

**Protecting and promoting livelihoods of the excluded  
through the Community Work Programme: a  
comparative case study of Munsieville and  
Bekkersdal**

*Themba Masondo*



**Supervisor**

*Professor Edward Webster*

**A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the  
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the  
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.**

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## DECLARATION

I, Themba Johnson Masondo, declare that this dissertation is my own work. It is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Sociology) at the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or for examination in this or any other university.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Themba Masondo', is written over a horizontal line.

Themba Masondo

**30<sup>th</sup> day of May 2018**

## **DEDICATION**

In memory of my mother, *Mhani* Topisa Evelyn Maluleke.

*U mutswari wa yi xiviri, manana!*

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## ABSTRACT

The idea of the government acting as an Employer of Last Resort (ELR), commonly known as ‘public works’, has become a prominent feature of the ‘impulse for social protection’ in the global South. The dissertation focuses on a long-term ELR programme in South Africa called the Community Work Programme (CWP) – a distinctively and innovatively designed component of the orthodox Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP). Based on field research involving the triangulation of a survey questionnaire, in-depth semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and ethnographic non-participant observation – this study adopts the comparative case study approach, imbued in the extended case method, to investigate the CWP’s potentialities in protecting and promoting livelihoods of the excluded in Munsieville and Bekkersdal—located in the West Rand region of the Gauteng Province, South Africa

The central question posed in this dissertation is whether the CWP has other transformative potentialities beyond its ameliorative role. The dissertation advances three connected arguments. First, the dissertation argues that in addition to protecting livelihoods, the CWP possesses transformative potential in fostering development from below. The CWP participants in Munsieville tended to possess greater autonomous capabilities in adapting the CWP to respond to a myriad of local social challenges. Secondly, the dissertation argues that the mainstream theoretical approaches to livelihood promotion through the ELR tend to ignore cooperative development as a potential vector for promoting livelihoods of the excluded. In this respect, the dissertation presents the case of three nascent CWP-linked cooperatives in Munsieville to illustrate this argument. Lastly, the dissertation argues that the operationalisation of the Organisation Workshop (OW) methodology in Munsieville helps clarify the significant variance in the outcomes of the CWP in the two townships.

**Key words:** *community work programme, employer of last resort, organisation workshop, protecting livelihoods and promoting livelihoods.*

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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANC	African National Congress
ARV	Antiretroviral
AZAPO	Azanian Peoples Organisation
BRP	Bekkersdal Renewal Project
CANSA	Cancer Association of South Africa
CHI	Chris Hani Institute
CofFEE	Center for Full Employment and Equity
CoGTA/DCoG	Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (SA)
COPAC	Cooperative and Policy Alternative Centre
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPF	Community Policing Forum
CSVR	Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation
CWP	Community Work Programme
DFID	Department for International Development – United Kingdom
ECD	Early Childhood Development
ELR	Employer of Last Resort
EPWP	Expanded Public Works Programme
ESCECC	Eastern Cape Socio Economic Consultative Council
FE	Facilitators Enterprise
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
HBC	Homebased Care
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HR	Human Resources
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
HIS	Information Handling Services
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISPA	Inter-Agency Social Protection Assessments

LA's	Lead Agent
LGBTI	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual and Intersex
LIA's	Local Implementing Agency
MASAF	Malawi Social Action Fund
MCDP	Munsieville Community Development Project
MERET	Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions
MGNREGA	Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
NALEDI	National Labour and Economic Development Institute
NANGOF	Namibian Non-Governmental Organisations Forum
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OW	Organisation Workshop
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress of Azania
PACSA	Pietermaritzburg Agency for Community Social Action
PEC	Participants Enterprise
PIA	Provincial Implementing Agency
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
PWP	Public Works Programme
RDP	Reconstruction Development Programme
SA	South Africa
SAFSC	South African Food Sovereignty Campaign
SAPS	South African Police Service
SWOP	Society, Work and Development Institute
TB	Tuberculosis
TIPS	Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNISA	University of South Africa
US	United States
VW	Volkswagen

## GLOSSARY

Airtime	a voucher used to load money on a cell phone to make calls or text
Ausie	a respectful way to address or refer to a young woman
Braai	barbecue
Braai pack	packaged frozen pieces of chicken
Crime hotspot	an area with a high crime rate
Gogo	grandmother or elderly woman
Magwinya	deep-fried traditional dough bread (also known as vetkoeks)
Mme	mother or polite title to address an older woman
Nyaope	dangerous and highly addictive street drug
Pap	maize meal
Shebeen	an informal licenced or unlicensed establishment that sells alcohol
Sishebo	curry or relish or stew
Spaza shop	a small informal shop, usually run from a private home
Specials	goods offered at reduced prices or rates than their usual price
Stokvel	an informal saving scheme where members contribute agreed amount
Zama zamas	illegal miners

## MAPS OF THE STUDY AREA

*Figure 1: Map of South Africa*



Source: Global Security <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rsa/maps.htm>

Figure 2: Map of Gauteng Province



Source: Gauteng Compliance <https://toolsforschool.net/compliance/gauteng-compliance/>

*Figure 3: Map of the West Rand Region*



Source: Municipalities of South Africa <https://municipalities.co.za/map/1236/rand-west-city-local-municipality>




**Figure 4: Map of Bekkersdal**



Source: Elize S van Eeden <http://elizevaneeden.co.za/research-focuses/ecohealth-and-wellbeing-research-in-mining-regions/community-engagements/bekkersdal-as-case-study/>

**Figure 5: Map of Munsieville**



Source: OpenStreetMap <https://www.openstreetmap.org/#map=16/-26.0753/27.7549>



## CHAPTER 1

### RESEARCH QUESTION, ARGUMENT AND METHODOLOGY

#### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

In his seminal work, *The Condition of Post Modernity*, David Harvey (1989) writes about the ‘sea change in the surface of capitalism since 1973’. As the ‘buzzword of our times’ (Kellner, 1998:23), ‘neo-liberal globalisation’ has become the subject of copious scholarly analysis with other leading scholars describing it as ‘The Second Great Transformation’ (Webster et al., 2008) and ‘Third Wave Marketization’ (Burawoy, 2010). This ‘sea change’, Harvey (1989) argues, involves the move from ‘Fordism’ to the ‘flexible mode of accumulation’. In other words, it entails the transition from ‘the logic of formal labour markets’ (Broad, 1995:68) to what Webster (2010:228) refers to as ‘the decent work deficit logic’. However, it is important to note that this sea change does not represent a completely new regime of accumulation but the intensification of the capitalist mode of production (Harvey, 1989).

The deleterious effects of the ‘Second Great Transformation’ on wage labour, livelihoods and the environment are well explored by the various scholars. Precarious work has become pervasive as witnessed by the intensification of ‘decent work deficits’, further alienation of labour, the proliferation of atypical forms of employment in the place of the forever diminishing standard employment relationships, rise in sweatshops and informal work, attacks on the hard-won labour rights and the decline in the political and organisational strength of labour unions (Webster et al., 2008; Kalleberg & Hewison, 2013; Kenny, 2005, 2007). Environmental degradation has also become a major concern in the current era of neo-liberal globalisation (Cock, 2007; Pillay, 2014; Satgar, 2015). These deleterious effects on the environment and the nature of work have had dire consequences for livelihoods – engendering a ‘crisis of social reproduction’ (Mosoetsa, 2005; Scully, 2013).

Harvey (1989:284) further observes that neo-liberal globalisation ‘has had a disorienting and disruptive impact upon political-economic practice, the balance of class power, as well as cultural and social life’. Similarly, scholars in the development literature such as Judt (in Webster & Bhowmik, 2014:4) observe that ‘we have entered the age of insecurity-economic insecurity, physical insecurity, [and] political insecurity’. Standing (2016:1) argues that the ‘Second Great Transformation’ has created ‘a global precariat [the dangerous class], consisting of many millions around the world without the anchor of stability’. However, it is important to point out that, although the commodification of life has intensified in the neo-liberal era, the emergence of the widespread precarity in the global South predates this era (Harris & Scully, 2015). According to Harris and Scully (2015:416), commodification and precarity in the South is a direct consequence of the “‘growth-first” approaches to development that preceded and continued into the neo-liberal era’.

The resistance against the ‘Second Great Transformation’ was led by Polanyi-type movements comprising of the old and new movements. It is taken for granted that a countermovement against marketisation would always come from below. But because Polanyi failed to provide ‘a theory of power’ on the countermovement thesis (Webster et al., 2008), Munck (2013:160) suggests that ‘there are many ways in which the self-protection of society can operate’. A countermovement can thus also emerge from above. Indeed, some scholars (Bannerjee; 2010; Bowles, 2009; Dale, 2010; Fakier & Ehmke, 2014; Harris, 2010) suggest that the expansion of cash transfer and ELR programmes in the global South constitute a countermovement from above. However, based on a review of social assistance programmes in China, India, South Africa and Brazil, Harris and Scully (2015:415) argue that these programmes ‘emerged not out of technocratic fixes from above but often out of political and social struggles from below ... that have forced states to recognise an obligation to provide welfare to citizens directly, rather than simply promise economic growth’.

The idea of the government acting as an ELR is central to this dissertation. Popularly known as ‘public works’ or ‘workfare’, the ELR can be described as a government-funded programme that provides work opportunities to able-bodied adults of the working age who cannot find jobs elsewhere (Wray, 2007). In South Africa today, the CWP is among the programmes which give practical expression to the idea of the ELR. The CWP began in 2007 as a pilot project under the South African government’s Second Economy Strategy Project. The CWP is designed as a safety net to supplement existing livelihood strategies for the excluded (Philip, 2013). It offers regular part-time work, on an ongoing basis, for two days in a week for each participant, and normally accommodates 1000 participants per site.

My interest in the idea of ELR started at the Society, Work and Development Institute (SWOP) at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg – where I was an intern in 2009, and later a PhD fellow. This interest developed after the submission of my Masters Research report in industrial sociology to the University of the Witwatersrand, Sociology Department in February 2010. At the time of submission, the workers at the Volkswagen (VW) plants in Uitenhage (Port Elizabeth, South Africa) and Kassel (Kassel, Germany) were still grappling with the persistent insecurity, particularly in the wake of the 2008/09 global economic crisis. Under pressure to adapt to the crisis, the VW management restructured work at both plants. Part of the work restructuring involved the reduction in working time (short-time), and threats of job cuts. The study exposed me to the work of scholars such as Franco Barcheisi (2011) who argued that wage labour in South Africa was not only in decline but was also increasingly becoming insecure, unstable and precarious for the few in formal, waged jobs.

Concerned about the growing joblessness and the decline in the quality of salaried jobs, I continued to grapple with the question: What is to be done about the livelihood security of the majority working-age, unemployed poor without access to salaried jobs or

social assistance programmes? This interest reverberated with the then popular South African discourse on what became known as the ‘Lula Moment’ supported by a series of insightful seminars organised and produced in report form by the Chris Hani Institute (CHI). At the same time, I was intrigued by new refreshing theoretical perspectives from the Left which had already surfaced such as James Ferguson’s (2009) work on the ‘uses of neoliberalism’ and Erik Olin Wright’s (2010) work on ‘envisioning the real utopians’.

From August 2010, I assisted with the preparatory work for a SWOP-NALEDI collaborative survey study on the CWP in Munsieville – the survey was ultimately conducted in October 2010, and I was one of the fieldworkers. This was followed by a field trip in December 2010 by a SWOP-ICDD research team to MGNREGA sites in Dhule district in the state of Maharashtra, India. During this field trip, I had the opportunity to do preliminary interviews with government officials in India’s Ministry of Rural Development and one of the leading development scholars in India, Jean Dreze. This study was initially intended to be a transnational comparative study of the CWP and MGNREGA, but this angle was later dropped. However, my involvement in this preparatory work not only shaped this study but also opened new intellectual space for critical reflection on the potentialities of the CWP.

The primary concern of this study is with the innovation in the design of the CWP. As will be demonstrated, the CWP’s core design challenges the traditional theoretical approaches to the concept of ELR, particularly as experienced and theorised in the global North. It is an oversimplification of the complexity of the ELR to uncritically transpose, for example, the experience of the 1930s New Deal public works programmes in the USA to make sense of a distinctively designed CWP in South Africa in 2010. Any attempt to do is akin to ‘comparing apples with oranges’ (Locke & Thelen, 1994). It is equally unhelpful to engage in ‘denunciatory analyses’ against any form of ELR only on the basis of the work obligation.

In the global North, the ELR emerged in a context of frictional unemployment and was designed primarily as a labour market activation policy. However, in the global South, the innovatively designed ELR programmes, such as the CWP, were introduced in the context of the ‘unlimited supply of labour’ with the intention to provide predictable and regular income to participants on an ongoing basis – not activation into the formal labour market. In the global North, the ELR formed part of the wider ideological onslaught against the established capitalist welfare state – in favour of the ‘workfare state’ or ‘welfare-to-work’. In most parts of the global South, however, there has never been a strong welfare state in the first place to be ‘rolled-back’, as the majority of the people relied on informal security regimes. The ongoing innovation in the design of the ELR programmes constitutes attempts by governments in the South to protect and promote the livelihoods of the able-bodied adults of working age.

Alongside these important differences, is the extent to which an ELR programme fosters meaningful, community-based, participatory planning from below in the selection of work assignments and sometimes the recruitment of participants. In this regard, the general experience of the ELR in the global North can be described as despotic to the core because the communities were hardly given any meaningful voice over decisions such as the selection of what constituted useful work in their communities. Most of the ELR programmes in the North do not have any solid traceable history of meaningful democratic control by communities from below. This in contrast to the recent experiences in the global South where some innovative ELR programmes, such as the CWP, give meaningful power to participants and communities to decide on what constitutes useful and productive work based on their context.

## 1.2 MAIN QUESTION AND CENTRAL ARGUMENT

The primary research question that this dissertation poses is: What is the role of the CWP in protecting and promoting livelihoods of the participants in Munsieville and Bekkersdal? This is a two-edged question which is unpacked into several manageable sub-questions guided by two-primary overriding themes: (i.) How the CWPs actually facilitate the protection and promotion of resilient and sustainable livelihoods among the excluded in Bekkersdal and Munsieville; and (ii) The conditions which enable or inhibits the CWP to perform these functions, i.e. livelihood protection and promotion.

Drawing from a wider source of interdisciplinary literature and theories, this dissertation makes a conceptual distinction between livelihood protection and livelihood promotion. Livelihood protection refers to the ability of the ELR to effectively respond to poverty, hunger and vulnerability. Livelihood promotion refers to the ability of participants to ‘graduate’ from an ELR programme, and develop sustainable livelihoods independent of state provisioning. While the idea of an ‘exit strategy’ is normally associated with conditional cash transfers which impose strict behavioural change, and blames the recipients of benefits for being poor, ‘graduation’ is conceptually different as it is not based on meeting a pre-defined bureaucratic threshold but real, natural and self-initiated potential to graduate (Chirwa et al., 2012; Moury, 2014). With ‘graduation’, the participants voluntarily leave a social assistance programme without being ‘pushed out’.

The central argument of this dissertation can be summed up as follows: While the CWP was effective in protecting livelihoods of the participants in Munsieville and Bekkersdal, it also held the potential to promote livelihoods of the poor through the establishment of CWP-linked cooperative enterprises. Firstly, the dissertation confirms the now-familiar argument that the cash income from the ELR enables the excluded to manage

and cope with idiosyncratic risks and vulnerabilities at the household level – on the condition that the cash income is regular and predictable (McCord, 2003). The CWP cash income alone, however, was inadequate to meet all essential household needs, and had to be supplemented by other existing livelihood strategies. The CWP in both communities also supported the livelihoods of vulnerable groups – such as school children, the frail and elderly, and orphans – through the home-based care programme, and the homestead and communal food gardens (located in the clinics, old-age homes, schools, churches and early childhood development centres).

Beyond protecting livelihoods, this dissertation demonstrates that the CWP has other important community development multipliers such as promoting the ethic of community care, the ethic of care for the environment and natural resources; building safe communities; and fostering friendship and solidarity among participants. The study problematises some of these multipliers. In addition to these common social multipliers, the CWP participants in Munsieville experimented with even more innovative initiatives independently such as gender awareness and youth development activities.

Secondly, the study is critical of the mainstream literature and theories, both in the academic and international ‘donor’ agency arenas, on the role of the ELR in promoting livelihoods. The mainstream literature tends to emphasise three common ‘graduation’ pathways through the ELR, namely: i) skills training and work experience; ii) individual entrepreneurship; and iii) asset creation. The first pathway, skills training, is generally influenced by development discourses in the global North where the ELR was used as a labour market activation policy in the context of frictional unemployment. Although the CWP was not originally designed to perform this role, the study captures the aspirational perspectives of the participants on how they thought the inclusion of a training component could improve their chances of securing formal wage employment. The entrepreneurship

pathway in both communities has not yielded any tangible or promising start-ups of small enterprises by individual participants – save for small, survivalist entrepreneurial activities with no real prospects of success.

The study presents the case of three nascent and survivalist CWP-linked worker cooperatives in Munsieville to introduce the development of cooperatives as a potential and most viable ‘graduation’ pathway through the ELR. The attempt by the CWP participants in 2013 to form an organic vegetable farming cooperative enterprise in Bekkersdal was unsuccessful. The study suggests that the application of the Organisation Workshop (OW) methodology can help us understand and clarify the relative capability of CWP participants in Munsieville to initiate more innovative community development programmes on their own, and to sustain their CWP-linked cooperative enterprises, compared to the participants in Bekkersdal<sup>1</sup>.

### **1.3 RATIONALE FOR THE SELECTION OF THE RESEARCH SITES**

Fieldwork was carried out in two black African townships in South Africa, namely Munsieville and Bekkersdal, located in the Gauteng province. Choosing research sites for any comparative case study in the social sciences is not a trivial methodological issue (Vogt et al., 2014; Walford, 2001). In this regard, the case selection for this study was guided by John Stuart Mill’s renowned methods of similarity and difference (Vogt et al., 2014). Central to

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<sup>1</sup> The OW (called Westonaria Organisation Workshop – (W.O.W) was operationalised in Westonaria from the 14<sup>th</sup> October 2015 to the 9<sup>th</sup> December 2015. The W.O.W was originally designed to recruit OW participants from Bekkersdal and the neighbouring community called Simunye. However, following discussions with senior local government officials, it was agreed that participants in the WOW should be drawn from all the 16 wards in Westonaria. The W.O.W was supported by leading local gold mines Sibanye Gold and Gold Fields operating in Westonaria, as well as the Westonaria Community Trust, the South Deep Education Trust and the South Deep Community Trust. The W.O.W’s participants’ enterprise was called the *Mine and Community Development Enterprises* which comprised a cluster of economic, institutional and social activities (Andersson et al., 2016). This dissertation does not provide an in-depth analysis of the potential influence of the W.O.W on the activities of the CWP in Bekkerdsdal because the OW in Westonaria was operationalised after the completion of the fieldwork for this study.



these methods, which remain a subject of intense debates in social science research (Ragin, 1987; Skocpol & Somers, 1980), is an important question that has to be considered in conceptualising a comparative case study: ‘Do you select similar cases/sites and focus your analysis on differences [method of difference], or do you choose different cases/sites and concentrate analytically on similarities? [method of agreement]?’ (Vogt et al., 2014:415).

This study uses the ‘method of difference’ to provide the methodological justification for the selection of Munsieville and Bekkersdal as the research sites. As discussed in Chapter 5, these communities are similar in important respects. Both Munsieville and Bekkersdal share roughly similar socio-economic realities (the challenge of rising unemployment owing to the steady decline in gold mining in the West Rand) and political histories. But because ‘limits to differences and similarity can always be found’ (Vogt et al., 2014:414), there were obviously other differences in regard to the size of the population, immigration patterns and the fact that CWP was introduced in Munsieville in 2007 and three years later (2010) in Bekkersdal. The selection of the two cases is ‘exciting’ because it helps us understand why the CWP had dissimilar outcomes in two communities which share similar historical and contemporary socio-economic characteristics. As discussed extensively in Chapter 5, the historical development of both communities can be traced back to the early thriving years of gold mining in the West Rand, and the subsequent decline in the recent years which has brought about livelihood challenges in these communities.

#### **1.4 ACCESS TO THE RESEARCH SITES**

Linked to the rationale for ‘case selection’ in comparative social research is a practical challenge of access to the selected sites (Walford, 2001). Access to both CWP sites was facilitated through SWOP as part of a series of surveys on the CWP in the two communities. The first SWOP survey was conducted in October 2010 in Munsieville in collaboration with

National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI), a labour think-tank for Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The second survey was conducted in December 2010 in several neighbouring communities (Simunye, Zuurbekom and Bekkersdal) surrounding the town of Westonaria. I was actively involved in these surveys.

My involvement in these surveys did not play a decisive role in the selection of the research sites. This needs to be emphasised particularly in light of the valid concern that site selection within comparative case studies and ethnographic research is sometimes informed by easy access to research sites and sometimes, at the behest of the ‘funders’. Based on an extensive reading of multiple comparative case studies and ethnographies of schools and classrooms, Walford (2001:151) observes a worrying trend: ‘insufficient concern is often given to the choice of research sites.... Researchers settle for research sites to which they can easily gain convenient and ready access rather than thinking through the implications of particular choices’. This ultimately results in situations where a choice of research site is not ‘closely related to any theoretical objectives of the study’ (Walford, 2001:152)

The selection of research sites for this study was an outcome of careful methodological considerations. I had multiple options to select other communities, such as Simunye or Zuurbekom, included in the SWOP CWP survey in Westonaria. I was also part of the initial research visits by the SWOP research team to the CWP site in Bokfontein in the North-West province. Moreover, SWOP conducted another CWP survey (though I was not involved) in Kieskammahoek in the Eastern Cape Province. Furthermore, I could have negotiated access to any other CWP site with relative ease as I was already known and in contact with some officials from the two CWP implementing agents, Seriti Institute and Teba Development, at the time. The selection of Munsieville and Bekkersdal for this study was not driven by the ready access to these sites but was purely informed by the main objectives of this study.

## 1.5 RESEARCH APPROACH

This study adopts the comparative case study approach to explore the CWP's potential in protecting and promoting livelihoods of the excluded. Comparative research in social sciences is usually employed to study what Ragin (1987:1) calls 'large macrosocial units' such as nation-states or societies. Over the past two decades, this approach was widely applied in most 'cross-national' or 'cross-societal' comparisons focusing on themes such as labours' responses to insecurity and work restructuring (industrial sociology), welfare regimes (development sociology), democratisation (political sciences), and foreign policy analysis (international relations). The use of this methodological approach, however, is not limited to 'large macrosocial units' but is equally suitable for 'micro-sites' (Walford, 2001:151) or 'comparatively oriented case studies' (Ragin, 2014). Similarly, Bartlett and Vavrus (2017:10) argue that the comparative case study approach could 'simultaneously [attend] to global, national, and local dimensions of case-based research'.

A comparative case study approach is adopted in this study to understand and analyse the (different) outcomes of the same ELR program – the CWP – in two similar ('micro-sites') communities (Munsieville and Bekkersdal) which are 31 kilometres apart from each other; in the same country, province and region (South Africa, Gauteng province, West Rand region); in a similar urban setting; and with similar socio-economic challenges and political histories. As a methodological tool, the comparative case study approach also guided the explanation and interpretation of this variation. There are two reasons for the adoption of this methodological approach. First, the main strength of the case study approach lies in its inherent ability to allow for a more robust, holistic and in-depth investigation into a defined research problem (Yin, 1989). The comparative case study approach overcomes the 'wide gulf' between the positivist and interpretivist philosophical approaches to social research (Ragin, 2014). It overcomes this gulf by encouraging the triangulation of qualitative and

quantitative research methods within a single study (Ragin, 2014; Yin, 2009). This study combines qualitative and quantitative research designs to investigate the central problem. The ‘what’ questions posed on the role of the CWP in protecting and promoting livelihoods would not be adequately answered had the study only relied on the qualitative research design and techniques. The qualitative research methods were equally crucial because relying on quantitative data alone would most likely provide a partial, if not a superficial, understanding of the CWP’s potentialities.

Second, the philosophical assumptions of the comparative case study approach are rooted in the ‘extended case method’ – which forms an integral part of the methodological framework for this study. Comparative case study approach ‘builds upon’ and ‘draws on the extended case method in several ways (Bartlett and Vavrus 2017). Bartlett and Vavrus (2017:16) highlight the ‘embrace of critical theory; the opportunities to generalise, theoretically rather than statistically, from qualitative work; and the comparing of theoretically similar work done on different topics in different places’ as some of the important ‘ways’ in which the comparative case study approach ‘draws’ from the extended case method. According to Burawoy (2000:26), the extended case method comprises of four ‘extensions’, namely: ‘the extension of the observer into the world of the participant’; ‘extensions of observations over time and space’; ‘extending out from micro processes to macro-forces’, and ‘extension of the theory’ – all with an inbuilt ‘sensitivity to questions of power and reflexivity’.

### **1.5.1 Extension of the observer into the world of the participant**

This dimension requires the researcher to ‘leave the security of the university for the uncertain life of the participant’ (Burawoy, 2000:27). In conducting this study, I lived in each of these communities for three months, respectively. I lived in Bekkersdal in the period

between June and August 2011 where I rented a backyard shack in the formal section of the township known as Uptown. I lived in Munsieville from 05 September until the end of November in 2011 where I rented a backyard room. During this period, I spent considerable time with CWP participants observing their work and meetings, and in other non-work spaces in the communities such as church services, funerals, community meetings, sport and cultural events, *chisa nyamas* and *shebeens*. On ‘paydays’ – the days when participants received their CWP income – I spent time with participants in many public spaces such as the local shops or public taxis as they made their way to the nearest towns to spend their earnings.

### **1.5.2 Extensions of observations over time and space**

The second dimension requires the researcher to ‘spend extended periods of time following their subjects around, living their lives, learning their ways and wants’ (Burawoy, 2000:27). Besides living in both communities for extended periods of time, I frequented the two communities in the following three years (2012, 2013 and 2014), for a survey in Munsieville in 2013 which involved non-participant observation and semi-structured interviews. I also conducted some follow-up interviews at the beginning of 2015. Preceding my extended stay in both communities were preliminary visits by the SWOP research team around August and September in 2010. I administered a survey questionnaire with 100 participants in Munsieville in the period between May and July 2013. In Bekkersdal, the survey was partly done in December 2010 as part of the SWOP survey study in Westonaria, but I had to administer more questionnaires on my own from February to April in 2011.

### **1.5.3 Extending out from micro processes to macro-forces**

The third dimension of the extended case method, as Burawoy (2000:27) contends, requires the researcher ‘to view the micro as an expression of the macro’. This is in contrast to conventional ethnography which is generally ahistorical and restricted to the micro-level

(Burawoy, 2000). This dimension ‘takes the social situations as the point of empirical examination and works with given general concepts and laws about states, economies, legal orders, and the like to understand how those micro situations are shaped by wider structures’ (Burawoy, 1991:282). The social realities in Bekkersdal and Munsieville were not seen or interpreted as insulated from the broader macro socio-political and economic dynamics. Instead, these realities were linked to and shaped by the national and global macro-forces. Accordingly, this study locates the micro-level processes in these communities within the context of the ‘Second Great Transformation’ – a system responsible for the deepening ‘crisis of social reproduction’ in the contemporary neo-liberal era.

#### **1.5.4 Extension of the theory**

Finally, the fourth extension compels the researcher to extend, refine and improve bodies of existing theories (Burawoy, 2000). The goal is not to confirm a theory or to build new theories from scratch but to ‘integrate and extend existing theory’ (Burawoy, 1991a:11). This study extends the livelihood promotion theoretical perspective by presenting cooperative development as a potentially viable ‘graduation’ pathway from the ELR, particularly in the contexts characterised by structural and chronic unemployment. The study argues that the dominant theories on livelihood promotion provide a limited theoretical framework for understanding the potential of the ELR in this regard. The extension of the theory on the promotion of livelihoods in the context of the ELR is a logical outcome of the first three ‘extensions’ of the extended case method.

### **1.6 RESEARCH METHODS**

The research methods involved the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative research methods, namely: non-participant observation, survey, semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and documentary analysis. At the conceptualisation of this study in 2010, I had the

privilege to attend numerous meetings organised by SWOP with key officials from the two agents assigned to implement the CWP in various communities across South Africa – Seriti Institute and Teba Development. During the course of the study, I attended workshops and seminars on the CWP organised by the Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS). These workshops and seminars provided the opportunity for me to interact with government officials, policymakers and researchers with an interest in CWP. I raised questions and expressed my own views on the programme in these seminars. I learned a lot from these engagements including the informal conversations outside the formal proceedings of these seminars.

### **1.6.1 Non-participant observation**

Urquhart (2015) argues that ‘non-participant observation means the observer is “looking on” and not playing an active role’. This technique was adopted to enable the ‘observer’ to ‘confront participants in their corporeal reality, in their concrete existence, in their time and space’ (Burawoy, 1991:291). I gathered the primary data during the six months I spent in Munsieville and Bekkersdal and this involved direct non-participant observation and informal interviews with the CWP participants. The observation of some CWP work activities and the work associated with the CWP continued beyond this period as I maintained constant visits to the two communities. I recorded my daily observations and reflections in my field diary.

On a typical day, the observation normally began with a walk, together with CWP participants, to the local CWP offices where all participants were required to sign the attendance register before they could start their assignments for the day. From here I would randomly select and join any of these groups, paying attention to the diversity in the CWP work activities in these communities. I stayed with the selected groups for the entire duration of their working time until they reported back to local CWP offices around 2pm to sign off.

After the participants knocked off, I would remain at the local CWP offices with the coordinators who had to perform daily administrative routines. This direct interaction with the participants allowed me to observe the CWP activities ‘in their natural setting’.

I attended the weekly meetings of the CWP coordinators every Friday. These were specifically set aside for administrative work such as the reconciliation of the attendance registers, training and a motivational talk by external parties, submission of weekly reports and debriefing on the work done in the previous week and work plans for the week ahead. In Munsieville, I attended several innovative projects such as the school holiday programme, sport and cultural events, celebration of commemorative days, and the men’s and women’s forums held at the Methodist Church in the community. I also spent a considerable amount of time observing the work of three CWP-linked cooperatives in Munsieville, and also attended some of their meetings where possible.

The observation extended beyond the immediate CWP work environment to neutral public spaces where CWP participants usually spent their leisure time. These spaces included community meetings, shops or shopping centres, funerals, church services, *shebeens*, *chisa nyamas*, local community sport and cultural activities. Paydays were very busy in both communities, and I also spent time with participants in non-work environments such as *chisa nyamas* and *shebeens* where the participants were more relaxed. The direct observation in both the work and non-work environments provided a complementary opportunity for data collection. It later turned out that most CWP participants were generally more open in their responses outside the CWP work environments. During CWP’s official working time, some participants tended to view me as a stranger from a ‘university’ or ‘government inspector’, at work like them. Compounded by the presence of the CWP coordinators, some participants appeared relatively tense in our informal discussions when undertaking their CWP work activities. In contrast, the non-work environments provided an opportunity for more robust



and open informal discussions. The silent dichotomy between the ‘Wits student’ and ‘CWP participant’ appeared to suddenly decapitate during the informal conversations with the participants outside the CWP work environment.

### **1.6.2 Survey**

A survey ‘normally uses a structured questionnaire as a data gathering instrument’ (Greenstein 2003:27). Greenstein further argues that it ‘target large numbers of people who are asked identical questions in the same order, so as to collect data about their demographic characteristics, living conditions, behaviour, opinions and preferences’. The survey was used in this study to gather demographic (gender, age, education, dependency ratio) and economic (employment history, income levels, other sources of income) profile of the CWP participants in these communities. The survey method was crucial as it provided base information on the profile of CWP participants in these communities—the main respondents of this study.

A questionnaire was utilised to gather data from 100 CWP participants from each of the communities (200 in total) on issues such as their socio-economic profiles, sources of additional income besides the CWP earnings, number of days worked in the CWP in a month, monthly expenditure patterns, and their opinions of the CWP as a tool for community development. The choice of 100 respondents was designed to achieve a 10% representative sample because each community had roughly 1000 participants at the time when the questionnaires were administered. The questionnaire comprised largely of closed questions, although some of the closed questions were followed by an open-ended question.

Random sampling, viewed by Chantler and Durand (2014:123) as the ‘purest form of probability sampling’, was employed to select respondents to the structured questionnaire. Random sampling ensures that ‘every member of the population has the equal chance of being included in the sample’ (Greenstein, 2003:34). Although the random sampling

procedure was followed to select respondents, attempts were made to ensure that the sample was sensitive to the gender, geographic and age diversity among CWP participants in both communities. The random sampling for the survey was done in such manner to minimize the chances of putting together a biased sample. As outlined earlier, the approximately 1000 CWP participants in in Bekkersdal and Munsieville, respectively, represented the total population to be studied. Each of these 1000 CWP participants in each of these communities had equal chance to be selected to be part of the sample.

Simple random sampling was initially adopted where CWP participants in both communities were chosen randomly, with each respondent standing an equal chance of being selected for the sample. To ensure diversity of the population in terms of age, gender and geography (different sections of the communities), the random sampling was later controlled without compromising the reliability and validity of the data gathered through the structured questionnaire. This was done by randomly selecting the respondents within each of these categories. In terms of the age category for the sampling, a random sample was selected within the two age categories of the old (over the age of 36) and youth (under the age of 35). As for geographic location, participants coming from different wards/sections of these communities were randomly selected to participant in the survey. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), Version 2.2, was used to capture and analyse the data from the questionnaires. Some of the information received from the open-ended questions and other important narrative elaborations were not analysed through the SPSS software but through the thematic analysis method.

### **1.6.3 Semi-structured interviews**

The interview remains a popular data collection technique in social science research (Greenstein, 2003). In general terms, an interview can be described as ‘a conversation that puts emphasis on the art of asking questions and listening’ (Greenstein, 2003:55). However, unlike casual conversations, an interview in social science research is ‘arranged in advance and the researcher will explain to the respondent why they have been approached, what they will be asked about and how the information they provide will be used’ (Greenstein, 2003:55). There are different types of interviews ranging from structured, semi-structured and unstructured. Semi-structured interviews are more flexible as ‘they allow the respondent to speak broadly about the topics being discussed’ (Greenstein, 2003:56). In this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 44 CWP participants, 10 coordinators, 8 members of the CWP-linked cooperatives and two site managers in both communities. Purposive sampling was used to select a sample for the semi-structured interviews.

The analysis of semi-structured interviews followed the thematic analysis method. Because some respondents agreed to the audio recording of interviews, I carefully listened to the recordings and transcribed interviews. This process involved language translation of the interviews from African languages into English since most interviews were conducted in isiXhosa, isiZulu, Sepedi, SeSotho and, to a limited degree, in Bekkersdal, Xitsonga. Multilingualism is common in urban black African townships which remains homes to migrant workers drawn from different parts of South Africa, and Southern Africa. The transcribed recordings and interview notes (of those who refused to be recorded) were used to manually generate codes using marking pens. The coded data were then analytically translated into themes and subthemes guided by the theoretical focus of the study on the protection and promotion of livelihoods through the ELR.

#### **1.6.4 Focus groups**

Greenstein (2003:60) defines a focus group as ‘a group discussion generally involving between eight and twelve participants from similar backgrounds or experiences to discuss a specific topic of interest’. One focus group was held with five participants who were involved in the failed attempt to start a CWP-linked cooperative in Bekkersdal. In Munsieville, three separate focus groups were conducted with the three groups, ranging between 7 and 10 participants, who were members of the three CWP-linked cooperatives. Although individual semi-structured interviews were conducted with some worker members of the cooperatives in both communities, the focus groups were useful in further probing the histories, operations and challenges that faced these cooperatives. The selection of the respondents for both the focus groups was purposive because only those participants who were members of the CWP-linked cooperatives were required to participate. The analysis of data followed the same thematic method applied to the semi-structured interviews.

#### **1.6.5 Documentary analysis**

The study also relied on documentary analysis to collect data in addition to surveys, participant observation, focus groups and the semi-structured interviews. Often referred to as ‘qualitative document analysis’ or ‘content analysis’ or ‘review of documents’ (Greenstein, 2003:65), documentary analysis relies on ‘gathering and analysing documents’. The documentary analysis in this study involved a thorough examination of documents and reports on the CWP from different sources. Among the valuable documents I closely examined were the reports by the CWP implementing agents, the annual reports produced by the COGTA, the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) of the Westonaria and Mogale City local municipalities, the evaluation report of the OW by Singizi Consulting and the detailed report on the OW in Munsieville.

## 1.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The process of data collection in social science research is intractably linked to the subject of ethics (Greenstein, 2003). This study was approved (Ethics Protocol No: 110616) by the Non-Medical Ethics Committee of the University of the Witwatersrand. All the ethical considerations made with the application for the clearance were strictly adhered to throughout this study. Permission was sought from the CWP site managers to observe the work activities. Except for the informal conversations, consent was sought from all respondents. Participation in the semi-structured interviews, focus groups and the survey was voluntary and confidential. I always introduced myself in full, clarified the objectives of the study and emphasised that any of the respondents could withdraw from the research at any time without any prejudice. The respondents were also at liberty to refuse to answer any question. Consent was sought from respondents for the use of an audio-recorder.

Whereas anonymity was guaranteed for the CWP participants and coordinators, this could not be guaranteed for the two CWP site managers. Extra care was taken when visiting homes of the beneficiaries of the CWP home-based programme. Before joining any of the home-based care groups in any given day, I would explain to the responsible coordinator and participants that they needed to first consult with their patients if it was acceptable for me to visit them. Even after permission was granted in this way, I always sought another confirmation directly from the beneficiaries on whether my presence was welcome. Initially this was a source of tension between me and some coordinators who interpreted this as a sign of mistrust on my part. In addition to the double confirmation, I always emphasised confidentiality and their right to ask me to leave their premises at any time. Young children were not interviewed in this study. Pseudonyms are used in this dissertation but real names are also used for those who insisted on the use of their real names.

## **1.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

One of the methodological limitations of observing people ‘in their own time and space, in their everyday lives’, is that the researcher cannot avoid the ‘effects of power’; that is ‘dominating and being dominated’ (Burawoy, 1998:22). My entry into both communities was a very open and transparent process. Most participants knew my identity as a student researcher from Wits University and were aware of my study. I was introduced to all the CWP participants in both communities when I started the fieldwork. Despite revealing my identity and purpose of my study, some CWP participants still viewed me as a ‘government inspector’ who was there to listen and resolve their CWP grievances. In the first few weeks of fieldwork, many participants were eager to speak but these discussions were initially skewed towards their demands such as ‘wage increase’ or increase in the number of days worked per week or ‘more tools’. It was common to be asked ‘how will you assist us?’ For them, I had the power to alleviate their plight by communicating their grievances and desires to ‘the government’. Although this perception subsided over time as most gradually accepted my true identity, some of the responses could be influenced by my perceived identity as a ‘government inspector’ or an official from the implementing agents.

The second limitation of this study is the fact that, whereas the OW methodology is identified and discussed as an important factor for understanding the variation between the CWP in Munsieville and Bekkersdal, I could not have attended the month-long workshop in 2007 because this study was only conceptualised in 2010. The OW workshop in Munsieville was administered from 12 March to 11 April 2007. To address this limitation, the study had to rely on interviews with some CWP participants who participated in the OW in the community in 2007, undertake a critical literature review on the concept of the OW methodology, closely analyse the OW report in Munsieville and interview Dr. Gavin Andersson who was the Coach of the OW team in Munsieville.

## 1.9 THE ORGANISATION OF THE DISSERTATION

Chapter 2 provides the conceptual framework and literature review by locating the ‘impulse for social protection’ in the global South within the Polanyian theoretical framework. The chapter demonstrates that the crisis of social reproduction in ‘the age of insecurity’ has led many governments across the global South to rethink development and ponder on alternative development paths. The chapter discusses cash transfers and ELR programmes as the main defining features of the ‘impulse for social protection’ in the global South. To provide more conceptual clarity, the dissertation proposes a typology for ELR programmes comprising three ideal types: short-term, long-term and employment guarantee.

Chapter 3 synthesises the diverse literature on the concept of the ELR to provide a theoretical framework for the dissertation. The chapter draws on the broader literature on the concept of the ELR to develop seven theoretical perspectives on the ELR, namely: market fundamentalism, post-Keynesian, livelihood protection, livelihood promotion, communitarian, clientelism and anti-paternalism. These perspectives have different assumptions on what should be a driving goal and output of the ELR. The primary theoretical focus of this study, however, is on the protection and promotion of livelihood theoretical perspectives.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of the CWP as one of the innovatively-designed ELR programmes in the global South. It locates the emergence of the CWP within the once dominant development discourse on the ‘second economy’ and how this discourse propelled the South African government to introduce the CWP as a distinctive component of the EPWP. The chapter also analyses the core design of the CWP in relation to the extent to which it prioritises the protection and promotion of livelihoods.

Chapter 5 briefly presents the historical and socio-economic context of Munsieville and Bekkersdal, the two communities selected for this comparative case study.

Chapter 6 discusses the role of the CWP in protecting livelihoods in Munsieville and Bekkersdal. This chapter concludes that the CWP was effective in reducing poverty and hunger, not only for participants but also vulnerable community members through the CWPs homestead and communal food gardens. Moreover, the experience of the CWP in Munsieville and Bekkersdal show that the ELR can do more than protecting livelihoods. The CWP in both communities had additional social multipliers such as promoting the ethic of care for the environment/natural resources and building safer communities. The CWP cultivated even more creative impulses in Munsieville, which saw participants implement more community development initiatives such as school holiday programme for primary school children, gender workshops for both men and women (called Men's and Women's Forums) and a dedicated social programme (that include sporting and cultural activities, workshops around HIV/AIDS, and drug abuse) focusing at the school-going youths.

Chapter 7 explores the role of the CWP in promoting livelihoods in Munsieville and Bekkersdal. This chapter presents the case of three nascent and survivalist cooperatives, though not yet fully autonomous or effective – one for sewing, one for beadwork; and the other for organic agriculture – in Munsieville to demonstrate that the more realistic potential of the CWP in helping participants to 'graduate' from poverty lies not on their individual abilities/opportunities to start small business or acquire skills to facilitate their (re)entry into the increasingly scarce and precarious jobs in the industry but on the collectivist economic activities such as cooperative enterprises. Attempts to establish a cooperative in Bekkersdal were unsuccessful. This chapter argues that the establishment of cooperatives linked with ELR programmes such as the CWP stands a relatively better prospect of promoting livelihoods than the prevailing mainstream theoretical framework that tends to rely on the



individual's ability to engage in self-entrepreneurial activities or skill upgrades for easy access to waged jobs.

Chapter 8 attempts to analyse and understand the relative ability of the CWP in Munsieville to establish the three, survivalist worker cooperatives and to successfully run more creative social initiatives which were absent in Bekkersdal. The chapter argues that the application of the OW methodology in Munsieville in 2007, before the launch of the CWP site in 2007, can help us understand this important variation. The chapter begins by presenting the theoretical underpinnings of the OW with reference to De Morais's theoretical work, followed by a description of how the OW works in practice and how it was actually operationalised in Munsieville in 2007, and then a discussion on how the OW can help us understand the presence of the autonomous innovative impulses in Munsieville.

Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation and suggests new themes and questions for further research on the CWP.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE ‘IMPULSE FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION’ IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

*‘Since the early 1990s, and against a background of economic crises, structural adjustment, and globalisation, social protection has increasingly defined a distinct policy agenda in developing countries. There are several distinguishing features of the emerging paradigm. In developing countries, social protection has a strong focus on poverty reduction, on the poor and especially on the poorest’.*

Armando Barrientos and David Hulme, 2009

#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

The crisis of social reproduction has led many governments in the global South to rethink development and consider alternative paths. The once-dominant, ‘trickle down’, neo-liberal ideology has only exacerbated the problems of poverty, inequality and vulnerability, resulting in a ‘dangerous gap between winners and losers in this new global order’ (Webster, 2013:4). The Polanyian ‘principle of social protection’ is gaining momentum in the global South, albeit at a slow pace. In the quest to ameliorate chronic poverty and insecurity, a number of governments in the global South are making strides to provide social security by providing monthly, non-contributory cash transfers and acting as an ELR. The ‘impulse for social protection’ in the global South is more pronounced than at any other period in history. How do we explain the rise in the innovative pro-poor policy interventions in the global South in the current conjecture? This chapter suggests that Karl Polanyi’s seminal work allows us to shed some light on the contemporary evolution of the ‘impulse for social protection’ in the global South in ‘the age of insecurity’.

There is evidently a renewed development discourse on how the challenges of unemployment, hunger, poverty and inequality could be addressed. This chapter argues that the contemporary ‘impulse for social protection’ in the global South can be characterised as a slow pendulum swing against the ‘Second Great Transformation’, namely, neo-liberal globalisation. The Polanyian pendulum is swinging away from the market to protect society. Embryonic as it may seem, this swing cannot be underestimated as it epitomised a paradigm shift in thinking about development as governments in the global South take the lead to provide for the basic social security for the excluded. This argument is not presented as entirely new, it draws from the work of development scholars who variously interpret the recent expansion of cash transfer and ELR programmes in the global South as ‘the quiet revolution’ or ‘the development revolution from the global South’ (Hanlon et al., 2010); the ‘new politics of redistribution’ or ‘the cash transfer revolution’ (Ferguson, 2015); a shift towards ‘a “welfare-first” approach to development’ (Harris and Scully, 2015); ‘state developmentalism’ (Sandbrook, 2011); ‘inclusive liberalism’ (Craig and Porter, 2005) and ‘social democracy in the global periphery’ (Sandbrook et al, 2007)

Ferguson (2015:1) observes that, in the recent years, a ‘host of different sites across the global South’ have seen ‘the creation and expansion of extensive social welfare programmes targeting the poor anchored in schemes that directly transfer small amounts of cash to large numbers of low-income people’. Similarly, Harris and Scully (2015:429) observe that ‘Starting in the mid-1990s and continuing through the 2008 global financial crisis, most of the global South embarked on a set of bold experiments in development policy that targeted the large segment of the population that had been excluded from the “development project”’. These experiments comprise of cash transfers, employment guarantees and the ‘expansions of access to health care and education’ (Harris & Scully, 2015:428). This is what exactly defines the ‘new politics of redistribution’ (Ferguson, 2015)

or a shift from a “growth-first” to a “welfare-first” approach to development’ (Harris & Scully, 2015:425).

This chapter argues that the Polanyian ‘impulse for social transformation’ in the global South manifests itself through the expansion of cash transfers and innovation in the design of ELR programmes. The chapter begins with a brief discussion on conditional and unconditional cash transfers. This is followed by a discussion on the innovation in the design of ELR programmes. Drawing from the existing literature on the ELR, the chapter proposes a typology for ELR programmes comprising three ideal types, namely, short-term ELR programmes, employment guarantee and long-term programmes.

## **2.2 THE DOUBLE MOVEMENT**

In the widely revered work, *The Great Transformation*, first published in 1944, Karl Polanyi (1886-1964) presents a compelling theory on the historical contestation between the market and society. The main focus of this influential work was on the emergence of the market economy in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the subsequent contradictions in the 1930s. His ideas, particularly the concepts of the double movement and embeddedness, have inspired many studies in development sociology/studies and many other studies on social change. Polanyi’s ideas had a notable influence in shaping the ideas of many leading scholars in development sociology such as Immanuel Wallerstein (world systems theory), John Ruggie (embedded liberalism) and Gosta Esping-Andersen (welfare regimes). This dissertation draws from Polanyi’s concepts of double movement and embeddedness to make sense of the evolving ‘impulse for social protection’ in the global South. It can be argued that the emergence of the innovatively-designed cash transfer programmes and ELR programmes, like the CWP, represents an attempt on the part of governments to re-embed markets into society.

Polanyi's (1944) main argument is that history is characterised by a constant contestation between society and the market on how society should be organised. This contestation ultimately generates a general tendency whereby social history is defined by a series of double movements. The concept of the 'double movement' describes a cyclical and contradictory historical interplay between the market and society. According to Polanyi (1944), an attempt to dis-embed the markets from the society generates a widespread protective countermovement to re-embed the markets in society. Until the Great Transformation, the market did not play any significant role in social life. Polanyi (1944:3) argued that an attempt to commodify land, labour and money was utopian: '... the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society'.

In the pre-industrial societies, the role of the market in the human social life was 'more than incidental to economic life' (Polanyi, 1944:43). Land, labour and money were not treated as commodities; instead, they were embedded in social relations. As Polanyi emphatically points out: 'The economic system was submerged in general social relations, markets were merely an accessory feature of an institutional setting controlled and regulated more than ever by social authority' (Polanyi, 1944:70). However, the 19<sup>th</sup> century gave birth to a new a social order – the Great Transformation – in which the market was dis-embedded from social relations. The 'marketization wave' (Burawoy, 2010) swept through the global North resulting in the commoditisation of labour, money and nature. Consistent with the double movement thesis, Polanyi described the Great Transformation, also known as Industrial Revolution, as an attempt to remove market restrictions or embeddedness of the medieval times. The countermovement against society in this period was led by the liberal political elites, nascent entrepreneurs and liberal intellectuals (Stewart, 2010).

The ‘principle of economic liberalism’ (Polanyi, 1944:141) reigned supreme between the 1800s until around the 1930s. This period witnessed an unprecedented shift towards rapid marketization and commoditisation of land, labour and money – what Polanyi termed fictitious commodities. Polanyi (1944) described this as utopian and, if left to fully develop, would ultimately annihilate society. However, this wave of marketisation or the rise of ‘market society’, Polanyi (1944) argued, was politically untenable because it would inevitably produce resistance to market domination. Accordingly, Polanyi (1944) warned that the countermovement could potentially give rise to regressive forms of politics. In some countries in Europe, for example, the countermovement against the marketization gave rise to fascism in Italy and Germany, and state capitalism in the Soviet Union. Whereas the countermovement could potentially engender both progressive and regressive politics, the common goal is the protection of society against market domination.

### **2.3 THE THIRD WAVE MARKETISATION: POLANYI’S FALSE OPTIMISM**

According to Burawoy (2010), the world has witnessed three ‘waves of marketization’: the first wave (industrial revolution), second wave (after the First World War) and third wave (neoliberal globalisation). The first wave was the main focus of Polanyi’s original work *The Great Transformation*. The other two waves of marketisation that followed negate Polanyi’s ‘false optimism’ about the history of capitalism as Polanyi never envisaged their re-emergence (Burawoy, 2010). The second wave started on the onset of the World War 1 until the 1950’s and involved ‘the commodification of money (and a renewed commodification of labour), leading to countermovement involving the regulation of national economies’ (Burawoy, 2010:39). In their groundbreaking work – *Grounding Globalization* – Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout (2008) argue that Polanyi failed to provide a theory of power and social change. Polanyi never imagined the resurgence of the Second Great Transformation towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century because he did not take seriously the question of power.

The emerging ‘impulse for social protection’ in the global South can be seen as a counter-movement against ‘third wave marketization’ (Burawoy, 2010) or the ‘Second Great Transformation’ (Webster et al., 2008). The third wave began in the early 1970’s and involved the re Commodification of labour, money and nature (Burawoy, 2010). The structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and 1990s failed dismally in their promise to reduce poverty and unemployment. Since the advent of the Second Great Transformation in the 1970s, there has been an exponential rise in precarious work, vulnerability, chronic poverty and structural unemployment (Webster et al., 2008), particularly in the global South. From the Polanyian point of view, the Second Great Transformation can be seen as a movement that sought to dis-embed the market from society. On the other hand, the rise and expansion of cash transfer and ELR programmes in the global South could also be interpreted as a countermovement against the Second Great Transformation.

#### **2.4 THE ‘IMPULSE FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION’ IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH**

Polanyi (1944:76) further argues that the intensification of marketisation would be accompanied by an ‘impulse’ to blunt ‘the action of this self-destructive mechanism.... [because] no society could stand the effects of such a system of crude fictions’. This is the countermovement to counter the effects of the market logic through state intervention. The impulse for social protection involves the ‘using of protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention’ (Polanyi, 1944: 132). The expansion of cash transfer programmes and the introduction of the innovatively-designed ELR programmes constitute an ‘impulse’ for social protection aimed at challenging the debilitating effects of the Second Great Transformation – this is in response to the failure of neo-liberal globalisation. As Sandbrook (2011:1) points out: ‘The global South has entered an era of ideological flux. The inadequacies of neoliberalism have spawned a widespread questioning

of this dominant worldview ... [This shift] has moved the debate on legitimate development strategies to the left and towards more statist approaches’.

Polanyi’s work provides a useful theoretical lens to analyse the ‘impulse for social protection’ and the ongoing contemporary development discourse in the global South anchored on ‘redistributive politics’. In a similar way that Polanyi warned against the dangers of marketisation, it can be argued that the new approach to development in the global South represents an embryonic backlash against the mainstream neo-liberal development mantra which assumes that economic growth would naturally trickle down to benefit those at the margins – the excluded. It must be emphasised that this new approach does not, in its current form, represent a fundamental departure from the core tenets of neo-liberal development trajectory. This is the reason why some scholars cautiously characterise the emergent impulse for social protection as a ‘moderate social democratic’ transformation, and others describe it in Gramscian terms as a ‘passive revolution’ (Ballard, 2013). Other development scholars, such as Harris and Scully (2015:416) contend that this nascent impulse ‘constitutes a new approach to development that moves beyond neo-liberalism in meaningful ways’.

The ‘impulse for social protection’ has some common salient features across the global South. The ‘impulse’ is likely to have occurred towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century or in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. The impulse is also likely to be driven by governments (even though there maybe donor financial support or involvement in the designs of specific programmes), and the interventions are likely to be targeted and conditional. Such responses are unlikely to be framed as a constituting some shift away from the neo-liberal logic. The counter movement in the global South is unique in that it seeks to provide innovative non-contributory cash transfers to a large number of people who are either vulnerable or have never *laboured* before (Ferguson, 2015). Some of the policy interventions are designed for the able-bodied adults of working age who are willing and able to labour but cannot find



formal employment. There is an emphasis on taking the people as they are and a clarion call has been made to *just give money to the poor* (Hanlon et al., 2010). The development discourse in the South has transcended the narrow confines of labourism, to embracing social citizenship.

The high level of structural unemployment and inequality in most parts of the global South has brought into question the role of the state as a guarantor of social security not only for the vulnerable groups but also for unemployed and unemployable able-bodied adults. Analytically, Polanyi's theoretical work is adaptable to any social context. Unlike some teleological theories on social change and development, Polanyi's intellectual work is 'open-ended, inductive, holistic and respectful of local cultures and histories....in stark contrasts to the modernization theorists' (Sandbrook, 2011:416). Modernization theory assumes that every society, irrespective of its unique historical circumstances, must follow a predetermined development trajectory, with advanced western countries serving as ideal models. It is exactly the culturally sensitive and 'decidedly non-evolutionary' Polanyian framework that allows for its applicability to understanding social change in any given social context (Sandbrook, 2011) – and in this case, the global South.

## **2.5 CASH TRANSFERS**

Cash transfers have gained significant political currency in most parts of the global South. This is one component of the 'impulse for social protection' in the global South. Cash transfers can be defined as 'programmes that provide poor households with a monthly income which they are expected to use to meet some of their basic needs' (Mothiane, 2014:3). The main goal is to provide the beneficiaries with a minimum social protection and consumption floor (Mkandawire, 2005). Although there is nothing fundamentally novel with the idea of a government giving money to the poor, the cash transfer programmes recently introduced in

the global South have distinctive features from those experienced in the global North (Ferguson, 2015). Firstly, the novelty lies in the possibility that countries considered ‘less developed’ are able to ‘consider having extensive nationwide welfare institutions’ (Ferguson, 2015:14). Second, unlike in the global North, these transfers are non-contributory – meaning that they ‘make no reference to prior “contributions” by beneficiaries’ (Ferguson, 2015:15).

Whereas cash transfer programmes may be designed differently, the common drive is to *give money* to the excluded to meet their basic livelihood needs (Hanlon et al., 2010). The modalities on how the money must be given have divided many scholars in development sociology, governments and non-state actors in ‘aid-work’, with others emphasising *un-conditionality* on the one hand and, others emphasising *conditionality* (Mkandawire, 2005; Mothiane, 2014). The major question that divides the two perspectives is: should the *money be given* with additional requirements for behavioural change on the part of the beneficiaries? Conditional cash transfers give money to the poor on a condition that they comply with particular pre-defined conditions or requirements, which if not fulfilled may result in the social benefits being withdrawn (Mothiane, 2014). Such conditions may include, but not limited to, enrolling children in schools and taking them for regular health check-ups and immunizations (Mothiane, 2014).

The conditioning of cash transfer can be seen as a ‘new form of social contract between the state and beneficiaries’ – with the state committing to support the poor who in turn commit to ‘improve their lives’ (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009:60). The overriding goal is to ‘help reduce poverty and vulnerability over long-term’ (Ruelle and Rockmore, 2011:1). The proponents of conditionality strongly believe that a conditional cash transfer could simultaneously deliver the double benefit of protecting livelihoods of the poor and improving their social conditions in a manner that averts generational poverty (Aber and Rawlings, 2011). In this respect, as Fiszbein and Schady (2009:11) put it, conditional cash transfer

programmes can be effective in ‘reducing present and future poverty’. In some parts of the global South, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean, the conditional cash transfers are popular because they are considered necessary for the eradication of ‘inter-generational transmission of poverty’ and enabling ‘human capital development/investment’ (Aber and Rawlings, 2011).

Mothiane (2014) points out that the debate on conditionality has also divided key international players in development with the World Bank and IMF in favour of conditionality in line with the fiscal austerity orthodoxy; while on the other hand, the UN and ILO support un-conditionality. Whereas the conditional cash transfers remain a popular choice in the ‘aid industry’ circles, they have been roundly criticised for promoting paternalism (Hanlon et al.; 2010). Anti-conditionality critiques argue that the conditional cash transfer is built on a mistaken assumption that the poor can never be trusted to make rational decisions on their own – hence the need to attach conditions to the social benefits. Drawing from an in-depth analysis of a number of studies on conditional cash transfers, Hanlon et al. (2010:129) argue that ‘conditions are often criticised as demeaning because they apply only to poor people receiving grants; and because they imply that recipients are irrational or incapable of acting in their best interest’. Conditional cash transfers are therefore seen as unnecessary because beneficiaries of the cash transfer are rational actors.

Scholarly work also suggests that the imposing conditionality does not, in reality, make any significant difference in changing the behaviour of the beneficiaries (Hanlon et al. 2010:131). For example, research shows that South Africa’s unconditional child support grant has increased attendance in primary school from 96% to 98% and Mexico’s conditional *Oportunidades* reported just over 1% ‘increase on a similar base’ (Hanlon et al., 2010: 56). In both cases, access to cash transfer programmes increased school enrolment irrespective of the conditionality. Anti-conditionality scholars also suggest that conditions create unnecessarily

costly administrative burdens on governments, and that the administrative discretion involved may create a breeding ground for corruption (Hanlon et al., 2010). In contrast, the unconditional cash transfer ensures that a significant portion of the government money benefits the intended beneficiaries directly instead of being wasted on the unnecessary and costly administrative systems to monitor adherence to the pre-defined conditions (Hanlon et al., 2010).

Those who argue for un-conditionality locate their arguments within the rights-based perspective to distributive justice and development (Standing, 2008). Conditionality not only stigmatises the poor but is also unnecessary as there is ‘substantial evidence that people with little money do know how to make good use of additional funds’ without paternalistic nudges from the institutions which provide the cash transfers (Hanlon et al., 2010:129). In other words, lack of financial resources is the major impediment for the poor to do things they would like to do, not that they have no agency to decide what is good for them. But the choice to impose conditions is not always practical, even if desired. Hanlon et al. (2010) suggest that conditional cash transfers require strong administrative capacity to ensure compliance. In certain countries, it would not be appropriate to impose conditions while social services (such as education and health facilities) are inadequate or in disarray (Hanlon et al., 2010). In other countries, conditionality is imposed to ensure that such transfers are viewed as fair and just, particularly by the middle class (Hanlon et al., 2010).

In a comparative study on how the governments of South Africa and Brazil choose to differently implement their cash transfer programmes, Mothiane (2014) suggests that there are three factors which may influence the choice on conditionality. Both governments of South Africa and Brazil introduced cash transfer programmes to ameliorate vulnerability and insecurity for those at the margins. However, the two countries opted for different modalities for the implementation of these programmes with Brazil adopting ‘a system that depends

heavily on conditionality’, with South Africa on the other hand, opting for unconditional cash transfers (Mothiane: 2014:3). According to Mothiane (2014) the policy choice on conditionality is likely to be influenced by the three important factors: (i) the ideology of the state (whether neo-liberal or social democratic); (ii) existence or absence of ‘strong civil society lobby against conditions’; and (iii) whether a cash transfer programme is constitutionally entrenched. These factors can help us better understand the politics of conditionality v/s un-conditionality in the design of cash transfer programmes.

In Brazil, the government could easily impose conditions on Bolsa Familia because, unlike the already existing Previdencia Rural and Beneficio de Prestacao Continuada, it is not embedded in the Brazilian Federal Constitution (Mothiane, 2014). Second, the ‘very instrumental role of the World Bank’ in the design of the Bolsa Familia from its inception, is seen to have rubbed-off the neo-liberal tint on the Brazilian government’s conception of cash transfers, thus leading to the irresistible ideological appetite for conditionality (Mothiane, 2014:48). Lastly, in Brazil, there was no strong civil resistance against government’s plans to impose the conditionality. However, the South African conditions were quite different: the Constitution guarantees citizens, including children, ‘the right to social security’ which is buttressed in the Social Assistance Act of 2004; the ‘strong civil society lobby’ successfully resisted government’s attempts to introduce conditions; and the government was more inclined to home-grown, social democratic policies (Mothiane, 2014).

### **2.5.1 ‘The cash transfer revolution’ in the South**

The conditional cash transfers are popular in Latin America and the Caribbean, benefitting over 135 million in this region by the end of 2016 (Saavedra, 2016:1). Out of 21 countries in Latin America, 18 have conditional cash transfers (Centofanti, 2015). Among the conditional cash transfers in this region that have featured prominently in debates on ‘the development

revolution' are Brazil's *Bolsa Familia*; the Mexico's *Oportunidades*; Colombia's *Familias en Accion*; Cambodia's *Education Sector Support Programme* and Nicaragua's *Red de Proteccion Social*. In Africa, the existing conditional cash transfers are more likely to be targeted, short-term and donor-funded, such as Burkina Faso's and Senegal's Orphans and Vulnerable programmes; Ghana's *Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty*; and Nigeria's *In Care of the People* (see Akinola, 2016). In Asia and the Pacific, small conditional cash transfers have been undertaken such as the Philippine's *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programme* and Indonesia's *Programme Keluarga Harapan*.

The unconditional cash transfers across the global South usually take the form of old-age and disability payouts. Some of these have been in existence for many years while others are fairly recent. In Latin America and the Caribbean, a number of unconditional cash transfers largely take the form non-contributory targeted old-age pensions in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia, and others targeted at poor and vulnerable households such as the unconditional component of Chile's *Ingreso Ético Familiar*. In Africa, some countries have adopted unconditional cash transfers such as South Africa's cluster of child support, disability, foster care and old-age grants; Zambia's *Child Grant Programme*; and Namibia's universal non-contributory old-age pension. Some parts of the global South, like South Africa and Namibia, have witnessed a strong civil society lobby for the idea of a universal basic income (Ferguson, 2015), with a successful pilot already conducted in the village of Otjivero-Omitara in Namibia (NANGOF, 2009).

### **2.5.2 The ELR: another form of a conditional cash transfer?**

The ELR programmes are sometimes conceptualised as conditional cash transfers because the eligibility for the cash transfer is dependent on the beneficiaries carrying out certain work activities (Das et al., 2005; DFID, 2011; Koohi-Kamali, 2010; Porras et al., 2016; Samson et

al., 2010; Slater, 2008; Standing, 2011). The historical foundation of this conceptualisation can be traced back to the Northern experience where attempts were made to replace welfare (welfare state) by a workfare/labourfare (workfare state). In late 1980s and early 1990s, various governments in the North such as the USA and Britain sought to unravel the Keynesian welfare state, which was castigated for fostering ‘welfare dependency’ and ‘low motivation’, by introducing conditionality for access to social benefits (Peck,1999:30). In this context, the ELR programmes were instituted as an alternative to the Keynesian welfare of yesteryear and to facilitate ‘activation’ into the labour markets for those considered to be lazy. In this context, the workfare programmes were designed as new social policy for removing people out of welfare dependence into productive formal paid work.

For conceptual and analytical purposes, however, the cash transfers (both conditional and unconditional) and ELR programmes in this dissertation are treated as two separate but related modalities for giving money to the poor. This is not to ignore the fact the ELR programmes are inherently built on the work requirement as a condition for access to cash transfer. The conceptual approach adopted in this dissertation is consistent with much of the growing Southern scholarly analysis of the emergent and ongoing ‘impulse for social protection’ which makes a clear analytical distinction between the concepts of the ELR and the conditional cash transfer (Beazley et al., 2016; Hagen-Zanker et al., 2011; Lieuw-Kie-Song, 2011; McCord, 2008; Philip, 2016). McCord (2008:4) argues that ‘one of the critical difference between PWP [i.e. ELR] and cash transfers’ is that the concept of the ELR ‘implies a labour-oriented form of social protection in which a wage is provided in return for labour’.

## 2.6 THE EMPLOYER OF LAST RESORT

The Polanyian ‘impulse for social protection’ also takes the form of governments’ commitment to act as an ELR. It is important to begin by providing conceptual clarity on the ELR. Some scholars in economics, and sometimes outside the discipline of economics, present the ELR as a recent phenomenon which only emerged in the 1930s in response to the Great Depression. Palley (2001:1), for example, claims that ‘the ELR proposal has its roots in a fusion of Keynesian and neo-chartalist monetary thought’. Similarly, Tcherneva (2012a:2) claims that ‘calls for government to become the ELR were popular as early as the 1930s’. However, historical evidence suggests that the ELR has a long history dating back to the Elizabethan poor laws of the early 1600s in England (Kaboub, 2007; McCord & Meth, 2013; Patriquin, 2007; Torjman, 1996). During this pre-capitalist period, the ELR constituted the ‘core component of social policy in response to the needs of the working-age poor’ (McCord & Meth, 2013:172).

The ELR is built on the principle that any government should provide work opportunities to anyone – irrespective of their skills, training, work experience, gender or race – who is able and willing to work but unable to find employment elsewhere (Lieuw-Kie-Song & Phillip; 2010; Minsky, 1986). The ELR can be defined as ‘a direct job creation programme that provides employment at a basic wage for those who cannot otherwise find work’ (Wray, 2007a:1). The government provides some form of work, whether as a universal right or targeted at certain areas or groups, ‘for the able-bodied poor in return for the receipt of “relief”, recognising, albeit implicitly, the inability of the market to provide sufficient employment’ (McCord & Meth, 2013:173). The work requirement is not applicable to the most vulnerable people such as children, elderly and people living with disabilities – these groups are normally covered by other targeted state social assistance programmes. In addition to being self-selecting, the work done in the ELR is not-for-profit making (Li, 2012).



Although underpinned with the grain of common thinking, ELR programmes in various countries in both the global North and the South, vary in terms of their legal status (others are statutory like the MGNREGA in India while most are not), design, size, goals and objectives. The heterogeneity in the designs and objectives of the ELR in different contexts is exactly the reason why this concept has multiple terms. For example, the ELR programmes designed to enhance employability through skill training is usually referred to as an active labour market policy. Those designed to provide public physical and social infrastructure with the aim of promoting economic growth and productivity at the macro-level are commonly referred to as public works. Whatever form or shape they take, the ELR programmes share the common drive to put ‘income in the hands of the unemployed, be that seasonal, or cyclical or structural’ and are concerned ‘not to distort the functioning of the labour market or diminish the work ethic of the poor, encouraging them [the able-bodied jobless] to withdraw from the labour market’ (McCord & Meth, 2013:173; 174).

One of the unresolved debates in the development discourse is whether the ELR constitutes wage labour or social protection (McCord & Meth, 2013). Others argue that the involvement of physical labour and wage payment to participants make this ‘identical to any paid employment activity’ (McCord & Meth, 2013:173). On the other hand, however, some argue the work done in the ELR does not represent wage labour: if there were adequate ‘decent jobs’ in the formal labour market, there would be no need for the state to act as an ELR (Henning, 2009). The ELR, according to this perspective, is seen as a ‘substitute to wage labour that lacks many of the positive characteristics wage labour has’ (Henning, 2009:175), such as a ‘living wage’, bargaining and organisational rights, unemployment and health insurance benefits and good working condition. In the absence of these characteristics, the work done in the ELR is unlikely to ‘produce adequate self-esteem’ or ‘earn the respect or social relations often associated with work’ (Henning, 2009:175) and ‘tend to be associated

with low levels of personal fulfilment' (Ben-Ishai, 2012:160). Accordingly, ELR programmes conceptually fit better not as a job or employment creation scheme but as a social policy primarily designed to deliver social protection outcomes for the working poor who are unable to secure formal salaried jobs in the labour market (McCord & Meth, 2013:173).

In the social policy debates, the ELR is usually juxtaposed with the concept of universal basic income (Seekings, 2006). These debates sometimes, and depending on a context, takes the form of a strict binary between the right to work (RtW) (employment guarantee) and the right to basic income (basic income guarantee), with the latter choice being seen as important for giving meaning to 'real freedom' and 'citizenship' (Noguera, 2004). In practice, however, the ELR has become the common choice for most governments, both in the global South and global North. This widespread preference has led some writers on the ELR such as Beazley and Vaidya (2015:1) to ask: 'why there appears to be a preference for workfare over welfare for supporting the working poor'. McCord (2008a:161) outlines some of the reasons for the preference of ELR over other alternatives such as the basic income:

Setting aside the assumed poverty-reducing impact of public works [i.e. ELR] programmes, such [ELR] programmes are attractive, both to donors and governments, for a number of reasons. These fall into four main groups: (i) they are consistent with the dominant development ideology that eschews 'dependency' and the perceived 'welfarism' of direct transfers; (ii) they involve the production of assets, thereby avoiding the perceived trade-off between productive investment and expenditure on welfare; (iii) in the popular political discourse they are perceived as creating 'jobs' rather than offering welfare; and (iv) they are perceived as offering the benefit of self-targeting by the poor, by means of a low-wage rate, rendering alternative targeting mechanism unnecessary.

Like with the creation and expansion of the different types of cash transfer programmes, as discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter, the concept of the ELR is not new to the history of social policy. However, there is interesting new thinking, or what Lieuw-Kie-Song and Philip (2010) call ‘significant innovation’, in the design of the recent ELR programmes in the global South. As Philip (2013:i) points out, ‘it is in the developing world that the most interesting innovation is taking place in terms of new approaches to public employment, including in India, South Africa and Ethiopia’. The new thinking is conspicuously evident in the actual design of some of the recent innovative ELR programmes such as the CWP (to be discussed extensively in Chapter 4), PSNP and the MGNREGA. The emerging scholarly analyses point out several ways in which some of these innovative programmes depart from the orthodox Northern experience with the concept of the ELR (Lieuw-Kie-Song & Philip, 2010; Philip, 2013a).

In the global North, the ELR was designed as a policy instrument to mitigate temporary shocks and disruptions such as economic crises and unexpected natural disasters. The traditional Northern conception is that the ELR should be a short-term intervention to offer temporary social relief in anticipation that the displaced workers would later be absorbed back into the formal labour market when the economy recovers. But, recently, the innovative ELR programmes in the global South have not been designed as short-term but as long-term policy interventions (Lieuw-Kie-Song & Philip, 2010). There is a growing realisation that the challenges of ‘joblessness’ and poverty in most parts of the global South are deeply structural and that markets are not capable of creating ‘employment at the scale required’ (Lieuw-Kie-Song & Philip, 2010:2). Secondly, some of the new ELR programmes, like the CWP, are designed to foster meaningful social participation and inclusion from below in ways that unlock ‘new forms of agency and development participation at community level’ (Philip, 2013a: 6).

### **2.6.1 The potential and limits of McCord's typology of the ELR**

The ELR programmes are not monolithic. There is, however, a tendency in the literature and broader development discourses, especially in the international donor industry, to homogenise the different types of ELR programmes into a single all-encompassing broad category of 'public works programmes' or 'workfare'. Yet, the evolving innovative experimentation with the concept of the ELR decidedly points to the diversity in the designs of these programmes. The 'one-size-fits-all' conceptual approach obscures the fact that ELR programmes, both in the global South and North, differ in many important respects – in their designs and their assumptions about the labour markets, their targeting mechanisms, and their aims and objectives. All these variations are important for a much more nuanced conceptual and theoretical understanding of the concept of the ELR. It is not helpful, for example, to simply classify the MGNREGA and CWP into one category of 'ELR programmes' or 'public works programmes' while turning a blind eye to their important differences.

McCord (2008), one of the leading scholars on the concept of the ELR, has attempted to construct a typology to clarify the diversity of ELR programmes. McCord's typology sought to clarify the 'conceptual confusion' that had arisen 'as a result of the use of the generic term Public Works Programme (PWP) to describe a range of highly diverse programmes without making an adequate distinction between the different forms' (McCord, 2008:2). McCord (2008) argues that the failure to recognise this diversity of the ELR has a number of drawbacks. One of the drawbacks is conceptual and manifests itself through the monolithic usage of the concept of ELR, 'resulting in the mistaken attribution of the benefits arising from one form of PWP to other types of programme within the genre that are different' (McCord, 2008:7). In practice, this 'conceptual confusion' has led to the widespread adoption of ELR programmes without properly clarifying their objectives in relation to the context in which they are introduced (McCord, 2008).

The development of McCord's typology must, therefore, be understood against the backdrop of these conceptual and the related practical ELR policy design drawbacks, and the fact that there was 'no typology to facilitate meaningful analysis or disaggregation of the generic term PWP' [i.e. ELR] (McCord, 2008:9). Drawing from extensive literature review based on over 200 existing ELR programmes at the time, McCord (2008:10) proposes a typology which comprises four ELR 'ideal types': (i) Short-term Employment' (Type A); (ii) Government Employment Schemes/Employment Guarantee Programmes (Type B); (iii) Labour Intensification (Type C); and (iv) The Promotion of Employability (Type D).

Type A programmes are 'typically implemented as a response to some form temporary labour market and livelihoods disruption, which may result from environmental (e.g. drought, flood or hurricane damage) or economic shocks, such as the East Asian financial crisis' (McCord, 2008:10). This type is usually designed to provide access to income for a short period of time until the full recovery from a temporary natural or economic disruption. Type B is typically implemented in response 'to chronic or sustained levels of elevated unemployment' (McCord, 2008:11). This type is defined by substantial government expenditures towards providing work opportunities for the unemployed who are willing and able to work, with the aim of promoting 'both macro-economic development and social protection outcomes' (McCord, 2008:11). The main goal of Type C is to promote labour intensification of government infrastructure spending by constructing assets through labour-intensive methods (McCord, 2008:14). Type D is designed to improve the labour market performance among the unemployed by providing work experience and skills training (McCord, 2008). The assumption here is that lack of skills and work experience – the supply-side constraints – are the main obstacles to employment. This type is 'implemented when the key constraint to employment is identified to be lack of skills rather than lack of employment opportunities per se' (McCord, 2008:14).

McCord's typology provides a refreshing conceptual framework for unbundling ELR programmes. However, this pioneering typology in its current form has two shortcomings. One of the main shortcomings is the apparent conflating of the design features and objectives of these four ideal types. One obvious conflation is the categorisation of the short-term US New Deal ELR programmes introduced in response to the 1930s Great Depression, Ethiopia's longer-term PSNP and India's statutory MGNREGA inaugurated in 2008 into the same ideal type of 'Government Schemes/Employment Guarantee'. McCord characterises the three ELR programmes as 'large-scale government employment programmes', but this design feature alone cannot justify their being clustered into one ideal type. McCord' overstretches a single common design feature – the size or scale of the programmes – to make strategic conclusions about three differently designed ELR programmes. The reality is that, in terms of their core designs, these ELR programmes have important design differences and it is not too helpful to club them together into a single category of 'employment guarantee'.

Linked to the first shortcoming is the inability of McCord's typology to provide some consistent, tentative, theoretical assumptions about the social protection outcomes of each of these ideal types. Whereas McCord (2008:2) argues elsewhere that 'PWPs offering only a single short-term episode of employment in low- and middle-income countries where unemployment is principally structural, an intervention which is unlikely to offer significant or sustained social protection benefits for participants', the discussion on the proposed typology disengages from this important argument. What is the potential of the 'Government Employment Schemes/Employment Guarantee Programmes' or 'Labour Intensification' or 'Promotion of Employability' types in protecting the livelihoods of those who participate in the different ELR types? Can it be assumed that the Employment Guarantee type – which according to McCord is typified by MGNREGA, New Deal programmes and PSNP – is equally capable of providing sustained social protection outcomes?

## 2.7 AN ATTEMPT TO REVISE MCCORD'S TYPOLOGY

In light of these shortcomings and the continuing innovative experiments in the global South, this dissertation proposes a revision of McCord's typology. The proposed revised typology further enhances the existing conceptual frameworks which delineate the characteristics and potentialities of the various types of ELR programmes. Although this revised typology draws mainly from McCord's work, it also draws from other writers on the ELR (such as Beazley and Vaidya, 2015) who have also made scholarly contributions towards unbundling the concept of the ELR. The revised typology is built on two fundamental criteria to distinguish the different ELR types. First, following McCord's work, it focuses on the core design of each ELR type with a specific focus on their assumption on the nature of labour markets. Second, the revised typology differentiates the ELR programmes ideal types according to their potential protecting livelihoods of those who participate in them. Like most other typologies in sociology, the purpose of the revised typology is not to generate any solid theory but to provide useful classification schemes for the ELR.

The proposed revised typology comprises three main prototypes: short-term ELR programmes; employment guarantee and long-term ELR programmes. The short-term type offers short-term employment opportunities either as a means to provide temporary relief in response to an episodic natural or economic crisis or for purposes of infrastructure development or to promote the employability of the participants. The fundamental design feature of the short-term type is its provision of short-term work opportunities for varied purposes. The employment guarantee type represents radical new thinking on the ELR that departs in significant ways from the short-term type – it offers a legally-based entitlement to regular and predictable work. This type has never been tested in the global North. The long-term ELR type is built on the foundational assumptions of, and modelled on, the core features of the employment guarantee type – although it is not actually an employment guarantee.

### **2.7.1 Short-term ELR programmes**

The short-term ELR programmes represent the traditional, older Northern conception of the ELR as a stopgap measure. The historical development of the short-term ELR type should be located within a particular development conjecture founded on the idealised normativity of wage labour as experienced in most parts of the global North. Within this historical context, the ELR is seen as a short-term policy intervention to respond to temporary interruptions, usually to formal labour markets. The foundational assumption of this type is that the ELR should be a temporary fix from the time when the labour markets and livelihoods are temporarily disrupted and the time when normalcy – that is, access to formal wage labour markets – is fully obtained. In other words, the main driving goal for the short-term type programmes is to provide temporary relief for a large number of people who are temporarily displaced or excluded from the world of formal wage labour. McCord (2008:10) points out that such ‘temporary labour market or livelihoods disruptions’ may result from a variety of unforeseen covariate shocks such as natural disasters or temporary economic downturns.

This type has been described as a ‘short-term employment’ (McCord, 2008) and ‘Safety Net Oriented Temporary PWPs’ (Beazley & Vaidya, 2015). The main distinctive design feature of this type is that it offers temporary short-term work opportunities for different purposes. According to McCord (2008:11), the short-term ELR programmes ‘are mostly, although not exclusively, implemented in the infrastructure sector, and the underlying intention is to temporarily increase aggregate employment while providing a basic income for consumption smoothing during the period of elevated unemployment or livelihoods disturbance’. There seems to be a general consensus among scholars of the ELR that the short-term type functions better as a palliative response to transient shocks but not in the context of structural unemployment and chronic poverty, the common features of most societies in the global South.



Depending on the context and policy choices, whether ill-conceived or otherwise, adopted by individual governments, the short-term ELR programmes are usually accompanied by three common official objectives, namely: consumption smoothing, infrastructure intensification and improving the labour market performance of the participants. The short-term ELR programme promotes consumption smoothing and reduces vulnerability to shocks by providing once-off, short-term employment opportunities which in turn enables participants to enhance their livelihood security in the face of seasonal and unpredictable but temporary natural (such flooding, droughts), macro-economic (recession, depression) and political (post-conflict situations) emergencies. The short-term ELR programmes 'promote consumption smoothing during disrupted access to income, particularly where the problem is covariate, i.e. affecting a whole community, and this way prevent or reduce distress selling of assets' (McCord & Farrington, 2008:2).

The short-term ELR programmes are also typically used to construct infrastructure through labour-intensive methods. In McCord's (2008:14) typology, this objective is treated as a standalone 'labour intensification' ELR type designed to construct assets 'while increasing aggregate labour usage'. However, the reality is that the ELR programmes that seek to promote 'labour intensification' or 'develop infrastructure assets' normally exist for a short, defined period and are likely to be wound down once the reconstruction or construction of the infrastructure has ended. This dissertation suggests that what McCord describes as 'labour intensification', in fact, represents a short-term ELR because the employment opportunity is provided on a short-term basis. The same logic applies to what McCord (2008) describes as the 'promotion of employability' type. This type is but one among a various subsidiary design features of the short-term type. The main goal is to provide short-term employment opportunities with a guaranteed exit upon the successful acquisition of skills training.

The short-term ELR programmes are defined by one, common, overriding, design feature: they offer short-term employment opportunities usually in response to temporary disruptions. The early experiments with the short-term ELR programmes lay in the crisis of the Great Depression in the early 1930s. Amidst the unprecedented rising levels of unemployment, reaching almost 20 percent in 1933, the US government introduced an expansive ELR programme called the Works Progress Administration in 1935 as one of the key components of government's response to the devastating Depression (Hansan, 2017). As a short-term ELR program, the WPA was designed to provide short-term income relief for the jobless throughout the Depression until the recovery in 1943. In the global South, the short-term ELR type was introduced in response to economic downturns 'in Chile in the early 1980s, South Korea in response to the financial crisis of 1997-98, northeast Brazil in response to drought in 1998, and Argentina in response to recession in 1997' (Seekings, 2006:4). The common feature of these short-term ELRs is that they were only operational for a short period of time and were discontinued once the situation improved.

While the short-term ELR programmes have been used in appropriate labour market and poverty contexts in both the global South and North, they have also ironically been utilised in inappropriate contexts. That is to say, they have been adopted in the contexts defined by chronic poverty and structural unemployment. This is exactly the novelty of McCord's (2007, 2008, 2008a) consistent argument that the design and objectives of any ELR programme should take into account the objective labour market and poverty realities in the context where it is to be implemented. For example, it does not make sense to introduce a short-term ELR programme to alleviate poverty where this phenomenon is deeply chronic (McCord, 2008). Equally, it is counterproductive to design a short-term ELR programme as a labour-market activation policy when the real problem primarily lies in the demand-side and not supply-side constraints to employment (McCord, 2008).

### **2.7.2 The employment guarantee**

The employment guarantee type represents the new thinking in the global South not only on the concept of the ELR but also about development more broadly. This type emerges in a context of the mass structural unemployment and chronic poverty in the global South. The employment guarantee challenges the Northern conceptions of the relationship between wage labour and development. Unlike the short-term ELR programmes, the employment guarantee type offers indefinite work opportunities not as a stopgap buffer or a palliative response to a temporary crisis, but to a much deeper structural problem: the failure of the formal labour markets to absorb the abundance of labour into productive employment. Whereas the Northern conception of development was predicated on the idea of formal wage labour as the necessary condition for development and social citizenship, there is evidently growing acknowledgement in most parts of the global South that this development trajectory may be difficult to replicate, at least in the foreseeable future, as the promise to enter the formal labour market grows increasingly elusive for the jobless and impoverished majority who have been relegated to the margins of contemporary societies (Webster, 2014).

Indeed, until the onset of the ‘quiet revolution’ or ‘the impulse for social protection’, the excluded masses in the global South eked out a frugal living outside the dwindling and increasingly precarious formal wage employment. They rely on what Wood (2004) terms ‘informal security regimes’ where people depend on kinship and community networks to fulfil the need for livelihood security. This normally takes the form of remittances from family members with access to regular income. Another common modality for the informal security regime entails the use of ‘diverse strategies to make a living, involving various types of labour’ (Gough, 2013:210), such as street trading. However, the major drawback of these informal security schemes is that they ‘merely temporarily alleviate the conditions of the poor; they do not enable the poor to escape poverty’ (Webster, 2014:163).

Within this broader context of the ongoing rethinking of development in the South, the employment guarantee breaks in significant ways with the traditional (Northern) conceptions and the modalities regarding the design and implementation of the ELR programmes. In this respect, the employment guarantee has two main distinctive and innovative features which distinguish it particularly from the short-term ELR type: it provides regular and predictable work on an ongoing basis and follows a rights-based approach to the concept of the ELR. Contrary to the traditional conceptions of the ELR as a short-term intervention for dealing with a transitory interruption of the social and economic order defined by full employment, the employment guarantee is distinguished by its commitment to provide ongoing, regular and predictable work where the vast majority of the population are excluded from the mainstream formal wage economy. The overriding goal is to ‘guarantee employment to a specified population over a sustained or indefinite period, in effect representing a form of unemployment or income insurance’ (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2011:2). In this way, the employment guarantee is seen as a permanent response to livelihood insecurity.

Also important is that the employment guarantee type categorically invokes the idea of ‘rights’. It is common for the struggles for redistributive justice to be framed around the discourses and politics of ‘rights’ such as the ‘right to education’ or the ‘right to health care’. The employment guarantee differs from the short-term and long-term ELR programmes in that it recognises ‘right to work’ as a legal right. However, the concept of ‘right to work’ does not enjoy ideological support from all progressive social forces across the globe (Peck, 1999). In India, for example, the discourse around the right to work enjoys a degree of popularity given the very high dependence on ‘informal’ livelihoods strategies other than formal wage employment. However, in the South African context characterised by a relatively high wage economy, the idea of the right to work is not popular among the progressive formations as it is viewed as a deceptive and designed to create a low-wage economy.

India's Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) has become the archetype of the employment guarantee. India has a long history of targeted experimentation with the concept of employment guarantee dating back to as early as the 1970s in the state of Maharashtra (Seekings, 2006). This unprecedented scope and scale of the MGNREGA constitute the new thinking on the ELR. The historic MGNREGA (Act No. 42 of 2005) was enacted by the Parliament of India on 5 September 2005 and was implemented in February 2006. The objective of the MGNREGA (2005:1) is 'to provide the enhancement of livelihood security of the households in rural areas of the country by providing at least one hundred [100] days of guaranteed wage employment in every financial year to every household whose adult members [18 years old or above] volunteer to do unskilled manual work and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto'. Participation in the MGNREGA is open to any adult member over the age of 18 of every household 'who resides in any rural area; and are willing to do unskilled manual work'.

The state is also mandated to take reasonable steps to provide employment to every participant within the radius of five kilometres from the village where they reside. The Act also mandates a legal responsibility on the part of the government to provide labour-intensive work to any citizen within 15 days of the receipt of such application, failure of which the state is legally bound to provide a daily unemployment allowance to the applicant. The Act (2005:4) further stipulates that the payment of such an allowance 'shall be made or offered not later than fifteen days from the date on which it became due for payment'. The novelty in the design of the MGNREGA has generated intense interest among scholars in development sociology and policy practitioners in development agencies.

### **2.7.3 Long-term ELR programme**

The long-term ELR type is modelled on the core design features of an employment guarantee, particularly as it relates to the conceptual assumption about the relationship between formal wage employment and development. In this way, the long-term ELR programmes also constitute an integral component of the ongoing new thinking about development in the global South. This type is usually viewed as a precursor to an employment guarantee (Philip, 2013a). Like with the employment guarantee, the long-term ELR guarantees access to work opportunities to anyone who is willing and able to do specified work normally at a minimum wage. The minimum number of guaranteed days for participation may vary from one long-term ELR programme to the other, but recent experience with the short-term ELR programmes shows that they are more likely to be designed to guarantee 100 days of work per year, in line with the standard set by the MGNREGA. Like the employment guarantee, the overriding goal of the long-term ELR type is to offer regular and predictable work, thereby creating an earnings floor to the excluded in a context of mass structural unemployment.

Although employment guarantee and long-term ELR types share important features, they are different in that the latter is not designed to provide work opportunities as a legal right. With the long-term ELR type, the government has no legal obligation to provide work opportunities to everyone even if an applicant meets the eligibility criteria. Participation in the short-term ELR type is largely limited to a particular number of participants for a variety of reasons like fiscal austerity. Unlike in the MGNREGA where the government is required by law to pay daily unemployment allowances in the event that it fails to fulfil applicants 'right to work', the long-term ELR type excludes many eligible applicants without any legal recourse. Because of the absence of its legal foundation, the long-term ELR programme may

easily be discontinued simply on the whims of the ruling political elites. In this respect, the long-term ELR programmes break with the sacrosanct principle of employment guarantee.

The ELR component of Ethiopia's PSNP and South Africa's CWP typify the long-term ELR type. The PSNP was launched in 2005 as a response to chronic food insecurity among the poor in Ethiopia, particularly in the face of recurrent famine and droughts. Subbarao, del Ninno, Andrews and Rodriguez-Alas (2012:270) argue that the 'PSNP represents an innovative attempt' by the Ethiopian government to provide a 'proactive response that relies on using predictable resources to address a predictable problem'. The PSNP has both cash transfer and ELR components with the former designed for those who are unable to undertake work activities. The ELR component of the PSNP provides regular and predictable work to the poor because it 'recognises the chronic nature of unemployment/underemployment and the need for state intervention to provide more than just one brief episode of employment' (McCord, 2007:17). While the government of Ethiopia has in the past used a number of ELR programmes as a short-term emergency response to natural calamities, 'the PSNP represents a conceptual shift' as it recognised that ELR that offer once-off short-term work opportunities 'had no impact on livelihoods or poverty' (McCord, 2007:17).

The PSNP provides uninterrupted access to work opportunities for up to five years per participant, while on the other hand 'implementing complementary livelihoods promotion initiatives as part of the broader strategy for graduation out of poverty' (McCord, 2007:17). What is evident is that, although it does not perfectly fit the typological criteria of an employment guarantee, the PSNP core design is inspired by the goal to provide regular and predictable work to the excluded through the ELR on an ongoing basis. But because it is not an employment guarantee, citizens of Ethiopia are not entitled to make any right-based demands for participation, and there would be no legal basis whatsoever for them to seek

judicial enforcement in this regard. Another ELR programme in the global South which typifies the long-term type is South Africa's CWP. Chapter 4 provides a detailed description of the CWP as one of the long-term ELR programmes.

## **2.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY**

This chapter has attempted to provide a critical literature and conceptual overview of the evolving 'impulse for social protection' in the global South. Using the Polanyian theoretical framework, this chapter has shown that this impulse has taken the forms of innovative non-contributory conditional and unconditional cash transfers, and the commitment by the government to assume the role as employers of last resort. Drawing from the existing literature, the chapter has also attempted to discuss the concept of the ELR by not only providing definitional clarity but also attempting to develop a revised typology for enhanced understanding of the diversity that exists among ELR programmes. This chapter has suggested that the ELR programmes can be divided into three ideal types, namely: short-term ELR programmes, employment guarantee and long-term ELR programmes.

The chapter outlines the conceptual foundation for further theoretical and empirical discussions. It defines the CWP as a long-term ELR programme which is distinct from an employment guarantee scheme. As it will be demonstrated in Chapter 3, the long-term type and employment guarantee are more likely to have a sustained impact on protecting livelihoods compared to the short-term type which offers short-term employment opportunities to the excluded. I draw this from McCord's consistent proposition on the potential role of the ELR as an instrument for promoting social protection. In Chapter 4, the CWP and EPWP are differentiated using the conceptual framework proposed in this chapter.



## CHAPTER 3

### THE EMPLOYER OF LAST RESORT: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter 2 articulated that the ELR constitutes an important component of the ongoing ‘impulse for social protection’ in the global South. The chapter showed that the existing ELR programmes differ in design, size, goals, objectives and implementation models. The ELR is an umbrella concept that covers several terms such as public works, labour market activation policy, cash-for-work, labourfare, government employment programmes, welfare-to-work programmes, buffer stock employment, public-service employment programmes, rights-based entitlements to work, workfare, public employment programmes, employment generation schemes, job guarantee, employment guarantee and public employment schemes. Whereas these terms tend to have different theoretical assumptions which in turn shape their designs and objectives, they are all underpinned by a common belief that, when markets fail, governments should provide work opportunities to able-bodied adults of working-age.

This chapter attempts to synthesise the diverse interdisciplinary literature on the concept of the ELR to provide a theoretical grounding for the dissertation. It expands on Lieuw-Kie-Song and Phillip’s (2010:15) work which identifies three theoretical approaches to ELR, namely: a perspective that considers the employment output as paramount; the livelihood protection perspective that views security of income as paramount and the ‘labour-intensive investment approach [which] typically emphasis the quality and nature of infrastructure or services provided’. The chapter also draws from Kumar’s (2010) embryonic work that distinguishes five theoretical perspectives on the ELR, namely: rights/activist; Keynesian, communitarian, political realism, and market fundamentalism.

Based on critical engagement with the emerging conceptual and theoretical work, and wider interdisciplinary literature on the ELR, I discuss seven theoretical perspectives with different underpinnings and emphasis on what should be a driving goal and output/s of the ELR, namely, market fundamentalism, post-Keynesian, livelihood protection, livelihood promotion, communitarianism, clientelism and anti-paternalism. Although some degree of overlap may exist among some of these perspectives, they nevertheless provide very useful theoretical lenses to analyse the ELR. I critically engage more with the livelihood protection and livelihood promotion theoretical perspectives and attempt to validate most of the social multipliers of the ELR as postulated in the livelihood protection perspective. I further argue that the livelihood promotion theoretical approach provides a limited framework for understanding the role of ELR in helping the excluded to graduate from poverty.

### **3.2 MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM: ELR DISTORTS THE MARKETS**

The market fundamentalism perspective has its roots in neoclassical economics (Kaboub, 2007). This perspective considers the provision of social rights such as the RtW as a problematic deviation from the free market. Unemployment and poverty are viewed as transitory phenomena which would gradually self-correct under the conditions of free market competition. Kaboub (2007:3) observes that ‘even during the periods of high unemployment, they [market fundamentalists] argued that the only thing the government should do is keep its hands off the market, which would eventually clear the labour market ... furthermore, they advocated that government should reduce its spending and encourage downward flexibility’.

According to this perspective, those who are unemployed are in that situation because they lack skills and training required by the free market. The only way out of this situation is for them to individually embark on their own path of personal development to ensure that their personal characteristics are compatible with the prevailing labour market demands

(Kaboub, 2007). Others are unemployed because they demand higher wages than what the market can afford: the solution to this is to sell the labour power at ‘a reasonable cost’ (Kaboub, 2007). Guaranteeing work through an ELR is regarded as an inappropriate and irrelevant intervention because it compromises free market competition and efficiency. By attempting to set the ‘wage floor’, the ELR also tampers with the sacrosanct demand and supply mechanism (Kaboub, 2007). However, the market fundamentalist perspective has only led to many economic failures, including the Great Depression in the 1930s.

### **3.3 POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS: FULL EMPLOYMENT AND PRICE STABILITY**

This perspective represents a theoretical tradition in macroeconomics which considers full employment and price stability as the paramount outputs of the ELR. This perspective draws largely from the work of Keynes’ *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* which challenged the neoclassical economic theories on the workings of capitalism – but also as a practical policy response to failures of the free markets as evidenced by the global economic crisis in the 1930s. If anything, the Keynesianism theoretical perspective represented a theoretical and a practical policy alternative to the market fundamentalism perspective premised on non-state intervention or involvement in the economy. Keynes’ central argument was that any government in a capitalist economy should play a visibly active role to boost the aggregate demand. For Keynes, the aggregate demand for goods and services could only be maintained when the government, private businesses and households have the ‘propensity to consume’ (Wray, 2007a).

It was Hyman Minsky (and later Randall Wray) who later expanded this theory by showing the economic benefits of maintaining non-inflationary full employment through the ELR. Minsky systematically argued that the ELR was an effective macro-economic policy

instrument for raising aggregate demand as compared to other ‘pump-priming’ options such as ‘investment incentives, tax cuts and government spending’ (Wray, 2007:iv). Minsky argued that cash income paid to participants in ELR programmes is important because it accrues ‘multiplier effects on the economy which boost aggregate demand’ (Wray, 2007:iv). It is assumed the cash income would automatically translate into increased spending (demand for goods and services) and growth in private sector productivity (Wray, 2007). The lack of adequate demand in the economy would only result in high inflation and unemployment (Wray, 2007a; 2009). Accordingly, because the ELR provides regular cash income to participants it directly boosts their capacity to consume more; what Keynes calls the propensity to consume (Wray, 2007a), which generates an equilibrium whereby the aggregate demand equals the aggregate supply.

According to the post-Keynesian perspective, the ELR would spell the end of unemployment in its various forms as it paves the way for non-inflationary full employment (Minsky, 1965). Providing an employment opportunity to anyone who is willing and able to work also has the benefit of not only maintaining non-inflationary full employment but also helps in preventing involuntary unemployment ‘as those who do not have an ELR job would be willingly and purposely outside the labour force’ (Hurford & Kaboub, 2012:20). Those who are unemployed because of a mismatch between their skills and the skills required in the formal labour market are also covered in the ELR. Accordingly, the able-bodied individuals of the working age who refuse to take the work opportunities offered in the ELR programmes would be ‘voluntarily’ unemployed (Hurford & Kaboub, 2012). In this way, the state effectively guarantees work as it operates as the ELR. This leads to an important role of the ELR as a ‘buffer stock’ (Tcherneva, 2012a).

The reference to the ELR as a ‘buffer stock’ mechanism in the economics literature is particularly instructive for two reasons. Firstly, it presents the ELR as a rights-based

employment guarantee (Forstater, 2012) recognising that ‘capitalist economies lack an inherent mechanism to create full employment (Kaboub, 2007:2). The ELR should be a right for the jobless, and every government is duty-bound to provide work to any person ready and able to work at the below-market wage rates. In the global North, this idea meant that workers who were laid off from formal wage jobs in the industry would secure jobs in an ELR programme with a reasonable expectation to be ‘hired away from the public sector [i.e. ELR programme] ... once the economy recovers’ (Tcherneva, 2012a:3). However, with the historical ‘unlimited supplies of labour’ (Lewis, 1954) in most countries in the global South; the buffer stock mechanism of the ELR would be inappropriate given the fact that unemployment in most of these countries is not a temporary but a structural phenomenon.

Secondly, the ELR is also seen as an instrument to guarantee a ‘basic wage which sets a floor to economy-wide wages ... The logic is that any private employer seeking to pay less would be unable to find workers as they would prefer ELR jobs’ (Palley, 2001:1). The wage floor set through the ELR gives structural bargaining power to those participating in an ELR programme to refuse precarious and low-wage work in the private sector ‘as workers would be free to choose between ELRs and other jobs proposals’ (Gomes & Cabral de Lourenco, 2014:295). Some scholars, like Murgai and Ravallion (in Rani & Belser, 2012), argue that the ELR could be an effective tool in fostering compliance with statutory or mandatory minimum wage. Indeed, a number of studies on the MGNREGA confirm this hypothesis (Banerjee & Saha, 2010; Berg et al., 2012, Rani & Belser, 2012). Rani and Belser (2012:61), for example, indicate that ‘There is enough evidence to suggest that in many rural areas where MGNREGA has been operational, it has helped to raise the agricultural wage rate’.

However, in reality, using ELR programmes to achieve this goal (i.e. setting the wage floor) is not a straightforward process for some countries in the global South (such as South Africa, Brazil, Chile and Argentina) where high wages and high levels of unemployment

coexist with strong labour unions that continue to demand higher wages (Seekings, 2006). Seekings (2006:22) further argues that, in such contexts, it would be difficult to use ELR programmes to set the wage floor because of high wages in the formal labour market coupled with the ‘immense political obstacles to setting low wages’. Some scholars (Samson et al., 2010) suggest that setting the ELR wage too low just for the sake of ensuring that it is below the statutory minimum wage could be counterproductive in protecting livelihoods. This is particularly the case in the ‘lowest-income countries, [where] market wage rates in the agricultural or informal sectors may be so low that setting programme rates below this level might fail to even meet minimum subsistence levels’ (Samson et al., 2010:160).

The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College in New York (USA), the Center for Full Employment and Price Stability at the University of Missouri (USA) and the Center for Full Employment and Equity (CofFEE) in Newcastle (Australia) are some of the contemporary leading think tanks that continue to propagate the ELR as a mechanism for achieving full employment and price stability. Most of the technical debates in the macro-economic literature on the ELR, perhaps with the exception of the potential ELR role in setting the wage floor and enforcing statutory minimum wage, are not particularly relevant to this dissertation. Suffice is to highlight the basic post-Keynesian theoretical assumptions on the ELR – that full employment and price stability are key outputs of the ELR.

### **3.4 PROTECTING LIVELIHOODS: LIVELIHOOD SECURITY**

This perspective considers the enhancement of livelihood security as an important function and output of the ELR. The central premise is that poverty, hunger and vulnerability constrain the livelihood security of the excluded. The ELR is regarded as an effective instrument to secure and sustain the livelihood security of the able-bodied adults who are neither formally employed nor covered by the traditional contributory social insurance or social assistance

programmes. Some proponents of the ELR in the field of economics (such as Wray, 2007a; Tcherneva, 2012) are beginning to pay serious attention to the ELR's potential in a manner that transcends the narrow technocratic macro-economic focus on non-inflationary full employment and price stability. The livelihoods protection perspective has gained considerable popularity among policymakers in national governments, some development research institutes, and international development (and donor) agencies.

According to Chambers and Conway (1992:5), 'a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for means of living'. Livelihood security refers to the 'adequate and sustainable access to income and resources to meet basic needs (including adequate access to food, potable water, health facilities, educational opportunities, housing, time for community participation and social integration)' (Frankenberger & McCaston, 1998:31). Moser (1998) argues that vulnerability can be viewed as dynamic because it recognises change. In contrast, poverty can be seen as being static. This distinction, however, ignores that poverty can also be dynamic. Mosoetsa (2005:22) argues that poverty is not a static phenomenon because 'people move in and out of poverty'. Those who are poor today may not be poor tomorrow, and those who are poor today may become poorer tomorrow (Mosoetsa, 2005).

Poverty is defined as lack of or reduced 'access to material, social, political or cultural resources needed to satisfy basic needs' (Phillip & Rayhan, 2004:6). Those in poverty lack the resources to meet basic needs. However, vulnerability is not about lack or want but more about 'defencelessness, insecurity and exposure to risks, shocks and stress' (Chambers, 2006:33). It is defined as the inability to respond to the threats to livelihoods. Barrientos (2010:3) defines vulnerability as the likelihood 'of staying in, or falling into, poverty in the future. It reflects the absence of protection'. Hunger is often conceptually defined as a consequence of poverty. In other words, the persistent lack of access to resources

(i.e. poverty) to ‘satisfy basic needs’ ultimately leads to a material reality where people literally do not have food (i.e. hunger) – what Weiesfeld-Adams and Andrzejewski (2008:4) also describe as ‘the most severe and critical manifestation of poverty’. However, it is important to emphasise that although ‘all hungry people are poor’, it cannot be assumed that ‘every poor person is hungry’ (Weiesfeld-Adams & Andrzejewski, 2008:4).

Some proponents of the livelihood protection perspective view the ELR as an instrument for the realisation of some parts of the social protection floor – particularly the guarantee of basic income security to able-bodied adults of the working age; and facilitating access to social services such as water, health and education (Beazley & Vaidya, 2015, Lal et al., 2010; Lieuw-Kie-Song & Philip, 2010). The concept of the social protection floor comprises a cluster of socio-economic goals aimed at minimising hunger, poverty and vulnerability among the poor. The ILO (2012:5), as the lead institutional voice behind the initiative, defines social protection floor as a ‘nationally-defined set of basic social security guarantees which secure protection aimed at preventing or alleviating poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion’. There are four key social security guarantees required to construct the social protection floor, namely: access to essential health care; basic income security for children; basic income security for persons in active age who are unable to earn sufficient income, and basic income security for older persons.

The ELR contributes to the building of the social protection floor by providing ‘immediate income and support to participants in the form of wages or similar compensations, such as cash and/or in-kind benefits, in return for their labour or co-responsibilities’ (ISPA, s.a.:12). Without access to regular and predictable income, which the ELR provides, many working-age unemployed adults have no other option but to face the risk of food insecurity. Lack of regular access to safe and nutritious food has many associated negative social consequences for the peoples’ ability to work, children’s ability to attend



school and excel academically; and vulnerability to ill-health and disease. Food insecurity, in the long-term, poses real life-threatening situations such as chronic hunger and malnutrition. By providing regular income to the poor, the ELR, when properly targeted and designed, can be effective in protecting livelihoods, particularly in urban contexts where access to food is largely through market purchases. Even those who usually rely on self-production in the countryside may require the cash when subsistence crops fail.

Instead of being considered as a standalone intervention, the ELR should complement, not replace, existing livelihood strategies of the poor as part of an ‘integrated component of wider social protection systems’ (ISPA, s.a.: 13). The cash income derived from participating in ELR programmes is critical as it provides food security for the excluded. Yet such income is seldom sufficient to meet all material needs in households. Research shows that, given the structural nature of unemployment and limited access to social insurance, most people in the global South rely on a variety of livelihood activities and strategies like informal trading, wage labour, survivalist self-employment initiatives, mutual help groups like community saving schemes, informal insurance mechanisms, kinship ties, social networks of support, subsistence farming, home food gardening and other social assistance programmes (Subbarao et al., 2012). Combined with some of these diverse livelihood activities and strategies, the cash income from ELR commensurately contributes to fulfilling the material livelihood needs of vulnerable and poor households (Lieuw-Kie-Song & Philip, 2010).

The cash income could also help poor household build resilience against livelihood risks. The concept of risk has become a dominant theme in recent development discourse and literature (Beazley & Vaidya, 2015; Chambers & Conway, 1992; Moser, 1998; Nair et al., 2007). The fundamental argument is that building and strengthening the physical asset base at the household level is important for improving and sustaining livelihood security (Nair et al.,

2007). The United Nations (in Arnold et al., 2006:22) defines risk as ‘the probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (deaths, injuries, property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions’. The literature makes a distinction between idiosyncratic and covariate (or common) risks (Shehu & Sidique, 2015). While the former refers to those shocks that affect individual households such as death, illness, unemployment; the latter refers to those shocks that affects a larger group of the population such as natural (e.g. drought, earthquake), economic (structural unemployment) and political (e.g. civil war, wars) disasters; epidemics (Shehu & Sidique, 2015). Both the risks have considerable impact on households’ vulnerability to insecurity. The vulnerability arises when individual households or a community is unable to respond or cope with risks to livelihoods.

The ELR has the potential to prevent and mitigate the two types of risks by creating livelihood assets both at the level of the household (idiosyncratic risks) and at the level of the community (common risks). In the absence of access to and/or ownership of livelihood enhancing assets, vulnerable households are exposed to risk. At the household level, the ELR could potentially ‘act as a social insurance and reduce vulnerability’ (Beazley & Vaidya, 2015:23) and strengthen resilience to risks and shocks. Access to regular and predictable income through ELR reduces chances of opting to livelihood asset-limiting coping strategies, with long-term catastrophic consequences, such as distress sale of important livelihood assets like livestock, houses, subsistence farming machinery and equipment, land and other household assets (Beazley & Vaidya, 2015).

Worse, others may adopt risky financial behaviour such as depleting prior household savings, buying goods on credit and entering high loan debts for consumption purposes that leave the excluded trapped in formal and informal financial debt. This could also ultimately lead to even more desperate risk-coping strategies to manage insecurity such

as purchase of cheap but non-nutritious food, skipping meals, infrequent school attendance and even dropping out of school, missing routine health check-ups and prescribed medication, which can push poor households' deeper into poverty, hunger and vulnerability (Beazley & Vaidya, 2015).

The effectiveness of an ELR in protecting livelihoods cannot be assumed. This potential relies on the design of an ELR programme (McCord, 2003; Samsom et al., 2010; Zimmerman, 2014). There is a growing body of theoretical work that postulates on contexts and conditions that determine the effectiveness of ELR in protecting livelihoods (McCord, 2003). As argued in Chapter 2, the three ideal types of ELR (i.e. short-term ELR programmes, employment guarantee and long-term ELR programmes) generally do not hold equal potential in effecting lasting impact on hunger, poverty and vulnerability. This potential is predicated on factors such as the continuity/duration of participation by participants and the predictability of the cash income to participants (Lieuw-Kie-Song & Philip, 2010; McCord, 2003, 2009). According to McCord (2003), the ELR could reduce poverty and hunger when designed as a long-term intervention and offer repeated access to income for participants. To drive home this point, I draw on McCord (2003:9-10):

As important as the total amount of the income transfer generated by public works [ELR] programmes is the stabilisation effect of a transfer on the income of the poor, and the extent to which this reduces vulnerability to shocks. This stabilisation effect is contingent on the length of the period over which employment is offered, and is a consequence of sustained employment, provided either through medium or long-term public works [ELR] programme, or cyclical employment provision at times of minimum labour market demand. Many workers return to the unemployed labour pool after completing a term of short-term public works programmes, rather than being absorbed into the labour market. ... In this context, prolonged

public works schemes are needed that will offer sustained employment, in order to address the fundamental objective of poverty alleviation.

Drawing from the experience of South Africa's EPWP, and as outlined extensively in Chapter 4, McCord (2009) provides systematic evidence to demonstrate that the EPWP, as a short-term ELR programme that provides temporary and once-off work opportunities, was unable to deliver sustained livelihood protection to participants due to the short-term nature of the work opportunities provided. The growing body of theoretical and conceptual work from the global South further confirms McCord's argument that only those ELR programmes that provide repeated income to participants (like the CWP, MGNREGA and PSNP) hold much potential in protecting the livelihoods of those who participate in them. Other leading scholars on the ELR, such as Lieuw-Kie-Song and Philip (2010:22), concur with this argument:

The greater the level of continuity, predictability, and income transferred, the greater the contribution to social protection and to the reduction of poverty is likely to be. Where [ELR programmes] are short-term, they have been criticised for only providing temporary relief, with people sinking back into poverty once their opportunity in [an ELR program] come to an end.

The wage rate and targeting mechanism also influence the effectiveness of an ELR in protecting livelihoods (Zimmermann, 2014; Lembani, 2006; Subbarao, 1997). Targeting refers to identification and selection of the excluded for purposes of transferring resources. If the goal of an ELR is to protect livelihoods of the poor, it should be targeted at poor and destitute households. Alternatively, if the goal, for example, is to equip the unemployed with skills and work experience, the ELR can work better when targeted at the unemployed youth or graduates. When not well-targeted, the ELR face the risk of benefitting the poor at the expense of the 'poorest' (Samson et al., 2010). With regard to the wage rate, the assumption

is that wages should be set at the right level to balance the dual goals protecting the livelihoods of the poor; and minimise the errors exclusion and inclusion.

As argued previously, the setting of a wage rate in an ELR programme is not always an easy and straight forward process, as Samson et al. (2010:160) argue:

Fixing the wages at the right level is a major challenge for these [ELR] programmes. If wages are set too low, this is likely to jeopardize the programme's objectives of providing social protection. However, if wages are too high, this is likely to reduce the programme's ability to target the poor effectively, because the non-poor will become interested in taking up work, which also reduces its social protection outcomes.

In theory, self-targeting based on the wage rate is intended to attract the poor and 'screen out the non-poor' (Samson et al., 2010:159) or under-coverage of the poor. The ELR should be targeted at the 'poorest of the poor' to help them cope with livelihood insecurity. While the wage rate in the ELR is designed to self-target the poor, it cannot be taken for granted that a low wage would always encourage the poor or discourage the non-poor from participating in ELR programmes (Samson et al., 2010). The ELR can be attractive to the relatively well-off as a source of supplementary income, while, on the other hand, 'poor households with limited available labour may find very low wages unattractive, given the high cost of failing to carry out their critical domestic and subsistence activities' (Samson et al., 2010:160). Yet others may insist on participating in ELR even if the wage rate is set so low that it barely fulfils their minimum subsistence level (Subbarao, 1997).

Evidently, a low-wage rate is not always an effective targeting mechanism.

Targeting becomes less complicated when the ELR is provided to everyone as a rights-based employment guarantee like the MGNREGA. The usage of low wages as an instrument for self-targeting, as commonly propagated by post-Keynesian economists, has been challenged

by some scholars advocating for the setting of higher wage rates and strengthening of the targeting mechanism for maximum livelihood protection in poor areas and poor households (Lembani, 2006). It is within this context that other forms of non-wage-based targeting mechanisms have been explored to eliminate the ‘errors of exclusion and inclusion’. One such experiment is community-based targeting where the targeting and selection are done at the local level by independent community organisations and groups (Lembani, 2006). Describing it as ‘a relative newcomer to the tracts of social policy analysts’, Samson et al. (2010:123) show that in addition to involving community groups in the process of identifying and selecting participants, community targeting also involves community groups in the monitoring of ‘the delivery of those benefits, and or engage in some part of the delivery process’. This type of targeting was tried with South Africa’s Zibambele projects where ‘supplemental community selection methods [were used] to ensure that participants are almost exclusively from poorest households’ (Samson et al., 2010:160).

The idea is that community participation could result in better targeting as it provides a local definition of poverty that transcends ‘rigid technical formulas’ in favour of ‘more adaptable local conditions and culture’ (Lembani, 2006:25). Community-based targeting is ‘seen as a means of relieving information constraints’ as it ‘utilises local knowledge of household conditions’ (Lembani, 2006:24). This kind of targeting has been lauded for providing ‘better information for identification of needs, lowering administrative costs, better screening, monitoring and accountability’ (Lembani 2006: 25). Some critics, however, argue that community targeting is susceptible to favouritism, corruption and abuse by local elites and could fuel conflict and divisions within communities (Lembani, 2006). This risk increases in social contexts characterised by prior racial, religious, ethnic, nationality or caste tensions (Lembani, 2006). This shows that community-based targeting may still be an inadequate mechanism for effectively targeting the poor. However, in the

presence of a robust, organic, progressive and democratic social movement from below, limitations associated with community targeting may be minimised.

### **3.5 LIVELIHOOD PROMOTION: GRADUATION OUT OF POVERTY**

The exponential increase in the innovative cash transfers and ELR programmes in the global South has been accompanied by literature on livelihood promotion (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2015). The tenet underlying the livelihood promotion perspective is that the ELR could enable participants to ‘graduate out of poverty’. This perspective represents the continuity of the livelihood protection perspective as it also considers livelihood security as the most important function of the ELR without which the promotion of livelihoods would be untenable. Although the notion of graduation remains generally contested (Daidone et al., 2015), it can be defined as ‘the process of reducing vulnerability so that people can move off social protection provisioning’ (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2013:911). The livelihood promotion perspective should be understood from the standpoint of securing resilient livelihoods independent of external support.

It is important to clarify the distinction between the concepts of ‘exit strategy’ and graduation as discussed in the literature. Proponents of the exit discourse are typically inclined to patronisingly emphasise the goal of minimising ‘dependency’ on social assistance programmes instead of focusing on building capacities to secure independent, resilient and sustainable livelihoods (Moury, 2014). This is the main drive of most conditional cash transfers. The main preoccupation of the ‘exit’ discourse is ‘with programme termination, not with graduation’ (Chirwa et al., 2012:4). This discourse is usually associated with short-term ELR programmes which typically provide temporary work opportunities to participants. On the other hand, the notion of ‘graduation’ would not allow ‘a removal of access to the [social protection] programme that leaves current beneficiaries supported by the programme unable

to pursue sustainable independent livelihoods' (Chirwa et al., 2012:1). The termination of participation in an ELR programme would be voluntary and not based on pre-defined narrow bureaucratic requirements but on the real potential of the participants to 'graduate'.

The conceptual difference between 'graduation' and 'exit' is further supported by the distinction the literature draws between 'threshold/benchmark graduation' and 'sustainable graduation' (Daidone et al., 2015). Threshold graduation refers to involuntary 'exit' from a social assistance programme 'after having reached a specific administrative threshold [such as reaching a certain level of household assets or time spent in a programme] that signals the point at which a beneficiary is no longer eligible' (Daidone et al., 2015:93). Some of the existing ELR programmes in the global South with explicit threshold graduation objectives include South Africa's EPWP (Subbarao et al., 2013). Sustainable graduation goes beyond threshold graduation to embrace 'positive transformation in livelihoods, such that over time households become more resilient to different shocks and stressors' (Daidone et al., 2015:93).

The literature on ELR identifies three dominant pathways through which an ELR programme could potentially promote livelihoods of the participants, namely: (i) provision of skills training and workplace experience to improve access to formal wage employment; (ii) creation of physical assets and (iii) self-employment. I argue that these pathways are least effective in promoting livelihoods of CWP participants. The provision of skills training is normally intended to 'increase capacity of participants to earn income after exiting [the programme]' (McCord, 2007, 2008). Embedded in this pathway are theoretical assumptions about the functioning of the labour markets and causes of unemployment. The fundamental premise is that lack of appropriate skills; education and work experience are the main entry barriers to the labour market (McCord, 2005). According to this view, the problem is not lack of jobs but lack of adequately trained, skilled and experienced workforce to match the demand in the labour market. As McCord (2005) puts it, the problem of unemployment is



considered a supply-side problem. In this context, therefore, the ELR is seen as a necessary and an appropriate instrument for enhancing participants' 'employability' in the labour market. These assumptions about the causes of unemployment and poverty were decisive in shaping the goals and designs of 'workfare' or 'labourfare' programmes (also known as labour activation policy) in the global North.

However, the idea that an ELR could enhance employability in the formal labour market has been challenged over the years (Allais, 2012; McCord, 2005; Minsky, 1965). Hyman Minsky is one of the leading critics of this approach. Minsky's critique is framed within the post-Keynesian theoretical framework that considers full employment as the paramount output of the ELR. This critique emerged as a response to President Lyndon Johnson's (US President at the time) *1964 War on Poverty Programme* which tended to place education and skills training as a panacea to the challenges of unemployment and poverty at the time (Bell & Wray, 2004). The programme assumed that low levels of human capital and lack of work ethic caused unemployment. Minsky's counter argument is simple: unemployment cannot be blamed on the characteristics of the unemployed but rather on the economic system that causes it (Bell & Wray, 2004). The focus of any effort that seeks to tackle poverty and unemployment, according to Minsky (1965:1), 'must not depend solely, or even primarily upon changing people, but must be directed towards changing the system'.

Instead of focusing on supply-side interventions, Minsky argued for 'taking people as they are' and strongly advocated for the creation of jobs 'to suit their existing educational and skill levels' (Bell & Wray, 2004:5). Whereas the idea of the ELR itself gives direct effect to the principle of 'taking people as they are', the inclusion of skills training and education, with the goal of improving access to wage labour, in such programmes is not sufficient to address the challenge of unemployment. The constant technological and structural changes in labour markets 'would outstrip any ability to educate and retrain displaced workers for the types of

jobs that would exist' (Wray, 2015:118). It is also not easy to keep pace with the skills requirements of the ever-changing labour markets. Even if the supply-side solutions were to work, they 'would have little effect for up to twenty years – what Minsky termed the 'gestation' period required to produce a worker' (Wray, 2015:118).

Based on an extensive study of South Africa's EPWP, McCord (2005, 2008a) argues that the effectiveness of the 'employability enhancing' approach, through the ELR, depends *inter alia* on the labour market context. McCord (2008) argues that the 'employability enhancing' approach – largely influenced by Northern experience with labour market activation policies (also popularly known as workfare) to tackle cyclical unemployment – is least effective in a context characterised by structural unemployment. Similarly, Allais (2012:639) argues that, in the context characterised by structural unemployment, inadequate social security systems, 'high levels of job insecurity and high levels of inequality' like in South Africa, it is not useful to posit 'skills training, public works [i.e. ELR], work placements, and apprenticeships as a "bridge" into a world of formal employment which firstly, does not exist, and secondly, where employment exist, does not lift people out of poverty'. The policy focus on education and skills training 'becomes part of how policy-makers avoid addressing structural challenges in the economy' (Allais, 2012:639).

Structural unemployment arises from structural deficiencies in an economy that give rise to long-term unemployment (McCord, 2008). Unlike cyclical or transient unemployment which normally arises out of periodic and temporary downswings in the economy, structural unemployment is caused by structural constraints that limit job creation in the formal sector – particularly for unskilled and semi-skilled would-be workers. Structural unemployment cannot be resolved simply by providing skills training, education or workplace experience because the fundamental problem is lack of jobs (demand-side problem) – owing to the

structural constraints in the economy – rather than lack of skill, training or education (not a supply-side problem) (McCord, 2007:6).

While the literature shows that labour market activation policies have generally been ineffective in addressing the challenge of unemployment, including in countries of the global North where the policy was popular among the ruling political elite, it could ‘influence the subsequent labour market performance of participants only if the training provided is closely aligned to the specific skills gaps identified in the wider economy’ (McCord, 2007: 22). In this way, the ELR could focus on training only on the specific skills in the areas where skill shortages really exist. Insisting on enhancing access to the labour market through the ELR, in a context characterised by structural unemployment, like in South Africa, would only give rise to what McCord (2008) terms ‘worker substitution’ instead of ‘a net increase in employment’. McCord (2005:582) expands on this argument:

Even if the programme were successful in terms of increasing the employment of workers in existing public works programmes, through improved labour market information and the provision of skills certification, given the lack of excess demand for low skilled labour, this employment would be at the expense of other workers, leading to the substitution of one segment of low/unskilled labour by another, with zero social or labour market benefit.

Interestingly, all the innovative ELR programmes recently introduced in the global South, such as the MGNREGA, PSNP and CWP are not institutionally designed to facilitate the transition into regular formal employment but to provide regular and predictable income on a long-term basis. This is partly due to the growing theoretical and empirical appreciation that the ELR is least effective as an employability-enhancing instrument in the conditions of structural unemployment. As it will be shown in Chapter 4, this appreciation was influential in shaping the core design and objectives of the CWP. Unlike the EPWP, skills training and workplace experience for purposes of enhancing employability in the labour market do not

form part of the original core design of the CWP, save for the now-familiar rhetorical pronouncements by politicians and government bureaucrats.

Self-employment is another potential ‘graduation’ pathway through the ELR (Ninno et al., 2009; Subbarao et al., 2013). Participants could use their wage earnings from the ELR to initiate or sustain self-employment initiatives. The concept of self-employment is usually conflated with entrepreneurship (Burchell et al., 2015). Fields (2014:4) argues that treating the two concepts as synonymous ‘can be misleading’. Entrepreneurship, unlike self-employment, ‘conjures the image of a risk-taker setting up a business with the intent of making it grow and prosper’ (Fields, 2015:04). This is hardly the reality for the poor in the global South where self-employment represents nothing more than a desperate livelihood coping tool used ‘to earn money for a time – preferably, a short time – before transitioning to a more remunerative activity’ (Fields, 2015:4). A typical example would be someone who uses their income or accumulates private savings to ‘buy a package of 20 cigarettes and then selling them individually at a higher unit price and surviving on profits’ (Fields, 2014:4). In this context, those involved in these types of survival self-employment would not be referred to as entrepreneurs. The poor often resort to these survivalist entrepreneurial activities because ‘they are too poor to remain unemployed and earn nothing’ (Fields, 2014:5).

In the context of the ELR, this pathway typically involves a combination of the cash income received by participants and, sometimes, entrepreneurship training. This combination, however, in reality, is neither unilinear nor mutually dependent because individual participants could still embark on self-employment initiatives in the absence of entrepreneurship training. On the other hand, access to entrepreneurship training also does not guarantee that participants will use their wage earnings (or private savings) to pursue self-employment initiatives. With regard to the cash income, the assumption is that participants can use or save some parts of their wage earnings from the ELR to initiate self-employment,

particularly the survivalist entrepreneurial activities in the ‘informal’ sector. Savings can be voluntary whereby participants privately decide on their own to save parts of their wage earnings as seed capital for their self-employment initiatives. Although unusual, some ELR programmes in the global South, like Bangladesh’s Rural Maintenance Programme, makes it mandatory for participants to attend income generation training and ‘to save part of their wage on a regular basis (participants are paid a wage of 51 Taka per day with a forced savings of Tk10)’ (Ninno et al., 2009:8).

The literature is generally less optimistic about self-employment as a potential pathway for ‘graduation’ through the ELR program. Firstly, because the wage rate is normally set below the official minimum wage in a given context, the wage earnings from ELR is normally insufficient to be utilised or saved for self-employment. The participants and their cash-constrained households would rather use the income for their immediate consumption needs. Secondly, the real, lived experience of self-employment in most countries in global South is that of ‘working hard but working poor’ (Fields, 2014: 2). As mentioned earlier, self-employment for the poor is seldom a matter of choice but a necessity and a desperate coping livelihood mechanism with very limited potential to grow and prosper.

One of the most popular and revered ‘graduation’ pathways, so prominent in both the academic and donor organisations’ literature is asset creation. This approach is typically framed using multiple but synonymous concepts emphasising either the creation (or generation or construction) or protection or maintenance or rehabilitation of productive assets and infrastructure. The potential role of the ELR in facilitating asset accumulation at the household level was discussed in the livelihood protection perspective as it is focused more on ameliorating idiosyncratic risks and vulnerabilities which usually affect individual households. In addition to ELR’s potential in facilitating asset creation at the household level,

the literature further suggests that the creation of productive assets and infrastructure at community level can also help communities to cope with common (covariate) livelihood risks, beyond the direct benefits of the wage earnings. Unlike asset accumulation at the household which depends on the receipt of regular cash income, the creation of assets at the community level is normally an outcome of the actual work of the ELR that not only benefits participants or participating households but a community at large.

The creation of public infrastructure through the ELR is traditionally associated with boosting of economic growth and productivity at the macro-level (Copeland et al., 2011). At least until recently, with the inauguration of the innovatively-designed ELR programmes in the global South, and the growing body of literature analysing these programmes, the ELR was almost exclusively seen as a mechanism to stimulate the economy through the construction of mega public infrastructure using labour-intensive methods. Even today, for most people, the idea of the ELR subconsciously evokes images of underpaid and temporarily employed masses of semi-skilled and unskilled workers involved in the construction and maintenance of infrastructure such as highways, roads, bridges, stadia, water and electricity networks and schools. In the past, the function of the ELR in creating public infrastructure was subordinated to the interests of ‘the economy’ – as postulated in the post-Keynesian theoretical perspective – and not the promotion of livelihoods of poor in communities. The overarching goal was to create an enabling environment for private firms and the economy in general to function optimally. Embedded in this conceptual framework is the assumption that increased productivity and economic growth would lead to increased demand for labour (jobs) (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2015).

However, new thinking is beginning to emerge from the global South that challenges traditional approaches which emphasise the stimulative effects of the ELR on an economy. Some of the innovative ELR programmes in the South are generally concerned with the

generation of local productive physical assets and infrastructure as a catalyst for promoting livelihoods in poor communities. These new emerging perspectives acknowledge that the creation of public assets and infrastructure could play an important role in improving the quality of life in poor communities. But, in addition to this principle commitment, the utility of these assets should not be limited to stimulating economic growth but must also contribute to the building and enhancement of livelihood resilience among the poor communities. Adequate public infrastructure such as bridges, irrigation, road connectivity and safe drinking water is essential for improving the quality of human life as these physical assets ensure access to social services and support the productivity of subsistence and smallholder farming.

Unlike short-term ELR programmes where participants perform prescribed infrastructural work outside their communities, the ELR programmes in the global South are increasingly implemented directly in communities where participants reside. As discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, some of these programmes are designed to facilitate local-level, participatory planning which encourages active and meaningful participation by community members in identifying and selecting community assets and infrastructure to be created. Community participation is vital because it helps in ensuring that ‘the infrastructure created is relevant to the community’s needs and will have their support’ (World Bank, 2012). Available data suggest that communities across the global South are using ELR as a tool for environmental rehabilitation. With the ongoing environmental degradation, the reliance on land (used for cultivating crops, investment in livestock) and other essential natural resources (access to adequate and safe water supply) becomes difficult.

The ELR can contribute to environmental sustainability by reducing vulnerability to climate change, particularly in contexts where people rely on land or natural resources for their livelihoods. In this regard, the ELR not only provides regular cash income to participating households but also promotes livelihoods in communities by creating eco-

friendly and productive assets. The MGNREGA, PSNP and, to a certain extent CWP, have undertaken various land, soil and water management projects which fit well into the ‘green jobs’ conceptual framework. According to Shome (2014:267), ‘green jobs’ are defined as the ‘direct employment created in various economic sectors and activities, which reduce adverse environmental impact and ultimately bring it down to a sustainable level’.

The MGNREGA has a component focused on environmental rehabilitation. Some of the common activities include, but are not limited to water conservation, recycling, water harvesting, drought proofing, irrigation of canals, land development and protection (Esteves et al., 2013). While the environmental focus in the MGNREGA is dictated by its institutional design, the environmental focus in the PSNP and the CWP varies from one community to the other depending on the selected choice of work at the community level. The PSNP’s environmental work is, like in the MGNREGA, generally focused on soil and water conservation (Subbarao et al., 2013).

Research suggests that PSNP’s environmental activities have shown early signs of success as evidenced by, among others, the ‘increased water availability and quality, increased ground water recharge and improved downstream base flow of streams, lessened damage from season floods’ and ‘enhanced downstream crop production through soil and water conservation interventions’ in communities (Tongul & Hobson; 2013:2).

### **3.6 COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE: ELR PROMOTES LOCAL DEMOCRACY**

The communitarian perspective places emphasis on the role of the ELR in promoting local democracy. The central argument, as McCord (2003:14) puts it, is that ‘public works [i.e. ELR] programmes have the potential to promote local democracy through the participation of communities in resource allocation decision making, and to promote democratic accountability by providing a structure for direct communication between local government



and communities'. This is based on the principle that meaningful development cannot take place if development policies, such as the ELR, do not give a 'voice' to the poor and their communities – what Chambers (1983) calls 'participatory development'. The concept of 'participatory development' generally encompasses various notions expressed in the ELR literature such as 'empowering the poor'; 'giving the poor a voice'; 'exercise of voice and choice', 'improving accountability' and 'building social capital'.

This perspective is primarily influenced by various theoretical and empirical studies and debates on the MGNREGA. It is for this reason that this perspective is discussed with reference to the development debates around the MGNREGA. The communitarian perspective derives its theoretical basis from the Gandhian concept of *Panchayat Raj* or *Swaraj* (Kumar, 2010). Although the concept and the practice of the *Panchayat Raj* have evolved overtime and adapted to different historical epochs in India, it is crucial for clarifying the fundamental theoretical tenets of the communitarian perspective and its assumptions about the role of ELR programmes in promoting (grassroots) local democracy.

The *Raj* can be translated to mean 'governance' or 'government' (Siga, 2015). Conceptually, the *panchayat* 'can be described as an assembly of the village people or their representatives' (Siga, 2015:50). For Gandhi, this concept was equated with 'village republic' (Siga, 2015:51). This is supposed to be the cornerstone of real participatory democracy as Gandhi remarked that 'Twenty men sitting at the centre could not work true democracy. It has to be worked from below by the people of every village' (quoted in Siga, 2015:51). The *Panchayat Raj*, for Gandhi, represented real democracy as each village would be treated as 'a little republic, self-sufficient in its vital needs, organically and non-hierarchically linked with the larger spatial bodies and enjoying maximum freedom of deciding the affairs of the locality' (Rathi, s.a.:1). The *Panchayat Raj* can be defined as a democratic decentralisation model that enhances the universal right to equality, development and dignity in the villages.

This is infused within the Gandhian fervent belief in the truth, freedom and non-violence (Rathi, s.a). In Gandhi's view, freedom could only be realised 'in autonomous, self-reliant communities that offer opportunities to the people for fullest participation' (Rathi, s.a.: 1). In the Indian context, the decentralisation of power to the Panchayat is intended to facilitate grassroots democratic political participation.

The concept of participatory democracy is deeply embedded in Gandhi's vision of the *Panchayat Raj* (Kumar, 2010). Participatory democracy is often juxtaposed with the elitist representative (parliamentary) democracy in the global North (Siga, 2015). The concept of the *Panchayat Raj* itself was born out of the ideological contestations between advocates of modern representative democracy and 'those convinced that the inadequacies of representative democracy could only be met by making democracy more participatory through the introduction of *Panchayat Raj*, transforming villages into units of self-government' (Mukherji, 2007:31). Gandhi advocated for a democratic polity in which 'every village will be republic or *panchayat* having full power' (Mukherji, 2007:31). The state would still exist but it would not deprive people of their autonomy to decide on what is good for them.

An ELR programme can be designed to promote democratic participation and involvement of the people at the grass-roots level. The involvement of the people, through the *Panchayat* institutions, is supposed to give practical expression to the government's commitment to building grassroots democratic political participation (Kumar, 2010). The MGNREGA (2005:7) declares that the Panchayat 'shall be the principal authorities for planning and implementation' of the programme. Scholars have argued that this institutional design, compounded by the legal RtW as enshrined in the MGNREGA, would further the Gandhian ideal to transform the *Panchayats* as conduits for rural development and grassroots participatory democracy. As Shabbir and Noor (2014:3) argue:

MGNREGA is a unique and unprecedented effort in strengthening grassroots democracy in India. For the first time, the Indian state has legally mandated the implementation of mechanisms that strengthen transparency and accountability at every step of the delivery chain, by creating a platform for citizens to articulate their voice and directly engage with the state.

The involvement of the *Panchayats* in the implementation of the MGNREGA forms part of a broader effort to build capacity for self-reliance and deliberative decision making (Mukherji, 2007). As discussed in Chapter 2, the selection of works in the MGNREGA work in each village is proposed by the *gram sabha* (village council) and later approved by the *panchayats*. In theory, decentralisation should have positive spin-offs on both demand and supply sides for the local government. On the demand side, ‘decentralisation strengthens citizens participation in local government by, for example, instituting regular elections, improving access to information, and fostering mechanisms for deliberative decision making’ (Mansuri & Rao, 2013:2). On the supply-side, the service delivery capacity of local government is enhanced because accountability and transparency strengthen service delivery capacity of the local state.

The democratic decentralisation involved in the MGNREGA is further buttressed by social audits that give power to ordinary people to demand information and accountability on any aspect of the programme (Kumar, 2010). Social audits are intended to strengthen citizenship and robust civic engagement, thus minimising maladministration and corruption. Recently, some scholars have used the theoretical foundations of the communitarian perspective to argue for an alternative form of democratic local governance, such as what Forstater (2012:150) describes as ‘municipal confederalism’, through the idea of the ELR. In the context of the ELR, this ‘communal anarchist and social ecology notion’; i.e., ‘municipal confederalism’, entails envisioning ‘counter-hegemonic possibilities for the future’ in which

‘the community and neighbourhood organisations take the reins and administer the [ELR] programmes to the fullest extent possible, rather than having federal government involved in the majority of the administration’ (Forstater, 2013:149). The state would only pay for wages and provide other essential material support while all other decisions, such as recruitment and selection of work, are left to the communities.

Mansuri and Rao (2013) argue that local decentralisation and promotion of participation through the ELR is not always guaranteed to build civic capacity. The challenge is that ELR’s role in promoting participatory democracy is ‘still driven more by ideology and optimism than by systematic analysis, either theoretical or empirical’ (Mansuri & Rao, 2013:3). In an attempt to address this theoretical weakness, Mansuri and Rao (2013) draw a distinction between ‘organic’ and ‘induced’ participation. Organic participation is organised outside state institutions and led by independent civil society often acting in opposition to the state. Mansuri and Rao (2013: 31) further characterise this type of participation as ‘usually driven by social movements aimed at confronting powerful individuals and institutions within industries and government and improving the functioning of these spheres through a process of conflict, confrontation and accommodation’.

On the other hand, ‘induced participation attempts to promote action through bureaucratically managed development interventions’ (Mansuri & Rao, 20013:ix). Unlike the organic participation that arises independently as a civic expression, induced participation is initiated and promoted through a state development policy and likely to be implemented by or under the supervision of state bureaucracies. Induced participation is also likely to be driven by a homogenous framework ‘in a manner that affects a large number of communities at the same time’ (Mansuri & Rao, 2013:32). However, there may be some overlap between ‘organic’ and ‘induced’ participation because ‘induced participation, may be a direct outcome of organic participation (i.e. independent social movements outside the state)’.

The effectiveness of ‘induced participation’ depends on a variety of factors. In other words, it is not automatic that the involvement of the people in decisions on the implementation of an ELR programme would always build civic capacity. McCord (2003:14) reminds us that this potential is generally ‘contingent on the institutional context and the extent to which these issues are explicitly prioritized in programme design’. According to Mansuri and Rao (2013), induced participation works better when supported by a democratic, strong, functioning and responsive state. Such a state must have a strong ideological commitment to deepen grass-roots democracy and willing to enforce this commitment meaningfully through, among other interventions, regular supervision, independent audits and promotion of access to information and free media (Mansuri & Rao, 2013). Inability by the state to internalise this ideal may result in minimal outcomes in enhancing the civic capacity of the people. The role of the government must go beyond ‘parachuting’ funds into communities without any monitoring or supervision (Mansuri & Rao, 2013).

The other factor can be explained drawing from Mansuri and Rao’s concept of ‘civil society failure’. Civil society failure can be defined as the inability of people who live in the same geographic space ‘to act collectively to reach a feasible and preferable outcome’ (Mansuri & Rao, 2013:4). Participatory development may thrive in communities with a strong civil society because such communities are less vulnerable to the ‘civil society failure’. In contrast, the benefits of community participation/involvement may be weaker in communities where civil society is less robust or totally absent (Mansuri & Rao, 2013). This is not to suggest that ‘participatory development’ is not suitable for communities at risk of civil society failure, but this should be established so that proactive remedial action can be taken to address such failures.

In addition, it is naïve to assume that every community would have the capacity for civic engagement. It should be borne in mind that civil society failure is ‘deeply conditioned

by culture, and [it varies] from place to place’ (Mansuri and Rao, 2013). What works in one community may dismally fail in another community. The lack of appreciation of the context and insistence on institutional rigidities may lead to a situation where the decision on the implementation of an ELR programme is not aligned to the preferences of the people where such programmes are undertaken. There is also a possibility that community involvement may be captured by government bureaucrats ‘to tighten central control and increase incentives for upward accountability rather than local discretion’ (Mansuri & Rao, 2013:7).

### **3.7 CLIENTELISTIC PERSPECTIVE: ELR A MECHANISM TO BUY POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONTROL**

The fundamental theoretical assumption of this perspective is simple: the ELR is an instrument used by those in power to buy-off discontent and quell potential social unrest by dispensing patronage (Kumar, 2010). Clientelistic and patronage-ridden politics have become a common feature of contemporary societies. Auyero (1999:249) defines clientelism as the ‘distribution (or promise of distribution) of resources by political office holders or candidates in exchange for political support, primarily –although not exclusively – in the form of the vote’. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2012:2) similarly define clientelism as a ‘strategic transfers made by political parties and governments to poor and disadvantaged groups as a means of securing their votes, in an effort to consolidate political power’.

Clientelism involves a political exchange between a ‘patron’ (politician) who dispensed patronage to the ‘client’ (citizen) in return for electoral support (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2012). A patron controls the resources such as access to jobs, goods, and services. The resources are to be made available to a client under the conditions set by the patron. According to Auyero (2012:96), clientelism as a concept helps in explaining why poor and destitute people sometimes support populist leaders and undemocratic regimes.

Clientelism can be detrimental to development in the long-term. As Stokes (2007:604) argues, clientelism ‘slows economic development by discouraging governments from providing public goods and by creating an interest in the ongoing poverty and dependency’. The relationship between the citizens and politicians (whether in office or campaigning to be in office) is built on a material transaction whereby the citizens exchange their electoral support and votes in exchange for access to state resources such as cash transfers, ELR programmes, housing, goods and services (Auyero, 2012).

Scholars in political science and political sociology have argued that clientelism is sometimes confused with concepts such as ‘capture’ and ‘vote buying’ (Stokes et al., 2013:15). However, their meaning is not the same though as concepts they are similar. Capture refers to a process by which politicians illegally expropriate public resources, through illicit means such as theft, money laundering and corruption, for their private benefit or close associates (Mansuri & Rao, 2013). Capture is likely to occur in poor remote communities with low literacy and significant caste, gender and race disparities (Mansuri & Rao, 2013), although the recent experience in South Africa challenges this view. Vote buying, on the other hand, is more overt and involves ‘exchange of goods for votes before elections’ (Stokes et al., 2013:15). Vote buying, unlike clientelism or capture, is often transient and is not built on a social relationship between a patron and a client (Stokes et al., 2013). In democratic contexts, clientelism is used to get votes but not in the overt manner in which vote buying works.

The politics of clientelism generally revolves around jobs in which jobs are exchanged for votes. Weingrod (in Robinson & Verdier, 2013:262) makes this point clearer: ‘patronage refers to the way in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special favours in exchange for electoral support’. Robinson and Verdier (2013) argue that politicians prefer public sector employment to redistribute resources because a job is not only

selective but can be withdrawn at any time by the patron as a punishment against the client. Clientelism is common in countries with low productivity and high levels of inequality and poverty. It is under these conditions that ‘the political allegiance of clients is cheaper to buy with employment offers, and this makes clientelistic redistribution more attractive as a way of gaining support’ (Robinson & Verdier, 2013:263).

Poverty and inequality leave ordinary people with no choice but to rely on the state provisioning and informal livelihood strategies for survival (Stokes et al., 2013). With a dysfunctional and weakened formal labour market that fails to provide sufficient jobs to the surplus labour, the state is left as the dominant, if not the only, institution to guarantee livelihood security, which can be provided through policy interventions such as the ELR programmes and cash transfers. This is the reason why some incumbent governments in the global South use redistributive interventions such as ELR as a political tool to ‘consolidate their grip on power, lowering effective political competition’ (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2012:2). Daiz-Cayeros et al. (in Chowdhury, 2014:34) describe ELR programmes and cash transfers as ‘instruments of electoral investment’ for the politicians in office.

However, these interventions are not always politically targeted in the manner theorised in the classical clientelism literature. This theoretical weakness in the clientelism literature has been acknowledged, and scholars such as Stokes (2007) and Zucco (2011) have attempted to address this gap. Stokes (2007) argues that clientelism should be distinguished from ‘programmatically redistribution’. With programmatic redistribution, the redistribution of resources is objectively defined, and no one may be excluded unfairly irrespective of their political affiliation or views (Stokes, 2007). For example, *prima facie*, there would be no reasonable ground in denying an able-bodied adult a right to participate in an employment guarantee, irrespective of what the incumbent politicians think.



On the other hand, unlike programmatic redistribution, clientelism involves delivery of public resources to a specific group of people, in a specific geographic locality, on the basis of their electoral behaviour. With clientelism, the patron in office has the political (and administrative) discretion over resource distribution processes. The major difference between the two is that programmatic distribution does not have selective targeting of beneficiaries, no monitoring of voters, ‘and consequently, no partisan networks are necessary’ (Zucco, 2011:6). Zucco (2011:2) challenges the mainstream clientelism literature by arguing that ‘political targeting of benefits and costly monitoring of voters are not necessary to ensure monetary rewards’. In other words, interventions such as ELR programmes do not have to be politically targeted at a particular group, with stringent monitoring of voters, to accrue reasonable electoral prospects for the incumbents.

However, the objective eligibility criteria used in most ELR programmes and cash transfers render such programmes vulnerable to clientelistic capture by the elites at the local level. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (in Ansell & Mitchell, 2011) argue that, in democratic societies, clientelism is more likely to manifest itself in the local communities. Objective national qualifying criteria may be set for purposes of identifying and selecting participants in an ELR programme, but this alone is not a guarantee that local elites would not engage in clientelistic politics in such a programme. Zucco (2011:4) observes that the persistence of clientelism in most communities ‘serves the interests of the local operators of the party networks (as opposed to national level politicians and voters)’. The local politicians may threaten participants with suspensions or dismissals as punishment for refusal – whether such refusal is real or perceived – to toe the (party) political line, thus validating the charge against ELR as charity and not a right (Standing, 2009).

This has serious implications for programmes such as CWP, even for the rights-based and legislative MGNREGA. A number of studies conducted on the MGNREGA confirm that

the ELR is susceptible to clientelistic capture in communities where they are implemented. In his extensive study on party-based clientelism in the MGNREGA sites in two blocks of the Cooch Behar district in the province of West Bengal, Das (2013:4) shows that the participants who supported the local ruling party stood a better chance ‘of getting benefits from local authorities’. Das (2013:1) reveals that 79% of households who supported the ruling party ‘got the work whereas, for households that did not support them, the figure is only 43%’. Within the 79% of those who got work in the MGNREGA, 71% were politically active irrespective of political affiliation.

This empirical evidence led Das (2013:7) to conclude that ‘political affiliation of the household matters – ruling party supporters are more likely to get work than opposition party supporters, irrespective of the level of political activity’. Also, politically active households are ‘more likely to get work than politically inactive households’. The supporters of the local ruling party were awarded more working days, and as a result of this, received higher earnings from the programme compared to those whose political/electoral allegiance was with the opposition parties. The other dimension was that politically active households, irrespective of affiliation, received more working days and earnings as compared to households which were not politically active (Das, 2013).

Another study on the MGNREGA, conducted by Sheahan et al. (2014) in a sub-district of the state of Andhra Pradesh in India, arrived at similar conclusions – although it was focused on the trends in budgetary allocation by the government towards the implementation of the MGNREGA in the sub-districts. The study uncovered ‘significant patronage effects where *mandals* [sub-districts] that voted for the winning incumbent coalition in the 2009 elections were awarded more MGNREGA funds in the following years’ (Sheahan et al., 2014:2). If a universalistic and rights-based ELR programme such as the MGNREGA, with tight legislated accountability and transparency mechanisms, is vulnerable to clientelistic

capture at local level, what more can we expect from the non-statutory ELR types such as the CWP and the PSNP? The risk of clientelism may even be higher for these non-statutory models. The contestation for limited resources becomes more intense when only a small number of eligible community members have to be selected for participation in these programmes. With a reasonable exception to the employment guarantee, submitting an application for participation in other types of ELR programmes, such as the CWP, is not a guarantee for participation. The recruitment and selection process may be hijacked by local party officials and dominant elites for narrow patronage and political purposes.

The risk for clientelistic capture becomes quite acute for programmes where a means test is required for the selection of participants. Information such as the size of the family and state vulnerability may be distorted by state officials to unfairly deny assistance to the eligible while benefits are given to the ineligible purely for political reasons. Instead of allocating resources according to a set, objective criterion, the distribution could be done according to the characteristics of a client such as their political ideology or party affiliations. Participants are targeted for inclusion based on their political inclination and their linkages to the party patronage networks. In the end, the poor and vulnerable are deprived of their right to livelihood security. Whether real or perceived, cronyism in the selection of participants may undermine social cohesion in communities.

### **3.8 ANTI-PATERNALISM: ELR IMPAIRS FREEDOM**

This perspective rejects the ELR, which it disparagingly describes as either ‘workfare’ or ‘labourfare’, for imposing a paternalistic obligation to work in exchange for welfare benefits. Some proponents of this perspective, such as Bailey (1995:285) equate the ELR to ‘coerced labour’; while the ‘anti-workfare’ activists in the UK roundly castigate it as ‘government-sponsored forced labour’ or ‘modern slavery’ in the neo-liberal era (Duffy, 2013). The ELR

is viewed as a fundamentally flawed policy because it restricts individual freedom and autonomy. This perspective can be traced to the classical Millian and Kantian theoretical frameworks founded on the principles of liberty, freedom and autonomy (Henning, 2009). It is unacceptable that those in need of welfare who refuse to abide by the work obligation, are ‘sanctioned with reduction or even withdrawal of payments’ (Henning, 2009:161). The penalty for the failure to fulfil the work obligation is exactly the gripe the anti-paternalism perspective has with the ELR as it regards this conditionality as a fundamental violation of individual freedoms and autonomy (Ben-Ishai, 2008; Henning, 2009).

Inspired by the anti-paternalism theoretical position, Standing (2014) systematically berates the ELR as ‘unjust’ because it ‘miserably’ fails to satisfy a set of requirements in what he describes as the sacrosanct ‘Principles of Justice’. This comprises a cluster of five cardinal principles upon which any poverty alleviation programme, such as the ELR or any form of cash transfer, should be assessed, namely: the security difference principle; the paternalism test principle; the rights-not-charity principle; ecological constraint principle; and dignified work principle. Standing (2014) argues that the ELR ‘offends’ almost all of these cardinal principles, thus rendering it as an ‘unjust’ social policy.

Firstly, consistent with the classical theories that eschews encroachment on personal freedom and autonomy, the ELR fails to satisfy the paternalism test because it ‘imposes controls on the precariat that are not imposed on the most of free society’ (Standing, 2014:273); and ‘also intrudes on [participants’] liberty and whittles away their sense of personal responsibility’ (Standing, 2011a:31). It is paternalistic because it coerces the unemployed to undertake sub-standard and low-paying jobs which others (such as the idling rich, politicians) are not expected or willing to occupy (Standing, 2014).

Secondly, because the concept of the ELR ‘increases the insecurity of already insecure people’, it ‘offends’ the security difference principle (Standing, 2014:274). Thirdly, the ELR also fails the rights-not charity principle test because it usually confers undue discretionary power on the states and ‘their profit-making privatized surrogates’ over such decisions as the work to be done (Standing, 2014:274). Like beggars, participants in ELR programmes do not have rights and always have to tread carefully not to offend the ‘philanthropy of the super-rich, the elite of the global order’ (Standing, 2009:297). Because the ELR inherently operates as charity and not as a right, this not only creates a breeding ground for corruption but also for bureaucrats and administrators in governments to manipulate these programmes through arbitrary decision making as they have the ‘powers to charge, convict and penalise, without what most of us would regard as due process’ (Standing, 2011:8). Lastly, Standing (2014:274) argues, the ELR also miserably ‘offends the dignified work principle, since labour done in un-freedom cannot be dignifying and rarely leads anywhere in terms of personal development’.

Related to the anti-paternalism perspective is a body of critical scholarship that questions the very essence of wage labour as a normative and constitutive component of modern society (Barchiesi, 2011; Fouksman, 2016; Standing, 2002, 2008, 2009). This critique challenges us to reimagine ‘new mechanisms besides wage labour that can create social meaning, mediate relationships and hierarchies and provide moral worth’ (Fouksman, 2016:8). This critique broadly challenges us to think about the future where wage labour does not constitute a significant and meaningful dimension of social life. Although directly targeted at wage labour in general, this critique is also relevant to the ELR given its inherent work requirement. In most instances, as Barchiesi (2011) states, the ELR is driven by the lingering melancholic desire to maintain wage labour as a moral imperative. Yet what the ELR offers is a second-class substitute for the real waged jobs. Both the anti-paternalism and

anti-wage labour perspectives, as presented above, reject the necessity of wage labour in its various forms and propagate for the basic income grant as an alternative mode for redistribution.

The debates on workfare versus welfare have also influenced the development discourse in post-apartheid South Africa. The question over which between ‘workfare’ and ‘welfare’ is the best policy tool for protecting livelihoods has generated intense debates in academia, civic society, government and the society at large. Reflecting on this debate in 1999, following a joint SWOP/FES/NALEDI workshop on ‘Rethinking Welfare in South Africa, Peck (1999:36) argues that workfare programmes are ‘not suited to countries where there is high unemployment’. Under conditions defined by ‘structurally-weak labour markets’, ELR programmes would not make any significant inroad in creating jobs but will only ‘rotate unemployed people through low-paying and unstable jobs’ (Peck, 1999:35). In response to this argument, Patel (1999) argues for an integrated approach that would involve a combination of both ‘workfare’ and ‘welfare’ programmes. In the same debate, Coleman (1999) argues for a basic income grant as a viable policy alternative.

### **3.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY**

This chapter has attempted to engage with the wider interdisciplinary literature and debates on the concept of the ELR in order to outline the theoretical underpinning of this dissertation. Drawing from the work of Lieuw-Kie-Song, and Philip and Kumar’s embryonic work on the ELR, this chapter distinguished and extensively discussed seven dominant theoretical perspectives on the ELR, namely: market fundamentalism, the post-Keynesianism theoretical perspective, livelihood protection, livelihood promotion, communitarian, clientelism and anti-paternalism. As outlined in this chapter, some of these perspectives are not based on any rigid or mutually exclusive compartmentalisation as some degree of overlaps exists among these

perspectives. The significance of this chapter lies in its attempt to demonstrate and unravel the new thinking that underlies some of the innovatively-designed ELR programmes in the global South.

Gone are the days where the role of the ELR was conceptually confined to the boosting of aggregate demand in order to achieve economic growth and productivity at the macro-scale through the creation of physical infrastructure. The ongoing experimentation of the ELR in the global South shows that, to borrow from Tcherneva (2012:99), the ‘ELR becomes not just a policy for full employment but an institution for change’. The literature shows that the ELR could be a catalyst for, among other potentialities, building and strengthening local democracy, enforcement of a statutory minimum wage and environmental rehabilitation. This dissertation, however, engages more critically with only two of the theoretical perspectives, namely: livelihood protection and livelihood promotion. The next chapter examines the concept of Community Work Programme (CWP).

## CHAPTER 4

### THE COMMUNITY WORK PROGRAMME

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a brief overview of the CWP as one of the innovative ELR programmes in the global South. Although South Africa has a long history with the idea of the ELR (Vaughan, 2016), this chapter demonstrates that the CWP has important distinctive features. It begins by locating the emergence of the CWP within a development discourse which metaphorically characterised South Africa's economy as consisting of two economies: 'first economy' and 'second economy'. The concept of the 'second economy', as the official government policy discourse at the time, culminated in the expansion of government expenditure on social security. The introduction of the CWP forms part of the broader government-led interventions to address the challenges faced by the informalised, marginalised, impoverished, unemployed, unskilled, jobless and unemployable masses in the 'second economy'—the excluded

The chapter further suggests that the introduction of the CWP should be understood within the policy discourse of the 'second economy' and some strategic flaws in the core design of the EPWP. Drawing from the growing research work on the CWP, the chapter outlines some of the EPWP's shortcomings, particularly as it relates to its institutional goal to facilitate participants' transition into formal salaried jobs through skills training. In essence, the EPWP assumes that unemployment in South Africa is transient or cyclical and not a structural phenomenon. It is within this context that the CWP emerged and later incorporated as a distinctive component of the EPWP. This chapter finally outlines the innovative features of the CWP, and how it converges with the employment guarantee type and diverges from the short-term ELR type as discussed in Chapter 2.



## 4.2 THE SECOND ECONOMY POLICY DISCOURSE

The history of ELR in South Africa can be traced back to the early 1930s when large-scale short-term ELR programmes were introduced in response to the Great Depression, though participation in these programmes was restricted only to the white population who were adversely affected by the economic downturn (Vaughan, 2016). By 1932, about 18 percent of the total national government budget was spent on the temporary ELR programmes (Vaughan, 2016). These programmes were gradually phased-out as the more than 230 000 participants were ‘absorbed into employment in the mainstream economy’ (Vaughan, 2016:7). In the years to follow, particularly in the 1980s, many other short-term ELR programmes were introduced ‘in response to drought, rising unemployment, and political unrest’ (Vaughan, 2016:8). In the early 1990s, just before the dawn of democracy, more short-term ELR programmes were implemented in partnership with the private sector who agreed to adopt labour-intensive methods in their construction projects (Vaughan, 2016).

When the ANC took over political power in 1994, it adopted a new macro-economic strategy, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which advanced the concept of the ELR as a central policy intervention to address the challenges of unemployment, lack of skills and poverty resulting from the many years of colonialism and apartheid (Phillips, 2004). As a result, the National Public Works Programme (NPWP) was adopted and implemented across the country. The main objective of the NPWP was to reduce unemployment by absorbing the jobless into productive work and providing skills training as a form of economic empowerment. The strategy was to implement the NPWP on two fronts: as a community-based PWP (CBPWP) and through the adoption of labour-intensive techniques on major government infrastructural development projects (Phillips, 2004). The CBPWP was intended to provide ‘rapid and visible social relief for the poor, and to build capacity of communities for development’ (Phillips, 2004:3).

Since the dawn of non-racial democracy in South Africa, different perspectives have emerged on how the social and economic legacies of apartheid could be redressed. The concept of the ‘second economy’ represents a particular perspective on the causes, consequences and solutions to the persistent challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment. This concept was introduced into South Africa’s post-apartheid development discourse by former President Thabo Mbeki. In his address to the national parliament in 1998, Thabo Mbeki, in his then capacity as the deputy president, characterised South Africa as a country with ‘two nations’ (Andersson & Alexander, 2016). The first nation, Mbeki (1998:1) argued, ‘is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographic dispersal’. This nation has ‘ready access to a developed economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure’ (Mbeki, 1998:1). In contrast, the other nation comprises of the majority excluded black and poor people who live ‘under conditions of grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure’ (Mbeki, 1998).

In another speech to the National Council of Provinces in 2003, Thabo Mbeki, this time as the president of South Africa following his inauguration in 1999, revisited the concept of the ‘two nations’ (Andersson & Alexander, 2016). In the same year, consistent his ‘two nations’ thesis, Thabo Mbeki (2003) wrote a famous article in his capacity as the President of the ANC on the party’s online journal *ANC Online* where he characterised South Africa’s economy as comprising of the ‘first world economy’ and the ‘third world economy’. The ‘first world economy’ denotes the mainstream industrial, mining, agricultural, financial and services sector (Mbeki, 2003). Existing side-by-side with the ‘first economy’ is another economy defined by underdevelopment and marginalisation – the ‘third world economy’ (Mbeki, 2003). Whereas government had made major interventions to ensure that the ‘first world economy ‘developed in the right direction, at the right pace’; this did ‘not necessarily impact on [the third world economy] in a beneficial manner’ (Mbeki, 2003).

The essence of Mbeki's (2003) article is that the burgeoning wealth in the thriving 'first world economy' could not be expected to naturally 'trickle down' to the majority marginalised in the 'third world economy'. Accordingly, Mbeki (2003:1) argues furthermore that the government had the responsibility:

to devise and implement a strategy to intervene in the "third world economy" ... to transform this economy so that we end its underdevelopment and marginalisation'. Increasingly there was an appreciation from the ANC-led government that its neo-liberal development trajectory had worsened the challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequalities, instead of resolving them. This wave of awakening culminated in a new policy discourse in government that delineated and devised government-led interventions for the 'first economy' ['first world economy'] and the 'second economy' ['third world economy']. In its report, *Towards a Ten Year Review* (2003:97), the Presidency defines the 'second economy' as 'a mainly informal, marginalised, unskilled economy, populated by the unemployed and those unemployable in the formal sector.

However, the characterisation of South Africa's economy as consisting of two parallel economies – the 'first' and 'second' economies – should not be interpreted as suggesting the actual existence of two structurally disconnected economies. Instead, this should be seen as a metaphor or a 'suggestive shorthand that can serve to name or frame the deeply segmented nature of South African society' (Du Toit & Neves, 2007:6). Webster (2010:228) has pointed out that the distinction between the 'first economy' and 'second economy' should not be interpreted literally as 'geographically or analytically separate' because these economies 'are interconnected, although in a very unequal way...the concept of a second economy is a metaphor that should not be taken to mean that there are literally two geographically separate centres'. The government policy discourse on 'second economy' provides an apt historical

context for understanding the context under which the CWP was inaugurated as one of the 'second economy' interventions.

In practice, the adoption of the concept of the 'second economy' as the official discourse for framing South Africa's socio-economic challenges translated into increased government expenditure towards the ending of 'underdevelopment and marginalisation' in the 'second economy' or 'third world economy'. Among the government funded 'second economy' interventions were the expansion of the already-existing, targeted, unconditional cash transfer programmes (social grants) and the introduction of the expansive EPWP in 2004, and the CWP in 2008. Indeed, the period from the early 2000s has been characterised by some as signalling a transition from 'an austere outward-looking state' into the 'Keynesian mode' (Hirsch, 2005:259). Even the NALEDI (Legassick, 2007), a research institute linked to the COSATU, applauded the government for the increased social expenditure in the early 2000s. Legassick (2007:138) further shows that the supposed "'turn" from neo-liberalism is also reflected in the growth of the budget deficit – from 1.4 percent (2001/02), to 2.1 percent (2002/03), to 2.4 percent (2003/04) to 3.1 percent (2004/05) and 3.1 percent in 2005/06'.

Although the concept of the 'second economy' and its subsequent influence over the government's official policy direction does not represent 'a radical about-turn' from South Africa's neo-liberal development trajectory, this, according to Du Toit and Neves (2007:4), nevertheless constitutes 'a significant shift'. This can be seen as the government's response to the rising levels of unemployment, inequality and poverty, particularly in the period between 1996 and 2000 (Frye, 2006). As Du Toit and Neves (2007:3) argue:

some of the importance of the concept of the second economy is undoubtedly related to the manner and timing of its introduction...by 2003, it was becoming increasingly evident that GEAR, however successful it had been in guiding fiscal policy, had failed as a job creation

and redistribution strategy'. A number of studies and reports, including the 'unexpectedly critical UNDP report on development', had shown at the time that poverty in South Africa 'had remained more or less constant.

#### **4.3 THE EXPANDED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME AND ITS 'FALSE OPTIMISM'**

Returning to Thabo Mbeki's influential article published on the *ANC Online*, the former president identified lack of skills as the main obstacle in the 'second economy'. Mbeki (2003) wrote: 'As the economy of our country has developed, it has tended to require people with higher levels of appropriate education and training. This renders many of the unskilled both unemployable and incapable of starting any small business that requires one skill or another'. This narrative assumes that lack of skills and training is responsible for unemployment and un-employability for the people in the 'second economy'. Providing skills training through the ELR was accordingly considered an important intervention for the much-needed integration of the 'second economy' into to the 'first economy'. In pursuit of this endeavour, the government launched the EPWP with an ambitious goal to 'facilitate exit strategies to build ladders between the second economy and the first economy' (EPWP, 2005).

At the official launch of the EPWP in April 2004, the then and now late minister of public works, Ms Stella Sigcau, introduced the EPWP as an 'initiative to take marginalised poor people out of spiral poverty' (McCord, 2004:14). The EPWP was designed as a short-term ELR programme as it only offers work opportunities to participants for a limited period of time. In its current form, the EPWP was touted by the government as a strategic policy instrument for addressing the 'structural disjuncture' in the economy which is caused by, among other factors, lack of skills training and work experience among the excluded. The idea was that participation in the EPWP presents an opportunity for the 'marginalised,

unskilled, informalised and unemployable’ masses in the ‘second economy’ to acquire the work experience and skills which would, in turn, enhance their employability in the ‘first economy’ upon their exit in EPWP projects. One senior government bureaucrat remarked that the acquired training and skills would allow ex-EPWP participants ‘to manoeuvre into businesses or enter the formal employment sector’ (RDM Newswire, 2015:1).

However, this assumption – that skills training and work experience in the EPWP enhances employability – ignores the objective structural realities of South Africa’s labour market (Hemson, 2007; McCord, 2004, 2003a; Shumba, 2014). In other words, this assumption creates ‘false optimism’ that ex-EPWP participants stand a relatively better chance of finding permanent jobs in the formal labour market. In a comprehensive review report on the EPWP, Hemson (2007:36) clearly argues that the ‘EPWP does not match South Africa’s economic context – it offers once-off short-term work opportunities when the problem is structural unemployment’. McCord (2004) is particularly skeptical of EPWP’s potential role as a ‘ladder’ into formal jobs in the context of structural unemployment. McCord (2004) argues that the EPWP, in its current form, is not best suited to promote participants’ employability given the fact that unemployment in South Africa remains a deeply structural and chronic phenomenon which cannot easily be resolved through short-term employment and training.

The idea of the EPWP as an instrument for integrating the first and the second economies is entrenched in the official government thinking about the relationship between skills training and employment. For instance, in his remarks in 2003, Thabo Mbeki pointed out that the EPWP would allow participants to ‘gain skills while they are gainfully employed and increase their capacity to earn an income once they leave the programme’ (McCord, 2004:13). According to McCord (2004), the fundamental problem with the EPWP lies in its inherent misdiagnosis of the nature of unemployment in South Africa as a transitory and not a

structural problem. Consequently, the EPWP has adopted an equally hopelessly misguided 'policy response appropriate for transient rather than chronic unemployment, with the belief that there will be a significant increase in employment in the wake of economic growth, and that through improved education and experience the unskilled who are currently excluded, will be absorbed into the labour market' (McCord, 2004:13).

According to McCord (2004), the formal demand for semi- and unskilled labour in South Africa has steadily declined since the early 1970s. This downward trend continues to be one of the key defining features of South Africa's labour market. McCord (2004:3) argues that this trend 'is largely due to structural changes in the economy, resulting from a decline in the importance of the primary sector, technological change, and liberalization and entry into the global economy'. These structural changes in the economy, McCord (2004:3) continues, have over time generated the mass, structural and chronic nature of the country's unemployment challenge. The failure of the labour market to create sufficient jobs for the increasing number of semi- and unskilled job seekers is responsible for these structural shifts in the South African economy. In this context, therefore, providing short-term work opportunities through the ELR do not help solve the solution in the long-term as 'many workers return to the unemployed labour pool after completing work in short-term public works' (McCord, 2003:26).

The innovation in the design of the CWP, the subject of this dissertation, should be understood against the backdrop of some of these flaws in the design of the EPWP. First, it is unhelpful to use the ELR as a transmission belt into the 'first economy' when the problem of unemployment is not frictional but rooted in the structure of the economy. Second, as discussed in Chapter 3, an ELR programme which offers short-term work opportunities like the EPWP is unlikely to protect the livelihoods of the participants in the long-term. However, the CWP is unique as it offers regular and predictable work. This innovativeness is informed

by the growing appreciation that unemployment in South Africa is not a temporary problem and that it will take some time to address. Drawing from the growing body of literature on the CWP the following section of this chapter discusses the innovative features of the CWP and how it represents an attempt at an employment guarantee and how it departs from the short-term ELR programmes.

#### **4.4 INNOVATION IN THE CWP**

According to Shumba (2014:88), the idea of the CWP was originally conceptualised by Dr Kate Philip who was appointed as the head of the government's Second Economy Strategy Project – with the 'mandate to create at least 50 000 jobs'. Faced with the daunting task of meeting this target in the face of structural and chronic unemployment, Philip was inspired to learn about the experience of India's MGNREGA during a conference organised by the Overseas Development Institute in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. After this conference, Philip started to read widely on the concept of ELR, particularly on the MGNREGA, with a view to experimenting with a similar programme in South Africa. Following a series of discussions with government and non-government stakeholders, the concept of the CWP was ultimately considered feasible (Shumba, 2014).

The CWP began in 2008 as a pilot project under the South African government's 'Second Economy Strategy Project' which was located at an independent policy think-tank called Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) (Andersson & Alexander, 2016). The initial donor-funded CWP pilot phase was implemented in Munsieville, Bokfontein, Sekhukhune and ten villages in the Alfred Nzo Municipality in the Eastern Cape (Department of Social Development [DSD], 2009). In 2008, the CWP was officially incorporated as a new component of the already existing EPWP. Although the CWP is part of the EPWP, its design and features are substantially different from the latter. Whereas the EPWP typifies the short-



term ELR type which provides short-term access to work opportunities with the intention to ensure re-entry of participants into the formal labour market, the CWP demonstrates innovation in the context of mass structural unemployment and chronic poverty (Philip, 2013). The CWP is distinctively designed as an employment safety net and intended to supplement existing livelihood strategies on an ongoing basis (Philip, 2013).

Andersson and Alexander (2016) suggest that the historical development of the CWP can be divided into four phases: the pilot phase (from 2008 to 2009); the first phase (from April 2010 to March 2012), second phase (April 2012 to March 2014); and the third phase (April 2014 to present). This rich historical account is important as it illustrates the rapid growth of the CWP since its inception in 2008. The CWP's initial pilot began in January 2008 in Munsieville and was known as the 'Right to Work' (RtW) scheme (Andersson & Alexander, 2016: 161). Many participants in the 'RtW' were drawn largely from the OW workshop operationalised in Munsieville in 2007. In the weeks to follow the RtW was renamed 'Saturday Work Scheme', and later the CWP. With more donor funding and government support, from 2009, the CWP was extended to 100 workdays a year in communities where the initial pilots were already underway. This period saw the rapid expansion of the CWP to 49 sites, with some 53 720 participants, across the country by March 2010.

The 'first phase' of the CWP is characterised as a period in which the Department of Cooperative Governance (DCoG) officially assumed most administrative functions of the CWP through a small secretariat of five people drawn from government, TIPS and the two implementing agents at the time – Seriti Institute and Teba Development. By the end of March 2012, the CWP was operational in 79 sites, with over 95 000 participants (Andersson & Alexander, 2016). The third phase, known as 'the scaling up' phase, is described as a period that saw an unprecedented 'bureaucratization' of the CWP which entailed the

confusing ‘three-tier structure’ involving a complicated ‘management chain of DCoG, LA’s, PIA’s and LIA’s’ (Andersson & Alexander, 2016:168). By March 2016, the number of CWP participants had increased to 223 315, spread in 196 municipalities across South Africa (DCoG, 2016). By the end of 2015, women constituted 75 percent of the participants, with ‘youth making up 45 percent’ (DCoG, 2015:14).

The aim of the CWP is to provide access to a minimum level of work, on a predictable and ongoing basis (Philip, 2010a; 2016). The CWP should be seen as ‘an employment safety net and not employment solution’ (Philip, 2010a:13). Although the CWP is not an employment guarantee, it nevertheless represents a ‘new modality for the delivery of public employment, and it was designed with the explicit intention of developing and testing an approach that could be used to implement an employment guarantee in South Africa’ (Philip, 2010a:8). The design of the CWP is modelled on many key features of the MGNREGA, such as access to predictable and regular work for 100 days per year per participant (Philip, 2010a). While the CWP and MGNREGA are similar in some important respects, these ELR programmes are different in some ways. First, unlike the MGNREGA, the CWP departs from the principle of employment guarantee because not everyone is guaranteed participation. Second, while the implementation of the MGNREGA is restricted to rural areas, the CWP is implemented in the urban, peri-urban and rural areas of South Africa.

How is the CWP different from the typical short-term ELR program, such as EPWP? Andersson and Alexander (2016:157) suggest that the CWP has ‘five distinct features which together differentiate it from other Public Employment Programmes around the world’. The first distinctive feature is that the CWP ‘offers two days of work per week indefinitely to a large number of people’ (Andersson & Alexander, 2016:157). Second, the CWP is designed to act as a tool in the hands of the people for the development of their communities. Third,

the type of work done in the CWP is decided upon by the community members themselves. Fourth, the labour intensity in the CWP is set at 65 percent, meaning that a significant portion of the CWP total budget directly benefits the participants. Lastly, while the CWP is funded by the national government it ‘is implemented by not-for-profit organisations’ (Andersson & Alexander, 2016:158). The following section of this chapter expounds on these five distinctive and innovative features of the CWP.

#### **4.4.1 Regular and predictable work**

The focus on regular and predictable work is the key innovative defining feature of the CWP. This ‘translates into regular and predictable incomes in poor households’ because participation in the CWP work is indefinite (Philip, 2016:199). The CWP ‘is designed to be an ongoing programme, and while it may help participants access other opportunities, there is no forced exit back into poverty where such opportunities do not exist’ (Philip, 2010a:14). It is quite evident that the CWP represents an attempt at adapting the concept of employment guarantee in South Africa. The CWP offers regular part-time work, on an ongoing basis, for two days in a week or monthly equivalent (100 days in a year) to each participant (Philip, 2016). The CWP normally takes approximately 1000 or more participants per site, with sites varying in geographical size (Philip, 2010a).

Unlike the EPWP which offers work opportunities for a period not exceeding two years per participant, participation in the CWP is indefinite. Any member of the community who wishes to participate is required to submit a formal application to local CWP office, and the placement is normally determined at the local offices on a needs-basis and availability of vacancies. The CWP’s wage rate is in line with the Ministerial Determination, pronounced by the Minister of Labour, which outlines the conditions of employment for all programmes in the EPWP (Philip, 2013). In 2017, the wage rate for CWP participants was R86 per day – a

participant who worked the full eight days in a month would receive electronic transfers of R688 as a monthly wage. It is not mandatory for participants to work for the full eight days in a month – the wage payment is calculated according to the number of days worked. The CWP coordinators (responsible for supervising the participants) worked for five days in a week and earned R2260 per month as of 2017. The CWP work does not have conventional fringe benefits normally associated with standard employment relationships such as pension contribution or medical aid.

#### **4.4.2 Catalyst for community development**

Another key innovative feature of the CWP is ‘its attempt to build a community-driven model of public employment, in which the work undertaken is identified and prioritized at a community level’ (Philip, 2013:13). The idea is that the community in which the CWP is implemented must decide on the types of work activities to be done by the CWP. Every CWP site is required to establish a ‘Local Reference Committee’ – a committee which normally comprises CWP officials, local government officials, local councillor/s, and local civic organisations – to facilitate the identification and selection of ‘useful work’ in their communities (Andersson & Alexander, 2016). In this context, useful work refers to ‘work that contributes to the public good and/or improves the quality of life in communities’ (Philip, 2013:13). Some of the typical work activities in most CWP sites are homestead and community food gardens, clean-up of public spaces, grass-cutting, fencing and pavement maintenance, home and community-based care, care for orphans and vulnerable children, community safety, assistance with social grants applications, environmental rehabilitation and maintenance and early childhood development.

By fostering the identification of ‘useful work’ through participatory processes at the community level, it is envisaged that the CWP would simultaneously act as a catalyst for

community development from below (Andersson & Alexander, 2016; Philip, 2013; Shumba, 2014). The participatory community process built in the CWP's core design 'helps to unlock new forms of agency in communities, providing an instrument that supports local initiatives to tackle local problems' (Philip, 2013:13). This design also creates an enabling environment for the mobilisation of community members to be involved in decision-making processes in the CWP. This has the potential to deliver some crucial social spins-offs such as the building of social solidarity and a sense of common purpose in tackling socio-economic problems in a given community.

#### **4.4.3 Labour intensity and role of not-for-profit organisations**

The Department of Public Works (2015:v) defines labour intensity as the 'expenditure on wages expressed as a percentage of the total expenditure on activities implemented labour intensively'. The CWP is designed to deliver at least 65 percent labour intensity ratio at the site level (Philip, 2013). This means that at least 65 percent of the total expenditure at every CWP site must go towards the participants' wage payments, while the other 35 percent is spent on non-wage costs. This makes the CWP a cost-effective ELR programme which puts 'maximum resources into the hands of participants' (TIPS, 2010:5). Complying with this ratio is 'achievable because of the high level of social services included in CWP work' (Philip, 2013:13). This is in contrast to the EPWP which, despite its official commitment to promoting labour-intensive production methods on the government-funded infrastructure projects, has been unable to maintain a high labour intensity ratio comparable to the CWPs.

The CWP is also different from the short-term ELR programmes because its implementation in communities is done by non-profit organisations – called implementing agents – operating outside government which are appointed by the national government as service providers through a competitive bidding process. This does not reflect common

practice in the world as most governments are wholly responsible for both the funding and administrative roles in the implementation of ELR programmes. However, with the CWP, the implementing agents are responsible for the actual implementation in the communities, while the national government provides the funding and the overall strategic oversight. The appointed implementing agent is required to ‘develop the [CWP] site and to provide financial, logistics and project management, while building local implementing capacity’ (COGTA, 2010:4). According to Philip (2013:13), the involvement of non-profit-making organisations is intentionally intended to build ‘new forms of partnership between government, civil society and communities’.

#### **4.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY**

This chapter has provided a brief overview of the CWP. The chapter describes the historical context under which the CWP was introduced. It was demonstrated that the discourse that characterised South Africa as consisting of two economies culminated in the accelerated roll-out of government social security programmes which took the form of unconditional cash transfers targeted at vulnerable groups and the commitment to act as ELR. The CWP was viewed as one of the policy interventions to facilitate the integration of the ‘second economy’ into the ‘first economy’. The CWP emerged out of the appreciation that the structural and chronic nature of unemployment in South Africa would not easily be solved by providing skills training and work experience to the unemployed. The CWP is not designed to facilitate activation of those in the ‘second economy’ into the formal labour market. Instead, it is designed to provide regular and predictable work while long-term solutions to unemployment are pursued. The chapter has also highlighted the key distinctive and innovative features of the CWP.

## CHAPTER 5

### SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT: BEKKERSDAL AND MUNSIEVILLE

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a brief historical and socio-economic context of the two localities selected for the comparative case study: Munsieville and Bekkersdal. The two black African townships are located in the West Rand District Municipality (West Rand) in Gauteng province, South Africa, and are about 30 kilometres away from each other. The West Rand comprises of three local municipalities, namely: Mogale City Local Municipality, Merafong City Local Municipality and Rand West Local Municipality. Munsieville is located within the Mogale City Local Municipality whereas Bekkersdal falls under the jurisdiction of the Rand West City Local Municipality which incorporates the previously separated Westonaria Municipality and Randfontein Municipality. In terms of its size, the West Rand covers 4,095 square kilometres and has a population size of 848 597 (West Rand Municipality, 2017).

A year after the discovery of gold in 1886, gold mining operations expanded to the newly-discovered goldfields in the West Rand – then known as Wonderfonteinspruit (Kritzinger, 2017). This discovery unleashed a wave of urbanisation which saw the establishment of mining towns such as Krugersdorp, Carletonville, Westonaria and Randfontein (Kritzinger, 2017). The expansion of gold mining in the West Rand gave rise to overcrowded informal settlements inhabited largely by non-white migrants on the outskirts of the nearby ‘mining towns’. Both Munsieville and Bekkersdal were designed as reservoirs for cheap labour for the adjacent mining towns of Krugersdorp, Westonaria and Randfontein. Although now in decline, gold mining remains the backbone of the West Rand’s economy, with some leading mining houses such as Anglo Gold, Harmony Gold, Gold Fields, JCI Limited and Durban-Roodepoort Deep still operating in the district.

## 5.2 THE THREE MINING TOWNS

The local towns in the West Rand; Krugersdorp (closer to Munsieville), Westonaria and Randfontein (closer to Bekkersdal); and Carletonville are generally described as ‘mining towns’ in the same way that Johannesburg is traditionally identified. Located about 42 kilometres east of Johannesburg and only nine kilometres from Munsieville, the history of Krugersdorp, which dates back to 1887, ‘is linked inextricably to its fundamental nature as a mining town, functioning in the interests of the gold mining industry on the western periphery of the Witwatersrand goldfields’ (Dugmore, 2008:16). Among the early gold mines established in Krugersdorp were the Luipaard’s Vlei GM Co. Ltd, Witpoortjie, Groot Paardekraal, Vera, Midas, Battery Reef, West Battery Reef, Monarch, New Violet, Standard, Shamrock and the Great Kruger (Dugmore, 2008). However, by 1892, the poor quality of the ore and the escalating costs for deep level mining resulted in the gradual downscaling of mining operations in Krugersdorp (Dugmore, 2008). As a result, some mines had to shut down and miners forced to look for ‘work elsewhere in the Rand’ (Dugmore, 2008:80).

Westonaria and Randfontein both ‘owe their very existence to gold mining, and this industry remains the most important source of direct and indirect income, raising concerns about implications of mine closure in the future’ (Winde & Stoch, 2010:69). These two towns are 18 kilometres apart. Randfontein was established in 1890 after the registration of the Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Company in 1889 (Lieverink, 2015). The town was initially administered by the town of Krugersdorp until it was declared a standalone local municipality in 1929. Goldmining operations in Westonaria started in 1910 when the Pullinger Shaft was sunk (Lieverink, 2015). The expansion of gold mining and agriculture activities in both towns resulted in the establishment of human settlements to accommodate the growing workforce. In 2016, the Randfontein and Westonaria local municipalities were merged to become Rand West Municipality.



### 5.3 MUNSIEVILLE

Munsieville is one of the oldest black townships in the West Rand situated on the northern outskirts of the mining town of Krugersdorp. The township was founded according to the Ordinance 58 of 1903 by the Krugersdorp Town Council as a 'native location' (Khumalo, 2010; Mogale City, 2016:17). In 1905, the local town council took administrative control of the Munsieville and enforced a series of state control measures, such as the permit system, to regulate the movement, residence and life of the black residents (Proctor, 1986. In 1911, the local council started building new houses in the 'New Location' with 'aligned sides and streets organised in an orderly grid pattern' (Dugmore, 2008:7). Residents of the Old Location would later be relocated to this New Location. The 'Old Location' where Munsieville was originally founded in 1905 did not allow for effective state control because it had 'a haphazard collection of privately owned and constructed dwellings with no clear boundary between sites and no common building line' (Proctor, 1986:168).

The decision to relocate Munsieville residents to the New Location did not work out as originally planned (Proctor, 1986). Many residents could neither afford the rent required to stay in the newly-built government houses nor to build their own houses in the New Location, while others preferred the convenience provided by Old Location's close proximity to the town centre (Dugmore, 2008; Proctor, 1986). By the early 1940s the New Location, which was officially named 'Munsieville' in 1941, was a properly established community (Proctor, 1986). The rapid expansion of Munsieville in its New Location raised serious disquiet on the part of the local authorities who in the 1950s decided to move Munsieville residents again because, according to the apartheid segregationist ideology, white suburbs could not 'share the hillside with black residents' (Proctor, 1986:170). A new township known as 'Kagiso' was established in the 1950s partly for this purpose although Munsieville never relocated (see Van Kessel, 2000) and, until today, remains on the New Location.

Like black African townships elsewhere in South Africa, Munsieville became a terrain of protest and resistance against racial oppression under apartheid. It was home to one of the iconic figures in the anti-apartheid struggle and the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu. Desmond Tutu's family moved into Munsieville in 1943 when Tutu was only 12 years old – and this is where he later spent the rest of his childhood and adolescent years. He was appointed as a professional teacher at Munsieville High School in 1954, and his parish/circuit was the St Paul's Church where he later married his wife Leah Shenxane in 1955 (Allen, 2006; Gish, 2004, Ntlokoa, 2017). It was during his residence in Munsieville that he grew increasingly infuriated by apartheid's brutality and its racist laws. Tutu resigned from his teaching post in 1958 in protest against Bantu Education Act of 1953, promulgated a year before he was appointed a teacher at Munsieville High School (Gish, 2004).

Munsieville residents in the 'Old Location' protested against restrictions imposed on their freedom of movement as early as the 1900s (Proctor, 1986). In the years to follow, the township witnessed a wave of resistance with anti-apartheid activists participating in mass and underground political activities to overthrow the regime (Stevenson, 2011a:222).

Munsieville is historically considered a stronghold of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Inter-organisational violence, particularly between the ANC and PAC, erupted in the early 1990s leading to several political killings (Van Kessel, 2000). In 1967, four members of the armed wing of the PAC, *Poqo*, were arrested in Munsieville and later sentenced to death for killing a black police officer (Ntlokoa, 2017). During the turbulent 1980s, protests, marches and boycotts against apartheid grew exponentially in this township (Stevenson, 2011). The growing unrest during this period, and the failure of authorities to contain it, led to the formation of armed white vigilante groups which undertook nightly raids to attack and kill black people in the township (Van Kessel, 2000).

In the post-apartheid era, Munsieville has expanded beyond its original boundary. Three informal settlements have emerged in the township, namely: Mshenguville established in the late 1980s; an informal settlement in the Mayibuye section called '2000', named after the year it was established, and more recently, an informal settlement dominated by 'poor whites' called Pangoville or 'ka koBatsi' as it was popularly known among black Africans in the township. In the South African context, 'msheguville' has come to mean 'informal settlement'. There are two black informal settlements that bear the same name in Atteridgeville in Pretoria and Soweto in Johannesburg. Msheguville in Munsieville emerged in the late 1980s as a response to the chronic housing shortage in the formal Munsieville and the growing number of migrant job seekers and migrants working in the industrial centres and mines around Krugersdorp. Stevenson (2011a:224) comments on the rapid expansion of Mshenguville as follows: 'After 1994, I watched Mashanguville [i.e. Mshenguville], the informal settlement attached to Munsieville, triple in size'.

In 2000, another informal settlement, named '2000', emerged in a section within Munsieville known as Mayibuye. Mayibuye today consists of a mixture of formal and informal settlements. '2000' is situated on Extension 7 and 8 of Mayibuye section. The establishment of '2000' came after a government decision to resettle people from some parts of Mshenguville which were declared unfit for human settlement due to the recurrent flooding during heavy rains. Shanty houses were erected when people were resettled in Mayibuye, although the government constructed some formal houses. This relocation, however, did not solve the problem as some residents remained on the land declared unfit for human habitation. Following the relocation from Coronation Park in 2014, a group of about 350 'poor whites' moved into Munsieville and established an informal settlement called Coronation. The residents of Coronation do not have access to regular and reliable public services as was the case with Mshenguville and '2000'.

Munsieville has not been spared from the violent ‘service delivery protests’ which have become a defining feature of the post-apartheid democracy. In her incisive and grounded analysis of Munsieville during the first decade of democracy, Stevenson (2011a) highlights the rising disparities between residents of the famous township. The inauguration of the non-racial democracy saw scores of ‘former devoted socialists’ transform their ‘political identities to one of contextual capitalists ... a contextual capitalist is one who seeks personal accumulation of commodities as a strategy to enact economic and social justice in relation to democracy and capitalism writ large’ (Stevenson, 2011a:219). The contextual capitalists in Munsieville exist side-by-side with a significant number of the ‘perpetual poor and working class people’ (Stevenson, 2011a:220). For the latter group, Stevenson (2011a:220) contends, ‘it became increasingly clear that as they had been during apartheid, they were still positioned as outsiders to economic and social gain’. As the new democratic order unfolded, many waited ‘for the social justice promised to them during the struggle’.

Munsieville residents had already begun expressing frustration and disappointment over the failure of the democratic, ANC-led government capacity to address their economic and social problems within six years of the new democratic dispensation (Stevenson, 2011a). This frustration gave rise to protests which sought to challenge the deleterious effects of the privatisation and commercialisation of basic public services. More ‘service delivery’ protests erupted in Munsieville in 2015 and 2016, and I witnessed some of them when I was collecting empirical evidence for this study. The 2015 protest was organised by thousands of residents from informal settlements (Mshenguville and ‘2000’) who were dissatisfied about lack of electricity connection and alleged corruption in the allocation of government (RDP) houses. The 2016 protest was sparked by a sudden electricity disconnection in the informal settlements. Unlike the previous year, the 2016 protests were violent, and this brought to the fore the deep-seated fissures between the formal and informal Munsieville.

According to census statistics (Statistics South Africa [StatsSA], 2011), Munsieville's population stood at 19 128 (9 673 females and 9 453 males), although the latest statistics from Mogale Local Municipality as at the end of 2016 suggests that the growing township had 33 048 people (Mogale City, 2016). Most of its residents are black Africans (18 920 [98.91 percent]) followed by other racial groups: Coloured (116 [0.61 percent]); Indian/Asian (29 [0.15 percent]); and white (19 [0.10 percent]) (StatsSA, 2011). Presently Munsieville has 6 166 households (StatsSA, 2011) spread across its three municipal wards, namely, wards 24, 25 and 27. In terms of the educational profile, StatsSA (2011) estimates that only 4.3 percent of Munsieville adult residents completed their higher education, with 31.1 percent in possession of senior national certificate/matric (passed grade 12), 41.6 percent who did not complete secondary education, and 5.1 percent who have no formal schooling. The 2011 Census estimated the unemployment rate in Munsieville to be at 24.5 percent, while the Mogale City Local Municipality is at 26.9 percent. In terms of annual earnings, 85 percent of the residents earned less than R38 200 per annum or R3 183 per month, while 17.7 percent did not have income (StatsSA, 2011).

The economic activities around Krugersdorp continues to attract job seekers from other parts of South African and neighbouring countries. Most of the migrants have few social networks and have no proper accommodation on arrival. As a result, most of them are more likely to settle in Mshenguville or '2000' because of the low costs tied to living there – the convenience any job seeker or low-income earner prefers. Perhaps one unique feature in Munsieville is the notable presence of various churches such as the Catholic Church, Anglican Church, Lutheran Church, Apostolic Church, Zion Christian Church, Methodist Church and other various smaller modern and charismatic congregations. Politically, the ANC remains hegemonic in Munsieville and is currently (in 2017) in control of all the three wards, despite it being widely considered a historical stronghold of the PAC.

## **5.4 BEKKERSDAL**

The history of Bekkersdal ‘reflects to a great extent the role and position of the blacks in Westonaria outside the mines’ (Rand Afrikaans University [RAU], 1996:156). Diedericks and Van Eeden (2016:148&149) similarly describe Bekkersdal ‘as a mining township to house migrant Africans who worked in surrounding towns and goldmines’. Bekkersdal was established in 1945 as an informal settlement for black Africans who worked in gold mines and farms around Westonaria and Randfontein. As the biggest and oldest black African township in Westonaria, Bekkersdal was formally proclaimed in 1949 by the local council, although it only assumed this name after 12 years of its existence (Van Eeden & Khaba, 2016). In the early 1950s, about 820 houses, with the municipal provision of water and sanitation services, were built by the apartheid government to boost housing infrastructure in the township (Van Eeden, 2015). By 1960, Bekkersdal was already ‘a well-planned township which made provision for the needs of its residents in a variety of ways’ (RAU, 1996:170).

Despite the 1964 declaration of Westonaria as a Group Area under the then-apartheid Group Areas Act, (this imposed strict restrictions on the expansion black urban townships in favour of white suburbs and areas), the demand for accommodation increased rapidly over time thus leading to the establishment of informal settlements in the early 1980s (Van Eeden, 2015). By 1983, temporary structures in Bekkersdal were estimated to be around 2 900 units (van Eeden, 2015). Although not peculiar to Bekkersdal, the problem of a chronic housing shortage, coupled with ‘an uncontrolled population increase far beyond the existing formal township boundaries’ and the gradual decline in mine operations, generated conditions not only for ‘political instability with traces of anarchical resistance’ (van Eeden, 2015:60) but also ‘created and reinforced the social divisions between residents in different types of accommodation’ (Crankshaw, 1996:56).

Bekkersdal was one of the epicentres of popular resistance against the apartheid regime, albeit fraught with inter-organisational feuds and, sometimes, political violence between rival liberation movements (Van Eeden & Khaba, 2016). The political resistance initially remained tamed and localised, and was led by community associations and other local organisations such as local NGOs and ward committees (Van Eeden & Khaba, 2016). The launch of political parties heralded a new era of confrontational politics that involved boycotts, stay ways and community protests (Van Eeden & Khaba, 2016). These activities were linked to the broader liberation movements which had an organisational presence beyond the boundaries of Bekkersdal. The Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) and, to a certain extent, the PAC, enjoyed a significantly large following in Bekkersdal with some describing the famous township either as AZAPO's or PAC's 'traditional stronghold' (Truth and Reconciliation Commission [TRC], 1998; Van Eeden & Khaba, 2016;).

The launch of an ANC branch in September 1990 increased 'the possibility of inter-organisational clashes between AZAPO and ANC members, especially among youth groups' (Van Eeden & Khaba, 2016:124). The greater part of the early 1990s leading to the first democratic elections in April 1994 witnessed an upsurge in political violence as a result of the rampant inter-organisational rivalries in Bekkersdal. According to the TRC (1998:721), the political violence in Bekkersdal 'was the result of a political battle for control, firstly between AZAPO and the ANC and later between AZAPO and the IFP'. The IFP and AZAPO tried to reconcile 'when it appeared that IFP members could offer AZAPO access to weapons' (TRC, 1998:721). However, more AZAPO supporters would later be murdered allegedly by IFP and ANC supporters (TRC, 1998). In the period between 1991 and 1993, eighty-six (86) people were killed in Bekkersdal (TRC, 1998:721), while close to 9 000 people were displaced from their homes as 'scores of houses were firebombed' between February and March 1994 (IBM, 1994:56).

Since its spatial founding in 1945, Bekkersdal has experienced a rapid internal expansion of informal settlements owing to the growing migrant influx, some coming from regional and neighbouring countries, into Westonaria and Randfontein in search of jobs and other economic opportunities. In the period between 1992 and 1994, informal settlements in Bekkersdal had increased by almost 2 500 units (O'Donovan, 1998). The number of informal settlements units in Bekkersdal was estimated to have risen to 15 500 units in 2016 (West Rand District Municipality, 2016:11). The formal section of the township is currently known as the Uptown Section, and the informal section comprised of a highly-populated cluster of informal settlements comprising of Skierlik, Spook Town, Holomisa, Mandela, Silver City, X-section, Y-section, Ghana and Tambo sections. The informal sections of the township have rapidly expanded over time and consist largely of high-density temporary structures such as shacks made from cardboard and tarpaulins.

Most of the informal settlements in Bekkersdal, particularly those in the western parts of the township, are built on a dolomite rock and 'dewatered underground springs' which pose a serious threat to human life given the high risk of cave-ins and sinkhole formations (Diedericks & Van Eeden, 2016: 160). Rain water can easily cause the dolomite rock underneath to disintegrate leading to the formation of sinkholes big enough to submerge a house. Despite repeated professional warnings, dating back as early as 1985, that pointed to the unsustainability and dangers of having human settlements 'beyond the western boundaries of the formal Bekkersdal' on dolomitic land, the expansion of the informal settlements in the unsafe ground continued unabated (Van Eeden, 2015:61). Since then, multiple attempts have been made by the post-apartheid government to relocate the inhabitants of informal settlements built on the dolomitic land into a safer and habitable ground. However, attempts at relocation are yet to yield any tangible results as people continue to build more temporary settlements on the unsafe ground.



In addition to the life-threatening hazards involved in the building of human settlements on the unsafe land, the population increase has put a strain on local government to provide basic public services to the residents of Bekkersdal. This has, in turn, generated a spate of chaotic and violent ‘service delivery protests’ in the township. In their study, involving 503 respondents, on service delivery and well-being in the informal Bekkersdal, Diedericks and Van Eeden (2016) highlight the growing dissatisfaction and frustrations among residents with what they considered to be lack of delivery of basic public services by the local state. In this regard, the majority of the respondents – 78 per cent – ‘were of the opinion that the lack of public services was affecting them negatively’ (Diedericks & Van Eeden, 2016:147). Although ‘the original protests in Bekkersdal were sparked by a demarcation struggle’ against the failed attempt to relocate the township to North West, the massive wave of violent protests that followed was centred on issues of service delivery which were compounded by unaccountability, corruption and maladministration (Fakir, 2014).

Since the 2005 protest against the planned demarcation, Bekkersdal has seen repeated community protests against poor governance (viz. poor service delivery, unaccountability, maladministration and corruption) at the local municipality (Fakir, 2014). Whereas South Africa has earned itself the name of ‘the protest capital of the world’ (Alexander, 2012), Bekkersdal is similarly referred as ‘a key protest flashpoint’ (Simelane & Nicolson, 2014:1). Others describe it as ‘the protest-affected community’ (Paret, 2017), ‘symbol of everything that went wrong with South Africa’ (Poplak, 2014), ‘the very real meltdown happening before our eyes’ (Naidoo, 2014) and ‘a disaster and dystopia’ (Fakir, 2014). As a firsthand observer, I witnessed some of the major protests that affected this community in 2013, 2014 and 2015 during the period I was collecting empirical evidence for this study. All these protests in the successive years shared common repertoires such as public violence and destruction of public property.

Today Bekkersdal is home to 47 213 people (24 579 men and 22 634 women), with 18 957 households (StatsSA, 2011) spread across seven wards (from Ward 9 to Ward 15) under the Westonaria Local Municipality. It has different types of housing including shacks, backyard rooms and shacks, formal housing and hostels. The racial composition of Bekkersdal is 98 percent (46 351) Black Africans, 0.43 per cent (204) Coloureds, 0.15 per cent (71) Indian/Asian and 0.13 percent (61) White (StatsSA, 2011). As in most urban townships in South Africa, joblessness remains a serious challenge in Bekkersdal. It was estimated at 42 percent using the narrow definition of unemployment and 49 percent with the expanded (StatsSA, 2011, cited in Kritzing, 2017). Other unofficial sources estimate the unemployment rate to be as high as 70 percent (Fakir, 2014). StatsSA (2011, cited in Kritzing, 2017:12) estimated that 60 percent of the households in Bekkersdal earned less than R1600 per month. This clearly presents Bekkersdal as a 'poverty-stricken' community.

While Bekkersdal has historically been considered AZAPO's 'traditional stronghold', in the post-apartheid era, the ANC has gradually gained significant political support as evidenced by its recurrent overwhelming electoral victories in the national and local government elections (in 2014 and 2016), even in the midst of heightened and violent community protests against poor service delivery and rampant corruption by the local state. Van Eeden and Khaba (2016:136) argue that much of the popular analysis on why the majority of Bekkersdal residents continue to vote for the ruling ANC government despite their widespread discontent often ignores 'people's political connections or patronage, voting habits and emotions'. Today Bekkersdal continues to embrace a vibrant, civic, political culture defined by intense political contestations between political parties, although this has a tendency to turn violent, and organic mobilisation by smaller, localised and independent organisations fighting for social justice and accountability while disengaged from the mainstream electoral politics.

## **5.5 THE DECLINE OF GOLD MINING AND ITS IMPACT IN THE WEST RAND**

As indicated earlier, the social and economic history of the West Rand region, including its surrounding towns, suburbs and townships, is deeply rooted in and tied to gold mining. Mining remains the biggest economic activity in the West Rand and continues today to be a source of economic attraction to migrant jobseekers (West Rand District Municipality, 2016a). However, gold mining in South Africa has experienced a steady decline since the 1970s. At the dawn of the democratic order, South Africa was the world's number one gold-producing country, producing 44.5 per cent of the total world output (Harrison & Jack, 2012). However, by 2010, this figure had dropped significantly to a meagre 7 percent thus resulting in South Africa slipping to the fifth biggest gold producer in the world (Harrison & Zack, 2012), after China, Australia, Russia and the USA (Neingo & Tholana, 2016). In February 2012, South Africa's gold mining 'had hit a 50- year low, with the mining sector accounting for less than 5 percent of GDP' (Harrison & Zack, 2012:561).

At the beginning of 2017, South Africa's gold mining output was reported to have sharply 'fallen by 85 percent since 1980 due to internal pressures on the gold industry, increased costs of mining ever-deeper gold reefs, labour demands and the slow-down in the Chinese economy', (Kritzinger, 2017:12). The ongoing decline in gold mining has prompted some analysts in the industry, such as Forest (2017:1), to warn about the 'death of the gold mining industry in South Africa' with De Lange (2017:2) similarly stating that 'SA gold mines are on the brink of death'. The depletion of the gold reserves and economic factors are largely responsible for this seemingly inevitable death (Basson, 2014; Coetzee, 2016). These negative developments have had a knock-on effect on jobs with statistics showing a loss of 179 000 mining jobs between 2001 and 2011, in addition to the 40 percent drop in mining employment in the late 1990s (Harrison & Zack, 2012:561). This downward spiral is set to continue as more gold mines are faced with closure of their operations.

The West Rand was well-endowed with considerable gold-ore reserves, and, for many years, contributed significantly to South Africa's total gold production output. It is therefore important to briefly highlight the particular dynamics in the gold-mining decline in this region, and its consequences for the local economy, the environment and livelihoods of its residents. Mining, and gold mining in particular, 'is still a very important economic sector in the West Rand, both in terms of production and employment' (West Rand District Municipality, 2016a:67). At the end of 2010, it was estimated that the mining sector alone contributed approximately 20 percent of the West Rand's GDP (West Rand District Municipality, 2016a:68). However, mining activities have since steeply declined particularly from the early 2000s (Basson, 2014; West Rand District Municipality, 2016). The region's mining GDP growth declined by 7 percent in the period 2001 and 2015, and by 5 percent in the period 2006 and 2010 (West Rand District Municipality, 2016a). The IHS Global Insight (Gauteng Government, 2015:74) estimates that the contribution of the mining sector into the region's economy declined from R17.9 billion in 2004 to R9.8 billion in 2013.

This decline is unevenly distributed across the four local municipalities of the West Rand region. By the end of 2010, the average mining growth per annum in the four local municipalities of West Rand for the period 2001 to 2010 was as follows: 0 percent in Mogale City Local Municipality; -9 percent in Randfontein Local Municipality; -8 percent in Westonaria Local Municipality and -4 percent in Merafong Local Municipality (West Rand District Municipality, 2016a:70). This has been accompanied by a concomitant decline in mining employment with statistics indicating a steady decline in this regard: -6 percent in Mogale City; -14 percent in Randfontein; -12 percent in Westonaria and -4 percent in Merafong (West Rand District Municipality, 2016a:71). The sharp decline experienced in this period clearly demonstrates that gold mining is on the brink of collapse. Analysts argue that gold mining in South Africa could cease completely as early as 2033 (Solomons, 2016).

There is a strong relationship between the ongoing shutdown of gold mine operations, changes in labour market and livelihood insecurity in the West Rand region. In its Provincial Economic Review and Outlook Report, the Gauteng Provincial Government (2016:38) reflects on the impact of the decline of the mining industry: ‘The most significant change in the labour market of the West Rand is a loss of approximately 4k [4 000] jobs in the mining and quarrying sub-sector as mines near maturity are closed due to the mines becoming too costly to run’. Consequently, the mining sector’s contribution to the formal employment in West Rand dropped from 3 per cent in 2010 to 1.5 percent in 2015 (Gauteng Provincial Government, 2016). While mining remains a mainstay of the West Rand’s economy and the biggest employer in other sub-regions (Merafong 44 074; Randfontein 12 367 and Westonaria 12 130), the decline has been so severe that by the end of 2011 only 1 253 people in Mogale City Local Municipality were employed in the mines, accounting for less than 2 percent of the total formal employment in the city (West Rand District Municipality, 2016a).

The unemployment induced by the ongoing decline in (gold) mining activities has in turn negatively affected the livelihoods most people residing in the West Rand. The Gauteng Provincial Government (2016: 62) further reveals that 16.4 percent of West Rand’s residents live below the food poverty line (i.e. living on R350 per person per month or less) and 36 percent below the upper poverty line, that is, living on R577 per person per month or less. In terms of income inequality, statistics show that the West Rand’s Gini-coefficient decreased from 0.62 in 2003 to 0.61 in 2012 (West Rand District Municipality, 2016:26). By the end of 2014, the region’s Gini-coefficient had remained static at 0.61, the lowest in comparison to other regions in the Gauteng province (Johannesburg 0.66; Ekurhuleni 0.64; Tshwane 0.63; and Sedibeng 0.62) (Gauteng Government, 2016:63). In 2010, the West Rand population had a life expectancy of 54 years, a decrease from 57.4 years in 2001 (Gauteng Provincial Government, 2015).

The 130 years of gold mining in the West Rand has left an intolerable legacy of environmental destruction which poses serious threats to the future of the surrounding communities (Van Eeden et al., 2009). It is widely accepted that the waste from gold mining operations contributes to the pollution of the surrounding land and water resources, and also disrupts biodiversity. This is caused by a process known as ‘acidic mine drainage’ which describes the actual flow of polluted water from old mining areas (Greenpeace, 2011). The polluted water, depending on the location of a mine, is likely to contain ‘high levels of salts, sulphates, iron, aluminium, toxic heavy metals such as cadmium and cobalt, and radioactive elements’ (Greenpeace, 2011:1). This degrades the quality of soil, air and water as the acid mine drainage flows into streams and rivers. In the medium to long-term, the acid mine drainage carries serious environmental, health and food security consequences: ‘poisoning of food crops, endangering human health, and the destruction of wildlife and eco-systems, infrastructure and heritage sites’ (Greenpeace, 2011:1).

Acid mine drainage in the West Rand continues to have a negative effect on the environment and the human well-being in communities. Although this problem reared its head as early as 1996, it was only from 2002 that it received serious attention, both from government and non-governmental organisations, following media reports of the decanting acid mine drainage from the Western Basin in the West Rand (Bobbins, 2015:1). Acid mine water from old shafts of the Rand Uranium in Randfontein/Westonaria had been decanting into the Tweeloopiesspruit river causing ‘significant damage to the aquatic life’, and in other areas the river feeds into such as Krugersdorp Game Reserve and the Cradle of Humankind in Mogale City....the other environment catastrophe is the dust from the mine dumps which degrades air quality. This potentially toxic dust ‘may contain radioactive particles ... which impact on human health’ (West Rand District Municipality, 2013:60).

Although major gold mines have ceased operations, with many other mine closures in the pipeline, gold mining activities in the West Rand continue in two forms, namely: artisanal and small-scale mining, and the illegal mining on the abandoned gold mines by *zama zamas* (illegal miners). Small-scale mining is a legally-recognised economic activity in South Africa, and the government has introduced a series of policies and interventions to support its sustainability. One of the first policy documents in the post-apartheid era, the RDP, recognises small-scale mining ‘as a vehicle for social and economic development of the historically disadvantaged South Africans who had previously been excluded from participating in the mainstream economy’ (Ledwaba, 2017:117). In South Africa, a small-scale mine refers to ‘a mining activity employing less than 50 people and with an annual turnover of less than 7.5 million rand’ (Mutemeri & Petersen, 2002:1). Although small miners are at liberty to mine a variety of minerals, provided that they comply with the relevant legislative framework, they tend to be largely concentrated on gold, diamonds, coal and quarrying (Mutemeri & Petersen, 2002).

In the West Rand, this type of mining is generally focused on gold mining and is usually undertaken by registered, smaller, mining companies which employ ‘improved technology to extract gold from lower grade ore that was not profitable for the bigger mines’ (Basson, 2014:12). Because starting a gold mine from scratch requires massive capital investment, small-scale miners in gold mining prefer to work on old but safe gold mines abandoned by big mining companies to extract the remaining minerals in those mines. However, mining an old gold mine shaft is dictated by a number of considerations such as the ‘availability of deposits, ease of mining, processing and extraction of the commodity; and access to the markets’ (Mutemeri & Petersen, 2002:287). Some of the common hurdles experienced by small-scale miners today include technical and management skills, and limited access to capital and markets (Mutemeri and Petersen, 2002).

The closure of mine operations in South Africa has also been accompanied by a rapid increase in illegal mining (Munakamwe, 2014). Illegal mining is defined as ‘conducting mining activities without a mining right’ (Thelwell, 2014:1). Unlike small-scale mining, illegal mining is not regulated. Out of the 7 500 mines in South Africa, approximately 6 000 of these are abandoned (Carte Blanche Online, 2017). These have become hotspots for illegal mining as they provide easy access to the remaining valuable minerals in the old mine shaft, although there have also been numerous reports of illegal mining activities taking place in active mines. This trend has become so intensive that illegal miners go all out to use explosives to force entry into closed mine shafts. Amidst rising levels of unemployment and poverty, and the ongoing decline in mining employment in South Africa, many desperate people participate in illegal mining activities as a source of income for their livelihood. Research shows that illegal mining ‘is often organised and carried out by organised crime syndicates...there is no doubt that illegal mining activities are directly linked to the lucrative illicit trade in precious metals and diamonds’ (Chamber of Mines, 2016:94).

Illegal mining activities have become common in the West Rand with some of its abandoned mines occupied by illegal miners (Thelwell, 2014), most of them ‘undocumented immigrants from neighbouring countries that have long provided migrant labour for South African mines, who are now being laid off’ (Stoddard, 2017:1). According to Department of Mineral Resources (in Thelwell, 2014:1), the reason why the West Rand has seen an upsurge in illegal gold mining lies in ‘some of the mines being ownerless and derelict and the gold-bearing material outcropping on the surface’. Illegal mining in the West Rand has recently been reported to be taking place in the abandoned mine shafts of Sibanye Gold in Westonaria, defunct Durban Deep west of Roodepoort, abandoned gold mines in Krugersdorp, old mine shafts around the community of Toekomsrus in Randfontein and old gold mine shafts in the mining village of Blyvooruitzicht in Carletonville.



With gold mining in South Africa nearing its sunset, the West Rand has been making efforts to reduce its heavy economic dependence on mining. In 2010, the mining industry was the biggest economic activity accounting for 18.3 percent of the region's GDP per sector (West Rand District Municipality, 2016a). This was closely followed by other sectors: 15.2 percent for manufacturing; 16 percent for government services; 12 per cent for wholesale and trade; 8 percent for transport; 5.2 percent for community services; 4.1 percent for construction; 1.7 percent for electricity and water, and 0.7 for agriculture. This reflects a shift towards economic diversification (West Rand District Municipality, 2016a:38). The recent economic structure of the West Rand is as follows: 25.1 percent for mining and quarrying; 15.5 per cent for manufacturing; 10.7 percent for construction; 12.9 percent for finance and business services; 23.5 percent for government services; 5.9 percent for transport 3.1 percent for construction and 1.6 percent for agriculture (Gauteng Government, 2015:73).

The mining industry in Westonaria Local Municipality (where Bekkersdal is located) contributed a staggering 60.3 percent to the GDP of the local municipality followed by other sectors: 10.4 percent for government services; 7 percent for manufacturing; 6.1 percent for wholesale and trade; 2.6 percent for construction; and 0.2 percent for agriculture (West Rand District Municipality, 2016a:38). Mogale City Local Municipality (where Munsieville is situated) is different from the other three sub-regions of the West Rand with mining only contributing 2.3 percent to the local municipality's GDP, with other sectors' contributions structured as follows: 20.1 percent for manufacturing; 14.8 percent for wholesale and trade; 21.7 percent for business services; 18.6 for government services; 9.8 percent for transport; 5.3 percent for construction and 0.7 percent for agriculture. The tourism sector is a promising industry as the region is 'renowned for its rich archaeological and anthropological sites' (West Rand Municipality, 2017). Agriculture, agro-processing and renewable industries have been earmarked for development in this region (Gauteng Government, 2016a).

## 5.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has attempted to provide a brief historical and socio-economic economic overview of the two communities selected for this study, Munsieville and Bekkersdal, and the region in which they are situated (the West Rand). The economic and political history of the two black African townships is highlighted. This brief historical overview shows how the two townships share many characteristics despite the obvious differences. Firstly, the chapter has demonstrated that the location of Bekkersdal and Munsieville was largely influenced by goldmining which began in the region in 1887. Munsieville is a historical product of gold mining activities in and around the town of Krugersdorp. Similarly, the location of Bekkersdal is tied to gold mining activities around the mining towns of Randfontein and Westonaria. Both communities emerged as residential areas to provide accommodation for cheap black labour.

The chapter has also shown that both communities share a common history as epicentres of popular black resistance against the apartheid. In addition, both communities have experienced inter-organisational violence between warring anti-apartheid movements, particularly on the eve of the 1994 democratic breakthrough. Historically considered strongholds of Pan Africanism, with AZAPO enjoying organisational presence in Bekkersdal and the PAC in Munsieville, currently both communities have shifted their allegiance to the ruling ANC government. The chapter has shown that the steady decline in gold mining activities in the West Rand has had deleterious effects in Munsieville and Bekkersdal, particularly on formal wage employment, the environment and livelihoods. The chapter has shown that the decline in mining activities has resulted in a rise in joblessness and livelihood insecurity. With this brief historical and socio-economic overview, it is evident that both communities share important common characteristics.

## CHAPTER 6

### BEYOND PROTECTING LIVELIHOODS

#### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

Drawing from the triangulation of data sources, the following chapters (Chapter 6 and 7) shows the CWP's potential in protecting and promoting livelihoods of the excluded. This chapter shows that the CWP was effective in alleviating poverty and hunger – protecting livelihoods – in Munsieville and Bekkersdal, not only for the participants but also for vulnerable community members through its focus on food security. The CWP's strength in providing food security has taken two dominant forms. First, the monthly cash transfers received as wages enabled CWP participants to meet basic livelihood needs in their households. Second, food security was also derived directly from some of the work done by the CWP. The homestead and communal gardens initiated and maintained by the CWP were crucial in meeting the food and nutritional security needs of vulnerable people such as the elderly, vulnerable children, child-headed households and the frail.

Moreover, this chapter shows that, beyond protecting the livelihoods of the excluded, the CWP had a variety of important social multipliers which promise social transformation from below. The innovation in the design and implementation of the CWP, as discussed in Chapter 4, has culminated in important social multipliers. Leading scholars and think tanks on the concept of the ELR tend to emphasis poverty alleviation and the price stability as the two main benefits of ELR programmes (Beazley & Vaidya, 2015; Lieuw-Kie-Song & Philip, 2010). The case of the CWP in Munsieville and Bekkersdal demonstrates the potential of the ELR as an instrument for promoting the ethic of community care through its home-based care programme. Home-based care in both communities benefited the elderly, frail, orphans and households affected by HIV/AIDS and TB.

The CWP also promoted the ethic of care for the environment and natural resources. Its key environmental activities in both communities included taking care of community social assets such as schools, streets, clinics, graveyards, the water storm drainage system and the use of environmentally-friendly gardening methods in the CWP's food gardens. This chapter also discusses the CWP's potential in the building of safe and cohesive communities. Whereas the CWP activities were similar in both communities, it was in Munsieville where the CWP undertook even more innovative work activities such as the school holiday programme; the establishment of the Men's and Women's Forums to address gender issues in the community; health campaigns focused on HIV/AIDS, TB and lifestyle-related diseases; initiatives to address the scourge of child and women abuse; and the celebration of national commemorative days. Most of these innovative social activities were conspicuously absent in Bekkersdal. In Chapter 8, this dissertation argues that the operationalisation of the OW methodology in Munsieville helps us to understand this variance.

## **6.2 PROTECTING LIVELIHOODS OF THE PARTICIPANTS**

The CWP is another case in the global South that shows that a properly-designed ELR programme could provide some components of the 'social protection floor' as conceptualised by the ILO. Like most innovative ELR programmes elsewhere in the global South, the CWP is innovatively designed to guarantee regular and predictable income for the participants. This income enables participants to provide for their own basic livelihood needs. As shown in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, a growing number of would-be workers in the South are excluded from formal wage labour. In the absence of meaningful social protection systems for the 'wageless', the CWP income has emerged as an important source of livelihood security. As will be shown in this chapter, most participants in these communities could not be absorbed into formal wage labour.

The CWP took the participants as they were without discriminating against them for their lack of formal education and training or ‘work experience’. This is exactly what defines the idea of the ELR in that people are provided with work opportunities only on the condition of their willingness and ability to work. The level of formal education among the CWP participants in both communities was very low. For example, 79 percent of participants in Bekkersdal and 66 percent of participants in Munsieville did not have a national senior certificate (matric/grade 12). This category comprised of those who either did not reach grade 12 or failed/dropped out of school before grade 12. Only 19 percent of participants in Bekkersdal and 20 percent in Munsieville had the national senior certificate. One percent of the participants in both communities had tertiary education, and the rest [1 percent in Bekkersdal and 13 percent in Munsieville] never received any formal education. It is quite evident that the CWP in these communities attracted people with limited formal education, with slim prospects of gaining entry into stable salaried jobs.

Without the CWP, most of these participants would probably reach their retirement age without any experience with formal wage labour. Notwithstanding the fact that unemployment in South Africa remains largely a structural phenomenon, the fact that 64 percent of participants in Bekkersdal and 54 percent in Munsieville indicated that they did not have experience with wage labour may partly be attributed to their limited formal education and training/skills as most jobs, including the precarious jobs, required a certain level of literacy and numerical capability. The CWP participants with past experience with wage labour – 31 percent in Bekkersdal and 46 percent in Munsieville – worked mainly as domestic workers, gardeners and other jobs in the surrounding mining and construction industries. Most of these jobs remained largely precarious and did not provide reliable income. Some continued to take up these types of precarious jobs while maintaining their participation in the CWP.

Whereas participants held different views on how the CWP income improved their lives, many praised it for ‘putting food on the table’. The income received was normally spent on basic subsistence commodities such as cooking oil, sugar, tea, beans, maize meal, flour and vegetables. It was common for participants to buy ‘grocery hampers’ from the local grocery supermarkets. The ‘grocery hamper’ was a very popular buy among CWP participants in both communities as it was generally considered a cheap way of buying all essential food commodities at once in a single package. Securing a ‘grocery hamper’ provided some assurance for most households that their very basic household needs would be covered until the next CWP payment. Almost all local stores and some supermarkets in Westonaria and Randfontein (Bekkersdal) and Krugersdorp (Munsieville) sold different packages of the ‘grocery hamper’. The grocery hamper package options cost between R200 to R350 and with the cheapest normally containing 10kg flour, 12.5kg of maize meal, 5 liters cooking oil, tea and 10kg of sugar. These packages constituted minimum consumption needs and excluded other important household requirements such as toiletries and clothing.

Most participants spent a significant proportion of their CWP income on basic food needs. The participants’ monthly food expenditure pattern in Munsieville was as follows: 4 percent spent R201-R300; 15 percent spent R301-R400; 33 percent spent R401-R501 and 47 percent spent over R501 on food. The monthly food expenditure in Munsieville followed a similar pattern: 4 percent spent less than R100, 11 percent spent R201-R300; 14 percent spent R301-R400; 21 percent spend R400-R501 and 47 percent over R501 on food. Once the staple food was bought, it was common for some of the CWP income to be used to pay for electricity, burial society subscriptions and finance debts in furniture and clothing shops. However, it should be noted that these figures do not exactly give a perfect picture of the total amount of the CWP income spent on food because it was inclusive of other sources of income, and the ‘pooling of resources’ among household members.

Whereas the CWP income was crucial in providing food security for many participants, its effectiveness in this regard was maximised when supplemented by other state interventions such as social grants and other sources of income or livelihood strategies. The fixed wage for each CWP participant was R480 in 2011 and R536 in 2013 (R688 in 2017) for the eight full days worked in a month. The coordinators worked for five days per week and were paid R1 425 in 2011 (R2 260 in 2017) in wages per month. The daily wage rate for the coordinators remained at R95 per day from 2011 and was only increased to R100 per day in 2014. The monthly income of R536 in 2013 could barely fulfil the basic subsistence needs of low-income households that relied on CWP income as the main source of income. While most participants emphasised the important role of CWP income in their households, not all of them worked the full eight days per month implying that not all participants received the CWP income in full. In Munsieville, 54 percent of the participants pointed out that they worked regularly for two days a week on the CWP. This was in stark contrast to Munsieville where 90 percent of the participants worked regularly for two days a week.

Nevertheless, the income received was still regarded as essential for guaranteeing food security for most participants. One of the participants in Bekkersdal explained how the CWP income helped in strengthening the livelihood base for her household:

‘With the little income I get from the CWP I can buy basic food items such as maize meal, beans and cooking oil. A half loaf of bread is better than nothing at all. This work is important for us because it helps put food on the table. As Africans, we were taught to share from an early age. No matter how big the family is, we share whatever we have. I don’t want to lie to you. The CWP has helped a lot of families to cope under difficult circumstances. It is not easy, people are not finding easy to survive in this area. It’s getting worse every day’ (Interview 10, 8 June 2011, Bekkersdal).

Another participant in Munsieville explained how the CWP income helped in fulfilling his household's basic food and nutritional needs:

'Other people think we are working for peanuts. We do not deny that we are working for peanuts. I am happy that these peanuts have made a huge difference in my house, especially for me as I am expected to provide for my family. Peanuts are better than not having anything at all. A house without maize meal and soap is not a home. With the little I get I have managed to get these basic items...this is what makes my home a home. Of course, the main problem is that Seriti [CWP] is not paying us well, but it would be ungrateful to ignore the positive aspects of this work in our lives' (Interview 16, 5 October 2011, Munsieville).

It was common for the CWP income to be shared with other household members. This was a common practice particularly among older participants who had larger households and dependents who relied on them for livelihood support. Most participants in these communities were breadwinners who had to provide for their households by combining various sources of income, including the CWP income. It appeared that individuals from large and low-income households were more likely to participate in the CWP than those from relatively well-off households. The average total number of household members staying with each CWP participant stood at five in both communities although in real terms this number varied between 1 to 14 household members per household.

In Bekkersdal, 90 percent of the participants had dependents they supported financially while this applied to 93 percent of the participants in Munsieville. On average, each participant in Bekkersdal had four (4) dependents compared to three (3) in Munsieville. In real terms, however, some participants had as many as nine (9) dependents. The dependency ratio was high and obviously put a strain on the few wage earners to provide for other household members. The high number of dependents in poor households was one of the



factors that motivated participation in the CWP. This was explained by one of the CWP participants in Bekkersdal:

‘I have done small piece jobs before to assist at home. We have many people living in this house. We are eight and only two people are employed. My mother receives old-age grant and my brother works as a merchandiser at Shoprite in town. Their combined income alone could not sustain us for a long period of time. That is why I applied for work here [CWP] because the little money we get [from the CWP] can make a difference when we add it together with my brother’s and mother’s income. I can buy some stuff and other people who work can pay for other costs in the house’ (Interview 3, 14 July 2011, Bekkersdal).

The strength of the CWP and other innovative ELR programmes in the global South lies in their ability to guarantee regular and predictable income for the excluded. The predictability of the income enables the participants to take financial and livelihood decisions with much greater certainty. A participant in Munsieville explained how the regular income from the CWP improved her life:

‘I know that at the end of every month I will receive an SMS on my cell phone notifying that my money from the school board (CWP) is in [my bank account]. I know that at the end of every month I will buy the food hamper and some clothes for my children. This is better than not knowing where the next plate of food will come from ... I also have a lay-by account with a furniture store in Krugersdorp because I get paid like other workers. For me, any ‘clever’ person can plan big things when they are working here at school board [CWP] because the work is permanent as long as you report to work’ (Interviewee, 15, 28 September 2011, Munsieville).

Some participants with other sources of income took calculated risks on their monthly expenditure. A participant in Bekkersdal explained how the predictability of the CWP income allowed her to buy essential groceries in bulk every month:

‘It doesn’t help to buy everything I need at the end of every month. I used my money [CWP income] two months ago to buy 50kg of maize meal and I used the previous month’s income to buy cooking oil and soap in large quantities. With 50kg of maize meal I know my household is sorted for the next coming five months. I am lucky that I am not the only one working at home...maybe that is why I can afford to do this kind of planning’ (Interview 7, 8 June 2011, Bekkersdal).

However, most participants did not have any other option but to use their income to buy all their basic needs at once. In Bekkersdal, 25 per cent of the participants indicated that they did not have other sources of income besides the CWP while in Munsieville 30 percent were in the same category. Those with additional sources of income – 75 percent in Bekkersdal and 70 percent in Munsieville – relied on various sources ranging from social grants, piece jobs such as domestic gardening and domestic work; and seasonal jobs in retail stores in the nearby shopping malls. In a typical month, most participants earned less than R500 [12 percent in Bekkersdal and 22 percent in Munsieville]; some earned between R501 – R1 000 [5 percent in Bekkersdal and 29 percent in Munsieville]; and some earned between R1 001- R2 000 [5 percent in Bekkersdal and 16 percent in Munsieville] from these additional sources of income.

The renting of rooms and backyard shacks in Bekkersdal and Munsieville also emerged as an important source of additional income for some households, particularly for the house owners in the formal sections of both townships. This type of accommodation was required by migrant workers from other parts of South Africa and regional countries who needed temporary shelter while looking for jobs or working in the surrounding industries. The intra-household conflicts in both communities have seen scores of young adults vacate their parents’ homes to seek independent lives. Other young adults vacated their homes as a way of avoiding family feuds, usually over the limited space and resources, while others

symbolically considered this movement a transition into adulthood. Unable to afford the hefty financial costs involved in relocating from the townships to seek residence elsewhere, most of these young adults had no choice but to rent rooms or backyard shacks in other households in these townships. This dynamic has also increased the demand for the rental of backyard rooms and shacks.

Surprisingly, few participants' households in Bekkersdal received remittances from household members who left to work elsewhere. Only 6 percent of the participants in Bekkersdal indicated that a household member/s had left to work elsewhere and only 3 percent sent money back to the household. In Munsieville, 37 percent of the participants indicated that one of their household members had left to take up wage labour elsewhere. Out of this 37 percent, only 26 percent of these household members sent money back home. In Bekkersdal, 28 percent of participants, as compared to 33 percent in Munsieville, indicated that members of their households pooled their income to respond to their livelihood needs. Some families had more than two participants in the CWP, and when the income was combined, it had a much greater impact in terms of livelihood security. When combined with other incomes, the CWP income was crucial in protecting the livelihood of many poor households in both communities.

Social grants emerged as a common supplementary income for CWP participants. In Bekkersdal, 53 percent [1 percent foster care grant and 52 percent child support grant on behalf of their children] of the participants received social grants as compared to 47 percent [13 percent old-age and 33 percent child support grant] in Munsieville. The combination of the social grants and CWP income ensured the food security of most households. However, some participants did not have access to additional sources of income. The CWP income for these participants was often overstretched such that households were unable to meet all their basic food and nutritional needs throughout the month. Some reported that their households

were food-secure for one or two weeks after receipt of the CWP income but suffered hunger for the next three or two weeks until their next pay. This further underscores Phillip's (2013) argument that CWP income alone can only make a difference to a limited degree and works much better when combined with other sources of income or livelihood strategies.

The case of *Mme* Khumalo in Munsieville (Mshenguville Section) is a typical example to illustrate this argument. *Mme* Khumalo is originally from Mafikeng in the North West province and relocated to Munsieville with her mother in the mid-1970s. *Mme* Khumalo, who was in her early 50s in 2013, is a single mother to two children who were ineligible for child support grant because they were over the age of 18. She sometimes received money from her brother who worked in a factory in Johannesburg – although this income was very erratic thus making planning around it impossible. There were months in the past where *Mme* Khumalo's brother failed to send the money as expected. She sometimes worked as a domestic worker on weekends in the nearby suburbs, but the income fluctuated from one weekend to the other, because some weekends she was not called to work. This left her with the CWP income as the only dependable source of income. She had started a small vegetable garden to cope with this precarious situation. She tried to operate a spaza shop but this failed due to poor credit control.

*Mme* Khumalo narrated her experience:

'I'm thankful for this work at the school board [CWP]. This work has assisted many poor households to cope with poverty. I am one of those who have benefited from the work at school board [CWP]. The problem is that the money is not enough. I can't feed my children and relatives with this money. I can only afford to feed myself and everyone at home for two weeks...after that everything is finished and I am back to "square 1". Everything I buy runs out before month end. You can imagine how the situation will be for me and my family without this work. All I am requesting is that they increase the money they pay us, even if it

means that we work for 5 days in a week...we are ready for that because we need the money and this work has brought changes in our lives and our community' (Interview 21, 14 October, Munsieville).

Many CWP participants narrated similar stories on how the CWP income alone was insufficient to cover all their essential household needs. Low-income households were hit hard by food price inflation because they 'are not able to absorb the increases by spending more money from the household purse...households are forced to underspend even further on food, or get trapped even deeper in debt' (PACSA, 2015:1). With the rising food price inflation, poor households struggled to make ends meet on low incomes. A common strategy used by some participants to maximise the utility of the CWP income was to spend their income on activities that saved them money. In Munsieville, 62 percent of the participants indicated that they spent some of their CWP income on activities that saved them money. However, only 16 percent of the participants in Bekkersdal used some of their income for this purpose. Some participants purchased ingredients for baking dumplings and *magwinya* as a bread replacement, seedlings and chicken manure for their backyard food gardens.

### **6.3 FOOD SECURITY FOR THE VULNERABLE**

In addition to protecting the livelihoods of the participants, the CWP food gardens also improved food security for vulnerable groups. Food insecurity in South Africa has become a serious challenge. Oxfam (2014:32) shows that 'Food insecurity and hunger destroy human potential, strip away human dignity and foster inequality throughout society'. The South African Food Sovereignty Campaign (SAFSC) (2015) estimates that 14 million people in South Africa suffer from hunger, with 46 percent of the population food. Food insecurity generally refers to the inability of people to acquire sufficient food to fulfil their daily dietary and nutritional needs (Oxfam, 2014). Oxfam (2014:1) further reveals that one in four people

in South Africa ‘suffers hunger on a regular basis and more than half the population live in such precarious circumstances that they are at risk of going hungry’. Joynt (2010) argues that the rising cost of energy and food price inflation has exacerbated the crisis of food insecurity. The effect of food price inflation is more acute particularly for the poor residing in urban settings without sufficient land for subsistence farming (Jooste, 2011; Oxfam, 2014; Van der Merwe, 2011).

According to Van der Merwe (2011:2), one of the challenges in most urban settings in South Africa is that ‘urban residents have to purchase most of the food they consume as opposed to rural areas where people can produce their own food’. Oxfam (2014:21) estimates that ‘[o]nly 1.7 percent of [South African] households grow their own produce as their main source of food, however, 17 percent of all households cultivate some crops to supplement their own food purchases, and in tribal and rural areas this figure increases nearly to 42 percent’. The report attributes this disparity to the availability of land and easy access to water in rural areas as compared to urban areas. However, Oxfam (2014) also shows that subsistence farming in rural areas has gradually declined with rural households increasingly relying on food purchases for their livelihoods.

Food security in urban settings like Bekkersdal and Munsieville is largely dependent on money, and without stable sources of income, many are at risk of hunger. The CWP fostered a culture of food gardening despite the challenge of inadequate land in both communities. The little available land in peoples’ homes and some communal spaces were used to plant vegetables for the benefit of the vulnerable individuals. Whereas the focus on vulnerable groups is commendable, many food insecure and jobless individuals did not benefit directly from the CWP food gardens. Unlike in Munsieville, the food-insecure adults of working-age in Bekkersdal could collect daily nutritious lunches from the Bekkersdal

Community Nutrition Centre. This Centre was officially launched in July 2012 (but became operational in June 2013) and was supported and managed by the DSD.

Food gardening was a central work activity for the CWP in Bekkersdal and Munsieville. The CWP's food gardens can be divided into two categories, namely: homestead and communal. The homestead food gardens were located in the home backyards of beneficiaries and communal gardens in public spaces such as schools, old-age homes, ECDs, clinics and local municipal amenities. As part of their work, the CWP participants maintained the vegetable gardens which produced cabbage, beetroot, spinach, tomatoes, onions, carrot and beans. The harvest was given to vulnerable individuals at risk of hunger such as school-going and malnourished children, the elderly, the sick, disabled, orphans and child-headed households. CWP participants prepared the soil for planting and maintained the gardens regularly until harvest. Tap water in the house backyards was used to water the vegetable gardens. The harvest was for the sole use of the household in which a food garden was located. A variety of vegetables were planted depending on the size of the land. The CWP gardens in the primary schools were used to supplement the government school-feeding schemes. The vegetables from the CWP gardens in high schools, clinics and other public spaces were given to vulnerable households in the community.

The CWP communal gardens in Bekkersdal were located at Simunye and Kuthamang Secondary schools, West and East clinics, Maputle Primary School, Satile Primary School, Ipeleng Primary School, Boitumelo Day Care Centre, Tsholofelo Community Crèche, some unoccupied RDP houses and Bekkersdal Old-Age Centre. In Munsieville, the biggest CWP communal garden, of approximately 400m<sup>2</sup>, is situated at Thuto Lefa Secondary School and the second biggest in the yard of the Municipal Constituency Office, which also served as the local CWP office. Other CWP communal gardens in Munsieville are located at Diphlane, Munsieville and Phatudi primary schools. Similar to the homestead gardens, the CWP

participants prepared the soil, cultivated, maintained the gardens and harvested vegetables. The seed and gardening equipment in both communities were provided by the CWP through the implementing agents. Participants were not allowed to take the harvested vegetables for their own consumption.

A CWP coordinator in Munsieville explained how the CWP helped to alleviate hunger for vulnerable individuals who were the main beneficiaries of the CWP food gardens:

‘I don’t know what would have become of Munsieville if we were not blessed with this work at the school board [CWP]. Those who are unable to provide for themselves can now rely on us to provide fresh vegetables from their yards. We have a lot of homestead food gardens to support those in need. You can imagine how hunger affects people who cannot do anything for themselves ... I am speaking of people living with disabilities, orphans and the bedridden. Yes, some of them are on social grants but grant money alone is not sufficient because they must also pay for their medical bills. They can use the money to buy things we don’t provide such as *pap*, salt, cooking oil ... and stuff like that. We provide *sishebo* for them to eat the *pap* with’ (Interview 11, 28 September 2011, Munsieville).

Some beneficiaries of the CWP food gardens indicated that the vegetables helped them to strengthen their livelihoods because some were already recipients of the social grants. An old woman in Munsieville explained how the CWP assisted her:

‘I am old now. I can’t do anything for myself. I am just waiting for the call from God to rest. My social grant has many responsibilities in this house. I have to use it to assist my children who are old and unemployed. I also need to go for regular check-ups at the hospital and transport is expensive. I must also buy medication. I was so happy when these people of the school board and Pinkie [site manager] told me that they would assist me in setting up a garden. All I need now is to ensure that I have enough maize meal because *sishebo* is already in the garden. Every time I go for a check-up [at the hospital], they always tell me to eat



vegetables. As you can see, I no longer have the strength and my children do not want to assist me. This food garden ensures that I consume spinach, beetroot and onions which I could otherwise not afford' (Interview 18, 9 November 2011, Munsieville).

In both communities, the vegetables from CWP food gardens also benefited people suffering from HIV/AIDS related illnesses. Coordinators and participants pointed out that very few people were prepared to talk openly about their HIV status. People living with HIV/AIDS without sufficient nutritious food are at risk of a lower CD4 cell count, which may lead to death (Anema, Vogenthaler, Frongillo, Kadiya & Weiser, 2009). Whereas most participants were ready to talk in general terms about HIV/AIDS in both communities, they strictly kept formal ethical boundaries by affirming confidentiality of beneficiaries living with HIV/AIDS. A CWP participant who worked on homestead and communal gardens in Bekkersdal explained how the vegetables helped some HIV/AIDS infected individuals:

'People are dying like flies in Bekkersdal because of Aids. Others just say someone died of TB or this or that disease..... The vegetables we give them help in keeping their bodies healthy because they provide the vitamins required for their immune system. Doctors say they must eat vegetables and fruits but poor people can't afford these things. They must also take their [ARV] pills as directed by the nurse at clinic. When you have this virus, you must take care of yourself to live longer. If you eat anything you will die ...its does not matter if you have the pills. The pills can only work when combined with healthy food' (Interview 12, 12 July 2011, Bekkersdal).

A male participant in Munsieville explained how the food gardens supplemented the food in households where a frail person was a breadwinner:

'Homestead food gardens take care of the whole household and not only the sick person. It is un-African to say you will start a food garden or deliver the vegetables only for the sick person while you know that other household members are also hungry. So we end up giving

vegetables to feed the whole household. It is incorrect to give food to one person when other people in the same house are also hungry' (Interview 8, 4 September 2011, Munsieville).

Some CWP gardens are situated at primary schools and ECD centres. Some of the harvested vegetables in these gardens comprised of spinach, pumpkin, cabbage, onions and beetroot. The vegetables were included as part of the meals provided in the schools. In the case of primary schools, these vegetables supplemented the food supplies from the government National School Nutrition Programme. The CWP participants also assisted with the preparation of the food for the children in the ECDs and primary schools.

This was an important intervention because these vegetables provided variety in the food served in the primary school and ECD's centres. The government's National School Nutrition Programme usually supplied basic processed food such as mealie meal, soup and canned food (usually tinned fish and beans). The combination of these foods and the fresh organic vegetables supplied by CWP gardens provided nutritious and balanced meals for the children in ECD centres and primary schools in the communities. Other researchers have pointed out that child malnutrition (stunting) is on the rise in South Africa (Motala & Jacobs, 2013). Stunting can lead to 'poor cognitive development, weak educational performance, increased risk of morbidity and impaired immune functions' in children which carries long-term consequences (Motala & Jacobs, 2013:5). The nutritious vegetables provided by the CWP were vital in not only minimising stunting among children but also improving their academic performance at school.

A coordinator in Bekkersdal explained the role of CWP in alleviating hunger among the school children thereby improving their concentration at school:

'Bad food is not good for children. People think that any food is OK as long as their stomachs are full. The problem is that most children in Bekkersdal are fed bad food at home because of

poverty. It is only at school where they have access to good food that supports their healthy growth. I am very happy that the vegetables we provide and cook for these children give them an opportunity to enjoy healthy food – even if it is once in a day. Unfortunately, when school are closed, these children are forced to continue eating bad and fattening foods at home ... we cannot blame them because we know the dire situation for most households in Bekkersdal. It is sad for these children because when they are out of school, it means they are subjected to unhealthy food’ (Interview 14, 21 July 2011, Bekkersdal).

#### **6.4 THEY GIVE US TENDER CARE LOVE**

It is a chilly morning in Munsieville. Clad in their colourful orange uniforms, with others carrying *magwinya* in transparent plastics, participants emerge from different sections of Munsieville and then move in unison along the busy Mogatle Street leading to the local CWP office. The participants are on their way to sign the attendance register before being paired into different groups to perform different work assignments. After signing the register, a group of six participants tasked with the ‘Door-to-Door campaign’ or household visits is dispatched and led by a young, energetic coordinator. The mood is jovial. One of the group members is heard proudly speaking about an old man they previously assisted with the re-issue of his lost identity document. The old man is now receiving assistance from the CWP to apply for an old-age social grant which he was previously denied due to a lack of the document. Other group members joined in the conversation which slowly dissipated as each participant visited the houses in the famous ‘Door-to-Door’ campaign.

The ‘Door-to Door campaign’ is an essential component of the CWP’s work in Munsieville and Bekkersdal. The campaign involves house visits to identify households and individuals in need of assistance. Once vulnerable individuals or households are identified, they would receive further assistance such as homestead food gardens or home-based care. The campaign is conducted at least once in three months in both communities. Those in need

of care or assistance normally comprise the sick and bedridden, orphans and vulnerable children, people living with disabilities, the elderly and destitute individuals. It is through the 'Door-to-Door' campaign that some community members have been assisted to acquire identity books and access to government social-assistance programmes. The home-based care programme provides auxiliary assistance to the frail and the bedridden by bathing them, cleaning their houses and clothes, cooking for them and helping them to keep track of their clinic/hospital cards for a check-up and monitoring intake of prescribed medications.

The role of the CWP in facilitating the ethic of care in both communities should be understood within the broader context of 'serious deficits of care at the local level' (Phillip, 2013:18). Fakier (2014:137) argues that 'In prioritizing social grants over direct care services which institutions such as old-age homes, state crèches and facilities for mentally and physically disabled could provide, care for the needy remains predominantly a private household concern'. The provision of social grants alone is not sufficient to address the care deficit. Whereas there has been an expansion in the provision of social grants 'social welfare in South Africa remains biased towards privatized care' (Fakier, 2014:137). This leads to 'care deficit' as most vulnerable people depend on their households for their care needs. Without adequate social services in the face of the dysfunctional public health system in South Africa, it is often the elderly women (*gogos*) and school-going children who have to provide care for the sick and vulnerable (Fakier, 2009). The HIV/AIDS epidemic has further widened the need for care due to the rise in HIV/AIDS orphaned children (Fakier, 2009). Orphaned children not residing with an older family member have no choice but to fend for themselves. These children are more likely to take greater responsibilities like generating income which exposes them to exploitation and missing out on education.

A child-headed household is defined as one which is 'led by children below the age of 18 because of the permanent absence of parents or any adult guardian' (Mamotsheane,

2010:17). Child-headed households were among the serious social challenges in Bekkersdal and Munsieville which the CWP attempted to address. In some households in both communities, children had taken over the responsibility as primary providers because of the permanent incapacity of a parent due to ill-health. The site manager in Munsieville, *Ausie Pinkie*, was seriously concerned about the increase in child-headed households in the community. She pointed out that this was a recent phenomenon which could be linked to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and abandonment by parents.

The case of a child-headed household in Bekkersdal demonstrates CWP's potential in facilitating care for the destitute and vulnerable children. The Ndamase household is located in the Holomisa informal settlement in Bekkersdal and has three children, aged 5 and 8 (boy and girl) and the older one 12 (girl). Both their deceased parents hailed from the Eastern Cape Province and settled in Bekkersdal in the early 1990s. These children considered Bekkersdal as their original home because they were born and raised in this community. They seldom visited their extended families in Tsomo in the Eastern Cape. Their mother died in June 2010 after a long illness. Without any person to take care of them, the 12 year-old daughter had already assumed parental responsibilities a few months before the passing away of their mother. None of the relatives, some of them as far as the Eastern Cape, were able to provide any meaningful support as they too struggled to make ends meet. In the absence of any support from the extended family, the children had to rely primarily on the foster care-giver grant with a community member volunteering to be their custodian. The coordinator explained the support provided by CWP to the Ndamase child-headed household:

‘The situation was really bad for these kids. They were destitute. When their mother was very sick, we assisted in washing and dressing her, cleaning the house and gave them vegetables from our gardens. We also requested the social workers to help the children with applications for the [foster care] grant. The process took some time to be finalized, but they finally got it

shortly after their mother passed on. Before our intervention, the older child was always stressed. She had to provide for her mother when she was sick and take care of her siblings. She nearly dropped out of school until we came in to help. We clean the house and wash their clothes ... sometimes we would cook when food is available. Now she can focus on her school work and play just like other children' (Interview 4, 22 June 2011).

The CWP participants and community members in Bekkersdal narrated similar stories on how the CWP was able to provide assistance to orphaned and child-headed households. They expressed gratitude for the CWP's ability to 'help children to be children' by reducing the burdens of household chores. A participant in Munsieville pointed out that CWP's assistance to the child-headed households worked best when the children were recipients of the child support or foster care grant or enjoyed some consistent familial assistance (Interview 16, 5 October 2011). Whereas the CWP assisted with basic house chores – such as cleaning, taking care of siblings, cooking – it could not provide for other needs such as clothes, toiletries and food (Interview 16, 5 October 2011). The vegetables from the CWP food gardens needed to be consumed together with a variety of other foods which the CWP did not provide. A participant in Munsieville expounded on this challenge:

'All I am saying is that Seriti [CWP] is unable to provide for everything. For us to cook or wash clothes, there must be food and clothes. We can cook these vegetables for *sishobo* but we also need *pap* to cook so that when children come from school, the food is ready. Children with government support grant are much happier than those who do not have it. Having some income gives them a peace of mind, and this also helps them to concentrate at school' (Interview 16, 5 October 2011).

Another area of the care deficit in both communities was the lack of or inadequate social services for the frail and elderly. Research shows that the abuse of the elderly is a growing concern in most communities in South Africa (Keikelame & Ferreira, 2000). The literature on

abuse of the elderly identifies four general types of abuse, namely: physical; verbal/emotional; material/financial; sexual and neglect (Keikelame & Ferreira, 2000).

Neglect of the elderly is normally defined by the abandonment of their care needs such as hygiene, cleaning of their clothes and linen, food and nutrition. This type is generally invisible as most neglected and abused elderly 'suffer in silence through fear of being victimized, isolated and abandoned' (Keikelame & Ferreira, 2000:7).

Neglect of the elderly was also reported as one of the major social problems in Munsieville and Bekkersdal. The high dependence by the sick elderly on the local old-age homes and the CWP was a clear sign that the households could no longer provide for their care needs. The late *Mme Motaung*, a respected community elder in Munsieville, expressed deep frustration about the neglect of the elderly in her community:

'Old people know our past and possess enormous wisdom. But what we see here in Krugersdorp is heartbreaking. The elderly are ill-treated and people cannot wait for them to die. We used to respect and care for old people. These days it is common for our children to us send away to old-age homes in town so that we are far away from them and their spouses. Some refuse to take care of the elderly because they want us to leave this world. It's really bad ... our African values and customs have been abandoned. Speak to any elderly person [in this community], they will tell you of how much they are not wanted by their families' (Interview 24, 09 November 2011).

Notwithstanding some of the challenges experienced by participants in providing care for the elderly, CWP in both communities was able to meet the minimum care needs of the frail elderly who desperately needed assistance with their care needs. The support usually took the form of auxiliary assistance in the community old-age homes and direct home-based care in the homes of the elderly. The CWP supported the Bekkersdal Old-Age Centre by growing vegetables, cleaning, gardening and preparing food for the beneficiaries. In Munsieville, two

CWP participants assisted with the cleaning and cooking at the Care for the Aged Centre. The CWP in Munsieville did not have a vegetable garden in the yard of the old-age home even though they sometimes provided vegetables harvested from the CWP's food gardens in the schools and local CWP office. There was no urgent need for starting a food garden because 'the old-age home here [in Munsieville had] enough sponsors' who provided regular and sufficient food supplies of food to the old-age home (Interview 6, 9 September 2011).

The elderly who received CWP's direct assistance in their homes suffered common chronic conditions affecting the elderly such as hypertension, diabetes, arthritis, respiratory disease, visual and sensory impairment (such as blindness or hearing loss). In addition to these common chronic health conditions, others had psychological conditions such as dementia and depression. Most of these conditions may affect the normal functional capabilities of the elderly, and as a result, they may require someone to lean on for care and daily assistance with daily chores like cleaning, washing, cooking and medical check-ups. The inadequacies of the South African social services system and the neglect of the elderly in households present a predicament for the elderly in need of care (Fakier, 2009). This predicament is further complicated by the fact that familial care is not always forthcoming in some households. The frail elderly are not only faced with the failure of the public health and social welfare services but also the inability of household members to provide sufficient care.

An old woman in Bekkersdal was grateful that the CWP came to her rescue at the time she needed the care most. Aged 84, *Mme* Sylvia had diabetes, was partially blind and had lost total muscle control of her lower body. She was unable to walk or turn on her own when in bed. She stayed with a younger relative who assisted her. Her two children found work elsewhere and they sent money/groceries to her on a monthly basis. When visited for an interview to learn about how the CWP assisted her in meeting her care needs, *Mme* Sylvia



began with an elaborate political history of Munsieville and Krugersdorp. After this, she started explaining how the CWP gave her ‘tender love care’:

‘They [CWP participants] treat me like their own mother. These people know the meaning of “tender care”. I am happy because they give me “tender love care”. I am truly grateful for this love. When I hear them come in every morning, I feel overjoyed. I feel happy because there are people who still care for others. These ladies [CWP participants] have shown me “tender love care”. They have taken the responsibility of feeding, cleaning, washing and taking care of me. My only wish is that they continue to do this great work and assist many other people. I think these people were sent by God to help the weak and the poor’ (Interview 25, 10 November 2011).

The CWP’s home-based care programme also benefited the young, frail and bedridden adults. Some of these young adults were terminally ill and needed care. The worrying presence of bedridden young adults in Munsieville and Bekkersdal vindicates Fakier’s (2014:137) argument that in the post-apartheid South Africa, ‘care for the needy remains predominately a private household concern’. A coordinator in Bekkersdal explained the extent of the deficits of care for the working-aged adults in the community:

‘We have many houses with sick people. The most disturbing fact is that the majority of these sick are young people ... our children. It is very expensive to take care of a sick person ... it is financially and psychologically stressful. Many people neglect their loved ones not because they don’t have money. It is very painful to watch someone you love suffer and you are helpless. So, you are left with a situation where a sick person is left to die. Those with resources can arrange for their sick relatives to be transported to their home villages so that they can die in peace and with dignity in rural areas’ (Interview 14, 21 July 2011, Bekkersdal).

Similar to home-based care provided to the aged, the CWP assisted these young adults by washing, cleaning, cooking and monitoring their intake of prescribed medicine. The vegetables from CWP food gardens were particularly vital because they provided a balanced and healthy diet needed for the physical strength of these frail and bedridden young adults. Some of these young men and women in these communities expressed satisfaction at the assistance they received from the CWP. A bedridden young man in Bekkersdal explained how the CWP home-based care programme helped him:

‘My brother, I just want to say that I am very happy about what these people have done for me. I cannot even find words to express my gratitude to these people. Look how I am. Look at me. I am very sick and if these people were not around I would have said ‘goodbye’ to this world already. Knowing that there are people who care for you in times of need can boost your confidence and help you appreciate life. Imagine you are sick and there is no one to care for you...the stress will kill you before your actual death’ (Interview 12, 25 July 2011)

The CWP participants in both communities understood and adhered to the basic precautionary measures when undertaking their CWP home-based care duties. Participants wore the protective masks and gloves to protect themselves from contagious infections. The participants also understood that taking care of the bedridden was a serious responsibility that required attention to detail and patience. Out of all different types of work in the CWP, the participants in the home based care raised discomfort about the taxing emotional labour involved in this work. At times, they had to intervene in minor domestic disputes in households where they were deployed to assist. This was particularly common in households where there were many household members.

Taking care of the sick and frail often involved a lot of emotional labour given the irritability from some people who received the assistance. This challenge was compounded by inadequate work equipment, lack of advanced training on home-based care and,

sometimes, sheer abuse of participants' generosity in some households where they offered assistance. This lack of appreciation revealed itself when some household members would deliberately leave the house untidy and dishes dirty with the knowledge that CWP participants would be coming to assist the following day.

The cleaning detergents and other necessary basic health needs such as health hygiene wipes were not always available in all the households. Some participants were frustrated by situations where they genuinely wanted to assist but could not because some households did not have basic cleaning detergents and essential medical items to assist in providing care for the sick. A participant in Bekkersdal explained a common difficulty they had to deal with in providing home-based care for those in need of care:

'We work with sick people...some are HIV-positive. We receive enough training on how to take care of the sick, but this is meaningless if we do not have things to wear to practice what we learn in training. It is like training someone to ride a scooter [motorcycle] but you do not give them protective gear. You are setting up that person for failure. If they fall from that scooter, they will suffer serious injuries than if they were wearing something to protect themselves. How are we expected to help when we do not have soap to wash them or food to cook for them? It is depressing to see someone suffer and you have the will to assist but there is nothing you can do about it. So, my appeal is that people we assist must use their grant money to purchase basic things such as soap, washing soap, food...because we cannot assist them to the best of our ability without these items' (Interview 9, 25 July 2011).

## **6.5 TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT**

The CWP's environmental work entailed keeping the streets tidy and other public spaces like community parks, schools, clinics, graveyards; clearing rubbish in the storm water drainage systems; the use of eco-friendly methods on the CWP food gardens; and, in the case of Bekkersdal, tree planting and the erstwhile recycling programme. The CWP work maintained

a generally clean environment in these communities. In Bekkersdal the CWP clean-up targeted streets, primary and secondary schools, local community parks, the taxi rank, old-age homes, early childhood centres and the Bekkersdal Hostel. In addition to most of these public spaces, the CWP clean-up programme in Munsieville also included the nearby community cemetery (Sterkfontein Cemetery) and churches which supported some of the CWP's activities in the community. The other difference was that CWP clean-up in Munsieville was extended to the adjacent public areas such as the Dr Yusuf Dadoo Hospital, West Rand College and a community hall in the town of Krugersdorp. The clean-up activities included picking up of litter, clearing bushes and removing weeds on the pavements.

Whereas the CWP clean-up programme was vital in maintaining a general state of cleanliness on the streets and most public areas in Munsieville, it dismally failed to do the same in the Mshenguville section (also known as Bango) – where the informal settlements were concentrated. Six huge heaps of rubbish dumped on the busy main street – Dr Martinez Ramirez Street – were observed as a common eyesore in Mshenguville. A further walkabout in the intersecting streets exposed many other smaller heaps with smelly trash – some with residual smoke from the attempts to reduce the size of the heaps by burning. Some heaps were at the doorstep of the overcrowded human settlements. A substantial amount of rubbish was also dumped on the bridge which separated the Mshenguville and Mayibuye sections. It was common to find children playing in the trash and occasionally opening the sealed garbage bags in the hope of finding small valuable items.

Participants and community members had conflicting explanations on the CWP's inability to maintain a clean environment in the Mshenguville section, compared to other sections of the township. Some participants cited the lack of mobile municipal bins and a shortage of plastic refuse bags in the CWP as the reason for programme's failure to maintain a clean environment in the infamous informal settlement. As a result, the municipal workers

could not pick up all the rubbish scattered all over the streets. Some community members and participants attributed the filth in Mshenguville to what they termed 'laziness' by residents in the informal settlement who were accused of failing to take all the collected rubbish to the main street where the municipal rubbish trucks had easy access. Indeed, most parts of Mshenguville were hilly and rocky with very narrow streets only suitable for pedestrian access. An enormous amount of rubbish was dumped in these narrow streets and was left to accumulate over a period of time.

Another participant expressed her frustration at the lack of community support towards the CWP's clean-up efforts in Mshenguville (Interview 26, 11 November 2011). He explained that residents in other formal sections of the township would 'sponsor' them with black refuse bags when they ran out of supplies from the CWP. This kind of community support was not forthcoming in Mshenguville (Interview 26, 11 November 2011). Other narratives from community members exposed the deep divisions between formal and informal Munsieville. A resident from the Patsima section accused people in Mshenguville of 'caring less about this community' (Interview 20, 11 November 2011), while, on the other hand, a resident in Mshenguville protested against 'being treated like a foreigner in this community' (Interview 19, 9 November). Another community member residing in the formal section of the township also accused residents of Mshenguville of 'caring less' about the community, adding that this was because 'this is not their home...they just don't care because they have homes where they come from' (Interview 13, 9 November 2011).

The clean-up of the streets in Bekkersdal also had its own contradictions. In a typical week, there were obvious contrasting pictures of the cleanliness of the streets during the week and on weekends. Unlike in Munsieville where Mshenguville could easily be singled out for its untidy streets, this challenge appeared more pervasive in Bekkersdal. The plastic and glass bottles, cans, cups, papers and used baby disposable nappies would begin piling-up in the

main streets of Bekkersdal from Friday to Sunday. At around 11am on any normal Monday, after an intensive clean-up by CWP participants, it looked as if the litter was not there in the first place – the streets were almost litter-free. This situation would stay like that until late Thursday when participants were off-duty. This was an odd cycle defined by contrasting pictures of the sparkling clean Bekkersdal on Mondays to Thursdays [when CWP participants are at work] and litter-ridden Bekkersdal weekends when participants were not working.

By contrast, the odd littering cycle was not too visible in Munsieville. The two main streets – Corane and Mogatle – were normally clean on any given day. Particularly in the formal settlements sections of Munsieville, the environment was generally clean. Ironically, in Bekkersdal, it was the ordinary community members who spoke proudly of how the CWP transformed the township into a ‘super clean’ township. An ordinary community member explained how the problem of littering has become pervasive in Bekkersdal:

‘After the BRP [Bekkersdal Renewal Project) was discontinued, littering started to get out of control. I think people are not well informed about the dangers of littering. I don’t think people are deliberately being disrespectful by littering. Disrespect is when someone undermines or hurts you intentionally. You can bring all clean-up government initiatives but when this culture of littering is not addressed people will continue to litter. People need to be informed about the importance of keeping their communities clean’ (Interview 2, 15 June 2011).

The CWP environmental work in both communities also focused on minimising illegal dumping near open water storm drains and involuntary clogging of tunnels. They did this by physically removing the rubbish in the storm water drainage system and tunnels. Their work also facilitated deterrence of illegal dumping in these communities. The mere presence of a CWP participant in an orange uniform made it difficult for a community member to freely engage in illegal dumping. In Bekkersdal, for instance, a group of women who sold *pap* and

chicken/beef stew at the MTN Bekkersdal Taxi rank could no longer freely dump used cooking oil from their mobile kitchen in the nearby storm water drainage system as they used to do in the past. A participant explained that even though some continued to do this, they normally did so early in the morning before CWP started work or on weekends. Even at this time, they needed to ‘first check around if there is no orange overall [referring to the CWP overall]’ (Interview 9, 25 July 2011).

The CWP also addressed environmental threats by adopting eco-friendly methods in the food gardens. Instead of using chemicals, all CWP homestead and communal gardens in the two townships used organic methods – thus reducing dependence on the chemicals and improving the quality of the soil. Environmental activists have long noted that organic gardening methods enhance the nutritional value of the crops; contribute to soil fertility and help combat climate change (Cock; 2011; 2011a; Earl 2011). Earl (2011:35) points out that chemical methods ‘generates waste which harms the environment, uses large quantities of fossil fuels, pollutes water supplies through chemical run-off and depletes soil fertility’. Earl (2011) asserts that 1 ton of oil and 108 tonnes of water are required to produce 1 ton of nitrogen fertiliser. The chemical based production also has long-term harmful effects on human health as chemically grown foods also contain chemicals (Earl, 2011). Recent scientific research has shown that ‘conditions like asthma, early onset of puberty and infertility are all being linked to chemical agriculture’ (Earl, 2011: 37).

The preparation of the CWP food garden beds followed a strictly eco-friendly process known in agricultural sciences as ‘trench composting’. Trench composting is famous for its simplicity and ability to enrich the soil (Compost Education Centre, no date). It involves the digging of knee-high holes and then filling them up with organic waste before vegetables are planted (Compost Education Centre, s.a.). In Bekkersdal, this organic method began with the digging of a pit on a garden bed where the organic waste was deposited. The organic waste

normally comprised dry and fresh leaves and grass; cardboards/paper, vegetable and fruit scraps; and meal leftovers. Whereas organic food waste was easily fitted in the pit, the garden waste would be chopped for neat fitting. Enough space was left after filling the holes with organic waste and soil was added on top before watering. The garden beds would then be watered regularly to accelerate the decomposition of the organic waste.

In Munsieville, the preparations of the garden beds followed the same ‘trench composting’ process. Moreover, CWP food gardens were raised, meaning that more soil was put above ground level of the garden beds because of the high acidity in the soil (Interview 27; 15 November 2011). Some of these raised gardens were filled with organic waste, like in Bekkersdal; and others filled with composted chicken manure sourced from a local chicken farm in Krugersdorp. Properly composted chicken manure can be an ‘excellent resource for amending and fertilising garden soil’ (Ellis et al., 2013:1). Agricultural scientists suggest that chicken manure ‘is very high in nitrogen and also contain a good amount of potassium and phosphorus’, while others have described it as a ‘convenient method for eliminating problematic waste, provides a good source of nutrients for the garden, improves soil texture, and creates the opportunity for sustainable home food gardening’ (Ellis et al., 2013:2). The chicken manure is first dipped into cold water for few days and the manure soup applied to the gardens once its strength is neutralised. Raw chicken manure is too strong and could damage vegetable roots (Interview 27; 15 November 2011).

In Bekkersdal, the CWP undertook two environmental activities, namely, tree planting and recycling of solid waste, which were not done in Munsieville. The trees were normally planted on the main street – Kgomo ya Hlaba Street – and community parks as part of the efforts to create a green environment in the community. A dedicated CWP participant was assigned to provide technical advice on appropriate tree-planting methods to ensure the survival of the trees. The planted trees were then watered regularly. Unfortunately, most of



the trees rarely grew to their maturity owing to vandalism or theft. Tree planting was not one of the prominent environmental activities in Bekkersdal. In fact, the future of the tree planting hangs in the balance due to theft, vandalism and irregular supplies of tree seedlings.

The BRP seems to have had a residual effect on the inclusion of tree planting as one of the CWP work activities in Bekkersdal. The BRP was launched in 2004 as part of President Thabo Mbeki's flagship service delivery initiative aimed at 'giving the township, which is in a squalid state, a facelift' (Gauteng Department of Human Settlements, 2005:1). The R1.2 billion development project sought to 'address the plight of Bekkersdal residents located on high-risk and dolomitic land through a relocation plan' (Gauteng Department of Human Settlements, 2005:1). The main activities of the BRP consisted of upgrades of local taxi ranks; building of homes, recreational facilities, community multi-purpose centre and community parks; reducing crime levels and violence; and creating a healthy and clean environment (Gauteng Department of Human Settlements, 2005:1). Tree planting was among the BRP activities aimed at creating a clean environment in this township. Because some CWP participants previously participated in the BRP, it is possible that the inclusion of tree planting may have been influenced by the BRP. The CWP recycling programme was carried over from the previous initiative supported by the National Youth Development Agency as part of its programme to nurture and expand entrepreneurial capabilities of the youth in Bekkersdal (Interview 12, 12 July 2011).

The CWP in Bekkersdal also ran an erstwhile recycling scheme which collected discarded recyclables such as paper, cardboard, tins, plastic and glass. Some of the known benefits of recycling include the reduction of pollution, conservation of energy and natural resources, and reduction of industrial manufacturing. The CWP participants in Bekkersdal collected recyclable waste as part of their clean-up programme and deposited the waste into a big container at the local CWP office. The waste was collected and sold for cash at the local

recycling firms around Westonaria and Randfontein. The income accrued from the sales later became a source of serious tension within the promising recycling scheme over how the income from the scheme was spent. Unfortunately, the recycling scheme was discontinued in 2012 amidst accusations of fraud and financial mismanagement. By the end of 2014, plans were already in place by some participants to start another CWP recycling programme.

## **6.6 BUILDING SAFE AND COHESIVE COMMUNITIES**

The CWP has, to a certain extent, improved safety and social relations in both communities. Some of the safety activities in the CWP included the day-patrolling in schools, bush clearing at crime ‘hotspots’ and other positive social multipliers – such as the facilitation of trust and friendship – associated with the CWP which resulted in improved social relations among the participants. Of course, the CWP cannot completely address all the security problems in these communities. As highlighted in the South African government’s *Manual for Community-Based Crime Prevention* (Department of Safety and Security, 2000:7) ‘crime prevention requires the involvement of many very different role-players’. In this regard, it was encouraging that CWP played its part in addressing some common crimes found in these townships. For example, by removing overgrown grass and weeds in the crime hotspots in both communities, the CWP contributed in minimising contact crimes such as rape, robbery on the streets, physical assault, muggings and pickpocketing.

The CWP’s role in improving community safety must be understood within the broader context of high levels of crime and violence in contemporary South Africa. The 2015 SAPS crime statistics paint a disturbing picture of the state of crime in the country. The statistics reveal that contact crimes (murder, attempted murder and sexual offences) increased from 50 194 to 53 639 and contact related crimes (arson and malicious injury to property) increased from 123 441 to 125 798 from 2014 to 2015 (SAPS, 2015). An increase was also

recorded in crimes such as hijackings, robbery with aggravating circumstances, robbery at residential and non-residential premises, common robbery, shoplifting, theft and assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm (SAPS, 2015). In the same period, a slight decline was recorded in crimes such as illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, common assault, theft of motor vehicles and motorcycles, commercial crime, robbery of cash in transit and bank robbery (SAPS, 2015).

Crime and violence are increasingly concentrated in the urban areas – such as Munsieville and Bekkersdal. In both communities, petty crime involving muggings and pickpocketing were common. Gotsch et al. (2013) argue that ‘crime and violence are disproportionately concentrated in South Africa’s urbanised areas, as it is the global trend’. In most parts of the global South, the rise in poverty and unemployment, limited human settlements and inadequate services in urban settings provide a breeding ground for crime and violence (Gotsch et al., 2013). In the South African context, these structural factors are compounded further by ‘the rapid growth and transformation of cities (high levels of migration), the opportunities for criminals that urban settings provide, enormous socio-economic disparities, socio-spatial contrasts and spatial segregation – largely a legacy of apartheid spatial planning’ (Gotsch et al., 2013:4). This explains why the leading urbanised provinces in South Africa – Western Cape, Gauteng and Kwazulu Natal – are ‘more crime-ridden than comparatively less urbanised ones’ (Gotsch et al., 2013:4).

A group of researchers based at the Johannesburg-based Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) undertook different studies to assess the role of the CWP in preventing crime and violence in various communities. Masuku’s (2015) study in Ivory Park, a community north of Johannesburg, found that the CWP helped in preventing crime and violence in this community. This was done by involving the youth and ex-offenders in recreational activities and cutting long grass in places ‘regarded as a hiding place for

criminals' (Masuku, 2015:43). Langa's (2015) study in Orange Farm shows that the CWP assisted in dealing with domestic violence by supporting victims with basic counselling, assistance in opening cases of domestic violence and filing for protection orders with the local courts (Langa, 2015). The CWP also embarked public campaigns to bring about public awareness around domestic violence and to prevent crime and drug abuse (Langa, 2015).

In their study in another community in the North West province in a new settlement called Bokfontein, Langa and von Holdt (2011) show that the CWP helped to bring about social harmony and prevented intra-community violence, including xenophobic violence. The Bokfontein case suggests the CWP as a potential catalyst for social cohesion, particularly in fractured communities. However, a follow-up study in 2014 warns that the sense of cohesiveness and solidarity in this community may be at stake as tensions 'are more likely to intensify over access to resources (e.g. proposed RDP houses will possibly lead to tensions between South African citizens and foreign nationals)' (Langa, 2015a:18). In some communities like Manenberg, a community in the Western Cape Province with a long history of gang violence, the results are not encouraging. Mullagee and Bruce (2015:39) show that whereas the CWP work assisted with the reintegration of ex-offenders and generated a 'strong perception' that CWP's visibility had improved safety, 'there is no clear evidence that they have had an impact on violence'.

In some instances, access to CWP income has resulted in gender-based domestic violence. Drawing from extensive literature, Bruce (2015:32) indicates that intimate partner violence is likely to happen when a woman is the main economic provider or earns more than the male partner since 'they [women] are seen to threaten the status of their male partners'. Bruce (2015:34) argued that whereas the CWP could contribute in reducing crime and violence, 'gender training' was required to 'help women more effectively negotiate their status as the main economic providers'. Research was also done in Grabouw, another crime-

ridden community in the Western Cape Province, where it was established that ‘some women have been subjected to violence because of their participation in the [CWP] programme...their partners see them as disrespectful now that they are earning an income. They beat them; take their money to buy alcohol and return home afterwards to abuse them’ (Puwana, 2015: 20). Based on these studies, it is evident that the potential of the CWP in addressing the problems of crime and violence is not always straightforward.

The CWP work in improving community safety in Munsieville and Bekkersdal was reflected by participants’ perceptions on how the CWP enhanced their sense of safety in their communities. In Munsieville, 85 percent of the participants indicated that they felt safe in the community. In contrast, only 55 percent of participants in Bekkersdal indicated that they felt safe in the community. This was further illustrated by participants’ responses when asked whether they thought theft had increased in their communities. In Munsieville, only 17 percent believed that theft had increased in their community while in Bekkersdal it was 56 percent. The CWP’s community safety work in both communities comprised day-patrolling in some primary schools and the clearing of ‘crime-hot spots’. Although these activities did not completely address the safety deficits in both communities, they made some important contributions in promoting and generating a sense of security.

The CWP scholar patrol programme enhanced learner safety and, to a certain extent, discipline in schools. In Munsieville, all primary schools were patrolled by the CWP, but in Bekkersdal some primary schools were patrolled by volunteers from the community independent of CWP’s support. The CWP’s scholar patrol was designed to promote safety in and around the premises of the primary schools during school hours and to ensure safe road crossings for school children before and after school. The CWP school safety patrollers normally arrived early in the morning before school to guide learners and regulate the flow of traffic to ensure that children crossed the streets safely. All school children were also

searched at the gates, including their school bags, and any item with potential to disrupt teaching and learning removed. Some parents felt more at ease leaving their children at school because they believed were safe. The presence of patrollers discouraged learners from leaving school premises during schooling hours. Learners in the elementary and lower classes were not allowed to leave the primary school premises without adult guidance even after the classes. In rare cases where parents or guardian were late in picking up a child, the CWP patrollers would safely accompany the child home.

Another way the CWP contributed to community safety was by cutting overgrown grass and weeds in what was known as in both communities as the ‘crime hotspots’. Clearing of the tall weeds at the hotspots made the work of the Community Policing Forums (CPFs) much easier. Long grass and weeds in secluded open fields were likely to attract criminal activities. Community members created their own footpath shortcuts that passed through the tall overgrown weeds. Instead of using the normal roads which were much clearer and safer, community members preferred to use these shortcuts for early arrival at their destinations. Criminals would easily hide in the long grass and weeds to rob unsuspecting pedestrians of their cell phones, clothes, money and other similar items. The criminals were likely to be aggressive and violent when faced with resistance from victims.

In Bekkersdal, there are two notorious ‘crime hotspots’. These are in the west-wing of the Bekkersdal Hostel and a bush with a big tree in the Modisa Otsile Street in Skierlik section. The Bekkersdal Hostel provides shelter largely to migrants working or looking for work in the gold mines. The infrastructure at the Bekkersdal Hostel has deteriorated with dilapidated roofing, broken windows patched with plastic and paper boxes and blocked sewage. Despite some of these challenges, hostel residents were generally perceived as relatively well-off because they could afford the high accommodation rentals. This attracted criminals who hid in the tall grasses behind the west-wing section of the hostel. The other

crime hotspot was in the Skierlik section on the Modisa Otsile Street where there was overgrown grass and a big tree – where muggings are quite common. The CWP contributed significantly in transforming the two crime hotspots into safe spaces by cutting the long grass at the hostel, the big tree at Otsile Street and removing the tall grass and weeds in the Skierlik section. However, crime remains a serious challenge in Bekkersdal despite CWP's efforts.

The crime 'hotspots' in Munsieville are the open veld in what is commonly known in the township as the 'Zion Christian Church (ZCC) section' in Extension 1 and the small footpath that separate Mshenguville and Mayibuye (on Dr Ramitez Martinez Street) immediately after the bridge. The 'ZCC section' is a sizeable open veld behind the Munsieville branch of the ZCC. The open veld serves as a convenient intersection connecting Extension 1, Mshenguville and Mayibuye sections of Munsieville. This intersection has multiple footpath routes used by community members as '*shortcuts*' when moving from one section of the township to the other. Some footpaths are used as routes to quickly reach the taxi or bus stops while saving money by avoiding the first taxi for the trip. When the grass is overgrown, it is difficult to see the pedestrians even when looking from the hilly parts of the township. By clearing the long grass and bushes in these areas, the CWP created safer footpaths for community members.

The CWP participants also believe that the CWP gives them the social space to make new friends and share personal problems. Other participants rely on the collective solidarity of fellow participants when faced with personal problems. The ability of the CWP to foster improved social relations has also proven to be effective in minimising social conflicts among participants. This can be attributed to the fact that the CWP creates the social condition for friendship and mutual support in times of need. Sixty two percent of the participants in Munsieville indicated they befriended fellow participants through their work in the CWP while in Bekkersdal it was 78 percent respectively. Unlike in the past where most

community members were unfamiliar with each another, the CWP brought together people from the Holomisa section to Uptown in Bekkersdal and from Mshenguville (Bango) to Deloeneng in Munsieville. Participants did not have to socially restrict themselves to familiar faces in their neighbourhoods because the CWP has helped them know fellow community members from other sections in the townships.

However, the level of trust was relatively low despite that 78 percent of participants in Bekkersdal made friends through CWP. Only 55 percent of the participants in Bekkersdal felt they could trust more people in their community since participating in the CWP. This variation probably reflects the quality of the friendship as some participants pointed out trusting someone was much deeper than friendship. The number of participants in Munsieville who made friends was relatively low at 62 percent compared to Bekkersdal (78 percent). However, the response on trust was also at 62 percent. It was nevertheless quite evident that the CWP provides an enabling environment for trust and solidarity among the participants. This is further demonstrated by the fact that 65 per cent of participants in Bekkersdal and 72 percent of participants in Munsieville respectively indicated that working together in the CWP provides space to share grievances and personal problems.

## **6.7 MORE INNOVATION IN MUNSIEVILLE**

This chapter has thus far demonstrated that the CWP in Bekkersdal and Munsieville focused on ‘useful work’ instead of work associated with traditional conceptions of ‘public works programmes’ where participants are paid to ‘dig holes and fill them up again’. It was in Munsieville where participants organised even more innovative social activities within the CWP’s organisational framework. Among these innovative social activities were the (i) innovative involvement of high school learners over the age of 18 in the CWP while at the same time creating the space for their active participation in sporting, recreational and



cultural activities; (ii) the school holiday programme targeted at the learners from the two local primary schools; (iii) establishment of the Men's and Women's Forums aimed at promoting 'gender awareness'; (iv) health campaigns focused on TB, diabetes, obesity, nutrition, cancer; (v) organising social activities such as the CWP Wellness Day, Child Awareness; (vi) community marches against child and women abuse; and (vii) celebration of national commemorative days like the Youth, Heritage, Women's and Mandela Days.

The CWP participants in Munsieville took the lead in creatively and autonomously structuring the CWP's work to address a variety of social problems in their community. The case of the CWP in Munsieville is instructive for two reasons. First, it further clarifies the potential role of a properly designed ELR programme as a tool for peoples' development from below where participants take charge of an ELR programme and use it autonomously to address their local social challenges. Secondly, it shows that the notion of community participation in the execution of an ELR programme is not always automatic. Similar to Ethiopia's PSNP and India's MGNREGA, the notion of 'participation from below' forms part of the CWP's core design. The comparative case study of Munsieville and Bekkersdal, the main focus of this dissertation, shows that the capacity to exercise real participation and autonomy from below through an ELR programme cannot be taken as given.

### **6.7.1 Participation of high school learners in the CWP**

The ELR programmes are generally targeted at able-bodied adults who are 'neither at work nor at school'. In Munsieville, the CWP was innovatively designed to include the participation of high school learners over the age of 18, most of whom are in grade 12 at the Thuto Lefa High School. In 2014, about seventy (70) of the almost 1000 CWP participants were high school learners. According to a coordinator responsible for supervising the learner participants, the idea of including the high school learners was motivated by the desire to

provide social guidance through sporting and cultural activities as a way of building and nurturing their capabilities (Interview 23, 09 November 2011). The major problem was that many young people, particularly outside school hours and during school recess, ‘spent too much time on the street corners drinking alcohol and smoking cigarettes and taking illicit drugs such as *nyaope* and marijuana’ (Interview 23, 09 November 2011). Their inclusion in the CWP formed part of the community’s effort to help defocus the youth from alcohol and substance abuse and risky sexual behaviours.

Preference for participation was normally given to learners from poor households (Interview 23, 09 November 2011), although, in reality, some learners from relatively well-off households also participated. Unlike other CWP participants who were required to work daily from morning until afternoon, the learner participants were only required to clean their class rooms and pick up litter around the school yard between 2:30pm to 4:00pm for two days in a week. They were also responsible for rolling-out the ‘Knock and Drop’ Campaign which involved the distribution of written invitations to community meetings, pamphlets from local stakeholders and the local newsletter *Vuk’uzenzele* (Interview 23, 09 November 2011). The CWP learner participants were strictly prohibited from carrying out any other work in the CWP such as home-based care, homestead and communal gardens, cleaning streets or storm water, or community safety work, and were not allowed to take up any supervisory responsibilities.

On Saturdays, normally between 9am and 12pm, some learner participants assisted with the clean-up of community halls and parks. This was normally followed by a series of cultural and sporting activities, and social education workshops. The CWP learner participants were paired into different groups to participate in cultural and sporting activities which took place in the community stadium, community halls and churches. Among the most common cultural activities were traditional dances, choir, gumboot dance, *pantsula* dance,

poetry and *kofifi* dance. Soccer and netball were the most popular sporting codes. They worked together with local sporting and cultural bodies/groups who provided technical assistance in the sporting, recreational and cultural activities. The social education workshops were attended by all learner participants for them to gain valuable information on various issues affecting the youth such as sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS, drugs and alcohol abuse and how to take care of their overall health (Interview 23, 09 November 2011).

Related to the innovative participation of the school learners in the Munsieville CWP was activity known as ‘teacher aides’ – a group of CWP participants selected on the basis of advanced numerical competence and literacy. The teacher aides comprised of younger participants who had either passed grade 12 (matric) or were pursuing a higher qualification at tertiary level. Most of the teacher aides comprised mainly of recent matriculants with no access to jobs or post-schooling education. This activity was designed in such a manner to immediately absorb the CWP learner participants upon completion of their high school education. The main goal of the CWP teacher aides was to assist the teachers at the two local primary schools – Diphlane and Phathudi – with some administrative work, preparing class rooms for the classes, maintaining discipline in the class room and also tutoring children with learning difficulties (Interview 17, 20 September 201). The administrative work generally involved photocopying, capturing and calculating learners’ marks and monitoring of class attendance registers.

### **6.7.2 Celebration of commemorative days**

The CWP sites in Munsieville and Bekkersdal both celebrate the Mandela and Heritage Days. The Mandela Day is normally held on the 18<sup>th</sup> of July every year with a specific focus on helping the destitute, in line with Nelson Mandela’s own belief in service to others. In Bekkersdal, the Mandela Day activities include painting of houses of the poor and public

areas like community halls and distribution of clothes collected from other community members. Mandela Day in Munsieville also focuses on the collection of clothes (known as ‘Jamboree’) for distribution usually to child-headed households and the elderly, and also gathering a group of old people into one room where they were reminded about the importance of their presence and wisdom in the community, while being treated to tea and biscuits. In 2013, some of the CWP beadwork and sewing products were freely distributed to school children and vulnerable adults to ‘cheer them up’.

Celebration of Heritage Day which is held in September every year is colourful, with CWP participants and other community members clad in different traditional attire which represent the cultural diversity in these communities. In Bekkersdal, the celebrations are held at the local CWP office. The activities on this day are usually filled with cultural dances. On the other hand, the celebration of the Heritage Day in Munsieville is not confined to traditional dances but includes performances like the *pantsula* and *kofifi* dances and poetry by the youth. In addition to the relatively well-organised annual celebrations of the Mandela and Heritage Days, the CWP participants in Munsieville also organise events to commemorate the Women’s Month, the Youth Month, and in addition their own sports day. The CWP coordinators in this community work very hard, in most cases outside the CWP ‘working hours’, to ensure that these events are successful. The commemorative events in Munsieville are designed to showcase sporting and artistic talent, particularly among the learner participants.

### **6.7.3 School holiday programme**

The school holiday programme in Munsieville was introduced after an observation that primary school children were not usefully occupied during school holidays (Interview 29, 22 May 2013). The first school holiday programme took place in June 2012 and was opened to

all primary school children in Munsieville irrespective of whether they were enrolled at the local primary schools. This programme has both short-term and long-term goals (Interview 29, 22 May 2013). In the short-term, the initiative sought to create a safe playing environment and to discourage school children from engaging in risky behaviours during school holidays (Interview 29, 22 May 2013). Deviant behaviour was likely in households where parents left their children unsupervised while at work. The programme was also crucial in curbing pedestrian fatalities involving children when they played on the streets. In the long-term, the programme seeks to instil in children good values, beliefs and ethics to ensure that they become responsible adults in future (Interview 29, 22 May 2013).

During the course of the programme, close to 100 children were paired into groups to perform different recreational and educational activities. The activities included reading, cultural dances, playing indigenous and indoor games, awareness on substance and alcohol abuse, ‘importance of family and living together in harmony’, and basic training on sewing, knitting, agriculture and food gardening. Unfortunately, the planned trip in 2013 to Bosasa Youth Camp did not materialise because of transport challenges. The programme may last for two weeks, from Monday to Friday, from 8:30am to 13:30pm depending on the availability of resources. Officials from the local church Renewal Ministries and the NGO Drug Free South Africa facilitated some of the sessions. It was encouraging that whereas the CWP only coordinated the successful hosting of the school holiday programme, it was the CWP coordinators who went all out to seek additional material support from stakeholders such as schools, local businesses and churches.

#### **6.7.4 Men’s forum**

The concept of the men’s forum originally started during the operationalisation of the OW in Munsieville in 2007 (Andersson et al., 2007:14). Although not a completely new idea, it was

under the CWP's framework that the men's forum gained a robust organisational life. Attended only by male CWP participants and a few other male community members, the CWP men's forum was a platform for men in Munsieville to discuss issues affecting them as men, either as victims or perpetrators. The forum is held at local Methodist Church of Southern Africa on a fortnight basis. According to one of the CWP coordinators, the main purpose of the men's forum is to 'bring awareness in the community about gender-based violence and abuse and other issues between men and women' (Interview 29, 22 May 2013). The issues discussed in the men's forum range from masculinity, violence against women and children, men's physical and sexual health, 'fatherhood' and child protection from alcohol abuse.

Most sessions at the CWP men's forum are facilitated by guests with relevant expert information and knowledge on the topics set for discussion. For example, the nurses from the local clinic and officials from the Department of Health are invited to facilitate discussions on health risks affecting men. Other external guests are invited from gender-based organisations around Krugersdorp, such as Leratong Crisis Centre, to facilitate discussions on women and child abuse. The forum also has a strong partnership with the local churches which make available the venues for discussions and facilitate some of the sessions. The discussions in the men's forum are generally lively, with some protesting against the principle of gender-equality as a 'white-culture' which has 'destroyed many families'. Although the forum provides a crucial platform for open discussions on gender, most discussions tend to focus more on men's sexual health and 'fatherhood', with less focus on the transformation of deep-seated unequal gender relations.

### **6.7.5 Women's forum**

The primary purpose of the CWP Women's Forum is to create 'a platform for the women in Munsieville to talk about our problems as women' (Interview 46, October 2013). Unlike the men's forum, the women's forum did not begin with the operationalisation of the OW workshop but originally emerged within CWP framework, although the very existence of the men's forum may have generated an interest to establish the CWP women's forum. Among the issues discussed in the CWP women's forum were domestic violence in households, 'oppression of women', poverty in households and challenges faced by women in responding to this challenge, women's sexual health and the burden put on older women in raising their grandchildren. Initially, the women met all at once in a single venue on a fortnight basis. However, this arrangement had to be changed because of the growing sense of discomfort from the older women who were not comfortable to freely share their personal problems in the presence of younger women (Interview 46, October 2013).

This resulted in the separation of the older and younger women into two separate women's forum sessions. The older women were categorised as those older than 37 years, and the younger women comprised of women in the age range between 18 years and 36 (Interview 46, October 2013). The forum was normally convened on a fortnight basis, with each session lasting for about two hours. The separation of the women's forum sessions meant that issues discussed by the younger and older women would not exactly be the same. The older women tended to focus on issues such as the 'burden' of raising their grandchildren on their very limited income base while their children 'did nothing' (Interview 46, October 2013). Related to this issue was their concern about their seemingly growing responsibility as breadwinners in their households where they were expected to 'bathe, clothe and feed our children and grandchildren' (Interview 47, February 2014). The young women tended to focus more on domestic violence, women's health and the 'oppression of women'.

### **6.7.6 Mass-based health educational campaigns**

The CWP in Munsieville embarked on health campaigns to promote awareness of cancer, tuberculosis (TB) and lifestyle diseases such as diabetes, hypertension and obesity. The ‘CWP Cancer Awareness Campaign’ was an annual event that was run during the month of August in collaboration with the local clinic and the CANSA. The CWP took the strategic lead in this campaign with the coordinators taking the responsibility to organise important logistical aspects such as a venue, sending invitations to expert facilitators and speakers and organising refreshments. The CWP participants also extended the invitations to local cancer survivors and people living with cancer to share their experiences with fellow community members. The cancer awareness sessions were held at the local Lutheran Church and were attended by CWP participants and any other community member who wished to attend. In some of the cancer awareness sessions, the attendees were taught basic self-administered techniques for early detection of prostate and breast cancers.

The CWP in Munsieville also ran a health campaign to raise public awareness about TB and its prevention. The TB campaign was usually held twice a year, at the beginning of the year around March and towards the end of the year. The public awareness on TB took the form of focused educational sessions at the local churches in the same way as the Cancer Awareness Campaign. The officials from the local clinic were invited to share the TB statistics in the community and facilitated some of these health educational sessions. The participants were encouraged to visit the local clinic to test for TB and were given tips for early TB detection and how they could contribute to curbing the spread of the disease. Another CWP health campaign focused on a cluster of related lifestyle diseases such as diabetes, hypertension and obesity. The CWP in Bekkersdal also had a similar health campaign only on lifestyle diseases. Participants in both communities were encouraged to lead healthy lifestyles and to visit the local clinic for regular health check-ups.



### **6.7.7 CWP Wellness Day and activism against women and child abuse**

In addition to the several health awareness campaigns done under the CWP's aegis, participants in Munsieville also organised the 'CWP Wellness Day' on an annual basis, usually around May. One of the coordinators responsible for the Wellness Day described it as 'the day to remind the community about the importance of good health'. The day was dedicated specifically to promote the physical well-being of the CWP participants and interested community members. The event was held at the local CWP offices with multiple office compartments utilised for the confidential health screenings and tests. The activities on this day comprised of HIV testing, TB screening, weight assessment, blood pressure and tests on sugar levels, breast and testicle examination, tests of cholesterol levels and Pap smears. All the health screenings were conducted by professional nurses from the local clinic and nearby Leratong Hospital. Some people with irregular test results were referred to the local clinic and hospital for further examination and, if necessary, treatment.

The CWP in Munsieville held a series of educational seminars during the nationwide Child Protection Week. Consistent with the broader objectives of the Week, the Munsieville CWP seminars sought to raise awareness in the community about the problem of child abuse and neglect. The central message conveyed in these awareness seminars, facilitated by professional social workers, was that the community had a responsibility to protect its children against abuse, neglect and exploitation. While there was a general appreciation of the information provided on children rights, most community members protested against some provisions in the Children Act such as rights of children over the age of 12 to independently consent to HIV tests and use contraceptives without parental guidance. The CWP in Munsieville also organised mass-based activities against women abuse, mobilising the whole community to fight women abuse. One such event was a massive community march against women abuse which was held in 2013.

### **6.7.8 New ideas and innovative approaches**

The CWP participants in Munsieville had many more new ideas and innovative approaches to solving problems in their community. Some of the ideas included the plans to build partnerships with the sporting academies in Krugersdorp for a structured youth sport development programme in the community, organising chess games for adults and youth, setting up a CWP Help Desk that was envisaged to serve as a one-stop point to advise community members on social (social education), economic (access to entrepreneurial opportunities) and educational matters (career guidance and access to post-schooling education), and establishment of a mobile library in the Mshenguville section of the community because the main community library (Desmond Tutu Community Library) was a bit far and unsafe for the children to visit. These were well-considered ideas, and CWP participants were prepared to work hard towards their realisation.

Perhaps one of the most striking realities in Munsieville was the ability of the CWP participants to build and sustain a strong relationship with other organisations and institutions to provide valuable support to their innovative initiatives. It was interesting to observe that it was the CWP participants who initiated and took the strategic lead in all these initiatives. In most cases, the CWP coordinators took the responsibility of allocating different tasks such as securing a venue, fundraising/ seeking donations, writing official letters to existing and potential partners, organising audio and sound systems and cooking during events. However, some of these innovative activities would probably not have materialised without building durable partnerships. For example, the CWP health campaigns would not succeed without the active support from local churches that provided venues at no cost. In addition, the women's and men's forums would face challenges without the support of the local churches and the NGOs.

## 6.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY

Recent studies show that ELR programmes in the global South are vital in minimising hunger and vulnerability among participating households or individuals. This chapter has demonstrated that the CWP was effective in protecting the livelihoods of the excluded in both communities. However, impact of the CWP income in this regard was negligible unless combined with other sources of income such as social grants. The combination of the CWP income and social grants was particularly vital in helping poor households respond to economic insecurity. The CWP not only guaranteed food security for the participants but also the poor and vulnerable members through its homestead and communal gardens. Beyond protecting the livelihoods of the poor, the CWP work activities were also instrumental in facilitating the ethic of community care and care for the environment. It was also highlighted that the CWP has the potential of creating safer and cohesive communities. In Munsieville, the CWP participants took the lead in innovatively and autonomously steering the programme to respond to a number of local social problems such as substance abuse among the youth and gender-based violence.

The innovation in the design of ELR programmes in the global South points to new transformative potentialities. In the 1930s, the ELR was used as a counter-cyclical intervention primarily as a tool for increased aggregate demand through expanded public investment and productivity. Recent experience in the global South shows that, depending on design, ELR programmes can have multiple positive social multipliers in communities where they are implemented. This chapter contributes to the growing body of literature on the global South that demonstrates that innovatively-designed ELR programmes such as the CWP can do more than protecting livelihoods of the excluded. As argued in Chapter 3, many studies have been conducted which showed the transformative potential of such innovative ELR programmes in the global South such as India's MGNREGA and Ethiopia's PNS.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE MONEY THAT DISAPPEARS IN THE HAND

#### 7.1 INTRODUCTION

While Chapter 6 has demonstrated that the CWP in Munsieville and Bekkersdal was effective in protecting the livelihoods not only of the participants but also vulnerable groups such as the frail elderly and child-headed households through its work focus on food security, the other question is around its potential in promoting the livelihoods of the excluded. Put differently, the other question is: can the CWP participants lead independent and sustainable livelihoods post their participation in this programme? The emerging literature from the global South suggests that, depending on specific designs and a prevailing enabling environment, an ELR programmes could promote ‘graduation’ out of poverty for the excluded.

This chapter critically explores CWP’s potential in promoting the livelihoods of the excluded in Munsieville and Bekkersdal. The chapter shows that most of the participants use their CWP income primarily for basic subsistence needs. Largely due to the low cash transfer in the CWP, most participants could hardly save parts of their wage income for long-term productive activities, started small businesses such as *spaza* shops or embarked on successful job searches. Unlike the EPWP, the training in the CWP was designed mainly for purposes of enhancing participants’ productivity in the programme’s work activities and not for facilitating entry into the formal wage labour. Accordingly, the chapter does not discuss the role of the CWP in improving the labour market performance of participants through the provision of work experience or skills training. Instead, it captures and presents the participants’ aspirational perspectives on how a dedicated training component in the CWP could help them ‘graduate’ into ‘real jobs’.

The chapter argues that the dominant literature on ‘exit’ pathways or ‘graduation’ through the ELR – as extensively discussed in Chapter 3 – provides a very limited theoretical framework for understanding the full potential of the ELR in promoting the livelihoods of the excluded. The existing theories normally focus on three ‘graduation’ pathways, namely: ‘the wage payment, improved labour market performance (as a result of both workplace experience and training) and benefits accruing from the assets created’ (McCord & Farrington, 2008:2). The emphasis on the cash transfer payment and improved labour market performance remains generally individualised as it continues to focus mainly on individual participants’ capabilities to start small businesses on their own or access salaried jobs with the skills acquired during their participation in an ELR program.

However, what about promoting livelihoods through collective forms of economic enterprises such as the cooperatives supported by the ELR programmes? This chapter further argues that the establishment of cooperative enterprises linked to innovatively-designed ELR programmes such as the CWP stands a relatively better prospect of promoting livelihoods of the participants than the dominant individualistic framework hinged on the individual’s ability to engage in self-entrepreneurial activities or skill ‘upgrade’ for easy access to formal wage labour. Insisting on individualistic exit strategies instead of collective ones is unlikely to be effective; particularly where the cash income from an ELR programme can barely fulfil most of the participants’ basic subsistence needs. This chapter presents the case of three nascent and survivalist cooperatives in Munsieville, though not yet fully autonomous or effective – one for sewing, one for beadwork; and the other for organic agriculture – to demonstrate that the more realistic potential of the CWP in facilitating meaningful ‘graduation’ lies not on their individual abilities/opportunities to start small business or acquire skills for easy access into the increasingly scarce and precarious jobs in the formal labour market but on the collectivist economic activities such as cooperative enterprises.

## 7.2 SAVINGS

Although some participants expressed interest part of their CWP income, this was almost impossible because a significant portion of their income was spent on basic foods and other essential households needs. Interestingly, a number of participants in both communities articulated common phrases such as *'chelete ya Seriti [CWP] e felela mo matsogong'* or *'chelete e efelela mo moyeng'* in SeSotho and *'le mali I phelela e sandleni'* in isiZulu or isiXhosa when expressing their shared difficulty in saving some parts of their CWP income. These phrases can loosely be translated to mean 'this money [CWP income] just disappears in the hands' or 'this money melts into thin air'. These phrases not only capture the challenge faced by most participants in saving the income earned from the CWP but also the ripple effect this has on their inability to engage in other livelihood promoting activities such as job searching and start-up of own small businesses.

In Munsieville, only 30 percent of the participants saved-up their household income while a whopping 70 percent were unable to do this. Out of the 30 percent who saved their income in Munsieville, 27 percent saved less than R100, with only 2 percent being able to save between R101 and R200 and 1 percent of the participants indicating that their monthly savings varied from one month to the other. In Bekkersdal, only 17 percent of the participants saved-up their CWP income compared to 83 percent who were unable to save. Of those who were able to save in Munsieville, 12 percent saved less than R100 per month, 4 percent between R101-R200 and only 1 percent over R300 respectively. Participants who were able to save parts of their income (30 percent in Munsieville and 17 percent in Bekkersdal) saved small amounts at home. This is despite all participants having access to bank accounts. Participants who preferred this mode of saving did not use the banks. Saving through banks was the least favoured option because of additional bank charges every time cash was withdrawn and, in some instances, the travel costs to withdraw the cash in the towns.

Cash would be withdrawn from the bank ATMs and some liquid cash cumulatively kept in the house to respond to any minor contingencies. These small amounts of subsistence savings at home were used to purchase food items that ran out and in difficult times. It was common for participants who had homes elsewhere to save money for travel to the countryside to attend to family commitments like traditional ceremonies and funerals. One participant in Bekkersdal saved to commute to a higher educational institution in Roodeport where she was enrolled for a diploma in human resource management (Interviewee 32, July 2013, Munsieville). While others were able to save small amounts at home, it was quite evident that the majority of participants – 70 percent in Munsieville and 83 percent in Bekkersdal – in these communities were unable to save. The inability to save was compounded by the fact that the CWP income itself, even when combined with other sources of income, could barely fulfil all the basic needs of most households. When asked whether she saved-up some of her CWP wage income, a visibly irritated participant in Bekkersdal responded:

‘What kind of a question is that? Saving? Saving what? Do you how much we are paid here? We only get R480 per month [CWP wage rate in June 2010]. With all these responsibilities, it is not possible to save anything, even if I can add the little money I’m getting from the piece jobs I do and the child [support] grant, there is nothing to save. I have the whole family to feed, two children and three unemployed adults...I need to buy them food and other things needed at the house. Do you understand what I am trying to say? I want to save, but this is not possible. The money we get at the CWP just disappears in the hands...you have it now and after few minutes it is gone. That’s how we live our lives, there is nothing more we can do because all the money is used to buy food, pay for electricity and other household needs we can’t avoid’ (Interviewee 35, 09 June 2010, Bekkersdal).

### 7.3 ATTEMPTS TO SAVE

The CWP participants in Munsieville and Bekkersdal recognised the need and importance of saving but most felt that this was beyond their means given their low CWP income. Although most could not save the cash, some participants explored various indirect saving mechanisms to cope with livelihoods insecurity in their households. These mechanisms took four forms, namely: (i) participation in the *stokvels*; (ii) use of ‘lay-by’ accounts to purchase personal and household goods/assets; (iii) investment in funeral insurance policies/burial societies; and (iv) specifically in Bekkersdal, the use of a ‘stamp’ system at the Shoprite branch in Westonaria. All these fixed and indirect saving mechanisms were used primarily for household consumption needs and not for generating productive economic activities such as the start-up of small businesses. The durability of these savings in promoting participants’ livelihoods was negligible. The savings were useful in as far as they helped participants cope with livelihood insecurity and life contingency risks such as death.

Like most black African townships in South Africa, Bekkersdal and Munsieville had *stokvels* (an informal group saving scheme) in which members’ pooled money together for equal collective distribution. *Stokvels* have been going on for many years and remain a popular way of saving in most communities in South Africa (Ranyane, 2014). The *stokvels* where CWP participants belonged varied in terms of size, method of distribution (i.e. cash or goods) and duration (some existed for long periods and others for shorter periods). The *stokvels* in these communities were generally small in scale (usually less than six members), dominated by women, less formal (less hierarchal, no rigid written rules) and were more focused on bulk grocery buying instead of pay-out of lump sums of cash. The preference for bulk buying of goods over cash payment is motivated by the principle of the economies of scale. Even if they were to receive cash as a lump sum, they would not save much when purchasing goods individually from the wholesale and retail stores.



Members of the *stokvels* saved money into a single pool to purchase groceries in bulk. Some *stokvels* bought groceries in bulk for distribution to all members at month end, while others opted for a rotational monthly grocery distribution to individual members and others preferred to save money throughout the year only to buy groceries in bulk at the end of the year just before the start of the festive season. Members of these *stokvels* made significant savings from bulk purchasing from the local wholesale grocery stores. Despite the obvious advantages of *stokvels*, only 12 percent of the participants in Bekkersdal were members of a *stokvel*. This was in contrast to Munsieville where 33 percent of the participants were members of *stokvels*. Similar to home savings, *stokvels* formed part of the broader survivalist strategies designed to protect livelihoods in poor households. In this way, the *stokvels* were more useful in protecting rather than promoting livelihoods.

Perhaps one striking reality about the CWP participants in Munsieville and Bekkersdal was their uncompromising preference to invest in funeral plans. Without a funeral or household savings, poor households are more likely to sell their physical assets (such as furniture, motor vehicles, livestock, or housing) or borrow more money from financial institutions to pay for burial expenses of a deceased family member. This could have long-term deleterious consequences on the livelihoods of effected households, particularly in instances where the deceased was a breadwinner. A funeral plan is a form of insurance that pays for funeral expenses in the event that any of the listed beneficiaries passes away. Depending on a policy choice, a funeral plan can cover as many as 15 members of an immediate and extended family. One of the participants explained that poor households struggle to get the required cash to bury their family members (Interviewee 16, 5 October 2013, Munsieville). A funeral requires immediate access to large sums of ready cash to ensure a ‘decent send-off’ of the deceased. For most participants in both communities, a funeral plan was considered a necessary expense.

The funeral plans were normally taken with established insurance companies, banks and some retail stores. Others preferred local burial societies operating in their communities. Depending on the number of beneficiaries and specific client's requirements, the monthly funeral plan fees could cost anything between R45 to R600 in 2014. In the event of death of a listed beneficiary, the funeral plan would pay for essential funeral expenses such as the caring and preparation of the deceased for burial, a coffin, a marquee, chairs, tables, pots, stove, a cow, airtime/top-up for communication for funeral arrangements, transport of the deceased from the place of passing to their resting place normally within the South African borders, transport for funeral arrangements and for the mourners on the day of the funeral. The major cost drivers were a coffin and a cow (each likely to cost R12 000 or R14 000 in 2014). Some African customs require additional animals such as goats for traditional ritual purposes. Without the readily available cash, the poor struggle to source the huge amounts of cash required for the burial expenses of deceased family members.

Another indirect saving method among CWP participants took the form of lay-by accounts with retail stores. Though very uncommon, at least three participants in both communities preferred to purchase personal goods (clothing) and durable household assets/items (furniture) via lay-by agreements with retail stores. A lay-by entails a formal agreement where a store commits to reserve goods selected by a customer who can only collect the goods later once they have been paid in full. Unlike credit purchases, lay-by sales do not allow a customer to take delivery of goods until the agreed instalments are fully paid. Some South African formal food, clothing and furniture retailers in South Africa use this system, and it is regulated by the Consumer Protection Act of 2008. The three participants (two in Munsieville and one in Bekkersdal) held lay-by accounts in the clothing and furniture stores in Randfontein, Westonaria (in case of Bekkersdal), Krugersdorp and various retail outlets in Key West Mall and Cradle Stone Mall (in the case of Munsieville).

Participants with lay-by accounts were required to deposit at least 20 percent of the total cost of pre-selected goods. This may be for personal goods such as clothing (dresses, sneakers, formal shoes, pants, shirts) and household assets (mostly white goods and sofas) with the payment period varying between 6 to 24 months. Faced with limited access to credit sales and even fears of being 'blacklisted', some CWP participants resorted to lay-by of goods which they could not afford to purchase at once. Like with the funeral plans, CWP participants had to keep up with the instalments for their lay-by accounts to avoid the wasteful cancellation of these accounts. The participants cited the reliability of the predictability of the CWP's income as crucial in helping them keep up with lay-by instalments. Without the regular and predictable income from the CWP, these participants would default on their instalments. This was a departure from the past, before the CWP, where some of their lay-by accounts had to be cancelled due to irregular payments.

Another indirect saving mechanism used by some participants in Bekkersdal was the 'stamp' scheme at the Shoprite store in Westonaria. The 'stamp' scheme is similar to the lay-by in that customers are required to make prepayments to a store for goods. Unlike the lay-by, this stamp-scheme did not require a pre-selection of the goods. Customers were encouraged to save by purchasing a stamp, to the value of R10 per stamp, which was placed onto the manual savings 'stamp' book. All unredeemed stamps maintained their original cash value and could be redeemed at any time to buy groceries from the store. The stamps were likely to be redeemed when the store announced '*specials*' on groceries from time to time (Interviewee 35, 09 June 2010, Bekkersdal). The few who had the Shoprite stamp praised the system for helping them save and giving them an opportunity to tap into the savings anytime they ran out of food or wanted to take advantage of '*specials*' at reduced prices. Some complained that the loss or damage of the savings book with stamps meant that all savings were forfeited (Interviewee 35, 09 June 2010, Bekkersdal).

## 7.4 SURVIVALIST ENTREPRENEURIALISM

The promotion of individual-based entrepreneurship and small businesses is also considered a potential 'exit' or 'graduation' pathway for participants in ELR programmes. As outlined in *Chapter Four*, the CWP is not designed to facilitate entrepreneurship or start-up of small businesses. However, the younger CWP participants were keen on starting their own formal small and medium businesses. These ambitions, unfortunately, hardly materialised because of lack of start-up capital. With the exception of one participant in Bekkersdal, virtually none of the CWP participants who expressed interest in entrepreneurship had a registered business. Unable to secure external financial support or rely on any personal savings from CWP income or kinship networks, the dreams of starting small formal businesses remained elusive. An application for a loan from financial institutions would most likely be rejected owing to insufficient collateral or high risk involved in lending to small businesses.

Most CWP participants in both communities were generally pessimistic about registering their own businesses as this alone was not a guarantee that financial support would later be granted. The idea of registering a business for purposes of seeking the highly contested and scarce funding options demoralised some participants. The process of registering a business was itself a lengthy and costly process which involved substantial administrative work and travel which most participants could hardly afford. Advice could also be required from legal, tax and accounting professionals during the start-up phase of a small business. The administrative work needed services or resources such as computers, access to the internet, e- and telecommunication and other basic tools such as stationery. Participants were unable to use or save their CWP income for these expenses because their income was channelled towards basic household necessities. Only one participant in CWP in these communities was able to save-up some of his CWP income to start a formal small business although the results were disappointing.

Nonetheless, like many with access to regular and predictable income, some CWP participants preferred to use parts of their income to start small, informal, survivalist enterprises. These survivalist enterprises are distinguished by their informality, fragility, minimal start-up capital and their immediate intended purpose as a source of additional income for livelihood security particularly in low-income households (Ranyane, 2014). Serviere (in Ranyane, 2014:14) describes survivalist entrepreneurs ‘as entrepreneurs that are pushed into entrepreneurship by factors which include unemployment, low-income jobs, low educational levels and social marginalisation’. The deepening crisis of social reproduction has seen an ‘increase in the number of survivalist enterprises, primarily in an attempt to escape and/cushion themselves from poverty’ (Ranyane, 2014:31). Unlike the formal businesses whose aim is to maximise profits, the survivalist enterprises form part of the diverse strategies aimed at protecting the livelihoods of the excluded.

The CWP participants who were involved in survival entrepreneurship operated their enterprises from the street corners and residential homes; and sold consumables like *atchaar*, candles, sweets, boiled eggs, biscuits, grilled gibleb kebabs, grilled chicken feet, cigarettes and sweetened ice blocks. These survivalist enterprises did not exactly resemble the conventional micro-convenience enterprises such as *spaza* shops. At least in a typical South African urban setting, a *spaza* shop would more likely sell a variety of essential consumer goods such as essential groceries, cool drinks, basic personal hygiene products, bread, airtime, candles, paraffin, sweets, fruit and vegetables and cigarettes. Whereas the *spaza* shops and tuck shops normally sell a whole range of grocery items, the survivalist enterprises operated by CWP participants in Munsieville and Bekkersdal hardly sold more than two items from their stores, respectively. Most CWP participants did not have adequate income to buy the requisite stock to start *spaza* shops. Instead, they resorted to selling either one or two items on busy street corners or from their own homes.

Survivalist entrepreneurs did not require significant start-up capital because of the limited range of consumer goods sold. Some CWP participants who were survivalist entrepreneurs needed as little as R40 or R50 to purchase the required stock for these enterprises. Unlike a *spaza* shop, the survivalist enterprises did not need a fixed space to operate their enterprises, and there were no fixed operating hours as is the case with most informal enterprises. A *spaza* shop is likely to be built as a separate structure in a section of a residential home. Some *spaza* shops observed operated from one of the rooms in a formal house or shack – with one of the windows used as a shopping counter. The CWP participants who were involved in survival entrepreneurism did not have any of these arrangements. Those who sold their goods from houses kept a limited stock and would easily take it from the house when someone wanted to buy. Those who operated from the streets preferred to move from one street to the other depending on the movement of customers.

The most common goods sold by the street-based CWP survivalist entrepreneurs were grilled chicken feet, grilled giblet kebabs, cigarettes, sweets and biscuits. Male CWP participants were likely to operate street-based survivalist enterprises, with women more likely to run home-based survivalist enterprises. Participation in any of the street-based survivalist entrepreneurial activities was not a complicated process. Take, for example, CWP participants who sold grilled chicken feet and giblet kebabs. Such a survivalist enterprise would simply begin with a walk into the nearest local supermarket to purchase a pack of chicken feet or giblets, a small bottle of cooking oil and spices. Depending on the quantity, all these would probably cost anything under R50 or slightly higher. From there, a small portable *braai* stand would be placed on a busy street during peak hours, the fire lit with wood collected from bushes and the grilling happening simultaneously with sales of the freshly grilled chicken feet or giblet kebabs. In 2013, one grilled chicken foot cost between R1 and R1.50c; while a grilled giblet kebab was slightly higher at R5.

The few CWP participants who were involved in the home-based survivalist enterprises preferred to sell non-perishable consumer items such as cigarettes, *atchaar*, candles (particularly in Bekkersdal during the winter season) and sweetened ice blocks. A participant who may want to run a home-based, survivalist entrepreneurs require as little as R50 as start-up capital to buy a 5kg of *atchaar* for sale from home. Once the bucket of *atchaar* was purchased, the first-time entrants in this home-based survivalist business would ordinarily place a placard at the gate of their houses with a sign simply written '*Atchaar*', with the price attached just below the wording. Community members would then come into the house with containers to buy *atchaar*.

Unfortunately, all these survivalist enterprises had serious shortcomings and defects which undermined their potential in supporting participants' 'graduation' from the CWP. They were beneficial only as a palliative measure against hunger and poverty and could barely function on their own without the continued receipt of the CWP income by participants who were involved in these. This dependent relationship was further complicated by the fact that these enterprises were seldom run in a professional manner with very poor credit control and cash management systems. Some of the daily management problems included the easy granting of credit to neighbours or close community/family members, the stock would sometimes be consumed in the household and accrued profits haphazardly used for other household expenses with no due regard for stock replenishment. These survivalist entrepreneurs had to wait for the next CWP pay to purchase the next lot of stock for their enterprises. Whether or not these enterprises were profitable remained unclear, and almost a non-issue for most participants as long as they were able to meet immediate consumption needs in their households. This situation not only created a relationship of dependency between these very fragile survivalist enterprises and the CWP income, it also threatened their sustainability.

## 7.5 THE SEARCH FOR PRECARIOUS JOBS CONTINUES

For most CWP participants in Bekkersdal and Munsieville, access to formal wage labour was seen as a vital guarantor of livelihood, dignity and social inclusion. Joblessness, on the other hand, was perceived as an anathema that stood in the way of true social citizenship. As shown in Chapter 2, some scholars are sceptical of the development efforts predicated on wage labour. According to Barchiesi (2011), the politics built around the value of ‘jobs’ was deeply entrenched in the political imagination and shaped the practical policy interventions of the post-apartheid government, the left forces and the progressive labour movement in South Africa. Barchiesi (2011:7) describes this pervasive glorification of jobs as the post-apartheid ‘work-citizenship nexus’ in which ‘earning a wage decides the boundary between inclusion and exclusion, privilege and marginality, prosperity and poverty’.

The CWP participants in Munsieville and Bekkersdal tended to assume multiple and vacillating identities as individuals who ‘worked’ or were ‘involved’ in the CWP. The participants variously described themselves as ‘workers’; ‘volunteers’; ‘participants’; ‘community workers’ or ‘community development workers’. The participants who viewed themselves as ‘workers’ believed that, like any other worker involved in wage labour, they too deserved a reward for their labour in the form of a wage/salary. The ‘workers’ were more likely to be older, with low levels of education and no prior experience with wage labour. Those who preferred other identities contested and resisted the identity of the ‘worker’ in describing their involvement in the CWP. Unlike the ‘workers’ who viewed the CWP income as a ‘wage’ or ‘salary’, the ‘volunteers’ or ‘participants’ viewed this income as a ‘stipend’. This group comprised mainly the old, nostalgic former workers and young, hopeful wage earners with higher formal employment expectations. The former included those who yearned for the stable jobs once occupied but now lost, and the latter were likely to be younger participants with hopes for a promised waged-based ‘better future for all’.



Most CWP participants of a working-age, specifically the youth, were ready to take up any job as long as it carried higher wages and the desired social signification. Ironically, these participants knew that most of the jobs they sought promised very little, if anything at all, in terms of security, conditions, rights and benefits. The participants who embarked on job searches generally seemed not to have any realistic expectation of finding stable and secure jobs. They were competing for the very few precarious jobs in the retail stores in the surrounding towns and malls, factories, mines, construction and security companies, and outsourced municipal refuse collection. Those who were successful with job searches would in all likelihood land in casual and precarious jobs – jobs with low pay, little security and limited rights.

While the ‘better a bad job or no job at all’ debate preoccupied scholars, politicians, social movements, policy makers, advocacy groups, business, labour unions; and international ‘decent work’ treaties signed, CWP participants in Munsieville and Bekkersdal were making desperate and practical choices in their localities: they were competing for the scarce, precarious and insecure jobs. This was not only a competition for jobs per se but also the struggle for social citizenship defined by access to formal wage labour. The CWP participants who resisted the identity of a ‘worker’ were more likely to be jobseekers. The CWP work, as they explained, was not a ‘real job’ but a temporary relief to cope with the immediate threats to their livelihoods. Accordingly, the best way out of the CWP’s ‘volunteer work’ was to look for ‘real jobs’ in the industry. Consistent with these sentiments, one of the participants in Bekkersdal explained why she searched for a job:

‘What we have here [CWP] is not a job. We are simply pushing time ... to feed our children so that they don’t go to bed on empty stomachs. Most of us accepted this [CWP] work because we struggled to get proper jobs elsewhere. Even today it is not that easy to find a job. A lot of people from Bekkersdal are looking for jobs, but these jobs are very scarce. This

[CWP] work is our only hope, but you can't rely on this. We are doing voluntary work to develop our community...but this is not a job. So that's why I will continue to search for a job where I will be paid a salary...not a stipend. I understand that getting a job is not easy these days, but it is also useless to sit at home and do nothing. I am young, and this [CWP] cannot be my last stop...no it can't be! I will not stop looking for a good job' (Interviewee 9, 25 July 2011, Bekkersdal).

This reasoning was echoed by many other job-seeking CWP participants. While some participants expressed their common frustration at the vigorous job-search efforts that seldom yielded positive results, some participants were not discouraged from looking for jobs. In Munsieville, 31 percent of the participants had looked for additional paid work in the previous seven days from the day they were interviewed. In slight contrast, 26 percent of the participants in Bekkersdal reported having searched for a job in the same period. The presence of active gold mines around Bekkersdal and the growing hospitality/entertainment industry and shopping malls around Mogale City attracted a lot of desperate jobseekers from Munsieville and the surrounding areas. With an ailing gold mining industry surrounding it, Munsieville did not have a single dominant economic industry that attracted jobseekers *en masse*.

Most participants who were actively searching for jobs (31 percent in Munsieville and 26 percent in Bekkersdal) described this process as an emotionally and financially draining experience. The constant uncertainty involved in searching for a job normally generated intense negative feelings of anxiety. To minimise this uncertainty and associated negative feelings, most of the participants I interviewed pointed out that they searched for jobs only when there was a realistic prospect of securing such a job. They could not afford the cost of job searches as it involved random door-to-door job inquiries from potential employers. A job-seeking effort was most likely to happen when a jobseeker was in possession of reliable

information or a tip off of an available vacancy. Such information was normally transmitted through informal networks with those already in waged jobs likely to be the main conveyors of the information. In cases where a sizeable number of temporary labourers was required, it was common to see scores of CWP participants filling-up mini taxis to apply for the jobs.

Whatever form it took, looking for a job required money to pay for costs such as transport and communication. Eleven percent of participants in Munsieville and 22 percent in Bekkersdal relied on CWP income for their job-search efforts. The breakdown of CWP income expenditure on job searches in Bekkersdal was as follows: 1 percent of participants spent it on cell phone communication, 19 percent on transport, 1 percent on buying a newspaper with jobs advert; and 1 percent on printing. In Munsieville, 7 percent spent some of their income on communication, 1 percent on transport and 3 percent on both cell phone and transport. Others used the income to type and print CVs in the local internet cafés. In 2013, typing and printing in an internet café could cost between R20 and R25.

Transport was the major cost driver for job searches as most job-seeking participants preferred to hand-deliver the CVs to prospective employers, instead of online or electronic applications. Like most urban townships in South African, Bekkersdal and Munsieville are located on the urban fringes outside the city centres and industries where jobs were normally found. This spatial segregation discouraged potential job seekers due to the additional burden of transport costs which was considered unaffordable for most participants. The little income had to be spent sparingly for maximum impact. Some participants had to travel about 30 kilometres to and from their homes in search of formal wage employment. A single return trip to a nearby shopping mall or mine shaft could cost anything between R25-R30 in Bekkersdal and between R18-R26 in Bekkersdal in 2014. Like the lottery, all this money was spent with no guarantee of finding a job.

A participant in Munsieville explained the challenge of transportation costs:

‘All of us want jobs. No one can refuse a job. Every time we hear there are new vacancies we make the effort to submit our applications on time. But travelling to Key West [Mall] or Cradle Stone [Mall] requires a lot of money. Sometimes you are faced with the choice to spend money on transport or to buy food. It is depressing to spend R50 going up and down looking for a job you are not guaranteed to get. To be honest with you, we always regret doing this [i.e. searching for jobs] because we could be using this money to buy *pap* and meat for our children. That R40 you pay for transport just to drop off a CV, which will be shredded within an hour after submission, can buy a *braai pack*. But we keep on hoping to find a job ... sometimes we don’t submit or make follow up on our applications because there is no money’ (Interviewee, 15, 28 September 2011, Munsieville).

As shown in Chapter 6, most of the participants in both communities (79 per cent Bekkersdal and 66 percent in Munsieville) did not have a national senior certificate (Grade 12), thus putting them at a disadvantage in competing for the precarious but better paying jobs that require advanced and/or post-schooling education and training. Participants who succeeded in finding jobs were more likely to be placed in low-paying, insecure jobs. Most job-seeking CWP participants looked for jobs as security guards, cleaners, car washers, restaurant waiters, bus and truck drivers, domestic worker, hotel assistants, subcontracted municipal refuse collectors, unskilled and semi-skilled mine workers; contract work in manufacturing companies; and various other low-paying jobs in the retail sector such as till operator and merchandiser. The precarity that defined most of these jobs did not deter the job-seeking CWP participants from competing and taking up these jobs.

The CWP participants also looked for jobs in the construction industry. These jobs would normally be available at the start of a construction project with the local residents given priority for such jobs. Unfortunately, besides being defined by precarity, these jobs

were insufficient for all the job seekers. By late 2013, Bekkersdal and Munsieville had a number of construction projects underway which included road construction in and around the communities; and building of public or private buildings. Such infrastructural activities required seasonal labourers whose employment contract would be terminated at the end of a project. There was also a demand for security guards from the private security companies. In Munsieville, there were two security companies – namely Bosasa Security Services and G4S which were popular potential employers in the security industry. Unfortunately, only a few participants could apply for such security guarding jobs because they required a grade 12 and relevant basic certification in security management.

Participants also targeted jobs in the nearby booming hospitality industry and the shopping malls (Key West Mall, Cradle Stone Mall) and heritage resources such as the Cradle of Humankind World Heritage Site, particularly those from Munsieville. This industry offered low-paying and insecure jobs such as housekeeping in hotels and lodges, cleaners, security guards, waiters in restaurants, till operators, merchandisers and other general occupations. However, partly due to their low levels of education, some participants could not qualify for jobs such as being chef, supervisor, receptionist and tour guides because they required advanced training. Others searched for jobs in the subcontracted municipal refuse collecting company, manufacturing factories and commercial transportation companies. Other job-seeking CWP participants looked for jobs as domestic workers in the nearby residential areas such as Randfontein, Simunye and Westonaria (in Bekkersdal); and Rent de Val, Dumpenaar, Monument, Chancliff, Furtherbrook and Krugersdorp, and as far as Roodeport and Witpoortjie (in the case of Munsieville).

The presence of gold mines in and around Bekkersdal tempted some CWP participants to search for jobs in these mines. There is also a huge employment expectation for the unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in the mines. In May 2013, the South Deep gold mine

in Randfontein, for example, received over 6 000 applications from across the country to fill only 200 new vacancies for the underground general workers (Gold Fields, 2013). In addition to the old South Deep Mine, job-seeking CWP participants in Bekkersdal also looked for jobs in other adjacent gold and uranium mines such as the Kloof, Driefontien, Lebanon, Ludron, Elliesburg, Ezulwini, Doornkop; and Cooke 2 and 3 shafts of the Sibanye Gold. Others reported having travelled as far as the platinum belt in Rustenburg, North West province in search of jobs in the mines.

Some participants in Bekkersdal pointed out that job-seeking in the mines, unlike in other industries, was characterised by its own political contradictions which made the attempts to search for jobs even more complicated. Some mines automatically disqualified applicants without a matric certificate or who failed to prove local residence. Getting a signature from the local police branch confirming residence was not always an easy process for some CWP participants who were or perceived to be migrants. The tense politics of who was the ‘resident’ and ‘foreigner’ in Bekkersdal, compounded by lack of required education requirements, discouraged some CWP participants from job-seeking.

It turned out, however, that the real source of discouragement and frustration for job-seeking CWP participants in Bekkersdal was not primarily the failure to meet these bureaucratic requirements (local residence and matric) but the contested politics of recruitment and placement in some of the nearby gold mines. The sentiment that one needed a ‘strong connection’ and money to bribe for a job was generally shared not only by job-seeking CWP participants in Bekkersdal but also ordinary community members. Some respondents claimed that jobs in the mines were ‘sold’ by unscrupulous mine human resource officials, working together with some labour union leaders. Saving money for the job-search expenses, such as travel or communication alone was not sufficient to get a job in a mine.

In addition, participants further explained that job seekers had to know the ‘right people’ and have between R3 500 to R10 500 in 2013 – to pay a bribe to be hired in the mines as labourers. Other community members I overheard in a *shebeen* in Bekkersdal spoke enviously about this practice while at the same time venting frustration that they did not have money to ‘buy’ these jobs. The price of the jobs was determined by considerations such as the employer (i.e. whether a prospective worker is to be employed directly by the mine or by a sub-contractor), nature of employment (i.e. temporary/seasonal or permanent) and the salary level/notch (Interviewee 33, August 2010, Bekkersdal). A good permanent job with better pay and benefits was more likely to cost more than a temporary, low-paying job offered by a sub-contractor in a mine (Interviewee 33, August 2010, Bekkersdal). Unfortunately, most CWP could not afford to save such huge amounts of money to ‘buy’ the jobs in the gold mines.

A CWP participant explained this phenomenon:

‘Everyone knows that jobs are sold in these mines. You do not go there [to the mines] without something in your hand. Money talks there, without it you must not even think of setting your poor foot there. There is one former CWP participant who is now employed in one of the mines. I don’t know if he saved the CWP money to buy this job, but everyone knows that jobs are sold at these mines. If you want a permanent job, you must be ready to pay even more for that...it’s tough for us. That’s the way it is’ (Interviewee 40, June 2010, Bekkersdal).

In one of the essays based on extensive ethnographic observations in Bekkersdal, Poplak (2014:66) in a book titled *Until Julius Comes: Adventures in the Political Jungle*, writes about this problematic phenomenon in some mines around Bekkersdal:

In Bekkersdal, one of the major complaints is this one: bang in the middle of Gauteng’s economic engine, when a Bekkersdalian arrives at the human resources department of a gold mine with CV in hand, he or she is expected to proffer R5000 in cash in order to get even a

whiff of a job opportunity. Bekkersdalians know that the HR departments are connected to the unions, the unions to local government, the local government to a fellow called Jacob Zuma. They may share problems with a location in the Northern Cape, but their local hell has its own geography.

Scholarly sociological work (Benya, 2008, 2015; Chinguno, 2013) on the politics of South Africa mining industry also makes reference to the similar bribery practices in other mines elsewhere beyond the borders of Gauteng, albeit underpinned by the influence of local traditional authorities. In a thorough longitudinal ethnographic study of some platinum mines in Rustenburg, Benya (2015:551) notes:

Women and men reported bribing corrupt mine officials or contractors with anything between R3000 for temporary jobs, and up to R10 000 for permanent jobs. Traditional authorities who are tasked with stamping reference letters which confirms that the work-seeker is indeed part of their community have also been reported to solicit bribes.

In another extensive study around the same area in Rustenburg, Chinguno (2013:20) also found that:

Workers also allege that union officials were selling jobs for as much as R7 000. The union apparently has strong influence in who gets a job in the recruitment process. As a result, to get a job, you often have to pay a bribe to union officials.

In 2013, a participant needed to save at least nine full monthly CWP incomes to raise at least R5 000 as a 'proffer' to get the 'whiff' of a job in the mines. This left most participants demoralised and discouraged from their job-search efforts. Others resorted to desperate job searching methods. Instead of sitting at home, at least one participant in Bekkersdal searched for 'piece jobs' on the roadside on the days he was not working in the CWP. While standing on the roadside did not guarantee a 'piece job' for the day, this was seen as a relatively



cheaper option because it involved fewer costs (communication and travel); and bribery for jobs was very unlikely (Interviewee 39, September 2010, Bekkersdal).

Some of the discouraged jobseekers decried the lack of training, work experience and skills as the cause of their failed job-search efforts. For them, the real challenge was not a lack of jobs per se but their low skills and lack of training and work experience. With more skilling, training and work experience, some strongly believed, their prospects of finding a job would be improved significantly. As indicated in Chapter 4, the CWP, unlike the EPWP, was not originally designed to provide work experience, skills or training to enhance access to formal wage labour. However, this was not always clear to the participants with some participants unable to reconcile the ‘training courses’ provided to enhance productivity in the CWP and their expectation that such training would help to improve their chances in the labour market. This challenge is discussed further in the next section of this chapter.

## **7.6 SKILLING, TRAINING AND WORK EXPERIENCE**

‘Training remains a critical delivery area in the CWP. Not only does it equip participants with skills to optimise useful work outputs in their communities, but also equips them with artisan and technical skills that enhance their employability prospects’ (Department of Cooperative Governance, 2016:75).

The role of ELR programme in improving labour market performance has been a subject of scholarly debates. The idea is that an ELR programme could facilitate the acquisition of skills and exposure to the workplace to improve participants’ access to the labour market. This perspective, which McCord (2002, 2005) describes as a ‘supply-side-intervention’, postulates that lack of training; skills and ‘labour market experience’ are the main factors driving joblessness in South Africa (McCord, 2005). This mantra, likely to find prominent resonance in policy documents of the South African government which purport to provide solutions to

joblessness, claims that people are not in jobs because they lack or possess skills which do not match skills required 'in the economy'. But, as Webster (2010:227) reminds us, this thinking goes against Minsky's argument that any 'public policy that favours education and training over job creation' is like putting 'the cart before the horse'.

Despite this, the government of South Africa has put in place an extensive skills policy regime, comprising of an array of legislative and policy frameworks, and institutions to provide skills training. McCord (2002) points out that the government sees joblessness as having various segments which require a differentiated but integrated intervention.

Unemployed graduates, for example, may need internships or learnerships to gain the job experience as they already have relevant educational qualifications. According to the South African government's 'job creation' ideology, the ELR programme could improve the employability of a segment of able-bodied unemployed with poor education levels, very low or lack of skills and training and no work experience.

The training provided for the CWP participants in these communities was designed to enhance participants' productivity in the various work tasks done in the programme. When asked whether they had received training since joining the CWP, 17 percent of the participants in Bekkersdal and only 3 percent in Munsieville indicated they had. In Bekkersdal, 1 percent received training in basic firefighting, 10 percent on HIV/AIDS, 1 percent on how to run an organisation, 1 percent on environmental training, and 4 percent on gardening. In Munsieville, 3 percent of the participants reported having received training on how to live healthy lifestyles. Further interviews revealed that Bekkersdal participants also received training on personal financial management, computer literacy, traffic policing, Phuza Wize-focused on alcohol abuse, child abuse, football coaching, and home-based care. In Munsieville, participants also received training on scholar patrolling, HIV/AIDS,

caregiving (HBC), early childhood development, agricultural skills, sewing, building, plumbing, plastering, personal financial management and how to form a cooperative.

The training that received certification was normally facilitated by external professional training service providers and would be provided in areas such as home-based care and early childhood development. Surprisingly, although some participants attended some training sessions organised by the CWP, they insisted that they had not received training as a protest against what some described as ‘useless training’. Despite the widespread frustration that the CWP did not deliver on their expectation of giving them skills for easy access into waged jobs in the industry, most participants did not consider any training without certification as worthy. This was further complicated by the fact that the managers and coordinators in both communities would easily call any life-skills, information-sharing session as ‘training’. Short workshops focused on personal improvement aspects such as personal financial management, how to start small businesses, prevention of lifestyle diseases such as TB or diabetes would easily be announced or claimed as ‘training’.

Notwithstanding this, some other participants believed that the CWP’s ‘soft training’ in the CWP was responsible for their difficulties in finding formal wage employment. One of the participants in Munsieville expressed this frustration:

‘I understand I did not go that far with education. But why must I be punished for not having education? Does it mean I must die here [in the CWP]? I also want to live a normal life. Every time I try to search for a job I am told that I do not have this and that...and that I must go back to school. I thought these people at the school board [CWP] would assist us to with the training, but I don’t see that happening. They call us for training just to tell us that drinking [alcohol] is not good for my health...how does that help me find a job? Tell me, can you hire me because I know that alcohol and drug abuse is bad for me?’ (Interviewee 38, 15 November 2011, Munsieville).

Many other participants made passionate pleas for the CWP to provide ‘real training’ so that they could find ‘real jobs’. The demand for ‘education’ or ‘training’ was the second most important area identified for improvement by most CWP participants in both communities – second to the popular demand for better pay in the CWP. Probably influenced by the dominant discourse, as championed by their government that regarded lack of skills and training as the reason why they were jobless, the younger participants believed that the CWP should equip them with ‘right skills and education so that we don’t struggle when we look for jobs’ (Interviewee 44, October 2013, Munsieville). A younger participant in Munsieville, in his late 20s, strongly believed that the lack of training in the CWP was responsible for his inability to find a job (Interviewee 37, 15 November 2011, Munsieville). In his study of the CWP in a community in Johannesburg called Bramfischerville, Mathende (2015) also found a huge demand for the inclusion of a training component in the CWP.

## **7.7 PROMOTING LIVELIHOODS THROUGH COOPERATIVES**

This dissertation argues that the establishment of cooperative linked to an ELR programme holds greater potential for promoting the livelihoods of the excluded. This section discusses three survivalist CWP-linked cooperatives in Munsieville: Zamokuhle Agricultural Cooperative, Nanogang Basadi Cooperative and an unnamed beadwork worker cooperative. The discussion provides details of each of these CWP-linked survivalist cooperatives to demonstrate how they represent not only a promising modality for promoting livelihoods but also a potentially new pathway for cooperative development. The COPAC (2010: 25) identifies ‘four contexts within which a worker cooperative can develop’, namely: worker take-over, trade union-linked, seeded through workers’ movements, and self-development. The development of the CWP-linked cooperatives does not fit any of the conditions envisaged in this typology. Their development did not involve a factory take-over nor were they seeded by the solidarity or trade union movement. They also do not fit the self-

development path either given that they emerged within the context of the CWP and cannot be considered as a sole, independent initiative of worker members.

The case of the CWP Munsieville illustrates the fact that the development and sustainability of CWP-linked cooperative cannot be taken for granted where the programme operates. In Bekkersdal, the attempts by participants to form a CWP-linked cooperative failed dismally. In 2013, a group of CWP participants in Bekkersdal tried to set-up a cooperative – named Letsema Cooperative – but it failed to take off. The Letsema Cooperative was supposed to be an organic agricultural cooperative for fresh produce on a small-scale; the plan was to plant and sell vegetables to community members at ‘reasonable prices’ (Interviewee 34, 29 September 2014, Bekkersdal). The participants cited lack of commitment from those involved, lack of financial resources and training as reasons for the failure of the Letsema Cooperative.

In an attempt to understand the relative capability of CWP participants in Munsieville to form and sustain the three survivalist cooperatives, in comparison to the failure of their counterparts in Bekkersdal, it is argued in Chapter 8 that the operationalisation of the OW methodology in Munsieville can help us understand this important variance. The International Cooperative Alliance (in COPAC, 1999:2) defines a cooperative as ‘an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet the common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise’. Williams (2013:2) similarly defines cooperative as a ‘worker owned and managed enterprises that operate on principles and values that place human needs at the centre’. Unlike typical business enterprises, cooperatives ‘are not-for-profit in the sense that voting in a cooperative is not based on the number of shares owned but instead on the universal principle: one member, one vote. While cooperatives make a profit, this is subjected to the logic of member needs’ (Satgar, 2007:3).

Although all cooperatives are built on common principles and values such as ‘democratic ownership, one-member-one-vote, collective decision making, and an ethic of cooperation and solidarity’ (Williams, 2013: 2), they can operate in different contexts and can take different forms. According to Nathan (2012:4), a cooperative ‘could exist in the context of both market and non-market economies, and in capitalist and non-capitalist contexts, and its members (co-operators) could be either bourgeois or proletarian in social composition’. Nathan (2012:5) further makes a distinction between three common types of cooperatives in South Africa, namely: consumer (‘which exist with intention of servicing the needs of their members as buyers’); producer (‘those that focus on the production of goods and services through cooperative and democratic means’) and worker cooperatives (where cooperative members serve as both owners and workers in an enterprise). The CWP-linked cooperatives in Munsieville best fit the worker type.

Although dissimilar in some respects, the CWP-linked cooperatives in Munsieville shared similar characteristics. First, their establishment was motivated by the desire to resuscitate previously failed attempts by worker members to form cooperatives on their own outside CWP’s support and its organisational framework. Lack of start-up capital and market access were cited as the main reasons for the previous failed attempts at cooperative development. Second, the membership was open to any CWP participant who wished to join, and there were no joining or membership fees required. All worker members were CWP participants, even though there were no formal restrictions that prohibited non-CWP participants from joining. Third, these cooperatives could best be characterised as ‘survivalist’ because the annual turnover was very low – in the range of R3 000 to R5 000 per annum. Since their formation, the worker members agreed that no wages would be paid until there was a substantial surplus. The surplus was normally used to buy more tools and other

materials needed in the cooperative. Only one of these the cooperatives was registered, while the other two had already initiated processes towards their official registration.

Third, although there was organisation within these survivalist cooperatives, the structures for democratic control by worker members were not fully institutionalised as none of the cooperatives had solid governance structures like a board, committees or worker-owner assemblies. Finally, the three CWP-linked cooperatives in Munsieville did not properly undertake thorough ‘ground work phase’ before they could start their operations. The COPAC (2010:37) defines ‘ground work’ as ‘the first phase to undertake when setting up [a] worker cooperative...it is the planning phase before you actually start a cooperative’. The inability to follow these steps partly accounts for some of the challenges in these cooperatives, particularly the lack of markets for their products. The choice of work, for example, was not informed by members’ consideration of factors such as the market access and none of these cooperatives had a coherent business plan before they were established.

### **7.7.1 Zamokuhle Agricultural Cooperative**

Established in July 2012 by 15 CWP participants who ‘shared the passion for agriculture’, the Zamokuhle Agricultural Cooperative produced different types of fresh organic vegetables like spinach, peppers, beans, peas, carrot and beetroot. The cooperative operated from a yard of a local high school called Thuto Lefa after the cooperative successfully negotiated and entered into a 10-year fee-free land lease agreement with the school management. The preparation of the vegetable garden beds followed a strict eco-centric method which involved the use of organic waste as compost to improve the quality of soil, thus reducing the heavy dependence on fertilisers. The Zamokuhle Cooperative did not apply pesticides on the vegetable gardens. The vegetable garden beds were raised because of the high acidity in the soil, meaning that more soil was put above the ground level of the garden beds.

The organic vegetables were usually sold to community members at low prices compared to the higher prices in the local *spaza* shops, street vendors and commercial retail stores. It was common to see community members walk in groups into the school yard to buy the bulky harvested fresh vegetables from the Zamokuhle Cooperative. While the local households remained the main source of the market for its products, this cooperative also received irregular requests for bulk supplies of vegetables from small businesses in the surrounding towns which specialised in freshly pressed organic vegetable and fruit juices. Some of the organic vegetables were donated to the Thuto Lefa High School to supplement the high-starch government school feeding programme. In addition to providing the land at no cost, the school also paid for the electricity costs for the running the borehole system used to pump water used to water the vegetables.

Like other cooperatives supported by the CWP, the worker members in this cooperative did not have to raise start-up capital on their own. They relied on the CWP's inputs, tools, resources and administrative support to form the Zamokuhle Cooperative. Some worker members pointed out that, without CWP's support, their goal to start a cooperative would most likely have failed as was the case with most previous unsuccessful attempts.

A long-standing worker member of the Zamokuhle Cooperative explained how the CWP helped them to establish their cooperative:

'We are poor people and we cannot afford to buy tools on our own. We tried to form an agricultural cooperative in 2008. This cooperative failed because we did not have enough money to start it. We sent many letters asking for donations, but we never received any assistance. We ultimately decided to make individual contributions from our pockets. I think we were 12...we agreed to contribute R50 each to buy basic garden tools and seedlings. Unfortunately, only four people made this contribution. Our plan to start a cooperative



became a reality only with the support from Seriti [CWP]. Seriti [CWP] has opened doors for us' (Interview 48, September 2014, Munsieville).

The CWP in Munsieville provided initial material resource assistance in the form of garden tools such as a pick, spade fork, spade, seedlings and a rake when the cooperative was formed in 2012. The cooperative would occasionally use other tools allocated for the main CWP agricultural work and were also allowed to use local CWP offices and resources for their meetings and any other basic administrative work. In addition to these, the CWP coordinated the provision of training on the best farming methods although such training was not intended to directly benefit the cooperatives per se as it was provided to all CWP participants irrespective of whether they were involved in the cooperatives. The cooperative later received additional resource assistance from the Gauteng Department of Agriculture and Rural Development which provided additional five spades, five garden hoes, five forks, five water pipes, five sprinkling water cans, a wheel barrow, electric water borehole, fencing, seedlings and a container for storage of the equipment (Interview 48, September 2014, Munsieville). By the end of 2014, the cooperative had 11 worker members and was relatively functional and organised.

### **7.7.2 Nanogang Basadi Cooperative**

The Nanogang Basadi Cooperative was established in 2013 and focused on sewing and knitting. Among the three, promising survivalist CWP-linked cooperatives in Munsieville, this was the only cooperative with a registration certificate (registered in 2015), bank account and a tax number. The delivery of 50 sewing machines in 2013 by the Seriti Institute – the CWP implementing agent in Munsieville until 2015 – to support both the work of the CWP and the Beadwork Cooperative, unleashed a new creative energy in the cooperative and the CWP; and saw the expansion of the product range. The product range was dynamically

diverse and included products such as pillow cases, shirts, trousers, handbags, portable door stoppers, serviette boxes, oven mitts, stove plate covers, cushions covers, school uniforms, aprons, vests and scarves. The cooperative enjoyed the flexibility of switching from one product to another depending on the changing market trends.

This cooperative had serious challenges in terms of accessing the markets and did not have the advantage of a localised market for its products. Like with the other two survivalist cooperatives, the lack of markets was the key challenge for this cooperative. Save for the very infrequent requests for tailoring of small quantities of uniforms from the Thuto Lefa High School, this cooperative did not have any competitive edge for its products. Instead of buying the products from the cooperative, community members tended to prefer to buy branded clothing and products from the retail stores in the surrounding towns and malls. For some community members, it made more sense, for example, to buy Levis Strauss or Soviet jeans in a retail store in Krugersdorp or any of the nearby malls than to buy a ‘no name’ pair of jeans from the cooperative. The lack of a local market effectively rendered this cooperative a tailor shop for the CWP uniforms for participants. This was so despite the fact that this 9-member cooperative had mastered the sewing and knitting skills; and produced quality products.

Similar to the experience of the organic agricultural and beadwork cooperatives, this cooperative enjoyed meaningful institutional and resource support from the CWP when it was established. One of the worker members explained:

‘Seriti [CWP] has brought true development in Munsieville. We had the sewing skill, but we did not have money to start a cooperative or small business on our own. I am happy that Seriti [CWP] gave us the chance to do what we have always wanted to do. We tried many times in the past to start a cooperative for sewing, and all our plans did not succeed. I was so happy when the Seriti [CWP] people donated the 50 sewing machines to this community in 2013.

That for me was the beginning of development in this community [Munsieville]'. (Interview 51, February 2014, Munsieville).

### **7.7.3 Beadwork Cooperative**

The other CWP-supported cooperative focused on beadwork and craftwork, and did not have any specific name as it awaited the selection of a name from the six names submitted for its registration. Established in 2010, the Beadwork Cooperative experienced teething problems of massive drop-out because some worker members were frustrated by the lack of immediate financial rewards from the cooperative (Interview 43, June 2013, Munsieville). Most of the worker members in the Beadwork Cooperative received advanced skills training in beadwork and craftwork through their ordinary participation in the CWP. The cooperative was intended to address the high turnover of participants who acquired the skills in beadwork and craftwork in the CWP but could not use their skills elsewhere. Among the range of the products produced by this cooperative were hand-crafted beaded items such as badges, bracelets, key holders, plate mats, safety pin pendants, table decorations, rings, earrings, necklaces, spoons and cutlery, serviette rings, ties, photo frames, pencils and pens.

The scope of products was so dynamic that this range was not static and could change at any given moment. This cooperative was not only an economic enterprise but also a people's centre of excellence where beadwork and craftwork skills were shared and transferred among the worker members. Although it had its own strengths, the Beadwork Cooperative was among the least effective cooperatives with very weak internal administrative and governance structures. At times, the cooperative lacked stable leadership as the vacillating worker members refused to take responsibility for most of the challenges in this cooperative. It was difficult to establish the exact number of worker members in this cooperative because number fluctuated on a daily basis between 6 to 14 worker members.

This cooperative relied heavily on the local market for its products. The market for beadworks was not easily accessible with most households in Munsieville prioritising essential household needs over what was generally considered a luxury they could live without. At times visitors from the CWP implementing agent, the government or independent institutions and NGOs operating in the community such as Project Hope would also buy some of their products. Some CWP participants also bought the CWP hand-crafted beaded badges and would put them on their work overalls when on duty. Like with the other two cooperatives, the CWP provided the basic institutional infrastructure and support, material and space for the operations of the Beadwork Cooperative. Until the new implementing agent (Dhlahla Foundation) took over from the Seriti Institute in 2015, the cooperative enjoyed regular supplies of materials such as beads, threads, glue and needles and scissors. Without the support from the CWP, this cooperative would probably have failed.

## **7.8 DEPENDENCE: STRATEGIC THREAT**

Similar to many cooperatives in South Africa which were established under different contexts and conditions, the survivalist CWP-linked cooperatives in Munsieville were not perfect and had their own share of challenges. Whether intended or unintended, perhaps one of the strategic threats they confronted was a very thin line that existed between their work and that of the CWP. The relationship of dependence was glaring and inevitably created other problems for their day-to-day operations. These cooperatives were required to submit monthly reports to the CWP local office on their activities although in reality, this requirement appeared to be a mere administrative compliance issue than any real attempt at exerting undue government control over the nascent cooperatives.

As mentioned earlier, all worker members in the three survivalist cooperatives were also CWP participants. The CWP participants who were assigned agricultural duties in the

CWP tended to join the Zamokuhle Agricultural Cooperative instead of the Beadwork Cooperative, and those allocated CWP sewing duties were more likely to join the sewing cooperative. Because participants generally preferred to join CWP-linked cooperatives which focused on the work they were already assigned in the CWP, this generated an untenable situation where some worker members were supervised by their fellow worker members who were coordinators in the CWP. The intermingling roles as a worker member in the cooperative and a participant (or coordinator) in the CWP generated a sense of unease for some worker members who felt that worker members who were also CWP coordinators wielded some residual power over decision-making in the cooperatives by virtue of their supervisory roles in the CWP.

Some felt that the CWP work hierarchy informally spilt over to these survivalist cooperatives thus giving worker members who were CWP coordinators some informal yet powerful leverage over the operations of the cooperatives. In the long run, this could lead to a problematic situation of unequal power relations which could undermine the democratic principle upon which true cooperatives must be built and sustained. The Nanogang Basadi and the Beadwork Cooperative operated from the CWP premises and relied on its resources. None of these cooperatives owned the working equipment and had to rely on the equipment provided by the CWP. The CWP local offices, which housed the working equipment, were normally accessible during official CWP office hours. Consequently, the work of the cooperative was dictated by the operational logistics of the CWP work structure.

This relationship of dependence was seemingly normalised with some members of these cooperatives expecting continued material and institutional support from the CWP. This was particularly evident when the new implementing agent – Dhladhla Foundation – discounted the supplies of raw bead and craftwork material to the Beadwork Cooperative. The apparent organisational deterioration of the Beadwork Cooperative is partly attributable

to the discontinued material support from the CWP, although it continued to operate from the CWP premises. In hindsight, it appeared that the worker members in the three cooperatives had not imagined a reality where their cooperatives could survive on their own without reliance on the CWP. Unable to generate sufficient income or secure external financial support, at least with the exception of the Zamokuhle Agricultural Cooperative, these cooperatives continued to rely on the CWP for their survival.

All these challenges coalesce into one common problem: lack of reliable access to the markets. This problem significantly constrained the ability of these survivalist cooperatives to become autonomous and self-sustaining enterprises. Recent research also identified lack of market access as the main problem for the sustainability of the CWP-linked cooperatives (Chabalala, 2013; Dichabe, 2015). In her study of the CWP in Erasmus, a community in the North West province, South Africa, Dichabe (2015) suggests that this challenge could be addressed by providing an integrated intergovernmental and multi-departmental support to all CWP-supported cooperatives. Dichabe (2015:v) further proposes as a solution the enactment of '[government] legislation mandating all relevant [government] departments to consolidate efforts to provide support and guidance to specific cooperatives'. At present, there is no legislation or framework at a local government level to providing support specifically to the CWP-linked cooperatives. In another similar study on multiple cooperatives in the Elias Motsoaledi Local Municipality in the Limpopo Province, Chabalala (2013:32) suggests that the best way to ensure the survival of cooperatives supported by the government's Cooperative Incentive Scheme (CIS) is to build synergy between this scheme (CIS) and the CWP, and that the 'government should take the lead in this regard'.

However, the role of government in supporting cooperatives should not be viewed as unproblematic. Whereas the government has an important role to provide support, this should be done in a manner that does not emasculate the CWP-linked cooperatives of their natural

characteristics as truly worker-owned, democratic, member-driven and self-sustaining enterprises. Scholarly work on cooperatives warns of potential dangers of governments' involvement in cooperative development (Mazibuko & Satgar, 2005; Satgar 2007). Based on the extensive literature on experiences of cooperatives across the world, Mazibuko and Satgar (2005:31) strongly argue that government support should be provided 'in a way which eliminates dependence and creates self-financing impulses within the cooperative movement'. With reference to the Kwazulu Natal provincial government's 'instrumentalist approach' to cooperatives, Satgar (2007:14) further argues that, if not properly managed, government's support to cooperatives may lead to a 'dangerous' situation in which:

the cooperatives are not developed in accordance with member needs and capacities but in terms of government objectives. This is dangerous because it does not cultivate the autonomous and independent impulses within the cooperative for sustainability. ... The challenge for government is to find a balance between ensuring it provides strategic enabling support while cooperatives are initiated around opportunities identified by aspirant co-operators (a women's group, youth groups, workers in trade unions, community groups and so on) rooted on their own organic impulse of collective effort and solidarity.

The case of Munsieville is instructive as it allows for new reflections and thinking about the role of ELR programmes in promoting livelihoods through cooperative development. However, as discussed in this chapter, the current trajectory of CWP-linked cooperatives in Munsieville is certainly unsustainable, unless they are to remain locked in their present precarious and survivalist path. Although these cooperatives were neither completely independent/autonomous from the CWP nor fully effective, they nevertheless promised a viable 'graduation' option from the CWP over dominant individual-based theoretical approaches which tend to put emphasis on skills training and individual entrepreneurship.

It was necessary that these survivalist cooperatives assumed a visible degree of independence from the CWP, although the important role played by the CWP in the development of these cooperatives cannot be underestimated or its good intention questioned. The CWP must continue to create the enabling environment for cooperative development. Besides creating the conducive environment for the building of collective solidarity among participants, the CWP also provided material support for these cooperatives. Lack of start-up capital is one of the major obstacles to cooperative development. By making available the office space and work equipment and material such as garden tools, seedlings (for Zamokuhle Cooperative), the 50 sewing machines (for Nanogang Basadi Cooperative), beads, threads, needles, glue and scissors (for the Beadwork Cooperative), the CWP provided the necessary conditions for the development of these cooperatives. Without this support, these cooperatives would most likely disintegrate.

## **7.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY**

This chapter has explored the potential of the CWP in promoting the livelihoods of the excluded in Munsieville and Bekkersdal. The chapter has shown that very few participants were able to save their income for investment in productive assets, with some opting for the various fixed saving mechanisms that helped them cope with hunger and poverty. Whereas some participants used some of their income to search for ‘real jobs’, very few were successful in finding jobs. Despite the structural nature of unemployment, some participants believed that the CWP needed to have a dedicated training component in its core design to improve their labour market performance. This chapter has argued cooperative development through the ELR promises a more viable ‘graduation’ pathway than dominant individualistic pathways that tend to put emphasis on the development of small businesses or improved labour market performance through skills training.



## CHAPTER 8

### THE MISSING PUZZLE

#### 8.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous two chapters explained that CWP participants in Munsieville undertook a number of innovative social activities, and managed to establish three relatively functional CWP-linked worker cooperatives compared to the failed attempt in Bekkersdal. On the social front, the participants in Munsieville embarked on creative initiatives such as school holiday programmes, innovative involvement of high school-going learners in the programme while simultaneously involving them in developmental, social activities and the establishment of the Men's' and Women's Forum. As argued in Chapter 6, the participants had to run most of these programmes on their own and, sometimes, with their own resources, although the activities were done within the CWP framework.

The case of Munsieville points to the potentialities of the CWP as an instrument for autonomous development from below. This case shows that a properly-designed ELR programme could play an important role in communities beyond its primary ameliorative role in poor communities. This chapter attempts to analyse the relative ability of the CWP in Munsieville to embark on the creative and innovative community development initiatives which were absent in Bekkersdal. The chapter argues that the application of the OW methodology in Munsieville in 2007, before the launch of the CWP site in 2008, can help us understand this important variation. The chapter begins by outlining the theoretical underpinnings of the Organisation Workshop (OW) with reference to Clodomir Santos de Morais's theoretical work, followed by a description of how the OW works in practice and how it was actually operationalised in Munsieville in 2007, and then a discussion on how the OW can help us understand the presence of the innovative impulses in Munsieville.

This chapter contributes to the emerging research on the CWP which points to the positive spin-offs of the OW in communities where the launch of a CWP site is preceded by this methodology. In their study of the CWP site in Bokfontein, a community in the North West province, Langa and Von Holdt (2011) found that the OW helped in building social cohesion and in quelling xenophobic violence. They further argue that the operationalisation of the OW prior to the launch of the CWP assisted this community to ‘deal with their anger and the effects of collective trauma resulting from forced removals and intra-community violence.... It was evident that the OW increased social cohesion, strengthening local community leadership and a collective approach to problem-solving’. They concluded that, without the operationalisation of the OW in Bokfontein, some of these important outcomes would not have been realised, particularly in such a community with a long history of forced removal and high levels of poverty and unemployment.

In an extensive evaluation study on different inception processes used to introduce the CWP in communities, Singizi Consulting (2010) found that the OW was effective, particularly when applied in fractured communities.

The report by the Singizi Consulting (2010:45) asserts that:

The evaluation has noted that the OW methodology has been run in communities that were initially so divided that councillors were afraid to enter and that through the OW process, the community began to work together and with the council. This highlights the potential of the OW methodology to support development work in areas where conflict has made real achievements difficult and illustrates that once there is increased social cohesion, it then becomes possible to implement the CWP where otherwise this may not have been the case.

## 8.2 THE MORAISEAN MODEL: LEARNING ABOUT ORGANISATION

The OW method or ‘Clodomir’s method’ was founded by a Brazilian sociologist and activist Clodomir Santos de Morais (1928-2016). The methodology was organically born from the grass-root working class struggles for agrarian reforms in the 1950s in north-eastern Brazil under the banner of the Peasant Leagues (*Ligas Camponesas*), a vibrant and revolutionary agrarian social movement led by, among others, the charismatic and influential socialist leader Francisco Juliao (Andersson, 2004). As a co-founder of the Peasants Leagues movement, de Morais was not a passive observer but an active participant in these struggles. During the course of the struggle, many secret educational classes and meetings were organised to build consciousness and capacity among the peasants. The foundations of the OW methodology can be traced back to the ‘unanticipated consequence’ or ‘unexpected effect’ of one of the secret courses or workshop held in 1954 in Recife, the capital of the province of Pernambuco (Andersson, 2004:129).

Attended by 45 people, the 30-day course or workshop was organised ‘for the middle-level management’ with specific focus ‘on agrarian reform and law’ (Andersson, 2004:129). The 45 participants had to share a family house designed to accommodate about seven people. The classes were held at night while taking care not to trigger any alarm particularly given the heavy presence of state security forces in the city of Recife at the time (Andersson, 2004). At the end of this 30-day long course, de Morais was particularly intrigued not by outcomes of the originally stated goals of the course but his observation that ‘each participant had developed strong organisational skills!’ (Andersson, 2004:129). De Morais (in Andersson, 2004:129) reflected after this course: ‘I learned nothing new about the theory as it was a pretty elementary course...but I learned an enormous lot in matters of organisation, above all how the existence of commonly owned resource pool became a capacitating factor in the organisation of popular movements’.

The ‘unexpected effect’ of the secret Recife course became more apparent when de Morais visited ‘the participants in their home villages’ (Andersson & Richards, 2015:27). In the course of these visits, de Morais observed that some participants ‘had forgotten some parts of what they learned about agrarian law, while some shared that they had learned little or nothing that they did not know already’ (Andersson & Richards, 2015:28). But one important outcome was clear: the course enabled the participants to learn about organisation. The sharing of a small accommodation space required organisation. This environment unwittingly generated organisational skills among participants who had to ‘organise’ important aspects of ‘daily life’ such as sleeping, laundry, sanitation, bathing, cooking, washing dishes, cleaning the house, reproducing and sharing of the course material and preparations for course, and recreational activities (Andersson & Richards, 2015:26). It was this experience that inspired de Morais to ‘create a method where more people could learn about organisation’ – the OW methodology (Andersson & Richards, 2015:28).

The task of defining any method or methodology immediately faces the insurmountable challenge of capturing its full meaning in a one-sentence definition. The OW methodology is not immune to this challenge. To fully define and comprehend the OW methodology, any reader would need to appreciate the historical context for its inception, key philosophical assumptions and systematization. Sobrado (2000:18) defines it as a ‘practice of organisational capacitation that unleashes a prodigious amount of social synergy’, while Andersson et al (2017:2) describes it as ‘a practical exercise in fostering organisation in a large group’. Andersson (2004:133) further provides a relatively nuanced definition: ‘The OW is an experiential methodology that combines training in enterprise organisation with vocational training, usually around the creation of infrastructure or other productive activities’. The main goal of the OW is to ‘develop the autonomous capacities of the poor’ (Sobrado, 2000:21) by involving them in real practical activity over a period of time.

Any effort to expound on the OW methodology would be inadequate without a brief discussion on how it complements Paul Freire's concept of 'conscientisation' or 'critical consciousness'. A close friend of Freire with whom he shared a tiny prison cell in 1964 in Recife, de Moraes was a firm proponent of the pedagogy rooted in the principles of democratic, mutual and dialogical learning in a 'real-life practice' (Sobrado, 2000:17). Like de Moraes, Freire was a fervent advocate of a democratic and dialogical approach to learning where participants 'learn by doing'. Freire used the term 'critical consciousness' as his critique of a pedagogical model based on what he identified as the 'banking concept of education' where the teacher assumes the role of a 'depositor' of knowledge while the learners become passive 'depositories' (Freire, 1970:72). This approach to learning inhibits the potential to develop critical thinking and consciousness.

Freire argued that this is the pedagogy of the oppressor which reflects the oppression in society where, like learners who are denied the opportunity to think for themselves, the oppressed masses are conditioned to reproduce the hierarchies of the dominant order (Freire, 1970). By reproducing these hierarchies, the oppressor maintains a stranglehold over the consciousness of the oppressed. Unlike animals, human beings are conscious beings equipped with the capacity to be critical and have the power to cooperate and fight for social change (Freire, 1970). Critical consciousness emerges when the oppressed begin to question and collectively resist the status quo. This consciousness does not emerge automatically but through popular dialogical education by and for the oppressed. However, is critical consciousness, on its own, enough? Carmen and Sobrado (2000: xii) remind us of a question once asked by de Moraes: "After conscientisation: what?" and even more importantly: "After conscientisation: how, when and where?" This is the fundamental question that preoccupied de Moraes, and inspired the pioneering of the OW methodology. The answer to this question lies in the de Moraian concept of organisational consciousness.

While critical consciousness remains a transformative concept, for de Moraes, it 'is inadequate in itself to achieve change' (Andersson, 2004:165). De Moraes (2000) argued that critical consciousness should be complemented by organisational consciousness to give real power to the 'oppressed' to effect social change. To use a metaphor, critical consciousness without organisational consciousness is akin to marching troops 'to the top of the hill' with only ideas but no weapons to fight the opponent (Carmen & Sobrado, 2000:xii). In practice, as discussed in the following sections of this chapter, the OW provides working tools and equipment (means of production) to participants to form an enterprise which they are expected to self-manage. De Moraes argued that the lived experience 'under new conditions of existence' in such a collective and self-managed enterprise would ultimately generate a new form of social consciousness – organisational consciousness – because the conditions of life influence peoples' consciousness (Correia & Castelo, 2000).

According to Andersson (2004:154), organisational consciousness 'is reached when the person has the ability to act, together with others, to address a problem or attain particular results, manifesting a 'methodological rationality'. This is in contrast to naïve consciousness rooted in the idealist philosophy which provides supernatural beliefs to explain the causes and solutions to social problems. The OW provides a real object (i.e. a collectively run enterprise for 30 or 40 days) for participants to learn organisation by doing practical work. In this way participants are able to learn the values of cooperativism and solidarity while dismantling the 'artisanal consciousness' – a form of individualist consciousness based on a typical artisanal labour process where the artisan does all the work on their own without any social division of labour or cooperation from other people (Andersson, 2004). The involvement of participants in the OW enterprise provides an environment for the 'cross-cultural' transition from the individualistic 'artisanal consciousness' to the collectivist worker's organisational consciousness (Andersson, 2004:140).

Organisational consciousness is achieved by means of capacitation. The OW becomes a capacitation methodology for ‘developing the autonomous capacities’ of the ‘poor and excluded’ (Sobrado, 2000:21). Capacitation is predicated on an interactive relationship between the ‘object’ (‘the Capacitation Enterprise) and the ‘subject’ – the *capacitandi*, as the participants in the OW are called. By allowing participants the total freedom to run the OW enterprise, this in itself facilitates the capacitation process as the participants (subjects) deal with predicaments and challenges encountered in managing the OW enterprise (object). As Correia and Castelo (2000:46) put it: ‘it is only when the subject has been challenged by the object that the need to change will become obvious to the subject’. The OW must have a team of facilitators or trainers, not teachers or educators, who provide guidance, not instructions, in dealing with some of the problems. In providing non-intrusive guidance, facilitators must ‘avoid all the forms of gratuitous, overbearing authoritarianism that normally come with the possession of superior knowledge’ (Correia & Castelo, 2000:46).

Capacitation is different from education or training. Inspired by Freirean critique of the ‘banking concept of education’, capacitation rejects the undemocratic and non-dialogical pedagogical model where a teacher is seen a depositor and learners (the *capacitandi*) as passive recipients of the deposited knowledge. Education or training ‘take place between the teacher and a learner, aimed at transforming (the knowledge world of) learners...This is done by means of the transmission of an already existing store of knowledge, via channels, to the learner’ (Correia & Castelo, 2000:46). This approach has become common in the contemporary development literature and practice of ‘capacity building’ or ‘building capacity’ where the teacher, ‘in possession of superior knowledge’, transmits knowledge to the (learners) recipients or beneficiaries of social assistance. In the case of capacitation, however, unlike education or training where the teacher is a transmitter of knowledge, ‘it is the object that capacitates the subject’ (Correia & Castelo, 2000:46).

The OW methodology, then known as the Experimental Laboratories, was first operationalised in north-eastern Brazil in the 1960s by its pioneer, Clodomir de Moraes. The experimentation was temporarily halted in 1964 when de Moraes was arrested and imprisoned for two years as part of a state's clampdown against political activists (Andersson, 2004). Upon his release in 1966, de Moraes was forced into exile in Chile where he was hired by the ILO as an agrarian reform regional advisor for Central America in the same year (Andersson, 2004). It was in this capacity as an advisor, and later as an official of the Food and Agricultural Organisation in the same region, that de Moraes operationalised many OWs in Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Honduras, Venezuela and Portugal (Andersson, s.a.). Most of these OWs were operationalised under the aegis of multilateral organisations such as the ILO, FOA and the UNDP (Andersson, s.a.). Since then, subsequent 'Moreisean' (OW) practitioners have reproduced the workshops in various countries cutting across the continents of Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and Europe (Andersson, s.a.).

According to Correia and Castelo (2000:198-199), 'there are four basic types of organisation workshop', namely: centre workshop intended to capacitate 'a cadre of leaders of membership organisations, of cooperatives or agricultural enterprises'; the course workshop for 'organisers of systems of mass capacitation'; the field workshop which usually 'applies in the case of communities and their leaders who have put in a request for their community to be capacitated'; and, lastly, the enterprise workshop which is 'run in the case of an already existing enterprise, which has landed in a situation of crisis'. Correia and Castelo (2015:4) add that the centre and the course workshops 'begin with the instructor's training and they happen under confinement, like a boarding school'. On the other hand, the field and enterprise workshops provide capacitation 'directly to the community, in a place where they live, without the need for confinement'.



All these types of OWs are underpinned by the same principles of organisational consciousness and capacitation, as outlined previously. The OWs in Southern Africa have generally adopted the field and enterprise types which Labra (in Andersson, 2004:132) characterises as the ‘Southern African model’. The OW method has been criticised for paying lip-service to the power relations at the macro-level (Open University, 2005) and for failing to decidedly invoke the Marxist notion of the class struggle (Sobrado-Chaves, 2002 while others chastise it for being ‘more accommodating within the existing oppressive situations rather than directly challenging the status quo’ (Green, 2012:1). In his ethnographic study which, among other objectives, studied the OW on a cooperative, the Genesis, in Nicaragua, Fisher (2010) paints a rather pessimistic account of the outcomes of the OW.

### **8.3 OW IN MUNSIEVILLE**

The OW operationalised in Munsieville mirrors a typical ‘Southern African model’ which combines the field and enterprise types. It was field workshop because it sought to capacitate the ‘excluded’ community of Munsieville to deal with what the people considered to be the pressing social challenges. It was also an enterprise workshop as it sought to provide space for learning organisation through the enterprise which was created – Kgetsu ya Tsie. The OW in Munsieville was formally inaugurated on 12 March and concluded on 11 April 2007 – 30 full consecutive days (Andersson et al., 2007). The operationalisation of the OW in Munsieville had two innovative features not common with most OWs implemented in the past the world over. First, whereas the traditional focus of OWs is generally biased towards ‘job creation’ and ‘income generation by the poor’ through productive activities, like cooperatives (Carmen & Sobrado, 2000), the OW in Munsieville transcended this conventional focus to include local social issues such as HIV/AIDS, child-headed households, drugs and alcohol abuse, community safety, violence and food insecurity (Andersson et al., 2007).

Second, the OW in Munsieville entailed a unique component that included a reality TV show of the workshop which was aired on national television. Some OW activities were video recorded, edited and produced, by a team of film experts, for a public broadcast on television (Andersson et al., 2007). Although this innovation had its own ‘weak and strong points’, in the final analysis, ‘it appears that TV added a strong motivation and enhanced the sense of social responsibility of the team’ (Andersson et al, 2007:26). The presence of the film crew and their work instruments, such as cameras, enhanced the effects of the workshop (Andersson et al, 2007). One of the ‘weak points’ of the TV process was the lack of proper coordination between the OW facilitators and the TV crew resulting in partial and, sometimes, non-filming of some key moments in the workshop (Andersson et al, 2007). This is an area that requires improvement for future innovative use of TV process in the OW.

#### **TYPICAL OW DESIGN PROCESS IN PRACTICE: WITH REFERENCE TO MUNSIEVILLE**

Intended to nurture ‘the process of social and organisational conscientisation (de Morais, 2000:26), Andersson and Richards (2015:15) describe OW as ‘a four to six week-long work experience where participants learn to organise by organising, and which creates enterprises and new ways of living in a community’. In practice, as a ‘method of mass capacitation’ (de Morais, 2000:34), the OW design usually takes place, (i) ‘with forty, a hundred, a thousand or more participants’ [*people*] (de Morais, 2000:26); (ii) who are required to self-manage a “common pool resources” that can be put at the ‘disposal of the participants’ [*means of production*] (de Morais, 2000:26), and (iii) the ‘total freedom to organise themselves the way they consider fit and to use all this to achieve self-reliance as a group’ [*freedom to organise*] (Andersson, s.a.: 13). The workshop involves the creation of a temporary enterprise which runs for four to six weeks, allowing the people to self-manage the means of productions or ‘common pool resources’ under conditions of total freedom.

The idea of operationalising the OW workshop in Munsieville came about around 2005 when the Soul City Institute for Health and Development Communications and the Clinic TV (consisting of Curious TV and Ochre Media) explored the ‘idea of making a reality TV series that tackled social problems like HIV/AIDS, child-headed households, violence, and care of orphans and vulnerable children’ (Andersson et al., 2007:5). The focus of the Soul City Institute was on the reduction of local social challenges that weakened the quality of life in Munsieville. To address these challenges, attention needed to be focused on both the economic and social aspects of peoples’ lives (Andersson et al., 2007). A final decision was taken in July 2006 to pilot the OW in Munsieville, a decision that led to the inclusion of Gavin Andersson from the then Aktiviti Associates to assist with the operationalisation of the workshop. Two other experienced ‘Moreisean practitioners’, Ivan Labra and Isabel Labra, from a network of OW practitioners called Integra Terra had ‘to travel to South Africa to lend support to the Munsieville OW’ (Andersson et al., 2007:5).

Andersson and Richards (2015) observe that, as a process, the initial phase of the OW in Southern Africa normally consists of four key steps, namely: invitation, scoping, ‘getting it together’ and directors’ speech. The invitation comes ‘from organised parts of a community and an agreement to run the workshop’ (Andersson & Richards, 2015:31). This interactive approach ‘starts from the organisational knowledge already embodied in the community’ (Correia & Castelo, 2000:43). The invitation from a community is an important ingredient for the ultimate success of the workshop because the ‘OW works best when leading actors in a community know it has problems, are willing to work to resolve its problems, are united enough to agree on the invitation and are interested to try new methods of community organising’ (Andersson & Richards, 2015:31). It is futile to insist on the operationalisation of the OW in a community where there is insufficient consensus or commitment from all key actors to the running of the workshop (Andersson & Richards, 2015).

In Munsieville, the ‘invitation’ phase involved meaningful discussions with grassroots local organisations initially identified by Clinic TV towards the end of 2006. All the identified local organisations were invited to a workshop on 11 January 2007 at Soul City offices for consultations on the OW crew’s intention to operationalise the workshop in the community. In addition to the workshop, further community meetings were held ‘to engage in discussions with key stakeholders’ (Andersson et al., 2007:5). Following the extensive community consultations and stakeholder engagements, in February 2007, the Facilitators Enterprise (FE) was constituted to deal with ‘the design, preparation and running of the Munsieville OW’ (Andersson et al., 2007:05). The FE is an integral component of the entire OW process – without which there cannot be an OW (Carmen & Sobrado, 2000). The FE is responsible for the non-intrusive advice on the organisational and learning processes that take place in the participants’ enterprise (PE) during the OW. According to Andersson and Richards (2015:33), the second step at the inception of the OW, ‘scoping’, refers to the:

set of tasks that enables the design process and specifically answers the following questions: how many people should attend? What work is there for them to do? What technical training or support will they need? How much money is needed for all this to happen, and where will this come from.

In this way, the OW process itself is driven by what community needs and what they want to learn and ‘under what conditions’ (Correia & Castelo, 2000:43). In conducting the scoping, the FE relies primarily on rigorous consultations with local organisations, individuals and stakeholders (Andersson & Richards, 2015). This is an intensive process that requires the scoping team to ‘spend time in the community, walk around, talk to people, meet with all kinds of community groups and organisations, visit the clinic, the school, churches’ (Andersson & Richards, 2015:33). The end goal is to understand people’s perceptions of existing challenges and what they think could be done to resolve them.

In Munsieville, the FE was called the ‘Development Crew’ and had to undertake preparatory work towards the launch of the PE, ‘the Team’. Among the proposed issues that came out during the extensive ‘scoping’ process were common desires to reduce HIV infections, improve community safety, care for the orphans and vulnerable children; and building resilient livelihoods (Andersson et al., 2007:8). The emergence of these social issues presented a challenge to the OW practitioners given that productive activities, in particular, social enterprises or cooperatives, and creation of infrastructure, are ‘usually the backbone of the OW methodology’ (Andersson et al., 2007:8). Ultimately, it was suggested that the OW would focus on both the productive and social activities. The suggested productive activities included the renovation of the Presbyterian Church to turn it into Community Resource Centre, farming activities, food gardens and tree planting. The suggested social activities identified were HIV prevention and awareness, crime and violence, and taking care of the vulnerable (Andersson et al., 2015).

The third step is what Andersson and Richards (2015:36) describe as ‘getting it together’. At this stage, the scoping process would have given some leads on the major social and economic issues emerging from the meaningful engagements with different organisations and individuals. The first step of ‘getting it together’ involves the identification, registration and assembling of the people who will participate in the OW. This is a group of people who would later run the PE – the real temporary enterprise to be run between four and six weeks – on their own. Ideally, the process of identifying participants should start with a ‘grand assembly of those who have volunteered to participate’ (Correia & Castelo, 2000:43). In assembling the participants, the effort is made to have a ‘right mix of participants’ by maintaining a balance between those ‘with experience of production-line work’ and those with no or little experience; the young and old; and women and men (Andersson & Richards, 2015:36).

In Munsieville, a total of 900 applications were received from prospective OW participants, with only 664 participants making it to the database and about 120 participants selected (Andersson et al., 2007:7;11). The selection process generated dissatisfaction from some community representatives. To address this challenge, ‘a new selection committee with their [community representatives] was formed’ and agreed on new selection criteria. The revised selection required that a) ‘1/3<sup>rd</sup> of participants should come from each of Munsieville’s 3 wards’; b) ‘within each ward, 60% of women and 40% men would be chosen’; and c) ‘within each gender, 50% youth i.e. below 25 years old, 25% ‘middle age’ i.e. from 25-35, and 25% people older than 35’ (Andersson et al., 2007:7). Ultimately the participants were selected, although most did not have prior ‘experience of production-line work; and despite the challenge of getting a ‘full complement of the [participants] until 5 full days after the start of the OW’ (Andersson et al., 2007:7). At this stage, the OW was ready to move to the next stage in which the PE would be established.

The final step for the inception of the OW is the Director’s Opening Speech. At this stage, following the preceding successive phases of invitation, scoping and ‘getting it together’, ‘all the equipment, tools, materials, technical resources and money to pay labour’ are ready to be handed over to the OW participants (Andersson & Richards, 2015:37) to run the PE. Other auxiliary support resources such as an office space, furniture, stationery, a hall or any big space conducive for participants’ meetings, storeroom, cooking space, water supply and sanitation should also be ready to support the work of the PE. The speech is delivered by the Director (sometimes called a ‘Coach’ or Coordinator’) of the FE ‘on the first day of the OW when the people are gathered together for the opening’ (Andersson & Richards, 2015:37). On this important and jubilant day, all participants are assembled in one venue to listen to the Opening Speech. The speech focuses on the huge task of running the enterprise and the ‘power to organise’.

In the case of Munsieville, the Opening Speech was delivered by ‘the Coach’—Gavin Andersson—on the 12<sup>th</sup> March 2007. According to Andersson et al (2007:11), the OW opening speech is generally ‘marked by a call to the participants to organise themselves into an enterprise, for which they enjoy freedom of organisation within the law’. The Director announces that all the equipment and tools to start an enterprise would immediately be handed over to participants to manage on their own (Andersson and Richards, 2015). The Opening Speech goes further to explain the nature of the relationship that exist between the Facilitators Enterprise and the Participants Enterprise (‘the Team’) while emphasising that no work could be done by the latter unless a contract exist with the former (Andersson & Richards, 2015). Other administrative issues (such as voluntary withdrawal from participation, the minimum working hours, basic rules like the prohibition of the use of alcohol and other substances, attendance of lectures, organising of food and childcare facilities) are also covered in the Opening Speech (Andersson & Richards, 2015:39&40).

Now that all OW preparatory work has been done (i.e. invitation, scoping, getting it together and opening speech), the onus is on the selected participants to autonomously manage a real temporary enterprise (the PE) for the next four to six weeks. The handover of the equipment and tools to the OW participants immediately sets in motion the learning of organisation (i.e. capacitation) by ‘allowing the participants operational control of the means and the very instruments that facilitate the capacitation process’ (de Morais, 2000:26). On the second or third day of the existence of the PE, participants would have already started with some preliminary administrative work to strengthen the enterprise. This process normally involves giving a name to the enterprise, drafting a constitution, opening a bank account and electing a committee of management of the enterprise (Andersson & Richards, 2015). All these preliminary work activities are done by participants on their own without any undue intervention or instructions from the FE.

Once the enterprise has taken-off, the elected committee of the PE begins negotiating work contracts with the FE. Before any work is done in the PE, there must be a contract (between the PE and FE) which specifies ‘what exactly is to be done in each job and what the pay will be when it [the work] is done’ (Andersson & Richards, 2015:45). As the enterprise gains more organisational strength during the OW, multiple contracts are negotiated with the FE either at once or at different times. Once the contract is approved, the PE is required to submit an invoice for payment to the FE’s bank account once the agreed work is completed. The main goal behind the idea of contracts is to capacitate the participants to plan better, both financially and operationally, and ensure that all participants are occupied during the workshop. For example, if the committee negotiates work that only requires only 40 people while the total number of participants stands at 200 this means the other 160 participants would be without work. This situation immediately creates problems thus requiring efficient division of labour, efficient operational and financial planning.

In Munsieville, the PE was named *Kgetsi ya Tsie*, a SeSotho saying that says that success is not an instant but a gradual and painstaking process. On the day of its formation (12 March 2007) – the same day when the Opening Speech was delivered – the participants were given an amount of R5 000 as a start-up grant and a ‘key to the container holding the tools and equipment as well as a key to the pick-up truck hired for their use’ (Andersson et al., 2007:12). The *Kgetsi ya Tsie* negotiated and entered into a range of contracts combining both social work (social enterprises) and productive work (economic enterprises) such as assisting vulnerable children and adults with their applications for identity documents in order to register for social grants; voluntary HIV testing and counselling; distribution of condoms; ‘handover of clothes gathered in the township to destitute and vulnerable children’; attempts to establish a men’s forum; clearing grass and weeds in crime-prone areas;



combating the sale of illicit drugs; reducing access to taverns by underage youths and children; gardening, tree planting, building and painting (Andersson et al., 2007:13-14).

In addition to these social and productive activities, the participants in the PE also had to organise important aspects of work such as cooking and taking care of young children during working hours. As per normal OW practice, the provision of food in the first three to four days was a responsibility of the FE, but from there the participants had to take full responsibility for organising their own food and any other additional support required. In Munsieville, the OW processes were initially set to be run from what was known as the ‘OW Camp’, a temporary makeshift office made of corrugated iron in front of Munsieville Community Library. The local council finally allocated an office space for the OW a few days before the start of the OW. (Andersson et al., 2007:6). This office would be the operational centre for the duration of the OW (Andersson et al., 2007). Like participants in the 1964 secret course in the town of Recife in north-eastern Brazil, the *Kgetsi ya Tsie* enterprise provided an opportunity for participants to learn organisation by means of capacitation.

The process of capacitation includes a series of compulsory lectures on the Theory of Organisation. According to Labra and Carmen (2011:3), the OW lectures ‘enable participants to gain perspective on their historical, social and economic context; the working of the market economy; current patterns/models of organisation, as well as individual and collective behaviour’. Correia and Castelo (2000:198) further expound on the rationale for combining practical experience in the enterprise with the lecture series on the theory of organising: ‘Practice combined with theory allows the consciousness of reasons for their actions to become ever more explicit’. The lectures are particularly designed to ‘enable participants to gain perspective on their social context and patterns/models of organisation, stimulate changes within the enterprise of the participants and provide tools for enterprise self-

management' (Andersson, 2004:134). The lecture series is normally organised on a daily basis for about one and a half hours and is facilitated by the FE (Andersson, 2004).

In Munsieville, a total of 10 OW lectures were held for two weeks from 8h00am to 10h00am in a large tent (Andersson et al., 2007). Among the topics covered were the origins of organisation of labour, social division of labour, technical division of labour, industrial revolution, political economy (with concepts of commodities, concrete labour, abstract labour and value of commodities) (Andersson et al., 2007:14). The lectures also covered different forms of organisational structure such as the difference between the top-down vertical structure and the less autocratic horizontal structure that 'is characteristic of the membership enterprises where there is common ownership of the means of production' (Andersson et al., 2007:15). These lectures enabled participants to critically reflect on the immediate challenges in the enterprise and their social history. Although facilitated by 'traditional skills trainers', who had to align their training 'with the method during the course of the OW', additional training classes on HIV prevention, orphans and vulnerable children, violence reduction and poverty reduction were done from the 14 - 20 March 2007 from 4:30pm to 6:30pm at Phatudi Primary School (Andersson et al., 2007:18).

The OW in Munsieville concluded with a very successful Closing Ceremony on the 11<sup>th</sup> April 2007. The Ceremony marks the formal conclusion of the 30-day long process of capacitation through learning by doing in a real enterprise – the object. At this point, the assumption is that the participants, most of them without prior experience with the production-line work, would have acquired organisational and management skills which they can employ in any given context. In other words, participants would be capacitated with the relevant social knowledge and skills to form and run new social enterprises on their own. For most of them, the whole OW process was not the typical 'extensionist' education but real and genuine capacitation which facilitated the generation of organisational consciousness.

Unlike the Opening Ceremony held on the 12<sup>th</sup> of March 2007 where the FE carried much of the preparatory work, the Closing Ceremony was organised by a committee consisting of members of *Kgetse ya Tsie* and some officials from the Soul City Institute (Andersson et al., 2007). Among the attendees of the highly successful Closing Ceremony were members of the *Kgetse ya Tsie*, local councillors and priests, Integra Terra, the OW Coach, a senior manager from the Soul City, multiple NGOs operating in Munsieville, speaker of the District Municipality and other dignitaries (Andersson et al., 2007). Although the OW Closing Ceremony in Munsieville was a great success in all important respects, it had some glitches (Andersson et al., 2007:21). The organising committee failed to invite some key stakeholders such as members of the Mogale City Mayoral committee and some councillors ‘who had contributed significantly towards the OW preparation and who helped [*Kgetsi ya Tsie*] to mobilise government departments to support the initiatives around HIV and support for orphans and vulnerable children’ (Andersson et al., 2007:21).

### **8.5 SUSTAINABILITY OF *KGETSI YA TSIE* POST THE OW**

The continuity of the temporary enterprise post the OW period is not automatic (Correia & Castelo, 2015). According to Correia and Castelo (2015:8), the continuity of the enterprise depends on both objective and subjective factors. The former refers to the ‘existence of material conditions’ such as the space to work, equipment and sufficient human capacity. The latter refers to the subjective willingness and ability of the ex-OW participants to sustain the enterprise, irrespective of ‘the level of capacitation achieved during the [OW] process’ (Correia & Castelo, 2015:8). Members of the *Kgetsi ya Tsie* continued to operate the enterprise after the official completion of the OW process on 12 March 2007. Most of the equipment and tools previously allocated for the OW – such as the chairs, tables, a computer, a container for the tools, the vehicle – were removed on the day of the Closing Ceremony.

Despite what would have appeared as a setback, members of the Kgetsi ya Tsie were unfazed and continued with their enterprise. The enterprise had already done extensive work in developing and the rehabilitating an adjacent, abandoned farmhouse (Andersson et al., 2007:22). Some of the work already done included the refurbishment of ‘a serviceable upper storey, with a meeting room and conferencing facility, three front rooms and a large kitchen and pantry’ (Andersson et al., 2007:22). Plans were afoot to turn the downstairs storeroom and another room into an operational centre ‘children’s therapy and counselling run by the NGO Shongololo’ (Andersson et al., 2007:23). By mid-2007 further plans were already underway to develop a business plan that would see Kgetse ya Tsie operating on three legs, namely social enterprises to focus on community social needs, economic enterprises to focus on productive activities; and training (Andersson et al., 2007).

However, all the hard-work and grand plans the *Kgetse ya Tsie* enterprise had for farming would later be frustrated by a seemingly antagonistic relationship with a section 21 company named the Munsieville Community Development Project (MCDP) which was formed, with the help of Soul City, just few months before the commencement of the OW workshop in March 2007 (Andersson et al., 2007). The MCDP was ‘was registered for the purpose of getting the lease of the farm for the community of Munsieville’ (Andersson et al., 2007:22). However, in the end, it was the *Kgetse ya Tsie* enterprise that took a decisive lead in the efforts to develop the farm. Many people had not ‘foreseen that the *Kgetse ya Tsie* would emerge from the OW’ (Andersson et al., 2007:22), but when this happened, it created some discomfort from some management sections of the MCDP which inevitably generated disagreements and a sense of mistrust between the two community-driven enterprises. But it was the internal squabbles, amidst allegations of misuse of funds, which would later sound the death knell for the fledging enterprise (Interview, June 2013). By October 2007, *Kgetsi ya Tsie* was almost non-existent (Interview, June 2013).

## **8.6 THE OW AS A CATALYST FOR AUTONOMOUS CAPACITY IN MUNSIEVILLE CWP**

This dissertation argues that the OW has had a tremendous effect in consolidating the organisational capacity among most CWP participants in Munsieville. This helps us understand why the CWP was capable of initiating innovative social activities and succeeded in establishing the cooperatives. This outcome can be attributed to the social knowledge and organisational consciousness acquired during the OW. The time difference between the closing of the OW (April 2007) and the launch of the CWP (February 2008) was less than ten months. Given the problems faced by *Kgetse ya Tsie*, the launch of the CWP provided an appropriate organisational framework to solidify the valuable organisational skills acquired in the OW. Many OW participants later became CWP participants, with most taking up supervisory positions (coordinators) and one appointed a site manager. Upon further research, it also emerged that most members of the CWP-linked cooperatives participated in the Munsieville OW and were members of the *Kgetse ya Tsie*.

In advancing the argument of the OW as a catalyst for autonomous capacity, this dissertation demonstrates how ‘this powerful capacitating instrument [the OW]’ has enhanced what Correia and Castelo (2000:198) describe as ‘the capacity to organise’ and ‘the capacity to manage’. The ‘capacity to organise’ manifested itself through the ability of the participants to effectively and creatively use the CWP to tackle a variety of social challenges in the community. In other words, to borrow from Correia and Castelo (2000:198), the OW made it ‘possible for the community to confront their problems and to actually “do” something about them, as they know the “how” and the “what” to do, be it in the organisations of struggle or organisations for social stabilisation’. Secondly, ‘the capacity to manage’ was evidenced by both the relatively efficient administrative capacity in running the CWP, and also the ability

to establish and sustain the CWP-linked worker cooperative. Without the OW, the CWP participants would probably not have managed to run the CWP effectively.

### **8.6.1 The capacity to organise**

The experience of the CWP in Munsieville demonstrates the effectuality of the OW in building ‘the capacity to organise’. In comparison to the experience in Bekkersdal, participants in Munsieville seem to have considerable control, autonomy and ownership over the CWP. The CWP participants in Munsieville successfully ran a number of programmes such as the school holiday programme for primary school children; integrated some high school learners while also creating the space for their participation in cultural and recreational activities; gender awareness activities; and, despite some internal challenges, the establishment of three worker cooperatives. Whereas the CWP provided the basic enabling infrastructure and environment for these innovative activities, the initiation and sustainability of these innovative activities fell squarely on the shoulders of the participants who, in most cases, had to utilise their own limited personal resources and time outside the CWP.

One of the sacrosanct principles emphasised in the design and execution of the OW is that participants are free to make their decisions autonomously as long as they are taken within the parameters of the law. Members of the *Kgetsis ya Tsie* had to exercise this freedom and autonomy in action during the 30-day long OW, and beyond this period after the workshop ended. The autonomous organisational capacity gained in the *Kgetsis ya Tsie* was adapted to the CWP’s organisational context. Instead of waiting for instructions or external intervention from the powers that be, the CWP participants in Munsieville took charge of their own destiny by identifying and taking practical action, on their terms, to address the prevailing social and economic challenges in their own community. This was in contrast to the Bekkersdal experience where the CWP work remained largely confined to what would

ordinarily typify CWP work such as homestead and communal food gardens, enhancing community safety, home-based care, assisting vulnerable children, and clean-ups of common spaces like schools, storm water, parks and streets.

The CWP site manager, *Ausie* Pinkie, a prominent ex-OW participant and member of *Kgetsi ya Tsie*, and several coordinators I interacted with in Munsieville, reported that their involvement in *Kgetse ya Tsie* – both during its time as an OW enterprise and post the OW – provided a valuable platform for them to learn organisation. For most of these ex-OW participants, the whole experience was best known as *Kgetse ya Tsie* instead of its formal technical name – the OW. Although a few cited what they variously described as their own ‘inherent’, ‘God-given’ or ‘natural’ abilities or ‘talents’, ‘passion for community development’, most of these former members of cited their experience in *Kgetse ya Tsie* as a crucial moment. An interview with one of the ex-OW or *Kgetse ya Tsie* members, who was later appointed a CWP coordinator for homestead food gardens shed some light on this. She explained:

‘*Kgetse ya Tsie* for me was an eye opener. It taught most of us many things...many things. Where can I begin? What comes to mind now is that people must work together to achieve their common goals. *Kgetse ya Tsie* was held together by team work. Fighting and competing against each other never works. So even here at the school board [CWP], we work together because we all share a common goal to develop Munsieville’ (Interview, September 2012).

Like their counterparts in Munsieville, CWP participants in Bekkersdal had an understanding of the local problems and appeared to possess the necessary imaginative clarity on what needed to be done to change their lives for the better, although not exactly comparable to the relatively well-organised Munsieville. Among the challenges mentioned by Bekkersdal’s site manager, some coordinators and participants were the social divisions structured along ethnic, residential and national lines (i.e. how long one had stayed in Bekkersdal or between

South African citizens and non-citizens); the scourge of HIV/AIDS, a growing intolerance towards LGBTI groups with some already known incidents of intimidation; unemployment and drug and substance abuse, particularly among youth. The ethnic, residential and national division appeared to be fuelled by the intense contestation for access to jobs in the mines and some temporary infrastructural projects in the community. The locals accused anyone they considered as an ‘outsider’ of stealing their jobs and other economic opportunities, and this generated social tension.

Although some of the CWP participants tended to perpetuate some of these social prejudices, there were some participants in Bekkersdal who were genuinely concerned about these issues and felt the CWP was best suited to play an active role in addressing these problems. One CWP coordinator who, based on the then existing social lingo of inclusion and exclusion, could be considered a ‘real resident of Bekkersdal’, was enthusiastic about how the CWP could help in reducing these troubling social prejudices:

‘Things are not fine in Bekkersdal. The way people hate one another, you think that we have thousand separate communities in one. When people get jobs in the mines, there is always a negative talk about people who arrived here yesterday jumping the que and undermining those who have been here for many years. What I would like to see is for this programme [CWP] to unite this community. We are all Africans and we must live well together’

(Interview, August 2011).

What distinguishes Bekkersdal from Munsieville, despite a common capacity to identify and offer solutions to local problems, is that the latter did not only know ‘what-to-do’ but also knew ‘how-to-do it’, and they had the capacity to act and organise. In Bekkersdal, problems were known but organised action was not forthcoming despite a possibility that they, like participants in Munsieville, could have innovatively adapted CWP’s organisational framework to address their problems. On the other hand, CWP participants in Munsieville not



only theorised their solutions but also took collective action to resolve the identified problems. When they were bothered by the killings of little children by speeding cars on the roads, and some even going missing during the school holidays, they acted by organising a school holiday programme. When they were concerned about the risky social behaviours among the youth, the CWP participants innovatively included them in the programme and ensured that they attended cultural and recreational activities. In Munsieville, three relatively functional cooperatives were formed, compared to the failed attempt in Bekkersdal.

Self-sufficiency and problem-solving are some of the focal points emphasised during the OW process. These important capabilities were clearly central in expanding the organisational resilience of the CWP participants in Munsieville in their resolve to confront local problems. Unlike in Bekkersdal, CWP participants in Munsieville went all out to build strong and meaningful relationships with local churches, schools, businesses and NGOs. Instead of giving up on their imaginative clarity on the idea of the school holiday programme or the men's or women's forum, the participants mobilised resource support by writing letters to local businesses; they spoke to the school management to assist with some of the food from the school feeding scheme programme; they spoke to the local churches to secure venues; and they asked for assistance from external parties such as the local municipality. The same organisational resilience was demonstrated when some of the CWP-linked cooperatives successfully secured external support without any intervention from the CWP.

Perhaps one of the most uncomfortable discussions I had with CWP participants, in both communities, was on what they thought would be an impact on both their households and community if the CWP was to be discontinued. I normally asked this question during the formal interview proceedings and informal discussions. The participants in Bekkersdal tended to be very despondent in their responses, with most decrying the 'poverty', 'hunger', 'misery', 'going back to square one', 'end of this community' or 'the end of us' or 'all hell

will break loose'. For them, without the CWP, not only would their livelihoods be at stake but this would also mark going back to the old ways in which, to borrow from one of the CWP participants in Bekkersdal, 'we wake up to only watch the sunrise and sunset'. One of the participants explained what he thought would happen if the CWP was to close down:

'Most of us here don't wish to hear, let alone, answer that question. We all pray that they don't stop this programme. Many households in this community survive on the little cents they receive from the CWP. *Eish!* If they close it, where will I get the money to buy food for my children? I can tell you, there will be instability in this community...we will fight!'

(Interview, July 2011).

Like in Bekkersdal, most participants in Munsieville shared the same fears on their constrained ability to protect livelihoods in the event that the CWP was discontinued. Besides this shared fear, participants in Munsieville were less despondent. This sentiment came out strongly from the site manager and some coordinators who maintained that the discontinuation of the CWP would not destroy their efforts in addressing local problems. It appeared that, for them, the CWP was but an organisational framework for the exercise and the solidification of their organisational capabilities. These optimistic responses and attitudes illustrate their unparalleled self-esteem and confidence, not passivity and dependence, to continue with organisation – with or without the CWP.

### **8.6.2 The capacity to manage**

Beyond generating the autonomous 'capacity to organise', the OW also triggers 'the capacity to manage'. Of course, 'the capacity to organise' and 'the capacity to manage' are not two separate, sequential processes. Instead, these are intertwined and mutually dependent capacities which are generated at the same time. In other words, without 'the capacity to manage' it is not possible to exercise the 'capacity to organise' in a free and autonomous

manner. Likewise, it is impossible for a group of people to autonomously run an organisation without the ‘capacity to manage’. The attainment of these capacities is exactly the cornerstone of the OW methodology. The OW’s footprints in generating the ‘capability to manage’ among CWP participants was also apparent in Munsieville. This is to say that, administratively, the CWP participants possessed the capacity to run the CWP. To advance this observation, the chapter focuses on two important managerial tasks: efficient planning and division of labour; and the democratic running of meetings.

The proponents of the OW credit the method for its ability to develop various management and administrative capacities and skills such as ‘labour management, financial record keeping and reporting; the planning, quoting and tendering for work; vocational skills (such as building and welding); literacy and numeracy development, as well as service provision skills in the areas as diverse as catering, early childhood development and cultural activities’ (Labra & Carmen, 2011:3). The development of these capacities, which shows the ‘capacity to manage’, takes place in an environment where people are able to organise themselves under conditions of total freedom and autonomy – during the OW. In executing the CWP programmes, including the innovatively designed social programmes like the school holiday programme and the men’s forum, CWP participants in Munsieville tended to exhibit the necessary management knowhow and skills. The dissertation posits that these capacities can also be attributed to the OW experience in Munsieville.

Planning, whether good or bad, is a requirement for the execution of work activities in all CWP sites across the country. The CWP in both communities had to develop work plans on the tasks to be executed, and participants were divided into groups to perform different tasks. However, the planning and execution of tasks in Bekkersdal and Munsieville took different forms. In Bekkersdal, the allocation of tasks and distribution of tasks was less democratic, with the power overly concentrated in the hands of the coordinators. This was so

despite the internal democratic organisational platforms through which participants were always encouraged to make suggestions on how the organisation of the CWP in the community could be improved. In Munsieville, by contrast, the planning was relatively participatory and interactive. It was common for the ordinary participants to make incisive contributions on work plans and also decisions around their allocation into different work groups. This dialogical and participatory approach to planning in Munsieville was particularly pronounced in the execution of the innovative social activities which they organised such as the school holiday programme.

De Morais (in Andersson, 2004:153), identifies four elements required for ‘the management of a complex organisational structure’, namely: analysis, planning, distribution and control. Cognisant of the ‘vices’ associated with ‘artisanal consciousness’ built on the individualistic and self-reliant approach to addressing problems, CWP participants in Munsieville worked together to analyse, plan, distribute tasks among themselves and control the innovative initiatives in addressing their local problems. In organising these social activities, the participants had to divide themselves into different teams assigned to perform different tasks such as fundraising, organising transport and purchasing food from wholesale retail stores in adjacent town called Krugersdorp, getting speakers to address some events, giving lessons to the young children, delivering lectures on gender issues at the men’s forum, and borrowing and safeguarding of the cooking utensils. All these activities were undertaken in an organised manner.

The democratic deficit in the running of the CWP in Bekkersdal also manifested itself in during the weekly meetings of the coordinators. As was in Munsieville, the meetings of the coordinators were held at the local CWP offices usually on Fridays. Opened only to the CWP coordinators, these were routine weekly meetings which were intended, among other objectives, to discuss the work activities in the previous four days, any challenges

experienced, work plans for the following week, presentations by external stakeholders, and submission of the coordinators' weekly reports. In Bekkersdal, these meetings were nothing more than non-dialogical platforms in which coordinators were lectured on the work to be undertaken in the following week, sometimes admonished for some of their mistakes, and advice on areas for improvement. Meaningful dialogue in these weekly meetings was still not forthcoming despite the repeated pleas by the site manager, who chaired most of the meetings, for the coordinators to contribute to the discussions.

In stark contrast, in Munsieville, the weekly meetings were very robust, and decision-making processes relatively democratic. The tasks of chairing and taking minutes were rotated among coordinators. The coordinators were free to openly express their views on any matter under discussion. The coordinators were given ample time to make inputs in areas (like food gardening, home-based care, school patrolling) which they were assigned to coordinate. This democratic approach, however, was sometimes restricted by 'instructions' or 'restrictions' from the implementing agent. One such restriction, some coordinators complained, was that none of beadwork products produced in the CWP could be sold. The participants had to abide by this instruction irrespective of their preferences. Perhaps one of major problems was that this democratic approach was restricted, at least formally, to the coordinators' weekly meetings and was hardly institutionally cascaded down to ordinary participants.

During the course of gathering the empirical evidence for this study, I had the privilege to be asked to speak at one of the coordinators' meetings in Munsieville and Bekkersdal, respectively. I was approached by a number of Munsieville CWP coordinators on separate occasions who requested that I share some of my research findings. They were concerned that, despite spending a considerable amount of time in their community, they had no idea about what my observations or thinking were on the CWP. Sometime towards the end

of 2013, I approached the Munsieville site manager to discuss this request only to find out she was already aware of this as some coordinators had already shared the idea with her. She agreed that it was a good idea, and I presented the preliminary survey findings in September 2013. The following year in May 2014, the site manager in Bekkersdal requested that I give a ‘motivational talk’ on the ‘importance of [formal] education’. As a university student, they thought I was an ideal candidate to give the motivational talk. I accepted the invitation.

After these presentations, I was particularly surprised by the sharp differences in the manner the CWP coordinators interacted with my presentations, delivered largely in SeSotho. Despite the effort on my part to create a conducive environment for a dialogical and interactive discussion on the subject, the participation from the CWP coordinators in Bekkersdal was rather timid, save for the very few who responded to some questions intended to spark dialogue. At the end of the presentation, I asked if there were any questions, and no questions were asked. This response was no different from their limited participation in other meetings of the coordinators. In sharp contrast, the CWP coordinators in Munsieville were more robust in their discussion of the preliminary survey findings I presented. They asked pertinent questions which required detail to some of the projected figures. Among them was a first-year university student registered at the UNISA, Florida campus, who suggested that the survey method I employed could be also be used to improve efficiency in the collection data for their CWP ‘Door-to-Door’ campaign.

## **8.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY**

In this chapter, I have argued that the operationalisation of the OW could help us understand why the CWP in Munsieville tended to exercise more organisational autonomy in solving the needs of the people it is supposed to benefit, as compared to Bekkersdal. The principle of ‘participation’ is now a common design feature of most innovative ELR programmes in the

global South. The fundamental question, however, is how to effect organisational autonomy to ensure that participants and their communities are equipped with the capacities to truly own, control and efficiently manage such programmes. In the case of Munsieville, the OW, previously attended by most CWP participants in the community, seem to have triggered creative and innovative capabilities in utilising the programme as a tool for dealing with their own local challenges on their own terms ('the ability to organise) while at the same time solidifying the efficient organisational and administrative management in the CWP, and to certain extent, the three worker cooperatives ('the ability to manage').

The case of the CWP in Munsieville demonstrates that a properly-designed ELR programme has the potential to be an instrument for both community-driven development, beyond protecting livelihoods, and to promote livelihoods through the development of cooperative enterprises – the central argument of this dissertation. However, without building autonomous capacity among participants, these potentialities could fail to materialise. The lesson from Munsieville is instructive: any ELR programme designed to facilitate participation from below should not ignore the fundamental question of how to build real organisational autonomy in its execution or implementation regime. Without organisational autonomy, any idea of 'participation' would only remain as an official rhetoric, or worse, could get transformed into a tool for what Carmen (1996) calls 'participation' which, while purporting to be pro-participation from below, is deeply inimical to genuine participation, autonomy and organisation, in favour of dependency.

## CHAPTER 9

### CONCLUSION

In the last two decades, the global South has seen an increase in cash transfer programmes and ELR programmes. As shown in Chapter 2, scholarly analyses have variously interpreted this interesting development as ‘the quiet revolution’, ‘development revolution’ or ‘new politics of redistribution’ or ‘welfare-first approach to development’. The primary focus of this dissertation is the extent to which the CWP – as one of the innovatively designed ELR programmes in the South – is able to protect and promote the livelihoods of the excluded in Munsieville and Bekkersdal. The core argument advanced in this dissertation is the claim that whereas the CWP was effective in protecting livelihoods of the excluded, it also has the potential not only to foster real autonomous development from below but could also act as an instrument for promoting livelihoods through cooperative development. This study has adopted the comparative case study approach, which is significant as it provides some insights to explain why the same ELR programme, the CWP, produced different outcomes in two communities which share similar socio-economic and political characteristics.

Drawing from the literatures in developmental sociology, development studies and the social sciences more broadly, this dissertation builds on theories which draw a distinction between livelihood protection and livelihood promotion. As extensively discussed in Chapter 3, livelihood protection refers to the capability of an ELR programme to reduce the vulnerability of the excluded to hunger and poverty, in other words, its effectiveness as a ‘poverty alleviation’ tool. On the other hand, the concept of livelihood promotion in this dissertation is used to define the ability of an ELR programme to build sustainable and resilient livelihoods independent of state provisioning.



This study contributes to the knowledge on the ongoing ‘development revolution’ in the South. In general terms, this dissertation builds on the emerging research in the global South that points to the transformative potential of ELR beyond the narrow traditional focus of boosting the aggregate demand and its revered ameliorative role. Drawing from the data gathered in Munsieville and Bekkersdal, this dissertation suggests that the CWP was effective in protecting the livelihoods not only through the direct cash transfer to participants but also to vulnerable groups through its programmatic focus on food security. This argument confirms McCord’s (2008) theoretical proposition that, in the context of mass unemployment and chronic poverty, ELR programmes which offer ongoing and predictable access to income stand relatively better prospects of protecting livelihoods of the excluded on a sustained basis. This theoretical argument has important policy implications in terms of setting realistic objectives in the design and implementation of ELR programmes in a given context. For example, it would be counterproductive to offer short-term ELR programmes to protect livelihoods in situations like South Africa where the nature of unemployment is structural.

This dissertation also contributes to knowledge by demonstrating that, beyond protecting livelihoods, the CWP has the potential to open new possibilities for real autonomous development from below. The empirical evidence gathered from the two communities, as discussed in Chapter 6, clearly shows that the CWP served as an object at the disposal of the excluded to realise and exercise their autonomous capabilities to resolve local social challenges, in their own ways. In both communities, for example, they did this by focusing the CWP on the massive community care deficits, environment degradation, crime, and by building a sense of solidarity among the CWP participants. As further shown in Chapter 6, it was in Munsieville where the participants possessed stronger autonomous capabilities, compared to Bekkersdal. In Munsieville, the participants took control of the CWP to address the multiple, pressing, local, social challenges in the community.

This dissertation also contributes to the less explored area of promoting livelihoods in the ELR through cooperative development. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, this dissertation presents the case of three survivalist cooperatives in Munsieville and advances the argument that the most realistic pathway for promoting livelihoods of the excluded in the context of the ELR is through cooperative development. By providing the basic institutional and material support, the CWP created an enabling environment for the emergence of these cooperatives. Furthermore, the dissertation, argues that although the CWP-linked survivalist cooperatives in Munsieville were neither fully autonomous from the CWP nor fully operationally effective, they nevertheless provide new insights and perspectives for understanding the role of ELR in promoting the livelihoods of the excluded. This argument challenges the mainstream ELR theoretical perspective on livelihood promotion – as discussed in Chapter 3 – which is anchored in individualised approaches for participants’ ‘graduation’ from ELR programmes.

This dissertation would be incomplete without making an attempt to explain why the same ELR programme (i.e. CWP) had different outcomes in two communities which are similar in important respects. In this regard, the dissertation grappled with two important questions emanating from the examination of the extent to which the CWP was capable of protecting and promoting livelihoods of the excluded in Munsieville and Bekkersdal. First, why is it that the CWP participants in Munsieville tended to possess more capabilities to autonomously steer the ELR programme to address what they considered to be social problems in their community? Second, what explains the fact that the CWP participants in Munsieville were able to establish and sustain the three nascent worker survivalist cooperatives (notwithstanding their own internal strategic and operational challenges as extensively discussed in Chapter 7), as compared to the unsuccessful attempt to start the

Letsema Cooperative in Bekkersdal? The empirical evidence suggests that the answer to both questions lies in the operationalisation of the OW methodology.

In this respect, Chapter 8 expounds on the OW in Munsieville. In addition to providing the detailed philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of the OW, this dissertation systematically demonstrates how its operationalisation in Munsieville in 2007 had an enduring impact in terms of enhancing the CWP participants' capabilities to 'organise' and 'manage'. Drawing from the data from Munsieville, the dissertation argues that OW's role in enhancing 'capacity to organise' is demonstrated by the ability of CWP participants in this community to organically and creatively embark on community development initiatives on their own, in their own ways and sometimes having to rely on their own personal resources. As argued in Chapter 6, these participants often had to go the extra mile, sometimes without any meaningful direct support from the CWP, to embark on these creative social activities. The 'ability to manage' took the form of the relative administrative efficiency in the running of the CWP, and seemingly dialogical and democratic approach to management.

At the conceptual level, by attempting to develop a revised typology for ELR programmes (short-term, long-term and employment guarantee), this dissertation also makes an important contribution towards the understanding of the heterogeneity in the design of ELR programmes. It contributes to the ongoing Southern scholarly attempts to unbundle the concept of the ELR based on recent and current lived realities of the innovative experiences with ELR programmes in the global South. As argued in Chapter 2, there is a tendency in the literature to conceptualise cash transfers simply as 'public works' or 'workfare' or 'public employment programmes' without an attempt to show the important diversity in the core design of these programmes (McCord, 2008). The ELR typology proposed in this dissertation can be useful for conceptual and analytical purposes for future studies on the ongoing

attempts from the global South to re-embed the markets in society through the ELR. While the CWP and MGNREGA may both be ELR programmes, it may not be conceptually or analytically useful to look at them simply as ‘ELR programmes’ or ‘public works programmes’ or ‘employment guarantee’.

Finally, the overall argument presented in this dissertation contributes to what Webster and Bhowmik (2014:i) term ‘the co-construction of knowledge production’ built on a ‘more interactive approach’ to knowledge production between the North and South. It cannot be denied that the ongoing ‘impulse for social protection’ in the global South offers fresh conceptual and theoretical reflections on social policy. It is in the global South where governments have made serious inroads in providing non-contributory cash transfers, and where the innovatively designed long-term ELR and employment guarantee are being experimented with, including the possibility of an unconditional, universal basic income. As suggested in Chapter 2, the general Northern conception of the ELR is that of a short-term, palliative policy intervention to a short-term disruption to wage-based livelihoods. The recent experience in the global South shows that ELR programmes, when properly designed, such as CWP in Munsieville, are capable of generating autonomous development from below – an innovation the North could draw inspiration from.

Perhaps the appropriate way to finally conclude this dissertation is by making some tentative reflections on the ‘possibilities’ and ‘dangers’ of the transformative potential of the CWP as suggested in this dissertation. This should also be seen as a way of proposing broader themes and questions for sociological research to further explore this transformative potential through an unusual, less explored, and sometimes denigrated, social policy intervention – the ELR. Writing about the ‘new politics of distribution’ with a particular focus on the ‘cash transfer revolution’ in Southern Africa, Ferguson (2015:188) cautiously notes that ‘the intersection of new kinds of welfare states with new kinds of thinking about

distribution has created a powerful conjunctural moment, one that I would like to suggest is as full of possibilities as it is of dangers'. In suggesting themes and questions for future research on the ELR as a tool for autonomous development from below, it would be fruitless to be overly triumphalist or hopelessly denunciatory of these new emerging (im) possibilities.

In the light of the CWP's potential role in fostering meaningful participatory and autonomous development from below, could the CWP be seen as a concrete example of the idea of 'real utopias', as suggested by Erik Olin Wright? In other words, to what extent does the CWP constitute an emancipatory real utopian alternative to the existing dominant institutions and social structures? Real utopia is about 'developing visions of alternatives to dominant institutions that embody our deepest aspirations for a world in which people have access to the conditions to live flourishing lives' (Wright, 2013:3). Envisioning real utopias requires the 'sociology of the possible, not just the actual' – this is the 'sociology of real utopias' (Wright, 2011:37). The main task of this sociology as articulated by Wright (2011:37), 'is to develop strategies that enable us to make empirically and theoretically sound arguments about emancipatory possibilities'. The insights from the CWP site in Munsieville tentatively point towards a real utopian emancipatory possibility – but more focused and dedicated research to further explore this possibility over time may be worthwhile.

According to Wright (2011:38), exploring the real utopias 'involves studying empirical cases that seem to embody emancipatory aspirations and prefigure broader utopian alternatives'. Such an exploration requires a theoretically-grounded, sociological research agenda on concrete cases that promise to offer some real utopian emancipatory alternatives, such as the CWP, to 'see how these cases work and identify how they facilitate human flourishing, to diagnose their limitations, dilemmas, and unintended consequences; and to understand ways of developing their potential and enlarging their reach' (Wright, 2011:38). Envisioning the real utopias should not only be grounded in theory, but also in reality –

because real utopias are not fantasies (Wright, 2011). If most CWP sites could replicate the possibility shown in Munsieville, surely this could be a significant step towards social transformation. If an ELR programme like the CWP is able to provide the social spaces for social solidarity and autonomy from below, surely this should be significant.

Second, in the quest for real utopian alternatives, besides promoting livelihoods, what is the role of the CWP-linked cooperatives in Munsieville towards the solidarity economy? Solidarity economy is the term used to describe various infinite forms of counter-hegemonic practices which seek to build an alternative society beyond the confines of the capitalist production relations (Satgar, 2014). Such counter-hegemonic practices are founded on anti-capitalist principles such as solidarity, democracy, collective ownership of means of production, and ecological sustainability (Haarmann & Haarmann, 2011). However, the solidarity economy is not ‘a blueprint for an alternative society, but a series of experiments, becomings, emergent possibilities and prefigurative practices’ (Williams, 2014:51). Because the CWP-linked cooperatives in Munsieville espoused some of these fundamental anti-capitalist principles and practices, such as solidarity, ecological sustainability and collective ownership, can these cooperatives be viewed as constituting the ‘experiments’ or ‘emergent possibilities’ towards a solidarity economy? If not, what, if any, are the possible short-term and long-term steps to be considered to steer these cooperatives in a manner that they play their part in the building of a solidarity economy and the solidarity network more broadly?

Besides the ‘possibilities’, there are also ‘dangers’. The CWP-linked cooperatives are susceptible to bureaucratic capture as conduits for the social economy. The concept of the social economy has gained traction in the South African government policy discourse as a blueprint for the deepening livelihood crisis. The government’s New Growth Path strategy, for example, places cooperatives at the centre of the social economy (Satgar, 2014a; Williams, 2014). However, the concept of the social economy has its own shortcomings as it

seeks to address ‘societal and social problems within the capitalist state’ (Satgar, 2014:201). Although this concept has a strong radical foundation as it originally sought to ‘re-embed the economy in society’, the dominant contemporary usage of the term, both at the theoretical and practical levels, is void of meaningful transformative politics (Williams, 2014:49). The social economy does not seek to build an alternative to capitalism but to tame it ‘through limited, progressive change within the confines of the current order by ameliorating the effects of market failure, unemployment and poverty through initiatives that target particular problems (such as hunger) and/or particular groups (such as training of disabled people)’ (Williams, 2014:46).

The CWP-linked cooperatives also face another ‘danger’ of being entangled in the state patronage networks. Research shows that some government-supported cooperatives in South Africa have ‘been tied to state patronage, corruption and elite formation’ (Satgar, 2014a:16). It is only through their participation in the solidarity economy network that the CWP-linked cooperatives are able to harness their promising potential as agents for social transformation from below, beyond their primary, socially-ameliorative role. The survivalist cooperatives presented in this dissertation are capable of embracing counter-hegemonic politics geared towards the creation of an alternative political economy built on the values of the solidarity economy such as those suggested by Williams (2014:51): ‘democratic management, redistribution, solidarity and reciprocity’. Obviously, cultivating these values of solidarity will not be as straightforward as it may seem.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Interviewee 16, 5 October, Munsieville

Interview 13, 9 November, Bekkersdal

Interviewee 26, 11 November, Bekkersdal

Interview, July 2011

Interview, August 2011

Interview, September 2012.

Interview, June 2013

Interview 8, 4 September 2011, Munsieville

Interview 6, 9 September 2011, Munsieville

Interview 7, 8 June 2011, Bekkersdal

Interview 2, 15 June 2011, Bekkersdal

Interview 3, 14 July 2011, Bekkersdal

Interview 10, 8 June 2011, Bekkersdal

Interview 16, 5 October 2011, Munsieville

Interview 12, 12 July 2011, Bekkersdal

Interview 4, 22 June 2011, Bekkersdal

Interview 18, 9 November 2011, Munsieville

Interview 19, 9 November 2011, Munsieville

Interview 20, 11 November 2011, Munsieville

Interview 23, 09 November 2011, Munsieville

Interviewee 33, August 2010, Bekkersdal

Interview 24, 09 November 2011, Munsieville

Interview 9, 25 July 2011, Bekkersdal  
Interviewee 32, July 2013, Munsieville  
Interviewee 9, 25 July 2011, Bekkersdal  
Interview 14, 21 July 2011, Bekkersdal  
Interview 21, 14 October 2011, Munsieville  
Interview 25, 10 November 2011, Munsieville  
Interview 17, 20 September 2011, Munsieville  
Interview 26, 11 November 2011, Munsieville  
Interviewee 39, September 2010, Bekkersdal  
Interview 11, 28 September 2011, Munsieville  
Interviewee 40, June 2010, Bekkersdal  
Interview 27, 15 November 2011, Munsieville  
Interview 15, 28 September 2011, Munsieville  
Interviewee 35, 09 June 2010, Bekkersdal  
Interviewee, 15, 28 September 2011, Munsieville  
Interviewee 43, June 2013, Munsieville  
Interviewee 44, October 2013, Munsieville  
Interview 46, October 2013, Munsieville  
Interview 47, February 2014, Munsieville  
Interview 48, September 2014, Munsieville  
Interviewee 37, 15 November 2011, Munsieville  
Interview 29, 22 May 2013, Munsieville  
Interviewee 38, 15 November 2011, Munsieville  
Interview 51, February 2014, Munsieville  
Interviewee 34, 29 September 2014, Bekkersdal

## APPENDIX B: CWP HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

### CWP HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Date of interview: \_\_\_\_\_

Location of interview: \_\_\_\_\_

Interviewer: \_\_\_\_\_

Notes: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

#### SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHICS

1. Age of respondent:

1	15-25years	2	26-35 years	3	36-50 years	4	51-65 years	5	>65 years
---	------------	---	-------------	---	-------------	---	-------------	---	-----------

2. Population group:

1	African	2	White	3	Coloured	4	Indian	5	Other
---	---------	---	-------	---	----------	---	--------	---	-------

3. Gender:

1	Male	2	Female
---	------	---	--------

4. What is the highest level of Education that you have received?

1	Grade R-7	2	Grade 8-11	3	Grade 12/Matric	4	Tertiary	5	No formal education
---	-----------	---	------------	---	-----------------	---	----------	---	---------------------

5. Total number of people in the household (agree on definition of household?)

6. Where do you live? (please include the Ward)

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**Section B: Questions for the Respondent**

7. What kind of dwelling do you have?

1	A permanent home
2	A room in a house
3	Back room
4	A shack
5	Other

8. Tick one of the following in relation to your dwelling

1	I own the home
---	----------------

2	I am renting
3	I am living with my parents/ relatives
4	Other

If 1, Go to Q8

If 2, Go to Q10

9. If you own a permanent house, are you paying a bond? If **no**, go to Q12.

1	Yes	2	No	3	Home paid up
---	-----	---	----	---	--------------

10. Would you say your bond is affordable and therefore are not at risk of losing your house?

1	Yes, the bond is affordable	2	No, it is not affordable and am at risk
---	-----------------------------	---	---

11. If you are renting/paying a bond how much do you pay on average per month?

1	Less than R500
2	R501-R1000
3	R1001-R2000
4	R2001-R3000
5	R3000+

12. Have you ever had a regular full-time job?

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

12.1. If yes, give details

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13. Did you have a job before you started working on the CWP? (Probe for any kind of work in the past). If no go to question 14

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

13.1. If yes, what kind of job was it?

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13.2. Where and for long?

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14. Do you have any other sources of income, beside the CWP?  
e.g. room rentals

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

14.1. If yes, how do you get this money?

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15. How much do you earn from these additional activities in a typical month?

1	Less than R500
2	R501-R1000
3	R1001-R2000
4	R2001-R3000
5	R3001-R4000

6	R4001-R5000
7	R5001+

16. Are you a recipient of a government grant?

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

17. If yes, which grant?

1	The Old Age Grant
2	Disability Grant
3	Care Dependency Grant
4	Foster Child Grant
5	Child Support Grant
6	Grant-in-Aid
7	War Veteran's Grant
8	Social Relief of Distress Grant

18. Do you have dependents that you support financially?

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

19. If yes, state the total number of dependents that you support financially? \_\_\_\_\_

	<b>Dependents</b>	<b>Number</b>
1	Spouse	
2	Children (own)	



3	Children (other)	
4	Grandparents	
5	Other family members	
6	Non-family members	
7	Other (please specify below)	

20. What proportion of CWP money do you spend on:

20.1. Household needs (e.g. food, electricity, water and rent):

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20.2. Personal Needs (e.g. hairdressing, cosmetics):

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21. Do you spend any of your CWP money on income generating activities?

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

21.1. If yes, (need to probe)

1	Cell phone for business activities
2	Flour for baking
3	Bicycle for deliveries/work
4	Saving money for a business – hair, sweets, sewing machine
5	Buying goods for resale
6	Other, specify

22. Do you spend any CWP money on activities that save you money?  
E.g. baking your own bread, growing your own vegetables, making your own clothes

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

22.1. If yes, please describe

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23. Are you involved in activities where you exchange goods and services with other community members? E.g. stokvel

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

If yes, please describe

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24. Did you have an account in a bank or post office before CWP?

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

24.1. Who in the household decides how the money in your CWP bank account is used?

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25. What kind of work do you do in the CWP?

1	Infrastructure development	2	Environmental and cultural programmes	3	Social sector (education, health, social development)	4	Economic programmes (SETA-funded learnerships, micro-finance and mentoring)
---	----------------------------	---	---------------------------------------	---	---	---	---

26. Describe the kind of CWP work that you have done in the last 7 days?

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27. How did you get this job in the CWP?

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28. Have you looked for additional paid work in the last 7 days?

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

If no, go to question 29?

28.1. If yes, please describe

---

---

28.2. If yes, did you use any of the money from the CWP to search for this work?

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

28.3. If yes, how did you use it?

1	Cell phone
2	Transport
3	Someone to write a letter
4	Newspapers
5	Other

29. How much are you paid by the CWP per month?

1	Less than R500	2	R501-R1000	3	R1001+	4	Non-wage
---	----------------	---	------------	---	--------	---	----------

30. When are you paid?

1	Daily	2	Weekly	3	Fortnightly	4	Monthly	5	Unpredictable as payment is often late
---	-------	---	--------	---	-------------	---	---------	---	--

31. Do you work regularly 2 days a week on CWP?

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

32. How are you paid?

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33. Are you able to save any of your income?

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

33.1. If yes, how much and what are you saving for?

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34. Did you receive any training on the CWP? If no. go to Q35

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

34.1. If yes, what kind of training did you receive?

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34.2. Who provided the training?

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34.3. What did you think of the quality of the training you received?

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**SECTION C: HOUSEHOLD**

35. Household Profile (Household members to make a living and receive a government grant). Include self here.

Member	Relationship to respondent	Gender	Age	How do you make a living?	Govt grant	How much do they earn?
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						

36. Has your household size expanded since you joined the CWP?

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

36.1. If yes, who are these people and why did they join the household? Probe

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37. Are there any people of this household who have left to work elsewhere? If no, go to Q38

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

37.1. If yes, why did they leave? (e.g. work, marriage, divorce, school)

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37.2. If yes, how often do they return?

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37.3. Do they give/send money to the household?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

38. Do members of the household pool their money?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

38.1. If yes, who decides how the money is spent?

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38.2. If no, please explain

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39. Do you have a home elsewhere?

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

If no, go to question 40

39.1. If yes, where is it?

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39.2. When do you go there? How often?

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39.3. Do you send money/goods (e.g. clothing, food) there?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

39.4. If yes, how much and how often?

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40. Does the CWP provide childcare facilities for children of the participants? If no, go to Q45

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

41. If yes, did you use them?

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42. If yes, what do you think of them?

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43. If yes, does the facility provide food for the children?

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44. How far is the facility from your house?

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45. Who takes care of the children while you are working?

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46. Are there other members in your household who are currently participating / have previously participated in the CWP? If no, go to Q51

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

47. If yes, how many members of your household are involved in these activities?

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48. What kind of work do they do?

1	Infrastructure development	2	Environmental and cultural programmes	3	Social sector (education, health, social development)	4	Economic programmes (SETA-funded learnerships, micro-finance and mentoring)
---	----------------------------	---	---------------------------------------	---	---	---	---

49. Did they receive any training on the CWP?

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50. Have those in your household who worked on the CWP been successful in finding other employment or starting a small business?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know	4	Not applicable
---	-----	---	----	---	------------	---	----------------

50.1. If yes, please explain

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50.2. If not, do you know why?

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51. How much does the household spend on food per month?

1	Less than R200	2	R201- R300	3	R301 – R400	4	R401- R500	5	R500+
---	----------------	---	------------	---	-------------	---	------------	---	-------

52. How often do you have the following per week?

1	Meat/fish/chicken	
---	-------------------	--

2	Vegetables	
3	Fruit	

53. What did your family eat yesterday?

Breakfast: \_\_\_\_\_

Lunch: \_\_\_\_\_

Supper: \_\_\_\_\_

54. Have you spent money on health care costs since you joined the CWP?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

54.1. Please explain your answer

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

55. How much does the household spend on the following education costs per year?

1	Fees	
2	Uniform	
3	Stationery	
4	Text books	
5	School trips	
6	School transport	
7	Other	
	<b>Total annual amt</b>	

56. How much does the household spend on transport per month? (Probe)

1	Less than R100	2	R101-R200	3	R201-R300	4	R300+	5	No fee
---	----------------	---	-----------	---	-----------	---	-------	---	--------

57. Where do you get your water from?

1	Communal Tap
2	Tap inside the house
3	Tap in the yard
4	Rainwater
5	Neighbour
6	Borehole
7	Other, please specify

58. Do you experience problems with the water supply to your household?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know	4	Not applicable
---	-----	---	----	---	------------	---	----------------

58.1. If yes, please explain

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59. How much do you pay on an average for water per month?

1	Less than R50	2	R51-R100	3	R101+	4	No fee	5	Included in the rent
---	---------------	---	----------	---	-------	---	--------	---	----------------------

60. Do you have access to electricity from the municipality? If no go to Q63

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

61. If yes, how much do you pay on average for electricity per month?

1	Less than R50
2	R51-R100

3	R101+
4	No fee
5	Included in Rent

62. Do you experience problems with the electricity supply to your household?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know	4	Not applicable
---	-----	---	----	---	------------	---	----------------

62.1. If yes, please explain

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63. Do you use other sources of energy? (probe and indicate if they use these only when there is no electricity)

1	Gas
2	Paraffin
3	Candles
4	Wood
5	Coal Stove
6	Other, specify

64. What kind of sanitation do you have?

1	Flush toilet connected to the sewerage system
2	Flush toilet with septic tank
3	Dry toilet facility (VIP)
4	Pit Latrine with Ventilation (with pipe)

5	Pit Latrine without ventilation
6	Chemical Toilet
7	Bucket toilet system
8	None

65. Do you experience any problems with sanitation?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

65.1. If yes, please explain

---



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66. How often does the municipality remove your garbage?

1	Once a week
2	Once every two weeks
3	Once a month
4	Never

67. Do you experience any problems with the garbage removal?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

67.1. If yes, please explain

---

68. Do you or any one in your household grow vegetables? If no, go to Q70

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

69. Do you use chemicals/pesticides in your vegetable garden?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

69.1. If yes, please describe.

---

70. Are there any communal food gardens started by the CWP in this community? If no, go to Q72

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

71. Do you know if pesticides/chemicals are used in the CWP food gardens?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

71.1. If yes, please describe.

---

72. Are there any other communal food gardens in this community (**not CWP**)?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

72.1. Do you know whether they use pesticides/chemicals in the food gardens?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

72.2. If yes, please describe.

---

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73. What happens to the food produce that is grown for the CWP? (only if answered Yes in Q70)

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<b>SECTION D: COMMUNITY</b>
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74. Do you think that the CWP has improved community services and/or the infrastructure?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

75. Please explain your answer above

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76. How do you feel about people from other countries living and working in this community? (if the person is a foreigner ask the question as follows: do you feel that you are accepted as a member of this community?)

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77. How do you feel about people from other places in South Africa working in your community? (if the person is South African but from outside the community, ask the question as follows: do you feel that you are accepted as a member of this community?)

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78. Are there organisations/voluntary associations in this community that you think represents your interests? If no, go to Q81

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

79. If yes, please provide the following information

Name	When formed	How structured	Main Function	Do you attend meetings?	Do you take part in discussions?

80. Can you give an example of a **social issue** that has been resolved by any of these organisations?

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81. Is there any conflict in this community?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

81.1. If yes, have any of the community organisations addressed the conflict?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

82. If yes, have any of these organisations been able to resolve this conflict?



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83. Do you have a community policing forum?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

84. If yes, when was it formed?

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85. Do you feel safe in the community?

1	Yes	2	No
---	-----	---	----

85.1. Please explain your answer

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---

86. Besides the income, has participation in the CWP improved the quality of your life?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

87. If yes, how? (need to probe)

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---

88. Have you gained new friends through participation in CWP?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

88.1. Please explain your answer

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89. Does working together in the CWP give you the opportunity to share grievances and person problems with others (i.e. promote community solidarity)

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

90. If yes, how? (need to probe)

---



---

91. Do you feel you can trust more people in your community since participating in the CWP?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

91.1. If yes, how?

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91.2. If no, why not?

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92. Do you think there is an increase in the number of thefts in this community?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

92.1. Please explain your answer

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93. Do vulnerable people (e.g. elderly, frail, disabled and orphans) get helped in any way by the community?

1	Yes	2	No	3	Don't know
---	-----	---	----	---	------------

93.1. Please explain your answer

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94. How do people in this community help each other when something bad happens? E.g. death, missing child, fire, flood, domestic violence, violence towards foreigners – need to probe here

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## **APPENDIX C: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULES**

### **A. Interview Schedule with the CWP participants**

- i. When and how did you join the CWP?
- ii. Why did you decide to be part of the CWP?
- iii. Do you regard your participation in the CWP as a job?
- iv. Can you please briefly explain what kind of work do you do in the CWP?
- v. In general, how would you describe your experience in the CWP?
- vi. How as the CWP impacted on your household?
- vii. Do you think that the CWP has had a positive effect in your community?
- viii. Which areas in the CWP do you think require improvement?

### **B. Interview Schedule with the CWP coordinators and site managers**

- i. Please briefly explain your history in the CWP—i.e., when did you join, did you start as a participant and later promoted?
- ii. Which sector of the CWP work do you supervise?
- iii. Can you please give an overview of your experience in the CWP as a coordinator/site manager?
- iv. What do you think are the major challenges facing the CWP in your community?
- v. What do you consider to be the most important contribution of the CWP in this community?
- vi. Do you think you have adequate support from the implementing agent and the government in implementing the CWP in your community?
- ix. Which areas in the CWP do you think require improvement?

### **C. Interview schedule with members of the CWP-linked cooperatives**

- i. When and why was your cooperative established?
- ii. What is the focus of your cooperative?
- iii. Were you provided with training before the cooperative was established?
- iv. What kind of challenges did you experience when you established this cooperative?
- v. What role did the CWP play in the formation of the cooperative?
- vi. Do you have any previous experience in cooperative development?
- vii. Please briefly explain how your cooperative functions? (i.e. structure, decision making processes, distribution of the profits etc.)
- viii. What are the major challenges facing your cooperative?
- ix. Do you think your cooperative will be able to survive on its own without the support from the CWP?
- x. Do you think that your cooperative is viable?

## **APPENDIX D: DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR FOCUS GROUPS**

- i. When and why was your cooperative established?
- ii. What kind of challenges did you experience when you established this cooperative?
- iii. What role did the CWP play in the formation of the cooperative?
- iv. Do you have any previous experience in cooperative development?
- v. Please briefly explain how your cooperative functions? (i.e. structure, decision making processes, distribution of the profits etc.)
- vi. What are the major challenges facing your cooperative?
- vii. Do you think your cooperative will be able to survive on its own without the support from the CWP?