network and how.

Anzac Day is a useful example in this respect, as one can identify the critical need to apprehend the means by which a commemorative programme can be identified as complicit in the exclusion of certain groups from a political community. Approaching Anzac Day with ANT allows one to develop an understanding of how hitherto underexplored elements of the exclusionary narrative are constructed and deployed. For instance, the theorization of the complexity and multiplicity of time through the use, principally, of ANT and new materialism enables us to approach both the mnemonic authenticity and historical fact of Anzac Day as illusory. They are illusory inasmuch as they are determined to be singular and conclusively true. Indeed, it is the identification of the situational enactment and multiplicity of both memory and history that renders such singularity fallacious.

As such, it can be inferred that the exclusionary narrative that rests on a rationalized memory and history is a house of cards. Such 'truths' are buttressed by the material and rhetorical actors, also entangled in the Anzac commemorative network. It is argued that these 'truths' are implicated in the development of the normative and formative frameworks out of which commemorative expectations are enacted. Commemorative expectations are powerful as they help constitute a community on the

basis of the expectation of shared obligations and features. The complex temporal character of expectations revolves around the enactment of synchronicity of experience. It is argued that the lack of such synchronicity begets an exclusion.

### *Chapter plan*

The argument identified in relation to the above research questions will be developed across each of the following chapters. Chapter Two demonstrates that there are several ways of approaching the question of exclusion and inclusion in relation to the Anzac story. Alongside this, it also suggests that there is space for re-imagining this exclusion. This is possible on the basis of an exploration of memory, truth, and expectation, accounting for the role played by each. Chapter Three introduces the methodological basis for this renewed exploration of what the Anzac story can tell us about inclusion and exclusion. It demonstrates that the vocabularies offered by both ANT and new materialism help frame the articulation of the participative and constructive capacities of a variety of actors within the Anzac story. The story is, of course, principally related to the exclusion of certain *humans*; this chapter argues that a methodological approach inclusive of non-human actors, too, offers a worthwhile critical position for understanding such an exclusion.

Chapter Four concerns the theorization of time. Indeed, the functionality of the ANT and new materialist vocabulary can be tested on the basis of how it helps to reframe an exploration of time. The theorization of time offers a chance to stretch this methodological position further in order to underscore its relevance, coherence, and criticality. This chapter also acknowledges how time relates to memory and expectation. Chapter Five is the first of three chapters that rebuilds the Anzac Day narrative, exploring in more detail the mnemonic features of Anzac Day. It approaches the retelling of the

Anzac story on the basis of exploring collective memory using the methodological and theoretical frames established in Chapters Three and Four.

Chapter Six concerns itself with the performativity of history. It considers a number of features of the Anzac Day commemorative narrative to demonstrate how history is constructed and promulgated rather than accessed as an undeniable truth. In turn, this examination also articulates a number of exclusions that are readily built into the Anzac Day commemoration through its historical narrative. Chapter Seven is the final 'Anzac chapter' and explores the role expectations play within the story. It determines that expectations are not future oriented, not least because time does not work linearly. Rather, expectations are situationally enacted and situationally rendered meaningful. This is evidenced in relation to the origin story of Anzac Day in the WWI campaign. The chapter ends with a consideration of how expectations, as a key basis for the development of a sense of community, are enacted in the Anzac Day commemorative pattern. Chapter Eight concludes this thesis with a consolidation of the approach taken and an outline of how this work may inform future research.

## Chapter II

### Anzac Day and Exclusion

This chapter seeks to articulate commemorations of Anzac Day as loci of an exclusionary narrative. This initially requires a brief description of why Anzac Day is deemed so important in the Australian national calendar;<sup>5</sup> this is approached in Section 1 of this chapter. Furthermore, the importance of Anzac Day is established through literature (eg Anderson 2006; Foucault 2007) that identifies the legal and political value in certain institutions and sites. As such, this chapter sets out to explain why Anzac Day matters—one of the preliminary questions of this thesis. Beyond simply signifying an

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<sup>5</sup> Anzac stands for the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, and it is also observed in New Zealand. Notwithstanding the claim that there exists a superior relationship between the Māori and European New Zealanders (Loveridge 2015), race relations in New Zealand are also strained. However, the enactment of the exclusion of indigenous populations from the Anzac commemorative narrative will be considered only in relation to Australia here. This is because both New Zealand and Australian production and observance of Anzac Day is tempered by conditions specific to each country. For instance, it is argued that any impression of superiority of race relations in New Zealand is a product of the employment of certain strategies that enable European New Zealanders to distance themselves from, and conceal, New Zealand's colonial past (see Liu et al 1999; Sibley, Liu, and Khan 2008). As such, this adds a dimension to the story of the colonization of New Zealand that warrants its own investigation. Moreover, the commemoration of the Treaty of Waitangi being signed on Waitangi Day is often the basis for protest (McKay 2013) as challenges to the nature of the rights conferred and agreed upon, and the process by which they were obtained (Abel 2013; Packer 2014), is an additional controversy that complicates the New Zealand Anzac Story.

important day in the Australian national consciousness, the importance of Anzac Day is revealed in dissent voiced about Anzac Day that points to its role in the preservation of a racialized Australian identity (see eg Moreton-Robinson 2015). In order to identify the inequality that revolves around the Anzac Day commemorative narrative, the commemoration specific to Canberra is considered.

This chapter also considers literature that theorizes what exclusion is and how it occurs (eg Agamben 1998; Butler 2004, 2009). This literature deals, specifically, with the notion of how certain groups of people come to be excluded, *excepted*, and unrecognized. These works also identify the legal and political consequences of such a dynamic. Both Giorgio Agamben and Judith Butler express *why* exclusion matters and, indeed, why talking about exclusion matters. Notwithstanding their ability to articulate how commemorative sites can come to be sites of exclusion and marginalization, the approaches to theorizations of exclusion taken by Agamben and Butler distinguish them from the approach adopted in this thesis.<sup>6</sup>

Sections 2 and 3 explore the exclusionary practices of Anzac Day in more detail. Section 2 offers a brief description of the emergence of the Anzac legend and a commemorative process. The story starts at the military operation that preceded the landing of troops at Gallipoli, works its way through the early establishment of a commemorative programme and ends with a consideration of the more recent commemoration of Anzac Day. Section 3 establishes key thematic explorations that relate to the interrogation of a commemorative pattern, identifying the scope for re-imagining the juridical significance of matters of time (eg Grabham 2010, 2016; West-Pavlov 2013),

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<sup>6</sup> This distinction is identified as a matter of methodology, which is established in the concluding section of this chapter and explored in more detail in Chapter Three.

expectations (eg Anderson 2006), notions of truth, and memory (eg Assmann and Czaplicka 1995). An exploration of each of these is considered necessary in order to tell a fuller story of Anzac Day, addressing why and how it can be thought of as exclusionary.

### **Exploring Anzac Day**

Before a consideration of why Anzac Day is considered to be so important, a brief description of the Anzac Story<sup>7</sup> will be presented here.

#### *Gallipoli: the origins of Anzac Day*

The landing of troops at Gallipoli on 25<sup>th</sup> April during WWI is identifiable as the origin of the Anzac legend, hence it is the day selected to commemorate Anzac Day. In truth, though, the legend emerges from events occurring across the previous nine months. While Britain only officially entered the war as a belligerent on 4<sup>th</sup> August 1914, the political environment in the lead up to this declaration made such a declaration inevitable.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, Australia's first contribution to the war came on 3<sup>rd</sup> August 1914. With a certain knowledge of the way the wind was blowing, the Australian Government informed Britain that it was willing to despatch a force of 20,000 combatants should the need arise (Bean 1983). The subsequent narrative of Australia as a youthful state inciting its population to volunteer for the war effort and articulate its strength is a common feature of the Anzac legend. It was thought that the war gave the British Dominions an

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<sup>7</sup> This, of course, will also be developed in more depth throughout this thesis.

<sup>8</sup> The political situation in Europe will not be considered in any great depth here. For a more detailed examination of the geopolitics of Europe in the decades leading up to the war, including the acute political crisis that immediately preceded it, see Christopher Clark (2013).

opportunity to demonstrate their respective power in the international arena (see Bean 1941; Sheftall 2009).

The precise narrative surrounding the origins of Anzac, however, was developed significantly in the following months. In fact, the reason the Australians were even deployed at Gallipoli was a product of a military strategy that emerged as part of a diplomatic crisis between Britain and the Ottoman Empire (Steel and Hart 1994). The Ottoman Empire entered the war as an ally to the Central Powers on 31<sup>st</sup> October. In the lead up to this declaration, the Allies were in the process of building two ships for the Ottoman Navy. These ships had been procured by subscription of the Turkish people. As such, the subsequent British requisitioning—effectively, the confiscation—of these ships for its own uses during the conflict deeply angered the Ottoman Imperial Government (see Millar 1991).<sup>9</sup>

The resulting antagonism between Britain and the Ottoman Empire resulted in a blockade of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits that isolated Russia from the Mediterranean and its Allies in Western Europe. The setback of losing such a beneficent power in the war only served to focus Allied attention on forcing the straits. Indeed, it was thought that the strategic advantage of forcing these waterways commanded by the Ottoman Empire could result in the end of trench warfare that characterized the war being fought on the Western Front (Millar 1991). However, the diplomatic blunder that necessitated the campaign to free Russia from its isolation from Western Europe was

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<sup>9</sup> As a result, German forces were quick to step in and offer two of its own cruisers to the Ottoman Naval Fleet (Steel and Hart 1994) having identified a strategic advantage in Ottoman support.

matched by the disasters of the resultant naval operation that was planned and implemented between January and April 1915.<sup>10</sup>

As a result of the failures of the naval campaign, the attention shifted towards the deployment of troops on the Gallipoli peninsula to try and force the submission of the straits to the Allies by land. So, the failure of the long-established strength of the British armed forces (the Navy) heralded the deployment of the Army instead. Traditionally, the British Army was a very small professional force bolstered by volunteers. They were not used to, nor fully prepared for, the nature of the combat on land that typified WWI. Like the Australians, they could be thought of as extraordinary men in an extraordinary situation. Similarly, both could be understood as victims of strategic and executive blunders, feeding the familiar rhetoric of being 'lions led by donkeys'.

This rhetoric, coupled with the idea that Australians should revel in the opportunity to demonstrate their strength on the international stage, goes some way to demonstrating why the Gallipoli campaign is heralded as a threshold moment for the nation. In spite of heavy losses suffered in the nine-month long campaign that ended in Allied retreat from the area, it was considered an accomplishment worthy of memorialization in Australia. Indeed, James Page's (2010) consideration of war memorials in Australia appears to buttress this point; memorials are thought to focus on exhibiting the virtues of Australia as an emerging nation. As such, the result of the conflict was not the prevailing concern. Rather, it was the manner in which the Australians who volunteered had acquitted themselves.

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<sup>10</sup> The failures of the naval operation and the immediate run up to the landing of troops at Gallipoli are more closely documented in Chapter Seven.



*Inventing a commemorative pattern, reinventing a commemorative purpose*

The Anzac story is focused squarely on the men who fought, and not any military triumph as they, along with the rest of the Allies, retreated from the campaign in defeat. As such, the figure of the 'Anzac' was at the heart of the discussion that took place in the years after the landing surrounding the best way of commemorating the legend. A lucid depiction of the Australian volunteers came from Charles Bean (1941). He suggests that the character of the Australian man was developed from adventurous liberal stock, tempered by harsher physical environments and a more egalitarian political ideology (see also Rhoden 2012).<sup>11</sup> The aggressiveness and 'vigorous and unfettered initiative' (Bean 1941: 5) of Australian volunteers was, for Bean, matched by their humour and temperament.

However, how this imagery was (to be) mobilized in the setting of a commemorative narrative was the source of much debate in the first 30 years after the Gallipoli landings. The Australian Government(s), the media, and the public each thought there was much at stake in the establishment of Anzac Day commemoration. Contrasts between the disastrousness of the campaign, the sadness at the loss of Australian life, the jovial and expeditionary mentality of the Australians who fought, and the sense that this marked the arrival of an international awareness of Australian nationhood made it difficult to settle on a cohesive commemorative message. This heralded marked shifts in the Anzac commemorative programme. For example, the prevalence of calls for solemnity in the inter-war years (Anon 1938) was overtaken by a focus on Gallipoli as a great source of national pride and celebration.

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<sup>11</sup> Notwithstanding, of course, the contention of this paper that Australia suffers from fundamental exclusions on racial grounds.

The notion that Anzac Day should be *celebrated* and observed as ‘the day on which [Australians] first became fully conscious of their nationhood’ (Anon 1940b: 4) had to overcome a focus on personal grief and austere reverence towards the sacrifices made by young men before it could be solidified. The quasi-religious overtones in the juxtaposition of celebrating sacrifice in the name of Australia, particularly as Anzac Day can fall on Easter Sunday (see Anon 1943), added an additional texture to this debate. Furthermore, there were calls from veterans to properly commemorate the fallen by allowing alcohol to be purchased on Anzac Day, and for it to be recognized as a day of leisure, as they ‘were not killjoys’ (Anon 1939b: 9). As soon as it became a day of significance in Australia, Anzac Day staged conflicts over what it should mean.

One thing that each conceptualization of what Anzac should mean had in common was a belief that the Anzacs were the custodians of the spirit of Australian nationhood. Notwithstanding this accord, fluency in the observance of Anzac only began to arise in the 1930s. Calls for uniformity were approaching in earnest in Canberra (Anon 1935a) with a highly detailed programme of events developed that centred on a service held at the graveside of Major-General William Bridges (the first Australian officer to die at Gallipoli).

However, despite this detailed programme for the observance of Anzac Day in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT)—and despite elevated numbers of observants at services and parades throughout Australia—a real diversity in the commemorative pattern remained. For instance, dawn services were customarily observed (Anon 1935b) in many places. However, it, like many other elements of Anzac Day, emerged slowly as an integral part of the Anzac Day programme throughout the inter-war years. Indeed, the challenges to the Anzac Day programme in the inter-war years forms the subject matter of Chapter Five, in the context of establishing how certain understandings of collective

memory can be used to examine what is happening in the development of the Anzac commemorative narrative. This chapter's consideration of the emergence of an Anzac narrative ends with its replication abroad, in Tokyo, in 1947. The reason the replication of Anzac Day commemorations abroad is significant is because it speaks to a point made by Diane Barthel (1996) that something does not need to be the most superlative of instances to be important, it just needs to be widely known. For the purposes of this thesis, the packaging and deployment of an Anzac Day programme abroad is adopted as the point at which Anzac Day solidifies its importance.

Notwithstanding the emergence of a more secure programme, the desire to commemorate Anzac Day at all became a question that caused fluctuations in observances in the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, the fact that Anzac Day has not always retained an undisputed popularity or unequivocal narrative has been identified by Jenny MacLeod (2002, 2004). Even within the normative narrative of the white, European male that sits at the heart of the story of the heroism of the Dominion soldiery, Anzac Day has had a lot of meanings attributed to it which belie the durability of the commemorative programme and sites.

In her aptly named article, "The fall and rise of Anzac Day', MacLeod (2002) compares the reception and treatment of Anzac Day at its 50<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup> anniversaries. She identifies a more ambivalent attitude towards Anzac Day in 1965, and suggests that it was given renewed meaning as a crux of Australian nationhood in 1990. She suggests a number of reasons for this. Academic embarrassment at what was considered to be an inherently conservative ritual was the zeitgeist in the 1960s, as was the religious disquiet with the narrative of Anzac Day. The rise—or return—of Anzac Day in the 1990s is put down, by MacLeod, to the increase in cinematic portrayals of Anzac and changes in the way commemorative displays were funded and organized. For instance, in relation to the

state-funded 1990 pilgrimage to Gallipoli, MacLeod discusses the careful choreography in comparison to the self-funded—and much more hurried and ill-thought out—1965 event. Moreover, funding and management changes at the Australian War Memorial (AWM) acted to motivate the renewal of the site as a focal point for Anzac Day commemoration. This all speaks to the idea that Anzac Day commemoration is a fluctuating beast which relies upon a number of things in order to garner its meaning.

### *Contemporary observance: a focus on Canberra*

Subsequent to the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Anzac Day, a raft of legislation was enacted in each of the Australian states that governed the commemoration of Anzac Day.<sup>12</sup> The 1990s also saw a federal restatement of Anzac Day as a significant national holiday. The three section long Anzac Day Act 1995 provides that:

#### 3. Observance of Anzac Day as the national day of commemoration

The national day of commemoration to recognize and commemorate the contribution of all those who have served Australia (including those who died) in

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<sup>12</sup> Queensland enacted the Anzac Day Act in 1995 restating the purpose of Anzac Day and trading restrictions enforced since 1990. New South Wales legislated on the legality of a traditional soldiers gambling game in the Gambling (two-up) Act 1998. Victoria enacted a series of primary legislation that governed trading hours (Shop Trading Reform Act 1996), the definition and consequences of public holidays (Public Holidays Act 1993), and the alcohol licencing (Liquor Control Reform Act 1998). The Anzac Day Act 1960, enacted in Western Australia, remains in force but had amendments relating to sports, leisure activities, and the management of charitable funds in relation to Anzac Day made in the 90s. The Northern Territory has legislated more consistently and continually on Anzac Day and gaming controls, and South Australia consolidates these issues in the Anzac Day Commemoration Act 2005. Tasmania has amended the Anzac Day Observance Act 1929 regularly since the mid-1990s. ACT has made similar amendments to the Holidays Act 1958 since the 1990s.

time of war and in war-like conflicts is to be known as Anzac Day and observed on 25<sup>th</sup> April each year.

The seemingly simplistic statement reveals a lot about the attitudes to the commemoration of Anzac Day in Canberra. The policy of the AWM not to recognize the frontier wars as within its remit to commemorate seems stark in light of this piece of legislation. Being the focal point of the commemoration of Anzac Day, it seems incongruous that the AWM does not fully recognize the frontier wars, or even 'war-like' conflict. In amongst this emphasis on Anzac Day as a day to commemorate a broad number of events is a similar stress on commemorating the service of *Australians*. It is here where we return to the exclusionary trait of Anzac Day; the pattern of its commemoration has implications for how the Australian identity is delimited.

#### *Why does Anzac matter?*

In spite of the poor execution of the campaign and the fact that it is not an example of military victory, an enduring legend surrounding the involvement of men from Australia emanated from the Gallipoli campaign, to the extent that 25<sup>th</sup> April is a day fixed in Australia's national calendar, as much as 14<sup>th</sup> July is celebrated in France, or 4<sup>th</sup> July is acclaimed in the United States of America (Robertson 1990). The legend surrounding the Anzacs is that the Australian volunteer soldiers acquitted themselves in an unimaginable and unmanageable situation. Indeed, a key component of the legend is the idea that 'the only figures in the canvas of the campaign who never failed were the men [who fought]' (North 1936: 354). The British and French military leaderships, to whom the Anzacs were subordinates, were characterized for their poor planning, organisation, and management

of the situation. The fact, then, that the Anzacs were volunteers<sup>13</sup> subjected to these conditions means they were, and are, regarded as heroes.

The importance of Anzac Day was originally 'not only for commemoration but also for reminding Australians of obligations to returned men' with the gratitude and pride for these men left to 'burn forever . . . in the heart of our new nation . . . tempered with a divine sadness for those who will never return' (Robertson 1990: 249). John Robertson goes on to suggest that the self-sacrificial and idealistic imperative of the Anzacs should be sustained for later generations, making children aware of the Anzacs' role in the origin story of Australia. That it remains the 'one day of the year'<sup>14</sup> (Robertson 1990: 258) for the commemoration of service to and sacrifice for Australia imbues it with the same significance as other commemorations of past conflicts in other nations; the memorialisation of war allows generations of people to find a moment when their forebears appear in history (Todman 2009).

Bean, for instance, was keen for Australians to be able to identify with the Anzacs, demonstrating that they were made up of a cross section of Australian society. He wanted to inspire the younger generations with the Anzac story, seeing it as a model for national development; the Anzac legend was 'a national history and not a military one' (see

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<sup>13</sup> The status of the Australian men as *volunteer* soldiers is emphasised as part of the Anzac legend. Charles Bean, Australian war diarist, suggested that the heroism of the men was, in part, due to the fact that they were not typical 'heroes' but 'ordinary Australians caught up in an extraordinary situation' (see Bean 1992: 237).

<sup>14</sup> The origins of this phrase can be found in Alan Seymour's play, *The One Day of the Year*, which offers a nuanced examination of the tone of observance on Anzac Day. The phrase has since been adopted as an indication of how special Anzac Day is to Australia as a fixed point from which Australian nationhood stems.

Thomson 2013: 174). The attempt to stress the inclusiveness and a shared sense of the national significance of Anzac Day attests to the idea that commemorative events are legally and politically significant sites that symbolize and sustain the idea of an imagined community (Anderson 2006). This is because one can vest an expectation of synchronicity of experience in fixed events that spread across the nation. Such expectations enable these events to promulgate a sense of collective identity. For instance, in relation to national anthems, Benedict Anderson suggests that 'no matter how banal the words and mediocre the tunes, there is in this singing an experience of simultaneity' (2006: 145).

In other words, the establishment of trust among a community is oriented around the perception of shared experiences. The form, then, that such expressions of collective identity take is as important as the substantive content being expressed (see eg Wilson 2006). Indeed, it is hard to dissociate the two. For example, the commemoration of Anzac Day revolves around a service at dawn. This service symbolizes the moment at which the first landings at Gallipoli were made. As much as the shared reverence to the Anzac legend can be thought of as the basis on which the Australian collective identity is reinforced, it is realization of synchronicity of experience, such as attending dawn services, that allows a disparate community to imagine itself as that, *one* community.

Such ritualistic displaces of memory can be considered the basis for authority and power, too. For Stephen Feuchtwang (2010), rituals offer a teleology of social progress and present obligations on the basis of a shared past. Commemorative or other mnemonic rituals can be thought of as a means of political authority or mandate for control. Moreover, such an approach to attributing and taking meaning from collective identity works on the basis that one can be assured of the sense of identity and responsibility that the shared memory imbues in others. Sibylle Puntcher et al (2014), for instance, seek to

express the correlation between collective memory and high social capital; a strong sense of collective memory imbues a sense of trust that people will behave as is expected of them. As it has been suggested above, the status of Anzac Day acted, originally, as a reminder to Australians of their obligations to provide for those who fought. Moreover, the imperative that 'lest Australians forget' the Anzac story highlights the obligations tied up in collective commemorations.

Identifying the legal and political significance of Anzac Day, then, comes from the identification of obligations that arise from collective memories. Memory can be thought of as a strategy by which populations can be governed. The Foucauldian emphasis of governance as 'an ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of [a] very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target' (Foucault 2007: 105) suggests that legal and political strategies for order are scattered among many possible apparatuses. The activity of government is defined to include the means of devices and techniques that make the utilisation of persons, knowledge, and legitimacy operable. This affords the latitude to acknowledge 'the vast assemblages of persons, theories, projects, experiments, and techniques' (Rose and Miller 1992: 177) that can be implicated in the strategic ordering of legal questions of citizenship, governance, and identity formation. The Anzac Day commemorative patterns bear such a mark of the activity of government.

This is because the Anzac Day commemoration—and, indeed, all other commemorative narratives—is a 'time rich' institution, much like archives or museums (see eg Douglas 2011, 2013, 2015). These institutions can be thought of as time rich because their mandate is to make past events intelligible for present audiences. As such, they are fundamentally concerned with matters of time. The reason such institutions can be thought of as significant or foundational apparatuses in the production and



articulation of governmental power is precisely *because* they present versions of the past to us. In recognizing the underdeveloped attention of legal scholars on questioning how we document and write history, Renisa Mawani (2012) highlights the juridical power of the past and how it is constructed. This is because the archive 'is the product of ongoing struggles over the production, politicization, and institutionalization of knowledge' (Mawani 2012: 342). Moreover, the stress on the distributedness of the state among techniques that produce exclusions, marginalisations, and silencing in Mawani's work demonstrates a scope for appreciating an array of institutions that are complicit in the construction of legal and political orders, particularly if they are immersed in time.

Arthur Stinchcombe (2009), for instance, asserts that people can build structures to carry values into the future while leaving out the more undesirable elements of a 'past heritage' from these future projections. This suggests that the regularization or institutionalization of a particular mnemonic story has a certain degree of constitutive significance. The dawn service, then, can be thought of as a method of disseminating the Anzac legend and the values instilled in its recollection and retelling to a community. The 'time richness' of a mnemonic narrative is similarly identified by Monika Reif-Huelser (2012). Her idea that a specific temporality is pivotal to the teleology of a particular commemorative narrative serves to address the strength of memories as a rationalizing device for future orientation. This rationalization can, no doubt, also be achieved through the construction of a temporal continuity. When the connection of the past, present, and future can be considered a vital tool for the maintenance of a political structure, this temporal coherence can be considered an important element of the generation and maintenance of power.

As such, events and processes that serve to conceal discontinuities and stress mnemonic and historic continuities are implicated in this political process. Reif-Huelser

is writing of memory in relation to political transition, which is a useful way of addressing the link between memory and politics as it enables memory to be thought of as a device that helps develop coherent and palatable political and societal narratives. James Wertsch (2012) presents another consideration of this connection. He seeks to address *how* narratives gain and retain their importance. For instance, it may be that narratives are used in modern nation-states to 'make sense of our own and others' actions' (2012: 174) but *how* they are used, and *how* they come about are equally important to address. Similarly, it is important to address how certain parts of the story, or voices within a narrative, come to be considered incidental or excluded altogether.

Indeed, the constitutive significance of Anzac Day is met with a sense that it does not fairly reflect the indigenous history of Australia and promulgates an exclusionary narrative. This is particularly evident in the Anzac Day commemoration in Canberra and depends, in part, on the original establishment of the Anzacs in WWI. At the time of the war, aboriginal Australians were not allowed to volunteer for the Anzacs. This policy was established unapologetically on the basis of race. The fact that thousands did manage to sign up is somewhat hidden from history. As such, aboriginal Australians were kept out of representations and accounts of soldiers in Europe. Rather than eventually being actively subsumed into official commemorative narratives, in recognition of the contribution of aboriginal volunteers, self-organized Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders' commemorations remain an adjunct to the official services. In Canberra, for instance, the aboriginal service is relegated to after dawn. Given the significance which is placed on dawn this represents an important exclusion from the Anzac legend.

The AWM in Canberra is the focal point for the official Anzac Day service, which is an integral element of the commemorative programme as it is held at the break of dawn, marking the commencement of Anzac Day. It was founded through the efforts of war

correspondent, Charles Bean, as a means of commemorating the Anzacs in WWI and, subsequently, other Australian wars. Notably absent from the AWM is the memorialisation of the 'frontier wars'<sup>15</sup> during the colonisation of Australia. This continues to be justified on the basis that it is beyond the remit of the AWM (see Nelson 2013), in spite of claims that it should be included (Inglis 1998).<sup>16</sup> The inference drawn from the exclusion of the frontier wars from the AWM is a continuing failure to fully recognize the constitutive experience of indigenous Australians (Nicoll 2014) and such a denial has implications for understanding race relations within Australia. A consequence of the lack of recognition of the frontier wars at the AWM was the establishment of a separate ceremony to promote awareness of the remembrance of indigenous Australians. The affront to the aboriginal history of Australia prompted the subsequent dismissal of aboriginal voices from the Anzac Day narrative.

This ceremony was established by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Veterans and Services Association (ATSIVSA). It continues to be held on Anzac Day directly after the dawn service at the AWM and it is conducted at the site of a modest plaque on Mount Ainslie, which is the peak overlooking the AWM. It has already been mentioned that the dawn service operates to fix a time on 25<sup>th</sup> April that Australians can identify as historically, and nationally, significant. It frustrates differences in time zones

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<sup>15</sup> The frontier wars denote the number of disparate conflicts that took place between the late-eighteenth century and the early-twentieth century whereby the British colonisers sought to wrest control of land from aboriginal Australians (see eg Connor 2002).

<sup>16</sup> The argument for inclusion focuses on the importance of acknowledging that Australian history extends beyond the moments of colonisation. Understanding that aboriginal Australians were striving to defend their land against invasion is an obligation that cannot be concealed by semantics. The stress on the AWM's remit to only acknowledge those who fought to defend Australia after colonization is, it is argued, tenuous (see also Reynolds 2013 for discussion).

as dawn acts as a temporal anchor for Australians across the globe. One can observe Anzac Day dawn services in London's Hyde Park or at the Anzac commemorative site at Gallipoli, or across the three Australian time zones.

Wherever in the world, it is possible to reaffirm one's Australian-ness through a coherent commemorative narrative that stresses the expectation of shared experiences. But what happens to representations that stray from this narrative pattern? If a community is 'contingent on its members sustaining a certain image of it that is based on their perceptions and feelings' (Tamir 1995: 423), and these perceptions and feelings are sustained by the visceral and affective dawn service, then an exclusion from these services could be thought to precipitate an exclusion from a community.

*Constitutive exclusion: banishment and 'unrecognition'*

The means by which a commemorative programme can effect an exclusion can be articulated on the basis that it is a tool that assists in the generation of juridical taxonomies of both the included and the excluded. Taking the lead from Michel Foucault (2003, 2007) and Giorgio Agamben (2009, 2011), one can identify certain institutions, symbols, or spectres as loci of the enactment of power to distinguish between the included and the excluded. In relation to Anzac Day, the dawn service operates to demarcate what is included and what is excluded from the narrative of Australian-ness within the Anzac legend. Beyond the dawn service functioning as a means of solidifying a particular impression of unity within a community, it can also be thought of as buttressed by the excluded other.

The legal and political significance of the excluded has, of course, been aptly expressed by Agamben (1998) in *Homo Sacer*. His thesis that the decision over life/non-life or inclusion/exclusion forms the lifeblood of sovereign power relies on identifying

exclusions from the legal order as constitutive of it. For Agamben, that which is excepted from the legal order assists in defining the realm of the included. So, in relation to Anzac, the exclusion of aboriginal Australians from the commemorative narrative could be thought of as the constitutive exclusion that stresses the Australian legal and political order as a product of colonisation and, as such, thought of as distinctly and categorically European.

Like law, the narrative security of Australian-ness and the Anzac legend is 'made of nothing but what it manages to capture inside itself through the inclusive exclusion of the exception . . . [nourishing] itself on this exception and is a dead letter without it' (1998: 27). The conclusion reached by Agamben about the nature of the legal order is compelling but the question of how exceptionality comes to constitute the rule is key. Interrogating *how* this constitutive exclusion is enacted in the context of the commemoration of Anzac Day is the task of this thesis.<sup>17</sup>

It suffices to say here that, in relation to Agamben's own assertion that 'the sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice', with sacred life being 'life that has been captured in this sphere' (1998: 83) there is an evident coalescence of the notion of exclusion and how we choose to commemorate life. It offers one basis for understanding

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<sup>17</sup> The enactment of a distinction between the included and the excluded in the Anzac Day commemorative programme is approached on the basis of understanding how rationality (corresponding to the included) and irrationality (as the excluded) are defined through the deployment of expectations and memory. They are also understood as temporally and spatially co-ordinated. This is attended to in detail in Chapters Four and Seven. Before then, intermediate chapters consider how memory (Chapter Five), and historical authority (Chapter Six) can each be thought of in terms of the materiality inflected methodology developed in Chapter Three as a means of approaching *how* this distinction can be enacted.

how commemoration, with a distinction made between the acts of killing life and sacrificing non-life, satisfies the paradox of the exception constituting the rule qua the rule acting to except. For instance, the physical difference in location and timing between the AWM and the site on Mount Ainslie serves to exclude the latter from the 'main' commemorative Anzac narrative. Similarly, contemporary bans (see Kwan 2015) on indigenous groups seeking to emphasize racial and historical violences joining Anzac marches affirms a particular identity through the exclusion of another (Moreton-Robinson 2015).

The significance of the act of 'banning' is also expressed by Agamben. He suggests that banishment exemplifies the interdependence of exclusion and inclusion. For Agamben, 'the banishment of sacred life is the sovereign *nomos* that conditions every rule, the originary spatialization that governs and makes possible every localization and territorialization' (1998: 111). Agamben suggest this is exemplified in the mythology of the werewolf. As half man and half animal, living between the forest and the city, the werewolf illustrates the inclusion/exclusion paradox. The process of exclusion (ie the forest or nature) is only given meaning in its relation to the constructed inclusion (ie the city or polis). Moreover, the city is only made meaningful in its distinction from the forest; this distinction is imagined on the basis that the forest precedes the political community and life within it is perceived as animalistic or primordial.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> The suggestion that the frontier wars should not be commemorated within the AWM as they preceded what could be considered 'Australia' is a tacit example of the ascription of the life that exists before civilization. The designation of certain communities of people as anachronistic makes it possible to consider the lives within these communities with disregard, or as problematic and, thus, excluded from the normative legal and political order (see Taylor and Wetherell 1999).

Such identity ascriptions are regularly used by non-indigenous Australians when describing indigenous Australians (Sarra 2011; Gorringe, Ross, and Fforde 2011).<sup>19</sup> The challenge here is to break away from this 'saturating narrative'. Moving away from such saturation requires 'the installation of a new type of language in its place' (Gorringe, Ross, and Fforde 2011: 7). If one can identify a constructed narrative as a contributory element to political ordering, then it is possible to suggest that participating in the examination of how such a narrative is conditioned speaks to Scott Gorringe, Joe Ross, and Cressida Fforde's above challenge. This resonates with the Agambenian notion that normativity is constituted *by* an exclusion as well as being constitutive *of* that exclusion.<sup>20</sup>

Of course, the *how* question remains: how is this normativity mediated and enacted? By, or in, what? It is possible, here, to cite how the vocabulary of actor-network theory (ANT) generates a particular means for approaching the detail of how normatively ordered inclusions and exclusions come to exist at all. Indeed, the tools offered by ANT allow us to bridge, on the one hand, the legal and political significance of Agamben's understanding of why certain life comes to be permitted as life and, on the other hand,

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<sup>19</sup> However, the language of 'deficit' or 'disadvantage' also buttresses lateral violence between indigenous communities. It is a significant difficulty because 'it is the established narrative of government policy and is constantly expressed (whether implicitly or explicitly) both within indigenous and non-indigenous Australia' (Gorringe, Ross, and Fforde 2011: 9). The link between this language, of deficit in particular, and exclusions on the basis of a community's perceived antecedence is clear. As such, this language exemplifies the emergence and enactment of an exclusion.

<sup>20</sup> This point is made by Agamben in relation to his understanding of Carl Schmitt's conceptualization of sovereign power. Agamben suggests that, 'what Schmitt wishes to establish above all is the superiority of the sovereign *nomos* as the constitutive event of law with respect to every positivistic conception of law as simple position and convention' (1998: 36). However, Agamben considers that, 'what is more original and stronger than the law is not (as in Schmitt) the *nomos* as sovereign principle but rather the mediation that grounds knowledge' (1998: 33).

the significance of Anzac Day commemoration as an exclusionary narrative. It helps to connect the two as it is a means of establishing what role a commemorative narrative might have in identifying certain lives as includable and others as not. Moreover, the purpose of ANT is to prompt the discovery of the detail of what is implicated in the process of making such a distinction between lives. In other words, how can a commemorative narrative become this influential?<sup>21</sup>

### *Recognition and grievability*

The link identified between commemorative patterns and the development of an exclusionary narrative is often stressed on the basis of language. Just as Gorringe, Ross, and Fforde identify in their study of the consequences of certain identity ascriptions, Lyn Spillman (1997) suggests that certain repertoires or languages can characterize the nation as deserving, distinct, or exceptional in some way. Spillman's identification of commemoration as a means of constructing these narratives makes it possible to understand why an exclusionary Anzac narrative can be thought of as having significant social consequences. Moreover, if one identifies the requirement of the nation as establishing a boundary between the prior and the now in colonized countries (see eg Salvatore 2008), the sacrificial nature of the exclusion of aboriginal voices from the Anzac commemorative narrative becomes apparent.

However, Christine Black (2011) suggests that the growth of a nation can also be ensured through diversifying the narrative of a nation's history to include the recognition of indigenous history. The language of both recognition and constitutive exclusion, while offering distinct means of conceptualizing how a narrative of nationhood can be secured,

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<sup>21</sup> ANT's contribution to this 'how' question will be considered in Chapter Three.



speak to the necessity of shared consciousness. On the one hand, constituting inclusion on the basis of exclusion depends on an imagined sense of who and what is considered 'other'. On the other hand, recognition suggests that framing similarity is a prerequisite of a shared consciousness. Of course, one implication of recognition is that certain groups can go unrecognized. The distinction between recognition and unrecognized 'operates to produce and maintain certain exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human' (Butler 2004: xv). As such Judith Butler's theorization of recognition, like Agamben's work, serves to articulate why commemorations can be understood as being juridically and politically significant.<sup>22</sup> Both make important contributions to the theorization of identity and normativity which frame the development of questions to be explored in this thesis.

Agamben suggests that citizenship and a sense of belonging to a national community is linked with the enjoyment of rights and a political life. Read alongside Butler's suggestion that a failure of recognition should be seen as a means of dehumanization, one can understand why narratives that exclude or do not recognize can be thought of as a rejection of (legal and political) life. Whereas Agamben suggests that normativity and the realm of the *included* is generated, partly, through the identification of the *excluded*, Butler considers particular frames to be standards by which distinctions between rationality and irrationality, credibility and dishonesty, or recognition and unrecognized are made.

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<sup>22</sup> For instance, the key consideration in this thesis is to understand how the legal and juridical significance of a commemorative pattern is secured and rationalized in time, memory, and notions of historical truth.

In other words:

To decide what views will count as reasonable within the public domain . . . is to decide what will and will not count as the public sphere of debate. And if someone holds views that are not in line with the nationalist norm, that person comes to lack credibility as a speaking person, and the media is not open to him or her (Butler 2004: xx).

In relation to Anzac Day, then, what matters is the identification of a commemorative process as a means by which such a distinction can be enacted. Why is Anzac Day identifiable as a means of effecting a nationalist norm that is *either* exclusionary *or* a basis for establishing the life of one group over the non-life of the other? Butler suggests that one means of establishing certain life as recognizable and, thus, deserving protection from transgressive non-life is through the propagation of unilateral messages with a binary logic.

When she states that 'our fear of understanding a point of view belies a deeper fear that we shall be taken up by it, find it is contagious, become infected in a morally perilous way by thinking of the presumed enemy' (2004: 8), Butler identifies the basis on which a normativity is underscored: the anxious defence of a single and simple narrative. This is a useful means of articulating the significance attributable to the defiant defence of the AWM's remit to only identify wars that took place in the name of colonized Australia. A failure to acknowledge the frontier wars as meriting commemoration and reflection in the AWM is to fail to recognize the non-European history and life of Australia. I would suggest that the pliability of the narrative of Australian origins to accommodate the frontier wars would not toxify Australian nationhood. Rather, the deep rooted

paranoia of European Australia that it needs to protect its settler identity from the threat of a transgressive population<sup>23</sup> can be interrogated with a more general set of questions that Butler poses: ‘who counts as human? Whose lives count as lives? And, finally, what makes for a grievable life?’ (2004: 20).

A corollary of these questions forms the basis of this current investigation, namely an exploration of the conditions that order particular boundaries and make the distinction between life and non-life—or recognized and unrecognized life—of the European and aboriginal Australians, respectively, possible. A similar enquiry can be made in relation to a subsequent point Butler makes, that ‘loss and vulnerability seem to follow from our being socially constituted bodies, attached to others, at risk of losing those attachments, exposed to others, at risk of violence by virtue of that exposure’ (2004: 20). Our vulnerability and ability to lose are associated with our sociality, our life within a community. Identifying certain other life as sharing in this sociality makes it possible to fear and mourn its loss. However, in the context of commemorations that are implicated in the definition of a national community, it is important to reflect on the life that is deemed to be outside of these communities. For instance, what are the implications for excluding the experiences of aboriginal Australians from the AWM and, subsequently, the Anzac commemorative programme?

Such a question gets to the heart of why the Anzac Day commemorative narrative can be thought of as legally and politically significant. Implicating it in processes of framing recognition and inclusion within a community means it can be admonished for not doing enough to make certain lives grievable or acknowledged as part of the origin

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<sup>23</sup> This is considered in more detail in Chapter Seven, when interrogating the possible impetuses Australians had for volunteering for the war effort.

story of a community. A key part of this exploration of how grief and loss help bind communities is to undertake an enquiry into the meaning, complexion, and consequences of collective memory.

Indeed, understanding identification, or one's identity, as a product of membership of a community which orients itself around (a) common feature(s), contingent on some form of standardization (Carter and Sealey 2007) speaks directly to the constitutive possibilities of a public commemorative event. Memories can be refashioned into a sacred experience that provides a nation with a depth of feeling and heritage to emulate (Olick and Robbins 1998). With regards to Anzac Day, the remoteness of experience of many Australians from those who fought in WWI does not prevent the veneration of those that died. While over a century has passed between the original Anzac landing at Gallipoli and today, the commemoration has ensured a proximity to Anzac remains. Despite her focus being on terrorism, Butler's disposition to grievability and the recognition of lives offers an interesting approach to the continual proximity to Anzac Day. For instance, she states that, 'when we argue for protection against discrimination, we argue as a group or class', suggesting that, 'in [this] context, we have to present ourselves as bounded beings—distinct, recognizable, delineated, subjects before the law, a community defined by some shared features' (Butler 2004: 24).

The proximity to Anzac Day, then, can be understood as a process of expressing what life belongs/belonged to the group or class and, thus, deserves to be commemorated when lost. Here, it must be noted that a statement of shared features in the establishment of a community is also a requisite stage in the protection of the ability *to* discriminate. So, when the commemoration of certain lives is identified as an important aspect of rendering a community intelligible, the notion that 'other lives will not find such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as "grievable"' (Butler 2004: 32) differentiates

important lives from unimportant, or non-, lives.<sup>24</sup> Some life warrants political and juridical protection on the basis of its grievability whereas other life does not.

Understanding memory as a frame of recognition or the grounds for determining the boundaries between the included and the excluded means it can be understood as instrumentalized for political purposes (see eg Hobsbawm 1983a; Assmann and Shortt 2012).<sup>25</sup> However, one inference I am keen to avoid being drawn is that such group memories are not genuine.<sup>26</sup> Whether or not they are constructed on the basis of contemporary political conditions (Lindsey 2004) does not make them any less real. Memories can be thought of as establishing relative safety and comfort for current populations, allowing them to make sense of past and present lives. Rather than the focus being placed on the exercise of power as the principal determinant of memory, memories themselves can be understood as a matter of public settlement over narrative cohesion.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> In Butler's own work, the focus is on the identification of certain life as requiring protection. This is ascertained as the justification for going to war. Here, though, Butler's example of war is brought into explicit relevance for an investigation into the commemorative foundations of a normative and formative framework. Rather than the recognizability of certain life being identified as a justification of going to war, this current enquiry is focused on establishing how the commemoration of war results in certain life being rendered recognizable.

<sup>25</sup> For instance, for Eric Hobsbawm (1983a, 1983b), durable and convenient mnemonic apparatuses are identified as being composed by elites.

<sup>26</sup> It is problematic to make an appraisal of whether or not memory is authentic or genuine (Misztal 2003), not least because they are affective and might *all* be thought of as prosthetic and inconsistent rather than organic and durable. The distinction between 'genuineness/truth' and 'construction' will be interrogated in Chapters Five and Six, when considering the contribution ANT and new materialism can make to the study of collective memory and history, respectively.

<sup>27</sup> This is the thesis of the Popular Memory Group (PMG). The PMG seeks to stress the 'importance of examining images from the past in relation to current images, of exploring how new meanings are layered down on old' (Sheridan 1990: 36). The layering of meaning also depends on the negotiations and compromise between the state and the individual, the public and the private.

Notwithstanding the decisions taken in relation to the AWM, if one considers the Anzac commemorative narrative as not *deliberately* exclusionary, it is still possible to explore how certain strategies make dominant narratives either agreeable and reasonable compared with other possible divergent narratives. Here again, then, it is important to emphasize precisely how such narratives are settled.<sup>28</sup>

### **Exploring exclusion: key themes in the Anzac story**

Whether the Anzac Day commemorative narrative is going to be thought of as exclusionary, a frame of/for recognition, or as a dominant narrative that secures a comfortable public memory, it is identifiable as a crucial component in drawing legal and political distinctions between groups. Whatever theorisation one might use when considering it, there are several key elements that need to be accounted for. The description of Anzac Day given in Section 1 acts as a reference point for understanding why each of the aforementioned elements have been identified as important considerations.

There are clear temporal considerations that pertain to the story of Anzac Day, particularly in relation to its commemorative sites. Distinctions between the AWM and Mount Ainslie, for instance, can be made on the basis of their temporal co-ordination. Moreover, the commemorative narrative performs, and relies on a performance of, a particular sense of historical and mnemonic truth. Furthermore, it relies on a supposition

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The extent to which memory is a matter of hierarchy is limited to understanding that individual memories might be 'risky and painful if they do not conform [to] public norms or versions of the past' (Thomson 1990: 25).

<sup>28</sup> The PMG's focus on examining how memories are constructed implicates a variety of public media in their analyses. This serves to suggest that popular memory is a matter of negotiation, compromise, amalgamation, and subsequent administration of memories.

about what memories are and can do, as well as on the performance of expectations. Each of these will be introduced in turn and identifiable points of enquiry for consideration in subsequent chapters in this thesis will be established at the end of each section.

### *Time*<sup>29</sup>

As identified above, appreciating the temporal and spatial elements of the Anzac Day commemorative narrative is one ground for understanding its exclusionary potential. Indeed, both Butler (2004) and Agamben (1998) address the temporal features of a frame of recognition or grounds for understanding the distinction between inclusion and exclusion, respectively.<sup>30</sup> For Butler, this is articulated in the parallel between those labelled as, or assumed to be, terrorists and the mentally ill. Terrorists, she states:

are *like* the mentally ill because their mind-set is unfathomable, because they are outside of reason, because they are outside of “civilization”, if we understand that

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<sup>29</sup> An understanding of time as a multiplicitous, complex, and contingent entity is developed in Chapter Four. How its multiplicity, complexity, and contingency emerge in the story of Anzac Day commemoration is developed throughout Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, too.

<sup>30</sup> Butler considers the consequences of indefinite detention for the intelligibility of life, serving to reconcile distinct temporalisations with political exclusion. For instance, Butler highlights the importance of those held at Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp being considered ‘detainees’ rather than prisoners. This is because ‘prisoner’ corresponds with a temporalisation that justifies and confers some form of political status. The rational, bounded, and recognizable temporality of the prison is distinguishable from the irrational, unlimited, and unrecognizable temporality of ‘indefinite detention’. Agamben makes a similar point in relation to the spatialization of the camp as extraterritorial and distinguishable from the prison. As such, time and space are both implicated in processes of distinguishing between taxonomies of life. Throughout this thesis, time is rendered as the explicit focus but this is inextricably bound up with concerns with space, too. As such, space is regularly considered as an adjunct to the analysis of time throughout this thesis.

term to be the catchword of a self-defined Western perspective that considers itself bound to certain versions of rationality and the claims that arise from them' (2004: 42).

The temporality of rationalization addresses the importance of a commemorative narrative for effecting an exclusion or a failure to recognize. Furthermore, Butler insists that 'the infinite paranoia that imagines the war against terrorism as a war without end will be one that justifies itself endlessly in relation to the spectral infinity of its enemy' (Butler 2004: 34). Butler suggests that this justification can prosper irrespective of whether or not such an enemy exists. A sense of infinity, endless justification, and imagination are sufficient tools with which a certain sense of identity can be rationalized through repetition.

The temporality of repetition can be engaged to rationalize the paranoia of the European settlers in Australia. The notion of aboriginality within the Australian political community—like the terrorist, the detainee, the mentally ill, the banished, the encamped—can be understood as being irrational as they do not fit a common and reiterated logic. Commemorative events can be thought of as having a measurable sense of progression inherent in them. This logic is of a clean linearity from the past, through the present, and into future projections (Schwarz 2012). Moreover, the narrative of nationhood is rationalized on the basis that 'the nation [is] a growing child, [invoking] the logic of progress and development' (Taylor and Wetherell 1999: 45). Time, then, can be identified as complicit in the promulgation of a certain power that is at the core of enacting an identity. Sarah Sharma (2014) suggests that 'one single . . . discursive mobilization of time' (2014: 13) enables one to distinguish between the rational (included) and the irrational (excluded).



In relation to Anzac Day, then, the official commemorative process can be thought of as rationalized. It reaches back to an easily identifiable point in time, seeking to draw out lessons from it that can be attributable to the lives of Australians going forward. The narratives that exist outside this rationality, challenging or disturbing it, are irrational. The proposition of a straightforward and categorical truth or unity of time, thus, can be considered an imperative fallacy that sustains particular conceptions of a community. Russell West-Pavlov (2013) and Sharma (2014) each make this point in relation to the rationalization of certain temporal logics that sustain a particular *economic* order, but the fallacy of a universalized time can be attributable to any commitment to one truth or narrative over others.<sup>31</sup>

Of course, the temporality of repetition only goes so far when explaining how the ability to mourn is attributable to certain life over others. Butler appears to suggest that it is the necessities of paranoia and protection that lead to the construction of temporal frames that sustain differences between lives. As such, this justifies particular political actions. However, the strength of differentiation between grievable life and un-grievable life is a product of more than a temporal framework such as repetition. Indeed, Butler herself poses an important question: ‘what are the cultural barriers against which we struggle when we try to find out about the losses that we are asked not to mourn, when we attempt to name, and so to bring under the rubric of “human”, those who the United States and its allies have killed?’ (2004: 46).

In the context of this thesis, this question can be truncated to read ‘what are the barriers against which we struggle when we try to find out about the losses that we are

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<sup>31</sup> For instance, temporalities have been recognised as key to the shaping of political (May and Thrift 2001; Scott 2014), legal (Valverde 2015), or cultural and academic ascriptions of alterity (Fabian 1983).

asked not to mourn and so recognize as having meaning?' The 'barrier' germane to this thesis is the distinction that has arisen between official Anzac Day commemorative services at the AWM and the post-dawn service on Mount Ainslie for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander veterans. The distinct spatial and temporal coordinates of these two services has briefly been considered above and problematized on the basis that such a differentiation can be thought of as exclusionary or a barrier to recognition. The task of this thesis is to demonstrate that this barrier is not sufficiently explained on the basis of 'culture' but one that is effected by a variety of factors.<sup>32</sup> The exhibition of the number of factors that go into producing such a barrier is a useful basis for embarking on an important consideration in this thesis. That is, if one understands the temporality of rationality as a key feature of a commemorative narrative, then the questioning of rationalized and universalized conceptions of time becomes a significant line of enquiry in relation to the subject matter of this thesis.

### *Historical and mnemonic truth*<sup>33</sup>

The question of rationality and truth of particular narratives over others also applies to historical and mnemonic facticity. Commemorations offer the possibility of articulating history's resemblance to, and entanglement with, memory. The collective recollection of the past in commemorative events depends on a condensed narrative of events that stretch over a long period of time into a few lines (Batiashvili 2012). This, of

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<sup>32</sup> Indeed, it is important to note that nothing can be thought of as 'wholly cultural' as multiple processes are involved in the production of all things and beings.

<sup>33</sup> An examination of history's performativity is introduced in Chapter Three, in the context of a discussion about truth and relativism which centres on how each is developed in ANT and new materialism. The contribution this makes to understanding how the Anzac Day commemorative narrative is imbued with a sense of authority is considered in Chapter Six.

course, necessitates a decision over what is included and what is to be omitted from such a version of the past. It is important to establish, then, that the achievement of an authoritative version of the past on which a mnemonic narrative hangs is not necessarily a matter of fact but of mediation.

Just as memory can be thought of as an active process (Rigney 2008; Batiashvili 2012), so too can history. Indeed, memories are enacted in a variety of forms, some of which are readily identifiable as 'historical sources'. When the dynamism of memory can be identified in the convergence of "media memory" such as 'location, memorial book[s], theatre, poems, songs, garden design, commemorative performances, newspaper and television reporting, website[s]' (Rigney 2008: 95), one can also begin to detect the dynamism of historical authority and authenticity. The nexus between witnessing, testimony, secondary accounts, and transgenerational transmission of the past means memory and historical studies can be brought together under the banner of 'mnemonhistory' (Erll 2011). If collective memory can be thought of as 'constantly "in the works" and, like a swimmer, has to keep moving even just to stay afloat' (Rigney 2010: 346), it is possible and important to acknowledge this in history, too.

What gives certain accounts of the history of Anzac a sense of truth over others? Why is Bean's account of the Australian experience of war the authoritative grounds on which the Anzac legend can be historicized? If not for the countless documentaries or works of fiction in film, television, and literature, would the Anzac legend have retained the position it does today as the grounds on which a mnemonic narrative can be built? After all, as well as being related, chasms can be identified between official mnemonhistorical accounts and commonly held notions of the past (eg Portelli 2003). The process by which the two come to converge so that certain accounts can be identified as 'the truth' is another line of enquiry in this thesis. This, of course, is one focus of the

PMG. Indeed, in relation to Anzac Day, the ways in which the history of the Anzac legend can be represented as fairly consistent and settled has been the basis of a significant PMG study (see Thomson 2013). However, this relatively secure historical narrative can be questioned in relation to this current interrogation into the exclusionary effects of the Anzac Day commemorative narrative: how does an exclusionary narrative depend on history for its settlement? How does this history come to be intelligible as fact? Furthermore, how does the identification of historical truth relate to narrative rationalization and the distinction one can make between the rational and the irrational? More generally, the temporal shade of a commemorative pattern suggests that these questions cannot be dissociated from a broader examination of the complexity of time.<sup>34</sup>

*What is a collective memory?*<sup>35</sup>

A significant aspect of exploring the temporal component of this thesis is a consideration of the notion of collective memory; namely, what is meant by it? It has already been suggested that memories can be collective in character and that they are implicated in the development of a sense of group identity. It follows that the formation of an exclusionary legal and political identity is a product of an exclusionary collective memory. However, the means by which this is achieved is one of the pivotal questions in Collective Memory Studies (CMS). For Maurice Halbwachs (1992), an early proponent of

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<sup>34</sup> This framing is considered in greater depth in Chapter Four, where time's complexity is considered as a means of exemplifying the politics of time and its exclusionary potential.

<sup>35</sup> A more focused debate about how we can understand collective memory to be a product of distributed enactment, implicating both 'material' and 'discursive' actors can be found in Chapter Three. The focus on the settlement of the early Anzac Day commemorative pattern in Chapter Five demonstrates the means by which a collective memory is arrived at can be understood on the basis of a materially inflected methodology.

the idea of collective memory, memory and social groupings are interdependently related. He suggests that memories hang together when they are 'part of a totality of thoughts common to a group, the group of people with whom we have a relation at this moment' (1992: 52). Understanding and remembering the Anzac legend, then, is a product of the ostensible sharing and a simultaneity of experience that a commemorative event enables. Indeed, the dawn service and commemorative sites can be thought of as instruments used by the collective memory to reconstruct an image of the past which is in accord, in each epoch, with the predominant thoughts of a society' (1992: 40).

Though this suggests that collective memory is solely a product of an identified social 'cause', coming to us 'from the social milieu' (Halbwachs 1992: 53), Halbwachs seems to suggest that memory and society are coproduced.<sup>36</sup> He argues that:

There is no point in seeking where [memories] are preserved in my brain or in some nook of my mind to which I alone have access: for they are recalled to me externally, and the groups of which I am part at any given time give me the means to reconstruct them, upon condition, to be sure, that I *turn toward them and adopt, at least for the moment, their way of thinking* (Halbwachs 1992: 38).

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<sup>36</sup> The language of coproduction would, of course, be unfamiliar to Halbwachs who developed his idea of collective memory in the early-twentieth century. However, the resemblance of the idea that memory and society are concurrently constituting each other and producing versions of themselves in the other corresponds with the notion that technology and society are coproduced (see eg Jasanoff 2004). The coproduction of technology and society is developed as a view of circumventing the rift between technological determinism and social constructivism. The resonance of this rationale for developing coproduction with a view to circumventing the notion that memory is wholly socially constructed is clear.

Halbwachs is both suggesting that memory is a product of social construction and that society is sustained by the obligations associated with the production of a memory. In other words, the facilitation of memory begets some form of social obligation. Commemorative patterns serve to ensure that a message resonates with a community and ensures something is appropriately remembered as a normative script (Assmann and Czaplicka 1995).

In relation to Anzac Day, then, the ability of a commemorative process to enable a coherent and satisfying memory to be constructed is coupled with a sense of responsibility towards the collective. As such, the link between memory and questions of law and politics can be made on the basis of recognizing that mechanisms and objects which facilitate an externalized memory also produce a sense of obligation (Assmann 2011).<sup>37</sup> Moreover, memory is linked with identity; secured memories of the past are considered integral to the psychological depth of the individual, too (Fagin, Yamashiro, and Hirst 2013). Notwithstanding the problematisation and eschewal of individualism within this thesis, Martin Fagin, Jeremy Yamashiro, and William Hirst's work moves us beyond identifying memory as a means of subjecting a populace to power (eg Schwartz 1995). Rather, it opens up a space where memory is implicated in the enactment of an individual's sense of self as well as the enactment of communities and the associated sense of obligation.

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<sup>37</sup> Susan Diane Brophy's (2009) suggestion that a state's authority is measurable in terms of 'whether or not its citizens act in accordance with a "general obligation to obey" those duties bestowed upon them by the juridical order of the state' (2009: 201) presupposes some ability to 'measure' obedience. Notwithstanding Brophy's focus on the concentrated, hierarchical production of order and obedience, Jan Assmann's (2011; Assmann and Czaplicka 1995) ideas about memory suggest that it is a possible yardstick with which to judge obedience, or at least a sense of social responsibility.

As such, the possibility of breaking the distinction between the individual and community in relation to memory forms the basis of another line of enquiry in this thesis. It shares the same impetus as the examination of the convergence of memory and history, as well as official and personal accounts, in the production of truth. Moreover, this latest enquiry also seeks to question the distinction between officialdom and the popular—or the elite and the vernacular. How might considering them in conversation rather than opposition (Sandall 2012), open a space up for examining the enactment of memory on bases other than direct and obvious political power? In relation to Anzac Day, how might one understand the production of exclusionary narratives as diffuse and an effect of encounter between a number of different actors?

Approaching this last question from the perspective of ANT and new materialism is where a consideration of the early Anzac Day commemorative pattern is particularly useful. Addressing the manner in which an early commemorative pattern was settled allows collective memory to be understood as being a product of a mixture of material and linguistic actors. Chapter Five examines the extent to which this can be articulated in relation to the development of the Anzac Day commemorative pattern before 1950. It suffices to say here that the commemorative pattern settled upon had to navigate tricky weather, the threats of war, and a number of competing pressure groups and political ideologies. How one can understand this in the context of literature that develops the idea of collective memory is considered in greater depth in Chapter Five. It offers a means of establishing how commemorative narratives can take on a particular character that is not engineered directly or wholly by a limited number of actors.

### *Expectation*<sup>38</sup>

There are a number of places in the Anzac story where one can identify the importance of expectations. Crucially, the role of expectations within the Anzac story intimates the importance of examining time for its role in Anzac Day, too. For instance, the expectation of *synchronicity* is identified as a feature of commemoration. It is considered essential for identifying the link between memorials or group events and legal and political consequences. How the expectation of synchronicity is enacted in Anzac Day depends on an understanding of how time is implicated in the enactment of a coherent narrative. Expectations also emerge as an important participant in the series of events that led up to the birth of the Anzac legend. A number of divergent expectations affect, and effect, different actions in the story.<sup>39</sup> The overall picture of both the naval and landed campaigns in British histories is overwhelmingly negative. One area of debate is who can be endorsed with culpability for the fiasco. Winston Churchill (Nevinson 1918; Curran 2011), Vice-Admiral Sackville Carden (Travers 2004), the establishment in general (Hamilton 1930; Spiers 1991), and the command structure (Hamilton 1930) are all presented as being worthy of 'blame' for the ignominy of the campaign.

The approach each took in relation to the campaigns was tempered by expectation. For instance, the expectations that Britain's naval strengths would be borne out in the campaign to force the Dardanelles and Bosphorus led to a tenacious pursuit of the campaign. Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, was particularly

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<sup>38</sup> The ideas considered in this section will be expanded on in Chapters Four and Seven.

<sup>39</sup> In Chapter Seven, it is established that an appreciation of the complexity and multiplicity of time assists in understanding expectations. As such, it is not merely synchronicity that operates to connect time and expectation. Rather, there is a complexity to expectation that can be apprehended on the basis of the situatedness and complexity of time.



stubborn in his pursuit of a naval attack on the straits, not least because pressure was being put on him to do something significant with the Navy (Steel and Hart 1994). This led to Churchill politicking to the extent that retreat from use of the Navy was made impossible, such was his confidence in the ships alone plan.<sup>40</sup> Such uncompromising behaviour demonstrated the strength of expectations in forming and sustaining a military plan.

Based on past experience, the expectation that the naval conflict would be brief was understandable, in many respects. Moreover, the precedent naval tradition of Britain (Goldrick 2007) toughened the resolve of many that the Navy would be the answer to the Allies' problems in the region. This imagery is carried over into the outlook of the landed forces that were eventually deployed at Gallipoli, too. The misgivings of General Sir Ian Hamilton (commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force) that he knew nothing of the area the Army was about to be deployed in (Hamilton 1930) were superseded by hopes and expectations. Firstly, there was an enduring anticipation that the naval campaign would succeed and the Army would not be needed. Secondly, Hamilton was somewhat captivated by the promise that a successful campaign would bring the end of the war, and victory for the Allies. As such, the landed campaign was presented as an attractive proposition by a deployment of the mythology of war and the prospect of fame and success that emerge from victory.

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<sup>40</sup> Churchill published an article in *The Times* on February 22 1915, detailing objectives of the operation and stressing that it should be carried through at all costs. This disregarded the Governments' keenness to keep operations secret, which would have allowed them to withdraw from the campaign without any embarrassment or discredit to themselves. Furthermore, Churchill ignored a feasibility study that he, himself, had ordered that stressed the need for large-scale troop support (Curran 2011).

One interesting element of the Gallipoli campaign that is teased out in Chapter Seven is the divergence in meanings and narratives that emerged from the naval and military fiasco. For instance, British histories look on Gallipoli with contempt and a feeling of senselessness, whereas Australian associations with the campaign are more positive. On the one hand, this is likely due to the emergence of the Anzac legend. On the other hand, it is indelibly tied up with expectations; such expectations differed between Britain and Australia, so they had different reactions to the emergent situation. While the British had their expectations and impressions of their military strength and strategic hopes for the campaign dashed, Australian expectations were not as bound up in the campaign. Rather, Australian expectations surrounding Gallipoli revolved around an anticipated invasion and defence of Australian borders against an Asian enemy (Seymour and Nile 1991).<sup>41</sup> As a result, the outcome of the conflict was effectively incidental to the fact of Australian participation; military engagement, alone, could be seen to satisfy the expectations of the Australian population.

This is because the narrative of Australian expectations of war are bound up in the paranoia surrounding Australia's ability to defend itself. This perceived vulnerability has been identified as a prompt for people to volunteer for the war effort. The fear of impending attack was one of the 'needs of the time' (Robertson 1990: 26) that impelled young men to instinctively volunteer for war. Thus, the expectation that Australian men

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<sup>41</sup> This resonates with a point Black (2011) makes about an innate sense of vulnerability felt by European Australians in Oceania. Moreover, this ties into a point that Butler makes about the link between vulnerability and a heightened nationalist discourse. This, alone, would serve to suggest that the vulnerability felt by European Australians that they were interlopers effects the narrative of the Gallipoli campaign. It could be argued that the opportunity to demonstrate military capability on the international scale as an unequivocally good thing is a product of this vulnerability and defensiveness.

were volunteering for a European crusade to assert dominance over non-Europeans may well have contributed to the 'great expectation and enthusiasm' (Erickson 2001: 981) for the campaign. Whether or not it is the colonial history of Australia, or desire for nationhood and recognition that drove Australians to volunteer for war,<sup>42</sup> or the fear of what *not* going to war would mean for Australia, a distinction exists between Australian and British expectations of Gallipoli. The extent to which this helps generate particular commemorative narratives is another central enquiry in this thesis and will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Seven.

### **Conclusion: approaching the study of commemoration as exclusionary**

With regard to expectations, it was identified that the constitutive potential of commemorative events relies on an expectation of shared responsibility (see eg Puntscher et al 2014, above). As such, the expectations that abound in a commemorative event offer a degree of "structuring of life relations", which the law needs' (Agamben 1998: 26) in order to determine who might be included and who is excluded from a particular community. If describing abnormality or exceptionality, and the exclusion of such, can be thought of as a continual process in which 'the very sense of the belonging and commonality of individuals is to be defined' (Agamben 1998: 22), what we identify this 'process' to be is key.

In other words, the enactment of an expectation of collective responsibility is bound up in more foundational questions of inclusion and exclusion. Bearing in mind Foucault's identification of governmental power as a product of a number of strategies

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<sup>42</sup> A consideration of more practical reasons for people to volunteer for war, including financial incentives (Rhoden 2012) is included in the context of considerations of expectations in Chapter Seven.

and apparatuses, one can give due regard to commemorations for their ability to effect legal and political order.<sup>43</sup> However, just as important is the question of how certain bodies come to be brought within the purview of the state and such disciplinary expectations. The ‘power to make live and let die’ (Foucault 2003: 241) is, in the context of a discussion on recognition, grievability, and the notion of exceptionality, an effective way of articulating the distinction between the inclusion and exclusion from a community.

Butler articulates it as such: ‘a life has to be intelligible *as a life*, has to confirm to certain conceptions of what life is, in order to become recognizable’ (2009: 7; original emphasis). Here, then, it is possible to understand the enactment of the life/non-life classification in particular apparatuses and institutions, such as a commemorative site. The power to define particular life as worth grieving is tantamount to deciding what can be recognized as life and what cannot, effecting juridical exclusion or inclusion, respectively. The identification of non-human institutions and things as embroiled in the process by which the recognition of certain human lives over others opens up the space for engaging a methodological perspective that attempts to ascertain how.

As such, the following chapter develops this in relation to ANT and new materialism. It is argued that the reliance of these two approaches on a radical symmetry between life and non-life is a productive foundation for an exploration of the exclusionary effects of a commemorative narrative. In this respect, the questioning of why Anzac matters has two interrelated answers. There is, first, an identification of its significance as a locus of identity production. It can be framed on the basis of stating that the capacity

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<sup>43</sup> Foucault articulates this as the construction and sustenance of this governance as the disciplining of bodies into docility (Foucault 1977).

worked into the Anzac Day commemorative narrative is insidious. This chapter has also briefly outlined *why* this is the case, identifying it as a participant in the exclusion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders from the Australian political and legal community. Second, Anzac Day has been identified as an important object of analysis as it is a process that can, productively, be opened up to an examination of *how* it can be thought of as insidious. This is the task of the remainder of this thesis.

## Chapter III

### Methodology

The previous chapter sought to bring the examination of why Anzac Day can come to be thought of as an exclusionary actor into focus. This current chapter seeks to develop this argument, addressing *how* certain things can be imbued with the capacity to exclude. Moreover, it is also important to explain *why* it is useful to explore the manner in which things come to have exclusionary power. The identification of both actor-network theory (ANT) and new materialism as appropriate perspectives from which to approach these questions is established on the basis that both can be thought to offer a means of rethinking how one conducts social scientific research. For instance, ANT seeks to identify ways of understanding how certain things come to be, making the case for the acknowledgement of non-human and non-‘sociolinguistic’ roles in the accounts being developed (Latour 2005).

In doing so, ANT develops a vocabulary that identifies the entanglement of disparate actors in the process of enacting ‘things’ as they are. In the context of this thesis, then, ANT can be thought of as a way of approaching the retelling of the Anzac story, exploring how exclusions are enacted and sustained in and around it. It can enable the identification of the actors involved in the enactment of the juridical and political effects of a commemorative pattern that were identified in Chapter Two, establishing how they come to be implicated in this process. Such an exploration is important as it offers a foundation on which a critique of memory and identity formation can be built.

Similarly, new materialism stresses the need to reject, and obfuscate, categorizations such as life, matter, human, and non-human (Bennett 2010b) and acknowledge agency and 'thingness' as products of *intra-actions* (Barad 2007). Both ANT and new materialism seek to grasp the relationality and situatedness of things as we know them. Both commit themselves to describing and defining how objects, processes, and systems come to exist as they do. As such, they are both excellent perspectives from which to explore the Anzac Day commemorative pattern and establish how it can be thought of as integral to the emergence of political and legal identity.

The extent to which both ANT and new materialism are meaningfully pliable to each other in establishing a composite methodology is considered in Sections 1 and 3 of this chapter. In Section 1, the theoretical underpinnings of each will be considered, demonstrating a degree of familiarity and rationalizing the uniting of the two approaches. In Section 3, the extent to which a methodology that eschews boundaries, embraces complexity, and, stresses intra-activity and entanglement is a useful means of approaching an object of research will be considered.

Section 2 concerns itself with justifying the appropriateness of this methodological approach to this thesis. As identified in Chapter Two, the exclusion of aboriginal voices from the Anzac Day commemorative narrative forms the subject matter of this thesis. The task of Section 2, then, is to reconcile an exploration of the exclusion of *humans* from a commemorative narrative with a methodology that seeks to respond to the exclusion of *non-human* actors from analyses. Each section serves to argue that ANT and new materialism are strong methodological bases for the exploration of the exclusionary effect of a commemorative narrative with Section 2, in particular, arguing that they are decidedly valuable methodological positions for understanding human, legal, and political conditions.

Section 4 establishes the use of the emerging methodological position for exploring the criticism of ANT as too relativist to be helpful, alongside a problematization of what we understand to be 'truth' or 'authority'. It is established that the ANT disposition to truth and relativity reveals a valuable basis for exploring the development of the historical narrative pertaining to the Anzac legend. Section 5 of this chapter focuses on the method used within this thesis. It considers the value of archival research and the challenges associated with deploying ANT in a historical study.

### **ANT and new materialism: theoretical underpinnings**

#### *ANT*

In *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*, Bruno Latour (2010) considers the contradictions at the heart of the modernist faith in scientific rationality and calculability. He suggests that fact and rationality are products of hard work rather than unassailable truths.<sup>44</sup> Nothing can enjoy inherent value or essence, and the meaning of everything is contingent on surrounding environments and encounters made. In other words, the

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<sup>44</sup> Latour makes this suggestion in the context of his thesis that the exceptionalism of modernism needs to be discredited. For Latour, the enlightened modern unfairly chastises others for fetishization. He who 'has built an idol with his own hands—his own human labour, [his] fantasies, his own human powers—yet . . . attributes this labour, these fantasies, and these powers to the very object that he has created' (Latour 2010: 8) is considered a fetishist. The problem for moderns, though, is that they are also afflicted by this fetishization. Any clearly identifiable truth is deceptive as it obscures the work put in to make it so. Such a contention follows on from his argument against human exceptionalism in *We Have Never Been Modern* (1993). Here, Latour suggests that the distinction between nature and society is an artificial rift that conceals the interplay between these two 'realms'. In other words, neither nature nor society can be thought of as clearly defined realms with any essential value; the 'truths' in each are not innate. Rather, they are relationally constructed.



meaning of everything is arrived at relationally. This relationality highlights the objective of ANT to ensure that exceptionalisms and essentialisms cannot be claimed over explorations that put humans and non-humans, the 'natural' and the 'social', and matter and language on an equal analytical footing. The contention, then, that 'nothing means outside of its relations' (Bingham 1996: 644) is a position that suggests the inadequacy of distinct analytical categories when embarking upon a study.

As such, ANT cannot be thought of as a theoretical framework that affords the researcher dependable grounds on which to make certain assertions. Rather, it could be said that ANT is a quasi-theoretical methodology that offers relationality as the basis of an engagement with questions about the enactment of being (see eg Latour 2005, 2012; Latour et al 2012). In this regard, its applicability to the study of *a* commemorative process or *a* specific legend is found in its ability to address the relationality behind identifying each as a singular entity. What permutation of relations between objects, ideas, environments, and people is behind the Anzac commemorative narrative? On what basis can the Anzac legend be considered a specific and bounded—thus discerning—entity?

The posing of these questions challenges any understanding of Anzac Day commemorative narratives as being an *inherently* and distinctly rational entity. Rather, these questions serve to offer a descriptive account of how Anzac 'works', has been assembled, and is sustained. Of course, the suggestion that ANT offers a 'descriptive account' of how identifiable systems and things come to be has been heavily criticized. It has been considered distinctly uncritical because it is reliant on metaphor (Corpataux and Crevoisier 2015) and too piecemeal or isolationist (Saldanha 2003) to appreciate how certain networks—as objects of research—are embedded in power relations and other networks.

Why, for instance, should we insist on a levelling out of distinctions between matter, language, humans, and non-humans in describing the commemoration of Anzac Day without situating it within certain political contexts and without being appreciative of power dynamics entailed in colonialism?<sup>45</sup> However, this does not take into account the potential for using ANT to trace, back into the past, the networks that effect power imbalances (see eg Corrigan and Mills 2012). Indeed, addressing how actions are produced—and how environments and situations act upon people (Griswold, Mangione, McDonnell 2013)—does not make ANT apolitical. Rather, ANT *is* interested in power but it ‘sets off in the first instance by thinking about the power to do things, the “power to” that grows out of . . . webby relations and practices’ (Law and Singleton 2013: 493). This primary concern with “power to” rather than “power over” does not mean ANT is an inappropriate means for making claims about domination and power relationships. The faith that one can have in ANT as a critical tool is found precisely in its attention to the “power to” as it facilitates a deeper exploration of the other details that make a network what it is.<sup>46</sup> It is an approach that can alert us to ‘relations and connections that existing approaches would preclude by their analytic bifurcations’ (Go 2013: 45).

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<sup>45</sup> The idea that ANT offers a ‘depoliticized account of colonialism’ (Kusiak 2010: 874) corresponds with the charge that ANT lacks responsibility as a method (Saldanha 2003), not least because of its political neutrality (Star 1991).

<sup>46</sup> That ANT suggests power and hierarchical organization are not considered preminent but, instead, an effect that emerges from the association of numerous actors is not simply an uncritical rhetorical trick (Collins and Yearley 1992). Rather, this localization of the emergence of power in relational processes is akin to Michel Foucault’s assertion that ‘power is not founded in itself or generated by itself’ (2007: 2). Addressing actions and consequences as conditional on networks of relationships (Callon 1998) is non-essentialist, certainly, but not uncritical if one accepts the importance of explaining how certain things come to have the “power to” act.

So, a focus on describing how the Anzac Day commemorative programme was constructed and is sustained does not elide colonial power relations. Rather, attending to this detail emphasizes the locality of networks that help effect relations between settler and colonized communities, rather than reliance on clean categorizations (Latour 1993; Anderson 2002). Indeed, an exploration of how certain powers and knowledges come to be effected which avoids certain claims about globalization, modernity, and development projects should be welcomed. ANT is poised to offer a way of addressing something that picks up on details that may have otherwise been overlooked or silenced. Similarly, it offers the chance to witness the role played by such details from a different perspective. The analytical symmetry between humans and non-humans means that anything is open to be apprehended as an actor within a network. Objects (see eg de Laet and Mol 2000; Fenwick and Edwards 2010) or non-human organisms (see eg Callon 1986a; Gramaglia and Sampaio 2012) can be identified as playing a significant role in generating particular social effects and orders. If, in the context of colonialism, colonial power relations can be thought of as enduring *within* intertwined hybrids (Anderson 2002), one cannot invoke these entanglements as explanatory devices without tracing the local relationships that have given them meaning.

As such, its distinction busting foundations suggest it is a useful basis for exploring the role a commemorative site and programme can play in effecting particular impressions of Australian nationhood and membership within this community. Moreover, subjecting identity formation to a vocabulary that eschews distinctions corresponds with the philosophical disposition that emerges within ANT. In particular, the work of Baruch Spinoza (see 1996) surfaces within ANT. This is because the eschewal of dualisms that separate the mind from the body and the body from the world are central to his work. The claim that the mind and body are unhelpful dualisms as they ignore the

porosity of the boundaries between the environment, the body, and 'individual' will be pertinent to addressing how the circumstances surrounding a commemorative pattern is linked with identity formation,<sup>47</sup> especially as it does not rely on human exceptionalism.

The idea of porosity offers an interesting way of looking at the commemoration of Anzac Day. When approaching the topic of memory, for instance, one can approach it as the prerogative of the individual to remember, or a product that arises out of social organization. However, the permeability of definitively bounded entities, such as the individual, suggests that memory should be thought of as a product of the entanglement and mutability of a number of elements, rather than the preserve of a privileged sphere.<sup>48</sup>

### *New Materialism*

The notion that the human is indebted to and limited by, rather than a master of, its surrounding conditions is also central to new materialism (see Orlie 2010). Indeed, its principal concern is with identifying the physical conditions and experiences that have an impact on our social lives. This concern is set against the perceived neglect of the everyday conditions that produce our lives in social and linguistic constructivism (Alaimo

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<sup>47</sup> Whilst Spinoza wrote with an explicit focus on the human, and understanding how moral judgment is a product of the human desiring the maintenance of its own existence, his work is an apt prelude to ANT. Indeed, that 'we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good [but] . . . we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it' (Spinoza 1996: 76) suggests that things such as moral autonomy and will are determined by circumstance. Moreover, Spinoza advances a theory of God that It is everywhere and in everything. Both this attitude towards God and the situatedness of human existence serve to suggest that everything can be thought of as having analytical importance when determining what is involved in establishing how identities, for instance, are formed.

<sup>48</sup> For instance, a debate between two 'cultures' of Collective Memory Studies (Olick 1999) is introduced in Chapter Five. The schism can be traversed if one identifies memory as being a relational product that depends on a number and range of actors.

and Hekman 2008; Conaghan 2013). Given our technoscientifically augmented being, it is argued that a focus on the material is necessitated when it comes to questioning the conditions of our existence (Coole and Frost 2010). Matching this suggestion, however, is an appreciation that *exclusive* focus 'on representations, ideology, and discourse excludes lived experience, corporeal practice, and biological substance from consideration' (Alaimo and Hekman 2008: 4) is also unhelpful.

It is not beneficial because it would rely on analytical distinctions that lead to the silencing of marginal ambiguities and interdependences. For instance, linguistics are not imbued with a logic independent from material form, nor can matter be liberated from language. They each have permeable frontiers and are messily related by way of ascription and affect. Webb Keane (2005) warns that exclusive focus on either of these two given poles to the detriment of the other results in dismissive academic practice: 'those whose attention centres on things may be tempted to relegate ideas to an epiphenomenal domain, subordinated to real, tangible stuff. Conversely, attention to ideas often seems to render material forms into little more than transparent expressions of meaning' (2005: 182-183).

This inclination towards not distinguishing between matter and language is not dissimilar from ANT's insistence that clean categorical distinctions conceal the truth of the hybridity that comes to construct the way the world works. At the heart of this is a particular ethic that stresses how unexceptional the human is. For instance, Jane Bennett's (2010b) materialism eschews the life-matter binary, acknowledging the presence of a non-hierarchical, indeterminate vitality in the world. A lively materiality that 'is my body and which also operates outside it to sometimes join forces with it and sometimes vie against it' (2010b: 63) stresses the porosity of the same boundaries that Spinoza was keen to reject. The way Bennett addresses the distinction between life and

matter demonstrates that, for the new materialist, matter is much more dynamic. If non-human materialities in Bennett's study of the materiality of politics are presented as 'bona fide agents rather than as instrumentalities, techniques of power, recalcitrant objects, or social constructs' (2010b: 47) then such an approach is committed to democratizing all things entangled in a story. Acknowledging their activity will reshape the way one approaches an object of research.<sup>49</sup>

The effectiveness of the new materialist disposition towards research in relation to the study of Anzac Day is clear. It is not useful to disregard the material elements of the Anzac Day commemorative programme in effecting an exclusionary narrative. Nor, though, is it productive to focus solely on the non-human objects in order to say something profound about the language and affect of matter. Rather, it is important to determine how, for example, matter, stories, times, and memories come to *matter*. Understanding that the meaning of each arises as a matter of situated experience<sup>50</sup> will,

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<sup>49</sup> In many respects, both ANT and new materialism fall into the category of 'inventive method' (see Lury and Wakeford 2012b). The inventiveness of a method is understood on the basis of its ability to appreciate openness and relationality. Both ANT and new materialism seek to do this. The ability to question and describe how things arise, as well as disrupt widely held understandings, is key to ANT and new materialism. The potential occasioned by understanding the conditions for the relational enactment of processes, actions, things, and political ordering makes it deeply significant and, in many ways, critical. This criticality is creative (see Coole and Frost 2010). Both ANT and new materialism are interested in describing and understanding the connections that make up a thing. This revealing of connections that may have hitherto gone unnoticed corresponds with the definition of inventiveness as 'the capacity of what emerges in the use of [a] method to change the problem' (Lury and Wakeford 2012a: 7). Both ANT and new materialism are inventive as they seek to address new ways of approaching the study of social life.

<sup>50</sup> Experience, for the new materialist, is not a prerogative of the human consciousness alone, but a responsiveness to the conditions any actor finds itself in (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012: 58).

inevitably, offer a distinct way of understanding how the Anzac commemorative story comes to take on an exclusionary character. Rejecting the idea of matter as inert and subject to predictable causal forces in favour of potentially random, complex entanglements that serve to develop *seemingly* obvious forces refocuses attention towards what is folded in to the Anzac story and how.

The ethical manifesto of such an approach is clear:

no adequate political theory can ignore the importance of bodies in situating empirical actors within a material environment of nature, other bodies, and the socio-economic structures that dictate where and how they find sustenance, satisfy their desires, or obtain the resources necessary for participating in political life' (Coole and Frost 2010: 19).

The focus on bodies as the locus of the interplay of diffuse and variable actors serves to stress the permeability of human–environment dichotomy. Such an emphasis on corporeality disrupts the notion of agency as a discretely human property and suggests that the ability to participate in political life<sup>51</sup> is dictated by numerous interacting actors and conditions. As such, the interaction between the observer and the Anzac Day commemorative programme that effects an exclusion is itself conducted and made meaningful by a number of dynamic actors.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Thereby entering the realm of the included or recognizable, as Agamben (1998) and Butler (2009) suggest, respectively.

<sup>52</sup> Chapter Four examines the themes identified in Chapter Two in more detail. The complexity of time, expectation, and memory are each identified as significant aspects of the Anzac story, and both ANT and new materialism allow us to approach these as coproduced.

### **Stressing the human in post-humanism**

The appeal for the inclusion of matter within political theory may seem incongruous with the identified iniquity of excluding of certain *human* voices from a legally and politically charged commemorative programme. However, it is argued here that the affirmation of ‘a vitality or creative power of bodies and forces at all ranges or scales . . . [and] cut against the hubris of human exceptionalism’ (Bennett 2012: 230) is a perfectly reasonable position to adopt in order to think more productively about the experience of humans (see also Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2015). The anti-anthropocentrism of new materialism serves to highlight the situatedness of the human. Moreover, the shift away from essentializing analytical categories means identifying ‘swirls of matter, energy, and incipience that hold themselves together long enough to view with the strivings of other objects’ (Bennett 2012: 227) becomes the focus of critical attention.

Both Judith Butler and Giorgio Agamben’s work has articulated the juridical and political dimensions of grief, recognition, and exclusion. Both Butler and Agamben demonstrate the variety of deployments that effect the constitution and sustenance of communities.<sup>53</sup> As such, it makes it possible to identify the narrative power of collective

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<sup>53</sup> See Arne de Boever (2009) for an understanding of how the reconciliation of governmentality and sovereignty in Agamben’s work gives rise to this possibility. Butler develops this at various points in *Frames of War* (2009), suggesting that ‘we cannot easily recognize life outside the frames in which it is given, and those frames not only structure how we come to know and identify life, but constitute sustaining conditions for those very lives (Butler 2009: 23-24). It is possible, here, to link the recognition and sustainment of life with the enactment and maintenance of communal boundaries because the body can be considered a social phenomenon (Butler 2009: 33). As such, defining one’s life as recognizable can also be thought of as defining the responsibility one has towards the conditions and frames that has made it so.



memory as having a role in defining exceptionality and the distinction between what can be considered life and what is thought of as non-life (see eg Assmann 2011).<sup>54</sup> Chapter Two concluded with a suggestion that it was important to engage with questions of how the maintenance of the distinction between the settler (as life) and the colonized (as non-life) in Australia is made manifest in commemorative forms.

It is in this space that the ethical connotation of *responsibility* also applies to the research process. This ethic has provided the impetus for approaching Anzac Day and exclusion with ANT and new materialism. For instance, it was suggested in the previous chapter that the concealment of aboriginal involvement in the Anzac legend in marches, official ceremonies, and commemorative sites enacts a distinction between groups of people on a day that reproduces a particular normativity against which a sense of nationalism can be imagined. Teased out in the brief account of the Anzac story presented in Chapter Two are a number of themes that can be attended to via the tools offered by ANT and new materialism that can open up the research process.

For instance, the concept of agency in assemblages (Bennett 2010b) necessitates understanding power as a product of interaction between a number of actors and compound sources. The materialist and ANT inclinations, here, would be to suggest that what can be included as actors extends beyond the human. Understanding how a certain

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<sup>54</sup> The relevance of Jan Assmann's thesis, here, emerges from the way he links memory and identity. For him, the controlling of variance, and the canonization of particular scripts are especially important. They underlie 'the establishment and stabilization of a collective identity that also provides the basis for individual identity' (2011: 108). Implicit in this identity formation are two questions: 'who are we?' and 'what should we do?' (2011: 122-23). These questions are bound up in a particular consciousness of belonging and togetherness (ie the "we") which 'is intensified by its alienation from "them" (2011: 136). Stability, canonization, and the controlling of variance each speaks to the role commemorations can play in anchoring particular conceptions of one's identity and what a community looks like.

image of membership of a community can be sustained (see eg Tamir 1995, above) can be broadened to include both human and non-human, animate and inanimate, actors. The dynamism, participation, and heterogeneity of things that can come to be defined as 'actors' emanates from the concession that objects and things are not reducible to themselves. Similarly, no 'self' is identifiable in isolation from contact with others (see eg Ahmed 2010). As such, the methodological orientation to the object of study in this thesis seeks to comprehend the non-human aspects of the processes by which an exclusionary Anzac Day commemoration can be sustained by the alterity of commemorations which focus on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. Furthermore, such elements can also be understood to aid in the security and rationalization of the apparatuses that frames recognition and inclusion.

Responsibility<sup>55</sup> is an expedient catchword for thinking about the requirement to attend to the details within a particular research field and uncover the meaning of this detail in the enactment of a 'whole'. The benefit of ANT and new materialism, then, is that it offers a framework that allows one to expose the complexity of 'things'. It enables the articulation of how things can be established as generated effects of an entanglement of a multitude of otherwise unobserved, or disregarded, actors. Therefore, the ethic of

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<sup>55</sup> Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh's (2012) appeal to the link between office (or authority), conduct, and responsibility emphasises this idea. In the context of exploring the jurisprudence of jurisdiction, Dorsett and McVeigh establish that jurisdiction can be 'understood in terms of the conditions under which an authority to act exists', with office being 'defined as an institutional ordering of duties, relationships, and responsibilities' (2012: 17-18). For academia, office can be understood as the authorization to act dutifully and responsibly to the subject of one's research. With ANT and new materialism in mind, a distinct exploration of the frames and conditions that pervade to create inequalities or exclusions within a particular political community can be thought of as an ethical imperative.

academic responsibility in the context of ANT and new materialism is the identification of how something comes to take on particular meaning and power.

The purpose of this research is not to explore, in sweeping terms, the conditions and experiences of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. Rather, the Anzac Day story is used as a medium for engaging questions of agency and distributed enactment, articulating what is being deployed in such an exclusionary narrative. For instance, the official Anzac commemoration at the AWM in Canberra requires months of planning, the presence of numerous marshals, the advertisement of the event, the strength of transportation links, the construction of temporary stadium seating, and clarity of communication to a vast number of people. Furthermore, there are temporal, spatial, and ideological conditions that need to be co-ordinated in order to make the affirmation of a political community easier to effect.

One is invited, then, to attend to the circumstances that allow certain relationships and political effects to persist and be compelling. The quality and complexion of (the boundaries of) legal and political communities is typified by the inclusion of detail beyond the human; the situatedness of key features that are deployed in order to effect these categories should be attended to.<sup>56</sup> This is akin to Latour's suggestion (above) that illusions of the purity of categories such as the human and its agency are actually a property of uncertain works that are subsequently concealed. If actions are to be recognized as composed of many elements, then agency needs to be articulated as arising from collective constellations of heterogeneous relations (Rammert 2012). This 'inter-agency' becomes the pivotal point of inquiry in understanding certain actions. The focus turns towards 'an *open* and empirical question whether the distributed agency is

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<sup>56</sup> In the context of Anzac Day, this extends to the recognition of life and the formation of identity.

observed then attributed to a single human actor or to a collective of human actors . . . or to some mixed constellation of inter-agency that is made of human and material agencies' (Rammert 2012: 91). The description of how agency and responsibility is exercised is a deeply political and juridical question; it is here that one can reconcile the interest in Anzac Day commemoration with the appeal made by Karen Barad (2003), and others, that matter is not cheated out of the fullness of its capacity when determining what participates in the materialization of particular political consequences.

In many ways, the relatability of ANT and new materialism with my interest in identifying the exclusionary potential of Anzac Day emerges from the shared suspicion of liberalism. The interest in Anzac Day as an exclusionary political device corresponds with the feeling that the development of a sense of national identity is conducive to defining the liberal political realm.<sup>57</sup> The impression that a sense of nationhood can be implicated in the production of a political community of individuals is paralleled by the methodological concerns of both ANT and new materialism. It tallies, for instance, with the concern felt by Barad that representationalism is given more power than it deserves and thinks this obscures any challenge to the notion of a world 'composed of individuals with separately attributable properties' (Barad 2003: 813). Indeed, identifying the role non-humans play in the enactment of being is one basis for understanding the 'individual' as a fallacy.<sup>58</sup> Objects, entities, systems are always dynamic and dependent on complex

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<sup>57</sup> This was briefly considered in the previous chapter with a consideration of Anderson (2006) and Hobsbawm (1983a).

<sup>58</sup> Much like Werner Rammert above, Barad suggests that agency arises through different *intra-actions* and is an ongoing process whereby a part of the world makes itself differentially intelligible to another part of the world. It is a process by which local causal structures, boundaries, and properties are stabilized and destabilized. In other words, agency is not aligned

networks of interactions between different phenomena; what we recognize as the individual is no different.<sup>59</sup>

This perspective shifts academic imperatives, and is the principal foundation for the critique of the cultural turn. Responsibility for particular happenings is not easily attributed at all, and cannot be explained with reference to, or as indicative of, particular cultural theorisations. Instead, if agency is to exist as a dynamic and emergent effect, then it is important to refrain from explanation in favour of responsible description. If things and systems are to have agency beyond their conception, then the claim that things can have 'life' after their construction (Wingfield 2010) is a compelling one. This 'life' is a consequence of vibrant relations among actants and it is here that agency exists. Both responsibility and power (Bennett 2010a), then, are enacted as a manifestation of agency but irreducible to what we *usually* understand agency to be. This means that both new

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with human intentionality as it is a matter of intra-acting and not something that someone or something 'has'.

<sup>59</sup> Nancy Tuana (2008) adopts a similar tone to Barad in her exploration of Hurricane Katrina as an exemplification of interaction and the defeat of clear categorizations such as nature and culture. Tuana develops the notion of viscous porosity to explain the way 'unity' is always dynamic and interactive, and 'agency is diffusely enacted in complex networks of relations' (2008: 188-189). Her example of why Katrina was so devastating demonstrates that events are enacted in complex interaction of phenomena. An instance of this is made clear when Tuana talks about the natural levees of New Orleans and how they 'transform the local geology and hydrology, and are in turn shaped by them' with the 'local geology and hydrology also [emerging] from complex social vectors' (2008: 195). In the end, the damage to New Orleans was a product of an imbroglio of actors. No one actor, in and of itself, was sufficient to cause the destruction that ensued, but each was certainly a necessary element. She states that it is only through eschewing the dichotomies between the natural and the social that an ethically enriching position can be crafted. Here, Barad's (2007; 207) understanding of agency as enactment is clearly expressed. It attests the notion that agency can be found emerging from relational configurations rather than being held to varying degrees by individual entities.

materialism and ANT can be thought of as assuming a novel ethical position where ‘an assemblage owes its agentic capacity to the vitality of the materialities that constitute it’ (Bennett 2010b: 34).

In this sense, then, the applicability of the methodological perspective developed in this chapter to this thesis in general is found in its ability to identify the imbroglio of diffuse participatory actors in its emergence of an exclusionary Anzac story. The Anzac commemorative narrative can be thought of as an assemblage, with the agentic capacity it has arising from the encounter and entanglement of a number of actors, both human and non-human. Appreciating the vitality of the materialities that constitute this emergent agency prompts the exploration of the situatedness of other assemblages—such as time, memory, expectation, and truth—that also contribute to the agentic potential arising in Anzac Day.

Positioning agency as a matter of relationality and vitalism rather than as a rigid and pre-eminent force (Bennett 2010b) means responsibility and causality must be reconsidered. Accountability for particular effects can still be attributed, but the process through which it is established is much more dependent on acknowledging that such actions are the product of entanglement and not necessarily simple cause and effect. Indeed, the possibility of non-human agency arising out of the idea that agency is relationally enacted (Passoth, Peuker, and Schillmeier 2012) affirms that one cannot think of agency as akin to the acted on intentions of human individuals.

The relevance of this conception of agency for legal and political theory is exemplified by John Law (2012). He explains that inquiries into failure, using the inquiry into the 2007 foot and mouth outbreak in the UK as an example, themselves fail because they work on questionable bases. Their desire to look for a single disruptive agent, subsequently discover it, and diagnose it as the cause of failure can only be a narrow and

partial approach. The commitment to finding a 'root cause' of a failure depends on identifying a single, clearly ascertainable source of a problem rather than acknowledging that adverse effects are often a product of a number of different, interrelated things.<sup>60</sup>

Again, we can return to the exploration of time, memory, expectation, and truth within the Anzac story to exemplify the merits of ANT and new materialism as means of approaching the story of exclusion in Anzac Day commemorations. This is because ANT and new materialism necessitates a fuller account of the way in which a number of disparate actors can come to be complicit in a particular story.<sup>61</sup> In the remaining chapters of this thesis, attention turns to addressing how these actors feature throughout the Anzac story, and how ANT and new materialism help us understand the relevant themes that are woven into the narrative. Before this point, consideration turns to developing a clearer impression of the key features of both ANT and new materialism.

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<sup>60</sup> Law (2012) also seeks to commit us to a non-foundational conceptualisation of agency when challenging the notion that knowledge exists external to reality. This position, Law states, needs to be rejected in favour of an acknowledgment that knowledge is inextricably intertwined with reality. It is inherently material as it is located in heterogeneous practices in specific circumstances. As agency is not the preserve of the human, non-human actors must be included in the performance of reality, and one such non-human actor is the idea of 'truth and knowledge'. There can be no causal externality to knowledge (Law 2007) and it is incumbent on the researcher to exemplify its situatedness. For instance, the knowledge of what makes a good Australian is continually enacted and reinforced in the Anzac Day commemorative programme rather than being a dispassionate and pre-eminent marker. The question, then, of how this 'knowledge' gains its status as 'true' is an important one to ask.

<sup>61</sup> As such, the utility of the distinction breaking ethic and vocabulary of ANT and new materialism are evident here, as is the responsibility entailed in these post-humanist methods (see eg Barad 2007; Braidotti 2013; More 2013).

## Exploring ANT and new materialism

The similar theoretical underpinnings of ANT and new materialism are underscored by a number of themes that have surfaced within each. Attention now turns to exploring the commitment to complexity, hybridity, following the actors, and the theoretical basis of the notion of assemblages found in each or either of ANT and new materialism. It also establishes the way in which each builds towards a methodology that allows one to say something meaningful about Anzac Day.

### *Complexity*

The dispelling of the reliance on simple and mutually exclusive distinctions from sociological analysis is pivotal to Latour's (1993) exposition of modernity. From the first pages of *We Have Never Been Modern*, Latour demonstrates the inescapable blending required in the formulation of things taken for granted as single entities. A newspaper article may tell of the mixing of chemical and political reactions in one story; a narrative that sees 'heads of state, chemists, biologists, desperate patients and industrialists . . . caught up in a single uncertain story of mixing biology and society' (1993: 2). Certainly, a steadfast commitment to complexity would also be an inventive means of approaching the topic of memory. Given the reliance on psychologism and the distinction between the individual and the group,<sup>62</sup> a methodology that stresses the need to look beyond dichotomies and categorical distinctions in order to understand how something comes to be effected is a useful means of approaching Anzac Day. How can one understand the

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<sup>62</sup> Which will be explored more detail in Chapter Five, when considering the distinction made in memory studies between the individual and the collective.



formation of memory and the strength of a commemorative narrative without depending on distinctions, say, between the mind and the body, and the human and its environments?

A number of stories within the canon of ANT literature exemplify this point. With Latour's (1991) example of hotel managers striving to ensure guests comply with a policy that hotel keys must be left in the hotel when they go out, the denial of distinctions and unbalanced analytical importance of different categories becomes clear. In this example, hotel managers seek to ensure guests do not leave hotel premises with their room keys; the policy is to return it to the desk whenever one ventures out. However, the compliance of the guests is originally minimal, when the only reminders they have are passive signs at front desks and requests from receptionists.

Acquiescence to the policy is increased with the addition of a large, weighted, tag on the hotel keys; guests can no longer absentmindedly leave the hotel with the key and nor would they want to. It appears that the durability of the practice of leaving the hotel key with the hotel manager depends on a mix of human and non-human actors in a chain. The work of the weighted key and myriad signs informing the guests of the policy are just as integral to the policy as the hotel manager's insistence and the attitude of the guests at the hotel. In other words, the disposition of people as considerate guests is enacted as a situational matter with no one element afforded pre-eminence in the exploration of this issue.

In the same way, the (un)reliability of a rail safety system depends on both human and non-human things. Law (2003a), in developing and analyzing his study of the Ladbroke Grove crash inquiry, has sought to demonstrate that there is a danger inherent in clamouring for a world that demands the creation and implementation of coherent systems. Systems can *never* be completely failsafe. Law's commentary on the inquiry

exhibits the importance of ensuring that both human and non-human components are treated on an analytical par. This serves to articulate one of the underlying principles of ANT, that no factor should be taken for granted as being more crucial or causal than others. In this particular study, Law is at pains to identify that it is the amalgamation of many elements, or 'domains', that has resulted in a failed system. Both human and non-human actors have contributed to the Ladbroke Grove rail disaster. The track layout, signalling systems, management culture, driver experience, training procedures, train protection systems, and the train itself are all implicated in the disaster. Indeed, if any of these elements were different or absent, the taken for granted system would look and operate differently, in either success or failure.

Both Latour's hotel policy and Law's railway safety mechanisms are systems. So, too, is the Anzac Day commemorative pattern. Just as the success of each of the systems exemplified above depends on a number of interacting and ostensibly divergent categories of actors, the success of the Anzac Day commemorative narrative relies on individuals, governments, museums, mountainsides, the weather, pressure groups, transport links, historical accounts, trinkets and medals to give it its form. For Law, relying on singular, central, and coherent logics to a system are actually counter-productive as it eschews the acknowledgment that myriad and inherently ambiguous actors across a system are required to make it work and keep it robust. For this reason, the notion of complexity (see eg Law and Mol 2002) is pivotal to ANT as it is a methodological tool that enables the researcher to look past a seemingly cohesive whole to explore what is working to maintain it.

Such an approach insists on a method that seeks to identify and acknowledge the work of all actors—without essence or categorization—that are caught up in, and thus contribute to, a system. This is clearly expressed in Callon's (1986a) study of the

conservation of scallops in St Brieuc Bay.<sup>63</sup> Throughout Callon's commentary, he points out the ways in which social scientists fall into a trap of asymmetrically observing the actors which are the focus of research. On this basis, Callon expresses the importance of the observer using a single repertoire when shifting between technical, natural, and social aspects to be studied. Indeed, the failure of the scientific enquiry central to Callon's story can only be adequately captured if one develops a vocabulary that traverses and refuses categorical distinctions when telling the story.

The moral of Callon's story suggests acknowledging the role of actors who do not necessarily embody the compliance, predictability, or intentionality that one might expect of a knowledgeable and purposeful human actor. As such, the role played by the scallop or local labour in contributing to the (failed) conservation project/system is as important as the role played by the marine biologists. This corresponds with the potential to give museum spaces, commemorative sites, and collective voices as much credence as individual or governmental voices<sup>64</sup> when establishing a commemorative narrative/system. By tracing and describing the ways a multitude of actors can be implicated in the production of a particular form, ANT identifies its purpose as revealing

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<sup>63</sup> In his study, Michel Callon addresses the process of trying to develop a conservation strategy lest the population of scallops in St Brieuc Bay be diminished and the livelihood of local fishermen ruined. He considers the efforts of three marine biologists who seek to understand more about the biology and farming of local scallops. Subsequently, the story presented by Callon unravels and the scientific enquiry fails. The biologists' assumptions are disrupted both by unruly scallops and rapacious fishermen, neither of whom behave according to the presumptions of the biologists.

<sup>64</sup> Even if one were to make an enquiry into Anzac Day on the basis of examining the role only human actors played in the story, the importance of giving as much weight to those voices that might not necessarily strike the researcher as noteworthy of authoritative is still an applicable moral to take from Callon's tale of the scallops of St Brieuc Bay.

how actors come to have importance in a particular story. Moreover, the associated notions of hybridity and symmetry ensure that nothing can be essentialized when implicated in stories of interest.

### *Hybridity*

Such a disposition is not limited to ANT.<sup>65</sup> Donna Haraway (1991), for instance, is an eminent proponent of such a position and works from the premise that we are all ‘fabricated hybrids of machine and organism’ (1991: 150). This enables her to develop a more imaginative analysis of the human body which escapes from ‘the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves’ (1991: 181). This idea has since been developed; the ethnographic study of boundaries between humans and machines demonstrates ‘that human and social reality is as much a product of machines as of human activity’ (Escobar et al 1994: 216). The notions that ‘no objects, spaces, or bodies are sacred in themselves’, and that ‘any component can be interfaced with any other’ (Haraway 1991: 163) are key to hybridity. It is a concept well suited to exploring the multitude of processes and amount of work that goes into shoring up, and giving meaning to, structures and boundaries that are not *necessarily* arbitrary but certainly not clear and uninterruptable.

The relevance of this idea when referring explicitly to the human is considered by Lucy Suchman (2007). She demonstrates that human interaction succeeds to the extent that it does not ‘simply [due] to the abilities of any one participant to construct meaningfulness but also to the possibility of mutually constituting intelligibility, in and

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<sup>65</sup> Indeed, it is a central concern to new materialism, too, as will be made clear in this current section.

through interaction' (2007: 12).<sup>66</sup> Even on a purely human level, the idea of interconnectedness and mutual dependence in the constitution of what we know is key. Furthermore, Suchman enforces this point by suggesting that future action on the basis of an original plan which orients a user depends on the changeability of the surroundings and the ability of the user to adapt to the environment. It is clear that, at the very least, 'behaviour can only be understood in its relations with real-world situations . . . [and] in reflexive relation to circumstances that are *themselves* in the process of being generated' (2007: 19; emphasis added).

As such, we can see a levelling out that suggests behaviour and environment are intertwined in the production of knowledge and action. In other words, they do not exist as distinct characterizations. The value of this disposition with regard to Anzac Day commemoration is evident if one refocuses on the quote from Suchman, above: '[memory] can only be understood in its relations with real-world situations . . . [and] on reflexive relation to circumstances [such as specific temporalities and expectations] that are themselves in the process of being generated.' Indeed, this is the basis on which a commitment to exploring the complexity of time and expectation—and how each are folded into the story of how mnemonic and historical narratives are produced—proceeds.

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<sup>66</sup> The resonance of this idea with the construction and maintenance of a mnemonic narrative is stark. Throughout the remainder of this thesis, the identification of interaction and complication rather than isolation and simplicity when determining how memories come to garner their meaning is a pivotal focus. It suffices to say here that such a conceptualization of hybridity is a firm foundation on which this enquiry is built.

Suchman's rejection of dichotomies also extends to humans and machines, with reciprocal action or two-way influences between the two blurring this distinction.<sup>67</sup> Thinking of the definition of the 'machine' as the result of the user-technology relationship enables one to establish hybridity, like complexity, as having meaning as a methodological tool when considering how systems are defined and sustained. Its applicability to the Anzac story has been briefly considered, above, and will continue to be explored in Chapter Four. Now, a *how* question needs to be asked of ANT and new materialism: how are the concepts of complexity and hybridity rendered intelligible as bases with which to explore the enactment of a particular system?

#### *Follow the actors*

Suchman develops her understanding of the machine in relation to the idea of 'situated action'.<sup>68</sup> The concept of situated action requests that social theory 'looks for the

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<sup>67</sup> This blurred distinction gives Woolgar's (1991: 86) definition of the machine as the configured relation between the user and the technological object a clear logic. This attitude towards the definition of machines and operations as inherently relational (ie a machine or process can only be thought of as constituted by the relationship between elements) is one that offers an analytical opportunity. One can interrogate the mechanics of the existence of something and give rise to critical possibilities that are readily utilizable by the social sciences. For instance, the expression of the individual as being made of parts that are not necessarily human has paved the way for committing to an idea of the social as an effect of relations between myriad things. To proffer that 'the difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally designed and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines' are now thoroughly ambiguous (Haraway 1991: 152) rationalizes the ANT and new materialist commitment to hybridity.

<sup>68</sup> The idea of situated action stresses the importance of understanding how knowledge and action are developed in relation to particular situations, rather than developed in isolation from the situation one has to execute particular actions within. In order to underline her point, Suchman demonstrates that plans are not 'directions' to take, as such, but exist to make it possible to

processes whereby particular, uniquely constituted circumstances are systematically interpreted so as to render meaning shared and action accountably rational' (Suchman 2007: 84). The moral here is that circumstance is afforded priority when explaining why and how certain action took the course it did. It is at this point that ANT's methodological backdrop finds its affinity with Suchman: the importance in the researcher's ability to 'follow the actors' (Latour 2005: 12; see also Latour 1987, Latour and Woolgar 1986). It follows a stark warning from Stephen Hester and David Francis (2007) that:

The process of transformation is premised on the position that . . . ordinary 'concrete' social life can only properly be understood by being transformed into analytical objects since only the latter enable orderliness to be displayed. In this transformation, the original orderliness of the phenomena, as it was produced by the parties to it such that it was intelligible as the phenomena it was, is lost from view (Hester and Francis 2007: 8).

With this mandate for how social studies should operate, an associated line of enquiry emerges. How is the understanding of phenomena without reliance on readily accessible frames of research accomplished? What is invoked when making something intelligible as itself without taking it for granted? The resonance here with Latour's (1988) understanding that nothing should be considered in a preordained hierarchy is clear. Of course, such an insistence on examining the apparent trivialities of conduct and

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'perform a post hoc analysis of situated action that will make it appear to have followed a rational plan' (Suchman 2007: 72). The similarity between this and the calls of ANT and new materialism to eschew explanatory devices in favour of addressing the detail of how something comes to be recognized as an entity renders Suchman's idea of situated action both interesting and pertinent.

relationships when determining how something exists can be criticized for its failure to 'appreciate the extent to which social relationships are propelled and animated through differential access to the means of power' (Sharrock and Button 2007: 33). As above, when we encountered similar criticism levelled at ANT, this criticism is unfounded.

The idea that tracing and describing the way a multitude of actors can be implicated in the maintenance of a particular thing (see eg Whittle and Spicer 2008), such as a commemorative narrative, demonstrates the point that power operates *within situated settings* (Sharrock and Button 2007; see also Vinkhuyzen and Whalen 2007). The purpose of ANT is to tell the story of how actors come to be important, how they come to have 'power to' act. Addressing the apparent triviality of the Anzac Day commemorative pattern is one means of understanding how a commemorative narrative can come to enjoy the 'power to' discriminate and exclude.<sup>69</sup>

The positing of inherent causality in power(s) without ascertaining what has occurred in order to *produce* that power is problematic. Such scepticism towards traditional social theory's inability to acknowledge the processes that have enacted society as we know it resonates with the work of Gabriel Tarde. This early twentieth

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<sup>69</sup> Wes Sharrock and Graham Button (2007) underline this point clearly, suggesting that power is situated in practical action. In other words, the nature of power is conditional on the situation in which it is to be exercised. In their examination of meetings between two middle-managers in a bank, they conclude that power can be an instructive and educative force, rather than necessarily constricting. In the conversations regarding sales operatives within the bank, Sharrock and Button identified two observable features. First, the conversation attempts to resolve the issue of what managerial measures need to be taken to achieve intensification of the work effort. Second, it involves a blend of persuasion and coercion to achieve compliance of one of the participants in the conversation to adopt the approach suggested by the other. Apparent in these conversations, to the authors, is that 'all social life is conducted within the circumstances of its production, including the *exercise* of power' (2007: 49; emphasis added).



century sociologist paved the way for the development of an understanding of the assemblage that has become so pivotal to ANT and new materialism. Turning to Tarde for an understanding of the foundations of ANT reinforces its efficacy as a method for unpicking explanatory devices, a reliance on 'truth' or authority, and the inherent complexity of things such as time. For instance, his work problematizes scale, essence, and singularity which comes to characterize the exploration of time in Chapter Four. An appreciation of the difficulty of dissociating things from the situations and networks in which they are enacted comes from an understanding of the aggregated constitution of a thing.

#### *Theoretical underpinnings of the 'assemblage'*

ANT's positioning of itself as a methodology against the grain of sociological research reflects the career of its ancestor (Latour 2002a), Gabriel Tarde. Somewhat overshadowed by the prevalence of Émile Durkheim in the origin story of sociology (Latour 2005), Tarde's conceptualization of society has enjoyed a recent renaissance in the sociological discipline (see eg Candea 2010). Latour considers the overshadowing of Tarde by Durkheim to be an unfortunate consequence of Tarde being ahead of his time, unable to 'transform his intuitions into data because the material world he was interested in was not there yet to provide him with any empirical grasp' (Latour 2002a: 118). With the poor reception of Tarde's ideas in sociology came an accepted analytical position that distinguished between the individual and society. Tarde's discomfort with such a

distinction, along with the distinction between the micro and the macro is one of the foundation stones of ANT.<sup>70</sup>

Moreover, the necessity of adopting a method of tracing and apprehending the ‘countless adaptations’<sup>71</sup> (Tarde 1899) that form life as we know it is also a key feature of ANT. In other words, Tarde’s rejection of the distinction between the micro and macro justifies the tracing of the detail which might be overlooked or explained away by a larger ‘whole’ which occupies a ‘higher level’, so to speak (Latour et al 2012). The reason that one cannot distinguish between the micro and the macro is that this ‘whole’ cannot be dissociated from the many things that have enacted and enabled it—nor can it be thought of as causal. With regard to the example of Anzac Day, this can be understood as a way of establishing that there can be no insistence on the inherent legitimacy of a particular mnemonically framed sense of Australian identity. This is because, on a Tardean basis, the distinction between the micro and the macro—or, similarly, causal authority—cannot be relied upon to explain the strength of the Anzac narrative. Rather, Tarde would invite a consideration of the elements that make up the Anzac Day narrative, just as ANT

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<sup>70</sup> Tarde also believed that ‘the nature and society divide is irrelevant for understanding the world of human interactions’ (see Latour 2002a: 118).

<sup>71</sup> Tarde’s argument is that everything is made up of countless, and infinite, ‘adaptations’. Each human body, for instance, is an aggregate effect of elements which can, together, form another aggregate themselves. Each aggregate is made up of many ‘adaptates’ but also exist as ‘adaptates’ themselves in larger aggregates. The human body is an aggregate because it is constituted by the association of organs, flesh, and bones which are, in turn, associations of other ‘smaller’ adaptations; the list can go on *ad infinitum*. This is Tarde’s lesson; one must acknowledge the status of everything as both an aggregate and adaptate in social organization. It follows, then, that as the individual is, itself a society, a distinction between individuality and society can be circumvented in favour of understanding how each is a product of dynamic adaptations that encounter and associate with others, with the potential to change and effect change in its aggregate body.

requires attention to the participation of actors, and the work put in, to a network in order to make it function.

At this point, it would appear that Tarde makes an implied distinction between the micro and the macro by suggesting that sociology should always be concerned with how aggregates are constituted from more precise parts. In other words, the most miniscule divisible unit is always the most precise and important element in understanding how an aggregate society is created. However, Tarde is cautious ‘not to derive the social and society from individual actors’ (Borch 2005: 83). Rather—and this is where the affinity between Tarde and ANT becomes most apparent—Tarde expresses how aggregates and constitutive parts simultaneously work to constitute each other. In the vocabulary of ANT, an actor is defined by its network in simultaneity with the network being fully defined by its actors (Latour et al 2012).

Moreover, when one remembers that each ‘individual’, however small, is also made up of a number of adaptates, so size is impossible to depend on.<sup>72</sup> Indeed, this exemplifies the prospect of the Anzac Day narrative as actively working on a sense of Australian identity; it can be thought of as both constructed and constructive. Of course, ANT articulates this as being the workings of an actor-network; something can act on the network that has worked to construct it. However, the Tardean focus makes plain the

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<sup>72</sup> This idea reminds me of an interesting online resource entitled ‘The Scale of the Universe’ that allows the user to use a scroll bar to ‘zoom’ in and out of the universe in order to get an idea of the sheer size of the universe, between the smallest identifiable thing to the largest. It struck me that despite its size, the ‘strings’ that are theorized as integral to the constitution of the entirety of life as we know it, a string is still derived from the efforts of physicists, technical tools and knowledge, and theoretical models developed throughout the twentieth century. They are simultaneously the most individual and micro entity as well as one of the most collective and macro.

ability for something to be identified as a productive actor in the generation of something (ie a sense of identity) whilst avoiding identifying it as monolithic, causal, and innately authoritative.

While the work of Tarde can be identified as a precursor to ANT, his work is as applicable to new materialism as both appeal to the notion of the assemblage<sup>73</sup> when determining how certain systems and entities come into existence as a product of a number of interconnecting and heterogeneous actors. The idea of the assemblage relates to Tarde's development of a Monadology, or the 'stuff out of which the world is made' (Latour 2002a: 120). Things perceived as structures, or wholes, are made up of myriad diverse 'monads'. There is no separating of monads permissible on the basis of arbitrary dichotomies<sup>74</sup> or analytical categories. They can be *anything* from subatomic particles to human beings and beyond.

A monad is at once large and small, simple and complex, because they are an association, an assemblage, made up of yet more monads. Such an idea pushes against the fallacy that there is a causal 'out-there-ness' that explains societies (Law and Singleton 2005). In relation to Anzac Day, then, the ANT approach gleaned from Tarde's work prompts an understanding of the Anzac commemorative programme as both an adaptate in a large community of adaptates that converge to enact Australian culture but is also, itself, a monolithic aggregate of a range of smaller adaptates. It is the life and role of these 'adaptates' in the Anzac story that operates as the focus of this thesis. It may help effect

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<sup>73</sup> For Latour (1999c) the notion of the assemblages is simply the acknowledgment that everything is assembled, and nothing is pre-eminent.

<sup>74</sup> In shying away from simple dichotomies, Tarde breaks from making explanations on the basis of cause and effect (Lash 2006) because it is difficult to get an explanatory foothold into the 'essence' of something without categorizing it.

particular discriminating narratives but its complexity as an assemblage/aggregate of several adaptates makes it impossible to identify a singular cause of such power.<sup>75</sup>

### **Being and meaning: responding to criticism in questions of truth and knowledge**

The Tardean underpinnings of ANT provides a useful perspective with which to respond to the criticisms of ANT's relativism addressed above. It helps emphasize that, rather than being a blunt and preposterous position (Baghramian 2011), ANT highlights uncertainty and constructionism over certainty and truth. Indeed, Latour suggests, while exploring the development of scientific knowledge, that relativism is a dubious philosophical position as it fails to appreciate the efforts of 'scientists at work who strive to make their claims more credible than those of others' (Latour 1987: 196), and denies the inequalities of truth and knowledge that do exist.<sup>76</sup> But how is this position arrived at and made intelligible if one recognizes that ANT and new materialism *do* stress anti-essentialism and the avoidance of certainty? It is argued here that a distinction between the 'being' and 'meaning' of something is a useful method of approaching this question. It reconciles the anti-essentialism of ANT and new materialism with a critical anti-relativist position that serves to highlight political imbalances.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Indeed, for now borrowing the language of Tarde, the adaptates that constitute the aggregate that is the Anzac Day commemorative narrative will be considered in more detail in the remaining chapters.

<sup>76</sup> In many respects, this corresponds with the idea of the multiplicity of time and the identification of certain pervasive conceptualizations of time as 'true', or as more rational than others. This will be considered in Chapter Four.

<sup>77</sup> For the purposes of this thesis, and an exploration of a time rich commemorative institution, it is important to develop this reconciliation in relation to time. The answer to the above question about the critical potential of ANT and new materialism rests on establishing the multiplicity of

Exchanges between Latour and Graham Harman (see Harman 2009, 2010; Latour, Harman, and Erdélyi 2011), and Latour and David Bloor (see Bloor 1999; Latour 1999a) have accentuated the philosophical propositions that emanate from ANT which approach the topic of relativism. Indeed, suggestions of local occasionalism (Harman 2009), obscurantism and rhetorical convenience (Bloor 1999) means ANT must remain concerned with such criticisms against it. Of course, ANT—Latour, in particular—has brought it on itself. Between, for instance, *The Pasteurization of France*, *We Have Never Been Modern*, and *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*, Latour builds a collection of works that deal specifically with a critique of modernity's treatment of nature and society as two different realms. The philosophical implication for shunning this distinction, and relying on the hybrid construction of these foundational 'truths', is a suspicion of the non-relational explanation of the existence of things.

It is the development of a method out of this suspicion that leads Latour to be criticized. Harman, for instance, criticizes the idea of mediation that is key to Latour's, and other actor-network theorists', work. Harman questions the 'infinite regress' that is emblematic of the ANT work to dissect things and examine the concealed details of how they operate. Harman presents the reliance on mediation as an absurdity, concerned that ANT depends on countless active mediators, creating and facilitating relations between actors and requiring their own mediation for their own enactment. Harman makes use of

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time. The following chapter establishes that this is usefully approached in relation to the theorization of the non-universality of space, too. In many respects, the distinction between being and meaning in relation to space offers a more tangible basis for understanding how something can be a singular base or stage for the production of many competing, coterminous, and conflicting resonances with many potential implications. It is suggested that one can identify how particular spatial and temporal co-ordinates can be *effected* without collapsing into unqualified relativism.

Latour's analysis of Frédéric Joliot in *Pandora's Hope* to buttress his point. He suggests that there cannot be an infinite army of Joliots mediating between two points, as Joliot did with neutrons and politics. 'Something', Harman stresses, 'must be capable of direct action' (Harman 2009: 145-146).

Of course, Harman could reach no other conclusion given his appeal to a linear representation of what he considers to be ANT's problem, where a line connecting two points is steadied by innumerable mediators which are never capable of reaching either point themselves. Such an understanding of mediation is akin to mathematical mediation, where it is impossible to reach zero by continually dividing one and its quotients by two.<sup>78</sup> Rather, it is important to remember that two 'points' do not pre-exist, between which mediators are working to relate them. Rather, mediation is a process whereby 'input is never a good predictor of . . . output' (Latour 2005: 39). The relationality expressed in ANT determines a relationship between two points to be mutually, and potentially messily, generated with the assistance of possibly inestimable numbers of active mediators, which are themselves effected.

However, the fact that every actor is a relational effect does not mean that things are separated *ad infinitum*. Instead, actors can meet or 'touch' by accident or opportunism, in ways that cannot be predicted or plotted on the basis of scale. Harman's worry about an infinite regress of mediators neglects the possibility for a large and complex actor-network to mediate a smaller and simpler relationship. Thus, there is no easy way of plotting a network of actors, because of their varying degrees of complexity

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<sup>78</sup> This is a quality that is familiar to ANT, but not in relation to mediation. Rather, Harman appears to be describing the 'role' of intermediaries, who 'shore up' the relation between two predetermined actors.

and perceived size. As such, Latour (2005) does express concern<sup>79</sup> that it takes unnecessary effort to demonstrate that actor-network accounts of topics which do not take the shape of networks—as the word is commonly understood—are possible.

However, the common meaning of the word network can usefully pull us towards an example that establishes how the conceptual difficulty with an infinite regress can be overcome. A rail network can provide a rough demonstration of the way in which actors do ‘touch’. More precisely, a stretch of track and a locomotive touch through mediating wheels. The wheels, themselves, are a product of myriad relations, mutations, and negotiations that have gone into creating the wheels that keep the train on the tracks. Such relations do not call the proximity of the track and the train into question but traverse it. This demonstrates the work being done to keep a system working rather than a way of severing it and dissociating the parts from one another.

In other words, the discovery of a network of many diverse actors in what previously looked like a single system does not distort the fact that, on the face of it, there is an immediate relationship between the train and the track. Here, we can see an operative difference between the descriptive utilization of ANT as a methodology and the subsequent extrapolation of ANT as a philosophical movement that denies the existence of things as we know them. However, the affiliation between ANT and new materialism can be introduced here, with new materialism demonstrating that theorizing the manner in which things come to exist *augments* our understanding of how things exist rather than

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<sup>79</sup> This concern is one justification for the opening up of ANT to other theorizations of being that are considered instructive in relation to time and space in the following chapter. Irrespective of whether or not ANT is misunderstood or wrongly criticized, an approach to being in relation to time and space that may circumvent the difficulties relating to the vocabulary and imagery of ANT is advanced. It builds upon the anti-essentialist underpinnings of ANT and new materialism whilst also evading wholesale relativism.



denying them.<sup>80</sup> An exploration of the complexity and materiality of time does not deny time as a condition of our existence. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate the conditions germane to the establishment of time(s) and how it participates as an actor within a particular association. In relation to the exploration of Anzac Day commemoration, the same can be said of the distinction that can be made between the Australian War Memorial (AWM) as a fixed and well-defined entity that has various *meanings* enacted into it. These meanings can depend on the networks within which the AWM circulates.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> The relationality that gives a 'thing' meaning is expressed in a question to Harman during a debate between Latour and Harman. The questioner, Peter Hallward, suggests that the nature of objects 'seems to depend on the relational system to which they belong' (Latour, Harman, and Erdélyi 2011: 69). He emphasises this point with reference to the game of chess; in what sense is a rook 'a rook' outside of the relations that define the rules of chess? It suggests an interesting distinction between what something is and what it means. Its physical shape and its status as a 'chess piece' does not change, just like train carriages and train tracks definitely operate as such. However, its status as a piece with a set role and limited movements does not change the fact that, to the manufacturers, it is the culmination of a creative process and, if handcrafted, may have particular sentimental value both to the creator and the user. Attunement to the relational enactment of value and meaning of something that unquestionably *is* can be realized through an ANT and new materialist disposition. Contingent definitions of the value of the chess piece suggests it is a tangible entity subject to change depending on particular networks of relations.

<sup>81</sup> The following chapter considers the distinction between being and meaning in much greater detail. It does so in relation to the theorization of space and place. For instance, in relation to the AWM, one can distinguish between its *tangibility* and the *significance* potentially attributable or attributed to it. The acknowledgment of the existence of something that can be discerned does not mean it has an essence. The malleability of meaning in a space, for instance, suggests space—or anything else—will always depend on a situation for an 'essence'. In other words, because ANT emphasises the importance of tracing networks of relations, translation, and mediation does not mean it works with the idea that nothing *exists* outside of its relations but that these relations must be understood if we are to derive the meaning of an entity. Of course, this requires a degree of stretching of ANT to enable one to read a distinction between being and meaning into it; the following chapter seeks to do this by bringing ANT into conversation with other theorizations of time, space, and being.

The contingency of meaning on network(ed) encounters can be identified in ANT stories. The ability to distinguish between what something *is* and what something *means* is typified in Madeleine Akrich's (see Law 2003b) story of technology transfer between Sweden and Nicaragua. Akrich's account of this fuel technology transfer offers an interesting foundation from which to view and understand the importance of distinguishing between being and meaning in the AWM. Her story indicates the extensive process of negotiations that were endured to guarantee the successful exporting of a machine that compresses woodland waste into combustible briquettes. As Nicaragua was short of fuel, the thought was that this machine could have been used to convert tropical forest waste into combustible briquettes. Along the way, however, various problems were encountered.<sup>82</sup> Ultimately, the technology transfer was a success. However, it is clear that without extensive work to adjust the machine, it would not have operated effectively within a new network of relations (Law 2003b). It took numerous negotiations and changes to generate a fully operative machine. A different set of relations and negotiations may have been unsuccessful and created a defunct entity.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> First, there was a question about which raw material to use as waste wood is in short supply in Nicaragua. Second, a new machine was required to make the collection of the new waste, cotton stalks, practicable. Third, as cotton is only harvested for three months in the year, storage for the cotton waste was required. Fourth, the issue of pests that destroy the stored cotton waste arises. Fifth, as there is not the same industrial demand for the briquettes in Nicaragua as there is in Sweden, the fuel needs to be marketed at domestic and commercial markets.

<sup>83</sup> The fact that, between two sets of relations, it is possible to talk about a working machine or a defunct machines serves to demonstrate a sense of fixity in the existence of 'the machine', if not necessarily what it might come to mean. That different sets of relationships, ie different networks, can encounter an entity and enact different meanings out of this encounter is an important point to consider in relation to the exclusionary potential of the commemoration of Anzac Day. This will be considered in greater depth in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven.

This story also exhibits how direct relationships do exist between entities, rather than just a set of indirect relations. The type of fuel directly encounters the fuel burning technology; indeed, the extensive negotiations required to make the technology work would not have been needed were it not for the importance and directness of such an encounter. What this points to is a conceptualization of mediation as a part of a continual, and fluid, process that is driven by relationality rather than a process that can be expressed by linearity and perpetual ruptures.

The moral that 'objects that make up such technical systems change with changing relationships' (de Laet 2000: 160) highlights the fact that mediation is a process by which things are understood to be contingent on the situations in which they operate. However, rather than being a process of *complete* contingency, it is more appropriate to consider the relational process to be an inescapable entanglement that generates and sustains an actor's agency. This is expressed in Marianne de Laet's (2000) examination of the fluidity of patents as objects which change through their travel. Not only are 'external conditions . . . required to make the patent work' (2000: 161) but the patent has a role in changing its new environment, too, exemplifying that 'the places where patents travel turn out not to be fixed entities, either' (2000: 167).

Similarly, the fixity of commemorative programmes and sites in Australia shape, and are simultaneously tested, by 'communities' that include socio-political circumstances, as well as economies and psychologies of participating human actors within a community. Each of these can have a changeable relationality to each other actor. The points at which they might intersect or diverge serve to generate particular outcomes which, alongside commemorative sites, coproduce a particular attitude towards Anzac as

a whole. It is this process, rather than the physical fact of the commemorative sites themselves, that imbue a site with meaning.<sup>84</sup>

In many ways, then, philosophizing ANT and the concept of mediation should not be understood as an exhibition of the relativism of ANT. Rather, it is a useful methodological tool that enables a more complete description of the process and stages from which the *meaning* of an entity emerges as an effect. Akrich's briquette making machine physically exists but its purpose, efficiency, and functionality are generated by many negotiations and connections made between many heterogeneous actors. Similarly, the distinction between the existence of an Anzac programme and the variety of affects, attitudes, and emotional evocations that can be produced when actor-networks meet suggests a distinction between factual existence and the process of generating meaning can be made.

#### *Performativity and enrolment in historical knowledge*

One important application of this distinction between being and meaning for the purposes of this thesis is in relation to the examination of the historical authority that underpins the commemoration of Anzac Day. An outlook that takes into account the networked contingency of a historical narrative rather than identifying its facticity is useful for understanding how a narrative can come to be imbued with exclusionary

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<sup>84</sup> A clear example of this is given by Joy Damousi (2010), who suggests that shifts in the meaning of Anzac in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries might be a result of the comingling of military and family histories prompted by Australian involvement in more recent wars. This particular element of the Anzac Day commemorative programme serves to proliferate civilian attachments to Australian armed forces and, thus, generate new emotional dynamics of the Anzac tradition.

meaning.<sup>85</sup> For instance, it is undeniable that certain events have occurred in years gone by, but the factuality of this is mediated by the way in which such events are recalled and historicized. Given that the concern of this thesis is ultimately the commemoration of an event that occurred a century ago, the question of how history is popularized and given more prominence as a truth telling discipline (see eg Blackburn 2007) is important to explore.

Of interest, here, is the notion that certain disciplines can be imbued with a sense of truthfulness, and the ANT line of enquiry in addressing how such authority is enacted is a useful means of problematizing such 'truth'. Michel Callon (1998) exemplifies the notion that these disciplines are not unequivocal or unqualified truths in his exploration of economic science.<sup>86</sup> Callon's insistence on an ANT understanding of the shape of things stresses that all actions and consequences are identifiable conditions of networked relationships that are constantly evolving.

Therefore, disciplines such as economic science are not dissociable from other 'realms' and cannot be readily compartmentalized. Rather:

the market is no longer that cold, implacable and impersonal monster which imposes its laws and procedure while extending them even further. It is a many-

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<sup>85</sup> Chapter Six addresses this in more detail. The contingency of the 'history' of Anzac is explored for its reliance on various representations and ordering of texts and artefacts rather than its definite accuracy.

<sup>86</sup> Economic science is a discipline, according to Kevin Blackburn (2007), that excels at insisting on its truthfulness and authority. It is a discipline that is given sustained attention in this current section as it usefully connects ANT, as an approach to the performativity of economics, with the question of the performativity of history and its own convictions as a truth teller.

sided, diversified, evolving device which the social sciences as well as the actors themselves contribute to reconfigure (Callon 1998: 51).

In other words, the importance of acknowledging the embeddedness of economics in extensive and heterogeneous networks necessitates acknowledging how economic science itself performs, shapes, and formats the economy. Indeed, the performativity of economics is thought of as a matter of *producing*, rather than just studying, the world (MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2007). The strength of this production depends on the work done to translate the world as a macrocosm of the experimental conditions in which economic models are developed. This, again, stresses the difficulty in explaining disciplines in passive terms. Moreover, the inability to disentangle the experimentation and modelling from diffuse actors, demonstrates how economic science and the world it is 'observing' are co-produced.<sup>87</sup>

The impetus for ANT-inspired explorations into economics corresponds with its interest in establishing that the security of particular things or systems can only be thought of as such because of the work done to allow it to take on the impression of fixity and enduring coherence. That a particular economic model, for instance, may 'work' has as much to do with the strength of particular decisions, actions, and the actors themselves—so enacted—to confine others to certain 'paths' (Callon 1998). Indeed, Fabian Muniesa and Michel Callon (2007) articulate this as the manipulative capacity of experimental economics. How, then, such experiments are cast into, or onto, the 'exterior' world forms the basis of an investigation into the performativity of a discipline.

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<sup>87</sup> The manner in which this resonates with Latour and Woolgar's *Laboratory Life* (1986) exemplifies the possibility of understanding the situatedness of disciplines that radiate a sense of reliability in their rigour.

The stakes invested in particular disciplines can participate in enacting those disciplines' sense of veracity.<sup>88</sup> Whether or not one considers these stakes to be the driving force behind a discipline's apparent veracity, itself driven by sociocultural contexts (Holm 2007), or as an indicator of the situational enactment of this power or authority, any *essential* truth can, nevertheless, be disregarded as a fallacy. The social and political, as well as financial, stakes in the development of certain disciplinary truths has been identified by Donald MacKenzie (2006). In his exposition of the role economic theorizations and models play in the construct of economies, one can identify the entanglement of many different actors in the production of a 'legitimate' contribution to the field. One can identify the summoning of material devices, routines, and concepts in the process of making economic calculations and theorizations possible. However, MacKenzie also emphasizes the personal connections, emotions, and sentiments that are integral to the development of economic models, notwithstanding the work done to conceal this.

The identification of the importance of 'stakes', in the development of particular disciplinary models does not stop at economics, however. When one considers that the

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<sup>88</sup> Rebecca Lave, Philip Mirowski, and Samuel Randall (2010) suggest that the impact neoliberalism has on shaping the sciences demonstrates how a 'truth' is constructed in the set of conditions that enact it. They suggest that investment can equate to a command inasmuch as it implicitly negates research or models that are not afforded similar levels of financial investment. Moreover, financial investment also motivates the ordering of ancillary actors and networks due to the desire for a return. As such, some form of investment becomes an integral actor in the construction of a truth. While this is considered an integral contribution to the development of biomedical sciences, such impetuses have 'spread out across the natural sciences and into the social sciences as well' (Lave, Mirowski, and Randalls 2010: 664). In this sense, then, constructing a realizable and believable truth in a variety of disciplines relies on a sense that the 'truth' in development 'matters', or that there is something at stake. It is suggested here that the stake need not be financial but could be scientific, political, or social.

Anzac legend has developed as the constitutive folklore of the Australian nation, one can consider the cultural and political stakes implicated in the maintenance of a particular representation of the past as a historical truth. The arrogation of something as a truth allows it to dismiss subversive claims, not least a more ambivalent or critical approach to Anzac Day.<sup>89</sup>

Furthermore, the fact that the efficacy of certain models depends, rigidly, on wider technological (MacKenzie 2006), social, and political conditions (Mitchell 2007) highlights that disciplinary models are not a matter of 'fact' but of re- and inter- action. That these conditions can be compelled by certain actors into transforming in order to reinforce their orthodoxy (Mitchell 2007) demonstrates how an authority is generated not in inherent truth but in the ability of things to be made 'actual' (Callon 2007) through relational conditioning. Indeed, one lesson to be found in the notion of performativity is that models and theories *are* susceptible to challenge and change. In order to sustain their premise, such models, theories, truths, and authorities need to invoke a variety of actors. These actors can be enrolled and deployed to induce compliance through some form of investment, or through employing rhetorical strategies that seek to maintain a sense of orthodoxy (MacKenzie 2006). This can be through the inclusive exclusion or weak actors who are deemed to participate in networks in regressive and irrational ways, thus providing a tonic for the 'approved' way (Mitchell 2007).<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> To a degree, this is the product of the emotional ease with which certain ideas and truths can be introduced and encouraged. Uncritical, straightforward, or affirmative truths can tap into the fear and apprehension (Massumi 2015) about being taken up by something 'other' in order to be maintained. How, though, these truths are developed and maintained needs addressing.

<sup>90</sup> See, for instance, Marilyn Lake's (2010) consideration of the attitude towards Anzac Day that does not correspond with the 'right' way of thinking about it.



That certain theorizations prevail over marginalized ones requires a constant endeavour to order conditions in a way that makes them conducive to the continuation of a particular theorization over others. If one understands performativity as the assumption of a theory before a reality, that it ultimately creates rather than re-expresses (Didier 2007), then ANT can augment the understanding of the manner in which this reality can be continually constructed. The understanding that ANT provides is in offering no firm ontological grounds on which this can be achieved. Rather, it would suggest that this work comes down to a constant 'proof race' (Mirowski and Nik-Khah 2007) when conflict over goals or controversies are 'won' through the enrolment of actors and ordering of associations.

These associations are built on attachments between technical objects, environments, and politics (Barry and Slater 2002a; Barry and Slater 2002b), with the respective strength of actors within networks as being integral to the success or failure of certain things over others. It is important to acknowledge these efforts and strengths in relation to history, as the facticity of the historicalization of the Anzac legend is what is subject to interrogation. How does history become a discourse 'of sobriety . . . which purport[s] to describe what is "real" or "tell us the truth"' (Blackburn 2007: 97-98)? It is important because this thesis concerns itself with the enactment of a mnemonic narrative, and history and memory overlap more than purists of history would have us believe (Winter 2010).

This, of course, corresponds to the suggestions made by proponents of the Popular Memory Group (PMG) that memories are tied in with the performance of coherent and institutionalized public narratives. As such, the suggestion that memory is encountered and effected by institutional histories makes the interrogation of the processes of enrolment a pivotal concern. This is particularly important if one considers that the

negotiated pervasiveness of certain historiographical standards and media (Ramos 2010) serves to delegitimize certain memories. In addition to the link between history and memory being understood on the basis of history being brought to bear on memory when constituting its own relevance and power, the link can also be made on the simple basis that 'there has never been a time when the past is performed as much as it is today' (Winter 2010: 21).

In other words, the past is *actively* constituted in both current history and memory. In the context of the distinction between being and meaning, it can be understood that meaning of both history and memory require enactment, notwithstanding that an event in the past may have taken place. Moreover, in addition to Jay Winter establishing the 'art' in both memory and history, he also establishes the inability to dissociate memory from history as they are both required to execute a particular impression or image of the past. The example Winter draws upon is the telling of a war story; he suggests that articulating the state of mind of the soldier within the condition of war is a pivotal strength of such stories. This suggests that the veracity and affect of such tales goes beyond identifying the bare 'fact' or 'truth' of the past.

Indeed, the notion that history and memory are linked through a process of binary responsiveness to each other (see eg Lorenz 2010) suggests that the notion of the organic and flexible, thus unauthoritative, memory is linked with history. As such, a recognition of the contingency and complexity of memory<sup>91</sup> also suggests one needs to consider the contingency of history, too. How this contingency is managed, either overcoming or being 'outperformed' by other performances of the past, forms the basis of an interrogation of history as a truth telling, or truth revealing, discipline. As a matter of fact, framing the

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<sup>91</sup> To be discussed in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.

enquiry as an exploration of the performativity of the past circumvents the essentialist distinction between history and memory.<sup>92</sup>

For instance, Paul Connerton (1989) writes that:

We may say that our experiences of the present largely depend upon our knowledge of the past, and that our images of the past commonly serve to legitimate a present social order. And yet these points, though true, are as they stand insufficient when thus put. For images of the past and recollected knowledge of the past . . . are conveyed and sustained by (more or less ritual) performances' (1989: 4).

Connerton goes on to suggest that, whilst the past (rather than either history or memory) is instructive, and therefore holds some form of veracity, our access to it is established on the basis of a constructed narrative enacted in ritual and routine. He states that many commemorations explicitly claim continuity by 'ritually re-enacting a narrative of events held to have taken place at some past time, in a manner sufficiently elaborate to contain the performance of more or less invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances' (1989: 45).

Such a construction of narratives gives *meaning* to the remembrance of the past, either in historical or mnemonic terms. Of course, this frame necessitates an elaboration

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<sup>92</sup> Nevertheless, this thesis does separate the consideration of the performativity of history from the construction of memory for the sake of chronicling the development of the Anzac narrative in the remaining chapters of this thesis. The task at hand, however, is to demonstrate that both are the product of situated enactment, serving to buttress the point that a distinction between history and memory is a difficult one to sustain on the basis of the veracity of one over the other.

on what helps buttress such a narrative. A reasonable foundation for this exploration is offered by Connerton in his discussion of habit memory as a basis for comprehension and the capacity to act within our lives. The notion that habit confers a sense of direction or coherence to our existences is translated, by Connerton, into ‘an essential ingredient in the successful and convincing performances of codes and rules’ (1989: 36). This notion of ‘social habit memory’ is fascinating, as it offers another taut conduit between history and memory as each could be extrapolated from this sense of ritual performance as the crux of authority. The fact, also, that habit can be considered an intrusive feature of our mental life (1989: 23) suggests that our own mental and mnemonic capacities are effected by habitual situatedness.<sup>93</sup>

In addition to this, the convergence of memory and history on the understanding that both operate as performances of the past imbues *both* with a texture that is more at home with ‘memory’ than it is with the notion of ‘historical fact’. That is, namely, the effect it has on cognition. If ‘memory seems to be a promising mode through which to measure the effects of culture on cognition’ (Gutchess and Siegel 2012: 201), then one must interrogate how certain details are encoded and retrieved in memory while others are excluded or concealed. The ability to confront history with this methodological disposition enables us to encounter the mediation that takes place in order to determine what can be considered ‘historical fact’. The disparagement of memory as not being as robust as history is lost if one considers historiography as a situated product.

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<sup>93</sup> Notwithstanding the human framing device being used to make this point, it demonstrates that sociality enables particular capacities, dispositions, and intelligibilities to be enacted—with the potential to consider the processes of this enactment in material-semiotic terms.

For instance, an interrogation of the applicability of the certain understandings of memory to history could render the authority of history relative to memory illusory. After all:

Because information processing is limited, certain information from complex environments is necessarily prioritized at the expense of other information. In terms of memory, culture guides information processing by encoding, retrieving and even distorting specific details. One's culture may affect the types of memories one recalls and, furthermore, it may reveal the values and priorities of a culture for information processing (Gutchess and Siegel 2012: 202).

One can readily identify a critique of historical veracity within this definition of memory. For instance, historiography is necessarily characterized by suppression or abridgment, not least because it depends on the mediation of researchers, research funding, editorial decisions, and the purpose of conducting the research. As such, certain information needs to be prioritized over other information.

Moreover, these mediations precede the more fundamental decisions taken over categorizing divergent historical sources, theses, and arguments and, subsequently, which of these to engage and which *not* to engage. The process that effects such decisions—with the suggestion that both are performed, or enacted, by virtue of a variety of heterogeneous actors taken seriously—is, ultimately, one concern of this thesis. The language of enrolment will be key for approaching the development of a secured and authoritative historical narrative truth around which the commemoration of Anzac Day is *enacted*. This is one element of the enquiry into the benefits of approaching an explanation of exclusion with an emphasis on relationality and entanglement.

## **Method: the suitability of archival research**

One supplementary concern of the enquiry into the manner in which ANT and new materialism are useful tools with which to engage the issue of exclusion in Anzac Day is the method chosen to approach the topic. The fact that the object of research in question relates, principally, to the origins and early commemoration of Anzac Day means ethnography is not a suitable method of research. This raises a particular challenge as ANT is developed with ethnography in mind. However, the commitment ANT has to research is not *exclusively* relevant to ethnography. For Latour (2005), the necessary imposition of ANT in the social sciences is meant to counter the tendency of sociologists to arrive at particular conclusions and assumptions about their own research. The theoretical positioning within a discipline that one feels comfortable with *applying* to research comes in for criticism by Latour.

As such, the criticism that ANT levels at other methods is that the hard, and politically significant, work has already been done at the cost of true empiricism. Latour's characterization of the purpose of ANT in the story of the ant and the hare<sup>94</sup> serves to give particular purpose to ANT. The ant, in the ANT story, 'trudges along, masticating endlessly; he allows himself no break in digging around miniscule galleries' (2005: 219). To the great surprise of the hare, who 'jumps, runs, leaps, slumbers, wakes up, and summersaults' (2005: 219), the ant wins the race. The researcher *qua* ant fastidiously explores the terrain, whilst the researcher *qua* hare takes huge strides, confident in the set of tools he/she possesses. The reward is, for Latour, stronger for the ant as it refuses

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<sup>94</sup> This, itself, is a meaningful conflation of the fables of 'the hare and the tortoise' and 'the ant and the grasshopper'.

to leap to context and revels in making new connections between things, registering a new account of the social.

In this regard, the ant has more to feast on when trying to find and attribute meaning to its research. Consequently, the ant researcher feels responsibility towards the milieu in which it finds itself, enabling it to make profound suggestions about the ways in which 'the social' is assembled. Conversely, the hare researcher is responsible to a canon and, thus, 'better . . . at defining the "older" social [and] worse . . . at defining the new one' (Latour 2005: 233). Now, the difficulty in approaching historical research with ANT is that there is a degree of dependence on accounts and versions of the story that are, comparatively speaking, solidified. As such, the researcher has 'less' to do in terms of exploration; little additional detail can be dug out.<sup>95</sup> Rather, the task is to make connections that have hitherto gone unconnected or unconsidered.

#### *Archival research, Anzac Day, and ANT*

The exploration of Anzac Day commemoration in this thesis is centred on the early negotiations of an Anzac commemorative programme, meaning that the majority of this work concerns the years between 1915 and 1950. Newspapers heavily documented the way in which the Anzac Day commemorative programme took shape. Though ANT does not immediately suggest functionality when conducting archival research, the notion that something can be apprehended by constructing it from its network (Latour et al 2012) can be thought of as an open and non-prescriptive challenge.<sup>96</sup> Understanding and

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<sup>95</sup> Few people who oversaw or worked on the early commemorative programme, or lived through or fought in WWI, are still alive.

<sup>96</sup> The link one can make between the purpose of ANT and the premise of ethnomethodological interest 'in the work that has to be done to make the activity available or recognizable as that

describing the enactment of an entity with a view to pushing against fixed explanatory devices does not only apply to contemporaneous research but historical understanding, too. It is, however, important to question how the methods of ANT can be translated in order to be of use in a historical study.

It is useful, in one respect, as a means of examining how a network may come to take shape whilst concealing the things that are implicated at any one time in the generation of a recognizable entity. Law states that ANT requires a 'sensitivity to the relationality and materiality of the world' (2008: 142). As such, one is not precluded from approaching documents as a medium of conducting ANT inspired research. This is particularly true of documentation that, for instance, demonstrates how collective mnemonics, as a form of knowledge, are not simply generated through single, or concentrated, privileged networks. Indeed, Law (1999) has suggested that the identification of simplicity in something is an effect that conceals complexity beneath it and, as such, requires a flat application of relationality to all things that might surface within an origin story.

The ability to trace how weather, war, charitable associations, social clubs, and governments effect particular mnemonic forms can be revealed in text. However, texts such as newspaper articles themselves conceal prior relations (see eg Law 2008).

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activity in the first place' (Hester and Francis 2007: 6) would suggest that archival research would be incompatible with ANT; the object of research within this thesis does not lend itself to ethnomethodology as it does not engage in empirical study of everyday conduct in order to learn about their function as socially organized (see Garfinkel 1967). However, the idea that 'every course of action depends in essential ways on its material and social circumstances' (Suchman 2007: 70) is a broad maxim that is applicable to any research that seeks to confront abstractions and broad understandings of action. In the context of this thesis, then, such an approach acknowledges the importance of challenging the attribution of a commemorative pattern as a 'frame of recognition' or an exclusionary technique without addressing *how*.



Notwithstanding this, the value of newspapers in telling cultural, political, and social stories is held in higher regard than concerns about the medium (Bingham 2010). They do reveal processes that would otherwise be unobtainable and are no more incomplete or subjective than other representations of the era. If anything, the principal problem of using newspaper archives as a basis for research is the quantity available. It is 'digitization [that] has transformed this situation, and historians now have access to a wide range of newspaper archives' (Bingham 2010: 226). Whilst this has transformed the discipline, the sheer volume and ease of availability poses problems for the researcher.

The development of digital archives heralds as many problems for archival research as it does facilitate such research. For instance, the circulation of newspaper articles need to be mediated by search terms at the behest of the researcher, cutting through extraneous material. However, this also cuts across continuities, connections, and contexts (Deacon 2007) that might otherwise be revealed. It may also conceal relevant material as 'keyword searching can be . . . a rather blunt instrument' (Bingham 2010: 229). This is because the absence of particular words need not mean that the subject has not been discussed, or that ancillary concerns are not discussed. There is, of course, a way in which such concerns can be alleviated and that is to ensure that search terms are as broad as possible.

Considering ANT's petition to let the actors talk, such minimal mediation is desired. As such, the search term used when searching for material pertinent to this thesis, quite simply, was 'Anzac Day'. This did, however, pose its own problem. The number of returns in the National Library of Australia archive database, Trove, for newspaper articles across Australia that contain the term 'Anzac Day' was eye-wateringly high. Parameters had to be set, then, not on the basis of search terms but on the basis of other limits that could be dictated by the constraints developed in the background

reading that has informed this thesis. For instance, the exploration of Anzac Day as a site of commemoration sits comfortably in the investigation of CMS that concerns itself with questioning *how* mnemonic narratives come to be constructed.

As such, the formation of the Anzac Day commemorative calendar—ie, the early years—is identified as an integral focus. How, though, ‘early years’ is defined is quite idiosyncratic. Taking Diane Barthel’s (1996) point that something only needs to be widely known to be important as instructive, the official ‘exporting’ of the Anzac Day commemoration to Tokyo in 1947—the first time it was officially scheduled to be observed outside of Australia or New Zealand—is considered a reasonable way of punctuating and defining ‘early’ or formative. As a means of ensuring reflective articles were not excluded from the search, an upper limit of 1950 was put on the search of Trove, with a lower limit of 1914 set as it coincided with the commencement of WWI and the build up to Australian involvement in 1915.

Archival research buttresses the enquiry into the study of Anzac Day and its re-imagination using the methodological tools of ANT and new materialism. Beyond the re-imagination of the early commemorative programme, more recent examples of Anzac Day commemoration, specifically in Canberra, are also included in this thesis. As such, archival research is substituted by a consideration of accounts that are both more recent and current. These events are observed—alas, remotely—and acknowledged as mediated by the source that happens to be reporting events. The provenance of each is determined on the basis of whether the narrative is given sustained and prevalent attention, or corroborated by other accounts.

## Conclusion

This chapter has sought to demonstrate the relevance of ANT and new materialism as approaches to the investigation of the Anzac Day commemorative programme. It has identified the purpose of both ANT and new materialism as grounds for re-imagining the way society and social organization can be thought of. The role of ANT is to describe processes which underpin taken for granted phenomena such as power, or effects such as institutions or organizations (Law 1992).<sup>97</sup> The aim of ANT is to demonstrate that 'there is no society, no social realm, and no social ties, *but there exist translations between mediators* [ie entities, actors] *that may generate traceable associations*' (Latour 2005: 108; emphasis added). This approach gives ANT an analytical foothold in sociological discussions of power, while also retaining its commitment to avoiding sweeping sociological explanations.

This approach does, however, have limitations. This chapter has identified the criticism of ANT that it somehow elides the violence and power of knowledge by only addressing the positivities of knowledge production (see also Hayden 2005) and is, thus, unhelpfully apolitical and amoral. However, recent explorations of the purpose of ANT (Law and Singleton 2013) have emphasized the deeply ethical and political potential for using ANT. They have developed the idea that its purpose is to describe a network, which offers 'the hope of a more fundamental appreciation and critique of the underlying relationships that pervade contemporary society' (Doolin and Lowe 2002: 76).

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<sup>97</sup> See also Tara Fenwick and Richard Edwards' (2010) study which demonstrates how, as an example, changes in education, curricula, teachers' performances, and behaviour are enacted in relational practices.

As such, there is critical potential in its descriptive purpose.<sup>98</sup> The manner in which it assists the exploration of power in the Anzac Day commemorative programme was considered throughout. A significant aspect of its use for approaching the commemoration of Anzac Day is developed in relation to its problematization of 'truth' and the authenticity of history. The purpose of the following chapter is to identify how significant aspects of the Anzac Day story can be explored in relation to time, and framed in the terms offered by the methodological positions presented here.

The main aim of ANT is to tell stories about how things are assembled through relations (Law 2008). Rather than an all-encompassing explication of why something happens, ANT requires an immersion in the complexity of particular situations. An attunement to complexity and an appreciation of interconnectivity are requisite features of ANT research. This notion of interconnected actors effecting what we understand life, things, and the conditions in which we live to be is also a central theme in new materialism. The commitment of each to this interconnectedness stresses the importance of 'following the actors' in order to illuminate how a particular scenario comes to be (maintained). This is only possible if one rejects the separation of nature and society, and other dichotomies, definitively. Only with the enmeshing of humans with non-humans, and the interrelationality of many distinct actors, has it been possible to retain distinct conceptions of nature and society. As such, the rejection of the modernist separation of nature and society (Latour 1993; see also Callon 1986a) has precipitated a reliance on hybridity and the understanding of the social as an assemblage.

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<sup>98</sup> Moreover, ANT *is* also steeped in morality because it identifies how morality rests upon a variety of apparatuses (Latour 2002b) that deserve analytical attention. As such, ANT offers more than empty philosophical posturing (Collins and Yearley 1992).

The ancestry of ANT and new materialism, in Tarde and Spinoza, was briefly considered, with both suffering somewhat from untimely developments of their own ideas. It is important to also say a little about the philosophical underpinnings of ANT and new materialism in relation to responsibility, developed in Chapter Two. ANT makes it clear that suspicion of ostensibly secure and pre-eminent entities comes from the suggestion that successful relationships and associations 'quickly makes us forget its history' (Callon 1986b: 28).<sup>99</sup> Exploring the processes and networked relationships that must have taken place in order that something is identifiable as a stand-alone system is the ethical basis of both ANT and new materialism that suggest they do say something about power. The granting of analytical worth to minutiae that might otherwise be disregarded as unimportant, tracing how they contribute to the functioning of an association/assemblage/aggregate suggests each has a capacity to be inventive and, thus, critical. Attention now turns to addressing how one can approach the minutiae of Anzac Day commemoration and trace how the entanglement of many elements in the Anzac story has come to effect the (exclusionary and discriminating) power of the commemorative narrative.

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<sup>99</sup> Callon makes this point specifically in relation to the concept of translation that he develops. He defines translation as 'a definition of roles, a distribution of roles and the delineation of a scenario' (1986b: 26). All entities, when they come into contact with each other, go through such a translation. Rather than frame it as a matter of translation, this thesis develops the relationality of actors in enacting a scenario in Tardean and new materialist terms instead. The notion that entities meet and combine in order to effect aggregates, or that things take on meaning and agentic capacities only in intra-action, were considered more expedient ways of making a similar point to Callon.

## Chapter IV

### Exploring the politics of time

In Chapter Two, several key themes that surface in the Anzac story were identified. It was suggested that an exploration of these themes is an important aspect of examining the link between the commemoration of Anzac Day and its legal and political significance. In this chapter, an exploration of the legal and political significance of Anzac Day proceeds on the basis of explaining how a narrative can come to take on a sense of rationality while others do not. One can identify the failures of the Australian War Memorial (AWM) to recognize the frontier wars as a significant example of this. When one considers, also, that the AWM is a crucial actor in the Canberra dawn service, it is clear that aboriginal communities are asked to embrace a *particular* impression of Australian constitutional history in order to access the commemorative narrative. Moreover, the official commemorative narrative necessitates a lopsided compromise; attendance at the dawn service is an integral element of the performance of the Anzac legend, but this requires attendance at a site which silences aboriginal Australian history.

As such, this chapter concerns itself with the interrogation of truth, which was introduced in Chapter Three. Whereas the focus was, there, on questioning the authenticity of history, attention now turns to examining time's perceived 'truth' as an element of the exclusionary capacity of a commemorative narrative. In relation to Anzac Day, how can the rationalization of an exclusionary commemorative narrative be

articulated in relation to the theorization of time? Here, it is suggested that time, like history, is not a singular, unifying, and authoritative phenomenon. Indeed, the perceived singularity of time conceals the work that goes into imbuing it with meaning. As such, the recognition of time's multiplicity assists in articulating how time is complicit in power relations.

The process of revealing the truthlessness of a particularly pervasive attitude towards the singularity of time is enabled by a consideration of memory and expectation. These two themes were also identified as significant features of the Anzac story. ANT and new materialist approaches to both memory and expectation signify the inability to identify memory as a recollection of the past or expectation as a promise to be delivered in the future. In this respect, an ANT and new materialist reading of memory and expectation exemplifies the fallacy of time's linearity. The eschewal of time's linearity and logic is, similarly, a significant step towards appreciating its complexity. The argument this chapter seeks to make is that a recognition of the complexity of time is necessary in order to understand how it can be politicized.

Time, it is argued, is politicized when it is imbued with several competing or conflicting meanings. Of course, using ANT and new materialism as a means of approaching the multiplicity of time opens this theorization up to the charge of relativism that was raised in Chapter Three (see eg Baghrarian 2011). Though the worries that such relativism renders these methodologies apolitical are misplaced, there is a sense that the rhetoric of ANT and new materialism can be softened. Certainly, the focus on symmetry and relationality can be considered fairly declamatory, not least because it insists on the relational enactment of being. In order to assuage this criticism, this chapter seeks to build upon Nick Bingham's (1996) suggestion that *meaning* depends on relationality. As such, this chapter is framed on a distinction between being and meaning.

This distinction depends upon an opening up of ANT and new materialism to, one could argue, a less audacious approach to ontology (see eg Mol 2002). Indeed, time is a useful vehicle for developing this argument as the theorization of the complexity of time encounters the work of Gilles Deleuze. In Section 1, a Deleuzian theorization of time, and of being, will be brought into conversation with both an ANT and new materialist account of time. Such a meeting enables an understanding of time to develop that productively and critically balances complexity, multiplicity, anti-essentialism, and anti-relativism. Section 2 considers another important encounter when developing a theorization of time's multiplicity whilst avoiding a descent into relativism: space.

There, the relationship between space and time is considered, suggesting that conceptualizing the distinction between being and meaning in relation to space is a useful means of approaching the distinction between being and meaning in relation to time. Section 3 of this chapter explores time, as it has been re-imagined in this chapter, in relation to memory and expectation, briefly identifying the political significance of both.<sup>100</sup>

### **The complexity of time**

The relationality stressed by ANT and new materialism is a valuable means of approaching the theorization of time. The rejection of explanatory concepts in favour of understanding how something is situationally enacted can be adopted as a means of approaching the complexity of time. ANT and new materialism are particularly useful means of identifying what acts in the construction of time. This is because, the emphasis ANT and new materialism can put on readings of time is that the notion of a singular time

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<sup>100</sup> Each will be explored in greater detail in Chapters Five and Seven.



as a universal foundation of consciousness of modern European subjectivity is *subsequently arrived at* rather than being an inherent truth (West-Pavlov 2013). Kevin Birth's (2012) thesis on the 'objects of time' exemplifies this point. Birth suggests that objects of time, clocks and calendars, both shape and embody our cognition. In other words, the material mediation of time changes the way we think and behave.

Birth laments the abstractions that can be found in 'objects of time' in opposition to the notion that we live by a variety of rhythms, embedded in and constituted by life. Such abstractions have the potential to mediate the idea of uniform and rational time, fostering social and psychological disquiet. Here, then, the 'truth' of time is a product of a network of relations. In this network, one can identify how objects and time rich institutions are enrolled in the *enactment* of time.<sup>101</sup> In relation to Anzac Day commemoration,<sup>102</sup> then, one can understand how it can be thought of as an object that is invoked in the networked enactment of time.

However, one might argue that the upending of time in order to demonstrate the relational enactment of its *being* is unnecessary. Even if, for instance, a clock did represent an unarguable manifestation of an equally available and universal truth of time, its *meaning* would still be found in correspondence between the time it indicated and the moment in which one finds oneself.<sup>103</sup> In other words, the emergence of time in

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<sup>101</sup> This corresponds with Russell West-Pavlov's idea that 'economic forces, the structuring of work and modes of production, have primarily governed notions of time which have been so deeply inculcated that we take them to be coterminous with reality itself' (2013: 120-121). Whilst ANT would not be comfortable with ascribing 'economic forces' with the power to create time, the idea that time emerges in everyday practices rather than utilized as an authoritative and incontrovertible tool, is important.

<sup>102</sup> Recalling from Chapter Two that commemoration can be identified for its time richness.

<sup>103</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein (2001) would argue that connection is key. Processes can only be compared with other processes and lapses of time can only be quantified by reliance on some

comparative relationality with a 'measure' of time (ie a clock) signifies that several temporal meanings can be enacted. Indeed, one can appreciate the complexity of time as a product of networked encounters on the basis of post-relative dynamism rather than the enactment of multiple beings.<sup>104</sup>

It is at this point that the Deleuzian conceptualization of time can be introduced in order to contribute to ANT and new materialism inflections in the theorization of time. As will become apparent in this chapter, a Deleuzian theorization of time softens the appeal to the multiplicity of *being* that can be criticized for its relativism and contributes to a more lucid framing of the exploration of Anzac Day. The foundations introduced in the previous chapter<sup>105</sup> suggests a productive congruence<sup>106</sup> between Deleuze, ANT, and

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other processes for comparison. For Wittgenstein, what we mean by 'time' only emerges in the relatability of processes so objects of time, in and of themselves, have no meaning.

<sup>104</sup> West-Pavlov (2013) suggests that, 'what we may call post-relativity temporality consists of the various sites, both human and non-human, at a multiplicity of scales, from the very small, to the very great, and the dynamic changes and the transformations which inhabit them. These immanent, entity-, and material-inhabiting temporalities and their respective time-trajectories are bound together to make up a complex interwoven time with a plethora of different tempos' (2013: 141).

<sup>105</sup> The theoretical and methodological underpinnings of ANT and new materialism were briefly drawn out and included a consideration of Spinoza's pantheist understanding of God, that God is everything and everywhere. This, it was suggested, is a useful way of articulating the levelling out of analytical categories. Given Deleuze's insistence on the Spinozist idea that 'all bodies are caused in relation to each other' (2004: 7), his conceptualization of time usefully relates to the ANT approach to being. Moreover, the meeting of the work of Rosi Braidotti (2006) with Deleuze in their logically arranged attacks on the ethics of liberal individualism and capitalism means that Deleuze is also an instructive consideration in this thesis in relation to the contribution his ideas have made in the development of new materialism.

<sup>106</sup> Indeed, Latour (1999b), crediting Michael Lynch for this proposal, suggests that ANT should be called 'actant-rhizome ontology' to acknowledge the Deleuzian influence on the method if not

new materialism can be utilized in relation to time. The reliance on Deleuze, here, depends on his problematization of the 'good sense' of post-enlightenment western epistemology and the emphasis on what this means for approaching time. When one situates the criticism of western notions of what is knowledge or truth alongside the ANT and new materialist desire to reveal the hitherto hidden interactions that enact our world, a clear resonance between the two positions becomes apparent.<sup>107</sup>

### *Rejecting the singularity of time*

Notwithstanding the difficulty in overcoming the 'common-sense' attitudes (Hodges 2008) to things such as time, Deleuze's conceptualization of time is a valuable means of unstitching the universal and singular notion of time. Moreover, it is an understanding of time that builds on a foundation familiar to ANT and new materialism. Deleuze's understanding of time challenges the notion that it logically and linearly moves from the past, through the present, to the future, relying on a thesis about the enactment of being shared by ANT and new materialism. This is because, first, the present needs to be understood to be a product of relational and corporeal enactment, determined by the state of affairs and mixture of bodies that temporalize the present.

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'for such a horrible mouthful of words' (1999b: 19). Such an influence on ANT will be developed in this chapter in relation to the theorization of the multiplicity of time.

<sup>107</sup> Though the examination of time's materiality and multiplicity in this section engages the work of new materialists more than that of actor-network theorists, the recognition of time's materiality is made clear in the context of a philosophical discussion about what ANT has to say about space in Section 2, not least because it is difficult to sustain an analytical distinction between time and space (Valverde 2015). The distinction is, however, continued here for the sake of clarity when identifying the ability of both ANT and new materialism to identify how time's multiplicity offers a particular inflection on the way the Anzac Day commemorative pattern can be examined for its exclusionary effects.

Second, time must be grasped as an entity divisible into two—past and future—and into the *incorporeal* effects which, similarly, result from the mixture of bodies, their actions, and their passions. Deleuze states that these two temporal dispositions, *chronos* and *aion*, respectively, ‘are not three successive dimensions but two simultaneous readings of time’ (2004: 8). Because these readings of time are simultaneous, it becomes clear that time’s coherence is actually situationally enacted. Notwithstanding Deleuze’s conclusion that the unlimited *aion* is independent of all matter,<sup>108</sup> the sense that the future and the past are both enacted in, nominally speaking, the ‘present’ means that time’s apparent linearity is fallacious. For instance, when Deleuze says the truth of a problem is defined by its conditions which subsequently define, or make possible, the finding of a solution (2004: 138-139), it is a characterization of *chronos* and *aion*. That is, a problem is conditioned and determined materially—which must be proximate and present—and the solution is the confining of a concurrent determination of this problem to either the past or future.

This gives both the past and future a character beyond the standard view of time as a ‘chronological succession of instants in consciousness, as an irreversible and linear progression of psychological states’ (Al-Saji 2004: 204). Alia Al-Saji uses a Deleuzian conception of time to overcome the failure to account for the process by which time passes or explains the constitution of the past *as* past—two issues which are encountered

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<sup>108</sup> Deleuze’s notion that the past and future are independent from matter comes from his critique of the role of the present in ‘good sense’ time; that is, progression from the past as most differentiated, through the present, to the future as least differentiated. Certainly, in the ‘arrow of time’ sense of time, the present day does play a directing role in the orientation from past to the future. However, the simultaneity of *chronos* and *aion* means there is nothing incongruous in appreciating the materiality of the present in generating the disordered/disoriented pasts and futures.

with the standard conceptualization of time. Aligning herself with Deleuze, she states that 'the encounter with others is based on affective attunement rather than spatial perspective, proximity rather than distance, entanglement and interpenetration of pasts rather than stagnant and exclusive histories (Al-Saji 2004). Time, then, does not encapsulate singularity and unidirectionality. Rather, our material and everyday existence *temporalizes* time (Hodges 2008).<sup>109</sup>

On this basis, then, such a reading of time offers an opportunity to approach Anzac Day as being a stage for the entanglement of histories and actors and, thus, generative of temporalities. This corresponds with Russell West-Pavlov's (2013) commitment to apprehend time within 'the multiple ongoing process of material becoming, the constant transformations, often invisible, that make up the life of *apparently* inert things' (2013: 3; emphasis added). In other words, this critique rests on the notion that time is an incontrovertible truth that offers a universal, equal, and rational dimension of our existence. Rather, one can understand how a multitude of temporalizations pertain to certain things. It is in this species of encounter that our lives are constructed as having particular meanings and our existences are textured.

In *Temporalities*, West-Pavlov (2013) offers a critique of the conceptualization of time on the basis of modernist rationality and focuses on challenging typical knowledge bases (ie our understanding of time) and presenting ethical, political, and utopian implications for such a project. Because of this, it is an interesting treatise on which this

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<sup>109</sup> Time is not fully predictable and lived experience has a complex relationship with 'duration'. Duration underpins human existence and the conditions which shape it, whereas time is enacted in 'the domain of every day practice' (Hodges 2008: 414). So, time is relational, though partially determined by duration.

current section can be built.<sup>110</sup> Whether or not one makes the case against singular time on the basis of identifying the non-linear, non-human, random, accidental, fluctuating, and potentially unintended encounters,<sup>111</sup> or on the basis of a criticism of how certain temporal forms sustain and justify particular orderings (see also Grabham 2014), it is clear that universality and rationality are heavily criticized characterizations of time.<sup>112</sup>

As such, the time richness of Anzac Day commemoration is not identifiable on the basis that it generates *a single* temporality that shapes cognition. Instead, it is a site at which disparate temporalities can be enacted in the encounters that make up the emergent Anzac Day narrative(s). At this juncture, the contribution such a conceptualization of time can be thought to have on ANT and new materialism is that it signifies the continued importance of questioning *how* disparate temporalities are enacted in the shaping of cognition. Additionally, and helpfully, it also allows one to strike a conciliatory tone with those who suggest ANT and new materialism stay silent on power. In relation to time, one can establish that unifying conceptualizations rely on particular logics, as well as understanding how social and psychological disquiet can be induced in relation to an overarching logic without removing the comparative foundation of the 'factual' being of time (Hoy 2012). Such an understanding of time rests between uncritically accepting the essence of 'a time' and the unhelpful suggestion that time is

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<sup>110</sup> Though not purposefully, it feeds the materialist statement of a fluid, dispersed subjectivity at the heart of Braidotti's (2002, 2006, 2013) work on time and becoming. This is because the notion of becoming is fatal to the linear, universal, and rationalized conceptualization of time that is, for West-Pavlov, to be found at the heart of the capitalist logic.

<sup>111</sup> This might give the illusion of a coherent time, along the same lines that Latour (1999c) suggests technoscientific work can conceal the processes that come to assemble it; this 'black-boxing' is a product of the efficiency of the processes themselves.

<sup>112</sup> Indeed, it is important to explore the means by which certain understandings of time help constitute specific legal and political orders.

wholly relative. This is because it allows one to develop time as a politically and socially significant phenomenon.

It raises the prospect of understanding how time can be considered a hallmark of identity formation.<sup>113</sup> The ‘time of one’s own life’ can, thus, be given meaning on the basis of its relation to an epoch or synchronization—through an event—with others (Rüsen 2007). Such value attribution in the constitution of identity depends on a shared experiencing of time, and one which requires a ‘complex interrelationship of memory and expectation’ to culturally orient human life (Rüsen 2007: 8).<sup>114</sup>

So far, then, the theorization of exclusion in the Anzac Day commemorative narrative can be shifted by a rethinking of time. If one is going to credit time with identity forming capacities, recognize its multiplicity, and acknowledge the possibility of a networked enactment of a particular rationalization of time, the significance of Anzac Day emerges. As a time rich institution, imbued with the identity forming power suggested of

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<sup>113</sup> David Hoy suggests that ‘the connectedness of our lives over time is . . . a central issue in our ability to be authentic beings insofar as inauthenticity is precisely the lack of temporal unity’ (2012: xvii). Of course, unity could be appropriated by the abstract rationalization and universalization of a particular temporal ‘truth’ across a social grouping. Notwithstanding this, the author makes an interesting point that relates identity formation with time. It becomes an important and enduring actor in the enactment of one’s subjectivity in relation to others. Hoy draws upon Martin Heidegger’s reading of time as the source of one’s subjectivity, on the basis that there can be no self without time, or without a future. In doing so, the author initiates a discussion that focuses on the relationship between political and ethical attitudes towards the past and the future and normative accounts of time (Hoy 2012: 39).

<sup>114</sup> The importance of memory and expectation as themes within the Anzac story has already been mentioned in Chapter Two. They will be considered in more detail in Chapters Five and Seven, after being framed in the final section of this chapter. However, it is worth briefly noting here that Jörn Rüsen identifies interrelationality as a key component in the orientation of one’s being as it speaks to the general methodological outlook adopted in this thesis and suggests its direct applicability to the discussion surrounding the definition of time.

commemorative sites, one has to wonder if and how a certain temporal rationalization—and, thus, identity—comes to gain prominence and convincingness over other competing and coterminous temporalities. The challenge is to map the situational enactment of the *times* that come to determine inclusion and exclusion, as time cannot be considered to exist outside of the material world (Müller 2007: 28) and, as such, exemplify time's fabrication.

The evident 'untruth' of time is wonderfully attested by Sarah Sharma (2014). She adopts a critical position that immerses itself in time for a greater assessment of complexity and multiplicity, rather than grand assumptions about time and subjectivity. Sharma recognizes that simple discourses of speed and critique, for instance, are problematic because they limit the ways in which people understand and experience time. Instead, she stresses the need to understand how social space is constituted by a multiplicity of different temporal itineraries.<sup>115</sup>

### *Multiplicity of time*

Working against the normative account of time as a universalizing constant in favour of a conceptualization of time that appreciates multiplicity means that Jon May and Nigel Thrift's (2001) point that time is not singular or uniform, but a product of

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<sup>115</sup> One basis on which this can be done is through the reconnection of previously bisected conceptualizations of 'natural' time from 'human' time (Rüsen 2007). The notion of a 'natural' time is fallacious when one comes to address how nature and culture intersect when ordering what we mean by 'time'. However, this reconnection should not come at the cost of understanding the distinction between the logics one may accept in relation to time and the attitude one adopts towards it. For instance, it is undeniable that there is a relatively strong sense of security in timing of Anzac Day; dawn on the 25<sup>th</sup> April is always at dawn, and always on the 25<sup>th</sup> April; in this respect, this time is 'naturalized'. However, this does not preclude attitudes towards dawn on the 25<sup>th</sup> April from changing.



various and uneven networks that stretch in 'different and divergent directions across an uneven social field' (2001: 5), is given real illumination. The disruption of the space–time dualism, espoused in May and Thrift's *Timespace*, means that time cannot be dissociated from space.<sup>116</sup> This inability to dissociate one from the other suggests that times can be sited, mapped, and differentiated. The unevenness expected of the spatiotemporal networks also means it is an appealing way of approaching the exclusionary time-space of Anzac Day, with a view to uncovering how times are rendered uneven.

Returning to Sharma, then, we can see the ethical promise in her methodological positioning of time in relation to being. She states that 'the goal of critical thought is to rescue the politics of time from domination by structures of power' (2014: 25) and this is difficult to achieve if the scope of one's own critique is to nourish the idea of *a* time to be critical of. ANT and new materialism are not in a position to offer *this* type of critique. Their critical positioning extends to exemplifying the contingency, thus vulnerability, of things in the face of processes of concealment. Though they offer a degree of explanation as to *how* things take on the form they do, ANT and new materialism do not necessarily,

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<sup>116</sup> This distinction has also, as noted above, been recognised by Mariana Valverde (2015). It operates as a means by which ANT attitudes towards space are also brought into relevance for the discussion of time in Section 2. It is important to state, here, that this interdependence is not confined to different temporalities being enacted in *different* places, though Jenny Shaw (2001) demonstrates this well in her analysis of the competing temporalities of work/home and the public/private. No, different temporalities are also enacted in the same place; there are sites where several times can be enacted through different relations (Hetherington 2001: 52). Technoscientific developments make this point clear. Technologies that compress time and space are implicated in uneven temporal, spatial, and social networks. May and Thrift exemplify this point with their consideration of technology and support networks in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The railway network compressed the time it took to traverse geographic locations, generating a temporal and spatial unevenness between those who could access such technologies and those who could not.

in and of themselves, allow one to determine the reason *why* multiple networks are politically significant. Moreover, in the face of an exceptionally secured phenomenon such as time, there is a degree of value in positioning its exploration *in opposition to* the spectre of an overarching logic.<sup>117</sup>

This does not mean that one cannot explore the things that condition what we can then come to identify as time. Rather, as Sharma requests, it is first important to recognize that time should be treated and considered on its own merits as a substantive object of research. Multiple times and temporalities should be taken seriously as this unmasks the fact that time has always been felt differently for different groups of people—and at different ‘times’. There is little political benefit in exploring the multiplicity of time *without* first identifying this work as being in critical opposition to (something we routinely and in everyday speak identify as) time. Sharma constructs her thesis around several separate temporally significant sites, each articulating different experiences and effects of particular technologies in building diverse temporalities. For instance, Sharma first expresses the industry of time making and maintenance in relation to air travellers—specifically, frequent business flyers.

Effectively, the affirmation of speed as a privileged temporality is supported by the complex and myriad contexts and material realities of those who pass through the airport. What is more, the temporal infrastructure that maintains the speeding up of time for travellers is supported by the ideological belief in speed as a ‘good thing’ (2014: 30). The experience afforded to frequent business flyers, whose work revolves around speed

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<sup>117</sup> For instance, in relation to Anzac Day, there is critical potential in identifying how different attitudes and experiences can be enacted. However, the political and ethical consequences of certain enactments prevailing over others can be more freely and purposefully articulated if one then adopts an approach that compares how each experience is effected.

and apparently requires enhancement, is 'an elaborate cocktail of military tactics, spa services, pharmaceuticals, technological gadgets, and commodities' that ensure wakefulness and productivity because 'being tired is a requirement of labour, but being tired *and* unproductive is not a viable option' (2014: 43).

This type of labour *effects* a subject whose temporality is enacted through the various techniques of body management. The external devices, comfortable or not, that augment one's living (see eg Freud 2004) in relation to labour are temporal technologies. Some, however, do not experience this augmentation and their labour is considered not worthy of or requiring mediation. Rather than a privileged existence, the people that do not have the 'advantage' of qualitative work are liminal and precarious because their work, quantitative and possibly on the basis of hourly pay, is not thought to need the same levels of technological, psychological, or managerial enhancement.

In other words, the agency of distinctions between classes of labour and, thus, people, can be thought of as intra-acted or enacted in the relationship between people and the technologies and environments available to them. This example, for instance, proceeds on the basis of identifying the political consequences of certain temporal logics *alongside* addressing the entanglement of a number of things that secures such a logic. As such, it builds an exemplification of multiplicity and situatedness into the politics of a rationalized logic.<sup>118</sup> It is an appeal to a democratization of time that recognizes the variety of actors that interact, ordering certain temporal enactments.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> The usefulness of such a concession in relation to the commemoration of Anzac Day and the rationalization of a particular mnemonic narrative over another is developed in the remaining chapters.

<sup>119</sup> Sharma sits this in direct opposition to a liberal democratic theorization of time which 'assume[s] a way of being in time, but the assumption itself is not a time politics; it is one single, and albeit very powerful, discursive mobilization of time' (2014: 13).

While this widely distributed enactment of the lives and livelihoods of the privileged working classes suggests they are inherently vulnerable to change, it stresses the more general point that the boundary between people and their environments (chemical or otherwise) is more porous than one might believe. One's sense of belonging, whether on the basis of class or membership of a civic community, is contingent on the situated enactment of the meaning of one's existence. The *meaning* imbued in one's life can be one of exclusion as well as belonging. Indeed, the unevenness of the experience of time proposed by May and Thrift attests to this, as does Sharma. The enactment of multiple times in specific entanglements and encounters of actors allows one to distinguish between those whose temporal experiencing is conducive to inclusion, on the one hand, and exclusion on the other.

What Sharma, and others, say about the temporal inequalities that are materially and spatially *effected* surfaces in Andrew Niccol's film, *In Time*. This story attends to the distinction between the pervasiveness of an overarching temporal logic and the inequalities that can be produced in relation to it. Moreover, this film's crucial theme corresponds with the difficulty encountered in the Anzac Day narrative in relation to the enacted security of one narrative and how other narratives are excluded, go unrecognized, or are considered irrational by comparison. The story is set in the future where humans are engineered to cease ageing at the age of 25. From this age onwards, the amount of life they have left is determined by the number of hours they have on their body clocks. This time is their currency, and they are afforded more time for labour, just as time is drawn from them when they purchase anything.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> The protagonist of the film is a time poor citizen called Will and the film traces the uncertainty of his life in opposition to those who live in the time rich neighbourhoods, with centuries or more on their clocks. Poverty is impossible to overcome as citizens are compelled by the necessity of

Time, thus, is implicated in the enactment of power in this film. Such an attitude to time is also attended to by Sharma. Exemplifying this in relation to taxi drivers' cabs being the stage for enactment of inequalities, powers, and identities, Sharma suggests time is a medium for engendering a sense of exceptionality of some people. The Agambenian notion that she introduces here speaks to his introduction in Chapter Two of this thesis. Indeed, Sharma's premise is usefully augmented by a suggestion that the taxi drivers' temporal condition of exceptionality is a consequence of the lack of 'time-maintenance infrastructure to support their time needs and to help keep things in order' (Sharma 2014: 74).<sup>121</sup> In relation to Anzac Day, then, one can consider the constitutive potential of the excluded with regards to a narrative of national identity as an emergent effect of the material, linguistic, human, and non-human encounters and entanglements that help enact the Anzac narrative.

If something as ordinary as a taxicab can be identified as a site of the temporalities of inclusion/exclusion, so can a commemorative site, as time is a process 'continually being produced in everyday practices' (Munn 1992: 116). Indeed, the lack of time-maintenance infrastructure that supports the needs and lives of Aboriginal and Torres

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sustaining precarious lives, with often less than a day left on their clocks. Despite the universality of the time standard used throughout the film, the *experience* of time is enacted in each character's personal situation; insecurity, haste, relentless work for the time poor, and security, leisure, and health for the time rich. In addition to the clear critique of capital inequality, sustained by the syphoning and hoarding of wealth rather than redistribution, Will's experience—and the experience of all other time poor citizens of Dayton for that matter—serves to exemplify that precarity, power, desperation, poverty, inequality, and juridico-political otherings are proliferated in time, as well as in, as Foucault (2007) makes clear, territorial encounters.

<sup>121</sup> In other words, the exceptionality of taxi driver's temporality is materially enacted and, so too, are temporal classes. The appreciation that differences between communities or political groupings are indebted to distinct temporalities demonstrates Sharma's commitment to understanding the politics of situated temporal enactments.

Strait Islander communities is identifiable in the explicit and materially sustained objection to aboriginal history being explored at commemorative sites.<sup>122</sup> While the corporeal and practical issues that may relate to the taxicab are quite distinct from the historical and psychological issues that may be incited in the Anzac commemorative narrative, both speak to the conditioning of belonging and/or exclusion within a class of people.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> The implication of the commemorative site in the development of a rationalized temporality and history of Anzac Day will be explored throughout the remainder of this thesis.

<sup>123</sup> Both, for instance, the experience of Sharma's taxi drivers and Andrew Niccol's film speaks to a point made by Karen Davies (2001) that 'the social construction of current temporal patterns has its roots in the central concerns of various male-dominated hierarchies which were interested in solidifying and retaining their positions of power in society' (2001: 137). This is relatable to the experience of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities as it identifies the logic of unity and truth of narrative at the expense of complexity. The identification of temporal complexity and multiplicity enables one to pick away at the proclaimed and entrenched truths of particular groups exercising their power. Instead, power can be identified as the 'materialization' of time. The ethic of Sharma's appreciation of temporal complexity becomes particularly apparent here. She restates, in Chapter Four of *In the Meantime*, and expands upon the thesis that time theorizing is more complex than attributing value to speed/slowness precisely because these serve to perpetuate a particular logic of time that is deeply unequal. She turns her attention to the morality that underlies one's consideration of time on such a dualist basis. One cannot comfortably appraise the social value of particular 'times' as this would belie the fact that time is not uniformly experienced (see also Southerton 2003). This is exemplified in Sharma's consideration of slow food. The highlighting of slow food production as a social and political good does nothing but conceal the temporal, social, and gender inequalities that abound because of that very slowness. A documentary's celebration of local food variations that focused on a woman who wakes early to start cooking demonstrates that slowness as an ethical characteristic of time is fetishized. This, however, masks the 'exploitative labour arrangements required for both food experiences' (2014: 126). One can, however, avoid oversimplification and reductive typifications of time (Munn 1992) that are uncritical in favour of identifying and articulating the simultaneous multitude of temporal experiences. This, in itself, is a much more critical ethical disposition than trying to identify moral value in any particular 'speed'.

The critical possibilities of appreciating the multiplicity of time are focused on understanding how its situational emergence means it can be understood as an aspect of power. In other words, seeking to address the materiality of time and tracing how it comes to be enacted offers an excellent basis on which to critically address matters of power.<sup>124</sup> For instance, in a study of the European colonization and Christian missionizing of a group of fundamentalist Australian missionaries in the Mount Bosavi region of Papua New Guinea, Bambi Schieffelin (2002) characterizes the mission as ‘aimed at placing Bosavi people into [the European’s] temporal narrative. This required that Bosavi people replace their own narratives about the nature of persons and society with those of their missionaries’ (2002: 5).<sup>125</sup> The demand for the replacement of a temporal narrative in order that it does not compete with another is, essentially, the expectation that the Anzac

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<sup>124</sup> Particularly in relation to the idea of ‘power to’ developed by John Law and Vicky Singleton (2013) identified in Chapter Three. Examining how certain temporalities are arrogated to a position of ostensible universality and standardization is equivalent to examining how time is implicated in effecting the legal and political ‘power to’ (exclude, include, obligate).

<sup>125</sup> Of note here is the link Schieffelin makes between time and, for want of a better phrase, the nature of persons and society. This means that a temporal narrative is considered one around which people can orient their identity. As such, a narrative stands as a pivotal actor in the enactment of power. So, by administering a divergent temporality from that specific to the Bosavi people, the mission hoped to convert them by shifting their attitudes to their tasks, while also changing the daily activities that structured their lives. For example, the oppositional temporal dualities—before/now, now/later—that are central to Christian rhetoric are elaborated in sermons, lessons, and scheduled radio broadcasts, conversations, and genres new to that part of Papua New Guinea. Such genres, according to Schieffelin, ‘aimed at shifting Bosavi people away from their indigenous time-place orientation to a fundamentalist Christian sense of time. This is a time with no need for a Bosavi past, a present charged with change, and a future that depended on choices made in the past’ (2002: 6). While suggesting that change in temporality is primarily due to discursive factors, Schieffelin does suggest that language is not exclusively responsible or capable of (de)legitimizing particular temporal orders.

Day commemorative pattern in Canberra has of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. This can be articulated as a matter of them being, somewhat, between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, continuing with the post-dawn commemoration of Aboriginal Australian service people means the evident significance of the dawn remains absent. On the other hand, there is an expectation that Aboriginal Australians demonstrate a degree of obsequiousness to the rationalized temporality of the Australian nation as a young, and European, one if they seek recognition as part of the dawn service at the AWM.

The temporality of the white, European, Australia(n) is, thus, ‘commodified, controlled . . . and compressed in a process rendered invisible by its pervasiveness’ (Firth and Robinson 2014: 382–383). As such, identifying the multiplicity of time is one step towards making the unevenness and political consequences of time visible. In doing so, it can identify how, for want of a better term, ‘alternative’ temporalities are overwhelmed. Similarly, normativity can be expressed through time and concealing the processes by which alternative experiences are silenced is equivalent to rendering a particular thing normative.<sup>126</sup>

Sharma’s belief is that the above process of rendering something normative is why it is incumbent on the researcher to democratize the study of time (see eg notes 119 and 123). Her point speaks to the influence a singular notion of time has on defining political,

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<sup>126</sup> Firth and Robinson suggest that, ‘by creating ontological viewpoints from which the “obvious” comes to seem problematic and contestable, [the theorization of time can] highlight oppressive aspects of mainstream understandings of time, whilst also signalling to possibilities for resistance at both psychological and social levels’ (2014: 394). In other words, appreciating time’s complexity—that it is not inalienable, objective, ‘irreducible to sequential progression’ (2014: 396), instrumental, or universally constructed—offers greater critical possibilities. Here, then, the possibility of a methodology which stresses the need to appreciate the situated and relational enactment of things, including time, can be rationalized as a way of approaching the formation of identity.



social, cultural, and economic boundaries. Implicit in this is an ability for such a notion of time to become the measure of distinction and otherness. If the 'mainstream' view of time is that it is linear and progressive, then a society reflects this in a commitment to self-supporting, self-serving, initiative displaying, enterprising individuals (Taylor and Wetherell 1999).<sup>127</sup> Likewise, if the 'mainstream' Anzac narrative is one that revolves around the 'dawning of a nation', it builds (and is built into) the imaginary of a youthful national consciousness. As such, the importance of acknowledging the manner in which specific temporal logics are propagated is an integral part of understanding the temporal dimension of exclusion.

The authors state that this othering is not an *inevitable* effect because the constructions of nations and national identity are neither singular nor consistent, but there is a real concern that temporally inflected normativity can give rise to the affirmation of particular standards for judging membership of a community. For instance, Taylor and Wetherell offer evidence that European New Zealanders affirm the irrelevance, perversity, and discontinuity of Māori occupation to feed the boundary logics of their own identity as the *rational* identity.<sup>128</sup> Approaching time as multiplicitous and a

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<sup>127</sup> Stephanie Taylor and Margaret Wetherell work on the basis that a life narrative can be staged for the nation, both temporally and spatially. They suggest a rationalizing narrative can be found in the time-based metaphor of 'the nation as a growing child, [invoking] the logic of progress and development' (1999: 45). Moreover, it also requires feeding and continual commitment to it. They also make the link between nationhood and capitalism on this same basis. Focusing on New Zealand, they ask 'if New Zealand is constructed . . . as a society of independent people who support themselves without assistance, and if enterprise and initiative are part of the national character, must those who are apparently less successful or less confident then position themselves as outside the national community?' (1999: 48).

<sup>128</sup> The way Taylor and Wetherell's interviewees position themselves and organize their own identities is nicely rearticulated by Ricca Edmonson (2000). She considers the notion that 'traditional societies are held both to value practices that have been consigned to the past in

product of a variety of experiences means that a distinction which affirms one identity as 'true' or 'rational' over others cannot be upheld. For this reason, the challenge to any perceived universality of time aligns itself with the new materialist insistence that one must look beyond dichotomies and into the complexity of the enactment of our world.

In relation to Anzac Day, one must acknowledge the staging of the commemorative pattern, and the work that goes into sustaining the Anzac legend, which helps construct the narratives and temporalities of both belonging and exclusion.<sup>129</sup> In other words, explanatory or scalar concepts cannot be relied upon when moving towards a flat ontology. At most, they can be understood as effects of networks or, for want of a better term, local connections (Slater and Ariztía 2010). A certain understanding of time, for instance, can only be revealed as even and linear because it is aggressively veiled as such

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modern ones, and to be more unusually preoccupied with past time' (2000: 269). The author points out that this judgment can be made on the basis that 'distaste for pre-industrial modes of sociality often seems linked with the impression that they include irrational forms of decision making' (2000: 272). The author goes on to say that the reverse may sometimes be the case and is keen to stress that, contrary to oft assumed correlations, indigenous populations are not uniquely or characteristically concerned with orienting themselves towards the past. In any case, the ease with which sense of belonging can be linked with a temporally ordained narrative is apparent. Interpretations of communities on the basis of their temporal disposition may be misapprehensions but they are still made, with 'societies perceived as traditional [being] seen as clinging to modes of behaviour inappropriate for contemporary issues' (2000: 269-70).

<sup>129</sup> An exploration of how meanings are generated as a result of a variety of simultaneous situations and networked encounters is the task of the remaining chapters of this thesis. For instance, Chapter Five seeks to explore how mnemonic meanings are contested and constructed in the Anzac narrative. Chapter Six explores the construction of a pervasive mnemonic and historical truth, suggesting that certain meanings come to be *made* more prevalent in spite of the facticity of a given event that occurred in earlier years. Chapter Seven addresses the means by which expectations are generated situationally, as well as implicating certain rationalized times and spaces in the development of expectations around which a commemorative narrative is built (and subsequently effects a distinction between the included and the excluded).

(Scott 2014), or dependent on material processes for its ostensible universality and legitimacy (Birth 2012).

### **The being and meaning of space**

The insistence that subjective and objective times should not be distinguished, in favour of appreciating time as an intersection of the environment and the mind (Birth 2012) exemplifies the ability to apprehend time in frames that reject unchallenging dichotomies. Similarly, identifying the confrontation of apparently robust networks and multiple other networks as the point at which multiple temporalities can be enacted can also be achieved through an ANT vocabulary. However, it is at this point that such a model teeters on the brink of falling into relativism. This is why it has been suggested that Deleuze and Sharma offer a meaningful contribution to the way in which one can approach the study of time. This section also seeks to expand upon the rationale for introducing additional theorizations in order to direct ANT and new materialism away from the charges of apolitical and irresponsible relativism. It does so by building upon the distinction between being and meaning in relation to space.

For instance, Tim Creswell's (2002) distinction between place as particular and bounded, on the one hand, and space as 'location',<sup>130</sup> on the other hand, is a useful foundation for determining how ANT and new materialism can refute criticism levelled at them. He builds upon Edward Casey's (1996) theorization of space and identity, that

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<sup>130</sup> Despite, of course, an appreciation for the appeal that one understands space as a material and discursive process, rather than a measurable entity, particularly when it is considered in a thesis in law (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2015). Nevertheless, in order to defend against a charge of pure relativism, and in order to facilitate the politicization and juridicalization of space (and, of course, time), such a pragmatic distinction, if a little crude, between bare fact and relationality is convenient to this modelling process.

'to know is first of all to know the place one is in' (1996: 18) to suggest that a place is the bounded site on which everything else is built. It is, for Creswell, the pre-requisite of existence in otherwise unlimited space. This depends, however, on a particular conception of space and place. It depends on a reading of space that suggests there are myriad meanings that can be imbued in a place. For instance, there is significant uncertainty in the notion of knowing a place. Knowledge is a discovery, a confrontation. Therefore, knowledge of a place is the confrontation with, and constitution of, a fixed and discoverable location that imbues it with meaning.

As such, it is possible to address the precarity of places, sites, and buildings on the basis that their uses can change, or a variety of uses can compete. Michael Guggenheim (2010) imagines such sites as 'mutable immobiles'.<sup>131</sup> The suggestion Guggenheim makes is built around his reading of a case brought before the Administrative Court of Zürich. The case concerned a former industrial building that was being protected by residential zoning restrictions against a plan to turn it into a commercial block. It is, of course, immobile as a building is fixed in one location. However, it is mutable as, 'once a building is built, by being used in specific ways and by being locally stable and thus connecting to its changing environment, it inevitably acquires a biography that makes it distinct from all other buildings' (Guggenheim 2010: 167). Consequently, a fixed location is given meaning through its connectivity with its surroundings, which may be human, administrative, or meteorological etc.

Creswell exemplifies this point when he refers to the critical distrust of the home as a haven for women (2002: 19). The plot of land one can call a home can be spatialized

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<sup>131</sup> He draws, here, on Law's (2003a) concept of the 'immutable mobile'—something that holds together whilst moving through geographical space.

as either having numerous possible implications depending on the environment to which such a place/site is connected. Similarly, Kevin Hetherington (2002) exemplifies such an understanding of space characterized by fluidity in his example of the attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. According to Hetherington, September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 was the point at which the World Trade Center became a plot—or location—around which the world had suddenly shifted onto another unexpected trajectory. In this instance, the unexpected trajectory is the (emotive and political) impact that the World Trade Center attacks have had.

The notion of trajectory attests to the verbification of space. Following on from what Hetherington says about distal and proximal approaches to global relations, we can conceptualize space not as a distal given but a product of proximal relations. He puts it as such:

Distal approaches within social science are concerned with the world as an established set of relations that are finished forms and are analyzable as such. Proximal approaches, in contrast, see relations as in a continual process of being made, a process that never comes to completion but perpetuates itself in terms of both an ongoing stasis and a source of possible change (Hetherington 2002: 181).

Such a distinction between the distal and the proximal returns us to the distinction between methodological certainty and relativism which, as far as both time and space are concerned, can be usefully rethought. For instance, there is a place for both distal and proximal approaches to an analysis of space. Deleuze (1988), for instance, expresses a desire to circumvent the rupture between anti-relativism and anti-essentialism by

speaking of the use of ‘longitude’ and ‘latitude’ when defining a body and its capacity for action.<sup>132</sup>

First, longitudinally speaking, a thing can be considered a product of an infinite number of particles and relations of speed and slowness, or motion and rest, between such particles. Second, latitudinally, a thing has a capacity for affecting other things. Its capacity for such action defines a thing. If we take the longitude of a thing, a body, as being the relations between particles, it takes on a dimensional connotation. A body can be described as fluid or static, depending on the relational integrity between “particles”. A building, for instance, is a static body. Our bodies have a fluidity but relative stasis in comparison to an entire group of people whose constitution is rarely static for a significant amount of time. In terms of place, such as a home, we can define it longitudinally as holding a particular shape, defined by set dimensions. It can also be determined on the basis of distance from other entities, too, because of its fixity. The latitude of a body, being affective, takes on emotional and textural implications.

If the longitude of a place is *where* it is, in terms of dimensions and distance, the latitude is *what* or *how* a place is. It stresses the affective capacities of a place; a home holds a shape, longitudinally, but affects many other bodies, and is subject to many contingent responses from them. Similarly, longitudinally, a place may be defined as being *x* number of miles away from something else but is *latitudinally* defined as being either (too) near or (too) far. It is this—the latitudinal definition of a body—that can be

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<sup>132</sup> Deleuze speaks explicitly of the definition of bodies and their capacity for affecting other bodies. His definition of what can be defined as a body extends to sounds, communities, animals, humans, etc. Moreover, the similarity of the longitudinal and latitudinal approach to the definition of bodies and the distinction between being and meanings of objects and concepts, such as space and time, suggests it sits comfortably alongside methodological positions that seek to flatten the distinction between the human and the non-human.

equated to a spatialization and the attribution of *meaning* to an entity. Such a characterization of the 'spatial'<sup>133</sup> permits a move away from the primacy of place and the understanding of space as 'empty' (Casey 1993). Rather, we can understand space as the way in which our cognition structures our experiences of place.

Because spatialities and temporalities are multiple, they are deeply political. Doreen Massey expresses it as such:

... the very possibility of any serious recognition of multiplicity and heterogeneity itself depends on a recognition of spatiality. The political corollary is that a genuine, thorough, spatialization of social theory and political thinking can force into the imagination a fuller recognition of the simultaneous coexistence of others with their own trajectories and their own stories to tell (Massey 2005: 11).

In other words, rather than space being understood as a void to be commandeered, apportioned, and filled, it should be thought of as the process by which a site or void *is* filled, or at least how a place's bare being is given meaning.

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<sup>133</sup> And, indeed, the 'temporal'. Here, the inability to enforce an analytical distinction between space and time is particularly useful to remember. A move away from overburdening place with primacy when explaining what incites, directs, or explains us is equally applicable to time. Temporalization and spatialization should both be understood as the ongoing processes by which meanings can be enacted *in* bare time and space that *actually* become the process by which one can explain the meaning and values of existence. Nostalgia, for instance, is not a pining for lost places (Casey 1993) but for a return to a particular affective state or set of circumstances that is enacted in the networked encountering of a site, but not in the site itself.

The acknowledgment of a distinction between being and meaning when determining the politics of space is equally applicable to time.<sup>134</sup> For instance, Sharma's (2014) efforts to stress the multiplicity of time means it accommodates the same attitude towards revealing the politics of time as Massey (2005) does with reference to space.<sup>135</sup> Indeed, the ANT insistence that one must describe the processes which underpin such taken for granted phenomena as, for instance, time and space (see eg Law 2003b; Callon 1986b) is essential. An investigation of the multiplicity of both time and space generates an ability to understand how each reveals something about power. With regards to Anzac Day, the adoption of such a perspective towards time and space allows one to interrogate the means by which certain temporalities come to be imbued with greater meaning. This process of enacting and rationalizing certain meaning maintains the ANT remit to explore 'power to-'. It does so, though, in relation to a model which stresses how power can be thought of as a product of a particularly pervasive, credible, and enacted meaning.

The Deleuzian notion of longitude and latitude when determining the existence of a body sits comfortably within the modelling of space on the basis of a distinction

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<sup>134</sup> The recognition of analytical equivalence and coalescence between time and space is also an ethically enriching position. For instance, Elspeth Probyn (2001) articulates the situatedness of both space and time, principally in relation to Michel Foucault's understanding of space. Acknowledging space as a product of connections between things at any one moment suggests that it can be understood as an ongoing and active practice, and ties together both space and time. The suggestion that 'it is the changing nature of relations of proximity that has become the central site of concern and intensity' (2001: 173), rather than *a* time and space, leads Probyn to state that such a position is ethically enriching. This is not least because 'conceptualizing concepts as sites compels both a recognition of their genealogical trajectories, and acknowledge that concepts are not geo-politically neutral' (2001: 174-75). The eschewal of neutrality suggests an appreciation of the situatedness of time and space.

<sup>135</sup> Being able to identify an assortment of temporalities as effects of particular network relations means that one can identify inequalities being enacted on a temporal basis.



between being and meaning. It is here that the importance of thinking about space for understanding time is emphasized for two reasons. First, it is a transferrable model when thinking about a distinction between the bare co-ordinates of time and an ability for a number of competing meanings to be enacted in time. Second, the model circumvents a criticism of ANT which, thus, rationalizes its continual use as a perspective with which to approach the theorization of time in relation to Anzac Day.

Attention can shift towards the juridical and political significance of the ‘time rich’ Anzac Day commemoration on the basis of exploring the process by which something is rendered true, singular, rational, and the standard by which a sense of identity can be judged. The task of the remaining chapters of this thesis, then, is to demonstrate how Anzac Day can be imbued with a variety of meanings, as well as offering an understanding of how certain meanings and narratives come to be secured as normative.<sup>136</sup> In order to do so, this thesis considers a number of themes that are temporally inflected which run throughout the Anzac story. Furthermore, an exploration of themes demonstrates that another pillar of a particularly pervasive perception of time—its linearity—is fallacious. Attention now turns to these themes in the remaining section of this chapter.

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<sup>136</sup> For instance, to opine critically on the Anzac legend, suggesting it amounts to a problematic creation myth for white Australia, courts controversy, abuse, and claims of disloyalty (Lake 2010). This is not because it is ‘wrong’. Rather, it confronts a particularly absorbing narrative. Identifying how this narrative obtains its strength is the task of the remaining chapters. From Chapter Five through Chapter Seven, it will be possible to recognize a variety of coalescing actors, including films, books, records and archives, calendars and other temporal representations, and physical sites that serve to enact a particular meaning that is difficult to threaten.

## **Collective memory and expectation**

### *Memory*

In Chapter Two, Maurice Halbwachs' (1992) notion of collective memory was introduced. Collective memory emerged as a main theme to consider in relation to the commemoration of Anzac Day as it is inextricably bound up in questions regarding the formation and maintenance of political identity. In this sense, it is an important consideration in light of the interrogation of the exclusionary potential of Anzac Day. However, the notion of collective memory raises an interesting methodological question, too. The notion that memory is a social product raises an important point about the linearity of time, as it suggests that the recollection of the past is not simply a matter of reaching into repositories of things that went in order to construct a coherent and linear narrative.

In detaching mnemonic processes from the sole prerogative of the individual, Halbwachs roots his thesis in memories being constructed in and through social frameworks with the present recreating, or at least affecting, the past. Already, then, the notion of collective memory is set in opposition to a reading of time as an unrelenting linear truth that was similarly challenged in the previous chapter. This makes sense, Halbwachs suggests, as it 'seems fairly natural that adults, absorbed as they are with everyday preoccupations, are not interested in what from the past is now irrelevant to these preoccupations' (1992: 47). The notion that memories are deformed, and forced, into the framework of the present is echoed by Paul Connerton (2009) who states that present spatial and temporal orderings have particular mnemonic effects, with a curious specificity of modernity being that the present structures a forgetting of the past.

The pervasiveness of social frameworks in the construction of memory is, for Halbwachs, evidenced by the existence of loci of memory. An individual can *have* memory,

he states, but it is always an aspect of group memory since everything the individual remembers or thinks leaves a lasting memory 'only to the extent that one has thought it over—to the extent that it is connected with thoughts that come to us from the social milieu' (1992: 53). Here, we can see a similar space emerging between the individual *having* memory that is *influenced* by the collective and the *being* of time and space that is rendered *meaningful* by situated encounters. Such a suggestion would ensure that *all* memory is thought of as collective and not an inherently individual process.<sup>137</sup>

This is arguable, for Halbwachs', in his suggestion that the elderly are more contented and able to recollect regularly because their lives permit them to interact in the present without the preoccupations of working-age adults. This allows them to rediscover their objects of memory (1992: 47-48). These preoccupations are, of course, inherently situated, but the situatedness of memory is also evident in the *processes* of recollection in the elderly. For instance, they are often incited by particular artefacts that have been accumulated throughout their lives.<sup>138</sup> This attitude towards memory considers artefacts as facilitative of a distinctly socio-linguistic construction and recollection of memory.

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<sup>137</sup> Notwithstanding Halbwachs' association of social interaction with people only, this offers a space for understanding the construction of memory as a matter of 'present'—ie situated—production that takes the entanglement of a variety of actors into account when understanding how memories are instilled with meaning.

<sup>138</sup> If both the lack of preoccupation and artefacts are considered important for access to memories, then the fact that Anzac Day is a public holiday and stresses the importance of the sociality of families and friends around traditional games played, and food and drink consumed, during the war suggests it is an event certainly conducive to the production of memory. Indeed, the fact that the AWM in Canberra is a museum full of war artefacts and is a pivotal site in the Anzac Day dawn service and the commemoration of war in general, means this always satisfies Halbwachs' understanding of collective memory. The importance of these artefacts when considering the performativity of history is considered in Chapter Six.

Since Halbwachs' exposition of such socio-linguistic foundations of memory, the discipline recognized as Collective Memory Studies (CMS) has developed to accommodate the implication of many different actors, beyond discourse, in the construction of memory. Refocusing on memory as an inherently social and collective thing, rather than an individual process facilitated by social frameworks (Middleton and Edwards 1990b) sits alongside appreciating the dynamism of memory in *interaction* (Aden et al 2009). This suggests a distributed construction of cognition. This moves CMS further away from the notion of memory as the individual's access to a repository of the past. Just as Halbwachs' notion of the sociality of memory, rather than the inherent facticity of recollecting the past, resonates with the distinction between meaning and being, respectively, it is also important to stress the need to appreciate that such a conceptualization of memory is not *utterly* relative (Wagner-Pacifici 1996).

Rather, there is an inherent uncertainty in memory, just as there is in time and space, as it depends on a networked enactment for its meaning. Robin Wager-Pacifici continues on this basis to suggest that the student of CMS must pay attention to the range and timbre of voices that effect the translation of a past event into collective memory.<sup>139</sup> In other words, memory shifts away from recognizing those in control of a collective memory and those not, towards a greater commitment to understanding what is collectively involved in the enactment of particular memories. As such, ANT and new materialism are excellent means of approaching CMS.<sup>140</sup> In addition to explaining the link

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<sup>139</sup> For Wagner-Pacifici, this offers a means of examining power in memory relationally rather than as a matter of hegemony or pre-existing frameworks (see 1996: 307)

<sup>140</sup> Particularly if one considers Jeffrey K Olick's (1999; see also Olick and Robbins 1998) appeal that we could more readily talk about social memory rather than collective memory as it identifies the idea that memory is a product of a widely distributed set of relations, rather than the preserve of individuals, much more explicitly. The concept of the 'social' is rethought in ANT and new

between memory and identity, CMS seeks to explore what is meant by collective memory; how does a memory become accessible and intelligible?

This is the cause of some debate within CMS, and the ANT and new materialist disposition towards dichotomies<sup>141</sup> offers a means of approaching CMS in a way that emphasizes how *collective* memory and *collective* identity are linked. Chapter Five approaches this debate in the context of an exploration of memory as a construction rather than an authentic and accurate representation of the past. There, the process by which mnemonic narratives come to be enacted builds on the notion that there is no truth to the linearity of time and, as such, develops the notion that time (through memory) is actually a contestable phenomenon.

### *Expectations*

Expectations, and how they are enacted, also demonstrate the difficulty of understanding time as a linear phenomenon.<sup>142</sup> As a branch of Science and Technology Studies (STS), the ANT focus of this thesis opens up an avenue for approaching the study of expectations within STS literature with the vocabularies of both ANT and new materialism. Having already identified the importance of expectations for the coherence and constitutive capacity of commemorative narratives in Chapter Two, the examination

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materialism, as the consideration of assemblages and associations in Chapter Three demonstrated.

<sup>141</sup> Moreover, the study of collective memory requires interdisciplinarity (Erl 2011) and the demands of many different disciplinary voices when examining collective memory can be traversed by ANT and new materialism with their appeal to democratize the object of research and the elements that come to constitute it.

<sup>142</sup> An interrogation of expectations, challenging the sense of futurity that surrounds them, is considered in greater detail in Chapter Seven. Here, it is useful to frame this problematization in relation to the fallacy of time's linearity.

turns to addressing how an ANT reading of expectations tells us *how* this capacity can be achieved in relation to Anzac Day. Therefore, the inclusion of expectation as a thematic interest within this thesis operates on two bases. On the one hand, it offers an exploration of how expectations are defined and approached. On the other hand, it seeks to understand the exclusionary effect of the Anzac commemorative narrative on the basis of this approach to expectations.

The language many use to articulate their particular approach to expectations is already ANT laden. Expectations, for instance, are implicated as actors within technoscientific networks—either in contributing to their success or failure. Vanesa Castán Broto (2010) considers the sociology of expectation in the context of a land regeneration and coal ash disposal project in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The author seeks to explore the link between expectations and political discourses, suggesting that ‘collective expectations, those articulated in relation to generalized others, are formulated within explicit narratives that support or justify political action’ (Castán Broto 2010: 443). As such, expectations become a key feature, and factor, in certain narrative formulations (of, for instance, justification). In relation to Anzac Day, then, this suggests that expectations can be explored for their ability to help secure the coherence of the commemorative narrative.

Similarly, Mathieu Quet (2015) identifies expectation as having widespread effects, on the basis that ‘project leaders use this future-oriented storytelling to present the social and economic consequences of an innovation or an emerging research field’ (2015: 210). In this article, about pre-emptive worry and criticism about technological advances, the author classifies the sociology of expectations as having two distinct

concerns. The first concerns itself with the structure of predictions<sup>143</sup> made and the second attends to the 'social actors and configurations involved in the economy of promises' (2015: 212). Expectations, for the author, can lead to discourses surrounding technoscientific networks being shifted. His example of gene therapy suggests that expectations can modify a discussion by making a threat sound more imminent than it actually is (2015: 216) and, thus, becomes a key actor in policy organization.<sup>144</sup>

The power of expectation expressed by Caragh Brosnan and Mike Michael (2014), in their research into the role expectation plays in clinical trials into the treatment of Parkinson's disease speaks to both elements of the sociology of expectation identified by Quet. The authors outline the role of expectation, or the role a *promise* of neuroscience, plays in funding and public understanding. As such, expectation has been identified as potentially having considerable consequences as an actor in a particular network. Brosnan and Michael (2014) make the point that the future orientation of expectation

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<sup>143</sup> The author develops the notion of prediction as a key actor at great length in his thesis. The production of fictions, insistence on experimental chains, confirmation biases and abductive logics, and interpretation of signs and 'evidence' in attesting original expectations are considered key moments when predictions are implicated in a technoscientific network.

<sup>144</sup> In relation to politics, and also in relation to the ambivalence of fear-inducing expectations in a technoscientific network, it is important to stress that expectations are not always a positive actor. Cynthia Selin (2007) makes this point in relation to the role future imaginaries can have in nanotechnology. She expressly uses ANT to articulate how expectations effect particular futures and, thus, incidents or strategies in political and technoscientific developments. Her identification of the ambiguity of expectations suggests that, for good or for bad, speculation (or prediction, or expectation) is still a powerful actor. For instance, politicians trade on particular recitations of either a dark or prosperous future to try and convince electorates that their capacity for government exceed that of the opposition. Or, in relation to this thesis, one can recall Butler's suggestion that recognition of another is precluded by fear from Chapter Two. How expectation is implicated in a commemorative network that effects the *inability to recognize* or *denial of recognition* to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders is considered in Chapter Seven.

and circumstance are linked, suggesting that the temporality of imagination is linked with the 'epistemic and organizational practices and the specific people involved' (2014: 681). As such, considering the milieu within which a prediction is produced attends to the question of how predictions can come to be made. The second concern about the configurations involved in the economy of promises implicates expectation in forging a path, generating the required impetus for, or selling a technological development.

Here, Brosnan and Michael also stress that 'the sociology of expectations is concerned with the ways in which such expectations are enabled, structured, and *circulated*' (2014: 683; emphasis added). Thus, they consider the proliferation and use of expectations to be a key focus. How other actors are mobilized, obstacles overcome, and resources are ordered with the assistance of an expectation to 'serve in the realization of that future state of affairs' (2014: 683) is a key consideration. The authors turn to Annemarie Mol's work on the different enactments of atherosclerosis and, in doing so, give rise to the idea that a coherence in objectives and visions can be achieved through a multiplicity of practices. When talking about the coherence of a clinical trial in its early stages, the notion of 'an explicit expectation that [coherence and progress] will happen at some stage in the future' (2014: 688) demonstrates that expectations can be relied upon to justify current actions and, thus, contribute to the specific economy of technoscientific development. Such expectations can manifest in many different ways, with different consequences.

Notwithstanding the identification of expectation as an actor within a network, and the suggestion that expectation and current circumstances are undeniably linked, there is a reliance on understanding expectations as *future oriented*. In relation to this thesis' exploration of time, the articulation of expectation as a future oriented actor can be contested. Bearing in mind that time is not comfortably divisible into three tenses,



confining expectations to the future alone is problematic. For instance, in relation to the Anzac Day legend, one can identify the presencing of expectations. The expectation of Australians on Anzac Day, on the basis of Benedict Anderson's (2006) thesis is that it is a simultaneous experience of all in the Australian community. Furthermore, the origin story of Anzac Day is steeped in a military disaster that was based on a series of expectations that were bound up in a disjuncture between past experience and present reality.<sup>145</sup>

The identification of expectation as a narrative strategy which might contribute to the binding and coherence of a network does, however, demonstrate that a methodological focus which avoids ontological distinctions is useful to the study of expectations. Such an approach allows one to identify the power of a non-material actor—ie ideology or expectation—in the success of, for instance, the development of particular technologies. Alex Wilkie and Mike Michael (2009) make this case in their research on the development of 3G mobile technologies. In particular, they identify the work done *by* a publication, *Mobilization*, from think tank Demos. Their focus on examining 'the way in which expectations can be enacted [ie returning to the structure of predictions] through the specific figure of the "user", or, to put it another way, . . . the

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<sup>145</sup> The identification of the role of experience, and thus 'past' experience and current circumstance in ordering expectation moves our understanding of expectation away from future outputs and self-fulfilling prophecy (eg Geels 2007), and builds upon Wilkie and Michael's (2009) understanding that *a* past, as well as *a* present and *a* future, are implicated in establishing a workable and effective expectation. Of course, such a shift in focus may well correspond with a shift away from technological developments and into politics and military strategy but it is, nevertheless, suggested that the contingency, as well as power, of expectations should be recognized. This can be established on the basis of understanding the complexity and materiality of time, and exemplified in a consideration of the role expectation played in the origin story of the Anzac Day legend. This will be considered in more detail in Chapter Seven.

rhetorical means by which the “future” user can be performed’ (Wilkie and Michael 2009: 503) suggests that a significant degree of work needs to be done in order to make expectations effective.

The authors do, however, recognize that discourse is not, in and of itself, persuasive or effective. Rather, ‘this performativity operates not simply because of the textual content of *Mobilization* per se but also because as a material entity it has been put into circulation in particular ways’ (2009: 504). As such, positive expectations, when simultaneously met with other actors that can assist in giving meaning to such expectations (Borup et al 2006), are a useful device by which a projected target can be achieved or anticipated advancement can be developed.

Of course, this still suggests expectations are explicitly oriented to the future. However, the importance of meaning is also evident here. In relation to the commemoration of Anzac Day, for instance, it is the entanglement of a number of actors, including expectation, that produces a meaningful narrative which can have certain juridical and political effects. The exploration of the character of expectations deployed in the Anzac network, depending on the complexity of time, thus determines the way one can articulate the means by which an exclusionary narrative can be effected in Anzac Day. This works on the basis of identifying the fallacy of a singular logic of time and raising the possibility that time is a fruitful basis for interrogating exclusion.

### **Conclusion**

The prominence of time as a theme running through the exploration of the commemoration of Anzac Day is explicable on the basis of its pervasiveness throughout expectation and memory. For instance, appreciating the multiplicity and complexity of time is applicable to the problematization of the futurity of expectations. As such,

expectations can be acknowledged as an integral actor in a commemorative narrative as they enable the performance of synchronicity and imagination required of community building. Moreover, appreciating the multiplicity and complexity of time has also offered a frame for approaching the situatedness of mnemonic enactments, too, particularly as such an understanding of time denies the possibility of identifying memory as a simple matter of recollecting the past.

Indeed, the distinction between the being and meaning of time and space was introduced in order to frame the subject matter of this investigation. Furthermore, the introduction of Deleuze and Sharma in relation to the exploration of time helps rearticulate and develop the anti-essentialist yet anti-relativist commitments of ANT and new materialism. This has underscored the appropriateness and critical potential of ANT and new materialism as methods of approaching matters of truth in relation to Anzac Day commemoration.

From this point, a greater examination of the Anzac story, briefly addressed in Chapter Two, will be reintroduced in the remaining chapters of this thesis on the basis of the frames developed in this and the previous chapter. The story will not, again, be explored chronologically but examined thematically, in relation to memory, the performativity of a historical truth, and expectation. This approach enables the articulation of the value of ANT and new materialism for exploring the enactment of an exclusionary Anzac narrative.

## Chapter V

### Collective memory and Anzac

[T]o understand the ways in which internal processes and external material objects are linked in the production of subjectivity and identity requires an analysis of material culture as well as the discourses and practices that define and situate objects in relation to the self (Hallam and Hockey 2001: 3).

Such a consideration opens up the space for evoking a theorization of memory that suggests it is effected and affected by a meeting of internal and external factors. These factors are both material and discursive. While their focus is on seeking to explore the 'everyday' contexts of memory making, rather than an exposition of large scale, public commemorations, Elizabeth Hallam and Jenny Hockey pose some interesting questions that are equally apt for the consideration of larger, collective mnemonic events. Namely, 'why do certain memories persist as others are seen to fade into a distant past? Why are certain aspects of society and culture afforded a permanence that others are denied?' (2001: 7).

In Chapters Two and Four, Maurice Halbwachs' (1992) introduction to the concept of collective memory was briefly presented. He suggests that cohesive mnemonic narratives are tied to 'social conditions'. Given that ANT seeks to disrupt the reliance on society as a framing device for the construction of memory, Halbwachs' reliance on 'social

conditions' for his explanation of memory is important to interrogate. However, it is also important to recognize the associated argument that Halbwachs makes about dislocating memory from the mind of the individual. Such an account of memory has caused a chasm between those who believe memory is the prerogative of the individual and those who believe it is an entirely social phenomenon. It is suggested, here, that this rift can be reconciled by introducing an ANT and new materialism inspired approach to Collective Memory Studies (CMS).

The stress on the entanglement and intra-action of a variety of seemingly disparate actors central to both ANT and new materialism offers a means of circumventing the rift in CMS. In doing so, it opens up CMS as a means of approaching the Anzac Day commemorative narrative and exploring how it has emerged. The process by which the memory of Anzac comes to be enacted will encounter the language of interconnectivity, obfuscation, and complexity in this chapter. Acknowledging the difficulty of relying on simple distinctions or categorizations when making assertions about the existence or essence of something gets to the core of the individual–social controversy in CMS. Section 1 of this chapter builds on the themes introduced in Chapter Four and explores the appropriateness of ANT and new materialism for approaching CMS. Section 2 considers the story of the early development of the Anzac Day commemorative programme, examining it in light of the approach developed in Section 1. It is argued that the ability to explain the enactment of an Anzac Day narrative that is neither individualist nor aggressively collectivist offers an opportunity to identify and address how a definite and specific memory comes to have political meaning.

The final section of this chapter explores this process in more detail, and identifies the relationship between the complexity of memory and the complexity of time. In this final section, the distinction one can make between the rationalized and included, on the

one hand, and the irrational and excluded, on the other hand, on the basis of time and memory is explored in relation to Anzac Day.<sup>146</sup> It is argued that one can readily approach the politics of memory on the basis of the distinction between being and meaning that has been developed, using ANT and new materialism, in relation to time and space in Chapter Four of this thesis.

### **Collective Memory Studies and ANT**

This chapter proceeds on the basis of examining a rupture at the heart of CMS, as it offers an interesting means of approaching the study of collective memory with a conciliatory and exploratory methodology that is informed by the notion of relationality, hybridity, and entanglement.

#### *Between the individual and the social*

Returning to Halbwachs' notion of collective memory, the dichotomy between the social and the individual is clear.<sup>147</sup> Social contexts frame and shape individual memories. Similarly, the Popular Memory Group (PMG) establishes a distinction between public and private memories, working from the same distinction that Halbwachs establishes in collective memory. There is an inherent ambivalence in talking of *a* collective memory yet vesting much in individual mnemonic processes, implicating collectivity in the mnemonic process only as some form of 'social frame'. It is here that methodologies

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<sup>146</sup> This is built on in Chapters Six and Seven in relation to the conditioning of a narrative that is inclusive of white European Australians and excludes Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders.

<sup>147</sup> This was considered briefly in Chapter Four in relation to examining what CMS approaches to memory reveal about time.

inflected with a concern for materiality offer an ameliorative suggestion for how the study of collective memory can be confronted.

The tension between the two—individualist and collectivist—cultures (Olick 1999) of collective memory can be circumvented with an appreciation of memory being a product of fragmented and distributed encounters across and within the material world. If one appreciates how objects, matter, ideas, and non-human life can act on memories, capable of shifting and effecting them (Radley 1990), it sidesteps the separation of the individual and the social. Thus, the worry that collective memory is a concept ‘curiously disconnected from actual thought processes of any particular person’ (Fentress and Wickham 1992: 1) can be assuaged, not least because non-human actors participate in effecting emergent individuality in us, anyway.

The entanglement of humans and a series of non-humans in the enactment of memories enables the articulation of an intra-active understanding of memory that renders the notion of agency (ie the capacity to remember) as a prerogative of the individual erroneous. In relation to Anzac Day, it will become evident in Chapter Seven that one can approach the collectivity of the memory of war as a product of a number of relations. This is also evident when tracing the development of the initial Anzac Day programme across Australia. One can identify the role played by the weather, fear of airstrikes during a conflict, humans, various commemorative sites, and political organizations in imbuing meaning in the programme.<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> This also confronts the problematization of collective memory as analogous to individual memory (Gray and Oliver 2004). The idea that memory is a process extant only within the minds of individuals suggests that the application of the language of psychoanalysis—of healing, recovery, satiation, and remembering—to the collective is deemed impossible. However, if one understands each instance of healing, recovery, satiation, and remembering on the basis that they are situationally achieved, one cannot identify these processes as the sole privilege of the

In other words, increased attention on the entanglements out of which memories are enacted leaves the distinction between the two cultures of collective memory somewhat moot. If memory can be explored as an emergent effect of encounter between a variety of actors beyond the human, the focus on whether or not collective memory is inherently collective or merely the collection of a number of individual memories in one place is problematic. Moreover, the recognition of the product of interplay and encounter between a single 'unit' and, for want of a better term, social 'context' when defining individuality establishes a productive ambiguity of the categorization of the 'individual' (Williams 1961). The difficulty of distinguishing between the individual and the social is further developed by both ANT and new materialism.<sup>149</sup>

Both the individual and the social can be comfortably eschewed in pursuit of a method that reveals much about how, and perhaps why, memories operate as they do. Wulf Kansteiner (2002) stresses the importance of a non-reductive method that avoids social constructivism or psychologism when positioning oneself in relation to memory studies. For instance, the distinction between whether or not individuals collect memories and thoughts on Anzac Day, or whether the commemoration is inherently collective is less important than exploring the conditions that make certain mnemonic narratives possible, widespread, and convincing.<sup>150</sup> This line of approach is developed in

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'individual'. This, therefore, challenges the grounds on which one criticism of the idea of the inherent collectivity of memory is advanced.

<sup>149</sup> This is before one considers either the Tardean notion that the individual is, simultaneously, also an association or the fact that the actor is also a network.

<sup>150</sup> Here, we can return to the argument made in Chapter Three, when stressing the human in post-humanism. When attention is paid to, for instance, materials in the construction of memories, beyond instrumentalizing them as repositories or facilitators of memory, the potential for more rounded critique is opened up. Instrumentalizing non-human actors conceals the process by which a number of actors enact particular mnemonic narratives. This means that the



relation to Anzac Day in Chapter Seven. The ability to understand the Anzac Day commemorative programme in light of the ANT and new materialist approach to CMS facilitates a greater discussion of the approach to CMS developed in this current section.

### *Rethinking memory*

The challenges posed to the CMS discipline by its own proponents debating what it means has, I believe, opened up a space for re-examining how one approaches the notion of memory. Indeed, the nature of the distinction between socially determined (see eg Connerton 2009) and individually experienced memories invites a perspective that articulates how memories can and do emerge in the space between these two poles. Such a perspective depends on identifying the incompleteness of memory (Aden et al 2009) and the prospect of establishing meaning as a product of interaction.<sup>151</sup>

Recognizing this obfuscation as a constructive means of approaching the study of memory is also reflected in the importance of approaching the notion of collective memory interdisciplinarily (Erl 2011).<sup>152</sup> In other words, the focus of CMS should be to

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creation of conditions for certain memories to be accepted and others rejected cannot be fully appreciated. That there is no ultimate rationality or meaning to a particular thing beyond, or prior to, its situatedness within complex networks moves us away from understanding collective memory as an inevitable product of the collection of individual memories. Moreover, it also shifts us away from understanding memory as an unassailable repository of past recollection which communities can access.

<sup>151</sup> Notwithstanding the fact that Rogan Aden et al (2009) suggest that the dynamism of memory is still discursively informed, the notion that memory is not extant in either the minds of individuals or in the social ether implores us to examine memory beyond the individual-social binary.

<sup>152</sup> Despite Jeffrey Olick's (2008; see also Olick and Robbins 1998) misgivings that one loses a sense of coherence or robustness if one approaches collective memory as 'non-paradigmatic,

seek to understand how memories are produced and obliterated (Steinert 2009) without developing strict disciplinary parameters. Certainly, Astrid Erll (2011) posits this a problem of memory studies. It is too focused on trying to specify what is meant by memory without promoting a broader understanding that unites heterogeneous phenomena, such as neural connections, everyday conversations, and tradition. This 'broadening' suggests an appreciation for the situatedness of memory<sup>153</sup> and is a point at which the methodological position adopted in this thesis can reconcile the individual–social chasm in CMS. This is because a focus on situated enactment, in the vocabulary of ANT and new materialism, serves to articulate everything as a product of collectivity or association. As such, memory claims are all inherently 'social' in the ANT sense of the word; such an appreciation is obscured by attempts to identify the social *in opposition to* the individual.

Such an opposition either predetermines the parameters and outcomes of research, or it relies on a distinction between the environmental effects on the body and mental processes such as memory. This merely serves to assemble a screen between the 'individual' and the 'social' that undercuts a commitment to explaining the situational embeddedness, the interconnectivity, and complexity of actors in the enactment of something such as memory. For instance, Martin Fagin, Jeremy Yamashiro, and William

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transdisciplinary, and [centreless]' (Olick 2008: 25), the meeting of multiple disciplinary perspectives enables one to avoid monocausal explanations of memory.

<sup>153</sup> This situatedness of [cultural] memory can be understood as the 'totality of the context within which such varied cultural phenomena originate' (Erll 2011: 7). Cultural memory is, itself, identified as a conceptualization of collective memory advanced by Jan Assmann (see eg 2011). Though the notion of *cultural* memory implies a particular explanatory realm, the identification of the 'totality' of the context in which a memory is effected encourages an assessment of the numerous and varied things that come to give memory its shape.

Hirst (2013) address the skill of pilots in landing a plane, identifying the mnemonic element to it. They suggest that the pilots' memory of how to land a plane is distributed between the discussions amongst pilots, the landing card, and the cockpit. They suggest that memories are co-ordinated by individuals in conversation who make use of particular objects at their disposal. As such, this suggestion already identifies the space in between the individual and the social in which memories are enacted and skills are remembered.

Furthermore, the instrumentality of the materials implicated in Fagin, Yamashiro, and Hirst's study of pilots' memories can be recast to demonstrate that memory is not simply *distributed* among many objects but enacted in productive association between them.<sup>154</sup> The ability to land a plane is a matter of memory design and encounter, because the 'memory'—ie the eventual ability to safely land the plane—is constructed situationally inasmuch as the skill required has to meet the material requirements of the present. Memory is not simply elicited in conversation but negotiated and reworked to take into account the weight and speed of the plane, the prevailing weather conditions, and the experience and number of pilots. As such, acknowledging 'the intrinsic distributedness and heterogeneity of action as a collective achievement' (Gramaglia and

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<sup>154</sup> When Aleida Assmann (2012) considers the question of inclusivity and exclusivity of certain groups in the remembering and forgetting of states that have a shared history of violence, she suggests that memory can be determined by, or at least a tool of, political machinations. She points to mnemonic narratives in post-war Germany/Europe, cold war imperatives, and post-Franco Spanish democracy as such examples of states dictating the direction of memory and forgetting. The question remains, though: how does the precise environment within which these memories are built foster such politicization of memory, beyond expressing the value of spatial reference points and monuments as merely enabling memory? In the context of Anzac Day, what meaning can be found in this commemorative pattern beyond simply identifying the character and location of monuments as *facilitative* of a memory?

Silva 2012: 190), which is so important to ANT and new materialism, can be applied to how we study and appreciate memory.<sup>155</sup>

Both the appeal to interdisciplinarity and the eschewal of sweeping dichotomies can be observed in relation to memory from the perspective of productive entanglement of varied actors developed by methodologies that are inflected by a concern for materiality. For instance, Erll suggests cross-disciplinary enrichment between the sciences, the arts, and societal discourse offers a greater understanding of how memory comes to be, not least because certain disciplines within the arts and sciences have a greater appreciation of materiality.<sup>156</sup> Similarly, the social sciences have not focused enough attention on the role of materials in the *construction* of memory (Radley 1990). The material world is not simply a repository of tools that facilitate memory but the relational encounter between matter and non-material representations which determine how people 'premise their remembering upon "the world" in which each has lived' (1990: 50).

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<sup>155</sup> Indeed, one can approach the study of memory using ANT and new materialism in the same way that they are used as a means of exploring questions of agency and fact. For instance, Christelle Gramaglia and Delaine Sampaio da Silva (2012) make clear that scientific 'fact' is, in fact, a constructed agency that depends on tireless work done 'behind the scenes'. This facticity is tempered by the way in which experiments are formatted and parameters established (see also eg Mol and Law 2002; Latour 2005). Seeking to acknowledge the distributedness of agency *as well as* avoid the simplified explanatory devices and parameters (such as individuality or collectivity) that might ultimately exclude certain things from the story is welcomed here as a reasonable approach to the study of memory.

<sup>156</sup> For instance, the arts offer an appreciation of how the physicality of a work of art; an object; curation; and, layout of an exhibition, gallery, or museum actively participate in the construction of emotion and meaning (see eg Dudley 2010). In relation to memory, then, the arts offer us greater attunement to the role objects play in the actual construction of remembrance, rather than seeing them simply as repositories or facilitators of memory.

Such a concession about the potential participation of matter in the construction of memory gives an indication of the contingency of ‘how people remember the course of events leading up to the present’ (1990: 49). Of course, this need not direct focus explicitly on the active participation of materials in the construction of memory but a commitment to a broader understanding of how memory comes to be that demonstrates it as being a product of present settings.<sup>157</sup> Such an approach may lend itself to focus on present *physical* settings but methodologies concerned with the inclusion of matter can serve to emphasize, in a more inclusive manner, the specificity of various mnemonic processes.

A reliance on the proximate and present, or environmentally situated, enactment of memory suggests that, sometimes, this would lead memories of persons to change depending on the situation. Fred Allison’s (2004) exploration of the difference between two interview accounts of one marine’s experience of Vietnam demonstrates that one’s memory cannot be kept from changing. Instead, it adapts to present circumstances or imperatives (see also Gray 2004). In his study, Allison talks of an apparent cohesion in the second interview with the marine, held in 2002. He suggests that this indicates that the interviewee is fitting in his recollection within the broader narrative that comes with both temporal remoteness from an event and contemporaneous contextualization. Allison states, for instance, that the original ‘finely detailed account [of 1968] is replaced with testimony that paints a *clearer but broader* picture’ (Allison 2004: 76; emphasis

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<sup>157</sup> Identifying the potential role of matter in the construction of memory opens up a space for students of CMS to question what is included in ‘the collective’ and, irrespective of discipline, interrogate archives and museums—and other stores of objects and materials—for their role in the administration of perpetuation of memories and the mapping of a particular mnemonic narrative (Crane 2000).

added). This testimony included, importantly, a justification of the experience, corresponding with the contemporary insistence that the war be 'understood'.

This idea of the changeability of one's memory on the basis of present circumstance is, in effect, the foundational premise of CMS. But the notion that memory is informed by, dependent on, and shaped in the present for its meaning means the focus of studies of memory practices sit within the context of the investigation of truth and the performativity of the past. In other words, if memory is to be deemed capricious and dependent on the changeable imperatives of the present, or even on changing demographics (Assmann 2010), then mnemonic processes are not a simple matter of 'truth-telling' or recollection, but of performing a convincing and coherent memory. An element of this is the satisfaction of an aspiration of people to have an ostensibly first-hand sense of history, rather than a perceived mediation (Barthel 1996). Structuring memories as a process by which people can experience and build upon a preserved history suggests that researching memory requires the acknowledgment of the 'range of strategies by which historic structures are maintained, managed, and manipulated' (Barthel 1996: 346).<sup>158</sup>

The sociology of the past, then, and the 'realization that our social environment affects the way we remember the past' (Zerubavel 1996: 283),<sup>159</sup> offers an interesting way

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<sup>158</sup> Indeed, this tells us much about the link between memory and history, both of which are performative (Winter 2010), and offers an insight into the intertwined relationship of the two (Erlil 2011). This will be examined in greater depth in Chapter Six. At this point, it suffices to say that what counts as an intelligible and coherent history depends on some work to maintain particular narratives and conceptions over others. On the basis of such a link between memory and history being suggested, it attests to the work that has to go into building coherent *mnemonic* narratives, too.

<sup>159</sup> Notwithstanding Eviatar Zerubavel's concession that various universal patterns of organizing, story, and accessing the past exist, he situates the teleology of CMS to be the obfuscation of

of approaching the study of memory through ANT. For instance, Diane Barthel (1996) suggests one should recognize the importance of a secured impression of history on which a memory can be constructed. If one adopts a ‘sociology of associations’ (Latour 2005: 9) approach to the sociology of the past, one identifies that the past—and, thus, memory—is a product of association.

The commitment to explaining memory as an emergent product of association rather than within a social vacuum (Misztal 2003) stresses the instability of memory. This offers the possibility of positioning the study of memory as the chronicling of the conditions in which a memory can be developed, altered, and constructed as a rationalized narrative.<sup>160</sup> If memory is to be identified as contingent on its present situation it, as a process, can be thought of as malleable and distortable in fundamental

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dichotomies such as the personal and the universal, subjectivity and objectivity. As such, this invites an approach to memory that also serves to explore interactions that may otherwise be concealed by simpler, but more detached, explanatory devices. Of course, part of this effort also depends on not relying on universalized truths as explanatory devices. This and the remaining chapters seek to disrupt the appearance of the idea that there are certain conceptualizations of memory and conceptual orientations to time that are ‘true’ in Zerubavel’s work on memory.

<sup>160</sup> This, for instance, would include the examination of the conditions that allow one to be adamant about one’s memory despite it being fallacious. For instance, Ron Eyerman (2004) recalls a meeting between a historian and a former inmate in a concentration camp where the inmate offers a certain memory but the historian says it is factually impossible as records show evidence to the contrary (2004: 159). Notwithstanding the possibility that the records were incorrect, and the difficult insistence of history’s certainty over memory, such examples raise a simple question: what is going on here? Is the recollection tempered by the requirement of an ease of narrative or coherence, or the existence of a prominent socialized mnemonic narrative (Zerubavel 1996)? Eyerman suggests that this is the case, and that the power of these narratives comes from the fact that they are emotionally compelling. *How* memories get to the point at which they become so compelling and are eventually legitimized is an interesting question that can readily be approached with the language of intra-action and distributed agency.

ways. As such, questioning how change is resisted or effected in memories is a significant one. This question underscores the importance of exploring the process by which memories come to be constructed.

Angela Gutches and Maya Siegel (2012) suggest that an approach to memory that considers social specificity allows one to determine how aspects of one's environment can be brought into focus, based on cultural priorities and argue that 'memory seems to be a promising mode through which to measure the effects of culture on cognition' (2012: 202). That the idea of specificity, and the idea that the enactment of memory cannot be articulated singularly (Erll 2011), in part, serves to highlight the importance of the *how* question pertaining to mnemonic construction. Moreover, it stresses the political dimension to memory and the ethical dimension of identifying it as a 'collective framework which [operates as a social matrix] which cultural, social, and political meanings are woven into' (Batiashvili 2012: 188). Exploring how these meanings can be embedded in memory suggests an exploration of how certain narratives become prominent and normative is warranted.

The notion of specificity is also found in the work of David Middleton and Derek Edwards (1990a). Their focus on how people construct versions of events when talking about them suggests that 'remembering events is the *production of versions of events*, which are acceptable in so far as they succeed over other possible, foreseen or actual versions' (1990a: 31; emphasis added). In other words, remembering is a negotiable practice, and one that sees controversy and argument as common features when trying to establish 'facts'. So, despite the authors dependence on situating cognition as a product of a variety of *linguistic* frames, to be contextualized and examined through discourse



analysis, their model is a promising one for the implication of material actors, too.<sup>161</sup> This is because their commitment to negotiation means their purpose is to reveal the situatedness of memory in the collective. One cannot, it is suggested, consider the cultural embeddedness and determination of variable memories without implicating both material and socio-linguistic actors in what we mean by ‘culture’.

The suggestion that matter and language are both effective when it comes to the construction of a mnemonic culture is appealing not least because one can identify mnemonic objects and sites as the focal point around which particular senses of the self can, themselves, be *cultivated* (see Schwab 2012). The notion that a sense of ‘self’ is cultivated in interaction mirrors the construction of the past to be remembered. Indeed, the recognition that memory is an important actor in the formation of community boundaries, acknowledged in Chapter Two,<sup>162</sup> corresponds with the exploration of memory as an important actor in the constitution of the self. The inability to dissociate the individual from the social suggests that the contribution memory makes to the development of a sense of community equates to the contribution it makes to the constitution of the self, and vice versa.

At this point, the notion that memorial places and objects can be categorized as receptacles of emotion and mnemonic significance is replaced by a sense that they are actors in their own right. If neither the self nor the community are defined without the participation of such mnemonic objects, such objects should be recognized as generative.

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<sup>161</sup> Moreover, the approach to CMS is overwhelmingly a socio-linguistic one. Identifying the importance of methodologies that are inflected by a consideration of matter and its active participation in heterogeneous networks offers, at least, the opportunity to interrogate memory from a noticeably different perspective.

<sup>162</sup> And developed in Section 3 of this current chapter.

The recognition of the *prospect* of matter contributing to the enactment of a mnemonic narrative is the means by which materialist approaches to CMS can drive a wedge into the study of the way a narrative can become comprehensible.<sup>163</sup>

As mentioned in Chapter Four, students of memory should pay attention to the range and timbre of voices that help enact a memory, with the ‘range’ equally inclusive of matter as it is of language. Attending to this range in relation to Anzac Day commemoration, beyond identifying memory as the preserve of the individual or the sociality of humans,<sup>164</sup> offers an opportunity to understand the conditions by which certain memories are imbued with a normative and formative quality and others are not. Indeed, discussions surrounding the meaning of Anzac Day characterized the negotiations about the commemorative programme in the early years.

### **Establishing an Anzac Day commemorative programme**

The importance of the Anzac landing at Gallipoli for the Australian nationhood has been considered in Chapter Two; its importance is linked, not least, with the fact that it was considered to signal the first military engagement of Australia as a nation. The desire

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<sup>163</sup> Here, then, the idea that identifiable ‘social frames’ lie at the heart of understanding collective memory and the process by which a group recalls a shared past and a common heritage can be challenged. This is, not least, because of the Durkheimian origins of Halbwachs’ original theorization. Notwithstanding the fact that this critique is, itself, subject to some criticism for being too reductive of Halbwachs’ theorization of collective memory (Truc 2011), memorial places and objects are still ardently categorized as receptacles of emotion and facilitators of memory rather than actors in their own right, which makes escaping the individual–social dichotomy difficult.

<sup>164</sup> For instance, Aleida Assmann (2010) suggests that personal memories include more than what we have, as individuals, experienced. In this sense, alone, one can understand memory as *always* socially constructed.

and need to commemorate the landing of Australian troops at Gallipoli during World War One (WWI) was keenly felt during the campaign, as well as in the immediate aftermath of the war. Despite this, the establishment of Anzac Day as an important national holiday, as it is considered today, was by no means an easy task. In fact, the security of Anzac Day—as both a foundational celebration of Australian nationhood and a reflection on the lives lost at war—was only relatively recently secured.<sup>165</sup>

A lot was considered to be at stake in the establishment of Anzac Day commemoration. The Gallipoli campaign, itself, offered equivocal material around which a commemorative narrative could be built.<sup>166</sup> The extensive campaign was disastrous; a long and, ultimately, unnecessary campaign that resulted in many deaths and casualties. The campaign itself had little strategic bearing on the outcome of the war; lives we lost, in the context of war, for no real purpose at all. On the other hand, the Anzacs were popularly considered to have acquitted themselves well during their involvement at Gallipoli (see Chapter Two). These contrasting points came to be integral parts of a debate over the best way to commemorate and each was advanced, buttressed, or defeated as a result of the situatedness of such discussions.

The disastrous maiden engagement for Australia was attested to in 1936, in a speech made by Governor-General Lord Gowrie at the 21<sup>st</sup> anniversary of the landings at Gallipoli. Juxtaposing the ‘inspiring and romantic’ heroism, self-sacrifice, and devotion to duty with ‘the barbarity, the cruelty . . . and utter futility of war’ (*Canberra Times (CT)*)

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<sup>165</sup> There was a waning association with it in substantial parts of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, despite a commemorative pattern beginning to be ‘settled on’ in the late 1940s. Furthermore, even in the lead up to the end of the 1940s, there were a great deal of discussions, interventions, unsureness, and obscurity surrounding the commemoration of Anzac Day.

<sup>166</sup> Although Anzac involvement in WWI did not end at Gallipoli, it provided the foundation for commemorating Anzac Day.

1936: 25 April, 2), Gowrie neatly summed up the problem with determining the purpose of and 'correct way' to mark Anzac Day in a way that would inspire much tension in the subsequent years. This tension reveals the importance of meaning in a commemorative programme, and gestures towards the understanding that commemorations are significant sites for political matters.

Reconciling the desire to bask in the confidence that could be taken from the commitment of the men and the sense of collective grief and antipathy towards the Gallipoli campaign in its aftermath was a principal sticking point. That the narrative coherence of the commemoration was such a problematic area exemplifies the malleability of memory.<sup>167</sup> This is attested by what Lisa Kirschenbaum (2004) has said about the work needing to be done to co-opt, contain, embellish, and reveal the meaning and emotional power of memory. Notwithstanding the focus Kirschenbaum places on state direction and sponsorship of particular mnemonic narratives,<sup>168</sup> she highlights the impurity of memory. The blurring of distinctions between both myth and memory and the public and personal forms the crux of Kirschenbaum's understanding that memory is pliable to a particular purpose.

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<sup>167</sup> This can be approached in light of Aleida Assmann and Linda Shortt's (2012) thesis about the link between memory and identity, which will be considered in more detail in Section 3 of this chapter. Briefly, they theorize that: memory is volatile and transient, constantly in flux; it is not the past itself that acts upon the present but *representations of past events*; heterogeneous memories can coexist in the individual and in society; memory and forgetting are not oppositional but both key features of negotiations about what a memory is; and, memory is not, itself, endowed with an inherent power.

<sup>168</sup> Which, ultimately, appeals to an understanding of collective memory as an effect of hierarchy or pre-eminent power structures. This is a well-established basis for acknowledging the politics of memory, and is considered in Section 3 alongside a consideration of the multiple meanings one can imbue in memory as the crux of the link between politics and memory.

Similarly, this pliability of memory can precipitate a change in narratives and meaning that is enacted in contemporaneous negotiations, which demonstrates the intricate interplay between the historicity and ahistoricity of memory. For instance, you may recall from Chapter Two the appeal to celebration rather than solemnity when it comes to observing Anzac (see Anon 1940b). However, such a suggestion had to overcome a focus on both personal grief and austere reverence towards the sacrifice made by young men in awful conditions for the birth of the nation (Anon 1939a).

The involvement of Australian forces in World War Two (WWII) did not relieve the tensions inherent in the commemoration of the Gallipoli landings. The epic of Anzac focused on the way Australian soldiers endured the environments in WWI and imbued future Australians—that is, soldiers of WWII—with the spirit of the original Anzacs. The discomfiting juxtaposition of celebrating sacrifice in the name of Australia became its *raison d'être*. It is here that the quasi-religiosity of Anzac Day is apparent. *The Western Australian* wrote that 'the atmosphere surrounding the commemoration of Anzac Day . . . was in harmony with the spirit of Easter' (Anon 1943: 4). Even when there was no calendrical alignment between Anzac Day and Easter, religious links were being made between the Anzac legend and the religious epics. 'Every nation', stated one reverend in a reflection on the meaning of Anzac, 'has some great event in its past history upon which it looks back with satisfaction and from which it takes inspiration for the future' (Anon 1942c: 64)

Already, the inherent contradiction of Anzac Day as a quasi-religious holiday that amalgamates grief, anger, and celebration exemplifies the difficulty in addressing the commemoration coherently, meaning that memory becomes the rich conceptual territory over which a dispute of the real normative and formative effect of the memory is staged. The involvement of Australians in WWI resulted in a composite of conflicting sentiments.

Here, the numerous narrative potentials can be included in the problematization of the individual–collective dichotomy.<sup>169</sup> In many respects, then, the notion that ‘commemorations are concerned less with what actually happened than with what people believe or *desired* to have happened’ (Burke 2010: 107; emphasis added) is verified by the conflict surrounding the meaning of Anzac Day. It is here that the space to engage the manner by which various meanings are enacted and solidified is opened up.

Many veterans, for example, expressed contempt for the decision to close hotels and restrain access to alcohol on Anzac Day, which serves to exemplify the difficulty in settling on the best way to ‘package’ the remembrance of Anzac. The veterans argued that Australian soldiers did not and would not ask peers to spend time in mourning for one another. Sport and leisure activities should be undertaken, and alcohol should be purchasable and consumed on Anzac Day to correspond with the attitude of the volunteer soldiers (see Anon 1939b). Here, then, we’re seeing the entanglement of social sites in the fight for meaning in Anzac, precisely because it was understood that the commemorative programme would engage particular shifts in meaning and memory. The friction emerging between several justifiable commemorative obligations,<sup>170</sup> each with corresponding tangible elements, had a role in enacting a remarkable narrative.

Of course, the negotiation and settlement of an enduring commemorative pattern that was borne out of these multiple impetuses both effected and affected an ongoing, and fairly public, controversy that featured in the heart of Anzac Day commemoration. The

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<sup>169</sup> This is because numerosness takes us beyond the inherent simplicity in addressing memory within the explanatory frames of either of the ‘two cultures’ of CMS to which Olick (1999) refers.

<sup>170</sup> In addition to the sense of mateship that characterized the Anzacs, the appeal to self-reflection, and judgment, a sense of romance, heroism, and respect towards enemy combatants all jostle for position to be accommodated in a commemoration that spans anger, futility, pride, and exuberance.

disjuncture between such controversy and a later perception of the security and consistency of the Anzac memory (see Thomson 2013) asserts the value of an ANT approach to CMS. Indeed, the notion that the inherent complexity of something can become obscured by a period of *relative* fixity is especially relevant to this example. As such, it is suggested that the relational arrival at a pattern is not foregone in favour of reliance on individuals or 'prevailing social conditions' in explaining how such a period of fixity has come about in relation to Anzac. For instance, material and temporal concerns must be taken into account when exploring how a mnemonic narrative finds its coherence.

For instance, the temporal remoteness of Australians today to the experience of returning soldiers meant that the imperative to consider the living returnees rather than the dead became replaceable, in favour of a sombre reflection on the conditions that were endured. In other words, the benchmark for assessing the worth of the war and the social indebtedness to those that fought is no longer laden with a proximity to the notion that 'the dead need nothing [but] the living require a lot' (Anon 1936c: 14). Memory, then, is not simply tied to human actors within political, institutional, or social frames (see eg Assmann and Shortt 2012) but within temporal frames, too. The existence of such 'frames' is, itself, dependent on material transformation; epochal shifts are a matter of situational change.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> The aftermath of the war, for example, was identifiable by specific material imperatives of looking after the wounded and having to reintroduce people to the workforce. Later commemorative generations are identifiable by markedly different situations. For instance, the desire in the interwar years to have a 'spirit of Anzac' captured in some material commemorative form was necessitated by the keenly felt obligation to maintain the memory of the war and of the men who had fought. The praise heaped on the Australian soldiers is rooted in both the romantic

The emergence of a more uniform observance began to arise in the 1930s. This decade was significant as it contained the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Anzac Day, and laid the foundations for the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 1940. It was hoped that, by the time of the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Gallipoli landing, a standard form of remembrance would be adopted throughout Australia (Anon 1935a).<sup>172</sup> Despite this appeal, and despite detailed programmes of observance being developed to reflect the elevated numbers of observants at services and parades throughout Australia, the commemoration remained fairly disparate for the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary and beyond.

This was not to say that certain things were not customarily observed on the day. It was usual, for instance, for a dawn service to be held in Western Australia (Anon 1936b), corresponding with the dawn landing at Gallipoli. The rising of the sun is more than a neat representation of the Allied military strategy. It is an accessory to the imagination, affording observers to reflect on the conditions experienced by those who landed at Gallipoli in 1915. Many Australians today consider it to be the crux of the commemoration and the event that allows them to memorialize both the conditions and the volunteers at Gallipoli. The ability for such an event to *effect* a mnemonic experience attests to the difficulty of pinning our psychology down as an inherently internal process. Such circumstances bolstered the 'lest we forget' moral and the solemnity of the occasion,

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ideal of soldiery and the widely perceived social imperative to appear supportive of the efforts of Australians who had gone to war.

<sup>172</sup> As mentioned in Chapter Two, this call for uniformity was taken up in Canberra. A highly detailed programme of events commencing at 9.30am, revolving around the service held at the graveside of Major-General Bridges indicates the desire for a well-organized and coherent commemorative narrative. The ability for public and private memories of war to be brought together is considered to buttress collective memory (Wagner-Pacifici 1996) and, as such, a commemorative site such as a graveyard can be considered a suitable mnemonic buttress.



augmenting the existence of observants. This affords them the ability to experience the past as generated in encounters in the present.

When contingency plans to move gatherings indoors were made in case of bad weather (Anon 1936b), and dawn services cancelled to worries about the potential for airstrikes during WWII (Anon 1942b), the Anzac narrative is tested. This is because the specific viscerality of dawn enacted by the participation of both the rising sun and viewing congregations was disrupted, meaning the enactment of the mnemonic programme was, too. With all the will in the world to make the dawning sun, a quasi-religious service, a public congregation, and the temporal links with the landing soldiers a feature of the commemoration of Anzac Day, this programme could be cut across by the overbearing capability of rain, wind, and the prospect of airstrikes.<sup>173</sup>

In the 1940s, the fragmented and competing rationales for, and organization of, Anzac commemoration were tested even further by the commencement of WWII. The Australian involvement in this conflict added a poignancy to the commemoration of Anzac Day.<sup>174</sup> The significance of Anzac Day, alongside the call to arms of Australians for WWII, gave the day a sombreness that challenged the wishes of many who had voiced their desire for Anzac Day to become a more joyful occasion. Rather, Anzac Day was given a renewed impetus as a day of sorrow. Similarly, its importance as a symbol of the fixity

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<sup>173</sup> In any case, it would be years until the dawn the service became a regular element of the Anzac commemorative programme across Australia. Instead, its commemoration had a much more provincial feel to its organization. Temporary cenotaphs were erected for the occasion and there was significant regional variety in marches, vigils, services, and parades being held (or, as the case may be, not being held).

<sup>174</sup> This is in addition to the fear inducing impact of the war and the prospect of airstrikes. Moreover, the endowment of more current mourning and anger in the Anzac Day programme made the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Anzac even more stirring than one would have expected of such a noteworthy anniversary (Anon 1940b).

of Australian nationhood was also secured when memorialized during WWII years, necessitated by the uncertainty felt about what may lay ahead (Anon 1940a).

Furthermore, WWII had the effect of making war more proximate and important to the young generation. No longer could this generation be considered increasingly detached from the commemoration of Anzac as the original Anzac generation slowly died out (Anon 1936a). The importance of justifying the commemoration of Anzac Day to younger Australians became less important during WWII as this conflict contributed to the renewal of the Anzac legend in the Australian consciousness; *new* generations of Australians were now volunteering for war. Memory is, thus, not only continuously changed by population fluctuations (Assmann 2010) but can be shaped by environmental and situational fluctuations, too. In each case, it is the acknowledgment of the presence of certain actors such as the sunlight, a war, or even 'threats' of bombings that suggests memory does not have a purely socio-linguistic provenance. Indeed, it is the concomitant situation that helps rationalize a particular commemorative narrative.<sup>175</sup>

Such situational indebtedness is one example of why the notion of a 'thing' called group, social, or collective memory can be problematized. Similarly, the idea of memory

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<sup>175</sup> However, no matter how emphatic the desire for sombreness was, it must be remembered that the commemoration was still at the whim of WWII. The risk associated with WWII operations cut right across the relatively stabilized character of Anzac Day. Daytime parades and dawn services were cancelled at the bequest of then Prime Minister John Curtin (Anon 1942a). This abrupt change to the Anzac programme comes in spite of renewed commitment to the prominence of sombreness brought about by the regret felt that so many Australians died in WWI and what was promised to be the war to end all wars (Anon 1944). Competing here are two distinct pressures on the coherence of a memory. On the one hand, we see the surfacing of greater sadness, regret, and anger at the futility of conflict in Anzac. On the other hand, there were physical pressures that reshaped the Anzac commemorative programme around the requirements of the day. That both these mnemonic shifts were effected by some form of conflict underlines the vulnerability of memory's consistency.

only being extant within the minds of the individuals is also challenged by this illustration. When the encounter between 'mnemonic apparatuses' and social conditions can shape it, memory cannot be thought as being the prerogative of the individual. In other words, it is the agentic effect of encounter between a variety of actants and is altered on the basis of interactional changes. Given the shifts that can occur in memory from situation to situation, memory is inherently collective—and social in the ANT sense of the word.

At a time when the Australian involvement in WWII was diminishing, Anzac Day would begin to take on a new function, as an occasion of 'hope and confidence in the future' (Anon 1945: 3). Such a narrative can be easily emplotted alongside sobriety in the memorialization of Anzac Day. However, the construction of a narrative is not a matter of either the individual or a collectivity effortlessly anchoring a clear story. Rather, a narrative emerges from the interplay between a range of voices that effect the transformation of an event into one of collective mnemonic importance. An appreciation of the language of materials can give rise to the inclusion of such matter in any exploration of the construction of memory.

This appreciation attests to a denial of the social and political derivation of a catch-all explanatory device. The emphasis here is on the centrelessness and complexity of memory in place of simplicity and consistency. The appearance of continuity is, no doubt, an indispensable ingredient when it comes to collective memorialization but such continuity is not smoothly arrived at. For instance, despite not gaining much ground since the mid-1930s, proponents of a more uplifting Anzac Day were still a significant voice of

dissent. This dissent was so prominent that the Returned and Services League (RSL)<sup>176</sup> called for strict observance of Anzac Day to be confined to the morning, with the afternoon left for free commemoration as Australians saw fit (Anon 1944a; 1994b).

Notwithstanding the eventual acceptance of the model of Anzac Day that splits morning observance from more casual celebrations in the afternoon, such a concession did not last long in the early years. In 1945, the Prime Minister renewed his appeal for solemn and reverential observance of Anzac Day. For the sake of uniformity, the policy of closing hotels and prohibiting sports was re-established (Anon 1945). Of course, this was met with much disappointment from the substantial number of soldiers who sought to treat Anzac Day as a celebratory event. In Western Australia, this disappointment was confounded by a vote on the issue at the annual conference of the Western Australian branch of the RSL. The vote returned an acceptance of the wholly solemn observance by a margin of 97 votes to 94. The motion for a more celebratory observance was defeated by the smallest of margins, but was a substantial fillip, nonetheless. Such a vote was indicative of the real tension between the conflicting ideas surrounding the purpose of Anzac commemoration.

Notwithstanding this tension, the observance of Anzac Day in the following years settled enough to pave the way for Anzac Day to be 'packaged and exported' to Tokyo.<sup>177</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> The RSL is a charitable organization that seeks to advocate for Australian ex-service people, advancing care and support programmes for service people and their families.

<sup>177</sup> Returning to Chapter Two, and Diane Barthel's (1996) point that something only need to be widely known, rather than the most superlative, to be secured, we can approach the first time an Anzac Day commemorative schedule was observed outside of Australia or New Zealand as satisfying this point. In the context of Anzac Day, it is not necessarily the *most satisfactory* approach to the meaning of Anzac Day that secured the narrative for a period of time, but its replication. In other words, the replicability and ability to disseminate a commemorative event with a coherent mnemonic narrative was an important step towards maintaining stability.

Each of the elements that got Anzac Day to this point in the 1940s occupies a nebulous position between matter, language, natural, artificial, individual, and social. As such, the complicity of each actor, themselves complex compounds of relational elements,<sup>178</sup> in the establishment of an Anzac Day programme means memory can be thought of as an entanglement of irreducible elements rather than a thing in and of itself.

### **The politics of meaning in memory**

One approach to collective memory sees it as a tool for maintaining a sense of social identity. Within this tradition, collective memory can be defined as ‘recollections of a shared past which are passed on through ongoing processes of commemoration, officially sanctioned rituals which remember a group through calling upon a common heritage, with a shared past as a central component’ (Eyerman 2004: 161).<sup>179</sup> This functionalist notion of collective memory has, since the final quarter of the last century, been deployed to explain identity formation. Much of the emphasis, here, has been on how collective memory facilitates the creation and maintenance of a national identity.<sup>180</sup> Katherine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone (2003), for example, suggest that certain

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<sup>178</sup> Whether this actor is war, a quasi-religious service, leisure activities (or lack thereof), or the weather.

<sup>179</sup> Bearing in mind the identifiable commitment of both ANT and new materialism (raised in Chapter Four) to identify how certain things come to take on, obdurately, a sense of truth, there is a critical potential in approaching the means by which a commemorative narrative can take on this function. The means by which this purpose can be achieved is developed in Chapters Six and Seven. The focus of this current section is to articulate the politics of memory by distinguishing between rationality and irrationality, a frame that was developed in relation to the multiplicity of temporality in Chapter Four.

<sup>180</sup> In this sense, collective memory is identified as an important concept for the study of ideology (see Billing 1990).

activities are founded on, and confirm, a belief that one's own memory is to be relied upon more than any other form of knowledge.

As such, the control of this foundational knowledge, and ability to manipulate it, is pinpointed as the constitutive effect memory can have on identity.<sup>181</sup> The link between the two goes beyond emphasizing the link between collective memory and social identity on the basis that memory holds a societal status quo together. Instead of identifying that the structural integrity of memory lasts only until a stronger collectivity that revolves around a different memory challenges it (Péquignot 2011), the Anzac legend suggests the contest is one of *meaning*. How are certain meanings imbued in a commemorative programme and made more compelling than others? If we can appreciate memory for its situatedness, we can understand it not as a truth but as a spectacle that is permeated with multiple potential meanings.

Identifying the potential for a number of *meanings* to be imbued in memory suggests that a mnemonic process retains a certain degree of cohesion. Neither a reading of the past nor the anticipated purpose of a memory has to be significantly rewritten; a memory can, broadly, retain an identifiable and consistent shape. As such, the exploration of memory, distinguishing between its *being* and its meaning, should proceed on the basis of examining how a variety of characterizations can be made about a single memory. This begs the question: how are certain meanings that contribute to the robustness of a particular social and political order accomplished? A collective memory, in this sense,

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<sup>181</sup> The establishment of memory as a process by which the meaning of historical periods can be shaped (Hodgkin and Radstone 2003) indicates its role in the construction of a narrative. The notion, then, that political powers may seek to institute a shift in collective memory to effect particular identity narratives (Resnik 2003) is a cogent argument advanced about the politics of memory.

becomes a tool that is endowed with cohesive power through its interaction with, and encounter by, a variety of other actors.

In this respect, the meeting of ANT and new materialism, on the one hand, with CMS, on the other hand, offers an opportunity for probing the link between collective memory and identity. Stressing the distinction between being and meaning allows one to reconsider the identification of memory as a tool that is endowed with cohesive power through its deployment *within* political frames. For instance, let us explore the premise offered by Aleida Assmann and Linda Shortt (2012) in their exploration of memory and political change. They offer five methodological premises that guide their study of memory and political change. First, they suggest that individual memory is constantly changing. In other words, the individual's memory is not secured by the individual itself, and the perpetuation of a memory requires a lot of work. This accommodates the ANT and new materialist ethic that nothing can be thought of as being extant solely in and of itself.

Second, it is never the past itself that acts upon a present society, but *representations of past events* that are created, circulated, and received within specific cultural and political frames. This is a particularly Halbwachsian point. It follows that control over representations of the past buttress the manipulation of fluctuating and contingent memory. However, when one is faced with fairly stable representations of the past, what 'control' is being exercised? In the Anzac Day example, for instance, the early negotiations about the commemorative programme did not revolve around historical revisionism or the ultimate purpose of observing the day but what the day should *mean*

for Australians.<sup>182</sup> Moreover, the ANT and new materialist approach to CMS prompts a focus on how different meanings can be identified in a mnemonic programme, rather than the suggestion that political frames substantially shift the substance of a memory.

Third, Assmann and Shortt consider the potential for heterogeneous memories to coexist in the individual as they do in society. A variety of memories can exist in opposition, converge, or fluctuate, making singular memory narratives inherently difficult to stage. This suggestion affirms the difficulty in attributing political causality to memory. It moves us away from understanding the development of mnemonic narratives as an identifiable effect of political frames and raises the prospect that the converse is, in fact, true. Fourth, it is suggested that remembering and forgetting cannot be neatly separated and the construction of a memory takes place in negotiating what is to be included in, and what is to be excluded from, a mnemonic story. This focus on negotiation is important to consider in relation to the fifth and final point made by Assmann and Shortt, that memory cannot, itself, be thought of as having an inherent agency.<sup>183</sup>

Notwithstanding a number of questions relating to the authors' theorization of memory and political identity, their general thesis offers some interesting insights for this

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<sup>182</sup> Indeed, returning to the first methodological point raised by Assmann and Shortt, what if memory does not *constantly* change? Rather, what if the point about the situatedness of an individual's memory suggests the possibility of concurrent and competing meanings that can be imbued in a relatively secure and purposeful representation of the past?

<sup>183</sup> Instead, the authors suggest that remembering and forgetting have to be 'tied to *human actors within cultural, political, institutional, and social frames*' (Assmann and Shortt 2012: 5; original emphasis). Of course, an ANT and new materialist disposition problematizes this and other points made in Assmann and Shortt's thesis. Moreover, if memory is to be identified as an apparatus of political power, its meaning cannot be wholly explicable on the basis of deployment by actors within particular political frames. Instead, attention needs to be paid to how mnemonic meanings can help effect a particular order.



section. This is, not least, because they seek to identify the importance of memory as a contributing factor to the development of a sense of identity. Their problematization of singularity and clarity when it comes to the theorization of memory suggests it is malleable and multiple. It is the potential for multiple meanings to exist in memory that rationalizes why it should be considered a significant preoccupation of politics (see eg Wertsch 2008). Moreover, Assmann and Shortt's thesis commits us to thinking about memory as an active and ongoing process.

Anne Heimo and Ulla-Maija Peltonen (2003), similarly, seek to demonstrate that collective memory is a process and one that is part of a larger pattern of social change. They argue that, in the long run, social cohesion in memory is a product of common history to which all in the community may relate. With a focus on the memory of the Finnish Civil War, Heimo and Peltonen demonstrate that recollected narratives are shaped by *current conditions*. They suggest that a shift towards a single national narrative in Finland, as opposed to a division in memory between the victor and the loser, implied a growing sense of honesty and trust in a shared account of history. Whilst the authors consider social and political conditions to have 'power over' memories, rather than addressing the possibility of memories giving these 'conditions' 'power to' function as they do, Heimo and Peltonen's work does address the responsiveness and situatedness of memory.

Appreciating this situatedness corresponds with the idea that contemporary public memorialization 'needs . . . to be interrogated for its contemporary motivations' (Gray 2004: 46). It also reasserts the second premise of Assmann and Shortt's work that the memory-identity link equates to the circulation of representations of the past within particular frames. As suggested above, the suggestion that memory serves as a dimension of power (see also Connerton 1989) does not necessarily mean that memory should be

thought of as a means of conditioning and maintaining *hierarchies* of power. Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka (1995) offer us an understanding of memory which suggests it can be established as a dimension of power without, strictly speaking, being an example of the *exercise* of power. Assmann and Czaplicka identify the derivation of collective identity from memory as being based on the concept of cultural memory. Cultural memory is comprised of 'that body of reusable texts, images, and rituals specific to each society in each epoch, whose "cultivation" serves to stabilize and convey that society's self-image' (Assmann and Czaplicka 1995: 132).

Both Assmann and Heimo and Peltonen's thesis depends on understanding memory as a means by which a society or community, respectively, can engineer a sense of shared identity. Both suggest that the substance of a memory shapes its identity potential. There is also a need to appreciate the *form* that memory takes in relation to Anzac Day. It is important to explore the ways in which the ordering of the Anzac commemorative pattern contribute to the definition of particular community identities and the enactment of *meanings*, rather than wholly different mnemonic narratives, which define inclusions and exclusions. Indeed, for cultural memory to be recognized as having a stabilizing effect, Assmann suggests cultural memory requires some form of obligation from participants. It 'engenders a clear system of values and differentiations in importance' (Assmann and Czaplicka 1995: 131).

The requirement of some form of obligation arising from memory speaks most plainly to the bond between media of collective memory and identity. Assmann (2006) asserts that this link is established on the basis of the mythology of cultural memory; 'normative texts codify the norms of social behaviour. Formative texts formulate the self-image of the group and the knowledge that secures their identity' (2006: 104). The establishment of a mythic origin or a narrative of a shared past can cement the peculiarity

of a particular group. This is most evident in the commemoration of war. Whether in commemorating the 200<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the battle of Waterloo, or the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Gallipoli landings, or the annual reflection on conflicts past and present on Armistice Day, the commemoration of war is laden with both a *formative* capacity to establish the group boundary and a *normative* capacity to offer some educative or moral adjunct. Of course, precisely *how* something emerges with such normative and formative power needs to be interrogated, particularly as such mnemonic narratives are incomplete, dynamic, and subject to changes in cultural contexts that shift cultural recall (Erl 2011).<sup>184</sup>

Integral to answering this ‘how’ question is the recognition of the link between a mnemonic narrative and the apportioning of time. This is helpful, not least because the idea that identity consists of the connection of an individual’s past to an imagined social future depends on a mastery of time. It requires the engineering of a stretched time span around which people can organize their lives, making the personal and social future more predictable (Stinchcombe 2009). Inherent in this predictability is the ability to anticipate shared obligations and form reasonable expectations of one’s community. This feature of memory, identified as a fundamental characteristic in terms of its political potential (Anderson 2006), can be allied with the recognition of time’s multiplicity and, following Deleuze, its situational existence.

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<sup>184</sup> In Chapter Seven, the link between obligations, on the one hand, and the expectations of others within an imagined community, on the other hand, is made. There, the ordering of form in such a way that obligations are imbued in a commemorative narrative is discussed. What is deployed in the rationalization of a particular meaning being attributed to past events that give it its formative and normative power?

With the contingency of time on both material and socio-linguistic actors already established, any implication of time in the enactment of memory buttresses the shift away from identifying 'root causes' of particular memories. This opens the study of memory up to an exploration of its situational enactment and, correspondingly, an exploration of the variety of things that are folded into a mnemonic narrative, including encounters with observers, in order to rationalize a particular narrative over others. Committing this chapter to the distinction between being and meaning that was developed in relation to time in Chapter Four requires an acknowledgment that the physicality of an object cannot be essentialized. Here, it is important to distinguish between acknowledgment of its physical being, and appreciation that a physical object can be imbued with several meanings.

The tangibility and distinctness of sites and objects does not preclude their malleability. Ken Inglis (1998) makes this point in *Sacred Places: War Memorials in the Australian Landscape*, reflecting on the shock of a continual, and constantly renewed, interest in Anzac Day commemoration. He questions what the *meaning* of a shrine is, and what work it does, challenging the notion that particular sites have specific meaning, given that shrines often mean different things on different days. In the context of Australia, for instance, shrines are places for reflections on death on Armistice Day but of birth, of a nation, on Anzac Day. As such, when attention is paid to materials and sites in the construction and resilience (Crane 2000) of memories, they should not be instrumentalized as repositories or facilitators of memory. Rather, they are part of a networked enactment of meaning and mnemonic significance that varies depending on the other actor-networks that encounter them.

This speaks to the core of the post-humanist methodological position adopted in this thesis that there is no essential or singular rationality or meaning to a particular

thing. Instead, its situatedness and contingency on interactions and negotiations for the development of a multiplicity of potential meanings needs to be considered. The *participatory* role of a number of things in the establishment of a particular mnemonic narrative is evidenced by the difficulties experienced in arriving at an Anzac Day commemorative pattern in the early years.

### **Conclusion**

The 'centrelessness' of CMS, while itself a potential cause for vexation among its students, suggests the impossibility of articulating memory singularly. Whether it is a matter of trying to establish a disciplinary 'home' for CMS or trying to establish the manner in which memory functions, one sticking point is the rift between those who subscribe to the notion of collective memory being inherently social and those that consider it to be the preserve of individuals whose memory is 'collected'. Such a rift, of course, is an effect of any foundational distinction made between the individual and the social. The Halbwachsian grounding of the study of collective memory means this rift runs deep in CMS. Ultimately, within such conflictual and oppositional understandings of CMS, reductionism and predictability come to characterize how one understands collective memory (Misztal 2003). Either one approaches collective memory as an apparatus of political control or as an impossibility. Moreover, the failure to traverse the gulf between the individual and collective 'cultures' of memory means the question of understanding how certain voices, symbols, events, and heroes are institutionalized while others are not may go unanswered.

The attempt to reconcile the individual–social dichotomy that characterizes the debate at the heart of CMS was established on the basis of identifying the active role played by non-humans in the enactment of memories. It was suggested that

circumventing this problem can be achieved, or at least prefigured, by the recognition of non-humans as active participants in the construction of memories. In relation to Anzac Day, the stress has been on identifying how non-human actors, whether commemorative artefacts or not, can contribute to the development of a commemorative programme, building on the materialist mediation of the 'two cultures' debate of collective memory. In short, this debate can be avoided by apprehending the interactivity of any site of memory (Aden et al 2009; Truc 2011) and can be more fully accomplished with the acknowledgment of more than just a passive role of non-human and non-linguistic actors.

The original reliance on identifying the participatory role of non-humans in memory helped obfuscate the distinction between the individual and the social that may be a means of proceeding with the study of collective memory without falling into the trap of relying on the primacy of either. However, as the next chapter demonstrates, the inclusion of non-humans in the analysis of memories does not preclude the acknowledgment of representation and language, too. Rather, taken together, both chapters suggest that, ultimately, it is important to understand the variety of things that are enrolled and deployed in the formation of a mnemonic narrative. Moreover, it suggests the importance of recognizing how memory is politicized and opened up to several contemporaneous and competing meanings.

## Chapter VI

### Anzac: the performativity of historical truth

This chapter argues that distrust is a useful disposition to have in relation to historical truth. This is because distrust and cynicism suggest an approach to history that questions the means by which certain narratives come to be thought of and sustained as 'true'. Rather than the rationalized core of a particular logic, the authority of a particular historical 'truth' is an effect of work done to make it compelling and/or conceal multiple other 'truths'.<sup>185</sup> The chapter therefore considers the Anzac commemorative story in light of an approach that challenges the historical foundations on which it is built. It examines how television, film, documentary, and non-fiction literature are deployed in the enactment of a historical truth. As such, the distinction between truth and untruth is blurred; it is suggested that both truth and untruth are a product of the work done to sustain a distinction.<sup>186</sup> Such an approach to the performativity of history offers an

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<sup>185</sup> This chapter considers the complexity and multiplicity of historical truth to be one foundation for exploring how history is performed. Several 'truths' may exist concurrently whilst only one is enacted as a constitutive and compelling authority.

<sup>186</sup> As such, the difficulty with sustaining the distinction between 'fact' and 'lies' is framed on the basis of appreciating the concurrency of being and meaning. The manifest difference between the happening of events in the past and the accounts that are developed in relation to these operates as an important distinction to have in mind when articulating the impossibility of talking about a historical 'truth'. Moreover, just as it does with time, the recognition of the multiplicity and contingency of historical accounts rather than their innate accuracy and universality opens up

interesting way of developing the Anzac story and acknowledging how a narrative built on a fallacious exclusion continues to operate as it does. This is particularly pertinent as the narrative *continues* to operate on an exclusionary basis in spite of apparently more welcoming attitudes towards Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders.

This chapter contains a single section which proceeds on the basis of exploring the means by which the historiography at the heart of the Anzac narrative is sustained through both documentary and media recognized as fiction. An element of the effectiveness of such media is the utilization and circulation of a quasi-critical vocabulary. This vocabulary is an important actor and the way it is deployed in the networked enactment of a sense of historical truth, running through documentary, film, promotional interviews, reviews, and historiography is focused on in this chapter.

### **Performing a commemorative narrative**

The fallacy of certain disciplinary truths and stability (Callon 1998) can be exemplified in the relationship between history and memory. This is because the boundary between historical 'fact', on one hand, and memory, on the other hand, is very permeable (Winter 2010). Understanding the permeability of this boundary enables the distinction between facticity and emotion to be challenged.<sup>187</sup> Indeed, this section is focused on acknowledging that a narrative finds its coherence precisely because it is a concoction of both history and memory. Indeed, rejecting such distinctions permits a

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the possibility of concluding that history is political and can effect deeply problematic consequences.

<sup>187</sup> The importance of challenging this understanding of history and memory, respectively, within this thesis is on the basis of exploring how certain narratives come to be compartmentalized and appropriated as authoritative and, thus, complicit in the constitution of identity.



demonstration of how certainty and authority are arrived at, without any judgment about 'truth'. With regards to the Anzac legend, the fallacy of historical and documentary truth is illustrated by Kevin Blackburn (2007) in his exposition of *Four Corners*<sup>188</sup> historical documentaries. His principal concern is an interrogation of what amounts to 'critical investigations' for *Four Corners*.

He argues that the *Four Corners* treatment of the Anzac Legend is incredibly *uncritical* and serves only to buttress a particular impression of what the Australian volunteer soldiers were like. Blackburn suggests that documentaries are an exemplary medium for censorship and editing for narrative purposes. Moreover, they find themselves in a privileged position to be able to circulate a particular impression of historical fact while concealing the emotion, biases, and equivocations that might be at the heart of the editorial decisions made. As such, the distinction between fact and emotion already forms the basis for a critique of history and documentary. When, for instance, Blackburn highlights that an Anzac documentary fails to include the work of more recent historians who may have offered a more critical appraisal of particular elements of the Anzac legend, one can begin to identify the fallacy of documented 'fact'.<sup>189</sup>

Moreover, the basis of *Four Corners*' 'critical' attention is problematic as it does not distinguish between piecemeal revision and significant critique. For instance, Blackburn worries that the historical authority of *Four Corners* is established on the basis that it identified several important 'corrections' to the historical representation of Anzac

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<sup>188</sup> Blackburn describes this show as an Australian current affairs show modelled on the BBC's *Panorama*.

<sup>189</sup> Indeed, the use of Australian journalist, Keith Murdoch, in the documentary is one example of this. In 1915, he had unequivocal praise for the Anzacs and heavily criticized the role of the British. However, in 1942, Murdoch himself scrutinized this idea but this revisionist contribution to the Anzac legend was not considered by the programme.

without a genuine attempt at critical exploration. For instance, checking a fictional representation of Gallipoli for inaccuracies, and finding them, offers certain insights into the glorification of the Anzac legend but it does not delve into the fundamental perceptions of Anzac Day. The documentary did not engage the same level of revisionism for the quasi-canonical sources that form a substantial part of the Anzac story.<sup>190</sup>

The impression given by Blackburn is that the documentary buttresses a narrative that romanticizes the Australian experience of Gallipoli but does not approach 'the truth'.<sup>191</sup> This is because Blackburn believes accuracy is eclipsed by the advancement of only one, dominant view. For Blackburn, this 'confirms the point made by scholars of television history that the medium in its current form is not amenable to drawing out historiographical debates but is driven by the needs of a simple, linear narrative story telling structure' (2007: 112).<sup>192</sup> As such, the concern about over-simplified historical narratives is nestled into broader discussions about simplicity and linearity that pervade temporal and mnemonic meaning, too.

The rejection of simple and logical narratives speaks to a disciplinary critique of history; it enables the development of a platform for re-evaluating the levels of trust and

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<sup>190</sup> The process by which such sources take on their trustworthiness and uncontested status depends on extensive work, and this work demonstrates historical truth as a construction.

<sup>191</sup> Of course, a critique of historical authority on the basis of clamouring for 'the truth' is, in part, an irony. However, it underscores the ANT approach to 'truths' are relationally, and multiply, arrived at. It is the concealment of this in favour of simplicity that requires critique.

<sup>192</sup> This might suggest that linguistics is the most important driver of a 'narrative' but the implication of a variety of things in the development of a documentary move us beyond this. For instance, from the political leanings of the producer to the practical limits of the documentary (eg time, budget, schedule), each have a role in driving a simple and readily consistent narrative. This demonstrates that a narration of history is worked at and, as such, a characterization of 'truth' rather than a direct and irrefutable reflection of the past.

scepticism one has when approaching history's claim to authority. For instance, the critique of simplicity brings the distinction between certainty and construction into question; if one cannot rely on a straightforward and rational logic, one cannot have certainty in a truth or authority. Just as this questioning of simplicity works for understanding the multiplicities of both time and memory, it works for understanding the memory–history relationship, too.

Furthermore, the entanglement of both history and memory in order to construct convincing 'histories' and 'memories' must also be noted. The link between memory, cultural knowledge, and a sense of identity can be ascertained on the basis that mnemonic narratives are built with a view, like history, to offering their own sense of truth that can be submitted to future generations. Memories, like history, are thought to mediate collective imaginaries and give authority to our actions in particular situations (Batiashvili 2012). The capacity for such memories to have this ability, according to Nutsa Batiashvili (2012), is thought to hang on the ability to produce memory. It is the concept, and exploration, of production that helps problematize the unabated truth of memory.

Just as the processes for coming to a decision on what memories are identifiable as having some form of authenticity and authority need to be explored, so, too, do the processes that allow things to be historicized.<sup>193</sup> Batiashvili, for instance, identifies three mnemonic frames that can be employed to contextualize trends in Georgian history. First, Georgia's ceaseless effort to reintegrate its historic territories into a powerful state. Second, the ability of Georgian people to preserve their national culture despite the fact that external enemies persistently try to defeat and culturally assimilate them. Third, the

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<sup>193</sup> Again, exploration of such processes is necessitated by the methodological assumption that both are produced. This serves only to make the boundary between history and memory more porous.

notion that Georgians have been able to resist their enemies and preserve their culture because of their innate characteristics which make them an impossible people to have external power inflicted upon them. The emphasis on remembering as an active process (Batiashvili 2012: 190) offers the opportunity to commit an understanding of the entanglement of memories and histories to an exploration of performativity of memory.<sup>194</sup>

From this point, one can also frame the investigation of the situated enactment of historical truth. Astrid Erll (2011) draws attention to the disciplinary problem with events like, for instance, the Holocaust, that test traditional conceptual categories to the limit. The nexus between witnessing, testimony, secondary accounts, and transgenerational transmission of traumata means the fact that memory and historical studies cannot be thought of in distinct terms is particularly relevant for extraordinary events.<sup>195</sup> As such, the notion that *history* is also constantly 'in the works' is a productive disposition for thinking about the performativity of history. In her assessment of the fields of memory and history, Erll has identified the dynamism and plurality of memory, the social construction of tradition and history, the partiality of archives (alongside their

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<sup>194</sup> This exploration can take us beyond the discursive. For instance, it has already been established (Chapter Five) that the mnemonic meanings that can be inscribed into Anzac Day are both arrived at within, and *helps* Australians arrive at, a commemorative programme. Moreover, the contestation over the early commemoration of Anzac Day surrounded the entanglement of history and memory: which succinct (and situated) message was the most appropriate and compelling reading of the events that had occurred?

<sup>195</sup> The extraordinariness of Anzac Day is a product of Australian geography, the youth of the settled Commonwealth, the experiences of the volunteers, and the manner in which World War One (WWI) campaigns were fought. It effected a peculiar event that was both historically and mnemonically significant.

appeal and ease of access), and an interest in heritage sites as key considerations for the enactment of a particular 'mnemonhistory'.

*'In the works' of CEW Bean*

In *The Pasteurization of France*, Latour (1988) demonstrates a theoretical position that is germane to the exploration of the performativity of history. The idea that actors, however defined,<sup>196</sup> verify the rules by making others play by them is an intriguing premise. If we work on the understanding that the fallacy of history's authority is akin to the requirement to follow particular rules, it opens up the potential to interrogate the production of history as a matter of some form of compulsion. In this sense, history can, indeed, be understood as 'rule based'. As such, Latour's conceptualization of strength and rules is a productive way of understanding how knowledge comes to be constructed. For instance, he suggests that strength is a relative concept which can otherwise be understood as a product of the inability of certain actors to withstand a slightly more compelling actor. As such, strength is defined as the capacity for certain actors to withstand other actors and acquire them as allies. The strength of a perceived truth, then, can be understood on the basis that it has secured itself a pathway or ability to subsist as an authority because of its ability to co-opt and deploy 'allies'. In the context of history, one can understand its authority and truth as a result of the work it has to do in order to accomplish this.

In this sense, then, history can be thought of as 'in the works'. Its meaning as an authority is established in the ordering of a network that necessitates the enrolment of

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<sup>196</sup> Of course, there is an ANT inflection in both Latour's work and this. However, the need to convince and enrol suggested by Latour is an equally interesting prospect for socio-linguistic explorations of the way history is enacted.

actors that continually attests to its truth.<sup>197</sup> For instance, the popular idea that Winston Churchill should be revered as an astute, strong, and tactically proficient Prime Minister is sustained in the face of substantial opposition that seeks to identify him as a poor military strategist, warmonger, serpentine, and a racist. The fallacy of historical truth may not only depend on the strength of a particular narrative but on the concealment of the work put in to give it its strength.

In the words of Charles Baudelaire, ‘the loveliest trick of the devil is to persuade you that he does not exist’ (1921: 164). Of course, that the negative descriptions of Churchill have been superseded by a reverential attitude towards his premiership is assisted by the advent of World War Two (WWII). It demonstrated that certain actors can help construct a historical narrative. These shifts do not necessarily have to be in the form of an entirely new focus. Rather, actors can condition a narrative to ensure it is sustained in the face of vocal opposition. For instance, we can consider, in this light, Margaret Thatcher’s veneration as the first female Prime Minister who changed the face of British politics for the better.

Not only is the insistence that ‘there is no alternative’; to the prevailing political and socio-economic ideology naturalized due to the apparent lack of reasonable and convincing alternatives (see Flanders 2013), but the very fact of this lack of alternative is due to the work done to ensure the strength of this narrative. One only need to witness the disgust vocalized at Glenda Jackson MP for criticizing Thatcher during a tribute debate in Parliament, not least in the House of Commons itself (HC Deb 10 April 2013:

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<sup>197</sup> Here, there is a convergence with the distinction between being and meaning. History can *mean* as authority rather than *be* inherently authoritative. Moreover, the generation of meaning in encounter applies to the meetings between actor(-network)s where ‘strength’ and convincingness is determined.

cc1649-1651). As such, particular 'rules' are in place to compel a particular insistence on the authority and authenticity of certain histories. These 'rules' need not be direct but can be a product of situation. For instance, the Anzac Day programme in Canberra, distinguishing between a dawn and post-dawn service, serves to insist on a particular narrative.

Of course, compelling others to follow particular 'rules' of history can also be achieved through legislation or uninhibited marginalization of particular utterances. That, for instance, the denial of the Holocaust is met with criminal sanction in some jurisdictions and unfettered condemnation in others is an instance where memories are legally and politically institutionalized. In each case, though, 'rule' based compulsion is achieved through the deployment of various strategies and processes. In the Anzac example, this is exemplified by the reverence towards CEW Bean and his body of work in the Anzac narrative. This is in addition to the fact that, as the founder of the AWM, he already occupies a prominent place in the Anzac Legend. Indeed, Bean's role in the Anzac narrative was given a great deal of attention during a documentary series to mark the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the landing at Gallipoli, *Memorial: Beyond the Anzac Legend*. In many respects, this series confirms Blackburn's disquiet about documentaries that present themselves as critical, investigative, or factual.<sup>198</sup>

However, the series quickly establishes a remit to illuminate a select few things about Anzac, avoiding most grounds for conflict or controversy. For instance, the consideration of Bean's founding of the Australian War Memorial (AWM) was cast as him feeling a heavy responsibility to tell the story of the Anzacs. The presenter, Neil Oliver,

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<sup>198</sup> The notion of 'beyond' suggests some form of revelation, an uncovering of qualities and important subjects that are otherwise disregarded or not acknowledged at all.

highlights Bean's fastidious approach to historical volumes that relies on formal documentation of those that fought. However, this, itself, conceals a 'truth' of exclusion because records would have concealed the policy of racial discrimination when recruiting volunteers for WWI. Of course, I take a very particular view on this image of the historical 'truth' of the AWM,<sup>199</sup> but it corresponds with the more general argument of this chapter. That is, there are multiple accesses to 'truth', and one should approach certain explanations and authorities with a degree of incredulity.

For instance, nearly 102 years on from Gallipoli, Bean's mediated account of the experiences of the Anzacs retain their sense of strength and veracity precisely because of this sort of documentary. Such programming continues to conceal other more difficult or competing elements of the commemorative narrative. The fact that Bean's collected diaries are given such prominence in the AWM, to the extent that they are treated as gospel, gives a key impression about the nature of the memorial. Of course, the notion that the memorialization of Anzac at the AWM has its establishment based on Bean's diarizing conveys a certain authenticity to the Anzac legend. For instance, the notion that his diaries started as he, one man, noticing something important taking place and making a note of it so people 'did not forget' gives a sense that his work is organic. This gives an untainted, thus authoritative, impression of Bean's work to diarize the Australian experience in conflict. The particular sense we get of who the men were and what they did from Bean's diaries is imbued with a certain truth that is secured by the existence of the AWM.

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<sup>199</sup> That is, the cynicism with which I approached this documentary was, to some degree, informed by the criticism of the genre I encountered in my research. It also developed out of my interest in the theorization of the way indigenous voices are silenced from the Anzac commemorative narrative.



Moreover, the *Beyond the Anzac Legend* documentary series performs the historical authenticity of, and the erasing of more complex or equivocal narratives towards, the AWM in other ways.<sup>200</sup> It does so by stressing the authority of the sources on which the AWM is built. Oliver considers the written artefacts of war, including letters home or poetry of soldiers. Such works are exclusively of Anglicized Australians and, thus, histories of the Australian involvement in WWI are constructed principally on these experiences. The third episode in the series, for instance, was built around British born Lieutenant John Alexander Raws, whose letters are given prominence in the AWM. As such, he is identified as ‘the spokesman of many other voices that were silenced.’ Oliver expresses how impressed he is by the lack of censorship in the letters sent home, and offers this as an indication of their unmediated truth. The absence of censorship, however, does not necessarily equate to truth. This is certainly the case of the Anzac story; when the official parameters of the campaign to enlist volunteers, by default, excluded Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders on the basis of race, a lack of censorship in letters does little to reveal the reality of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders’ involvement in the war.

Anne-Marie Condé (2007a, 2007b) makes a similar point to Oliver, venerating the lack of censorship proposed and enforced by Bean. She explains that, created at the behest of Bean, the purpose of the Australian War Records Section (AWRS) in London was ‘to collect and organize the documentary record of the Australian forces so that it could be preserved for Australia rather than be absorbed into Britain’s records’ (2007a: 453). Thus, the development of an Australian military history was a principal reason for

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<sup>200</sup> See note 185. The problem of historical authority is not simply, or only, truth but also a set of assumptions about the complexity of the world and of events which is elided as part of the process of arrogating a certain narrative to authority.

the establishment of the AWRS. Condé identifies Bean's attitude to the collection as being one of plain truth. Condé compares the attitude of Bean with that of Lord Beaverbrook, who was not above allowing images to be doctored for the Canadian War Records Office. Condé states that 'Bean objected privately to Beaverbrook's sanctioning of doctoring and faking photographs', instructing the AWRS official photographers to 'regard photographs as "a sacred record—standing for future generations to see for ever the plain, simple truth"' (Condé 2007a: 456; quoting Bean).<sup>201</sup>

This attitude towards the truth of unedited photographs spreads through the AWM, too. Here, the mnemonic and historical converge. The pictures of WWI servicemen currently in the AWM are artefacts which are collected, according to Assistant Curator of photographs, David Gist, to enable the present to bear witness to the past and make sure what they endured was not for nothing. These artefacts sit alongside official records in order to endorse a particular version of the Anzac history apparent to the users of the AWM. Both are embroiled in the quest of the AWM 'to write "the truest history that was ever written"' (Condé 2007b: 39; quoting Bean).

Gabriele Schwab (2012) suggests that photographs, in particular, are useful, tangible items around which a certain sense of the past can be built.<sup>202</sup> Condé developed her idea beyond this, suggesting that the format for presenting such items is also key. She does so by initially suggesting that museum curators and historians are often not aware

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<sup>201</sup> It is useful, here, to consider Mawani's (2012) consideration the 'proliferation of the archive through the digitization of the ordinary' (2012: 348) as heralding an ostensibly democratizing force. Notwithstanding the lack of digitization in Bean's time, it is interesting to note his concern with opening up the Anzac legend to 'everyday' artefacts such as photographs. Embedding the authority of the narrative in such artefacts gives it a more organic and authentic feel.

<sup>202</sup> Moreover, Schwab also considers photographs to be useful focal points for the cultivation of the self, emphasizing the constitutive significance of such mnemonhistorical devices.

that the role of museums is to provide history ‘lessons’. Moreover, these lessons should be situated in the context of the memories and life experiences that the visitors bring to the museums. This relies on a particular understanding of the role of artefacts within the development of a history. By establishing the museum as a chance ‘to lead the visitor from the known to the unknown, which is the essence of teaching’ (2007b: 34), the author is expressing the museum as a site for the performance of historical fact. However, this disguises the role of curation, at least to a certain degree, to mediate.<sup>203</sup>

Photographs, for instance, have an ‘active sensory interface’ (Edwards 2010: 26). Even if one cannot sense the entire materiality of the photograph in a museum because one cannot touch it, it is still affective and not merely a forensic history. More generally, an affective history is *effected* as a product of the materiality of the museum (Watson 2010). Ordinary objects and records of Gallipoli are transformed into symbols of national importance by their presence within the AWM. Indeed, the AWM and its ability to augment such mnemonic artefacts has helped buttress the transformation of Australia ‘from “a nation with no interest in history or historical collections to one where both formed a central focus of national identity”’ (Condé 2007b: 34; quoting historian Kimberley Webber<sup>204</sup>). Webber’s point converges with the attribution of power to certain representations, both in content and structure, in relation to identity (Watson 2010).

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<sup>203</sup> A documentary purports to do the same thing, and both should be examined for the way in which their structure performs particular histories.

<sup>204</sup> Webber is loosely criticized by Condé for fearing that museums may become sites of secular worship rather than sites within which the past can be revealed. Condé’s criticism rests on highlighting that Bean was steadfast in his commitment to history because the companion guidebook created was detailed and didactic (2007b: 35), which seems curiously self-referential.

The capacity of the museum to effect this sort of power is suppressed by the constructed sense of the museum's veracity. Documentaries, like museums, can also suppress the notion that histories are implicated in power, inasmuch as they are bound up in the enactment of certain identities. This self-concealing capacity of the documentary genre is exemplified in *Beyond the Anzac Legend*.<sup>205</sup> For instance, one episode of the series contained, as a feature, a dramatic discovery, claimed by Oliver to be unique. The feature revolved around a donation to the AWM from a member of the public. Cameron Ross, Collection Donations Assistant, identified the object as a Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM), which is second only to a Victoria Cross as an award for enlisted men. The reason the donation was considered to be so special was that the donor's mother is an indigenous Australian.

Having 'bolted down stairs to have a look', Indigenous Liaison Officer, Gary Oakley, made mention of the fact that this was the only known DCM given to an indigenous Australian in *any* collection. The lack of interrogation of the point that 'colour didn't come into it at the time and he was being seen as a good soldier' is telling.<sup>206</sup> The soldier was identified as Richard Kirby, who signed up in 1915 and survived Gallipoli. He died after being shot on the Western Front. The plan to display his medal and find a picture for the national memorial's collection was made manifest in the documentary. Moreover, Oakley

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<sup>205</sup> Not least because it speaks to the point made above in relation to the documented inaccuracies of the film *Gallipoli* in the *Four Corners* documentary about the Anzac legend. There, a distinction was made between documentaries that fundamentally cut across historical orthodoxy and those that claim criticality by offering minor corrections or revelations, which may also, themselves, be problematic.

<sup>206</sup> Notwithstanding that such a statement is an understandable trope of 'investigative history documentaries'. Indeed, the fact that the documentary entailed such adornments is one object of the problematization of the genre.

offered to collect a trunk of 'goodies' from the family which, he explained, was not normally within his remit. The chest they uncovered contained historic newspaper clippings and photos of Kirby and his brothers. The significance of this, for Oakley, was that it revealed that 'the Anzac story—the Anzac legend—has a black face. People didn't realize that for a long time. Now it's coming out.' Indeed, he continues that 'it can become part of the nation's story, too . . . people have a tendency to think indigenous Australians didn't do anything . . . they were all somewhere out of sight.'

In many respects, though, the documented investigation of these artefacts may not have necessarily contributed to the revelation that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders are present in Australia's (post-European settlement) history. The family, themselves, recognized Kirby as 'looking' European and explained that he would not have revealed his indigeneity at the time he volunteered. As such, what the family says undercuts the notion that the presence of Kirby's belongings in the AWM brings indigeneity 'into sight'. Indeed, the fact that his indigeneity would have been concealed serves only to highlight the problem of representing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders as part of the war history of Australia.<sup>207</sup>

The lack of analysis or critical reflection in the programme, in relation to points made by Oakley, means the documentary cannot be thought to critically engage with marginal historiography. Rather, it perpetuates a particular narrative. This is particularly palpable if one considers the affect of photos and the notion that collections are responded to on the basis of how participants in exhibits relate their own identities to them.<sup>208</sup> Furthermore, the link between the Anzac legend and the recognition of a sense

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<sup>207</sup> This sits alongside the policy of the AWM to refuse acknowledgment of the wars between aboriginal Australians and the British as part of the history of Australia.

<sup>208</sup> As suggested by Edwards and Condé, above.

of Australian nationhood on the international stage rests on one particular thing for its origin and orientation—the Gallipoli landing and the conduct of Australians during WWI. In many respects, the notion that the landing at Gallipoli was the point at which Australians would be internationally recognized was prophetic. The commemoration of Anzac Day, and this legend, is sustained in the performance of Anzac Day in other parts of the world. For instance, the British observance of the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Gallipoli landings was marked with a grand ceremony. It was also framed, for viewers at home, by coverage of the event and a running commentary on BBC One from broadcaster and historian, Dan Snow.

The programme impressed upon the audience a particular history of the Anzacs. It sought to stress the courage shown by the Anzacs in defeat, suggesting they changed the way both the war and Australia were thought about. The programme also validates the notion that this was the first real experience of war for Australians and New Zealanders. As such, it affirms that the Anzac legend was of constitutive importance and promulgates an exclusionary feature of Anzac Day mnemonhistory. This is because the events that are identified as being of constitutive importance to Australians are also built around a prohibition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders from enlisting.<sup>209</sup>

This prohibition is reaffirmed in the commentary at the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary event. Snow's co-commentator and battlefield historian, Clive Harris, identifies the Anzac commemorative ritual in London as an exemplification of the rainbow coalition of the

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<sup>209</sup> This prohibition consequentially helped effect a lack of recognition for those Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders who did secretly enlist. As such identifying an event that was founded on a racist programme of enlistment reaffirms an exclusionary legend.

Empire. A discussion of the Indian Army, as well as the Māori and the Gurkhas,<sup>210</sup> serves to underscore the complete omission of aboriginal Australians who fought at Gallipoli and subsequent battles and wars. Certainly, the fact that there was no aboriginal representation as the Australian States laid their wreaths at the Cenotaph was a particularly definite point at which the exclusion of aboriginal Australians from both the narrative and the Australian political community was exemplified.

Indeed, each of the above depictions of the history of Anzac<sup>211</sup> serves to reinforce a particularly dominant historical narrative as true. It does so in a process neatly identified by Jan Assmann (2011): 'the past only comes into being insofar as we refer to it' (Assmann 2011: 17). The conflation or collapsing of the distinction between memory and history means that Assmann's suggestion that memory holds formative and normative power is as relevant for understanding the power of history.<sup>212</sup> Assmann's suggestion that a narrative is performed through widespread and continual distribution and circulation is clearly problematic in the context of the exclusion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders.

Commemorative events around which a narrative can be focused tend to lend themselves to the creation of the past. This is because *ritualistic* performances of the past stage a sense of continuity which, itself, engenders a sense of legitimacy and authority.<sup>213</sup>

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<sup>210</sup> Unsurprisingly, the recognition of each elided problematic British imperialism and recent attitudes towards fair representation and legal provision.

<sup>211</sup> Especially the commemoration at the Cenotaph marking the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary milestone.

<sup>212</sup> Certainly, the fact that his statement refers to 'the past' is usefully ambiguous, not least because it permits the re-introduction of the complexity of time into proceedings when conceptualizing the complexity and multiplicity of memory and history.

<sup>213</sup> Jörn Rüsen (2005) suggests that a continual, thus legitimized, narrative matters for both historical authority and mnemonic authenticity as neither can be dissociated from each other, particularly as 'history is a part of social reality' (2005: 4). Moreover, Rüsen establishes that

Indeed, David Cannadine's (1983) definition of the 'meaning' of ritual suggests that the 'sense' of continuity need not reflect an actual continuity across a number of years. For instance, he suggests that a ritual is contingent on 'the specific social, political economic, and cultural milieu within which it [is] actually performed' (1983: 105). This feeds the idea that the remembrance of the past is not so much dependent on the consistency of stories that are told but on the consistency of the opportunity for acts of shared remembering (see Erll 2011).<sup>214</sup>

The consistency of remembering also responds to what can be thought of as the 'threatening experience of time', not least realized by the passing of life. Rüsen (2005) suggests that history seeks to overcome uncertainty 'by seeing a meaningful pattern in the course of time, a pattern responding to human hope and intentions,' continuing by suggesting that, 'narration therefore is the process of making sense of the experience of time' (2005: 10). As such, this notion of historical narrative can be brought into conversation with Cannadine's (1983) consideration of ritual performance responding to particular situational necessities. As far as the constitutive effect of Anzac Day commemoration goes, and commemorations more generally, it is the ritualistic renewal of a tradition in the face of change that acts as an important anchor of identity.

This suggests that Rüsen's notion of the performance of *a* history in order to foster purpose and comprehension can be addressed alongside Assmann's (2011) reading of

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historical thinking and recognition are contingent on a creative activity and suggests that 'narration is the way this activity is being performed and "history"—more precisely, *a history*—is the product of it' (2005: 10; emphasis added).

<sup>214</sup> At this point, then, it seems perfectly reasonable to suggest that the development of a commemorative programme and narrative that is ritually performed and inclusive of hitherto silenced voices can help effect a more inclusive historical truth.



memory. In particular, Assmann presents the idea that memory is the 'resuscitation performed by the desire of the group not to allow their dead to disappear but, with the aid of memory, to keep them as members of their community and to take them with them into their *progressive present*' (2011: 20; original emphasis). As such, a commemorative pattern is both an opportunity to continually reintegrate the lives that have been lost and renew a cohesive sense of tradition or peculiarity. However, it could also be said that identifying this role of a commemorative pattern provides an opportunity to enact a history that also includes lives that have not only been lost but also forgotten.

Alas, the commemoration of Anzac Day tends to be more readily characterized as an exclusionary narrative pattern. It is a narrative that excludes certain characters from the story and, consequentially, these characters are not woven into the 'progressive' present. This section has served to identify historiography as one performance of the past, but 'historiography is *one* medium of cultural memory alongside other media, such as novels, architecture, or rituals' (Erl 2011: 45). Indeed, it is argued that historiography can be identified as contributing to rituals, a medium of memory. Furthermore, 'documentary; and 'non-fiction' depictions and performances of the past are only two forms of televisual actors that help enact a past; they do give continuing credence to certain canonical historiographies and help secure a particular reading of history. However, *fictional* representations also contribute to the security of a particular narrative. They help sustain the authority of, in the main, Bean's recording of Anzac history.

#### *Film as an important mnemonhistorical 'site'*

The implication of fiction as an important actor in the performance of the past corresponds with a crude criticality. Namely, if one can critique 'factuality' and

'authenticity' of historical sources as being performed, one is admitting to a certain degree of fiction. However, as much as one can identify the inauthenticity in historiography, the converse can actually be identified in fictional accounts. Certainly, if one eschews the distinction between history and memory,<sup>215</sup> the distinction between fiction and non-fiction becomes untenable. This is because history becomes a product of a narrative that is, in many senses, cultivated. For instance, Jay Winter (2010) appreciates that a successful telling of a war history involves adding texture to the bare details of a past event through performance. Winter, elsewhere (1995), has identified the ability of films to affect responses from audiences and communities that are conducive to satisfying and exemplifying the authenticity of mnemonhistories. In suggesting this, he implicates film and other forms of publicity as key to the maintenance of a mythology.<sup>216</sup>

Memorial sites are also considered a medium with which to uphold the image of soldiers as heroic and virtuous while fighting for a noble cause (Keren 2009b). The 'mass cultural proliferation' of war memorials, identified by Michael Keren (2009b), is prompted by the need to include those in the remembrance process who were far removed from the war. Indeed, Keren extends the cultural proliferation of commemorative sites to histories that are not necessarily focused on the nobility of war (Keren 2009a). Alongside an appreciation of the many 'forms' of history that can be

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<sup>215</sup> Either on the basis of 'mnemonhistory' or on acknowledging a 'historical culture' (Rüsen 2005).

<sup>216</sup> The power of film, according to Winter, is the capacity it has for drawing audiences into particular worlds. It impresses visual messages upon audiences which conform to, and nourish, a specific narrative.

commemorated<sup>217</sup> is an acknowledgment of the variety of forms that commemoration can take, too. For instance, Keren identifies poetry as a site that helps continually assert a particular mnemonic narrative.

The inclusion of media such as poetry and film as 'sites' of mnemonhistory is constructive for two reasons. First, addressing these media as sites means they can be considered loci for the enactment of a narrative. This enables them to be imbued with a sense of instrumentality, or at least contribution, when it comes to effecting particular narratives. As such, they can be included as actors within an analysis of the enactment of the Anzac commemorative narrative which is not simply limited to the commemorative programme *on* Anzac Day. Indeed, identifying such media as 'sites', circumvents a difficulty with understanding them on a textual basis.<sup>218</sup> For instance, in relation to memory, Paul Connerton (2009) considers certain places as being dynamically conducive to memory, rather than as a medium of representation.<sup>219</sup>

Connerton's thesis, for instance, is that memory can be bifurcated on the basis of memorial, on the one hand, and locus, on the other hand. His chosen example of a memorial is with street and place naming. He suggests that such naming may commemorate a political regime change or death of a notable citizen. A locus of memory, however, has an additional temporal dimension. That is, it helps in the enactment of a

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<sup>217</sup> For instance, Keren (2009a), suggests that the commemoration of historic Jewish martyrdom assists in the construction of a Jewish identity that asserts itself as one of being able to prevail in the worst situations.

<sup>218</sup> Identifying such devices as scripts connotes a direct participation in shaping a narrative. However, it does so without the additional implication that they are actors that are, in turn, shaped by the encounters made with them.

<sup>219</sup> The particular example he considers is that of the home but his thesis is also a productive way of thinking about fictional film and television, too.

continuity between the past, the present, and the future. The home, for instance, does not just belong to the present but extends to the past, drawing it into the present and projects it into the future with a promise of progression.<sup>220</sup> Such dynamism is also present in commemorative sites and artefacts. They move beyond the static memorialization of a particular passing and into a more active performance of the past with constitutive effects. Continuity is an important temporal orientation for the formative and normative dramatization of the past. Just as documentaries, commemorative rituals, and historical texts contribute to this dramatization, so does fictional film.

The second reason for including such media as constructive 'sites' of a mnemonhistorical narrative speaks to the binding capacities of such media. Dramatizations of a national history appeal to, and help construct, a progressive narrative when plotting a story. Furthermore, the idea that the 'collective construction of the past by a given community' (Gildea 1994: 10) is the general manner in which collective memories and histories are constructed depends on an understanding of what is included within the 'present community'. Understanding the construction of a secure narrative in the present depends on an appreciation of the collective effort of a number of actors for its coherence. That cinema is a productive media filled with resonant imaginative figures that can extend into wide circulation means it can be thought of as working to secure the present narration of the past. Timothy Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper's

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<sup>220</sup> This intersects with Mariana Valverde's (2015) consideration of the home as a constitutive chronotope of citizenship. Indeed, the notion that home-ownership and taxpaying as a precondition of citizenship and belonging is framed on the basis of economic progress (see also Taylor and Wetherell 1999). However, the home–nation analogy in relation to belonging and community can also be made on a more experiential basis. The notion of temporal progression from a known and instructive past into an unknown future (cf Grabham 2016) is enacted in the chronotopicity of the home and commemorative sites.

(2000) approach to the commemoration of war buttresses this point. They frame their discussion as a critique of other approaches to commemoration. The 'state-centred' approach, for the authors, too readily ignores the narrative forms that make up state action.

Moreover, they consider this approach to ignore the subjective needs and desires which are mobilized by commemorative activities. On the other hand, the 'social-agency' approach is deemed to universalize the psychological responses to grief. The authors think it generalizes the way in which individual subjectivity is implicated in particular public narratives of remembrance. Furthermore, this approach may 'also [take] the politics out of mourning' (2000: 43) by identifying commemoration as a therapeutic process by which private pain is alleviated through being symbolized in shared forms. As such, identifying film as a 'site' of remembrance and the performance of historical authority cuts across these two problematizations. The meaning such sites help enact *are* politically charged, offering a variety of potential responses whilst still enacting the cohesive logic of a particularly powerful narrative.<sup>221</sup>

Out of this, then, a space emerges for thinking about film as an actor which can be deployed in a collectivity (which includes documentaries and other media) that enacts a believable and palatable narrative. Such a narrative can be considered believable if it appears authentic as a result of a perceived ability to withstand the test of time, and palatable in the sense that it is agreeable and enrolls enough 'support' to take it beyond

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<sup>221</sup> The authors do also consider the approach of the Popular Memory Group (PMG), which discusses the capacity to connect and articulate the connections between popular conceptions and dominant memories whilst also managing to silence or marginalise others (2000: 13). The problem, they suggest, with this approach is that remembrance of the past is always framed as a disjuncture between the individual, civil society, and the state.

the threshold of contestability. This palatability does not, of course, reject the politicization of mnemonhistorical narratives.<sup>222</sup> Peter Weir's 1981 film, *Gallipoli*, is just one example of the cinematographic extension of the Anzac legend. While one can situate it in the midst of a critique over the accuracy of the history it portrays,<sup>223</sup> such a focus conceals, or diverts attention from, the role it plays in performing a history that can be readily apprehended as believable.

This requires it to be situated among other mnemonhistorical sites, including arranged pilgrimages to Gallipoli. Nick Osbaldiston and Theresa Petray (2011) identify Weir's film as an element of pilgrimages to Gallipoli that contributes to the meaning given to the trip. Thus, it can be thought to assist in enacting the experience of the collective commemoration of the Anzac legend for the travellers. Osbaldiston and Petray suggest that 'the harsh, dreadful and disturbing realities of war that remain embedded both physically and aesthetically in those fields [at Gallipoli] where so many died horrifically' (2011: 177) are engendered by various mediums, including Weir's film. The *affect* of the Gallipoli pilgrimage, itself a ritualization that promulgates the Anzac legend, as the visiting of a land 'now synonymous with images of horrific and senseless violence' (2011: 181) is enacted in the encounter between those who have travelled and representations of war including, but not limited to, films such as *Gallipoli*. This means that such 'representations' should be addressed as performative rather than depictive.

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<sup>222</sup> Indeed, the suggestion that only 'enough' support is required to take it into the realms of believability suggests that palatability comes at the cost of more complex, attentive, and open narratives.

<sup>223</sup> See eg MacLeod (2004: 223-226) for a brief overview of several critiques of the film ranging from criticisms of propaganda, the charge of factual inaccuracy, and criticism of the politicking which surrounded the film.

*Gallipoli* also performs the authority and authenticity of the canonical texts of the Anzac legend. It is based on both Gammage and Bean's accounts of the Anzacs (MacLeod 2004; McKenna 2010) as well as that of Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett (Ubayasiri 2015).<sup>224</sup> As such, it built on the tropes present in Bean's correspondence of each Anzac as 'an ordinary Australian willing to do his duty in extraordinarily difficult circumstances, a testament to the rugged stoicism of the average Australian' (Ubayasiri 2015: 217). Further impetus is given to Bean's account of the men at Gallipoli through another film that has its roots in the Anzac legend.

Russell Crowe's directorial debut, *The Water Diviner*, tells the story of a widowed father who travels to Gallipoli, after the close of WWI, to search for his missing sons. The story, itself, is a discovery epic that does not directly relate the viewer to the experience of Anzac through the protagonist. Rather, the authority it brings to CEW Bean's account of Gallipoli is that Crowe, in various promotional interviews, identifies that the purpose of the film was to bring to life just one brief story from Bean's account of a father searching for the remains of his son at Gallipoli. The additional depth that such an account gives to a foundational historical text serves to buttress its status as a respected and dependable history.<sup>225</sup>

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<sup>224</sup> Interestingly, Ashmead-Bartlett was considered to have written the most positive and unequivocal accounts of the Anzacs. A delay in publication of Bean's correspondence, due to required approvals and his own delay in sending his work, resulted in Ashmead-Bartlett's account of the Gallipoli landing being published first. This account was swiftly adopted by the public due to the positivity of the message. This account serves to imbue Bean's subsequent account with more authority, simply on the basis that it was not as 'embellished' or *radically* censored. However, this does not preclude, of course, acknowledging that relying on such a lack of censorship, itself, is problematic.

<sup>225</sup> A more significant aspect of Crowe's film was in its fallout. There was unfavourable criticism of the film based on historical inaccuracies in the portrayal of the 'Turkish side' of the Anzac story.

### **Conclusion: theorizing the multiplicity of truth**

In the example of Anzac Day, one can identify how film and documentary are embroiled in the enactment of a compelling narrative. It is compelling, paraphrasing Latour (1988), because it holds together. More accurately, in relation to the exploration of historical truth in this chapter, one could argue that it is compelling because it is *being* held together. The work that film, documentary, and historical texts do in order to sustain a particular history has to encounter lulls in popular or academic attention (see eg Robertson 1990; Macleod 2002, 2004; Blackburn 2007). It also works to conceal the politicking and socio-economic difficulties that threatened the coherent mobilization of the Anzac myth and the imagery of the ‘digger’<sup>226</sup> (Thomson 1993, 2013).

The enactment of history can, thus, be identified as a product of enrolment of a number of ‘sites’ that serve to continually secure, rather than merely ‘represent’, a

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Though these criticisms will not be discussed here (see Kilmister and Debenham 2015), such critiques of the film are, themselves, an interesting performance of the truth of Bean’s account. It does so by negation: the criticism of the portrayal of the Turkish soldiers was a crucial distraction from analysis of the accuracy of Bean’s account—this was not, itself, widely criticised. As such, it formed the basis of positive publicity. It speaks to the idea that certain accounts are under-examined for their facticity and, as such, retain their authoritativeness. The manner in which Bean’s account is presented as a strong, factual grounding of the Anzac legend is, as such, reliant on the work and conventions of popular media (just as the media itself is indebted to such historiography for its ability to ‘represent’). This interconnectedness is an exemplification of the work done to sustain the verity of particular accounts.

<sup>226</sup> Digger is an Australian slang term that has its origin in anti-imperialist unity amongst Australian miners. It was appropriated as a term to denote the Australian soldiery during WWI (Moorehead 2015); it fed the egalitarian imagery of the Anzacs.



historical narrative.<sup>227</sup> The introduction of a peculiar dynamic that exists in the convergence of memory and history resembles the ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ dynamics that facilitate the theorization of, for instance, particular economic truths. In other words, the notion that a recognition of disciplinary convergence is necessary if serious evaluation and redesign of economics is to be attempted (Callon 2007) is a critical position that is true for history, too. Indeed, the means by which certain historical narratives are, in many respects, either inculcated with meaning or *made* compelling depends on a number of actors beyond historiography. The ‘truth’ of historiography is a resultant effect, rather than a rational, consistent, and exact foundation.

Here, then, the ability to distinguish between the being and meaning of something enables the development of a distinction that serves the practice of critical history and historical revisionism. If ‘historical truth’ is revealed through association, the ability to distinguish between the bare facts of the events that have *been*, on the one hand, and the ability to commend certain accounts of these events as having meaning as historically accurate, on the other hand, is possible. In this respect, historical revisionism needs to account for the manner in which certain stories are imbued with a sense of truth.<sup>228</sup> A historical revisionism that demonstrates the contingency and, thus, the precarity of a particular historical narrative indicates that authoritative history is a particularly effusive *meaning* rather than a rationalized fact.

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<sup>227</sup> Indeed, the theorization of the enactment of truths in the ANT accounts considered in Chapters Three and Four corresponds with history on the basis of appreciating the dynamism of the networks that serve to maintain authority in particular ‘truths’.

<sup>228</sup> With regards to Anzac Day, this may come in the form of seeking to disrupt the notion of ‘unbounded enthusiasm’ (Mansfield 2007) that widely characterized the men who volunteered during WWI. It could also come in the form of a more foundational critique of the Anzac legend as the identifiable constitutive moment in Australian history (Reynolds and Lake 2010).

As the building of an exclusionary commemorative narrative enjoys, as its foundation, certain historical accounts, a criticism of the facticity of a history extends into a criticism of the rationality of the commemorative narrative. Such an interrogation can be achieved on the basis of identifying what is enrolled, and how, in order to make it a convincing tale on which the Anzac myth rests and enacts its capacity to constitute a sense of Australian national identity. This raises the prospect of understanding mnemonhistorical narratives as, at once, both 'true' and 'untrue' for their ability to offer coherence and authority only inasmuch as they are supported and taken up as factual. Identifying a historical account as contingent on encounter rather than 'a fact' means it is true only inasmuch as it is expressed and adopted as such. The political value in expressing the distinction between being and meaning is evident here. An expression of historical 'untruth', dissenting from popular consciousness and prevailing conditions, can otherwise be thought of as a disqualification from the constitutive capacities of a commemorative narrative. Thus, a rejection of historical 'orthodoxy' is a rejection of the story around which a collective mnemonic and identity can form. The means by which this is rendered particularly visible in the commemoration of Anzac Day in Canberra is considered in the final section of Chapter Seven.

## Chapter VII

### Expectations in and of Anzac

Like time, memory, and perceptions of historical truth, expectations are situationally enacted. This chapter acknowledges that expectations are implicated in the Anzac legend. Indeed, expectations play as much of a role in securing the Anzac Day narrative as textual and visual representations do, not least because expectations are an integral element of the ostensible authority of such representations. In fact, this current chapter works to acknowledge that expectations are an important actor when ensuring that certain dispositions towards an event are enacted and particular versions of history persist. For instance, the expectations of Australian soldiers of conflict and its purpose when volunteering play an important role in the construction and enduring authority of the Anzac legend.<sup>229</sup> As the expectations that act on the origin story of the Anzac legend are numerous and varied, it is suggested that expectations, like time, memory, and perceptions of historical truth, are contingent. Such an approach also enables the expression of the juridical and political impact expectations have on a commemorative

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<sup>229</sup> Moreover, on a more fundamental basis, expectations also played a role in ensuring the very existence of Anzac Day. This chapter demonstrates that expectations determined particular courses of actions and plans which, ultimately, led to the deployment of Australian troops at Gallipoli. Such expectations, then, shaped the attitudes, stories, and sentiments arising in the campaign.

narrative, the historical claims on which that collective memory is based, and, thus, on senses of community identity and belonging.

As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the symmetry stressed in ANT and new materialism should assuage criticism that these approaches engender materials with analytical primacy. Examining the participative role of expectation as an actor in a particular story emphasizes this. Expectations are experiential and representational hybrids and this chapter demonstrates that, primarily, the focus should be on entanglement rather than materiality when exploring the usefulness of materiality-inflected methodologies. The Science and Technology Studies (STS) literature that examines expectation as an actor in technoscientific networks was considered in Chapter Four. The suggestion made in that chapter was that the future-orientation of expectation emphasized in this literature could be re-thought on the basis of a more equivocal understanding of time as non-linear and effected by the circumstances it finds itself produced and deployed in. As a temporally-laden notion, expectation should be afforded this equivocation, too. Within the context of this chapter, such an approach to expectation is examined as an actor in the ordering of commemorative networks and in the maintenance of a sense of national consciousness.

In order to interrogate the role expectations play in the Anzac story, it is useful to distinguish between their surfacing in the introduction of the Anzacs into World War One (WWI) and the role expectations play in the commemoration of Anzac Day. Indeed, this chapter is framed on the basis of a distinction between the appearance of expectations *in* the Dardanelles and Gallipoli campaigns and the expectations that Anzac commemoration actually has *of* Australians. Section 1 of this chapter is concerned with the former. The expectations of both Australians and the British are considered alongside each other, implicated in both the strategizing for and reception of the military campaign

in which the Anzac legend was born. Section 2 concerns itself with the latter. Here, the role expectations play in the Anzac commemorative programme is considered, suggesting that expectations assist in the enactment of an exclusionary, yet rationalized, commemorative narrative. As much as it is an interrogation of the pervasiveness and situatedness of expectations, this section is also a consolidation of previous chapters and the articulation of the exclusionary potential of situationally enacted commemorative temporalities.

### **Gallipoli: exploring expectations *in* Anzac**

It has already been noted that the Gallipoli campaign is generally regarded as a military disaster, in terms of both loss of life and the fact that the strategic promise of the campaign was never realized. The British military establishment that spearheaded both the assault on Gallipoli and the erstwhile naval assault on the Dardanelles Strait was greatly embarrassed by the whole episode. The hopelessness that is focused on in British accounts of the campaign is offset by the positivity that tended to typify early accounts of the campaign in Australia. The Australian people saw the country's involvement in the Gallipoli campaign, and the war in general, as the point at which it could claim fully-fledged nationhood (Sheftall 2009) and the Anzacs were regarded as national heroes.

The variance of British post-war sentiment to that of Australia is quite remarkable, and the dissimilarities between the two merits attention.<sup>230</sup> This section offers an

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<sup>230</sup> The Gallipoli campaign is one of the most remarkable campaigns within WWI on the basis that reactions to it were so divergent. For this reason, and because it serves as the basis for the commemoration of Anzac Day, it is the sole focus of this thesis. However, the divergences in post-war accounts of British and Australasian writers of WWI, on the whole, are similarly noteworthy (see Garton 2000).

explanation as to why such differences appear to have arisen. It seeks to clarify how discrepancies in attitudes towards the campaign have arisen between Britain and Australia. In order to do so, the difference in, and significance of, expectations between British military commanders and Australians will be examined. The utility of past experience was overplayed by the British when determining the action they would take in the run up to the Gallipoli campaign. It is suggested that the reliance on past experience prompted a failure of expectations. Conversely, promise and futurity provided a substantial impetus for Australians to be involved in WWI. The consideration of expectations will be framed by a reconsideration of the sociology of expectations literature in order to stress that expectations are not solely characterized as being oriented to the 'future'. Future orientation is only one possible temporal disposition that can be implicated in the setting of expectations. Moreover, the situational contingency of expectation will also be examined.

#### *Military strategizing: a failure of expectations*

The Anzac story has received much attention. Significant attention has also been paid to the naval campaign instigated by the British which foreshadowed the landing at Gallipoli. The objective of the naval campaign was to force the Dardanelles Strait and wrest control from the Ottoman Empire. Unsurprisingly, due to the disastrous outcome of the campaign for the Allied Forces, the reflection on this particular episode of British military history is much less generous than can be found in Australian accounts of the Anzac expedition. British histories of the campaign paint a negative picture of the events

and the one significant difference among histories appears to be who is blamed for the calamity.<sup>231</sup>

Charles Edward Callwell (2005), somewhat against the prevailing view, speaks kinder words about the military officials. Rather, he stresses that it is difficult to lay the blame on anybody in particular, or discuss the policies adopted during the campaign in terms of right or wrong. Instead, the meteorological and geographical climates encountered were, to Callwell, considered to have contributed to the fruitlessness of the naval operation. The weather, the enemy, and the geography were all cited as serious problems in the diary of Ian Hamilton (1930), too. Among the identification of a variety of reasons why the campaign ended in disaster, there is an intriguing prevalence to the suggestion that experience of previous military campaigns unduly shaped the approach to the Dardanelles and Gallipoli.

Acknowledging the role of such experiences permits the possibility of understanding the manner in which expectations can also be implicated in the arrival at particular decisions, courses of action, and particular narratives surrounding the campaign. As will become clear, the manner in which expectations correspond with predictions (Quet 2015) or the *promise* of something (Brosnan and Michael 2014) tells only part of the story of expectations. Additionally, past experience, reputation, and bloody-mindedness<sup>232</sup> are explored for the role they have on decision making and the form expectations take. As such, the extent to which expectations can be thought of as

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<sup>231</sup> It has already been identified in Chapter Two that blame has been attributed to many, from Winston Churchill (eg Curran 2011), Vice-Admiral Sackville Carden (Travers 2004), and General Ian Hamilton (Liddle 1976) to the establishment and its command structure (Hamilton 1930). This chapter stresses the role expectations have played in the decisions and actions taken by each.

<sup>232</sup> For instance, Churchill's unashamed politicking and refusal to acknowledge disagreeable advice in the lead up to the Dardanelles campaign.

contingent on continuity or conflict when determining *how* they are implicated within a story is nicely exemplified in the negotiations and plotting in advance of the Dardanelles naval campaign and Gallipoli landed campaign.

Britain's first few months as belligerents in WWI were, as far as the Allies were concerned, greatly mismanaged. Exceedingly poor British diplomacy was an identifiable factor in the decision of the Ottoman Empire to ally with Germany and prevent Allied access to the Black Sea and Russia. The expectation that diplomatic and economic relationships between the Ottoman Empire and Britain would trump the perceived necessities of war ended up contributing to the breakdown of affiliation between the two. The anger felt by the Ottoman Imperial Government at Britain's decision to appropriate their ships (see Chapter Two) was not expected, or it wasn't expected to be deleterious to the relationship between the two Empires. In this respect, the expectation that Britain could requisition the ships was not a misreading of the future but of the strength of the relationship between themselves and the Ottoman Empire. This suggests that the temporality of futurity is not the *only* possible temporal orientation implicated in the generation of expectations.

Of course, the expectations of the Ottoman Imperial Government, which are also implicated in this exemplary failure of diplomacy, *are* somewhat oriented towards the future; the failure of these expectations, and the subsequent allying with German forces, was tantamount to a thwarted promise. Nevertheless, this futurity is also rooted in past actions and commitments made.<sup>233</sup> In other words, expectations and promise are not

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<sup>233</sup> The future orientation of expectations is identified in the STS literature introduced in Chapter Four. Mathieu Quet's (2015) suggestion that future oriented story telling can be identified as a key actor in technoscientific networks identifies the cohesive power of futurity and promise.



developed in isolation from the previous experiences that temper them.<sup>234</sup> Indeed, that German forces were so keen to step in and offer assistance to the Ottoman Naval Fleet suggests that they were attuned to the strategic promise of the Dardanelles and of blocking Russia's access to Western Europe from the Black Sea. However, this promise is a creature of circumstance, contingent on the material realities of war and the chain of diplomatic failures that led to both Russia and Germany entering the war.

The Allies evidently shared the imagined consequence of failing to secure the Dardanelles, despite the British willingness to speculate over their relationship with the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, the Allies would respond to Russia's call for assistance in trying to force an end to the Blockade in order to open up a trade route between Russia and its allies in Western Europe. As such, when the Ottoman Empire accepted the German offer of cruisers, concern at Germany's apparent advantages became apparent (Callwell 2005).<sup>235</sup> For the Allies, this concern was hardened by the strategic frailty of trench warfare, which was a deadly stalemate; the Dardanelles was established as the opportunity to force the war.

In some ways, the shift in focus to the Dardanelles suited the British because it satisfied the traditional strengths of the British armed forces. The British Army was, traditionally, a very small professional force that was neither used to nor necessarily fully prepared for the nature of the combat on land that typified WWI. In addition to this, and

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However, this chapter seeks to stress the situatedness of expectations in antecedent and current experiences, not least because these situations help enact future orientation.

<sup>234</sup> The following section considers this point in relation to the commemoration of Anzac Day and how expectations are rooted in the narrative in order for them to develop their constitutive capacity.

<sup>235</sup> This was identified as an issue when German ships were allowed into the Dardanelles whilst the Allied Fleet was refused entry.

mounting political pressure on the Admiralty (Steel and Hart 1994), the Dardanelles became 'a strategic conception surpassing others in promise' (Nevinson 1918: 39). Promise, yes, but the manner in which expectations proliferated to get to this point speaks to a more nuanced understanding of what expectations are. For instance, the British Army was bolstered by swathes of volunteer soldiers and was not prepared for the nature of combat in WWI. This was a product of the familiarity with, or representation of,<sup>236</sup> military conditions jarring against the actual experience of military conditions in WWI. Similarly, the encouragement to launch a naval attack on the Dardanelles was a matter of both reliance on previous experiences and intuitions about the strength of the

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<sup>236</sup> This follows the suggestion of Michael Charles and Keith Townsend (2011) that the expectations of how a war is fought can significantly mediate reactions or conduct. The authors' work is interesting to note in relation to the experience of the British Army and military strategy in general. Whilst this work considers how audiences react to two different films—*Full Metal Jacket* and *Jarhead*—rather than how particular dispositions towards war are fostered, it speaks to the notion that expectations of war can be particularly influential of behaviour. The fact that both films challenge the dominant genre of war films, leading to initially poor receptions among audiences, demonstrates how formative expectations can be. *Full Metal Jacket* presents quite an uncomfortable account of training, temperaments of soldiers, and the Vietnam War itself, while *Jarhead* leaves out combat scenes entirely, focusing on anticipation of combat, instead. Charles and Townsend suggest that respective reactions to each film are, to a degree, shaped by the films that preceded them. Not only does the authors' idea serve to suggest that upsetting expectations is as much a case of diverging from previously established standards as it is from an eventual failure to live up to a particular promise. Certainly, the importance of expectations is enacted in the encounter of promise *and* expectation with current circumstances. Moreover, the idea that representations of war can have a compelling influence over audiences, with previous archetypal experiences of the war film genre having a powerful impact on the expectations of other representations of war, is relevant when considering the experiences of volunteer soldiers. This is because they may only have had mediated accounts of how wars *were* fought when making the decision to volunteer.

British Navy that suggested it would give the Allies strategic purchase and speedily end the war.

Moreover, the question of how wars are managed can also be answered with a nod to expectations as an influence. For instance, the development of a plan to attack the German–Ottoman held Dardanelles Strait in early January 1915 was as much a matter of depending on past glories as it was trying to deliver a certain potential outcome. The forceful taking of the Dardanelles and the compulsion of ‘benevolent neutrality’ of Balkan states to the Allies suggests that the forcing of the Dardanelles was more than just an operation ‘undertaken for the mastery of [both the Dardanelles and Bosphorus]<sup>237</sup> straits’ (Callwell 2005: 2). Ultimately, the assault on the Dardanelles would amount to nothing, so it would amount to conjecture to suggest that this aspiration would have been achieved. However, the importance vested in the operation—the expectation of strategic advantage—in many ways forced a particular narrative, championed by a tenacious Churchill (Spiers 1991; Curran 2011) and planned by Carden.

The strategy developed was a ‘ships alone’ attack on the German–Ottoman forces in the Dardanelles. It was a course of action that stood in opposition to the advice of the General Staff who had, in 1906, questioned the feasibility of a hypothetical naval attack on the Dardanelles and concluded that no such attack should, or could, take place without military assistance. Fierce reservations were recorded about whether an attack of any sort would be possible, and it was suggested that the small example of successful tasks

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<sup>237</sup> The Bosphorus strait is the strait at the north of Turkey that connects the Sea of Marmara with the Black Sea. Both straits would have been required for passage to Russia to be opened up. As it was, the Allied campaign to force the Dardanelles was fruitless. As such, there was no campaign on the Bosphorus. Here, reference is regularly made to the Dardanelles campaign alone for the sake of expediency.

being accomplished by sailors alone was far exceeded by the success of landed troops in military operations. The report was, however, ignored and the General Staff's opinion was not sought when the plan was being discussed in late 1914 and early 1915.<sup>238</sup>

The manner in which this plan was developed and presented emphasized the disjuncture between expectation and reality. The Navy was considered more than capable with conducting expeditions, with certain examples from history attesting to this sentiment. It was felt that letting an academic discussion supplant these expectations, rooted in tradition and reputation, was inappropriate. Such was the attitude of Churchill, according to Tom Curran (2011), who presents quite an alarming story of Churchill suggesting the 'ships alone' approach to the War Council. This was in spite of a feasibility study—which Churchill had, himself, ordered—being presented to him by Admiral Henry Jackson which stressed the need for large-scale troop support (Curran 2011).<sup>239</sup>

Why might Churchill have been so obstinate in the face of this advice? James Goldrick (2007) explains that such an unconcerned approach to the planning of this naval operation was tempered by the intensity of the naval tradition of Britain. Such an intense narrative would help effect the determination surrounding the 'ships alone' plan as 'a Navy, indeed an entire nation, immersed in traditions of decisive victory at sea [would need] some time to modify such a mind-set' (2007: 24). This, it would appear, was what drove Churchill's behaviour during the planning stage of the Dardanelles operation. The

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<sup>238</sup> The academic question they were asking had now become a practical one and, as such, it was deemed inappropriate to seek their counsel (Callwell 2005)! The arrogation of this practicality is odd, not least because such 'practical' planning was itself rooted in theorizing the ability of the Royal Navy and the nature of conflict.

<sup>239</sup> That Churchill appeared to ignore this, and the advice of John Fisher—First Sea Lord at the time—that the venture would be 'mightily hazardous' (Steel and Hart 1994: 4), seems remarkable.

imagery that surrounds key military figures such as Horatio Nelson aids in the construction of an idealized imagination of conflict (Sheftall 2009). The allure and veneration of naval figures and their exploits may have been operative in Churchill's conduct. Though the general impression of the Dardanelles campaign was that it was too difficult to force the Strait by ships alone, the image of Nelson and Blake both demonstrating that floating forces are sometimes necessitated 'to throw down the gauntlet to shore defences' (Callwell 2005: 5) was a tempting image of the past to rely upon in shaping conduct in the current.

Given the failures encountered in the planning and preparation,<sup>240</sup> it may not seem too difficult to appreciate where the campaign went so badly wrong. However, these troubles were only indicative of what was to come and the list of problems encountered grew steadily longer as the campaign got underway. From the outset, the operation encountered problems that would steadily unravel the plan. Blunders, including the use of paint in gun turrets that emitted noxious fumes when burnt; feeble execution, including the lack of shrapnel on ships to be fired; and the generally poor communication of orders (see Travers 2004) characterized the campaign. Many unnecessary—in the context of war—and avoidable deaths also occurred during the operation. More fundamentally, as far as the British plan goes, it became clear that the British Navy had a lack of high-angle firing experience, a central component of the plan to conquer the Dardanelles.<sup>241</sup>

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<sup>240</sup> That is, the failure to fully deliberate the plan, compounded as it was by the critical speed of the decision making.

<sup>241</sup> Again, Curran points the finger at Churchill, here, suggesting that his political engineering of the situation prevented the Government from withdrawing from the operation if and when they became too protracted or difficult to persevere with. Here, we return to the behaviour of Churchill identified in Chapter Two; the press release he authorized served to tie the hands, politically speaking, of the Government.

Compounding the practical difficulties with the plan was Churchill's uncompromising behaviour. His attitude to the campaign suggested that the differences between operational planning and translation into the execution stage were not being accounted for. Any commitment, according to Jon Tetsuro Sumida (2007), to a certain type of preparedness, due to a particular expectation, may lead to difficulties in the face of contrary conditions. Goldrick (2007) neatly demonstrates the ways in which particular concrete situations can differ from expectations, and thus prove problematic, in relation to the Dardanelles campaign. Above all else, disillusionment at unanticipated events—the causing of rifts between expectation and reality—is a key factor. Discouragement and frustration was caused by different economic, practical, and temporal conditions. For instance, the cost and frequency of refuelling was 'disagreeable' (Goldrick 2007: 27), the demand for high-speed steaming 'had been underestimated' (28), and the manoeuvres that were usually performed in the summer became a challenge when they were executed by ships in heavy weather.

Moreover, expectations of the engagement tended to rest on the previous brevity of naval conflicts with one junior officer explaining that the expectation of a short war meant that many did not know how to behave when faced with a more protracted campaign. In many ways, the failure of the political machine to appropriately engage with the conflict situation and the actual, rather than presumed, preparedness of the Navy to engage in particular campaigns speaks to Lucy Suchman's (2007) thesis on plans and situated actions, considered in Chapter Three. The manufactured disconnect between the politics of expectation, experience, and operational planning and the situation in which the plans were being adopted and executed would have precluded the possibility of mutual intelligibility between the plans and action in the shape of their extemporized

situational execution. In other words, if one's plan is too prescriptive,<sup>242</sup> it could preclude such situated action.

We can return, here, to the Dardanelles campaign to exemplify why such a disconnect is problematic. Though *actual* success began to be achieved by the end of February and guns were being silenced, the second stage in the plan—to destroy the forts from close range—was being undone by the problem of ships encountering mines when they closed in on land to make more targeted attacks. Despite this, Churchill grew more impatient and expected a faster sweep of the mines and more urgent action to destroy the landed armaments to take place (Travers 2004; Steel and Hart 1994). Whether it was the pressure being exerted on him by more senior politicians or the public—in light of their mediated understanding of the Royal Navy to, traditionally, exert unsurpassable might—or whether it was a matter of idealized anticipation, Churchill's desire for a ships alone demonstration did not abate. However, in the early weeks of March, several ships struck mines and were either severely damaged or sunk. This, ultimately, cleared the way for the Army to become involved in the campaign to force the Strait.

#### *Introducing the Army: the divergence of expectation and circumstance*

Unbeknown to Carden, a plan was hatched back in Britain which would see the British Army prepare troops for landing. The troops being offered in support of the campaign were one British division and two divisions made up of troops mainly from Australia and New Zealand. This plan was being discussed while the naval fleet was preparing to begin its own campaign. In fact, news of the plan only reached Carden during the assault, around the time that the Navy started to encounter considerable problems.

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<sup>242</sup> In this case stubbornly imposed.

Despite the involvement of the Army being offered as a contingency plan in the face of the increasing reality that the ships alone strategy was quite brittle, there was no clear indication of what the Army's role would be. It was unclear whether the Army would be taking the lead or simply provide landed support to the ongoing naval operation.<sup>243</sup>

Not even when Lord Herbert Kitchener, Secretary of State for War at the time, gave General Sir Ian Hamilton command of an expeditionary force to be sent to the Mediterranean to support the Navy was a plan made clear. In his diary, Hamilton records his misgivings about the campaign on the basis that he neither knew anything nor was told anything significant about Turkey and the Dardanelles (see Hamilton 1930).<sup>244</sup> What was clear, however, was that the involvement of the Army was qualified by the enduring hope and anticipation that the naval campaign would succeed and that Kitchener was as guarded against the use of an air force in the campaign as Churchill was about the use of the Army (Hamilton 1930: 4-5).

This, in itself, begs the question: why was Hamilton so determined to embark on this military operation, despite misgivings about its efficacy and his eligibility for the job? Perhaps Hamilton was as captivated by Kitchener's parting message to him as Churchill was by the past successes of previous British naval personalities. Kitchener left Hamilton with the message that 'if the Fleet gets through, Constantinople will fall of itself and *you* will have won, not a battle, but the war' (Hamilton 1930: 9; emphasis added). That message, alongside Hamilton's reverence for his good friend Kitchener, made the

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<sup>243</sup> The strength of this planning, then, was not outstanding either. This is, perhaps, unsurprising given the issues surrounding the naval campaign and its associated political configuration.

<sup>244</sup> Indeed, it became clear that the representations made to Hamilton, by Kitchener, about the position of Ottoman forces in the region were made 'on the authority of a map which afterwards proved inaccurate, and of little use . . . it would seem that no really good maps were available until some were taken from Turkish prisoners' (The Dardanelles Commission 2000: 18).



campaign an attractive proposition and it exploits the mythology of war and the prospect of fame that emerges from victory.

It also corresponds with the expected advantages that forcing the Dardanelles would open up for the Allies. Hamilton mentions that Kitchener saw the possibility that a landed campaign would offer one clever tactical thrust which would rally the Balkans. Here, certainly, the adoption of Alex Wilkie and Mike Michael's (2009) implication of the past, present, and future when considering how expectations come to be so effective is possible here. The assertion that expectations are temporally complex is exemplified by the imagery, and imaginary, offered to Hamilton.

This imagery suggests that an understanding of expectations that moves beyond a linearity is required. This is because Kitchener's fantasies and impressions of war were not presented on the basis of 'the past [being] represented as the place when there is a problem and the future as the time when this problem will be solved' (Castán Broto 2010: 443). Rather, Kitchener's impression of war is that both a present and future problem can be partially resolved in present arrangements based on well-worn impressions about the nobility and glorification of war and its heroes. As such, expectations of war can problematize such well-defined temporal underpinnings of the commonly held notion of expectation.

The bold and encouraged outlook that Hamilton took with him to the Mediterranean was certainly unsettled when he arrived in the region. From here on, he encounters terrain that looks much tougher than it did on Kitchener's map<sup>245</sup> and sailors whose tone was 'graver and less irresponsible than the tone of the War Office' (Hamilton

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<sup>245</sup> This was the first indication to Hamilton that the map was obsolete and the tactics that were derived from it were flawed.

1930: 14). When reading Hamilton's diary, it becomes clear that his initial reverence for Kitchener is slowly overcome by increasing frustration at the disjuncture between the task he is experiencing and the undertaking expected of him from officials in Britain. He appears to get aggravated by the idleness of the likes of Kitchener when he asks for more troops to be deployed in the region. Moreover, his presence in the region leads him to ruminate on issues that he, quite understandably complains, should have been tackled before leaving England (Hamilton 1930).

When expectations of such glory are dashed by experiences of difficult conditions frustration abounds. This is a product of both experiencing conditions that are not conducive to the execution of the plans and having plans and proposals not necessarily conducive to the conditions encountered. This is the point in the build up to Gallipoli where the suggestion made by Mads Borup et al (2006) about the meaning of expectations being the product of particular circumstances and other actors holds up. In relation to the Dardanelles and Gallipoli campaigns, expectations that were *contemporarily* being deployed were as much backward facing as they were oriented towards sometime in the future when being imbued with meaning.

The notion that meanings of expectations are enacted situationally is exemplified by Hamilton's involvement in the campaign. It is only when Hamilton is right in the heart of the circumstances he finds himself in that the expectations set are appraised as broken or unrealizable promises. However, the strength of previous experiences and representations of the past still acts on Hamilton's disposition. He seems to remain relatively jovial and pragmatic about the politics of war and his diary also reveals continual reminiscing about the nature of previous conflicts. For instance, he discusses the arrival of Admiral Thursby in these terms: 'we served together at Malta and both broke sinews in our calves playing lawn tennis—a bond of union' (Hamilton 1930: 30).

To mention his military past in the same breath as discussing the sport they played gives an interesting insight into his character and the environment of previous military campaigns. The marked difference between those conditions and the conditions Hamilton experienced in WWI demonstrates a rift between past and present experiences, even if past experiences of war still tempered Hamilton's attitudes to the present. On occasion, he discussed the merits of conflict and states that there is greater virtue in war than in peace (Hamilton 1930).<sup>246</sup>

After a meeting on board the *Queen Elizabeth*, where military and naval officials met to agree on the involvement of the landed military in their campaign, Hamilton discusses his inspection of men waiting in Egypt for their deployment. During this inspection,<sup>247</sup> Hamilton makes special mention of a Rupert Brooke. Brooke was a junior naval officer and author of the poem *The Soldier*; Hamilton asked him to join his personal staff. According to Hamilton, Brooke declined, wanting to land 'shoulder to shoulder' with his comrades—the reply expected from a '*preux chevalier*' (Hamilton 1930: 41). By mentioning Brooke, Hamilton clutches onto the impression of the nobility of war. It also demonstrates an enthusiasm in the young elites about the possibility of engaging in conflict.<sup>248</sup>

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<sup>246</sup> This observation is made in relation to the act of destroyers coming to the rescue of another ship that struck a mine.

<sup>247</sup> This inspection took place while waiting for the 29<sup>th</sup> Division to arrive, a division of British troops that Kitchener was 'lending' to Hamilton for the campaign. Hamilton requested this additional assistance from Kitchener after arriving in the region.

<sup>248</sup> Interestingly, *The Soldier*, is one of the few well known war poems that does not give a sullen reflection on war. One can speculate that this may be because Brooke died before he could be involved in any conflict, with the timing of his work reflected in its tenor. Hamilton's next diary entry referring to Brooke exhibits a very particular attitude to the integrity of war. On hearing that Brooke died from sepsis before the landing, Hamilton writes: 'death on the eve of battle,

These sort of entries appear to substantiate an attitude to conflict that relies on a particular imaginary steeped in tradition and precedent, just as Churchill's did with regard to the Navy. His pre-engagement mood relies on an especially romantic understanding of conflict that is a product of the pre-Boer War army when wars were fought as more 'gentlemanly affairs.' This is established as a potential reason for Hamilton's 'optimism, his lack of drive, and his reluctance to leave the general headquarters at critical moments' during the battle (John FC Fuller, quoted in Spiers 1991: 175). A letter dated to his men a few days before the eventual landing at Gallipoli is also immersed in the gallantry and steadfastness that is expected of belligerents in previous conflicts.

Despite his recognition that modern war offers distinct challenges, Hamilton appeals to the tradition of honour in conflict and makes use of quixotic language in his rallying call to his troops:

Before us lies an adventure unprecedented in modern war. Together with our comrades of the Fleet, we are about to force a landing upon an open beach in face of positions which have been vaunted by our enemies as impregnable.

The landing will be made good, by the help of God and the Navy; the positions will be stormed, and the War brought one step nearer to a glorious close.

"Remember," said Lord Kitchener when bidding adieu to your Commander, "Remember, once you set foot upon the Gallipoli Peninsula, you must fight the thing through to a finish."

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death on a wedding day—nothing so tragic save that most black mishap, death in action after peace has been signed' (1930: 75).

The whole world will be watching your progress. Let us prove ourselves worthy of the great feat of arms entrusted to us (Hamilton 1930: 72).

### *The arrival of the Anzacs*

Expectations in and of war include the expectations of those who fight, what to expect from soldiers, the probability of war, and how a war is fought. For instance, John E Mueller (1979) considers how the public perceives the likelihood of conflict, suggesting that expectations of war are, in part, a matter of perception. This perception is contingent on various factors, such as education, politics, and general outlook. In light of the experiences of Ian Hamilton and Winston Churchill considered above, it is apparent that their pedigrees, past experiences, access to a variety of media, and exposure to certain circumstances is conducive to the enactment of particular expectations, rendering such enactments explainable on the basis of their situated and relational enactment, too. Identifying expectations as being a product of such enactment brings the study of expectation into line with the ANT understanding of how things come to take on the meaning and effects they do.

Indeed, Bruce Russett et al (1994) suggests that expectations can have a profound impact on current dispositions of people. In other words, they are *generative* rather than simply passively *generated*. Returning to the vocabulary of ANT, then, they exemplify the actor-network in as much as they are produced as a network effect but are also imbued with a power to shape their constituting networks. For instance, the expectations that were enacted by the British in the planning and execution stage of the Dardanelles campaign also acted on the attitudes, dispositions, and narratives that arose out of the campaign itself. The generative and referential power of expectations can be emphasized with a consideration of the *Anzac* experience of WWI. The divergence in narrative

between the Australians, on the one hand, and the British, on the other, provides the basis for understanding the active participation of expectations within particular narratives.

Recalling the letter Hamilton sent on 21<sup>st</sup> April (above), it is interesting to note that it was not only targeted at British troops but French and Dominion forces, too. The Anzacs contributed to a substantial number of those addressed in the letter.<sup>249</sup> The way the impending war was received by people in the Antipodes has been given keen attention by both historians of and commentators in WWI. The most direct, and perhaps most lucid, account comes from Charles Bean (1941), the Australian war correspondent, who depicts the Australian man as a product of harsher physical, yet more politically egalitarian, environments.<sup>250</sup> The fact that Bean grounds his opinion that Australian men were ready and willing to volunteer and spontaneously drop their work and their everyday lives for Britain's war effort (1941: 59) is fascinating. His account resets on the

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<sup>249</sup> The appearance of the Australian forces at Gallipoli is the result of the Australian Government readily volunteering combatants to the Allies, which was mentioned in Chapter Two. Of course, Chapter Two stressed the existence of a variety of possible reasons which may have incited the Australian Government to extend this offer. These, and other points, will be considered in this current chapter as integral facets of the enactment of expectations that sit at the heart of the Anzac legend.

<sup>250</sup> This characterization of Australian men was no doubt advanced by Bean on the basis of the youth of, and *European* history in, Australia. The glorification of an 'assertive and forcible disposition' (mentioned in Chapter Two) of one's parentage is incongruous to the central point this thesis seeks to make. The argument this thesis makes is that the egalitarianism of the Australian political environment does not extend to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. Indeed, Chapter Six demonstrates the complicity of Bean's account in this exclusion. Notwithstanding the problematic insistence on the 'egalitarian' disposition of the Australian people in light of the distinction that can be made between the included and excluded from such an ideal political community, Bean's work is important to this thesis in that it serves to suggest that one is a product of environment and will act according to the conditions that have enacted oneself.

appropriation of a historical imaginary on which the Australian commemoration of the Anzac story establishes itself.

For instance, the tales of the Australian men who volunteered in the early months of the war and were engaged in combat at Gallipoli forms an important pillar of Anzac commemoration. These stories are an integral part of the construction of the imagery associated with the Anzac legend. Many authors, in addition to Bean, have documented accounts of Australian veterans of Gallipoli and some veterans published their own diaries or authored their own accounts of their experiences at Gallipoli. Attention now turns to examining such accounts of Gallipoli given that the generation of soldiers that experienced the war has passed away.

According to Bill Gammage (1974), 52,561 men had enlisted in the Australian Imperial Force by the close of 1914, with those volunteers travelling from across the land and making significant sacrifices to get to the cities to enlist. Several reasons behind the men's decision to volunteer have been offered. Gammage suggests that the high pay the Army was offering could have been a contributory factor to the large numbers of people who wished to volunteer. Given that unemployment, caused by a drought, was widespread in Australia, the prospect of pay is a plausible explanation. Similarly, Gammage suggests that 'men offered because they had friends in Europe, or mates enlisted, or because everyone else in the district had gone and they could not bear the abuse of elderly women' (1974: 11).

The idea that men would sign up because they had friends in Europe suggests an idea that enlisting was an opportunity to have a trip abroad, or adventure, in Europe. The impression of war as both a chance for adventure and as work suggests particular expectations of war. Even the prospect of abuse felt at home is driven by and shapes expectations. The expectation that men *should* go to war is behind the criticisms of those

who do not volunteer. The prospect of admiration being bestowed on those who did volunteer also fits into previous depictions of the virtues of war (see eg Anon 1916).

The notion of adventure is one that is picked up on by Ellis Silas, whose sketches and diary entries give a detailed account of the life of a soldier. Silas makes it clear that many men were ignorant of the political climate in which they were volunteering. The unawareness of what was waiting for them on the other side of the globe was matched by elation that they were going on a great adventure (see Silas 2010).<sup>251</sup> This corresponds with Bean's assessment of the 'innate' sense of adventure in Australian men that has been presented above. Many Australian men appeared to be quite comfortable with the voyage and the conditions, and many felt the continuity between this life and their civilian lives. Silas, for instance, recounted the tale of a young man being rude to him and a bushman giving the youth a telling off because he 'ain't used to this kind of life like we are' (quoted in Robertson 1990: 36). In the same place, John Robertson (1990) also attests to the feeling that the voyage to Egypt was a great adventure. This translated itself into boisterousness and drunkenness on arrival in Cairo and on the voyage itself (see eg Gammage 1974; Robertson 1990; Winter 1992; Thomson 2013).

Reports of ill-discipline were received back home and a certain amount of criticism of the expeditionary force was to be found in Australia (Anon 1915b). Such reports are notable because they are set alongside gushing accounts of the behaviour of Anzacs that would satisfy expectations of a noble soldiery. The negative judgments of such behaviour aligned with an irritation. The irritation felt was that the historically popularized idea of the soldier as warrior and hero (see eg Rankin and Eagly 2008; Korte

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<sup>251</sup> Prior to this 2010 edition, edited by John Laffin, Silas' work was published in 1916, under the title *Crusading at Anzac*, which gives an indication of the characterization that many rely on in building an image of war.



2016) were not being maintained. Conversely letters were also sent to papers in defence of the soldiers. Such letters accused the newspapers of inaccurate reporting of the behaviour of the men. Such inaccuracy was assumed because these reports *did not tally with the expectation of the heroism of those who go to fight* (Anon 1915a). In either case, it is interesting to note how intertwined reports of ill-discipline were with expectations soldiers had of their roles and responsibilities in the Army.

Aside from the men treating the expedition as some form of adventure—giving rise to a generally jovial, holiday atmosphere—one of the other overriding expectations of army life was that it should be treated as a job. This gave rise to other expectations that shaped the conduct of the volunteer soldiers. For instance, it would appear that the impression of war as work contributed to the ill-discipline of the men during training. Clare Rhoden (2012) suggests that the Australian expectation of egalitarianism<sup>252</sup> that pervaded social life and labour relations in Australia carried over into the Army; the men expected an ‘egalitarian bargain’. This was encouraged by the similarities between life as a civilian and life in the Army that appeared in camp. Indeed, ‘Australians would not accept that an army was regulated by norms and rules not civilian’ (Gammage 1974: 37). Because of this, and the expectation that officers and volunteers alike ‘would retain, and return to, their civilian positions after the war, and even out of the line’ (Rhoden 2012: 458), the disciplinary standards set by the British Army were not well received. These standards seemed to be, without real malice, instinctively ignored or challenged by the Australians.

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<sup>252</sup> Again, relatively speaking and only if you were lucky enough to be considered worthy of inclusion within such a political community.

Rather than respect officers on the basis of a deferential bargain,<sup>253</sup> Australians tended to give credit and respect only where and when they believed they were due. Rhoden's paper revises the accounts of Australian ill-discipline during the war and shows that discipline was contingent on particular expectations. The expectation that civilian life and military life were comparable emerges from particular spatial and temporal imaginaries. That is, volunteer Australian soldiers had the expectation that they would return to an Australian 'sense' of civic life after the war was over or when away from the line. That this had an effect on their conduct is rather instructive, not least because they were under the impression that the war was a transitory venture thus not requiring any arrogation over civilian lives and expectations.

Despite Rhoden suggesting that the Australians approached the war as a job, there was an additional sense that an Allied victory, in which Australian people were involved, would do much to protect Australia as a nation (Seymour and Nile 1991). The protection of European heritage in Oceania is thought, by Alan Seymour and Richard Nile, to be a sufficiently powerful motivation to want to go to war. Australia's geographical isolation, it was felt by many, was met by an ethnic isolation. In fact, before being called into war in Europe, young men between the ages of 12 and 26 had to undertake military training or service compulsorily, with the defence of Australia against an Asiatic enemy the most immediate intention behind the scheme. Australia's 'invasion anxiety' prompted the apparently willing attitude towards war in Europe.<sup>254</sup>

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<sup>253</sup> That is, the idea that a patriarchal model of discipline and hierarchy would benefit the group as a whole.

<sup>254</sup> This, it is thought (Robertson 1990), was another impetus for young Australian men to volunteer to go to war.

Many personal accounts of the voyage and preparation in the lead up to the Gallipoli campaign gave an impression of the spirit of crusade against such an enemy, which was toughened by the underlying paranoid racism of many in the Australian forces. For instance, one 20-year-old Sergeant complained in a letter home that he hadn't 'had any sport Turkey roasting yet' (Sgt TM Scott quoted in Gammage 1974: 40). The desire to get 'stuck in' to the conflict, and to the Turkish forces, was a common sentiment among the men. Such attitudes were evident in the frustration and impatience of the Australian forces to stop training and get to the front line.<sup>255</sup>

A variety of possible impetuses to go to war were, therefore, experienced by Australian volunteers. A budding sense of Australian nationhood, the chance for work, the fear of discerning elderly Australians, and even the fear of what not going to war would mean for the Australian nation are each identified as possible motivations for volunteering. In some ways, the reasons Australians had for going to war are not, themselves, important for the purposes of this thesis. Rather, it is the acknowledgment that expectations of and dispositions towards certain circumstances are situationally contingent that is significant. Such an inclination about these motivations serves to demonstrate the complexity of expectations as an actor beyond the linear temporality of 'current problem, future promise, future solution'. The distinction between the British experiences of the deployment of expectations while strategizing the Dardanelles operation and the variety of Australian expectations deployed when forming an imagination of conflict serves to exemplify this point.<sup>256</sup>

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<sup>255</sup> A similar degree of disappointment was felt when they were not asked to contribute to the effort to repel Turkey from trying to retake Egypt early in 1915 (Robertson 1990, 45).

<sup>256</sup> Of course, equally likely is that there were men who enlisted with no sense of expectation, other than wide eyed naivety or innocence (Thomson 1991, 2013). In many respects, the prospect

### *Living up to expectations*

One important point to recall from the previous chapter about the use of historiography to resource this chapter and build such authorities into a narrative about expectations is that these 'historical' sources must be approached with a degree of caution or scepticism about their provenance and accuracy. This is because, for instance, Grant Mansfield (2007) suggests that there is a certain degree of revisionism that surrounds war histories. When the stakes are high,<sup>257</sup> revisionist efforts that call for the investigation of the events and sentiments that most historians draw upon when writing the Australian war history are important. Therefore, appreciating that the mentalities and purposes of volunteers enlisted in WWI, presented to us in the accounts of people like Bean, are multiple and a product of varying expectations enables the role of such expectations in the development of authority to be established.

Moreover, the prominence of such authoritative accounts is also based on expectations. Certain accounts can be considered 'true' on the basis that they accord with particular expectations one has of representations of conflict and soldiers. It is not necessarily the veracity of the sources or the accuracy of the accounts that matters. Rather, it is an exploration of what is in play to make an account palatable as accurate

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of *no* expectations of war stresses the difficulty in pinning down a definitive role for expectations in unfolding stories. However, the above implication of expectations in the Anzac story has been made on the basis that expectations, themselves, are contingent on a number of circumstances. The second section of this chapter addresses this point in relation to the observance of Anzac Day, today, suggesting it is a useful means of rendering the process of inclusion and exclusion from the Anzac narrative intelligible.

<sup>257</sup> That is, when so much is pinned to the sense of euphoria and 'unbounded optimism' of the volunteer soldiers in the Anzac legend.

that is significant; what buttresses a story, making it both coherent and intelligible? In relation to the appearance of expectations in the Anzac story, this necessitates an acknowledgment made about the significance of time, too.

When the ‘romances of a tradition brought from a distant homeland and an ancient past’ (Gammage 1974: 43) are employed as images that drive an attitude towards war, one can identify a powerful temporal adhesive that would assist in the continuity of an Anzac commemorative narrative. These have clear *anticipatory* effects, yes, but are rooted firmly in one’s material and ideological environment and upbringing, too. Expectations are both a condition of human experience and *assist in the conditioning of* human experience. Moreover, they garner their value as unfulfilled, false, or realized when brought into either an agreeable or conflicting encounter with *current* conditions. As such, there is some indication that the enactment of the Anzac legend as a positive is, in part, a matter of the specificity of expectations brought to the battlefield. After all, Gallipoli was as much a military and human disaster for the Australians as it was for any other nation.

The question remains, though, what maintains the relevance of these expectations and experiences in the contemporary commemorative narrative, and how? How, for instance, is the character of soldiers as brave, adventurous, and quixotic—which Bean links back to the Ancient Greek Classics—rendered meaningful in Anzac commemorations? What participates in the development of a story that retains a continuity with the past and traditional images of soldiery (Londey 2007)? Chapter Six examined the performativity of historical truth, identifying the means by which a narrative comes to gain and sustain a meaning. There, it was suggested that the sources which are rife with exclusions, equivocations, and narrational techniques that provide a

particular representation of the history of Gallipoli are considered 'true' because of the work put in to make them so.

The securing of the truth of certain sources around which the Anzac Day narrative is built was established on the basis of the circulation of certain representations. However, more is at play in the securing of the Anzac narrative than the deployment of particular textual and visual representations. This is one important element of the Anzac narrative. How expectations are included within the narrative, and assist in the exclusion of certain groups of people, will be considered in the following section. What roles do expectations, not of war but of observance, play in the commemoration of Anzac Day?

### **Commemoration: exploring expectations of Anzac**

Previous chapters have sought to establish the situatedness of a commemorative pattern, the work put into developing and sustaining a sense of historical truth in the Anzac legend. In addition, this current chapter has approached expectations as both situationally enacted and important to the Anzac legend. The backdrop to each of these themes has been the recognition of time as multiple and complex, rather than unifying and exact. The suggestion of time's multiplicity means it can be acknowledged for its political significance. Here, the manner in which times are politicized in a commemorative observance is addressed.<sup>258</sup>

At this point, we return to the example of the difference between the Australian War Memorial (AWM) and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Veterans and Services Association (ATSIVSA) commemorative plaque on Mount Ainslie. In Chapter

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<sup>258</sup> The situatedness of expectations, the implication of both matter and representation in effecting a particular truth, and the possibility for understanding how (ir)rationality is effected in a commemorative pattern will be considered.

Two, the distinction between each site was situated within a theorization of commemorations as a locus of the decision about inclusion and exclusion within the Australian political community. Attention now turns to *how*. How can we identify the exclusionary practices of Anzac Day commemoration and how these contribute to the definition of a political community?<sup>259</sup>

### *Co-ordinating rationality*

By way of a quick restatement of the example given in Chapter Two, the AWM is the site at which the official dawn service on Anzac Day is held, commemorating the first point at which Australian troops were deployed in WWI. Its reticence, or refusal, to commemorate the frontier wars and, recalling Chapter Six, the distinct lack of presence of artefacts identified as having belonged to indigenous Australian servicemen served to bring about the establishment of a smaller commemorative site for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. A service, after dawn, is held here, also on Anzac Day, with a view to giving proper recognition to those Anzacs who it is felt are not fully recognized by virtue of their aboriginality. The difference in location, and the distinction between the dawn service at 5.30am and the post-dawn service at 6.30am were highlighted in Chapter Two as an important ground for identifying the Anzac commemorative programme as exclusionary.

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<sup>259</sup> An important aspect of answering this question is a demonstration that criticisms of ANT are misplaced. The suggestion that it is irresponsible and lacks due regard to power can be countered with the argument that one can see the means by which the Anzac commemorative programme is exclusionary *by virtue* of the vocabulary and approach offered by ANT, as well as new materialism.

How, though, can such abstracted co-ordinates be imbued with such exclusionary<sup>260</sup> meaning? Initially, it is important to recognize that one can and should distinguish between the bare facts of time and space, and the meaning that can be vested in such co-ordinates (eg Creswell 2002; Massey 2005; Sharma 2014). This makes it possible to distinguish between the fixity of a particular temporal or spatial 'site' and the entanglement of the many different elements which imbue these particular sites with meaning. Returning to Michael Guggenheim's (2010) idea of the 'mutable immobile', one can reconcile the seemingly incongruous notion of the politics of time and space. That something can be identified as both mutable and immobile is the crux of the distinction between being and meaning. In other words, it is important to stress that spatial and temporal co-ordinates are fixed properties that can come to have wildly different, yet simultaneous, meanings and implications.<sup>261</sup>

The recognition of both time and space as multiplicitous stresses the potential for thinking about both as deeply political, rather than apolitical. Times and spaces can be made meaningful, with numerous possible implications, depending on the environment to which such co-ordinates are connected. For instance, the ATSIWSA commemorative site might be considered too far away, or too late in the day to attend. Or, indeed, too early, given the practicalities of filtering out of one site and onto the next. Moreover, the spatial and temporal dynamics of feeling that this element is somehow an addendum rather than an integral part of the 'main' narrative emerge from interactivity between abstracted

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<sup>260</sup> Or, more accurately, the ability to distinguish between who may be included and who may be excluded.

<sup>261</sup> For instance, the identification of changing attitudes towards Anzac Day by Jenny MacLeod (2002, 2004), despite the lack of change to the physical entity itself, attests to the need to understand how something's 'fixed' properties or co-ordinates are implicated in potentially numerous meanings based on encounters, or comparison, between networks and sites.



spatial and temporal co-ordinates. The distinction between the physicality of the actual sites, too, can also highlight the distinction between being and meaning.

The difference in design, size, and impressiveness of each site is self-evident, but can also be made on a comparative basis. As such, certain meaning can be imbued in the sites *only* out of interaction between the two. Each site can evoke different emotions, and the situatedness and physical being of each are affective and, thus, participate in the conversation just as much as those leading each service. Here, then, the possibility of understanding that matter has, or is, language, is indeed practical—in terms of being a suitable critical tool—and not simply a preposterous rhetorical device (Bloor 1999). Indeed, the work in Chapter Four moves ANT and new materialism beyond this sort of criticism precisely *because* it can be read as allowing a distinction between being and meaning to be made on the basis that the generation of meaning does not discriminate on the basis of ‘type’ of participant that acts to produce it.<sup>262</sup>

Section 1 of this chapter also identified the role expectation has in determining how the *story* central to the Anzac commemorative narrative comes to take shape. Expectations also have a role to play in relation to the generation of an exclusionary aspect of the commemorative narrative *itself*. Indeed, the link made between commemorations and expectations has been made by Benedict Anderson (2006) in *Imagined Communities*, and it is useful to reintroduce here.<sup>263</sup> In Chapter Two, inclusion

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<sup>262</sup> The suggestion that ‘nothing means outside of its relations’ (Bingham 1996: 644) demonstrates that one can observe the commemoration of Anzac Day productively through the lens of materialist methodologies.

<sup>263</sup> Having approached commemoration, historical truth, and expectation as contingent and complex themes, it is useful to reintroduce Anderson’s approach to suggesting that communities are continually re-imagined in the context of establishing the means by which such imaginings are achieved (eg Osborne 2001).

of Anderson's thoughts on the importance of national anthems being sung on national holidays was done so on the basis of the importance of synchronicity and cohesion for the restatement of a national community. What is so significant about the process of *restatement*? One can ask in relation to Anzac Day: what significance is vested in the annual repetition of the commemorative event?

Restatement and repetition are significant because they offer an opportunity to revise, or cut against the revision of, a narrative<sup>264</sup> and establish a framework for a determination of inclusion and exclusion within an imagined political community. Addressing the notion of an imagined community head on reveals just how important expectations are. As the nation is made up of people who 'will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them', the importance of the imaginary that, 'in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' (Anderson 2006: 6) is one basis on which a community can be defined. This coalesces nicely with the notion, introduced by Assmann and Czaplicka (1995), that memory has formative power, as Anderson identifies commemorative sites as being particularly powerful means of engendering a sense of a community.<sup>265</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> Indeed, in relation to Australia, the formulation of identity is often being debated (Scorrano 2012). However, identifying sites and events such as the commemoration of Anzac Day as sites of collective memory offer an annual opportunity to recollect a collective memory which grounds an identity. The suggestion being made here is that there is a wide enough margin of permissible deviation from a particular identity narrative captured by the importance of expectations. Certain expectations are enacted in Anzac Day that effect an exclusion, even if the zeitgeist of Australian identity politics is ostensibly one of inclusion and recognition.

<sup>265</sup> Similarly, commemorative sites can be thought of as media that have the affective potential to offer a means of arrogating certain people to a status of heroism, thus relegating others to obscurity. There is a degree of desire for familiarity that is satiated by certain representations of fame or, in the case of Anzac Day, heroism that rationalizes our recognition of certain people over others (see Parsley 2005). In each instance, a commemorative event can be examined for the role

However, if one can understand expectation as being temporally complex, malleable, and performative, rather than just a matter of anticipation, one can identify in commemoration the expectation that those who share an identity are also engaged *at that very moment*. As such, one can identify commemorative sites and times as fixed points that gain formative and normative power because of the expectations that other members of the community will share one's experience. Despite differences in time zone,<sup>266</sup> politics, age, or anything else, the shared and consolidating experience of that one day in the calendar is considered an integral part of a commemorative programme. As such, at this point, the memory being remembered, the past being commemorated, and the *affect* of the dawning sun and the emotions aroused in the Anzac service are rationalized as the point at which a sense of Australian identity and belonging to this community is nourished. Demographic differences are accommodated, here, on the basis of the expectation that others share a perception of what is normative (Cowan 2001). What, though, happens when there is an ostensible asynchronicity and remoteness from this orientation?

On the basis that nations are held together by the unifying power of some symbolic or spectral apparatus (Foucault 2003; Agamben 2011), the failure to 'meet' expectations set by such apparatuses—and they are set by them, in as much as they should be implicated in the network that generates a sense of normativity in a commemorative narrative—begets exclusion and a failure of recognition. At this point, the alignment of

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expectations play in rationalizing a certain sense of what is normal or recognizable over what is not.

<sup>266</sup> Brian Osborne (2001) identifies this as an issue that a sense of 'Canadian-ness' needs to overcome and it is an issue that Australians are similarly afflicted by. Of course, one could certainly argue that the degree of distribution of people across the globe means this issue is no longer specific to countries whose land mass spans several time-zones.

ANT and new materialist vocabularies when articulating time and space can be understood as the means by which we arrive at the possibility of thinking about the situated and multiplicitous enactment of both. Furthermore, it addresses the possibility of understanding the manner in which a commemorative narrative can enjoy a relative degree of sustained meaning and coherence. Moreover, the ability to identify, in particular, the complexity and multiplicity of time has allowed for a re-examination of the temporality of expectation.

As such, the exploration of expectations set in and by a commemorative narrative that effects an exclusion and a rationalisation of one particular narrative is indebted to the vocabulary offered by both ANT and new materialism.<sup>267</sup> It has, for instance, allowed for the weakness of clear distinctions between legitimization, rationality, and inclusion, on the one hand and, delegitimization, irrationality, and exclusion, on the other hand, to be identified. Such distinctions and the rationality of a commemorative narrative do not, paraphrasing Latour, hold together because they are true, but because they hold together we say that they are true. When this truth is buttressed on the co-ordinated *irrationality* of another narrative, it is vital to identify this fallacy.

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<sup>267</sup> Indeed, the distinction established in this thesis between being and meaning is particularly germane to questions of identity formation. It establishes that a distinction between identity formation on the basis of territory (ie the factual existence of a particular space) and identity formation as a product of affect and ideology can be made (see eg Galbraith 2014). The former requires no degree of expectation; one recognizes others as members of a political community on the basis of locality. The latter requires a substantial degree of expectation of others in order to recognize them as a member of a community. It is the situational co-ordination of these expectations that effects a commemorative narrative that has the capacity to exclude.

## Conclusion

This chapter has explored the manifestation of expectations in the Anzac Day narrative. The first section explores a few impetuses behind the decision made by many Australian men to go to war alongside an interrogation of the role expectations played in the emergence of the Gallipoli campaign and, by extension, the Anzac story. These two examples have been used to illustrate the malleability and complexity of expectation as a concept. The exploration of divergences in how the campaign is recalled between Australians and Allies suggests that expectations are situationally contingent and particular. They are enacted by, and also generative of, particular spatial and temporal positioning. For instance, the idea of war as work relies on an appreciation of socio-economic relations back in Australia and in pre-war conditions. This generated the expectations of Australian men that the Army would follow similar norms.

Moreover, the notion of war as an adventure depends on an imaginary that manifests itself as excitement to be embarking on a novel journey. In contrast, the British strategy for the Dardanelles campaign was dictated by expectations that were encouraged by tradition and reputation. Ultimately, this particular expectation heralded the way for the 'lions led by donkeys' narrative that found its way into various representations of WWI in Allied Countries. So, not only did Australian expectations of the war prescribe, to a degree, the conduct of the men but British expectations of the war also established the contemporaneous emergence of a narrative that would be used in the subsequent commemoration of Anzac. The entanglement of particular temporal and spatial dispositions towards war in the various expectations set is integral to the Anzac commemorative narrative.

Attention then moved from exploring the expectations that are found *in* the origin story of Anzac Day to interrogating the expectations that Anzac Day has *of* observants.

Section 2 acts as a restatement of the exclusionary potential attributable to Anzac Day identified in Chapter Two, exemplified by the commemorative programme in Canberra. The prominence of the narrative of 'crusading' white, European-Australian men early in the Anzac story corresponds with the 'truth' that pervades the heart of the normatively white Anzac legend established in Chapter Six. The manner in which this normativity is sustained is on the basis of the expectations Anzac Day has of Australians. It expects a synchronicity of observance. The importance of the dawn service for the commemorative narrative was considered in Chapter Five and it is borne out in the expectations Australians have that their compatriots will partake in the observance of the settled upon meaning of the Anzac Day commemorative narrative.

Moreover, the ordering of elements in the Canberran commemorative programme is conducive to an exclusionary narrative on the basis that expectations set on Anzac Day are situationally co-ordinated. These expectations are the normative basis for rationalizing both a particular impression of the Australian community and the exclusion of other groups from it.

## Chapter VIII

### Conclusion

This thesis has explored the ability to implicate a commemorative event in the establishment of a legal and political community (Hobsbawm 1983a, 1983b; Anderson 2006). The exploration was initially framed in terms expressed by Agamben (1998) and Butler (2004, 2009) in order to identify how certain lives come to be excluded from or unrecognized by a community, respectively. Such framing demonstrates the juridical significance of exclusion. The groundwork laid in Chapter Two serves to demonstrate the importance of interrogating Anzac Day as an actor with the capacity to exclude. It has been identified for its ability to enact a distinction between the included or grievable, on the one hand, and the excluded or ungrievable, on the other hand. As such, it has enabled an identification of *why* Anzac Day was thought of as a significant object of research. However, a substantial gap between *why* Anzac Day is important and *how* it comes to be so important was established as the focus for the chapters which followed. This thesis sought to focus on articulating the means by which something is understood as having the power to *effect* a community identity more clearly.

This exploration is an ethical matter. It seeks to give a fuller understanding of the actors which are implicated in the production of an exclusionary commemorative narrative. As such, the ethical components of this thesis are twofold. First, its commitment to developing such an approach to a commemorative narrative seeks to add

texture to the understanding of the processes by which populations can be identified as belonging or othered. Second, the inclusion of a wider range of actors when articulating how a certain thing comes to take the shape it does approaches the question of what it means to *be* human. Of course, each of these components are related, and both meander through the arguments made in this thesis in a number of ways.

Fundamentally, if one is going to approach the study of exclusion, it seems apposite to approach the tools at hand in an inclusive and borderless manner. This reflects the ethical dimension of post-*humanism* identified in Chapter Three. Identifying ANT and new materialism as ways of approaching the theorization of boundaries and identities confronts the idea that analytical distinctions should be eschewed. Following the consideration of Lucy Suchman (2007) in Chapter Three, that ‘every course of action depends in essential ways on its material and social circumstances’ (2007: 70), one can conceptualize all things for their level potential for action.<sup>268</sup> Both ANT and new materialism proceed on this basis.

That ANT, in particular, is a tool which can be utilized to tell stories about how things come together relationally offers the opportunity for explaining the existence of things on the basis of the strength of conditions which have effected their enactment. A semblance between ANT and new materialism is identifiable here, not least on the basis that things only garner a sense of substance or essence through intra-action rather than any sense of pre-eminence. Allying the two positions has offered a distinct way of characterizing encounters between actors and the generation of a coherent actuality.

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<sup>268</sup> This is in spite of the number of ways they may be categorized; that is, as human, non-human, material, linguistic, natural, man-made etc.



For instance, Bennett's (2010b) exposition of the vibrancy of matter demonstrates the multitudinous, accidental, or unpredictable trajectories of matter. This adds another dimension to the material-discursive assemblages of ANT that re-emphasizes the potential volatility and precarity of identifiable things. This volatility arises because of their situated reliance on a number of heterogeneous and distributed actors, or interaction, for their agency and meaning. Taken together, the materiality-inflected positions of both methodologies can be applied to a commemorative narrative in order to understand its contingency on a number of factors and elements. As such, this demonstrates what ANT and new materialism have been able to say about the story of Anzac Day.<sup>269</sup>

The criticality of the adopted methodological position extends to its capacity to offer a means of rethinking definitions of collective memory and reconciling disparate factions of the study of memory. This was achieved by a dismantling of the distinction between society and the individual. Eschewing this distinction allowed for a fuller recognition of disparate actors that contribute towards the establishment of a commemorative narrative. This was supported by the theorization of temporal multiplicity. In working through such a theorization of time, we re-encounter criticisms of ANT. Here, ANT is charged for descending into unhelpful and uncritical relativism. However, the distinction between *being* and *meaning* that is developed in Chapter Four identifies the possibility of understanding how certain tangible locations are still imbued with meaning, produced in encounter, which serves to stress that shared existences does not necessarily mean shared experiences.

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<sup>269</sup> This, responds to the exploration of criticism levelled at ANT considered in Chapter Three.

Understanding the multiplicity of *meanings*, or experiences, of times and spaces renders them politically consequential as it suggests that normativity is a product of the hard work that has gone into arrogating one of many times as a universal truth (see eg Scott 2014). One such universal temporal ‘truth’ that was problematized in the preceding chapters is the linearity of past, present, and future. In the context of memory, one can understand this as a matter of presently recalling the past for the sake of posterity. The same can be said of history, that it recalls things that happened in ‘the past’. However, acknowledging the situatedness of the generation of each of these tenses suggests that—following Deleuze’s (2004) conflation of the past, present, and future—the ‘recollection’ or ‘remembrance’ of the past is actually a process that is contingent on current conditions. As such, both memory and history could be critiqued for the senses of authenticity and singularity that are attributed to them. With regards to the former, Chapter Five focused on demonstrating, specifically, that memories are constructed out of negotiation and choreography. In Chapter Six, it was suggested that the latter was heavily contingent on the enrolment of a number of actors.

This intertwining of the past, the present, and the future was also addressed in relation to expectations in Chapter Seven, too. The identification of the role of expectations in the emergence of the Anzac story was considered, exemplifying the manner in which the ‘past’, the ‘present’, and the ‘future’ are all complicit in the development of expectations. By distinguishing between the British and Australian experiences and narratives of Gallipoli, the peculiarity of expectations each held in relation to the conflict suggested that this temporally laden notion could not be addressed as simply a matter of futurity or anticipation. Here, then, just as they were used in relation to Collective Memory Studies, ANT and new materialism have offered a way in which one can rethink expectations.

Furthermore, expectation was considered for its role in contemporary commemoration. This included a consideration of how a performed history is co-opted into a mnemonic narrative that effects particular expectations and helps enact an exclusion. Reintegrating the multiplicity—thus politics—of time alongside the situatedness of memory in the context of commemorative expectations underlined the critical position explored in this thesis. The manner in which a commemorative programme can be rationalized while another is rendered irrational—and, thus, othered—can be articulated on the basis of expectation.

In bringing the thesis full circle, the same example of the Canberra commemorations at the AWM and the ATSI VSA site suggest that expectations of shared experience and synchronicity, introduced as part of Anderson's (2006) thesis of the imagined community, certainly *are* the basis for distinguishing between belonging within and outside a community. However, the ANT and new materialist explorations of time, space, memory, history, and expectation have identified the *means* by which a certain narrative can be deployed in a way that develops and satisfies such expectations, imbuing a commemorative narrative with formative and normative power (Assmann and Czaplicka 1995).

### **Informing future research**

In Chapter Three, it was established that the difference between the production of facts and accounts stresses the importance of reflexivity (Latour and Woolgar 1986). Reflecting on this piece of research, then, it is important to state that the method used was a product of the physical remoteness from the research, both temporally and spatially. Nevertheless, this should not preclude an exploration of the sources available with an approach that serves to identify how something comes to take the form it does

(from afar) or *did*. However, to a certain degree, it is a photo taken with a cracked lens, particularly if one is methodologically concerned to engage with the object of research as extensively as possible. Indeed, this has been established as the general precept of ANT. The idea that one must allow room in research for actors to express their role is, in fact, the grounds on which a materiality-inflected method is developed. It is the opening up of study to a wider range of voices that might otherwise be silenced (eg Latour 1993, 2005).

As such, this work entreats a further exploration of the Anzac narrative. The necessity of such work builds, not least, on the argument advanced in Chapter Six that historical continuity can be thought of as both materially and representationally contingent. Indeed, this itself served to explain how temporal remoteness is deeply embedded in the present; there is an ambivalence to where and how history is 'being done'. If nothing more, this suggests a temporality to history that invites exploration. Moreover, the brief consideration of the contemporary Anzac commemorative programme in Canberra means that this research does not wholly sit outside of the possibility of qualitative research.

Indeed, the contemporary relevance of Anzac Day raises the prospect of a more targeted examination of the current commemorative programme, the way it is experienced, and its implications, through field research which can build on and interact with this current research. Furthermore, there are themes introduced in this thesis which can be explored in further detail. A continual engagement with the materiality of time and expectations, tested across a number of potential circumstances, would contribute to an understanding of human situatedness and a critique of liberalism. Moreover, there is a space for the re-introduction of the New Zealand experience of Anzac Day in future research, in order to re-emphasize the situatedness of the Anzac experience and the role it plays in the enactment of community identity.

Of course, returning to Anzac Day in light of the New Zealand experience is still a return to Anzac Day. As such, it is a return to familiar narratives of the sacrifices made for the birth of nationhood from under the British Empire. Notwithstanding the issue of conscription in New Zealand, and the specific questions raised about Māori–Pākehā relations, this exploration encounters similar issues as have been raised here. As such, an exploration of the temporal dimensions of memory and history in the constitution of legal identity requires wider consideration. Opening up this exploration to numerous commemorative patterns and questions of how ‘national’ histories are established, proliferated, and come to take on legal intonations and constitutive political qualities is, therefore, a significant reason to also move beyond Anzac Day.

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