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The topography of medieval popular protest

The topography of revolt has been essential for understanding changes in popular insurgency during the Middle Ages and to distinguish more broadly and globally 'modern' revolt from what some historians and social scientists have labelled as 'pre-modern'. To begin, what constituted popular revolt in the Middle Ages remains ill-defined, and when defined, the notions are often conflicting. Riots, revolts, risings, uprisings, conflicts, disturbances, popular movements, insurgency, and other terms for popular protest are often used interchangeably.¹ Other historians, however, have drawn a sharp divide between 'riot' or 'revolt' or 'revolution'. For Michel Mollat and Philippe Wolff, a revolt is 'a spontaneous reaction, a reflect of anger or self-defence', while 'revolution is something planed and prepared', and in the Middle Ages, the authors assert, the latter was extremely rare.² Guy Fourquin went further: 'rebellion' was 'the complete overthrow of a society's foundations', and in the Middle Ages this was an impossibility; 'rebellion' had to await the French Revolution.³ By his account, 'victory was something the medieval 'insurgent never tasted...revolt led only to repression and not to revolution'.⁴ Similarly, Perez Zagorin distinguished 'riot' from 'revolution', but defined 'revolution' more broadly as an 'attempt by subordinate groups through the use of violence to bring about (1) a change of government or its policy; 2) a change of regime, or (3) a change in society...'⁵ Both Fourquin and Zagorin relied on the sociologist Jacques Ellul (1912-94) for their definitions: 'the phenomenon of revolution is without precedent in premodern history'.⁶ Apparently, these authors were oblivious to the hundreds of medieval uprisings that overthrew ruling classes or that achieved fundamental constitutional changes granting those outside the realm of the current ruling elite, artisans and, in some cases, manual

labourers citizenship and rights to participate in governance as with numerous revolts of the *'popolo'* in central and northern Italy from the mid-thirteenth century, ones in Low Countries, as in 1297 to 1305, or in French cities such as Toulouse as early as 1202.⁷ I would distinguish a 'riot' from a 'revolt', in that the latter is collective action with evidence of prior planning, negotiation, and implicit or stated demands. By these criteria, all the incidents I am considering in this paper were revolts. None of them fits the patterns that the authors above and many others⁸ have assumed as the norm or even the only possibility of popular political action in the Middle Ages—that these acts were 'spontaneous', without planning, organization, or aims.

Over forty years ago, through comparative analysis of revolts in Italy, Spain, France, Flanders, and England, Rodney Hilton argued that revolts of the central Middle Ages were largely fixed by village or manorial borders.⁹ However, following the Black Death, popular revolts extended over much wider terrain, especially with the so-called English Peasants' Revolt of 1381 that spread beyond Kent, Essex, Hertfordshire, and London to places as far north as York, as far west as Shrewsbury, and as far south as Canterbury. Some have even speculated that these protests covered the entirety of England to places yet to be uncovered either because of an absence of historical research or because of the disappearance of documents. Towns as small as Rochester and Guildford had their revolts in 1381.¹⁰ Hilton and others¹¹ have viewed this fanning out across wider terrains as reflecting progressive changes in the basic elements of revolts, their organization, communication, and ideology, that paralleled changes in state formation.

Sociologists and modern historians since the 1950s—George Rudé, Charles Tilly, Yves-Marie Bercé, Winfried Schulze, James C. Scott, and others--have pushed this connection between the topography of popular revolts and their organization and

ideology further by proposing models of ‘pre-modern’ and ‘modern’ revolt.¹² In these, the Middle Ages and its insurrections are almost never mentioned: instead, along with the Early Modern Period, two millennia or more of history are squeezed into a long and amorphous ‘pre-modern’ or ‘pre-industrial’ past.¹³ The pivotal dates dividing modernity from its long shadowy prelude have varied, ranging from the opening stages of the French Revolution¹⁴ to as late as a revolt in Indonesia in 1966.¹⁵

In earlier works I have criticized these models, primarily from the chronological perspective and from primary sources describing protests and revolts of the later Middle Ages. First, against claims of ‘pre-modern’ revolts being triggered by scarcity and correlated closely with grain prices, I have found extremely few uprisings sparked by famine or sharp rises in the prices of grain and other basic commodities. By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, these conditions may have, however, changed.¹⁶ Second, instead of women playing a predominant role in pre-modern revolts supposedly because these incidents were caused by matters of the hearth—scarcity—women were remarkably absent from popular revolts in late Middle Ages, even more so than in supporting and fighting wars.¹⁷ Again, these matters may have changed in the sixteenth or seventeenth century, at least in England and France.¹⁸ Third, against the pre-modern models, late medieval popular revolts did not depend on elite leaders from the clergy, nobility, or patriciate, who often co-opted these movements for their own political ends. Instead, a wide range of artisans and peasants led large insurrections. In the 1,112 examples of popular insurrection I discovered in my *Lust for Liberty*, members of the clergy appeared in less than 2 percent of revolts, and only a handful were leaders. The most prominent of these was the Augustinian Friar Iacopo Bussolari (or Bossolaro), who led three revolts of the *popolo* in Pavia against Milanese ‘tyranny’ and rule by Pavia’s principal

magnate family, the Beccheria. In Friar Iacopo's case, however, Roman history, not the Bible, supplied his guiding principles and examples to persuade his followers from the *popolo*.¹⁹ Finally, according to these models, the ideology of pre-modern movements harkened back to mythical golden ages of good popes or princes without challenging current economic or political structures of oppression. As a consequence, prior planning, secret meetings, strikes, and organization beyond local markets or family lineages did not figure in pre-modern uprisings. As the early modernist Yves-Marie Bercé concluded, pre-modern revolts were matters of biology, arising from basic needs of sustenance and fused together by familial ties.²⁰ Others have gone even further, claiming that these protests were no more than outbursts of rage, lacking all traces of organization: they were spontaneous.²¹ Records from the medieval past tell a different story.

The Typology of Late Medieval Revolt: Italy

In earlier discussions of models of popular revolt, I failed to recognize that underlying all these supposed differences between 'pre-modern' and 'modern' revolts rested assumptions about the topography of medieval and early modern popular insurrection. This paper will investigate that connection: were late medieval or early modern insurrections tightly bound by the neighbourhood or village as has been alleged, structured by local market relations or the family? Again, my findings clash with what sociologists and some modern historians have related about the Middle Ages. The prolific and internationally renowned historical sociologist Charles Tilly (1929-2008) has presented the case most clearly. More than most social scientists, even among historical sociologists, Tilly engaged in what he called 'old fashion digging in the archives', at least from late seventeenth to the twenty-first century.²²

For him the division into modern and pre-modern revolts (or what he called 'repertoires') was underpinned by two categories of topographical organization. He called the 'pre-modern' ones 'communal' forms of protest. For these, collective violence was 'localized, uncoordinated, dependant on the normal rhythms of congregation like those of marketing, church-going, or harvesting'. They were 'small in scale', contained by the village or neighbourhood, and were organized by 'family lineages' or limited to 'religious congregations'. 'Associational' structures, by contrast, defined modern protest, and by Tilly's reckoning emerged only at the time of the European revolutions of 1848. These were large-scale and transcended family lineages, religious congregations, and neighbourhoods. Their actions, moreover, were 'deliberately scheduled and organized in advance'.²³ Over time, Tilly introduced new concepts such as 'repertoires of revolt' and new terms such as 'reactive' and 'proactive actions'.²⁴ Yet still in his last book, published posthumously in 2008, the taxonomies of typography remained as the defining features of a dualistic change in popular protest with conclusions similar to his articles in the 1970s. However, now his analysis centred on Britain between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: for the earlier period the repertoires of collective action were 'parochial, particular, and bifurcated', while in the nineteenth century, they became 'cosmopolitan, autonomous, and modular'.²⁵

Yet for revolts in the later Middle Ages it is difficult to find any that centred on a single parish or neighbourhood or even on a section of a town or city, or any when the participants were organized strictly by families or around a single local market place. The closest we find from the Italian archives are occasions when a chief justice such as a *podestà* or *capitano del popolo* sent his officers (*sbirri*) into neighbourhoods or villagers to arrest heads of households who had refused or failed

to pay their taxes, rents, or private debts to merchants or to their landlords and landladies. The families of the accused, sometimes assisted by a handful of neighbours, resisted the officers, thereby enabling the debtor, usually the father, to escape. Yet these small incidents of arrest centred on nuclear families can hardly be called revolts.²⁶ One revolt, however, that stemmed from neighbourhood strife occurred in Naples in 1374. The neighbourhoods involved, however, did not result from commoners' attachments or restriction to them.²⁷ Rather, it was the nobility's attachment to these neighbourhoods and their unconstitutional rule over them that roused the populace to revolt. Moreover, the revolt that ensued against the nobles' usurpation of governance was city-wide. First, the *popolo* appealed to the queen. When she failed to intervene, commoners across the city (and not just those in the affected neighbourhoods) engaged in armed conflict and succeeded, forcing the nobility to share power with them as was practiced in the other districts of Naples.²⁸

Similarly, Siena's famous revolt of caterpillar or Bruco—whose rebels lived in the city's poorest *contrada*, that of d'Ovile, possessed a neighbourhood base for protests in 1370 and 1371. But these revolts again proved to be city-wide and were not circumscribed by parochial networks or 'religious congregations' to use Tilly's terms. Their targets and topography of action did not even flare within the confines of their own neighbourhood. In May 1371, the revolt began as a wage dispute between wool workers and their bosses. The Company of the Bruco marched into Siena's central piazza, Il Campo, where they attempted to present specific industrial demands before the town hall. When refused entry, they rioted and, according to Siena's chronicler of these events, Donato di Neri, 'wished to kill the wool guild bosses and others'.²⁹ In a second rising of this company that year, their demands and battle lines broadened: wool bosses were no longer the targets and the rebels'

chants were no longer those of workers in one industry. Now, their cries centred on politics, protesting: 'The [government] of the Twelve and the Nine have betrayed Siena; Death to the Twelve, and long live the People.' Armed, they again marched into Siena's central piazza surrounded by Siena's famous town hall and other governments offices. This time, the Bruco stormed the palace of Siena's chief officer, the *sanatore*.³⁰ [fig. 1]

Through the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, numerous revolts of the *popolo* also flared in Rome to defend the privileges of their secular government against encroachments by the papacy or senatorial families as in 1405, when they forced the pope and his cardinals to flee Rome,³¹ and again in 1410, when the rebels succeeded in extending the rights of the city's secular 'comune'.³² Into the early modern period, commoners organized these revolts first within their geographic-military units called *rioni* (but not in their parishes).³³

The revolt of the Ciompi presents another example of a city-wide revolt that utilized neighbourhood organization. With the ringing of church bells, rebels from the wool industry allied with a wide variety of artisans in other trades—some with guild recognition and others without these rights or citizenship. Concentrated in parishes around the city's periphery, they converged on the town hall, the Palazzo Signoria.³⁴ As Nicolai Rubinstein in his last book discovered, the rebels knew the weakest spot of the palazzo's fabric and arrived there like clockwork from the poorest parishes, which lay across the city's periphery.³⁵ While parish bells may have called them together, parish churches do not appear as the places of prior-planning and congregation. One vital source of our knowledge of the Ciompi derives from the Signoria uncovering a secret meeting and capturing and torturing a Ciompi leader and wool carder, Simoncino called Bugigatto on the eve of the revolt (19 July). The

day before he had organized a meeting, where rebel syndics had been elected at a house or club called Il Ronco at Florence's southern-most tip, just inside the Porta Romana. The addresses of the attendees show no parish gathering. Rather they came from across the parishes of the sopr'Arno and several resided north of the river.³⁶ Then, with fifty comrades, Simoncino crossed the Arno into neighbourhoods comprised largely of labourers on the city's northern periphery—Belletri and San Lorenzo. Here, they held further meetings and planned tactics that they enacted the following morning.³⁷ The radical push for a second revolt at the end of August--that of the so-called Eight of Santa Maria Novella—also avoided parishes for their prior meetings. First, they met south of the Arno in a field behind the nunnery of the converted prostitutes [*convertite*]. Later, they moved operations north of the Arno to the Dominican church from which they took their name, but their actions (as with the revolts five weeks before) happened at the city centre—the piazza della Signoria--where they first presented petitions to the city priors in the town hall and then marshalled their military ranks.³⁸ **[fig. 2]**

Finally, the Ciompi insurgents understood the importance of flags for organizing and disciplining militia formations and had benefited from their experience in the wars against the Papacy that continued into the first days of the new Ciompi government. Several Ciompi leaders, despite not possessing Florentine citizenship, had advanced through military ranks to commanding positions as 'corporali'.³⁹ On 24 July, two days after their victory, they made sure that the flags of the sixteen neighbourhood districts--the *gonfaloni*--and those of the guilds were under surveillance, but the ones they coveted the most were citywide flags--that of liberty with gold letters against a red background, which Florence's armies had unfurled in battles against the papacy since 1374 and the Ciompi's new standard of the Angel

holding a sword in one hand and a shield in the other.⁴⁰ Both flags had longer lineages: Cola di Rienzo in his revolts against the Papacy and noble bandits had invented the one of liberty in 1347, and the Ciompi flag of the angel reached back to 1342, when the Duke of Athens granted Florence's disenfranchised wool carders the right to carry a shield painted with an angel.⁴¹

Citywide popular protest also characterized lesser-known revolts in smaller cities as with uprisings in Viterbo to preserve rights of the *popolo* against encroachments by the city's titular noble ruler, the Prefect of Vico. One, on 17 March 1387, again illustrates the centrality of a city's town square as ritual and political space, not only for elites but for commoners alike. The town's *popolo* chased the Prefect into hiding. Once caught, they dragged him into the central square to stage his public humiliation before an assembled populace: first they pressed his mouth up the arse of his favourite steed and then ushered him beyond the city walls alive in a coffin⁴²--so much for the claim that 'pre-modern' rebels held their titular leaders in awe and respect.

The Typology of Late Medieval Revolt: The English Rising of 1381

Certainly, revolts that extended beyond family lineages and neighbourhoods were not unique to Italy. The English Uprising of 1381 began with the organized convergence of peasants and townsmen into London on the same day. Their travel from places as distant as Canterbury in Kent, St Albans and Ware in Hertfordshire, and villages in Essex required prior organization and long-distant communication, as Nicholas Brooks argued over thirty years ago: this precise convergence on London on 13 June 1381 could not have happened by happenstance.⁴³ In fact, more than circumstantial evidence supports Brooks' claims: indictments in King's Bench show

that the English rebels had had their secret ‘covins’ before their long march into the capital. In one of these in Maidstone, Kent, commoners discussed tactics and demands to the king, before and after the rebels’ convergence, and a mason, John Cote of Lose, organized both.⁴⁴ Moreover, as the records of the Sheriff’s court a year after the revolt attest, the rebels’ unopposed crossing of London Bridge had to have been previously negotiated and planned with London’s aldermen, who possessed the bridge’s keys and monitored who crossed.⁴⁵ Once in London, their revolts were hardly restricted to neighbourhoods. **[fig. 3]** Their first target was the Savoy palace, probably the wealthiest piece of real estate in London and that belonged to the most powerful and hated man in England, John of Gaunt, uncle and chief advisor of the boy-king Richard II. Furthermore, their other targets were spaced widely across the city--at the estates of Highbury, the hospital of Clerkenwell, the Inns of Court, and the Tower of London. These had been carefully chosen because of their connections to government and key royal figures such as John of Gaunt and Robert Hales, the Royal Treasurer. Then, the rebels assembled *en masse* at Smithfield and the day after, at Mile End to present their demands to the king.⁴⁶

The Typology of Late Medieval Revolt: The Jacquerie of 1358 and beyond

The third most-studied popular insurrection of the Middle Ages—the French Jacquerie of 1358—comprised two separate but interlinked insurrections. One was of Parisian merchants and artisans led by Paris’s provost of merchants, Étienne Marcel, against royal power. The other was mostly rural, extending westward as far as Caen and eastward into the county of Bar, bordering German-speaking regions (more than 450 km across).⁴⁷ Despite stories of peasants roasting their lords on spits with their wives and children looking on before they were raped⁴⁸ and the absence of

any surviving lists of demands from the Jacquerie, neither of these movements amounted to what we now would call a jacquerie; those in 1358 were not spontaneous risings of 'uncontrolled, diabolical madness', 'senseless bestial rage', or of 'leaderless people' as chroniclers such as the aristocratic canon Jean le Bel, proclaimed.⁴⁹ Descriptions of the revolts from over 250 royal letters of remission tell another story. Before marching against the castles and manor houses of their lords, peasants across the Île de France, Picardy, the Beauvaisis, and Champagne held village meetings, where they elected their leaders, discussed tactics and decided whether to rise up against their lords. Moreover, on occasion, they voted not to do so, judging that their own lords had not been oppressive or remiss in fulfilling their feudal obligations of protection.⁵⁰

These were not isolated parochial uprisings. None were specified as meeting in a parish church or led by a clergyman, even if church bells may have called them to action. Instead, letters of remission trace cross-village, even regional organization. The peasant Jean Flageolet was elected leader of several villages in the Perthois.⁵¹ When the lord of Saint-Dizier 'with a great number of soldiers' rode towards Vitry, the 'people' throughout that region rang their [church] bells and assembled to defend themselves against his army.⁵² Another letter pardoning the mason Mahieu of Leurel is one of several letters to mention the supposed grand leader of the Jacques, Guillaume Cale. Peasants had discovered a Jehan Bernier, who carried secret letters from the king of Navarre. Charged with treason, he was handed over to Calle to be tried in an unnamed village. For unexplained reasons, Calle transferred him to another village, Montataire in the Beauvaisis, 6 kilometres north of Saint-Leu d'Esserent, where the rural Jacquerie had originated. Here, its village captain, Étienne du Wès, held a public trial before 300 peasants from Montataire and

surrounding villages. The one pleading for the King's grace, Mahieu, had been ordered by Wés to deliver the *coup de grace* with his mason's rule. Mahieu was one of those present who had travelled from another village.⁵³ Another letter reports that a Pierre de Montfort not only gave speeches 'to rouse and sow discord between commoners [*menu commun*] and the big fish [*les gros*] of [Caen]'; he also 'drew in people as far away as Picardy' to join the revolt (at least 290 kilometres away even by modern roads).⁵⁴

The networks of communication and organization among the Parisian rebels were more extensive. They used a device not found even among the literate Ciompi. Before violence had broken out in the countryside, Étienne Marcel and the Parisian aldermen drafted letters to the major cities of France [*les bonnes villes*], requesting them to wear the hoods (*chaperons*) of Paris, half red and blue, in support of the capital.⁵⁵ Later, Marcel wrote to the communes of Picardy and Flanders, soliciting counsel and aid in joining the uprising.⁵⁶ Still later, with the prospect of the rural Jacques' defeat, Marcel sought to maintain support from these cities by distancing Paris from what urban elites now saw as the peasants' atrocities, and at least one of these letters survives today in a Belgium archive.⁵⁷ In them, Marcel further described sending town criers from Paris to sixty villages in the Beauvaisis, Artois, and Picardy to beg the Jacques to limit their violence against their lords.⁵⁸ The Parisians' battle cry--"Gand!"--further underlies their international ties and sympathies: it was to remind Parisians of Jacob van Artevelde's victory twenty years earlier against the suzerainty of the French king.⁵⁹

In addition, Marcel had sent the Parisian grocer Pierre Gilles and Jean Vaillant, provost of the Mint, to recruit peasants to join the Parisians against the Dauphin, Charles [later Charles V]. Letters of remission to Jacques in the

countryside testify to the Parisians' efforts to gain their support, and other letters show that the peasants did not always bend to Paris's beck and call.⁶⁰ For the Parisian's march on the royal stronghold at Meaux, 50 kilometres from the capital, not only did artisans and shopkeepers travel the distance, Parisian leaders recruited 300 peasants to join the alliance. Froissart's chivalric chronicle glorified the slaughter that ensued, leaving Meaux totally destroyed. But illustrations of it in numerous illustrated versions of Jean Froissart's chronicle show no isolated parochial revolt.

As seen above, coloured hoods were crucial for rebel identity. In northern France, these differed from livery worn by late medieval English artisans demonstrating their allegiance to a single lord or the colours worn by circus parties in late Antiquity, or by football supporters today. Instead of demarcating narrow factional or neighbourhood associations, those of the Jacquerie were first citywide and then employed to orchestrate alliances across northern French cities. This trend became more pronounced with the next wave of French revolts from Paris to Rouen, 1380 to 1383, that then crossed the border to Ghent. With the hammer men's revolt in Paris in January 1382 (*les maillotins*), the Parisian rebels changed their colours to white hoods to be in sympathy with Ghent's rebels against the count of Flanders and the king of France.⁶¹ And those in Caen, Rouen, Amiens, and St-Quentin, in revolt against Charles VI's new *gabelles*, soon followed suit, wearing white hoods and rallying their city troops with cries of "Vive Gand!"⁶²

The Typology of Late Medieval Revolt: Flanders

The less celebrated revolts (at least in Anglophone historiography and teaching) those of Flanders from 1296 to 1304 and 1323 to 1328 were geographically as extensive but lasted much longer than the Jacquerie or any other late medieval

revolt until the early sixteenth-century *Bundschuh*, which stretched the length of German-speaking regions. The two waves of Flemish revolts were not revolts of Bruges, Ghent, Ypres, or Courtrai *per se* but were international, crossing borders between Flanders, Hainault, the Episcopacy of Liège, and the Flemish-French frontier.⁶³ Space does not allow coverage of these supposed ‘pre-modern’ revolts, but the Flemish ones appear to have been less problematic than the Jacquerie in coordinating urban-rural alliances. Their leaders came from the countryside and its major cities without obvious lines of hierarchy imposed by one group over the other. Moreover, illuminated representations of these revolts, despite kings of France and the wealthiest of nobles patronizing them, do not portray the rebels in the worst possible light or even with subtle mocking insults later seen in abundance (and not so subtle) with German block books during the *Bundschuh* and German Peasants’ War of 1524/6 that pictured peasant rebels riding boars, geese, or slugs.⁶⁴ [figs 4 and 5]. Instead, Flemish insurgents were depicted as disciplined in their military ranks. In fact, other than by their flags, it is difficult to distinguish the rebels from the royal armies they opposed. In the case of the famous battle of the Golden Spurs in 1302, when artisan foot soldiers defeated the noble French cavalry at Courtrai [Kortrijk], royal miniaturists could celebrate that victory, highlighting the artisans’ military tactics, even their genius. [fig. 6] These representations did not depict these popular rebels as consumed by ‘an irrational fire of anger’.⁶⁵

Repression

Repression and punishment of rebels also reflect the cross-city organization of so-called ‘pre-modern’ uprisings. The most colourful of the revolts spurred by Charles VI’s need for revenue in 1382 occurred in Rouen. Led by journeymen, this revolt,

known as *La Harelle*, emboldened cities across northern France to oppose royal authority and new fiscal impositions. First, the Rouennais invaded the powerful monastery of Saint-Ouën, destroyed its ancient charters that had granted the monks privileges of barony over the city and cajoled notaries to draw up new ones, granting these rights to the commune of Rouen. The rebels then captured a bourgeois they nick-named 'fat-so', 'raised him onto a throne as a monarch', placed it on a chariot, and paraded him through all the city's streets. When they arrived at a market square, they demanded that their mock king for a day grant them any rights they desired. The following day the journeymen's actions turned bloodier, when they attacked the royal taxmen charged with collecting Charles VI's newly imposed *gabelles*.⁶⁶ Yet for five weeks no royal vengeance ensued. Finally, in February the king gathered his troops and entered Rouen by ceremoniously destroying its eastern gate of Martianville. They then marched straight to the city's centre, ripping the bell from the belfry that 'had called the commune to action'. Actions followed symbolism: even after bare-footed supplications for royal mercy, Charles executed the rebel leaders and struck down Rouen's ancient rights as a commune.⁶⁷ Along with the revolt, its downfall and punishments were city-wide.

More ghoulish and more geographically extensive was the symbolism inflicted upon the leaders who in 1347 formed a union of the six principal cities of Aragon to defend their urban privileges against royal encroachments. It took the king, Pere III of Catalonia, also called Pedro the Ceremonious, over a year to defeat this union. Once accomplished, he too celebrated his victory with destruction and punishments rich in symbolism: first he ceremoniously cut to pieces and burnt the Union's documents in the presence of his court at Valencia. Then, his troops destroyed Valencia's belfry while momentarily preserving its bell that had called the intercity

rebels to unite. He melted it down, gathered the six deputies of the six rebel towns, and executed them by forcing the bell's leaden liquor down their gullets.⁶⁸

Rebel alliances across city walls

Finally, as the examples above suggest, popular insurgency north of the Alps readily established connections between rural and city rebels and often in alliance with other cities. By contrast, late medieval Italy's city walls were metaphorically thicker: Italian peasants and artisans rarely united, and historians have yet to recognize it. Take the Ciompi: no countrymen are seen in the lists of hundreds of indicted rebels, and less than two days after coming to power, one of their first ordinances demanded that all *contadini* remaining in town leave at once. When few left, the government passed a second decree condemning to death any peasant who remained.⁶⁹ Jumping to the end of Florence's artisan-based regime, on 19 January 1382, armed peasants provided the patriciate with the shock troops who destroyed the workers' guild halls, ripped to shreds their documents, and restored the old regime.⁷⁰

With Siena's many popular revolts, rebel alliances similarly did not cross city walls. Instead, the opposite occurred. In 1319 and 1320, when alliances among Siena's urban butchers, artisans, notaries, and outcast nobles sought to overthrow the Government of the Nine, the rebels moved their operations to the countryside, where with secret pacts and assistance from the Florentines, they raided villages in the Val di Strove and attacked small towns such as Poggibonsi.⁷¹ Nor was this pattern peculiar to Tuscany. From over 600 popular insurrections I have found across the Italian peninsular from 1200 to 1425,⁷² only three reveal any alliances between popular rebels in towns and countryside; two of these, moreover, are questionable.⁷³ Inter-regional or cross-urban participation was also almost entirely

absent, except for movements run by heads of communes such as those of Cola di Rienzo's in Rome in 1347 against the autocracy of papal rule and abuses from barons⁷⁴ or the united movement of central and northern city-states against papal rule from 1374 to 1378. However, while these movements may have benefited artisans and workers, they cannot readily be labelled popular protest.⁷⁵ Yet, despite popular insurrections routinely crossing city walls in northern Europe with some even stretching across nations, it would be wrongheaded to conclude that these geographically more extensive revolts were more sophisticated in their organization, tactics, modes of communication, and demands than the city-centred revolts in Italy. Indeed, no demands for constitutional and economic change anywhere in medieval Europe were as precise or far-reaching as those of the Florentine Ciompi.⁷⁶ The reasons for this metaphoric thickness of city-walls in Italian city-states no doubt stemmed from political, social, and cultural causes reaching back before the periods under discussion in this essay and demand new comparative study.⁷⁷

In conclusion, despite the prejudices of elite chroniclers, along with miniaturists, who produced their exquisite masterpieces for royal and courtly circles, these works fail to underlie present sociological assertions that popular insurgency arose without planning or discipline or were confined to parishes, local markets, or small religious congregations. Instead, chronicles, royal letters of remission, judicial archives, and illuminations reveal city-wide insurrections of artisans and workers, which in the north of Europe often crossed city walls into their hinterlands and allied with other towns and cities. These attacked town halls with military discipline and clock-work coordination and could succeed in changing class relations and overturning previous constitutional arrangements. But from as early as the end of the fifteenth century, the frequency, character, and successes of popular insurgency

were changing, first in the Tuscan hotbeds of insurgency, Siena and Florence, and later across Italy, France, and Flanders during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.⁷⁸

Perhaps, in some ways and some places, the sociological models of 'the pre-modern' revolt were capturing new realities. With revolts and especially enclosure riots in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, women rebels made their appearances more often than in any medieval uprisings and here, as well as in seventeenth-century France, produced effective women rebel leaders as with the 'rascally serving women', who resisted Charles I's imposition of the Book of Common Prayer at St Giles's Edinburgh in 1637,⁷⁹ Captain Ann Carter, who gathered support from surrounding towns and villages and led grain riots at Maldon in 1629,⁸⁰ or a woman, who called herself 'la Branlaire' and led a tax revolt in Montpellier in 1645.⁸¹ Along with the Edinburgh riot above, popular revolts inspired by matters of faith and religious ideology became more prominent in the early modern period as with the Pilgrimage of Grace in 1536 that raged against Henry VIII's dissolution of the monasteries⁸² and with the drift eastward of insurgency, first with Hussites from the early fifteenth century and then the German's Peasants War of 1524-6. Finally, in keeping with the 'pre-modern' models, leaders from outside the ranks of peasants and artisans appear to have become more prominent in early modern Europe as with the nobleman of the ancient dynasty of La Mothe de la Forêt, who disciplined and led peasant troops of the 'nouveaux Croquants' in 1637 against royal troops to resist new taxes and encroachments on their ancient liberties, enjoyed by peasants and the nobility alike in the region of Périgueux,⁸³ or with the minor gentry, who often led enclosure riots in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England.⁸⁴

The wide-range of revolts across early-modern Western and Eastern Europe needs to be further investigated through the primary sources; nonetheless, our

present knowledge of these later insurrections cast doubts on these sociological models as ideal types for revolts of the sixteenth and seventeenth century anywhere in Europe. As discovered thirty years ago, women were not the predominate participants even in food riots or enclosure movements.⁸⁵ Nor was the food riot, despite the increasingly prevalence of scarcity or famine, provoked by climatic changes, war, excessive taxation, and the billeting of excessive numbers of troops and their animals emblematic of the early modern revolt. During the Italian wars in Italy, 1494 to 1559, for instance, when drought, flooding, or wind storms, coupled with war, sacks of cities and villages, and increased taxation, drove communities to starvation, abandonment of their homes, and mass migration,⁸⁶ food riots remained rare, either ones that attacked grain deposits and bakers' shops or those whose crowds, comprised principally of women and children, rushed on bakeries or grain distribution centres, screaming 'Misericordia'.⁸⁷ Nor do women rebels increase ubiquitously during the early modern period. In Italy, women leaders akin to la Branlaire or Captain Ann Carter fail to appear at least for the sixteenth century.⁸⁸ The closest approximation I have thus far found comes from Pisa's revolt against Florentine domination, 1496 to 1509, when in 1499 and 1505 a woman, never named by any of the sources, was called a captain (*capitania*) and led two separate military squadrons of women soldiers against the Florentines and their allies.⁸⁹ Otherwise, women rebels appear as invisible in late fifteenth- and sixteenth-century revolts as they had in the Middle Ages.⁹⁰

Yet the most crowning of mismatches between the historical record of the early modern period and present models of 'pre-modern' insurrection regards topography, notions that these later revolts, supposedly like the medieval ones, were 'small in scale', confined to a village or neighbourhood, even if enclosure riots in

sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England could on occasion be confined to a single village or locality.⁹¹ Instead, with the centre of gravity of popular insurrection moving eastwards--the 'Great Revolt' of Dosza in Hungary in 1514, the Bundschuh revolts across German-speaking regions during the first decades of the sixteenth century, the German Peasants' War of 1524–26 that stretched eastward from Alsace into present-day Austria and across the Trentino and Friuli in north-eastern Italy, followed in seventeenth-century with the Russian revolts of Bolotnikov in 1606 to 1607 and Stenka Razin's in 1667 to 1671, the topography of insurrection became more extensive than anything known to the Middle Ages, crossing national boundaries, linguistic groups, and thousands of kilometres.⁹²

In contrast to trends in late medieval and early modern historiography that have argued for the continuities of 'traditional' societies across the medieval/early modern divide, popular protest illustrates differences from the late fourteenth to the sixteenth century. In places such as northern Italy with new cultural divisions within the labouring classes, greater powers of states to suppress any challenges from below, and the decline in powers and status of artisan guilds,⁹³ this was a history moving backwards as far as artisan rights, equality, and early notions of democracy are concerned. These changes from the late Middle Ages to the sixteenth century call for new documentary investigation and new models. It is now clear that no simple binary model will work, no matter what it is called. Our next assignment is to construct these models in ways that countenance the wide variations and contrary shifts over time and place in the composition of crowds, social origins of leaders, roles of women, mechanisms of organization and communication, symbols and rituals, and the aims and ideologies of popular rebels.

¹ See for instance the essays in *Resistance, Representation, and Community*, ed. P. Blickle (Oxford, 1997). Furthermore, Charles Tilly ('Introduction' to *Class Conflict and Collective Action* [Beverly Hills, 1981]) held that distinctions should not be made between terms such as 'protest', 'rebellion', 'disorder', and 'disturbance'; such terms 'prejudge the intentions and political position of the actors, usually from the perspective of authorities' (17). In other places, such as *European Revolutions 1492-1992* (Oxford, 1993), however, Tilly strove to script 'a more precise definition', at least of 'revolution': that it was 'a forcible transfer of power over a state, in the course of which at least two distinct blocs of contenders make incompatible claims to control the state...' (8). He did not then claim that no revolutions happen in the Middle Ages but in this book none of his examples preceded the late fifteenth century; they essentially begin only with Henry VIII's suppression of the monasteries in 1536.

² M. Mollat and P. Wolff, *The Popular Revolutions of the Late Middle Ages*, trans. A.L. Lytton-Sells (London, 1973; French ed., 1970)

³ G. Fourquin, *Anatomy of Popular Rebellion in the Middle Ages*, trans. A. Chesters (Amsterdam, 1978), 20-1, 24-5, 83, 101-2, and 109; citation on p. 20.

⁴ *ibid.*, 25.

⁵ P. Zagorin, *Rebels and Rulers, 1500-1660: Vol I. Society, States, and Early Modern Revolution: Agrarian and urban rebellions* (Cambridge, 1982), 3-28, citation on p. 17.

⁶ Zagorin, *op. cit.*, 22; Fourquin, *op. cit.*, 20-22.

⁷ Among other places, see S. Cohn, *Lust for Liberty: The politics of social revolt in medieval Europe* (Cambridge, Ma., 2006), 5, 7, 32-3, 53-7, 200, 209, 239; and for Toulouse, J.H. Mundy, *Liberty and Political Power in Toulouse 1050-1230* (New York, 1954), 67.

⁸ See note 11.

⁹ R.H. Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free: Medieval peasant movements and the English rising of 1381*, with new introduction by C. Dyer (London, 2005).

¹⁰ R.B. Dobson, 'The Rising in York, Beverley and Scarborough, 1380–1381', in *The English Rising of 1381*, ed. R.H. Hilton and T.H. Aston (Cambridge 1984), 112–13.

Much earlier, the prodigious research of A. Réville and C. Petit-Dutaillis, *Le soulèvement des travailleurs d'Angleterre en 1381* (Paris, 1898) and later that of A. Prescott, 'Judicial Records of the Rising of 1381' (Ph.D, Bedford College, University of London, 1984), have shown the wide geographical sweep of English revolts in 1381.

¹¹ C. Wickham, *Framing of the Early Middle Ages* (Oxford, 2005), ch. 9: 'Peasant Society and its problems' (518-88).

¹² Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (Westport, Ct., 1959); Tilly, 'How Protest Modernized in France, 1845–1855', in *The Dimension of Quantitative Research*, W. Aydelotte, A. Bogue, and R. Fogel, eds. (Princeton, 1972), 380–455; idem, 'Hauptformen kollektiver Aktion in Westeuropa, 1500–1975', in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* (1975): Heft 2: *Sozialer Protest*, R. Tilly, ed. (Göttingen, 1977), 154–163; idem, *European Revolutions, op. cit.*; and idem, *Contentious Performances* (Cambridge, 2008); Bercé, *Histoire des croquants: étude des soulèvements populaires au XVIIe siècle dans le sud-ouest de la France* (Geneva, 1974); idem, *Modern Europe: An Essay on the History of Political Violence*, trans. J. Bergin (Manchester, 1987); idem, *History of Peasant Revolts: The social origins of rebellion in early modern France*, trans. A. Whitmore (Cambridge, 1990); Schulze, 'Peasant Resistance in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Germany in a European Context', in *Religion, Politics and Social Protest: Three studies on early modern Germany*, ed.

K. van Greyerz (London, 1984), 61-98; J. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven, 1985); P. Crone, *Pre-Industrial Societies* (Oxford, 1989), 75; and D. Sabean, 'The Communal Basis of Pre-1800 Peasant Uprisings in Western Europe', *Comparative Politics*, 8 (1976), 355–364.

¹³ In some of his work, Tilly was exceptional in paying greater attention to changes in the 'repertoires' of popular protest through the Middle Ages and early modern period but without questioning the supposedly more crucial divide that occurred in the mid-nineteenth century between modern and pre-modern forms of revolt.

¹⁴ See Rudé, *op. cit.*

¹⁵ See Scott, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ See for instance H. Kamen, *The Iron Century: Social Change in Europe 1550–1660* (London, 1971).

¹⁷ See Cohn, *Lust for Liberty, op. cit.*, 131.

¹⁸ See for instance, N.Z. Davis, 'Women on top', in *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (Stanford, CA., 1975); J. Walter, *Crowds and Popular Politics in Early Modern England* (Manchester, 2006), 49–58. However, my current research on popular insurrection in sixteenth-century Italy shows no substantial change in women's role in popular insurgency. The case of women 'captains' in Pisa in 1500, leading battalions of women in the city's struggle for independence from Florence is a striking exception. Yet, even here, none of these women are named.

¹⁹ *Lust for Liberty, op. cit.*, 114-15, 199.

²⁰ Bercé, *History of Peasant Revolts*, 174-5; and idem, *Revolt and Revolution*, 106.

Also see J. Delumeau, *La peur en Occident (XIVe–XVIIIe siècles): Une cité assiégée* (Paris, 1978), 181–2, for similar claims concerning women's participation in revolts from pre-history to Baader Meinhoff

²¹ Zagorin, *op. cit.* 20.

²² Most strikingly, see his *Vendée* (London, 1964) and *The Contentious French* (Cambridge, Ma., 1986).

²³ Tilly, 'How Protest Modernized', *op. cit.*, 199; also see Cohn, *The Laboring Classes*, *op. cit.*, 134-5.

²⁴ C. Tilly, 'Hauptformen kollektiver Aktion in Westeuropa, 1500-1975', in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* (1975): Heft 2: *Sozialer Protest*, ed. Richard Tilly (Göttingen, 1977): 154-63. On Tilly's changes of mind, concepts, and vocabulary; see Michael Hanagan, 'Charles Tilly and Violent France', *French Historical Studies*, 33 (2010) 283-96. and M. Van Der Linden, 'Charles Tilly's Historical Sociology', *International Review of Social History* 54 (2009), 237-74, esp. 255-9.

²⁵ C. Tilly, *Contentious Performances* (Cambridge, 2008), 14-15 and 44-5.

²⁶ For 52 such incidents, see Cohn, *Creating the Florentine State: Peasants and rebellion, 1348 – 1434* (Cambridge, 1999), 145; and idem, *Women in the Streets: Essays in Sex and Power in Renaissance Italy* (Baltimore, 1996),

²⁷ Capuane, Nidi, 'and other squares'.

²⁸ *Cronicon Siculum incertis authoris ab a. 340 ad a. 1396*, ed. J. de Blasiis, *Monumenti storici, ser 1a: Cronache* (Naples, 1887), 27; and Cohn, *Lust for Liberty*, *op. cit.*, 77.

²⁹ *Cronaca senese di Donato di Neri e di suo figlio Neri* in *Cronache senesi*, ed. A. Lisini and F. Iacometti, *Rerum Italicarum Scrittores* [hereafter, RIS], XV/6 (Bologna, 1936), I, 639-40; Cohn, *Popular Protest*, *op. cit.*, doc. n. 83.

³⁰ *Cronaca senese di Donato di Neri*, *op. cit.*, I, 640-2.

³¹ Laurentius Bonincontri Miniatisensis, *Annales an anno MCCLX usque MCCCCLVIII*, ed. L. Muratori, *Rerum Italicarum Scrittores*, 21 (Milan, 1731), col. 93.

³² *Cronaca Gestorum ac factorum memorabilium civitatis Bononie a Fratre Hyeronimo de Bursellis [ab urbe condita ad a. 1497]*, ed. Albano Sorbelli, RIS, 23/2 (Città di Castello, 1911-29), 71.

³³ Cohn, *Lust for Liberty*, *op. cit.*, 77, 181.

³⁴ There are many descriptions of these events, see most recently the thoroughgoing analysis of E. Screpanti, *L'angelo della liberazione nel tumulto dei Ciompi: Firenze, giugno-agosto 1378* (Siena, 2008). Both Trexler (*op. cit.*) and N. Eckstein, *The District of the Green Dragon: Neighbourhood Life and Social Change in Renaissance Florence* (Florence, 1995), 13, have emphasized the importance of Ciompi rebels south of the Arno and in the case of Eckstein, one district alone, Camaldoli, in the southwest corner of Florence for both the July and August revolts of 1378. However, as their descriptive evidence and the clockwork coordination on the Palazzo della Signoria from all four quarters reveal, the insurgents during these revolts came from all quarters of the city and did not rely on a single neighbourhood or geographical district.

³⁵ Rubinstein, *The Palazzo Vecchio 1298-1532: Government, architecture, and imagery in the civic palace of the Florentine republic* (Oxford, 1995), 17.

³⁶ Cohn, *Lust for Liberty*, *op. cit.*, 125, 193.

³⁷ R. Trexler, 'Neighbours and Comrades: The revolutionaries of Florence, 1378', *Social Analysis*, no. 14 (December 1983), 56-7.

³⁸ N. Rodolico, *La Democrazia fiorentina nel suo tramonto (1378-1382)* (Bologna, 1905), Doc. I, pp. 441-5.

³⁹ On their previous military experience and the advancement of future Ciompi leaders, see Screpanti, *op. cit.*, 119-20; G. Brucker, 'The Ciompi Revolution', in

Florentine Studies: Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (Evanston, 1968), 329; and Trexler, *op. cit.*, 64, 67, and 97-100.

⁴⁰ Screpanti, *op. cit.*; Trexler, *op. cit.*, 56-60, 64-7.

⁴¹ *Cronaca fiorentina di Marchionne di Coppo Stefani*, ed. N. Rodolico, RIS, XXX/1 (Città di Castello, 1903), 199-200.

⁴² Niccola della Tuccia, *Cronache di Viterbo e di altre città*, in *Cronache e statuti della città di Viterbo*, ed. I. Ciampi, Documenti di Storia Italiana, V (Florence, 1872), 40. That night, they sent him naked out of the city in a casket. Next, the *popolo* went after the prefect's bastard son, who had killed the father of a rebel leader. The Prefect's son fared worse than his father. They skinned him alive [*e tagliare a pezzi vivo*] and fed his flesh to hungry dogs; *ibid.*

⁴³ Brooks, 'The Organization and Achievements of the Peasants of Kent and Essex in 1381', in *Studies in Medieval History Presented to R.H.C. Davis*, ed. H. Mayr-Harting and R.I. Moore. (London, 1985), pp. 247–70.

⁴⁴ Cohn, *op. cit.*, *Popular Protest in Late Medieval English Towns*, *op. cit.*, 247; and A. Prescott, *op. cit.*, 233-5.

⁴⁵ Cohn, *op. cit.*, *Popular Protest in Late Medieval English Towns*, 324-5.

⁴⁶ For these places, targets, and events, see documents in R.B. Dobson, *The Peasants' Revolt of 1381*, 2nd ed. (London, 1983); and Hilton, *op. cit.*, ch. 4: 'The events of the rising', 137-43.

⁴⁷ For these sources, see S. Luce, *Histoire de la Jacquerie d'après des documents inédits*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1894); Cohn, *Popular protest in late medieval Europe: Italy, France, and Flanders*, Medieval Sources Series (Manchester, 2004), chs 3 and 5; D. Aiton, "'Shame on him who allows them to live": The Jacquerie of 1358' (Ph.D., University of Glasgow, 2007); and J. Firnhaber-Baker, 'The eponymous Jacquerie:

making revolt mean some things', in *The Routledge History Handbook*, *op. cit.*, 55-75; and Firnhaber-Baker, 'The Social Constituency of the Jacquerie of 1358', to appear in *Speculum*.

⁴⁸ Most famously alleged in the chronicles of Jean le Bel and Jean Froissart, see Cohn, *Popular Protest*, *op. cit.*, doc. nos. 91 and 92.

⁴⁹ *Chronique de Jean le Bel*, ed. J. Viard and Eugène Déprez, Société de l'histoire de France (hereafter, SHF), CCCXVII (Paris, 1904-5), 2 vols, I, pp. 255-62; and *Popular Protest*, doc n. 91.

⁵⁰ Cohn, *Popular Protest*, *op. cit.*, doc. nos. 108-15.

⁵¹ *ibid.*, doc. no. 114.

⁵² *ibid.*

⁵³ *ibid.*, doc. no. 115.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*, doc. no. 113. For further examples, see Aiton, "Shame on him", *op. cit.*, and Firnhaber-Baker, 'The Social Constituency of the Jacquerie', *op. cit.*.

⁵⁵ *Chronique des règnes de Jean II et de Charles V*, ed. R. Delachenal. 4 vols, SHF, CCCXLVIII, (Paris, 1910-20), I, 130 and 158-9.

⁵⁶ Cohn, *Popular Protest*, *op. cit.*, doc. no. 101, which refers to 300 confidential letters sent out to villagers (177); and Cohn, *Lust for Liberty*, *op. cit.*, 298, note 29.

⁵⁷ 'Lettre d'Étienne Marcel aux communes de Picardie et de Flandre', in *Œuvres de Froissart*, ed. K. de Lettenhove (Brussels, 1868), VI, pp. 470-1; and Cohn, *Popular Protest*, doc. no. 101. He also made a specific appeal to Ghent, which inspired the weavers to revolt against the Flemish nobility in 1359 and 1360; see W. Prevenier and M. Boone, 'The "City-state" Dream (1300-1500)', in *Ghent: In defence of a rebellious city: history, art, culture*, ed. J. Decavele and H. Balthazar (Antwerp, 1989), 87.

⁵⁸ Cohn, *Popular Protest*, *op. cit.*, doc. no. 101.

⁵⁹ Jacques d'Avout, *Le Meutre d'Etienne Marcel* (Paris, 1960), 303-10; and W. Blockmans and W. Prevenier, *The Promised Lands: The Low Countries under Burgundian rule, 1369-1530*, ed. E. Peters, trans. E. Fackelman (Philadelphia, 1999; Houten, 1988), 10.

⁶⁰ Luce, *op. cit.*, 263-4.

⁶¹ On the 'White Hoods' of Ghent, a gang that in 1379 terrorized the rural population and attacked workers who were digging the New Leie to divert trade from Ghent, see D. Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders* (London, 1992), 228; and Prevenier and Boone, *op. cit.*, 90-3.

⁶² For these chants, see L. Mirot, *Les insurrections urbaines au début du Règne de Charles VI (1380-1383): Leurs causes, leurs conséquences* (Paris, 1905), 92, 98, and 110. The same impression is given by Froissart. His description of Philip van Artevelde and the revolt of Ghent fills two chapters and twelve pages in the latest edition based on the Pierpont Morgan Library manuscript (*Jean Froissart Chroniques, Livres I et II*, ed. P. Ainsworth and G. Diller [Paris, 2001], 849-60), while the Maillotins of Paris are confined to one paragraph at the end of a chapter on famine and war preparations in Ghent (853-4). Further, Froissart presents the hammer men's uprising, not as a popular revolt, but as one of 'the rich and powerful' with their "valets armed to the nines".

⁶³ See J. Dumolyn and Y. Haemers, 'Patterns of Urban Rebellion in Medieval Flanders', *Journal of Medieval History* 31 (2005). An example of rebel recruitment across cities is found in an inquest following the defeat of the Flemish rebels at Cassel in 1328: an anonymous rebel from Bruges confessed to having had ties with

rebels from the city of Geraardsbergen, who had brought him into contact with rebel weavers in Ghent; cited in *ibid.*

⁶⁴ R.W. Scribner, 'Images of the Peasant, 1514-1525', in *The German Peasant War*, ed. Janos Bak (London, 1976), 29-48.

⁶⁵ See the comprehensive survey and analysis of J. Haemers and V. Challet, 'La révolte médiévale en image', in *Images & Révoltes dans le livre et l'estampe (XIV^e-milieu du XVIII^e siècle)* (Paris, 2016), 53-77, which concentrates on royal illuminated chronicles in France and the Low Countries. It takes, however, a single, negative view of the intentions of these royally-employed artists; citation on p. 55.

⁶⁶ *Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys*, ed. M L. Bellaguet, Collection de Documents inédits sur l'histoire de France, 6 vols (Paris, 1839-42) I, pp. 128-43; Cohn, *Popular Protest*, *op. cit.* doc. n. 136; and Cohn, *Lust for Liberty*, *op. cit.*, 83.

⁶⁷ Cohn, *Popular Protest*, *op. cit.*, doc. no. 146.

⁶⁸ Pere III of Catalonia (Pedro IV of Aragon), *Chronicle*, trans. M. Hillgarth and ed. J.N. Hillgarth, *Medieval Sources in Translation* (Toronto, 1980), 391-448; executions on 446.

⁶⁹ *Diario d'anonimo fiorentino dall'anno 1358 al 1389*, ed. A. Gherardi, in *Cronache dei secoli XIII e XIV*. Documenti di storia italiana, IV (Florence, 1876); and Cohn, *Popular Protest*, *op. cit.* doc. no. 121, 209-10.

⁷⁰ *Diario d'anonimo fiorentino*, *op. cit.*, 435.

⁷¹ *Cronaca senese attribuita ad Agnolo di Tura detta la cronaca maggiore*, in XV/6.1 *Cronache Senesi*, ed. Lisini and Iacometti, *op. cit.*, 375-80; and *Frammento di cronaca senese di anonimo (1313-1320)*, in *ibid.*, 172.

⁷² Cohn, *Lust for Liberty*, *op. cit.*

⁷³ On these, see Cohn, 'The thickness of city walls', *op. cit.*, 137-9.

⁷⁴ Anonimo Romano, *Cronica*, ed. G. Porta (Milan, 1979); and R. Musto, *Apocalypse in Rome: Cola di Rienzo and the politics of the new age* (Berkeley, 2003).

⁷⁵ Cohn, *Lust for Liberty*, *op. cit.*, 85-6.

⁷⁶ On a discussion of these demands, such as fixing rates of exchange to secure wage stability, outlawing criminal punishment for indebtedness, setting production quotas on wool manufacturers to ensure employment, and creating three new revolutionary guilds of class rather than occupation that bestowed citizenship on previously disenfranchised workers and allowed them to be elected to legislative bodies, see Cohn, *The Laboring Classes*, *op. cit.*, 132-3.

⁷⁷ I have developed these comparisons further in 'The thickness of city walls: Late medieval popular revolt in England and Italy compared', pp. 129-46, in *Campo y ciudad: Mundos en tensión (siglos XII-XV)*, XLIV Semana Internacional de Estudios Medievales (Pamplona, 2018). In this regard, the city-states of the central and northern Italy were distinctly different from northern monarchies or the city-states of Germany and Flanders in that with few exceptions the Italian cities lorded over considerably larger hinterlands that could encompass other towns and cities. For central and northern Italy, the city-countryside bitterness permeated political culture, literature, and economic policy, and the hatred and violence travelled in both directions (see *ibid.*, 138-9).

⁷⁸ On this decline, see Cohn, 'Rich and Poor in Western Europe, c. 1375-1475: The political paradox of material well-being', in *Approaches to Poverty in Medieval Europe: Complexities, contradictions, transformations, c. 1100–1500*, ed. S. Farmer (Turnhout, 2016), pp. 145-73, esp. 158-9; and for Flanders, J. Haemers, 'A Moody Community? Emotion and ritual in late medieval urban revolts', 63-82, in *Emotions in the Heart of the City (14th-16th century)*, ed. E. Lecuppre-Desjardin and A-L. Van

Bruaene, *Studies in European Urban History (1100-1800)* (Turnhout, 2005); and Dumolyn and Haemers, *op. cit.*, 369-93.

⁷⁹ N.Z. Davis, 'Women on top', in *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (Stanford, CA., 1975), 146. Dr Laura Stewart has questioned whether these servant women were the leaders of the riot; paper delivered at the 41st Pre-Modern Towns Conference, Institute for Historical Research (London), 30 January 2010.

⁸⁰ J. Walter, *Crowds and Popular Politics in Early Modern England* (Manchester, 2006), 49–58.

⁸¹ W. Beik, *Urban Protest in Seventeenth-Century France* (Cambridge, 1997), 37; and Davis, *op. cit.*, 146.

⁸² B. Beer, *Rebellion and Riot: Popular disorder in England during the reign of Edward VI* (Kent, Ohio, 1982), 4, 6, and 44; and A. Wood, *Riot, Rebellion and Popular Politics in Early Modern England* (Basingstoke, 2002), 50-4.

⁸³ B. Porshnev, *Les soulèvements populaires en France de 1623 à 1648* (Paris, 1963); and G. Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change & Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven, 2013), 297–298, and 322.

⁸⁴ Manning, *Village Revolts: Social Protest and Popular Disturbances in England, 1509–1640* (Oxford, 1988), 64. Also, more recently, see McDonagh, *op. cit.*, on a more complicated picture of landlord-tenant relations created by enclosure movements.

⁸⁵ J. Bohstedt, 'The Myth of the Feminine Food Riot: Women as Proto-Citizens in English Community Politics, 1790–1810', in *Women and Politics in the Age of the Democratic Revolution*, ed. H. Applewhite and D. Levy (Ann Arbor, 1990), 21–60; and Manning, *op. cit.* Recently, historians have found that women in sixteenth-century England were more involved in popular protest against enclosures by less

violent means; see N. Whyte, 'Custodians of Memory', *Cultural and Social History*, 8 (2011): 153-173.

⁸⁶ See the numerous descriptions and appeals for grace on taxation and protests against the destructive billeting of troops in the voluminous records of the Carteggio delle cancellerie dello Stato, Archivio di Stato, Milano as well as in chronicles such as G. Burigozzo, *Cronica Milanese dal 1500 al 1544, con note* (Milano, 1851), 46, 64, 67, 89, 205, and 214, or in M. Sanudo's diaries (*I diarii di Marino Sanuto*, ed. R. Furlin, 58 vols. (1881-1902), such as the evacuations and mass migration in the summer of 1509 with the invasions of the French and Germans, resulting in the Venetian loss of most of its Terra Ferma. For instance, Sanudo, *op. cit.*, IX, 161, reports that around 4,000 men and women from the villages of Lizzafusina (today, Fusina, a parking lot, just over the lagoon west of Venice) were forced to flee their homes by the invasion of the French and ended miles. They crossed the Brenta pass over the Dolomite Alps.

⁸⁷ These are for now my impressions from reading numerous diaries and chronicles of sixteenth-century Italy, including the 13 volumes of Jacopino and his son Tommasino De' Bianchi detto de' Lancellotti, *Cronaca Modenese* (Parma, 1861-84) and the 58 volumes of M. Sanudo, *I diarii di Marino Sanuto*, eds. R. Fulin, F. Stefani, N. Barozzi, G. Berchet, and M. Allegri (Venice, 1879-1903)

⁸⁸ On this score, matters may have begun to change in places during the seventeenth century as witnessed by the role of women in the famous Neapolitan revolt of Masaniello in 1647; see R. Villari, 'Masaniello: Contemporary and Recent Interpretations', *Past & Present*, no. 108 (1985): 117-32. However, with the exception of the Neapolitan revolt of 1647, the question of women's participation in popular protest in early modern Italy has yet to be examined in Italy.

⁸⁹ M. Luzzati, *Una Guerra di popolo: Lettere private del tempo dell'assedio di Pisa (1494-1509)* (Pisa, 1973), 150.

⁹⁰ Funded by a small project grant from the Royal Society of Edinburgh, I am presently engaged in research, primarily in archives in Milan, Florence, and Rome, on sixteenth-century Italian revolts.

⁹¹ See for instance, B. McDonagh, *op. cit.*; eadem, 'Making and Breaking Property: Negotiating Enclosure and Common Rights in Sixteenth-Century England', *History Workshop Journal*, 76 (2013): 32-56, esp. 33; and A. Wood, 'Afterword: Landscapes, Memories and Texts', 237-44, in *Remembering Protest in Britain since 1500: Memory, Materiality and the Landscape*, ed. C. Griffin and B. McDonagh (Cham, Switzerland, 2018), esp. 238.

⁹² See the references in Cohn, 'Authority and Popular Resistance', *op. cit.*, 436-7.

⁹³ See Cohn, 'Rich and Poor', *op. cit.*

Fig. 1: Siena

d'Ovile



Campo




Fig. 2: Florence: Tumulto dei Ciompi




Fig. 3: Medieval London

Highbury Estates



Mile End



SAVOY

TOWER

Blackheath




Fig. 4: The Revolt of the “popolo minuto” of Bruges against the French,
Villani, ms 170r, Lib. IX,55




Fig. 5: Thomas Murner, *Von dem grossen Lutherischen Narren*, 1522,
Strassburg I. Grienniger, BL 11517, c. 33



Fig. 6: The French defeated at Courtrai (1302)
Villani ms, 172v, IX,56, 202

