Children's Spatial Mobility and Household Transitions:

A study of child mobility and care arrangements in the context of maternal migration

Katharine Hall

For Priscilla, my mother and editor.

"Apartheid as a national project did two things simultaneously. It positioned the Christian family as the centrepiece of the white nation. At the same time economic growth was premised on the fracturing of the family lives of those who were not white."

(Lund Committee on Child and Family Support 1996)

"Any study of poverty in southern Africa must focus first on the position of children and women."

(Wilson and Ramphele 1989)

"[People] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please. They do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past."

(Karl Marx 1852)

Abstract

South Africa has uniquely high rates of parental absence from children's lives. Apartheid-era restrictions on population movement and residential arrangements contributed to family fragmentation, particularly when adults – mainly men – migrated to work in cities and on the mines. Despite the removal of legal impediments to permanent urban settlement and family co-residence for Africans, patterns of internal and oscillating labour migration have endured, dual or stretched households continue to link urban and rural nodes, and children have remained less urbanised than adults. Importantly for children, migration rates among prime-age women have increased, alongside falling marriage rates, declining remittances and persistently high unemployment. Households, and women especially, may have to make difficult choices about how to manage the competing demands of child care and income generation. It is the mobility patterns and household configurations arising from these strategies that are the focus of this research.

The thesis uses a mixed-method approach to explore children's geographic mobility and care arrangements. Using micro data spanning two decades, it traces children's co-residence arrangements with parents and describes changes in household form from the perspective of children. It maps recent patterns of child migration within South Africa using four waves of a national panel study and compares these with patterns of maternal migration to reveal various dynamics of migration in mother–child dyads: co-migration, sequential migration, independent migration, and immobility. The child-focused analysis augments the existing migration literature, which has tended to focus on adult labour migration and ignore children or regard them as appendages of migrants. A single, detailed case study spanning three generations of mothers adds texture to the analysis by demonstrating the complexity of household strategies and plans for child care in the context of female labour migration. This in turn helps to reflect on the value of micro data for describing and analysing household form and migration patterns, particularly among children.

Acknowledgements

Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Abbreviations

ASSA	Actuarial Society of South Africa
CARe	Centre for Actuarial Research
CSG	Child Support Grant
GHS	General Household Survey
HDSS	Health and Socio-Demographic Surveillance System
NIDS	National Income Dynamics Study
OHS	October Household Survey
PSLSD	Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development
SALDRU	Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit
Stats SA	Statistics South Africa
SPP	Surplus People's Project
TBVC States	Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei

Preface

My initial interest in the topic of children and migration was triggered almost accidentally when I was doing research in the rural Eastern Cape in the mid-2000s. I got talking to an elderly woman whose grandchildren were living with her. Their mother had left to find work in the city of Cape Town. I was struck by the grandmother's description of the situation as a temporary arrangement: it was just until their mother was ready to send for the children. I asked what would need to be in place for the mother to send for them – what would signify "ready"? She explained that the mother was still looking for work and that she only had temporary lodging with someone from the village, renting a space in an informal shack. Before the children could join her she needed to find a job and a suitable house of her own with enough space for the family. It sounded simple, but I knew these were not easy criteria given the extent of unemployment and housing shortages in South Africa.

I returned to the village a few times in the course of the three-year research project, and the children were always there. Two years after completing the research I happened to be in the area and visited again, and found that the children were still living with the grandmother. Their mother was still in Cape Town, she still did not have a stable job or a suitable house, and she did not have the money to bring her children to Cape Town. The arrangement was still considered transient. It seemed to me like permanent limbo, and in the meantime childhoods were passing.

I did not set about gathering information in a systematic way then, as it was not the focus of my research at the time. But these kinds of care arrangements are widely known in South Africa and elsewhere, and I heard of other families in similar situations. As I talked to colleagues and friends it seemed that everyone had a story of someone, often a domestic worker, whose children were living with a grandmother, or had moved to the city, or had been sent away, depending on the availability of care and the circumstances of the urban household.

The obstacles described by the grandmother back in the Eastern Cape meshed with some of the concepts I had read about in the migration literature, about how social networks, informality and processes of cumulative causation are mechanisms for urban migration, but when I went back to the literature I found children largely missing from the discussion. Could the mechanisms of migration actually serve to separate children from adult migrants? How could the obstacles be resolved so that families could achieve the household arrangements they aspired to? How many children were in this situation? I started to see maternal absence and the children's separate care arrangements as a product of household livelihood strategies – against a backdrop of unemployment, urban housing backlogs and the risks associated with informality.

This thesis is my attempt to investigate some of the questions that arose from that story, and to contribute to a literature that can inform policy and planning so that families have a better chance of consolidating their living arrangements in the way they wish.

Chapter 1. Introduction

The disruption of family life is one of the important legacies of South Africa's colonial and apartheid history, and it is the context for this thesis. Families were undermined by deliberate strategies implemented through the pass laws, forced removals, urban housing policy and the creation of the homelands. The migrant labour system meant that it was mainly men who worked in urban areas, while the rural homelands became places for "surplus" people whose labour contributions were not needed in towns or on white-owned farms. Children formed a substantial part of that surplus population, along with women and the elderly.

The effect of apartheid-era policy was to entrench patterns of oscillating migration between urban and rural nodes, so that migrant labour remained temporary and urban residential rights were withheld. Contrary to expectations, temporary labour migration has remained an important livelihood strategy for many households, and extended and dual household arrangements persisted (Posel 2006).

An important shift in labour migration trends, however, is that migration rates among adult women of working (and child-bearing) age have risen in the post-apartheid period (Casale and Posel 2006; Collinson et al. 2006a; Posel 2009, 2010; Posel and Van der Stoep 2008; Williams et al. 2011) and it is suggested that rural households have become "more geographically flexible" alongside expectations that women will participate in circular migration (Hunter 2006:155). Women are more likely to be labour migrants if they are members of households that receive pensions, suggesting that income from social grants provides a means to migrate, or the means for the pensioner to care for children of the female migrant (Ardington et al. 2009; Posel, Fairburn and Lund 2006). At the same time, studies have found that remittances to rural households are shrinking, possibly because the expansion of social grants reduces the need for migrants to remit (Casale and Posel 2006; Posel and Casale 2003). These shifts have implications for children and child-care arrangements, in turn suggesting the need for a better understanding of children's mobility patterns in relation to adults.

With this in mind, the aim of the thesis is ***to investigate post-apartheid patterns of child mobility and care arrangements in the context of maternal migration***.

This aim is linked to two main areas of policy concern. The first relates to widespread acknowledgement that urbanisation is gathering pace, globally and locally. In 2014, for the first time in history, more people in the world lived in urban areas than in rural ones, and the gap is projected to widen rapidly (South African Cities Network 2016). Urbanisation is seen as unavoidable and even desirable. Yet, as I show in this thesis, children living in South Africa remain under-urbanised relative to the rest of the population. Without appropriately informed planning that provides for mobile child populations, urbanisation could exacerbate inequality, trap children in poverty (at either the urban or rural end) and perpetuate family fragmentation. This thesis aims to demonstrate that it is possible to quantify and describe children's household arrangements and migration patterns in ways that could be useful to policy makers and planners.

Second is a mismatch between the prevailing thinking on the status of the family in policy and popular discourses that often imply a moral breakdown of the family as a normative social institution, on the one hand; and on the other, the wealth of evidence from work on migration which suggests that decisions about location and household composition are strongly influenced by structural and strategic considerations. In tracing household forms, parental co-residence arrangements and migration patterns I set out to show the complexity of family living strategies. By putting children at the centre of the picture, and through a detailed case study, I explore nuances in the dynamics of mobility and child care, and demonstrate some of the considerations and constraints that influence household form and care arrangements, especially when mothers migrate. The thesis sets out to challenge popular discourses that assume certain family forms are the norm, and that blame poor families for their own fragmentation. It aims to inform our understanding of why, after more than twenty years of democracy and in the absence of legal obstacles to family co-residence, many children continue to live apart from their parents.

My purpose here is not to promote a particular family form, or even suggest that children *should* live with their mothers rather than with other relatives. Rather, I am interested in how far people can make deliberate and strategic choices about their own lives and household configuration. Faced with absent men and declining remittances, persistently high unemployment and falling marriage rates, families – and women especially – may have to make difficult choices about how to prioritise child care and income generation. It is the household arrangements and mobility patterns that arise from these decisions that are the concern of this thesis.

1.1 Research questions

The primary research question asks: ***What are the post-apartheid dynamics of children's household and care arrangements and how are children's patterns of mobility affected by rising female migration?***

Embedded in the overall question are subsidiary questions that are dealt with in various sections of the thesis.

First, *in what ways have parental co-residence arrangements and children's household forms changed since the end of apartheid?* Two chapters are dedicated to exploring this question. I review an extensive literature dealing with aspects of household form and family dislocation, returning to legislation and research from the apartheid era to establish the historical context and continuities in household arrangements and patterns of migration. I use publicly available micro data to examine children's household circumstances from various perspectives, to describe the spatial distributions, orphaning rates, parental co-residence arrangements and the reasons for parental absence, household forms and caregiving responsibilities for children. The emphasis is on post-apartheid dynamics, and the two post-apartheid decades are the time frame for the empirical analysis, which focuses particularly on whether there have been changes, and how we might interpret these changes or the lack thereof.

Second, *what are the dynamics of child migration within South Africa, and how do these interact with patterns of maternal migration?* A further two chapters are devoted to contextualising and answering the question. I discuss some of the main concepts in the international and local

migration literatures and, since there is little about children in these discourses, consider the implications of some of the theoretical concepts for children in South Africa. I give a synthesis of available research on patterns of migration and urbanisation within South Africa, also drawing attention to the fact that most of the existing research focuses on adults and that little is known about child migration. I then present an analysis of panel data, exploring various specific questions about child and maternal mobility: What are the recent observable patterns of child migration within South Africa? What is the extent of child migration, and in which directions do children migrate? What are the characteristics of migrant children and of their sending and receiving households? How do patterns of child migration relate to those of maternal migration? Are migration events associated with changing maternal co-residence arrangements? Who cares for children when mothers migrate? The empirical findings are considered in light of some of the themes emerging from the literature, and also compared with results from the limited body of other child-focused migration research in South Africa.

Third, *to what extent can micro data be used to describe and analyse household arrangements and migration patterns, particularly among children, and what insights are gained through qualitative research?* These methodological questions are considered throughout the thesis. I reflect on how households and families have been defined in previous research and to what extent the concepts can be explored through household survey data. I detail how household membership is defined in different surveys, and consider whether the inclusion of nonresident members (in surveys that use a broad definition of the household) is useful for determining the strength of ties with children in the household. I discuss some of the pros and cons of various approaches to defining whether parents are alive and living in the same household as the child. Finally, in chapter 6, I present a detailed case study and use it to reflect on the analytical categories adopted in quantitative surveys, and on what can be learnt about household membership, the relationship between child and maternal migration, and child care dynamics through more textured qualitative research.

1.2   Rationale and contribution

The thesis sets out to address three main gaps in the existing research literatures on household form and mobility.

- First, it augments the child-focused work on family, households and mobility by situating the study firmly in historical and structural context.

- Second, it addresses a gap in the literature on internal migration by contributing a child-focused perspective to the national migration picture and linking the dynamics of child migration to that of mothers. In this way, it both advances the empirical work on children's participation in migration and establishes a clearer link between adult labour migration and children's mobility and care arrangements.

- Third, it is an attempt to combine qualitative and quantitative approaches to the study of household form and migration – something referred to as a necessity in the literature (De Haas 2014; Haug 2008; Potts 2011) but which is notoriously hard to do. In the process,

the mixed method approach also strengthens the link between considerations of household form and migration patterns.

The study brings together two related but nevertheless distinct areas of inquiry, each with its own literature and theoretical frameworks. The first relates to the family and household form. The second is about migration. The literatures are presented and discussed in chapters 2 and 4 respectively. What follows below is a brief discussion of the rationale for the thesis to show how it connects with and contributes to existing knowledge. It also briefly outlines the areas of policy to which this thesis could contribute.

1.2.1 Strengthening the historical context around children, households and mobility

It is generally established that many children in South Africa live separately from one or both of their biological parents, for a variety of reasons including orphaning, high rates of nonmarital childbirth and low rates of co-residence between parents, financial or other logistical necessity, and cultural convention (see, for example, Amoateng et al. 2007; Amoateng et al. 2004; Hall and Posel 2012; Makiwane et al. 2016; Hall and Meintjes 2016; Mhongo and Budlender 2013; Ngwane 2003; Ross 2003; Sibande 2011). Compared with other countries, rates of paternal absence in South Africa are high (Posel and Devey 2006). Less than half of rural children have co-resident fathers when they are born (Hosegood and Madhavan 2012), and only a third of all children nationally have their father co-resident in the household (Hall and Wright 2010). Although maternal co-residence rates are higher, a substantial share of children – about a quarter – live without their mothers. Conversely, a large number of mothers are not co-resident with their biological children. These dynamics are historically rooted and are also influenced by contemporary factors.

During the 1980s and '90s (and before the rise of HIV/AIDS), a number of studies described the relationship between the migrant labour system, kinship networks and household living arrangements in South Africa, often with specific reference to children (see, for example, Bank 2001; Burman 1986; Jones 1993; Murray 1981; Ngwane 2003; Ramphele 1993; Reynolds and Burman 1986; Ross 2003; Spiegel et al. 1996). This body of work included descriptions of how extended families traversed urban-rural nodes, documenting the mobility of children in oscillating migratory journeys between rural and urban spaces, family life in the hostels, social networks, care chains and household fluidity.

A second literature emerged in the 1990s and for a while dominated the discourse on children's mobility and household form. It arose in response to the rapid escalation of the HIV epidemic and a corresponding rise in orphaning rates, and was explicitly situated in that context (see, for example, Ansell and Van Blerk 2005; Ford and Hosegood 2005; Haour-Knipe 2009; Hill et al. 2008; Hosegood and Ford 2003; Hosegood et al. 2004; International Organisation for Migration 2006; Le Roux 1999; Madhavan and Schatz 2007). There were widespread concerns about the vulnerability of children whose parents had died: where would they go and who would look after them? How long could extended families continue absorbing orphans before they became overburdened? What household vulnerabilities or ulterior motives underlying care decisions might put children at further risk?

There seems to be a disciplinary disjuncture between the first and second literatures. As Helen Meintjes and Sonja Giese noted in their provocative paper "Spinning the Epidemic" (2006), the literature on children's mobility, parental absence and care arrangements that emerged in considering HIV was not new, but it did not acknowledge or build on the earlier discourse on mobility, care and household form in the context of apartheid planning and labour migration. Meintjes has observed there might have been more continuity if the social sciences had not been so slow to start paying attention to the social implications of the HIV epidemic (pers. comm. 2014). Instead, the HIV-oriented literature on care and mobility was dominated by a public health agenda.

This could have been partly in response to government inertia and denialism. The focus of much child-oriented research quickly shifted to gathering evidence that supported the civil society lobby for antiretroviral roll-out, the prevention of mother-to-child transmission, the protection of children made vulnerable by HIV, and various other interventions in the face of government inaction. The demographic surveillance sites at Agincourt in Mpumalanga and Hlabisa in KwaZulu-Natal, out of which extremely rich data and much very good work on migration and on children's living arrangements have emerged, were established with an explicit public health focus and funding. The sustained focus on HIV and "OVC" (orphans and vulnerable children) was also undoubtedly driven by the agendas of international development organisations and funding priorities of the likes of UNAIDS, UNICEF and Save the Children (Meintjes and Giese 2006; Reynolds 2015).

Another body of work, not necessarily child-focused, continued pointing to the interwoven nature of household and care arrangements with structural-historical considerations such as poverty and inequality, land and land use, urban housing access, labour migration and unemployment. Some research that explicitly set out to analyse the effect of motherhood on labour participation among women found that labour migration was a key reason for maternal absence (Posel and Van der Stoep 2008; Van der Stoep 2008). Case studies illustrated the marginalising effects of being "unskilled", rural and female (Budlender and Lund 2011; Du Toit and Neves 2009), and how this influences choices about where to live and how to access income. Research demonstrated that urban destinations may offer opportunities for income generation, however precarious, but can further marginalise women and their children by removing them from established chains of care, and that child care can be unaffordable in the absence of kinship networks (Bray 2008). A study of child care arrangements among poor families living in Masipumelele township in Cape Town stressed the importance of recognising the continuity of care as household and care arrangements change, where households are fragmented and restructured (Bray and Brandt 2007). It showed that a lack of child care options can in turn limit the caregiver's freedom to seek work and earn income. The literature suggested that women, who often bear both economic and household responsibilities, share these responsibilities within networks that span generations and geographic space and that children often remain at the rural home of origin when parents migrate from rural areas, an arrangement that is made possible by the availability of substitute caregivers – particularly grandparents (Ardington et al. 2009; Casale and Posel 2006; Madhavan et al. 2012).

This thesis builds on all of these literatures, and embeds itself firmly in historic context, making a link back to the work that emerged mainly from the fields of economics and anthropology in the late years of apartheid. This helps to foreground some of the structural constraints to family

migration and co-residence of mothers and children – constraints which, I argue, are not only past impediments but remain in place today. Labour migration is an important backdrop because labour mobility within South Africa has been "fundamentally distorted" by policies of separate development (Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015), and the effects of these distortions are felt in families and child care arrangements. By linking child migration (and child immobility) to patterns of maternal migration, I make an explicit connection between child mobility and the dynamics of adult labour migration.

1.2.2 Contributing a child-focused perspective to the migration literature

South Africa now has an abundance of household surveys, and a body of quantitative studies of migration has emerged alongside the growing quantity and quality of publicly available micro data. Chapter 4 includes a review of what is known about patterns of internal migration and urbanisation in South Africa.

Relatively little is known about child migration patterns, however, and almost no attention has been paid to how children are affected by adult migration. This has contributed to an impression that migration is an adult phenomenon, primarily linked to labour migration, while children are either assumed to be less mobile, or, as frequently evidenced in the international migration discourse, are treated as "luggage" rather than as participants in migration processes (Orellana et al. 2001) and are simply assumed to accompany adult migrants (see, for example, De Jong and Steinmetz 2006). Either way, children have remained largely invisible in the literature. The gap has been noted by a range of commentators (for example, Kok et al. 2003; Madhavan et al. 2012; Richter et al. 2006).

Children are arguably affected by adult migration, whether or not they themselves move. Commentators have pointed out that children often migrate "as a consequence of many of the same processes that stimulate adult migration, and in response to living arrangements that emerge due to adult migration" (Hosegood and Ford 2003:1). But children do not necessarily migrate together with, or at the same time as, adults; and it cannot be assumed that their migration patterns follow that of adults at all. Rather, children "participate in migration, both independently, as well as with their parents and caregivers as households relocate" (Richter et al. 2006:197). A focus on children, then, provides an unusual lens for considering migration patterns and may help to advance an understanding of the complexities of migration choices for families.

There has been a recent resurgence of interest in child and family migration dynamics, and the demographic surveillance sites have once again been a valuable resource for quantitative studies. Work from Agincourt has focused specifically on children who are "left behind" or "included" when parents migrate (Kautzky 2009; Madhavan et al. 2012), and a more recent analysis of children's mobility in the context of family migration drew on data from the Africa Centre at Hlabisa, with two papers similarly focused on children left behind and on children's inclusion at the destination households of migrant parents (Bennett et al. 2015a, 2015b). The surveillance sites are both rural, and so the migration dynamics they reveal are limited to that context. An urban-focused investigation into patterns of residential mobility among children was undertaken using data from the Birth-to-Twenty cohort study, located in Johannesburg – providing a

perspective on child mobility that is specific to the greater Johannesburg (urban) region (Richter et al. 2006).

Thus far there has not been a nationally representative analysis of children's migration patterns. It is important to have a national perspective precisely because of the history of internal migration in South Africa with the controls on population movement and residential rights that restricted the ability of African families to migrate and live together, while dual housing arrangements facilitated circular movement between urban and rural homes (Bank 2001; Collinson et al. 2006b; Kok et al. 2006; Mafukidze 2006; Murray 1981; Posel and Marx 2013; Russell 2003a; Spiegel et al. 1996).

1.2.3 Combining quantitative and qualitative methods

Migration is fascinating from a disciplinary perspective as it lends itself to study by geographers, demographers, economists, sociologists, psychologists, political scientists and anthropologists. Yet, far from being an interdisciplinary melting pot, empirical research on migration has taken divergent methodological directions, with what has been described as a widening gap between quantitative (mainly positivist) and qualitative (interpretive) approaches. Both have been critiqued for failing to connect adequately with theoretical frameworks and both have been accused of patently failing to explain real-world patterns of migration (De Haas 2014; Potts 2011).

On the one hand, a number of quantitative studies have been undertaken, fuelled by the increasing availability of large data sets that enable migration analysis. Statistical work has tended to focus mainly on identifying predictors and determining consequences of migration. These analyses have been critiqued for being theoretically thin, implicitly reverting to functionalist models that are technically possible to do but which, in their data-driven focus on individual attributes and determinants, ignore the broader context and so add little to what is already known about migration. For example, Hein de Haas argues that "while most quantitative studies confirm that factors such as wage gaps, networks and geographical distance have an, on average, positive effect on migration, this is hardly surprising … [and] because of the inherent bias of regression towards the average, they tend to give limited insights into how larger social, economic and political structures affect migration behaviour" (2014:6).

On the other hand, micro-level qualitative studies have emerged as a way of providing insight into the experiences and strategies of migrants and their networks, partly in response to the perceived limitations of positivist quantitative studies. Qualitative migration research using case study approaches and ethnographic methodologies is perhaps influenced by the post-modernist "reaction to the overly deterministic theorising of the meta narratives of modernization or Marxism" (Potts 2011:4). There is a growing body of interpretive sociological and anthropological work, conducted through qualitative micro studies, for example documenting migration histories and experiences, exploring issues of agency and decision-making, and giving voice to migrants. Rich as these accounts can be, it is not easy to discern any generalisable patterns from them. Thus, "theoretically, the difficulties of situating a mass of individual narratives within a broader framework, allowing for more general insights, can be as much of a drawback for postmodernist approaches as the supposed inflexibility of single meta-narratives" (Potts 2011:4–5).

What we are left with is a large and varied literature, broadly divided into functionalist, structural-historical and postmodern or socio-interpretive studies. It includes a sizeable body of quantitative studies that tend to revert to unilineal models and have "little power to explain real-life migration patterns" (De Haas 2014:8), plus an "abundance of case studies" (Potts 2011:5), also with limited explanatory power. Thus, De Haas argues for "conceptual eclecticism to bridge disciplinary and paradigmatic divides" (2014:2), and Deborah Potts concurs that "a combination of approaches yields the most satisfactory results" (2011:4–5).

This thesis uses a mixed methods approach to allow for breadth and depth, and for some integration of analytical perspective. Quantitative analyses paint a national picture, enabling analysis of patterns and changes over time and giving scope and breadth to the qualitative research. The case study deepens and augments the picture through the micro world of a family, providing the nuance, complexity and texture that survey data cannot. For example, surveys are not well suited to examining extended household arrangements and systems of care. In the case study, the focus on a single migrant and her family enables the research to see the connectedness of the rural and urban homes, which are part of the same "single social field" (Trager 1991:vii).

The triangulation of methods benefits the research not only in the analysis, but throughout the research process as each poses questions to be interrogated through the other, with the two components working symbiotically, linked through me, the researcher. By using mixed and complementary methods I am able to reflect on the strengths and limitations of each and then, from these triangulated perspectives, I draw some inferences that may be of use to other researchers and to policy makers.

1.2.4   Relevance to policy and planning

This is an opportune moment for research on child mobility and care arrangements because projections show that urbanisation will increase (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 2016; United Nations 2015) and the existing research suggests that patterns of female migration may be changing in ways that are likely to affect children. These developments suggest the need for a better understanding of children's mobility patterns in relation to adults, and closer consideration of the child population in spatial and infrastructure planning.

The National Development Plan, South Africa's overarching strategic framework for development and transformation, acknowledges the importance of empirical research to inform planning and service delivery and points to a lack of information as being a constraint:

> Movements into and within municipalities have significant implications for planning, budgeting and the provision of services. Municipalities are often unable to respond effectively because they do not have sufficient data, or the necessary skills to make sense of the data they have. Research by the African Centre for Migration and Society found that most municipalities lacked an understanding of their indigent communities, most lacked financial and human capacity to plan for population dynamics and that there was ineffective inter-government coordination on planning and service delivery. (National Planning Commission 2011:104)

The thesis aims to contribute to the research evidence on household form and family migration at a time when a Green Paper on human settlements is being drafted in response to the NDP, an Integrated Urban Development Framework has been developed to guide human settlements

planning over the next period (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 2016) and a national family policy has been published (Department of Social Development 2012). Despite the conceptual links between the built environment and social sectors, there is little articulation in policy thinking or in programmatic responses. By using children as a lens to focus on the links between spatial and social dynamics it may be possible to contribute to more deeply integrated thinking about families and how they are accommodated, both literally in the built environment, and figuratively within social and economic policy.

1.3 Overview of methods and data sources

There are three parts to the empirical work, linked to the three main questions, and each of these is presented in a separate chapter in the thesis. The quantitative analyses of children's households, presented in chapter 3, draws on numerous data sources to investigate trends over time. The analysis of child and maternal migration, presented in chapter 5, draws on data from four waves of a national panel study. The case study, which describes household arrangements and migration processes of a single family, draws on my own field research. The methods and data sources are introduced briefly here, and more detail about the processes and analysis is provided in the relevant chapters.

1.3.1 Descriptive analysis of cross-sectional data

To characterise children's household contexts and living arrangements over the two post-apartheid decades I analyse a collection of nationally representative data sets that span the years 1993–2014, to investigate trends in parental co-residence, orphaning, household size and form. The details of the analysis are presented alongside the findings in chapter 3 of the thesis. Here I briefly introduce the surveys that are used, following a more-or-less chronological order.

The baseline dataset is the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD), a once-off cross-sectional survey that was conducted by the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) based at the University of Cape Town in 1993 (Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development 1994). The survey was supported by the World Bank, with funding from the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. It was the first national survey since the mid-1970s to cover the whole country, as the independent homelands had been excluded from official national surveys after the Transkei was made independent in 1976. The sample for the PSLSD was approximately 9000 households with about 40,000 resident members (with nearly 15,000 children under 15). It was designed as a self-weighting survey, using a two-stage sampling design. The main concern was to ensure that the racial and geographic distributions were as accurate as possible. Minor re-weighting was done to correct for the exclusion of a few areas where fieldwork could not be undertaken due to violence, and for the under-representation of white people due to a large number of refusals. Because computer files were so limited in size at the time, the data are stored in over seventy small datasets that can be merged as needed using the household and person identifiers. The data files are available from DataFirst, a research data distribution service based at the University of Cape Town.

The October Household Surveys (OHS) were large general purpose household surveys designed and conducted by Statistics South Africa (Stats SA, previously called the Central Statistical Service). The OHS covered questions related to employment and income, household assets and services, and socio-demographic information. The first OHS, in 1993, did not cover the homelands. The second, in 1994, was nationally representative but not widely used due to concerns about the disproportional sampling scheme used and the difficulties these created for analysis (Wittenberg 2008). The analysis presented in this thesis includes data from the OHSs spanning 1995 to 1999, when it was discontinued. The sample for the 1995 OHS was approximately 30,000 households with over 130,000 resident members (Central Statistical Service 1996). Sample sizes varied in later years, with much smaller samples in 1996 and 1998. OHS data were weighted by province, sex, and five-year age groups in line with the population size estimated for each year on the basis of the 1996 population census and mid-term estimates after that (Statistics South Africa 2001). The OHS data sets are publicly available and were downloaded from Nesstar, Stats SA's interactive data portal. At the time of writing, the link to the OHS surveys had disappeared from the Nesstar site but the files were still available through DataFirst.

The first nationally inclusive post-democracy population census was conducted by Stats SA in 1996. They did another census five years later, in 2001, after which it was decided that the census would be conducted every ten years. All three post-apartheid censuses (1996, 2001 and 2011) are included at points in chapter 3 for purposes of the trend analysis. Census data (reduced to 10 per cent samples of each dataset) are publicly available through Nesstar and DataFirst.[1]

The General Household Survey (GHS) was established by Stats SA as an annual series and has been conducted every year since 2002 (Statistics South Africa 2015). Designed to be nationally representative, the sample size is approximately 25,000 households with over 90,000 resident members, which includes about 30,000 children under 15 years – although the numbers vary slightly from year to year. Like its predecessor the OHS, the GHS has modules that cover a range of socio-demographic, household, labour and income questions. All the GHS data sets include weights calculated to match the mid-year population estimates of Stats SA, including matches for age-sex-race and province. The population estimates are calibrated to the most recent population census (2011), and iterations of the GHS that preceded it were re-weighted and re-released. The GHS data come in two files, a household file and a person file, which can be merged as needed. The data files are available from Nesstar and from DataFirst. All years of the GHS are used for the continuous trend analysis, and the 2014 GHS is used as the end point.[2] This allows for an overall trend analysis spanning 22 years (1993–2014 inclusive).

The National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) is South Africa's first national panel survey, and was designed and is conducted by SALDRU with financial support from the Presidency (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 2009). The first wave of NIDS was conducted in 2008, and

---

[1] The full dataset is also distributed but only together with custom-built software called SuperCross, which allows for basic tabulations at small area level without compromising the anonymity of households. The analytical possibilities in this format are extremely limited. I did not use the 2007 Community Survey as that year was covered by a series of annual surveys that ran from 2002. Where possible, I wanted to maintain consistency in survey instruments across the years. The 2016 Community Survey is outside the time frame of the research.

[2] The 2015 GHS became available during 2016 but was not included in the analysis, which was already mostly complete by that time.

this is used in the analysis as a cross-sectional survey. The sample was over 7000 households with 28,000 resident members including nearly 10,000 children under 15. The second wave was done in 2010/11 and further waves in 2012 and 2014/15. The panel data are used in the migration analysis discussed below. Only the 2008 (wave 1) data were used in the household trend analysis because of the panel nature of NIDS and concerns about the representativeness of the survey in later waves. The NIDS wave 1 data were weighted to match the 2008 mid-year population estimates produced by Stats SA, including matches for (five-year) age-sex-race and provincial totals. NIDS data come in multiple files, for individuals, households and derived variables, as well as a household roster that links them all. The data are distributed by DataFirst.

There are advantages and disadvantages to having so many surveys at one's disposal. All of them are nationally representative and can be weighted to provide national population estimates. Those with very large samples (the OHS, GHS and census) have relatively small standard errors and so may provide more reliable estimates than those with smaller samples. Where all surveys have similarly formulated questions on the same topic, it is possible to produce a fairly smooth long-term trend. But questions are not always asked in the same way and in these instances the differences in design could affect the results. Chapter 3 includes some discussion of differences in approach, for example in how surveys define households and determine the vital status of parents. The trends presented should therefore be seen as indicative rather than definitive, and this is another reason for using multiple data sources.

For ease of presentation, some of the analysis draws on only a few surveys. The main ones used are the 1993 PSLSD (as a baseline), the 1995 OHS (a larger sample from around the same time), the 2008 wave of NIDS as a mid-term measure (NIDS has similarities to the PSLSD and includes more detailed data than the Stats SA surveys on children's intra-household and care relationships), and the 2014 GHS (as an end point with a large national sample). The main surveys used therefore include two detailed surveys conducted by SALDRU, and two larger general purpose surveys conducted by the national statistics agency.

Stata v.13.1 was used for all the quantitative analysis.

1.3.2   Panel data analysis

I map patterns of child mobility by analysing nationally representative panel data from NIDS. This analysis is presented in chapter 5. The great advantage of a national panel survey for the research is that it collects data on all the resident members of the originally sampled households in each wave, making it possible to follow individuals as they move, and to characterise both sending and receiving households. Such a national view had not been possible in previous migration analyses, even from the demographic surveillance site studies which, although they are also panel studies, are limited to the sites where they operate and cannot show national patterns or follow individuals beyond their borders.

The first wave of NIDS, in 2008 with a sample of just over 7000 households, included 9605 children under 15 years. Chapter 5 contains a detailed description of subsequent attrition rates and the method for constructing the child panel: a cohort of 3750 children aged 0-8 in the first wave, whom I then follow over four waves for a period of eight years.

Each wave of the NIDS panel comes in a set of files that can be merged according to the needs of the analysis with the person and household identifiers as linking variables for individual and household level data respectively. Households cannot be linked across different rounds but each person from the original sample has a unique identifier that allows them to be linked across waves.

1.3.3   Case study

Placed within the broader structural context and set against the national patterns of child and maternal migration is a micro study of a single family, viewed primarily from the perspective of a migrant mother in her late thirties.

I was inspired by the work of Lillian Trager, an anthropologist who is also interested in the complexity of families and migration and whose book *The City Connection* presents and discusses seven case studies of urban migrants and their families in the Philippines. She writes:

> Individual biography or life history provides an individual's own "personal document" of the decisions he or she has made and the activities he has engaged in. With regard to the study of migration, such personal stories can help in understanding how individuals perceive and act on the social structural and cultural forces that affect them. (Trager 1991:14)

My smaller study was deliberately chosen as an example of a well-trodden internal migration route. The urban context is Cape Town – a practical choice, as that is where I live and work. Within Cape Town I chose to work in Imizamo Yethu (informally known as Mandela Park), a relatively small and contained but rapidly growing township with both formal and informal housing arrangements. Set on a hillside in the picturesque Hout Bay valley, which it shares with the affluent historically white suburb of Hout Bay and the old coloured fishing community of Hangberg, the township has been profiled by photographer Johnny Miller in aerial images depicting extreme spatial inequality (2016). Mandela Park attracts immigrants from neighbouring countries, particularly Namibia and Angola, as well as from across South Africa, but the main province of origin, as for the rest of Cape Town, is the Eastern Cape. A migration survey of the area conducted in 2005 found that, of the 95 per cent of the population who were South African, only 17 per cent had been born in the Western Cape while 79 per cent were originally from the Eastern Cape (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit and Centre for Actuarial Research 2006). More than half of those from the Eastern Cape were specifically from Willowvale, an area in the former Transkei that includes about seventy rural villages. I therefore set out to find migrant mothers from Willowvale who lived in Mandela Park.

I approached a social worker who lives in Mandela Park and explained the purpose of my research. I described the participants I was looking for: women originally from Willowvale who were local residents with at least one child, although the child did not necessarily have to be living with them. I did not want to control the scenario, but was more concerned to find willing participants. A week later the social worker got back to me with the names and numbers of three women who said they would be willing to meet me. One of these women became my primary informant, and her story is presented in chapter 6.

The research took place between April 2015 and December 2016 and consisted of multiple interviews with the primary informant as well as some with her mother and her adult daughter.[3] Most of the interviews took place at the Cape Town end, but there were three return trips to the Eastern Cape, one at the beginning of the field research, one in the middle and one at the end, when we visited the rural home and conducted interviews there.

I employed a research assistant, Nwabisa Gunguluza, primarily as a translator because the participants' first language is Xhosa, the main African language of the Eastern Cape, and my Xhosa is very weak. Nwabisa has training in anthropology and experience in field research, and as the research went on we worked increasingly as a team, planning the main questions for interviews, taking turns leading the interview as conversations shifted between languages, stopping to confer during interviews and reflecting afterwards on the information we gathered. She was with me for some of the Cape Town interviews and all of those in the rural Eastern Cape, where she took on the role of primary interviewer as those interviews were conducted almost entirely in Xhosa, with breaks for translation and discussion. We used basic anthropological methods including structured and unstructured interviewing with a lot of reflective summaries, as well as observation and informal conversations with a range of family members and other people we met along the way. Our main tools when recording migration and life histories were kinship diagrams to map out family and household arrangements at various points in time, and a timeline grid with rows for each year and columns for family members, to track their whereabouts in relation to one another. We recorded most of the interviews digitally for later translation and transcription.

I started weaving a narrative from the interviews as they went along, at times checking back with participants to clarify or correct facts and to get more detail on certain events or decisions, and then comparing key events or themes in the story with the material emerging from the literature reviews and the quantitative analysis. This inductive treatment of the data suited an exploratory and iterative process where interviews could build on one another. As a way of verifying my own filtering of someone else's story, I told parts of it back to the primary informant, and I gave her a near-final copy of the narrative to read. She said that it was a "good" account and that it was true. Thus, in a sense, it has become her own personal document. More detail about the method and process is included in chapter 6, alongside the narrative.

There is much that the qualitative research does not do. In particular, it does not capture the lived experience of migration for children, something that Sean Jones noted as an important knowledge gap at the time of transition to democracy:

> Much of our knowledge of the effects of the migrant labour system on the family, and on children in particular, remains inferential and impressionistic. We have little substantive information about parenting arrangements and child-rearing practices in these circumstances; about children's experiences of separation from either one or both of their parents; and about the relationships which children forge, or fail to forge, with the adults in whose care they are left. In short, we know very little about how children, and how women and children *as families*, experience migrant labour. (Jones 1993:15)

---

[3] I was not able to interview her teenage son formally as the inclusion of children in the study was rejected in the ethics process.

I regard this research as the beginning of an ongoing project on families, migration and urbanisation, with plenty of opportunity for collaboration and mixing of disciplines.

1.4 Definitions and limits to the scope of work

1.4.1 Internal migration

In this thesis I completely ignore international migration flows and focus on internal migration. Although cross-border migration is important in South Africa, both numerically and in the social and political challenges it poses (approximately 2.2 million people, or four per cent of the population, consisted of foreign immigrants in 2011 (Statistics South Africa 2012)), this can be a very different kind of movement to internal migration. The latter is "the most numerically significant movement in the country" (National Planning Commission 2011:104) and is rooted in historical and deliberately discriminatory systems of employment and residential rights, and in the patterns of oscillating migration that arose from them. For my method the focus on internal migration makes it possible to use a panel survey that tracks individuals wherever they move, provided it is within South Africa, whereas a study encompassing cross-border migration would need completely different data sources. Some internal migration may of course include the movement of foreign immigrants within the country, and I have made no effort to limit the analysis to South African citizens.

1.4.2 Children

Although children are defined by the South African constitution and in international law as being under 18 years, my analysis of children throughout the thesis focuses on those under 15. This choice is partly methodological, as the detailed migration analysis presented in chapter 5 is based on the NIDS panel data, where the child module only covers children up to the age of 15. Those aged 15 and above are included in the adult module, in line with labour force and income-expenditure surveys (15 is the age when a person may legally work in South Africa). Some of the questions for children were not asked in the adult module. These include questions about care arrangements, details of absent parents and other child-focused variables that are relevant to this study. It thus makes sense to limit the population of focus to those for whom the appropriate data are consistently available.

There is also a conceptual logic to limiting the analysis to a slightly younger group of children, as the dynamics of child mobility are likely to change as children become older and more independent. By limiting the sample to children under 15, I effectively exclude a large portion of young people who move independently from their home of origin to take up residence with a partner or to seek work. This form of youth mobility has been described elsewhere (see, for example, Hall et al. 2015). It is worth further investigation but does not suit the current study, which is focused on the mobility and care arrangements of dependent children in relation to their mothers.

1.4.3 Africans

Because this work is conceptually linked to the historical literature on internal migration and the effect of discriminatory spatial policies on African households, I focus on a subset of the population classified as African. All the surveys used in this research include racial classifications, and restricting the analysis to Africans helps to remove the confounding effect of other population groups who in the past were afforded very different rights and were not subject to the same restrictions on movement, forced removals or interventions in household arrangements. In particular, the independent homelands were established solely for Africans. All the surveys used for the quantitative analysis are nationally representative, but in effect I exclude around 15 per cent of the child population as non-African; between 84 and 85 per cent of children under 15 have been classified as African in recent years (own analysis of GHS 2002–2014).

1.4.4 Maternal migration

The focus of this research is on children's mobility in relation to their mothers. This is not to say that fathers are unimportant to children's lives – on the contrary, there has been growing concern that men are absent not only from many families but also from the discourse around families (see, for example, Denis and Ntsimane 2006; Eddy, Thomson-de-Boor and Mphaka 2013; Hosegood and Madhavan 2012; Madhavan et al. 2008; Posel and Devey 2006; Ramphele and Richter 2006). But it would have been infeasible to replicate the migration analysis for mothers and fathers within a single thesis, and I have chosen to prioritise mothers. This is partly because of the data gaps for fathers (there would be much more missing data in the surveys due to higher rates of paternal absence). Most importantly, the mother–child relationship is of specific interest because the overwhelming majority of primary caregivers of children in South Africa are women. Female migration was far more heavily restricted than male migration under apartheid (Hunter 2010) but since then the main increase in rates of migration has been among prime-age women (Posel 2006, 2010; Williams et al. 2011). It is precisely the historical phenomenon of (male) labour migration, coupled with urban housing constraints and the availability of child care by extended family, that is generally thought to have contributed to the low rates of paternal co-residence and involvement with their children (Budlender and Lund 2011). These same dynamics might influence patterns of maternal-child co-residence.

1.4.5 Area type

The data sets use various labels to differentiate geography types within South Africa and these can be confusing. "Rural traditional" is often used to signify areas under traditional authority – the former independent homelands. They are also sometimes referred to in the data sets as "rural informal", possibly alluding to the fact that sites are not formally demarcated as they are for commercial farms. It is to these former homelands that Africans were assigned citizenship under the Bantu Homelands Citizens Act of 1970, which also stripped Africans of their South African citizenship. As many as 3.5 people were forcibly removed between 1960 and 1983, in support of the policy of territorial separatism and consolidation of the bantustans (Platzky and Walker 1985). The long-term effects of this spatial planning are still evident: within the African population, 48 per cent of children and 35 per cent of adults were resident in the former homelands in 2011, compared with less than 1 per cent of non-African children and adults (own analysis of census

data). To clarify the historical nature of these areas, I have referred to them as "rural former homelands" throughout the analysis. The other area types are "urban", a category that is sometimes further split into formal and informal (referring to settlement types, rather than dwelling types), and "commercial farms" to denote the rural areas of the former white South Africa, which are not all necessarily farms (some are game reserves, for example) but which are formally demarcated and not under communal tenure.

1.5   Structure of the thesis

This chapter has outlined the aim and rationale of the research and given a brief introduction to the literatures and the methods used. These are expanded in the rest of the thesis, which is divided as follows: chapters 2 and 3 focus on the household, while chapters 4 and 5 are about migration. Chapters 2 and 4 (the first in each of these dyads) deal with the respective literatures, and chapters 3 and 5 present the empirical findings. Chapter 6 is a qualitative case study where the dynamics of household form, child care arrangements, migration and family configuration are integrated into a single narrative. Chapter 7 discusses the main findings in light of the literature and considers the implications for policy.

The chapter summaries below provide a clear map to the structure and scope of the chapters that follow:

1.5.1   Children's households and care arrangements

Chapter 2 reviews the literature on family formation and households, starting with an overview of the discriminatory legislation that controlled the movement of Africans and fractured families. The purpose of this detail is to move the context beyond the common rhetoric of "apartheid legacy" and get fairly specific about the deliberate nature of policy and its consequences specifically for families and children. This is necessary as I later argue that many of the structural constraints to family life, established under apartheid, remain in place in contemporary South Africa but are overlooked in discussions about the family. I return to some of the literature of the 1970s and 1980s which sought, in various ways, to document the social effects of apartheid, including those on childhoods, family structure and household form. I also examine some of the more recent dynamics that affect family form, including a fairly detailed discussion of the research literature on marriage. There has been considerable debate about definitional issues of the household and the extent to which household survey data can describe such fluid constructs as households and families. I consider some of the methodological questions for quantitative analysis, as a backdrop to the child-centred analysis of household and co-residence dynamics that follows.

Chapter 3 is an empirical chapter that characterises children's household contexts and draws on various national surveys to examine changes over the two post-apartheid decades. I use population estimates dating back to 1960 as a baseline to trace changes in the geographic distributions of children and adults over half a century. By contrasting the spatial distributions of children and adults, I highlight the fact that the child population remains disproportionately rural. Acknowledging the importance of considering data collection methods and question formulation

when comparing trends over time, I provide a critical review of how households are defined in the various surveys, and discuss their approaches to determine the vital and co-residence status of children's parents. I then track orphaning and co-residence rates over two decades and show that, although orphaning remains prevalent, it is not the main reason for parental absence – rather, large (and increasing) numbers of children have mothers and fathers who live elsewhere, and there has been a decline in the share of children with parents who are nonresident household members (who are regarded as part of the household but do not stay there regularly). Finally, I turn to a discussion of household composition as regards children and present a child-centred typology of households that includes categories commonly considered to be vulnerable. The analysis finds little measurable change in vulnerable household forms, but there seems to be a decline in nuclear households and an increase in households headed by women.

1.5.2 Child and maternal migration

Chapter 4 reviews some of the theoretical work on migration and discusses its relevance in South Africa and to child migration. It outlines the main migration and urbanisation trends in South Africa and ends with an overview of the small but growing literature that focuses specifically on child migration.

Chapter 5 explores patterns of child and maternal migration in South Africa. Drawing on nationally representative data from waves 1–4 of the National Income Dynamics panel study, I estimate the overall child migration rates nationally, and present child migration streams across area types and provinces. The analysis then maps maternal co-residence status and migration rates onto children, and distinguishes absent and nonresident mothers to see whether these categories are useful for proxying the strength of relationship ties with the household of origin and the likelihood of child migration. The second half of the chapter deals with the descriptive characteristics of child migrants and non-migrants to see whether they are similar to correlates found in other, more localised, studies of child migration. I present a typology of child and maternal migration patterns, with a number of permutations including co-migration, sequential migration, return migration and immobility. The chapter ends with a section on care and support for children in the context of maternal migration, which investigates changes in caregiver arrangements for migrant and non-migrant children, and considers the frequency of contact between children and absent mothers.

1.5.3 Case study

In chapter 6 I present a detailed case study centred on the life history and migration experience of a single migrant mother, her children and her extended family, spanning three generations. Drawing on nearly two years of field research, the story is an example of a family that straddles an established migration path between the rural Eastern Cape and the city of Cape Town. The study augments the quantitative analysis, providing context and demonstrating the complexity of considerations (but also the absence of choice) in processes of migration, household formation and child care. The descriptions of urban life highlight the many challenges of the township and strategies for survival as the family configures and reconfigures itself across households. Migration intentions change frequently, a reminder that much migration (and non-migration) is responsive, determined by constraints, challenges and opportunities, and that long-term intentions are often superseded by short-term necessity. The findings help to reflect on the

patterns found in the micro data and also draw attention to some of the limitations of surveys for understanding the dynamics of household form and migration.

1.5.4 Conclusion

Chapter 7 is a discussion of all the evidence – the literature, the statistical analyses and the case study. I refer back to some of the main themes and findings of the thesis and reflect on the contribution of this research to what is known about children's households, children's care and co-residence arrangements and their patterns of migration. I consider how the quantitative and qualitative components have provided different kinds of data on migration and child care, and the ways in which the qualitative research has both affirmed the patterns found in the micro data as well as illuminating some of their limitations. Finally, I discuss the findings in relation to two main policy areas concerned respectively with strengthening the family and improving the built environment. These two areas of concern have clear overlaps when one considers them from the perspective of children, but there is little articulation between the two at the level of policy or programming. I argue that this is an oversight if the long-term effects of apartheid on the family are to be reversed.

Chapter 2. The disruption of family life: Historical and contemporary dynamics

In this chapter I explore how households and families have been conceptualised and examined, as a backdrop to the child-centred analysis of family relations and household composition that follows.[4] I start with a short overview of the discriminatory legislation that has controlled the movement and residential rights of Africans, and fractured families and households. Then I return to some of the literature of the 1970s and 1980s which sought, in various ways, to document the social effects of apartheid, including those on childhoods, family structure and household form. Information on households at the time was limited mainly to qualitative research, drawing on historical anthropological concerns with kinship systems and the ways in which social relations are structured over time and place. From the early 1990s there was a concerted effort to collect nationally representative survey data where individuals were aggregated into households. This was accompanied by the growth of quantitative studies that allowed for some analysis of household composition and family form, and which catalysed considerable debate about definitional issues of the household and the extent to which household survey data could describe such fluid constructs. I end the chapter by discussing some of the limitations of household surveys and ways to circumvent them.

2.1 The effect of apartheid-era policy on household living arrangements

Writing in the mid-1980s about the unique challenges of childhood in South Africa, Sandra Burman observed that, as elsewhere in the world, South Africa was "in the throes of major and rapid social change" and that it was not the fact of large-scale urbanisation, immigration, shifting values and incomes that made it unique. Rather, it was "the scale and combination of these factors, together with the effects of such social engineering measures as mass population removals and influx control" (Burman 1986:10). Those converging forces, she argued, require an interdisciplinary approach to understanding childhoods in South Africa, to ensure that child-focused studies place children in the wider setting of society and its historical context.

Apartheid had a massive and lasting impact on settlement patterns and family form in South Africa. In light of Burman's advice to pay attention to historical context, I start by examining some of the apartheid legislation and processes that affected household formation, fragmentation and the consequent living arrangements for children – to move beyond the rhetoric of "apartheid legacy" to the specifics of the mechanisms that influenced (and continue to shape) children's households, family form and care arrangements. I also return to some of the research literature of the late apartheid period that describes how families were disrupted through spatial planning and social engineering. This literature, in effect, provides a baseline for tracing what happened after the policies of apartheid were dismantled.

---

[4] I am indebted to the Lund Committee for the title of this chapter: "The disruption of family life" is the title of chapter 2 of the Lund Committee report on Child and Family Support, 1996.

2.1.1 Apartheid legislation and human settlement

Of particular consequence for enduring spatial arrangements and mobility patterns was the Verwoerdian ideology that African people in the Republic of South Africa were temporary residents.[5] Even when they spent most of their time living in "white" South Africa, their "permanent homes were situated in the homelands within which they could enjoy rights of nationality and citizenship" (Bekker and Humphries 1985:12). Predating Verwoerd, in 1921 the Stallard Commission on local government in the Transvaal had already recommended the following:

> It should be a recognised principle of government that Natives – men, women, and children – should only be permitted within municipal areas insofar and for so long as their presence is demanded by the wants of the white population and should depart therefrom when they cease to minister to the needs of the white man. (Quoted in Savage 1984:25–26, cited in Jones 1993:7)

This principle set the scene for the array of legislation that was to follow, starting two years later with the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. The period of industrialisation after the Second World War was accompanied by rapid urbanisation and the establishment of an urban black working class. After coming to power in 1948, the National Party began implementing the recommendations of the Sauer report (1947), which strengthened the idea of territorial separation and proposed measures to slow and ultimately reverse the movement of Africans to urban areas under white control (Hindson 1987). The Sauer recommendations were incorporated into law through the Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Act in 1952 which, together with the Group Areas Act of 1950, provided the main basis for influx control and forced removals.

The timeline below summarises the main pieces of legislation that, over a period of more than half a century, were designed to control population movement and residential arrangements and restrict the permanent settlement of Africans in urban areas. The enforcement of these laws curbed the mobility of African citizens and frequently had the effect of separating family members along generational and gender lines, either by constraining movement (for example by prohibiting entry or denying tenure rights) or by enforcing movement (for example through forced removals to prescribed areas, or compulsory absences from urban areas in order to prevent residents from acquiring tenure rights).

Table 1. Timeline of selected apartheid legislation affecting population movement, family and household arrangements

Year	Event / legislation	Repealed
1910	Union of the four colonies: the Cape, Orange Free State, Transvaal and Natal.	
1913	**Natives Land Act**, No. 27 of 1913 – Africans were dispossessed of the bulk of their land and prohibited from owning or renting land outside designated reserves, which constituted just 13% of the country's surface area.	1991
1920	**Native Affairs Act**, No. 23 of 1920 – created tribally based government-appointed district councils alongside the establishment of a Native Affairs Commission; part of a	effectively 1986

---

[5] Verwoerd is widely regarded as the architect of grand apartheid through his enforcement of apartheid policies. He was instrumental in bringing the National Party to power in 1948 and was prime minister of South Africa from 1958 until his assassination in parliament in 1966.

	process to transfer the regulation of African life from parliament to the executive, and to undermine claims for representation of Africans in parliament. Effectively repealed in 1986 alongside other apartheid legislation, but traditional authority systems are retained as a parallel form of governance in former homelands.	
1923	**Natives (Urban Areas) Act**, No. 21 of 1923 – established the basis for residential segregation in urban areas. It created a single legislative framework for the country to regulate the presence of Africans in urban areas, and gave municipalities powers to demarcate and manage African locations. It allowed for removal of Africans from white areas to demarcated locations or to the reserves, and limited revenue for the maintenance and improvement of urban locations to what could be extracted from those residents in fees and rent.	effectively 1986
1927	**Native Administration Act**, No. 38 of 1927 (later renamed the Black Administration Act, 1927) – created a separate legal system for the administration of African law. Together with the Native Affairs Act, its purpose was to establish a separate legal regime for Africans living in the reserves, which could be administered by proclamation.	2005
1932	**Native Service Contracts Act**, No. 24 of 1932 – forced Africans living on land outside the reserves to contribute their labour to the white agricultural economy; gave farmers rights to evict tenant families if the employed member defaulted on the labour obligation; allowed farmers to whip tenants; and compelled farm tenants to carry passes.	1964
1936	**Development Trust and Land Act**, No. 18 of 1936 – expanded the number of African reserves to 13, and enabled the elimination of "black spots" where African-owned land was surrounded by white-owned land. It established the South African Native Trust (later the South African Development Trust) to acquire and administer land for African settlement.	1991
1937	**Black (Native) Laws Amendment Act**, No. 46 of 1937 – prohibited Africans from acquiring land in urban areas.	1991
1945	**Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act**, No. 25 of 1945 – replaced the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 and tightened influx controls. It also included an early version of what was to become section 10 of the Group Areas Act.	1986
1948	Republic of South Africa – National Party in government until 1994.	
1950	**Population Registration Act**, No. 30 of 1950 (together with Proclamation 123 of 1968) – classified everyone in the country into one of three main categories / nine sub-categories.	1991
1950	**Group Areas Act**, No. 41 of 1950 – consolidated existing segregationist policies and Bills; determined that categorised racial groups must live separately, in allocated areas; resulted in wide-scale forced removals and the establishment of peri-urban townships to consolidate the urban African population and control urban influx stimulated by the growing economy.	1991
1951	**Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act**, No. 51 of 1951 – enabled land-owners and local authorities, through the minister of Native Affairs, to remove Africans from public and private land, demolish their housing and relocate them to resettlement camps.	1998

	Eventually repealed four years after democracy, and replaced by the Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act.	
1951	**Bantu Authorities Act**, No. 68 of 1951 – abolished the Native Representative Council and instead provided for the establishment of ethnic regional authorities in African bantustans (later renamed "homelands"), in order to create separate self-government for Africans and remove their entitlement to South African civic participation or identity.	1984
1952	**Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Act**, No. 54 of 1952 – narrowed the category of Africans with a right to permanent residence in towns to those who had been born there and had lived there continuously for at least 15 years, or to those who had been employed there continuously for at least 15 years, or with the same employer for at least 10 years.	effectively 1986
1952	**Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act**, No. 67 of 1952 – contrary to its name, the Act entrenched pass laws, requiring Africans to carry identification with them at all times. A permit was required for an African to move from a rural to an urban area, and on arriving in an urban area a work-seeking permit had to be obtained within 72 hours.	1986
1953	**Bantu Education Act**, No. 47 of 1953 – created a separate education department within the Department of Native Affairs, with its own curriculum for Africans designed to provide them only with the skills needed to work in labouring jobs under whites, or in the bantustans.	1979 (and completely in 1991)
1954	**Natives Resettlement Act**, No. 19 of 1954 – enabled the establishment of Soweto by granting powers to remove Africans from any areas within or adjacent to Johannesburg.	1984
1955	**Group Areas Development Act**, No. 69 of 1955 – was designed to support the purpose of the Group Areas Act by preventing nonwhites from living in areas reserved for whites. Replaced in 1966 by the Community Development Act.	1991
1956	**Natives (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act**, No. 64 of 1956 – prevented Africans from appealing to the courts against forced removals.	1986
1959	**Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act**, No. 46 of 1959 – classified Africans into eight ethnic groups, each with its own commissioner-general tasked with developing an independent bantustan. A few years later, Transkei became the first of the bantustans to be established.	1993
1961	**Urban Bantu Council Act**, No. 79 of 1961 – established African councils in urban areas linked to the authorities responsible for the related ethnic bantustan.	1977
1963	**Transkei Constitution Act**, No. 48 of 1963, along with the **Transkei Self-Government Act**, No. 6 of 1964 – created the legislative basis for the Transkei to become an independent country with an officially recognised government; deemed the bantustan of Xhosa-speaking Africans in South Africa.	1993
1966	**Community Development Act**, No. 3 of 1966 – took over the function of the Group Areas Development Act of 1955.	1991
1970	The Population Census – categorised families into one of four nuclear-type structures.	

1970	**Bantu Homelands Citizens Act**, No. 26 of 1970 – removed South African citizenship from all Africans and automatically made each one a citizen of a homeland deemed ethnically appropriate, regardless of whether they had ever lived there. It was followed by 18 Acts specific to the establishment of self-governing territories or independent homelands, including the Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, Lebowa and Venda.	1993
1971	**Bantu Homelands Constitution Act**, No. 21 of 1971 – provided for increased powers to homeland governments, towards achieving independence as separate states.	1993
1971	**Bantu Affairs Administration Board Act**, No. 45 of 1971 – provided for the establishment of administration boards which would take over the functions of municipalities in implementing policy of the Department (of Native Affairs); particularly to tighten influx control and labour regulation.	1984
1972	**Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act**, No. 59 of 1972 – consolidated the laws that determined the admission or prohibition of people from entering the (white) Republic.	1991
1973	**Black Laws Amendment Act**, No. 7 of 1973 – provided that a removal order could be served on an entire "Bantu Community" or tribe, in order to speed up the consolidation of homelands.	1986
1972–3	Establishment of 22 administration boards (transferred responsibility for the control of "black affairs" from white municipalities to administration boards, thereby centralising control).	
1976	**Status of the Transkei Act**, No. 100 of 1976 – made the Transkei an independent state, separate from South Africa. The **Population Registration Act**, No. 24 and **Citizenship of Transkei Act**, No. 26 and **Republic of Transkei Constitution Act**, No. 15 of 1976 created a Transkei constitution, provided for citizenship rights in the Transkei and for the compilation of a population register. The Transkei became the first independent homeland in 1977. Its status as an independent country was not recognised anywhere else in the world.	1993
1977	**Community Councils Act**, No. 125 of 1977 – provided for the establishment of community councils in urban townships, with civil and criminal judicial powers – as part of the new state urban policy after the urban crisis of 1975–1977.	1982
1977	**Aliens and Travellers Control Act**, No. 29 of 1977 – provided for the control and monitoring of aliens, and refusal of entry to the Republic. Africans were considered aliens as they were technically citizens of the independent homelands.	1991
1977	**Acquisition of Immovable Property Control Act**, No.21 of 1977 – provided for state expropriation of property.	1993
1977	**Status of Bophuthatswana Act**, No. 89 of 1977 – declared Bophuthatswana an independent state.	1993
1978	KwaZulu proclaimed a self-governing territory.	
1978	**Blacks (Urban Areas) Amendment Act**, No.97 of 1978 – introduced a 99-year leasehold system, the most secure tenure arrangement available to Africans in urban areas.	1991

1979	**Status of Venda Act**, No. 107 of 1979 and **Republic of Venda Constitution Act**, No. 9 of 1979 – declared Venda an independent country.	1993
1981	**Status of Ciskei Act**, No. 110 of 1981 – declared Ciskei an independent country.	1993
1984	**Black Communities Development Act**, No. 4 of 1984 – introduced freehold ownership and made it possible for Africans to rent or lease property, but only if they were "competent".	1991
1986	**Abolition of Influx Control Act**, No. 68 of 1986 – repealed laws relating to influx control.	
1991	**Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act**, No. 108 of 1991 – repealed or amended a range of laws in order to abolish certain restrictions based on race.	

Compiled from Bekker and Humphries 1985; Boddy-Evans (n.d.); Burman 1986; O'Malley (n.d.); *South African History Online* (n.d.); South African Institute of Race Relations 1987 and various previous issues of the *Race Relations Survey*.

The list above represents only a fraction of the apartheid legislative arsenal. It excludes the mass of discriminatory laws pertaining to individual provinces and to specified population groups other than black Africans. It also excludes legislation related to labour relations, trade unions and commercial activities; to most of the discriminatory legislation on schooling and tertiary education; to public amenities; to political and civil rights including (dis)enfranchisement, prohibitions on mixed marriage and on the right to association and assembly; to security intelligence, public safety, terrorism and criminal procedure; to the institutions and capacities of the police and the military, justice and prisons; and to information, the media and censorship.

The timeline presents only the main enabling legislation behind a massive regulatory framework that directly limited property rights and population movement, and provided for evictions and forced removals to the homelands, as well as "betterment planning"[6] and removals within the homelands – all of which influenced tenure arrangements, household form and formation. In effect, the system "trapped the majority of South Africa's population in remote pockets of the country while instituting dependence on urban economic centres" (Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015: no page numbers provided). The effects on household form would certainly have influenced living arrangements for children, although the records of the time have little to say specifically on their situation.

Most of this legislation was revoked only from the mid-1980s onwards – a strong reminder that the controls on population movement and residence continued until very recently. Other than the

---

[6] Betterment planning was a system of spatial reorganisation carried out within the homelands, starting from the 1930s but becoming most intense after the mid-1950s. The stated purpose of betterment was conservation, but arguably the focus was on preventative strategies (for example the prevention of land degradation) rather than developmental strategies. Rural wards or identified betterment areas were categorised into three land-use types: residential, arable and grazing. This required relocating people from dispersed rural homesteads into village-like arrangements and demarcating new arable land areas outside the villages for agriculture. Betterment planning was widely hated and resisted, and commentators have argued that its real purpose was about control and consolidation of the labour reserves. In effect, betterment planning resulted in forced removals and the destruction of neighbourhood networks and, if anything, had a detrimental effect on agriculture and the environment (see De Wet 1987 and McAllister 1991 for further discussion).

removal of the legal constraints, mainly through the Abolition of Influx Control Act No. 68 of 1986, and the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act No. 108 of 1991, it is unclear whether any of the post-democracy policies and programmes has succeeded in redressing the effects of these population controls on household arrangements, or indeed what a "normal" household would be in the absence of colonial and apartheid history.

Apartheid was a deliberately divisive system. Its strategy to entrench minority rule required divisive tactics to weaken opposition. Laurine Platzky and Cheryl Walker wrote thus: "It divides urban people from rural, employed from unemployed, 'legal' from 'illegal', male from female, enfranchised from disenfranchised, white/coloured/Indian from African, and African people into ten different ethnic groups" (1985:xxi). It also divided families, split generations and separated breadwinners from dependants.

2.1.2 Urban development imperatives and implications for households

Underlying influx control was the desire to control and limit black urbanisation, but not to prevent it completely. Segregationist ideals and the long-term vision of a white-only South Africa had to be balanced with the labour needs of urban employers and industry. The overall strategy was therefore to contain Africans in (or remove them to) rural areas unless they were usefully employed in serving the white economy. Those permitted to live in urban areas were confined to townships or hostels in an effort to maintain the racially segregated boundaries and minimise the costs of housing and service provision to municipalities.

In their detailed account of the establishment and operations of the administrative boards, Simon Bekker and Richard Humphries describe how, after 1948, tensions grew between the National Party government and United Party-controlled city councils, which retained some discretionary power in the development of urban regulations. At the 1958 conference of the Institute of Administrators, the Boksburg manager of the Non-European Affairs Department criticised municipalities that failed to realise the intention of labour control measures of the Department of Native Affairs, claiming that some municipalities "slavishly follow the policy of encouraging every Native employed in their areas to become urbanised, to welcome him with his family and to provide him with accommodation in the Bantu Townships" (Bekker and Humphries 1985:5). He proposed limiting municipal discretion to admit women and children to urban areas – something that had previously been allowed in Section 10 of the Group Areas Act.

Broadly, Section 10 prescribed that Africans may not stay in an urban area for more than 72 hours unless they qualified for exemption on the basis that (a) they were born there, (b) they had legal work there, or (c) in the case of women, were married to a man with permission to be there AND who had an approved house (Burman 1986; Hindson 1987; Platzky and Walker 1985). Section 10 in effect provided qualifications to the provisions of the Act, viewed by some as discretionary loopholes in the implementation of influx control. During the 1960s, following the defeat of the anti-pass campaigns of the 1950s, the Section 10 qualifications were eroded in a number of ways, further reducing the legal security of urban dwellers previously covered by these clauses. In particular, a regulation introduced in 1968 was designed to remove the route for permanent settlement through employment (Section 10(1)(b) of the Act), by limiting employment contracts under Section 1(d) to a year, annually renewable (Hindson 1987). Section 10(1)(c) was also

amended to make it more difficult for women (and by extension their children) to acquire residence rights. The residential rights of urban Africans were increasingly temporary and insecure. The Nationalist agenda was explicitly to achieve territorial apartheid, and one of the mechanisms was to keep unemployed Africans and, as far as possible, the dependants of migrant workers (mainly women and children) out of white South Africa.

Under the Bantu Affairs Administration Board Act of 1971, 22 administration boards were established. Responsibility for implementing policy and control of "black affairs" was transferred from the United Party-dominated white municipalities to these boards. This shift in responsibility brought about changes in the locus of power and also in the spatial application of that power. Whereas municipalities previously had some autonomy in developing municipal regulations, the boards had no power to make policies or regulations; they simply implemented central policy. And whereas municipalities were primarily located in (and concerned with) towns and cities, the jurisdiction of administration boards included both rural and urban areas: in effect they were more like regional authorities, with greater control of the movement of people across the urban–rural divide.

Two camps emerged through the 1970s as the rate of urbanisation increased and the economy underwent structural change: one was concerned primarily with industrial relations and sought to ensure that the urban labour pool was able to adjust to the demands of a more modern and industrialised economy, which required less state control, greater scope for free enterprise and a less constrained black labour market; the other sought to ensure the fulfilment of the separate development policy, implemented by the Department of Cooperation and Development and its agents (notably the administration boards, the chief commissioners and the security forces who enforced influx control). Consequently, the administration boards were required to differentiate between Africans (mainly men) who could actively participate in the modern sector of the economy, and those who could not – thereby even more stringently enforcing the qualifiers in Section 10 (Bekker and Humphries 1985). The entitlements and opportunities for urbanisation, particularly for women and children, were further eroded.

2.1.3 Migrancy, hostels and family accommodation

The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, passed in 1959, heralded the establishment of bantustans (independent homelands). From this time, officials "continually emphasised the links urban blacks were to have with these homelands and that migratory labour was to be preferred to stabilized labour" (Ibid:7). Any proposed new housing developments in urban townships had to be approved by the then Department of Bantu Administration, which needed to be satisfied that "(1) such new developments (particularly family housing) were imperative and that (2) it was not possible to provide such accommodation in an adjacent black homeland" (Surplus People Project 1983:97).

Household arrangements, and particularly the co-residence arrangements of women and children with their men, were therefore constrained not only by law: often there was literally no room for women and children in places that were only designed to accommodate the (mostly male) urban labour force. Women who had permission to work in town often had to leave their children elsewhere, in the care of relatives. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that urban

residential rights for African families (dependent women and children) were not only subject to the increasingly stringent requirements of Section 10 of the Group Areas Act, but also contingent on the availability of "suitable" family accommodation. From the late 1960s housing construction in urban townships slowed and eventually ground to a halt, while single sex hostel accommodation was expanded (Hindson 1987). The shortfall of family housing became an indirect way of preventing the urbanisation of women, children and other "surplus" Africans. This left stark choices for the families of male urban migrants: to be geographically separated, or to attempt to cohabit, illegally, in unsuitable accommodation.

The Lwandle migrant labour hostel complex near Somerset West is now a museum. Walking through one of the preserved hostels, the rooms now reconstructed with the original belongings of hostel dwellers, it is possible to imagine the cramped spaces in which some families attempted to live together. Towards the end of apartheid these kinds of living arrangements were documented and really considered for the first time in relation to children, notably by Sean Jones (1993: "Assaulting Childhood: Children's experiences of migrancy and hostel life in South Africa") and Mamphela Ramphele (1993: "A Bed Called Home: Life in the migrant labour hostels of Cape Town"); and beyond the hostels by Pamela Reynolds (1989: "Childhood in Crossroads", and other work that examines childhoods in an urban setting).

Jones (1993) wrote of children's life in the hostels of Lwandle, to which women (and their children) had started to move and cohabit with their men even before the lifting of influx control legislation. At the time of his research, in 1989, 25 per cent of the Lwandle hostel residents were children, mostly of preschool age. Living in cramped communal conditions, children witnessed marital arguments, sex, violence, police brutality and murder, and were themselves at risk of abuse and assault. Although the hostels were designed for single men living at extremely close quarters, in reality they accommodated an average of more than four people to a bed. Sometimes sharing arrangements extended to seven or eight people, who used the bed in shifts. "A single hostel room contains a number of beds, each of which is occupied in most instances by an entire family or some other functionally-independent domestic group. In other words, any number of separate domestic groups may all reside together in one room…. In these circumstances, the conventional analytic concept of the 'household' is clearly inappropriate" (Jones 1993:28). Instead Jones speaks of "bedholds", a term that Ramphele adopted in her accounts of the relationships of dependency and patronage around those with bedhold rights, who could operate like landlords.

In Ramphele's study at about the same time but across a different selection of hostels in Langa, Gugulethu and Nyanga, only a third of the hostel population were bedholders – those to whom the spaces were allocated. The rest were dependants: men, women and children who shared the bed and the small floor space surrounding it. In contrast to the idea that hostels were temporary places for migrants, some of the hostel dwellers had lived in the hostels for more than 25 years, having nowhere else to stay in the city. The married women Ramphele encountered in the hostels tended to oscillate between town and country, "torn between the responsibilities of looking after the rural 'home', bringing up children and fulfilling wider family responsibilities on the one hand, and maintaining a personal relationship with their husbands on the other" (Ramphele 1993:72). The hostels were an extreme but, at the time, not uncommon example of the complexity of "household" and "family" as constructs, and of family formation and dissolution as a continuous social process.

2.1.4   Forced removals

The resettlement policy, implemented as part of influx control, specifically targeted nonworking Africans for removal from designated white areas – towns and farms. General Circular No. 25 of 1967, entitled "Settling of nonproductive Bantu resident in European areas, in the homelands", states:

1. It is accepted Government policy that the Bantu are only temporarily resident in the European areas of the Republic… As soon as they become, for one reason or another, no longer fit for work or superfluous in the labour market, they are expected to return to their country of origin or to the territory of the national unit where they fit in ethnically….

2. The Bantus in the European areas who are normally regarded as non-productive and as such have to be resettled in the homelands, are conveniently classified as follows:-

    (i) The aged, the unfit, widows, women with dependent children, also families who do not qualify under the provision of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Act No.25 of 1945 for family accommodation in the European urban areas.

    (cited in Platzky and Walker 1985:28)

The Surplus People's Project (SPP) was established in 1979 to investigate, document and quantify forced removals nationally. The figures compiled from years of fieldwork suggest that over 3.5 million individual removals took place between 1960 and 1983, mainly to support the policy of territorial separatism and consolidation of the bantustans. A further two million were under threat of removal at the time (Ibid:10). The figures are known to be underestimated as they exclude two important categories. First, they exclude the bulk of those affected by influx control in urban areas: SPP estimated that over two million urban arrests were made in terms of the pass laws over the two decades leading up to 1983, although not all of these people would have been deported to the bantustans and so are not counted among those forcibly removed. In addition, many of those who were removed would have returned illegally, and so would have been excluded from the count. Second, the figures exclude those who were forced to move *within* the bantustans as a result of betterment planning: no national figures were available, but it was estimated that in the province of Natal alone, over a million people had been moved as a result of betterment planning during the two decades reviewed (Ibid:9).

The estimated two million under threat of removal included a quarter of a million people – the entire African population of Cape Town at the time – who were to be moved to a planned dormitory township 30km outside the city. The township was to be called Khayelitsha, which means "new home". There were therefore three main types or directions of removal: from white South Africa to the bantustans; internal removals within the bantustans (as part of the betterment planning process); and internal removals within white South Africa, from urban suburbs to townships on the urban periphery.

Those living in or deported to the bantustans, later called the "homelands", were not permitted to leave and seek work elsewhere. Even if they managed to find an urban job, they would be refused registration, have no residence rights, and risk being arrested or deported again. The only way to move legally to white South Africa was to apply to one of the labour bureaux inside the bantustans and wait to be offered work. For the few who managed to secure jobs in this way, it was still impossible for their families to relocate to town as the employment contracts could only

be valid for a year at a time, thereby preventing migrants from obtaining urban residence rights in terms of the Section 10 qualifications.

It was envisaged that the repeal of these legal constraints would catalyse permanent urbanisation and family reunification, including a reverse movement for households that had been divided by influx control or affected by forced removals. Despite some policy reforms aimed at redress, however, the post-apartheid era did not provide an enabling context for this to happen. It is possible that further changes at the level of family, combined with a failure to undo the structural constraints to urbanisation established under apartheid, mean that many of the divisive spatial and social arrangements are perpetuated in contemporary South Africa.

2.2 Post-apartheid: Children's households and family fragmentation

2.2.1 Family fragmentation as "legacy"?

The deliberate disruption of households and families by the apartheid regime, or what Debbie Budlender and Francie Lund refer to as the "state-orchestrated destruction of family life" (2011:926), is widely acknowledged to have had a massive and lasting effect on African household structure (see for example Amoateng and Heaton 2007; Bray and Brandt 2007; Bray et al. 2010; Budlender and Lund 2011; Harvey 1994; Lee 2009; Madhavan and Schatz 2007; Reynolds and Burman 1986; Ross 2003; Simkins 1986).

In his introduction to one of the early accounts of forced removals, Cosmas Desmond wrote:

> At present [1970] … more than 40% of the economically active men are absent from the 'homelands' at any given time. This enforced splitting-up of families is probably the most evil of all the effects of the resettlement schemes.… For the sake of the comfort of the White man the Black man must be deprived of his right to live with his wife and family. (Desmond 1970:19)

Similarly, on the effect of migrant labour on extended families, Anthony Barker commented:

> It is at family level that the most pain is felt, and we cannot forget that the African cultural heritage enshrines a broader, more noble concept of family than that of the West. The extended family has proved a marvellous security for those for whom, otherwise, there was no security at all. The extended family is a net wide enough to gather the child who falls from the feeble control of neglectful parents, it receives the widow, tolerates the batty, gives status to grannies. Migratory labour destroys this.
>
> (Barker 1973, cited in Murray 1981:101)

The report on the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa refers to multiple papers presented at this seminal conference held in 1984 that describe the dislocating effect of migrant labour, the enforced separation of family members, and the complexity of co-residence arrangements and care strategies. Children's vulnerability to malnutrition is explained in relation to these dynamics:

> There seem to be three underlying causes of … wasting in young children. First is obviously the absence of adequate income amongst the families to which these children belong. Second is the fact that many children are born of young mothers who are unmarried or divorced or whose husbands are away working in town as migrants. The instability of family life, for which the

migrant system must bear much of the blame, is a major factor in both infant mortality and the malnutrition of children. The third related cause of the problem is the absence, particularly in the urban areas, of adequate child-minding or pre-school facilities for working mothers, whose earnings are vital for the survival of their children but whose hours … necessitate their being away from home for twelve hours or more each day. (Wilson and Ramphele 1989:175)

Here, as in much of the literature, family instability or fragmentation is explicitly attributed to the migrant labour system. The concept of fragmentation, as frequently used in relation to the family, implies that a social unit has been broken or scattered, and relationships have disintegrated. It suggests that there was once a coherent and unfragmented family form; that this is the natural state for a family.

Family fragmentation (and concern about it) is not new. A detailed discussion of historical family structure before apartheid is beyond the scope of this work. Suffice to say that many historical studies of kinship have documented the extended and complex structure of families in southern Africa where family members were not always present and children did not always live with their biological parents (Murray 1981). Labour migration to (and within) South Africa predates apartheid; the extended separation of migrants from their home environments was common in the region as far back as the late nineteenth century (Ibid; Russell 2003a; Walker 1990).

It has also been argued that the physical separation of family members for sustained periods dated back, in some forms, to precolonial times. Zolani Ngwane, writing about rural villages of the Eastern Cape, argues that "the household never quite attained the status of a unit, but merely existed as a site of struggle over an imagined form of the household, a form whose realization was perpetually deferred in practice owing to a combination of historical transformations … [including] regional political instabilities in the nineteenth century" (Ngwane 2003:688). Family members were separated by the upheavals of the Mfecane wars of 1815–1840 and the waves of migration that followed; visits to distant kin meant sustained absences by family members; households expanded as men took more wives, and contracted with departures and death; children's living arrangements were restructured when adults died prematurely from battle, disease or childbirth.

Ngwane cautions against a narrowly causal interpretation of the effects of migrant labour on households. He slates the dominant scholarship, which contains

> a litany of moralistically tinged criticism of migrant labour as responsible for the dissolution of the black family.… Hence the tendency to portray the black rural family in South Africa as, on the one hand, a site of resistance in which some pre-colonial traditional values are jealously preserved and, on the other, a site of capitulation in which a secular urban culture is progressively replacing traditional lifestyles." (Ibid:688)

He argues that household fluidity cannot be assumed to have originated with migrant labour, and that dating the dissolution of black families to the onset of migrant labour "betrays a modernist stereotype in which pre-colonial African societies are presented as self-contained, 'windowless monads' whose social conflicts and their outcomes are structurally generated and resolved" (Ibid:689). Even among those households and communities directly affected by migrant labour, the local discourse (expressed through songs, for example) simply adopts the idiom of migrant labour but nevertheless continues voicing the earlier domestic struggles to define "the local". For people have always been in motion, even before the start of migrant labour (Ibid:699).

Across Africa, the practice of distributing (and moving) children across households is well documented, and "almost certainly predate[s] the economics and political upheavals of colonialism and industrialism. African children are expected to circulate between kin, as needed, for errands and companionship and according to capacity to support them. In southern Africa, children are expected especially to spend time in the household of their grandparents" (Russell 2003b:25). While the terms "fragmentation" or "dissolution" are commonly used to describe household dispersion as a negative consequence of migration patterns, or even worse, of abandonment, the practice of leaving children with family members in households of origin could also be regarded as the opposite – a strategy to retain an unfragmented (albeit spatially dispersed) household.

In *Families Divided* (1981), Colin Murray warns against employing essentialist assumptions linked to binary constructs ("extended" = African; "nuclear" = Western) or trying to trace social change from one household form to another in linear ways. Murray studied the effects of migrant labour on rural household structure. Although his research was located in Lesotho, many of his observations can be taken to represent social structures and processes across the labour reserves serving South Africa – including the bantustans. He refers to two simultaneous and apparently paradoxical processes, which he terms the "dissolution/conservation contradiction" (Murray 1981:107): on the one hand, kinship systems are dissolved or "restructured" (for example through individual mobility, conjugal instability and the break-up of families), while on the other hand reciprocal obligations are conserved through relatively stable agnatic structures that endure across generations. These, he argues, are flipsides of the same process: "far from being contradictory in their implications, both the conservation and the change are rooted in the political economy of the labour reserve" (Ibid:112). These parallel processes of dissolution and conservation of family ties appear in more recent South African literature too. Referring to the complexity of care arrangements in Masiphumelele, Rachel Bray and René Brandt observe that "these arrangements have been common for several generations in communities disenfranchised by apartheid. The severe restrictions on adult movement and employment … forced families to fragment, to draw on cultural values relating to a sense of communal responsibility for children, and effectively disperse care for children over time and space" (Bray and Brandt 2007:5).

Bearing in mind the warnings about narrow stereotypes, one should be careful to avoid relying overly on attributing contemporary patterns and trends in family life to the residual effects of apartheid and the destructive consequences of labour migration, although this period clearly had a significant effect on the living arrangements of families. Neither is it possible to establish a "baseline" view of what families looked like at a particular point in time, for purposes of comparison. Rather, the intention is to view changing family structure as a "social process" within a longer process of societal change (Murray 1981:100) where current forms are partly influenced by historical forces (including the spatial arrangements and restrictions of apartheid as well as various earlier events and dynamics, which I cannot attempt to describe here). In addition, "new" developments may be expected to have had an effect on household residential arrangements. These include the increased absorption of women in the labour market relative to men, rising female migration rates (discussed in chapter 4), declining marriage rates, HIV/AIDS-related illness and mortality, high unemployment, housing backlogs, and an expanding social assistance programme.

2.2.2   Contemporary dynamics of household and family formation

Despite arguments that processes of modernisation and industrialisation lead inevitably to the simplifying of family structure towards a nuclear form (Goode 1982), South African surveys suggest that, in rural areas at least, the extended (complex) household form continues to predominate, and that nuclear structures are not increasing (Wittenberg and Collinson 2007). However, the "extended" household type is very wide, and there may have been changes within this broadly construed form. An analysis of surveillance site data from rural Agincourt in Mpumalanga found a decline in nuclear family structures (also observed in national household data from Stats SA) and an increase in three-generation linear households. The authors suggest that the increasing prevalence of these households is due largely "to changes in migratory behaviour (such as an increase in female labour migration)" (Wittenberg and Collinson 2007:136). Similarly, a comparison of census data from 1996 and 2001 showed no increase in the proportion of nuclear-family households in the five-year period, but a clear increase in "extended" family structures (Amoateng et al. 2007).

Extended households in the form of "skip-generational" or "three-generational" households are more prevalent in rural than urban areas. In 2001, 47 per cent of rural households with an African head were defined as extended in that they spanned three generations, compared with 31 per cent of urban African households. In contrast, only around 10 per cent of households headed by whites were extended households spanning three generations, with similar proportions in urban and rural areas (Ibid).

Patterns of marriage and cohabitation are relevant to a discussion of changing household structure and family form, and are among the contemporary dynamics that may be expected to influence household mobility and child care arrangements. The reorganisation of social relations and the disruption of family (and conjugal) life under apartheid clearly affected the position of women, their family structure, marital practice and status (Mhongo and Budlender 2013; Posel and Rudwick 2013; Walker 1995). The standard labour system enforced the separation of migrant men from women for 11 months of the year, meaning that marriage relationships became harder or lengthier processes to enter into, and more difficult to sustain (Ramphele and Richter 2006). Post-apartheid dynamics have served to accentuate some of the negative trends in the gendered political economy. Writing in the era of rapidly rising HIV, Mark Hunter identified three important dimensions of the contemporary political economy of sex: "(1) rising unemployment and the marginalization of women; (2) rapidly declining marriage rates; (3) the growth in women's movement, often in circular migration patterns that pivot around a rural home" (Hunter 2007:693). These dimensions are clearly linked and are relevant to the dynamics of household form and child care.

Marriage rates are unusually low in South Africa, even relative to the rest of Africa, and are gradually declining. As Christine Mhongo and Debbie Budlender point out, declining marriage rates are not a new phenomenon, and one must be specific about time periods. Their analysis of census data between 1921 and 2001 shows that the percentage of African women who were never married was fairly stable (at around 25%) from 1921 to the 1950s, and started increasing from 1960, with the biggest increase in the 20-year period between 1960 and 1980, when the nonmarried rate had risen to 43 per cent. The share of never-married African women

subsequently increased gradually to 49 per cent in 1996 (Mhongo and Budlender 2013). These long-term comparisons were for women aged 15 and over. However, very few women under 18 are married. A comparison of marriage rates for African women aged 18 years and older in the three post-apartheid censuses shows that marriage rates have continued to decline. The analysis is complicated by the inclusion of a category "living together as partners" – which could include people who have been previously married but are now living with another partner to whom they are not married, as well as those who have never been married. In 1996, 50 per cent of African women were reported to be never married or living together, while the other 50 per cent were reported to be currently married or previously married but now widowed or divorced. In 2001, the percentage of African women who were never married or living together as unmarried partners had increased to 54; and in 2011, 61 per cent of women were recorded as never married or living together. Only 39 per cent were reported to be currently or previously married (own analysis of census 2011). This suggests that the declining marriage rates observed since 1960 have continued in the post-apartheid decade. Significantly, the most dramatic decline in marriage rates occurred well before the end of apartheid, at a time when controls on population movement and residential arrangements were at their height.

Many of the reasons offered to explain the decline have been explored and reiterated over several decades, suggesting a long and continuous process of social change, with multiple influences. A range of reasons for declining marriage rates is documented in the literature:

The possibility of inconsistent translation and interpretation of the term "married" in the census data and other surveys: The strongest claims about trends over time are those derived from quantitative data sources that are comparable over a particular time period. However, surveys tend to treat marriage as a binary construct (married / not married), linked to a once-off event, presumably premised on the idea of a civil marriage ceremony, and therefore fail to capture the nuance of customary marriage as a process that can take many years (Hunter 2007; Mhongo and Budlender 2013; Murray 1981). This might lead to under-reporting of marriage by those for whom the process has not reached completion, though it could also affect the responses in the opposite direction. Either way, it is not clear that this limitation would explain declining marriage rates as the problem would apply across all years – unless under-reporting increases over time, for example because customary marriage has become a lengthier process.

Women's independence from male providers: Various commentators have pointed out that a matrifocal cell was increasingly viable as women became better educated and were able to earn income, making them less dependent on men for material support (Mhongo and Budlender 2013). The effects of increased economic participation of women on their economic independence would be offset in part by the fact that women's earnings continue to be lower than those of men (Seekings 2009). However, certain national programmes have served to increase women's independence from male providers. The introduction of the National Housing Scheme (1994) gave women independent access to urban housing. Provided they had dependants, women could access the housing subsidy to establish households independently of men (Hall 2005), whereas previously their access to urban areas was greatly restricted (more so than for men). With the expansion of the social assistance programme and the introduction of the child support grant in 1998, the number of women with access to financial support from the state has increased dramatically. By March 2016, 12 million child support grants were being disbursed monthly to 6.6

million adult caregivers, almost all of whom were women (social grants data from the South African Social Security Agency, by special request). Yet the extent to which the child support grant could support women's economic independence would be limited, given the very low value of the grant (R360 per month at the end of 2016). In fact it has been argued that, in the absence of wage work, social grants may have had unintended negative consequences for rural women: a study in KwaZulu-Natal found that grants were perceived as contributing to declining marriage rates as they unsettle traditional household arrangements and "absolve men of the responsibility of fatherhood" (Dubbeld 2013:198). It has also been argued that grants may crowd out private transfers from men for the support of their children (Patel 2012).

Women's preference to remain unmarried: While customary marriage is still widely practised, decisions about when and whom to marry have become more to do with individual choice and less the product of strategic social alliances forged by kin. Women may decide not to marry because they regard men as too irresponsible to make good husbands, for instance because they have affairs and spend money on other women rather than supporting their wives and children. Husbands may also refuse to allow their wives to use birth control to limit the number of children, who will then need to be supported. It has been argued that staying single becomes a strategy against poverty and one study explains it as a way for women to take control of their own fertility (Van der Vliet 1984). Given the high rates of nonmarital fertility, it may be that there are other constraints to women's control over reproduction, such as poor access (or adherence) to contraception.

Men's preference to remain unmarried: Men occupy a particular role in which much of the expected support from them is material – and conversely, when men are unable or unwilling to provide material support, their role in household engagement is diminished (Bray and Brandt 2007). Although employment rates are higher among men than women, male unemployment rates have remained high since the 1970s, and earnings for many of those who are in the labour market are extremely low. Yet the main role of men has persistently been regarded, by both men and women, as being that of material providers (Eddy, Thomson-de-Boor and Mphaka 2013). In this context, it is argued that men may be disinclined to marry because of the expectation of financial support and their own concern about their ability to act as providers (Hosegood, McGrath and Moultrie 2009; Hunter 2007; Mhongo and Budlender 2013). Another argument is that men feel their authority to be undermined by women's changing roles, which challenge traditional gender power relations (Hosegood et al. 2009).

The crisis of African masculinity: Alongside these arguments is a body of work that deals with the crisis of African masculinity, which may affect patterns of marriage and cohabitation. Hunter writes of a "fundamentally changing" *isoka* masculinity (Hunter 2004:130). Definitions of the concept *isoka* (in Zulu terminology) vary, and have varied over time: historically associated with a young man's coming of age and the onset of the courting period, it later came to refer to the status attached to men who could attract multiple sexual partners (in some interpretations it might be translated as "Casanova") – and even came to "describe and justify men's sole right to have multiple partners" (Hunter 2004:130). Rising unemployment from the 1970s made it increasingly difficult for men to pay *ilobolo* (bridewealth). Patterns of migrant labour, the contradictions of urban and rural living and the restriction of patriarchal authority under apartheid all served to undermine African masculinity (Morrell 1998). More recently, multiple forms of

disappointment and frustration about the job market, the inability to marry and support a family, and the slow pace of political and economic change have led to a "chronic loss of identity" for young men (Campbell 1992:623). Alternative ways of expressing masculinity emerged, including violence. *Isoka* became another way for men to express their masculinity, not only through traditional polygamy but through multiple sexual partnerships alongside marriage or in the absence of marriage. In the context of HIV, multiple-partnered relationships posed a serious threat to health and life for both men and women. Some may argue that sexual practices have changed, that "there are no longer *amasoka* [because] people are scared to die of AIDS" (this is what a 20-year-old male informant tells Hunter, the quote being recorded in the introduction to his 2004 paper). But Hunter describes how the effects of AIDS can be seen in the emasculating symptoms of the disease and are visible to all in the funerals of young people. Nevertheless, in some areas at least, the *isoka* masculinity remains a way to "reiterate gendered power in broader spheres of everyday life" (Hunter 2004:142), including the absence of marriage. In the 2011 population census, 55 per cent of African men reported that they were never married and another 12 per cent were living together with a partner to whom they were not married. This was an increase from the 52 per cent never married and 6 per cent living together reported in the 1996 census (own analysis of census 1996 and 2011).

The separation of motherhood and marriage: A large part of women's social identity and value derives from their reproductive role, a role which traditionally has been associated – in African culture as in many others – with marriage. The difference in fertility rates between married and unmarried women has narrowed over the years, in part because the stigma of single motherhood has declined (Denis and Ntsimane 2006; Walker 1995). While changes in the social order may have reduced the perceived relevance of marriage, the value placed on fertility among African women has endured. Conversely, it seems that marriage is delinked from having children – for example, one of the traditional functions of *ilobolo* was a "child-price", in that it only applied to women of child-bearing age and would need to be returned if the woman failed to produce children. (This function was found to have no resonance in a sample of Zulu-speakers in contemporary KwaZulu-Natal (Rudwick and Posel 2014).)

In Xhosa culture there used to be a distinction between *iintombi* (young marriageable girls) among whom pregnancy would be viewed as a disgrace, and *amankazana* (older nonmarriageable women), who are free to have sexual relations and bear children (Mayer and Mayer 1961) – in other words, it was historically possible and even acceptable for unmarried women to have children. A 1989 study of teenage pregnancy suggested that "the value placed upon children is so high that marriage is, in some contexts, quite irrelevant to the bearing of children" (Preston-Whyte and Zondi 1989:55). Thus there has been an "uncoupling of African marriage and motherhood during the course of the twentieth century" (Walker 1995).

In her study of the ways in which sequential generations of women constructed a sense of "home" in an urban setting, Rebekah Lee describes very different demographic profiles among three generations of African women in Cape Town's townships. The older generation, born in the 1920s and 1930s, had low levels of education and all were married. Second-generation women, born in the 1950s and 1960s, had attained higher educational standards. Most were in some kind of employment, and most, but not all, were married. All of the third-generation women, born in the 1970s and 1980s, were single and, Lee observes, they "generally expressed doubt as to the future

relevance of the institution of marriage in their lives, or the belief that they would be able to find suitable husbands" (2009:15). Through interwoven oral histories, Lee shows that membership of patrilineal groups lost relevance for women altogether, being replaced by networks of association and mutual support that enabled women to become central figures in managing and sustaining their urban households (Lee 2009).

Other studies have found that marriage (and accompanying *ilobolo*) remains the ideal for many women as it confers social status and makes women feel valued and respected (Rudwick and Posel 2014). An analysis of attitudinal questions in the South African Social Attitudes Survey suggests that there were clear cultural differences in attitudes towards marriage: rural women were more likely than urban women to regard marriage as desirable, and African women were more positive about marriage than white women (Moore and Govender 2013). These patterns are to a certain extent reflected in actual marriage rates: rural women are more likely to be married than those living in urban areas. But despite the racial differences in attitudes, marriage rates among African women are substantially lower than among white women (Budlender et al. 2004; Moore and Govender 2013; Posel and Rudwick 2013).

Economic constraints to marriage: The "simultaneous collapse of agrarian and wage livelihoods" among young South Africans (Hunter 2007:694) is significant for marriage and household formation, and one of the effects is that it may be too costly to enter into marriage. The cost of *ilobolo* has been documented as a reason for declining marriage rates for many decades (Mhongo and Budlender 2013), and current research indicates that it continues to be a barrier (Posel and Rudwick 2013; Posel et al. 2011; Rudwick and Posel 2014). *Ilobolo* is a historical indigenous custom, particularly among Zulu and Xhosa populations, and was traditionally linked to cattle ownership. Stephanie Rudwick and Dori Posel (2014) draw on a substantial literature to show how early colonial policies both undermined and entrenched this practice in three ways. First, a 'hut tax' was introduced in the former province of Natal in 1846, forcing young men to engage in migrant labour in order to pay a tax on the family homestead. Generational tensions between fathers and sons about who should pay *ilobolo* arose when younger men, engaged in migrant work, were no longer available to work on the household's land and "thus no longer played the same role in the inter-generational bargain" – and there is evidence of these tensions as far back as the 1920s (McClendon (2002), cited in Mhongo and Budlender 2013:191).

Second, colonial land dispossessions reduced capacity for cattle farming, and the depletion of herds was exacerbated by the rinderpest epidemic of 1897 (Rudwick and Posel 2014). In combination these reduced the capital that households needed for marriage. Further land dispossession and betterment planning under apartheid, and more recent processes of de-agrarianisation, would have further eroded households' stock-keeping capacity.

Third, in 1869, *ilobolo* amounts were standardised by the colonial government of Natal, starting at 10+1 cows for a commoner (the additional cow being for the bride's mother), up to 20 or more cows for a chief's daughter. The Natal Code of 1878 also required that all the cattle be paid before the marriage, although this was not an inflexible requirement in customary practice (Rudwick and Posel 2014). Later changes in the type of resources needed for *ilobolo* (from cattle to the equivalent value in cash) also changed the nature of intergenerational and reciprocal obligations of support to provide bridewealth: whereas previously a man's male relatives helped to provide the cattle needed for *ilobolo*, such kinship exchanges diminished in the money economy, and the

financial burden of *ilobolo* became more individualised (Wilson 1981). Monica Wilson analysed the effective cost of *ilobolo* in relation to the migrant wage and found that in the 1960s it would take a typical miner two years to afford *ilobolo* if he saved all of his earnings, and 10 years taking into account other expenses (Mhongo and Budlender 2013). A more recent study in KwaZulu-Natal found that the vast majority of men under 35 years felt that payment of *ilobolo* was their own responsibility, not their father's (Rudwick and Posel 2014). A national survey indicated that 44 per cent of Africans saw *ilobolo* as the main reason that people do not marry (Yaw 2006), and the percentage was even higher among unmarried Africans (Rudwick and Posel 2014).

Alongside declining marriage and cohabitation rates are high rates of paternal absence from the households where children live (Posel and Devey 2006). Less than half of rural children have co-resident fathers when they are born (Hosegood and Madhavan 2012), and only a third of all children nationally have their father co-resident in the household where they live (Hall and Wright 2010). The rise in female-headed households is a related concern in the literature, although again this form of household is not new. Referring to women's transfers across households, Murray points out that the moves are far more complex than a linear transfer from the parental home to the marital one. He suggests that women's patterns of mobility are "best understood in terms of a triangular set of possibilities" (1981:107) with three apices: a natal (rural) home, an affinal home (where her husband may or may not be co-resident most of the time), and a workplace home (if the woman embarks on migrant work to help maintain children or other kin, and to which she may or may not take her children). Depending on the scenario, any of these households could be female-headed. The natal home may be headed by a widowed mother; the affinal home may be headed for most of the year by the woman while her husband works on the mines; and the workplace home would be female-headed if the woman migrates alone and establishes her own home or shares with other women. Female-headed households are recorded in the work of Philip and Iona Mayer (1961), where unmarried urban mothers expressed a preference for running their own home in town rather than returning to the control of their parental home.

A comparison of households across comparable nationally representative surveys from 1997 to 2006 suggested a modest increase of just over two percentage points (from 35.2 per cent to 37.5) in the share of households headed by women, according to self-reported data on household headship (Posel and Rogan 2012). The percentage of households with a *de jure* female household head (defined as a household where the self-reported female head has never been married or attached with a male partner) rose by five percentage points (from 24 per cent to 29) over the same period. The percentage of *de facto* female-headed households (those where the self-reported female head has been married or in a permanent partnership with a man who is no longer resident in the household perhaps because of death or separation) declined by nearly three percentage points (from 8.9 per cent to 6.1) (Rogan 2013).

Female-headed households are also found to be disproportionately poor. Although social grants have helped to decrease gender differences in the depth of poverty (Posel and Rogan 2012), the poverty gap between female-headed and male-headed households has widened over the post-apartheid period (Bhorat and Van der Westhuizen 2012; Posel and Rogan 2012; Rogan 2013). And despite women's increased share of employment and the targeting of child grants to caregivers (i.e. mainly women), poverty rates have dropped more sharply among men than among women (Leibbrandt et al. 2010; Posel and Rogan 2012).

2.2.3   Definitional challenges and the normative family ideal

Expectations of the post-apartheid family form were varied. On the one hand there were expectations that, once the legislative controls on population movement were lifted, families would be reunited, reconstituting themselves either as extended families or in simpler (more nuclear) forms. On the other hand, some predicted that the effects of apartheid on family life would persist into the future and that split families would not necessarily reunite if the legal restrictions were lifted. Writing in the mid-1980s, Charles Simkins correctly surmised that "influx control will probably be abolished or erode, perhaps rapidly, in the coming years. The impact of this on African household structure … will probably be slow to work itself out … the effects of decades of this system could therefore be expected to survive (in diminished or attenuated form) the demise of the system itself" (Simkins 1986:18).

It is unclear what "natural" form households and families might have been expected to return to when the legislative and structural constraints were removed. The very concepts of "household" and "family" have been much debated, and they are certainly not static. The terms are often used interchangeably, even in academic discourse that is specifically about households and families (Amoateng and Heaton 2007; Russell 2003a). The distinction is particularly complicated in the South African context, where family members who are immediately related by blood and marriage often spend much of their time living apart, while extended household arrangements, combined with a range of individual and household strategies such as labour migration, urbanisation and the allocation of care roles, create ties of co-residence between members who are less closely related by blood or marriage.

If one tries to distinguish between the terms, then "household" might be regarded broadly as referring to arrangements of co-residence (even though household members need not be co-resident for much of the time), whereas "family" would refer to social groups that are related by kinship, marriage, adoption or other some other agnate affiliation and which endure over time and space. Both of these constructs are difficult, if not impossible, to replicate through household surveys, and it is clear that the "household" cannot be construed simply as the residential dimension of the "family" (Amoateng and Richter 2007; Hunter 2010; Russell 2003b; Spiegel and Mehlwana 1997). Arguably both are dynamic and there will always be some conceptual and definitional overlap, for both constructs may incorporate degrees of kinship, forms of emotional attachment, and relations of dependence and reciprocity.

The frequent conflation between family and household arises partly from assumptions (and, some argue, idealised notions) of families being essentially nuclear in form. Margo Russell argues that confusion about household and family constructs stems from the fact that those who attempt to analyse them do not see Western kinship and household systems as the product of culture (Russell 2003b). The "household" and "family" may coincide in the context of Western nuclear forms, but this is culturally specific and cannot be taken as the norm. Such an assumption, however, is frequently found in the South African context. Back in 1970 the South African Population Census defined a family as one of four structures: husband and wife; father, mother and children; father and children; or mother and children (Simkins 1986). In other words, the default family classification was limited to two generations and was dependent on the existence of marital union and/or biological parenting, to the exclusion of other forms.

Studies dealing with the intricacies of "household" and "family" developed over decades in the field of anthropology (see, for example, Murray 1981; Spiegel and Mehlwana 1997; Spiegel et al. 1996), and were only relatively recently (from the 1990s) taken up as the focus of interdisciplinary study and more quantitative analyses as household survey data became available. Two editions of the journal *Social Dynamics* were dedicated to studies of households and family in the decade after democracy. The Winter 1996 issue reflected on mainly ethnographic research that explored the complexity and "domestic fluidity" of living arrangements. A second special issue, in 2003, included a newer set of social science studies, many of which had explored quantitative data to reflect on the meaning of "household". This was partly "in response to the shortcomings of the first 'household' surveys conducted in South Africa in the mid-1990s" (Seekings 2003:1).

The main problems or lines of criticism discussed in relation to survey data were:

- Whether the "household" was an appropriate or meaningful unit of analysis at all, given that little could be known about intra-household relationships or resource distribution; that a co-residential household was not necessarily a static or coherent unit; and that links beyond the sample household meant that some members may be omitted, while others may be also be part of other households. There were questions about whether surveys should aggregate individuals into households at all;
- The dependence on a single informant to provide information about other household members – creating an inherent difference in the reliability of self-reported data and proxy-reported data on behalf of other resident or even nonresident household members;
- The identification of a single, nominal "head of household". Survey instruments often suggest that the "head of household" is someone who makes the main decisions or exerts financial control over household spending. In the context of research on children this is particularly problematic, since decisions about individual children (such as who should take the child to a clinic or where the child should go to school) may be differently located to household decisions (such as whether to prioritise debt repayment over the purchase of some new item);[7]
- The inability of cross-sectional surveys to provide data that allowed for analysis of changing household arrangements over time or enabled analysts to discern the factors underlying household formation, composition, dissolution and fluidity.

Any quantitative analysis of household form and family relations will be constrained by the limits of survey measures and considerations such as those described above. It has been argued that the available survey data cannot really support claims about changing household form, as they do not adequately reflect the fluidity of households, do not capture the complexity of household or family form (Russell 1998, 2003b), and are unable to portray the nuances of relationships of attachment and obligation or reflect patterns of child care beyond material and practical indicators of care (Reynolds 2015).

---

[7] The South African Demographic and Health Survey is notable in that, following the international DHS, questions in respect of children are asked of each child's mother or primary caregiver, even if there are multiple mothers or caregivers for different children in a single household.

However, Reynolds also argues that "both demographic and ethnographic gazes can allow for both moments of insight and moments of obscuring" (Ibid:541). While I acknowledge the critiques of quantification, I believe that in a study of households, migration and care arrangements, as with many areas of research, there is a trade-off between texture and scale. In the following chapters I focus foremost on scale through descriptive quantitative analyses that provide a national picture and allow for some spatial disaggregation and comparison over time. This approach requires systems of classification even if they reduce complex dynamics to relatively simplistic categories. In contrast to this is the case study, presented in chapter 6, where the complexity of family arrangements is central to the story of child care and migration.

Hunter and Reynolds, both anthropologists, argue respectively for "households" and "families" as central constructs in their analysis. For Hunter,

> giving attention to the household helps … to clear some space between intimacy and the narratives of 'family decline' or 'family degeneration' that particularly surround the lives of black South Africans. Households are not sites of morality that simply 'break down' but dynamic institutions formed in relation to the labor market, kinship, racial segregation, the state, and much more. (Hunter 2010:13)

Reynolds, in contrast, argues for "more reified notions of kinship and family" because she is "particularly interested in exactly these emotional and moral forms of attachment that inhere between members of families" (Reynolds 2015:550–1). My own focus will be on households, and then on child–mother dyads, rather than on families. This is partly pragmatic, as the relations of attachment underlying the concept of family are particularly hard to capture in survey research and are generally difficult even to proxy from the available household surveys, whereas child–parent dyads are relatively easy to construct from the data. It is also more appropriate, in this research, to focus on households than on families, as children are the prime units of analysis: in my study, children are mobile and are central characters in households that may change and fluctuate around them. As the qualitative part of the study illustrates, households are moveable if one follows a central character.

Household surveys, by definition, use the household as the mode of enumeration and, as Reynolds points out, "certain kinds of questions come to the fore while others are obscured, a concern raised by anthropologists and demographers alike" (Ibid:550). I see this study as an opportunity for a mixed method approach that makes the most of quantitative and qualitative elements to provide different kinds of data on migration and child care arrangements.

South Africa now has an abundance of household surveys, including the nationally representative General Household Survey which is conducted every year, a quarterly Labour Force Survey which also includes basic demographic details of all resident members on the household roster, intermittent Living Conditions Surveys and Income and Expenditure Surveys, and panel surveys from two demographic surveillance sites as well as a national panel survey, NIDS.

As will be shown, the limitations of household surveys for exploring the complexity of household form and changes in household composition can be partly addressed by defining relationships

through the household roster, for example classifying intra-household relationships by defining the relationships of members to the household head, and defining the relationships of primary caregivers to children.

In the next chapter I present an analysis of children's living environments over the two post-apartheid decades, to see what changes have taken place in the composition of households when viewed from the perspective of children.

Chapter 3.   Children's households and living arrangements

Chapter 2 described the relatively recent emergence of quantitative data as a source of information on families and households. Despite their limited ability to portray the complexity of households and family structures, large cross-sectional surveys are indispensable for describing broad national trends that cannot be captured through smaller surveys or more nuanced qualitative work. In this chapter I use descriptive analyses from a range of national household surveys to examine what household contexts imply for children, and to see what changes have taken place over the two post-apartheid decades. In some instances I refer back to baseline data from the literature to provide long-range trends.

I start with an overview of the data sources, which comprise large national household surveys that provide a more-or-less comparable set of measures over time. I draw on population estimates dating back to 1960 and trace changes in the geographic distributions of children and adults over half a century. The analysis takes into account the complexities of definitional changes in area type as the former homelands, which for some time were not included in the national census, were reincorporated into South Africa. By contrasting the spatial distributions of children and adults, I highlight the fact that the child population remains disproportionately rural.

I then investigate the vital status of parents and their co-residence arrangements with children. The section starts with a review of inconsistencies in the way these data are captured in the surveys, highlighting the importance of asking specific questions rather than trying to ascertain vital information on status and co-residence in a one-shot question. The analysis differentiates between children living with both parents, with their mother only, their father only, and with neither parent, and tracks these trends over time. It shows that the biggest category of children are co-resident with their mother but not their father, and that the share of children living with neither parent has increased.

I track orphaning rates over two decades and find that maternal orphaning declined sooner than projected. Although orphaning remains prevalent, the analysis shows that it is not the main reason for parental absence – rather, large (and increasing) numbers of children have mothers and fathers who live elsewhere, and there has been a decline in the share of children with parents who are nonresident household members.

Finally, I turn to household composition and present a child-centred typology of households that includes categories commonly considered to be vulnerable.

3.1 Methods, data and caveats

3.1.1 Data sources

To characterise children's household contexts and living conditions over time I analyse a range of surveys that provide nationally representative household data. The surveys were introduced in chapter 1. They include the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development, a cross-sectional survey conducted in 1993 by the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit at the University of Cape Town; the October Household Surveys of 1996–1999 conducted by Stats SA; the 10 per cent samples of the 1996, 2001 and 2011 population censuses; wave 1 of the National Income Dynamics Study conducted by SALDRU in 2008; and the General Household Surveys of 2002–2014 conducted by Stats SA.

The table below summarises the data sets and provides unweighted sample sizes for households as well as for children under 15 years. Asterisks mark the surveys that are the main data sources for comparison over the 20-year period. The others are used to fill in some of the trends.

Table 2. Datasets used

Year	Survey	Institution	Sample - HHs	Sample <15 years
1993*	PSLSD	SALDRU	8 810	14 843
1995	OHS	Stats SA	29 700	43 191
1996	Census 10%	Stats SA	846 478	1 223 999
1996	OHS	Stats SA	15 922	25 564
1997	OHS	Stats SA	29 811	50 391
1998	OHS	Stats SA	18 981	28 538
1999	OHS	Stats SA	26 134	35 633
2001	Census 10%	Stats SA	948 592	1 209 795
2008*	NIDS W1 v6.0	SALDRU	7 296	9 605
2011*	Census 10%	Stats SA	1 307 743	1 314 124
2002–2014*	GHS	Stats SA	approx 26 000 in each year	approx 30 000 in each year

The surveys span a period of two decades, from 1993 to 2014. This time frame is useful for two main reasons. First, there is a historically defined logic to it: the baseline (1993) is on the cusp of regime change[8] and the time frame then extends to cover the two post-democracy decades – effectively a whole post-democracy generation during which people technically had freedom of movement but unemployment, poverty and urban housing shortages continued to restrict free movement. Second, the timeframe incorporates data sources that have some symmetry in their

---

[8] It should be remembered that many of the 'post-apartheid' shifts attributed to regime change were already taking place from the mid-1980s when formal restrictions on population movement were revoked; the transfer of council housing, the construction of new urban housing areas and site-and-service developments from the late 1980s were a precursor to the RDP housing programme.

approach: NIDS[9] in a sense mirrors the PSLSD because there are similarities in many of the questions, including how nonresident household members are defined and recorded, recognising that membership and residency are not always synonymous. The intervening Stats SA surveys have different household definitions and information about family, absent parents, child care and support, and intra-household arrangements, and here the GHS mirrors the OHS. This means there is a methodological symmetry to the comparative analysis over time, as the range of surveys provide two early measures (around the time of democracy) that are comparable with two more recent measures (2008 in the case of NIDS and 2014 for the GHS).

3.1.2   Definitions, and limitations of surveys for describing households and families

The previous chapter outlined some of the challenges in defining households. I now approach the task of describing the child population (and children's households), acknowledging that a quantitative analysis of household form will inevitably be reductionist: the scope is limited by how the household members and intra-household relationships are captured. Generally, all relationships between household members are recorded through the head of the household (Stats SA uses a standard set of relationship categories in its OHS, GHS and census – and this is followed in NIDS and other surveys).

Household surveys have to include an operational definition of the household in order to set rules about who can be included on the roster. The rules for household selection and the definition of those who are allowed to appear on the roster determine the parameters for what the household can look like, after which the membership is self-reported within the prescribed parameters. In this sense the composition of a household is to a large extent determined by those who designed the survey. Its definition varies from one survey to another.

The 2011 census defines a household as "a group of persons who live together, and provide themselves jointly with food or other essentials for living, or a single person who lives alone. Domestic workers are counted as a separate household even if they live in the same dwelling as the employer" (Statistics South Africa 2011). The enumerator manual (for the 2001 census) provides more guidance on how to determine whether people living on a sampled property are part of the same household or constitute different households. The main suggested clarifying question is whether everyone "eats from the same pot" or shares resources. If so, they are considered part of the same household. If not, they are seen as separate households and interviewed separately. Enumerators are told to include as household members all persons present in the household on the reference night, with a special reminder to include babies and household members who died between the reference night (in 2011 the night of 9–10 October, which fell on a Sunday night to Monday morning) and the date of the interview. In addition to household members present on census night, enumerators are instructed to collect data on visitors who were staying overnight as well as members of the household who were absent on census night (for example because they were at work, travelling or at an entertainment venue or religious gathering), provided they returned to the household the next day. A follow-up question

---

[9] Only wave 1 of the NIDS survey (2008) is used in the trend analysis, as this was the original nationally representative sample.

then determines whether they are usually a member of the households.[10] It is unclear whether this approach would eliminate most nonresident members who live and work much of the time away from their home, including weekly migrants if they returned to their place of work on the Sunday evening. It could also lead to under-counting, for example if somebody who usually stays in the household happened to be out of the country, or for some other reason was not recorded at another household. This definition of a household is virtually identical to that used in the 1996 and 2001 censuses.

The GHS and OHS use a different definition, where a household is seen as including "every person who is considered to be a member of the household … who stayed here [in this household] at least four nights on average per week for the last four weeks" (Statistics South Africa 2015b, and previous iterations of Stats SA household questionnaires for GHS and OHS). In other words, these surveys do not require that household members were present on a particular day, and they do not include visitors (who would instead be counted as part of their usual household). These surveys would therefore provide a more accurate profile of households than the census, which is more concerned with ensuring that every person is counted, irrespective of where they are on census night. However the GHS and OHS still define households narrowly: for example, family members who usually stay at their place of work during the week and return every weekend would be excluded from the roster – even if they have close kinship ties and regard the household as their main home. On the other hand, a resident lodger or backyard tenant may be included even if they have no kinship or social relationship to other members and are staying only temporarily but share food with the main household. The definition is clearly unable to capture the complexity of households as documented in the anthropological literature.

The narrow *de facto* definition of household used in the census, the GHS and indeed most of the official national household surveys precludes any analysis of nonresident household members such as temporary migrants. These surveys are designed to avoid double-counting of household members and so, by definition, cannot help to describe situations where individuals are members of multiple households. Most of the national data that would support child-centred analysis (including the census and other household surveys conducted by Stats SA) use a *de facto* definition of the household, which only counts as household members those who physically reside in the household at the time of the survey. The fact that these surveys are only able to yield a cross-sectional picture of a narrowly defined household is a serious limitation given the temporal dynamics of labour migration. The census is conducted in October. The timing of the GHS data collection process has changed over the years. Between 2002 and 2008 data collection took place in July, but this was extended to a three-month period (July–September) between 2010 and 2012. Since 2013, data collection has taken place throughout the year (January–December), although there is a break in data collection between the middle of December and the second or third week of January (pers. comm.: Niël Roux, manager, Service Delivery Statistics at Stats SA, July 2016). The households and population distributions recorded in these surveys would look rather different if the fieldwork were conducted over Christmas time, when many migrants return to their home of origin.

---

[10] In the 2011 census, 3% of the population, or 1.5 million people, were enumerated in a household which was not their "usual" household (own calculations from Census 2011, 10% sample).

A broader *de jure* definition of the household, by contrast, includes individuals who are regarded (usually by the primary respondent) as household members but who spend some or even most of their time somewhere else. Some independently conducted surveys have used this broader definition, capturing information about nonresident household members. Both the PSLSD and NIDS provide some information on absent members such as migrant workers (albeit very limited data, provided by proxy respondents who are resident in the household at the time of the survey).[11] This means that an individual may in theory be recorded as belonging to multiple households. The longitudinal panel design of NIDS theoretically enables the identification of household members who have left or rejoined the household during the period of study, although unfortunately nonresident household members were not assigned a unique person number and so cannot be tracked through the panel.

The two SALDRU surveys (the PSLSD of 1993 and the NIDS panel study) apply three criteria for defining household membership, all of which must be fulfilled:

- Household members must have lived "under this roof" or within the same compound/homestead at least 15 days in the last 12 months (OR, in the case of NIDS only, have arrived in the last 15 days and this is now their new residence); AND
- When they are together they share food from a common source; AND
- They contribute to or share in a common resource pool.

The SALDRU surveys therefore include nonresident household members such as migrant workers who return a few times a year. Thus a household is defined not by regularity of a member's physical presence, as in the Stats SA surveys, but by their subjective "belonging" to the household implied by shared resources and communal living arrangements when they are there. Both the SALDRU surveys include a subsequent question to determine whether household members are resident in the household. The NIDS survey asks whether household members usually reside in the household at least four nights a week (the same definition as in the Stats SA surveys). The PSLSD asks whether household members have lived under this roof for more than 15 days out of the last 30. Four days a week would be 16 days in four weeks. For my own analysis this is close enough to the Stats SA definition for comparison, but means that the strict definition of household must be applied for comparative analysis across the SALDRU and Stats SA surveys. In some cases, where it is necessary to include nonresident members, this will be limited to the two SALDRU surveys.

---

[11] More localised studies have also used a broad household definition. These include the Hlabisa "Africa Centre" and Agincourt Health and Socio-Demographic Surveillance System surveys, the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study and the Cape Area Panel Survey.

3.2 Population and demographic trends

Because the movement and residential arrangements of the African population were heavily controlled under apartheid, my analysis of children's households starts by examining the spatial distribution of the population across different area types to see how this has changed over time.

3.2.1 Spatial distribution of the child and adult populations

A real constraint to historical demographic estimates is that independent homelands were not included in the official national population counts for South Africa from the time of the Transkei's independence in 1976 until 1993, when the PSLSD was undertaken. By the end of 1981 there were ten homelands, four of which were established as independent states (the "TBVC states" – Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) and six were homelands that did not acquire full independence (Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa and QwaQwa). The process of "repatriation" to the homelands continued through the 1980s, but despite the massive scale of the operation the consolidation of the homelands was never completed.

Citizens of the TBVC states were by definition stripped of South African citizenship and became foreigners, or "aliens" in the language of the time. The removal of citizenship was justified by notions of "separate development" and "self-determination". Yet dependence on the wage economy meant that rural households in the homelands were overwhelmingly reliant for their survival on remittances sent by family members working in South Africa. In this way white South Africa and the homelands, cities and rural areas, were inextricably linked through extended household and family relationships.

The South African Institute of Race Relations monitored population numbers, settlement patterns and the impact of apartheid regulations on population movement from the 1950s onwards. The estimated population of South Africa in 1985 (excluding the homelands, adjusted for under-count and rounded to the nearest million) was 28 million, of whom 67 per cent (19 million) were black Africans. The estimated population of the homelands in 1985 was 13 million people, of whom six million lived in the TBVC states and seven million in the non-independent homelands (South African Institute of Race Relations 1987). Based on these rough population estimates, one can calculate that around 40 per cent of all black South Africans were counted as being resident in the homelands in the mid-1980s. However this estimate excludes migrants.

Another estimate, by the SPP, put the percentage of black South Africans in the homelands at 54 per cent in 1980, noting that "if migrants are included in the bantustan population, then the figure rises to nearly 60%" (Surplus People Project 1983:6). No disaggregations for age or sex are provided in these estimates but, given the regulatory environment and migration patterns at the time, it is likely that the African urban population would have contained a disproportionately large number of working-age men, while the rural homeland population would have contained an unduly large share of old people, women and children, as well as disabled and unemployed men of working age.

In 1981 Simkins produced a paper which estimated the African population across the (then) four region types: metropolitan areas in white South Africa, as defined in the 1970 population census; other towns in the white areas; white rural areas (consisting mostly of commercial farmlands);

and homelands. The 1960 census did not identify homelands, but it was possible to estimate the 1960 populations of these areas by allocating populations based on details of the magisterial district or sub-district (Simkins 1981).

Simkins made further adjustments to improve the comparability of the population estimates for 1960, 1970 and 1980, and these are noted in detail in his paper (Simkins 1981). They included applying corrections for under-enumeration of Africans; imputing homeland populations in 1960 by using magisterial boundaries to approximate their boundaries; using the Regional Population Estimates for 1978 from the Bureau of Market Research to estimate the Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda populations in 1980, as these "independent" homelands were excluded from the 1980 population census; and the adjustment of rural–urban ratios as the definition of "rural" was broader in 1980 than in previous surveys.

Calculations derived from his analyses are summarised in the table below, which shows the distributions (population numbers and population shares) across the four area types. I have collapsed the five-year age bands provided by Simkins to summarise the distributions for children under 15 years, for the over-15 population, and for the total population. To this I have added 1993 as another year for comparison, based on my own analysis of the nationally representative PSLSD data. In order to replicate the four area type categories used by Simkins, I have combined the original "metro" variable (which distinguishes "metro", "other urban" and "rural"), with the old province variable, which I have used to define the four old provinces of pre-1990 South Africa (Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal) as white RSA (Republic of South Africa), and all ten homelands (including the four TBVC states and the six quasi-independent homelands) as "Homeland". These are shown in Table 4. A factor that may affect comparability is that Simkins' estimates are for the "domestic" African population – i.e. they exclude foreigners. The 1993 data do not provide this information and so the 1993 distributions are for all those classified as "African" in the survey irrespective of their citizenship. According to the 1996 census, 97% of people classified as "African" also had South African citizenship, so the vast majority would be regarded as the domestic population (own calculations from census 1996).

Table 3 shows how, from the 1960s, the size of the African population grew considerably in both urban and rural areas, but the distribution was increasingly skewed towards rural areas, and specifically the homelands, rather than farms.

Table 3. Domestic African population 1960–1993

	Metropolitan		Other urban		Rural (farms)		Homelands		TOTAL	
1960	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Children <15	720 000	14%	436 000	9%	1 770 000	35%	2 132 000	42%	5 057 000	42%
Adults 15+	1 676 000	24%	653 000	9%	1 997 000	29%	2 608 000	38%	6 935 000	58%
Total pop	2 396 000	20%	1 089 000	9%	3 767 000	31%	4 740 000	40%	11 992 000	100%
1970	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Children <15	956 000	14%	500 000	7%	1 798 000	26%	3 675 000	53%	6 929 000	44%
Adults 15+	2 041 000	24%	900 000	10%	2 032 000	23%	3 711 000	43%	8 683 000	56%
Total pop	2 996 000	19%	1 400 000	9%	3 829 000	25%	7 386 000	47%	15 612 000	100%
1980	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Children <15	847 000	9%	492 000	6%	2 151 000	24%	5 429 000	61%	8 919 000	43%
Adults 15+	2 570 000	21%	1 411 000	12%	2 173 000	18%	5 910 000	49%	12 063 000	57%
Total pop	3 417 000	16%	1 903 000	9%	4 324 000	21%	11 338 000	54%	20 982 000	100%
1993	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Children <15	1 504 000	13%	1 757 000	15%	796 000	7%	7 814 000	66%	11 870 000	41%
Adults 15+	3 367 000	20%	3 019 000	18%	1 541 000	9%	9 318 000	54%	17 245 000	59%
Total pop	4 871 000	17%	4 775 000	16%	2 337 000	8%	17 132 000	59%	29 115 000	100%

	Metropolitan		Other urban		Rural		Homeland		TOTAL
	Difference in		Difference in		Difference in		Difference in		Difference in
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%	number
Children <15									
Diff 1960–80	18%	-33%	13%	-36%	21%	-31%	155%	44%	76%
Diff 1960–93	109%	-11%	303%	72%	-55%	-81%	267%	56%	135%
Total pop									
Diff 1960–80	43%	-18%	75%	0%	15%	-34%	139%	37%	75%
Diff 1960–93	103%	-16%	338%	81%	-38%	-74%	261%	49%	143%

Own calculations from Simkins 1981 and PSLSD 1993.

The changing distributions over three decades of apartheid demonstrate the success of the apartheid system in its efforts to control urban influx and increase the concentration of Africans in homeland areas. Women were particularly affected by the policy: while the share of the adult male population resident in metropolitan and urban areas remained around 40 per cent in the period 1960 to 1993, only 26–27 per cent of women were urban between 1960 and 1980, this share rising quickly to 36 per cent by 1993 (own calculations from Simkins 1981 and PSLSD 1993). The share of all Africans resident in the homelands increased from 40 per cent in 1960, to 54 per cent in 1980 and 59 per cent in 1993. Bearing in mind the SPP's caveat that the homeland population excludes migrants, these figures only reflect residence patterns at the time of data collection. The homeland populations would be expected to rise over Christmas time when many migrants returned to their rural homes.

The summary of differences at the bottom of the table shows that the share of the total African population in metropolitan areas was reduced by 16 per cent between 1960 and 1993, while the percentage in homeland areas rose by nearly 50. Yet the growth in actual population numbers

61

meant that the African population in metropolitan areas increased during the same period by over 100 per cent (from 2.4 million to 4.9 million), while the homeland population grew by a massive 261 per cent (from 4.7 million people in 1960 to 17 million in 1993).

Like metropolitan areas, "other urban" areas (i.e. smaller cities and towns) reduced their share of children over the period 1960–1980. The share of adults living in those areas remained stable. However there was a substantial increase in that population between 1980 and 1993, with both the child and adult populations more than tripling in size (from half a million to over 1.7 million children, and from 1.4 to 4.8 million adults). Indeed, previous migration studies have found that at a sub-provincial level the net in-migration was to the smaller towns, which are destinations for those moving from rural villages as well as those returning from cities (Collinson et al. 2006).

The "rural" category, which refers to farms in the old white South Africa, shows a decline in both the proportion and number of Africans. Large-scale evictions from farms took place over this period: the SPP calculated that between 1960 and 1983, 3.5 million people had been forcibly removed, of whom 1.1 million had been moved from white-owned farms (Platzky and Walker 1985). In 1984 there were about 1.3 million farm workers in South Africa, and an estimated 4.3 million African farm dwellers living on white-owned farms (Wegerif et al. 2005, calculated from data quoted by Platzky & Walker 1985). Farm evictions continued throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, peaking in 1992, the year following a severe drought. In the 2000s a national study on farm evictions found that more people were evicted from farms in the first decade *after* democracy than in the preceding decade. This was despite (and in fact it is argued, partly *because of*) land reform legislation intended to strengthen the tenure rights of farm dwellers (see Wegerif et al. 2005 for more discussion). An estimated 1.7 million people were evicted from farms over the 21-year period 1984–2004. More than three-quarters of those evicted were women and children, a finding that is in part explained by the "direct relationship between employment status and land tenure rights and the failure of land owners and the courts to recognise women and children as having their own independent tenure rights" (Ibid 2005:49).

There are striking differences between the changing distributions of children under 15 years and of adults. In all years, the share of African children living in the homelands was greater than the share of adults in the homelands, with the difference widening over the years. In other words, the child population was more rural than the adult population in 1960, and became more rural over time. This makes sense, given deliberate attempts to confine the "non-productive" population to the homelands. In 1960 there were 2.1 million African children under 15 years living in what were to become the homelands (representing 42 per cent of children in this age group). By 1993, this had risen to 7.8 million (66 per cent of African children).

Thus, as a baseline, the majority of Africans were resident in the former homelands at the end of apartheid, and children were more likely than adults to be living in these areas. In 1960, 44 per cent of African women were living there compared to 31 per cent of men. By 1993 the respective shares of the female and male adult population in the homelands were 58 and 49 per cent. From 1993 onwards, the old area typology was discontinued in national surveys as the legislation underpinning it had been revoked. There followed a number of area type classifications, which differentiated the following:

- Urban/peri-urban – though this distinction was dropped at the time of the 2001 population census;
- Urban/rural – a classification that was not reported on by Stats SA between the years 2004 and 2010 as there was such controversy around it; and
- Formal/informal – a distinction between different types of urban areas which has been discontinued in recent years in recognition that it conflates geography type with housing type. For rural areas, the informal classification has come to denote areas where residential sites are not formally proclaimed (i.e. areas under communal tenure or "traditional authority"), which roughly means those parts of the previous homelands that are not formally proclaimed as towns or townships. "Formal rural" denotes formally proclaimed areas, which mainly take the form of commercial farms or game reserves, and would approximate to the rural parts of the old white South Africa.

For the 2011 population census, Stats SA reported only three geography types:
- Urban area (which includes formal and informal areas in metropolitan areas, cities and towns)
- Tribal or traditional area (i.e. the former homelands)
- Farm (i.e. demarcated commercial farms of the former white South Africa).

For the sake of consistency in the continuing analysis I have collapsed area type variables to fit with these categories, starting with the 1993 PSLSD. However it is important to note that the populations classified as "urban" will have changed over time, as towns that were previously part of the homelands (such as Butterworth, Mthatha and Mafikeng) would now be defined as "urban" whereas before 1994 they would have been included under TBVC states or homelands. Table 4 shows how the African population of 29 million people was distributed across the old RSA provinces, homelands and area types at the time of the 1993 survey.

Table 4. Distribution of the African population by province & area type, 1993

Old RSA	Province	Metro	Urban	Rural	Total
"White SA"	Cape	1 032 000	312 000	277 000	1 621 000
	Natal	71 000	275 000	385 000	730 000
	Transvaal	3 219 000	1 480 000	1 177 000	5 876 000
	Orange Free State	-	1 303 000	498 000	1 801 000
TBVC States	Transkei	-	209 000	3 457 000	3 666 000
	Bophuthatswana	-	-	2 272 000	2 272 000
	Venda	-	-	582 000	582 000
	Ciskei	-	199 000	581 000	780 000
Other homelands	KwaZulu	548 000	584 000	4 698 000	5 831 000
	Kangwane	-	101 000	719 000	820 000
	Qwa-Qwa	-	-	279 000	279 000
	Gazankulu	-	35 000	964 000	1 000 000
	Lebowa	-	182 000	3 148 000	3 330 000
	KwaNdebele	-	96 000	432 000	528 000
	TOTAL	4 871 000	4 775 000	19 468 000	29 115 000
		17%	16%	67%	100%

Own calculations from PSLSD 1993, based on the African population only. Population numbers are weighted and rounded to the nearest thousand.

In order to increase comparability between the area classifications of the time and those used currently, I use both the province and area type data in the PSLSD to allocate the population to one of the three groups (urban/tribal/farm), as follows:

- All those classified as "metro" or "urban" (irrespective of old RSA provincial boundaries) are classified as urban (the "metro" population of half a million in KwaZulu is related to the fact that for a short while the Durban township of KwaMashu was reclassified as being part of the KwaZulu homeland);
- Those classified as "rural" who live in one of the four provinces of the old white South Africa are classified as living on "farms", as these areas would not have been under tribal authority; and
- Those classified as "rural" and living in one of the TBVC states or other homelands are classified as being in a "tribal or traditional area".

This provides a classification of area type that is broadly comparable with the area type variables included in the GHS data – the comparative analysis simply requires collapsing "urban formal" and "urban informal" into a single "urban" category.

Using the analysis by Simkins presented above, and complementing it with more recent data from a range of other sources (the OHSs of 1996–1999, the three post-democracy censuses and the GHSs 2002–2014), it is possible to trace the share of the African population living in urban areas over time. Figure 1 reveals a gradual urbanisation trend for both adults and children, which started sometime between 1980 and 1993. The adult population remains more urban than the child

population and, although the gender gap has narrowed considerably, the adult male population remains more urban than the female population.

Figure 1.   Share of African children and adults in urban areas, 1960–2014

Own calculations from Simkins 1981, PSLSD 1993, OHS 1996–1999, GHS 2002–2004 and 2010–2014, Census 1996, 2001 and 2011, based on the African population only.

Turning to the current provincial population shares, children are unevenly distributed across the country, and the distribution of the child population is different from that of adults. Compared with adults, children are over-represented in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo, and under-represented in Gauteng and the Western Cape. The provinces with disproportionately large child populations are also the main sending provinces for adult migrants, and those with disproportionately small child populations have the largest metropolitan centres and are the main destinations for cross-province migration. It is to these areas that permanent migration might be expected, although the possibility of counter-urbanisation or reverse migration is also possible due to poor living standards in urban slums (Collinson et al. 2007), chronic illness (Clark et al. 2007; Neves 2009), and high unemployment and employment insecurity (Klasen and Woolard 2009; Posel and Marx 2013; Potts 2011). The case study presented in chapter 6 also points to reverse migration in the older generation.

Table 5 provides a comparison of African child and adult populations in 1993 and again in 2014. In 1993 there were nearly 11.9 million children under 15 years in South Africa, constituting 41 per cent of the African population. The number of children has increased slightly over two decades, reaching 13 million in 2014, but the child share of the population decreased to 30 per cent. Fertility rates, which had been dropping since the 1960s, reached their sharpest decline among African women in the 1980s and have continued to decline post-apartheid (Burger et al. 2012; Caldwell and Calwell 1993; Chimere-Dan 1997; Moultrie and Timæus 2003) – the "fertility transition" being driven partly by higher education levels and declining marriage rates (Burger et al. 2012). At the same time, adult longevity has increased and adult mortality rates, which previously rose with the HIV/AIDS epidemic, have fallen, contributing to a larger adult population overall and relative to children. Even the falling child mortality rates have not been enough to offset this (own calculations from ASSA2008).

Table 5. African child and adult populations by area type, 1993 & 2014

	1993				2014			
	CHILDREN <15		ADULTS 15+		CHILDREN <15		ADULTS 15+	
Area type	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Urban	27.5	3 260 000	37.0	6 386 000	49.2	6 419 000	59.2	17 681 000
Rural farms	6.7	796 000	8.9	1 541 000	2.9	383 000	3.4	1 009 000
Rural former homelands	65.8	7 814 000	54.0	9 318 000	47.9	6 249 000	37.5	11 202 000
Total	100	11 870 000	100	17 245 000	100	13 051 000	100	29 891 000
Total (as percentage of total African population)	40.8		59.2		30.4		69.6	

Own calculations from PSLSD 1993 and GHS 2014, based on the African population only. Population numbers are weighted and rounded to the nearest thousand.

The table shows that only 28 per cent of African children under 15 were resident in urban areas at the end of apartheid, compared with 37 per cent of adults. Two-thirds of children lived in the rural areas of the former homelands. While population numbers have increased and both adult and child populations have become more urban, the overall pattern has remained consistent: children are over-represented in rural areas under tribal authority (48 per cent of children in 2014), when compared with adults (38%), and under-represented in urban formal areas (49 per cent, compared with 59 per cent of adults) (own analysis of GHS 2014). The number of children living in urban areas has doubled since 1993, but this increase is outstripped by the growth in the adult urban population, which nearly tripled from 6.4 million in 1993 to 17.7 million in 2014. The analysis therefore suggests that, based on a narrow definition of households where migrants are not counted as residents at their place of origin, adults are urbanising faster than children.

3.2.2   Changes in the size and distribution of households

An increase in the number of households and a reduction in average household size since 1996 is undisputed (Public Service Commission 2003; Todes et al. 2010). The rate of household formation increases by about 3 per cent per year, while the population growth rate is below 1 per cent

(National Planning Commission 2011). The total number of households (of all races) in South Africa has increased substantially, from around 8.5 million in 1993 to 15.6 million in 2014 (own analysis of PSLSD and GHS), and the more recent Community Survey estimates the number at 16.9 million in 2016 (Statistics South Africa 2016). The increase in the number of households is partly related to population growth, but it is mainly the result of the splitting of households and the formation of new households, leading to a decrease in average household size – a phenomenon that has been well documented in South Africa (see, for example, National Planning Commission 2011; Pirouz 2005; Wittenberg and Collinson 2008). Based on analysis of the household surveys used here, the mean household size in 1993 was 4.5 nationally, and by 2014 had dropped to 3.4. The decline in average household size seems to be driven by two main factors. One is the splitting of large and extended households into smaller units, for example to accommodate families in the tiny 40m^2 dwellings provided through the housing subsidy scheme (Hall 2005; Public Service Commission 2003; Ross 2003) or even as a strategy to diversify access to housing subsidies (Ross 1995, 2003). Second, there has been an increase in the number of adult-only households (see also Pirouz 2005), which may in turn be associated with low marriage rates and labour migration among adults who are childless or who have left their children with kin. For example, it has been observed that increasing numbers of unmarried women entered the labour force after 1994 (Posel and Casale 2002). The number of adult-only households has more than doubled over the post-apartheid period, as shown in Table 6 below.

Table 6.   Distribution of mixed-generation and adult-only households, 1993 & 2014

	1993				2014			
	HOUSEHOLDS WITH CHILDREN <15		HOUSEHOLDS WITH ADULTS ONLY		HOUSEHOLDS WITH CHILDREN <15		HOUSEHOLDS WITH ADULTS ONLY	
Area type	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Urban	46.6	2 457 000	63.6	2 057 000	63.0	4 877 000	74.5	5 850 000
Commercial farms	7.1	375 000	18.0	582 000	3.1	239 000	5.6	441 000
Rural former homelands	46.2	2 435 000	18.4	582 000	34.0	2 631 000	19.9	1 565 000
Total	100	5 395 000	100	3 106 000	100	7 747 000	100	7 855 000
		Std. Err.		Std. Err.		Std. Err.		Std. Err.
Total (as a percentage of all households)	63.5	1.71	36.5	1.71	49.7	0.5	50.3	0.5
Mean household size (resident members)	5.9	.06	2.1	.07	5.3	.03	1.9	.02

Own calculations from PSLSD 1993 and GHS 2014, based on total households. Numbers are weighted and rounded to the nearest thousand.
Note: the calculations exclude children between the ages of 15 and 18, as this child-focused analysis is concerned with children under 15 but children aged 15-17 are constitutionally defined as children and are not adults. Adult-only households would therefore be those that only include adults over 18 years. The excluded number of 15-17 year-olds is fairly small – around 3 million or 6 per cent of the population in 2014.

In 1993, nearly two-thirds of all households in South Africa included at least one child under 15 years. Although the number of households with children increased over the next 20 years, the share of households with children dropped by ten percentage points, to 50 per cent (Table 6). And

whereas just under half of all households with children were urban in 1993, this had increased to 63 per cent by 2014. Nearly three-quarters of adult-only households were urban in 2014.

The mean size of mixed-generation households (i.e. those that include both adults and children, with the exception of a very few with children only) has dropped slightly, from 5.9 in 1993 to 5.3 in 2014. Adult-only households tend to be much smaller than mixed-generation ones, with a mean household size of 2.1 in 1993 and 1.9 in 2014. In 2014, 46 per cent of adult-only households had only one member, up from 41 per cent in 1993. The declining share of households with children has occurred across all nine provinces, although there is considerable provincial variation in the extent of the decline. In effect, the overall decline has reduced the provincial variation in the share of households with children (Figure 2).

Figure 2.   Share of households with children under 15, by province

Own calculations from PSLSD 1993 and GHS 2014, based on all households.

The most striking decreases have been in provinces that were the main labour reserves: the Eastern Cape (where the share of households with children under 15 years has decreased from 77 per cent in 1993 to 54 per cent in 2014), KwaZulu-Natal (a decrease of 24 percentage points) and in Limpopo (a decrease of 19 percentage points). These are all provinces that include former homeland areas and historically are home to a large share of the country's children. (The Northern Cape also had a proportionately large decrease in the share of households with children, although the numerical change is very small because of the small population of that province.)

Overall, these analyses show that the number of households in South Africa is growing faster than population growth, and that the increase in adult-only households is greater than the increase in households with children. They also show that the urban share of households is growing. The numbers suggest that residence arrangements for many (adult) urban migrants continue to exclude children. This suggests that there may still be a large population of potential child migrants: children of urban adults who might move to join their parents if the obstacles to family reunification were removed.

3.3 Children and their biological parents

3.3.1 Trends in parental co-residence and absence

The majority of children in South Africa live without one or both of their biological parents. South Africa is unusual in this respect. An international comparison of children's living arrangements, the World Family Map, analysed data from 49 countries and found that "in spite of marked family changes around the globe over the last half-century, children are still most likely to live in two-parent families in all countries except South Africa" (Child Trends 2014:3). Although the study covered eight countries from sub-Saharan Africa, it did not include any of South Africa's immediate neighbours, many of which have provided migrant labour to South Africa and which also have relatively low parental co-residence rates. Another recent international study of child care and co-residence arrangements found that, of the 77 countries studied, the three with the lowest rates of parental co-residence were South Africa (where 35 per cent of children lived with neither of their biological parents), Namibia (27%) and Swaziland (23%). Lesotho and Zimbabwe also featured in the bottom ten countries (Martin 2016).

It is often assumed that parental absence is due to orphaning. However, as will be shown, parental deaths are not the main reason for parents being absent despite the substantial rise in HIV-related orphaning since the late 1990s. There are a number of other reasons why children might live separately from one or both of their parents. These include nonmarital childbearing (where the child lives with only one parent), cultural convention (for example, when a parent remarries and the child of a former union is cared for by a grandparent or other family members rather than being incorporated into the new household), financial or logistical necessity (as when the parent is a migrant worker or workseeker and cannot provide accommodation or care for the child), or preference (as when the child is sent elsewhere in order to access some benefit, such a better schooling, or to provide company for a relative or help with household chores) (Amoateng et al. 2007; Amoateng et al. 2004; Hall and Meintjes 2016; Mhongo and Budlender 2013; Ngwane 2003; Ross 2003; Sibande 2011).

This section is limited to an analysis of parental co-residence with children. The surveys do not ask about intra-household relationships other than capturing the relationship of each member to the household head. This means that it is not possible to determine reliably the relationships between children and other household members such as siblings, aunts, grandparents and non-relatives. But all the surveys do provide data (albeit with inconsistent methods) on whether the child's biological parents live in the household.

There are three important differences in the surveys that could affect comparability of this section of the analysis. One is how household members are defined at the outset, which has been discussed above. In the Stats SA surveys, which use a narrow definition of the household, any household member who is identified as a child's parent is by definition counted as a co-resident parent. In the more broadly defined household used in the SALDRU surveys (the PSLSD and NIDS), some are identified as parents of resident children, but are nonresident household members. These are counted as nonresident parents, whereas those who are resident household members are treated as resident parents.

The second main difference between the surveys is how parents' vital status and household membership are determined. Earlier surveys are less precise in their questions. The PSLSD differs from the later surveys in that it does not have a separate question that asks whether the parents of each household member are alive. Both the PSLSD and OHS for the years 1997–1999 do not ask the specific question: "Is the father/mother of [the child] living in this household?" They simply ask for the person code of the father/mother, and one has to infer from a zero value (in OHS) or "99" (in PSLSD) that the parent is not co-resident.[12] A similar approach was used in the 2001 and 2011 population censuses. NIDS and the GHS, by contrast, ask first whether the biological parent of each child is alive, and whether they are resident in the household.

The third difference relates to how the terms "mother" and "father" are understood, and whether they are interpreted consistently. The early surveys (PSLSD and OHS) refer only to the household member's "father" and "mother", whereas the latter two specify "biological father" and "biological mother". The specific use of *biological* may make a difference as the unqualified term "mother" (or "father") could be interpreted to include foster parents, adoptive parents or step-parents, and could even be applied more broadly to include other family members who perform the social role of parent.

Figure 3 shows patterns of reported parental co-residence with children under 15 years. In 1993, just over a third (34.6%) of children had two parents living at home for at least half the month preceding the survey – a statistic that was reported at the time by Reynolds (1995) and cited in Russell (2003b). Co-residence rates then declined further, reaching as low as 28 per cent in 2008 and 30 per cent in 2014. In terms of actual population numbers, the estimated number of children who lived with both parents has remained fairly stable between 1993 and 2014, the slight decrease in percentage being offset by a small increase in the child population. In 1993, four million children lived together with both their parents, compared with 3.7 million children in 2014. Over the same period, the number of children living with neither of their parents increased from 2.3 million (19%) to 2.7 million (22%). If the comparison is made between 1993 and 2008 only (arguably a relevant comparison given the similarities in the two data sources), there is a larger decrease in the share of children living with both parents and a corresponding increase in the share of children living with neither parent.

---

[12] In the analysis I use the OHS 1995 and 1996 where appropriate and possible, but do not use 1997–1999 for this reason.

Figure 3. **Parental co-residence with children, 1993–2014**

	1993	2008	2014
■ Neither parent	19.3	25.8	21.7
▨ Father only	2.7	2.5	3.6
■ Mother only	43.4	44.7	45.1
■ Both parents	34.6	27.0	29.7

Own calculations from PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008 and GHS 2014, based on African children under 15 years only.

The graph illustrates the strong role of mothers who, in all years, lived together with nearly half of children in the absence of their fathers, whereas only between two and four per cent of children lived with their fathers but not their mothers. Thus, while the historical organisation of descent in African families has tended to be patrilineal, many children's household arrangements are matrifocal (Preston-Whyte 1978). In the context of rising nonmarital births and the absence of fathers from children's households, "the patrilocal basis of African families in South Africa has been increasingly eroded" (Gelderblom and Adams 2006:235). Single motherhood has become regarded as more normal, and less stigmatised (Denis and Ntsimane 2006).

Although the share of African children living with both their parents has decreased, little has changed in terms of maternal co-residence since 1993 other than a slight dip in the 2000s. Figure 4 maps the percentage of children whose biological mothers were recorded as co-resident, using selected surveys spanning the period 1993–2014.

Figure 4.　　　Percentage of children with co-resident mothers, 1993–2014

Own calculations based on African children under 15 years; weighted data.

The two census estimates are below the fairly consistent trend emerging from other surveys, while the NIDS estimate for 2008 is almost identical to the GHS estimate of the same year. The 1995 OHS estimate appears to be an outlier. On average, across all years, about a quarter of children do not have a co-resident mother. Labour migration, low marriage rates, single parenting arrangements, orphaning and the availability of kinship care are all likely contributors to maternal absence.

3.3.2　Orphaning and co-residence arrangements

This section discusses orphaning rates, as one of the key reasons for maternal absence over the post-apartheid period has been HIV-related mortality. There are two common ways to define orphans. The first, used for example in the ASSA Aids and Demographic model (Actuarial Society of South Africa 2011) as well as by the UN Population Division, counts all children whose mothers are deceased as "maternal orphans", irrespective of the vital status of their fathers, and all children whose fathers are deceased as "paternal orphans", whatever the vital status of their mothers. This approach is useful for quantifying maternal and paternal mortality as independent phenomena, but results in overlap and does not distinguish between the loss of one parent (single orphans) and both parents (double orphans).

The second method, used in the South African child indicator monitoring project Children Count (www.childrencount.net) and elsewhere (see, for example, Hill et al. 2008; Richter and Desmond 2008), consists of mutually exclusive categories. A "double orphan" is a child who has lost both parents. There are two categories of single orphans: "maternal orphan" and "paternal orphan". The sum of all orphans is obtained by adding up the three categories. The sum of all children is obtained by the addition of a fourth category, "non-orphan". This approach is useful for

determining the contribution of each orphan category to overall orphan prevalence rates, and for distinguishing the impact of orphaning on different categories of orphans.

In the analyses below, "maternal orphan" refers to a child who has lost its mother but not its father, and "paternal orphan" refers to a child who has lost the father but not the mother. Children are described as "*maternally* orphaned" if they have lost their mother, irrespective of the status of their father.

To determine the orphan status of a child one needs to know the vital status (alive/deceased) of each biological parent. As noted above, the surveys differ in how the vital status of biological parents is determined. The GHS and NIDS contain a direct question that asks whether each household member's biological father/mother is alive. Three response categories are provided for: yes / no / don't know. This third category is important as it reflects situations where a parent has abandoned the child or is unknown to the household. Whereas "don't know" responses in household surveys are often treated as residual data, many analyses of orphaning have opted to incorporate this category into the definition of an orphan, since a parent whose vital status is unknown is unlikely to play a role in the care and support of the child: from the child's perspective it is *as if* they are maternally or paternally orphaned (Case et al. 2004).

In the GHS of 2014, 10 per cent of African children (1.3 million) had fathers who were known to be deceased, and a further 2 per cent (255,000) had fathers whose vital status was unknown. Both these categories are included in the definition of paternal orphans and paternally orphaned children. Unknown vital status is far less common in the case of mothers: 5 per cent of children (713,000) had mothers who were reported to be deceased, while less than 1 per cent (52,000) had mothers whose vital status was unknown. Both these categories are included in the definition of maternal orphans and maternally orphaned children.

The 1993 PSLSD does not ask directly about the vital status of parents. Rather, as explained above, the household roster includes a single question that requires the interviewer to fill in the person code for each member's father and (separately) for their mother. There is a note to interviewers to record the number "99" if the parent is absent from the household, and to write "88" if the parent is deceased. It is from this code that the vital status of the respective parents can be derived, although the indirect method is likely to be less reliable than the direct question on vital status. Similarly, the later OHS surveys do not capture vital status of parents directly.

When compared with the projections of the ASSA2008 model (Actuarial Society of South Africa 2011), the 1993 PSLSD and census-derived estimates of maternally orphaned children are unexpectedly low whereas the GHS matches fairly well with the modelled estimates between 2002 and 2009, a period when orphaning rates rose rapidly. This is illustrated in Figure 5. (Note that in this instance the analysis is based on all children under 15 years as the projected orphan numbers derived from ASSA do not specify race categories. It shows the prevalence of maternally orphaned children (i.e. all children whose mothers are dead, irrespective of the status of their fathers) as the ASSA projections do not distinguish between maternal and double orphans.)

Figure 5. **Maternally orphaned children 1993–2014: ASSA2008 model and surveys**

Own calculations from ASSA2008, PSLSD (1993) OHS (1995-1997), Census 1996, 2001 and 2011, NIDS (2008) and GHS (2002-2014), based on all children under 15 years. The trends include children of all races, as race disaggregations are not available in ASSA2008.

After 2009 the orphaning rates, as measured through the GHS, started to decline earlier than was predicted by the ASSA2008 model.[13] Figure 6 below shows the illustrative number of African children who are maternal, paternal and double orphans across the four surveys. It seems likely that the 1993 survey over-estimated the number of children with living parents, and therefore under-estimated orphans. It is juxtaposed in the graph with the results of the OHS of 1995, which corresponds more closely to the modelled estimates and probably provides a more realistic baseline. Similarly, NIDS appears to have slightly under-counted orphans if compared with the ASSA model (which was thought to provide reliable estimates at the time as it had been calibrated to existing data). Results from the GHS 2008 (the same year as NIDS wave 1) have been included for comparison, and more closely approximate to the modelled estimates in that year.

---

[13] The Actuarial Society of South Africa issued a cautionary note in 2012, warning that recent estimates of AIDS mortality (in particular adult survival rates) were likely to be overstated as the assumptions around antiretroviral treatment initiation became out of date with public sector guidelines (Actuarial Society of South Africa 2012). A new model is being prepared, which will take into account new developments in HIV prevention and treatment (Johnson 2014).

Figure 6. Orphan numbers 1993–2014

	PSLSD 1993	OHS 1995	NIDS 2008	GHS 2008	GHS 2014
■ double orphan	61 000	179 000	502 000	592 000	394 000
▨ paternal only	769 000	1 427 000	1 531 000	1 775 000	1 184 000
■ maternal only	154 000	164 000	444 000	418 000	369 000

Own calculations; African children under 15 years only.

Uncertain as the numerical estimates may be, some important trends can be gleaned from this analysis: paternal orphaning is, in all years, the main form of orphaning. In 1995 paternal orphans (with living mothers) constituted 81 per cent of all orphans. In 2014 paternal orphans still predominated, but only accounted for 61 per cent of all orphans. The number of maternal orphans increased by over 150 per cent between 1995 and 2008, and then dropped slightly. The number of double orphans increased even more sharply, by 230 per cent, between 1995 and 2008. This increase was driven largely by higher rates of maternal mortality, while paternal mortality rates remained fairly constant. Between 2008 and 2014, double orphaning rates dropped by 33 percent as maternal and paternal mortality rates declined.

The surveys examined here cannot provide data on cause of death, but the ASSA2008 model gives a trend in HIV-related orphaning over the period (Figure 7).

Figure 7. **"AIDS orphans" as a share of all maternally orphaned children under 18 years**

Source: ASSA2008 and GHS 2002–2014; own calculations based on all children under 18 years, as this is the definition of a child used in ASSA.

Note that in ASSA2008, "maternal orphans" refers to all children who have lost their mother, whatever their father's vital status. The analysis thus includes double orphans.

Up to the mid-1990s, before HIV became visible as an epidemic, maternal deaths were generally not caused by AIDS. The effect of HIV/AIDS on orphaning started to appear in 1994, with 1 per cent of maternally orphaned children being "AIDS orphans" (Actuarial Society of South Africa 2011). The numbers continued to escalate during the 1990s, so that by 2000 HIV/AIDS accounted for 17 per cent of maternal orphaning, according to the ASSA2008 model. By 2010 over 1.5 million children had lost their mothers and ASSA estimated that 72 per cent of these maternally orphaned children were orphaned as a result of AIDS. As seen earlier (and shown in the above graph), HIV-related maternal mortality declined more rapidly after 2009 than the ASSA model had predicted. This is a positive outcome of policy decisions and improved interventions: higher antenatal attendance by pregnant women, accompanied by higher (and earlier) rates of HIV testing (District Health Information System), and revised guidelines that recommended antiretroviral treatment initiation for adults with CD4 counts below 350µl (Actuarial Society of South Africa 2012). It would therefore be expected that the declining orphaning rates (shown by the line representing the GHS trend) would be accompanied by declining AIDS-orphaning rates.

The place in which an orphaned child lives is not necessarily where their parent died, or where they lived at the time of parental illness or death. Many studies have shown that orphaning can trigger mobility across households either within or between districts or provinces as children are informally fostered by kin (Ansell and Van Blerk 2005; Bray 2008; Ford and Hosegood 2005; Haour-Knipe 2009; Hosegood and Ford 2003). Rural households have long carried a large burden of child

care in the cause of labour migration, and an even greater burden of care with more recent increases in orphaning rates.

Table 7. Spatial distribution of maternally orphaned children

	1993			2014	
Geotype	N	%		N	%
Urban	61 000	28.3		311 000	40.6
Rural tribal	138 000	64.0		417 000	54.4
Rural farm	17 000	7.7		38 000	4.9
Total	215 000	100.0		765 000	100.0

Own calculations from PSLSD (1993) and GHS (2014), based on African children under 15 years.

As shown in Table 7, the majority of maternally orphaned children live in households in the former homelands. This does not necessarily mean that children of rural mothers are more likely to be orphaned: the return migration of chronically ill adults to former homeland areas has been documented (Neves 2009), and when urban mothers become ill and die their children may have to be sent to stay in rural households. The share of orphans in rural homelands declined from 64 to 54 per cent as orphaning rates rose in urban areas. It is not possible to know from cross-sectional data whether the rise in number and proportion of urban orphans means that more children were *becoming* orphaned in urban areas, or that more urban children who were orphaned were able to stay in urban households. Part of the increase in urban orphan numbers will be linked in this study to the overall rise in the urban share of the child population.

What are the household contexts of orphaned children? It is possible, in most of the surveys, to determine whether maternal or paternal orphans are living together with their other parent. Figure 8 reveals that, while most paternal orphans live with their mother, the majority of maternal orphans do not live with their father.

Figure 8. Orphan co-residence with surviving parent

Own calculations from PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008 and GHS 2014, based on African children under 15 years.

77

As shown in Figure 8, over 70 per cent of maternal orphans in 2014 did not live with their father even though their father was alive, and conversely less than 30 per cent of paternal orphans did not live with their mother even though their mother was alive. Paternal co-residence with maternal orphans appears to have declined slightly even though maternal orphaning rates increased over the 1993–2014 period. The share of paternal orphans who live with their mother has also declined, from nearly 80 per cent in the baseline years (95% confidence interval in 1995: 76.6–81.9%) to the low 70s in the more recent surveys (95% confidence interval in 2014: 70.1–75.2%).

Of the three surveys shown above, only NIDS attempts to identify the main people in the household who care for the child, and to determine their relationship to the child. The only possible proxy for caregiver that is consistent across the surveys is the reported relationship of each household member to the head of the household. Despite the inherent problems with the concept of "household head" (Budlender 2003), it is possible to use this information simply to gain a conservative estimate of the number of orphans who live with relatives: if the nominated household head is related to the child, then the child lives in a household where at least one person is a family member. Figure 9 presents this data in respect of maternally orphaned children (i.e. maternal and double orphans).

Figure 9. **Relationship of household head to maternally orphaned child (%)**

Own calculations from PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008 and GHS 2014, based on African children under 15 years only.

The vast majority of maternally orphaned children live with family members, in that they have at least one reported relative (the household head) who is a resident member of the household. Most of the household heads referred to as "parents" are surviving fathers (in the case of maternal

orphans only) or else they are step-parents or foster parents. Some may be other relatives fulfilling the social role of parenting. Whether or not they are biologically related, there has been a decrease in the proportion of maternally orphaned children living in households headed by a parent. The role of grandparents in providing a home for their maternally orphaned grandchildren has remained fairly constant over the past two decades: well over half of all maternal orphans live with household heads who are grandparents, and another quarter live with household heads who are aunts, uncles, siblings or other relatives. Less than 1 per cent live in households where the nominated household head is unrelated to them.

3.3.3   Parental absence and vital status

Although orphaning is not the main reason for parental absence, it did increase as a contributing factor after 1993. Of the 2.7 million children who had neither parent living in their household in 2014, 64 per cent had both parents known to be alive and 86 per cent had at least one living parent. In 1993, fewer children lived with neither of their parents (2.0 million), and orphaning accounted for a much smaller proportion of these children. Eighty-five per cent of children living without parents had two living parents and 97 per cent had one living parent.

Table 8 shows the scale of maternal and paternal orphaning attributed to the absence of mothers and fathers.

Table 8.   Contribution of orphaning to parental absence

	1993	2014
Number of children without a co-resident MOTHER	2.6m	3.2m
Mother deceased *(as a percentage of children without co-resident mother)*	8%	24%
Number of children without a co-resident FATHER	7.4m	8.5m
Father deceased *(as a percentage of children without co-resident father)*	11%	19%

Own calculations from PSLSD 1993 and GHS 2014, based on African children under 15 years only.

The table reveals that, of the 2.6 million children who did not have their biological mother living at home in 1993, only 8 per cent were maternally orphaned. The remaining 92 per cent had a mother who lived somewhere else. In the same year, 7.4 million children did not have a co-resident father, of whom 11 per cent were paternally orphaned. By 2014 the number of children without a co-resident mother had increased to 3.2 million, and orphaning rates had increased too: orphaning now explained 24 per cent of maternal absence. This increase is a direct result of the rise in AIDS-related deaths among prime-age women. Given the significant change in maternal survival rates, it is striking that the maternal co-residence rates with children have remained fairly stable, as was seen in the trend graph (Figure 4). By 2014 the effect of paternal orphaning on paternal absence was less pronounced than the effect of maternal orphaning on maternal absence. In other words, children who live without their mothers are more likely to be orphaned than those living without their fathers.

The fairly widespread absence of parents from children's lives predates the HIV epidemic. Factors other than orphaning, such as labour migration, housing availability, child care options, health and education choices, would need to be considered in order to understand why so many children live apart from their parents. Some of these factors are illustrated in the case study (chapter 6).

3.3.4 Parents living elsewhere

Children with absent living parents are concentrated in the former homeland areas, as might be expected given that historically these are sending areas for labour migrants and also have disproportionately large shares of pensioners (grandmothers being the main substitute caregivers for children). Table 9 presents the share of children whose parents are known to be living elsewhere, by each of the geography types. The share of urban children whose mothers are absent has reduced slightly, while among rural children in the former homelands the share with absent mothers has increased from 22 to 27 per cent since 1993. The shift is even more pronounced in respect of fathers: the share of rural children with absent fathers has increased from 61 to 73 per cent over the period, while among urban children it has remained fairly stable at just under half. Clearly, urban children are more likely to live with their parents than rural children in the homelands, and the difference is becoming more pronounced over time.

Table 9.   Share of children with absent (living) parents, by geotype

Mothers living elsewhere

Child's geotype	1993		2014	
	N	%	N	%
Urban	578 000	17.7	839 000	13.8
Rural tribal (homeland)	1 676 000	21.5	1 579 000	27.2
Rural farm	142 000	17.8	51 000	14.8
Total	2 396 000		2 469 000	

Fathers living elsewhere

Child's geotype	1993		2014	
	N	%	N	%
Urban	1 536 000	47.1	2 853 000	49.7
Rural tribal (homeland)	4 759 000	60.9	3 902 000	73.0
Rural farm	299 000	37.6	218 000	64.1
Total	6 594 000		6 973 000	

Own calculations from PSLSD 1993 and GHS 2014, based on African children under 15 years only.

Parents, and fathers in particular, are often absent from children's lives. Rates of paternal absence in South Africa are high compared with other countries (Child Trends 2014; Posel and Devey 2006). Less than half of rural children have co-resident fathers when they are born (Hosegood and Madhavan 2012), and only a third of all children nationally have their biological father co-resident in the household (Hall and Wright 2010).

Information on paternal involvement, where it exists, is typically in relation to biological (rather than social) fathering. Statistics on co-residence tell us little about the role of men, and the frequency and nature of their engagement and support of children. The data gaps may lead to some misrepresentation of fathers: the physical absence of a father from the household is commonly equated with the absence of paternal support, while it is often assumed that children automatically benefit materially and emotionally if there is a father present in the household (Hosegood et al. 2012, Richter et al. 2012). A qualitative investigation into the father–child connections and paternal support in a rural setting found the opposite: nonresident fathers were more engaged and available to their children than those who were co-resident household members (Madhavan et al. 2008).

This analysis has been limited to a narrow definition of household residence in which parental co-residence is only a measure of whether parents are resident members in the same household as their children. One cannot necessarily assume that nonresident parents are absent from their children's lives: a parent who is not co-resident may be a migrant worker who returns home intermittently, or they may live nearby and see the child regularly. This will be explored later in this section, and in chapter 5.

Are absent parents considered to be part of the households in which their children live? It is not possible to see this in the Stats SA surveys, but both the 1993 PSLSD and NIDS record nonresident household members. From this it is possible to distinguish the residence status of absent parents. The data reveal that a substantial proportion of parents who are alive but absent are also regarded as members of the child's household.

Table 10. Parent co-residence status, 1993 and 2008

Mother status	1993			2008		
	N	%	95% CI	N	%	95% CI
Co-resident member	9 246 000	77.9	(76.4 – 9.3)	9 278 000	70.9	(68.9 – 72.7)
Nonresident member	728 000	6.13	(5.3 – 7.1)	438 000	3.4	(2.7 – 4.2)
Absent	1 668 000	14.05	(13.0 – 5.2)	2 036 000	15.6	(14.3 – 16.9)
Deceased	215 000	1.81	(1.5 – 2.2)	920 000	7.0	(6.1 – 8.1)
Unspecified	13 000	0.11	(0.1 – 0.2)	422 000	3.2	(2.4 – 4.3)
Total	11 870 000	100		13 094 000	100	

Father status	1993			2008		
	N	%	95% CI	N	%	95% CI
Co-resident member	4 411 000	37.2	(35.1 – 9.3)	3 877 000	29.6	(27.1 – 32.2)
Nonresident member	1 799 000	15.2	(13.4 – 7.1)	705 000	5.4	(4.3 – 6.7)
Absent	4 793 000	40.4	(38.5 – 2.3)	5 942 000	45.4	(43.3 – 47.5)
Deceased	830 000	7.0	(6.2 – 7.8)	1 971 000	15.1	(13.8 – 16.4)
Unspecified	37 000	0.3	(0.2 – 0.5)	599 000	4.6	(3.7 – 5.7)
Total	11 870 000	100		13 094 000	100	

Own calculations from PSLSD 1993 and GHS 2014, based on African children under 15 years only.

In 1993, 2.4 million children had absent living mothers, of whom 30 per cent were defined as nonresident household members (i.e. although they spent most of their time living elsewhere they were regarded as part of the household and stayed in the household for at least two weeks a year). A much larger 56 per cent of children (6.6 million) had absent living fathers, of whom 27 per cent were defined as nonresident household members.

Fifteen years later, in 2008, fewer absent parents were defined as nonresident members of the households where their children lived: of those children with an absent mother or father, only 18 and 11 per cent had a nonresident mother or father respectively. The rest had mothers or fathers who lived elsewhere and were not described as being part of the household. Thus, in addition to showing a decline in children's co-residence with both mothers and fathers, the results also show a decline in the share of children with absent parents who are nonresident household members. This fits with another analysis of the same two surveys, but at household level, which found that the proportion of African rural households reporting at least one adult as a nonresident household member had dropped from 39 per cent in 1993 to 30 per cent in 2008 (Posel and Marx 2013).

NIDS provides some information about the frequency of contact between children and their absent parents. This information is presented in Table 11.

Table 11. Frequency of contact between children and absent parents

Parent sees child...	ABSENT FATHERS		ABSENT MOTHERS	
	N	%	N	%
... every day	337 000	4.9	107 000	3.9
... weekly	880 000	12.8	359 000	13.2
... monthly	1 778 000	25.9	1 073 000	39.5
... yearly	1 776 000	25.9	874 000	32.2
... never	1 894 000	27.6	195 000	7.2
Don't know / missing	190 000	2.8	107 000	3.9
TOTAL	6 856 000		2 715 000	

Own calculations from NIDS 2008. African children under 15 years only. Based on those whose parents are known to be alive but live elsewhere.

Two things are immediately striking: the majority of absent parents (both mothers and fathers) are in contact with their children, and there are large differences between mothers and fathers in how often they see their child. Over 40 per cent of children with absent fathers had contact with their father once a month or more often, while 57 per cent of those with absent mothers were in regular contact, at least monthly. Only 28 per cent of children with absent fathers and 7 per cent of children with absent mothers were definitely not in contact at all – a situation that might signal abandonment. This is a conservative estimate on abandonment, as there were small proportions of children whose parental contact status could not be classified because the information was missing or unknown (3 per cent for absent fathers, and 4 per cent for absent mothers).

NIDS also asks about financial support received from absent parents. Nearly 40 per cent of children with absent fathers received some kind of financial support from their father, and 50 per cent of those with absent mothers received financial support from their mother. It is not possible to determine with any reliability the frequency or extent of financial support, but these data do confirm that the majority of children with absent parents have not been abandoned. Only those whose parents never see them and do not send money would definitely be considered completely abandoned. By this definition, the maternal abandonment rate is 6 per cent of children with absent mothers, and just over 1 per cent of all children under 15 years. The paternal abandonment rate is considerably higher, at 24 per cent of children with absent fathers, and 13 per cent of the child population.

It is not easy to know from the available data the reasons for parental absence or the whereabouts of absent parents. The only information we have is for absent parents who were identified as being nonresident members of the household, where the household roster asked for information (provided by another household member) about the whereabouts and reasons for absence in the case of nonresident members. The main reasons for parental absence are related to labour participation. Two-thirds of nonresident mothers (67%) and 71 per cent of nonresident fathers were reported to be away because they were working or looking for work. This suggests that, while there may be a decline in adult labour migration as the explicit reason for family separation (Posel 2009), it remains a substantial reason for parental absence from children's lives.

3.4   Children's households: Have they changed in form?

3.4.1   Household size and adult–child shares

Children who live with their mother but not their father are not necessarily living in single-parent households, although this is a common misinterpretation (see, for example, Holborn and Eddy 2011). The vast majority of children who have a mother but no father present in the household, have two or more adults who are co-resident. Conversely, households with two adults are not necessarily two-parent households: in many cases one or both adults are not the child's biological parents.

In 2014, 12 per cent of children under 15 lived with only one adult (single parent or single caregiver households), while 33 per cent were co-resident with two adults. The remaining 55 per cent lived in households with three or more adults. This pattern is fairly consistent across all years, as shown in Figure 10 below.

Figure 10. **Number of co-resident adult household members, 1993–2014**

Own calculations from PSLSD 1993, OHS 1995. NIDS 2008) and GHS 2014. African children under 15 years only.

3.4.2 Household types

Household types based on intra-household relationships and generational profiles tell us little about interdependencies within and beyond the household, or about householding as a dynamic process. It was argued years ago that "co-residential household composition cannot be understood outside the temporal processes of formation, consolidation and dissolution" (Russell 2003b). Indeed, as illustrated by the case study in chapter 6, even the process that Russell terms "consolidation" may be one of constantly reformulating the household. It is thus with some trepidation that I attempt to define a household typology in terms of children, as this can only reflect households as static forms through cross-sectional analysis. Of the limitations identified in the previous chapter, this is the most important.

There are many ways of classifying households. The first challenge is to find a typology that can be analysed from the perspective of children and can be compared over time using various surveys. Writing about household composition and structure in the mid-1980s, Simkins noted that most typologies were variations on the following set:

- Solitary (1-person HHs)
- No family (two or more people who are unrelated or related in a way that prevents them being nuclear, extended or multiple households – e.g. two siblings living together)
- Nuclear (a single family nucleus with no other members)
- Extended (one family nucleus plus one or more relatives)
- Multiple (two family nuclei, with or without extensions). (Simkins 1986)

Later systems of classification have more or less followed this pattern. For example, Amoateng et al. (2007) collapsed the typology to four types: one-person, nuclear, extended and non-related person households. Contrary to assumptions that modernisation is accompanied by a rise in nuclear family household forms, they found that nuclear-family households decreased as a share of households between the 1996 and 2001 censuses, and the share of single-person and extended family households grew. They also found that extended households in the form of "skip-generational" or "three-generational" households were more prevalent in rural than urban areas.

"Solitary" and "non-related" person households are not useful for a child-centred analysis as very few children live in these situations. Classifying households in a child-focused way is also constrained by the fact that the available surveys do not enable analysis of intra-household relationships. One can usually determine the relationship of children to the nominal head of each household and whether children have co-resident biological parents, but it is difficult to define the relationships between children and other household members. This makes it unfeasible to pin down degrees of kinship within the household.

In their book *Growing Up in the New South Africa*, Bray et al. (2010) present a typology of children's households in Cape Town, using data from the Cape Area Panel Study. Their system of classification combines a focus on the presence of parents (both parents / mother only / father only / neither) with nuclear versus extended structure, as follows:

- Two-parent, extended
- Mother-only, nuclear
- Mother-only, extended
- Father only, nuclear and extended
- No-parent, extended.

The distributions presented in their analysis show that the two-parent nuclear-family household is an exception rather than the rule, and that the presence of parents is associated with higher income: 32 per cent of children in poor households have both parents co-resident, compared with 69 per cent in upper-income households (Bray et al. 2010:52).

Working with data the Agincourt surveillance site, Sangeetha Madhavan and Enid Schatz (2007) defined categories for a number of "fragile" household forms that were commonly considered to be highly prevalent and vulnerable in the context of HIV/AIDS. These included child-headed and skip-generation households. Other studies from the same period similarly problematised widespread assumptions about the rise of vulnerable household forms, focusing specifically on trends in the prevalence of child-headed households (Hill et al. 2008; Meintjes et al. 2010; Richter and Desmond 2008). In all these studies it was found that child-headed households were relatively rare (these household arrangements accounting for less than 1 per cent of children in all years) and were not increasing despite rising maternal orphaning rates. Madhavan et al. found that the fragile households that were assumed to have increased were in fact less prevalent in 2003 than in 1992.

An unpublished background paper on the situation of children commissioned for the Presidency's 20-Year Review (Hall and Budlender 2013) used a typology incorporating categories that articulated with the earlier studies and are often referred to as "vulnerable" household forms

(child-headed, youth-headed, skip-generation and single-adult households with children) as well as broad categories (nuclear, extended), in order to see whether there had been a worrying increase in vulnerable household forms as commonly assumed in popular and policy discourses. The authors found over two-thirds of all children under 18 were living in extended households – a proportion which, if anything, increased since 1993 (Ibid). Based on his analysis of an earlier set of data, Simkins concluded in the early 1980s that "if there is a trend towards a nuclear household, it is a very weak one" (1981:41). The more recent child-centred analyses suggest that the trend seems to be the other way.

Using a similar system of classification as that used for the 20-Year Review, but focusing specifically on African children under 15 years, I analyse a series of datasets from 1993 to 2014 as follows:

- *Child-only household*: All household members are below 18 years of age (i.e. the strict definition of a child-headed household);

- *Young-adult-headed household*: Household includes one or more children and at least one adult below the age of 25. No household members aged 25 or older. There is some overlap with nuclear households, where both biological parents are under 25 years (for example, in 1993, 3 per cent of children living in "young adult" households were also defined as living in nuclear households. I have included them in the youth household category);

- *Single-adult headed household*: Household includes one or more children and only one adult, where the adult is aged 25 or older. Here again, there is overlap with skip-generation households, where the single adult is two generations removed from the children of that household. (In 1993, 13 per cent of single-adult households were also skip-generation households, and were defined as skip-generation);

- *Skip-generation household*: Household includes one or more children, and only adult members who are over 50 years and not the biological parents of any children in the household. (Two-thirds of these were also single-adult households in 1993);

- *Nuclear family household*: Household includes one or more children and exactly two adults who are both biological parents of all the children in the household (but who are not necessarily married to each other); and

- *Extended and compound household*: Households contain children but are not captured in one of the above, including three-generation households and two-generation households with extended family such as siblings and cousins, non-relatives or a mix of biological and non-biological children.

The typology uses a very strict definition of "nuclear" which requires that parents and children are biologically related, thus excluding households with stepchildren and foster children, for example. It also uses a very broad construction of "complex/extended", which is effectively a catch-all for households that are neither "nuclear" nor separately specified as one of the "vulnerable" forms. This residual use of "extended" may be a limitation, and is something that Murray cautioned against when referring to the habit of capitalist employers who frequently used the concept of extended family to "refer to something that allegedly accommodates everyone (the sick, the

unemployed, the elderly)" (1981:103). However, given the multiple permutations of extended household forms and the fact that intra-household relationships cannot be clearly delineated, it is extremely difficult to create a very detailed system of subcategorisation for extended households.

As shown in Figure 11, the assumed "vulnerable" categories of household are relatively rare and seem to have decreased in prevalence since 1993.

Figure 11.   Distribution of children by household type, 1993–2014

	Complex / extended	Nuclear	Single adult	Skip-generation	Youth-headed	Child-headed
1993	64.8%	17.8%	11.2%	2.9%	2.9%	0.4%
2008	66.4%	14.6%	12.8%	3.9%	2.1%	0.2%
2014	71.1%	15.7%	9.3%	2.3%	1.4%	0.2%

Own calculations from PSLSD 1993, NIDS 2008 and GHS 2014. African children under 15 years only.

The nuclear category represents a relatively small share of children's household types and, as with other analyses, the share has, if anything, decreased over the post-apartheid period. The 1993 percentage is similar to that reported by Murray (18 per cent of his sample of 150 households in Lesotho consisted of a husband, wife and their children) (Ibid:102), although a notable difference in the current analysis is that the parents are not required to be married in order to meet the definition of a nuclear household. In 1993, 18 per cent of children lived in nuclear households according to the narrow definition used here. In later years this percentage seemed to have reduced further, although the slightly overlapping confidence intervals mean that this may not be a significant change (95% CI in 1993: 16.2–19.4%; 2014: 14.7–16.7%).

There is, however, a definite increase in the proportion of children living in what have been classified here as complex or extended household forms (95% CI in 1993: 62.8–66.7%; 2014: 69.9–72.3%). These households are varied in structure, and are also likely to vary over time. They are

larger than other household forms, consisting of an average of six members in 2014, compared with an average of four members in nuclear households and two to three members in the minority vulnerable forms.

Broad frameworks such as such as those described above do not begin to capture the diversity of living arrangements or the temporal and shifting dynamics of household life. An alternative typology proposed by Andries Du Toit and David Neves (2008) attempts to categorise households in terms of linkages and systems of reciprocity, and consists of four fundamental types:

- Urban households connected to a rural base
- Urban households with no connection to a rural base
- Rural households with a current or recent connection to an urban base
- Rural households with no current or recent connection to an urban base.

This categorisation is designed as a framework for ordering qualitative data about households and would be impossible to apply to existing household survey data. Despite widespread acknowledgement of the double-rootedness of many households, even those surveys that include migration modules typically ask only about where people lived *before* their current place, rather than whether they currently have another place that they regard as home. Thus, while it is possible to derive some system of classification for household composition within a physically bounded homestead, it is very difficult to measure household dispersion through cross-sectional surveys.

3.4.3 Female headship

A category excluded from the typology presented above is the female-headed household. This is partly because of the definitional overlap between household form and the gender of the household head, and also because of the inherent problems with the concept of household headship as it is captured in surveys.

Budlender (2003) and Posel (2001) have discussed the conceptual flaws in requiring the identification of a single individual who is "responsible for the household" without acknowledging that various members may be responsible for different aspects of household management and decision-making, and that responsibilities may be shared. Defining a single "household head" assumes a hierarchical household structure and usually requires that the individual who responds on behalf of the household makes a subjective choice. In some surveys, where the respondent cannot choose a "head" because responsibilities are shared, the interviewer is instructed to designate the oldest member as the household head (for example, an instruction to the interviewer on the questionnaire for the 2011 census reads: "The head or acting head is the person who is the main decision-maker of the household. If people are equally decision-makers, then take the oldest person as the household head.") This instruction illustrates the arbitrary approach to defining headship. However, the household-head variable is not entirely useless as headship has been found to be well correlated with the characteristics commonly associated with heads (Posel 2001).

Surveys invariably require that the designated household head be a resident member of the household. This ignores the authority of nonresident household members, who in many cases

may be primary breadwinners and therefore exert control over household income and expenditure. In effect, the household head identified in most surveys is simply a reference person subjectively assigned (or self-assigned) by the primary respondent, and failing that, by the interviewer. This is typically the case with household surveys conducted by Stats SA. Many countries, according to Budlender, have moved away from this approach, but all the South African surveys referred to in this chapter still attempt to identify a household head at least in nominal terms.

Despite the imprecise concept of headship and the arbitrary way it tends to be defined, female-headed households are frequently referred to in academic literature and public discourse. Self-reported female-headed households are not a new phenomenon. Two sources of data from 1980 (the Current Population Survey and the Income and Expenditure Survey of African households conducted by the Bureau of Market Research at UNISA) recorded over 50 per cent of African households in the rural homelands as being headed by women. Female headship was between 20 and 25 per cent in small towns and farms, and higher in metropolitan areas (Simkins 1986). Many later studies have tried to quantify female-headed households and comment on the trends in their prevalence and their relative vulnerability to poverty (see, for example, Department of Health et al. 2007; Rogan 2013; Schatz et al. 2011; Statistics South Africa 2016). Both the 2011 census and the 2016 Community Survey found that 41 per cent of all households in South Africa were headed by women (Ibid).

In the analysis presented below (Table 12), I distinguish two categories of female-headed households: those where all resident adults over 18 are women ("female-only" or *de facto* female-headed households); and those with both male and female adults, but where a woman is given as the nominal head of household on the survey roster ("female-nominated" or subjectively defined female-headed households). Similarly, two categories of male-headed households are distinguished: those where the only adults are male ("male-only"), and those where there are male and female adults, and a male is assigned as the head of the household ("male-nominated"). In doing this I draw on an approach suggested by Nobuhiko Fuwa (2000), cited in Michael Rogan (2013), in which all households can be categorised into three groups: those with both male and female adults; those with only female adults; and those with only male adults. This method therefore defines headship in terms of the demographic composition of households. Much of the existing work on female-headed households has been concerned with gendered poverty dynamics, whereas my primary concern is with care arrangements and decision-making about children (bearing in mind that these matters are not unrelated to issues of income poverty and other resources).

Table 12. Male and female household heads, 1993 & 2014

1993	Female only		Female nominated		Male only		Male nominated	
	% or mean	95% CI	% or mean	95% CI	% or mean	95% CI	% or mean	95% CI
Household & population shares								
All households	21.5	(19.9 – 23.2)	12.8	(11.6 – 14.1)	13.6	(10.4 – 17.6)	52.1	(49.2 – 55.0)
Child population (African children under 15)	28.7	(26.6 – 31.0)	18.5	(16.9 – 20.3)	1.4	(1.1 – 1.9)	51.3	(49.0 – 53.6)
Distribution by area type								
Urban	18.5	(15.9 – 21.4)	20.7	(17.8 – 23.9)	1.6	(0.9 – 2.9)	59.2	(55.3 – 63.1)
Rural former homeland	36.6	(33.9 – 39.3)	17.0	(15.4 – 18.8)	2.3	(1.8 – 2.9)	44.1	(41.7 – 46.5)
Household size								
Mean household size	5.0	(4.9 – 5.2)	7.5	(7.3 – 7.8)	3.9	(3.5 – 4.3)	6.5	(6.3 – 6.7)
Mean no. of adults over 18	1.6	(1.6 – 1.7)	4.0	(3.8 – 4.1)	1.4	(1.2 – 1.5)	3.2	(3.1 – 3.3)
Mean no. children under 15	2.9	(2.8 – 3.0)	3.0	(2.9 – 3.2)	1.8	(1.6 – 2.1)	2.9	(2.8 – 3.0)
Number of working adults								
0	64.3	(60.3 – 68.1)	33.1	(29.1 – 37.5)	52.7	(41.6 – 63.5)	21.0	(18.3 – 24.0)
1	30.3	(27.0 – 33.9)	38.1	(34.4 – 41.9)	37.2	(27.8 – 47.7)	45.6	(42.9 – 48.3)
2 or more	5.4	(4.1 – 7.0)	28.7	(25.0 – 32.8)	10.1	(5.1 – 18.9)	33.4	(30.9 – 36.1)

2014	Female only		Female nominated		Male only		Male nominated	
Household & population shares								
All households	24.5	(23.8 – 25.3)	16.8	(16.2 – 17.4)	20.2	(19.3 – 21.1)	38.5	(37.7 – 39.4)
Child population (African children under 15)	25.0	(23.9 – 26.1)	28.6	(27.3 – 29.9)	1.5	(1.3 – 1.8)	44.9	(43.6 – 46.3)
Distribution by area type								
Urban	24.4	(23.0 – 25.9)	19.8	(18.5 – 21.2)	2.3	(1.9 – 2.9)	53.4	(51.7 – 55.1)
Rural former homeland	38.0	(36.6 – 39.4)	27.4	(26.1 – 28.7)	2.3	(1.9 – 2.8)	32.3	(31.0 – 33.7)
Household size								
Mean household size	4.2	(4.2 – 4.3)	6.2	(6.1 – 6.3)	3.3	(3.1 – 3.4)	5.1	(5.0 – 5.2)
Mean no. of adults over 18	1.7	(1.7 – 1.7)	3.5	(3.4 – 3.5)	1.4	(1.3 – 1.5)	2.8	(2.8 – 2.9)
Mean no. children under 15	2.2	(2.2 – 2.3)	2.3	(2.3 – 2.4)	1.5	(1.4 – 1.7)	2.0	(2.0 – 2.1)
Number of working adults								
0	50.9	(48.7 – 53.0)	36.0	(33.9 – 38.1)	32.7	(26.3 – 39.9)	16.6	(15.4 – 17.9)
1	42.2	(40.2 – 44.3)	37.9	(35.9 – 40.0)	61.1	(53.5 – 68.1)	42.3	(40.4 – 44.2)
2 or more	6.9	(5.6 – 8.6)	26.0	(24.1 – 28.0)	6.2	(3.2 – 11.7)	41.1	(39.0 – 43.3)

Own calculations from PSLSD 1993 and GHS 2014. Households with African children under 15 years, unless otherwise specified.
95% confidence intervals shown in brackets.

Relative to the overall household distribution, African children were disproportionately concentrated in households with female-only or female-nominated heads in 1993 (47 per cent of children compared with 34 per cent of households), and this skewed distribution had become slightly more pronounced in 2014 when 54 per cent of children lived in households with female-only or female-nominated heads (representing 41 per cent of all households).

In 1993, just over half of children lived in households where a male adult was defined as the household head. These were virtually all "male-nominated" heads in households with both male and female adults. While "male-only" household heads represent a substantial share of all households (14 per cent in 1993, rising to 20 per cent in 2014 – and this is linked to the increase in single-person households), only 1 per cent of children lived in these households in both years, the other 99 per cent being co-resident with at least one adult woman.

All household types have declined in size over time, in keeping with the overall national pattern. Households with only adult women or only adult men are smaller, on average, than those with both male and female adults, while female-headed households are larger than their male-headed equivalents and have more child dependants. Female-headed households are also more likely than male-headed ones to be workerless, where nobody is employed: in 2014, 51 per cent of female-only households and 38 per cent of households with female-nominated heads reported that no adults were working. Interestingly, the share of female-only households with at least one income earner rose from 36 per cent in 1993 to 49 per cent in 2014, suggesting increased employment which might in turn be linked to the documented rise in women's labour migration.

The results suggest the increasing feminisation of households where children live, particularly in urban areas, and also indicate that levels of unemployment remain relatively high in households headed by women, compared with those headed by men. In a more nuanced analysis, Posel and Rogan (2012) have demonstrated that even with increased employment rates among women, the income differentials between women and men mean that poverty has remained strongly gendered – a dimension of inequality which is inherited by children and only partly offset by social grants.

> The process of change in African family structure has involved not simply the breaking down of former relationships, but also the adoption of new family forms and values. Prominent among them has been the female-centred household, consisting of a woman, her children and, often, their children, without a permanent male head. Undoubtedly, however, the decay of traditional structure of support and security imposed, and continues to impose, enormous stress on women. (Walker 1990)

3.5   Conclusion

Despite their limitations the micro data are able to reveal a number of important patterns and trends in children's household arrangements that could not otherwise be identified with certainty. The existence of multiple datasets spanning a period of over 20 years strengthens the value of the data in that it enables identification of outliers and of plausible, consistent patterns, and the relatively small confidence intervals mean that the estimates are fairly accurate. The chapter has pointed to some areas where the technical formulation of questions can strengthen the data around parental vital status and co-residence.

The long-range analysis of the population distribution demonstrates the success of apartheid spatial policy in concentrating a large proportion of the population – particularly women and children – in the homelands. From the 1980s and particularly following the repeal of apartheid laws there has been a sharper increase in the urban share of the population, although children

remain disproportionately represented in the rural homelands, where nearly two-thirds of children now live in households that are headed by women. The most striking change in the urban–rural distribution is among women, who have become more urban. The migration analysis in chapter 5 and the case study in chapter 6 illustrate how some of the skewed distribution can be explained by the fact that children of urban migrant mothers may grow up in rural homes where they are cared for by family members.

The size of the child population has been fairly stable over the two post-apartheid decades – a trend that masks more nuanced ones including the worst years of the HIV epidemic when child mortality rates increased substantially and then dropped again. Despite a small gain in population size since 1993, children have become concentrated in a smaller share of households. Only half of all households in the country had at least one child in 2014, down from nearly two-thirds in 1993. The number of households has grown because they have split into smaller units (possibly as a response to the national housing subsidy scheme) and particularly because of a rise in adult-only households, including single-adult households.

Only a third of children have co-resident fathers, and the share of children living with both their parents, estimated at 35 per cent in 1993, has declined by five percentage points. The data point to the overwhelming role of mothers, who still care for three-quarters of children, but there may be a shift as rates of parental absence have also risen slightly among both mothers and fathers.

Orphaning rates increased rapidly from the mid-1990s but levelled off and started declining sharply well before the projected plateau – a demonstration of the success of policy reversal after the Treatment Action Campaign case of 2002.[14] Although there were still an estimated two million orphans in 2014, over half of them were paternal orphans who had a living mother. Orphaning only accounts for a small share – less than a quarter – of maternal and paternal absence.

The child-focused analysis suggests a decline in temporary migration among absent parents in that the share of children with absent parents who are nonresident members dropped between 1993 and 2008. This is true of both mothers and fathers. Conversely, 2.5 million mothers reported 4.1 million biological children as nonresident. The main reason for maternal absence is simply that mothers live elsewhere. Chapter 5 explores dynamics of maternal migration and child care in greater detail, and chapter 6 illustrates the difficulty of migrating together with children.

The data show that complex household forms continue to predominate and that there has not been a shift towards a more nuclear family structure. Rather, the child-centred analysis points to a slight increase in extended or complex household forms. These extended households are, however, smaller than they were two decades ago: "extended" does not necessarily mean large. In 2014, nearly a third of extended households with children contained four people or less. A number of studies have examined household form at the aggregate level and find little change overall from the perspective of children. But the slight shift (towards a more urban population, and towards smaller non-nuclear households) may mask a myriad changes in the composition of individual households that are constantly reconfigured.

---

[14] The TAC case was a landmark judgement in which the Constitutional Court obliged the Department of Health to make antiretrovirals available to pregnant women, to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV.

Commentators have argued that the "household" also refers to the imaginary (Du Toit and Neves 2008; Ngwane 2003) – but imagined households cannot be captured in household surveys. The reality of family and household form in South Africa is that neither households nor families have fixed boundaries; both extend over geographic space and degrees of kin, both are multi-generational and porous, shifting rather than static, and there are possibilities for overlaps and duplication in that many people may belong to more than one household, just as kinship ties connect multiple families in complex ways. As shown later, a household may span different dwellings, so that even where surveys would sample units separately, there are familial relations of mutual support and householding that link households. These complexities are seldom reflected in household surveys or in policy instruments, which tend to require systems of classification that are fixed and comprehensive, where households need to be linked to an immovable structure, and where double-counting tends to be avoided.

The case study presented in chapter 6 describes a rural household that grew as it accommodated dependants, shrank as potential breadwinners were dispatched, grew again as they took in a next generation of children, and shrank again as adult members died or followed the urban pioneers to seek work, or when children went off to school. Throughout all these changes there was a sense that people's places were held in the imagination of the household, although the "full" household was seldom if ever convened, not even at Christmas time, and even then the augmented household was not without tension. These descriptions differ in tone from the fluidity described elsewhere, for it is not an easy flow between open doors but rather a series of difficult transitions in which households gamble on expensive routes, uncertain work opportunities and housing arrangements at the urban end, and an endless struggle for income to support dual and sometimes multiple households. Decisions about child care are made in the context of broader household strategies.

Individual household change can be examined to a certain extent through panel surveys which provide repeated snapshots in time. I attempt to do this in chapter 5, which investigates the mobility of children in relation to their mothers, using waves of the NIDS panel survey conducted at two-yearly intervals.

Chapter 4. Migration theory and trends

The multiple literatures on migration can be broadly divided into an empirical one that describes macro patterns of migration, its prevalence and direction; a theoretical one concerned mainly with explaining or predicting the causes and consequences of migration; and a literature which theorises the mechanisms that enable or perpetuate migration. Thus, the combined literatures address the questions: What is the scale and direction of migration? Why do people migrate and with what consequences? And how do they migrate? The questions have been considered from multiple disciplines and theoretical perspectives, ranging from neoclassical economics to Marxist political economy and non-economic approaches.

The central focus of this thesis is children's migration patterns and household arrangements. I am setting out to describe the patterns of migration, rather than attempting to model or theorise the reasons. Migration frameworks are outlined here as a background, since the observed migration patterns are presumably the product of decisions and trade-offs that cannot be explored directly in the thesis but emerge in the case study, in particular. Much of the South African discourse on migration stems from broader models that have relevance in local context – but a focus on children implies a different set of considerations. The determinants of migration as outlined in the literature are primarily about labour and income. But this is clearly not the case for children. Cities may offer better education and health services – attributes that are more directly related to children and may influence decisions about their mobility. However there are also drawbacks to city life, including the lack of adequate family accommodation, high crime rates and other personal risks, higher costs of living, and the possibility of adults remaining unemployed. These risks could be perceived differently for adults and children. For example, adults might be willing to take the risk of living in places that are subject to fire and flooding so that they can be close to income-earning opportunities, and yet not want to have their children living in such circumstances if alternative accommodation is available. As Posel and Van der Stoep have commented:

> Although mothers can now move permanently with their families to places of employment, there are a number of reasons why they may be choosing to migrate without their children. The precarious nature of employment, a higher cost of living and the accessibility and quality of accommodation at places of employment would discourage migration with children. (Posel and Van der Stoep 2008:6)

Examples of such considerations appear throughout the case study in chapter 6, where the accounts of mobility in the life histories cannot be separated from decision making.

This chapter briefly reviews some of the theoretical work on migration and discusses its relevance to the South African context and to child migration. It outlines some of the main migration and urbanisation trends in South Africa and ends with an overview of the small but growing literature that focuses specifically on child migration. The empirical chapter that follows then compares child migration rates with adult (maternal) migration rates within South Africa, and explores some of the characteristics of migrant and non-migrant children.

4.1 Migration theory: An overview

Contemporary international migration theory dates back to around the 1950s. This was a time when Europe was rebuilding itself after the Second World War, when human losses still resulted in labour shortages in some countries; a period that saw the softening of some borders through the rise of supranationalism in Europe (with precursors to an EU-type international community arising from the Treaty of Paris in 1951 and the Treaty of Rome in 1957), and when other borders were being more rigidly secured and enforced as Cold War tensions grew. The first migration models were developed then to predict international migration flows. Many countries that were traditionally migrant-sending societies had become migrant-receiving (this was the case in most European countries in the postwar period, for example), and it is presumably the striking mid-century shifts in labour migration flows that prompted interest in empirical studies and the development of migration theory. Although my focus is on internal migration within South Africa, many of the drivers and mechanisms of migration discussed in the international literature, as well as the theoretical critique they prompted, are relevant to domestic migration dynamics. It should also be remembered that the system of the independent homelands in South Africa was a deliberate device to separate labour-demand and labour-supply areas so definitively that separate countries were artificially created, with international borders to control migration flows.

4.1.1 Macro-level migration theory

Early macro-economic migration theory, later termed neoclassical, is usually attributed to Arthur Lewis (1954) and was expanded by others including Gustav Ranis and John Fei (1961), and John Harris and Michael Todaro (1970). Migration trends were explained in terms of macro-level opportunity structures in the context of uneven economic development across the world, with underlying assumptions about linear processes of development and the advancement or modernisation of some countries relative to others. Initially applied internationally, Lewis's model assumed that cross-country migration is caused by geographical differences in labour supply and demand: it theorised that differentials in wages cause workers from capital-poor countries with a labour surplus to migrate to higher-wage, capital-rich countries with a labour shortfall. Wages in the labour-sending country were predicted to rise as the local labour supply decreased, and conversely wages would decrease in the labour-receiving country as it became saturated with in-migrants. The underlying assumption is that this balancing act continues until equilibrium is reached and migration eventually slows and ceases. In this way the model attempted to explain why migration starts, as well as why it continues and why it ends, and although the assumptions about equilibrating mechanisms were unlikely to hold true in the real world (Hagen-Zanker 2008) the notion of migration as a phenomenon that imitates the scientific forces of the physical world has remained remarkably persistent.

Extensions of the model included its application to internal migration, explained in terms of employment and wage differentials between "traditional" (or agricultural) and "modern" (or industrialised) sectors, and between rural and urban areas. Later work, especially by Todaro (1976), augmented this approach to account for persistent urban migration despite rising urban unemployment, acknowledging that migration was not risk-free, and that it could be driven by

anticipated returns over a long period even if these were not realised in practice. A critique of this explanation is that, in sub-Saharan Africa at any rate, the approach fails to consider adequately the circularity of migration between rural and urban areas and the effects of circulation on net migration (Potts 2011).

The idea of modernisation as a linear process also gave rise to the idea of a "mobility transition" (Zelinsky 1971), where certain patterns and rates of migration might be expected at particular stages of modernisation or industrialisation. Temporary migration would be expected to give way eventually to permanent migration. Many commentators have pointed out that unilinear models such as this are not useful for conceptualising migration processes, particularly in the Southern African region, and that urban transition models "whereby permanent migration inexorably replaces circulation as urban economies develop" (Ibid:2) are particularly unhelpful, as they ignore the role of circular migration in contemporary dynamics of urbanisation. Expectations of linear migration do not adequately consider the influence of uneven urban development (high unemployment rates, vulnerable low-paid employment), the quality of housing, and the role of culture and history in influencing migration patterns and the permanence of migration.

The "urban transition" describes a shift in a population that is primarily rural to one that resides mostly in urban areas (United Nations 2015). Urbanisation has tended to happen alongside the "demographic transition" where mortality and fertility rates decline, slowing the rate of natural population growth. This is the case in sub-Saharan Africa too, although both mortality and fertility rates in the region remain higher than in the global North. South Africa has been described by some as having a "delayed 'mobility transition' [in that] more than a decade into democracy, urban growth patterns are still predominantly a result of migration process rather than a case of natural increase" (Williams et al. 2011: no page numbers provided). But the notion of mobility transition or urban transition, whether delayed or not, may be inappropriate if circular migration and dual housing arrangements are to continue in the foreseeable future.

Dual labour market theory (also called dual economy or segmented labour market theory) focuses more specifically on the inherent labour demands of industrialised regions. According to its main early proponent, Michael Piore (1979), migration is caused by "a permanent demand for immigrant labour that is inherent to the economic structure of developed nations … [which have] a chronic and unavoidable need for foreign workers" (Massey et al. 1993:440–441). The "dual economy" relates to the segmented structure of the labour market in industrialised countries, where there are strongly delineated primary (more skilled / professional) and secondary (unskilled / labour intensive) sectors. In this context, there may be little incentive for native residents (or in the case of South Africa, urban/ white/well-educated residents) to take up jobs in the secondary sector for a number of reasons: secondary sector wages have to be kept artificially low even in the face of labour shortages, because wages are determined not only by supply and demand, but by the relative status and prestige of jobs; the secondary sector does not offer the possibility of upward mobility within the job hierarchy and this reduces motivation to enter it; secondary-sector jobs tend to be relatively unstable as the workforce is more easily replaced and therefore expendable. All these factors contribute to a "permanent demand for workers who are willing to labour under unpleasant conditions, at low wages, with great instability, and facing little chance

for advancement" (Ibid:441). The theory is therefore concerned with the systemic demand or "pull" of the labour market, which is seen as an active recruiter of migrants. A South African example would be the mining industry, which for decades actively recruited unskilled labour from parts of South Africa and neighbouring countries. The theory is also relevant to contemporary South Africa, where there are marked distinctions between skilled and unskilled jobs, not least differences in job security and pronounced wage differentials.

Dependency theorists expanded migration theory, critiquing the neoclassical approaches and their assumptions about the linear and beneficial processes of modernisation. Drawing on Marxist principles, these theorists described migration as an inevitable response to a Western-dominated capitalist system characterised by economic and structural inequality between wealthy or "core" states and poor, underdeveloped or peripheral ones. It could be argued that these two types of state exist within one country in South Africa, and that the establishment of underdeveloped peripheral nation-states to serve as labour reserves was an express strategy of the homeland policy. The homelands, or "bantustans" in the early language of the time, were politically independent in theory but subject to the influence and intervention of South Africa, and their economic dependence on South Africa perpetuated oscillating patterns of migration (Grieger et al. 2014). In terms of dependency theory, wealthy states systematically exploit poorer states or regions, ensuring that resources (for example, raw materials and cheap labour) flow from less developed to more developed regions, which are thereby enriched while the dependence of the poorer states is perpetuated. Theorists have held that migration further marginalises the peripheral areas that supply labour, polarising the sending and receiving nodes in an unequal and exploitative relationship. Importantly, sending areas would tend to forfeit young and prime-age adults who were better educated and skilled, more ambitious and enterprising, and this social cost was unlikely to be offset simply by remittances (Dasgupta 1981; Mafukidze 2006; Posel and Marx 2013).

Other structural-historical perspectives primarily concerned with the relationship between economic systems and labour flows are "world systems theory" in sociology, and "institutional theory" in economics. Both theories hold that the creation and expansion of markets leads to the structural transformation of societies and the creation of migrant-prone populations (Massey 2015). Central to the world systems theory proposed by Wallerstein (1974) is the notion that the world economic system is effectively a global capitalist order in which there is a hierarchy of countries, ranging from the core to semi-peripheral to peripheral, where more peripheral countries are dependent on the dominant core countries and migratory movement is determined at the macro level through forces of exploitation.

4.1.2   Micro-level migration theory

At a micro level, the focus is on the individual characteristics of migrants and the logic of their decision-making process. The risk is of making false assumptions that "such decisions are made in an environment relatively free of constraints" (Trager 1988:6). Economists and sociologists have theorised on the individual motives of those who responded to the structural forces operating at the macro level, sometimes ignoring the macro level entirely. Neoclassical economics essentially assumes that people move to maximise lifetime earnings, and the associated rational choice theory has been one of the most influential and controversial approaches in migration sociology. Derived from economics and from behavioural decision theory in social psychology, it is a micro-economic model of individual choice. Those using a rational choice approach typically view migration decisions from an actor perspective: the potential migrant weighs up the costs and benefits of moving to another place versus staying in the current place and chooses the option with the best expected net return, usually calculated in monetary terms. The model assumes there are alternatives to choose from, and that, while constraints and opportunity structures impose restrictions on choice, the potential migrants will ultimately make an independent and rational decision for their own benefit.

One of the best-known micro theories of migration is that of behavioural push-pull. First developed by Lee (1966), the push-pull theory has been revised over many decades and still features in much of the migration literature. In its simplest form, it is concerned with the real or perceived positive and negative factors at either or both the supply and demand ends of the migration route. The push-pull approach potentially explains non-migration as well as migration decisions, and it led to later more nuanced concepts that tried to incorporate both individual decision making and the macro/structural context.

There are variations of rational choice theory: the human capital approach treats migration as an individual investment to increase the productivity of human capital within the labour market. The model helps to explain differences in selection (for example, younger people are more likely to migrate than older people) but tends to ignore the structural context. The value-expectancy model (see De Jong and Fawcett 1981) similarly uses a cost-benefit approach but allows for the migration decision to be based on more than economic factors, incorporating non-monetary considerations such as autonomy, affinity and self-fulfilment.

The new economics of labour migration (Stark and Levhari 1982) is similar to neoclassical economics in that it theorises the motives of those who respond to structural forces by migrating. But it differs substantially from other micro-level decision models as it envisages that households, rather than individuals, might make decisions (see also Becker 1965 for a seminal analysis on household decision making to maximise earnings and utility). Linked to the new economics approach, household strategies or social network approaches have been proposed as a third or "meso" perspective as they encompass the units of the household / dual household / extended family and wider social networks. In a sense this intermediate view links the macro and the micro (Trager 1991). Household fragmentation through the migration of individual members may then be seen as a household decision – a means for survival of the broader family or household, driven

by a complex of economic and social strategies to "maximise household income, minimise economic risk and increase exposure to social resources such as education and health care" (Collinson et al. 2006b:195). Thus household members "spread themselves over rural and urban places to experience the particular utility each has to offer" (Collinson et al. 2006a:24).

With the new economics perspective, migration can be seen as cumulative and self-perpetuating, facilitated over time by a network of kin, extended kin and migrant networks (Massey 1990). The dissolution or fragmentation of families therefore has particular consequences for livelihoods in the context of labour migration, particularly in South Africa, where the impact has been strategically to link the rural and urban economies through the movement of people (Collinson et al. 2006b; May et al. 1998).

Whether at the individual/micro or household/meso level, the notion of rational choice framework has been widely critiqued as being overly simplistic. The main criticisms of a push-pull dualism, summarised by Julian May (1987), are:

- It does not explain how push-and-pull forces came into being in the first place;
- It needs to be linked to relative social and economic development in urban and rural areas, as "the migration process is both determined by, and is itself a determinant of, the nature of the development path followed in both regions" (Ibid:125);
- It tends to assume that individual migrants are rational actors, whereas the "movement of migrant workers is a system, which is therefore beyond the control of any individual" (Ibid); and
- Migration should be seen as an ongoing process linking the village or rural household to the modern capitalist economy (this echoes the argument against the notion of a mobility transition).

However, some contemporary researchers and theorists have suggested that a push-pull approach, if appropriately adapted, can be useful as part of an organising framework in migration research. Potts suggests that, although Southern African migration studies largely escaped the individual-level structural-functionalist approach that focused on motivations, there is a role for push-pull models in looking at circular migration (she is thinking particularly of sub-Saharan Africa), as this helps to conceptualise forces at both ends of the migration path and recognises that "both rural and urban conditions are shaped by the same structural forces". So, a push-pull framework not only sheds light on some of the individual-level migration influences, but can also provide ways to organise data relevant to the macro context. It can thus link micro and macro levels of thinking.

Figure 12.   Push-pull model of circular migration

In the simple model outlined by Potts (2011), urban and rural pulls and pushes change over time. In sub-Saharan African countries during the 1960s and '70s they would have included real increases in urban incomes alongside colonial controls on urban influx. These forces would have reduced subsequently, but shifts in rural push and pull factors may not have changed at the same time or extent. In fact Potts argues that in the case of contemporary Zimbabwe the economic security of land in the face of widespread urban unemployment, a devaluating currency and wage losses has reinvigorated patterns of circular migration as urban populations have returned to the land. Children would be affected by these changing forces, possibly in ways that differ for adults, but the impact on children's mobility and living arrangements cannot be determined without studying them directly.

Douglas Massey (2015) proposes an integrated theoretical framework that incorporates five features of migration, also encompassing considerations of structure and agency. Massey's main geographical area of interest is the Mexican–US border, but there are aspects of this model that appear relevant to South Africa. With children in mind, though, one realises that child migration has tended to be both invisible and under-theorised. The first element in Massey's framework is the *structural forces in sending areas* that create a population prone to migration. This begs the question: what would these be for children and how would they affect patterns of child migration? The second consideration is the *structural forces in receiving areas* that generate a persistent demand for migrant workers. But what does a persistent demand for labour mean for the children of those who provide labour, particularly in contexts where child care services are neither readily available nor affordable? The third criterion is the *motivations of those who respond to these structural forces* by migrating. This is about decision making among agents. Arguably children are not necessarily agents and often do not have decision-making power. But the factors that adults would consider on behalf of children may be different from considerations for adults. In child-focused work one should ask: what are the motivations for moving children, how do these relate

100

to the motivations of adults, and what are the trade-offs between competing interests? Fourth, Massey's framework considers the *social structures that perpetuate flows* of people over time and space. But in what way do the social structures that facilitate and perpetuate migration work for children? What, for example, do processes of cumulative causation mean for child migration? The final consideration is *government policies and responses to migration*, which shape the numbers and characteristics of migrants. Here, a South African researcher interested in child migration might ask: what are the post-apartheid policies of the South African government and of metropolitan cities on accommodating or even enabling urban influx of families with child dependants? As Mark Collinson et al. point out, "administrative and structural arrangements in a country have a direct and pervasive influence on migration" (2006a:3). Although the formal discriminatory restrictions have been lifted, cities might effectively discourage permanent in-migration of dependants through under-provisioning of housing, services and social infrastructure – all of which could be considerations for children.

Another point relevant to the mobility of children is that its flipside is immobility. Migration has been a feature of human behaviour for as long as people have existed. Given the tendency of humans to move about, it is remarkable that much contemporary migration theory and research appears more interested in mobility than immobility. It is only from the twentieth century that governments have formalised and enforced systems to control and manage international population flows across countries (the modern passport and visa systems did not exist before the First World War, for example (Massey 2015)). Against this background, migration studies could be described as the analysis of human movement in a system that expects (and even compels) people to be immobile unless structural forces, natural disasters or war require otherwise. As Pieter Kok and Mark Collinson (2006:1) point out, "being sedentary and immobile seems to be regarded as the 'right thing to do'" whereas migration tends to be seen as the consequence and/or cause of problems.

De Haas (2014) outlines a proposed aspirations-capabilities migration framework which is not just about push-pull factors that drive migration but about the capability to be able to respond to those forces and realise aspirations. In these terms, migration is seen as "a function of aspirations and capabilities to migrate within a given set of opportunity structures" and, drawing on Amartya Sen's capabilities approach, human mobility is defined as "people's capability (freedom) to choose where to live, including the option to stay" (De Haas 2014:2). De Haas distinguishes between the instrumental and intrinsic dimensions of human mobility, conceptualising moving and staying as "complementary manifestations of the same migratory agency". Where people lack the capability or agency to migrate, De Haas describes this as involuntary immobility, or displacement in place. This is a concept that has not been adequately or explicitly explored in migration analyses, but which seems particularly relevant to any study of child and maternal migration. The migration analysis presented in chapter 5 below describes child immobility in contexts where mothers move. The case study in chapter 6 also brings out the inability of a mother to take her children with her to the city. Involuntary immobility was, in effect, legislated under apartheid. I believe that the concept can contribute to a more sympathetic understanding of what is often a morally tinged critique of continuing family fragmentation in the post-apartheid era.

Even when families are fragmented as members spread to different places, this may not be permanent. Temporary migration, where the migrant stays in the place of origin for only a small part of the year but still retains strong links there, is an important category. It is likely to be an underlying factor in many instances of what might appear to be family fragmentation (this is explored more deeply in chapter 5 in relation to mothers). Notions of temporary and permanent migration abound in the literature, but they are not always clearly specified and terminology is often used interchangeably. For example, temporary migration / labour migration / circular migration / oscillating migration / circulatory migration may be used to describe similar migration phenomena and are sometimes used interchangeably. They can however be distinguished: "temporary" implies the opposite of permanent – in other words, the migrant retains ties of attachment and may be expected to return to the place from which they came (i.e. circular migration) or to another place (which could be circulatory migration or step migration in which the migrant uses one place as a stepping stone to another). Circular migration implies a direction as well as a temporal element. The temporal aspects of temporary or circular migration can be broadly classified into periodic, seasonal and long-term (Collinson et al. 2006a:7). Oscillating migration implies that a bipolar migration path is followed repeatedly. The term "labour migration" specifies a reason for migration, an activity at the destination, and also implies a temporary move in that the migrant only does so in order to work or find work. If the migrant intended to move permanently, then "labour" would not be specified. Some studies have specified short-term versus long-term labour migration (Collinson et al. 2006a), and it is argued that these, together with permanent migration, make up the three types of spatio-temporal mobility that have tended to attract policy attention in South Africa (Kok et al. 2003).

The Agincourt surveillance site, which has produced the largest body of data and analysis on migration in South Africa to date, differentiates between a permanent and temporary migrant as follows (Collinson et al. 2006a:7):

- A permanent migrant is "a person who enters or leaves a household with a permanent intention";

- A temporary migrant is "a household member who is away the majority of time, but retains a significant link. This implies that the person is a *de jure* member of the household, but absent for more than six months of a year."

Intention is therefore another important point in distinguishing between temporary and permanent migration. Temporary migration might not be what the migrant planned, but be forced by unemployment, lack of money, sickness, inability to find housing or for other reasons. Conversely, a migrant may intend to move temporarily but may for a range of reasons end up staying for longer than planned, long enough for the migration to be considered permanent. Thus, although temporary and permanent migration may appear to be quite distinct categories in the theoretical literature, they are not always easy to discern in practice and do not necessarily reflect the intentions of migrants, plans that themselves might change over time. The case study presented in chapter 6 illustrates the difficulty of ascribing "temporary" or "permanent" migration to a migrant, when the person herself vacillates in response to various challenges and experiences which might be termed push-pull factors.

This section has presented some of the main concepts in migration theory and considered their relevance to migration research on children in South Africa. In the next section I focus on what is known about migration trends within South Africa, before examining migration rates for children. The overview is limited to internal migration, as cross-border migration has a whole literature of its own but is not a theme of this thesis.

4.2   Migration trends in South Africa

4.2.1   The establishment of circular migration

South Africa has a long history of labour mobility which was subject to colonial and apartheid controls, and later, to post-apartheid structural forces. Up to the late 1800s African participation in labour migration was not uncommon but was relatively discretionary: accounts of early African labour migration suggest young men engaging voluntarily in temporary wage labour in order to buy guns and other commodities and then returning home, while female labour in household agriculture provided the main means of survival and reproduction of the homestead (Walker 1990). The mining rush following the discovery of diamonds and gold led to the institutionalisation of a migrant labour system that served the interests of white capital, and by the end of the nineteenth century the expansion of the migrant labour system was a major policy goal (Ibid). Under pressure from the Chamber of Mines, the colonial government used an array of strategies to ensure a large supply of cheap labour and lock Africans into an extractive system of labour relations that profited the mines and other interests. A hut tax, payable in cash, was introduced in the last decades of the nineteenth century as a device to force households that might otherwise subsist into the cash economy. African households were stripped of their land, notably through the Land Act of 1913, thereby putting an end to independent agricultural production as a means of survival and forcing Africans into wage labour, so that not only young men but older men had to leave their rural homes and take up employment. Labour recruitment was centralised and regulated through labour bureaux, and mechanisms to control population movement ensured that labour, both from within South Africa and from neighbouring states, remained migratory. The migrant system was entrenched through the policy of separate development, which prevented migrants and their families from relocating permanently to places of wage employment. This gave rise to dual housing arrangements and circular or oscillating patterns of migration, where labour migrants moved between places of employment and homes of origin. The system of circular migration and dual housing was effectively legislated and, by the time the National government came to power in 1948, labour migration was firmly established alongside deliberate policies to entrench the economic drivers of migration while restricting non-economic ones.

It is easy to see, then, why rational theory approaches have been so heavily critiqued in the South African context. They imply a level of free decision making, yet, as May describes, "the migrant labour system [in South Africa] was established through joint action by the state and capital, in order to meet the labour supply needs of the latter. Thus, the decision to migrate does not simply come about, but is the result of a deliberate policy of inducement" (1987:125–126). In this sense,

while labour migration would usually be classified as "voluntary" in the migration discourse, the patterns in South Africa were not really voluntary in the common sense, being determined by the unavoidable need to earn a cash income, and the absolute necessity of separating breadwinners from their families. Of course many people flouted the law and risked arrest. Between 1916 and 1986, when the pass laws were revoked, there were nearly 18 million recorded arrests or prosecutions of Africans who breached the pass laws and there would have been many millions more instances where people evaded arrest (Maylam 1990). Much of the migration that took place before the repeal of the pass laws would have been unlawful (Reed 2013).

Circular migration may not be unique to South Africa (Potts 2011) but it is unique to a part of the South African population that has ties to rural land. It is particularly relevant to the African group which, while it has been historically discriminated against, dispossessed of land and relocated, in a sense has options that are not available to others. The homeland system entrenched the possibility of dual housing, making it feasible for many of the poorest families to have access to a town house and a country house – creating options and the possibility of choice and of oscillation. The National Housing Subsidy Scheme, with its focus on delivery of low-cost urban housing, was able to provide the town house. Keeping the homelands as scattered villages under communal tenure meant that rural property rights could be transferred down generations. Plots might not be large enough to support subsistence agriculture but, unlike urban low-cost housing developments, they can accommodate the flexibility of families and living arrangements. Increasingly, and possibly at the expense of urban townships, parts of the rural former homelands are becoming places of substantial private housing investment, both as status symbol and as investment for retirement (Bank 2015).

Circular migration commonly occurs in places where labour market conditions are insecure, and where there is a rural base (Todes et al. 2010). In South Africa, a home of origin on rural land represents a "sense of security, identity and history … and a preferred place for retirement" (Posel 2004:286). Jill Williams et al. also argue that labour migrants need circular migration and dual housing arrangements as a matter of security: "The uncertainty of entry into the formal urban labor market and the ever growing competition within the informal sector (as South African cities become nodes of internal and international migration), creates an imperative for migrants to maintain significant linkages to rural homes. These act as buffers or safety nets in times of economic or health related crises" (Williams et al. 2011: no page numbers provided). Despite the lifting of apartheid laws, it may be that labour market dynamics, urban development backlogs and attachment to the land perpetuate the patterns established under apartheid.

4.2.2   Migration rates

Research on migration and urbanisation in South Africa has been uneven, due partly to the limitations of available data (Posel and Casale 2003; Rogan et al. 2009; Todes et al. 2010). Analyses of migration dynamics have also been inconclusive, and sometimes contradictory. For example, Kok and Collinson (2006) studied migration rates at three intervals, spanning the apartheid era under the pass laws (1975–1980), a time of political transition (1992–1996) and a post-apartheid period (1996–2001), and found that migration rates had been fairly constant, at around 12 per

cent of the population throughout the three periods. However their data were from the population census which, in 1980, excluded the former homeland populations, undermining the comparability of data over time.

Holly Reed (2013) analysed the patterns and determinants of migration among Africans over four adjacent time periods: 1955–1976 (apartheid before the Soweto uprisings), 1976–1985 (until the repeal of the pass laws), 1986–1993 (the lead-up to democracy) and 1994–2000 (post-democracy). Her hypothesis was that, as the labour control systems started to crumble and people had freedom to move, urban migration rates would increase substantially and the probability of family co-migration would also increase. Reed found migration spikes that Kok and Collinson did not identify from census data: using the cross-sectional South African Migration and Health Survey data, she tracked the residence histories of a relatively small sample of 2233 people. She placed the biggest spike in African mobility (both inter- and intra-provincial) in the period following 1976, which also coincides with rising unemployment from the late 1970s and the economic crisis of the 1980s, suggesting that increased migration is not a uniquely post-apartheid phenomenon and that a substantial amount of migration was taking place even in the face of the police crackdowns of the early to mid-1980s. This was not only labour migration. A rise in family migration (as opposed to solo migration) can also be traced back to the 1970s. Family migration rates were higher for women than for men, and this was particularly the case in the post-election period when women were three times more likely than men to migrate with family members (Reed 2013).

The spatial and temporal elements need to be defined up front in any study of migration. One reason for seemingly inconsistent migration rates and trends is that data sources and methods often differ. While Reed's analysis differentiated between inter- and intra-provincial moves, he counted any move away from the place of birth (i.e. a move did not need to be across municipal boundaries to qualify as migration). This approach would be expected to yield higher (and perhaps more variable) migration rates than that of Kok and Collinson (2006), for whom migration was defined as a movement across an electoral boundary. In chapter 5 I follow the approach suggested by Kok et al. (2003:10), which is to define migration as a change in the district of usual residence. They use magisterial (electoral) districts; I will use municipal districts, which are easier to identify from the panel data.

Most of what is known about national migration rates comes from the censuses and the October Household Surveys (OHSs). More recent data have been inadequate to support detailed and nationally generalisable analyses of migration patterns, because migration questions were deprioritised in the national surveys after the OHSs were discontinued – possibly because of expectations that temporary migration would decline (Posel 2006). Another suggestion is that the post-democracy shift away from monitoring migration was a reaction to the apartheid system, which obsessed about scrutinising and controlling population movement (Williams et al. 2011). The establishment of the NIDS panel has provided more recent opportunities for studying the national migration patterns.

While extensive migration analyses were done on the 1996 and 2001 census data, surprisingly little has emanated thus far from 2011, the most recent population census. The only publicly

available migration studies of the 2011 census migration data at the time of writing, three years after the data were released, are an analysis of urbanisation dynamics (Turok and Borel-Saladin 2014), some work on youth migration (Hall et al. 2015) and a report on migration dynamics by the statistical agency itself (Statistics South Africa 2015a). The Stats SA report refers to the definition of internal migration provided by Mostert et al. (1998:168) as

> the movement between various provinces, regions and cities as well as the movement from rural to urban areas and vice versa. Internal migration refers to a process of crossing boundaries but within the country. A person who leaves an administrative area to live in another administrative area within the same country is regarded as an out-migrant in the administrative area of origin and is regarded as an in-migrant in the administrative areas of destination. (Statistics South Africa 2015a:3)

However, for the main analysis, Stats SA defines internal migration very strictly as between provinces, ignoring moves between municipalities. This would result in low migration prevalence rates: most movement in South Africa is intra-district, with a substantial proportion taking place within provinces (Rogan et al. 2009). Inter-provincial moves are only a small part of the picture emerging from other migration analyses, which commonly include rural-to-urban migration and other cross-municipality moves (see, for example, Reed 2013; Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015). Nevertheless the Stats SA report reveals a fairly mobile population across provinces: over a fifth (22%) of the population of 50 million people were lifetime migrants in that their province of residence at the time of the census was different from their province of birth (Statistics South Africa 2015a). Net in-migration rates were highest in Gauteng and the Western Cape, where 45 percent and 29 percent of the respective provincial populations had been born elsewhere. This finding, based on the 2011 census, seems to contradict a previous finding that 70 per cent of population growth in Gauteng was the result of natural growth rather than migration (Cross et al. 2005).

Slightly more recent estimates of migration rates have been produced from studying three waves of NIDS. According to Reinhard Schiel and Murray Leibbrandt (2015), whose analysis is limited to adults of all races aged 16 and over, 6.7 per cent or 3.1 million people had migrated across municipalities over a four- to five-year period from 2008 to 2012. Clearly, both the definition of migration and the time period studied have a huge bearing on the analysis of migration rates.

4.2.3   Gendered migration

The South African migrant labour force stayed largely male throughout the twentieth century. There were times, for example in the first decades, when female migration rates rose, but women migrants were not part of the formally organised migrant labour system and, because of the strict laws preventing the co-residence of wives and dependants with male labour migrants, the absolute numbers of migrant women remained low. In 1936, only 11 per cent of African women were living in the urban areas of what was then the Union of South Africa, the majority remaining linked to rural homesteads where their role as primary producers effectively underwrote male migration (Walker 1990). However, when women did move to towns in the pre-apartheid era, they were more likely than men to become permanent migrants. Possible reasons include that

women may not have derived security and status from their rural homesteads in the same way men did and so were less committed to returning; that women, who in any case bore the burden of household maintenance and reproduction, were not as dependent on others to sustain a remote home when they migrated; that urban migration may have been a way for women to escape the "oppressive social relations" of the rural areas; and, perhaps for this reason, it may have been harder for migrant women to reintegrate themselves into rural society after living in cities (Ibid:188).

Based on her analysis spanning over five decades, Reed (2013) found that solo migration rates were always higher for men than for women from 1955 to 2000, and male migration increased fivefold after the pass laws were repealed, with this rate continuing until 2000. Solo migration rates for women, on the other hand, grew very gradually until 1986 and then stabilised or even declined slightly to 2000. Reed distinguishes between solo migration and family migration (the latter being defined narrowly as a move with "one's immediate family members (spouse and/or children)" (Reed 2013:78), and which Reed interpreted as a proxy for permanent migration). In her analysis, women's solo migration rates did not rise after 1986, but women's family migration rates rose threefold although from a very low base. She concludes that although there were some instances of family migration before the repeal of the pass laws, probably illegally, the ending of apartheid "allowed black families to move together when they previously could not" (Ibid:89).

It is generally accepted that temporary migration rates among adult women of working (and child-bearing) age have risen in recent years, both globally (Williams et al. 2011) and locally (Collinson et al. 2006a; Posel 2004, 2009, 2010; Posel and Casale 2003, 2006; Williams et al. 2011). These interlinked dynamics have particular relevance for children and their care arrangements, especially as the ages when women's migration is most likely to occur are also prime years for child bearing and care.

At a sub-provincial level, women aged 15–25 years appear to be the most mobile group of all. The main categories of migrants (irrespective of temporary or permanent migrant status) are: young women moving alone (whether or not they are mothers); women moving with children; and women with men and children (Collinson et al. 2006a). Since children are potentially involved in all three, we can assume that children are also an aspect of the migrant labour movement – whether they move or are left behind.

By 2012 the rates of male and female migration (defined as any move across a municipal boundary) had equalised so that the movement had become gender neutral (Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015). Women with children are less likely to migrate, although this restraint is moderated when there is a substitute caregiver such as an adult female relative at the home of origin (Posel and Van der Stoep 2008; Van der Stoep 2008). Marriage rates have continued to decline and marital status appears to have no significant impact on migration rates (Posel, Fairburn and Lund 2006; Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015). One study from KwaZulu-Natal found that unmarried individuals were more likely to migrate than those who were married or had previously been married, and this applied both to in- and out-migration (Muhwava et al. 2010).

4.2.4 Migration streams

Although both temporary and permanent migration streams occur in multiple directions, the main net direction is urbanward: from rural areas to towns and cities, and also from smaller towns and cities to the larger metropolitan cities (Reed 2013; Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015). Overall migration rates mask some striking differences, for example in the in- and out-migration rates for certain metropoles, secondary cities and small towns. Comparing geo-spatial data from the 1996 and 2001 censuses, Alison Todes et al. (2010) demonstrate that, overall, small towns and rural municipalities have had net out-migration rates, while larger towns and cities have had net in-migration ones. But there is evidence of migration from metropoles to secondary cities (Collinson et al. 2007), and migration to peri-urban areas has also emerged as an important migration stream (Muhwava et al. 2010). As a result, some secondary cities have grown rapidly. Urbanisation is not just about the growth of metropoles.

Movement also takes place between rural areas. Indeed, it has been argued that rural-to-rural migration is a fairly substantial migration stream (Cross 2001; Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015) and one that has tended to be overlooked or "crowded out" by a focus on urban migration, "perhaps borne out of the assumption that migration would consist of permanent moves to urban areas in the post-apartheid era" (Rogan et al. 2009:10). Inter-rural migration might occur because migrants begin their step migration to cities by first moving from rural areas to small rural towns (Reed 2013), for example, or because return migration is to rural areas, or as part of marriage, household formation or dissolution, or as a result of farm evictions.[15]

A breakdown of migration streams by sending province shows similarities between the Free State, North West, Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal (Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015). Most migrants from these five areas either stay within their province of origin or settle in Gauteng. There are very few migration streams to other provinces. The Eastern Cape is different in that a substantial amount of migration is to the Western Cape, and conversely there is substantial migration (probably return migration) from the Western to the Eastern Cape. Gauteng and North West differ in terms of population size and migration rates, but they are similar in that they are not associated with particular migration streams to other provinces: when people from those two provinces migrate, they either move to somewhere within the same province, or else they move anywhere in the country (Ibid).

A migration corridor is a reciprocal migration stream, with movement in both directions. The three top inter-provincial migration corridors in South Africa are Limpopo ↔ Gauteng; KwaZulu-Natal ↔ Gauteng; and Eastern Cape ↔ Western Cape (Statistics South Africa 2015a). Stats SA reports that, compared with inter-provincial migrants elsewhere, young child migrants and their parents dominate in two streams: Limpopo to Gauteng and the Eastern Cape to Western Cape. The case

---

[15] Most of those evicted from farms in the ten years before and the ten years after democracy ended up living in poor townships, backyard shacks or informal settlements (Wegerif et al. 2005) – so only a small portion of evictee moves would have been inter-rural.

study presented in chapter 6 is an example of a migration corridor between the Eastern and Western Cape.

Schiel and Leibbrandt (2015) compare the sending and receiving locations of migrants who moved across municipal boundaries and find that migration streams tend to keep people in similar types of areas: those who migrate from rural homeland areas tend to end up in other ones; those from farms end up on farms; and most of those from urban areas move to other urban areas. As the next chapter shows, the patterns of migration for children are slightly different, with greater levels of transition from one area type to another.

4.2.5   Correlates of migration and non-migration

The existing literature shows that migration in South Africa is age selective and that it is mainly young adults who move. The rates increase from the age of 18 years and peak among those in their mid- to late-20s, and then decline gradually until the mid-30s and fall rapidly from the age of 40 (Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015; Statistics South Africa 2015a). As these are prime years for child rearing, this age pattern begs the question: what happens to children when adults migrate?

The main factor associated with internal migration in South Africa is economic opportunity: the highest net in-migration rates are towards centres of economic growth. But this does not automatically translate into migration from places with the highest levels of unemployment. Indeed, areas with higher levels of unemployment do not generate higher levels of out-migration (Kok et al. 2003) – possibly indicative of a link between deep poverty and involuntary immobility or lack of capacity to migrate (De Haas 2014). If this is so, then the combination of unemployment and non-migration may be seen as a form of extreme vulnerability, since rural livelihoods cannot be sustained without the contribution of cash income. South Africa has among the highest unemployment rates in the world, and the rural unemployment rate (narrowly defined as those actively seeking work) was an astonishing 38 per cent in 2012 (Ebrahim et al. 2013). The sole form of cash income in the absence of wage labour or remittances is social grants, which are directed only to pensioners, children and the disabled, and are not sufficient to support a household.

In much the same way that unemployment is not necessarily a predictor of migration from areas with high unemployment, areas with lower levels of service infrastructure do not necessarily generate higher levels of migration even though the availability of housing and services has made small towns into migration destinations (Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015; Todes et al. 2010). Education is another factor that can influence both mobility and immobility. It spurs migration in two main ways: people migrate or move their children for better education, and better educated people are more likely to migrate. The corollary then is that poorly educated people are less likely to migrate, possibly because they do not have the resources to move or the skills to secure work at the destination. Again, this suggests that non-migration can be a sign of deprivation, linked to vulnerability or lack of capacity. Another example of this relationship is that migrants come from slightly wealthier households than non-migrants, supporting the notion that "migration is a costly affair undertaken by individuals originating from households that can afford the costs" (Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015:31).

A feature of vulnerability is that it is a perpetual condition that persists while the underlying threats remain. Michael Aliber (2001) outlines two ways where vulnerability contributes to chronic poverty. First, being vulnerable is an aspect of poverty in and of itself, and can lead to feelings of resignation that in turn discourage people from taking steps to escape their present state. He writes, "Resignation is perhaps the most succinct subjective correlate to the notion of chronic poverty: it is the assumption that poverty will endure" (Aliber 2001:22). Second, poor people develop multiple livelihood strategies to mitigate risk. While this may reduce vulnerability to potential future shocks, it also lessens the chances of escaping poverty if it means that people are inhibited from investing in a single, more lucrative, enterprise. These livelihood strategies include what Du Toit and Neves (2009:2) refer to as "informal strategies for social protection", which are dependent on spatially extended networks that support reciprocal exchange. The networks may alleviate poverty, but they can also erode resources and transmit the economic effects of shocks (Ibid:2).[16] While migration (and particularly circular migration) continues to be an important mechanism to maintain rural households, "some [people] are unable to move, and are falling out of these networks" (Todes et al. 2010:332).

Forced removals were a deliberate strategy to relocate African households away from economic centres to rural homelands. It was envisaged that the precarious livelihoods there would ensure a steady supply of labour, and that remittances from wage labour would be just enough to maintain the survival of the remote household. The rural household in return was expected to provide insurance against unemployment (in that it would need to take back migrant members who lost their jobs or could not find work), against retirement, against illness and death. It also had to offer insurance for child care and financial support in the absence of mothers and/or remittances (Posel, Fairburn and Lund 2006). In the face of widespread unemployment, it could be impossible for rural households to meet these obligations.

Large sections of the South African population are increasingly vulnerable and marginalised. Among other things, Du Toit points to de-agrarianisation as central to vulnerability, particularly when the labour market fails to provide alternatives. Crucially, this process is "not part of an 'agrarian transition' from rural to urban, non-farm livelihoods: rather, tens of millions of people find themselves reduced to the status of a 'surplus' population: not only landless, but also unemployed and redundant to the needs of the global economy" (Du Toit 2011:2). Migration is a livelihood strategy (Williams et al. 2011), but it is one available only to those who can afford it. The state old-age pension (valued at R1500 per month in 2016) is disbursed to just over three million people aged 60 and above. Higher rates of labour migration, particularly among prime-aged adults, are reported from households with a pensioner, demonstrating that even this small amount of additional income can support the costs of migration (Ardington et al. 2009). But other factors can offset even this small benefit: for example, rural homesteads might also have to bear the load of supporting unemployed youth who must stay dependent on family at their home of

---

[16] In the case study presented in chapter 6, the financial shock of the death of the migrant son was something that took years to recover from, and the memory of this has led to possible over-investment in funeral policies to prevent such strain in the future.

origin simply because they cannot afford to establish their own households (Klasen and Woolard 2009).

Overall, and consistent with findings from other developing countries, adult migration is found to be skewed towards younger, better educated individuals from relatively wealthy households. Conversely non-migration is biased towards older, less-educated and poorer people. Migration can thus be seen as a marker of human and financial resources that enable geographic mobility and the diversification of livelihood strategies. Non-migration might be a matter of choice, or it could be involuntary due to poverty and other constraints. This distinction is important where children are concerned, particularly when migration events separate children from their mothers. Co-migration can be even more heavily biased towards those with resources, while maternal absence or family "fragmentation" could well arise from and signal household deprivation and, by extension, vulnerable children.

4.2.6   Temporary and permanent migration

Temporary migration is enabled by the continued presence of family members in the sending area. Many of these members left behind are children. Some have argued that "gravitational flows" are starting to replace temporary or circular migration (Bekker 2001; Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015). This refers to processes where additional family members gravitate towards places where migrants live, thus over time eroding the pull of the home of origin and resulting in permanent migration. The literature, however, appears to be mixed on whether this is happening at any scale, and whether, if it did start, it would increase and eventually overtake temporary migration as the main migration trend.[17] Potts (2011) argues that, in Southern Africa at any rate, circular migration is here to stay; and within South Africa there has been some debate as to whether there has in fact been a shift towards permanent migration as was anticipated when apartheid ended.

On the one hand there is some evidence that temporary migration may be declining. A comparison of migrant-sending households in NIDS (2008) and the PSLSD (1993) shows a decrease in nonresident household members and remittances from household members living elsewhere, suggesting a decline in temporary migration (Leibbrandt and Woolard 2009) – although the decline in remittances could also be the result of an expanded social grants system that mainly targets children and pensioners (i.e. many of those left behind), reducing the perceived need for the remote member to remit (Posel and Casale 2003). Similarly, Dori Posel and Colin Marx report a decline in nonresident household members when viewed from sending households, but the perspective from destination households in two informal settlements was quite different: the majority of adults identified themselves as being a member of another household elsewhere, though the probability of attachment there waned as the duration of migration increased (Posel and Marx 2013)

---

[17] The very notion of a "gravity flow" (Williams et al. 2011) is reminiscent of Harris's neoclassical equilibrium theory, where human behaviours are likened to phenomena in the natural world. That theory has been solidly critiqued over the decades.

On the other hand, several studies have found evidence that patterns of circular and temporary migration remain strong in South Africa even though there are no restrictions on permanent migration and settlement in urban areas (Cox et al. 2004; Kok and Collinson 2006; Posel 2006; Posel and Casale 2003). Dori Posel and Daniela Casale (2006), using nationally representative data from the PSLSD, two iterations of the OHS and a 2002 Labour Force Survey, find that labour migration increased between 1993 and 2002. By 2002, 38 per cent of all rural African households had at least one labour migrant, up from 33 per cent in 1993. The surveys are designed to define labour migrants as "individuals who remain members of the household of origin but who are away for a period of time each year to work or look for work" (Ibid:352). This allows for any distance of household move to be counted as migration. Labour migrants, when identified as absent members from the perspective of households in which they spend part of the year, are generally regarded as signifying temporary rather than permanent migration.

An analysis of panel data from a rural surveillance site in the north-east of South Africa for the period 1992–2003 finds that, while movement from village to village was the main form of migration, there was no net change in the population size as the number of in-migrants equalled that of out-migrants – illustrating the circular form of temporary migration. But a small net out-migration was found when comparing permanent migration to and from a primary urban metropolis (Collinson et al. 2007). About two-thirds of migratory moves were identified as temporary (Collinson et al. 2006a). Findings like these have led commentators to conclude: "Despite political and economic changes, migration patterns are essentially a continuation of patterns that pre-date the abolition of apartheid in South Africa" (Kok et al. 2003:xiv. See also Collinson et al. 2007; Collinson et al. 2006b).

Whether temporary or circular migration has declined or persisted and even increased, some definite variations in migration patterns have also emerged (Todes et al. 2010). First, and perhaps because the formal system of migration and labour recruitment no longer exists and mines are no longer major employers, temporary migrants are often involved in insecure and poorly paid work in the informal sector, in domestic employment or security services (Cox et al. 2004) – so, temporary migration could be more insecure and less financially beneficial than it was under the formal migrant labour system. The informal sector contributed nearly 60 per cent of the net increase in jobs between 1995 and 2003 (Casale et al. 2004). Second, and related to this, it is only since the lifting of apartheid laws that women have migrated in substantial numbers (Williams et al. 2011). A rise in migration in South Africa between 1993 and 1999 is largely attributed to the feminisation of the labour force and increasing prevalence of migration among women (Hunter 2006; Posel 2004; Posel and Casale 2003). Overall, more women are migrating to urban centres for work or to look for work while retaining their attachment to a household of origin. In 1993, women made up 29 per cent of all temporary migrant workers from rural areas in South Africa. More recently there has been a narrowing of the (adult) gender differential in migration patterns (Casale and Posel 2006:12). By 2000, women made up 34 per cent of the urban migrant population (Posel and Casale 2003:5), and in 2008 women comprised 37 per cent of African labour migrants (Posel 2009). These migrants were identified from their households of origin, so the count would exclude those who were no longer seen as nonresident household members. This national trend

of women's migration rates increasing is echoed in analyses from the Agincourt surveillance site (Collinson et al. 2006b).

Strangely, South African surveys that provide migration data generally do not ask people whether they have another home or "main" home to which they return. The census, NIDS and other surveys ask about the previous home and record data on where each person lived before. But this merely captures sequential moves, not dual housing arrangements. Simkins recorded this apparent oversight back in the early 1980s when he commented, "Demographic data contains no information about where 'home' is" (Simkins 1981:4). It is thus not possible to get directly reported data from the migrant because surveys do not allow for circular migration to be recorded from the migrant's end, and temporary migrants are generally not available to answer questions at the household of origin.

Where direct (self-reported) measures of temporary migration are not readily available, researchers have found other ways to distinguish temporary and permanent migration, by using data provided by a key respondent in the household of origin (Posel and Marx 2013). In her analysis of the migration data in NIDS, Posel (2009) presents the reasons for the absence of adults who are nonresident household members, comparing frequencies for reasons provided in NIDS and in the PSLSD 15 years earlier. Employment (work or workseeking) declined as the main reason for absence (for 77 per cent of all absent adult members in 1993, but only 59 per cent in 2008), suggesting a decline in temporary labour migration. This coincided with an increase in the proportion of absent adults, who were described simply as "living elsewhere" (from 2 per cent of absent adults in 1993 to 17 per cent in 2008) – which could indicate a shift towards permanence, although the migrant was still regarded as a household member in the household of origin.

Another way to approximate circular migration is to ask how often absent household members return home. Schiel and Leibbrant (2015) found that 46 per cent of all migrants (i.e. nonresident household members as identified from their household of origin) were still considered part of their original households after three waves of NIDS. On average, migrants living elsewhere returned home every eight months. There was considerable variation in intervals of absence, however, depending on the reason for migration. Those who searched for work elsewhere were absent on average for seven months at a time, while those who were working were away for just three months, and those who had migrated for education returned twice a year.

The field definition of a temporary migrant in the Agincourt Health and Socio-Demographic Surveillance System (HDSS) is someone who is considered part of the household but is away for at least six months of the year (Collinson et al. 2006a). This is a strict definition that would not be able to detect the increase in female migration through the 1990s found by Posel and others. Williams et al. (2011) argue that, for migration analyses to be sufficiently gender sensitive, parameters should allow for the minimum duration of absence to be shortened. This, they say, would yield a larger share of female temporary migrants partly because women are likely to return more often than men to fulfil family and household responsibilities, but also because women are more likely than men to be involved in tenuous informal work. Indeed, when these researchers relaxed the requirement to one month of absence from the home, women's migration rates

almost doubled. They also found that women transitioned in and out of temporary migrant status more than men did. A study from the Africa Centre surveillance site in KwaZulu-Natal revealed that, while women and men were equally likely to migrate, men migrated longer distances than women (Muhwava et al. 2010). This may also explain why women return home more often than men.

4.3   Urbanisation

Although not all migration is to cities, much of it is "essentially an urban affair" (International Organisation for Migration 2015:2). In 1950, only 30 per cent of the world's population was urban. By 2014 the share of the global population living in urban areas had increased to over half (54%), and the projected urban population is expected to reach 66 per cent by 2050 – an increase of 2.5 billion urban dwellers between 2014 and 2050. Ninety per cent of this urban population growth is expected to take place in Asia and Africa (United Nations 2015).

4.3.1   Urbanisation rates in South Africa

Within South Africa the rate and process of urbanisation has been debated for many decades and has generally been described as rapid and even exponential: "The rate of black urbanisation, defined as the change from a rural to an urban residential environment, has been … dramatic over the last decade, and will continue to be so. In the words of the Science Committee of the South African President's Council: 'This phenomenon is inevitable and universal'" (Bekker and Humphries 1985:45, citing President's Council 1/1983:33).

Some commentators claim there was a dramatic increase in internal migration to cities during the 1990s, "as if the dam of unrealised migration intentions had been released" (De Jong and Steinmetz 2006). Others have suggested the opposite, that "settlement patterns have been remarkably persistent and movement to cities has not been as rapid as was expected" (Todes et al. 2010:332). These statements may not necessarily be contradictory. First, internal migration may have increased but not all of it was permanent migration, so a sizeable share remained the circular type of migration that had characterised apartheid South Africa. Second, there is a distinction between the growth of the urban population and the rate of urbanisation. In 2010, Todes et al. wrote, "As is occurring internationally … [South African] urbanization rates have declined, and are now lower than they were under apartheid" (2010:332). These analysts are referring to the rate of change, which (as Reed showed) increased before the end of apartheid. The urbanisation rate might decline while the urban population continues to grow. Third, differences of opinion about the actual share of the urban population are understandable considering difficulties in defining what constitutes "urban", and the fluidity of movement between urban and rural areas. I return to this point later.

The urban share of the South African population was calculated at 54 per cent in 1996 (Kok et al. 2003). Ivan Turok (2012) reported that nearly two-thirds (62%) of South Africa's population of 56 million live in urban areas. Although the source of the data is not provided, this is presumably from the 2011 census. The United Nations report "World Urbanisation Prospects" gives the urban

share of the South African population in 2014 as 64 per cent (United Nations 2015:198). The South African Integrated Urban Development Framework gives a similar estimate and suggests rapid urbanisation: almost 63 per cent of South Africa's population lived in urban areas in 2011 (up from 53 per cent in 1994), and the rapid pace of urbanisation in South Africa is expected to continue: by 2030, 71 per cent will be urban, and this is likely to increase to 80 per cent by 2050 (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 2016). But a footnote to this acknowledges: "The Spatial and Temporal Evidence Platform for South Africa … programme estimates an even higher figure at 78% in 2011" (Ibid:15). If this is so, then the projected 2050 figure has almost been reached already. Edgar Pieterse of the African Centre for Cities (pers. comm. 2014), explains that the higher figure is more suitable for planning purposes because it includes people as urban if they live within 60km of an urban node. The conservative definition excludes peri-urban populations, which is probably inappropriate where those living close to urban nodes are dependent on cities for their infrastructural, transport and employment needs, and where the boundaries of cities are constantly spreading.

In a paper that explores the relationship between urbanisation and living conditions in South Africa, Ivan Turok and Jacqueline Borel-Saladin (2014) outline some of the recent urbanisation trends in South Africa:

- The urban population has grown substantially since the 1980s. In the ten years leading up to 2011, the share of the population living in metropolitan areas grew by 26 per cent;

- Urban population growth has been concentrated mainly in the eight metros, which occupy only 2 per cent of the country's land. Sixty per cent of the increase in the country's population between 2001 and 2011 occurred in the metros;

- The metros also show very uneven population growth, with the fastest growing ones being the three Gauteng metros (Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni) and Cape Town; and

- Urban employment rates have more or less kept pace with urban growth. Just under 50 per cent of the working-age metro population was employed in 2011 – in other words, a large employment shortfall, but no worse than it was ten years before and considerably better than the 32 per cent employment rate in the rest of the country. (Turok and Borel-Saladin 2014)

Of course the binary construct of "urban versus rural" is problematic for a range a reasons. First, the distinction between urban and rural implies a clear dichotomy, yet in many cases the boundaries are blurred. Some areas that were established as resettlement areas or subjected to betterment planning in the homelands are as densely populated as urban areas and do not have an agricultural base (Todes et al. 2010). That being so, population density might be more appropriate than a descriptive category for defining "urban". When Stats SA used an alternative definition of urban based on population density, South Africa appeared more urbanised than when descriptive categories were used. Based on an objective measure of population density, the South African population was 69 per cent urban in 2001, compared with an urban share of 58 per cent for the same year when using the enumerator area classification system (Ibid).

Second, and related to this, a binary classification system "urban versus rural" creates a false dichotomy as there is much greater nuance in the spectrum of area types. For many years, Stats SA differentiated areas by a typology that included metro, urban and peri-urban. The definitions and boundaries of these areas were so heavily contested that for five years, from 2005 to 2009, Stats SA did not include any variable to define the type of area in its reports or in the datasets it made publicly available. From 2010 the variable was replaced by a geography-type variable with four categories: urban formal, urban informal, tribal areas and rural formal. This approach was an improvement in that it acknowledged apartheid history by differentiating between rural areas in the former homelands ("tribal areas") and rural areas that were commercial farming areas in the old white South Africa ("rural formal"). It also acknowledged that formal and informal urban areas are completely different from each other in terms of housing, services and other environmental factors.

Third, as regards population, urban and rural areas are interlinked and there is some messiness in the multi-directional population flows and dual (or multi-) household arrangements: patterns of temporary and circular migration mean that there is constant movement between urban areas (both formal and informal) and the rural areas of the former homelands.

The growth of the urban population is partly through natural increase (Todes et al. 2010; Wittenberg and Collinson 2007; Ziehl 2001), but some have argued that South Africa has had a delayed mobility transition as a result of influx control and its lasting effects (Williams et al. 2011) – it has been argued that urbanisation was still (in 2000) largely the result of migration rather than natural growth (Ibid, citing Cross 2000). This overall trend is not true for all urban areas. For example, 70 per cent of population growth in Gauteng between 1996 and 2001 was due to natural increase (Todes et al. 2010).

Analyses based on previous population censuses point to changes in the established patterns of internal migration in South Africa: while circular migration remains a common form of movement, there are signs of more permanent urban migration (Leibbrandt and Woolard 2009; Wittenberg and Collinson 2007; Ziehl 2001). This has not been confirmed by the recent census of 2011, however, and the census is in any case not the best way to determine trends in permanent migration – panel data are a preferable source.

At a national level, the main post-apartheid population growth has been in metropolitan areas, as a result of both in-migration and natural population growth. An analysis of the 1996 population census suggests that around three-quarters of all internal migration nationally was to metropolitan areas, although this migration is not necessarily one-directional or permanent (Kok et al. 2003:35). A more recent analysis of the NIDS panel data finds that the main receiving destinations for adult migrants were metropolitan cities, followed by small towns (Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015).

4.3.2 Informality as a stepping stone to the city

Informal settlements are important transitional spaces for urban migration, since informal housing can be used as an initial point of access to the city for people who cannot obtain their

own land through formal processes (Gilbert and Crankshaw 1999; Lemanski 2009; Marx 2007). The main kinds of informality in urban areas are settlements on demarcated or invaded land, and backyard shacks on existing properties. An advantage of backyard housing over informal settlements is that it is often better located, enabling easier access to services and resources. Informality, particularly in backyards, is commonly associated with single adult migrants or young people in transition after leaving their parental home, yet children are also present. In 2014, 1.5 million people were living in informal backyard shacks. Nearly a third (30%) of this population was made up of children (own calculations from GHS 2014). There are known risks associated with informal settlements – particularly for young children, who are vulnerable to a range of threats associated with crowded conditions, poor or absent water, sanitation and refuse removal services, the use of paraffin stoves and associated risk of fire or poisoning, perpetual problems with drainage and flooding, long distances to reach health facilities and schools, and so on. However, an analysis of household structure in three informal settlements showed that, although there were more single-adult households in informal settlements than in other housing types, nuclear families and single-parent households predominated (Marx 2007).

4.3.3   Urbanisation and chain migration

Migration is now widely viewed as a cumulative and self-perpetuating process, facilitated over time by a network of kin, extended kin, and social networks. Key mechanisms of urban migration include cumulative causation, reliance on migrant networks and informality as stepping stones to the city (Gilbert and Crankshaw 1999; Lemanski 2009; Marx 2007; Massey 1990; Turner 1968). The processes of migration are often unstable, and the transitory places of residence unsafe or unfit for children.

Existing research suggests that urbanisation is enabled by the existence of migrant networks, where knowing a person at the destination is a means for in-migration. Illegal occupation of peri-urban land is related to a shortage of affordable housing within the confines of the city, and the growth of these settlements is enabled by "social catalysts" that have to do with "specific relationships of ownership and control over vacant land" (Beall et al. 2002:132). Connections of people over space mean that migration gains momentum through a process of "cumulative causation" (Collinson et al. 2006a; Kok et al. 2003; Massey 1990; Stark and Levhari 1982). Thus "the propensity to migrate grows over time through expansion and intensification of the migrant network" (Zelinski 1971, cited in Collinson et al. 2006a). This network is described as essential for securing accommodation and accessing land. But dependence on social networks for temporary lodging may discourage the simultaneous migration of children, particularly if the host household is already overcrowded.

As with cumulative causation, chain migration is "the simultaneous or successive migration of individuals or groups from the same origin to the same destination" (Adepoju 2006:29). Acheampong Adepoju argues that this process "has characterised African migration since pre-colonial times … [although] colonial regimes altered the form and nature, and hence the intensity and motivations for such migrations" (Ibid).

The migration stories in chapter 6 suggest a strong process of chain migration within an extended family, as successive members provided the next in-migrants with accommodation when they arrived in the city.

4.4. What do we know about child migration?

Most of the migration trends discussed above are derived from research focused on adults of employment age (typically 15 or 16 to 59 or above) or the population as a whole. There has been very little analysis of child migration specifically, and children are seldom disaggregated from the overall migration statistics. Internationally, and despite efforts to improve data on migration, quantitative surveys have tended to "pay minimal attention to children" (Castaldo et al. 2009:5).

When children do appear in general migration typologies, it is often as residual or absent dependent family members, or as appendages to adults. As Madhavan et al. observe, "despite the recognition that migration is a family decision … there is a notable absence of a focus on children in the migration literature, in which children are assumed to simply follow their parents" (2012:715). For example, a study of migration intentions among adults in South Africa assumed that, if realised, these intentions would "translate into the migration of nearly four million adults *plus their children under 18*" (De Jong and Steinmetz 2006:264, emphasis added), when there were no direct questions about intentions for child co-migration. It is clear from the analysis presented in the next chapter that children do not automatically migrate when adults do.

When children are specified in relation to adult migration patterns, they tend to be considered from the adult's perspective. For example, an analysis of migrants in Soweto found that over half the urban adult migrants had "some of their dependent children living at [their rural] home" (Gilbert and Crankshaw 1999:2380). The corollary is that many rural children have an absent parent living in the city. It is from this adult-centred angle that the children-left-behind literature emerges. This is not solely a South African concept or phenomenon. Indeed, a large literature on children left behind now seems to be coming from China as women move from rural areas to urban or industrial centres to work in factories (see, for example, Jongzhong et al. 2005 – an entire book dedicated to the topic). But South Africa is unique in the extent of parental absence from children's households, even when compared with developing and middle-income countries (Child Trends 2014), and labour migration contributes to this.

4.4.1 Child migration rates

Drawing on the 2011 population census, Stats SA found that between 2 and 3 per cent of children under 15 years were inter-provincial lifetime migrants.

My own analysis of inter-municipal migrants, from the 2011 census, yields a higher share of child migrants than that found by Stats SA because I define migration in terms of municipalities rather than provinces: of young people aged 0–14, 10 per cent had moved municipality in the ten years preceding the census. This equates to 1.5 million child migrants under the age of 15 (Figure 13)

and accounts for 18 per cent of all migrants (in all age groups) over the space of a decade. Migration rates increased rapidly until they peaked at 28 per cent in the 30–34-year age group, and then dropped to a stable rate of about 10 per cent from the age of 50, with the real numbers of migrants declining as the population numbers fell in the older age groups.

Figure 13.   Headcount of cross-municipality migrants, 2001–2011

Allowing for an even smaller level of inter-household movement, Collinson (2009), using data from the Agincourt HDSS, finds that about a fifth of children moved each year – the shifts being temporary or permanent, to a household within or beyond the surveillance site. Madhavan et al. (2012), also using surveillance site data, find that about a third of children under 15 years had moved household at least once over a nine-year period. The findings suggest that children are highly mobile when one considers inter-household mobility. But this is different to migration, which is a move to a different place.

In contrast to the pattern of adult migration, urban areas might feature less strongly as destination areas for children who migrate. An analysis of internal migration to Gauteng Province, using census 2001 and Labour Force Survey data, found striking differences in the shares of children (under the official working age of 15) when comparing the population of Gauteng residents born in the province with those born outside it. Of Gauteng-born residents, two-thirds were working-age adults and nearly a third (31%) were children aged 0–14 years. However, an age breakdown of the in-migrants found that 82 per cent of them were working-age adults (15–64 years) while only 14 per cent were children under 15 years (Oosthuizen and Naidoo 2004:11).

In the rural Hlabisa surveillance site, children with mothers who migrated were 42 times more likely to migrate (Hosegood and Ford 2003) than those whose mothers did not migrate.[18] This supports the idea that an increase in adult female migration is likely to be accompanied by increased child mobility – though not necessarily that children accompany their migrant mothers. Internal migration of children was evident within the study site: 5 per cent of children migrated from one household to another during a single year. Of those who moved from their household, 56 per cent went to one outside the surveillance site (external migration) and so would not be possible to trace, and in most cases (69%) children moved alone or with one or two others rather than with the entire household, suggesting that, where children are involved, migration tends to occur in a phased manner over time (Ibid).

While child in-migration to urban areas lags behind that of adults, trends in the urban–rural distribution of children indicate a gradual process of urbanisation: the share of children living in urban areas increased from 47 per cent in 2002 to 56 per cent in 2014 (Hall and Sambu 2016).

4.4.2 Correlates of child migration

Studies of child migration in South Africa concur that, apart from mobility relating to orphaning and education (which is associated with older children), it is younger children who are most likely to move (Bennett et al. 2015b; Madhavan et al. 2012; Statistics South Africa 2015a). Madhavan et al. suggest that this is because older children can supply labour and so would be more likely to be retained by the original household. The logical extension of the argument is that young children are seen mainly as a burden, and are redundant to the needs of the household. This line of argument seems unduly harsh given that it is not evidence based, as it assumes that the interests of the household rather than the child are the main consideration in decisions about children's mobility. One might equally infer that there is a greater incentive in the case of very young children to ensure that they are placed in a household with the best quality of living environment and where they will receive the best care – and that for many children this may mean moving when their primary caregiver moves (although not necessarily with the caregiver).

It is unclear whether child migration is correlated with the sex of the child. Stats SA finds no significant differences between inter-provincial rates for girls and boys, while Madhavan et al. (2012) find that girls are slightly more likely to move than boys. Bennet et al. (2015a, 2015b) do not report sex ratios for migrant and non-migrant children. Interestingly, Madhavan et al. find that the higher the socio-economic status of the household, the lower the odds of child mobility, although the pattern is not entirely linear. The explanation provided is that "the poorest households are pushed into child mobility" (Madhavan et al. 2012:713). Adult-focused and general migration studies similarly suggest that households with migrants are over-represented among the poorest households (see, for example, Casale and Posel 2006).

---

[18] The Africa Centre Demographic Information System at Hlabisa, KwaZulu-Natal, is a longitudinal study which, since 2000, has collected socio-demographic data on individuals attached to the approximately 11,000 households in the demographic surveillance area.

Having a mother who is a temporary migrant increases the odds of the child moving. Children also face higher odds of moving if their mothers live elsewhere or are deceased, compared with those whose mothers are co-resident (Madhavan et al. 2012). This suggests that children with mothers who are temporary migrants or live elsewhere may be moving to join their mothers. Once again, the panel data analysis in chapter 5 is able to confirm this pattern for many migrant children.

The fact that there are family members who can care for children at a household of origin enables working-age mothers to migrate to cities in search of employment (Casale and Posel 2006). In addition, receipt of the old-age pension in three-generation or skip-generation households is associated with greater numbers of dependent children and higher rates of labour migration among prime-age adults, suggesting that women are more likely to migrate when there is an elderly person at the sending home who can care for and financially support children left behind (Ardington et al. 2009). Madhavan et al. (2012) find that the presence of an elderly woman at the rural home decreases the likelihood of children moving by over 25 per cent when the mother is living elsewhere, and the odds are further reduced if there are prime-age females in the household – although the presence of other women there has little effect on child mobility if the child's mother is co-resident (Madhavan et al. 2012).

4.4.3   Children left behind

"Children left behind" refers to situations where parents migrate, leaving children at the home of origin. Keegan Kautzsky (2009) produced a dissertation on the subject, using cross-sectional data from Agincourt. He found that of parents who had migrated, only 11 per cent included one or more children at their destination households – illustrating the extent of children left behind. By disentangling the range of co-residence options, Kautzsky (2009:58) demonstrated the complexity of care arrangements for the children of adult temporary migrants, as shown in Table 13.

Table 13. Child moves and care arrangements in Agincourt, 2007

Child care arrangement	Female migrants %	Male migrants %
All children remain in the sending household	82.7	87.7
All children move with the migrant	10.1	5.8
All children move somewhere else	1.6	1.9
Some children remain in the household and some move with the migrant	4.0	3.4
Some children move with the migrant and some move elsewhere	0.2	0.2
Some children move elsewhere and some remain in the household	1.4	0.9
Some children remain in the household, some move with the migrant and some move elsewhere	0.0	0.1
TOTAL	100	100

Source: Kautzky 2009 (calculations from Agincourt HDSS).

From this we can see that children were more likely to accompany a migrant mother than a migrant father and that, in total, 14 per cent of migrant mothers took at least one of their children with them when they migrated. A child-centred analysis of the same data did not suggest different mobility patterns for children of either gender or age groups except that, understandably, infants under one year constituted only 2.8 per cent of all children left behind (Kautzky 2009).

Two recent linked studies from the Africa Centre surveillance site at Hlabisa explored family migration and dispersion, with a particular focus on children left behind and children's inclusion in the destination households of migrant parents (Bennett et al. 2015a, 2015b). They find that only 5 per cent of children are included in their migrant parents' households when parents move (2015b), and conclude that "two decades after the restrictions on family migration were lifted, it remains uncommon for children to be included in the destination household of migrant parents" (Bennett et al. 2015a:328). As with the Agincourt study, they find that young children (under five years) are more likely than older children to move from the home of origin to the migrant parents' home.

4.4.4. Placing child mobility in the migration discourse

A comparatively established literature on international migration has paid attention to children in trans-border family migration (see, for example, Escobal and Flores 2009; Evans 2007; Jeffrey 2010; Orellana et al. 2001; Trager 1991). Categories or ordering of children's migration in relation to their families include simultaneous migration (where children move together with the adult migrant/s), chain or staged migration (where children are initially left behind, with the expectation that they will later join the migrant destination household), circular or reverse migration (where children are sent away from the migrant home, or sent back to the place of origin), and autonomous or child-led migration (where the child moves independently, or in advance of other household members) (Massey et al. 1993; Orellana et al. 2001). These ordering principles have informed a framework used in the next chapter on child migration patterns.

The broadening of migration to include social networks is clearly linked to the new economics of labour approach described by Oded Stark and David Levhari (1982), which has parallels in anthropology's "household strategies" approach. An example of the latter is found in Lillian Trager's (1991) rich study of migration and family dependence in the Philippines. The theoretical introduction to her work identifies two dominant perspectives that articulate broadly with rational choice and dependency theory but can also be defined by their level of focus: the micro level (which focuses on individual decision making) in terms of rational choice, and the macro level (focusing on the structural-historical determinants of migration) using dependency theory. To these she adds an intermediate level: the household and social networks. These in turn enable different levels of focus in that social networks "provide a broader category of relationships than does analysis of household alone" but they are similar in "providing access to a middle level of social organisation" (Trager 1991:8). A child-centred lens on migration can help to craft a perspective that encompasses the social systems within and beyond the household, precisely

because children are highly mobile, their care arrangements fluid, and in the case of young children at least, their needs uniquely different from those of adults.

My contribution to the child migration discourse will be to provide, for the first time, a nationally representative analysis of child migration patterns within South Africa. Because I am particularly interested in the interaction between children's migration and that of mothers, I map mothers onto children and compare their migration patterns to reveal the extent of co-migration, and autonomous and sequential migration. While some earlier analyses are constrained by the limitations of retrospective reporting, I am able to measure migration directly by using location data derived from each iteration of a panel survey. I complement the analysis of micro data with qualitative research in the form of a case study that provides a rich account of maternal and child migration histories, demonstrating the complexity of mobility dynamics and living arrangements. I can thus review the nature of the micro data, pointing to the strengths and weaknesses of surveys as sources of data on migration and household arrangements. The quantitative analysis of children's migration is presented in the next chapter, and the case study in chapter 6.

Chapter 5. Child and maternal migration: A panel survey analysis

Given the growing interest in understanding patterns of population mobility and migration in South Africa, detailed studies of migration patterns are surprisingly scarce. In particular, little is known about family migration and the dynamics of child mobility and care in relation to adult migration. The scarcity of migration research on families and households is partly due to the limitations of available household surveys, including the constraints of cross-sectional or region-specific data, with narrowly defined households and poorly defined intra-household relationships.

The existence of nationally representative longitudinal data, provided through four waves of the National Income Dynamics Study, offers a new opportunity to examine child migration through a nationally representative panel. This makes it possible to trace the geographic direction of children's migration; to compare the characteristics of sending and receiving households; and, by linking children to their mothers, to examine the relationship between child and maternal migration, and the implications for maternal co-residence and care arrangements.

This chapter explores the following questions from the perspective of children:

- What are the recent observable patterns of child migration within South Africa?

- What are the characteristics of migrant children and of sending and receiving households?

- How do patterns of child migration relate to patterns of maternal migration, and how are migration events associated with changing maternal co-residence arrangements? And

- Who cares for children when mothers migrate, and how often do children see their nonresident mothers?

The first half of the chapter is about identifying children and mothers and calculating their migration rates. After a short overview of the data I begin with a detailed explanation of how the child panel is set up and how children are linked with their mothers. I then explain the method for measuring migration, estimate the overall child migration rates nationally, and present child migration streams across area types and provinces. I also map maternal co-residence status and migration rates onto children, and distinguish absent and nonresident mothers.

The second half of the chapter deals with the descriptive characteristics of child migrants and non-migrants to see whether the characteristics are similar to correlates found in other migration studies. I then present a typology of child and maternal migration patterns, with a number of permutations including co-migration, sequential migration, return migration and immobility. The chapter ends with a section on care and support for children in the context of maternal migration, which investigates changes in caregiver arrangements for migrant and non-migrant children, and considers the frequency of contact between children and absent mothers, as well as financial support from absent mothers.

5.1   Data limitations and new opportunities with NIDS

There are two main ways in which migration can be studied through surveys. One is through self-reporting, where respondents are asked retrospective questions – for example, about their place of birth and their previous place of residence – and a migration history is constructed retrospectively. The other main way is through panel studies that track individuals over time, so that migration events are recorded in "real time" through repeated iterations of the survey, and the migration history is built up over the life course of each individual in the panel. Most publicly available national surveys, such as those conducted regularly by Stats SA, do not include any migration questions at all. The main sources of data on migration within South Africa have been: a dedicated migration survey conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in 2001–2002 but never repeated (the survey methods and findings are presented in Kok et al. 2006); the population census and inter-census community surveys; panel studies from the demographic surveillance sites at Hlabisa and Agincourt, and another localised panel of children, the Birth-to-Twenty study in Gauteng; and NIDS.

Repeated cross-sectional surveys can be compared over time (for example to monitor trends in poverty levels or living conditions), but there are limits to drawing conclusions about individual and household mobility or the dynamics of migration. NIDS offers solutions to many of the limitations of the other surveys, making it an ideal data source for analysing migration in South Africa.

First, NIDS is nationally representative, and is the only national panel study in South Africa that tracks individuals even if they have moved to different districts or provinces.[19] For research on internal migration this is a distinct advantage over the surveillance site panels: NIDS follows people anywhere in the country whereas the surveillance site studies are limited to the districts they are conducted in – those who move beyond the sites are lost to the panel. NIDS collects migration data in both ways discussed above: it asks retrospective questions about migration and the place of previous residence, and it follows the panel over space and time. A panel study is particularly useful for child-focused research in that, rather than presenting a static picture, it is possible to link individuals over the different waves so that children's progress can be followed across households and places as they grow up and move into adulthood. It is, in theory, possible to map moves to a very small area level as NIDS records the GPS coordinates[20] of all respondents' households in each round, allowing for accurate mapping of spatial migration patterns. The analysis presented in this chapter does not use the GPS data as the sample is not designed to be representative at a small area level. Instead, other spatial variables are used to describe patterns of movement, including municipality, province and geography type.

---

[19] Some regular StatsSA surveys, for example the Quarterly Labour Force Survey, use rotating panels of households, but the panel is linked to a physical sampling point rather than to the individuals living there.
[20] The GPS co-ordinates are not included in the publicly released data. In order to maintain the integrity of the anonymised data, analyses making use of geocoded data can only be undertaken in a secure space at the University of Cape Town.

Second, although NIDS is a panel of individuals rather than of households, it provides household-level information in each wave. If individuals in the panel move into a different household between waves, then household data for the new household are collected and the full individual questionnaire is administered to all the resident members even if they are not part of the panel. This means that the characteristics of both sending and receiving households can be analysed when a member of the panel moves. In this chapter I use some of these data to characterise children's households in wave 1 and wave 4, comparing changes for migrant and non-migrant children.

Third, as described in chapter 3, NIDS uses both broad and narrow definitions of the household. The narrow *de facto* definition is similar to that used by Stats SA in that it counts as resident members only those who physically reside in the household at least four nights a week and who share food and resources. The broad *de jure* definition includes nonresident members, who may live elsewhere for most of the time but are regarded as part of the household and return to stay there for at least 15 days a year. Thus, for example, temporary migrants who return for a few weeks at Christmas can be considered nonresident household members. Data are obtained on the reason for absence of nonresident household members, making it possible to distinguish labour migrants (those who have left the household of origin in order to work or to seek work) from other kinds of migrants (such as those who are away studying, or away in prison or hospital, or vising family elsewhere for a prolonged time). The NIDS household roster records the same basic information about nonresident household members as it does about resident members (including their age and sex, their relationship to the household head, their marital status, highest level of education, and periods of absence from the household). As with other members recorded, this information is supplied by the key respondent in the household. Resident children can be linked to nonresident parents via the person code (PID) in the household roster. Thus, if a child's mother is recorded as a nonresident member it is still possible to obtain basic demographic information about her through the proxy interview. And if a mother is co-resident at wave 1 (i.e. part of the panel) and then migrates, it is possible to determine her status in subsequent waves, including distinguishing whether she is a resident or nonresident member.[21] I interpret nonresident to be an indicator that the mother has retained ties with the household, as she is perceived by the key respondent to be a member.

Fourth, NIDS has a detailed questionnaire for children, which includes information about absent parents so that, even if the biological parents are not part of the household at all, it is still possible to get some demographic information about them including their vital status, age, marital status, their highest level of education, and their occupation. Of course there are likely to be the same reliability limitations as there are for other data provided by proxies, and there are numerous "don't know" responses, but the information is still useful for filling some of the gaps in the parent profiles. The NIDS child questionnaire is administered to "the mother/caregiver of the child or

---

[21] NIDs only follows individuals who were resident household members at wave 1, so movement of nonresident household members cannot be traced If nonresident household members had been included in the panel from the start, then they could have been tracked just as resident members are. This would have added to the logistical challenges of data collection and increased attrition, but would have provided further opportunities for more nuanced longitudinal migration analyses of temporary migrants.

another household member who is knowledgeable about the child" (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 2008). This approach, which is also used in the Demographic and Heath Surveys, is likely to produce more reliable data on children than general household surveys where a single respondent answers questions on behalf of all members of the household. The child questionnaire contains questions related to care: it identifies the main person who takes care of the child, defines their relationship to the child, records the relationship of others who help care for the child, and includes information about financial care by identifying recipients of child grants (which are targeted to the "primary caregiver") as well as recording financial support from absent parents and identifying the person who pays for each child's education and medical costs.[22] A short section at the end of this chapter describes the care arrangements for children, including changes after migration of the child or mother.

NIDS is effectively an expanding panel in that babies born to women in the panel also become part of the panel in their own right and are followed into the future. This provides great opportunities for researching the effects of changes and innovations in the early childhood development sector. The analysis presented here, however, is based on a balanced sample of children (i.e. they were present in wave 1 and still present in wave 4), and so has not made use of the expanding panel. The expanding panel will be useful in future migration research as the findings of this and other research indicate that patterns of child migration are quite different for the very young compared with older children. Age-differentiated analyses *within* the child population could assist in discerning underlying reasons for child migration.

This chapter presents analyses drawn from NIDS panel data. The main focus is to trace children and their mothers over four waves of NIDS, to determine whether they moved, and if so, the direction of their movement.

5.2   Setting up the balanced sample

5.2.1   Data, attrition and weights

Four waves of the NIDS panel were available for this analysis. It was intended that waves of data collection would take place at regular two-year intervals but the real-world challenges of a panel study have meant that the waves were not quite as regular as originally envisaged. Wave 1 was conducted in 2008; wave 2 was conducted in two phases, the first in 2010 and a mop-up in 2011; wave 3 took place in 2012 and wave 4 spanned 2014–2015 (see Chinhema et al. 2016 for more detail on the data collection process and timing). The dates of the surveys are important for this analysis as they determine the ages of children selected into the sub-sample from each wave.

---

[22] While this information is naturally inadequate for any nuanced analysis of child care, it provides a reasonable indication of intra-household relationships and roles in relation to children, which is of particular interest when mothers are absent.

The data are re-released from time to time, as corrections and updates are made. The versions used in this analysis are:

- NIDS_1_v6.0 (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 2016a)
- NIDS_2_v3.0 (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 2016b)
- NIDS_3_v2.0 (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 2016c)
- NIDS_4_v1.0 (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 2016d).

The first wave covered 7300 households and collected information on their 28,226 resident members as well as nearly 2915 nonresident members. Of the 28,226 resident members, 9605 were children under 15 years. Resident members of sampled households who were successfully surveyed in the first wave constituted the baseline panel of continuous sample members (CSMs). CSMs who move out of the originally sampled households are tracked to their new ones provided they are still in the country. This is a particular strength of NIDS for migration analysis, as much of the internal migration in South Africa is across provinces (Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015). Once tracked, migrant CSMs are surveyed, and so are all the members of their new household, who become temporary sample members (TSMs). TSMs are not part of the panel, and are only surveyed in their capacity as co-resident members with CSMs. If households split between waves, with CSMs contained in both households, then effort is made to track both households, and new household identifiers are allocated (Baigrie and Eyal 2014).

A downside of any panel survey is the threat of attrition, particularly as there may be bias in the demographic and other characteristics of panel members who die or cannot be found or refuse to continue their participation in the study. In wave 2 of NIDS, only 79 per cent (21,000) of the successfully interviewed individuals from wave 1 were re-interviewed. This was even after a second phase of wave 2 data collection was undertaken (in 2011) in an attempt to reduce the high non-response rate of the first phase (2010). Attrition rates improved to such an extent in waves 3 and 4 that the overall attrition rate from wave one remained almost constant, as 80 per cent of those interviewed in wave 1 were successfully interviewed in wave 3, and 78 per cent in wave 4 (own calculations from the User Manual – see Chinhema et al. 2016).

A detailed analysis of attrition in wave 2 (Baigrie and Eyal 2014) found that attrition rates among Africans, at 18 per cent, were lower than among other races, and Africans were the only group for whom non-contact was a more common reason for attrition than refusal. In terms of age, the largest share of attrition (but not the highest rate) was among 15–35 year-olds. Given the age distributions of migrants and the fact that non-contact outweighed refusal as the reason for attrition in this age group, it is possible that geographic mobility in the young-adult age group leads to attrition bias – something which would be highly relevant to an analysis of child and maternal migration. The highest attrition rate was for CSMs over 65 years, of whom 44 per cent died between waves 1 and 2. Attrition was also disproportionately high for those in the wealthiest quintile (mostly due to refusal), and those living in the Western Cape and Gauteng. In summary: "attritors are older, more educated, more likely to be male, richer and come from smaller households than non-attritors" (Ibid:50). This is reassuring for the current analysis, as the population of interest consists of children and women of child-bearing age, who are likely to be poorer and less educated than the typical attritor.

Table 14 presents the overall response rates for the child panel. Like the panel as a whole, the rate of successful re-interview for children dips substantially in wave two (mostly because of household-level non-response), and then recovers slightly in waves 3 and 4. This is because, even if members of the panel could not be found or interviewed in one of the waves, there were still attempts to find and interview them in subsequent waves.

Table 14. Response rates and attrition in the child dataset

Interview outcome	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4
CSM – successfully interviewed	9396	7635	7867	8048
CSM – refused / not available	209	156	82	65
CSM – HH level non-response	0	1068	870	459
CSM – moved outside SA	0	8	8	8
"Not tracked in wave 4"				247
TOTAL	9605	8867	8827	8827
Wave 1 panel successful re-interviewed (%)		79%	82%	84%
Attrition from wave 1 (%)		21%	18%	16%

Own calculations from NIDS waves 1 to 4, unweighted. Sample is the full sample of children under 15 years in wave 1.

Households for which there was repeated non-response or refusal over multiple waves were simply recorded as "not tracked" in wave 4. The introduction of this new response category in wave 4 coincides with the recorded decline in household-level non-response (Chinhema et al. 2016). The attrition rate for panel members who were children in wave 1 was just 16 per cent at the end of wave 4 – four percentage points lower (better) than for those who were adults when first interviewed.

The NIDS survey data are made available in separate files that can be merged as needed for analysis. They include household data files (the household-level data and derived household-level variables) and individual data files (the household roster, adult, child and proxy files, and the derived individual-level variables). The analyses presented here draw on data from all of these files, with relevant household-level and adult variables mapped onto children, as the child is the unit of analysis.

A number of different weights are available in the derived files. The two weights used in the analyses that follow are the post-stratified weights and the panel weights. The post-stratified weights are based on the design weights, which take into account the two-stage sampling design (accounting for the probability of including a primary sampling unit (PSU) and of selecting a household within that PSU) and correcting for non-response. They are then calibrated to provincial and gender-race-age group cell totals in the mid-year population estimates so that disaggregated and overall population numbers are representative when weighted (Ibid; Wittenberg 2009). The post-stratified weights have been applied to analyses using cross-sectional data from wave 1.

The panel weights provide some control for attrition by taking into account the probability of observing an original panel member in subsequent waves. The panel weights incorporate the

design weights for each wave, which are also calibrated to the national population. Where the analysis describes changes across waves 1 and 4, the panel weights for wave 4 have been used.

5.2.2   Defining the child panel

Of course the panel is ageing every year, and a substantial number of children from wave 1 would be classified as adults by wave 4. They would no longer be interviewed with the child questionnaire, which is designed to capture information about parental co-residence and vital status, care arrangements and other variables that are important for the child-focused analysis. The child panel analysed in this section consists only of those who were defined as children throughout the four waves (i.e. those who were still under 15 years in wave 4). In order to construct a balanced panel of children who were interviewed in wave one and successfully re-interviewed in wave 4, I have limited the age group at wave 1 to children under eight years.

Most of the analysis that follows is based only on waves 1 and 4, partly because it allows for a simpler before-after design, and partly because, as shown above, the wave 4 response rate is high compared with the previous waves, and therefore provides a larger balanced sample than would be achieved if successful interviews were required in all four waves. The attrition calculation was repeated for children under eight at wave one, and the differences in response rates were even more pronounced: 91 per cent of those originally interviewed were also interviewed in wave 4. It is possible for wave 4 response rates to be higher than previous waves because, as noted above, membership of the panel is permanent and NIDS attempted to re-interview all the original panel members even if they could not be interviewed in one or both of the intervening rounds. If the balanced panel were contingent on individuals being successfully interviewed in all four waves, then the overall response rate at wave 4 would be reduced to 79 per cent.

Table 15 presents an age matrix across waves 1 and 4. Of 7323 African child CSMs in the fourth wave, 3122 had been born into the panel since the first wave. The remaining balanced sample is 4201 CSMs.

Table 15.   Age matrix of CSMs in NIDS Wave 1 and Wave 4

Age in Wave 4 (2014-2015)	Age in Wave 1 (2008)										Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	.	
0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	459	459
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	445	445
2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	428	428
3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	454	454
4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	456	456
5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	452	452
6	119	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	390	509
7	392	98	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38	528
8	34	402	102	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	538
9	-	33	406	104	-	-	-	-	-	-	543
10	-	-	35	398	93	-	-	-	-	-	526
11	-	-	-	39	377	108	-	-	-	-	524
12	-	-	-	-	41	372	76	-	-	-	489
13	-	-	-	-	-	29	345	120	-	-	494
14	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	355	104	-	478
Total	545	533	543	541	511	509	440	475	104	3122	7323

4201 CSMs present in W1 and W4

children born into the panel

Own calculations from NIDS waves 1 & 4, unweighted, based on African children aged 0–14 in wave 4.

In the first wave, 82 of the sampled 4201 children were recorded as being not available or the interview was refused (in reality, this would have applied to the adult respondent or caregiver who was meant to respond on the child's behalf, as children under 15 were not interviewed directly). This left 4119 successfully interviewed CSMs in wave 1. The response rates for wave 4 are presented in Table 16. Overall, 91 per cent of the children originally sampled were successfully re-interviewed.

Table 16.   Response rates wave 1 – wave 4

Age intervals (at wave 1)	Wave 1 Initial panel Successfully interviewed			Wave 4 Successfully re-interviewed			Wave 1 – wave 4 Probability of re-interview		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
0	268	264	532	243	231	474	0.907	0.875	0.891
1–4	1067	1018	2085	968	909	1877	0.907	0.893	0.900
5–8	766	736	1502	710	689	1399	0.927	0.936	0.931
Total	2101	2 018	4119	1921	1 829	3750	0.914	0.906	0.910

Source: Own calculations from NIDS waves 1 & 4, unweighted, based on African children aged 0–8 in Wave 1.

Of the 369 CSMs for whom wave 4 interviews were not conducted, the majority (196) were due to household-level non-response. This could be related to migration of the whole household, or movement of children into new households that could not be found. Another 139 were recorded

as not tracked in wave 4, while 34 refused or were not available. The final balanced sample consists of 3750 children for whom interviews were successfully conducted in wave 1 and again in wave 4. This represents 6.2 million children when weighted using the wave 1 post-stratified weights. The vast majority of these children were also interviewed in either or both of waves 2 and 3. Although this was not a requirement for this analysis, data from the intervening waves were used, where available, to help determine whether children migrated at any point over the four waves.

Despite the low attrition rate (of less than 10 per cent over four waves of the panel) there is still a possibility of non-random attrition from the sample which could bias the results. This would be especially problematic if the variables affecting attrition are correlated with the variables of interest – in this case child mobility, maternal co-residence and care (which is proxied through co-residence arrangements). Logit regressions were used to estimate the likelihood of children attritting between waves 1 and 4, with a particular focus on the residential and vital status of mothers, as this is directly relevant to child mobility and care in relation to maternal migration (Table 17).

Table 17.   Test for attrition bias between waves 1 and 4

Variable	I	II	III
Mother residence status			
Resident household member	0.445	0.310	0.269
Nonresident household member	0.116	0.055	0.329
Absent – lives elsewhere	0.116	0.066	0.110
Unclassified	0.160	0.225	0.253
Child's age		-0.087***	-0.087***
Geography type			
Rural formal (commercial farms)			0.007
Rural traditional authority areas			-0.613***
Urban Informal			-0.094
Province			
Eastern Cape			-0.292
Northern Cape			-1.615***
Free State			-1.287***
KwaZulu-Natal			-0.563*
North West			-0.643*
Gauteng			-0.261
Mpumalanga			-0.777*
Limpopo			-1.539***
Constant	-2.200***	-1.935***	-1.017***

Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
The sample includes all CSMs who were 8 years or younger in wave 1.
The dependent variable equals 1 if the child was not present in wave 4; 0 if present in wave 4.
The omitted categories are:
- Mother's residence status: the child's mother is dead
- Geography type: Child is living in an urban formal area
- Province: Western Cape.

The likelihood of child attrition after wave 1 decreased with increasing age of the child (significant at the 99 per cent level), suggesting that, if attrition were related to movement of the child, then this was more likely to take place in the early years of a child's life. Children living in rural former homelands were less likely to attrite than those living in formal urban areas (significant at the 1 per cent level), and there was some differential attrition across provinces. Importantly, the regressions indicate that the variables of interest (related to mother's vital and co-residence status) do not affect child attrition significantly.

5.2.3   Mapping mothers to children

The absence of biological mothers from children's households presents another challenge for the analysis. Yet it is precisely this phenomenon that needs to be investigated, as maternal absence is known to be relatively common and is likely to be related to migration. Mothers who live apart from their children include both those who live elsewhere and are not part of the child's household (whom I will term "absent"), and those who live elsewhere but are considered to be nonresident members of the child's household (whom I will term "nonresident").

Household membership is determined through the following questions in NIDS wave 1 (and similarly in subsequent waves):

B2   You are a household member if:

(i)   You have lived under this "roof" or within the same compound/homestead/stand **at least 15 days** during the last 12 months OR you arrived here in the last 15 days and this is now your usual residence **and**

(ii)   when you are together you share food from a common source with other household members **and**

(iii)   you contribute to or share in a common resource pool.

This broad definition of household membership includes those who stay in the household for as little as 15 days a year (for example, two weeks over Christmas time). It therefore includes migrants who spend most of their time living elsewhere. Resident versus nonresident household membership is subsequently distinguished through the following question:

B12   Does […] usually reside here at least 4 nights a week?

Those for whom the answer is "yes" are counted as resident household members; those for whom the answer is "no" are nonresident household members.

The co-residence arrangements of parents are determined through the following question on the household roster (the question is identical in respect of biological mothers and fathers):

B11   Is […]'s biological mother listed on this roster? If yes, write the mother's pcode.
(Interviewer: If absent, code 77; if deceased code 44.)

Therefore a nonresident mother would be an adult who is a household member (as recorded in question B2), who does not stay in the household at least four nights a week (B12) but whose pcode (or PID in later waves) is recorded and corresponds to that of a household member on the

roster (B11).[23] An absent mother would not be recorded as a household member at all (B2 and B12) and would have code 77 recorded against the child's name in B11.

It is possible that the resultant distinction between nonresident and absent mothers is not as clearly defined in the real world. There are two main ways in which the categories "absent" and "nonresident" may be ambiguous or overlap. First, an absent member may be regarded as a household member but this cannot be reflected on the questionnaire unless they return every year –which many migrants are not able to do. The requirement that nonresident household members should stay in the household at least 15 days a year is, in a sense, an arbitrary definition linked to an objective measure, necessitated by the fact that the question is almost invariably asked of someone else in the household. In effect, reported return visits are used as a proxy measure of perceived household membership on the part of the absent member who is not available to answer. If they do not return to the household for at least 15 days a year then absent mothers are not eligible to be listed as household members on the roster, even if the householders regard them as part of the household. Migrants might still return occasionally for major events like funerals and other ceremonies even if they do not return every year. They may wish to return every year but be prevented from doing so because of financial constraints. They may still plan to retire or be buried at their home of origin. They may still retain close ties with their household of origin, for example by keeping in contact via mobile phone. They may remit to support children or contribute to large household expenses such as buildings or funeral costs.[24] They may do all these things and yet not qualify to be counted as nonresident members because they do no spend the minimum amount of time in the household each year.

Second, as Posel and Marx (2013) have pointed out, family members at the household of origin might assess the membership or attachment of an absent migrant quite differently from the migrants themselves. Perceived household membership does not necessarily mean that nonresident members see themselves as household members, but unless the migrant member is part of the panel it is virtually impossible to find them and record their perspective on household membership. Even if the migrant is in the panel or identified through some other means, the questionnaire would not allow one to ascertain whether they consider themselves part of the household of origin as it does not ask about dual household membership or the existence of another home.

Thus, despite delineating absent and nonresident family members as separate categories in this chapter, I expect there may be some overlap in the real world, and that some mothers who are defined as absent from the households where their children live may still regard those households as their other home, returning occasionally and staying in touch with family members there. It will

---

[23] In addition to the household roster questions to determine co-residence and identify parents for all household members, the child questionnaire also records the vital status and whereabouts of each child's mother and father. As is usually the case in surveys where some question is asked in two different places, there are some inconsistencies – in this case, between the parental information obtained from the household roster and from the child dataset. A number of imputations were undertaken to arrive at the best possible vital status and co-residence measure for children's mothers, and where available (where they were resident or nonresident members of the child's household) the derived variable "best PID" was used to identify them and match them to the child.

[24] All of these examples are illustrated in the case study (chapter 6) despite the fact that the key informant, the middle-generation mother, would not always qualify as a nonresident household member according to the rules of the NIDS household roster.

be possible to explore this to some extent by comparing patterns of contact with children whose mothers are defined as absent or nonresident. That analysis is presented towards the end of the chapter.

Table 18 below shows the residential status of mothers for the panel of children as reported in wave 1.

Table 18.   Whereabouts of children's mothers in wave 1

Mother's status	n (unweighted)	N (weighted)	Prop.	SE	95% CI
Co-resident	2 765	4 782 000	0.773	0.011	(0.751 – 0.793)
Nonresident	163	224 000	0.036	0.005	(0.028 – 0.047)
Absent	652	932 000	0.151	0.008	(0.135 – 0.168)
Dead	168	249 000	0.040	0.005	(0.032 – 0.051)
Unclassifiable	2	3 000	0.000	0.000	(0.000 – 0.002)
TOTAL	3 750	6 190 000	1		

Source: NIDS wave1, based on African children aged 0–8 in wave 1. Post-stratified design weights used. Weighted population numbers rounded to nearest thousand.

Of the panel of 3750 children, 77 per cent had co-resident mothers when they were interviewed in wave 1. These mothers were also classified as CSMs, became part of the panel and could be tracked over subsequent waves. Four percent had nonresident mothers listed as household members but living elsewhere, and 15 per cent had mothers who were entirely absent. None of these mothers could be tracked over time as they were not CSMs. Another 4 per cent of children were maternally orphaned before the start of the study. Just two children had mothers whose residential status could not be determined because necessary data were missing.

Table 19 shows the residential status of mothers for the same panel of children in wave 4.

Table 19.   Whereabouts of children's mothers in wave 4

Mother's status	n (unweighted)	N (weighted)	Prop.	SE	95% CI
Co-resident	2 429	4 746 000	0.675	0.013	(0.650 – 0.700)
Nonresident	203	366 000	0.052	0.007	(0.040 – 0.067)
Absent	699	1 161 000	0.165	0.009	(0.148 – 0.184)
Dead	407	739 000	0.105	0.007	(0.091 – 0.121)
Unclassifiable	12	17 000	0.002	0.001	(0.001 – 0.005)
TOTAL	3 750	7 028 000	1		

Source: NIDS wave 4, based on African children aged 0–8 in wave 1. Post-stratified design weights used. Weighted population numbers rounded to nearest thousand.

The share of children in the panel who had co-resident mothers declined substantially over the four waves, and only 68 per cent of the children had a co-resident mother by wave 4. This rate of

maternal co-residence is lower than the national average (75 per cent for African children under 15 in wave 4) because very young children are more likely than older children to have co-resident mothers, but children in the balanced panel grow older each year and there were no children younger than 6 years in the panel by wave 4. The main contributor to lower rates of maternal co-residence was orphaning, which rose from 4 per cent in wave 1 to 10 per cent in wave 4. The share of children with absent mothers was fairly stable, at about 16 per cent in wave 4, while nonresident mothers rose by one and a half percentage points to 5 per cent, although this change was not significant.

Mothers who had been resident members of their child's households in wave 1 were also part of the panel, and were followed even if they were later separated from their child by a migration event. For these absent or nonresident mothers, it was still possible to obtain data on their whereabouts and other variables over the subsequent waves by mapping data from their interview onto the child's data. For those who were not co-resident with their children at baseline and were not CSM mothers, there were a number of other possible data sources available. Mothers who were nonresident household members were listed on the household roster and so could be linked to the child via their PID, together with some demographic data recorded for nonresident members. Those mothers who were completely absent at wave 1 and never joined the household did not appear on any household roster or adult questionnaire. Variables about these mothers were derived, for the purposes of this analysis, from reported parent information obtained in respect of the child. The child questionnaire includes a few questions about absent parents, including the frequency of their contact with the child, their education level, and year of birth. The availability of alternative sources of data on mothers considerably reduced missing data about mothers when examining characteristics of migrant and non-migrant children, although it also created the need for some careful imputation when the various sources yielded contradictory data on the same mother.

5.3   Child migration rates and spatial transitions

5.3.1   Child migrants: Methods and prevalence

While wave 1 is limited to retrospective reporting on migration, subsequent waves are able to determine objectively whether there has been a physical move between waves. The wave 2–4 datasets include a derived mobility variable for each individual. The variable, named "w_x_stayer", is derived from data about the dwelling rather than the place or municipal area, and has a value of 1 for those who stayed in the same dwelling, and a value of 0 for those who moved to a different dwelling – even if it was within the same geographic locality. In each of waves 2–4, the variable refers to the individual's status relative to the previous wave only (De Villiers et al. 2013). Thus, for example, it is possible for an individual to be a "mover" in wave 2 (if someone moved between waves 1 and 2) and a "stayer" in wave 3 (if there was no movement between waves 2 and 3).

Just over a third (35%) of all children in the panel moved house or place during the course of the panel. This represents nearly 2.5 million child movers who moved across or within municipalities at least once during the first four waves of NIDS. This is an under-count of the total moves that children would have experienced, as some may have moved multiple times. NIDS is able to establish whether a move has taken place in the two-year period between two adjacent waves,

but this is recorded as a single move even though there may have been more than one move. Twenty-three per cent of children had just one recorded move (i.e. at least one move, but only between two of the waves) while 12 per cent had moved between two or three sets of waves.

The child population is known to be highly mobile in that children may experience sequential moves across households as care arrangements change (see, for example, Collinson et al. 2006b; Ford and Hosegood 2005; Hosegood and Ford 2003; Madhavan et al. 2012). But thus far there has been little information on the spatial mobility of children across place, as opposed to intra-place moves or changing household arrangements.

In order to avoid counting small moves within towns, the remaining analysis focuses on inter-municipality moves. Migration after wave 1 was defined by comparing the 2011 district council codes assigned to the household in which the child lived in each wave (the survey covered 53 different municipal districts, using the 2011 boundaries). A limitation of using the municipal district to define migration is that some municipalities, for example the metropolitan cities, are very large, both in land area and population, and include suburbs, townships, and informal settlements with vastly different socio-economic profiles. The migration headcounts therefore exclude intra-city moves even though they may represent significant shifts in geographic location and in the quality of living environments.

For the child migration analysis a new migration variable was derived that differs from the NIDS-derived variable in two ways: first, it defines migrants as those who moved across municipal boundaries (by comparing the district council codes for each wave); second, it is a single variable applicable to all four waves, and includes those who moved between waves 1 and 4, or any of the intervening waves. Thus, someone who moved across district boundaries between waves 1 and 2, but not between waves 3 and 4 would still be described as a migrant, since they had moved place at some time between waves 1 and 4. All of the 3750 children in the balanced sample were classified in this way, and 501 were defined as migrants. This equates to 14 per cent of the child sample, representing nearly a million child migrants between 2008 and 2014, after applying wave 4 panel weights (Table 20).

Table 20.   Migration status for children (waves 1‑4)

Migration status	n (unweighted)	N (weighted)	Prop.	SE	95% CI
Non-migrant	3 249	6 049 000	0.861	0.010	(0.840 – 0.879)
Migrant	501	979 000	0.139	0.010	(0.121 – 0.160)
TOTAL	3 750	7 028 000	1		

Source: NIDS waves 1–4, based on the balanced panel of African children aged 0–8 in Wave 1. Wave 4 panel weights used. Weighted population numbers rounded to nearest thousand.

This estimate is slightly higher than the census-derived estimate of 10 per cent for a similar age group of children, shown in the previous chapter. The inconsistency could be partly because the time periods are slightly out of sync (the NIDS panel analysis spans the years 2008–2015, while the census analysis, restricted to a similar age cohort, effectively spans the years 2004–2011). It could also be that NIDS loses representativeness over the period. The most likely reason for the difference in estimates, however, is that the census under-estimates child migration rates, as it relies on retrospective reporting over a ten-year period, and the report is from the key household

respondent rather than the child's caregiver. Susan Ziehl (2016) similarly found what seemed to be an under-estimate in census migration rates for Africans (though not specifically for African children) when comparing in-migration rates to the Western Cape from three sources, the comparators[25] having more detailed migration modules. Referring to the reliability of the census data, she concluded that the comparisons "suggest that there is a higher consistency for more aggregate-level measures than for disaggregate measures: provincial level is better than district level, and measuring by race is less reliable than measurements for the total population" (Ziehl 2016:no page numbers provided).

5.3.2 Maternal migrants: Methods and prevalence

Maternal migration status was defined in the same way as for children: mothers of children were classified as migrants if they had moved across municipal boundaries at least once during the course of waves 1–4. It was not possible to complete this exercise for all the children in the sample as not all of them could be matched to mothers, even when it was established that their mothers were alive. The geographic location of the household is stored in the household dataset, which is then linked to each individual in the panel, allowing the researcher to track "place" over time. In order to construct a migration measure for mothers in the same way as for children, there needed to be geographic information on mothers for each wave of the survey – in other words, mothers needed to be CSMs, and co-resident members of the child's household at wave 1.

Of the 3750 children in the balanced sample, 2765 (77%) had co-resident mothers who became CSMs and could be traced. A further 163 had mothers who were nonresident household members. They were not given CSM status, and so could not be traced over the panel. The remaining 822 (19%) had mothers who were absent or dead, and by definition could also not be traced. Although the child questionnaire provides some information about absent parents, it does not record the kind of geographic information that would be needed to determine whether mothers had migrated across municipal boundaries over waves.

In order to reduce missing migration data for mothers who were not CSMs but were present in wave 4, migration status was also inferred from retrospective migration questions in the wave 4 adult questionnaire, for those children whose mothers were present in wave 4. This left 503 children for whom maternal migration status could not be determined. All of these mothers were TSMs (i.e. they were not part of the panel) and most were absent from the child's household in all four waves. Co-residence arrangements for children with missing maternal migration data are summarised below:

---

[25] Results from the 2001 census were compared with those from the Khayelitsha / Mitchells Plain Survey of 2000, which allows comparison with census data at district level, and a study commissioned by the provincial government of the Western Cape and conducted by researchers from the Universities of Cape Town and Stellenbosch in 2001, which provides provincial-level data.

Table 21. Co-residence status of children's mothers whose migration status could not be defined, waves 1 and 4

Wave 1	Wave 4				
	Resident HH member	Nonresident HH member	Absent	Unclassifiable	Total
Resident HH member	0	0	0	1	1
Nonresident HH member	0	0	71	3	74
Absent	53	32	333	8	426
Unclassifiable	0	0	2	0	2
TOTAL	53	32	406	12	503

Source: NIDS Waves 1 & 4, unweighted. Based on the balanced panel of African children aged 0–8 in wave 1 whose mothers were alive but could not be assigned a migration status.

Almost a third (156 out of 503, or 31 per cent) of children whose mothers were alive but could not be classified in terms of migration status may have experienced at least one change in their co-residence status over the four waves: 53 had mothers who had been absent in wave 1 but were resident household members by wave 4; another 32 had mothers whose resident status changed from absent to nonresident, while 71 had mothers whose status changed from nonresident to absent. As discussed above, it is possible that the latter two categories are interchangeable in terms of household reporting, and in terms of the child's experience of maternal absence there may not be a qualitative difference between nonresident and absent mothers. At a conservative minimum, 53 children (or 1.4 per cent of the panel) had mothers for whom migration status could not be determined even though there had been a definite change in maternal co-residence arrangements (from absent to co-resident), which could be related to a migration event of the mother or the child or both. This is an unavoidable limitation of the analysis.

Of the 3750 children in the balanced sample, 488 were defined as having migrant mothers, 2433 had non-migrant mothers, 326 were already maternally orphaned in wave 1 or their mother died between waves 1 and 4, and 503 had mothers whose migrant status could not be defined.

Table 22. Migration status for children's mothers

Mother's migration status	n (unweighted)	N (weighted)	Prop.	SE	95% CI
Non-migrant	2 433	4 794 000	0.682	0.013	(0.656 – 0.708)
Migrant	488	834 000	0.119	0.009	(0.102 – 0.137)
Dead	326	567 000	0.081	0.007	(0.068 – 0.096)
Unclassifiable (TSM / absent / missing)	503	833 000	0.118	0.008	(0.104 – 0.135)
TOTAL	3 750	7 028 000	1		

Source: NIDS Waves 1–4, based on the balanced panel of African children aged 0–8 in wave 1, and their mothers. Wave 4 panel weights used. Weighted population numbers rounded to nearest thousand.

If one excludes those for whom maternal migration status could not be defined, then the maternal migration rate is 17 per cent – slightly but not significantly higher than the child migration rate.

Child migration is clearly correlated with maternal migration and, to a lesser extent, with maternal workseeking behaviour. This is shown with a logit regression (Table 23), which estimates the likelihood of child migration in relation to mother's migration status and employment status. The analysis is restricted to children whose mothers were still alive in wave 4.

Table 23.   Likelihood of child migration by mother migration and employment status

	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P>z	95% CI-	95% CI+
Mother migrated	42.043	0.173	907.100	0	41.705	42.384
Mother's w.1 employment status						
Discouraged workseeker	1.105	0.007	16.560	0	1.092	1.118
Actively seeking work	2.465	0.012	186.990	0	2.442	2.489
Employed	1.454	0.007	75.020	0	1.439	1.468
Child's w.1 age squared	0.991	0.000	-88.370	0	0.991	0.991
Child's w.1 geotype						
Urban areas	2.867	0.012	253.740	0	2.844	2.891
Commercial farms	8.553	0.063	293.040	0	8.431	8.677
Constant	0.028	0.000	-874.56	0	0.028	0.028

Number of observations = 2433

Log pseudolikelihood = -1208646.2

Source: NIDS waves 1–4, based on the balanced panel of African children aged 0–8 in wave 1, and their mothers. Analysis restricted to children whose mothers were alive in wave 4. Integer weights derived from wave 4 panel weights.
Omitted categories: Not economically active and traditional authority areas.

Children whose mothers migrated during the course of the panel were 42 times more likely to migrate than those whose mothers did not migrate, when controlling for maternal employment status, the age of the child and the child's geographic area type in wave 1. Those whose mothers were actively seeking work (the strict definition of unemployment) were two and a half times more likely to migrate than those whose mothers were not economically active.

5.3.3   Geographic migration streams

It is established that adult migration within South Africa, when it is linked to workseeking activities, tends to be towards urban areas, but that return migration, inter-urban and inter-rural migration patterns are also found for adults (Collinson et al. 2006a; Kok et al. 2006; Mafukidze 2006; Posel 2006; Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015). Children might migrate in a variety of directions, and not necessarily the same directions as adults – from urban to rural, from rural to urban, or between rural or urban areas. Stats SA defines a migration stream as "the route taken by migrants from a common area of origin to a single area of destination" (Statistics South Africa 2015a:15). This section explores children's broad migration streams by comparing the incidence and direction of their migration across geotypes and provinces.

The child population in the panel was slightly skewed towards rural areas in wave 1, with 50 per cent living in the rural former homelands, 4 per cent on farms and 46 per cent in urban areas. Child migrants originate from both urban and rural areas, with rural areas contributing slightly more than half (53 per cent of child migrants were rural in wave 1). The destination places for migrant children were also quite evenly split between urban and rural, with net in-migration

slightly skewed towards urban areas (53%). In-migration to commercial farming areas is negligible, at less than 1 per cent. A transition matrix of sending and receiving geotypes (Table 24) shows the high levels of movement of children between geography types, including both urban–rural and rural–urban migration. This suggests multiple migration streams for children, possibly operating in reverse directions.

Table 24. Transition matrix of sending and receiving geotypes for child migrants

Sending destination (2008)	Receiving destination (2014–2015)			
	Urban	Rural former homeland	Rural (farms)	Total
Urban	63.62	36.38	-	100
Rural (trad authority)	46.71	51.64	1.65	100
Rural (farms)	24.21	73.85	1.94	100
TOTAL	53.14	45.96	0.90	100

Source: NIDS Waves 1 & 4, based on the balanced panel of African children aged 0–8 in wave 1 who moved across district municipality boundaries at least once over waves 1–4. Panel weights used.
Note: Only the final (wave 4) destination is recorded here, although there may have been multiple moves between waves.

The multi-directional spatial movement among children is more pronounced than the adult migration patterns reported by Schiel and Leibbrandt (2015) in a similar analysis of cross-municipality migration for the over-15 population. Both the child- and adult-focused analyses find that the modal direction of migration is to areas similar to the sending locations (i.e. urban-to-urban or rural-to-rural). In the adult analysis, however, only 26 per cent of migrants from tribal authority areas had moved to urban areas (compared with 47 per cent of children), while 71 per cent had remained in rural areas under traditional authority. In the adult analysis, 85 per cent of those whose sending areas were urban, ended up in urban areas, while urban-to-rural migration was only 15 per cent. For children, by contrast, over a third (36%) of those who moved from an urban area ended up in a rural area. The multi-directional movement of children may be related to independent movement of children in the context of adult labour migration, where for example children are sent home from urban to rural households, or brought from rural households to join migrant parents in urban areas.

Child migration rates vary slightly by the province of origin. They are highest among children living in Gauteng in wave 1, a fifth of whom had moved municipality by wave 4, and lowest in the Free State and Western Cape, where only 7 per cent of children migrated over the waves. The detailed provincial migration rates are presented in Table 25 below, with standard errors, confidence intervals and unweighted numbers. It should be noted that the unweighted numbers are very small, and the confidence intervals wide.

Table 25. Migration rates by province of sending household

Province (ranked)	Proportion	SE	95% CI-	95%CI+	n (unweighted)
Gauteng	0.2039	0.0338	0.1453	0.2785	59
Limpopo	0.1540	0.0263	0.1091	0.2131	73
Eastern Cape	0.1500	0.0188	0.1167	0.1908	94
North West	0.1138	0.0337	0.0624	0.1988	31
KwaZulu-Natal	0.1137	0.0142	0.0886	0.1448	165
Mpumalanga	0.1016	0.0233	0.0640	0.1576	34
Northern Cape	0.0984	0.0445	0.0391	0.2266	18
Western Cape	0.0710	0.0222	0.0379	0.1292	10
Free State	0.0706	0.0248	0.0348	0.1379	17
South Africa	0.1393	0.0101	0.1207	0.1604	501

Source: NIDS waves 1–4, based on the balanced panel of African children aged 0–8 in wave 1. Panel weights used.

Nearly half (47%) of the cross-municipal moves recorded for children included cross-provincial moves, in that children who had moved district were living in a different province in wave 4 from their province in wave 1. The spatial patterns of child migration are explored further by comparing sending and destination provinces (Table 26).

Table 26. Transition matrix of sending and receiving provinces of child migrants

Sending province (2008)	Receiving province (2014–2015)										Total
	W Cape	E Cape	N Cape	F State	KZ-Natal	N West	Gauteng	Mpuma-langa	Limpopo	Outside RSA	
W Cape	7.8	**81.5**	10.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
E Cape	**26.4**	47.9	-	0.5	8.6	3.4	13.1	-	-	-	100
N Cape	-	19.8	34.0	-	-	16.5	**29.7**	-	-	-	100
F State	-	-	-	51.9	10.0	21.1	17.0	-	-	-	100
KZ-Natal	0.5	7.5	-	0.9	78.9	-	10.8	1.4	-	-	100
N West	-	**20.2**	2.3	-	2.1	42.5	**28.8**	-	-	4.1	100
Gauteng	-	4.8	-	2.7	3.1	6.3	49.7	7.5	**25.9**	-	100
Mpumalanga	-	-	-	2.8	3.4	4.9	**34.3**	46.8	7.8	-	100
Limpopo	-	-	-	-	-	5.2	**33.8**	16.2	44.7	-	100
TOTAL	4.9	13.8	0.6	2.8	18.1	6.3	29.6	8.4	15.3	0.2	100

Source: NIDS waves 1–4, based on the balanced panel of African children aged 0–8 in wave 1 who moved across district municipality boundaries at least once over waves 1–4. Panel weights used.

In all provinces but the Western Cape, a substantial share of child migrants migrated within the province. Over 80 per cent of child migrants from the Western Cape went to the Eastern Cape,

suggesting high rates of urban–rural migration for children who are sent away. The transition matrix shows that a quarter (26%) of children whose sending household was in the Eastern Cape ended up living in the Western Cape, while 48 per cent remained in the Eastern Cape and 13 per cent went to Gauteng. Gauteng had the highest in-migration rate, receiving 30 per cent of all child migrants: 34 per cent of migrants from Mpumalanga and Limpopo, 30 per cent from the Northern Cape, and 29 per cent from North West migrated to Gauteng. KwaZulu-Natal is striking in that the majority of child migrants (79%) remained within the same province. The comparatively high level of internal migration within KwaZulu-Natal was also recorded for adult migrants, based on the same data (Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015). This could be related to the fact that KwaZulu-Natal contains a large rural population (mostly located in the former homeland areas of KwaZulu), as well as a metropolitan city (Durban) and a small city (Pietermaritzburg), both of which attract labour migrants.

5.4   Characteristics of child migrants

This section describes the characteristics of migrant and non-migrant children, with a particular focus on child migration in relation to maternal co-residence and migration. The analysis reveals significant differences between children who migrate and those who do not, echoing results from child-focused analyses based on more localised samples (Bennett et al. 2015b; Madhavan et al. 2012).

5.4.1   Household characteristics

Both sending and receiving households are smaller, on average, for children who migrated after wave 1 than for those who did not migrate (Table 27). Children who did migrate also lived in smaller households in wave 4 than in wave 1, while children who did not migrate did not experience a significant change in household size, on average.

Table 27. Household characteristics of migrant and non-migrant children

	Non-migrant child			Migrant child		
	Mean / %	SE	95% CI	Mean / %	SE	95% CI
Household size (mean)						
Wave 1 (sending HH)*	6.76	0.177	(6.4 – 7.1)	5.77	0.238	(5.3 – 6.2)
Wave 4 (destination HH)*	6.56	0.161	(6.2 – 6.9)	4.79	0.172	(4.5 – 5.1)
Real per capita HH income (mean)						
Wave 1 (sending HH)*	822.33	48.273	(727 – 917)	970.71	164.185	(648 – 1294)
Wave 4 (destination HH)*	1258.77	78.282	(1105 – 1413)	1480.51	136.375	(1212 – 1749)
Housing type W1 (sending household)*						
Formal	62.6	2.5	(57.6 – 67.4)	54.6	4.9	(44.8 – 63.9)
Informal	15.8	1.9	(12.5 – 19.8)	23.3	4.5	(15.6 – 33.4)
Traditional	21.5	2.3	(17.4 – 26.4)	22.1	3.2	(16.5 – 29.1)
Housing type W4 (destination household)*						
Formal	73.7	2.0	(69.6 – 77.5)	67.4	3.3	(60.6 – 73.6)
Informal	12.9	1.7	(10.0 – 16.6)	20.5	2.9	(15.3 – 26.9)
Traditional	13.4	1.7	(10.4 – 17.0)	12.1	3.3	(6.9 – 20.2)

Source: NIDS Waves 1 & 4. Panel weights used. Weighted percentages based on 3750 observations (balanced panel of African children aged 0–8 in Wave 1).
Per capita household income is calculated by dividing household income by household size. Wave 1 income converted to Nov 2014 real values, using the deflators published by NIDS.
* For non-migrant children, the "destination household" in wave 4 is the same as the "sending household" in wave 1.

The mean real per capita household income of sending households from which children migrate is higher than for those with non-migrant children,[26] signalling that migration may be dependent on the resources of sending households to support the costs involved. Research elsewhere has found that receipt of social grants may be a driver of migration among youth. The likelihood of migration among prime-aged adults, for example, increases when they are co-resident with someone who is eligible for an old-age pension (i.e. over 60 years) (Ardington et al. 2013). Mean per capita household income in destination households is also higher for migrant children than for non-migrant children in wave 4, suggesting that migrant children may be better off financially, both before and after migration. Perhaps surprisingly, a comparison of differences in real income across waves 1 and 4 does not indicate that migrant children gained financially, on average, when compared with non-migrant children. Both migrant and non-migrant children experienced substantial increases of over 50 per cent in their mean per capita income over the four waves. Social grants may have been a contributor to this: the reach of the child support grant expanded during the period and social grants, which go mainly to households where children are present, also had slightly above-inflation increases over the period (own calculations using headline CPI for 2008–2014 as published by Stats SA, and grant values as published by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA)).

Following Schiel and Leibbrandt (2015) I map the densities of logged per capita household income at baseline for migrant and non-migrant children (i.e. for those who would and would not have migrated by wave 4).

---

[26] The differences are not always significant as the migrant child group is a fairly small sample and the standard errors are large.

Figure 14. Per capita income for migrant and non-migrant children

The fact the densities are not completely aligned means that the distributions of migrant and non-migrant children's per capita incomes are slightly different. The distribution for migrant children lies to the right of that of non-migrant children, suggesting that migrant children are mostly better off. However, the density line for migrant is above that of the non-migrant line at the lower end of the distribution and dips just below the non-migrant line at the upper end, suggesting that at the extremes migrant children may be slightly worse off. It is therefore not possible to say conclusively that migrant children are better off – echoing analyses by Madhavan et al. (2012) and Bennett et al. (2015a), who also failed to find statistically significant or linear associations between wealth and migrant status. Analysis in a later section of this chapter suggests that child migration might result in the loss of social grant income in the child's destination household, as the child support grant does not always follow the child.[27]

The analysis presented in Table 27 above also compares dwelling types for migrant and non-migrant children. For this purpose, the dwelling type variable in NIDS, which consists of nine categories, is collapsed into three: formal, informal and traditional.[28] Although migrant children come from households that are slightly better resourced in terms of income, differences in dwelling type for migrant and non-migrant children at baseline suggest a higher rate of migration away from informal housing. This could reflect situations where children living in informal areas

---

[27] Although, as shown later, social grant receipt among migrant children increased over the panel, I also show that the recipient of a social grant for a child was more likely to live outside the household, in the case of migrant children.

[28] "Formal housing" includes brick or cement structures on separate stands, and clustered and semi-detached units, flats and apartments; "informal housing" refers to shacks or other self-built structures in backyards, informal settlements or other vacant land – such structures are usually built from materials that are less durable than brick or cement, such as corrugated iron, zinc, wood, plastic or cardboard; "traditional dwellings" are defined as "huts" (i.e. rondavels) or other structures made out of traditional materials (such as mud bricks and thatch). These structures are still quite common in former homeland areas.

or dwellings are sent away to live elsewhere. Both groups (migrants and non-migrants) experienced changes in their dwelling type in that they were more likely to live in formal dwellings and less likely to be in traditional dwellings in wave 4, compared with wave 1. If formal housing can be regarded as an improvement in living conditions, then this benefit was associated with migration as the increase in formal housing among migrant children is greater than among non-migrant children. The fact that the share of non-migrant children living in formal housing has increased significantly may be related to the continued roll-out of low-cost formal housing in cities (where an inter-municipal move would not be counted as a migration) and also to the erection of formal housing in rural areas (Bank 2015). Migrant children were also more likely than non-migrant children to live in informal dwellings in both waves 1 and 4. At a national level, Stats SA similarly found that households headed by a migrant adult were more likely than non-migrant households to live in informal dwellings. In the Western Cape, 30 per cent of migrant households were informal, compared with 17 per cent of non-migrant households (Statistics South Africa 2015a).

Overall then, children who migrate come from smaller households with slightly higher per capita incomes than those who do not migrate, although there is a caveat that there are different patterns at the extremes of the distribution curve. The household characteristics comparing the situation before and after migration suggest that, while non-migrant children have better access to formal housing and migrant children are more likely to live in informal dwellings, child migration is associated with improved access to formal housing.

5.4.2 Individual characteristics

A comparison of the individual baseline characteristics of migrant and non-migrant children (Table 28) shows that children who migrated over the seven-year period were younger than those who did not migrate even when controlling for the fact that the entire cohort aged over the period. This supports recent findings from the Africa Centre surveillance site which showed that younger children were more likely than older children to be included in their parent's destination household (Bennett et al. 2015b).

Table 28. Baseline characteristics of migrant and non-migrant children

	Non-migrant child			Migrant child		
	Mean / %	SE	95% CI	Mean / %	SE	95% CI
Child's age in wave 1						
Mean age of child (within 0–8 band)	3.7	0.06	(3.6 – 3.8)	3.2	0.12	(3.0 – 3.5)
0–3 years	84.0	1.23	(81.4 – 86.2)	16.0	1.23	(13.8 – 18.6)
4–7 years	88.2	1.22	(85.5 – 90.4)	11.8	1.22	(9.6 – 14.5)
Receipt of a social grant for child						
Yes	70.8	1.49	(67.8 – 73.6)	60.2	3.32	(53.5 – 66.5)
No	29.2	1.49	(26.4 – 32.2)	39.8	3.32	(33.5 – 46.5)
Mother's age in wave 1						
Mean age of mother	30.9	0.22	(30.5 – 31.4)	28.7	0.43	(27.8 – 29.5)
Mother residence status in wave 1						
Resident HH member	78.9	1.10	(76.7 – 81.0)	67.5	3.33	(60.6 – 73.7)
Nonresident HH member	3.5	0.47	(2.7 – 4.6)	3.7	1.09	(2.0 – 6.5)
Absent / lives elsewhere	13.3	0.89	(11.7 – 15.2)	25.8	2.91	(20.5 – 31.9)
Deceased	4.2	0.51	(3.3 – -5.3)	3.1	0.97	(1.7 – 5.7)
Mother's education level in wave 1						
None or primary only	23.4	1.60	(20.4 – 26.7)	15.1	2.61	(10.6 – 21.0)
Some secondary	48.5	1.63	(45.3 – 51.7)	53.5	4.27	(45.1 – 61.8)
Matric	26.4	1.50	(23.6 – 29.5)	27.9	3.25	(22.0 – 34.7)
Tertiary	1.7	0.36	(1.2 – 2.6)	3.5	1.22	(1.7 – 6.9)
Mother's employment status in wave 1						
Not economically active	30.2	1.88	(26.6 – 34.0)	26.4	3.89	(19.4 – 34.7)
Unemployed, not looking (discouraged)	11.2	1.05	(9.3 – 13.4)	13.5	3.12	(8.4 – 20.9)
Unemployed, looking for work	24.9	1.97	(21.2 – 28.9)	36.4	4.41	(28.3 – 45.5)
Employed	33.8	1.79	(30.4 – 37.4)	23.8	4.36	(16.2 – 33.4)
Orphan status of child in wave 1						
Non-orphan	88.3	0.98	(86.3 – 90.1)	88.0	2.30	(82.7 – 91.9)
Maternal (mother dead, father alive)	2.1	0.32	(1.6 – 2.9)	2.1	0.87	(0.9 – 4.7)
Paternal (father dead, mother alive)	7.8	0.73	(6.4 – 9.3)	9.3	2.14	(5.9 – 14.5)
Double (both parents dead)	1.7	0.40	(1.1 – 2.7)	0.6	0.32	(0.2 – 1.7)

Source: NIDS wave 1 (baseline characteristics); waves 1–4 (child migrant status). Based on the balanced panel of African children aged 0–8 in wave 1. Panel weights used.

A "non-migrant child" is one who did not migrate over any of the four waves. A "migrant child" migrated at least once over the four waves. Migration is defined as movement across a municipal boundary.

Children who migrated were significantly less likely than non-migrant children to be receiving any child grant (child support, foster child or care dependency grant) at baseline. The same analysis was repeated for wave 4, by which time there was no significant difference in grant receipt when comparing migrant and non-migrant children. There are a number of possible reasons for this. One is that there are proven delays in early enrolment of children onto the child support grant (CSG), which is by far the biggest grant in terms of numeric reach: slow uptake in children under two is one of the greatest concerns in terms of CSG implementation (SASSA and UNICEF 2013). As migrant children are likely to be younger than non-migrant children within the cohort, the migrant

child population could be reflecting the widely known error of exclusion in the CSG. It is also known that children who are not co-resident with their mother might have difficulty in accessing a CSG, either because they do not have birth certificates or because the officials responsible for grant administration are overly strict in their requirements and do not accept a simple affidavit from the child's caregiver claiming responsibility for the child in the absence of the mother. Children who migrate to join their biological mother might have a better chance of being enrolled onto the CSG after migration. Examples of these scenarios were found in the case study (chapter 6), where both of a migrant mother's children were initially unable to access the CSG.

The mothers of migrant children are younger on average[29] than those of non-migrant children. Schiel and Leibbrandt (2015), using the same data for an adult-centred migration analysis, find that migrant adults were younger on the whole than non-migrant adults, although the mean ages were higher (30 and 37 years respectively), presumably because, unlike this analysis, their adult migration rates were not conditional on adults being parents of children under eight years at baseline.

Mothers of migrant children appear to be slightly better educated[30] than those of non-migrant children, although maternal education levels were fairly low generally: only about 30 per cent of children in either category had mothers who had completed high school, and very few had any further education. Migrant children were more likely than non-migrant children to have mothers who had progressed beyond primary school (85 versus 76 per cent). The higher education levels among mothers of migrant children echo a similar finding by Schiel and Leibbrandt (2015), where adult migrants had more years of schooling than non-migrants, and were more likely to have completed high school.

Children's orphan status at baseline was not significantly associated with child migration between waves 1 and 4. Children who were already orphaned in wave 1 may have moved household already if changed care arrangements were required.[31]

Perhaps the most striking finding from this section is that children who migrated during the four waves were more likely to have absent mothers at baseline, compared with non-migrant children. Coupled with the finding that child migration was associated with mothers who were looking for work at baseline, this suggests that child migration could be linked to the workseeking activities of mothers.

---

[29] The ages of children's mothers could be defined for 89 per cent of children in the balanced panel (424 out of 3750 children had mothers whose ages could not be defined, after using best available data from the derived data file, and from the child questionnaire in the case of absent mothers).

[30] The education level of children's mothers could be defined for 92 per cent of children in the balanced panel (291 out of 3750 children had mothers whose education level could not be defined, after using best available data from the derived data file, and from the child questionnaire in the case of absent mothers).

[31] One in five maternally orphaned children had already moved household before wave 1 (using the "mobility" variable derived from retrospective migration questions).

5.4.3 Maternal and child co-mobility

The next part of the analysis explores the distinction between absent and nonresident mothers, and investigates whether children who migrate are more likely than non-migrant children to have lived in a household where their mother was a nonresident member or entirely absent. The hypothesis is that if nonresident mothers, by virtue of their membership status, have stronger ties with the child's household and therefore with the child, then sequential migration (children joining mothers) would be more likely to happen in relation to nonresident than to absent mothers.

In order to explore the relationship between maternal co-residence and child migration I begin by constructing variables to measure change in maternal co-residence status over the four waves. The analysis is based only on children whose mothers were alive throughout waves 1-4. Six categories are distinguished:

- *Children whose mothers were living in the same household in both wave 1 and wave 4.* In the case of non-migrant children, this would probably indicate non-migrant mothers over the period, while in the case of migrant children it would indicate co-migration or, if the parent and child moved at separate times, it was at least in the same direction and within the seven-year period;

- *Children whose mothers were co-resident members in wave 1, but nonresident members of the child's household in wave 4.* For non-migrant children this would indicate maternal migration away from the household, while the mother is still regarded as a member of the household – a possible signal of temporary migration; for migrant children it would indicate independent child migration away from the mother's household to another household where the mother is regarded as a household member even though she is not present (such as her household of origin);

- *Children whose mothers were co-resident in wave 1, but not members of the child's household in wave 4.* For non-migrant children this would indicate maternal migration away from the household; for migrant children it would indicate independent child migration away from the mother's household (in other words, this category is similar to the previous one in that children live separately from their mothers in wave 4);

- *Children whose mothers were nonresident in wave 1 but co-resident in wave 4.* For non-migrant children this would indicate a return migration by the mother to the child's household, while for migrant children it would indicate independent migration of the child from the mother's former household, to which she is still attached, into the mother's new household;

- *Children whose mothers were absent in wave 1 but co-resident in wave 4.* For non-migrant children this would indicate maternal migration into the child's household, while for migrant children it would indicate independent migration of the child into the mother's household; and

- *Children whose mothers were absent or nonresident in both waves 1 and 4.* For non-migrant children this would indicate long-term absence of mothers, irrespective of their household membership status; for migrant children it would indicate migration events undertaken independently of mothers.

The distributions of these categories are strikingly different for migrant and non-migrant children (Table 29):

Table 29. Change in maternal co-residence status for migrant and non-migrant children

Mother's co-residence arrangements	Non-migrant child				Migrant child		
	%	SE	95% CI		%	SE	95% CI
Co-resident in both waves	73.1	1.31	(70.4 – 75.6)		43.3	3.62	(36.3 – 50.5)
Co-resident in W1, nonresident in W4	4.0	0.60	(2.9 – 5.3)		9.7	3.29	(4.9 – 18.4)
Co-resident in W1, absent in W4	6.3	0.61	(5.2 – 7.6)		16.6	2.75	(11.9 – 22.8)
Nonresident in W1, co-resident in W4	1.3	0.31	(0.8 – 2.1)		3.6	1.08	(2.0 – 6.5)
Absent in W1, co-resident in W4	3.2	0.40	(2.5 – 4.1)		17.3	2.49	(12.9 – 22.7)
Absent or nonresident in both waves	12.2	0.92	(10.5 – 14.1)		9.5	1.80	(6.5 – 13.7)

Source: NIDS Waves 1 & 4 (mother & child co-residence status); Waves 1–4 (child migrant status). Based on the balanced panel of African children aged 0–8 in Wave 1 whose mothers were alive in wave 4. Panel weights used.
A "non-migrant child" is one who did not migrate over any of the four waves. A "migrant child" migrated at least once over the four waves. Migration is defined as movement across a municipal boundary.

Most children who migrate (about 57%) do so without their mothers. Children who migrate are more likely to experience a change in co-residence arrangements with their mothers than those who do not migrate, and when children migrate without their mothers then this is more likely to be away from, than towards, the mothers. Only 15 per cent of non-migrant children with living mothers had a change in their mother's co-residence status when comparing wave 4 with wave 1, whereas 47 per cent of children who migrated also had a change in their maternal co-residence arrangements. There is no evidence that migrant children are more likely to join mothers who were identified as nonresident (rather than absent) household members of the child's household at baseline. In other words, sequential migration between children and their mothers is not correlated with the membership status of mothers who live elsewhere: the distinction in maternal membership status in the child's household is not useful for predicting child migration. This could be because, as discussed above, the distinction between absent and nonresident is not as stark in real life as it appears on the survey instrument.

Patterns of changing co-residence arrangements in the context of migration are explored further by comparing the location of the child's receiving household (urban versus rural) for each of the categories. The analysis is presented in Figure 15 below and is based only on children in the panel who migrated across municipal boundaries between waves 1 and 4.

**Figure 15.**   **Urban/rural location of receiving households for child migrants in wave 4, by change in maternal co-residence status over waves 1–4**

Source: NIDS Waves 1 & 4 (mother & child co-residence status); waves 1–4 (child migrant status). Based on African children aged 0–8 in Wave 1 defined as migrants, whose mothers were alive in wave 4. Panel weights used.

Migrant children who were always co-resident with their mothers were more likely to end up in urban areas than rural areas, while those who were always separate from their mothers were more likely to live in rural areas in wave 4. However, the confidence intervals for these statistics overlap. The other distributions suggest a clearer link between the geography of moves and maternal co-residence arrangements. Children whose mothers changed from being co-resident in the household to being nonresident or absent were more likely to be living in rural areas than urban areas in wave 4. These categories can be broadly clustered as migrant children who moved apart from their mothers. Conversely, an urban destination was most likely for children who had lived separately from their mothers in wave 1 (i.e. in households where their mothers were nonresident or absent) but were co-resident with their mothers in wave 4. These are broadly defined as migrant children who united with their mothers.

The most striking and statistically significant contrast in the destination area is among child migrants who went to join their absent mother: 78 per cent of those whose mother's residence status had changed from absent to co-resident ended up in urban areas.

The distributions suggest that migration to (or between) urban areas can serve to facilitate co-residence with mothers. An example of this would be when a child who previously stayed with a grandmother or other relative at the home of origin is sent to live with her migrant mother in the city. In contrast, migration to (or between) rural areas may serve to separate children from mothers. An example of this could be when migrant mothers are unable to manage both work (or workseeking) activities and care responsibilities for young children, and send their children to be cared for at their home of origin.

5.4.4 A typology of migration events

Underlying the child and mother migration dynamics is the fact that migration events do not necessarily coincide: one might move while the other does not. In the context of maternal absence or migration, child immobility or non-migration is equally relevant to children's living arrangements and care. Half of the children who had migrant mothers also migrated over the four waves. For the other half, non-migration could be a deliberate choice, or signal inability to co-migrate, a situation of "involuntary immobility" because the necessary agency, resources or other capabilities are lacking (De Haas 2014). Conversely, of the children who migrated between 2008 and 2014 and who had living mothers, just over half (54%) had mothers who migrated, 28 per cent had non-migrant mothers, and 17 per cent had mothers whose mobility could not be determined because they were absent from the household and out of reach of the survey – which may in itself signify migrancy.

I use the term "migration event" to refer to any situation where a child and/or their mother migrated, irrespective of the mobility of the other. In constructing a typology of child and mother migration, I draw on the child-migrant and mother-migrant variables as well as variables on co-residence arrangements and the mother's vital status. The typology is presented in Table 30, with unweighted and weighted frequencies and percentages.

Table 30. Child & mother migration events between wave 1 and wave 4

	Unweighted n	Weighted N	Prop.	Std. Err.
Co-migration				
Child & mother co-migrated, stayed together	180	377 000	0.053	0.007
Independent child migration				
Child migrated away from mother	103	230 000	0.033	0.006
Child migrated independently: Mother lived elsewhere	47	83 000	0.012	0.002
Maternally orphaned child migrated	60	102 000	0.014	0.003
Sequential migration (to nonresident and absent mothers)				
Child migrated to join nonresident or absent mother	108	182 000	0.026	0.003
Independent mother migration (non-migrant child)				
Mother migrated away from child	338	552 000	0.079	0.007
Mother migrated to join child	159	242 000	0.035	0.004
SUBTOTAL: MIGRATION EVENTS	995	1 768 000	0.253	0.012
Non-migration				
No migration events: Child & mother co-resident	1 982	3 944 000	0.560	0.014
No migration events: Child and mother not co-resident	412	659 000	0.094	0.007
No migration events: Child orphaned at w1 or during panel	347	637 000	0.091	0.007
SUBTOTAL: NO MIGRATION EVENTS	2 741	5 240 000	0.747	0.012
Missing (unclassifiable)	14	20 000	0.003	0.001
TOTAL	3750	7 028 000	1.000	

Source: NIDS Waves 1 & 4 (mother & child co-residence status); Waves 1–4 (child migrant status). Based on all African children aged 0–8 in Wave 1. Panel weights used. Weighted population numbers rounded to nearest thousand.

It is clear that migration events for children take multiple forms and directions. Overall, 25 per cent of children experienced some kind of migration event in relation to their mother during the

course of the four waves of NIDS. These included mother and child co-migration, independent child migration, sequential migration and independent mother migration. When weighted, the numbers equate to just over 7 million children of whom nearly 1.8 million children experienced migration events before their fifteenth birthday – either through their own movement, or that of their mother, or both. A further 75 per cent of children in the panel (5.2 million) did not experience any migration event. This category includes a majority of children who were consistently co-resident with their mother and stayed in the same municipal district, but equal and non-negligible shares were non-migrant children whose mothers were consistently living elsewhere (absent or nonresident household members), and children who never moved and whose mothers had died prior to the first wave or during the panel. A small number of children could not be classified according to this migration typology because there were missing data about mothers.

Adding the categories a different way, the analysis reveals the high percentage of children who migrate independently of mothers (9 per cent or 600,000 children). Nearly a third of this movement (31%) is entirely separate from mothers as the mothers are dead or live elsewhere throughout; another 30 per cent of the migration is to join mothers; even more (39%) is movement away from mothers. When weighted, this last category represents 230,000 children who are sent away to live separately from their mothers. Half a million children have mothers who migrated away from them (children left behind), while 242,000 have mothers who migrated to join them.

As already noted, some families may prefer that children live separately from their mothers. But in a hypothetical situation where all children were to join their mothers, this would mean that 1.5 million or 22 per cent of children would move. In other words, of a cohort of seven million African children under eight years in wave 1, over a fifth are living apart from or were left behind by their mothers by the age of 15, but could be reunited with them if they migrated. Two-thirds of these children (one million) live in the former rural homelands.

The relationship between child–mother migration events and the spatial dimensions of migration become apparent when looking at the final destination type for children (Table 31). Particularly striking is the fact that when children migrated to join mothers who were already living elsewhere, the majority (75%) of their destination households were in urban areas. Conversely, when mothers migrated away from children, the majority (69%) of the children left behind were staying in rural households. Most children (65%) who were sent away from their mothers ended up in rural households, while 66 per cent of non-migrant children whose mothers consistently lived elsewhere remained in rural households.

Table 31. Area-type destination for children who experienced migration events

Migration event:	Urban destination		Rural destination	
	%	95% CI	%	95% CI
Co-migration				
Child & mother co-migrated, stayed together	56	(43.1 – 67.8)	44	(32.2 – 56.9)
Independent child migration				
Child migrated away from mother	35	(21.8 – 52.0)	65	(48.0 – 78.2)
Child migrated independently: Mother lived elsewhere	45	(25.9 – 65.5)	55	(34.5 – 74.1)
Orphaned child migrated	50	(32.5 – 67.4)	50	(32.6 – 67.5)
Sequential migration				
Child migrated to join mother **	75	(62.3 – 84.7)	25	(15.3 – 37.7)
Independent mother migration (non-migrant child)				
Mother migrated away from child **	31	(22.9 – 39.6)	69	(60.4 – 77.1)
Mother migrated to join child **	34	(22.9 – 47.4)	66	(52.6 – 77.1)
Non-migration				
No migration events: Child & mother co-resident	53	(46.3 – 59.7)	47	(40.3 – 53.7)
No migration events: Child and mother not co-resident **	32	(22.8 – 43.0)	68	(57.0 – 77.2)
No migration events: Child orphaned at w1 or during panel	42	(32.1 – 52.2)	58	(47.8 – 67.9)

Source: NIDS Wave 4 (geotype); Waves 1–4 (migration and co-residence status). Based on African children aged 0–8 in wave 1. Panel weights used.
** Significant difference between urban and rural destination.

These results suggest that the direction of maternal migration is primarily to urban areas, and that child migration to join their mothers is associated with urban migration. Conversely, rural areas (which are predominantly the former homelands) remain places of care for children whose mothers live or migrate elsewhere, and there is some return migration of children to rural areas.

It is not possible, using survey data, to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary separation of mothers and children. Possible scenarios for voluntary separation could be when a grandmother or aunt would like a child to live with her for company and assistance. In this scenario, even if the separation is not what the child prefers, it is a deliberate decision of the family. Involuntary separation is when intention or aspiration cannot be realised. An example might be when the mother migrates to seek work and cannot take her child with her because of the cost of migrating, or because she does not have a suitable place to stay, or because there is no available or affordable child care. Even if a mother prefers to have her children living with her, this may have to be deferred because of financial or structural constraints. When a mother moves but the child cannot, this would be a case of the "involuntary immobility" described by De Haas (2014). Examples of this emerge in the case study presented in chapter 6.

This section has shown that a quarter of children experience migration events in relation to their mother before the age of 15, and almost half of these migration events result in a change of co-residence arrangement with their biological mother. This suggests that there are likely to be changes in caregiving arrangements for the child too, and so child care, maternal contact and financial support are the focus of the next section.

5.5   Child care and support

It is widely acknowledged that children, and particularly African children in South Africa, may experience a sequence of different caregivers during their childhood. This may be due to the mobility of the children themselves, or the result of mobility or death of their primary caregivers. I now turn to the question of child care in order to see who cares for children in the absence of biological mothers and what changes in care arrangements take place when migration events occur.

Unlike the regular Stats SA household surveys, which are limited to describing the relationship between household members and the household head, NIDS includes a fairly detailed section on child care arrangements. Person and relationship codes are recorded in respect of each child for the household member who is mainly responsible for the care of the child (NIDS asks: *"Who is the person that is currently responsible for the care of this child?"* and *"Who else helps to care for the child?"*). Relationship codes for additional members who help care for the child are recorded. It is also possible to identify the member who receives a social grant on behalf of the child (this person should, in terms of social assistance regulations, be the *de facto* 'primary caregiver') as well as the member who pays for medical aid if the child has medical insurance. Thus the design caters for the fact that there may be an array of types of "care", and that responsibilities might be shared among several household members. Importantly, one can determine the role of fathers, grandmothers, aunts, siblings, non-relatives and so on where mothers are absent.

This section briefly describes some of the changes in child care arrangements over the four waves of NIDS, comparing what happens for migrant and non-migrant children in the panel. A change in caregiver is not necessarily a bad thing, but it may signify some disruption in the child's life and that of the co-resident household members. The previous section has already established that child migration is often associated with a change in maternal co-residence arrangements. I am interested to see whether migration – itself an upheaval – is also likely to be accompanied by a change in the child's caregiver. If the child moved towards or away from the mother, then who cared for the child when the mother was not there?

5.5.1   Primary and secondary caregivers

The notion of a "primary caregiver" may be an artificial one where child care is a shared function within the household, often with different roles for varying circumstances or from one time to another. Thus one person might make important decisions for a child (for example, the grandmother decides where the child should live or where she should go to school) while someone else (say, the mother) takes responsibility for getting the child to a doctor and paying the bill, and others (perhaps older siblings) keep an eye on the child while the first and second caregivers are busy or at work during the day.

In the NIDS panel of children, 61 per cent had the same person recorded as their primary caregiver in wave 1 and wave 4, while 37 per cent had a different primary caregiver in wave 4, and 1 per cent could not be classified because there was missing information in one or both of the waves. In other words, out of the sample representing seven million children, 2.6 million would have experienced a change in primary caregiver during the course of the panel. Children who migrated were significantly more likely than those who did not migrate to experience a change in caregiver, as shown in Table 32 below.

Table 32. Comparison of primary caregiver over the panel, by non-migrant and migrant children

	Non-migrant			Migrant		
Primary caregiver	N (weighted)	Prop.	95% CI	N (weighted)	Prop.	95% CI
Primary caregiver stayed the same	4 010 000	0.663	(0.636 – 0.689)	346 000	0.353	(0.288 – 0.424)
Primary caregiver changed	2 039 000	0.337	(0.311 – 0.364)	633 000	0.647	(0.576 – 0.712)
	6 049 000			979 000		

Source: NIDS waves 1–4 (migration); NIDS waves 1 & 4 (identity of primary caregiver). Based on African children aged 0–8 in wave 1. Panel weights used.

Two-thirds of non-migrant children retained their wave 1 primary caregiver in wave 4 (this is likely to mean that their primary caregiver was consistent throughout the panel, although there could have been switching in the intervening waves). In contrast, only 35 per cent of migrant children had the same primary caregiver in wave 4 as they did in wave 1, while for 65 per cent the migration was accompanied by a change in caregiver.

In addition to their primary caregiver, many children had secondary caregivers listed, in response to the question, *"Who else helps to care for the child?"* Of all the children aged under eight years in wave 1, 22 per cent had just one caregiver – their primary caregiver – while 60 per cent had two caregivers and 18 per cent had three or more. In wave 4, when children in the panel had aged by seven years, the caregiving arrangements were less diversified than for younger children: now half the children (51%) had just one caregiver listed, while 42 per cent had two and 8 per cent had three or more caregivers. There was no significant difference in the number of caregivers assigned to migrant and non-migrant children.

The vast majority (91%) of children who had their mother co-resident in wave 1 also had "parent" listed as their primary caregiver. In most cases, this would mean that their mother is their primary caregiver. Seven per cent of children with a co-resident mother had their grandparent recorded as the primary caregiver, suggesting that grandparents (most likely grandmothers) may still take primary responsibility for rearing children even when the mother is in the household. NIDS also makes it possible to determine who assumes primary responsibility for children in the absence of mothers. Children whose mothers were not co-resident were overwhelmingly cared for by other family members: 70 per cent of them by grandparents, another 17 per cent by aunts and uncles, and most of the rest by other family members or foster parents. Only 1 per cent were recorded as being in the care of someone who was not a family member. These findings echo evidence from elsewhere that extended families assume responsibility for children when mothers are absent, and that grandparents (particularly grandmothers) carry a large burden of child care (Amoateng and Richter 2007; Hill et al. 2008; Madhavan and Schatz 2007; Schatz et al. 2011).

Of particular relevance to this study is the question of how caregiving arrangements change when children experience migration events. Given the care arrangements outlined above it is fair to assume that when the mother and child co-migrate then the mother is the primary caregiver. In the analysis below (Table 33) two different outcomes of child-and-mother migration events are examined: the first is where the child and mother lived together at baseline but a migration event led to their separation; the second is where the child and mother lived apart at baseline and a migration event led to their unification. In both cases, the sample is restricted to children whose

mothers were still alive in wave 4, and who experienced a migration event that changed their maternal co-residence status.

Table 33. Relationship of primary caregiver to child in waves 1 & 4, by effect of migration event on changing mother–child co-residence

	N (weighted)	Wave 1		Wave 4	
		%	95% CI	%	95% CI
Migration event <u>separates</u> previously co-resident mother and child	884 000				
Primary caregiver is… biological parent		83	(78.4 – 87.4)	24	(18.1 – 32.2)
… step / foster / adoptive parent		0	(0.0 – 0.6)	0	(0.1 – 0.9)
… grandparent / great-grandparent		14	(9.9 – 18.3)	53	(45.9 – 59.5)
… aunt / uncle		2	(1.0 – 4.0)	15	(11.2 – 19.2)
… sibling / cousin / other family		0	(0.1 – 1.8)	7	(4.3 – 11.4)
… non-family		0	(0.1 – 1.9)	1	(0.2 – 2.8)
Migration event <u>reunites</u> previously separated mother and child	424 000				
Primary caregiver is… biological parent		12	(7.2 – 19.4)	91	(83.9 – 95.4)
… step / foster / adoptive parent		1	(0.4 – 5.4)	0	(0.0 – 1.6)
… grandparent / great-grandparent		60	(50.5 – 68.3)	8	(3.6 – 15.1)
… aunt / uncle		19	(12.9 – 28.0)	1	(0.1 – 3.8)
… sibling / cousin / other family		4	(1.9 – 10.1)	0	(0.0 – 0.0)
… non-family		3	(0.9 – 9.4)	0	(0.1 – 2.5)

Source: NIDS waves 1–4 (migration); NIDS waves 1 & 4 (co-residence & caregiver relationship). Panel weights used.
Based on African children aged 0–8 in wave 1 whose mothers were still alive in wave 4 and for whom a migration event resulted in a changed co-residence arrangement.

In each of the scenarios presented above, children experience significantly different care arrangements in waves 1 and 4 (i.e. before and after the migration event). This is to be expected, as the mother is usually the main caregiver when she lives together with the child, and by definition cannot be the main caregiver when she is not co-resident. Once again, the central role of families generally, and of grandparents in particular, is demonstrated in the child care arrangements when mothers are absent. When children rejoin their mothers, then mothers assume the primary caregiving role again. These patterns of care arrangements are to be expected, but the implications of migration patterns for child care are now also established in the context of child and maternal migration, using panel data.

Another way of identifying children's primary caregivers is to determine the relationships of grant beneficiaries to the children on behalf of whom social grants are paid. The Social Assistance Act and its regulations are very clear that child grants must be paid to the primary caregiver and that this needs to be confirmed by means of an affidavit (House of Assembly 2004). Provided that the grant has been appropriately targeted and allocated, it will be received by the primary caregiver. Alternatively, if the grant recipient is someone other than the reported primary caregiver, and particularly if the grant is received by someone outside the household, then the grant may have

been mistargeted. The analysis is not possible for all children as not all receive social grants. In wave 1, 69 per cent of all children in the panel received a social grant. In wave 4 grant receipt had increased to 80 per cent of children. For purposes of comparison with reported primary caregivers, the analysis of grant beneficiaries is limited to wave 4, where more children receive grants.

Of the children who received a child grant in wave 4, 13 per cent of grant beneficiaries were not listed as household members at all. This situation would be regarded by the grant implementers as a targeting error, or even fraud, but given the mobility of children and caregivers the reality is that grants might be paid to mothers or other caregivers who were co-resident with children at the time of application but have since moved away from the child's household or sent the child to live elsewhere.

Four out of five children who received a grant (80%) had the same relationship with the grant beneficiary as they did with their primary caregiver, suggesting that this was the same person. Notably, for children whose mothers were co-resident, almost all the child grants (93%) were paid to the mother; only 4 per cent were paid to another household member. Among those whose mothers were nonresident household members, a smaller majority of grants (62%) were paid to the mother while 23 per cent were paid to someone else in the household and 15 per cent to someone who was absent from the household. Among children whose mothers were absent, by contrast, over half the child grants were paid to someone who was not a household member – possibly the absent mother. The results suggest that caregivers are generally well defined in the NIDS survey despite the inherent problems with pinpointing main or primary caregivers for children. This also suggests that, even when mothers are nonresident members or entirely absent from children's households, the majority of child grants are paid to them. This situation, though technically unlawful, probably makes sense in contexts where children and their mothers are mobile.

When comparing grant beneficiaries for children who had experienced migration events versus those who had not, there are some striking and significant differences, presented in Table 34:

Table 34.   Child grant beneficiaries, comparing children who did and did not experience migration events

Child grant is paid to…	No migration events		One or more migration events	
	%	95% CI	%	95% CI
… mother, who is a household member (resident / nonresident)	72	(69.1 – 74.7)	55	(50.1 – 59.8)
… someone else, who is a household member	18	(15.8 – 20.4)	19	(16.1 – 23.3)
… someone who is not part of the household (could be mother)	10	(8.4 – 12.0)	26	(21.4 – 30.2)

Source: NIDS wave 4 (child grant beneficiaries); NIDS waves 1–4 (migration events). Based on African children aged 0–8 in wave 1 who received a child grant in wave 4. Panel weights used.

Children who had experienced migration events were significantly less likely than those for whom there had been no migration events to have their grants paid to a mother who was a household member, again suggesting that the net effect of child migration is away from the mother. Children who had experienced migration events were also significantly more likely to have their grants paid to someone outside the household – who could be an absent mother. Examples of this would

include instances where the mother had applied for and received a child grant but then moved away or sent the child to be cared for elsewhere, without transferring the grant to a beneficiary based in the household. The fact that a quarter of migrant children's grants were being paid to someone who was not co-resident suggests that their migration could also be associated with the loss of grant income, unless the beneficiary regularly remits the full value of the grant to a co-resident caregiver in the household where the child lives.

5.5.2 Contact with nonresident and absent mothers

Earlier comparisons between children of nonresident and absent mothers found that child migration to join mothers was not correlated with the household membership status of the mothers (prior to child migration). Table 35 provides a further comparison between nonresident and absent mothers, using questions about frequency of contact between children and mothers who are alive but not living in the household.

Table 35. Contact with nonresident and absent mothers

	N (weighted)	Wave 1		Wave 4	
		%	95% CI	%	95% CI
Mother is nonresident HH member	225 000				
Child sees mother…					
… daily or a few times a week		12	(6.1 – 22.5)	16	(9.2 – 25.8)
… monthly or a few times a year		86	(76.2 – 92.3)	81	(71.2 – 88.3)
… never		2	(0.5 – 7.1)	3	(1.0 – 8.9)
Mother is absent from household	932 000				
Child sees mother…					
… daily or a few times a week		23	(17.2 – 29.5)	16	(12.9 – 20.8)
… monthly or a few times a year		70	(63.8 – 75.8)	76	(71.2 – 79.8)
… never		7	(4.8 – 10.5)	8	(5.5 – 10.9)

Source: NIDS waves 1–4 (migration); NIDS waves 1 & 4 (co-residence & caregiver relationship). Based on African children aged 0–8 in Wave 1 whose mothers were still alive in wave 4 and for whom a migration event resulted in a changed co-residence arrangement. Panel weights used.

Very few children whose mothers are alive but not co-resident are completely out of contact with their mothers: in wave 1 only 2 per cent of children with nonresident mothers and 7 per cent with absent mothers never see their mother. In wave 4 the respective percentages are similar, at 3 and 8 per cent. The differences between the categories are not statistically significant.

Somewhat surprisingly, a substantial share of children without co-resident mothers still see their mother every day or a few times a week (12 per cent of children with nonresident mothers and 23 per cent of children with absent mothers in wave 1 – again, the difference is not significant; and by the fourth wave 16 per cent of children with nonresident or absent mothers see their mother daily or at least every week). The frequency of contact suggests that, even though the mother does not live in the same household, she is commuting on a weekly basis or lives nearby. An example of the latter arises in the case study (chapter 6), where a family divides itself into two shacks in an informal settlement and the children live with their grandmother while their mother

stays in a different shack a short distance away. Although they regard themselves as a household, share resources and eat their main meals together, a household survey or census would have sampled them as separate households.

The most common form of contact for children whose mothers are not co-resident is to see their mothers fairly seldom – monthly or annually. Most of these children are based in rural households. It is not possible to determine whether children travel to see their mothers or mothers travel to see their children.

In summary, children with absent mothers are more likely than children with nonresident mothers to not see their mothers ever during the year, but they are as likely, or more likely, to see their mothers regularly (although neither of these differences is significant). Again, this suggests that the distinction between absent and nonresident mothers does not have a bearing on the strength of ties between the mother and the child's house, or the frequency of contact between the mother and child.

5.6   Conclusion

5.6.1   Summary and discussion of results

Previous research on child mobility in South Africa has established that children are not necessarily less mobile than adults, but that the timing, distance and direction of their migration may differ from that of adults (see, for example, Hosegood and Ford 2003; Kautzky 2009). This chapter has shown that children are indeed mobile: a third of a cohort of children under 8 years had moved place before turning 15, and 14 per cent migrated across municipal boundaries. The mobility of children has previously been quantified using data from specific regions or surveillance sites, or through analysis of retrospective self-reported movement, but not from nationally representative panel data.

The policy implications related to these findings need to be considered in light of the historic context and structural constraints to population movement and family co-residence. The dynamics of co-residence and mobility among children in relation to mothers suggest the endurance of apartheid-era demographic and migration patterns. Children living without their mothers are concentrated mainly in rural (former homeland) areas, and when they do migrate to join their mothers the movement is likely to be towards urban areas. Conversely, children who consistently have nonresident mothers or are sent away from the mother's household are likely to end up staying in rural areas. In this way, rural households continue to carry a large burden of care for the dependants of those working in, or attempting to join, the labour force. This is precisely the vision that underpinned the establishment of the independent homelands and justified under-resourcing urban areas in terms of housing, education and other social amenities for families with children.

Child migration often occurs over long distances. Half of the cross-municipal moves recorded for children were also cross-provincial, with Gauteng having the largest share of in-migrant children and also the highest out-migration rates. The Eastern Cape was the main destination province for migrant children from the Western Cape. In KwaZulu-Natal, intra-province moves outweighed moves to other provinces.

The multi-directional spatial movement identified among children differs somewhat from adult migration patterns reported elsewhere, where the tendency has been for high rates of intra-area type movement, and an overall predominance of movement towards cities. Children's migration patterns, in contrast, suggest a fairly even split between urban and rural areas as child migration destinations. These differences may be related to the reasons for moving – for example, the quest for employment in the case of adults, and the need for care, education or other services in the case of children. This distinction, and the reasons for it, will require further investigation.

Individual and household characteristics have been presented, providing a comparison between migrant and non-migrant children. Younger children (within the age band of 0–8 at baseline) are more likely to migrate than older children. Other studies have similarly found that migration rates decline with the rising age of the child, and pick up again after the age of 15. The movement of young children could be related to their particular need for continuous care – a function that is often undertaken by family members in the absence of accessible, affordable or adequate child care facilities.

Both sending and destination households for migrant children tend to be slightly smaller and wealthier than those accommodating non-migrant children,[32] although few of the households in this sample could be described as wealthy. The relevance of higher per capita income in out-migration households is that financial resources are needed to support migration.

Mothers of migrant children are slightly better educated than those of non-migrant children, and are also more likely to be actively seeking work at baseline. Children whose mothers were jobseekers were three times as likely to migrate compared with those whose mothers were not looking for work. Yet the order is not clear: it might be that children are sent away to be cared for by someone else, freeing the mother to dedicate herself to the job hunt. Alternatively, if the mother secures a stable job then she might send for her child to join her at her work home, or she might need her child to be cared for elsewhere if formal child care is unavailable or expensive and alternative caregivers are not present. More detailed analysis, including individual analysis of each of the four waves, could help clarify the order of events. If the lack of adequate and affordable child care is a major reason why mothers and children separate, then this is an important motivation for scaling up subsidised early childhood care and educational facilities.

A sizeable share of children do not migrate with their mothers, and mothers do not necessarily migrate with their children. Using a typology of migration events that takes into account both maternal and child migration, the analysis has established that the modal situation for children is no migration events. But child migration is clearly associated with maternal migration: children whose mothers had migrated during the panel were 42 times more likely to move than those whose mothers had not migrated. For those who do experience migration events, a variety of types have been identified, including co-migration of the mother and child, independent child migration, independent maternal migration, and sequential migration where the child moves to join the mother. A quarter of the children had experienced a migration event of some kind. The analysis shows that child migration is associated with changes in maternal co-residence and is

---

[32] Mean per capita household income and household size are related in that total household income is divided by the number of household members to derive per capita income. It will be worth investigating the effect of alternative equivalence scales on per capita income.

more likely to result in separation from a previously co-resident mother than reunification with a previously absent mother.

Nearly 40 per cent of children experienced a change in their primary caregiver over the course of the panel, and changing caregiver arrangements were strongly associated with migration: two-thirds of children who migrated also had a change in caregiver. Changing caregiver arrangements might have been the underlying reason for migration (for example, if the initial caregiver was unable to continue looking after the child and sent the child to be cared for by someone else) or the result of migration (for example, if the child was being cared for by an extended family member but migrated to join her mother). The continued role of extended family in caring for children is demonstrated in the analysis: caregivers are overwhelmingly family members when parents are not available. There can be some continuity in care even when there is a change in the primary caregiver because many children (60 per cent in wave 1 and nearly half in wave 4) have more than one caregiver. Thus a secondary caregiver would be able to provide continuity if the primary one moved away.

The vast majority of children without co-resident mothers see their mother at least occasionally, and nearly a fifth see their mother several times a week or even more frequently. This suggests that many absent or nonresident mothers may live or work nearby, allowing for regular contact. Perhaps surprisingly, a nonresident mother's membership in the child's household is not associated with mothers retaining more contact with their children, or with children being more likely to migrate to join their mothers.

5.6.2   Limitations and further research possibilities

The unit of analysis throughout my research has been the child. A complementary study, from the perspective of mothers, would be a useful counterpoint, particularly for gauging the potential migrant population (i.e. children left behind). This would help urban planners in forecasting the populations they need to cater for, if a principle of human settlement development and the associated amenities is to support the migration of children to join mothers.

With the child as unit of analysis, this chapter has not ventured into the respective migration experiences of children within the same household – for example, the co-migration of siblings. An analysis of this kind would add an important dimension to the study of child migration as it could also reveal choices and preferences about who migrates, possibly revealing greater nuance in phased migration and the life stages associated with child migration.

The thesis is deliberately framed around children and their mothers, and so I have ignored the co-residence and migration status of fathers. Fathers are notoriously absent from children's lives in South Africa, and they are historically the main labour migrants. It might be useful, in another study, to replicate at least some of this analysis in respect of fathers and also examine the interactions between the migration patterns of mothers and fathers, linking these to child mobility and dynamics of care.

Seen against a backdrop of rising female migration, the present analysis paints a picture of divided families, with children separated from mothers, and shifting patterns of care in the context of mobility. Nearly two-thirds of migrant children also experienced a change in caregiver. Whether or not these arrangements are detrimental to children is not the focus here: sequential and shared

care arrangements have long roots that predate colonialism, and grandmothers have historically reared children for a range of reasons, including customary practice and preference.

Quantitative data do not reveal what influences whether mothers or their children migrate alone or together. In the next chapter I present a detailed qualitative case study that begins to explore the complexity and fluidity of child care strategies in the context of maternal migration, and how this influences the migration of children.

Chapter 6.   Lindiwe's story: A family case study

In this chapter I present an account of the life of Lindiwe Jali,[33] a mother, daughter, sister and, during the course of this story, a grandmother – although she is not yet 40 years old. Her home of origin is in what used to be one of the independent homelands, and her childhood years were spent under that regime. Her other home, as a migrant, is a township in Cape Town. The entire family migrated to Cape Town at various times, so there is a clear sequential migration path and the story encompasses other migrants: her mother, her siblings, her children. As the story ends, her daughter is deliberating about her adult migration path and co-residence arrangements with her own child.

Lindiwe's story is a four-generation epic that includes rape, murder, terminal illness, shack fires and other shocks. In writing it I wondered whether it would be critiqued as an anomaly: how can so much bad stuff happen to a single person? But then, when considering the high rates of homicide and of violence against women in South Africa, the prevalence of HIV and inaccessibility of antiretrovirals in the 2000s, the frequency of fire and flooding in informal settlements, I was convinced that none of these are anomalies: they are very common risks. In any event, Lindiwe is a person in her own right and is not intended to be representative of other mothers or migrants. Rather, this is a story that illustrates, through the case of a single family, migration patterns, flows and dynamics. Embedded in the study are the kinds of decisions that are made along the way, but this is not first and foremost a study of decision making. It is a vignette intended to complement the quantitative study of households and mobility, to provide context and texture to the migration patterns observed through the microdata. The case study also highlights the complexities and fluidity of movement and household membership in South Africa, and thereby illustrates the challenges of distinguishing between types of migration in quantitative surveys and analysis.

I interviewed Lindiwe over a period of nearly two years, during which time I also got to know her mother and her children and met other members of her family. Some of the meetings were at her Cape Town home on Saturday mornings, but these were often interrupted as people popped in to say hello or borrow things or just see what was going on. Her neighbours were curious about me, and she justified my visits by describing me to them as a friend from her church. We also took to meeting after she had finished work: I would collect her from her work place and we would go to a coffee shop or a farm stall on the way to her house where we could talk without disturbance, after which I would take her home. We had three visits to the Eastern Cape, her place of origin. The first was our initial meeting. The other two were return trips that we did together – at the end of 2015 and again in December 2016.

For much of the fieldwork, particularly in the Eastern Cape, I worked with a research assistant, Nwabisa Gunguluza. She is trained in anthropology, a fluent Xhosa speaker and a deeply reflective and empathetic interviewer. When we were together, interviews could move seamlessly from English into Xhosa and back again, apparently without Lindiwe even noticing the switch. She would shift to Xhosa particularly when telling stories or relating emotional moments. At intervals

---

[33] All the names have been changed.

Nwabisa would pause the conversation and make sure that I had the gist of what was said, and we could quickly formulate the next question. The interviews were transcribed and translated after each meeting so that I could build up a story and develop an outline of questions for the next interview. When we were in the Eastern Cape interviewing Lindiwe's mother, the conversation was almost entirely in Xhosa, with Nwabisa leading the interview process and pausing every now and then for us to discuss and redirect. The three of us – Lindiwe, Nwabisa and I – had a whatsapp group to arrange meetings and to communicate between meetings. The text history on my mobile phone, short as it is, provides additional data.

The chapter starts with a brief introduction to Lindiwe's two homes, a description of our initial meeting and of the methods and tools used. I then give substantial attention to her rural childhood. This is an important and vivid time which rooted her in the Eastern Cape, when important events occurred that set the course of her life. By the end of the story it seems that a rural childhood might be an important predictor of return intentions, and that conversely an urban childhood could translate into a permanent urban life. The migration accounts start with Lindiwe's mother and then Lindiwe's own migration, followed by a long hiatus before her children join her, one at a time. The descriptions of their urban life highlight the many challenges of the township and their strategies for survival as they configure and reconfigure their household. Plans go awry as unexpected events and setbacks take place, and there is constant strategising and reformulation of plans. Migration intentions come and go – a reminder that much migration (and non-migration) is responsive, determined by constraints, challenges and opportunities, and that long-term intentions are often superseded by short-term necessity. At the end, there appears to be a generational split in perceptions of home: although she feels ambiguous about where home is, Lindiwe's attachment to the rural home lies in the memories laid down in childhood, and in the desire to escape the stressful demands of the city. Her children feel much more urban, and may be the ones who relinquish the rural home.

6.1   Introductions

Lindiwe Jali grew up in a small village south-east of Willowvale, towards the sea. I will call it M village. Situated in the Mbashe district of the Eastern Cape, the area was formerly part of the Transkei, one of the independent homelands created under apartheid and used as a labour reserve for white South Africa. Willowvale is a tiny town with remnants of an old Victorian settlement: crumbling houses with wrap-around stoeps and a derelict hotel. The streets are still lined with willows and gum trees, planted decades ago. Willowvale is the administrative centre for about seventy surrounding villages, and people come there to do their shopping, attend major church services and get transport to the district capital Idutywa (itself a small town with a resident population of 11,000 but always crowded as it serves a much larger surrounding population). There is a police station, a satellite social welfare office and a clinic in Willowvale, and Lindiwe's village is a half-hour drive away.

Spread out over a few hills, the total population of her home village at the time of the 2011 population census was just 1200 people, of whom nearly half were under 15 years. The population pyramid (Figure 16) shows a mass exodus of young adults, particularly men, from the age of 20,

and the ratio of children to adults is much higher than the national average. There are few income-generating opportunities in the area other than small-scale subsistence agriculture and a small amount of private construction work.

**Figure 16.   Population pyramid for Lindiwe's rural home village (M village)**

Figure 17.   Population pyramid for Lindiwe's urban township (Mandela Park)

Own calculations from Census 2011 (100% census, using SuperCross).

166

For most of the year Lindiwe lives in Mandela Park,[34] a mainly informal township in Hout Bay, Cape Town. The population pyramid for Mandela Park is strikingly different from that of her rural village. It shows a bulge in the population aged 20 to 40 years and an under-representation of children relative to the prime-age population. The exception is very young children: the pyramid suggests that many children move away after infancy. Few elderly people live here. Mandela Park is a relatively new residential area, only settled in the mid-1990s, so there is no inter-generational history. Also, given that it is mainly informal, suffers regular shack fires and is severely under-serviced, with about twenty families sharing four toilets and one tap for drinking water, it is not a place where people would want to retire.

Of course the population count provided by the census merely reflects the number of people who were resident at a certain place on census night. The census does not allow the same person to be counted in two different places and does not count nonresident members. Many people regard rural villages as their home, but are nonresident members of rural households who work or study elsewhere and return periodically. Lindiwe is one of those who would have been excluded from the population count of her village, but still thinks of it as her home and she tries to return at least once a year.

She expects to be buried in her home village, although she is not sure whether she would retire there. One of the challenges over the course of my interviews with her was to try to determine whether she would be classified as a "permanent" or "temporary" migrant. Through the research, I realised that these categories are not easily definable; that adult migrants may themselves vacillate between a sense of temporary and permanent status in the city. The hardships of township life, especially repeated shack fires and the loss of possessions that she had worked hard to accumulate, made Lindiwe feel certain that she was only in Cape Town to work and would return to her village at the first opportunity when she was no longer required to be a breadwinner for the family. Later, when we were walking around her rural village at Christmas time, she was less sure.

I had met with a social worker from Mandela Park, to whom I explained the purpose of my study and described the kind of research participant I was looking for. She gave me Lindiwe's phone number after first checking with her that she was willing to meet me. Lindiwe and I were then in contact via phone and whatsapp for many weeks, but struggled to find a time when we could meet in person. We first met face to face in Willowvale over the Easter weekend of 2015. Lindiwe tries to get there for Easter every year as this is the most important festival in her church's calendar, and Willowvale is the headquarters of the Foursquare mission in South Africa.[35] People had travelled from all over the country to be there, and the church was packed. The service, conducted in Xhosa, consisted of readings and preaching, much loud singing accompanied by an electric keyboard and full drum kit, two rounds of the collection baskets after which the money was counted and publicly announced, and individual prayer time when the congregation stood

---

[34] Officially named Imizamo Yethu, Mandela Park is the name used by most residents, including Lindiwe.
[35] The Foursquare Gospel Mission is an evangelical Pentecostal denomination established in the United States in the early 1900s. Its name and teachings are based on the four faces of Jesus in Ezekiel. It explicitly emphasises international missionary work and, according to the website (www.foursquaremissions.org) has established churches in 17 countries across Eastern and Southern Africa, including 87 churches and meeting places in South Africa. The founder of the South African mission is buried at Willowvale. People travel there from all over the country at Easter, and again in September for a 10-day conference.

and prayed aloud simultaneously, many people speaking in tongues. The priests, deacons and musicians were men; the congregation was almost entirely women. Another team of women, including Lindiwe's mother, prepared food in the adjacent hall: over two hundred people needed to be fed.

Nwabisa and I had met Lindiwe here by arrangement. We sat with her through the service and chatted during intervals. We also met her sister, her mother and friends from Cape Town. The day after the Easter service we met at a private house in Willowvale and talked more about the research project. Although there were some other people around, and frequent interruptions, Lindiwe immediately gave us a brief outline of her migration history, the main elements of which were as follows:

- When she was about 20, her mother sent her to Cape Town to take care of her older brother, who had been the main breadwinner for the family but had become ill. She left her two young children with her mother in their rural village and lived with her brother and a cousin in a shack in Mandela Park, where she nursed her brother and also tried to find work. But her brother's health deteriorated and he was taken back to the Eastern Cape, where he died.

- She spent four years in Mandela Park looking for a job. During this time she started working in local shebeens (taverns) – work that was insecure, erratic, dangerous at times, and kept her out late at night. Her children remained with her mother in the Eastern Cape.

- Finally she got a job working two days a week as a domestic worker for a family in Hout Bay. Once she had secured this job, she brought her children from the Eastern Cape to live with her in Mandela Park, where she had also managed to get a formal house.

This account and its implied causal flow fitted neatly with my own assumption that if alternative care were available at the home of origin, a migrant mother would be inclined to delay co-migration of her children until she had some security – of employment, housing or both – before bringing her children to live with her. But things were not as simple as that. Over the next few months the details and timing of the events altered many times.

The story, as she originally told it, had become Lindiwe's narrative. But a process of mapping the residential histories of family members revealed a much more complex tale of multiple migrations. Our process included two main visual tools. First, we used a detailed timeline arranged as a grid, with a row for each year and individual columns for Lindiwe and each of her children, showing their age in each year, their main place of residence, their school and grade (for the children), and place of work (for Lindiwe). Another column tracked some of the other members of the family, especially her mother. We also marked down important events and shocks to the family, such as births, deaths and shack fires. Using this timeline we were able to plot the whereabouts of each person in relation to other family members and events, year by year, making adjustments and corrections each time we met.

Second, we developed a series of kinship diagrams showing family relationships and co-residence arrangements over time. The kinship network changed and fluctuated in size, and we were able to add more people as they entered her stories. Using these tools, we gradually adjusted and refined the sequence of the events by aligning activities, events and living arrangements across

the whole family. Later, Lindiwe described this process as one that had helped to refresh her memories and given her a clearer picture of her own life course. When we flew together to the Eastern Cape eight months after our first meeting, we bought three identical notebooks at the airport: one each for my research assistant and myself to use for field notes, and one for Lindiwe. She wanted to use it to continue writing down her thoughts, as her memories were now flowing more freely and vividly.

The account that follows is a reflection of Lindiwe's story as it emerged over time. It reads as a static record, but is the product of a series of varied and at times contradictory accounts over multiple interviews. I believe that the story would continue to evolve and change even if we talked for years. The facts presented here represent a life history as it stood at an arbitrary cut-off time when it needed to be written up as part of this thesis.

I start by outlining some of Lindiwe's memories of her own childhood as her experiences are relevant to many of the decisions she has made as an adult, particularly about her own children's care and education, as well as her perceptions of what constitutes home. Various themes emerge from her narrative. Three of the most striking are her own naivety, which she repeatedly referred to as "ignorance" (due to a poor education that failed to equip her for later life in the city, and also in relation to the unspoken knowledge of adults around her); the seemingly contradictory roles of neighbours and extended family who, on the one hand, can be relied on for support, and on the other hand are a source of tension and fail to intervene in moments of crisis; and her very different relationships with her mother (a wise and powerful woman who constantly strategises about the survival of the family even if it means fragmenting the household) and her father (described as a gentle man and a peacekeeper whose death, during her childhood, marks a critical turning point for the family). It is through Lindiwe's memories of rural life that we gain insight into the tension between the two worlds she inhabits as an adult: her urban and rural homes which, later, she distinguishes as being places of residence and citizenship respectively.

6.2   Childhood and household arrangements

Lindiwe's childhood household was constantly in flux. She describes the household at a time she remembers when all her siblings had been born, and before the birth of her first child and the death of her father. The kinship diagram (Figure 3) therefore depicts a household form that was more or less sustained for the years when Lindiwe was aged eight to fourteen (1988–1993). The main members were her biological mother, her father (who had by then retired from his job in Cape Town), her older half-brother (the son of her mother, born out of marriage), her three younger siblings and her father's two grandchildren from a previous marriage, both of whom were older than Lindiwe. His first wife had died, and two of their adult daughters had children of their own but could not have the children living with them. One daughter was unmarried and working as a live-in household help in another village, so could not live with her child. The other was married and had two children, but her first child was not the child of her husband and so, according to custom, could not live in his house. It was decided that these grandchildren would be brought up by Lindiwe's mother. Overall, the household was what would be described from

survey data as a complex, three-generation household. To Lindiwe it was not complex; it was fairly normal compared with other households she knew as a child.

Child care arrangements were circulated around the extended family according to the needs of the children and adults. At one stage Lindiwe's youngest brother was sent to live with an aunt in Centani, a neighbouring district. "My mother had given her Sabelo and one of my other aunt's children, because this aunt never had any children of her own … But he left halfway through [the school year] because he didn't get along with my aunt … She is very strict and she's tough on children, and they ended up taking their children back."

Her father was already old when Lindiwe was born. After being widowed, he took her mother as a much younger wife. The son from his previous marriage was himself married by the time Lindiwe was born, and had children of his own. They lived nearby, in the same village. Another aunt and uncle (on her mother's side) lived on a neighbouring homestead, and Lindiwe was good friends with their children.

Lindiwe describes her childhood as happy and fun, but also protected, isolated and full of chores. It is the chores that are among her fondest memories.

Figure 18.   **Lindiwe's childhood household**

Former wife
of Madoda

Bongani's father

Noluthando
b. ±1960

Madoda
b. ±1925 / d. 1995

Fezile
(half-brother)

Thembeka
(half-sister)

Zanele
(half sister)

Thembeka's son
(Lindiwe's nephew)

Zanele's daughter
(Lindiwe's niece)

Bongani
b.1975

Lindiwe
b.1979

Vuyo
b.1982

Dumile
b.1984

Sabelo
b.1987

Lindiwe's household

6.2.1 Memories of school

She went to the local primary school, which at that time consisted of seven rondavels – one for each grade from Sub A up to Standard 5, with 35 to 40 children packed into a class. A year after she finished primary school the rondavels were replaced by more modern buildings: two long straight classroom blocks in an L-shape. When we visited them in December 2015 we found they were in disrepair. We pressed our noses to the dusty windows and saw that a few ceilings had caved in, scattering debris on the floor. Yet the desks and chairs were neatly stacked for the holidays, and some classrooms had piles of textbooks, some of them still in their plastic packaging but covered with dust. Peering into the locked classrooms Lindiwe remembers that, even though they only had rondavels, the school was never so dirty in her day. Before leaving, the children would scrub and polish the floors and clean the windows until everything shone. She says, "I don't get it. We had no resources when I was studying, but our classrooms were always pretty." The only remnant of her original school is a single dilapidated rondavel next to the entrance gate – her very first classroom.[36]

Lindiwe's first school classroom, now derelict

Together we walked the route she used to take to school, something she has not done since leaving it as the school is at the far end of the village, the end of the road, and she has had no reason to go there. We sat and talked in the shade on the narrow stoep that links the classrooms. Lindiwe remembers school as a time of frustration, fear and punishment. Teachers used to beat the pupils if they performed poorly or didn't understand concepts, even when the concepts and language were difficult. For example, she remembers the whole history class being beaten because they did not know the meaning of the word "influence". And they would have to sprint when they heard the bell at the end of break, because they would get five lashes if they arrived after the teacher was in the classroom.

---

[36] All photographs are my own unless otherwise specified.

Nwabisa and Lindiwe peering into locked classrooms

The main reason she didn't like school was because it made her feel stupid, and in retrospect she believes they were badly taught. All the teaching was done in Xhosa, but the text books were in English. The teacher would explain some concepts in Xhosa and then tell the pupils to go and read the textbook and learn from that – "but now when you read it on your own in English you don't understand it and you get stuck there." The tests and exams were all written in English, but she didn't have the vocabulary to express herself. She felt, even as a child, that they were just "studying to pass, and not studying to know." As a young adult looking for work in Cape Town, Lindiwe was painfully conscious of her poor English and felt that her education had been a real setback. "Oh rural schooling, oh no! ... When you get there [to Cape Town] you become really dumb … although you passed well and you got good results, you don't appear to have passed. You become so lost because of the language…. You become confused and you have no confidence to answer."

But her primary school years also carry happy and funny memories. There were all kinds of dangers lurking, terrifying at the time but hilarious in retrospect: snakes in the long grass of the school yard which could really bite, and geese that attacked children on the way to and from school, forcing them to run.

She and her girlfriends would meet at a nearby store after school or during the lunch break and play a game called black toti: this involved lining up three empty tins and then trying to hit them with a ball. Once you knocked a tin down you would have to rush over and try to set it upright again while dodging the ball which the others continued to throw – now at you, the target. Lindiwe laughs, remembering that she was very good at this game, one of the best.

6.2.2   Child labour and sociability

After school and on Saturdays the children did household chores, and the girls especially were responsible for washing and fetching water. "We were young but we would come back and wash dishes and cook supper, and we would wash the shirts, and then after all that we would do our homework and then sleep." In summer they had time to play before going to bed.

Sometimes Lindiwe went to collect firewood with her father. He would wake her early in the morning, at four o'clock, and they would span two oxen that she would be allowed to lead by a rope. They talked a lot on these trips and became very close. Collecting firewood is usually women's work but Lindiwe explains that "my father did not want my mother to experience hardship … he loved my mother so much and didn't want her to have tough times." After they had collected the wood they would tie it together and lead the oxen back, dragging the wood on the side.

The water came from a spring higher up the valley, and was clean and tasted delicious, unlike the river water in some other villages. Fetching water was fun because she would meet up with other girls at the spring, but there were many scary and funny mishaps too. She would clean a tin drum or bathtub and take it down to the stream through the tall grasses, as tall as she was, having to part them all the way. Sometimes, when it was raining, she would be battling her way up the steep path "and maybe when you are halfway up you slip, and you go bam! and spill all the water … you have to walk back to fetch more water. Oh no, that was boring, sometimes you would really cry, you'd be sniffing and you would go back and get the water."

There were a lot of crabs in the stream, and these were her enemies: "It's like the crab can hear you coming, and it's jealous of this water. The water is clean when you first go down and place the bucket to scoop water…. Just when you go there, the crab comes and dances in the water and makes the water dirty and then disappears under the stone again. Oh you would be so angry, you have to wait until it's clean again."

We were retracing the path to the river when Lindiwe stopped suddenly: she remembered a very hot day many years ago, when she had got up late. Her cousin from next door had already been down to the river, so she had to go alone. She knew all about snakes; usually they would hear you coming and rustle away because they know that if you spot them you will beat them. But this time was different and the snake was huge. "I got the water from the river and placed the bucket on my head and went up. Oh! When I was halfway up, just when I was thinking that now I am close to crossing the path, the snake just showed up in front of me [her hands showing how it reared up, almost eye-level]. It just stopped, whoosh, in front of me … I fell over with that bucket, and I just left that bucket there and ran!"

The snake reared up right in front of her

The cooking was always done on a fire outside, but when it rained the fire would have to be made inside the old thatched rondavel "and the smoke would make your eyes red, and when you are going to sleep you would cry first because your eyes hurt so much from the smoke."

During the cold July holidays work was extra fun because then children would work in large groups – a reciprocal arrangement called *ibhoxo*. One of the mothers in the village would put out word that she needed to stock up on firewood, and all the girls of Lindiwe's age would go and gather a lot of wood for that household. "That part was really nice. We enjoyed it a lot because we would all go to the forest together and would be laughing and chat and share news." Even better, once they delivered the firewood, a feast would be waiting for them: freshly baked bread and *mahewu* (a delicious homemade drink made from fermented mealie meal) and samp and beans cooked with Aromat and Holsum fat. They would eat until they were full, and sing songs, and afterwards they could each take a hunk of bread home. *Iboxho* was specifically about fetching wood, and was an arrangement of requests and favours, always with rewards. The young girls might provide a bulk wood supply for ten different households during the winter holiday, having fun and feasting all the while.

In December, after the fields had been cultivated, the weeds needed to be cleared from around the mealies. Households that had money would employ the children to hoe their fields in return for staple household goods – sugar, paraffin or sometimes even money. Lindiwe remembers that she worked from 6am to 4pm with a lunch break, and went home with two packs of sugar.

Children, and particularly girls, carried a considerable burden of labour for their own households and the village. But this might also have been a strategy to keep them busy and safe, as there were always concerns about the risks that children could be exposed to if they had a lot of free time. There was nowhere to go during the holidays, and nothing to do other than to work or play, and possibly get up to mischief. It is precisely the periods of child labour – groups of girls working long days for payment in cash or kind – that Lindiwe remembers as some of her happiest moments, because they were so sociable.

Lindiwe had initially described herself as an introvert, and someone who stayed at home most of the time: "I was not the kind of child who liked being with other children." But then she clarified: "It's not because I didn't want to … but my mother didn't like it … Most of the time they didn't want you to go out and play and hang out with friends or wander around. You had to stay at home." The strong role of her mother as decision-maker is a theme that recurs throughout her life story. Her mother was protective of her children, and concerned about bad influences in the village. Still, Lindiwe was not safe.

6.2.3 Birth of Asanda

During our third interview Lindiwe told us that the birth of her first child was the result of a rape. She was 15 at the time. It was the Christmas holidays and she had just finished Standard 5 (Grade 7). The story is presented here in Lindiwe's own words.

> What happened is that my mother was not home, she was away at her sister's house because her sister had lost her mother-in-law. And then, you know children become naughty when the adult is gone, especially if you are always watched … So there were parties that weekend and I sneaked along with my uncle's children [who] lived next door. My brother Bongani was still alive at that time. He didn't know that I snuck out of home and went to a party – back then it was called a *potsoyi* [dance party].

> When we got there the place was packed with boys and everything, like that. And then my brother saw me and asked me, "What are you doing here?" and I said, "No, my cousin is the one who said I should come" and he said, "But you know your mother!" My mother was very strong, so strict. And then he said I shouldn't dare go outside, I should stay inside because the boys outside are naughty, they drag children away and things like that. So what happened was that my uncle's child, the one I had gone with, was called by another boy and he tricked her and told her to ask me to escort her outside to pee so that he would be able to talk to me. So what happened was that I agreed, and then my brother saw us going outside and told us not to go too far and to stay close to the house to pee. But then when we went outside my cousin said, "No, people will see us peeing next to the house, so we should move a little bit further" and all along she knew what was going on and I didn't know.

> Okay fine, we moved over there, and when we were done this boy appeared and grabbed me and my cousin ran away and went back to the house, and all along I thought she had gone to call my brother [to get help]. But no, she had been asked to play this game so that he could be able to talk to me; all along she didn't know what was going to happen, she thought they were going to talk to me nicely. So what happened was that that young man dragged me off to sleep with him, and that's when I got Asanda you see. It was not like we were lovers.

At the time, Lindiwe did not know how children were conceived; no-one had ever talked to her about sex or reproduction. She felt changes in her body and suspected that they might be linked to the incident that night, but was afraid to tell her mother what had happened. Incredibly, the pregnancy went unnoticed or unacknowledged until she was in labour.

> At home they only found out that I was pregnant on the day that I gave birth to Asanda. It's not because I was hiding it, but I didn't know how it happened … My mother didn't see it. All along other adults could see it but they were afraid to tell my mother, you see, so she only found out on the day that I gave birth.

> I became sick with an illness that I didn't know anything about, and my mother was leaving for Idutywa along with my father – they had an issue that they wanted to resolve there in Idutywa. When I was growing up I was often sick, so when my mother was leaving she called my [maternal] aunt who does not live far, like in the next village close by, so my aunt can come quickly when there is a problem. I was left with her … My aunt can tell when someone is pregnant, but she didn't know

176

with me that I was pregnant and that I was going to give birth. The Lord hid this thing so that it could come out directly and not through another person. So I stayed with my aunt who made me cover myself over some hot water [because] she thought that I had a cold.

And then my mother came back, they came back after 3pm and had tea with my aunt who then left. After she had gone for maybe 15 minutes, then this thing started again, it was back. My mother heard me groaning from the bed and asked. "What's going on"? And I said, "I feel like my back hurts and I don't know what is going on." You see, every time I spoke, my mother was listening to everything that I was saying, and then because she was an adult, she knew what happens when one is in labour, so she was listening to the things that I was describing, and she thought, "Could Lindiwe be in labour or what is going on?" But in her mind it was a passing thought because she had never seen me … like …

Out and about with boys?

Yeah, and then my father realized that this is getting worse. My water broke. I told my mother that some watery substance came out of me, and that's when she said, "What did you say?" and I explained, and then she said, "How?" and I told her and then she came over and uncovered me and then my mother exclaimed, and in my mind the thought came back: "What could be happening, could it be that I got pregnant at that time?" and things like that. After all of that, where was the person who got me pregnant? He had long run away, the day after the event, because he knew exactly what he was doing, he was older than me, so he realised that he was going to get into trouble so he ran away and went to Johannesburg.

So my father said, "What should happen is that we should take this child to the doctor before they close." So I was quickly bathed and dressed and afterwards we went and waited by the road for cars going to town. Then a van came quickly and we got on and went to town, and when we got to the doctors, just as we were entering the doctor's office the doctor said, "This child is giving birth" and my mother fainted. She was dead quiet, she didn't speak or do anything for eight hours. It was from the shock. And then my father – when they told my father, "Hey Gatyeni, your child is giving birth" – he ran off to Pep [Stores] before they closed at five and said, "Please give me clothes for someone who has a child that is unknown, that we didn't know anything about. Give me everything, bottles and anything else."

So I am saying it happened in a good way, because on that day my parents had gone to Idutywa to fix money issues, so my father had money at that time. My mother eventually became all right, we stayed and waited for her, and they did everything for me. And then a car took us home at night. When it was explained back at home (they called my aunt, the mother of the child that I had snuck out with, and explained that there is this mess), they didn't believe it. They didn't believe it! But then what is to be done? Even I didn't believe it, I thought … you know when they say I wish the ground would open up and swallow me? I really wished it would open up and I would just disappear. I was afraid, like I didn't know how my mother was going to treat me.

But my [older] brother Bongani is the one who stood up for me and said, "Lindiwe was young and as she is young, mother, you were unable to sit down with her and talk to her, and so what happens? If you had talked to her while you were making her stay at home, because she wasn't going out with friends or doing anything so she didn't know about other things, maybe she would have known what to do when something happens. Maybe she would have even have known to report it at that moment when it happened so that she could get help. Because everything that happened here – she was raped because of you. Yes she did something wrong by leaving home and breaking house rules but the way that it happened is your fault, so it is your responsibility."

My grandmother was very angry with my father – my father doesn't like bad things – because he said, "We should leave that boy alone, the Lord will deal with him because he knew everything he was doing." … So I stayed for a little while and went back to school, and then I passed Standard 7 and then went to Standard 8 at Zwelidumile, but my father died while Asanda was still a baby.

Asanda was brought up by Lindiwe's mother Noluthando as if she were her own child. For many years she did not know that Lindiwe was her biological mother: Lindiwe was like a big sister to her and Asanda grew up calling her *Somnci* (little sis), a diminutive of affection.

> My mother is the one who raised Asanda, I don't want to lie, it was my mother. I don't even remember it at all … even myself at that time I would go out and play and everything and at home they had let me out for everything because I was young. I would just come back, for example on weekends, because of the time children play on weekends, and then if we are playing outside the yard at my home, I would be called in to come and breastfeed the baby.

It was partly the response of her half-brother Bongani to the rape and the birth that made Lindiwe feel particularly close to him. She repeatedly described him as her ally and protector – although later, when he was sick, it was she who cared for him.

6.2.4   Family tragedy

Lindiwe's baby Asanda was just four months old when Lindiwe's father was killed.

> He passed away in a horrible way because he was attacked at home and killed by people. The reason was that he lost a horse – because he had horses and goats and everything, you see. There was this man in the village that he didn't get along with; the man was jealous of my father because that man practised *ukuthwele*[37] but my father just had his own things without anything else. Everything my father had, that man wanted. So if my father's cattle were having calves, he wanted his own cattle to have calves like his, and so on. One day my father's horse went missing.... It was that man who had sent people to go and take the horse. But they knew that my mother is clever … we are Xhosas and my mother is Mfengu, so the Xhosas believe the Mfengus are clever because they are educated. They said that the day that the horse is found, they should kill my father because they will all be arrested.

> So indeed my father did find it. He had gone to town to watch soccer, he liked watching soccer. It was a sporting day for school children. He heard from someone that his horse is in a certain place. So he came home and told my mother that "Hey Dlamini, I heard that my horse is in Komkhulu, so I will ask a young man to come with me to go and check and see." And indeed the following morning they went there and when they got there they found it. So, everything my father did was straightforward: when it went missing he went to report it in town and he was told to bring a ticket, because horses have tickets, and then they put a stamp that explained that it went missing on this date and so on. So he went back there and told them that he found a horse in that place, and the police went to the place and found that indeed it is the horse with the features he had described. So what was going to happen was that they were going to go to court and that man would explain how this horse could be his and my father would also explain so that they can be able to decide … but the court day didn't come, because the date was on a Monday and then on the Saturday night those people came to kill my father, so that is how my father died.

Lindiwe's mother Noluthando remembers that night very clearly: the moon was so bright you could clearly see people outside. You could walk outside in the dark and be able to see the path. It happened at midnight, and she remembers it was midnight because in the room back then there was a clock above the wardrobe. There was a knock at the door and her husband got up to answer. Thinking it strange she looked up at the clock and saw that it was midnight, and she wondered why someone would come at midnight. And then her husband went to open the door, and

---

[37] *Uthwele* – a cult-like membership for those seeking wealth through mystical means. It often involves rituals or sacrifices to gain wealth.

immediately she could hear by the way he exclaimed that he was shocked. He came back quickly into the room and closed the door. He was shocked by who he saw there – two men with long trench coats, wearing balaclavas.

By the time he got back into the room everyone was awake (the children slept together with them, on the floor), and they were trying to keep the interleading door closed. The men had axes, and one tried to lever the door open. And in that struggle, when the men were trying to get in and they were trying to hold the door closed, there was a gunshot, which scared them. Immediately after the gunshot they let go of the door and everyone dived under the bed. Noluthando says, "I managed to get under the bed quickly but my husband didn't. It was an old bed with an oak headboard and the wire springs underneath, so when he tried he got hooked and couldn't get under. So these guys saw him and dragged him out … and they said, 'We have come to kill you.' By the grace of God nobody shouted or screamed, everybody kept silent, even the children." The two men took Madoda out into the living room area and for a long time they were still inside the house. They closed the door to the little bedroom, and Noluthando managed to get out of the window without them seeing. But just as she got near to the four-corner house in the middle of the property she tripped over a rock, and one of the men saw her and came over to her with an axe. He asked where she was going and she said, "No, I was just going to this middle house." And she says she doesn't know why or how but that man let her be, and went back into the house. But Madoda was taken out onto the path above the house, where he was hacked to death.

Lindiwe remembers: "We tried to scream so that people could hear that something is happening, but not even one person heard. People only came when we found a chance to run away and go to the houses and knock on the doors. They never heard the screams, and not one person came." She also suspects that the gunshot was a sign to the neighbours – a deliberate warning shot signalling that "if you hear this, neighbour, you should not come." The violence of her father's death, the lack of any intervention from the neighbours and the fact that the nearest police are far away in Willowvale continue to be a source of worry for Lindiwe and for her mother, who now lives alone in the house for most of the year and is very vulnerable. It is also a serious consideration for Lindiwe when she thinks about whether she would retire to her rural home.

Madoda's death was a great shock and a loss to the family. For Lindiwe personally, it was devastating. In her descriptions he is gentle, kind, peace-loving and completely accessible to her. Lindiwe knew him well, perhaps unusually so for a young girl, as he had retired and returned home when she was young. He taught her to sew (he was very good with an old Singer sewing machine and made a bit of money from tailoring), and told her many stories. He worked hard and helped with housework in order to lighten her mother's load. The gentle love between her parents was particularly touching given their age difference and the fact that it had been a marriage of convenience.

Her mother Noluthando told us how she had grown up in another village and was spotted by Lindiwe's father. His first wife had died, leaving him with four children, and he needed to marry again. Noluthando was still very young and unmarried but had already had an illegitimate child. "Back then if you were of an age to be married and had spoilt the family name by having a child out of wedlock, nobody cared who you marry." So she was farmed off to Madoda, an old man whom she neither loved nor knew.

Difficult years followed: Noluthando and Madoda moved into the house where Madoda had lived with his previous wife, and Noluthando was expected to take over the running of the house. But the children, now almost adult, never accepted her. They would tell her, "This is not your home, this is our mother's house" and make her life miserable. She persuaded her husband to build a new house on a different homestead; one that she could call her own. He agreed, and the two of them moved into the house she still occupies, where Lindiwe grew up. The children of his former wife, by then old enough to look after themselves, stayed in the original house and wouldn't let Noluthando take anything that had belonged to their mother, so Noluthando had to furnish her house from scratch. Madoda and Noluthando then had another four children: Lindiwe (the oldest), her sister Vuyo, and younger brothers Sabelo and Dumile.

Madoda had made a reasonable income while he was employed. He worked for many years at De Beers in Cape Town and so spent very little time at home initially. He came back to the Eastern Cape once a year and Noluthando went to Cape Town once a year to be with him, getting a female relative to keep an eye on the children. He retired when Lindiwe was quite young, but nobody is sure of the date. Instead of a pension he received a cash payout of R10,000 ("a lousy R10,000" says his widow Noluthando) which they could live off for a while. It soon ran out. But they had some horses and cattle, and when one horse gave birth they would sell the old one, and that kept them going until his death.

6.3   Migration

6.3.1   Noluthando's migration

After Madoda's death, his children from his former marriage laid claim to the cattle and other livestock. There was no pension from his former employer, and Noluthando was far too young to receive an old-age pension. The child support grant had not yet been introduced. There was no cash income at all. Someone needed to earn money to support the family. Noluthando sent Bongani, Lindiwe's beloved half-brother, to Cape Town to find work. Lindiwe is not sure what work he did, but after a while he was able to start remitting small amounts of money back home. His living expenses were small as he had gone straight to live in Site B, Khayelitsha with an aunt who was already living and working there, and also helped to support him with food costs. But the money was not nearly enough. Noluthando decided that she had to start working too, as they would otherwise have to depend on charity from the extended family.

She had a connection working for the Blue Line bus company that ran from the Eastern Cape to Cape Town, and got a job as a bus operator, taking tickets and looking after the passengers. She travelled up and down the route, carrying a stock of German print cloth from the Eastern Cape that she sold for a profit in Cape Town. Because her travel was free, she was able to bring all the profit home.

When we asked how she made the decision to do work that required travel, leaving her children behind, she explained that there was no other option:

> It was never something I thought about except that it just became a problem when father [i.e. her husband] left me with nothing. I never thought that this could happen, and it just happened. I did not like to depend on people. So I felt that it would be all right on the buses … I would get to feed the children and I also found an opening to sell [material], and so I would keep going to Cape Town.

The work was exhausting. She would leave on a Friday, working all the way on the bus, sell her material in Cape Town and work another bus shift back to the Eastern Cape, arriving on Monday. Lindiwe, now 16, was the eldest child left at home, and so she was in charge of the household when Noluthando was away, and looked after her younger siblings (aged 14, 12 and 8) and her baby daughter, whom she also regarded as a sibling. Their aunt, who lived next door, kept an eye on the children and made sure they had food. We pressed Noluthando about her thoughts on leaving the children at the time – how did she consider the options? Did she have any worries or misgivings? But she insisted: "It just happened. There weren't those [thoughts or worries] because I trust in Christ. I just thought, whatever comes next I will figure it out, I can't do otherwise. I was forced and under pressure and had to stand on my own."

In another interview, Noluthando reiterated: "As I have said, there is nothing that we ever sat down and discussed but when we saw the situation, each thought okay it would be good if I could do like this. But eventually we all came to Cape Town in that way and we all ended up working."

And another time she said:

> When you see the situation, you act, you get up and close it because life doesn't stand still. For us people life changes … and so when life changes you decide. I can't even tell my neighbour [the plan]. I just call them to tell them, "Please look after those children," you see that? You can feel the hardship, but you also have to do whatever. What I mean to say is that when they are left alone it's not that they are not loved, that is the truth, but it's because of the situation.

This theme, the absence of choice, recurred throughout our conversations with both Lindiwe and her mother when we were discussing migration and child care decisions. In fact the question of where children would live in relation to their caregivers was hardly ever described as a decision – just a necessary fact, without alternatives.

6.3.2 Birth of Sipho

It was during this period, in 1999, that Lindiwe became pregnant with her second child. She was 20 and attending Grade 11 at Zwelidumile High School in the neighbouring village, a short drive but a considerable walk from her home.

Her aunt persuaded Noluthando that Lindiwe should be sent to give birth in a hospital in Cape Town where the care was better. So she was put on a bus and did the long trip alone. It was the first time that she had been further than Idutywa. Her mother had arranged that she would go straight to her sister's home[38] in the informal settlement of Mandela Park. When she went into

---

[38] This is not her biological sister, but an older girl who stayed with them in the Eastern Cape because her school (the same high school that Lindiwe attended) was close to their home. "We took her as family but she was like a big sister, so I called her 'sister.'" However she was never mentioned or included in the family maps we drew. This sister now lives in Saldanha. She and Lindiwe stay in touch.

labour, her sister arranged for a man who had a car to take her to the Retreat Maternity Hospital to give birth.

By day two the baby had severe jaundice. The nursing staff referred her to Groote Schuur Hospital and discharged her. Lindiwe asked the security guard to let her sister know where she had gone if she came looking for her. This was before the days of cell phones. Then, carrying her new-born baby and her luggage, she caught public transport to Groote Schuur where they were admitted. They were there for two weeks. After a few days her sister went to look for her at the Retreat hospital and found that she had been discharged. None of the nurses remembered or told her about the referral to Groote Schuur. The security guard who was meant to give her a message was off duty. Her sister went to Groote Schuur in any case, to see if she was there, but Lindiwe's name had not be recorded at reception: they checked the file and said there was nobody by that name. Her sister called everyone she knew, but there were no leads. The family went into panic: Lindiwe had just been through childbirth, had a tiny baby and was entirely new to the city. They imagined she was lost somewhere, or worse. Lindiwe's mother left Asanda (Lindiwe's daughter, now five years old) with Lindiwe's younger sister Vuyo who was still living at home in the Eastern Cape, jumped on a bus and raced down to Cape Town to help search for her daughter and new grandson. Lindiwe describes how her mother, ever practical, said to the family, "Okay fine, we know Lindiwe was at Retreat, so now we are going to search at each and every hospital, and also at the mortuaries." When the family returned to Groote Schuur to check a second time they met a man who remembered: there was a short lady who came with a little child. So they went up and searched the wards.

Lindiwe had been wondering why nobody came to visit. Other people in the ward were getting visitors, and she was asking herself: "The days are going by, why is nobody coming?" She remembers the day they burst into the ward at Groote Schuur and found her. "All my family was here – my mum, my brother, my aunt, my cousins, everyone." They ran to her and hugged her and everyone was crying tears of joy. They sat outside in the sun and talked and talked, passing the baby around, and she realised how much she was loved.

6.3.3   Lindiwe's migration

After they were discharged from Groote Schuur Hospital, Lindiwe and her baby Sipho went to stay with Bongani and their aunt in Site B, Khayelitsha. She didn't return immediately to the Eastern Cape because her Cape Town family wanted her with them: after the shock of her disappearance they wanted to look after her, spend time with her and the baby, and know that she was safe. She and baby Sipho stayed with them for two months and then returned to the Eastern Cape.

Noluthando continued working on the buses, travelling back and forth to Cape Town. In the meantime Sipho's paternal grandmother, the mother of Lindiwe's boyfriend, urged Lindiwe to return to school and finish her matric. She offered to take the baby and care for him so that Lindiwe could focus on her school work. Lindiwe's family was very poor, but her boyfriend's family had a large homestead with about eight rondavels and many cows. They live in a neighbouring village, and one can still see their distant homestead on the hillside across from Lindiwe's house. Sipho took me aside one day to show it to me. He described their wealth with pride: they are a family with a lot of status, but were also warm and kind to him, and he still visits them occasionally

even though the relationship between Lindiwe and his father ended soon after he was born and his father never formally recognised him, paid damages or supported him. It was just his grandmother who treated him like family.

There was something of a tussle between the grandmothers: the boyfriend's mother believed that Lindiwe's education should be prioritised, but Lindiwe's mother, desperately working to support all her dependants, could not think about the needs of an individual child – her focus was on the survival of the family. Lindiwe says, "She saw that it wasn't working out because the money was too little, it was not enough for us [and] the burden was too much for her ... so she just gave up. She said I should go and find work: 'Lindiwe, I would like you to go [to Cape Town].'" Sipho's grandmother argued with Noluthando about it. Lindiwe herself wanted to stay at school, but she was not in a position to argue – she was the oldest child and had a responsibility to the family. Ultimately it was Noluthando's decision. Lindiwe was very clear: "[The decision] was made by her and not by me."

Another problem arose that made things even more urgent. Bongani had become sick in Cape Town and had stopped working. He was now living with a cousin from his mother's side, in a shack in Mandela Park, and somebody needed to care for him as the cousin was working at a shebeen and was out at night.

> Our main support at that time was my brother, he would buy us school clothes and all of that. So it turned out that my brother was alone over there and there was no one else, he had no sister to take care of him. Our cousin would take care of him but she had to go to work, then there was no one. At that time I became pregnant with Sipho, and left school that year. I thought that the following year I would go back to school, but it turned out that I should go and take care of my brother, I left the child behind … That's how it started. My mother said, "Go to Cape Town to look after your brother because he's not well," you see, and when I arrived here I found that she had made it seem like a small thing, this business with my brother, but it turned out that all along my brother was sick, and he was not going to make it. So I was forced to stay in Cape Town and find work in order to help those who come after me.

Lindiwe believes this was her mother's intention all along: she knew that her son Bongani was dying and that, if Lindiwe went to Cape Town to care for him, then she would eventually take his place as breadwinner for the family. The matter was never discussed explicitly. In our conversation with Lindiwe and her mother, Noluthando explained that "things from the old days were not the kinds of things where you sit down [and discuss]; you would think about it while sleeping." In other words, the solution would come to you. Migration and co-residence decisions were described as a pattern of circumstance in which there was little or no choice, but only one possible response. The decision is therefore not a decision between options, but a realisation of what needs to be done.

There was no question of Lindiwe taking her own children with her to Cape Town. At first she thought it was a temporary trip. As time went on it was clear that this was no place for the children: three adults living in a small crowded one-roomed shack, one of them bedridden most of the time. Lindiwe's time was spent keeping house and looking after her brother. Both Bongani and Lindiwe were supported by their cousin, who only had part-time work and was earning very little. So Asanda stayed with Noluthando, who had stopped working on the buses altogether, and Sipho stayed with his paternal grandmother. Asanda turned six years old and Sipho turned two.

183

They were in a state of what De Haas (2014) would term involuntary immobility in relation to their mother. At this stage she envisaged her own migration to be temporary. "Oh it was difficult, more especially as I had left Sipho very young – he was young when I left him. All along I knew that he was safe where he was because he was with his grandmother, but it was painful – I mean it was not easy."

The following year, Bongani's health deteriorated so badly that they knew it was terminal. He could do nothing for himself and was completely dependent on care. On top of everything, they were living in a shack that hardly kept the weather out, and there was always the fear of fire. An uncle, who also lived in Cape Town (but far away in Gugulethu), intervened and said it was time to take Bongani home. Lindiwe did not accompany him, and that was the last time she saw him. He died soon after arriving in the Eastern Cape.

Lindiwe continued to stay with her cousin in their shack on the hill for a while. She spent four years without proper employment, and in the meantime got some shifts at the local shebeen where her cousin worked. This was a stressful and risky job. Men would harass her and sometimes try to follow her home. They also tried their luck avoiding the bill, pretending that they had already paid for their drinks – and she would have to cover the cost from her meagre earnings. She described it as very dangerous, and didn't want to talk much about it. She was making about R300 a month.

6.3.4   Asanda's migration

Back in the Eastern Cape, Asanda was eight years old and was going to a local pre-school. It was not much more than a small shack in the veld. That school is gone now, but we saw another during our visit. Little had changed.

Day care centre in Lindiwe's home village

Although the compulsory school age starts at seven, Asanda could not be enrolled in primary school because she didn't have a birth certificate; she didn't even have a clinic card to prove that she had been born. Lindiwe wasn't aware of the need to have such documents and nobody had

informed her: "Until I got here to Cape Town it wasn't at all clear to me that it's important to have a birth certificate." She needed to apply for this documentation in person in Willowvale. The year after Bongani's death she travelled back to the Eastern Cape, at huge expense, and applied first for the clinic record, which she then used to apply for the birth certificate.

Things were very different with Sipho's birth: she got the proof of birth from the clinic after three weeks and took that straight to Home Affairs. After getting Asanda's birth certificate, Lindiwe applied for the child support grant for both her children. A cash benefit of just R170 per month at the time, this made a huge difference to their lives, effectively doubling her earnings. She received both the grants even though her son was still living in the Eastern Cape – a technically unlawful arrangement as the grant is always meant to go to the *de facto* caregiver. She needed some of the money to support herself, and sent the rest to her mother in the Eastern Cape.

Lindiwe and her mother agreed that Asanda would move to join Lindiwe in Cape Town so that she could start school there. "The reason why is because when I got here to Cape Town I found that it's better to go to school here. As I went to school in the Eastern Cape, I didn't learn English, and then I found that to learn in Xhosa didn't help me. So I wanted my children to have a better education than me." Another reason for the move was that Asanda was sick – she had been suffering from stomach pains for some time, and Lindiwe felt that she should be looking after her. She wanted to be nearer to good health services. Asanda was accompanied on the bus by Lindiwe's younger sister Vuyo. She took her straight to Victoria hospital, where her stomach ailment was cured. Lindiwe never knew what it was. Asanda's subsequent migration to join her mother in Cape Town was therefore informed by a number of considerations, including preferred care arrangements, health and education.

Lindiwe had started the search for a school for Asanda before her arrival. It was late in the year, and the schools were full. She managed to get Asanda onto a waiting list for the Moravian primary school in Mandela Park, a public no-fee school originally built by German philanthropists on land belonging to the Church. This was Lindiwe's first choice of school because it is close to where they live and doesn't charge fees, and she believes that the quality of education is good. They didn't know until the school opened in January that a place had become available, and Asanda was enrolled. Asanda had never worn shoes before, and still remembers the shame of arriving in class in the wrong uniform and a pair of sandals on her feet.

Noluthando had spent a lot of time in Cape Town over the years and had many connections and family networks there, and she decided to move too. Sipho was still in the Eastern Cape with his grandmother. Lindiwe says, "I wasn't a hundred per cent happy. My wish was that both my children could be with me. But because of my problem that I wasn't working, I told myself that I must be patient until I get a job, and when I get the job both my children are going to come and live here." Although she didn't have the complete family she dreamed of, she knew that Sipho was in good hands and did not worry about him. Sipho's involuntary immobility at this time was related to the obstacle of his mother's unemployment. He was not yet of school-going age, and so the education consideration was not yet paramount.

By the beginning of 2003, both Noluthando and Asanda were together with Lindiwe in Cape Town. They stayed with her cousin's sister and brother in a shack belonging to their cousin: five people in a small two-roomed structure. Lindiwe mapped it out: "This is the kitchen, this is the bedroom.

But when it's time to sleep, then the others [her cousin's sister and brother] would go and sleep with their friends because we could not all fit in the house." Noluthando started working on the buses again, so there were periods when she was away and the house was less crowded.

Lindiwe was still working at the shebeen, and was also very busy looking for a job as a domestic worker. She needed better working conditions and the security of a regular salary. By this time Lindiwe's sister Vuyo and youngest brother Sabelo had also moved to Cape Town. Her younger brother Dumile, who had mental health problems, stayed alone at home in the village, looking after the house. Sipho, now four years old, was still living with his paternal grandmother in the Eastern Cape, but visited his mother in Cape Town at least once during this time, chaperoned on the bus by Lindiwe's sister Vuyo.

6.4   Urban life

6.4.1   Shack fires and housing mobility

The informal settlement of Mandela Park is regularly gutted by shack fires that sweep through the area, fuelled by the strong south-easter. We saw the debris of fires when visiting Lindiwe at home. Municipal officials and members of the local charity organisation Thula-Thula were in the area, distributing starter packs for those who had lost everything: plastic tubs, cleaning equipment and thin sponge mattresses, and delivering donations of clothing and food to the community centre. The City of Cape Town distributes building packs to those whose shacks have been destroyed and are listed on the register. These consist of wooden poles (now treated with fire retardant), iron sheeting, one door, one window and some nails.

Residents of the Mandela Park informal settlement help to clear the rubble on
28 December 2015 after a fire ripped through a section.
Picture credit: Aletta Harrison / Eyewitness News

Picture credit: Ashleigh Furlong / GroundUp

The media reported no less than six fires over a period of half a year while I was interviewing Lindiwe:

- Early August 2015: 1 shack burnt down; two children aged 9 and 14 died, their mother burnt and permanently disfigured;
- Mid-August 2015: 3 shacks burnt, 15–17 people displaced; three people burnt to death;
- November 2015: "dozens" of shacks destroyed;
- December 2015: 200 shacks razed; around 600 people left homeless (other reports put the number of displaced people at over 1000); one person burnt beyond recognition;
- Early February 2016: 60 shacks destroyed; 240 people homeless. The shack that Lindiwe owned and rented out was destroyed in this fire, which was mentioned in a small column on page 7 of a local newspaper;
- Late February 2016: 128 shacks destroyed; 538 people homeless and two people killed.

Cape Argus
TUESDAY FEBRUARY 2 2016

7

Imizamo Yethu fire leaves 240 homeless

MORE than 200 people were left homeless in Imizamo Yethu informal settlement yesterday after their homes were destroyed by a fire.

The city's Disaster Risk Management Centre spokeswoman, Charlotte Powell, said the fire broke out at around 4pm, destroying 60 shacks.

"Sixty dwellings were destroyed, leaving 240 people displaced."

Powell said the cause of the fire was still unknown. However, relief efforts had begun.

"The South African Red Cross is providing immediate relief and emergency shelters, such as community halls have been opened to shack fire victims."

Lindiwe's cousin's shack, in which they were all living, burnt down in the first year that they lived together. Nobody was injured but they lost many of their possessions and had to rebuild. Family tensions grew, however, and Lindiwe and her mother knew they had to move out of the cousin's place. Noluthando explained that at that time it was difficult to get a site for a shack, but "the community leaders spoke on my behalf so that I could be able to erect a shack, because I had a family."

By now the entire family was in Cape Town except Sipho, who was still living with his paternal grandmother, and the family home in the Eastern Cape was locked up. Noluthando, Lindiwe, Asanda and Lindiwe's younger sister moved into the new shack together, and her brother Sabelo had an adjoining room on the same site. Her other brother Dumile had moved from the Eastern Cape and was living in another shack elsewhere in the settlement. It was 2004. Their new shack burnt down the following year.

> We were there at the time; we were just sitting and chatting … then Dumile came in and told us: "There is fire outside" and we went out to look and we found that the fire had already come to our house.

> When the fire starts you check to see how far it is from your house, and then you try to save the important things. But if you see that you can't you just leave it all inside. The first thing you think about: my ID, my birth certificate, my [cell] phone – even before clothes … We tried to take things that were important but the fire came in and then everything burnt inside. It was very fast …

> The fire is terrible, it is so quick. That's why sometimes we find the news that there is someone who died in a fire, because sometimes you think that it's far although it is not far, because it just goes so quickly. And when you breathe the smoke of that fire it's hard for you to go out. So you've got to get out quickly. You mustn't even take a risk to get your ID.

> The fire engines came but because it's the top of Mandela Park there are no streets where they can get in. The fire wasn't stopped until they called the helicopter to drop water. There were a lot of shacks burnt – I don't remember how many, but maybe 30 or 40.

They only managed to save a few things that time: their ID books, a suitcase of Noluthando's and a blanket. I asked Lindiwe why ID documents were so important – more important even than clothes or money or food that would help a family to survive after a fire. She explained that at the time of those fires it was difficult to get a replacement, but things have got easier: nowadays you can just explain that your ID burnt, and apply for another copy and pay the fee.

It is impossible to get insurance against shack fires, and even the *stokvels* (group savings schemes) do not cover this kind of risk. So every time there was a fire, they had to start building and furnishing their home from scratch.

After the second fire Lindiwe got approval to build her own shack on a separate site because she had children and could be counted as a separate family. Noluthando rebuilt hers using the replacement materials provided by the municipality after her shack burnt down. Lindiwe used her own savings and money that she borrowed to buy her building materials. Lindiwe then lived in her new shack and Asanda lived with Noluthando.

At this time Lindiwe's sister brought Sipho on the bus to live in Cape Town. There were two main reasons for the move. First, he was due to start Grade 1 the following year and Lindiwe wanted him to benefit from the better schooling he could get in Cape Town. Second, Lindiwe had finally managed to get a job as a domestic worker and, although she was still earning very little, at least her income was stable. She had always intended to have both her children with her in Cape Town once she got a job.

Sipho went to the Kwamsane preschool in Mandela Park that year, and she applied to the Moravian primary school for a place for him in Grade 1 in 2006. The siblings Sipho and Asanda were now living together for the first time. Sipho was six and Asanda was eleven, and they stayed with their grandmother Noluthando in her shack. I asked Lindiwe why they were living in separate shacks. She explained:

> We were all staying together as family, but I was the big one, the breadwinner. So I decided that we could not all stay together. The reason was that if we have another fire we will still have another house. So it's better to have two … And it does help because even my mother's shack burnt again in 2008, and then we were all staying at my house. They were not close to each other, but not too far. I would see them [Noluthando and the children] every day, I would see them on the way to work, and I would buy the food and we had supper together.

There are a number of striking points here. First, although they considered themselves to be a single family, they could take advantage of the fact that they were technically counted as two families because they spanned three generations – and this enabled Lindiwe and her mother to acquire two informal sites and split into two physical households. Second, it was the first time Lindiwe had made an independent decision about the configuration of her family. Up to this point the decisions had all been made by her mother, but Lindiwe's role as the main provider shifted the power balance between them. Third, Lindiwe describes the diversification of the family dwellings as a form of security or insurance against fire. Having a second shack at a slight distance

189

meant that there was a lockable space to store the contents of one shack if it was under threat of fire and, provided one of the shacks survived, there would still be shelter for the family in the aftermath of a fire. The distance between the shacks was therefore an important consideration: they needed to be close enough for family life to continue but far enough to have a chance of one shack surviving a fire if the other was burnt. Fourth, although they operated as a single household, this configuration would defy all efforts to construct such a household from survey data. They regarded themselves as a family, shared resources and ate their meals together (all common requirements for defining members of the same household), but lived on different sites, which would be sampled separately. In a survey, they would appear as two distinct households: a single-adult household, and a three-generation household where two children have a nonresident mother.

Splitting the family into different dwellings was described as a survival strategy, but it still didn't explain why the children were living with their grandmother rather than their mother. I raised the subject again during our next interview, and this time there were different angles to the story. Lindiwe explained that she had a boyfriend at the time, but that "if my mother sees my boyfriend it is like I'm not respecting her." Lindiwe wasn't hiding the relationship: her mother knew perfectly well that Lindiwe had a lover who stayed overnight, but both of them preferred that Lindiwe had privacy so that this arrangement was not visible to her mother. She explained this as part of her culture. Lindiwe also felt more at liberty to conduct her love affair away from her children, so it was better for the children to live with their grandmother.

There were other important reasons too, and they related to Noluthando's own preference. Noluthando told Lindiwe, "You can have your own house but you can't have your children. They are going to stay with me." Lindiwe's younger brother Sabelo was also staying with Noluthando and attending high school in Hout Bay. But Lindiwe says, "He was already old at that time, and going with his friends after school, and my mum did not want to be alone." Her sister Vuyo had moved into another shack with her boyfriend. Having the children meant that Noluthando had extra hands to help her, and had company in the evenings. Besides, she had always been the main mother figure to the children, as Lindiwe had left home when they were very young. Her mother used to taunt Lindiwe, saying, "This is my child, not your child." When Lindiwe asked the children for their opinion, they said they were happy with the plan. So the separate living arrangements were in the end attributed to four main considerations: security in the event of a fire, Lindiwe's privacy, company and assistance for Noluthando, and the close relationship that existed between Noluthando and the children as she had spent more time with them while Lindiwe was a migrant worker.

Lindiwe continued to support the children and her mother, buying all their food and other necessities. In fact from 2006, when she was working full time, she supported the whole family, including her younger brother who was finishing high school, and her sister who was unemployed and living with her boyfriend.

Noluthando's shack burnt down in 2008. They managed to get some of their possessions out and put them in Lindiwe's shack. She was worried that the fire might burn her shack too, but luckily the fire didn't reach it. The children were at home, and they still remember it well because that was the time that Asanda, aged 14 years, saved their neighbour's baby from the fire.

This was their third shack fire in six years. They rebuilt Noluthando's shack, while all staying together in Lindiwe's shack.

6.4.2   Working in Cape Town

Lindiwe first got a job as a domestic worker in 2005, four years after moving to Cape Town. She worked one day a week, which was later extended to two days a week.

She talked about the feeling of being lost when arriving in Cape Town. She had no idea about the place and didn't know how to behave or communicate as she had only lived in a village. She hated working at the shebeen and was desperate to find employment as a domestic worker. The first time she went to look for a job she had no idea what to say. A group of five friends had gone job hunting together – they went to a part of Hout Bay where white people stay. When they got there they chose a street and divided up the houses so that they could take turns going door to door to ask for work. Then they looked at each other and asked each other what they would say when someone opened the door. "Nobody knew," she said, laughing. They didn't even know the English words. Somebody remembered the word "job" and they all practised saying the word "job, job, job" and decided that they would also gesticulate to explain what they meant. She showed me how they would demonstrate sweeping and cleaning. They had no luck that day. They also tried to find work at the harbour in Hout Bay as they had heard that the manager of one of the shops was looking for employees. They got there so early in the morning that they went to sleep while waiting. When the manager arrived they told him that they had come to work for him. He said there was no work here, they were mistaken, and aggressively chased them away.

Her first job as a domestic worker was for a woman in Llandudno, a small cluster of expensive houses above a secluded beach on the Atlantic seaboard around a headland from Hout Bay. She was surprised to get the job. "I had never worked as a domestic worker, I didn't know how to use a Hoover. I didn't even know the English word for a broom," she remembers, laughing again. She had to act out sweeping to her employer in order to ask where the broom was kept. That first day, her employer put the laundry into the washing machine and said, "Lindiwe, I'm going out. You must take the washing out of the machine when it is done, and hang it up." Then Lindiwe was alone in the house. She waited for the machine. She had no idea how long a washing cycle would take. After what seemed like a very long time she thought it must be done and wrenched the door open. Water came gushing out all over the floor. She hung up the washing and cleaned up the mess. She thought she must have broken the machine and had a long terrifying wait for her employer during which she wondered whether she should tell her employer what had happened or just keep quiet. Eventually she decided it would be best to be honest, and felt sure that she would be fired instantly, on her first day, and that would be the end of her time as a domestic worker. When the woman returned Lindiwe said, "I'm very sorry, I think I have broken your machine." Her employer checked the machine and said that it was indeed broken and would need to be fixed. But she didn't fire Lindiwe. Instead she explained how the machine works and how to tell when it is finished, and also explained other things.

Another day, Lindiwe went out into the back courtyard to hang up washing but didn't know that she needed to secure the latch on the back door as she was unfamiliar with Yale locks. The door swung closed, and Lindiwe was locked out of the house for the whole day. There was no shade –

she just stayed outside in the hot sun and got burnt, feeling very silly and waiting for her employer to arrive back and let her in. She laughs as she remembers hearing her employer calling for her around the house, and her employer's surprise when she eventually found her locked out in the back yard.

After a month, her employer told her she was a slow learner, paid her and fired her.

Her next employer was in Hout Bay. This was much easier as the family already had a domestic worker who could show her everything and explain things to her in Xhosa. Lindiwe worked just one day a week: the employer ran a small guest house in a cottage on the premises and her job was to keep it clean and ready for guests.

In 2006 she got a full time job as a domestic worker and nanny. Her employer, also in Hout Bay, had two children, both girls, whom Lindiwe cared for and loved. This job lasted until 2012, until her employer said, "Lindiwe, now the children are growing up, they are going to school so we don't need to have a fulltime nanny." She said they could only employ her for two and half days a week, and they found someone else, a friend of their family, to employ her for the rest of the time. Lindiwe was worried that it might be too much work as it is a much heavier workload to split one's time between different households than to work for a single household. But they agreed to try it out. Lindiwe found the arrangement particularly hard because there was a lot of work on a Monday – she had to deal with all the washing and the dishes and dirt from the weekend, but her job was split so that she had to spend half of every Monday at one house, and half at the other. She was exhausted and stressed, and made mistakes. "I told my old boss that it wasn't working out: I had a lot of stress, and it's better to have just one job. So I left the old job and stayed with the new employer." Her new employer increased Lindiwe's job to three days a week, and this arrangement continued for three years. In mid-2015 she got an additional job, two days a week, for an employer in Claremont.

These two jobs added up to full time employment, but this time Lindiwe was managing fine. The difference was that her boss in Claremont did not expect her to do everything every day, for example she didn't always have to do the ironing. Her confidence grew, and she started taking pleasure in setting herself goals and timing herself as she went about her domestic work. The house in Claremont where she still works two days a week is enormous. It has nine rooms and an outside cottage for visitors. When she started working there her employer would give her a lot of instructions. Lindiwe parodies her: "Lindiwe, go and clean the bathroom, or do this or do that." And Lindiwe would be able to say, "I've already finished it." Her employer said, "Wow, Lindiwe, you are so good. I've never had someone who cleaned so well and so quickly." Lindiwe decides the order in which she will set about cleaning the house, and allocates one hour to this, two hours to that. Then she times herself on her cell phone and tries to beat her previous record. When she is finished everything she can go home. So her work days have become shorter as she becomes more efficient. By the end of 2016 she was still working for the Claremont employer but had left her other job after a serious fight with her employer. She was down to two days a week and was struggling financially, and falling deeper into debt. The financial shocks of the year – the destruction of her shack by fire and the arrival of her grandchild – compounded her financial anxieties.

She has other dreams. She doesn't want to be a domestic worker all her life. She had some years of experience as a child-minder and enjoys looking after young children. She would like to train in ECD (early childhood development) and get a job at an ECD centre. But she would need a matric to do this, so would have to go back to school first. She's prepared to study again but isn't sure how or where to go. She has always been aware of the importance of education, but hers was compromised in two ways. First, she believes that the education she received in the Eastern Cape did not prepare her for life in the city or for the world of work, largely because she could not speak English when she came to Cape Town. It is for this reason that she was determined to bring her children to Cape Town before they started school, even though she was not ready – she had intended to get a stable job before they came. Second, she sacrificed the end of her schooling in order to support her family. Although this was not her decision, and she was not able to provide financial support to the family for many years, she sees that it was necessary. Her younger sister also left school before finishing, and her younger brother Dumile stopped school soon after their father died. Noluthando commented (perhaps unfairly, given that Dumile has a learning difficulty, Vuyo was expelled and she herself forced Lindiwe to leave school in order to work): "The only person I remember persevering, even though it was difficult, was Sabelo."

Lindiwe is determined that her children will finish their schooling and study further to get skills so that they can get good jobs. This means that she must continue to support them even when they leave school so, although she dreams of a different career, she is resigned to staying in domestic work for the foreseeable future.

6.4.3   A formal house

Noluthando is a formidable and well-educated woman. She herself acknowledges: "I'm from the rural areas but we were taught by the old teachers who had strong education." She soon got involved in local politics and development work, and became a respected member of the street committee in Mandela Park. Through her contacts or her position she managed to get her name onto a waiting list for formal housing in 2007, and fast-tracked her way up the waiting list. The small housing development in Mandela Park is a philanthropic project linked to the national housing subsidy scheme. The houses, which are slightly larger than the usual $40m^2$ subsidy-linked units, are co-funded by the Niall Mellon Township Trust and built by volunteers from Ireland in collaboration with local residents and the City of Cape Town. Community leaders have had an influential role in the targeting and selection of beneficiaries.

Noluthando received her house in 2010 and moved in, together with her two grandchildren and her youngest son Sabelo. Lindiwe continued to live in her own shack. The front part of the house, with two windows facing the street, is an open plan space with a kitchenette on one side of the front door and a living room on the other. There are two small bedrooms and a bathroom with a flush toilet and running water. Their standard of living improved dramatically, as they were previously reliant on communal services to the informal settlement, which were insufficient to provide adequately for all the households and were poorly maintained.

Stock photo of formal houses in Mandela Park, built by the Niall Mellon Township trust.
Picture credit: Artur Widak / Getty Images

But Noluthando only stayed for a year. With the whole family away from the Eastern Cape, their homestead there was locked up and empty. Their house had been broken into numerous times, and their possessions stolen. Some of the furniture was vandalised. Noluthando gave a key to the neighbours and asked them to keep an eye on things but "closing up the house is a problem." Their own neighbours turned out to be among those who damaged and stole things: "They stole some of the plates and basins and whatnot. We had many but now we are scrimping. It's like that."

Lindiwe also talked about this problem, saying that whenever the family went to Cape Town they would come back and find that a lot of the belongings were damaged or missing; even if people break in, their neighbours do not intervene or ask them what they are doing. Various households, knowing that their neighbour had the key, would claim that they had arranged to borrow items and borrow the key to get in. This led to awkward situations where Lindiwe's family would see their own kettle or washbasin at somebody else's house when they returned, but didn't want to confront them openly and so kept quiet and tried to replace the items.

In addition to concerns about their rural home, Noluthando felt that her work in Cape Town was done. She had achieved her purpose, which was to ensure that her children could sustain themselves and the next generation.

> So when I saw that the children are now working, things now are not the same as before. And also, all of them including Sabelo, I have educated them by combining saliva and tears until they became real people. So I decided that I am not leaving behind people who can't take care of themselves over there. When my work ended it was good to come back home and open the house. So [I decided that] I am going home now because I am not leaving behind people who can't do anything for themselves, they are adults, and Asanda and others are at school, they are grown. So much that I came back in 2010 [actually 2011].

194

When Noluthando left, Lindiwe moved into the formal house and lived with her children. Lindiwe was 32 years old, Asanda was 17 and Sipho was 12. It was the first time that the three of them had lived together in the same home. Her brother Dumile, who had a mental illness, also stayed with them a lot of the time and she continued to support him financially and monitor his behaviour, taking him to the mental hospital when necessary. The other siblings had their own homes now – her brother Sabelo in a shack in Mandela Park, and her sister Vuyo with her husband in Mfuleni – but they often visited each other.

6.4.4 Where to bring up children?

Their quality of life had ostensibly improved. Lindiwe had a stable job, they were living in a formal house, and both her children were attending schools that she felt provided a good education. But there were still stresses and worries: about money, about the safety of her mother who was living alone in the Eastern Cape, and about the safety of her children.

Asanda was about 12 or 14 when she learned that Lindiwe was her biological mother. Noluthando decided that it was time to tell her the truth about how Lindiwe got pregnant, as a warning and a lesson. She told Asanda the story of the rape, without Lindiwe's knowledge. I asked Lindiwe whether she minded this but she said that it was good that Asanda knew the truth, and it was better for Noluthando to tell her. Lindiwe also had concerns about Asanda's safety and wanted her to learn caution. Their relationship remained the same, and they continued to refer to one another as sister.

When Asanda was in Grade 11 and 12 she went through what Lindiwe called a bad stage when she had many friends and was going out a lot. Lindiwe was worried that Asanda might succumb to bad influences and was particularly worried that Asanda would get pregnant before finishing school. She says, "I didn't want Asanda to be the same as me." She decided that Asanda should know about sex, and took her to the clinic "so that she can know everything". She says, echoing Bongani's statements from years before: "I blame my mother, she told me nothing. I know why: the thing that is difficult with our culture is that parents are scared to talk about it. Now TV is helping us because you see something and then you can start talking about it." Although it was awkward, she made an effort to talk openly to Asanda about sex.

Lindiwe had worries about Sipho too. During 2015, while I was doing fieldwork in Mandela Park, violent clashes erupted between groups of young men and boys. While Mandela Park does not have a history of gangsterism, it does have high levels of youth unemployment, and gang activities started to emerge through rising crime and then open warfare between competing factions. According to some reports the timing was linked to the release of a number of gang members from prison. This was a scary time for all residents and I also stopped visiting the area for a while. The media had reported that women and children had rushed to the police station for safety. I checked in with Lindiwe via whatsapp and she confirmed that the family were all safe.

> *Hi kath, i am ok and my family also, but we keep ourself inside not walking around*

Talking about it later she said it was lucky that they were not affected, and she believes this is because her son wasn't involved in those groups.

The thing that affected other parents is that their children were in those groups that were fighting … We were worried because when they were fighting they didn't care about other people – if they were throwing stones or starting a fire. Even at school we were worried about our children there, because there was also fighting at school.

What helps is the community, because the police didn't find a way that they could help. But the community came together and started the patrols – the men have been patrolling every night, and since then nothing has happened. So now we are not in that scare. The children respect them because if they [the patrol] find the children when they are doing something, they just beat them … They didn't hand them over to the police; they just beat them. They [the youth gangs] were also stealing things, phones and other things from the houses, but now they have stopped.

But it was very bad because each and every weekend there was someone who died.

This led us into a discussion about the relative merits of the city and rural areas for children. I asked Lindiwe which would be a better place to grow up, when she reflected on her own rural childhood and the environment where her children are now. There wasn't a clear answer: there are pros and cons to both. Her own childhood was happy and in retrospect felt carefree, but the schooling was terrible and there were also problems of violence and crime. She believes that things are worse now: "It's also the same at the Eastern Cape. Other parents took their children from here to the Eastern Cape, but when they get there they are still doing the same things that they do here. It's not safe there also. But I think some places are better than others." She would not send her children to live in the Eastern Cape again because her priority for them is to get the best possible free education, as she cannot afford to pay fees. And she thinks they are best off with her where she can keep an eye on them, support them and give them advice.

She is proud of her children and how they are progressing. Sipho attends Harbour High School and is passing his grades. He is a diligent student and also very helpful to his mother. He has friends, and is learning to play the violin as part of a local music outreach project. Asanda passed matric at the end of 2014, and her mother paid for her to do a six-month course in telemarketing. She then saw an advertisement for employment on international luxury cruise ships through the Royal Caribbean Cruise Line. Asanda applied and was accepted onto the training course. She planned to start working immediately after completing the course and there was the prospect of being able to return substantial income as she would not have living expenses. She would also get to travel to foreign countries and see the wider world. The company would pay for her airfare and had already organised her passport and international visas. Asanda was the new hope of the family: she would travel further and potentially earn more than anyone else.

6.5 The ambiguity of home and unpredictability of life

6.5.1 Return trip #1

The original plan was for us to travel together by bus to the Eastern Cape at the end of 2015 – for me to accompany Lindiwe on her usual route to her rural home. Delays in finalising leave dates with her employer changed this. She only managed to confirm her leave dates the week before, and by then most of the buses were fully booked. Her last day at work would be Tuesday 15 December. But she could not leave the following day (a public holiday) as she needed to do her Christmas shopping and get her hair done. As this left only a few days for us in the Eastern Cape before I had to return to my family for Christmas, I suggested that we save time by flying, and I had money to cover our travel costs. I was a little unsure of this suggestion, and how to justify it to her: she had never flown before and for the same price she could have transported herself and both her children to the Eastern Cape. The one-way air ticket cost R2000; the bus she usually travels on (Jobela or City-to-City) costs R600. But she was delighted. As the day got closer, the whatsapp messages increased.

> Hi I cant wait, am so excited, yeah I packed already

We had arranged for a shuttle service to collect Lindiwe at the police station at the entrance to Mandela Park at 5.20am and then collect me from my house in Observatory at 5.40. Nwabisa, my research assistant, was living in Grahamstown and was driving the hired car to meet us in East London. We were at Cape Town airport just before 6am and checked in our luggage. We took photos of each other and selfies of the two of us in the airport terminal, and she whatsapped them immediately to her sister and other family members.

We talked throughout the flight. We talked about going home, and I asked her which place felt more like "home" – Cape Town or Willowvale. She said they were both home but "the Eastern Cape is the most home." Why was this? What is home? I asked. She explained that she had spent so much time at her childhood home: she was there all the time, never went anywhere during the school holidays. She had never travelled anywhere, not even to East London. She never thought she would go to Cape Town and the only reason she was there was for work. At the age of 36 she had still never been anywhere except Idutywa, the villages of Willowvale, and Cape Town. She distinguished between being a resident and being a citizen, using those English words. In Cape Town she was a resident. She had a house there, and a job and a daily life. But in the Eastern Cape she was a citizen. This was her true home.

At one stage during the flight she took out a small pocket book of readings from the gospel of St John and read a passage, then put it away in her handbag and looked pensively out of the window. She commented on the beauty of the clouds, which she had never seen from above. They were cumulus and bouncy, lit brightly by the sun. And then we descended through them and the green hills of the Eastern Cape lay below us, dotted with houses. "So quick," she said. The flight took one and a half hours. The bus trip takes over 16 hours.

As we walked down the steps onto the tarmac of the East London airfield she looked around and asked me quietly where her luggage was. I apologised for not explaining properly when we checked in the cases in Cape Town: the luggage has been put in the bottom of the aeroplane and

will be brought inside the terminal building where we collect it off a conveyor belt. I said this confidently, but inside I had a niggling worry – it doesn't always happen so neatly, luggage gets lost, damaged, opened… Hers was a big case, full of presents for her family. She had spent most of her remaining money on the gifts, clothes and hairdo for her homecoming. I felt a surge of relief as it appeared on the belt.

A short while later we met up with Nwabisa, wedged Lindiwe's large case and my small case into the back of the hired VW Polo and set off for Willowvale. In the car Lindiwe talked about the uncertainty surrounding her December trip home. She had decided at the beginning of the year that she wanted to go home for Christmas, but had not managed to save any money as she was paying for Asanda to attend a college to get a diploma. The trip was entirely dependent on her getting a bonus at the end of the year, but her employers are never explicit about whether they are going to give her a bonus. As it turned out, she did not get a bonus that year – and she had only discovered this when she was paid on her last day of work, two days before our trip and too late to book a bus. She had managed to buy a bus ticket for her son Sipho to return home and he was already in the Eastern Cape. She told us that he loves going home, and sulked for days when she first warned him that the trip might not happen. Her daughter Asanda was not going to the Eastern Cape at all this year. Lindiwe told us that she herself was only able to return because of the research project. I asked whether she could have asked her employers directly about the bonus, as she needs to budget so carefully. But she felt this was far too awkward and could have compromised her relationship with them. A bonus is a discretionary gift, not an entitlement. Yet she had hoped… and not receiving it was a great disappointment.

We talked all the way in the car, with Lindiwe holding the recorder. She asked us to stop in the town of Willowvale so that she could buy groceries to take home. We went into the big Boxer store where she bought bulk-sized containers of mealie meal, rice, oil, sugar, and also chicken pieces, long-life milk, vegetables and other items. We piled the shopping into our heavily laden car, put the cabbages on our laps and continued to the bottle store where she bought a bottle of brandy – a homecoming gift for the elders. Shortly before reaching Lindiwe's village we stopped off to look at her old high school. She had been pointing out the villages and significant places along the way. I am familiar with the Eastern Cape, having grown up there, and I have spent a fair amount of time in the former Transkei – both for holidays and research projects. I had built up a mental image of the places Lindiwe had described. But this was a new experience: I was seeing her world properly for the first time.

Willowvale main road in December

En route to Lindiwe's village

Unpacking the car at Lindiwe's rural home

The last short section of the drive is off-road and we scraped the chassis over the tufts of grass and occasional rocks. Her family's homestead is next to a new reservoir on the top of a hill and is now completely fenced off with a gate that locks. Lindiwe's mother came out to open the gate, and Sipho, Lindiwe's son, stopped the washing he was doing to come and greet us. Lindiwe's youngest brother Sabelo was also there, with his two-year-old daughter. Two nieces were there, staying with Noluthando. An inquisitive aunt (Noluthando's sister) had come by too, to wait for our arrival and see who we were. We were all introduced. After unloading the shopping and Lindiwe's suitcase, the rest of us talked politely in English and Xhosa while Lindiwe walked round the perimeter of the property to talk to her ancestors. As she was wearing pants, and this is generally frowned upon for women in traditional environments, she took off her jersey and wrapped it round her waist like a skirt.

6.5.2   Lindiwe's rural home

We hadn't meant to impose on the first day of the family reunion. Our intention was to deliver Lindiwe, greet the family and head straight to Kob Inn, a modest coastal holiday resort about forty minutes away and the only nearby accommodation other than a B&B in Idutywa, where we had stayed on the previous trip. But when Noluthando produced cooldrink and biscuits we stayed for a while and chatted. We told the family a bit about where we were from and what we were doing, as this unusual visit required some explanation. Our interviews would continue the following day.

Noluthando had been very busy cleaning the house and preparing for the arrival of her family. When we arrived she had just finished painting the middle house – a bright green – and the paint tins and brushes were still lying on the grass. (Later on, Lindiwe commented that the place was a mess and that she had spent much of the day after her arrival cleaning up.)

Sipho was also hard at work. Lindiwe had told us before that he loves the Eastern Cape and Nwabisa observed in her field notes how he seemed to fit right in:

> True to what Lindiwe had said about Sipho he really enjoys village life. During the brief time Kath and I spent at the house today, Sipho had to go fetch water. He came back with a full 20 litre bucket on his head. He seemed very comfortable doing this chore as if he had grown up doing it or as something that has been part of his daily life. Overall as his mother had said he is very disciplined and knows what his role is in the home when it comes to cleaning and helping maintain the household. As it is, when we arrived he was busy washing lace curtains outside.

Much of the work that Sipho was doing – fetching water, doing laundry, washing pots and dishes – is often regarded as women's work, and is exactly the kind of thing that Lindiwe described herself and other girls as doing when she was young. Lindiwe explains that in her household everyone works – men, women, boys and girls. This is how they were raised: "everyone is the same." Other than his two-year-old cousin, Sipho was the only child at the homestead, and it seemed that his age was more important than his gender in determining his role in performing household chores. Talking about it the next day, Lindiwe said that Sipho really likes the domestic chores but he works very hard and needs to take breaks otherwise the local boys will laugh at him. This suggests that, although Sipho is clearly used to doing this kind of work, it is not usual for boys of his age to do so much of it. She felt it was important for him to get out and socialise with his village friends. He was busy at the homestead, doing chores and playing with his young cousin, all

the time we were there. A year later, when Sipho was 17, things had changed. He was into designer clothes and was reluctant to return to the Eastern Cape and all the hard work that entailed.

Lindiwe's family have three dwellings on the homestead – two old rectangular buildings built from mud bricks and plastered with mud, and a new large rondavel built from cement bricks. The main house is still the two-roomed building (a bedroom and kitchen / sitting room) where the men who murdered Lindiwe's father knocked on the door many years ago. The sitting room is painted a dusky pink. Newly electrified, it has two plug points attached to the prepaid meter, from which a network of cables and adaptors run across the three dwellings. There are no other plugs and no light switches on the property. Sitting on the couch, it occurred to me that, in a household survey, this would be counted as a household with a "mains" electricity connection; it would be in the same category as my own suburban house. And yet they are not equivalent at all because the internal connections here were all makeshift and potentially hazardous.

Cooking no longer happens on a fire: there's a two-plate electric stove, balanced precariously on a low table. A large glass cabinet against one of the walls contains all the crockery and groceries, as well as a television set that was often on when we visited. The room is dominated by a lounge suite covered in plastic to protect it from dirt.

Lindiwe preparing samp and beans on the hotplate

The second rectangular building is much smaller, a single room that is used as a spare bedroom. Although the outside was freshly painted, the inside was damp and musty and the floor and walls were in need of repair.

The third building is the new rondavel, which Lindiwe and her brother Sabelo have paid for and local contractors have recently finished building. Lindiwe had opened an account with a building supply store and paid R750 per month over a period of two years – a total of R18,000. The shop has a branch in Willowvale which then delivered the building materials to her mother's house. Local contractors did the building. The labour costs were R3500 for the foundations, floor and walls, and another R2000 for the roof. Lindiwe is not sure about Sabelo's contributions. He was not able to pay as regularly as she did, but sent money to his mother when he was able to so that she could spend it on additional building expenses.

Lindiwe was dissatisfied with the new building as soon as she saw it. She complained that the windows were too small and that she had wanted an "eight-corner" (octagonal rondavel) which is more modern and has flat walls against which you can put furniture, unlike a round rondavel. She had invested over R20,000 in that building by saving hard and sending money home. It was meant to be a self-contained room where she or her siblings could stay when they come to the Eastern Cape. She still wants the contractors to change the windows, and they need to finish it properly and conduct the necessary traditional rituals. The tin roof will need to be covered with thatch for communication with ancestors, as there are no longer any thatched buildings on the property (the old cooking rondavel has been replaced by this one). A patch of the cement floor will be symbolically smeared with cow dung so that the space is suitable for cooking meat. For now, Lindiwe was sharing the old bedroom with her mother.

Below the three buildings a sagging fence of wooden poles and wire separates the residential homestead from the field. Other fields have mealies growing to shoulder height at this time of year, but Noluthando's field is fallow: she cannot plant it on her own. At the top of the field is an enclosed pit latrine, another new improvement to the homestead.

Behind the old house is a small kraal. It is empty and the gate stands open. The animals were stolen long ago. Lindiwe explains that "even though we don't have livestock, it is an important thing in our culture to have it, because that's where if things are not going well, then the old people in the family will go and talk in the kraal. We believe that our ancestors are there." The dregs of the brandy are scattered in the kraal as a libation. It's a sacred place and we don't go near it.

That evening the extended family got together for the second night in a row to drink brandy and talk. There had been a longstanding tension between their household and that of Lindiwe's nephew, whom she calls her brother. He is her father's grandson from his first marriage, and old enough to be her father. The families had not been on speaking terms for a long time. Lindiwe was unclear about the details but thought it dated back to the time when her younger brother was initiated and her nephew, the oldest male in that generation, felt excluded from the process and then refused to perform the roles expected of him. They had recently decided that the whole clan needed to meet and resolve the issue. Her father loved his oldest grandson and had told him the family secrets before he died, so the younger members of the generation depended on him to teach them the family ways. As they talked openly, it emerged that the entire matter had arisen

from a misunderstanding. Lindiwe's nephew visited the household on the first evening after we had left Lindiwe with her family. She heard about the reasons for the estrangement of the families, and the resolution, and they felt close again, talking late into the night.

She was telling this story as we walked down the path from her house to visit her old school. It was the beginning of a day of memories.

Lindiwe and Nwabisa on our walk through the village

6.5.3   Asanda's change of plan

Lindiwe first told me the big news while we were on the flight to East London: Asanda is pregnant. She says it out straight, but clearly it is a huge concern for the family. According to Lindiwe, this is the reason that Asanda is not returning to the Eastern Cape for Christmas in 2015 – not because she is too pregnant to travel, but so that she can avoid the family and especially her grandmother, Noluthando. Although both her mother and her grandmother had children out of marriage when they were younger than she is now, her pregnancy is a scandal and a disappointment.

The baby is due in March, so that makes her about six months pregnant at the time that we are travelling back to the Eastern Cape together for the first time.

> I caught her on the third month. She would keep saying that she feels pain in her lower back … and I counted the number of times that she kept complaining … Then one day I searched: I had this idea that I should search for her [clinic] card, and I couldn't find it at all – because I often see it and check her date. And then I asked her, "When last did you go to the clinic?" and she said that she doesn't remember. There is this time that she went there and found that it was full and came back. And then I checked her face and found that her face was glowing and beautiful, so I asked her, "What's going on with you, sister? Why are you beautiful and big?" And she laughed and didn't say anything [but] she knew it at the time.

Eventually Asanda sent Lindiwe a text message confirming her suspicions. She later told Lindiwe that she was afraid to tell her face to face. She had completely forgotten to return to the clinic for

her contraceptive injection and didn't notice that she had missed her period. It was her boyfriend who noticed a change in her body and asked her to go to the clinic for a pregnancy test. Sure enough, the test was positive – she was pregnant. Lindiwe approves of the boyfriend: he's been together with Asanda for about three years and is a decent young man. I ask whether she thinks they might get married and she says it's not even a consideration right now.

The family was shocked. Lindiwe's sister Vuyo is "like an old granny: she takes things to this level and her [blood] pressure goes up … She's strict in an unimaginable way," Lindiwe says. "Then I called my brother Sabelo and told him. And he said, "Oh sister what are we going to do with this? Asanda has disappointed us." Her own mother Noluthando is also very strict and Lindiwe completely agreed that Asanda should not go home for Christmas: she too did not want to face the family showdown that would ensue. But Noluthando already knew:

> Her spirit told her that something was up – because that's how my mother is… she sleeps and then dreams about things and she knows that once she dreams about something then it is like that. Every while she would call and ask about Asanda: "Where is my child? Is she all right?" We would be so afraid because we had this scandal we were not talking about.

Vuyo was eventually the one who told their mother about the pregnancy, when she returned to the Eastern Cape for a funeral. Noluthando said: "Oh well I knew it. I have been waiting for all of you to tell me … There is nothing we can do; we must endure." There was a sense that the family's hopes were pinned on Asanda, and this added to the shock and disappointment. Lindiwe herself told Asanda: "I first wasted my money when you went to school for the call centre course, and now this second one… this year you have hit me hard. It is no small thing." She was also worried about HIV:

> My heart skips a beat [when thinking about that disease] … It doesn't matter if someone says that they are 100 per cent [sure that they are HIV-negative], you should not trust them … The important thing is for both of you to go and get tested. This is something that I preach each and every time to her, that even if you meet someone you love so much … the most important thing at all times is the condom. But I don't know where she failed, I don't want to lie.

I asked what would happen about Asanda's plans to work on the cruise ships, whether this idea would be dropped now that Asanda was going to have a child. Lindiwe said firmly that the timing of the pregnancy was a real blow because Asanda was meant to leave early the next year (2016), but would now have to wait for the baby to be born in March. There was no way that she was going to give up this opportunity, and nobody in the family expected or wanted her to cancel the job – it was too great an opportunity for her, and for everyone. She would just have to delay it long enough to breastfeed the child for a few months and go later in the year. So Lindiwe will become a grandmother and will look after the baby while holding down her two jobs. The boyfriend's mother, who lives in a village in the Eastern Cape, has said that she will also move to Cape Town to help care for the child. They will share this grandmotherly duty between them, even if it means that the child moves between different homes.

In March 2016 Asanda gave birth to Babalwa. Her facebook page was filled with baby photos and the entire family was charmed by the big, healthy smiling baby girl. She was the centre of attention in all my visits, and from this point on the recorded interviews are full of chortles and baby talk.

According to Lindiwe, the cruise ship idea was dropped. She decided that Asanda should stay with the baby. Her primary reason – or the first reason she gave – was that Asanda should be punished for getting pregnant by being forced to look after her own baby. She later amended this, saying that it was important for Asanda to get experience in mothering her first child, so that she would have the skills to care for subsequent children. She added that she would not be able to work and look after a grandchild, and so the mother needed to stay.

Unbeknown to Lindiwe, it was entirely possible that Asanda could have left her baby to work on the cruise ships. When Babalwa was four months old, Asanda applied again for the job: "I was going to leave her because I could see that I was going to need money, and then I thought I need to make money so I would go on the ships.

It turned out later that the company had tried to contact her but were unable to reach her. Her mobile phone had dropped and broken and she spent months without a phone, forgetting to give them an alternative contact number. She forgot the password to her email and so did not see their messages until much later. In the meantime she got a job with the Mott Foundation teaching life skills at a local school, and it was this – not her mother – that convinced Asanda to stay. "Then I could see that I am getting a few cents, at least I can take care of Babalwa, and then I decided that I should go back to school and get a degree."

Asanda now plans to enrol at CPUT, a university of technology, to study further. Her first choice is tourism management followed by accounting, and she would also settle for teaching having had some experience as a school tutor. She had previously been accepted at the CPUT campus in Wellington (about an hour and a half from Cape Town) and was planning to apply again, although this means finding accommodation there and leaving her baby with her mother, Lindiwe.

6.5.4   Continued financial responsibility and insurance against shocks

One of my interviews with Lindiwe in late 2015 had to be cut short because she was going to a meeting of her new group savings scheme. In addition to managing day-to-day bills, supporting her children, sending money home to her mother, investing in the building of a rural house on the property, saving for the exorbitant cost of visits to the Eastern Cape and occasional claims on her generosity by extended family in need, Lindiwe has also taken it upon herself to ensure that the entire family is protected against the financial shock of death. She is the oldest of her siblings, and she remembers vividly how the death of her beloved Bongani plunged the family into financial ruin.

> When my brother passed away there wasn't even a cent, to go to the Eastern Cape or anything. He stopped paying the funeral plan when he stopped working, but it has a rule that if you stop for four months you don't get anything back. It was so hard, so painful.

She is already part of a burial society that covers her immediate family but doesn't cover the extended family. She is very practical about the details:

> The reason why [we need a new funeral plan] is because we have a lot of people in our family so we are trying to cover everyone. The one that I've got now just covers me, my mother and my children. I have cover of R30,000. If the problem is with me [if I die] then my children can get R15,000 in cash and they can also pay to take me to the mortuary, and buy me a coffin and organise

the transport that will take me to the Eastern Cape. My family won't have to pay any money. It helps so much. So we want another that can cover even my aunt, my brothers and sisters. Even if my brother has one already, I can also include him – because it's expensive to go to the Eastern Cape when somebody passes away.

The day we met she was going to join the new burial society. She feels that it's very good value – just R120 or R150 per month to cover everyone. She says, "We are just trying to build ourselves." My sense is that this could describe the entire family history.

To supplement her income she has allowed a tenant to build a shack at the back of the house and pay rent. She also still owns her shack in the informal section on the hill and rents it out. This means that, in addition to her job, she has two streams of rental income.

In mid-2016, we drew up a detailed budget of her income and expenses (Table 36). In addition to the regular items, there are occasional large costs. The expense of school uniform for Sipho has been a headache for her as he is constantly growing out of his clothes. A pair of shoes doesn't even last a year. Thankfully his growth seems to have slowed, and in any case he will be in his final year of school next year. At the beginning of 2016 Lindiwe had to spend about R400 on school uniform for him. One pair of school shoes alone cost R250. She also bought a pair of grey pants for R89, a white shirt for R25, a pair of socks for R15 and a school tie for R60. The previous year she had to buy him a school blazer as he had grown out of his. This alone cost R400. As a teenage boy he also wanted branded clothes and designer jeans. He had begged her for a pair of high-top takkies, which turned out to cost R1700. She was outraged that he should even ask for such a thing, but also felt guilty, and a failure in the face of his disappointment. As it was, the baby was a considerable expense. Asanda insisted on using disposable nappies and bottle feeding her with formula. Asanda wanted to be like the other young mothers in the township, and Lindiwe could not refuse. The baby was cared for by a day mother down the road, who looked after three babies in the mornings. This was necessary because Asanda was now doing a bit of teaching work at the local school. Although she was only paid a small stipend (which she kept as her own spending money) she was getting valuable experience and would have a reference at the end of it.

Lindiwe also had the considerable cost and effort of rebuilding her shack, which burnt down in March 2016. She had received the standard rebuilding kit from the City: 27 sheets of zinc for the walls and roof, ten poles, one door, one window and some nails. In addition, she bought cement, some extra poles, ceiling boards, paint, burglar bars for the window and a few other fittings. This cost R3500.

By mid-2016 she had had so many setbacks that she was desperate to return to the Eastern Cape. She said, "I'm sick and tired of staying in Cape Town now. Everything is just money money money."

As often happens when people estimate their monthly expenses, there appears to be a surplus, but in reality Lindiwe runs out of money every month. Debt repayment, funeral policies and remittances to her mother together amount to over half her monthly expenditure and she spends another R530 just on transport to work.

Table 36. Lindiwe's monthly budget in mid-2016

Monthly income	R6500	
Wages from employer 1 (employed 2 days a week)	R1900	
Wages from employer 2 (employed 3 days a week)	R2800	
Rent from tenant of shack in informal settlement	R500	
Rent from backyard tenant	R600	
Child support grant – Sipho	R350	
Child support grant – Babalwa (Asanda's baby)	R350	

Monthly expenditure	R6276	
Store card debt – Jet (total outstanding: R5000)	R500	Total debt repayment: R1360
Store card debt – HomeChoice (total outstanding: R2500)	R250	
Store card debt – Mr Price (total outstanding: R1200)	R150	
Store card debt – Woolworths (total outstanding: R1800)	R160	
Cell C contract (replaces phone lost in shack fire)	R296	
Funeral plan – Nonthuthuzelo (immediate family incl mother)	R150	Total funeral insurance: R490
Funeral plan – Ndondela (Self + Sihle)	R70	
Funeral plan – Sibanye (siblings)	R120	
Funeral plan – Malukhanye (aunts & uncles)	R150	
Payment of tenant's rent to mother in Eastern Cape	R600	Remitted to mother: R1100
Monthly remittance to mother in Eastern Cape	R500	
Transport to Claremont job (2 days a week by minibus taxi)	R230	
Transport to Camps Bay job (3 days a week by MyCity bus)	R300	
Eletricity (pre-paid: estimated average)	R400	
Monthly groceries – bulk shop	R1000	
Top-up shops (vegetables & small items)	R200	
Baby products (nappies and formula)	R600	
Morning day mother for Babalwa	R500	
Sipho's lunch money (R5 a day)	R100	

It was after we worked out this budget that Lindiwe left her employer for whom she was working three days a week. It was an extreme step to leave the job given her financial responsibilities, but she felt the situation had become untenable as their relationship had broken down. From that time, and for the rest of the year, she looked grim and tired, suffered from headaches, and we were worried about her health. She received constant phone calls from debt collectors who insisted that she pay her overdue accounts. Money problems were a daily nightmare and she longed for the mental escape that the Eastern Cape seemed to offer.

6.5.5   Further developments and concepts of home

Early in 2016 Lindiwe's shack burnt down. In a whatsapp message she told me that she had received some replacement materials from the City to help her rebuild, but she still had to buy cement, ceiling boards and other materials. The financial shocks never seem to end.

This is particularly devastating as Noluthando had told Lindiwe during her trip home in December 2015 that she was going to move back to Cape Town. Lindiwe had told us about this decision while

we were with her in the Eastern Cape: "Today she just told me that next year she will go back to Cape Town … she says she's tired of staying alone here, and she will go and live in Cape Town." We asked Lindiwe for her response: how did it affect her, and had they discussed it? Her main sense was the relief of not having to worry about her mother's safety.

> I mean it's all right with me, I am not worried, no I am not worried. It's very all right, because it is worrying [Noluthando being here in the Eastern Cape]. I mean most of the time, we have to make sure that each and every day she has airtime because we don't want her to go to bed without it, even if it is R5 airtime, we have to make sure that she has airtime. At least even if it is not going to help, just so that there could be people who would come quickly.

But this decision, made unilaterally by Noluthando and announced to her daughter the first morning after we had arrived in the Eastern Cape, has huge implications for Lindiwe. The formal house she lives in belongs to her mother. She says, "We can't all fit in there, I will go back and live in my house, in my shack, because we will not fit into that house. It's too small."

Their rural home in the Eastern Cape will be closed up again – something which both of them had talked about as a problem. Noluthando's decision is also striking in contrast to her previous description of her rural home as her true home. Like Lindiwe, Noluthando distinguished a place of residence from a place of citizenship:

> In the end I am a refugee in that country…. Because in the end even if you die in Cape Town you will be brought back to your home, to be buried here.
>
> *But what does home mean? If you have a home in Cape Town and you have a home in [this village], which one is home? Are they both home? Are they home in different ways? What is a home?*
>
> Over there I am a resident, and not a citizen, because there is a difference between a resident and a citizen. You see I got a house because I was living over there and I had a family, because I was living there with the hope that I could find a job and a place to rest my head. But a home, the real home is this one that I am a citizen in, this one is because I am a resident, when I am visiting, but all of those things belong to me because they are in my name.
>
> Well I am saying that I was born in L village, yes that is home, but this is my marital home because of this thing called a wife in Xhosa. My home where I was born is the Nkayi family in L village. I am married here, in M village, to the Gatyeni family, the Mabaso family, the clan name of this family is Gatyeni and the surname is Mabaso. And then I went to become a resident in Cape Town, and because of being a resident, I got the rights of a resident over there. Because I was looking for a dish in the dark, because I am the person whose husband left her with nothing, you see that.
>
> *So what is the main home, between L village and M village?*
>
> The home now is this one. Back home I no longer have a place. The real home is this one. I do go back just so that it could be known that I am a daughter of that home, and I am always welcome. But even when you stay over there, people will make their beds and prepare to sleep and they say, "Oh no, where is our sister going to sleep?" Which means that she left this place. I no longer have power over there, my power is here in M village. Although I call it a home, because it is a home that I was born into, I have no power over there. My power is here.

Because she is lonely and feels unsafe living on her own, even with extended family all around her, Noluthando has decided to leave her main home, the place where she feels she has citizenship and power, and move to a place where she is only a resident, also knowing that it will disrupt Lindiwe's household.

Lindiwe imagines that they will still return home at Christmas time, but cannot necessarily count on finding their possessions there. She thought they would ask the wife of her newly reconciled nephew to keep a check on the house.

> *So you're not going to lose your rural home?*
> No. Never, never, never. It will be Asanda and others who will discard it.

Asanda herself was less sure. She spoke of the dangers of the city, and the fact they require so much money because of the social pressure to appear decent. Rural villages are more peaceful, egalitarian and pleasant places to live in. The pressures are not the same. Nobody minds if you wear the same torn dress for a week. Contrary to what her mother imagines, Asanda also thinks of the village near Willowvale as "home" – she has clear memories of her early childhood there and a part of her would like to return there, but she knows that it simply can't provide the same opportunities.

> Here in Cape Town it's really bad because when a child is here he learns about drugs, he gets mixed up with bad friends and all of that, so you can't say that you will raise a child here. But then at the end of the day we raise them here in Cape Town because we want them to be something in life.

6.5.6   Return trip #2

One of Lindiwe's great worries throughout 2016 was the fact that her children had never been formally introduced to the ancestors and the elders through a process called *imbeleko*. This is an important rite of passage where the family or clan gathers at the homestead and a goat is ritually slaughtered in the family's kraal, then cooked and eaten by all – the child receiving a piece of unsalted meat to suck on. An elder from the community formally introduces the child to the family. Usually conducted in infancy or early childhood, *imbeleko* can also be done later in adolescence but must be completed before a boy is initiated. Sipho was 17 already, and needed to go through initiation next year. He could not have his *imbeleko* ceremony before his older sister Asanda had hers – or they could have theirs at the same time. It had been impossible to have the ceremony before now: Asanda's birth was a shock and her parenting arrangements were initially ambiguous, then there was the murder of Lindiwe's father and a long period of hardship and migration. Lindiwe had been away from home since Sipho was a baby and had never had the money to get the Cape Town contingent of the family back home and buy a goat – or two, if both children were to have the ritual. Lindiwe was beside herself with worry and felt like a failure. As I had remaining funds for field research running costs, this seemed an excellent use for them and an appropriate way of reciprocating after nearly two years of fairly invasive research. We booked tickets for the Cape Town family to travel to the Eastern Cape, got permission to spend NRF funding on two goats, and set off for Willowvale a year to the day after our first return trip together.

A reluctant goat is dragged towards the kraal (Lindiwe's photo)

The plan was for Nwabisa, Lindiwe and me to go ahead to the Eastern Cape to locate a goat owner and negotiate the sale. We took the baby with us. It was surprisingly difficult to buy a goat, even though they roam everywhere on the roads. On the third day we managed to clinch the sale with a goat owner and get the cash receipt that my university required. He would deliver the goats the day before the ceremony.

The children were to arrive a week later. They straight-out refused to go to the rural home so early, as they would have lost their "urban appearance" and good complexion by the time their peers arrived just before Christmas. They felt enormous pressure going to the rural home. They needed new clothes, and so did the baby. They had to look urban and successful. Asanda explained:

> If we go home, so people will expect that we have money ... If you show up with clothes that you were wearing here in Cape Town, then you get there and maybe there are some people from here, then they will say, "Oh we know what she is wearing, we are used to it, she often wears it in Cape Town, it's what she wakes up in" ... then it's all over the village. You must be someone, even though we don't have money ... In the rural areas you know that you should look good when you are from Cape Town, they have that expectation.

If there is no money to do her hair and buy the homecoming clothes she wants, then Asanda would rather not go home at all. Another reason for her reluctance is all the work required in the rural area. The previous time Asanda returned home early, she worked nonstop.

> We are the ones who do the work; oh how we work, we fetch water, we boil water, we are told that the water is finished, we bake, you are burning up while cooking. Then you pass the food around and when you finish that the old women want tea and while making them tea they tell you that a certain man has arrived, you must bring food, oh!

Sipho is also expected to work at the rural home because he was still a child up until the time of his initiation. He would also be expected to help his cousin who was being initiated – washing him,

burning the initiation hut, bringing the cousin home. "Everyone in the village works, it doesn't matter where you are from. Everyone, every boy is used." The siblings decided they would go home as late as possible to avoid work. This was the last year that Sipho would help with the household chores. After he is initiated he will no longer fetch water, do the washing or even make his grandmother a cup of tea. He says the other young men would "attack my dignity". Even in Cape Town, he will no longer help with the housework after he has been initiated.

The siblings had to go to the Eastern Cape because they knew that the *imbeleko* ritual was important. But they were determined to make the trip as short as possible, to try to be the last to arrive and to make a strong impression.

Nwabisa and I did not ask to attend the ritual and we were not invited to do so. This was a family affair. Lindiwe sent us photos of the preparations and both she and her mother sent text messages afterwards thanking us profusely for making the *imbeleko* possible. With such an important ritual completed, she felt better able to face another year of poverty and hardship in Cape Town.

Babalwa met her first chicken when she visited the family's rural home in 2016.

Figure 19.   Lindiwe's household in 2016

Share the two-bedroomed house

Lindiwe

Dumile

Sabelo

Noli

Share the one-room front yard shack

Asanda
b.1994
(Willowvale)

Sihle
b.1999
(Cape Town)

Coceka
b.2014

Babalwa
b.2016

Lindiwe's household

Figure 20.   Lindiwe's rural homestead

A: Lindiwe's childhood home. Now her mother Noluthando lives alone there.

B: Her paternal half-nephew's homestead. He is an elder in the village.

C: The new reservoir, which provides water to the communal taps for the whole village. The taps were installed in 2011/2012.

D: The forest, where they used to collect wood.

E: The spring, where Lindiwe collected water as a child.

F: The long winding road to the primary school.

6.6   Discussion

The case study provides a detailed account of life at the rural and urban ends of a migration path, and of multiple migrations within a single family. The effect of these movements was to link family members, through sequential migration, at the urban end, while retaining an occupied home of origin at the rural end.

Lindiwe's story starts with a retrospective life history in which events and decisions are compacted into clear (though at times contradictory) narratives. Even with this foreshortened perspective, there are at least 15 mobility events that affect Lindiwe, and later her children:

1. When she is a child, her father is a migrant worker in Cape Town. Her mother visits Cape Town every year to spend time with him, leaving the children at home with an aunt to keep an eye on them.
2. Her youngest brother is sent to live with his aunt in another district as she doesn't have children of her own. When that doesn't work out he returns home.
3. Her older brother is sent to Cape Town to find work and remit money home.
4. Her mother gets a job with a bus company, travelling between the Eastern Cape and Cape Town, leaving her four children and a grandchild at home with Lindiwe in charge.
5. Lindiwe travels to Cape Town to give birth to her second child and stays there for nearly three months.
6. Lindiwe's son is sent to live with his paternal grandmother in a neighbouring village.
7. Lindiwe is sent to Cape Town to look after her sick brother, leaving her two children in the Eastern Cape, in two different grandmothers' houses.
8. Her brother, now terminally ill, is brought from Cape Town to the Eastern Cape, where he dies.
9. Lindiwe stays in Cape Town as a migrant worker. Her children remain in the Eastern Cape.
10. Her mother comes to Cape Town, bringing Lindiwe's daughter with her so that she can get medical attention and go to school there. They live in a shack in Mandela Park. The shack burns down, and they have to rebuild.
11. Lindiwe's son moves to Cape Town to join the family and start school.
12. Their shack burns down. This time they get two shacks – Lindiwe lives alone; the children stay with their grandmother.
13. Lindiwe's mother, through her work in the street committee, is able to fast-track her application for a formal house, and they all move into the house.
14. Lindiwe's mother moves back to the Eastern Cape. Lindiwe and the children continue to stay in the formal two-bedroomed house. Lindiwe's younger brother Dumile stays in an informal room at the back of the house.
15. Her youngest brother, Sabelo, builds a shack in the front yard of the house and stays there with his partner and baby daughter. Dumile moves into the house and a paying tenant occupies the backyard shack.

The story then moves into the present tense, at the point when I am interviewing her (just as, in a panel study, it is possible to follow individuals in real time). At the end of 2015, after nearly a year of interviewing, there are further planned or anticipated movements for 2016:

16. Lindiwe's daughter will give birth, then leave home after a few months to work on the cruise ships. Lindiwe will care for her grandchild.
17. The baby's paternal grandmother will move from the Eastern Cape to Cape Town to help care for the baby, as Lindiwe is working.
18. Lindiwe's mother might move from the Eastern Cape back to Cape Town as she is too vulnerable on her own.
19. If Lindiwe's mother moves to Cape Town then Lindiwe will have to move out of the formal house, which belongs to her mother. She will move back into the shack that she still owns and rents out. It is not clear whether her children and grandchild will move with her or remain in the house with their grandmother.

None of these anticipated migrations materialise in 2016. Lindiwe's daughter stays at home in Cape Town and looks after her baby. Both the paternal and maternal grandmothers stay in the Eastern Cape and Lindiwe can keep the city house. Now what is anticipated for 2017 is that Asanda will study, possibly leaving her baby Babalwa with Lindiwe if she is accepted at an institution outside Cape Town. The baby would then need to go to a crèche as Lindiwe is working during the day. Sipho will complete his schooling and travel to the Eastern Cape at the end of the year to attend initiation school, after which he will almost certainly return to Cape Town. Lindiwe's dream at present (but not in 2015) is to return to the rural Eastern Cape as soon as her children have finished their further studies, got jobs and are able to support themselves. She imagines surviving by planting crops as they did when she was a child and living off the land. To her, that is a "simple life". She does not imagine that her children will ever want to live permanently in the rural home, even though they call it home. Both she and the children suggest a generational shift in attachment to the rural home, and therefore also in circular migration – the strength of the ties depend on where one grew up. Thus Asanda (who lived in the Eastern Cape until she was eight) feels a stronger tie than Sipho does (he left when he was six), but unlike Lindiwe, who was there until she was 20, neither of them envisage themselves living at the rural homestead permanently.

At the beginning of Lindiwe's migration story, Lindiwe is the potential labour migrant but she does not know it. Her brother has been sent to the city before her, and when he becomes sick, probably with AIDS, she is sent to look after him. The decision-maker is Lindiwe's mother Noluthando. In retrospect Lindiwe realises that her mother is sending her to replace her brother as the migrant worker and breadwinner of the family, knowing (but not revealing at the time) that his condition is likely to be terminal. As Lindiwe reflects back years later, she describes her mother as being slightly underhand or deceptive in the way she dispatches her to the city. The trip is framed as care, when in fact the eventual intention is about labour and remittances. As Noluthando describes it, the migration is a necessity, not a choice. And it is perhaps in her wisdom that she initially presents the trip to Lindiwe as a temporary caregiving arrangement, while hoping and anticipating that it will become a longer-term income-earning venture. The decision is made on behalf of the household, which it is Noluthando's burden to sustain. For her part, Lindiwe is trapped in unemployment or risky insecure part-time work for four years but is unable to return home, where the prospect of employment does not exist.

The case study illustrates the mobility of children (and of their mother and other adult relatives) and the fact that mobility takes many forms. There are large moves across provinces, but also

small moves as the family rebuilds destroyed shacks, reconfigures itself into separate households and then reunites in a formal house. Not all of children's mobility would be captured as migration when using provincial or even municipal moves as a measure. Caregiving arrangements are important in that they influence the migration of mothers and children. After the mother migrates, children are able to remain where they are because alternative care is available – in this case from two grandmothers. Children might also migrate, following the mother's path but not necessarily to join the mother. In the case study the children move to the same informal settlement as their mother, and are able to do so because their grandmother has also migrated and can care for them. Although they move to the place of their mother they do not live with her but with their grandmother, as part of a complex household strategy to insure against the shock of fire and afford the mother some privacy.

The case study describes a situation where children do not migrate with their mother even though she would have liked them to be with her. The combination of unemployment, poverty and unsuitable living arrangements means that she cannot bring them to live with her. Yet the desire for a better education for her children eventually outweighs the barriers to their migration. Her daughter migrates before Lindiwe is ready – when she still lives in a shack and is looking for work. As a result the child is exposed to the danger of multiple shack fires, but this is a trade-off for human capital investment (better health care and schooling).

The theme of "no choice" is what May was referring to when he described radical analysts as arguing that "individual migrants should not be conceived of as rational actors, maximizing their interests through a system of market forces, but instead, that the movement of migrant workers is a system, which is therefore beyond the control of any individual" (1987:125). It has been argued that neither functionalist nor historical-structural theories have adequate room for the idea of individual agency (the former because people are assumed to respond automatically to cost-benefit opportunities and outcomes; the latter because people are assumed to move passively in response to broader capitalist forces) (De Haas 2014; Potts 2011). Yet interestingly, the absence of real agency or lack of choice is precisely Lindiwe's experience of migration, and in fact even her mother, who makes the decisions, describes a migration decision as being simply a realisation of the only course of action, devoid of choice. She says: "For us people, life changes … and so when life changes you decide" – but you don't sit down and think about it; the decision simply comes to you as the only option. Choice, or absence of choice, is relevant to the initiation of a migration (as in the case of Noluthando's and Lindiwe's migrations, and later the sequential migrations of Lindiwe's children which, in their timing, are linked to schooling) as well as to the duration or permanence of the move.

Surveys have evolved clear definitions to distinguish categorically between temporary and permanent migrants. The definitions and criteria were discussed in chapter 4, and again in chapter 5 as regards NIDS specifically. The distinction between temporary and permanent migration is typically made in relation to three main criteria: the perception, from the vantage point of a household of origin, of an absent family member's household membership; the frequency and/or duration of return visits; and the intention of the migrant. The case study reveals that such clear definitions do not necessarily reflect the complexity and ambiguity of living arrangements. Lindiwe would almost certainly be regarded by her mother as a member of her rural household;

Lindiwe herself regards her rural home as her main home, the place where she is rooted or has "citizenship" and with which she maintains a connection. She remits money regularly to her mother and has also invested in building a house on the property. But she is indecisive about whether she would return to live there and she does not even visit every year. If her rural household had been surveyed by NIDS or the Agincourt HDSS, which use a broad definition of the household, and if the membership criteria were strictly applied by enumerators and respondents, she would have been recorded as a temporary migrant in 2016 (after I paid for her trip home at the end of 2015) and again in 2017 (after our trip at the end of 2016) but she would not have featured on the household roster in 2015 as she had been unable to return home the previous year, and it is quite possible that she will not return in the coming year, given her overwhelming debt and financial responsibilities. Over a four-year period she might have be recorded in household surveys as:

- 2015: absent household member (permanent migrant) – not on the household roster;
- 2016: nonresident household member (temporary migrant) – on the household roster;
- 2017: nonresident household member (temporary migrant) – on the household roster;
- 2018: absent household member (permanent migrant) – not on the household roster.

This finding articulates with the quantitative analysis, which suggested that the difference between absent mothers and non-resident mothers may be arbitrary. It is also consistent with the finding that absent mothers have frequent contact with their children. Lindiwe might regard herself as a nonresident member with ties to the rural household but vacillating return intentions. Temporary migrancy and membership of a single household might therefore be expected to fluctuate in surveys depending on whether nonresident household members have the time, resources or inclination to return home every year.

The definitional situation with her children is even more complicated. Asanda, now an adult, thinks of their rural home as her home of origin: she remembers her childhood years in the village and feels that she has roots there. She may well be regarded by her grandmother as a nonresident member of that household and, in years where she visited for at least two weeks over Christmas time, she could well be included on the household roster as a nonresident member, rendering her a temporary migrant. But she has no return intentions and in fact does not like returning to the Eastern Cape. She had not been there for five years before our trip, when she returned for the *imbeleko* ceremony. Her social life and opportunities are in Cape Town; she dislikes the way that being in the rural area makes one drab and dusty, and she dislikes the household chores that seem like hard labour compared with those in the city. A survey that recorded Asanda as a nonresident member of the rural household would be misrepresenting her situation and intentions. It would certainly not be an example of the temporary migrant envisaged by Collinson et al. when they explain: "A temporary migrant leaves behind a viable household and aims to send back resources to the household" (Collinson et al. cited in Kautzky 2009:7).[39] Similarly, in Lindiwe's story the return of resources to a household of origin is not directly linked to any sense of temporary migrant status. Neither was there ever a time when she definitely stopped being a temporary migrant. The remittances that Lindiwe sends to her mother are simply designed to support her mother, who is not working or receiving a pension. Even her investment in an additional rondawel

---

[39] The report that Kautzky cites is not publicly available. For the full quote, see Kautzky 2009.

on the property is not linked to a definite return migration intention. Rather she explains it as being a place where she and her brother can stay when they visit, as she no longer wants to share a room with her mother.

The research has shown that Lindiwe's temporary or permanent migrant status cannot be clearly ascertained from annual return visits of at least two weeks as these depend on resources and failure to visit does not reflect a loss of connection. Her migrant status cannot be deduced from her intentions, which are unclear even to herself and change over time. It cannot be determined from remittances or investments in the rural household either, since these are not linked to migration intentions. Another option in the literature is to do with family co-migration: Collinson et al. report that a temporary migrant is usually solitary,

> whereas permanent migration is more likely to happen in larger groups, as children move with adults, or whole households move…. The fact that a whole household moves reduces the need for circular migration in order for key household members to remain in contact and so when a household moves together it is likely to show weaker links between migrants and sending households." (Collinson et al. 2009, cited in Kautzky 2009)

This claim does not ring true in Lindiwe's case either, given that there was never a time when the "whole household" had moved. Instead, the household has remained dispersed across Mandela Park, across greater Cape Town and across the provinces of the Western and Eastern Cape. The fact that a critical mass of family members now live in Cape Town has not reduced the ties with the rural home. Trager argues that an important difference between migration in many African countries and in the Philippines is that in Africa, where there is often a strong connection to land, "the ties are to *place* … as well as to *people*" (Trager 1991:182, her emphasis) and that this creates a single path. In the Philippines the same attachment to land does not exist; instead the family disperses in several directions, creating multi-directional ties so that family members can travel to many places to visit kin. Despite the dispersal of Lindiwe's family, the ties are still strongly to the home of origin, where the family congregates from time to time. It is partly the large gatherings at the rural home that have required investment in a new building to provide more accommodation.

The case study shows that migration is often not a linear process; rather, there can be multiple moves between rural and urban areas. It traces processes of stepwise urban migration for an entire family (and indeed the extended family, although they are not prominent in the case study itself. The family holds an annual beach picnic at Clifton beach, where about fifty family members attend). It also shows reverse migration – in this case, of Noluthando the grandmother. But circular migration does not mean that the final destination is the place of origin. Even as she approaches pension age, Noluthando is unsure where she will live, changing her mind three times in two years. Lindiwe also vacillates. Importantly, the options are there in theory, even if eking out a rural livelihood may be difficult in practice. The circularity of the migration route echoes Potts (2011) in her rejection of linear theorising particularly in the Southern African context of high unemployment rates and strong cultural attachment to land and place of origin. The fact of a rural home enables urban processes; the possibility of circular migration is the mechanism for urban migration. Thus the former homelands retain the insurance function that was deliberately adopted by the apartheid regime.

The main predictor of permanent versus temporary migration status, in Lindiwe's story, has to do with her quality of life in the city. She describes herself as "trying to live". When she feels successful in this endeavour, when she is fully employed and getting along with her employers, when she is coping financially, when she is in a formal house without fear of fire, when she is not worried about her children, then she does not talk of returning home. But "a shack is not a home" and when city life feels overly demanding or unstable, when everything revolves around money and there is insecurity and anxiety, then the peace, the relative isolation and the nonmaterialist character of the rural context seem attractive.

The rural home is not without difficulty and anxiety, however. Her mother Noluthando now lives alone at the rural home of origin but even she considered moving to Cape Town, leaving their rural house locked up. The family has had this situation before – a period when their Eastern Cape home was locked and empty, when all of them lived in Cape Town. Even then, there was ambiguity about the permanence of their status as city residents. The ties with the rural home are not only ties with family members, but ties with place. It is a place that symbolises home and the dignity of "citizenship", but a home where, because of historic underdevelopment, one cannot provide the means to live and is constantly vulnerable. The different generations are caught in this established but awkward path between two nodes, each with its own pros and cons: Noluthando might continue her rural life as a pensioner; Lindiwe is unsure where she will be and her decision will be informed largely by her fortunes in the coming years; her children are likely to remain in the city provided they can live a productive life there; the baby, Babalwa, may grow up to have memories of rural visits, but there are no plans for her to live there. She will therefore never experience a childhood in the rural household – something which the older generation claim as the main factor that creates the attachment of home. But her mother Asanda is determined to introduce her to the place and its significance:

> I will teach her to go home, I will teach her not to abandon the home. You must go home to check out your home, to see that okay, my grandfather is still there, his grave is still over there, and you go to the grandfather to tell him, "Grandfather, it's Asanda your grandchild, I have brought back your great-grandchild Babalwa." So you see, that is what we believe, that if you go there, you will come back.

At the end of 2016, Asanda buried Babalwa's umbilical cord in the Eastern Cape.

Chapter 7. Conclusion

Here I refer back to some of the main themes and findings of the thesis and reflect on the contribution of this research to what is known about children's households, their care and co-residence arrangements, and their patterns of migration. I consider how the quantitative and qualitative components have provided different kinds of data on migration and child care, and how the qualitative research has both affirmed the patterns found in the micro-data and shown up some of their limitations. Finally, I discuss the findings in relation to two main policy areas concerned respectively with the family and with the built environment. These areas have clear overlaps when it comes to children, but there is little articulation between the two at the level of policy. I argue that this is an oversight if the long-term effects of apartheid on the family are to be reversed.

7.1   Main themes and findings

7.1.1   Households and child care

Complex, fluid and stretched households are highly prevalent in South Africa, along with circular migration and the maintenance of rural households. Chapter 2 described how these patterns predated apartheid but were then effectively entrenched through a large and intricate regulatory framework that remained in place until at least the mid-1980s. The main purpose of the framework was to relegate Africans to the status of foreigners who could only acquire temporary residence rights as migrant workers in South Africa and whose movement could be controlled. The possibilities for urbanisation were eroded specifically for women and children. This history is important as it formalised the separation of migrant workers from their families, establishing a pattern that has persisted decades after the legal impediments to family life were removed. It also means that women and children were disproportionately discriminated against in terms of migration opportunities.

To trace these patterns from the past, chapter 3 analysed the African population of the independent homelands, established as remote labour reserves, and showed how, relative to the African population in white South Africa, the share living in homeland areas increased substantially over the decades between 1960 and 1980 while the share in urban areas declined, signifying the success of the apartheid homeland policy. By the time of regime change the majority of Africans were resident in the homelands, which comprised only 13 per cent of the land area of South Africa. Women, children and the elderly – i.e. those who were not directly serving the labour needs of whites – were over-represented in the homelands compared with the distribution of men. Men were separated from their partners and parents from their children. Low and declining rates of marriage and cohabitation between parents, particularly after 1980, also contributed to the nonresidence of fathers with children, and this trend has continued in the post-apartheid period. The dynamics of segregation and relocation are well known and their impacts on family life are often referred to. However, this research has for the first time used the available quantitative data to trace the distribution of children in the labour reserves over half a century,

demonstrating that in numeric terms the homeland policy was extremely effective at keeping the majority of African children out of white South Africa: by 1993 two-thirds of African children lived in the homelands. The quantitative analysis also shows a clear reversal of the trend in the recent past, so that by 2014 the share of African children living in the homelands had dropped to below half of all children – not quite back to 1960 levels. These statistics therefore suggest the considerable mobility of African children over the past two decades, although not necessarily their migration to urban destinations.

The trend towards greater urbanisation started somewhere between 1980 and 1993 as more adults moved to towns in search of work, often in defiance of the apartheid regulations. In chapter 3 I traced changes in the urban share of men, women and children over time and showed that the gender gap has narrowed substantially so that by 2014 women were almost as urbanised as men. Although the share of children in urban areas has increased too, child urbanisation rates lag well behind those of adults. The binary distinction between urban and rural is problematic in that it does not reflect the complexity of interdependence and population flows between locales, or the fact that the categories themselves are forced. Yet, assuming that repeated surveys occur at similar times of the year (and not over Christmas time) and are subject to the same kinds of errors, the analysis showed that the urban share of the population has grown substantially. This is in keeping with trends across the world and concurs with local analyses and projections from various sources. But in South Africa residence arrangements for many adult urban migrants continue to exclude children, and a large share of children live in households without their parents. This is particularly the case for children in rural areas. If the slower rate of child urbanisation is related to structural obstacles at the urban end, then this would mean that fragmentation, or separation of children from their mothers, is not a matter of choice but of constraints.

The extent of parental absence from children's households is uniquely high in South Africa. The research found that a quarter of all children do not have co-resident mothers while two-thirds do not have co-resident fathers, and that co-residence rates were dropping slightly. Rural children are less likely than urban children to live with their parents, and the difference has become more pronounced over time. This suggests that enduring adult labour migration patterns continue to separate parents from children (parental deaths account for only a small portion of parental absence, and labour migration accounts for the majority of children with nonresident parents). Of the 13 million African children under 15 years in 2014, 2.6 million have biological mothers who lived somewhere else. Conversely, a large number of mothers do not have their children living with them.

In the absence of parents the burden of child care generally falls on the extended family. Complex or extended households have remained the norm for most children, although they have also reduced in size – alongside a general drop in household size across the country. The research found that children's households are increasingly feminised in that their adult members are only female or they are headed by women. This has long been the case in rural areas, but the rate of increase is particularly pronounced in urban areas. Unemployment levels are high generally, but they are even higher in households headed by women, compared with those headed by men. Women bear the main burden of caring for children and supporting them financially. This places mothers in a double-bind, as the case study clearly shows: it is not possible to work or seek work

and look after young children at the same time. In the absence of affordable (which for many would mean free) day care services for children, having children may necessitate a choice between having another person in the household who can provide care, and having the children live elsewhere with someone who can provide care. Both scenarios require the availability of a substitute caregiver, usually a female family member, who is not working.

The child-focused analysis provided an opportunity to test the distinction, adopted in studies that explore labour migration and inter-household relationships, between nonresident and absent family members. Most household surveys collect information only on household members who are physically resident in the household for much of the year. But the NIDS survey, analysed in this thesis, allows one to distinguish between household members who are not resident in the household ("nonresident"), and family members who are not considered to be part of the household at all ("absent"). When analysing data from the perspective of a child one has access not only to basic demographic data on nonresident members, but also on absent parents. It is because of this additional detail that it was possible to examine differences between nonresident mothers (who are on the household roster) and absent mothers (who are not). It would be expected that by virtue of their membership status, nonresident mothers would maintain closer ties with children than absent mothers and would be more likely to become united with children over the course of the NIDS panel. However the analysis presented in chapter 5 suggested that the distinction between nonresident mothers and absent mothers did not significantly distinguish the frequency of contact between mothers and children, nor was it a good proxy for predicting future cohabitation of mothers and children who lived separately at baseline. This raises questions about whether these categories are useful in distinguishing the strength of ties between family members who do not co-reside.

7.1.2   Child and maternal migration

The fact that women's migration rates have increased in South Africa is significant for children, especially as the increase affects prime-age women in particular. Unless there were a similar increase in child migration rates, the expected outcome would be a rise in the share of children living without co-resident mothers. The analyses presented in chapter 3 suggest that this has not happened: maternal co-residence rates have declined only slightly since 1993 (hovering around 75 per cent of all children) despite the rise of maternal orphaning and maternal migration. This suggests that more children must be migrating with, or to join, their mothers.

It is not possible to tell whether child migration rates have increased over the long term as there is no reliable baseline for comparison. NIDS provides the first national panel data from which migration rates can be measured directly rather than through retrospective reporting, which is less reliable. Nearly a million children (14 per cent out of a cohort of seven million) migrated across municipalities over a seven year period between 2008 and 2015. This is the first national estimate of child migration rates and supports evidence elsewhere that children are highly mobile. Chapter 5 also showed that an even larger share of children do not move, even when their mothers move. The immobility of children in the context of maternal migration may be due to obstacles at the (mother's) destination household, or it may be a deliberate strategy, or it could signify

vulnerability or lack of capability for migration – articulating with the theory of involuntary immobility (De Haas 2014).

The analysis found that younger children are more likely to migrate than older ones (within the age band). Other studies (for example Bennett et al. 2015; Madhavan et al. 2012) have similarly found that migration rates decline with the rising age of the child, and pick up again after the age of 15. The movement of young children may be related to their particular need for continuous care – a function often undertaken by family members in the absence of accessible, affordable or adequate child care facilities.

The analysis went further than purely examining children's migration rates: it linked maternal and child co-residence arrangements with maternal and child migration events (a migration event being a scenario in which either or both of the mother and child migrated) and found that a quarter of children nationally experienced maternal-child migration events before their fifteenth birthday. As found in the Hlabisa surveillance site (Madhavan et al. 2012), child migration is clearly associated with maternal migration. In both analyses (that from Hlabisa and my own), children with mothers who migrated were over forty times more likely to migrate than those whose mothers did not migrate. This implies that an increase in adult female migration is likely to be accompanied by increased child migration, although the children do not necessarily accompany migrant mothers. Some migration is in the opposite direction. One of the striking findings is that more than half of children who migrated did so independently of their mother in terms of timing (for example, to join their mother or to move away from their mother) – when weighted this amounted to 600,000 independent child migrants. Children who migrated were more likely than non-migrant children to be living apart from their mothers at baseline. Many of them migrated to join mothers who were looking for work. When children migrate to join their mothers the movement is likely to be towards urban areas. Conversely, children who consistently have nonresident mothers or are sent away from the mother's household are likely to end up staying in rural areas. In this way, rural households still carry a large burden of care for the dependants of those working in (or attempting to join) the urban labour force. This is precisely the vision that underpinned the establishment of the independent homelands, although the labour force then was largely envisaged as male.

The multi-directional spatial movement identified among children is strikingly different from adult migration patterns reported for South Africa (for example Schiel and Leibbrandt 2015), where the tendency has been for high rates of intra-area type movement, and an overall movement towards cities. Over a third of children who moved from an urban area ended up living in a rural area. About 80 per cent of child migrants whose household of origin was in the Western Cape went to the Eastern Cape, suggesting high rates of urban-to-rural migration for children who are sent away on that migration path. This challenges the view that migration is only, or particularly, an urban-bound process, and supports work by Potts and colleagues for other countries in Southern Africa (Potts 2011), which highlights patterns of return migration to rural areas.

The migration literature points to migration as a livelihood strategy, but one available only to those who can afford it. Co-migration of children may depend on resources for the additional cost of travel and the costs of accommodation and care at the destination. Conversely, maternal

absence or family fragmentation may signal household deprivation and vulnerability. Results from the national panel data analysis show that, as with more localised research, child migration is indeed associated with slightly higher household income, albeit that average incomes are generally low within the population of focus. The results also suggest that migration is associated with informality, in that children living in informal dwellings are more likely to be sent to live elsewhere than those in other kinds of housing. In the case study this was not an option, and the children were repeatedly exposed to the risk of fire. The household strategically split itself into two in order to counteract the risk of losing accommodation and possessions to shack fires. Children may be sent away from informal areas, but they also move into them as adults negotiate stepwise access to the city.

Patterns of child and maternal migration operate in many directions and configurations. Migration is not arbitrary: it uses resources and, as the literature describes, is the outcome of decisions made at individual and household levels. Yet migration events do not necessarily serve to unite children with their mothers. Sometimes they result in the separation of children from mothers. This suggests that what might be termed family fragmentation can be a household or child care strategy, the product of care choices made in the context of external forces and structural constraints. Any policy response concerned with the family would need to bear this in mind.

7.2 Contribution of the mixed method approach

Nationally representative surveys, including the NIDS panel and a range of cross-sectional surveys, have provided a much-needed national perspective on household and migration dynamics for children. This broad view is valuable for policy makers because it quantifies, for the first time, the extent of internal child migration across the country. The movement of people has always been of importance for policy and programming, including infrastructure planning. The analysis has also highlighted and quantified immobile children who might be regarded as potential migrants in that their mothers have migrated or live elsewhere.

The national trends have, at various points in this thesis, been compared with existing analyses from more localised studies based at demographic surveillance sites. The sites yield an abundance of data on migration and mobility but their main limitation is that of representivity. The NIDS analysis has now been able to confirm many of the previously reported patterns at a national level: that children are highly mobile and that their mobility is linked to the migration of mothers; that child migration is associated with slightly higher household income and younger age groups.

The qualitative study enhances the quantitative results in a number of ways. It affirms and provides context for the patterns observed in the national data: that children mostly live with mothers, but a substantial share do not; that fathers rarely feature, but that grandmothers and extended family play a crucial role in providing child care; that women carry an enormous financial burden and may be forced to migrate without their children. The qualitative data also suggest that children's migration is deliberate and strategic but strongly influenced by circumstance: for example it may happen at different times for siblings depending on the available care arrangements and on their life stage and school readiness; it may be delayed far longer than

planned, or happen prematurely, before the hoped-for living conditions are in place. Qualitative research can capture, in a way that surveys do not, the plans and aspirations of families and how these are modified over time as circumstances change – or fail to change in anticipated ways. For example, despite her desire to be with her children, the central character Lindiwe, a migrant mother, fails to have them living with her for much of their childhood, even after they migrate to the same place.

The available data sets, and particularly those like NIDS that use both broad and narrow definitions of the household, are designed to do the best job they can in characterising households and, in the case of NIDS, measuring the individual mobility of household members. The emphasis on following individuals rather than households is important because it acknowledges and caters for the fluidity of people in and out of households. Of course there are limits to what the data can show, particularly in contexts where populations are highly mobile. Household forms and relationships that precede the first wave of data collection are beyond the scope of the study; although attrition rates are low, some attrition will be the result of migration; and importantly the household survey approach offers only partial insights into family and social networks beyond the household, even if they are next door. The qualitative case study enables the study of a broader set of family relationships than is possible from analysis of household surveys, limited as they are by their own sampling method and definition of the household. Not being restricted to a specific sampling point or household definition, the case study can trace a dispersed family which at various times spans households in urban and rural nodes, or multiple households at the urban end. It describes the return migration of a sick household member and the separation of siblings who are sent to live in different households – a scenario that would be difficult to confirm even with panel data, as not all the intra-household relationships are defined in the available surveys. It incorporates family members – aunts, cousins, a paternal grandmother – who would not be counted as part of the household but nevertheless play important roles in supporting household processes, stepping in to provide care and facilitating migration.

Through repeated interviews and the construction of family history the case study is able to give a greater sense of continuity and connectedness between events than the panel survey, which is limited to snapshots at two-yearly intervals. In my own analysis, presented in chapter 5, I further reduced the panel data to a before–after comparison, losing the detail of the intervening waves, and this is a limitation of the study. Future research could augment this inquiry through more detailed analysis that models multiple or sequential migrations and the household circumstances surrounding them.

A number of central themes emerge from the case study. The survey data have shown that most children live in households with complex or extended relationship structures. The case study illustrates the complexity of household form and household relationships, with multiple generations and degrees of kinship, half-siblings, half-cousins, a granddaughter who is brought up as a daughter, and even an informally fostered child who is omitted from the household diagram but later enters the story as a beloved sister who provides an urban home base when Lindiwe migrates to the city for the first time to give birth. Following the key respondent Lindiwe over time, the case study household changes shape and size as well as place. Lindiwe lives in a large extended rural household as a child and later her own children are included; she lives in a small

adult-only household in the city, without her children; in a three-generation household with her mother, her child and two cousins crammed into a single shack; in a single-adult household (leaving her children and mother in a skip-generation household); in a larger three-generation household including her mother, her children and her siblings; in a two-generation household with her brother and children; and ultimately in a large, complex, three-generation household where she is a grandmother and has a backyard tenant and her younger brother's family in a front yard informal extension to the house. The case study describes not only an array of the household types defined from the survey data, but also the transitions between them. Such transitions also emerge if one treats Lindiwe's mother or either of her children as the index person. Each of them experiences different sequences of household configurations. In this way the study reveals that, while the distribution of children across the household types may be fairly stable, as shown by the comparative analysis of three surveys spanning two decades, there is considerable movement underlying this overall stability.

The case study illustrates the complicated dynamics of family relationships, some fraught with tension and distrust while others exemplify the stable agnatic support structures that Murray (1981) describes as keeping the family together even in the face of physical dispersion. It illustrates the reconfiguration of roles, responsibilities and power relations in the context of household shocks: in this case the deaths of two key family members who are both breadwinners force the women of the household – first Lindiwe's mother then Lindiwe herself – to redefine their role in the household even when they don't want to, prioritising financial responsibility over child care and, in the case of Lindiwe, reluctantly abandoning her education. Through the case study we see the necessity of female labour migration, even at the cost of family fragmentation and the separation of mothers from children. The decisions are described not as decisions between a choice of options, but about a lack of options. The alternative is to appeal to the mercy of an extended family that is estranged and unsupportive, compromising the family's dignity and risking deeper poverty.

The case study illustrates the complexity of migration dynamics and living arrangements through multiple migrations and smaller moves, and highlights some of the strategies and considerations surrounding them and the family networks that support them. It illustrates the role of substitute caregivers at the rural home, enabling the migration of a young adult mother, and the necessity of sharing child care responsibilities in an urban setting where the mother is working or seeking work. For the children to migrate and join their mother, their grandmother needs to migrate so that she can care for them, and their aunt must travel the migration path many times in order to chaperone them. The children's migration is scaffolded by multiple relatives as the entire family, in a number of sequential moves, relocates to Cape Town.

The urban migration strategy undertaken by Lindiwe and her family illustrates processes that are well established in the literature although they are not all typically associated with the migration events of a single family. There are the elements of sequential family migration with pioneer migrants making use of family networks and initially remitting back to the home of origin. Later, other family members follow the same migration path, building up social and family networks, which then facilitate the migration of more family migrants. Step migration is an important mechanism, although in this case the period of informality is associated with numerous setbacks

as shacks are repeatedly destroyed by fire. Ultimately, however, the family manages to secure ownership of a formal house, bringing some stability and, later, an additional income stream through backyard rental. Finally, there are elements of oscillating and return migration, which is held as a future possibility particularly for those in the middle and older generation, while the old mother, who has returned to the rural home, still entertains the possibility of another migration, back to the city.

In exploring the relationship between the origins and destinations of migration in the case study, the idea emerges of a tension between residency and citizenship. Residency is associated with the pragmatic question of housing and living arrangements in the city, linked to the need for income and for educating children so that they have better opportunities. Citizenship is described as less about the practicalities of housing and daily life; it is more about a sense of belonging, of power and a permanent home to which one is entitled. Both Lindiwe and her mother make this explicit distinction, and Lindiwe's daughter, now a young mother herself, also talks in these terms as she returns to the place of her birth to undergo the childhood ritual of *imbeleko* and to introduce her own baby to the extended family and the ancestors. Yet all three mothers have ambiguous feelings about where they will ultimately live, revealing the complexity of the push-pull dynamics in the context of dual housing arrangements and something of what Lindiwe describes as a generational shift in attachment to the land. The old mother tends towards the rural home, where she is staying at the end of the research period, yet she has also announced plans to move back to the city, away from the isolation and endless work and threats of living alone. The young mother, Lindiwe's daughter, feels thoroughly urban, has not been to the Eastern Cape for years and initially does not even want to return to the rural home, or wants to delay her return as long as possible in order to preserve the carefully cultivated sophistication of her urban appearance, which the harsh dusty conditions can unravel within days. Yet she too identifies it as home, a place of roots and buried umbilical cords. Lindiwe, in the middle generation, vacillates throughout the two years of the field research, her changes of heart suggesting that even a dedicated study of migration intentions would merely capture a moment in time. The changeability of her feeling about where to live is strongly linked to what migration theorists might call push factors. The stresses, shocks and money worries she experiences in the city push her back towards the imagined quiet and relaxation of rural life. The hard labour, family tensions and boredom she experiences at the rural homestead (where, incidentally, she became sick each time we visited) push her back to the city. The only certainty is that she will be buried at her rural home, as will the rest of her family, and for this a substantial portion of earnings are saved each month in funeral policies. Investments in construction of a new dwelling at the rural homestead ensure that there is a comfortable place for her to stay when she visits. Most surveys capture nothing of the duality of housing or home arrangements, as they do not ask about the existence of another home, or where people plan to retire or be buried.

The ambiguity around return migration is linked to uncertainty about whether Lindiwe is a temporary or a permanent migrant. It was impossible for either of us – she the migrant or me the researcher – to classify her status. The case study is a reminder that people have plans and aspirations that change as circumstances unfold, so that life's trajectory is not neatly mapped or predictable. Surveys may try to differentiate categories of migrants according to various rules (for example, based on their stated intentions, their remittance patterns, their non-residency status

of another household or the reported frequency or duration of return visits), but these measures are themselves likely to be dynamic, prone to change. Temporary migration is notoriously difficult to measure through household surveys and probably requires longitudinal data, collected over decades, that track the individual. It was impossible to pin down in the qualitative study.

The case study augments the picture in many ways. Although some aspects of the account are exceptional and may make Lindiwe's story appear anomalous, the events and processes that it describes in relation to family configuration, child care and migration are not uncommon when one compares it with the literature and the survey data. It cannot replace the quantitative analysis. It just describes one family's trajectory, and even that consists of different realities and conflicting accounts. The narrative I have presented largely smooths over inconsistencies by placing one character at the centre and prioritising her perspective. Even that individual story changed and contradicted itself at times as it evolved, demonstrating the complexity of constructing retrospective history and the difficulty of recall. Surveys are subject to similar limitations, especially as micro-data are often collected from a principal respondent whose recall or version of events might differ from those on whose behalf they are reporting. Still, the advantage of having large numbers is that there is some convergence on differing realities across households, which does not happen with an individual case study, and that the aggregate results are fairly reliable for the overall picture.

7.3 Some reflections on policy implications in the South African context

In December 2016 there was a media flurry around reports of a young mother who left her unsupervised young children tied to a bed inside a locked shack near Benoni, Johannesburg, while she went looking for a job. Her explanation was that she had no other option: she needed to find work, there was nobody else to care for her daughters (aged four and one), and she wanted to ensure that they were safe from rape and other threats in the informal settlement. The fact that the mother was a Zimbabwean immigrant may have meant that she was in a particularly vulnerable position, far from home and without family or social support networks. She was arrested and charged with child neglect. The children were institutionalised in a "place of safety". Community members pointed out that they need childcare facilities. (ENCA 2016).

Public responses to the story ranged from outrage at the negligence of the mother, to outrage at the impossible conditions under which mothers have to rear children. These reactions highlight the conjuncture of two areas of policy in South Africa that, in my view, are relevant to the themes and findings of the research presented in this thesis. The first relates to family policy and the second to the built environment and the continuation of structural arrangements that are not conducive to family life.

7.3.1 Family policy

The discourse on families and households frequently refers to changing family structure, the fragmentation of family, the rise of female-headed and skip-generation households, and so on, alluding to issues of vulnerability in a context where the notion of the family as the basic unit of society is threatened. Thus "policy and academic discussion of family forms has been overshadowed by moral and symbolic fears about 'break down' and 'fragmentation', especially with regard to dynamics of modernisation and urbanisation" (White 2002:1098). This discourse, often imbued with architectural imagery describing the family as a foundation, cornerstone, pillar or building block of society, has been taken up locally by political parties and by government (see, for example, Democratic Alliance n.d.; Department of Social Development 2013).

Concerns about family fragmentation are not new, and neither are critiques of it. Hunter has pointed out that as far back as the 1930s ethnographic studies "fed perceptions that African families were in slow but steady decline. Yet more recently, scholars have questioned teleological narratives of 'family breakdown' in Africa" (Hunter 2007:694). Even while the apartheid government was busy implementing policies that disrupted family life, it was stressing the importance of family life. In 1971 the minister of Social Welfare and Pensions was quoted as saying that "healthy families are the building blocks of a healthy and effective national structure" (Harvey 1994:2) – yet it was obvious that "the high value attached to the maintenance of the white family was evidently not attached to black family life" (Ibid:18). At the end of the apartheid era Edwin Harvey, then a director in the Department of National Health and Population Development, Family and Community Care, stated in his book on social change and family policy: "The change that family life has undergone over the years in South Africa, as well as the increasing family disintegration, has made family policy increasingly relevant" (Ibid:1). There was no explicit family policy at the time, but a family policy has been developed since, first as a Green Paper, and then (with some rewriting after that was critiqued as being socially conservative) as a White Paper (Department of Social Development 2013).

The White Paper on Families was approved by cabinet on 26 June 2013 as a "new family policy for South Africa … [whose implementation] would result in well-functioning and resilient families that are able to nurture and promote care to their family members" (Department of Social Development 2013). The historical racial differentiation in the way families were imagined and treated is an important point of departure for the White Paper, which observes (citing Harvey 1994:29) that "the government of the day's view [was] that 'the interests of the black group lay in the reserves, that the Indian group was an exogenous group and that the Coloureds should fend for themselves', [while] the Western core family was adopted as the model of family life in the country" (Department of Social Development 2013:7). The White Paper consciously departs from such assumptions, stating that "there are different types of families in South Africa which are products of various cultures and social contexts. Therefore, the need exists to recognise the diverse nature of South Africa's families in all initiatives that address their plight. This principle will guide Government and all stakeholders in their engagement with the family" (Ibid:9). However, the text goes on to emphasise the importance of the institution of marriage and of responsible parenting, assuming that the expected roles of parents are universal. I quote two paragraphs from the guiding principles, bullets inserted:

- Stable marital unions are essential for the stability of families and ultimately society's well-being. Where unions are flourishing, efforts will be made to promote them and where they are under threat there will be a focus on strengthening them.

- Family stability hinges on responsible parenting. Parents or caregivers will be encouraged to play their expected roles in the upbringing of their children. Where there is a case of parental breakdown or its absence, means will be sought of strengthening this area. (Ibid:9)

There seems to be an inherent contradiction in all this: the White Paper is careful to acknowledge the diversity of family types, which it sees as both a product of culture and of apartheid's social engineering. At the same time, its own explicit vision of the ideal family, rooted in an ideology of protection, is of a stable unit built on the foundation of marital union and the co-residence of biological parents with one another and their children. Given the high rates of mobility for both adults and children, the well-documented fluidity of household form, low and declining marriage rates and generally low rates of parental co-residence with biological children (all demonstrated through this thesis), this recent vision represents a minority of family configurations in South Africa. It would require social engineering on a large scale to achieve its ideal vision of stable families.

The language of family fragmentation and the notion that it is newly under threat tends to ignore or obscure the historical and structural contexts that have shaped and continue to shape family life. With high unemployment, spatial inequalities, continued urban housing shortages and inadequate social infrastructure (in other words, the very characteristics that were the outcome of deliberate strategies under apartheid), responsibility for the state of the family has fallen to the Department of Social Development, which has little influence over these critical sectors.

7.3.2 Structural constraints to family life

Some of the constraints to family life in the apartheid era, outlined in chapter 2, included (in addition to the legal impediments) the absence of adequate family accommodation in urban areas, stalled township developments and shortfalls in urban housing, household services and social infrastructure, together with strategically underdeveloped rural areas without work opportunities, and betterment schemes that negatively affected household agriculture, forcing family members to migrate.

The shortage of family housing became an indirect way of preventing the urbanisation of women, children and other "surplus" Africans, and left stark choices for the families of urban migrants – whether to be geographically separated, or to attempt to cohabit, often illegally, in unsuitable accommodation. This is where migrant parents had to make strategic decisions.

The legislative basis for family fragmentation may have fallen away, but many of the structural obstacles or disincentives to family co-residence have remained in place post-apartheid and this may well have contributed to the persistently high numbers of children with absent mothers.[40] Contemporary factors could in fact have compounded the legacy of apartheid. First, HIV/AIDS, a

---

[40] The absence of fathers is a different matter, as the high number of nonmarital child births is compounded by low and declining marriage and co-residence rates, which themselves are related to a complex set of structural forces and strategic considerations, outlined in chapter 2.

disease that has disproportionately affected migrants and women, was allowed to decimate families in the absence of a freely available treatment plan. As a result, and as shown in chapter 3, orphaning rates soared through the 2000s before levelling off and declining from the end of the first decade. This certainly contributed to family fragmentation and child mobility but, as was shown in the same chapter, it is not the main reason for the separation of children from their parents. Second, adult labour migration remains a key reason for parental absence from children's lives. It is not possible to tell, through household surveys, the reasons for the absence of family members who are not part of the household being interviewed, but we can see the reasons for absence of nonresident household members. From the perspective of children, most nonresident parents live elsewhere from economic necessity: to work or seek employment, or to complete their education. The migration analysis showed that some children do join their migrant mothers, presumably when this is feasible for the family. Third, as Fiona Ross and others have demonstrated, the housing policy, implemented through the national housing subsidy scheme, failed to cater for the varied and fluid shape of households in South Africa. Instead, households had to reconfigure themselves to meet the criteria for a subsidy and then fit into the size and shape of the houses that were delivered (Public Service Commission 2003; Ross 1995, 2003). Fourth, migration theory tells us that informal settlements are key as stepping stones to the city. In the absence of affordable housing options in formal areas, informality is not necessarily a temporary arrangement but may continue for years, as seen in the case study. Informal settlements are notoriously risky places for children to grow up in (Meth 2013). Decisions about co-residence and migration arrangements may be taken with the safety of the child in mind, and it might not be in the best interests of the child to co-migrate. The analysis presented here suggested that one of the child migration paths was away from informal housing.

The careful work on the complexities of migration and household strategies did not find its way into the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the first guiding policy document of the ANC government. Rather than highlighting structural issues, the RDP placed problems with family life firmly in the realm of the social, focusing on social welfare programmes as a critical lever, as illustrated in the following extracts:

> 2.13.1 Apartheid contributed to the destruction of family and community life in various ways. The present racially-based, discriminatory social welfare services are piecemeal responses. They have little impact on the root causes of social problems and on the disintegration of the social fabric.

> 2.13.15 The RDP must focus on the reconstruction of family and community life by prioritising and responding to the needs of families with no income, women and children who have been victims of domestic and other forms of violence, young offenders and all those affected by substance abuse.

It is perhaps from here that the later family policies took their cue, in seeing the family primarily as a welfare issue, the domain of social development. Certainly, there was little in the policy response of the democratic government that explicitly or implicitly enabled a reversal of apartheid's spatial structuring of households or supported the unification of fragmented families. In the interests of meeting ambitious numeric targets, the housing programme perpetuated the development of densely packed low-cost housing settlements on the peripheries of towns and cities. These new township developments were very similar in form to the labour dormitory suburbs of the previous regime, while the small square RDP houses closely resembled the

"matchbox housing" of the apartheid era. Housing developments had little space for social amenities, recreation or community life and were often developed without consideration for social infrastructure, like crèches, schools or clinics.

The Integrated Urban Development Framework of 2016 acknowledges that

> apartheid spatial patterns have largely not been reversed. Indeed, in part because of the pressure to provide housing and services quickly, most of the post-1994 infrastructure investments have unintentionally served to reinforce the apartheid status quo. The cumulative effect is that it is harder to reverse apartheid geographies in 2014, than it was in 1994. (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 2016:22)

At the same time, and despite the intentions articulated in the Spatial Development Framework (Office of the President 2006), there was very little investment to develop infrastructure or generate work opportunities in the former homelands, to which hundreds of thousands of people had been forcibly removed. Instead, employment opportunities continued to be concentrated in and around cities, which had massive housing backlogs, a rising problem of informality and a shortage of schools, clinics, crèches and other social infrastructure. "The dynamics of urbanisation and urban growth are influenced by contradictory forces that don't have the long term interests of migrants at heart" (Sue Parnell, pers comm 2016).

If living arrangements cannot be resolved satisfactorily, this may deter migrant parents from including children in their urban households. The service delivery models of municipalities are based on assumptions about the number of households that need to be housed and serviced. These are generally calculated from existing populations, rather than potential in-migrants including dependent family members who may wish to join urban migrants.

From a policy perspective, there is a need for expanded and rigorous evidence based on patterns, predictors and outcomes of child mobility, plus aspirations about family form and care arrangements for children – all of which are under-researched. The issue of decision-making around child and maternal migration needs further investigation. What household forms do families hope to achieve, and what are the obstacles to realising this? How are decisions made about where children should live when adults migrate? Little is known about the drivers and constraints to child migration and incorporation into the households of migrant parents. The family policy of the Department of Social Development raises concerns about fractured families in South Africa, but it is important to acknowledge the enduring structural barriers to co-residence, as well as to understand the strategic considerations, preferences and choices that households make around living arrangements and child care.

It is only through an evidence-based response to migration patterns, intentions and aspirations about co-residence arrangements and household form that South Africa would be able to reverse some of the lasting damage done to families and work towards the realisation of the vision expressed in clause 9 of the Freedom Charter: "All people shall have the right to live where they choose, to be decently housed, and to bring up their families in comfort and security."

References

Actuarial Society of South Africa. 2011. "ASSA2008 AIDS and Demographic Model." ww.actuarialsociety.org.za.

—. 2012. "Note to users of the ASSA2008 AIDS and Demographic Model." www.actuarialsociety.org.za.

Adepoju, A. 2006. "Internal and International Migration within Africa" in Kok et al., eds, *Migration in South and Southern Africa*, 26–46.

Aliber, M. 2001. "Study of the Incidence and Nature of Chronic Poverty and Development Policy in South Africa: An overview." Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, Chronic Poverty and Development Series 1. Belville: PLAAS, University of the Western Cape.

Amoateng, A. and T. Heaton, eds. 2007. *Families and Households in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Socio-demographic perspectives*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Amoateng, A., T. Heaton and I. Kalule-Sabiti. 2007. "Living Arrangements in South Africa" in Amoateng and Heaton, eds, *Families and Households in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, 43–60.

Amoateng, A. and L. Richter. 2007. "Social and Economic Context of Families and Households in South Africa" in Amoateng and Heaton, eds, *Families and Households in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, 1–26.

Amoateng, A., L. Richter, M. Makiwane and S. Rama. 2004. "Describing the Structure and Needs of Families in South Africa: Towards the development of a national policy framework for families." A report commissioned by the Department of Social Development. Pretoria: Child Youth and Family Development, Human Sciences Research Council.

Ansell, N. and L. van Blerk. 2005. "Children's Migration as a Household/Family Strategy: Coping with AIDS in Lesotho and Malawi." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 30(3):673–690.

Ardington, C., T. Barninghausen, A. Case and A. Menendez. 2013. "Social Protection and Labour Market Outcomes of Youth in South Africa." SALDRU Working Paper 96. Cape Town: Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.

Ardington, C., A. Case and V. Hosegood. 2009. "Labor Supply Responses to Large Social Transfers: Longitudinal evidence from South Africa." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 1(1):22–48.

Baigrie, N.and K. Eyal. 2014. "An evaluation of the determinants and implications of panel attrition in the National Income Dynamics Survey (2008–2010)." *South African Journal of Economics* 82(1):39–65.

Bank, L. 2001. "Living Together, Moving Apart: Home-made agendas, identity politics and urban-rural linkages in the Eastern Cape, South Africa." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 19(1):129–147.

Bank, L. 2015. "City Slums, Rural Homesteads: Migrant culture, displaced urbanism and the citizenship of the serviced house." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 41(5):1067–1081.

Beall, J., O. Crankshaw and S. Parnell. 2002. *Uniting a Divided City: Governance and social exclusion in Johannesburg*. London: Earthscan.

Becker, G. 1965. "A Theory of the Allocation of Time." *Economic Journal* 75(299):493–517.

Bekker, S. 2001. "Diminishing Returns: Circulatory migration linking Cape Town to the Eastern Cape." *Southern African Journal of Demography* 8(1):1–8.

Bekker, S. and R. Humphries. 1985. *From Control to Confusion: The changing role of Administration Boards in South Africa, 1971–1983*. Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, in association with the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown.

Bennett, R., V. Hosegood, M.-L. Newell and N. McGrath. 2015a. "An Approach to Measuring Dispersed Families with a Particular Focus on Children 'Left Behind' by Migrant Parents: Findings from rural South Africa." *Population, Space and Place* 21(4):322–334.

—. 2015b. "Understanding Family Migration in Rural South Africa: Exploring children's inclusion in the destination households of migrant parents." *Population, Space and Place* 21(4):310–321.

Bhorat, H. and C. van der Westhuizen. 2012. *"*Poverty, Inequality and Nature of Economic Growth in South Africa.*"* DPRU Working Paper 12/151. Cape Town: Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town.

Boddy-Evans, A. (n.d.). *"*Apartheid Legislation in South Africa*"* in *About.com*. www.africanhistory.about.com/library/bl/blsalaws.htm.

Bray, R. 2008. *"*The Influences of AIDS-Related Mobidity and Mortality on Change in Urban Households: An ethnographic study.*"* Centre for Social Science Research Working Paper 235. Cape Town: CSSR.

Bray, R. and R. Brandt. 2007. *"*Child Care and Poverty in South Africa: An ethnographic challenge to conventional interpretations.*"* *Journal of Children and Poverty* 13(1):1–19.

Bray, R., I. Gooskens, L. Kahn, S. Moses and J. Seekings. 2010. *Growing Up in the New South Africa: Childhood and adolescence in post-apartheid Cape Town*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Budlender, D. 2003. *"*The Debate about Household Headship.*"* *Social Dynamics* 29(2):48–72.

Budlender, D., N. Chobokoane and S. Simelane. 2004. *"*Marriage Patterns in South Africa: Methodological and substantive issues.*"* *Southern African Journal of Demography* 9(1):1–25.

Budlender, D. and F. Lund. 2011. *"*South Africa: A legacy of family disruption.*"* *Development and Change* 42(4):925–946.

Burger, R., R. Burger and L. Rossouw. 2012. *"*The Fertility Transition in South Africa: A retrospective panel data analysis.*"* *Development Southern Africa* 29(5):738–755.

Burman, S. 1986. *"*The Contexts of Childhood in South Africa: An introduction*"* in Burman and Reynolds, eds, *Growing up in a Divided Society*, 1–45.

Caldwell, J. and P. Calwell. 1993. *"*The South African Fertility Decline.*"* *Population and Development Review* 2:225–262.

Campbell, C. 1992. *"*Learning to Kill? Masculinity, the family and violence in Natal.*"* *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18(3):614–18.

Casale, D., C. Muller and D. Posel. 2004. *"* 'Two Million Net New Jobs': A reconsideration of the rise in employment in South Africa, 1995–2003." *South African Journal of Economics* 72:978–1002.

Casale, D. and D. Posel. 2006. *"*Migration and Remittances in South Africa: Background document on migration and first set of draft questions for inclusion in the National Income Dynamics Study.*"* Cape Town: SALDRU, University of Cape Town.

Case, A., C. Paxson and J. Ableidinger. 2004. *"*Orphans in Africa: Parental death, poverty and school enrollment.*"* *Demography* 41(3):483–508.

Castaldo, A., S. Gent, G. Sondhi and A. Whitehead. 2009. *"*Child Migration in National Surveys.*"* Brighton: Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty.

Central Statistical Service. 1996. *"*October Household Survey – RSA.*"* Statistical Release P0317. Pretoria: Central Statistical Service.

Child Trends. 2014. *"*World Family Map: Mapping family changes and child well-being outcomes.*"* Besthesda, ML: Child Trends.

Chimere-Dan, O. 1997. *"*Recent Fertility Patterns and Population Policy in South Africa.*"* *Studies in Family Planning* 24(1):31–39.

Chinhema, M., T. Brophy, M. Brown, M. Leibbrandt, C. Mlatsheni and I. Woolard. 2016. *"*National Income Dynamics Study Panel User Manual.*"* Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.

Clark, S., M. Collinson, K. Kahn, K. Drullinger and S. Tollman. 2007. *"*Returning Home to Die: Circular labour migration and mortality in South Africa.*"* *Scandinavian Journal of Public Heath Suppl* (Aug 2007) 69:35–44.

Collinson, M. 2009. *"*Striving against Adversity: The dynamics of migration, health and poverty in rural South Africa." Umeå: Department of Public Health and Clinical Medicine, Epidemiology and Public Health Sciences, Umeå University.

Collinson, M., P. Kok and M. Garenne. 2006a. *"*Migration and Changing Settlement Patterns: Multilevel data for policy." Pretoria: Stats SA.

Collinson, M., S. Tollman, K. Kahn, S. Clark and M. Garenne. 2006b. *"*Highly Prevalent Circular Migration: Households, mobility and economic status in rural South Africa" in M. Tienda, S. Findley, S. Tollman and E. Preston-Whyte, eds, *Africa on the Move: African migration and urbanisation in comparative perspective*, 194–216. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Collinson, M., S. Tollman and K. Kahn. 2007. *"*Migration, Settlement Change and Health in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Triangulating health and demographic surveillance with national census data." *Scandinavian Journal of Public Heath* 35(Suppl 69):77–84.

Cox, K., D. Hemson and A. Todes. 2004. *"*Urbanization in South Africa and the Changing Character of Migrant Labour." *South African Geographical Journal* 86(1):7–16.

Cross, C. 2001. *"*Why Does South Africa Need a Spatial Policy? Population, migration, infrastructure and development." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 19(1):111–127.

Cross, C., P. Kok, M. Wentzel, K. Tlabela, G. Weir-Smith and J. Mafukidze. 2005. *"*Poverty Pockets in Gauteng: How poverty impacts migration." Human Sciences Research Council Report to the Gauteng Inter-sectoral Development Unit on Population Health, Health Systems and Innovation. Cape Town: HSRC.

Dasgupta, B. 1981. *"*Rural–Urban Migration and Rural Development" in J. Balan, ed, *Why People Move: A comparative perspective of the dynamics of internal migration*, 43–58. Paris: Unesco.

De Haas, H. 2014. *"*Migration Theory: Quo vadis?" International Migration Institute Working Paper 100. Oxford: IMI, University of Oxford.

De Jong, G.F. and J.T. Fawcett. 1981. *"*Motivations for Migration: An assessment and a value expectancy research model" in G.F. de Jong and R.W. Gardner, eds, *Migration Decision Making: Multidisciplinary approaches to microlevel studies in developed and developing countries*, 13–58. New York: Pergamon.

De Jong, G.F. and M. Steinmetz. 2006. *"*Migration Intentions in South Africa and Elsewhere" in Kok et al., eds, *Migration in South and Southern Africa*, 249–267.

Democratic Alliance. n.d. *"*Our Values: Freedom, fairness and opportunity." Policy statement adopted 2015.

Denis, P. and R. Ntsimane. 2006. *"*Absent Fathers: Why do men not feature in stories of families affected by HIV/AIDS in KwaZulu-Natal?" in Richter and Morrell, eds, *Baba*, 234–249.

Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Republic of South Africa. 2016. *"*Integrated Urban Development Framework: A new deal for South African cities and towns." Pretoria: Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.

Department of Health, Republic of South Africa, Medical Research Council and OrcMacro. 2007. *"*South Africa Demographic and Health Survey 2003." Pretoria: Department of Health.

Department of Social Development, Republic of South Africa. 2012. *"*White Paper on Families." Draft. Pretoria: Department of Social Development.

Department of Welfare, Republic of South Africa. 1996. *"*Report of the Lund Committee on Child and Family Support." Pretoria: Department of Welfare.

De Villiers, L., M. Brown, I. Woolard, R. Daniels and M. Leibbrandt. 2013. *"*National Income Dynamics Study Wave 3 User Manual." Cape Town: Southern African Labour & Development Research Unit (SALDRU).

De Wet, C. 1987. *"*Betterment Planning in South Africa: Some thoughts on its history, feasibility and wider policy implications." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 6(1–2):85–122.

Desmond, C. 1970. *The Discarded People: An account of African resettlement in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Christian Institute of South Africa.

Dorrington, R. 2013. "Alternative South African Mid-Year Estimates, 2013." Centre for Actuarial Research Monograph 13. Cape Town: CARe, University of Cape Town.

Dubbeld, B. 2013. "How Social Security Becomes Social Insecurity: Unsettled households, crisis talk and the value of grants in a KwaZulu-Natal village." *Acta Juridica* 2013:197–217.

Du Toit, A. 2011. "Nasruddin's Key: Poverty measurement and the government of marginal populations." Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies Working Paper 20. Bellville: PLAAS, University of the Western Cape.

Du Toit, A. and D. Neves. 2008. "The Dynamics of Household Formation and Composition in the Rural Eastern Cape." Centre for Social Science Research Working Paper 228. Cape Town: CSSR, University of Cape Town.

—. 2009. "Trading on a Grant: Integrating formal and informal social protection in post-apartheid migrant networks." Brookes World Poverty Institute Working Paper 75. Manchester: BWPI, University of Manchester.

Ebrahim, A., I. Woolard and M. Leibbrandt. 2013. "Unemployment and Household Formation." Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit Working Paper 126. Cape Town: SALDRU, University of Cape Town.

Eddy, M., H. Thomson-de-Boor and K. Mphaka. 2013. "'So We Are ATM Fathers': A study of absent fathers in Johannesburg, South Africa." Johannesburg: Centre for Social Development in Africa, University of Johannesburg, and Sonke Gender Justice Network.

ENCA. 2016. "Mom Appears in Court for Chaining Kids to Bed." www.enca.com/south-africa/mom-appears-in-court-for-chaining-kids-to-bed.

Escobal, J. and E. Flores. 2009. "Maternal Migration and Child Well-Being in Peru." Young Lives Working Paper 56. Oxford: Young Lives, Department of International Development, Oxford University.

Evans, R. 2007. "Social Networks, Migration and Care in Tanzania." *Journal of Children and Poverty* 11(2):111–129.

Ford, K. and V. Hosegood. 2005. "AIDS Mortality and the Mobility of Children in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa." *Demography* 42(2):757–768.

Fuwa, N. 2000. "A Note on the Analysis of Female-Headed Households in Developing Countries." *Technical Bulletin* 54:125–138. Chiba: Faculty of Horticulture, Chiba University.

Gelderblom, D. and W. Adams. 2006. "The Limits and Possibilities of Migrant Network" in P. Kok, D. Gelderblom, J. Oucho and J. Van Zyl, eds, *Migration in South and Southern Africa*, 227–248 . Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Gilbert, A. and O. Crankshaw. 1999. "Comparing South African and Latin American Experience: Migration and housing mobility in Soweto." *Urban Studies* 36(13):2375–2400.

Goode, W. 1982. *The Family*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Grieger, L., A. Williamson, M. Leibbrandt and J. Levinsohn. 2014. "Evidence of Short-Term Household Change in South Africa from the National Income Dynamics Study." *Development Southern Africa* 31(1):146–167.

Hagen-Zanker, J. 2008. "Why Do People Migrate? A review of the theoretical literature." Working Paper MGSoC/2008/WP002. Maastricht: Maastricht Graduate School of Governance.

Hall, K. 2005. "Accommodating the Poor? A review of the Housing Subsidy Scheme and its implications for children" in A. Leatt and S. Rosa, eds, *Towards a Means to Live: Targeted poverty alleviation to make children's rights real*. Electronic series. Cape Town: Children's Institute, University of Cape Town.

Hall, K. and D. Budlender. 2013. *"*20-year review: Base paper on the state of children.*"* Unpublished: Paper commissioned by the National Planning Commission for the Presidency's 20-Year Review.

Hall, K., A. Ebrahim, A. De Lannoy and M. Makiwane. 2015. *"*Youth and Mobility: Linking movement to opportunity.*"* in A. De Lannoy, S. Swartz, L. Lake and C. Smith, *South African Child Gauge 2015*, 75–82. Cape Town: Children's Institute, University of Cape Town.

Hall, K., and Meintjes, H. 2016. *"*Demography: Children living with parents.*"* in *Children Count – Abantwana Babalulekile*. *www.childrencount.net*. Cape Town: Children's Institute, University of Cape Town.

Hall, K. and D. Posel. 2012. *"*Inequalities in Children's Household Contexts: Place, parental presence and migration.*"* in K. Hall, I. Woolard, L. Lake and C. Smith, eds, *South African Child Gauge 2012*, 43–47. Cape Town: Children's Institute, University of Cape Town.

Hall, K. and W. Sambu. 2016. *"*Housing and Services: Urban–rural distribution.*"* in *Children Count – Abantwana Babalulekile. www.childrencount.net*. Cape Town: Children's Institute, University of Cape Town.

Hall, K. and G. Wright. 2010. *"*A Profile of Children Living in South Africa in 2008.*"* *Studies in Economics and Econometrics* 34(3):45–58.

Haour-Knipe, M. 2009. *"*Families, Children, Migration and AIDS.*"* *AIDS Care* 21(S1):43–48.

Harris, J.R. and M.P. Todaro. 1970. *"*Migration, Unemployment and Development: A two-sector analysis.*"* *American Economic Review* 60:126–142.

Harvey, E. 1994. *"*Social Change and Family Policy in South Africa, 1930 to 1986.*"* Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council.

Haug, S. 2008. *"*Migration Networks and Migration Decision-Making.*"* *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 34(4):585–605.

Hill, C., V. Hosegood and M.-L. Newell. 2008. *"*Children's Care and Living Arrangements in a High HIV Prevalence Area in Rural South Africa.*"* *Vulnerable Children and Youth Studies* 3(1):65–77.

Hindson, D. 1987. *"*Orderly Urbanisation and Influx Control: From territorial apartheid to regional spatial ordering in South Africa*"* in R. Tomlinson and M. Addleson, eds, *Regional Restructuring under Apartheid: Urban and regional policies in contemporary South Africa*, 74–105. Johannesburg: Ravan.

Holborn, L. and G. Eddy. 2011. *"*First Steps to Heal the South African Family.*"* Johannsburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.

Hosegood, V. and K. Ford. 2003. *"*The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Children's Living Arrangements and Migration in Rural South Africa.*"* Paper presented at conference on African Migration and Urbanization in Comparative Perspective. Johannesburg, 4–7 June 2003.

Hosegood, V. and S. Madhavan. 2012. *"*Understanding Fatherhood and Father Involvement in South Africa: Insights from surveys and population cohorts.*"* *Fathering* 10(3):257–273.

Hosegood, V., N. McGrath, K. Herbst and I. Timaeus. 2004. *"*The Impact of Adult Mortality on Household Dissolution and Migration in Rural South Africa.*"* *AIDS* 18:1585–1590.

Hosegood, V., N. McGrath and T. Moultrie. 2009. *"*Dispensing with Marriage: Marital and partnership trends in rural KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa 2000–2006.*"* *Demographic Research* 20:279–312.

House of Assembly, Republic of South Africa. 2004. *"*Social Assistance Act No.13 of 2004.*"*

Hunter, M. 2004. *"*Masculinities, Multiple-Sexual-Partners and AIDS: The making and unmaking of *Isoka* in KwaZulu-Natal.*"* *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa* 54:123–53.

—. 2006. *"*Informal Settlements as Spaces of Health Inequality: The changing economicand spatial roots of the AIDS pandemic, from apartheid to neoliberalism.*"* Centre for Civil Society Research Report 44. Durban: Centre for Civil Society.

—. 2007. "The Changing Political Economy of Sex in South Africa: The significance of unemployment and inequalities to the scale of the AIDS pandemic." *Social Science & Medicine* 64:689–700.

—. 2010. *Love in the Time of AIDS*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

International Organisation for Migration. 2006. "HIV/AIDS, population mobility and migration in Southern Africa: Defining a research and policy agenda." Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

International Organisation for Migration. 2015. "World Migration Report 2015: Migrants and Cities: New partnerships to manage mobility." Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

Jeffrey, C. 2010. "Geographies of Children and Youth I: Eroding maps of life." *Progress in Human Geography* 34(4):496–505.

Johnson, L. 2014. "THEMBISA version 1.0: A model for evaluating the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa." Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Research Working Paper. Cape Town: CIDER, University of Cape Town.

Jones, S. 1993. *Assaulting Childhood: Children's experiences of migrancy and hostel life in South Africa*. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand Press.

Jongzhong, Y., J. Murray and W. Yihuan. 2005. *Left-Behind Children in Rural China: Impact study of rural labor migration on left-behind children in mid-west China*. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press; Woking: Plan International.

Kautzky, K. 2009. "Children Left Behind: The effect of temporary labour migration on child care and residence patterns in rural South Africa." Unpublished Master of Public Health dissertation. Faculty of Health Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand.

Klasen, S. and I. Woolard. 2009. "Surviving Unemployment Without State Support: Unemployment and household formation in South Africa." *Journal of African Economies* 18(1):1–51.

Kok, P. and M. Collinson. 2006. "Migration and Urbanisation in South Africa." Report 03-04-02. Pretoria: Stats SA.

Kok, P., D. Gelderblom, J. Van Zyl and J. Oucho. 2006. *Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and determinants*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Kok, P., M. O'Donovan, O. Boure and J. van Zyl. 2003. *Post-Apartheid Patterns of Internal Migration in South Africa*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Lee, E. 1966. "A Theory of Migration." *Demography* 3(1):47–57.

Lee, R. 2009. *African Women and Apartheid: Migration and settlement in urban South Africa*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Leibbrandt, M. and I. Woolard. 2009. "NIDS Wave 1 Overview." Cape Town: SALDRU, University of Cape Town.

Leibbrandt, M., I. Woolard, A. Finn and J. Argent. 2010. "Trends in South African Income Distribution and Poverty since the Fall of Apartheid." OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper 101. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Publishing.

Lemanski, C. 2009. "Augmented Informality: South Africa's backyard dwellings as a by-product of formal housing policies." *Habitat International* 33:472–484.

Le Roux, T. 1999. "Home Is Where the Children Are: A qualitative study of migratory domestic workers in Mmotla village, South Africa" in T. le Roux and J.H. Momsen, eds, *Gender, Migration and Domestic Service*, 179-189. London: Routledge.

Lewis, W.A. 1954. "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour." *Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies* 22(2):139–191.

Madhavan, S. and E. Schatz. 2007. "Coping with Change: Household structure and composition in rural South Africa, 1992–2003." *Scandinavian Journal of Public Heath* 35(Suppl 69):85–93.

Madhavan, S., E. Schatz, S. Clark and M. Collinson. 2012. "Child Mobility, Maternal Status and Household Composition in Rural South Africa." *Demography* 49:699–718.

Madhavan, S., N. Townsend and A. Garey. 2008. "'Absent breadwinners': Father–child connections and paternal support in rural South Africa." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 34(3):647–663.

Mafukidze, J. 2006. "A Discussion of Migration and Migration Patterns and Flows in Africa" in C. Cross, D. Gelderblom, N. Roux and J. Mafukidze, eds, *Views on Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa: Proceedings of an African Migration Alliance workshop*, 103–129. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Makiwane, M., M. Nduna and E. Khalema. 2016. "Children in South African Families: Lives and Times." Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars.

Martin, F. 2016. "Who Cares for Children? A descriptive study of care-related data available through global household surveys and how these could be better mined to inform policies and services to strengthen family care." *Global Social Welfare* 3:51–74.

Marx, C. 2007. "Do Informal Land Markets Work for Poor People? An assessment of three metropolitan cities in South Africa." Pretoria: Urban LandMark.

Marx, K. 1997. "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" in D. McClellan, ed, *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, 329–355. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Massey, D. 1990. "Social Structure, Household Strategies and the Cumulative Causation of Migration." *Population Index* 56(1):3–26.

—. 2015. "A Missing Element in Migration Theories." *Migration Letters* 12(3):279–299.

Massey, D., J. Arango, G. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A. Pellegrino and J.E. Taylor. 1993. "Theories of International Migration: A review and appraisal." *Population and Development Review* 19(3):431–466.

May, J. 1987. "Migrant Labour in Transkei: Cause and consequence at the village level." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 6(1–2):123–149.

May, J., J. Govender, D. Budlender, R. Mokate, C. Rogerson and A. Stavrou. 1998. "Poverty and Inequality in South Africa: Summary report prepared for the Office of the Executive Deputy President and the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality." Pretoria: Office of the President.

Mayer, P. and I. Mayer. 1961. *Townsmen or Tribesmen: Conservatism and the process of urbanization in a South African city*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Maylam, P. 1990. "The Rise and Decline of Urban Apartheid in South Africa." *African Affairs* 89:57–84.

McAllister, P. 1991. "Reversing the Effects of 'Betterment Planning' in South Africa's Black Rural Areas." *Africa Insight* 21(2):116–19.

Meintjes, H. and S. Giese. 2006. "Spinning the Epidemic: The making of mythologies of orphanhood in the context of AIDS." *Childhood* 13(3):407–430.

Meintjes, H., K. Hall, D.-H. Marera and A. Boulle. 2010. "Orphans of the Aids Epidemic? The extent, nature and circumstances of child-headed households in South Africa." *AIDS Care* 22(1):40–49.

Meth, P. 2013. "'I Don't Like My Children to Grow Up in This Bad Area': Parental anxieties about living in informal settlements." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 37(2):537–555.

Mhongo, C. and D. Budlender. 2013. "Declining Rates of Marriage in South Africa: What do the numbers and analysts say?" in A. Claasens and D. Smythe, eds, *Marriage, Land and Custom: Essays on law and social change in South Africa*, 181–196. Cape Town: Juta.

Miller, J. 2016. "Unequal Scenes." www.unequalscenes.com

Moore, E. and R. Govender. 2013. "Marriage and Cohabitation in South Africa: An enriching explanation?" *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* XLIV(5):623–639.

Morrell, R. 1998. "Of Boys and Men: Masculinity and gender in Southern African studies." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 24(4):605–30.

Moultrie, T. and I. Timaeus. 2003. "The South African Fertility Decline: Evidence from two censuses and a demographic and health survey." *Population Studies* 57(3):265–283.

Muhwava, W., V. Hosegood, M. Nyirenda, K. Herbst and M.-L. Newell. 2010. "Levels and Determinants of Migration in Rural KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa." *African Population Studies* 24:259–280.

Murray, C. 1981. *Families Divided: The impact of migrant labour in Lesotho*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

National Planning Commission, Republic of South Africa. 2011. "National Development Plan Diagnostic Report: Material conditions." Pretoria: National Planning Commission.

Neves, D. 2009. "HIV/AIDS and Migration within the Rural Eastern Cape." Unpublished paper presented at the Institute for Poverty Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape, 19 March 2009.

Ngwane, Z. 2003. "'Christmas Time' and the Struggles for the Household in the Countryside: Rethinking the cultural geography of migrant labour in South Africa." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 29(3):681–699.

O'Malley, P. (n.d.). "Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue." www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley

Oosthuizen, M. and P. Naidoo. 2004. "Internal Migration to the Gauteng Province." Cape Town: Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town.

Orellana, M.F., B. Thorne, A. Chee and W. Lam. 2001. "Transnational Childhoods: The participation of children in processes of family migration." *Social Problems* 48(4):572–591.

Patel, L. 2012. "Poverty, Gender and Social Protection: Child support grants in Soweto, South Africa." *Journal of Policy Practice* 11:106–20.

Piore, M.J. 1979. *Birds of Passage: Migrant labour in industrial societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pirouz, F. 2005. "Have Labour Market Outcomes Affected Household Structure in South Africa? A descriptive analysis of households." Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper 05/100. Cape Town: DPRU, University of Cape Town.

Platzky, L. and C. Walker. 1985. *The Surplus People: Forced removals in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Ravan.

Posel, D. 2001. "Who Are the Heads of Households, What Do They Do, and Is the Concept of Headship Useful? An analysis of headship in South Africa." *Development Southern Africa* 18(5):651–670.

Posel, D. 2004. "Have Migration Patterns in Post-Apartheid South Africa Changed?" *Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics* 15(3-4):277–292.

—. 2006. "Moving On: Patterns of labour migration in post-apartheid South Africa" in M. Tienda, S. Findley, S. Tollman and E. Preston-Whyte, eds, *Africa on the Move: African migration and urbanisation in comparative perspective*, 217–231. Johannesburg: WITS University Press.

—. 2009. "Migration: Analysis of the NIDS wave 1 dataset." National Income Dynamics Study Discussion Paper 1. Cape Town: SALDRU, University of Cape Town.

—. 2010. "Households and Labour Migration in Post-Apartheid South Africa." *Studies in Economics and Econometrics* 32(3):129–141.

Posel, D. and D. Casale. 2002. "The Continued Feminisation of the Labour Force in South Africa: An analysis of recent data and trends." *South African Journal of Economics* 71(1):156–184.

—. 2003. "What Has Been Happening to Internal Labour Migration in South Africa, 1993–1999?" *South African Journal of Economics* 71(3):455–479.

—. 2006. "Internal Labour Migration and Household Poverty in Post-Apartheid South Africa" in H. Bhorat and R. Kanbur, eds, *Poverty and Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, 351–365. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Posel, D. and R. Devey. 2006. "The Demographics of Fathers in South Africa: An analysis of survey data, 1993–2002" in Richter and Morrell, eds, *Baba*, 38–52.

Posel, D., J. Fairburn and F. Lund. 2006. "Labour Migration and Households: A reconsideration of the effects of the social pension on labour supply in South Africa." *Economic Modelling* 23(5):836–853.

Posel, D. and C. Marx. 2013. "Circular Migration: A view from destination households in two urban informal settlements in South Africa." *Journal of Development Studies* 49(6):819–831.

Posel, D. and M. Rogan. 2012. "Gendered Trends in Poverty in the Post-Apartheid Period, 1997–2006." *Development Southern Africa* 29(1):97–113.

Posel, D. and S. Rudwick. 2013. "Changing Patterns of Marriage and Cohabitation in South Africa" in A. Claasens and D. Smythe, eds, *Marriage, Land and Custom: Essays on Law and Social Change in South Africa*, 169–180. Cape Town: Juta.

Posel, D., S. Rudwick and D. Casale. 2011. "Is Marriage a Dying Institution in South Africa? Exploring changes in marriage in the context of *ilobolo* payments." *Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity* 25(1):102–11.

Posel, D. and G. van der Stoep. 2008. "Co-Resident and Absent Mothers: Motherhood and labour force participation in South Africa." Paper presented at the 13th Annual African Econometrics Society Conference, Pretoria; and Conference on Income Distribution and the Family, Kiel (Germany).

Potts, D. 2011. *Circular Migration in Zimbabwe and Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa*. Cape Town: UCT Press.

Preston-Whyte, E. 1978. "Families Without Marriage" in W. Argyle and E. Preston-Whyte, eds, *Social System and Tradition in Southern Africa*, 55–85. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Preston-Whyte, E. and E. Zondi. 1989. "To Control Their Own Reproduction: The agenda of black teenage mothers in Durban." *Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity* 4:47–68.

Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development. 1994. "South Africans Rich and Poor: Baseline household statistics." Cape Town: SALDRU, University of Cape Town.

Public Service Commission, Republic of South Africa. 2003. "Report on the Evaluation of the National Housing Subsidy Scheme." Pretoria: Public Service Commission.

Ramphele, M. 1993. *A Bed Called Home: Life in the migrant labour hostels of Cape Town*. Cape Town: David Philip.

Ramphele, M. and L. Richter. 2006. "Migrancy, Family Dissolution and Fatherhood" in Richter and Morrell, eds, *Baba*, 73–81.

Ranis, G. and J. Fei. 1961. "A Theory of Economic Development." *American Economic Review* 51(4):533–565.

Reed, H.E. 2013. "Moving Across Boundaries: Migration in South Africa, 1950–2000." *Demography* 50:71–95.

Reynolds, L. 2015. "Category and Kin in 'Crisis': Representations of kinship, care and vulnerability in demographic and ethnographic research in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 50(4):539–560.

Reynolds, P. 1995. *The Ground of All Making: State violence, the family and political activists.* Human Sciences Research Council Report HG/MF-24. Pretoria: Co-operative Research Programme on Marriage and Family Life, HSRC.

Reynolds, P. 1989. *Childhood in Crossroads: Cognition and society in South Africa*. Cape Town: David Philip.

Reynolds, P. and S. Burman, eds. 1986. *Growing Up in a Divided Society: The contexts of childhood in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Ravan.

Richter, L. and C. Desmond. 2008. "Targeting AIDS Orphans and Child-Headed Households? A perspective from national surveys in South Africa, 1995–2005." *AIDS Care* 20(9):1019–1028.

Richter, L. and R. Morrell, eds. 2006. *Baba: Men and fatherhood in South Africa*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Richter, L., S. Norris, T. Swart and C. Ginsburg. 2006. "In-Migration and Living Conditions of Young Adolescents in Greater Johannesburg, South Africa." *Social Dynamics* 32(1):195–216.

Rogan, M. 2013. "Alternative Definitions of Headship and the 'Feminisation' of Income Poverty in Post-Apartheid South Africa." *Journal of Development Studies* 49(10):1344–1357.

Rogan, M., L. Lebani and N. Nzimande. 2009. "Internal Migration and Poverty in KwaZulu-Natal: Findings from censuses, labour force surveys and panel data." Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit Working Paper 30. Cape Town: SALDRU, University of Cape Town.

Ross, F. 1995. *Houses Without Doors: Diffusing domesticity in Die Bos*. Pretoria: Co-operative Research Programme on Marriage and Family Life, Human Sciences Research Council.

—. 2003. "Dependants and Dependence: A case study of housing and heuristics in an informal settlement in the Western Cape." *Social Dynamics* 29(2): 132–152.

Rudwick, S. and D. Posel. 2014. "Contemporary Functions of *Ilobolo* (Bridewealth) in Urban South African Zulu Society." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 32(1):118–36.

Russell, M. 1998. "Black Urban Households in South Africa." *African Sociological Review* 2(1):174–80.

—. 2003a. "Are Urban Black Families Nuclear? A comparative study of black and white South African family norms." *Social Dynamics* 29(Special Issue 2):153–76.

—. 2003b. "Understanding Black Households: The problem." *Social Dynamics* 29(Special Issue 2):5–47.

SASSA and UNICEF. 2013. "Preventing Exclusion from the Child Support Grant: A study of exclusion errors in accessing CSG benefits." Pretoria: UNICEF South Africa.

Schatz, E., S. Madhavan and J. Williams. 2011. "Female-Headed Households Contending with AIDS-Related Hardship in Rural South Africa." *Health and Place* 17(2):598–605.

Schiel, R. and M. Leibbrandt. 2015. "Migrant Labour in Contemporary South Africa." Report prepared for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development by the Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit. Cape Town: SALDRU, University of Cape Town.

Seekings, J. 2003. "Households and Families in Southern Africa." *Social Dynamics* 29 (Special Issue 2):1–4.

—. 2009. "Measuring the Gendered Consequences of AIDS: Household dynamics and poverty in South Africa" in J. Klot and V.-K. Nguyen, eds, *The Fourth Wave: Violence, gender, culture and HIV in the 21st century*, 423–444. Paris: UNESCO.

Sibande, A. 2011. "Ethnic Differences in the Living Arrangements of Children in South Africa." *Journal of Contemporary Family Studies* 42(4):479–508.

Simkins, C. 1981. "The Distribution of the African Population of South Africa by Age, Sex and Region-Type: 1960, 1970 and 1980." SALDRU Working Paper 32. Cape Town: SALDRU, University of Cape Town.

—. 1986. "Household Composition and Structure in South Africa" in Burman and Reynolds, eds, *Growing Up in a Divided Society*, 16–42.

South African Cities Network. 2016. "State of South African Cities Report 2016." Johannesburg: SACN.

South African History Online. (n.d.). "Segregationist Legislation Timeline 1856–1979." www.sahistory.org.za.

South African Institute of Race Relations. 1987. *Race Relations Survey 1986*. Johannesburg: SAIRR.

Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit. 2008. "National Income Dynamics Study Wave 1, 2008: Questionnaire." Cape Town: SALDRU, University of Cape Town.

—. 2009. "National Income Dynamics Study Wave 1: User document." Cape Town: SALDRU, University of Cape Town.

—. 2016a. "National Income Dynamics Study 2008, Wave 1 [dataset]." Version 6.0. Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit [producer], 2016. Cape Town: DataFirst [distributor], 2016.

—. 2016b. "National Income Dynamics Study 2010-11, Wave 2 [dataset]." Version 3.0. Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit [producer], 2016. Cape Town: DataFirst [distributor], 2016.

—. 2016c. "National Income Dynamics Study 2012, Wave 3 [dataset]." Version 2.0. Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit [producer], 2016. Cape Town: DataFirst [distributor], 2016.

—. 2016d. "National Income Dynamics Study 2014–15, Wave 4 [dataset]." Version 1.0. Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit [producer], 2016. Cape Town: DataFirst [distributor], 2016.

Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit and Centre for Actuarial Research 2006. "Migration to Two Neighbourhoods in the Suburb of Hout Bay, Cape Town, 2005." Cape Town: SALDRU and CARe, University of Cape Town.

Spiegel, A. and A. Mehlwana. 1997. *Family as Social Network: Kinship and sporadic migrancy in the Western Cape's Khayelitsha*. Co-operative Research Programme on Marriage and Family Life, Report HG/MF-31. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council.

Spiegel, A., V. Watson and P. Wilkinson. 1996. "Domestic Diversity and Fluidity among Some African Households in Greater Cape Town." *Social Dynamics* 22(1):7–30.

Stark, O. and D. Levhari. 1982. "On Migration and Risks in LDCs." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 31(1):191–196.

Statistics South Africa. 2001. "South Africa in Transition: Selected findings from the October Household Survey of 1999 and changes that have occurred between 1996 and 1999." Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.

—. 2011. "Census 2011: Household Questionnaire." Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.

—. 2012. "Census 2011: Census in brief." Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.

—. 2015a. "Census 2011: Migration Dynamics in South Africa." Report 03-01-79. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.

—. 2015b. "General Household Survey 2014: Statistical release PO318." Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.

—. 2016. "Community Survey 2016: Statistical release P0301." Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.

Surplus People Project. 1983. *Forced Removals in South Africa: The Eastern Cape.* Volume 2 of the Surplus People Project report. Cape Town: Surplus People Project.

The Presidency, Republic of South Africa. 2006. "National Spatial Development Perspective." Pretoria: The Presidency, RSA.

Todaro, M.P. 1976. *Internal Migration in Developing Countries*. Geneva: International Labour Office.

Todes, A., P. Kok, M. Wentzel, J. van Zyl and C. Cross. 2010. "Contemporary South African Urbanization Dynamics." *Urban Forum* 21:331–348.

Trager, L. 1991. *The City Connection: Migration and family interdependence in the Philippines*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Turner, J.F.C. 1968. "Housing Priorities, Settlement Patterns and Urban Development in Modernizing Countries." *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 34:354–363.

Turok, I. 2012. "Urbanisation and Development in South Africa: Economic imperatives, spatial distortions and strategic responses." Urbanisation and Emerging Population Issues Working Paper 8. London: International Institute for Environment and Development, United Nations Population Fund.

Turok, I. and J. Borel-Saladin. 2014. "Is Urbanisation in South Africa on a Sustainable Trajectory?" *Development Southern Africa* 31(5):675–691.

United Nations. 2015. "World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 revision." Report of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, ST/ESA/SER.A/366. New York: United Nations.

Van der Stoep, G. 2008. "Identifying Motherhood and Its Effect on Female Labour Force Participation in South Africa: An analysis of survey data." Unpublished MA thesis. School of Economics and Finance, University of KwaZulu-Natal.

Van der Vliet, V. 1984. "Staying Single: A strategy against poverty." Paper presented at the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa, hosted by SALDRU at the University of Cape Town, 13–19 April 1984.

Walker, C. 1990. "Gender and the Development of the Migrant Labour System c. 1850–1930: An overview" in C. Walker, ed, *Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945*, 168–196. Cape Town: David Philip.

—. 1995. "Conceptualising Motherhood in Twentieth Century South Africa." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 21(3):417–37.

Wallerstein, I. 1974. *The Modern World-System*. New York: Academic.

Wegerif, M., B. Russell and I. Grundling. 2005. *Still Searching for Security: The reality of farm dweller evictions in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Nkuzi Development Association and Social Surveys.

White, S. 2002. "Being, Becoming and Relationship: Conceptual challenges of a child rights approach in development." *Journal of International Development* 14(8): 1095–1104.

Williams, J., G. Singh, B. Clark and M. Collinson. 2011. "Redefining Migration: Gender and temporary labour migration in South Africa." Boulder, CO: Institute of Behavioural Science, Population Programme, University of Colorado.

Wilson, F. and M. Ramphele. 1989. *Uprooting Poverty: The South African challenge*. Cape Town: David Philip.

Wilson, M. 1981. "Xhosa Marriage in Historical Perspective" in E. Krige and J. Comaroff, eds, *Essays on African Marriage in Southern Africa*, 133–47. Cape Town: Juta.

Wittenberg, M. 2008. "October Household Survey 1994 (Technical review)." Cape Town: School of Economics and SALDRU, University of Cape Town.

—. 2009. "Weights: Report on NIDS wave 1." Technical Paper 2. Cape Town: SALDRU, University of Cape Town.

Wittenberg, M. and M. Collinson. 2007. "Household Transitions in Rural South Africa 1996–2003." *Scandinavian Journal of Public Heath* 35(Suppl 69):130–137.

Wittenberg, M. and M. Collinson. 2008. "Poverty and Migration: Restructuring of households in rural South Africa: Reflections on average household size in the Agincourt Sub-District 1992–2003." Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit Working Paper 12. Cape Town: SALDRU, University of Cape Town.

Yaw, A. 2006. "On Marrying, Mixing and Everything Else." *Human Sciences Research Council Review* 4(2):4–5.

Zelinsky, W. 1971. "The Hypothesis of Mobility Transition." *Geographical Review* 61(2):219–249.

Ziehl, S. 2001. "Documenting Changing Family Patterns in South Africa: Are census data of any value?" *African Sociological Review* 5(2):36–62.

Ziehl, S. 2016. "How Accurate Is Our Migration Data?" *Econ3x3* June 2016. www.econ3x3.org/article/how-accurate-our-migration-data