#### Introduction

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# Globalisation, Global Governance and the European Union

Globalisation is the buzzword of our times. No other term has been used and abused as frequently in politics, the media and in academia. Despite that – or perhaps because of that – there exists little agreement on how to define globalisation, the possible implications of globalisation, how globalisation manifests itself or whether globalisation is a qualitatively new process. Globalisation, it appears, means different things to different people. However, despite the amazing (and still growing) variety of definitions a cluster of similar ideas is identifiable:

Among the terms usually included in the definitions offered were, in order of frequency, speed and time (accelerating, rapidly developing etc.), processes and flows, space (encompassing ever greater amounts of it), and increasing integration and interconnectivity. A composite definition, therefore, might be:

Globalization is an accelerating set of processes involving flows that encompass ever-greater numbers of the world's spaces and that lead to increasing integration and interconnectivity among those spaces (Ritzer 2007:1).

Hence, most analysts tend to agree that globalisation at its core is about interconnectivity and intensified transnational interaction between state actors and

between non-state actors. Another much-cited definition states that globalisation 'denotes a shift in the spatial form of human organisation and activity to transcontinental or interregional patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of power' (Held 1997: 3). This has implications for the structure of international affairs. Here as well, the academic debate has become polarised between hyperglobalisers such as Kenichi Ohmae (1996) who pronounced the dawn of a 'borderless world' and the continuous decline of the sovereign nation-state as a reference point for the political, economic and social organisation of human organisation, and their detractors. For hyperglobalisers, national governments find themselves with little autonomy or capacity to act effectively as they are increasingly sidelined by global capital and reduced to becoming 'market states', existing merely as providers of a legal framework for market forces to operate more effectively (Strange 1996). Globalisation is also enhancing transnational problems that are beyond the scope and scale of individual states to deal with effectively. These include, for instance, environmental degradation (such as pollution, exploitation of the global fisheries, global warming), transnational pandemics (such as SARS and HIV), transnational crime (such as human trafficking and the drugs trade) and new transnational security issues (such as refugee movements and international terrorism).

The detractors from this school of thought highlight the agency of states in unleashing the economic forces that characterise economic globalisation.<sup>1</sup> Rather than being a 'force of nature', contemporary globalisation here is viewed as the outcome of a political project that has created a framework for economic neoliberalism to flourish

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> It should also be mentioned that the thesis of the 'decline of the state' is nothing new. It can be traced back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the writings of Marx and Engels.

(Wunderlich and Warrier, 2007: 10). Or as Hay (2006) argues, states like the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) were instrumental in putting in place the current neoliberal infrastructure that facilitates economic globalisation. And states remain in a key position in international relations. To date, there is no other entity that is able to organise social, political and economic energies in the way national governments still can do by enforcing their authority, generating loyalty and appealing to a sense of shared identity (Maull 2000). Hyperglobalisers often seem to overlook that states retain a primacy and significance in international relations, including in international organisations such as the Word Trade Organisation (WTO) or the United Nations (UN). Far from being passive recipients of economic globalisation, national governments have, for their own purposes, actively fostered an international climate propagating a neoliberal agenda.

It also needs to be recognised that much of the literature highlighting the decline of the nation-state is working with an unrealistic premise, namely that at some point in the past the state possessed levels of nearly complete authority and dominance over domestic and international forces that have now been lost due to the influence of globalisation. Such a reading, of course, represents a grossly over-simplified understanding of the contemporary nation-state and is based on an erroneous conception of the historical evolution of the Westphalian state-system. The modern nation-state consists of a range of different institutions, fulfilling various functions, providing the highest level of authority over a specific territory and a particular population. Not being able to practise a traditional function, such as trade protection, should not be confused with a structural decline of the power of the state: 'Changing

function, or indeed a net reduction of function, does not logically equal overall decline unless one takes a narrow and strictly functional definition of the state' (Bisely, 2007: 65). It needs to be recognised that while restraining the functions of the state in some areas, globalisation has also provided the state with the opportunities to enhance its powers in others. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the sphere of domestic security. Here, globalisation has not diminished state power at all but, on the contrary, it has been a clear source of strengthening state capacity ((Bisely, 2007: 73).

Whilst states have by no means been sidelined or surpassed, it is important to recognise that globalisation is changing the environment in which states find themselves. It is forcing us to rethink our traditional conceptions of world politics, which have been dominated by an emphasis on the state as the central actor and the main focus of analysis. The so-called high politics -- diplomacy, geo-political and security issues – have been the main issue areas in the study of world politics. Indeed, International Relations as an academic discipline has, traditionally, prioritised the study of relations between states. The multifaceted and complex nature of globalisation, however, implies that this is no longer tenable. Globalisation is enhancing the salience of low politics issues such as financial crises, trade flows, migration and environmental change. New actors have gained international significance and need to be recognised as international actors in their own right. Examples include multinational enterprises, investment banks, non-governmental organisations, and global and regional institutions such as the United Nations. New issue areas, such as global terrorism and global environmental change, have entered the agenda of international relations and more traditional ones, such as security, have

undergone a paradigm shift. The concept of human security, for instance, has become of relative importance. This has practical implications as the discussions surrounding the rights and wrongs of humanitarian intervention highlight.

Globalisation is putting a question mark on the normative foundations of the state system. The Westphalian model based on an explicit connection between sovereignty and territory is past its sell-by date. Individual states find their autonomy to set independent national objectives increasingly compromised. The formal institutional framework of the Westphalian state system based on exclusive territorial sovereignty is breaking and is increasingly being replaced with a more flexible global multilevel governance structure. Sovereignty, and with it the Westphalian model, are under pressure as the defining and normative foundations of world politics. Globalisation is transforming the organisation of society; it is opening up new spaces and it is creating new challenges. Consider, for instance, deterritorialisation, a feature and consequence of globalisation, which has increased pressure for the creation of various forms of post-sovereign governance.

There has been an expansion in the authoritative functions of international regulative regimes and international organisations (international and global governance). There are also devolutionary trends with the transfer of decision-making power from the central government to the municipal and the provincial levels as the result of pressures from ethnic- and identity-based groups below state level. None of this, however, implies the end of the state. Rather, in a changing environment states are adapting to

protect themselves from the negative fallouts of globalisation and to protect their national interests.

In response to these changes, academic literatures have also moved beyond the state-centric model of world politics effectively broadening the analysis to include other actors at the global stage such as international institutions, non-governmental organisations, multinational companies, transantional advocacy networks, civil society and regional institutions. And it is in relation to this that we speak of 'global governance' which, very broadly conceived, refers to governance without the existence of an overarching sovereign authority. Global governance scholars tend to focus on a broader range of issues rather than traditional security concerns, and this includes capital and financial flows, patterns of international trade, environmental issues, international regimes, international law, migration movements and human rights, to name but a few.

The emerging global governance system, therefore, moves beyond state-centrism in international relations. It is characterised by five features:

First, it is a multilayered multilevel system where decision-making power is
dispersed between the global level (through organisations such as the UN or
the WTO), the wider international level (through organisations such as the
OECD), the regional level (through regional organisations such as the EU,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For a good overview of the finer subtleties and contestations surrounding the conceptualisation and definition of global governance see Hoffmann and Ba (2005: 1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Examples of this global governance literature include Rosenau and Czempiel (1992), O. Young (1999), Cooper, English Thakur (2002), Behrens (2002), Ba and Hoffmann (2005) and Telò (2009).

ASEAN or Mercosur), the transnational level (through civil society actors, business networks, advocacy networks, political elites etc.), the national level (through governmental authorities) and the substate level (through municipal and community authorities, city council, subnational regions).<sup>4</sup>

- Second, it suggests the development of a more cooperative international
  system. Although sovereignty remains one of the key norms of this system it
  is tempered by other liberal principles such as a commitment to some form of
  democracy and free market principles and, perhaps even more importantly, an
  emerging consensus on the centrality of human rights principles.
- Third, it is a multiple actor system. States, while still being central actors, are
  no longer considered the only international actors of interest to International
  Relations scholars.
- Fourth, the system 'is structurally complex, being composed of diverse
  agencies and networks with overlapping (functional and/ or spatial)
  jurisdictions, not to mention differential power resources and competencies'
  (Held and McGrew 2002, p. 9).<sup>5</sup>
- And, last but not least, the regional level and regional institutions have become integral parts of the complex multilevel and multi-actor framework of global governance.

It is with these points in mind that we need to turn out attention to European integration and the European Union. European integration, and the EU that has been

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See Scholte (2000).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> For point one and three of the elaborations above also see Held and McGrew (2002).

created by it, should not be viewed as autonomous projects. The EU is ultimately embedded in the global governance structure, driven by geopolitical change and globalisation in multiple and complex ways. And, importantly, the EU can be regarded as a case study of multilevel governance, the successful management of globalisation or international actorness beyond the state. It is, therefore, an important repository that can facilitate a better understanding of the evolving global governance framework and contemporary world politics in general.

### The EU and Global Governance

To date, the EU is the most evolved and most highly institutionalised experiment in regionalism. It also represents the largest concentration of economic power in the global arena. In terms of combined population and human resources and trade and finance it can be considered to be at the very least an equal of the current global economic powerhouses of the United States (US), China or India. Furthermore, it has created a unique zone of peace and stability. Not a mean achievement considering the rather unpleasant history of Western Europe, which has twice been at the centre of destructive modern warfare. Patterns of rivalry and enmity that characterised the international relations of Western Europe until 1945 have effectively been transformed into a set of relationships largely characterised by amity and cooperation between the member states of the European Union. Almost sixty years of institutional development, several waves of enlargement and various treaty revisions has created a unique experiment in multilateral international governance at the European level. It is a unique entity that sits somewhere between being a conventional international

organisation and a state. Indeed, there has been much confusion in determining the character of the EU. *State in the making, civilian, normative* and *market power* are expressions that have been used to describe the external character of the EU. However, none of them describes the complexity of the EU in its entirety.

Nonetheless, these ideas are indicative of the external power of the EU. Without doubt, it is an important power in the evolving global governance framework and it is increasingly recognised as such. In particular, the EU serves as a significant reference point for regional initiatives in the global arena within the global governance framework. Its longevity is unprecedented for such an experiment in regional integration, as is its complexity, combing political and economic integration. Simply by existing, the EU demonstrates stability and security and the successful management of globalisation. However, regionalism is not confined to Europe and the EU. Since the Single European Act (SEA) and the subsequent revival of European integration, the world has witnessed a resurgence of regionalisms around the world. Examples include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mercosur (Comisión Sectorial para el Mercado Común del Sur), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union, a new assertive ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), the developing ASEAN Plus Three framework (including South Korea, Japan and China)<sup>6</sup>, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). This new regionalism is driven by the geopolitical shifts following the end of the Cold War and the contemporary wave of globalisation. The emphasis on trade liberalisation and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Perhaps more aptly called 'Three Plus ASEAN', as Jones and Smith (2007: 181) observed.

international financial deregulation and a general increase in transboundary activities is undermining the autonomous policy-making capacity of many states in political, social and economic affairs. As a result, regional spaces and institutions have emerged as an important level in the emerging multilevel global governance structure (Wunderlich 2007: 29).

The new regionalism is fostering regional stability, regional policy cooperation, regional economic convergence and regional political cooperation and, thus, forms a new and important building bloc within the global governance complex. Due to its character and its success the EU is the natural reference point (if not blueprint) for the construction of regional arrangements. However, far from being just a passive model the EU also has and is actively fostering regionalism in other parts of the world. It has created a web of interregional relations (for instance with ASEAN and Mercosur, to mention but two) and thus facilitated the creation of yet another layer in the global multilevel governance framework – interregionalism. This can be regarded as a deliberate strategy to strengthen regional entities and foster interregionalism, thereby enhancing its own visibility, influence and identity. It can also be regarded as a deliberate strategy designed to prevent national retrenchment as a response to the many crises triggered and exacerbated by globalisation. Hence, the EU can be regarded as an important actor within the global multilevel governance framework.

European integration has created a unique framework for policy-making where decision-making power is dispersed across the local, the regional (micro-), the national and the European levels. It has facilitated the creation of a much more diverse

and multilayered political space where levels of authority overlap. This policy-making environment has enabled non-state actors to assert much more influence in decision-making processes to the extent that they have now joined state agency in many areas of policy-making. This EU multilevel governance framework emphasises the fluidity, interconnectivity and transboundary nature of actors and institutions involved in regulatory and political decision-making. It seeks to overcome the inadequacies of the Westphalian model in dealing with the manifold challenges arising out of an increasingly interconnected and globalised world. Thus, the EU policy-making environment represents a unique case study of experiments in governance beyond the state and can be regarded as an important reference point for the organisation of the global governance system.

In addition, the EU has emerged as a new and multidimensional actor in world politics, actively shaping and influencing the emerging global governance complex. As such, it forces us to reconsider conceptions of actorness in the discipline of International Relations, which still predominantly focuses on the Westphalian model and the sovereign state. Not being a state, the EU's actorness is not so much determined by sovereignty but rather by a mixture of institutional identity, presence and capacity (see Wunderlich's contribution to this volume). Of course, this claim is not entirely uncontested. The EU often appears as a rather ambiguous entity, lacking consistency and coherence. The reasons for which are partly to be found in the internal institutional structure representing a precarious balance between two competing logics — Westphalian/ intergovernmental and post-Westphalian/ supranational.

This volume seeks to present a unique and timely overview of the multiple interactions, policies and impacts of the EU within the wider global arena. It goes beyond a narrow understanding of the EU's international relations or its foreign policies, to focus on a much wider array of factors and influences. The term 'international relations' appears to be far too restrictive given the complexities of contemporary world politics. Rather than a focus on international relations, therefore, this volume focuses on 'global governance', by which it seeks to denote a widening of the issues, actors and processes under consideration.

## **Structure of the Volume**

The volume is divided into four distinct thematic parts. The first part provides an overview of attempts to theorize the process of regional integration in terms of how it relates to the notion of global and/or transnational (regional) governance. The second part focuses on the internal dimension, looking particularly at theoretical and empirical developments in the European institutions with specific regard to the question of global governance. Part three focuses on the most relevant policy areas in terms of the European Union's engagement with wider questions of global governance. Finally, part four presents a series of chapters highlighting the way in which the European Union has sought to engage with both third countries/regions and international organizations, creating and/or adapting current structures of global governance in the process.

As noted, the chapters that form the first part of the handbook discuss alternative theoretical approaches to European integration, with particular reference to what this means for patterns of global governance. The aim with each of the chapters, therefore, is to consider both what the process of European integration can tell us with regard to general developments in patterns of global governance, and to consider the extent to which global governance trends impact upon European integration. This is therefore a two-way learning process, a point made by Alex Warleigh-Lack in his chapter in the present volume. Indeed, in Warleigh-Lack's chapter we find a convincing argument that the theoretical debates already undertaken by European studies scholars can be used to inform important debates within international relations. At the same time, EU studies can learn through an engagement with the important debates within the IR literature on issues related to globalisation and global governance. Lee Miles addresses similar issues in his chapter, where he also goes on to argue that we can see important overlaps between the arguments and claims made within both the EU studies literature and that focusing on global governance. This, he argues, is particularly the case if we consider the 'fusion thesis' approach that has developed within the European integration literature. In identifying these common points of departure, however, Miles shows how we can also identify a number of important gaps between the two sets of literatures. There are a number of absences in one or both of the literatures that we might be inspired to fill as a result of comparing the two related bodies of work. Whilst the Warleigh-Lack and Miles chapters identify room for mutual inspiration between the European integration and global governance literature, therefore, the two chapters by Björn Hettne and Uwe Wunderlich both

consider the theoretical and conceptual apparatus that has developed amongst those seeking to understand the process of regionalism and region-building. This is both with regard to the European region, but also as has occurred in other regions around the globe. As the European Union tends to be considered the most integrated of the 'macro-regions' globally, it has also on a number of occasions tended to be viewed as something of a template for regionalism elsewhere (both for academic scholars and political practitioners). In the Wunderlich chapter, therefore, we see a specific focus on the construction of 'actorness'. Whilst in the Hettne chapter we witness a discussion of the tensions that exist between integrating and disintegrating pressures within the European Union. The final chapter in part one considers some of the attempts to introduce critical theories to the study of European integration and EU external relations. Here, David Bailey shows how some of the insights of these critical theoretical approaches can (and have) help(ed) us to produce an alternative perspective on the European Union's position within emergent patterns of global governance.

The second part of the handbook focuses both on the way in which the major

European Union institutions have dealt with the question of global governance, and
how scholars have sought to conceptualise and theorise this process. Thus, the chapter
by David Spence discusses the opportunities and challenges facing the Commission in
its attempt to engage with issues of global governance. In the chapter by Giacomo

Benedetto we turn our focus to the European Parliament. Here Benedetto highlights
some of the important institutional developments that arise at the supranational level.

As the European Parliament is the most advanced attempt at constructing a

transnational/supranational institution of representative democracy we are particularly interested in what this might suggest with regard to general patterns of global governance and the potential for it to be democratic. As Benedetto shows, the increased size of the European Union has created a Parliament characterised by numerous national and linguistic groups, which has in turn created a tendency for consensus to be privileged over competition. Benedetto also highlights the way that the European Parliament has developed a number of limited foreign policy competences, which indicates the manner in which transnational/supranational institutions of representative democracy might play a role within patterns of global governance. Further, in discussing the role of the Council of the European Union, Uwe Puetter highlights three important roles with regard to the European Union's position within contemporary global governance. First, the Council has the capacity to pass legislation that has an important impact upon patterns of global governance, most notably through the adoption of a supranational customs and commercial policy. Second, the Council is able to coordinate a number of member states' policies – most notably their foreign policies – in areas where they might not be able to adopt legislation. Third, the Council acts to represent the European Union in a number of both formal and informal international organizations. Puetter goes on to reflect on what we might take from these observations, and the wider theoretical debates concerning the role of the Council. This includes both a more general consideration of contemporary patterns of, and potential trajectories for, global governance. Similarly, Klaus Brummer's chapter on the European Council and the Presidency shows how some of the working patterns and power relations witnessed in the operation of these two 'power centres' of the EU provide us with insights into potential trends within alternative forms of global governance. Most notably, Brummer shows how the

experience of the European Council highlights the way in which a lack of codification of an institution's role and its functions does not necessarily impede its ability to be influential within emerging institutions and relations of global governance.

Whilst a number of the chapters in the second part highlight the way in which regional institutions might provide a template for alternative forms of global governance, European integration also has the potential to produce supranational institutions that might exist in a more antagonistic relationship with regard to alternative institutions of global governance. In particular, in his chapter on the European Court of Justice, Adam Cygan shows how supranational law can clash with emerging international law. As a result, we cannot assume that different tiers of global (supranational) governance will always be mutually complementary.

Part three of the handbook is concerned with policies that have developed at the European level, and which as a result have implications for wider attempts to understand and theorise issues of relevance for global governance. In his chapter on the common foreign and security policy of the European Union, therefore, Alister Miskimmon shows how this is one of the most central policy areas in which the EU both influences, and is influenced by, contemporary global governance. In particular, Miskimmon shows how 'soft power' instruments – especially the promotion of European norms – have enabled the European Union to be a more effective source of influence than would otherwise be achieved through the promotion of more military forms. In seeking to work with, and thereby consolidate, emerging patterns of global governance, the European Union is clearly both affecting, and being affected by,

international institutions such as NATO and the UN. Environmental policy has also witnessed the rise of the European Union over time, to become one of the leading actors within current global environmental governance relations. Thus, whereas earlier chapters highlight the potential antagonisms between regional and global governance, in her chapter on environmental policy, Magalie Bourblanc shows how the European Union has been keen to promote global governance, as part of the process of regional integration. Clearly, therefore, the relationship between the regional and global level has the potential to vary by both institution and policy sector. Indeed, we witness similar trends in Ferdi de Ville's chapter on common commercial policy. Here we find that the European Union has been one of the key advocates of 'positive integration', meaning the attempt to introduce greater regulation at the global (WTO) level. Equally, the European Union uses its common commercial policy as a means by which to seek to influence the domestic policies of its trading partners. As such, despite a number of important internal differences that afflict EU decision-making in this area, common commercial policy is an important area where the European Union is able to have a significant impact upon the institutions of governance emerging at the global level. On other occasions, EU-level policies have had a more indirect impact upon global governance. For instance, as Wyn Grant's chapter shows, the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) had important effects upon international power relations as a result of the export subsidies that were often used to dispose of the agricultural surpluses resulting from that policy. As Grant goes on to illustrate, the CAP has subsequently had important effects, both directly and indirectly, upon attempts by the European Union to facilitate agreements of relevance to global governance. This has perhaps been most notably the case with the negotiations surrounding both the GATT and the WTO.

Other policy areas developed by the European Union have a more direct impact upon international power relations and trends in global governance. This can be witnessed in the chapters on development policy, accession policy, neighbourhood policy, and conflict policy. Through these empirical investigations we are able to identify a number of important trends. Thus, Maurizio Carbone's chapter on EU development policy highlights a number of important themes that recur throughout the handbook. First, in his discussion of the dual role that the European Union plays in development policy – as both a bilateral and multilateral donor – we witness some of the ongoing tensions between supranational and intergovernmental pressures that arise in many attempts at governance beyond the nation state. Further, as Carbone shows, and echoing the arguments made in Warleigh-Lack's chapter, the various interpretations of the EU's development policy feed into the longstanding realist vs. idealist debates within international relations theory. Finally, as also noted in a number of the chapters in the handbook, the attempts by the European Union to work with institutions such as the World Bank and the WTO in the area of development policy have led to disagreements of opinion on whether this either consolidates or undermines EU influence within institutions of global governance.

An Schrijvers and Eline De Ridder argue in their chapter that an examination of the EU's accession policy enables a better understanding of the EU's role in global governance, both because it relates to the European Union's power and influence within the world, and also to the stance that the EU seeks to adopt vis-à-vis third countries. Thus, the chapter particularly highlights the way in which the adoption of

conditionality by the European Union in its relations with applicant countries reflected its superior power with regard to the central and Eastern European countries that joined in 2004/7. In discussing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Syuzanna Vasilyan provides a critical analysis of the historical record, policy stimuli, and the policy and institutional constructions that have been produced as a result. Vasilyan also touches on some of the questions raised in the discussion on accession policy, particularly over whether ENP acts to the advantage of partner countries and/or represents an act of 'othering'. Finally, in their chapter on conflict transformation, Thomas Diez and Laurence Cooley review the alternative means by which the European Union has sought to intervene in conflicts – through the prospect of integration and through direct intervention. As their chapter shows, the ability of the European Union to achieve desired outcomes in these areas has been limited, due to problems associated with both policy coherence and the failure to fully incorporate local grassroots actors.

The final part of the handbook focuses on the European Union's place within contemporary international relations. In particular, it seeks to examine how the European Union fits within international institutions and relates to other countries and regions globally. This part therefore offers an overview of the EU's place within the developing framework of global governance. Thus, Vassiliki Koutrakou's chapter focuses on the European Union's relationship with the United Nations, looking particularly at the area of conflict and development. As she notes, whilst EU-UN relations suffer from a number of important tensions – including the reluctance of the EU to work under UN-led operations (although it is willing to work on UN-mandated

operations), and the difficulties involved in securing internal coherence amongst the EU member states – the trajectory for global governance appears to indicate a tendency for more multilateral cooperation between the EU and international institutions such as the UN to occur over time. Similarly, in Bart Kerremans' chapter on the European Union's role in global trade and its place within the World Trade Organization we witness debates both between EU member states and between member states and the Commission over the direction of, and competence to decide over, trade policy. These disputes in part explain how the market power of the European Union can have unexpected and paradoxical implications when it seeks to engage with institutions of global trade governance such as the WTO.

In the chapters on the European Union's relations with third countries/regions, we are able to draw upon a comprehensive picture of how the EU both feeds into, and acts as a template for, an overall pattern of global governance. The chapter by Fredrik Söderbaum provides a useful introduction to this topic, discussing both the different types of region-to-region relationships, or 'interregionalism', before moving to a discussion of the concrete cases of EU-African, EU-Asian, and EU-Latin American interregionalism. As the chapter shows, the European Union's policy towards regions varies according to the policy tools available to it within each context, and therefore also according to the particular conditions within each regional context. We can also take lessons for wider trends in global governance by studying EU external relations. Thus, in his chapter on EU relations with the United States, Michael Smith shows how EU-US relations are so closely interconnected that they provide a potential indication of how global forms of integration might emerge, whilst also themselves

Easlavskaia's chapter on EU-Russian relations we see how attempts to form a stable relationship have been based on both shared values and shared interests, with the latter prevailing in the light of the inability to find a common ground with regard to the former. In Mary Farrell's chapter on EU-Africa relations we see how the EU has predominantly focused on promoting a neoliberal model of governance within Africa. Further, Farrell shows how academic analysis of this relationship has tended to focus on Africa as a region, to the detriment of understanding of relations at the level of African states (both within and between them). This therefore clearly raises questions about whether similar analytical trends have developed in the study of the EU's role in inter-regional relations. Moreover, as Martin Dangerfield shows in his chapter, in studying inter-regional relations we need also to include a consideration of subregional cooperation – i.e. between those smaller groups of states that cooperate within a region – which has the potential to both coexist with regionalism and to offer an alternative form of cooperation to it.

A number of the chapters highlight the increased global prominence of the European Union. For instance, in Fabienne Bossuyt's chapter we see how Central Asia, a region that has long had relatively low levels of engagement with the European Union, is becoming increasingly important for the EU as a result of the changing role and power of its neighbours (particularly China and Russia). This also reflects the strategic importance of the region in relation to Afghanistan, and the implications of the region for European gas supplies. As Bossuyt shows, this increased interest led to a new EU Strategy for Central Asia, although the lack of means by which the EU is

able to coerce and/or incentivise Central Asian countries to adhere to (or adopt) EU norms represents an important test for the potential impact of the EU's attempt to become a normative power. Julie Gilson's chapter on the EU's relations with East Asia also highlights a growing EU role. Here we see particularly how processes of globalization have fed into the construction of EU-East Asian relations in such a way that they contribute to changing global governance structures. This is a trend that is also echoed in Ivaylo Gatev's chapter on the EU and Eastern Europe, where the EU has moved from relative indifference and non-engagement through to full engagement, especially as a result of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. As Gatev shows, enlargement has created the need for the European Union to increase its engagement with those Eastern European countries that form its new neighbours; this is particularly the case for Belarus, the Ukraine, and Moldova. The trend from relative indifference/non-engagement to becoming a key strategic partner can also be seen with regard to the EU's relations with Latin America. As Clarissa Dri shows in her chapter, whilst for reasons largely related to France's colonial history Latin America was not initially one of the primary focuses of EU foreign policy, it has become in recent years one of the most important regions in terms of the EU's attempt to promote 'normative' or 'soft' power amongst third countries/regions. This move, from low to high levels of third party engagement, has also witnessed a transformation in the means by which the European Union seeks to exert influence. Thus, in Michelle Pace's chapter on the EU and the Mediterranean we see how the qualitative form of policymaking has also undergone a shift from 'government to governance'. In particular, Pace shows, this has meant the greater importance of political communication and narrative in seeking to understand and explain EU-Mediterranean relations.

Finally, the last chapter in the handbook, by Dawid Friedrich, shifts attention away from the European Union's relations with states and/or international (state-created) organizations, to look at the changing relationship between the European Union and civil society. As Friedrich shows, in the ongoing attempt to ensure the European Union's democratic legitimacy there has been an increased awareness amongst EU-level elites that they must engage with, and enable the participation of, 'civil society' within the EU's decision-making process. The challenge remains, however, to move from the virtuous language of civil society participation to the actual opportunity for democratic engagement by organizations that have roots within and across European society. The handbook ends, therefore, with a discussion of perhaps one of the most pressing issues facing the European Union in its attempts to engage with patterns of global governance: the question of how to do so whilst at the same time maintaining, and hopefully promoting, values of democracy, inclusion and participation that remain ongoing challenges for all contemporary experiments in global governance.