

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

A New Global Order

ON 21 FEBRUARY 1939, a few months after British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain travelled to Munich in an attempt to appease Adolf Hitler, the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London held a panel discussion about world order. The main speaker, Lionel Curtis, argued that interdependency was the main characteristic of the modern world: ‘What one small country, a Serbia or a Czechoslovakia, does or leaves undone instantly affects the whole of human society’. He added that in spite of the fact that ‘socially and economically human society is now one closely integrated unit’, the political order reflected fragmentation rather than unity. His conclusion was clearly stated: ‘I am now convinced that a world commonwealth embracing all nations and kindreds [sic] and tongues is the goal at which we must aim before we can hope to move to a higher plane of civilisation. Indeed, I will now go so far as to say that unless we conceive that goal in time, and take steps to approach it, our present stage of civilisation is doomed to collapse’.¹ Curtis’s address was followed by a lively debate about the merits of his suggestions, which reassured him of the public interest in the problem of ‘world order’ and led him to convene a Chatham House study group on the topic.

Curtis was not the only one to find the problem of world order particularly timely and intriguing. In January 1940, H. G. Wells published his own global vision, under the title *The New World Order. Whether It Is Attainable, How It Can Be Attained and What Sort of World a World at Peace Will Have to Be*.² By then, Europe was already at war. The National Peace Council in London organised a panel discussion about Wells’s book, including the philosopher C. E. M. Joad and the Spanish diplomat Salvador de Mada-riaga, at which the author was confronted with proponents of alternative

¹ Lionel Curtis, ‘World Order’, *International Affairs* 18 (1939): 301–320. Curtis was one of the founders of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House).

² H. G. Wells, *The New World Order. Whether It Is Attainable, How It Can Be Attained and What Sort of World a World at Peace Will Have to Be* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1940).

visions of post-war world order.³ In the United States, the sinologist and geopolitical thinker Owen Lattimore published in 1942 an article on ‘Asia in a New World Order’, while his friend, US Vice President Henry Wallace, gave an address at Ohio Wesleyan University on the Christian foundations of a new world order.⁴ Luigi Sturzo, Hans Kuhn, E. H. Carr, Robert M. Hutchins, and Quincy Wright were just some of many commentators and intellectuals who wrote books and delivered speeches under the title of ‘world order’.⁵

Google Ngram analysis of twentieth-century English-language publications registers a significant rise of interest in ‘world order’ in the 1940s, with its frequency peaking in 1945. But the concern with the problem of order extended beyond references to the specific expression ‘world order’. The fundamental problem of ordering and reordering the world after a devastating conflict seemed a worthy preoccupation for many public intellectuals in Britain and the United States. The destabilising war was perceived not only as a menacing prospect of doom, but also as an opportunity to question and redefine the fundamental categories of politics. These reconsiderations were often motivated by the perception of a growing tendency towards technological, economic, cultural, and political interconnectedness, which for many mid-century thinkers gave rise to a new political concept, the global.

The Emergence of Globalism is an intellectual history of the complex and nonlinear genealogy of globalism in mid-century visions of world order. Ever since the outbreak of the war, American, British, and émigré intellectuals had diagnosed the emergence of globalism as the defining condition of the post-war era. Their proposals for ordering the post-war world envisaged competing schemes of global orders motivated by concerns for the future of democracy, the prospects of liberty and diversity, and the decline of the imperial system. In this book, I explore the languages employed to outline the meaning of the ‘global’ as a political idea to shed light on the configurations of ‘world order’ as a normative foundation for geopolitical, economic, and legal structures.

Mid-century commentators, as well as later historians, have often invoked the term ‘world order’ when writing about international politics. The statistical data match the textual evidence in revealing that ever since

³ National Peace Council, *On the New World Order* (London: National Peace Council, 1940).

⁴ Owen Lattimore, ‘Asia in a New World Order’, *Foreign Policy Reports* 28 (1942): 150–163; Henry A. Wallace et al., *Christian Bases of World Order* (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943).

⁵ The University of Denver organised a series of lectures on world order by Robert Maynard Hutchins, E. H. Carr, Robert Oppenheimer, W. E. Rappard, and E. M. Earle, later published in E. L. Woodward, ed., *Foundations of World Order* (Denver: University of Denver, 1949); Quincy Wright, *Human Rights and the World Order* (New York: Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 1943); Luigi Sturzo, *Italy and the New World Order* (New York: Macdonald, 1944); Hans Kohn, *World Order in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942).

the beginning of the war, public intellectuals in Britain and the United States have sought to imagine the shape of the world to come. The idea of order embodied their attempt to make sense and reorganise the belligerent and disordered post-war world.⁶ They hoped to overcome the political chaos that was seen as the tragic consequence of the international disorder, economic strife, and social unrest of the interwar years. The idea of order did not necessarily imply a rigid, unifying, or homogeneous system. Rather, many conceptions of world order revolved around the aspiration to accommodate change and flexibility as valuable and desirable aspects of human life. The tension between order and instability remained a central aspect of mid-century political commentary.

The political debates about world order explored in this study exhibited a growing sensitivity to a particular dimension of politics that I define as ‘global’. One of my main objectives is, therefore, to outline the competing meanings of the global as a political space in mid-century thought. If we examine the statistical analysis of published texts in English language provided by Google, we can see that the term ‘global’ started to gain ground just after the outbreak of the war. It was at that moment that the new political space of the global was generated as a response to the total and all-encompassing nature of the war, facilitated by technological innovations. If the war was global, an adequately global plan for peacetime order was necessary. Thinking about the global sphere did not signify the abandonment of all other constituent elements of politics; states, empires, federations, non-state communities, and supranational organisations were reimagined and redefined—but not necessarily abolished—before they could acquire a new place in the modern, global world. In this book, I use the term ‘global’ in the widest, most inclusive sense, as a perspective on politics, a sometimes abstract space that was modified, redefined, and challenged in lively transnational conversations.

The ‘global’ was invoked to outline a different political order than the international, transnational, and cosmopolitan spaces of politics. In the writings of mid-century public intellectuals, all four categories make their appearance in content if not by name. As a political category, the international attributes importance to the nation, or the state, as a defining, order-creating

⁶ For some references to ‘world order’ in the study of international relations, see, for example, Daniele Archibugi and David Held, *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Patrick J. Hearden, *Architects of Globalism: Building a New World Order during World War II* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2002); Christopher D. O’Sullivan, *Sumner Welles, Post-war Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937–1943* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Benn Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).

unit, and explores the relations between nations as sovereign entities.⁷ The transnational space stretches beyond national boundaries to explore interconnections across borders, without undermining the significance of national communities and states.⁸ Cosmopolitanism, by contrast, typically assumes that all human beings are part of a world community, and should orient their political and moral allegiances accordingly.⁹ Globalism emerged from an awareness of the political significance of the globe as a unitary whole made of interconnected, diverse political units. The recognition of the world's 'oneness' did not always mean political monism. Globalism often implied a renewed awareness of diversity, and an attempt to envisage a world order to preserve it. The tension between diversity and unity is, therefore, a central aspect of the idea of globalism.

The assumption that the post-war order should reflect the spatial unity of the globe often relied on technological innovations like flights and telephone communications, which contributed, for mid-century commentators, to the world's interconnectedness. One of the best-selling books advocating this view was *One World*, the account of the 1942 world tour of the American Republican politician Wendell Willkie.¹⁰ Two years after his defeat in the presidential race to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Willkie embarked on a private airplane for a goodwill tour of Egypt, Palestine, Turkey, Russia, Siberia, and China, meeting with leading politicians and local residents. His book provides colourful and enthusiastic commentary on disparate topics: from the beauty of Mongolia and Mount Scopus seen from the air to Charles de Gaulle's Beirut home, where 'every corner, every wall, held busts, statues, and pictures of Napoleon', to an enthusiastic analysis of the Chinese economy. The general message was that there were no more distant or uncovered places in the world; one could easily travel to any remote spot, meet its inhabitants, and discover their lifestyle and opinions. In consequence, for Willkie, the post-war world order should be drafted according to the interests of the world as a whole, not only of powerful states or empires. Political and economic freedom in China or the Middle East

⁷ Akira Iriye, *Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), 10–12.

⁸ C. A. Bayly et al., 'AHR Conversation: On Transnational History', *American Historical Review* 111 (2006): 1441–1464.

⁹ There are many possible definitions of cosmopolitanism in current literature. One definition for Kantian cosmopolitanism is 'an attitude taken up in acting: an attitude of recognition, respect, openness, interest, beneficence and concern toward other human individuals, cultures, and peoples as members of one global community'. See Pauline Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1. For recent intellectual histories of internationalism and cosmopolitanism, see, for example, Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Luca Scuccimarra, *I confini del mondo: Storia del cosmopolitismo dall'antichità al settecento* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006).

¹⁰ Wendell L. Willkie, *One World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1943).

was no less important than American freedom. The increasing availability of air power rendered, for him, the space of politics more interconnected, closed, and therefore 'global'.

Thinking about the global as a material and conceptual political space emphasises the complexity of this idea. The 'spatial turn' in historical research highlighted the importance of space, place, location, and spatiality as categories for understanding and analysing historical knowledge.¹¹ The study of international thought is concerned, explicitly and implicitly, with the category of space. Geographic space, its perceptions and representations, provides a fundamental and intriguing conceptual framework for understanding and analysing world politics. Put differently, political space is the theoretical conceptualisation of the geographic materiality of politics. Yet, as Harvey Starr suggests, scholars of International Relations usually ignore the notion of 'space', misinterpret it as deterministic, or dismiss it as irrelevant to their analysis.¹² Starr's proposal to take the concept of 'space' more seriously applies also for historians of international thought. In this study, I argue that the category of political space offers a useful perspective on political thought, which is particularly appropriate to delineate and locate the meanings of world order and globalism. I employ this category to reflect on the mid-century perceptions of the physical geographic conditions of the world and their impact on political and social order.¹³ The notion of political space suggests that the interpretation of the relationship between politics and geography depends on perception: the global was not a mere objective description of the actual spherical geographic conditions of planet Earth. The political space created by the globalist ideology was anchored in observations about geography but shaped by a range of other philosophical, sociological, and political assumptions. This is not a unilinear relationship, but a mutual one: politics can influence the geographical conditions of the world, as well as be influenced by them.

The idea of political space provides a helpful connection between the concrete geopolitics of international relations and the abstract notion of order. It clarifies how various public intellectuals perceived the actual organisation and interaction of different political units in the world. My goal in using this concept is not to impose a rigid theory of political space on past thinkers, but rather to investigate how they characterised and theorised political space in their own writings. Examining the theoretical and

¹¹ Charles W. J. Withers, 'Place and the "Spatial Turn" in Geography and in History', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 70 (2009): 637–658.

¹² Harvey Starr, 'On Geopolitics: Spaces and Places', *International Studies Quarterly* 57 (2013): 433–439.

¹³ Carlo Galli, *Political Spaces and Global War*, trans. Elisabeth Fay, ed. Adam Sitze (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 4; Leif Jerram, 'Space: A Useless Category for Historical Analysis?', *History and Theory* 52 (2013): 400–419.

material spatial dimension of political structures helps understand their internal functions and dispositions towards other units and towards the global space.

DRAWING THE CONTOURS OF GLOBALISM

Globalism meant different things to different people. The book explores aspects of the 1940s discourse of globalism through seven mid-century conversations about world order. Political commentators drew on various fields of knowledge to conceptualise the rise of the global space in world politics. Economics, philosophy of science, sociology, law, geopolitics, theology, political thought—each provided a distinct set of tools for shaping the global order. The multifaceted, flexible character of the idea of the global enhanced its appeal but also highlighted its weakness. There was no one ‘global’ ideology, no single definition of the ‘global’ political sphere. Yet three main themes can be discerned from mid-century attempts to conceptualise globalism.

First, globalism offered an alternative to empire. The global order embodied a growing acceptance of the decline of the imperial world order established by the European powers: France, Britain, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands.¹⁴ By 1945, the new empires *in potentia*, Germany, Italy, and Japan, were effectively defeated. After the war, some feared the rise of the United States and Soviet Russia as powerful empires controlling vast territories around the world. While the political experience of empire could not be expunged from the international public sphere, and indeed had significant ideological and structural influence on the institutions of liberal internationalism, the League of Nations, and the United Nations, mid-century thinkers sought to fashion the global space as an alternative to imperial relations.¹⁵ Some, like Owen Lattimore and Barbara Wootton, expressed a clear hostility to the very idea of empire. Arguably, as Ian Hall suggests, many British liberal international thinkers felt the urge to reformulate their theories of world order in view of the decline in Britain’s

¹⁴ On the end of empire, see, for example, John Darwin, *The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991); Piers Brendon, *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781–1997* (London: Vintage, 2008); Jacques Frémeaux, *Les empires coloniaux dans le processus de mondialisation* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2002).

¹⁵ For example, see Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Patricia Clavin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

global supremacy and the dissolution of its empire.¹⁶ Yet, as I will show, the rejection of empire emerged not only from observations of imperial political and military decay but also from a growing ambivalence about the cultural and political legacy of empire. Thus, the globalist ideology sought to elaborate an alternative defining principle of world order, against the exploitative, unequal political space of empire.

Writing about the foundations of international thought, David Armitage has suggested that historians should explore the international transition from a system of empires to the current system of states.¹⁷ This transition, I argue, was not linear or neat: mid-century thinkers developed competing and sometimes incompatible visions to accommodate not only states and empires in the world system, but also federations, regional unions, transnational communities, and international organisations. The space between empires and states was complex, multilayered, and at times incoherent. Political thinkers have long been engaged in assessing the political legacy of empire, and questioning the place of liberty therein.¹⁸ In the interwar years, both imperial and anti-imperial dynamics inspired British thinkers to imagine a new international order.¹⁹ As Jeanne Morefield has shown, by relying on the imperial experience to construct a new world order, interwar liberal internationalists failed to overcome the repressive and exclusive aspects of the imperial mind-set.²⁰ By the 1940s, however, many

¹⁶ Ian Hall, *Dilemmas of Decline: British Intellectuals and World Politics, 1945–1975* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).

¹⁷ David Armitage, *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 12–20.

¹⁸ On the relations between international order and imperialism, see, for example, Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Sankar Muhtu, ‘Adam Smith’s Critique of International Trading Companies: Theorizing “Globalization” in the Age of Enlightenment’, *Political Theory* 36 (2008): 185–212; Karuna Mantena, *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Duncan Bell, ed., *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

¹⁹ On the rise of interwar liberal internationalism, see, for example, Daniel Laqua, ed., *Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World Wars* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011); Daniel Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Michael Pugh, *Liberal Internationalism: The Interwar Movement for Peace in Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012); Louis Bisceglia, *Norman Angell and Liberal Internationalism in Britain, 1931–1935* (New York: Garland, 1982); Inderjeet Parmar, ‘Anglo-American Elites in the Interwar Years: Idealism and Power in the Intellectual Roots of Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations’, *International Relations* 16 (2002): 53–75; Cornelia Navari, *Internationalism and the State in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 2000).

²⁰ Jeanne Morefield, *Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). For other accounts of interwar critiques of empire, see David Long, *Towards a New Liberal Internationalism: The International Theory of J. A. Hobson* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Bernard Porter, *Critics of Empire* (London: Macmillan, 1968); Nicholas Owen, *The British Left and India: Metropolitan Anti-imperialism, 1885–1947* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

argued that the damages created by the imperial order outnumbered its benefits.

The second constitutive element of the global ideologies was a concern for the future of democracy. During and after the war, it was difficult to predict the long-term survival of democracy as a political system; domestic and international threats loomed large.²¹ The global perspective on the future of democracy relied on regional, transnational, federal, or global institutions, rather than on the basic unit of the territorial state. For some mid-century commentators, democracy could not function well if limited to the domestic realm: a new conception of global democratic order that transcended the boundaries of the state was necessary. This required reconceptualising the basic values commonly associated with democracy: equality, inclusion in the political community, political participation, and—the greatest challenge for the ideologues of globalism—a new global political subject.²²

Democracy was central to American and British efforts of post-war planning and reconstruction, which configured the world order discourse in institutional and private political debate.²³ Wartime Chatham House-based committees on world order and reconstruction united prominent British thinkers on international relations to discuss a post-war internationalist and democratic order.²⁴ After the war against totalitarianism was won, deliberations in the United Nations aimed at refashioning democracy for the post-war era.²⁵ While many shared the conviction that democracy was the best political system to foster liberty and prosperity, efforts were made to reinforce its stability and enhance its flexibility to adapt to diverse social and economic conditions. No one model of democracy was deemed fit for all. The challenge of creating a pluralist yet coherent global democratic order, of globalising its political culture and institutions, required a new conception of modernity. For some mid-century thinkers, the solution would be to draw on a wider range of sources that represented the unify-

²¹ On the crisis of democracy after the war, see David Runciman, *The Confidence Trap* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), chap. 3; Edward A. Purcell, Jr., *The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973).

²² Jan-Werner Müller explored the multifaceted democratic discourse in twentieth-century European history, without dedicating attention to the place of democracy in the globalist discourse. See *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011).

²³ On American post-war planning, see Hearden, *Architects of Globalism*; Stephen A. Wertheim, 'Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy in World War II' (PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 2015). On American post-war planning regarding Britain and the dominions, see Andrew Baker, *Constructing a Post-war Order: The Rise of US Hegemony and the Origins of the Cold War* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).

²⁴ On the American and British post-war planners and the role of Chatham House, see Andrew J. Williams, *Failed Imagination? New World Orders of the Twentieth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 126–140.

²⁵ Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, 79–80.

ing elements of humanity. The conceptual toolbox of modern global democracy included not only rationality and scientific progress but also morality, faith, myth, and religion, which attained an increasingly greater importance for mid-century planners of world order.

The attempts to come up with new interpretations of democracy for the global age were later castigated by historians as ‘a failure’ since most ideas received no practical application.²⁶ However, anachronistic and hindsight judgments run the risk of obscuring the issues that past commentators were concerned with. My main aim, therefore, is not to investigate if and how these global schemes were actualised, but to uncover the political terms and conceptual vocabulary employed to promote certain ideas about politics in historical context. The approach I adopt focuses on examining the aims behind international theories to discern their meaning at the time and their implications for later conceptions of world order. Thus, I argue that mid-century interpretations of democracy beyond the state can provide insights on the intellectual origins of the globalist discourse even if the concrete political visions they proposed—such as a world democratic federation or a regional union—were not realised.

Third, globalism was anchored, for mid-century thinkers, in a pluralistic conception of world order.²⁷ Many of the intellectuals I discuss here argued that the post-war global order should reflect the political, cultural, and social pluralism that they had diagnosed in their world. The existing condition of political and moral diversity should, they suggested, acquire a normative expression in the new global order. Inspired by the British pluralists, especially Harold Laski and Lord Acton, these thinkers explored the potential implications of pluralism on political order in the global, rather than domestic sphere.²⁸

Arguably, there is more than one way to define and interpret pluralism in the history of political thought. For Avigail Eisenberg, pluralism goes beyond mere freedom of association: ‘Political pluralism are theories that seek to organize and conceptualize political phenomena on the basis of the plurality of groups to which individuals belong and by which individuals

²⁶ On visions of global order as (at least partially) a failure, see, for example, Wesley T. Wooley, *Alternatives to Anarchy: American Supranationalism since World War II* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988) 40–65; Williams, *Failed Imagination?*; Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (London: Allen Lane, 2012), 284–290; Jo-Anne Pemberton, *Global Metaphors: Modernity and the Quest for One World* (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 115–166.

²⁷ On Anglo-American pluralism in the twentieth century, see Mark Bevir, ed., *Modern Pluralism: Anglo-American Debates since 1880* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Marc Stears, *Progressives, Pluralists, and the Problems of the State: Ideologies of Reform in the United States and Britain, 1909–1926* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

²⁸ For the history of pluralism as a political idea in the context of the state, see David Runciman, *Pluralism and the Personality of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David Nicholls, *The Pluralist State: The Political Ideas of J. N. Figgis and His Contemporaries* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975).

seek to advance, and more importantly, to develop, their interests'.²⁹ In this book, I adopt an inclusive definition of pluralism to propose that mid-century political commentators and public intellectuals employed this term to suggest that states could not claim sole authority over individuals. Other associations, groups, and organisations provided individuals—and 'persons'—with important opportunities to interact and construct political spaces to advance their political, social, and cultural interests. Pluralism was not a source of political and social chaos, but a form of global order. Nonetheless, these thinkers did not always distinguish clearly between value pluralism and political pluralism, between pluralism of acceptable moral views and pluralism of political institutions governing the community. The opacity of the term 'pluralism' contributed to its rhetorical efficacy, but undermined its analytical power in the globalist discourse.

The attention to pluralism as a key factor in the globalist agenda does not imply making a case for the inclusion of all these figures in the pluralist tradition of political thought. However, in view of recent interest in the political theory of pluralism, I suggest that looking back at the 1940s attempts to deploy the vocabulary of pluralism within the globalist discourse can reveal the limits of conceptualising a pluralist world order.³⁰ There were evident tensions between the pluralistic approach and the support for democracy as the preferable form of government. It was difficult to valorise non-Western forms of political order and insist that the Western interpretation of humanity embodied a universal truth.³¹ By consequence, the proponents of the globalist discourse struggled to reconcile the universalising and the pluralistic aspects of their visions of world order, which thus collapsed sometimes into a defence of Western moral and political values.

THE MID-CENTURY DISCOURSE OF GLOBALISM

The time frame of this study is the decade between the outbreaks of two wars: World War II and the Korean War. It is a recurrent claim that 'we still live in the shadow of the most dramatic and decisive decade of the

²⁹ Avigail I. Eisenberg, *Reconstructing Political Pluralism* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), 2.

³⁰ For recent analytical accounts of pluralism as a philosophical position, see Victor Muñoz-Fraticelli, *The Structure of Pluralism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); William A. Galston, *Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

³¹ Jacob T. Levy identified a similar tension between pluralism and rationalistic universalism in the history of liberal thought. See Levy, *Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

twentieth century'.³² Over the course of the decade, the European powers were starting to lose grip on their empires, while new voices in the American public debate called for greater intervention in world politics.³³ The war years and their immediate aftermath represent a significant moment of world crisis, understood in terms of change and transition, if not decisive innovation. Allied political leaders established governmental think tanks to envisage the post-war settlement and reconstruction on domestic and global scales.³⁴ After the war, the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid led to a stronger American presence in Europe. The redefined spatiality of the Atlantic region was sanctified in legal agreements through the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, which established a closer American-British cooperation, highlighting the shift from the old to the new imperial power.³⁵

New experiments in international organisations brought about the Charter of the United Nations (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), both influential efforts to redefine international and transnational relations on a global scale.³⁶ In 1945, delegates of fifty states gathered in San Francisco to agree upon the Charter of the United Nations. The document was finalised in April and subsequently signed on 26 June 1945.³⁷ At the Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta conferences in 1944 and 1945, the Allied powers had already launched a series of discussions to create a long-term post-war settlement to guarantee international peace. The UN Charter built upon and expanded these earlier proposals and created a new international organisation, the United Nations, to 'reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights', establish a regime of justice based on international law, and 'promote social progress'.³⁸ The main aim of the new organisation was a peaceful settlement of international disputes by employing legal as

³² David Reynolds, *From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1.

³³ John A. Thompson, 'The Geopolitical Vision: The Myth of an Outmatched USA', in *Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War*, ed. Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 91–114. See also Pemberton, *Global Metaphors*, 115; Wm. Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay, 1941–1945: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977).

³⁴ On post-war reconstruction, see, for example, Reynolds, *From World War to Cold War*; David Reynolds, *One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2000), 9–30; Mark Mazower, Jessica Reinisch, and David Feldman, eds., *Post-war Reconstruction in Europe: International Perspectives, 1945–1949* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–51* (London: Methuen, 1984); István Deák, Jan Tomasz Gross, and Tony Judt, eds., *The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

³⁵ Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*; John Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405* (London: Allen Lane, 2007), 470.

³⁶ Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

³⁷ For a detailed history of the United Nations, see, for example, Evan Luard, *A History of the United Nations* (London: Macmillan, 1982); Alessandro Popsi, *Storia dell'ONU* (Rome: Laterza, 2006).

³⁸ UN Charter, Preamble, www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/index.html.

well as military means, and by encouraging the development of friendly and harmonious relations between its members. The charter outlined the various organs of the new organisation, including a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.

The UN Charter outlined a world order based on the principle of the sovereign equality of its members; the constitutive unit of this world vision was the state as a self-governing, independent, and autonomous polity. Regional organisations, such as unions or federations, were permitted, but not required for the functioning of the new international system.

However, the institutional design of the United Nations suggested that, in practice, not all member states were equal. The Security Council, which held ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’, included fifteen members, of which five were permanent. The permanent members of the council, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, held a veto right that endowed them with a privileged position within the nascent international order. The apparent equality of states was, in fact, a deeply hierarchical order aimed at defending the interests of the victors.³⁹ The outsized role of a few states was not accepted without protest.⁴⁰ It led many, including the Chicago constitutionalists whom I discuss in chapter 6, to doubt that the new organisation could indeed set the foundation for a radically new world order, not infested with the faults of the League of Nations.

Chapter I of the charter reaffirmed the centrality of state sovereignty: ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII’. The emphasis on domestic sovereignty set a severe condition on the activities and jurisdiction of the new international organisation, in a way that many political commentators at the time found ineffective and counter-productive. The UN Charter announced the creation of a new, long-lasting international order; yet mid-century globalists found it unsatisfactory, and continued their quest for an alternative.

If the charter promoted the principle of state sovereignty, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights apparently embodied a commitment for universality and shared values. The declaration, proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, was a significant land-

³⁹ Mazower, *Governing the World*, 213.

⁴⁰ A. W. Brian Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 264.

mark in mid-century debates on world order. Eleanor Roosevelt was a prominent member of the drafting committee, which included representatives from eight different countries.⁴¹ Building on ideas and draft bills provided by a variety of civil organisations and governments, the committee sought to form a universally consensual vision of human rights and their implementation in the post-war order. As I demonstrate, the declaration was one of many attempts to come to terms with the need to define the basic qualities of humanity that embodied entitlements to be respected and defended. Catholic scholars, global constitutionalists, and European federalists each had their own interpretation of the universal rights of humanity. The feeling of urgency that surrounded the drafting of the declaration reflected the wider mid-century concern with the idea of human rights and their potential role in the new world order. Yet, as Samuel Moyn argued, the declaration ‘was less the annunciation of a new age than a funeral wreath laid on the grave of wartime hopes’.⁴² The mid-century debate on order and rights was truncated by the Cold War.

The decisive geopolitical changes in the early 1950s set the temporal limits for this study. The rise of the Cold War mentality in the United States undermined the support for new schemes of global order, and rendered many of these visions impractical.⁴³ In American public debate, and to a lesser extent in Britain, the idea of globalism was overpowered by the idea of bipolarism. By the outbreak of the Korean War, imagining a new global order of the world seemed futile, and sometimes dangerously naïve.

Setting a precise time frame for an intellectual history embodies the risk of obfuscating important continuities and imposing anachronistic temporal divides. The spotlight on one decade should not become a rigid artificial constraint. On the one hand, this study constructs the 1940s as a coherent historical period, rather than as two half decades, divided by the world-changing detonation of the atomic bomb in August 1945.⁴⁴ On the other hand, it recognises evident overlaps and continuities with earlier and later modes of thinking about world politics, especially along the ‘transwar’ period, stretching from 1930 to 1950.⁴⁵

After 1950, the central themes of the globalist ideology of the previous decade did not completely disappear from political debate. Instead, the ‘global’ space was marginalised, until its return to centre stage after 1989.

⁴¹ On Eleanor Roosevelt and the declaration, see Mary Ann Glendon, *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York: Random House, 2002).

⁴² Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2010), 2.

⁴³ Campbell Craig, ‘The Resurgent Idea of World Government’, *Ethics & International Affairs* 22 (2008): 133–142.

⁴⁴ William Graebner, *The Age of Doubt: American Thought and Culture in the 1940s* (Boston: Twayne, 1993), 1.

⁴⁵ Philip Nord, *France’s New Deal from the Thirties to the Postwar Era* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 12–13.

Today, globalism and globalisation embody important patterns of thinking about the spatiality of political and economic order.⁴⁶ The processes of European integration and globalisation and the development of international institutions including the United Nations and its agencies brought to the fore many questions about the desirable and viable spaces of politics that had already been discussed in the 1940s.⁴⁷ Political philosophers today face, to a certain extent, similar challenges to the ones that daunted mid-century thinkers, and seek to apply the same political categories—such as constitutionalism, federalism, and pluralism—to outline a solution. In this context, *The Emergence of Globalism* presents an archaeological excavation of unrealised plans, an investigation of past attempts to translate observations about the world into new forms of political order. The contemporary revival of the idea of the global provides another motivation for looking more closely at the rendering of global ideas by mid-century public intellectuals.

The 1940s should be understood, I suggest, not only against an analysis of historical events, but also against debates about globalism and world order that proliferated in the British and American public sphere during the decade. Scholarly literature on mid-century political thought has been largely focused on the creation of international institutions and the human rights regime or on individual figures and political leaders of the time.⁴⁸ However, as this book aims to show, without understanding the development of the discourse of globalism and the intellectual history of ‘world order’, the history of twentieth-century Western political thought remains incomplete.

In writings about world order during and immediately after the war, many political commentators embraced a degree of dynamism and instability as inherent in the new globality of politics. Yet these mid-century representations of the concept of order have been downplayed by International Relations scholars who have delineated the foundational moments of their discipline.⁴⁹ The conceptual tools provided by conventional his-

⁴⁶ The relations between globalisation, history, and politics have been the subject of innumerable studies in various disciplines, including, for example, Yale H. Ferguson and R. J. Barry Jones, eds., *Political Space: Frontiers of Change and Governance in a Globalizing World* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); John A. Agnew, *Globalization & Sovereignty* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).

⁴⁷ There are many intellectual histories of the European Union. See, for example, Fabrizio Sciacca, ed., *La dimensione istituzionale europea: teoria, storia e filosofia Politica* (Florence: Le Lettere, 2009); Justine Lacroix and Kalypto Nicolaidis, eds., *European Stories: Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

⁴⁸ Recent publications include Mazower, *Governing the World*; Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Moyn, *Last Utopia*. The UN Intellectual History Project similarly aims at expanding the historical scholarship about this organisation (www.unhistory.org).

⁴⁹ A recent revisionist history of International Relations (IR) focuses on an earlier period; see Brian C. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations* (Albany:

torical accounts of international thought, exemplified by the paradigm of the debate between realism and idealism, can do little to explain the emergence of globalism in mid-century thought, when concerns about power, order, morality, and democracy were closely intertwined.⁵⁰ In drawing on a wide range of intellectual sources, including science, law, religion, economics, geopolitics, and ideology, the 1940s discourse on globalism was not confined by disciplinary boundaries and rigid paradigms. To explore the intellectual development of the idea of the global, one needs to cast a wider net.

THE IDEOLOGUES OF GLOBALISM

Public intellectuals in the 1940s shared an awareness of the role of public debate in sustaining political change. If the war was fought for democracy, many thought that the post-war order should be decided democratically through open debate in the public sphere, and not exclusively through parliamentary deliberations and diplomatic conferences. Thus, debate on world politics attracted many keen commentators who hoped to contribute to shaping the post-war order by joining public conversations, if not by drafting concrete policy plans. Who were the participants in these conversations, and why did they highlight the importance of the global political sphere? These were not secluded scholars, writing comfortably from their academic ivory towers. Rather, most of the figures examined in this book can be defined as public intellectuals, academically trained experts who engaged in public debate in order to influence popular opinion and decision makers.⁵¹

State University of New York Press, 1998). Two recent accounts of the history of American IR explore mid-century international thought without reference to the idea of the 'global'; see Nicolas Guillot, ed., *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).

⁵⁰ The classic version of this argument is Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (1939; repr., Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). For a revisionist history of the interwar discipline of IR, see Peter Wilson and David Long, eds., *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995); Peter Wilson, 'The Myth of the "First Great Debate"', *Review of International Studies* 24 (1998): 1–16; Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Where Are the Idealists in Interwar International Relations?', *Review of International Studies* 32 (2006): 291–308. On the interplay between intellectual history and IR, see David Armitage, 'The Fifty Years Rift: Intellectual History and International Relations', *Modern Intellectual History* 1 (2004): 97–109; Duncan Bell, 'Writing the World: Disciplinary History and Beyond', *International Affairs* 85 (2009): 3–22.

⁵¹ For definitions of the public role of intellectuals, see, for example, Cornelia Navari, *Public Intellectuals and International Affairs: Essays on Public Thinkers and Political Projects* (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters, 2012), 1–12; Julia Stapleton, *Political Intellectuals and Public Identities in Britain since 1850* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001); Stefan Collini, *Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain 1850–1930* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), 1–25.

The ideologues of globalism at the centre of this study were predominantly white male scholars who were privileged enough to be able to travel the world, lecture to educated audiences, and publish their ideas in widely read outlets. They invested considerable time and energy to generate public support for their ideas about world order.⁵² Nonetheless, there was no one authoritative version of the ‘global’ ideology, but rather there were many competing visions striving to attain political purchase and public support. In this context, I refer to the global ideologies as ‘clusters of ideas, beliefs, opinions, values and attitudes usually held by identifiable groups, that provided directives, even plans, of action for public policy-making in an endeavour to uphold, justify, change or criticise the social and political arrangements of a state or other political community’.⁵³ Without committing themselves to a direct involvement in politics, the promoters of the global ideologies considered their participation in public debate as a responsibility that came with their role as preeminent scholars in prestigious universities (although their main field of expertise was not always politics).

The elusiveness of the globalist agenda in the 1940s allowed a range of public intellectuals to participate in transnational debates on the desirable form and substance of the post-war world order. These individuals came from different disciplinary and national backgrounds. They were renowned scholarly experts in politics, sociology, law, economics, theology, philosophy of science, or geopolitics. While the conversations I explore in the book took place in Britain and the United States, some of the participants were émigrés who had escaped political and racial persecution in their native countries, including Italy, France, Hungary, Austria, Germany, and Romania. Others were frequent travellers with expert knowledge of various parts of the world. Thus, the protagonists of this study represent, to a certain extent, diverse cultural, political, and geographic realities, which, I suggest, contributed to their particular attention to the global aspects of politics.

The rhetoric employed by these intellectuals was an essential part of their global visions since, for them, actualisation depended on popular consent.⁵⁴ Their works aimed at a general audience that included but was

⁵² Some of these authors may be considered ‘public moralists’, who, according to Stefan Collini, based their ideas on ethical arguments rather than expertise. Yet in the context of this study, I use the more flexible term ‘public intellectuals’ to describe individuals who engaged in public debate to promote both political and moral ends. Stefan Collini, *Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

⁵³ Michael Freedon, ‘Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy’, in *Handbook of Political Theory*, ed. Gerald Gaus and Chandran Kukathas (London: Sage, 2004), 6.

⁵⁴ For general accounts of the cultural and political roles of the public intellectual in the twentieth century, see Helen Small, ed., *The Public Intellectual* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002); Richard A. Posner, *Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

not limited to politicians. Thus, political commentary meant engaging with the wider evils of their age rather than with specific problem solving. Many of these commentators saw their role in adapting generic theoretical categories to their political reality. Their public authority depended on the ability to communicate effectively with their audience, through a variety of media: radio broadcasts, public meetings, speeches, pamphlets, newspapers and magazines, books, and scholarly articles.

The intellectuals I discuss in the book construct a loose network united by a shared concern with world order. This transnational Republic of Letters includes Raymond Aron, Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, Lionel Curtis, Friedrich Hayek, Owen Lattimore, Jacques Maritain, Richard McKeon, Charles E. Merriam, David Mitrany, Lewis Mumford, Michael Polanyi, Lionel Robbins, Nicholas J. Spykman, Clarence Streit, Luigi Sturzo, H. G. Wells, and Barbara Wootton. This intellectual cohort is not a homogeneous group of thinkers adhering to a well-defined ideology. Their interest in the global dimension of politics forms a bond of unity in diversity without giving rise to a dominant or representative political stance. This study outlines their relations, fleshing out points of agreement and divergence, in order to suggest the intellectual force of the discourse on globalism was its capacity to attract individuals of diverging worldviews, thus transcending many of the traditional classifications of political thought: liberals, socialists, Catholics, radicals, conservatives, and atheists all found appeal in the promise of global order.

Some of the book's protagonists might be considered by historians as 'minor thinkers' who lacked the intellectual stamina to develop philosophically sophisticated accounts. My aim is not to argue in favour of the inclusion of these thinkers in any canon, nor to lament the neglect of some in standard treatments of the history of political thought. Other mid-century international figures are doubtlessly no less deserving of the historian's attention. I suggest, however, that the 'great' minds of political thought embody an exception rather than a representative example of the general trends of public debate. The intellectual sources for the emergence of globalism as a political category are not necessarily confined to the publications of outstanding philosophers and brilliant theorists. Instead, I focus on the writings of a diverse group of scholars and commentators who actively engaged in transnational debates on world order and sought to influence public opinion on international affairs.

This book reconstructs the globalist conversations by interrogating the writings of a transnational network of intellectuals through their publications, speeches, and newspapers articles. This study has no pretence to provide a comprehensive or final assessment of mid-century thought on world order. I make no attempt to gauge the popularity of various global schemes, their reception by the general public or politicians, and their political implementation. Rather, I examine the contributions of public intellectuals to

shaping the idea of the global within the intellectual and political context of their times, employing a method inspired by Duncan Bell's 'hybrid contextualisation'.⁵⁵ The detailed analysis of particular visions of world order provides a nuanced and complex account of the historical development of globalism during the 1940s. The wider thematic explorations of key theoretical perspectives on the 'global' serve to ground the individual visions in their intellectual, political, and cultural context.

Throughout the book, the personal and professional bonds between these thinkers will unfold. For example, Wells's scientific internationalism was a source of inspiration for Aron, Merriam, and Polanyi.⁵⁶ Wells sought advice from Wootton in writing his universal declaration of the rights of man.⁵⁷ He, like Mitrany, also participated in debates on federalism orchestrated by the British political organisation Federal Union, whose members included Wootton, Curtis, Robbins, and Hayek. Wootton and Curtis were colleagues at Chatham House, and met Lattimore at international conferences organised through the global network of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR).⁵⁸ The correspondence between Curtis and Polanyi reveals their mutual interest in world politics and faith.⁵⁹ Hayek, Polanyi, and Aron met in 1938 at the Colloque Walter Lippmann in Paris and kept in close touch in wartime London.⁶⁰ Aron debated political Machiavellianism with Maritain, who, in turn, supported the global constitutionalism of Borgese and McKeon.⁶¹ McKeon and Lattimore spoke in a panel on 'Problems Arising from the Interrelations and Policies of the Great Powers' at a conference on the development of international society, held at Princeton University in 1946. Mumford's correspondence with Borgese dates back to their world constitution project of 1941, revealing a strong convergence of opinion on the future of democracy.⁶²

The flexible network of political thinkers that I outline in this study serves to embed the emergence of globalism in the historical intellectual

⁵⁵ Bell, *Idea of Greater Britain*, 26.

⁵⁶ Michael Polanyi, *The Logic of Liberty: Reflections and Rejoinders* (London: Routledge, 1951); Raymond Aron (René Avord), 'L'universalisme de Wells, Tribute to H. G. Wells on His 75th Birthday', *Adam: International Review* 153 (1941): 6–7; Charles E. Merriam, 'Review of *The New World Order* by H. G. Wells', *American Journal of Sociology* 46 (1940): 402–403.

⁵⁷ H. G. Wells, *The Rights of Man: An Essay in Collective Definition* (Brighton: Poyning's Press, 1943).

⁵⁸ For records of the Chatham House participation in the IPR conferences, see the Records of Royal Institute of International Affairs, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, box 6, folder 1.

⁵⁹ Michael Polanyi to Lionel Curtis, 21 December 1944, Michael Polanyi Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library (hereafter MPP), box 4, folder 12.

⁶⁰ Serge Audier, *Le Colloque Lippmann: Aux origines du néo-libéralisme* (Lomont: Le Bord de l'Eau, 2008); Angus Burgin, *The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

⁶¹ Richard McKeon, 'A Philosophy for UNESCO', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 8 (1948): 573.

⁶² Herbert Agar et al., *The City of Man: A Declaration on World Democracy* (New York: Viking, 1941).

fabric in which it developed.⁶³ The political and philosophical foundation of these intellectual exchanges is an underlying theme in the book, revealing the importance of this transnational Republic of Letters to the building of the interdisciplinary vocabulary of globalism.

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

The Emergence of Globalism explores the various facets of the theoretical discourse of the 'global' in mid-century Britain and the United States, by uncovering the political assumptions that motivated its proponents, examining the intellectual webs that linked advocates of globalism, reconstructing the cultural conventions that fashioned their ideas, and critically assessing the rhetorical moves that they made. The book is a non-chronological history, a thematic analysis of the diverse conversations in which globalism was developed and shaped.

Two arguments sustain the theoretical claims advanced in the individual thematic chapters of the book. First, the stimulus for thinking about world order and for imagining it as particularly 'global' rose from the perception of epochal crisis that, for mid-century intellectuals, conditioned their world. As I have suggested, the war generated a diffused awareness of the great uncertainty that undermined the foundations of human existence and political order alike. Disquiet about the prospects of democracy in Europe drove mid-century public intellectuals to seek a more stable and resistant form of democratic order that could be applied globally. After the war, trust in international organisations was waning. The failure of the League of Nations to prevent war led many to doubt the new United Nations could operate more effectively. Visions of global order emerged as an attempt to provide a better response to confusion and turmoil.

The second argument is about change. Mid-century thinkers identified the global as an innovative, indeed unprecedented condition of world politics. The crisis they diagnosed as the prime characteristic of their time embodied not only dangerous instability but also flux and fluidity that, for some, could lead to a positive change. Although visions of world order in the 1940s oscillated between ambitious schemes and minimalistic reforms, they shared a common perception of the unique opportunity warranted by the world-changing war to refashion world order. Fear of world destruction by new weapons was accompanied by a cautious optimism about the

⁶³ Usually, the works of some of these thinkers were analysed separately, without reconstructing the intellectual conversations of which they were part. See, for example, Ian Hall and Lisa Hill, eds., *British International Thinkers from Hobbes to Namier* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010); Henrik Bliddal, Casper Sylvest, and Peter Wilson, eds., *Classics of International Relations: Essays in Criticism and Appreciation* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Kenneth W. Thompson, *Masters of International Thought: Major Twentieth-Century Theorists and the World Crisis* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980).

possibility to construct a better political order in which liberty, diversity, and peace could be salvaged. The threat of war—and for some the potential annihilation of humanity—endowed the mid-century debate with a novel sense of urgency that had not characterised earlier international thought. Thus, the perception of global crisis and the sensibility of an unprecedented opportunity for global change gave shape to many 1940s visions of world order.

The book is structured around the geopolitical and conceptual notion of political space, a wide theme that runs across the global visions I discuss. Concerns about the desirable spatial dimension of politics formed mid-century globalism. Thus, the historical narrative I frame in this book seeks to reflect the centrality of spatiality for mid-century thinkers. The chapters of the book are organised by spatial scale, progressing from the state to the region, the empire, the federation, and finally the universe. Each chapter examines how past authors reconceptualised different dimensions of political order in the context of the new framework offered by the global space.

Chapter 2 explores perceptions of the state in a global context, arguing that the emergence of globalism encouraged mid-century thinkers to reimagine—but not abandon—the nation-state. My analysis explores Raymond Aron's writings during his wartime exile in London, most of which were published in the journal *La France libre*.⁶⁴ Historians have downplayed the significance of Aron's early writings on world politics and focused on his studies of international relations theory in the 1960s.⁶⁵ Through an analysis of his proposals to reinterpret the political space of the nation-state in the post-war era, however, I suggest that the war experience formed Aron's conceptualisation of international relations. While the state remained for Aron the main bastion of individual liberty, he acknowledged its conceptual and structural insufficiency in the age of globalism. Aron's interpretation of political ideologies in conversation with the sociologist Karl Mannheim and the philosopher Jacques Maritain led to the development of his loose and pluralistic vision of European unity held together by 'political myth'. A comparison between Aron's vision of world order and that of David Mitrany reveals their shared concern with the need to embed the state in a new global context to guarantee its survival as a political unit in the post-war era. Mitrany's idea of functional relations and Aron's political myth both served to reconceptualise the state in new global settings. I draw on the writings of E. H. Carr to demonstrate that Aron and Mitrany based their proposals

⁶⁴ Raymond Aron, *Chroniques de guerre: La France libre: 1940–1945*, ed. Christian Bachelier (Paris: Gallimard, 1990).

⁶⁵ Raymond Aron, *Paix et guerre entre les nations* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1962).

on two very different interpretations of politics that rendered their global visions politically and intellectually incompatible.

Chapter 3 expands the spatial perspective from the state to the region. In the early 1940s American geopolitical thinkers used spatial concepts to outline the post-war political map, and reimagine the role of the United States in it. Halford Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, and Isaiah Bowman had pioneered the study of the relations between geography and politics. Americans interpreted geopolitics as the dynamic, ever-changing interaction between political government and natural geography. The chapter explores the notion of ‘dynamic geopolitics’ in the writings of two leading American geopoliticians, Nicholas J. Spykman and Owen Lattimore. Their proposals for tripolar regional world order were grounded in empirical observations and competing interpretations of world politics: Lattimore imagined a post-imperial order based on a global pluralistic democracy, while Spykman wanted to establish the United States as a new player in a world order still organised by the precepts of empire. I analyse the key concepts in their geopolitical visions to distinguish their seemingly similar tripolar world orders, and reveal the conceptual centrality of ‘empire’ to their global thought. Finally, I explain the marginalisation of geopolitics in the post-war American discipline of International Relations.

Chapter 4 returns to the problem of empires and their position in a new global order. It examines the notion of ‘democratic federalism’ through the story of the British organisation Federal Union. In this and the following chapter, I uncover an important change in the meaning of democratic federalism as the foundation of mid-century global order. Originally, this structure was proposed as a solution to safeguard the declining British Empire, but by the end of the war it became part of a global scheme for socioeconomic reform. The chapter examines the visions of democratic federalism promoted by Lionel Curtis and Clarence Streit, aimed at creating a democratic world region based on the British Empire and the idea of Anglo-American cultural supremacy. The discussions at Federal Union committees and in the organisation’s newsletter reflect the growing resistance to the imperial model of organising the global political space. Finally, the chapter reveals the limits of Federal Union’s approach to the European colonies and their future within the new federal system.

Chapter 5 traces a different debate on democratic federalism at Federal Union, which sought to overcome the legacy of empire by emphasising the economic and social emancipatory function of the democratic federation. I outline the rise of a new idea of democratic federalism that shifted from a constitutional structure to safeguard the declining British Empire to a regional scheme for socioeconomic change. This transition was shaped in debates among its members, including William Beveridge, Lionel Robbins, Barbara Wootton, and Friedrich Hayek, in Federal Union meetings and in

the pages of *Federal Union News*. This new conception of federalism hoped to meliorate individual social and economic living conditions through transnational unity. However, there was no clear consensus on the desirable and possible political strategies to bring about federal economic democracy, as Wootton and Hayek's debate on free market and social planning demonstrated. This episode revealed the tensions between competing ideas of liberty and democracy, and their implications for global politics, anticipating some of the debates around the European Union.

Perceptions of federal world order are the theme of chapter 6, which shifts the spatial focus from the region to the whole world. I look at a group of American and European émigré intellectuals in the United States who formed the Chicago Committee to Frame a World Constitution (1945–1948). The committee, led by Robert M. Hutchins, Richard McKeon, and Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, united leading intellectuals and scholars concerned with the crisis of world order after the atomic bomb. Theirs was a sustained intellectual attempt to delineate the theoretical foundations for a world federation and global government, and cement them in a constitutional document.⁶⁶ The constitution was, in Mark Mazower's words, 'a staggeringly implausible document' that 'sank almost without trace'.⁶⁷ Yet the real contribution of the committee rests, I suggest, in the vast unpublished documentation it has produced on key theoretical aspects of the new global condition of world politics like representation, political participation, and moral unity. I examine the theoretical contribution of this project to mid-century conceptualisations of legal, political, and moral universalism. The protagonists of this debate were the philosopher McKeon, who advanced a minimalist form of pluralistic universalism, and the anti-fascist Italian literary critic Borgese, who proposed an all-encompassing constitution grounded in natural law and moral universalism. When Borgese's version was accepted, McKeon retired from the committee and advanced his ideas at the UNESCO preparatory committee on human rights and democracy (1948). However, as the jurist Hans Kelsen noted in his comments on the constitution, by alienating the advocates of the pluralistic approach to world constitution the committee undermined the project's feasibility.

Chapter 7 outlines the interplay of globalism and perceptions of science through a series of debates about the potential contribution of scientific practices and technological innovation to the conceptualisation of the global sphere. The atomic bomb presented a global threat that required, for many mid-century commentators, a global solution. The bomb intensified perceptions of the global impact of science and ignited public debate

⁶⁶ Robert Maynard Hutchins et al., *Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).

⁶⁷ Mazower, *Governing the World*, 233.

on its political implications. The *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* provided a platform for scientists and politics scholars to discuss world affairs. The chapter charts conversations about the place of science in global politics through the writings of four individuals: H. G. Wells, Charles E. Merriam, Michael Polanyi, and Lewis Mumford. Through this network of thinkers and publications, I explore how mid-century perceptions of global order developed in debates on the philosophy of science, liberalism, individualism, and morality. I examine the different roles assigned to experts and scientists in these global visions, and highlight the hidden assumptions about moral universalism that motivated them. Despite the universal aspiration of these globalist proposals, their philosophical precepts were grounded in an implicit—sometimes explicit—defence of Western civilisation, its moral values and political traditions.

Chapter 8 investigates how religious ideas shaped and constrained mid-century theories of world order. The chapter revolves around Jacques Maritain and Luigi Sturzo, who argued that Christianity—and especially Catholicism—provided the theoretical toolkit for constructing a peaceful and prosperous post-war order for individuals and communities. Charting their interactions with other protagonists of the book, including Raymond Aron, Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, and Reinhold Niebuhr, I discuss their support of federalism as a shape-giving principle for the new order. While both drew on Catholic thought to theorise the various components of a desirable pluralist global order—persons, communities, the common good—their visions differed on a crucial point: the place of democracy in the globalist agenda. The chapter reveals the tensions between the particularistic, inherently Western Christian theological doctrines, and their attempted application as a conceptual foundation for a pluralistic yet united world order. I argue that Sturzo's attachment to social Catholicism led his vision of global order away from the conservative stance that characterised Maritain's proposals, towards a dialectical interpretation of politics. The concluding chapter ties together the various theoretical and historical narratives of global thought in the 1940s, and proposes some reflections on the decline of the globalist ideology at the end of the decade, and its omnipresent return at the end of the twentieth century.