


Diplomatic style as foreign policy insight: A case study of South Korea

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I declare that this thesis is the result of my original work and all sources have been acknowledged.



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ABBREVIATIONS

ABC	Australian Broadcasting Corporation
ANZCERTA	Australia – New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement
APC	Asia Pacific Community
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
APS	Australian Public Service
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DEFCON	Defense Readiness Condition
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICNND	International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
IFANS	Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security
IFES	Institute for Far Eastern Studies
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organization
INSS	Institute for National Security Strategy

KIEP	Korea Institute for International Economic Policy
KINU	Korea Institute for National Unification
KNDA	Korea National Diplomatic Academy
KORUS	Korea – United States
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOU	Ministry of Unification
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
WTO	World Trade Organization

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For full-time students, writing a thesis is a long journey. For part-time students, writing a thesis is an adventurous journey. For part-time students undertaking full-time employment with a wife and two kids, it is an adventurous journey of epic proportions undertaken only late at night or in the hours of the morning when saner individuals are asleep. With this in mind, I have many people to thank.

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Diplomatic style is problematic. In academic research it is dismissed, misconstrued, treated perfunctorily, or wholly absented. Despite substantial expansion in the field of diplomatic studies, it has attracted scant attention. Yet, practitioners maintain a faith-like confidence in it. They allude to its importance in memoirs and instructional texts, and assume it gives them an advantage over scholars in analysing foreign policy. For scholars and analysts, this raises the question; does diplomatic style really provide additional insight into foreign policy?

This study assesses whether the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style provides additional analytical insight above and beyond that which is available through academic research. I first explore the concept of diplomatic style and present a framework for its analysis. I construct four Weberian ideal types of diplomatic style – purposive-rational, value-rational, traditional, and emotional, which provide a means to contrast and compare concrete examples. Using South Korea as a case study, I elicit experiential narratives of diplomatic style from practicing and retired South Korean diplomats, and practicing and retired members of the Seoul foreign diplomatic corps. I then analyse, contrast, and compare these narratives with the Weberian ideal types.

I find a tendency towards emotionalism, and concerns regarding status, generational change, cosmopolitanism, and estrangement, to be characteristics of the South Korean diplomatic style. While these phenomena are featured in academic research, I argue that focusing on diplomatic style highlights their relevance to foreign policy. In particular, the relevance of estrangement is difficult to ascertain from academic research alone. Therefore I also argue that in this specific case, the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style does not provide additional analytical insight into a state's foreign policy, above and beyond that which is normally available through scholarly research, but rather narrows the vast range of information analysts must cover, and thus is an important guide to the factors which are 'policy relevant'.

Hence the study makes three core contributions. First, it contributes to the field of diplomatic studies by presenting a comprehensive framework for the conceptualization of style in diplomatic practice. Second, it contributes to the field of Korean studies by highlighting influences on South Korean foreign policy, which were previously disparate and difficult to isolate. And finally, it presents a tangible policy solution to address the scholar-practitioner gap through a focus on diplomatic style.

INTRODUCTION: The problem of diplomatic style

I know you're a diplomat and that warfare is not supposed to be your game; but you'll discover soon enough out here that statesmanship, diplomacy, economics, and warfare just can't be separated from one another. And if you keep your eyes and ears open, you'll start to see some of the connections between them. It's not something you can learn from textbooks. It's a feel for the thing – *The Ugly American*.¹

In 2007, I had a conversation with a retired senior intelligence official who recounted his dilemma in recruiting a Korean peninsula analyst. He had interviewed four academics with expertise in Korean studies, each with a strong academic background, and three former diplomats, each with a wealth of on-the-ground experience at post in Seoul.

In response to one question, the consistency of responses between the two types of applicants attracted his curiosity. The question seemed simple: "What would be the first thing a South Korean diplomat did on receipt of information that North Korea was going to collapse?"

The academics shared a degree of consistency in their response. This included recounting the strict hierarchical structure and reporting requirements within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the structure of the National Security Cabinet; the agreements on wartime operational control between the United States and South Korea; a justification for entry and control of territory based upon the December 1948 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) declaration that South Korea was the sole legitimate government of the Korean Peninsula; and opinion on the need for

¹ William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, *The Ugly American* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 109.

cooperation with China reflecting that state's historical role and contemporary strategic interests on the Korean peninsula.

The academics' responses focused on state-to-state relations. They reflected the scholarly basis of the academic study of international relations. The vast majority of which, according to Roland Bleiker, a senior academic, is dominated by a "relatively narrow, positivist and exclusive understanding of social science".²

The diplomats gave an altogether different response. They stated that upon receiving the news, a South Korean diplomat would call his wife, girlfriend, or mother, and arrange for their savings to be turned to United States currency; send his children, wife, or girlfriend overseas to study English; or keep the news quiet, so that no responsibility would fall on their head.

The diplomats' responses are embedded in a different approach to international relations. In this case, international relations concerns the actions of individuals. In the context of their everyday practice, the aims, hopes, desires and fears of individuals as well as their habits and traditions, decide the actions, which in turn affect the relations between states. From this approach, according to Vincent Pouliot, another senior academic, international relations is "not a matter of mathematical calculation" and "not an exact science" but rather "a matter of human skills and judgments".³

My conversation with the retired senior intelligence official segued to the type of candidate he had wanted to recruit. According to him, most candidates had a standard set of skills, including Korean language competence; a specialization in area studies (including political, economic, social and cultural affairs); and perhaps a background in

² Roland Bleiker, "The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, 30, No. 3 (December 2001): 518.

³ Vincent Pouliot, "The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities," *International Organization*, 62, No. 2 (Spring 2008): 258.

modern history, international relations, or regional security. But the ideal candidate's skills would go beyond knowledge of the country based on scholarly inquiry and research – beyond textbooks.

The ideal candidate would have additional skills. They would have an understanding of contemporary government practices and processes. The ideal candidate would know the characteristic behaviours of South Korean officials and would have an understanding of when and how these behaviours become more or less prominent. The ideal candidate would possess knowledge, which results from daily interaction with host-country officials. In the senior intelligence official's exact words, the ideal candidate would have knowledge resulting from scholarly inquiry and research *and* would be able to recognize and comprehend the South Korean "diplomatic style".

The senior intelligence official's recruitment dilemma rapidly became my abiding research concern. Diplomatic style provides practitioners and ex-practitioners with additional analytical insight. It is ostensibly only accessible to practitioners and ex-practitioners, who have experienced daily interaction with host-country officials. In the words of Lederer and Burdick, the additional level of analytical insight is "not something you can learn from textbooks. It's a feel for the thing".⁴ As a scholar and a non-practitioner, and an analyst focusing on the Korean peninsula, I wanted to know if diplomatic style does indeed provide practitioners and ex-practitioners with additional analytical insight into foreign policy above and beyond scholarly research.

The problem of diplomatic style

Despite the senior intelligence official's nonchalant reference to diplomatic style, it is not a commonly understood phenomenon. Style is not an easy concept to research. A simple search on the subject is more likely to return information on fashion, fine arts,

⁴ Lederer and Burdick, *The Ugly American*, 109.

website design, or editorial practice and grammar, than on the theoretical structure of style. Yet, style is not confined to these subjects. Indeed, it is central to everyday life. Described in its simplest sense, it is a distinct or particular form, appearance or action. Style can be both a way to categorize – the Baroque style, the Classical style or a jazz style. Equally, it can be a way to communicate, encompassing “a complex system of actions, objects, and behaviours that is used to form messages that announce who we are, who we want to be, and who we want to be considered akin to”.⁵ Style is a “preoccupation of nearly all sectors of society”.⁶ It is an “analytical category for understanding social reality”.⁷ It is the “means by which power and advantage are negotiated, distributed, and struggled over in society”.⁸ Yet, style attracts less scholarly focus than one would expect.

Diplomatic style attracts even less scholarly focus. In diplomatic studies literature, diplomatic style hardly rates mention. Its treatment can be divided into four approaches: the dismissive, the misconstrued, the perfunctory, and the absent.

There is a tendency in mainstream international relations texts to be dismissive of diplomatic style.⁹ Greater credence is given to the common and shared (formerly aristocratic) values of diplomats. In this sense, diplomats are internationalized and culturally desensitized, having more in common with their fellow diplomats than even with nationals of their own country. Influenced by mainstream international relations

⁵ Barry Brummett, *A Rhetoric of Style* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), xi.

⁶ Stuart Ewen, *All Consuming Images: The Politics of Style in Contemporary Culture* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 3.

⁷ Robert Hariman, *Political Style: The Artistry of Power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 9.

⁸ Brummett, *A Rhetoric of Style*, xi.

⁹ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

theory, these texts argue that diplomacy occurs within an international space or “diplomatic culture” that reduces the relevance of national styles on formats, processes and outcomes. Hedley Bull notes “the diplomatic corps that exists in every capital city...[is] tangible evidence of international society as a factor at work in international relations”.¹⁰ The diplomatic culture, while not as strong as it was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, remains as a symbol of universal acceptance of a common set of ideals and norms of interaction. Following this argument, national styles in diplomacy are given less importance than the universalizing effects of the “strange and archaic diplomatic procedures that arose in Europe in another age...”.¹¹

Mayall continues Hedley Bull’s treatment in *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society*. In the opening page, Mayall notes:

Should the man on the Clapham Omnibus encounter a diplomat, he would be likely to regard him as a member of a different species... diplomats often seem to have more in common with each other than with those they allegedly represent.¹²

Texts such as Mayall’s convey the institution of diplomacy as both dominant and consequential, dismissing the role of national style and its tacit recognition and reaction by diplomats as less relevant.

Other texts simply misconstrue diplomatic style with other phenomena.¹³ The greatest weakness in the existing literature is the understandable tendency to float between

¹⁰ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 166.

¹¹ Ibid, 177.

¹² James Mayall, “Introduction,” in *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 1.

¹³ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Touchstone, 1995); Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011); Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985); Thomas Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of*

definitions of diplomacy construed as diplomatic practice and diplomacy construed as foreign policy. In this way we have styles of foreign policy masquerading as styles of diplomatic practice. An author will begin by discussing the style of the diplomats of a certain state only to end up using the state's foreign policy as evidence. This is particularly evidenced in studies from the United States and states influenced by the United States, where the term "diplomacy" is often used interchangeably with "foreign policy".¹⁴ The most obvious and high profile example of this is Henry Kissinger's text *Diplomacy*, which despite its name does not focus specifically on diplomatic practice.¹⁵

There are also a large number of texts that allude to diplomatic style in a perfunctory fashion.¹⁶ This is particularly common in comprehensive studies of a state's foreign policy. A study of a state's foreign policy often stretches to include bureaucratic structures, traditions, as well as diplomatic methods and practices. Although alluding to, or even covering it in a limited fashion, diplomatic style remains a secondary consideration to the overarching aim of comprehensively accounting for a state's foreign policy. Such studies can tease a reader with a clear appreciation of diplomatic style, yet inevitably, due to space restrictions, fail to explore the concept in all but a perfunctory manner. One such example of this is the coverage of Australia's diplomatic

the American People, 10th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1980); Paul Gordon Lauren, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

¹⁴ Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*; Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*; Robert D. Schulzinger, *U.S. Diplomacy since 1900*, 6th ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); I. S. Ivanov, *The New Russian Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2002).

¹⁵ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*.

¹⁶ Derek McDougall, *Australian Foreign Relations: Contemporary Perspectives* (Melbourne: Longman, 1998); Fedor Mediansky, "Into the New Millenium," in *Australian Foreign Policy: Into the New Millenium* (Melbourne: MacMillan, 1997), 287-98; Stewart Firth, *Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy* (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1999); Gareth J. Evans and Bruce Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s*, 2nd ed. (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1995); Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

style in Russell Trood's edited volume *Diplomatic Ideas and Practices of Asian States*.¹⁷ While Trood acknowledges the importance of diplomatic style and notes the lack of academic focus on style, his coverage of the subject is unfortunately confined to little more than a page and a half, limiting a more extensive investigation.¹⁸ Other texts, such as Ronald Barston's *Modern Diplomacy*, provide a more extensive discussion of style, yet still fail to define precisely what it is or the additional insight it can provide.¹⁹ Finally, there are an increasing number of modern texts in which diplomatic style is wholly absent.²⁰ Many of these texts have appeared with the resurgent interest in diplomatic studies since the late 1990s, and demonstrate innovative approaches to the role of diplomacy within the discipline of international relations.²¹ Diplomatic studies has grown to include two dedicated series in prominent academic publishing houses, the Palgrave-MacMillan *Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations* series, and the Brill *Diplomatic Studies* series, as well as a dedicated journal, the *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*. However, diplomatic studies, like many social sciences disciplines, deem rationalism, efficiency, and empiricism, as positive and mainstream, while style and tradition, are deemed less positive and non-mainstream.²² Thus, diplomatic style hardly rates a mention in the plethora of new studies in the field, and in what is the most

¹⁷ Russell Trood, "Australian Diplomatic Practice," in *Diplomatic Ideas and Practices of Asian States* (New York: Brill, 1990), 100–101.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ronald Barston, *Modern Diplomacy* (Essex: Pearson Education, 2006), 70–74.

²⁰ Andrew Fenton Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Rameth Thakur, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Jönsson and Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy*; Andrew Fenton Cooper, Brian Hocking, and William Maley, *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Paul Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

²¹ Stuart Murray et al., "The Present and Future of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Studies," *International Studies Review*, 13, No. 4 (December 2011): 709–710.

²² Bleiker, "The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory," 515.

comprehensive text to date on the subject of diplomacy, *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, the subject of diplomatic style is wholly absent.²³

Reflecting the above, there is today a gap in knowledge regarding diplomatic style. Diplomatic style is not adequately covered in diplomatic studies literature. It has attracted scant attention from scholars of diplomacy. It has been dismissed as irrelevant in the context of diplomacy's universalism; misconstrued as a component of foreign policy; alluded perfunctorily amidst broader considerations of a state's foreign policy; or been wholly absented from discussions, in which it should conceivably comprise an important component.

Yet, diplomatic style comes across as an article of faith to practicing and ex-practicing diplomats. It is treated as a form of knowledge that requires no elaboration or explanation. Texts written by practicing and ex-practicing diplomats often treat style as being intuitive.²⁴ Style is treated as an accepted phenomenon, not requiring further explanation of its genesis, structure or implications. This is particularly apparent in the works of the scholar-diplomat. The scholar-diplomat is typically a serving or ex-diplomat that has reached an advanced level of professional service, often in a state at the height of its diplomatic influence. Unsurprisingly, given the enduring relevance of their work, these authors are also often accomplished scholars, published in a variety of disciplines outside the immediate subject of diplomacy (Nicolo Machiavelli in politics, Francois de Callières in linguistics, Ernest Mason Satow in Asian studies, Harold Nicolson in literature and history, George F. Kennan in Russian studies).

²³ *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*.

²⁴ See Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (London: Penguin, 2011); François de Callières, *De La Manière de Négocier Avec Les Souverains* (Genève: Librairie Droz, 2002); Ernest Satow, *Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, 5th ed. (New York: Longman, 1979); Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1950-1963* (London: Hutchinson, 1973); *Encounters with Kennan: The Great Debate* (London: Cass, 1979); George Kennan, *Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy* (New York: Norton, 1994); Ronald A. Walker, *Multilateral Conferences: Purposeful International Negotiation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

The works of the British diplomat, Sir Harold Nicolson demonstrate the practitioner's intuitive acceptance of diplomatic style. In his treatise on the theoretical underpinnings of Nicolson's work, Derek Drinkwater points out that "the effect of a nation-state's character on its foreign policy and diplomacy is not easy to determine". Yet, according to Drinkwater, Nicolson "never doubted its significance".²⁵ In his own seminal text, *Diplomacy*, Nicolson describes a small number of distinct and long-established styles, such as the United States, Soviet, French, British, Italian and German, and dismisses lesser known 'oriental' and 'third-world' styles.²⁶ Throughout his text, Nicolson elucidates on what, at an early stage he terms the "freemasonry of professional diplomatic practice" – the degree of accumulated professional knowledge, which guides and informs diplomats in their work.²⁷ The diplomatic profession, argues Nicolson, is distinct from that of the statesman or politician, having its own form, rules, conventions and prescriptions.²⁸ Nicolson's work goes on to demonstrate that diplomats recognize, comprehend and adapt to the diplomatic style of their counterparts, which informs their assessments of the country's diplomacy.

Other ex-practitioners, while failing to provide a solid framework to account for diplomatic style, are more explicit regarding its importance.²⁹ Perhaps the most explicit account of the importance of diplomatic style to practicing diplomats is contained within a chapter on national style in the instructional text *Multilateral Diplomacy*, by former senior Australian diplomat, Ronald Walker.³⁰ Walker notes that each national

²⁵ Derek Drinkwater, *Sir Harold Nicolson and International Relations: The Practitioner as Theorist* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 111.

²⁶ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*: 127–154.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 28.

²⁹ Walker, *Multilateral Conferences: Purposeful International Negotiation*.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 227–241.

delegation at a multilateral conference “has its own distinctive characteristics which need to be known by those who would engage with them to shape the conference outcome. Just as the personalities of individual delegates matter in multilateral conferences, so do the ‘personalities’ of national delegations”.³¹

However, for practicing diplomats, style is still a problematic phenomenon. As noted sociologist, Edward Shils, the “progress of mankind has been the progress of empirical science and of rationality of judgment”.³² Progress in human affairs has placed style and tradition on a divergent path from science and rationalism, despite their shared inherent qualities. Thus, in the practice of diplomacy, performance is judged against efficiency, objectivity, and rationalism. Diplomats are recruited using psychometric tests, evaluated against standardized skill sets, and interviewed and measured for their fit into the modern ‘one size fits all’ civil service. Once hired they are measured and audited on performance according to ‘key performance indicators’ that determine their progress in the rational, efficiency-maximizing bureaucracy. The ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style cannot however be audited or measured. To advance in the modern foreign ministry, practitioners do not have to demonstrate the ability to recognize and comprehend style, but rather must demonstrate efficiency-maximizing, rational human resources skill sets. Style is antithetical to the efficient, rational bureaucracy. It appears that in the practice of diplomacy, style is not less relevant, but rather is less *recognized* as relevant.

Thus, on the one hand we have a scholarly community, which has not adequately investigated diplomatic style. Diplomatic style is dismissed, misconstrued, treated perfunctorily, or wholly absented. On the other hand, we have a practitioner community,

³¹ Ibid, 241.

³² Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 4.

which has maintained a faith-like belief in the importance of diplomatic style. Practicing and ex-practicing diplomats have alluded to it in diplomatic memoirs, utilized it intuitively in texts, and explicitly accounted for its importance in instructional texts. Furthermore, as noted above, despite efforts to avoid relying on such an intuitive, uncertain, and elusive phenomenon, anecdotal evidence suggests it plays an important role in providing additional analytical insight.

Reflecting this, we need a better understanding of diplomatic style. Style has already attracted greater scholarly attention in closely related fields, including rhetoric, politics, leadership, and negotiation.³³ Related borrowings from other disciplines, including aesthetics and practice, are starting to provide insight into other sub-fields of international relations.³⁴ A greater understanding of diplomatic style could narrow the gap between the scholarly and the practitioner community. Importantly, it could also lead to a more structured approach to the use of diplomatic style to attain additional analytical insight in the assessment of a state's foreign policy.

Aim and scope

As noted above, diplomatic style has not been adequately investigated. Yet, it is believed by practitioners to provide additional analytical insight into the assessment of a state's foreign policy. This portends to a research proposition: the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style provides additional analytical insight into a state's foreign policy, above and beyond that which is accessible through scholarly research. Accordingly, the aim of this research is to assess whether diplomatic style does in fact provide additional analytical insight into the analysis of a state's foreign policy, above

³³ Brummett, *A Rhetoric of Style*; Hariman, *Political Style: The Artistry of Power*.

³⁴ Bleiker, "The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory"; *International Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Vincent Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

and beyond that which is accessible through scholarly research. The aim thus entails a single central research question: does the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style provide additional analytical insight into a state's foreign policy, above and beyond that which is accessible through scholarly research? This can be broken down into four research sub-questions.

First, what is diplomacy? Diplomacy has proved a difficult and sometimes controversial term to define, with a number of differing definitions in use. In the context of the current study, an appropriate definition needs to reflect the most widely accepted definitions, yet importantly, also reflect 'repetition in performance', or the 'practice of diplomacy'. 'Practice' refers to socially oriented action repeated over time and space within an organizational context.³⁵ Second, what is diplomatic style? The greatest difficulty in any study of diplomatic style is the lack of formal investigation into the phenomenon. To address this question it is necessary to both look at how style is used in other fields, as well as look at the elements of style specific to diplomacy. Third, how can diplomatic style be contrasted and compared? To address the question, it is necessary to determine the constituent elements of diplomatic style and establish a framework from which they could be contrasted. Finally, how can a non-practitioner ascertain and access diplomatic style from practitioners' experience? Addressing this sub-question will largely be methodological, and will inevitably result in further methodological sub-questions, specific to the approach utilized.

As noted, the aim of the study is to assess whether the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style provides additional analytical insight into a state's foreign policy, above and beyond that which is accessible through "scholarly research". "Scholarly research" is here defined as the body of knowledge produced through

³⁵ *International Practices*, 6–7.

scholarly inquiry. In the field of intelligence analysis, scholarly research is classified as a distinct category of 'open source intelligence'.³⁶ It includes published dissertations and theses; information communicated at academic conferences, symposia or other presentations; academic journal papers; and academic texts.³⁷ Accordingly, "additional analytical insight above and beyond" scholarly research refers to knowledge, which is unlikely to be attained from the body of existing literature on the subject. Finally, foreign policy is defined as "all actions of state directed in whole or part outside of the boundaries of the state".³⁸

Given the potential size of the study, it is necessary to limit its scope. I limit the research to a single state's diplomatic style – the Republic of Korea, hereafter, South Korea. Additionally, I limited the study to English language materials. I utilize South Korea as the sole case study for a number of reasons.

First, South Korea was the subject of the original conversation, which motivated my interest in the topic. As an analyst working on Korean peninsula issues for over ten years, the notion that the ability to recognize and comprehend the South Korean diplomatic style provides practitioners and ex-practitioners with additional analytical insight on South Korea's foreign policy, above and beyond scholarly research, greatly intrigued me.

Second, within the context of the central research question, South Korea is an ideal case study. The small number of studies on diplomatic style referred to above, largely focus on what former British diplomat and academic Ronald Barston labels "trade mark"

³⁶ Richard Best and Alfred Cumming, *Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Issues for Congress*, CRS Report for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, December 5, 2007), 6.

³⁷ Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 5th ed. (Los Angeles: Sage/CQ Press, 2012), 79.

³⁸ Gyngell and Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, 19.

diplomatic styles.³⁹ States with trademark diplomatic styles include the United Kingdom, United States, France, Russia, China, and Japan. Each state has long established organizational histories, stable bureaucratic structures, and built-in operating procedures, which are often the subject of official histories or substantial scholarly inquiry, such as the case of the United States and the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series.⁴⁰ This makes determining whether diplomatic style does in fact provide ‘additional analytical insight’ into the analysis of a state’s foreign policy particularly difficult. It could be assumed that the ability to recognize and comprehend non ‘trade mark’ diplomatic styles would provide a relatively larger benefit to an analyst, in the absence of official histories detailing long established organizational histories, stable bureaucratic structures, and built-in operating procedures.

Third, there is a manageable volume of scholarly research informing the analysis of South Korean foreign policy. A manageable volume of scholarly research makes it more possible to determine whether diplomatic style does in fact provide ‘additional insight’ into the analysis of a state’s foreign policy. The body of literature, which makes up scholarly research on South Korean foreign policy can be divided into three groups – diplomacy and diplomatic practice literature; foreign policy literature; and related literature. A complete list of these works is at Appendix A.

It is important to note that limiting the study to a single case has significant implications for the findings. Findings on the utility of diplomatic style as foreign policy insight in the context of a single case study cannot be applied universally. In this sense, the study’s findings are of intrinsic value to the specific case of South Korea’s diplomatic style. At the same time, I note the arguments of senior academics Robert Stake and

³⁹ Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*:70.

⁴⁰ Office of the Historian, “Foreign Relations of the United States,” *State Department*, February 14, 2014, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments>.

Deborah Trumbull who argue the existence of 'naturalistic generalization'.⁴¹ Stake and Trumbull posit that we generalize from the particular through vicarious experience, including through interaction and texts, and that "practical, functional application of research findings... intuitively fall naturally in line with readers' ordinary experiences".⁴² This particularly applies to the current study's research methods based on the narrative and phenomenological approaches.

Diplomacy and diplomatic practice literature includes dissertations and theses; information communicated at academic conferences, symposia or other presentations; academic journal papers; and academic texts directly related to South Korean diplomacy or diplomatic practice. This included diplomatic memoirs and commentary, practitioner commentary, and diplomatic history texts.⁴³ To my knowledge, there are no English language studies that focus solely on the diplomatic practice of contemporary South Korea. South Korean diplomatic practice has been traditionally marked by a distinct lack of transparency. The early struggle for political legitimacy as one-half of a divided nation and the ongoing security threat presented by North Korea has inevitably placed a high premium on secrecy. The function, process and structure of foreign policy implementation, including diplomatic practice, for a long time remained behind closed doors. As noted by Koo and Han in 1985, South Korea has "always been a security conscious and security oriented nation...foreign policy has always been a super-

⁴¹ Robert Stake and Deborah Trumbull, "Naturalistic Generalizations," *Review Journal of Philosophy and Social Science* 7, No. 1 (1982): 1-12.

⁴² Sherri Melrose, "Naturalistic Generalization," in *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2010), 600-602.

⁴³ Kun Pak, *Hibiscus: The Journey of a Korean Man through the Rise of His Country* (Tokyo: Random House, 2009); Ben C. Limb, "Speech: The Life of a Diplomat," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 43, No. 1 (February 1957): 55-61; Tong Won Lee, *Tasks and Times: Memoirs of Lee Tong Won, Foreign Minister Who Finalized the ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty* (Seoul: Jimoondang, 2004); Woonsang Choi, *The Diplomatic History of Korea* (Seoul: Myoung Ji Publishing, 1987); Jack Pritchard, ed., *Ambassadors' Memoir: U.S.-Korea Relations through the Eyes of the Ambassadors* (Washington, D.C: Korea Economic Institute of America, 2009).

sensitive issue monopolized by a few select top decision makers”.⁴⁴ Indeed, as Hoon Jaung contends, it was not until recent times that “foreign policymaking remained in the secret garden of the president, who was largely insulated from democratic control and public involvement”.⁴⁵

Foreign policy literature includes dissertations and theses; information communicated at academic conferences, symposia or other presentations; academic journal papers; and academic texts directly related to South Korean foreign policy. In establishing this category, it was necessary to distinguish between literature on South Korean foreign policy and literature on South Korea as a foreign policy *subject*. The volume of the former is miniscule in contrast to the latter. For example, in the first 100 hits on a search for “foreign policy” and “Korea” on the mainstream academic databases *Jstor* and *Proquest*, there are 6 and 8 hits, respectively, related to South Korean foreign policy, with the others hits relating to South Korea as a foreign policy subject (most often relating to security), North Korea, or other unrelated topics.

It is also necessary to distinguish between texts focusing on South Korean foreign policy and texts focusing on South Korea’s North Korea policy. North Korea policy, also known as unification policy, is considered in this study to be separate to foreign policy. North Korea policy inevitably does involve aspects of foreign policy, just as North Korea policy includes aspects of aid and development, security, defence, and economic policy. North Korea policy comes under its own ministerial portfolio - the Ministry of Unification, much the same as aid and development, security, defence, and economic policy. Accordingly, just as a study focusing on foreign policy would exclude

⁴⁴ Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han, *The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 14.

⁴⁵ Jaung Hoon, “Foreign Policy and South Korean Democracy,” *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, 1, No. 2 (December 2005): 51.

studies overtly focused on security, defence, and economic policy, this study excludes literature overtly focused on North Korea policy.

Related literature includes dissertations and theses; information communicated at academic conferences, symposia or other presentations; academic journal papers; and academic texts indirectly related to South Korean foreign policy. These studies focus on related topics, such as strategy, security, defence, public administration, and economic development. However, given the volume, only those with specific relevance to diplomatic practice or diplomatic style were included.

To recap, the aim of the study is to assess whether the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style provides additional insight into a state's foreign policy, above and beyond that which is accessible through scholarly research. To limit the scope of the study, I focus on English language literature on South Korea's foreign policy, including materials on diplomacy and diplomatic practice, materials directly related to foreign policy, and materials indirectly related to foreign policy, but considered to be relevant to an understanding of diplomatic style.

Methodology

The study is structured on a Weberian sociological inquiry. Weber's approach to social sciences research recognizes the importance of studying reality in a rational, value-neutral manner, but at the same time recognizes the difficulty of applying the strict procedures of the physical sciences to social phenomenon that can bedevil attempts at abstraction and generalization. It thus presented an ideal means to investigate diplomatic style. The study therefore consisted of two central methodological tasks, the construction of ideal types, and the gathering of data to enable a concrete example to be contrasted, compared and analysed.

The first of these tasks involved the construction of four ideal types of diplomatic style. An ideal type is a constructed, heuristic device designed to understand the significance, meaning, and in some circumstances the causes and consequences, of concrete phenomena. To construct ideal types of diplomatic style, I extracted and accentuated elements of style in classic diplomatic literature to form four logically precise and coherent wholes, which serve as frames of reference or yardsticks to contrast, compare, and analyse the diplomatic style of a case study – South Korea. More details on the methodology to construct ideal types of diplomatic style are provided in Chapter Three.

The second of the methodological tasks involved an inherently more difficult process. Gathering data on a concrete example of diplomatic style proved very difficult. As explored in Chapter Two, diplomatic style consists of both explicit and tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge, by its nature cannot be transferred by impersonal means. Thus, to gather the data, I utilized a phenomenological narrative approach. Phenomenological narrative combines two methodological approaches: narrative or storytelling, and phenomenology, the study of the way we experience things. Narrative phenomenology essentially utilizes the very human desire to tell convincing stories as a means to understand individuals' common or shared experiences of a phenomenon. This consisted of eliciting narratives of lived experience from individuals who had experienced the phenomenon of South Korean diplomatic style, including serving and retired members of both the South Korean diplomatic service and the Seoul diplomatic corps. More details on the methodology to gather the data to contrast, compare and analyse the concrete example of diplomatic style are provided in Chapter Five.

Significance

The study arrives at three significant findings. First, the research findings demonstrated the significance of the concept of style to the field of diplomatic practice. It

demonstrated that diplomatic style remains important to diplomatic practitioners despite bureaucratic trends reducing its import. Style plays an important role in both categorization and communication, and comprises an essential component of a practitioner's tacit knowledge, which contributes to the mediation of particularism and universalism. Second, the research findings demonstrated that diplomatic style does not provide additional analytical insight into a state's foreign policy, above and beyond that which is normally available through scholarly research, but does highlight phenomena of policy relevance, which narrows the range of information an analyst must cover. This includes highlighting phenomena, which are not immediately apparent through scholarly research. Third, the research findings demonstrate that in the South Korean diplomatic style, there is a tendency towards emotionalism, a preoccupation with status, significant generational change and cosmopolitanism, and concerns with estrangement from international society. These phenomena are prominent features, which explain South Korea's foreign policy. In particular, the study demonstrates that the phenomenon of estrangement is highly relevant to South Korea's foreign policy, despite being particularly difficult to ascertain from scholarly research alone. The impact of estrangement from international society on South Korean foreign policy is scantily covered, widely dispersed, and difficult to perceive as relevant without the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style.

As detailed immediately below, these findings contribute to the field of diplomatic studies and Korean studies. Additionally, the study presents a methodological solution and a corresponding tangible policy recommendation to addresses a contemporary challenge at the nexus of academic and practitioner interaction.

The study thus contributes to the field of diplomatic studies. As noted, diplomatic style has not been adequately investigated. Expansion in the field of diplomatic studies has to

date not yet included style, despite promising investigations into diplomatic tradition, contemporary practice, and theory.⁴⁶ The significance of this contribution lies in expanding the field of diplomatic studies to include an area, which has remained important to practitioners, despite bureaucratic trends reducing its import. A primary concern of diplomatic studies scholars has been the erasure of the gap between scholars and practitioners of international relations and the establishment of a “two-way conduit” between scholars and practitioners, and between the discipline of international relations and the sub-discipline of diplomatic studies.⁴⁷ This was a central theme of a 2011 *International Studies Review* article, in which the leading scholars of the diplomatic studies field discussed the state of the art and its way forward.⁴⁸ Establishing style as a unit of analysis brings to the fore the role of the practitioner in the scholar’s efforts to understand international relations. It thus takes steps towards narrowing the scholar-practitioner gap. It establishes a two-way conduit between scholars and practitioners, and between the discipline of international relations and the sub-discipline of diplomatic studies.

The study also contributes to the field of Korean studies. South Korea is the world’s 13th largest economy in terms of gross domestic product (purchasing power parity).⁴⁹ It is

⁴⁶ Mai’a K. Davis Cross, *The European Diplomatic Corps: Diplomats and International Cooperation from Westphalia to Maastricht* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Geoff Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Geoff Berridge, ed., *Diplomatic Classics: Selected Texts from Commynes to Vattel* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*; *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*; *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World*.

⁴⁷ Jan Melissen, “Diplomatic Studies in the Right Season,” *International Studies Review*, The Present and Future of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Studies, 13, No. 4 (December 2011): 724–725.

⁴⁸ Murray et al., “The Present and Future of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Studies.”

⁴⁹ OECD, *Country Statistical Profile: Korea*, (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, November 15, 2013).

increasingly recognized as playing important regional and multilateral roles.⁵⁰ As the only state to transform from net aid recipient to net aid donor and member of the Organization for Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) it is also uniquely positioned between the developed and developing world.⁵¹ It is a state which, when unification occurs could have within 30 years an economy larger than France, Germany and Japan.⁵² However as noted above, there are very few studies on South Korea's foreign policy and none, which focus on South Korea's diplomatic practice. This study contributes what is to the author's knowledge, the first English language study focusing solely on the South Korean diplomatic style.

The study also presents an innovative and tangible solution to a research problem of diplomatic style. As noted above, diplomatic style has not been adequately investigated, yet remains important to practicing diplomats. A central reason for this is the difficulty to measure, account, and even explain what it is. The framework presented in this study presents an innovative approach, which lays the foundations to access practitioner knowledge regarding diplomatic style, and to methodologically contrast and compare different diplomatic styles, thus enabling the incorporation of diplomatic style into analysis of a state's foreign policy.

Finally, the study presents basic policy recommendations for greater interaction between the academic and practitioner communities through the use of diplomatic style.

⁵⁰ Heike Hermanns, "National Role Conceptions in the 'Global Korea' Foreign Policy Strategy," *The Korean Association of International Studies*, 11, No. 1 (June 30, 2013): 55–82; James Cotton, "Middle Powers in the Asia Pacific: Korea in Australian Comparative Perspective," *Korea Observer*, 44, No. 4 (Winter 2013): 593–621; David Hundt, "Middle Powers and the Building of Regional Order: Australia and South Korea Compared," *Korea Observer*, 42, No. 1 (Spring 2011): 69–94.

⁵¹ Keun Lee, *How Can Korea Be a Role Model for Catch-up Development? A "Capability-Based View"* (Helsinki: UNU-WIDER, 2009).

⁵² Gooheon Kwon, *A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks*, Global Economics Paper, Goldman Sachs Global Economics, Commodities and Strategy Research (Seoul: Goldman Sachs, September 21, 2009).

The opening narrative of this study reflects a policy problem in intelligence analysis. In the field of analysis, it is widely believed that analysts should not just have academic experience, but also in-country experience.⁵³ Because of the desire to fulfil this criteria, as well as the desire to recruit from within government (for security and familiarity reasons), in the Australian Public Service (APS), an informal career progression from an in-country diplomatic role to a country analysis role has been established.⁵⁴ However, this goes against intelligence analysis best practice. It has been noted in various studies of the United States intelligence community that it is also important to recruit outside of the public service, including those with more diverse experience, such as is acquired studying or teaching in-country.⁵⁵ If implemented, the recommended policies to share knowledge regarding diplomatic style would benefit both the scholarly and practitioner community, opening up country analyst recruitment to a wider and more diverse field of applicants. This recognizes the importance of the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style; which at the moment is only possible with an in-country diplomatic role; and the importance of a sound academic background.

Research outline

This introduction highlights the motivation behind the study and presents the research problem, namely, a discrepancy between scholarly research and practitioner use of diplomatic style. It introduces the aim and scope of the study, including the central research question: does the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style provide additional analytical insight into a state's foreign policy, above and beyond that which is accessible through scholarly research? The central research question is then

⁵³ Arthur S. Hulnick, *Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century* (Westport: Praeger, 1999), 60.

⁵⁴ Interview with DFAT Embassy Staff, October 2013.

⁵⁵ Kenneth Lieberthal, *The U.S. Intelligence Community and Foreign Policy*, Monograph, Foreign Policy Paper Series (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, September 2009), 34.

broken down into four sub-questions, focusing on diplomacy, diplomatic style, the means to contrast and compare diplomatic style, and the means to ascertain and assess the use of diplomatic style. The introductory chapter then defines key terms, limits the scope, highlights the potential significance, and presents the structure of the study.

Chapter One addresses the first sub-question: what is diplomacy? The chapter explores standard definitions of diplomacy, until settling upon a functional definition. It explores the four core diplomatic functions of representation, reporting, negotiation and the protection of nationals abroad. It demonstrates how these core diplomatic functions, like any object or practice of human creation, can be understood to have both a functional component, and an extra-functional or aesthetic component. Reflecting previous research on the link between the aesthetic and style, the chapter argues style to be an inherent component of diplomacy.

Chapter Two addresses the second sub-question: what is diplomatic style? The chapter explores and clarifies the concept of style and its application to diplomacy. It first looks at differing interpretations of style, and how it has been utilized in other fields. The chapter then argues that the academic and practitioner communities have evolved to interpret style differently. It argues academics have utilized style as an explicit device, predominantly to classify; while practitioners have utilized style as a tacit device, predominantly to communicate. The chapter goes on to explore these two aspects in the context of diplomacy. The chapter then presents a definition of diplomatic style.

Chapter Three addresses the third sub-question: how can diplomatic style be contrasted and compared? The chapter introduces concept of the 'ideal diplomat' and 'ideal diplomatic style' - two recurrent themes in western diplomatic literature, particularly in the works of the scholar-diplomat. The chapter argues that the concepts of the ideal diplomat and ideal diplomatic style correlate to Max Weber's methodology of the

generalizing ideal type. The chapter thus argues that by extracting the constituent components of the ideal diplomat and ideal diplomatic style from the scholar-diplomat genre, Weberian ideal types of diplomatic style can be constructed, which will provide a means to methodologically contrast and compare diplomatic style.

Chapter Four applies the argument outlined in the previous chapter. It constructs ideal types of diplomatic style, utilizing four classics of western diplomatic literature, including *The Prince* by Nicolo Machiavelli; *De la manière de négocier avec les souverains* (On the manner of negotiating with sovereigns, often translated as *Diplomatic Practice*) by Francois De Callières; *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, by Sir Ernest Mason Satow; and *Diplomacy* by Sir Harold Nicholson; as well as selected papers of the same authors. The chapter concludes by again highlighting the means to methodologically contrast and compare diplomatic style.

Chapter Five addresses the final sub-question: how can a non-practitioner ascertain and access diplomatic style from practitioners' experience? The chapter thus introduces narrative phenomenology as a means to extract tacit knowledge regarding diplomatic style from diplomatic practitioners. It first provides the philosophical background to both narrative theory and phenomenology and how they work together. It then presents a contrast to other approaches considered. The chapter then explores the strengths of narrative phenomenology in the context of diplomatic style and justifies its use in the current study. Finally, the chapter explores the processes of narrative methodology, including the collection of data, validation and evaluation, and analysis.

Chapter Six and Seven present the findings of the research. The two chapters are split between the narratives of South Korean diplomats themselves, and the Seoul diplomatic corps, who through repetitive interaction have experienced the South Korean diplomatic

style. Chapter Six and Seven retell representative narratives as textural and structural descriptions, highlighting significant statements, and developing meanings units.

Chapter Eight, explores the essence of the phenomenon of the South Korean diplomatic style, using the textural and structural descriptions, significant statements, and meanings units explored in Chapters Six and Seven. The chapter presents an assessment of the essence of the phenomenon of South Korean diplomatic style to determine if it can provide additional insight into South Korean foreign policy, above and beyond that which is accessible through scholarly research.

Finally, the Conclusion highlights the significance of solving the research problem, detailing the study's contribution to the field of diplomatic studies. The chapter then returns to the opening narrative, highlighting how the findings solve the research problem it inspired. Finally, the study presents policy recommendations on the incorporation of diplomatic style into analyses of a state's foreign policy.

To borrow from the opening quote of William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, diplomatic style is currently "not something you can learn from textbooks" but rather "a feel for the thing".⁵⁶ Yet, as will be demonstrated in the study, a fuller understanding of diplomatic style; a means to access it; and policies to incorporate it into analysis; may allow any additional insight it offers, to be more effectively utilized by both scholars and practitioners alike.

⁵⁶ Lederer and Burdick, *The Ugly American*, 109.

CHAPTER ONE: Diplomacy

The current chapter defines and explores diplomacy. It argues that diplomacy, like all human action or objects made from human action, can be thought to consist of two constituent components: the functional and the extra-functional. It further argues that understanding the extra-functional component of diplomacy allows a fuller understanding of diplomacy and points towards a role for style in diplomacy. The chapter first looks at definitions of diplomacy, settling upon a utilitarian definition focused on the four core tasks of diplomacy. These tasks are then reinterpreted as consisting of both functional and extra-functional components. Finally, it is shown that these extra-functional components of diplomacy portend an important role for style in a more comprehensive understanding of diplomacy.

Defining diplomacy

The renowned diplomat-scholar, Sir Harold Nicholson, states in his text of the same name, that the term diplomacy is “carelessly taken to denote several quite different things”.⁵⁷ This leads him to conclude that, “there are few branches of politics which have been subject to such confusion of thought”.⁵⁸ Indeed, such is the level of confusion regarding the term that most studies in the field, from Nicholson onwards, have felt obligated to commence, as does this one, with an attempt to clarify and distinguish the term from its varied usages.

Diplomacy derives from the Greek word *δίπλωμα* or diploma, which literally means ‘an object folded in two’. The Greek term diploma, reflecting its modern usage referred to an official document, which bestowed the holder with certain privileges. Through the Latin term *diplomaticus*, the word *diplomatique* entered the French language around

⁵⁷ Nicholson, *Diplomacy*, 13.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 14.

1708, referring to the study of the age, authenticity and value of ancient texts in the same sense as the term palaeography.⁵⁹ In time, the term came to refer in particular to the study of ancient texts concerning relations in the international environment. From this emerged such terms as *corps diplomatique*, *protocole diplomatique* and *mission diplomatique*. Around 1790, the French term *diplomatie* emerged to describe the branch of politics specifically relating to the relations between states.⁶⁰ Soon after, thought to be around 1796, the term diplomacy appeared in the English language with the same meaning.⁶¹ The Oxford English Dictionary defines diplomacy in its primary sense as:

The management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist; skill or address in the conduct of international intercourse and negotiations.⁶²

In its secondary and more aged sense it can mean “the diplomatic body” or diplomatic personnel and in its third sense, it can mean the “skill or address in the management of relations of any kind; artful management in dealing with others.”⁶³

Yet, in modern popular usage, diplomacy can have a meaning that is roughly “a catch-all alternative to war” or “negotiations”. This is particularly popular in the mainstream media. In the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the *New York Times* reported on the 21 January “Rumsfeld says Iraq diplomacy is nearing the end of its tracks”; on the 13

⁵⁹ Josette Rey-Debove and Alain Rey, *Nouveau Petit Robert*, Nouvelle édition remaniée et amplifiée (Paris: Dictionnaires le Robert, 1993), 649.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ G. R. Berridge and Alan James, *A Dictionary of Diplomacy*, 2nd ed., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 70.

⁶² Oxford English Dictionary, “Diplomacy, N.,” *Oxford English Dictionary Online*, June 30, 2011, <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/53200>.

⁶³ Ibid.

March, it warned of "Diplomacy's last chance"; and on 18 March it lamented "War in ruins of diplomacy". In each example a clear contrast between war and diplomacy is established. This of course runs contrary to historical experience, which demonstrates only too well that diplomacy is as important during and after war as it is before. The consideration of diplomacy as the opposite of war is an oversimplification of the conduct of state-to-state relations.

Diplomacy can also have a meaning analogous to statecraft—the conduct, rationale and art of conducting affairs of state. Its confusion with diplomacy perhaps derives from their common academic ancestry from the likes of Machiavelli, De Callières and Richelieu. More recently, the link has been reinforced by the widespread dissemination of one text—Henry Kissinger's *Diplomacy*. Kissinger's ill named text leads the reader through a riveting account of power politics and the application of *raison d'être* throughout the ages, but touches only fleetingly upon the practice of diplomacy. Mark Amstutz distinguishes diplomacy from statecraft as such:

Statecraft is essentially concerned with foreign policy making. Diplomacy, by contrast, involves the peaceful pursuit of foreign policy through negotiation. Moreover, whereas statecraft is the responsibility of elected government officials, diplomacy is the responsibility of a trained cadre of professionals.⁶⁴

As noted by Amstutz, using diplomacy as a replacement for statecraft fails in two key areas. First, it fails to distinguish between the implementation (diplomacy) and the creation (statecraft) of policy. Second, it fails to distinguish between the professional (diplomacy) and the political (statecraft). However, Amstutz gives credence to the arguably flawed belief that diplomacy is a 'peaceful pursuit'. Perhaps, a more useful

⁶⁴ Mark Amstutz, *International Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to World Politics*, 2nd ed., (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1999), 280.

explanation would be to think of diplomacy as the glue that connects the instruments of statecraft. Thus war, trade, propaganda and espionage—all the instruments of statecraft—are bound by the practice of diplomacy.

Finally, the term diplomacy can have a meaning analogous to “foreign policy” or “international relations”. This meaning is particularly popular in academic circles amongst historians. It is also particularly common in the United States, where notable and highly influential scholars, institutions and schools have supported this interpretation of the term. However, as noted by Berridge and James in their *Dictionary of Diplomacy*:

The use of the word diplomacy as a synonym for foreign policy, which is especially common in the United States, can obscure the important distinction between policy and the (non violent) means by which it is executed.⁶⁵

Sir Harold Nicholson was particularly opposed to diplomacy being used as a synonym for foreign policy. The opening paragraphs of his classic text *Diplomacy*, leads the reader through an explanation of the difference between diplomacy and foreign policy. For Nicholson, the confusion between the two terms resulted in a failure of the public to distinguish between “the early deliberative stages during which the ‘policy’ is being framed and decided” and the later stages when it is being implemented.⁶⁶ Indeed, Nicholson goes even further to imply that confusion between the terms weakens democratic control of foreign policy.

Contemporary definitions of diplomacy are considerably broader. Leading scholars at the academic-practitioner juncture have pushed forward research agendas that are differentiated by epistemological and methodological approaches, strengthening the

⁶⁵ Berridge and James, *A Dictionary of Diplomacy*: 70.

⁶⁶ Nicholson, *Diplomacy*: 12–13.

quality of academic debate. Geoffrey Allen Pigman divides these works into two categories: the positivist approach, with a focus on state actors and state-to-state relations, and the post-positivist approach, with less focus on state actors, and a greater focus on the core functions of diplomacy.⁶⁷ Stuart Murray however, sees three categories, suggesting the different approaches to diplomacy can be classified into differing “schools of diplomatic thought” along traditionalist, nascent and innovative lines.⁶⁸

The traditionalist school of thought emphasizes the centrality of the state to diplomacy, and thus focuses on a traditional political-military agenda.⁶⁹ Accordingly, definitions of diplomacy within this category focus on the work undertaken by accredited representatives of sovereign states.⁷⁰ In contrast, the nascent school of thought emphasizes emerging, often non-state forms of diplomacy, and thus focuses on broader contemporary issues, which have transformed post-Cold War international relations.⁷¹ Definitions of diplomacy within this category are considerably broader, seeing the core functions as being more important than the actors, thus focusing on negotiation, representation, reporting, mediation, and other forms of communication.⁷² Finally, Murray positions the innovative school between these two, arguing that the exclusivity of the two schools leads to a false dichotomy between state and non-state diplomacy,

⁶⁷ Geoffrey Allen Pigman, “Debates about Contemporary and Future Diplomacy,” in *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 78.

⁶⁸ Stuart Murray, “Consolidating the Gains Made in Diplomacy Studies: A Taxonomy,” *International Studies Perspectives*, 9, No. 1 (2008): 23.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 28–29.

⁷⁰ Paul Sharp, “Diplomacy in International Relations Theory and Other Disciplinary Perspectives,” in *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 61.

⁷¹ Murray, “Consolidating the Gains Made in Diplomacy Studies: A Taxonomy,” 30–31.

⁷² Sharp, “Diplomacy in International Relations Theory and Other Disciplinary Perspectives,” 62–63.

when in reality the latter's growth only occurs in relation to the former.⁷³ Definitions within this category fill the space between the state and non-state conceptualization of diplomacy, both recognizing the dominant role of state actors, yet at the same time avoiding the exclusiveness of the state-centred approach.

Sociological studies of diplomacy, which constitute Pigman's post positivist approach, and Murray's latter two categories, substantially inform the current study. Sociological studies of diplomacy focus on the development, structure, and function of diplomatic interaction and thus offer a fuller understanding of diplomacy.⁷⁴ Senior diplomatic studies academic, Paul Sharp, in particular, situates diplomacy in its sociological roots, focusing on the efforts to mediate or relate to separateness, and uses this to explain international theory.⁷⁵ Costas Constantinou follows a similar vein, positing that diplomacy deals with the political imperative, and is concerned with "how we can live together in difference".⁷⁶ Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall similarly situate diplomacy in its sociological roots.⁷⁷ They analyse diplomacy as the mediation of universalism and particularism, focusing on communication, representation, and the reproduction of international society, as the constituent elements of diplomacy.⁷⁸

In the same way, the following section argues that diplomacy formally consists of four core functions, which can be reinterpreted according to social aesthetics, and ultimately, style. Reflecting this, and noting that no definition is complete without an appropriate

⁷³ Murray, "Consolidating the Gains Made in Diplomacy Studies: A Taxonomy," 33–34.

⁷⁴ Bertrand Badie, "Transnationalizing Diplomacy and Global Governance," in *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 87–88.

⁷⁵ Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*, 75–92.

⁷⁶ Costas M. Constantinou, "Between Statecraft and Humanism: Diplomacy and Its Forms of Knowledge," *International Studies Review*, 15, No. 2 (June 2013): 142.

⁷⁷ Jönsson and Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy*.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 67–134.

example, as the diplomatic historian Robert Balmain Mowat wrote in 1935: "Many definitions of diplomacy have been made; but perhaps it is easier, as Aristotle said of energy, to explain diplomacy by giving examples of what it does, than by trying to put into half a dozen words what it is".⁷⁹

The functional component of diplomacy

Throughout the ages, the functions of diplomacy have centred on four key areas: representation, the protection of nationals abroad, negotiation and reporting. These functions were codified in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as:

Representing the sending State in the receiving State;

Protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law;

Negotiating with the Government of the receiving State;

Ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State;

A less narrow interpretation of diplomacy could of course include many more functions. For example, it has been argued that an important function of diplomacy is the maintenance of international order.⁸⁰ The Vienna Convention itself includes a further function, namely, the promotion of "friendly relations between the sending state and the receiving state, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations". However, such functions could be construed as culturally myopic at best, and strategically blind at worst. The fact is that states are not always interested in friendly

⁷⁹ Robert Balmain Mowat, *Diplomacy and Peace* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1935), 1.

⁸⁰ Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*:4.

relations or the maintenance of international order. Certain states may profit from the cessation of friendly relations and the disruption of international order.

Indeed, it is hard to imagine why a state that feels restrained by the international order, would seek its maintenance. Tasks, such as promoting friendly relations or maintaining international order are more reflective of the author than any concrete diplomatic function, which is not covered by the other four. Representation, the protection of nationals abroad, negotiation and reporting are the mainstay of diplomatic practice upon which this study is based.

Representation

Representation is neither a simple nor unequivocal concept.⁸¹ In diplomacy, it refers to representation as behaviour—‘acting for others’; and representation as status—‘standing in for others’.⁸²

In acting for others, the diplomat represents the political, economic, strategic and military interests of the sending state. The sending state accords the representative with the authority to act on its behalf. This can be an extremely limited mandate, acting in much the same way as messenger or mouthpiece for the sending state. It can also extend to a broad ranging mandate, giving the representative the authority to enter into legal instruments or commit the state to action.

The most basic tasks of ‘acting for others’ include negotiation and reporting. The diplomat acts on behalf of the sovereign or executive authority in negotiation and reporting. The connection between the sovereign or executive authority and the individual acting on their behalf is much clearer in a historical context when envoys were often personally and sometimes intimately connected to the sending authority. In

⁸¹ Jönsson and Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy*, 98.

⁸² Ibid, 100.

the modern context, this connection is largely symbolic and quite often superfluous, given the tendency of leaders of states in regular contact to be in direct personal communication.

In standing in for others, the diplomat represents the status of the sending state. Traditionally, this was the symbolic representation of power, prestige and influence of the sending state as well as the esteem with which the receiving country is held in the sending country. Accordingly, dispatching a senior, well-respected and connected politician sends a contrasting signal to the dispatch of a career diplomat, military or business professional. Similarly, the choice of transportation, domicile, number of employees at mission, attendance at state functions and hosting of functions all symbolically convey information regarding the prestige of the sending country and the esteem with which the receiving country is held in the sending country. There is an important symbolic nature to both the choice of envoy and their arrangements.

For the modern diplomat representative tasks are a daily event. They may be perceived as glamorous, but in reality comprise an enduring tedium of modern diplomatic life. A presence at the opening of a cultural centre, attendance at a lunchtime event hosted by the local chamber of commerce, participation in an interview with the local media, or the hosting of a dinner party for local academics. At each event the diplomat in their presence, attire, behaviour, and composure, represent the sending state.

As with all facets of diplomacy, the nature of diplomatic representation is changing rapidly. Increasingly, states seek to ensure that diplomats sent abroad are representative of the society itself. Thus, a multicultural state may make an effort to ensure that its diverse linguistic, cultural and ethnic populations are equally represented in its pool of diplomats. Similarly, a theocratic or ideological state may seek to ensure its beliefs or ideology is represented in its pool of diplomats.

There is also the potential for more sweeping change. The security risk and cost associated with permanent representation combined with advances in transportation and communication technologies mean that states are increasingly seeking alternatives. This includes the use of home-based 'roving ambassadors' assigned to a particular thematic issue or geographic region; greater use of 'virtual' embassies and teleconferencing; and increased use of targeted public diplomacy, through social-networking services and online forums. Representation is rapidly transforming.

The protection of nationals abroad

The protection of nationals abroad, also known as the consular function, is an important diplomatic task in that it demonstrates a significant level of social, economic and political interaction between two states. In his study of diplomacy amongst tribal societies of Oceania and Australasia, Ragnar Numelin points out that contacts between estranged primitive societies occurs in one of two ways—trade or war.⁸³ Either way, the protection of nationals, be it traders or soldiers, becomes an increasingly important task as contact continues.

The protection of nationals abroad is subsumed in the consular functions of the modern diplomatic mission. Consular functions include assistance to nationals arrested or otherwise detained by the receiving state, the processing and provision of identity and travel documents, the processing of administrative matters including births, deaths, marriages, compulsory national service, social security and elections, and the restitution of nationals injured or incapacitated.

Over the last ten years, the consular function has expanded in both volume and complexity. The long-term trend of a greater number of citizens engaging in travel and

⁸³ Ragnar Numelin, *The Beginnings of Diplomacy: A Sociological Study of Intertribal and International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950), 5–10.

work overseas has been exacerbated by the increased need for security awareness. A large part of this is of course in response to heightened security concerns since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

These changes have inspired new ways of looking at the problem. States have increased the number of programs aimed at alerting citizens to the risks associated with travelling and working abroad and have established new procedures to handle large-scale crises. This has included efforts to reduce the consular workload in non-essential administration through a greater use of technology. Other states have looked at the potential for the private sector to play a much larger role, including in education programs, non-essential administration and crisis response.

Negotiation

Negotiation plays a defining role in all aspects of diplomacy. Indeed, the term negotiation is used as an analogue to diplomacy in classical literature. De Callières classic, *De la manière de négocier avec les souverains*, which can be found as a reference in nearly every subsequent treatise on diplomacy, testifies to the importance of negotiation to the field of diplomacy. Modern diplomats may pursue a career in which their experience of formal negotiation is secondary. Nonetheless, in the course of their careers, they will inevitably rely upon the basic skills of the negotiator outlined by De Callières three centuries ago—truth, accuracy, calm, patience, good temper, modesty, and loyalty.

Negotiation serves multiple functions. In addition to its primary function of the exploration and reconciliation of conflicting positions, it can also serve other functions, such as strategic delay, publicity, diversion or intelligence gathering.⁸⁴ It occurs at a variety of levels. Negotiation can be the exploration, preparation and completion of a

⁸⁴ Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*, 48.

multilateral agreement undertaken through email, formal diplomatic correspondence, special missions, multilateral conferences and leadership summits. Equally, it can be an informal oral exchange on attitudes towards a future proposal, discussed casually over dinner.⁸⁵

In the daily life of the modern diplomat, negotiation is best expressed in its extremes. Certain diplomats may never participate in formal negotiation. Instead focusing on other, equally important issues, such as representation (public relations) or reporting (political analyst/monitor). Others may focus exclusively on negotiation, with their mission set in terms of a specific negotiating forum, which comprises of ongoing multilateral and bilateral negotiations. The work of diplomats in multilateral trade sections of the modern foreign ministry has evolved beyond the skills of negotiation to include the ability to manage and administer negotiation with much of the subject matter necessitating technical skills beyond the generalist negotiator's capacity.

Changes in diplomatic practice have equally affected the function of negotiation. There is recognition that a substantial component of the contemporary negotiation function requires highly specialized knowledge. Areas such as trade, environment, finance and investment necessitate that specialists accompany or replace diplomats in negotiations. Certain states do not have the capacity to recruit, train and maintain such specialists, thus necessitating the ad hoc participation of private sector consultants in a core diplomatic function.

Reporting

Reporting deserves a particular focus in contemporary diplomacy. If negotiating were the bricks in the foundations of diplomacy, reporting would be the mortar. The task of reporting is the acquisition of accurate and regular updates on the political, economic,

⁸⁵ Ibid, 48–68.

social, military and strategic affairs of the host state. As noted by Barston: "...timely warning of adverse developments is one of the major tasks of an embassy...requiring considerable co-ordination, expertise, judgment and political courage".⁸⁶

The contemporary diplomat is aided by the spread of information and communications technology. Today, it is not necessary to be at post to be able to report on the domestic social, political or economic situation. There is any number of well-informed media bureaux, business/political intelligence, open source intelligence and media monitoring agencies to provide more than enough information. Indeed, many contemporary foreign ministries have effectively allowed much of the reporting function to be outsourced to other areas of government dedicated to information collection and analysis. This has substantially narrowed the reporting function to the collection of mission relevant information obtained through direct interaction with host country sources. Indeed, there is a trend in countries of major importance to obtain mission relevant information through professional business intelligence consultancies.

The reporting function is also undergoing substantial change. Increasingly locally engaged staff or private sector providers undertake the function. The private sector can fulfil basic political and economic intelligence collection; collation and analysis function but remains limited in its capacity to secure the same level of insight available to accredited diplomats with high-level and official access.

Thus, dating back to antiquity, representation, the protection of nationals abroad, negotiation and reporting have been the central tasks of the diplomat. Jönsson and Hall theorize that diplomacy is a timeless institution, which reduces the economic, political and social transaction costs of interdependence between distinct and alienated political

⁸⁶ Ibid, 3.

entities.⁸⁷ Representation, the protection of nationals abroad, negotiation and reporting are the functional components of this timeless institution.

The extra-functional or aesthetic component of diplomacy

In a 1948, the academic journal *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* published a paper by philosopher Paul Schrecker, entitled the “Phenomenological Considerations on Style”.⁸⁸ Schrecker’s paper focused on style and the aesthetic. The aesthetic relates to the human appreciation of, or response to, what pleases the senses.⁸⁹ Academic Barry Brummett notes the aesthetic is the “dimension of experience that is connected to sensory appreciation and form”.⁹⁰ Simply put, the aesthetic relates to the appreciation of beauty. However, modern interpretations of the aesthetic go beyond the appreciation of beauty and its narrow focus on the arts, to include broader questions of communication, expression, comprehension, and representation.⁹¹ Thus, when we speak of ‘the aesthetic’ we have to consider elements of human work, or the products of human work, which evoke not only a sense of beauty, harmony and pleasure, but also other elements of sensory experience to the very opposite end of the spectrum – such as consternation, foreboding, alarm, agitation, awe, and fear.⁹² Schrecker’s argument is relevant to the current study. Schrecker’s argument, in simple terms, was twofold: the aesthetic is present everywhere, thus the phenomenon of style, which is a constituent element of the aesthetic domain, is also everywhere.

⁸⁷ Jönsson and Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy*, 26–29.

⁸⁸ Paul Schrecker, “Phenomenological Considerations on Style,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 8, No. 3 (March 1948).

⁸⁹ *The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 26.

⁹⁰ Brummett, *A Rhetoric of Style*, 17.

⁹¹ Roland Bleiker, *Aesthetics and World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

⁹² *Ibid.*, 67.

First, Schrecker argued that both the functional and extra-functional (for him the aesthetic) was present in all human work or objects made from human work.⁹³ He believed the aesthetic is manifest in every human action to varying degrees, along a gradation from the purely aesthetic to the non-aesthetic.⁹⁴ At one extreme of this gradation would be the work of humans that comes closest to fulfilling no other purpose than the aesthetic—music, fine arts and literature. At the other extreme of the gradation would be the work of humans that comes closest to fulfilling no other function than that for which it was produced—a stop sign, a bandage or an emergency flare. For Schrecker, the level of aesthetic or functional determination places the work of humans at one point along this gradation - while we naturally associate the aesthetic with fields such as music, fine arts and literature, there can be no field in which the aesthetic is absolutely devoid.⁹⁵ Differences in a stop sign, bandage and emergency flare can be found across cultural and temporal spaces even while discounting for technological and geographical varieties.

Second, he believed that “the phenomenon of style may rightly be considered as the constituent element of the aesthetic province of civilization”.⁹⁶ Indeed, Schrecker, believed it would be difficult to find any man-made object in which style was not present. Essentially, Schrecker argued that the phenomenon of style can be found everywhere because of its presence in the extra-functional or aesthetic, which is a component of all human work, or objects made from human work. Naturally, style should be easier to recognize in some fields than in other fields. For example, one can assume that within the field of architecture, cathedral designs would have a greater

⁹³ Schrecker, “Phenomenological Considerations on Style,” 373.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 372.

aesthetic aspect (and thus clearer styles) than factory designs. In the same way, one can assume that within the field of diplomacy, representation and negotiation would have a greater aesthetic aspect (and thus clearer styles) than reporting and the protection of nationals abroad. Yet, as can be ascertained in re-appraisals of the work of early 20th century industrial architecture, even the seemingly functional can within a given context be placed within the realm of the aesthetic.

Accordingly, Schrecker's argument suggests that the phenomenon of style *must* be present in diplomacy. The trick is being able to recognize this extra-functional, or aesthetic component of diplomacy. A way to do this is to draw a parallel between diplomacy and a field more commonly associated with the aesthetic domain, namely – art.

Artistic works are comprised of three elements: inspiration; the use of creativity; and communication. From a sociological perspective, art is an attempt to better understand “reality which is to all intents and purposes, chaotic, enigmatic, and often threatening”, with an aim “to discover the nature of the world with which we have to deal and how we may best survive in it”.⁹⁷ Thus, we can immediately see a parallel in diplomacy. We can also consider diplomacy to be comprised of the same three elements: inspiration, the use of creativity, and communication. Diplomacy also aims to understand reality, to make sense of it, and to determine the means to progress through real world problems. Thus, both the artist and diplomatic practitioner utilize inspiration, creativity, and communication to achieve aims to comprehend reality, interpret reality, and find ways to deal with reality. There are distinct parallels between art and diplomacy. As noted above, art is commonly associated with the aesthetic domain. Reflecting this, with a

⁹⁷ Arnold Hauser, *The Sociology of Art* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 6.

focus on the elements of inspiration, creativity, and communication, we should be able to better recognize the aesthetic in the four core diplomatic functions.

Representation – the aesthetic component

Representation is an inherent component of art as it is diplomacy. The artist, much like the diplomat, acts for others. Through their actions, the artist represents not only themselves, but also their society's thoughts, ideas and conscience. The artist acts as a social or political conscience. Through their symbolic position in society, they also stand in for others—supporting, criticizing or condemning what others cannot.

The parallels to diplomacy are clear. As noted earlier, the diplomat represents as behaviour—acting for others, and represents as status—standing in for others.⁹⁸ The point, at which representation assumes aesthetic value, is the point at which the diplomat or artist frees themselves from the conventions of communication, yet still maintains comprehension, understanding and acceptance.

An example of the aesthetic in diplomatic representation is the architecture of the resident embassy. The architecture of resident embassies has a highly symbolic representative role. A resident embassy can convey the strength, power, technological prowess and importance of the state. Jane Loeffler quotes former U.S. Ambassador to India from February 1973 to January 1975, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, as stating:

Embassies are unique architectural subjects. Perhaps no other public buildings are of such symbolic importance: much more than our domestic public buildings, their appearance establishes an image of the American government and people.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ Jönsson, *Essence of Diplomacy*, 100.

⁹⁹ Jane Loeffler, "The Architecture of Diplomacy: Heyday of the United States Embassy Building Program, 1954-1960," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, 49, No. 3 (September 1990): 251.

In the Australian capital, Canberra, the architecture of embassies has taken on a further representative role. With the capital being a planned city, the majority of embassies were newly constructed in the 1950s and 1960s. As part of the city's planning, embassies were to be constructed, as far as functional suitability would allow, in a style that was representative of the sending state's national culture.

Accordingly, on Moonah Place, standing at the top of a hill, one can find the United States Embassy, designed in the Georgian style of the American colonial south of the 17th and 18th centuries. On Forster Crescent, the Chinese embassy stands in a modern style, fitted with overlay of traditional motifs and masonry, sided by a classical southern Chinese garden.

The representative role of diplomatic architecture has thus taken on a strongly aesthetic component. Both embassies are recognized as 'tourist attractions' due to their distinct and impressive appearance. They convey a sense of power, attraction and influence. This form of representation is aesthetic. It conveys a message that is somewhat freed from the conventions of communication (compared to more staid diplomatic architecture), yet still maintains comprehension, understanding and acceptance.

Reflecting this, what may appear as overt aestheticism in diplomacy, equally serves a functional purpose. In 1990, Jane Loeffler published an article describing the 'heyday' of U.S. embassy building during 1954-1960. Her research captures the fine balance between the aesthetic and functional in diplomatic architecture. Loeffler describes architectural teams as aiming to "speak to the world of American hopes and American strength" and to build "mutual trust and respect with people of different cultures and sensibilities".¹⁰⁰ Newly constructed embassies were meant to be functional, yet at the

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

same time aesthetically characteristic of America whilst conforming to local sensibilities and the conditions (cultural sensibilities and weather).¹⁰¹

There is a delicate balance between the aesthetic and the functional. In certain circumstances, diplomatic tradition, which over the years has become highly aestheticized, plays an equally important functional role. This can be demonstrated by the tradition of diplomatic rank. In the years following the Bolshevik revolution, the Soviet regime challenged the conventions of communication in the function of representation, but failed to maintain comprehension, understanding and acceptance. The Soviet regime sought to replace pomp and ceremony with simplicity and equality in all diplomatic functions. Representatives were to be diplomats without rank, known as plenipotentiary representatives or *polpred*, rather than ambassadors, ministers or first secretaries. Rank was disowned and equality was promoted in a bid to reflect the Soviet ideology. As Trotsky argued, Soviet diplomats did “not belong to the diplomatic school” but should rather be considered as “soldiers of the revolution”.

The representative role of the Soviet diplomat was to convey a message of equality, simplicity and the rejection of major power secretive diplomacy. This form of representation was highly aesthetic in that it conveyed a message freed from the conventions of communication (compared to accepted practice of diplomatic representation which relies heavily on the distinction of rank and access). However, just as occurred with the nouveau diplomats of revolutionary France, the regime inevitably reverted to accepted forms when the functional aspects of diplomacy demanded access to high-level officials, precedence in negotiating forums, or positions in social functions. The attempt to instil the aesthetic into the functional failed to maintain comprehension, understanding and acceptance.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 251–261.

Protecting nationals abroad – the aesthetic component

The protection of nationals abroad is a task of diplomacy that is understandably not immediately associated with the artistic domain, but nonetheless it sustains an aesthetic component. Diplomatic practitioners are the first to state that ‘there is an art’ to the protection of nationals abroad. Some diplomats do it well, while others fail abysmally. The skill of individuals is compounded by national differences. It is a well-known fact that certain states pay much greater attention to the task than other states. Diplomats can tell of incidents in which several people of differing nationalities have been arrested for the same crime in a foreign capital, yet only those of certain states receive assistance from their governments—and this is not dependent on material resources alone. If ‘there is an art’ to the protection of nationals abroad, where does it lie?

The protection of nationals abroad is comprised of several components. It includes education—to inform and warn citizens of dangers inherent in travelling abroad, investigation—to inquire after and determine citizen safety, and negotiation—to liaise and reach settlement with the host country. It also includes administration, not only the day-to-day running of programs for the protection of nationals abroad, but also more mundane functions of passport control and notary services.

Central to these tasks is one function—communication. When broken down like this, the parallels to the aesthetic become much clearer. As noted, the central component of art is communication. It can also be used to educate, inspire, question (investigation), and as earlier noted, to negotiate between artist and audience. The differing approaches to the protection of nationals abroad have been particularly exposed since the rise in non-conventional violence and terrorism as a result of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. States have been forced to establish new procedures to address the threat of terrorism and targeted non-conventional violence. The art of diplomacy in the context of

the protection of nationals abroad has centred on creative ways to address issues, such as through cooperative projects with the private sector and other states, as well as through creativity in communication of whole-of-government campaigns.

Negotiation – the aesthetic component

Negotiation is itself often described as an art. The fine arts and negotiation have much in common. Both are a form of communication between alienated but interdependent entities. The artist represents his or her social position and experience, communicating, persuading and ultimately arriving at an understanding with an interdependent audience.

Similarly, the negotiator represents his or her social position and experience, in addition to their sovereign. Again similarly, the negotiator's aim is to communicate, persuade and ultimately arrive at a settled understanding with an interdependent interlocutor. The statement "art never wants to just represent, but also to persuade", is just as true for art, as it is for diplomacy. Art, like negotiation, is not passive but rather active in its aims to influence and persuade – excluding specific movements which sought to negate any functional or utilitarian component in art, such as the 19th century movements promoting art for art's sake.

In negotiation, the point at which, the functional assumes aesthetic value is paralleled by the point at which craft, the functional, becomes art, the aesthetic. It is the point at which the artist or negotiator frees themselves from the conventions of communication, yet maintains comprehension, understanding and acceptance. During the armistice negotiations to end the Korean War, tactics beyond the conventions of communication reached a level, which seemed plainly absurd to many people. The temperature of negotiating rooms was fixed to impose stress, the sizes of representative flags were challenged, the timing of meetings was relentlessly manipulated, and even the height of the opposing side's chairs and tables were shortened to achieve psychological advantage.

Reporting – the aesthetic component

The diplomatic task of reporting has obvious connections to the aesthetic realm. Art, as noted by Hauser, is an attempt to:

...understand better a reality which is, to all intents and purposes, chaotic, enigmatic, and often threatening, to judge it more accurately and cope with it more successfully.¹⁰²

Diplomatic reporting is similarly the depiction of conditions in the host country in an attempt to make sense of anarchic interstate relations and enigmatic alien others, both of which are often enough considered threatening. Diplomatic reporting and art are similarly depictions sourced from experience of the prevailing social, political and economic conditions. The difference lies in contemporary western cultural associations. Diplomatic reporting is associated with rationalism, and hence mimesis, and art is associated with creativity and the non-imitative.

Diplomatic reporting inevitably follows a process that despite substantial rationalization still relies upon a process that is remarkably similar to the artistic process. A diplomat experiences the prevalent political, economic and social conditions. He or she then views and assesses the impact of these conditions upon their interests, discarding what is irrelevant and noting what is relevant. The diplomat then produces a work expressing their findings, using the conventions of communication available to them, be it standardized departmental memorandum, cable or briefing.

This process is significant. A diplomat assesses and selects elements to be expressed in a subsequent work. This naturally implies that it is not accuracy which is the dominant characteristic but rather relevance. To express this differently, consider a diplomat

¹⁰² Ibid, 251.

asked to describe a diplomatic function. An infinite amount of data could be collected to describe the function. Details on the size, shape, temperature, fixtures, colours, lighting of the room; the guests, their positions, conversations, emotions... the list could go on and on. Indeed, it would be theoretically impossible to describe all the elements in a single room during at a single point of time, let alone a room during an entire diplomatic function. An accurate, scientifically precise description is not what is required. Rather, a relevant, selective interpretation is required.

The importance of selecting the relevant, and the importance of an artistic interpretation can be demonstrated through a look at significant artworks of diplomatic events. Perhaps the most famous, the *Congress of Vienna* (1815) a sepia drawing by Jean-Baptiste Isabey, held at the Louvre in Paris, depicts 23 participants at the signing of one of the covenants, including Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Stewart, 1st Baron Stewart, Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, Prince Karl August von Hardenberg, and more. A list of the participants, save for the lengths of their titles, would provide little insight. Yet, Isabey, using an artist's interpretation of position is able to capture the relationship between each individual. Indeed, he is able to go even further, by centring the gathering around an empty chair, he is able to draw attention to the absence in the room for which they are all gathered – the presence of Napoleon Bonaparte. Just as the artist Isabey emphasizes those elements he feels most relevant in a depiction, so too the diplomat emphasizes elements they discern to be most relevant when reporting an event.

At times, these conventions of communication can be challenged. George F. Kennan as a young diplomat in Moscow wrote many cables reporting on conditions in the Soviet Union. His views began to be noticed when he served as Deputy Head of Mission, in February 1946 writing what later became known as 'the long telegram', depicting the

political rationale behind Soviet foreign policy behaviour. However, ultimately, the essence of this reporting would only take on much greater significance after it was rewritten and published, unarguably, with a distinct and stylized aesthetic focus, in the July 1947 issue of *Foreign Policy* magazine. From the same experience of the political, economic and social conditions in Russia, Kennan produced two differing products—one using the immediately available conventions of communication, another challenging these conventions.

Style as an inherent component of the aesthetic – and diplomacy

This chapter presented a definition of diplomacy, and highlighted that style is an inherent component of diplomacy. The chapter first demonstrated that there are multiple definitions of diplomacy. The current study utilized a functional definition. It focused on the four core functions of diplomacy – representation, the protection of nationals abroad, negotiation, and reporting. Importantly, such a definition allows a look at each individual function and ascertains its connection to style.

As highlighted above, Paul Schrecker's 1948 paper, "Phenomenological Considerations on Style" argues that the aesthetic is present everywhere; in all human work and in all products of human work; and further argues that style is a constituent element of the aesthetic domain.¹⁰³ Thus, we should be able to discern style in all human work and in all products of human work – including diplomacy.

To make it easier to discern the presence of the aesthetic (and thus style) in diplomacy, the chapter drew a parallel between diplomacy and art – a field in which we are more accustomed to associating with the aesthetic. Comparing diplomacy and art, and their similar elements of inspiration, creativity and communication, we can see that there is indeed an aesthetic component to diplomacy. Accordingly, following Schrecker's

¹⁰³ Schrecker, "Phenomenological Considerations on Style."

argument – style must also be an inherent component of diplomacy. This leads us to the question to be addressed in the next chapter – what is style?

CHAPTER TWO: Defining diplomatic style

The current chapter explores style. It argues two points. First, that in modern society, despite its prominence, style is overlooked and misunderstood. Second, that there are both explicit and tacit components of style, with the latter, in the context of diplomacy, being more difficult to access and convey. Thus, the chapter first looks at the status of style in modern society and how it is used in different fields. It then looks closer at the two core functions of style, the use of style as categorization and the use of style as communication. The chapter then turns to the explicit and tacit dimensions of style. It looks at how style has been used differently between the academic and practitioner community, which parallels the explicit and tacit use of diplomatic style. Finally, the chapter provides a definition of diplomatic style.

The status of style

Style is central to modern life but is often overlooked and misunderstood. Every day we are bombarded with images, touch, sounds, fragrances and tastes, which rest upon style as the determinant of social interaction. Its centrality to modern life reaches a point that it is described as, 'transcendental', 'all-encompassing' and even a 'preoccupation'.¹⁰⁴ As noted by Brummel "we live in an age in which the smallest and most mundane parts of every-day living are reworked into aesthetic experiences".¹⁰⁵ On the aestheticization of every-day life rests the importance of style as a means to both catalogue and communicate social action – "human behaviour... when and in so far as the acting

¹⁰⁴ Brummett, *A Rhetoric of Style*, 2–3.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 18.

individual attaches a subjective meaning to it... related to the behaviour of others and thereby oriented in its course".¹⁰⁶

As noted in the previous chapter, the philosopher Paul Schrecker argues style is an inherent component of the aesthetic.¹⁰⁷ The aesthetic is manifest in all forms of human activity to varying degrees along a gradient from the purely aesthetic to the non-aesthetic or purely functional.

At one extreme of this gradation is the work of humans that comes closest to fulfilling no other purpose than the aesthetic—music, fine arts and literature. At this end, style plays a major role. Style is routinely associated with the extreme of the gradation where the work of humans comes closest to fulfilling no other purpose than the aesthetic. Musical, artistic, and literary styles are widely recognized and understood. We recognize and understand the difference between jazz and rock 'n' roll; between impressionist and cubist art; and between romantic and post-modern literature. At the other extreme is the work of humans that comes closest to fulfilling no other function than that for which it was produced—a car license plate, a bandage or an emergency flare. Yet, as noted, there can be no field in which the aesthetic is absolutely devoid.¹⁰⁸ Just as there are no fields in which the aesthetic is absolutely devoid, there are no fields in which style is absolutely devoid. There are unique styles of car registration license plate design just as there are unique styles of painting. As Schreker contends, style is the:

¹⁰⁶ Peter A. Munch, "Empirical Science and Max Weber's *Verstehen* de Soziologie," *American Sociological Review* 22, No. 1 (1957): 28.

¹⁰⁷ Schrecker, "Phenomenological Considerations on Style," 373.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

...element in a product of human work which, ceteris paribus, might be different from what it actually is, or which, differently shaped, would yield the same effect in every extra-aesthetic respect.¹⁰⁹

Accordingly, style is everywhere. It is manifest across the spectrum of human activity to greater or lesser degree. It is an inherent part of culture.¹¹⁰ If we think of culture as “human processes of meaning-making generating artefacts, categories, norms, values, practices, rituals, symbols, worldviews, ideas, ideologies, and discourses”, then it is style which organises, facilitates, and spreads culture.¹¹¹ Yet, at the same time, culture also plays an integral role in the constitution of style. Style is both defined and controlled by culture is equally an influence on and an organiser of culture.¹¹² In modern western society, style and the aesthetic are viewed as separate and secondary to science and rationalism. Science and rationalism presuppose that reason and experience are the fundamental criteria upon which problems are solved. Solutions, it is thought, lie in simplicity, clarity, consistency, logic, and generalization. Scientific reasoning and rationalism are accepted to be by nature, independent of and superior to non-rational criteria, such as tradition, super-natural perception (religion) and the sensory (the aesthetic). Science and rationalism are married to the western notion of progress. That simplicity, clarity, consistency, logic, and generalization should regulate the lives of individuals and societies has been held as self-evident since the enlightenment. As noted by Edward Shils:

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Barry Brummett, *A Rhetoric of Style* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), 45.

¹¹¹ George Ritzer and J. Michael Ryan, *The Concise Encyclopedia of Sociology* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 113.

¹¹² Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy* (Houndmills; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 77.

The progress of mankind has been the progress of empirical science and of rationality of judgement. These have been thought of as good in themselves and as the bringers of limitless benefits.¹¹³

The aesthetic and style are perceived as not conforming to the rules of rationality and empirical observation. The aesthetic is not perceived as based on rational reasoning and it is not perceived as observable, empirical or measurable. The aesthetic has become increasingly compartmentalized from modern society. As noted in the previous chapter, following the argument of philosopher Paul Schrecker, style is a constituent component of the aesthetic.¹¹⁴ Thus, if the aesthetic has become increasingly compartmentalized from modern society, so too has style. Style in modern society continues to be conceptualized narrowly. Hariman notes:

For the most part, the canon of style remains identified with cataloguing discursive forms in the artistic text alone rather than understanding the dynamics of our social experience or the relationship between rhetorical appeals and political decisions.¹¹⁵

One reason for this is recognition. Style must be *recognized* in order for it to fulfil its functions in the context of social interaction. Recognition of style is what allows the human mind to reduce the level of mental process required to make sense of an observed action or artefact. As Schaper notes style is:

¹¹³ Shils, *Tradition*, 4.

¹¹⁴ Schrecker, "Phenomenological Considerations on Style," 373.

¹¹⁵ Hariman, *Political Style: The Artistry of Power*, 8.

...the idiom in which a number of works speak recognizably the same language.

Recognizing the idiom is knowing what to do with the work, how to approach it, how to read it in relation to other works.¹¹⁶

The modern individual has difficulty recognizing style in all but its most common forms. It is easily recognized in certain domains, such as fashion, music, fine arts or architecture, but less recognized in other domains, such as education, leadership, politics or diplomacy. As noted above by Hariman, style in modern thought has more to do with cataloguing forms in artistic expression rather than understanding the dynamics of social experience and the effect of style on an audience.¹¹⁷ Recognition is not as simple as could be thought.

This has important implications. The inability to recognize, interpret and understand style can in certain circumstances lead to miscommunication or even deliberate manipulation as demonstrated by research into the aesthetics of fascism.¹¹⁸ This represents a danger in a society, in which style is 'transcendental', 'all-encompassing' and even a 'preoccupation'. As noted by Hariman, "modern societies have become unduly defenceless against aesthetic manipulation".¹¹⁹ Despite the centrality to everyday life in modern society, the aesthetic and style are often misunderstood, only sometimes recognized and rarely used as an analytical category to comprehend social action.

¹¹⁶ Eva Schaper, "The Concept of Style: The Sociologist's Key to Art," *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 9, No. 3 (1969): 248.

¹¹⁷ Hariman, *Political Style: The Artistry of Power*, 8.

¹¹⁸ George Mosse, "Fascist Aesthetics and Society: Some Considerations," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 31, No. 2 (April 1996): 245–252.

¹¹⁹ Hariman, *Political Style: The Artistry of Power*, 10.

What is style and what does it do?

Style is anything but a precise term. It is amorphous, elusive and often misunderstood. Its widespread popular usage in its shallowest sense, denoting beauty, grace, ease of manner or technique, such as appears across the covers of innumerable magazines, diverts and numbs contemplation of its other usages. As captured by Stuart Ewen, this lack of precision portends a challenge to those conducting research on style:

On news magazines, sports magazines, music oriented magazines, magazines about fashion, architecture and interior design, automobiles, and sex, 'style' was repeated endlessly. It [style] seemed to be a universal category, transcending topical boundaries, an accolade applied to people, places, attitudes and things...¹²⁰

In its academic sense it is also rarely understood. Academics are just as likely to understand style in the context of spelling, punctuation, capitalization, and typographic conventions, as they are in any other context. A search of an average university library catalogue returns results dominated by references to style in the humanities. Yet, a more detailed search reveals that style occurs just as commonly in both the natural and social sciences. It is its application across the spectrum of human activity that gives confusion to its meaning. As noted by one author, it is impossible to make a definition which suits everyone, to the point that:

Everybody has his or her own notion of style, and inevitably, therefore, his or her own notion as to the proper words in which to clothe it.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Ewen, *All Consuming Images*, 2–3.

¹²¹ David Rannie, *The Elements of Style: An Introduction to Literary Criticism* (London: JM Dent & Sons, 1915), 1.

Whilst another author, in exploring the concept, theories and application of style, notes at the very beginning of their paper that there are three discoveries awaiting anyone interested in the study of style:

The first is that there is no the definition of style in existence. The second is that there is neither consensus amongst linguists on what its aims are, nor a uniform approach or methodology for its analysis. The third (and this is the only meeting of minds) is all those who practice stylistic analysis agree that the concept is 'nebulous', 'slippery', and a 'sitting target' for all its practitioners.¹²²

Reflecting this, the approaches to explain and conceptualize style are wide and varied. It is sometimes narrowly defined and applicable only within a distinct sub-discipline, and it is sometimes broadly defined to encompass the entire spectrum of human activity. As Dale Jacquette notes, it is "systemically ambiguous" and "means different things in different contexts".¹²³ A universal understanding of style is obstructed by the differing and sometimes overly simplistic contexts in which it is found. Yet, within these disparate contexts there is a broad difference in how style is used. Style is used to either categorize or communicate.

Style as categorization

Categorization is the cognitive process that enables identification through conceptualization of the differences and similarities to what is already known. Although not uniquely a human capability, the human mind is able:

¹²² M. Azuiki, "Style: Theories and Practical Application," *Language Sciences*, 14, No. 1–2 (April 1992): 110.

¹²³ Dale Jacquette, "Goodman on the Concept of Style," *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 40, No. 4 (October 2000): 461.

...to assemble its experiences into categories at various levels of abstraction, labels these categories with lexical terms, and uses the terms effectively in communication and thinking.¹²⁴

Stylistic categorization occurs when human work, which is identical in the functional aspect, is differentiated, and assembled into separate and distinct groups. This information can then be arranged to allow easier and more reliable communication. Music provides a simple example of style as categorization. The functional aspects of music are the physical characteristics of sound—frequency, wavelength, period, amplitude, intensity, and speed. These functional aspects are common to all musical styles. The physical characteristics are arranged based on the qualities of sound they produce—pitch (melody and harmony), rhythm (tempo, meter and articulation), volume, timbre and texture. An arrangement that exhibits polyrhythm, syncopation, shuffle notes (alternating long and short note durations) and blue notes (note in a major scale played at a slightly lower pitch) is recognized as jazz. An arrangement that exhibits limited chord progression, syncopated melody, and an accentuated backbeat is recognized as early rock ‘n’ roll. Both jazz and rock ‘n’ roll are composed of the same functional aspects. It is their arrangement, recognition and ultimately, their categorization that distinguish them as distinct styles of music. The use of style as a means to catalogue and categorize forms of production is the dominant function of style and is common to most disciplines.

In the field of design, style is predominantly conceptualized as a means of identification and categorization. Style is thought to be comprised of recognizable features or forms, which enable identification with the source of generation. The source of generation can be an individual or group, often further categorized into distinct geographical territories

¹²⁴ Uday Athavankar, "Categorization... Natural Language and Design," *Design Issues*, 5, No. 2 (1989): 101.

and time periods. In design, contemporary research predominantly focuses upon the identification and measurement of stylistic attributes. Essentially, the research aims to determine if a set of common attributes can be used to differentiate one individual style from objects of another style. In one example representative of this movement, Chiu-Shui Chan compares the measurement of colours to style.¹²⁵ Colour, notes Chan, cannot be measured and confirmed to be identical by words alone, yet with information-technology colours can be mathematically defined, enabling confirmation of identical hue, saturation and brightness.¹²⁶ Chan seeks to determine if the stylistic attributes of Wright's Prairie Style can be similarly reduced to a mathematical model.¹²⁷

Contemporary psychological research into style serves as the conceptual basis in the attempts to apply (or measure) style in the field of design. The field of psychology looks at how people perceive style and how designers can utilize these perceptions to guide product design. An important contribution of this research to wider field is the importance placed upon recognition. As noted by Martin Stacey:

A range of psychological evidence indicates that style perception is dependent on knowledge and involves the interaction of perceptual recognition of style features and explanatory inference processes that create a coherent understanding of an object as an exemplar of style.¹²⁸

Psychological research into style provides an account of the inference processes, such as contextual reasoning, abstract identification, experiential reasoning, visual similarity

¹²⁵ Chiu-Shui Chan, "Can Style Be Measured?," *Design Studies*, 21, No. 2 (2000): 278–279.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 278.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 283–287.

¹²⁸ Martin Stacey, "Psychological Challenges for the Analysis of Style," *AI EDAM*, 20, No. 3 (June 2006): 167.

awareness and network association, which provide the basis for an understanding of style.

Art history has similarly traditionally been focused predominantly on identification and categorization. This focus is what Judith Genova calls the “signature view style”. The signature view holds the aim of research as distinguishing recognizable features or forms to identify and categorize. In art history, the unit of analysis is the work of art. Style is the structure on which these units of analysis can be compared, contrasted and analysed. It remains consistent to a degree that differences can be distinguished; transformations can be traced over time; and ultimately, a historical narrative created. Style is the structure of art history just as institutions, people or social groups serve as the structure to political and social history. Style is what defines relationships between works of art, based on time, person, place or group, thus allowing the classification of individual artworks in a comprehensive and self-contained manner.

The history of science conceptualizes style in much the same way as art history. Categorization is based upon collective work, and further categorized into distinct geographical territories and time periods. At the heart of style in the history of science is the notion that ‘processes’ can include ways of thinking. Thus ‘national style’ – the classification of processes and objects into categories based upon national origin enabled researchers to determine typical variables that distinguish scientific processes of one nation-state from another. Thus, even in the physical sciences, arguably the most universal of academic disciplines, distinct national styles can be distinguished by research agendas, publishing and collaboration preferences, and institutional funding and organization.¹²⁹ In a paper published in 1993, Mary Jo Nye traces the differences

¹²⁹ Jonathan Harwood, “National Styles in Science: Genetics in Germany and the United States between the World Wars,” *Isis*, 38, No. 3 (1987): 390–414.

between French and English national styles in chemistry.¹³⁰ Nye notes that in France at the turn of the 20th century, the educational background, from Ecole Polytechnique and Ecole Normale Supérieure, instilled preferences for the theoretical rather than the experimental.¹³¹ Nye contends that this and other developmental processes ultimately led to a dichotomy between the abstract and the concrete in the physical sciences.¹³²

Thus, style is used to categorize. The aim of style is thus to identify and to categorize features of human work, or the products of human work, in order to simplify the cognitive process when presented with new information. Categorization is the most obvious function of style, and is implicit in dictionary renderings of the term as a distinctive manner or technique by which something is done, created, or performed.¹³³ Stylistic categorization occurs across all disciplines ranging from the arts to the sciences, and forms the basis for contemporary scientific research into style, including attempts to understand its cognitive processes, measurement, and machine replication.

Style as communication

The second core function of style is communication. Style in certain circumstances also provides for the communication of enormous amounts of information. Based upon our social experience, we impute information regarding the sender when a particular style is recognized.

To take the example of music again, when we interact with a person who identifies themselves with a preference for jazz or early rock 'n' roll—we impute much more information than their preference for polyrhythm, syncopation, shuffle and blue notes or

¹³⁰ Mary Jo Nye, "National Styles? French and English Chemistry in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," *Osiris*, 2, No. 8 (1993): 37–41.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 34–37.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 49.

¹³³ *The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus*, 1518.

limited chord progression, syncopated melody, and an accentuated backbeat. We (over) generalize from previous social experience that a devotee of jazz is older, liberal, and materially well-off. We (over) generalize from previous social experience that a devotee of early rock 'n' roll is older, Caucasian, middle-class, and prone to outrageously out-dated hairstyles.

To take this one step further, manipulation of how this information is sent, that is, using a particular style at a particular time, allows the communicator to deliver information outside of the dynamics of the medium used. A musician that chooses a particular style communicates information beyond the medium of sound. Thus, a trained classical pianist who chooses to play jazz at a late night piano bar rather a concert hall is communicating information beyond the music itself.

Accordingly, in many contexts, style has a dualistic function. On the one hand it serves as a means to categorize and catalogue forms of human production. Yet, at the same time, it can serve as a means to communicate and manipulate social action. This dualistic function is not limited to the obvious example of music.

In archaeology, style was traditionally conceptualized as a component of material culture, which, in much the same way as art history, allowed the categorization of objects into a hierarchical structure.¹³⁴ From this structure variations could be analysed to determine geographic and temporal distribution of specific social groups. More recent research has taken a 'more active perspective on style'.¹³⁵ Style is viewed as a component of human activity that functions in cultural systems as an avenue of communication. This has led to recognition of style as a multidimensional phenomenon,

¹³⁴ Michelle Hegmon, "Archaeological Research on Style," *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 21 (1992): 518.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

with both categorization and communication having distinct roles in archaeological research.

Similarly, in sociology, the relationship of style and socio-cultural processes has become more prevalent in recent research. Style is particularly significant to sociology because of the connection between patterns of artistic expression and culture.¹³⁶ The artist, like any individual is social being, a product and producer, both speaking to and speaking for, the society in which they exist.¹³⁷ This has been repeatedly demonstrated by art historians, who manage to demonstrate the influence of a particular culture, be it religion, political movement, social drive, economic condition or even 'spirit of the times' on a specific stylistic development.¹³⁸ Essentially, style develops in the course of interpreting and solving the social conditions which frame the artist's environment. Accordingly, for the sociologist, style functions as both a means of categorization and as a means of communication as the artist speaks for and speaks to society, respectively. The interaction of the artist and society is the driving force in the development of style. Hauser notes that style is a "dynamic, dialectical, relational category which is constantly changing according to its content, scope and sphere of validity... modified by every important work".¹³⁹ Reflecting this, a style can only be an approximation. No single work can represent the style nor do all the accepted characteristics of a style appear in every work categorized as such. It follows that style can be conceived of as an ideal type as espoused by Max Weber – much more of which will be said later in the study.

¹³⁶ Schaper, "The Concept of Style: The Sociologist's Key to Art," 247.

¹³⁷ Hauser, *The Sociology of Art*, 41.

¹³⁸ Frederick Antal, *Florentine Painting and Its Social Background: The Bourgeois Republic before Cosimo de Medici's Advent to Power, XIV and Early XV Centuries* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 238.

¹³⁹ Hauser, *The Sociology of Art*, 68.

Research in the field of political science places considerably more emphasis on style as a means of communication. Whilst style is used as a means to categorize variations in political methods and behaviour, it is how these styles are used, or abused, in political communication, or rhetoric, that dominates the contemporary research agenda. An astute politician may use different styles at different times to invoke reactions in an audience. Through the use of a realist political style, a politician may demonstrate a preference for what is, rather than what ought to be, thus separating ethics from politics.¹⁴⁰ It presents the politician as down-to-earth, practical and focused. Yet, at other times, the same politician may use a courtly style with its associated appeals to ceremony, decorum, rank and majesty.¹⁴¹ This presents the politician as sophisticated, dominant and authoritative.

Recent research, such as that undertaken by Robert Hariman, Bradford Vivian and Barry Brummet go much further, seeking a more expansive concept of style than available in modern classifications of art and politics.¹⁴² This conceptualization views style as an analytical category necessary to understand contemporary social reality—a means of academic inquiry essential for a comprehensive understanding of politics. As noted by Hariman:

...in order to identify the aesthetic routines and everyday inventiveness of political actors, we need a more expansive concept of style than is available within modern classifications of art and of politics.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ Hariman, *Political Style: The Artistry of Power*, 14.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, 51–94.

¹⁴² Ibid, 9.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

Thus, style is also used to communicate. An aim of style is to communicate and to convey knowledge related to social experience and context. As recognized by certain sociologists and political scientists, style as communication plays a prominent, but less recognized role.¹⁴⁴ Yet, communication is a less obvious function of style, and is not captured in standard dictionary definitions. Style as communication often goes hand in hand with style as categorization, with the former less recognized and latter substantially more obvious. This suggests that there are two dimensions of style – an explicit and tacit dimension.

Style as explicit knowledge

Explicit knowledge refers to knowledge that can be articulated, transmitted and stored. Examples of explicit knowledge could include grammatical formulations (documents, books, manuals); illustrative formulations (process diagrams, signs, posters); and codified formulations (mathematical expressions, design specifications).

Explicit knowledge has three key qualities. First, it can be articulated in a universal manner. It is available anywhere, to anyone who can access and comprehend the means of communication. Second, it is impersonal and public. It does not rely upon a specific social connection or position within specific social network. Third, it is cumulative. It is built upon knowledge that has preceded it and (generally) continues progress in a unidirectional manner.

Knowledge in the natural sciences is the perfect example. It can be articulated through universally accepted and understood means. This includes the communication of information via words and symbols that can be stored, copied and transferred. This information is publicly available to anyone that can access and understand these words and symbols regardless of their connections or social position. Finally, knowledge in

¹⁴⁴ Brummett, *A Rhetoric of Style*; Hariman, *Political Style: The Artistry of Power*.

the life sciences builds upon the research that preceded it. It is physically stored in written or other form, allowing historical developments to be accepted as fact, and more recent advances to be referenced or cited, thus accumulating in a unidirectional manner.

For the scholar of diplomatic studies, there is a plethora of explicit knowledge available. There is a vast amount of literature in the field of diplomatic studies. This literature can be divided amongst three main bodies of work, namely, diplomatic history, international relations and practitioner treatises (memoirs and instructional texts). While there is inevitably a degree of overlap, each body of work can be distinguished by characteristics of the authors' profession—the historian, the international relations scholar and the scholar-diplomat. Important in the context of this study, each body of work has, for different reasons, failed to undertake a comprehensive study of diplomatic style.

As noted by Jönsson and Hall, despite the vast amount of literature, there is a lack of theoretical interest in diplomacy.¹⁴⁵ The works of diplomatic historians has tended to be idiographic rather than nomothetic; the works of scholar-diplomats has tended to anecdotal rather than systematic; and the work of international relations scholars on diplomacy has tended to be marginalized.¹⁴⁶

The works of diplomatic historians have tended to touch upon style only in the context of 'national' or 'period' styles as a means of categorization; the works of the scholar-diplomat treat style as common sense, a near 'matter-of-fact', not necessitating further enquiry; and international relations scholars have, until recently, passed it over in favour of other areas of research promising more potential for nomothetic advancement.

¹⁴⁵ Jönsson and Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy*, 7.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

The treatment of diplomatic style by the historian has focused on categorization. This includes classification into period styles of major civilizations at the height of their influence—Mesopotamia, Egypt, Ancient Near East, China, India, ancient Greece, Rome and Byzantium; as well as styles that have had a degree of influence on contemporary diplomacy, such as Renaissance, 'Classical', 'old' and 'new' diplomacy. There is a plethora of such studies, going well beyond the means of the current study.¹⁴⁷

A number of studies more removed from mainstream diplomatic history have touched upon style as communication in addition to style as categorization.¹⁴⁸ These include ethnographic, anthropological or socio-political based studies. A prominent example is the paper by Linda and Marsha Frey on revolutionary French diplomacy, which details the efforts of a revolutionary state to communicate political ideals through the display of a distinct diplomatic style.¹⁴⁹ However, even in this example, the question of style as communication remains largely implicit and secondary to the main aim of the paper.

The treatment of diplomatic style by the scholar-diplomat is particularly interesting in the context of the current study. As noted, the scholar-diplomat is typically a serving or ex-diplomat that has reached an advanced level of professional service, often in a state at the height of its diplomatic influence. On the surface, the works of the scholar-diplomat provide professional advice to those aspiring to become diplomats or

¹⁴⁷ Andrew Wolpert, "The Genealogy of Diplomacy in Classical Greece," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 12, No. 1 (March 2001): 71–88; Michael Mallett, "Italian Renaissance Diplomacy," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 12, No. 1 (March 2001): 61–70; Brian Campbell, "Diplomacy in the Roman World (c.500 BC–AD 235)," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 12, No. 1 (March 2001): 1–22; Wladyslaw Kulski, "Soviet Diplomatic Techniques," *Russian Review*, 19, No. 3 (1960): 217–26; Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

¹⁴⁸ John Hoffman, "Reconstructing Diplomacy," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 5, No. 4 (November 2003): 525–43; Maurice Keens-Soper, "The Liberal Disposition of Diplomacy," *International Relations* 5, No. 2 (January 1, 1975): 908–16; Alisher Faizullaev, "Diplomacy and Self," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 17, No. 3 (September 2006): 497–522; Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, "'The Reign of the Charlatans is Over': The French Revolutionary Attack on Diplomatic Practice," *The Journal of Modern History*, 65, No. 4 (December 1993): 706–44.

¹⁴⁹ Frey and Frey, "'The Reign of the Charlatans Is over': The French Revolutionary Attack on Diplomatic Practice."

diplomats seeking to become better diplomats.¹⁵⁰ Accordingly, their works carry a clear prescriptive tendency.¹⁵¹ This includes advice on procedures, negotiating methods, management strategies and even correspondence and protocol. They also contain advice on the personal qualities, academic and professional competencies and social skills that an ideal diplomat should aspire to. Below the surface of the genre's focus on professional advice lies a rich contribution to international relations theory. However, as noted by scholars of these works they are too often overlooked as contributions to international relations theory. Derek Drinkwater in his book *Sir Harold Nicolson and international relations: the practitioner as theorist* notes that the high praise accorded to Nicolson "led many scholars to dismiss his diplomatic works as marginal contributions to the study of international relations".¹⁵² Importantly, these studies also recognize the importance of diplomatic style. However, despite having greater methodological rigor and research accuracy than memoirs, the works of the scholar-diplomat largely leave diplomatic style as an article of faith that is not researched but rather accepted. Attempts to describe diplomatic style are marked by a highly subjective nature and are often limited to a small number of distinct and long-established styles, such as the United States, Soviet, French, British, Chinese or are casually dismissed as 'third-world' or 'oriental' styles.¹⁵³

Recent works serve as a good example. Ronald Barston, a former British diplomat, in a text on diplomacy does not give emphasis to how diplomatic style is determined, but

¹⁵⁰ Machiavelli, *The Prince*; De Callières, *De La Manière de Négocier Avec Les Souverains*; Satow, *Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice*; Nicolson, *Diplomacy*.

¹⁵¹ Jönsson and Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy*, 7.

¹⁵² Drinkwater, *Sir Harold Nicolson and International Relations: The Practitioner as Theorist*, 2.

¹⁵³ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*: 127–153.

rather its effect.¹⁵⁴ He notes “diplomatic style, or at least elements of it, becomes in effect a diplomatic trade mark” and claims that diplomatic style “contributes to international identity and diplomatic reputation”.¹⁵⁵ This strongly supports the existence of diplomatic style but fails to pursue the subject. Diplomatic style is treated as an article of faith rather than a phenomenon to be investigated. Barston describes diplomatic style as a “trade mark” that derives from bureaucratic inertia. He contends that style contributes to international identity, such as unpredictability or acceptability; and diplomatic reputation, such as treaty drafting skill, mediation or quiet diplomacy.¹⁵⁶ He further contends that states have inherent characteristic styles of negotiation, which derive from tradition, culture, bureaucratic organization and role perceptions.¹⁵⁷

Ronald Walker, a former senior Australian diplomat, comes closer than any other authors to attributing a cause to diplomatic style. In a text on performance in multilateral conferences, he details the characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of national delegations to multilateral conferences, concluding “just as the personalities of individual delegates matter in multilateral conferences, so do the ‘personalities’ of national delegations”.¹⁵⁸ Walker notes “diplomats are notoriously cosmopolitan, even de-nationalized, and multilateral diplomats work in a common culture. Nevertheless, delegations have marked national traits that evolve over time, *as the societies themselves change*” (italics added).¹⁵⁹ Walker poses diplomatic style (or national traits)

¹⁵⁴ Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*:70–71.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, 37.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, 53.

¹⁵⁸ Walker, *Multilateral Conferences: Purposeful International Negotiation*, 241.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, 228.

as reflective of the society being represented, implying that socio-cultural, economic and political influences all play a role in determining a state's diplomatic style.

John-Robert Leguey-Feilleux suggests that style has become more important in the context of modern diplomacy. Cultural diversity, argues Leguey-Feilleux, has increased the "diversity of behaviour and perspective" as new states bring "different cultures, work habits, and negotiating styles". This has led to a greater degree of heterogeneity in diplomatic practice.¹⁶⁰ Leguey-Feilleux does not go so far, but diversity, it could be argued, does not disappear, but is rather accommodated as distinct national styles.

As earlier noted, Nicolson provides ample reference to style. Very much a prisoner of his time, he contends that the central distinctions in the various types of diplomacy can be viewed through a comparison the 'great powers' of Britain, Germany, France and Italy, excluding the United States, "small power diplomacy" and "oriental diplomacy".¹⁶¹ Differences in style, argues Nicolson, stem from "variations in national character, traditions and requirements".¹⁶²

Following Walker, Leguey-Feilleux, and Nicolson, it is clear that the universalizing effect of diplomacy has not weakened diplomatic style. Rather, as noted below, the universalizing effect of diplomacy impacts the study of diplomacy, which as a consequence has to date viewed style as less significant. Diplomacy does not feature prominently in international relations scholarship. It rates only a cursory mention in most introductory international relations texts. Despite its centrality to both the nature of representation and negotiation, diplomacy generally occupies less space than "non-state actors" and "conflict resolution" in the average introductory international relations text.

¹⁶⁰ Jean-Robert Leguey-Feilleux, *The Dynamics of Diplomacy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 12.

¹⁶¹ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 112.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 127.

The words of Paul Sharp in the first issue of *International Studies Review* in 1999 still ring true:

...we might think that students of international relations would pay a great deal of attention to diplomacy, but they do not. The study of diplomacy remains marginal to and almost disconnected from the rest of the field.¹⁶³

In fact, not only does diplomacy not figure prominently in international relations theory, but schools of thought that have placed a premium on its role, have tended to emphasize the universalizing effect of the diplomatic mechanism as opposed to the distinctiveness of its many members.¹⁶⁴ International relations theorists have argued that diplomacy occurs within an international space or "diplomatic culture" that reduces the relevance of style on formats, processes and outcomes.

Hedley Bull notes "the diplomatic corps that exists in every capital city...[is] tangible evidence of international society as a factor at work in international relations".¹⁶⁵ The diplomatic culture, while not as strong as it was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, remains as a symbol of universal acceptance of a common set of ideals and norms of interaction. Following this argument, style in diplomacy is given less importance than the "strange and archaic diplomatic procedures that arose in Europe in another age..."¹⁶⁶

However, there has been a rise in the breadth and depth of research on diplomacy since the end of the Cold War. The rise in research reflects, in part, the greater diplomatic activity that occurred as new states and diplomatic actors appeared from under the veil

¹⁶³ Paul Sharp, "For Diplomacy: Representation and Study of International Relations," *International Studies Review*, 1, No. 1 (1999): 34.

¹⁶⁴ Jönsson and Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy*, 12–23.

¹⁶⁵ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 172.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 183.

of ideological constraint that accompanied the Cold War. But it also represents a new approach to diplomatic studies that has seen it develop as a self-contained sub-discipline. Since the 1990s, there has been a growth in courses (within international relations schools) and institutes specifically dedicated to the study of diplomacy and a commensurate growth in policy-relevant research. As a result, academic-practitioner interaction has increased with academics participating in reviews of diplomatic performance and practitioners participating in foreign ministry sponsored courses and/or institutes. As noted in Chapter One, certain diplomatic studies scholars have broadened the conceptualization of diplomacy to include a wider range of actors. Yet, just as diplomacy has remained on the fringe of international relations scholarship, diplomatic style has remained on the fringe of diplomatic studies scholarship. To date there have been no attempts to delve deeper into style, to differentiate between its conceptualization as categorization and communication, or to investigate its effects on diplomatic interaction.

Accordingly, despite the vast amount of literature in the field of diplomatic studies, diplomatic style has escaped focus. Diplomatic historians, despite coming tantalizingly close, have avoided a more comprehensive analysis of style as communication in favour of more widely accepted conceptualization of style as categorization. For scholar-diplomats, style has largely remained as an 'article of faith' not necessitating detailed study and for international relations scholars, diplomatic style has been considered a marginal topic at the edge of another marginal field.

However, developments in social sciences research have transformed diplomatic studies into a field ripe for innovative and cross-cutting research. Specifically, the pursuit of a 'practice turn' in several applied social sciences disciplines and its introduction to

international relations scholarship promises an ideal agenda for the investigation of the role of diplomatic style and its effect on diplomatic interaction.

Though not encapsulated in a distinct seminal paper, like other applied social sciences disciplines, international relations has several authors proposing a 'practice turn'—a movement to overcome representational bias of theoretical research and instead place an emphasis on action.¹⁶⁷

Moving away from the representational bias and placing an emphasis on social action in international affairs portends a focus on diplomatic practice. In perhaps the best example of this, Vincent Pouliot uses Bourdieu's theory of practice to argue for a practice turn in international relations theory. He situates diplomatic practice at the heart of an exploration of the logic of practicality in security communities, arguing convincingly for further exploration of how this affects world politics. Pouliot's paper raises important points as to why diplomatic style has to date not attracted scholarly attention. First, practice is embedded in contextual action and is accordingly difficult for outsiders to recognize, record and measure.

Regardless of whether you call it common-sense, experience, intuition, knack, skill, ability, practical knowledge, background knowledge or tacit knowledge—it does not exist in form, but rather exists in action. As Pouliot notes: "Practical knowledge is everywhere but always dissimulated in practices. Consequently, it must be interpreted

¹⁶⁷ Pouliot, "The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities"; Pouliot, *International Security in Practice*; *International Practices*; Iver B. Neumann, "The English School on Diplomacy: Scholarly Promise Unfulfilled," *International Relations*, 17, No. 3 (September 1, 2003): 341–69; Faizullaev, "Diplomacy and Self"; Iver Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations*, 2, No. 2 (June 1, 1996): 139–74; Bruce Jentleson, "The Need for Praxis: Bringing Policy Relevance Back in," *International Security*, 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002): 169–83.

from contexts and practices as well as through agents' dispositions and subjective meaning".¹⁶⁸

Style as tacit knowledge

Tacit knowledge is unarticulated knowledge. It is knowledge that has not been, and perhaps cannot be, formulated explicitly.¹⁶⁹ It is knowledge that is difficult to express in speech. Equally, it is difficult to represent in grammatical formulations (documents, books, manuals); illustrative formulations (process diagrams, signs, posters); and codified formulations (mathematical expressions, design specifications). The only means to convey tacit knowledge is in practice – repeated practice in context. Studies show tacit knowledge has a number of characteristic qualities.¹⁷⁰

First, tacit knowledge is conceptually difficult. As noted by Bird, it is "available to the possessor primarily in the form of intuition, speculation and feeling".¹⁷¹ As knowledge, it is very difficult to convey. The highly personal, informal and subjective nature, which one often acquires through 'first-hand experience', 'infers' or 'learns by doing' does not

¹⁶⁸ Pouliot, "The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities," 284.

¹⁶⁹ Donald McKenzie, "Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 101, No. 1 (1995): 44–99.

¹⁷⁰ Michael Polanyi, "Tacit Knowing: Its Bearing on Some Problems of Philosophy," *Reviews of Modern Physics*, 34, No. 4 (October 1962): 601–16; Rodney McAdam, Bob Mason, and Josephine McCrory, "Exploring the Dichotomies within the Tacit Knowledge Literature: Towards a Process of Tacit Knowing in Organizations," *Journal of Knowledge Management*, 11, No. 2 (2007): 43–59; Stephen P. Turner, *The Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge, and Presuppositions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); William T. Scott, "Tacit Knowing and the Concept of Mind," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 21, No. 82 (1971): 22–35; H. M. Collins, *Tacit and Explicit Knowledge* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010); Nada K. Kakabadse, Alexander Kouzmin, and Andrew Kakabadse, "From Tacit Knowledge to Knowledge Management: Leveraging Invisible Assets," *Knowledge and Process Management*, 8, No. 3 (July 2001): 137–54; Charlotte Linde, "Narrative and Social Tacit Knowledge," *Journal of Knowledge Management*, 5, No. 2 (2001): 160–71; Michael Polanyi, "On Body and Mind," *The New Scholasticism*, 43, No. 2 (1969): 195–204; Michael Polanyi, "Knowing and Being," *Mind*, 70, No. 280 (October 1961): 458–70; Michael Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

¹⁷¹ Allan Bird, "Careers as Repositories of Knowledge: A New Perspective on Boundaryless Careers," *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 15, No. 4 (1994): 328.

lend itself to conceptualization.¹⁷² William Scott goes further to suggest that this conceptual difficulty or as he labels it, “vagueness”, is in fact one of the characteristics of tacit knowledge.¹⁷³ He suggests that all terms used to describe tacit knowledge have “an inescapable degree of indefiniteness in their meaning”.¹⁷⁴

Efforts to conceptualize tacit knowledge generally focus on its relationship to explicit knowledge. Knowledge can be viewed as a spectrum at which one end lie tacit knowledge and the other explicit knowledge; or it can be viewed as a collection of categories, of which tacit and explicit knowledge are two distinct types. As a spectrum, at one end lies knowledge, which is predominantly explicit, such as mathematical formulae or computer code. At the other end of the spectrum, lies knowledge, which is predominantly tacit, such as learning to swim or learning to ride a bicycle. However, the beauty of this conceptualization is in the recognition that all knowledge is comprises both the explicit and tacit. Knowledge can be thought of as an iceberg, the explicit component of which lies above the surface and in full view; and the tacit component that lies beneath the surface and out of view.¹⁷⁵ Thus, even in mathematical or scientific formulae, there exists a degree of tacit knowledge passed on from teacher to pupil; just as in learning to swim or ride a bike, we seek to hone or expand skills through referencing explicit knowledge.

Tacit and explicit knowledge can also be viewed as two distinct categories, each mutually exclusive and endowed with distinct characteristics that have important

¹⁷² McAdam, Mason, and McCrory, “Exploring the Dichotomies within the Tacit Knowledge Literature,” 46.

¹⁷³ Scott, “Tacit Knowing and the Concept of Mind,” 33.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, 33.

¹⁷⁵ McAdam, Mason, and McCrory, “Exploring the Dichotomies within the Tacit Knowledge Literature,” 47.

implications for use, transfer and longevity.¹⁷⁶ Conceptualized thus, there are challenges to converting tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge with transfer predominantly occurring through tacit means. Tacit knowledge is embedded in experience and social action and would lose much its richness is transformed into explicit knowledge.

Second, tacit knowledge is inherently highly contextualized. Tacit knowledge is a component of the context within which social action takes place. Thus, meaning is lost when attempts are made to extricate the knowledge from its context. This has important implications for the transfer of knowledge and can be used to explain the loss of knowledge as practitioners are removed from a specific context.

This brings us to the third characteristic of tacit knowledge. Because of its unarticulated nature, tacit knowledge cannot be stored or transferred by impersonal means. It is knowledge that is often informal, embedded in personal experience and social interaction. Consequently it cannot be stored, and cannot be transferred except through personal experience and social action. An example of this is the loss of knowledge in medicine and healing in an indigenous culture.

Despite these limitations, tacit knowledge plays a larger role than mainstream academic tradition would suggest. As suggested by the above, our access and use of explicit knowledge to a large extent depends on tacit knowledge. The process of discovery or research itself, involves progress from the subsidiary to the focal. As noted by Polanyi, concept formulation requires an integration of subsidiary particulars into a coherent focus.¹⁷⁷ Delamont and Atkinson further contend that scientists are socialized into a profession in which tacit knowledge is essential, noting that "they learn to write public accounts of their investigation which omit the uncertainties, contingencies and personal

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 49.

¹⁷⁷ Michael Polanyi, "Logic and Psychology," *American Psychologist* 23 (1968): 27-42.

craft skills".¹⁷⁸ Accordingly, while explicit knowledge may be the end result, tacit knowledge can be considered to be foundations and scaffolding upon which it is built.

Tacit knowledge is highly relevant to diplomatic style. As noted, style has two elements—categorization and communication. Whilst recognizing knowledge as a continuum between the explicit and the tacit, a focus on the tacit as communicated in the works of Michael Polanyi provides us with a theoretical appreciation of how tacit knowledge could play a role in the perception (and hence categorization), as well as the communication of style in the context of diplomacy. Polanyi contends that there are two elements in 'knowing'—the element, which is the object of our attention, as well as marginal elements, which combine together to produce the object of our attention.¹⁷⁹ He suggests that there is a functional relationship between these two elements—between focal and subsidiary knowing. This functional relationship and the ability to integrate subsidiary knowing into focal knowing is the structure of tacit knowledge.¹⁸⁰ Subsidiary knowing operates at different levels, ranging from the conscious to the subconscious, and can be what Polanyi labels 'physiognistic' or 'telegnostic'.¹⁸¹

Physiognostic refers to the recognition of subsidiary elements of knowing and the ability to integrate these into a focal knowledge. The most common example of this cited in the works of Polanyi is medical diagnostics, in which the presence of a disease is recognized through the accumulation of a series of clues in a patient at their bedside.¹⁸² Medical practitioners recognize the physiognomy of a disease in much the

¹⁷⁸ Sara Delamont and Paul Atkinson, "Doctoring Uncertainty: Mastering Craft Knowledge," *Social Studies of Science*, 31, No. 1 (February 2001): 88.

¹⁷⁹ Polanyi, "On Body and Mind," 195–197.

¹⁸⁰ Polanyi, "Tacit Knowing: Its Bearing on Some Problems of Philosophy," 601–602.

¹⁸¹ Polanyi, "Knowing and Being," 463.

¹⁸² Polanyi, "Tacit Knowing: Its Bearing on Some Problems of Philosophy," 603–604.

same way as taxonomist can recognize the physiognomy of a species; a critic the physiognomy of a work of art—and arguably, a diplomat the physiognomy of a particular diplomatic style. The latter of course have particular importance to the current study.

‘Telegnostic’ refers to the use of constituent elements of knowing and the ability to integrate these into a comprehensive entity or skill. The most common examples of this cited in much of Polanyi’s work is the use of tools or skills, where “uncomprehended particulars are inside our body or at its surface” and extend to a unified meaning.¹⁸³ The example of riding a bicycle has become a standard example of ‘telegnostic’ knowing. For parents with young children, the example comes to life. As much as you tell them before to hold the handlebars, keep pedalling and turn gently, nothing will compensate for riding the bicycle and ultimately learning through trial and error. Once they have learnt it, younger brothers and sisters will receive as much ‘formal’ instruction as you gave the eldest. Once again, nothing will compensate for riding the bicycle. Children learn to ride using both physiognostic knowing, but ultimately rely upon telegnostic knowing. Any number of examples, such as the conduct of biology experiments; the patenting of industrial processes; the design of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; or the conveyance of support for a diplomatic resolution routinely accompanies learning to ride a bicycle, all point to the distinct roles of both physiognostic and telegnostic knowing.

Applied to a diplomatic context, physiognostic and telegnostic knowing tell us much about the two functions of diplomatic style, categorization and communication, respectively.

¹⁸³ Polanyi, “Knowing and Being,” 463.

As noted earlier, categorization uses tacit knowledge. The perception and subsequent categorization of diplomatic style has to this point been described as based upon a shared aesthetic reaction – a shared ability to appreciate the sensory or sensory-emotional components of action, such as the recognition of jazz or classical music styles. However, as described above, the ability to perceive, recognize the subsidiary elements and integrate them so they may be categorized is tacit knowledge. It is knowledge that is difficult to convey, except through contextual, social interaction. Thus, a diplomat who can perceive and recognize a preference for informality; a disdain for tradition; or a preference for appeals to public reason; and integrate these into a whole, may capture and recall from memory (or create) a specific categorization of diplomatic style.

Communication similarly uses tacit knowledge. The importance of telegraphic knowing in diplomatic practice is apparent in Michael Polanyi's statement that "all communication relies to a noticeable extent on evoking knowledge that we cannot tell, and that all our knowledge of mental processes, like feelings or conscious intellectual activities, is based on a knowledge which we cannot tell".¹⁸⁴ Communication is a skill. In diplomacy, the importance of the skill of communication is enhanced. A diplomat utilizes the ability to evoke emotion, tradition, values or shared goals. In the performance of this skill, a diplomat will rely upon any number of subsidiary elements, such as informal meetings, formal dinners, phone calls or even games of golf. Each subsidiary element may be explained and transferred explicitly, but ultimately, how they combine into an integrated whole within the specific context, becomes a skill.

Reflecting the above, it could be assumed that tacit knowledge is where the "additional analytical insight" offered by the recognition and comprehension of diplomatic style lies. It can be assumed that to access this additional analytical insight, it will be necessary to

¹⁸⁴ Polanyi, "On Body and Mind," 195.

be able to transform tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. This challenge is addressed in Chapter Five.

Diplomatic style between academics and practitioners

The aim of this section is to provide an introduction into how style is used in diplomacy. It focuses the use of style in diplomacy by two distinct communities—academics and practitioners. There are distinct differences between academics and practitioners regarding style in the field of diplomatic studies, which parallels the nature of explicit and tacit knowledge.

Between the academic and the practitioner, there has always existed a difficult relationship. Amidst the practitioner community (and wider public in general), there is often no shortage of cynicism regarding the obscurity of academic research and the ‘ivory tower’ elitism of the academic themselves. Conversely, amidst the academic community, practitioners can often be viewed as subjects for research, directionless actors unable to understand the larger picture, or hungry consumers of academic wisdom. The academic and the practitioner are often thought to inhabit two different worlds. Their approach to problem solving can be inherently different. As noted by Charles Lindblom in his study of public administration, a practitioner often feels more confident “flying by the seat of his pants”, whilst the academic will prefer the “long way round” following the “best canons of scientific method”.¹⁸⁵

In applied disciplines, such as social work, education, medicine, law and public administration, there is often a particularly large gap between academia and practice.¹⁸⁶

The field of international relations is one such applied discipline. This should not be

¹⁸⁵ Charles Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling through,’” *Public Administration Review*, 19, No. 2 (Spring 1959): 87.

¹⁸⁶ H. T. Miller and C. S. King, “Practical Theory,” *The American Review of Public Administration*, 28, No. 1 (March 1998): 43.

construed as suggesting there is no interaction between academia and practice. Indeed, there are multiple venues where the two interact. One can think of the practitioner hosting the academic with track 2.0 and track 1.5 diplomacy, the academic hosting the practitioner with universities housing diplomatic training institutes, and the academic and practitioner engaging on common ground at the multiple think-tanks and professional institutes specifically designed to engage the two sides.

However, there remains a fundamental divide. At the risk of over-generalisation, an academic will approach a question of diplomatic interaction from the perspective of one of the dominant theoretical frameworks of contemporary international relations scholarship – realism, liberalism, constructivism or critical theory. As noted by Vincent Pouliot, these approaches are based on the logics of consequences, appropriateness and arguing, and accordingly have a bias towards explicit, representational knowledge.¹⁸⁷ Representational knowledge is characterized by the separation of the object of inquiry from the agent—or researcher, thus leading to the assumption of neutrality and objectivity. It is grounded in positivistic, analytic and reductionist epistemologies, with its utility in the ability to generalize, theorize and ultimately (perhaps) predict events. However, here also lies its greatest weakness. Representational knowledge separates the academic from the practitioner. As noted by Pouliot:

The epistemological consequences of such a contemplative eye are tremendous: what scientists see from their ivory tower is often miles away from the practical logics enacted on the ground.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁷ Pouliot, "The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities," 258.

¹⁸⁸ Pouliot, *International Security in Practice*, 15.

Representational knowledge, by its nature, is decoupled from the social action at the heart of the problems being studied. It is decoupled and distant from this action, both in temporal and spatial terms.

On the other hand, practitioners will generally approach the question of diplomatic interaction from an altogether different perspective. They will approach the question not from a theoretical perspective, but from the perspective of practice. It follows logics of necessity, urgency, feasibility and expediency. Accordingly it has a bias towards contextual, often tacit, practical knowledge. Practical knowledge is characterized by the participation of the agent in the object of inquiry. It is grounded in concrete, local and often experiential practices that are not interpreted, generalized, theorized or studied, but rather just done. As noted by Pouliot, such a form of knowledge “primarily rests on bodily experience and practice: it is knowledge *within* the practice instead of *behind* the practice”.¹⁸⁹ Practical knowledge in layman’s terms is common-sense, experience, intuition, knack, skill or ability.¹⁹⁰

Representational knowledge and practical knowledge run parallel to explicit and tacit knowledge, respectively. As Pouliot notes: “Representational knowledge is rational and abstract; practical knowledge is reasonable and contextual”.¹⁹¹ The explicit and tacit dimensions of knowledge are particularly significant in the context of style theory, and consequently significant the current research into diplomatic style. As previously noted, style itself has two dimensions—categorization and communication. When style is conceptualized as categorization, such as a archaeological curator assessing an Etruscan vase, the knowledge required to recognize it is explicit. In comparison, when style is

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, 24.

¹⁹⁰ Pouliot, “The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities,” 271.

¹⁹¹ Pouliot, *International Security in Practice*, 28.

conceptualized as communication, such as an artisan constructing a vase, the knowledge required to recognize it is more often tacit. Once again, this suggests the “additional analytical insight” offered by the recognition and comprehension of diplomatic style lies in tacit knowledge. To reiterate, accessing additional analytical insight it will necessitate the transformation of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. As noted in the previous section, this challenge is addressed in Chapter Five.

A working definition of style

Style at its most basic involves three core elements: human activity, repetition and/or time and similarity of production. From this point a more detailed explanation can be considered through an exploration of its application across the spectrum of human activity, from the fine arts to computational physics. In his paper “Towards a theory of style”, Meyer defines style as “a replication of patterning, whether in human behaviour or in the artefacts produced by human behaviour, that results from a series of choices made within some set of constraints”.¹⁹² Meyer’s definition allows insight into the structure of style that is manifest in all human activity and is worthy of closer examination.

Meyer’s first condition of style is replication. Style, as noted above, involves the work of humans. Regardless of discipline, the work of humans involves certain means and methods of generation that result in certain forms or actions. As these means and methods and their resultant forms or actions are replicated over time, a pattern emerges. The pattern, or set of invariant relations between variables, remains constant despite changes in the content of the work that complies with it.¹⁹³ These patterns can be

¹⁹² Leonard B. Meyer, “Toward a Theory of Style,” in *The Concept of Style* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), 3.

¹⁹³ Schrecker, “Phenomenological Considerations on Style,” 373.

identified through recognizable features or forms.¹⁹⁴ In diplomacy, just as in any other art of profession, success breeds repetition. The successful achievement of goals in one instance encourages attempts to achieve similar success in repeated instances. This is an understandable natural human trait. When a diplomat is able to obtain agreement to undertake an initiative through a personal connection with a senior official, this same method of approach will be employed until it fails. This will even extend to initiating fellow diplomats into the same request process, be it dinner, drinks or golf in order to sustain the approach.¹⁹⁵

However, there are also circumstances in which repetition does not follow this pattern. In certain circumstances, it may seem that repetition is in fact reinforcing negative results. Nicolson's contention that Italian diplomacy seeks to achieve immediate success at the expense of stability is one example.¹⁹⁶ It cannot be imagined that it was ever in the strategic interests of Italian foreign policy planners to serve only immediate interests. It could be assumed that other forces were at work, be it the political system (seeking immediate policy success to ensure popularity), the bureaucratic system (seeking immediate policy success to ensure professional advancement) or even cultural (immediate policy success as gratification of personality).

Diplomatic activity itself is a series of patterns replicated over time to establish accepted values and norms of behaviour. As noted by Der Derian, diplomacy is "the absence of sovereign power, constituted and...sustained by a discursive practice, the *diplomatic culture*" [italics in original].¹⁹⁷ Diplomatic culture, which Hedley Bull described as "the common stock of ideas and values possessed by the official representatives" of states, is

¹⁹⁴ Chan, "Can Style Be Measured?," 227.

¹⁹⁵ Seoul diplomatic corps, Interviews with Seoul diplomatic corps, February 2008.

¹⁹⁶ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*: 151–53.

¹⁹⁷ Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*: 10

effectively a pattern reproduced over time.¹⁹⁸ Diplomatic norms become institutionalized through successive interaction and reinforcement, and ultimately through codification. Diplomacy, whether universal or national, is essentially constituted through replication, reflecting Meyer's first condition of style.

Meyer implies that the nucleus of style is human choice. Choice distinguishes a stylistic replication in patterning from other replications in patterning that occur naturally in human behaviour. One can assume that there is a greater element of choice when a painter employs a certain brush stroke than when a painter reacts to pain—both are replications in patterning, while the former employs human choice. The role of human choice in the structure of style is not so cut and dry. Meyer contends that in human behaviour, choice occurs at different levels. The vast majority of human behaviour consists of an “interaction between innate modes of cognition and patterning...and ingrained, learned habits of discrimination and response”.¹⁹⁹ Eating, drinking and talking are all ingrained, learned habits of discrimination and response. Yet, even at this level, there is an element of choice. Where an alternative is present a choice has been made—even if conditioning has effectively placed the alternative beyond the conceivable choice of the individual.

Meyer goes on to explain that a much smaller fraction of human behaviour consists of deliberate choice. In certain situations, cognitive processes must go beyond the ingrained, learned habits of response to include consideration of a wider range of alternatives, more subtle distinctions between alternatives, alternatives outside previous experience or alternatives carrying significant consequence. Deliberate choice involves a consideration of both alternatives and their implications.

¹⁹⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 316.

¹⁹⁹ Meyer, “Toward a Theory of Style,” 4.

The variety of choices widens with time. A practitioner, be it diplomat or artist, can only choose amongst a set of options that are set out within the context of the time period. Just as the series of choices available to the modern artist is much greater than that which was available to Da Vinci, the series of choices available to the modern diplomatic practitioner greatly exceeds those available to their 15th century counterpart.

Diplomatic tasks can be divided into the (sometimes overlapping) categories of negotiation, representation, reporting and the protection of nationals abroad. Within each category is a multitude of individual tasks. Each of these tasks contains to varying degrees, an element of choice. A widely known example is negotiation. In terms of diplomatic negotiation, the series of choices are considerably greater. At the macro level, there is the choice on the format of negotiation. A diplomatic aim can be pursued at various levels of negotiation. Certain states, by way of their political systems and by dint of their relative power in the international system prefer to seek multilateral solutions. Other states, prefer bilateral solutions. This of course will change dependent on the issue. However, effectively, these are choices made by individual diplomats, policymakers, or leaders. Again, diplomacy, whether universal or national, is essentially involves choice, reflecting Meyer's second condition of style.

The artefacts produced by human behaviour refer to 'social artefacts'. Social artefacts are "simply any material products that people produce".²⁰⁰ This could include those produced by individuals or social groups to address specific or recurring problems and/or needs and could include implements or tools, documents, literature and multimedia, or representations of the aforementioned. As noted by Monette, Sullivan

²⁰⁰ Duane R. Monette, *Applied Social Research: A Tool for the Human Services*, 8th ed. (Belmont: Brooks/Cole, 2011), 88.

and DeJong, there is an almost limitless range of social artefacts.²⁰¹ In the context of diplomacy there are a range of social artefacts that could be considered more relevant, including diplomatic memoirs, instructional texts, museums and galleries, buildings (foreign ministries, embassies and chancelleries), promotional material (foreign policy and recruitment) and media, analytical and academic representations of the aforementioned.

Meyer's final condition is that the choice be made within some set of constraints. All human behaviour is subject to constraints of a physical (matter, motion, space and time) biological (structure, growth, function, distribution, evolution and origin) and psychological (perception, cognition, identity, behaviour and interpersonal relationships) nature. Operating alongside these physical, biological and psychological constraints and sometimes incorporating them is another constraint—culture.

Cultural constraints on behaviour can be understood through its role in the process of social learning. Culture is a “cumulative inheritance system allowing members of a group to incorporate behavioural features not only with a positive biological value, but sometimes also with a neutral, or even negative, biological value”.²⁰² Cultural constraints derive from sources such as ideology, institutions, technology and semiology, and act on behaviour directly (prohibition or obligation) and/or indirectly (norms).²⁰³ One example of these is bureaucratic culture. As noted by Batora, the rules and routines of bureaucratic culture are:

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² L. Castro, “The Evolution of Culture: From Primate Social Learning to Human Culture,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 101, No. 27 (June 2004).

²⁰³ Meyer, “Toward a Theory of Style,” 10.

...embedded in organisational practices, structures and cultures at foreign ministries, which in aggregate form the organisational basis of diplomacy.²⁰⁴

The link between style and culture is complicated. Style is both defined and controlled by culture and is equally an influence and an organiser of culture.²⁰⁵ We can think of individual diplomats as working within a global diplomatic culture. They are socialised into a common code and are distinguished from non-diplomats through distinct behavioural features and modes of interaction between themselves and with the world around them. Diplomatic style is thus defined and controlled by the overarching code and conventions of diplomatic culture. Yet, global diplomatic culture is at the same time extended and transformed by the styles of individual diplomats. Diplomatic style influences and organises diplomatic culture.

All of these constraints, physical, biological, psychological and cultural, operate on style in a hierarchical fashion, ranging from physical laws to culturally specific norms. These constraints serve a purpose. As noted by Jozef Batora, constraints make:

...the actions of states comprehensible and to some extent predictable due to the limited number of available (or legitimate) options.²⁰⁶

Style then, can be considered as a generative principle for aesthetic production within this set of constraints. Diplomacy, and the choices associated with the activities described above, occurs within a set of constraints that include international law, diplomatic norms and principles, norms of professional conduct, accepted standard

²⁰⁴ Jozef Batora, "Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?" *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, No. 87 (2003): 5.

²⁰⁵ Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy* (Houndmills; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 77.

²⁰⁶ Jozef Batora, "Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?": 5.

operating procedures and linguistic boundaries. In addition, the diplomacy of individual states and the choices associated with the activities described above, occurs within a set of further constraints that include physical constraints, biological constraints, cultural constraints, material and linguistic capacity.

We can thus utilize an adapted version of Meyer's definition for style in a definition of diplomatic style. Diplomatic style is thus: "the replication in diplomatic behaviour or the artefacts produced by diplomatic behaviour that result from choices made within the constraints specific to diplomatic interaction".

Accordingly, this chapter first demonstrated that style is everywhere. This is a fact that accords with the philosopher, Paul Schrecker's account of style, as being a constituent component of the aesthetic, which is manifest in all forms of human activity, along a gradient from the purely aesthetic to the purely functional. This is also a fact, which accords with contemporary research on style by the likes of Barry Brummett and Robert Hariman, who note that despite its prominence, it is often overlooked and misunderstood. It then demonstrated that the use of style across different fields and how this contrasts to diplomatic style, distinguishing between the use of style as categorization and the use of style as communication. It highlighted the fact that style as categorization is the more obvious function of style, and that style as communication is less recognized. The chapter then focused on the explicit and tacit dimensions of style, showing a parallel to the differing use of diplomatic style by academics and practitioners. Finally, the chapter presented a definition of diplomatic style.

CHAPTER THREE: Ideal types and ideal diplomats

The aim of this chapter is to present a means to better understand diplomatic style. The chapter looks at the concept of the 'ideal diplomat' – a recurrent theme in diplomatic literature, and contrasts this with the Weberian ideal type – a constructed, heuristic device designed to understand the significance, meaning, and in some circumstances the causes and consequences, of concrete phenomena. The chapter then juxtaposes the practitioner's use of the ideal type as a tacit device to contrast and compare diplomatic styles, and the academic use of the Weberian generalised ideal type as an explicit device to contrast and compare social phenomenon. Finally, the chapter explores the Weberian ideal type and establishes a framework to construct ideal types of diplomatic style.

Ideal diplomats and ideal diplomacy

The distinguished British diplomat, Sir Harold Nicolson, claimed that there were seven qualities, which are representative of an ideal diplomat—truthfulness, calm, precision, good temper, patience, modesty and loyalty. These qualities form a set of attributes that Nicolson labelled the "ideal diplomat", summarized as:

A man of experience, integrity, and intelligence; a man of resource, good temper and courage; a man, above all, who is not swayed by emotion or prejudice, who is profoundly modest in all his dealings, who is guided only by a sense of public duty, and who understands the perils of cleverness and the virtues of reason, moderation, discretion, patience and tact.²⁰⁷

The ideal diplomat is a recurrent theme in diplomatic literature. In the 16th century, Machiavelli contended that an ideal diplomat should be "liberal and honest" yet able "to

²⁰⁷ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*.

conceal a fact with words...in such a way that it does not become known".²⁰⁸ In the 17th century, Wicquefort added that an ideal diplomat should have knowledge, skill and prudence, as well as the "tincture of a comedian".²⁰⁹ In the 19th century, De Callières furthered the concept, devoting several chapters on the broad theme of the ideal diplomat, contending that amongst other qualities, a diplomat should have "an observant mind", "sound judgment" and must be "quick, resourceful, a good listener, courteous and agreeable".²¹⁰ The ideal diplomat often goes hand-in-hand with the notion of "ideal diplomacy". For Nicolson in particular, the success or failure of diplomacy was predicated on the character and capacity of individual diplomats.²¹¹ As Francois De Callières noted in 1716, and Nicolson repeated in 1939:

These, then, are the qualities of my ideal diplomatist. Truth, accuracy, calm, patience, good temper, modesty, and loyalty. They are also the qualities of an ideal diplomacy.²¹²

The ideal diplomat and ideal diplomacy are also often used subconsciously to compare and contrast diplomatic style within the genre of the scholar-diplomat. Nicolson not only constructs a narrative of ideal diplomacy, but also compares and contrasts diplomatic styles that he had encountered throughout his professional career as 'ideal' and 'less ideal'. His accounting of just one these attributes, 'moderation', demonstrates this point.

²⁰⁸ Niccolò Machiavelli, "Advice to Raffaello Girolami When He Went as Ambassador to the Emperor," in *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others*, Vol. 1 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 116–17.

²⁰⁹ Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, 94–95.

²¹⁰ Callières, *De La Manière de Négocier Avec Les Souverains*, 77–79.

²¹¹ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 268.

²¹² *Ibid*, 127–53.

Nicolson contends that moderation is an inherent quality of British diplomacy, based upon the mercantile or shopkeeper foundation of the British mind. German diplomacy on the other hand lacks moderation. Unlike the mercantile nature of British diplomacy, Nicolson contends that German diplomacy exhibits a 'warrior' complex, which characterizes moderation as weakness or timidity. The French cede moderation for concentration in the pursuit of a particular line of policy which "prevents them on occasions from observing events which lie outside their immediate and intense focus", while the Italians forfeit moderation for immediate advantage, exhibiting a style that is "more than opportunist" and "based upon incessant manoeuvre".²¹³

In establishing moderation as an ideal attribute, Nicolson can contrast and compare the diplomatic styles of Britain, Germany, France and Italy. However, Nicolson's conceptualisation of the ideal remains methodologically stunted. The conceptualisation of ideal diplomacy, as articulated in the works of Nicolson and other scholar-diplomats, is above all, intuitive and experiential, and does not present a methodologically sound approach. Nicolson's conceptualisation of ideal diplomacy is built on tacit knowledge. As noted in the previous chapter, there are explicit and tacit dimensions of style, showing a parallel to the differing use of diplomatic style by academics and practitioners.

Coincidentally, at roughly the same time that Nicolson was devising his conceptualization of the ideal diplomat to contrast and compare, the sociologist Max Weber was developing a more robust methodological approach. The conceptualization of the ideal diplomat, as articulated in the works of Nicolson and other scholar-diplomats, is above all, intuitive. Max Weber's conceptualization of the ideal type provides a methodologically sound mirror to Nicholson's ideal diplomat.

²¹³ Jönsson and Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy*, 8.

For Weber, an ideal type is a heuristic device. It is constructed by the researcher with the sole purpose of solving a central investigative problem. It is not a hypothesis, an average or a formulation of common traits.²¹⁴ It is a constructed device—designed to aid in the understanding of the significance, meaning, causes and consequences of “concrete phenomena”. Being an heuristic device, an ideal type is not random, but rather specifically constructed within the realms of logic to understand the significance, meaning, and in some circumstances, causes and consequences. Weber specifies that the construction of an ideal type involves the logical abstraction of certain features of a social phenomenon. The aim is to present an overview of the phenomenon in its purest form. In Weber’s own words, an ideal type is constructed:

...by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (Gedankenbild) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia.²¹⁵

The “unified analytical construct” is a logical model that rests within the realms of objective possibility and in certain cases, adequate causation. The ideal-type, in its purity, presents an:

²¹⁴ Kenneth Bailey, *Typologies and Taxonomies: An Introduction to Classification Techniques* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994), 17.

²¹⁵ Max Weber and Edward Shils, *Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949), 90.

...exaggerated but typical course of action which is useful for interpreting and explaining individual, concrete instances in a way that is consistent with the postulates of science and, therefore, entirely subject to replication.²¹⁶

Importantly, in contrast to ideal diplomacy, Weber's ideal type is not evaluative. It has nothing to do with "exemplary", "moral" or "perfected" attributes. In Weber's much repeated words, "there are ideal types of brothels as well of religions".²¹⁷ The tradition of ideal diplomacy articulated in the texts of the scholar-diplomat are a less robust reflection of Weber's methodology. Nicolson even admits that the qualities of British diplomacy, namely moderation, are "exaggerations of certain elements of experience". Indeed, the qualities Nicolson imbues British diplomacy could hardly be less exaggerated. They are essentially what diplomacy would be, were it undertaken in a purely rational fashion. They are exaggerations of elements of experience, derived from abstractions of reality, which if the methodology were to be followed to its natural conclusion, could be used to measure and compare real behaviour.

Max Weber undertook his major contributions to social science methodology during the years 1903 to 1917. It is hard to imagine that Weber's centrality to German political and academic affairs could have gone unnoticed by the scholar-diplomat, Harold Nicolson. Nicolson played an important role in the Paris Peace Conference. He was recognized as a highly promising young diplomat for his work in the British delegation and also showed an ongoing academic interest in the Conference. He was undoubtedly aware of Weber's advisory role in the German delegation, his contribution to the Weimar constitution and more widely. As is clear from Nicholson's diaries, he also shared

²¹⁶ Francis Hearn, "The Dialectical Uses of Ideal Types," *Theory and Society*, 4, No. 2 (Winter 1975): 536.

²¹⁷ Weber and Shils, *Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences*, 99.

Weber's views on the settlement as a "treaty of shame".²¹⁸ Nicolson would later serve as Counsellor in Berlin between October 1927 and December 1929. One can assume that, as a speaker of German and an astute follower of German politics, Nicolson may well have been aware of Weber's earlier writings.

Weber's major work describing the ideal type was presented in the essay "*Die 'Objektivität' sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis*" ('Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy") published in 1904. The ideal type "enjoyed a mixed fate, both in discussions in his day and in contemporary discussions of the philosophy and methodology of the social sciences".²¹⁹ While the use of ideal types was not unknown prior to Max Weber, they were "loosely formed and used".²²⁰ Weber formalized and greatly popularized the use of the ideal type as coherent method of sociological inquiry. Weber's work on the ideal type precedes Nicolson's non-literary work, by around two decades.²²¹ While tracing a direct connection is beyond the scope of this study, there exist similarities between the two that while tenuous, demonstrate a common background to their conceptualization and use of the "ideal type".

Both Nicolson's intuitive use of an evaluative idealized type to contrast and compare diplomatic styles and Weber's more methodological approach to contrast and compare, share similar roots in enlightenment philosophy. The point of departure and the ultimate unit of analysis in Weber's methodological reflections is the individual person.²²²

²¹⁸ Max Weber, "Letter to Count Bernstorff", as quoted in Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Max Weber and German Politics, 1890-1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 316.

²¹⁹ Susan J. Hekman, *Weber, the Ideal Type, and Contemporary Social Theory* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 1.

²²⁰ Ben Nefzger, "The Ideal-Type: Some Conceptions and Misconceptions," *Sociological Quarterly*, 6, No. 2 (1965): 168.

²²¹ Weber and Shils, *Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences*, iii.

²²² Max Weber, C. Wright Mills, and H. H. Gerth, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948), 55.

Nicolson, both in professional practice and in his theoretical enquiry into ideal diplomacy, held at the centre, an intractable belief in the qualities of the individual diplomat and their character and capacity.²²³ Both Nicolson and Weber shared a philosophical basis of reflection separated only by the former's intuitive and experiential approach, compared to the latter's more academic and more methodological approach.

The tradition of ideal diplomacy articulated in the texts of the scholar-diplomat does not make clear the rationale behind conceptualization. The tradition of ideal diplomacy is utilized didactically and much less often, heuristically. Jönsson notes that the majority of such texts are predominantly treatises on the professional skills and qualities of an ambassador, prepared with the explicit aim of passing on knowledge to future generations.²²⁴ They are essentially historical versions of the modern US State Department's recruitment text *Realities of Foreign Service Life*.²²⁵

Nicolson comes agonizingly close to Weber's methodology, but fails to explicitly declare the distinction between the evaluative and the logical sense. Nicolson thus limits his ability to use ideal diplomacy as a conceptual instrument for comparing and measuring types or styles of diplomacy. Understandably, the tradition of ideal diplomacy articulated in the texts of the scholar-diplomat does not go into any depth in the methodological sense. The intuitive nature of the tradition of ideal diplomacy only hints at what Weber makes more explicit. Weber goes much further. He specifies three varieties of ideal type: the individualizing ideal type; the model and the generalizing ideal type.

²²³ Drinkwater, *Sir Harold Nicolson and International Relations: The Practitioner as Theorist*, 94–96.

²²⁴ Jönsson and Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy*, 7.

²²⁵ See Patricia Linderman and Melissa Brayer-Hess, *Realities of Foreign Service Life* (San Jose: Writers Club Press, 2002).

The first variety, the individualizing ideal type, also known as the non-abstract historical ideal type, is primarily used as a theoretical device.²²⁶ The second variety, the model, which Weber used in the “if... then” construction, is commonly used to describe what would occur in an ideal situation. This is then compared to reality, thereby gaining insight into the phenomenon. The classic example of this variety is abstract economic theory—the point of departure in much of Weber’s writings on the ideal type.²²⁷ In economic theory, ideal types are used to determine what course of action would take place if social action were purely rational and targeted towards economic ends alone. The classical example is *homo economicus*. Economic theory is based upon actors being informed and rational, acting upon self-interested goals to maximize utility (often towards wealth accumulation and labour minimization). Whereas there is no such thing as a perfect market in reality, a theoretical construct based upon all participants in a market being *homo economicus* allows us both to “understand” and “portray” the connections, and thus suggest an “objectively probable” hypothesis.²²⁸ Or, as Weber put it:

...an ideal image of events in the commodity market under conditions of a society organized on the principles of an exchange economy, free competition, and rigorously rational conduct... where market-conditioned relationships of the type referred to by the abstract construct are discovered or suspected to exist in reality to some extent, we can make the characteristic features of this

²²⁶ Bailey, *Typologies and Taxonomies: An Introduction to Classification Techniques*, 18.

²²⁷ Fritz Ringer, “Max Weber on Causal Analysis, Interpretation and Comparison,” *History and Theory*, 41, No. 2 (2002): 173.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

relationship pragmatically clear and understandable by reference to the ideal-type.²²⁹

This construction can then be used to assist in the comprehension of social action, which is not purely economically determined, allowing the intrusion of other than economic considerations to be measured and compared.

The third and final variety is the generalizing ideal type. The generalizing ideal type is a heuristic device, a logically constructed rational model of a pure form of social phenomenon, from which concrete social phenomena can be contrasted and compared. Kenneth D. Bailey, who labels it “extremely valuable as a typological tool”, provides the analogy of numismatics to explain its strengths.²³⁰ In classifying coins, it is the uncirculated, mint-condition specimen that is used to compare and contrast other samples, given the fact that its features are all present in their clearest form. This is the ideal or pure type. From this uncirculated, mint-condition specimen, all other types are compared and contrasted by grading the features and how they deviate.²³¹

The connection of the generalizing ideal type to the professional tradition of ideal diplomacy is best illustrated through an example provided by Dennis H. Wrong. In his introduction to Weber’s methodology, Wrong quotes Alexis de Tocqueville’s writing of his masterwork, *Democracy in America*:

In my work on America... though I seldom mentioned France, I did not write a page without thinking of her, and placing her as it were before me. And what I specifically tried to draw out, and to explain in the United States, was not the whole condition of that foreign society, but the points in which it differs from

²²⁹ Weber and Shils, *Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences*, 89–90.

²³⁰ Bailey, *Typologies and Taxonomies: An Introduction to Classification Techniques*, 18.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 19–20.

our own, or resembled us. It is always by noting likeness and contrasts that I succeeded in giving an interesting and accurate description of the New World.²³²

De Tocqueville utilizes France as an internal referent. However, as noted by Wrong, Weber's ideal type removes the implicit, internal and subjective referent, and replaces it with a more explicit, accountable referent, that, while still subjective, increases clarity, transparency and therefore objectivity. Whereas the scholar-diplomat uses an internal referent (their own perception of what makes ideal diplomacy), Weber's constructed ideal type provides a systematic, explicit frame of reference from which to compare and contrast concrete phenomena. It is this third variety, the generalizing ideal type, which is used in the current study.

A generalizing ideal type has its foundations firmly grounded in the social sciences, and relies completely upon explicit knowledge. It is a constructed, rational model of a social phenomenon. It would thus seem to contradict the study to this point, which has emphasized the challenges of representational knowledge in accounting for style due to its tacit nature. However, as explored in the next section, a generalizing ideal type should be understood as a construction of conceptual scaffolds or yardsticks. Its value thus lies in its ability to contrast, compare and analyse concrete examples of diplomatic style.

The generalizing ideal type

As noted, an ideal type is a logical constructed device, a rational model of a pure form of social phenomenon designed to aid in the understanding of the significance, meaning, causes and consequences of "concrete phenomena". The generalizing ideal type in particular, is a logically constructed model of a pure form of social phenomenon, from

²³² As quoted in Reinhard Bendix, *Embattled Reason: Essays on Social Knowledge* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), 126.

which concrete social phenomena can be contrasted and compared. Before proceeding to further explore how and why ideal types are used in the study, it is important to provide a background to the theory underpinning their use, namely, Weberian sociological inquiry. A typical Weberian sociological inquiry emphasizes three elements: (a) methodological individualism; (b) analytical primacy; and (c) intentionality.

Methodological individualism pertains to the doctrine that social phenomena—behaviour that influences or is influenced by another's behaviour—can be explained through an individual's actions. Methodological individualism has a deep philosophical tradition, and can be traced through the works of Hobbes, Smith, Locke, Rousseau, and Mill.²³³ Weber's formulation of methodological individualism pertains to his belief that sociology consists of social action carried out by individuals. For Weber, methodological individualism was primarily concerned with the subjective meaning that individuals attach to their actions and to the actions of others. Thus, Weber's formulation of methodological individualism should be distinguished from both earlier formulations of methodological individualism in neo-classical economics, and later reformulations of methodological individualism.²³⁴ Indeed, in a review of the differing types of methodological individualism, Lars Udhen argues Weber's approach should be relabelled *social individualism* in recognition of its assumption that individuals are social beings existing in a society that is inherently an intersubjective reality.²³⁵ In the context of the current study, methodological individualism reflects Weber's usage, thus

²³³ James S. Coleman, "Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action," *American Journal of Sociology*, 91, No. 6 (1986): 1309.

²³⁴ Lars Udhen, "The Changing Face of Methodological Individualism," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 28 (2002): 485.

²³⁵ *Ibid.* 500.

emphasising a deeper focus on individual diplomats as a macro-micro linkage to diplomatic style.

Methodological individualism can explain macro-level structure, change and variation, through the behaviour of individual actors. As noted by Merton and repeated by Hedstrom and Swedberg, 'individual choice behaviour' aggregates to 'rates of institutionally consequential behaviour', affecting their 'institutional patterns', which in turn affects the initial 'individual choice behaviour'.²³⁶ In the current study, methodological individualism provides the rationale for a deeper focus on the individual diplomat.²³⁷ The purposive actions of the individual diplomat, when aggregated influences institutional patterns, national diplomatic styles (which in turn influences the individual diplomat) and diplomatic tradition. Methodological individualism presents a macro-micro linkage, which explains a state's diplomatic style through the aggregated behaviour of individual diplomats.

Analytical primacy refers to the use of a simplified analytical abstraction to account for the infinitely more complex social reality. The complexity of social reality is one of the primary points of distinction between the natural and social sciences. As widely argued and noted by Hedstrom and Swedberg, simply describing the events occurring in a room during one second, if indeed possible, would take centuries.²³⁸ Analytical abstraction allows social reality to be rendered selectively, simply and explicitly. In the current study, analytical primacy justifies the construction of a model, which simplifies the complexity of diplomatic practice, as it exists in reality. The study constructs Weberian

²³⁶ Peter and Richard Swedberg Hedstrom, "Rational Choice, Empirical Research, and the Sociological Tradition," *European Sociological Review*, 12, No. 2 (1996): 139.

²³⁷ Daniel Steel, "Methodological Individualism, Explanation, and Invariance," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 36, no. 4 (December 1, 2006): 441–442.

²³⁸ Peter and Richard Swedberg Hedstrom, "Rational Choice, Empirical Research, and the Sociological Tradition", 130.

'generalizing ideal type'—logically constructed models of pure forms of social phenomenon, from which concrete social phenomena can be contrasted and compared. Ideal types are of necessity a distortion of reality, facilitated by the professional tradition of 'ideal diplomacy', as espoused in the literature of the scholar-diplomat. It ignores certain aspects of the 'concrete' or 'real' diplomatic behaviour, diplomats and constraints, and accentuates other aspects. Its value is determined not by their closeness to reality (remembering that they are models), but rather by their usefulness to the task at hand—essentially, a yard stick to contrast and compare a concrete example.

Intentionality refers to the type of explanation that the methodology seeks to deliver. Given a meaningful and adequate connection, the actions of an individual actor can be said to be representative of their intentions. In the context of the current study, intentionality allows us to assume the individual diplomat to be an agent of their action. Weber describes "human behaviour" as action, "when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it".²³⁹ He describes social action as action "which in terms of its meaning, as intended by the actor or actors, is being related to the behaviour of others and thereby oriented in its course".²⁴⁰ Yet, intentionality is not just an individual concern but also a collective concern.²⁴¹ There are also joint intentions by individuals sharing a sense of project and process, in which individuals cognitively seek coordination.²⁴² This has a clear application to diplomatic practice and diplomatic style.

²³⁹ Munch, "Empirical Science and Max Weber's *Verstehen* de Soziologie," 28.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁴¹ Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller, "We-Intentions," *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal of Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* 53, No. 3 (May 1988): 367–89.

²⁴² Deborah Tollefsen, "A dynamic theory of shared intentions and the phenomenology of joint action", in Sara Rachel Chant (ed.), *From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 18-22.

As described below, all diplomatic action is inherently related to the behaviour of others and thereby oriented in its course.

Analytical assumptions

It is important to consider constructed ideal diplomatic action as 'pure'. Ideal diplomatic action is a form that may not have ever existed in real life. A pure or precise form of the brush stroke to create an Impressionist, Cubist or Dadaist painting style does not exist in real life. While certain examples may be exemplary representations, it would be very rare to find one brush stroke upon which everyone would agree is a pure form. Similarly, the below constructed ideal types of diplomatic action would be recognized, perhaps even as exemplary representations, but they would be unlikely to neatly fit concrete examples.

The value of this type of construct lies in its ability to act as a heuristic device. Just as we can gather the combination of brush strokes, colours, themes and subjects, which typify an Impressionist, Cubist or Dadaist painting, and from there discern the style of a concrete example, the below constructed ideal diplomatic styles are essentially conceptual scaffolds or yardsticks, which provide the means to analyse concrete examples. Its value will only become apparent when used to compare and measure reality. As noted by Kluver:

A priori it can never be decided whether this type is a pure fantasy or a scientifically fruitful conception. Only later investigation can set this question at rest. Thus all representations of ideal types – for example, of the "essence" of Christianity are necessarily and always only of very relative and problematic validity if they are viewed as historical representations of the empirically existent; although, on the other hand, they are of high heuristic value for

investigation, of great systematic value for representation, if they are used as conceptual instruments for "comparison" and for "measurement" of reality.²⁴³

In constructing an ideal type to be used in contrast and comparison of concrete reality (or in this case perceptions of reality), there are certain methodological and analytical assumptions, touched upon earlier, which must be taken into account. First, the construction depends upon the purposive actions of individual diplomats as elicited from explicit narratives. The explicit narratives of the classic texts are illustrative due to their influence across both professional communities being investigated.

Second, diplomatic style evolves steadily with the passage of time and can also be transformed abruptly under circumstances ranging from dominant personalities, foreign domination or wartime necessities. Weber noted that to describe the intricacies of a single room at even one point in time would be impossible, let alone to describe the room at any other point in time. Accordingly, any contrast and comparison of concrete reality using a constructed ideal type will be highly contextual and limited to the particular period of time in which the research is undertaken.

As a final assumption, it is important to note that ideal types are a creation of the social scientist. An ideal type is constructed from traits or elements chosen by the social scientist based upon preconceptions and understanding of the phenomenon being studied. In this way, the ideal type is subjective. The objective basis of an ideal type is held within this admission. Through being clear and explicit in the construction of the ideal type, the social scientist is able to utilize it in much the same as the numismatist's mint coin, as a yardstick from which to measure other examples. Constructed ideal

²⁴³ H. Kluver, "Max Weber's 'Ideal Type' in Psychology," *The Journal of Philosophy*, XIII, No. 2 (January 21, 1926): 30.

types of diplomatic action are exactly that—yardsticks. They are yardsticks designed ultimately to contrast and compare repetition in concrete diplomatic action.

Four ideal types of diplomatic style

Recall that Meyer defines style as: “a replication of patterning, whether in human *behaviour* or in the *artefacts* produced by human behaviour, that results from a series of choices made within some *set of constraints*”.²⁴⁴ This corresponds to the study’s working definition of diplomatic style as the replication in diplomatic behaviour or artefacts produced by diplomatic behaviour that result from choices made within the constraints specific to diplomatic interaction. Our definition of style can be broken down into three constituent components – replication in diplomatic behaviour; replication in artefacts produced by diplomatic behaviour; and the set of constraints within which replication occurs. Reflecting this, it is necessary to determine a means to contrast and compare diplomatic behaviour.

We know that diplomatic style consists of human behaviour. Weber describes “human behaviour” as action, “when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it”.²⁴⁵ He describes social action as an act “which in terms of its meaning, as intended by the actor or actors, is being related to the behaviour of others and thereby oriented in its course”.²⁴⁶ Put simply, social action consists of acts, which are undertaken in the expectation of the acts of others. They are therefore oriented or directed in anticipation of another’s actions. Diplomatic actors, or diplomats, always attach subjective meaning to their actions. In all diplomatic tasks choices are made in anticipation of the subsequent action having subjective meaning oriented towards the

²⁴⁴ Meyer, “Toward a Theory of Style,” 3.

²⁴⁵ As quoted in Peter A. Munch, “Empirical Science and Max Weber’s *Verstehen* De Soziologie,” *American Sociological Review*, 22, No.1 (1957): 28.

²⁴⁶ Munch, “Empirical Science and Max Weber’s *Verstehen* De Soziologie,” 28.

behaviour of others—social action. To illustrate in context, when an ambassador attends or does not attend a given function, when an ambassador positions him or herself near one interlocutor and far from another, or when an ambassador leaves a function before or after another, all convey intentional meaning related to the behaviour of others—social action. Thus, we can consider all human behaviour – including diplomatic behaviour, to be social action, or as defined from this point on, diplomatic action.

Weber presents four ideal types of social action—rational purposive oriented action, value-rational action, traditional action and emotional action.²⁴⁷ Weber's ideal types of social action apply equally to diplomacy. Based on Weber's ideal types of social action, we have the means to construct four ideal types of diplomatic action.

Correlated to Weber's first ideal type of social action, is rational purposive-oriented diplomatic action. Purposive-oriented diplomatic action demonstrates a fixated orientation on the achievement of diplomatic goals, and relatively less orientation towards values, emotion and tradition. The works of Machiavelli serve as an example. In the study of political science and international relations, Machiavelli has become synonymous with the realist school, associated with actor self-interest and rational power-maximization. Similarly, in his writings in diplomacy, Machiavelli shows an purposive oriented approach in which moral issues and the values associated with contemporary social mores are secondary considerations unless utilized to facilitate the achievement of an objective.

Correlated to Weber's second ideal type of social action is value-oriented diplomatic action. A value-oriented diplomatic action demonstrates a fixated orientation on the maintenance of values, even at the expense of failing to achieve diplomatic goals (unless of course, as is often the case, diplomatic goals are value-oriented), emotion or

²⁴⁷ Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 24–25.

tradition. In contrast to Machiavelli, a reading of Nicolson presents an unrelenting fixation on moral values. In Chapter 5 of *Diplomacy*, Nicolson launches a diatribe on the virtues of morality in diplomacy. For Nicolson values comprised of qualities that he believed integral to the British diplomatic style, namely truthfulness, precision, calmness, patience, good-temperedness, modesty and loyalty. In value-oriented diplomatic action, values are more important than achievement of diplomatic goals and remain the ultimate arbiter of success.

Correlated to Weber's third type of social action is traditional diplomatic action. Traditional diplomatic action demonstrates a fixated orientation on the maintenance of tradition, be it diplomatic, cultural, legal or any other tradition. Traditional diplomatic action in a more modern sense places institutions and processes as important vehicles for the achievement of diplomatic objectives. The works of Francois De Callières demonstrates a strong belief in the importance of institutions and traditions as guarantors of diplomatic success. It is as much the structure and objectives of De Callières' work that designates traditional diplomatic action. The work permeates with themes such as tradition and innovation in diplomacy, the balance between formal and informal diplomacy, and the question of order and legalism. Indeed, the work has been used as a guide to diplomatic process and tradition more than any other, and through its citation in most subsequent guides to diplomacy, remains an important reference for embassies around the globe.

Finally, correlated to Weber's fourth ideal type of social action is effectual or emotion-oriented diplomatic action. Emotion-oriented diplomatic action demonstrates a fixated orientation, on the satisfaction of emotional objectives. Emotion oriented diplomatic action is often reactive, appears during periods of high stress and is often perceived as 'irrational' in western accounts. Emotion is viewed by Machiavelli as a facilitative to

the pursuit of an objective, by Nicolson as a failure to adhere to values, and by De Callières as deleterious to the pursuit of an objective. Emotion appears in high disregard in all scholar-diplomat texts, yet nowhere is it so abhorred as in the works of Ernest Mason Satow. As explained in the next chapter, Satow is essentially the epitome of the anti-emotionalist ideal type of diplomacy.

The first step in the construction of an ideal type is the selection of elements of reality from which information relevant to the researcher can be compiled. In constructing an ideal type of protestant ethic, Weber selected only certain elements of historical reality to form a logically precise and coherent whole. These elements were in no way a precise statistical measurement of aggregate or average behaviour, but rather subjectively selected to accentuate and sometimes abstract typical courses of conduct.

In the current study, the elements of historical reality that are used to form a logically precise and coherent whole consist of four classic diplomatic texts, and associated papers. These texts include *The Prince* by Nicolo Machiavelli; *De la manière de négocier avec les souverains* (On the manner of negotiating with sovereigns, often translated as *Diplomatic Practice*) by Francois De Callières; *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, by Sir Ernest Mason Satow; and *Diplomacy* by Sir Harold Nicholson; as well as selected papers of the same authors.

These four texts stand out in diplomatic studies literature. Each text was chosen for its centrality to both the study and the practice of diplomacy. They are four of a very small number of classic diplomatic texts, which are routinely read by both scholars and practitioners of diplomacy. They are particularly prominent examples of a sub-genre of diplomatic literature, in which serving and ex-diplomats provide professional advice to those aspiring to become diplomats or diplomats seeking to become better diplomats - the genre of the scholar-diplomat. Importantly, each text was considered as a guide to

diplomacy for at least a generation following its publication. Even today, each text appears on the reading lists of preparatory courses for aspiring diplomats and equally on the preparatory courses for students undertaking diplomatic studies courses.

From a close reading of these texts, I extract and accentuate elements of diplomatic action or behaviour, recognising the definition of diplomatic style to be “the replication in diplomatic behaviour or the artefacts produced by diplomatic behaviour that result from choices made within the constraints specific to diplomatic interaction”. The writings of the scholar-diplomat focus on two questions: what makes an ideal diplomat and what makes ideal diplomacy. In the pursuit of answers to these questions, the genre evolved into what Jönsson and Hall describe as a “long tradition of prescriptive tracts” in which “one can find similar but rather vacuous advice”.²⁴⁸ A contemporary reader could find the advice to be “rather vacuous”. A surface level reading provides advice on procedures, negotiating methods, management strategies, correspondence and protocol. Each piece of advice is as out-dated as the next in the contemporary context of modern telecommunications. Yet, the texts also invariably contain pithy advice on the personal qualities, academic and professional competencies and social skills that an ideal diplomat should aspire to. In the context of this study, this superfluous, pithy advice can be considered valuable. The fact that the advice is both “similar”, of “long tradition” and the fact that it is primarily concerned with a search for the ideal, gives the genre a particularly strong relevance. This “vacuous advice” can be viewed as the very substance of the tradition of ideal diplomacy. The literature of the scholar-diplomat is the physical embodiment, or vehicle, that perpetuates and gives life to the tradition in successive generations of diplomats. The texts are thus embodiments of a tradition of an ideal diplomatic style. As noted by Garret Mattingly and repeated in Jönsson and Hall:

²⁴⁸ Jönsson and Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy*, 7.

Translated from the clichés of the fifteenth century to those of the twentieth, what Rosier has to say might have been said by Andrew D. White, or Jules Jusserand or Harold Nicolson. Students in foreign service schools in Rome and Paris, London and Washington are reading in their textbooks much of the same generalities at this moment.²⁴⁹

The current research focuses on this "tradition of prescriptive tracts" and its "similar but rather vacuous advice", which "students in foreign service schools in Rome and Paris, London and Washington" are reading "much of the same generalities", in order to derive insight into diplomatic style. These four classic texts are used to select elements of reality, which can be compiled to construct ideal types of diplomatic style.

As demonstrated, the concepts of the ideal diplomat and ideal diplomatic style correlate to Max Weber's methodology of the generalizing ideal type. The chapter argued that by extracting the constituent components of the ideal diplomat and ideal diplomatic style from the scholar-diplomat genre, a Weberian ideal types of diplomatic style can be constructed. The construction of ideal types of diplomatic style would lead to a methodological framework to contrast, compare and analyse concrete examples of diplomatic style. This leads to the next chapter, and the task of constructing ideal types of diplomatic style to build a systematic, explicit frame of reference from which to compare and contrast concrete phenomena of diplomatic style.

²⁴⁹ Ibid, 8.

CHAPTER FOUR: Four ideal types of diplomatic style

As noted, Weber presents four ideal types of social action—rational purposive oriented action, value-rational action, traditional action and emotional action.²⁵⁰ Weber's ideal types of social action apply equally to diplomacy. Based on Weber's ideal types of social action, below I construct four ideal types of diplomatic style from classic diplomatic literature. This will establish a framework from which to contrast, compare, and analyse a concrete example of diplomatic style.

Purposive-rational diplomatic action in Machiavelli's *The Prince*

Niccolo Machiavelli was born in 1469, as the son of politically active family of Florence, one of the then relatively well-organized states that vied for power, territory and ultimately survival in the intensely competitive and geographically remote north of the Italian peninsula. Machiavelli's influence in the diplomatic and political traditions of Europe are intrinsically linked to the inter-state system of 15th century Italy, a system numerous scholars hold to be the cauldron in which evolved much of what we recognize as the modern states system.

By the second half of the 15th century, the states system in the north of the Italian peninsula comprised a small number of proximate states, roughly of equal strength, and each with a well-resourced, established governmental structure. Proximity meant state interests were continually contested, while at the same time equal strength meant that no single state could hope to achieve victory through force alone. As Hamilton and Langhorne note:

The pattern which had been present much earlier in classical Greece was *mutatis mutandis* repeated in Renaissance Italy: an absence of outside threat, an equality

²⁵⁰ Weber, *Economy and Society*, 24–25.

of power among the states within the system, sufficient proximity both to enable and compel communication, and a shared linguistic and cultural infrastructure which made such communication effective.²⁵¹

The existence of well-resourced and established governmental structures meant that just as armies could be raised and resourced, so could effective strategies to limit (or refine) their use. With the decreasing efficacy of armed force in the existing environment of equality, the natural tendency was to seek security through other means. So it was, we could assume, that structures; such as the resident ambassador, emerged to support intelligence gathering, recruitment and financing, alliance building, mediation and peacemaking.

It is in this world that Machiavelli the diplomat was groomed. In 1498, he was appointed second chancellor of the Florentine Republic and Secretary to the Ten of War, the subcommittee responsible for foreign affairs. These were positions that, with a first chancellor more interested in Greek poetry than Italian politics, placed him in a position of substantial consequence.²⁵² The requirements of the office of secretary ultimately necessitated that Machiavelli be intimately involved with foreign affairs in much the same way as would be a modern departmental head. The position took him on numerous missions both within Italy and further afield to France and Germany.

Interpretations of Machiavelli's work are inherently tied to our understanding of Renaissance Italy and the political intrigue and turmoil with which it is often characterized. As noted by Mattingly:

...to this basic insecurity of political life historians have sometimes attributed certain characteristics of Italian Renaissance diplomacy, instability, cynical

²⁵¹ Hamilton and Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration*, 31.

²⁵² Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, 8.

disregard of obligations, greedy opportunism and ruthless grasping of petty gains.²⁵³

Machiavelli remained in the service of the Florentine Republic until its demise in 1512. The return of the Medici family to Florence and the end of the republic removed Machiavelli from his position of influence over the diplomacy of Florence. Ultimately, however, in the ample time allowed in unemployed reflection, Machiavelli went on to write the multiple works that would seal his position, not just in diplomacy, but in Western philosophical and political thought.

To the average reader, 'Machiavellian' behaviour is associated with cunning, deceit and duplicity. Similarly, 'Machiavellian diplomatic action', would mean little more than a diplomatic action infused with cunning, deceit and duplicity. More than 400 mentions of the 'murderous Machiavel' in Elizabethan drama and his works, written by 'Satan's finger', placed on the Index of Prohibited Books by Pope Paul IV in 1559 provided an indication that his name would become synonymous with villainy and political intrigue for the next three centuries.²⁵⁴ However, more modern interpretations remind us that before this, Machiavelli was "a politician and diplomat like others of his time".²⁵⁵ Indeed, he was a public servant "so scrupulously honest that when investigated for embezzlement he ended up being reimbursed monies that were due to him".²⁵⁶

The entire oeuvre of Machiavelli, including plays, poetry and novella can, and has been, read in the context of politics and by extension, diplomacy. As much as the characters, tempos and plots of these pieces can be applied to diplomacy, their relevance remains

²⁵³ Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London: Cape, 1955), 95.

²⁵⁴ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, xxi–xxviii.

²⁵⁵ John Geerken, "Machiavelli Studies since 1969," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 37, No. 2 (April 1976): 353.

²⁵⁶ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, xviii.

less acute. In the context of diplomacy, the key works include the classics *Art of War*, *The Prince*, *Discourse on the First Ten Books of Titus Levy*, and *The History of Florence*. Another useful resource are those works not specifically intended for public appraisal, namely, the plethora of diplomatic papers and correspondence, such as in *Legations*.

The current reading focuses on *The Prince*, whilst inevitably touching upon other samples of Machiavelli's extensive oeuvre. Despite its centuries of controversy, *The Prince* appears as a simple text. It is a slim volume. The first eleven short chapters describe various types of government followed by three chapters on the conduct of war. Next, four chapters present a reasoned argument justifying unethical action in pursuit of political goals followed by four chapters on fortifications, propaganda and the work of government. The final three chapters linger on the role of fortune in benefiting prudential action, and culminate in an expression of the author's hopes for the independence of the Italian states. On a first perusal, it seems simple. Yet this reading belies the depth upon which nearly 500 years of debate has circulated.

The most obvious point of departure for a study of Machiavelli's ideal diplomat is the question of whom. It would be a fair argument to contend that Machiavelli's ideal diplomat was indeed himself. Machiavelli wrote *The Prince* at an important point of time in his professional career. His experience at the height of Florentine diplomacy remained fresh, whilst at the same time his potential return to diplomatic service, now under a Medici ruler, remained possible. One of Machiavelli's aims in writing *The Prince* was to impress Florence's new ruler, Lorenzo De Medici, in order to secure a position in which he could once again play a central role in diplomatic affairs. Machiavelli takes efforts to demonstrate his experience and knowledge throughout the

text, in what could be described as a 16th century (and rather more elaborate) speculative cover letter and curriculum vitae combination.

Yet, it must also be recognized that Machiavelli also wrote *The Prince* with less professional personal intentions. Tim Parks notes that Machiavelli wrote *The Prince* as a form of private therapy, which allowed him to “control and bolster” his self-esteem.²⁵⁷ It allowed him to engage in the passion and drama of diplomatic and political events that were him as a public servant. He could enthral the reader in examples of the rise to power and maintenance of power, yet at the same time gloss over the fall from power and grace that ends diplomatic and political careers.²⁵⁸

Finally, *The Prince* can also be interpreted as a quest for literary and philosophical achievement. The structure and skill of the argument, combined with the engaging and dramatic presentation of the content strongly supports this interpretation. *The Prince* was written at the end of an impressive diplomatic career and was followed by a variety of literary and academic endeavours. Much like De Callières *How to Negotiate with Princes*; Satow’s *Guide to Diplomatic Practice*; and Nicolson’s *Diplomacy*, *The Prince* stands out as a work which rests comfortably between the academic and the professional (as well as the literary).

Thus, the text can be interpreted as an instrument to further Machiavelli’s own diplomatic career; a cathartic expunging of diplomatic and political experience; and as a quest for literary and philosophical achievement.²⁵⁹ Yet, in all three interpretations, it is Machiavelli himself who stands at the centre. It is Machiavelli himself who is put forward as the ideal diplomat. There are three characteristic qualities, which stand out in

²⁵⁷ Ibid, xx.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid, xxi.

Machiavelli's assessments of what makes an ideal diplomat. The first of these is the primacy of purpose-oriented social action over other types of social action; the second is the importance of *virtu* or expediency; and the final is the role of fortune and its mirrored image, preparation.

The opening lines of the *Letter to Lorenzo de Medici*, which accompanied *The Prince* in its original form highlights a characteristic which symbolizes Machiavelli's ideal diplomat—the primacy of purpose over all other qualities. Machiavelli lets the reader know from the very beginning that the work itself has a purpose, which will be pursued without overt beautification:

I haven't petrified the book or padded it out with long sentences or pompous, pretentious words, or any of the irrelevant flourishes and attractions so many writers use; I didn't want it to please for anything but the range and seriousness of its subject matter.²⁶⁰

To his contemporary readers he was signalling that the text could be distinguished from its predecessors and would not conform to traditions prevalent at the time. The modern reader may recognize that Machiavelli's proviso is itself a distinct type of subtle beautification, which contributes enormously to the impact of the work. Yet, for both his contemporaries and modern readers, it also conveys a deeper message. It conveys the fact that the proceeding text has a structurally embedded object orientation. These opening lines are representative of Machiavelli's ideal diplomat—a diplomat distinguished by the unfettered commitment to purposive, rational pursuit of objectives. This directly calls Weber's ideal type of social action known as, *zweckrational* or purposive-oriented rational action. As noted by Peter Lassman, there is a degree of

²⁶⁰ Ibid, 3.

similarity in the political ideas of Machiavelli and Weber.²⁶¹ That there is a degree of similarity between Weber's conceptualization of a specific ideal type of purposive-oriented action and an underlying construct in Machiavelli's *The Prince* is unsurprising.

The second characteristic of Machiavelli's ideal diplomat is expediency. The Machiavellian concept of *virtu* underpins both *The Prince* and *The Art of War*. As noted by Cary Nederman, 'virtu' is normally translated from the Italian as 'virtue' and ordinarily conveys the conventional connotation of moral goodness.²⁶² Machiavelli's use of the term is quite distinct from this. For Machiavelli, 'virtu' refers to the personal qualities that a prince requires to maintain his rule and achieve greatness or a general requires to succeed in different battles. For Machiavelli, a *virtu* could be cruelty just as well as compassion. Thus, *virtu* can also be understood as expediency. *Virtu* in *The Prince* and *The Art of War* refer to the ability to recognize, to adapt to, and to operate according to differing circumstances. Thus, one type of behaviour, which works in one situation, may require a different type of behaviour in different circumstances. Diplomacy itself can be thought of as deriving from the evolution and institutionalization of practices based on both pragmatism and expediency.²⁶³

Expediency reinforces the primacy of the object-orientation in Machiavelli's assessment of the ideal diplomat. This is succinctly captured in Machiavelli's treatment of morality. In a descriptive sense, morality is a code of conduct imposed by a society or group upon its members. Morality can vary widely in terms of content and foundation, dependent upon the society or group in question and its historical time-period. In the context of diplomacy, it is concerned with the code of conduct that regulates the behaviour of the

²⁶¹ Stephen Turner, *The Cambridge Companion to Weber* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 98.

²⁶² Cary Nederman, "Niccolò Machiavelli (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Fall 2009, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/machiavelli/#3>.

²⁶³ Leguey-Feilleux, *The Dynamics of Diplomacy*, 1.

distinct social group that comprises the diplomatic profession. This code of conduct is centred upon attributes that facilitate the central tasks of the professional diplomat, namely representation, reporting, negotiation and the protection of nationals abroad. To facilitate these tasks, the diplomat must be credible, reliable, discrete and trustworthy. Such characteristics are not based upon the particular situation of the diplomat, but rather are universal. Diplomats bridge misunderstanding at the situational level, through demonstrating the facilitative, and contextually normative, moral conduct that is valued by diplomats in the international milieu. In *Advice to Raffaello*, Machiavelli recommends the ambassador-elect to be "liberal and honest, not stingy and two-faced". He goes on to recount the importance of having integrity, stating "I know men who, through being clever and two-faced, have so completely lost the trust of a prince that they have never afterward been able to negotiate with him".²⁶⁴ Yet in the lines immediately following these apparent reproaches of dishonesty, we are provided with a more nuanced account: "And if, to be sure, sometimes you need to conceal a fact with words, do it in such a way that it does not become known or, if it does become known, that you have a ready and quick defence".²⁶⁵

Machiavelli essentially advises the ambassador-elect to adhere to a facilitative code of conduct. It is not the code of conduct that permeates the wider society—"thou shalt not bear false witness". Rather, it is a code of conduct, which facilitates the work of the ambassador, 'thou shalt not bear false witness *and get caught*'. For Machiavelli, the attribute of 'credibility', which facilitates the achievement of professional diplomatic objectives, takes precedence over 'honesty'. This is of course not surprising. Machiavelli's works are marked by their departure from the humanist morality that

²⁶⁴ Machiavelli, "Advice to Raffaello Girolami When He Went as Ambassador to the Emperor."

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

dominated the works of his contemporaries. He notes in the introduction to Chapter 15 of *The Prince*, that while many have written advice for princes he would 'depart very far from the methods of others'. It is upon this point that the subsequent historical moral aversion to Machiavelli's advice is based. Concerning Machiavelli's departure from the conventional moral approach taken by his contemporaries, Skinner notes:

But what of the Christian objection that this is a foolish as well as a wicked position to adopt, since it forgets the day of judgment on which all injustices will finally be punished? About this Machiavelli says nothing at all. His silence is eloquent, indeed epoch making; it echoed around Christian Europe, at first eliciting a stunned silence in return, and then a howl of execration that has never finally died away.²⁶⁶

Machiavelli replaced the conventional dictates of humanist morality with the dictates of necessity and purpose. From this posture, in *The Prince*, Machiavelli recommends the rulers of his day that 'wise cruelty is true mercy', 'craft conquers truth' and that to be 'merciful, trustworthy, humane, blameless, religious' is dangerous, yet to appear so, is useful. It is also from this posture that Machiavelli can advise to the aspiring ambassador in *Advice to Rafaello*, to distinguish honesty from credibility.

Subsequent treatment of the question of morality in the literature of the scholar-diplomat counters Machiavelli's distinction between honesty and credibility. Nicolson, in particular, goes to considerable length to counter Machiavelli's advice, devoting the whole of Chapter 5 of *Diplomacy* to the moral virtues that the ideal diplomat must possess. Nicolson goes so far to state that the negotiator should not "for one moment allow himself (sic) to agree with Machiavelli that the dishonesty of other justifies any dishonesty in oneself". Yet, underlying this surface level contempt for all things

²⁶⁶ Quentin Skinner, *Machiavelli* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 42.

Machiavellian, is a similar appreciation of the role that values play in facilitating diplomatic intercourse. He notes that morals, particularly truthfulness, allows the establishment of a “stock market of diplomatic reputation”, which, facilitates trust and diplomatic interaction.

Machiavelli is abundantly clear that morals are second to purpose. In *Advice to Raffaello*, Machiavelli invokes the ambassador-elect to distinguish between honesty and credibility. He places substantially more emphasis on ‘moral influence’ than ‘morality’. For Machiavelli morality correlates to a facilitative code of conduct. Morality is a quality that aids in the process of carrying out the task of diplomacy. Machiavelli’s establishes a dichotomy between morality and the objective. For Machiavelli, the departure from the humanist moral values of his contemporaries was justified in term of purpose. A diplomat acting for a prince: “holds to what is right when he can but knows how to do wrong when he must”. For Machiavelli, the ideal diplomat is one which values the importance of credibility yet at the same time recognizes that this can be superseded by the pursuit of the objective. The ideal diplomat to Machiavelli is expedient.

The final characteristic of Machiavelli’s ideal diplomat is awareness of the role that fortune plays in the affairs of states. Like many of the themes in Machiavelli’s works, the importance of fortune has autobiographical characteristics. The theme of fortune weaves its way throughout all of Machiavelli’s works both professional and literary.²⁶⁷ Indeed, Machiavelli’s treatment of fortune could be considered as directly drawn from his own professional experience as a diplomat. *The Prince* opens and ends with reference to fortune in Machiavelli’s own life. The *Letter to Lorenzo de Medici*, which introduces the original text ends with an exhortation on how fortune has affected

²⁶⁷ Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, 8–22.

Machiavelli's present situation "if from the high peak of your position, you ever look down on those far below, you will see how very ungenerously and unfairly life continues to treat me". The final chapter, which is also directed to Lorenzo de Medici, and therefore indirectly related to Machiavelli's position, states that the conditions for a ruler to lead Italy out of foreign oppression are right, should Medici choose to do so.

It may seem that such a strong belief in the role of fortune is characteristic of the era. Yet in the writings of modern diplomats, we also see similar accounts. George Kennan in his later writings notes that there is an:

...inevitable element of tragedy that attends the life of every individual in the form of the blows administered to him by his own mortality and that of others, and by the crueller vagaries of chance.²⁶⁸

For Machiavelli, fortune is not the bringer of both good and ill that we are today accustomed to, but rather primarily a bringer of ill—a specific type of ill relevant to the establishment and/or maintenance of the state. For Machiavelli, fortune is the threat of disruption, disaster and anarchy. It is that which can make the difference between success and failure with all other factors being equal.

Thus, fortune is haphazard in nature, but something, which can be prepared for. As Machiavelli contends, one should not give up their free will, for while fortune may decide half of what is done, the other half is up to the individual.²⁶⁹ This is the key to Machiavelli's conceptualization of fortune—preparation. Fortune, interpreted as the need to prepare, once again calls to Machiavelli's support for purposive action. Machiavelli compares fortune to a flooding river. He presents fortune as similar to a powerful flood that washes away everything in its path. This leads to a juxtaposition of

²⁶⁸ Kennan, *Around the Cragged Hill*, 35.

²⁶⁹ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 98.

Italy's situation. According to Machiavelli, Italy was the riverside village that had neither banks nor dykes to protect it. France and Germany, who had similarly experienced revolutionary change, were 'properly protected' with banks and dykes, and thus saved from fortune's flood. This comparison leaves no doubt as to the importance of preparation in Machiavelli's position.

Preparation can thus be considered as one of the 'virtues' that Machiavelli's repeatedly juxtaposes with fortune. This juxtaposition runs through Machiavelli's work. Virtue is connected to human work, human skill and rationality. Fortune is connected to irrationality, anarchy and disorder. According to Machiavelli, preparation, the epitome of human work and virtue, imposes order on its apposite, fortune. The positioning of preparation as a counter to fortune is also seen in Machiavelli's *Advice to Raffaello*. Machiavelli advises the ambassador-designate in practical terms. He notes that an ambassador is judged by the usefulness of the reports, which he submits to home authorities. An ambassador must collect, collate and analyse this information, and use his judgment to discern which information should be submitted. Finally, Machiavelli recommends the ambassador-designate remain informed of home affairs in order to exchange information with those who may provide insight into court affairs. This entire section of the letter can be considered as the practical side to Machiavelli's position that preparation can address the challenges of fortune.

This also reflects Machiavelli's own experience as a diplomat. Machiavelli never rose to the highest levels of professional diplomacy, never achieving the rank of full ambassador. His professional experience was thus at the lower-levels at which information gathering was a primary task and at the upper levels, what we would now consider senior civil-service positions, in which the use of gathered information was crucial in decision-making. Thus, Machiavelli's *Advice to Raffaello* has been considered

'conventional' and 'one-dimensional'.²⁷⁰ Information gathering and the use of information were central to Machiavelli's own experience. Whether it is study, the cultivation of reputation, the cultivation of sources or the institution of diplomacy itself, Machiavelli's ideal diplomat understood the importance of preparation and acted on this understanding.

Machiavelli delves deeply into the broad qualities, which he deems important to the ideal prince and through this pays equal attention to the broad qualities necessary of an ideal diplomat, representing the prince. However, reflecting the period and the nature of Machiavelli's writing, he understandably pays less attention to the specific personal qualities and professional skills necessary for the ideal diplomat. Accordingly, Machiavelli's work on diplomacy should be distinguished from that of De Callières, Satow or Nicolson in three key ways.

First, Machiavelli's works are primarily about power, taking power and maintaining power. This is instructive to the diplomat in the context of the relationship between states and the relationship between politics and diplomacy. Accordingly, as philosophical or political texts, the works of Machiavelli cannot be expected to delve into specific personal qualities or professional skills necessary for an ideal diplomat.

Second, whilst Machiavelli's work as a diplomat was remarkable, it was also limited. Much like Kissinger, Machiavelli's expertise in diplomacy was primarily that of a statesman. It is clear from a reading of his works that his involvement in key decisions of the period is impressive and his understanding of how states interact based on this experience is as insightful as it is invaluable. Yet, this statesman like centrality to events could also mean that there is an element of experience lacking. Machiavelli, much like Kissinger, was primarily a statesman who could see diplomacy as an extension of

²⁷⁰ Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, 16.

politics, but lacked the experience of a diplomat who is apprenticed from the lowest ranks of diplomatic service.

Finally, the remoteness of the age in which Machiavelli wrote his works limits their applicability to the modern diplomatic profession. As noted previously, modern diplomacy during Machiavelli's time was in its infancy—a formative period in which the modern structures of contemporary diplomacy were being built. The specific personal qualities or professional skills necessary for an ideal diplomat could hardly be explicitly recorded in the midst of their formation.

Accordingly, purposive rational diplomatic action is about acting expediently and adapting to maximize chances of achieving diplomatic objectives. It is about being aware of, and preparing for changes of fortune that may present challenge or opportunity in the pursuit of diplomatic objectives. It is about recognizing the importance of fortune, and preparing to seize the opportunity or deflect the misfortune if it appears. It is about preferring to achieve an objective than upholds values, yet at the same time being willing to utilize values to achieve an objective. It is about being unfettered by tradition, yet at the same time willing to utilize tradition to achieve an objective.

Every practicing diplomat has seen purposive-rational diplomatic action. The colleague who engages in local practices of gift exchange to facilitate the achievement of an objective, instead of following civil-service guidelines; the colleague who insists upon strict adherence to formal rules of procedure, only because it will intimidate negotiating partners; or the colleague who seems so intent on achieving the objective that they've prepared back-up plans for their back-up plans. As Weber noted, an ideal type is a one-sided exaggeration of concrete characteristics. An ideal type of purpose-oriented

diplomatic action may be an exaggeration, but every professional diplomat has witnessed it and may even have seen it in him or herself.

For Machiavelli, the rational pursuit of objectives is the primary purpose of diplomatic action. Machiavelli in his texts pursued a “modern, positivist attitude, where thought and analysis serve in so far as they produce decisive action, rather than abstract concepts”.²⁷¹ Decisive action towards an objective is the message, which underlies not just *The Prince* but all of Machiavelli’s writings on diplomatic affairs. Above anything else, the goal is paramount.

Value-rational diplomatic action in Nicolson’s *Diplomacy*

Sir Harold Nicolson was born in 1886 in Tehran, Persia (Iran). Nicolson was born to diplomacy, the youngest son of distinguished diplomat and orientalist, Sir Arthur Nicolson, 1st Baron Carnock. Sir Arthur was British ambassador to Madrid (1904-05), St. Petersburg (1906-10), and later Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs (1910-16). As for pedigree to become a representative of his state, Nicolson could have no better. Indeed, Sir Harold Nicolson was even born into a period of diplomatic significance. He was born into a period during which diplomacy was of dire necessity, being witness to two world wars. He was born into a period during which modern diplomacy was undergoing its greatest transformation since the eighteenth century, from the ‘old diplomacy’ to the ‘new diplomacy’.

The transformation from old diplomacy to new diplomacy is often associated with the impact of the First World War and the momentous changes it brought to the diplomatic profession.²⁷² These changes included greater public scrutiny and control over diplomacy; and the establishment of a permanent international forum for the peaceful

²⁷¹ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, xv.

²⁷² Gordon Craig, *The Diplomats: 1919-1939* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 60–65.

settlement of disputes and the deterrence of aggression. Reformers sought an end to what they viewed as the control of diplomats from the aristocratic elite over the lives of millions. Essentially, they sought the same degree of openness, control, democratic participation and institutionalization that had occurred in domestic politics. Yet, as noted by Hamilton and Langhorne, these were gradual changes that had actually been underway for a considerable period of time: "The term 'new diplomacy' was neither novel in its application nor precise in its definition... Jules Cambon insisted in 1905 that faster communications, the press and democratic indiscretion had overthrown the 'old diplomacy'..."²⁷³ The First World War had acted as an accelerant, speeding up evolutionary change, which was already underway.

It is perhaps for this reason that Nicolson's entire oeuvre is so influential. Nicolson's *Diplomacy* is essentially a text devoted to a set of professional values, which he considered central to good diplomacy. Nicolson saw professional values as the guiding principles to good diplomacy during a period in which the profession and the institution of diplomacy were undergoing substantial transformation—a transformation between the 'old diplomacy' and 'new diplomacy'. Yet, Nicolson's advice goes beyond this period of change. As he notes: "In this new and revised edition I have not altered a word that I wrote ten years ago regarding the principles and ideals of correct diplomacy. These principles appear to me necessary and immutable".²⁷⁴

For Nicolson, the value or belief oriented ideal type is encapsulated in the above preface to the second edition of his seminal work *Diplomacy*. Nicolson's underlying argument in both *Diplomacy* and *The Evolution of Diplomacy* is that in the sudden transformation from the old to the new diplomacy, all that is good should not also be discarded.

²⁷³ Hamilton and Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration*, 137.

²⁷⁴ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 3d:7.

Essentially, Nicolson was a contemporary professional and sceptical voice warning a less informed and reform-minded public not to throw out the baby with bathwater.

Unavoidably, Nicolson is often considered representative of old diplomacy. He has been described as a “nineteenth-century character... living an eighteenth-century life in the midst of the twentieth century”.²⁷⁵ His background appears as one of unabashed privilege. As noted, he was born into diplomacy, quite literally, in Teheran where his father Sir Arthur Nicolson, later Lord Carnock, was in charge of the British legation. Sir Arthur Nicolson would later retire as permanent under-secretary of the Foreign Office after having served as ambassador to Madrid and St. Petersburg. Harold Nicolson’s path to diplomacy could seem assured. He was educated at Wellington and Balliol. When he left Oxford in 1907, whilst visiting his father in St. Petersburg, he commenced study for entrance into the Foreign Office.²⁷⁶ In October 1909, Harold Nicolson started as the most junior Foreign Office official, while his father soon after started as the most senior. He seemed to be the epitome of the aristocratic, privileged diplomat, which is in the popular imagination “a caste set apart, collectively as well as personally”.²⁷⁷

Yet, Nicolson was by no means representative of the old diplomacy, which reformers sought to transform, but rather all that was good about the “old diplomacy”. He was above all, a strong supporter of what he considered to be a set of professional values, which up until the First World War, had contributed to 43 years of peace amongst the great powers of Europe. It is these professional values, which would be the focus of his writings on the subject of diplomacy.

²⁷⁵ As quoted in Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, 172.

²⁷⁶ Harold Nicolson and Nigel Nicolson, *Diaries and Letters* (London: Collins, 1966), 3.

²⁷⁷ Sharp and Wiseman, *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society*, 1.

In considering Nicolson's ideal diplomat, as with Machiavelli, we again start with the question of whom. Whilst Machiavelli leads the reader on a path to determine that the ideal diplomat is in fact the author of the text, Nicolson lets us know from the beginning that he is not the ideal diplomat, through text's dedication to Sir Horace Rumbold. Rumbold was Nicolson's chief in Berlin in the late 1920s and played a significant historical role as the first of three British ambassadors who experienced Germany under Nazism. He demonstrated a particular degree of insight into the threat of Nazism that his April 1933 dispatch on Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and the nature of Nazism would be reread as "prophetic" by Chamberlain's closest advisors during the German *Anschluss* with Austria in 1938.²⁷⁸ Rumbold's long diplomatic career ended with the Berlin posting. When he died in 1941, Nicolson would write of him as representing "a standard of integrity, intelligence and fair-mindedness which was higher than that of most people".²⁷⁹ Otte's citation of Nicolson's eulogy of Sir Horace Rumbold, deserves to be similarly cited here with the same purpose of drawing a portrait of what Nicolson considered to be the ideal diplomat:

[He] was able to represent unerringly those qualities of truthfulness, tolerance and good sense which form the foundations of all sound diplomacy. He was self-confident without being self-assertive, proud but not vain, inflexible rather than rigid, shrewd but not cunning. He applied simple standards of decent conduct to the intricate problems with which he had to deal; he was so trustworthy that he enlarged the areas of trust; he was so respected that he made the most tortuous characters behave respectably. He was a man in whom there was no guile.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁸ Gaynor Johnson, *The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, (London: Routledge, 2006), 112–113.

²⁷⁹ As cited in Gaynor Johnson, *The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, 112.

²⁸⁰ As cited in Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, 166.

Yet Nicolson's ideal diplomat could be equally applied to a number who attract his praise in his chief works: Jules Martin Cambon as "one of the most intelligent and high-minded of professional diplomatists"²⁸¹; Pierre Paul Cambon, as "one of the most successful diplomatists in modern history" and a "miracle of patience"²⁸²; and Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg and Pyotr Stolypin as honourable, intelligent and able to be relied upon.²⁸³ Whilst others rate a mention, including Jusserand, Barrère, and Berthelot, it is the historical figure of De Callières, who clearly attracts the greatest admiration. Whilst it would be impossible for Nicolson to know intimately the qualities of De Callières the diplomat, it is clear he had much to agree upon with De Callières the scholar. Nicolson liberally quotes from De Callières throughout *Diplomacy* and in particular turns to De Callières as evidence of the timelessness of the qualities, which are necessary for the ideal diplomat.

Nicolson devotes an entire chapter to what he deems the "ideal diplomatist". From the outset, it is overly clear that this ideal diplomatist is about a set of professional values that have evolved over time. Nicolson opens by stating that he would seek to "define the *moral and intellectual qualities* which the ideal diplomatist should possess" (emphasis added), with an emphasis on the practical exposition of qualities that have evolved over "the passage of centuries".²⁸⁴ This is immediately reinforced by recalling similar attempts by scholar-diplomats over the ages. This allows Nicolson to distance himself from his conceptualization of the ideal diplomat. In effect, Nicolson's conceptualization of the ideal diplomat is thus presented as objective and timeless.

²⁸¹ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 57.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, 117–118.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, 78–79.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 104–105.

The first quality that Nicolson touches upon after this introduction is moral character, and in particular, truthfulness. For Nicolson “a lie always leaves in its wake a drop of poison...”.²⁸⁵ In his exposition of truthfulness, Nicolson refers liberally to historical examples, once again distancing himself from the concept in order to present it as objective and timeless. Truthfulness for Nicolson is equated to good diplomacy. It is an essential quality, which not only differentiates good and bad diplomacy, but also allows the practicing diplomat to build “moral influence”.

Nicolson’s conceptualization of truthfulness is not a passive one. It is not enough for a diplomat to abstain from conscious misstatement, but also to avoid the suggestion of falsity or to suppress the truth. According to Nicolson, an ideal diplomat must actively seek to correct any false impression that occurs. Truthfulness can also be one-sided. A diplomat, according to Nicolson must maintain truthfulness even in the face of dishonesty and deceit in other parties. In a phrase cited by Nicolson, which would today be considered less than diplomatic, he notes: “Do not waste your time trying to discover what is in the back of an Oriental’s mind; there may, for all you know, be nothing at the back; concentrate all your attention upon making quite certain that he is left in no doubt whatsoever in regard to what is at the back of your mind”.²⁸⁶

For Nicolson, truthfulness came down to the most basic precept of diplomacy. Truthfulness was at the core of a professional code of conduct that guaranteed an ordered and reliable relationship between the representatives of estranged entities. This code of conduct was one of the strengths of traditional diplomacy. It allowed the establishment of a “stock market of diplomatic reputation”, which, according to

²⁸⁵ Ibid, 109.

²⁸⁶ Ibid, 111.

Nicolson, far exceed the usefulness of other forms of diplomacy, such as personal or conference diplomacy.

The second quality Nicolson puts forward as essential for an ideal diplomat is precision. Precision is an essential component for accuracy in the recording and communication of information. However, Nicolson's conceptualization of precision is not limited to intellectual accuracy. Once again, Nicolson returns to professional values. For Nicolson, moral accuracy is just as important as intellectual accuracy. Moral inaccuracy refers to tendency of diplomats to underutilize their skills in order to avoid reproach. Nicolson places this in the context of a diplomat's communication. In communication, a diplomat can be tempted to clothe unpleasant news in more positive terms. This can include expressing disagreement with unpleasant news to express conciliation or watering down unpleasant news to avoid giving offence. According to Nicolson, this can present an "inaccurate and flaccid impression" of instructions from the ministry and lead to miscommunication and misunderstanding.

Nicolson also uses the quality to launch a sleight on the amateur diplomat. The amateur diplomatist, according to Nicolson, is "apt to be slovenly" and was not able to record or communicate in the written form as was able a professional diplomat. Amateur diplomats include those undertaking a diplomatic role from outside of the profession, predominantly politicians. During Nicolson's work on diplomacy, the personal visits of statesmen to foreign capitals were emerging as an important trend. Nicolson believed this trend towards the use of amateur diplomats marked a decline in the professionalism of diplomacy; weakened the core strengths of diplomacy that had evolved over centuries; and increased the potential for misunderstanding. It ignored the core qualities

"which are not always found in the ordinary politician, nor even in the ordinary man".

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The third quality Nicolson puts forward as essential for an ideal diplomat is the quality of calm. Calmness and good temper, according to Nicolson, are part of a wider set of characteristics relating to the role of emotion in professional diplomacy. Emotional reaction is anathema to diplomacy. Indeed, so much that "emotional diplomacy" is considered to be the greatest error a diplomat can make. This fact is reiterated in the writings of scholar-diplomats from Machiavelli to Kissinger.

Nicholson's sense of calm is also reiterated throughout his other writings, including his later published diaries. *The Harold Nicolson Diaries*, demonstrate a structured mind, as noted by their editor (and Harold Nicolson's son, Nigel), he had a "gift for arranging facts and ideas intelligibly and attractively".²⁸⁸ The sense of calm that he thought so vital for ideal diplomacy, pervaded his very personal thoughts on the tumultuous period of his post-diplomatic life, much of which he penned meticulously in his diaries.

Thus, in a hierarchy of social action, Nicolson's work places Max Weber's *Wertrational* or value-oriented ideal type at the top. Nicolson's writings emphasize the conscious recognition of, and social action in support of a set of distinct professional diplomatic values. He reiterates throughout his oeuvre that these values should be maintained at the expense of achieving diplomatic goals, fulfilling emotional motives, or maintaining tradition. Weber's value-oriented action is characterized by the pursuit of a goal based on a "conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other form of behaviour". For Nicolson, ideal diplomatic action is undertaken

²⁸⁷ Ibid, 105.

²⁸⁸ Nicolson and Nicolson, *Diaries and Letters*, xiii.

according to a set of values. While for Nicolson himself, professional values were most prominent, conceivably, these values could equally be ideological, religious or patriotic. Nicolson views values as more important than the purpose-rational action, yet at the same time views them as facilitative towards the achievement of objectives. Accordingly, the objective can be considered of foremost importance, yet not at the cost of compromising the set of professional values he held as most important. Third place is filled by tradition-oriented action. Tradition-oriented diplomatic action takes its place in Nicolson's hierarchy of social action predominantly through his appreciation of the set of professional values inherited from European diplomatic tradition. His repeated tirades against what he viewed as senseless reform demonstrate his strong identification with time-tested traditions. Again, he interprets tradition as being facilitative towards the achievement of diplomatic objectives. There is little doubt which type of diplomatic action Nicolson placed at the bottom. Nicolson, like the majority of other scholar-diplomats, placed emotion-oriented action at rank bottom. Failure to maintain calm, or the showing of any tint of emotion, was viewed as unhelpful to the achievement of diplomatic objectives. As demonstrated, this stands in contrast to Machiavelli, who viewed the deliberate use of emotion as facilitative to the achievement of objectives.

Tradition-oriented diplomatic action in De Callières *De la Manière de Négocier*

Francois De Callières was born to a minor noble family on 14 May 1645 in the village of Thorigny, Normandy. His first flurry in diplomatic activity was at the age of 25, in the form of an undercover mission to Poland to secure French interests in the election of the Polish throne. This was followed by a second mission to Poland, then Germany, England (on the behalf of the Court of Savoy), until the mission, for which he would become most famous, an undercover mission to prepare for the negotiations of the Ryswick Treaty to end the Nine Years War (1688-97, aka the War of the League of

Augsburg). After this, De Callières would remain in the service of France, undertaking further missions to Lorraine, Poland, and serving as the King's First Secretary.

Like many scholar-diplomats, De Callières served as a diplomat in a leading state at the height of its diplomatic influence. Within the third quarter of the seventeenth century, and definitely by the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659), France replaced Spain as the leading power of Europe. Louis XIV (1638-1715) would not only expand France's influence in Europe, but would also build France into a modern bureaucratic state, capable of sustaining the continuous balance between warfare and diplomacy that marked the historical period. Yet, it was also a period when the notion of French hegemony had passed. France would no longer be able impose its will through force of arms alone. Serving as a diplomat and statesman from 1689-1715, De Callières was very much at the centre of French and European diplomatic tradition. As stated in his seminal text, the states of Europe were "membres d'une même république", necessitating continuous diplomacy to find areas of substantial common agreement.

Negotiating with Sovereigns is thought to have been written during the period between De Callières return to France and his appointment as First Secretary, or between 1698 and 1701.²⁸⁹ It is one of several texts in the author's oeuvre, which also includes *Histoire poétique de la guerre nouvellement déclarée entre les anciens et les modernes* (1688), a treatise on the polemic between followers of the strict conventions of classical Greek and Roman literature, and supporters of the innovative and adaptive styles in contemporary literature; and *Du bon et du mauvais usage dans les manières de s'exprimer, des façons de parler bourgeoises, et en quoi elles sont différentes de celle de la Cour* (1693), a guide to correct language usage, remotely associated with the movement of middle classes into higher positions in the service of the state. As noted by

²⁸⁹ Laurence Pope, *Francois de Callières: A Political Life*, (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters, 2010), 193.

Laurence Pope in his study of De Callières political life, it is known that *Negotiating with Sovereigns* was “circulating within a select circle” as early as 1704, prior to being published 1715 (with a publication date of 1716).²⁹⁰ The text was immediately popular with two editions and an English translation released. It sustained a reputation in Europe as a standard reference for the study of diplomacy throughout the eighteenth century; underwent a period of relative neglect in the nineteenth century; until its revival at the turn of the twentieth century. A new English language ‘rendering’ of the text by Alexander Frederick Whyte appeared in 1919 under the title *The Art of Diplomacy*. This rendering, combined with the substantial praise bestowed upon it in Satow and Nicholson’s texts. From this point on, De Callières’ position in diplomatic tradition was set in stone.

Francois De Callières is today considered the epitome of diplomatic tradition. His seminal work, *De la Manière de Négocier avec les souverains* (*On Negotiating with Sovereigns*), was successful in its own right. Yet, at the turn of the twentieth century with the transformation of the ‘old diplomacy’ to ‘new diplomacy’, De Callières’ work achieved a new prominence. It passed irrefutably into diplomatic tradition through the abundant praise proffered it by Satow, Nicolson, and other scholar-diplomats in their own contributions to diplomatic tradition. De Callières, and the diplomatic maxims and methods he represented, became associated with the exclusivity, relative simplicity, and predictability of the ‘old diplomacy’. He became inextricably associated with diplomatic tradition.

The interpretation of De Callières’ work as focused on tradition derives from his formative role in the development of European diplomacy. Far from being hindered by tradition, De Callières himself was very much an innovator. He laid the foundations for

²⁹⁰ Ibid, 192.

the institutionalization and professionalization of European diplomacy, in his time arguing vehemently for the establishment of a training school for diplomats, the appointment of professional, rather than politically-appointed ambassadors, and the recognition of diplomats as belonging to a distinct profession, a corps with shared skills, training, and conduct, much the same as the martial profession of the era.

The text commences with an introduction to European diplomacy, serving as both a device to justify the importance of diplomacy (and the text), and to bolster the experience and expertise of the author. This is immediately followed by a chapter dedicated to the ‘usefulness of negotiations’, in which the scholars of subsequent centuries have elicited substantial insight into the nature of international relations. The author uses historical examples, including the “great genius” of Cardinal de Richelieu, to support his contention regarding the “efficacy and force” of negotiations. De Callières then moves on to the qualifications and conduct of diplomats, a theme already common in the genre.²⁹¹ It is from this early chapter that De Callières begins to expound his views on the ideal diplomat. The format changes only slightly through the next twelve chapters, until moving on to another common theme of similar texts in the period, the legal privileges, functions, and powers of envoys. This is followed by the similarly themed processes of an envoy’s pre-departure, arrival, and departure. This is concluded with further advice on the processes and skills of negotiation, means of communication, and coded communications. The text closes with an additional advice on the choice of envoys.

So who is De Callières’ ideal diplomat? Unequivocally, by pure volume of citation alone, De Callières’ ideal diplomat is Armand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal-Duc de Richelieu et de Fronsac, most often known simply as Cardinal Richelieu. Yet, the

²⁹¹ Maurice Keens-Soper, “Francois de Callieres and Diplomatic Theory,” *The Historical Journal*, 16, No. 3 (February 11, 2009): 497–500.

evidence of De Callières' acceptance of Cardinal Richelieu as an ideal diplomat is not left to volume of citation alone. De Callières notes that Richelieu "may be proposed as a model to the greatest statesmen", and within a page notes "the testimony of this great genius ought to have the greater weight, in that the great things which he has done by the means of negotiations, are convincing proofs of the truth of what he advances".²⁹²

De Callières goes on to list Richelieu's accomplishments and skills, not hiding his admiration for his "ideal diplomat". The fact that De Callières ideal diplomat is drawn from a period, which is known for the strengthening of the nation-state, and the formation of fundamental norms in international relations, including state sovereignty, settlement under international law, and the use of foreign policy to serve state interests, reinforces the assessment of De Callières as a bastion of diplomatic tradition. Throughout the text, De Callières utilizes other examples, some named and some unnamed, to contrast the skills of his ideal diplomat, yet consistently returns to Richelieu.

However, while utilizing Richelieu as the personification of his ideal diplomat, De Callières is explicit in his listing of the qualities needed by an ideal diplomat. The numerous qualities which De Callières listed as qualities of an ideal diplomat combine to form a sense of tradition – an appreciation of the beliefs and behaviours developed over time which are characteristic of the European diplomatic tradition. Attempts to translate and modernize De Callières' writings on the ideal diplomat leave a list, which epitomizes what Jönsson and Hall called the 'vacuous advice' of 'long tradition'. Amongst the numerous qualities, an ideal diplomat must have: "...spirit of attention and application, which is not capable of being distracted with pleasures, and frivolous amusements; a right judgment, which may be able to comprehend things clearly as they

²⁹² Francois De Callières, *The Art of Diplomacy* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 70.

are, and pursue the main point by the shortest and most natural ways...”²⁹³ Yet, for the more distracted modern reader, De Callières advice unfortunately does not come to the point “by the shortest and most natural way”.²⁹⁴ In the French composition, and to a degree also in the 18th century English language translation, these qualities are expressed with a stylistic grace, which distracts and even confuses a modern reader. Satow and Nicholson, sought to convey the qualities through the use of both direct quotes and summaries. Yet, so intricate and detailed are the qualities of De Callières ideal diplomat, so subtly nuanced and balanced in their composition, that to the modern reader, Satow and Nicholson’s rendition still belie sensibility. There are a vast number of qualities, which make up De Callières ideal diplomat. A modern rendering appears no less incredulous – the ideal diplomat should be focused, precise, frank, engaging; demonstrate understanding, readiness of mind, subtlety, directness, evenness of temper, calmness, preparedness, courtesy, civility, agreeableness, self-control, discretion, dignity, pride, and transparency; not to mention a nobleness of soul - to list but a few. It is thus, with the sense of tradition that De Callières is often associated by the modern scholar.

Yet, this association with tradition belies the work of De Callières the diplomat and De Callières the politician. De Callières, while recognizing the importance of tradition, was very much an innovator. Laurence Pope in his study of De Callières political life goes further, arguing that De Callières was indeed very much a supporter of modern technology and political reform.²⁹⁵ He sought to transform and reconstitute the diplomatic profession and its traditions into his own conception. De Callières sought to

²⁹³ Ibid, 75.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Pope, *Francois de Callières*, 64.

set the foundations upon which diplomatic tradition could be based – and arguably, subsequent interpretations of his works suggest he did just that.

It was De Callières' belief that ideal diplomacy is based on professionalism. De Callières notes in his text that diplomacy constitutes a "carrière à part" – a distinct, specialized, professional occupation. The ideal derives from Richelieu's concept of "continuous negotiation" – the need for both ongoing negotiation (pursuit of agreements) and permanent representation.²⁹⁶ De Callières built upon this concept, calling not just for continuous negotiation but also for the establishment of a corps of diplomats, educated, trained, and apprenticed into the traditions of professional diplomacy, in much the same way as the professional soldier. He noted the different requirements needed in the differing tasks of diplomacy. For representation it may suffice to have a 'great name and wealth' but when it came to negotiation, professionalism was required.²⁹⁷ Indeed, it was De Callières hope that the diplomatic profession would one day be considered much the same as the military profession. It is thus with De Callières that we see the beginnings of the professional values of diplomacy, which Nicolson held so highly.

A key component of this ideal was training and education. De Callières support for a more professional cadre of diplomats is also demonstrated in his ideas for the training and education of the professional diplomat. De Callières believed that diplomats required a combination of learning and real world experience – a blend of the academic and practical. The ideal diplomat, De Callières believed, should have travelled not as a tourist, but rather as an informed and active observer. The study that the ideal diplomat undertakes should be enough to maintain a general knowledge. In De Callières own

²⁹⁶ Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, 74.

²⁹⁷ Jean-Jules Jusserand, "The School for Ambassadors," *The American Historical Review*, 27, No. 3 (April 1922): 454.

words, they should hold knowledge “sufficient to enlighten their understanding” but, importantly, must “possess it and not be possessed by it”.²⁹⁸

De Callières would ultimately see this aim achieved. After the death of Louis XIV, the salaries and appointments of ambassadors and ministers were standardized. De Callières close friends and associates Saint-Simon and Chevreuse were to play central coordinating roles in the establishment of a ‘political academy’ to prepare young men of birth in the skills required to represent the country.²⁹⁹ Indeed, it has been argued that, much like Machiavelli, De Callières had authored his text with the sole purpose of strengthening the likelihood that he would be chosen to serve the new administration in a senior capacity.³⁰⁰

Emotion oriented action is hardly touched upon in De Callières text. Consideration of emotions, and the characteristic behaviours associated with them are of course contained within the general qualities De Callières deems essential to an ideal diplomat, including modesty, patience, evenness of temper, agreeableness, self-control, discretion, dignity, and pride. Yet, De Callières does not directly mention the need to avoid their impact, as does Nicolson. He does not completely remove them from the text, as does Satow. Yet, nor does he argue for its use in a facilitative manner, as Machiavelli. Throughout the text, emotion is treated perfunctorily, as it has not overt or covert role in negotiation.

From the records of De Callières as a professional diplomat, we know that he sought to achieve and held his objectives in paramount consideration. Tradition and professional values were important, but in no way would they ever trump the achievement of

²⁹⁸ As cited in Jean-Jules Jusserrand, “The School for Ambassadors,” 455.

²⁹⁹ Pope, *François de Callières*, 193.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

objectives. De Callières was professional, clever, and hard-working, but also impatient, overly-ambitious, proud, and as evidenced by his record, willing to forego the very advice which the book contained. Purpose-oriented diplomatic action dominated tradition-oriented, value-rational oriented, and emotion-oriented diplomatic action. Yet, it is from De Callières that Satow and Nicolson inherited the sense of a distinct and replicable tradition of ideal diplomacy. De Callières place in European diplomatic history, thus above all, evokes tradition.

Emotion-oriented diplomatic action in Satow's *Diplomatic Practice*

Sir Ernest Mason Satow was born of a German father and English mother in June 1843. As a youth and student growing up in the second half of the nineteenth century England, this predisposed the young Satow to an understanding of 'the other'. He began his work in the diplomatic profession as a member of the British Consular service. Here he witnessed the height of British imperialism and western gunboat diplomacy. After a short language sojourn in China, he moved on to Japan in 1862. He undertook subsequent postings in Siam, Uruguay and Morocco, but it was China, and in particular, Japan, where his heart and mind stayed.

His arrival in Japan placed him at a unique point in history. He was a member of the diplomatic service of a country at the height of its power, posted to a country of stark social, cultural and political contrasts between those that sought to cling to the past (and reject Western culture and thought) and those that sought to modernize (and learn from and emulate Western culture and thought). He would see Japan forced out of self-imposed isolation, the Emperor restored, and its society, political system and military radically modernized. He would see Japan shake off its isolation and engage with its neighbours and the world. He would ultimately see Japan emerge as a rival to Western power in the Far East. Perhaps significantly, Japan is also a country in which cultural

mores dictate an aversion to outward displays of emotion.³⁰¹ It is this attitude that pervades Satow's professional academic work. As noted in his diaries when he considers whether he should have turned out a persistent and unpleasant guest:

...I should have snubbed him, and had him turned out, but when one reflects how many Europeans are more intrusive, and how well the Japanese usually receive their forwardness, it seems best to take a leaf out of their book and keep one's temper.³⁰²

Satow's contribution to diplomacy was substantial. Not only was he "an outstanding figure in the diplomatic service of his time", he was also a prolific scholar with an oeuvre consisting of "historical, cultural, philological studies, as well as writings on the nature of diplomacy and diverse questions of international law".³⁰³ His works on diplomatic practice includes themes such as the balance tradition and innovation in diplomacy, the balance between formal and informal diplomacy, and the question of order and legalism. H. W. V. Temperly, quoted in the fifth edition, described his seminal text, the *Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, as "full of practical wisdom, legal acumen and antiquarian knowledge".³⁰⁴

In authoring *The Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, Satow followed in a long tradition of scholar-diplomats, who in the later stages of their career or in retirement, seek to impart their accumulated wisdom to future generations of diplomats. While guides to diplomatic practice formed the mainstream of the scholar-diplomat genre Satow had

³⁰¹ Saba Safdar et al., "Variations of Emotional Display Rules within and across Cultures: A Comparison between Canada, USA, and Japan," *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science/Revue Canadienne Des Sciences Du Comportement*, 41, No. 1 (2009): 9.

³⁰² Ernest Mason Satow and Ian C. Ruxton, *The Diaries of Sir Ernest Satow, British Envoy in Peking (1900-06)* (Morrisville: Lulu Press, 2006), 220.

³⁰³ Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, 126.

³⁰⁴ Satow, *Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, xii.

found a niche in the market. At the time of writing, major works, which comprised this tradition, were not in the English language. With a significant growth in public interest in diplomatic affairs as a result of the First World War, Satow's practical English language guide to the profession was widely acclaimed in both the public and professional spheres.³⁰⁵

Also true to the tradition of the scholar-diplomat, *The Guide to Diplomatic Practice* not only served as reference guide for aspiring diplomats, but also presented the author's conceptualization of the ideal diplomat: "Good temper, good health and good looks. Rather more than average intelligence, though brilliant genius is not necessary. A straightforward character, devoid of selfish ambition. A mind trained by study of the best literature and by that of history. Capacity to judge evidence. In short, the candidate must be a gentleman..."³⁰⁶

The question of who is Satow's ideal diplomat is particularly interesting. The ideal diplomat for Satow is not based on an individual. For Satow, the ideal diplomat is closer to Weber's concept of an ideal type. It is an exaggeration of qualities, which no single individual could fulfil. This is demonstrated in the structure and writing style of *The Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. It is an attempt to quantify and describe the ideal diplomat in an impersonal, objective, and rational manner. Individuals are not the focus, but rather their actions as precedents for future action. As noted by the contemporary Foreign Office Librarian, and later quoted by Otte, Satow's Guide would be "in constant use as for reference", saving "many a weary hunt for the precedents and information of which it is so complete a storehouse".³⁰⁷ Satow's ideal diplomat, like his

³⁰⁵ Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, 127–128.

³⁰⁶ Ibid, 133–134.

³⁰⁷ Thomas G. Otte, "'A Manual of Diplomacy': The Genesis of Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice," *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 13, No. 2 (June 2002): 230.

professional work, is devoid of any sense of an individual. According to Satow, the individual, and his or her accompanying foibles and weaknesses, such as emotion, do not hold a position in professional diplomacy.

A useful comparison with Nicolson's *Diplomacy* can be made. Nicolson's writing style places his voice in an authoritative position throughout the text. The reader is well aware that the text is the result of the author's experience and is equally aware that the text is replete with personal views. The use of the personal pronoun throughout the text makes this abundantly clear:

I try to define the moral and intellectual qualities which the ideal diplomatist should possess. Yet if *I* catalogue these qualities in the shape of personal characteristics, *I* should not wish it to be supposed that *I* am indulging in a mere character sketch...³⁰⁸

Accordingly, the reader is well aware that not only is the text comprised of Nicolson's observations, but it also contains his personal and views. At times, these views could be considered as even having a degree of emotional content. His discussions of developments in diplomacy, such as the rise in the importance of the press and the public in the development of foreign policy and its execution demonstrate a degree of emotion that is not wholly unsurprising. As a public commentator, politician and respected authority on international affairs, Nicolson could not help but allow emotion – as a rhetorical device – take its rightful place in his public voice.

Satow, however, does not allow his voice to enter the text. It remains external to the text. The author's views are external to the text, thus making an explicit or even implicit connection between the ideal diplomat and an actual individual impossible. Importantly, emotion also remains external. Despite several chapters of Nicolson's *Diplomacy* and

³⁰⁸ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 104–105.

Satow's *Guide to Diplomacy* covering similar topics, the structure and writing style makes the two texts very different. At the heart of this difference is the personal voice of the author. Subsequent editions of Satow's *Guide to Diplomacy* continued this trend, reiterating the relevance of the text as a professional guide rather than a recounting of a diplomat's experience and observations. Indeed, Lord Gore-Booth who edited the fifth edition, published in 1979 notes that the aim in editing was to remain as close as possible to the original text, whilst accommodating changes in the world that necessitated major revision.³⁰⁹ Satow's aversion to personalism and emotionalism both in structure and content sustained the relevance of the work as a professional guide. The latest edition, released in 2011 edited by Ivor Roberts of Trinity College Oxford University greatly expands the text, yet maintains this original aversion to emotionalism.³¹⁰ The most recent edition, five years under a century since its first edition, remains above all – a professional guide.

Yet Satow's aversion to emotion is not confined to *The Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. Satow repeats this aversion to emotionalism in his other works with a particular reference to it in his later the Rede Lecture on the Austrian diplomat Count Von Hübner, Satow elaborates on the need for an ideal diplomat to be removed from all expressions of emotion, both good and bad:

The ambassador who fulfils the duties of his office never betrays fatigue, boredom nor disgust. He keeps to himself the emotions he experiences, the temptations to weakness that assail him. He has to remain silent regarding the

³⁰⁹ Satow, *Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, xi.

³¹⁰ Ivor Roberts and Ernest Mason Satow, *Satow's Diplomatic Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

bitter disappointments to which he is subjected, as well as the unexpected successes which sometimes, but rarely bestows on him.³¹¹

The aversion to emotionalism is even demonstrated in his diaries. Satow's diaries are a record of events.³¹² They are structured in a way that one would expect of a highly professional individual. There is barely a mention of personal circumstance (except statements on reaction to appearance and environmental conditions) and no sign of emotion – no anger, no happiness, no jealousy or no longing. Once again comparing Satow to Nicolson, the difference is clear. Nicolson's diaries are written as if in the expectation that they would be read in the future. When accompanied with the private letters (compiled and edited by his son, Nigel Nicolson) they reveal a deeply emotional man, capable of great sympathy, anxiety, anger, and jealousy. Satow's diaries in stark contrast, are a record of events – detached, rational and almost scientific.

Satow is the epitome of the ideal 'anti-emotion' diplomat. Who then could be considered the ideal emotional diplomat? Contrary to mainstream expectations, several accounts claim that the best example of ideal emotional diplomat is an individual most people would assume to be an unemotional, detached and harshly rational realist – Dr. Henry Kissinger. In Barbara Key's Bernath Lecture she explores the emotional side of Kissinger.³¹³ Her work demonstrates the contrast between the Kissinger portrayed in his academic and public persona and the Kissinger portrayed in his relations with colleagues. She draws a picture of an individual whose actions, including highly significant actions having a major diplomatic import, were dictated by emotions of jealousy, anger, betrayal and fear. Key goes so far as to state that Kissinger's decision to

³¹¹ Ernest Satow, *An Austrian Diplomatist in the Fifties: The Rede Lecture Delivered in the Cambridge Senate House on June 13, 1908* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908).

³¹² Satow and Ruxton, *The Diaries of Sir Ernest Satow, British Envoy in Peking (1900-06)*.

³¹³ Barbara Keys, "Bernath Lecture, Henry Kissinger: The Emotional Statesman," *Diplomatic History*, 35, No. 4 (September 2011): 587–609.

put United States forces on the Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) 3 alert on 24 October 1973 during the Yom Kippur War was “an angry move triggered in part by a sense of outrage at what seemed like a Soviet betrayal of the cooperative relationship he had worked so hard to build”.³¹⁴ DEFCON is an alert state used by the United States military, which prescribes five graduated levels of threat, from 5 to 1, where 1 is the highest threat level. The contrast Key exposes in her paper on Kissinger is the belief that rationalism is good and that emotionalism is bad. In the context of negotiation, this belief has a long history. Willen Mastenbroek traces the constraint of emotion in negotiation back to the earliest texts on the subject, noting that constraint of emotion is a condition, which was an early feature of negotiation instruction.³¹⁵ For all intents and purposes, emotion-oriented diplomatic action is anathema to what has come to be considered normal diplomatic action.

Yet, an equally prominent feature is also the use of emotion to obtain advantage in negotiation. Mastenbroek cites the works of De Callières as examples of recommending negotiators to keep their own emotions hidden, to expose the emotions of others and to be able to leave an impression of sincerity and good faith.³¹⁶ As earlier noted, the ability to purposefully use emotion was also considered by Machiavelli to be an important skill.

Diplomats today, are by definition supposed to be the epitome of calmness, detachment and rationality. Nicolson goes so far as to cite calm and good temper—essentially the removal of emotional influence—as one of three central qualities essential to good diplomacy. Indeed, the constraint of an outward expression of emotion has been a feature of studies in diplomacy since the earliest writings on the subject. It is in the

³¹⁴ Ibid, 607.

³¹⁵ Willem Mastenbroek, “Negotiating as Emotion Management,” *Theory, Culture and Society* 16, No. 4 (August 1999): 49–73.

³¹⁶ Ibid, 58.

works of Sir Ernest Mason Satow that this aversion to emotion is most distinct. In structure, content and form Satow demonstrates a degree of emotional constraint that serves as a stark opposition to emotion-oriented diplomacy.

Four ideal types of diplomatic style

Recalling the definition presented in Chapter One, diplomatic style is the replication in diplomatic behaviour or the artefacts produced by diplomatic behaviour that result from choices made within the constraints specific to diplomatic interaction. This definition consists of four constituent components: replication; diplomatic behaviour (or artefacts produced by diplomatic behaviour); choices; and constraints. This chapter demonstrates that these constituent components can be extracted from classic diplomatic literature to construct four distinct ideal types of diplomatic style based on Weber's ideal types of social action. The value of constructing these generalizing ideal types of diplomatic style is as heuristic devices designed to contrast, compare, and analyse concrete examples of diplomatic style. How to access the tacit knowledge of concrete examples of diplomatic style will thus present the next methodological hurdle, as outlined in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER FIVE: Accessing diplomatic style: A case study of South Korea

As noted in the introduction, the research is limited to a single case study – South Korea. To reiterate, South Korea was chosen for its position in the original motivation for the study; the very limited references to South Korean diplomatic style in diplomatic studies literature; and the manageable volume of scholarly research on South Korean foreign policy. Chapter Two demonstrated that diplomatic style is comprised of both explicit and tacit knowledge. It was assumed that it was tacit knowledge regarding diplomatic style that would potentially provide practitioners with additional insight into a state's foreign policy, above and beyond that which is accessible through scholarly research. Chapters Three and Four presented four ideal types of diplomatic style, which provide the means contrast, compare and analyse concrete examples of diplomatic style. However, this leaves the most pressing methodological question – how can tacit knowledge regarding diplomatic style be accessed? The current chapter aims to answer this question, and presents an introduction to the case study.

I first recount an initial failed attempt to access tacit knowledge regarding diplomatic style using a quantitative approach – a descriptive, cross-sectional survey. The reasons for the failure of this attempt are explored before turning to an alternative approach qualitative approach – narrative phenomenology. I then explain the background of narrative phenomenology, before turning to its appropriateness to access tacit knowledge. I then outline the procedures undertaken to gather, evaluate and analyse data utilizing the narrative phenomenological methodology.

Learning from mistakes

This section highlights the challenges I faced in an initial attempt to investigate diplomatic style. It looks at the attempt at data collection and assesses the reasons for its

failure, leading to an analysis of the requirements, which would be needed in the search for an alternative method.

In the initial attempt, I sought to determine the difference in knowledge regarding the South Korean diplomatic style between academics working on Korean peninsula issues, and the diplomatic corps based in Seoul. This meant measuring the variance of the two populations from a third control population of South Korean diplomats. I utilized a descriptive, cross-sectional survey, established with a contextual categorization based upon the central diplomatic tasks of representation, negotiation, reporting, and the consular function. The survey additionally included standard general and demographic questions to account for bias as a result of background characteristics. Accordingly the initial attempt was situated squarely within a quantitative research methodology. It sought to systematically and objectively investigate (measure) a real social phenomenon (expectations of behaviour). From this, I planned to hypothesize various relationships, such as the correlation between accuracy and time spent at post.

Data collection was undertaken through a series of internet-based self-administered questionnaires to be supplemented by personal interviews. Each package posted or emailed to potential respondents included (a) an introduction letter and human research ethics statement; (b) an introduction letter from a senior official from the Australian Government DFAT; and instructions on how to undertake the survey via the internet. The choice of an internet-based self-administered questionnaire was based on the fact that the target populations were (a) computer literate; (b) maintained regular computer access as part of their profession; and (c) typically maintained a high-volume professional schedule. The ability to commence, save and return to the internet-based survey at their own convenience was an important feature to minimize the impact on the

respondents' professional schedule. The distinct disadvantages of an Internet survey were taken into consideration.

First, respondents are often concerned about online data privacy and fraud. Given the nature of the information sought, respondents could become concerned that the survey was not legitimate. This was overcome by (a) clearly indicating on the welcome page the standard human research ethical outlines and privacy guidelines; and (b) attaching an introduction letter from a senior DFAT official. Further, in the interests of increasing the response rate and reducing concerns regarding fraud and/or privacy, the assistance of the South Korean MOFA was sought. The first warning signs that this method of research would be difficult came in the form of strong informal advice to not formally request assistance.

Second, with internet-based self-administered questionnaires, researchers have no ability to know that the respondents are in fact the targeted individuals. For example, after receiving the survey invitation, a target could forward the email to junior staff, clerical staff, or in the context of this study, locally engaged staff (non-diplomats that are nationals of the host country). This could potentially corrupt the population sample size. This was overcome by (a) indicating on the invitation letter the importance placed on the views of the invited person, and (b) obtaining demographic information at the end of the survey, which indicates the level of professional diplomatic experience.

Third, internet-based questionnaires can have significant technical problems. This can result from differing browser types and differing Internet speeds. Further, differing language-enabled browsers can have problems reading non-uniform characters.³¹⁷ To

³¹⁷ Barbara Kaye and Thomas Johnson, "Research Methodology: Taming the Cyber Frontier: Techniques for Improving Online Surveys," *Social Science Computer Review*, 17, No. 3 (1999): 331.

minimize these technical issues, the questionnaire was pre-tested using the commonest browser types in Seoul and the questionnaire itself was simplified for ease of access.

Thus, the initial attempt involved working with three populations: academics focusing on Korean peninsula issues; serving and retired South Korean diplomats; and the diplomatic corps serving in Seoul during 2006-2010. The first survey was conducted amongst academics working in the field of Korean studies. Recruitment for the survey was undertaken by direct contact with academics with the assistance of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES) and the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), a South Korean state-sponsored international economic policy research institute. The size of the epistemic community is significantly large and did not present any concerns regarding the sampling size.

The second survey was conducted amongst serving and ex-members of the South Korean diplomatic service. Recruitment for the survey was undertaken through direct contact and introductions via KIEP, IFES and the South Korean Council on Foreign Relations, a non-governmental organization assisting and coordinating the community of ex-members of the ministry. Ultimately, 'snowball' recruitment, ideally suited for the socio-cultural environment was utilized to enhance respondent numbers. This method was very useful in the cultural context of South Korea. South Korean social structure is very network centric with influential hierarchical seniors able to organize and coordinate hierarchical junior participation. The survey used questions correlated to the first survey, altered to account for the first person perspective.

The third survey was conducted amongst the foreign diplomatic community resident in Seoul. Recruitment for the survey was undertaken by direct contact with foreign diplomatic missions in Seoul. In July 2009, there were 84 foreign missions in South Korea. The size of these missions ranged from that of the United States, consisting of

over 450 personnel, to that of Kenya, consisting of three personnel. Reflecting the nature of the target population, I expected a large number of non-respondents. According to Burnham, in statistical theory, a sample size of 300 is large enough for most analytical purposes.³¹⁸ Accordingly, the sample size of the diplomatic corps in Seoul could potentially have been of insufficient size. To reduce this risk, two measures were taken: (a) the invitation letter sought the participation of the addressee as well as any other members of the diplomatic mission, thus increasing the response rate per invitation; and (b) a rigorous phone, postal and email reminder campaign was undertaken to encourage responses.

The questionnaire used a logical sequence of questions. It started with general warm-up questions to raise respondent confidence. This was followed by more substantive questions with a careful control for contamination undertaken in pre-testing. More contamination sensitive questions were placed at the end of the section. The final section consisted of standard demographic items. The questionnaire used only closed-ended questions. This aimed at reducing ambiguity in the results as well as making analysis and coding considerably easier. The potential for questions having an overly narrow range of answers was reduced through pre-testing.

The three surveys were to be appraised to determine the degree of match between the tacit knowledge within the foreign diplomatic community, the epistemic community and the self-perception of South Korean diplomats, regarding the diplomatic style of South Korea. The surveys were then to be further appraised in conjunction with follow-up interviews to determine the usefulness of style as a means to explain South Korean diplomatic interaction. However, the initial attempt failed.

³¹⁸ Peter Burnham, *Research Methods in Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 110.

A poor response rate forced me to abandon the attempt to conduct an online survey. The first survey conducted amongst academics working in the field of Korean studies received an inadequate response rate with 26 responses from 60 invitations to participate. With a substantially large reserve of potential respondents, the survey could have been continued. However, the second survey conducted amongst serving and ex-members of the South Korean diplomatic service received no responses from 60 invitations to participate – including non-responses from colleagues I knew well. Similarly, the survey conducted amongst the foreign diplomatic community resident in Seoul received an inadequate response rate with 12 responses online from 70 invitations to participate – once again, including non-responses from colleagues I knew well.

I investigated and found there were several reasons for the poor response rate in the second two surveys. The most serious of these was the choice of an internet-based self-administered questionnaire. Security and privacy concerns amongst the diplomatic corps were overwhelming. In follow-up interviews, one participant confided in me that due to the delicate nature of bilateral relations and the security-related nature of their work, participating in an online survey would be “inappropriate and even foolish”.

The survey was also perceived as irrelevant and time-consuming to practitioners. Diplomats have little time for unwieldy academic concepts and are often sceptical of theory, given their focus on the practical.³¹⁹ The target population of professional diplomats could be considered infamous for their limited time availability. From previous experience, I was aware they had very little time for questionnaires unless they can clearly anticipate value and/or are directed to participate. Accordingly, I had used contextual questioning to increase relevance and placed restrictions on the length. Unfortunately, this did not reduce respondent perceptions of irrelevance.

³¹⁹ Vincent Pouliot, “The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities,” *International Organization*, 62, No. Spring (2008): 260-62.

The survey also suffered from a poor response rate in the second survey because of the use of English. The use of English in cross-national studies has several well-researched disadvantages, such as differing response styles based on power-distance, collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and extraversion.³²⁰ I had assumed that this would not apply to the target population of professional diplomats because the target population used English in their professional lives on a daily basis. This was not the case, particularly amongst the second population, serving and ex-members of the South Korean diplomatic service. In follow-up interviews, I was told in very clear terms: "Talking is fine, but when I see a survey full of English questions at the end of the working day... no way!".

Finally, in follow-up interviews with the third survey group, several participants noted that a difference in assessments of South Korean diplomatic style between academics and practitioners was accepted as common knowledge. They accepted this as self-evident. Participants were considerably more interested in a more accurate assessment of South Korean style and hearing what other diplomats had to say regarding South Korean diplomatic style.

Ultimately, the initial attempt was not an abject failure. Whilst response rates were low, it would have been possible to continue with in-person interviews. This would have required substantially greater amount of time dedicated to survey collection through one-on-one interviews. However, as I continued to investigate the reasons for the failure of the online survey and continued down the path of in-person survey collection, I became increasingly aware that this level of interaction with the Seoul diplomatic corps and serving and retired diplomatic personnel was wasted upon survey collection. The discussions, which inevitably flowed from survey questions throughout the interviews,

³²⁰ Anne-Wil Harzing, "Response Styles in Cross-national Survey Research: A 26 Country Study," *International Journal of Cross-cultural Management*, 6, No. 2 (2006): 243.

became increasingly interesting. In these discussions, diplomats told me stories about their understanding and experiences of diplomatic style. Rather than trying to fit their accounts into my surveys, I became aware that the accounts themselves were a much richer source of data just waiting to be explored.

Thinking narratively regarding diplomacy and tacit knowledge

In this section I provide a brief introduction to the methodology, I settled upon after the initial failure. I suspend a more detailed introduction to the methodology in favour of first explaining the relevance of the approach to the study and its argument. Specifically, I demonstrate the applicability of the approach to accessing, and potentially transforming tacit knowledge.

The greatest weakness of the first attempt was the failure to “think narratively and phenomenologically” about diplomacy. This refers to the chosen methodology – narrative phenomenology. A narrative phenomenological inquiry combines two approaches to qualitative inquiry – narrative and phenomenology. In the simplest terms, narrative is storytelling. It is “a basic human strategy for coming to terms with time, process, and change”.³²¹ Phenomenology, in its simplest terms, is the study of the way we experience things. It is as a means to “understand several individuals’ common or shared experiences of a phenomenon”.³²² Narrative phenomenology is an alternative approach to the study of human social action. It is alternative because it breaks from the mainstream approach of modernist research in the social sciences. The modernist approach assumes that human action is based on rationality and can be expressed in

³²¹ David Herman, *The Cambridge Companion to Narrative* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3.

³²² John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007), 60.

universal truths, and as a consequence should be studied objectively. In the modernist approach, problems are solved through the application of empirical scientific method.

Narrative phenomenology derives from the postmodernist approach. Postmodernism broke with the mainstream through an emphasis on context. Context refers not just to the actors but also the investigator. Thus, postmodernism posits that there are multiple realities, embedded in the everyday lives and social relations of subjects and in the differing values of investigators. In the postmodernist approach, problems are not necessarily solved, but rather revealed or approximated truths, discovered through the application of multiple methods.

To “think narratively and phenomenologically” means to think in the context of stories of experiences. This is a skill that is embedded in our subconscious – a natural skill that we build our lives around, yet it is a skill that many academic researchers find incredibly difficult to call upon at will.³²³ Reflecting this, my first approach typified non-narrative thinking. I sought to address the problem as one faces a mathematical sum. I assembled my theories, laid out my instruments and sought to crunch the numbers. This was despite the motivation for the story coming from an individual’s narrative; my earliest anecdotal accounts of the importance of style coming from individual diplomats’ narratives; and the strongest references to style in diplomatic studies literature being in a narrative format. To think narratively and phenomenologically about the problem would be to recall other similar stories of experiences; to encapsulate the human-centeredness of the problem; and to recognize the differences between narrator and audience as well as the links between them.

³²³ Arch G. Woodside, *Case Study Research: Theory, Methods, Practice* (Bingley: Emerald Group, 2010), 42.

To think narratively and phenomenologically about diplomacy is to understand it a series of temporal sequences with event trajectories involving human experience. The basic functions of diplomacy representation, negotiation, reporting and the consular function are essentially composed of experiences, which are inherently related narratively prior to being transposed into other forms. They are a series of stories, which detail the experiences of interaction between the officials of one international actor with another international actor. Different communities handle these stories in different ways, as demonstrated by the study and practice of international affairs.

In the study of diplomacy, diplomatic historians seek an objectively knowable past through the reconstruction of narratives or stories, in which possible causes of events are described, often resulting in the expounding of implicit causal analysis. Mainstream international relations theorists similarly use constructed narratives in pursuit of an objectively knowable past to provide facts, which can be measured to determine cases for more explicit causal analysis.

Stories play an equally important role in the practice of diplomacy – a point often lost in the utilitarian environment of the modern diplomatic service. One example is the diplomatic corps social function. Social functions by their nature place a premium on storytelling. To be able to tell a story and capture an audience gives a diplomat the opportunity to build and strengthen relationships. The impact of such opportunities, particularly in the context of East Asia, have been captured by researchers on negotiation.³²⁴ This is a point which is also repeated in the works of the scholar-diplomat. Sir Ernest Mason Satow, before even beginning his classic contribution, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, noted to his commissioning editor that to write a manual on diplomacy, he would "like to treat it historically, bringing in Wicquefort and

³²⁴ Hal Movius et al., "Tailoring the Mutual Gains Approach for Negotiations with Partners in Japan, China, and Korea," *Negotiation Journal*, 22, No. 4 (October 2006): 389–435.

Finnet".³²⁵ Historical choices, comparisons, symbols and precedents of a body of diplomats tacitly inform their beliefs, attitudes and practices in everyday work.

Perhaps the most important aspect of narrative in the context of diplomacy is experience. Narrative conveys understanding of a lived experience. It conveys a level of understanding, which supersedes the same information if it were provided as a series of facts or list of events. Thucydides account of the Peloponnesian War provides insight not only into the events of the period, but also the much larger questions of why states go to war, the extent to which states will risk war and the consuming nature of war.³²⁶ Implicit in these stories are the experiences of Thucydides himself, as an Athenian General and an Athenian exile in Peloponnesus.

Narrative, in a socio-cultural context allows for the promotion of values and beliefs, which contribute to the construction of identity, the concept of community and ultimately, individual social action. These are built upon shared experiences. As noted by Jerome Bruner and cited by David Herman in the *Cambridge Companion to Narrative*:

...we organize our experience and memory of human happenings mainly in the form of narrative – stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing, and so on.³²⁷

There is a formal and an informal side to narrative. Narrative is used in nation building, providing "an account of where they [nations] have been and where they [nations]

³²⁵ As cited in Otte, "'A Manual of Diplomacy': The Genesis of Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice," 231.

³²⁶ John Kirby, "Narrative Structure and Technique in Thucydides VI-VII," *Classical Antiquity*, 2, No. 2 (October 1983): 184–184.

³²⁷ Herman, *The Cambridge Companion to Narrative*, 8.

should be going".³²⁸ National narratives, like those of individuals, are not representations of fact. Rather they are constructions, which present a reasonable link to the past with the intention of providing meaning to the present. In an organization dedicated to the representation of the nation—the foreign ministry—narrative could be considered as constitutive of the organization and representative of the national identity. Modern foreign ministries perpetuate narrative through a number of different means. This includes organized periods of induction, such as cadetships or traineeships; corporate functions; corporate training retreats; and internal publications. More modern examples include internal blogs, wikis and social networking services. Yet, narrative also plays an important role in the formation of collective identities within social groups.³²⁹ It is used to mark membership, capability, allegiance and any other aspect of identity, from courage to intelligence. Equally, it is used to hide or promote exclusion, incapability, opposition and any other aspects of identity, from fear to stupidity. As noted by Monika Fludernik, "Narratives construct selfhood as individuality and functional role".³³⁰ Through relating lived experiences of a phenomenon, narrative can provide for who we are, where we belong, and where we are going.

The diplomatic corps serves as a good example. Members are familiarized into the capital through interaction and socialized into a specific role (junior/senior, partner/opponent, host/guest, etc.). Members soon see themselves as belonging to a distinct social group, distinguished from others in the city around them. In certain capitals, it serves as an institution, representing the diplomatic community - engaging it

³²⁸ Michael Barnett, "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change," *European Journal of International Relations*, 5, No. 1 (March 1, 1999): 8.

³²⁹ See Andrew Brown, "A Narrative Approach to Collective Identities," *Journal of Management Studies*, 43, No. 4 (June 2006): 731–53.

³³⁰ Monika Fludernik, "Identity/Alterity," in *The Cambridge Companion to Narrative* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 260.

in social/charitable events for the benefits of the host public; bestowing benediction on the host government on state occasions; and safeguarding terms and conditions for its members.³³¹ It is a social group, in which members share information and pool resources, confide failure and celebrate successes. Membership of this social group is based on shared experiences.

Each step of the way, from familiarization to celebrating successes, narrative serves as the means by which the identity of the social group is confirmed and strengthened. A new diplomat at post will tell stories about their experiences, and be told experiences about the new post. This occurs in a semi-institutionalized nature as the new diplomat is introduced at formal meetings, staff drinks, dinner with the head of mission, and embassy social functions. Narrative is perpetuated through constant interaction and in certain circumstances, institutionalized meetings and/or functions, and/or publications and newsletters. Remarks by James Hoare, a former British diplomat stationed in Seoul during the early 1980s, demonstrates the role of narrative in sharing lived experiences:

The consular body met once a month over lunch at the American Embassy Club – this was very much a working group, which swapped experiences of attempted visa fraud and such like matters... American, Australian, British, Canadian and New Zealand political officers met monthly for lunch... the discussions were surprisingly frank and wide-ranging.³³²

From another perspective, this time an American one, we know the same tradition continues. Paul Gilmer notes in his record for Inside a United States Embassy:

³³¹ Sharp and Wiseman, *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society*, 265–266.

³³² James Hoare, "Diplomacy in the East: Seoul, Beijing and Pyongyang, 1981–2002," in *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 107–108.

12pm. I attend the monthly lunch for administrative and consular diplomats in Seoul. Although it is a no-host lunch, our office has made all the arrangements with the Seoul Club. About 25 attend, representing 20 different countries. I sit between colleagues from New Zealand and Switzerland.³³³

Narrative plays a particularly important role in formal social groups.³³⁴ It is in informal settings that lived experience of phenomena come to the fore. The informal nature of narrative within the diplomatic corps contrasts with the more formalized structure in the foreign ministry. At the heart of informal dialogue within the diplomatic corps are shared experience of a phenomenon, be it isolation, alienation, or otherness in a foreign land; frustration and anger with South Korean bureaucracy; or appreciation, understanding or loathing of the South Korean diplomatic style.

Narrative phenomenology thus plays an important role in both the diplomatic corps and the foreign ministry. It allows for the transfer of tacit knowledge, the overcoming of ambiguity and complexity, the construction and maintenance of identity, and the perpetuation of otherness.³³⁵ The corporate world has caught on to this. Corporations which value employee contributions, such as Microsoft, Dell, and Oracle, first noticed the importance of "water cooler" conversations to innovation and corporate identity in the 1990s. This has transformed to since the 2000s to the establishment of "breakout rooms" with puzzles, unidentified objects, and art to encourage employee conversations and social interaction.

³³³ Shawn Dorman and American Foreign Service Association, *Inside a U.S. Embassy: How the Foreign Service Works for America* (Washington, DC: American Foreign Service Association, 2003), 79.

³³⁴ Stuart Hannabuss, "Narrative Knowledge: Eliciting Organizational Organizational Knowledge," *Aslib Proceedings*, 52, No. 10 (2000): 407.

³³⁵ Charlene Collison and Alexander Mackenzie, "The Power of Story in Organisations," *Journal of Workplace Learning*, 11, No. 1 (1999): 39.

Most importantly, in the context of the current study, I found a narrative phenomenological approach to be particularly ideal, given its relationship to tacit knowledge. To recall from Chapter Two, tacit knowledge is by definition knowledge that has not been formulated explicitly and therefore cannot be stored or transferred effectively by impersonal means. In many circumstances, those holding tacit knowledge are unaware or unable to explicitly transfer this knowledge.

However, as noted in Chapter Two, tacit knowledge is routinely transferred by personal and experiential means. One common means to do this is narrative. A narrative is the representation of past events in visual, aural, written and oral form. As Charlotte Linde notes, narratives form a bridge between tacit and explicit knowledge.³³⁶ Studies in knowledge management have worked upon the narrative as a means to transform tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge.³³⁷ Thus, narrative phenomenology is particularly suited to first accessing and potentially transforming tacit knowledge regarding South Korean diplomatic style into explicit knowledge.

Reflecting the above, narrative phenomenology is particularly suited to the current study, given the appropriateness of the method to research in the field of diplomacy. Remembering, the aim of this study is to assess whether diplomatic style does in fact provide additional insight into the analysis of a state's foreign policy, above and beyond that which is accessible through scholarly research. Narrative phenomenology facilitates access to a crucial component to support the argument, namely, the diplomat's tacit knowledge regarding diplomatic style.

³³⁶ Linde, "Narrative and Social Tacit Knowledge," 163.

³³⁷ Hannabuss, "Narrative Knowledge: Eliciting Organizational Organizational Knowledge," 402.

A narrative phenomenological inquiry

The aim of this section is to provide further insight into narrative phenomenology. From the title alone, 'narrative phenomenology' says volumes. It is the combination of two approaches to qualitative inquiry – narrative and phenomenology. The limited familiarity of students, researchers and the wider public to both approaches necessitates a detailed look at each prior to a discussion on how they work together. Such explanatory introductions are an integral component of studies utilizing qualitative research.³³⁸ They are an important means to understand the rationale and academic basis for their use. Accordingly, I first provide a descriptive introduction to narrative and phenomenology and then describe how these two methods of research work together in the context of applied research.

There are many definitions of narrative, with many theorists recognizing the futility of seeking to define what is often a subjective and highly complex concept.³³⁹ With a focus on practice, this study first explores the structure of narrative. Narrative consists of three key structural elements – time, events, and human interaction.

Narrative necessarily relates a period of time. It involves a beginning and an end along a temporal sequence (although not necessarily in chronological sequence). Implicitly, this means that narrative is more than mere description. Narrative must also include a temporal sequence, which opens the descriptive conveyance to alternatives. Temporal sequences play an important role and can be a marker for 'tellable' stories, which are often conveyed as sequences of events.³⁴⁰

³³⁸ Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 183–189.

³³⁹ Marie-Laure Ryan, "Toward a Definition of Narrative," in *The Cambridge Companion to Narrative* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 30–31.

³⁴⁰ Teresa Bridgeman, "Time and Space," in *The Cambridge Companion to Narrative* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 53.

Thus, details on the participants at a diplomatic conference could be considered description. A series of events, which occur during the diplomatic conference – a specific temporal sequence with a beginning and an end, could be considered to be narrative. Narratives generally include an event trajectory, which is the ‘tellable’ aspect, which turns narrative into stories.³⁴¹ It often traces an initial state of equilibrium through to disequilibrium and a return to equilibrium along the temporal sequence. This is the feature most recognized in the most common forms of narrative, literature, drama or cinema. These events can equally be related to place, which bind together specific experiences.

Continuing the above example, the actions of participants over a period of time at a conference would often not be ‘tellable’ unless there were some sort of disruption or breach of the equilibrium. Thus, the diplomatic conference commences in equilibrium. During one speech, a conference participant angrily thumps their shoe on the table. The diplomatic conference erupts in bewilderment and surprise at such an “undiplomatic” response. Equilibrium is restored as the conference continues. Thus, through the disruption of equilibrium, the narrative becomes ‘tellable’.

Finally, narrative generally also involves human experience (although this can be imposed upon other animate or even inanimate actors). Narrative generally relates a human reaction to the sequence of events and the disruption of equilibrium. This is arguably the most valuable aspect of narrative, inherently holding the rationale and meaning in the retelling of a story. Thus, when the above example is retold and the human reaction (and implicitly the story teller’s reaction) is included, the narrative reaches fullness. As noted by Velleman, narrative does not just recount a series of

³⁴¹ Herman, *The Cambridge Companion to Narrative*, 10.

events, but rather makes them intelligible. Thus, narrative conveys “not just information but also understanding”.³⁴²

By now the reader would be aware that the above example relates to the actions of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at the 902nd Plenary Meeting of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, held 12 October 1960. Retelling of the incident has taken many narrative forms, each with their own rationale and implicit meaning.

Roy Underhill retells the story as an example of how to captivate an audience and indeed, has written a book explaining just that: *Khrushchev's Shoe: And Other Ways to Captivate an Audience of 1 to 1,000*.³⁴³ Underhill notes that Khrushchev “irritated by the indifference of his audience, astounded his peers by taking off his shoe and pounding it vigorously on the podium. His indelible gesture not only captured the attention of the audience, but it also transformed their lack of interest into outrage”.³⁴⁴

The BBC's radio program *Letter from America*, recounts the story of the “rubbery little tough guy, Nikita Khrushchev”, who, while “listening to a Western statesman up there on the high podium”, suddenly “rudely interrupted... banging one shoe on the desk in front of him and shouting: ‘We will bury you’”.³⁴⁵ This is despite the fact that the speaker was Philippine delegate Lorenzo Sumulong; there are conflicting witness accounts as to whether Khrushchev actually even banged his shoe on the desk; and the

³⁴² David Velleman, “Narrative Explanation,” *The Philosophical Review*, 112, No. 1 (January 2003): 1.

³⁴³ Roy Underhill, *Khrushchev's Shoe and Other Ways to Captivate an Audience of 1 to 1,000* (Oxford: Perseus, 2002).

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 10.

³⁴⁵ BBC, “Cycle of Boom and Bust,” *BBC News: Letter from America*, April 24, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/letter_from_america/724419.stm.

quoted words were actually delivered four years previous in a different context at a Polish embassy function in Moscow.³⁴⁶

The often-retold story of Khrushchev's shoe clearly demonstrates the structure of narrative. It includes a temporal sequence, an event trajectory and human interaction. The two examples of how this story is retold also demonstrate an aspect of narrative. There are not only two accounts of Khrushchev's shoe, but dozens. There are accounts from witnesses, from autobiographers, from relatives and more. Narrative is not just facts of the event, but how and why a story is told. What does the narrator achieve in telling the story in that particular way, who is the story told to, what elements of the story are missing or emphasized? Narrative is focused on human agency – human thought and imagination. This holds an unfathomable array of complexities to be discovered. Yet, at its heart it is still just knowledge constructed through a simple and common, everyday occurrence – the telling of a story.

Phenomenology is in many ways closely related to narrative. The difference between the two is often put in simple terms. A narrative inquiry focuses on the individual, a phenomenological inquiry focuses on several individuals. Yet, it is not the number of individuals that distinguishes the approach. A phenomenological inquiry focuses on how individuals *experience* a concept or phenomenon. The aim of a phenomenological inquiry is to “reduce individual experiences with a phenomenon to a description of a universal essence” – to attain a “grasp of the very nature of the thing”.³⁴⁷ The methodology of a phenomenological inquiry is to identify an object of human experience, collect data from individuals who have experienced it, collate and analyse the shared experiences of these individuals, and ultimately develop practices or policies

³⁴⁶ Anonymous, “Foreign News: We Will Bury You!” *Time Magazine*, November 26, 1956, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,867329,00.html>.

³⁴⁷ Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 58.

that reflect a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. Underlying this simple methodology is a rich philosophical tradition, which provides insight into the methodology.

Phenomenology derives from the work of German (Czech born and Austrian educated) philosopher, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). Phenomenology, often defined as the science of the essence of consciousness, concerns an individual's conscious experience. It emphasizes the intentionality of conscious experience and its place as a representation of the lived world.

The origins of phenomenology lies in Husserl's negotiation of the central problems in philosophy – the opposing doctrines of realism and idealism. Realism posits that the world exists regardless of whether we see or think about it. In the classic undergraduate explanation, when a tree falls in the forest, the realist knows that it makes a sound. By evidence and observation, the falling tree is known to obey established scientific conditions, including the vibration of air and the production of sound. Independent of the individual seeing and thinking about the tree, it is known to make a sound. In contrast, idealism posits that the world exists only because we see and think about it. Thus, returning to the classic undergraduate explanation, when a tree falls in the forest, it does not make a sound if no one is there to see, hear, feel and think about it falling. The existence of tree itself is after all, just a bundle of ideas in the human mind.³⁴⁸ It was with this central philosophical problem, which Husserl wrestled for much of his life.³⁴⁹ For Husserl, the answer lay in phenomenology.

Phenomenology is based on the structure of the individual's conscious experience. It thus distinguishes between an *act* of consciousness, the *content* of an act of

³⁴⁸ David Woodruff Smith, *Husserl* (London: Routledge, 2006), 55.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

consciousness, and the *object* of an act of consciousness. An act of consciousness is intentional, or directed towards something. The object of this act is what physically exists, such as an object - noting its existence may be irrelevant, reflecting the fact that in phenomenological reflection, it is experience rather than existence of the object that is relevant. The content, designated "noema" in Husserl's later work, is the concept or idea of the object. Thus, again returning to the classic undergraduate explanation, to view a tree falling in the forest on phenomenological reflection is an intentional act of consciousness. The object of consciousness in this context is a tree falling. It falls according to physical laws of gravity and motion, and is temporal, perhaps lasting only last a few seconds. However, the *content* may be very different. The content of this act may emphasize a fear of the falling tree, the sound of cracking pine, or the sense of awe as the falling tree pushes a gust of wind. Nor is it temporal. It may be entertained at different times, long after the event of the intentional act and its object. Thus, on phenomenological reflection it is the experience and content rather than the object of an intentional act of consciousness, which is most important.

Distinguishing between an *act* of consciousness, the *content* of an act of consciousness, and the *object* of an act of consciousness has significant implications in terms of methodology. It necessitates an important process – reduction. Reduction requires that the researcher bracket, or suspend judgment, with regard to an object of a conscious act. Effectively, the researcher "must suspend, or 'bracket', the 'natural attitude' to the world".³⁵⁰ This is not an easy task. A researcher must suspend or bracket scientific theory and knowledge; veracity of claims made by research participants; and personal

³⁵⁰ "Husserl, Edmund" in Ted Honderich, *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 410.

views and experiences of the researcher.³⁵¹ Thus, once again returning to the classic undergraduate explanation of a tree falling in the forest, a phenomenologist must suspend or bracket their prior conceptions of the nature of a tree falling in a forest, including knowledge of theories of gravity and motion; suspend claims of veracity by research participants; and suspend their own personal views and experiences of a tree falling in the forest.

Narrative and phenomenology are often used simultaneously. Researchers utilize narrative methods within the framework of a phenomenological inquiry. This occurs across a number of disciplines, with it being particularly common in qualitative research in the health sciences.³⁵² A common aim of research in the field is an in-depth understanding of people's lives in specific circumstances, including their emotional experiences, such as pain, loss or anger; and their experiences of specific phenomena, such as hospitalization, alienation or palliative care. In Husserl's view, the task of phenomenology is "to abstract the structure and content of an experience from the flow of consciousness, so that we may reflect on various forms of consciousness and their significance".³⁵³ Narrative phenomenology conveys lived experiences.

It is important to note that this research is essentially applied research – an attempt to solve a very real problem put to me by a senior intelligence official. The findings would thus be immediately applicable to practice. A narrative phenomenological inquiry is

³⁵¹ Linda Findlay, "Debating Phenomenological Research Methods," *Phenomenology & Practice*, 3, No. 1 (2009): 12.

³⁵² See Marianne Mahler and Anneli Sarvimäki, "Fear of Falling from a Daily Life Perspective; Narratives from Later Life," *Scandinavian Journal of Caring Sciences*, 26, No. 1 (March 2012): 38–44; Wendy K. Watson, Nancy J. Bell, and Charlie Stelle, "Women Narrate Later Life Remarriage: Negotiating the Cultural to Create the Personal," *Journal of Aging Studies*, 24, No. 4 (December 2010): 302–12; Joanne Rains Warner, "A Phenomenological Approach to Political Competence: Stories of Nurse Activists," *Policy, Politics, & Nursing Practice*, 4, No. 2 (May 1, 2003): 135–43; Sam Larsson and Yvonne Sjöblom, "Perspectives on Narrative Methods in Social Work Research," *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 19, No. 3 (July 2, 2009): 272–80.

³⁵³ Smith, *Husserl*, 239.

ideally suited to such a task and could be thought of as an ideal means to integrate academic rigor and professional relevance.³⁵⁴ Narrative phenomenological inquiry can be thought of as collaboration between the researcher and participants. It involves “collaboration between researcher and participants, over time, in a place or series of places, and in social interaction with milieus”.³⁵⁵ An ideal narrative phenomenological inquiry is embedded in social practice and ultimately serves to advance an understanding of this practice.

Participants in my research, particularly those from the Seoul diplomatic corps, were very keen to see the results. I was informed that they continually faced similar problems, including the gap between what they read, and what it was like on the ground. In particular, during the earliest stages of their postings, they felt overwhelmed and confused. In ensuing conversations, some have suggested practical solutions to this recurring problem, including the establishment of either a not-for-profit academic-analyst online workspace where ideas and insight can be shared confidentially and anonymously in a monitored and reliable forum or a for-profit consultancy that provides helpdesk type academic and professional analysis for time starved diplomats arriving ‘fresh’ in the country.

The diplomatic corps in any city is well known for its unique blend of professional camaraderie and professional distance. Diplomats are a tribe of their own. They are helpful, respectful and collegial, while at the same time competitive, untrusting and sceptical. But ultimately, many of them shared a lasting characteristic, which became ever more salient in retirement – a lasting intellectual and personal interest in the

³⁵⁴ Jennifer Dodge, Sonia Ospina, and Erica Foldy, “Integrating Rigor and Relevance in Public Administration Scholarship: The Contribution of Narrative Inquiry,” *Public Administration Review*, 65, No. 3 (May 2005): 287–288.

³⁵⁵ D. Jean Clandinin and F. Michael Connelly, *Narrative Inquiry: Experience and Story in Qualitative Research* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 2000), 20.

country in which they spent their most memorable posting. This is evidenced by the transformation of ex-ambassadors and diplomats into niche specializations focused on their previous roles, such as former British ambassador to Seoul and later Pyongyang, James Hoare, in the field of Korean studies; former United States ambassador to Seoul and representative to the Six-Party Talks, Christopher Hill in the field of North Korea studies ; and former Australian ambassador to Seoul, Mack Williams, in the field of Korean trade and investment. Needless to say, the sense of collaboration I held with the research subjects in my study was very strong and continues as of this writing.

Accessing the South Korean diplomatic style

In this section I present the procedures to be undertaken in the study. To reiterate, the aim of the research is to assess whether diplomatic style does in fact provide additional insight into the analysis of a state's foreign policy, above and beyond that which is accessible through scholarly research. Thus, this section seeks the answer to the question: what additional insight into diplomatic style do practitioners have? As described below, this included eliciting narratives from retired and serving members of the Seoul diplomatic corps and retired and serving members of the South Korean foreign ministry and related agencies; workplace observations of retired and serving members of the Seoul diplomatic corps and retired and serving members of the South Korean foreign ministry and related agencies in the field and in related social activities; collection and analysis of documents, including official public documents and diplomatic memoirs; and the analysis of possessions and ritual objects displayed in places of significance to South Korean diplomatic practice. I first explain the procedures for interviews, observations, and other data, then turn to the standards of validation and evaluation used in qualitative research. Next, I touch upon the ethics consideration for the research, before turning to the procedures for analysing the results. The section

concludes with an introduction to the research results contained in the following in Chapters Six and Seven.

Interviews

Interviews were undertaken with two populations – retired and serving members of the Seoul diplomatic corps and retired and serving members of the South Korean foreign ministry and related agencies. Participants were selected to reflect their position as practitioners, with a preference for those with a greater degree of experience. Accordingly, the strategies employed focused on opportunity, strategically (organizationally) important and snowball or chain recruitment.

Participants selected from the first population included a purposive sample of 26 individuals. Each served in or had retired from public service positions involving substantial exposure to, participation in, or support of South Korean diplomatic activity. This included participants from a number central government departments, predominantly MOFA. Of these 26 individuals, a considerably greater amount of time was spent with four individuals, including observation of work in the field and observation of participation in related social activities. While recognizing that it is not the aim of narrative inquiry to document reality but rather individual's experience, within the bounds of practicality, the background of participants were selected to represent the population, with considerations for sex, age, seniority, years in the position, functional role, method of entry into current position, and educational background.

Participants from the second population included purposive sample of 19 individuals. Each served in or had served in the Seoul diplomatic corps. This included participants from both foreign ministries and other line departments with representation at the post. Those in line departments with representation at post were individuals that had been on

at least one three-year posting. Accordingly, each of the 19 individuals were practitioners and accordingly, if the research proposition can be confirmed, should hold tacit knowledge regarding diplomatic style. Of these 19 individuals, a considerably greater amount of time was spent with four individuals, including observation of work in the field and observation of participation in related social activities. Without access to an adequate profile, it could not be determined how representative of the population these individuals were, yet nor did it matter. The most important criteria was each individual's phenomenological experience of the South Korean diplomatic style. This meant that both a longer amount of time at post, and/or more regular interaction with Korean diplomats as a result of a vigorous bilateral relationship, was more important. However, in recognizing this, early interviews indicated that it was important to account for potential differences in experience between male/female and young/old participants; as well as Western/Non-Western and developed/non-developed states.

Dodge, Ospina and Foldy posit three different approaches to narrative inquiry: narrative as language, narrative as metaphor and narrative as knowledge.³⁵⁶ Each these different approaches represent a distinct line of inquiry. "Narrative as language" refers to the use of narrative to convey meaning. It conveys meaning about a subject's experience of the world (or the experience they wish to recount) and can thus be used by a researcher to elicit stories that "serve as windows to the informants' world".³⁵⁷ Thus, in the context of the current study, the aim is to attain a degree of insight into meaning-making process regarding South Korean diplomatic style of the two communities.

"Narrative as metaphor" similarly attends to the actors' interpretation of events, but considers narrative to be a symbol of deeper structures of meaning. It assumes that

³⁵⁶ See Dodge, Ospina, and Foldy, "Integrating Rigor and Relevance in Public Administration Scholarship: The Contribution of Narrative Inquiry."

³⁵⁷ Ibid, 291.

narratives are constitutive and “people shape stories and, in turn, stories shape people”.³⁵⁸ Through analysis of narrative, a researcher is able to expose socially embedded “institutions of meaning”, which regulate social action and interaction. Thus, in the context of the current study, the aim is to identify socially embedded “institutions of meaning” regarding South Korean diplomatic style within the two communities.

“Narrative as knowledge” highlights individual and social group interpretations of experience, emphasizing “the immediate, practical use of experience”.³⁵⁹ Thus, it assumes that narrative is a way of attaining, holding and generating knowledge. Storytelling provides a means to obtain insight into practical problems, as well as sustain and distribute the knowledge of solutions to practical problems. It is naturally impractical to solve certain problems with logical proof, analysis, argumentation and hypothesis driven discovery. Instead “good stories”, convincing, persuasive, credible, and believable narratives are used to convince an audience of a solution.

Data collection in narrative phenomenological inquiry essentially concerns the collection of stories on lived experience. This sounds easier than it is in practice. Stories are used for a range of purposes. They are used to lay claim to identity; to dominate and demonstrate power; to defend beliefs and traditions; or to encourage support and empathy – the list is endless. The key for the researcher in narrative phenomenological inquiry data collection is to be an effective listener – meaning that the research subject is treated as a ‘storyteller’ rather than a ‘respondent’.³⁶⁰ I subsequently found a distinct difference between asking survey questions and encouraging participants to tell stories. With every survey question, participants would appear to think twice. Responses

³⁵⁸ Ibid, 293.

³⁵⁹ Ibid, 292.

³⁶⁰ Maggi Savin-Baden and Lana Van Niekerk, “Narrative Inquiry: Theory and Practice,” *Journal of Geography in Higher Education*, 31, No. 3 (September 2007): 464.

seemed guarded and prepared. When telling stories, human nature kicked in and the participants sought above all to “tell a good story”.

The questions consisted of three broad open-ended invitations to tell stories relating to their experience of the South Korean diplomacy and the South Korean diplomatic style, specifically “Tell me about your experience of South Korean diplomacy” and “What do you think is characteristic of South Korea’s diplomatic style?”. Lead-in questions included a range to increase familiarity and determine the participant’s awareness of the issue, including questions such as “What is diplomatic style to you?”; “Have your experiences been positive in your current position?”; and “Have you had any experiences in your career that you think should one day be in memoirs and shared with the public?”. In the course of interviews, the two central broad questions broke down into multiple questions to engage and encourage story-telling. Examples included “Is the South Korean diplomatic style distinctive?”; “What is different between South Korea’s diplomatic style and ‘x’ country’s diplomatic style?”; and “Based on your experiences here, what advice would you give to a diplomat arriving in Seoul for the first time?”. As could be expected, there was a wide variety of responses. Some respondents proved to be natural storytellers and thrived on the opportunity to convince me as a listener and did not require to be invited to tell stories through further questions. As appropriate within the context of the interview, I sought to focus on the phenomenon of South Korean diplomatic style itself and the participant’s experience. From the first interview, the respondents were asked to tell me about five diplomatic tasks which involved interaction with South Korean diplomats/the Seoul diplomatic corps in the last week. This continued each meeting until a body of narratives was built up from which further investigation could be undertaken. The number of meetings varied dependent on the respondent, with the shortest being a single meeting and the longest being monthly meetings over a period of three years.

Data from interviews was collected through the use of meeting notes and immediate post-meeting entries in a research journal as opposed to audio and video recording. From a very early stage, it became apparent that participants held concerns regarding security, peer pressure, and impact on their career. Whilst personal introductions reduced this to a degree, from an early stage I found participants considerably more open and willing to discuss issues when a recording device was not used. Recording was both impractical and impossible.

Analysis and representation of interview data was undertaken in four steps. First narratives were compiled into either distinct 'retellable narratives' or 'significant statements' with direct relevance to participants' experiences of the phenomenon. Using methodology based on suggestions put forward by Clandinin and Connelly, retellable narratives were analysed for interaction (personal, social and professional), continuity (past, present and future), and situational context (physical places and storyteller's places) and analysed for deeper structures of meaning.³⁶¹ Using methodology based on suggestions by Creswell, 'significant statements' were collated (horizontalization); divided into themes (meaning units); transformed into textural descriptions (essentially 'what happened') and structural descriptions (essentially 'how it happened').³⁶² In the final step the narratives and descriptions were incorporated into the final synthesis of meanings and essences of experience.

Observations

Observations were undertaken amidst two populations – retired and serving members of the Seoul diplomatic corps and retired and serving members of the South Korean foreign ministry and related agencies in four types of settings, diplomatic functions,

³⁶¹ Clandinin and Connelly, *Narrative Inquiry*.

³⁶² Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 60–61.

diplomatic conferences, social functions and work locations. In the context of diplomacy, each location, including those labelled as 'social functions', can be considered as directly related to the professional practice of diplomacy. In addition to standard work locations at ministries and agencies, observation was also undertaken at a university location where a retired diplomat taught courses on South Korea's diplomacy. Where possible, observation was undertaken as both a participant and observer. Participation allowed me to substantially reduce the marginality of being an external observer in a strange setting, while it must be recognized that in no circumstances could it be considered that this marginality was completely removed. Early sessions involved simple observation with notes written immediately after. Dependent on location, this transformed to concurrent note-taking (work locations) or continued as observation with notes written immediately after (diplomatic functions, diplomatic conferences and social functions). Observation can present challenges to a researcher, with deception and/or misperceived meaning accorded to action/interaction, particularly in a cross-cultural context.³⁶³ To avoid this, where possible, observation involved a subsequent follow up with the informant to provide greater details and/or to confirm previously identified events.

Other data collected

Other data consisted of three sources – official public documents, diplomatic memoirs, and possessions and ritual objects displayed in places of significance to South Korean diplomatic practice. The research focused on triangulating findings of interviews and observations. The aim was to confirm the 'retellable narratives' and 'significant statements' of participants' experiences of the phenomenon of South Korean diplomatic

³⁶³ Juliet Corbin and Anselm L. Strauss, *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2008), 30.

style. The focus was thus on confirming the background and setting to 'retellable narratives'; confirming, when possible, textural and structural descriptions; and particularly important, confirming the synthesis of meanings and essences of experience.

Data collection and analysis was varied. Official public documents and diplomatic memoirs were relatively straight forward. Official public documents included diplomatic white papers, and ministerial and vice-ministerial speeches during the period 2006-2012. In addition, speeches by previous South Korean ministers of foreign affairs and ambassadors on the subjects of the diplomatic profession, diplomatic life and the South Korean diplomatic service were included. Diplomatic memoirs included those by foreign diplomats who had served in Seoul and South Korean diplomats – including at the ambassadorial and ministerial level.

Data relating to possessions and ritual objects in places of significance to South Korean diplomatic practice were studied during visits to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Central Government Complex building and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA) Diplomatic Museum. These were studied with notes and images taken on location of displays, use of images and multimedia, textual descriptions accompanying displays, and the displays themselves.

Standards of validation and evaluation

Narrative phenomenological inquiry does not seek to document reality but rather seeks to document the individual's or social group's experience of reality. Thus, traditional methodological concerns of validity, reliability and objectivity cannot apply. Research quality can instead be applied through tests for credibility, dependability and confirmability.

Credibility serves as a means to assure the plausibility of research, in much the same way as validity is used in quantitative research to assess whether a measure accurately

reflects what it is meant to measure. Credibility can be assured in narrative inquiry through multiple strategies. The current study focuses on two methods – triangulation and confirmation.

As with mainstream research methodologies, triangulation of research adds to quality. There are several types of research triangulation, including data triangulation (the uses of multiple sources of sample data), investigator triangulation (the use of more than one researcher to gather and interpret data), theoretical triangulation (the use of more than one type of theory to investigate the research question) and methodological triangulation (the use of different methods to gather data).³⁶⁴

The current study utilized data triangulation to confirm narratives. It does not depend solely upon narratives conveyed by individuals and groups in interviews. It also utilized official narratives – official foreign ministry sanctioned reports and publications; the structure, objects and displays in the official foreign ministry history museum; and the objects and displays contained within the central foreign ministry building.

Confirmation also assures credibility. Confirmation consists of continued interaction with the study participants to ensure their stories are accurately portrayed through the research production phase. This also plays an important role in ensuring the relevance of research and plays an important role in applied studies. Important in this process is the concept of “believability”. Stories related by participants in one community told to participants in another community should in most circumstances be “believable”.³⁶⁵ Thus in the current study, stories told by South Korean diplomats could be confirmed with members of the Seoul diplomatic corps. If they assess the stories as believable, it could be assumed that the stories told to the researcher are credible.

³⁶⁴ Norman K. Denzin, *The research act in sociology: a theoretical introduction to sociological methods* (London: Butterworths, 1970), 368.

³⁶⁵ Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 46.

Dodge et al. note that dependability and confirmability “represent the interpretivist counterpoint to reliability”.³⁶⁶ In quantitative research, reliability refers to the degree of consistency in results obtained by a certain measure. A measure must be able to be used in other studies under the same conditions and yield the same results. Strauss and Corbin argue that reliability equally applies to qualitative research and that qualitative researchers should arrive at the same results under the same conditions.³⁶⁷ This study does not support this claim. Rather, the study assumes that stories will change because of their heavy dependence on context and their sensitivity to “place, time and even participation”.³⁶⁸

Whilst it is often implied that quantitative and qualitative research are exclusive approaches, they are in fact supplements. The initial attempt using quantitative research served as a basis and guide for the subsequent turn to qualitative research. The limited findings confirmed and justified an in-depth study, thus acting as a form of methodological triangulation. Methodological triangulation provides a wider perspective in order to better understand and explain a given research question. Importantly, it also enhances confidence by demonstrating that the research undertaken can be confirmed across different methodological approaches.

Ethics

Perhaps most important in the context of standards in the current study was the question of ethics. The research fully complied with the standards and procedural requirements of the Australian National University (ANU) Human Research Ethics Committee. Yet,

³⁶⁶ Dodge, Ospina, and Foldy, “Integrating Rigor and Relevance in Public Administration Scholarship: The Contribution of Narrative Inquiry,” 295.

³⁶⁷ Corbin and Strauss, *Basics of Qualitative Research*, 299.

³⁶⁸ Dodge, Ospina, and Foldy, “Integrating Rigor and Relevance in Public Administration Scholarship: The Contribution of Narrative Inquiry,” 295.

the subject of the inquiry deserved particular attention, given the nuanced interrelation of vulnerability and power in the social context of professional diplomacy and the diplomatic corps in a national capital.

Clandinin and Connelly note that researchers undertaking a narrative inquiry hold a relational responsibility that extends beyond the participant's retelling of a story. As part of the participant's life, the inquiry will affect them not only at the point of time in which they recount their story to the researcher, but at every point of time in which that story is reread throughout their lives. Thus, while the researcher may leave behind a particular story and move on to the next story, that story remains a part of the teller's life.

An example often retold from classical diplomacy serves to illustrate this fact. In 1604, renowned diplomat Sir Henry Wotton whilst on a mission rest in Augsburg, Germany, was requested by his host to leave a note in the visitor's book. Wotton's note at the moment and in context was a jovial and pleasant remark upon the role of an ambassador: "*Legatus est vir bonus peregrè missus ad mentiendum Reipublicae causā*", which translates into English, as "An ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country". Eight years later an opponent of Sir Henry used these same words to attack both Sir Henry and King James. Sir Henry, by then an ambassador in Venice was forced to write an apology to the authorities in Augsburg and King James. Sir Henry fell out of favour of the King and his diplomatic career was irreconcilably affected.

The written word, when it loses its context, can be reinterpreted and misinterpreted either mistakenly or maliciously to the detriment of the author. In the same way, a story told during the course of this investigation, whilst seemingly innocuous at the time of

writing, could prove detrimental at a later stage. Accordingly, the utmost care was taken to protect the identity of participants.

I was lucky to be briefed on these issues by members of DFAT prior to departing for field research. This enabled me to gain an understanding of the sensitivities of key issues and the likelihood of securing interviews. Two letters were presented to participants to allay their concerns. The first introduced the research and explained the ethics procedures as per university research regulations. The second, written by a senior DFAT official further introduced the research and presented the aims within the context of diplomatic practice. Both letters served to allay the concerns of participants. The utmost care was taken to avoid identifying individuals, agencies, states, periods of time and in certain circumstances even subjects, which were discussed. To ensure this was acceptable, the narratives and the final study, were shared with respondents prior to finalization.

Synthesis of meanings (motivation) and essences of experience (characteristics)

Narrative uses narrative metaphor, narrative meaning and narrative knowledge to understand the meaning of experience. Phenomenology uses textural descriptions and structural descriptions to arrive at an overall essence of common experiences. Narrative phenomenology combines these two approaches to arrive at a synthesis of meanings and essences of experience.

The synthesis of meanings and essences of experience above all aims to present both an accurate representation and a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. As noted by Creswell, to achieve this it is necessary that the writing is “clear, engaging, and full of unexpected ideas” and that the findings “become believable and realistic, accurately

reflecting all the complexities that exist in real life".³⁶⁹ The aim is to achieve verisimilitude - presenting findings in a way that the reader experiences being there.³⁷⁰

Another way to look at the synthesis of meanings and essences of experience is to think of them as motivation and characteristics, respectively. The academic community is notorious for coming up with jargon, just as the practitioner is notorious for coming up with acronyms. They each speak their own language amongst themselves. Accordingly, while 'synthesis of meanings' and 'essences of experience' serve as a means to more accurately express the procedure being used, it pays to also consider simpler, although less accurate terms, such as motivation and characteristics.

To the narratives

The narratives below commence with an introduction to the setting and characters. These are then put into context through a general description of the time period and its significance. The narratives then tie these elements together within a structured plot sequence. The narratives are necessarily restructured texts. They combine a central character's retelling of an epiphanic or representative experience of the phenomenon of South Korean diplomatic style, with their additional comments and observations made during subsequent (or prior) meetings.

Each narrative is accompanied by additional commentary, which both puts the narrative into context and triangulates the findings with other data collected (see above). A series of significant statements are then extracted from the narratives. The significant statements are listed in tables below each narrative. The significant statements were collected, collated, analysed, and categorized into formulated meanings, and action clusters, as below. Inevitably, these significant statements were collated and re-

³⁶⁹ Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 46.

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

categorized as research progressed, with certain statements taking on further meaning as other diplomats told their stories. For example, the statement "Diplomacy is not always fair, Koreans know this", taken alone seems innocuous enough, perhaps one individual's understanding of historical events. Yet, in the context of subsequent diplomats, even younger diplomats' experiences, and their sense of injustice prevalent in international society, the statement takes on new meaning. The formulated meaning units were reviewed regularly as each narrative was recorded. They were later categorized into a wide array of formulated meanings. Finally, the formulated meanings were categorized into action clusters based on the four ideal types of diplomatic action – tradition oriented, value oriented, objective-oriented, and emotion oriented diplomatic action.

CHAPTER SIX: Diplomatic style: Narratives of South Korean diplomats

This chapter presents the findings of the study. These findings relate to the first purposive sample of 26 serving and retired South Korean diplomats. In this chapter, I first reiterate the aim of the study and specify the findings to be presented. I then present the findings from the entire sample and the more detailed findings of four individuals. I present how the narratives were analysed, including the process to extract elements able to be contrasted and compared with the constructed ideal types of diplomatic style; and the process to extract meanings units and themes. Next, I present two representative examples of narrative, which highlight the two most prominent themes discovered in the analysis of the South Korean diplomatic style. I then put both representative narratives into context through an exploration of the two most prominent themes. Finally, I present a summary of the South Korean diplomatic style as viewed by the sample group of serving and retired South Korean diplomats.

As noted, the aim of the research is to assess whether diplomatic style does in fact provide additional insight into the analysis of a state's foreign policy, above and beyond that which is accessible through scholarly research. Thus, this section seeks the answer to the question: what additional insight into diplomatic style do practitioners have? Through eliciting stories from the above mentioned purposive sample, the aim is to arrive at concrete examples which could be contrasted and compared with the constructed ideal types of diplomatic style – namely purposive-rational diplomatic style; value-rational diplomatic style; tradition-oriented diplomatic style; and emotion-oriented diplomatic style, which in Chapter Eight, will be analysed to determine if this is indeed, additional insight, above and beyond scholarly research.

As noted, the purposive sample consisted of 26 serving and retired South Korean diplomats. The sample included six top-ranking, 6 mid-ranking, and 10 lower-ranking or non-ranked MOFA personnel, and four mid-ranking non-MOFA central government agency officials – each of who had undertaken more than two diplomatic postings. One interview was undertaken with each of these 26 individual subjects in order to determine ideal respondents from which to elicit deeper narrative. Out of the 26 serving and retired South Korean diplomats a considerably greater amount of time was spent with four individuals, including observation of work in the field and observation of participation in related social activities. These four individual subjects included one top ranking, and three mid-ranking MOFA and non-MOFA central government agency personnel. During and after collection, narratives were assessed for relevance to the study. As noted in the previous chapter, this assessment utilized a criteria based on Clandinin and Connelly's suggested methodology.³⁷¹ This was adapted to the definition of diplomatic style presented in Chapter Two, which to recall emphasized the three elements of social action, repetition, and choice within a set of constraints. Thus, I utilized the following criteria to assess the relevance of narratives to the study:

- **Interaction (social action and choice).** Reflecting the definition presented in Chapter Two, a key feature of diplomatic style is social action. Thus, narrative actions should have subjective meaning and be oriented towards the behaviour of others. Additionally, the action should comprise deliberate choice from a set of possible alternatives.
- **Continuity (replication).** Again, reflecting the definition presented in Chapter Two, a key feature of diplomatic style is replication in diplomatic behaviour or

³⁷¹ Clandinin and Connelly, *Narrative Inquiry*.

the artefacts produced by diplomatic behaviour. Thus, narrative actions should demonstrate replication or continuity.

- **Situational context (constraints).** Finally, reflecting the definition presented in Chapter Two, a key feature of diplomatic style is that choices and replication should occur within the set of constraints of diplomacy – international law, diplomatic norms and principles, norms of professional conduct, and accepted operating procedures. Thus, narrative actions should occur within these constraints.

After a total of 42 meetings, 35 individual narratives were collated, which matched the criteria detailed above. From these 35 individual narratives, significant statements were collated and assessed. This first involved summarizing narratives into textural descriptions – essentially constructing simple statements on ‘what happened’; structural descriptions – essentially constructing simple statements on ‘how it happened’; and then categorizing them into themes and meanings units. These are explained immediately below.

‘Meaning units’ are scores given to the action clusters of the textural description and refer to the predominant meaning or motivation for the social action. Thus, they can be categorized to match the constructed ideal types of diplomatic style, namely purposive-rational diplomatic style; value-rational diplomatic style; tradition-oriented diplomatic style; and emotion-oriented diplomatic style. Recognizing that there can be multiple motivations for social action, each meaning unit was given a score of primary, secondary, tertiary or quaternary. Thus, Table 1 shows that from the 35 individual narratives collated from four subjects (A1, B1, C1, and D1) of the sample group of serving and retired South Korean diplomats, the primary ideal type of diplomatic style

was emotion-oriented diplomatic style, followed by purposive-rational oriented diplomatic style, tradition-oriented diplomatic style, and value-rational diplomatic style.

Table 1: Narrative meaning units – South Korean diplomats

Subject	Textural	Purpose	Value	Tradition	Emotion
A1	Interview with journalist	1	3	4	2
A1	Speech at national day celebrations	2	3	4	1
A1	Task force on trade facilitation workshop	3	2	4	1
A1	Accompanied visiting parliamentary delegation	3	4	1	2
A1	Presentation at diplomatic function	1	3	4	2
A1	Lunch with former senior officers	3	2	4	1
A1	Lunch with cultural diplomacy officer	2	4	3	1
B1	Weekly meeting with foreign embassy official	2	3	4	1
B1	Accompanied visiting government officials	1	4	3	2
B1	Visit to state capitals and officials	1	3	4	2
B1	Accompanied delegation to host-country ministry	1	3	2	4
B1	Attended diplomatic evening function	4	3	1	2
B1	Attended national day	2	3	4	1
B1	Attended host country veterans' centre	3	4	2	1
B1	Meeting at host-country ministry	1	3	4	2
B1	Official function with	2	3	4	1

	diplomatic corps				
B1	Attended award ceremony	3	2	4	1
C1	Presentation of awards for scholarships	1	4	2	3
C1	Lunch with dean of diplomatic corps	4	3	1	2
C1	Ministry visit welcome	2	4	3	1
C1	Consular training workshop	1	3	4	2
C1	Attended national day	4	3	1	2
C1	Award ceremony	3	4	1	2
C1	Newspaper interview	2	3	4	1
C1	Presentation at diplomatic function	2	4	1	3
C1	Arrival of delegation	3	4	1	2
C1	Accompany delegation	3	1	4	2
C1	Delegation presentation	3	4	1	2
D1	UN facilities tour	2	3	4	1
D1	Dinner with visiting academics	1	3	4	2
D1	Embassy function	3	4	2	1
D1	State visit preparation	1	4	3	2
D1	Lunch with former colleagues	3	4	2	1
D1	Presentation at diplomatic function	4	1	2	3
D1	Embassy function	3	4	2	1
Total		80	112	98	60

‘Themes’ are related to the structural descriptions and refer to the underlying main cause of the social action. These were discussed with respondents in meetings and where possible, further explored in academic literature. From the 35 individual narratives collated, two predominant themes were discovered – estrangement and status.

Estrangement relates to a state of alienation or separation of two entities, often referring to the human condition of being alienated or separated from something or somebody,

and is associated with psychological conditions of powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, social isolation, anxiety and insecurity. As demonstrated in the first representative narrative below, estrangement could be detected to affect diplomats at a personal level, but also the state at an international level. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the meaning units and themes, including estrangement are incorporated into a final synthesis of meanings and essence of experience, and explored in detail in Chapter Eight.

Status in the social sciences is defined as the location or position of groups within the social hierarchy of honour and prestige.³⁷² Status is particularly important in the context of diplomacy, international relations, and East Asian culture. As demonstrated in the second representative narrative below, status was shown to affect diplomats at a personal level, and at the international level. As noted above, the meaning units and themes, including status are incorporated into a final synthesis of meanings and essence of experience, and explored in detail in Chapter Eight.

The two representative narratives below highlight the role of meanings units and themes in the South Korean diplomatic style, and explain them in context of South Korean foreign policy.

Representative narrative 1: Estrangement

The subject, named here as Ahn, was a retired officer of the South Korean government. He had served with the government for over 20 years and had undertaken a variety of overseas postings, including at the highest levels, and had held senior posts within the government. He remained highly respected amongst his peers within the diplomatic and academic communities. During his government career, and throughout his academic

³⁷² George Ritzer and J. Michael Ryan, *The Concise Encyclopedia of Sociology* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 613.

career, he had interacted with the Seoul diplomatic corps on a regular basis. This included meetings requested by members of the Seoul diplomatic corps, invitations to lunch by South Korean government officials at which members of the Seoul diplomatic corps were present, and most prominently, at conferences and functions. Ahn strongly believed that diplomatic style was significant. As Ahn noted, "style is the one thing that cannot be hidden".³⁷³ For him, the South Korean style of diplomacy was all about tradition, "South Korean diplomatic style comes from our history. We were invaded so many times. Diplomacy is in our culture".³⁷⁴ He had a strong sense of pride in South Korea, Korean traditions, and Korean history. However, my interviews and observations of Ahn undertaken during two separate periods, highlighted that beneath this pride in Korean tradition, lay an equally influential sense of estrangement, which pervades the South Korean diplomatic style.

Towards the end of class, a foreign student asked why I was teaching Samguk Sagi and Samguk Yusa.³⁷⁵ He'd learnt these in undergraduate studies in Korean history and knew them well... He believed Korea's diplomatic traditions before 1948 didn't matter. He thought Korean diplomacy was a product of US traditions – it was even funded by the US he pointed out... He compared our diplomacy to North Korean diplomacy... just as North Korea inherited Soviet diplomatic traditions, South Korea inherited US diplomatic traditions.

The student made me mad... I am sorry to say, I yelled at him and I'm sorry to say, I even thumped the table. To say that Korea has no diplomatic tradition is

³⁷³ Ahn, Serving and retired South Korean diplomats, Personal Interview, 2010.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ As noted later in the text, the *Samguk Sagi* or *History of the Three Kingdoms*, and the *Samguk Yusa* or *Legends of the Three Kingdoms* are the oldest surviving chronicles of early Korea, the former compiled in the 12th century by a high official of the *Koryo* state, Kim Pusik (1075-1151) and the latter compiled in the 13th century by a Buddhist monk and Court Priest going by the name of Ilyon (1206-1289).

crazy! Our diplomatic tradition is very rich and deep. For someone to say such a thing to a professor shocked me... He had no understanding of Korea...

At every stage during my diplomatic career I have struggled to show that Korea has its own voice... Korea struggled to become independent, it struggled for survival against North Korea, it struggled to become an economic leader! Despite all the obstacles, Korea is now an important force in global diplomacy... I've pointed this out to colleagues at the highest levels. To face such an argument from a student angered me... This is something I have battled throughout my career... We are nobody's puppet!

Ahn, Serving and retired South Korean diplomats, Personal Interview, 2010

It was springtime in Seoul. Students at Korea's leading universities, Seoul National University, Korea University, Yonsei University, and Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS) were preparing for the new semester. The first three universities are the leading educational institutes in Korea. They are the ultimate aim of thousands of school children (and their mothers) in Korea's education obsessed society. Along with the fourth university, they are also the source of the vast majority of personnel in the South Korean diplomatic service. Although rapidly diversifying, and changing substantially with personnel recruitment reforms and the establishment of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA), undergraduate degrees from these four universities, accompanied by a (preferably United States) international postgraduate degree, dominate the broad field of international relations study and practice in South Korea.

I observed a class in which there were approximately 20 students. Several of these were undergraduates, allowed to undertake classes at this level through an advancement scheme for those planning to undertake studies abroad. Several were part-time students,

with a mix of public and private sector employees, as well as two individuals from NGOs focusing on aid and North Korea. There were three foreign students undertaking the course as part of their year abroad for degrees back home. Finally, the largest number of students were mainstream graduate students, hoping to complete their degree before heading overseas to achieve an international degree or to apply for the public service examination, in order to be appointed to a ministry with an international component. Each one could only weakly hide their ultimate desire to obtain a position within the foreign ministry.

The lectures commenced at a period during which Korea's foreign affairs were undergoing substantial change. A new government with a substantially different foreign policy outlook had come to power. After 10 years of progressive rule a conservative president took the helm. The balance between a preference for continuity and the desire for change remained fine. The public had voted in the Lee administration with a convincing 48.7 per cent of the vote. Yet, after only three months in office, during his first major international engagement the public appeared to have turned. All Korean presidents make their first overseas visit to the US. During Lee's visit in April 2008, the decision to allow the resumption of United States beef imports – banned since December 2003, as a result of concerns regarding bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), or 'mad cow disease' – resulted in widespread protests. It was thought at the time, that Lee's capacity to pursue his foreign policy objectives were substantially affected by declining political fortunes at home.³⁷⁶

The lectures commenced with the aim to "understand continuity and change in South Korea's foreign policy and diplomatic practice". There would be sixteen weeks of lectures, starting with a chronological introduction to Korea's diplomatic history prior

³⁷⁶ Oxford Analytica, "South Korea: Politics Will Constrain Foreign Policy," *Daily Brief*, 29 July 2009.

to Western contact; Western contact; the struggle for independence; diplomacy under exile; liberation and the Korean War; the struggle for legitimacy; and the post-Cold War. The course would then move on to relationships with key partners, specific thematic issues, and the challenges of contemporary diplomacy.

After administrative formalities, the lecturer started after a brief glance at his lecture notes. It was a dramatic start, with the professor's slow and steady rasp drawing each student's attention as he peered over his reading glasses: "Korea has a rich diplomatic tradition, which has survived transformation in the diplomatic system, challenges to, and loss of sovereignty, rupture in the national identity, and modernization at a pace unparalleled in history".³⁷⁷ He looked down at his notes again, paused, and then recommenced.

The first lecture focused on diplomacy drawn from the *Samguk Sagi* or *History of the Three Kingdoms*, and the *Samguk Yusa* or *Legends of the Three Kingdoms*. The *Samguk Sagi* are the oldest surviving chronicles of early Korea, compiled in the 12th century by a high official of the *Koryo* state, Kim Pusik (1075-1151). The *Samguk Yusa* was compiled in the 13th century by a Buddhist monk and Court Priest going by the name of Ilyŏn (1206-1289). Together, they comprise the primary historical sources of the Three Kingdoms (*Silla*, *Baekche* and *Koguryo*) Period and are central to contemporary attempts to explore Korean and East Asian tradition.

It was during the same class one year prior, when the incident described in the above narrative took place. Ahn had, in his words "exploded" when a student challenged him regarding the usefulness of teaching Korean diplomatic traditions from the pre-1948 period. It started shortly after the lecture's mid-class break. The student was not particularly arrogant or difficult. In fact, he turned out to be one of the better students in

³⁷⁷ Ahn, Serving and retired South Korean diplomats.

the class. On that first lesson, the student may have wanted to show his interest, or demonstrate his intelligence by asking questions, Ahn was uncertain. The questions at first started quite simply, focusing on the nature of diplomatic interaction during the period, record keeping, and historical evidence. Ahn had thought about his actions a lot. He had gone over the incident in his head many times. In the middle of the second half of the lecture, Ahn remembered the questions started to turn to the linkage between the historical period and contemporary Korea.

Finally, one specific comment had angered him. In going over his actions, Ahn felt that the student's comment questioned his choice of materials. The student had compared the *Samguk Sagi* and *Samguk Yusa* to the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicles* – the collection of 12th century manuscripts, parts of which detail Anglo-Saxon history from Caesar's invasion to the Norman conquest. The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicles* have little to do with contemporary British diplomatic tradition – different times, different peoples, different languages, and different countries, he'd claimed. The student had listed a range of reasons why their study was irrelevant. The question of why it is important to study diplomatic history was not a problem, Ahn stated. He could have answered it and justified why it is important to study diplomatic history. Ahn then proceeded to lecture me why – a lecture he had no doubt gone over many times. However, the student's statement immediately following the question had made him snap. The student stated that South Korean diplomacy was the product of Japanese trained administrators and United States directed and funded leadership. The student then compared South Korean traditions to those of North Korea, the only difference being "the puppeteers". From this point, Ahn could not control his behaviour. He slammed the lectern. Pens and papers flew from the lectern and the PowerPoint blinked blue. Ahn responded angrily and coldly, shouting the student down in a rage.

My questions on the matter brought out a range of emotions in Ahn. He was deeply sorry for his behaviour. He knew he had lost control and was disappointed at himself. Yet, at the same time, he demonstrated a sense of pride in having stood up for what he still viewed as unjust criticism on South Korea's diplomatic tradition. As he retold the story and I asked further details, his emotions were a mix of anger and shame. This story became representative of my time spent with Ahn. We would go on to talk much more about Korea's diplomatic history. Each time Ahn defended Korea's "rich diplomatic tradition", his emotion shone through. With time I realized that it was not only pride, but also despair. Ahn demonstrated this in his words and actions. As he noted: "Diplomacy is not always fair. Koreans know this from experience". It was a despair born of efforts to prove to himself and others that the country deserved, what the historian Bruce Cumings so appropriately titled his text, *Korea's place in the sun*.³⁷⁸ Despair pervaded both his accounts of his own diplomatic experience and his accounts of Korea's diplomatic experience.

Representative narrative 1: Estrangement in context

Korea as a state estranged from mainstream diplomatic interaction emerged reluctantly as a modern state at the end of the 19th century. For Europeans, this hostility became legendary, fuelled by reports of the treatment of shipwrecked sailors, forced to assimilate into Korean society and forbidden to leave the country. Most famous amongst these is the case of Hendrik Hamel. In 1653, Hendrik Hamel and 36 survivors from the Dutch East India Company vessel, "De Sperwer", were shipwrecked near Jeju Island. They were subsequently imprisoned and transported to Seoul. For 13 years they were held under varying degrees of custody until eight of the men managed to escape to Japan.

³⁷⁸ Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).

Hamel would later write a report, while awaiting return to Holland, detailing the customs and treatment the crew had received. In 1668 a book produced from the report, the first European text detailing Korea, was published in Rotterdam. While Hamel's account, just one amongst the many Dutch seafarer adventure publications of the era, may not have significantly contributed to the European perception of Korea, it is symbolic of the repeated rumours that would be built up over the next two centuries leading up to the "opening" of "the Hermit Kingdom".

In 1842 and 1854, China and Japan were forced to open their ports, after the Opium War and the visit of Commodore Perry's 'Black Ships' respectively. It was only a matter of time before attention turned to what had become known as the 'Hermit Kingdom'. Early engagements were anything but smooth. In 1866, a French squadron occupied Ganghwa Island, an island in the Han River estuary to the west of Seoul, in retaliation for the execution of French Catholic priests proselytizing in the country. In 1871, an American squadron occupied the same island in retaliation for the burning of an American ship, the *General Sherman*, three years earlier.

However, it was not until Japan appeared on the scene that Korea was forced to open its doors. In September 1875, the imperial navy ship *Unyo* arrived at Kanghwa Island, was fired upon, and retaliated in kind. The Japanese dispatched further forces in preparation for a more decisive battle, demanded an apology and settlement of outstanding issues. The resultant Treaty of Kanghwa, signed in February 1876, provided extra-territorial rights to Japanese citizens in Korea; clarified the position of Korea as independent from Chinese suzerainty; and opened the ports of Pusan, Wonsan and Incheon to Japanese trade. This was Korea's first modern era treaty.

Korea was a particularly late entrant to international society. The very concept of a professional corps of diplomats within a government ministry dedicated to handling

state to state relations was unknown at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Kanghwa. Korea's first dedicated foreign ministry to replace the traditional Board of Rites, which dealt with diplomacy in addition to rituals, culture and state exams, was established in 1882, led by Cho Yong-Ha.

Resident embassies, a feature of international society constituted under the modern European diplomatic system since the 15th century, were as yet unheard of in Korea. Indeed, Korea continued to pursue a dualistic approach, caught as it was between factions which sought modernization along the lines of Japan and those that sought to maintain the more traditional East Asian diplomatic system.³⁷⁹

In our conversations, Ahn was always keen to elaborate on the 'richness' of Korea's diplomatic traditions. He never missed an opportunity to express the skill of Korean diplomacy in ensuring the country did not disappear, despite being surrounded by powerful states. Korean diplomacy he stated, had "a history of loss, subjugation and abandonment".³⁸⁰ But it was a history in which "despite everything, the nation, its people traditions, and language survive".³⁸¹ This sentiment came to the fore when the class turned towards Korea's turn of the century relations with its increasingly powerful neighbour, Japan.

The force of Ahn's voice in class was always palpable. He often slowed his speech and chose words carefully. He was a good speaker. At times, when he sought to emphasize a point, each word would have a visible chilling effect on the class. In the normal run of class, students would be playing with mobile phones, flicking and spinning pens, or listening and reading simultaneously. When he emphasized a point, every face was

³⁷⁹ Kue-Jin Song, "Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the Modern Treaty System in the Sino-Korean Relationship," *International Journal of Korean History*, 15, No. 2 (August 2010): 102.

³⁸⁰ Ahn, Serving and retired South Korean diplomats.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

attentive. Interestingly, at certain times, this emphasis particularly impacted Korean students, denoting an inherent cultural effect.

In talks with students after the first lecture, they noted the introduction to Korea's diplomatic tradition as being consistent from what they had learned in previous courses on Korea's international relations and was even consistent with history classes from grade school. One local student even suggested that I turn to a comic book, which had helped him through grade school history.³⁸² Indeed, the book had much the same material as was presented in the lecture. For every Korean student, there was no doubt about the fact that Korea has a very rich diplomatic tradition. To the foreign students, it was new. Reflecting the majority of English language textbooks on Korea's diplomacy, foreign students were accustomed to thinking of South Korea's diplomacy as separate to and distinct from Korean diplomacy prior to the establishment of the state in 1948.³⁸³

The professor's account of Min Yonghwan epitomized this cultural emphasis. Nearly every Korean student straightened in their chair when the professor slowed his voice and stated: "It is every Korean diplomat's hope to be as noble as Min Yonghwan". In historical accounts, Min Yonghwan is interpreted as a hero of Korea's search for independence from Western and Japanese encroachment. He was not a professional diplomat, indeed, far from it. Rather, as many diplomats of the era, he was a consummate aristocrat. From an early age, this had allowed him access to political circles and to become acquainted with the questions that dominated debate of the period. Importantly, this included access to the increasingly influential coterie of foreigners

³⁸² Won-Bok Yi, *Korea Unmasked: In Search of the Country, the Society and the People* (Seoul: Gimm Young International, 2005).

³⁸³ William Henthorn, *A History of Korea* (New York: MacMillan, 1971); Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History*; Song, "Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the Modern Treaty System in the Sino-Korean Relationship."

who had become an influence on the Korean political elite.³⁸⁴ Ultimately, it also accorded him the position of lead diplomat on two of Korea's earliest diplomatic missions. The first to the coronation of Tsar Nicolas II in Moscow, in May 1896, and the second to the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria in London, June 1897.

However, it is not for his diplomatic missions that Min is most remembered amongst Korean students. Rather, he remembered as a hero of Korea's search for independence from Western and Japanese encroachment. After his brief stint overseas on diplomatic missions, Min undertook a number of official posts and remained an influential contact for the foreign diplomatic corps in Seoul. He made prominent but ultimately fruitless efforts to maintain Korea's independence from Japanese encroachment. In the final year of his life he struggled to maintain Korea's diplomatic representation abroad, first as prime minister and then foreign minister.

In November 1905, the Treaty of Ulsa was signed, making Korea a protectorate of Japan. On 30 November, Min Yonghwan committed suicide in protest at the Japanese action. As noted by the professor:

After committing suicide in protest at the Japanese annexation, Min Yonghwan left five letters on his body - one each to the representatives of China, Great Britain, the United States, France and Germany – and one to the Korean people.³⁸⁵

Undying patriotism is the key characteristic that is most prominent in the historical narrative detailing the life of Min Yonghwan. This patriotism can be interpreted in different ways. One can find patriotism in rational objective oriented action of sacrifices

³⁸⁴ Michael Finch, *Min Yong-Hwan: A Political Biography* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 31.

³⁸⁵ Ahn, Serving and retired South Korean diplomats.

made in service of the nation, such as Min Yonghwan's efforts to discard traditional dress in order to allow him to fully participate the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria. Yet, in Ahn's retelling of this narrative, it was emotion that was most prominent. Ahn's account of the tragic tale of Min Yonghwan was very emotional. I repeatedly heard from members of the Seoul diplomatic corps that emotion was an accepted and expected component of the South Korean diplomatic style.³⁸⁶ The narrative as relayed by Ahn was not about achieving a specific aim (rational purposive-oriented diplomatic action), nor was it about upholding a tradition, such as a suicide ritual (rational value-oriented action). Rather, it was about loss and desperation. It was an emotion-oriented diplomatic action in a tragic final act. Ahn's retelling of the tale of Min Younghwan reflected both his accounts of his experiences as a diplomat, and the accounts of members of the Seoul diplomatic corps in their interaction with South Korean diplomats.

The end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century was not favourable to China or Korea, relatively new and grudgingly reluctant entrants to the modern European diplomatic system. Much has been written on China's entry into the modern Western diplomatic system, with considerably less written on Korea's entry. Historical texts on Korea often leap from the ignominious end of the Choson dynasty to the sufferings of the colonial period.³⁸⁷ It is a leap, not in temporal terms, but rather in terms of focus—a leap from the international to the domestic. It is a leap from the diplomatic intrigue and political machinations of the imperialist struggle for Korea to an inward looking, painful recount of the Japanese occupation. Understandably, this leap reinforces an oversight of Korea's diplomatic history. Yet, it is a period, which served

³⁸⁶ Seoul diplomatic corps, Interviews with Seoul diplomatic corps, February 2008.

³⁸⁷ William Henthorn, *A History of Korea*; Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History*; Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*. (London: Warner, 1999).

as an exemplar for Ahn's representative statement: "Diplomacy is not always fair. Koreans know this from experience".³⁸⁸

In 1869, Japanese attempts to establish relations with Korea were rebuffed on the basis of Japanese usage of the term 'emperor' to designate the Japanese leader—a term reserved for the emperor of China in pre-modern Asian diplomatic system.³⁸⁹ In 1873, Japanese attempts to establish relations were rebuffed on the basis that Japanese officials, attired in Western suits, were not appropriately attired and could not be accepted under the pre-modern Asian diplomatic system. To wear a western suit was thought of as improper and a show of disrespect.³⁹⁰ Tradition had dictated Korea's diplomatic action. Only grudgingly in 1876, did tradition begin to give way to other actions. In retelling these historical events, Ahn did not focus on modernization, but rather on the emotional impact of Korea's increasing estrangement from international society.³⁹¹

In November 1905, the former Japanese prime minister and soon to be Japanese resident-general in Korea, Ito Hirobumi, accompanied by Japanese troops entered the palace of King Kojong and forcibly seized the official seal of the Korean Foreign Ministry. The official seal gave imprimatur to all state documents. The official seal, along with the forced signature of the Korean cabinet gave the appearance of Korea's assent to the 1905 Japan–Korea Treaty, also known as the Eulsa Treaty. The treaty provided for the Japanese assumption of full authority over the foreign affairs of Korea. The treaty provided for all matters relating to the foreign affairs of Korea to be administered by the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo. It forbade Korean participation

³⁸⁸ Ahn, Serving and retired South Korean diplomats.

³⁸⁹ Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History*, 99–100.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Ahn, Serving and retired South Korean diplomats.

in international agreements except through the medium of the Japanese administration, and it provided for the appointment of a Japanese Resident-General, who would administer Korea's foreign affairs.

In February 1906, with the establishment of the Japanese Residency-General in Seoul, the Japanese administration made a request to the foreign diplomatic corps in Korea for the removal of all foreign diplomatic representatives from Korean territory. By March 1906, the United States, United Kingdom, Chinese, German, French and Belgian representatives had departed. Estrangement, or displacement from international society was now almost complete.

From this point on, Ahn's lectures on the period focused almost exclusively upon the diplomatic initiatives undertaken by a small number of individual Koreans. Sometimes these individuals worked on behalf of what they considered to be the 'rightful' government. Sometimes these individuals worked on behalf of what would later be formed as the Korean government-in-exile. Sometimes, these individuals worked alone on behalf of what was then a more nebulous concept – the Korean nation.

Without an ability to interact directly with foreign representatives, Korean efforts were forced to adopt less-than-conventional means. Ahn laid this out along the contemporary accepted historical narrative with a focus on the dispatch by King Kojong in 1907 of a secret mission to the Second Hague Peace Conference in a desperate attempt to declare to the world the invalidity of the 1905 Japan–Korea Treaty.

This story is widely repeated in historical texts. Significantly, it also features as a prominent narrative in displays of both the foyer of the central government complex building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Seoul and in the National Diplomatic History Museum at the Korean National Diplomatic Academy (KNDK). In 1907, the Korean Emperor Kojong sent three emissaries, Yi Jun, Yi Sang-Seol and Yi Wi-Jong to

the Second Hague Peace Conference. They were well educated, spoke several languages and were by all accounts very able diplomats—most importantly, they had with them the credentials endorsed by Emperor Kojong and carried his seal. They departed at the behest of King Kojong without the sanction of the occupying Japanese administration, which under the Eulsa Treaty and subsequent measures, effectively had complete control over Korean diplomacy. Kojong's representatives attempted to directly engage participating states at the conference and obtain support for Korea's independence.

Through the more prepared diplomacy of Japan, the three emissaries were blocked from participating in the conference and were unable to meet any of the major state delegates. Moreover, their attempts to engage public support by publishing newspaper articles were countered and thwarted by a more coordinated and better resourced Japanese campaign. Even attempts to engage the 19th century equivalent of the parallel non-government organization (NGO) conference, a semi-public peace conference presided over by British peace activist William T. Stead, failed.³⁹²

The last Korean participants at a major international diplomatic conference prior to Japan's annexation of Korea, presented Ahn with the perfect case study to reinforce his views about the 'unfairness' of diplomacy. When I asked him about this after the lecture, he could easily rattle off example upon example of the inequality of international diplomacy. Each example placed Korea in the position of victim. Each example placed a contortion of emotional despair onto his face. Indeed, to Ahn, there was a human chain of 'ideal diplomats' who both exemplified the qualities of Korean diplomacy and the trying, difficult circumstances that justified his claim that diplomacy was not always fair. A key link in this chain for Ahn was Rhee Syngman.

³⁹² Klaus Schlichtmann, "Japan, Germany and the Idea of the Hague Peace Conferences," *Journal of Peace Research*, 40, No. 4 (2003): 387–389.

Before his tragic death, Min Yonghwan had returned to Korea after a self-imposed exile in the United States of one year. His path linked him to a young Korean with aspirations to serve the nation – the future first President of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee. Min was responsible for obtaining a pardon for the young Rhee, who had been sentenced to life in prison for taking part in anti-government demonstrations. He was also responsible for supporting Rhee on a mission to the United States to plead for an invocation of support under the ‘good offices’ clause of the Korea-United States Treaty of Amity and Commerce. The good offices clause refers to the first clause of the Korea-United States Treaty of Amity and Commerce signed in 1882. The first clause, which in part states:

...If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices on being informed of the case to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings...

The treaty has been interpreted in two ways. It has been interpreted as a standard, but essentially meaningless, periodic diplomatic phrase that recognizes the establishment of friendly relations between the two states. Equally, and perhaps in justified desperation, it has also been interpreted more literally as the promise of ‘good offices’ or assistance should one party be oppressed or threatened by a third party. In either case, Rhee’s faith in the treaty and the diplomatic text that it contained could be assumed to have served as a pretext for what would later become a distinct lack of faith in diplomacy as President.

Lack of faith in diplomacy is something I consistently came across in the narratives of serving and retired South Korean diplomats. Ahn in particular, with his knowledge of Korea’s diplomatic history, believed that diplomacy had on several occasions left Korea in dire straits. Ahn’s views on Korea’s diplomatic history while more strident, matched

the narratives of other serving and retired South Korean diplomats. It is not surprising that it is also a feature of Rhee Syngman's experience of diplomacy.

Rhee was sent to the United States not as a diplomat, but as a student. The power of the Japanese influence over Korea and its finances prevented Rhee from even being accredited as a diplomat on his first mission to the United States. He did however take with him, hidden in a false bottom of his trunk, messages for the Korean legation in the United States. He was further afforded assistance by the Korean legation at the behest of Min who had arranged for his reception in advance. Ultimately, Rhee was able to present letters from Min to his friend and colleague, Senator Hugh A. Dinsmore, who had previously served as Minister Resident to Korea between January 1887 and May 1890.³⁹³ In turn, Dinsmore facilitated and accompanied Rhee to a meeting with Secretary of State, John Hay. Rhee would also ultimately meet with President Theodore Roosevelt in August 1905 in a final effort to beg support for Korea's independence.³⁹⁴ According to Ahn, by this time, "the international community had turned its back on Korea" and "Korea was alone".³⁹⁵ This part of Ahn's narrative is supported by displays at the MOFA Central Government Complex, the KNDa, and the National Diplomatic Museum. Visitors are presented with images and documents highlighting the struggle against encroaching estrangement.

Rhee was not a diplomat. Indeed, from all accounts of his personality, Rhee lacked the most basic qualities often associated with the diplomatic profession. Nicholson stated in *Diplomacy* that there is one type of person, which makes the worst diplomat - the

³⁹³ Finch, *Min Yong-Hwan: A Political Biography*, 167.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 168.

³⁹⁵ Ahn, *Serving and retired South Korean diplomats*.

missionary.³⁹⁶ Rhee is often described in terms that imbue in him exactly these qualities. Accounts describe him as obstinate, unyielding, brazen, vain and zealous. In his biography of Rhee, tellingly entitled "Master of Manipulation", Stephen Jin-Woo Kim stated "Rhee possessed an almost messiah-like belief in his ability to command a unified, independent, democratic Korea" and quotes General Maxwell D. Taylor as describing Rhee as "a curious mixture of an Old Testament prophet... and a shrewd Oriental politician...".³⁹⁷ Despite this, his active role and his influence over South Korea's early diplomacy and foreign policy cannot be questioned.

In Rhee's final attempt in the United States to secure support for Korean independence, he was reminded that he was not a diplomat. At the meeting with President Roosevelt, Rhee received only polite acknowledgement of his request, which was coupled more forcefully with the need for the request to be put through the proper diplomatic channels. By that time, the proper diplomatic channels were blocked. The Korean Minister to Washington, Kim Yun-Jong, obeyed the directives of the foreign ministry to the letter. The foreign ministry was by that time, under the firm control of the Japanese. Regardless of his future skills as a politician and indeed of his skills in even obtaining access to the President, Rhee had essentially failed.

Yet, Rhee continued in his efforts. He displayed an unwavering consistency in his efforts to engage in diplomatic discourse with western powers to free his country from Japanese domination. After failure in Washington in 1906, Rhee next led the 1932 mission of the provisional government of Korea, the Shanghai-based government-in-exile, to the League of Nations in Geneva. Here he once again sought support for Korea's independence from Japan. Rhee encountered polite and not so polite rebuff. As

³⁹⁶ Drinkwater, *Sir Harold Nicolson and International Relations: The Practitioner as Theorist*, 93.

³⁹⁷ Stephen Kim, *Master of Manipulation: Syngman Rhee and the Seoul-Washington Alliance, 1953-1960* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), 20.

Professor Ahn noted "Rhee was treated as *persona non grata*, an unfortunate exiled and illegitimate representative of a colonized and occupied Korea".³⁹⁸ Throughout the war, Rhee would seek unsuccessfully to obtain greater recognition of the Korean government in exile. "At the same time as Rhee sought Korea's freedom through diplomatic means, others sought Korea's freedom through more direct means".³⁹⁹ The professor went on to explain the efforts of the Korean independence fighters in more detail, including a description of later North Korean president, Kim Il-Sung, who he labelled as just one of thousands of Koreans fighting for an independent Korea.

The struggle for recognition, which individual Koreans had fought in, was meant to end with the declaration of independence from Japan. It did not. The struggle for recognition segued seamlessly into a struggle for recognition as a legitimate member of the international diplomatic community. The aim to become the legitimate representative of the Korean people would dominate both North and South Korea's diplomacy until the late 1980s.⁴⁰⁰

The end of the Second World War and the clear emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union laid the foundations of a transformed diplomatic system, which was reflected on the Korean peninsula. In 1945, the sudden collapse of Japan and the unpreparedness of the United States for the occupation of the Korean peninsula led to the temporary division of Korea into military occupation zones administered by the Soviet Union and the United States. This in turn laid the foundations for the more permanent division of Korea along ideological and ultimately political lines.

³⁹⁸ Ahn, Serving and retired South Korean diplomats.

³⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁰ Byung Chul Koh, *The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 10.

In 1948, the United Nations recognized the Republic of Korea as the only "validly elected lawful government of Korea in which elections were permitted", and in turn urged member nations to recognize and establish full relations with the new state.⁴⁰¹ On 15 August 1948, three years after liberation from Japan, the National Assembly appointed Rhee as President. The establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the Soviet occupation zone quickly followed. The two states were products of the rapidly deteriorating relations between their two super-power patrons, which would see them both struggle for recognition until the late 1980s. Reflecting Ahn's retelling of these events, Korea's diplomatic history is indeed, a narrative of estrangement.

Table 2 below highlights statements made by Ahn during a lecture he delivered on Korea's diplomacy and during a meeting afterwards when he retold the incident detailed above. The formulated meanings and action clusters were the result of further questioning on each specific statement.

Table 2: Ahn – Significant statements, formulated meanings, and action clusters

Significant Statement	Formulated Meaning	Action Cluster
Korea struggled to become independent, it struggled... Despite all the obstacles, Korea is now an important force in global diplomacy... I've pointed this out to colleagues at the highest levels... This is something I have battled throughout my career... We are nobody's	<p>A <i>timeless</i> feature of Korean diplomacy is the <i>struggle</i> to promote the country's <i>independence to act</i>.</p> <p><i>Timeless</i>: the struggle is seen as continuing from the past (tradition) and continuing into the present (purposive rational)</p> <p><i>Struggle</i>: Diplomacy conceptualized as a struggle, implies emotional content.</p> <p><i>Struggle</i>: Diplomacy conceptualized as a struggle implies acceptance of unconventional</p>	Emotion Purposive

⁴⁰¹ Young-Kyu Yoon, "The Problem of Korean Unification in the General Assembly of the United Nations," *Korean Observer* (October 1968): 46.

puppet!	(non-traditional) political action. <i>Independence to act</i> : A central aim underpinning diplomacy is purposive-rational action directed towards independence to act.	
Korea has a rich diplomatic tradition, which has survived transformation in the diplomatic system, challenges to and loss of sovereignty, rupture in the national identity, and modernization at a pace unparalleled in history.	A <i>timeless</i> feature of Korean diplomacy is expressed <i>pride</i> at continuity of tradition despite <i>external</i> challenges. <i>Timeless</i> : the past (tradition) is viewed as continuing into and influencing the present. <i>Pride</i> : Korean tradition is believed to have survived despite substantial challenges. Pride is expressed emotionally. <i>External</i> : the challenges to these traditions are viewed as being imposed on Korea from an external source.	Tradition Emotion
...a history of loss, subjugation and abandonment"... "despite everything, the nation, its people traditions, and language survive.	<i>Timeless</i> feature of Korean diplomacy is pride in <i>overcoming</i> challenges. <i>Timeless</i> : the struggle continues from the past into the present. <i>Overcoming</i> : historical failures are reinterpreted to reflect the heroism and sacrifice (emotional) of individual struggle.	Emotion
After committing suicide in protest at the Japanese annexation, Min Yonghwan left five letters on his body - one each to the representatives of China, Great Britain, the United States, France and Germany – and one to the Korean people.	<i>Timeless</i> feature of Korean diplomacy is the value of <i>patriotism</i> which is held at the highest level. <i>Timeless</i> : value-oriented action continues from the past into the present. <i>Patriotism</i> : is conceptualized as value-oriented action, which finds its ultimate form in emotion-oriented action - to give one's life for the state.	Values Emotion
Diplomacy is not always fair. Koreans know this from experience.	A <i>timeless</i> feature of Korean diplomacy is the facing of <i>external</i> challenges, which are viewed as <i>unfair</i> . <i>Timeless</i> : the value continues from the past into the present.	Objective Emotion

	<p><i>External</i>: challenges are viewed as being imposed on Korea from an external source.</p> <p><i>Unfair</i>: the diplomatic system is viewed as controlled by major powers in their own interests – as experienced historically and personally.</p>	
...the international community had turned its back on Korea... Korea was alone.	<p>A <i>timeless</i> feature of Korean diplomacy is <i>separation</i> from others, <i>isolation</i>, and the struggle for <i>self-reliance</i>.</p> <p><i>Timeless</i>: the value continues from the past into the present.</p> <p><i>Separation</i>: Korea and its diplomats, were excluded from mainstream international society. Separation is reiterated in a historical (colonialism, independence) and contemporary (divided state/non-major power) sense.</p> <p><i>Isolation</i>: Absence of enduring alliances.</p> <p>Doubt regarding aims of self-interested allies.</p> <p><i>Self-reliance</i>: Uncertainty regarding allies and need to reform to strengthen self.</p>	Emotion
Rhee was treated as <i>persona non grata</i> , an unfortunate exiled and illegitimate representative of a colonized and occupied Korea.	<p>A <i>timeless</i> feature of Korean diplomacy is <i>separation</i>.</p> <p><i>Timeless</i>: the phenomenon of separation continues from the past into the present.</p> <p><i>Separation</i>: Korea and its diplomats, were excluded from mainstream international society, which can lead to resignation.</p>	Emotion
At the same time as Rhee sought Korea's freedom through diplomatic means, others sought Korea's freedom through more direct means.	<p>A <i>timeless</i> feature of Korean diplomacy is <i>separation</i>, which can lead to either <i>resignation</i> or <i>revolutionism</i>.</p> <p><i>Timeless</i>: the value continues from the past into the present.</p> <p><i>Separation</i>: Korea and its diplomats, were excluded from mainstream international society.</p> <p><i>Resignation</i>: Accepting a perceived wrong and</p>	Emotion Objective

	working for change from within. <i>Revolutionism</i> : Turning to an alternative means to right a perceived wrong.	
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Experience was woven into the fabric of each story told by Ahn. Every claim he made was supported by, and defended with examples from lived experience. His more than 20 years of experience as a Korean government officer made reversion to lived experience and anecdote, a natural and common feature of every conversation. In the same way, to give credence and credibility to his university lectures, he defended each question with personal accounts: “when I was working in...”, “when I was conducting meetings with...”, or “when I worked at the...”. His accounts of diplomatic interaction were inherently built on life experience. The day of our first interview was representative of the level of interaction he undertook with the Seoul diplomatic corps. In that week, he had met a former colleague travelling from the US. He would normally interact with the Seoul diplomatic corps on a social basis at least once a week – though he noted there was a fine line between social and professional basis in diplomatic practice. He considered his relationships with former colleagues of the Seoul diplomatic corps to be very strong. Many of these had lasted since his retirement from government service. We went through seven ‘significant events’ of diplomatic interaction in detail, two examples from his recent experience and five he could recall from when he was in government service. From Ahn’s retelling of the below events, I assume his diplomatic action in these cases to have had a predominantly emotion-oriented motivation.

Table 3: Ahn – Significant events and meaning units

Event	Purpose	Value	Tradition	Emotion
Interview with journalist	1	3	4	2
Speech at national day celebrations	2	3	4	1
Task force on trade facilitation workshop	3	2	4	1
Accompanied visiting parliamentary delegation	3	4	1	2

Presentation at diplomatic function	1	3	4	2
Lunch with former senior officers	3	2	4	1
Lunch with cultural diplomacy officer	2	4	3	1
	15	21	24	10

The subjects which dominated our conversations were North Korea, Korea-US bilateral relations, Korea-Australia bilateral relations, and trade – in particular FTAs. FTAs were attracting substantial media and public attention at the time as a result of the ongoing KORUS FTA negotiations. It was clear however, foreign policy was his favoured subject. He had knowledge of nearly every detail of Korea's foreign policy. Ahn viewed Korea's foreign policy as a continuum. He saw it as continuing from the end of the Choson dynasty, through Japanese intervention and occupation, and onto contemporary South Korea. When talking on the subject he demonstrated strong views, which generally agreed with the interpretation presented in official documents and presentations, such as at the MOFA Central Government Complex foyer and the Seocho-Gu National Diplomatic History Museum, which both contain displays on Korea's early diplomatic history. The narrative contained in this display highlights the same factors Ahn and other serving and retired South Korean diplomats felt most strongly about.

Ahn's emotions were particularly prominent when discussing Korea's ability to act independently. Specifically, when talking about situations concerning unfair treatment, exclusion and separation, reliance upon others, and challenges to sovereignty. In light of subsequent interviews, this emotional action can be closely linked to the sense of estrangement. Ahn's emotional reactions centred on the idea that as a diplomat, and as a Korean diplomat, he could not reconcile the estrangement imposed upon him. Indeed, this agreed with other interviews undertaken, as well as with the other source materials I was able to access. In particular, displays of Korean diplomatic history at the MOFA Central Government Complex, the KNDA, and the National Diplomatic Museum

showed a similar degree of emotional content. For visitors and indeed MOFA personnel who wander around the lobby everyday, there is a continual reminder that Korea has been estranged from mainstream international diplomatic interaction throughout its history. Displays are arranged to evoke emotion. There are large photographs of the Korean mission sent to plead for independence at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 at the height of this estrangement, and there are photographs of the celebrations as this estrangement was reconciled when South Korea hosted the Olympics and when South (and North) Korea joined the UN in 1991. Ahn's narrative highlights the distinct sense of estrangement as an influence on the South Korean diplomatic style, and the predominance of an emotion-oriented motivation for diplomatic action.

Representative narrative 2: Status

The subject, named here as Baek, was a practicing diplomat. He had served for just under 20 years and had undertaken a variety of overseas postings, including at senior levels in Europe and South Asia. He believed he had one more posting left before he retired. He had served in a variety of challenging roles at different posts, mostly focused on security and political affairs. In his career, he had not interacted with the Seoul diplomatic corps much at all. While in Seoul, his roles did not demand much work with foreign diplomats at all. Most of his career was spent at post and he had interacted with foreign government officials on a daily basis while at post. In his words, "there would hardly be a day go past" in which he would not attend a meeting, a luncheon, or a function with foreign (non-Korean) government officials while on a posting.⁴⁰² At certain times of his career, he worked very closely with foreign government officials.

⁴⁰² Baek, *Serving and retired South Korean diplomats*, 2009.

Mr. Baek saw style as significant. He believed his career was built on understanding people, and that “style is what makes people different from one another”.⁴⁰³ For him, the South Korean style of diplomacy was distinct from other states and importantly for him “... very different from Chinese and Japanese”.⁴⁰⁴ He had a strong sense of pride in South Korea, and often felt slighted at being confused with Chinese, Japanese and Southeast Asians. I was lucky enough to undertake multiple interviews and observations of Mr. Baek both in Canberra and Seoul.

It was very rude and made me angry... My assistant made the appointment. It was for the afternoon, I think three o'clock... I wanted to get to know them better as I felt very distant after formal introductions... we had some issues that would be coming up in the future... It is easier to work with people you know well, so this was relationship building...

When I rang from the lobby desk phone he was not at his extension. When I found him, he talked to me in a very rude voice... very impolite. He said I was two hours early for the appointment. I don't know how this confusion happened and I apologized. But as I returned to the office I felt very angry. How could he be so rude? Why didn't he at least come down to explain? How can you leave someone at the security desk who has travelled from far away? It is polite to at least come down to explain the situation. I found him to be very rude...

I met him again at diplomatic function... he did not recognize or remember me. After introducing myself again... He was again rude... I received this type of treatment in many places. Maybe it is my English. I know it is not perfect. But I have no problems in Sri Lanka or India... We are a global middle-power... our

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

companies are the best in the world... they invest a tremendous amount in this country... but still we are not treated as equal.

Baek, Serving and retired South Korean diplomats, 2009.

Mr. Baek worked in the South Korean embassy. He had worked in 'his organization' for all of his career, with postings to several South Asian and European capitals. I say 'his organization', as it is the way he always described it. "My organization is currently interested in...". This of course would nominally imply that his organization was MOFA. Yet, at the same time it did not confirm that this was the case. It was not my place to inquire further, even though he would be unlikely to have left the question unanswered. As noted at the beginning of this research, modern diplomacy is difficult to define. Determining who is a modern diplomat is even more difficult. The strongest definition comes through a description of what a diplomat does – representation, negotiation, reporting and the protection of nationals abroad. Every South Korean government officer posted overseas effectively undertakes these roles. With his multiple posting abroad accredited as a diplomat, his substantial work undertaken in liaison roles in South Asia and Europe, Mr. Baek could be considered an ideal candidate to explore the South Korean diplomatic style.

Meetings with Mr. Baek were always enjoyable. Canberra does not have a large selection of fine restaurants, but Mr. Baek knew each one perfectly well, and indeed, the staff at each restaurant knew him well, reserving his favourite tables and ensuring other guests were seated adequately far away. In a private setting, he was an engaging and adept conversationalist, a performer who loved singing and drinking, and a comedian with a quick and sharp sense of humour. The type of person who could laugh so enthusiastically that it drew tears and put him off balance. Yet, at diplomatic functions he appeared quiet and reserved – calm, dour, and serious.

His story told part of an ongoing relationship he had to maintain with an Australian official in the security field. An increasing number of South Koreans on working holiday visas were beginning to work in the sex industry.⁴⁰⁵ While legal in Australia, it was illegal in South Korea. It was Seoul's belief that this would tarnish South Korea's international reputation. Without legislation in South Korea to prevent this, and without means to address the issue, there was a need to establish contacts in the field to gauge how to proceed. Mr. Baek accordingly sought to establish contacts in the field.

Mr. Baek thus sought contact with an official he was referred to by another contact. In general, during his stay in Australia, he had not found interaction with officials easy. While diplomats who knew about Northeast Asia were easy and helpful, others who did not know about the region, he found difficult. In his current task, it was necessary to interact with security officials, whom he found particularly difficult. He knew that much of this was because of cultural differences. Sometimes, he felt there was a gap in communication and understanding. But he also felt that he was "treated unfairly". He did not say racism – at first. In subsequent meetings, he mentioned that at diplomatic functions, these officials would mix with other Australians, Americans, New Zealanders and the British, but less with Asians. He would later admit he at times felt ostracized and would himself seek the company of other Asians.

His assistant arranged the appointment to meet the Australian official. She was competent, organized, and very able. He had no doubts about her abilities and had relied upon her for many tasks since his arrival. He believed it was not possible that she had made a mistake. The appointment was for the afternoon. The aim was to have a coffee, get to know the official, learn more about the organization the official worked in, and

⁴⁰⁵ Chosun Ilbo, "Envoy to Address Problem of Korean Sex Workers in Australia," *Chosun Ilbo*, 14 November 2011, 5.

perhaps to signal the issue, which would be raised later through a more direct channel. The appointment according to Mr. Baek, was for three o'clock in the afternoon.

Mr. Baek recounted the details precisely. He told me that he had gone over the details many times. He arrived on time. The building did not allow for direct access. There was a reception desk, which he knew from previous occasions, was not always attended. He used the security reception desk to call his contact. There was no response. Mr. Baek thought he was on the way down to the reception desk and waited. People came in and out, but none of them he recognized. He called the extension again, only to receive no answer. He again waited and then called again. This time he called the organization's main line. The operator put him through to the extension again, with no effort to find his contact. Mr. Baek was now frustrated. He decided to call the phone extensions with the last four digits altered slightly in the hope that they were numerically ordered and ultimately revealed people working in the same section, as used to be the case in most government offices. When somebody finally answered he asked for his contact. He came to the phone and responded in what Mr. Baek thought was an angry tone. His contact stated that he was early and the meeting was not for another two hours. In the shock at the response, Mr. Baek apologized. He returned to his office.

At this point in his telling of the story, Mr. Baek's eyes visibly widened. His emotions let loose in a tirade of accusations. Each accusation pointed out the impoliteness and lack of civility of his contact. He thought his contact was rude for speaking in the way he did. He thought he was impolite for not cancelling other tasks and making the appointment earlier, something he stated he would have done. Finally, he thought he was uncivil for not at least coming down to explain the situation. Mr. Baek had thought about the event over and over, as demonstrated by his listing of accusations. It had clearly had an impact on him, and continued to have an impact on him.

As he further elaborated on the story, Mr. Baek revealed his conclusions as to why he received this treatment. His conclusions put the event into the wider context of his experiences in Australia. His concerns included: the failure to recognize South Korea as a prominent international partner; the unequal treatment of Korea vis-à-vis other partners; and the overwhelming focus on North Korea, as opposed to South Korea. Each concern derived from his experience of interaction with non-Korean diplomats and host-country government officers.

Representative narrative 2: Status in context

Mr. Baek noted that there are four points, which are repeated over and over by Australian officials and politicians at every Australia-Korea function. He had heard them many, many times. The first was that the Australia-Korea relationship started in the 19th century, when Australian missionaries went to Busan. The second is the Australian contribution to the defence of South Korea as part of the United Nations forces in the Korean War. This is the defining act, from which the modern relationship is measured. Mr. Baek was confident this was more than a defining point, but rather often the only point that many of his interlocutors knew about Korea. The third point is the economic relationship. In economic terms, the relationship bloomed since the 1970s, with Australian raw materials; predominantly coal, crude petroleum, iron ore, nonmonetary gold, and aluminium; exported to South Korea to return in the form of elaborately transformed manufactures, including passenger motor vehicles, telecommunications equipment and televisions. The fourth and final point is increased security cooperation. Since the early 2000s, the role of security in the bilateral relationship has increased, culminating in the release of a Joint Statement on Enhanced Global and Security Cooperation in March 2009. In late 2011, Prime Minister Gillard

and President Lee agreed to the establishment of a '2+2' dialogue between defence and foreign affairs ministers.

His recalling of each of these points was accurate. The DFAT 'country brief' notes that the "first recorded contact between Australia and Korea took place in 1889, when Australian missionaries landed at Busan".⁴⁰⁶ Again, the DFAT 'country brief' notes that "More than 18,000 Australian troops served under UN command and 340 Australians died during the Korean War".⁴⁰⁷ Similarly, both the economic and security aspects of the relationship are dutifully mentioned in the DFAT "country brief".⁴⁰⁸ However, Mr. Baek's interpretation of them was quite distinct. Australian missionaries went to "teach" Koreans; Australian soldiers went to "save" Korea; Australian raw materials "fuelled" the Korean economy; and Australia has "invited" Korea to undertake its first security agreement outside of the US. Each of the four points he claimed, was conveyed as requiring Korean indebtedness and reciprocity. Australia was an advanced state while South Korea was a less advanced, backward state that needed Australian assistance. Australia he claimed, often came across as arrogant. Indeed, Mr. Baek had even been questioned by Australians, Australian Government officials no less, regarding the weather in "tropical" Korea. He was quick to tone down his statement, but the feeling injured pride was not far below the surface.

His efforts to tone down his statement focused on the greater recognition of South Korea in more recent efforts. This, he claimed was a result of Australia's need to work with South Korea as a middle-power. However, he was right. Even these efforts came across as condescending. The DFAT 'country brief' as late as 2011 noted that "the ROK

⁴⁰⁶ Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), "Republic of Korea Country Brief," *Republic of Korea Country Brief*, April 2011, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/rok/brief_index.html.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

sees itself as a 'middle power' that is well-positioned to play a pivotal role on global and regional issues, such as disarmament and economic governance. It appreciates the benefits of working together with Australia, which it sees as sharing similar values and interests".⁴⁰⁹

After one discussion, Mr. Baek suggested I look at the differences in Australia and South Korea's status as middle-powers. Examples of Australia's successful middle-power diplomatic initiatives derive from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s. The period is generally agreed to be the height of the Australian pursuit of 'middlepowerism'. The period is marked by the formation of the Cairns Group; the formation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping; the 1989 Government-Industry Conference Against Chemical Weapons and the Australia Group; and the United Nations Cambodian Peace Process. More recent Australian attempts have been less than successful. The ambitious Asia Pacific Community (APC) proposal was quietly shelved; the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) completed its report and made few ripples amid global efforts, and was largely overwhelmed by timelier, more credible, more committed and better funded non-governmental organization (NGO) work in the area; finally, the securing of a UNSC non-permanent member seat faced serious competition from such an unlikely and arguably unimpressive rival in the form of Luxembourg.

This contrasts sharply with contemporary South Korea. South Korea has steadily assumed characteristic diplomatic behaviour often associated with middlepowerism, including diplomatic activism, niche diplomacy, coalition building and 'good international citizenship'. During the 1990s, South Korea did not routinely demonstrate characteristic middle-power behaviour. South Korea's diplomacy could be considered

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

one dimensional, focused on security and economic development. By the end of the 2000s, diplomatic activism, niche diplomacy, coalition building and 'good international citizenship' could be considered characteristic feature of South Korean diplomacy. Over three years beginning in 2010, South Korea hosted three major international conferences, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness; the G20 Leaders Summit and the Nuclear Security Summit. This demonstrated diplomatic activism. Similarly, South Korea's hosting of the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, which, while focused on nuclear security also serves related interests of nuclear energy, nuclear plant construction and nuclear non-proliferation. Niche diplomacy allows a state to position itself in a specific niche area in which it holds related interests. South Korea has also demonstrated good international citizenship as evidenced by the growth of its aid and development program over the last ten years. With formal membership of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2010, and hosting of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, South Korea is today increasingly recognized as enacting the role of 'good international citizen'.

As he became more comfortable, and indeed I confirmed his hunches with research evidence, Mr. Baek became more frank. He argued that quite often he felt that individual Australian officials were arrogant. He felt that they did not recognize South Korea's status as a global middle-power. South Korea he claimed was increasing its corps of skilful diplomats, increasing the number of South Koreans working at multilateral agencies – "look at Ban Ki Moon!", and hosting more international conferences. He was well aware of the status of Australia's diplomatic credentials.

The 2009 Blue Ribbon Panel Report “Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in our instruments of international policy” by the Lowy Institute highlights the growing gap between Australia’s aspirations as a middle-power and its capability to act on these aspirations.⁴¹⁰ The report found Australia’s network of overseas diplomatic missions to be “overstretched and hollowed out”, with DFAT staff numbers falling steadily, resulting in “not enough diplomatic missions or trained diplomats overseas to build vital contacts with governments and other important international actors, to interpret events in emerging centres of power, to advocate our interests or to help distressed Australian travellers”.⁴¹¹ As quoted in the report, Richard Woolcott, a distinguished former diplomat and Secretary of DFAT, stated in a 13 June 2008 interview with Monica Attard of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC): “I do feel that the Department of Foreign Affairs... has been allowed to run down to a dangerously low level... we can’t go on doing more with less... these sorts of undertakings do need to be properly resourced”.⁴¹² Yet, it was not only in diplomatic capacity that Australia’s capacity was diminishing. Relative to rising states in the region, Australia’s military capacity was also facing challenges. Much like its diplomacy, Australia’s military capacity was over-stretched and hollowed out. As noted by Hugh White, “we pretend to be a middle power and we say we’re a middle power, but we have the defence capability of a small power”.⁴¹³

Mr. Baek arrived for one meeting with a list of international rankings in which South Korea outranked Australia. “Despite all this..” he motioned, “...people still ask me

⁴¹⁰ Allen Gyngell et al., *Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy*, Blue Ribbon Panel Report (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, March 2009).

⁴¹¹ Ibid, xviii.

⁴¹² Ibid.

⁴¹³ Peter Hartcher, “Dear Foes: Invade Us in 2028,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 4, 2012, <http://www.smh.com.au/business/federal-budget/dear-foes-invade-us-in-2028-20120503-1yl1vl.html>.

where is Korea!”. Mr. Baek was a very skilful diplomat. He could anticipate reactions, avoided hurting feelings, and was able to quickly turn a serious point into a light-hearted one. Yet, it seemed unavoidable, and his narrative pointed out that it was - emotion inevitably played a large role in his diplomatic action. Status was a particularly emotive issue.

Table 4 below highlights statements made by Baek during meetings in which he retold the above story. The formulated meanings and action clusters were the result of further questioning on each specific statement.

Table 4: Baek – Significant statements, formulated meanings, and action clusters

Significant Statement	Formulated Meaning	Action Cluster
It was very rude and made me angry...	<p>A contemporary feature of Korean diplomacy is change in <i>status</i> and associated realignment of <i>motivation</i>.</p> <p><i>Status</i>: Korea is a more central, important actor in global affairs.</p> <p><i>Motivation</i>: Primary motivation of social action is purposive rational, but discord between perceived and accorded status result in emotion-oriented action.</p>	Emotion
<p>I wanted to get to know them better as I felt very distant after formal introductions...</p> <p>It is easier to work with people you know well, so this was relationship building...</p>	<p>A <i>timeless</i> feature of Korean diplomacy is a preference for <i>relationship building</i> over formalized agreement.</p> <p><i>Timeless</i>: the past (tradition) is viewed as continuing into and influencing the present.</p> <p><i>Relationship building</i>: is conceptualized as purposive rational, but entails emotion-oriented action, particularly in context of failure.</p>	<p>Tradition</p> <p>Emotion</p>

<p>...I felt very angry... Why didn't he at least come down to explain? ...It is polite to at least come down to explain the situation. I found him to be very rude...</p>	<p>A <i>timeless</i> feature of Korean diplomacy is a preference for <i>relationship building</i> over formalized agreement.</p> <p><i>Relationship building</i>: is conceptualized as purposive rational (achieving objectives), but is often motivated by tradition-oriented action (undertaken in a Korean cultural context) and entails emotion-oriented action (personal sleight), particularly in context of failure.</p>	<p>Emotion</p>
<p>We are a global middle-power... our companies are the best in the world... they invest a tremendous amount in this country... but still we are not treated as equal.</p>	<p>A contemporary feature of Korean diplomacy is change in <i>status</i> and associated realignment of <i>motivation</i>.</p> <p><i>Status</i>: Korea is a more central, important actor in global affairs.</p> <p><i>Motivation</i>: Primary motivation of social action is purposive rational, but discord between perceived and accorded status result in emotion-oriented action.</p>	<p>Emotion</p>
<p>...Australia and Korea are similar... we are both middle-powers... treatment is different.</p>	<p>A contemporary feature of Korean diplomacy is change in <i>status</i>, <i>external challenges</i>, and associated realignment of <i>motivation</i>.</p> <p><i>Status</i>: Korea is a more central, important actor in global affairs.</p> <p><i>External challenges</i>: are viewed as being imposed on Korea from an external source. Nature of challenges changed, and ability to address them changed.</p> <p><i>Motivation</i>: Primary motivation of social action is purposive rational,</p>	<p>Emotion</p>

	but discord between perceived and accorded status result in emotion-oriented action.	
...Often I feel more comfortable with Japanese partners, despite the distance between our governments...	<p>A <i>timeless</i> feature of Korean diplomacy is <i>separation</i>.</p> <p><i>Timeless</i>: the phenomenon of separation continues from the past into the present.</p> <p><i>Separation</i>: contemporary diplomats still feel excluded, or distanced from closeness of Anglophone states.</p>	Emotion

Baek drew much of his experience and opinions from interaction with non-Korean officials. In particular he often contrasted his experiences in Australia with those in his most recent posting, and of course, with South Korea. In the course of the week prior to our first interview, Mr. Baek had three social engagements with non-Korean officials and one social engagement with host-country officials. Mr. Baek claimed there was effectively no true social engagements while at post – he was “always working”. He did not consider his social relationships with non-Korean officials or host-country officials to be particularly strong, with the exception of one or two. He did not believe he would keep in contact with any of them after his posting, again, except one or two. In the course of the week prior to our first interview, he could recall 10 ‘significant events’ of diplomatic action in the course of interaction with non-Korean and host-country officials. From Mr. Baek’s retelling of the events listed in Table 5, he demonstrated a predominantly emotion-oriented diplomatic style.

Table 5: Baek – Significant events and meaning units

Event	Purpose	Value	Tradition	Emotion
Weekly meeting with foreign embassy	2	3	4	1

official				
Accompanied visiting officials to host-country department.	1	4	3	2
Visit to state capitals and officials	1	3	4	2
Accompanied delegation to host-country ministry	1	3	2	4
Attended diplomatic evening function	4	3	1	2
Attended national day	2	3	4	1
Attended host country veterans' centre	3	4	2	1
Meeting at host-country ministry	1	3	4	2
Official function with diplomatic corps	2	3	4	1
Attended award ceremony	3	2	4	1
	20	31	32	17

Our conversations were wide ranging, covering a number of topics. Chief amongst these were North Korea, trade, development, South Korea's position in international society, and South Korean foreign policy, with the last three subjects also involving substantial discussion on middlepowerism. His approach to the subject of middlepowerism was nuanced. He did not approach the subject like an academic. There was no interest in the problem of defining a middle-power, there was little interest in the conditions required to become a middle-power, or the implications of being a middle-power.

Mr. Baek focused near exclusively on the question of status. At first I thought it was just a personal passion for the subject. As I spoke to other acting and retired Korean diplomats, I realized that this was a common thread in many narratives. This was a significant discovery. Baek interpreted discussions on the topic as invitations to compare and contrast the security, economic, and political influence of South Korea. For Mr. Baek, what mattered was the status of South Korea relative to other states: "South Korea is the world's 15th largest economy..." or "...though a middle-power, South Korea is top-ranking in a number of key economic sectors...".⁴¹⁴ He viewed

⁴¹⁴ Baek, Serving and retired South Korean diplomats.

being a middle-power as the achievement of a status, much the same way as achieving OECD or DAC membership.

However, Mr. Baek's focus on status had another side to it, which became more obvious with time. In circumstances when Mr. Baek believed South Korea's status was not recognized, he became emotional. In particular, in circumstances he described, such as when Australians knew very little about South Korea, or thought Samsung was Japanese, he was visibly perturbed. At times, this would extend to listing the strengths of South Korea relative to the country in question in order to highlight his claim to status. His reaction often became emotional. This was reflected in interviews with other South Korean MOFA and related ministries personnel. Interestingly, it was also reflected in other sources. In the small number of diplomatic memoirs written by former South Korean diplomats, the importance of status also makes an appearance.⁴¹⁵ Perhaps the best example is the beautifully written memoirs of Keun Park.⁴¹⁶ Keun Park was a South Korean diplomat whose career stretched from the end of the Rhee Syngman era to the hosting of the Seoul Olympics in 1988. Although Keun Park's career as a diplomat ended more than 20 years ago, his subsequent work as an advisor and senior member of the leading conservative political party, meant his opinions regarding the need for Korea to achieve greater respect remained relevant. A constant theme in his memoirs, published in 2009, is both the need to secure Seoul's rightful place vis-à-vis other states in the world and an undercurrent of hurt pride when this is not achieved. It is also something that is touched upon by both former South Korean and US Ambassadors in the *Ambassadors' Memoir: U.S.-Korea Relations through the eyes of*

⁴¹⁵ Lee, *Tasks and Times*; Choi, *The Diplomatic History of Korea*; Pak, *Hibiscus*; Jack Pritchard, *Ambassadors' Memoir*.

⁴¹⁶ Pak, *Hibiscus*.

the *Ambassadors* series.⁴¹⁷ Mr. Baek was not alone in his sensitivity to South Korea's status. His narrative highlights the importance of status as an influence on the South Korean diplomatic style, and the predominance of an emotion-oriented motivation for diplomatic action.

⁴¹⁷ Jack Pritchard, *Ambassadors' Memoir*.

CHAPTER SEVEN: Diplomatic style: Narratives of the Seoul diplomatic corps

This chapter presents further findings of the study. These findings relate to a purposive sample of 19 serving and retired members of the Seoul diplomatic corps. In this chapter, I first reiterate the aim of the study and specify the findings to be presented. I then present the findings from the entire sample and the more detailed findings of four individuals. As in the previous chapter, I then present how the narratives were analysed, including the process used to extract elements able to be contrasted and compared with the constructed ideal types of diplomatic style; and the process to extract meanings units and themes. Next, I present two representative examples of narrative, which highlight the two most prominent themes discovered. I then put both representative narratives into context through an exploration of the two most prominent themes. Finally, I present a summary of the South Korean diplomatic style as viewed by the sample group of serving and retired members of the Seoul diplomatic corps.

As noted in the previous chapter, the aim of the research is to assess whether diplomatic style does in fact provide additional insight into the analysis of a state's foreign policy, above and beyond that which is accessible through scholarly research. This section seeks the answer to the question: what additional insight into diplomatic style do practitioners have? Through eliciting stories from the above mentioned purposive sample, the aim is to arrive at concrete examples which could be contrasted and compared with the constructed ideal types of diplomatic style – namely purposive-rational diplomatic style; value-rational diplomatic style; tradition-oriented diplomatic style; and emotion-oriented diplomatic style, which in Chapter Eight, will be analysed to determine if this is indeed, additional insight, above and beyond scholarly research.

As noted, the purposive sample consisted of 19 serving and retired members of the Seoul diplomatic corps. The sample included four top-ranking, 10 mid-ranking, and five lower-ranking diplomats. One interview was undertaken with each of these 19 individuals in order to determine ideal respondents from which to elicit deeper narrative. Out of the 19 serving and retired members of the Seoul diplomatic corps a considerably greater amount of time was spent with four individuals, including observation of work in the field and observation of participation in related social activities. These four individual subjects included one top-ranking, two mid-ranking, and one lower-ranking member of the Seoul diplomatic corps. A total of 36 meetings were undertaken and 29 individual narratives collated, which are detailed in Table 6 below. As with the previous sample, during and after collection, narratives were assessed for relevance to the study utilizing a criteria adapted from Clandinin and Connelly's suggested methodology.⁴¹⁸ To recall, I utilized the following criteria to assess the relevance of narratives to the study:

- **Interaction (social action and choice).** Reflecting the definition presented in Chapter Two, a key feature of diplomatic style is social action. Thus, narrative actions should have subjective meaning and be oriented towards the behaviour of others. Additionally, the action should comprise deliberate choice from a set of possible alternatives.
- **Continuity (replication).** Again, reflecting the definition presented in Chapter Two, a key feature of diplomatic style is replication in diplomatic behaviour or the artefacts produced by diplomatic behaviour. Thus, narrative actions should demonstrate replication or continuity.
- **Situational context (constraints).** Finally, reflecting the definition presented Chapter Two, a key feature of diplomatic style is that choices and replication

⁴¹⁸ Clandinin and Connelly, *Narrative Inquiry*.

should occur within the set of constraints of diplomacy – international law, diplomatic norms and principles, norms of professional conduct, and accepted operating procedures. Thus, narrative actions should occur within these constraints.

After a total of 36 meetings, 29 individual narratives were collated, which matched the criteria detailed above. From these 29 individual narratives, significant statements were collated and assessed. As shown in the previous chapter, this first involved summarizing narratives into textural descriptions – essentially constructing simple statements on ‘what happened’; structural descriptions – essentially constructing simple statements on ‘how it happened’; and then categorizing them into themes and meanings units. To recall, ‘meaning units’ are related to the textural description and refer to the predominant meaning or motivation for the social action and can be categorized to match the constructed ideal types of diplomatic style, namely purposive-rational diplomatic style; value-rational diplomatic style; tradition-oriented diplomatic style; and emotion-oriented diplomatic style. Each meaning unit was then given a score of primary, secondary, tertiary or quaternary. Thus, Table 6 shows that from the 29 individual narratives collated from four subjects (A2, B2, C2, and D2) the sample group of serving and retired members of the Seoul diplomatic corps, the primary ideal type recognized as a feature of the South Korean diplomatic style was purposive-rational oriented diplomatic style, closely followed by emotion-oriented diplomatic style, value-rational diplomatic style, and tradition-oriented diplomatic style.

Table 6: Narrative meaning units – Seoul diplomatic corps

Subject		Purpose	Value	Tradition	Emotion
A2	Attended national day event	1	2	4	3
A2	Attended conference	1	3	4	2
A2	Attended conference	2	3	4	1

A2	Accompanied delegation to host-country ministry	1	2	4	3
A2	Accompanied delegation to regional government	1	2	4	3
A2	Attended bilateral event planning task force	1	4	2	3
A2	Meeting with host-country ministry	1	2	4	3
A2	Attended diplomatic corps social function	1	3	4	2
B2	Host-country official function	2	3	4	1
B2	Attended conference	1	3	4	2
B2	Meeting with host-country politician	2	4	3	1
B2	Attended host-country ministry course	1	3	4	2
B2	National Day	4	1	3	2
B2	Host-country event for diplomatic corps	2	3	4	1
C2	Award ceremony for scholarship holders	1	4	2	3
C2	Visiting delegation function	4	1	3	2
C2	Attended National Assembly function	1	3	4	2
C2	Host-country official function	2	1	4	3
C2	Attended national day event	4	3	2	1
C2	Commercial committee	1	3	4	2
D2	Consular assistance	4	3	1	2
D2	Trade delegation	1	2	4	3
D2	Consular assistance	4	3	2	1
D2	Chamber of commerce function	1	4	3	2
D2	Attended conference	4	3	1	2
D2	Attended bilateral planning committee	1	4	3	2

D2	Host-country official function	3	1	4	2
D2	Attended conference	2	4	3	1
D2	Attended conference	2	3	4	1
Total		56	80	96	58

As noted in the previous chapter, ‘themes’ are related to structural descriptions and refer to the underlying main cause of the social action. They were discussed with respondents in subsequent meetings and where possible, further explored in academic literature. From the 29 individual narratives collated, two predominant themes were discovered – cosmopolitanism and generational change.

Cosmopolitanism conveys a variety of approaches to explain the basic concept that regardless of local or particular social structures, humans are inherently affiliated to a wider shared universal social structure.⁴¹⁹ It is a particularly important phenomenon in the context of South Korea’s development. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the meaning units and themes, including cosmopolitanism are incorporated into a final synthesis of meanings and essence of experience, and are explored in detail in Chapter Eight.

Generational change refers to the idea that different age cohorts hold distinct socio-cultural values, based upon shared life experiences during critical developmental periods. As noted by Twenge and Campbell, “broad forces, such as parents, peers, media, and popular culture, create common value systems among people growing up at a particular time”, which “distinguish them from people who grow up at different times”.⁴²⁰ Once again, this is an important phenomenon in South Korea’s modern

⁴¹⁹ Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider, “Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences: A Research Agenda,” *The British Journal of Sociology*, 57, No. 1 (March 2006): 3.

⁴²⁰ Jean M. Twenge and Stacy M. Campbell, “Generational Differences in Psychological Traits and Their Impact on the Workplace,” *Journal of Managerial Psychology*, 23, No. 8 (2008): 863.

development. As noted above, the meaning units and themes, including generational change are incorporated into a final synthesis of meanings and essence of experience, and are explored in detail in Chapter Eight.

The two representative narratives below highlight the role of meanings units and themes in the South Korean diplomatic style, and explain them in context of South Korean foreign policy.

Representative narrative 3: Cosmopolitanism

The subject, named here as Alice, was an active member of the Seoul diplomatic corps from a developed country with historically strong and growing bilateral relationship with South Korea. At the time of our meetings she had been a member of the Seoul diplomatic corps for three years and had requested a fourth year. She had entered the diplomatic service as graduate trainee. She successfully completed the rotation through different sections of the foreign ministry, and was ultimately assigned to the Korea desk. Before her first posting she undertook intensive Korean language training, mixed (and practiced Korean) with the small circle of academics, business people, and Korean expatriates, who attended every function related to Korea in her home country. She interacted with South Korean officials on a daily basis. She had undertaken a myriad of tasks while at the embassy, this included preparations for incoming and outgoing state and federal parliamentary and ministerial delegations; preparations for the establishment of a new bilateral political and security dialogue mechanism; preparation for home country representation at multilateral forums in South Korea; and what had taken most of her time, preparation for bilateral trade negotiations. Accordingly, whilst she most prominently dealt with the South Korean MOFA, she also regularly dealt with other ministries. She regularly spent her non-work time with other members of the Seoul diplomatic corps, and had a strong network with other members around her age. She

particularly enjoyed talking Korean politics and foreign affairs at regular gatherings of friends from closely allied states, which would stretch from an afternoon meeting to evening drinks.

Alice understood diplomatic style in broad terms, contrasting several states and generalized behaviours. “Diplomatic style helps you understand the person”. She noted that it dictated the way you behave, and the way you get somebody to do something. This was an explicit understanding of style, reflected in her contrast of style to the ability of a professor to help students learn dependent on whether they were more attentive orally, aurally, or visually. For Alice, South Korean diplomatic style “varied greatly” and was “cosmopolitan”.⁴²¹ Although, she also believed it to be “confused, stressed and reactive”.⁴²² Her opinion was backed up by several examples. I met with Alice on several occasions during her posting in Seoul and on her return to her home country. My interviews with Alice highlighted cosmopolitanism in the context of South Korean diplomatic style.

I am very conscientious and I take my work seriously. Some of my friends say I take it too seriously, but I guess that's what got me into the graduate program in the first place... I wanted to work on South Korean affairs because it blends several areas of my interest – economic affairs, security affairs, and also people-to-people links.

I read everything I could on South Korea. I mean everything. Every book I could get my hands on I read. I also talked to lots of people to get an idea of what was waiting for me – and also to practice my language. Korean is not too hard... but

⁴²¹ Alice, Seoul diplomatic corps, Personal Interview, 2010.

⁴²² Ibid.

there was no point, since I've been here, I've only ever used English with Korean officials.

When I got here I was shocked. It was nothing like I expected. Everything that I read seemed out-dated... The Koreans I work with are just like us... I cannot find any differences... maybe the only thing is their temper... I've seen them get pretty stressed at times...

Once... my supervisor was engaged in discussions on a matter relating to the upcoming negotiations. To express the impossibility of the request he was silent, then noted that it would require extra work. This is a polite way of saying 'no' in most Asian cultures – I read about this, it applies to Korea too! But the exact opposite occurred... They took it for a 'yes' and the next day a pile of documents were in my inbox for further work! It was not what I or my colleagues expected ...the Koreans did not behave as the books written about them suggested!

...I contacted him to explain what happened, but he wouldn't accept my explanation... he had already written up his report and had it cleared and told me changing it would pose problems... he insisted several times that I at least look through the materials and pass it on to my supervisors... his arguments were quite frankly not logical... I did not like his attitude... He was actually quite angry about it.. he sounded so rude.

We arranged a meeting... When I refused to take the material to my supervisors I noticed he was beginning to cry... I thought it was a mental breakdown. He was responsible for FTA negotiations... this can be very tough. He looked fragile and stressed. I'd never let work get to me like that... I found out later... he'd been receiving death threats all week on the phone. It was not uncommon.

The negotiations he was engaged in were everywhere in the press and emotions were heated.

Alice, Seoul diplomatic corps, Personal Interview, 2010.

It was Thursday, early evening, and a number of young diplomats were gathering at a venue in Seoul for a meal and drinks at a chamber of commerce function. These functions, held by different state's chambers of commerce, acted as regular networking events, bringing together local and expatriate business people, government officials, and at times, academics. The evening's function was at a premier hotel in Seoul. It was summer themed, and encouraged participants to kick back and relax with a barbecue dinner, plentiful alcohol, and a distinctly 'less Korean' atmosphere. For the young members of the Seoul diplomatic corps, it was an opportunity to share stories, to hear others' stories. As previously noted, such contextual settings are ideal for the communication of tacit knowledge.

One of these diplomats, Alice, was on her first posting to Seoul. Her posting began at a significant time. Each conversation I saw her participate in with other members of the diplomatic corps, one topic alone dominated – Free Trade Agreement (FTAs). Warnings regarding the potential impact of the KORUS FTA on third parties had begun to appear more frequently in the Korean and international media. Each diplomat was eager to hear more about experiences of trade negotiation with South Korea. Several participants were from states, which had negotiations underway; several were from states, which had completed a scoping study, and were anticipating an announcement on the commencement of negotiations; others were from states, which were under pressure to enter into a scoping study, and commence on the sometimes long and difficult path towards completion of an FTA (some of which are still underway, four years after the evening!

The story above, related to me in detail by Alice, was representative of her experience in South Korea. The story, like most others on that evening, were about trade – specifically FTAs. Indeed it was typical of several other stories related to me by other members of the diplomatic corps on that very evening. Yet, a deeper reading reveals a more meaningful theme – cosmopolitanism in the context of the South Korea's diplomatic style. The story concerned her formative experience in South Korea. Common to many amongst the diplomatic corps, these experiences defied her expectations. She had made efforts to prepare for her posting in South Korea. She had read books, engaged academics, and former practitioners to learn more about what she could expect in Seoul. She claimed that she had put in substantially more effort to prepare for her posting to Seoul, than her colleagues did in preparing for other postings. According to Alice, she knew every book in the Korea section at her old university's library. She read as much as possible about Korea, particularly history and politics, in order to be prepared for her posting. Yet, she found this was inadequate: "I knew as soon as I arrived that Korea was very different from what I'd read".⁴²³

Alice was involved in preliminary negotiations towards an FTA. As a junior diplomat, it was her task to undertake much of the preparation. This included attending to meeting logistics, preparing speaking briefs, taking notes, and writing up results. It also allowed her ample time to watch and learn – an opportunity she considered equally important to establishing networks with other diplomats. As she noted, almost paraphrasing Harold Nicholson's own words, it is with these people that she would be working throughout her career, and they would prove important. Much like the senior colleagues she observed, she would ultimately in Nicholson's own words, have "either met or known

⁴²³ Ibid.

by reputation most of the professional diplomatists” of her age.⁴²⁴ Being able to observe and work with seniors, both from her home state and South Korea, served as a type of apprenticeship.

Alice had assumed that there would be no cultural surprises, as she’d read widely on Korean culture, and had many more practical aspects of it taught to her while in intensive language training both in her home country and in Seoul. During one meeting, she observed her seniors respond to South Korean requests with no response and several dismissive comments, such as “that would require extra work”, “that may prove too difficult” and “we will have to look at this later”. Alice explained to me her understanding of East Asian cultural traditions. Silence can indicate a polite, negative response, which ‘gives face’ to the requestor. Silence plus a dismissive remark can be used to avoid direct conflict and to demonstrate respect. Yet, when she went to work the next day, the South Korean side had understood silence to be acquiescence. There was a cultural misunderstanding. The South Korean side had effectively assumed that ‘international norms’ of western cultural tradition in trade negotiations would apply. Alice’s senior colleagues had assumed, much as Alice had assumed, that shared East Asian cultural traditions would apply in negotiations with South Korea. This was not the case. South Korean FTA negotiators did not demonstrate shared East Asian negotiating characteristics. When she tried to resolve the problem, she received responses that in her words, were “quite angry” and “rude”. They met for a quick lunch to see if both of them could sort the problem out before their supervisors had to deal with it. At lunch, her counterpart broke down. He cried. Alice found out later that he had received death threats because of his participation in FTA negotiations.

⁴²⁴ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 78–79.

Representative narrative 3: Cosmopolitanism in context

FTA negotiations serve as a useful subject of study to put cosmopolitanism in the South Korean diplomatic style into context. FTAs are trade policy instruments characterized by the preparation, negotiation and implementation of a legally binding international agreement, designed to remove barriers to trade in goods, services and in certain circumstances to regulate investment, environmental and labour provisions between participating states. An important aspect of bilateral FTA negotiations is their relative 'newness'. The modern FTA is a relatively recent phenomenon. While certain FTAs, such as the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA), implemented in 1983 and the United States-Israel FTA, concluded in 1985, pre-date the modern variety, the vast majority of FTAs now in effect were concluded after 1995. The implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, expansion of the European Union, successive failures to progress multilateral trade liberalization and the fear of being 'left out' resulted in an exponential growth of FTAs. When the WTO was formed in 1995, only 124 regional trade agreements had been notified to the WTO.⁴²⁵ As of January 2014, the total number of trade agreements in force reported to the WTO stood at 583.⁴²⁶

South Korea was a late entrant into the FTA race. It commenced negotiations for its first FTA with Chile in December 1999. These were concluded in October 2002, and after an agonizing domestic journey the FTA went into effect in April 2004. Before this, South Korea was one of only two WTO member economies that did not have an FTA. Since

⁴²⁵ WTO members are required to notify negotiation and accession to regional trade agreements under several WTO agreements including the Enabling Clause, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article V and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXIX.

⁴²⁶ World Trade Organization, "Regional Trade Agreements," *World Trade Organization*, January 31, 2014, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm.

overcoming the challenges of its first FTA, South Korea has pursued several with varying degrees of success.

South Koreans involved in FTA negotiations are overwhelmingly international in their outlook. In no way can they be narrowly defined within a distinct South Korean cultural context. In interviews with 36 negotiators and support staff more than three-quarters had undertaken postgraduate studies abroad and all had on average undertaken at least three trips to the target countries prior to an official launch of negotiations. They shared a high degree of familiarity and cultural understanding with western cultural tradition. Further, interviewees from the diplomatic corps that interact with South Korean economic negotiators on a regular basis recognized no specific instances of cultural miscommunication. Interlocutors of South Korean diplomatic practitioners in the capital, Seoul, recognized that instances of cultural miscommunication occurred less frequently in the context of trade than in other sectors of the relationship. Reflecting the personnel involved, this was hardly surprising. So strong was this international outlook that in certain circumstances, South Korean negotiators took on identities that are wholly unrepresentative of traditional Korean cultural values and customs.

There is a large gap between what has been written on South Korean negotiation and what actually occurs in contemporary practice. In 1999, *Asian Survey* published a paper by Scott Snyder entitled 'Patterns of Negotiation in a South Korean Cultural Context'.⁴²⁷ The paper contributed broadly to Korean studies and was subsequently referenced not only in papers that argue the prominence of a distinct South Korean national style in general negotiation, but also influenced those that argue the existence

⁴²⁷ Scott Snyder, "Patterns of Negotiation in a South Korean Cultural Context," *Asian Survey*, 39, No. 3 (1999): 394–417.

of distinct South and North Korean national styles in leadership, strategy, management, social organization and diplomatic style.⁴²⁸

The 1999 paper sought to identify within South Korean society what the author termed “dominant and perhaps unique patterns” in behaviour that have a bearing on negotiation and conflict resolution.⁴²⁹ Snyder analysed the cycle of conflict initiation, escalation, management and resolution, in a selected series of case studies in order to highlight typical variables in the South Korean approach to conflict management or conflict resolution.

Snyder’s work, like many before and after, placed hierarchism and collectivism behind the fundamental patterns of behaviour and thought that mold perceptions within South Korean society. Hierarchism and collectivism are two facets of the inherited Confucian norms and values that shape strategies of action in contemporary South Korea.⁴³⁰

Traditional Korean Confucian social institutions sought to maintain stable political order and social harmony. For the purposes of this study, the Confucian value system can be encapsulated in the order of social relationships, which are outlined by the Three Bonds and Five Relations (ruler-subject, father-son, husband-wife, elder-younger, friend-friend). This framework of social relationships promoted reciprocity, loyalty, virtue, self-cultivation and morality. Individuals were aware of their position in the social network, be it family, clan, kin, school, region or state and acted accordingly. Stability was predicated on subservience to seniors and benevolence to juniors.

⁴²⁸ For a wide selection see Jongryn Mo, “Political Culture and Legislative Gridlock: Politics of Economic Reform in Precrisis Korea”, *Comparative Political Studies*, 34, No. 5 (June 2001): 467-492; Andrew O’Neil, “Confronting the Reality of a Nuclear North Korea: The Challenge of Shrinking Policy Options,” *Policy and Society*, 23, No. 2 (2004): 101-128; Dennis McNamara, *Market and society in Korea: Interest, Institution and the Textile Industry* (London: Routledge, 2002); and Brian Bridges, *Korea After the Crash: The Politics of Economic Recovery* (London: Routledge, 2001).

⁴²⁹ Snyder, “Patterns of Negotiation in a South Korean Cultural Context,” 395.

⁴³⁰ Yunesuko Hanguk Wiwonhoe, *Korean Philosophy: Its Tradition and Modern Transformation* (Seoul: Hollym, 2004).

Authority was “tempered by benevolence downward and reciprocal loyalty and submissiveness to the state from below”.⁴³¹

Despite the momentous political and social upheaval of modernization, occupation, national division and economic development, there remains a distinct Confucian cultural legacy in contemporary South Korea, which acts as an internalized guide to social behaviour.⁴³² As Rozman notes, the Confucian legacy remains as “a set of ideals to achieve goals at the individual, community and state level.”⁴³³

Snyder squarely places this Confucian cultural legacy at the centre of conflict initiation, escalation, management and resolution – the process leading to all negotiated outcomes. Snyder viewed recurrent variables in South Korean negotiations as the direct result of efforts to destabilize (initiation and escalation) and stabilize (management and resolution) relationships that are predicated on Confucian mores and norms, both within and external to negotiating teams. The recurrent variables that Snyder identified include crisis initiation, brinkmanship, stalling, inflexibility and moral suasion.

In a society in which Confucian norms and mores predominate, a crisis, be it real or manufactured, serves a dual purpose. First, it creates the opportunity for power to be redistributed within a hierarchical relationship. Crisis, and the threat of instability, necessitates the initiation or facilitation of stabilization efforts. It allows the economic, social and symbolic capital, which reinforces typical disparate social relationships, such as ruler-subject or elder-younger, to be momentarily displaced, thus allowing negotiation to commence and/or proceed. Second, crisis creates the opportunity for

⁴³¹ Michael Robinson, “Perceptions of Confucianism in Twentieth-Century Korea,” in *The East Asian Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaption* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 205.

⁴³² Young Whan Kihl, “The Legacy of Confucian Culture and South Korean Politics and Economics,” in *Korean Philosophy: Its Tradition and Modern Transformation* (Seoul: Hollym, 2004), 138.

⁴³³ Gilbert Rozman, *The East Asian Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), iii.

power to be consolidated within a social group. Crisis, and the threat of instability, necessitates unity and resolve, thus overcoming internal opposition and reinforcing collective behaviour. Reflecting this, it is argued that South Korean negotiators frequently use crisis as a means to either commence and/or facilitate negotiation.

The use of brinkmanship in the South Korean cultural context is closely related to the use of crisis. Essentially, it is a precursor, establishing the conditions in which crisis can be utilized to commence and/or facilitate negotiation. Thus, in the South Korean cultural context, it is more than a tactical device. There are multiple examples of the use of brinkmanship in South Korean negotiations. Snyder goes further to suggest that North Korea's use of brinkmanship may be attributed to similar cultural influences. Many scholars have written on North Korea's use of brinkmanship. However, as Snyder notes, it would require further access to North Korea before a specific cultural link could be established.

Snyder identifies the use of stalling and inflexibility as further recurrent variables in South Korean negotiations. Once again, these variables can be linked to efforts to manage relationships predicated on Confucian mores and norms. What may appear as stalling and inflexibility to opposing negotiating partners, is more often an attempt to secure internal group solidarity and is thus geared toward stabilization. As Snyder argues, the need for internal consensus often requires South Korean negotiators to delay progress until an internal decision can be made.

South Korean negotiating teams are often larger than those of their western counterparts. This is due to the fact that in collectivist cultures decision-making requires a degree of consensus, necessitating representation of different interests. It is often the case that in formal diplomatic negotiations, representatives from differing government departments would be equally represented, each with their own agenda and aims. In comparison,

western negotiators are often delegated authority from other government departments to negotiate on their behalf with agendas and priorities agreed upon prior to negotiations taking place.

Further, South Korean negotiators are often not delegated authority to undertake key decisions. While western negotiators are often delegated authority to negotiate the best outcome within a set of margins, South Korean negotiators are often directed to achieve a specific outcome. If this outcome cannot be achieved, consultation with higher authorities will be required before an alternative outcome can be accepted. This cultural influence can be somewhat comical. John Kie-Chiang Oh and Bonnie Bongwan Cho Oh note that during negotiations with Japan in the 1950s, the importance of demonstrating subservience to authority placed South Korean negotiators in difficult circumstances:

President Rhee's understandable and vehement enmity against the Japanese had much to do with the long stalemates at Korea-Japan meetings... 'negotiations' sometimes amounted to the Koreans reading vitriolic statements, which were reportedly drafted by President Rhee himself.⁴³⁴

Another recurrent variable not identified by Snyder in the paper in question, but relentlessly repeated in texts on South Korean commercial negotiation, is the related phenomena of post-agreement negotiation or the renegotiation of agreed texts.⁴³⁵ The propensity of this phenomenon to occur in commercial negotiations with Korean counterparts leads certain writers to conclude that negotiations with Korean counterparts do not actually begin until an agreement has been signed. As noted by Jeswald Salacuse:

⁴³⁴ John Oh, *The Korean Embassy in America* (Seoul: Hollym, 2003), 61.

⁴³⁵ It should be noted that renegotiation of agreed texts in the context of North Korea is covered extensively in: Scott Snyder, *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1999).

...for Americans, signing a contract is closing a deal; for many Asians signing a contract might more appropriately be called opening a relationship.⁴³⁶

In a society in which Confucian norms and mores predominate, the ritual expression of reciprocity, loyalty, virtue, self-cultivation and morality, are inherently more important than words on a page reiterating the same. Accordingly, negotiations, which establish the relationship and the concomitant hierarchical status, need to be reinforced through ritual or symbolic expression. As much as this may appear to be the renegotiation of an agreed text to the non-Korean observer, it may appear to the Korean negotiator as merely the demonstration of benevolence, submissiveness or reciprocal loyalty in the fulfilment of an ongoing relationship.

The final recurrent variable that Snyder identified in South Korean negotiations is the use of moral suasion. Moral suasion is essentially an effort to stabilize and/or consolidate social relationships predicated on Confucian mores and norms. When power is redistributed in a hierarchical relationship, the relationship needs to be redefined. This means that patterns of reciprocity, loyalty, virtue, subservience and benevolence must again be demonstrated. In the context of negotiations, this is often evidenced by calls to moral conscience. A negotiator will often seek to remind a partner of their loyalty, their subservience or benevolence, and encourage the partner to act accordingly. This can occur regardless of the partner's awareness of Confucian mores and norms. Essentially, for a South Korean negotiator, it is the conceptual framework within which the social relationship is structured.

Accordingly, as encapsulated in the work of Snyder, existing texts have identified a series of recurrent variables in South Korean negotiation. The use of crisis,

⁴³⁶ Jeswald W. Salacuse, "Intercultural Negotiation in International Business," *Group Decision and Negotiation*, 8, No. 3 (May 1, 1999): 224.

brinkmanship, stalling, inflexibility, the renegotiation of agreed texts and moral suasion were thought to be recurrent variables in South Korean negotiation. Any narrative which would highlight elements of these recurring variables interested me greatly. A story I was told by one diplomat highlighted the substantial difference in behaviour that they had experienced. The story related to the closing moments of negotiations towards the KORUS FTA.

At 01:00 am on 2 April 2007, top-level negotiators from the United States and South Korea struggled to conclude negotiations for a comprehensive bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The deadline for talks had been extended two times. To South Korean negotiators, each deadline had appeared to be the last chance. Each deadline had initiated a crisis both within the Korean side and seemingly, their partners. Pressure had been mounting since the United States publicly indicated that the agreement was likely fail. On 30 April, Whitehouse spokesperson Tony Fratto in an email statement released to the press had remarked, "The talks are not going well. Unless the negotiations show some sign of progress in the next few hours this agreement will most likely not come together".⁴³⁷ Since the release of the statement, the negotiations appeared to be in crisis and were on the brink of collapse.

South Korea was the largest economic partner to negotiate an FTA with the United States since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which went into force in 1994. Studies have shown that an FTA could add more than USD10-12 billion to United States Gross Domestic Product (GDP).⁴³⁸ Yet, supporters in the United States describe the FTA as more significant than the dollar value alone. It is described as central to efforts to reinvigorate the wider bilateral relationship in political, security and

⁴³⁷ Reuters, "Whitehouse Says S.Korea Trade Talks Not Going Well," *Reuters*, March 30, 2007.

⁴³⁸ "Korea - U.S. Free Trade Agreement", Office of the United States Trade Representative, <http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta>.

economic terms. As noted by US Ambassador Ron Kirk at the US-Korea Business Council:

...the potential effects of this FTA extend far beyond the economic realm. This Agreement will help to strengthen our bilateral alliance at a crucial time in global political affairs. While some Congressional leaders have continued to voice concern over specific elements of the FTA, they have told the President time and again that they are interested in expanding America's strong and proven partnership with South Korea. And they see this Agreement as one way to do so.⁴³⁹

The relationship, which suffered from waning support due to generational change, was the focus of several widespread demonstrations during the period 2002-2009. Essentially, support for the FTA and the wider alliance was presented as a 'moral' issue.

The deal was finally reached seven hours before the final opportunity for United States President George W. Bush to notify Congress of the intention to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with South Korea. "Fast-track" trade promotion authority, which would expire on 1 July 2007, required United States negotiators to submit the proposed text to Congress by 2 April 2007 (Washington time) for a mandatory 90-day congressional review in return for an up or down vote. This was an inflexible deadline. Failure to meet the deadline would mean that the FTA would be mired in congressional politics and would be unlikely to pass.

Within one week after the negotiations concluded, press reports indicated that the United States would seek to renegotiate certain aspects of the agreement. In mid-June 2007, the United States made a formal request to renegotiate sections of the agreement.

⁴³⁹ Ron Kirk, "Remarks by Ambassador Ron Kirk at the U.S.-Korea Business Council, Office of the United States Trade Representative," accessed July 14, 2010, <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2009/november/remarks-ambassador-ron-kirk-us-korea-busine>.

While South Korean negotiators had persistently reiterated their refusal to renegotiate the agreement since the press reports first emerged, on 19 June 2007, South Korea accepted the United States request to further discuss the agreement. In March 2009, during confirmation hearings for incoming United States Trade Representative, Ron Kirk, in incongruously moral terms, noted that the negotiated FTA "simply isn't fair" and needed to be renegotiated.⁴⁴⁰ Finally, on 27 June 2010, both sides agreed to enter into working level talks on the FTA. The talks were labelled as "adjustments" rather than "renegotiation".⁴⁴¹

The vignette above had become a hot topic in the Seoul diplomatic corps – particularly amongst those working on trade. From an academic standpoint, it challenged the assumption that specific negotiating behaviours were tied to common cultural traits. Indeed, if one were to switch the actors around the vignette would make more sense. It was the United States that initiated crisis after crisis as deadlines approached. It was the United States that used brinkmanship as the final deadline drew near, letting it be known via the press that the negotiations were near collapse. It was the United States that had utilized inflexibility, stalling and moral suasion to pressure the Korean side into the renegotiation of an agreed text. The United States had demonstrated use of crisis, brinkmanship, stalling, inflexibility, the renegotiation of agreed texts and moral suasion—variables, which have been characterized as recurrent in South Korean negotiations. The vignette suggests that in this, and similar circumstances, there may exist patterns of negotiation involving South Korean diplomats that are *not* in accordance with expectations based on explicit accounts of the South Korean diplomatic

⁴⁴⁰ Agence France Press, "Obama's trade pointman vows strict enforcement," 10 March 2009.

⁴⁴¹ He-Suk Choi, "Obama Pledge Boosts KORUS FTA," *Korea Herald*, June 27, 2010, <http://www.koreaherald.com/business/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20100627000251>.

style. From a practice standpoint, it stood as a reference point to the stories told to me by members of the diplomatic corps.

The majority of participants in FTA negotiations demonstrate common purpose and background. FTA negotiations were originally designed to bring together states with similar levels of economic development, thus removing negotiation obstacles which existed at the multilateral level. The early trend towards FTAs generally involved states with advanced economies and similar levels of development. These states shared a common sense of identity and purpose. Subsequent states which pursued FTAs did so for a variety of reasons, including the pursuit of political goals and the desire to avoid competitors obtaining market advantage. Regardless of the rationale behind the pursuit of an FTA, the majority of these states shared a common identity in the pursuit of free market liberalization and common purposes of trade volume growth. This has certainly been the case for South Korea.

FTA negotiations also bring together people with similar backgrounds. Trade negotiators, and in particular the large coterie of specialist advisors, often have similar educational and professional backgrounds. This is particularly relevant in the case of South Korea, where there is a significant benefit to be accrued from postgraduate study in the United States. Further, trade negotiators and advisors in any particular FTA negotiation are often known to each other through the work undertaken in the lead-up to FTA negotiations. Most FTAs are negotiated only after a scoping or feasibility study has demonstrated that an FTA is economically beneficial and politically feasible. These studies usually take around one year to complete, involve academics and government trade specialists, and require substantial coordination between future negotiating partners.

Finally, FTA negotiations are generally undertaken over a long duration. While diplomatic interaction between any two states is an ongoing process, in most cases, individual diplomats spend a limited amount of time at post, usually 3 to 4 years. Accordingly, on a personal level, the level of interaction between a diplomat and the members of the foreign ministry with which they deal is limited in duration. In comparison, FTA negotiations can last substantially longer, requiring both diplomats and specialists involved in the negotiations to interact with foreign counterparts on a constant basis from the initial pre-negotiation period, throughout negotiations and during implementation.

The time period from the initial pre-negotiation period, throughout negotiations and implementation can be significant. Preparation towards an FTA between South Korea and the United States commenced considerably before the official launch of negotiations occurred on 2 February 2006. Indeed, there appears to have been quite substantial negotiations, with many believing South Korea's unilateral concessions in beef, automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and screen quotas to be connected to the launch of FTA negotiations.⁴⁴² Economic studies that would have required the interaction between the two sides can be traced back to 2001.⁴⁴³ In June 2010, during a meeting between South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak and US President Barack Obama, it was stated that both leaders would seek to have the FTA ratified in time for their next scheduled meeting on the sides of the G20 Summit in November 2010. Accordingly, a high degree of familiarity between participants would be expected. Such long-running negotiations,

⁴⁴² Wonhyuk Lim, "KORUS FTA: A Mysterious Beginning and an Uncertain Future," *Asian Perspective*, 30, No. 4 (2006): 179.

⁴⁴³ United States International Trade Commission (USITC), *U.S.-Korea FTA: The Economic Impact of Establishing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the United States and the Republic of Korea*, Investigation (Washington D.C.: United States International Trade Commission, September 2001).

and the fact that participants share professionally similar backgrounds, would conceivably contribute to the fostering of cosmopolitan attitudes amongst participants.

Table 7 below highlights statements made by Alice during meetings in which she retold the above story. The formulated meanings and action clusters were the result of further questioning on each specific statement.

Table 7: Alice – Significant statements, formulated meanings, and action clusters

Significant Statement	Formulated Meaning	Action Cluster
When I got here I was shocked. It was nothing like I expected. Everything that I read seemed out-dated. Even things people told me about Korea seemed out-dated...	<p>Korean diplomatic practice is <i>cosmopolitan</i> and <i>distinct from explicit accounts</i>.</p> <p><i>Cosmopolitan</i>: Alice's experience of SK diplomats show rapid change (in period of one posting and replacement, approx. 7 years) and particularly generational change (between ex-members of diplomatic corps and contemporary members), with younger generation highly cosmopolitan.</p> <p><i>Distinct from explicit accounts</i>: Much of what is written on negotiating style and foreign policy is out-dated. Much of what is written highlights cultural roots of behaviour, which are not evident in contemporary style.</p>	Purposive
...the Koreans I work with are just like us... I cannot find many differences... there is really no difference when we work together today...	<p>Korean diplomatic practice is <i>cosmopolitan</i> and <i>modern</i>.</p> <p><i>Cosmopolitan</i>: Alice's experience highlights very cosmopolitan style, with SK diplomats well-travelled, educated, and experienced. In particular, many mentioned knowing diplomats from previous positions.</p> <p><i>Modern</i>: Alice's experience of SK diplomats highlight openness to modern and innovative approaches to diplomatic practice, rather than</p>	Purposive

	traditional formulas.	
It was not what I or my colleagues expected ...the Koreans did not behave as the books written about them suggested!	<p>Korean diplomatic practice is <i>cosmopolitan</i> and <i>distinct from explicit accounts</i>.</p> <p><i>Cosmopolitan</i>: Alice's experience of SK diplomats show cosmopolitanism, including amongst other non-national members (this is also a feature amongst multilateral staff working with SK diplomats)</p> <p><i>Distinct from explicit accounts</i>: Much of what is written on negotiating style and foreign policy is out-dated – this includes foreign ministry recorded notes of meetings. Specifically, the change between SK administrations can lead to significant changes in approach (esp. experienced to less experienced and vice-versa).</p>	Purposive
FTA negotiations include more specialized participants, but so do all issues we handle nowadays... our Korean counterparts in FTA negotiations are essentially no different to...[other areas].	<p>Korean diplomatic practice is <i>cosmopolitan</i> and <i>modern</i>.</p> <p><i>Cosmopolitan</i>: Alice's experience highlights very cosmopolitan style, with SK diplomats well-travelled, educated, and experienced. In particular, many mentioned knowing diplomats from previous positions.</p> <p><i>Modern</i>: Alice's experience of SK diplomats highlight openness to modern and innovative approaches to diplomatic practice, rather than traditional formulas.</p>	Purposive
...I contacted him to explain what happened, but he wouldn't accept my explanation... He was actually quite angry about it.. he sounded so rude.	<p>Korean diplomatic practice is marked by both <i>adherence to procedures</i> and <i>emotion</i>.</p> <p><i>Adherence to procedures</i>: Alice's experiences highlight that SK diplomats have tendency to revert to procedure in periods of uncertainty (contradicting openness to modern and innovative approaches to diplomatic</p>	<p>Purposive</p> <p>Emotional</p>

	<p>practice).</p> <p><i>Emotion:</i> Alice's experiences highlight that SK diplomats have tendency to emotionalism during periods of uncertainty.</p>	
<p>When I refused to take the material to my supervisors I noticed he was beginning to cry... I thought it was a mental breakdown. He was responsible for FTA negotiations... this can be very tough. He looked fragile and stressed.</p>	<p>Korean diplomatic practice is marked by <i>stress</i> and <i>emotion</i>.</p> <p><i>Stress:</i> Alice's experience highlights very high levels of stress caused by over work, responsibility, time pressures, and public opposition to policy.</p> <p><i>Emotion:</i> Alice's experience highlights significant emotional reactions to stress, including direct relation to work.</p>	Emotion
<p>...he'd been receiving death threats all week on the phone. It was not uncommon. The negotiations he was engaged in were everywhere in the press and emotions were heated.</p>	<p>Korean diplomatic practice is marked by <i>stress</i> caused by <i>public opinion</i>.</p> <p><i>Stress:</i> Alice's experience highlights very high levels of stress caused by public opposition to policies that diplomats are required to implement, particularly during period of FTA negotiations.</p> <p><i>Public opinion:</i> regarding diplomats quite low. Viewed as elitist, corrupt, and removed from general public. Specifically in context of FTAs, dual citizenship, and treatment of Koreans abroad. Highly emotional reaction.</p>	Emotion
<p>Korean diplomats, especially trade negotiators, always seem stressed. I mean we are too but the difference is we can work through the problem in a rational and logical way.</p>	<p>Korean diplomatic practice is marked by <i>stress</i> and <i>emotion</i>.</p> <p><i>Stress:</i> Alice's experience highlights very high levels of stress caused by over work, responsibility, time pressures, and public opposition to policy.</p> <p><i>Emotion:</i> Alice's experience highlights significant emotional reactions to stress,</p>	Emotion

	including direct relation to work.	
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Alice did not have the same level of experience as other diplomats. However, her willingness and ability to relate stories concerning her experiences was substantially stronger than other subjects. This was greatly helped by her diary. Alice kept a diary in which she recorded events in great detail. Throughout our conversations she would refer back to it, in order to confirm details. Her stories were thus particularly vivid, and her personal opinions on issues not clouded by time. In addition, Alice's interaction with South Korean officials was strongly buttressed by her networking within the Seoul diplomatic corps. She had a strong network of friends and colleagues, from a wide variety of states with a very close group of similar aged friends and colleagues from states with strong bilateral relations to her state.

In the course of the week prior to our first interview, Alice had two social engagements with South Korean officials and three social engagements with members of the Seoul diplomatic corps. Similar to others, she noted that there was very little difference between the social and the professional while at post. This was, she insisted, a very quiet week. She would normally interact with South Korean officials on social level two to three times a week and with members of Seoul diplomatic corps "every other night". She considered her social relationships with both South Korean officials and members of the Seoul diplomatic corps to be particularly strong. She believed she would keep in contact with most of them after her posting and hoped to work with them, and planned to visit them in the future. In the course of the week prior to our first interview, she could recall eight 'significant events' of diplomatic action in the course of interaction with South Korean foreign ministry staff. From Alice's retelling of the events listed in

Table 8, she believed the South Korean diplomatic style to be predominantly a purposive-rational oriented diplomatic style.

Table 8: Alice – Significant events and meaning units

	Purpose	Value	Tradition	Emotion
Attended national day event	1	2	4	3
Attended conference	1	3	4	2
Attended conference	2	3	4	1
Accompanied delegation to host-country ministry	1	2	4	3
Accompanied delegation to regional government	1	2	4	3
Attended bilateral event planning task force	1	4	2	3
Meeting with host-country ministry	1	2	4	3
Attended diplomatic corps social function	1	3	4	2
Total	9	21	30	20

The subjects we discussed included trade and middlepowerism. In particular and as noted, FTAs were particularly prominent topic of conversations during the period of our meetings. After a particularly long discussion on FTAs on the evening when the above narrative was told, she noted that the evening had proceeded like most evenings at the time with an overwhelming focus on FTAs and demonstrations.

The central theme highlighted in our conversations was the cosmopolitanism of South Korean diplomatic action. This was particularly revealing and stood out against other interview subjects. Alice viewed South Korean diplomatic style differently from other interview subjects. She thought there was a lack of consistency in officials she interacted with. She noted the majority were very cosmopolitan and even denationalized, making her feel as if she was dealing with a Korean who had lived in her

own country for as long as her. A significantly smaller number were considerably less cosmopolitan, less open to compromise, matching every generalization about Koreans she had read before arriving at post. She noted this was generally limited to officials who were older, but not those who had risen to higher levels of leadership. Despite the cosmopolitanism, she had still experienced several noticeable incidents of emotionalism. This included several outbursts of anger and frustration, which she deemed inappropriate. She put this down to stress. In most cases, she recognized, it was younger diplomats were desperately trying to fulfil requirements placed on them.

Alice's assessment of South Korean diplomatic style as cosmopolitan was the least supported amongst other interviewees. However, significantly, it was highly supported amongst two groups – those who interacted with younger foreign ministry staff, and those who interacted with officials working in trade and investment. This was supported by other sources. Between the 1990s and the 2000s, there was a steady increase in the number of personnel recruited who have studied and/or lived overseas, particularly in related economic ministries participating in FTA negotiations.⁴⁴⁴ The stories told by Alice highlighted that the inputs into diplomatic style are very dynamic. Her narrative highlights the influence of cosmopolitanism on the South Korean diplomatic style, and the predominance of a purposive-rational oriented motivation for diplomatic action.

Representative narrative 4: Generational change

The subject, named here as Bay, was an active member of the Seoul diplomatic corps from a developing country with a vibrant and growing bilateral relationship with South Korea. At the time of our meetings, she had been a member of the Seoul diplomatic corps for three years and was now into her fourth year. She was a senior officer in the diplomatic service of her country, on her third posting and her second to Seoul. She

⁴⁴⁴ KIEP, Interviews at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), February 2008.

spoke Korean fluently, as well as several other East Asian languages. She interacted with South Korean officials on a daily basis.

The size of her embassy meant that she undertook a wide range of tasks. Her favourite of these was trade and industry cooperation, and least favourite consular. She had a personal passion for Korean studies and was particularly interested in North and South Korean interaction. Many citizens of her country were in South Korea undertaking low-paid, labour intensive, and often dangerous work. Consular work was difficult given the nature of problems, which occurred and the difficulty of providing assistance. Most of her work was with South Korean MOFA, but often also included other agencies. Bay spent a lot of time with other members of the Seoul diplomatic corps, and had a strong network of contacts and friends. She spent a lot of time with diplomats from states belonging to the same regional organization as her country. Bay thought diplomatic style was significant but “dangerous”. Individuals do not always demonstrate the style they should, she noted. She gave examples of diplomats from multicultural states, whom she thought “could take on multiple styles”.⁴⁴⁵ Still focused on the previous train of thought, her estimation of South Korean style was that it is “more varied” and that it would be dangerous to generalize. My interviews with Bay highlighted generational change in the context of South Korean diplomatic style.

All the senior officers are men, and these old men are very different from younger diplomats... I arranged annual bilateral talks every year... every time I met with my ROK partners during the first and second year... it was unpleasant... it felt as if I was being interrogated. It felt like I was the enemy. Every second question was about our links with North Korea. North Korea acted as a shadow over everything we did...

⁴⁴⁵ Bay, Seoul diplomatic corps, Personal Interview, 2011.

During my third and fourth year I worked with a different diplomat... a much younger diplomat. He was charming and polite. I really looked forward to going to our meetings. On one occasion... I was here at a conference on human rights. There were North Koreans who told stories about their difficult time in North Korea and in China... Some came through Vietnam... One story was particularly sad, about her child... I saw tears form in his eyes. I saw a diplomat cry... His senior talked sternly to him. He went outside and returned later...

He was really a different type of diplomat. North Korea still played a large role, but only in the context of reform, trade, and investment. There was more talk about development. It felt like we were partners... sometimes rivals... in trade... but not enemies.

Bay, Seoul diplomatic corps, Personal Interview, 2011.

Bay often attended the University of North Korean Studies. It is located at the top of a picturesque walk from an equally idyllic café district in the Bukchon district of Seoul. The pleasantness of the location contrasts to the seriousness of the subjects discussed within the halls of the small graduate school. The University of North Korean Studies was established in 1998 and claims to be the first graduate school specifically specializing in the study of North Korea. Along with the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES), it is one of two Seoul-based graduate schools of Kyungnam University. The two graduate schools are collocated and share faculty. Given the substantially stronger reputation of IFES, it was clear that the founders also hoped the two graduate schools would also ultimately share their reputation.

The collocated University of North Korean Studies and IFES are one of the several destinations on the conference circuit for foreign specialists and researchers of North Korea, given the regular conferences and functions held at the campus, the expertise of

the faculty, and the interests of the student body. I had previously stayed at IFES as a Visiting Fellow. I knew the walk up the hill towards the Institute, I knew the entrance to the conference hall that avoided the front door and let me walk past the faculty and administration officers, and I knew the coolest place was not the conference hall but rather the strongly air-conditioned library nearby. As a Visiting Fellow, I had also undertaken several interviews with a diplomat who regularly turned up at the air-conditioned library during late lunch hours, and was a regular attendee at every conference small and large – Ms. Bay.

Today's conference focused on non-traditional security issues in North Korea. It included an impressive mix of domestic and foreign specialists, including names, such as Su-Hoon Lee and Taik-Young Hamm, both colleagues from IFES-University of North Korean Studies, Jae-Jung Suh from John Hopkins University, Peter Hayes of the Nautilus Institute, David Kang of the University of Southern California, and Scott Snyder of the Asia Foundation. All were names, which if you studied North Korea from afar were easily recognizable and very welcome, but if you studied from much closer, served as all too regular participants with their views somewhat expected.

Ms. Bay's story related above is on the surface focused on the subject of North Korea. Yet, on another level, it is insider's view into generational change in the South Korean diplomatic style. The story was reflective of several others I heard amongst the diplomatic corps. The story, or varieties of it, were common to diplomats across a variety of states, regardless of their relationship to South Korea. Yet, Ms. Bay told it in a way which highlighted it within the context of perhaps the most common topic in South Korean foreign affairs – North Korea.

Like many diplomats at post, Ms. Bay had several annual events for which she was responsible. For three years of her posting to Seoul, she had undertaken preparation for

an annual meeting between officials of her country and the host country. During first two years, preparations had been difficult. In particular, dealing with one diplomat had given her problems. In her words "I struggled to build a relationship, until I gave up. We are from different countries, sure, but I felt he actually disliked me and my country".⁴⁴⁶ She went on to say that she felt that she was not dealing with a diplomat, but rather a businessman. The difference she pointed out was that that diplomats knew they must to deal with each other, and regardless of personal differences, get on with the job. Business people can choose who they deal with (within limits). Bay felt like she was being treated as a business person, by another business person who had no interest in doing business.

However, in her third year, the situation changed substantially. The South Korean officer responsible for dealing with Ms. Bay's embassy had changed. She described in detail the difference between the two. The first was older, the second was younger. The first was courteous but cold, the second was both courteous and warm. Her feelings toward the first was an "almost adversarial" relationship, the second was "a true working partnership" and "a friendship".⁴⁴⁷

Ms. Bay felt that her state had meant little to the first officer. Indeed, she had felt that the relationship was inherently affected by the politics of the Cold War that had once kept her state and South Korea inherently opposed. He had on several occasions questioned her on political developments in her country on which she had no idea. He had on several occasions asked her questions regarding her state's relations with North Korea, and about her experience with North Korean diplomats. She felt that "North

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.

Korea acted as a shadow over everything we did".⁴⁴⁸ North Korea was both a weight, which slowed down progress, and a hurdle, which could not be passed.

Ms. Bay was more impressed by the second officer. The officer was "charming and polite" and a "pleasure to work with".⁴⁴⁹ Indeed, she admitted that he was the type of Korean man that most women from her country see in the cinema and want to meet. Ms. Bay noted that it was not just in his looks or mannerisms that he was different. It was also his attitudes. During a previous conferences at the IFES campus, she had seen both officers at the same time – the first who she had dreaded working with and the second she had looked forward to working with. The conference was on human rights and the plight of North Koreans in China. The conference included presentations by North Korean refugees, including those who had suffered abuse and exploitation in China and other transit countries to South Korea. The conference included a large number of government representatives from continental Southeast Asian states, international NGO advocates, academics, and media. At one point of the proceedings, as a mother told of losing her child Ms. Bay saw the younger South Korean diplomat start to silently cry. Tears formed in his eyes and rolled down his cheeks. Then she saw what most caught her attention. The senior South Korean diplomat, who had so tormented her, appeared to scold the younger diplomat. He talked quietly, but in both of their facial expressions Ms. Bay knew what was happening. The younger diplomat exited the conference hall. He returned after a while with dry eyes and a sterner expression.

Her relationship with the younger diplomat was fundamentally different. She believed it was no longer adversarial. There was no vestiges of the Cold War that linked her country to an antagonistic relationship with South Korea. Rivalry was limited to

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid.

competition to secure advantage in trade and investment – and even this was never presented as a zero sum game. She felt that the officer recognized that both sides benefited from working together. She fielded only several queries regarding North Korea – and each was focused on economic reform or investment. More about helping North Korea find its way out of its problems than competing with it. “North Korea is a global challenge, a regional challenge”.⁴⁵⁰ Within one generation of diplomats, North Korea’s position in the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Bay’s country had changed. To the new generation of South Korean diplomats, North Korea was neither a weight, nor hurdle to the bilateral relationship.

Representative narrative 4: Generational change in context

North Korea invokes an array of contradictions. It is described as both the ‘most militarized country in the world’⁴⁵¹, but also as a ‘relatively powerless nation’.⁴⁵² It has been described as pursuing a policy of ‘international military extortion’⁴⁵³, but also seeking to ‘come in from the cold’.⁴⁵⁴ Arguably, it is above all a lack of knowledge that pervades English language discussion and debate on North Korea, summed up succinctly by the historian Bruce Cummings when he states that North Korea has “evolved into a singular and puzzling nation that resists easy description”.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁵¹ Joseph Bermudez, *Shield of the Great Leader: The Armed Forces of North Korea* (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 2001), 1.

⁴⁵² Chuck Downs, *Over the Line: Dealing with North Korea under the Armistice* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1999), 2.

⁴⁵³ Nick Eberstadt, *The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis & Catastrophe* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007), xxiv.

⁴⁵⁴ Bertil Lintner and Suh-Kyung Yoon, “Coming in from the Cold,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 25, 2001.

⁴⁵⁵ Cummings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History*, 394.

At the closing stages of the Second World War the Soviet Union and the United States agreed that their respective forces would occupy the Korean peninsula divided by the 38th parallel just north of the capital, Seoul. With the rapid emergence of the Cold War, efforts to unify the peninsula under a single government failed. A pro-Soviet regime, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was installed in the North under Kim Il-Sung, an anti-Japanese resistance fighter who had fled to Soviet territory during the Japanese occupation. In the South, a pro-American regime, the Republic of Korea (ROK), was established, led by an American exile, Syngman Rhee.

North Korea emerged rapidly from the devastation of the Korean War (1950-1953). It installed a centralized economic system allowing for rapid industrialization and economic growth. Focus was on heavy industry with a lower priority given to light industry and agriculture. During the 1960s, to avoid becoming overly reliant upon the Soviet Union and China, North Korea implemented a development strategy based on the concept of *juche*, or self reliance.

From the 1970s, North Korea began to retreat deeper into isolation. US-China detente and US-Soviet detente led to greater international acceptance of a divided Korean peninsula, leaving only North Korea to pursue its aim of unification by military means. The failure to repay international debt due to poor economic planning isolated North Korea from investment and trade. North Korea was further isolated by its continuing erratic militancy, losing the brief support it gained from the non-aligned movement. In 1983, the death of 17 ministers and officials in a failed assassination attempt on South Korean president Chun Doo-Hwan in Burma by North Korean agents and the 1987 bombing of a Korean Air Lines plane, resulting in 115 deaths, confirmed the international community's perception of North Korea as a 'pariah state'.

In 1994, national founder and President, Kim Il-Sung died. This led to speculation that political change could occur as the son of Kim Il-Sung and heir apparent, Kim Jong-Il, attempted to consolidate his succession. With the destitute state of the economy, its failing political institutions and an increasing inability to feed its population, the end of the regime seemed not only probable, but imminent. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent collapse of its autocratic satellites had cast a long shadow over the future of North Korea.

Despite expectations to the contrary, North Korea continued to survive and between 1995 and 1998 Kim Jong-Il consolidated his position. A new policy known as *songun*, or military first politics, was put in place, which raised the profile of the military in the leadership structure. Limited and reactive economic reform as well as substantial international aid enabled the regime to survive. Writing in 1997, economist and North Korea analyst, Marcus Noland, stated that North Korea could 'muddle through for years before turning toward reform or chaos'.⁴⁵⁶ Similarly, a study by the South Korea based Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), based upon interviews and surveys of North Korean defectors and refugees, found that the regime of Kim Jong-Il, while never in a stable position, survived through a precarious balance between 'the power of dissatisfaction' and 'the power of regulation'.⁴⁵⁷ The study concluded that predictions of regime collapse in North Korea should not be made lightly.⁴⁵⁸

The relationship with North Korea affects individual Koreans, the institution of Korean diplomacy, and Korean diplomats. The Korean War (1950-53), was a particularly vicious fratricidal war, which resulted in the division of the Korean peninsula along the

⁴⁵⁶ Marcus Noland, "Why North Korea Will Muddle through," *Foreign Affairs*, 76, No. 4 (August 1997): 111.

⁴⁵⁷ Hyun-Joon Chin et al., *An Assessment of the North Korean System's Durability* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, June 2007), 7.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

De-Militarized Zone (DMZ). Relations between these two states were based on irreconcilable ideological differences, marked by intermittent hostility and confrontation. One of the most notorious events, which particularly affected South Korean diplomats was the Rangoon bombing. On 9 October 1983, a bomb placed under a podium where the South Korean President Chun Doo-Hwan was to speak, was detonated, killing 21 people, including the South Korean Foreign Minister and the Ambassador to Burma. In the entrance hall at the MOFA Central Government Complex, at the KNDA, and at the Diplomatic History Museum, the event is instilled into the institutional memory. Every year there are commemorations of the event. Every day, those working at the complex will walk past the displays. All South Korean diplomats receive substantial security training prior to posting. For South Korean diplomats, it is not just terrorism that is a concern, but an ongoing struggle with North Korea that has taken many forms, from hissing and shouts at presentations to kidnapping, extortion, and murder.⁴⁵⁹

This begs the question, how have South Korean perceptions of North Korea changed to the point that Ms. Bay and other members of the Seoul diplomatic corps notice distinct generational differences between older and younger diplomats?

The answer is the Sunshine Policy. The Sunshine Policy, instigated by Kim Dae-Jung in 1998, sought to end hostility that existed between South and North Korea. The policy effectively sought peaceful co-existence, as opposed to the absorption or defeat of North Korea that had previously driven South Korean policy.⁴⁶⁰ In June 2000, the leaders of North and South Korea held a meeting for the first time since the division of the peninsula. The meeting was greeted with elation in South Korea, giving hope for the first time that peaceful unification may be possible. This was followed by events such as

⁴⁵⁹ Shin Sang-Mi, Interviews MOFA, November 2012.

⁴⁶⁰ Kyung-Sook Chae, "The Future of the Sunshine Policy," *East Asian Review*, 14, No. 2 (2002): 233.

the joint march around the stadium under the 'unification flag' by athletes at the opening ceremony of the Sydney 2000 Olympics and increased working contacts on issues such as displaced families reunions, trade and investment.

Despite the success of the Leaders Summit, subsequent progress was sporadic. Kim Jong-Il failed to make a return visit to Seoul and no progress was made on military confidence building measures. Controversy also erupted when it was learnt that Kim Dae-Jung made illegal financial payments to North Korea to arrange the historic Summit. In 2003, when Roh Moo-Hyun became President of South Korea, the Sunshine Policy was continued under a new banner of 'Policy for Peace and Prosperity'. Substantial attempts to further cooperation, particularly in the economic sphere, have achieved limited success due to ongoing international pressure over North Korea's nuclear program. In October 2007, Roh Moo-Hyun visited Pyongyang for a second inter-Korean leaders summit. The visit resulted in an ambitious eight point 'Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity' that if fulfilled, could substantially improve inter-Korean cooperation. However, a significant degree of cynicism surrounded the visit, based upon the failure to implement agreements made at the June 2000 Leaders Summit and speculation that the October 2007 summit was coordinated to bolster support for the liberal camp in the lead up to Presidential elections in December 2007.

In February 2008, the conservative Lee Myung-Bak became president. This led to a rapid deterioration in North-South relations. Relations were further complicated by the March 2010 sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, and the November 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in the disputed maritime border region off the west coast of South Korea. In February 2013, another conservative, Park Geun-Hye, became president. To date, relations between North and South Korea have not improved. Despite this, there

remains a large proportion of the population which continues to support closer relations with North Korea. Policies supporting reconciliation with North Korea are an existential expression of the fear that South Korea has regarding the possible collapse of North Korea. Reconciliation and strengthening the North Korean economy, despite the country's human rights situation and unique challenges to international order, delay and hopefully soften the economic burden that unification could present.

Table 9 below highlights statements made by Bay during meetings in which she retold the above story. The formulated meanings and action clusters were the result of further questioning on each specific statement.

Table 9: Bay – Significant statements, formulated meanings, and action clusters

Significant Statement	Formulated Meaning	Action Cluster
I struggled to build a relationship, until I gave up. We are from different countries, sure, but I felt he actually disliked me and my country.	Korean diplomatic practice is marked by <i>generational change</i> including change in <i>values</i> . <i>Generational change</i> : Experience highlights older generation has primary motivation for social action as values. <i>Values</i> : Experience highlights primary motivator of social action amongst older generation of diplomats (patriotism, anti-communism/pro-US).	Values
...my relationship changed from being almost adversarial to a true working partnership towards joint prosperity.	Korean diplomatic practice is marked by decline in importance of <i>values</i> . Experience highlights younger generation primary motivation for social action as purposive rational. Values do not matter as much, aim is to achieve objectives.	Purposive
North Korea acted as a shadow over everything we did.	A <i>timeless</i> feature of Korean diplomacy is <i>separation</i> . <i>Timeless</i> : the phenomenon of separation continues from the past into the present. In different ways, affects both older and younger	Emotion

	<p>diplomats.</p> <p><i>Separation:</i> Korea and its diplomats, were excluded from mainstream international society, which can lead to resignation or revolutionism. Even extremes of behaviour.</p>	
<p>Other countries, like Vietnam, freed themselves from imperialist oppression. Korea was not able to do this. In their heart, many Koreans feel ashamed that their country could not do this... this is why there is still problems...</p>	<p>A <i>timeless</i> feature of Korean diplomacy is <i>separation</i>.</p> <p><i>Timeless:</i> the phenomenon of separation continues from the past into the present.</p> <p><i>Separation:</i> Korea and its diplomats, were excluded not only from mainstream international society, but also to a degree excluded from efforts to resolve the largest problem they have.</p>	Emotion
<p>Korean diplomats can be arrogant... I find it difficult to deal with staff on consular issues. Politics and trade get a lot of attention... consular affairs less.</p>	<p>Korean diplomatic practice is marked by <i>arrogance</i> and <i>elitism</i>.</p> <p><i>Arrogance:</i> Experience highlights perceptions of arrogance amongst SK diplomats. Tendency of this perception is higher in non-American, especially, dev. country diplomats.</p> <p><i>Elitism:</i> Experience highlights SK preferences for 'boasting' re position, title, other areas. Protocol mistakes can be interpreted as personal insult inciting emotional reaction.</p>	Emotion Values
<p>North Korea is a global challenge, a regional challenge</p>	<p>A <i>timeless</i> feature of Korean diplomacy is <i>separation</i>.</p> <p><i>Timeless:</i> Experience highlights the phenomenon of separation continues from the past into the present. Features remain consistent between contemporary and former diplomatic corps members.</p> <p><i>Separation:</i> Korea and its diplomats, were excluded from mainstream international society, inability to address greatest challenge as well as opposition from own public over efforts to do</p>	Emotion

	so.	
...the question of North Korea is depressing. But what can we do? It is all up to China...	<p>Korean diplomatic practice is marked by efforts to address <i>external</i> challenges, which are viewed as <i>unfair</i>.</p> <p><i>Timeless</i>: the value continues from the past into the present.</p> <p><i>External</i>: challenges are viewed as being imposed on Korea from an external source.</p> <p><i>Unfair</i>: the diplomatic system is viewed as controlled by major powers in their own interests – as experienced historically and personally.</p>	Emotional

Bay's experience was central to her assessment of South Korean diplomacy. Her two postings in Seoul and her constant and varied interaction with South Korean officials gave her a particularly strong insight into South Korean diplomatic action. She felt she had reached a point where she could, in her words "anticipate the next move" by her South Korean partners. This experience gave her a degree of authority in conversations, which she did not hesitate to use, providing examples to support her claims.

In the course of the week prior to our first interview, Bay had one social engagement with a South Korean official and one social engagement with a member of the Seoul diplomatic corps. Similar to other diplomats, she claimed that social engagements at post were effectively the same as work. It was a quiet period when we met, and Bay insisted she would normally interact with South Korean officials on social level once or twice a week and with members of Seoul diplomatic corps up to three times a week. She considered her social relationships with both South Korean officials and members of the Seoul diplomatic corps to be strong. She stated she was very selective with who she kept in contact with, but had several contacts that she'd never lose. In the course of the week prior to our first interview, she could recall six 'significant events' of diplomatic action in the course of interaction with South Korean foreign ministry staff. From Bay's

retelling of the events listed in Table 10, she believed the South Korean diplomatic style to be predominantly an emotion oriented diplomatic style.

Table 10: Bay – Significant events and meaning units

	Purpose	Value	Tradition	Emotion
Host-country official function	2	3	4	1
Attended conference	1	3	4	2
Meeting with host-country politician	2	4	3	1
Attended host-country ministry course	1	3	4	2
National Day	4	1	3	2
Host-country event for diplomatic corps	2	3	4	1
Total	12	17	22	9

Bay's experience provided substantial insight when she spoke on the subject which often dominated our conversations – North Korea. The subject of North Korea was a conversation which consistently returned. It is a subject that obviously plays a large role in South Korean diplomatic practice, as well as one which had always played a role her relations with South Korean officials.

It is through the subject of North Korea that the predominant theme of my conversations with Bay emerged. Through interaction with South Korean officials on the subject of North Korea, Bay had observed generational change in South Korean diplomatic action. There was, she claimed, a distinct change in attitudes between younger and older generation of diplomats. Older diplomats were more suspicious and even hostile towards the subject of North Korea. Younger diplomats were more open, empathetic, and according to Bay, "ashamed of the situation".⁴⁶¹ The story above exemplified this situation – the change from one older diplomat to another younger diplomat completely

⁴⁶¹ Bay, Seoul diplomatic corps.

changed her interaction with the ministry, from a difficult task to dread to an enjoyable task to look forward to. Bay noted the generational divide was also a political divide. Older diplomats were near exclusively conservative leaning while younger diplomats consisted of a mix of conservative and progressive.

However, reflecting Bay's stories, the generational divide did not affect the dominant motivation for diplomatic action. She noted that in her time spent interacting with the older diplomat she saw him express emotion several times, reflecting anger, frustration, pride, and stress. In her time interacting with the younger diplomat, emotions were either much better hidden or not as intense. As noted by Bay, he "communicated his stress" rather than expressing it as anger or frustration. The younger diplomat did demonstrate emotion, but seemed to do so in a way that was controlled and socially acceptable. Accordingly, despite the generational change, emotion-oriented diplomatic action remained predominant. The only evidence to corroborate this is surveys of change in youth attitudes towards North Korea. However, these obviously do not focus on foreign ministry personnel, nor do they focus on the social cohort likely to enter into the foreign ministry. These surveys have been conducted by a range of institutes, including the South Korean Ministry of Unification (MOU), the government-funded Korea Institute for National Unification, media organizations, as well as South Korean and foreign, predominantly US, think-tanks. It is fair to say that the vast majority of such surveys demonstrate a distinct reduction in threat perception amongst the younger generation.⁴⁶² Both the mid-1990s widespread North Korean famine and the subsequent Sunshine Policy changed South Korean attitudes North Korea. From Bay we can also assume this change in perception has also indirectly affected South Korean diplomacy. Bay's narrative highlights generational divide as an influence on the South Korean

⁴⁶² Sook-Jong Lee, "The Rise of Korean Youth as a Political Force: Implications for the US-Korea Alliance," in *Brookings Northeast Asia Survey 2003-04* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2004).

diplomatic style, and the predominance of an emotion-oriented motivation for diplomatic action.

CHAPTER EIGHT: South Korean diplomatic style as ‘additional analytical insight’

As noted, the aim of the study is to assess whether the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style provides additional insight into a state’s foreign policy, above and beyond that which is accessible through “scholarly research”. This chapter continues with the case study of South Korea. The aim of the chapter is to determine what, if any, ‘additional analytical insight’ is provided by knowledge of the South Korean diplomatic style.

Accordingly, I first reiterate the scope of scholarly research from which ‘additional analytical insight’ will be determined. I then present the South Korean diplomatic style as elicited from narratives of two purposive samples: the retired and serving South Korean diplomats, and retired and serving members of the Seoul diplomatic corps. I contrast the South Korean diplomatic style to the constructed ideal types presented in Chapter Four, then put the main themes elicited from the narratives into context, constructing a synthesis of meanings and essence of experience. I then summarize the South Korean diplomatic style, and assess the degree to which this provides ‘additional analytical insight’ into an understanding of South Korean foreign policy.

As noted in the introduction, scholarly research was defined as the body of knowledge produced through scholarly inquiry, including dissertations and theses; information communicated at academic conferences, symposia or other presentations; academic journal papers; and academic texts.⁴⁶³ Scholarly research on South Korean foreign policy was defined as consisting of three broad groups – diplomacy and diplomatic

⁴⁶³ Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, 79.

practice literature; foreign policy literature; and related literature. As earlier noted, the compilation utilized for this study is at Appendix A.

An emotion oriented diplomatic style

As noted in Chapter Four, there are four ideal types of diplomatic style – the purposive-rational, value-rational, the tradition oriented; and emotion oriented. Reflecting the definition of diplomatic style presented in Chapter One, each ideal type of diplomatic style features social action, replication, choice, and constraints. Thus, a purposive-rational ideal type of diplomatic style consists of deliberately chosen, replicated social action with a purposive-rational motivation, undertaken within the constraints of diplomatic norms. The formulated meanings derived from narratives of retired and serving South Korean diplomats, and retired and serving members of the Seoul diplomatic corps, show that the South Korean diplomatic style most closely resembles the emotion-oriented ideal type diplomatic style. As demonstrated in Chapter Six and Chapter Seven, from a total of 64 individual narratives, the emotion-oriented diplomatic style was the closest match, followed by purposive-rational diplomatic style, value-rational diplomatic style, and tradition-oriented diplomatic style.

Yet, as noted throughout the contextual analysis of the narratives of retired and serving South Korean diplomats, and retired and serving members of the Seoul diplomatic corps, the fact that the South Korean diplomatic style comes closest to resembling an emotion-oriented ideal type of diplomatic style could conceivably be ascertained from scholarly research. Diplomacy and diplomatic practice literature, including the limited number of diplomatic memoirs, allude to the prominence of emotion.⁴⁶⁴ Further, a wider reading of related literature, particularly in the fields of development, modernization, and the

⁴⁶⁴ Pak, *Hibiscus*; Lee, *Tasks and Times*; Jack Pritchard, *Ambassadors' Memoir*; Choi, *The Diplomatic History of Korea*; Limb, "Speech."

democracy movement, could lead a scholar to assume that Weberian ideal type emotion-oriented action has played a prominent role across all fields in the development of modern Korea.⁴⁶⁵ In particular, narrative studies, such as Sheila Miyoshi Jager's *Narratives of Nation Building in Korea* provide a level of insight into the motivation behind decision-making that could be directly applied to an understanding of South Korea's foreign policy. Indeed, to understand *why* emotion plays such a prominent role, it could be considered essential to turn to scholarly research. The role of emotion in political and foreign policy decision-making, particularly during periods of crisis, is a well established topic of research.⁴⁶⁶

Thus, reflecting the above, recognizing and comprehending the South Korean diplomatic style does not necessarily provide additional analytical insight into South Korean foreign policy. However, it becomes more complicated as we consider not just formulated meanings, but also the synthesis of experience.

Characteristics of the South Korean diplomatic style

The synthesis of experience derived from narratives of retired and serving South Korean diplomats, and retired and serving members of the Seoul diplomatic corps, demonstrate that there are contextual themes which permeate the South Korean diplomatic style. These themes can be considered the 'characteristics' of the South Korean diplomatic style. These include status, generational change, cosmopolitanism and estrangement.

⁴⁶⁵ Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); Sheila Miyoshi Jager, *Narratives of Nation Building in Korea: A Genealogy of Patriotism* (Armonk: Sharpe, 2003).

⁴⁶⁶ Irving L. Janis, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment* (New York: Free Press, 1977); Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: a Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton, 1972); Alex Mintz, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Valerie Hudson, "Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Touchstone for International Relations Theory in the Twenty-First Century," in *Foreign Policy Decision-Making* (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2002); Erica Simone Almeida Resende and Dovile Budryte (ed.s), *Memory and Trauma in International Relations: Theories, Cases, and Debates, Interventions* (London: Routledge, 2013); Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

Of these four themes, the first three come as no surprise to a well-read scholar. Status, generational change, and cosmopolitanism are features reiterated in diplomacy and diplomatic practice literature; foreign policy literature; and related literature. However, estrangement is a more difficult case. Estrangement does not feature prominently in diplomacy and diplomatic practice literature on South Korea; foreign policy literature on South Korea; or other related literature on South Korea. This is despite estrangement being a prominent topic in postmodernist theories of international relations, such as James Der Derian's *On Diplomacy: a Genealogy of Western Estrangement*, which will be discussed later in this chapter.⁴⁶⁷ While tangential components can be perceived in the limited number of diplomatic memoirs of South Korean diplomats, such as the former ambassador Park Keun's memoirs entitled *Hibiscus*, it is hardly enough to recognize without foreknowledge.⁴⁶⁸ It is not touched upon in foreign policy literature, and is not touched upon in related literature. Each of the characteristics of the South Korean diplomatic style are explored further individually below, with substantially more attention paid to what could be considered the best example of 'additional analytical insight', namely, estrangement.

Status

Status in the social sciences is defined as the location or position of groups within the social hierarchy of honour and prestige. In international relations, status relates directly to numerous lines of contemporary research enquiry, including system structure (hierarchy) and international norms. In diplomacy, status of course has always played a

⁴⁶⁷ James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

⁴⁶⁸ Pak, *Hibiscus*.

very prominent role.⁴⁶⁹ Indeed, status is perhaps one of the oldest features of representation.

The narratives of retired and serving South Korean diplomats, and retired and serving members of the Seoul diplomatic corps demonstrated that status was important to them. In each instance there was concern over both personal status and national status.

As earlier noted, hierarchical status is a “dominant and perhaps unique pattern” in South Korean negotiation and conflict resolution. Indeed, many authors go further to note that status is the dominant factor in South Korean society.⁴⁷⁰ Korean Confucian social institutions sought to maintain stable political order and social harmony. Stability was predicated on adherence to structures dependent on status. Indeed, any scholar with Korean language competence knows full well that status is built into the language, with verb-endings changing dependent upon the relative status of the person being spoken to. Reflecting this, recognizing the prominent role played by status in the South Korean diplomatic style is not tacit knowledge. It does not provide additional analytical insight into foreign policy.

Generational change

Generational change is based on the ideal that different age cohorts hold distinct socio-cultural values, based upon shared life experiences during critical developmental periods. As noted by Twenge and Campbell, “broad forces, such as parents, peers, media, and popular culture, create common value systems among people growing up at a particular time”, which “distinguish them from people who grow up at different

⁴⁶⁹ Frey and Frey, “‘The Reign of the Charlatans Is over’: The French Revolutionary Attack on Diplomatic Practice.”

⁴⁷⁰ James Hoare, *Korea: An Introduction* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1988), 117.

times".⁴⁷¹ Each generation will develop a shared consciousness, which has an integrative effect, with members becoming aware of their distinct position in the historical process.⁴⁷² As each generation transitions into maturity, and positions of increased power and/or leadership, these shared life experiences become increasingly influential.

The influence of generational change on international relations has attracted substantial academic interest. This has included attempts to explain the impact of specific historical events upon subsequent generations of policymakers, such as Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and the subsequent glasnost/perestroika generation; and to explain differences in attitudes towards foreign policy decision-making between generations, such as differences in attitudes towards US foreign policy between the 'Munich generation' and the 'Vietnam generation'.⁴⁷³ Similar studies have been used to explain the influence of generational change on South Korea's international relations. This has included the impact of specific historical events upon subsequent generations of policymakers, such as the 1980s democratic movement's influence, and specifically the 1980 Kwangju uprising, and the subsequent 'Sunshine Policy' generation; and differences in attitudes towards foreign policy decision-making between generations, such as differences in attitudes towards South Korean foreign policy, and particularly

⁴⁷¹ Twenge and Campbell, "Generational Differences in Psychological Traits and Their Impact on the Workplace," 863.

⁴⁷² Tim Luecke, "Blast from the Past: The Generation of 1914 and the Causes of World War II," in *APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper* (Presented at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, 2009), 19.

⁴⁷³ See Vitalii Lelchuk, "Khrushchev's Reforms in the Light of Perestroika," in Theodore Taranovski and Peggy McInerney, eds., *Reform in Modern Russian History: Progress or Cycle?* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), 342–65; and Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "Does Where You Stand Depend on When You Were Born? The Impact of Generation on Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy Beliefs," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 44, No. 1 (1980): 1.

attitudes towards the US, between the post-Korean War generation and the post-democracy movement generation.⁴⁷⁴

As could be expected, the narratives of the Seoul diplomatic corps and South Korean diplomats, similarly demonstrate that generational change influences the South Korean diplomatic style. Specifically, the narratives demonstrated a change in attitudes towards the US and China. Retired or older generation South Korean diplomats are highly value-oriented, espousing a strong belief in the importance of the US and the threat of China to South Korea's security and foreign policy. In contrast, younger diplomats are less convinced of the importance of the US and are more likely to view China in the context of opportunity. Yet, the narratives of the Seoul diplomatic corps demonstrated that generational change has an even deeper effect. They demonstrated that generational change can directly impact a bilateral relationship, with an informant noting that change in attitude and personal relationship resulted in significantly more effort on her part to interact with her counterpart.

Generational change, while not touched upon in diplomacy and diplomatic practice literature or foreign policy literature, is a prominent feature in related literature. In particular, it features prominently in literature relating to South Korean domestic politics, political leadership, and public opinion.⁴⁷⁵ Each of these is inherently related to foreign policy. However, while generational change is an important feature of the South Korean diplomatic style, it is subsumed by the more dominant, and related feature of

⁴⁷⁴ See Young Whan Kihl, *Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2005); Sook-Jong Lee, *The Transformation of South Korean Politics: Implications for US-Korea Relations*, Working Paper, Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution, September 2004); and *Korean Attitudes toward the United States: Changing Dynamics* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2005).

⁴⁷⁵ Lee, "The Rise of Korean Youth as a Political Force: Implications for the US-Korea Alliance"; Lee, *The Making of Minjung*; *Korean Attitudes toward the United States*; Lee, *The Transformation of South Korean Politics: Implications for US-Korea Relations*; Auriel Croissant, "Electoral Politics in South Korea," in *Electoral Politics in Southeast & East Asia* (Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2002).

estrangement. The narratives demonstrated a differing, but pervasive sense of estrangement between both the older and younger generation of diplomats.

Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism conveys a variety of approaches to explain the basic concept that regardless of local or particular social structures, humans are inherently affiliated to a wider shared universal social structure.⁴⁷⁶ It reflects a long tradition, based on recurrent observations of modernization, and the trend from relatively closed societies to more open societies as a result of social and economic interdependence. As noted by Beck and Sznaider, the modern conceptualization of cosmopolitanism is based on the recognition that “it is neither possible to distinguish clearly between the national and the international, nor, correspondingly, to make a convincing contrast between homogenous units”.⁴⁷⁷

In the field of international relations, cosmopolitanism lays down a central challenge to mainstream state-centric theory.⁴⁷⁸ The nation-state and its particular socio-economic structures are today balanced by global governance, global society, and the global economy.⁴⁷⁹ Yet, in the field of diplomatic studies, cosmopolitanism has always been construed differently. A distinct form of cosmopolitanism has always been a necessary feature of the diplomatic system. The diplomatic system allows the bridging of separated entities by putting aside the “longing for strong cultural attachments” in order

⁴⁷⁶ Beck and Sznaider, “Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences,” 3.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid, 6.

⁴⁷⁸ Anthony McGrew, “Realism vs. Cosmopolitanism: A Debate between Barry Buzan and David Held,” *Review of International Studies*, 24 (1998): 388.

⁴⁷⁹ Richard Wolin, “The Idea of Cosmopolitanism: From Kant to the Iraq War and beyond,” *Ethics & Global Politics*, 3, No. 2 (May 26, 2010): 147–149.

that they can be “mediated by principle”.⁴⁸⁰ Indeed, the diplomatic corps in every capital city can be thought of as the epitome of the cosmopolitan ideal, or as stated by Wiseman, “an idealized icon of international society”.⁴⁸¹ Thus, a degree of cosmopolitanism could be considered an essential feature of any diplomatic style. Further, diplomats could be expected to demonstrate differing degrees of cosmopolitanism, dependent on their state’s position within international society, and the training and experience of personnel.

The narratives of the Seoul diplomatic corps and South Korean diplomats, demonstrate the South Korean diplomatic style to be bifurcated between the distinctly national and the distinctly de-nationalized, with the point of division being older and younger generations of diplomats. Further, while explicit assessments emphasized a strongly cultural-based distinctiveness, tacit assessments demonstrated that amongst the younger generation of South Korean diplomats, cultural-based distinctiveness was largely insignificant. This was even more evident amongst those who predominantly worked in areas of trade and economics. Thus, cosmopolitanism – and the bifurcation of cosmopolitanism between the older and younger generation – is an important feature of the South Korean diplomatic style.

Cosmopolitanism is a feature not touched upon in the diplomacy and diplomatic practice literature or the foreign policy literature on South Korea. However, as noted in the contextual explanation, it is a theme that has attracted attention in related literature. In particular, a number of more modern studies have focused on this subject.⁴⁸² Yet, while cosmopolitanism must be recognized as an important feature of the South Korean

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid, 147.

⁴⁸¹ Sharp and Wiseman, *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society*, 36.

⁴⁸² Yunshik Chang, Seok Hyun-ho, and Don Baker, eds., *Korea Confronts Globalization*, (New York: Routledge, 2008); Kyong Ju Kim, *The Development of Modern South Korea: State Formation, Capitalist Development and National Identity* (London: Routledge, 2006).

diplomatic style, it is subsumed by the more dominant, and related feature of estrangement. As noted by Beck and Sznajder, cosmopolitanism should also be interpreted through its process – ‘cosmopolitization’.⁴⁸³ As a social action, cosmopolitization is correlated to estrangement. Cosmopolitization can be thought of as social action, which partially contributes to the reconciliation of estrangement. Accordingly, we can interpret cosmopolitanism in the South Korean diplomatic style as directed towards the reconciliation of estrangement. Estrangement, explored further below, is the underlying essence of the South Korean diplomatic style.

Estrangement

Although difficult to discern at the beginning, it was ultimately clear that estrangement lies at the heart of the themes of generational change, status, and cosmopolitanism. South Korean diplomats express their lived experience as attempts to mediate estrangement, and the Seoul diplomatic corps expressed their lived experience as attempts to understand, and to address the behavioural consequences of estrangement. Estrangement as an underlying essence of the phenomenon of the South Korean diplomatic style deserves further attention.

Estrangement in the simplest terms is the state of alienation or separation of two entities. It most often refers to the human condition of being alienated or separated from something or somebody, and is associated with psychological conditions of powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, social isolation, anxiety and insecurity. Despite considerable attention during the 1950s and 1960s, it is a concept, which remains largely misunderstood. This is particularly true in the field of international relations. Indeed, more than ever, Georg Hegel’s words concerning the term ring true:

⁴⁸³ Beck and Sznajder, “Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences,” 7–8.

...the familiar, just because it is familiar, is not cognitively understood. The commonest way in which we deceive ourselves or others about understanding is by assuming something as familiar, and accepting it on that account....⁴⁸⁴

In discussing the above quote, James Der Derian notes that while the terms ‘alienation’ and ‘estrangement’ are frequently heard in international relations scholarship, “the concept itself is for the most part a stranger to the discipline”.⁴⁸⁵ Across the diversity of international relations and related disciplines, the concept of estrangement sits silently beneath the surface. In international relations, estrangement, because it is familiar, is rarely cognitively understood.

As noted, the terms ‘alienation’ and ‘estrangement’ are frequently heard in international relations scholarship. We hear of Iran’s increasing estrangement from the international community as it allegedly pursues a nuclear weapons program and of North Korea’s self-imposed alienation as it seeks to maintain the current regime. While the terms are used frequently, as James Der Derian noted, “the concept itself is for the most part a stranger to the discipline”.⁴⁸⁶ What is estrangement and how does it affect the practice of international relations?

There are three important aspects to estrangement, which any study on the subject needs to explore. First, estrangement can exist between a wide variety of entities. This can include individuals; social groups; societies; and states. Most commonly, estrangement is conceived of as ‘A’ - an individual alienated from ‘B’ - another individual (a parent or sibling); a social group (family, work colleagues, classmates, neighbours); a society (mainstream community, an artistic community, a philosophical movement, etc.) or a

⁴⁸⁴ Georg Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 18.

⁴⁸⁵ James Der Derian, *Critical Practices in International Theory* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 11.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid.

state (as a rebel, as an exile, as political prisoner, etc.). Equally, estrangement can exist between these entities, thus one social group or state can be estranged from another or from others, as is commonly related in mainstream media diplomatic reporting. We can read of 'diplomatic estrangement' existing between two states or between one 'rogue state' and the wider 'diplomatic community'.

It is also commonly conceived of as 'A' - an individual alienated from 'B' - the self or a particular aspect of the self. Thus, an individual can be alienated from their professional self; alienated from their past; or, most commonly, alienated from the produce of the self (thoughts, ideas, work or labour). This of course is most commonly associated with the works of Karl Marx. Finally, estrangement can also be conceived of as 'A' - an individual or all of humankind, alienated from 'B' an ethereal entity. Thus, we read of humankind as alienated from 'god', 'nature', 'the universe' or the 'spiritual self'.

Thus, estrangement can occur between a state and international society; between two states or groups of states; or between a state and its dependent territories. It can also occur within or across states, between ethnic, religious and/or political minorities; between social classes. Finally, the state can also be 'alienated from itself' during periods leading up to or during major political repression; colonialism; or political change, such as rebellion, insurrection or revolution. Any combination of these conditions of estrangement can occur at one time.

Second, estrangement is the nominal form of the transitive verb 'to estrange'. Syntactically, as a transitive verb, 'to estrange' requires both a subject and object. Essentially, this means that in any situation in which the verb 'to estrange' is used, there must be a subject 'A' and an object 'B'. When the verb is used in the passive sense, 'A' is estranged from 'B'. This is a roundabout way of stating that both 'A' and 'B' are

necessary. Modern usage shows that it is not uncommon to refer to 'A' as 'estranged' or 'alienated' without bothering to state from what or whom. As noted by Kaufmann, in discussing the same problem "'Alienation' is an elliptical term that requires completion in two directions".⁴⁸⁷

Estrangement is most often discussed in the context of an individual's estrangement. Individual behaviour aggregates to group behaviour. As noted by Merton and repeated by Hedstrom and Swedberg, 'individual choice behaviour' aggregates to 'rates of institutionally consequential behaviour', affecting their 'institutional patterns', which in turn affects the initial 'individual choice behaviour'.⁴⁸⁸ Thus, choices made as a result of an individual diplomat's perception of estrangement, can be thought to aggregate to institutionally consequential behaviour and institutional patterns in a state's diplomacy, which in turn affects the individual diplomat's behaviour.

Finally, estrangement implies a former state of unity or togetherness as a natural state. The estrangement or alienation of 'A' and 'B' is the result of 'A' estranging or alienating 'B'. If it were not the case, entities 'A' and 'B' would not be estranged, but rather strangers. This is an important conceptual differentiation. In conceptualizing 'A' and 'B' as formerly in union or together, we imply that this situation is the natural and complete state. Thus, estrangement or alienation is often thought of as unnatural. In common usage, estrangement and alienation hold negative connotations as conditions, which require attention, reconciliation or mediation to once again return to a natural state.

Estrangement applies to individual diplomats (the diplomat estranged from the home country), social groups (the diplomatic profession estranged from wider society), and

⁴⁸⁷ Walter Kaufmann, "The Inevitability of Alienation," in *Alienation* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971), xxii.

⁴⁸⁸ Hedstrom, "Rational Choice, Empirical Research, and the Sociological Tradition," 139.

the state (the state estranged from 'international society'). International society is defined along English School lines, as "a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values", which "form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another".⁴⁸⁹ Within this framework "the diplomatic system is the master-institution of international relations".⁴⁹⁰

Thus, when we talk of a state being estranged from international society, it connotes an unnatural state. States can be thought of as estranged or alienated when they (arguably) do not adhere to a common set of rules. North Korea, Iran since 1979, South Africa during the apartheid era, or Libya during the 1980s and 1990s, are examples of such cases. Estrangement can also be imposed upon a state, which does not adhere to the common set of rules, as a form of 'punishment'. In contrast, the reward for a state's adhesion to the common set of rules is reintegration into international society.

Of course, there are also other examples of estrangement from international society. This can include geographical (a perennial issue in the early diplomacy of Australia due to its distance from Europe and proximity to populated Asia) or economic (such as the physical inability to participate mainstream diplomatic discourse experienced by developing states). Perhaps the most common is the inability to obtain recognition as a legitimate participant in international society. Thus, examples of Taiwan, Palestine, and indeed Korea under the Japanese colonial administration, and later in a state of 'contested legitimacy' with North Korea, come to mind. Any combination of these conditions of estrangement can occur at one time. Significantly, each case of

⁴⁸⁹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 9–10.

⁴⁹⁰ Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, and Carsten Holbraad, *Power Politics* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), 138.

estrangement holds negative connotations as conditions, which require attention, reconciliation or mediation to once again return to a natural state.

Estrangement has a rich intellectual tradition. It weaves through the works of philosophers across time and space. Plato, arguably the progenitor of Western philosophy was an individual estranged from his society: "disaffected, disillusioned, and convinced that it would be utterly pointless for him to participate in the public life of his city".⁴⁹¹ The awareness and contemplation of estrangement has been traced through the theological writings of Luther and Calvin; and in the equally influential musing on social contract theory of Grotius, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.⁴⁹²

However, it was not until the end of the 18th century, when Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel would directly address the concept of estrangement—most often translated from the German as 'alienation'. Hegel dedicates a chapter of his influential work *Phenomenology of Spirit* to alienation, which has been thought of as the first work to elevate the term to a 'position of philosophical importance'.⁴⁹³

Hegel utilizes the term 'alienation' in two senses. First, he utilizes the term in the sense of separation or discordant relations, such as can occur between an entity and something strange, foreign different or alien. Thus, when an entity becomes 'alienated' it is separated from the whole. This usage was an intellectual tradition woven into the fabric of the Reformation, in the theological context of man's separation from God. Accordingly, it brings with it the idea that alienation is a condition that simply exists, rather than a condition that is intentional or self-willed.

⁴⁹¹ Kaufmann, "The Inevitability of Alienation," xxvii.

⁴⁹² Richard Schacht, *Alienation* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1972), 1–13.

⁴⁹³ Kaufmann, "The Inevitability of Alienation," xi.

This is the most common usage in international relations. A state separated from, or having discordant relations with, international society due to differences or inability to conform. In this context, separation is not intentional or self-willed but rather the result of circumstances. Thus, we can think of examples such as China's entry into the Western European diplomatic system in the 19th century.

Hegel utilizes the term 'alienation' in a second sense, not referring to separation or distance, but rather to surrender or sacrifice.⁴⁹⁴ This usage refers to the overcoming of separation or discordant relations through the willing sacrifice of individual sovereignty to social order. Accordingly, it alludes to the renunciation or relinquishment of particularity to universality, a debate which, at the time of writing, set the Romanticist cult of the individual against conservative defenders of existing social, political and economic mores.

Thus, using the above example, China needed to overcome separation or discordant relations through the willing sacrifice of individual sovereignty to social order. Thus estrangement occurred as China gave up its position at the centre of the East Asian diplomatic system and found itself on the periphery of the Western European diplomatic system.

Estrangement, of course, is a human condition and is not specifically a Western phenomenon. Confucius, the progenitor of one of the main streams of Eastern philosophy, was as much the alienated philosopher as his European counterparts. Confucius resigned as the justice minister of the state of Lu, and set on a path of self-imposed exile in a series of journeys through Wei (衛), Song (宋), Chen (陳), and Cai (蔡), before returning to teach. Although not a central subject in Confucian philosophy,

⁴⁹⁴ Schacht, *Alienation*, 46.

estrangement is unequivocally an implied subject in the structure of the social system put forward by Confucius. Estrangement plays an important role in the understanding of virtue and hierarchy.⁴⁹⁵

Contemporary understandings of the term often focus on the writings of Karl Marx, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and equally are influenced by any number of psychologists and social commentators who based their work upon one or all of these three during the 1960s and 1970s. As Richard Schacht wrote in 1970, "There is almost no aspect of contemporary life which has not been discussed in terms of 'alienation'. Whether or not it is the salient feature of this age, it would certainly seem to be its watchword".⁴⁹⁶

Modern debate on estrangement, or rather alienation, as was preferred, worked around two perspectives. The first continued the largely sociological inquiry started by Hegel and Marx, seeking to determine the causes of alienation through reference to social and historical structures. The second, a largely psychological inquiry inspired equally by scholarly and literary works, sought to determine the effects of alienation on the individual. Reflecting this, scholarly work on estrangement can be differentiated by the exploration of *sociological causes* or the charting of *psychological experiences*.⁴⁹⁷

However, despite its popularity in the 1970s, no attempt was made to squarely situate the concept in the field of international relations until the late 1980s. This is despite questions of estrangement being central to contemporary international relations theory.

⁴⁹⁵ James Harold, "Is Xunzi's Virtue Ethics Susceptible to the Problem of Alienation?," *Dao*, 10, No. 1 (January 11, 2011): 74–80.

⁴⁹⁶ Kaufmann, "The Inevitability of Alienation," xxvii.

⁴⁹⁷ C. Yuill, "Forgetting and Remembering Alienation Theory," *History of the Human Sciences*, 24, No. 2 (April 13, 2011): 106.

Realist international relations theory holds the basic assumption of a zero-sum, atomistic and anarchic international system, in which units (states) compete for power and pursue rational self-interest. In such a system, conflict is ultimately inevitable and particularly likely during changes in the dynamics of power distribution. In realist international relations theory, estrangement between states is taken as an inherent and permanent fixture of the system.

Liberalist international relations theory holds the basic assumption of a positive-sum pluralist international system, in which units (states, as well as firms, NGOs, IGOs, etc.) are interdependent and cooperation between them feasible. Conflict in such a system occurs when external factors prevent cooperation, with the shift from economic competition to military conflict taken as a historically proven fact. In liberalist international relations theory, the mediation or overcoming of estrangement is taken as an inherent condition for the maintenance of stability.

Accordingly, estrangement, like the state, is inherent in the realist and liberalist conceptualizations of the international system. However, while the conceptualization of the state as an inherent fixture in international relations theory has attracted much scholarly attention, the conceptualization of estrangement as an inherent condition between states, and their representatives, has largely escaped mainstream scholarly inquiry.

The situating of estrangement squarely in the field of international relations did not occur until the 1987 publication of James Der Derian's text *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*. Der Derian's work goes considerably further than previous treatments of estrangement in international relations theory. Der Derian uses estrangement or alienation as theory to explain mediation of estranged individuals, groups and entities, specifically diplomacy and "its origins and transformations which

are related to conditions of alienation, and the attempt to mediate those conditions through systems of thought, law and power".⁴⁹⁸

Der Derian provides four reasons why alienation theory is suitable to a study of diplomacy.⁴⁹⁹ First, alienation theory is suited to historical analysis. Those who have used it have sought to explain alienation from a state of solidarity, which is manifest across an extended historical period. Hegel used alienation theory to explain the alienation of the particular to achieve the universal; Feuerbach used it to explain the alienation of essential humanity to religion; and Marx used it to explain the alienation of the worker from work, the product of work, other workers and nature itself. Accordingly, alienation theory has primarily been used to explain the historical condition.

Second, Der Derian contends that the primeval alienation of man from man necessitates mediation. How this mediation occurs and how these relations evolve over time "constitutes a theoretical and historical base for the study of diplomacy".⁵⁰⁰ Anthropological, archaeological and sociological studies of the evolution of diplomacy, such as Ranger Numen's, *The Beginnings of Diplomacy*, serve as justification of the use of alienation theory in the study of diplomacy.⁵⁰¹

Third, Der Derian contends that by the fact that alienation theory is a 'systems theory', it avoids the micro-macro dichotomy and resultant bifurcated analysis. Systems theory approaches allow greater interdisciplinary insight. The non-Cartesian non-representative and non-referential nature avoids the creation of closed binary categories, such as

⁴⁹⁸ Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*, 7.

⁴⁹⁹ Der Derian, *Critical Practices in International Theory*, 9.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁰¹ Numelin, *The Beginnings of Diplomacy: A Sociological Study of Intertribal and International Relations*.

between subject-object, form-content or structure-agency, which plague theoretical debates in mainstream international relations.

Finally, Der Derian suggests that the rich yet unexploited philosophical tradition of alienation could represent a valuable contribution to classical approaches to international relations theory. Research into alienation as a concept in law, history and philosophy often only extends to Marx, notes Der Derian. This provides an opportunity to explore classic approaches as yet neglected or forgotten, and stimulate traditionalist approaches to innovative approaches to the application of international relations theory.

Despite (or perhaps because of) Der Derian's attempt, estrangement has since remained a largely neglected approach in international relations theory. The fact is Der Derian's work is not an easy read. It has been considered "tedious to read" and "obscure and imprecise"⁵⁰²; as well as "not ordered for maximum clarity" and "often turgid".⁵⁰³ Yet, with nearly every criticism of style comes a matching recognition of a creative and provocative approach to diplomacy. Der Derian's work "moves theory beyond the rich, classical analysis of the phenomenon, without breaking with the classical furrows";⁵⁰⁴ and "treats its subject with a scholarship and a philosophical sureness rare in contemporary international theory".⁵⁰⁵ Perhaps the most balanced account came from a practicing US diplomat, who in the scholarly journal, *The Review of Politics*, noted:

The stylistic problem is unfortunate. This is a profoundly interesting approach to diplomacy, one which gives this diplomat much to think about and has changed

⁵⁰² Christopher Hill, "On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement by James Der Derian," *International Affairs*, 64, No. 1 (Winter 1988): 104.

⁵⁰³ Mark Warren, "On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement by James Der Derian," *The Journal of Politics* 51, No. 1 (February 1989): 211.

⁵⁰⁴ Iver Neumann, *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making?* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 347.

⁵⁰⁵ N.J. Rengger, "Book Review: James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, 17, No. 2 (June 1, 1988): 380.

my idea of North-South diplomacy. It is well worth reading despite its heavy manner.⁵⁰⁶

Estrangement is after all a phenomenon common to both academics and practitioners working in the field of international relations. Academics and practitioners, estranged from each other, address the condition of estrangement in pursuit of their own goals. The aim of both the academic and practitioner is ultimately to determine a means to mediate between estranged entities. For the academic, this may be mediation between estranged states, communities or polities. For the practitioner, this may be between representatives of estranged states, communities or polities. Ironically, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that it is in the mediation of estrangement between the academic and the practitioner that estrangement between states, communities and polities often occurs.

The only mainstream approach to the concept has to date been limited to the fringes of the English School. The publication of *The Expansion of International Society* in 1984 spurred research into one particular aspect of estrangement, namely the estrangement of states from international society. The ensuing English School debate focused on the conceptualization of international society, its expansion, and the inclusion and/or exclusion of states and the spreading of norms. This debate transformed into a wider debate on the role of 'pariah' or 'rogue' states within the international system and the role of norms in mediating this estrangement.⁵⁰⁷

⁵⁰⁶ Damian Leader, "Diplomacy as Mediation of Estrangement - On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement by James Der Derian," *The Review of Politics*, 51, No. 3 (1989): 464.

⁵⁰⁷ See Elizabeth N. Saunders, "Setting Boundaries: Can International Society Exclude 'Rogue States'?" *International Studies Review*, 8, No. 1 (March 2006): 23-54.

The first narrative consisted of Ahn's retelling of a story from lectures one year prior, as well as observations of the lectures delivered to the class. In one way or another, each of these lectures addressed the question of Korea's estrangement from international society. This is something that is constant in all attempts to recount Korea's diplomatic history. Historical texts cannot neglect the injustices of Korea's estrangement from international society as the nation's fate was again and again decided by external powers. Strategic and military texts can't but dwell upon Korea's estrangement from itself as a divided state and its estrangement from international society in its struggle for recognition as the sole legitimate representative of the Korean people. Finally, political and economic texts (particularly in the fields of modernization, democratization, globalization and development) devote chapter upon chapter to the mediation of estrangement as step by step, Korea has overcome hurdles to reintegrate into international society and establish itself comfortably as a state of economic and political influence.⁵⁰⁸

Yet, Korea's estrangement from international society occurs across various levels, not all of which are routine topics of discussion in mainstream texts. First, we recognize estrangement in Korea's position in mainstream international relations scholarship. Korea suffers from an unenviable position in the Western mindset. Despite its contemporary position in the global economy, it remains on the periphery of the Western mindset, wedged between historical accounts of the Korean War and mocking or sensationalist accounts of North Korea. To a degree, Edward Said's accounts of the genealogy of Western Orientalism, can still be applied to Korea. Said notes American Orientalism:

⁵⁰⁸ See Kim, *The Development of Modern South Korea*.

...derives from such things as the army language schools established during and after the war, sudden government and corporate interest in the non-Western world during the post-war period, Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, and a residual missionary attitude towards Orientals who are considered ripe for reform and re-education.⁵⁰⁹

In this way, Korea rests on the periphery of international relations scholarship. While this is rapidly changing, Korea is still routinely used as an example to demonstrate theory in international relations, but rarely used as a source of theory. This situation of estrangement from mainstream international relations scholarship has raised concern within the scholarly community in Korea.

Approximately five years ago, the *Korean Journal of International Relations* (*Gukje Jeongchi Nonchong*) published a special volume on the state of scholarship in the field international relations in Korea.⁵¹⁰ The volume demonstrated that there is a degree of frustration and concern regarding the failure to generate and develop a 'Korean school' of IR theory. Jong Kun Choi in a later issue of *Asian Perspective* encapsulated the state of affairs as a balance between particularist aims for theory to integrate the uniqueness of the Korean experience and universalist aims for theory, which can be applied across the board in international relations.⁵¹¹ The estrangement of Korea from the mainstream is an issue being addressed by both Korean scholars and practitioners in the field of diplomacy.⁵¹²

⁵⁰⁹ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage books, 1994), 291.

⁵¹⁰ See Byoung-Won Min, "International Relations Studies in Korea," *Korean Journal of International Relations*, 46 (2007): 39–49.

⁵¹¹ Jong Kun Choi, "Theorizing East Asian International Relations in Korea," *Asian Perspective*, 32, No. 1 (2008): 204–209.

⁵¹² Seoul diplomatic corps, Interviews with Seoul diplomatic corps, Personal Interview, October 2009.

In this way, the second narrative concerned Baek's dissatisfaction at the status accorded both himself as an individual and himself as a representative of South Korea. He felt that he was not accorded a status commensurate with his state's achievements – something which as related above, concerns both practitioners and scholars of international relations in South Korea.

Second, we recognize in Korea the universal case of estrangement, which exists between the wider public and the practitioner of diplomatic policy. South Korean diplomatic practice has traditionally been marked by a distinct lack of transparency. The early struggle for political legitimacy as one-half of a divided nation and the ongoing security threat presented by North Korea inevitably placed a high premium on secrecy. The function, process and structure of foreign policy implementation, including diplomatic practice, for a long time remained behind closed doors. As noted by Koo and Han in 1985, South Korea has "always been a security conscious and security oriented nation...foreign policy has always been a super-sensitive issue monopolized by a few select top decision makers".⁵¹³ Indeed, as Hoon Jaung contends, it was not until recent times that "foreign policymaking remained in the secret garden of the president, who was largely insulated from democratic control and public involvement".⁵¹⁴

To a degree, remnants of this situation continue today. In most societies, the diplomat is set apart from the wider population. Particularly when abroad, but also when at home, as a result of their education, training and professional experience, diplomats can be considered to be distinct from the wider public. Recalling James Mayall's reference to diplomats in London:

⁵¹³ Koo and Han, *The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea*, 14.

⁵¹⁴ Hoon, "Foreign Policy and South Korean Democracy," 51.

Should the man on the Clapham Omnibus encounter a diplomat, he would be likely to regard him as a member of a different species. Even those who are aware of their existence seldom have a clear idea about what they do beyond possessing an enviable capacity to avoid paying parking fines... they belong to a caste set apart, collectively as well as personally.⁵¹⁵

Until recently in Korea, this meant graduation from one of the top three universities and entrance into the profession via a path separate from the exams undertaken by the rest of the civil service. In Korea, as in other countries, the elitism of the position remains a reminder of the public's estrangement from the practice of diplomacy.⁵¹⁶ Estrangement between the public and practitioner of diplomacy was demonstrated in the third narrative. Alice retells the case of a South Korean diplomats not acting in accordance with cultural expectations. South Korean diplomats were cosmopolitan with none of the marking traits thought to be representative of the South Korean negotiating behaviour.

Finally, Korea's geography can be considered a determinant of estrangement. It is Korea's geography, which is most often cited as a determining factor in the lives of its inhabitants. The Korean peninsula is located on the periphery of the Eurasian landmass, tucked neatly into the north eastern corner. From here it protrudes southwards towards the southernmost reaches of the Japanese island of Honshu and its southern neighbour Kyushu. From the southern Korean metropolis of Busan, it is a mere 216 km to Fukuoka. Between these two cities, lies the Japanese island of Tsushima.

To the north, contemporary Korea is separated from its continental neighbours by the Yalu and Tumen rivers. This of course was not always the case. Borders between ancient Korean and Chinese states or the tribes that preceded them were hardly existent.

⁵¹⁵ Mayall, "Introduction," 1.

⁵¹⁶ Sung-Ki Jung, "Korea to Overhaul System to Pick Diplomats," *Korea Herald*, April 24, 2010, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2012/01/242_65048.html.

Peoples and armies continually moved across the sometimes narrow, winter-frozen rivers that today separate Korea from China and Russia. At different periods of history, Korean states have expanded to control large swathes of Chinese and Russian territory, stretching to Manchuria's Liao River in the west and to the lower reaches of Russia's Primorsky Krai in the north. Equally, the control of Chinese states over the Korean peninsula has ranged from (arguably) complete domination to (unarguably) firm military control stretching down to the Han River, which roughly divides the peninsula. Similarly, the narrow Korea Strait, which separates the peninsula from the Japanese archipelago, was not a burden to the movement of peoples and armies between the historical states that occupied either side. Continental armies composed of Chinese, Mongolian and Korean forces crossed the straits to invade Japan in 1274 and 1281 and Japanese forces crossed the straits to invade Korea in 1592 and 1594. Popular and widely believed historical accounts suggest that Korea has been invaded 3000 from its earliest historical records to the present.⁵¹⁷

Korea's historical interaction with its neighbours has never been limited to exchanges of arms. Korea has always been a conduit and source of cultural, technological and commercial exchange in the northeast Asian region. The traditional account of the passage of Buddhism from the state of Eastern Chin in south China to the Korean state of Koguryo by the monk Marananda in 384, and its consequent transmittal to Japan from the Korean state of Paekche, during the reign of King Song in 552, is often presented as evidence of Korea's position as a conduit and source of cultural, technological and commercial exchange in the northeast Asian region.⁵¹⁸

⁵¹⁷ Yi, *Korea Unmasked: In Search of the Country, the Society and the People*, 120.

⁵¹⁸ William Henthorn, *A History of Korea*, 58.

It is from this geographic position that one can begin to appreciate the importance of diplomacy to the Korean state, both ancient and modern. Positioned between China and Japan, the interaction of peoples in the region, during both peace and war, has been a constant. The Three Kingdoms period (57AD-668AD) in which the ancient Korean states of Paekche, Silla and Koguryo struggled for dominance serves as an ancient parallel to Korea's more modern diplomatic history. As the three states contested control of the central Han and Imjin River regions, alliances between themselves; with the smaller Kaya States of the south-eastern Nakdong Delta region and the northern Parhae state; and ultimately with China and Japan; became the defining means of securing state survival.⁵¹⁹

However, its geographic position, situated at the intersection of major power interest has also meant that Korea has to a degree been estranged from international society. Its proximity to major powers and history of invasion has meant a constant effort to reinforce a separation from the threats that surround it. Pre-modern Korea enforced separation through a variety of measures, including through the enforcement of a diplomatic system that limited trade and interaction. Modern South Korea remains as much an island as it is a peninsula, with land connection to Eurasian continent blocked by North Korea.

Finally, we must also recognize estrangement in the youthfulness of Korea's diplomacy. It would irritate most scholars of Korea to suggest that Korea's diplomacy is youthful. It has after all, inherited a rich recorded diplomatic tradition of interaction between the states of the peninsula; between these states and China; and between these states and Japan. Yet, in the context of modern diplomacy and the Western diplomatic system, it is relatively youthful. Modern Korea's earliest diplomatic missions were undertaken at the

⁵¹⁹ Daeyool Ku, "The Failure of Baekjes Prudential Diplomacy: Revisiting the *Samguk Sagi* from an International Relations Perspective," *Korea Journal*, 50, No. 2 (2010): 178.

end of the 19th century. With these records we can trace the halting acceptance of Western diplomatic tradition, as the vestiges of the China-centred diplomatic tradition became increasingly dated. Yet, it is even more recent that we have the formation of the modern incarnation of Korea in the form of the Republic of Korea. From here we can trace a Korean diplomatic tradition that includes remnants of the pre-modern China-centred diplomatic system, influences of public administration shaped by the Japanese colonial period, and structures formed under the influence of a United States led post-war administration. This portends to estrangement itself potentially playing an important constitutive role in the development and transformation of South Korea's diplomatic style. As argued by Jönsson and Hall, Numelin, and Der Derian, the coexistence of universalism and particularism in varying balances is a perennial feature of the institution of diplomacy from the earliest interaction between estranged social groups.⁵²⁰ The universalism of diplomatic culture coexists with the particularism of diplomatic style. As stated in Chapter 2, style is both defined and controlled by culture and is equally an influence and an organiser of culture. The case of South Korea demonstrates that as much as the institution of diplomacy is affected by the balance of universalism and particularism, an individual state's diplomatic style is affected by the ability to mediate its estrangement.

Reflecting this, it could be argued that a consistent and predictable style of Korean diplomacy is only now beginning to emerge.⁵²¹ Distinct generational differences, changes in status, and cosmopolitanism reinforced by Korea's rapid social and

⁵²⁰ Ragnar Numelin, *The Beginnings of Diplomacy: A Sociological Study of Intertribal and International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950); James Der Derian, "Mediating Estrangement: A Theory for Diplomacy," *Review of International Studies*, 13, No. 2 (1987): 91–110; Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

⁵²¹ Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*, 70–73.

economic modernization, all affect diplomatic style.⁵²² Yet, as every parent is aware, a combination of youthfulness and independent-mindedness can result in alienation. If we take just one aspect of Korea's diplomatic history, its sometimes difficult relationship with the United States, we can imagine parallels to both the rebellious teen and the overachieving prodigy. Estrangement is an important, but as yet unstudied phenomenon in South Korea's foreign policy.

'Additional analytical insight' into South Korean foreign policy

Estrangement is a topic, which can be thought of as an undercurrent in Korean studies. There are no texts which focus on this topic. There are no topics which directly relate to it. However, it is covered in a multitude of different ways. This includes the variety of approaches mentioned above. There are a plethora of studies, which cover estrangement between South and North Korea.⁵²³ There are a plethora of studies, which cover estrangement between South Korea and the United States.⁵²⁴ There are a plethora of studies, which cover South Korea's mediation of estrangement during its development and modernization.⁵²⁵ Yet, there are no studies, which look specifically at this topic. Accordingly, such knowledge is available, but whether one would know to look into it without knowledge of its relevance is questionable.

⁵²² Seoul diplomatic corps, Interviews with Seoul diplomatic corps, February 2008.

⁵²³ Koh, *The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea*; Kwon, *A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks (Part I)*; Edward A. Olsen, *Korea, the Divided Nation* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2005); Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*.

⁵²⁴ Jack Pritchard, *Ambassadors' Memoir*; Lee, *The Transformation of South Korean Politics: Implications for US-Korea Relations*; Cotton, "Middle Powers in the Asia Pacific: Korea in Australian Comparative Perspective"; Croissant, "Electoral Politics in South Korea"; *Korean Attitudes Toward the United States*.

⁵²⁵ Kim, *The Development of Modern South Korea*; Chang, Hyun-ho, and Baker, *Korea Confronts Globalization*; Kihl, *Transforming Korean Politics*; Sung-hum Kil and Chung-in Moon, *Understanding Korean Politics: An Introduction* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001); Seungsook Moon, *Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea*, Politics, History, and Culture (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Jager, *Narratives of Nation Building in Korea*; Lee, *The Making of Minjung*.

Reflecting this, recognizing and comprehending the South Korean diplomatic style highlighted phenomena of policy relevance. It provided a fuller explanation of the South Korean foreign policy by directing attention to what is most relevant. Recognizing and comprehending the South Korean diplomatic style thus narrowed the range of information, which a foreign policy analyst must cover, including highlighting phenomena, such as status, generational change, cosmopolitanism, and estrangement, which are not immediately apparent through scholarly research.

CONCLUSION: Diplomatic style as foreign policy insight

The genesis of this study was a conversation with a senior intelligence official seeking to recruit a Korean peninsula analyst. The differing responses he received from two groups of applicants, highlighted what he believed to be a gap between the academic and practitioner community. He believed that the ideal candidate's skills would go beyond knowledge of the country based on scholarly inquiry and research – beyond textbooks. The ideal candidate would have knowledge resulting from scholarly research *and* would be able to recognize and comprehend the practice of South Korean diplomatic style.

Accordingly, the aim of the research was to assess whether diplomatic style does in fact provide additional analytical insight into the analysis of a state's foreign policy, above and beyond that which is accessible through scholarly research. Thus the study entailed a single central research question: does the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style provide additional insight into a state's foreign policy, above and beyond that which is accessible through scholarly research?

To answer the question, I first presented a definition of diplomacy and through an exploration of the use of style in different disciplines, demonstrated that style has both explicit and tacit components. I then defined diplomatic style as "the replication in diplomatic behaviour or the artefacts produced by diplomatic behaviour that result from choices made within the constraints specific to diplomatic interaction". Applying Weber's ideal type methodology to classic diplomatic literature, I then constructed four ideal types of diplomatic style. Using a case study of South Korea, I then used a narrative phenomenological approach to elicit lived experiences of the phenomenon of South Korean diplomatic style from retired and serving South Korean diplomats, and retired and serving members of the Seoul diplomatic corps. I then analysed, contrasted

and compared these to the constructed ideal types of diplomatic style and extracted characteristics of the South Korean diplomatic style. Finally, an analysis of the results demonstrated that the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style did not provide additional insight into South Korea's foreign policy, above and beyond that which would normally be accessible through scholarly research. However, the ability to recognize and comprehend South Korean diplomatic style did highlight its key characteristics. This included a tendency towards emotionalism, a preoccupation with status, widening generational change, high levels of cosmopolitanism (especially in trade policy), and concerns with South Korea's estrangement from international society. Each of these phenomena are important in the analysis of South Korean foreign policy. However, the importance of the last of these, estrangement from international society, is particularly difficult to ascertain from scholarly research alone. The impact of estrangement from international society on South Korean foreign policy is scantily covered, widely dispersed, and difficult to perceive as relevant in scholarly research on South Korea.

Diplomatic style as 'additional analytical insight'

Reflecting on the above, the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style does not provide additional analytical insight into a state's foreign policy, above and beyond that which is normally available through scholarly research. However, the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style does highlight phenomena which are of 'policy relevance'. Thus, the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style narrows the vast range of information an analyst must cover. Identifying factors which are relevant to policy analysis may not provide 'additional analytical insight' but this ability is nonetheless critical for analysts working in the information-rich and time-constrained setting of contemporary global affairs.

Relevance, along with reliability and significance (or usefulness), is one of three critical processes to evaluate information for an analyst.⁵²⁶ In our modern information-rich society, the volume of information available can be overwhelming.⁵²⁷ Access to scholarly information has also increased substantially with digitization and database storage. Articles which would once require a request to be sent to a distant library or storage facility, the request processed, the article photocopied, and then sent via post to the requesting library, are today available immediately. Yet, more information does not necessarily aid analysis. Indeed, more information can hamper analysis. The former head of analytic methods in the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Political Analysis, and author of the text *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, Richards J. Heuer, notes:

Experienced analysts have an imperfect understanding of what information they actually use in making judgments. They are unaware of the extent to which their judgments are determined by a few dominant factors, rather than by the systemic integration of all available information.⁵²⁸

A similar view is expressed in former senior diplomat Raymond F. Smith's text *The Craft of Political Analysis for Diplomats*. Smith cites timeliness, aid to policymakers, predictive accuracy, and relevance to United States interests, as the four critical determinants for political analysis.⁵²⁹ Relevance, specifically policy relevance, also lies

⁵²⁶ Hoffman, Robert R International Conference on Naturalistic Decision Making, ed., *Expertise out of Context: Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Naturalistic Decision Making* (New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2007), 282.

⁵²⁷ Gregory F. Treverton, *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information*, RAND Studies in Policy Analysis (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 102–103.

⁵²⁸ Richards J Heuer and Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.), *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* ([Washington, D.C.]: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2010), 52.

⁵²⁹ Raymond F Smith, *The Craft of Political Analysis for Diplomats* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2011), 63–64.

at the heart of the ongoing debate regarding the scholar-practitioner gap in international relations.⁵³⁰

This points to an important finding for the field of diplomatic studies. As noted in the introduction, a primary concern of diplomatic studies scholars has been the erasure of the gap between scholars and practitioners of international relations and the establishment of a "two-way conduit" between scholars and practitioners, and between the discipline of international relations and the sub-discipline of diplomatic studies. In demonstrating that the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style *does not* provide additional analytical insight into a state's foreign policy, but *does* highlight phenomena of policy relevance, thus narrowing the range of information to be covered by an analyst, the study highlights the need for this "two-way conduit". Put simply, a scholar's research on foreign policy would be better and more useful with the diplomat's insight; while the diplomat and the analyst's assessment of foreign policy would be better with the scholar's research.

Yet, perhaps the most significant contribution lies in the steps towards expanding the field of diplomatic studies to include an area, which has remained important to practitioners, yet neglected by scholars. In starting this study I was amazed that there could be such a large gap between the scholar and the practitioner. In opening up diplomatic studies to a greater focus on style, the study narrows this gap between the scholar and the practitioner.

Diplomatic style adds an important direction for future research in the field of diplomatic studies. Scholars, such as Barry Brummett and Robert Hariman have

⁵³⁰ Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff, eds., *Two Worlds of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas* (New York: Routledge, 1994); Jentleson, "The Need for Praxis: Bringing Policy Relevance Back In"; Joseph Lepgold, "Is Anyone Listening? International Relations Theory and the Problem of Policy Relevance," *Political Science Quarterly* 113, no. 1 (March 1998): 43–62, doi:10.2307/2657650; Joseph Kruzal, "More a Chasm Than a Gap, but Do Scholars Want to Bridge It?," *Merishon International Studies Review* 38, no. 1 (1994): 179–81.

expanded definitions of style to further explain contemporary society and political communication, respectively.⁵³¹ Further research into diplomatic style could provide deeper insight into the nature of diplomacy, and could also provide deeper insight into the countries on which studies of diplomatic style focus. In much the same way, this study has added to knowledge regarding South Korea, through its exposition of the impact of estrangement on individual diplomats and on foreign policy.

South Korean diplomatic style as ‘additional analytical insight’

As noted in the introduction, there are very few studies on South Korea’s foreign policy and diplomatic practice. This study, I believe, is the first to focus solely on the South Korean diplomatic style. As noted in Chapter Eight, the fact that there is a tendency towards emotionalism, a preoccupation with status, widening generational change, high levels of cosmopolitanism (particularly in trade policy), and concerns with estrangement from international society, cannot be considered ‘additional analytical insight’ into South Korean foreign policy. However, as alluded to above, the relevance of each of these to South Korean foreign policy, and especially the exposition of the impact of estrangement is significant.

While elements of estrangement are dispersed throughout the literature of Korean studies, there are no studies which focus solely upon it. The relevance of estrangement to the analysis of South Korean foreign policy is hidden amidst studies of South Korean relations with North Korea, studies of the South Korea – United States bilateral relationship, and studies of South Korea’s development and modernization. This research highlights the connection between these disparate fields.

In highlighting the relevance of estrangement, this study shines a new light on South Korea’s foreign policy and places it within the context of Korean studies, as opposed to

⁵³¹ Brummett, *A Rhetoric of Style*; Hariman, *Political Style : The Artistry of Power*.

security studies, strategic studies, or Cold War studies where it is most often found. The mediation of estrangement is a feature of Korea's modernization and development, and its role in the state's foreign policy should also be recognized. Thus, in tracing the South Korean diplomatic style, the study has highlighted an important feature in South Korea's foreign policy. Further research into the role of estrangement in South Korea's diplomatic style and foreign policy could potentially provide insight into future comparisons with North Korean foreign policy, North-South relations, and unification policy.

Diplomatic style as foreign policy insight

The study's finding – that the ability to recognize and comprehend diplomatic style *does not* provide additional analytical insight into a state's foreign policy, *but does* highlight phenomena which are of policy relevance by narrowing the vast range of information an analyst must cover – addresses the original motivation for this study and answers the research question.

In addition, the study highlights what the British diplomat Harold Nicholson called the 'freemasonry of professional diplomatic practice' – the degree of accumulated professional knowledge, which guides and informs diplomats in their work.⁵³² As noted in the introduction, diplomats recognize, comprehend and adapt to the diplomatic style of their counterparts, which informs their assessments of the country's diplomacy.⁵³³ Reflecting the findings of this study, Nicholson's 'freemasonry of professional diplomatic practice' is the ability to determine policy relevance. When an agency seeks an analyst and insists upon experience as a diplomat in-country, they are not necessarily seeking *additional analytical insight*, but rather seeking to avoid *superfluous analytical*

⁵³² Ibid, 13.

⁵³³ Ibid, 28.

insight. They are seeking analysts who are able to rapidly and concisely produce assessments. What they are seeking is above all policy relevance.

There are policy solutions available to promote greater relevance in scholarly work and reduce the scholar-practitioner gap. This could include more regular engagement between diplomats at post and home-country based scholars. When the diplomats at post return home, they could seek to transform their tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. The diplomat could be encouraged to undertake a period of 'narrative reflection', during which public and private memoirs could be produced; public and private lectures given; and policy sector round tables undertaken. The returning diplomats would share their insight into negotiation, representation, reporting, consular work, and other functions of diplomacy. Returning diplomats would thus share the degree of accumulated tacit knowledge, which guides and informs their work – returning diplomats would be able to share Nicolson's 'freemasonry of professional diplomatic practice'.

This study opened with a quote from William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick's *The Ugly American*. It alluded to the fact that diplomatic style as an additional level of analytical insight was "not something you can learn from textbooks" but rather one needs "a feel for the thing".⁵³⁴ This study demonstrates, that one can indeed learn enough from textbooks, but you still need "a feel for the thing" to know what is relevant.

⁵³⁴ Lederer and Burdick, *The Ugly American*, 109.

APPENDIX A: Scholarly research on South Korean foreign policy

Diplomacy and diplomatic practice literature

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