Interpreting political discourse at the Pan African Parliament into Arabic

by

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Sample of recording consent form

Abstract

This study analyses the interpreting of political discourse at the Pan African Parliament (PAP) into Arabic, with a special focus on conflict resolution in the context of PAP debates on conflict situations in Africa and with special reference to the Libyan conflict. The debate I examine was held within a broader context of international dominant discourses and competing narratives of conflicts and foreign interventions, dominated by the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) resolutions on the Libyan conflict. But its battleground includes a broader African context, characterized by a certain degree of resistance as reflected in the discourse of conflict resolution that is informed by the immediate context of the PAP – an organ of the African Union (AU) which seeks to assist in conflict resolution and promote democracy and human rights throughout the continent in actualization of its motto: *One Africa, One Voice.*

My analysis focuses on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and I investigate in particular the conditions of reproduction of dominant discourses, narratives and framings in order to ascertain how they influence debates in the PAP and also what influence they have on interpreting strategies. The aim is to identify the degree to which these elements influence an interpreter's role and performance and, in turn, how the interpreter then influences the course of a discussion.

Based on this, the analysis seeks to determine certain variables, such as discursive and linguistic patterns, discursive moves, style, argumentation, ideologically and politically charged expressions, etc., so as to trace the influence of dominant discourses and competing narratives in the context of interpreting, and specifically how it relates to the political discourse on the Libyan conflict.

In investigating interpreting strategies, the analysis also aims at pinpointing elements such as omissions, shifts, repetitions and the occurrence of certain discursive or linguistic elements that would demonstrate the scope of such influences. The analysis furthermore highlights some difficulties and recommends some points for future research.

Key words: CDA, interpreter's role, interpreting strategies, narratives, framing, cognitive load, structure of discourse, linguistic features, discursive strategies, conflict discourse, Africa, conflict resolution

Transcription symbols

Arabic font: Arabic transparent, font size 12

English font: Times New Roman, font size 12

Line spacing: 1.5 for the body of the research text and 1 for extracts and samples

◙ pause

= lag

≡ extended lag

≈ hesitation

Abbreviations

APSA	Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
BT	Back translation
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
DHA	Discourse-Historical Approach
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

1. Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Introduction

"Definitions of conflict inevitably draw on notions of power, and vice versa." (Baker 2006: 1)

This research is a pioneer study of interpreted political discourse at the Pan African Parliament (PAP) – a contemporary African institution. The study focuses on the conflict resolution dimension of political discourse and its interpretation into Arabic.

The founding assumption of this research is that our understanding and interpretation of events is based, to a large extent, on a number of constant and variable factors that include our existing knowledge, experience, beliefs and ideologies; our 'so-called models, that is, mental representations of experiences, events or situations as well as the opinions we have about them' (Van Dijk 1993: 258). As Cunningham and Browning (in Baker 2006: 106) put it, our existing knowledge and ideas are framed in a certain way to provide 'a mechanism through which individuals can ideologically connect with movement goals and become potential participants in the movement's action.' Toolan (1991: 227) concurs that 'narratives carry political and ideological freight.'

Baker (2006: 105) elaborates this further, stating that translators and interpreters face a basic ethical choice, namely 'to produce existing ideologies as encoded in the narratives elaborated in the text or utterance, or to dissociate themselves from those ideologies.' Accordingly, this study will discuss and investigate language, knowledge, cognition, framing, access to discourse, power, control and dominance, as well as media discourse in the context of conflict. This will be done by focusing on the strategies used by Arabic interpreters in interpreting parliamentary debates on conflict resolution in Africa, both within meetings of the PAP committee on international cooperation and conflict resolution and within debates on this topic during the Plenary Session of the PAP.

1.2. Background to the research problem

1.2.1. The Pan-African Parliament

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) is 'an organ of the African Union established under Article 2 of the Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community relating to the Pan-African Parliament in accordance with Article 17 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union' (PAP Rules of Procedure 2004: 6). This treaty was signed in Abuja, Nigeria in 1991, and the PAP was officially established at an African Union (AU) summit in Durban on July 9, 2002 to replace the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The PAP is one of the organs of the AU and currently consists of 47 African member states from the five African regions (seven of the 54 member states of the African Union have not as yet joined the PAP for a number of different political, financial and regulatory reasons).

The seat of the PAP is in Midrand, South Africa. The PAP holds at least two ordinary sessions every twelve months, and may also hold extraordinary sessions in response to certain requests, as set out in its Rules of Procedure.

The African continent is politically divided into five regions, with different linguistic groups in each of the regional caucuses. The first region is North Africa whose members represent one language group of Arabic-speaking countries. The second region is West Africa which includes the member countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This group has three official languages: English, French and Portuguese. The countries of the third region, East Africa, speak Swahili, Arabic, English and French. The Southern African region includes the member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the languages spoken in this region are English, French and Portuguese. The fifth and last region is the Central African region whose members are mostly French speaking.

From the abovementioned data we note that the member countries of the PAP come from widely differing linguistic and cultural backgrounds. This linguistic diversity is provided for within the PAP; according to Rule 39 of the Pan-African Parliament Rules of Procedure (2004: 32), 'the working languages of the Pan-African Parliament shall be the working languages of the Union' – namely Arabic, English, French, Portuguese and Swahili. The rule also stipulates the following:

simultaneous interpretation shall be provided into the working languages at the proceedings of Parliament and the Permanent Committees.' It furthermore stipulates that 'the Clerk of the Parliament shall ensure that all official documents of the Parliament and the Permanent Committees are translated into the working languages.

Such linguistic diversity has significant implications for my study of political discourse and argumentation and its interpretation into Arabic and gives me ample opportunity to investigate different strands of cultural influence on PAP parliamentary discourse, as well as to trace the patterns of interpreter influence in discussions. Such influence is recognized from the outset, though implicitly, by the fact that discussions are conducted by interpreting between these languages.

The organs of the PAP are the Bureau, which consists of a President and four Vice-Presidents, and the Permanent Committees of the Parliament, which consists of ten permanent committees. The Parliament has the power to restructure these committees or establish other committees and 'may appoint Ad Hoc Committees whenever it deems necessary, for a particular function' (PAP Rules of Procedure 2004: 23). For the purposes of this study, the research will focus only on the Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution. The four general functions of this committee are to:

a) consider issues relating to the development of an efficient policy in matters of cooperation and international relations of the Parliament and the African Union;
b) consider the conventions and protocols linking the Parliament with regional and international institutions and report to the Parliament;
c) carry out examinations on the revision of Protocol and Treaties of the Union; and
d) assist the Parliament in its efforts of conflict prevention and resolution (PAP Rules of Procedure 2004: 26).

1.3. Aim and rationale

The study focuses on parliamentary discussions/debates around African conflicts in general, but with special emphasis on the conflict in Libya, and the ways in which these discussions/debates are interpreted into Arabic. The rationale behind my emphasis is that the conflict in Libya is an ideal representation of the conflict resolution dimension of Pan-African political discourse and poses a real

test for narratives of Pan-African political discourse on conflict resolution and African unity, which can be loosely captured by political slogans and rhetoric such as: *African Solutions to African Problems; One African, One Voice; Africa Agenda* and *The Re-Colonization of Africa*, as well as by the use of ambiguous, ideologically loaded terms like *war, liberation, rebels, revolutionaries, civil war, internal affairs, foreign intervention, regime change,* etc. An analysis of these discussions/debates will make it possible for me to explain the different viewpoints and divergent positions held across the African continent, as well as the marked difference between Africa's position as a whole and that of Western countries, primarily represented by those who play an active role in the NATO military campaign in the Libyan conflict: France, Britain, Italy and the USA.

My choice to focus on the Libyan conflict allows me to show how narratives about it are used/abused by different parties and reflected by the media in their portrayal of different sides of the conflict or, to put it differently, to demonstrate how reality is framed in different ways. For example, while Aljazeera TV refers to the opponents of the Libyan government as *revolutionaries*, South African and other African media sources refer to them as *rebels*. According to Baker (2006: 3), 'such narratives are dynamic entities; they change in subtle or radical ways as people experience and become exposed to new stories on a daily basis.' Most telling, however, is the fact that such uses of narratives constitute a powerful weapon with which parties can frame each other. These uses of narratives also reflect and add to the thrust of the power relations in the conflict. Baker rightly terms this 'ambiguity of framing' (Baker 2006: 3).

This narrative framing sustains the discourse of conflict and is clearly reflected in different political discourses, positions and power relations. Fairclough (2001), in his groundbreaking work on discourse analysis, explains how language functions in maintaining and changing power relations. For instance, African countries and civil society groups call the NATO Air bombardment of Libya a foreign intervention aimed at controlling oil wealth. They accuse NATO of seeking to advance its own, self-serving interests and pursuing a regime change in Libya, and argue that the West is promoting conflicts in Africa as part of a new scramble for natural resources and as a prelude for re-colonization. Such positions were prominently manifested in a joint appeal by former presidents and prime ministers of 20 African countries to the AU that was published in *The Thinker* magazine (2011) and stated that 'developments in both Libya and Côte d'Ivoire have resulted in the marginalization of the African Union and that others from outside the continent took decisions to resolve the conflict in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire by resorting to force rather than negotiations'. In contrast, Western countries insist that

they are merely implementing the Security Council resolution of 1973 which imposes a no-fly zone over Libya in order to protect the civilian population from the lethal force and campaign of slaughter unleashed against them by ousted Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi's forces.

The choice to focus on this conflict is also important in that it provides scope for highlighting some aspects of argumentation in such debates – as a reflection of the influence of different cultural and linguistic backgrounds – and to explore the different interpreting strategies used in this regard. It is important to note that conflict resolution and power relations are interrelated: '[d]efinitions of conflict inevitably draw on notions of power, and vice versa' (Baker 2006). Such a view is also supported by Van Dijk's (1993: 250) assertion of the role of discourse in the (re)production of dominance. In his view, '[t]his reproduction process may involve such different modes of discourse-power relations as the more or less direct or overt support.'

Given this background, I investigate not only the strategies used by speakers in the original language of the discussion, but also the way in which this discussion is interpreted into Arabic. This implies that any analysis of the discourse of conflict will also be influenced by the discursive processes used by the interpreter(s) who are themselves influenced by the dominant discourses of the PAP and the media, as well as their own subjective views which may be similar or dissimilar to these overriding discourses.

1.4. Research question

In this study I aim to ask the following research question: Do dominant CDA and competing narratives influence Arabic interpreters' choices of interpreting strategies at the PAP and do the Arabic interpreters then influence the trajectory of the discussions through the interpreting strategies they use?

1.5. Literature review

Discourse analysis can be defined as 'an approach to the analysis of language that looks at patterns of language across texts as well as the social and cultural contexts in which the text occur' (Paltridge 2006). For the purposes of this study, it is useful to borrow Van Dijk's (2001: 352) definition of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as 'a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context.' Considering this definition, the basic tenets of CDA are how dominance, inequality and other influences of power relations are enacted or actualized in social and political contexts and specifically how they are reproduced through language use in terms of texts and speech to manufacture mental models that shape the understanding and interpretation of reality.

My study is limited to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) or what Van Dijk (1993: 249) calls 'socio-political discourse analysis' and is focused on the role of language, language use and discourse in power relations and the shaping of understanding and opinions, as is emphasized by Van Dijk (1993: 279). There are two major ways in which discourse is involved in dominance: through the enactment of dominance in text and speech within specific contexts and, more indirectly, through the influence of discourse on the minds of others.

According to Paul Simpson (1993: 88), 'speakers encode in language their mental picture of reality and how they account for their experience of the world around them.' Thus, when interpreting, the interpreter is not a neutral co-participant in the communication but is present 'with all his/her deeply held views on power, status, solidarity, etc. that are used by him/her to construct and interpret reality' (Angelelli 2001: 16). Simpson (1993) uses the notion of transitivity to describe how speakers encode their notion of reality and Fairclough (1989) explores the linguistic effects of the imbrication of language and social institutional practices.

Historically, research on conference interpretation has focused mainly on the linguistic, neurolinguistic and psycholinguistic aspects of interpreting. In recent years, however, researchers focusing on conference interpreting, influenced by research on the liaison interpreting domain, have begun to examine issues such as the role of the interpreter in the conference context, factoring in aspects such as situation (context), text and culture. Liaison interpreting researchers question the notion of the 'invisibility of the interpreter' and explore the idea that interpreters are not only language conduits but

also active co-participants in the communicative event (Angelelli 2007). The interpreter is thus seen as an essential partner in cross-cultural conversation and a co-constructor of interactions (Roy 1989; 2000; Wadensjö 1995; 1998). As Pöchhacker (1995: 31) explains, 'in the past conference interpreting studies have tended to focus more on the cognitive mechanics of second-by-second processing than on holistic conceptions of text, situation, culture and the entire course of action involved in professional interpreting assignments.'

This theoretical shift is a significant one because bringing such holistic conceptions into focus has also brought into play the influence of conference interpreters within the communicative process, either in terms of the strategies they use or with regard to the influence of culture, discourse, deeply held views and mental representations of reality. Angelelli (2004: 29) suggests 'that various sociological theories allow us to approach the problem of the role of the interpreter at three different levels: societal, interpersonal and discursive.' At a societal level, the interpreting process does not unfold in a social vacuum and it seems clear that previous discourses on specific topics will also influence interpreters' strategic choices. Kohn and Kalina (1996) highlight this fact when stating that: 'Both in production and in comprehension, discourse processing relies on a diversified knowledge base.' This means that interpreters need to adopt certain strategies to help them receive, comprehend and process utterances and to mitigate difficulties and pressures in delivering the interpreted messages. Such strategies entail utilizing different linguistics tools, experience, knowledge and context, amongst others things, to design and adopt the most appropriate and effective interpreting strategies to deal with such situations. Setton (in Wallmach 2004: 181) explains this by stating that 'in interpreting, speech processing is critical and consequently, so is whatever can be mobilized to support it from immediate context and prior knowledge.'

Taking the above discussion into account and given the difficulty of the simultaneous interpreting process and the numerous pressures and constraints placed upon the conference interpreter, including those of divided attention, time pressure, continuous response stress and concentration, Gile (1995) proposes that anything that mitigates this 'effort' and relieves some pressure is vital. The accumulated knowledge of institutional discourse and the ability to produce stock phrases is one of the most important determinants of the interpreter's performance as it minimizes the effort involved in producing a simultaneously interpreted message and allows the interpreter to anticipate the next segment of speech.

In addition to the general constraints involved in the simultaneous interpreting process, there are also a number of 'problem triggers' mentioned by Gile (1995), such as text complexity, text pace, text preparedness and linguistic and syntactic dissimilarities between languages. In this context, Kohn and Kalina (1996: 119) highlight factors that determine the time lag between source discourse and target language rendering. These include language pair, processing direction (structurally similar or structurally dissimilar languages), cognitive processing load, memory capacity, fatigue and interpreting strategy.

One of the chief problem triggers appears to be the additional cognitive load produced when interpreting between languages that are linguistically and syntactically different. Le Ny (1978: 295), in Al-Khanji et al. (2000), states: 'the principal problem posed in any translation is actually the non-concordance between the semantic structure of two given languages.' Akira Mizuno (2005) notes that 'simultaneous interpreting between Japanese and English seems more difficult than other structurally similar language combinations. The difficulty arises mainly from the difference of language structure rather than the difference of cultures and other elements.' Such difficult linguistic and cognitive situations resulting from the dissimilarity of semantic structures are also a factor when interpreting between Arabic and English. Al-Khanji, El-Shiyab and Hussein (2000) highlight this fact, stating that 'it is clear that the "mental gymnastics" required to perform this type of difficult linguistic and cognitive operations will force even professional interpreters to resort to a kind of groping for words, a kind of lexical or synthetic search strategies, i.e. "compensatory strategies" as this is the term used in the present study.'

All of these challenges confirm the fact that interpreters have to manage competing mental activities at the same time, as described in Gile's (1988; 1991) capacity management model. To manage these difficult situations, interpreters need to use specific strategies within the four basic phases of the interpreting process, i.e. decoding of a SL segment, recording, TL production, and output monitoring (Kirchhoff, in Pöchhacker and Shlesinger (2000: 112). Kohn and Kalina (1996: 126) state that '[i]n order to cope with the manifold difficulties inherent in interpreting, interpreters attempt to convert their knowledge into strategic action.' Interpreters make use of strategies such as segmentation of input, rephrasing, anticipation, reproduction and output monitoring, and self-correction. Other frequently used compensatory strategies include approximation, filtering, comprehension, omission, summarizing, code-switching and substitution. This indicates that any interpreter choice will be influenced by factors that include previous discourse, embedded ideas and the experience of the interpreter. In this regard,

anticipation is regarded as one of the most important interpreter strategies (Vandepitte 2001). Kohn and Kalina (2000: 130) confirm this in stating that 'target discourse production will then rely on a corresponding mental modeling based on early anticipation.'

The above overview suggests that the strategies used by interpreters play a mitigating role that frees up more capacity for the interpreter's mental representation and delivery of the target discourse. As Kalina (2000) rightly proposes, '[t]he strategies interpreters use most frequently must become, to a certain degree, automatic so as to leave cognitive capacity for complex operations that occur less frequently.' Kalina goes on to point out that 'mental modeling (building a representation of a text and of the world to which the text refers), is not only carried out by those to whom texts are addressed but also by those who interpret texts for addressees' (Johnson-Laird in Kalina 2000: 6). This postulation confirms the influence of the cause-effect relation of discourse and framing narratives on interpreters. As Baker (2006) puts it:

> Translators and interpreters can make use of various other routines that allow them to inject the discourse with their own voice – meaning actively frame its narrative – while signaling their intention to stay within the prescribed frame space for their activity.

1.6. Research methodology

As explained above, the main aim of my study is to detect how the discourse of conflict resolution in the PAP is interpreted into Arabic and how dominant CDA and competing narratives of conflicts influence the interpreters' choices of interpreting strategies at the PAP and whether Arabic interpreters influence the trajectory of the discussions through the interpreting strategies they use in this interpreting assignment. Hence the study seeks to explore topics such the role of the interpreter, the influence of narrative and discourse on the interpreter's strategic choices and, most importantly, what influence the interpreter brings to different competing narratives and the course of the discussion.

In order to perform this task, I analyze different texts and compare interpreted Arabic discourse to original English speaker utterances with the aim of detecting the set of tool variables used to affect and operationalize such influences, so as to gauge the influence of dominant discourse and competing narratives on the interpreters' choices of interpreting strategies and whether the Arabic influences the course of the discussion. This means that the analysis is aimed at examining CDA parameters of

discursive and linguistic patterns which are used as tools used to create mental models and representations of reality. These tools include variables such as argumentation, lexical style, choice of words, rhetorical figures, and structural and semantic emphasis. The analysis also includes narrative markers such as framing, framing ambiguity, political imports of narratives and ideologically and politically loaded expressions, as well as an investigation of elements of interpreting strategies such as omissions, shifts, repetitions, rephrasing, anticipation, reproduction, approximation, filtering code-switching and substitution so as to identify the occurrence and scope of the aforementioned influences.

Authentic recordings of professional Arabic interpreting under real-life circumstances are analyzed, as are some written texts representing relevant discourses as well as speeches and reports by the PAP committee on international relations and conflict resolution that were delivered in committee meetings, as well as in the Plenary Session of PAP between September 28 and October 18, 2011. The recordings are made in dual track and then transcribed and divided into small segments for easy analysis, tracing and comparison. The choice of segments is evenly selected in order to cover as many speaker opinions as possible and to represent all five African regions.

This endeavour is performed by analyzing recordings of interpreting from English into Arabic, supported by relay interpreting from French into English into Arabic, and interpreting from French into Arabic (as detailed below), in order to paint a broader picture of different influences and speaker backgrounds, together with interpreter influence on the trajectory of discussions which can be observed in the responses and/or reactions of the participants after each segment of the interpreted text. In order to identify the interpreting strategies used, I examine:

1. 60 minutes of recordings of interpreting from English into Arabic.
2. 30 minutes of recordings of relayed interpreting from French into English into Arabic.
3. 30 minutes of recordings of interpreting from French into Arabic
4. An analysis of original English texts of letters, opinions, speeches and reports of the committee meetings and the plenary session.

I have obtained the written consent of both the PAP administration and the interpreters to use these recordings and texts for research purposes only.

1.7. Research contribution

This study will contribute by adding to the body of research on Arabic interpreting, especially in the field of Critical Discourse Analysis of parliamentary discussions of conflicts.

1.8. Research outline

Chapter 1: Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss my research aims, the main focus of my research and its founding assumption that our understanding and interpretation of events is based, to a large extent, on a number of constant and variable factors that include our existing knowledge, experience, beliefs and ideologies. I explain that this entails discussing language, knowledge, cognition, framing and access to discourse, power, control and dominance, as well as media discourse in the context of conflict and strategies used by Arabic interpreters in interpreting parliamentary debates on conflict resolution in Africa with special emphasis on the Libyan conflict.

The chapter thus outlines the background of the research problem against the milieu of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) with a special note about the implications of linguistic diversity in the PAP on this study. The chapter also highlights the aim and rationale of the study and poses the research question centered on whether dominant CDA and competing narratives influence Arabic interpreters' choices of interpreting strategies and whether the Arabic interpreters influence the trajectory of the discussions through the interpreting strategies they use. Then the chapter gives an overview of the literature review as foundation for the research with the aim to answer the research question. The review discusses different aspects of CDA and narratives as well as general constraints and difficulties of interpreting, the role of conference interpreters in the communicative process and interpreting strategies. The chapter also detailed the research methodology to be followed together with resources to be used for analysis.

Finally, Chapter 1 concludes by highlighting the research contribution to the body of research on Arabic interpreting especially in the field of Critical Discourse Analysis of parliamentary debates on conflicts.

Chapter 2: Literature review

Chapter 2 focuses mainly on CDA (Van Dijk 1993) and on Baker's (2006) adaptation of the features of narrativity and the framing of discourse in the media to the contexts of translation and interpreting. I also examine cognitive models of simultaneous interpreting such as Gile's (1995) effort model and tightrope hypothesis, as well as the general constraints on simultaneous interpreting that make it difficult. I then explore more holistic, context-focused approaches to simultaneous interpreting in order to examine the role of conference interpreters in the communicative process, either in terms of the strategies they use or with regard to the influences of culture, discourse, deeply held views and mental representations of reality. I investigate different strategies used by interpreters in order to detect the influence of discourses and conflict narratives on their choices of interpreting strategies as well as the influence of these strategies on the performance, role and influence of interpreters on the course of discussions.

Chapter 3: Conflict resolution in the context of the PAP

This chapter provides an overview of the concept of conflict resolution within the PAP, with special reference to debates on the Libyan conflict during meetings of the Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution and during plenary sessions. The chapter presents a brief historical context of the main events of the Libyan conflict. Power relations, competing narratives and different positions on the conflict, such as the strong positions of South Africa and other African countries, are discussed.

Chapter 4: Research methodology

In this chapter, I explain my research methodology: aspects of CDA, Baker's (2006) notion of narratives of conflict and Kalina's discussion of interpreting strategies. To investigate these concepts I will use certain research procedures for conducting the required analysis consisting of using two tools for data collection and analysis: real-life audio recordings and written texts.

The study will adopt an *analytical approach* aimed at presenting a profile of conflicting discourses, power relations and dominant discourses, and their roles in shaping and informing discussions, as well as their interpreting within the PAP.

The analysis procedure will focus on systematically identifying specific parameters, variables or tools of the abovementioned influences, which specifically include:

- At the level of discursive and linguistic patterns: argumentation, lexical style, choice of words, rhetorical figures, structural and semantic emphasis, etc.
- At the level of narratives: framing, and ideologically and politically loaded expressions.
- At the level of interpreting strategies and interpreters' influence: anticipation, omissions, shifts, rephrasing, repetitions and code-switching, etc.

Chapter 5: Research analysis

In this chapter I conduct an analysis of various written texts, as well as recordings of original interpreted speeches in order to identify the ideological standpoints of African vs. Western countries on the Libyan conflict. The analysis will seek to identify specific variables which serve as tools of discursive and linguistic patterns as well as narratives markers. These parameters include tools such as argumentation, lexical style, rhetorical figures, structural and semantic emphasis, framing, and ideologically and politically loaded expressions. The analysis also aims at identifying the interpreting strategies used, such as anticipation, omissions, shifts, repetitions, rephrasing and code switching.

Chapter 6: Findings, recommendations and conclusions

In this chapter, I identify the main discursive and linguistic patterns in original and interpreted speeches and the strategies employed by interpreters, and relate these to my research question. I highlight difficulties facing the research analysis. I then provide some recommendations for further research.

In concluding this chapter I present my results and highlight their relevance to the literature review. I determine to what extent interpreters influence the course of discussions on conflict resolution at the

PAP and whether they reflect the institutional ideology of the PAP in their interpretations. Do they support or weaken embedded ideologies and political positions on the conflict?

Finally, I discuss how these findings can contribute to the training of Arabic interpreters working within this context and highlight the role of interpreters to show how the PAP can benefit more from interpreting services and an understanding of what this entails.

2. Chapter 2: Literature review

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter I focus on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as explicated by Van Dijk (2001: 352) who defines CDA as 'a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context.' I also focus on Baker's (2006) adaptation of the features of narrativity and the framing of discourse in the media in the context of translation and interpreting and examine cognitive models of simultaneous interpreting, such as Gile's (1995) effort model and tightrope hypothesis, as well as the general constraints on simultaneous interpreting that make it difficult. Following this, I explore more holistic approaches to simultaneous interpreting. I specifically investigate context-focused approaches in order to examine the roles of conference interpreters in the communicative process, either in terms of the strategies they use or with regard to the influence of culture, discourse, narratives, 'deeply held views' (Baker 2006), and mental representations of reality.

2.2. Approaches to discourse through Critical Discourse Analysis

According to Wodak and Meyer (2009: 10), CDA is 'fundamentally interested in analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language.' However, according to Van Dijk (1993: 258, 259) the core of CDA is 'a detailed description, explanation and critique of the ways dominant discourse (indirectly) influence socially shared knowledge, attitudes and ideologies, namely through their role in the manufacture of concrete models.' This chapter, however, does not aim to provide an exhaustive overview of all the approaches to CDA; it only considers aspects relevant to my study and the corpus of texts under examination. According to Beaton (2014: 276) text is seen as 'a tangible manifestation of layers of discourse.' Ideologies manifest in suborders or orders of discourse which are, in turn, manifest in text.' Beaton (2014: 276) notes that 'the term order of discourse is used in the Foucauldian sense of organization (of language, etc.) into systems (orders) of knowledge (epistemes) and hence social practice.' As such, aspects like language function, knowledge, cognition, framing, access to discourse, power, control and dominance are discussed. In my discussion I also draw on Baker's (2006) views on discourse and conflict in the media and specifically in the context of narrative theory.

Wodak and Meyer (2009) highlight the fact that 'the terms Critical Linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) are used interchangeably, and that recently, the term CDA seems to have been preferred and is being used to denote the theory formerly identified as CL.' According to Wodak and Meyer (2009: 3), research in the field of CDA is relatively recent and its history can be traced back to the early 1990s and the emergence of the CDA group, a network of scholars (including Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak) that formed after a symposium held in Amsterdam in January 1991. As stated before, the core of CDA is concerned with the ways in which dominant discourse (directly or indirectly) influence socially shared knowledge, attitudes and ideologies. Such influence is not limited to the content of discourses and narratives, but also extends to the forms, properties and structure – among other things – of text and speech, through their roles in drawing specific mental images and perceptions that influence and are sustained by our cognition and knowledge. In fact, Van Dijk (1993: 250) explains that CDA wants to know 'what structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction or communicative events play a role in these modes of reproduction of dominance.' He further postulates that 'we need to know how specific discourse structures determine specific mental processes, or facilitate the formation of specific social representations' (Van Dijk 1993: 259).

In the same domain, however, Chernov (2004: 96) points out that 'one of the most important characteristics of a discourse is its semantic coherence, the sense of the whole.' This highlights the significance of mental representations and background experience and knowledge in discourse (re)production, understanding and interpretation. Van Dijk (1993: 258) explains that 'concrete text production and interpretation are based on so-called models, that is, mental representations of experiences, events or situations, as well as the opinions we have about them.' Such models do not form in a vacuum; they are shaped within and sustained by overarching contexts and structures or, in Baker's words, a 'master frame.' This is what Van Dijk (1993: 259) means when he stresses that 'we need to focus on the relations between discourse structures and the structures of social cognition.' Significantly, this suggests that social cognition may change as discursive structures and individual experiences change.

It is critical to draw attention to the fact that individual actions, knowledge, perceptions and mental representation are sustained by and contribute to such social representations. This is highlighted by Van Dijk (1993: 258) who states that 'models allow us to link the personal with the social, and hence individual actions and (other) discourses, as well as their interpretations, with social order, and personal

opinions and experiences with group attitudes and group relations, including those of power and dominance.'

In this context the influence of discursive structures and rhetorical figures, such as metaphor, do not merely determine mental processes but, as stated by Van Dijk (1993: 259), 'influences the organization of models or the formation of opinions embodied in such models.' However, it should also be noted that such organization or formation of opinions takes place within 'our global village' with its ever-changing and advancing sophisticated communication technologies and social media networks such as Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. This, in turn, indicates the role of character, context and setting, as explained by Toolan (1991: 48) when highlighting 'the subtle technique for disclosing characters' words or thoughts known as free indirect discourse.' In this regard, Hung and Bradac (1993: 165) draw our attention to the role of a global context of utterances, stating that 'it can be exploited in conversation as well as writings for identity switching, for loosening the coherence (reference) of a discourse, and for embedding a propaganda message.' This highlights the power as well as the danger of propaganda, manipulation and reframing the facts to mitigate the embedded message or to create completely different contexts and messages. In addition to context it is imperative to discuss approaches to discourse analysis and to explore features of discourse and discursive interaction as essential tools for identifying the influence of discursive structures on creating mental models and mental representation of reality.

2.2.1. Discourse-Historical Approach

In explicating how discursive structures influence the formation of mental models, it is important to explore features of discourse and discursive interaction so as to identify such discursive structures. This makes it imperative to discuss approaches to CDA. In this context I will briefly discuss two approaches which are relevant to my study, mainly the Discourse-Historical Approach and Sociocognitive Discourse Analysis approach.

In discussing approaches to discourse through CDA, it is useful to highlight Van Dijk's (1997; 2007a) view that 'as CDA deals with complex real-world problems it needs a historical, cultural, socio-economic, philosophical, logical or neurological approach, among others depending on what one wants to know.' This is an important statement as it highlights the fact that different approaches within CDA will influence how one deals with discourse. The Discourse-Historical Approach is relevant for this

analysis as it offers a tool for tracing features of discourse, linguistic and cultural factors and power relations, as well as providing historical, social and political background knowledge 'within which discursive events are embedded.' This is the view of Wodak (2011: 39) too who explains that the Discourse-Historical Approach provides 'a vehicle for looking at latent power dynamics and the range of potentials in agents.'

In this context, the Discourse-Historical Approach is useful to my analysis as it is concerned with issues such as the structure of discourse, linguistic features and discursive strategies. The relevance of the Discourse-Historical Approach in engaging with these issues is highlighted by Wodak (2011: 39) who states that it 'distinguishes between three dimensions which constitute textual meanings and structures: the topics; the discursive strategies employed and the linguistic means that are drawn upon to realize both topics and strategies.' This confirms the significance as well as the relevance of these three dimensions to my analysis.

2.2.2. Sociocognitive Discourse Analysis approach

The Sociocognitive Discourse Analysis approach is relevant here as it is concerned with discursive interaction, which includes aspects like knowledge, perceptions and mental representations. It is useful to highlight some links between the two approaches in the sense that both of them are concerned with issues such as cognitive means, structures of discourse and constructions of text and speech. I will not deal with all the possible approaches to CDA but will, instead, limit myself to the Sociocognitive Discourse Analysis approach as used by Van Dijk (2009 :65); in other words with a focus on the 'sociocognitive interface of discourse, that is, the relation between mind, discursive interaction and society.' This limitation is fundamentally important to my study of CDA, narratives, communicative events, verbal interaction and interpreting, which require an investigation of, amongst other things, mental representations, language processing and the (re)production of discourse, all of which are contained in what interpreters do and is based on their cognition, knowledge, beliefs, ideologies and perceptions. These are some of the primary cognitive processes that interpreters are concerned with, together with factors such as the production and comprehension of discourse based on specific mental models within a broader context that is, in turn, influenced by factors including, but not limited to, knowledge, experience and ideologies. This is what is articulated by Van Dijk (2008: 65)when he states that 'whatever cognitive and social dimensions of critical discourse study (CDS) deals with, it

always needs to account for at least some of the detailed structures, strategies and functions of text or talk.' It is worth noting here that the discourse model developed by Beaton and Grant (2014: 276) views text 'as a tangible manifestation of layers of discourse.' All these aspects inform this study, and my analysis illuminates different components of verbal structures of communicative events.

In conclusion, my analysis is based on this approach summed up by Van Dijk (2008: 65) when he states that: 'such an approach examines the ways in which such cognitive phenomena are related to structures of discourse, verbal interaction, communicative events and situations, as well as societal structures, such as those of domination and social inequality.'

2.3. Approaches to discourse through narrative theory

Approaching discourse from the angle of narratives, Baker (2006: 3) states that 'narrative overlaps to some extent with Foucault's notion of "discourse" and Barthes's notion of "myths", especially where these concern the normalizing effect of publicly disseminated representations.' Baker (2006: 3) thus approaches the issue of discourse through the notion of narratives in the sense of 'everyday stories we live by' and describes narratives as 'dynamic entities; they change in subtle or radical ways as people's experiences become exposed to new stories on a daily basis.' Baker (2006: 9) further explains that 'narrative cuts across and underpins all modes of communication.' Significantly, Baker (2006: 3) uses sociological and communicative approaches rather than literary approaches to narrative, thereby signalling the fact that these models and mental representations of reality do not operate in vacuum but rather in a sociological context or a master frame. According to Briggs (1996: 3), narratives constitute a crucial means of generating, sustaining, mediating, and representing conflict at all levels of social organization.' In addition to that, Baker (2006:3) describes narratives as 'dynamic entities' which implies that people's experiences change within social context(s) and through interaction, which highlights the fact that sociological context(s) serves as incubator for social cognition which informs people's experiences and mental representations of reality. In fact, Baker (2006: 4) emphasizes that 'narrative theory is simultaneously able to deal 'with individual text and the broader set of narratives in which it is embedded, and it encourages us to look beyond the immediate, local narrative as elaborated in a given text or utterance to assess its contribution to elaborating wider narratives in society.'

This view explains not only the influence of daily stories and social cognition in forming and shaping our opinions, knowledge and mental representations of events, but also highlights how these narratives are structured to gain more influence within our utterances and verbal interactions in communicative events. One of the most effective aspects of such influence is the normalising function of narrative. In terms of this, Baker (2006: 107) emphasizes the role of framing and framing ambiguity; she states: 'one of the effects of narrativity is that it normalizes the accounts it projects over a period of time, so that they come to be perceived as self-evident, benign, incontestable and non-controversial.' Fisher (1987: 193), in Baker (2006: 9), elaborates further by stating that 'narrative is the context for interpreting and assessing all communication – not a mode of discourse laid on by the creator's deliberate choice but the shape of knowledge as we first apprehend it.'

In this context it is important to highlight Baker's (2006: 4) view that 'narrative theory as outlined here treats narrative – across all genres and modes – as diffuse, amorphous configurations rather than necessarily discrete, fully articulated local "stories"'. This study, however, is more concerned with the relation between individual narratives and the broader social narratives within which they operate, because this forms and sustains our views and understandings and subjects us to the influence of the 'community of knowledge' we live in. Baker (2006: 4) explains that narrative theory is simultaneously able to deal 'with individual text and the broader set of narratives in which it is embedded, and it encourages us to look beyond the immediate, local narrative as elaborated in a given text or utterance to assess its contribution to elaborating wider narratives in society.' As previously mentioned, this is exactly what is meant by Van Dijk (1993: 259) when he states that 'we need to know how specific discourse structures determine specific mental processes, or facilitate the formation of specific social representations.' It is also important to highlight some discourse characteristics as subdivided by Beaton (2014: 376), for example 'institutional self-reference, intertextuality, rhetorical repetition, repeated collocation and ambiguous pronoun use.' Here Beaton is drawing on institutional self-reference and on Luhmann's (1995) concept of the institution as a 'self-governing and self-constitutive entity.'

The analysis in this review thus highlights various properties of discourse and different aspects of CDA such as access, setting, context, genre, communicative and speech acts, and political dominance, as well as narratives, framing, assertions, discrediting, vilification, intimidation, participant positions, and roles and argumentation. These aspects are important as they indicate how 'attacks, marginalization,

discrediting and other socio-political acts are enacted by properties of discourse' (Van Dijk 1993: 274) and by analysing these properties, one can trace the influence of the formation of attitudes and models of events, as well as that of argumentation, rhetorical figures, lexical style, choice of words, quoting credible sources (such as in news reports) or using/abusing factual statements and resolutions. This also highlights the role of the media in disseminating and promoting certain narrative and discourse structures that shape or influence our mental models and knowledge. Van Dijk (1993: 264) draws our attention to the fact that 'these and many other, sometimes very subtle, structures may be interpreted as managing the processes of understanding in such a way that "preferred models" are being built by the hearers/readers.' That being said, it is also the case that each of these models and narratives are competing to introduce and advance certain discourses, denoting conflict, tension or struggle. The notion of conflict can therefore be said to encompass power relations and denotes struggle, tension or confrontation between opposing forces, discourses or competing narratives. Baker (2006: 1) summarizes by noting that 'conflict in its broadest meaning refers to a situation in which two or more parties seek to undermine each other because they have incompatible goals, competing interests, or fundamentally different values.'

This highlights the fact that competing discourses or narratives seek to construct or (re)construct reality for us in order to manage our minds. Baker (2006: 5) explains, for example, 'how narratives function in terms of how they construct the world for us.' Van Dijk (1993: 260) also reminds us that a "critical analysis of access modes to communicative events pay special attentions to those forms of context control that are legally or morally illegitimate or otherwise unacceptable." He further argues that 'some voices are thereby censored, some opinions are not heard, some perspectives ignored' (Van Dijk 1993: 260), and this is supported by Bolinger's (1987: 120) perspective on the role of the media: '[e]ditorializing in newspapers is theoretically limited to the editorial page, but the sympathies of editors and publishers are subtly conveyed in the biased language used for reporting the news.'

2.3.1. Power relations and competing narratives

With conflicts and conflict resolution efforts come power relations and the power of language and discourse in shaping ideas, knowledge and positions advanced by conflicting parties, as Baker (2006: 1) observes: 'Definitions of conflict inevitably draw on notions of power, and vice versa.' Such power relations manifest themselves in language, discourse play and competing narratives, as can also be seen

in the Libyan conflict, and these narratives are influenced and sustained by narratives of the past, as Baker (2006: 20) explains when states that '[b]ecause narratives of the past define and determine the narrative present, completion among different versions of a narrative may continue for centuries.' But even though narratives are influenced by the past, they can also change over time and this is often reflective of the ever changing nature of power relations and contestations, which confirms Baker's (2006: 3) postulation that '[n]arratives, as understood here, are dynamic entities; they change in subtle or radical ways as people experience and become exposed to new stories on a daily basis.'

Another important and related aspect is *framing ambiguity* with all its normalizing functions and the role of translation and interpreting in naturalizing and promoting certain narratives across linguistic boundaries. As Baker (2006: 107) notes, 'one of the effects of narrativity is that it normalizes the accounts it projects over a period of time, so that they come to be perceived as self-evident, benign, uncontestable and non-controversial.' My analysis will, however, take into account the changing nature of narratives given that people, including PAP parliamentarians and interpreters, are exposed to stories about the Libyan conflict in this context, and that these narratives can change daily. This fact is highlighted by Ewick and Silbery (1995: 199) who write that:

> narrative theory recognizes that at any moment in time we can be located within a variety of divergent, crisscrossing, often vacillating narratives, thus acknowledging the complexity and fluidity of our positioning in relation to other participants in interaction. Because narratives are continually open to change with our exposure to new experience and news stories, they have 'significant subversive or transforming potential.

This research will highlight the difficulties that may affect the analysis, such as aspects of cultural adaptation stemming from the rendering of certain cultural or language specific elements of the discourse. Kohn and Kalina (1996: 127) highlight these difficulties in stating that the interpreter may sometimes 'make explicit for the target discourse audience elements that were only implicit in the source discourse or forgo the full rendering of an element which does not even exist in the target culture and can therefore not be adequately expressed in the target language'.

In conclusion, the above overview brings us to an investigation of the role and function of language pertaining to discourse and narrative.

2.3.2. Language function and knowledge

'Language is not powerful on its own; it gains power by the use powerful people make of it.'
(Wodak 2011: 35)

Hall (1997), in Wodak (2011: 28) states that '[k]nowledge linked to power not only assumes the authority of truth but has the power to make itself true.' This statement is significant not only because it highlights the power of knowledge but also because it sees contestation and conflict as finding their expression in competing narratives and discourses, manifested in text and speech. This is also argued for by Liu (1999: 299), in Baker (2006: 21) who states that this contestation arises 'where different versions of a narrative are completely at odds with each other, [so] that there is no way a mutually-agreed upon decision can be reached on any issue of significance.'

Kohn and Kalina (1996: 120) stress that 'language can only be used successfully for the purpose of (communicative) discourse-based mental modelling because of a specific integration of world knowledge and linguistic knowledge.' Beaton (2014: 271) points out the fact that: 'The interplay between ideology and language use has long been the focus of, and point of contention between, numerous disciplines.' But more significant is that Beaton's (2014: 271) study, which investigates the impact of simultaneous interpretation on ideology in the European Parliament, concludes that her study 'provides evidence of interpreter mediation and agency and demonstrates that the simultaneous interpreter is an additional subjective actor in heteroglot communication.' Based on this understanding of the role of language in representing reality to us, it is informative to draw on Hung and Bradac's (1993: 147) views on the role of 'masking' and other tools used to delete or stress particular aspects of reality. They explain that 'a person uses language for representing reality mentally to himself or herself and to others as well as for maintaining a sense of reality over time.' In this regard it is useful to mention Paul and Elder's (2004: 1) statement that 'those who possess power in the form of wealth, property, and weaponry are those who decide what truths will be trumpeted around the world and what truths will be ridiculed, silenced, or suppressed.' They continue by stating that '[t]he mass media of the world generates an unending glut of messages that continually sacrifice truth to "spin". When we reach beneath the surface of things, we find a world in which the word 'communication' and the word "manipulation" collapse into virtual synonyms.' Examining the function of language within such a complex socio-political context requires that my study be multidisciplinary, deploying a variety of tools from linguistic and socio-political studies in order to properly develop an understanding of the role and

function of language as a social practice.

This type of multidisciplinary approach is clear in Fairclough and Wodak (1997), in Wodak and Meyer (2009: 5): 'Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of "social practice"'. Wodak and Meyer (2009: 2) elaborate on this view, stating that CDA is 'not interested in investigating a linguistic unit per se but in studying social phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a multidisciplinary and multi-methodical approach.' This is essential as it draws a master frame and, more importantly, emphasizes the crucial role of context within which language use and other forms of social interaction operate, interact and interplay, entailing an approach that combines linguistic, socio-political and other domains in a synchronized manner in order to understand how language functions in constructing and transmitting knowledge, (re)constructing reality and shaping or (re)shaping conflicting viewpoints. This is stressed by Wodak and Meyer (2009: 7): 'CDA emphasizes the need for interdisciplinary work in order to gain a proper understanding of how language functions in constituting and transmitting knowledge, in organizing social institutions or in exercising power.' Wodak and Meyer (2009: 5-6) concur with this interchangeable, multidisciplinary approach to CDA in these webs of complex relations within which language operates as a *social practice*: when quoting a popular definition among CDA researchers:

> CDA sees discourse-language use in speech and writing as a form of *social practice*. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them.

From this view it can be argued that CDA constitutes a web of relations between different disciplines; Van Dijk (1993: 253) sums this up: 'CDA requires true multidisciplinarity and an account of intricate relationship between text, talk, social cognition, power, society and culture.' Generally this, at least to some extent, constitutes a broader framework of conflict and complex relationships between dominance and discourse.

The discussion above highlights the crucial role of knowledge and the role of the media in disseminating, promoting, strengthening and reshaping knowledge, facts and realities. Wodak and Chilton (2005: 75) describe knowledge as a 'cognitive device as well as an important category of context models, that influence discourse structures including speech acts, rhetoric, lexical and syntactic

style, and so on.' This is stressed by Van Dijk (1993: 259): 'discursive (re)production of power results from social cognitions of the powerful, whereas the situated discourse structures result in social cognition.' This explains the ways in which dominant discourses directly or indirectly influence socially shared knowledge, attitudes and ideologies through their roles in manufacturing concrete models. Van Dijk (1993: 259) highlights the significance of discourse structure, stating that 'more specifically, we need to know how specific discourse structures determine specific mental processes, or facilitate the formation of specific social representations.'

It is significant that the roles and influences of discourse structures can be traced and detected through an analysis of different speeches, debates and interpreted discussions that help us to determine the extent to which interlocutors as well as interpreters are influenced by these mental models. This influence is deeply rooted in a number of fundamental aspects that include knowledge, beliefs, narratives and mental models relating to the situation at hand. Van Dijk (1993: 259) captures this well when he states that 'we eventually have to deal with relations between discourse and cognition. And in both cases discourse structures form the crucial mediating role. They are truly the means of the "symbolic" reproduction of dominance.' Van Dijk (1993: 259) also highlights the fact that 'semantic moves may directly facilitate the formation or change of social attitudes, or they may do so indirectly, that is, through the generalization or de-contextualization of personal models (including opinions) of specific events.'

We can deduce that such socially shared knowledge falls within the definition of narrative adopted by Fisher, Landau, Bruner and Somers and Gibson in Baker (2006: 19): 'Narrative in this view are public and personal 'stories' that we subscribe to and that guide our behaviour.' It is necessary here to shed some light on Van Dijk's (1993: 254) view that:

> The crucial point is where discourse and Critical Discourse Analysis manage the minds of others is essentially a function of text and talk. That dominance may be enacted and reproduce by subtle, routine, everyday forms of text and talk that appear "natural" and quite "acceptable".

This is also described by Baker (2006: 3): 'Narratives, as understood here, are dynamic entities; they change in subtle or radical ways as people experience and become exposed to new stories on a daily basis.' This statement provides some tools for exploring, tracing and analysing functions of text and speech, such as mind management, the enactment and reproduction of dominance, framing, access,

setting, genre, communicative and speech acts, political dominance, discrediting, participant positions, and roles and argumentation. In other words, participants in communicative events, including interpreters, are influenced by perceptions, expectations, mental models and framings of people and events. This is discussed by Tannen and Wallat (1993: 60), quoted in Baker (2006: 107), who observe that framing is 'often used in conjunction of schema or schemata, which generally denote those expectations about people, objects, events and settings in the word that participants bring with them to the interaction.'

In this context, Baker (2006: 14) asserts that 'in our war-ridden contemporary societies, we must continually remind ourselves that all conflict starts and ends with constructing or deconstructing an enemy.' This crucial observation provides an insight into how language functions within the exercise of power and, more significantly, how it portrays the relations between language, conflict, power and dominance, delineating how conflicts unfold in text and speech before finding their expression in war. Baker (2006: 1) highlights these relations as 'definitions of conflict [which] inevitably draw on notions of power, and vice versa.' And this then leads to an engagement with various important components of the critical analysis of conflict, such as the discursive reproduction of dominance, the enactment of power, access and the reception of reproduced discourse. Here, Van Dijk (1993: 259) highlights an important distinction between 'enactment, expression or legitimating of dominance in the (production of the) various structures of text and talk, on the one hand, and the functions, consequences or results of such structures for the (social) minds of recipients, on the other.' This emphasises not only the relations between discourse, cognition and dominance, but also stresses the important role of discursive structure. Van Dijk (1993: 259) highlights this role, observing that '[i]n both cases discourse structures form the crucial mediating role. They are truly the means of symbolic reproduction of dominance.'

2.3.3. Power relations, dominance, control and conflict

According to Hastie (2009: 705), 'Political discourses reflect and shape public constructions of past and present events, and social "problems"'. Fairclough (1985), in Van Dijk, (1993: 254), stresses that 'managing the mind of others is essentially a function of text and talk', and thus supports the view that 'CDA also needs to focus on the discursive strategies that legitimate control, or otherwise "natural-ize" the social order, and especially relations of inequality.'

Since I am convinced that conflicts start in the domain of language and discourse, as each party attempts to introduce or impose its perspective on any issue of conflicting interests, agendas or strategies, it becomes extremely important to highlight the fact that conflicts and conflicting narratives are the natural results of competing or differing versions of narrative and discourse. In this regard, a critical analysis of discourse strongly illuminates the manifestation of power relations, as well as emphasizing the power of discourse and framing in mind management and the legitimation of actions in conflict situations. Van Dijk (1993: 254) postulates that 'modern and more effective power is mostly cognitive and enacted by persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation, among other strategic ways to change the minds of other in one's own interests.' The study of power relations within the discourse of conflicts is thus highly relevant, as is emphasized by Lukes (1974: 23) in Baker (2006: 1):

> More robust definitions of power, however, acknowledge that the supreme exercise of power involves shaping and influencing another party's desires and wants in such a way as to avert observable conflict, that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent… conflict from arising in the first place.

Habermas (1967: 259) expresses this more directly: '[l]anguage is also a medium of domination and social force.' Echoing Habermas's view, I argue that as long as there is dominance and social force, resistant and opposing forces will play out in the form of contesting discourses and narratives. Wodak and Meyer (2009: 10) concur: 'an important perspective in CDA is related to the notion of "power" is that texts are often sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourse and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance.' Bennett and Edelman (1985: 160), in Baker (2006: 20), expand on this, arguing that 'the awareness that every acceptance of a narrative involves a rejection of other makes the issue politically and personally vital. In a critical sense the differences among competing narratives give all of them their meanings.'

It is also important to take into consideration the role of the media where words are used to discredit and frame targeted or perceived enemies, often long before bullets are shot. The media play a crucial, influential role in accessing, disseminating, promoting and controlling discourse and context. This is supported by Van Dijk's (1993: 260) view that 'one way of enacting power is to control context.' Such control is undoubtedly an essential tool for shaping or manipulating reality and, in the process, mind management. Fairclough (1985), in Van Dijk (1993: 254), notes however that such mind management is not always bluntly manipulative. On the contrary, dominance may be enacted and reproduced by subtlety and routine, by everyday forms of text and speech that appear 'natural' and 'acceptable.' This

is reflected in Van Dijk's (1993: 254) view that 'modern and often more effective power is mostly cognitive.'

Again, this is crucial in highlighting the role played by the media in giving prominence to, promoting, reinforcing, masking, or discrediting certain versions of narrative. Baker (2006: 20) highlights this, stating that 'narrative circulates in many different versions.' Different versions may become more or less valued and may achieve more or less currency through various processes of reinforcement and contestation. In other words, the mass media plays a prominent role in the dissemination, suppression or manipulation of certain narratives in order to manufacture public opinion. Baker (2006: 20) reiterates this, stating that 'newspapers carry different stories, promoting some version of the narrative or another, through heavily mediated textual and visual representations.' In this context, the role of interpreters in strengthening, weakening or transforming narratives is crucially relevant. Baker (2006: 20) explains that 'every time a version of the narrative is told or translated into another language, it is injected with elements from other, broader narratives – or circulating within the new setting or from the personal narrative of the retellers.' Baker (2006: 107) furthermore points out that '[t]ranslation may also be treated as a frame in a less metaphoric sense.'

What concerns me most here is the nature of conflict between different narratives, as this explains the prominence and roles of different players together with the factors, tools and means used to influence, frame, manipulate, advance or suppress specific narratives. In this regard, since I am convinced that conflicts start within the domain of language and discourse, and with each party attempting to introduce or impose its side of the story pertaining to any issue of conflicting interests, agendas or strategies, it is extremely important to note that conflicts are the natural result of competing or differing versions of narratives. It is equally important to note that conflicts may involve many forms of dominance, control and uses and abuses of power as each party tries to impose its will, achieve its objectives or promote its own interests at the expense of the other party, which has often already been elevated, in the discourse of the dominant party, to the level or status of "enemy", "Number One enemy", "enemy of democracy", "dictator", "tyrant", "enemy of humanity", "terrorist" and so forth. This is exactly what is meant by Baker (2006: 107) when she explains that the 'same set of events can be framed in different ways to promote competing narratives, with important implications for different parties to the conflict; this often results in frame ambiguity.'

In this regard Baker (2006: 107), illustrated by Chilton (1997: 175) and Smith (1997), notes, in relation

to the Chechen conflict and the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that 'forms of violent conflict may be framed as "war", "civil war", "guerrilla warfare", "terrorist acts", or even "low intensity conflict"'. Such abuse of power is highlighted by Van Dijk (1993: 254-5): 'despite complexities and subtleties of power relations, Critical Discourse Analysis is specifically interested in power abuse, that is, breaches of laws, rules and principles of democracy, equality and justice by those who wield power.'

Dominant discourses and abuses of power are thus not only intended to frame the enemy and consolidate negative political narratives against it, but also to create a false impression of consensus in the international community in order to conceal, cover up or create a pretext for legitimizing any act of aggression against this perceived or constructed enemy. This is referred to by Herman and Chomsky's (1988) who state that 'one major function of dominant discourse is precisely to manufacture such consensus, acceptance and legitimacy of dominance.' Van Dijk (1993: 255) concurs, stating that 'power and dominance are usually organized and institutionalized, legitimated by laws enforced by police and ideologically sustained and reproduced by the media or text-books.' This statement by Van Dijk is reflective of a situation where a small dominant group, also referred to as 'power elites' (by, for example, Domhoff 1978 and Mill 1956), play a crucial role in decision-making and in the processes of enactment of power.

Such elites also possess special access to discourse as has been described by Bourdieu (1982) in Van Dijk (1993: 255): 'they are literally the ones who have most to say and their "symbolic power" as measured by the extent of their discursive and communicative scope and resources.' This highlights not only the importance of access to discourse but the fact that the controlling group or power elites have the ability – and are at liberty to use and sustain – specific discourses, genres or style in order to enact or sustain social or political dominance. Van Dijk (1993: 256) points out that the 'analysis of the various modes of discourse access reveals a rather surprising parallelism between social power and discourse access.' By controlling access to discourse, the dominant group is able to manipulate and control the perceptions of others, what Van Dijk (1993: 256) terms the 'management of social representations.'

This justifies a focus on the Sociocognitive Discourse approach to CDA as it will have become clear that a primary concern of this study is tracing how people are influenced and influence others, including interpreters, through specific representations of the reality of conflicts and world developments. This is in part a typical situation, as is described by Van Dijk (1993: 245): 'that the

powerful group may limit the freedom of action of others, but also influence their minds.' This confirms my earlier postulation that conflicts begin in the domain of language and speech. Not only does it vindicate the fact that control over the cognition and knowledge of others is a powerful weapon, but it also sustains certain discourses and narratives as "soft power" or a power of "mass re/construction of facts and reality" that ultimately enacts and sustains "hard power" and dominance. This is exactly what Van Dijk's (1993: 254) means when he writes that 'modern and more effective power is mostly cognitive, and enacted by persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation, among other strategic ways to change the mind of others in one's own interests.' Such strategic acts of power and control involve framing, defined by Baker (2006: 106) as 'structures of anticipation, strategic moves that are consciously initiated in order to present a movement or a particular position within a certain perspective.'

In order to provide an overarching frame for the above theoretical overview, the role of context must be further illuminated, as highlighted by Van Dijk in Wodak and Chilton (2005: 74) in pointing out that Aur (1992), Duranti and Goodwin (1992) and Gumperz (1982) are in general agreement that 'a sound theory of discourse should comprise not only a theory of the structures of text and talk, but also a theory of context, of relations between text/talk and context and of (re)contextualization processes in general.' However, it is also worth noting that Van Dijk, in Wodak and Chilton (2005: 74), sees the notion of context as oftentimes being vague: '[t]he notion of context used in most of these approaches in the human and social sciences is however quite vague and intuitive, and based on the concept of a social "environment" or "situation" of language use.'

The role of context and its relation to, or influence on, mental representations is extremely relevant as it affects interpreter cognition, understanding and performance – a potential consequence of the influence and control of dominant discourse through mind management. Such influence on interpreter performance is clearly highlighted by Van Dijk (1999) in Wodak and Chilton (2005: 75) who argues that 'such models are stored in episodic memory.' Wodak and Chilton (2005: 75) concur, arguing that 'context models are just a special case of the kind of mental models that define all our personal experiences and that control all the situations and interactions in which we participate.' This is especially important as it suggests that different speakers and interpreters each have their own mental models of prevailing situations which themselves entail the various differing influences of communicative situations which, in turn, can be traced back to some of these influences, as well as those of control and dominance. This situation is described by Wodak and Chilton (2005: 75): 'context

models may be seen as the crucial interface between actual discourse and the surrounding communicative situation, including the way participants represent themselves and the others as speakers and hearers.'

This approach is invaluable in identifying dominant discourses by describing and explaining how they directly or indirectly influence knowledge, attitudes and ideologies through their role in the manufacturing of concrete models. This is described by Van Dijk (1993: 253) in his explanation of 'how specific discourse structures determine specific mental processes, or facilitate the formation of specific social representations.' Baker (2006: 5) concurs with the above view, emphasising that 'processes of (re)framing can draw on practically any linguistic or non-linguistic resources, from paralinguistic devices such as intonation and typography to visual resources such as colour and image, to numerous linguistic devices such as tense shifts, deixis, code switching, use of euphemisms, and many more.'

The main focus in the current study is on the occurrence of control and influence in a conflict environment, as opposed to its occurrence in a peaceful environment. The impact of the environment is described by Baker (2006: 14), who reminds us that:

> In our war-ridden contemporary societies, we must continually remind ourselves that all conflict starts and ends with constructing or deconstructing an enemy, an other who is so foreign and distant that who becomes it can be tortured, maimed, slaughtered.

Baker (2006: 2) goes on to say that conflict is 'discursively justified and legitimated; politicians have to pave the way for war to be accepted, for human sacrifice to be justified.'

An analysis of such conflict environments clearly casts a spotlight on different discourses and narratives of conflict that are fought out, often before the actual war or fighting begins. The construction or deconstruction of an enemy, therefore, depends to a large extent on both constant and variable factors, such as existing knowledge, experience, beliefs and ideologies, as well as mental representations of experiences, events or situations and the opinions we have about them. This is especially stressed by Cunningham and Browning in Baker (2006: 106) who argue that 'our existing knowledge and ideas are then framed in a certain way in order to provide a mechanism through which individuals can ideologically connect with movement goals and become potential participants in the

movement's action.' Such influences and connections are discussed further by Toolan (1991: 27), who observes that 'narratives carry political and ideological freight.'

The aspect most relevant to this study's main focus, however, is that elaborated by Baker (2006:105) when stating that 'translators and interpreters face a basic ethical choice: to produce existing ideologies as encoded in the narratives elaborated in the text or utterance, or to dissociate themselves from those ideologies.'

2.3.4 Dominant discourse, power abuse and framing

As my analysis is essentially based on exploring, tracing and analyzing aspects such as mind management, the enactment and reproduction of dominance, framing, access, setting, communicative and speech acts, political dominance, discrediting, participant positions and roles and argumentation, along with other functions of text and speech. This approach will constitute a founding pillar of my application of CDA methods of analysis in this study. Shedding light on these aspect is thus crucial in order to determine to what extent parliamentarians, interpreters and other participants in the communicative event come loaded with framing, perceptions, expectations and specific mental models of people and events in the Libyan conflict.

The significance of these aspects is highlighted by Tannen and Wallat (1993: 60) in Baker (2006: 107) when they note that framing is 'often used in conjunction of schema or schemata, which generally denote those expectations about people, objects, events and settings in the word that participants bring with them to the interaction.' In this context, my study leans heavily on Baker's (2006: 14) assertion that '[i]n our war-ridden contemporary societies, we must continually remind ourselves that all conflict starts and ends with constructing or deconstructing an enemy.' This is essential as it provides an insight into how language functions in the exercise of power and, more significantly, in portraying the relations between language(s), conflict, power and dominance and how conflicts unfold in text and speech before finding their expression in war. Such dominance is often reproduced, enacted and practiced by small dominant groups, or what Domhoff (1978) and Mill (1956) term power elites. This is exactly what Van Dijk (1993: 254) means when he argues that '[p]ower involves control, namely by (members of) one group over (those of) other groups.'

Another important dimension in this overview is to highlight how cognitive power is more effective in changing the minds through approaches such as persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation, whereby

dominant discourses indirectly influence knowledge, perceptions and attitudes through their roles in the manufacturing of concrete models, or the formation of opinions embodied in such models, or police access to discourse or even the limited physical movement of other group(s) in support of mind management and cognitive influence. Situations typical of these arrangements are described by Van Dijk (1993:254): '[t]he powerful group may limit the freedom of action of others, but also influence their minds.' This supports Baker's (2006: 106) assertion that 'frames are defined as structures of anticipation, strategic moves that are consciously initiated in order to present a movement or a particular position within a certain perspective.'

In this context, the current research is thus an attempt to draw a profile of conflicting discourses, power relations and dominant discourses, and their roles in shaping and informing the discussions and their interpreting within the PAP through the analysis of different speeches, texts, statements, debates and interpreted discussion.

2.3.4 Access, modes, style and formulation

Having delineated the overarching framework and general environment of discourse and narrative, I now turn my focus to access to discourse, means, and modes of power relations that affect the role of CDA in conflict environments either enacting, (re)producing and/or challenging dominance. Van Dijk (1993: 250) elaborates on such access, modes and means by arguing that the (re)production or challenging of dominance 'may involve different modes of discourse-power relations – more or less direct or overt support enactment, representation, legitimating, denial, mitigation or concealment of dominance among others.' Thus, without controlling access to discourse, any narrative and discursive influence on mental representations used in the construction or (re)construction of enemies and in constructing and representing facts will be either mitigated or of no real value. Van Dijk (1993: 256) highlights this fact: 'one of the most important tools in this regard is control or organization of access to discourse to enhance its impact in the words.' This is further explained by Margolis and Mauser (1989) in Van Dijk (1993: 257) who state 'that it is a very crucial aspect for controlling public opinion and hence, for the manufacture of legitimating, consent and consensus needed in the reproduction of hegemony.' The vital role played by access control over discourse is most relevant for the purposes of this study and is described by Van Dijk (1993: 257) as 'control over the minds of other peoples, that is, the management of social representations.'

In our context of a 'conflict-ridden environment', to borrow Baker's phrasing, such roles become a kind of weapon of mass destruction – a (re)construction of images and representations or a reformulation of facts and reality – when deployed in the domain of wars and conflicts. This understanding of contextual relations takes into account factors such as style, register and other signals of text and speech that operate within such contexts/domains. This is explained by Van Dijk (1993: 250): 'such factors can take different forms, style, rhetoric or meaning of texts/discourse/talks/statements in concealing power relation in fine/opaque diplomatic statements/language.' But it is crucial that these factors operate effectively in order for them to gain prominence and have meaningful effects when they are employed as different tools, examples of which are given by Van Dijk (1993: 250): 'playing down, leaving implicit or understating responsible agency of powerful social actors in the events represented in the text.' The influence of style extends beyond this; as Van Dijk (1993: 259) argues, 'specific rhetorical figures, such as hyperboles or metaphors, preferentially affect the organization of models, or the formation of opinions embodied in such models.' This, in turn, highlights again the role of context in shaping and sustaining mental representations as is explained by Van Dijk (1993) and supported by the work of Wodak and Chilton (2005: 72), especially concerning the role of context in discourse processing. Van Dijk (1993: 258) further postulates that 'control of knowledge crucially shapes our interpretation of the world, as well as our discourse and other actions.' It is therefore reasonable to argue that the influence and power of interpreters within discussions about conflict resolution is premised on their access to the media and public discourse, as is the case with other segments of society. This influence and power is also gained through their privileged access, as a group of professionals, to the discourse of the PAP.

Van Dijk (1993: 256) explains that 'analysis of various modes of discourse access reveals a rather surprising parallelism between social power and discourse access: the more discourse genres, contexts, participants, audience, scope and text characteristics they (may) actively control or influence, the more powerful social groups, institutions or elites are.' Such an analysis of access and influence will assist me in sketching, following Van Dijk (1993: 256), a 'discourse access profile'; that is, 'for each group, position or institution, we may spell out a discourse access profile.'

2.4. Approaches to simultaneous interpreting research

In this section I explore some approaches to simultaneous interpreting research. Kohn and Kalina (1996: 132) define interpreting as 'strategic discourse processing geared to the interlingual transfer of mental world modelling from a source to a target discourse platform.' In addition to understanding interpreting as a linguistic or discourse process, I also aim to gain a better understanding of interpreting as a cognitive process involving multiple overlapping efforts and performed within a variety of contexts, each providing different influences over and constraints on the communicative events of source discourse processing and delivering target discourse production. My exploration is underpinned by an investigation of context-oriented approaches to simultaneous interpreting. Investigating these approaches further assists in identifying strategies used by interpreters to overcome said constraints and to improve their performance.

2.4.1. Cognitive approaches to simultaneous interpreting

According to Kohn and Kalina (1996: 120), the ability of human beings to perceive or experience the 'real' world and/or imagine a factious world is a complex cognitive affair involving an integrated set of interacting processes whose combined forces are geared towards a cognitive modelling of the world. Simultaneous interpretation is therefore regarded as among the most complex human cognitive-linguistic activities. As Gile (1997), in Pöchhacker and Shlesinger (2002: 164), points out: 'The evidence suggests that there is an intrinsic difficulty in interpreting.' This postulation of intrinsic difficulty is supported by the fact that interpreting involves the simultaneous operation of multiple overlapping cognitive processes: listening to speech, the conceptual and linguistic processing of messages, speaking in order to deliver interpreted messages and self-monitoring delivery as a kind of "quality assurance", rectifying faults and improving delivery as necessary.

There have been many efforts to design a model that can be used as a tool for the analysis of interpreting as a cognitive process. Gile's (1995) effort model, tightrope hypothesis and general constraints on simultaneous interpreting are regarded as among the most comprehensive and useful in this regard. I will touch briefly on Gile's approach, which focuses on the cognitive and linguistic

activities involved in interpreting before exploring more holistic approaches to simultaneous interpreting that are more context-focused vis-à-vis broader political, discursive and narrative contexts. It is important to note that the cognitive load experienced by interpreters in certain contexts may also influence the interpreter's choice of interpreting strategies. In other words, the intrinsic complexity of the act of simultaneous interpreting also plays a role in the production of interpreted discourse, quite apart from more obvious influences such as culture, discourse, interpreters' deeply held views and the interpreters' mental representations of reality.

Gile's approach is premised on a general agreement that the interpreting process involves complex mental activities that are intrinsically difficult and require the execution of multiple cognitive skills and sub-tasks, as underscored by De Groot (2002: 54), in Sutton (2002: 2): 'Translation and simultaneous interpreting are complex activities comprising many sub-skills. Each has been a separate object of study in cognitive psychology: perception, listening and speaking (…), reasoning and decision making, problem solving, memory and attention.' What interests me here is that when interpreters are engaged in 'competing activities' of comprehension, processing, production and monitoring, they perform these complex operations at different cognitive levels, applying different skills, strategies and 'coping tactics' to different activities. This is significant because the identification of strategies as tools to manage time lags or deficiencies between the delivery of source utterances and the production of target discourse will provide a pointer to a number of influences, constraints and performance determinants. Kohn and Kalina (1997: 119) point out that 'the time lag between a stretch of source discourse and the target language rendering depends on many factors such as language pair, processing direction (structural similar or structural dissimilar languages), cognitive processing load, memory capacity, fatigue and interpreting strategy.' This suggests that interpreting strategies play a determining role in interpreter performance.

It is evident that cognitive aspects are interlinked with a variety of factors related to mental processes which, to a large extent, determines interpreter performance as well as limitations to their delivery of output, errors and omissions. Given that the processing capacity of an interpreter is limited, i.e. that they are only able to manage a finite number of simultaneous efforts, functions and adaptations to these limitations, difficulties and 'problem triggers' require the deployment of coping tactics or strategies. Gile (1995) addresses these issues in his well-acknowledged effort model which was developed in the early 1980s and provides a comprehensive analysis tool for overlapping and complex cognitive efforts in the interpreting process. Gile (1997), in Pöchhacker and Shlesinger (2002: 164), groups these efforts

into three categories: the listening and analysis effort (L), the production effort (P), and the memory effort (M).

The effort model comprehensively defines these processes via comprehension-oriented operations, analysis, the mental representations of messages to be delivered and the processes and operations that utilize the available memory capacity of the interpreter. It is important to stress here that I am merely highlighting Gile's model and not entering into a detailed analysis of the model itself. My interest is limited to the model's focus on processing capacity and its finite availability. This is relevant because it directly bears on interpreter strategies to cope with or overcome difficulties and to enhance their performance in each operation or effort.

Setton (2002: 3) approaches the issue of cognitive processing from a different angle which may be of use in designing models for interpreter training, and emphasizes that '[t]he postulate that there might be sub-tasks common to the processing of any and all discourse is not implausible, but any suggestion about what kind of cognitive or linguistic operations these might be needs to be argued with some reference to discourse, especially with a view to any real-life application.' What is most relevant here is Setton's (2002: 13) emphasis on the role of discourse and previous knowledge in the performance of the interpreter that identifies the following variables as factors in performance:

> External factors like acoustics and visibility, the interpreter's linguistic competence, for the linguistic decoding and encoding phrases of comprehension and production, properties of the discourse like semantic density, information structure, meta representational demand, cohesive pointers; and the interpreter's background knowledge.

What is primarily of interest here is the influence of background knowledge, discourse and narrative in determining interpreting strategies to be used to manage memory deficits, rectify mistakes and improve delivery. Kohn and Kalina (1996: 127) state that '[i]n order to fill mental modelling gaps, the interpreter may have to rely on elaborative inferencing, backed up by appropriate memorising strategies, which may be needed to reconstitute details of previous source discourse so that a maximum degree of continuous monitoring as to the validity of the inferred elaborations is possible.'

My main interest here lies in exploring these interpreting strategies, which include comprehension strategies such as segmentation of input, anticipation, inference and accessing previously stored

knowledge. This is useful in exploring the influence of discourse, narrative and cultural adaptation in the selection of these strategies. My investigation here focuses on comprehension and production strategies, as classified by Gile (1995) in Bartlomieczyk (2006: 152) in his observation that basic comprehension tactics or strategies include tactics such as 'delaying response, reconstructing the segment with the help of the context, using the boothmate's help and consulting documents in the booth.' Production strategies include tactics such as 'restructuring, paraphrasing, condensing or expanding information, changing register and the use of prosodic or non-verbal features such as stress and nonverbal signals.' In addition to this, Kalina (1992: 254), in Kohn and Kalina (1996: 127), states that:

> in the phase of target discourse production, the interpreter may either decide to deploy adaptation strategies, and insert modelling details following target discourse conventions; or where source-discourse based mental modelling fails to provide sufficient specification, he may resort to strategies of neutralisation and evasion, trying to avoid committing himself to a definite position.

Investigating this helps our analysis in two ways: first by detecting the influence of narratives and discourses on the production of interpreted utterances or on the strategies used in producing them, and second, by determining the influence of interpreters, if any, on the course of discussion.

This is significant as each coping, comprehension, reformulation or (re)production tactic, together with any strategies and efforts undertaken by the interpreter, are informed, underpinned or sustained by factors that include previous knowledge, prevailing narratives and dominant discourses, this partially constituting the real life case study.

2.4.2. Context-oriented approaches to simultaneous interpreting

In this section I examine more recent holistic, context-focused approaches to simultaneous interpreting. This is necessary in order to examine the role of conference interpreters within the communicative process and the strategies they use that are informed by socio-cultural and interactional context(s). The context-oriented approach represents a change of focus in research on the interpreter's role, from a view that understands interpreting as the decoding and encoding of messages and then communicating these from speakers to listeners – a view that is more focused on the cognitive, text-linguistic and mental process aspects of interpreting – to a view that factors in the influence of broader socio-cultural

and political context(s) or master frames. Diriker (2004) points out that the change of focus, especially in the field of simultaneous interpretation, began with Bruce Anderson's emphasis on 'the importance of looking at the presence and performance of interpreters in relation to actual socio-cultural and interactional context(s).' This postulation is significant as it emphasizes the influence of context as an important factor that forms, informs and sustains the deeply held views of interpreters, as well as their mental representations of reality, and is thus a vital determinant of their presence and performance within communicative events. It is useful to point out that Chernov (2004: 100) assumes that 'the perception of the discourse semantic structure is a dynamic process effected (among other things) through subconscious inference of relations between discourse semantic structure and its situational context, based on the interpreter's previous experience and her background knowledge.' More importantly, however, Baker (2006: 2) not only places importance on the influence of context and the master frames within which communicative processes take place, but also explicates the role of interpreters in disseminating and sustaining narratives of wars and conflict: 'contemporary wars have to be sold to an international and not just domestic audiences, and translation is a major variable influencing the circulation and legitimating of the narratives that sustain these activities.'

Hatim and Mason (2002: 258) further emphasize the influence of context and structure by arguing that 'experienced interpreters use all kinds of anticipation strategies which enable them to formulate in advance plausible hypotheses regarding both context and structure.' Importantly, the influence of context and prevailing discourses and narratives extend to other aspects, such as interpreter identity and performance. Dyer and Keller-Cohen (2000: 283) note that 'narratives are a means of textually constructing not only personal but also professional identity.' This aligns with the generally accepted view that 'concrete text production and interpretation are based on so-called models, that is, mental representations of experiences, events or situations, as well as the opinions we have about them.' (Johnson-Laird 1983; Van Dijk, 1987b; Van Dijk & Kintsch 1983). Van Dijk (1993: 258) further elaborates on this by stating that 'these models [are] shaped by existing knowledge and by more or less general attitudes and ideologies.'

'Social cognition' is the overarching context in which these models, knowledges and attitudes interplay and interact. This is described by Farr and Moscovici (1984), Fiske and Taylor (1991) and Wyer and Srull (1984), in Van Dijk (1993: 257): 'Exercise of power usually presupposes mind management, involving the influence of knowledge, beliefs, understanding, plans, attitudes, ideologies, norms and values.' This is significant because existing knowledges and opinions are

informed and sustained by access to discourse which, in turn, inform the strategies used by interpreters. Kohn and Kalina (2000) confirm this in observing that 'target discourse production will then rely on corresponding mental modelling based on early anticipation.' This confirms Van Dijk`s (1993: 257) postulation that 'mental operations such as interpretation, thinking and arguing, inferencing and learning, among others, together define what we understand by social cognition.' This also leads to a consideration of factors such as access to and control of discourse, which serve to draw, shape or influence the general context. In Margolis and Mouser's (1989) view there are influential ways of using the media to control public opinion 'for the manufacture of legitimating, consent and consensus needed in the reproduction of hegemony' (in Van Dijk 1993: 257). Such control over the minds of other people is described by Van Dijk (1993: 257) as 'the management of social representations.'

This brief survey of context-centric approaches again confirms that CDA views language use within speech and writing as a form of social practice or, as Wodak and Meyer (2009: 5-6) explain, 'CDA impl[ies] a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event.' Finally, it is important to point out that *social practice* is used here to mean using language within a system of knowledge within broader or specific discourse.

a) Redefining the role of the interpreter

Interpretation studies and research are relatively new and still evolving. As Pöchhacker and Shlesinger (2002: 3) point out, 'it was not until the 1990s that the term *interpreting studies* came into being.' Early studies regarded the interpreter's role as simply to decode and encode the message and communicate it from the speaker to the listeners or audience. Simultaneous interpreting research therefore mainly emphasized such issues as faithfulness, sense, the accuracy of the message communicated by the interpreter and neutrality. The main focus of interpretation research and studies was on areas such as cognitive psychology and the various psycholinguistic, text-linguistic, neurolinguistic and mental processing aspects of interpreting. Over time the focus has changed to factor in the influence of broader socio-cultural contexts – among other context(s) – that in turn has led to an acknowledgement that interpreters are active participants who play a vital role within the communicative event. Additionally, context(s), prevailing discourses, narratives, ideology and surrounding factors in the broader global

environment influence their performance and the strategies they use in the interpreting process. As a result, an interpreter is now seen as an essential partner in cross-cultural conversation and as a co-constructor of interactions (Roy 1989; 2000; Wadensjö 1995; 1998). This change in focus means that an examination of interpretation as an act of communication has to factor in, beyond linguistic aspects, extra-linguistic factors as well as the larger socio-cultural context that affect an interpreter's performance, the formulation of her/his views and the understanding of the message intended to be communicated to an audience. This change in focus is discussed by a number of scholars and researchers, including Hella Kirchhoff (2002: 24), who states that 'each utterance was actually valid only in the specific moment and situation in which it occurred.' Pöchhacker (2002: 24) expresses a strong view on this change of focus, arguing that 'interpreting studies tends to focus more narrowly on the cognitive mechanics of the second-by-second processing rather than on holistic conceptions of text, situation, culture, and the entire course of action in professional interpreting assignment.'

It is important to note that the important role of interpreters is shaped and sustained not only by their access to prevailing discourses and public narratives, but also by their privileged access to institutional, parliamentary and conflict discourses, among others. This means that an analysis of narratives and discourses of conflict will pinpoint to what extent interpreters access discourse, as well as provide a pointer to their influence in discussions via 'injecting their voice.' Baker (2006: 5) rightly draws attention to the work of Goffman and other literature on social movements that examine the many ways in which 'translators and interpreters and other agents involved in the interaction-accentuate, undermine or modify aspects of the narrative(s) encoded in the source text or utterance, and in so doing participate in shaping social reality.'

It is clear that the narrow original focus of interpreting studies has contributed to shaping the perception that interpreters are mere language conduits. This perception of the role and presence of interpreters regards them as neutral and not party to the conversational act, what Angelelli (2004: 1) terms the 'invisibility of the interpreter.' Angelelli (2004: 1) also highlights the shift in focus in posing a very pertinent question:

> Why is it that interpreters, powerful individuals who have occupied centre stage since the origins of cross-cultural communication, have traditionally been portrayed (and even more importantly) have allowed themselves to be portrayed as mere language conduits, invisible parties in the communicative event?

The above discussion emphasizes the fact that interpreters do in fact play an important role in mediating meaning and delivering interpreted discourse within a communicative event. Also, interpreters draw on their previous experience, knowledge and mental modelling generated by the discourses they are exposed to. Baker (2006: 20) argues that it is 'because narrative of the past define and determine the narrative present, competition among different versions of a narrative may continue for centuries.' Baker (2006: 14) also highlights the key role of 'translation in naturalizing and promoting such narratives across linguistic boundaries.' Translators, like interpreters, are therefore not 'mere language conduits, and invisible parties in the communicative event', as Angelelli argues. Kohn and Kalian (2000: 130) confirm this, observing that 'target discourse production will then rely on a corresponding mental modelling based on early anticipation.' This is significant because, as discourses and narratives change and interpreters are exposed to different aspects, they will add their voice to the interpreted discourse. Baker (2006: 3) reiterates this: 'narratives, as understood here, are dynamic entities; they change in subtle or radical ways as people experience and become exposed to new stories on a daily basis.' But Baker (2006: 20) makes this point even more directly when she states that 'every time a version of the narrative is told or translated into another language, it is injected with elements from other, broader narratives circulating within the new setting or from the personal narrative of the retellers.' And it is in this sense that also states that '[t]ranslation [and interpreting] may also be treated as a frame in a less metaphoric sense' (Baker 2006: 107).

Such views are supported by other researchers, such as Roy (1989; 2000) and Wadensjö (1995; 2000), both of whom view the interpreter as an 'essential partner in cross-cultural conversation and a co-constructor to the interaction. The significance of context is manifest not only in its influence on an interpreter's performance but also in the formulation of her/his views and understanding of the message intended to be communicated.

In discussing the role and influence of interpreters in conflict, an important dimension should be emphasised. Baker (2006: 2) highlights this as follows:

> Translation and interpreting are essential for circulating and resisting the narratives that create the intellectual and moral environment for violent conflict in the first place, even though the narratives in question may not directly depict conflict or war.

One of the most notable recent developments within the field of Arabic interpreting is the emergence of interpreting in live satellite broadcasts. This has exposed Arabic interpreters to a wide range of competing narratives and has created a new demand for interpreting in live satellite broadcasts of debates, discussions and interviews with hosts from around the world in order to cope with ever-increasing international interaction, events and current affairs. These developments have made the role of simultaneous interpreters more vital. This new element of Arabic interpreting is emphasised by Darwish (2006) in a paper titled "Standards of Simultaneous Interpreting in Live Satellite Broadcasts", where he argues that 'simultaneous interpreting today is an important aspect of live international satellite broadcasts since it facilitates ad hoc cross-lingual communication and brings to the viewers' arguments and counterarguments by foreign experts, analysts.' Darwish also notes that 'simultaneous interpreting has gained global significance with the dramatic changes on world stage, such as embedded reporting, live broadcasts from war zones.'

Most importantly, Baker (2006: 14) highlights the crucial role of interpreters: 'translation plays a key role in naturalizing and promoting such narratives across linguistic boundaries.' In this role, interpreters use different linguistic or non-linguistic tools. Baker (2006: 5) draws attention to this, observing that interpreters 'can draw on practically any linguistic or non-linguistic resources, from paralinguistic devices such as intonation and typography to visual resources such as colour and image, to numerous linguistic devices such as tense shifts, deixis, code switching, use of euphemisms, and many more.' In investigating the role of interpreters in parliamentary discussions of conflict, it is also important to refer to Baker's (2006: 1-2) assumption that 'translators and interpreting are part of the institution of war and hence play a major role in the management of conflict – by all parties, from warmongers to peace activists.'

The important role of interpreters in conveying interpreted discourse is undertaken in difficult and complicated situations in which they are required to perform mental activities such as receiving, processing and delivering interpreted discourse. These challenges confirm the fact that interpreters have to manage competing mental activities at the same time, as is described in Gile's (1988; 1991) capacity management model. This also means that interpreters need to deploy coping tactics or strategies in order to manage such difficult situations.

b) Interpreting strategies

In discussing interpreting strategies it is informative to begin with Gile's (1995: 1) view that 'many errors and omissions in the simultaneous interpreting mode are due not to the intrinsic difficulty of the corresponding source-speech segments, but to the interpreters working close to processing capacity saturation, which makes them vulnerable to even small variations in the available processing capacity for each interpreting component.' To manage such difficult situations, interpreters need to use specific strategies within the four basic phases of the interpreting process outlined by Kirchhoff in Pöchhacker and Shlesinger (2002: 112), namely 'decoding of a SL segment, recording, TL production, and output monitoring.' Kohn and Kalina (1996: 127) state that '[i]n order to fill mental modelling gaps, the interpreter may have to rely on elaborative inference, backed up by appropriate memorising strategies, which may be needed to reconstitute details of previous source discourse so that a maximum degree of continuous monitoring as to the validity of the inferred elaborations is possible.' Kohn and Kalina (1996: 126) further elaborate on the interpreter's need for coping tactics or strategies by stating that 'in order to cope with the manifold difficulties inherent in interpreting, interpreters attempt to convert their knowledge into strategic action.'

In discussing interpreting strategies, Bartlomiejcyk (2006: 154) highlights the concept of achievement and reduction strategies adopted by Al-Khanji et al. (2000) and Al-Salman & Al-Khanji (2002) as the basis for their product-oriented research projects. In their view, more achievement strategies and fewer reduction strategies are the key to higher quality interpretation. Al-Salman & Al-Khanji (2002) classify approximation, anticipation, filtering (compressing the utterance with a view to finding a more economical form of expression) and skipping (omitting unnecessary repetition, redundant expressions, etc.) as achievement strategies and incomplete sentences, code switching (shifting the style from standard to colloquial), literal interpretation and message abandonment (extensive omissions) as reduction strategies.

A general understanding of interpreting strategies is premised on the idea that these strategies determine the interpreter's course of action in a given situation and is based on probabilities. This indicates that any probable choice will be influenced by factors such as previous discourse, embedded ideas and experience. Anticipation is therefore regarded as one of the most important strategies used by interpreters. Vandepitte (2001) alludes to this when stating that '[i]n conference interpreting, anticipation is a generally recognized strategy.' This is echoed by Kohn and Kalina (1996: 130), who

argue that 'target discourse production will then rely on a corresponding mental modelling based on early anticipation.'

Empirical studies reveal that the most frequently used compensatory strategies include skipping, approximation, filtering, comprehension, omissions and substitution. Kalina (2000) rightly proposes that 'the strategies interpreters use most frequently must become, to a certain degree, automatic so as to leave cognitive capacity for complex operations that occur less frequently.' This overview suggests that the strategies used by interpreters, if subtly deployed, will play a mitigating role that will create more capacity for the interpreter's mental representations and delivery of target discourse. This is in line with Kalina's (2000: 6) reference to Johnson-Laird's (1981) postulation that '[m]ental modelling – building a representation of a text and of the world to which the text refers – is not only carried out by those to whom texts are addressed but also by those who interpret texts for addresses.' This confirms the influence of discourses and framing narratives on interpreters.

The foregoing discussion underpins the main focus of this study: how to detect the discussion of conflict resolution interpreted into Arabic, focusing on Baker's (2006) take on framing narratives and her view that interpreters face an ethical choice 'to produce existing ideologies as encoded in the narratives elaborated in the text or utterance, or to dissociate themselves from those ideologies.' The discussion further highlights Baker's (2006: 50) assertion of the political import of narrativity and 'how narratives function in terms of how they construct the world for us.' The influence of the interpreters I investigate is measured partly by these same interpretation strategies in order to judge whether he/she supports, consolidates or weakens embedded ideologies in the narrative.

To contextualize the discussion above on CDA, narratives and the interpreter's role in the framework of conflict interpretation, the study seeks to investigate how key aspects such mental representation, framing, negative framing about the Libyan conflict and other conflicts in African in particular play themselves out and together with other factors such as previous experience, knowledge, among others, influence the conflict interpretation. In the final analysis such contextualization will materialize through the analysis of certain variables contained in different texts and talks concerning the Libyan conflict under study.

It is worth noting that contextualization of the above theoretical discussion has been put into practical application by tracing multitudes of influences as manifested in selected texts and recordings of discussions on the Libyan conflict to identify discursive and linguistic patterns, discursive moves, lexical style, argumentation, framing and competing narratives of the different parties involve in the Libyan conflict in an attempt to answer the research question. In this regard, the study contextualizes the main tenets of the theoretical discussions by projecting them onto the different discourse processes, linguistic patterns and speech acts as evidence of how discourse has been reproduced and power has been abused by the dominant powers and power relations in the international system of governance as can be seen in the Libyan conflict, as well as how this has been resisted by the African discourse to various degrees with its different strands. In fact, contextualization of the above discussions provides insight of the structural relationships of power relations as manifested in the selected texts and recordings in terms of manufacturing "mental models", framing at the level of narratives and content of discourses as well as CDA forms, features and properties.

Finally, another level of contextualization relates to interpreting strategies, language processing and interpreter's performance as is shown in the analysis in terms of lexical style or word choice by the interpreters as transfer of their 'mental world modelling', for instance as a reflection of their experience in interpreting in contexts other than Africa conflicts, as well as reflection of their exposure to African conflict resolution discourse among other influences.

2.5. Conclusion

In conclusion, what has been highlighted above points to the fact that as interpreters receive a produced uttered discourse and reproduce interpreted discourse in another language, they contribute to the processes of the 'discursive reproduction of dominance,' described by Van Dijk (1993: 259) as the main object of critical analysis, which 'has two major dimensions, namely that of production and reception', or, in Baker's (2006: 105) words, 'to produce a politically charged narrative in the target context.' Given the intrinsic difficulty of the simultaneous interpreting process, the cognitive constraints involved in producing interpreted discourse should not be ignored, nor should the more context-related factors be. The above discussed theoretical overview will be contextualized in practical application and will form the basis of my analysis in the subsequent chapters.

3. Chapter 3: Conflict resolution in the context of the PAP

3.1. Introduction

This chapter gives an overview of the concept of conflict resolution within the PAP, with special reference to debates on the Libyan conflict during meetings of the Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution and in plenary sessions. Power relations, competing narratives and different positions on the conflict, such the strong position of South Africa and other African countries, is discussed.

I highlight prevailing global power relations – with reference to regional and continental environments, African poverty and the Arab Spring – not accepting them as natural or perennial but instead as imposed either historically, geopolitically, or through direct acts of dominance and invasion by competing superpowers in order to control African resources as part of a new struggle for African control.

3.2. Overview of the concept of conflict resolution within the PAP

The main focus of this study – the conflict resolution dimension of political discourse at the PAP and its interpretation into Arabic – is based on a multifaceted theoretical grounding consisting primarily of the application of CDA, as well as the adaptation of the features of narrativity and the framing of discourse in the media which I apply to the context of interpreting. This focus on CDA, narrativity and the framing of discourse allows me to cast a spotlight on the 'theatre' of conflicts that are fought out before actual war or fighting begins, thus enabling me to discover and investigate other aspects of the influence of discourse on different actors and real participants in conflicts. My primary engagement will be with different discourses about the Libyan conflict; these include those of Western powers, Africa, warring Libyan factions, the PAP as an organ of the AU that attempted to resolve the conflict and, most importantly, the interpreters who mediate the discussions about this conflict.

Before the uprising, which took place on February 15, 2011, the official name of Libya was the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. *Jamahiriya* is a term coined by Col. Mu'ammar al-Gaddafi

and which he defined as a 'state of the masses' or governance by the populace through local councils. A public holiday, Revolution Day, was declared on 1 September 1969.

The Pan African Parliament (PAP), as an organ of the African Union, tries to play a proactive role in conflict resolution efforts on the African continent. This role is based on the stated objectives and founding vision of the AU, as spelled out in the Constitutive Act of African Union and includes the following objectives:

> … the achievement of greater unity and solidarity between African countries and the peoples of Africa, the promotion and defense of African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples, the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent, the promotion of popular participation and good governance and the establishment of the necessary conditions which would enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy.

Conflict resolution is therefore one of the main objectives of the PAP. However, since the PAP, as an organ of the African Union, is still acting as an advisory body waiting to be transformed into a fully-fledged legislative continental body, its role in conflict resolution is limited to debates and discussions, fact-finding missions and the presentation of recommendations to the African Union assembly of heads of states and governments on how to deal with conflicts. It is for this reason that the PAP is described by some as a "toothless talk shop". Despite this, the PAP seeks to engage meaningfully in conflict resolution efforts, and to this end it has mandated its Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution to undertake this role. This, then, is what my study investigates, but within the domain of interpreting and by undertaking a Critical Discourse Analysis of PAP debates and discussions on conflict resolution, with special emphasis on the Libyan conflict and within an overarching framework of discourses of international power relations.

In investigating PAP conflict resolution efforts, it is useful to present a situational analysis of the African context in terms of peace and security, as well as African positions and hard and soft powers – political, diplomatic and military – and African capacity to deal with continental conflicts within the context of an unfavorable global order and skewed international power relations. In this regard, the reality is that despite the fact that Africa, as a continent, seeks to depend on itself in solving its problems, the continent still lacks the military power and financial muscle necessary to independently support and sustain peaceful efforts or military intervention aimed at preventing or resolving conflicts without international support. Furthermore, the nature of power relations in Africa is shaped, to a large

extent, by the legacy and influence of the colonial divide as well as the residual impacts of the cold war era, narrow national interests, foreign interference and the new realities of the global order.

In order to gain a better understanding of the PAP's role in conflict resolution, it is necessary to present a general background on peace, security and conflict resolution efforts in Africa. The main organ of the AU dealing with these issues is the Peace and Security Council (PSC) which is also the African Union standing decision-making body responsible for the maintenance of continental peace and security. It has 15 members, elected by the AU Executive Council on a regional basis. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) protocol, which was adopted in July 2002 in Durban, and entered into force in December 2003, outlines the various components of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and their respective responsibilities.

The main pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the Peace and Security Council (PSC) which is supported, in the discharge of its mandate, by various structures, namely: the Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was launched at the level of Heads of State and Government on May 25, 2004. Some of the main objectives include: the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa; anticipating and preventing conflicts; and, where conflicts have occurred, undertaking peace-making and peace-building functions for the resolution of these conflicts; promoting and implementing peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence, etc. (AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) 2014).

For the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) to fulfill its mandate, it is imperative that it interacts with other AU organs, such as the Pan-African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, amongst others. However, despite these efforts, the inability of the AU to intervene militarily is clear in the Libyan conflict as well as in others African conflicts, such as the conflicts in Cote d'Ivoire in 2012, Mali in 2013 and the Central African Republic in 2013. In such situations, especially after the NATO military intervention in Libya in 2011 and the French military intervention in Mali in early 2013, the AU began looking for different ways to strengthen its peacekeeping efforts. For example coordinating with the UN Security Council on peace keeping missions; having joint or hybrid force; having African countries contribute forces for peace-keeping; undertaking peace enforcement missions under joint command structures financed by the UN; exploring other temporary

measures or mechanisms, such as the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) that are capable of acting swiftly and, most importantly, are not dependent on Western support but is, instead, financed and resourced by AU member states on a voluntary basis.

This is the general African background vis-à-vis the power to intervene in conflicts. In my view, given the situation, the only viable option is the peaceful, negotiated settlement of conflict through political means and diplomacy, premised on a common African position as represented by continental organs such as the PAP. In this context it is useful to give a brief historical background of the key events of the Libyan conflict, as a brief summary of how it began and evolved. This is significant in order to understand the timeframe within which different powers and parties to the conflict acted, reacted, became involved in and engaged with the conflict.

The conflict in Libya began as peaceful protests in the eastern part of the country on February 15, 2011, in the context of the wave of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 and quickly spread to the rest of the country, evolving into an armed confrontation between government forces and protestors. Later on, the protestors formed a governing authority based in Benghazi, east of the country, called the National Transitional Council (NTC), to coordinate their activities and serve as interim government. Some government ministers, diplomats and army personnel in the Gaddafi government defected to join the National Transitional Council in Benghazi. The causes of the conflict in Libya are complex, varied and deep-rooted. One school of thought argues that the conflict was caused by the lack of democratic reform and respect for human rights, while others argue that the conflict was caused by a longstanding historical agenda by Western powers to control Libya's resources. The conflict in Libya attracted attention from people all over of the world. Eventually the matter was put on the agenda of the United National Security Council (UNSC) which adopted Resolution 1970 (2011) on February 26, 2011 and which, among other things, condemned the violence and the use of force against civilians in the Libyan the resolution and, as a result, imposed an arms embargo on Libya. As the violence escalated, the United Nations' Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 (2011) on March 17, 2011, which imposed a no-fly zone on Libya and, most importantly, authorized taking 'all necessary measures' to protect civilians, which lead to the direct intervention of NATO in the conflict. The NATO intervention has led to a swift advance of anti- Gaddafi forces to the capital, Tripoli. By the end of August 2011, NTC forces had captured most parts of Tripoli, including Gaddafi's compound after brutal fighting with the Gaddafi forces. The anti-Gaddafi forces extended the fighting to the east of Tripoli for control of Gaddafi's home town, Sirte, and eventually Gaddafi was killed while his convey tried to flee from Sirte.

Subsequently, with help of NATO intervention, the anti-Gaddafi forces controlled the country and formed a government. But since then Libya has never been stable and the situation generated into bloody civil war which is still ongoing and has led to many local, regional and international complications born out of and inflamed by the deep-rooted cause of the conflict itself.

This brief background survey serves to highlight both the dominant and resistant discourses of the Libyan conflict, as well as to show competing narratives of this conflict and how power relations are manifested in the power of language and discourse in shaping ideas, knowledge and positions advanced by the powers involved, such as stakeholders and different parties to the Libyan conflict. The debate conducted by the PAP along the above two broad lines of thoughts about the causes of the Libyan conflict can therefore be said to be informed and sustained by general prevailing discourse(s) and different strands of African discourse and narratives centered on the Libyan conflict.

This is the general background within which debates on the Libyan conflict were conducted during meetings of the Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution and in the plenary sessions of the PAP. The were informed, shaped and sustained by prevailing competing narratives, discourses and power relations on the continent and at an international level which, in turn, shaped and sustained the many divergent and convergent positions. Such power relations, competing narratives and different positions on the conflict are clearly manifested in the strong position taken by South Africa and other African countries. In fact, the position of South Africa is a case study in itself, because South Africa, as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, voted in favour of the 1973 UNSC resolution which imposed a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized member states 'that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General' to take all necessary measures to protect civilians (UNSC resolution 1973/2011). It is worth noting that the resolution was adopted 'by a vote of 10 in favour to none against, with 5 abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, the Russian Federation) (UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, March 17, 2011). The significance of this is that the five abstained countries are major powers and two of them – China and the Russian Federation – are permanent members of the UN Security Council with veto power. However, the main point here is that, based on this authorization, NATO immediately started military intervention in Libya under the pretext that they were protecting civilians. But later, South Africa took a strong stance against Western/NATO military intervention when it discovered that Western powers were abusing the resolution as a pretext for their real motives which was a regime change and dominance. This generated deep mistrust between South Africa, other African countries and Western powers. Again, however, such power relations, competing

narratives and different positions played themselves out clearly in the diverging positions of African countries: while Nigeria and Gabon, the other two African non-permanent members in the UNSC, voted in favour of the no-fly zone and continued their support for NATO military actions and intervention in Libya, other African countries strongly opposed this.

We can thus deduce that for any rigorous and relevant investigation into the discourse on the Libyan conflict, it has to take into consideration the fact that the PAP, by trying to grapple and deal with the conflict, is in fact attempting to navigate the stormy geopolitical seas of international, regional and continental politics. In my view, the PAP has no option other than to live with a divided African position due to the numerous factors shaping African political behaviour and constructing and deconstructing African positions on the conflict, while simultaneously dealing with Western positions. That is, debates on the Libyan conflict have been informed and guided by African concerns and fears, fuelled by threats of the real intentions of Western powers, as represented by the emergence of discourse on neo-colonialism, humanitarian intervention, the scramble for African resources, human rights, a coalition of willing states, the responsibility to protect and regime change – discourse which has sent global politics into turmoil. These discourses and narratives have created a mood of conflicting interests, with increased warnings that Africa risks a severe crisis that will have tragic consequences, such as those caused by the US-led invasion of Iraq in 1993, which eventually tipped the balance of global politics and power and dragged the region and the world into decades of war and conflict.

3.3. Different African positions on the conflict

Within this debate, some have expressed fears that the Libyan conflict will have far reaching repercussions which will undermine the central vision of the AU and the PAP as one of its organs, namely that of 'an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena' (www.au.int). Such fears have been expressed in the opinions, positions, discourses and narratives on the conflict and are themselves informed and guided by dominant discourses in the international political arena and made public in international media. It is thus safe to assume that PAP parliamentarians and interpreters are influenced by the prevailing discourse about the Libyan conflict and loaded with mental models, political ideologies and social representations of the conflict. It is worth noting that my study is not limited to the parliamentary debate, but also refers to different opinions, commentaries, newspapers articles and TV interviews.

3.4. Conclusion

In conclusion, I aim to identify, through my analysis, the extent to which PAP parliamentarians and interpreters, as is the case with any other individuals in society, buy into, disseminate, contest, accept, or reject the dominant discourses and narratives about the Libyan conflict. In doing so, I seek to identify whether PAP parliamentarians and interpreters have (re)framed prevailing discourses and narratives about the Libyan conflict through linguistic strategies such as tense shifts, code switching, rephrasing, rhetoric and metaphor, or through non-linguistic devices such as intonation and stress. My study of the PAP discussion on the resolution of the Libyan conflict further attempts to demonstrate many aspects of the interplay of discourse and framing as the direct enactment of power and in justifying and legitimizing dominance not only through mass media but also more directly through the use/abuse of UNSC resolutions. In a sense then, we can say that such debates mirror power relations and competing narratives at regional, continental and international levels with all their numerous influences on PAP MPs. My analysis is thus an attempt to study opaque diplomatic statements and language, along with the style and rhetoric of text and speech, through an investigation of expressions in PAP discussions, reports and resolutions, as well as published statements, articles and opinions, in order to identify the concealment of power relations via means such as manipulation, playing down certain aspects, rendering statements implicit or understating. I also study discursive properties and text-context relations in order to identify their role in the reproduction of dominance and abuse and other negative effects of the exercise of power. Considering the concept of conflict resolution within the context of the PAP, international and regional power relations, competing narratives and different positions on the Libyan conflict, thus provides a useful background against which I outline my research methodology in the next chapter and lays the groundwork for my analysis in Chapter 5, with the aim to validate the main premises and assumptions of my study and finally to arrive at specific conclusions, based on which I will make recommendations.

4. Chapter 4: Research methodology

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I outline the research methodology used to investigate my research problem, namely my application of aspects of CDA, Baker's (2006) notion of narratives of conflict and Kalina's (2000) discussion on interpreting strategies. I describe how I collected my texts, the transcription of recordings, and the analysis and processing of the collected data. I also discuss the shortcomings and limitations of the transcription as well as other difficulties.

4.2 Broader methodological context

As explained earlier, my methodological approach, broadly speaking, is to investigate the role of conference interpreters in the communicative process, both in terms of the strategies they use and with regard to the influence of discourses and broader socio-cultural contexts, based on Van Dijk's (2001: 352) definition of CDA as 'a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context.' This is explained further by Angelelli (2000: 47) who writes that 'interpreters are social beings who are subject to the interplay of social factors, institutional constrains, and societal beliefs.'

As my primary focus is on conference interpreters as 'social beings', it is necessary for my methodological approach to view discourse vis-à-vis narrative. Baker (2006: 3) draws attention to the fact that 'narrative overlaps to some extent with Foucault's "discourse" and Barthes's "myths", especially in its emphasis on the normalizing effect of publicly disseminated representations.' Baker's (2006: 3) description of narratives as 'the everyday stories we live by', and as 'dynamic entities [that] change in subtle or radical ways as people experience and become exposed to new stories on a daily basis', holds special significance because it articulates the fact that discourses are shaped and influenced by a myriad opinions, knowledge and mental representations of events. Of particular importance here is how these narratives are structured to gain more influence through utterances and verbal interactions; it is equally important to explore ways to oppose or challenge these narratives through competing or alternative narratives.

Based on this understanding, my study traces discursive, linguistic and cultural features, as well as aspects such as knowledge, perceptions and mental representations, all of which require an investigation of language processing, the production and comprehension of discourse, and participation in verbal interaction. The study of these is premised on the assumption that simultaneous interpretation is a complex task of competing human cognitive and linguistic activities. Such an assumption no doubt entails the investigation of determinants of interpreter performance and performance limitations, delivery output, errors and omissions and problem triggers, as well as how to manage these difficult situations through the use of specific strategies.

I will attempt, through an analysis of different texts, recordings, parliamentary discussion and its interpretations, to identify the broader set of narratives embedded in individual texts or utterances, as well as to attempt to profile some mental models – or the formations of opinions embodied in such models – revealed in such texts and utterances in order to determine to what extend dominant discourse and narratives play a role in reproducing and sustaining dominant discourses and shaping mental images which guide people's understanding and opinions about the Libyan conflict. The analysis will specifically concentrate on segments and extracts as detailed below in research data section.

4.3 CDA Approach

While there are different views on discourse, for the purpose of my analysis I focus on textually-oriented discourse in order to look at patterns of language across texts so as to determine processes of power relations and to identify dominant discourses through detailed descriptions and critique. I thus limit my analysis to aspects of discourse such as argumentation, rhetorical figures, structural emphasis, lexical style and some aspects of narrative and framing encoded in these texts or utterances, highlighting the political contexts and settings in which these texts and utterances occur. It is important to state here that I limit myself to the Sociocognitive Discourse Analysis approach as the main aspects of my study will focus on the sociocognitive interface of discourse with special emphasis on CDA, narratives, communicative events, verbal interaction and interpreting, which require the investigation of, among other things, mental representations, language processing and the (re)production of discourse, all of which takes place during interpreting. In other words, I am investigating how interpreters' cognition, knowledge, beliefs, ideologies and perceptions influence what they do and how they frame events when interpreting. These aspects, in turn, relate to elements such as memory, which

includes short term (working) memory, long term memory, episodic (personal, autobiographical) memory, semantic (sociocultural, shared) memory, semantic mental models and context models. These are the primary cognitive processes I am concerned with and how they are related to factors such as the production and comprehension of discourse based on specific mental models within a broader context that is, in turn, influenced by factors including, but not limited to, knowledge, experience and ideologies. This means that my analysis needs to focus on aspects that affect these different influences, such as lexical style, structures, strategies and functions of text and talk. It is worth noting that the discourse model developed by Beaton and Grant in Beaton (2014: 276) views text 'as a tangible manifestation of layers of discourse.' All these aspects inform this study, and my analysis illuminates different components of verbal structures of communicative events, including grammatical, stylistic, rhetorical, narrative, discursive and argumentative forms and meanings.

For the purposes of this study, my analysis is designed, and to some extent sequenced, according to Van Dijk's model of CDA. Due consideration has been given to rhetorical figures such as hyperbole and metaphor which may affect the organization of models, or the formation of opinions embodied in such models. These influences can be traced through an analysis of different PAP parliamentarian speeches and debates, as well as through an analysis of the interpreting of discussions, in order to determine the extent to which parliamentarians and interpreters are loaded with these mental models and influences. In order to determine this I analyze discourses, semantic content and structures in discussions, statements and reports that are informed by mental processes and perceptions that view as either a negative or a positive evaluation of 'us' and 'them', bearing in mind that such semantic moves may directly or indirectly facilitate the formation or changing of attitudes through the generalization or de-contextualization of personal models (including opinions) of specific events.

4.4 Aims and methodological procedure

As explained in the previous chapters, the main aim of my study is to detect how the discourse of conflict resolution in the PAP is interpreted into Arabic and what strategies are used by Arabic interpreters in this assignment. Hence, my study explores issues such the role of the interpreter, the influence of narrative and discourse on their strategic choices and, most importantly, interpreter influence on differing ideologies and competing narratives.

In order to perform this task, my study compares interpreted Arabic discourse to original English speaker utterances in order to detect interpreter influence on the course of the discussion, as well as the influence of institutional discourses and previous knowledge of PAP political discourse. My aim is to identify discursive and linguistic patterns, omissions, repetitions and the occurrence of certain discursive or linguistic elements in order to demonstrate the existence of such influences.

In support of this, my study seeks to detect the influence of the discourses and narratives embedded in different political statements, positions and media discourses on the Libyan conflict and their impact in shaping and informing PAP parliamentarian and interpreter views and knowledge of the conflict. This is crucial as it either validates, supports, vindicates, refutes or challenges some long held views, assumptions and premises about the influence of narrative and discourse on interpreters' strategic choices and influence. And it for this reason that it is important to critically analyze the discourse and narratives embedded in statements, media reports, commentaries and articles that reflect different positions on the Libyan conflict. Furthermore, such an analysis allows for a practical application of CDA and the notion of narratives to simultaneous interpretation, as well as an exploration of the role of discourse and narrative in mind management, mental representations and the way in which reality is framed and presented as dominant discourses and competing narratives.

My analysis of texts, combined with original recordings, also serves to mitigate some of the concerns regarding the subjectivity, validity and reliability of data as such recordings and published texts of statements and positions are documentary proof in their own right. Shlesinger (1998: 3) suggests that '[i]deally, the notion of comparable corpora in interpreting studies should be extended to cover setting up three collections of texts in the same language: interpreted texts, original oral discourse delivered in the similar settings, and written translations of such texts.' This not only serves to mitigate concerns about the validity of data, but also confirms the fact that utilizing a broad combination of data widens the scope of variables and data to be analyzed in order to detect elements such as variance in the use of vocabulary across different texts as well as differing discursive patterns.

4.5 Research approach and research tools

As the notion of discourse is a complex one, I limit my research to Van Dijk's (1993: 254) view that 'modern and often more effective power is mostly cognitive, and enacted by persuasion, dissimulation

or manipulation, among other strategic ways to change the mind of others in one's own interests.' More specifically, my study limits itself to Van Dijk's (1993: 254) postulation that 'managing the mind of others is essentially a function of text and talk.' In this context I also base my analysis on Baker's (2006) notion of narrative adaptation and narrative ambiguity, which involves different versions of the same event.

My study uses two tools for data collection and analysis: real-life audio recordings and written texts consisting mainly of reports, statements, articles and media reports. The study explains the context in which the data was collected in order to elaborate on the relations between the participants in the communicative events as well as illuminating power relations and different situations and positions. The recordings are transcribed and textually analyzed in order to obtain information relevant to the main focus and hypothesis of my study.

In discussing the main issues, my study adopts an analytical approach that attempts to present a profile of conflicting discourses, power relations and dominant discourses, and their roles in shaping and informing the discussions and their interpreting within the PAP. This can be done through the analysis of different PAP speeches, texts, statements, debates and interpreted discussions in order to determine the extent to which parliamentarians and interpreters are loaded with mental models and influences, and to what extent Arabic interpreters influence the trajectory of discussion.

4.6 Research data

Authentic recordings of interpreting into Arabic by professional interpreters in real-life circumstances are analyzed, along with written speeches, articles, statements, media reports and reports by the PAP Committee on International Relations and Conflict Resolutions delivered in committee meetings and the Plenary Session of PAP 2011, as well as discussions around the general context of African conflicts during the same period.

The recordings were made using dual track recording and relevant extracts have been transcribed and divided into small segments for easy analysis, tracing and comparison. Segments have been evenly selected to cover as many speaker opinions as possible in order to represent the five African regions. This endeavour is supported, where needed, by the use of relay interpreting from French into English

into Arabic, or from French into Arabic, in order to project a broader picture of different influences and speaker backgrounds, together with interpreter influence on the trajectory of discussions, which can be noticed from the responses and reactions of participants after each segment of interpreted text.

In order to identify the interpreting strategies used, I examine:

- 60 minutes of recordings of interpreting from English into Arabic.
- 30 minutes of recordings of relayed interpreting from French into English into Arabic.
- 30 minutes of recordings of interpreting from French into Arabic.
- Original English texts of speeches, articles, statements, media reports and reports on the committee meetings and plenary sessions.

In order to avoid possible problems with poor recordings, the recordings were made by a professional technician from Congress Rental with a proven track record of recording conference discussions.

I limit my analysis to three samples of written texts and interpreted recordings as I would argue that these represent a good overview of the overall discourse and competing narratives on the Libyan conflict and thus provide a good profile for my analysis. These samples are the following:

1. **Discourses of world politics and foreign interventions**
   - United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1970
   - United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973
   - Opinion on Foreign Intervention entitled: "Irresponsible Interventions"

2. **African discourses/narratives**
   - Joint appeal made by former Presidents and Prime Ministers of 20 African countries
   - Libya, Africa and the New World Order: An open Letter to the Peoples of Africa and the World from Concerned Africans

3. **Western discourses/narratives**
   - Represented by the Libya letter written by President Barack Obama of the US, Prime Minister David Cameron of the UK and President Nicolas Sarkozy of France

4. Media discourses/narratives

- Reports and discussions

5. Political discourses at the PAP

- Recordings of interpreted PAP discussions

4.7 Rationale behind the sample selection

First of all, the rationale behind selecting extracts from the UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973 is that the discourse of the UNSC resolutions generally represent, at least to some extent, the epicenter of world politics. In fact, UNSC resolutions are the highest form of international diplomatic discourse, specifically in terms of their style, argumentation, enactment of power, and discursive reproduction of dominance. However, the main purpose of presenting extracts of UNSC resolutions is to present some background knowledge of the conditions of reproduction of dominant discourses in world politics because such resolutions and discourses usually set the stage for international politics.

The choice of the article, "Irresponsible Interventions" by Ould Mohamedou (2013) is significant because it presents a critical and informed view on the context of foreign interventions by a leading international specialist, i.e. a Western educated and prominent Afro-Arab scholar who is well conversant in international power relations and foreign interventions, with the Libyan conflict as one of its contemporary manifestations. But the most significant aspect about this extract is that it presents a historical perspective on foreign intervention as an 'upshot of an intellectual movement that began almost 35 years ago.'

Secondly, selecting the "Joint Appeal" made by former Presidents and Prime Ministers of 20 African countries, and "Libya, Africa and the New World Order, An open Letter to the Peoples of Africa and the World from Concerned Africans", as samples of African discourse and narratives, is justified by the fact that both the "Joint Appeal" and the "Open Letter" are true representations of mainstream African discourse and narratives on the Libyan conflict. But most significant is the fact that both of them were written by prominent African leaders and intellectuals who cut their teeth on African political discourse and who, for decades, witnessed and experienced actual political events on the African continent and in relation to world politics.

Thirdly, the selection of the "Joint letter on Libya by President Barack Obama of the US, Prime Minister David Cameron of the UK and President Nicolas Sarkozy of France" is relevant because the three writers were, at that time, heads of the most powerful Western countries both in terms of the West and on a global level. They represent three of the main global superpowers and are three of the five permanent and veto-holding members of the UNSC – the primary authority on global peace and security issues and one of the main stakeholders in the Libyan conflict. The three people/countries also represent historical and contemporary colonial powers with all their global economic, political, cultural and linguistic influence, especially in their former colonies on the African continent. Publishing the joint letter in *The Times* of London, the *International Herald Tribune*, and *Le Figaro*, three of the most influential newspapers in the world, certainly would have had an effect on prevailing worldwide and African discourses, narratives and discussions about the Libyan conflict.

Fourthly, the rationale for using media discourses and narratives, such as reports and discussions, is based on the fact that the robust debate in South African newspapers represent a fair segment of news coverage in Africa and abroad. Most of these newspapers are extensions of mainstream Western media and some of the them, such as *The Independent, Pretoria News* and *The Star* are sister organizations of the British Independent Newspapers Group, while the *Mail & Guardian* is a sister newspaper of the British newspaper *The Guardian*. Also, many of the main sources for news coverage and reports of these newspapers and other newspapers in Africa and worldwide come from a few international news agencies such as Reuters, AFP (Agence France Presse), dpa (Dutch Press Agency), AP (Associated Press) and *Al Jazeera TV* Network, which also makes them more representative of different discourses, narratives and views. In addition, commentary and article selections observe the principle of fair representation of opinion – or 'opinion and opposing opinion' as the logo of *Al Jazeera TV* reads – which means that both those supporting Western standpoints and African positions, including the discourses and narratives about the Libyan conflict, are represented.

Fifth, the recordings of original interpreted texts of speeches, reports and debates in the PAP represent my main focus for tracing and determining the influence of the above segments of discourse and narrative on PAP parliamentarians and Arabic interpreters, and detecting the influence of the latter on the course of discussions in order to prove the main hypothesis of my study.

I have obtained the written consent and authorization of the PAP administration and the interpreters to use these recordings and texts for research purposes only. The recordings have been stored securely and

only transcriptions that fulfill ethical and transparency considerations and guarantee interpreter anonymity have been used.

4.8 Positioning of the booths

There are ten rooms in the PAP dedicated to committee meetings. The Committee on International Relations and Conflict Resolution usually holds its meetings in Committee Rooms 1 and 2 on the ground floor. The Arabic booth in each room is adjacent to the Swahili booth and located to the right side of the entrance, facing the seats of the chairperson, deputy chair and secretary of the committee, while the English, French and Portuguese booths are located at the end of the room, behind the seats of the chair.

All interpreting booths in the PAP assembly – the primary hall for plenary sessions – are located past the main entrance to the foyer, at the right side of the entrance of the main hall. They overlook the hall from behind, facing the high table of the PAP president, vice presidents and administration.

4.9 Possible research constraints

Difficulties that may affect my analysis include aspects of cultural adaptation that sometimes stem from interpreters rendering certain cultural or language specific elements of the discourse in a specific way, or from interpreters rendering certain implicit elements in the source language as explicit, or from counterfeiting elements which cannot be which be satisfactorily communicated in the target language. However, due to the limited scope of my study, these considerations did not have a significant impact on my analysis.

Other difficulties and limitations concern what Diriker (2004: 52) refers to as 'naturally occurring data'; i.e. the fact that the presence of a researcher and/or the knowledge that an event is being observed and recorded for further investigation very likely has an impact on the way naturally occurring data takes place, despite the fact that the interpreters are informed that they will be recorded and sign consent forms. However, I overcame this difficulty by increasing the number of interpreters who consented to recording, without giving specific dates and times for these recordings. This arrangement was aided by the nature of the PAP committees and plenary sessions which run for about

two weeks. As such, the interpreters did not know on which date they would be recorded or during which committees I would be working. Another mitigating factor is that the interpreters did not know the exact timing of the subject matter to be discussed or recorded, which helped guarantee that they perform naturally, without being aware that they might be recorded.

This is further facilitated by the way in which the chief PAP interpreter prepares the interpreter roster: that is, it is prepared on a daily basis according to the need for interpreting services. This then allows interpreters to focus more on the duty roster than to think about recording as dates and times of recordings were not scheduled according to a specific roster and thus remained open and unknown.

The recordings of committees meetings took place in the control room which is remotely located on the ground floor of the administrative building of the PAP, while recordings of the plenary sessions took place in the control room in the main chamber which controls and records the proceedings and is located on the second floor above the interpreting booths. Therefore, none of the interpreters know if there is a recording taking place as the general understanding is that the function of these control rooms is to monitor interpreting equipment by the technicians who operating them. This is also correct, but my agreement with Congress Rental Cos. who operates the PAP interpreting systems was that the same technicians would make the required recordings. These arrangements helped a lot as no one other than me and the technicians were aware of the recordings at any given moment.

Other shortcomings highlighted by Diriker (2004: 52) include the fact that 'transcribing basically means representing oral language in writing, a complex if not insurmountable task, given that oral language includes many variables that normal written language does not possess, e.g., intonation, pauses, slips, repairs, false starts, blends and non-verbal behaviour.' In addition to these difficulties, Diriker (2004: 53) echoes Powney and Watts's (1987: 147) concern that 'a transcription cannot represent everything featured in the original spoken language and, thus, has to be an interpretation by the transcriber of what is being said.' Besides this, transcription may also change the way we represent and perceive a language, a fact which is highlighted by Diriker (2004:52) who argues that 'writing moves the words from the sound word to a word of visual space and actually locks the words into position in this space, thereby transforming their perception completely.' For these reasons Diriker (2004: 54) stresses that:

No matter how objective and data-driven (bottom up) the researcher aims or claims to be, the analysis of data always reflects the researcher's explicit and implicit assumptions about the material at hand. In that

sense, there is always a theoretical stance (top down) that informs the researcher's constitution, understanding and interpretation of data.

I overcame these difficulties to a large extent in most cases by basing my analysis on listening to recordings chunk by chunk, then using transcription to double check the validity of my analysis and/or to improve on the transcription itself. Despite the fact that the process is laborious and time consuming, it helped a lot in overcoming the above shortcomings. However, this method has helped in identifying elements such as false starts and repairs which helped in the analysis of interpreting strategies as shown later on. Success of such methods became possible due to the limited volume of the recordings.

4.10 Profile of interpreters

There were a number of different interpreter profiles:

1. The interpreter who interpreted from English into Arabic as well as from French into Arabic is a trilingual professional female interpreter, aged 60 years. She holds a PhD in translation and has more than 25 years of experience in interpreting in international and regional organizations.
2. The interpreter who interpreted from English into Arabic is a bilingual professional male interpreter, aged 51 years. He holds a Master's degree in translation and has more than 15 years of experience in interpreting in national institutions and regional organizations.
3. The interpreter who interpreted from French into English is a bilingual professional male interpreter, aged 55 years. He holds a Bachelor's degree in English and has about 10 years of experience in interpreting in national institutions and regional organizations.

4.11 Conclusion

In this chapter, I outline the research methodology used to investigate my research problem. I explained my research approach and tools, as well as how I use research data in the form of texts and recordings which were collected, transcribed and analyzed. The chapter also provides a general methodological context to investigating the role of conference interpreters in the communicative process and the influence of discourses, narratives and broader socio-cultural contexts and factors and their roles in performance. Then I highlighted possible research constraints, as well as shortcomings and limitations

of the transcriptions and other difficulties. Finally, this chapter sets out the general methodological context within which I conduct my research analysis in the coming chapter.

5. Chapter 5: Research analysis

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I conduct an analysis of various written texts, along with original recordings of interpreted speeches, reports, debates, statements and articles, in order to identify the ideological standpoints of African and Western countries on the Libyan conflict, with special reference to debates within the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). The analysis aims to identify discourses of power relations and competing narratives and the influence of these on debates, as well as the role of Arabic interpreters in reproducing or contesting such narratives. The analysis focuses on selected extracts of interpreted texts from English and French into Arabic and then on identifying the various influences on the given discourse, thus tracing patterns of language and their political and cultural contexts across texts and utterances. The interpreted extracts where taken from recordings of interpreting done by professional interpreters with the following profiles:

1. The interpreter who interpreted from English into Arabic as well as from French into Arabic is a trilingual professional female interpreter, aged 60 years. She holds a PhD in translation and has more than 25 years of experience in interpreting in international and regional organizations.
2. The interpreter who interpreted from English into Arabic is a bilingual professional male interpreter, aged 51 years. He holds a Master's degree in translation and has more than 15 years of experience in interpreting in national institutions and regional organizations.
3. The interpreter who interpreted from French into English is a bilingual professional male interpreter, aged 55 years. He holds a Bachelor's degree in English and has about 10 years of experience in interpreting in national institutions and regional organizations.

To identify and measure these influences, I examine in my analysis specific parameters which include discursive and linguistic patterns, argumentation, lexical style, choice of words, rhetorical figures, structural and semantic emphasis, framing and ideologically and politically loaded expressions. I also identify interpreting strategies which includes elements such as omissions, shifts, repetitions. By identifying these parameters, the analysis paints a clear picture of the power relations playing out in the

domains of discourse and narratives and clearly illustrates how these shape ideas, knowledge and advancing positions of different powers, stakeholders and parties to the Libyan conflict, together with their various influences on different people including, PAP MPs and interpreters.

The general discourse describes the beginning of the Libyan conflict as a series of peaceful demonstrations calling for democracy, reforms and human rights. This discourse, however, is contested by the existence of many other strands of discourse and framing developed and sustained during the course of the conflict. There are also other opposing discourses and narratives that describe the demonstrations as armed and violent from the beginning. Significantly, such contestations were assisted and sustained by the West's historically negative discourse and propaganda around the Libyan leader, Gaddafi, who was portrayed in a generally negative way over the last four decades, often described as a dictator and a madman. Opposing these narratives, African discourses often portrayed Gaddafi as a hero, icon, freedom fighter, guide and visionary leader. Furthermore, while some accept Western military action as legitimately mandated by UNSC resolutions, others view it as false legitimacy manufactured by discourse of dominance, grounded in manipulation and thus as an abuse of these resolutions to such an extent that it can be regarded as neo-colonialism.

No doubt the long-held and propagated Western narratives, negative framing and portrayal of Gaddafi has significantly influenced and sustained the narratives of the recent Libyan conflict. However, and with similar significance, the competing narratives and opposing discourse postulated that the main cause and motives for the Libyan conflict were shaped and sustained by an avaricious scramble by foreign powers for control of African resources (Libya is one of the richest African countries in terms of high quality oil and oil wealth). Other discourses stated that the situation was further complicated at both political and economic levels by the role and declared position of Gaddafi, who called for immediate African unity – a 'United States of Africa' *(The Telegraph,* February 2, 2009), with one government and one army. Gaddafi took serious steps in this direction and was thus regarded as a direct threat to the strategic interests of the West, as is evidenced by the fact that 'Libya was pouring aid and investment into Africa' (Mast-Ingle 2011).

This multitude of factors has led to the emergence of competing narratives about Libya and the Libyan conflict that shaped and informed behaviour and perception(s), opinions and positions about the Libyan conflict. The influence of the dominant discourses and narratives have been effective in the media with the Western powers and their powerful media arsenal dominating news and stories of the conflict. In

this context, my analysis takes into account framing ambiguity with all its normalizing functions as propagated by the media as normal daily occurences. But more importantly, the analysis highlights the role of translation and interpreting in naturalizing and promoting such narratives across linguistic boundaries, as stories change daily in different ways to serve the purposes and objectives of different parties to the conflict.

Within this framework, I start my analysis by critically analyzing written texts (statements and joint appeals, open letters and joint letters) to identify African vs. Western positions, discourses and narratives in order to investigate power relations in the framing of the Libyan conflict. I then analyze media discourse (articles, reports and commentaries) in order to identify different intellectual and general public discourses and narratives that are, in turn, influenced by the aforementioned positions and discourses. To illuminate the prevailing general discourses on the context of the Libyan conflict, I thereafter analyze original recordings of interpreted discussions, specifically speeches in the PAP, in order to identify the ideological standpoints of African vs. Western countries and to trace the influence of these recorded segments of discourse and narrative on PAP parliamentarians, as well as on the interpreters. I also identify the influence of the latter on the course of the discussions.

As indicated before, Van Dijk's (1993) approach to the principles of CDA constitutes the founding pillar of my analysis of the political discourse on the Libyan conflict through analysis of relevant speech acts, texts, parliamentary debates and interpretations thereof. Hence, my analysis is essentially based on exploring, tracing and analyzing the influence of different aspects, such as mind management, the enactment and reproduction of dominance through various tools of influence such as framing, access, setting, genre, communicative and speech acts, political dominance, discrediting, participant positions and roles, and argumentation as a manifestation of text and speech.

This is crucial in order to determine to what extent parliamentarians, interpreters and other participants in the communicative event come loaded with framing, perceptions, expectations and specific mental models of people and events related to the Libyan conflict. The analysis provides insight into how language functions in the exercise of power and, more significantly, in portraying the relation between language, conflict, power and dominance and how conflicts unfold in text and speech, often before finding their expression in war. My study thus investigates the role of discourse and language in analysing different statements given by leaders of powerful Western countries, as well as African leaders and intellectuals, and PAP parliamentarians on the Libyan conflict. This is also crucial in terms

of detecting the role of the media in giving prominence to, promoting, reinforcing or discrediting certain versions of narratives.

The aim of my analysis is thus to investigate how dominant discourses and the abuse of UNSC power not only frames the enemy (the Libyan government) and consolidates negative political narratives against it, but also how it creates a false impression of consensus in the international community as a pretext for legitimizing any acts of aggression against Libya. Recall here that in the Libyan conflict in 2011, as well as in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the West – the USA and the UK in particular – tried to manufacture what it termed an 'alliance of the willing nations', abusing principles such as a 'responsibility to protect' and enlisting the support of some Arab countries by abusing the Arab League's resolutions as a justification for the purported international consensus and, as such, constructing a guise of relative acceptance for their actions against the Libyan government.

This dominant discourse and abuse of power is manifested in a joint letter written on April 15, 2011 by President Barack Obama of the US, Prime Minister David Cameron of the UK and President Nicolas Sarkozy of France and published in *The Times* of London, the *International Herald Tribune* and *Le Figaro.* In this letter they state that 'our duty and our mandate under Security Council Resolution 1973 are to protect civilians, and we are doing that. It is not to remove Gaddafi by force.' Yet in the same letter they state that 'it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in power… Colonel Gaddafi must go, and go for good.' They pledge to keep up the pressure on Gaddafi and to maintain NATO military pressure on his forces in order to protect civilians.

My focus on the position of Western leaders, as expressed in their letter, is not premised on their purely personal power, but on their power as enacted as the individual realization of group power; i.e. Western powers as a group, especially as the three leaders represent three out of five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The letter reflects power relations in the global political order, the abuse of power and manipulation, for example in the dissemination of phrases, such as *NATO allies and coalition partners* and *continue military operations to protect civilians in Libya*. Again, the letter states that '[o]ur duty and our mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians, and we are doing that. It is not to remove Gaddafi by force…But it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in power.' A competing narrative was cited by former South African deputy minister of foreign affairs,

Aziz Pahad (*Pretoria News*, October 12, 2011) when quoted from "Open Letter – Libya, Africa and the New World Order", issued in July 2011 by some of Africa's most prominent politicians, academics and NGOs, wherein they stated that: 'The Security Council allowed itself to be informed by what the International Crisis Group (ICG) in its June 6, 2011 Report on Libya characterizes as the *more sensational reports that the regime was using its air force to slaughter demonstrators.*

In studying the Libyan conflict, I highlight the relations between discursive structure, power structure and the abuse of power in order to explore how this has been used to enact power and thus also to exercise and reproduce dominance. This is exactly what has manifested itself in the UNSC resolution on the Libyan conflict, which has been abused as a direct enactment of power through the imposition of no-fly zones, effectively preventing African leaders mandated by the AU – including South African President Jacob Zuma – from visiting Libya to mediate. The timing of the UNSC resolution is questionable and represents a direct imposition of the will of Western powers in order to undercut any possibility for an African solution to the conflict. More precariously, it reflects the disregard of these powers for the African position. This suggests that the discourse of this conflict was predetermined a long time ago.

I also investigate competing discourses and narratives on the Libyan conflict as reflected in, among other things, an article written by former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, in which he describes the situation as a 'failure of the AU to ensure respect by the entire international community of Africa's right and duty to resolve its problems – to respect the aspiration that as Africans we should devise the solutions to our problems.' This was expressed in its most acute form in the 2011 conflict in Libya, during which Western powers brazenly arrogated to themselves the unilateral right to decide the future of this African country, determined to treat the decisions of the AU with undisguised contempt (Mbeki 2011: 13). Through the presentation and comparison of competing narratives and discourses, my study aims to reflect the imbalance and hierarchy of power in the architecture of the international order and global politics, as manifested in the actions of small dominant groups, or what Domhoff, (1978) and Mill (1956) term 'power elites', represented in this case by the permanent members of the UNSC who play a special role in decision-making and in the processes of enacting power within global politics and international peace and security issues.

My study of the PAP discussions on the resolution of the Libyan conflict further attempts to demonstrate many aspects of the interplay of discourse and framing as the direct enactment of power,

and in justifying and legitimizing dominance not only through mass media but directly through the use/abuse of UNSC resolutions. Through this detailed analysis, description, explanation and critique of the ways in which dominant discourses indirectly influence knowledge, perceptions and attitudes through their roles in the manufacturing of concrete models, I aim to identify how specific discursive structures determine particular mental processes and models or the formation of opinions embodied in such models.

In the Libyan conflict Western countries have exercised different forms of control: they have abused UNSC resolution 1973 to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, effectively preventing travel by African leaders to mediate in peaceful negotiations, and have further exercised control through mind management and cognitive influence, portraying the situation as an intervention aimed at bringing democracy and protecting civilians and human rights. Such power relations and powers of language and discourse play themselves out clearly in discourses and narratives about the Libyan conflict. The general discourse describes the beginning of the Libyan conflict as a series of peaceful demonstrations calling for democracy, reforms and human rights, which commenced in the east of Libya and spread from there. However, this discourse was opposed by a different discourse and narrative which described these demonstrations as armed and violent from the beginning. The general discourse about the Libyan conflict was assisted and sustained by the West's historically negative discourse, which framed Gaddafi as a dictator and a madman and which had significant influence and sustaining power on the narrative of the recent Libyan conflict. At the same time, African narratives were opposed to that of the West and regarded Gaddafi as a hero, icon, freedom fighter, guide and visionary leader. Furthermore, while some accepted Western military action as legitimately mandated by UNSC resolutions, others viewed it as a manipulation and abuse of these resolutions – as a foreign invasion and an act of neo-colonialism. In addition to this, the competing narratives and discourses about the Libyan conflict have been shaped and sustained by a scramble of foreign powers for control of African resources which further calls into question the real motives of Western powers in the conflict. The situation is further complicated at political and economic levels by the role and declared position of Gaddafi who called for immediate African unity – a 'United States of Africa' *(The Telegraph,* February 2, 2009), with one government and one army. Gaddafi took serious steps in this direction and was thus regarded as a direct threat to the strategic interests of the West, as is evidenced by the fact that 'Libya was pouring aid and investment into Africa' (Mast-Ingle 2011). This multitude of factors has led to the emergence of competing narratives about Libya and the Libyan conflict that has shaped and informed behaviour and perceptions. The influence of the dominant discourses and narratives have

been effective on the media front, the Western powers with their powerful media arsenal dominating news and stories of the conflict. It is worth mentioning that such narratives and stories change in different ways to serve the purposes and objectives of different parties to the conflict.

5.2 Discourse of world politics and foreign interventions

In this section I have selected extracted samples of discourse relating to world politics and foreign interventions from a number of documents, specifically the UNSC resolutions, as outlined in my methodology.

In the analysis I attempt to, in a systematic manner, identify the following variables:

1. Influence of discourse: discursive and linguistic patterns, argumentation, lexical style, choice of words, rhetorical figures, structural and semantic emphasis and others.
2. Influence of narratives: framing and ideologically and politically loaded expressions.
3. Interpreting strategies: anticipation, omissions, shifts, rephrasing, repetitions and code-switching, etc.

5.2.1 <u>Extract 1: UNSC Resolution 1970 (2011)</u>

(See next page.)

In response to the conflict in Libya, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 (2011) at its 6491st meeting on 26 February 2011, in which it:

Condemns the violence and use of force against civilians by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; and *rejects* unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government;

considers that the widespread and *systematic attacks* currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya *against the civilian population* may amount to *crimes against humanity*;

reaffirms its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libya Arab Jamahiriya; and *urges* the Libyan authorities to: act with the utmost restraint, respect human rights and international humanitarian law, and allow immediate access for international human rights monitors; In addition the UNSC decided to refer the situation in the Libyan to *International Criminal Court ICC*, *imposed Arms embargo*, and declared *freezing of Libyan Assets*.

expresses concern at the plight of refugees forced to flee the violence in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; expresses concern also at the reports of *shortages of medica*l supplies to treat the wounded; underlining the need to respect the freedom of peaceful assembly and of expression, including freedom of the media; expresses concern for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

Lexical style: From the standpoint of CDA and narrative theory, the UNSC Resolutions are the highest form of international diplomatic discourse, specifically in terms of their style, argumentation, enactment of power, and discursive reproduction of dominance. The purpose of presenting extracts from the UNSC Resolutions is not to give a detailed CDA for them, but to present a brief background of the conditions of reproduction of dominant discourses in world politics because, ideally, the discourse of such resolutions usually sets the stage for international politics. This can be seen via a brief critical analysis of the discourse of the UNSC Resolutions that traces the patterns of language used across the texts, focusing on argumentation, structural emphasis, lexical style and progression.

Discursive and linguistic patterns and choice of words: This analysis reveals that the texts centre on a powerful position, reflected in the use of expressions such as *condemns* (line 3), *rejects* (line 4) and *in response to the conflict in Libya* (line 1).

Framing: The framing of the Libyan conflict is introduced in the strong argument put forward in lines 6 and 7, where the Resolution states that the *systematic attacks* currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya *against the civilian population* may amount to *crimes against humanity*.

Argumentation: The significance of framing is to design argumentation that supports the authority of the UNSC – the world body primarily responsible for maintaining global peace and security – and its responsibility to protect the civilian population and to prevent and punish crimes against humanity. The most significant part of the argumentation, however, is that it provides justification for any actions taken against the Libyan authorities. In fact, the above discourse serves as a prelude for real action in the enactment and application of power. This is noticeable in subsequent segments where the UNSC resolution states that the *UNSC decided to refer the situation in the Libyan to International Criminal Court ICC* (line 12), *imposed Arms embargo* (line 12), and declares a *freezing of Libyan Asset* (line 13).

5.2.2 Extract 2: UNSC Resolution 1973 (2011)

(See next page.)

1 Further to the initial UN resolution 1970, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973 (2011) on 17 March
2 2011, in which it:
3 *expresses its grave concern* at the deteriorating situation, the *escalation of violence* and the *heavy*
4 *civilian casualties;*
5 *condemns* the *gross and systematic violation of human rights,* including arbitrary detentions, enforced
6 disappearances, torture and summary executions;
7 *further condemns* acts of violence and *intimidation committed by the Libyan authorities* against
8 *journalists, media professionals* and associated personnel and urging these authorities to comply with
9 their obligations under international humanitarian law as outlined in resolution 1738 (2006);
10 *expresses* its determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas and the
11 rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the safety of humanitarian personnel;
12 *takes note* of the decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 12 March   2011 to call for the
13 imposition of a *no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation*, and to establish safe areas in places for
14 nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; *takes note* further of the Secretary-General's call on
15 16 March for an immediate ceasefire, *deplores* the continuing use *of mercenaries by the Libyan*
16 *authorities;*
17 *Stresses* the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate
18 demands of the Libyan people; *decides* to establish *a ban on air flights* in the airspace of the Libyan
19 Arab Jamahiriya.
20 *Authorizes* member states 'that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through
21 regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary- General to take
22 all necessary measures to protect civilians, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to
23 protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
24 including Benghazi,, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan
25 territory;
26 *Decides* to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help
27 protect civilians;

Further analysis of the extract of UNSC Resolution 1973 provided below clearly shows the increasing prevalence of the framing and discursive reproduction of dominance.

Lexical style: From the outset this second resolution not only builds on the first but also serves to further its aims and objectives. The style of the resolution has progressed from an expression of concern to one of condemnation escalating to direct accusation (lines 5, 7 and 8).

Discursive features: The UNSC diplomatically conceals its power by delivering a form of subtle warning, as in the phrase *urging these authorities to comply with their obligations* (lines 8 and 9). The discourse progresses towards seeking broader support to justify UNSC actions – there is a response to existing support and a call for action in lines 13, 14 and 15 – and then shifts to an extremely negative framing of accusation as stated fact: *deplores the continuing use of mercenaries* (lines 16 and 17). The text culminates in a call for practical action that manifests power relations and enactment (lines 19 and 20). This discursive move is concretized through the application of authority in the form of resolutions such as *the UNSC decided to refer the situation in the Libyan to International Criminal Court ICC, imposed Arms embargo, and declared freezing of Libyan Asset* (lines 11, 12 and 13) in Extract 1.

A brief critical analysis of the discourse of this resolution reveals that it centres on a powerful position, negative framing and power enactment, escalating to condemnation and direct accusation. The significance of such escalation in the lexical content of the text is that it serves as a concealed warning and deterrent to the Libyan authorities and, more importantly, as a move towards providing the basis for any possible practical actions or enactments of power. This analysis is supported by the fact that the discursive escalation of the text resulted in decisions being taken to open the way for direct action, for example: *decides to establish a ban on air flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya* (lines 19 and 20). But the most significant part of the resolution is lines 21-28 where it authorizes members states to take 'all necessary measures' which gives these countries freehand or carte blanche to intervene in Libya as it determines no specific limitations or measures to be taken to protect civilians or how to impose no-fly zone.

Lexical style: The lexical style, semantic emphasis and language patterns evident in the extract clearly indicate the main determinant of processes of power relations at an international level. The resolutions themselves reflect the dominant discourse, supported by the prevailing international and regional

political context(s) and settings. It is reasonable to conclude that the rhetoric of these resolutions creates influential mental images and models of the conflict that further inform the processes of knowledge and understanding pertaining to the situation in Libya at an international level.

Discursive features: These acts of discourse, narrative and dominance (re)production are based on and sustained by the prevailing conditions of world politics post-World War II. When the war ended, the League of Nations made five countries permanent members of the UNSC, giving them the power to adjudicate and decide issues of international peace and security. This situation has created conditions conducive for the production and enactment of a powerful dominant discourse that manifests in resolutions such as those under discussion and has a significant influence on cognitive models and representations in the minds of different political agents in the Libyan conflict, including Pan African Parliament Members of Parliament and interpreters who form part of a global audience and who, in turn, perpetuate this discourse through their contribution to text and utterance (re)production and interpretation. The decades-long prevalence of these conditions has led some accepting this situation as a given, and as acceptable and a 'natural fact of life'. As a result, the system of power relations that contribute to the generating, disseminating and reproducing of narratives, frames and discourses of dominance and power has become a kind of world order that awards a few 'elite club' countries the right to either decide on or veto the fate of the world. At the same time there is an ongoing resistance to this system and its (re)production of dominance, as well as its legitimacy, equality and representativeness. Such contestations of legitimacy are manifested in the international calls to reform the UN system. This explains why the dominant discourse – especially that of Western countries – seeks legitimacy and acceptability by using ambiguous terms such as *broad-based coalitio*n, *coalition of willing states, coalition partners, responsibility to protect, international community, international legitimacy* and *world order*.

Western discourse is generally a manifestation of said power relations and usually bases its arguments on the UNSC resolutions, thus relying on a world body dominated by five permanent members holding veto power to adjudicate and decide on issues of world peace and security. These power elites abuse these resolutions as an indispensable tool in their discursive and narrative arsenals, as I reveal later in my analysis. In fact, the UNSC resolutions have set the tone for competing narratives about the Libyan conflict and have prepared the scene for the unfolding of the actual conflict.

5.2.3 Extract 3: Foreign interventions: Extract from article entitled "Irresponsible Interventions"

(See next page.)

With France launching its third "*humanitarian" military operation* in as many years this time in the Central African Republic *interventionism,* which seemed discredited after *the US invasion of Iraq,* seems to have returned as an accepted norm in international affairs.

Indeed, decades of *relentless intervention* have shifted the terms of debate, with recent operations *justified by their achievability rather than their merit*. To understand how this shift occurred is to see why, more often than not, such *intervention has failed to attain its objectives*.

As France's recent actions demonstrate, *intervention* nowadays requires *nothing more than a unilateral decree of humanitarian* or *counter-terrorism objectives*, an *atmosphere of urgency*, and *an ambiguous link to ongoing United Nations (UN) deliberations*. This is the *upshot of an intellectual movement* that began *almost 35* years ago and that has facilitated no fewer than a dozen *interventions* in just over two decades.

The context of foreign interventions is critically presented in the following extract from the article "Irresponsible Interventions" by Ould Mohamedou (2013) who is regarded as a leading international specialist on new forms of transnational terrorism. He is a Harvard University scholar and was previously the Associate Director of the Harvard University Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research in Cambridge; he also served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Mauritania from 2008 to 2009 and is currently a Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Head of the Middle East and North Africa Program at the Geneva Center for Security Policy, Visiting Professor in the Doctoral School at Sciences Po Paris and Research Associate at the Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations in New York. The below extracts of his article paint a clear picture of international power relations and foreign interventions, with the Libyan conflict as a contemporary actualization.

Discursive features and narratives: The significance of the above extracts is that they highlight the extent to which discourses and narratives can be dangerously manipulated to confuse humanitarianism, legitimacy and foreign military intervention (line 1). But, more significantly, the article puts 'foreign interventions' into a historical perspective as the *upshot of an intellectual movement* that began *almost 35 years ago* (lines 9, 10 and 11).

The article invoked the recent *US invasion of Iraq* to sum up the state of affairs in international politics (lines 2 and 3). This is underpinned by the debate, argumentation and evidence put forward by the writer in lines 4-11.

5.3 Western discourse/narratives: Libya letter by Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy

US President Barack Obama, UK Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy have wrote a joint letter that was published in *The Times* of London, the *International Herald Tribune*, and *Le Figaro*, in which they vow to maintain pressure on Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and NATO military pressure on his forces.

5.3.1 <u>Extract 4: Libya Letter by Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy</u>

(See next page.)

Together with our NATO allies and coalition partners, the United States, France and Britain have been *united at the UN Security Council*, as well as the following Paris Conference, in building a *broad-based coalition* to respond to the crisis in Libya. We are *equally united* on what needs to happen to end it.

Even as we continue *military operations* today to *protect civilians in Libya*, we are determined to look to the future. We are convinced that *better times lie ahead for the people of Libya*, and a pathway can be forged to achieve just that.

We must *never forget* the reasons why the *international community* was obliged to act in the first place. As *Libya descended into chaos* with *Colonel Gaddafi attacking his own people*, the Arab League called for action. The *Libyan opposition* called for help. And the people of Libya looked to the world in their hour of need.

In an historic resolution, the United Nations Security Council *authorised all necessary measures* to protect the people of Libya from the attacks upon them. By responding immediately, our countries halted the advance of *Gaddafi's forces*. The *bloodbath* that he had promised to *inflict on the citizens* of the besieged city of Benghazi has been prevented.

Tens of thousands of lives have been protected. But the people of Libya are *suffering terrible horrors at Gaddafi's hands* each and every day. *His rockets and his shells rained down* on defenceless civilians in Ajdabiya. The city of Misrata is enduring a medieval siege as Gaddafi tries to strangle its population into submission. The evidence of disappearances and abuses grows daily.

Our duty and *our mandate* under UN Security Council Resolution 1973 is to *protect civilians*, and *we are doing that*. It *is not to remove Gaddafi by force*. But it is *impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in power*. The International Criminal Court is rightly investigating the crimes committed against civilians and the *grievous violations of international law*. It *is unthinkable* that someone who has *tried to massacre his own people* can play a part in *their future government*. The brave citizens of those towns that have held out against forces that have been mercilessly targeting them would face a fearful vengeance if the world accepted such an arrangement. It would be an *unconscionable betrayal*.

Furthermore, *it would condemn Libya* to being not only *a pariah state*, *but a failed state* too. *Gaddafi has promised* to carry *out terrorist attacks against civilian ships and airliners*. And because he has lost the consent of his people any deal that leaves him in power would lead to further chaos and lawlessness. We know from bitter experience what that would mean. Neither Europe, the region nor the world can afford a new safe haven for extremists.

There is a pathway to peace that promises new hope for the people of Libya: *a future without Gaddafi that* preserves Libya's integrity and sovereignty and restores her economy and the prosperity and security of her people. This needs to begin with a genuine end to violence, marked by deeds, not words. The regime has to pull back from the cities it is besieging, including Ajdabiya, Misrata and Zintan, and its forces return to their barracks.

However, *so long as Gaddafi is in* power, NATO and its coalition partners must maintain their operations so that *civilians remain protected* and the pressure on the regime builds. Then a genuine transition from dictatorship to an inclusive constitutional process can really begin, led by a new generation of leaders. For that transition to succeed, *Colonel Gaddafi must go, and go for good.* At that point, the United Nations and its members should help the Libyan people as they rebuild where *Gaddafi has destroyed - to repair homes and hospitals*, to restore basic utilities, and to assist Libyans as they develop the institutions to underpin a prosperous and open society.

This *vision for the future of Libya* has the *support of a broad coalition of countries*, *including many from the Arab world*. These countries came together in London on March 29 and founded a contact group that met this week in Doha to support a solution to the crisis that respects the will of the Libyan people.

Today *NATO and its coalition partners* are *acting in the name of the United Nations* with *an unprecedented international legal mandate*. But it will be the people of Libya, not the UN, who *choose their new constitution, elect their new leaders* and write the *next chapter in their history*.

50 *Britain, France and the United States will not rest until* the United Nations Security Council
51 resolutions have been implemented and the Libyan people can *choose their own future*.

Brief CDA analysis of the letter by Obama, Cameron & Sarkozy (2011)

In terms of argumentation and lexical style, the letter legitimates the acts of Western countries in the Libyan crisis as authorized by the UNSC and supported by the international community. It describes the UNSC resolutions as *historic* and further argues that these acts are a response to a call for help by the Libyan people, using negative framing for further justification. The letter frames Gaddafi as a terrorist by using a narrative of terrorism that constructs the image of a terrorist threat that is larger than the Libyan territory and includes possible attacks on *ships and airliners* (line 30).

Lexical style: Applying CDA to the argumentation and lexical style of the letter, the discourse of dominance and the enactment of collective power is evident from the beginning in the use of phrases such as *together with our NATO allies*, *coalition partners* and *broad-based coalition* (lines 1, 2 and 3) and the absence of any mention of African institutions, despite the fact that Libya is an African country on the African continent. It is clear from the outset that the letter not only represents a competing discourse and narrative to the African discourse, but that it also aims to marginalize Africa in the Libyan conflict.

Discursive features: One of the prominent discursive features of the letter is that it presents the acts of the Western countries within the context of the Libyan crisis not only as legitimate acts authorized by the UNSC and supported by the international community, but as part of the duty, responsibility and mandate to protect civilians (lines 5 and 6). It even describes the UNSC resolutions as *historic* (line 12). It is significant to note how the concealing of the enactment of power is reflected in the argumentation of the letter, which portrays actions not only as mandated by the international community, but also as a response to a call for help by the Libyan people and the Arab League. The letter is clearly a negative framing of the Libyan government in an attempt to draw a mental representation that justifies, accepts and support the acts of Western powers in Libya. Such negative framing is clear, for example, when the letter states that *as Libya descended into chaos with Colonel Gaddafi attacking his own people, the Arab League called for action. The Libyan opposition called for help, and the people of Libya looked to the world in their hour of need* (lines 9, 10 and 11).

Narratives and framing: The letter uses the narrative of terrorism to frame Gaddafi as a terrorist: *Gaddafi has promised to carry out terrorist attacks against civilian ships and airliners* (lines 29 and 30). The aim here is to construct an image of terrorism that stretches beyond the Libyan territory by

invoking the threat of attacks to *ships and airliners* (line 30). Drawing on this narrative of terrorism and the longtime framing of Gaddafi as a 'madman' serves to evoke memories of the last decade, entrenching the idea that Gaddafi is responsible for the explosion of American civilian aircrafts in the so-called Lockerbie debacle and the September 2011 attacks on the USA. The use of such narratives substantially influences Western audience and constituencies and can be used to garner popular support for any military action.

Argumentation: The argumentation of the letter further plays down the role and influence of NATO military actions by presenting NATO as having a mandate to protect civilians (lines 21 and 22). One of the most striking argumentative moves in the letter is that it uses denial and disinformation, as can clearly be seen in the phrase *it is not to remove Gaddafi by force* (line 22). The letter also immediately attempts to mitigate such denial by resorting to more diplomatic language: *it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in power* (line 23). However, later on the letter the intentions are made clearer: *Colonel Gaddafi must go, and go for good* (line 43). The letter also implicitly threatens the construction of a negative mental representation of the future of Libya if there is no intervention: *it would condemn Libya to being not only a pariah state, but a failed state too* (line 29).

The argumentation of the letter plays down and conceals NATO military operations in Libya and also uses positive framing and discourses of 'humanitarian intervention' and good intentions to portray NATO actions as *duty* and *our mandate to protect civilians,* supported by a lexical emphasis on *we are doing that* (line 22). The letter can also be seen as using discursive tools like denial and disinformation as is evident when it states that *it is not to remove Gaddafi by force* (line 22). This is underpinned by the implicit threat to construct a negative mental representation about the future of Libya if there is no intervention (lines 29 and 30).

Discursive patterns: The discourse of domination is clear from the start in the statement *together with our NATO allies and coalition partners, the United States* (lines 1, 2 and 3) and the lack of mention of any African institution, despite the fact that Libya is an African country on the African continent. This reveals an intention to marginalize any African role in the Libyan conflict, especially the road map of the AU to peaceful solution to the Libyan conflict. This is an act of unilateral imposition and abuse of power and dominance by three Western powers, but it is also evident that such dominance is jointly produced along with dominated groups, including the Arab League and various African countries, both

of which are either persuaded or threatened – by whatever means – to act as though such dominance is natural and the acts stemming from them legitimate.

After derogating Gaddafi via negative framing based on the construction of a mental model of a *terrorist attack*, the letter proceeds to warn of the consequences that *would condemn Libya to being not only a pariah state, but a failed state too* (line 29). Then the letter discursively uses the method of presenting an 'image and its opposite' to create more present and stronger mental representations. Such methods are clearly coherent with drawing a gloomy picture as presented by the above warning, while at the same time accompanying it with a promise of brighter future: *There is a pathway to peace that promises new hope for the people of Libya…* (lines 34, 35 and 36); and as in *Colonel Gaddafi must go, and go for good* (lines 42 and 43). This is confirmation that the aforementioned 'elite club' comprised of the permanent members of the UNSC maintain a dominant, unequal status in the world system of governance through a series of discursive strategies. In general this involves the deliberate concealing of the real motives of Western countries, motives which are revealed and disputed by competing narratives, as we will see later in extracts from the article "Was Gaddafi the madman he is made out to be?"

The current letter's general pattern is to suppress and omit any positive peaceful approach; there is no mention of the AU or the AU road map, or any other peaceful efforts. This is reflected in framing narratives that portray the conflict as concerning only one individual, Gaddafi, and can thus be seen as a deliberate attempt to conceal the real motives of Western countries. These motives are revealed by a competing narrative, the aforementioned "Was Gaddafi the madman he is made out to be?" by Edwin Mast-Ingle (2011: 11), published in the South African *Sunday Independent Newspaper* on October 30, 2011. The article quotes the Reuters report **"**Libya was pouring aid and investment into Africa" (November 24, 2010 – cited in Extract 2 below) which portrays the ousting of Gaddafi as a:

> battle in a war between the US and its European allies with China for the heart, soul and riches of Africa, to exploit Libya`s oil reserves, to access the foreign funds of Libya, estimated at more than $200 billion to avoid further crises in the international monetary structures; control the oil ; and to ensure an ongoing low-key war among the 41 tribes that will provide a lucrative market for arms manufacturers as what happening in Iraq.

Discursive features: The most notable general discursive feature of the letter is power enactment; this is apparent from the fact that the letter appeals to mandated action by the international community and the

UNSC in which the countries of the three signatories are permanent members with veto power. This is a clear example of the dominant discourse in world politics since World War II which gave these permanent members of the UNSC the power to act as custodians of world peace and security. The enactment of power is also apparent in the semantic moves represented by expressions such as *together with our NATO allies and coalition partners*, *building a broad-based coalition* and *equally united*. The objective here is to project the power of a 'united front' and an 'alliance', and to highlight the legitimacy afforded by wider international acceptance. This is coupled with a strategy to appear convincing and credible, e.g. *unprecedented mandate of international community*, supported by a persuasive appeal based on the negative framing of statements like *Colonel Gaddafi killing his own people*. At the same time, the letter lends the signatories a positive image by invoking a moral discourse that frames them as *protectors*, and *guardians of human rights*.

The structural emphasis: The structural emphasis of the letter shows the assertive attitude of superpowers determined to impose their will. For instance: *we together with our NATO allies*, *coalition partners*, *united at the UN Security Council broad-based coalition*, *we are equally united, we are determined* (lines 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). Such emphasis aims at managing understanding of the conflict by constructing specific models in the minds of readers in order to influence public opinion.

Rhetorical figures: In terms of rhetoric and meaning, the letter aims to conceal power relations under the guise of a *duty [to] protect civilians*, a derived narrative from the recently invoked principle of *responsibility to protect R2P* in the international law and makes use of hyperbole, e.g. *it is unthinkable.* The genre of the letter can be described as formal, with a declaration of war embedded in veiled threats. It employs a discourse with features of power enactment, evident in the semantic strategy of beginning with expressions such as *together with our NATO allies and coalition partners*, *building a broad-based coalition* and *equally united*. This approach is clearly aimed at constructing a mental model that projects the power of a *united front allianc*e and a *wider international acceptance* and legitimacy.

The rhetoric and meaning of the letter also aims to conceal power relations under the guise of *our duty [to] protect civilians, and we are doing that*. Further, the letter employs denial, coupled with hyperbole and metaphor, to conceal real motives, e.g. *it is not to remove Gaddafi by force* and *it is unthinkable that someone who has tried to massacre own people can play a part in their future government* (line 25 and 26). The negative framing uses the metaphor of rain to construct the image of a merciless and

brutal dictator: *his rockets and his shells rained down on defenseless civilians* (lines 17 and 18). Some of these arguments, frames and expressions are used in the text of the UNSC resolutions.

The Libya letter (of 2011 by Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy) accords high status to the UNSC resolution by describing it as *historic* (line 12). More importantly, it bases its argument on crucial aspects of the resolution, diplomatically drafted in an open form: *all necessary measure* and *to protect the people of Libya* (lines 12 and 13). In order to prepare a mental representation to support any such undefined 'necessary measures', the letter uses rhetorical figures, hyperbole and warning, overestimating the power of Gaddafi and constructing a dangerous image of his intentions (lines 25 and 30).

The lexical style: The lexical style of the letter (Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy, 2011) has a general focus on negative terms such as *terrorist attacks, bloodshed* and *attacking his people* (line 25 and 30), framing Gaddafi negatively while simultaneously promoting UNSC actions as positive acts *to protect civilians* and to help the *people of Libya* to *choose their new constitution* and *elect their new leaders* (line 52). The text continues this promotion in the use of the metaphorical phrase *write the next chapter in their history*. Negative framing is enhanced through the exaggeration and overestimation of events, e.g. *Gaddafi is killing his people*; this framing also serves to conceal and deny the UNSC's real motives and their killing and bombardment of Libyans.

The lexical style of the letter bases its argumentation on a subtle, open-ended and highly diplomatic phrase borrowed from the UNSC resolution: *all necessary measures* (line 12). This discourse of good intentions *to protect the people* employs an ambivalent diplomatic style that elides the real motives, as when the letter states *but it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in power* (line 23). This ambivalent style is dropped later in the letter: *for that transition to succeed, Colonel Gaddafi must go, and go for good* (line 42).

Stylistically, the letter also diplomatically conceals power relations within opaque language and negative framing, as when it states that *Libya descended into chaos with Colonel Gaddafi attacking his own people*. It is significant to note that the letter invokes other regional groupings in order to add legitimacy to its call; this can be seen in the statement *the Arab League called for action.* A striking double standard is revealed here given that the same Western powers that are signatories to the letter have ignored both the repeated calls for interventions in other conflicts in the region and said regional

groupings more generally. It is also worth noting that the letter uses the phrase *the Libyan opposition called for help* (line 10) to portray its intervention as a response to a legitimate opposition as opposed to rebels. This is another marker of a discourse of good intentions and the promotion of democracy; i.e. responding to the call of the opposition without even mentioning that it is an armed opposition.

Negative framing*:* In order to defend NATO action in Libya, the letter presents a detailed negative portrayal of the conflict that it attempts to render convincing and credible; this portrayal relies on unverified claims such as: *Gaddafi killing his own people* and serves, in turn, to support the positive image the signatories construct of themselves as *protectors, Salvatore* and *guardians of human rights.* The letter also uses rhetorical figures in order to magnify the negative image of the Libyan regime when stating, for example, that it is *unthinkable that someone who has tried to massacre his own people can play a part in their future government* (line 26). While the letter positively portrays the acts of Western countries as legitimate, it simultaneously degrades and discredits the legitimacy of the Libyan government through the use of expressions such as *Libyan regime*, *Libyan authorities* and *Colonel Gaddafi* instead of *Libyan government* and *Libyan leader*. By using the military appellation *Colonel Gaddafi* instead of *the Libyan leader*, the letter not only seeks to degrade Gaddafi but also aims to justify military action and to portray the conflict as a *one man act*. Such negative portrayals seek to change international public opinion of the Libyan government through de-contextualization, personification and the underestimation of the matter – military action against one 'madman' is not an attack on a country – and to positively frame military actions via a *discourse of good deeds*. Such claiming of the moral high ground is apparent in statements such as *tens of thousands of lives have been protected (line 16)* and *it would be an unconscionable betrayal* (line 16).

In conclusion, the attempts by the UNSC to moralize their Western discourse fails when their real intentions are revealed, confirming that their moral stand is not guided by the claim to protect civilians but instead by the strategic and economic interests of the Western countries in Libya, pursued via a regime change sealed by the killing of Gaddafi. The political power and dominance expressed through the joint letter shows not only the personal power of the three leaders but also their enactment of power as group members of the UNSC – an 'elite club' that affords them privileged access to international resources in addition to the wealth, economic and military advantages and historical influence they enjoy as colonial and neocolonial powers.

My analysis shows that this is an act of unilateral imposition and an abuse of power and dominance by three Western powers, but it also reveals that such dominance is jointly produced along with dominated

groups, including the Arab League and various African countries, both of which are either persuaded or threatened – by whatever means – to act as though such dominance is natural and the acts stemming from them legitimate. This can be traced back to some of the opinions expressed within the discussions of the PAP as a reflection of Western discourse and is also reflected in framing narratives that portray the conflict as concerning only one individual, namely Gaddafi. This framing is a deliberate act to conceal the real motives of certain Western countries, revealed by another competing narrative published in the media. Most importantly, the highly influential nature of the letter means that it will be quoted by international media and disseminated worldwide.

The above Critical Discourse Analysis also reveals a clear case of abuse of the UNSC framework with the resolutions representing the direct enactment of power to undermine the African position of solving African problems in African countries. Such enactment of power and dominance is glaringly manifested in the resolution's imposition of a no-fly zone that effectively prevents the panel of African leaders – including South African President Jacob Zuma and others appointed by the AU – from flying to Libya to mediate a timeous and peaceful settlement.

The timing of the resolution is questionable and that in itself suggests the direct dominance and of Western powers in an attempt to undermine any possibility for an African solution to the conflict. More precariously, it reflects a disregard of the African position by these powers. This supports the position that the discourse of this conflict has long-since been predetermined and that the UNSC resolutions not only exercise but also reproduce such dominance. In turn, this confirms the fact that the 'elites club' of permanents members of the UNSC maintain their dominant status in the world system of governance through discursive strategies.

5.4 African discourses/narratives

Having concluded my brief CDA analysis of Western discourses, I now move to African discourses and narratives that, in many respects, oppose, compete with and reject the Western discourses. These competing discourses and narratives represents the mainstream African discourse indicated earlier, and is represented by extracts from the Joint Appeal and Open Letter.

5.4.1   Extract 5: Joint Appeal

(See next page.)

1 *Your Excellenc*y, We, the undersigned, thank the Africa Forum for giving us the possibility to address
2 this Appeal to you. For many months now we have each, individually, followed the events on *our*
3 *Continent* with great interest and concern. We have each focused on the events in *North Africa and*
4 *Cote d'Ivoire*.
5   Having consulted with one another, we thought it appropriate that we should present to you this *Joint*
6 *Appeal relating specifically to Libya and Cote d'Ivoire.* We take this opportunity to salute *Your*
7 *Excellency* and the *African Union* as a whole for the great efforts that have been expended to address
8 the challenges which have arisen in the context of *the political developments in these two African*
9 *countries.*
10 In this regard we have fully *supported* your insistence that these challenges should be addressed in a
11 manner which would *promote and entrench democracy in both these countries*. We have also
12 supported your view that all conflicts in this regard should be *resolved peacefully* and in a manner
13 which would lay the basis for *national unity and reconciliation* in the countries concerned.
14 Similarly, like you, we have thought it vitally important that *our Continent*, especially through the
15 *African Union, should play a leading and decisive role in terms of assisting the peoples of the African*
16 *countries* we have mentioned to respond to their challenges correctly. It is *conflicts in both Libya and*
17 *Cote d'Ivoire.* Inevitable that *Africa will inherit* the final outcomes of the
18 Accordingly *our Continent* has a *right and duty t*o do everything it can to encourage outcomes which
19 address the *fundamental and long-term interests of both the peoples of the countries concerned and*
20 *Africa as a whole.*
21 It seems obvious to us that developments in both *Libya and Cote d'Ivoire* have tragically resulted in the
22 *marginalisation of the African Union* with regard to the *resolution of the conflicts in these two African*
23 *countries*.
24 We are certain that this will *not serve the long-term interests either of the peoples of Libya and Cote*
25 *d'Ivoire* or *of Africa as a whole*. Among other things, as a result of this *marginalisation*, *others from*
26 *outside our Continent took decisions to resolve the conflicts in Libya and Cote d'Ivoire by resort to*
27 *force rather than negotiations*. As we understand it, *none of* those who took these decisions had the
28 courtesy to consult the African Union about *actions that will inevitably* have *a profound and long-*
29 *lasting impact on the future of our Continent*. This suggests that various global processes have
30 developed in such a manner that *powerful international players* have come to the conclusion that they
31 *have the leeway freely to intervene in Africa to advance their interests. '*
32 It seems clear to us that among these processes which have *re-opened the way* towards *new foreign*
33 *domination of Africa is our own weakness*, centered on the *erosion of our cohesion and unity in pursuit*
34 *of shared goals*, in particular the defence of our independence. In this regard we find it *difficult to*
35 *imagine that the kind of interventions that have been made in Libya and Cote d'Ivoire could easily be*
36 *visited on the countries of Latin America and Asia.*
37 We must therefore answer the question *why Africa stands out as an exception in this regard!* It
38 therefore seems obvious *that Africa* has to take urgent steps to ensure that the *negative tendencies*
39 which have resulted in *the external interventions in Libya and Cote d'Ivoire* do not become entrenched
40 as a permissible manner of responding to *Africa's challenges*. The *violent intervention in Cote d'Ivoire*
41 has further entrenched the deep-seated animosities and divisions which manifested themselves as an
42 electoral dispute arising from the 2010 Presidential elections.
43 The *conflict in Libya threatens to dismember the country*, o*bliging its population to engage in a deadly*
44 *fratricidal strife* which will make *national unity and reconciliation* immensely difficult*.* Inevitably the
45 *conflict in Libya* will contribute *to conflict and instability in the neighbouring countries both in North*
46 *Africa and the Sahil*. This is the miserable legacy *that Africa* will inherit from its failure to play a
47 decisive role in resolving the conflicts in Libya and Cote d'Ivoire.
48 Nevertheless it is imperative that that the *African Union* should intervene in both these countries as a
49 matter of urgency, as much as possible to *mediate and manage the consequences of the immense*

50　*damage that has been caused*. We believe that *our Continent* is faced with a highly dangerous
51　emergency and must therefore respond accordingly, refusing to conduct it as though it can treat the
52　challenges we face as busy ness as usual.
53　We therefore humbly propose that: An *Extraordinary Assembly of the AU* should be convened at the
54　AU Headquarters urgently to consider the totality of the emergency facing *our Continent* as indicated
55　in this joint Appeal; The Assembly should consider and adopt decisions focused on *defending the*
56　*independence of our Continent* and protecting its *right to self-deternation*; The Assembly should take
57　practical decisions about what the *African Union* should do to *intervene in Libya and Cote d'ivoire*
58　especially to help ensure durable *peace, national unity* and *reconciliation* in these countries;
59　The Assembly should initiate processes for the mobilization of the *peoples of Africa*, throughout its
60　length and breadth, to demonstrate in defence of their *right to determine their destiny*,
61　" We plead with *Your Excellency* to respond to this joint Appeal with the necessary urgency, informed
62　by the *imminent threat* which *Africa* faces of once more losing its ability to determine *its destiny*. We
63　look forward to your earliest response to our Appeal and further advice from *Your Excellency* bout
64　what we can do to support your critically important work as Chairperson of the *African Union*
65　Commission at this particularly difficult moment facing *Africa.*

Brief CDA analysis of the Joint Appeal

Lexical style: I will introduce my analysis of the Joint Appeal by recourse to lexical style and power relations, highlighting the fact that the Joint Appeal is a mere call for action that is devoid of assertiveness and power enactment which is, as I observed in the analysis of the Libya letter, in stark contrast with Western discourses. Another observation in this context is that this lack of power enactment reflects – in spite of the fact that the Joint Appeal was written by prominent former heads of African states as well as intellectuals from a range of African countries – the power relations and dominant discourses in world politics. The dominance of Western discourse is entrenched within such skewed power relations whereas the Joint Appeal drives its strength from the moral weight and power to represent the concerns and interests of 'the African people'.

It was noticed from the outset that despite the fact that the Joint Appeal is a mere call for political action lacking the capacity to enact and project power, as is the case with the Libya letter, it is written by prominent former heads of African states and intellectuals from a range of African countries, which may lend it some moral weight.

The Appeal's lack of the kind of assertive language that would reflect the capacity to impose and the ability to act on the Libyan conflict reveals the structural relationships of dominance and power in the world order. This analysis is supported by the fact that the Joint Appeal is, in its lexical and semantic construction, only an expression of concern, while the Libya letter argues for military action as a duty and a mandate based on the UNSC Resolutions. The semantic emphasis of the Joint Appeal is clearly reliant on the narrative and discourse of African solidarity and the discourse of *African solutions to African problems*. This is clear in its attempt to construct a mental representation of the feelings and concerns of *the African people* and *peace loving people of the world*.

Choice of words: At the level of lexical choice it is clear that the Joint Appeal lacks the power to compel action; it is simply an expression of concern, as is made clear in the preamble: *we followed the events on our Continent with great interest and concern* (lines 1, 2 and 3). In contrast, the Libya letter argues for military action in response to a *call for help by the Libyan people*. Such divergence between these two competing discourses clearly creates differing mental models, attitudes and opinions about the Libyan conflict, both in terms of understanding the scope of its influences and in other aspects of the conflict.

Genre: The general style and genre of the Appeal appears to be diplomatic, polite and supportive of the efforts of the African Union, exemplified by the mode of address of *your excellency* (lines 1, 7, 64 and 67) and similar expressions of salutation and support (line 7). The style and content of the Appeal reveal a primary focus on the narrative and discourse of *African solutions to African problems*. This is made clear in the Appeal's attempt to construct a mental representation that represents the interests and concerns of *our continent* (line 3). While the Western discourse draws its power of representation from the mandate of the UNSC Resolutions and the world community, the Appeal attempts to draw its power of representation from *African people* and *peace loving people in the world*, made clear by the repeated use of phrases such as *the African people*, *African Union* and *our continent*.

Below are extracts from the Joint Appeal, written in April 2011 by prominent former heads of African states and intellectuals from a range of African countries, and addressed to Mr. Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union Commission. These extracts will be followed by a brief CDA analysis.

Competitive narratives: While the competing narratives of the Appeal focuses more on the context of political developments, the main focus of the Libya letter is on *intervention*, *military development* and military operations to *protect civilians*.

Structural emphasis: This makes it clear that the structural emphasis of the Appeal reflects an African discourse calling for *peaceful resolution, reconciliation* and *national unity* (line 60) which is premised on a narrative of African unity and solidarity that focuses on Africa's role in solving African problems. This is evident in expressions such as *our Continent*, *African Union* and assisting the *peoples of the African countries* (line 16) that stand in opposition to a Western discourse which bases its arguments on being *mandated by UNSC Resolutions* and being a *broad based coalition* with *international legitimacy* to act on the situation in Libya.

This explains why the Appeal criticizes and bemoans the weakness of Africa and the erosion of cohesion and unity as factors that *re-opened the way* towards *new foreign domination of Africa* (lines 35 and 36). In conjunction with this, the Appeal presents a strong opposing discourse and competing narratives that refute, dispel and utterly reject the dominant Western discourse of *humanitarian intervention* and *good deeds* by framing these as *new foreign domination* and the *marginalisation of the African Union* (lines 23, 23, 35) and also levels a direct accusation in order to unmask the real intention of the Western discourse: *powerful international players* have come to the conclusion that they *have*

the leeway freely to intervene in Africa to advance their interests (lines 31 and 32). The Appeal also negatively frames NATO military operations in Libya as *external interventions* (line 41) and discusses the *violent intervention in Cote d'Ivoire* (line 42). In fact, the competing African narrative presents a strong case against the Western discourse's claims of forging a *pathway to peace that promises new hope for the people of Libya, preserves Libya's integrity and sovereignty and restores her economy and the prosperity and security of her people* (Libya letter lines 34, 35 and 36) by counter-blaming Western interventions in Africa for *dismember[ing] the country, obliging its population to engage in a deadly fratricidal strife and disunity* (lines 45 and 46) and entrenching deep-seated animosities in Cote d'Ivoire (line 42).

Discursive features: The Appeal decries the marginalization of and disrespect for Africa and African institutions and warns that *Africa will inherit the final outcomes of the conflicts in both Libya and Cote d'Ivoire* (line 19). This competing discourse is justified by the fact that while the Western discourse argues that it seeks to preserve the interests of the *Libyan people*, it fails to even mention *Africa, African interest* or *African people,* whereas the discourse of the Appeal carries a lexical and semantic emphasis on notions such as *our continent, African Union* and *African people.* The Appeal explicitly highlights the complaint that Africa has been marginalized: *developments in both Libya and Cote d'Ivoire have tragically resulted in the marginalisation of the African Union with regard to the resolution of the conflicts in these two African countries*.

The competing discourse is also evident in the Appeal's assertion that while the Western narrative focuses on international mandates and legitimacy to act to protect the civil population in Libya, *others from outside our Continent took decisions to resolve the conflicts in Libya and Cote d'Ivoire by resort to force rather than negotiations*. The Appeal further underscores the lack of respect for Africa when stating that *none of those who took these decisions had the courtesy to consult the African Union about actions that will inevitably have a profound and long-lasting impact on the future of our Continent* (lines 29 and 30).

The Joint Appeal criticizes dominant international discourse in stating that *This suggests that various global processes have developed in such a way that powerful international players have come to the conclusion that they have the leeway freely to intervene in Africa to advance their interests.* Thus, while the Western discourse describes NATO action as an implementation of an international mandate to protect and serve the interests of the Libyan people, the Appeal regards this as foreign intervention.

Argumentation: In its argumentation, the Appeal uses accusation and a comparison with other regions of the world, stating that *we find it difficult to imagine that the kind of interventions that have been made in Libya and Cote d'Ivoire could easily be visited on the countries of Latin America and Asia,* asking *why Africa stands out as an exception in this regard*? The Appeal uses the threat of grave consequences for North Africa and the Sahel region to support its argument: *the conflict in Libya will contribute to conflict and instability in the neighbouring countries both in North Africa and the Sahel* (line 48). This is why, in order to counter the claims of the Western discourse, the Appeal calls for the AU to intervene (lines 50 and 59). The type of intervention sought by the Joint Appeal is thus an intervention that is wholly opposite to the proposed foreign intervention in its means and objectives; i.e. the intervention proposed by the AU is a *positive intervention* based on the African discourse of *peaceful settlement* and *African solutions to African problems* that seeks to *defend… the independence of our Continent*, the *right to self-deternation* and the *right to determine [our] destiny* (lines 58, 63 and 66).

Another aspect of the African discourse is represented by the open letter entitled "Libya, Africa and the New World Order, An open Letter to the Peoples of Africa and the World from Concerned Africans." This letter was signed by more than 200 prominent Africans (Concerned Africans Criticize NATO, August 24, 2011). Compared to the Appeal, the Open Letter is more assertive in its lexical choices and exhibits a stronger power of representation, made clear in the repeated use of the phrases *ordinary citizens of Africa, fellow Africans* and *as Africans* (lines 1, 2, 82, 103 and 117). More importantly, it represents a more powerful and direct opposing discourse and competing narrative to the Western and world discourse(s) on the Libyan conflict.

An examination of the discursive structure of the Open Letter demonstrates from the outset two competing narratives of representation, captured in the uses of *us* and *them*. The first *us* is the referent of phrases such as *concerned Africans* and *ordinary citizens of Africa* and connotes a wider power of representation through the repeated use of the phrase *we as Africans*; this is opposed to the use of *them* which denotes Western powers, NATO and the UNSC. The marker of such starkly divergent, opposing relations in terms of their power of representation is clear from the beginning of both letters: while the Open Letter begins with *we [the undersigned, as] ordinary citizens of Africa,* the Libyan Letter begins with *together with our NATO allies and coalition partners [in building] a broad-based coalition.* This initial declaration of powers of representation draws the battle lines of narratives to come. The fact that

the Open Letter was signed by more than 200 prominent Africans, making it powerful in terms of language and the contextualization of competing discourses.

5.4.2 <u>**Extract 6: An Open Letter**</u>

(See next page.)

We, the undersigned, are *ordinary citizens of Africa* who are *immensely pained* and *angered* that *fellow Africans* are and have been subjected to *the fury of war by foreign powers* which have clearly *repudiated* the *noble* and *very relevant vision* enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

Our action to issue this letter is inspired by our desire, not to take sides, but to *protect the sovereignty of Libya* and the *right of the Libyan people to choose their leaders and determine their own destiny. Libya is an African country*.

On March 10, the *African Union Peace and Security Council* adopted an important *Resolution (3)* which spelt out the *roadmap* to address *the Libyan conflict*, consistent with the obligations of the AU under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

When the UN Security Council adopted *its Resolution 1973*, *it was aware of the AU decision* which had been *announced seven days earlier*. By deciding to *ignore* this fact, the *Security Council* further and consciously contributed to the *subversion of international law* as well as *undermining the legitimacy of the UN in the eyes of the African people*. In other ways since then, it has helped to promote and *entrench the immensely pernicious process* of the *international marginalisation of Africa* even with regard to the *resolution of the problems of the Continent.*

Contrary to the provisions of the UN Charter, t*he UN Security Council declared its own war on Libya on March 17, 2011*. The Security Council *allowed itself to be informed by what the International Crisis Group (ICG)* in its June 6, 2011 Report on Libya characterises as the *"more sensational reports that the regime was using its air force to slaughter demonstrators".*

On this basis it adopted Resolution 1973 which mandated the *imposition of a "no-fly zone"* over Libya, and resolved "to take *all necessary measures . . .* to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya…" Thus, first of all, the *Security Council used the still unresolved issue in international law* of "*responsibility to protect R2P*", the so-called *R2P,* to justify the Chapter VII military intervention in Libya.

In this context the *UN Security Council has committed a litany of offences* which have underlined, the further transformation of the Council *into a willing instrument of the most powerful among its Member States*; Thus the Security Council *produced no evidence to* prove that its authorisation of the use of force under *Chapter VII of the UN Charter* was a proportionate and appropriate response to what had, *in reality, in Libya, developed into a civil war.*

It then proceeded to *'outsource' or 'sub-contract' the implementation of its resolutions to NATO, mandating this military alliance to act as a 'coalition of the willing'.* It did not put in place any mechanism and process to *supervise the 'sub-contractor'*, to ensure that it faithfully honours the provisions of its Resolutions.

It has made *no effort otherwise to monitor and analyse the actions of NATO* in this regard. It has allowed the establishment of a legally *unauthorised 'Contact Group'*, *yet another 'coalition of the willing'*, which has displaced it as the authority which has the effective responsibility to help determine the future of Libya.

To confirm this unacceptable reality, the July 15, 2011 meeting of the 'Contact Group' in Istanbul, "reaffirmed that the Contact Group remains the *appropriate platform for the international community to be a focal point of contact with the Libyan people*, to coordinate international policy and to be a forum for discussion of humanitarian and post-conflict support. "Duly permitted by the Security Council, *the two 'coalitions of the willing', NATO and the 'Contact Group'*, have effectively and practically rewritten Resolution 1973.

Thus they have empowered themselves openly to pursue the objective of *'regime change'* and therefore the *use of force* and all other means to *overthrow the government of Libya*, which objectives are *completely at variance with the decisions of the UN Security Counci*l.

Because of this, *with no regard to UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973*, they have made bold to declare the government of *Libya illegitimate and to proclaim the Benghazi-based 'Transitional National Council' as "the legitimate governing authority in Libya."*

The Security Council has failed to answer the question how the decisions taken by NATO and the 'Contact Group' address the vital issue of *"facilitating dialogue* to lead to the *political reforms* necessary to find *a peaceful and sustainable solution."*

The actions of its *'sub-contractors', NATO* and the *'Contact Group',* have positioned the *UN as a partisan belligerent in the Libyan conflict*, rather than a *committed but neutral peacemaker standing equidistant* from the *Libyan armed factions*.

The Security Council has further willfully decided to *repudiate the rule of international law* by consciously ignoring the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter relating to the role of *legitimate regional institutions. The George W. Bush war against Iraq began on March 20, 2003.*

The following day, March 21, the UK newspaper, the *Guardian*, published an abbreviated article by the prominent US *neo-conservative, Richard Perle, entitled "Thank God for the death of the UN".*

But the *post-Second World War global architecture* for the *maintenance of international peace and security centered on respect for the UN Charter.*

The *UN Security Council* must therefore know that at least with regard to Libya, it has acted in a manner which will result in and has *led to the loss of its moral authority* effectively to preside over the critical processes of achieving global peace and the realisation of the objective of *peaceful coexistence* among the diverse peoples of the world.

Contrary to the provisions of the *UN Charter,* the *UN Security Council authorised and has permitted the destruction and anarchy* which has *descended on the Libyan people.*

At the end of it all: *many Libyans will have died* and have *been maimed*; much *infrastructure will have been destroyed,* further *impoverishing the Libyan people*; the *bitterness* and *mutual animosity among the Libyan people* will have been further entrenched; the possibility to arrive at a *negotiated, inclusive* and *stable settlement* will have become that much more difficult; *instability* will have been reinforced among the countries neighbouring Libya, especially the countries of *the African Sahel*, such as Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania; Africa will inherit a much more difficult challenge successfully to address issue of *peace and stability,* and therefore the *task of sustained development*; those who have *intervened to perpetuate violence* and *war in Libya* will have the possibility to set the parameters within which the Libyans will have the possibility to *determine their destiny,* and thus further constrain the space for the *Africans* to exercise their *right to self-determination.*

As Africans we have predicated our future as relevant players in an *equitable system of international relations* on the expectation that the United Nations would indeed serve "as the foundation of a *new world order*." The ICG Report to which we have referred says: "The prospect for Libya, but also North Africa as a whole, is increasingly ominous, unless some way can be found to induce the two *sides in the armed conflict* to negotiate a compromise allowing for an orderly transition to a *post-Qaddafi, post-Jamahiriya* state that has legitimacy in the eyes of the Libyan people. A political breakthrough is by far the best way out of the costly situation created by the military impasse..."

When Richard Perle wrote in 2003 about the "*abject failure of the United Nations*", he was bemoaning the refusal of the UN to *submit to dictation* by the world's sole superpower, the US. The UN took this position because it was conscious of, and was inspired by its obligation to act as a true *representative of all peoples of the world*, consistent with the opening *words of the UN Charter -- "We the peoples on the United Nations. . ;* However, and *tragically*, eight years later, in 2011, the UN Security Council *abandoned its commitment to this perspective.*

Chastened by the humiliating experience of 2003, *when the US demonstrated that might is right*, it decided that it was more expedient to submit to the *demands of the powerful* rather than *honour its obligation to respect the imperative* to uphold the will of *the pe*oples, including the *African nations.*

Thus it has communicated the message that it has become no more *than an instrument in the hands and service* of *the most powerful* within *the system of international relations* and therefore the vital process of the peaceful ordering of human affairs.

98 *As Africans we* have no choice but *to stand up and reassert our right and duty to determine our destiny*
99 *in Libya* and everywhere else on our Continent.
100 We demand that all governments, everywhere in the world, including Africa, which expect genuine
101 respect by the governed, such as us, should act immediately to assert "that law by which all nations
102 *may live in dignity."*
103 We demand that: *the NATO war of aggression in Libya should end immediately;* the AU should be
104 supported to implement its Plan to help the Libyan people to achieve peace, democracy, shared
105 prosperity and national reconciliation in a united Libya; the UN Security Council must act immediately
106 to discharge its responsibilities as defined in the UN Charter.
107 *Those who have brought a deadly rain of bombs to Libya today should not delude themselves to believe*
108 *that the apparent silence of the millions of Africans means that Africa approves of the campaign of*
109 *death, destruction and domination which that rain represents.*
110 *We are confident that tomorrow we will emerge victorious, regardless of the death-seeking power of*
111 *the most powerful armies in the world.*
112 The answer we must provide practically, and *as Africans*, is -- when, and in what ways, will we act
113 resolutely and meaningfully to *defend the right of the Africans of Libya to decide their future*, and
114 therefore the right and duty of all Africans to determine their destiny! *The AU Road Map* remains the
115 only way to peace for the *people of Libya.*

Analysis of the text of the Open Letter

Lexical style: From the beginning, the lexical style and choice of words of the Open Letter show not only a strong rejection of Western discourse, but also expresses a more passionate solidarity, anger and resistance, all of which is clear in the lexical and semantic strategies contained in the preamble of the Open Letter which states that *We, the undersigned, are ordinary citizens of Africa who are immensely pained and angered that fellow Africans are and have been subjected to the fury of war by foreign powers which have clearly repudiated the noble and very relevant vision enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations* (lines 1, 2 , 3and 4). This is significant because it reflects clear lines of opposition to Western discourse that claims a continuance of *military operations to protect civilians in Libya.* That is, the Open Letter openly frames these operations as a *war* and states that *fellow Africans are and have been subjected to fury of wa*r (lines 1 and 2), later terming this *the NATO war of aggression in Libya* (line 108).

The lexical style and semantic emphasis of the Open Letter focus on highlighting, negatively framing and refuting the claims of Western discourse through direct accusation and the use of framing in phrases such as *foreign powers, clearly repudiated the noble and very relevant vision enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations*, *subversion of international law*, *undermining the legitimacy* and *UN Security Council has committed a litany of offences* (lines 1, 3, 13, 14 and 26). The lexical style and word choice of the Open Letter highlight an extremely negative image and employ accusation in order to demolish another aspects of negative framing in the Western discourse, for instance by accusing the UNSC of *producing no evidence***,** outsourcing *sub-contractors***,** establishing an *unauthorized Contact Group* (meaning NATO) and mandating this military alliance to act as a *coalition of the willing* implementing its decisions in pursuance of its real objectives of regime change.

Discursive structure: From the outset, the examination of the discursive structure of the Open Letter clearly shows – in its representations of 'us' and 'them' and with regard to its power of representation – the standpoint of a competing discourse and narrative that opposes and resists Western discourses and narratives. The fact that the Open Letter was signed by more than 200 prominent Africans gives real weight to its language and its contextualization of competing discourses.

Semantic content: The semantic content of the Open Letter shows another dimension of this opposing narrative in its framing of the Western discourse as ignoring and disrespecting Africa as

well as the decisions of African institutions like the AU, thus violating International law. The letter states, for example, that *when the UN Security Council adopted its Resolution 1973, it was aware of the AU decision which had been announced seven days earlier* and that the *Security Council further and consciously contributed to the subversion of international law as well as undermining the legitimacy of the UN in the eyes of the African people* (lines 11, 12, 13 and 14).

Semantic emphasis: The structural semantic emphases of each letter is aimed at the formation of different mental models of the events surrounding the Libyan conflict, each model loaded with embedded positions. The opposing discourses and competing narratives are more visible in the lexical choices of words and meanings: while the Western discourse refers to the *rebels* as *Libyan opposition*, without even mentioning that this is *an armed opposition*, the African discourse refers to *armed conflict*, *regime change* and the *use of force* to *overthrow the government of Libya*.

The Open Letter's mode of expression to reflect its power of representation focuses on the use of the phrase *as Africans* and claims both moral authority and neutrality in stating that *our action to issue this letter is inspired by our desire, not to take sides, but to protect the sovereignty of Libya and the right of the Libyan people to choose their leaders and determine their own destiny*. The Open Letter also employs an intensifying semantic emphasis in the form of a strong declaration that *Libya is an African country* (line 7) and that African countries should have more rights than those *outside the continent* to solve the problems of African countries – this again draws from the *African solution to African problems* narrative. The Open Letter furthermore uses the same lexical and semantic emphasis as the Western discourse, but in precisely the opposite way as a means to dispel and refute it by quoting reliable sources for same purpose. A case in the point is in the quoted phrase *to slaughter demonstrators*; in this competing narrative the Open Letter attempts to mitigate the effects and to arrest the scope of the Western discourse which uses the same phrase in an exaggerated form: *to slaughter his people.* This is an important tool to use in magnifying the negative image of Western discourse and NATO military actions and refuting their claims of protecting civilians, human rights and democracy.

Competing narratives: The competing narratives become clearer when they are contrasted to the Western discourse which discusses mandates and the implementation of a *historic resolution*, i.e. the United Nations Security Council *authoriz[ing] all necessary measures to protect the people of Libya from the attacks upon them*. The discursive structure of the African Open Letter, in turn, is focused on accusation and the construction of a negative portrayal of the behaviour of Western countries and their flouting of international law and the UN Charter (lines 57, 59 and 69).

Framing ambiguity: In general the competing narratives are clear from the statements comprised in the two letters and how each of the parties frame the events in Libya differently, resulting in *framing ambiguity*. This framing ambiguity is clear in the discursive structures and semantic emphases of both Western and African discourses and narratives; while the Libya Letter frames the actions of the Western leaders in Libya as a *mandate* and a *duty to protect civilians,* the African leaders frame these acts as *aggression* and a *war by foreign powers.*

Negative framing: The Open Letter draws on the recent history of international conflicts in order to highlight the danger that NATO military action might bring to Libya and to discredit Western leaders. It supports this argument not only by invoking negative memories, but also by quoting conservative views published in respected Western sources like the British newspaper, *The Guardian* (for example in the articles "The George W. Bush War Against Iraq" and "Thank God for the Death of the UN"), in order to draw a parallel between these previous conflicts and the NATO operation in Libya and to highlight the lack of respect Western powers have for the UN (lines 59, 60, 61 and 62). The Open letter warns of the grave consequences of instability in order to frame the NATO military operations in Libyan negatively (lines 75, 76 and 77).

Discursive acts: Discursive dominance in the world system, as well as the conditions of this dominance and resistance to it, are made evident in another clear statement of the African position: *as Africans we have predicated our future as relevant players in an equitable system of international relations on the expectation that the United Nations would indeed serve as the foundation of a new world order*. The Open Letter underpins this position by quoting the preamble of the UN Charter: *we the peoples on the United Nations*. It also uses the phrase *outsourcing sub-contractors* to set up its competing narrative that seeks to counter both the Western and the Libyan armed opposition narratives that depict pro-Gaddafi forces as using *African mercenaries*. The Western narrative here is intended to serve several purposes, but primarily it is to portray Africans as non-neutral mercenaries siding with Gaddafi and thus destroying any chance for an African solution and illegitimating the notion of African neutrality in the Libyan conflict.

Discourse of resistance: The significance of this discourse lies in its aim to dispel the Western discourse's moral claims of *protecting civilians* and implementing a *mandate* of *international legitimacy* as well as its attempt to unmask the real motives underlying the Western discourse: *regime change* and a desire to *overthrow the government of Libya*.

Argumentation: The argumentative position of the Open Letter is strongly marked with accusation and the invocation of recent negative experiences like the war in Iraq 2003 (line 59), and suggests that the UNSC has become a tool in the hands of the USA which abuses its military power instead of respecting the power and rights of other nations. This is clear in statements such as *when the US demonstrated that might is right*.

Rhetorical figures: The Open Letter uses rhetorical figures such as the Security Council *allowed itself* to *be informed* by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in its June 6, 2011 Report on Libya which has been characterized as one of the *more sensational reports that the regime was using its air force to slaughter demonstrators.* The letter also employs accusation by quoting a report that states that the UNSC based its resolutions on *sensational reports*.

Syntax: The syntax of the Open Letter draws an unsettling parallel with the bloodshed, killing and destruction in Iraq. The recent history of the Iraq war and its horrible images still linger in the living memory of the international community and its human cost is ongoing more than a decade after the American led invasion of Iraq. In drawing this parallel, the Open letter invokes salient negative features of narratives of the Iraq war in order to highlight the deceptive nature of the Western discourse: the invasion of Iraq was justified with deliberate lies that framed it as an attempt to destroy *weapons of mass destruction*, even though to this day no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq.

Competing narratives: Competing narratives are strongly underscored by the Open Letter when it states that *those who have brought a deadly rain of bombs to Libya today should not delude themselves to believe that the apparent silence of the millions of Africans means that Africa approves of the campaign of death, destruction and domination which that rain represents*. The Open Letter uses rhetorical figures and the same metaphor of the *rain[ing]* down of bombs that is employed by the Western leaders in their letter: *his rockets* and his *shells rained down on defenseless civilians*. The Open Letter specifically talks about the raining of *bombs* as bombs causing more destruction than rockets and shells.

The Open Letter uses direct accusation to expose Western claims, stating that *it produced no evidence* and that it *outsources* or *sub-contracts*. Notably, this draws on strong narratives of the recent Western occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, where Western countries along with NATO forces used private armies, the military and security services of private companies like Blackwater. The significance of using such narratives lies not only in their negative framing of NATO and the

Western intervention in Libya, but also in how they respond to the discursive framing of the Western countries and their allies, the Libyan opposition, which invokes *African mercenaries* fighting alongside Gaddafi's forces, whereas the Open Letter discusses *sub-contractors, NATO* and the *unauthorized Contact Group* (lines 31, 36, 54 and 55).

The competing narratives of the Libya Letter and the Open Letter are clear in the latter's statements that *the UN Security Council authorised and has permitted the destruction and anarchy which has descended on the Libyan people* and also in its response to the claim of the Western discourse that *tens of thousands of lives have been protected*, namely: *many Libyans will have died and have been maimed; much infrastructure will have been destroyed, further impoverishing the Libyan people, and the bitterness and mutual animosity among the Libyan people will have been further entrenched* (lines 69, 70, 71 and 72). Finally, this competing narrative plays itself out in the expression of future hopes and expectations, for instance when the Open Letter states that *we are confident that tomorrow we will emerge victorious, regardless of the death-seeking power of the most powerful armies in the world* (lines 115 and 116).

As can be seen from the above analysis, the difference between African and Western discourses and narratives is that the Western discourse tends to be premised upon the discourse of dominant power, while the African discourse is based upon the discourse of a peaceful resolution to African conflicts as a precondition for economic and social development on the continent. The Western narrative focuses on a portrayal of the conflict that reduces it to issues specific to the person of the Libyan leader, Gaddafi, and because he has been perennially portrayed as a 'dictator' and a 'madman', it becomes easy to focus on him in order to conceal the real target, namely Libya which is a country rich in oil and gas resources and which is in close proximity to Europe. In this case the Western narrative represents a high degree of manipulation of facts in order to draw specific mental models of the conflict and to conceal power relations and real motives. This is clear in the discursive pattern of the Libya Letter which clearly reveals that Western countries are ambivalent in implementing the UNSC Resolutions. While the letter claim that their actions are intended to *protect citizens* by imposing *no-fly zones*, they are in fact using and abusing the UNSC Resolution provision for the use of *all necessary means* as a pretext and justification for the bombardment of Libyan towns and facilities, leading to bloodshed and the loss of lives that is, in effect, an implementation of their policy of *regime change*. This is clear in the letter's later statement that *[we] are not removing Gaddafi by force;* on the contrary, Gaddafi was removed by force and eventually killed.

In comparison, the African discourse and narrative of this conflict, as represented by the Joint Appeal and the Open Letter, premises its argumentation on the power to represent the African people, made clear in expressions like *as Africans* and *we the people of Africa*. More importantly, these letters draws a negative image of unfair power relations in the world system in the form of a direct accusation leveled against the UNSC: *the Security Council used the still unresolved issue in international law of 'the right to protect', the so-called responsibility to protect "R2P", to justify the Chapter VII military intervention in Libya.*

The African discourse also constructs another negative framing that presents a highly disturbing image of Western discourse, accusing the UNSC of committing *a litany of offences* and as having been *transformed into a willing instrument of the most powerful among its Member States,* and having *produced no evidence to prove that its authorisation of the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was a proportionate and appropriate response to what* had, *in reality, in Libya, developed into a civil war* (lines 26, 27 , 28, 29 and 30).

In conclusion, the mainstream African discourses and narratives represent strong resistance to and competition with the Western discourse of dominance. The influence of such competing and opposing discourses will be traced further on in the analysis of the PAP discussion and its interpretation into Arabic.

5.5 Media discourses/narratives

The competing narratives about the Libyan conflict played out in the media are reflected in the selected extracts below.

5.5.1   Media discourse: Reports

Extract 1
Report in the South African newspaper, *Business Day* (Smith, 2011), entitled "SA rejects US 'lies and propaganda; it is blocking release of funds for Libya rebels" (Smith, 2011) which quoted comments by South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, in July 2011, that France was attempting to *re-colonize* Africa by *arming rebels* in Libya and for its involvement in Cote d'Ivoire.

Extract 2
Report in the British *Guardian News Media* (March 25 to 31, 2011) titled "Rebels still being held at bay" reported that: *The revolutionaries* also claimed that Gaddafi`s forces bombarded the *rebel-held* town of Zintan, about 100km south of Tripoli.

Extract 3
A Reuters report published by the South African newspaper *Mail & Guardian*, (October 21 to 27, 2011), under the title "Libya now needs to forge a future" states that: Jockeying for power among Libya's *well-armed and fractious new leadership* may intensify after the death of *deposed autocrat Muammar Gaddafi*, an anxious and, for many joyous moment in a country hungry for stability and impatient to swap the bullet for the ballot box [...] The fact that *NATO can be blamed for his death is worrying, in terms of regional support*, and may undermine the *legitimacy* of the *National Transitional Council*.

Extract 4
Report of Peter Apps, Reuters, published by the South African newspaper, *Mail & Guardian,* (October 21 to 27, 2011) under the headline "Death avoids potentially embarrassing trial", states that *Muammar Gaddafi's death* from wounds received during the fall of Sitre means a *long and complex trial* that could have *divided Libya* and *embarrassed Western governments* and *oil firms will be avoided*.

Extract 5
Report of Reuters, in the South African newspaper, *Business Day* (October 17, 2011) states that *Libyan Government fighters battled yesterday to subdue pockets of resistance by pro-Gaddafi fighters*, whose refusal to abandon the ousted leader's hometown of Sirte is delaying *Libya's move to democracy*.

Extract 6
Reuters reported (July 9, 2012) that: Supporters of the *NATO-backed uprising* that *overthrew Gaddafi* dismissed suggestions that the violence showed the election lacked legitimacy**.**

5.5.2   Media discourse: Commentaries

Extract 1
Commentary of the South African newspaper, *The Star* (May12, 2012) entitled **"When might is not right"** commented that: *In truth*, if *NATO* and *the ICC* needed mandates to probe what Human Rights Watch calls "*Undeclared deaths*", they *would get it*. But the message is clear: *NATO can mess up your country from up in the sky without a care about how lives are ruined*-or at least a *pretence at investigating*. It is *shameful that attempts* at *self-preservation by NATO and the ICC obviated the need for justice for poor civilians*.

Extract 2
A comment in the *Pretoria News* (Mogotsi 2011) by executive director of the Centre of Economic Diplomacy in Africa, entitled "Editorial has no right to own facts on Libya" responding to the Newspaper Editorial on August 27 2011 headlined "Time for SA to accept the reality in Libya**",** accused the newspaper of *projecting blatant Pro-NATO* and *anti-AU posture,* saying: To support the *"regime change"* in Libya is to support the *rebels*, *the West* and *their dubious agenda* […] *Is*

your editorial really trying to convince us that the NATO military intervention in Libya and the Libyan rebels' military assault on Tripoli represent an Arab Spring revolution? (Mogotsi 2011).

5.5.3   Media discourse: Opinions

Extract 1
An article published in The South African newspaper, *The Sunday Independent* (Mast-Ingle 2011), titled "Was Gaddafi the madman he is made out to be?", states that: *The spin-doctoring for the world at large* has also succeeded in *obliterating any good* that *may have come out of the country 'Libya' as far as Africa is concerned.* According to a *Reuters report* on November 24, 2010, *Libya was pouring aid and investment into Africa,* including:

- *An offer of $97bn in the continent to free it from Western influence on condition the states rid themselves of corruption and nepotism.*
- *$ 65bn into sovereign wealth funds one designed to make investments in Africa.*
- *Libya is one of the biggest contributors to the budget of the AU.*

The US and its European allies have won another battle in the war with China for the heart, soul and riches of Africa with the ousting of Gaddafi in Libya, leaving the country completely vulnerable to exploitation immediately and for as long as its oil reserves last'. Brilliant spin-doctoring has obscured the US's three-fold purposes in Libya- to access the foreign funds estimated at more than $200 billion to avoid further crises in the international monetary structures; control the oil, which is the richest in Africa, easily accessible by Europe and comprising 2 percent of the world's supply; and to ensure an ongoing low-key war among the 41 tribes that will provide a lucrative market for arms manufacturers that head up a long list seen plying their trade in Iraq.

Extract 2
In an article published in the South African newspaper, the *Pretoria News* (Pahad 2011), former South African deputy minister of foreign affairs, under the heading "NATO`s victory in Libya is Africa's defeat"**,** quotes what he termed as *The conservative Royal United Services Institute* regarding the UK report "Accidental Heroes" (September 27, 2011) about NATO military assistance *to the rebels, and that it deployed special forces in Libya* to provide all-around assistance for the *rebels*. Pahad commented that *Without this intervention* the *National Transitional Council (TNC) rebels* would have *failed to defeat* the *Gaddafi regime.* Accordingly, they *literally owe their "victory"* to the *leading role played by NATO* and its *Arab allies* in the military offensive against *this regime* […] During the current 66th Session of the UN General Assembly, relating to the *Libyan Question*, the *P3* (The three Permanent members of UNSC i.e., USA, UK and France made at least eight assertions. They claim that the "*Libyan revolution*", resulting in the *overthrow of the Gaddafi regime*, was a product of the "*brave" actions* of the "*Libyan revolutionaries*" (Pahad 2011).

Extract 3
In an article in the South African newspaper, *Business Day* (Steremlau 2012), the Vice-President in charge of the peace programs at the Carter Centre in Atlanta, US, who also led the Centre's international observation mission to Libya, wrote an article titled "SA still has much to offer the eager new Libya", he states that: *Libya's liberation* received *vital foreign military* and *diplomatic backing, including SA's crucial United Nations (UN) vote* (Steremlau 2012).

Extract 4

In an article in the South African newspaper**,** the *Mail & Guardian* (Adebajo 2011), Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, and author of *The Curse of Berlin: Africa After the Cold War*, writes in the article entitled "Gaddafi: the despot who would be king" that: *Events in Libya* suggest that the *end of the regime of the world's longest ruling autocrat, Muammar Gaddafi, is near* (Adebajo 2011).

Extract 5

In an article in the South African newspaper, the *Mail & Guardian* (Mills 2011), the Director of Brenthurst Foundation writes in an article entitled "SA's stance on Libya furthers rogue trend" that: *The European Union diplomat was puzzled*: *'Why South Africa would be against the Iraq war* or *why it would resist Western 'interference in Zimbabwe'*, but *why the outcry over Libya, a popular revolt against a despot* (Mills 2011)

Extract 6

In an opinion piece in the South African newspaper, *Pretoria News* (Makoe 2011), the founder and editor-in chief of the *Royal News Services* writes the following in an article entitled "Disgraceful demise of a visionary leader": *In Gaddafi, I saw a proud African leader* (*notwithstanding his dictatorial tendencies*) with some *truly Pan-African views*, particularly his *desire to transform our disjointed continent into the United States of Africa* [...] *In a post-Gaddafi Libya*, my greatest fear is over *control by NATO of Libya's oil* and *gas pipes* and *stores-* in *my mind* the *ulterior objective behind the UN Resolution 1973* marks the *beginning of re-colonisation of Africa in the 21st century* [...] and, despite the *media's lopsided coverage* of *Libya,* the *truth is Gaddafi was loved by many Africans* who could *see in his actions and statements a kinship* to *their dreams* of *being able to stand upright* in the *greater assembly of humanity.*

Extract 7

In an opinion piece in the South African newspaper, *Business Day* (Moorcraft 2011), former senior instructor at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College, writes the following in an article titled "Are Britain and France Trying to Colonise Africa again?: *Now the dynamic Anglo-French duo*, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy, *are putting 'boots on the ground:*, no matter how *much they deny it. Their special forces* have *already put their booted feet on Libyan sands*, as have *US Central Intelligence Agency operatives*". ...."If *Gaddafi stays in power it could severely embarrass the Conservative-led coa*lition and perhaps *inspire regime change in London, not Tripoli* (Moorcraft 2011).

Extract 8

In an opinion piece in the South African newspaper, *The Sunday Times* (Mills & McNamee 2011), entitled "Hedging their bets in the Libyan war", they wrote: *So, in all likelihood*, we will see the *NATO-led mission up the ante*, either through more *intensive bombing of strategic targets in Tripoli like electricity stations*, which *turned the lights off for Slobodan Milosevic in 1999,* or *providing arms to Gaddafi's enemies*. Both are fraught with dangers. *Although CIA and M16 operatives, among others, are on the ground gathering intelligence*, no one is even hinting at sending ground troops to assist the *still largely unknown* rebels (Mills & McNamee 2011).

Brief analysis of media discourse

A brief analysis of media discourses, either through the reporting of events, commentaries or published opinions in newspapers, reveals that opposing discourses and competing narratives about the Libyan conflict clashed in the media domain and that these represent almost the same divides between dominant and opposing discourse(s) explored above. A cursory look at sample extracts of the media discourse shows that it reflects the above-analyzed dominant Western and world discourses and opposing and competing African discourses and narratives. However, in the media discourse – especially in the commentary and opinion segments – there are Africans who propagate and support Western discourses and narratives on the Libyan conflict and, vice versa, Western citizens who propagate and support African discourses and narratives on said conflict.

An analysis of the media discourse shows that the media plays an important role as it not only sustains and disseminates other discourses but also sometimes lends prominence to some narratives while marginalizing, manipulating or suppressing others in order to create negative or positive attitudes through constructing and representing reality and dominant understandings of events, depending on how the media is aligned which, in turn, is based on its ideological or commercial interests. An analysis of media discourse via the reporting of events, commentaries or published opinions also reveals competing narratives about the Libyan conflict in the media domain, as is reflected in the above extracts. Some sections of the media have a clear focus on elaborating stories that deal with only one side of the conflict.

A cursory overview of the above extracts of media reports and commentary discourses indicates that while the media represent an important means for each discourse and narrative to present its case, the media can itself become a weapon within such contestation, suppressing one discourse or narrative or siding with another in order to give it prominence. This is clear from the above extracts which show that media discourse not only sustains and disseminates competing narratives and opposing discourse(s), but that it also sometimes lends prominence to one over the other or marginalizes, manipulates and suppresses other narratives in order to create negative or positive attitudes based on whatever side the media aligns with influenced by their own ideological or commercial interests.

A general analysis of the report and commentary segments of media discourse supports this view, drawing a clear profile of the media as a mirror of both Western and African discourses and

narratives. This is clear from the headlines of reports and commentaries, as well as from their lexical choices semantic emphases, reflected in headlines such as:

- *SA rejects US lies and propaganda; it is blocking release of funds for Libya rebels*
- *Rebels still being held at bay*
- *West is in Libya for Oil, not people*
- *Libya now needs to forge a future*
- *Death of deposed autocrat Muammar Gaddafi*
- *Gaddafi`s death heralds new dawn for Libya*

It is also reflected in sub-headings such as:

- *The revolutionaries claimed that Gaddafi`s forces bombarded the rebel-held town of Zintan*
- *Death avoids potentially embarrassing trial which could have divided Libya and embarrassed Western governments* and *oil firms will be avoided*

Furthermore, this mixed profile of dominant and opposing discourses, framings and counter-framings is clearly manifested in the use of politically charged language carrying embedded views and framings, e.g. *Libyan Government fighters*, *pro-Gaddafi fighters*, *NATO-backed uprising*, *overthrew Gaddafi, pro-NATO and anti-AU posture*, *regime change*, *rebels*, *the West* and *their dubious agenda*, *Libyan rebels' military assault*, *Arab Spring revolution*, *Undeclared deaths*, *NATO military intervention in Libya* and *the Libyan rebels' military assault*.

This brief analysis of report and commentary segments of media discourse also demonstrates the way in which discursive acts can be (re)produced and disseminated by the media. In this context, a brief analysis of the opinion segment of the media discourse (Extract 1) demonstrates that its headline, which highlights the way in which Western discourse has framed Gaddafi as a 'madman', is not only a form of character assassination but also a deliberate attempt to draw a bigger frame that aims at creating a mental model that reduces the whole scene to *one mad person*. Hence the focus on *Colonel Gaddafi* and, later on, *pro-Gaddafi fighter[s]* instead of on the *Libyan leader* and *Libyan forces*, provides an easy target that conceals the bigger picture and real motives as well as the 'real prize' which is the wealth of the entire country. This is exactly what is revealed in a quoted Reuters report and in the second segment of Extract 1: *the US and its European allies have won another battle in the war with China* – this is self-explanatory and falls within the ambit of African discourse and narratives.

In the same manner, I find Extract 2 to be a true representation of African discourse and narratives in its lexical style, semantic emphases and structural dynamics, all of which oppose and resist the Western discourse and narratives.

In divergence from the two above-mentioned extracts, it is evident that Extract 3 propagates a Western discourse. Its divergence with African discourse is stark as can be seen in its lexical choice to term Western intervention in Libya as *Libya's liberation*. This extract thus attempts to leverage South Africa's vote in favour of UNSC Resolution 1870 (the imposition of a no-fly zone to protect the civilian population) as crucial backing for *Libya's liberation*. However, it is well known that South Africa changed its stance once it became clear that the Western powers were abusing the power and authority of the UNSC.

Extract 4 falls squarely within the domain of Western discourse and narrative, especially in its framing of Gaddafi as a *despot* and *autocrat*, this despite the fact that the writer is African. Interestingly, the writer of Extract 6, also African, completely rejects the Western discourse and narratives, which is clear in his portrayal of Gaddafi as *a visionary leade*r and *a proud African leader* with some *truly Pan-African views*. In fact, Extract 6 represents one of the central themes of African discourses and narratives, especially in terms of seeing the real motives of the Western powers (e.g. NATO) as wanting to control *Libya's oil and gas* and in its unmasking of the *ulterior objective behind the UN Resolution 1973*, which *marks the beginning of re-colonisation of Africa*.

In the same manner, we find that Extract 5 supports Western discourse and narratives in portraying the conflict in Libya as a *popular revolt against a despot*, but that it also uses the narratives of *the Iraq war* and *Western interference in Zimbabwe* to question the moral standing of South Africa, especially after this country changed its position and identified itself with mainstream African discourse.

It is interesting to note that the title of Extract 7, despite the fact that this was written by a Western citizen – a former senior instructor at both the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst and the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College – is presented in the form of a provocative question that is clearly supportive of African discourse and narratives of the Libyan conflict: "Are Britain and France Trying to Colonise Africa again?" In this extract, the writer highlights the divide within Western discourses and narratives as between *conservative*s and *liberals*, made clear in the directing of blame towards the *conservative-led coalition*. The writer supports another aspect of the African discourse in using the narrative of *regime change* which has become the most prominent international frame against Western powers since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. It is worth noting that this extract highlights the influence of the Libyan conflict on the domestic politics of Western countries: *if Gaddafi stays in power it could severely embarrass the Conservative-led coalition and perhaps inspire regime change in London, not Tripoli.*

Finally, a brief analysis of Extract 8 shows that while the writers tends to support Western discourse, they prefer not to pronounce a clear-cut position, reflected in the anticipative headline of the article: "Hedging Their Bets in the Libyan War." This may represent another segment of those aligned with the Western discourse that do not advocate a clear position, not because they are in opposition to Western intervention in Libya, but because alternatives to the regime change in Libya are unknown to them. This is clear in the use of the phrase *still largely unknown rebels* and might also be due to the fact that at the time the extract was written the conflict was still ongoing, with no decisive outcome or clear trajectory having as yet emerged.

In conclusion, through this explanation and critique of the dominant discourses and competing narratives – Western, African, global or media-specific – of the Libyan conflict, it has become clearer that all of these discourses and narratives manufacture specific models of events pertaining to the conflict that directly or indirectly influence our knowledge about the conflict. These models serve to entrench, refute or dispel certain images or beliefs which then influences both the positions we take and our selections of words and expressions. This leads me to investigate below the influence of the mental models constructed by these competing narratives and discourses on parliamentarians and interpreters. I argue that such models facilitate, either directly or indirectly, the formation or change of attitudes through a decontextualization of personal models and opinions about events pertaining to the Libyan conflict. As parliamentarians and interpreters are loaded with these mental models and influences, their influence on perceptions and opinions is reflected in the discussions as well as in the interpreting strategies applied to these. This, then, leads the main emphasis of my study, which focuses on tracing the influence of these discourses and competing narratives through the opinions expressed, the labels, words and phrases used in PAP discussions and the interpreting in into Arabic.

5.6 Recordings of interpreted PAP discussions

Below I trace the influence of the above discourse(s) and narrative(s) on interpreters by noting the prevalence of certain words and phrases in their utterances, e.g. *rebels, revolutionaries, opposition, armed opposition, uprising, dictatorship, visionary leader, despot, democracy, human rights, terrorism, stability, peaceful solution, military action, NATO led-mission, NATO backed-uprising, Libyan war, conflict, civil war, Libya liberation* and *pro-Gaddafi*. All of these have ideological and political loads, standpoints and positions embedded in them. My tracing allows for a better

understanding of how discourses and narratives are constructed based on the models and representations of events in Libya and what influence these have had on both PAP members and Arabic interpreters, this being the particular focus of my study.

5.6.1 Transcription of recorded extracts from the interpreted debate of minutes of the committee

Below are extracts from interpreted discussions of the minutes of the sitting of PAP's Permanent Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution, held on Friday May 6, 2011 in Midrand (Johannesburg), South Africa, in Committee Room 1. The meeting was chaired by the Honourable Marwick Khumalo, Chairperson of the Committee and centered on a report on the latest developments in Africa's peace and security situation, presented by Dr. Petrus de Kock from the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and with a special focus on the following countries: Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Madagascar, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Djibouti and Eritrea.

For the purpose of this study I focused only on those recordings of interpreted discussion pertaining to the situation in Libya.

The recorded debate was held in English, Arabic and French, relayed into English an then interpreted into Arabic. Thereafter these were both back translated (BT) into English.

<u>English into Arabic</u>
<u>Transcript 1</u>
Chairperson: Now I ask the clerk of the committee to read the next item of our agenda.

Committee clerk: discussion of development of the situation in Libya,

Chairperson: Honourable members, we now start our deliberations on the situation in Libya, and I hope that after your interventions we will be able to come up with recommendations, so as to table them to the plenary session.

<div dir="rtl">

رئيس اللجنة: ← أرجو من سكرتير اللجنة أن يتلو علينا البند التالي في **جدول الأعمال.**
سكرتير اللجنة: مناقشة التطورات في ليبيا.
رئيس اللجنة: معالي الأعضاء نبدأ الآن مداولاتنا حول الوضع في ليبيا، وآمل بعد مداخلاتكم أن نتمكن من الخروج بتوصيات لكي نعرضها على الجلسة العامة.

</div>

Back translation of Arabic (BT1)
Chairperson: Clerk of the Committee please read to us the next item on the agenda.

Committee clerk: discussion of *the developments* in Libya.

Chairperson: Honourable members, we start now our deliberations on the situation in Libya, and I hope that after your interventions will make recommendations, so as to present them to the plenary session.

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: A brief discourse analysis of the above extract indicates a parliamentarian genre and lexical style; this is clear from the choice of terms such as *deliberations*, *interventions*, and *plenary session.* The mode of address in the extract is formal and demonstrates politeness and adherence to PAP conventions, as is clear in the addressing of members as *honourable members*. In terms of the identities, positions and roles of participants, the members of the committee speak both as politicians and as members of the PAP who debate continental issues in a setting that gives them privileged access – above that of their colleagues in the national parliaments – to discussions pertaining to continent-wide issues.

Interpreting strategies: In analyzing the Arabic interpreting strategies of the same extract, I note that the Arabic interpreter has omitted the word *situation* in *development of the situation* and instead referred to *developments* (in plural form); this is acceptable and still conveys the intended meaning, which can be inferred from the context. But such an omission reflects the influence of prevailing political discourse, as the plural form of the word *development* is a prevailing generic expression in Arabic used to describe various developments of political, social or economic situations. Such a choice of word points to the influence of discourse on the interpreter's choice of interpreting strategy.

Transcript 2
The conflict in Libya between *the opposition* and *pro-Gaddafi forces* continue to wreak havoc in the country. Since the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, fighting between the opposition and pro-Gaddafi forces continued unabated.

ما **فتئت** النزاعات **الجارية حاليا** بين المعارضة والقوات الموالية للقدافي في ليبيا تحدث خرابا **كبيراً** في البلاد. ومنذ تطبيق القرار 1973 لمجلس الأمن للأمم المتحدة، تواصل القتال بين المعارضة والقوات الموالية للقدافي **بنفس القوة**.

Back translation of Arabic (BT2)
The *current* conflicts in Libya between the opposition forces and forces loyal to Gaddafi, *has been* causing *huge havoc* in the country, and since the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, the fighting continued between the opposition and pro-Gaddafi forces with the *same ferocity*.

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: Analyzing this extract reveals that PAPMPs' account and 'mental picture' of the Libyan conflict are, to some extent, in line with the prevailing African discourse that calls for a peaceful solution of African conflicts, the independence of the continent, an ending of the marginalization of Africa, and African solutions to African problems. It reflects a mediator discourse that attempts to remain neutral. At a lexical level, the influence of discourses and narratives with embedded standpoints is clear from the use of terms such as *opposition forces* and *pro-Gaddafi forces* instead of *rebels* and *government forces*; the use of these terms confers equal legitimacy upon both parties *as peacemakers standing equidistant* to the conflict. Another marker of such mediator discourse is the use of neutral terms such as *conflict* instead of *war* or *civil war* to describe the situation in Libya.

As the situation develops, it would be valuable to monitor directional changes in discourse given that the narrative of the conflict changes almost daily. For example, it remains to be seen whether the discourse will continue to employ terms such as *implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973* together with a stress on terms such as *continue to wreak havoc in the country* or whether the narrative will develop into a more figurative description of the conflict with a clearer position.

Interpreting strategies: In analyzing the strategies used by the interpreter in the Arabic interpreting of Extract 1, I note that rephrasing and anticipation are prevalent. In my view, the interpreter's use of rephrasing, made clear in the use of terms such as *ongoing* and *has been*, is dictated by specific linguistic structural constraints and also by the similarities and dissimilarities of the Arabic and English languages' semantic structures. The interpreter starts the first sentence with *has been* (ما فتئت) which indicates the continuation of an act and its connection to time-telling – in this case the continuity of the conflict(s) (the interpreter used *conflicts* in plural form). This represents a good lexical choice in terms of economy of words as the interpreter is hereby able to forego the use of the word *continue*. Such a lexical strategy also indicates an anticipation strategy. In conformance to the grammatical rules of the Arabic language, which reads from right to left, the interpreter starts interpreting by rephrasing the beginning of the sentence, as underlined. The interpreter further consolidates the speaker's discourse by using the word *current*, which is not in the original utterance, to confirm the time factor. But again adding the word *current* reflects the influence of prevailing discourse as it indicates that the interpreter follows daily current news of the conflict which forms a mental model in the back of his mind ready to be used as a given fact which, in turn, serves as a marker of influence of discourse on the interpreter's choice of interpreting strategy.

The anticipation strategy is apparent in the attachment of the description *huge* to the word *havoc* because expressions such as *huge havoc* (خراباً كبيرا) and (دماراً كبيراً) are usually used in Arabic as stock phrases generally related to wars and explosions. Such stock phrases are readily at hand at the interpreter's disposal to use as part of an anticipation strategy, which gives a clear indication of the influence of prevailing discourses on the interpreter's choice of interpreting strategy. Looking at the interpreted utterance from another angle, I note that the use of the hyperbolic term *huge* as an intensifier may be attributed to the interpreter's ability to combine the immediate context of discussion with background knowledge of the discourses and narratives on the Libyan conflict. I suspect that the interpreter is familiar with the conflict and has been influenced by sustained daily narratives and television images of the destruction in Libya; if this is the case then the use of hyperbole can be attributed to the interpreter's ideological view or standpoint on the conflict. This further confirms the role of interpreters as active participants in the communicative event. More importantly, it reveals the influence of discourses and narratives in the interpreter's choice of interpreting strategy.

The same analysis applies to the interpreter's choice of the term *same ferocity* instead of the Arabic equivalent of the term *continued unabated* (بلا هوادة). Such choices may be dictated *a priori* by rephrasing due to linguistic structural constraints and that the lexical choice of *same ferocity* may also serve as an enhancer of the utterance by reflecting the gravity or ferocity of the fighting which, in turn, reflects the influence of dominant narratives and media images of bloodshed and destruction. I do, however, think it would have been better if the interpreter had used the Arabic word (بلا هوادة) (*continued unabated*) as this equivalent denotes both the continuity and the ferocity of the conflict within the same phrase, also reducing the interpreter's memory load.

From the above I note that the influence of discourses and narratives in the interpreter's choice of interpreting strategy is detectable and is, in fact, very clear in more than one instance. As for interpreter influence on the course or trajectory of the discussion, this is not entirely clear here. It is possible, however, that due to the mental model of the situation constructed by the interpreter through the use of intensifiers that may enhance utterances or evoke memories and images of bloodshed and destruction, the tone of the discussion might be altered, leading listeners to adopt a modified understanding of the discussion.

Transcript 3: PAPM

Lack of water, intermittent electricity supply, scarcity of food, and pressure on medical facilities to deal with the dead and wounded, are commonplace conditions. In addition to the desperate humanitarian situation, the shelling of opposition *forces* by *those loyal to Muammar Gaddafi* has been taking a huge toll on the civilian population.

وأصبحت **الندرة** في المياه والكهرباء والأغذية والضغط على المؤسسات الاستشفائية للتكفل **بالضحايا** والجرحى أمورا مألوفة. وزيادة على الأوضاع الإنسانية الحرجة، فقد تسبب قصف القوات الموالية لمعمر القذافي لقوات المعارضة في الكثير من الضحايا وسط المدنيين.

Back translation of Arabic (BT3)

Scarcity in water, electricity, and food, and pressure on medical facilities to care for the *victims* and the wounded, have become common matters. In addition to the critical humanitarian situations, the shelling of pro- Muammar Gaddafi forces to the opposition *forces* has caused fall of a lot of victims among the civilians.

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: An analysis of Extract 2 shows that the Pan African Parliament Member of Parliament expresses *true* sympathy with human suffering in the Libyan conflict, not only in terms of the direct material suffering of daily life but also the psychological trauma and suffering inherent in having *to deal with the dead and wounded*. The focus on human suffering stems from the influence of African discourses and narratives of the conflict that focus on conflict resolution, whereas Western discourses and narratives focus on threats and military actions. Whenever suffering is mentioned within this latter framing, it is in the context of a negative discursive framing of the 'enemy', i.e. Gaddafi. This is evident in claims such as *tens of thousands of lives have been protected,* which is stated to justify military actions and material gains in the conflict.

Comparing the discourses of Extracts 1 and 2, I notice slight changes in PAPMP discourse reflected, for example, in the use of the phrase *opposition forces* instead of simply *opposition*. Such lexical changes are significant: the former term denotes the use of weapons or an 'armed opposition' whereas *opposition* denotes peaceful opposition. Such changes are logical as they correlate to subtle daily shifts in narratives on the conflict and the situation on the ground as they develop.

Interpreting strategies: In analyzing the Arabic interpreting of Extract 2, I note that the Arabic interpreter has made a good lexical decision by using the Arabic for scarcity (ندرة) as an equivalent of the word *lack* to denote lack of *water*, *electricity* and *food* instead of using direct equivalents of the original utterances of *lack, intermittent* and *scarcity*. This is acceptable as the word scarcity (ندرة) can have all the three meanings. This economy of word use as summarizing or condensing strategy is a good strategy as it reduces cognitive pressure on the interpreter and leaves him better able to prepare for the incoming chunks of utterance. The advantages of this strategy are evident in

the next sentence where the interpreter is able to enhance the original utterance by using the loaded term *victims* (الضحايا) instead of the neutral term *the dead* and *victims* which not only serve as a marker of cognitive anticipation or comprehension strategy applied to the incoming sentence – *shelling of the opposition forces by those loyal to Muammar Gaddafi* – but also as an enhancer of the original utterance that makes explicit the causal relation between the shelling and the victims of such shelling by noting that the latter are not only dead but are dead *as victims*. The influence of discourse is clear in such lexical choices: the term *victims* is a marker of a loaded view. Such a descriptive shift is acceptable in that it is a lexical property of the Arabic language and as there are victims in all conflicts; the shift is a significant reflection of the influence of the prevailing narratives and discourses of the Libyan conflict.

In Extract 3 it is therefore possible to conclude that the interpreter's choice of words and interpreting strategy is strongly influenced by discourses, narratives and background knowledge; this is apparent in more than one instance. Further interpreter influence on the course or trajectory of the discussion remains unclear.

Transcript 4: PAPM
The humanitarian situation is disconcerting and is further exacerbated by the fact that no political solution acceptable by all parties seems to be in sight. The peace and security situation in Libya is therefore desperate, and a political solution has to be found. If this is not forthcoming, the conflict may escalate further.

الوضع الإنساني مقلق للغاية ، بل تزداد خطورته باستمرار لغياب تسوية **سلمية** مقبولة من كل أطراف النزاع. وعليه، فإن وضعية السلم والأمن في ليبيا تبقى **مأساوية للغاية** بحيث يجب إيجاد حل سلمي بأسرع ما يمكن. وإذا تأخر هذا الحل أكثر، فإن **كثافة وخطورة** النزاع قد تزداد.

Back translation of Arabic (BT4)
The humanitarian situation is *'extremely worrying'* and is increasingly becoming serious due to the *lack* of *peaceful settlement* acceptable by all parties to *the conflict*. Therefore the peace and security situation in Libya remains *very tragic, a peaceful* solution has to be found *as soon as possible*. If such solution delay further, the *intensity and gravity* of the conflict may increase.

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: The discourse in this extract further reflects an African concern with the humanitarian situation, influenced by the prevailing African discourse of conflict resolution mentioned previously. The discourse of conflict resolution and peaceful solutions is more apparent here than before, highlighted by the lexical repetition of terms such as *political solution* and *peace and security*. These terms are aligned with conflict resolution and general developmental discourses that promote "peace and security" as prerequisites for economic development in Africa.

Interpreting strategies: The interpreter reconstructs and paraphrases some sections of the extract using the affirmative conditional form. For example, the statement *if there is more delay* predicts that the *intensity and gravity* of the conflict will escalate. The interpreter's addition of the words *intensity* and *gravity* (كثافة وخطورة) reflects again the influence of prevailing narratives and also alludes to past experiences of African conflicts as generally escalating and continuing for longer periods in order to anticipate the future of the Libyan conflict. The influence of conflict resolution discourse is more prevalent in the achievement interpreting strategy, as is clear in the repeated use of the terms *peaceful settlement* and *peaceful solution* instead of the term *political solution* that was used the original utterance. I therefore conclude that there is a strong influence from existing discourse and narratives on the interpreter's choice of words and interpreting strategy. Interpreter influence in the course or trajectory of the discussion was not found in this extract.

5.6.2   Extracts from the debate of the committee recording

Below are extracts from interpreted discussions of the PAP's Permanent Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution in its meeting at the seat of the Pan-African Parliament on Friday May 16, 2011 in Midrand (Johannesburg), South Africa, in Committee Room 1. The meeting was chaired by the Honourable Marwick Khumalo, Chairperson of the Committee. The meeting discussed the peace and security situation in Africa and covered the following countries: Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Madagascar, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Djibouti and Eritrea. For the purpose of my study I selected only recorded samples of interpreted discussions pertaining to the situation in Libya.

Transcript 1: English into Arabic
Chairperson: Now I ask the clerk of the committee to introduce the next item of our agenda.

Committee clerk: discussion on the conflict in Libya,

Chairperson: Honourable members, I now open the floor for discussions; I hope that your interventions will be focused and present concrete decisions and recommendations that form **view** of our committee bout the conflict in Libya, which we will present for consideration and adoption by the plenary session…Now…I see there are number of honourable members who want to take the floor, I will start from this side and will proceed in this order**…..**I will start with Honourable J. ◙., Honourable,…over to you…to can start.

رئيس اللجنة :أرجو من سكرتير اللجنة أن يتلو علينا البند التالي في **جدول الأعمال.**
سكرتير اللجنة: مناقشة الوضع في ليبيا.

Back translation of Arabic (BT1)
Chairperson: Clerk of the committee would you please read the next item of the agenda.

Committee clerk: discussion of the situation in Libya.

Chairperson: Honourable members, I open discussion and I hope that your interventions will be *direct to the point* and to present recommendations that form *our vision* as committee on the Libyan conflict, to be presented to the plenary session. I see there are number of those who want to speak, I will start from this side and proceed in this way.. I start with Honourable J…., Honourable you can start…

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: In analyzing the above extract I note a slight change at the lexical level as an indicative marker of the influence of discourses and narratives onthe conflict, as made clear by the replacement of the phrase *situation in Libya* with *conflict in Libya*.

Interpreting strategies: An analysis of the Arabic interpreting of the same extract shows that the Arabic interpreter changes the semantic inference by using *direct to the point* instead of *focused.* The semantic shift here is acceptable as an elaboration that improves the original utterance; i.e. *direct to the point* necessarily also denotes *focused* discussion. In interpreting the chairperson's utterance, the Arabic interpreter changes the lexical form by using the phrase *our vision as committee* instead of *view of our committee*; this too is an acceptable shift as it enhances the original utterance by giving committee members ownership of the recommendations. In addition it indicates the strong and united position of the committee. However, the interpreter renders a sentence incomplete by omitting the word *adoption.*

Transcript 2: English into Arabic
PAPMP 2: I thank the chairperson for giving me the floor. First of all we as African Parliamentarians have *great responsibility* on our shoulders to help in resolving *conflicts* in Africa and to prevent *bloodshed*. In my view the situation in Libya, is an *armed rebellion* against the Libyan government which may plunge the country into civil war, moreover NATO *intervention* will fuel the conflict which may deteriorate further with more *bloodshed* and suffering of the *innocent civilians*. We as Parliamentarians should help the *Libyan government* to solve the problem *peacefully*. Therefore I propose that our parliament should *work closely* with the AU commission to find peaceful solution. I thank you.

تجر البلاد لحرب أهلية، وعلاوة على ◉ ذلك أن تدخل حلف الأطلسي سيؤدي لتدهور الوضع **وسفك الدماء** وزيادة معاناة **الشعب**
الليبي. ونحن كبرلمانيين يجب أن نساعد ليبيا في إيجاد **تسوية سلمية.** لذلك أقترح أن يقوم البرلمان **بالتنسيق** مع مفوضية الاتحاد
الأفريقي لإيجاد حل سلمي. وشكراً.

BT: I thank the chairperson for giving me the opportunity. First of all let me emphasize that we as Parliamentarian have *a big responsibility* to help in resolving conflicts in the continent. My opinion is that, what is currently going on in Libya is an *armed opposition* against the government may drag the country into *a civil war*, in addition to that NATO intervention will lead to deterioration of the situation, *bloodshed* and increase the suffering of the *Libyan people*. We as Parliamentarians, should assist *Libya* in finding *peaceful* settlement. For that I propose that the parliament should *coordinates* with the AU commission to find a peaceful settlement. I thank you.

<u>Analysis</u>

<u>Discourse and narratives:</u> The member opens their speech with *we as African Parliamentarians* as a preparation for a strong argumentation. That is, using *we* strongly indicates collective representation as Africans and clearly draws on the prevailing African narrative of *African solutions for African problems* previously reflected in the Open Letter in the use of terms like *concerned Africans*, *ordinary citizens of Africa* and *as Africans*. The influence of competing discourses and narratives is also clear in the use of *we [...] have great responsibility* as opposed to the terms *our duty* and *our mandate* forming part of Western discourse in the Libya letter. A clear marker of influence on discourse is reflected in the use of expressions such as *armed rebellion* (against the government) instead of *opposition* (to the government). The argumentation warns of *civil war* and develops into further warnings of *bloodshed* and *suffering* as the result of NATO intervention. The influence of African conflict resolution discourse is also clear in the lexical choice of terms such as *peaceful solution* and *peaceful settlement.*

<u>Interpreting strategies:</u> The interpreter omits the word *African* in *African Parliamentarian* despite the fact that this would render the speaker's utterance more accurately. However, taking the influence of the immediate context into consideration, as well as the possible influence of the broader African context on the interpreter's knowledge, such an omission does not negate the understanding that the speaker speaks in his capacity as an *African Parliamentarian.* The interpreter has, however, performed a lexical and syntactic transfers by using the term *armed opposition* instead of the original *armed rebellion.* Such transfers suggest the possible influence of the prevailing narratives of *rebels* and *opposition* which connote different mental representations of the situation. The interpreter also employs filtering by using the term *the government* instead of the original *Libyan government.* Such shortening and compressing of the source utterance is an acceptable tactic to relieve memory pressure as long as the context of the discussion still allows for the inference of the intended meaning.

From the above I conclude that the influence of African discourse is detectable and that this is especially clear in PAPMP argumentation. The influence of narratives on the interpreter's strategic choices is clear in the syntactic transfer. The influence of the broader African context on the interpreter's background knowledge is also apparent.

Transcript 3: Arabic into English:

النائب3: شكراً على إعطائي الكلمة، يجب أن نكون واضحين. إن **تدخل حلف الناتو في ليبيا** هو **عدوان سافر** يهدف إلى **السيطرة** على الموارد النفطية والطبيعية لليبيا. إن عدوان الناتو **هو انتهاك مباشر لنفس قرارات مجلس الأمن الدولي**، التي استخدموها **كذريعة** للتدخل في ليبيا بزعم **حماية السكان**. وهي مزاعم كاذبة، **كلكم تذكرون** إدعاءاتهم الزائفة لتبرير احتلالهم للعراق. في واقع الأمر ما يجرى في ليبيا هو أن قوات الناتو تفعل عكس ما تدعيه تماماً، فهي **تذبح المواطنين الأبرياء في وضح النهار**، فالدول الغربية تستخدم **جبروتها العسكري** لتدمير **القوات الليبية وتقوم بقصف** المدن والمنشآت وتدمير **البنية التحتية الليبية** بلا تمييز ، بل هناك **تقارير موثوقة** تؤكد أن قوات الناتو تقوم **بتسليح المتمردين** وأن لديها قوات خاصة **ومستشارين عسكريين** يعملون في الميدان... **زملائي** النواب الموقرون.. .يجب علينا أن ننظر بجدية للآثار **الخطيرة والبعيدة** المدى لهذا **العدوان الغربي** ليس على **ليبيا** وحدها بل على **قارتنا ككل**. ويجب أن **ندين** بشدة **حلف** الناتو وبأقوى عبارات ممكنة ومطالبته بوقف **عدوانه العسكري** ضد ليبيا **فوراً**..كما ينبغي علينا **كبرلمانيين** الإصرار على ضرورة التحرك العاجل للاتحاد الأفريقي لإنقاذ ليبيا من المخططات والهيمنة الغربية.

BT: Thank you for giving me the floor, we have to *be clear* in condemning NATO *intervention* in Libya as *gross aggression* aiming at controlling the oil and natural resources of Libya. In fact NATO *aggression* is a *direct* violation of the same UNSC resolutions which *they used as pretext* for intervention in Libya, claiming to *protect civilians*. These are false claims*, you all remember* their *leis* to justify their *occupation of Iraq.* The fact of the matter that NATO forces in Libya, *are just doing totally opposite to what they claim*, *they manslaughter unarmed* innocent *civilians* …, the *Western countries* use their military might to destroy the *Libyan government force*, indiscriminately *bombarding* cities and installations, and destroying the infrastructure. not only that there are *reliable reports* that NATO forces arming the *rebels* and they have special forces and military *advisors* working on the ground.

Honourable members, we have to look seriously to the long term grave consequences of this *aggression* not only against Libya, but against *our* continent as a whole. We have to strongly *condemn* NATO *aggression* and to call upon NATO to immediately stop its military *aggression against* Libya…we as *African parliamentarians* have to insist on the *AU* to act urgently so as to *rescue Libya* from the Western *schemes* and *hegemony.*

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: In the above extract, the Member of the PAP employs a clear resistance discourse from the start and narratives about the Libyan conflict that are in competition with the Western discourse. The lexical style of the PAP Member is formal political speech and uses direct accusation in its argumentation by framing NATO intervention in Libya in a highly negative way. This is made clear in the speaker's discourse structure at a lexical level and in his choice of phrases such as *flagrant aggression, slaughter innocent civilians in the daylight* and *indiscriminately bombarding.* The Member's speech reflects a strong influence of African political and historical narratives, with terms and phrases like *colonialism, foreign interventions, occupations,* and *foreign scramble to control African resources* defining the discourse.

The semantic use of the expression *in the daylight* not only supports the negative framing of NATO actions, but also draws a mental model wherein the *slaughter of innocent civilians* is intentional, which is wholly opposite to the Western claim that they are *protect[ing] civilians*. The lexical choice of the daylight metaphor also aims to pre-empt any counter claims that the loss of life is either a mistake or unintended *collateral damage*. The argumentation is discursively aligned with mainstream African discourse about the Libyan conflict in rejecting the claims and justifications of the Western countries as utterly false. The structural emphasis is clear in the use of the phrase *The West* instead of the term *NATO*, employed in order to emphasize the negative framing of the issue at stake as broader than mere military actions. This, in turn, discursively supports his argument by evoking colonial and imperial narratives about the Western countries.

The rhetorical approach of using the phrase *you all remember* is an attempt to stir the members' memories. The evocation of the recent history of the Iraqi invasion supports the speaker's argument by discrediting Western claims and revealing the falsehood both of the Western discourse and the narrative of moral standing as protectors of civilians. Such counter claims and competing narratives in fact use some of the features of the lexical style of the Western discourse itself; for example the Western discourse evoking of the recent history of *September 2011 terrorist attacks* and *terrorist attacks against civilian ships and airliners*.

In general, the competing narratives and the framing used by the Member are clearly influenced by mainstream African discourse, confirmed by the presence of phrases such as *we as African Parliamentarians* which indicates a clear positioning as a representative of the African people. The influence of African discourse is also clear in the framing emphasis on politically charged expression such *rebel forces* instead of *opposition*, *aggression* instead of *intervention*, and *Western domination* instead of *humanitarian intervention* and *responsibility to protect*. The discourse structure of the speaker thus generally reveals how he presents 'us' as victims and 'they' as aggressors, especially when he replaces the word NATO by phrases such as *they claim* and *they bombarded*, and from the usage of *our continent* instead of *Africa* or the *African continent*.

Interpreting strategies: The interpreter skips a very important semantic move by not interpreting the speaker's use of the expression *in the daylight*. Possible reasons for this omission could include comprehension problems, the interpreter not hearing the speaker clearly or a misjudgment from the interpreter as to the significance of the expression. However, I think it is more likely that the

omission results from memory pressure and the interpreter's use of an anticipation strategy which he is tempted to use when the speaker states that they *are just doing totally opposite to what they claim*. This explanation is supported by the fact that the interpreter compensates for such an omission by attempting to recover lost information through the addition of the term *unarmed* which is not uttered by the speaker. The interpreter also uses the word *civilians* instead of *citizens*. In both cases the interpreter not only makes up for his omission but also enhances the speaker's argument and the negative framing of NATO actions; the addition of the term *unarmed* supports the speaker's argument that those in question are not fighters but instead are innocent, *unarmed civilians* who are supposed to be protected. The interpreter further enhances the speaker's utterance by using the term *civilians* instead of *citizen* – *citizen* may be understood *military* or *fighter*. This supports the reasoning behind the anticipation strategy as the phrase *unarmed civilians* (المدنيين العزل) is commonly used as a stock phrase within the discourse of conflict and war in the Arabic language. This indicates the influence of prevailing discourses and narratives on the interpreter's strategic choice, especially the influence of the Arabic media.

The influence of prevailing African discourses and narratives about the Libyan conflict is also reflected in the interpreter's syntactic addition of the term *African Parliamentarians* in lieu of the original speaker's utterance *we as parliamentarians*. However the interpreter has skipped the speaker's cordial form of address *Honourable colleagues* when the speaker urges his *colleagues* to look seriously to the long term grave consequences of the *aggression*, in fact such cordial form of address holds stronger emotional plea which the interpreter fails to reflect.

I conclude that African discourse strongly influences PAPMP argumentation and that African discourse and media narratives also influence the interpreter's choice of interpreting strategy, as is clear in the use of anticipation strategies, compensation as part of production strategies, and the presence of syntactic transfer and addition.

Transcript 4: French relayed into English
 PAPMP: Merci Honorable Président de m'accorder la parole afin que je m'exprime sur ce sujet. Avant tout, je voudrais rappeler aux honorables membres que les manifestations en Libye ont commencé d'une manière pacifique, de la même façon que le soulèvement qui a eu lieu dans les pays voisins , l'Egypte et la Tunisie, qui revendiquaient la démocratie, la justice et le respect des Droits Humains. Toutefois, les rapports montrent que les forces de sécurité libyennes ont utilisé la violence et des balles réelles sur les manifestants non armés qui ont pris des armes pour se défendre. Je pense que nous connaissons tous les souffrances du peuple libyen et reconnaissons leurs revendications légitimes. Nous, en tant que représentants des peuples africains devrions exprimer notre soutien en faveur de revendications légitimes des révolutionnaires libyens pour la démocratie,

la justice et le respect des Droits humains ; en conformité avec les objectif s du PAP et de divers chartes et instruments africains et internationaux. Je vous remercie.

النائب4: شكراً سيدي الرئيس على إعطائي الفرصة للإدلاء برأي في هذه القضية، في البداية أود تذكير الأعضاء أن **المظاهرات** في ليبيا بدأت سلمية مثلما ما حدث في الدول المجاورة خاصة تونس ومصر، للمطالبة بالعدالة والديمقراطية، لكن قوات أمن النظام الليبي استخدمت العنف ضد **المدنيين** العزل الذين حملوا السلاح للدفاع عن أنفسهم. وأعتقد أن جميعنا يعرف معاناة الشعب الليبي ومطالبه المشروعة. **ونحن** كممثلين للشعب يجب أن نعبر عن دعمنا وتأييدنا للمطالب المشروعة **للثوار الليبيين** المطالبين بالديمقراطية والعدالة واحترام حقوق الإنسان، و هذا ما تنص عليه أهداف هذا البرلمان الموقر والمواثيق الأفريقية والدولية.

BT: Thank honourable Chairperson for giving me the opportunity to express my view on this issue. Firstly I would like to remind the honourable members that the *demonstrations in Libya* started *peacefully,* same as the *uprisings* which took place in the neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt, demanding democracy, justice and respect of human rights, *however* the Libyan *security force* used *violence* and *life ammunition* against *unarmed revolutionaries* who were took arms to defend themselves. I think all of us know the suffering the Libyan people and acknowledge their legitimate demands. *We* as representatives of the African people should express our *support* for these *legitimate* demands of the Libyan people, as provided for in the objectives of PAP and different African and international instruments and conventions.

<u>**Analysis**</u>

<u>Discourse and narratives:</u> It is clear that the speaker tries to steer the debate towards the prevailing discourse on the Arab Spring by reminding listeners of *peaceful demonstrations* and evoking the recent memories of what happened in *the neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt*. It is also clear that the speaker is evoking such narratives in order to draw a certain mental model, something he discursively reveals in subsequent segments of his argument which he introduces with the connector *however* as a way to establish a link that supports his argument that *the Libyan security force used violence and live ammunition against unarmed revolutionaries*, an argument that resembles the Western discourse *Gaddafi is slaughtering his people*. This indicates that the speaker has injected a different discourse into the debate – one that clearly diverges from mainstream and prevailing African discourses and narratives. Such divergence is confirmed by the member's use of the politically charged phrase *unarmed revolutionaries* as opposed to *armed rebels*, the generally used phrase within current African narratives about the Libyan conflict.

The speaker's utterance also reveals a competing narrative within African discourse itself that reflects not only the divergent positions of some African countries, but also the possibility of the significant influence of Western discourses and narratives on opinions in general, as well as the influence of daily Western media discourses and narratives about the Libyan conflict in particular (as well as about other African conflicts in countries such as Cote d'Ivoire). This is possibly because the speaker is French and thus most likely primarily dependent on French media discourse, due either to the dominant position of French media in African Francophone countries or a language barrier in investigating Arab-phone or Anglophone sources. This analysis is supported by

subsequent segments, with a source of knowledge revealed when the speaker supports his argumentation by use of the phrase *I think all of us know*. The influence of Western discourse is also apparent in the Member's assertion that *I think all of us know the suffering of the Libyan people*.

The Member's use of *We as representatives of the African people* serves a twofold purpose: it supports his broader representative capacity via *we as representatives* and also distinguishes between his capacity to speak on behalf of *we as Africans* or *African Parliamentarians,* as uttered by the previous speakers, and his capacity as a representative of the people suggested by the term *representatives of the African people*. The member further discursively supports his argument by citing *objectives of PAP and different African and international instruments and conventions.*

In conclusion, a brief analysis of the above extract reveals the traces of both Western and international discourses and narratives on the Libyan conflict, made clear in the use of phrases such as *legitimate demands* and *international instruments and conventions*, the latter phrase aligned with a discourse that presents foreign intervention in Libya as a legitimate implementation of international law and conventions.

Interpreting strategies: It is clear that the Arabic interpreter delays his response, possibly because he is interpreting relayed utterances from French into English and thus needs to hear more segments of the message. It also appears that he is hesitant in choosing words as is clear from the incomplete sentence that omits the phrase *respect of human rights*. It is furthermore notable that the Arabic interpreter omits a significant segment of the speaker's utterance by skipping the phrase *reports show* and using instead a direct connector in the affirmative form: *however the Libyan security force…* Such an omission demonstrates that the interpreter has added his own voice and mental representation of the events, creating a false impression of the speaker's utterance; when the speaker cites *reports*, for instance, the interpreter presents these as fact.

This analysis shows that there are some traces of the influence of a general Western discourse and, in particular, Western media discourse, as is clear from the argumentation presented by the French speaker for PAPMP. On the other hand, hints of the prevailing Arab Spring uprising discourse are noticeable in the interpreter's mental representations of the events relating to the Libyan conflict via omissions and assertions as is explained above in terms of a possible anticipation strategy

Transcript 5: French relayed into English

PAPMP: Merci M. le Président, en fait, les différentes interventions de mes collègues reflètent précisément les points de vue et positions divergentes. C'est le reflet de la confusion qui règne parmi les pays africains. Nous avons trois pays qui sont membres non permanents de l'UNSC, notamment le Nigeria, l'Afrique du Sud et le Gabon qui on voté en faveur de la résolution 1973 de l'UNSC qui a imposé la zone aérienne interdite au dessus de la Lybie dans le but évident de protéger les civils. La tragédie est que ce sont des civils innocents qui sont maintenant victimes et subissent les effets du feu provenant des parties en guerre. Nous avons des rapports contradictoires sur ce qui se passe exactement en Lybie, à moins que nous n'obtenions les informations et les faits de la source, à partir du terrain, nous ne pouvons pas donner une assistance effective, ni prendre une position réaliste. Donc, je propose d'envoyer une mission d'information en Lybie. Merci pour votre attention.

النائب5: في الواقع أن ما عبر عنه الزملاء يعكس بالضبط **تضارب آرائنا ومواقفنا**. وهذا ما تؤكده حالة الارتباك في مواقف الدول الأفريقية. حيث أن الدول الأفريقية الثلاثة غير الدائمة العضوية في مجلس الأمن الدولي وهي نيجيريا وجنوب أفريقيا والجابون صوتت لصالح القرار 1973 بفرض حظر طيران على ليبيا **في الظاهر** بهدف حماية المدنيين، لكن المأساة الآن هي أن المدنيين الأبرياء هم ضحايا نيران القوات المتحاربة. ودائماً نسمع تقارير متضاربة حول ما يجرى في ليبيا، وما لم نحصل على المعلومات والحقائق من مصادرها لن نتمكن من تقديم مساعدة فعالة أو اتخاذ موقف عملي. لذلك اقترح إرسال بعثة تقصي حقائق **إلى** ليبيا. شكراً على حسن إصغائكم.

BT: In fact the different interventions of my colleagues reflect precisely *our conflicting views and positions.* This was confirm by the confusion in positions of the African countries, as we have three African countries, namely Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon who are non-permanent members in the UNSC have voted in favour of UNSC resolution 1973 which imposed non-fly zone over Libya *apparently* to protect the civilians. But the tragedy is that the innocent civilians are now the victims of hostile fires of the *warring parties.* We hear conflicting reports about what is exactly happening in Libya, unless we obtain information and facts from first-hand source, we can't provide effective assistance neither taking a realistic position. Hence I proposed sending a fact finding mission to Libya. Thank you for your attention.

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: The speaker tries, from the start, to present a realistic position – highlighted in his pinpointing of divergent and competing narratives within African discourse in the use of *conflicting views and positions* – without indicating a common African position. The speaker provides factual details in support of his argument by using the term *African countries* instead of *our position* or *African position*, indicating that there are different African positions on the Libyan conflict. The speaker uses opaque, diplomatic language, including the non-specific term *warring parties* instead of *rebels*, *government forces, revolutionaries* or *NATO forces*. This is a clear marker of a passive and neutral position, discursively supported by the use of the phrase *we hear conflicting reports*. The speaker's argumentative discourse reaches a high point when he proposes sending a *fact finding mission to Libya*.

Interpreting strategies: The Arabic interpreter adds the erroneous preposition *our* when rendering the relayed speaker's utterance *reflect precisely conflicting views and positions*. This addition is an unacceptable lexical shift and conveys the wrong message – the speaker is not specific about

conflicting views and positions and with his addition the interpreter makes a specific marker out of an unspecific position.

The Arabic interpreter changes the semantic content of the interpreted utterance by using *apparently* instead of *stated aim* – the original utterance interpreted from French. This may be attributed to an erroneous anticipation about the incoming segment of the interpreted utterance or it may reflect the possible influence of either Arabic media discourse or general African narratives and discourse about the Libyan conflict. The term *apparently* indicates a possible marker aimed at discrediting the intentions of the *UNSC Resolution 1973 which imposed a no-fly zone over Libya*; this is not the intended aim of the interpreted speaker, who only reported the *stated aim*. This addition possibly reflects the interpreter's own position, but may also be a mere omission, or the result of prevailing narratives the interpreter has been exposed to.

The extract reflects a different discourse that tends, in general, towards neutrality and which may possibly be termed a *discourse of mediation*, especially given that the speaker represents a section of PAP members who are, ostensibly, influenced by conflicting and competing discourses and narratives. This tendency towards neutrality is reflected in different segments of the speaker's argumentation, which is also possibly influenced by African discourse which seeks to mediate a peaceful solution by advocating neutrality and evenhandedness. I further note that while the influence of prevailing discourses and narratives are clear in the interpreter's choice of words, and lexical and semantic strategies, any influence on the course of discussion is not visible. Where such influence does exist, it is rather insignificant.

Transcript 6: English into Arabic

Chairperson: I think we have enough discussion, what we need now is to come up with concrete proposals. Allow me in this juncture to give the floor to Honourable deputy Chairperson.

Deputy Chair: Thank you chair, I have listened to different conflicting views of my Honourable colleagues. In my view, *if we want* to contribute meaningfully we have to listen to both parties to the conflict. That is why I support the proposal to send a fact finding mission to both *Benghazi* and *Tripol*i. I would also like to reiterate that our position has to be balanced, so as to have attentive ear **with both partie**s to the conflict. I thank you.

الرئيس: أعتقد إننا ناقشنا الموضوع بما يكفي ويجب الآن أن نقدم اقتراحات محددة. سمحوا لـي أن أعطـي الكلمـة الآن للموقر نائب الرئيس ......

نائب الرئيس: شكراً سيدي الرئيس، لقد استمعت للآراء المتباينة المختلفة لزملائي. حسب رأي **انـه لكي** نسـهم بصـورة ذات معنـي في حل النزاع لا بد لنا من الاستماع لطرفي النزاع. لذلك أؤيد اقتراح إرسال بعثة تقصي حقائق **لكل مـن بنغـازي وطرابلس**. وأؤكد علـى أن يكون **موقفنا متوازناً** لكي نـجد أذناً صـاغية لدى الطرفين **المتحاربين**. وشكراً

BT: **Chairperson:** I think we have enough discussion on this issue, what remain is that we have to present specific proposals. Now I give the floor to Honourable Deputy Chair.

Deputy Chair: Thank you chair, I have listened attentively to different views of my colleagues. My opinion is that '*for us*' to have meaningfully contribution in solving the problem we have to listen to both parties to the conflict. For this reason I support the proposal to send a fact finding mission to both *Benghazi* and *Tripoli*. I would also like to emphasis that we have to have a balanced position, so as to have attentive ear in *both warring parties*. Thank you.

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: The speaker tries, from the start, to present a realistic position, clearly highlighting divergent positions and competing narratives within African discourses by pointing to *conflicting views and positions*, though without indicating a common African position or giving any indication of support for particular views. However, the fact is that the speaker is indirectly expressing prevailing African narratives of conflict resolution through mediation. This is apparent in the indirect recognition of the party opposing the government when the speaker proposes that the fact-finding mission be sent both to the city of Benghazi and the capital, Tripoli. The speaker's argumentation style here is diplomatic, as it is well known that the city of Benghazi is not only the stronghold of the armed opposition against the Libyan government, but also where the conflict originated. Another marker of this diplomatic argumentation style and of mediation and conflict resolution narratives is that the speaker avoids using the narratives of *government and opposition*, *rebels* or *armed rebellion*. Such a move is supported by the speaker's pronouncement that *our position has to be balanced* (so as to act as a neutral and acceptable broker between both parties in order to mediate a peaceful solution to the conflict).

Interpreting strategies: The Arabic interpreter changes the syntax of the speaker's utterance *if we want* by replacing it with the phrase *for us*. This can be regarded as an achievement strategy as it strengthens the speaker's utterance by turning it into a conditional clause, thus emphasizing the condition of *listening to both parties* as a precondition for meaningful contribution of the members of the PAP to mediation efforts. It is also notable that this enhancement of the speaker's utterance has shifted the emphasis of the speaker's discourse – focused on the member's intentions of *if we want* – by placing the emphasis on the conditional clause *for us*.

The significance of this centres on the possible effects or impressions it creates in those listening to the Arabic interpreting; conditional clauses such as *for us* may serve to present mental models that render the appeal *to listen to both parties* more convincing. More importantly, however, such influence may be reflected in the *acceptance* or *non-objection* to the call *to listen to both parties* as a condition for meaningful contribution. This, in turn, will have a significant impact on the course

of the discussion by encouraging an acknowledgement that it is necessary to recognize and talk about the *non-government party* in the conflict instead of illegitimating this party as *rebels* who should not be listened to.

The Arabic interpreter makes a lexical change by using the phrase *warring parties* instead of *parties to the conflict*, the original utterance of the speaker. This lexical change has the significant effect of narrowing the scope of what is meant by the speaker: *parties to the conflict* is broader than *warring parties* as it includes, in principle, parties not directly participating in the fighting but influencing the conflict.

This analysis demonstrates that the influence of emerging African narratives and a discourse of mediation and peaceful conflict resolution are clear in the speaker's utterance which leans strongly towards neutrality and mediation advocacy. The influence of prevailing discourses and narratives is also apparent in the interpreter's choice of words and lexical style; however, one can also trace the possible influence of the interpreter on the course of the discussion, suggested by the Arabic interpreter's change of syntax as well as the shifting of emphasis to the conditional clause. This influence is possibly reflected by the Arabic interpreting causing listeners to change their position and accept the speaker's argument.

Transcript 7: English into Arabic

Chairperson: I think we have discussed this item thoroughly. Now I would like to summarize the main point raised in our discussion, so as to draft them in a form of resolutions and recommendations to be table to the plenary session. I think the main points should be: that our committee expresses its deep concern about the violent conflicts in Africa especially massacres of civilians and the humanitarian crisis in Libya. We call for *immediate* cessation of hostilities between the *rebel forces* and the *Libyan government*. We reiterate that the civilian population must be protected, but we reject totally occupation of Libya by any foreign forces. And we finally recommend sending a fact finding mission to Tripoli and Benghazi, and to prepare a report to *be tabled* in the next session.

Chairperson: Honourable members any comment on these points, or shall we adopt as resolutions and recommendations of our committee to be presented to the plenary sessions.

PAPMP: Mr. Chairman, I agree with all these points, but I think that we have to be careful in choosing our words. You may notice Chair,that we described the *opposition* as *rebels,* but at the same time we recommend sending a fact finding mission to their strong hold the city of Benghazi. My question is, are they are going to receive the fact finding mission, while we already *branded* them as rebels? Because that will be understood that we already siding with the government. For this reason I propose replacing the word '*rebels'* by the word *'opposition forces'*. Because that will strengthen our position as neutral side, which will at least guarantee their acceptance to receive our mission. I thank you Honourable Chair.

PAPMP: I support this recommendation for amendment.

PAPMP: I support the amendment.

Chairperson: Honourable members any objection to this amendment? I don't see any objection. Anyone want to *move* for adoption of the recommendations with this amendment?

PAPMP: I *move* for adoption with the amendment.

PAPMP: I *second…*

Chairperson: Honourable members, the resolution was adopted. We no move to the next item in our agenda.

رئيس اللجنة: أري أن هذا البند أخذ حظه من النقاش وهنا أوجز النقاط الأساسية المنبثقة من نقاشنا والتي تشكل مشروع قراراتنا وتوصياتنا لتقديمها للجلسة العامة وهي كما يلي: التعبير عن قلقنا من استمرار الصراعات العنيفة في أفريقيا وخاصة قتل المدنيين والأزمة الإنسانية في ليبيا؛ وأن ندعو لوقف الأعمال العدائية بين **قوات المتمردين وقوات الحكومة الليبية** فوراً، ومع تأكيدنا على حماية المدنيين، إلا إننا نرفض مطلقاً احتلال ليبيا من قبل أي **قوات أجنبية**؛ وأخيراً أن نوصي بإرسال بعثة تقصي حقائق إلى **طرابلس وبنغازي**، وأن تقوم بإعداد تقرير لعرضه على الجلسة القادمة للبرلمان الأفريقي.

رئيس اللجنة: معالي الأعضاء... هل هناك أي تعليق على هذه النقاط أم نجيزها كما هي كقرارات وتوصيات للجنة لعرضها على الجلسة العامة؟

النائب .: أنا أؤيد كل هذه النقاط ، لكن أعتقد إنه يجب علينا توخي الحذر في اختيار تعبيراتنا. تلاحظون إننا وصفنا **المعارضة بالمتمردين**، لكن في نفس الوقت أوصينا بإرسال بعثة تقصي حقائق إلى معقلهم القوى مدينة بنغازي، فسؤالي هو هل هم سيستقبلون بعثة تقصي الحقائق ونحن وصمناهم بالمتمردين؟ لأن ذلك سيتم فهمه على إننا انحزنا بالفعل لجانب الحكومة. لذلك اقترح استبدال كلمة **متمردين** بكلمة **معارضين**، لأن ذلك سيعزز موقفنا كطرف محايد. ذلك على الأقل سيضمن قبولهم استقبال البعثة. شكراً سيدي الرئيس.

النائب..: أنا أؤيد هذا الاقتراح،

النائب..: أنا أؤيد هذا التعديل،

الرئيس: معالي الأعضاء... هل هناك أي اعتراض... لا أري هناك اعتراض. هل يتقدم أحدكم باقتراح لإجازة هذه التوصيات مع هذا التعديل؟

النائب... أنا أقترح إجازة القرار مع التعديل.

النائب:... أنا اثني ذلك.

الرئيس : معالي الأعضاء ، إذن أجيز القرار. ننتقل الآن للبند التالي من جدول الأعمال..

BT: Chairperson: I think this item was thoroughly discussed. Here I will summarize the main point of our discussion which will form our draft resolutions and recommendations for submission in the plenary session. The main points shall be as follow: To express our deep concern about the violent conflicts in Africa, especially killing of civilians and the humanitarian crisis in Libya. We call for cessation of hostilities between the *rebel forces* and the *Libyan government force*; we emphasis that the civilian population must be protected, but we totally reject occupation of Libya by any foreign forces. Finally we recommend sending a fact finding mission to Tripoli and Benghazi which has to prepare a report to *be tabled* in the next session of PAP.

Chairperson: Honourable members any comment on these points, or shall we adopt them as resolutions and recommendations of our committee to be presented to the plenary sessions?

PAPMP: Mr. Chairman, I agree with all these points, but I think we have to be cautious in choosing our words. You notice that we described the *opposition* as *rebels*, however at the same time we recommend sending a fact finding mission to their strong hold the city of Benghazi. My question is, are they are going to receive the fact finding mission, while we already *branded* them as rebels? Because that will be understood that we are taking the government side. That is why I propose replacing the word *rebels* by *opposition forces*. Because that will strengthen our position as

neutral side. That at least will guarantee their acceptance to receive the mission. I thank you Honourable Chair.

PAPMP: I support this suggestion.

PAPMP: I support this amendment.

Chairperson: Honourable members any objection to this amendment? I don't see any objection. Anyone want to *move* for adoption of these recommendations with the amendment?
PAPMP: I *move* for adoption of the resolution with the amendment.

PAPMP: I *second…*

Chairperson: Honourable members, the resolution was adopted. We no move to the next item in our agenda.

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: The summary of the discussion, as presented by the Chairperson of the Committee, reflects the influence of broader African discourses and narratives revolving around deep fear and a concern about the violent nature of the conflicts, as well as their human cost and repercussions for the continent. This influence is reflected in the call for the *immediate* cessation of hostilities. The summary also reflects the contradictory discourses, competing narratives and framing ambiguities within the politically charged discourse of the Committee Members, an indication of wider disparities and a multitude of influences on broader African discourse narratives. This can be seen from the use of phrases such as *rebel forces* and *Libyan government forces* in place of r*evolutionaries*, *opposition forces* or *pro-Gaddafi forces,* all of which are employed by various members of the Committee during the debate. The influence of African narratives of *colonialism* and *liberation,* as well the influence of international discourse that uses terms such as *foreign interventions*, *occupations*, *new-colonialism* and *scramble to control African resources,* is very strong, expressed in a *total rejection* of foreign occupation of Libya. The influence of the African discourse of *common African position*s, *mediation* and *peaceful resolution of the conflicts* prevails, echoed in the Committee recommendations to send a *fact finding mission* to the individual Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi instead of sending the mission to Libya as a whole; this has further significance, elaborated in the previous analysis.

The most significant manifestation of this influence, however, is reflected in the proposal of the last speaker who changes the word *rebels* to *opposition*. Such a change of discourse and narrative is politically charged and carries an ideological load, made clear by the fact that the proposal was supported by almost all of the Committee Members and unanimously so as there is no objection to the proposal or its adoption as a common position of the Committee.

<u>Interpreting strategies:</u> The Arabic interpreter delivers a well-interpreted text, possibly due to the successful use of anticipation strategies coupled with knowledge gained from Committee debates and the immediate context. The influence of the dominant discourse in the debate is clearly reflected in the interpreter's lexical choices. Notably, the role of the interpreter becomes more apparent, a possible effect of the interpreter's rephrasing and modification of the syntactical and lexical style of the original speaker's utterance. This is clear in the interpreter's addition of the word *PAP* to the *next session* which makes the speaker's utterance more specific. However, the interpreter's influence is remotely reflected in the course of the discussion, as I will explain below.

In conclusion, one can argue that the influence of African political narratives and a *discourse of mediation* and *peaceful conflict resolution* clearly shapes the position of the Committee Members, as is demonstrated in their decision to send a *fact finding mission* to both Tripoli and Benghazi. Interpreter influence on the course of discussion due to the Arabic interpreter's change of syntax and his emphasis on the speaker's utterance (as explained in the previous extract) may be subtly identified by the fact that no objection is made by those listening to the Arabic interpreted discourse, nor is there an objection to the Committee Member's proposal to send a *fact finding mission* to both Tripoli and Benghazi. Here it is possible that a change of syntax and emphasis, in addition to other factors, may help create a mental model in the listener's mind. By placing emphasis on the conditional clause in the extract above the interpreter convinces listeners that it is prudent to accept the proposal for the sake of a meaningful and positive contribution towards efforts of obtaining a peaceful settlement of the Libyan conflict. It is important to stress here that such influence cannot be confirmed at this stage for two reasons: firstly because no pattern has yet been established and secondly because influence may be primarily attributable to other factors. For instance, listeners may become convinced of a particular position by listening to different arguments during the debate as opposed to being swayed by any one argument, thereby forming a convincing mental model that leads them to accept the common position emerging from the discussion. Again, this is reflected in the acceptance of the proposals to change *rebels* to *opposition* and to send a *fact finding mission* to both Tripoli and Benghazi.

5.6.3   Debate of the PAP Plenary Session

Below is a presentation of the debates, resolutions and recommendations that formed part of the meeting of the PAP Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution in

the Plenary Session of the PAP on May 16, 2011. This session debated the issues of peace and security in Africa.

English to Arabic

S -Time line – E	1. Je vous remercie Mr. President …Mr. President... Cough …. I hope you will excuse me Mr. President, I started coughing because I have *flu* …and I have lost my French somewhere …
0:00:02:000-0:00:20:000	
0:00:09:371-0:00:23:799	1. سيدي الرئيس ≡ ≈ !! سيدي الرئيس ≡ ≈ !! أرجو المعذرة سيدي الرئيس لأنني بدأت أسعل بسبب معاناتي من الأنفلونزا.... وقد فقدت لغتي الفرنسية في مكان ما مؤخرا....
	BT: Mr. President ≡ ≈ !! Mr. President ≡ ≈ !! . excuse me Mr. President, because I started coughing because I have *influenza* ≡ ≈ and I have lost my French somewhere recently…

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: From the start it is clear that the speaker tries to use linguistic tools as part of his discursive structure in order to make his statement more plausible. He does so by injecting a sense of humour into the debate, beginning his speech in French, even though he is not a French speaker, something he reveals later when he fakes a cough and then claims that he has flu and must have lost his French somewhere for this reason.

This is a good move as it not only injects fun into an otherwise difficult political debate about the miserable conditions of war and conflicts but also, and more significantly, grabs the attention of other members, particularly those who are French speakers. It is possible that the speaker employs this discursive structural feature as a deliberate persuasive strategy to gain support from French speaking members.

Interpreting strategies: The first notable strategy used here by the Arabic interpreter is a delayed response. This is understandable as it aids the comprehension of what the speaker is saying given that he starts by thanking the chairperson in French. This, however, causes some confusion for the interpreter, as is apparent in his long pauses, hesitations, extended lags and groping for words. The influence of this stuttering start is reflected in the interpreter's lexical choice between *flu* and *influenza,* as well as in the unnecessary addition of the word *recently* at the end of the sentence; this word is not in the original utterance. This redundant addition can possibly be explained as the interpreter attempting to repair the sentence and can thus be seen as a compensatory strategy.

I conclude that the speaker employs a specific strategy to draw more attention to his speech and this has clearly influenced the interpreter's performance and delivery which, in turn, has influenced the speaker's message.

S -Time line - E	2. Mr. President, I will beg for the indulgence of the members that the document ◉ that there are small changes which were affected by the Committee on Tuesday … *unfortunately* we have been told that there are some technicalities which *didn't make* it to the final document, however is so minor ◉ that members ◉ = I will *bring* them to their attention where we made *some* changes.
0:00:21:000-0:00:44:002	
0:00:23:910-0:00:46:160	2. سيدي الرئيس أتسمح الأعضاء عذراً أن ≈ ◉.الوثيقة = فقد أدخلت تغييرات **صغيرة** عليها من قبل اللجنة في يوم الثلاثاء ◉ وقيل لنا أن هناك≈ بعض الأمور الفنية **التي ينبغي إدخالها** في الوثيقة النهائية وهي أمور صغيرة ◉ **وسأطبعها** لعناية الأعضاء = ◉ عندما نجرى أي تغييرات... **BT:** Mr. President, I ask members to forgive me. that ≈ ◉ the document = there are small changes were inserted by the Committee on Tuesday ◉ = we have been told that there are ≈ some technical matters *supposed to be inserted in the final document*, however *they are* minor *things* ◉ and I will *print* them to *the member's* attention *when we make any* changes.

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: The speaker continues his style of delivery, gaining the attention of the listeners by alerting them to the fact that there are some changes that have been affected but that are not included in the document. The speaker repeats that the changes are minor and tries to assure the members that, despite these changes, the document presented to them is still valid. He further notes that he will draw their attention to these changes later on.

Interpreting strategies: It is clear that the Arabic interpreter has still not recovered from the comprehension difficulty characterizing the opening segment. This is reflected in his pauses, time lags and literal interpreting, and is also clear in his lexical choice of the Arabic equivalent for the word *small* (صغيرة). In better conditions, the interpreter would likely have made a better lexical choice, perhaps using the Arabic word for *slight* (طفيفة). The interpreter misunderstands the speaker's utterance more than once, stating, for example, that *there are some technical matters supposed to be effected in the final document*, which differs from the speaker's intended statement that there are some technical matters that have prevented effecting these changes in the final document. This misunderstanding leads to another comprehension mistake where the interpreter reproduces the sound heard in the speaker's utterance, creating confusion and making an erroneous lexical choice, thus interpreting the word *bring* in the original utterance as *print*. This confusion, in turn, leads to the further erroneous lexical choice of *any changes* in place of *some changes*.

I conclude that the above segment reflects some of the comprehension difficulties faced by interpreters due to a speaker's accent and style of delivery.

S -Time line - E	3. Mr. President the issue of resolution of peace and security in Africa. The Pan-African Parliament, deeply concerned by the persistence of violent conflicts in Africa with special reference to Libya.
0:00:45:000-0:01:00:058	
0:00:46:239-0:01:02:800	3. سيدي الرئيس... إن القرارات الخاصة بالسلم والاستقرار في أفريقيا هي .. حيث أن البرلمان الأفريقي قلق للغاية بسبب استمرار العنف والتوتر ...مع الإشارة خاصة إلى ليبيا..
	BT: Mr. President = ◙ that the resolutions of peace and *stability* in Africa are. The Pan-African Parliament is deeply concerned by continuation of *violence* and *tension*, ◙ with special reference to Libya.

<u>S -Time line - E</u>	4. and the massacre of the civilian population, creating a desperate humanitarian crisis and unprecedented migration; *calling for the cessation* of hostilities between *NATO*, the Libyan Government and the rebel forces.
0:01:00:308-0:01:21:196	
0:01:03:000-0:01:25:100	4. ومذبحة السكان المدنيين ≈ **والتي أدت** إلى هجرات وتشرد **وهناك معاناة هائلة** . وبالنسبة للعداءات ... العدائيات بين القوات المعارضة وحكومة ليبيا.... فإن هناك إشارة لقوى أحزاب المعارضة..
	BT: and the massacre of the civilian population ≈, *which has led* to *migration* and *displacement* and *there is immense suffering* ◙ with regard to hostilities = hostilities between the opposition force and the Government of Libya ◙ there is *referenc*e to the *opposition parties*.

<u>**Analysis**</u>

<u>Discourse and narratives:</u> In segment 3, the speaker delivers resolutions on peace and on the security situation in Africa, reflecting a typical African discourse about conflict on the continent which is regularly cited as one of the main reasons for underdevelopment in the region. This discourse is clearly expressed by the Chairperson of the PAP Committee in their voiced concerns about conflict resolution on the continent. The African discourse and narrative is also clear regarding the Libyan conflict as violent.

However, in segment 4, the influence of African discourse becomes more apparent in the expression of deep concern about the human cost of the conflict, specifically in the use of phrases such as *massacre of the civilian population*, *humanitarian crisis* and *unprecedented migration*. At the same time, discourses and narratives of conflict resolution, peaceful settlement and mediation also become more prominent in the call for a *cessation* of *hostilities between NATO, the Libyan government and the rebel forces*. The prevalence of this strand of discourse is further revealed when the speaker asks the Plenary Session to change the word *rebels* to *opposition forces*.

The interpreter makes an incorrect lexical choice here between *security* and *stability*, possibly reflecting the influence of the prevailing conflict and developmental discourses in Africa that make

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a strong connection between development, security and stability as preconditions for economic development. This erroneous choice also appears to be the result of an anticipation strategy that primes the interpreter to use a stock term that, due to his inability to cope with the speed of the discussion,   is applied incorrectly. This seems clear at the beginning of the extract where the speaker speaks unexpectedly in French, resulting in the interpreter seemingly losing his composure and becoming hesitant in choosing words. As the interpreter continues, however, it is clear that he starts to regain his composure, possibly becoming more accustomed to the speaker's accent or to the subject matter. But the result of this initial loss of composure is a clumsy Arabic sentence.

The above discussion supports the significance of textual aspects like cohesion and lexical choice, as well as discourse for interpreting in general and for simultaneous interpreting in particular.

Interpreting strategies: In segment 3, the Arabic interpreter chooses incorrectly between the terms *security* and *stability*, interpreting *peace and stability* (السلام والاستقرار) instead of *peace and security* (السلام والأمن) as uttered by the speaker. This reflects the possibility that the interpreter is influenced by prevailing conflict and developmental discourses in Africa that make a strong connection between development, security and stability as prerequisites for the socio-economic development of the African continent. This also leads the Arabic interpreter to anticipate *peace and stability* as a stock phrase in an attempt to reduce time pressure and memory deficit so as to keep up with the speaker. Due to the fact that the speaker is reading from a prepared text, the increased speed of delivery forces the interpreter to resort to anticipation and skipping; the first tactic leads to incorrect lexical choices such as interpreting *violent conflicts* as *violence and tension* and skipping the word Africa.

However, I suspect that the interpreter becomes more aware that he is facing a challenge in coping with the speed of the speaker, which is why it is notable that the interpreter resorts to a twofold coping strategy. On the one hand, the interpreter uses his background knowledge about the discourse of African conflicts as leverage for anticipation and to gain some pace while, on the other hand, he adopts compensatory strategies of self-correction and self-monitoring to repair or make good any wrong choices.

The first part of this strategy is apparent in the use of the prevailing general discourse about African conflicts and civil wars; for example, the use of the phrase *migrations, and displacement* (هجرات وتشرد) in place of the original *desperate humanitarian crisis and unprecedented migration*. As the interpreter discovers that he has made an incorrect lexical choice he applies the second part of his

strategy, making a compensatory move to repair and to strengthen the delivered message by adding the term *there is immense suffering* to compensate for the use of the term *humanitarian crisis* in the original utterance. In addition, words such as *migration* and *displacement* (الهجرة والتشرد أو النزوح والتشرد) are used more often as joint phrases in the Arabic language, especially in the literature dealing with conflicts and civil wars which, in turn, reveals the cultural and linguistic influences of the interpreter's choice.

The interpreter has skipped the word *NATO*, an important word uttered by the speaker, and the fact that he makes no effort to apply an emergency strategy as a corrective measure for this omission suggests that he might be more focused on the speaker's explanation and request to the members to change the word *rebel* to *opposition*. This view is supported by the interpreter's two later utterances of the word *opposition*; once in the term *opposition force* and later by indicating, incorrectly, that there is *reference to the opposition forces*.

It is possible to conclude from this that the influence of African political discourses and narratives, especially as they pertain to the Libyan conflict, is clear in the speaker's utterance. However, the strand of conflict resolution and peaceful settlement discourse is more influential in the speaker's speech. On the other hand, the influence of African developmental and conflict discourses and narratives prevails in the interpreter's performance and in his choice of interpreting strategies, together with cultural and linguistic influences.

S –Time line – E 0:01:21:679-0:01:34:348	5. Whilst appreciating the *need* to protect the civilian population from all *warring factions*, it however, condemns strongly the bombardment of Libya by NATO forces;
0:01:25:200-0:01:36:700	5. ومع الإشادة بجهود **حلف الناتو** لحماية المدنيين، إلا إنه يدين بشدة قصف قوات حلف الناتو لليبيا.
	BT: With praising of the *NATO efforts* to protect the *civilian*, however it strongly condemn the bombardment of NATO forces to Libya;

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: The speaker's utterance indicates the influence of African discourse on conflict resolution, especially that strand of the discourse concerning *the protection of the civilian population*. However, the speaker reliably applies this discourse via diplomatic language, avoiding any pronouncements about which bodies are supposed to be protected and which are supposed to be mandated to provide such protection. This is done so as not to give credence to Western discourses and narratives that proclaim that NATO intervention in Libya is intended to protect the *civilian*

population and forms part of a *duty* and a *mandate* by the UNSC Resolutions. On the other hand, the speaker uses the same diplomatic language in their non-specific statements about the party(s) from whom said protection has to be sought or provided, this being clear in the use of the phrase *from all warring factions*. However, the speaker remains aligned with the mainstream African discourse on the Libyan conflict and strongly condemns *the bombardment of Libya by NATO forces*.

Interpreting strategies: The Arabic interpreter is faced with comprehension difficulty, ostensibly mishearing and then incorrectly interpreting the phrase *appreciating the need* as *with praising NATO efforts*. This is possibly due to the influence of the immediate context in which conflict discourse is invoked, along with specific mention of NATO involvement. The interpreter thus, very likely, wrongly anticipated that the appreciation the speaker is discussing is in praise of NATO for their protection of the civilian population as is claimed in Western and media discourse**.** This mistake is due either to comprehension difficulty or to the influence of Western and media discourses, specifically the *Al-Jazeera Arabic TV* network. In this instance, the interpreter has committed a clear lexical mistake which is in complete contradiction with the subsequent sentence *condemns strongly the bombardment of Libya by NATO forces*. Here, any attempt at self-correction is futile.

In general, the influence of African political discourse seems clear in the speaker's speech, while the immediate context influences the interpreter's performance and lexical choices.

S –Time line – E	6. Cognisant of the democratic transitions in Tunisia, Egypt and Cote d'Ivoire;
0:01:34:511-0:01:47:352	
0:01:36:700-0:01:50:130	6. ...ومع إدراك الانتقال الديمقراطي في تونس، فإن مصر... في مصر وتونس وكوديفوار.
	BT: Cognisant of the democratic transitions in Tunisia, ≈ that Egypt ═ in Egypt, Tunisia and Cote d'Ivoire;

S –Time line – E	7. Noting the deterioration of the *humanitarian* situation in Tunisia and Ivory Coast; Paying tribute to the efforts of the UN Security Council and African Union towards the restoration of the democratic order and peace in Cote d'Ivoire, Tunisia and Egypt;
0:01:47:981-0:02:01:605	
0:01:50:400-0:02:03:187	7. إلا إنه **يشير لتدهور الأوضاع** في تونس وكوردفوار. ويشيد بالجهود التي يبذلها مجلس الأمن الدولي والاتحاد الأفريقي لإعادة **النظام والأمن** في كوردفوار وتونس ومصر..

> **BT:** However it notes the deterioration of the *situation* in Tunisia and Ivory Coast; ◉ Praising the efforts of the UN Security Council and African Union towards the restoration of order and *security* in Cote d'Ivoire, Tunisia and Egypt;

Analysis

<u>Discourse and narratives:</u> The speaker, in the two segments above, reflects a general African interest in democratic transition and in efforts to restore democratic order and peace, coupled with a concern about the humanitarian situation.

<u>Interpreting strategies:</u> The Arabic interpreter fails to keep pace with the speaker's delivery, his hesitance seemingly a result of this being clear in the incomplete sentence *that Egypt…* and the subsequent repetition of *Egypt, Tunisia and Cote d'Ivoire*. The interpreter tried to cope with the speaker by resorting to skipping which is apparent in the skipping of the word *humanitarian.* This failure to cope with the speaker's rate of delivery results in the interpreter attempting to use his previous knowledge of conflict discourse, where the focus is generally on bringing order and security, in order to anticipate what the speaker is saying in the incoming segment of his speech. However, this results in him wrongly anticipating the use of the joint term *order and security*, which results in the inaccurate delivery of the speaker's reference to *the restoration of the democratic order and peace*. The interpreter's use of the term *order* instead of *democratic order* also renders a different meaning, indicating the intention to end chaos and restore order. This problematic lexical choice leads to a completely incorrect semantic indication, given that it is possible that there is still order under a dictatorship even though *dictatorship order* means almost the complete opposite of *democratic order*. This also applies to the interpreter's use of the term *security* in place of *peace*.

I conclude that the influence of African political discourses on conflict resolution, peace and democratic transition is clear in the speaker's speech. However, in general the influence of discourses on conflict and security is more dominant in the interpreter's lexical choices and performance. If the erroneous choice of semantic strategies of the interpreter continues, they will likely influence the course of the discussion, establishing a pattern that could serve to shift the understanding of those listening to the Arabic interpreting and influencing their input in the discussion. Such influence, however, is not yet identifiable.

S –Time line – E	8. Reaffirming its commitment to all United Nations and African Union resolutions on the decolonization of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
0:02:02:629-0:02:35:805	

0:02:04:100-0:02:37:394	Republic, and the status of the settlement *process*; *geared towards* organizing a free, fair and *impartial* referendum to decide the fate of Saharawi People; Recalling that the Sahrawi Republic is a founding member of the African Union and of the Pan-African Parliament; 8. ويؤكد التزامه مرة أخرى بكل قرارات الأمم المتحدة والاتحاد الأفريقي بشأن إنهاء الاستعمار في الجمهورية العربية الصحراوية... ووضع التسوية بشأن إجراء استفتاء حر ونزيه وعادل لتحديد. ≡. لتقرير مصير الشعب الصحراوي.... ويشير كذلك إلى أن الجمهورية العربية الصحراوية هي عضو مؤسس في الاتحاد الأفريقي والبرلمان الأفريقي... **BT:** Reaffirming *once again* its commitment to all United Nations and African Union resolutions with regard to decolonization of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic…and the status of the settlement *concerning* organizing free, fair and *just* referendum to *decide* ◙ !!*determine* the fate of Saharawi People; It *notes also* that the Sahrawi Arab Republic is a founding member of the African Union and of the Pan-African Parliament;

Analysis:

Discourse and narratives: As in the previous segment, the influence of the PAP discourse on conflict resolution is clear in the speaker's speech. The speaker's speech also reflects the prevailing African discourses on conflict resolution and decolonization, which tend towards upholding legitimacy based on international and regional resolutions along with peaceful means for settling conflicts. The prevailing African discourse regarding the self-determination of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is dominant.

Interpreting strategies: The Arabic interpreter delivers a good interpretation, despite the fact that he is challenged in coping with the speaker's speed of delivery. The interpreter attempts to respond to this challenge by using emphasis, as in his addition of the phrase *once again* and resorting to his background knowledge, as is apparent from his lexical choices. For example, he uses the word *just* instead of *impartial* (محايد), despite the fact that he has already used the word *fair*. One may argue that it would be better to use the Arabic for *impartial* (محايد/غير منحاز), but using the Arabic word *just* (عادل) is still acceptable as it provides the same meaning as well as strengthening the speaker's message. The speedy delivery of the speaker also forces the Arabic interpreter to search for words and this results in the hesitation between the Arabic words *decide* and *determine*. By utilizing background knowledge influenced by dominant discourses and narratives of decolonization, liberation and occupation, in addition to relying on the context in order to anticipate the speaker's message, the Arabic interpreter is able to make the right lexical choice, using the Arabic phrase (تقرير المصير) – which means *self-determination* – when referring to the political rights of countries or people under occupation. Besides strengthening the speaker's message, this choice also shows the influence of dominant discourses on the interpreter's choice of interpreting strategy.

The above analysis indicates that the influence of African political discourses on conflict resolution, independence and decolonization is clear in the speaker's utterances. This influence is, however, more apparent in the interpreter's performance and choice of interpreting strategies. The influence of the interpreter on the course of discussion cannot be established at this point.

S –Time line – E	9. Taking into consideration its role to promote peace and security on the African Continent; Therefore resolves:
0:02:36:362-:02:59:385	1. To send a fact finding to Tripoli and Benghazi that will study the *extent of the violent conflict*, meet with the *warring parties* and then table a report in the next session of the *PAP*; and
0:02:37:562-0:03:02:700	9... ويأخذ بالحسبان دوره في تعزيز السلم والأمن في القارة الأفريقية..فإن البرلمان الأفريقي يقرر ما يلي: أولاً: إرسال بعثة لتقصي الحقائق إلى طرابلس وبنغازي **للتحقيق** في **الحوادث** والاجتماع مع **الأعضاء** المتحاربة وأن ترفع تقريراً إلى الجلسة القادمة **للاتحاد الأفريقي**...
	BT: Taking into account its role in promoting peace and security in the African Continent; The Pan African Parliament resolves the following: Firstly: Sending a fact finding mission to Tripoli and Benghazi to *investigate* the *incidences, and to* meet with the warring *members* and to table a report to the next session of the *African Union*….

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: The influence of prevailing African discourse on a peaceful resolution of the Libyan conflict is reflected in the speaker's highlighting of the role of the PAP in the promotion of peace and security on the African continent and its resolution to send fact finding missions to both Tripoli and Benghazi. In fact, sending fact finding missions to Tripoli and Benghazi specifically, instead of to Libya as a country, shows that the PAP tends to act as a neutral body, equidistant from both sides of the Libyan conflict. The influence of this discourse on mediation and peaceful resolution of conflicts is further confirmed in the diplomatic word choice; referring to both Tripoli and Benghazi instead of to Libya as a country indicates that the PAP wants to listen to both parties in the conflict instead of siding with one on them. Using city names also helps to avoid the use of politically loaded descriptors like *government, rebels* or *opposition*, although these are still alluded to given that we know that the Libyan government was, at the time the discussion took place, still in control of the capital city of Tripoli, while Benghazi was controlled by the rebels/revolutionaries/opposition and regarded as their stronghold.

The speaker's speech is a good example of PAP discourse on conflict resolution. The speaker uses two qualifying discursive conditions in order to achieve effectiveness: first, establishing the facts

pertaining to the extent of the conflict and, second, describing the conflict as *violent* and using the phrase *warring parties* instead of *parties to the conflict* in order to reflect the gravity of the situation as necessitating intervention in order to achieve a peaceful resolution.

Interpreting strategies: The influence of prevailing African discourse on the peaceful resolution of conflict is clear in the interpreter's choice of interpreting strategies. This influence is clear in more than one place in the above segment, including the interpreter's application of anticipation strategy where he responds to the phrase *fact finding mission* with the word *investigate* rather than *study*, and when he uses the term *incidences* (الحوادث) in place of *extent of the violent conflict* and refers to warring *members* instead of warring *parties*. Here it is clear that the interpreter is using context and background knowledge to support his anticipation strategy, which is applied as a tool to cope with the speaker's speed of delivery. However, the above segment also reveals the strong influence of discourses, narratives and context in the interpreter's lexical choices and interpreting strategies; using the terms *investigate* and *incidences* indicates the possibility that the interpreter generally spends more time working in conflict environments than in peaceful resolution environments, i.e., he is influenced more by the discourse of the AU peace and security council than by that of the PAP. Despite the fact that both of these are organs of the AU, each of them has a different mandate as well as distinctive discourses. For example, the PAP is primarily concerned with solving conflicts through dialogue, peaceful settlements, democratic transitions and fact finding missions, whereas the AU Peace and Security Council focuses on how to respond to different conflicts in the continent through negotiations, the imposition of ceasefires or truces between warring parties, sanctions, sending peace keeping forces or even, in some cases, peace imposing missions. It is clear that there is a subtle difference in the influence of each of the prevailing discourses and narratives on the interpreter's choices and interpreting strategies. The interpreter's erroneous reference to the AU in the last part of the sentence *the next session of the AU*, an interpretation of *the next session of PAP,* may point to such influence. This analysis also shows the influence of context on the interpreter's role, performance and choice of interpreting strategies.

The above analysis shows that the influence of African political discourse on conflict resolution is identifiable in the speaker's utterance as well as in the interpreter's performance and choice of interpreting strategy. However, the influence of the AU Peace and Security Council and the discourse of conflict in general are more transparent in the interpreter's performance than in the speaker's utterances. Despite these facts, the interpreter's influence on the course of discussion remains unclear.

S -Time line - E 0:03:00:148-0:03:25:155	10. To send a *goodwill* mission to Tunisia, Egypt, Cote d'Ivoire and Sahrawi Republic that will collect information and express solidarity, on behalf of PAP, with the peoples of those countries and then table a report in the next session of PAP. 10. و أن يرسل بعثة تقصي حقائق أيضاً..وبعثة **وساطة وجهود** إلى مصر وتونس وكوردفوار لجمع المعلومات وللتعبير عن التضامن بالنيابة عن الاتحاد الأفريقي لشعوب تلك الدول.. ومن ثم أن ترفع تقريرها إلى الجلسة القادمة للبرلمان الأفريقي...... **BT:** To send *a fact finding mission* and *mediation mission and efforts* to Tunisia, Egypt, and Cote d'Ivoire to collect information and express solidarity, *on behalf of the UA*, with the peoples of those countries and then to *submit its* report to the next session of PAP.

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: The influence of prevailing African discourse on peaceful resolution of the conflict and on African solidarity is clear in the speaker's utterance. This discourse is strengthened through the use of the phrase *collect information,* which indicates that the PAP is not taking sides and is also an argumentative move to indicate that the PAP needs more information about the conflict in order to determine its position on the conflict. More significantly, the PAP has expressed its solidarity *with the peoples of those countries*, another marker indicating its representation of the *people* instead of governments. Here the PAP is aiming to construct a mental model in which governments act as the representatives of the people. In doing so, the PAP avoids taking strong positions that may be opposed by some of its members, even though this opposition could be overcome through voting, given that the PAP makes decisions via simple majority votes. What is notable here is that this solidarity was expressed despite the fact that the members of the PAP predominantly represent the ruling parties of their African countries. This kind of 'people's representation', combined with avoiding taking sides, may give the PAP a better chance to mediate in the conflict.

Interpreting strategies: The influence of prevailing African discourse of peaceful conflict resolution and mediation is dominant in the interpreter's lexical choices and choice of interpreting strategies. This is clear in the interpreter's use of *fact finding, mediation and effort mission* in place of *goodwill mission.* The use of addition, rephrasing and shifting of the register to a non-formal style, like using a phrase such as *effort mission* as an achievement strategy, is due to the interpreter's anticipation based on context and on previous segments of the speaker's utterance. The interpreter skipped *Sahrawi Republic*. However, redundant expressions such as these may also be regarded as a reduction strategy that changes the essence of the speaker's message and results in a clumsy Arabic sentence.

The influence of prevailing discourse of African institutions vis-à-vis the form of names and acronyms is clear in the interpreter's erroneous reference to the AU instead of the PAP in *on behalf of PAP*. But the interpreter concluded with a direct reference to the mission by submitting *its* report to the next session of the PAP.

I conclude that the influence of African political discourse on conflict resolution, as well as the position of the PAP as representative of the African people, has been identified in the speaker's utterance as well as in the interpreter's performance and choice of interpreting strategy, with the influence of African institutional discourse also apparent in their lexical choices. However, no influence of the interpreter on the course of discussion can be identified.

<u>S -Time line - E</u>	11. Recommendations on the situation in Somalia. The Pan-African Parliament,, *Deeply* concerned by the continued violent conflict and the instability in Somalia;
0:03:25:749-:04:45:283	Concerned about the *military confrontations* between Transitional Federal Government (TFG) *forces*, AMISOM and *extremist- it is a new word-* The round of negotiation held in the first quarter of 2011; regretting the constitutional crisis that has risen between the transitional Parliament, the office of the President and the office of the Prime Minister; Recognizing the efforts of the African Union through AMISOM working towards peace and *reconciliation* process in Somalia; Noting that the humanitarian situation in Somalia remains *in crisis*; Strongly condemning the piracy off Somalia's coast; *and the dumping of toxic waste – new addition,* There recommends that: 1. All parties to the Somalia conflict work together to restore peace and security in the country; 2. All decisions of the African Union Peace and Security Council should be adhered to.
0:03:29:525-0:04:47:900	11... **وبشأن الوضع في الصومال.. فإن التوصيات هي**...إن البرلمان الأفريقي يعرب عن قلقه من استمرار النزاع والعنف وعدم الاستقرار في الصومال ومن استمرار **الخلاف والنزاع** بين الاتحاد //...والحكومة الانتقالية والمتطرفين. وهذه ≡ ...وجولة المحادثات في قطر ...فإنه يعرب عن.... الأزمة الدستورية القائمة بين الحكومة الانتقالية... الرئيس ≡ منصب الرئيس ومنصب رئيس الوزراء و يعترف بجهود الاتحاد الأفريقي من خلال أوميسون للعمل من أجل السلام **وإعادة الإعمار** في الصومال.... ويشير إلى أن الوضع الإنساني في الصومال لا يزال **متوتراً..** ويدين نشاطات القرصنة إزاء ≡ في الساحل الصومالي **وكب** النفايات .. كما ينادي كل الأطراف للعمل معاً من أجل تحقيق السلام والأمن في البلاد ..**ويشير** إلى كل قرارات مجلس الأمن الأفريقي التي ينبغي الالتزام بها.
	BT: *Regarding the situation in Somalia. there are recommendations*…The Pan-African Parliament, *expresses its* concern for the continued *conflict, violence* and the instability in Somalia; and by continuation of *dispute and conflict* between the Union ...// and the Transitional Government and extremists.. and this ≡ ...talk session in Qatar… it expresses…. The constitutional between the Transitional Government…. The President ≡ post of the President and the post of the Prime Minister. And recognize the efforts of the African Union through AMISOM working for peace and

> *reconstruction* in Somalia…. and notes that the humanitarian situation in Somalia remains in *tension*; . It condemns the piracy *activities* ≡ off Somalia's coast; and *the dumping of waste*…. It also calls upon all parties to the work together for peace and security in the country. It *notes* all resolutions of the African Union Peace and Security Council which should be adhered to.

Analysis

<u>Discourse and narratives:</u> The influence of prevailing African discourse on peaceful resolution is clear in the speaker's expression of deep concern about the continued violent conflict, instability and military confrontations in Somalia. This discourse manifests in the framing of those who oppose transitional governments and negotiations as *extremist* instead of *insurgents* or *opposition*, as in the Libyan case. The narrative on the peaceful resolution of conflict and concern about the humanitarian situation is also clear in the speaker's recognition of the work of the AU and AMISOM – the Mission of the African Peace Keeping Force in Somalia – in terms of peace and reconciliation processes and in support of the call for all parties to work together to restore peace and security and adhere to the decisions of the African Union Peace and Security Council.

The influence of the internationally prevailing discourse on *condemning piracy* is also clear in the speaker's utterance, *piracy* being a distinctive aspect of the Somali conflict discourse. Factors that may help sustain this distinctive discourse include the fact that the *piracy* has lasted for a number of years and that the collapse of the Somali state has resulted in lawlessness and the emergence of extremist groups and foreign interference.

<u>Interpreting strategies:</u> In the beginning of this segment the interpreter changes the direct formal style of the speaker by beginning the sentence with the word *regarding* in place of the original utterance's *recommendations on the situation in Somalia*. This change in style is possibly due to the interpreter anticipating that the speaker may start in this way; when this anticipated beginning fails to materialize the interpreter tries to rescue the situation by using the connector *there are* to rephrase the sentence but this weakens the strength of the direct, forthright style of the speaker by giving an indication that there are recommendations. Using the connector *there are* results in a weaker form of expression that dilutes the speaker's utterance and the use of this tactic by the interpreter can be described as a reduction strategy that weakens the interpretation of the segment.

My interpretation here is that the interpreter is faced with a comprehension challenge due to the speed, accent or style of delivery of the speaker and, in trying to cope with the situation, he resorts to different strategies of anticipation, rephrasing and omission. This view is supported by the fact that the interpreter has omitted the word *deeply* in the next sentence and that he fails to accurately deliver the speaker's message in interpreting *violent conflict* as *dispute and conflict*. He also omits the words *forces* and *AMISOM*. Despite the fact that the interpreter correctly delivers the speaker's utterance in the final part of the sentence by using the word *extremist*, he still evidently faces a comprehension problem, which is why he pauses and seems hesitant, a clear indication that he has

not heard or understood the speaker's utterance properly, which would then explain why he fails to convey the speaker's remark reminding PAP members that the word extremist *is a new word,* added to the text that was already distributed to them.

It is clear that the speaker has omitted a segment of the speech by saying *held in the first quarter of 2011* without mentioning the location; however, the interpreter understands that the speaker means a *round of negotiations held in Qatar*. The interpreter's addition of *Qatar* can be regarded as an achievement strategy that improves the speaker's utterance. This strategy indicates the influence of background knowledge and discourse on the interpreter's choice and performance – it is widely known in Arab speaking countries, African countries at the level of the AU and the Arab media, that Qatar plays host to peaceful negotiations around various African conflicts, including the peaceful negotiations on the Somali and Darfur (Sudan) conflicts. He then goes on to explain that the word *extremist* is a new addition to the committee report. If this is the case, it means that the interpreter has used his background information to improve the speaker's utterance by compensating for the information skipped or lost in the speaker's utterance. However, in the subsequent segment, the interpreter tries to anticipate the speaker's utterance by beginning to rephrase a sentence in such way that it has to be completed by a suitable word uttered by the speaker. When the speaker fails to meet the interpreter's anticipation and uses the direct form *regretting* where the interpreter anticipated the indirect form *expressing regret*, the result is the delivery of an incomplete sentence by the interpreter who skips the key word *regretting*.

The influence of developmental and conflict resolution discourses and narratives is notable in the interpreter's choice of terms such as *peace and reconstruction*, *the humanitarian situation remains tense* and *to achieve,* in place of the speaker's original terms *reconciliation*, *the humanitarian situation in Somalia remains in crisis* and *restore*. These choices may be regarded as part of a reduction strategy employed by the interpreter, in the sense that they weaken the speaker's description of the situation and shift the originally intended meaning.

The interpreter shifts from a standard to a semi-colloquial style by using the Arabic word (كب) for dumping in place of (رمي أو طمر) which, despite the fact that it is formal, is used mostly in a colloquial context. Additionally, the interpreter abandons the speaker's message by failing to indicate that what the speaker is discussing are recommendations that are being presented in a more formal style. The strength of this presentation is, in some instances, mitigated by the non-formal style of the interpreter, culminating in the interpreting of *toxic waste* as *waste* without conveying the speaker's reminder to the Member that this was a new addition. Furthermore, the interpreter

delivers the last segment of the speaker's utterance in a weaker lexical form by using the word *noting,* ignoring the formal style in which the speaker recommends adherence to all decisions taken by the African Union Peace and Security Council. Reducing this recommendation to a weakly conveyed *noting* indicates that the interpreter has used a reduction strategy that has also resulted in a clumsy Arabic expression.

Finally, the above analysis shows that the influences of discourses and narratives are significant in both the speaker's utterance and the interpreter's choice of interpreting strategies, as well as in the choice of words used in the discourse and narrative on the PAPMP and in the interpreter's influence on the course of the discussion. Despite the fact that this is not clear within the current analysis, I expect that there will be a definite influence if the discussion carries on for a longer period and that this will become detectable if a significant volume of data is collected in order to support a comparison between speaker utterances and viewpoints, especially before and after interpreter shifts and changes of the speaker's utterance and message. The matter needs more investigation and the collection of a huge volume of data for a longer period of time.

S –Time line – E 0:04:46:389-0:06:17:280	12. The situation in Madagascar: I hope the members do have copies of recommendations on the situation in Madagascar, because it came a little pit later. Otherwise the documents are available at the entrance, I have been informed. Recommendations on the situation in Madagascar: The Pan African Parliament deeply concern by the political crisis in Madagascar which is still far from resolved , noting that very little progress has been made to return Madagascar to the constitutional rule, recognizing the efforts of the SADC through the mediation of Mozambique's former President Joaquim Chissano towards finding the lasting solution to the crisis, recognizing further the continuing efforts of African Union in helping to resolve the crisis in the country , taking note of the agreement which has been reach on the road map to democratic elections as well as the establishment of transitional government and parliament. Regretting the fact that there is a lack of political will on the part of the current President Mr. Rajoelina… Therefore recommend that SADC and African Union should bring pressure on all parties to the Madagascar crisis to implement *the letter and spirit of the agreements signed* to return the country to the constitutional rule.
0:04:48:559-0:06:21:400	12..... أرجو أن يكون للأعضاء توصيات بشأن الوضع في مدغشقر .لأنها ستأتي لاحقاً .. وإلا فإن .... فالوثيقة ستكون موجودة للأعضاء.. التوصيات بشأن مدغشقر ≈ إن **الاتحاد الأفريقي** يعرب عن قلقه الشديد بسبب الأزمة السياسية في ≈ .في مدغشقر والتي لم تحل بعد.◙ . يشير إلى أن تقدماً طفيفاً قد تحقق من أجل إعادة مدغشقر إلى الحكم الدستوري...≡ ويشير إلى جهود المجموعة الأفريقية ..مجموعة تنمية الجنوب الأفريقي والاتحاد الأفريقي لإنهاء الأزمة. و يعترفوا كذلك ويشيد بجهود الاتحاد الأفريقي في المساعدة لحل الأزمة في البلاد. ويشير إلى الافتقار للإرادة السياسية من قبل الأطراف المتحاربة ورئيس الوزراء السيد راجولينيا≡. ويشير إلى أنه ينبغي على سادك والاتحاد الأفريقي جمع كل الأطراف ≡. للاهتمام أزمة مدغشقر للاتفاق

> **BT:** I hope the members do have recommendations on the situation in
> Madagascar, because it *will* come later… Otherwise the… document will be
> available for the members..
> Recommendations on Madagascar ≈ The *African Union expresses* its *profound*
> concern by the political crisis in ≈ in Madagascar which *is not been resolved yet*
> . ◙ and notes that there is very little progress has been *achieved* to return
> Madagascar to the constitutional rule .. ≡ and *notes the efforts of the African*
> *Group…*South African Development Community and the African Union to end
> the crisis; and *they* recognize also... and commend the efforts of African Union
> in helping to resolve the crisis in the country. It *notes* the lack of political *by the*
> *warring partied and the Prime Minister* Mr. Rajoelina ≡ *and indicate* that
> SADC and African Union should *bring together all parties* ≡ *to concern* with
> the Madagascar crisis to agree to return the country to the constitutional rule.

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: The speaker employs the prevailing African discourse on peaceful resolutions and constitutional rule, a reflection of the AU policy to reject any unconstitutional change of governments. This discourse is clear in the lexical structure and semantic acts of the speaker's utterance. Notably, the discourse and narratives in the speaker's utterance, as well as in the interpreted discourse, is slightly different here in terms of lexical choices; this due to the fact that the conflict under discussion is a political crisis and not a violent conflict, as in the cases of Libya and Somalia. The dominant discourse in this conflict focuses on the political crisis and constitutional rule, whereas with Libya and Somalia the focus of the discourse and narratives was on violent conflict, bombardment, human suffering, massacres, instability and military confrontation.

Interpreting strategies: It is evident that the interpreter has either not heard the speaker properly or has had difficulty understanding the speaker's accent or pronunciation; this is clear from the interpreter's struggle to decode and encode phrases from the source discourse which results in comprehension and production problems. These problems are made clear in the use of the incorrect future tense, the interpreter indicating that documents *will come* later on and that the documents *will be available*, whereas the speaker was alerting members that the documents *came* a little late and *are available* at the entrance. Such difficulties and hesitation lead to another mistake by the interpreter who refers to the AU instead of the PAP as being deeply concerned. This is possibly due to the interpreter wrongly anticipating that the speaker will state that the AU is deeply concerned, or it could be due to a standard omission from the interpreter. It could also indicate that the interpreter is more influenced by the narratives of the AU than those of the PAP or, on the other hand, that this

is simply a result of the way in which information is structured in the speaker's utterance. However, it seems most likely that it is an omission by the interpreter, a view supported by the fact that the interpreter uses the incorrect preposition *which* (الذي) after *the AU*, leading to a badly constructed Arabic sentence. It would have been better to use the Arabic preposition *whereas* (إذ) which would have produced a well-constructed Arabic sentence with a hint (*touché*) of the formal style of official statements. The interpreter also uses the incorrect preposition *yet* instead of the original utterance *still far from*, which serves to weaken the speaker's message that the crisis is *still far from resolved*.

It is clear that the interpreter is using anticipation, as well as rephrasing, self-correction and omissions in an effort to cope with the speaker's delivery speed. These strategies feature especially in the next segment where the interpreter resorts to anticipation by using the phrase *African Group*, but then self-corrects when he ascertains that the speaker means the SADC countries. However, in the process, the interpreter omits and abandons a significant portion of the speaker's utterance: *through the mediation of Mozambique's former President Joaquim Chissano towards finding the lasting solution to the crisis*. The interpreter begins interpreting the abandoned portion by uttering *and they recognize also* (و يعترفا كذلك) – which is an incorrect beginning – and then abandons the sentence completely in order to cope with the speaker's speed of delivery, which he manages in the next sentence even though he omits the qualifier *the continuing efforts*.

The interpreter's inability to cope with the speaker's speed of delivery recurs, forcing the interpreter to abandon another significant segment of the speaker's message: *taking note of the agreement which has been reach on the road map to democratic elections as well as the establishment of transitional government and parliament.* In grappling with the speaker's speed, the interpreter makes an incorrect lexical choice in the next segment, using the word *noting* instead of *regretting,* which weakens the speaker's message of regret. The interpreter attempts to compensate for this by using the affirmative form of *there is lack of political will* instead of the original *the fact that there is a lack of political will*, and in the process makes an erroneous lexical shift by using the term *warring parties* instead of *on the part of*. The interpreter makes a further incorrect lexical choice by referring to the *Prime Minister* instead of the current *President*, as referred to by the speaker. The difficulties encountered by the interpreter in this segment may be attributed to the information structure of, or cohesive pointers in, the speaker's utterance; this is apparent in the interpreter's failure to pick up an important indicator uttered by the speaker: *therefore recommend*. This pointer is highly significant as the structure and style of the coming segments – comprising a formal listing of such recommendations – depend on it. The information structure of the speaker's utterance clearly influences the interpreter's performance in the last segment, apparent in the interpreter's

repeated omission of the speaker's utterance *therefore recommend* (a cohesive pointer to what will come next), which the interpreter interprets as *and indicate,* which entails an entirely different rephrasing. The influence of the properties of discourse – especially in terms of information structures, semantic acts and lexical choices – on the interpreter's performance and in their strategic choices is clear, especially in the last segment; for example in the interpreting of the speaker's utterance *should bring pressure.* It is clear that the information structure here, particularly the position and choice of the word *bring*, influences the interpreter's inference and anticipation – he interprets this segment of the speaker's message as *should bring together*. One might excuse the interpreter for this because of the speaker's choice of the word *bring*, which is more often paired with *together* than *pressure* (this usually used in conjunction with *exert* or *put)*. The situation is possibly compounded by the word sounds: the sound of the word *pressure*, under the pressure of memory deficiency and divided attention, may sound like *together,* especially when used with the word *bring*. Moreover, the interpreter, helped by the context as well as by the discourse of mediation and peaceful conflict resolution, is justified in anticipating the use of *bring together* as opposed to *bring pressure*. Regardless, the significance of pointing out these problems is that they highlight the influence of discourse, in this case the source discourse, in setting up mental models and in shaping the interpreter's understanding of utterances.

Finally, the interpreter employs summarizing tactics, using the shorter form of *to implement the agreement* in place of the original *to implement the letter and spirit of the agreements signed.* This, in my view, is acceptable as the main message in the segment – the agreement – is still rendered.

I conclude that the influence of discourses and narratives is notable in both the speaker and the interpreter's utterances. Discursive properties, like information structure, and lexical and semantic aspects, strongly influence the speaker's message and the interpreter's performance and choice of interpreting strategies. Furthermore, the influence of external factors – especially the speed of the speaker's delivery and his accent – affect the interpreter's performance. The interpreter resorts to a number of strategies to fill mental modelling gaps and to compensate for memory deficiencies resulting from comprehension problems and difficulties in coping with the speaker's delivery and non-conducive style of structuring information.

| **S -Time line - E**
0:06:17:875-0:07:27:423 | 13. PM Kholmalo: Mr. President, *If I may add* that… We are aware of the *tensions* particularly in Libyan.., but we have consulted widely on the matter, the office here have been consulting , the *honourable* members particularly *Honourabl*e Mr. Al- Hadori has been consulting , and came to our committee to make a presentation even in individual form and we assured about the security at least to a certain extend the |

<table>
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<td>fact that they too are here is giving us the necessary passage, I also assure the honourable House. Mr. President that Egypt and Tunisia are just waiting to receive the members, they have given us the *dates, even as I am speaking* Tunisia called this afternoon to say they are sending a letter to PAP just to confirm the dates with PAP…   So there is progress**,** *we hope the Secretariat*, Mr. President will assures on such preparations and arrangements in so far as Cote d'Ivoire, and Sahrawi Arabic Republic is concern.
I, Thank you Sir</td>
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<tr>
<td>0:06:21:500-0:07:32:398</td>
<td dir="rtl">13. سيدي الرئيس أود أن أضيف أننا ندرك التوترات القائمة في ليبيا وقد تشاورنا حول هذا الأمر على نطاق واسع..وقد تشاورنا مع فخامة الحضوري.... ومع أعضاء المجلس وقد وعد بأن يقدم كلمة أمام المجلس...
وأؤكد للمجلس بأننا سنرتب هذا الأمر......
ونؤكد للمجلس يا سيدي الرئيس بأن مصر وتونس تنتظر استقبال الأعضاء ونحدد التواريخ ..كما وأن تونس سترسل خطاباً **للاتحاد الأفريقي** لتؤكد التاريخ... فهناك تقدماً يتحقق.. ونؤكد يا سيدي الرئيس أنه سنجرى ترتيبات وفيما يتعلق بكوديفوار والجمهورية العربية الصحراوية.
شكراً سيدي الرئيس...</td>
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<td>**BT: PM Kholmalo**: Mr. President, *I would like to* add that ... We are aware of the *tensions* running in Libyan..and we have consulted on this matter widely.. We have consulted with Honourable Al- Hadori … and with members of the house... and he promised that he will present a speech before the house…..
I assure the House that we will arrange this matter...
 I assure the House Mr. President that Egypt and Tunisia are waiting to receive the members, and we to set the dates…also that Tunisia will send a letter to the *African Union* to confirm the dates… there is progress *been achieved*… I *confirm*, Mr. President that will assures on such preparations and arrangements will be done with regard to Cote d'Ivoire, and Sahrawi Arabic Republic. I, Thank you Mr. President</td>
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Analysis

Discourse and narratives: The speaker diminishes conflict discourse by describing conflicts as *tensions* but he intends to show the Plenary Session or the House of the PAP that his committee is really concerned, particularly about the situation in Libya. The speaker uses examples to support his argumentation, indicating that one of the Libyan PAP members (The Honourable Mr. Al-Hadori) has briefed the committee about the situation in his personal capacity. The fact that the speaker uses a form of parliamentary address, *Honourable*, and the name of the Libyan member without mentioning that he is a Libyan member, indicates that Mr. Al-Hadori is a well-known and respected Libyan member of the PAP. This is supported by the fact that the speaker uses the word *particularly* to indicate the special place this member occupies. At the same time, as Al-Hadori has just arrived from Libya, his presentation is regarded as a first-hand source of information on developments which, in turn, lends more credence to the speaker's argument about the consultations and the security situation being mere *tensions*. In fact, the speaker's diminishing of the situation by

describing it as *tensions* appears to be a prelude to a discursive attempt to convince the House about the security situation in Libya.

It is clear that the speaker tries to convince the House that the security situation in Libya is, to some extent, not dangerous and it seems that he is convinced and assured to a certain degree by the Libyan member's presentation to the committee on the security situation. The opinions of the Libyan member more likely reflect the views of the Libyan government than those of the opposition views – according to the Libyan system of government, *Jamahiriya* (rule of the people), there is no official opposition and so the Libyan members of the PAP are sent as representatives of the Libyan government. The speaker uses another example to prove his point about the security situation in Libya by mentioning the presence of the Libyan members: *they too are here is giving us the necessary passage*.

These arguments by the chairperson of the committee are in addition to his written speech which represents the position of his committee and, in making them, the chairperson, Mr. Khomalo, has resorted to diplomatic parliamentary discourse as a method of argumentation. By presenting all these views as mere additions to his written speech, he avoids presenting them as representative of the committee's position which may be disputed. At the same time, by presenting these opinions as oral (off-record) additions, he avoids them being recorded as part of the written documentation of the debate. However, expressing them as the opinion of the chairperson of the committee, and thus exploiting his position in the debate, lends them some weight, creating a specific mental model and possibly influencing the opinion of the rest of the House regarding the security situation in Libya at the given time.

The speaker continues to positively note the progress of his committee's efforts in sending goodwill missions to Egypt and Tunisia, defending this progress by using phrases such as *even as I am speaking Tunisia called* and *we hope the Secretariat,* in addition to providing assurances about preparations and arrangements concerning Cote d'Ivoire and the Sahrawi Arabic Republic.

Interpreting strategies: It clear that the Arabic interpreter, in trying to cope with the speaker's speed of delivery, abandons the speaker's message and resorts to filtering by compressing the original utterance and skipping details, especially in regard to the list of consultations mentioned by the speaker. However, in the process, the interpreter omits a significant segment of the speaker's message that was intended to convey to the house the twofold purpose of the speaker's argument. The interpreter misinterprets the speaker's message by omitting the segment *Honourable Mr. Al-*

Hadori has been consulting, and came to our committee to make a presentation even in individual form, as well as the equally relevant segment *we assured about the security at least to a certain extent the fact that they too are here.*

The significance of the two omitted segments shown above is in their support for the speaker's argumentation, not only about the consultations – it seems the interpreter understands that this is the main focus of the speaker's message – but also in their assurances about the security situation. This misinterpretation is probably due to memory overload caused by an attempt to cope with the speed of delivery of the source discourse which causes comprehension problems, causing the interpreter to fail to properly follow the flow of the speaker's argumentation or his message which, in turn, leads the interpreter to provide incorrect information when stating that *Mr. Al- Hadori [has] promised that he will present a speech before the house*. This indicates that the interpreter has failed to follow the flow of the speaker's message to the House that Mr. Al-Hadori had already given a presentation to the committee in his individual capacity.

Faced with these challenges, the interpreter tries to employ anticipation strategies based on the previous fragments of the speaker's utterance, also utilizing background and general knowledge to gain some ground in coping with the speed of delivery. However, he does not succeed in this, as is clear from his statement that Tunisia would send a letter to *the AU* to confirm the dates, whereas the speaker referred to the *Pan African Parliament*. One possible reason for this failed anticipation attempt is that the interpreter hears the word *African* and infers that the speaker means the African Union. Another possible reason is the stronger influence on the continent of the dominant discourse of the African Union over that the Pan African Parliament, an organ of the AU.

This analysis suggests that the influence of the discourse is more prevalent in the speaker's utterance than before. The speaker uses discourse features to advance his argument, including the use of framing and a lexical style to play down the conflict in order to create a specific mental model of the conflict as *tensions*. The speaker supplies details and uses discourse features in support of his argumentation. As for the interpreter, the possible influence of the dominant discourse and narratives of the African Union was identified as a reason for his use of anticipation strategy.

French into Arabic

S –Time line – E 0:00:00:466-0:00:21:138	1. J'aiuneliste d'inscritspour l'examen de recommandation et résolution de la commission corporation de relation International et règlement de conflits. Le premier c'est l'honorable F. Perrera.

0:00:00:700-0:00:21:177	**1. رئيس البرلمان:** لدي قائمة بمن طلبوا الكلمة لبحث والنظر في التوصيات والقرارات الصادرة عن لجنة التعاون الدولي..المتحدث الأول هو السيد/ ف. بريرا... ....لم يأخذ الكلمة...
	1. **PAP President**: I have a list of those who ask to take the floor to consider and discuss the recommendations and resolutions issued by the Committee of International Cooperation. The first speaker is Mr. F Pereira (*not taking the floor)*

S –Time line – E 0:00:30:367-0:01:10:902	2. Merci honorable S. Moussa. Mr le président, je ne m'étais pas inscrit pour prendre la parole pour cette commission mais comme que on me l'a donné, je vais la prendre pour exprimer tout simplement mon adhésion au rapport qui vient d'être lu par mon collègue et dire que j'avais parfaitement å l'ensemble,des dispositions qui sont prisent par cette commission pour contribuer aux règlement de certains conflits qui éclatent en Afrique.
0:00:30:229-0:01:11:821	**2. رئيس البرلمان:** شكراً .. **الموقر سي. موسي.** سيدي الرئيس .. لم أضع اسمي على قائمة المتحدثين ≡ المتحدثين في هذه اللجنة.. ولكن حيث تعطوني الكلمة سوف أتناولها لكي ما أعرب عن موافقتي على التقرير الذي قرأءة زميلي.. وأقول.. إنني أوافق تماماً على مجمل القرارات **والأحكام** التي اتخذتها اللجنة من أجل تسوية المنازعات في أفريقيا، وشكراً. **رئيس البرلمان:** معالي د فيليب—آسف سيدي الرئيس... هو خرج لمهمة طارئة..... الرئيس أنا ذكرت معالي د فيليب... سيدي الرئيس هو خارج القاعة.. لكن يمكنني الحديث بالنيابة عنه.. **الرئيس:** لا .. لا ;. ..
00:21:13 – 00:00466	2. **PAP President**: Thank you. Honourable S. Musa. Mr. President. I did not registered my name in the list of speakers ≡ *speakers in this committee*. However as you gave me the *floor* I will take it to express my agreement with the report that has been read by my colleague, and I say that I agree totally with all the resolutions and *provisions* taken by the committee to solve the conflicts in Africa. I thank you. **PAP President:** Honourable D. Philip— sorry Mr. President…..He is out in an emergency mission…. Sir I can speak on his behalf …*The President…* No…. No….

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: In the first segment, the President of the PAP introduced the debate using formal parliamentary register and rules within an institutional setting when he indicated that *he got a list of those who ask to take the floor*. From the start this explains the institutional rule that members who want to speak in any debate have to register first on a list of speakers on a given debate or subject. In the second segment, the speaker uses an informal form of address when he utilizes the given opportunity to express his total support for the committee report. This is clear in

calling the chairperson of the committee *my colleague* instead of *honourable chairperson of the committee* which indicates a cordial debate and stronger support for the resolutions of the committee at a formal as well as at the personal level.

Interpreting strategies: In the first segment, the Arabic interpreter uses a shorter version of the committee name. This is an acceptable move gearing towards gaining more time to hear more from the President when introducing the debate. The significance of this may be attributed to two factors, the first one being that the interpreter judges that there is no need to utter the full version of the committee name because it was only uttered by the President and, also, the members already know that they are going to debate the report of this committee as is specified on the 'order paper' (agenda), so there is no need for repetition. The second factor is that the interpreter might have thought that it is more important to hear any instructions regarding the debate than to repeat the full version of the committee name.

In the second segment, the interpreter uses delaying tactics to hear more of the speaker's message. As the member of the PAP firstly reacted that he did not register his name in the list of speakers, this may lead one to anticipate that he will not speak. However, the interpreter uses the delay as a constructive pause which enables her to continue delivering the speaker's message accurately when he decides to speak, even though his name was not registered, and since he was given the floor. The delaying tactic indicates that the interpreter has a high level of experience, proven by the fact that she delays the response time in order to give herself optimum space to hear the speaker's next move. More significantly, the interpreter skillfully uses various lexical properties of the Arabic language, especially connecters and separators with synchronized pauses and prepositions, such as *however, as* (ولكن حيث) and *to* (لكي ما), as flexible tools to quickly change the course of the interpreted discourse in order to adapt to whichever way the speaker follows. Such flexibility no doubt helps the interpreter in case the speaker does decline to take the floor. The interpreter can easily end the sentence here with a full stop; alternatively if the speaker accepts the offer to speak, as he did and as was rightly anticipated by the interpreter, then using the prepositions *however, as* and *to,* (حيث) (ولكن), (لكي ما), as connectors, enables the interpreter to proceed delivering the speaker's message without appearing to have stopped awkwardly and abruptly to cope with the situation. This enables the interpreter to deliver a well-connected and smoothly rendered chunk of interpreting. The interpreter uses a good style of formulation which helps her to self-correct and to mitigate any negative influence on her performance or, more importantly, to cope with any abrupt changes in the speaker's course, style or mode of delivery, without compromising the quality and flow of the produced discourse. It is worth noting that the interpreter also uses voice modulation by

stressing and extending the last letter in the Arabic word (سوف أتناولها), *I will take*, which perfectly supports the function rendered by the above prepositions.

Aided by context, discourse and previous knowledge, the interpreter uses these tactics successfully, demonstrated by two moves she performs. The first is when, after using a short pause as a delaying response tactic, the interpreter repeats the word *speaker* in a rephrased form and qualifies it by stating specifically *speakers in this committee,* which accurately conveys the speaker's message that he might have been registered under his name as a speaker in another committee. The second move is reflected in the fact that the interpreter strengthens the speaker's message by adding the word *provisions* as an achievement strategy, resulting in a good interpretation.

In conclusion, I argue that the influence of context, general knowledge, narratives and discourse on the interpreter's choice of interpreting strategies has been detected and identified. In fact, all of these elements play a role in helping the interpreter deploy a successful delaying response and rephrasing strategy in order to deliver an accurate message. As for interpreter influence in the course or trajectory of the discussion, this has not been detected; such detection possibly needs more investigation over a longer period and the collection of a larger volume of data.

S –Time line – E	
0:09:02:198-0:09:57:705	14 **PAP President:** Honourable S. Masebo… **S. Masebo**: Thank you Mr. President, I also joint the others to *commend* the committee on this good job done. ..ia.hm… But I just had one issue that I want to *find out* from the President of this committee and *that is a kind of look back* to what we earlier resolved in the motion that was put forward to this House in the morning concerning Libya and whether there is any conflict, ... in our decision earlier on in the morning and now…I also I want him to look at … I notice that he made a correction on one point and that is he described… I think the description was the opposition parties… earlier on he had put the term rebel… I also just want him to make a comment on that. Just for my clarity….
0:09:03:845-0:10:02:875	**14. رئيس البرلمان:** الموقرة س. ماسيبو... **س. ماسيبو:**......شكراً سيدي الرئيس... ..أنضم إلى الأعضاء الآخرين **لأعلق** على .. و**أهنئ** اللجنة على هذا العمل الجيد الذي أدته .....ولكن لدي أمر واحد أريد أن أستفسر عنه من رئيس اللجنة وهو يتعلق.. **بالنظر** إلى ما قررناه سابقاً في القرار الذي قدم صباح اليوم بشأن ليبيا في هذا المجلس وما إذا كان هناك أي تضارب في قرارنا سابقاً والآن... وأريد منه أيضاً أن ينظر.... ولاحظت إنه أجرى تصحيحات في نقطة واحدة.. أعتقد إنه وصف أحزاب المعارضة أو أطراف المعارضة واستخدم كلمة متمردين.. أريد منه أن يعلق على هذا الأمر. من أجل التوضيح. **BT: 14. PAP President**: Honourable S. Masebo.. **S. Masebo**: Thank you Mr. President, I also join others members to *comment on and congratulate* the committee for this good work done. ..ia.hm…But I *have* one matter that I want to *enquire* about from the

> Chairperson of this committee… it is regarding… *considering* what we resolved earlier on the *resolution regarding Libya* that *was* submitted this morning to this *House* and whether there is any contradiction in what we decided previously and now…and I also want from him to look…and I noticed that he made *corrections* on one point. I think that he described *the opposition parties or opposition sides* and used the word *rebels* ...I want him to comment on this matter for clarity.

Analysis

Discourse and narratives: In this segment of the parliamentary debate, the speaker shows the influence of competing narratives and discourses about the Libyan conflict. This is revealed in the speaker's inquiry about whether there are any possible contradictions between the House decision concerning Libya which apparently uses the term *opposition* and the Committee Report which uses the term *rebels*. However, the speaker's utterance reveals that the prevailing competing discourses and narratives in the Plenary Session are much stronger and more divergent than what is reflected in the Committee Report later on. This, in turn, reveals that African narratives and discourses on conflict resolution and reconciliation have finally prevailed, reflected in the resolution presented to the House the same morning. Possibly, however, the House has opted to request the committee to reconsider this resolution in order to come up with more reconciliatory recommendations that reflect the African discourse of meditation, which is clearly materialized in replacing the word *rebels* with *opposition*. The influence of competing narratives and discourses is possibly still developing in the speaker's mental representation of the events, as revealed by two speech acts. The first is the speaker's apparent hesitance, shown by hesitation/umming (*…ia...hm*) – a pointer of an unassertive style, together with her prolonged sentence expressing concern regarding *one issue* that could be expressed in a shorter and more direct sentence (which eventually came in the form of an enquiry). The second is the speaker's retraction, clear in her utterance *I also want him to look at … I notice that he made*, which indicates that she has not as yet made up her mind, or that her mental representation of the conflict is still in the process of formation. This last point is supported by a stronger marker of unassertiveness, reflected in the speaker's use of the word *corrections* to describe the replacement of the word *rebels* by *opposition parties*. This also came as an enquiry for clarity that mitigates her discursive position on the conflict; alternatively it could be a reflection of a stronger discourse of conflict resolution and reconciliation that seeks to express a balanced mediating position.

Interpreting strategies: At the beginning, the Arabic interpreter relies on word sounds when interpreting the word *commend* as *comment*. However, given the context of discussion and the structure of the speaker's utterance, the interpreter can be excused for this apparent slip. However,

the interpreter self-corrects by successfully adding the word *congratulate* which serves to strengthen the speaker's message by correctly conveying it not as a mere comment, but also as an expression of commendation, appreciation and congratulations; this is supported by the subsequent phrase in the speaker's utterance: *good job done*. It is also possible to conclude that these interpreting strategies were used due to the influence of discourses and narratives on the interpreter that create a mental representation and make her aware of the course of the discussion. The setting and context have helped the interpreter in her rephrasing of the speaker's message into a more direct form when she uses the Arabic word for *enquire* (أستفسر) instead of *to find out*, which represents an economic use of words and a more direct style than that of the speaker's. In my view, this is a good strategy as it serves to strengthen the speaker's message by adding a sense of directness. This is again supported in the interpreter's subsequent reformulation of the speaker's message, where she uses the word *considering* to replace the speaker's longer utterance *and that is a kind of look back to what…* However, I suspect that the interpreter might be misunderstanding or confusing the phrase *look back* in the speaker's utterance as *look at*, as in this case the interpreter does not reflect the speaker's intention to *look back* to *what was earlier resolved*. This is why she used the term *considering* instead. Apart from this, the interpreter reflects the speaker's message up to the end and strengthened it in more than one instance.

I conclude that the influence of competing narratives and discourses about the Libyan conflict is clear in the speaker's utterance. More significant is the influence of African discourse on reconciliation, conflict resolution and mediation apparent in the speaker's questions and in her mitigating discourse, especially in her replacement of the word *rebels* with the word *opposition* as a correction which, in turn, reveals that said influence is still developing in some incidences of the speaker's utterance.

As for the Arabic interpreter, the influence of context as well as of prevailing discourses and narratives is clear in her choice of interpreting strategies and in her performance. The fact that the interpreter has strengthened the speaker's message more than once means that the interpreter has a clear influence on the discourse, and might also have some influence on the course of the discussion by strengthening the speaker's message. At this point, however, this cannot be detected due to the fact that there were no many Arabic members of the PAP who took the floor after this segment. Even if one or two Arab speaking members did take the floor, one could still argue that the aforementioned interpreter influence would be very meager as it would not suffice to establish a pattern of influence.

S -Time line - E	
0:10:02:922-0:11:14:250	15. And lastly Mr. President. I think that sometimes….this just brings me to an issue transpired earlier when we are talking about Ivory Coast … there is an issue of African Union did send African leaders to go and try and solve their problems or assist the warring parties in Ivory Coast… but what was transpired was that those were sent were not *met by* the other side of the warring parties... This to me some times an organization such as ourselves... must *try to be very* careful if we are going to help solve problems in some of these conflicts within Africa... not to be seen as taking very strong positions especially if we are going to meet two warring parties,. I just thought that I have to make these comments for *the consideration of the committee or the Chairperson to consider when he responds*… but otherwise I support all the recommendations that the committee has put forward.
0:09:58:270-0:11:18:308	15. وأخيراً سيدي الرئيس أعتقد أننا في بعض الأوقات.. هذا يقودني إلى بعض//أمر... برز سابقاً عندما تحدثنا عن كوردفوار.. وهناك قضية أن الاتحاد الأفريقي أرسل قادة أفريقيين لمحاولة حل المشكلة في كوردفوار.. ولمساعدة الأطراف المتحاربة في كوردفوار.. ولكن اتضح أن الذين أرسلوا لم **يلتقوا** .. بالأطراف../ببعض الأطراف المحاربة.. وهذا يقودني إلى أن أقول أن منظمة كمنظمتنا يجب أن تكون حذرة للغاية إذا كانت ستكون **قادرة على** حل مشاكل في النزاعات الأفريقية، حيث لا ينبغي أن ينظر إلينا بأننا نتخذ مواقف قوية جداً .. لا سيما إذا كنا سنواجه../سنقابل **مجموعتين متحاربتين**.. **أردت أن أعلق..**/**أن أنقل ذلك أمام رئيس اللجنة** ... وبخلاف ذلك فأنا أؤيد كل التوصيات التي توصلت إليها اللجنة.. وشكراً جزيلاً
	BT: 15. And lastly Mr. President. I think that sometimes….this leads me to *some//*matter… emerged earlier when talked about cote de voir … there is an issue *that* African Union did send African leaders to try and solve *the problem in Cote d`avoir*… but what was transpired was that those who were sent have not met the parties/some warring parties... *This leads me to say* that an organization such *as our* organization *must be* very careful if *it will be able* to solve problems in the *African* conflicts such that *should not* to be seen as taking *very* strong positions… especially if we are going to *face / to* meet *two warring groups*, ..I just thought that I have to *comment… /to convey that before the chairperson of the committee*...otherwise I support all the recommendations that the *reached* by the committee. Thank you very much.

Discourse and narratives: In this segment, it is clear that the speech acts and style of delivery of the speaker sometimes tend to follow difficult patterns of retraction, hesitation and false beginnings, as if the idea or mental representations are not clear in her mind. Most probably, however, the speaker is simply trying to be careful and diplomatic in choosing her words. This is clear in two instances; firstly in the first segment of the speaker's utterance where she starts by saying *I want him to look at* … but instead of completing the sentence she begins another sentence: *I notice that*…; and, secondly, in segment two, where the speaker begins the sentence with *I think that sometimes…*, but

then fails to complete the sentence and instead begins another sentence by saying *This just brings me to an issue transpired earlier*.

Coming back to the influence of African discourse on reconciliation and mediation, we notice that it becomes very prominent in this segment of the speaker's utterance. In fact, the speaker appears to be one of the proponents of such discourse, as reflected in her argumentative moves, especially when she uses an example of recent AU efforts to solve the conflict in the Ivory Coast in order to evoke memories and remind the PAP members of the possibility that their efforts may fail if they do not talk to the two parties of the conflict. The speaker discursively supports her point by using the phrase *an organization such as ourselves* in order not to take a strong position towards one party and thus remaining equidistant between the two warring parties. Finally, the influence of the African discourse of mediation, reconciliation and conflict resolution is present in the speaker's diplomatic style; she avoids taking a position even though she tries to influence the debate towards the adoption of a neutral mediation position, culminating in her pronounced support for the recommendations presented by the committee, and especially the replacement of the word *rebel* with *opposition*.

Interpreting strategies: The interpreter clearly experiences difficulty in coping with the speaker's style of delivery, which is characterized by the false beginning of a sentence followed by a retraction, then abandonment at the beginning of another sentence. This style of delivery makes it difficult for the interpreter to anticipate what will be said or to draw a clear mental model of the trajectory of the speaker's utterance. This difficulty causes the interpreter to fail to convey the speaker's message accurately; this is evident when the interpreter adds the word *some* to the phrase *some warring parties*, weakening the speaker's message that by not meeting *the other side of the warring parties* the African leaders have failed in their effort to assist in solving the problem (meeting only one party to the conflict is seen as taking sides in the conflict, or as an indication of not recognizing *the other side of the warring parties*). The interpreter tries – unnecessarily in my view – to compensate for this by adding the preposition *very* to the phrase *taking [a] very strong position*. However, considering the context as well as the mental model constructed through the influence of African discourse on mediation and conflict resolution, the interpreter still manages to convey the speaker's message and added his own direct style in some instances.

It is worth noting that the speaker's style of delivery adds more load to the interpreter's short term memory because of the repeated retractions, making it difficult for the interpreter to anticipate the speaker's next move. Such added effort results in occasional clumsy interpreting of the speaker's

utterance, including the use of inappropriate prepositions and lexical choices such as *will be able to solve problems [in] the African conflicts* instead of *if we are going to help solve problems in some of these conflicts within Africa*. However, at least in some instances, the interpreter has succeeded in making good and strengthens the speaker's message through a direct style such as using *our organization* instead of *an organization such as ourselves* as uttered by the speaker. Furthermore, the style of delivery influences the interpreter's performance, as is reflected in his apparent hesitation in the subsequent segment when uses the phrase *to face,* then self-corrects by saying *to meet*. But I think the most probable explanation is that, faced with such a difficult style of delivery, the interpreter deployed anticipation as well as self-correction strategies. This explanation was supported by the fact the term *to face* has the same meaning in Arabic as the term *to confront* – possibly justified by the use of the subsequent phrase *warring groups* which is either to be *confronted* by counterforce or *to meet* or hold a meeting as part of peaceful efforts. This is clear evidence that the interpreter has usefully used certain properties of Arabic to underpin both strategies which positioned the interpreter in a better place to cope with either course the speaker will follow. For instance, if the speaker chose to adopt a confrontational stance towards the *warring parties*, the interpreter has already deployed the word *face/confront* which will serve this purpose and, alternatively, if the speaker tends to speak about peaceful resolutions, the interpreter was already prepared to convey this message by using the word *to meet*. The interpreter's choice of phrases such as *warring groups* instead of *warring parties* is clearly a marker of the influence of discourse and narratives of African conflicts because, generally, terms such as *armed groups* and *rebel groups* are used more frequently that *warring parties* in the context of African conflicts which are often characterized by the involvement of many and different groups fighting each other either in an *intrastate* or in *interstate* conflicts. Lastly, the interpreter adds the phrase *to convey* which supports the speaker's message given that the apparent intention is not merely to comment but to convey a message of support for the course of action recommended by the committee, as explained above and as is clearly pronounced by the speaker in the last segment of her utterance.

Accordingly, I conclude that the influence of African discourses and narratives is clear in both the speaker and the interpreter's utterances. The above segments reveal, in several places, the influence of factors such as style of delivery on the interpreter's choice of interpreting strategy, as well as on the interpreter's performance. I argue that it would have been better for the interpreter to adopt techniques such as delayed response, rephrasing and summarizing in order to package the speaker's message more clearly. At this point I conclude that there was limited influence on the course or trajectory of the discussion exerted by the interpreter.

French into Arabic

S –Time line – E	3. **Honorable P. Hero**… Merci monsieur le Président. Je voudrais avant tout féliciter la commission et dire que je soutiens parfaitement les résolutions et recommandations qu'ils nous ont proposé mais en même temps, je voudrais souligner le fait que la commission devrait se pencher également sur les vieux conflits pour est-il, nous croyons que les conflits sont terminés mais quand on observe ses conflits sont toujours en cours.
0:01:13:811-0:02:06:275	
0:01:22:200-0:02:09:000	**3. معالي بي. هيرو** : شكراً سيدي الرئيس أود بادئ ذي بدء أن أهنئ اللجنة وأقول إنني أؤيد تماماً القرارات والتوصيات المقترحة علينا .. وفي نفس الوقت أود أيضاً أن أشير إلى أنه اللجنة **يتعين عليها** أن تتناول أيضاً مسألة النزاعات السابقة التي.◙ ≡ . اعتقدنا بأنها قد انتهت ولكننا حين نراقبها فندرك أن النزاعات لا تزال مستمرة . **PT: 3. Honourable P Heru..** Thank you Mr. Chair, First of all I would like to congratulate the committee, and say that I totally support the resolutions and recommendations proposed to us... and at the same time I would also like to indicate that the committee *should have* also deal with previous conflicts where ◙ ≡ we though *that* they are over, but when we monitor them so we become *cognizant* that they are still going on.

Discourse and narratives: The speaker's utterance reflects the general influence of African narratives and discourses about conflicts in Africa. There is no clear influence of narratives and discourses about the Libyan conflict in particular, other than an expression of support for the resolutions and recommendations proposed by the committee. This is apparent in the last segment of the speaker's utterance when he proposes that *the committee should have also dealt with previous conflicts.* One possible reason for the apparent absence of African narratives and discourses on the Libyan conflict may be a language barrier that limits the speaker's access to continental and worldwide narratives and discourses about this conflict, these being mostly in English, Arabic and other non-French languages. A related possible reason may be that the speaker is influenced more by Western narratives and discourses, specifically by French narratives and discourses about the Libyan conflict which are mostly in competition with – and attempt to conceal – the African discourse. There may also be underlying political or ideological reasons, or a reliance on a discourse or narrative that portrays the Libyan conflict as insignificant or as no different from previous African conflicts.

Interpreting strategies: The Arabic interpreter renders the speaker's message directly into well-constructed Arabic. It is clear that the interpreter is well aware of the wider contexts and is also *au fait* with the discourse and narratives of conflict, as revealed by the ease with which she renders the speaker's message. It is clear that the interpreter has a good command of both Arabic and French

and that she makes good lexical choices, such as using the Arabic word (يتعين عليها) for *should have* as a connector word that helps the flow of delivery. She also effectively uses a one letter preposition (ف) in فندرك (*so we cognizant*), not only as a connecter but also as a conditional particle for the conditional clauses *observe them* and *so become cognizant*. More significantly, the interpreter makes a good semantic choice by using the Arabic word (ندرك) for *cognizant* which has deeper cognitive sense than *realize*, *perceive*, *know*, *notice* or *become aware*. Such a good semantic choice strengthens the speaker's message on giving due consideration to the previous conflicts which are still ongoing.

In conclusion, I argue that the primary influences here are general African discourses and narratives on conflict resolution, but that the influence of other competing discourses may also be detectable in the speaker's utterance. The interpreter shows full awareness of the general context and displays a high level of linguistic competence, resulting in effective interpreting which definitely made the speaker's message more convincing and which no doubt will show the influence of the interpreter on the trajectory of the discussion if space constraints had enabled us to establish and follow the patterns of such influence in more detail.

S –Time line – E	4. Je pense notamment aux problèmes de la République Démocratique du Congoqui est devenu un centenaire pour différentes fortes négative qui déstabilisent les pays voisins mais aussi la République Centre Africaine où même s'il y a eu des élections très ressèment continu d'être un territoire d'autre parts des rebellions pour déstabiliser les pays voisins. Mais il y a aussi d'autres région en conflits comme le Darfour et bien d'autres, l'heritreretc donc je crois que dans l'avenir le rapport de la commission devrait être plus exos tiffe et concerner toutes les régions du continents qui sont en conflits . Je vous remercie.
0:02:08:732-0:03:01:749	
0:02:08:900-0:03:06:170	4. وأقصد هنا على وجه الخصوص مشكلات جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية التي أصبحت أراضي لكثير من البلاد ◙ القوات السلبية التي تقوض استقرار الدول المجاورة... وكذلك جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطي بالرغم من إجراء الانتخابات حديثاً فإنها تعتبر أراضي ينطلق منها المتمردون لتقويض استقرار الدول الأخرى وهناك نزاعات في مناطق أخرى مثل دار فور وغيرها..فأرجو في المرة القادمة أن يكون تقرير اللجنة مستفيضاً ويتناول جميع النزاعات في مختلف الأقاليم.شكراً.
	PT: 4. I mean in particular the problems of Democratic Republic of Congo which has become territories for many…*countries* ◙.negative forces that undermine stability of the neighboring countries….and also the Central African Republic, despite that election were organized recently, however is regarded a territory from which rebels base to destabilize other countries, and they are other conflicts in other areas such as Darfur and others... So; I hope that next time the report of the committee should be elaborate and to deal with all conflicts in different regions... Thank you.

<u>Analysis</u>

<u>Discourse and narratives:</u> The influence of general African narratives and conflict resolution discourses becomes more apparent in this segment of the speaker's utterance. In fact, the speaker does not comment on the Libyan conflict, instead he uses examples of other conflicts in his argumentation in order to support his point that the Committee Report should be more comprehensive and deal with conflicts in different regions. It is worth noting that the examples of conflicts the speaker uses are mostly those in French speaking countries, reflecting the same possible influences of discourses, narratives and ideological preferences previously highlighted.

<u>Interpreting strategies:</u> As the Arabic interpreter becomes more aware of the speaker's pace, style of delivery and information structuring, she begins to employ an anticipation strategy, exemplified by the use of the word *countries* instead of *forces*. Here, however, the interpreter makes a good move by pausing to hear more of the speaker's message, after which she self-corrects by adding the word *forces*. This move slightly affects the interpreter's lexical choice and she proceeds to use the Arabic word (السلبية) for *negative*. This is a technically suitable term, but the word (سالبة) – a relatively new Arabic term which has only recently begun to be used to describe armed/rebel forces based in one country in order to destabilize neighboring countries or a region – would have been better. Apart from this, the interpreter delivers a good performance and makes excellent lexical and semantic choices, such as the use of the Arabic word (مستفيضاً) for *comprehensive* instead of (شـاملاً) – the first term does mean *comprehensive* but it also denotes a sense of *more elaborate* and *detailed*.

I conclude that the influence of general African discourses and narratives on conflict resolution, along with the possible influence of other competing and/or specific discourses and narratives, can be further confirmed in this segment of the speaker's utterance. The interpreter continues to give a good performance and makes excellent lexical and semantic choices which will surely have an influence on the discourse. However, no influence of the interpreter on the trajectory of the discussion has been detected.

| **S –Time line – E**
0:03:32:570-0:04:41:906 | 5. Honorable K. Balla. Merci monsieur le Président. Comme vous le savez les conflits en Afrique sont d'actualités. Je pense que la commission qui est chargé du règlement de ses conflits a traité de beaucoup de sujets mais il me semble que la bande Sahélienne qui est soumise aussi a beaucoup de conflits notamment avec la rebellions et les enlèvementdes Européens doit constituer également un point de vue de cette commission. Parce que le Mali, depuis fort longtemps est entrain de former un regroupement serigionale pour pourvoir traiter ce problème maismalheureusement tous les pays de cette zone n'ont pas |

	compritl'esprit du Mali dans le cadre d'un règlement globale.
0:03:33:047-0:04:41:100	**5. معالي ك. بالا:** ..شكراً سيدي الرئيس كما تعلمون فإن النزاعات في إفريقيا هي جارية ومستمرة حتى الآن ◙ وأعتقد أن اللجنة المعنية بتسوية هذه النزاعات قد بحثتها.. ولكنني اعتقد أن منطقة الساحل وهي تتعرض أيضا لكثير من النزاعات ولا سيما بوجود المتمردين وكذلك اختطاف الأوروبيين ..الذي يجب أن يعتبر نقطة تبحثها هذه اللجنة... لأن مالي منذ وقت طويل ...ـ.. تحاول إنشاء مجموعات شبه إقليمية لبحث هذه المشكلات.. ولكن للأسف جميع بلدان هذا الإقليم الساحلي لم يفهموا روح مالي في إطار التسوية الشاملة.
	BT: 5. **Honourable K. Bala:** Thank you Mr. President,… as you know that Conflicts in Africa are going on and continuing till now ◙ **I**, think the Committee in charge of conflicts resolution, has discussed them…., however, I think the *Sahel region* is also facing many conflicts especially with the presence of rebels and also kidnapping of the Europeans... which should be considered a point to be discussed by this committee…. Because //... Mali... for a long time… has been trying to establish sub-regional grouping to discuss these problems….however regretfully all the countries of this *'coastal'* region haven't understood the spirit of Mali in the framework of *comprehensive settlement*.

Discourse and narratives: The speaker's utterance reflects the influence of African narratives and discourses about conflicts in Africa in general. There is no clear influence of the prevailing African discourse about the Libyan conflict. It seems that the speaker is influenced by other strands of discourses and narratives, such as those dealing with persistent conflicts in Africa in general and those focusing on specific regional conflicts, the Sahel region in particular. The speaker's utterance does draw on one aspect of mainstream African discourse, namely its concern with the repercussions of the Libyan conflict on the stability of neighbouring countries in North Africa and the Sahel region. These specific discourses and narratives are, however, possibly related to broader global narratives and to discourses of rebels and terrorism as is clear in the example used by the speaker to support his argumentation on the kidnapping of Europeans which usually falls under Western discourse on terrorism. It is possible that these influences are more dominant than the influence of the African discourse about the Libyan conflict which seems to take a back seat in the mental representations of the speaker's utterance and his mental models of the Libyan conflict. This is further supported by the speaker's reference to Mali's efforts to establish a sub-regional grouping and a *comprehensive settlement* – a clear pointer that the Libyan conflict is viewed as a mere part of these persisting and emerging conflicts in Africa in general and in the Northern African and Sahel regions in particular.

Interpreting strategies: The Arabic interpreter's understanding of the context and her background knowledge of the narratives and discourses of African conflict enable her to rephrase and deliver

the speaker's message in well-constructed Arabic. The interpreter makes a suitable lexical choice by using the Arabic word (لا سيما) for *especially*, stressing the speaker's point. It is worth noting that the interpreter uses a delayed response tactic and pauses to gain a better understanding of the speaker's message, especially in the segment concerning Mali's efforts. However, despite the fact that the interpreter correctly delivers the essence of the speaker's utterance, she makes an erroneous lexical choice in adding the adjective *coastal* (ساحلي) to the word *region*, whereas the speaker was using the word *sahel* (الساحل)*,* which is the name of the region and which also means *coast* (ساحل). There is a regional organization in that African region called CEN SAD (سين صاد) which is an Arabic acronym for Sahel and Sahara (الساحل والصحراء) where CEN stands for Sahel and SAD stands for Sahara, and where the Arabic letter SAD (ص) does not have an equivalent in the English language. The CEN SAD organization was championed by the late Libyan leader Gaddafi. That being said, it would have been better for the interpreter to end with the word *region* or, alternatively, to have used the word *sahel* instead of the Arabic adjective *saheli* which means coastal. However, the interpreter may be excused given that both these words sound similar and also have similar meanings.

I conclude that the influence of specific discourses and narratives, as well as the possible influence of global or European discourses – in particular the French discourse on terrorism – is more apparent in the speaker's utterance than the influence of general African discourses and narratives on conflict resolution. The Arabic interpreter's good knowledge of the context as well as of different strands of discourses of conflict and terrorism clearly helps her performance. However, due to limited data and time it is not possible to determine the full extent and nature of the influence of the Arabic interpreter on the course of discussion.

S –Time line – E	6. Donc, je crois que la commission pouvait prendre cela en compte parce que dans l'avenir, si ses pays ne ce comprenaient pas ça peut poser encore des problèmes, surtout avec le problème Libyen ou actuellement des armes lourdes on été , les Libyens ont été rencontré dans la zone du Sahara. Je pense qu'à l'avenir *al Qaeda* pourra avoir d'importance dans cette zone. Je vous remercie.
0:04:42:241-0:05:08:800	
0:04:41:100-0:05:17:604	6. أعتقد أن اللجنة بوسعها أن تأخذ هذا الموضوع في الاعتبار لأنه في المستقبل إن لم تتمكن هذه الدول من أن تتفاهم فيما بينها ستظهر المشكلات ...ومثلاً بالنسبة لمشكلة **ليبيا فكثير من الأسلحة الثقيلة قد ظهرت في ليبيا**. واعتقد إنه إن لم تسوى المسألة فإن **القاعدة** سيكون لها وجود وستسبب في مشكلات في هذا الإقليم ...وشكراً.
	BT: 6. I think that the committee could take this issue into account, because in the future if these countries couldn't have understanding with each other, the problems will appear…. For example with regard to the *Libyan problem*, *there were many heavy weapons appeared in Libya*, and I think if the issue has not

been settled... *al-Qaeda will* have presence and will cause problems in this region.. Thank you.

Discourse and narratives: The speaker uses some discursive properties to support his argument when he warns of future problems between countries in the region. The influence of other specific discourses becomes more prominent in the speaker's utterance than that of mainstream African narratives and discourses about the Libyan conflict. This is supported by the fact that the speaker does not mention the Libyan conflict per se as an example, but instead only discusses one aspect of its repercussions for the region – the proliferation of *heavy weapons*. Significantly, the speaker's use of the term *Libyan problem* instead of *Libyan conflict* is another pointer of the speaker's mental representation of the Libyan conflict. The influence of Western narratives and discourses of terrorism is also dominant in the speaker's utterance, to such an extent that he uses the narratives of the African discourse of conflict resolution in order not to apply them to the Libyan conflict directly but instead to argue that the non-settlement of the conflict is a warning that will lead to the presence of the terrorist organization *al-Qaeda* in the region.

The speaker's utterance indicates here a different strand of the African narrative and discourse on the Libyan conflict that does not simply reflect divisions within the African position on the Libyan conflict but is also reflective of linguistic and cultural influences on mental representations and how these construct mental models about events. Possible reasons for this clear influence of dominant Western discourses on this strand of African discourse include French cultural and linguistic dominance, political and ideological factors, the speaker's (possible) limited access to other continental and global narratives and discourses about the Libyan conflict in languages other than French, or the strong influence of French media in this part of the continent, which is in competition with African discourse.

Interpreting strategies: As the Arabic interpreter is fully aware of the context and familiar with African discourses and narratives on conflict resolution in general and the Libyan conflict in particular, she does not encounter any difficulties and is able to deliver the speaker's message with ease. The influence of discourse is clear, especially in the fact that the interpreter's apparent knowledge of international discourse on terrorism helps her to make good lexical choices.

In conclusion, I suggest that the influence of African discourses and narratives on conflict resolution on the speaker's utterance is as prominent as the influence of the aforementioned specific strand of African discourse as well as Western and international discourses on terrorism. The

interpreter's background knowledge of different discourses about the Libyan conflict and of international discourses about terrorism clearly influences her choice of interpreting strategies and her performance. Despite this, it is difficult to conclusively establish any pattern of specific influence of the interpreter might have on the trajectory of the discussion.

Below, I present the same French interpreted segments, this time interpreted from French into English, for the purposes of making a brief comparison between the strategies used by the above interpreter, who interprets these segments from French directly into Arabic, and the below interpreter, who interprets them from French into English.

French to English (F-E)

S –Time line – E	1. J'aiuneliste d'inscritspour l'examen de recommandation et résolution de la commission corporation de relation International et règlement de conflits. Le premier c'est l'honorable F Perrera.
0:00:00:466-0:00:21:138	
0:00:02:000-0:00:20:071	**1. PAP President:** I have got a list of MPs who wanted to give input on the… consideration of the recommendations on conflicts resolutions, and the first one is Honourable F Pereira.. (desist *taking the floor- spoke on Portuguese*)

S –Time line – E	2. Merci honorable S. Moussa. Mr le président, je ne m'étais pas inscrit pour prendre la parole pour cette commission mais comme que on me l'a donné, je vais la prendre pour exprimer tout simplement mon adhésion au rapport qui vient d'être lu par mon collègue et dire que j'avais parfaitement à l'ensemble, des dispositions qui sont prisent par cette commission pour contribuer aux règlement de certains conflits qui éclatent en Afrique. Je vous remercie
0:00:30:367-0:01:10:902	
0:00:32:200-0:01:11:099	2. Honourable S. Musa: Mr. Chair I did not want to take the floor for the time being, but I am going to express myself then as you given me the floor to say that I agree with the report that has been read by my colleague, and I say that I agree totally with all the measures taken by this committee to be able to contribute to conflict resolutions in Africa. I thank you… *Thank you…* ..Honourable: S. Masibo: ….

Interpreting strategies: Comparing the interpreting strategies used by the French/Arabic interpreter, particularly her delaying tactic (employed to hear more of the speaker's utterance) and her pauses (in order to perform good processing and production, which results in conveying the message of the speaker's utterance successfully), I note that the French/English interpreter has not utilized tactics such as a comprehension strategy, which results in abrupt and inaccurate interpreting of the speaker's intention in this segment, conveying it inaccurately by saying that the speaker *do[es] not*

want to take the floor, while the speaker is actually saying that he had *not registered his name in the list of speakers in this committee*; this is accurately conveyed by the previous interpreter.

Notably, the French/Arabic interpreter strategically distributes pauses underpinned by the use of flexible connecters in order to better anticipate the speaker's next move. This is reflected in her use of prepositions like *as* and *however* as flexible connecters which enable her to construct the subsequent sentence in a manner that either enables her to retract or proceed in a way that provides a logical flow by subjoining the speaker's utterance through a connecting clause, such as *however he was given the floor*. It is clear that constructing the speaker's utterance in this way conveys the intention of the speaker in a logical sequence. The French/English interpreter uses a different sequence by indicating that the speaker first decides to speak: *then as he was given the floor*. In my view the French/Arabic interpreter uses a good strategy that results in a logical sequence and flow of communication supported by correct lexical choices and a more direct style. This is clear in the way she uses phrases such as *I will take it* and *to express my agreement* instead of longer formulations such as the French/English interpreter's *to express myself then as you given me the floor to say that...* The French/Arabic interpreter uses suitable parliamentary discourse, reflected in her use of good lexical choices such as *resolutions* and *provisions*, as compared to the French/English interpreter who uses a more general discourse, e.g. in using the word *measures*.

From this brief comparison it is clear that the French/Arabic interpreter displays a higher level of experience than the French/English interpreter and that this is demonstrated in her use of suitable strategies and tactical moves, reflected in her appropriate distribution of pauses, good lexical choices, direct style and formal parliamentary discourse, all of which results in a good performance. I conclude that the most significant possible reasons for such differences in performance are levels of experience, background knowledge of parliamentary discourse and debates and the influence of narratives and discourses about the subject of the debate, which no doubt has its influence in the course of discussion .

S –Time line – **E**	3. Honorable P. Hero.
0:01:13:811-0:02:06:275	Merci monsieur le Président. Je voudrais avant tout féliciter la commission et dire que je soutiens parfaitement les résolutions et recommandations qu'ils nous ont proposé mais en mêmetemps, je voudrais souligner le fait que la commission devrait se pencher également sur les vieux conflits pour est-il, nous croyons que les conflits sont terminés mais quand on observe, ses conflits sont toujours en cours.

0:01:16:200-0:02:06:723	3. Honourable P. Hero thank you Mr. President .. I have to congratulate the committee, I say that I support all the resolutions and recommendations that have been proposed, and at the same time I would like to *underscore* the fact that the committee should have *focused as well* on the previous *conflicts* where we think that *these conflicts* are over… but they are still underway…

Interpreting strategies: The French/Arabic interpreter correctly renders the inceptive/opening (*je voudrais avant - first of all*) of the speaker which is omitted by the French/English interpreter. She further adds the preposition *to us* at the end of the first sentence in order to precisely convey the speaker's intention, instead of using the passive voice as the French/English interpreter does. The French/Arabic interpreter makes sound lexical and semantic choices by using terms such as *to indicate* and *deal with* instead of *underscore* and *focused,* which are also used by the French/English interpreter. The French/Arabic interpreter also rephrases the speaker's utterance better in a way that enables her to use the preposition *they* in order to avoid repeating the word *conflict* twice in the same way that the French/English interpreter does. One of the possible reasons why the French/Arabic interpreter is able to use this strategy successfully is that she is influenced by the discourses and narratives of conflicts and conflict resolution and is familiar with the parliamentarian context and discourse. It is significant that this strategy provides the French/Arabic interpreter with more pace not only to reconstruct the speaker's message well, but also to free up more space in her short term memory which, in turn, allows her to convey the speaker's message superbly up until the end by fully rendering the last part of the speaker's utterance (*but when we observe them, we realize that*…), which is completely abandoned by the French/English interpreter.

This brief analysis shows the positive influence of discourses and narratives on the interpreter's choice of interpreting strategy. It further confirms the influence of experience, background knowledge, context and linguistic competence on the interpreter's performance. The analysis further provides empirical evidence that adopting a suitable interpreting strategy not only alleviates pressure on the interpreter's short memory but also guarantees strategic dividend to free up sufficient memory space for the interpreter to elegantly package and deliver the speaker's message in an accurate, stylish manner, which of course strengthens the speaker's message with possible influence on the trajectory of discussion.

S –Time line – **E** 0:02:08:732-0:03:01:749	4. Je pense notamment aux problèmes de la République Démocratique du Congoqui est devenu un centenaire pour différentes fortes négative qui déstabilisent les pays voisins mais aussi la République Centre Africaine où même s'il y a eu des élections très ressèment continu d'être un territoire d'autre parts des rebellions pour déstabiliser les pays voisins. Mais il y a aussi d'autres région en conflits comme le

	Darfour et bien d'autres, l'heritreretc… donc je crois que dans l'avenir le rapport de la commission devrait être plus exos tiffe et concerner toutes les régions du continents qui sont en conflits . Je vous remercie.
0:02:08:732-0:03:05:147	4. *as far* as Democratic Republic of Congo, is concerned which has become sanctuary for to *different* negative forces that *destabilize* the neighbouring countries and also the *Centrum* African Republic, *even if* where election organized recently *continued be* a territory that is the basis of rebellion to destabilize the neighboring countries, and they are all other regions that are in conflict such as Darfur and Eritrea and *all this*….. So; I think in the future, reports of the committee should be more *exhaustive* and they should concern with *all other regions* of the continent*, the regions that are regions in conflicts…* : Thank you

Interpreting strategies: In this segment, the French/English interpreter begins conveying the speaker's utterance as though it is separate from the previous utterance by starting with *as far as DRC is concerned*. In my opinion this weakens the link with the previous segments to some extent. This position is supported by the different manner in which the French/Arabic interpreter begins conveying this segment: *I mean in particular the problems of DRC*. In my view this demonstrates a good strategic sense by ably conveying the speaker's affirmative and accretive style, providing a strong link with the previous segment through the use of the affirmative phrase *I mean*.

It is worth noting that the French/English interpreter makes a good lexical choice, accurately conveying the speaker's message by using the word *different* instead of *many*, as is used by the French/Arabic interpreter. The French/English interpreter also correctly renders the term *negative forces* without any apparent hesitation, whereas the French/Arabic interpreter's rendering was marked by hesitant anticipation.

In this segment, the French/Arabic interpreter tries to anticipate the speaker's utterance by using the phrase *many…country*, whereas the speaker instead aims to communicate *many forces*. As the interpreter pauses to hear more of the speaker's utterance, she is able to adopt a repair strategy, clear in her self-correction of the term *negative forces*. However, it would have been better for her to use a slightly different form of the Arabic descriptive word for this term.

One possible reason for the good performance of the French/English interpreter in this segment is that he is influenced by specific discourses and narratives of the conflict in this region and/or in the DRC in particular. The DRC has witnessed conflicts in different parts of the country over many decades and these have become more prevalent in recent decades in the eastern part of the country, fueled, sustained and influenced by conflicts in neighboring countries like Rwanda, Uganda and the

Central African Republic, to the extent that these have become a collective threat to the stability of the whole Great Lakes region. This, in turn, has led to the convening of the International Conference for the Great Lakes in an attempt to find lasting solutions for these conflicts, and it is in this context that the phrase *negative forces* has recently emerged.

These facts indicate the possibility that the French/English interpreter is influenced more by this regional or special strand of narratives and discourses than the French/Arabic interpreter is. This view is supported by the fact that the French/English interpreter rightly anticipates the speaker's use of the term *negative forces* as a ready stock phrase, whereas there is an apparent lack of this specific discursive influence on the French/Arabic interpreter. This view is further supported by the fact that this special strand of regional conflict discourse and narrative is more dominant in French speaking countries and media than in Arabic speaking ones. Again, this justification is supported by the fact that even when the French/Arabic interpreter self-corrects, she fails to use the more suitable and recently evolved Arabic phrase for *negative forces,* as I explained previously.

It should be highlighted that a good choice of interpreting strategies in terms of making the right lexical and semantic choices influence the interpreter's performance to a large extent. This view is supported by the phrases and prepositions used by the French/English interpreter, e.g. *centrum*, *even if*, *continued to be, concern with* and *all this,* all of which clearly hinder the interpreter's delivery and result in occasionally incomplete sentences. The reason for this is that incorrect or unsuitable strategic moves in terms of lexical and semantic selection tend not to give the interpreter enough flexibility to maneuver by changing formulations, rephrasing and constructing sentences, the end result being a compromised performance. This view is supported by the fact that the French/Arabic interpreter makes good lexical and semantic choices by using appropriate phrases, prepositions and connecters like *central, despite, regarded a territory, deal with* and *others*. Compared with the lexical and semantic choices of the French/English interpreter, it is noticeable that their later ones denote cause and effect and are flexible enough to enable the interpreter to repair, correct or even change track without compromising the delivered output. These strategic choices provide the French/Arabic interpreter with the optimal pace to deliver the speaker's message more accurately. This is reflected in the well-constructed delivery of the French/Arabic interpreter in subsequent segments, strengthening the speaker's message by using phrases like *to undermine stability* instead of *destabilize,* as is uttered by the speaker and correctly conveyed by the French/English interpreter. In my view, the addition of the word *undermine* is a good lexical choice and possibly strengthens the speaker's message.

Lastly, the benefits of applying an appropriate strategy are evident again in the good delivery by the French/Arabic interpreter in the last segment of the speaker's utterance where she delivers the concise *to deal with all conflicts in different regions* instead of the clumsy and repetitive delivery of the French/English interpreter's *should concern with all other regions of the continent, the regions that are regions in conflicts.*

This analysis confirms the influence of different strands of discourses and narratives on the interpreter's choice of interpreting strategy. It also provides evidence which confirms the importance of applying appropriate interpreting strategies, showing that these aid performance by providing memory space to focus on production and stylistic strategies in order to deliver the speaker's message accurately and in an appropriate standard and style which, in turn, will influence the discussion in one way or another by strengthening or weakening the speakers' messages.

S –Time line – E	
0:03:32:570-0:04:41:906	5. **Honorable K. Balla**: Merci monsieur le Président. Comme vous le savez les conflits en Afrique sont d'actualités. Je pense que la commission qui est chargé du règlement de ses conflits a traité de beaucoup de sujets mais il me semble que la bande Sahélienne qui est soumise aussi a beaucoup de conflits notamment avec la rebellions et les enlèvementdes Européens doit constituer également un point de vue de cette commission. Parce que le Mali, depuis fort longtemps est entrain de former un regroupement serigionale pour pourvoir traiter ce problème,maismalheureusement tous les pays de cette zone n'ont pas Comprit 'esprit du Mali dans le cadre d'un règlement globale.
0:03:34:505-0:04:40:417	5. **Honourable: K. Bala**: Thank you Mr. Chair… as you know that Conflicts in Africa are really rife, *we/ I…,* think that the Committee in charge of conflict resolution, *has really focused on different topics*, but the Sahel-*ian* territory *which* is *really* rife *of conflicts mainly* with the *rebellion* and the *ambushing* of the Europeans, is *really* an *opinions* this committee should *focus on...* Mali *,as you know*, for a long time has been trying to *form* a regional grouping to *treat* these *issues,* but *unfortunately* all the countries of t*he zone* haven't understood the spirit of Mali *in terms* of the *Global conflict resolution in general,*

Interpreting strategies: In this segment, the French/English interpreter commences hesitantly, either due to comprehension difficulty, hesitation in anticipating the speaker's message or a lack of clear strategy. Had the interpreter utilized the two pauses constructively as a comprehension and processing tactic, he would be in a better position to deliver a more coherent utterance. It is clear that this weak beginning results in erroneous lexical choices, such as the use of the word *rife* and the hesitant choice of the pronoun *we* which is then corrected to the first person pronoun *I*. This lack of strategy adds pressure, leading to further erroneous semantic and lexical choices, such as the use of the phrases *focus* and *different topic*. In contrast, it is clear from the beginning that the

French/Arabic interpreter adopts a delayed response tactic that enables her to grasp the speaker's message and to make appropriate lexical and semantic choices such as the use of *going on* instead of *rife*, supplying the appropriate sense of dynamism intended by the speaker. More significantly, this strategic clarity helps the French/Arabic interpreter to adopt a better formulation and employ the right connecters. For example, correct rephrasing and lexical choices provide the interpreter with enough flexibility to use the pronoun *them,* as in the phrase *has discussed them,* instead of having to resort to the long phrasing used by the French/English interpreter: *has really focused on different topics.* The different choices of the two interpreters not only influence their performance, but also affect subsequent strategies for a number of reasons, including the fact that economical word usage frees up memory space. Another repercussion is that longer sentences reduce the number of reformulation and rephrasing options open to the interpreter when attempting to deal with subsequent chunks in a way that optimally connects them to the preceding message. This reasoning is supported by a brief look at the different choices made by the two interpreters when interpreting the above segment. While the French/Arabic interpreter uses the pronoun *them* and the verb *discussed,* allowing for an accurate reference to *conflicts* and *discussion* which is the subject matter of the debate, the French/English interpreter uses *focused* and *different topics,* which leads to them conveying a more general message that does not necessary refer to *conflicts*. In the latter case there is insufficient evidence supporting reference to the discussion as the verb *focused* can refer to different acts that do not necessarily entail *discussion* or *debate*.

This analysis is further supported by the performance of both interpreters in the subsequent segment. While the French/Arabic interpreter correctly uses words and prepositions such as *but, I think, region, also*, *many*, *especially*, *rebels*, *kidnapping* and *point* to convey the speaker's message, I note that in the same segment the French/English interpreter uses *but*, *territory*, *which is really*, *rife of, mainly with*, *rebellion*, *ambushing* and *opinion*. The lack of strategic direction on the part of the French/English interpreter results in poor lexical and semantic choices, such as using the word *opinion* for *point*, *rebellion* for *rebels*, *ambushing* for *kidnapping* and *zone* for *region*. This lack of interpreting plan results in a semi-fragmented, disconnected delivery, as is clear in the last segment where the French/English interpreter fails to establish a coherent link between it and the preceding segments of the speaker's message, saying *Mali, as you know*, instead of using a more appropriate connecting phrase like *because*. This results in a clumsy and inaccurate interpreting of the speaker's message that lacks consistency and flow and which no doubt weakens the speaker's message with possible influence on the subsequent course of discussion.

This analysis practically demonstrates the crucial importance of interpreting strategies in the interpreter's performance.

S –Time line – E	6. Donc, je crois que la commission pouvait prendre cela en compte parce que dans l'avenir, si ses pays ne ce comprenaient pas ça peut poser encore des problèmes, surtout avec le problème Libyen ou actuellement des armes lourdes on été, les Libyens ont été rencontré dans la zone du Sahara. Je pense qu'å l'avenir *al-Qaeda* pourra avoir d'importance dans cette zone. Je vous remercie.
0:04:42:241-0:05:08:800	
0:04:40:518-0:05:13:835	6. So the committee should takes that into account, because in the future if the country…, the countries does not understand each other this could be a *source of conflict*, especially with *Libyan problem* where heavy weapons have been found in our zone,… in the Sahara, sub-Saharan zone, I think this will definitely influence the presence of *al-Qaeda*, Thank you very much.
	PAP President : Honourable Khomalo to respond to members.

Interpreting strategies: It is clear from the beginning that the French/English interpreter establishes a connection between this segment and the previous one, starting with *so*, which indicates the cause and effect relation. This is a good tactic, facilitated by sound lexical choices and supported by the affirmative clause *should* which strengthens the speaker's message. This is especially the case in the use of the word *because* to support the speaker's argumentation. The interpreter attempts to anticipate the speaker's utterance which is clear, for example, in the use of the word *country,* where it is evident that the interpreter is expecting more references to Mali from the speaker. However, the interpreter self-corrects when it becomes clear that the speaker intends to refer to all the countries in the region. The interpreter employs good strategy in rephrasing the speaker's utterance, reflected in the use of the phrase *a source of conflict* instead of *problems* (*des problèmes*), as uttered by the speaker. In doing this, the interpreter has, in my view, strengthened the speaker's argument further as in the context of the debate the word *conflict* carries more weight and influence than the word *problems.* The interpreter also stresses the speaker's message by using the emphasizing word *especially* to accentuate the danger of heavy weapons spread in the region as an adverse consequence of the Libyan conflict. However, in the last part of the speaker's utterance, the performance of the interpreter degenerates in the unnecessary repetition of the word *zone*. This, in itself, is for example, not a good lexical choice despite the fact that it is uttered by the speaker. In addition there is an incorrect reference to the *sub-Saharan zone,* where the speaker means the *Sahara* as part of the *Sahel and Sahara* region which consists of the member countries of the CEN SAD regional organization. This decline in performance is also evident in the interpreting of the last part of the speaker's warning message, which is derived from the discourses and narratives of

terrorism. Here the interpreter uses the phrase *definitely influence,* which weakens the speaker's warning of *al-Qaeda* presence by not stating specifically that this is *in the region*. Comparing this performance with that of the French/Arabic interpreter, I note that the latter conveys the speaker's message in a more diplomatic way by using terms such as *I think* and *could* instead of the affirmative forms *so* and *should* as used by the former interpreter. In addition, by adding the phrases *this issue* and *these countries,* the French/Arabic interpreter renders the speaker's message with greater clarity. This is supported by the use of the phrase *the problems will emerge* by the speaker but which the French/English interpreter delivers as *source of conflict.* The French/Arabic interpreter rephrases the speaker's message in a way that enables her to convey the message more accurately. This becomes clearer in the interpreted text of the last part of the above segment; using the term *for example* supports the speaker's argument and is strengthened by the use of a subordinate warning – *if the issue has not been settled* – coupled with a fundamental warning about *al-Qaeda* in a more definite terms, *will have presence,* and with a more specific and direct reference to the region.

I conclude that the influence of the regional discourses and narratives on conflict resolution, as well as the influence of international discourses and narratives of international terrorism, are clear in both the speaker and the interpreter's utterances. This brief analysis and comparison demonstrates once again the effect of interpreting strategies on the interpreter's performance which entails the interpreter's influence in the discussion. It further shows that the influence of a specific regional strand of African discourse on conflicts is more prominent than the mainstream African discourses and narratives on the Libyan conflict which are used here only in terms of their repercussions and not as pertaining to the conflict per se.

S –Time line – E	16. **Honourable Khomalo Marwik** President of the Committee to response: Thank you very much Mr. President…and thank you very much to my colleagues = Mr. President.. ◙ the Honourable S. Musa , we thank him for his support .. = the Honourable S. Masebo…Mr. President…=…any *conflict with the resolution* that was made this morning… I wouldn't say it is *a conflict per se.* Mr. President, but properly we wouldn't drafted the motion the same way that it was drafted , =.considering the fact that we are still going there Now… but I find my hands tied, because once the motion passed by Parliament even those opposed are party to that motion. So I *think Madam President…Mr. President. I will suggest properly we leave that part over and ab*ove that what the motion seek to do was the same action that we arrived in and that is to send a mission to Libya ≡…◙...so the contradictions are not there….is just probably the wording was a *bit tilted* just a little bit …
0:15:19:591-0:16:29:070	
0:15:21:404-0:16:30:203	16 رد **معالي رئيس اللجنة م. خومالو**: شكراً جزيلاً سيدي الرئيس، وأشكر زملائي.= . سيدي الرئيس . ◙...أنا أشكر السيد سيسي على **مساعدته** لنا... فقد. .= .آه. .= .. آه إن.. .= ..إن سيدي الرئيس أن = أي

نزاع و **أي تسوية** لا أقول أن أي تسوية حدثت بنسبة مئة بالمائة.. ولكننا عندما لم نكن قد **أصغنا** القرار بالطريقة ذاتها **ولا نزال نستمر في ذلك الجهد** ، ولكن أجد يدي **موثقتين** لأنه متى ما أجيز قرار بواسطة المجلس فإن حتى الذين يعارضونه ينبغي أن يلتزموا به وبالتالي **فاعتقد** سيدي الرئيس **واقترح أن نضع** هذا.. ◙. ≈... ...يجب أن نعرف ما يسعى القرار إلى تحقيقه والإجراء الذي توصلنا إليه هو إرسال ◙=مه بعثة إلى ليبيا وليس هناك تناقضات بل ربما هناك **تغيير في** الكلمات التي استخدمت ...

BT: 16. Honourable M. Khomalo Chairperson of the Committee response :
Thank you very much Mr. President…and I thank my colleagues,… Mr. President .. ◙ I thank the Honourable Sese., for *assisting us , as..ah..ah..that..* …that Mr. President…. = *any conflict* and any settlement, I wouldn't say any settlement happened *hundred percent*…but *if we haven't* drafted the *resolution* the same way, ….we are *still continuing in that effort*…however I find my hands *tied,* because once the *resolution* passed by *the House* even those oppose it should abide by it. Therefore I think *Mr. President…and suggest we put this ..* ◙. ≈.. *we have to know what the resolution seek to* achieve and the actions that we arrived to is to send a mis◙ =mission to *Libya* , and *there are no contradictions … however there is* a *change in the words which have been used.*

Discourse and narratives: A discourse analysis of this segment of the committee chairperson's response to the debate in the Plenary Session shows that the speaker's utterance contains different forms of politeness as well as formal modes of parliamentary address, such as *Mr. President* and *honourable members*. It also shows forms of respect through expressions of thanks and cordial forms of address such as *my colleagues,* and adds a personalized flair by mentioning members by name.

The speaker uses different linguistic tools and agents in his response to the debate of the Committee Report he presented in his capacity as chairperson of the committee. Such use of linguistic agency is clear in the speaker's utilization of his position in the debate as *chairperson* to express his own viewpoints in support of his committee report. Such a linguistic move was noticed before too when the speaker expressed his own opinions about the written committee's report he presented to the Plenary Session.

The speaker uses different forms of argumentation not only to respond to the members, but also to convince them and seek their support for the position taken by him and his committee, especially with regards to the Libyan conflict. His argumentation strategy is multifaceted: he commends those who expressed their support for the report he presented in the Plenary Session and he continues to defend the report. Through this appreciative move, the speaker persuasively seeks not only to consolidate support already expressed, but also to increase support for its resolutions and recommendations by the House. Another noticeable argumentative move is his apparent concession in not directly referring to the existence of any contradictions, ostensibly in order to mitigate their significance, as in his statement *I wouldn't say it is a conflict per se.* Notably, the speaker not only responds directly to the member who raises the point of contradiction/conflict, he also alerts the

PAP president and the House that he is responding to her: *Honourable S. Masebo Mr. President*...,
after which he indirectly denies any contradiction.

This kind of argumentative move by the speaker discursively develops from one form to another.
This is clear from the fact that after the apparent concession and indirect denial, the speaker moves
to another form of refuting contradictions by resorting to underestimation and justification. This can
be seen when the speaker turns the issue into a matter of *drafting* in order to create the impression
that there is not any fundamental difference in the contents or any contradiction with the morning's
previous resolution. The speaker supports this persuasive move via a structural emphasis on the
facts: *considering the fact that we are still going there.*

In addition to these persuasive moves, the speaker resorts to rhetorical figures and hyperbole in
order to support and enhance his argument, using metaphors such as *I find my hands tied*. In doing
so the speaker aims to blame any contradiction on the parliamentary system: *once the motion [is]
passed by Parliament even those opposed are party to that motion*. The speaker also introduces the
notion of *compromise* in order to accommodate divergent views and thus assist in conveying
neutrality within the conflict as a meaningful role. The influence of African discourses and
narratives of conflict resolution is clear here: the speaker highlights the role that the PAP as an
African institution can play in solving the Libyan conflict and this invokes the notion of African
solutions for African problems.

Significantly, the speaker repeatedly addresses the President of the PAP as *Madam President*,
before correcting himself and addressing him as *Mr. President*. This apparent slip of the tongue
reveals the influence of the previously dominant local discourse of parliamentary form of address in
the PAP: the former President of PAP was female.

The speaker develops his persuasive move by suggesting *leav[ing] that part* of the report as it is,
again using structural emphasis on the semantic content of facts by emphasizing the fundamental
issue the resolution seeks to address: *to send a fact finding mission.* The speaker further supports his
argument by adding a hyperbole, thus delivering the phrase *over and above* to be more convincing.
The speaker concludes by resorting to an apparent concession/underestimation in his concluding
remark that *the wording was a bit tilted, just a little bit*.

Interpreting strategies: The Arabic interpreter correctly delivers the speaker's formal mode of
parliamentary address and his discourse of politeness; however, he misinterprets the speaker's

intentions. Despite this it seems that the interpreter is influenced by parliamentary discourse. He wrongly anticipates the speaker's utterance, interpreting *his support* as *assisting us*, whereas the speaker meant to thank the member for expressing his support for the resolutions and recommendations presented by the speaker as chairperson of the committee. A possible reason for this failed anticipation is that the interpreter wrongly assumes that the speaker will speak more about Honourable S. Musa. This may be due to the earlier poor lexical choice of the phrase *assisting us* which, in turn, may have led the interpreter to anticipate that the speaker would elaborate on the said assistance. This is further explained by the interpreter's hesitation and stuttering at the end of the sentence as if he was expecting more from the speaker, which makes the sentence seem incomplete.

By skipping the name of the Honourable S. Masebo, the interpreter fails to understand the speaker's intention behind mentioning her name, which is to remind the President and the House that she is the one who raised the issue to which he is responding. This skipping indicates that the interpreter is under pressure to keep pace with the speaker's accent, speed and mode of delivery, which causes comprehension difficulty. This is supported by the interpreter's apparent hesitation and reliance on word sounds, as is clear in interpreting the term *per se* as *hundred percent*. This reasoning is further supported by the interpreter's misunderstanding of the speaker's utterance when interpreting *considering the fact that we are still going there* as *considering the fact that we are still continuing in that effort*. However, despite this, utilizing the context has helped to cushion the Arabic interpreter's effort in interpreting the subsequent chunk of the speaker's utterance more accurately and in managing to inject a higher Arabic register, as is clear in using the word (أجد يدي موثّقتين) for *I find my hands tied*, instead of resorting to a more common register such as (أجد يدي مقيدتين). However, it seems that this enhanced delivery has used up more of the interpreter's short term memory, which may reveal some bias in utilizing available short term memory capacity for listening, processing and comprehending the incoming chunk of the speaker's utterance. This may explain why the interpreter makes an omission – it is possibly due to a comprehension deficiency or because he has loaded too much of his short term memory with the formulation for the delivery of the previous segment. This is supported by the apparently hesitant and clumsy use of the terms *I think* and *suggest*. The interpreter would have performed better if he had properly utilized the space provided by the speaker's hesitation, retraction and self-correction when repeatedly addressing the President of the PAP as *Madam President.* The interpreter skips this entirely, although it is also possible that the speaker's stuttering has confused the interpreter. This is supported by the fact that the interpreter has not accurately conveyed the speaker's persuasive concessionary move – the speaker's statement that the *wording was a bit tilted, just a little bit* – which the interpreter renders as *however there*

may be change in the words which have been used. This formulation dilutes the persuasive power of the original utterance which intends to mitigate the influence of change in wording, by describing it as *a bit tilted, just a little bit* in a persuasive move to convince the House that there was no major change in the text.

I conclude that the influence of general African discourses and narratives on conflict resolution is apparent in both the speaker and interpreter's utterances, as is evident in their lexical choices and argumentative acts. The speaker uses different discursive features and persuasive moves in support of his argument. It is clear from this how important the role of context is in interpreter performance. This can be explained by the fact that, despite the difficulties encountered by the interpreter in some instances, utilizing the context allows him to make better use of the available space in his short term memory, thus mitigating processing pressures and eventually being able to deliver the speaker's message. This is further supported by the apparently more confident delivery of the interpreter in some parts of the above segment where he is able to employ a higher Arabic register. However, it is not possible at this point to detect a clear influence of the Arabic interpreter on the trajectory of the discussion.

<u>S –Time line – E</u>	17. that leads me to the second issue of *opposition vs. rebels*... ◙..
0:16:29:418-0:17:17:500	initially it was rebels… because ＝ ah.. ah…＝. the members felt.. no.. that how it was drafted.. but again the same issue ..members of the committee said no… we are going to Libya,,, we are going to Tripoli and we are going to go to Benghazi….now If these people get to find out that.. ＝…Oh.. you called us rebels in the Pan African Parliament ＝ how we are going to be received. So we chose a… a. ≈. a terminology that is properly appropriate, and we used a opposition because indeed they are an opposition to the government….
0:16:31;553-0:17:17:523	17. وهذا يقودني إلى الموضوع الثاني وهو الموقف تجاه المتمردين فقد كان. ◙ وهناك متمردون من حيث المبدأ. .وا.≈. . لأن ◙...اه..◙ آه .≈. .. آه..≡ .. لقد أعدت الصيغة كهذا ..هذا الموضوع ذاته.. ＝.. وقال الأعضاء كلا..＝.. .. نحن ذاهبون إلى ليبيا والى طرابلس وإلى بنغازي . وا ◙ فإذا كا＝ اكتشف هؤلاء الأشخاص أننا نتحدث.. ◙ نصفهم بأنهم متمردون فكيف سيستقبلوننا وبالتالي اخترنا مصطلحناً يكون ملائما وبالتالي استخدمنا المعارضة.. لأنها معارضة للحكومة ...سيدي الرئيس.
	BT: 17. this leads me to the second subject *which is the position towards the rebels…there was ◙ there are rebels in principle s,* and ≈.. because. ◙ …*ah ◙…. Ah…* ≡.. this is how it was drafted …this subject itself .. ＝ ..the members *said*.. no.. ＝ .. we are going to *Libya, and to Tripoli and to Benghazi…and* . ◙ . If .. ＝ these people *discover* that we talk.. ◙ … we *describe* them rebels .so how *they will* receive us. So we chose terminology to be appropriate, *therefore* we used a opposition ..because *it is* an opposition to the government…*Mr. President.*

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<u>Discourse and narratives:</u> In this segment, the speaker, who is the Chairperson of the Committee, discursively shifts his argumentative persuasion to another level, utilizing the thrust of his persuasive acts in the previous segment through the use of the connecting phrase *that leads me to the second issue*. Here the speaker moves to the crucial and controversial issue of *opposition vs. rebels* – a manifestation of competing discourses and narratives within mainstream African discourses and narratives themselves. In this part of the debate it is clear that the speaker needs a balancing act to accommodate these competing and divergent views. It is possible that the speaker's search for a balancing discourse is the reason behind his stuttering and repeated pauses, as he attempts to find a convincing response to help him navigate carefully between these competing discourses and narratives about the Libyan conflict. This is clear in the speaker's persuasive moves in the segment: he makes an apparent concession by admitting that the wording was initially *rebels*, but immediately moves to justify this by referring to what has transpired in the Committee discussion. In this regard the speaker uses structural emphasis on the facts of the Committee discussion, arguing that *the Committee said no… we are going to Libya*.

The speaker's discursive support for these persuasive acts is influenced by mainstream African discourse on conflict resolutions as well as the broader discourse of African solutions to African problems that necessitates neutrality. This is embedded indirectly in the speaker's warning of the consequences of using the term *rebels*, i.e. that the warring party will come to know that the PAP is framing them as *rebels*. The speaker shifts his persuasive act by employing implicitness and drawing on examples expressed by other members in the debate in order to support his argument, namely the fact that the *African Union sent African leaders to go and try to solve the conflict in Ivory Coast. But what was transpired was that those were sent were not met by the other side of the warring parties*. This has contributed to the undermining of these efforts as can be seen from the implication that these warring parties demonstrate that the AU is taking sides which is at odds with its role as a neutral mediator. This is why the speaker intends to evoke the memories of members in order to lead them to accept the replacement of the term *rebel* with the term *opposition,* thus balancing the competing and conflicting discourse(s) in the PAP and devising a common neutral position that will allow the fact finding missions to be accepted by both parties in the Libyan conflict. By doing so, the speaker consolidates the notion of *compromise* in order to accommodate conflicting discourse(s) and competing narratives within mainstream African discourses, as mirrored in the PAP discussions.

<u>Interpreting strategies:</u> It appears that the discourse of conflicts influences the Arabic interpreter's choice of interpreting strategy from the beginning of this segment. This is clear in the interpreter's anticipation strategy: the speaker begins by saying *that leads me to the second issue,* causing the

interpreter to anticipate that the speaker will discuss *the position towards the rebels*, whereas the speaker in fact intends to explain the replacement of the word *rebels* with the word *opposition* in the Committee Report. The interpreter is justified in inferring this given the speaker's style of arranging information; his apparent hesitation, his repeated pauses and his stuttering, clear in his utterance *opposition vs. rebels... [pauses] ...initially it was rebels*. The speaker's style and/or accent possibly causes comprehension difficulties for the interpreter. This possibility is reflected in the interpreter's failed anticipation attempt in the second part of the segment; he interprets the speaker's utterance as *there are rebels in principle*, while the speaker is in fact trying, by way of confession and as a means of persuasive argumentation, to convince the House that the wording of the report initially contained the word *rebels*.

The above explanation is supported by the fact that the interpreter's anticipation has provided him with more space to cope with his comprehension difficulties, made clear in his good delivery of the speaker's message in the subsequent part of this segment. This is further supported by the interpreter's improvement of the speaker's message in using the clause *therefore* as a causal connector that consolidates the speaker's appeal to replace the term *rebels* with the more appropriate term *opposition*. Helped by the immediate context of the discussion and by becoming more aware of parliamentary discourse and other broader discourses and narratives of conflicts, the interpreter strengthens the speaker's message by adding *Mr. President* to the end of his interpreting as a closing remark, which may wrongly indicate to the Arabic speaking audience that the speaker has concluded. While the fact that the speaker directs his response to the PAP President indicates an appropriate form of respect and a formal mode of Parliamentary address, it is also possible that the speaker is soliciting the President's support for his argument.

This analysis suggests that the influence of African discourses and narratives on conflict resolution are apparent in the interpreter's anticipation strategy. The speaker's accent and style of delivery clearly affect the interpreter's performance. However, in coping with these difficulties, and with the help of context as well as immediate and broader discourses, the interpreter positively influences the speaker's message.

Finally, it is possible that the interpreter may influence the subsequent course of discussion through his influence on the Arabic speaking members of the PAP. This possibility, however, needs to be investigated further with the help of more data, premised on the assumption that the debate on the same subject – all other things remaining the same – will continue for a longer period with the active participation of these members in the subsequent discussions.

S –Time line – E	18. **Chairperson**. Mr. President the members who just *making comment* that we should be mindful of taking sides…*when we deliberating with these issues… I couldn't agree* more with them…
0:17:17:546-0:17:32:500	
0:17:19:837-0:17:37:953	18. سيدي الرئيس إن هناك أعضاء قدموا ◙ أبدوا ..≈ ... =بعض **التوصيات** بشأن عدم الانحياز لطرف أو آخر **وأنا اتفق معهم كذلك تماماً.**◙ .... نعم
	BT: 18. Mr. President *there are members* who presented …◙ shown express. ≈...= some *recommendations* regarding not taking sides , *and … I totally agree with them* .. ◙ *yes…*

Discourse and narratives: In the above segment, the speaker has consolidated the notion of a common neutral position through a forthright expression of agreement with the members who caution the Committee against *taking sides*. H accomplishes this through the use of the indirect clause *I couldn't agree more with them.* This pronounced agreement reflects the fact that neutrality is the main focus of African discourses and narratives on conflict resolution and is therefore seen as a precondition for playing a meaningful role in solving African conflicts.

Interpreting strategies: The interpreter's apparent hesitation at the beginning of this segment indicates that the interpreter has encountered a comprehension difficulty, most probably due to the speaker's style of delivery which makes it difficult for the interpreter to fully anticipate what the speaker is intending. This is supported by the fact that the interpreter tries two tenses to begin with, namely *presented/submitted* and *shown/express*, as an attempt to prepare for the next chunk of the speaker's utterance. And here it seems that the interpreter is unsure of the direction of utterance the speaker is going to take. This becomes clear in the incorrect lexical choice made by the interpreter in saying *some recommendations* instead of *making comments*. However, the interpreter utilizes context, together with background knowledge and the influence of the prevailing discourses to better position himself to deliver the speaker's message. The interpreter does however adopt the appropriate strategy of skipping inessential parts of the speaker's utterance and so still conveys the message that he is clear skipping, namely *when we [are] deliberating these issues,* which gives the Arabic interpreter more space to rephrase and to make a good summary, which results in delivering the speaker's message accurately.

The above segment reflects that the speaker is generally in agreement with and sustains the general African discourses and narratives on conflict resolution by consolidating the notion of neutrality and by not taking sides, one of the main principles of effectiveness of these discourses and narratives. The importance of the influence of context and prevailing discourses on the interpreter's influence and his choice of interpreting strategy is clearly shown above. However, there is no

noticeable influence by the interpreter on the course of the discussion at this stage, and there is not enough data to further investigate the existence of such influence.

S –Time line – E	
0:18:18:085-0:18:18:085	*19. **Honourable Prospeir,** Yes he is right* .. Mr. President... but the problem *the issue in Africa is* so wide.. it is numerous.. but then.. Mr. President... we just have to carefully select… the issues, or the conflict areas we will be working on at *that given time.* Otherwise if we can actually focus ourselves on all *the trouble situations in Africa* I think we need two days…or… three days this Parliament debating on these issue…so we carefully select… otherwise some issues Honourable members have raised *they are going to form part of deliberation* in the future..
0:17:38:724 -0:18:21:563	19 سيدي الرئيس أن المشكلة فيما يتعلق بموضوع النزاعات هو موضوع واسع النطاق ومتعدد أيضاً ولكن.. ◙.. يا سيدي الرئيس يجب أن نختار بعناية القضايا في النزاعات ◙ **في مناطق النزاع** التي نعمل عليها. وإلا فإننا إذا ◙ **ركزنا** في كل **مناطق التوتر** في أفريقيا فأعتقد بأننا بحاجة إذا ◙ يحتاج البرلمان ليومين أو ثلاثة لكي يناقشها البرلمان الأفريقي ..وبالتالي اخترنا بعناية بعض القضايا التي تحدث عنها الأعضاء المحترمون وسوف نتناقش في هذا الأمر مستقبلاً. <u>**BT:**</u> *19.* Mr. President... the problem *regarding the issue of conflicts.* It is so wide *issue and numerous also,* but ◙ Mr. President.. we have to select carefully *the issues in the conflict*s . ◙ *in the areas of conflicts* we working on. Otherwise if we… ◙ *focus* on all the *tension areas* in Africa I think *we need .. if .* ◙ *the Parliament will need two* or three days for the *Pan African Parliament to debate them* …Therefore we carefully *selected* some issue that *respectful members talked about… we will discuss on this matter* in the future..

<u>Discourse and narratives</u>: Besides the fact that the speaker's utterance is in line with the objectives of mainstream African discourses and narratives on conflict resolution, he also makes use of discursive properties, such as justification and extensive statements, in order to respond to the members calling for a more comprehensive report on African conflicts in the above segment. The speaker tends towards a discourse of realism, constructing a mental representation of African conflicts as wide and numerous and thus in need of more time than the PAP can afford.

In response to proponents of regional and specific strands of discourses and narratives within broader African discourse which express more concern about conflict areas other than Libya, the speaker supports his persuasive act by employing both a structural emphasis on semantic content and assertion as a speech act, using the term *carefully* as an intensifier to support his persuasive move. The speaker discursively consolidates this argumentative move with a closing remark that takes the form of an undertaking, stating: *otherwise some issues… are going to form part of deliberation in the future*. The phrase *otherwise* here adds to the assurance of his undertaking. One can expect that such a closing remark, with its clear emphasis in the form of an undertaking or

promise, may be a good use of linguistics agency as a tool to support the persuasive act, and that this will probably garner support for the speaker by the members who raised these issues. In conclusion, if such support materializes, it means that the speaker has succeeded in persuading different members with diverging and conflicting discourses and narratives, and supporting different strands in the broader African discourses and narratives, to support the position taken by his committee (as contained in the report submission).

Interpreting strategies: Helped by context, and fully aware of parliamentary as well as broader African discourses and narratives, the Arabic interpreter is able to correctly anticipate the speaker's message. The interpreter's successful strategy here enables him to sustain his position with a tactical pause, reflected in his delayed response to the subsequent sentence which enables him not only to anticipate but also to support and clarify the speaker's message by adding more information. In doing so he indicates that careful selection should include *issues in the conflict* instead of *the issues* in abstract form, as is rendered by the speaker. However, despite the interpreter's apparent divergence from the speaker's intended message in the subsequent chunk – the speaker refers to careful selection in the context of the issues and the conflict areas, which the Arabic interpreter renders as *the issues in the conflict… in the areas of conflicts* – we can see this as a discursive extension of the previous enhancement and achievement strategy that serves the same role as the preposition *or* does as connector. This may possibly even add emphasis on both chunks, which is itself another improvement and reinforcement of the speaker's persuasive acts. This analysis is further supported by the lexical and semantic choices of the interpreter, as well as his structural assertion and emphasis reflected in the use of the phrase *tension area* in place of *trouble situations*, followed by *we need* and further asserted, after a pause, with the statement that *the Parliament will need*, which again reinforces the speaker's message by using *discourse of justification* as persuasive moves. However, in the final part of the segment, despite the apparent divergence between the past and present tenses in the speaker's utterance and the interpreter rendering these so, the interpreter generally manages to convey the speaker's message (e.g. the speaker says *so we carefully select… otherwise some issues… Honourable members have raised; they are going to form part of deliberation in the future,* which is interpreted as *so we carefully selected some issues Honourable members talked about… we will deliberation on this matter in the future*).

I conclude that the influence of general African discourses and narratives on conflict resolution is clear in both the speaker and the interpreter's utterances. This influence, coupled with an awareness of the immediate context and together with the utilization of various properties of discourse and linguistic tools as persuasive acts, allow the speaker to present a convincing argument. At the same

time, these factors influence and sustain the interpreter's choice of interpreting strategies which results in a good performance and an enhancement of the speaker's message. However, as there is no subsequent debate after the response of the Committee Chairperson, it is not possible to detect any influence by the Arabic interpreter on the trajectory of the discussion in the above segment.

S -Time line - E 0:18:18:325-0:18:39:992	20. *Indeed* Mr. President we take the mandate from here … ◉ *those issues that members concerned with* , ◉.*then you know will formulate presentation on that…* **Honourable Keita,** *I think your point has been noted ….* Mr. President *I, Thank you Chairperson… Thank you to honourable members*.
0:18:21:563-0:18:44:600	20. **لا شك** سيدي الرئيس إننا وبتفويض من هنا فإن **الأعضاء المهتمون..** ◉ = **المهتمين ببعض** القضايا يمكن أن **يتقدموا بأي..** ◉ =**أن يقدموا رأيهم عن** هذا.. أنا أشكرك سيدي الرئيس على هذه الفرصة. **BT:** 20. *No doubt* Mr. President we with mandate from here …that members *who concerned …*◉*..=. concerned* with *some* issues ,.*they can present any…*◉*…= can present their view on this.…I, thank you Mr. President for this opportunity*.

Discourse and narratives: The speaker fully utilizes the parliamentary discourse as a persuasive act when he introduces his argument by rhetorically using the phrase *indeed Mr. President we take the mandate from here*. In doing this, the speaker intends to make the case to the President and the House that he and his committee are at the disposal of the House, asserting the fact the PAP Assembly is the highest authority and that they mandate the Committee to deal with *issues that members [are] concerned with*. The speaker supports his persuasive act further by using the phrase *then you know* as an intensifier, which then makes his argument appear more axiomatic and matter-of-fact. This can be seen especially when the speaker says that *we will formulate presentation on that* by which he means to say that his committee will formulate a presentation on these issues. That is also evident when the speaker concludes, using clear parliamentary rhetoric, with a statement assuring the members who raised these issues that *their point has been noted*; that is, he directs his speech to the members by invoking their names and the full formal mode of parliamentary address which he accompanies with a message of thanks to the President and members.

Interpreting strategies: Utilizing context and background knowledge, the Arabic interpreter rephrases and conveys the essence of the first part the speaker's message in a simpler form, replacing *indeed* with *no doubt*. However, the interpreter renders a clumsy interpreting of the second part which, to some extent, weakens the speaker's message. This is possibly due to the unsuitable rephrasing of the speaker's utterance in the beginning of this part. The probable

explanation may involve comprehension difficulties due to the way the speaker arranges information, as well as the style of formulation of this part of his utterance. This is clear in the divergent points that each of them emphasize; the speaker's emphasis is on *those issues* while the interpreter's anticipation focuses his rephrasing effort on *those members concerned*. However, the interpreter makes a tactical pause which helps him to better understand the speaker's message which results in his self-correction and a repetition of the word *concerned* after the pause. However, this move was weakened by the interpreter's use of the phrase *some* and undue repetition of *can present* before and after the pause which rendered a clumsy ended sentence. Such desperate efforts to rescue the situation through self-correction undermine the interpreter's ability to accurately hear the incoming chunk of the speaker's utterance, which forced him to rely on word sound, as evident in his interpreting of *then* as *they*, which led him to misinterpret the subsequent part of the speaker's utterance. As is clear from the interpreter's rendering of *then you know will formulate presentation on that* as *they can present any…can present their view on this*, his pause is probably intended to allow him to construct a better mental presentation of the speaker's message. It seems, however, that this is a futile attempt as the subsequent effort of self-correction fails to convey the message intended by the speaker, which is apparent in his interpreting *this committee, with a mandate from the Assembly*, *will formulate a presentation on those issues that members are concerned with*.

There are two possible reasons for this weak performance. The first is the failure to utilize the speaker's pauses optimally, although these pauses themselves could be a source of confusion for the interpreter; and the second is that the interpreter spends too much time self-correcting which lead him to lose information and not to hear the speaker correctly. The matter is further aggravated by the inaccurate transmission of the last part of the speaker's message. If not conveying its essence, the interpreter should have at least tried to convey the form and style of the utterance. His failure here is clear in the partial abandonment of some parts, e.g. *Honourable Keita, I think your point has been noted*, and in the partial interpreting of the closing speech in an informal form: *I, thank you Mr. President for this opportunity*. Generally, however, the interpreter conveys a substantial part of the speaker's message.

This analysis suggests that the influence of parliamentary discourse is used positively by the speaker as part of his persuasive act. Also, the influence and awareness of the immediate parliamentary context, as well as broader African discourses, constitute, along with other factors, an important influence on the interpreter's choice of interpreting strategies and the sustaining thereof. As there is no subsequent debate, it is not possible to detect any influence that the Arabic interpreter

might have had on the trajectory of the discussion. What is apparent though is the interpreter's influence in conveying the speaker's message as is evident in the above segment.

S -Time line - E	21. **PAP President** : Thank for your reply on this, honourable Khomalo …Thank you very much Honourable Members now we are going to submit the first committee's resolution related peace and security with amendment of the second paragraph, *opposition* instead of *rebels*. So we are going to adopt this resolutions, thank you adopted…..
	21. رئيس البرلمـان: شـكراً علـى الإجابـة علـى ذلك معـالي خومـالو... شكراً جزيلاً معـالي الأعضـاء. الآن سـوف نقدم قرارات اللجنـة الأولـي المتعلقة بالسلم والأمن مـع تعديل الفقرة الثانية، **المعارضة** بدلاً من **المتمردين**. عليه سنعتمد هذا القرار،.. شكراً اعتمد...
	BT: 21. **PAP President**: Thank you for responding to that honourable Khomalo…Thank you very much Honourable Members. Now we will submit resolutions of the first committee concerning peace and security with amendment of the second paragraph, *opposition* instead of *rebels*. Accordingly we will adopt this resolutions….thank you adopted…

Discourse and narratives: The President of the PAP uses typical parliamentary discourse here, as is clear from his formal address and the expression of thanks, as well as from the formality of submitting resolutions for adoption. The adoption of the resolution with amendment (replacing the word *rebels* with *opposition*) is a significant manifestation of mainstream African discourses and narratives on conflict resolution, with special reference to the Libyan conflict.

Interpreting strategies: The Arabic interpreter, with the support of the current context and knowledge of parliamentary discourse, manages to render the speaker's message directly and accurately into well-constructed Arabic.

In conclusion, I suggest that the influence of mainstream African discourses and narratives on conflict resolution reaches its climax in the adoption of the resolution with amendment, establishing a sense of the PAP as a neutral body acceptable to both parties in the Libyan conflict. This will help the PAP play a more meaningful future role in helping to solve the problem through the application of the notion of African solutions to African problems.

5.7 Report of the Fact Finding Mission to Libya (FFM)

A brief analysis of the FFM report shows some overlapping between the different strands of mainstream African discourses on conflict resolution, with traces of subtle influences of global

discourses in general and Western discourses and narratives in particular. However, one may note that the main discoursal characteristics of the report, in terms of text and rhetorical as well as semantic structures and lexical choice of words, revolves around discourse and narratives of mediation and conflict resolution. The main possible justification for this is that the writers of the report attempt to encompass different African discourses and narratives as a means to position themselves as widely representative of the opinions of different caucuses in the PAP and the parties to the Libyan conflict. That is, they mean to reflect their neutrality despite the fact that they clearly states clearly that the report reflects the opinions of parties to the conflict vis-à-vis the Libyan government, as the mission has only visited the capital city Tripoli and was not able to visit the city of Benghazi which was the stronghold of the *rebels* or the *opposition* at that time. The overall structure, form and style of the report, is a typical parliamentary fact-finding report.

5.7.1   Extract 7: Report of the FFM

"The Origin of the conflict: The conflict in Libya began as a
peaceful protest in the eastern part of the country on 15 February 2011 and quickly spread to the
rest of the country, and evolved into an *armed confrontation* between *Government forces* and
protestors."
"Subsequently the *uprisings* and *conflict* spread to various parts of Libya and several *rioters*
were arrested. In order to form a coordinated platform for *the uprising*, the *protestors* formed
a governing authority based in Benghazi called the National Transitional Council (NTC)."
"The causes of the conflict in Libya are complex, profound, deep-rooted and varied. In the
absence of a report from Benghazi, the mission does not intend to interrogate this matter too
far save to say that *two schools of thought* have been proffered as being the causes of the
Libyan conflict. *One school* of thought argues that the conflict *was caused by lack of
democratic reform and respect for human rights* while the other that the *conflict was caused
by a long standing historical agenda by western powers to control Libya's resources*. The
causes of the war notwithstanding, the conflict in Libya attracted attention from all comers of
the world."
"*The Mission was struck firstly by the number of refugees fleeing Libya* seen at the Tunisian
border. Once inside Libya, the mission saw many of them, mostly blacks, along the road
fleeing towards the border". "The number of pupils and students suffering from various
psychological and emotional disturbances was said to be on the increase. Doctors confirmed
that there were cases where children were suffering from uncontrolled urinating."
The situation on the ground is worsening each day on both sides; *the number of wounded and
dead was alarming and increasing*; Private and public properties, including administrative
blocks, had been destroyed; Civilians, innocent people, had been attacked and killed; *Blacks
were mistaken* for *mercenaries and were attacked and tortured; Fear and distress seized the
population, particularly in the conflict zones; Today Libyans are fighting and killing
Libyans'*.
The fact that NATO has *deviated from the UNSC's initial objective to protect civilians*' cannot
be over emphasized. *It has instead killed hundreds of thousands of civilians."*
*NATO Intervention:**" At the time the delegation undertook the mission, despite the UN
Security Council Resolutions which purported to protect civilians, many had been killed by
NATO bombs and missiles. NATO also blocked shipments of food items, medicines, fuel and
all items listed by the UN as exempt from embargo. During the site visits the *'team witnessed
several NATO bombings and firing of missiles in Tripoli'*. The Mission visited *several
buildings which were bombed or destroyed by missiles*. The places destroyed by bombs and
missiles that we visited include the residence of former leader Gaddafi, Central Police
Headquarters, the Security Headquarters, the residence of Gaddafi' s son, the Transparency
Building, the Library and the Office of the Public Protector Building. The Mission also *visited
a major hospital* where seriously injured **victims of the** *NATO operations were admitted***.** The
team could not visit and therefore cannot confirm all places that were attacked by NATO due
to security reasons. Such places include *Mosques and the Parliament Building"*.
Our Observation and current major development in Libya:" *The unprecedented advance of
the anti- Gaddafi forces to the capital, Tripoli, has caught many by surprise'*. By the end of
August, after NTC forces had captured most parts of Tripoli, including Gaddafi's compound
after brutal fighting with Gaddafi forces, fierce fighting continued in a key Gaddafi
stronghold, the Abu Salim neighborhood. The anti- Gaddafi forces had extended the fighting
to the east for the control of Gaddafi's home town of Sirte and other pockets of resistance
still under the control of pro-Gaddafi forces.
Although Gaddafi has been deposed, the future of Libya is far from certain. There are many
factors that pose serious threats to the security and stability of post-Gaddafi Libya. The first
challenge for the NTC is to establish law and order in the country, including Tripoli.
One of the major security concerns *in* the *post* Gaddafi era will be the wide availability of
small arms and light weapons. The proliferation of these weapons has further compounded the

security situation in the country. Another challenge which both the NTC and its *international backers* need to address, is the need to ensure protection for vulnerable sections of society. The rebellion, as well as the fall of Gaddafi, also created the conditions for the emergence of divisions on the basis of religious ideologies between Islamists and secularists.

As mentioned in the introduction, the report of the PAP mission to Benghazi has not yet materialized since the mission never took place. Therefore, this report only covers information solicited from Tripoli by the Mission. Since the PAP delegation left Libya more than three months ago, the situation has evolved very fast and dramatically with the NTC in full control of most of Libya save for the two towns of Sirte and Ben Waleed. The AU and UN have since recognised the NTC as the legitimate authority in Libya. It is, however, of great concern that despite the enormous challenges that the African continent is confronted with, the *AU lacks a united approach* to issues affecting the continent. The decision to recognize the NTC as the legitimate authority in Libya was *made in New York more as a caesarian operation* despite having taken a contrary position earlier in Addis Ababa. Several individual African states had already recognized the NTC well before the AU position. It is therefore not *surprising that the AU has been marginalized by NATO member* states in respect of the conflict in Libya.

Our Mission is of the view that Libya should remain a Sovereign State and should not face the same fate as Iraq and Afghanistan. Both the *Pro-Gaddafi forces* and the *Transitional National Council* should work towards a peaceful solution in pursuit of the AU Road Map. The AU should take the lead in that regard assisted by other International Institutions such as the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the European Union.

*The Mission to Tripoli therefore recommends as follows***:** An immediate cessation of war in conformity with the AU roadmap; It is pertinent to observe that the former Government of Libya, under Gaddafi, made it clear to the delegation that it was willing to meet its opponents and find an acceptable solution to the problem affecting the country; As pointed out by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the best solution is "*to fulfill the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people to Democracy, Good Governance and Respect for Human Rights, Achieve Sustainable Peace and Preserve Unity and Territorial Integrity of the Country*"**.** It is therefore high time that the *pro- Gaddafi forces* and the *Transitional National Council* start *negotiations immediately* to form an *Inclusive Government; PAP* should continue to be engaged with the Libyan situation and consider a follow up Mission to Libya*;* *PAP* should be involved in national reconstruction mechanisms to reinforce nation unity and preserve the integrity of Libyan citizens; In future *PAP* should set itself to *act timeously* on events and conflict situations on the continent; *PAP* should work with relevant organizations to ensure that rules and regulations relating to protection of migrant workers are adhered to; *PAP* should be ready to respond to peace *and security concerns on the continent within a reasonable timeframe*. It was *embarrassing for the PAP Mission to arrive in Tripoli three months* after the conflict had started and worsened. Yet, it is important to note that similar missions from Europe and the United States of America had *visited Libya less than one month after the conflict had started.*

CDA and narratives of the fact finding mission's report (FFM)

A general overview of the FFM report shows the interplay of overlapping strands of mainstream African discourses on conflict resolution and conflict narratives, with a subtle influence of global discourses in general and Western discourses and narratives in particular. The predominant characteristic of the report is a discourse of mediation; despite the fact that it presents and narrates facts, it tries to fairly represent all the different African discourses and narratives as a way to reflect its power of representation to different groupings and caucuses in the PAP, as well as the parties to the Libyan conflict, in order to assert its neutrality.

The overall discursive structure of the report, in terms of its semantic content, form and style, is that of a typical parliamentary fact-finding report. However, it is clear that the report frames the events in Libya differently, creating frame ambiguity through its promotion and sustaining of competing and/or divergent narratives. A case in point is that from Extract 1 through to Extract 5, the lexical choices as well as semantic content present different degrees of discourses and narratives, for example in the use of phrases such as *peaceful protest*, *armed confrontation*, *government forces, pro-Gaddafi forces*, *protestors*, *anti-Gaddafi forces, uprisings*, *conflict, rioters* and *NATO intervention*. Two possible justifications for this frame ambiguity are that the report tries to give a fair representation of power relations in the PAP by accommodating different intertwined discourses and narratives, as explained previously, or that, due to its nature as a fact-finding report, it is narrating the discourse on the conflict as it evolves.

This explanation is supported by the fact that the report avoids adopting a one-sided version of events; it presents the facts, as is clear in its emphasis in Extract 3 that *in the absence of a report from Benghazi, the mission does not intend to interrogate this matter too far save to say that [there are] two schools of thought*. It is significant, however, that at the same time the report acts as a mirror for these competing discourses and narratives without pronouncing a strong position. This, to some extent, reflects the essence of the debate, as expressed by some of the members in the Plenary Session, as being true to mainstream African discourses on conflict resolution. This relies on a discourse of mediation which, by its nature, has to remain neutral and not take sides. In this context, the discursive structure of the FFM report is a real manifestation of the African discourse of conflict resolution; this is evident in the actual resolution adopted by the PAP Plenary Session in which the word *rebels* is replaced with *opposition,* with the aim of supporting a discourse of mediation and compromise and

eventually establishing a sense of the PAP as a neutral body acceptable to both parties of the Libyan conflict.

On another level, the report reflects the African discourse in terms of its concerns with highlighting humanitarian concerns and suffering, as stated in Extract 5: *the number of wounded and dead was alarming and increasing*; *civilians, innocent people, had been attacked and killed*. This aspect of discourse is highlighted in the PAP discussions.

It is notable that the report draws attention to one of the most sinister discourses and narratives used during the Libyan conflict: the notion of *Black African mercenaries* fighting side by side with pro-Gaddafi forces. This is reflected in the report when stating that: *Blacks were mistaken for mercenaries and were attacked and tortured; fear and distress seized the population*. The aim of such narratives is multiple and includes the preempting of any attempt by African countries to send troops to support the Libyan government under Gaddafi, making it difficult for Africans to mediate by making them appear to be taking sides and thus not remaining neutral. These narratives also drive a wedge of mistrust between different components of Libyan society (some parts of Libya are predominantly black, especially in the South) and seek to prevent the Libyan government from recruiting any fighters from the large population of African expatriates who have worked and lived in Libya for a long time. The most sinister aim of such narratives, however, is to create a mental model among the rest of the Libyan population that Africans support the dictatorial rule of Gaddafi, as well as to reinforce Western discourses and narratives of intervening Western forces as liberators and protectors of civilians. It is significant that there are no competing discourses and narratives that frame the opposition forces as well NATO forces – white Europeans – as mercenaries.

In order to unmask and highlight the danger of this problematic discourse, the report employs specific rhetoric, e.g. *today Libyans are fighting and killing Libyans*. The report also uses facts to support its argumentative move, leveling direct accusations in order to emphasize the negative presentation of NATO action that is in line with mainstream African discourses: *NATO has deviated from the UNSC's initial objective to protect civilians; [this] cannot be over emphasized. It has instead killed hundreds of thousands of civilians.* This discursively consolidates the African discourse which negatively frames NATO abuses of power: *the UN Security Council Resolutions which purported to protect civilians, many had been killed by NATO bombs and missiles.* The report further uses facts as argumentative tools in order to interrogate such negative framing at a deeper level: *during the site visits the team*

witnessed several NATO bombings and firing of missiles in Tripoli.

The lexical style and choice of words in the report represent the African discourse's rejection of the Western discourse's claims to be *protecting civilians*. This view is supported by the choice of words in Extract 6 which is aimed at delegitimizing the NATO acts by framing them as *intervention*. This framing is, in turn, supported by the direct accusation that *NATO also blocked shipments of food items, medicines, fuel and all items listed by the UN as exempt from embargo*; and this framing is in line with mainstream African discourses.

The report exposes not only the manipulation inherent in Western discourses and narratives, but also the abuse of power by NATO. The UN Security Council has committed a litany of offences but, despite this, when it comes to its position towards the *anti-Gaddafi forces,* the report employs a kind of implicit argumentation in stating that *the unprecedented advance of the anti- Gaddafi forces to the capital, Tripoli, has caught many by surprise*. This presupposes, by implication, that these forces are supported by NATO. Such implicitness is significant as it conceals any direct accusation in order to avoid being seen as having a strong position, which may be interpreted by the opposition/rebels as taking sides. This move is supported by the use of the phrase *the anti-Gaddafi forces* instead of *rebels* or *revolutionaries*. It is also significant that the lexical choices and semantic content of the report show several shifts, clear for example in the use of the phrase *anti-Gaddafi forces* instead of *anti-government forces*. This semantic move balances the position of the commission by conferring legitimacy to both sides in the conflict in order to support the notion of PAP neutrality.

The report expresses a mainstream African discourse in terms of reflecting the weakness or lack of a united African position and the marginalization of the continent: *it is, however, of great concern that despite the enormous challenges that the African continent is confronted with, the AU lacks a united approach to issues affecting the continent*. The decision to recognize the NTC as the legitimate authority in Libya was *made in New York more as a caesarian operation* despite a contrary position being adopted earlier in Addis Ababa. Several individual African states had already recognized the NTC well before the AU position was adopted. It is therefore not surprising that the AU has been marginalized by NATO member states vis- à-vis the conflict in Libya. To support its argumentative strategies, the report further draws on other recent international conflicts, warning that *our Mission is of the view that Libya should remain a Sovereign State and should not face the same fate as Iraq and*

Afghanistan. It aims to highlight the danger and evoke the memory of the catastrophic consequences of NATO intervention.

In conclusion, the general discursive structure of the report supports the efforts of the African Union and the notion of African solutions to African problems.

Conclusion

Through analysis of various written texts and original recordings of interpreted speeches, reports and debates, I have identified different viewpoints on the Libyan conflict, with special reference to debates in the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). Most importantly, the analysis has critically identified competing discourses, narratives, framings, power relations and the influence of these on debates and on the Arabic interpreter's choice of interpreting strategies and on the role of Arabic interpreters and his/her influence on the trajectory of discussions. In my view, I have succeeded in achieving these objectives by tracing influences of discourse, narratives, discursive and linguistic patterns and their socio-political and cultural contexts across the texts and utterances. Based on the above I will present a detailed account of these findings related to my research question in the next chapter and then present some recommendations for further research.

6. Chapter 6: Findings, recommendations and conclusions

In my study I asked the following research question: do dominant CDA and narratives influence the Arabic interpreters' choices of interpreting strategies at the PAP and do these interpreters influence the trajectory of the discussions through the interpreting strategies they use?

In an attempt to answer this question I presented, in Chapter 2, a definition of CDA. In that chapter I also included a literature review of CDA, adaptation of the features of narrativity and framing in the context of conflict situations, and the impact of these on interpreting, interpreting strategies and the role of interpreters. The discussion highlighted the significance of discursive and linguistic acts and properties and their role in the reproduction of dominance and the enactment, abuse and exercise of power.

This chapter discussed different aspects of CDA and narratives in order to lay the groundwork for an investigation of the research question from various angles. The chapter also discussed cognitive models, approaches to simultaneous interpreting, the role of conference interpreters in the communicative process, and the influence of culture, discourse, narratives and mental representations of reality.

In Chapter 3, I then presented a general overview of the concept of conflict resolution within the context of PAP, with special emphasis on Libya, in an attempt to identify the extent to which PAP parliamentarians and interpreters are influenced by, contest, accept, reject or disseminate dominant discourses and narratives about the Libyan conflict. I further attempted to demonstrate various aspects of the interplay of discourse and framing, and their influence on PAP MPs in terms of enactment of power, power relations and competing narratives at regional, continental and international levels.

This overview provided a useful background against which I outlined my research methodology and laid the foundation for my analysis in the proceeding chapters, with the aim of validating my main premises in order to answer my research question and, finally, to arrive at specific recommendations and conclusions.

In the current chapter I will point out the main discursive and linguistic patterns in original and interpreted speeches and the strategies employed by interpreters as they relate to my research question.

I will then provide some findings, along with recommendations for further research, before presenting my conclusion.

6.1 Findings

My research and analysis has empirically explored the discursive and linguistic patterns of mainstream African, global, Western and media discourses and narratives pertaining to the Libyan conflict. I have also detected distinctive strands of African discourses and narratives of conflict resolution and revealed traces of the covert influences of global and Western discourses and narratives within broader African discourse about the Libyan conflict, observing this in both speaker and interpreter utterances.

Tracing these linguistic patterns reveals that phrases such as *new foreign domination of Africa, peace, peaceful resolution/settlement, human suffering, African solution, African role, national unity, African people, our continent, peace loving people* and *reconciliation* are prevalent in African discourse. However, there appears to be no place for these notions in Western discourses and narratives, despite the fact that the Libyan conflict is essentially an African conflict. It is fair to conclude from this that such discursive jamming represents the intentional marginalization of Africa, African discourse and narratives, and African institutions.

My analysis has confirmed the clear influence of dominant CDA and competing narratives on interpreters' choices of interpreting strategies, as well as the influence of Arabic interpreters on the course of discussion, although this influence is not sufficiently demarcated.

Furthermore, my findings demonstrate the existence of a multitude of discourses playing out around the Libyan conflict: a discourse of war, a discourse of peace, a discourse of conflict and conflict resolution, a discourse of dominance and the dominated, a discourse of good intentions and a discourse of bad intentions and deception. These are the main discursive patterns evident in both the original and the interpreted speeches.

My analysis also shows the clear influences of political ideology, cultural affiliation and mainstream discourses and narratives about the Libyan conflict on both members of PAP and the interpreters. It further reveals the influence of specific strands of discourses about regional conflict on some speakers and interpreters, as well as the influence of the African developmental discourse; this is particularly notable in the case of one Arabic interpreter.

One of the main findings of the study is that due to limited scope, time span and data it is not possible to clearly identify the specific influence of Arabic interpreters on the trajectory of discussion. However, the analysis has proven beyond doubt that the Arabic interpreters definitely influence the course of discussion through either strengthening, improving or weakening speakers' messages.

The aforementioned limitations also make it difficult to identify clear boundaries of interface between the influences of various discourses, competing narratives, party or national African politics, personal interests and other external influences. This, in turn, leads to my main recommendation: the clear identification and separating out of these multitudinous influences demands further and more thorough investigation. Such an investigation will require the collation of a much larger volume of data, as well as a longer time span and the production of detailed profiles over a longer time series for each interpreter.

My analysis of the different linguistic aspects of the interpreted Arabic, such as grammar, style, coherence and cohesion, shows that a good utilization of the properties of the Arabic language coupled with experience afford the Arabic interpreter the necessary flexibility and space to successfully employ different interpreting strategies. This includes, most notably, the use of derivatives and synonyms not only in order to cope with pressure but also to change the track of utterances in response to abrupt changes in a speaker's mode, speed of delivery or course of logical linguistic sequences.

A brief analysis of world political discourses as represented by extracts from UNSC resolutions shows that these are highly diplomatic in terms of style and argumentation and more decisive in terms of the enactment of power and the discursive reproduction of dominance in world politics. Analysis of the linguistic patterns used in the UNSC resolutions also reveals that, in terms of their argumentation, structural emphasis, lexical style and persuasive progression, these texts are centered around a powerful position, reflected in expressions such as *condemns, rejects* and *expresses its grave concern* which escalate to a direct condemnation and accusation of the Libyan government (clear in phrases like *deplores the continuing use of mercenaries by the Libyan authorities*) and reach their discursive summit in the phrase *authorizing member states to take necessary measures*. As I have demonstrated, these discursive and linguistic patterns represent the main determinants of processes of power relations at the international level, the resolutions themselves representing the dominant discourse supported by prevailing international and regional political context(s) and settings. This leads me to conclude that the

rhetoric within these resolutions has created specific mental models that influence knowledge and the formation of opinions about the Libyan conflict and also serve as a prelude for military action. The power of discourse and narrative is clearly demonstrated in prevailing mental representations and in what became the dominant global view, i.e. that the UN Security Council had authorized NATO to intervene militarily in the Libyan conflict, whereas, in fact, the UN Security Council resolution 1973(2011) had not explicitly authorized NATO to take such measures. Through drafting, wording and the discursive nature of the resolution, supported by the mental models and representations created by power relations along with competing discourses and narratives, the common view was created that the UN Security Council had in fact authorized NATO to take military action.

These acts of discourse, narrative and the (re)production of dominance rely on conditions conducive to the production and enactment of the powerful properties of a dominant discourse that has been sustained by the prevailing conditions of global politics since World War II. Such discourses and narratives influence cognitive models and representations in the minds of different political agents in the Libyan conflict – PAPMP as well as interpreters as part of a world audience – which in turn, as my analysis demonstrates, affects the interpretation and (re)production of any texts or utterances about the Libyan conflict.

However, my analysis reveals that there is a clear discourse of resistance – as well as competing narratives – to this dominant discourse within the world political system. This is represented by the ongoing global debate about the legitimacy, equality and representativeness of a world order that gives a handful of countries – an 'elite club' – the right to decide on the fate of the world. Such contesting of legitimacy is manifested in international calls for the reform of the UN system.

This is why I note that the dominant discourse, especially that of Western countries, seeks legitimacy and acceptability through the use of ambiguous terms such as *broad-based coalition*, *coalition of willing states*, *coalition partners*, *responsibility to protect "R2P"*, *international community* and *international legitimacy* in order to justify foreign interventions. My analysis suggests that UNSC resolutions have set the tone for competing narratives about the Libyan conflict and prepared the scene for the real unfolding of the violent conflict.

My analysis also reveals some resemblance between Western discourse and world/UNSC discourse. The distinctive feature of Western discourse, however, is its discursive emphasis on the negative

framing of the Libyan government under Gaddafi, coupled with a simultaneous focus on the positive framing, via a discourse of good intentions, of NATO actions in Libya. Western discourse uses different discursive and narratives structures and tools to produce persuasive argumentation in order to attempt to moralize acts, as is made clear in expressions such as *tens of thousands of lives have been protected*. There is also an attempt to legitimize NATO intervention in Libya by appeal to the notion of international legitimacy, i.e. via UNSC resolutions, the legitimacy of which is determined mainly by Western countries.

These apparent features of Western discourse and narratives reveal clear aspects of a discourse of dominance and the *abuse of power* of international institutions, particularly the UNSC. This is evident in the fact that the Security Council resolution (1973 (2011) has called for necessary measures to protect civilians, not to change the regime in Libya, whereas the Libya letter written jointly by Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy (2011) clearly states the intention that, after the adoption of the resolution, *'Colonel Gaddafi must go, and go for good'*. My analysis shows that Western discourse employs various features of power enactment, for example the semantic moves inherent in expressions such as *together with our NATO allies*, *coalition partners*, and *international legitimacy.* However, this enactment of dominance and power relations is concealed within a discourse of good intentions *to protect the Libyan people* and *not to remove Gaddafi by force*, supported by rhetorical moves such as *our duty*, *our mandate [is to] protect the people of Libya*, *to protect civilians and to fight terrorism.*

This discourse of dominance is jointly produced by dominated groups that include some Arab and African countries, leading them to act as though this dominance is natural and the NATO intervention in Libya legitimate. I have demonstrated this through the identification of various linguistic patterns and standpoints expressed within the PAP discussion and in interpreted speeches; I have elaborated on these in the analysis beneath each segment and extract.

I have also demonstrated that the discursive argumentation and lexical style of Western discourse seeks to justify Western intervention in the Libyan conflict as a legitimate act authorized by the UNSC and supported by the international community. UNSC resolutions are framed as 'historic resolutions' and employ the diplomatic language of world discourse, using terms such as *all necessary measures.*

I furthermore revealed the concealment of power, among other things, through manipulation; this is evident in the justification of Western intervention as a response to the *people of Libya's call for help*

and the moralizing of this intervention as intended to *protect civilians*. Such moves are supported through the use of discourses and narratives of terrorism as a means to gain more influence among Western audiences in order to garner support for military action.

Significantly, my analysis has identified one of the most glaring examples of denial as a tool for argumentation: the statement *it is not to remove Gaddafi by force*, supported by indirectness and veiled diplomatic language such as *it is unthinkable that someone who has tried to massacre their own people can play a part in their future government* or *but it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in power*. I have also identified additional argumentative moves used in Western discourse, such as playing down the role and influence of military actions and the leveling of implicit threats, e.g.,: *it would condemn Libya to being not only a pariah state, but a failed state too*. I have demonstrated that the Western discourse uses the overestimation and extensive negative framing of the Libyan government, coupled with the positive framing of Western acts, as an enactment and imposition of power and dominance; the persuasive moves and justifications of Western actions are clear in the lexical and semantic contents of phrases such as *Gaddafi has promised to carry out terrorist attacks*, *his rockets and his shells rained down on defenseless civilians*, *terrorist attacks, bloodshed* and *Gaddafi attacking his people*.

My research suggests that Western discourse has intentionally marginalized Africa. This is clear in how it neglects to mention African people, the African continent, the AU road map, peaceful efforts or African institutions such as the AU. This research also shows that the main focus of the Western discourse is visible in its semantic moves, moves such as *together with our NATO allies and coalition partners, the United States* and *building a broad-based coalition*.

The attempt to moralize Western discourse fails when the real intentions of Western interests start becoming clear, confirming that such moral positions are not guided by the claim to protect civilians but instead by strategic and economic interests, in this case including regime change sealed by the killing of Gaddafi. This in turn confirms the validity of mainstream African discourse in promoting peaceful solutions and reconciliation in Libya.

My analysis shows the political dominance of Western discourses and narratives supporting the enactment of power by a powerful 'elite club' of UNSC members with privileged access to international resources based on the power vested by them by the UN Security Council, in addition to their wealth, economic and military power and historical influence as colonial and neocolonial regimes.

I have not only uncovered clear acts of dominance and the imposition and abuse of power by Western powers but have also demonstrated that such dominance is jointly produced by dominated groups that include some Arab African countries; furthermore, I have observed that the dominant discourses and competing narratives of Western countries have more scope for reproduction and influence as they will be quoted by international media and disseminated worldwide. This confirms that the aforementioned 'elites club' comprised of the permanent members of the UNSC maintain their dominant status within the global system of governance through discursive strategies.

African discourses and narratives generally appear to offer resistance to and compete with Western discourses, in essence seeking to reject, refute and negatively frame these latter discourses. These features are revealed by an analysis of structural emphasis, discursive structure, argumentative position, rhetorical figures, negative presentation, future expectations, lexical style and the choice of words and semantic contents. I have shown the existence of the above features by identifying the semantic contents of the linguistic patterns evident in the negative framing of Western acts, for example: *repudiated of the noble and very relevant vision enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations*, *subversion of international law*, *undermining the legitimacy of the UN, aggression, foreign intervention, war by foreign powers, regime change, military alliance* and a *coalition of the willing*. By tracing lexical structures and linguistic patterns I have also been able to identify the nature of mainstream African discourses as well as particular strands within them.

While Western interests base their power of representation on international legitimacy (which in reality means UNSC resolutions, which function as the sole determinant of such legitimacy and within which, historically, Africa has had no permanent representation), I have found that African discourses and narratives about the Libyan conflict premise their argumentation more upon their power to represent the African people than upon international legitimacy.

Interestingly, both Western and African discourses and narratives have used the same rain metaphor as well the same lexical choices, albeit in a different manner and with different semantics, e.g., *bombs, rockets* and *shells*. Furthermore, both sets of discourses and narratives use the same argumentative position of accusation and both draw on negative historical experiences to support their opposing objectives, evident in the use of semantic framings of *security, sub-contractors* and *mercenaries*.

One clear finding is that, while Western discourses and narratives are characterized by a discourse of dominance, enactment of power, abuse of power, denial and a high degree of manipulation aimed at concealing power relations, African discourses and narratives are characterized by appeals, call for peaceful resolution, a defense of the right of Africa to solve its problems and a critique of the marginalization of African and the unfair power relations of the world system; these latter discourses and narratives are further characterized by lacking powers of assertiveness and imposition.

My analysis demonstrates how media discourses and narratives aid in the (re)production and dissemination of competing discourses and narratives; this was exemplified in the opinions expressed, as well as the labels, words and phrases used within PAP discussions (including by interpreters), members of PAP being clearly influenced by the daily stories they watch, listen to and read. I have also confirmed that the media is integral, being the primary arena within which competing discourses and narratives play out in order to manufacture specific models of events pertaining to the conflict, thereby clearly influencing the knowledge of members of PAP and interpreters of the Libyan conflict, which is in turn reflected in discussions and interpreting strategies.

Analysis of different segments and extracts of debates at the committee level, as well as at the PAP Plenary Session, has identified the influence of competing discourses and narratives by tracing the way in which these are expressed in specific words and phrases: *rebels, revolutionaries, opposition, armed opposition, uprising, dictatorship, democracy, human rights, terrorism, al-Qaeda, stability, peaceful solution, national unity, African people, military actions, NATO led-mission, NATO backed-uprising, Libyan war, conflict, civil war, Libya liberation, government forces, Pro-Gaddafi and anti-Gaddafi forces,* etc. It is clear that all of these have ideological and political loads, standpoints and positions embedded in them. I have elaborated on these under each segment and extract and have identified how these competing discourses and narratives construct contradictory models and representations of the reality of events in Libya, revealing the different discursive and narrative influences on the members of PAP as well as on the Arabic interpreters.

There are a number of notable discursive and linguistic aspects of the recordings, most significantly a parliamentarian genre and lexical style that is clear in the choice of terms such as *deliberations*, *interventions* and *plenary session.* The mode of address can be identified as formal parliamentary address, demonstrated by the polite tone and the addressing of members as *honourable members*.

The participants' identities, positions and roles, both as members of the committee as well as members of PAP, are clearly identifiable; they speak as politicians and as members of PAP in a setting that gives them privileged access to the discussion of continental issues above that enjoyed by their colleagues in the national parliaments.

Analyzing the different segments reveals that PAPMP's account and mental model of the Libyan conflict is to some extent in line with a prevailing African discourse that calls for a peaceful solution to African conflicts, the independence of the continent, an end to the marginalization of Africa and a call for African solutions to African problems, reflecting a mediator discourse that attempts to remain neutral.

The influence of discourses and narratives with embedded standpoints is clear at a lexical level in the use of such terms as *opposition forces* and *pro-Gaddafi forces* instead of *rebels* and *government forces*, as if giving both parties equal legitimacy as *peacemaker standing equidistant* (to borrow from *An Open Letter to the Peoples of Africa and the World from Concerned Africans*). Another marker for this discourse appears in the choice of words, such as the use of the term *conflict* – a neutral term for describing the situation in Libya – in place of *war* or *civil war*.

The discussion generally reflects African concerns around the humanitarian situation influenced by the prevailing African discourse of conflict resolution. More importantly, the discourse of conflict resolution and peaceful solutions is more apparent here than before, highlighted by the lexical repetition of terms such as *political solution* and *peace and security*, in line with conflict resolution discourses and general developmental discourses that position peace and security as prerequisites for economic development in Africa.

The analysis reveals that some speakers attempt to invoke the discourse of the Arab Spring uprisings as a reminder of peaceful demonstrations, invoking what has happened in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt in order to draw a specific mental model that discursively supports their arguments. However, the general discourse tends towards neutrality and may be termed a discourse of mediation and conflict resolution, apparent in the fact that the speakers represent sections of PAP membership that are subject to influence by conflicting and competing discourse and narratives. This is reflected by the different segments of argumentation that were generally influenced by the African discourse seeking to mediate a peaceful solution, dictating a certain degree of neutrality and even handedness in the discourse.

I have identified a competing narrative within African discourse itself that reflects not only the divergent positions of some African countries but also reveals the possibly significant influence of Western discourses and narratives (including Western media discourses and narratives) about the events of the Libyan conflict in particular and other African conflicts such as Cote d'Ivoire more generally. This is more prevalent in the utterances of French speaking PAP members.

My study also confirms the important influence of context, general knowledge, narratives and discourse on an interpreter's choice of interpreting strategy. All these elements play a role in allowing the interpreter to deploy successful delayed responses and rephrasing strategies in order to deliver an accurate message. The study further confirms the influence of different strands of discourses and narratives on an interpreter's choice of interpreting strategy, confirming the importance of the application of appropriate strategies for an interpreter's performance; these strategies provide interpreters with the memory space needed in order to focus on production and stylistic strategies so as to deliver a speaker's message accurately and in an appropriate standard and style.

The main finding of my study is that Arabic interpreter influence on the course or trajectory of discussion is largely undetectable despite the fact there are clear pointers to such influence in the strengthening, improving or weakening of speaker messages by interpreters. This no doubt influences the trajectory of discussion as listener understanding is informed by the message as conveyed by the interpreter and not as originally uttered by the speaker. This matter clearly requires more investigation over a longer period and with a larger volume of data. From the analysis, however, it is clear that such influence is possible. In certain cases, for instance, it is evident that an interpreter has constructed a specific mental model of the situation through the use of hyperbole or intensifiers in order to enhance the original speaker's utterance or to deliver an utterance in a way that may influence listeners by evoking memories and images of bloodshed and destruction, potentially changing their understanding or the positions they adopt within the discussion.

A general overview of the FFM report provides a profile of the mainstream African discourse of conflict resolution, as well as conflict narratives and different strands and streams within broader African discourses. Here the subterranean influences of global and Western discourses and narratives, particularly the influence of the French media, are clear. The report provides a profile of conflict narratives that fairly represents different groups within broader Libyan society; the methodology

adopted by the fact-finding mission in preparing the report is based on what the members of the commission observed, witnessed and heard during their stay in Tripoli from members of the Libyan government, state organs, representatives of civil society organizations, academics, professionals, the media and individuals.

A related finding is that there are some dissident discourses/voices in mainstream Western media (as there are in Africa); these possibly emerge either from ideological standpoint or via social media, which has to some extent diluted control over access and weakened the grip of the powerful Western media houses. The global anti-war movement that rose up to resist the US- and UK-led invasion of Iraq a decade ago has also been influential.

One of my most significant discoveries is that the proper use of Arabic language properties reduces the negative influence of general constraints on an interpreter's performance; this includes the use of derivatives, hyperbole, synonyms and other forms of description and provides an interpreter with an ample stock of words and expressions that can be used to mitigate production effort and to cope with difficult situations. These properties can be used as part of an interpreting strategy, especially in the rephrasing or summarizing of a speaker's message – reflecting the Arabic proverb *the ideal phrase is that which is short and to the point* (خير الكلام ما قل ودل) – to provide an interpreter with the necessary flexibility to change course in order to deal with unexpected changes in a speaker's mode of delivery or with other eventualities. The lexical properties of the Arabic language afford professional interpreters an ample choice of words with which to cope with difficult situations.

My research confirms the importance of access to discourse and especially the role of linguistic or cultural barriers in determining such access, this being especially clear in the case of French speaking members of PAP. This is supported by my analysis, which has shown that there are clear patterns of divergence from established mainstream African discourses and narratives evident in the utterances of some French speaking members and interpreters. The research has conclusively demonstrated the influence of discourse, narrative and socio-political and cultural contexts on the choice of interpreting strategies. Most importantly, the analysis has clearly indicated the influence of the Arabic interpreters on the trajectory of discussion; however, the scope and nature of this influence needs more research and investigation.

6.2 Recommendations

The main recommendation of my study is that more statistical analysis is needed to establish the main trends that serve as definite markers of the influence of interpreters in general, and Arabic interpreters in particular, on the trajectory of discussions. This was not possible within the constraints of the present research report.

My study shows the difficulties of identifying a clear-cut influence based on a small volume of data that covers a short period and involves more than one interpreter. It is clear that interpreters have differing levels of knowledge and experience and are subject to different influences. In light of this I recommend a longer study focusing on either one interpreter or a small, specific set of interpreters, carefully selected as a statistical sample that factors in all possible influences in order to produce scientifically acceptable results.

I have also confirmed that interpreters are active participants in the communicative event. Again, however, the influence of Arabic interpreters on the trajectory of discussion needs further investigation due to the fact that the samples are not large enough to conclusively prove such influence. A larger volume of corpus data and a longer time period are needed and it is clear that the matter involves other factors – ideological standpoint, prior knowledge and so forth. For this reason I recommend further investigation using a larger volume of data over a longer time series as well as the application of multidisciplinary statistical analysis and, potentially, utilizing the tools of corpus-based interpreting studies or other feasible scientific methods.

More collaboration and longer investigations are needed. Since an interpreter's knowledge is not static but changes subtly in response to shifts in daily narratives, information and experience, even retrospective investigation to support the transcription of real life interpreting will change over time. One event or conference, therefore, is not sufficient to arrive at concrete conclusions about the influence of interpreters on discussions or the influence of discourse on an interpreter's knowledge. A prolonged study of a specific number of interpreters in different settings and covering different subjects might help in drawing up an interpreter profile that detects influence on discussions, given that each interpreter has different background knowledge and is exposed to different influences.

As the analysis revealed that the interpreters faced some difficulties in understanding different accents and coping with speed, I also recommend that interpreters should be trained by listening to different accents – both African and worldwide accents, especially strong and difficult ones – in order to better prepare them for future interpreting tasks. I further recommend that interpreter training should include the use of recordings of speakers discussing different subjects at different speeds; this will allow for the easier identification of the different strategies used by the interpreters under training, strategies which can then be improved upon or replaced with better strategies. Exercises such as these should be employed repeatedly in order to bring the trainees to an optimum level of familiarity with different interpreting strategies; repetition will also help them to perfect some strategies, especially anticipation strategy.

I recommend that interpreter training curricula should include training in different aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis in order to facilitate better understanding of the process utterances and standpoints of different speakers.

I further recommend that PAP should attempt to retain the same freelance interpreters through different sessions and committee sittings in order to better utilize their accumulated knowledge of PAP discourse and context, which will in turn also aid in continuously improving the performance of interpreters.

6.3 Conclusions

I have presented my results and highlighted their relevance to the literature review. I have determined to what extent interpreters influence the course of discussions on conflict resolution at PAP and whether they reflect the institutional ideology of PAP in their interpretations, also asking whether they support or weaken embedded ideologies and political positions on the conflict. Finally, I have discussed how my findings can contribute to the training of Arabic interpreters in this context. Highlighting the role of interpreters can allow PAP to benefit more from insights into the interpreting process.

My study has proven, through tracing discursive structures and acts, linguistic patterns, words, expressions, lexical choices and semantic contents as emphases, that competing discourses and narratives are constructed according to the selective presentation of events. I have revealed that the

same semantic moves, when used selectively within different contexts, denote completely different realities, opposing standpoints and competing discourses and narratives.

I stress, however, that these power relations and condensations for reproduction are more complicated; they are not created by a single letter, speech or statement. This is why it is important to bear in mind that prevailing global power relations, regional and continental environments, the situation of the poor in Africa, the Arab Spring and so forth are not naturally accepted but are imposed either historically, geopolitically or as through direct acts of dominance and invasion in order to control African resources as part of the global strategy of competing superpowers.

From my analysis it is clear that discourses and narratives influence interpreters' strategic choices and especially the anticipation strategies they adopt – mental representations provide, or help interpreters to prepare beforehand, ready-made stock expressions.

It is my strong conviction that Arabic interpreters may influence the course of discussion by deploying anticipation strategies that influence narratives and discourses. The scope and nature of such influence, however, has not been conclusively proven in this study; this would require the collection of more data over a longer period of time, tracing the performance of one or more specific interpreters. The paradox here is that in this short study it is not possible to neutralize the influence of discourses or narratives on each interpreter, nor is it possible to gauge the differing levels of knowledge or quantify the differing experience of each interpreter, said influence, knowledge and experience resulting in the use of different strategies.

More generally, there appears to be a clear division within African discourse, as revealed by the differences between the terms *rebel* and *opposition*. The adoption of the term *opposition* shows the influence of PAP discourses of peaceful conflict resolution and adherence to a balanced position in order to gain the acceptance of both warring parties.

It also appears to be the case that, despite the fact that the Arab League supports the UNSC, with countries like Qatar participating in NATO campaigns and the Al Jazeera TV network clearly supporting the opposition (calling them revolutionaries), some Arab/African countries identify themselves with the African position, as made clear in the analysis of PAP discussions involving members from Arab countries in Africa. This represents a clear influence given that the Arab

interpreters are Africans as opposed to hailing from other parts of the Arab world. This in turn reveals that there are divisions in the positions Arab countries adopt towards the Libyan conflict, just as there are divisions within the African position.

The influence of the media and of prevailing discourses and narratives on the Arab interpreters is more likely come from broader sources than the comparatively limited influence on French PAP members and French interpreters. This is possibly due to the fact that Arab interpreters listen to or read from Arabic, English and to some extent from French sources, whilst French interpreters are more likely to depend on French sources only. This is evident in my analysis, which indicates that African French speakers are more likely to be influenced by the French media discourse on both the Libyan conflict and African conflicts in general. It is also made clear in the PAP discussions where French speakers tend to focus more on conflicts in African French speaking countries than on the Libyan conflict, whereas Arabic and English speaking PAP members focused on the latter. This again reveals traces of discursive and narrative influence as well as cultural linguistic influences.

To reiterate another finding, there are some dissent discourses or voices within the mainstream Western media (as there are in Africa), possibly stemming from specific ideological standpoints or resulting from the role social media has played in diluting control over access and weakening the grip of the powerful Western media houses. The global anti-war movement that resisted the invasion of Iraq a decade ago might be an additional influence.

Finally, it is possible that the Arabic interpreter may influence the course of discussion through his influence on Arabic speaking members of PAP. This possibility, however, needs to be investigated further and with the help of more data, premised upon the assumption that the debate on the subject will, *ceteris paribus*, continue for a longer period, with the active participation of these Arabic members in subsequent discussions.

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